Contingent Loyalties

State Agents in the Yunnan Borderlands (1856-1911)
Contingent Loyalties
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State Agents in the Yunnan Borderlands (1856–1911)

Diana Duan

Amsterdam University Press
For Yao Jingye, Duan Kuangcheng, and Yao Xiaoban
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I am deeply grateful for my parents who have been patiently and lovingly supporting my education and academic endeavours. My parents and Yao Xiaoban have been my best friends, who have given me tremendous encouragement and comfort in research and writing. My aunt Yunwen has been a great friend and emotional support throughout the writing process. I further thank Mark & Marina Busby, Arlene Stalzer, Nancy West, Rita Huang, Grace Lee, Jeannie Hyer, Randy & Kathrine Hadfield, Qi Heng, Li Yuxian, Xu Yuhuan, Zhong Hui, Roger Wu, Kalo Latu, Annette Fairbanks, Zhang Yuanchang (deceased), Karen Janes (deceased), Josh Robins, Jessica Auckland, and Jessica DeBell who have faith and confidence in me.

I owe my intellectual debt to many mentors who have opened my eyes and guided me in the process of academic inquiries. They are Stephen MacKinnon, Qi Pengfei, James Rush, Hoyt Tillman, Juliane Schober, Kirk Larsen, Eric Hyer, Ma Jianxiong, and Christian Daniels.

I express my gratitude to Tim Davis, Yang Mei, Ye Tong (deceased), Qi Heng, Zhao Xingling, and Wang Yunwen, whose great support in locating archives, library sources, and rare books has been essential for me to finish this book. Brandon Plewe, Teresa Gomez, and the students at BYU Geospatial Services and Training lab have helped me create the maps for this book. My uncle has converted a photo I took at the Taiping River valley into a beautiful oil painting for the book cover. I give special thanks to my colleagues Kirk Larsen, Aaron Skabelund, and Jon Felt, for their tireless efforts to view my manuscript and provide invaluable advice for revision. I am very thankful for Christian Daniels and Ma Jianxiong, who have patiently guided me in the process of revision. I thank Vicky Hay, Kim Sandoval, Kate Stradling, Heather Randall, Michelle Leonard, Mike Sanders, and Floor Appelman for their great help to examine and edit the manuscript. My research assistants, Nhi Phan, Spencer Fields, Jackson Keys, and especially Maddy Buckles and William Martindale, have provided me with great help in translating, collecting sources, editing, and proofreading.

I particularly thank my other colleagues such as Leslie Hadfield, Brian Cannon, Ignacio Garcia, DJ Gonzales, Ed Strafford, Amy Harris, Darren Ray, Sarah Guerrero, Sarah Reed, Christopher Jones, Paul Keery, Jay Buckley, Cole Hooley, David Honey, David Kenley, Niwako Yamawaki, Laura Walker, and Mikaela Dufur, who have given me great advice and support in the research and writing process. I express my gratitude to BYU FHSS College and the Department of History for providing me tremendous resources for
research. The great support my colleagues have offered allows me to finish and publish my book and continue my academic endeavour in the future.

I thank the members of the Asian Borderlands Editorial Board at AUP, whose guidance has greatly inspired me intellectually and scholarly. Lastly, I am very grateful for Loretta Lou who has been patiently working with me and has made the publication of this book possible.
Abbreviations in the Notes

BL  The British Library
BNA  The British National Archives
BPP  British Parliamentary Paper
CYYZG  Cen Yuying zougao
DARNP  Dao Anren nianpu
DLCS-ZP  Dali congshu-zupu pian
DNTL  Đại Nam thực lục
HQZZ  Heqing zhouzhi
LCYJ  Liu Changyou Ji
LP&NP  Li Hongzhang zhi Pan Dingxin shuzha, Li Wen-zhonggong (Hongzhang) nianpu.
LYFLSC  Liu Yongfu lishicao
LYFZ  Liu Yongfu zhuang
MGHQXZ  Mingguo Heqing xianzhi
MGTCXZG  Mingguo Tengchong xianzhigao
MJLHB  Majiali shijian shiliao huibian
MJLJB  Majiali shijian shiliao jianbian
MOFA  Ch‘ing Dynasty and ROC Treaties and Agreements Preserved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan)
QWJSL  Qingji waijiao shiliao
ONEETRCB  Official Narrative of the Expedition to Explore the Trade Routes to China Via Bhamo
QSLYMTL  Qingshilu Yuenan Miandian Taiguo Laowo shiliao zhaiachao
SSZP  Yunnan Heqing Shushi zupu
TCDSHLSJP  Tengchong Dieshuihe Lishi jiapu
TYTZ  Tengyue tingzhi
WJSZLJY  Zhongguo jindai waijiaoshi ziliao jiyao
XSNL  Xuesheng nianlu
YCFWZ  Yongchangfu wenzheng
YNHMQYSL  Yunnan Huimin qiyi shiliao
YNHZSHLSDC  Yunnan Huizu shehui lishi diaocha
YNWSZLXJ  Yunnansheng wenshi ziliao xuanji
YPA  Yunnan Provincial Archives
YPL  Yunnan Provincial Library
ZGZZ  Zhongfa Zhanzheng
Introduction

Contingent Loyalties

In January 1875, after a five-month journey across southern and western China in cold, wet winter weather, British diplomat Augustus Margary arrived in Bhamo, a town in what the British then called Upper Burma. He joined a British mission there as an interpreter. The mission aimed to revive the regular Burma-Yunnan trade that had been affected by the rebellions and wars in Yunnan and to explore the possibility of building a railway. The British intended to at least reach Dali, centre of the Muslim regime established after Du Wenxiu rebelled in 1856 and then proceed to Shanghai.¹

¹ In 1856, widespread rebellions swept across Yunnan because of intensified intergroup relations. In western Yunnan, Du Wenxiu was elected as the Zongtong Bingma Dayuanshuai, or Generalissimo, and established an anti-Manchu regime in Dali. Du identified his rebellious force as the White Flags Army (or White Banners). Terms such as the Du Wenxiu Regime, Du Wenxiu’s Dali Regime, the Dali White Flags Regime, and Dali Shuaifu (The Generalissimo’s Government in Dali) have appeared in the Hui collective memory and historical writings. Contemporary scholars in Yunnan often employ these terms; however, most late Qing and early Republic of China (ROC) historical documents created by non-Hui scholars usually denied the legitimacy of Du Wenxiu’s Regime. They often used the term Hui bandits and called Du Wenxiu a “wei Dayuanshuai” (Fake Generalissimo). See Du Wenxiu, “Du Wenxiu zizhuan,” in Yunnan Huizu renwu beizhuan jingxuan, ed. Wang Zihua and Yao Jide (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2004), vol. 1: 192–93; See early ROC historical documents in Jing Dexin, ed., Yunnan Huimin qiyi shiliao (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1984), 179–270; Ma Jianxiong, “Du Wenxiu yu Qingmo Xiantong nianjian Yunnan Dali Baiqi zhengquan de Qingzhenjiaomen yu minzu lunshu,” in Yincang de renqun: jindai Zhongguo de qunzu yu bianjiang, ed. Huang Kewu (Taipei: Xiwei chubanshe, 2021): 344–70; Gao Fuyuan, ed., Du Wenxiu qiyi lunji (Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 1993). Local Hui scholars identify the Hui as a religious and ethnic identity group in Yunnan that incorporated the migrants from the Middle East, West Asia, Central Asia, and China Proper since the seventh century. The terms Hui Muslims and Huihui are also employed to address this group. Overall, the Muslims had been recognised as the Huihui since the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) and the term “Huihui jiaomen (gates of teaching)” had been used to categorise the Islamic sects since the Ming era (1368–1644). Nevertheless, the term Hui had become a simplified term to address the Muslims during the Qing (1644–1912). See Ye Tong, Dali Huizulishi yu wenhua lunji, (Dali: Dali Musilin wenhua zhuankan xuexiao bianyin, 2006), 113–22; Dali Baizu zizhizhou Huizu xuehui, ed., Dali Huizushi (Kunming:Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2009), 11–66; Ma Jianxiong and Yao Jide, “The Mosque and Scripture-Hall Education,” in Islam.
In late February, Margary was killed in Mangyun, less than sixty kilometres from Bhamo, and the rest of the mission suffered attacks in the Kachin Hills. The British believed that a low-ranking Qing army officer named Li Zhenguo orchestrated the murders and attacks. Nevertheless, local people considered him a hero because he fought against the rebels and defended the country from foreign invasions. In the 1860s and 1870s, the French explorers' and diplomats' attempts to penetrate France's growing colonies in Indochina were also stymied, primarily by Liu Yongfu and his Black Flag Army who occupied the upper Red River. At that time, Liu was no Qing soldier or loyalist. Rather, he was arguably a bandit, a pirate, and a warlord whose power and reach straddled southern Yunnan, western Guangxi, and northern Vietnam. However, both the Chinese and the Vietnamese governments relied on him to pacify bandits and deter the French while questioning his loyalty and formidable power.

Those historians who are acquainted with the general narrative of China’s foreign relations in the nineteenth century may find the Margary Affair and the Black Flag Army all too familiar. Loyal Qing officials were notorious for resisting foreigners with all possible stratagems and deceptions. Full of nationalist sentiment, Chinese civilians fiercely confronted the foreigners, as the Tianjin Massacre (1870) and later the Boxer Rebellion (1900) so clearly demonstrated. Moreover, unruled bandits and indigenous forces posed constant dangers and even waged wars against the Europeans. In short, what seems like a simple, straightforward story of Western imperialist penetration and patriotic Chinese resistance when viewed from thirty thousand feet above becomes a much messier affair when viewed from the ground. This is because Yunnan, from the perspective of Qing imperial authorities, or, for that matter, from the views of European imperialists or the Burmese and Vietnamese kings, was not merely a distant, marginal, uncivilised periphery. It was also a borderland.
Loyalty and related collective identities deserve careful examination in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Yunnan as patriotism throughout the Qing era often found its roots in anti-Manchu sentiment as well as loyalty to the Han- and Confucian-dominant Chinese state, with the Ming dynasty (1638–1644) the latest example. Nevertheless, elites and commoners could tolerate the Qing government as the vehicle to carry the Chinese state forward. Many patriotic local actors in the borderlands could hardly be labelled Qing but rather Chinese loyalists because their past resistance to the Manchu territorial consolidation was as vociferous as their current efforts to impede the Europeans. Some of them had formally raised the standard of rebellion, such as Du Wenxiu and Liu Yongfu. Still others, as well as their convoluted networks and connections, were altogether beyond the purview of the court of Beijing. In 1868, when Edward Bosc Sladen led a British mission to survey Upper Burma and Yunnan, he reported opposition from King Mindon of Burma (r. 1853–1878), the Burmese officials, the Shans, and the Kachins, whose networks, influence, and obstructions had transcended the Qing-Burma border. By 1875, when the Margary Affair occurred, the British believed that the obstructions came from an orchestra of local militia, officials in Yunnan, and even the court of Beijing.

Yunnan was then filled with a variety of figures that Western imperialists often labelled as disobedient officials, rule-breakers, unruly militia members, outlaws, or “uncivilised” and greedy “savages” who were ready to block the Westerners at every opportunity. Popular Chinese narratives have often lionised these figures as patriots, nationalists, anti-imperialists, and heroes. However, these figures created networks that stretched across China’s unclear and contested border with Mainland Southeast Asia. Their interests did not always coincide with that of the provincial, state, or imperialist powers. In a word, to understand these local actors, who were primarily frontier inhabitants, one needs to reconsider the traditional, state-centric approaches and replace the perception of overwhelming state power and absolute local submission with the uncertainties of confrontations and reconciliations.

Further, what transformed the modern Yunnan borderlands was far more than the sole will of any ethnic groups or the state powers that could be significantly crippled, given that Qing, French, and British officials could first lose their lives to malaria and other diseases at the beginning of their mission. The stories were more about dynamic, local but transregional (-national) networks, exchanges, and political and cultural constructions that sustained power, faiths, visions, identities, and motives for progress. Therefore, this book examines the local actors mainly in the Yunnan
borderlands but also in the neighbouring areas of northern Indochina. The time span stretches roughly from the 1850s, when Yunnan was struggling with increasing ethnic rebellions, to the 1910s, when the warlords took control of Yunnan after declaring independence from Manchu rule. I especially focus on the local actors who acted as the state agents and the intermediaries between the state and their own communities. I argue that the state and its agents shared contingent loyalties to each other in the construction of modern Yunnan borderlands. While utilising and wrestling with the central government, the state agents performed decisive roles in shaping Yunnan’s historical development as they competed with each other. In this process, the visions, agendas, and interests of the state and the local elites brewed contested historical memories and narratives to interpret the making of this borderland.

The concept of state agents traces its origin to Ma Jianxiong’s scholarship on “the state agents in the borderlands” (边疆上的国家代理人) of southern Yunnan. The complicated intergroup relations, along with the Ming-Qing territorial expansion as well as the diverse conflicts that the Qing and Western imperial powers faced in Mainland Southeast Asia, led the state to look for allies on the frontier. Historically, the Chinese state depended on its local allies to enclose, consolidate, and defend its borderlands. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, China’s state agents also engaged in operations to counter European imperialism along and across the border in a way that the state officials and a standing army could not. Nevertheless, these state agents were local-oriented and primarily served their own and local interests while attending to the state’s timetable. This book explores these agents’ social roles, networks, and agendas; examines their relationship with the state authorities and with their peers; and evaluates their impact in creating the Yunnan borderlands in collective memory.

Scholarship on Yunnan has flourished. However, few monographs have analysed Yunnan’s history during the late Qing and early Republican China (ROC) era. Even fewer have thoroughly examined the local actors and their relationship to state power and impact in shaping modern Yunnan’s historiography. Preexisting literature has examined major historical figures and events, creating robust conversations about merchants, warlords, native officials, and ethnic rebellions. Using a bottom-up approach, some scholarship further connects Yunnan’s experiences to a broader sense of borderlands.

3 Ibid., 89.
elsewhere in the conversations on transnationalism, decolonisation, and human agency. However, nineteenth- and twentieth-century Yunnan has unique features that deserve special attention as China transformed from a traditional, multi-ethnic Manchu empire to a communist Chinese nation-state. General histories covering two centuries cannot capture the dynamics and transformations of the complicated local developments of Yunnan. Traditional narratives that did not carefully examine the subjectivity of the sources and historical writings on Yunnan could perpetuate long-term biases and fail to reflect the complete picture and nature of the competition and rivalry in the region.

Yunnan was a multi-ethnic frontier in the Manchu-ruled Qing Empire, and the government relied on and rewarded local elites, most of whom claimed to be Han, to maintain Beijing’s sovereignty. Because of such interdependence, the native and Han populations in Yunnan demonstrated different levels of autonomy within the imperial orbit. Their transregional and cross-border kinship, religious, and economic ties created webs of entities that could be relatively independent from the state political administration. Consequently, border dwellers’ collective identities and loyalty to their local communities were not necessarily state-centred. However, their loyalty to the Qing government could be cultivated if the latter provided the platforms and mechanisms to sustain nonstate collectives and related identities and interests.

Due to a frequent vacuum of state power in Yunnan and contingencies in local-state alliances, the six decades following the 1850s held immense uncertainties for both the state and local actors. The state authority and its mechanisms experienced tremendous challenges that included internal rebellions and violence; local, independent regimes; natural disasters and desolation; government deficit and financial crisis; the loss of imperial tributary states; increasing European influence and potential encroachment; and the rise of anti-Manchu sentiment and competing forms of nationalism that were not necessarily Han. In a word, modern conceptions of sovereignty, nationalism, identities, equality, and independence saw exceptions, contradictions, and clashes in Yunnan’s daily life, merging new elements into traditional structures and relationships. While affecting the course of history, these developments established the foundation and framework of future social and political evolution in Yunnan, such as the economic and political inequality between the Han and non-Han population, as well as the Han distrust and discrimination of the “others.”

This book challenges the traditional, simplified, and stereotypical narratives and interpretations of borderland history that may not have clear awareness of their subjectivity or may have been circumscribed within the perspective of Han ethnocentrism. Top-down and ethnocentric approaches tend to portray a formidable state power and passive, weak local actors. Their active and complicated roles are often neglected or downplayed because the borderlands are frequently brought into the realms of state policies and international relations that conform to state-centric discourses. Challenging the state-centred approach, however, does not overlook the state influence and interference in the borderlands. Rather, it emphasises the limits of state power in both physical and mental territories as well as the limits of state-centric narratives. This book emphasises that the contested process of borderlands-making in Yunnan is found in various, competing interpretations of the local actors as well as in their efforts to negotiate and reconstruct their status in the twentieth-century Chinese nation-state.

**Historical Context**

Sitting at the crossroads where southwestern China meets South, Southeast, and Inner Asia, China's Yunnan province borders Tibet and Sichuan in the north and Guizhou and Guangxi in the east. The Hengduan mountain range in the northwest stretches into northern Burma and India and merges into the Himalayas. The upper streams of the Irrawaddy, Mekong, Salween, Red, Yangzi (Yangtze), and Pearl Rivers cut through treacherous gorges in Yunnan before they dump into the lower and fertile plains in the seaboard of the Indochina Peninsula and coastal China. From tropical lowlands in the south to temperate high ground in the north, river deltas, gorges, meadows, lakes, valleys (often referred to as bazi locally), and snowy mountains have formed mosaic landscapes and habitats for humans and animals. Historically, trade routes and numerous small paths have connected border settlers in Yunnan to kin, friends, fellow migrant workers, believers, and trading partners across the broader region of northern Indochina.

Nineteenth-century European travellers, merchants, and officials created a “Yunnan Myth” that emphasised Yunnan’s natural resources and its tremendous market potential. British Indian Army officer Richard Spyre had been an ardent advocate of surveying the trade routes since 1831. In 1858, he promoted the construction of railways to connect Burma with Yunnan. England merchant communities tirelessly urged the British Indian Government to open Yunnan and China’s southwest. French officers Francis
Garnier (1839–1873) and Ernest Doudart de Lagree (1823–1868) were among the promoters of this myth. Their enthusiasm led to frequent surveys and explorations along the vulnerable, untamed borderlands of China and its neighbouring states in the northern Indochina Peninsula, which triggered both state and local fear about potential European invasion.

Yunnan was home to the historical Nanzhao (738–902) and Dali (937–1253) kingdoms. The Mongols conquered the Dali Kingdom in the mid-thirteenth century with the aid of the Muslim troops they recruited from Central Asia. In the 1380s, General Mu Ying extended the Ming Empire’s dominance to Yunnan, which would end with Qing general Wu Sangui’s conquest in 1659. As Wu himself rebelled in 1673, the Manchu control of Yunnan saw a tumultuous beginning. To consolidate the frontier and govern the non-Han population, the Yuan, Ming, and Qing Empires adopted the tusi system, a form of indirect rule, and granted the title of tusi (native official) to indigenous rulers, local elites, or state military men of various ethnic and religious backgrounds, including the Muslims. When the state attempted to transform the native officials into civil bureaucrats, especially in the eighteenth century, imperial authorities were frustrated by the bloody warfare in the southwest. This process of gaitu guiliu proved that local people were too difficult to “tame.” Further south, the Tai cawfas (headmen, saopha in Burmese) submitted to both the Qing and Burmese authorities to gain


7 Hu Shaohua, Zhongguo nanfang minzu lishi wenhua tansuo (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2005), 285.
protection or to overcome local rivals. They had supported either the Burmese or the Qing armies during the Qing-Burmese campaigns (1762–1769). Although the Qing Empire had established its nominal suzerainty over Burma after the war, the tribute from the latter never came. Beijing would still face Burmese and Siamese aggression as well as their interference in conflicts and succession crises in Xishuangbanna (or Sipsong Panna) in the nineteenth century.

The Hui-Han tension that rose in the 1820s was another factor that fundamentally challenged the state structure and changed the power relations in Yunnan. By the nineteenth century, both the Han and Hui settlers had embraced Confucian education, developed close connection to state power, and made Yunnan their homelands. Nevertheless, competition over Yunnan’s mining industry led to frequent disputes between these two groups. Confrontations occurred repeatedly, especially in silver mines that were mostly situated within the native officials’ jurisdiction, where the state government had little influence. In 1856, the Yunnan provincial authorities’ elimination of Hui triggered widespread rebellions. The Muslim rebels in Western Yunnan elected Du Wenxiu to be their commander-in-chief and established the Dali Regime. That same year, Nuosu (Yi) leader, Li Wenxue revolted and founded another regime in the Ailao Mountains. To challenge Manchu rule, Dali’s armies subdued the Tai in Xishuangbanna, occupied Yongchang and Tengyue near Upper Burma, and, within a decade, controlled much of western Yunnan. The state military and local militia were engaged in continual warfare for almost two decades to pacify the Muslim rebels. Li Zhenguo was among the militia leaders and gentry in western Yunnan who swore never to submit to Dali’s rule.

11 This book adopts Philip Kuhn’s methods to broaden the functional definition of gentry. The gentry in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Yunnan borderlands have been referred to as the local elites who possessed prestige and power primarily over their communities, such as a city, a town, or a village. However, local gentry’s expansive transregional or cross-border connections stabilised and extended their social control, which also enabled them to form interest groups with a broad social base and affect regional or international politics. The status of local gentry was usually based on the academic or martial arts degrees and titles, earned or purchased. This general category mainly included the “active, retired, expectant, and potential officials” on Ho Ping-ti’s list as well as the lower gentry (shengyuan and jiansheng) proposed by Chang Chung-li. Nevertheless, this book recognises that not all members of local gentry
As elsewhere in the Qing Empire, such as Hunan and Guizhou, where rebellions frequently occurred, local communities in Yunnan had become militarised. Philip Kuhn identifies militarisation as "a disease of border regions," ridden by the complexities of ethnic conflicts, secret societies, bandit groups, and sectarian movements.\(^\text{12}\) While some elites in Yunnan became rebels, others defended the state to answer the Qing government's call for a local, independent approach to counter the widespread revolts that had been occurring since the mid-nineteenth century.\(^\text{13}\) However, as with the ethnic diversity within the leadership of the Dali Regime, the Qing government did not just cooperate with the Han gentry. Late Qing historians in western Yunnan recorded that some Hui elites in Tengyue, such as Ming Qingchong, were commissioned by the government in 1856 to calm two rebellious groups: one was a band of Hui who had connections with Du Wenxiu and possessed weapons; the other a secret alliance of mainly Hui families who would obtain degrees and titles, and not all degree holders would necessarily become government officials. However, the "upholders of Confucianism," and the "scholars and literary people in general," as Fei Xiaotong points out, still possessed "real political power" while sitting on the bottom of the ruling hierarchy. Kuhn also argues that the lower gentry or "even some wealthy and educated commoners" could dominate rural, poor, and remote communities. In the meantime, the status of local gentry and merchants could overlap because members of the gentry in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Yunnan engaged in commercial activities. Likewise, merchants could possess gentry status or develop high social status as they earned and purchased degrees, organised militias, and were awarded titles by the state. Overall, this book recognises local gentry as individuals and families who presented a local entity and interest group. They established and maintained their socioeconomic dominance, family continuity, and cultural hegemony that were demonstrated by the observation of Timothy Brook. See Philip A. Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 3–4; Chang Chung-li, *The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955), 6–8; Ho Ping-ti, *The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368–1911* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), 38; Fei Xiaotong, *China’s Gentry: Essays in Rural-Urban Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 17–18; Timothy Brook, “Family Continuity and Cultural Hegemony: The Gentry of Ningbo, 1368–1911,” in *Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance*, ed. Joseph W. Esherick and Mary Backus Rankin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 28–29.


\(^\text{13}\) *Xuanzong shilu*, vol. 438 (18–19), in Yunnansheng lishi yanjiusuo, ed., *Qingshilu youguan Yunnan shiliao huibian* (QSLYN) (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1985), vol. 2: 81. The Qing military ceased stationing a standing army in Tengyue during Du Wenxiu’s Rebellion and did not resume doing so until 1873. On the other hand, local militia and military colonies had been established to guard the border since 1823 and remained in function during the mid-century rebellions. See Chen Zonghai and Zhao Duanli, *Tengyue tingzhi* (TYTZ, 1887), vol. 11, wubeizhi 1, yingzhi, 5; Li Genyuan and Liu Chuxiang, ed., *Minguo Tengchong xianzhigao* (MGTCXZG) (Kunming: Yunnan meishu chubanshe, 2004), 190, 241.
Han merchants and civilians who later burnt down “an empty house” and triggered the Hui revenge. Indeed, armed elites and civilians compensated for the weakened state force during the rebellions in Yunnan and performed a crucial role in securing the imperial frontier.

War and destruction at this time interrupted regular commercial exchange between Burma and Yunnan, which prompted the British to restore trade to its profitable pre-war volume. The British gained the cooperation of some previous and potential trade partners: as soon as King Mindon tightened his monopoly on cotton, Burma-Yunnan trade was paused due to the Muslim rebellions. The king’s cotton was therefore piled up in Mandalay, and over time, the cotton fields across Burma became desolate. Moreover, the Dali Regime was struggling to profit from trade and fund its military. The Kachin and Shan communities’ tax revenue had also been shrinking. The British claimed that some Shan and Kachin leaders were eager to resume the trade, and therefore, “in 1863 one of the chiefs” told the British that he would protect any merchants who travelled on the road. However, the Qing and the Burmese governments remained sceptical when the British said that they were only interested in trade instead of territorial expansion.

In addition, Burma and Vietnam, seen as the “fence” of China’s territory by the Qing imperial officials, both saw increasing European influence in their unstable, northern frontiers. Beginning his rule with the loss of Lower Burma, especially Pegu, his ancestral land, King Mindon distrusted the British and intended to restrain any further Western influence. However,

14 TYTZ, vol. 11, wubeizhi 4, rongshi, 11.
15 Appendices, Official Narrative of the Expedition to Explore the Trade Routes to China Via Bhamo (ONEETRCB) (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, 1870), xxvi. A small volume of trade did exist, as John Anderson, a member of a British mission that arrived in Mandalay in early January 1868, observed the arrival of a caravan from Dali that carried a variety of goods, including opium and yellow orpiment. John Anderson, Mandalay to Momien: A Narrative of the Two Expeditions to Western China of 1868 and 1875, under Colonel Edward B. Sladen and Colonel Horace Browne (London: Macmillan and Co. 1876), 16.
17 For more arguments and historical context about the loss of Burmese territory, including Pegu, and Mindon’s unsuccessful efforts to restore his land, see Joseph Dautremer, Burma under British Rule (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons; London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1913), 63–65; G. E. Harvey, British Rule in Burma 1824–1942 (New York: AMS Press Inc., 1974), 20; Oliver B.
after he withdrew to the north and created a landlocked territory, the loss of Burmese sovereignty would be just a matter of time. Mindon attempted to maintain Burma’s independence by building irrigation systems and industrial factories in Mandalay as well as promoting trade networks that stretched to China, the Shan states, Lower Burma, India, Britain, France, and Italy. With a clear understanding of the necessity of a royal monopoly on essential resources, the Burmese king became the largest dealer of foreign trade and especially the trade with Yunnan. The British merchants constantly complained about the king’s meddling of price and market. Overall, Britain’s growing interest in southwestern China and strategies to eliminate Mindon’s monopoly clashed with the king’s vision of economic and political autonomy. With two treaties signed in 1862 and 1867, Britain gradually established its political and commercial bases in Mindon’s troubled Upper Burma frontier as he agreed to trade with Yunnan and construct railways as well as telegraph lines to connect Yunnan with Mandalay.

Vietnam faced French encroachment. Britain’s old rival on the Indian subcontinent had intended to control a share of the regional markets after Catholic missionaries had successfully aided King Gia Long (or Nguyễn Ánh, 1762–1820) in 1802 in countering the Tây Sơn Uprising (1777–1802) and in crowning him the first emperor of the Nguyễn dynasty (1802–1945).


18 Pollak, Empires in Collision, 113.
19 Keeton, King Thebaw, 7–8; Pollak, Collision of Empire, 123.
21 The Burmese Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885) conquered Upper Burma less than one hundred years before. In the 1860s, Shan rebellions swept across Moby, Mongmit-Mong Leng, Moguang, and Myitkyina. Once supportive of Mindon’s undertakings to overthrow King Pagan Min, the Shan leaders by 1865 had strongly opposed Mindon’s control of their lands and natural resources. The succession disputes in Mongmit-Mong Leng since the 1840s would also not cease until 1892. These Shan rival groups absorbed the mercenaries provided by Kachin allies whose relationship with Mindon had been weakened as Burma-Yunnan trade declined. See Pollak, Empires in Collision, 141–42; E. R. Leach, Political Systems of the Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 241–44.
In Paris, commercial and imperial ambitions harmonised the Catholic vision of divine missions, which by the mid-century had driven France to join Britain, asserting its power in China and deterring Russian expansion in central Asia and eastern Europe. The annexation of Vietnam became a subject of study for the French government’s Committee on Cochinchina.\(^{23}\) As France gradually gained control of southern Vietnam and Saigon in the early 1860s, revolts along the Qing Empire’s southern and southwestern borderlands created refugees, rebels, and bandits who fled into northern Vietnam, prompting King Tự Đức (r.1847–1883) to seek help from the Qing military throughout the 1870s.\(^{24}\) Liu Yongfu, who attempted to bring order to the chaos with his Black Flag Army, won the trust of both Vietnamese and Qing officials.

John Agnew notes that “political power never appears to be exercised equally everywhere,”\(^{25}\) which sheds light on the essence of the Qing’s uneven and weakened control of its empire as well as Beijing’s dependence on local allies, the state agents, to restore, construct, and govern its imperial borderlands. The Qing officials also appreciated whatever aid they could get to resist European advancement in Burma and Vietnam. In a word, local forces, especially those that were mobile and could operate across the border, would become crucial for territorial defence and instrumental in deterring European dominance in China’s tributary states.

**The State Agents and Representatives in the Yunnan Borderlands**

Ma Jianxiong identifies the state agents\(^{26}\) as active local political elites in southwestern Yunnan-Burmese borderlands. “Based on their own

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\(^{24}\) The Hmong people in Guizhou rebelled in the eighteenth century when Emperor Qianlong aggressively pushed the policy of *gaitu guiliu*. They revolted again in the 1850s. In Guangxi, following the Taiping uprising, numerous revolts erupted following the Taiping Rebellion (1850) and local regimes also appeared, such as the founding of a short-lived Yanling State in 1861.


\(^{26}\) Ma Jianxiong traces the original context of this concept to post-modernist and post-colonial discussions of human agency—whether the state agents had self-determination and/or were
positions, interests, and cultural identities,” states Ma, they demonstrated
great initiatives as social activists. They further posed themselves as the
representatives of local collectives and “participated and promoted the
construction of new border political relations and ethnic identities” in the
transformation of the Yunnan-Burmese border region during the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. According to Ma, these elites “possessed the
abilities and means to manipulate the state political and cultural resources
from a local standpoint.” Therefore, imperial officials and scholars had to
depend on these local authorities and operations to fulfil their missions
successfully. In the meantime, with the support of the state, the state
agents in the borderlands had the power and resources to meddle with
local competitions and negotiations. Overall, “the state agents expanded
the state influence within the circumstances in the borderlands while
constructing the borderlands within the framework of the state.” This
characteristic differentiates them from the representatives of the state.

The “representatives of the state,” according to Ma Jianxiong, were impe-
rial officials and scholars who were commissioned by the state to conduct
assignments in the border region. In comparison to the state agents,
the state representatives were state-centred and they prioritised the state
interests and agenda. Therefore, they merely envisioned or followed the
state agenda of borderlands construction, demonstrating a top-down force
of transformation and even assimilation. In contrast, state agents’ motiva-
tion for political participation came from two concerns: representing the
positions, interests, and cultural identities of their own as well as that of a
broader local community. From this perspective, a local-centred primary
role enabled them to first act as local advocates in their interactions with

a social construction; and whether they could become post-colonial subjects and possess the
political agency and ability to deter imperial powers. Ma further references the theoretical
application in Ralph A. Litzinger’s studies of contemporary Yao communities that emphasise
ethnic elites’ creative approach to exercising their agency. These individuals took advantage
of the social and economic sources provided by the state political system and ethnic policies,
creating a greater level of flexibility in their political participation. They were “never simply
agents of the state,” although, as the “elite cadre of scholars and officials,” they had to examine
their fellow Yao people from the critical eyes of the state and the Party. See Ma Jianxiong,
“Bianfang sanlao,” 88–89; Vivienne Jabri, The Postcolonial Subject: Claiming Politics/Governing Others
in Late Modernity (Florence: Taylor & Francis Group, 2012), chap. 1–2; Ralph A. Litzinger, Other

27 Ma Jianxiong, “Bianfang sanlao,” 88–89.
28 Ibid., 90.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
the state. For them, the state interests and agenda might become secondary, and the state power and institutions might become instrumental in serving the local initiatives. In other words, the concept of the state agents suggests a decentralised approach to viewing local-state relations by recognising that the state could be secondary in their decision-making.

This book adopts Ma Jianxiong’s theories and recognises state agents as those local actors who were usually gentry, merchants, and militia leaders and who prioritised their own or local collectives’ interests in their interactions with the state. The state representatives, on the other hand, were state-oriented imperial officials and scholars who prioritised the state's interests and agenda in the borderlands. The state representatives may include some state agents who leaned toward fulfilling the state interests when serving the country, especially when interacting with the foreigners. Although the Qing rule of avoidance prevented local actors from rising and monopolising the political power in their own native places, the mid-century rebellions enabled native Yunnan or Guangxi gentry and militiamen to become powerful state officials in their own lands. Therefore, complexities may have marked individual cases when the state agents were transformed into state representatives in a temporary and subtle fashion, creating an imbalance in their dual identities.

Nevertheless, the ability for the local actors to exercise their agency and advocate for their own communities was not necessarily reduced once they became state officials. Local actors in Yunnan took on multiple social roles and placed themselves in various frameworks and networks, which could include associations with the state at various degrees. Before serving the state or while serving as the intermediaries between the state and local communities, these elites could have already been commanding or brokering for various nonstate systems, such as family clans, merchant groups, religious sectarian movements, and secret societies. Therefore, their service for the state suggested a shift of focus instead of a withdrawal from all non-state social networks. Consequently, this shift from a presumably nonstate system to state affairs did not necessarily suggest a loss or a significant restriction to their agency and social control but posed restrictions in their agency only in certain contexts. Moreover, restrictions that were bound by state expectations and protocols could be compensated by the privileges and power the state offered to its agents to obtain and distribute greater social and economic resources. Thus, the opportunity cost for the state agents to maintain their status could be individual and difficult to measure, but their new status gave them more leverage in negotiating with the state for their native place and their own communities. They could also pass on
the benefits and privileges to their allies and associated networks, which in turn, strengthened their local control and enabled them to compete against rivals. Nevertheless, local actors were not necessarily competing to obtain the status of state agent, although the winners of local rivalries could possess more resources to bargain for this status and for their individual or group interests.

Thus, state agents maintained contingent and negotiable loyalty to the state. Their service occupied a temporary middle ground between state interests and their individual or group interests. The state agents might lose or leave their positions due to changing social and political circumstances as well as the conflicts of interest and growing discord between the local-state alliances. In other words, while there was always a path for the rebels, bandits, and fugitives to represent and serve their enemy state, the same path also allowed state agents to become outcasts and traitors. Therefore, the relationships and alliances between local actors and the state could be historical, indefinite, and conditional.

Overall, representing the state was only one route for elites in the border regions to maintain and strengthen their local control, which further indicates that their relationship with the state and their actions on behalf of the state would shape only limited aspects of the borderlands’ development. Consequently, examining their relationship with the state reveals only limited aspects of borderlands history. This understanding raises two concerns. First, it is very important to more fully understand how local actors have affected the borderlands’ history with their overlapping social roles and multiple networks. C. Patterson Giersch’s examination of Yunnan merchants’ contribution to local education and modern China’s revolutions provides a timely discussion about the roles of local actors. From that perspective, this book shows its value by addressing the complex identities of border denizens as well as the dynamic spatial relations they formed in daily life. After all, imagining and categorising the people and events with a fixed label of social roles causes an isolated, stagnant, and partial understanding and interpretation of the history of the Yunnan borderlands.

Second, it is equally important to pay more attention to how dynamic, shifting relationships between the state and local actors affected the writing of Yunnan’s history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Contingent alliances between the state and local actors in Yunnan were linked by their conditional loyalty to each other. Such complexities produced various narratives to explain how and why their relationships worked, or did not

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31 Giersch, Corporate Conquests.
work, as well as why there were failures and successes in their collaboration. Thus, similarities and discrepancies could exist between the state and local narratives regarding the same people and the same events because local storytellers may have had various perspectives and because their relationship with the state could have evolved over time. Therefore, as the history of the Yunnan borderlands moved forward, the state and local actors formed their own systems of collective memory to interpret the same changes.

Indeed, the motives and purposes of memory creation could vary, which results in controversies, disputes, and clashes about how to recount the past. According to Maurice Halbwachs, collectives in society—from family groups to the state—remember and reconstruct their collective memory through “memory frameworks” that localise individuals, facts, images, rites, formulas, conventions, and symbols into certain contexts and narratives. Thus, memory frameworks are essential to create a “proper mentality” for their corresponding groups to maintain relationships, traditions, values, and identities. Historical writing about society can be considered a process in which the storytellers reorganise and modify their traditional memory frameworks. Through this effort, they respond to changes in society and in their own communities in particular, as well as to the needs of negotiation and compromises when navigating complex relationships with other memory frameworks and other historical narratives. In the same sense, historical writing about the contested borderlands of Yunnan demonstrates chronic and perhaps ongoing clashes and reconciliations of competing collective memories and narratives that have been created under a certain “proper mentality” and framework. Along with clashes and reconciliations are long-term biases. For instance, the popular discourse of the Hui-Han divisions had been employed to construct and reinforce intergroup confrontations during the Qing era, causing widespread hatred toward the Hui and prejudice in interethnic relations throughout the course of the mid-century Muslim rebellions.

It is critical to examine how historical and collective memories have developed in modern Yunnan and how they have been recorded. Likewise, it is important to unpack what roles various historical records have

33 Ibid., 59.
34 Ibid., 52–68.
36 Ma Jianxiong emphasises that the Qing rhetoric of Hui-Han dichotomy and the construction of Hui identity intensified and realigned the social division and confrontations in Yunnan along the Hui-Han lines. See Ma Jianxiong, “Shiye Kuanggong yu difang junshihua,” 71, 95.
played in defining modern Yunnan borderlands, its place and people, and its relationship with the state political centre. These concerns reflect on where knowledge has come from, how knowledge has been produced, and how historical subjectivity, or the “expression of individual historical consciousness,” perspectives, as well as biases have affected these processes. These reflections reckon with David Carr’s question on how awareness of the past has developed “prior to or independently of its becoming thematic in a disciplined inquiry like history.” Indeed, such an inquiry is necessary in the eras when the Han gentry dominated the literary discourses of historical documentation and historiography or when the state-run archives and libraries in contemporary China have had a subtle but growing impact on shaping the results of research. Archives and libraries selectively open their records to certain viewers according to the “sensitivity” of the period, the topic, and the research keywords. This vetting procedure suggests that the results of the research can be measured and predicted within a state-designated memory framework. And, argues Susan Crane, “unfortunately, libraries and archives are in fact cluttered with dust bunnies, and dust, as we shall see, can in fact inaugurate historical subjectivity.” While local historical records and oral history accounts provide the means to mitigate the situation, these materials also bring along their own memory frameworks and subjectivity that affect their storytelling. In some cases, storytellers from historically controversial groups subtly manipulated the records to reconstruct public knowledge and shape future intergroup relations. Distinguishing the subjectivity of the historical sources and the historiography of Yunnan, therefore, becomes an essential step to unveil the complicated construction of the borderlands, physically and mentally.

The subjectivity found in various historical documents and their interpretations further belong to the same subjectivity of the source creators and of the storytellers who were bound by their own historicity. Historicity, according to David Carr, indicates individuals’ involvement in ongoing historical development, which essentially shapes and contextualises the storytellers’ perceptions and reflections of reality and daily experience in the world. Drawing commonalities from Martin Heidegger’s and Edmund

Husserl’s notions of historicity, Carr emphasises the intersubjective nature of the concept, which suggests that “the relation with others is somehow essential to the individuals’ being.”¹¹ Individuals’ being, as shown by their cognitive life in this circumstance, can be contextual, which relates individuals to a web of predecessors, peers, and successors, from the past to present to future, through accumulative, generational, retrospective, and projective perceptions, values, and experiences.¹² Hence, historicity indicates individuals’ and groups’ “place in a historical setting.”¹³

Instrumental to the storytellers, narratives and their structures are also intersubjective. Carr further points out that “story-telling in its usual social and literary forms is an intersubjective activity which assumes a hearer’s or reader’s point of view on the events narrated.”¹⁴ Narratives, therefore, involve the historical character, the narrator, and the audience, as well as the views of them all.¹⁵ Susan Crane also notes that historians’ multiple roles have placed themselves “in relationship to others” to form “paradialectical triplets” with their subjects and their audience.¹⁶ Thus, the intersubjectivity of narratives and narrative structures has been demonstrated in accumulative and generational traditions and values that have affected the storytellers as well as in the relativity of the potentially overlapping roles of the narrator, historical character, and audience.¹⁷ The latter notion, in particular, suggests that storyteller, historical character, and audience often take each other’s roles in their individual narrative construction, which broadens the social and cognitive context of individuals and their stories.¹⁸ Nevertheless, storytelling, under the authoritative role of the storytellers, reaches a subtle balance and unity between the narrator, the character, and the audience as these three participants possess separate and yet interconnected cognition and consciousness about the past.¹⁹

As storytellers adopt various narratives and narrative structures to organise, interpret, and analyse their past experience, their stories have been involved in, or become incorporated into, a milieu of understandings of the past, present, and future that have been contributed to by others “in

¹¹ Carr, *Time, Narrative, and History*, 111.
¹² Ibid., 104–16.
¹³ Ibid., 115.
¹⁴ Ibid., 63.
¹⁵ Ibid., 57, 111.
¹⁶ Crane, “Historical Subjectivity,” 435.
¹⁷ Carr, *Time, Narrative, and History*, 106–9, 112.
¹⁸ Ibid., 112.
¹⁹ Ibid., 58.
a predecessor-successor relation. This process allows individual stories to find the larger narrative context to which they belong and also enables the storytellers to localise themselves in a larger group or a collective that recognises the value of themselves and their stories. Hence, the storytellers and the collectives to which they belong unify their communities and create their collective identities through various ties, including the narrative construction of their common experiences. In the same fashion, local historical records regarding modern Yunnan, such as gazetteers, journals, biographies, genealogies, and private papers, contain consistent or contradictory narratives along with varied value judgements about the people, the events, and the place. Historians have more or less conformed to these existing narratives as well as their value judgments. Thus, in addition to examining the relationship between state and nonstate actors, this book analyses how collective memories and historical narratives were created by different groups of storytellers and how these stories presented different perspectives to conceptualise the Yunnan borderlands in the long run.

Challenging the State-Centric Approach

Traditional Chinese historiography has treated Yunnan as a place of barbarians, exiled intellectuals, and fugitives despite its transregional outreach in South, Southeast, and Inner Asia as well as its heavy Han and Confucian influence in the Nanzhao and Dali periods. Contemporary Chinese literature portrays Yunnan’s passive, backward, and oppressed ethnic people as needing enlightenment and liberation. This ethnocentric discourse has its historical roots in the elites from China’s imperial capitals (Chang’an, Luoyang, Kaifeng, Lin’an, Nanjing, and Beijing), who perceived and represented the lands of “barbarians” surrounding the superior Han civilisation. They joyfully reported that the leaders of the peripheral kingdoms and tribes eagerly learned Confucianism and wanted to join the empire. The imperial historians and recordkeepers often defended state expansion and wars as just means to spread the blessings from heaven and civilise the barbarians. They rarely recognised the cultural accomplishments of societies on the peripheries, nor did they appreciate that these societies’ interactions with other regions were legitimate signs of civilisation and

50 Ibid., 4–5, 114.
51 Ibid., 114–15.
52 Ibid., 132–35.
cosmopolitanism. Therefore, as the expansion of the Yuan (1271–1368), Ming (1368–1644), and Qing (1644–1911) empires bound Yunnan more tightly to China Proper, imperial historians celebrated the state’s civilising mission. Their conventional narratives of consolidation and Sinification downplayed the long-term struggles in molding Yunnan into an integral part of the state. In other words, behind the historical construction of the glorious unification of China and the assimilation of the non-Han population were persistent intergroup conflicts and rebellions.

This traditional Chinese approach finds its modern, Western parallels in the European literature on Asia and Yunnan. From Henri Mouhot to H. R. Davis, European travellers marveled at the costumes, cuisines, arts, artifacts, architecture, and monuments that were much more sophisticated than what they had expected from uncivilised backcountries in Asia. The European civilising mission defended the agenda of political control and resource exploitation. Although the Margary Affair and the warfare in upper Indochina temporarily paused the European explorations in the region, French Prince Henri of Orléans wrote *Around Tonkin and Siam* in 1894 and revived the Yunnan Myth. Despite the construction of the Tonkin-Yunnan railway in 1910, topological inaccessibility and social unrest in Yunnan largely stifled the enthusiasm, for Yunnan regained the labels of stagnant, impoverished, and isolated, which laid the foundation for the twentieth-century Chinese political rhetoric and historiography of liberating the borderlands, showing a pattern in which “a backward, naive, and perhaps barbaric people are gradually incorporated into an advanced, superior, and more prosperous society and culture.”

These state-centric views, methods, and narratives are strikingly similar to Frederic Jackson Turner’s (1861–1942) 1893 thesis about the North American frontier that was imbued with the spirit of American exceptionalism and ethnocentrism. Turner considered the American frontier the “hither...
edge of free land,” “a whole frontier belt” with “the Indian country and the outer margin of the ‘settled area,’” “the line of most rapid and effective Americanization,” and a “wilderness” needing to be transformed into a “new product that is America.” Turner’s vision of America shared the same nature with the twentieth-century Chinese elites’ vision of Yunnan. Li Genyuan (1879–1965), a leader in the provincial government established after 1911, consistently pushed the transformation of the native officials into civil bureaucrats in southwestern Yunnan. Likewise, Ke Shuxun, who governed Xishuangbanna from 1911 to 1926, intended to “improve the [indigenous] norms and hopefully eliminate their differences with the Han.” Later, the ethnic policies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) did not break through the old spirit of Han ethnocentrism but featured new, pragmatic focuses on nationalism and patriotism, as well as an ideological orientation of “Marxism with Chinese characteristics.” Therefore, Yunnan’s “liberation” since the 1950s aimed to create a new borderland of the “New China,” a socialist China. To a certain degree, this goal resembled Turner’s notion of Americanisation and the aim to transform the American frontier into something new and different from traditional European societies.

As the American school of frontier studies has challenged Turner’s thesis, it brings new perspectives to counter the state- and ethnocentric approaches in the conventional historiography of Yunnan. Richard White’s theory of “middle ground,” which describes the creation of a common ground where the Algonquians and French interacted in colonial North America and defined their identities and interests, provides a critique applicable to Yunnan. White’s theory deviates from the state-centric approach by focusing on the actors on both sides. The deployment of his method sheds light to alter the

58 Turner, The Significance of the Frontier, 29.
59 In their everyday life and diplomatic relations, Algonquians and French reconstructed their conceptions toward each other and each other’s identities. Their mutual dependence to achieve certain “specific ends” by non-violent means hastened their integration, further creating common conventions for their exchanges and interactions. They actively connected both sides through their real or perceived/constructed commonalities that were phrased in the language of the others. The middle ground enabled them to legitimise their interests and actions within the cultural context of the other side. See Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 51–53.
general, stereotypical narratives that favour and defend the state agenda in a territory-bound Yunnan, which fail to envision a place where “the social boundaries and cultural practices were in flux.” Giersch's examination of “the Crescent” identifies southern Yunnan as a meeting place or “middle ground” for various interactions and relations, including the intrusive and the indigenous as well as the male and female. Guo Xiaoling's application of “a marketplace” stresses the diversities and uncertainties in northwestern Yunnan as people of various backgrounds and origins mingled. With hints at White's impact, Yang Bin elaborates on Yunnan's long historical connections with the outside world at the crossroads of China Proper, Tibet, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.

While the “middle ground” theory conceptualises a space where two or more groups interact, it highlights the varieties of and exceptions to the common perceptions of local actors' social roles and behaviours. The term itself indicates that the nature of borderlands is a converging point, both physical and cultural, for individual and collective exchanges, which could transcend the historical evolution of the space as the state territory shifts. In other words, the “middle ground” theory explains the mechanism of the interactions and relationships between the natives and the outsiders. To a certain degree, this approach mixes the imagination and creation of both borderlands' inhabitants and external observers. This approach also explains local actors' pragmatism in utilising their alliance with “the others” to achieve their own interests. Such an alliance, largely driven by cooperation, is usually based on the common ground of its members' shared interests. Thus, White's method presents the borderlands' history under a more sophisticated light of negotiation and reconciliation, instead of a linear and absolute course of assimilation and confrontation.

Within the context of this book, the middle ground, ideally, exists within various platforms that facilitate exchanges between the natives and outsiders. Physical places, such as a marketplace or a tea house, serve as mediums of interaction and reshape human behaviours and cognition. Likewise, the social, cultural, and intellectual spaces within the Yunnan borderlands contain middle grounds for negotiating and constructing identities and historical narratives. Therefore, while adopting White's theory, I intend to push the conversation further by treating the middle ground as a contingent and

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60 Giersch, Asian Borderlands, 7.
61 Guo Xiaoling, State and Ethnicity in China’s Southwest (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008), 68.
context-sensitive concept that continued to evolve in Yunnan from the 1850s to the 1910s. In other words, this book examines the conditions and uncertainties that accompanied various local-state relations, especially their alliances, which would affect the assessment of historical figures and events as well as the historiography in the long run. Nevertheless, when the politically and literarily dominant groups control the discourses of local history documentation and writing, they often push the middle ground to a minimum or nonexistence, leaving little or no room for negotiation and modification.

The framework of storytelling therefore becomes essential when examining local agency in the “regions of imperial rivalry” as well as the “zones of contact between intrusive and indigenous peoples” without a state-centric approach.63 James Scott’s concept of Zomia presents one model of idealistic, stateless, or runaway societies.64 Although conceptualising the power structure and hierarchy of the indigenous powers, theories of the mandala and galactic polities engage the perspectives of Hindu and Buddhist cosmologies and theologies to examine how the indigenous communities could affect the geopolitical and socioeconomic landscape that would be transformed to a certain type of modern state borderland. The concept of mandala, according to O. W. Wolters, denotes the radiation of religious, political, cultural, and economic control of a certain power from its centre to its peripheries, creating a loose, centralised structure and various levels of submission from smaller, satellite polities.65 Hence, a mandala power ushers its imperial dominance through its tributary polities, which challenges the possibility of having a fixed state territory and boundary. In fact, “the circle of kings” often overlaps at the margin of a mandala as its tributaries incline to “look in all directions for security” and give their allegiance to another or several other overlords in the region.66 Therefore, interweaving and shifting loyalty further complicates the “overlapping frontiers” of the mandala states.67

Stanley Tambiah derives the theory of galactic polity from Wolters’s analysis and builds a constellation structure to interpret the power structure

63 Giersch, Asian Borderlands, 4.
67 Winichakul, Siam Mapped, 100–101.
of traditional Southeast Asian kingdoms. From his perspective, the polities in the region existed as a cluster of decentralised units, which demonstrates the autonomy of the entities and their varied connection and allegiance to the power centre.68 David Atwill points out that Tambiah’s model presents “a closer approximation” of Yunnan’s “local reality.”69

These theories have influenced the formation of the theoretical framework of this book in conceptualising the power relations between the Yunnan borderlands and the state. The concepts of mandala and galactic polity shed new light on the state and borderlands as having a shifting, convertible spatial and territorial relationship. Therefore, the status of being peripheral, small, and weak is relative. The borderlands perceived by the state centre could otherwise exist as a space unbounded by the state’s territoriality, which includes the meaning, purposes, and function of the state (a designated physical space) as well as its social space.70 In other words, denizens of the borderlands could conceive of this space as a recipient of top-down enforcement with restrictions to local spatial relations.71 Moreover, these models also indicate the fluid and contingent nature of a state’s territoriality,

68 Tambiah’s characterisation of the “cosmological, topographical, and politico-economic features” of traditional Southeast Asian kingdoms is modelled on Muang (Meng), a Tai concept that integrates a centre-oriented space with peripheral, satellite domains. In this model, the political landscape encompasses a capital city as the power centre, some provinces as the sub-power centres, and the outer-ring, tributary states as independent kingdoms. See Tambiah, “Galactic Polity,” 503–34.

69 Challenging the assumption of a “steady and perpetual imperial presence” and highlighting the “prevailing autonomy of people and territories”, Atwill believes that Tambiah’s model, however, still “does little to acknowledge the perspective from the periphery and from the people who live there.” See David Atwill, The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856–1873 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 13–14.


which coincides with the nature of its borderlands. This understanding brings recognition to various local community centres and their dynamic relationships with each other and with dominant regional powers.

Inspired by a broad array of scholarships on Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas, this book reflects on the concept and nature of border and borderlands under the context of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Yunnan. I define border as a state political boundary and borderlands as an area proximate to the state border, which makes it a zone, perceived as the periphery by the political centre that claims jurisdiction over it. 72 This definition combines both natives’ and outsiders’, as well as the state-centred and local-oriented, perspectives, because borders and borderlands are shaped and created by forces from both sides. To certain degrees, borders are “social and political constructs” and “historically contingent.” 73 They cut off or realign existing local kinship, trade, religious, and political ties with state interests and agendas, turning newly acquired lands into the borderlands of a geopolitical unit. This book will not engage in a thorough discussion of the complicated and controversial process of modern China’s border demarcation. Rather, these definitions establish the framework to visualise the spatial relations that existed in the borderlands and across the state political boundaries, as well as to conceptualise how such relations become redefined and restricted by the state territory.

To create border and borderlands, whether conceptually or in reality, the state political centre transforms a certain space into a state territory and claims sovereignty over its land and people. To serve state interests, a certain space and its residents, as well as its spatial and social relations, are moulded in accordance with the state elites’ expectations about what the borderlands and local communities should be. However, all state and local actors in the borderlands have a different comprehension of the territoriality of the same geographic location due to their varied spatial and social relations. Therefore, as the territory of the borderlands is not exclusively associate with the state, its territoriality is also open to the interpretations of the nonstate and local actors. Hence, the reality of space sees overlapping and

72 In an examination of the India-China borderlands, Nimmi Kurian argues that the periphery or borderlands marks the outer limits of a state’s sovereignty and is a space that is “territorially organised, patrolled, enforced, and enclosed.” From a national perspective, a more “expansive and fluid frontier” existed as a zone whereas a state territorial border existed as a line. Nimmi Kurian, India-China Borderlands: Conversations Beyond the Centre (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2014), 6.

clashing territories that are imagined and claimed by individuals, groups, and the state.

In their nineteenth-century expansion and territorial acquisitions in Mainland Southeast Asia, the Europeans and the indigenous states clashed widely over their conceptions of boundary, territory, and territoriality. However, as the formation of state territory cuts off a designated land from its broader spatial context and relations, the process itself transforms a dynamic perception of spatiality into a more fixed, standardised notion of territoriality that can be utilised by the state. Because of that, whether by negotiation or force, local actors and the state had to settle their intrinsic discords in the process of borderland- and state-making, reaching temporary middle grounds and landmarks to bridge their different visions of spatiality and territoriality. Within this context, it is important to identify the heterogeneous nature of “the agents that enact state-led agendas ... even if the state itself is reified as unitary and fixed.”

When the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) initiated the process of creating agreements and protocols of modern European states, the empires and indigenous polities in East and Southeast Asia had little understanding, or a different understanding, of the factors that legitimise and define the modern, Western sense of nation states: sovereignty and demarcated borders. In the following centuries, the creation of state boundaries and “the need for territory” further became “a convenient intellectual justification” for the European conquest overseas. Consequently, the British and French aggression in Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century would extend the application of state political boundaries to their empires and challenge the traditional perception of territoriality of the Asian states and their border


77 Storey, Territories, 36; Nimmi, India-China Borderlands, 13–16.
communities. In the meantime, the European counterparts of imperial competition in the region, such as the Qing Empire, possessed their own view of imperial order and territorially that was composed of China Proper, the borderlands, and the tributary states. Therefore, the encounters of these dominant state actors gradually shifted the borderlands’ historiography into the discourse of state affairs, foreign diplomacy, and international relations. Consequently, discussions of borderlands could fall into a “territorial trap,” as argued by John Agnew, which considers states as “fixed units of sovereign space” and “containers” of power and society.  

Traditional interpretations of the modern Yunnan borderlands are, at times, bounded by a “territorial trap” when state policies and international diplomacy overshadow the necessity to explore people and events within their local context and networks. In other words, it is important to “locate each border within its own political, economic, social and cultural specificities.” After all, state territoriality designates only one model to construct power structures and spatial relations, which may fail to encompass other forms of spatial relations created by cross-border, transregional, or global connections. It is critical to understand that in the vast border regions of Indochina, local powers and elites also conceived of their own territories and territorialities. Thus, clashes ensued when the European, Qing, and local forces encountered each other in the Yunnan borderlands from the 1850s to the 1910s.

This book intends to describe the complexities of these exchanges that created the historical state spaces (or state territories) and the historical local spaces (or borderlands). Both state territory and borderlands are historical constructs. Therefore, Yunnan’s transformation from the 1850s to the 1910s laid the foundation for its future evolution into a “remote,” “isolated,” and “backward” Chinese frontier. This historical approach in examining the creation and interpretation of different perceptions of territorially in modern Yunnan’s context also follows Stuart Elden’s call to move beyond the territorial trap by engaging in “historical and conceptual examination of the term.” Moreover, to move beyond the “territorial trap,” it is necessary to challenge the binary of territorially associated with the common perception of borders. This conventional, top-down approach divides borderlands into domestic (within established boundaries) and international (beyond the

80 For other models of spatiality, see Agnew, *Hegemony*, 42.
boundaries), which reconstructs the nature of intrinsic as well as existing local ties and activities into that of transnational and cross-border ties. To the contrary, I emphasise that the concept of periphery is relative, and I therefore treat borderlands as separate centres of development that often influence regional, national, and even global history.

The Structure of the Book

This book has eight chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 1, “The Han Homelands in the Multi-Ethnic Qing Borderlands,” ties the international and state affairs that revolved around the British Sladen Mission and Augustus Margary back to the local actors in Upper Burma and Western Yunnan. This chapter contextualises the state agents who were involved in domestic and international affairs in the Yunnan-Burma borderlands from the 1850s to the 1870s. By examining their construction of Han lineage and homelands, this chapter aims to explicate how the state agents established their territorial and cultural dominance in China’s multi-ethnic frontier that would become the centre of imperial contest and internal rebellions in the mid-nineteenth century.

Chapter 2, “Investigating and Writing about the Margary Affair,” discusses how the local gentry’s role in borderlands consolidation and defence affected the decisions of Qing officials in Anglo-Chinese negotiations to settle the Margary Affair. This chapter also draws attention to the competing narratives documenting the Margary Affair since the late nineteenth century, which underscores the patriotism and contribution of different groups of state agents and civilians who countered the British.

Chapter 3, “From Bandits to Heroes,” moves the dialogue to how borderland officials in Guangxi and Yunnan weighed and manipulated their cooperation with non-traditional allies, including the French and Liu Yongfu. The Guangxi and Yunnan governments’ relationship with Liu and the French demonstrated the relativity of “ally” and “enemy” in different contexts and visions of domestic and borderland consolidation.

Chapter 4, ”The Imperial Agents in the Contested Realms,” explores the nuances behind Liu Yongfu’s transformation from a bandit and enemy of the Qing and Vietnamese states into a defender of Asian autonomy against French imperialism. While reflecting on the formation of the Qing-Liu Yongfu alliance, this chapter underscores Liu’s subtle position in the multilateral relations involving various state agents and state powers.

Chapter 5, “Documenting the Hui Rebellion and Genocide,” uses different sets of local historical documents to discusses how the discourse of Hui-Han division
had affected the documentation of the mid-century rebellions in Yunnan. This chapter presents the Hui collective memory of the shift of their status from the ally to the enemy of the state, which would bring profound impact on their financial status and affect the handling of their assets in the future.

Chapter 6, “Trading While Fighting,” explores the historical memory that reflected the structural changes to Yunnan’s commercial life and capital accumulation during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This chapter traces the roots of Hui social and economic inequality and the rise of military-merchants to the appropriation of Hui wealth and properties in the mid-nineteenth century. The chapter also provides the big picture of Yunnan’s prosperous transregional trade and the contribution of both civilian traders and military-merchants.

Chapter 7, “The Imperial Frontier and the Native Lands of Inheritance,” focuses on the reconstruction of Tai cawfa Dao Anren’s anti-British history in the late nineteenth century that had been initiated by local historians in Yunnan beginning in the 1980s. This chapter stresses that Dao’s stories and the rewriting of his history would be less meaningful without examining other local elites’ counter-British undertakings, which have been neglected by this reconstruction of Dao’s history.

Chapter 8, “Modernisation or Separatism? Competing Narratives of the Revolution,” continues to discuss the reconstruction of Dao Anren’s role in Sun Yat-sen’s revolution and the Tengyue Uprising in 1911. Paying attention to the power relationship between the Yunnan warlords and the gentry in western Yunnan, this chapter echoes chapter 1 and sheds light on how the Han-ethnic division affected power struggles within Tengyue as well as the writings of non-Han elites in China’s revolutions.

In sum, this book shows how local actors shaped the history of Yunnan through extensive cross-border networks and contradictory roles along with the attempted state consolidation of this contested area from the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth century. These state agents, both Han and ethnic as well as natives and outsiders, acted on the state’s behalf in the borderlands’ affairs while balancing the interests of the state and their own communities. While utilising and wrestling with the state authorities, they competed against each other and wrote about each other. The dynamic relationship between the state and local actors thus created another contested facet of modern Yunnan’s transformation. Competing narratives emerged when local actors negotiated and reconstructed their status within the contemporary Chinese nation-state. Bandits became heroes; separatists became patriots; and a vibrant regional centre became an isolated, exotic, and marginal province of the PRC.
1 The Han Homelands in the Multi-Ethnic Qing Borderlands

Abstract
Chapter 1 ties the international and state affairs that revolved around the British Sladen Mission and Augustus Margary back to the local actors in Upper Burma and Western Yunnan. The chapter contextualises the state agents who were involved in domestic and international affairs in the Yunnan-Burma borderlands from the 1850s to the 1870s. By examining their construction of Han lineage and homelands, the chapter aims to explicate how the state agents established their territorial and cultural dominance in China’s multiethnic frontier that would become the centre of imperial contest and internal rebellions in the mid-nineteenth century.

Keywords: the Sladen Mission; genealogy; gender roles; gentry; militia; rebellion

True, the big Chinese [the Qing government] are not against you, but it will be difficult to overcome all the evil which Burmans and Chinamen of Bhamo have done by misrepresentation, and more especially by making it so apparent that the Burmese Government is against you. Why did the Shans send back your presents? They are ready to oppose you if you go on. Lees-hee-ta-hee [Li Zhenguo] has received letters from Bhamo, and is determined to stop you. You ought to have given me the money I asked for. The Panthays may be your friends, but Lees-hee-ta-hee is very powerful, and is not only guided by Burmese advice, but receives supplies in money and arms from Bhamo. He visits that town sometimes, and his mother resides there. The Panthays are his enemies; but he is strong enough to be independent and to altogether disregard them.¹

¹ “Captain Sladen’s Report,” in Official Narrative of the Expedition to Explore the Trade Routes to China Via Bhamo (ONEETRCB) (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, 1870), 60.

In January 1868, Major Edward Bosc Sladen, the British Resident in Mandalay, led a mission (1868–1869) to penetrate Yunnan from Upper Burma, intending to search for trade routes and allies. Because of the Qing court’s reluctance to provide Britain access to the vast markets of southwestern China, the mission planned to open a “backdoor” to Yunnan with the cooperation of Du Wenxiu’s Dali Regime. King Mindon of Burma felt reluctant to support the British mission. Later, the Burmese officials in Bhamo, Sladen’s “steadiest opponents,” grounded the mission for over a month using many kinds of petty obstructions. As Sladen finally left for the Yunnan border town Tengyue (now Tengchong) that had been occupied by Dali’s army, Burmese officials in Bhamo pressed the Kachin headmen to stop the British. Worse, the notorious “robber chief” and “most dreaded leader” Li Zhenguo vowed to end Sladen’s mission.

Although Hui general Li Guolun in Tengyue uprooted Li Zhenguo’s bases in the Kachin Hills to clear a way for his potential trade partner, Sladen never reached Dali. He and General Li made promising trade agreements. While this trip enabled the British to identify their allies and enemies, it alerted the Chinese communities across the Yunnan-Burma borderlands to the increasing British threat to their political and economic interests. Li Zhenguo did not act alone or with only his own interests in mind as he sought to counter the Sladen Mission. He represented the Burmese officials as well as Chinese merchants and local gentry who wanted to deter British influence. Therefore, his obstruction was an expression of a long-term, fundamental conflict between British imperialism and its opponents in Upper Burma and Yunnan. As British expansion continued, more oppositions and clashes would eventually place Li Zhenguo and the local gentry at the centre of future Anglo-Chinese diplomatic exchanges. In early 1875, Li Zhenguo was accused of attacking a new British expedition led by Colonel Horace Browne and murdering Augustus Margary as they intended to survey potential trade and rail routes between Burma and Yunnan.

Li Zhenguo is a familiar name in the scholarship of the Margary Affair, though without in-depth explanation. Regarding the popular narratives...
of the Margary Affair, the Chinese accounts have generally noted that various ethnic groups united to fight against the British who had ruthlessly shot innocent civilians. Yang Mei provides a brief description the organisation and agenda of the British expedition and the settling of the incident. English-language historiography largely favours the discourse of state competition and diplomacy. Robert Nield’s recent treatment of the Margary Affair recognises accusations by the British that Li Zhenguo and Yunnan’s governor Cen Yuying were responsible for the incident but does not explore the matter further. Wang Shengzu’s earlier research examines the potential planners and executors of the attack, arguing that Li Zhenguo, Yunnan government officials, Kachin leaders, and the Burmese were possibly involved. Nevertheless, Wang focuses on international diplomacy and the Treaty of Chefoo and does not explore this argument in depth. In fact, few scholars have examined how local actors, their collaboration, and mass mobilisation may have affected the Margary Affair and its outcomes, and how Sino-British negotiations may have been affected by Qing officials’ concerns about protecting the local actors who had been defending the empire’s borderlands. In sum, an in-depth examination of Li Zhenguo and his fellow state agents is necessary, thus answering Elizabeth Chang’s call to focus more on “the complex network of local agents” than on “Margary’s actions and demise.”

5 I will analyse the popular Chinese narratives of the Margary Affair in the last section of this chapter.
6 Yang Mei, Jindai Yunnan xiwen wenxian (Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 2017), 16–18.
9 Chang’s account of the Margary Affair does not specifically expound on how local actors shaped the historical event. However, Chang emphasises that the interpretation of the affair should “hinge on a calculated and geographically specific British engagement with the complex network of local agents with more than a passing interest in Margary’s actions and demise.” See Elizabeth Chang, “The Life and Death and Life of Augustus Raymond Margary,” in Tribute and Trade: China and Global Modernity, 1784–1935, ed. William Christie, Angela Dunstan, and Q. S. Tong (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2020): 245.
This chapter ties international relations involving the Sladen Mission and the Margary Affair to the local actors of Upper Burma and Western Yunnan to contextualise the events in a borderland setting and from a bottom-up perspective. This chapter focuses on the state agents who represented their own and the state's interests in domestic and international affairs in the Qing Empire's border regions. This chapter also presents how the state agents shaped their homelands in Upper Burma and Yunnan, which had become the centre of imperial contests and internal rebellions beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. As a result, when Yunnan, a part of China's imperial territory, was splintered into the domains of local communities or sought after by other imperial powers, its territoriality demonstrated various possibilities. By focusing on the establishment of the Han homelands in China's multi-ethnic frontier, this chapter initiates the conversation about how complicated perceptions of territoriality and corresponding systems of spatial relations intersected and interacted in Yunnan. This chapter also continues Ma Jianxiong's dialogues on the meaning and construction of the Han identity group and the Han lineage, as well as how the spatial relations established on such a localised lineage sustained border/cross-border communities and their loyalty to the Chinese state.  

State and local actors possessed different visions of spatiality, the “property or condition of space.” They formed overlapping or competing institutions to create the desired spatial relations and to secure territorial control. Both cooperation and confrontation brought opportunities for various parties to achieve these goals. As presented in this chapter, the Han homelands in the Yunnan borderlands largely provided the foundation for the state to establish political, military, and economic influence and institutions. However, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this vast borderland saw other existing or emerging spatial relations that cooperated or competed with the Han homelands and Qing imperial territory. Therefore, the western Yunnan gentry's resistance to the Muslim rebellions and the British missions were parts of a broader opposition to competing spatial relations and alien territorialities. In the same border region, to govern their lands of inheritance, the Tai native officials also engaged in collaborative or competing territorial acquisitions with the state (chapters 7 and 8).

12 The state garrisons and colonies, as well as the local kinship, commercial, religious, and social networks, formed some major platforms of spatial relations that appeared in the borderlands.
The remote state peripheries were indeed the centres of local and even regional political, cultural, and economic development. This chapter begins a discussion about territorial competition and conflict while grounding these theories in local history.

**Loyalty to the Chinese State**

John Anderson, a member of the Sladen Mission, remembered that among all the oppositions the expedition encountered, Li Zhenguo (1827–1887) was “the most dreaded leader.” A “Burman Chinese,” Li was “a faithful officer of the old regime, who had established himself on the borders of Yunnan, and waged a guerrilla war against the Panthays and their friends.” The Tongmenghui and Kuomingtang (KMT) leader Li Genyuan (1879–1965) grew up knowing Li Zhenguo, who had fought the Muslim rebels with Genyuan's great-granduncle. The ancestors of Li Zhenguo and Li Genyuan served in the Qing army together, and Genyuan's father, Li Damao, a low-ranking Qing army officer, was under Zhenguo's command. Li Genyuan recorded that Li Zhenguo was born to a Chinese father and a Burmese mother, who was the aunt of a concubine of King Mindon. Li Genyuan admired Zhenguo for his contribution in resisting the Dali Regime, for killing Margary, and for his deep grief over the British annexation of Burma. Contrary to the British depictions of Li Zhenguo as bandit and a murderer, Li Genyuan's view of him represents a local yet popular nationalistic approach to interpreting his roles and the roles of his fellow gentry in border affairs: in pacifying rebels and deterring the British, they shared the same purpose of preserving their homeland, the Qing borderlands.

Simply put, the state’s border consolidation and the border dwellers’ homeland protection converged and formed a middle ground for both parties’ cooperation and competition. In the process of consolidating the borders, the state gained local allies and cultivated state agents by aiding the latter in restoring their homelands that had been destroyed or threatened by the rebels. Likewise, in defending their homes and communities, border inhabitants became state agents who were instrumental in the state's efforts to establish or strengthen territorial control. Therefore, as the state and the state agents utilised the other side’s efforts to fulfil their own needs, Li

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Zhenguo’s mixed Burmese and Chinese lineage did not seem to complicate his loyalty to both countries, especially his identification as a Chinese patriot. In fact, Li’s epitaph composed by local gentry in the late 1880s recorded that his ancestors came to Tengyue from Nanjing in the early Ming dynasty.

Similar to Li Zhenguo, elites and commoners in western Yunnan shared similar collective memories that recognised their status as state defenders and agents. Their ancestors might have joined the Yuan and especially the Ming campaigns led by General Mu Ying to enclose Yunnan. Then they stayed to govern, construct, and guard the new frontier, to be joined by more migrants who left China Proper to serve the state in the following centuries. Li Genyuan and other prominent Tengyue families adopted this narrative in their genealogy. Native to Xilin, Guangxi, Governor Cen Yuying of Yunnan linked his lineage to a Henan military leader in the early Eastern Han dynasty. His ancestors later settled in Zhejiang, and received imperial awards and titles as they joined General Di Qing to pacify the Nong Zhigao (Nungz Ciqgau) Rebellions in Guangxi during the Northern Song dynasty. In the 1870s, French merchant and explorer Jean Dupuis observed that Cen, a fierce “leader of the mountain people” and a man of the “Lolo tribe,” had become a “naturalised” Han Chinese. Han lineage was also common among the hereditary native officials or local military leaders in

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15 Jayde Lin Roberts observes that the self-identification of being Chinese was common among the Burmese Chinese and sometimes was even found among the Burmese. Roberts further contends that the self-understanding and self-presentation are adjustable values as the Chinese-Burmese adapt to changing political and economic environments. For them, maintaining and retrieving “aspects of their Chinese heritage” in various circumstances was “a way of living” instead of “a matter of expedience.” See Jayde Lin Roberts, Mapping Chinese Rangoon: Place and Nation among the Sino-Burmese (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2019), 12.


18 Li Genyuan wrote that his ancestor left Shandong and followed Mu Ying to Yunnan. See Yunnan Provincial Library (YPL) collection, Li Genyuan: Tengchong Dieshiuhei lishi beizhuanji-Tengchong Dieshiuhei lishi zuifu (1919). The Cun, Liu, Yin, and Jia clans in Tengyue found a common ancestry origin from the Sichuan Basin. See “Tengchong Cunshi zongpu” and “Heshun Liushi jiapu,” in Yun Baohua and A Weilai, Dali congshu-zupu pian (DLCS-ZP) (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2009), vol. 1: 6; 354–57; Ma Yong and Dai Yanzhi, “Tengchong Hanzu yimin,” 127.


western Yunnan. The Zuo clan in Menghua (now Weishan), whose current ethnic identification includes both Han and Yi,\(^{21}\) claims a controversial connection\(^ {22}\) to Yuan imperial official Zuo Zhengzi, a native of Ji’an, Jiangxi, with offspring who continued to govern the area during the Ming and Qing eras.\(^ {23}\) The ancestor of the Tai cawfa of Ganya was a Nanjing officer named Hao Zhongguo, whose son inherited his post to govern Ganya and, according to their family history records, was granted the new surname of Dao by the Ming court.\(^ {24}\) Close to Ganya, some Kachin and Tai clans in Zhanxi also traced their roots to Han ancestors.\(^ {25}\)

Among ordinary civilians, the Duan families in western Yunnan have two popular ancestral lineages. Their ancestors could be the eighth-century migrants who later ruled the Dali Kingdom or those who moved from Anhui to Nanjing, followed Ming General Mu Ying to Yunnan, and eventually settled in Tengyue and Heqing. Duan Liben (1903–1996) was born in Heqing, with a fraternal grandmother who was a Tibetan from Zhongdian (now Shangri-La). At sixteen, he walked for a week to reach Dali and became an apprentice at a small grocery shop. Later, he was converted to Christianity when he married Qian Lixian (1909–1990), a young Christian woman whose ancestors were Hui. When he began working on his genealogy in the 1970s, he identified himself as Han and traced his original roots to Duangan Mu (475–396 BC), a student of Kongzi’s disciple Zixia, who served the Marquess Wen of Wei (472–396 BC). He also discovered that his ancestors in Nanjing followed Mu Ying to Yunnan.\(^ {26}\)

In these family stories, military and state relocation, especially since the late fourteenth century, had gradually transformed the land of the

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non-Han people to the homeland of the Han whose ancestors came from China Proper. Some of them had become indigenised and adopted non-Han customs; however, they still talked about their Han ancestors. Ma Jianxiong observes that while some Han settlers adopted non-Han identities, such as Luohei (known as Lahu) and Wa, “indigenous residents also changed to identify themselves as Han.” Christian Daniels also points out that the credibility of a Han lineage should be carefully evaluated with the corroboration of further historical sources, because there were many native officials in Yunnan who claimed a Han ancestry. After all, being Han promised a better chance of stability and upward social mobility in a Han-dominant empire, especially after the Song dynasty. Han surnames and even prominent Han ancestors thus were widely adopted by the elites and commoners in China’s vast imperial frontier. In Yunnan, Han identity was localised and became “a type of native identity” by the nineteenth century. Over time, for the local population, the term Yunnanese, which is associated with Yunnan, a territorial definition imposed by the state,

27 Heshun village in Tengyue had been transformed from the land of the Puman (the Pu barbarians in Chinese or known as the Wa people) to a homeland of the Han migrants from Sichuan, Hunan, and Nanjing. Yin Wenhe, Yunnan Heshun qiaoxiangshi gaishu (Kunming: Yunnan meishu chubanshe, 2003), 4.
29 Daniels points out that in 1950 and 1983, Jiang Yingliang had made observations on the Tai native officials’ or ethnic groups’ potential fabrication of their Han lineage. See Tang Li (Christian Daniels), “Tuliu jianzhi diquzhong de tuguan shizheng,” 38.
30 Existing ethnic inequalities especially motivated the elites in China’s ethnic frontier to claim a Han lineage for reasons such as achieving higher social status, surviving ethnic conflicts, receiving mutual assistance, and benefiting from commercial networking. See Ma Yong and Dai Yanzi, “Tengchong Hanzu yimin,” 128–29; Wang Mingke, Huaxia bianyuan: Lishi jiyi yu zuqun rentong (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2006), 51–52.
31 Wang Mingke, Huaxia bianyuan, 51–52.
33 In classic Chinese documents, Yunnan appeared as Dian, Yelang, Xicuan, Ailao, Kunming, Jianwei, Yuexi, Yizhou, Zangke, Yeyu, Gufu, Longdong, Dianchi, Yongchang, Nanzhao, and Dali. These terms were the names of both indigenous polities and Chinese administrative units, partially or completely occupying the territory of current Yunnan. The term Yunnan appeared when Zhuge Liang established a Yunnan Prefecture in Xiangyun in 225. After the Han period, frequent wars accompanied the Chinese state’s consistent effort to govern Yunnan. The Song rulers gave up state political control of Yunnan and excluded it from the imperial territory. See Xia Guannan, Zhong-Yin-Mian dao jiaotongshi (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1948), Prologue by Jin Longzhang, 11–12, 14, 19–21, 26. Yang Bin argues that despite the state’s ambition to enclose Yunnan, it did not become a part of China until the Mongol conquest in 1253 and the concepts of Yunnan and Yunnanese did not appear until the Yuan-Ming eras. Yang observes that the term Yunnan was originally a Chinese phrase and a “Han invention that was imposed upon local peoples and their land.” The indigenous population did not consider themselves as Yunnanese
thus “often referred to the people who defined themselves as Han Chinese” in the Yunnan-Burma borderlands.34

The process of creating the Han homelands in Yunnan found similarities in the civilising project in Xinjiang conducted by the Xiang (Hunan) Army later in the nineteenth century, with schools and institutions designed to assimilate and educate the non-Han residents.35 From the late fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries, four Confucian academies operated in Yongchang (now Baoshan), despite their temporary destruction during the Muslim rebellions.36 To civilise the “barbarians,” northeastern Yunnan opened sixty-one Yixue (or charitable schools) during the mid-Qing era.37 In southern Yunnan, three Yixue were founded in Yibang, Jinghong, and Mengzhe in 1737.38 By 1746, over 700 Yixue had been built throughout Yunnan.39 In fact, Yunnan’s Yixue would inspire Xiang army leader Zuo Zongtang to organise schools in Xinjiang to “Confucianize Muslim families through education.”40 Through military relocation from China Proper to Yunnan and to Xinjiang, the Han migrant society initiated the process of dominating the non-Han majority in modern China’s border regions.41

Over time, the Han identity and lineage that connected to the Han homelands in China Proper became essential in perceiving the settlers’ respected or even legitimate social and political status in the context of state expansion and the corresponding transformation of a new territory because “to be

37 Pan Xianlin and Pan Xianyin, “Gaitu guiliu yilai Dian Chuan Qian jiaoqie diqu Yi Zu shehui de fazhan bianhua,” Journal of Yunnan Nationalities University (Social Sciences Edition), vol. 4 (1997): 37–43. The translation of Yixue adopts the same translation as Yishu that is found in Schluessel, Land of Strangers, 93.
38 Guan Kairong and Wang Jianjun, Xishuangbanna Dai Zu zizhizhou jiaoyuzhi (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1998), 13, 46.
39 Pan Xianlin and Pan Xianyin, “Dian Chuan Qian jiaoqie diqu Yi Zu shehui de fazhan bianhua,” 37–43.
40 Schluessel, Land of Strangers, 93. For this argument, Schluessel also refers to the same argument in his book chapter titled “Language and the State in Late Qing Xinjiang,” in Historiography and Nation-Building among Turkic Populations, ed. Birgit Schlyter (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 2014).
41 Schluessel, Land of Strangers, 5.
Han meant having a different life style, as well as an identity distinct from neighbouring groups.42 Further, the common Han lineage and corresponding spatial relations, especially trade networks, would continue to grow and “link the two sides of Yunnan and Burma”43 as well as provide a long-term and broad platform for the construction of compatible collective identities. As the Duans settled across western Yunnan, they began migrating to Burma during the Ming period, as political sojourners, merchants, labourers, and war refugees. In this process, they developed other collective identities in addition to the Han or Chinese,44 and their connections expanded across the border. Through marriage, the Duans in Heqing were linked to the Shu clan that had developed over one hundred branches with thousands of family members by the 1860s. Numerous merchants from the Shu clan established transregional corporations such as Xingshenghe (chapter 6). As their business prospered, the Shus spread across western Yunnan, inner China, Burma, Thailand, and Singapore.45

The Duans in Burma and Tengyue remained in touch from the 1940s to the 1980s. They had been planning to compile a complete genealogy that would link all the Duans across the border. The Duans in Burma organised an area family association in Lashio in 1976 and a national (Burma) association in Mandalay in 1980.46 Duan Huaichen then began to compile the genealogy of the Duan clans in Burma, intending to trace their ancestral roots and fulfil their social responsibility of upholding the “way” as well as the moral traditions of the Chinese nation.47 This new genealogy, released in 1985, identified Duan Yin, who left Nanjing to guard the Ming borderlands of Yunnan, as the common ancestor for the Duans in Burma.48 The Shus in Burma also contacted the Shus in Heqing and requested to be reconnected to the family genealogy that was compiled beginning in 1900. In 1998, the newly revised Yunnan Heqing Shushi zupu (Genealogy of the Shu Clans of Heqing) included family members outside China and identified a more recent ancestor who settled in Heqing in 1566. Shushi zupu also recognised

43 Ibid.
44 “Miandian Duanshi shipu,” in DLCS-ZP, vol. 4: 2427–32. In addition to the Duans who were identified as Minjia, they mingled with other ethnic groups. Some of them settled in the northern Shan states received the titles of saopha from the Burmese court for their contribution in the Burmese campaigns in Siam and the wars with the Qing Empire. “Miandian Duanshi shipu,” 2443, 2449.
45 Shu Ziyi, Yunnan Heqing Shushi zupu (SSZP) (printed in 2006), 429, 481.
48 Ibid., 2433–34.
an earlier ancestor named Gaotao, who was the great-grandson of the Yellow Emperor. Nevertheless, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, some Shu clan members incorporated other ethnic groups, such as the Naxi, and had been identified as Minjia.49

Therefore, whether for natives of or newcomers to Yunnan, many of their genealogies demonstrated a phenomenon of “genealogical amnesia,” an unavoidable and yet necessary step in forming a collective family memory. Such manipulations reorganise the past to explain the current position and role of a family group.50 The construction of the Han lineage, kinship, and spatial memories created a complicated Han identity for various practical needs. Han origins could represent a pragmatic strategy for both Han and non-Han to adapt to frontier life with increasing state influence and ethnic distinctions. Hence, family and local history created new types of identities and social connections, with the purpose of seeking the acceptance and recognition of the dominant Han elites and the state power they represented and associated with. From this perspective, it was not surprising that genealogies and gazetteers often followed certain “structures” that standardised the pattern and established the expectations for the creators to foster their practical relationship with the state51 and with each other. Consequently, those who claimed to be Han bore the obligation to sustain and defend the Han communities in the frontier that was also settled by competing, non-Han groups.

Li Zhenguo and his fellow gentry in western Yunnan fulfilled these obligations and expectations. They assisted the Qing government’s restoration of

49 SSZP, 2–4, 9–11; local scholars have identified that prominent merchant Shu Jinhe was ethnically Bai (Minjia), see Cun Lixiang, Baizu renwu jianzhi (Beijing: Zhongguo minzu sheying chubanshe, 2009), 69. Shu Zirong recently confirmed that his family came from the Han lineage of the Shu clan. He recognised that the men from his generation (thirteenth generation) to the ninth generation were all Han, although his grandfather Su Yuliang married a Naxi woman. In the meantime, Tan Chengqi, a descendent of the Shu clan, also confirmed that Shu Jinhe was a Minjia. Phone interviews with Shu Zirong and Tan Chengqi, on August 22, 2022.

50 Wang Mingke, Huaxia bianyuan, 85, 98. John Arundel Barnes stresses the phenomenon of structural amnesia regarding those forgotten people “who have become unimportant in the social structure, or who never attained importance.” A type of structural amnesia is seen in Philip Hugh Gulliver’s research on Jie people’s selective memory of their ancestors in Uganda. Hildred Geertz and Clifford Geertz argue that in the idealised lineage system “genealogies may conflict, individuals may forget, ignore, or manufacture ties, and lineage-clan systems reach varying levels of articulateness.” John Arundel Barnes, “The Collection of Genealogies,” Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, no. 5 (1947): 49, 52; Philip Hugh Gulliver, The Family Herds: A Study of Two Pastoral Tribes in East Africa, the Jie and Turkana (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1955), 113; Hildred Geertz and Clifford Geertz, Kinship in Bali (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 85.

51 Wang Mingke, Huaxia bianyuan, 395.
Tengyue in 1873 when the standing army, a total of 2,601 troops, was stationed in the city again.\textsuperscript{52} They showed strong loyalty to the Qing Empire that preserved their homeland that nurtured a local, Han-dominant collective identity and social order. Most of these gentry were Ming loyalists who then became Qing state agents that assisted the consolidation of the empire’s periphery. Their dominions were further strengthened and extended through the policy of \textit{gaitu guiliu} that undermined the native officials, their local rivals. In fact, “they did not care very much about which states they should support,” as argued by Ma Jianxiong, for they focused more on territorial control, economic exploitation of the non-Han people, and “new commercial opportunities.”\textsuperscript{53} Over time, these gentry and their interdependent relationship with the Qing government followed a pattern observed by Philip Kuhn:

Thus the Chinese state, along with its Manchu overlords, was enabled to survive because significant segments of the elite identified the dynasty’s interests with their own and took the lead in suppressing the dynasty’s domestic enemies.\textsuperscript{54}

The shared efforts and memory of pacifying the Muslim rebellions and protecting their homes further united various clans across the Yunnan borderlands. Due to the incompetence of the state government, gentries in Yunnan trained militias and attended to local affairs with increasing financial expenses that prompted them to enlarge their economic control.\textsuperscript{55} In Heqing, Duan Yunjin, a \textit{jinshi}, and his fellowmen died in the battles against the Hui rebels at the northwestern corner of the city.\textsuperscript{56} Hence, the civilians in Heqing kept the tradition of holding an annual memorial service on the twentieth-fourth day of the twelfth month.\textsuperscript{57} In Dali, young scholar Zhao Fan, a descendent of Prince Zhao Dezhao (951–979) of the Northern Song

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{52} Chen Zonghai and Zhao Duanli, \textit{Tengyue tingzhi (TYTZ)} (1887), vol. 11, wubeizhi 1, yingzhi, 5; Li Genyuan and Liu Chuxiang, ed., \textit{Minguo Tengchong xianzhigao (MGTCXZG)} (Kunming: Yunnan meishu chubanshe, 2004), 190.
\bibitem{53} Ma Jianxiong, “Gentry Power,” 47.
\bibitem{55} Ma Jianxiong, “Gentry Power,” 39.
\bibitem{56} Duan Liben vaguely recorded that the battle occurred during Emperor Xianfeng’s rule. According to \textit{Heqing xianzhi}, Heqing fell into the hands of the Hui rebels in 1860, which was the tenth year of Xianfeng’s reign. Therefore, it is highly likely that Duan Yunjin died in the battle before Heqing’s fall in 1860. Duan Liben, \textit{Family History Notes}; Yang Jinkai, \textit{Minguo Heqing xianzhi}, ed. Gao Jinhe (Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 2016), 159.
\bibitem{57} Duan Liben, \textit{Family History Notes}.
\end{thebibliography}
dynasty, had been leading a fierce militia force since 1868 to counter the Dali Regime. In Menghua, Zuo Qingnian, who held a hereditary military position, died in the confrontations with the Hui troops in the autumn of 1858. In Tengyue, Cun Huaiquan, a militia officer, fought the Hui rebels under Liu Guanghuan’s command. His son later joined the Qing military and pacified the rebellions in Zhanxi. Cun Lücuí and Cun Chaoyuan were merchants who traded in Burma, and both claimed the status of jiansheng, students of Guozijian (the Imperial Academy). They either joined or funded the militia to counter the Hui army. The Duans in Burma further recorded that at least five of their clansmen in Tengyue and Longling had died in war during the Qing era.

Hence, the collective memory of state and home defence was formed as the state agents transformed a space far away from the state political centre into both the imperial frontier (the state territory) and their homeland (their own territory), giving the land a unique spatiality that balanced their obligations to the state and their own communities. This process also conformed to the Confucian teaching that a noble man would fulfil his duties as a loyal subject of the emperor and a filial son. On the other hand, cultivating the borderlands’ spatiality could be a long-term project. Anssi Paasi argues that to create spatiality, individuals and groups participate in spatial socialisation “as members of specific territoriality bounded spatial entities.” From these interactions, both physically and intellectually, collective territorial identities and traditions are internalised and shared. While some platforms of spatial socialisation overlapped and collaborated to reinforce common or similar group identities and pursuits, others confronted and undermined each other. In nineteenth- and twentieth-century Yunnan, genealogy compilation, ancestorial veneration, associations, and local gazetteer writing nurtured a sense of “us” and “others,” tying spatial

60 “Tengchong Cunshi zongpu,” 19.
61 More Duan clan members sacrificed their lives during WWII. “Miandian Duanshi shipu,” vol. 4, 2436.
63 For instance, nationalism, religious institutions, political parties are common channels of spatial socialisation. These platforms also come with specific ideologies, intellectual and cultural discourses, as well as territorial demands that unite or alienate people. Ibid.
relations to collective identities, socioeconomic control, cultural hegemony, and territorial demands. These forms of spatial socialisation fostered and maintained familial territorial, social, and economic control, which generated more forms of spatial socialisation, such as folk religious temples and merchant associations, that would expand the outreach of the Han collective identity and the scale of the Han homeland.

Genealogy, for example, often contains information about government titles and positions, marriage connections, family laws, and sites of ancestral temples and cemeteries, as well as the possession, transaction, and boundary of family properties. Ma Jianxiong argues that genealogy compilation, especially for the Han in southern China, “provided the mechanisms whereby communities organised for the purposes of religious worship, controlling property, education, social relief, defence, and interaction with the imperial state.” Therefore, the construction of genealogy would attach a sense of belonging and loyalty to the land, forming a core family or clan territory. In the meantime, temples, family associations, and business entities extended the breadth of social and economic control beyond the core territory. These platforms further connected

64 Chen Jianhua argues that a straightforward emphasis of practicality and functionality is more apparent in the Chinese genealogy compilation than any other Chinese historical documents. Almost every record of family history during the Ming-Qing era indicated the purpose and motivation for its compilation. Instead of documenting the real situation, creators of family history usually prioritised genealogy’s practical functions, such as expanding kinship ties and social control. See Chen Jianhua, “Song yilai sixiu jiapu de gongneng yu xuanziu tili,” in Zhongguo pudie yanjiu: quanguo pudie kaifa yu liyong xueshu yantaohui lunwenji, ed. Wang Heming, Ma Yuanliang, Wang Shiwei (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1999), 108–9. According to Joseph Dennis, local gazetteer compilation often involved intellectuals who were connected by kinship ties, which turned local history writing into projects that produced “public genealogy” of the creators’ extended families. The composition of local gazetteers often adopted the framework of genealogy and family records, which blurred the line between local history and genealogy. In the meantime, the process of gazetteer writing intentionally or inadvertently confirmed or sustained the leadership of the elite groups in local affairs, which indicated that the compilation of local gazetteers was also a strategy for the formation and expansion of the local gentry group as well as elevating their social status. See Joseph Dennis, Writing, Publishing, and Reading Local Gazetteers in Imperial China, 1100–1700 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 64–67 and “Gazetteer Writing as Strategic Act: The Private Purpose of the Wanli Xinchang Xian Zhi,” in Zhongguo zupu difangzhi yanjiu, ed. Sha Qimin and Qian Zhengmin (Shanghai: Shanghai kexue jishu wenxian chubanshe, 2003), 243, 257.

65 Ma Jianxiong points out that the “lineage corporations displayed significant characteristics of merchants’ networks along the transportation routes between Yunnan and Burma.” See Ma, “Gentry Power,” 29.


67 Ma Jianxiong, “Introduction: Hui Communities from the Ming to the Qing,” 1.
individuals and families, especially the emigrants, to common ancestors, native places, cultural roots, and even the state. Despite the uncertainties of individual choices, mobilisation to cultivate and defend a Han-dominant and Confucianism-centred homeland could transcend space and time as loyalty to Han identity and the Chinese state became inseparable from a collective identification. In other words, various transregional ties based on the construction of Han lineage tied the Chinese communities across the border (overseas), on the frontier, and within the inland.

Scholars have pointed out that the Yunnanese merchants in Burma especially cultivated and maintained their distinct Chinese identities by centring their socialisation around their native place and commercial associations as well as their Buddhist and folk religious temples. Their influence continued to increase as they cooperated with emigrants from other parts of China in commercial interests and community needs. Some of them worked for the Burmese government and married Burmese women; however, they often sent their sons back to Yunnan to receive a classical education and take the imperial examination. The Tengyue migrants were united. They took pride in maintaining their traditions and customs when they mingled with other residents in Burma. They took great care in home-schooling their children and teaching them how to run a successful business. They clung to Chinese morals and ethics, believing that they were the most righteous group that was still faithful to Confucian teachings and thus had not been corrupted. Consistent ties with their homeland in China

68 The temples and associations expanded members’ ties to a wide range of associates and partners outside of their homestead or native country, breaking through and challenging the traditional perception of state boundaries. In other words, spatial socialisation performed by various agents such as merchants, native officials, religious groups, and revolutionaries would establish domestic and transnational ties and social spaces. These cross-border entities compressed space and breached the boundary of state and local administrative units. See Thomas Faist, The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). For more on the spatial socialisation of the Chinese and Yunnanese emigrants in Burma, including their commercial activities, see Yin Wenhe, Heshun qiaoxiangshi, 20–21, 59–60. Also see Chen Yi-sein, Miandian Huaqiao shilüe, 89, 100–108; Li Yi, Chinese in Colonial Burma: A Migrant Community in A Multiethnic State (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 34–44; Ma Jianxiong, “Gentry Power.”

69 The influence of Yunnan’s emigrants continued to increase in Burma in the early twentieth century. Their connection with other Chinese migrants’ associations revealed that cooperation and integration within the Chinese merchant community had overcome the boundaries defined by city, native place, and family line. See C. Patterson Giersch, Corporate Conquests: Business, the State, and the Origins of Ethnic Inequality in Southwest China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020), 81–82, Kindle.

70 “Miandian Duanshi shipu,” 2436.
and the government authorities enabled the Yunnanese emigrants in Burma to serve the Chinese state. The migrants from Heshun village, a famous Han homeland in Tengyue, had mostly settled Mandalay, Ava, and Bhamo. Some merchants from Heshun spied on British activities and gathered intelligence for the Yunnan provincial government in the late 1890s.

In the same way that familial networks and institutions functioned for their counterparts in the Lower Yangzi Delta, the gentry in western Yunnan maintained the traditions their ancestors had brought from China Proper, the basis for their group identification. In the mid-nineteenth century, when rebellions shook the foundation of state control, they continued to dedicate their native places to the traditional Han cultural values that were anchored in Confucianism. They kept genealogies that traced their roots to China Proper and maintained the social connections to their Han peers. They settled in Han-dominant villages, towns, and garrisons with temples, schools, stone archways, and traditions that commemorated righteous men and chaste women. They restricted marriage relations with non-Han groups, considering themselves and their communities as beacons of civilisation on the barbaric frontier. They instrumentalised kinship, native place, and commercial networks to maintain control of political and economic resources, with institutions that were not always systematically organised but could transcend the clan and state boundaries. They profoundly transformed parts of the imperial borderlands into their homeland, shaping parts of state territory into their community territory.

Righteous Men and Virtuous Women

On November 9, 1885, during the Third Anglo-Burmese War, Li Genyuan and his father, Li Damao, were visiting Li Zhenguo’s residence. Li Genyuan remembered seeing stars falling from the sky, a bad omen. Li Zhenguo

71 Yin Wenhe, Heshun qiaoxiangshi, 20.
72 See more details in chapter 7. Li Yi’s Chinese in Colonial Burma (39–40) and Yin Wenhe’s Yunnan Heshun qiaoxiangshi (192–97) both mentioned the intelligence that Zhang Chenglian and his brother Zhang Chengyu collected for the Qing government in the 1880s and 1890s. An earlier account on the Zhang brothers is also found in Qing official Yao Wendong’s Yunnan kanjie choubianji (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1967).
wanted to fight the British in Burma. However, Yunnan’s governor-general, Cen Yuying, who had been focusing on the battlefields in Vietnam, forbade him from doing so. Three years later, according to Li Genyuan, Li Zhenguo passed away due to severe distress caused by the British annexation of Burma and was buried by Genyuan and Li Damao in the Laifeng Mountain in Tengyue. Li Zhenguo’s epitaph, drafted by the local gentry in 1888, describes him as an extremely intelligent and valiant man who was dedicated to martial arts because of his desire to serve the country like the Han dynasty general Ban Chao. His wife and daughters were killed in the Muslim rebellions. The “bandits” abducted his son and raised him as their own. To defend his country and avenge his family, Li gathered brave men and intelligent intellectuals and held the banner of resistance. He won the support of the Burmese king and the native officials, who provided him with money, supplies, and troops. Later, he officially joined the Qing army and eventually received the title of Baturu (meaning warrior in Manchu) from Beijing. His son also returned home with his grandchildren. With the glorious award from the Qing emperor and the reunion of his lost family, the epitaph narrated Li’s happy ending that a noble Confucian man deserved.

The stories of Li Zhenguo and the gentry in western Yunnan were largely recorded in the genealogies, epigraphs, personal papers, and gazetteers that were mostly compiled by the gentry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. From the 1870s to the 1940s, the collective memories of righteous men and virtuous women in the local genealogies and gazetteers of Yunnan reinforced a Confucian-oriented social and cultural order. Along with the fall of Dali in 1873, the gentry widely wrote about the restoration of their homeland and their contribution to the state borderland consolidation. After the collapse of the Manchu Empire in the 1910s, they further emphasised their loyalty to the Chinese state as well as to the Confucian and Han values and traditions in their life and family history. These historical documents and their manifestation of Han cultural hegemony maintained the local gentry’s political solidarity as the Qing government failed to counter internal rebellions and foreign encroachment. Through their writings, the gentry reported that they had been upholding Confucian values throughout the struggles to keep and expand the imperial frontier.

75 XSNL, 37, 38–39.
76 The Qing royal edict granted Li the title of Baturu in the autumn of 1874 and assigned him to take charge of the Burmese king’s plan to send elephants to China as tribute. See Li Genyuan and Liu Chuxiang, ed., Yongchangfu wenzheng (YCFWZ) (Kunming: Yunnan meishu chubanshe, 2001), vol. 3: 2558; “Li Zhenguo muzhi,” 837–39.
their own homeland. Therefore, family lineage, spatial relations, and the historical interpretations of these essential aspects of identity and memory construction would define and maintain the complicated territorialities attached to the Yunnan borderlands.

In comparison to the prose and poetries of local geography, topography, and scenery, stories of respected individuals formed their own genre within local historical composition. Despite its convenience in preserving and sharing its content, biography composition in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Yunnan also showcased certain families’ prestige, value judgement, expansive social connections, and control of cultural discourses. These biographies usually adopted a similar and standardised method of composition that recorded the individuals’ lineage, education, personality, reputation, family background, and notable family members. The authors of these biographies focused on individuals’ challenges, choices, and sacrifices to fulfil their duties to their family and country. The original biography, such as an epitaph, usually laid the basic tone and foundation for the writings about the individual. Many future biographies on the same individual would quote or even duplicate the narrative, rhetoric, and value judgement of the original biography.

Biographies were normally written by family members, close friends, and local officials and intellectuals. Some families sought essays and poems from renowned scholars and officials in the country to commemorate their family members. Sometimes, famous artists were invited to write the title or preface of the genealogy or to engrave epitaphs. These biographies were often included in genealogies, inscriptions in family temples, and local gazetteers. Some local gazetteers might simply adopt the biographies in existing genealogy records. For instance, the gazetteers of Tengyue that were compiled from the 1880s to the 1940s included many biographies from Li Genyuan’s genealogy. Over time, the interpretation of certain individuals, clans, and related historical events had become largely homogenised, consistent with the local gentry’s recognition and value judgements.

The attributes of loyalty, filial piety, and female chastity were commemorated in genealogies and local gazetteers in Yunnan. These qualities were the focus of the Chinese genealogies at large, especially during the Ming-Qing periods. Confucianism had a profound influence on the format of Chinese genealogies, and the family records compiled after the

77 However, as found in the genealogies of many Han families in Tengyue, fabricated records regarding the ancestry origins or migration history also served the needs of roots tracing and creating collective memory. Ma Yong and Dai Yanzhi, “Tengchong Hanzu,” 128.
fifteenth century especially utilised their social function to establish orders and manage expanding families and clans. 

Therefore, the existence of righteous men and virtuous women in Yunnan manifested generations’ faithful commitment to keep the Han traditions, Confucian teachings, and the social control ushered in by related institutions. In addition, when outside authorities joined the commemoration and celebration of a frontier family through a royal decree to award a chaste woman or a eulogy written by a non-Yunnanese scholar, it elevated this exceptional individual in the borderlands to a nationwide example. These individuals and their families therefore became the beacons of Han civilisation on the ethnic frontier. Their homeland in the borderlands not only symbolised state control but also signified the vigour and superiority of their Han lineage and culture. Their ties and identification to their kin in China Proper was further justified by their collective memory, ancestral roots, and cultural bonds as the offspring of Han migrants.

Li Genyuan’s ancestors migrated to Yunnan from Shandong around 1381 and settled by the Dieshui River in Tengyue. In 1792, Li Yingzhang compiled the first genealogical record of his family and Li Damao, Genyuan’s father, continued the project. Following an introduction, Li Yingzhang presented Ming Emperor Hongwu’s decree that granted the Li family hereditary military positions in Yunnan in 1396. The main text of this 1792 edition of the genealogy included *Shiguanji* (Book of the Officials), focusing on prominent men, and *Xiandeji* (Book of the Virtuous), with stories of both noble men and women. Li Genyuan had followed this format prior to 1911 and began organising a new edition of the genealogy. He invited famous figures such as intellectuals and officials to compose multiple prefaces for his new edition. Based on Li Damao’s narration, Li expanded *Shiguanji* to his grandparents’ generation. He consulted some records in the 1887 edition of *Tengyue tingzhi* (Gazetteer of the Tengyue Sub-prefecture) and corrected some discrepancies. He clarified that instead of including all the Li clans in Tengyue and other parts of western Yunnan, his edition focused only on the branch of the Dieshui River. He made a special note on his lineage potentially tracing to the Tang royalty. However, with no records in the Tang royal house’s genealogies in Yunnan since the Ming period, Li did not intend to publicise this connection for vanity or status.

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79 Ma Yong and Dai Yanzhi, “Tengchong Hanzu,” 130.
In the following decades, Li Genyuan continued to update and expand the content of the old genealogy book to contain the biographies, epitaphs, and funeral eulogies of the recent generations of the Li family. The contributors to the new edition included nationally renowned scholars, calligraphers, artists, and politicians. Among those who wrote the prefaces for this edition were the Tongmenghui leader Huang Xing, politician Sun Guangting, late Qing and early Republican official Chen Rongchang, late Qing scholar and educator Yang Qiong, and Zhao Fan, one of Li’s mentors who once served as Governor-General Cen Yuying’s counsellor. They sent prose tributes and poems to honour Li’s ancestors and to mourn his parents. They praised Li family traditions and teachings. They also inscribed the collection titles and cover pages and created rubbings from the tombstones and steles.

Therefore, from the early 1900s to the late 1920s, the compilation of the Li family genealogy and collections had become a platform for the local and national elites to socialise and validate each other’s social status and cultural beliefs. This process saw the nationwide collaboration of elites in constructing Han identity in the borderlands as well as in a country that had been transitioning from a traditional empire to a modern nation-state. The family history of Li Genyuan and other local gentry demonstrated that the Han settlers in the borderlands were equally loyal to Han identity and Chinese state, making no less of a contribution than their counterparts in China Proper. Such an emphasis reckoned with the Han ethnocentrism that had prevailed among the Chinese revolutionaries since the late Qing era.

More than ten generations of the Li family had served the Ming Empire before they served the Qing Empire. Two of Li Genyuan’s great-granduncles died in the Muslim rebellions, as did his grandfather and six granduncles. Li Genyuan’s great-grandfather died at a young age, and his great-granduncle Li Guoke had been fighting the rebels since 1857. Under Li Guoke’s command, the Li clan guarded their base in Nandian. The infamous robber chief Li Zhenguo in the British literature was Li Guoke’s subordinate, though there is no proof of their immediate kinship. Li Genyuan’s grandfather Li Dianqiong was severely wounded in the spring of 1859 in a battle against the rebel army.

81 YPL, Tengchong lishi beizhi wuzhong and Tengchong Dieshuihe lishi jiapu. See also, Tengchong Dieshuihe Lishi jiapu, vol. 24: 89–268.
83 TCDSHLSJP, 117–19.
84 “Tengyue Li Cailiu xiansheng mubei,” in TCDSHLSJP, 153.
and he died in the summer of 1860, leaving two sons, Damao (age five) and Dayin (age three), and his wife, Huang Runsan (age twenty-nine).\textsuperscript{85} Huang Runsan’s epitaph traced her ancestors to Hunan and recorded the life of a filial and loving woman who was accomplished in the Chinese classics. After the death of her husband, Huang cut her hair to show her determination to raise the children on her own.\textsuperscript{86} In late 1862, the Li clan was dispersed as the Muslim army overtook Tengyue and Nandian. Great-granduncle Li Guoke sought refuge in Hexi (the west bank) and depended on Li Zhengu. In 1864, he died of an illness as Li Zhengu’s force withdrew to Ganya to escape the rebels’ assaults. Huang and her two sons also drifted to Hexi for a while and then to other places across Tengyue.\textsuperscript{87} Huang’s epitaph further described the sacrifices she had made to rear two sons during wartime. With her meagre income from doing laundry and mending clothes, she sought the best education for them. She once argued with their schoolteacher when he suggested that the boys should become traders, and she disciplined her sons when they showed little motivation in learning.\textsuperscript{88} Huang’s challenges, determination, and choices narrated by her epitaph therefore resembled the mother of Mencius, who was the exemplary mother in raising accomplished Confucian scholars.

Li Damao and his brother joined the military as the wars in Yunnan raged.\textsuperscript{89} He and his uncle Li Zichang both served under Li Zhengu’s command and accompanied him to Ava in 1875 to deliver Qing royal decrees to King Mindon.\textsuperscript{90} Li Damao later married a Han merchant’s daughter named Que Guanzhen. Que’s epitaph indicated that her charitable, generous, and industrious nature was greatly appreciated by Huang Runsan, her mother-in-law. Que gave birth to Genyuan, Genyun, and Genpei. When Li Damao was on military duty, Que diligently served her mother-in-law, managed the family winery, and taught the children. Like Huang, Que dedicated herself to Buddhist learning and worship.\textsuperscript{91} Huang had been a devoted Buddhist believer and followed a frugal, vegetarian diet even when

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{85} YPL, Qing gaofeng wude jiwei longlingying qianzong mingluan li gong muzhiming and Qing gaofeng gongren jRIXai xiaojing jixiaojing limu Huang gongren mubiao.
\item \textsuperscript{86} YPL, Huang gongren mubiao.
\item \textsuperscript{87} “Li Cailiu Xiansheng mubei,” in TCDSHLSJP, 154; YPL, Qing gaofeng gongren jixiaojing limu Huang gongren mubiao.
\item \textsuperscript{88} YPL, Huang gongren mubiao; TCDSHLSJP, 156–60.
\item \textsuperscript{89} YPL, Huang gongren mubiao.
\item \textsuperscript{90} “Xiankao rongting fujun ji xianpi Duan yiren xinglie and Guqing Tengyuezhen zhongying Qianzong lijun muzhiming,” in TCDSHLSJP, 169, 172.
\item \textsuperscript{91} “Tengchong limu Que taifuren jiazhuang and xianmu Que taifuren aizhuang,” in TCDSHLSJP, 188–90, 201.
\end{itemize}
her sons had become army officers. She also taught her grandson Genyuan to be righteous, humble, diligent, consistent, and honest.\(^{92}\) Li Genyuan and his friends attributed his accomplishments to the examples and teachings of these virtuous women in the family.\(^{93}\)

From unmarried women who raised their nephews to men who lost their lives in the battlefields, Li Genyuan’s family records demonstrated that Confucianism and Han norms shaped common experience, choices, sacrifices, and devotions made by Han elites and commoners in western Yunnan. *Dali xianzhigao* (Gazetteer of Dali County, 1915) documented the names of more than 4,000 “martyrs” across western Yunnan during Du Wenxiu’s Rebellion. They included soldiers, scholars, monks, and numerous families that committed suicide when their homes were invaded.\(^{94}\) The commemoration of loyalty, filial piety, and heroism in countering the rebels was further extended to Qing government’s non-Han allies, such as native officer Zuo Xiangxuan, who was highly praised by the officials and gentry in Menghua when they compiled an epitaph for him in 1886.\(^{95}\) In Dali, the Dong family, descendants of Ming imperial army officer Dong Bao, lost eight clansmen fighting Du Wenxiu’s army.\(^{96}\) Local gentry also liked telling stories of non-Han civilians embracing Confucianism and Han norms. *Tengyue tingzhi* (1887) included a small number of virtuous Tai women among over 282 chaste, filial, and loyal women since the Ming era.\(^{97}\)

Nevertheless, the records on the virtuous women had been an essential part in constructing the Han identity and homeland in the Yunnan borderlands. In *Tengchong xianzhigao* (Gazetteer of Tengchong County) compiled by Li Genyuan and Liu Chuxiang in 1941, Heshun, a Han village, owned one hundred chaste women out of a total of 450 historical chaste women in Tengchong, despite the fact that the village comprised only around 1 per cent of the entire population of the county.\(^{98}\) From the seventeenth to the late nineteenth century, the Dong family in Dali recorded thirteen chaste

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92 YPL, Huang gongren mubiao.
93 See the epitaphs and biographies of Huang Runsan and Que Guanzhen composed by Li Genyuan, his siblings and clansmen, as well as his associates across the country, in *TCDSHLSJP*, 156–63, 187–205.
97 *Tingzhi* also recorded many women who confronted the Hui rebels and were killed or who committed suicide when the Hui rebels took over the city or captured them. See a list of records in *TYTZ*, vol. 14, renwuzhi 12, lienü, 1–19, with a couple of Tai loyal and chaste women in section 13.
98 Yin Wenhe, *Heshun qiaoxiangshi*, 137.
widows who remained unmarried and another two who committed suicide. Dong Shijue’s widow even cut the flesh of her thigh to feed and nourish her mother-in-law who was ill.99

The epitaph of Fan Minzhai’s widow, who lived from 1819 to 1904 in Menghua, presented an exemplary female leader who prioritised filial piety, chastity, and loyalty to the state over her own life when her home, family, and community were devastated by the rebels. Raised in a scholar’s family, Zhao attempted to commit suicide when her husband, Fan Minzhai, died at age twenty-five. Fan’s parents convinced Zhao that although it was virtuous for her to die, it would be equally virtuous for her to fulfil the filial piety obligations on behalf of her deceased husband and care for the in-laws. By the outbreak of the Hui rebellions, her father-in-law had died. Zhao and her mother-in-law sought refuge in a Buddhist temple in the hills. Her brother-in-law Fan Jiong and his wife Liang remained in the city to resist the Hui army. After the fall of Menghua, Liang came to the temple after an unsuccessful suicide attempt. Fan Jiong bid farewell to his mother and escaped to Shunming. In the following years, Zhao found new shelters and managed to collect rent from tenants on the family lands. However, Du Wenxiu was irritated by Fan Jiong’s continual resistance and association with Cen Yuying, and he ordered his officials in Menghua to confiscate the Fan family lands. Fearing the starvation of more than ten family members, Zhao and Liang reasoned with the rebel leader, who was moved by these brave women and returned part of the rent to them.100 Yunnanese scholar and official Chen Rongchang (1860–1935), who composed Zhao’s epitaph, stressed that ruthless Hui bandits brought calamity to an entire family because of their hatred for one man. In contrast, Zhao disregarded her life, entered the “tiger’s mouth,” and lived. Her filial piety, integrity, and sincerity must have moved the heavens.101 Zhao enjoyed a happy ending: she adopted a son and a daughter from Fan Jiong. Fan Jiong also built a memorial arch and placed her name tablet in the Fan family’s ancestral hall.102

The massive records about women in Yunnan’s local gazetteers and genealogies, however, had little concern for gender equality. Popular narratives that praised virtuous women were no invention, but a tradition found before the nineteenth century. One example is the epitaphs of Lady Zhou and Lady Qian, who both lived during the Wanli era (1573–1620) of the Ming dynasty.

100 “Qing jingbiao jixiao fanmu Zhao taishuren mubiao,” in DLCS-ZP, 1625.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
Their stories are recorded in the Zuo clan’s genealogy that was compiled in 1793 in Menghua.¹⁰³ This traditional writing about frontier women formed a competing discourse to the male representations of women during the New Cultural and May Fourth Movements (1910s–1920s) that were influenced by liberal humanism and Western feminism.¹⁰⁴ However, these two genres shared the same characteristics of incorporating the writing on women into broader social and political discourses. The 1920s Chinese male feminist champions considered “women’s emancipation as serving larger purposes rather than as being an end in itself.”¹⁰⁵ Likewise, the women in Yunnan exemplified narratives of individual agency and collective identities that were bound to Confucian traditions, against opposition from the “barbaric” multi-ethnic frontier. These virtuous and chaste women were praiseworthy because they strived to follow the traditional gender roles in Confucian social order and hierarchy. Their trials through rebellion, war, and death echoed the experience of the talented women in China Proper and other parts of the imperial borderlands,¹⁰⁶ creating the standards of the sacred womanhood that was dedicated to Confucianism and sacrificed for the state and the family.

As an important part of the local gazetteers and genealogies, the virtuous women and righteous men in western Yunnan indicated that the Han migrants had nourished and sustained their loyalty to a common, collective identity since the fourteenth century. Their Confucian education and service in the government since the Ming period enabled the Han migrants to possess political, economic, and legal privileges. In return, the gentry’s active engagement in the local education, crisis management, legal disputes, and

103 Menghua Zuozu jiapu (1793), in Zuoshi jiazu ziliao huibian, 114–15.
105 Wang Zheng argues that the male representations of women in China during the May Fourth Movement considered women’s emancipation a necessary step to achieve some larger purposes. Therefore, these writings incorporated women and women’s rights into the popular discourses of revolution, nationalism, modernisation, and decolonisation (anti-imperialism). Nevertheless, the New Culturalists’ feminist discourse could be seen as “cultural continuity,” which ironically maintained the Confucian gender hierarchy while it attempted to “dismantle Confucian hierarchical social relations.” Ibid., 22, 63.
106 See Susan Mann, The Talented Women of the Zhang Family (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2007). In 1871, the Qing government decided to compensate and awarded the families of close to 4,000 gentry and women who were killed during the past rebellions. See Muzong shilu, vol. 303 (11–12), 305 (8), and 310 (10), in Guangxi Zhuangzu zizhiyuan tongzhiguan and tushuguan, ed., Qingshilu Guangxi ziliao jilu (Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1988), vol. 5: 45, 48.
construction of infrastructure stabilised the state’s control.\textsuperscript{107} In Han border towns and villages, such as Heshun, a thriving gentry population meant the sustainability of the state agents. Confucian academies and schools became the cradles of government officials and the centre of Han civilising projects. The cooperation between the state and its agents empowered the latter with growing authority in the borderlands and regional affairs. In this process, the Han gentry in western Yunnan established a new social order that undermined the dominance of the non-Han groups, gradually changing their status from “the others” in the borderlands to “the core” of their new homeland.\textsuperscript{108} Hence, the thriving Han homelands in the ethnic frontier would preserve local elites’ identification of a Chinese state that could survive dynastic successions. The division between the Han and non-Han communities would increase as the former managed to stay close to the state power\textsuperscript{109} and possessed social and cultural dominance.\textsuperscript{110}

Furthermore, Han cultural hegemony and orthodoxy were further sustained and enhanced in a broader region of the Yunnan-Burma frontier, along with the cross-border social and commercial ties of the gentry and merchants from western Yunnan.\textsuperscript{111} In the Chinese communities in Burma, stories of chaste and loyal women from Tengyue were popular. From the 1870s to the early 1900s, after being exposed to Western education and anti-Qing activism, many Tengyue gentry in Burma and Yunnan sought to reform China and their native places, with funding, resources, knowledge, institutions, and new perspectives.\textsuperscript{112} By 1911, Heshun had become known as a place “largely inhabited by Chinese who have lived in Burma and acquired advanced ideas.”\textsuperscript{113} Overall, the Han collective identity and homelands


\textsuperscript{108} Chen Yan, “Mingqing Tengchong shishen,” 45.

\textsuperscript{109} For instance, as the Tengyue gentry strictly followed the Qing laws that forbade Han-Tai intermarriage, kinship and inter-clan relations had enlarged the distinctions between Han and non-Han groups. On the other hand, the connections between the Han families and the government were strengthened. See Luo Chunmei, “Lun Qingdai Yunnan shishen yu Yunnan shehui de guanxi,” \textit{Journal of Guiyang University (Social Science and Humanities)} 8, no. 2 (2013): 45–46.

\textsuperscript{110} Han dominance in education and cultural activities, such as the compilation of local gazetteers, reinforced Confucian traditions and values, and maintained the Han-ethnic dichotomy in the borderlands.

\textsuperscript{111} Chen Yan, “Mingqing Tengchong shishen,” 45–46; Luo Chunmei, “Yunnan shishen,” 46.

\textsuperscript{112} Yin Wenhe, \textit{Heshun qiaoxiangshi}, 22, 137–38; Giersch, \textit{Corporate Conquest}, 66–70.

\textsuperscript{113} The British Library (BL), IOR/L/PS/11/3, 8.
became essential factors in maintaining the Han-dominant social order when the Qing Empire and the forthcoming ROC saw disintegrating or weaker state control accompanied by the collapse of Confucian ideology.\textsuperscript{114} Local Han collective identity hence rejuvenated crumbling state identification, creating a higher level of coherence to redeem the falling state power from its peripheries.

In the following decades, the Tongmenghui and KMT would actively mobilise the Chinese migrants in Burma, known as the Huaqiao (Chinese diaspora), to engage in and sponsor the revolutions in China. In comparison to the construction of the Han lineage, the construction of a common Chinese lineage, or a national identity, proved to be essential in the context of China’s nation-building in the twentieth century. In 1939, entrusted by the KMT Central Committee, Hui scholar and official Sha Guozhen travelled across Burma to rally among the Huaqiao and encouraged them to counter the Japanese and remain loyal to China.\textsuperscript{115} Later, these Huaqiao would transform their loyalty and patriotism toward China to the Communist Party of China (CCP) and the PRC government. In 1954, Chairman Mao Zedong convened with the Burmese Prime Minister U Nu and addressed the presence of the ethnic Chinese in Burma. It was only one of the many conversations the two state governments had regarding the status and national identification of the Huaqiao in Burma throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Mao remarked:

We often admonish the Huaqiao [overseas Chinese] to obey the law of their countries of residence. If [they] reside in a country, [they] should follow the law and not participate in illegal activities. We often organise such education to ask the Huaqiao to become law-abiding and to cultivate a good relationship with the government and people of their residing countries. Such a good relationship is yet to be built in the countries that many Chinese live, because the governments of these countries are suspecting us of using the Huaqiao to cause trouble. It needs to be proven that in the long term or even the medium term whether we are either educating the Huaqiao to obey the laws or we are secretly instigating them to go against the governments of their residing countries. Every country has illegal activities or revolutions; however, these are their domestic matters and the Huaqiao should not participate.\textsuperscript{116}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{114} Ma Jianxiong, “Gentry Power,” 48.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Sha Guozhen, Miandian shichalu (Rangoon: Yanguang Jiyou Yinwu Gongs, about 1940).
\item \textsuperscript{116} “Mao Zhuxi jiejian Wu Nu Zongli tanhua jilu,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China Archives, 105-00510-07, 4 (my own translation).
\end{itemize}
Resisting the Hui Rebels and the British Invaders

According to the gazetteers of Tengyue that were compiled in 1887 and 1905, local militia began resisting the Hui rebels in late 1856. In 1861, Du Wenxiu's troops seized Yongchang and Tengyue, killing respected gentry, conscripting labourers, and confiscating a large amount of silver from people. *Tengyue xiangtuzhi* (1905) recorded that the Hui army raided and slaughtered civilians, blackmailed those who had surrendered, and drove many out of the city. Local gentry such as Liu Guanghuan, Li Zhenguo, Jiang Xiangshi, and Zhao Chunxiang withdrew to traditional military colonies such as Guyong, Jingkou, and Daxilian. To fight the rebels, scholars such as Yin Yi and Liu Guanghuan, who was a *jiansheng* (student of the Imperial Academy), often became militia leaders. Li Zhenguo was a major commander of the militia in Tengyue, known as the Eighteen Regiments.

In 1862, the Hui army assaulted Jingkou. Liu Guanghuan retreated. Li Zhenguo went to Ganya to mobilise the native officials in the area to defend Nandian and Maofu (or Mauphoo). It was around this time, according to various accounts from local historical records, that his family members were killed or taken hostage by the rebels. Li successfully fended off the Hui troops that assaulted Ganya, Nongzhang, and Zhanda in 1863. In the
following years, he and his fellow gentry recovered a stronghold in Hexi, a military garrison to the north of Tengyue where Li Genyuan's grandmother, father, and uncle had found refuge in 1862. After that, a standoff with the rebels began.  

When the British Sladen Mission attempted to reach Dali in 1868, Li Zhenguo and his fellow gentry in Tengyue had been driven out of their homeland for seven years. Most residents in Heshun had also escaped to Burma, and the entire population in Tengyue had significantly decreased. The Sladen Mission felt threatened by Li Zhenguo, whose wide connections across Upper Burma and Yunnan borderlands were hidden under his astute interactions with various allies. A Kachin headman, as illustrated by the chapter epigraph, revealed that Sladen faced many opponents on this trip. Some were orchestrating obstructions against the British, while others were being manipulated to do so. Sladen would gradually learn that his opponents all had connections to Li Zhenguo, who represented the Burmese government, cooperated with the Chinese merchants, and acted on his own interests and the interests of the Tengyue gentry. Behind the individual obstacles Sladen faced was an interlocking network to deter the British political and economic expansion in Upper Burma and western Yunnan.  

Sladen learned that Li Zhenguo led a deputation to Ava when the Shan states in Upper Burma rebelled against the Burmese court in 1866. Representing the loyalty of those native officials on the other side of the Kachin Hills, Li supported the king's lingering ambition to recover the Shan states that Burma had lost in the Qing-Burmese Campaigns (1760s). Mindon praised Li's loyalty and awarded him with two gold umbrellas as "a mark of vassalage." By then, Li had enlarged his influence over the Tai and Kachin territories by countering the Hui army in Tengyue and stalling their the rebels whereas his son was taken and raised by the "bandits" (the Hui). Cun Kaitai, Tengyue Xiangtuzhi (1905), vol. 2, bingshi, 14; MGTCXZG, 517; “Li Zhenguo muzhi,” 837.  

123 YPL, Tengchong Dieshuihe lishi beizhuanji.  
125 According to Yin Wenhe, Tengyue had a total population of 383,870 people in 1823, and by 1879, the number had fallen to 55,407. Yin, Heshun qiaoxiangshi, 16–17.  
127 Ibid., 60.  
128 From northern Burma to southwestern Yunnan, the Tai polities retained their autonomy while paying loyalty to both Burma and the Qing, although with more fealty toward the latter until the mid-eighteenth century. E. R. Leach, Political Systems of the Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 34; Giersch, Asian Borderlands, 104.  
advancement to Burma. He was acquainted with the native officials, such as Dao Yingting of Ganya and Dao Shouzhong of Nandian, as well as the those in Burma. It was not surprising that Li gained Mindon’s sponsorship in his resistance to the rebels.\textsuperscript{130} It was also predictable that Mindon and his officials could depend on Li to stop the British because of their opposition to Sladen’s coercion.\textsuperscript{131} Wang Shengzu argues that Li might have discussed the counter-British measures with Mindon.\textsuperscript{132} Sladen recorded that while the mission lingered in the Kachin Hills, the members saw that the officials in Bhamo frequently sentmessengers who, perhaps, not only met with Kachin headmen but also communicated with Li, who maintained a stronghold in the area. A Kachin leader even frankly admitted that Li had received letters from the officials in Bhamo and was “determined” to stop the British.\textsuperscript{133}

Li Zhenguo had many relatives and friends in Mandalay and Bhamo. He owned a jade shop in Mandalay and had entrusted the shop to friends and continued to draw money from the business to fund his operations against the rebels. His stronghold in the Kachin Hills enabled him to control access between Tengyue and Bhamo, hindering the Dali Regime’s plan to sustain its economy and military by cross-border trade.\textsuperscript{134} In 1863, Hui General Ma Xingtang failed to strike a deal with Li to cease fire and safeguard the trade route.\textsuperscript{135} In 1868, the Sladen Mission’s intention to seek Dali’s cooperation to revive Yunnan-Burma trade would attract Li’s opposition.

In fact, Sladen found out that the Chinese merchants in Bhamo and Mandalay had frequently corresponded with each other and were nervous about the increasing British influence over Burma-Yunnan trade.\textsuperscript{136} John Anderson, a member of the Sladen Mission, recorded that the Chinese merchants in Bhamo “were unlikely to favour any project which threatened to admit the hated barbarians to a share of their monopoly and profits.”\textsuperscript{137} Anderson heard that the Bhamo Chinese were hostile toward the Kachin

\textsuperscript{130} Wang Zhi, Haike ritan (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2016), 29–32; “Li Zhenguo muzhi,” 837; XSNL, 37.
\textsuperscript{131} Sladen understood Mindon’s crises, and personally experienced the 1866 revolt that killed the crown prince. For more details on Sladen’s coercion, see “Captain Sladen’s Report,” 21.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., 60.
\textsuperscript{135} Huang Jiamo, Dianxi Huimin zhengquan de lianying waijiao 1869–1874 (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2015), 17–18; Jing Dexin, Du Wenxiu qiyi (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1991), 197.
\textsuperscript{136} “Captain Sladen’s Report,” 27.
\textsuperscript{137} Anderson, Mandalay to Momien, 38–39.
and Shan leaders because they had befriended the British. Although they abhorred the possibility of a British-Dali alliance against the Qing court, the Chinese were more concerned that the British would undermine their control over a small volume of cross-border trade. Therefore, they had faith in Li Zhenguo and considered him “an irresistible barrier” to prevent the British from reaching Tengyue. Li agreed to exterminate the British once they entered into his territory of control.

The Bhamo Chinese, or “the Chinamen of Bhamo,” in the British and the Kachin leaders’ accounts, remained a group with a vague identity but considerable size. According to Burmese Chinese historian Chen Yi-sein, by 1835, at least 200 out of a total of around 2,000 houses in Bhamo belonged to the Chinese. In addition to merchants, there were many Chinese vegetable farmers around Bhamo who sold their produce on the streets. By 1853, the Chinese accounted for about 50 per cent of over 2,000 households of residents in Bhamo. While most of them came from Yunnan, over half of them were from Tengyue. It is very likely that some Bhamo Chinese who collaborated with Li Zhenguo belonged to the Yunnan gentry’s transregional social and commercial network. Their secret correspondence with Li regarding the elimination of the British threats indicated a convenient channel for exchanging intelligence, which would be essential for future communication about foreign appearances in the following decades. Looking forward, the “ignorant and excitable” Chinese traders in Bhamo would disregard the Sino-British diplomatic exchanges over the annexation of Burma in 1886.

138 Ibid., 337–38.
139 “Captain Sladen’s Report,” 27.
140 Ibid., 38.
141 Ibid., 15, 32, 35.
142 Ibid., 32.
143 The term “Chinese” is insufficient to represent the ethnic and religious diversity as well as the political leanings of merchants throughout the borderlands of Burma and Yunnan. In addition to the well-known Han, Minjia, and Hui, the Tibetan caravans commanded the paths in northwestern Yunnan. The Akha had been associated with Chinese, Tai and other groups of traders across southwestern Yunnan, Laos, Vietnam, Siam, and Burma. See Roberts, Mapping Chinese Rangoon, 7, 14–15; Liu Ruizhai, “Simao shangwu shengshuai gaikuang,” in Yunnan wenshi ziliao xuanji, vol. 16: 286; Mika Toyota, “Cross-Border Mobility and Social Networks: Akha Caravan Traders,” in Where China Meets Southeast Asia: Social and Cultural Change in the Border Regions, ed. Grant Evans, Christopher Hutton, and Kuah Khun Eng (New York: St. Martin’s Press; Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), 206–10.
144 Chen Yi-sein, Miandian Huaqiao shilüe, 89–90.
145 “Miandian Duanshi shipu,” vol. 4: 2346.
and challenge British supremacy in its new colony.¹⁴⁶ In the early 1890s, the British chief commissioner of Bhamo complained that the Chinese in town were “distinctly rude and aggressive in their style and altogether different from the Chinese he had met in other towns.”¹⁴⁷ The British Political Officer of Bhamo further observed that:

The Yunnanese constitute by far the most important section of Bhamo community, and nearly all the trade of the place is in their hands. Their influence with the Provincial Government of Yunnan is strong and they practically control the Chinese border policy in this region.¹⁴⁸

Although Sladen managed to reach Tengyue in June of 1868 after the Muslim army had uprooted Li Zhenguo’s base in the Kachin Hills, the British and the Muslims did not form a firm alliance. They made some trade agreements that were not fully implemented and did not last beyond the fall of the Dali Regime in 1873. In fact, the British had little interest in sponsoring the Dali Regime and jeopardising Anglo-Chinese relations. In 1872, they had already declined the possibility of cooperating with Dali when Liu Daoheng, known as Prince Hassan and an alleged representative of Du Wenxiu, received a lukewarm welcome during his diplomatic mission in London.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶ The British Library (BL), IOR/L/PS/7/65, Sec. No. 37., Minutes by the Chief Commissioner of Burma, 4 (or 830).
¹⁴⁸ Ibid., Enclosure No. 8.
¹⁴⁹ Liu Daoheng led a mission to Rangoon in March 1872, and sought British aid to overthrow the Qing Empire. However, Ashley Eden, the Chief Commissioner of British Burma, refused to give Liu any assurance and sent him to Calcutta. Liu then proceeded to London where his request was rejected by the British statesman. Du Wenxiu’s autobiography did not recognise Liu as a legitimate representative of Dali as he sought the support of the British and the French. Du considered that commercial agreements that exchanged local products for Western machines would be acceptable. However, Du would have executed Liu if he had traded the Dali Regime’s territory for Western machines. See Du Wenxiu, “Du Wenxiu zizhuan,” in Yunnan Huizu renwu beizhuan jingxuan, ed. Wang Zihua and Yao Jide (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2004), vol.1: 224; Brian L. Evans, “The Panthay Mission of 1872 and Its Legacies,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 16, no. 1 (March 1985): 117–28. Mao Zedong highly praised Du Wenxiu as a leader of anti-Qing movement. Therefore, scholars in China have debated whether Du had dispatched Liu to Britain. The debate was important, because the CCP needed a positive example of a historical, anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolution. However, Du’s alleged alliance with the British would make him a “traitor” of the Chinese nation. Tien Jukang raised the matter specifically in 1963 and questioned what had caused Du’s “disgrace.” See Tien, “Youguan Du Wenxiu duiwai guanxi de jige wenti,” Lishi yanjiu, no. 4 (1963): 141–50. Since then, Chinese scholars had actively participated in the discussion. They focused on Liu’s relationship with Du and Dali’s foreign policies. They explored whether Du had personally made the decision to collaborate with the
1873, the British turned to the Qing government to explore the possibility of opening Yunnan’s market. In the meantime, Li Zhenguo was still active in western Yunnan. He and his fellow gentry assisted the provincial government in restoring its control in Tengyue. Under these circumstances, the British were planning a new mission to explore trade and railway routes to connect Burma and Yunnan. The gentry in western Yunnan and their kin in Burma had fought the Muslim rebels to regain their homeland, and they would not hesitate to counter the British, who posed another threat to their territorial control.

2 Investigating and Writing about the Margary Affair

Abstract
Chapter 2 discusses how the local gentry's role in borderlands consolidation and defence affected the decisions of Qing officials in Anglo-Chinese negotiations to settle the Margary Affair. This chapter also draws attention to the competing narratives documenting the Margary Affair since the late nineteenth century, which underscores the patriotism and contribution of different groups of state agents and civilians who countered the British.

Keywords: the Margary Affair; Cen Yuying; Li Zhenguo; historiography of Yunnan; Jingpo; Anglo-Chinese relations

In February 1874, a caravan of 1,300 mules from Yunnan arrived in Mandalay, with three or four Qing officials who had brought letters from Beijing. Later in August, King Mindon of Burma sent ten elephant tusks to Yunnan as presents for Governor Cen Yuying. The tributary relations between Burma and China therefore resumed for the first time since the 1850s. Cen reported to the Qing court that Mindon was preparing roads and selecting elephants for an envoy to Beijing. Mindon was humble, in Cen’s opinion; however, he was unaware of the correct format of correspondence and did not address the Qing authorities properly. Despite these flaws, Cen saw the necessity of gaining Burma’s loyalty as rebellions in Yunnan began subsiding.

After the fall of the Dali Regime in 1873, the British officials in Burma and India believed it would be easier to open Yunnan for trade if they could gain

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1 The British Library (BL), IOR/L/PS/18/B40, Diary of Resident at Mandalay (Capt. Strover), 4.
2 In fact, Beijing had not seen any tribute from Burma for over 200 years from Ming Emperor Jiajing (r. 1522–1567) to Qing Emperor Qianlong (r. 1736–1795). The fragile connection resumed in 1788 after the Qing-Burmese war but experienced another interruption from the Muslim rebellions in the 1850s. See Cen Yuying, Cen Yuying zougao (CYYZG) (Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1989), vol. 1: 346.

doi: 10.5117/9789048558995_CH02
the Qing government’s support. In England, various chambers of commerce were excited to hear that the Qing government had invited Mindon to restore the trade route between Yunnan and Bhamo, and they pressed the British Indian government in Calcutta to resume surveys in the region. With the support of the viceroy of India, the plan for a new expedition was gradually formulated to explore routes for trade and a railway. The British claimed that they planned for only three or four officers to participate; they would leave Mandalay for Dali in November and pass Thiennee (or Hsenwi), which was about forty-nine kilometres northeast of Lashio. After reaching Dali, the expedition could return to Burma or proceed to Shanghai. Thomas Wade (1818–1895), the chief British representative in Beijing, selected an interpreter named Augustus Margary, who would travel across China and join the expedition in Burma.

Margary left Shanghai in August 1874 and reached Yunnan in November. He reported having positive interactions with the officials in Yunnan. Governor Cen Yuying arranged officers to escort him to Yongchang. Li Zhenguo, who threatened to eliminate the Sladen Mission in 1868, seemed “exceedingly courteous, intelligent, and straightforward.” He appeared to “facilitate the advance of the expedition” and treated Margary “with unexpected civility, even to the act of the Ko-t’ou [kneel and bow the head down to the ground].” Margary observed that Li had had conversations with gentry, merchants, and Kachin headmen about reviving trade.

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7. Wade took charge of the British legation in China “from June 1864 to November 1865 and from November 1869 to July 1871.” He then assumed the positions of the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary and Chief Superintendent of the British Trade in China from 1871 to 1883. See Henri Cordier, “Thomas Francis Wade,” in T’oung Pao 6, no. 4 (1895): 407–12. Margary spoke proficient Chinese after seven years’ tenure in the British consulates in Beijing, Shanghai, and Yantai (Chefoo). Wade also considered that Margary was courageous and intelligent, a “promising member of the China Consular service.” See 1876 [C.1456] LVI, in BPP, vol. 41: 514, 529, 544.
10. Ibid.
When Margary passed through Yunnan, King Mindon’s embassy to Beijing had left Mandalay, passing Bhamo in mid-December and arriving in Tengyue in early January 1875. In mid-January 1875, Margary reached Bhamo. Expedition member John Anderson, who once joined the Sladen Mission, recorded that Margary’s “arduous but successful journey” was “crowned by the politeness shown by the dreaded Li-sieh-tai [Li Zhenguo].” However, Margary was killed in Mangyun a month later. The British accused Li Zhenguo of ordering the attacks on the expedition and the murder of the diplomat, instigated by local officials and gentry who received the original order from Governor Cen Yuying.

Building on chapter 1, this chapter explains how the local gentry’s value in border consolidation and defence affected the Qing government’s strategy to settle the Margary Affair. In their interactions and negotiations with the British diplomats, the Qing officials in Beijing consistently emphasised the borderland officials’ agency. Instead of appeasing the British, they prioritised the protection of the local gentry, the guardians of the borderlands. Such considerations enabled the Qing court to balance local and state interests in Yunnan amid British and French aggression in Indochina. Meanwhile, the history of the Margary Affair was mostly documented in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by local gentry who praised their own contribution in protecting their Han homelands. In these historical accounts, one can still find traces of the nationalistic narrative prevailing in post-1949 China that stresses ethnic unity and collaboration to counter Western imperialism.

The Margary Affair and the Negotiation of the Statesmen

For years, the British Foreign Office had been aware of the widespread anti-foreign sentiment in China. However, it probably failed to perceive the specific challenges a new expedition would encounter in the imperial borderlands. Fearing the obstacles posed by ill-prepared local officials and

11 BL, IOR/L/PS/18/B40, 5–6.
13 Li Hongzhang, “Qing kuangyou Li Zhenguo deng pian,” in Majiali shijian shiliao huibian (MJLHB), ed. Zhengxie Dehongzhou weiyuanhui, Zhengxie Yingjiangxian weiyuanhui, and Dehong shifan gaodeng zhuanke xuexiao (Mangshi: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 2021), 452.
14 The rumours of infant-killing, organ-harvesting, and devilish French missionaries had fuelled the Chinese people’s fear and animosity toward the Europeans, which eventually erupted in the
uncertainties in the areas that rarely saw a foreign presence, Thomas Wade requested that the Zongli yamen, China's foreign office, arrange assistance from the governors-generals of Hu-Guang, Yunnan, and Sichuan. To keep him safe, Wade admonished Margary to frequently update Qing officials about his status and avoid any activities that might cause confrontations. By late August 1874, the expedition members seemed ready except for their controversial passports, which were Qing travel authorisations issued by the Zongli yamen. Fearing the suspicion of the Qing government due to the Sladen Mission's association with the Dali Regime, Wade did not reveal the real purpose of the expedition and requested passports only for pleasure (tour or travel) for the expedition members.

On August 15, 1874, Margary received a package containing his passport to travel from Shanghai to Yunnan. Having been longing for such a “magnificent opportunity” to distinguish himself, he was hopeful that the Zongli yamen’s instructions to the provincial authorities would keep him safe. As Margary travelled across southern and southwestern China, the expedition’s agenda changed under the influence of King Mindon. Instead of Hsenwi, the expedition would start in Bhamo and take the highway the Burmese envoys had previously travelled when they went to Beijing. The British were convinced that the Bhamo route was the “easiest and best adapted for securing carriage,” leading to “a considerable commercial interest in the hands of the Chinese traders at Yeng Chan [Yongchang].”

Tianjin Massacre (1870). The British Foreign Office worried about the safety of a new expedition because the British consulates, which were mostly located in China’s port cities, could not provide effective protection to those who travelled far in the country. 1876 [C.1456] LVI, 510.

16 Wade sent Margary a list of precautions, including that he should carry a copy of the Treaty of Tianjin; he should present his name card and arrange meetings with chief local officials at his new destinations; he should avoid local unrest; and he must not attract attention to any activities related to surveying and mapping. 1876 [C.1456] LVI, 514–15.
17 The Qing government usually issued two forms of travel authorisations, or known passports, to the foreigners, for business (trade) or for pleasure (tour or travel). See Wang Shenzu, The Margary Affair and Chefoo Agreement (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), 38–39.
19 Ibid., 112, 185, 308.
20 King Mindon pointed out that travelling on the Bhamo route would avoid bandits and rough roads. The British understood that Mindon attempted to keep them away from Hsenwi to avoid foreign interactions with the Shans and Karens. Mindon lured the British with the opportunities and wealth along the Bhamo route, and the British adopted the king’s proposal to please him. 1876 [C.1456] LVI, 519–20.
21 Ibid., 519.
investigating and Writing about the Margary Affair

Optimistic that some Shan leaders had remained friendly since the Sladen Mission. A Chinese trader in Rangoon had recently confirmed that the Bhamo route was safe and that the Qing officials in Dali and Yongchang were expecting the British and would receive them well. In addition, William Frederick Meyers, a secretary in the British Legation in Beijing, also confirmed that government officials in Yunnan would cooperate. However, the timing of the British entering Yunnan was no better than it had been in the 1868 Sladen Mission. In 1875, the Yunnan provincial government was still trying to suppress sporadic revolts in western Yunnan. The British understood the risk, especially when sending “an armed force, even though its object was peaceful, into so disturbed a district.” Ironically, in addition to its formal members, the expedition appeared as a small military force under the command of Colonel Horace Browne. The British Indian government sent Chinese and Burmese attendants as well as fifteen Sikh sepoys as bodyguards. Commander Tsare-daw-gyee from Bhamo also led around 120 ill-equipped soldiers to protect the expedition. They all, however, would march to Yunnan with the tourist passports that Thomas Wade had obtained for the European personnel. Later, Li Hongzhang, the governor of Zhili as well as the minister of commerce and trade, would point out that Wade might have violated international protocols if he had failed to inform the Zongli yamen about the arrival of additional troops and had not discussed the matter with Cen Yuying. 

The expedition members interacted with the Chinese community in Bhamo and visited their temple. According to John Anderson, the Chinese were convinced that the British would construct a railway; however, they disregarded the expedition’s goals of peacefully seeking commercial interests and conducting scientific research. Before their departure, Margary sent letters to the magistrate of Tengyue and Li Zhenguo. However, the

22 Ibid., 522.
23 The British National Archives (BNA), FO 17/742, 26, 35.
24 Ibid.
25 The members included Colonel Browne, Margary, John Anderson, geographer Nay Elias, and another interpreter Mr. Allen. 1876 [C.1422] LXXXII, 614.
30 Margary’s letter did not reach Li. According to Anderson, Li had left Nandian to greet the British in Mengmao (now Ruili). Ibid., 378.
civilians in Tengyue told each other that over ten foreigners were coming to do business, but this was a ruse. An additional two to three hundred armed foreign soldiers would attack the city.\(^{31}\) Another frightening rumour indicated the coming of several thousand foreign troops.\(^{32}\) Over time, this narrative of foreign invasion persisted and has been widely taught in schools in mainland China.\(^{33}\)

Anderson recalled that before their departure around late January 1875, the Yunnanese in the bazaar of Bhamo had already been discussing that Li Zhenguo was going to lead an armed force, full of troops from Dali and Tengyue, to intercept the mission. The British heard more rumours of an impending attack as they travelled through the Kachin Hills around mid-February. However, Margary dismissed this information and volunteered to travel to Mangyun in advance and explore the situation. Hence, the expedition had split into three groups, with Colonel Browne following Margary and leading the main party through the Bhamo route while Nay Elias took a different path to Tengyue.\(^{34}\) In early March, the viceroy of India received a telegram from Rangoon reporting that Li Zhenguo’s nephew had attacked Colonel Browne’s company on February 22 with “many hundred

\(^{31}\) CYYZG, vol. 1: 397.

\(^{32}\) “Zongli geguo shiwu yamen cun shenxun Dian’an gongci,” in MJLHB, 15.

\(^{33}\) In China, the local resistance against the British invasion is a common narrative to explain the Margary Affair. For an example of history education and textbooks, see “Yingguo dui Yunnan he Xizang de qinlüe,” in Zhongxiaoxue tongyong lishi jiaocai bianxiezu: Zhongguo lishi (Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, 1979), vol. 3: 12–13. The entry of “Majiali shijian” on Baidu Baike provides an example of common historical literacy regarding the matter. See https://baike.baidu.hk/item/%E9%A6%AC%E5%88%89%E7%90%86%E4%BA%8B%E4%BB%B6/7936820, accessed June 1, 2022. As an example of the official tone of the local government, the website of the Dehong Prefecture that governs Mangyun has a specific account that stresses the collective memory on the unification of all people in deterring the foreign invaders. See http://www.dh.gov.cn/cjb/Web/_F0_0_4VGP41T7A8EBC5D2631C4054A9.htm, accessed June 1, 2022. The government of Dehong recently sponsored the compilation of historical documents regarding the Margary Affair, which highlighted the British ambition and invasion, local civilians’ patriotism, as well as the Kachin people’s rightful self-defence as Margary killed their people. See “Xuyan,” “Houji,” and other content in MJLHB, 1–4; 630, 685–87. On the island of Taiwan, the Margary Affair is no longer mentioned in current high school history books. Telephone interview with the High School Editorial Office of Han Lin Publishing Company, conducted by Wang Yunwen, June 6, 2022. Nevertheless, a supplementary reading provided on Han Lin’s online learning website wrote that “Colonel Browne of the British Army led troops to invade Yunnan from Burma in 1874.” See “High School History-Margary Affair,” https://www.ehanlin.com.tw/app(keyword/%E9%AB%98%E4%BB%AD%E6%AD%B7%E5%8F%B2/%E9%A6%AC%E5%88%89%E9%87%8C%E4%BA%8B%E4%BB%B6.html, accessed June 24, 2022 (my own translation).

\(^{34}\) Anderson, Mandalay to Momien, 381–82, 415–17.
Chinese” from Mangyun and some “hill tribes.” The Sikh bodyguards killed twenty Chinese and injured many. Browne believed that the Qing magistrate of Tengyue had sent 3,000 men to end the expedition. On the other hand, Margary and his attendants were killed in Mangyun.

At this point, the Zongli yamen had not received any direct reports from Yunnan but was informed of the incident by Thomas Wade on March 3. In addition to the Zongli yamen, Li Hongzhang actively communicated with his colleagues and became involved in the investigation as he held another key position in the Qing government’s foreign affairs as the governor of Zhili and the minister of commerce and trade. Two days before Margary’s death, Li had received a letter from Pan Dingxin (1828–1888, also known as Pan Qinxuan), his old subordinate in the Huai (Anhui) Army who had been appointed the provincial administration commissioner of Yunnan in 1874. Pan informed Li that the British had entered Yunnan with over 300 troops, and he was concerned about potential confrontations.

In the meantime, the British Foreign Office in London, the Indian government, and the Legation in Beijing were carefully contemplating their response. Thomas Wade believed that the expedition had encountered well-planned ambushes and that a large body of Chinese troops had already prepared to intercept the expedition a month before its departure from

36 “Zhongguo haiguan midang,” no. 94, in MJLHB, 94.
39 Since Li Hongzhang’s appointment in 1870, the Governor of Zhili had been holding a concurrent position as the Minister of Commerce and Trade and was also given the responsibility of managing the foreign affairs, maritime defense, and custom service in northern China. Li was not subjected to the Zongli yamen when conducting foreign affairs but was expected to discuss the matters with the bureau. Over time, he would become the representative of the Zongli yamen as he frequently engaged in foreign exchange, especially when the negotiations of treaties often occurred in the seaports of northern China that were under his jurisdiction. See Wu Fuhuan, “Nanbeiyang tongshang dachen de sheli jiqi yu zongli yamen de guanxi,” Hebei xuekan, 1991(1): 93–96.
40 For over a decade, Li Hongzhang had been corresponding frequently with Pan Dingxin and their communication continued when Pan assumed his position. See Li Hongzhang, “Zhi zongshu lun Dian’an,” in MJLHB, 239–40. In his response to Pan, Li said that the incident of Margary’s death was not out of Pan’s expectation as he reported the entrance of the British expedition on February 20, 1875. See “Letter 112,” in LP&NP, 4653–54.
Bhamo. The British collected the testimonies of some Burmese cotton merchants in Mangyun, which indicated that a battalion of Chinese troops had gathered outside the city gate to prepare for the attacks. Some Chinese military officers had asked one of Mindon's cotton agents to warn the Burmese commander that safeguarded the expedition, which explained why the Burmese troops dug rifle pits and breastworks in front of their camp in the Kachin Hills. One Burmese cotton merchant saw Margary on the street of Mangyun before he was killed. Later the merchant recalled that the heads of Margary and his servants were displayed on the city wall. On the morning of February 22, as Colonel Browne observed a line of armed Chinese approaching his camp, he was informed of the death of Margary and the coming of Tengyue's troops, who intended to annihilate the British. The headman of Tsarai seemed aware of the situation, and some Kachin men and Chinese who gathered here attempted to kill a Burmese scout who had once accompanied Margary and had escaped from Mangyun after the attack.

The viceroy of India, Thomas Wade, and Secretary Edward Stanley of the British Foreign office laid the framework for Wade's negotiation with the Zongli yamen. First, they agreed that local Qing authorities, especially Li Zhenguo, were involved in the attacks. Second, Secretary Stanley directed Wade to prioritise the British government's interests when settling the affair. Later, in his communication with Prince Gong, or Yixin, the head of the Zongli yamen, Wade emphasised his suspicion of Li Zhenguo, although Li had once shown Margary "great civility." Wade composed a list of demands with the request to open Yunnan to trade. He urged Beijing to organise a special investigation commission with the participation of the British officials because of his distrust of the Qing bureaucracy. To fulfil the goals of the aborted expedition, the Indian government would organise a second mission and would need new passports. Wade argued that the Treaty of Tianjin, signed at the conclusion of the Second Opium War in 1858, should

42 1876 [C.1456] LVI, 538–40, 548; 1876 [C.1422] LXXXII, 604–5. In 1876, some Burmese guides took Captain Crawford B. Cooke, the Political Agent in Bhamo, to the site of Margary's murder and disclosed more details of his death: Margary was attacked by some Chinese and Kachin men and was wounded at the hot spring. He tried to escape to a grassy slope, east of the stream, and was killed under a tree. See 1877 [C.1832] LXXXVIII, 776.
43 In the evening of March 11, the viceroy of India confirmed with Wade that the Qing authorities in Tengyue had ordered a nephew of Li Zhenguo to lead 3,000 men to annihilate the British. On March 12, Wade informed Prince Gong that a high authority of Tengyue sent 3,000 men to exterminate the mission. 1876 [C.1422] LXXXII, 562; 1877 [C.1832] LXXXVIII, 846.
receive new attention to ensure Britain’s freedom and privileges to trade in China. To conclude, Wade asked for an indemnity of 150,000 liang of silver.44

While assuring Thomas Wade of the cooperation of the Zongli yamen and the Yunnan provincial government,45 Yixin brought the matter to the newly enthroned, four-year-old Emperor Guangxu (r. 1875–1908) and perhaps, Empresses Dowager Cixi and Ci’an.46 Later, the court issued a decree instructing Governors Liu Yuezhao and Cen Yuying to arrange “intelligent and judicious” officials for the investigation. Yixin rejected most of Wade’s demands. In mid-April, Yixin clarified that he had misunderstood Wade and thought that the British wanted to build a consulate in Yunnan, which would have been an unprecedented move in interior China.47 Overall, Yixin emphasised that Beijing could issue orders, but the court trusted the local authorities in Yunnan and respected their agency. Therefore, the Zongli yamen was not interested in launching a special investigation. Instead, the proper procedure should begin in Yunnan. Yixin especially noted that the investigation would entirely depend on Yunnan’s provincial authorities making “every possible effort” and discovering and capturing the criminals for lawful punishment. He was confident that justice would be served without the involvement of British officials.48

Thomas Wade threatened to withdraw the British Legation and pressed the Zongli yamen to accept his demands, especially to open Yunnan. On March 30, the Zongli yamen issued passports for a new British mission and agreed to have British representatives in the investigations and trials in Yunnan. However, Yixin indicated that he had not received any official reports from Yunnan.49 The Grand Council sent a secret edict to Yunnan the next day, instructing Governor Cen Yuying to take extra precautions and to be prepared, because the British might use this incident to blackmail Yunnan.50 Li Hongzhang recommended that his old subordinate Song Baohua join the special investigation, for Song had served under Pan Dingxin for many years. As the current subprefect of Tianjin in charge of maritime defence, Song was familiar with foreign affairs and could speak some English.51 In the following days, Li communicated with the British

44 1876 [C.1422] LXXXII, 566.
48 Ibid., 567, 586.
49 Ibid., 568–76, 581.
50 CYYZG, vol. 1: 387.
51 Li Hongzhang, “Fu zongshu lun Dianbian qiangsha Majiali,” in MJLHB, 237.
diplomats. He also corresponded with his elder brother Li Hanzhang (the governor-general of Hu-Guang) and officials in Shanghai and Yunnan. He alerted his colleagues, especially those in the borderlands, about the urgency of a thorough investigation and requested they assist Song’s work in the future.\footnote{See Li Hongzhang’s letters to Li Hanzhang and other Qing officials, in MJLHB, 239–42.}

Thomas Wade’s victory did not mean that the Qing officials were frightened by his pressure. Quite the opposite, Yixin completely understood the British ambition to open Yunnan and had anticipated Wade’s demands. Yixin had also sensed the complexities behind the attacks and contemplated Beijing’s role in settling the case. He and his colleagues had evaluated China’s disadvantages before the special investigations and negotiations were to begin later that year. It was also possible that Yixin had begun formulating strategies to respond to Wade’s demands not long after Margary’s death. When interacting with the British diplomats, he seemed to portray his powerlessness over local affairs and emphasised the authority and agency of the officials in Yunnan. Before he denied Wade’s demands, Yixin had formed a clear view of the competition between Britain, France, and China in the Indochina Peninsula as well as the Europeans’ ambition on Yunnan. When explaining the incidents at the court on March 15 and 21, he recalled the death of French naval officer Francis Garnier who occupied Hanoi and was killed by the Black Flag Army in late 1873. He mentioned that Wade had been an intermediary in resolving the Japanese military incursion of Taiwan in 1874, known as the Mudan Incident. Therefore, Yixin asserted, Wade would try to ask a favour and open Yunnan. He saw the possibility that Wade would threaten him and dispatch troops to the border of Yunnan. Thus, he strengthened the border and maritime defence during the investigation of the Margary Affair.\footnote{QJWJSL, vol. 1: juan 1 (10–13), 25–27.}

Yixin understood that a thorough investigation would appease the British and possibly prevent armed conflicts like the recent crises in Taiwan and Ili. When the Qing government failed to exercise jurisdiction over the aborigines in Taiwan or to tame the Muslim rebellions in Xinjiang, it gave the Japanese and Russians an excuse to take military action. Yixin believed that in the vast imperial borderlands, the places governed by the untamed native officials would suffer greater danger from foreign encroachment, for the process of \textit{gaitu guiliu} was at various stages and could not ensure effective state control.\footnote{Ibid., juan 1 (12), 26.} The British could find an excuse to invade Yunnan
if the Qing government hesitated to claim jurisdiction over these native officials or failed to provide a reasonable explanation regarding the Margary Affair. Yixin saw that the consequences of the affair could be as big as a war or, to the satisfaction of the British, the opening of Yunnan. He expected Britain’s military mobilisation to threaten the Qing government. To avoid these possibilities, he urged the Yunnan provincial officials to collect more intelligence and strengthen the border defence.55

Governor Cen Yuying’s report arrived on March 22, 1875, and made Yixin aware of some complexities he could not see from Beijing. Cen reported that the yeren, or “wild men,” from the Kachin Hills had robbed some foreigners and forced them to withdraw from Yunnan.56 He suggested that the Zongli yamen should remind local officials to protect any foreigners who travelled to Tengyue. Nevertheless, he still worried about the little control the local officials had over the uncertainties the foreigners might face, which could cause them to get hurt or killed. Cen did not specifically mention Margary’s death, but Yixin was suspicious of Cen’s ambiguous and subtle use of “hurt or killed,” which indicated that the governor was trying to hide something.57 Hence, Yixin became more concerned about Britain’s military aggression because China had claimed jurisdiction over the Kachin Hills with a traditional boundary marker called the Tiebi Gate, one of the fortresses erected by the Ming Empire.58

In his interactions with Thomas Wade around late March, Yixin emphasised that the Yunnan provincial authorities were overseeing the investigation and the application of the Treaty of Tianjin.59 His argument seemed to reveal the discord between Beijing and the provincial authorities over diplomatic matters, in which the provincial officials had gained increased power over the Qing court’s decision-making process along with the pacification of the mid-century rebellions.60 However, he could also have adopted a strategy of posing as a weak central government incapable of controlling strong local authorities. This approach would have several benefits: First, it precluded the possibility of Beijing’s direct and forceful interference in the investigation of the Margary Affair and thus shifted

55 Ibid., juan 1 (11–13), 26–27.
56 Ibid., juan 1 (15), 28.
Beijing’s role to be the intermediary between the British and Yunnanese officials. Second, it redirected the spotlight and blamed the Yunnanese officials should the investigation fail to please the British. Third, it bought him space to settle the dispute at a future, less confrontational time, as the officials in the remote frontier took their time to investigate and correspond with Beijing. In fact, the perspective of suiting local conditions and needs as well as depending on local leaders and resources was not new in Qing foreign policies, but had been proposed by Wei Yuan in the 1840s. After all, the local officials’ interests and their consequent impact on the Qing court’s worldviews and policies should not be underestimated. Hence, when the Qing court entrusted the investigation to Cen Yuying and his subordinates in Yunnan, it recognised local officials’ agency and liberty to collect and interpret evidence and to shape the narrative of the negotiations.

Voices of the Borderlands’ Protectors

Thomas Wade first heard of Cen Yuying’s “treacherous” reputation in November 1874 when William Frederick Meyers, a secretary at the British Legation, reported his meeting with Commander Ma Rulong of the Yunnan provincial military. Commander Ma had left Yunnan to collect monetary aid from the other provinces and had recently arrived in Beijing. He had been a Hui rebel leader but defected to the Qing government in 1861. He once cooperated with the French missionaries and merchants in Yunnan to suppress the Dali Regime and to explore the Red River for mineral trade (chapter 3). From Ma and his brother, Meyers learned about Britain’s potential trade partners in Yunnan: Governor-General Liu Yuezhao of Yun-Gui “would be much more ready to agree to commercial proposals”; and Commander Yang Yuke of Kaihua (now Wenshan) was interested in gaining a “monopoly over the Yunnan trade.”

Ma Rulong was interested in the mineral trade and was among the Yunnan provincial leaders, such as Liu Changyou and Cen Yuying, who advocated for the industrialisation of the mining industry in the 1870s and 1880s. Ma

63 BNA, FO 17/742, 26–27.
told Meyers that he had collaborated with the French, but they had failed him and were not trustworthy. Ma's brother indicated their willingness to cooperate with the British to import mining machinery, which would make the business more profitable. Ma's brother, who sympathised with his Hui fellowmen, especially wanted to tap into British connections and expand his trade with Burma.65 As Meyers heard more about Ma's disputes with Cen Yuying, he also learned about Cen's opposition to foreign trade. Ma's brother said that Cen was a “treacherous man ... who means one thing and says another.” He warned that Cen desired to gain the Qing emperor's favour by displaying his “anti-foreign feeling.”66 Ma's brother offered the following advice:

The people of Yunnan would be glad to see commercial relations established, but nothing would be done, he said in a low tone, unless the present governor, Ts'en Yu-ying [Cen Yuying], were first got out of the way ... The British Minister, he said, should memorialise the emperor to remove Ts'en to some other province: as in Yunnan he is certain to obstruct any attempt at intercourse with the British.67

Given the fact that Cen Yuying's disputes with Ma Rulong had become known in the Qing court back in 1864,68 it was possible that Ma attempted to utilise the British to crush his rival. Ma's brother, due to his sympathy toward the Hui rebels and potential business gains, probably had a similar purpose. They helped the British cultivate a dim view of Cen's integrity and an awareness of his consistent opposition before 1875. By late March 1875, Thomas Wade had expressed his suspicion of Cen and speculated that Li Zhenguos had received Cen's approval to attack the mission. Therefore, Wade pressed Yixin to investigate two questions: first, whether any officers in Tengyue, at the rank of commander or subprefect, had given orders to attack without instructions from the provincial government; and second, whether the Yunnan provincial government had ordered the attacks, leaving local authorities to suffer the consequences. Wade was eager to find out “not only who committed the act, but by whose orders it was committed.”69

65 BNA, FO 17/742, 24, 27, 32–35.  
66 Ibid., 35.  
67 Ibid., 26.  
69 1876 [C.1422] LXXXII, 574.
Despite the Zongli yamen’s agreement with the British and Li Hongzhang’s efforts to arrange travel for the special investigation, Cen Yuying did not welcome the British. Nor did he seem to appreciate Beijing’s interference. In a memorial to the throne as well as his message to the Zongli yamen on April 14, 1875, Cen sounded astonished by the death of Margary and the British accusations. Cen reminded them that the officials in Yunnan had shown great hospitality to the British man, who, under the protection of guards selected by Cen, had arrived in Burma safely. He argued that it was unreasonable for Tengyue’s troops to have engaged in the attacks, which were over 1,000 li from their base. He believed that Margary had abruptly returned to Yunnan without any notice and that his death, therefore, had indeed been an accident. Cen was confident that his subordinates would locate and punish the criminals if the attacks occurred within Yunnan’s territory. He would require King Mindon’s cooperation if the incidents happened in Burma. Cen further reminded the court that due to the French aggression in Vietnam, he had asked the Zongli yamen to prohibit foreigners from coming to Yunnan prior to the expedition. He and his colleagues were nervous for two practical concerns: foreign spies could pretend to be French travellers to enter Yunnan, and local bandits could pose as Qing troops to rob and attack the foreigners. However, the British still appeared in Yunnan abruptly without notifying local officials. Indeed, the governor subtly criticised the Zongli yamen for failing to heed his warnings. He also blamed the British for their own loss.

In the following months, Cen Yuying pressed Beijing to take stronger measures to prevent the British from encroaching on Yunnan as he had petitioned the court to stop the Indian viceroy from sending a new mission or any troops. He warned that new tragedies and diplomatic crises could occur if the British clashed with the untamed, wild men again. He believed that the British and French expansion would not be deterred by the deaths of Francis Garnier and Augustus Margary. The Qing court might inadvertently open a door to the European invaders if they were not cautious: satisfying Wade’s request of trade would pave the road for a future British annexation of Yunnan, whereas rejecting Wade’s demands might trigger an immediate war. Cen reported that he was quietly strengthening

70 See Li Hongzhang’s letters to the officials in Yunnan and to the British diplomats, in MJLHB, 240–43, 245–46.
72 CYYZG, vol. 1: 388–89.
Yunnan's border with Vietnam and carefully planning how to counter a potential British invasion. 73

Some intelligence Yixin received in early April validated Governor Cen's warnings. W. N. Pethick, the vice consul of the American consulate in Tianjin, informed the Zongli yamen that the members of the British parliament, mostly merchants who longed to open Yunnan, had asked the Indian government to launch a military campaign. Pethick said that Thomas Wade and the Russian ambassador had formulated a secret plan for the British troops to invade Yunnan while the Russian army attacked Xinjiang, which would leave the Qing government desperate. Robert Hart, the inspector-general of the Qing Imperial Maritime Customs Service, indicated that the British had assembled 5,000 troops in Rangoon to be stationed at Burma's northern border. Li Hongzhang also informed the Zongli yamen about the matter. 74 It was possible that the British army was preparing to deter King Mindon's attempt to possess the Karen state, but such a movement triggered panic among the officials in Beijing. 75 However, Li Hongzhang believed that the war would not happen because Thomas Wade seemed to understand that he had failed to inform the Zongli yamen and the Yunnanese officials of the additional troops that came with the expedition. 76 Around the same time, the Zongli yamen speculated that the British had mobilised troops to punish Burma because the Burmese could have orchestrated the incidents when the news reported Mindon's order to prevent the British from entering Yunnan and to even kill them if they came back. Robert Hart also thought that a war with Burma would be possible if such reports were true. 77 Nevertheless, Yixin later concluded, concurring with Cen Yuying, that in addition to preventing a war, he needed to avoid the traps set by the British. In response, the court issued orders to strengthen the defence of the southwestern and northwestern borderlands. 78

Cen Yuying strategically utilised the rhetoric of border security to defend Li Zhenguo and the western Yunnan gentry against British accusations. In late May 1875, Cen denied Thomas Wade's charges against Li and highly praised Li's crucial role in the consolidation of the imperial frontier. Cen stressed that having lost his family members during the Muslim rebellions,

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76 “Letter no. 112,” in LP&NP, 4654.
77 “Zongli geguo shiwu yamen wei Majiali anshi fu Yunnan xunfu Cen Yuying handi,” in MJLHB, 4–5; Zhongguo haiguan midang, no. 104, in MJLHB, 94.
Li had been battling against the rebels for over a decade. Li’s fellow gentry also made significant contributions to restoring the Qing government’s control of Yunnan’s border region. Cen insisted that Li was incapable of organising the attacks because his militiamen had been disbanded a year ago. Nor would Li attack Margary, argued Cen, because he had treated the British diplomat warmly, with a clear understanding that hostile behaviours would damage Sino-British relations. Cen asserted that the crimes were committed by the Kachin men or by some former militiamen who intended to make Li the scapegoat.79

Governor Cen had delivered a clear message that the court needed to evaluate the importance of its state agents in the borderlands. Li Zhenguo and the local gentry had not turned against Beijing, even when the Muslim rebels devastated the imperial control in Yunnan. Punishing Li would undermine his loyalty to Beijing as well as the confidence of the local gentry who could be implicated. As Yunnan was still recovering from decades-long destruction and social turmoil, the British and French had become increasingly aggressive in the area. The court needed to understand how much it depended on the state agents for stronger local control and border defence. Therefore, while Li and the borderlands elites had demonstrated their alliance to the state, Beijing should assure them with the same level of loyalty. Cen downplayed the dangers of ending Anglo-Qing relations and a potential invasion. He argued that the British were profit-driven speculators who could have invaded and occupied Yunnan during the chaotic years of the Muslim rebellions if they had intended to. He believed that the British troops’ movements along the Burmese border were not merely a result of the Margary Affair: this could be a strategy to force China to open Yunnan, or to deter China from resuming its suzerainty over Burma and assisting Mindon in reclaiming the lost territories.80

In late June 1875, Cen Yuying’s report of the investigations in Yunnan matched his earlier claims. Cen continued to defend Li Zhenguo and added that having had no knowledge of Margary’s travel itinerary, Li could not have offered any help when he came back from Bhamo and that his scouts had actively collected the information about the attacks after they happened. Cen further emphasised that the gentry and civilians in Tengyue had a strong desire to defend themselves when facing foreign invasions. Cen said that just as they were recovering from the wars, the gentry and civilians in Tengyue were enraged and frightened to hear that foreign merchants

and troops would occupy their city. Without concrete evidence to alert the Yunnan provincial government, the gentry, militia, and the native officials followed the convention of self-defence to respond to the crisis. The gentry sought Li Zhenguo’s aid, and their correspondence showed their plan to fend off the foreigners with absolutely no intention of killing Margary. Li had clearly wanted to protect Qing imperial territory, Cen asserted.\(^\text{81}\) In contrast to his downplaying of a potential British invasion in May, Cen now warned Beijing of an impending invasion, which underscored the empire’s reliance on the state agents forevermore. According to Cen, recent intelligence revealed that the British were planning operations that could endanger the Qing frontier, which included clearing a path to Yunnan, stationing more troops in Burma, and sending a British-Burmese joint army to Xishuangbanna and Simao. Mindon, however, risked his relationship with the British and refused to cooperate.\(^\text{82}\)

While revealing more information about the local actors’ involvement in the Margary Affair, the governor’s attitude was clear: those who had come to defend the Qing imperial borderlands should not be blamed for the death of potential invaders. Instead, Cen Yuying insisted that the wild men in the Kachin Hills, who robbed to make a living, had murdered Margary. Cen also implied that Margary was responsible for his own death: he had never notified local officials of his return, and his wealth had fomented the vicious desires of the Kachin men. Cen had acknowledged that the local authorities should take some responsibility because the incident had occurred within their jurisdictions. Therefore, he had ordered Commander Jiang Zonghan, Li Zhenguo, and some native officials to search for and arrest those wild men who had committed the crime. He stressed that he would remember the “kind concerns” the court had for the Yunnan borderlands. Despite possible obstructions from native officials, Cen promised to capture the criminals and bring them to Kunming when British investigators arrived.\(^\text{83}\)

Wade would not accept Cen Yuying’s reports. Nor could he change the underlying narrative that these reports had established or their future impact. As the relationship between Yixin and Wade deteriorated, Li Hongzhang stepped into the negotiations.\(^\text{84}\) Li had expressed his disapproval of Cen. He had also seen tremendous difficulties in investigating the incidents. Earlier on February 20, 1875, a letter from Pan Dingxin in Yunnan had

\(^{81}\) CYYZG, vol. 1: 397–400.
\(^{82}\) Ibid., 399.
\(^{83}\) Ibid., 397–400.
\(^{84}\) LP&NP, 4720–21.
warned Li of the potential dangers when the British expedition entered Yunnan with hundreds of troops. On April 11, Li urged Pan to report the future investigation in a timely manner. Li also mentioned that the Qing government could only find some excuses in its inability to protect foreigners in a newly restored province with civilians who felt uncertain and were easily agitated. 85 On May 9, the Zongli yamen instructed Pan to probe the situation in Yunnan due to a lack of channels to obtain the information there. 86 Li also wrote to Cen to discuss the importance of the investigation and encouraged Cen to communicate with Pan. 87

Nevertheless, Pan, a subordinate of Cen Yuying, could only inform Li Hongzhang his observation of Cen in secret letters that excluded the Zongli yamen, and Li would have discussions with other colleagues such as Ding Richang, the governor of Fujian. 88 Later, Pan revealed to Li how Margary was killed and that Cen looked flustered, as if he were trying to hide something. Pan thought a royal decree was necessary to order the interrogation and punishment of Li Zhenguo. Li Hongzhang then discovered that Pan’s message largely matched the accounts in some translated English news reports he copied from the Zongli yamen. Li Hongzhang further observed that the officials at the Zongli yamen had shown great anxiety when Thomas Wade set off for Hubei, which was around a week before they received Cen’s highly outspoken report in late May. 89 Both Li Hongzhang and Ding Richang agreed that it was necessary to send an official to Yunnan for the investigation as they gradually found Cen’s many problems, such as neglecting correspondences, deceptive, and arrogant. Li considered that the Margary Affair happened due to Cen’s poor calculation in the beginning, and Cen had to defend his subordinates again and again. However, Li struggled to find a suitable official to send to Yunnan. Ding would have been the right person to handle the investigation; however, Li was afraid that Cen would not submit to Ding’s authority. 90

From June 17 to July 6, 1875, Li Hongzhang sent five letters to his elder brother Li Hanzhang, the governor of Sichuan, who would soon be appointed to lead the special investigation in Yunnan. Li Hongzhang initially informed his brother that Cen Yuying’s notoriously unbridled and domineering manner

85 “Letter 112,” in LP&NP, 4653–54. The same letter is also in the thirteenth volume of Li Hongzhang’s pengliao hangao, which, however, misses the postscript (dated around a month later) found in Letter 112 (Li Hongzhang zhi Pan Dingxin shuzha).
86 Ibid.
87 “Fu jianshu Yun-Gui zhidai Yunnan futai Cen,” in MJLHB, 251–52.
88 “Fu Ding Yusheng,” in MJLHB, 263.
89 “Letter 113,” in LP&NP, 4655; Li Hongzhang’s letters to Li Hanzhang in MJLHB, 258–60.
90 See Li Hongzhang’s letters to Ding Richang and Li Hanzhang, in MJLHB, 258, 260, 263.
had intimidated the foreign investigators who were still lingering in Shanghai. After the Qing court officially assigned Li Hanzhang and Xue Huan to join the investigation in Yunnan, Li Hongzhang told his brother about what he had heard from Pan Dingxin and what he had discussed with Ding Richang. He warned that Cen, as a domineering provincial leader, would try very hard to protect his “confidants and minions”—all were borderlands officials—because they had secretly plotted against the British in the first place. Li Hongzhang admonished his brother, who was unfamiliar with foreign diplomacy, that the priority was to find and indict the executors and masterminds behind the incidents instead of worrying about opening Yunnan for trade. However, it would be difficult to find the murderers with Cen present in Yunnan. Li Hongzhang wanted his brother to discuss every matter with Pan. Regarding investigation, he insisted that Cen should be protected whether or not he knew the truth about the incidents, because he had been fighting in the wars and performing great service in Yunnan. Nevertheless, as a militia leader, Li Zhenguo, who had an unkind nature, would find aid from his local supporters. Overall, Ding Richang always worried that Li Zhenguo could easily escape due to his frequent connections with the Burmese and the Kachins. Ding and Li Hongzhang were concerned that Cen would never hand Li Zhenguo over to the investigation commission. Li Hongzhang had contemplated assigning Cen somewhere else when Li Hanzhang left for Yunnan; however, this was not applicable.

In the meantime, he asked Pan to lure Li Zhenguo to Kunming and not let him escape. Surprisingly, in early August, Cen agreed to put Li Zhenguo and some Tengyue officials under Li Hanzhang’s scrutiny, although he still opposed British participation in the special investigation. By giving the British peace of mind, Cen asserted, the unwavering evidence would prove that they were wrong. In the meantime, Li Zhenguo, Commander Jiang Zonghan, and Sub-prefect Wu Qiliang had begun searching for twenty-three “criminals” in the Kachin Hills. They received assistance from Dao Yingting, the native official of Ganya, and eventually captured seventeen men alive. They also claimed to have seized the horses and properties lost by Margary and his company.

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91 “Fu Li Hanzhang,” in MJLHB, 259.
92 “Zhi Li Hanzhang,” in MJLHB, 260.
93 See Li Hongzhang’s letters to Li Hanzhang, MJLHB, 258–59, 262, 266–67.
94 “Letter 113,” in LP&NP, 4655.
95 CYYZG, vol. 1: 405, 409–12, 418–19; Huang Chengyuan, “Majiali an yu Yuanshan, Jin Guoyu, Li Wenxiu yuan Mian jishi,” in Majiali shijian shiliao jianbian (MJLJB), in Majiali shijian shimo,
Li Hanzhang's Decision

In August 1875, Thomas Wade quickly lost his patience in his interactions with Li Hongzhang due to the obstacles to British participation in the investigations in Yunnan. Stressing the impending danger—the interference of the British navy and Indian Government—caused by the “misunderstandings” between the Chinese government and foreign powers, Wade raised seven requirements. He demanded China's fair treatment of British diplomats in the trials in Yunnan, and the sending of a Qing embassy to London to offer official apologies. Thomas Grosvenor, one of the British representatives to join the special investigation, had many complaints about Li Hanzhang, who showed the “most complete ignorance” of the Margary Affair. Like Yixin, Li Hanzhang emphasised the agency and power of the officials in Yunnan. He told Grosvenor that he could not promise anything without consulting the provincial officials in Yunnan.

In April 1876, Li Hanzhang concluded the special investigation with an official report that found some Kachin men guilty of murdering Margary and found Li Zhenguo responsible for obstructing the expedition. His conclusion did not deviate from the framework of Cen Yuying's previous reports but provided some details to convict “hill bandits” Ladu and Tong’ao and their followers. According to Li Hanzhang, these “habitual robbers” led one hundred people, including the Hui bandits, to stop and blackmail Margary. They killed the diplomat when he refused to comply and shot one of their men. These bandits also killed Margary's attendants and seized their luggage. Ladu later gathered more people to rob Colonel Browne's company because they carried even more valuable belongings. Soon, about 2,000 people, including bandits, Han, and the son of deceased Hui rebel General Li Guolun, “unexpectedly gathered together” to attack the British.

Li Hanzhang had dismissed most of the evidence and allegations against Li Zhenguo provided by the British. However, Li Zhenguo's correspondence with the Tengyue gentry became a controversial piece of evidence for his...
innocence. Li Zhenguo admitted that he had received messages from the Tengyue gentry, who had requested that his militia protect the area as the foreigners were approaching. However, he did not respond to those gentry’s request and therefore, he was not guilty. Instead, he reported the case to Cen Yuying but did not receive any response due to the long time period needed for communication. Cen had previously reported that Li Zhenguo's nephew had never involved himself in government affairs or commanded any troops, and the British had received a petition letter from Li's mother to prove his innocence. In contrast, subprefect Wu Qiliang testified that the gentry and their militia did not enter Burma. He would have stopped Li Zhenguo had they communicated; however, he had heard from the gentry that after receiving their plea for protection, Li responded that he had spent a large sum of money to arrange the defence. Commander Jiang Zonghan also said that it had been a norm for the gentry to organise militia and they did not usually leave Yunnan's territory. He never heard that they had any intention to stop the foreigners. According to his investigation, Jiang believed that Margary was killed by the Kachin men who demanded tolls from the diplomat and that Li Zhenguo was far away when the incident occurred. Li Hanzhang then reported that both Wu and Jiang heard about Li Zhenguo's arrangements after the incidents. Hence, this evidence proved Li Zhenguo's obstruction of the expedition.

Thomas Wade dismissed Li Hanzhang’s official investigation report. He and Thomas Grosvenor believed that the Yunnan provincial authorities intended to prove Li Zhenguo's innocence and to justify the execution of the Kachin men with contradictory and false evidence. The British also believed that Li had stopped Nay Elias's party in Nandian when they took a different route to Tengyue. This allegation was supported by Elias's account and a letter from French missionary Pére Fernouil, which contained the testimony of a Chinese attendant who served both Margary and Elias.
Later, the trials in Kunming were conducted with the intention of impairing the British judgement. In the eyes of the British, the Qing officials not only deviated from the British standards of procedural justice but also demonstrated a shocking level of negligence and indifference. Li Hanzhang never left Kunming, only sending a subordinate to secretly investigate in Tengyue and Mangyun before he came to Yunnan. Grosvenor remarked that “it is sufficient to state that the Commissioners have not produced, nor even pretended to produce, a single witness, either of the murder or the subsequent attack.” Grosvenor’s two colleagues believed that the Kachin suspects could not speak Chinese. Nor could they understand the interpreter well enough to properly respond to the interrogation. Wade also believed in their innocence. Contemporary local scholars have chastised the Qing officials for forging the testimonies of innocent Kachin men.

Thomas Wade once charged Cen Yuying and his subordinate Yang Yuke to have been the mastermind behind the Margary Affair. Wade even suspected that the court of Beijing had been involved in the matter, although he did not have any direct evidence. He further speculated that the officials in Tengyue would not openly challenge the Zongli yamen’s decree without Cen’s consent. Governor Cen, being a “truculent and ferocious” man, would compromise the safety of the mission because he was probably confident that the court would not be offended by his disobedience. Wade wishfully insisted that Cen, related Yunnan officials, and other suspects come to Beijing for more trials and that Li Hanzhang and Xue Huan be charged for conducting a dishonest investigation.

The investigation conducted by Li Hanzhang allowed him to carefully evaluate the relationship between the Qing state and its agents as well as its competitors in Yunnan and Indochina. Demonstrating his loyalty to Beijing, Cen Yuying had shown his determination to protect his subordinates and the local gentry, the protectors of the borderlands, who had violated the Zongli yamen’s decree to obstruct the British expedition. Previously, Li had not ruled

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110 1877 [C.1832] LXXXVIII, 780.
111 Ibid., 788.
112 Yu Nairen and Yu Xiqian, Majiali shijian shimo, 77.
113 “Fu Pan Qinxuan fangbo,” in MJLHB, 304.
out the possibility that Cen had been deceived by his subordinates.\textsuperscript{116} His younger brother Li Hongzhang had also reminded him to protect Cen in their correspondence in June 1875. Nevertheless, a debate ensued about whether to punish Cen in 1875 when Guo Songtao claimed his eccentric, perverse involvement in the Margary Affair and suggested his impeachment.\textsuperscript{117}

Guo Songtao would become China’s ambassador to Britain, France, and Russia after the signing of the Agreement of Chefoo that settled the Margary Affair in September 1876.\textsuperscript{118} While on duty in Fujian, Guo had often received intelligence that contradicted Cen’s reports, showing that Cen had ordered the officials in Tengyue to watch Browne’s party. However, these officials delegated this responsibility to the militias in Nandian (Li Zhenguos base). In this process, rumours emerged which ultimately led to the murder of Margary. Guo charged Cen with the crime of disobeying the Zongli yamen’s dispatches and failing to instruct and restrain local officers. Punishing Cen would warn those arrogant and prideful officials who had jeopardised the country with their behaviours. However, Guo soon faced overwhelming attacks from his colleagues whom he believed were protecting Cen simply because he had killed a foreigner and boosted their national pride.\textsuperscript{119} This backlash signalled the rise of the qingliu sect of officials and scholars who would push young Emperor Guangxu and Empress Cixi to take aggressive measures against the Westerners.\textsuperscript{120} Therefore, Li Hanzhang’s reports had

\textsuperscript{116} Li Hanzhang, zhengshu, vol. 2: 590.  
\textsuperscript{117} Guo Songtao, Guo Songtao zougao (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 1983), 350.  
\textsuperscript{118} The Agreement addressed the Margary Affair, the Sino-British diplomatic relations, and commerce. Specific diplomatic and legal measures included opening Yunnan and southwestern China for trade, stationing British officials in Yunnan to observe trade conditions, as well as establishing Chinese missions and consulates overseas. See Ch’ing Dynasty and ROC Treaties and Agreements Preserved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (MOFA), 910000013–002. The “single, monolithic Chinese World Order” had already been challenged by Western imperialism, especially after the Opium War when the Qing Empire had to give up previous perception of the world as “a collection of discrete frontier areas.” The Chefoo Convention continued to cement China’s status as a participant in the modern international order in which industrialised, imperial powers ruled. Because of the Convention, the Qing government had to open Yunnan and more coastal ports for trade and adjust the arrangement on customs and likin (a tax extracted from opium transactions). One term that the Qing officials especially struggled to comply with was sending official diplomats to Europe. See Kirk Larsen, Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008), 47; Mosca, From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy, 2–3, 303. Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire (New York, distributed by Paragon Book Gallery, 1917), vol. 2: 301–5.  
\textsuperscript{119} Guo Songtao, zougao, 348, 350; “Fu Ding Yusheng zhongcheng,” in MJLHB, 326.  
to appease the British, the nationalist Qing officials, and the state agents in the borderlands.

The long conversations with Cen Yuying and the investigation results drew Li Hanzhang to some fundamental issues regarding the Qing government’s initiative in opening Yunnan for trade and the stability of the borderlands. Facing increasing European aggression in Indochina, the Qing government could not risk jeopardising border defence by discouraging the state agents or provoking their antagonism toward Beijing. Therefore, Li regularly explained the nuances of the case in his memorials to the court. He denied Guo Songtao’s charges, saying that Cen had not issued secret letters or orders related to the attacks. Neither did Cen have any intention of covering up for his subordinates. Li commented on Cen’s tremendous contribution in quelling rebellions and restoring order in Yunnan. Cen’s only negligence, according to Li, had been the delay in addressing the case due to his heavy administrative duties. Li therefore conformed to his younger brother Li Hongzhang’s expectation of protecting Cen. Later in April 1876, Li Hongzhang praised Li Hanzhang’s handling of the investigation and confirmed with him that in addition to the fact that there was a lack of evidence, it was inappropriate to seriously punish Cen.

Li Hanzhang carefully presented the Tengyue gentry’s perspective to the court of Beijing: they were the state agents who mobilised for border consolidation and defence and, therefore, the attacks on the British expedition. After all, the testimonies collected by the special investigation sounded compelling: the civilians in Tengyue had been plagued by the Hui rebels for over a decade, and they organised to protect their homes as their fears about foreign invasion loomed large. Li Hanzhang adopted Cen Yuying’s narrative and emphasised the popularity of a rumour—the invasion of foreign merchants and troops—as soon as Margary passed the city and set

Hebei Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), no. 2 (1994): 23–29, 88. Rankins points out that the qingliu scholars and officials expressed their ideas in the form of qingyi (pure discussion) that was driven by strong national consciousness and opposition toward the Western countries and Westernisation. Qingyi evolved to “a national political consciousness that could be called public opinion” by the mid-1890s. The development of qingyi and the rise of the qingliu scholars also affected the redistribution of political power within the Qing bureaucracy. See Mary Rankins, ‘Public Opinion’ and Political Power: Qingyi in Late Nineteenth Century China,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 41, no. 3 (1982): 453–84.

122 Li Hongzhang, “Zhi Li Hanzhang,” in MJLHB, 337.
123 “Zongli geguo shiwu yamen cun shenxun Dian’an gongci,” in MJLHB, 22.
off for Burma in mid-December 1874. The Tengyue gentry assumed that the foreigners had ill intentions because they had coveted Yunnan for a long time. In their letter to Li Zhenguo on January 2, 1875, the gentry considered safeguarding Margary if he merely needed to pass through Yunnan. However, if Margary intended to proselyte or trade, they would follow the examples of how Westerners were treated in other provinces: surround him with big crowds, and force him to leave. The gentry further urged Li Zhenguo to prevent Margary from seeking attention and support from local officials. They stated that the purpose of their operations was to “repay the favours given [by the Qing government] for over 200 years.” They admonished Li to disregard the Han-barbarian division and collaborate with the native officials, except the uncivilised *yeren* (the Kachins). They then invited Li to join their joint militia exercise on January 13 and 14, a necessary preparation when the foreigners’ intentions remained uncertain. In the Tengyue gentry’s minds, the foreigners would pose “tens of thousands more dangers” than the rebels they had fought in the past decade. However, Li was accompanying Margary in Mangyun as the British had just arrived on January 13.

Li Zhenguo replied to the gentry in Tengyue on February 7, 1875. He explained that because of his deep concerns about tens of thousands of lives in his native Tengyue, he had been exhausting his mind and energy, carefully preparing day and night to stop the peril of foreign invasion. Li told the gentry that he had spent a large amount of silver to secure cooperation from the native officials, who had carved wooden plaques as tokens of their alliance and pressed their seals on an agreement that had been kept in Mangyun. Li said that he had met various Kachin leaders in three separate locations and awarded them generously with cattle and silver. These headmen would intercept the British expedition at some main intersections. Li sounded content with the preparations that had been made in Lasa, Longchuan (or Mongwan), and Mengmao (now Ruili). He was able to obtain more information about the British movements when he led some troops to Mengmao. Therefore, he had asked the headman of Tsarai to collect more intelligence and ordered all the native officials to make serious efforts to intercept and kill the British. Although the foreigners temporarily retreated to Bhamo, the interception

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124 See CYYZG, vol. 1: 397. The vagueness of Cen’s language makes it unclear whether the rumour began spreading after Margary left Tengyue’s territory or after he left Yunnan’s territory.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
mission was still carried out by officer Lin Xiaohong in Xuelie (or Xueli) and some Kachin leaders. Li Zhenguo believed that it would be impossible for the foreigners to escape. He informed the gentry that he was ready to attend to the operations at different locations and would start out in Namhkam. However, he worried that his men in Mangyun would be too far away from any assistance. Therefore, he urged the gentry in Tengyue to provide aid if the operation failed in Mangyun.130 Despite the disputed credibility of these letters,131 Li Hanzhang presented them to the throne. The letters offered the facts that the local gentry and officials wanted the Qing court to believe, which would further affect the court’s negotiations with the British.

In fact, Li Hanzhang had constructed a new narrative to strategically reduce the Qing government’s liability for the incidents and justify its state agents. He began by changing the definition of *yeren* (the wild men) in a memorial to the court in early December 1875. Instead of following the traditional way of defining *yeren* as the Kachin people, Li argued that *yeren* was a general term that included various inhabitants in the Kachin Hills, including the Kachins, the escaped Hui rebels, and the Han who were abducted by the natives. None of these people were the Qing militiamen who were accused of the attacks and murders.132 This extended definition indicated the existence of an unruled zone on the Burma-Yunnan frontier that was settled by “the uncivilised” and the outlaws. This language implied

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130 Ibid.; “Zongli geguo shiwu yamen cun shenxun Dian’an gongci,” in MJLHB, 18–19.
131 Wang Shengzu doubts the credibility of these letters. First, the letters were dated in the thirteenth year of Emperor Tongzhi’s rule, which was a year prior to the Margary Affair. The dates also did not match the dates in the documents that the British had translated. Second, Thomas Wade suspected the credibility of these letters. Third, Li Hongzhang once complained that all the suspects and evidence were ready before his brother had reached Yunnan and that the British had also already obtained the truth through their own investigations. Li Hongzhang also believed that his brother was unaware of too many “embellishments” that might have distracted his attention while working with Cen Yuying. Therefore, Wang wonders if these letters were part of those “embellishments” mentioned by Li Hongzhang. Wang also does not rule out the possibility that Cen forged these letters. See Wang Shengzu, “Majiali an he Yantai tiaoyue,” in Zhongying guanxi luncong (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1981), 99. Nevertheless, the meaning of “embellishments” was unclear in Li Hongzhang’s letter. At least, Li Hongzhang agreed with Thomas Wade’s charges against Li Zhenguo. For Li Hongzhang’s complaints about the embellishments found in the Yunnan officials’ handling of the case, see Li Hongzhang, “Bayue ershi ri fu Ding Weihuang gongbao,” in Pengliao hangao, vol. 18: 22–23.
132 Li Hanzhang, zhengshu, vol. 2: 611. The testimonies collected by the special investigation provided Li Hanzhang direct support of his definition. The Hui rebels, especially General Li Guolun, had collaborated with the Kachin men to resist the Qing military. Li Guolun’s son and the Kachin men also frequently robbed civilians. In addition, there were some Han who were abducted into the Kachin Hills and became Hanjian, the collaborators. See “Zongli geguo shiwu yamen cun shenxun Dian’an gongci,” in MJLHB, 22, 26.
that as robberies and raids were the norm here, it was inevitable that the British would be attacked or killed by the greedy and unruled hill bandits. This rhetoric also favoured the existence of the state agents whom the court depended on to guard the imperial frontier.

Later in his official investigation report issued in April 1876, Li Hanzhang used a tactful method to defend the state agents without completely irritating the British. Because the British did not have direct evidence of Li Zhenguo’s participation in the attacks, Li Hanzhang was able to maintain Cen Yuying’s claims and convict the Kachin men. However, the British allegation of Li Zhenguo’s obstruction in general was confirmed by the correspondence between him and the gentry as well as the testimonies of Jiang Zonghan and Wu Qiliang. Therefore, Li Hanzhang did not challenge, but contextualised, the accusation with some nuances. First, he reported that Li Zhenguo had completely denied sending any letters to the gentry. Second, the gentry had criticised Li Zhenguo for his arrogance and failure to coordinate with them. He detached Li Zhenguo and the gentry from a common, anti-British collaboration by presenting their mutual dissatisfaction and split. He explained that, fearing the Hui rebels’ secret return with the foreigners, the gentry invited Li Zhenguo to Tengyue to prepare for the defence. However, Li Zhenguo was suppressing bandits in Ganya and did not come. Hence, Li Zhenguo acted on his own and spent a fortune to mobilise people, hoping that the Tengyue gentry would cover the cost. In other words, Li Hanzhang provided the evidence that Li Zhenguo, not the Tengyue gentry, was responsible for the incidents. It was unclear whether such statements by Li Hanzhang reflected the gentry’s genuine desire to dissociate themselves from Li Zhenguo to avoid punishment. It was also unclear whether these notes were rhetoric, either from Li Hanzhang or from the gentry, to prevent more state agents from being convicted. Ultimately, the court would decide how to settle the case. Li Hanzhang only needed to practically demote Jiang Zonghan, Wu Qiliang, and Li Zhenguo for negligence or limited involvement in the matter.

In a separate memorial sent along with the official investigation report, Li Hanzhang pleaded with the court to fully consider the circumstances in the borderlands when settling the Margary Affair. Li explained the contradictions in the report:

There is no doubt to be earnest in the course of the Chinese-foreign negotiations in order to convince those who came from afar. Nevertheless,

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134 Ibid., juan 5 (22–26), 100–102; Li Hanzhang, *zhengshu*, vol. 2: 620–21, 625.
the Chinese officials and civilians were often stirred by spontaneous feelings of indignation and anger, which could result in grave mistakes that they were unaware of. Situations such as these were worthy of sympathy. In this case, the correspondence between the gentry in Tengyue and Li Zhenguo all indicated the intention to hold the foreigners back. If [we] actually are going to follow these letters and investigate [the case], it would not only bring Li Zhenguo severe punishment but also implicate the gentry.135

As shown in the epigraph, Li Hanzhang reminded the court that if they were to convict Li Zhenguo for killing Margary on the evidence collected, scourges would befall the gentry. This result would disappoint those state agents who had shown unwavering loyalty to the Qing government, especially when they had exhausted their own resources to fight against the rebels in a dire situation.136 Therefore, Li Hanzhang’s official investigation report argued that the gentry’s mobilisation was not aimed at resisting the foreigners but at preventing the bandits and rebels from entering Yunnan to stir up internal unrest. Li Hanzhang believed that “with solid and clear evidence,” Li Zhenguo, a capable man with mixed reputation, “was the main culprit of this matter, and there was no law to forgive [his misdeeds].”137 Therefore, the investigation finally concluded with the blame on Li Zhenguo as the “sole mastermind” behind the Margary Affair, although Li never pleaded guilty.138 Months later, Li Hongzhang would plead with the court to pardon Li Zhenguo by underscoring his contribution to Qing’s border consolidation.139 After all, Li Zhenguo was invaluable in “fighting for the country without reservation in the future.”140

Historical Writings on the Margary Affair

The literary tradition of commemorating the righteous men and virtuous women in Yunnan (chapter 1) has influenced popular interpretations of Li Zhenguo and the Margary Affair in the local historical documents that

136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 “Fu Ding Yusheng zhongcheng,” and “Zhi Pan Dingxin,” in MJLHB, 333, 336.
139 Li Hongzhang, “Zhi Lihanzhang,” “Qing kuanyou Li Zhenguo deng pian,” in MJLHB, 337, 452.
140 QJWJSL, vol. 1: juan 5 (32), 105.
were compiled before the PRC was established. In these writings, Li was a hero who fought for his country and his home against the rebels and foreign invaders. Li’s epitaph composed by the Tengyue gentry in 1888 did not mention his Burmese lineage but traced his ancestral roots to the guardians of the Ming imperial frontier who were from the Lower Yangzi Delta. The text of the epitaph did not prioritise historical accuracy. Instead, the authors glorified Li’s sacrifices and suffering by awarding him a happy ending with fame and the reunion of families. The epitaph especially wrote that the wrongful charges against Li were clarified after the settlement of the Margary Affair. Even the foreigners admired this great man’s bravery and patriotism, and they widely told his stories and brought glory to him.141

In the 1930s and 1940s, Li Genyuan reflected on the history of the Margary Affair and argued that the “wrongful charges” against Li Zhenguo might not be entirely wrong. In the early 1930s, Li Genyuan wrote that Li Zhenguo and Commander Jiang Zonghan were the ringleaders in Margary’s death.142 In 1942, Li Genyuan offered another account in his collection *Qushi wenlu*, with the portrayal of an arrogant British diplomat who had insulted the Yunnanese officials such as Cen Yuying and Commander Jiang.143 He indicated that the civilians and officials in Tengyue considered the British military movements in Burma and Margary’s topographic surveys as signs of foreign invasion. The operations against the British were initiated by the Tengyue gentry, arranged by Li Zhenguo, and approved by Cen Yuying. The killing of Margary was eventually executed by Li Zhenguo’s subordinates, officers Lin Xiaohong and Yang Dawu, with the cooperation of some Kachin headmen.144 This account aligned with the testimonies of Kachin men Tong’ao and Ladu in late November 1875, stating that Lin Xiaohong and

142 Li Genyuan, “Xuesheng nianlu” (XSNL), in *Zhengxuexi yu Li Genyuan*, ed. Cuncui xueshe (Hongkong: Dadong tushu gongsi, 1980), 40. Another piece of oral historical record collected in Commander Jiang Zonghan’s hometown Heqing indicated that Jiang had convened with the Tengyue gentry and collaborated with seven native officials to block the British, probably Browne’s party, by force. Cen Yuying consented to Jiang’s plan and supported him secretly. See Li Dacheng, *“Jiang Zonghan yu ‘Majiali shijian’,”* in *Heqingxian wenshi ziliao*, ed. Heqingxian zhengxie wenshuiwei (Dali: Dali xinhua yinshua chang, 1994), vol. 4: 185–86.
143 Li Genyuan’s wording was very vague. He stated that Margary intended to visit Cen Yuying following the enemies’ (the British) protocols. Cen refused, but Margary insisted arrogantly, which irritated Cen. Cen finally reconciled due to the concern over the Sino-British relations. See Li Genyuan, *“Ji Majiali an,”* in *Qushi wenlu* (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe), 76–78. Wang Shengzu argues that Li Genyuan’s account on the “rage of Yuying” over Margary was an indication of the inaccuracy of the document because Cen never received Margary in person. See Wang Shengzu, “Majiali an,” 106–7.
144 Li Genyuan, *“Ji Majiali an,”* 76–77.
Ladu both attacked and killed Margary. Li Genyuan further revealed that Cen visited Li Zhenguo in jail in Kunming before the trial. Cen then asked a subordinate to test Li Zhenguo’s loyalty by tempting him to turn in Cen’s secret letter to Li Hanzhang. However, Li Zhenguo had sewn the letter inside the cotton filling of his coat and refused to betray Cen even if he were executed. Therefore, Cen was determined to protect him. In November 1875, Cen lined up his army for miles and “welcomed” Li Hanzhan and Xue Huan in a very intimidating manner.145

In 1992, the government of the Dehong Prefecture in Yunnan sponsored the publication of local historians Yu Nairen’s (1913–1975) and Yu Naiqian’s writings on the Margary Affair as well as their compilation of the primary sources regarding the matter.146 The Yus identified the work of two late-Qing scholars, Huang Chengyuan and Chen Du (or Chen Guyi), who offered a different voice by stressing the role of the common people, the non-Han heroes, and the ethnic solidarity in the efforts to resist the British.147 Native to Guangxi, Huang Chengyuan (1863–1939) served several government positions in Yunnan during the late Qing era and had been an educator in Kunming since the 1911 Revolution.148 Huang’s account of the Margary Affair was included in his manuscript Wojilu xubi (Extended Writings in Wojilu). Huang utilised a new collective identity of bianmin, or the border people, which vaguely included the civilians of all ethnicities in the Yunnan borderlands. His strong criticism of the Qing officials and the gentry, such as Li Zhenguo, as well as his records of the border rebellions excluded the state and local elites from this identity group. Huang further identified the yeren as an inclusive group of border people that included the Kachin, Tai, Nùng, and the remnants of the Muslim rebellions, which underscored the ethnic unity and cooperation that had broken through the distinctions between the Han and non-Han groups.

Huang Chengyuan’s interpretation of the Margary Affair took a bottom-up approach, focusing on the mass mobilisation led by the non-Han border

146 See Preface (by Ma Yao), in Majiali shijian shimo, 5–9.
147 Yu Nairen and Yu Xiqian included some exclusive historical documents written by Huang Chengyuan and Chen Du that cannot be found in current libraries and archives in Yunnan, especially with the Covid-19 restrictions. For example, Huang Chenyuan’s Wojilu xubi was originally hand-copied by a staff at the Wenshiguan (Research Institute of Literature and History) of Yunnan who then allowed the Yus to hand-copy some content. The Yus also hand-copied and kept Chen Du’s Guolai renyu and a part of Aijingzhai riji. See MJLJB, 231.
people. This narrative deviated from the conventional historiography of the late Qing and early Republican eras that favoured the role of the gentry. Huang adopted a dichotomy when identifying the main actors in the border affairs. He placed the border people on the opposite side of the state officials and local elites. According to Huang, the border people were not passive agents that acted upon the orders of the state officials and local elites: facing the same foreign humiliation and invasion, they thought and responded differently than the latter group. In comparison to the state and local authorities who bent to the will of the foreigners to secure their own interest, the border people protected their homeland and country with great patriotism. Such a contrast reflected both groups’ deep disagreement about the foreigners and border defence, causing the inevitable deterioration of their relationship. Consequently, the border people would rebel when they became the target of persecution in the process of settling the Margary Affair.  

Huang Chengyuan wrote that the border people were concerned that “the British had stationed thousands of troops in Rangoon and were going to assault Tengyue” and that they had “disregarded the provincial officials’ repeated order to protect the foreigners.” In the spring of 1875, a coalition of Tai, Nùng, and Han were united under the leadership of the Kachin and Hui “to establish a very tight defence line of hundreds of kilometres’ distance, connecting Nandian, Ganya, Longchuan, and Mengmao.” He stressed that the border people killed Margary because of their dignity and righteousness in defending the borderlands and countering foreign humiliation. He clarified that the Kachin and Tai were unsophisticated, honest, and orderly people: they would not possess lost items on the road, nor would they lock their doors at night. It was impossible for them to covet Margary’s wealth and rob him. Therefore, Huang was baffled by why such a group of patriots, or defenders of the country, would be labelled and charged as robbers and murderers.

150 Ibid., 241.
151 Ibid., 244. Huang Chengyuan’s view challenged stereotypical descriptions of the native population, especially the Kachins in both the Chinese and British documents. The Kachins were often referred to as yeren, the wild men, in Chinese literature. The British, on the other hand, recorded that “the Kachins are a savage race of mountaineers, without civilisation or law, recognising no common Chief, turbulent and warlike nature, and living to a large extent by plundering and blackmail levied on caravans.” See BL, IOR/L/PS/7/65, Sec. No. 37., Note by W. Warry, Esq., Political Officer, Bhamo, on the Burmo-Chinese Boundary, 838.
152 Huang Chengyuan, “Majiali an,” 244.
In contrast, Huang considered the officials and elites in Yunnan to be complicit in the British accusations and persecution of the border people. Cen Yuying struggled to justify his claims. Li Hanzhang and Xue Huan were intimidated by Cen and fabricated evidence. Li Zhenguó denied all the charges and completely disassociated himself from the incident. Worse, local military officers and gentry arrested the Kachin men and slaughtered innocent border people to appease the British. Huang wrote that the “wrath of ... heavens and men” manifested when Jiang Zonghan and Li Zhenguó killed and captured the border people in two battles in the Kachin Hills. Nevertheless, despite the language barrier, these men of great dignity raised their voice and rebuked the “bandits” (the British officials) during the trial in Kunming.153

Huang Chengyuan established a narrative in which the border people’s consistent resistance against the British suffered suppression by the Qing government, which would trigger rebellions in the following years and destabilise the frontier.154 At times, he failed to find clear and direct evidence for his arguments.155 His accounts could also contradict other sources, especially regarding the case of officer Yuan Shan, who, according to Li Genyuan, was assigned by Cen Yuying to lead a counter-British operation in Burma (chapter 4).156 Huang identified Yuan Shan, Jin Guoyu, and Li Wenxiu, who were recorded as Qing army officers in other sources, as notable leaders who led the border people to aid the Burmese resistance, just like how the Black Flags assisted Vietnam to counter the French.157 Ultimately, despite the border people’s consistent efforts to protect the country, the Qing government succumbed to the British in the 1890s and eventually lost the Hongbang River (or Nampaung) and the Huju Gate.158

Chen Du (1864–1941), a Kunming scholar who participated in the compilation of the Pu’er fuzhi (Gazetteer of the Pu’er Prefecture, 1900),159 shared

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153 Ibid., 241–42.
154 Huang Chengyuan wrote that in 1876, as soon as Su Kaixian and Wang Yulin called border people to rebel against the Qing government for revenge, the Kachin and Hui responded quickly. But the border officials would not dare to report the truth of the rebellion. In 1876 and 1877, more revolts occurred in Longchuan and Gengma due to the same reason. Ibid., 243.
155 Tracing some vague and brief historical accounts, Huang argued that in 1876, the Qing military assaulted and killed the Kachins and Hui who built fortresses or occupied towns to deter the British. Ibid., 242–43.
156 XSNL, 37–38.
157 Huang Chengyuan, “Majiali an,” 242–43.
158 Ibid., 243–44.
159 Chen Du was also known as Chen Guyi, who received a jinshi degree in 1904. He was in charge of the Yunnan provincial mint factory and then temporarily served in the office of foreign
Huang Chengyuan's views. In a personal diary accredited to Chen,\(^{160}\) Li Genyuan’s father was the first person to inform Chen of the coming of the British invaders in December 1874.\(^{161}\) This alleged diary written by Chen became a main source for many scholars in supporting their arguments on border civilians’ collaboration in the Margary Affair and anti-Qing rebellions. In Chen's other writings, he contended that in the collaboration against foreign humiliation, there was no distinction between “the hill and the valley, as well as the Han and the non-Han.”\(^{162}\) He commented on the contribution of Hui General Li Guolun's force in the operation against Margary’s expedition. Like Huang, Chen criticised Cen Yuying’s betrayal and Li Zhenguo’s ruthless killing of the non-Han people. He also shared Huang's view in evaluating the roles of Qing officials and border people in the rebellions in Yunnan and Burma after 1875.\(^{163}\)

Huang Chengyuan and Chen Du challenged the traditional narratives and value judgements that emphasised the leadership and contribution of local elites and the state agents in the borderlands. They laid the foundation for recognising the border people as an inclusive and diverse identity group diplomacy in the Yunnan provincial government after the 1911 revolution. Chen Du's ten-volume essay compilation was known as Paoyingji. See Sun Le, “Chen Guyi xiansheng zhuan,” in Xu Diannan beizhuanji jiaobu, ed. Fang Shumei (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1993), 491–92; Jiang Qingbo, ed., renwu zhuanji, vol. 10: 668; Pan Xianlin has a very thorough examination on Chen Du. Pan Xianlin, “Chen Du Kunming jinshi shehui bianqian zhilüe,” in Xueshu tansuo, no. 7 (2004): 93–97. Li Shuo's article in 1986 provided the information for later research on Chen Du; however, the article did not provide references to its sources. See Li Shuo, “Chen Du yu Kunming jinshi shehui bianqian zhilüe,” Journal of Yunnan Normal University (Humanities and Social Sciences), no. 6 (1986): 52–55.

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160 According to Sun Le's account, Chen Du died in 1941 at age of 77. This record indicated that Chen was around ten years old when the Magary Affair happened. It is possible but still very unusual for a ten-year-old boy to have befriended the gentry in the borderlands and received intelligence on the border affairs. See Jiang Qingbo, ed., renwu zhuanji, vol. 10: 668.

161 Chen Du, “Aijingzhai riji,” vol. 8, in MJLJB, 244.


163 Chen argued that the British forced the Qing border officials to “turn against their own kind” and suppress Jin Guoyu’s rebellion in Bhamo. He further criticised local scholars, such as Yin Zijian from Tengyue, for possessing ill intentions and defiling Jin’s reputation by labeling him as a bandit. Ibid., 247–49. Yin Zijian was a scholar from Tengyue who was very productive in the research about the western Yunnan borderlands. His uncle Yin Rong was the founder of the Yunnan Association in Mandalay and served the Burmese king before he retired in Tengyue. Yin Zijian lived in Burma for most of his life and was a mentor to Fang Guoyu in his research on ethnic history, local history, and Sino-Burmese relations. See Yin Wenhe, Yunnan Heshun qiaoxiangshi gaishu (Kunming: Yunnan meishu chubanshe, 2003), 246–50; Li Yi, Chinese in Colonial Burma: A Migrant Community in A Multiethnic State (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 42.
that had been independent from the Qing government and the Han gentry. Compared to the Han gentry whose loyalty to their native place and their country prompted them to fight against the Hui rebels and foreign invaders, the border people fought against the Qing government and the foreigners for the same reasons. Over time, Huang’s and Chen’s literary traditions would become part of the common historical interpretation of the agency of the people in Mao Zedong’s New Democratic Revolution that was led by the proletariat and the CCP.\footnote{In January 1940, Mao Zedong proposed the concept of the New Democratic Revolution, which was a new type of bourgeois revolution, led by the proletariat. According to Mao, under the leadership of the CCP, the New Democratic Revolution in China commenced on the May Fourth Movement. The New Democratic Revolution, however, was the first stage of China’s revolution and would be followed by the socialist revolution. See Mao Zedong, “Xin minzhu zhuyi lun,” in Mao Zedong xuanji (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), vol. 2: 662–711.}

The aims of this new revolution were to overthrow the Three Mountains—imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism.\footnote{In June 1945, Mao Zedong argued the concept of the Two Mountains—imperialism and feudalism—that had been oppressing the Chinese people. He compared the effort to remove these oppressions to Yugong yishan, a Chinese parable that tells the story of an elderly man who was determined to remove two giant mountains in front of his house by hand. This comparison laid the foundation for the future conceptualisation of the Three Mountains in April 1948 when Mao addressed the CCP party cadres from Shanxi and Suiyuan. Mao pointed out that China’s New Democratic Revolution could only be led by the proletariat. The goal of this revolution is to overthrow imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. See Mao Zedong, “Yugong yishan,” in Mao Zedong xuanji, vol. 3: 1101–2; Mao Zedong, “Zai Sui-Jin ganbu huiyi shang de jianghua,” in Mao Zedong xuanji, vol. 4: 1313, 1316–17.}

Huang Chengyuan’s and Chen Du’s new discourse would align with the main themes of the PRC historiography, underscoring that the people are the creators of history. Earlier in the Seventh National Congress in April 1945, Mao Zedong taught all CCP party members that “the people, and only the people are the drive of creating world history.” He recognised that the people had been leading great struggles in China for the past hundreds of years.\footnote{Mao Zedong, “Lun lianhe zhengfu,” in Mao Zedong xuanji, vol. 3: 1031. The term the People has been a contingent term in the CCP literature. Nevertheless, the Qing government officials and gentry could hardly fit into this category.}

Therefore, the foundation and direction of the future historiography had become clear: focusing on the critical role of the people and their leadership in China’s rebellions and revolutions, as well as in anti-feudal (Qing) and anti-imperialistic struggles.

Huang Chengyuan’s and Chen Du’s criticism of the Han gentry and Qing officials would also align with the CCP’s criticism of the same groups of historical figures who had brought humiliation to the Chinese nation.
Their writings provided the insights and primary sources that could corroborate the CCP’s promotion of the unity of all ethnic groups in the Chinese national effort to deter Western imperialism. This emphasis would support the construction of a historical unified Chinese nation under the CCP’s ideological framework, such as the writings of Yu Nairen and Yu Xiqian. From the 1980s to 1990s, Fei Xiaotong’s construction of a unified Chinese nation with diverse ethnicities would benefit from the examples found in Huang’s and Chen’s narratives arguing for Chinese national coherence in the process of fighting against the foreign invasions throughout history.\(^{167}\)

As the traditional literature and historical documents compiled by the gentry in western Yunnan have enlarged the Han-ethnic distinctions, Huang and Chen promoted ethnic solidarity, especially ethnic leadership, in the history of the borderlands. They portrayed the Han gentry and the Qing government as the oppressors of the border people and their patriotic operations. This narrative would echo the CCP’s conventional interpretation of the ruling classes of the Qing dynasty. In the 1960s, the historical writing on the Margary Affair in the PRC would demonstrate a trend: the discussions on Li Zhenguo gradually disappeared as more literature praised the border people’s active role in countering the British invaders.\(^{168}\) In the meantime,

\(^{167}\) Fei Xiaotong, Zhonghua minzu duoyuan yiti geju (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu daxue chubanshe, 1999).

\(^{168}\) In their compilation on the primary and secondary sources on the Margary Affair, Yu Nairen and Yu Xiqian have a list of Chinese publications on the matter with abridged content from the original books. See Fan Wenlan, Zhongguo jindaishi (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1962), 221–23; Guo Moruo, Zhongguo bianjiang diqu zhi weiji (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1962), 92–93; Wang Boyan, Zhongguo jindaishi jianghu (Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 1959), 103–4; Huadong Shifan Daxue zhongguo jindaishi jiaoyanzu: Zhongguo jindaishi jiangyi (Shanghai: 1959), vol. 2: 164–65; Ding Mingnan, “Majiali shijian,” in Dingguo zhu yi qinhuashi, ed. Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, vol. 2: 365; Zhang Jianfu, “Zhongying Yantai tiaoyue yu Miandian de sangshi,” in Zhongguo jindai bainian lishi jiaocheng (Guilin: Wenhua gongyingshe, 1943), 86–89. None of these publications mentioned Li Zhenguo and the Tengyue gentry. All of these works discussed the border people’s operations to defend the country against the foreign invaders. See MJLB, 250–61. In their own research, Yu Nairen and Yu Xiqian largely cited Huang Chengyuan and Chen Du. They further developed the discourse of the border people’s contribution in the Margary Affair, and their narrative emphasised the power and agency of the people in the historical development. See Yu Nairen and Yu Xiqian, Majiali shijian shimo. In Zhongguoshi gangyao, Jian Bozan had a brief account on the Margary Affair, writing that Margary was refused a passage through Manyun by the civilians, and he was killed in their arguments with each other. See Jian Bozan, Zhongguoshi gangyao (Beijing: renmin chubanshe,1964), vol. 4: 55. Lu Ren argues that although Margary’s preparation for Britain to launch an economic invasion in Yunnan deceived the Qing government, it failed to fool the people of Yunnan. With great rage, local Jingpo (Kachin), Dai (Tai), and Han people killed Margary in Manyun and drove Browne back to Bhamo. Lu Ren, Yunnan duiwai jiaotongshi
the local gentry and their roles in the Margary Affair, which was mentioned by Wang Shengzu, were never fully developed until the government of Dehong Prefecture compiled and published a new collection of historical documents on the Margary Affair in 2021.

This new compilation of primary sources, an effort to create a new, standardised collective memory, is based on some historical accounts collected and written by Wu Jiafu (a former associate secretary of the CCP party school in Dehong), the oral interviews sponsored by the government of Dehong in 2020, and Qing historical documents and archives. This publication, according to the People's Political Consultative Conference Committee of Dehong Prefecture, has multiple purposes, including unifying the competing narratives and propaganda about the event, building a base of patriotic education with this history and related historical sites, and developing cultural tourism. The committee has consolidated a unified narrative that recognises the Margary Affair as a “patriotic, counter British struggle” in which local people of various ethnicities participated, aiming to “protect the borderlands of [their] home country.” The movement was organised by the native officials of Nandian and Xueli, who were “Dai” and “Jingpo,” and supported by Jiang Zonghan and Li Zhengu. However, the “Jingpo people had made greater contributions and paid grave sacrifices in this struggle.”

Wu Jiafu indicates that he had been drawn to the history of the Margary Affair since he was small. In 1953, his Jingpo teacher and local Jingpo civilians educated him more on their heroic counter-British activities, including the Margary Affair. In late 1979, he was urged by Hu Yaobang, the head of the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party, to write the history of the Margary Affair and the Jingpo people's contribution

(Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 328; Yunnan jindaishi (edited by Li Gui) has a similar account (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1995), 28. In Yunnan jindaishi, the authors discuss Li Zhengu's and the Tengyue gentry's mobilisation of border defence. They also point out that the merchants and scholars in Manyu had asked the secret society leaders Lin Xiaohong and Yang Dawu to deter the foreigners. While Li Genyuan identified Lin Xiaohong as a subordinate of Li Zhengu, Yunnan jindaishi indicates that Lin and Yang were drifters from inner China. In this book, Lin and Yang led over one hundred civilians of Hui, Han, Dai, and Jingpo, killing Margary and driving Browne out. See Yunnan jindaishi bianxiezu, ed., Yunnan jindaishi (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1993), 75–77.

169 MJLHB, 686.
170 Among various historical narratives recognised by the Committee, one interview with the descendants of Nandian cawfa indicates that the cawfa followed Cen Yuying’s secret order and killed Margary. See Zhengxie Dehongzhou weiyuanhui, “Majiali shijian yizhi baohu he liyong qingkuang xieshang yijian,” in MJLHB, 641–45.
171 Ibid., 644–45.
in protecting the Ming border gates. Therefore, Wu spent the next forty years conducting interviews and investigations, dedicating a total of sixty years of his life to researching the matter.\footnote{Wu Jiafu, “Xueli shanguan yu Majiali Shijian ji Ajiledai yu shang siguan shishi diaocha qingkuang shuoming,” in MJLHB, 654–56.} Without deviating from Huang Chenyuan’s and Chen Du’s traditional discourse, Wu provided more details on a well-organised defence force operated by the Kachin elites, especially Lin Xiaohong, and civilians, who were also the state agents in his narrative.

According to Wu Jiafu, Lin Xiaohong was born around 1844 and given the name Yuezaola. His father, Yuezaonong, was a Kachin native official in Xueli (or Xuelie) who had hired a Han tutor to teach Chinese and history. To fulfil his patriotic wish to save the nation and serve the people, Yuezaonong sent his son to a Han gentry friend named Lin Yuexiang who was well-connected with other native leaders and the Qing army. Lin Yuexiang became Yuezaola’s surrogate father, giving him a Chinese name, Lin Xiaohong, and taking him to social activities. Dressed like a Han, Yuezaola learned “the Han language,” “the Han characters,” and “the ways and customs the Han treated people and handled things,” as well as the “Chinese people’s beliefs and the traditional Chinese culture.”\footnote{Ibid., 660.} Later, Lin Xiaohong became an army officer under the command of Li Zhenguo.\footnote{Ibid., 660–61.} Wu Jiafu narrates that to assist the Qing border defence and deter potential British invasion, Yuezaonong and the native officials around the Tongbi Gate organised a force called “Zhongguo Jinpozu Tongbiguan Diqu Kangying Ziweijun” (the Jingpo people’s Counter-British Self-defence Army of the Tongbi Gate District of the Chinese Nation). Yuezaonong was elected as the chief commander, and Lin Xiaohong was invited to train this force of three squadrons and a total of 432 people.\footnote{Ibid.}

Wu Jiafu indicates that under the order of Commander Jiang Zonghan, Lin Xiaohong escorted Margary to Bhamo, where Lin heard about the coming of a British army. On his way back, Lin asked Yuezaonong to watch their movements. Yuezaonong then learned that an armed force of 200 troops was coming with a Jingpo guide they had bribed. Yuezaonong sent this message to his son and asked the defence force to prepare for war. Lin Xiaohong passed the information to Li Zhenguo, who then informed Commander Jiang and Subprefect Wu Qiliang. After that, while arranging the defence with the gentry, Li Zhenguo ordered Lin and his colleague Yang Dawu to join the operations in Xueli. In the meantime, Li Zhenguo began arranging defence against the British
invasion, which won strong support from the Tengyue gentry. While appointing troops from the Jingpo self-defence force to follow and intercept the British, Lin and Yang urged the native officials in Zhanda, Ganya, Nandian, and Longchuan to mobilise people of various ethnicities. Wu Jiapu reports that Lin Xiaohong confronted Margary, and, as one of his troops was shot, Yuezaonong gave the order to kill the foreigners. After Lin Xiaohong and Ledu cut off Margary’s arms, Lin Dapeng pierced his chest with a javelin and others threw their knives at him. Later, Lin Xiaohong, Yang, and over ten patriotic young leaders commanded over 2,000 people of “Dai, Jingpo, Han, Hui, Lisu, Achang, and De’ang” origins to join the Xueli defence forces that were attacking Browne’s company.¹⁷⁶

Since the Margary Affair, various historical documents have indicated that local actors actively shaped local history and international relations. The historical writings about various state agents revealed their immense social and commercial networks across western Yunnan and Upper Burma. Within these networks, both the Han and non-Han families compiled genealogies, engaged in ancestor veneration, and organised native place associations. They followed Confucian and Han norms and established the Han homelands in the multi-ethnic Yunnan borderlands. While sustaining their collective identity and core family territory, these families stabilised the imperial borderlands by countering internal rebels and external threats. Their voice was essential if the Yunnan provincial government and the Qing court would continue to rely on them for border consolidation and defence.

The stories of state loyalists and patriotic border defenders had already appeared before the outbreak of Du Wenxiu’s Rebellion and became a dominant rhetoric within the Qing bureaucracy by the time of the Margary Affair. Competing narratives provided different explanations of who these protectors were and how they defended their local communities and the country. While the roles of local gentry had been dominant in traditional historiography, they were downplayed in Huang Chengyuan’s and Chen Du’s writings that emphasised ethnic unity and the contribution of non-Han civilians. This new discourse broke through the strong ethnic divisions and Han ethnocentrism that ruled the traditional writings of the Yunnan gentry, challenging the stereotypes of the ignorant, unruled, and inactive non-Han groups that were the passive agents of the Han leadership. Echoing the CCP’s emphasis on people’s agency and decisive roles in the revolutions, this discourse has laid the foundation for the historical and ongoing creation of Yunnan’s new collective memory and literature after 1949.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 661–66.
3 From Bandits to Heroes

Abstract
Chapter 3 moves the dialogue to how borderland officials in Guangxi and Yunnan weighed and manipulated their cooperation with non-traditional allies, including the French and Liu Yongfu. The Guangxi and Yunnan governments’ relationship with Liu and the French demonstrated the relativity of “ally” and “enemy” in different contexts and visions of domestic and borderland consolidation.

Keywords: The Black Flag Army; Jean Dupuis; Huang Chongying; Ma Rulong; the Red River

On the eleventh day of the ninth month, Madam Liu née Wang gave birth to Yongfu at the eastern corner of a brick house. [The child had been] named Jianye ever since. Neighbours all said that this baby would accomplish great success in the future because he had radiant eyes and loud cries.
—Liu Yongfu Zhuan

One day, the honourable gentleman [Liu Yongfu] went to fetch firewood in the mountains. When he took a nap on the stone path, Yongfu suddenly saw an old man with long sideburns and a beard. The old man ... said to him: “Aren’t you the Black Tiger General? Why are you still hiding in the woods and not willing to get out of the mountains?” [Yongfu] woke up immediately after [the man] stopped talking and realised that it was a dream. The honourable gentleman was twenty then and did not think too much about the dream (which inspired the creation of the Black Flags later).
—Liu Yongfu Lishicao


doi: 10.5117/9789048558995_CH03
In the late 1860s, Liu Yongfu (1837–1917), leader of the Black Flag Army, successfully settled in Vietnam after subduing rival bandits in Tonkin. While assisting the Guangxi military in pacifying the Chinese bandits in Vietnam in the early 1870s, he ironically hindered the efforts of French merchant Jean Dupuis and the Yunnanese officials to trade via the Red River. At the end of 1873, the Black Flags killed French officer Francis Garnier when he came to aid Dupuis in his occupation of Hanoi. Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, Liu had transformed himself from an outlaw into an agent for both the Vietnamese and Qing governments, especially in the latter’s efforts to secure its tributary and southwestern frontier. The Qing court officially recruited him as a military commander in 1885 and awarded him the honorary title of Baturu, the warrior.3

There is no shortage of traditional Chinese literature that emphasises Liu Yongfu's heroism in Vietnam.4 Among the Western literature, Henry McAleavy’s account examines Liu within the contexts of Sino-Vietnamese relations as well as the British, French, and Qing competition and diplomatic exchanges regarding Indochina.5 Focusing on the Black Flag Army’s hegemony and violence in the upper Red River, Bradley Davis argues that “bandits exist as fundamental aspects of imperial power” with which the “Qing, Vietnamese, or French, attempted to buttress formal authority.”6 Bradley discusses the alliance between Dupuis and the Yellow Flags, who were the rivals of the Black Flags in Tonkin, though without thorough engagement with both parties’ connections with the Qing provincial authorities. This chapter continues that conversation by discussing how Yunnan provincial authorities cooperated with the French missionaries and Jean Dupuis while alienating Liu Yongfu. In contrast, Liu became an ally of the Vietnamese government and Guangxi military as he cooperated with both parties to suppress the Yellow Flags and rival bandits in Tonkin.

Traditional narratives of nationalism and patriotism sometimes simplify Liu Yongfu's stories by neglecting the alliances and networks that did not completely conform to the conventional perceptions of “them” and “us,” subject to political and national boundaries. The Guangxi and Yunnan authorities’ relationships

4 See the examples from Shao Xunzheng, Zhongfa Yuenan guanxi shimo (Shijiazhuang: Hebei Education Publishing House, 2000); Liao Zonglin, Zhongfa zhanzhengshi (Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe, 2002); Long Zhang, Yuenan yu Zhongfa zhanzheng (Taipei: The Commercial Press, 1996).
with the Black Flags and the French exemplified the relationship between “ally” and “enemy” in different contexts and contrasting visions of domestic and borderland consolidation. This chapter discusses how the borderland officials in Guangxi and Yunnan weighed and manipulated their cooperation with non-traditional allies, including Jean Dupuis and the Black Flags. While Liu’s rise in the Qing military demonstrated that local actors’ loyalty to the state could be cultivated, it also showed that common goals between the state powers and local actors moved them closer under certain conditions.

Creating the Hero

*Liu Yongfu lishicao* (Manuscript of Liu Yongfu’s History, 1936) and *Liu Yongfu zhuan* (Liu Yongfu’s Biography, 1938) were published amid the Japanese invasion of China, both claiming to be Liu Yongfu’s personal account of his life stories. *Lishicao* was edited by historian Luo Xianglin, who managed to obtain Liu’s recollections on a research trip in southern China in 1932. These volumes were compiled and kept by Huang Hai’an, who served in the Black Flag Army and later became the tutor of Liu’s children and grandchildren. Huang transcribed Liu’s oral records and documented a rough draft of 100,000 words one year before the general died in 1917. Luo then spent two months proofreading and punctuating the manuscript “without changing any words” and later published it as *Liu Yongfu lishicao.*

Monk Tiechan also claimed to have kept Liu Yongfu’s oral records. A clansman of Liu Yongfu, Tiechan served the general in Guangzhou and remained connected after he became a monk. When he came to Guangzhou for the last time, Tiechan received six volumes of Liu’s life events, “recorded by a secretary,” directly from the old general. Liu Yongfu once said the manuscript was merely a chronicle of events, without much literary value; however, he hoped that his record could be presented to the public if Tiechan encountered scholars someday and that his life stories would not vanish. In 1934, Tiechan entrusted these volumes to a scholar named Li Jian’er from Sanshui, Guangdong, who then thoroughly examined the manuscript and compiled *Liu Yongfu zhuan* in 1938.

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7 For more details on how Luo obtained the manuscript see *LYFLSC*, 1–2.
8 Liu Xiushan was the monk’s given name.
9 Tiechan Shangren xu, in *LYFZ*, 1.
10 Tiechan postponed the project to publish the rough manuscript. More details see Preface by Li Jian’er and Tiechan, in *LYFZ*.
Both Luo Xianglin and Li Jian'er commented on Liu Yongfu's remarkable contributions to the fight against the French and the Japanese. Their books recorded heavenly signs that prophesied Liu's extraordinary life, during which he would face afflictions and tests to cultivate his abilities even when he was young. Liu was filial, intelligent, diligent, and courageous; however, he and his younger brother drifted across southwestern Guangxi and Vietnam after losing their parents and uncle. In 1858, Liu joined a rebel army led by Wu Yuanqing, who, with alleged ties to the Tiandihui, founded the Yanling State in Guangxi in 1861.

The Qing government commonly identified these rebels as bandits who moved around depleting local resources. They sometimes fought against each other but also occasionally collaborated in anti-Qing operations. As these bandits migrated across Guangxi, Yunnan, and northern Vietnam to survive Qing suppression, Liu Yongfu shifted from one group to another for more stable supplies and capable leaders. In 1865, he returned to Wu Yuanqing's camp with 200 men. However, Wu had been killed in 1863, leaving his son Wu Azhong to command the most powerful rebel force in Guangxi (3,000 to 4,000 troops) after the fall of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. Liu became a banner leader and picked the black flag with seven stars as his symbol. In 1867, when Wu Azhong was defeated by the

11 For stories of how Liu lovingly served his mother and brother, see LYFZ, 1–7. For Liu's stories of drifting across Guangxi and Vietnam, see LYFZ, 8–10.
12 As the rural population in China often assembled in secret societies such as the Tiandihui, Gelaohui, and even some small, unheard-of groups, the rebels in Guangxi claimed such connections as well. Qing surveys in Guangxi throughout the 1860s indicated that more than ten active anti-Qing forces were related to the Tiandihui, including two rebellious regimes (the Yanling and Dacheng States). Wu Yuanqing and his son were alleged Tiandihui members, and his son was elected as the Tiandihui leader in Zuojiang and Youjiang in 1865. Because of Tiandihui members' frequent, falsely claimed ties with the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, Wu Yuanqing likewise announced that Hong Xiuquan had granted him the crown of Yanling. See LYFLSC, 5, 32–33; LYFZ, 11; Tang Zhijing, Qingdai Guangxi lishi jishi (Nanjing: Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1999), 473–83. 494. 504.
13 Liu, on the other hand, liked talking about how local civilians provided supplies and rewarded his troops. See LYFZ, 28. Usually, the Chinese banditry and rebellions found their origin in rural China's population pressure, which caused growing lawlessness and a bankrupt peasantry especially after the 1830s. However, mid-century wars and famine exacerbated the desperation and forced more civilians to become drifters or to join the secret societies, rebels, and bandits, falling into a vicious cycle of increased numbers of outlaws and decreased volume of supplies. See Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 9.
14 More on the drifting bandit groups and their competitions and raiding, see LYFZ, 11–22.
15 More details see LYFZ, 11–16, 21–24, 26.
16 Tang Zhijing, Guangxi lishi, 508.
Qing army and his supplies were exhausted, Liu entered Vietnam with his Black Flags to look for new opportunities. In addition, Liu mentioned that he had fled because Wu Azhong had intended to marry his younger sister to this promising young leader.17

Liu Yongfu and the Black Flags joined the continual emigration from China to Vietnam, which intensified during the nineteenth century. Đại Nam Thực Luc, the chronicle of the Nguyễn dynasty, recorded sporadic incursions of Qingfei, or Qing bandits, since 1804, which became regular in the late 1820s. More Qing bandits came in the 1850s and peaked throughout the 1860s,18 echoing the southward emigration of the Miao in China.19 However, the terms bandits and Miao both failed to identify all emigrants who might be Ming loyalists, fleeing rebels, drifting fugitives, and others who escaped Qing imperial control. Some of the recent arrivals were remnants of the Taiping Rebellion and other insurgencies. Moreover, the Qing Empire’s policy of gaitu guiliu and suppression of ethnic revolts in the southwest from the 1720s to the 1870s had consistently driven many from Guizhou to Yunnan and further south. These migrants were commonly identified as Miao, a rather vague and inclusive categorisation, although the revolts and migration mobilised a variety of ethnic groups, including the Han.20 They

17 LYFZ, 25, 30–32; LYFLSC, 55. The Gazetteer of Bobai, on the other hand, recorded that Liu Yongfu joined the Tiandihui in 1857 and then Wu Azhong in 1864. Then he entered Vietnam in 1865. See Bobai xianzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui ed., Bobai xianzhi (Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1994), 1022. Charles-Éouard Hocquard, who went on an expedition in Vietnam in the 1880s, recorded that in 1867 Wu Azhong’s troops invaded Vietnam and they were divided into two bands — the Black Flags and the Yellow Flags. Charles-Éouard Hocquard, Une Campagne au Tonkin (Paris: Arléa, 1999), 398, 400.

18 Đại Nam Thực Luc recorded a bandit named Ma Shiying who came from Shaozhou of China and invaded Hưng Hóa and Văn Bàn in 1804. See Danan shilu zhengbian di i ji (DNTL–CB–i) in Danan shilu Zhongguo xinan bianjiang xiangguan shiliaoji, ed. Wang Baizhong (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2015), vol. 25 (9): 35. For a list of the Qing bandits’ incursions in Vietnam in the 1830s, 1850s, and 1860s, see the index of Danan shilu: Qing-Yue guanxi shiliao hui bian compiled by Xu Wentang and Xie Yiyi (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, 2000), xiv–xlvi. To best utilise the publication of Đại Nam Thực Luc, this book counsels two of its collections published by Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe in Beijing and Zhongyang yanjiuyuan in Taipei. However, this book mainly cites the Beijing edition due to its explicit editing format and will make a special note if the reference comes from the Taipei edition.

19 Some scholars recorded this wave of Miao emigration as the “second Meo ‘invasion.’” See Frank M. Lebar, Gerald C. Hickey, and John K. Musgrave, Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1964), 73.

20 Wu Xinfu, “Lun Miaozu lishishang de sici daqianxi,” Minzu yanjiu, no. 6 (1990): 103–10. Qing scholars constructed a homogenised group of “Miao” to include indigenous people who came from diverse linguistic and cultural backgrounds in the empire’s southwest. See William Rowe, China’s Last Empire, 78. From today’s view, the Miao refugees during the Qing could include
came to Vietnam as early as the 1800s and reached the southern tip of the Mekong River delta. More Miao arrived in the 1860s as the mid-century ethnic rebellions in Guizhou continued.21

The Miao emigrants from China were known as Qianmiao (meaning Guizhou Miao), Maoman (meaning cat barbarians), and Baimiao (the White Miao) in Chinese and Vietnamese documents. Vietnamese officials often described them with pejorative terms such as Maoman and Maofei (cat bandits).22 In the 1860s, they led the White Flag rebellions in northern Vietnam.23 In 1865, a Vietnamese official in Hưng Hóa reported that those Maoman who settled in remote areas were uncivilised and immoral. They were predators driven by hunger. Then fearing punishment for their crimes, they confronted the government and would not surrender. However, it seemed difficult to tame these rebels because they would hide as the Vietnamese army approached and re-emerge again once the troops were gone.24

When Liu Yongfu told his life stories in the 1910s, he had become a prestigious Qing military general, though with a disgraceful history of being a rebel and a bandit. When he narrated his patriotic stories for Huang Hai’an to record,25 he had to address this controversy when leaving his own history to the judgement of future generations. His narratives therefore followed the traditional formula of Chinese sages and notable men whose births and supernatural encounters prophesied their extraordinary accomplishments.

many highland minority groups, such as the Miao-Yao (Hmong-Mien) linguistic family, which include the Hmong. See Jean Michaud and Christian Culas, “The Hmong of the Southeast Asia Massif: Recent Migration,” in Where China Meets Southeast Asia: Social and Cultural Change in the Border Regions, ed. Evans, Grant, Christopher Hutton, and Kuah Khun Eng (ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2000), 99–105. While acknowledging its ethno-centric and general nature, this book adopts the term Miao to refer to the vague, multi-ethnic group created during the Qing era and described in Qing historical documents.

22 More examples of these terms can be found in Đại Nam Thực Lục. Dankang shilu zhengbian di 4 ji (DNTL–CB–4), vol. 34 (5), vol. 38 (22), and 38 (39): 362, 376–77.
23 The employment of the term Qianmiao can be found in the memorials that Guangxi Governor Liu Changyou sent to Beijing. See Liu Changyou, Liu Changyou Ji (LCYJ) (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2011) vol. 1: 33; vol. 2: 564, 577, 609, 642. The Miao in Vietnam were largely from Guizhou, and some were from Yunnan and Sichuan. See Lảm Tâm, “Lịch sử di cư và tên gọi của người Mèo,” Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Lịch sử, 30 (September 1961): 54–58 (translated by Bao Nhi Phan). The White Miao was a sub-category of Miao vaguely identified by the ancient Chinese documents. They were originally from central and western Guizhou, and linguistically belonged to the Sichuan-Guizhou-Yunnan Miao category. See Wu Xinfu, “Lun Miaozu,” 103–10.
25 See the preface in LYFLSC and in LYFZ.
Consequently, Liu had offered self-serving accounts to challenge the conventional perceptions of bandits, such as his Black Flag Army. He recounted that in the 1850s, the Black Flags were no ordinary fleeing bandits who raided and harassed the Vietnamese civilians. He won the hearts of people both in China and in Vietnam, for the brave and disciplined Black Flag troops were dramatically different from the unruly and random mobs. When he defeated the Qing army in Guangxi, the merchants and gentry submitted to and welcomed him, and the civilians voluntarily awarded him with supplies. For Liu, countering the Miao was necessary to relieve the extreme suffering that the Vietnamese government was incapable of handling. He boasted that forbidden from harassing the civilians, the Black Flags were welcomed by the Vietnamese from whom they obtained supplies through fair trade. Valiant and formidable, the Black Flags did not confront the Vietnamese army; however, with superior tactics, even 400 to 500 of them could defeat over 10,000 White Miao. Most importantly, Liu portrayed himself as an exceptionally gallant and intelligent leader, superior to his peers in the Qing military. He despised the unreliable Guangxi army officer Huang Guilan, who was drunk night and day. Even Cen Yuying, the governor-general of Yunnan who led his troops into Vietnam at the eve of the Sino-French war, admired Liu and told mysterious stories about himself to impress the Black Flags’ general.

The Vietnamese government gained temporary success in suppressing the Miao in Hưng Hóa beginning in 1866 and began the debate over the agenda of purging the Chinese bandits, including Liu Yongfu, in the northern frontier. In 1868, the court of Huế considered selecting and cultivating native strongmen to deter the bandits. The Vietnamese officials also contemplated appeasing and enlisting the bandits to serve the government, as some Chinese bandit leaders pleaded with the court to give them legal status and supplies. However, these solutions were financially costly without completely removing the risk of social unrest, because those xiangfei, or surrendered bandits, were untrustworthy and would not stop their raiding.

For Yongfu’s accounts of the White Miao harassments in Vietnam, see LYFZ, 40.

Ibid., 27.


LYFZ, 39–43.

Ibid., 25.

LYFLSC, 190–91; LYFZ, 144.


To address the Chinese bandits, the term xiangfei often appears in Đại Nam Thực Lục with other common terms, such as Qingguo tufei/Qingfei (Qing bandits), beifei/ beibian zhufei (various bandits from the north), and Qingdi gufei (Qing bandit groups). See selected examples
Therefore, despite some bandit leaders’ continual pleas of surrender, their unceasing harassments and open fights to seize resources and territories discouraged the Vietnamese government.

Đại Nam Thực Lục recorded that Wu Azhong had anonymously surrendered to the Vietnamese government; however, in the spring of 1867, he returned to Longzhou, Guangxi from his base in Cao Bằng, to aid a fellow bandit’s operation. After Liu Yongfu entered Vietnam, Wu came back again, possibly with his subordinate Huang Chongying, the head of the Yellow Flag Army. Wu attacked Cao Bằng in early 1868, resulting in him being considered a surrendered bandit who had betrayed Vietnam. Wu appeared to be very unreliable and expensive: his raids did not cease, but neither did his petitions to surrender. From 1868 to 1869, he harassed an extended region from Cao Bằng to Lạng Sơn, Lạc Dương, Tuyên Quang, and Thái Nguyên. His force also frequently migrated between Vietnam and Guangxi to avoid Qing military attacks. In late 1869, Wu asked for over 10,000 liang silver pieces from the provincial government of Lạng Sơn.

Facing Wu’s consistent harassment, King Tự Đức considered seeking the Qing government’s help to eliminate Wu. After communicating with Commander Feng Zicai in Guangxi, the Vietnamese Ministry of War proposed that Tự Đức should take the responsibility because it was difficult to explain to the Qing government why Vietnam had accommodated a fleeing outlaw. In addition, it was impossible for Vietnam to feed Wu’s 14,000 to 15,000 men. Seeing Wu as extremely cunning and deceptive, Tự Đức insisted on eliminating him with the aid of the Qing army. However, calls to accommodate and appease Wu also rose temporarily due to the risk of warring with a large number of bandits in the hill areas. On the other hand, the notorious reputation of Wu and other Chinese bandits perhaps discredited Huang Chongying’s plea to surrender from his stronghold in Hà Giang. In late 1868, the officials in Tuyên Quang

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40 Ibid., vol. 39 (23): 382.
turned down another insincere petition from Huang. 41 In early 1869, the Vietnamese Ministry of War warned that accepting Huang might result in a confrontation between the Yellow Flags and local civilians. Moreover, the court needed to address the pleas from Wu and other bandit leaders before responding to Huang. 42

In this debate, some Vietnamese officials suggested that the court should recruit Wu Azhong’s rivals and enemies to deter him, and the king ordered Liu Yongfu and other surrendered bandits to fight Wu. 43 In 1867, Liu defeated some of his rivals in Tuyên Quang and received the recognition of local Vietnamese authority. In early 1868, the king approved the Tuyên Quang government’s request to employ Liu to counter Pan Wenyi (or Ban Van Nhi) and Liang Wenli, who had been flying the White Miao flags and harassing Lục Yên. 44 Soon, Liu would receive Tự Đức’s permission to mine in Tuyên Quang. Later, he was given a military title and ordered to eliminate the White Miao rebels in Lục Yên. 45 It might have been too expensive to sustain Wu, but recruiting the Black Flags, which were smaller in size, seemed expedient for the “financially weakened” Vietnamese government. 46

Practically, the Vietnamese intended to use Liu Yongfu and other surrendered bandits to fight against those bandit groups that the government did not intend to enlist. While it was expedient for Liu to settle in the country by fighting rival bandit forces, it was also expedient for the Vietnamese government to rely on Liu for the same matter. Nevertheless, the king and some officials still considered Liu a bandit and distrusted him. In fact, the Black Flag Army was not exempt from plundering and raiding, although Liu himself insisted that his troops were very disciplined. Moreover, Liu demonstrated an alarming ability to expand and seize resources through unauthorised operations. Beginning in the summer of 1868, his competition with He Junchang in Bảo Thắng, a trading post on the Red River, had caught

43 The court observed the confrontation between Wu Azhong and a bandit named Zhang Jinbang in late summer 1868 and considered appeasing and sponsoring Zhang Jinbang against Wu Azhong. See DNTL–CB–4, vol. 39 (20–23): 381–82. The court also used the same strategy to manipulate the mutual animosity between Liu Yongfu and Huang Chongying in 1870. DNTL–CB–4, vol. 43 (5): 399.
46 Davis, Imperial Bandits, 46.
the attention of the court of Huế.\textsuperscript{47} He Junchang was a surrendered Cantonese bandit leader who had defeated the White Miao in Lào Cai and had been dealing opium and collecting taxes in Bảo Thắng.\textsuperscript{48} His conflict with Liu inevitably involved more Chinese bandits, such as those he freshly recruited from Yunnan. Huang Chongying also agreed to assist He Junchang as the Yellow Flags contemplated seizing Bảo Thắng for its rich supplies and trade revenues.\textsuperscript{49} However, when the Yellow and Black Flags blocked the Red River and attacked junks in their confrontations, regular trade “had almost been annihilated.”\textsuperscript{50} As these bandit fights continued, it was not surprising to see Huế’s ambivalent attitudes toward Liu Yongfu.

The Qing military’s records of hunting down the bandits in Vietnam dated back to 1828, when the Yunnan army came to Tuyên Quang for an operation. King Minh Mạng (r. 1820–1839) then strongly criticised the Qing army for trespassing the border.\textsuperscript{51} In 1869, in response to the Vietnamese government’s request, Qing military commanders such as Feng Zicai, Chen Chaogang, Tang Yuanfang, Xie Jigui, and Liu Yucheng arrived to eliminate Wu Azhong. Before June, Commander Feng crushed Wu’s stronghold in Cao Bằng. King Tự Đức also ordered the provincial officials in Tuyên Quang to mobilise Liu Yongfu and other surrendered bandits to fight the Yellow Flags. Two months later, after Wu was killed in Bác Ninh, Huang Chongying fled back to Hà Giang and found refuge among the White Miao.\textsuperscript{52} Commander Feng began to enlist the Chinese bandits after this operation. The Vietnamese government and merchants in Hanoi and Nam Định provided rice and money to the Qing army and surrendered bandits. Chinese refugees also came to beg the Qing commander for supplies. By November, over 10,000 Chinese bandits in Thái Nguyên and Sơn Tây had surrendered to the Qing army.\textsuperscript{53} In the meantime, the officials in Tuyên Quang asked the king to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{47} Huế was alerted about He Junchang’s encounter with the Black Flags and had instructed the provincial officials to prepare to either exterminate or appease Liu Yongfu. See DNTL–CB–4, vol. 38 (39, 47): 377–78.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Đại Nam Thực Lục dated Liu Yongfu’s incursion into Bảo Thắng as 1868, but Liu Yongfu lishicao and Liu Yongfu zhuan recorded the date as 1869. This book adopts the timeline recorded in Đại Nam Thực Lục. Both Liu Yongfu lishicao and Liu Yongfu zhuan implied that He Junchang took over Bảo Thắng and collected a heavy tax without Vietnamese authorization. LYFZ, 45; LYFLSC, 12, 78–79; DNTL–CB–4, vol. 38 (39, 47): 377–78; Davis, Imperial Bandits, 46–47.
\item \textsuperscript{49} LYFZ, 45–46; LYFLSC, 79–83.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Hocquard, Une Campagne au Tonkin, 400.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Đasn shilu zhengbian di 2 ji (DNTL–CB–2), vol. 53 (4–5): 105.
\item \textsuperscript{52} More details see ibid., vol. 40 (12–13, 19–20, 31–32, 34, 41) and vol. 41 (5–6, 31): 386, 388–90, 394.
\item \textsuperscript{53} DNTL–CB–4, vol. 41 (11, 17, 22): 391–92.
\end{itemize}
persuade Feng to enlist the Black Flags and bring them back to China so that Vietnam could regain control in Bảo Thắng.\textsuperscript{54}

This consideration, however, did not seem to align with the Qing officials’ vision of keeping Liu Yongfu in Vietnam as an ally, especially to cooperate with the army units Feng Zicai would leave there for future operations against the bandits. Liu claimed that Feng sent subordinates to Bảo Thắng to secure an alliance with the Black Flags. They awarded Liu a medal and recruited one of his subordinates.\textsuperscript{55} Liu Yongfu’s accounts were often self-serving; however, he was not wrong in identifying his transformation from a bandit leader to an agent of both the Chinese and the Vietnamese governments. Feng and Liu drove Huang Chongying out of Hà Giang in June 1870.\textsuperscript{56} After this success, they pleaded with Emperor Tongzhi to let Feng return because of the high cost of stationing and operating his army in Vietnam. He had many obstacles and security concerns, including tropical diseases, high budget to sustain military supplies, a weak defence along China’s border, and increasing reports of rebellions in Guizhou.\textsuperscript{57} Some Vietnamese officials thus pleaded with Feng to take “the remnants of Wu Azhong’s force,” which included Liu Yongfu and some other bandits.\textsuperscript{58} Nevertheless, the commander’s departure had made it necessary for Liu to remain in Vietnam and counter other Chinese bandits. After all, Huang was still alive, and the court could manipulate the feud between Liu and Huang to deter the Yellow Flags.\textsuperscript{59} Liu also determined to stay, partially fearing execution if he returned to China.\textsuperscript{60}

At this point, neither Commander Feng nor the Vietnamese court forced Liu Yongfu to leave. Liu then petitioned the Vietnamese court to officially enlist him, a move that was supported by the provincial officials in Hùng Hóa. In early 1871, Liu severely traumatised Huang Chongying, a turning point at which local officials in Hùng Hóa began trusting him and even appealed to the court to award him.\textsuperscript{61} However, Huế remained suspicious of Liu while depending on him to counter the Yellow Flags. Huang, on the other
hand, continued to plead with the Vietnamese government for surrender and supplies until he was captured and killed in 1875. Although Huang and Liu both harassed Vietnamese civilians and challenged the government, the Yellow Flags were not recognised by the Vietnamese authorities. Liu seemed more reliable and had avoided the mistakes that Huang had made, such as forming alliances with the White Miao and the French explorer Jean Dupuis.

**Yunnan's French Allies**

Before the outbreak of Du Wenxiu’s Rebellion (1856–1873), Catholic missionaries had converted 700 to 800 people in Kunming and as many as 7,000 to 8,000 people across Yunnan; however, the number had dramatically dropped by at least 75 per cent by 1868. Some missionaries and explorers from France had cultivated a cozy relationship with the Yunnan provincial government since the 1860s by aiding the campaigns against the rebels: they were becoming unconventional state agents in the Qing border consolidation. In 1867, members of the French Mekong Exploration Commission (1866–1868) encountered Father Fenouil, who dedicated himself to serving the government of Yunnan while expanding the Catholic influence and the French interest in the province. Yet, other missionaries such as Father Protteau and Father Leguilcher avoided such undertakings. While the French missionaries and explorers came to Yunnan with different intentions, their complex relationship with the provincial leaders kept evolving in the swirl of factional conflicts, internal rebellions, and French aggression in Vietnam. For the officials in Yunnan, the missionaries were instrumental in obtaining external political, military, and financial resources. In 1869, the Yunnan provincial leaders, in their dire financial situation, were impressed by Jean Dupuis’s plan to profit from the trade between Yunnan and Vietnam. With their support, Dupuis discovered the waterways connecting Yunnan and the Tonkin Bay via the Red River (or Song-Coï).

Francis Garnier remembered that Father Fenouil had made a serious effort to know all the Yunnanese officials and possessed specific knowledge about

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63 Father Protteau strived to avoid the government officials. Father Leguilcher, who directed a Catholic mission to the north of Dali, also showed little interest in politics, and had pretty much hidden himself in the country since the rebellion. See Francis Garnier, *Report*, 159, 160–72, 200, 213.
each of them.\textsuperscript{65} The late Governor-General Lao Chongguang of Yun-Gui (1802–1867) was impressed by Fenouil’s techniques of making gunpowder and firearms. Lao awarded him a sizeable residence in Kunming, where he installed a gunpowder factory. Hence, Fenouil became notorious among the Hui, whom he suspected to have blown up the factory and nearly buried him alive.\textsuperscript{66} However, the provincial leaders dragged the missionaries deeper into their rival competitions. For instance, General Ma Rulong utilised the missionaries to press the French Legation in Beijing to endorse his promotion after the death of Lao. Father Protteau implied that he was forced to be involved in this matter. Father Fenouil complained that he had to send a letter to the French minister in Beijing and designated Ma “as the only man capable of pacifying Yunnan.”\textsuperscript{67} Count Lallemand, who oversaw the French Legation from 1866 to 1868, was unhappy about the missionaries’ interference but still communicated with the Qing officials in Beijing and secured funding and supplies for Ma.\textsuperscript{68} Francis Garnier believed that the French Legation had made a mistake by encouraging and even supporting the missionaries who appeared to have abandoned French interests in favour of local rivalry.\textsuperscript{69}

In contrast, the Mekong Exploration Commission had a different vision in securing French interests by establishing “commercial and friendly relations” with Dali.\textsuperscript{70} Despite the order of assistance from Beijing, the Yunnan provincial authorities worried about the Commission’s survey projects in the upper Mekong River and their peculiar interest in Dali. These officials mobilised some missionary friends to sway the Commission from their travel agenda as they entered Xishuangbanna from Laos in the autumn of 1867.\textsuperscript{71} Francis Garnier recalled that the late governor-general, Lao Chongguang, had asked Father Fenouil to compose a letter to the Commission with the

\textsuperscript{65} Garnier, \textit{Report}, 170.

\textsuperscript{66} Francis Garnier believed that it could have been an accident caused by sheer carelessness, and that Fenouil simply “had imagined since then that he was the target of powerful and numerous enemy persecutions.” Ibid.

\textsuperscript{67} Fenouil suspected that Ma Rulong had been trying to poison him. He indicated that the letter he wrote to the French Embassy was merely a translation of Ma Rulong’s script. Fenouil stressed that he was forced and had no idea why his signature appeared on the bottom of the letter. Francis Garnier did not believe Fenouil’s stories. More details see ibid., 163–64, 170–71.


\textsuperscript{69} Garnier, \textit{Report}, 172.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 216.

\textsuperscript{71} Nevertheless, the Chinese translation of this letter, which was sent to the local officials, indicated that the French were forbidden to enter China. Ibid., 83, 109–10, 159, 172–73.
intention of delaying their entrance into Yunnan. Later, Ma Rulong and the acting governor-general Song Yanchun continued to persuade the French to abort their plan. Army officer Yang Yuke in Dongchuan Prefecture, who would conquer Dali in 1873, also asked Father Fenouil to help him stop the Commission. The Commission managed to reach Dali with aid from other missionaries, local converts, and even prominent Hui officials and scholars, such as Ma Dexin. However, the plan to establish commercial ties with Dali failed due to strong suspicion from Du Wenxiu, the head of the regime.

Nevertheless, Francis Garnier’s experience would lend some insights into French merchant and explorer Jean Dupuis (1829–1912), who claimed credit in creating an imperial arsenal to help pacify the rebellions in China, including those in Yunnan. Dupuis first came to China from Egypt in 1858, enthusiastic to explore the Far East. Later, he was convinced to partner with French naturalist Eugène Simon, who was assigned by the French Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce to explore China. In February 1861, to ensure their safety while travelling through Nanjing, the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom’s territory, they joined a British squadron that intended to explore the Yangzi River and cross Tibet to open trade outlets between China and British India. Some scholars have argued that Dupuis wanted to sell firearms to the Qing army that had just embraced Western weapons in their efforts to restore public order. Dupuis claimed that in 1868, he had been hired by Li Hanzhang, the new governor-general of Hu-Guang, to facilitate the construction of an arsenal near the central and southwestern provinces, with the purpose of providing some assistance in pacifying the rebels in the country.

72 Ibid., 188–89.
73 De Lagrée obtained a letter of endorsement from prominent Muslim leader and scholar Ma Dexin, who defected to the Qing Empire in 1862. Ma’s letter of support was full of optimism and praise toward the French sincere intentions and proposed activities of surveying and mapping across Yunnan. With the letter, Ma had requested all Muslims, all the Chinese, and “barbarians” to conform to the Qing’s friendly attitude towards the French and facilitate their journey without any forms of hindrance. The Chinese converts, especially Father Lu, who was later summoned to fight the Muslims in Yongbei, were busy finding contacts, interpreters, guides, and porters for the French. Father Leguilcher eventually led Garnier to Dali. Ibid., 173–75, 200–201, 213–14.
75 Ibid., 2–8.
76 See McAleavy, *Black Flags*, 92. Ji Pingzi argues that Dupuis wanted to make a fortune by selling firearms to the Qing army, but he had nothing to sell at this point and had to stay in Hankou to wait for opportunities. Ji Pingzi, *Cong yapian zhanzheng dao Jiawu zhanzheng: 1839 nian zhi 1895 nianjian de Zhongguo duiwai guanxishi* (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1998), 466.
77 Dupuis, *Tong-kin*, 11.
Due to a decree issued by the imperial Ministry of War, Li Hanzhang became the sole official to supply firearms to the provincial leaders who wanted modern weapons to counter the rebels.\textsuperscript{78} Dupuis said that because of his position in the arsenal, he knew of the provincial governors in China, and his reputation spread among the Qing officials. He portrayed himself as a very popular figure: he had been putting off the invitation from Zuo Zongtang and Mutushan, who oversaw Shaanxi and Gansu, to visit their camps. Later in the year when Dupuis set off for Yunnan, he took a detour to visit these generals in the northwest where he also met officer Georges Vlavianos, who was assisting Zuo Zongtang and would aid his exploration of the Red River in 1872.\textsuperscript{79} Dupuis bragged about his frequent interactions with the provincial authorities of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou. One instructor whom Dupuis sent to Guizhou participated in the operations against the Miao and later became known as Major-General William Mesny.\textsuperscript{80}

When Dupuis contemplated creating “a path of communication” between “the French colony of Cochinchina and the southwest of the celestial empire,” he was inspired by the Mekong Exploration Commission.\textsuperscript{81} In June 1868, Dupuis briefly met Francis Garnier when the Commission travelled through Hankou. Garnier encouraged Dupuis to access Yunnan through the Red River. Dupuis would make his first trip to Yunnan between 1868 and 1869 when the government of Yunnan desperately needed firearms to suppress

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 11–12.
\textsuperscript{79} Before Beijing appointed him to crush the Muslim rebellions in western China, General Zuo founded the Fuzhou Navy Yard in 1866 and had welcomed French assistance. Prosper Giquel and Paul d’Aiguebelle, two founders and commanders of the Franco-Chinese contingent (the Ever-Triumphant Army) had been assisting the organisation of the Fuzhou Navy Yard since the autumn of 1866. In Xi’an, Zuo continued to work with the Franco-Chinese corps and introduced Dupuis to Georges Vlavianos. In mid-November, Dupuis reached Lanzhou and met Mutushan. About a month later Mutushan sent his men to escort Dupuis’ journey down southwest. Ibid., 14–16, 28–29, 34. From 1863 to 1864, Prosper Giquel had written three different accounts regarding the origin of the Franco-Chinese corps and his effort to organise the contingent since late 1861 when he was serving at the maritime custom service in Ningbo. Later he joined d’Aiguebelle, who commanded the Ever-Triumphant Army, to assist Zuo Zongtang’s campaign to pacify the Taiping Rebellion. For more details, see Steven A. Leibo, \textit{Transferring Technology to China: Prosper Giquel and the Self-strengthening Movement} (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1985), 26–39, 49–60; David Pong, “Keeping the Foochow Navy Yard Afloat: Government Finance and China’s Early Modern Defense Industry, 1866–75,” \textit{Modern Asian Studies}, 1987, vol. 21, no. 1 (1987): 85, 123.
\textsuperscript{80} Dupuis, \textit{Tong-kin}, 12.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 13.
the Muslim rebellions. He then explored the Red River in 1870–1871 and again in 1872–1873. 82

When Dupuis arrived in Kunming for the first time in March 1869, he encountered divided provincial authorities under Liu Yuezhao, the newly appointed, powerless governor-general of Yun-Gui. Having been banished to Yunnan for falsely charging Governor-General Wu Tang of Sichuan with embezzlement, Liu was expected to discuss every matter carefully and impartially with Cen Yuying, the governor of Yunnan, to avoid mistakes and severe punishment in the future. 83 Dupuis observed that “as a newcomer to the province,” Governor-General Liu “relied upon the Fou-tai Tchen [Cen Yuying] and Marshall Ma [Ma Rulong] for directions on his affairs.” 84 Liu’s involvement in Yunnan’s internal affairs remained minimal because Beijing still entrusted Cen with leading the campaigns to pacify the Muslim rebels in western Yunnan and relied on Ma to direct the military affairs in central and southern Yunnan. 85 Émile Rocher, the future French consul in Mengzi, recorded that Liu constantly waited for Cen’s approval, and even with Ma, he did not want to take any initiative. Since Cen never gave approval, Liu was forced to accept everything Cen did. 86

In the meantime, the feuds between Ma Rugong and Cen Yuying were growing, as was their competition to pacify the Hui rebellions and seize political dominance. In fact, Ma promoted Cen to the position of provincial administrative commissioner in the early 1860s despite the opposition of all the other officials in Yunnan. However, the duo had become bitter rivals, partially, observed Émile Rocher, because of Cen’s jealousy over Ma’s discretionary power and prestige. 87 Francis Garnier mentioned that Ma had been suffering the accusations of his colleagues who seemed jealous or felt suspicious about his connections with the Hui rebels. 88 Over time, the conflicts between Cen and Ma had become so notorious that the news reached the court of Beijing. 89 Cen had managed to arrogate more

84 Dupuis, _Tong-kin_, 69 (trans. Spencer Fields).
85 Ibid.
87 Ibid., 97, 134.
88 Garnier, _Report_, 162.
administrative power before the arrival of Liu Yuezhao while strenuously obstructing Ma's control in bureaucratic and military affairs.90

Dupuis was able to visit Liu Yuezhao and Cen Yuying the day after he arrived in Kunming.91 However, Dupuis reported little interaction with Ma Rulong because Cen had purposefully attempted to stop them from becoming close. At one time, Liu had even become too sick to meet him.92 Cen was not willing to connect Dupuis to Ma for additional reasons. First, Ma had recently given some luxury rifles to a subordinate, who, ironically, had run away with them and defected to Dali. Hence, Ma had been in an awkward and painful position: he was suspected of complicity as he vouched for the deserter.93 Second, previously, the Mekong Exploration Commission's eagerness to connect with Dali had triggered Yunnan officials' misgivings regarding the French. Any association between Ma and Dupuis would need to be avoided before Cen could confirm the latter's intentions.

Nevertheless, Dupuis reported pleasant interactions with Cen Yuying, who had “uncontested authority” in Yunnan. He convinced Cen that a path across Tonkin would give Yunnan direct access to Saigon and the ports for foreign trade, which would relieve Yunnan's chronic financial hardship caused by wars and a broken economy.94 Earlier in 1867, Dali's army took over the salt mines in northeastern and southern Yunnan, which had devastated the province's revenue. By the spring of 1868, Yunnan was able to collect less than 20 per cent of its regular annual taxes, which made it impossible to sustain over its 80,000 troops. In fact, the standing army and militia in Yunnan had not received salt and vegetable supplies for over two months. Cen begged Beijing to order surrounding provinces to send the monetary aid they owed Yunnan.95 Further, Cen proposed that Beijing stop taxing domestically cultivated opium in Yunnan, for high taxes had

91 Dupuis, Tong-kin, 67–69.
92 Ibid., 68, 88.
94 Dupuis, Tong-kin, 70, 73–74.
95 See a list of salt mines Du Wenxiu's army had taken in Rocher, Yün-nan, vol. 2: 107. Yunnan would have received a monthly aid of 121, 666 liang of silver from other provinces, which had been the main source of Yunnan's military budget; however, only Guangdong had dispatched a total of 37,000 liang of silver for the past four years. Shortly before Dupuis’ arrival in Yunnan, the throne ordered the Grand Council to collect money from Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Jiangxi, and the Maritime Custom Services in Hunan, Henan and Guangdong. About 20,000 liang of silver was collected to aid Yunnan. See Cen Yuying, Cen Yuying zougao (CYYZG) (Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1989), vol.1: 47, 93–96.
discouraged the opium merchants and worsened the financial deficit. He wanted to resume Yunnan’s opium likin fees to rejuvenate the market, and he wanted Beijing to direct surrounding provinces’ likin revenue to him. Therefore, Dupuis’s proposal of exploring the Red River for lucrative mineral trade, especially for copper, with a low cost of transportation was worth the risk.

Moreover, Dupuis’s offers of Western firearms were appealing as the war with Du Wenxiu continued. He promised Cen Yuying and Ma Rulong two cannons, new styles of guns, and various types of ammunition, which would significantly quicken the process of subduing Du and boosting their bureaucratic status. Dupuis guaranteed that European instructors would teach them how to operate the guns. He boldly declared that the whole province would be pacified within three years if his proposal was adopted. In fact, the French had provided practical aid to the Qing government: the missionaries had been instrumental in pacifying Yunnan’s Muslim rebels; and the Franco-Chinese corps had been crucial in crushing the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. To justify his later activities, Dupuis could have exaggerated or misunderstood the level of support from Yunnan’s officials. It was also possible that Cen had approved the project without reporting anything to Beijing throughout the spring of 1869. Nevertheless, an immediate obstacle hindered Dupuis’s exploration: the bandits on the Red River.

Dupuis said that with thirty escorts provided by Cen Yuying, he left for Hankou in early April 1869 to purchase firearms and look for instructors for the Yunnan army. Liu Yuezhao and Cen also gave him two letters of credit to Li Hanzhang, who would repay Dupuis. While fetching Li Hanzhang’s reimbursement in Guangzhou, Dupuis found two firearm instructors, a Frenchman and a Greek man who were serving in the Franco-Chinese corps.

96 Ibid., vol. 1: 87, 96.
97 Ibid., Tong-kin, 75.
98 Ibid., 71.
99 Ibid.
101 Dupuis, Tong-kin, 74. On the other hand, Chinese scholar Ji Pingzi believes that Dupuis had intended to invade Yunnan. Ji argues that although Guangxi provincial authorities had been collecting intelligence on the French aggression in Vietnam in the early 1870s, the court of Beijing had little awareness and did not pay special attention to the matter. In the meantime, Cen had failed to recognise that Dupuis had well concealed his real ambition of invading Yunnan. See Ji Pingzi, Cong yapian zhanzheng dao Jiawu zhanzheng, 467.
102 Dupuis, Tong-kin, 76.
In June he hired Émile Rocher, who would also become an instructor and help set up the arsenal in Yunnan. Per Rocher’s request, Dupuis sent him to the Fuzhou Navy Yard for a few months to learn the art of foundries. In October 1870, after the arranged arms had been sent off to Yunnan with the instructors, Dupuis left Hankou with Rocher.¹⁰⁴

When Dupuis returned to Yunnan at the end of January 1871, Cen Yuying was no longer supportive of his plan. At the battlefield of Chengjiang to the south of Kunming, Cen said that within a year, the Yunnan provincial government would still have little control over the perilous lands the Frenchman intended to cross.¹⁰⁵ After receiving Cen’s warning letter, Ma Rulong, who was still recovering from the defection scandal, refused to cooperate. Even Governor-General Liu Yuezhao, who had endorsed Dupuis previously, backed out for the same reason. However, Dupuis reported that Ma changed his mind and wrote letters of introduction for Dupuis to show the local authorities. He gave Dupuis thirty guards, an army officer, and a civil mandarin who was familiar with the frontier geography.¹⁰⁶ Later, fearing the bandits and the malaria in Lào Cai, some of these escorts remained in Mengzi. Dupuis then proceeded with the geographer as well as two guides and probably eighty men he obtained from the magistrate at Mengzi.¹⁰⁷ Modern Chinese scholars claim that the protection from the Qing officials enabled Dupuis to find the waterway connecting Yunnan and Vietnam and, in the long run, resulted in China’s loss of control over the Red River.¹⁰⁸

Both the Yunnan provincial authorities and Dupuis understood that the cooperation of the Black and Yellow Flags was essential to smooth the Red River trade. Dupuis posed himself as an agent of the Yunnan provincial government and exaggerated his abilities when negotiating with Liu Youngfu and Huang Chongying. He informed Liu that he had been commissioned by the leaders in Yunnan to make a deal with Liu. He implied that Governor Cen Yuuying was tired of the Black Flags and contemplated taking over Lào Cai. However, Dupuis’s proposal of trade had changed the governor’s mind, perhaps prompting Cen to rely on the outlaws to maintain safety along the Red River. He said that the government of Yunnan would forgive Liu’s misdeeds if Liu cooperated and would grant Liu free access to Yunnan. Moreover, Cen would petition Beijing to pardon Liu so that he and his men

¹⁰⁴ Rocher, Yün-nan, vol. 1: vii, ix, 3; Dupuis, Tong-kin, 81–83.
¹⁰⁵ Dupuis, Tong-kin, 88.
¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 88–91.
¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 93.
could “come back to the homeland, and their ashes could rest next to the ashes of their ancestors.” However, Liu showed little interest in changing his status quo in Vietnam. By then, Liu had become the Guangxi army’s ally in fighting against Huang Chongying. Although Cen was originally from Guangxi, the current Guangxi officials seemed more capable of fulfilling Dupuis’s promises. Nevertheless, Liu avoided confrontations with Dupuis and appeared somewhat troubled by the Frenchman’s threats of termination if he was to obstruct free travels along the river.

Contrary to his experience with Liu Yongfu, Dupuis received warm support from the Yellow Flags, who were struggling to survive the suppression of the Guangxi army, the Vietnamese government, and the Black Flags. Huang Chongying was very cooperative after hearing the same stories Dupuis had told Liu. He wanted Dupuis to inform the officials in Yunnan that he and the Yellow Flags were entirely at their disposal and that “all would be happy to render services to their country and thus to deserve to be rehabilitated.” Dupuis assured Huang that Governor-General Liu Yuezhao and Governor Cen Yuying would keep their end of the bargain. When Dupuis returned to Yunnan, he reported his progress directly to Ma Rulong, who oversaw the area adjacent to the upper Red River. Dupuis explained that the Red River would be navigable for steamers up to Lào Cai, with some rock excavation work, which the Yellow Flags were willing to provide. Dupuis observed that everyone at Ma’s camp was enthusiastic about his message. Later, he touted, “I became ... the marshal’s proxy. His flag flew on the masts of my ships, although I was also the agent of the viceroy and of the fou-tai, that is to say of the entirety of Yunnan.”

Eventually, Dupuis claimed to have received some documentation stamped by the top three provincial officials in Yunnan, authorising him to represent the Yunnan government and lead the Red River expedition. Dupuis hence received a certain sum of money from them, including 10,000 dan of tin as a substitute due to Yunnan’s tight financial condition. In addition, Dupuis said that the leaders of Yunnan gave him another 12,000 dan of copper to sell on their behalf once the water route was open for trade.

109 Dupuis, Tong-kin, 94 (trans. Fields).
110 Ibid., 94–95.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid., 98 (trans. Fields).
113 Ibid., 98–100.
114 While Cen Yuying oversaw western Yunnan, Ma Rulong took charge of central and southeastern Yunnan, from the capital to the border region. Ibid., 99–100.
He also bragged that Beijing had authorised the exploitation of mines on behalf of Yunnan. Therefore, he was even given a large share of the mining operation and was entrusted by the Yunnan government to buy equipment and hire engineers and foremen.116 Dupuis eagerly returned to France in late 1871 to enlist the French government’s support. He would become known as the silver mine dealer of Yunnan.117

In early 1872, the French Ministry of the Navy promised Dupuis its unofficial support and gave him permission to use a boat flown under the French flag. Later, the French Ministry of War approved Dupuis’s plan to order guns, arms, and ammunition from French foundries. From May to November, he travelled back and forth between Saigon and Hankou, his old base in China, meeting the French administration, purchasing boats, and preparing for the trip back to Yunnan.118 In late 1872, when Dupuis was ready to find access to the Red River near Quảng Yên, Captain André Senez came in his ship Bourayne to assist.119 However, they failed to locate the entrance to the Red River among the numerous channels on the seaboard and decided to find a way through the inland province of Hải Dương.

At that time, the Vietnamese in Hải Dương saw two steamers and one junk seeking a path to Yunnan. Đại Nam Thực Lục recorded that “the Qing people, the French, the English, the Luzonese, and the black people were mingled together” on these vessels that had been equipped with cannons and guns, with “Great Qing Provincial Commander Ma (Rulong)’s” flag flying. These boats claimed to carry “the French consul” Dupuis; Englishman Georges Vlavianos, who had received a Qing official title; and Qing official Li Yuxi, whom Dupuis claimed to be his secretary.120 Vietnamese commander Lê

116 Ibid., 101–2.
117 Garnier, De Paris au Tibet, 46.
118 Dupuis originally considered going back to Yunnan via Huế. However, an interpreter and some French military personnel, such as Commandant André Senez, opposed, warning him not to go by Huế with the French flag flying. See Dupuis, Tong-kin, 106–7, 112–14.
120 DNTL–CB–4, vol. 47 (24–25): 420–21; As mentioned earlier, Dupuis met Georges Vlavianos at Zuo Zongtang’s camp in Gansu in 1868. There were twenty-seven Europeans and 125 Asians of all countries of origin in Dupuis’ company. See Dupuis, Tong-kin, 114–15; Dupuis, Journey, 9–12. Qing court historians recorded that Li Yuxi had very close connections with the French and caused many troubles to the Vietnamese government. Li accompanied the French to, namely, transport firearms for Yunnan and Guizhou in 1873. He later joined Qing rebel officer Li Yangcai’s harassment in Vietnam. See Dezong shilu, vol. 139 (8), in Qingshilu Guangxi, vol. 5: 141–42.
Tuân refused to let Dupuis pass due to the river’s unnavigability and the rebels’ occupation. He later reported to King Tự Đức that Dupuis had forged the letters from the officials in Yunnan. André Senez and Lý Yuxi pressed Lê Tuấn to comply because Dupuis was a representative of China and had been an agent of the Yunnan provincial government.121

Tự Đức and his officials were shocked by Lê Tuấn’s report that Dupuis did not have any documentation from Yunnan and Guangxi to validate his activities, particularly the transportation of firearms. The king asked the officials to stop Dupuis while reporting to the governor-general of Liang-Guang, who could further enquire after the matter from Yunnan.122 Nevertheless, the Qing officers, who were stationed in Bắc Ninh and Thái Nguyên to pacify the bandits, connected Dupuis to the Chinese merchant communities in Hanoi. On behalf of Yunnan’s officials, they further requested the governors of Hanoi and Sơn Tây to assist the Frenchman. On the contrary, the governor of Hanoi secretly requested that the Black Flags in Hưng Hóa prevent Dupuis from proceeding.123 These manoeuvres had little effect, and the Vietnamese officials who failed to stop Dupuis were demoted.124 Later, the Cantonese merchants who provided him with junks were imprisoned by the Vietnamese government.125

On this trip, Dupuis received more friendly signals from the Yellow Flags and the hill tribes in the upper Red River. The Yellow Flags provided him “crucial intelligence and assistance,” including information about the rich gold mines along the Black River (or Sông Đà) bank, a seven-day journey by land. The leaders of some hill tribes aided Dupuis, especially when he was near Lào Cai and Manhao. Some of these tribes, such as the White Miao, were connected to the Yellow Flags. Some of them were Tai, and all claimed to be the victims of the Black Flags’ oppression.126 “With tears in their eyes,” Dupuis recounted, some headmen begged him to “deliver them from the claws of this bandit [Liu Yongfu].”127 These leaders then informed Dupuis of the locations of coal mines, copper mines, and silver-holding lead

121 Dupuis, Tong-kin, 119–20.
123 The governor informed Dupuis that he had secretly asked the Black Flags to be at Dupuis’s disposal as they travelled beyond Sơn Tây; however, Dupuis’s encounter with the Black Flags suggested the opposite. See Dupuis, Journey, 40–44, 50.
125 Dupuis recorded that one Cantonese merchant died in the prison due to mistreatment. The Vietnamese also imprisoned these merchants’ families and pillaged the house of the Chinese merchant who had been accused of giving Dupuis supplies. See Dupuis, Journey, 77–78.
126 Dupuis, Journey, 56–58, 60; Davis, Imperial Bandits, 74.
127 Dupuis, Journey, 60.
mines along the river and in surrounding areas.\textsuperscript{128} This information would be crucial not only for the government of Yunnan but for future French efforts to exploit the mineral deposit along the Vietnam-Yunnan railway. As Huang Chongying depended on Dupuis to mediate his submission to the government officials in Yunnan,\textsuperscript{129} various hill tribes found “friendship” in him because of their shared antipathy toward the Black Flags. In contrast, the interactions between the Black Flags and Dupuis remained problematic due to mutual suspicion. Dupuis threatened to exterminate the Black Flags, such as those in Hưng Hóa, if they dared to hinder him. Dupuis observed that, although sponsored by the officials in Yunnan, the agenda of opening the Red River for trade would threaten Liu Yongfu’s dominance in the upper stream.\textsuperscript{130} Liu did not meet Dupuis in person; however, his subordinates appeared very cooperative and hoped that their connection with Dupuis would prevent further clashes with the Yunnan provincial army.\textsuperscript{131}

When Dupuis arrived in Kunming again in the spring of 1873, the Dali Regime had been pacified. Dupuis was able to reach agreements with the provincial officials regarding the mines in Mengzi and Kaihua. He also obtained three letters requesting that the Vietnamese facilitate his mission.\textsuperscript{132} Dupuis said that one of Cen Yuying’s subordinates struck a deal with him to exchange over 50,000 dan of Yunnan’s copper for the same quantity of salt. The traders in Manhao formed a merchant association to negotiate business with Dupuis, giving him 1,000 dan of tin in exchange for cotton and salt. They also promised up to thirty junks for his use by September.\textsuperscript{133} Moreover, Ma Rulong had loaded up Dupuis’s boat with copper and tin in exchange for 4,250 tons of salt (worth 75,000 dan) from Vietnam.\textsuperscript{134} Ma also gave him a letter granting a pardon to the Yellow Flags if they continued to behave well. Moreover, the Yellow Flags would have the opportunity to be employed in the operations of mines in the future.\textsuperscript{135} Hence, Dupuis further

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 58–59.
\textsuperscript{129} Davis points out that Huang was known as Pan Lunsi. Davis, \textit{Imperial Bandits}, 52, 74.
\textsuperscript{130} Dupuis, \textit{Journey}, 50, 54, 58.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., 60.
\textsuperscript{132} Long Zhang believes that when Dupuis claimed to purchase the firearms on Yunnan officials’ behalf, he could speak only for Ma Rulong since Cen Yuying and Liu Yuezhao had no knowledge of such dealings. See Long Zhang, \textit{Yuenan}, 22.
\textsuperscript{133} Dupuis, \textit{Journey}, 71–73.
\textsuperscript{134} Scott, \textit{French and Tongking}, 8. Dupuis said that due to the opposition from the Vietnamese, Ma Rulong once considered sending 10,000 troops to occupy the Red River and facilitate the trade, or at least sending two to three thousand men to protect the Frenchman. Dupuis, \textit{Journey}, 69–70.
\textsuperscript{135} Dupuis, \textit{Tong-kin}, 152.
promised the Yellow Flags and the hill tribes that he would uproot Liu and chase him out of Lào Cai.136

Nevertheless, Dupuis’s name had become abominable in Hanoi by the spring of 1873: under his protection, Huang Chongying had returned to Hanoi, plundering the marketplace and killing civilians.137 Local Vietnamese officials had asked Liu Yongfu to provide intelligence, especially on the "copper, tin, and other metals" coming from Yunnan.138 When Dupuis returned to Hanoi in late April, he discovered that the Vietnamese had also arrested some Cantonese merchants who had assisted him previously.139 In early May, Dupuis threatened to occupy the citadel in Hanoi and requested that his Chinese merchant friends be released from prison. He even kidnapped the Vietnamese chief of police as leverage. In late May, Dupuis and the Vietnamese officials successfully negotiated with the brokerage of the Cantonese merchant community.140 Despite repeated warnings from the Vietnamese officials, especially on the salt embargo, Dupuis planned to ship more firearms and salt to Yunnan to fulfil his deal with Ma Rulong. However, this deal would not last with the French occupation of Hanoi.141

In fact, the authorities of China’s border provinces had quickly drawn a line between them and Dupuis when they heard the grievances of the Vietnamese court in the summer. The Vietnamese complained to the governor-general of Liang-Guang that Dupuis passed through Vietnam with loads of firearms and was involved in business speculation and salt smuggling. The governor-general of Liang-Guang responded that Dupuis had accomplished his mission to assist Commander Feng Zicai to transport firearms and would be ordered not to come anymore. In June, King Tự Đức learned that Cen Yuying had proposed to Beijing to request that all provinces withhold the firearms that had been purchased on behalf of

136 Dupuis, Journey, 76.
138 Dupuis, Journey, 75.
139 Ibid., 77; Yang Mei, findai Yunnan xiwen wenxian, 35; Shao Xunzheng, Zhongfa Yuenan, 40; McAleavy, Black Flags, 121–23.
140 In this meeting, the Vietnamese accused Dupuis of trespassing and travelling to Yunnan without authorisation, returning with Chinese soldiers and metals to set up an outpost, intending to smuggle salt, and imprisoning those Vietnamese mandarins who tried to prevent his crimes. Dupuis, Journey, 82–83; Dupuis, Tong-kin, 159–61, 166.
141 Nevertheless, the Yunnan provincial government’s efforts to develop and industrialise the mining industry would continue with the efforts of Liu Changyou and Cen Yuying later in the 1870s and 1880s. See C. Patterson Giersch, Corporate Conquests: Business, the State, and the Origins of Ethnic Inequality in Southwest China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020), 128–29; CYYZG, vol. 2: 577–79.
Yunnan. In this case, Dupuis would no longer have any reason to represent the government of Yunnan in the Red River trade. The Yunnan provincial officials responded to Dupuis’s petition for aid with the excuse that the Qing government did not intend to open the Red River for trade. Despite the opposition, Dupuis sent twelve junks of salt to Yunnan in October.

In late 1873, the French administration in Saigon, however, decided to dispatch Francis Garnier to aid Dupuis when his clashes with the Vietnamese authorities escalated. Hearing the complaints about Dupuis’s conduct in Hanoi, Admiral Marie-Jules Dupré, the French governor in Saigon, ordered him to withdraw, as he had accomplished the tasks commissioned by the Qing provincial authorities. However, Ernest Millot, second-in-command to Dupuis, convinced Dupré of the importance of French control in Tonkin amid the German and British threats. In mid-1873, Dupré further attempted to solidify this idea in the mind of his superior in Paris, the Minister of the Navy. The French believed that this step was crucial in deterring China’s intervention and the Qing army’s incursion into Indochina, which could further prevent Britain from reaping the ultimate benefit. Further, the operation to aid Dupuis had aligned with Garnier’s ambition to expand French control along the Red River and further into Yunnan, especially after the Mekong Exploration Commission. When Dupuis was in Paris in February 1872, he spoke at the French Geography Society and highly praised his success in proving that the Red River was the shortest and most advantageous route to penetrate the interior of China.

Dupuis’s aggression in Hanoi and France’s intervention in Tonkin ironically increased Vietnam’s dependence on Liu Yongfu, giving the Black Flags a legitimate reason to openly fight the French. The Vietnamese urged Liu to prepare for deployment as the French breached four provinces in Tonkin.

143 Shao Xunzheng argued that the officials in Yunnan only used Dupuis to transport firearms without intending to open the Red River for trade. Shao, Zhongfa Yuenan, 41.
144 Dupuis, Tong-kin, 211.
146 Kees van Dijk argues that at least Garnier, and probably Dupré, speculated that the British would push Beijing to invade Tonkin. Consequently, Hong Kong would threaten Saigon’s advantages in international trade. Kees van Dijk, Pacific Strife, 202–3.
147 Davis, Imperial Bandits, 76–77.
148 Garnier, De Paris au Tibet, xv–xii.
Liu was willing to serve. In December, the Black Flags lured Francis Garnier to Cầu Giấy and slew him. After that, King Tự Đức sent the Black Flags back to the upper Red River because Liu could have little to contribute to the forthcoming peace negotiation. Nevertheless, Liu continued to resist the French presence and influence. He informed the French that he would allow the Yunnanese to return home as long as they were not traitors or robbers. Liu announced that the French could entrust their goods to the Chinese merchants who could freely pass Bảo Thắng, and he would guard their safety and compensate for their loss of property if they were robbed. However, he opposed the presence of European merchants and ships in Bảo Thắng and he would use force to stop them from coming.

A stronger Qing-Liu (Yongfu) alliance was forming as the Guangxi and Yunnan authorities became increasingly aware of the French aggression in Vietnam. The officials in Yunnan would recognise Liu Yongfu’s importance in deterring the French in Vietnam. Their collaboration with the French, especially Dupuis, had been conditional, subject to either side’s interpretation. Their mineral and salt businesses were doomed not only because of the latter’s arrogance and aggression in Hanoi but also because of the door he had opened to French imperial expansion. In the long run, Liu’s alliance with the Guangxi and Yunnan authorities was inevitable due to one commonality they all shared: the clash of interests with France in Vietnam.

Neither the Qing nor the Vietnamese governments had posed serious threats to Liu Yongfu’s survival and prosperity in the upper Red River before the arrival of the French. Liu had seized rich resources, as he was involved in the mining business in Tuyên Quang in 1868 and reaped handsome profits from taxing the opium trade between Yunnan and Vietnam. However, in the early spring of 1873, the French in Saigon offered to assist the Vietnamese in eliminating the bandits in the north. Dupuis had also been threatening to exterminate the Black Flags since January 1873. When sending salt to Yunnan and exchanging some provisions with the Black Flags in October, Dupuis warned them, “The day where you try to cross me ... I will exterminate you all from Lào Cai to Hanoi.” While organising Liu’s oral records for publication, Luo Xianglin believed that the French...
aggression in Vietnam forced the Black Flag general to fight back, which had little to do with the persuasion of the Qing military officers. By the end of the Hanoi crisis, the Vietnamese government finally promoted Liu as the deputy general and defender of Bảo Thắng. The Black Flags gained more control in the upper Red River to collect taxes and replenish their supplies. Liu could harvest approximately 50,000 liang of silver each year by collecting trade taxes. During the late 1860s and 1870s, the Black Flags raided, looted, and subdued the hill communities in Tonkin and appropriated foodstuffs from the Tai communities between the Red River and the Clear River (Sông Lô). Consequently, Liu had established a “parallel state” to the Vietnamese government, guaranteed by force and violence.

155 LYFLSC, 6.
156 Liao Zonglin, zhanzhengshi, 60–61.
157 Davis, Imperial Bandits, 61.
4 The Imperial Agents in the Contested Realms

Abstract
Chapter 4 explores the nuances behind Liu Yongfu's transformation from a bandit and enemy of the Qing and Vietnamese states into a defender of Asian autonomy against French imperialism. While reflecting on the formation of the Qing-Liu Yongfu alliance, this chapter underscores Liu's subtle position in the multilateral relations involving the various state agents and state powers.

Keywords: Sino-Vietnamese relations; Sino-French relations; Tonkin; French annexation of Vietnam; King Tự Đức; Liu Yongfu

China, Vietnam, and France had different conceptions of Vietnam's (and Tonkin's) spatiality, which placed the Black Flag Army at the centre of their conflicts. The space of Vietnam contributed to the presumed territoriality of other state entities such as France and China. While France gradually turned Vietnam into its protectorate, the Qing officials still considered Vietnam an essential part of the Qing imperial territory that comprised the hinterlands, borderlands, and tributary states. The tributaries, including Vietnam, were envisioned as the fanli, or the fence, of China's borderlands. This perspective was essential for the Qing government to justify its military presence in Tonkin and its alliance with Liu Yongfu. Therefore, the reinforcement of the Qing-Liu (Yongfu) alliance against France had failed to consider Vietnam's desire for independence and sovereignty, or even the mere desire to survive the conflicts between two overlords. On the individual level, Liu Yongfu's stories of sojourning in Vietnam illustrated the contradictions, struggles, calculations, and compromises in the multilateral relations involving the various state agents and state powers. This chapter addresses the nuances behind Liu Yongfu's transformation from an outlaw to a state agent and underscores his subtle position in these multilateral relations.

doi: 10.5117/9789048558995_CH04
The Black Flag’s great value lay in its ability to compensate the weak state military as a nonstate or semi-state force that could operate unbounded by international treaties and protocols. Compared to Li Zhenguo, who had an official title in the Qing military, and the Tengyue gentry, who appeared to be lawful subjects of the empire, Liu’s bandit status allowed the Qing government to deny any secret aid to the Black Flags in their counter-French operations. His bandit status also made it more difficult for the French government to initiate diplomatic negotiations with China regarding Liu’s opposition. Instead, the French had to send their protests mainly to King Tự Đức of Vietnam, which, over time, would increase the king’s distrust of Liu.

The Diplomatic Exchanges Regarding Vietnam’s Suzerainty

In March 1874, Vietnam and France signed the Treaty of Saigon to settle the crisis in Hanoi and the death of Francis Garnier, which recognised Vietnam as an independent state, ironically, under French protection. The treaty set the tone and legal foundation for France’s suzerainty in a poorly defined protectorate, commencing the process of detaching Vietnam from China’s tributary system. The vague language that defined the term protection favoured the French interpretation of the treaty in terms of contingencies.

such as the presence of Chinese bandits or the Qing military in Vietnam.\(^2\) The negotiation with China regarding the harassment of the Chinese bandits therefore became urgent as France claimed the responsibility of guarding Vietnam’s independence and stability. Finding the Chinese bandits, especially Liu Yongfu, threatening, the French consistently pressed the Vietnamese government to drive them out of the country. As the Vietnamese government sought China’s aid in pacifying the bandits, France’s newly claimed suzerainty over Vietnam was challenged. However, the Qing military needed Liu’s cooperation to suppress other Chinese bandits and to deter French expansion in Vietnam, which continued to justify the Black Flags’ control in the upper Red River.

In late May 1875, the French minister M. Rochechouart began negotiating with Prince Gong (Yixin) regarding the Treaty of Saigon (1874), trade, France’s status as Vietnam’s protector, and the Chinese army and bandits in Vietnam. Following Britain’s footsteps to build a road to connect the trade between Burma and western China after the Margary Affair, France requested to enter Yunnan and open new ports of trade.\(^3\) In mid-June, Yixin informed Rochechouart that the Red River was not open for trade. Moreover, the Qing government could not deny Vietnam’s plea to exterminate the bandits, which was the primary reason why Qing troops were in Vietnam. The Qing troops were also guarding the imperial border from the bandits’ assaults and would withdraw as soon as they accomplished their missions.\(^4\)

Contemporary Chinese scholars believe that Yixin’s response to the French expansion in Vietnam constituted a diplomatic failure, for he did not firmly challenge the Treaty of Saigon and reassert Qing suzerainty over Vietnam in a timely fashion.\(^5\) By stating that Vietnam had historically been China’s tributary state, Yixin intended to declare China’s continuous suzerainty in Vietnam, but the subtleness and ambiguity of the Chinese language had the opposite effect. Unsurprisingly, the French translation of Yixin’s statement indicated that Vietnam “used to be” China’s tributary.\(^6\) Six years later, the French Foreign Ministry admitted that Yixin’s 1875 statement had been


\(^6\) ZFZZ, vol. 3, no. 39: 109. The Chinese translation of the French translation of Prince Gong’s response in 1875 indicated that Rochechouart viewed the document and said that Vietnam used to be a Chinese protectorate.
incorrectly translated. It was likely that Rochechouart misinterpreted Yixin’s real intention and believed that Beijing had recognised the French status in Vietnam. It was equally possible that Rochechouart understood Yixin’s meaning but had intentionally manipulated the language discrepancy.

Moreover, Yixin might have failed to utilise diplomacy and international protocols to secure China’s influence in Vietnam due to his unfamiliarity with the Western style of foreign exchanges and his misunderstanding of the ramifications of international treaties. Having the misconception that the legitimacy of Qing suzerainty was based on Vietnam’s submission instead of the recognition of international society, Yixin did not see the need to dispute the French status and damage Sino-French relations. Therefore, Yixin responded to Thomas Wade poorly when he required clarification about whether Vietnam, a Qing tributary, had the liberty to sign agreements with any foreign countries without Beijing’s permission. Yixin indicated that Vietnam followed the traditional conventions for a Chinese tributary state to interact with Beijing, and that international society also knew how Vietnam had handled its political and religious policies. He vaguely stressed Vietnam’s autonomy under China’s suzerainty and indirectly implied that the French should not challenge that. This less affirmative and subtle rhetoric had become a standard response to other foreign powers’ inquiries into the relationship between China and its tributary states.

Overall, China, France, and Vietnam all seemed to have taken obscure and passive approaches to redefine their new relationships. China did not recognise the Treaty of Saigon but was reluctant to dispute its terms.

7 Instead of conveying that Vietnam had a long history as China’s tributary state and was still China’s tributary state, French interpreter F. Scherzer’s translation in 1875 had shown Rochechouart that Vietnam’s tributary relationship with China was in the past. Although the head interpreter Mr. Deveria had reported the accident to the French Legation and the Foreign Ministry in Paris, the misinterpretation was not corrected but was conveniently accepted to recognise the French status. China’s ambassador Zeng Jize found out the problem and protested to the French Foreign Ministry in 1881. See a series of Qing-French diplomatic exchanges in ZFZZ, vol. 1: 97–99, 101–2.
12 The Zongli yamen “repeatedly issued the paradoxical declarations that Korea was simultaneously a dependency of China and an autonomous nation.” See Kirk Larsen, Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008), 52.
While attempting to detach Vietnam from China’s influence, the French did not stop Huế from sending tribute to Beijing or seeking Qing aid to pacify the bandits.\textsuperscript{13} Both China and France frequently talked about peace and friendship. Therefore, the Chinese would tolerate the French if Vietnam continued to pay tribute. The French could temporarily accept what Kim Munholland characterises as a “less than satisfactory arrangement,” restraining their own imperial expansion, due to other factors such as domestic political opposition as well as the tension with Germany and the effects on the economy.\textsuperscript{14} Nevertheless, this approach would change in less than ten years when the Qing government actively interfered and mitigated Korea’s treaties with the Western powers in 1882 and secured the interests of both the Qing and Chosŏn courts.\textsuperscript{15}

Nevertheless, the Qing court was not ignorant of the situation in Vietnam,\textsuperscript{16} for regular reports came from the borderlands to report on French aggression and the Guangxi army’s operations in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{17} In this process, the Qing provincial authorities often played essential roles in finalising the Zongli yamen’s foreign policies.\textsuperscript{18} Guangxi governor Liu Changyou reported the Hanoi crisis to Beijing in December 1873 and pointed out that the Guangxi military did not need to interfere because the dispute was about trade. He disclosed that although his troops were far away from Hanoi, they would act on Beijing’s order and seize the opportunity to fight the Yellow Flags, who had attacked some cities. Liu emphasised the need

\textsuperscript{13} ZFZZ, vol. 1, no. 55: 97–98 and vol. 3, no. 103: 226; Lamb, Vietnam’s Will to Live, 184.


\textsuperscript{15} Larsen, Tradition, Treaties, and Trade, 72–80.

\textsuperscript{16} At first glance, the Qing authorities showed some “negligence” in the situation in Vietnam because of various reasons: first, the long distance allayed the Qing court’s alarm about the French expansion in Cochinchina; second, the internal turmoil, especially in the borderlands, had diverted the Qing court’s attention. See, Li Enhan, Zeng Jize de waijiao (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1966), 166–67. However, Matthew Mosca argues that the Qing foreign policies, especially in Central Asia, had demonstrated sophisticated strategies that were marked by “pragmatism, flexibility, and a judicious mix of force, guile, and diplomacy.” See Mosca, From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy, 7–8.

\textsuperscript{17} ZFZZ, vol. 1, no. 13–15: 19–24.

\textsuperscript{18} The Zongli yamen had actively participated in the policy-making process from 1861 to 1884 but had withdrawn to the position as a secretariat from 1884 to 1901. For more on the Zongli yamen’s influence and role in the Qing foreign policies from 1861 to 1901, see S. M. Meng, The Tsungli Yamen: Its Organization and Functions (Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University; distributed by Harvard University Press, 1962), 44–46, 50–53.
to strengthen China’s border defence. Liu was concerned that suspicions, rumours, and confrontations could arise as the bandits in Vietnam might pretend to be French military subjects, while the Vietnamese troops could pose as Qing military. The court of Beijing was reluctant to meddle in the disputes between Vietnam and France. Although the Guangxi army in Vietnam had outnumbered Francis Garnier’s troops, Empress Cixi and Emperor Tongzhi instructed the Zongli yamen to inform the French that China had absolutely no interest in intervening. After the Black Flags killed Francis Garnier, Beijing ordered the Qing troops in Cao Bằng and Lạng Sơn to stay away from Hanoi and avoid skirmishes with the French.

As the business collaboration with Jean Dupuis indicated a sign of treason after the Hanoi crisis, the Yunnan provincial government was eager to correct the mistakes, and Ma Rulong was demoted. Cen Yuying cut off ties with Dupuis and drew a clear boundary with Ma. In June 1874, Cen reported to Beijing that former provincial commander Ma had been involved in the firearm business with Dupuis. He had obtained a large quantity of weapons after thoroughly searching Ma’s house and camps. He further assured Beijing that his actions to strengthen their defence were working: some foreigners had reached Yunnan’s border and did not proceed because of the presence of his defence troops. Later, Cen warned Beijing that the bandits and Hui rebels could organise a joint force and assault the French under the cover of the Qing military. Nevertheless, neither Cen nor Liu Changyou wanted to confront the French at this point, and they repeatedly tried to convince the French that the Qing troops in Vietnam were not interested in interfering with French operations in the country.

Nevertheless, the security of China’s borderlands became a primary concern because the annexation of Vietnam was not the only way France could meddle in or even invade China. In May 1875, J. P. Cowles, an English instructor at Beijing’s government language academy Tongwen Guan, issued an analysis indicating that the roots of the Treaty of Saigon lay in

21  In late 1874, Ma expressed his strong regret and distrust toward the French in a conversation with Secretary Meyers of the British Legation. See The British National Archives (BNA), FO 17/742, 24, 27, 32–35.
23  Tongwen Guan was established in 1861 as the first institution in China to train interpreters for western languages under the direction of Zongli yamen. See Melissa Mourt, "The Establishment
Vietnam’s obstruction of Dupuis’s agenda to transport firearms on behalf of Yunnan. Cowles warned that France did not have to dispatch its standing army and declare a formal war with the Qing but could penetrate China by inciting the bandits in Vietnam and giving them firearms. Therefore, the Zongli yamen’s emphasis on border defence echoed both Cen Yuying’s and Liu Changyou’s judgement. Without direct confrontations with the French, the Qing army’s continual presence in Vietnam gave China hope that they could deter France and its local allies and even restore full control of its tributary. Thus, the Zongli yamen twice denied French requests to open Yunnan in April and May 1875 and indicated that the Qing government would not withdraw its army from Vietnam.

Yixin dodged Ambassador Rochechouart’s persistent requests to set up a port along the Red River, and he strategically threw this problem to the borderlands’ officials. In June 1875, Rochechouart pressed the Zongli yamen to designate Manhao as a trading port, insisting that Beijing’s cooperation would enable the Vietnamese to keep the promise of letting the French sail through the Red River. The Zongli yamen did not respond when the letters from the Yunnan and Guangxi officials arrived reporting their interactions with the French and the Qing counter-bandit operations in Vietnam. After a careful discussion with Li Hanzhang, who was in Kunming investigating the Margary Affair, Cen Yuying warned Beijing that the Yellow Flags might infiltrate the border region and agitate the Miao, Yao, and Hui to revolt if Yunnan were to open new ports for trade. In addition, the Yunnan army had never entered Vietnam. Governor-General Yinghan of Liang-Guang also forwarded to the Zongli yamen his correspondence with the French consul in Guangdong, who had complained about Qing interference in Vietnamese affairs. At this point, Yinghan’s troops in Tuyên Quang and Thái Nguyên were still far away from the French, and the officers leading these troops had requested that the French give them notice of any travel into their territory. The French consul did not want to put the Sino-French
“friendship” at stake by confronting Yinghan. Instead, he decided to leave the matter to the Zongli yamen and the French ministers in Beijing and Hanoi.28

For Yinghan, the Guangxi army’s real purpose in Vietnam had been to prevent further collaboration between Vietnam and France. He alarmed the Zongli yamen with some concerns: first, it was difficult to know of the secret deals between Vietnam and France since the signing of the Treaty of Saigon; second, France intended to encroach upon Vietnam as well as Guangxi and Guangdong; and third, the French had been paranoid about the Qing army and the Chinese refugees (immigrants).29 Yinghan believed that the Qing army in Tonkin would aggravate the French; however, Vietnam would fall into a greater disaster without the Qing troops.30

These decisive and active voices from the imperial borderlands enabled Yixin to utilise the rhetoric of local agency in his exchanges with the French. On September 2, 1875, Rochechouart sent two subordinates to the Zongli yamen to reinstate the request regarding Yunnan’s trade in conjunction with the British demand to settle the Margary Affair. Officials at the Zongli yamen responded that the issue of trade could not be addressed at this time and that the governor of Yunnan had the authority to decide the matter. On September 6, the Zongli yamen’s formal response stated that the agency of Yunnanese officials had outweighed Beijing’s speculation and desire to make the decision.31 Yixin had adopted this rhetoric—leaving the borderlands’ matters to the borderlands’ officials—in the negotiation regarding the Margary Affair. The Zongli yamen also had intentionally

29 Đại Nam thực lục frequently recorded about the insurgence of the Chinese refugees and the court’s policies to investigate the situation and settle them. It was also clear that the French not only wanted to get rid of the bandits but also these refugees. See Danan shilu zhengbian di 4 ji (DNTL–CB–4) in Danan shilu Zhongguo xinan bianjiang xiangguan shiliaoji, ed. Wang Baizhong (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2015), vol. 50 (27): 433; vol. 54 (11–12): 445; vol. 54 (22): 446; vol. 54 (33–34): 447; vol. 54 (45): 449.
30 ZFZZ, vol. 1, no. 6: 4–5. To echo such concerns and strategies, Governor Ding Richang of Fujian presented the Zongli yamen quite a few maps of Vietnam in early March of 1876. He had been acquiring and collecting maps and survey reports on Tonkin and the French occupied areas. Among them was a translated chapter of an 1868 French survey report on interior Yunnan, Guangxi, Sichuan, Vietnam, Burma, Laos, Siam, and India. Ding Richang discovered that this report had explicitly depicted the landscape and resources along China’s borderlands with major neighbouring countries in Southeast and South Asia. He initially intended to organise the translation of the entire survey to assist the Zongli yamen to respond to the border affairs in Yunnan. However, it seemed that these maps could have served the greater needs in the Sino-French exchanges in Vietnam. See ZFZZ, vol. 1, no. 16: 24–25.
31 Ibid., no. 10–11: 10–12.
put off the exchanges with the French.\textsuperscript{32} At least Rochechouart did not consider this response a rejection, and the Qing officials had been telling him that he had actually proposed some good ideas.\textsuperscript{33} Thus, knowing that the provincial authorities in Guangxi and Yunnan would not consent to the French request, Yixin had provided an impractical option and directed Rochechouart’s attention to the imperial borderlands.

The Agency of the Borderlands’ Officials

Overseeing Yunnan and Guangxi, Cen Yuying and Liu Changyou had been two main decision makers in interacting with the French and British. Cen became the deputy governor-general of Yun-Gui in the late autumn of 1873. Liu, who had been the governor of Guangxi, replaced Cen in late 1875. He then passed the duty back to Cen in the summer of 1882 when he fell ill.\textsuperscript{34} Both of them spent much of their time suppressing internal rebellions in Guangxi and Yunnan. They were fully aware of Vietnam’s inability to counter the French, and they did not count on Vietnam to buffer their provinces from France’s threat.\textsuperscript{35} Moreover, they both understood that China would probably not raise a formal war to protest the French expansion; however, the French might lose patience over China’s anti-bandit operations in Vietnam.

The issue of Chinese bandits and Liu Yongfu’s presence in Vietnam had become more complicated as both the Qing and France used the anti-bandit rhetoric and operations to bolster their control. To pacify the bandits, China heard Vietnam’s plea and sent its army. Beginning in 1870, Liu Changyou had considered withdrawing the Qing troops from Vietnam; however, because of the continual harassment of the bandits, the Vietnamese officials’ calls for aid, and Feng Zicai’s concern about the revival of the bandit groups, roughly ten battalions of Qing soldiers remained in Cao Bằng and Lạng

\begin{itemize}
\item Guangxi saw frequent shift of governors from 1874 to 1885, with a list of officials such as Ruilin (March 1865–October 1874), Yinghan (October 1874–September 1875), Deputy Governor-General Zhang Zhaodong (October 1874–March 1875), Liu Kunyi (September 1875–December 1879), Deputy Governor-General Yukan (December 1878–December 1879; December 1879–May 1880; April–May 1882), Zhang Shusheng (December 1879–April 1882; July 1883–May 1884), Zen Guoquan (May 1882–July 1883), and Zhang Zhidong (May 1884–August, 1889).
\item Cen Yuying still saw the revolts of the Muslim rebels in Tengyue in the summer of 1874 and he had to pacify ethnic revolts in the same area until the late 1870s. See CYYZG, vol. 1: 332–34.
\end{itemize}
By the end of 1873, the anti-bandit operations would constitute an essential aspect of China’s military strategy to deter French expansion. Liu Changyou, who had been concerned about a potential French invasion of Guangxi, proposed that the Qing court utilise bandit-pacification as an active defensive measure after the French occupation of Vietnam. He continued to promote this strategy in 1874 as the bandits and the French posed great dangers to Vietnam and China’s borderlands.

In August 1874, Liu Changyou reported that the French considered Huang Chongying their primary ally and Liu Yongfu a major bandit who needed to be eliminated. Liu Changyou, however, believed that Liu Yongfu was leading the only dependable force in Vietnam that could resist the French. He speculated that aiding Vietnam’s pacification of bandits could be France’s excuse to control Vietnam and further detach the country from Qing’s imperial orbit, which would expose Guangxi directly to the French aggression. As the Vietnamese king and local officials continued to petition for Chinese aid, China should not withdraw its military from Vietnam. While pacifying the bandits with the cooperation of the Vietnamese and Black Flags, the Qing military could have the flexibility to recruit those bandits who were considered valuable and to protect China’s border region.

As the French had found an ally and local agent in the Yellow Flags, the Qing officials saw the feasibility of aiding the Black Flags to contain the French expansion. The killing of Frances Garnier in late 1873 had won the Black Flags prestige throughout northern Vietnam and among the Qing scholars and officials. Liu’s control in Bảo Thăng and the upper Red River threatened French mobility in Tonkin. However, facing France’s complaints, Beijing would frequently claim that the Qing army in Vietnam had never operated beyond the anti-bandit mission, or in other words, aided the Black Flags. Hence, while France attempted to challenge China’s suzerainty in

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38 Ibid., 615–18.
41 Liao Zonglin, zhanzhengshi, 73.
42 McAleavy, Black Flags, 165.
Vietnam, the Qing troops and their ally Liu reinforced the reality of China’s intervention.\textsuperscript{43} Nevertheless, Guangxi and Yunnan did not engage equal forces in Vietnam. The officials in Guangxi had especially collaborated with Liu Yongfu to pacify bandits and deter French expansion. In contrast, the officials in Yunnan had pragmatically used French missionaries and technicians to pacify the Muslim rebels. Indeed, the guardians of the borderlands did not always agree with each other, as exemplified by their discord with Beijing over the policies regarding Tonkin.\textsuperscript{44} The Yunnan provincial government had business deals with Dupuis, and Commander Ma Rulong had considered drafting the Yellow Flags, who would be sponsored and equipped with firearms by the French. Yet, the Yellow Flags and White Miao attacked Yunnan’s border towns in Kaihua and Mengzi in October 1874.\textsuperscript{45} Prior to Augustus Margary’s death in February 1875, Cen had warned Beijing not to allow the Europeans to travel or trade in Yunnan.\textsuperscript{46} Shortly after that, Liu Changyou requested Cen to join a Guangxi-Vietnamese joint operation to eliminate the Yellow Flags.\textsuperscript{47} Cen had become increasingly concerned about French expansion in Vietnam and its impact on Huang Chongying’s aggression;\textsuperscript{48} however, he was busy suppressing the remnants of the Muslim rebels and worrying about the British invasion should the negotiation on the Margary Affair fail. While the Guangxi army actively hunted down the bandits, troops from Yunnan rarely appeared on the other side of the border under Cen’s watch. Nevertheless, in less than ten years, Cen would have a more profound understanding of Liu Yongfu’s value in deterring the French, for the civilians in northern Vietnam “knew Liu Yongfu but not the Vietnamese King.”\textsuperscript{49}

Twelve days after Yixin was officially informed of the Treaty of Saigon, Cen Yuying mobilised 4,180 troops to guard Yunnan’s border with Burma and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{50} He must have noticed the French protest of the Guangxi army’s activities, so he wrote to Beijing that his troops had never entered

\textsuperscript{43} Chere, Diplomacy of the Sino-French War, 19.
\textsuperscript{46} This was the memorial that Cen mentioned when responding to the Zongli yamen’s initial inquiry on the Margary Affair, which accused the British and the Zongli yamen of “negligence” in having sent Margary to Yunnan at the wrong time. CYYZG, vol. 1: 315.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., vol. 2: 577–79.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., vol. 1: 394–95.
Vietnam. In early August, Cen further explained to Beijing that Yunnan had been strengthening the border and training more soldiers and would be ready to aid Vietnam upon receiving the royal decree. Cen probably understood that he should have aided Liu Changyou because of the geopolitical interdependence between Yunnan and Guangxi. However, he could not afford new campaigns in Vietnam, because of the 1874 downsizing of the Yunnan army and Yunnan's chronic financial deficit that had become more devastating since Beijing and other provinces suspended their aid.

In early 1876, Liu would become the new governor-general of Yunnan and would soon be trapped by the revolts in Tengyue and Shunning. He would realise that the financial hardship and shortage of military funds of which Cen complained were real and had become more pressing. By the summer of 1876, seven provinces that used to aid Yunnan had owed more than 2.2 million liang of silver to Yunnan. Over the next few years, despite Liu's willingness, the Yunnan army was largely still absent from Vietnam until 1882.

In 1875, Liu Yongfu and Liu Changyou razed the Yellow Flags' base in Hà Giang. The Guangxi troops later penetrated White Miao territory and eventually captured and executed Huang Chongying in the autumn. Vietnamese General Hoàng Kế Viêm, later known as the Black Flags' liaison to the Vietnamese court, struggled to satisfy the Qing troops' tremendous food consumption, which comprised a monthly average of 7,000 to 8,000 cubic metres of foodstuffs. Liu Changyou's strategies in Vietnam won support from other Guangxi officials. Governor-General Yinghan approved the counter-bandit operations to deter the French and secure Vietnam's loyalty. Liu Changyou once considered that it would be expedient to withdraw as

51 Zhongfa Yuenan jiaoshedang, vol. 1: 27.
52 Ibid., 28–29; CYYZG, vol. 1: 401–42.
53 Ibid.
55 In late August, the Qing troops captured Huang Chongying in the hills of An Bien. As a friendly gesture, the Guangxi army sent seven Frenchmen they found in Hà Giang back to Hanoi: there had been reports that some foreigners were assisting Huang Chongying to manufacture firearms and manage intelligence. See Liu Changyou, Liu Wushengong (Changyou) yishu, vol. 26 (52), in vol. 250: 3380; LCYJ, vol. 2: 637–38, 640, 651–60.
57 DNTL–CB–4, vol. 53 (25–26): 441. Later, the Vietnamese King said that it would be very hard to find porters to transport the food supplies to the Qing military, and thus ordered Hoàng Kế Viêm and Tôn Thất Thuyết to inform Qing officers to collect the supplies on their own. See DNTL–CB–4, vol. 53 (39) and vol. 57 (10–11): 442, 457.
soon as Huang was eliminated. However, even after the death of Huang, the remnants of the Yellow Flags and other bandits continued to justify Vietnam's plea for help as well as the Qing military's “rightful” presence in Vietnam.\(^{58}\) As mentioned previously, Yinghan's firm stance enabled Yixin to underscore the agency of the borderlands' officials in his interactions with French minister Rochechouart. Later, after the Guangxi army successfully defeated the Yellow Flags, Yinghan stressed that France and Britain were more interested in trading with Yunnan while seeking to take over Vietnam and Burma. With this understanding, Yinghan's successor Liu Kunyi admonished the Guangxi army to expend its strength to save Vietnam so as not to leave it to the French.\(^{59}\)

The Guangxi army's presence and its alliance with Liu Yongfu would gradually crystallise French antagonism and anxiety about a potential Qing occupation of Vietnam. Later in 1878, Guangxi army officer Li Yangcai's rebellion and incursion into Vietnam further disturbed France's security regarding their status quo, stimulating the French government to initiate aggressive policies.\(^{60}\) In December, the French consul in Haiphong began preparations to defend important cities in Cochinchina, envisioning a formal war against Li Yangcai with 400 to 500 French soldiers and 200 to 300 sailors.\(^{61}\) Yet, General Feng Zicai and his army soon came to eliminate his rebellious subordinates. Later, the Vietnamese court also wanted the French to return six provinces in Cochinchina.\(^{62}\) Hence, the French saw no hope of establishing their suzerainty in Vietnam and ending the prolonged Qing military presence.\(^{63}\) A war seemed practical not necessarily “to gain the

\(^{58}\) *ZFZZ*, vol. 1, no. 6: 4–5.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., no. 13–14: 19–20.

\(^{60}\) In late September, Li Yangcai, an officer under General Feng Zicai, recruited thousands of bandits in the name of the Liang-Guang provincial authority and fled into Vietnam. Claiming to be the offspring of former Vietnamese royalty, he intended to overthrow the court of Huế and re-establish the Lê dynasty (1428–1788). King Tự Đức dispatched General Hoàng Kế Viêm and 500 troops to Bắc Ninh where they joined another 500 Chinese troops to fight Li Yangcai after he had attacked Lạng Sơn. The French, however, had various accounts on the number of his troops, ranging from 6,000 to 10,000 to 100,000. See *DNTL–CB–4*, vol. 60 (24–26), 464; *ZFZZ*, vol. 3, no. 69 and no. 73: 165, 174; Kim Munholland, “Admiral Jauréguiberry and the French Scramble for Tonkin, 1879–83,” *French Historical Studies*, vol. 11, no. 1 (Spring, 1979): 81–107; Davis, *Imperial Bandits*, 37–38, 88, 90; Liao Zonglin, *zhanzhengshi*, 83–84.

\(^{61}\) The French expected that Vietnam would soon lose the northern provinces and that the French could only protect some major cities in Cochinchina. *ZFZZ*, vol. 3, no. 75 and no. 76: 178, 181.


right to annex Tongkin, but to force China to acknowledge the agreements made between France and the Kingdom of Annam.  

The Qing-Liu (Yongfu) Alliance

For the Chinese, the space of Vietnam constituted a broader imperial territory that included China Proper, the borderlands, and the tributary states. The Qing officials recognised Vietnam’s geopolitical function as the barrier protecting China’s borderlands. Cen Yuying argued that Vietnam, as a Qing vassal state, was the shield of Yunnan and Guangxi. Liu Changyou elaborated that “the border provinces were China’s gate whereas the tributaries were China’s fanli, or fences.” The geopolitical importance of the fences (tributaries) was to guard the gate (borderlands) and stabilise the house (China Proper). The loss of the fences, according to Liu, would endanger the gate and the house, and flimsy fences would not deter foreign invasion. Liu believed that France’s aggression in Vietnam had destroyed China’s barrier and allowed the French to loiter near the Chinese borderlands. If Vietnam intended to disconnect from China, argued Liu, Guangxi “would lose its fence.” From this perspective, the tributary system performed the function of an extended network of state security. Therefore, guarding Vietnam required more than the maintenance of China’s old convention of tributary relations. However, the French annexation of Tonkin, which would facilitate Vietnam’s domestic trade and secure French access to China’s southwest, broke into China’s extended territory and further threatened China’s borderlands. Consequently, Vietnam was torn between these two visions of imperial territoriality and struggled to adjust to its relationship with two overlords, especially when appeasing France seemed the only practical way to avoid annexation.

Since the French annexation of the Cochinchina provinces, the Vietnamese had adopted the policy of “neither genuine peace nor outright war” and used expedient methods that would not risk the future of the country. Although the king and his officials appeared cooperative when signing

64 Chere, Diplomacy of the Sino-French War, 3.
treaties under French pressure, they would dispense with the agreements at the withdrawal of the French military.\textsuperscript{68} For the king, peace treaties were convenient and necessary when the dangers of White Miao and Chinese bandits were raging through the country, when Vietnam's granaries had become “emptier with each passing day,” and when the state “treasuries [had] been all but depleted while endurance of [their] population [had] reached its limit.”\textsuperscript{69} Otherwise, Tự Đức and his officials violated the Treaty of Saigon with their continual submission to Beijing, the Qing army in Vietnam, and Liu Yongfu's obstructions. Therefore, the treaty had little use to establish France's suzerainty and restrict Sino-Vietnamese relations.\textsuperscript{70} Since the Autumn of 1875, the French Foreign Ministry had received more complaints about Vietnam's non-cooperation. Marie-Jules Dupré, the governor of Cochinchina, reported that the Vietnamese were unwilling to assist French diplomats in entering Tonkin. They were jeopardising France's tax revenue and the French merchant community in Haiphong by manipulating the import taxes and controlling the customs service.\textsuperscript{71} In 1876, some French officials wanted to modify the Treaty of Saigon to save the relationship with the Vietnamese.\textsuperscript{72} Overall, the cost for France to obtain commercial interests in Tonkin was increasing, and the French government had begun to envision turning Vietnam into a full protectorate.\textsuperscript{73}

Vietnam's submission to China was, perhaps, expedient to “escape” French dominance.\textsuperscript{74} Having been obsessed with Vietnam's inability to resist the French, Tự Đức could “gamble on China's susceptibilities” and exchange his subordination for China's assistance.\textsuperscript{75} In September 1876, an envoy of seventeen Vietnamese officials arrived in Beijing to celebrate the enthronement of Emperor Guangxu while mourning the death of Tongzhi. The French representative in Hanoi had advised the envoy to visit the French Legation in Beijing; however, this request was dismissed as the head of the envoy argued that he needed Chinese permission to do so.\textsuperscript{76} Louis Decazes, the French foreign minister in Paris, was disturbed to think that

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\textsuperscript{68} Chere, Diplomacy of the Sino-French War, 20.
\textsuperscript{69} “King Tự Đức’s Edict,” in Truong, Patterns of Vietnamese, 106.
\textsuperscript{70} Long Zhang, Yuenan, 47; Liao Zonglin, zhanzhengshi, 77–78; McAleavy, Black Flags, 171.
\textsuperscript{71} ZFZZ, vol. 3, no. 48: 120–23.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., no. 51, 129–31.
\textsuperscript{74} Munholland observed that Tự Đức utilised Beijing to “escape French tutelage.” Ibid. Morse added, the king had made a “persistent effort to escape” his supposed allegiance to France. Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, vol. 2: 347.
\textsuperscript{75} Truong, Patterns, 20.
\textsuperscript{76} ZFZZ, no. 52, 133–34.
the relationship between Huế and Beijing had become closer than ever, which would be very concerning should the Qing government establish tough policies against the French in the future.\textsuperscript{77} Brenier de Montmorand, the French minister in Beijing, had the impression that both China and France were Vietnam's protectors.\textsuperscript{78} Another envoy Huế sent to Beijing in 1880 further convinced the French that Tự Đức had given his ambassadors a secret mission—to obtain substantial aid from the Qing government to oppose the French invaders.\textsuperscript{79}

To save his throne and Vietnam's waning sovereignty in a relatively peaceful environment, Tự Đức moved closer to China to deter France. This move was part of the grand strategy—"playing one foreign power off against another"—proposed by Vietnamese official Nguyễn Hiệp in 1870 to check the French by establishing commercial relations with all foreign powers based on the principle of strict equality.\textsuperscript{80} The British had protested the French monopoly of trade and ports in Vietnam, and they would probably favour China's intervention in Tonkin. Tự Đức also attempted to warm up his relationship with Bangkok in 1879. Vietnam and Spain sent missions to each other and signed a commercial treaty in January 1880. Moreover, Vietnam befriended Germany as both the Germans and Spanish attempted to set up consulates in Tonkin.\textsuperscript{81} Nevertheless, these developments demonstrated Vietnam's considerable liberty when France failed to enforce its status quo, which would justify the move to turn Vietnam into a full protectorate.\textsuperscript{82} In the meantime, Vietnam's understanding of sovereignty and independence did not align with the visions of the nationalistic and pro-war officials in China who would eventually force Vietnam to pick a side in order to secure the Qing imperial territory. As the qingliu sect of officials rose along with their strong criticism of Guo Songtao (chapter 2), they would become the strongest anti-French voice in China. Despite the polarisation between the peacemakers led by Li Hongzhang and the war advocates led by the qingliu sect, more officials leaned toward tough policies against the French.\textsuperscript{83}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{77} Ibid., no. 56, 141.
\item \textsuperscript{78} Ibid., no. 60, 148.
\item \textsuperscript{79} Ibid., no. 172, 390; Truong, Patterns, 20.
\item \textsuperscript{80} "King Tu Duc's Edict," in Truong, Patterns, 105; Truong, Patterns, 18.
\item \textsuperscript{81} ZFZZ, vol. 3, no. 130, no. 146, and no. 151: 290–91, 337, 359; Munholland, "the French Scramble for Tonkin," 81–107.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Long Zhang, Yuenan, 47–50; Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, vol. 2: 347.
\item \textsuperscript{83} For Li Hongzhang's involvement in the Qing foreign affairs and his reluctance to radicalise the Sino-French disputes see Chere, Diplomacy of the Sino-French War, 77; S. M. Meng, Tsungli Yamen, 58–59; Lloyd E. Eastman, Throne and Mandarins: China's Search for A Policy during the
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In late 1881, the court of Beijing saw several options for tackling the crisis in Vietnam. First, Li Hongzhang insisted on staying out of the Franco-Vietnamese conflicts and leaving the Black Flags alone. Second, Zhang Peilun, a qingliu official and Li Hongzhang’s son-in-law, considered occupying Vietnam and countering the French invasion. Third, the idea of collaborating with Vietnam to resist France had a large audience among the Zongli yamen, the borderlands officials, and the overseas Qing diplomats, including Liu Kunyi, Zhang Shusheng, Liu Changyou, Zeng Jize, Ding Richang, and Zhou Derun. The fourth option was to assist Liu Yongfu in deterring the French. Most borderlands officials who agreed with the third option favoured the fourth as a supplementary strategy. These competing voices echoed the divisions, contradictions, and reconciliations occurring in the diplomatic negotiations and decision-making process in Beijing and Paris, as well as in the forefront of confrontations in the imperial borderlands and tributary states.

As nationalism prevailed, China’s diplomats took a more affirmative stance in the heated exchanges with France. At this point, France had recovered from the war with Prussia and had little concern over potential interference from Germany and Britain regarding its status in Indochina. The Republicans’ rise under the leadership of Léon Gambetta and Jules Ferry had given the French colonial officials and adventurers a green light for expansion. As a result, “most of the new French territories were acquired during Ferry’s two terms as premier from 1880 to 1881, and 1883 to 1885.”

Sino-French Controversy, 1880–1885 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 12–15. Eastman also discusses qingliu scholars’ increasing power to dominate the court and shape Beijing’s foreign policy, especially on Vietnam and France in the early 1880s (Throne and Mandarins, 209–19). Eastman further argues that as the guardian of northern China, Li Hongzhang saw the dangers in Korea more imminent and threatening, and he hesitated to divert military funds and manpower into the southwestern borderlands and Indochina. Ibid., 13–15.

84 Huang Xiaoyong, Zeng Jize de waijiao huodong yu sixiang yanjiu (Changsha: Hunan daxue chubanshe, 2013), 59; Liao Zonglin, zhanzhengshi, 117–19; Li Enhan, Zeng Jize, 176–78.

85 The qingliu scholars and the peacemakers were split in their different strategies and principles regarding the foreign diplomacy of China and Vietnam. However, the division was not a clear-cut and did not restrict individuals’ arguments. For example, the qingliu scholars often disagreed with Zeng Jize’s ideas to open Yunnan for trade but supported his strong stance in warring against the French. Huang Xiaoyong, waijiao huodong, 57–58; Li Enhan, Zeng Jize, 177.

86 Since 1878, Otto von Bismarck, the chancellor of Germany, had expressed no desire to interfere with the French business in Vietnam. Although Britain posed a threat in Mainland Southeast Asia, France largely enjoyed little interference from this European counterpart. Shao Xunzheng, Zhongfa Yuenan, 77; Li Enhan, Zeng Jize, 76–77, 168.


88 Power, Jules Ferry, 1; McAleavy, Black Flags, 182.
In contrast, after surviving the crisis of Margary Affair, China had fallen into tension with Russia over Ili (Xinjiang), and with Japan over Ryukyu.\(^{89}\)

The *qingliu* sect expanded its base in 1879 as Chinese officials denounced Ambassador Chonghou, who had signed an unacceptable treaty with Russia.\(^{90}\) Under pressure from the *qingliu*, Zeng Jize, the Qing ambassador to France (since 1878) and Britain (since 1879), had to divert his attention and travel to Russia in the summer of 1880.\(^{91}\)

Zeng Jize believed that the French annexation of Tonkin would extend the danger far beyond Vietnam due to China's ongoing disputes with Russia and Japan. He worried that the annexation would incite a scramble for China's tributaries or peripheries, such as Korea, Mongolia, and Tibet.\(^{92}\)

Although the French media had publicised an impending French operation in Vietnam, the French officials kept it a secret and would not respond to the inquiries that Zeng had made since early 1881.\(^{93}\) When the Third Republic's national assembly agreed to raise 2.5 million francs to fund the naval force in Tonkin Bay in July 1881, Zeng and the Chinese ambassador in Japan (He Ruzhang) alerted Beijing about the danger of an invasion unless France could be distracted by its war with Turkey (the Ottoman Empire) over the occupation of Tunis.\(^{94}\) Robert Hart also reminded the *Zongli yamen* that they should take advantage of the Franco-Turkish disputes and raise the military to defend Vietnam.\(^{95}\)

The French Foreign Ministry's ambiguous response to the annexation of Vietnam prompted Zeng Jize to firmly declare China's suzerainty over its tributary. Zeng further pressed France to enter into peace negotiations with China, instead of forcefully annexing Vietnam.\(^{96}\) His affirmative tone could be a result of increasing confidence in international diplomacy after the successful negotiation with Russia, which also made him feel comfortable advocating for more aggressive measures in Vietnam.\(^{97}\) Zeng intended to

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90 Li Enhan, *Zeng Jize*, 64–66, 86, 95 (quote 28); Huang Xiaoyong, *waijiao huodong*, 23–24.
92 *ZFZ*, vol. 1, no. 36: 57–60.
95 *ZFZ*, vol. 1, no. 45: 68–69.
96 After receiving another vague response from the Foreign Minister Saint-Hilaire in November of 1881, Zeng firmly declared that Vietnam had been China's tributary. Ibid., no. 42–43: 65–67.
97 Li Enhan, *Zeng Jize*, 159–60, 174–78. Zeng proposed seven terms to the *Zongli yamen* to increase China's control over Vietnam. These measures included that Vietnam should send
reinforce China’s control in Vietnam by invalidating France’s suzerainty and the Treaty of Saigon, which had encountered repeated opposition from the French.\textsuperscript{98} In early 1882, he discovered the French mistranslation of the Zongli yamen’s 1875 response to the Treaty of Saigon; however, the French Foreign Ministry had lost patience with his protest. In a few months, French naval officer Henri Rivière would take over the citadel of Hanoi.

Nevertheless, Zeng Jize had proposed that Beijing dispatch the Qing fleet to the south, while Li Hongzhang had directed more merchant junks to Vietnam and dispatched the Qing navy to accompany them. In early 1882, Liu Changyou, the governor-general of Yunnan, praised these moves and suggested that the Qing navy should enter Huế in the name of protecting the Chinese merchants.\textsuperscript{99} In fact, in late 1881, Liu Changyou had communicated with Zhang Shusheng, then the governor-general of Liang-Guang, about his plan to deploy the Qing army and navy to Vietnam from the two border provinces.\textsuperscript{100} When he heard Zeng’s proposal, Liu Changyou suggested that the Guangxi army should cooperate and train more soldiers with the excuse of suppressing bandits. It was at this time that Liu Yongfu took a break from Vietnam and connected with the Guangxi officials. Thus, in addition to the endorsement from Zhang Shusheng, Liu Changyou also urged Beijing to press Tự Đức to rely on Liu Yongfu, who had already become a military commander in Vietnam. In the meantime, Liu Yongfu, who oversaw Tuyên Quang and Hưng Hóa, could utilise the Qing army to counter the French. This collaboration in Tonkin would benefit China’s defence and prevent problems if the Qing military were to campaign in Hanoi.\textsuperscript{101}

Fundamentally, Zeng Jize could accept the coexistence of two overlords in Vietnam as long as the Qing government had the sole rights to extract tribute, provide military aid, and oversee Vietnam’s domestic and international affairs. His ideal solution was that France, as another protector, would facilitate only economic exchanges and the Sino-French trade. He had informed the French that he could not tolerate a neighbouring state

\textsuperscript{98} ZFZZ, vol. 1, no. 36, 42: 57–60, 65; Long Zhang, Yuenan, 67.
\textsuperscript{99} LCYJ, vol. 2: 773.
\textsuperscript{100} Liu Changyou, yishu, vol. 27 (29a): 128.
\textsuperscript{101} LCYJ, vol. 2: 774–76.
switching from Chinese suzerainty to that of a Western country.102 His unyielding stance and the frontier officials’ practical strategies would merge into the overall umbrella of the qingliu war advocates, fostering China’s increasingly aggressive engagement in Vietnam in the 1880s. Their attitude presumed Vietnam’s unconditional submission and support as a Qing tributary and would overcome Li Hongzhang’s negotiation efforts, a strategy that the qingliu scholars saw as needless appeasement. The qingliu scholars advocated for war preparation, aiding Vietnam, collaborating with Liu Yongfu, and appointing like-minded officials to guard the borderlands and lead the Qing army to Vietnam.103 Liu Yongfu also demonstrated the determination that would ignite the qingliu scholars’ excitement and fuel their continual charges against the French.104

In February 1882, in response to the Qing officials’ debate over Vietnam, the Zongli yamen dispatched Tang Tinggen and Ma Fuben to Huế to gather intelligence. Governor-General Zhang Shusheng of Liang-Guang also asked them to bring a secret letter to the Vietnamese court. However, King Tự Đức feared that the interactions with the Qing officials would raise more misgivings from the French. Therefore, he assigned an official to meet them secretly. The Qing officials clearly expressed Beijing’s attitude regarding Vietnam’s dilemma: China was still Vietnam’s protector, which was a well-recognized fact. They warned that Huế should understand that expelling Liu Yongfu was a French excuse to quicken the annexation of Vietnam.105

Overall, China’s qingliu scholars and frontier officials valued the allegiance of Vietnam and Liu Yongfu in deterring the French and securing the Qing imperial territories. They were willing to aid the Black Flags to compete with the French indirectly. Therefore, the Qing-Liu (Yongfu) alliance suggested a strategic employment of the state agents in China’s informal warfare and indirect confrontations with foreign powers while utilising diplomatic procedures to maximise China’s state interests. Dominating Bảo Thắng and Hưng Hóa, Liu needed official recognition from Beijing, which promised a stable future and proper settlement if the Qing government were

104 Liao Zonglin, zhanzhengshi, 107.
105 DNLT–CB–4, vol. 66 (37,41–42): 491. The secret letter indicated that the French Parliament had been discussing the invasion of Tonkin via the Red River and the conversion of more than six million people into Christianity. Specific measures of war preparation had been given to the French administration in Saigon. This reason determined the French hostility toward Liu Yongfu. See ZFZZ, vol. 1, no. 58: 109–11; Long Zhang, Yuenan, 84.
to tighten its control on Vietnam and open the Red River for trade. This future would provide Liu a ladder to step out of the mire of Vietnam’s distrust and the muddy pond of Sino-French conflict. Further, the Qing-Liu alliance would force King Tự Đức to turn against France. As war became the only viable and acceptable solution to settle the disputes, Liu and Vietnam would be caught in various levels of power struggles between France and China.

Defending the Qing Empire’s Territory

While King Tự Đức and his officials had been torn between the Qing call to resist France and French pressure to sever ties with China, Liu Yongfu’s dominance in the upper Red River had complicated the situation. On one hand, the king worried that France would invade Vietnam in the name of eliminating the bandits. However, it would make Vietnam more vulnerable if the Black Flags retreated from the forefront to deter the French. On the other hand, Beijing had validated Liu’s status in Vietnam and demanded Tự Đức’s full support, which had made it impossible to contain the Black Flags. Therefore, Vietnam’s own interests became secondary as King Tự Đức struggled to appease both overlords and balance the consequences of their completely different policies regarding Liu Yongfu.

Nevertheless, from the late 1870s to the early 1880s, Tự Đức’s pragmatic but ambivalent attitude pushed Liu Yongfu closer to the Qing army. Liu understood the mixed attitudes he had to face in Vietnam: the king needed him to suppress the rebels and bandits but feared his disobedience. Tự Đức depended on him to deter the French but largely restrained him, fearing that the Black Flags would entice a large-scale French aggression. The Vietnamese officials had been attempting to marginalise Liu since 1868 and had petitioned Beijing to bring him back to China. In the spring of 1877, the French increasingly protested the Black Flags’ presence in the upper Red River. Tự Đức and his officials had more discussions on relocating Liu and clearing French access to Yunnan. Liu had sensed his predicament and sought General Hoàng Kế Viêm’s approval to move from Bảo Thăng to Hải Ninh. Liu’s petition pleased Tự Đức as the King saw Liu’s humility. Yet, the king saw that Liu could stay in Bảo Thăng to deter the French or begin mining in Hạ Long and Thái Nguyên without bothering the French. The court officials agreed that Thái Nguyên would be a good place to accommodate the Black Flags, though they worried that Liu might collude with Chinese

106 Li Enhan, Zeng Jize, 180.
bandits near Hải Ninh. But, Liu rejected the first option with the excuse that the Black Flags were unfamiliar with mining. Later, when it seemed almost certain that Liu would move to Hải Ninh, he convinced Hoàng Kế Viêm that he would not harass the French if they intended to go to Yunnan. Hence, Liu was able to remain in Bảo Thăng. 107

However, no good reports about the Black Flags came to the court of Huế in the following years. In the spring of 1878, Liu Yongfu’s troops clashed with the French near Hanoi. The king ordered Hoàng Kế Viêm to warn Liu to restrain his men. 108 The Vietnamese officials’ hostility toward Liu rose due to the Black Flags’ continual insubordination and raids in Hưng Hóa. Liu’s influence also surpassed that of the Vietnamese authorities within his sphere of influence. 109 In the autumn of 1879, the Vietnamese officials began to urge the relocation of the Black Flags as new protests from the French increased. 110 Liu still had some support from Hoàng Kế Viêm and King Tự Đức and earned several awards and promotions in 1880. 111 However, in January 1881, Liu’s stipend from the Vietnamese government and the Black Flags’ supplies had been suspended because of some slanderous rumours. Liu and Hoàng were also both demoted because of the former’s disobedience in a recent counter-bandit operation. 112 After the incident, Liu petitioned to return to Guangxi for tomb-sweeping. Although a normal gesture of ancestral worship and filial piety, it was a strategic move for Liu to seek allies back home. However, Tự Đức would not approve such a request unless Liu had cleared the bandits in Thái Nguyên. 113

In early October of 1881, Tự Đức had made up his mind to move Liu Yongfu away from the upper Red River after another clash between the Black Flags and some French travellers. 114 Under this circumstance, returning

109 Davis, Imperial Bandits, 87.
111 In 1880, Liu Yongfu’s appointment as the vice-governor-general of the provinces of Sơn Tây, Hưng Hòa, and Tuyên Quan made the French paranoid. See Truong, Patterns, 21. Also, DNTL–CB–4, vol. 64 (22–23): 483.
112 DNTL–CB–4, vol. 64 (41–42): 483–84. The Vietnamese court sent an official to lead the operation. However, Liu stayed at home due to illness and then secretly smashed the bandit base as soon as the official had returned to Huế. Ibid., vol. 64 (46–47): 484.
113 Ibid., vol. 65 (15–16): 486.
114 En route from Yunnan to Hanoi, French travellers Jules-Marcel Courtin and Horace-Marius Arndre Villeroi encountered the Black Flags with their Malayan attendants. They accused the Black Flags of humiliating them in Bảo Thăng and the Vietnamese government of violating the Treaty of Saigon. The French urged the expulsion of Liu Yongfu, and Vietnam refused to comply due to its inability to command the Black Flags and the need for them to counter bandits.
to Guangxi became necessary and urgent for Liu to avoid tension with the Vietnamese government and seek the Qing army’s support. Around mid-December, he finally received permission for a five-month break, and he left for Guangxi with 200 men and 100,000 liang of silver.\textsuperscript{115} Although Liu Yongfu’s intention to return seemed unclear to the Qing government,\textsuperscript{116} Zhang Shusheng, then the governor-general of Liang-Guang, intended to win his allegiance, as the French annexation of Vietnam seemed inevitable. Zhang believed that in pushing Liu Yongfu out of Vietnam, the French had ironically created a firmer alliance between the Qing military and the Black Flags. Zhang later admonished Tự Đức that he should invite Liu Yongfu back to Vietnam.\textsuperscript{117} The tomb-sweeping trip further solidified the support from Liu Changyou, the governor-general of Yun-Gui. In the early 1870s, Liu Changyou had already urged the Vietnamese officials to entrust Liu Yongfu to suppress the bandits when he was the Guangxi governor. In 1882, Liu Changyou proposed that the court of Beijing should secretly order Tự Đức to trust Liu Yongfu and provide him with supplies. He believed that the Vietnamese should encourage Liu Yongfu to recruit more bandits, which would reduce the strain of China’s border defence and increase the odds of Vietnam surviving a French invasion.\textsuperscript{118}

Liu Yongfu held a subtle position between China, Vietnam, and France, receiving expectations, distrust, and hostilities from these state powers. The French treated him as a primary enemy. The officials in Guangxi had been cooperating with him to eliminate the bandits and saw the Black Flags as the vanguards and a “ghost army” to confront the French.\textsuperscript{119} This strategy eventually received the support of the Yunnan officials and the Qing court. In addition to suppressing the bandits, the Vietnamese also

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\item \textsuperscript{115} Li Jian’er, ed., Liu Yongfu zhuan (LYFZ) (Taipei: wenhai chubanshe, 1976), 130; Liao Zonglin, zhanzhengshi, 100–101.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Liu Yongfu repaired the Liu family graveyard and bought some lands and properties. It was also possible that Liu intended to purchase firearms and secretly bring them back to Vietnam because the French customs service in Haiphong confiscated some firearms he had imported. Long Zhang, Yuenan, 82.
\item \textsuperscript{117} ZFZZ, vol. 1, no. 53: 88–94.
\item \textsuperscript{118} LCYJ, vol. 2: 774–75; Liao Zonglin, zhanzhengshi, 87–91, 122–23.
\item \textsuperscript{119} In February 1882, officials in the Grand Council at the court of Beijing warned that Liu Yongfu’s cooperation with the Qing army in Vietnam had become somewhat noticeable when the latter was still on the mission to pacify the bandits. See Dezong shilu, vol. 140 (11–12), in Qingshilu Guangxi ziliao jilu, ed. Guangxi Zhuangzu zizhiqu tongzhiguan and tushuguan (Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1988), vol. 5: 143.
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took advantage of Liu's counter-French operations to maintain Vietnam's autonomy. However, the Chinese bandits and Liu Yongfu remained the sources of Vietnam's dilemma in the relationships with the two overlords.

In the meantime, Liu Yongfu had been testing the Vietnamese and Qing governments' attitudes toward the Black Flags. He found that the alliances with the Qing government were a better alternative to survive the French expansion. After all, China possessed the ability to exterminate the Black Flags if necessary. However, the Guangxi officials had extended an olive branch to him, which relieved his concern of being wiped out by the Qing troops or further alienated by the Vietnamese government. In return, he had to strive to prove his loyalty to China. Later in November 1882, a memorial from Cen Yuying, the reappointed governor-general of Yun-Gui, revealed Liu's calculations: he feared being eliminated by the French or attacked by the Yunnan and Guangxi military. Therefore, Liu strived to guard and preserve a stronghold in Hưng Hóa, waiting for the opportunity to serve China and hoping that this service would save him in the future. From this standpoint, the Qing-Liu alliance was practical and expedient for both the Qing government and Liu Yongfu.

Vietnam's tension with both France and China had tightened since the formation of the Qing-Liu alliance in the early 1880s. Stefan Eklöf Amirell points out that the French dream of exploiting the Red River and reaching China had been hindered by the social turmoil in Tonkin and obstructions from the Black Flags. The French had become increasingly angry and aggressive, showing little understanding of King Tự Đức's struggles and unsuccessful efforts to restrain the Black Flags. The French seemed neither to have appreciated Vietnam's attempts to relocate Liu Yongfu nor to have sensed Tự Đức's frustration with the Qing government. They firmly believed that Vietnam had tested France's patience by sending another envoy to Beijing in 1882 and that Vietnam wanted to remain a Qing tributary. The Vietnamese had also failed to protect the French traders from harassment by rebels and pirates near Hanoi. As the demands on the expansion of French control in Vietnam and on the forceful implementation of the Treaty of Saigon (1874) were raised in France and Tonkin, the French government

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120 In July 1882, the court of Beijing appointed Cen Yuying as the new governor-general of Yun-Gui. CYYZG, vol. 2: 570.
121 Ibid., vol. 2: 577.
began considering a new treaty and more concessions that would exceed the terms of the 1874 treaty.123

By 1881, the French statesmen had realised the urgency of acting quickly to avoid the loss of French control due to “Annam’s subtle policy,”124 as the disobedient protectorate hardly met France’s expectations and only demonstrated “flagrant violations” of the Treaty of Saigon.125 Therefore, in the spring of 1882, Le Myre de Vilers, the governor of Cochin-China, had accrued enough excuses to send naval officer Henri Rivière to Hanoi to counter the Black Flags and establish fortifications along the Red River.126 This action suited those French statesmen who had been considering a quick occupation of Tonkin to consolidate French control in Vietnam.127 In April 1882, Rivière occupied the citadel of Hanoi and was killed by the Black Flags in May. Vietnam’s crisis began evolving into confrontations between the Qing and French military. Although the Qing diplomats consistently denied China’s association with Liu Yongfu or involvement in counter-French military operations in Vietnam, they could not prevent the war from coming. Bearing the hope of pro-war officials in both Vietnam and China, Liu’s reactions had escalated and legitimised France’s decision to annex Vietnam. For the Chinese, Vietnamese, and even the French, ironically, Liu was instrumental in enforcing their agendas.

King Tự Đức pointed out that the French were using Liu Yongfu as an excuse to occupy Tonkin in the spring of 1882,128 and he intended to make limited reconciliations to appease the French. However, Henri Rivière would not withdraw until the Vietnamese government had driven Liu out and cleared the river route. Rivière also contemplated occupying Sơn Tây and forcing Vietnam into a new treaty that would extend French control in Tonkin, if not all over Vietnam. Tự Đức lashed out against General Hoàng Kế Việm, who persistently opposed relocating Liu for the sake of national

123 Truong, Patterns, 2; Lamb, Vietnam’s Will to Live, 173–74.
125 Truong, Patterns, 21.
126 Ibid. Both Western and Chinese scholars have pointed out that Rivière had been given the liberty to confront the Black Flags, however, without the agency to occupy any Vietnamese territories or challenge the Vietnamese government and the Qing army. He failed to comply. Long Zhang, Yuenan, 86; Amirell, Pirates of Empire, 189–90; Davis, Imperial Bandits, 105–6.
127 The French had been disturbed by China’s military operations in Vietnam throughout 1881. Admiral Georges Charles Cloué, the Minister of Navy and Colonies, had requested Saint-Hilaire’s support to leverage funds to establish French authority and rights in Vietnam. Admiral Jauréguiberry, Cloué’s successor as of January 1882, also urged “a swift move to take all of Tonkin.” Power, Jules Ferry, 158–60.
The king ordered the expulsion of the Black Flags from Bảo Thăng and their dispersal to Hưng Hóa, Tuyên Quang, and Thái Nguyên. He expected the Black Flags to be self-reliant with funds and supplies provided by the court. He also asked the Vietnamese officials to urge the Black Flags to move to prevent them from clashing with the French. Tự Đức’s ultimate solution was to send Liu back to China.

However, the Vietnamese resistance force in Tonkin and the Qing policy for border defence soon crushed the king’s hope of peace with France. The Vietnamese officials had been divided in their attitude toward the French and the Black Flags. General Hoàng Kế Viên had organised a joint anti-French campaign with Liu Yongfu when he returned from the tomb-sweeping trip, thereby fostering good connections with the Guangxi army. Qing commander Huang Guilan’s promise of sending firearms and supplies to the Black Flags also suggested Qing involvement, if not directly, in this anti-French campaign. By June 1822, more than half of the provincial officials in Vietnam had indicated their commitment to fight back with General Hoàng and Liu. Moreover, numerous attacks against the French, especially in the north, would violate the king’s will and transform local officials into resistance leaders and heroes.

The French withdrew from Hanoi less than a week after plundering the city; however, they continued to threaten Bảo Thăng and dispatched junks to scout Sơn Tây. Liu Yongfu sought Commander Huang Guilan for aid. Qing officials began to worry about a French invasion of Yunnan. Zhang Shusheng, who became the governor of Zhili and the minister of commerce and trade in the spring of 1882, pushed Beijing to send more troops to secure Tonkin. He considered Tonkin the barrier of China’s frontier and France’s bargaining chip in forcing Vietnam into a new treaty. Under the cover of hunting bandits, China’s military operations in Vietnam would save the Qing-occupied areas from falling into French hands. Thus, China officially dispatched troops to Vietnam from Guangdong, Guangxi, and

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131 Davis, Imperial Bandits, 105.
133 Ever since the second French occupation of Hanoi, the northern Vietnamese gentries had been disappointed at Tự Đức’s leadership and become more autonomous in their counter-French undertakings. As villages organised militias with firearms they obtained from the Chinese, their Vietnamese fellows, and the indigenous brokers in the hills, they pushed the king to fight the French. See David G Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885–1925 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California, 1971), 45–46.
Yunnan, with armies and navies stationed in key areas and to support Bảo Thăng, which dismayed the Vietnamese court and French administration in Saigon.\textsuperscript{135}

King Tự Đức thus condemned the Qing military advance in Vietnam as “unrighteous operations” amid his negotiation with the French. The king remembered that the governor-general of Liang-Guang had never mentioned the Qing military operations against the French. The king was baffled because it was difficult to associate the Qing troops in Vietnam with their border defence mission in Guangxi and Yunnan. After all, China had only affirmed to France that Vietnam was its tributary and urged the French Foreign Ministry to withdraw the army from Hanoi. None of these communications suggested the Qing army’s direct intervention. Tự Đức believed that the Qing military presence worsened the situation because France had been paranoid about China’s interference in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{136} The Vietnamese officials also saw that their country had been “trapped between an extensive Chinese military presence in the north and an aggressive French colonial administration in the south.”\textsuperscript{137} Inasmuch as Tự Đức worried about the negative impact of Qing aggression, his negotiation with France had already jeopardised the legitimacy of the Qing military presence in Vietnam. In September 1882, concerned that Hoàng Kế Viêm and Liu Yongfu’s troops in Sơn Tây might endanger the negotiation with France, Tự Đức stripped Hoàng of his position and ordered him to withdraw. Liu was also ordered to retreat to Bảo Thăng with less than 10,000 men.\textsuperscript{138}

As China and France continued to mount their forces in Vietnam, diplomatic negotiations failed to stop the war from beginning. In the early autumn, Commander Xie Jingbiao led three battalions of Yunnan troops to Hưng Hóa. In response, the French also increased its military might in Tonkin.\textsuperscript{139} The Black Flags had been dispersed when the Guangxi army arrived in Bắc Ninh and Lạng Sơn. Hence, the Guangxi and Yunnan military were both ready to join Liu Yongfu and the Vietnamese troops to defend northern Vietnam.\textsuperscript{140} When the tension between Zeng Jize and the French Foreign Ministry rose, the negotiation between China and France ceased in Paris but continued in Beijing.\textsuperscript{141} Li Hongzhang and the French

\textsuperscript{135} DNTL–CB–4, vol. 68 (10–11): 495.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{137} Davis, Imperial Bandits, 108.
\textsuperscript{138} LCYJ, vol. 2: 798.
\textsuperscript{139} DNTL–CB–4, vol. 68: (10–11): 495.
\textsuperscript{141} Li Enhan, Zeng Jize, 190–91.
minister Frederic Albert Bourée signed a treaty in late 1882, which was not appreciated by the French and Chinese officials at home who were enraged by the treaty’s provision to divide Tonkin. Despite the qingliu officials’ strong desire for war, Li urged Zeng to collaborate with English, Russian, and Prussian ministers in France to continue the conversation with the French Foreign Ministry.

At this point, both the Zongli yamen and Zeng Jize denied that the Qing troops had entered Vietnam. The Qing court’s rhetoric of denying military operations in Vietnam and its continual sponsorship of the Black Flag Army echoed the considerations of Governor-General Cen Yuying of Yunnan. Seeing the Qing government’s dilemma, Cen predicted that Qing military withdrawal would show China’s weakness, whereas confronting the French would bring the scourges of constant warfare. Cen had been pragmatic, and his concerns revealed the difficulties that would be associated with the Qing occupation in Vietnam without careful calculations and proper strategies. In late 1882, Cen suggested that, ideally, Yunnan and Guangdong should station their troops in each province of Vietnam; however, long distances and tropical diseases would weaken the Qing defensive line. The long-distance coordination between Yunnan and Guangxi also seemed impractical to sustain the Qing occupation of Hanoi. Cen believed that the Qing military should safeguard some key posts in Vietnam and secretly sponsor Liu Yongfu with supplies and arms. He contended that while Liu countered the French on behalf of the Qing, Yunnan should open trade and begin building factories according to the terms of the Chefoo Convention.

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142 Zhongfa Yuenan jiaoshedang, vol. 1: 181; The French and Qing officials considered the treaty insulting because the patriotic French wanted all of Tonkin and the nationalistic qingliu officials wanted a war. See DNTL–CB–4, vol. 69 (6–7, 7): 499; Shao Xunzheng, Zhongfa Yuenan, 89–96; Lamb, Vietnam’s Will to Live, 186; Eastman, Throne and Mandarins, 134.

143 DNTL–CB–4, vol. 68 (29–30): 498. The Qing provincial authorities doubted that the court of Beijing would sanction the Li-Bourée agreement. Some considered that the Qing-French buffer zone proposed in the treaty was too narrow; others worried that the settlement of Tonkin would cause the removal of Liu Yongfu and the loss of a barrier against the French. Most provincial officials were content with their isolation and did not want to open China’s interior to foreign trade. However, the qingliu officials’ voice and political influence began to peak and overshadowed Li Hongzhang and his league of peacemakers. Zhang Peilun had particularly advised the throne to collaborate with Liu or to take over Hanoi. Eastman, Throne and Mandarins, 64; Yu Zheng, “Zhongfa Zhanzheng qian de Zhang Peilun,” Journal of Nanjing University (Philosophy, Humanity, and Social Science), no. 3 (1983): 85–92.

144 Chere, Diplomacy of the Sino-French War, 25.

145 CYYZG, vol. 2: 577–79. In late 1874, Ma Rulong considered that the industrialisation of Yunnan mining industry would bring tremendous profit. See The British National Archives (BNA), FO 17/742, 24–27. More on Liu Changyou’s and Cen Yuying’s vision to mechanising Yunnan’s mining
Hence, with Liu Yongfu’s commitment to fight the French, China sustained its control in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{146} By aiding Liu in secret, China could publicly deny its association with the Black Flags or its official military operations in Vietnam. This tactic seemed useful for dodging a formal war or avoiding being blamed for starting the war. After the Black Flags killed Henri Rivière in May 1883, the Qing government continued to convince France of China’s innocence, as both countries were entering into a new round of negotiation.\textsuperscript{147} However, the Treaty of Huế (August 25, 1883) would officially establish Vietnam as a French protectorate, and Beijing would struggle to hold back the qingliu officials’ desire for a war. In addition to aiding Liu Yongfu, the qingliu officials urged the court to launch a “full-scale, undisguised invasion of the whole of Tonkin.”\textsuperscript{148} In late September, Beijing ordered Cen Yuying to instruct the Yunnan army not to reveal any signs that the Qing military had been assisting the Vietnamese to counter the French. Although China and France had not officially broken their peace with each other, Beijing wanted Cen to move carefully, provoking the French into starting the conflict.\textsuperscript{149}

By the end of 1883, when the Sino-French conflicts officially broke out in Sơn Tây, the Vietnamese officials had realised that the Qing military was in fact proactively defending China’s border with the excuse of supporting Vietnam. They believed that Vietnam had been caught in between the Chinese and the French, the traditional overlord and the most dangerous threat. The Vietnamese believed that they should stay neutral, since the French also had requested that the Vietnamese not collaborate with the Chinese.\textsuperscript{150} By mid-1884, the court of Beijing would accuse Vietnam of hindering Qing military’s strategic moves in Vietnam. The Qing government criticised the Vietnamese court for having procrastinated reporting the treaties signed with France previously and blamed the Vietnamese officials for not remaining completely loyal to Beijing.\textsuperscript{151} As Liu Yongfu and the French engaged in larger-scale battles in Tonkin, it was too late for Vietnam
to escape the crisis: behind Liu were his firm Chinese allies and pro-war Vietnamese officials.

The Imperial Agents

Outlaws and bandits had been, and would remain, instrumental in anti-European operations across the borderlands of China, Vietnam, and Burma, especially when the Qing military attempted to avoid direct confrontations and formal wars. Unbound by international treaties and protocols, they could be ghost armies, performing operations that the standing army could not. They could mobilise a wide network of forces that the standing army was incapable of mustering. As “irregular troops” in the eyes of the French, the Black Flags were China’s informal military force and represented China’s active intervention in Vietnam. Therefore, amid European encroachment, the state agents and their powerful transnational forces continued to connect the Qing government with its tributary states and frontier communities. In fact, the Qing officials desired to use and even create such forces despite the possibility of failure.

From late 1883 to early 1885, the Sino-French military confrontations swept Vietnam, Guangxi, Fujian, Zhejiang, and Taiwan. On the negotiation table, from 1884 to 1885, the Li-Fournier Convention (May 1884) and the Li-Pateno Treaty (June 1885) would gradually shape the new Sino-Vietnamese boundary and its demarcation procedure. With these agreements, especially the Li-Pateno Treaty, China would recognise France’s suzerainty in Vietnam and begin the process of border demarcation. China also agreed to facilitate trade between Tonkin and neighbouring Chinese provinces, and to seek French assistance in building railways in the future.152 In April 1886, the Convention of Tianjin (or Tientsin) further confirmed that trade would be opened between Tonkin and China’s border provinces (Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong) with specific commercial regulations.153

152 Ch’ing Dynasty and ROC Treaties and Agreements Preserved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (MOFA), 910000045–001 and 910000046–002. The Convention of Tientsin between China and France was signed by Li Hongzhang and French naval officer Ernest François Fournier, and therefore was known by the Li-Fournier Convention. The Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Commerce between China and France, known as the Li-Pateno Treaty, was signed by Li Hongzhang and French Representative Jules Patenotre des Noyers. Also, see Guo Zhenduo and Zhang Xiaomei, Yuenan tongshi (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2001), 624–30.
153 MOFA, 910000047–004. The convention is also known as Convention on Commerce along the Yunnan-Annam (Vietnam) Border between China and France.
After 1885, the Black Flags and other bandit forces remained a threat in the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands. In May 1885, Liu Yongfu was reluctant to follow the Qing court’s decree to relocate to Guangxi and be commanded by Zhang Zhidong. The Qing court frequently reminded Cen Yuying, who was also reluctant to withdraw his own army from Vietnam, and Zhang Zhidong to urge Liu to move. Liu eventually arrived in Yunnan two months later. Among the approximately 2,000 men who followed him, less than 500 were his old troops, the original Black Flags, and the rest were scattered Cantonese militiamen he recruited along the way. The Qing court urged Liu to set off for Guangxi as soon as possible, concerned that the Black Flags would cause trouble if they stayed in Yunnan for too long. Those Black Flags who did not follow Liu Yongfu remained in Vietnam. By the end of July 1890, Governor-General Wang Wenshao of Yunnan reported that some Black Flags in Vietnam had entered and harassed his province. In the following decade, Beijing regularly received reports about the bandits in Vietnam, not necessarily the Black Flags, who were collaborating with local Chinese bandits, robbing civilians in Yunnan and Guangxi, and threatening the safety of foreign missionaries in Guangxi and Vietnam.

The Black Flags’ obstruction in the Sino-Vietnamese boundary demarcation in 1886 remained in the memory of the French. China and France had begun organising their own border demarcation delegations in April 1885, preparing for two phases of cooperation along Vietnam’s border with Guangxi and Yunnan in 1886. The French selected civil servants and military officers from Paris, China, Egypt, and Indochina. The Qing government appointed Governor Cen Yuying and Zhou Derun to oversee China’s delegations. In late March 1886, the Sino-Vietnamese border demarcation commission officially began surveying the border after two months of dragging negotiations at the Zhennanguan (or Zhennan Pass) on the side of Guangxi. The process generally went smoothly, though there

154 Dezong shilu, vols. 206 (4, 9–12, 14), 207 (6–7, 8–10), 208 (2–5, 8–9), in QSLYMTL, 531–37.
156 Ibid., vols. 286 (9–10), 329 (5), 340 (12), 403 (9), 404 (7–8, 10–11), 495 (5–9): 541–44.
158 Neis, Border Demarcation, vii (1). Zhou Derun was from Guangxi and served in the Grand Secretariat. At the conclusion of the Sino-French wars, he proposed the reformation of eight areas, among them the expansion of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the establishment of its branches in Fengtian and Haikou. Like Cen Yuying, he also promoted the industrialisation of Yunnan. “Zhou Derun zhuan,” in Qingshigao, vol. 442: 12432.
159 MOFA, 910000050–003, Kanjie jilu qianziben; Neis, Border Demarcation, 16.
were frequent disagreements and complaints.\textsuperscript{160} When the rainy season hit in early April, the commission postponed the work to avoid bad road conditions and miasma.\textsuperscript{161}

On the way to Japan, where they would wait for the dry season to resume work, some French delegation members were assigned to demarcate Vietnam’s border with Yunnan and join those Chinese officials who had been waiting in Yunnan for almost ten months.\textsuperscript{162} French navy doctor and delegation member Dr. Paul Neis recorded that around late June, they arrived in Lào Cai, which used to be Liu Yongfu’s stronghold. Around twenty days later, they formally convened with the Chinese officials. However, the French suffered attacks from the Black Flags on August 18.\textsuperscript{163} On September 16, the court of Beijing received Cen Yuying’s report that confirmed the attack.\textsuperscript{164} As a result, the commission decided to finish the demarcation entirely on paper by comparing each other’s maps and documents. Along the right bank of the Red River, some provinces such as Phong Thổ, Lai Châu, and Điện Biên Phủ, which the governor of Yunnan intended to enclose, would be recognised as Vietnamese territory.\textsuperscript{165} However, the pirates’ harassment of Lào Cai continued. Neis heard that, “being present everywhere without being seen,” the bandits “cut telegraph lines, intercepted the trams, pillaged isolated junks,” and insulted the French fortifications every night.\textsuperscript{166}

Overall, France’s ambition to dominate Tonkin still saw a wide array of obstacles and resistance after the wars with China. The French would encounter deliberate challenges from the rebels and the Vietnamese court, especially in the Cần Vương movement (1885–1896) and the mobilisation to aid the Vietnamese monarchy. The Black Flags recruited deserters from the Qing army and the French regiments of the Vietnamese infantry. Liu Yongfu and his army continued to aid the Vietnamese resistance and associate with Vietnamese rebels and revolutionaries, such as Nguyễn Thiện

\textsuperscript{160} The French complained about the Chinese bureaucracy, and their exaggerating, repetitive, and unproductive negotiation manner, which, at times, seemed more interested in demonstrating their own personal authority than solving the disputes. See Neis, \textit{Border Demarcation}, 7, 16–19.
\textsuperscript{161} MOFA, 910000050–011, \textit{Kanjie jilu qianziben} (zanting zhi qiumo zaixing qikan you); Neis, \textit{Border Demarcation}, 70.
\textsuperscript{162} Neis, \textit{Border Demarcation}, 73–74.
\textsuperscript{163} According to Neis, two French junks followed the lead of a Chinese junk to survey a location that was about 40 kilometres away from Lào Cai. As the Chinese junk disappeared mysteriously, the French junks were ambushed twice. Ibid., 88–90, 104, 112, 117–18, 124, 131.
\textsuperscript{164} \textit{Dezong shilu}, vol. 231 (10), in \textit{QSLYMTL}, 540.
\textsuperscript{165} Neis, \textit{Border Demarcation}, 131, 137.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
Thuật and Phan Bội Châu. In addition, Qing officials remained hostile toward the French across the border and sometimes ignored the anti-French activities sponsored by the militias, bandits, and gentries in southwestern China.167

The hostility against the French would gradually wane, at least among the Qing officials, as cross-border trade fostered closer cooperation and interdependence between the Chinese and the French, especially after the opening of the Mengzi port and construction of the Yunnan-Vietnam railway (1901–1910). Yunnan’s government officials had become concerned by the rise of Vietnamese nationalism in 1914, with increasing efforts to prevent the Vietnamese revolutionaries from entering Yunnan to prepare anti-French operations via the railway. The prefect of Mengzi feared that the Vietnamese rebels might threaten Yunnan’s security and jeopardise China’s friendship with France.168 In October 1914, the French arrested over thirty Vietnamese revolutionaries in the railway stations in Yunnan without informing the Yunnanese railway police force. Li Chaoshi, chief of Yunnan’s railway police, admonished his subordinates to remain alert and report all details regarding the foreign visitors in the future.169 From late October to November, Li ordered that any Vietnamese who entered Yunnan be searched and that those who possessed arms or appeared suspicious be detained or expelled.170

During the Sino-Vietnamese boundary demarcation process, the tensions between Britain and Burma increased. King Mindon of Burma had died in 1878 without any direct contact with the British for the last three years of his reign. His successor, King Thibaw (r. 1878–1885), continued to challenge the British by seeking more European allies. Britain launched the Third Anglo-Burmese War and annexed Burma at the end of 1885. Cen Yuying had attempted to solve the crisis in Burma by implanting “fugitives” as resistant forces in the mid-1880s. The officials in Tengyue had been sending Cen reports on the warfare in Burma while he was handling the aftermath of the Sino-French war. On December 31, 1885, Cen reported to Beijing that he originally assigned officers Yuan Shan and Li Wenxiu to probe the situation in Burma. However, he ordered them to return as the British had occupied Ava, and instead assigned a Tengyue scholar named Zhang Chenglian, who was very familiar with Burma, to collect intelligence. Cen urged Beijing for

168 Yunnan Provincial Archives (YPA), 1026–001–00051–073.
more instructions. Nevertheless, the court paid more attention to France and Vietnam and hesitated to interfere, especially with aggressive measures, at such a critical moment.

In fact, Cen Yuying had appointed Yuan Shan and Li Wenxiu to aid the Burmese restoration of the country. When Cen returned from Vietnam and arrived in Kaihua, he instructed Commander Yuan Shan to lead his men to secretly enter Burma with weapons and other supplies worth 150,000 liang of silver. To avoid the charge of agitating confrontations along the border and jeopardising the Sino-British relations, Cen planned to cover the operation with the story of a rebellion that his subordinates could not prevent and have Yuan take the blame. He calculated the time Yuan needed to reach Tengyue and then Burma. Only after he expected that Yuan had arrived in Burma would Cen issue the official order for Commander Zhu Hongzhang in Tengyue to restrain Yuan. The governor-general instructed Zhu to confiscate Yuan's firearms and expel his troops if Yuan refused to comply. If the plan went smoothly, Yuan, who had been assigned to Burma by Cen, would appear to have rebelled and deserted his Qing military post, leading a group of bandits to fight the British in Burma.

Li Genyuan's account indicated that Cen Yuying intended to create some outlaws in Upper Burma to counter the British, similar to the way the Qing-Liu alliance had worked in Tonkin. Given time, these new “outlaws” could plug into the network of existing local powers and form a stronger anti-British force. However, Cen's plan did not go well. Yuan Shan overstayed in Tengyue because his wife was giving birth. Cen miscalculated and his order to Commander Zhu came too early. Eventually, Commander Zhu killed Yuan and two of his fellowmen, inadvertently crushing Cen's plan. In early 1886, Cen reported to the court that he was shocked to hear about Yuan Shan's operation to aid the Burmese resistance against the British, and that Yuan went to Tengyue without Cen's authorisation and recruited hundreds of troops on his own. Cen reported that he had instructed Commander Zhu to investigate the situation and to restrain Yuan. However, Yuan was determined to leave, and Zhu had no choice but to execute him to avoid unrest in the area. Yuan might have failed, but his colleague Li Wenxiu succeeded in entering Burma before the fall of Ava as a rebellious

173 Ibid., 38.
Qing officer. His resistance in Mogaung lasted until he died in a bombing months later. In April 1886, Cen reported to Beijing that officer Li Wenxiu had entered Burma and been killed by the Kachins who intended to stop him.\(^{175}\) Li Genyuan criticised Cen for cunningly branding Yuan and Li as rebels, although he had secretly commissioned both officers to fight against the British.\(^{176}\)

The bandits could be loyal to the Qing government when they shared the common goal of resisting the Europeans. Whether they were Black Flags who chose to enter Vietnam, or the rebellious officers Cen Yuying intended to implant in Burma, their survival space was directly threatened by the Europeans, which forced them to fight back with or without alliances. In this process, they speculated carefully, fought voluntarily, and cooperated wisely to define their own space and their relationship with larger regional powers. Nevertheless, the borderland brewed transregional forces that were not merely militant. As exemplified by Li Zhenguo and Liu Yongfu, these military men sought for state offices and engaged in cross-border trade to fund their activities. The complexity of social, political, and economic roles granted them more local control and leverage for the negotiations with larger regional powers. However, as military forces actively sought expedient ways to generate funds and supplies quickly, their competition and successions often disrupted the existing social and trade networks. Investigating various historical discourses in documenting the Hui rebels and the Qing military leaders, the next two chapters reveal the historical construction of their social, political, and economic roles as well as the cycle and dilemma of their wealth accumulation.

\(^{175}\) Ibid., 811, 814.

\(^{176}\) Li also pointed out that Cen's reports were contradicted by the accounts from other scholars and officials in Yunnan. Li Genyuan and Liu Chuxiang, ed., *Yongchangfu wenzheng* (Kunming: Yunnan meishu chubanshe, 2001), vol. 3: 2550.
5 Documenting the Hui Rebellion and Genocide

Abstract
Using different sets of local historical documents, Chapter 5 discusses how the discourse of the Hui-Han division had affected the documentation of the mid-century rebellions in Yunnan. This chapter presents the Hui collective memory of the shift of their status from the ally to the enemy of the state, which would bring profound impact on their financial status and affect the handling of Hui assets in the future.

Keywords: Hui; Han; Du Wenxiu; genocide; collective memory; Ma Mingkui

Historical documents about Ma Mingkui (1796–1892) are rare. In the Qing court historian’s vague account, Ma Mingkui, a wujinshi, was also a rebel chief in Dali at the early stage of Du Wenxiu’s Rebellion (1856–1873) who had little inclination to surrender, for he had been planning to betray the Qing court for a long time. An autobiography that was attributed to Du Wenxiu identified Ma as a supporter and fellow leader of the Hui army. A century later, more records about Ma emerged in Yunnan Huizu shehui lishi diaocha (Social and Historical Surveys of the Hui in Yunnan), in which he was a successful merchant who ran businesses across western Yunnan and Burma. In 1850, he passed the Qing imperial examination in martial arts. The Hui oral historical records indicated that Ma was

1 The Metropolitan Graduates of martial arts.
4 Ma Mingkui was also known as Ma san jinshi, meaning the third son of the family who owned a jinshi degree.

doi: 10.5117/9789048558995_CH05
forced to rebel because of the Muslim genocide launched by the Yunnan provincial government. In addition, he was the designer of the Dali Regime’s economic policies. However, the Yunnan government jailed him for nine years after pacifying the rebellions, and his firms fell into the hands of Qing military officers.

Following the nationwide ethnic classification and surveys on ethnic languages, societies, and history, the PRC State Ethnic Affairs Commission began compiling the history of China’s ethnic minorities in 1958. With the assistance of local scholars and officials, this ethnic history project drew sources from field research, interviews, and historical documents collected by the work teams that were dispatched by the central Chinese government. Yunnanese scholars such as Wu Qianjiu and Liu Shaochuan conducted the interviews with local Hui residents for the reports. They also searched genealogies and gathered historical documents dating back to the Qing and early ROC eras. These materials collected during the 1950s and the 1960s would form the main content of *Yunnan Huizu shehui lishi diaocha* that was originally published in 1985.⁵

Compared to the classified documents in the Chinese state archives that have been selectively opened to the readers, the oral historical interviews and gazetteers are mostly available. The grave weakness of the post-1949 compilation of historical records is mainly due to government interference and the creators’ acquiescence to the political pressure of the time. Some documents were more of political statements and propaganda, which, however, could not represent all the Hui and other historical records that surfaced after 1949, especially those that were created long before 1949. In fact, some materials created in the late Qing and early ROC periods had been hidden for various reasons or been neglected by the conventional historic writings on the Hui due to lingering distrust and hostility toward the group. In one Yunnan Hui’s opinion, the people who had written about the Hui did not necessarily know Hui history since few Hui from the older generations could write.⁶ As the CCP’s anti-feudal and anti-capitalist discourses drew strong criticism toward the Qing and early ROC literary tradition and historiography, it ironically gave the Hui elites some room to compile historical documents and present a past with previously inaccessible

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⁵ “The Publishing Statement,” in *Yunnan Huizu shehui lishi diaocha*, ed. Yunnansheng bianjizu (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1985), vol. 1. Also see the three different publishing statements of the same volumes that were reprinted by Minzu chubanshe (Beijing) in 2009.

voices. Therefore, these post-1949 compilations of sources deserve careful examination.

The post-1949 Hui historical records and historiography have presented the evidence and narratives necessary for documenting and revising the collective memory of related individuals and groups. Such a shift makes it possible to recognise the long-existing biases in local historical records and traditional historiography. The discrepancies between the new and conventional documents and narratives further reflect the historicity and subjectivities of different groups of record-creators and storytellers that focused on the same topic. For instance, the Hui, Han, and other groups have been stigmatised with the stereotypical labels of “rebels” or “heroes” to fit into the traditional, outdated discourses as well as the construction of ethnic and religious distinctions. Following Han norms and ethnocentrism, the conventional local historiography had manifested strong discrimination against the Hui who, as Jaqueline Armijo points out, were considered outsiders despite their longtime residence in Yunnan. More contemporary Hui scholars argue that, with the intention of seeking personal gains and awards, the Qing officials manipulated the Hui-Han confrontations and escalated anti-Hui policies. Therefore, the Hui were forced to rebel for survival, especially after the Yunnan provincial government issued a draconian Hui elimination order in 1856.

Hui intellectuals have adopted at least two main approaches to shift the course of historical writing by collecting and creating materials for the post-1949 compilation of historical documents. First, some sources demonstrate efforts by their creators to reconstruct a past that meets the dominant ideological guidelines of the time, especially to prove the CCP’s legitimacy and success in leading China’s revolution and nation-building efforts. Second, the collections of historical documents and interviews indicated the efforts by their creators, within a limited scope and in a subtle language, to present neglected records or to modify the local history that had been largely written by non-Hui gentry and government officials during the Qing and early ROC eras. Both approaches aimed to negotiate related individuals’ and groups’ social and political status in the PRC, altering their relationship with the dominant political power. Accompanied by other scholarly writings in the twentieth century, both approaches contributed

8 Ma Weiliang, Yunnan Huizu lishi yu wenhua yanjiu (Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 2000), 78; Dali Baizu zizhizhou Huizu xuehui, ed., Dali Huizushi (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2009), 72–78.
new content to the complicated landscape of the historical and collective memory of the Yunnan borderlands.

Using different sets of historical and collective memories, such as oral records, gazetteers, private papers, scholarly writings, and government reports, this chapter investigates how the construction of the Hui-Han division affected the documentation of the mid-century Hui rebellions, especially their genocide in Yunnan. Since the early twentieth century, Hui intellectuals had argued that the intergroup confrontations and Hui rebellions in Yunnan did not merely represent the hostility between two vaguely and arbitrarily defined identity groups of Hui and Han. The causes of social division then were more complicated than disputes about religious practices and commercial interests and the consequential armed fights. The Hui-Han distinction, however, was also a rhetoric instrumentalised by civilians and government officials to address the intergroup clashes in Yunnan that did not only involve Hui and Han but were largely represented by these two groups. The construction of the Hui-Han division began in Yunnan’s mining areas, as an approach to social mobilisation against Hui business competitors. Likewise, the Qing officials and scholars used the same discourse to explain the widespread rebellions and confrontations in Yunnan that the local government had failed to address.

The Construction of the Hui-Han Division

Born into a prominent Hui family in Dali in 1796, Ma Mingkui traced his lineage to a Ming military officer from Kunshan, Jiangsu, who brought his entire family with him when he went to Dali to serve in a government

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9 In recent decades, there have been increasing discussions on the arbitrary definition of the Hui-Han division during the Muslim rebellions. However, in 1915, Yunnanese Hui intellectual Xie Jikang had already argued the historical unity of Hui and Han based on shared ancestral roots, and that the Hui suffered the same abuses and oppression the Manchu had brought to the Han. In 1964, Yunnanese Islamic educator Ahong Na Runzhang also argued that the “Hui rebels” the Qing government had identified since the 1850s also included Minjia (Bai), Han, and Nuosu (Yi). See Xie Jikang: “Lun Jujinhui zhi yuanyin,” Qingzheng yuebao, vol. 1, no. 3 (1915), in Zhongguo Yisilan lishi baokan cuibian-Qingzhen duobao, ed. Yao Jide and Lei Xiaojing (Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 2004), 27; Na Zhong, “Yunnan Yisilanjiao jianzhi,” in Yunnan Huizu shehui lishi diaocha (YNHZSHLSDC), ed. Yunnansheng bianjizu (Beijing: minzu chubanshe, 2009), vol. 2: 179–80; David Atwill, The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856–1873 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 36–40.

position after receiving a jinshi degree in 1577. His father, Ma Yunxiang, resigned as a lower-ranking military officer in Kaihua and moved back to Dali to become a merchant. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the west bank of Lake Erhai had become a trade hub, connecting Yunnan to Mainland Southeast Asia, Inner Asia, and China Proper. The city of Xiaguan, by the south bay of the lake, looked prosperous, even resembling the glory days of the Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms that lingered in the memories of nostalgic intellectuals. Years of military service had won Ma Yunxiang good connections. According to the Hui oral historical records, he became the most prominent merchant in Xiaguan, known for his worth of over 100,000 liang of gold.

Ma Mingkui’s two older brothers were wujinshi, who served in the Qing army in Mengzi and Kaihua in the 1830s. Ma Mingkui showed little interest in working for the government. Instead, he expanded his family business to at least thirteen large shops in Xiaguan, Kunming, Yongchang, Chengdu, Xufu (now Yibin), Mandalay, and Rangoon, with lodging, accounting, and stable services for caravans and other local businesses. Caravans and scholars who travelled for the imperial examination relied on Ma’s businesses for banking needs. Hui resident Yang Dakai’s family used to own a firm called Hongchanzhoao in Xiaguan. He recalled that Ma’s six shops—Yutai, Yushun, Tailai, Yonghe, Lianxing, and Fuchun—were concentrated along the Hui quarter called Shoukang Po (now Doukang Po), or the Shoukang Slope. These shops occupied sizeable complexes, and the buildings even maintained their original look in the late 1940s. Ma owned orpiment (a golden-yellow mineral) mines and copper mills. He hired skilled workers from Sichuan to reel and weave in his textile factories. He also had more than ten caravans

12 C. Patterson Giersch points out that unprecedented commercial growth had occurred in southwestern China during the eighteenth century, especially Yunnan, and big firms emerged decades before the 1850s. Businesses based in Dali, such as Sanyuanhao, were among the earliest large-scale firms in the province. Giersch, “Borderlands Business: Merchant Firms and Modernity in Southwest China, 1800–1920,” Late Imperial China 35, no. 1 (June 2014): 38–76.
13 Ma Shaoxiong and Zhao Rusong, “Ma San Jinshi qiren” 79.
14 Ibid. “Ma San Jinshi qiren,” in the second volume of Yunnan Huizu shehui lishi diaocha, recorded that Ma Mingkui’s two brothers, Ma Yuankui and Ma Jingkui, became wujinshi in the dingyou and xinmao years of emperor Jiaqing’s reign (1796–1821). However, there were no dingyou and xinmao years during emperor Jiaqing’s rule. Emperor Daoguang’s rule covered a year of xinmao in 1831 and a year of dingyou in 1837. It is possible that his brothers received wujinshi in 1831 and 1837. It is also possible that his brothers received wujinshi during Emperor Jiaqing’s reign. This chapter recognises the dingyou and xinmao years as the mark of their success and locates the time between 1831 and 1837.
with hundreds of mules and horses, transporting cotton, linen, silk, tea, herbs, orpiment, and other local products from Yunnan to Sichuan, Upper Burma, and India.\textsuperscript{15}

Ma Mingkui and his family represented the experience of the extraordinary Hui gentry in Yunnan, who, in their collective memory, served the state, made Yunnan their new homeland, and succeeded in commercial activities. The Hui had adopted the Han practice of genealogy compilation not only for the records of socioeconomic control but also for the legitimacy of religious authority.\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Menghua zhigao} (Gazetteer of Menghua), compiled by historian Liang Youyi from 1906 to 1918, recorded that the Hui ancestors in Yunnan were originally Arabians who had arrived with the Mongol conquest.\textsuperscript{17} Many Hui in Yunnan and elsewhere in China have traced their lineage to General Sayyid Ajall Shams al-Din, a Central Asian Muslim who became the Yuan Empire's first Yunnan Governor.\textsuperscript{18} As more Muslims arrived in Yunnan after the Ming era, they became scholars, officials, farmers, and merchants. The most prosperous time for the Hui came during Qing Emperors Qianlong's and Jiaqing's rule (1735–1820).\textsuperscript{19}

Contemporary Hui intellectuals and Western scholars maintain that the Hui elites, including gentry, merchants, and native officers, rose during the Yuan and Ming Empires' military recruitment, operations, and settlement in Yunnan. The artisans' traditions from Central Asia also prepared Hui to become craftsmen, traders, miners, caravanners, and farmers. Overall, the Hui were largely inclined to participate in commercial activities, with consistent involvement in mining and trade in Yunnan.\textsuperscript{20} In 1964, Yunnan's

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. Also, Yang Dakai, “Ma Mingkui (ji San Jinshi) zai Xiaguan shanghao de bianqian,” in \textit{YNHZSHLSDC}, vol. 2: 82–83.


\textsuperscript{17} Liang Youyi, \textit{Menghua zhigao} (Mangshi: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1996), 125.


\textsuperscript{19} Liang Youyi, \textit{Menghua zhigao}, 125.

\textsuperscript{20} Twentieth-century Hui scholars reckon with the peaceful, orderly, and multicultural Yunnan that was created by General Sayyid Ajall Shams al-Din when the Mongols trusted their Muslim allies more than the Han and the natives in the borderlands. In the 1270s, the Muslim governor transformed his military institution to civil administration, giving his officers the titles of native officers to oversee the state and military colonies. Later, the Hui in China Proper joined Ming dynasty Generals Mu Ying, Fu Youde, and Lan Yu to unify Yunnan. More Hui arrived throughout the Ming and Qing periods, pouring labourers and capital into Yunnan's copper, iron, gold, silver, salt, lead, zinc, and jade industries. “Yunnan Huizu gaikuang,” in \textit{YNHZSHLSDC}, vol. 3: 9–11; Jiang Wenzhong, “Shilun Dali zhengquan de gongshangye zhengce,” in \textit{Du Wenxiu qiyi
Islamic educator Ahong Na Runzhang (1900–1971) identified ten prominent Hui state loyalists during the Ming era who had contributed to the empire's formation and construction. Among these figures were General Mu Ying, who had conquered Yunnan in the 1390s, and Zheng He, a Yunnanese Hui who, during the first three decades of the 1400s, had led seven naval expeditions across the Indian Ocean and reached as far as West Africa. Generally, Hui scholars in China believe that the Hui's high social, political, military, and economic prestige during the Yuan and Ming eras resulted in the prosperity of the Islamic religion, which was respected and praised by the Ming rulers.

Chinese culture had been promoted in Yunnan since the Yuan era, and the Muslims demonstrated great loyalty to the state. Later, they directed and maintained their loyalty to the Chinese state of Ming and actively participated in the social and political arenas that were based on Confucian norms and institutions. Hui scholars Ma Jianxiong and Yao Jide observed that the Hui valued both Confucianism and Islamic canons in the Scripture-Hall education system that had emerged in the sixteenth century and become popular in the Hui communities across China by the eighteenth century. Another Hui scholar, Ma Weiliang, argues that the Hui ancestors' embrace of Han language, culture, Confucianism, and patriotism enabled the formation of a Hui collective identity that was based on the indigenised Islamic culture in the borderlands' shifting environment. However, the rise of the Manchu complicated the Hui's loyalty to the state.


Na Runzhang, “Yunnan Yisilanjiao,” in YNHZSHLSDC, vol. 2: 177. Contemporary scholars in Yunnan do not all pay equal attention to Zheng He when they discuss the development of the Hui communities in Yunnan. However, General Mu Ying and Lan Yu have been consistently identified as important Hui leaders who played important roles in shaping Hui history in Yunnan. See Ma Weiliang, Yunnan Huizu, 27–28; Huizu xuehui, ed., Dali Huizushi, 64.


Atwill, Chinese Sultanate, 34–35.


Ma Weiliang, Yunnan Huizu, 19–23.
just as it had affected the Han gentry. Despite the Hui’s success in the Qing political arena, their anti-Manchu profile triggered the Qing government’s distrust and oppression.26

Contemporary Hui scholars agree that the Qing court divided and ruled the Hui by detaching the Hui elites from the commoners and drawing the former closer to state authority. The court also tolerated and even encouraged widespread anti-Hui sentiment, laying the groundwork for social confrontations and violence.27 Na Runzhang notes that the view of Islamic worship as an anti-government activity had emerged during Emperor Kangxi’s rule (1661–1722), forcing many Hui to become rebels.28 Ma Jianxiong further argues that the rhetoric of the Hui-Han division was constructed when the Qing government failed to effectively address intergroup conflicts and social unrest in Yunnan’s mining communities that were under the jurisdiction of the native officials. The outbreak of the Hui rebellions, therefore, was not merely a result of the tension between two vague identity groups, but was also a result of the “rebels’” attempts to seek social justice, which the Qing legal system had failed to provide.29 With a consistent interpretation about the mid-century Hui rebellions, these perspectives largely conform to Du Wenxiu’s arguments in his autobiography: that the Hui were not necessarily against the Han and a traditional concept of a Chinese state to which the Hui remained loyal. They opposed the tyranny of the Manchu government, which was demonstrated by local officials’ oppression and manipulations.

Indeed, the Hui rebels, such as Du Wenxiu, still intended to demonstrate their loyalty toward their own country, which was not equal to their loyalty toward the Manchu and the Qing government. In his autobiography, Du stated that a junzi, or a noble man in Confucian standards, prioritised his country and people. Thus, Du’s life stories focused on the “mighty power unleashed by the Han, Hui, Yi [Nuosu], Miao, Bai [Minjia], and Tibetan
when they rebelled against the Manchu and the Qing government.³⁰ Born to a Hui father and a Han mother, Du was forced to change his surname and identity at age ten so that he could be identified as a Han when he was interviewed by a Qing official at an examination. Du claimed that the Hui and Han had turned against and killed each other because of the deception of the Manchu and the Qing government. Therefore, he called people in the country to join the revolts to overthrow and expel the Manchu. To achieve such a goal, the Dali Regime restored the Ming dynasty rituals and institutions that were centred on Confucianism.³¹

Despite the spread of anti-Hui sentiment, the Hui traders and caravanners traversed more than ten trade routes between Yunnan, Indochina, and the Indian Subcontinent.³² In late 1841, the famous Islamic scholar Ma Dexin³³ travelled with the Hui caravans during part of his journey from Dali to Mecca, passing Jingdong, Pu’er, Simao, Kengtung, Mongnai, and Heipaw before reaching Lashio. While the caravans turned back to Dali, he proceeded to Mandalay and boarded a ship for Rangoon. Sailing down the Irrawaddy River, he saw junks loaded with copper purchased from the Chinese merchants.³⁴ In Tengyue, the Hui traders owned 70 per cent of the shops on the main street of the city.³⁵ Hui merchants Ming Qingchong, Ma Ruhao, and Zhu Dachun owned Sanshenghao, which had probably become prosperous before 1840. The firm imported cotton, jade, and opium from Burma, with branches in Yongchang, Xiaguan, Kunming, Sichuan, and Guangzhou. Like the Han gentry in western Yunnan who held multiple social roles, these prominent Hui merchants of Sanshenghao had considerable political influence locally. As intellectuals, or Confucian-merchants, they sponsored the construction of schools and local infrastructure, such as

³² In his historical records that had been compiled before the 1950s, Ahong Ming Ruihua (~late 1870s–1968) stressed that the Du Wenxiu Rebellion was aimed to restore the Ming dynasty. Ming Ruihua, “Qing xiantong nianjian tengchong Huizu linanji,” in YNHZSHLSDC, vol. 2: 60.
³³ Luo Qun, Jindai Yunnan shangren yu shangren ziben (Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 2004), 42.
bridges, roads, and canals.\textsuperscript{36} Both the Hui oral historical records and \textit{Tengyue tingzhi} (Gazetteer of the Tengyue Subprefecture, 1887) documented that Ming Qingchong, Ma Ruhao, and Zhu Dachun were \textit{jiansheng}, or students of Guozijian (the Imperial Academy). They were granted the titles of salt commissioners in the 1840s to reward their charitable donations to the construction of a bridge.\textsuperscript{37}

In the meantime, hostilities against the Hui within the silver mining communities had been aggravated for diminishing resources.\textsuperscript{38} From owners to shareholders to individual labourers, Yunnan's mining areas, known as factories, saw great occupational variety and competition among food and grocery suppliers, cooks, accountants, clerks, security guards, tax managers, furnace workers, charcoal providers, traders, horsemen, and even militia men.\textsuperscript{39} Miners and merchants usually formed factions: while the Han were often connected through native place associations and secret societies, the Hui gathered in their mosques.\textsuperscript{40} The disputes

\textsuperscript{36} “Tengchong Du Wenxiu qiyi lishi diaocha,” in \textit{YNHZSHELSDC}, vol. 1: 128.


\textsuperscript{38} Along with the boost from the state military activities, more external capital had poured into Yunnan's mining industry since the last quarter of the eighteenth century, which outweighed the sporadic local investment. The food crops from the New World stimulated a massive population boom in China Proper, pushing millions to migrate into the borderlands. Yunnan's total population had been dramatically increasing since the late eighteenth century while the silver mines in the province showed signs of exhaustion. See a series of Chinese and English literature, such as Giersch, “Borderlands Business,” 48; Luo Qun, \textit{Jindai Yunnan shangren}, 35; Ma Weiliang, \textit{Yunnan Huizu}, 212–23; Dong Mengxiong, \textit{Yunnan jindai jingjishi yanjiu} (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1991), 18, 21; Atwill, \textit{Chinese Sultanate}, 6, 22, 27–28; Atwill, “Blinkered Visions,” 1085; Huizu xuehui, ed., \textit{Dali Huizushi}, 68; Ma Cheng, \textit{Wanqing Yunnan jubian: Du Wenxiu qiyi yu dali zhengquan de xingwang (1856–1875)} (Chengdu: Sichuan daxue chubanshe, 2012), 5–6; James Z. Lee, “Food Supply and Population Growth in Southwest China, 1250–1850,” \textit{Journal of Asian Studies}, vol. 41 (1982), 729; Ma Jianxiong, “Shiye kuanggong yu difang junshihua: Qing zhongqi Yunnan xibu yinkuangye shuatui yu Huimin de zuqun dongyuan,” \textit{Minzu xuejie}, vol. 34 (October 2014): 80; Armijo, “Narratives Engendering Survival,” 298–99. The deficit in the copper industry had also been growing. Above and beyond the large amount of factory debt, the payments on oil and rice had been neglected, accumulating to more than 100,000 liang silver from 1817 to 1822. See \textit{Xuanzong shilu}, vol. 69: 20–22, in \textit{Qingshilu youguan Yunnan shiliao huibian}, ed. Yunnansheng lishi yanjusuo (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1985), vol. 4: 171.


\textsuperscript{40} Ma Jianxiong, “Shiye kuanggong,” 77–78.
that accompanied the miners’ competition and cooperation were often affected by complicated factors involving native place, migrants’ generation, seniority, ethnicity, and religion. The arbitrary classifications of “Hui-Han” or “Han-Yi” (Chinese-barbarian) also failed to reflect the ethnic and religious complexities found in the silver mines under the jurisdiction of the native officials in central-southern Yunnan.

In the early nineteenth century, a sharper Hui-Han distinction emerged in reality and in government papers when the confrontations in Shunning’s Xiyi silver mine (1800) and Jiuzhou’s Baiyangchang (1821) silver-copper mine provided the Han “irrefutable proof,” argues David Atwill, that the Hui were hostile and inclined to violence. Han miners’ testimonies indicated that to confront the Hui, an emerging umbrella of Han collective identity in Baiyangchang had been constructed and surpassed the coalition of common native places. In their reports to Emperor Daoguang (r. 1820–1850), local officials, whom the Hui distrusted, adopted the Han’s accusation that the Hui monopolised rice and were arrogant, blaming the Hui for oppressing and irritating the Han miners. This language further crystallised the discourse of the Hui-Han division and encouraged a simplified rhetoric to interpret complicated daily, social interactions and relationships, which enabled the Han to realign the existing, native place–based factional conflicts as ethno-religious mobilisation and confrontations. In the following decades, from the massacres in Mianning (1839) to the massacres in Yongchang (1845),

41 More details see Atwill’s thorough elaboration in Chinese Sultanate, 51–83.
42 See Ma Jianxiong two articles, “Shiye kuanggong,” 70–77 and “Fowang’ yu Huangdi,” 54–99. On the other hand, Atwill observed that loyalty to the Qing government had become associated with the Han identity in the area. See Chinese Sultanate, 51–54.
43 Xiyi was under the jurisdiction of the native official of Gengma and was managed by him as well. Baiyangchang was originally a silver mine but had been producing copper since 1778. See “Diankuang tulüe,” in Diannan kuangchang tulüe, ed. Wu Qixun (1844), vol. 2: 10, 19; Atwill, Chinese Sultanate, 66.
44 The Han miners testified that street fights were triggered when the Hunanese miners accused the Hui of oppressing Han miners and of monopolising rice. Soon after, rumours of a Hui plot to kill the Han workers from Lin’an (now Jianshui, Yunnan) and Hu-Guang spread quickly. Feeling oppressed, Han workers of various origins united because they feared and desired to deter the Hui’s vengeance and murderous intentions. “Baiyangchang Hanhui xiedou’an,” in YNHMQYSL. For the Han miners testimonies, see page. 12–13, 15–16, 18, 20, 24–25. For the Hui miners’ testimonies, see page. 2, 10, 14–15.
45 See “Baiyangchang Hanhui xiedou’an,” 10, 34, 37, 39, 43.
47 In October 1845, Qing officials, Han gentry, the Xiangbahui (or Incense Brotherhood), and militia killed thousands of Hui residents in Yongchang. Survivors such as Du Wenxiu and Ding Canting claimed that over 8,000 Hui perished, though Qing official Lin Zexu, who settled the case, disputed this number. See Lin Zexu, Lin Wenzhonggong (Zexu) zougao (Taipei: Wenhai
intergroup confrontations largely followed the Baiyangchang pattern. This pattern, according to contemporary scholars, showed the Qing officials’ support of those Han who could have been the “perpetrators of the violence” in 1839. Hence, the government shifted from noninterference in intergroup conflicts to brazenly sponsoring violence against the Hui. Hui scholars especially argue that the local officials’ appropriation of Hui properties and stimulation of Hui-Han antagonism triggered the tragedy in Baiyangchang.  

This pattern, Ma Jianxiong argues, further indicated the Qing government’s minimal role in dealing with unemployed miners, heated Hui-Han alienation, and related social unrest, leaving the civilians to address the disputes through their own social mobilisations. As the civilians became militarised and were organised either as “Hui” or “Han,” this mechanistic classification failed to consider ethnic diversity and conditional opposition between many Hui and Han individuals.

From this perspective, Ma Mingkui’s stories were not unique to himself or to the Hui. Similar experiences were found in the lives of the Han, Minjia, Nuosu, and other groups who were caught in the dynastic succession and the swirl of social confrontations. They were not short of ancestors who contributed to the imperial border consolidation and construction, and they possessed preeminent social and economic status as officials, military leaders, or, overall, state agents. Like the Han settlers who had made Yunnan their homeland, these non-Han groups found their homes and lands of inheritance in the same borderland. However, by the mid-nineteenth century, their social status had been largely affected by state policies, and they fell into polarised social division and confrontations in which they did not intend to participate. Overwhelming hostility had discouraged Hui loyalty toward the Qing government but did not stop all Hui from seeking...
bureaucratic and military positions. Within the three decades prior to Du Wenxiu’s Rebellion in 1856, the Hui counted for more than 12 per cent of the military degree holders in Yunnan. However, that number climbed to 19 per cent after the three exams held in the five years prior to the outbreak of the Rebellion.\(^{50}\) Du Wenxiu passed the entry level of the imperial examination in 1843 and became a *xiucai* (distinguished scholar).\(^{51}\) Ma Mingkui became a *wujinshi* in 1850. Despite increasing Hui-Han confrontations, the Hui elites did not immediately withdraw from state service, a status that could provide them with more security.

After the Yongchang massacre, the provincial officials in Yunnan, such as governor-general Li Xingyuan, identified a history of Hui-Han confrontations and solidified a long-term bias against the Hui by victimising the Han.\(^{52}\) While recognising vague groups of miners, vagabonds, and bandits as the instigators of violence, Li specified that the Hui’s violent and erratic behaviours as well as the Hui-Han mutual suspicion had destroyed the foundation of cooperation desired by his predecessor, He Changling.\(^{53}\) The Yunnan officials’ common strategy was to suppress the bandits and aid the victims, two labels subject to the officials’ own interpretation. This approach did little to ease the intergroup confrontations but rather triggered a vicious cycle as the “criminals” adopted more violent methods to seek social justice.\(^{54}\)

Therefore, Du Wenxiu pointed out that the Hui people’s anti-Manchu army had emerged in 1846 in response to the Qing government’s unfair settlement of the Yongchang massacre.\(^{55}\)

Decades later, the gazetteers of Yunnan compiled in 1894 and 1901 maintained the discourses of the Hui-Han division and bandits-victims to document the mid-century intergroup confrontations, such as the Shiyangchang massacre in 1856 that eventually led to widespread rebellions in the same year.\(^{56}\) The 1894 edition of *Yunnan tongzhi* (Comprehensive Records of

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\(^{50}\) Atwill, *Chinese Sultanate*, 44; See statistics that Atwill extracts from *Dali xianzhigao* and *Xu Yunnan tongzhigao* in quotations 50 and 52.

\(^{51}\) Du Wenxiu, “Du Wenxiu zizhuan,” 140.

\(^{52}\) Li Xingyuan, *Li Xingyuan ji* (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2013), vol. 1: 308.

\(^{53}\) Ibid., 304, 306–8, 328.

\(^{54}\) Ma Jianxiong, “Shiye kuanggong yu difang junshihua,” 96.


\(^{56}\) The provincial authorities such as Cen Yuying and Chen Can supervised the compilation of *Yunnan tongzhi* (Comprehensive Records of Yunnan, 1894). In 1901, *Xu Yunnan tongzhigao* (Extended Comprehensive Records of Yunnan) was published under the supervision of Tang Jiong, who oversaw the mining affairs in Yunnan. These two editions of Yunnan gazetteers had many flaws and were controversial. According to Governor-General Wei Guangtao of Yun-Gui (1900–1902), former Governor-General Songfan (1895–1900) and Governor Huang Huaisen
Yunnan), or known as *Guangxu Yunnan tongzhi*, identified both Hui and Han bandits who were pacified by the provincial commander at the time of the Shiyangchang massacre. The Hui bandits belonged to a general category of outlaws who participated in the Hui-Han mutual contention and who were led by fierce individuals like Ma Linghan, who was stripped of the title of *wujuren*. In contrast, the Han bandits usually belonged to a specific category of factory bandits who were armed and lawless delinquents, wearing blue-green turbans and gathering in hundreds or even thousands. The factory bandits had appeared before the 1850s and were recruited to work at Shiyangchang, where they competed with the Hui and other Han workers and were full of hatred for the Hui. In the spring of 1855, the Yunnan provincial army had to pacify the factory bandits from Lin’nan who had been raiding the mining communities. In contrast, the 1901 edition of *Xu Yunnan tongzhigao* (Extended Comprehensive Records of Yunnan) contained a brief account of the matter, which largely attributed the cause of the massacre to the competitions and disputes of the Hui miners who had previously received the protection of the magistrate of Chuxiong.

Nevertheless, it seemed that the Hui elites had managed to assert their voices since the early 1870s through Émile Rocher, the future French Consul in Mengzi (1882). Rocher came to Yunnan with Jean Dupuis in 1870 to assist the Yunnan government with the use of Western firearms. In addition to the account from Governor Cen Yuying, Rocher obtained Ma Dexin’s diaries and lent some insights from Ma Rulong when writing about the history of the Hui rebellions in Yunnan. In *La Province Chinoise du Yün-nan*, Rocher painted a poetic scene in which two very general identity groups, the Hui and Han, had lived in temporary harmony at Shiyangchang before the

(1895–1897) questioned the credibility of the 1894 edition because many events recorded were based on hearsay. They believed that the 1894 edition left out some important matters, and they had commissioned Tang Jiong to take charge of revision and correction. Modern Yunnanese scholar Zhao Fan also addressed the credibility and numerous mistakes of the 1894 edition. The 1901 edition adopted different perspectives, however, combining the information from both the 1835 and 1894 editions of the Yunnan gazetteers. Governor-General Wei Guantao believed that the narration and structure of the 1901 edition were more orderly. However, contemporary historians in Yunnan believe that the 1901 edition had entirely missed its original goals and was even more disorganised than the 1894 edition. See Kunming tushuguan wenxian cankaobu and Yunnansheng tushuguan difang wenxianbu, ed., *Lidai Kunming difang wenxian shuping* (Kunming: Yunnan meishu chubanshe, 2005), 137–39.

57 See *Guangxu Yunnan tongzhi*, vol. 107, wubeizhi, 2 (7), rongshi, 7 (1–2).
58 Ibid., vol. 106, wubeizhi, 2 (6), rongshi, 6 (36–37).
59 “Pingding Huiluan lüe (shang)” in *Xu Yunnan tongzhigao*, vol. 81, wubeizhi, 11.
outbreak of the infamous massacre. It was a time when the Hui and Han were not jealous but sympathetic toward each other despite their differences in diet and religion. Rocher reported that the Hui and Han from Lin’an were known for being the most hardworking of all miners and that the Hui were especially capable and resourceful. However, aggressive competition between the Han and Hui miners eventually ruined the spirit of harmony, which enabled the greedy “outsiders” to exacerbate the pre-existing feuds and violence.61

Rocher’s narrative—the shift of the Hui-Han relations and the outsiders’ instigation—formed a clear contradiction to the 1894 Yunnan gazetteer’s stigmatisation of ferocious Lin’an Hui and their long-term grudges toward the Han.62 If Rocher had truly obtained the sources from Ma Dexin and Ma Rulong, his accounts could have indicated some Huis’ vision of a society with higher levels of intergroup collaboration and tolerance until such an alliance was crushed by fierce business competition and external manipulation. Through Rocher, the Hui elites could also have delivered the message that they were neither intrinsically violent nor hostile toward the Han, despite the claims of Qing officials and scholars. Emphasising a harmonious relationship between the Hui and Han, this discourse would be echoed by twentieth-century Hui intellectuals, such as Xie Jikang, who sought a higher level of Hui political participation in the framework of Five Races Under One Union after the 1911 Revolution and advocated the shared historical ancestral roots of Hui and Han.63

The Hui Extermination Order

The prime years of Ma Mingkui’s business suffered during the escalation of the Hui-Han conflicts that had stopped caravan travel. Ma’s business was also affected by increasing government restrictions on mining and

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62 See Guangxu Yunnan tongzhigao, vol. 107, wubeizhi, 2 (7), rongshi, 7 (8).
63 In March 1915, the Hui in Yunnan began publishing Qingzhen yuebao (Halal Monthly). In the first issue, Xie Jikang wrote a commentary to explain the importance of having a branch of Hui association in Yunnan. He argued that just as the Christians established the YMCA, the Hui were entitled to lawfully organise their own associations, which would facilitate Hui’s political participation and their endeavour to seek for democracy and freedom. Xie argued with Han ancestors, the Hui was an ethnic group that emerged since the Tang Empire with Han ancestors and were the offspring of Emperor Huangdi (the Yellow Emperor). Xie described the Hui rebellions as serving the just cause of overthrowing the Manchu rule that oppressed both Hui and Han. Xie Jikang: “Lun Jujinhui zhi yuanyin,” 27–29.
obstructive local officials. Perceiving that holding a government office would clear some obstacles, he took the imperial examination in martial arts at age fifty-four and became a *wujinshi* around 1950. However, Ma had remained close to Du Wenxiu, who was a house guest among the retainers and armed caravan guards Ma hired from Shaanxi. After the Yongchang massacre, Ma sponsored Du and Ding Canting to seek justice at the court of Beijing, and they remained close afterward. Later, Du secretly settled at the Xiaoweigeng village in the outskirts of Menghua, where he became a student of Imam Ma Chaozhen. Under the cover of operating a tea house, Du and a few men organised secret societies and prepared for a revolt. According to Du’s autobiography, some Hui gentry in Dali had clashed with the government in 1851 for secretly purchasing firearms to prevent potential attacks from Lin Zexu or the Han. The Hui had gradually organised across western Yunnan prior to the rebellions in 1856. Ma Mingkui was a member of Zhongyitang and was later ranked fourth in its leadership. As the Hui-Han confrontation intensified in 1856, Ma’s status of *wujinshi* temporarily intimidated the Qing officials and Han gentry who intended to capture and kill the Hui in town.

Émile Rocher wrote that following the large-scale confrontations and bloodshed at Shiyangchang, the Yunnan provincial authorities issued an order to execute the Hui in Kunming and throughout Yunnan within an 800 *li* radius. The Qing officials and Han gentry across the province quickly assembled and began recruiting militiamen, even from among the delinquents. The Hui historical documents and the gazetteers in Yunnan contain varied accounts on the matter. The Hui records and contemporary scholars in Yunnan denounced the Qing officials’ decision of genocide, which directly forced the Hui to rebel. In contrast, largely avoiding or downplaying the issue of Hui genocide, the historical documents and gazetteers compiled by the government officials and local gentry often recounted their heroic efforts to pacify the Hui bandits. For instance, the gentry in Dali constructed...
a temple for Cen Yuying and Yang Yuke in 1873, with a eulogy that intended to praise both men’s contributions that had brought devastation to the Hui.70 Without any reference to the Hui genocide, this eulogy accused the Hui of plundering villages and attacking the Qing military. Its text adopted a discriminative symbol to dehumanise the Hui by adding a radical, meaning beast, to the original Chinese character for Hui.71

The 1901 edition of the Yunnan gazetteer did not mention the Hui elimination order. The 1894 edition of the Yunnan gazetteer admitted that there was a provincial massacre, which, however, had been a result of local authorities’ misunderstanding of the provincial order of defence. To counter the stubborn Hui leaders after the Shiyangchang incident, the provincial government recruited Lin’an factory bandits, which calmed the anxious civilians, and then ordered Yunnan’s gentry and militias to exercise their forces and prepare for defence. Local authorities were given permission to kill those treacherous and rebellious Hui if they resisted. However, according to this gazetteer, many Han people who favoured chaos did not understand the context of the order; instead, they clung to their authority to kill, and they provoked the Hui, which eventually resulted in the Hui rebellions.72

In 1894, Heqing scholars and gentry Yang Jinkai, Yang Jinjian, Yang Jinhe, and Zhao Heling finished their compilation of Heqing zhouzhi (Gazetteer of the Heqing Prefecture), known as the Guangxu edition. All four authors of the Guangxu edition were Minjia scholars who had received degrees in the imperial examination. The authors interviewed one native official in Heqing and other local scholars to compile the gazetteer. This project received donations from military officers such as Ding Huai and was reviewed by the instructors of the Heqing Confucian Academy.73 In 1922, due to his regrets about the Guangxu edition, Yang Jinkai compiled Heqing xianzhi (Gazetteer of the Heqing County), known as the Republican edition, with a foreword given by Li Genyuan at its publication in 1943.74 The Guangxu and Republican editions had overlapping content. For example, the Republican edition adopted the Guangxu edition’s accounts on military affairs from 1856 to 1870, which included the Muslim rebellions.75 Like the two editions

70 Editor’s foreword to “Xianfeng bingchen jibian luxu,” in YNHMQYSL, 175.
72 Guangxu Yunnan tongzhigao, vol. 107, wubeizhi, 2 (7), rongshi, 7 (2–3).
73 “Yuxiu Heqing zhouzhi xianming,” 1–3, in Yang Jinkai, Yang Jinjian, Yang Jinhe, and Zhao Heling, Heqing zhouzhi (HQZZ, 1894).
of the Yunnan gazetteers, neither edition of the Heqing gazetteers adopted the specific term “Hui elimination.” Instead, they recorded the provincial governor’s order to suppress the rebels. Similarly, other historical accounts of the Muslim rebellions that were created during the late Qing and early ROC eras mostly muted their voices or presented ambiguous accounts on the matter. They did, however, often accuse the Hui of killings and raids prior to the government’s operations to pacify the rebels.76

Nevertheless, evidence of the Hui genocide was still traceable in local historians’ subtle and vague language about controversial historical figures and key participants in the Hui elimination order. In western Yunnan, the order of genocide was executed by Zhang Zhengtai, a military commander from Heqing.77 The Yunnan gazetteers, the Heqing gazetteers, and other local historical records pieced together Zhang’s atrocities in western Yunnan. The Heqing gazetteers portrayed Zhang as a leader of gangsters and criminals. In Yang Jinkai’s narrative, Zhang was commissioned by former Yunnan governor Lin Zexu to join the counter-rebel campaigns in Hubei and Hunan. Extremely conceited and overbearing because of his victories in the battlefields against the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, Zhang withdrew from Hubei in 1855 without any authorisation. He then recklessly killed and robbed civilians on his way back to Yunnan. With the intention of more than just “keeping out the bandits,” he recruited troops, attracted villains, and organized a gang called Heyitang in Heqing.78 Huang Chengyuan, who wrote about the Margary Affair, revealed that Zhang’s strong hatred toward the Hui had resulted from a failed murder

76 See Li Yuzhen’s “Dianshi shuwen” (1902), Wang Shusen, “Dianxi Huiluan jilüe” (~1925), and Huang Chengyuan’s Wojilu suibi (1925). All these historical documents are found in YNHMQYSL. Wojilu suibi was also published in 1925 by Yunnan wubentang. Huang Chengyuan recorded that Hui were killed in the operations to eliminate the rebels. Wang Shusen wrote that the Hui bandits killed over 30,000 Han in Dali 1855, including men and women as well as the young and elderly. Li Yuzhen’s “Dianshi shuwen,” however, admitted that the Hui elimination order triggered the social upheaval and disasters. Nevertheless, he attributed the Hui elimination to the suggestion of the Han people, a very vague group, instead of Yunnan’s government authorities. See YNHMQYSL, 180–82, 199, 233.
77 See Du Wenxiu, “Du Wenxiu zizhuan,” 187. Also see a selected list of works for more details on the Yunnan Hui scholars’ description and condemnation of the genocide against their people, as well as Zhang Zhengtai’s cruelty in the Hui-elimination operations. Yang Zhaojun, ed., Yunnan Huizushi, 113; Ma Yuan, “Dali, Xiguan Huizu,” 29; Ye Tong, Dali Huizulishi yu wenhua lunji (Dali: Dali Musilin wenhua zhuanye xuexiao bianyin, 2006), 7–8; Ma Cheng, Wanqing Yunnan jubian, 19–21; Ma Weiliang, Yunnan Huizu, 78; Huizu xuehui, ed., Dali Huizushi, 76–78. Yunnan jindaishi adopted the same narrative about Zhang Zhengtai and his league of mobs who executed the Hui elimination order in western Yunnan. YNJDS, 26.
78 HQZZ, vol. 19, wubeizhi, 2, rongshi, 1–2.
attempt by his previous Hui ally, Ma Debao, during a horse race. Huang and other late Qing and early ROC historians all noted Zhang’s tyranny and oppression of local officials, gentry, and civilians, which shed light on Yang Jinkai’s unfavourable view of him.

Both the 1894 and 1901 editions of the Yunnan gazetteers gave more praise to the valiant and intelligent Zhang Zhengtai, agreeing with Dali scholar Li Yuzhen’s account in 1902. The 1894 edition of the Yunnan gazetteers recorded that Zhang had organised Heyitang in 1855 and recruited Han members. Both editions depicted Zhang’s popular support when the civilians in Heqing, Jianchuan, and Lijiang jumped at the opportunity to join Heyitang. Zhang had also been able to enlist over 10,000 militiamen from Sichuan. He “bravely” killed the Hui in Heqing because the Hui intended to murder him out of fear. In contrast, both Heqing gazetteers mentioned that the delinquents from Sichuan came to join Heyitang and elected Zhang to lead the elimination of the rebels. Within a month, over 10,000 fugitives had gathered under Zhang’s wing. The Heqing gazetteers and the Yunnan gazetteers all admitted that Zhang had killed the Hui in Heqing, Jianchuan, and Lijiang. However, the Yunnan gazetteers portrayed Zhang as a brave leader and described his actions as self-defence. Zhang marched south to kill more Hui. In the autumn, he reached the outskirts of Dali, which had been besieged by 50,000 to 60,000 troops.

In the Hui historical documents, facing Zhang Zhengtai’s troops, Dali’s magistrate Tang Dunpei attempted to capture the Hui elites by luring them to a meeting to discuss mutual protection for the Hui and Han. However, when Tang’s plan failed, armed fights between the Hui and the Han erupted in Dali. The 1901 edition of the Yunnan gazetteer accused the Hui of looting the state arsenal. Wang Shusen’s account in 1925 charged the Hui in Dali

80 According to Huang Chengyuan, Zhang offended both the military and civil authorities; however, none of them had the courage to oppose him. Wang Shusen further recorded that Zhang’s behaviours, such as blackmailing, ruthless killings, and raping, had angered the people in Heqing who did not dare to challenge him. Huang Chengyuan, *Wojilu suibi*, 180; Wang Shusen, “Dianxi Huiluan jilüe,” in *YNHMQYSL*, 233–34.
81 Li Yuzhen, “Dianshi shuwen,” in *YNHMQYSL*, 193.
82 *Guangxu Yunnan tongzhi*, vol. 106, wubeizhi, 2 (6), rongshi, 6 (38).
83 Ibid., vol. 107, wubeizhi, 2 (7), rongshi, 7 (9); “Pingding Huiluan lüe (shang)” in *Xu Yunnan tongzhigao*, vol. 81, wubeizhi, 12.
84 *MGHQXZ*, 162; *HQZZ*, vol. 19, rongshi, 3.
85 *HQZZ*, vol. 19, rongshi, 4; “Pingding Huiluan lüe (shang),” in *Xu Yunnan tongzhigao*, vol. 81, wubeizhi, 12.
with killing over 30,000 Han. In contrast, the Hui historical memory implied their appreciation of the wife of Provincial Commander Wen Xiang, who was sympathetic to the Hui and allowed them to take arms from the arsenal for self-defence. Ma Mingkui especially stood out as a brave and intelligent leader of the Hui. In 1856, his title of wujinshi and his reputation as an excellent fighter temporarily deterred the assaults from the officials and Han gentry in Xiaguan. The Hui storytellers shared a heart-stirring episode about Ma Mingkui crushing a plan by local officials and gentry to kill him. Magistrate Mao Yucheng and the Han gentry in Xiaguan wanted to capture and kill Ma by inviting him to a banquet that addressed the agenda of Hui-Han mutual protection. Ma was already aware of their ill intention. However, following the example of Guang Yunchang (Guan Yu), who attended a treacherous meeting set up by Lu Su with only his blade and a guard, as written in The Romance of Three Kingdoms, Ma went with his meteor hammer, a classic Chinese weapon that connected two hammers with a chain. He exposed the Han gentry’s intrigue and took one of them hostage. Later, he jumped onto a horse’s back, sped toward Xiaowei, and sought aid from Du Wenxiu. Du immediately made the decision to march north and protect his fellowmen. Soon, they conquered Dali. Later, in November 1856, Du Wenxiu was elected by Ma Mingkui and forty-eight fellow rebel leaders as the Zong bingma dayuanshuai, or Generalissimo, to command the White Flag Army based in Dali.

The discrepancies between the local historical accounts also appear in the stories of Han trader Zhao Liancheng in Tengyue. In the Hui’s collective memory of discrimination and persecution, Zhao was known for his strong opposition against the Hui firm Sanshenghao’s dominance of the jade market, which he blamed for his own business losses. Zhao then actively led the attacks against the Hui in the autumn of 1856. Sanshenghao also became the target of raids conducted by the Han gentry and militia, who took possession of numerous gems and 480,000 liang of silver. In contrast,
Tengyue tingzhi (1887) recorded that after Du Wenxiu’s uprising in 1856, people in Tengyue were shocked to find that the Hui bandits had secret connections with Du and possessed firearms. Tingzhi narrated that Zhao, Li Zhipei, and Dong Dayong began organising a secret alliance to prepare an insurrection without a clear indication of its target. As rumours of the insurrection spread, local officials initially urged both the Han and Hui gentry, such as Sanshenghao’s owner Ming Qingchong, to travel across Tengyue and stop the confrontations from happening. However, unrest still occurred in the marketplace at the end of October, and Zhao declared war by burning an empty house at night. Later, Zhao was commissioned to lead five to six thousand militiamen to counter the Hui bandits who rebelled and raided civilians.93

Behind the Scenes of Dali’s Ethnic Unity and Transregional Trade

Contemporary Hui scholars in Yunnan stress the Dali Regime’s policies of ethnic unity and argue that the rebellion was not merely a Hui rebellion but also a multi-ethnic collaboration against the Qing oppression.94 In fact, the Hui historical records, especially Du’s autobiography, had laid the foundation for such arguments. Du recorded that the Han people had been excluded from Zhongyitang in the beginning, when the organisation was not under his leadership. When he travelled to Yongchang in 1852, he overturned this restriction and mobilised Han, Hui, Nuosu, Hmong, Minjia, Tibetan, Naxi, and Lisu civilians under one counter-Qing league. Before the outbreak of the Rebellion in 1856, Zhongyitang had established the principle of seeking ethnic equality by honouring the leadership of the Hui, Han, and Nuosu while

93 Tengyue tingzhi’s original record showed that Zhao’s secret alliance was preparing an insurrection. TYTZ, vol. 11, wubeizhi 4, rongshi, 11.
94 Ma Cheng argues that Du’s policies had well addressed the hatred and fights between the ethnic groups in Yunnan since the nineteenth century. Ma Cunzhao points out that the discourse of “Hui-Han confrontation” was the Qing government’s excuse to slaughter people of various ethnicities who joined the mid-century rebellions. Ma Cunzhao further argues that the phrase of “Hui rebellion” ignored that there were Han, Minjia, and even Manchu troops in Dali’s army. Ma Cheng, Wangqing Yunnan jubian, 71–73; Ma Cunzhao, “Qingji Xiantong nianjian Dali shehui biange de zai renshi,” in Yisilan yu Zhongguo xinan bianjiang shehui, ed. Yao Jide and Ma Jianxiong (Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 2017), 77–87. See Ma Cunzhao’s annotation on “Qianqing enji shouyuan Li Gong Xiansheng zhimu (1919),” in Dali Fengyi gubei wenji, ed. Ma Cunzhao (Hong Kong. Xianggang Keji Daxue Huanan yanjiu zhongxin, 2013), 152. For more on the ethnic diversity within the Dali regime and Du Wenxiu’s policy of welcoming non-Hui elites, see Huizu xuehui, ed., Dali Huizushi, 83–84; Ye Tong, wenhua lunji, 11.
embracing other groups such as the Minjia and Miao.\textsuperscript{95} While promoting the Dali Regime’s role as the protector of civilians of all ethnic backgrounds, Du’s autobiography identified local pro-Qing military leaders and gentry as traitors of their traditional collective and local identities. He especially criticised commander Yang Yuke, who was born into a family that followed anti-Qing traditions, for he and his troops had killed a staggering number of people—more than 145,000 between 1859 and 1871 across Yunnan and Sichuan, with Hui, Han, Tibetan, and Nuosu victims. For Du, when Yang and other pro-Qing gentry joined the Qing campaign to fight Dali, they bent to the Qing government and turned against their fellow civilians in exchange for wealth and power.\textsuperscript{96}

Nevertheless, these reasonings and narratives behind Du Wenxiu’s ethnic policies had been challenged by some Han and Hui historical documents. Earlier in 1951, Hui historians in Dali and Xiaguan had composed an official report for the ethnic investigation commission sent from the central government. The report pointed out that one important reason for Du to embrace ethnic diversity in the Dali Regime was the decrease in the Hui population and the need for manpower.\textsuperscript{97} An interview with an elderly Han resident in Dali in 1958 indicated that the Han had suffered discrimination in the early stage of Du Wenxiu’s Rebellion. They had escaped or been killed, maintaining a small number of people to serve the Hui. Later, Du recruited many Han civilians, who, however, were only allowed to reside outside the city of Dali and were given some freedom to eat pork outside the city walls.\textsuperscript{98}

After the Qing government launched military campaigns both against Du Wenxiu and in order to block Dali’s trade with Burma, fewer than forty shops had survived in Xiaguan by the end of 1856.\textsuperscript{99} The Qing blockade increased Dali’s needs for manpower and resources, creating complications for Du Wenxiu in sustaining military campaigns, agricultural development, and trade. Dali’s tremendous military expenses had heavily burdened the rural population.\textsuperscript{100} Trade became critical for maintaining food and military supplies. However, commercial activities could pull labourers out of the agricultural sector to fill in at the urban mills and shops or the caravans. Thus, trade and

\textsuperscript{95} Du Wenxiu, “Du Wenxiu zizhuan,” 175–76, 181, 183–84.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., 213–15.
\textsuperscript{97} Ma Yuan, “Dali, Xiaguan Huizu,” 32.
\textsuperscript{98} “Dali diqu Du Wenxiu qiyi lishi diaocha,” 105.
\textsuperscript{100} Liu Shaochuan’s interviews revealed that Du Wenxiu’s military expenses did not place noticeable burdens on urban civilians. See “Dali diqu Du Wenxiu qiyi lishi diaocha,” 105.
agriculture, two essential economic pillars for Dali’s survival and military operations, competed for manpower and hindered each other’s progress.101

In the Hui historical records, the leaders of Dali possessed the insight and knowledge to solve the economic crisis. Therefore, military expansion would gain Dali access to transregional trade and more resources. After seizing a few posts between Dali and Kunming in 1860, Du Wenxiu’s much-trusted General Cai Fachun emphasised the urgency of resuming trade with Burma while consolidating northwestern Yunnan. By the spring of 1861, Dali’s army had conquered Tengyue and Yongchang and subdued the native officials in the area. The cawfas in Ganya and Lujiang both received official titles from Dali. In 1862, Dali’s army subdued the Tai polities in Xishuangbanna and received tribute, including two elephants, from the pacification commissioner in Jinghong.102 This new development would provide Dali access to the famous tea trade based in Simao and the Six Grand Tea Mountains. Moreover, the salt mines in western Yunnan, especially the profitable mines in Yunlong, would increase Dali’s revenue.103

The Muslim army stationed in Tengyue resumed trade with Burma to a certain degree and attempted to press the Kachin and Shan native officials to protect the caravans. However, King Mindon, who remained an ally of the Qing court, was reluctant to develop political and direct commercial connections with the Dali Regime.104 Li Zhenguo, who had threatened the British Sladen expedition, also remained the greatest threat to the Muslims, although both parties had a failed agreement to guard the trade routes between Tengyue and Burma in 1863.105 In 1868, Hui general Li Guolun “tried very hard to woo the British” when Sladen stayed in Tengyue for seven weeks. Sladen also “treated the Panthays as the de facto rulers of Yunnan” and signed a trade agreement with General Li.106 Nevertheless, the Dali Regime

101 There were three main reasons for the loss of rural labourers: first, the decrease of overall Hui population due to wars and massacres; second, the draft of most able men as soldiers; and third, the concentration of people in urban areas to seek the maximum protection from Dali’s army. Due to a consistent loss of labourers in rural areas as well as the losses and gains of Dali’s territory, its overall agricultural yield had been shrinking. “Dali diqu Du Wenxiu qi yi lishi diaocha,” in YNHZSHLSDC, vol. 1: 104–5; Yang Zhaojun, ed., Yunnan Huizushi, 128–29; Huizu xuehui, ed., Dali Huizushi, 85.
103 Jing Dexin, Du Wenxiu, 121–22.
105 Jing Dexin, Du Wenxiu, 197.
still reaped handsome profits from the small volume of salt, orpiment, and cotton trade with Burma.\textsuperscript{107} The markets in Sichuan also remained essential for Dali to break through the Qing blockade.\textsuperscript{108}

In 1958, Liu Shaochuan and Wen Meihu interviewed Ming Ruihua and Liu Mingde in Tengchong. The two interviewees indicated that the Dachun Huadian (Dachun Cotton Shop) in Tengchong was Du Wenxiu’s business and that its historical site in the city had been burned down by the Japanese in 1944. Ming Ruihua and Liu Mingde recalled that Du had another cotton shop on the 29th street of Mandalay, with a mosque for its employees. The two interviewees did not clarify whether these shops were Du’s private possessions or were owned by the Dali Regime; however, at a certain point, Du’s sister came to manage the cotton shop in Mandalay.\textsuperscript{109} Du also sought civilian merchants to assist with trade, mining, remittance, and accounting. The Li family from the Dujia village in Yongchang carried Du’s cotton products in their shops in Yongchang and Burma.\textsuperscript{110} The Heqing Shu family’s genealogy also records that Dali’s army commissioned Shu Chengyuan to run businesses, and he opened two shops in Mandalay.\textsuperscript{111}

To connect the markets in Burma and Sichuan, the Dali Regime repaired roads and established checkpoints to guard and facilitate traffic. Shops and warehouses were erected in Dali, Yongchang, and Tengyue with convenient taxation and compensation policies for traders, and this drew caravans to traverse the mountains and valleys between Sichuan and Yunnan. Merchants from other provinces gathered and rested outside the southern city gate of Dali.\textsuperscript{112} The Yunnan provincial authorities requested that the governor-general of Sichuan ban trade with Dali and impose the death penalty on violators. However, many local Qing authorities were delighted by the merchants’ bribes and would not interfere in such commercial exchanges.\textsuperscript{113}

The grand designer of Dali’s economic growth, according to the Hui oral records, was Ma Mingkui. These records indicated that Ma’s sponsorship of

\textsuperscript{107} “Dali diqu Du Wenxiu qiyi lishi diaocha,” and “Baoshan Du Wenxiu qiyi lishi diaocha,” in \textit{YNHZSHLSDC}, vol. 1: 105, 115.


\textsuperscript{109} “Tengchong Du Wenxiu qiyi lishi diaocha,” 128.

\textsuperscript{110} Interviews with the Hui elders in Baoshan (Yongchang) indicated that Du Wenxiu probably owned shops in Yongchang. See “Baoshan Du Wenxiu qiyi lishi diaocha,” 113, 115, 117–18.

\textsuperscript{111} Shu Ziyi, \textit{Yunnan Heqing Shushi zupu (SSZP)} (printed in 2006), 103, 234.


the Hui uprisings from the very beginning had prevented Dali's army from raiding civilians. Later, his business infrastructure provided the foundation and platform for Dali's engagement in trade and mining. Moreover, he had established most of Dali's economic and trade policies. However, few other records indicated Ma's official position in Dali. His retainers were not seen to participate in military operations between 1856 and 1871. Ma's overall involvement in Dali's economic policies had little publicity except for the testimonies found in a few oral records whose creators explained that invisibility was needed for him to better serve his Hui fellowmen. Ma's official title of *wujinshi* was still valid after the Dali Regime was founded, which allowed him to maintain his business connections with the officials and merchants outside Dali's territory. Although the Qing officials and the merchants on the opposition camp would not mingle and trade with the “bandits,” they would cooperate with a *wujinshi* for the sake of business profit. Therefore, Ma's lack of an official title in Dali's bureaucracy “should be understood as a collective decision from the leaders in Dali who prioritised trade in a complicated social and political landscape.”

The stories in various historical sources speak of the complicated situations and practical considerations behind the discourses and frameworks comprising different versions of the collective memory about the Hui rebellions in Yunnan. While some neglected nuances challenged the idealistic representation of Dali's economic and ethnic policies, more historical records revealed that the Dali Regime, as well as the Hui leaders and merchants in western Yunnan, did possess a considerable amount of capital. Where did the wealth go after the pacification of the Dali Regime in 1873, and what happened to these Hui businesses? Ma Mingkui's story could provide some insights. In 1871, Ma went to Kunming to negotiate with the provincial government; however, the success of the Qing military turned the situation against him. When the Qing army repossessed Dali in 1873, close to one hundred members of Ma's extended family either died in battle or were executed. After Cen Yuying arrested and detained Ma in Wuhua Mountain, Ma's properties and firms were divided up by the Qing army officers. Jiang Zonghan possessed Fuchundian, rebranding it and merging it into his own enterprise called Fuchunheng. Commander Yang Yuke seized Tailai, Yonghe, and Lianxingchang as well as an orpiment mill in Menghua. Qing officer

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114 Ma Shaoxiong and Zhao Rusong, “Ma San jinshi qiren,” 80.
115 Ibid.
116 Ma Mingkui was released in 1883 when he was assigned to become the Military Commander of Zhongdian. Ibid., 80–81; “Ma San Jinshi yuanliubiao,” 81.
Shi Xiaobing seized Yutai and Yushun.\textsuperscript{117} Cen also commissioned the militia leaders in Tengyue and Yongchang to acquire the shops that were under Du Wenxiu’s name.\textsuperscript{118} These examples indicate the massive confiscation and seizure of Hui wealth by the Qing military and local officials, which had begun with the Yongchang massacre of 1845.

\textsuperscript{117} Ma Shaoxiong and Zhao Rusong, ”Ma San Jinshi qiren,” 80–81; Yang Dakai, ”Ma Mingkui,” 83–84.

\textsuperscript{118} Wu Qianjiu, ”Yunnan Huizu de lishi he xianzhuang (zhong),” \textit{Yanjiu jikan} (Kunming: Yunnansheng lishi yaniusuo, 1982), vol. 2: 191.
6 Trading While Fighting

Abstract
Chapter 6 explores the historical memory that reflected the structural changes to Yunnan's commercial life and capital accumulation during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This chapter traces the roots of Hui social and economic inequality and the rise of military-merchants to the appropriation of Hui wealth and properties in the mid-nineteenth century. The chapter also provides the big picture of Yunnan's prosperous transregional trade and the contribution of both civilian traders and military-merchants.

Keywords: Muslim; trade; wars; inequality; merchants; military

The Yunnanese merchants had established large-scale firms well before the 1850s and traded in much of southwestern Yunnan and Burma. 1 Nevertheless, rebellions and violence had interrupted the regular course of Yunnan's transregional trade since the mid-nineteenth century. When confrontations between the Qing and Hui troops hindered the trade route between Yunnan and Burma, the bandits' conflicts also blocked the upper Red River. These temporary interruptions, 2 however, brought structural changes to the formation of Yunnan's business enterprises as well as to the approaches to wealth and capital accumulation. Throughout the decades of internal rebellions and foreign threats that began in the mid-nineteenth century, military powers and their establishments guaranteed more security and consistent access to resources and channels of commercial exchange. Assuming the role of merchants, the military men in the imperial borderlands expanded their territorial control with their networks and ties in both systems, challenging state territoriality and breaching the state political boundary through their business entities. In a larger picture, connections with local, dominant military

2 Giersch points out that the Hui uprisings brought temporary interruptions to Yunnan's transregional trade. Ibid.
power contributed to the survival and even prosperity of civilian capital throughout the tumultuous nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Yunnan.

The hostility against the Hui in the late Qing and early ROC periods had also affected the traditional historiography of modern Yunnan’s commercial development, which paid limited attention to the phenomenon of the Hui-Han division and ethnic inequality in Yunnan’s economic and social life. The messages from the Hui storytellers did not receive enough attention, as Western and Chinese scholars have mainly presented the stories of a vague group of Yunnan merchants. Examining the many overlooked sources and frameworks of historical memory is essential to understanding the structural changes to Yunnan’s commercial life and capital accumulation during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

This chapter explores the historical memory that reflected a thorny process of competition and cooperation behind the idealistic and prosperous scenes of Yunnan’s large transnational corporations, petty traders, and busy caravans. First, the Yunnan provincial government’s policies regarding the “rebels’ properties” since the 1840s exacerbated the Hui’s social and economic inequality. Second, the transfer of wealth that came with the redistribution of the rebels’ properties in the 1870s gave rise to the military-merchants who traded while performing the duty of Qing army officers. Third, thriving civilian traders and military-merchants laid the foundation for the prosperity of large Yunnanese corporations, especially after the opening of Yunnan’s five ports throughout the late 1880s and 1890s and the construction of the Tonkin-Yunnan railway in the early 1900s.  Nevertheless, while the union between commercial interests and military power set the course for even greater success for Yunnan’s trade, it intensified ethnic, economic, and social inequality as well as the inequality between those merchants with and without political and military ties.

Seizing Properties and Transferring Wealth: The Hui Collective Memory

The Hui had a long-standing, dreadful historical memory of the state’s seizure of their properties after the Yongchang massacre (1845). In 1847, Emperor

3 See the examples of these historical documents in Jing Dexin, ed., Yunnan Huimin qiyi shiliao (YNHMQYSL) (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1984) written by Huang Chengyuan, Li Yuzhen, and Wang Shusen. Giersch’s recent work, however, provides a timely discussion on the matter. See C. Patterson Giersch, Corporate Conquests: Business, the State, and the Origins of Ethnic Inequality in Southwest China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020).
Daoguang heard Du Wenxiu and Ding Canting’s plea for justice and assigned Lin Zexu, who had destroyed the British merchants’ opium in 1839, to govern Yunnan and reinvestigate the case. The Hui historical documents recorded that Lin’s distrust toward the Hui had affected how he handled the Hui properties, businesses, and thousands of acres of lands that were left unattended after the tragedy. Du Wenxiu’s autobiography recorded Lin’s wrongful killing of over 1,300 Hui in Midu without formal investigations and, over time, the execution of over 21,074 Hui across western Yunnan. Contemporary Yunnanese scholars stress that although Lin had appeared impartial and executed Han mobs, he had mistakenly killed more Hui. Hui scholars especially argue that in the name of investigation, Lin extended the inquisition from Yongchang to Dali and severely damaged the Hui gentry across western Yunnan.

Lin Zexu’s other grave mistake was forcefully relocating the Hui to the remote, desolate Guannai Mountains. Hui oral records indicated that Lin had ignored the Hui people’s plea to restore their lands and properties. Instead, he labelled these assets as “rebels’ properties” and put them up for sale. In Yongchang, those Hui who had survived the massacre of 1845 and Lin’s recent execution of their fellowmen were forced to move. Lin justified that the relocation would prevent future Hui-Han fights, because confrontations would occur if the Hui were to rebuild their homes in the same neighbourhood as the Han. David Atwill observes that Lin relocated the Hui due to his strong skepticism about the Hui’s accusation of Han persecution as well as their claims of high numbers of deaths and casualties. The Guannai Mountains were 200 li away from Yongchang, a common destination for new migrants and the home of the Lisu people. However, the Hui abhorred this solution as they had given up their homes, wealth, and original occupations to adapt to a challenging life by the west bank of the Salween River.

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10 “Baoshan Du Wenxiu qiyi lishi diaocha,” in *YNHZSHLSDC*, vol. 1: 119.
12 Jing Dexin, *Du Wenxiu*, 42.
Without mentioning the opposition of the Hui, Qing local historians and Lin Zexu himself gave good reports on the relocation program. *Xu Yunnan tongzhigao* (Extended Comprehensive Records of Yunnan, 1901) documented that Lin assisted in resettling over 200 households of Hui residents who were willing to move. He further ordered all local authorities in Yunnan to search and arrest escaping Han and Hui bandits.\(^{13}\) In his memorials to the emperor, Lin emphasised that the Hui and Han had accumulated generations of hatred toward each other.\(^{14}\) He contemplated inviting the Hui back, who would only find that it was too difficult to rebuild their houses that had been burned down. Further, he feared that keeping the Hui and Han as neighbours would generate more short- and long-term disputes and confrontations. Therefore, he decided to relocate the Hui.\(^{15}\) Lin said that the Hui received discounts to purchase houses, lands, and trees in their new settlement, and quite a few Hui were glad to sell their properties in the city and move. Some local Hui leaders even wanted to trade properties owned by the mosque or unclaimed Hui lands for the properties in the Guannai Mountains. Lin’s program sounded successful as he reported that more Hui continued to request to be relocated. In addition, local officials had been searching for the Hui who had previously escaped. They patiently persuaded the Hui to sell their properties and move, which would eliminate future disputes.\(^{16}\)

Despite the discrepancies in these accounts, Lin Zexu’s solutions had set the precedent of state appropriation and confiscation of Hui properties. In contrast, his predecessor, He Changling, Atwill argues, “was sympathetic to the Hui” and attempted to protect the Hui ownership of the lands they had lost in the Yongchang massacre. Lin, however, “was pursuing a policy of ethnically based banishment.”\(^{17}\) Hence, by identifying the “rebel’s properties” and forcing relocation, Lin and the state power he represented reinforced and institutionalised the Hui’s social and economic inequality as well as the Hui-Han conflicts in western Yunnan.

Later, the burning of cities and villages, mass killings, and the seizure of Hui properties marked the traumatic Hui collective memory of the Qing

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\(^{13}\) “Pingding Huiluan lüe (shang),” in *Xu Yunnan tongzhigao* (1901), vol. 81, wubeizhi, 6.


\(^{15}\) Ibid., vol. 5: 1170.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., vol. 5: 1101, 1171.

\(^{17}\) Atwill also points out that He Changling was not able to resolve the issue because he feared that those Hui who were from other provinces would come to possess the unclaimed lands. See Atwill, *Chinese Sultanate*, 79.
conquest of Dali in 1873. Hui women committed suicide to avoid becoming the conquerors’ concubines, or they compromised under various conditions to raise children in the Islamic faith and maintain the existence of the Hui identity. Local gentry also reported that, in some villages, the Hui population had been wiped out and lands had been deserted. According to Émile Rocher, the Qing troops engaged in three days of human butchery in Dali. To remove the Hui from the area, Cen Yuying ordered the confiscation of land and houses from the Hui who refused to give up the Islamic religion. The Yunnan provincial government organised committees to settle the rebels’ properties, claiming to funnel Hui wealth into funds for the military, war refugees, and impoverished civilians. Previously, Cen had reported Yunnan’s dire economic condition: long-term wars had exhausted the financial reservoir of both the civilians and the military, and he had received less than a third of the aid promised by the state since 1869. Desperately seeking funds for war recovery and veterans’ welfare, he could have found immediate relief in the wealth of the “rebels.” Hence, the loss of wealth and means of survival became an inseparable part of the Hui collective memory of suffering as the Qing army pacified the rebellions in Yunnan.

Cen Yuying explained to Emperor Tongzhi that utilising the rebels’ property would reduce social unrest and benefit both military and civilians in the post-war era. Appearing to have demonstrated the Confucian spirit of benevolence, he explained that the rebels’ properties were distributed to build temples and schools as well as care for the weak and dead:

To settle the unemployed militiamen and civilians where rebels’ properties concentrated, [we] allotted farmlands [to people] with discretion. Their taxes, grain or money, at an adjustable rate due to the circumstances, would pay for the construction of memorial halls [for the loyal], and renovations of schools and academies. [We] recruited tenants to farm the rest of the lands for annual tax revenue, which could further supply [administrative and military] fees, the pension for the [family of] deceased or disabled troops, and food for the uncared for and poor. [We] will stop [this operation] immediately when the children of these families have

grown up in ten or more years. Then local government officials and gentry will discuss how to distribute this tax revenue and report their solution. For the areas where rebels’ properties were limited, there is no need to accommodate the [discharged] militiamen except for making arrangement deliberately to fix the memorial halls and academies, and to supply [administrative and military] fees. The rest of the lands could be leased to tenants to collect taxes, which would be distributed to the family of the deceased or disabled troops.23

The provincial government established the Central Settlement Bureau to prevent disputes and future rebellions while handling the rebels’ properties. The gentry were invited to oversee the prefecture and the county Investigation Bureaus or Public Bureaus that were directed by local magistrates.24 After communicating with some officials and gentry, Cen Yuying issued guidelines for local bureaus to follow when reassigning the rebels’ properties. He divided the rebels’ properties into ten portions, especially in areas with large Hui populations. Half of these properties would become farmlands to produce tax revenue. A quarter of these properties could be sold to fund the maintenance of temples and academies. Local officials and gentry could manage the rest of these properties and collect taxes to aid families of veterans. Anything left would be given to orphans of the veterans’ family to assist them until they grew up and became independent.25 However, the process began with the interpretation and judgement of local officials and gentry to identify rebels and to classify, confiscate, and distribute their properties. The provincial leaders such as Liu Yuezhao and Cen Yuying also gave extended explanations of the term “rebel.” Consequently, not only Hui but also Han, Minjia, and Nuosu properties faced confiscation.26

In 1932, the prominent Wang family in Xiangyun sold two Hui men each a booklet called Nichan quan’an (Complete Profile of the Rebels’ Properties). Later, one of the Hui men turned his copy over to the ethnic investigation team sent by the central Chinese government in 1951. Nichan quan’an was compiled by the gentry who ran the local Public Bureau in the summer of 1873 and recorded all Hui properties and lands confiscated by the government of Yunnan County (now Xiangyun, Midu, and part of Binchuan).27

23 Ibid., vol. 1: 280–81 (my own translation).
25 Nichan quan’an, 118, 123.
26 Jing Dexin, Du Wenxiu, 246.
27 Nichan quan’an and its introduction, 122.
The Bureau identified 157 locations of rebels' properties in Yunnan County, including farmlands, orchards, ponds, shops, and houses with courtyards. The farmlands alone were roughly more than 4,417 qiū (approximately over 44,170 mu).\(^{28}\) An investigation in the Hui villages of this area during the 1950s and 1960s indicated that the Qing government had possessed all the Hui assets in Yunnan County because most Hui had been killed or escaped. In the mid-twentieth century, even with new migrants who rejuvenated the county population, the total number of Hui and the size of their settlements would barely reach 10 per cent of their scale a century before.\(^{29}\)

Chinese scholars have observed that the military men and local gentry had the advantage of seizing the rebels' properties. According to Wu Qianjiu, the leaders of Yunnan's standing army seized the rebels' assets in the urban and suburban areas before they were confiscated by the state. The militiamen often possessed rural houses and lands, leaving the rest to be identified as public lands for academies, roads, bridges, and horse ranches.\(^{30}\) Public schools throughout western Yunnan obtained no less than 1,500 mu of land, fifty salt-extracting stoves at the Qiaohou salt mine, sixty-eight shops, and more than 810 dan of annual farmland yields. However, the lands given to public schools were largely desolate and barren, merely “leftovers” from the Qing army and militia leaders.\(^{31}\) In Dali, Jiang Zonghan, Ding Huai, and the Han native place associations took over the Hui residential quarters stretching through the central and southwestern compounds of the city. Yang Yuke, Yuan Shan, and other officers possessed the Hui lands in a broad rural area outside the city.\(^{32}\) In Tengyue, military officers, Han gentry, native place associations, and monasteries seized major Hui firms and properties. The native place association of Hunan possessed part of the properties owned by the Hui firm Sanshenghao. The Buddhist Baima temple occupied the Hui’s houses along Yibao street and Guanyi alley. The Han gentry also annexed Hui land in the name of a Daoist temple called Wenchang palace. Approximately 60–70 per cent of the rebels' properties went into the hands of Jiangxi guilds because a good number of civil servants in Tengyue were from Jiangxi.\(^{33}\)

\(^{28}\) Ibid., 126-36.
\(^{29}\) Ibid., introduction, 122.
\(^{30}\) Wu Qianjiu, “Yunnan Huizu de lishi he xianzhuang (xia),” 119, 135.
\(^{31}\) Ibid., 135–37.
\(^{32}\) Ibid., 121–23.
In addition to promoting social welfare as reported by Cen Yuying, the rebels’ properties also satisfied personal interests. The rebels’ properties in Menghua were divided into several categories: public usage, veterans’ compensation, awards to army officials and gentry, and private lands, known as the “rouge and flower fields,” for the wives and children of military officers. On the outskirts of Menghua, ten houses in Xiaoweigeng had been allotted for accomplished Qing officials, while 200 to 300 mu of land became the rouge and flower fields. Further, more than 1,000 mu of land was turned into military farms, whereas 1,500 to 1,600 mu became the private possessions of army officers and gentry. In the 1950s and 1960s, Hui villagers in Xiaoweigeng still remembered that most of their lands had been awarded to army and militia leaders or used to build temples and public schools.

With their collective memory of losing and restoring their homes, businesses, and lands during and after the mid-century rebellions, the Hui presented a helpless situation to the Qing state and its local allies. As military men and local authorities claimed the use of the rebels’ properties for charitable causes, education, and local infrastructure, their own interpretation of social and economic equality overshadowed that of the rebels. There were times when the Hui army in Yongchang claimed the right to restore their fellowmen’s lost properties along with their conquests. Nevertheless, this provided the non-Muslim gentry with more evidence of their losses as the Hui invaded and raided their homes. The genealogies and stories mentioned in chapter 1 described the Hui’s cruelty in persecuting Han officials, gentry, and civilians. Menghua zhigao (1906–1918) recorded frequent violence since 1856 and the deaths of close to 1,000 civilians when Hui general Cai Fachun conquered Menghua. Zhaozhou zhigao (Gazetteer of Zhaozhou), compiled during the Guangxu era (1875–1908), listed a series of crimes committed by the Hui rebels, including burning, killings, abductions, and the occupation of civilian properties, which caused half of the people in Zhaozhou to flee.

In 1900, a stele erected at the Hongshan village in Zhaozhou (now Fengyi) described how the “rebellious bandits” killed the government officials and

35 Ibid.
36 Wu Qianju, “Yunnan Huizu de lishi he xianzhuang (xia),” 130.
38 Wang Kangguo, “Guangxu Zhaozhou zhigao,” in Dali Fengyi gubei wenji, ed. Ma Cunzhao (Hong Kong: The Hongkong University of Science and Technology, 2013), 362.
burned down houses and temples in 1856, causing the civilians to flee and leaving the farmlands barren.  

The most notorious case of such charges occurred in the 1890s when some Han gentry anonymously composed a booklet to reveal the crimes of Ma Rulong and his subordinates before his surrender to the Qing army in 1861. The Han gentry talked about Ma’s notorious killings and raids before his defection. They believed that Ma and his subordinates had accumulated tremendous fortunes from looting civilians. The Han gentry further exposed the crimes of Wang Chi, prominent philanthropist and founder of the Tongqingfeng firm (known as Tianshunxiang outside of Yunnan), and an associate named Zhang Ren. In the mid-1850s, Wang and Zhang followed Ma’s order to go to Sichuan and sell all the assets they had seized; however, they took half of the 200,000 liang of silver they had made on the trip and escaped. While Ma captured and executed Zhang, Wang launched his business in Shanghai, Hankou, and Chongqing. In 1874, Wang began cooperating with a Shanxi bank called Qianshengheng. Later, he established his own brand, Tongqingfeng, and purchased a government position.  

While merchants and civilians struggled through turmoil and violence, wealth and capital were largely transferred along political and ethnic divisions, which enabled the rise and prosperity of military-merchants who served either in the Dali Regime or the Qing army. The Hui records also

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39 Later after 1872, the gentry collected the donations and began rebuilding the village temple; “Chongxiu gongdian chuangzhi duimo tianchan beiji” (1900), in Dali Fengyi gubei wenji, 333.  
41 Ibid., 301. According to Chen Hefeng, Qianshengheng, however, might be the name of a firm run by the Zhejiang merchants. See Chen Hefeng, “Wang Xingzhai zai Qingmo jingying de nan bang piaohao Tongqingfeng Tianshunxiang jianshi,” in Yunnan wenshi ziliao xuanji (YNWSZLXJ), vol. 28 (1986): 147. In the later historiography on the Yunnanese traders, Wang Chi appeared as a righteous, trustworthy, disciplined, and patriotic “Red Hat Merchant” (a Qing honourable title for businessmen who were granted government positions). The origin of Wang’s start-up fund remained vague in the research of contemporary Yunnanese scholars. They wrote that Wang had taken refuge in Chongqing during Emperor Tongzhi’s reign (1861–1875), where he rented a shop and started Tianshunxiang with 400–500 liang of silver. These scholars praise Wang’s remarkable attributes and accomplishments. As a prominent merchant, he made a significant donation in 1883 to fund Cen Yuying’s campaign in Vietnam. As the chief director of the Yunnan provincial mining company since 1887, he had been sponsoring the industrialisation and development of copper and tin mines in Yunnan for over ten years. He built the Hongxi Academy in 1894 and donated a large amount of funds and books. He also founded a modern electric light company and built infrastructure projects in Kunming. Most importantly, Wang aided Empress Dowager Cixi when she escaped Beijing in 1900. After that, he continued to refill the Qing government treasury and assisted the Shaanxi and Shanxi provinces for drought relief. See Luo Qun and Luo Min, Huashuo dianshang (Beijing: Zhonghua gongshang lianhe chubanshe, 2008), 238–48.
showed that Hui leaders sometimes defected to the Qing government to save community properties and protect fellow civilians.42 However, the defectors faced an uncertain future. After their surrender, Dali’s General Yang Rong and his fellowmen were killed by Cen Yuying and Yang Yuke. In Tengyue, although Commander Ding Huai pardoned the Hui defectors, Commander Jiang Zonghan killed them all.43 The defectors who obtained temporary security still faced consistent scrutiny of their loyalty. Distrust justified their colleagues’ antipathy and fomented factional conflicts. They were also in a subtle position between the state’s demands and expectations and their own community’s demands and expectations. Prominent scholar Ma Dexin was recruited by the government of Yunnan in 1862 but was executed in 1874 for treason. Commander Ma Rulong found tremendous difficulty gaining trust from his colleagues and became a suspect of treason when one of his subordinates defected to Du Wenxiu with European firearms. Ma’s older brother served under Du Wenxiu’s command before his defection, and he had been sympathetic to the Hui who escaped to Burma after the fall of Dali. He even claimed that he had no interest in serving in the Qing government but wanted to focus on running his business of cross-border trade.44

Military-Merchants

The Chinese armies’ historical engagement in border trade provided strategic and effective means of self-reliance.45 In the eighteenth century, the Qing

42 For instance, having a personal connection with Yang Yuke, Hui officer Ma Shuangyuan defected when Qudong, a Hui settlement by Yongping, was conquered by the Qing army. He was able to divide 70 per cent of the land with Yang’s subordinate Zhang Yintang and save 208 households of Hui who later became his tenants. "Dali diqu Du Wenxiu qiyi lishi diaocha," 108.
44 The British National Archives (BNA), FO 17/742, 32–33.
45 Yu Yingshi (Yu Ying-shih) traced the precedents of military participation in trade to the camp markets in the frontier garrisons during the Warring States era and continued sporadically to Qing. See Yu Ying-shih, Trade and Expansion in Han China: A Study in the Structure of Sino- Barbarian Economic Relations (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 94. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also engaged in commercial activities from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s to supplement military funds. In August 2013, the CCP News, Sohu, Sina, and other news platforms in China released an article reviewing the CCP Central Military Commission Chairman’s measure of managing the PLA since the 1950s. The article was originally published by Jiefang ribao (Jiefang Daily), stating that “the military commercial interests had expanded quickly and developed into a gigantic network.” In July 1998, Jiang Zemin formally announced the termination of all military business, because “it is impossible for a military force
government created Neiwufu, or the Department of Imperial Household, and gave the banner men in each province a special fund called shengxi yinliang (shengyin), meaning silver for profit. The state intended to use a fixed amount of the money to encourage military entrepreneurship and self-reliance. This policy gradually faded during the Qing-Burmese War (1769) and the Second Jinchuan War (1771–1776). Emperor Qianlong officially terminated the practice in 1781 as the state reserves had increased while the reputation of the Qing military had decreased. However, military entrepreneurship remained in force.46 Following this fashion, some Yunnan army leaders actively observed the profitable market flow and participated in the cross-border trade.47 Military power and social connections provided these military-merchants with the ability to acquire, distribute, and transport resources and commodities.

When Cen Yuying reported his efforts to enrich the military and provincial budget, he omitted his own army’s plunders and appropriations of rebels’ properties. Emile Rocher recorded that, in northeastern Yunnan and southwestern Guizhou, Cen rarely restrained his subordinates from annexing private lands and raiding civilians. In the mountains of Bijie in Guizhou, Cen coerced the rebel leaders into taking bribes. His soldiers looted indigenous settlements, killing the residents and raping and abducting women. The caravans feared Cen’s army, except for those merchants who sold opium to the troops.48 The Qing officials and the native officials also took gold, silver, foodstuffs, and horses from the civilians in southwestern and southeastern Yunnan.49 Moreover, the reports from the Yunnan government made no reference to those rebels’ properties which had become the private assets of the officials, army leaders, and gentry. Rocher also noted that Yang Yuke conquered the Zhennan Prefecture in 1871 and then used the assets he seized to expand his army. However, Yang kept the gold and silver ingots that were intercepted from a caravan for himself.50 Yang later

46 Wei Qingyuan and Dai Yingcong have done thorough research on this topic regarding the sources, distribution, and application of shengyin as well as the utilisation of its profit. See Dai Yingcong, “Yingyung Shengxi: Military Entrepreneurship in the High Qing Period, 1700–1800,” *Late Imperial China*, vol. 26, no. 2 (December 2005): 1, 8; Wei Qingyuan, *Ming Qing shi bianxi* (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1989), 113–14.
49 Ibid., vol. 2: 163.
50 Ibid., vol. 2: 141–42.
controlled the salt-extracting stoves at the Qiaohou mines and handed the
mining and processing facilities over to his subordinates, local officials, and
gentry.\textsuperscript{51} Yang’s story revealed that the arrangement of the rebels’ assets
could be complicated without clear-cut ways to identify private, public,
and state ownership.

Further, the Hui in western Yunnan remembered that their wealth, capital,
and businesses provided the Qing army officers with the opportunity to
seek a luxurious life as well as a jump start in transregional trade. Yang
Yuke’s story continued as he possessed sixty shops in the city of Dali, 430
\textit{mu} of land on the outskirts of Dali, and more than 1,300 \textit{mu} of land in Niujie
and Eryuan. He obtained 3.7 million \textit{liang} of silver in total by selling the
rebels’ assets in Yongchang and Dali. With the money, he opened two firms,
called Changshenghao and Yuntaifeng.\textsuperscript{52} He built a luxury residence of
over 130 rooms with the logs and stones he disassembled from Du Wenxiu’s
palace.\textsuperscript{53} Sometimes, the Hui oral records on certain events were vague and
contradictory. However, their general claims on the matter were corroborated
by other historical records and gained further support from modern Chinese
scholars who were critical of the feudal Qing legacies. Overall, it is difficult
to detach the Hui collective memory of property loss from the Qing army
officers’ aggression. Therefore, how was the sudden discontinuance of
many Hui businesses in western Yunnan related to the quick rise of the
Qing military-merchants who were accused of turning Hui wealth into
their own? It is very likely that Yang’s subordinates, such as Ding Huai and
Jiang Zonghan, followed Yang’s example, engaging in trade and blending
private assets with military possessions.

Jiang Zonghan was born in Heqing in 1838 into a poor family with Nuosu
and Minjia heritages. He left Heqing and joined the Qing army in 1856.
The Hui troops captured him in 1859 and lured him into joining them by
offering him an official position. He managed to escape and then served
under Yang Yuke’s command. In 1865, Jiang was promoted to lieutenant
(\textit{bazong}). In 1873, he attained the position of military commander of Tengyue.
In 1875, he was demoted due to his involvement in the Margary Affair. A
year later, the Qing government appointed Jiang to pacify some rebellions
in Tengyue and then sent him to Sichuan in 1879. In 1882, he arrived at the

\textsuperscript{51} Ma Shaoxiong and Zhao Rusong, “Du Wenxiu qiyi shiqi de Qiaohou yanjing,” in \textit{YNHZSHLSDC},
vol. 2: 97.
\textsuperscript{52} Ma Weiliang, \textit{Yunnan Huizu lishi yu wenhua yanjiu} (Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe,
2000), 224; Wu Qianjiu, “Yunnan Huizu de lishi he xianzhuang (xia),” 138.
\textsuperscript{53} Ma Zhiguo, “Yang Yue fudi,” 149.
battlefields of the Qing-French confrontations in Tonkin. Three years later, he became the military commander of Zunyi, Guizhou. Later, he served as the provincial commander in both Guizhou and Yunnan and died in the late spring of 1903 in Guizhou.\textsuperscript{54}

Neither Jiang Zonghan's biography written by the Qing court historians nor the Heqing gazetteers written by Yang Jinkai mentioned his commercial activities. Nevertheless, Yang Jinkai noted Jiang's generous donations for the construction of local Confucian academies, temples, roads, and bridges, worth over tens of thousands liang of silver.\textsuperscript{55} The Heqing xianzhi (Gazetteer of Heqing County) compiled in 1998 and other records in Yunnan corroborated the Hui accounts, indicating that Jiang seized over 40,000 mu of land in Heqing, Yongsheng, Dengchuan, Tengyue, and Yongping. The farmlands in Heqing alone yielded rich tax revenues each year, including no less than 10,000 dan of grains and over 20,000 boxes of sugar. The Fuchunheng and Fuqingdian firms run by the Jiang family had more than forty branches across the country and outside of China, making them the biggest business corporation in modern Yunnan.\textsuperscript{56}

These documents commonly recorded that in 1876 Jiang Zonghan founded the Fuchunheng firm in Tengyue, though there are some discrepancies.\textsuperscript{57} For instance, while stating that Jiang founded Fuchunheng with other merchants in Tengyue in 1876, Jiang's great-grandson noted that Fuchunheng began engaging in trade between Yunnan and Burma before 1861.\textsuperscript{58} Tang Fangyin, an accomplished intellectual from Heqing, however, indicated that Jiang began trading in 1861 after accumulating some wealth serving in Tengyue.\textsuperscript{59} As mentioned earlier, Jiang had just joined the Qing army in 1856 and was captured by the Hui in 1859. The Qing court historians documented that Jiang was busy fighting the Muslim army in other parts of western Yunnan in the 1860s and was far away from Tengyue.\textsuperscript{60} The Heshun gentry and intellectuals

\textsuperscript{55} See Jiang’s biographies in “Guoshiguan liezhuan-Jiang Zonghan and Minguo Heqing xianzhi,” in MGHQXZ, 228–29.
\textsuperscript{58} Jiang Wanhua, “Fuchunheng de xingshuai,” 84–85.
\textsuperscript{60} “Guoshiguan liezhuan-Jiang Zonghan,” in Yang Jinkai, Minguo Heqing xianzhi (MGHQXZ), ed. Gao Jinhe (Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 2016), 229.
recorded that Jiang became the commander of Tengyue in the spring of 1873 and arrived to fight the rebel General Li Guolun. Jiang and the Tengyue militia succeeded a year later, driving Li into the Kachin Hills. Regardless of possible inaccuracies in oral historical records, the contradictions in these materials and their suggested time frames indicated that there was little possibility for Jiang to engage in trade and found Fuchunheng in Tengyue before the 1860s. However, it was likely that he would have undertaken a series of operations to possess civilian businesses, form partnerships with local merchants, and establish his own brand.

Hui oral records claimed that Jiang Zonghan seized Ma Mingkui’s firms and assets in western Yunnan and captured the shop managers in Yongchang, Xiaguan, and Tengyue. Jiang then used the previous platforms of Ma’s business and launched Fuchunheng, a new firm that borrowed the phrase “Fuchun” from Ma’s old brand. The Qing army conquered Dali in late 1872, and Jiang took over Tengyue in the spring of 1874, which would allow him to gain possession of Ma’s firms in both cities within a couple of years and gradually stabilise his own business. According to his great-grandson, when serving in Tengyue, Jiang observed that western Yunnan’s products, such as vermicelli, cheese panels, walnuts, gongyu fish, and ham, were very popular in Burma, while Yunnan’s consumers welcomed the cotton, yarn, and fabrics imported from Burma. He then asked a subordinate with the surname of Ma, a Hui, perhaps, to purchase and exchange goods between Yunnan and Burma. Tang Fangyin also confirmed that Jiang relied on an officer surnamed Ma to run his business. These records indicated that Jiang’s business was developing before 1876. However, there was no evidence of Jiang or his subordinate running a business before 1861, for the Tengyue gentry and militia had begun countering the rebels in 1857 (chapter 1) and the Muslim army had taken over Tengyue in 1861. Therefore, it seems possible that Jiang initially got involved in cross-border trade after the seizure of Ma’s firm in 1872, which could have provided him with another reason to stop Margary’s expedition in 1875.

Jiang Zonghan’s great-grandson recalled that in 1876 Jiang partnered with two merchants of Tengyue, Ming Shugong and Dong Yisan. They organised a joint venture called Fuchundian. Later, they opened Fuchunheng in Yongchang and Fuqing Cotton and Yarn Shop in Xiaguan. These three

61 Weiyuanhui, ed., Heqing xianzhi, 763; Cun Kaitai, Tengyue xiangtuzhi, vol. 2, bingshi, 15–16.
firms also provided accommodations and warehouses for other merchants and caravans.\textsuperscript{64} The surname of Jiang Zonghan’s partner Ming Shugong in Tengyue indicated a possible but unproven family tie to Ming Qingchong, the founder of Hui Sanshenghao. In the meantime, Hui records indicate that Jiang possessed Du Wenxiu’s Sanshenghao in Tengyue.\textsuperscript{65} It was likely that as a Hui business, Sanshenghao could have assisted the Dali Regime’s trade and been falsely accredited to Du in some people’s memory. Nevertheless, these records suggested the possibility that Jiang funneled Sanshenghao’s manpower and resources into his business. In addition, Wu Qianjiu pointed out that Jiang took possession of Yuanshenghao, owned by Zhu Dachun, one of the original shareholders of Sanshenghao when the firm was founded, and renamed it Fucheng Kezhan (Fucheng Inn).\textsuperscript{66}

Therefore, it was likely that after suppressing the rebels across western Yunnan, Jiang Zonghan began to create his business entity by possessing Ma Mingkui’s firms and adopting the reputable brand Fuchun. As with the brand Fuchun, Ma’s previous staff, clients, and networks continued to serve their new owners. He also partnered with local merchants, such as Ming Shugong and Dong Yisan in Tengyue, and incorporated other Hui firms into their business institution. Hence, prosperous Hui businesses did not entirely cease after the pacification of the Dali Regime and continued to exist within Jiang’s commercial enterprise. When Jiang’s great-grandson traced the timeline of Fuchunheng’s cross-border trade to the years before 1861, it was possible that he traced the history of the original business started by Ma Mingkui instead of the history of Jiang’s ownership. Another incident also reveals the likelihood that Ma accumulated great wealth by taking possession of civilian properties and private businesses. In late 1911, Li Genyuan, then a high-ranking commander of the Yunnan army, launched an investigation of the “rebels’ properties” in Xiaguan. He contended that all the firms and properties under Fuchunheng came from Jiang’s confiscation of civilian assets when pacifying the Hui. Li ordered Jiang’s second grandson to turn all the family assets over to the Yunnan army, and finally received 20,000 liang silver.\textsuperscript{67}

In 1885, Fuchunheng’s two shareholders, Dong Yisan and Ming Shugong, withdrew from the firm after Jiang Zonghan was assigned to serve in

\textsuperscript{65} “Tengchong Du Wenxiu qi yi lishi diaocha,” 127.
\textsuperscript{66} Wu Qianjiu, “Yunnan Huizu de lishi he xianzhuang (xia),” 132.
\textsuperscript{67} Jiang Wanhua, “Fuchunheng de xingshuai,” 86; Tang Fangyin, “Fuchunheng,” 38.
Guizhou. While Dong Yisan reorganised Maoyanjì (which would become Maoheng), Ming Shugong continued to cooperate with Fuchunhêng to run the jade business in Burma. Jiang's great-grandson recalled that Jiang's offspring had little involvement in the family business. Consequently, the firm was in the hands of Jiang's nephew and other relatives. Before the 1911 revolution, three merchants from another firm joined Fuchunhêng as new shareholders and reorganised the business, leaving Fuchundian and a warehouse exclusively under the Jiang family's control. However, these shareholders left Fuchunhêng in 1911 when Jiang Zonghan's grandson intended to use Fuchunhêng's funds to pay for the ransom requested by Li Genyuan. To survive the split, Fuchunhêng merged with Fuqingren, a thriving firm managed by Zhou Shouzheng, who had once worked for Fuchunhêng. Under Zhou, the new Fuchunhêng developed into a transnational corporation, with trading companies in Mandalay, Shanghai, Chengdu, Chongqing, Luzhou, Hankou, and Hong Kong. Zhou also managed over ten silk factories in Sichuan and Shandong and opened a company in Sichuan to provide shipping services along the Yangzi River.

Fuchunhêng's complicated development explains why its book-keeping had become a challenge. Although many other firms in Yunnan had a more successful history of book-keeping, exceptions to the strict and orderly manner of the practice occurred at Fuchunhêng. Jiang Zonghan's great-grandson confessed that the records of Fuchunhêng and Ming Shugong's business transactions had never been processed and remained unsettled for many years. Tang Fangyin also pointed out that the Jiang and Ming families had been struggling with accounting for decades, but did not suggest any fraud from the Ming family's side. Even many people who understood accounting very well considered the Jiang-Ming business records a mess, for they could not locate evidence of transactions or receipts.

Ding Huai, the founder of Qingchanghe, began his business while serving in the military. Ding was also born in Heqing, and his father and uncle had lost their lives in the battles against the Hui rebels in 1860. After their deaths,

69 Jiang Zonghan's only son was a dedicated official and served in Sichuan. He and his son both died in 1903. His grandsons were not involved in the management of Fuchunhêng; Ibid., 86–89; “Jiang Guanling,” in MGHQXZG, 238; Tang Fangyin, “Fuchunhêng,” 38–40.
70 According to Giersch, Shanxi banks' book-keeping practices instructed the Yunnan merchants to organise their businesses and develop their own accounting and management strategies that would sustain long-distance transactions and shareholding partnerships. See Giersch, Corporate Conquests, 44.
Ding inherited his father's position and grew up while serving in the Qing army. Ding became the commander of Tengyue and then was transferred to Taipei in 1882. Later, he joined Liu Yongfu to fight against the French in 1884. In 1894, he was stationed in Shandong during the Sino-Japanese War, and in 1905 he was promoted to be the Guangxi provincial commander. Along with his promotions, Ding possessed tens of thousands of mu of land in Yunnan and Hubei. He started Qingchanghe, a weaving mill in Heqing, in 1887, with branches in Xiaguan, Kunming, Hankou, and Beijing. Duan Liben, a Christian leader in Dali in the twentieth century, recalled that his great-uncle Duan Huanwen (?–1907) had worked for Ding Huai at Qingchanghe. Later, Duan Huanwen became the manager of Qingchanghe's main branch in Sichuan and developed close connections with Yunnanese merchants and officials in the area.

The military men's participation in cross-border trade involved foreign capital that was associated with the Western imperialism they actively fought against on the battlefield. Their commercial networks and ties challenged the traditional state territoriality and breached the state political boundary that they were guarding. In the meantime, the story of Ma Mingkui's business and other Yunnan firms indicated that civilian merchants, who might have ties with the military, had been an essential part of Yunnan's trade in the nineteenth century despite the interruptions and even destruction that accompanied the mid-century rebellions. Therefore, the rising military-merchants represent only a part of the competitive merchant group in western Yunnan that would make significant contributions to Yunnan's prosperous transregional trade in the post-Hui rebellions era. While the merchants from Lin'an, Yuxi, and Shiping would flourish in southern Yunnan and the neighbouring countries, those from Dali, Xizhou, Heqing, and

74 Duan Liben, Family History Notes (unpublished, 1970s).
75 Minjia traders from the bank of Lake Erhai had reached Sichuan, Tibet, and Burma before the 1860s, with famous firms such Sanyuanhao (1796–1820) and Yuhehao (founded in the 1820s) that carried cotton, cotton yarn, salt, and tea trade across western Yunnan, Sichuan, Tibet, and Burma. In Tengyue, notable Sanchenghao and Yongmaohe were founded in the 1820s with shops in Burma, trading gems, jade, cotton, silk, and sundries. See Luo Qun, Jindai Yunnan shangren yu shangren ziben (Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 2004), 40–44; Giersch, “Borderlands Business,” 49–51. Yuan Jianwei dated the founding of Yongmaohe to 1840 with its first shop in Burma. Yuan Jianwei: “Lishi renleixue shiye xia de Zhong-Mian minjian maoyi—zuowei ‘wenhua zhongjieren’ de Tengchong Yongmaohe shanghao yunzuo moshijqi xiandai yiyi,” Journal of Southwestern University for Nationalities (Humanities & Social Sciences), no. 3 (March 2004): 10–16.
Tengyue would connect the markets across India, Upper Burma, western Yunnan, and Tibet. Moreover, the Hui returned to “trade, transport, and caravansaries,” the “occupations that they had dominated for centuries in China.” Nevertheless, the rise of military-merchants had fomented a structural change to the approaches of wealth accumulation and business development. The connection between civilian businesses and local, dominant military power became increasingly important due to military men's essential roles in sustaining the flow of resources, capital, and business operations.

**Civilian Traders**

Jiang Zonghan and Ding Huai both came from the small town of Heqing, where a new generation of merchants rose to fame after the 1870s. Situated in a valley of the Hengduan Mountains of northwestern Yunnan, Heqing borders Zhongdian (now Shangri-La) in the north and Dali in the south. Known as a town of scholars, Heqing saw caravans frequently passing on their way to Sichuan and Kham but rarely had any reputation in trade until the Qing period. Prior to the 1850s, merchants from Heqing had traded in Sichuan, Kham, and Hubei. Some of them had moved their businesses out of western Yunnan amid the mid-century rebellions. Famous firms such as Tongxinde, Xingshenghe, Fuchunheng (founded by Jiang Zonghan), and Qingchanghe (founded by Ding Huai) formed the strongest merchant group in western Yunnan and were no less competitive than their counterparts in Tengyue and Dali. Like their peers in Dali and Xizhou,

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76 Luo Qun and Luo Min, *Huashuo dianshang*, 13–16. Luo Qun identified the existence of main local merchant groups in Yunnan, such as those from Dali and Tengyue as well as those of Hui and Tibetan. In fact, the merchants in Dali and Tengyue could also be Han or Minjia. Also see Luo, *Jindai Yunnan shangren*, 35.


78 The 1998 Heqing gazetteer portrayed Heqing as a self-sufficient haven with fertile soil and a variety of vegetation. Small lakes, water reservoirs, grasslands, and hot springs add to Heqing’s dynamic landscape. Heqing’s history of producing papers, ceramics, and bricks dates back to the time of the Dali Kingdom. Migrants from the Lower Yangzi Delta rejuvenated its population during the Ming era. Silver mining and private metallurgical mills thrived during the Qing era, attracting more than 10,000 migrant workers and yielding over 100,000 liang of silver for tax revenue. See Weiyuanhui, ed., *Heqing xianzhi*, 61–75, 139.


Heqing merchants built local infrastructure and established Western-style schools; they travelled and studied abroad; and they participated in the revolutionary groups, both the nationalists and communists. Among them, the Shu clan developed an extensive commercial entity that encompassed major corporations and numerous small businesses with close connections with the military and civil bureaucracy as well as convoluted commercial and marriage ties with other Yunnan merchants.

In 1877, Shu Yuhou (1829–?), Shu Jinhe (1835–1923), and Shu Chengyuan (1848–?) established a joint venture called Xingshenghe in Heqing.82 These three shareholders were cousins and had been individually trading across Yunnan, Sichuan, Kham, and Burma. In the 1860s, Shu Chengyuan had once assisted Du Wenxiu in running the business and opened two firms called Yuanxing and Yuanfa in Mandalay, trading cotton and yarn for yellow silk, tea, and orpiment from Yunnan. In 1870, Shu Chengyuan opened the Hongsheng Jade Shop in Heqing, with clients in Bhamo, Tengyue, Yongchang, Kunming, Hankou, and Shanghai.83 Shu Yuhou was raised in a merchant’s household. His grandfather, Shu Fenghe (1792–1873), founded Zengyuhe in 1854 and traded jade, tea, and other miscellaneous items. His two uncles were traders, and his father, Shu Yongpei, founded Tongxingde in 1851 with a partner named Li Hengchun. Li fled to Sichuan to escape Zhang Zhengtai’s blackmail. Shu Yongpei was arrested by Zhang but was rescued by the Muslim army when they seized Heqing. Shu Yongpei escaped to Sichuan to avoid the duty of running the business for the Muslims. Later, he split Tongxingde with his old partner and began to work with the traders from Shanxi and Hubei. After the fall of Dali, Shu Yuhou welcomed his father back and took charge of the firm. As the business prospered, Shu Yuhou became known for his tremendous wealth, and he purchased a government title.84 Shu Jinhe’s father, Shu Guomian, was a doctor who, according to the Heqing xianzhi (Gazetteer of Heqing County, 1944), valued saving lives more than seeking wealth. In 1856, Shu Jinhe transported and sold opium, herbs, and fabrics in Dartsedo (now Kangding), also known as Dajianlu. He partnered with traders from Shaanxi to expand his business. After leaving Heqing when the rebels took over the city, Shu Jinhe continued to trade in Zhongdian, Dartsedo, and Lijiang with funding from some shareholders, including his

82 Shu Jinhe was also known as Shu Lichun, Shu Yuhou as Shu Zhuoran, and Shu Chengyuan as Shu Qimei.
83 Shu Ziyi, Yunnan Heqing Shushi zupu (SSZP) (printed in 2006), 103, 434.
84 Ibid., 84–85, 93–94, 434; “Shu Guomian,” in MGHQXZ, 260.
father-in-law and clansmen. By 1875, Shu Jinhe had won great wealth and fame.

In the 1870s, these three merchants of the Shu clan decided to organise a family corporation by merging their firms in response to Yunnan's increasing demand for resources. Shu Yuhou, Shu Jinhe, and Shu Chengyuan gathered a start-up fund of around 500,000 liang of silver, which included 400,000 liang from themselves and contributions from at least six small shareholders from their clan. Xingshenghe, the new corporation, was headquartered in Heqing and had branches in Xiaguan, Jianchang (now Xichang), Xufu, Funing, Jiading (now Leshan), Chengdu, Huili, and Dartsedo. Based in these regional commercial centres, Xingshenghe covered a broad region in Sichuan and western Yunnan.

In 1882, Xingshenghe moved its headquarters to Xiaguan, with a warehouse and new cotton shop known as Xingshenghe Huadian. Xiaguan's relocation facilitated Xingshenghe's expansion along Yunnan's trade routes with Burma. More branches were founded in Yongping, Jiuzhou (in Yunlong), Yongchang, Tengyue, Bhamo, Ava, Mandalay, and Rangoon. Xingshenghe exported silk to Burma, where its branches often acquired yarn, cotton, Indian satins, and a small number of daily necessities. Xingshenghe also purchased valuable items such as Burmese gold bars, Indian gold coins, silver coins, gems, deer antlers, silk, and ambergris. The goods from Burma were usually sold in Xiaguan, Heqing, Kunming, and Sichuan. While Xingshenghe's branches in Sichuan received most of the yarn coming from Burma, Sichuan's silk was highly prized in Burma, which prompted the firm to keep most of its turnover cash to acquire silk from Sichuan.

Thanks to its shareholders' networks, Xingshenghe's branches spread in nearby provinces and reached Shanghai, Hankou, and Hong Kong as well as other important ports along the Yangzi River and coastal cities in eastern and southern China. These branch locations enabled Xingshenghe to coordinate, transport, and distribute resources at a greater scale and flexibility. For

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85 “Minguo qishou qian Qing erpin fengzhi guoxuesheng shufujun xingshu (1923),” in SSZP, 494–95; SSZP, 88–89, 100, 432; “Shu Jinhe,” in MGHQXZ, 265.
87 SSZP, 435–36.
88 The existence of the modern sense of huadian, or flower shop, was rare in the late nineteenth-century Yunnan. The term huadian was very likely referring to a cotton shop due to the popularity of cotton trade and the precedent of Du Wenxiu’s Dachun huadian being a cotton shop. Nevertheless, the interpretation of huadian does not rule out the possibilities of a joss paper shop or a real flower shop.
instance, to avoid the dangerous roads between Jianchang (now Xichang) and Xiaguan, Xingshenghe often took a detour through southern Sichuan and northeastern Yunnan, where its branches in Yibin, Zhaotong, and Kunming relayed the goods to Xiaguan. To avoid long caravan trips across western Yunnan and Upper Burma, Xingshenghe would send Sichuan’s silk from Yibin to Chongqing, where the Shanghai Postal Service would carry the items to Rangoon by sea with water insurance. Increasing demands prompted Xingshenghe to organise a shipping company in Shanghai, which could process over 200,000 jin of silk and close to 100,000 packages of cotton yarn each year. Over the years, Xingshenghe grew into a transnational corporation with trading companies, factories, banks, and transportation services and with close associations with the caravans.

Xingshenghe’s commercial networks also expanded through the entrepreneurs from the Shu clan and their ties to other Yunnan merchants. First, the Shu clan produced many successful merchants in addition to Xingshenghe’s shareholders. Shu Chunjia (1845–?), for example, had been trading in Burma and other parts of Southeast Asia for more than a decade. His son Shu Yishou brought clocks, cameras, compasses, and all kinds of tools back from Southeast Asia and opened a jewellery and clock shop in Heqing. Shu Zengtai, the uncle of main shareholder Shu Yuhou, ran his own salt business. Second, Xingshenghe absorbed clan members and trained them to expand the firm or to organise their own, independent businesses. Main shareholder Shu Jinhe’s oldest son, Shu Liangfu, worked for Xingshenghe before he founded Hengyutong, which opened more than twenty branches, including two in Myitkyina and Mandalay. Shu Liangfu also founded the Merchant’s Society of Xiaguan and became its first president. Shareholder Shu Yuhou’s brother Shu Yude managed Xingshenghe’s branch in Heqing before he invested in the coal industry with his own firm, Yonghehao. One of the small shareholders was Shu Yude’s cousin Shu Yuxin, who traded in Kunming, Wuhan, and Guangzhou and managed Xingshenghe’s bank in Hong Kong. Later, he established Xielongxing in Jianchuan, focusing on the fabric and grocery business in northwestern Yunnan. The Shu clansmen also founded many other firms, including Shitong, Jinshunhe, Wenshunxiang, Yiqing Leather Factory, Yihexing, Dingxingtai, and Xiexinglong. These

90 SSZP, 436–37.
91 Ibid., 91, 104.
92 Ibid., 94.
93 Ibid., 118.
94 Ibid., 106.
95 Ibid., 107.
firms continued the transregional trade and brought modern machinery to Heqing’s textile industry. 96 Moreover, while the older generations of the Shu clansmen cooperated with other prominent firms to organise new businesses, younger generations often invested or served in other prominent Yunnan firms as well as in medicine shops such as Maoheng, Fuxiehe, Qingzhengyu, and Yongchangxiang. 97 Shu Haoran once invested in the Jiang family’s business Fuchunheng with two other merchants as shareholders. However, they withdrew after Li Genyuan obtained 20,000 liang as ransom from Jiang Zonghan’s second grandson. 98

Beginning in the 1880s, the opening of new trading ports, such as Mengzi, Simao, and Tengyue, and the construction of the Tonkin-Yunnan railway had boosted Yunnan’s commercialisation, industrialisation, and integration with the world. The changing environment exposed the Yunnan merchants to more risks and forced them to cooperate with traditional and new trade partners and allies with various measures. For instance, the Heqing merchants still relied on the caravans to traverse the complex terrain between western Yunnan and the neighbouring markets. Xingshenghe exclusively hired caravans from Yongbei (currently Yongsheng) that could employ close to one hundred mules per trip between Yunnan and Sichuan. 99 The Heqing corporations actively traded with the British factories within the Raj and made regular payments in gold, silver, and yellow silk. They increasingly depended on the banks and money lenders in Burma, as they received loans in Indian rupees to aid their competition against low-priced Japanese silk. However, the Heqing firms, including sixteen smaller businesses of the Shu clan, experienced a wave of bankruptcy in the 1920s due to the appreciation of the value of silver in Yunnan and the dramatic rise of interest rates. 100

Heqing merchants also saw benefits and setbacks from their ties with the military. Xingshenghe befriended Qing officer Zhu Hongzhang who was assigned to oversee Heqing and Lijiang in 1877. 101 The Shu family generously loaned Zhu money to build a canal. Later, Zhu obtained funds from the provincial government, cleared the debt, and deposited the rest of the money at Xingshenghe. Thus, Xingshenghe became the de facto government bank in Heqing and was authorised to collect tax payments

96 Ibid., 102–31.
97 Ibid., 122–23, 431–32.
101 Zhu would serve in Tengyue later and inadvertently killed Yuan Shan whom Cen Yuying assigned to aid Burma’s resistance after the Third Anglo-Burmese War (chapter 4).
and issue local currency. Nevertheless, military power could also pose dangers to Xingshenghe and other Yunnan firms, especially after the 1911 Revolution when the Yunnan warlords were eager to fund their expansion into southwestern and southern China. For instance, the Jiang family's Fuchunheng paid Li Genyuan ransom to prevent their business from being confiscated, and Xingshenghe's branch in Chongqing was forced to sponsor the Yunnan army's operation in Sichuan beginning in 1915. Therefore, Fuchuncheng's manager, Zhou Shouzheng, sought connections in the Yunnan provincial authority and military. He eventually held important government positions and won the trust of Lu Chongren, the financial expert who served both Yunnan governors Long Yun (r. 1927–1945) and Lu Han (r. 1945–1949). Jiang Zonghan's great-grandson pointed out that in addition to the threats from foreign businesses and domestic bureaucratic capital, Fuchunheng had suffered great loss due to its close association with the military and utilisation of military funds. Shu Ziyi, a family historian and local government official during the PRC era, concludes that in addition to Western imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism, as demonstrated by the Yunnan warlords' industrialisation and financial policies, largely caused the eventual downfall of his clan's businesses in the 1930s.

In a broader picture, the rise of the military-millionaires and civilian traders in Heqing after the 1870s echoed the thriving state of the Yunnan merchants in Xizhou, Dali, Kunming, and Lin'an. Many of these merchants actively engaged in the cross-border trade of silk, cotton, and fabrics;
however, they were also energised by the lucrative opium trade, a new booster of Yunnan’s economy. Opium had arrived in Yunnan from India in the 1820s, and by 1838, although illegal, opium cultivation had gained great popularity in the mountainous regions. In the spring of 1839, the government confiscated over 22,000 liang worth of opium from southern Yunnan. By 1840, it had become common for merchants from inner China to collaborate with gangs in Sichuan to create opium firms with armed guards in Yunnan. Gangs in Yunnan were also drawn to this profitable business. The government of Yunnan began collecting the likin tax from opium sales to fund the pacification of the Muslim rebels. In the late 1860s, Cen Yuying asked the court of Beijing to stop taxing Yunnan’s opium and allow him to keep the opium likin to relieve Yunnan’s financial hardship amid the warfare with the Dali Regime. Scholars in Yunnan argue that the collection of opium likin since the 1850s had legalised opium cultivation and increased Yunnan’s financial independence.

By 1890, opium represented a significant portion of China’s exports. Government officials in the opium-cultivating provinces, including Yunnan, had been giving false reports on the opium taxes and had been seizing opium revenue secretly. In 1897, Governor-General Songfan of Yun-Gui proposed increasing the opium likin. In the meantime, the scale of opium consumption had been growing at a stunning rate. In 1838, the Qing court historians recorded that the opium addicts accounted for 50–60 per cent of Yunnan’s urban population, among them government servants, intellectuals, military officers, merchants, and ordinary civilians. In 1886, Mr. Stevens, a clergyman from the China Inland Mission in Dali, reported, “It is estimated that 80% of the adult male population of that province [Yunnan] are opium smokers. Of the soldiers, 95% must smoke opium.” Furthermore, the cash revenue yielded by opium cultivation and consumption in Yunnan would

108 Li Gui, ed., Yunnan jindai jingjishi, 55.
114 Li Gui, ed., Jindai jingjishi, 55–56.
117 The British Library (BL), IOR/L/PS/7/47, External No. 148., 1296.
continue to flow into the opium market and the capitalist institutions and organisations in Southeast Asia.¹¹⁸

Yunnan's opium cultivation increased steadily during Governor Tang Jiyao's tenure (1913–1927) and spread across the mountains and lowlands from the 1920s to the 1940s. Southern and western Yunnan became prosperous opium hubs, and the Nuosu communities at the border of Sichuan and Yunnan abducted Han slaves to care for the labour-intensive opium fields.¹¹⁹ Assuming the position of Yunnan's governor after Cai E in 1913, Tang encouraged opium cultivation and taxation to fund the administrative and military budget despite the Beiyang and British governments' collaboration on an opium ban in 1916. The Yunnan army became notorious for transporting and selling opium to fund their campaigns. Yunnan's government officials and military leaders often invested in and collaborated with merchants in opium businesses. Prominent firms such Shunchenghao, Yongchangxiang, Fuchunheng, Maoheng, and Qingzhengyu led the opium trade in Yunnan and across nearby regions.¹²⁰ Beginning in 1922, Fuchunheng had been using all the silk payments received in Burma to purchase opium and transport them to Xiaguan to be further processed and sold in Sichuan and Hubei.¹²¹ Opium sustained not only Yunnan's currency but also the political independence of the Yunnan warlords as well as that of the warlords in Sichuan, Guizhou, Hunan, and Guangxi.¹²² Although governor Long Yun's economic reforms


¹²¹ Jiang Wanhua, "Fuchunheng de xinghuai," 88–89.

in the 1930s reduced Yunnan’s heavy reliance on opium, the provincial government’s monopoly on the opium trade did not cease. In the late 1930s, Sichuan warlord Liu Wenhui, who governed the newly established Xikang, and Long Yun, who was Nuosu, collaborated in the opium trade between Sichuan and Yunnan. At that point, the Long family had been controlling their homeland, Jinyang, in the Greater Liangshan Mountains in southwestern Sichuan as well as monopolising opium production and trade in cooperation with local Nuosu elites for close to a decade.

Yunnan’s commercial prosperity then was accompanied by banditry, violence, wars, and the militarisation of commercial parties. Caravans were equipped with pikes, axes, spears, and even muskets to deal with wild beasts and robbers who wanted opium. From 1938 to 1944, notable firms such as Yongchangxiang, Fuxiehe, Fuhegong, and Maoheng suffered robbery when caravans and trains carried their goods from Yunnan to Sichuan, Guizhou, and elsewhere. The robbers were often armed bands who were also very interested in yellow silk, tea, and cotton yarn. The Yunnan Provincial Police Department issued licences for the firms that applied for firearms for self-defence. In late 1940, Yongchangxiang obtained a licence to purchase five guns and fifty bullets with the guarantee of the merchant association of Kunming.

From the Hui oral records to government papers to the Han genealogies, various historical materials presented different frameworks to interpret modern Yunnan’s commercial development and social-economic life. At times contradictory, these sources and frameworks indicated a brutal past of wealth accumulation and business operation since the mid-nineteenth century. Behind the glory of Yunnan’s transnational business enterprises that

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were created by both military-merchants and civilian traders in the early twentieth century lay a thorny history of social and economic inequality that favoured military power as well as Han institutions and networks. Without a careful evaluation of the historical records that were created by different groups, with different intentions, the rise of the Yunnan merchants would appear to have been a smooth process, without the suffering and contradictions embedded in the neglected historical memory.

On the other hand, Hui collective memory and the conventional historical writings of the Yunnan gentry and officials had considerable discrepancies, especially in the documentation of the Hui elimination order and the handling of the rebels’ properties. Similar to the “genealogical amnesia” discussed earlier (chapter 1), historical amnesia appeared in the Han and some Confucian-educated non-Han gentry’s writings about the Hui rebels. Both phenomena demonstrated that the subjectivity and perspectives of these gentry had had a long-term and broad impact on the historiography of Yunnan. Drawing attention to the contradictory accounts on Dao Anren, the next chapter continues with the stories of historical amnesia, historical subjectivity, and the flawed narratives regarding the Tai cawfa.
Chapter 7 focuses on the reconstruction of Tai cawfa Dao Anren’s anti-British history in the late nineteenth century that had been initiated by local historians in Yunnan beginning in the 1980s. This chapter stresses that Dao's stories and the rewriting of his history would be less meaningful without examining other local elites' counter-British undertakings, which have been neglected by this reconstruction of Dao’s history.

Keywords: Tai; Dao Anren; Dao Yingting; Sino-Burmese border demarcation; border survey; Dao Anren nianpu

Dao Anren had exhausted his fortune to carry out bourgeois democratic revolution and develop bourgeois industry and agriculture. He had pawned all the lands from which he could collect official taxes [as a native official]. Back then, he had said that “official taxes were no longer needed if my undertakings have been accomplished.” Indeed, the feudal system of Ganya might have changed were his causes successful, and the society would have made a huge step forward. However, his venture failed, and he died. The land ownership on which the feudal lords relied for survival was also lost, eventually causing a big military disaster in Ganya in 1924. Hence, the conservative forces in Ganya cursed him as well. They considered Dao Anren “neither loyal nor filial.” They said that the title of tusi was given to his family by the emperor, but he was against the emperor, which was not loyal; and they said that he had pawned and sold all the lands and properties that had been guarded by over twenty generations of ancestors, which was disobedient and unfilial to his ancestors. Therefore, few people in Yingjiang knew of Dao Anren's endeavours.¹

Dao Anren (1872–1913) was the twenty-second generation of the native officials of Ganya, also known as Gan’ai (Yunnanese dialect), Ganyai, or Kanai, was a Tai polity to the south of Tengyue also known as Gan’ai (Yunnanese dialect), Ganyai, or Kanai. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, caravans frequently took Ganya as a shortcut to travel to Bhamo. Dao went to Japan to study in 1906 and joined the revolutionary party Tongmenghui. In late October 1911, he participated in the Tengyue uprising to overthrow the Qing government. In the spring of 1912, he was arrested in Nanjing for a series of crimes, including blackmailing local native officials, inciting the native officials to support his independence, rebelling against the Han, and attempting to eliminate the Han. Dao was transferred to a prison in Beijing and died in a German hospital in the early spring of 1913. The local historical documents created during the early ROC era largely portrayed Dao as a separatist who was involved in open rebellions against the Han. In 1924, Dao’s second son led another revolt in Ganya and Nongzhang. Hence, the precedent of Dao’s rebellion and this new revolt justified the perception that Tai cawfas in western Yunnan were “traitors and separatists,” which became a popular label for the Chinese media to employ in the late 1940s. In 1984, local historians and officials in the PRC’s Dehong Dai Ethnic Autonomous Prefecture published a booklet named Dao Anren nianpu (Chronicles of Dao Anren). One of the authors, Dao Anlu, of Dai (Tai)

2 Ibid., 5; Li Genyuan and Liu Chuxiang, Minguo Tengchong xianzhigao (MGTCXZ), 47, 87.
4 DARNP, 90.
6 MGTCXZG, 70.
8 This chapter follows the context of the sources that have been created during the PRC era and adopts the current Chinese official terms in referring to the ethnic classification and ethnic autonomous administrative units.
ethnicity, had been collecting sources about Dao Anren and interviewing people in Yingjiang, Kunming, and Beijing. He intended to rewrite the history of Dao Anren and restore the cawfa’s reputation.⁹ In the early 1980s, Dao Anlu cooperated with Yang Yongsheng, a Bai (Minjia) from Jianchuan who became a government official in Dehong, to compile *Dao Anren nianpu*. The two authors intended to seek a just recognition of Dao Anren’s historical contribution and “to restore the true face of history and correctly demonstrate the great achievement that all ethnic people in the borderlands have achieved in protecting the sacred territory of [our] home country and in overthrowing the feudal monarchy.”¹⁰

According to Dao Anlu and Yang Yongsheng, the book project had received support from a wide range of government officials and scholars. Zhang Tianfang (1893–1984), a Tengyue-born PRC official who participated in the Tengyue uprising, wrote a memorial for Dao Anren in 1981. Cao Chengzhang, an ethnologist and expert on Tai studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, joined the scholars at the Yunnan Provincial Museum and Wen-shiguan (Research Institute of Literature and History) to offer critiques of the book manuscript. A year after the publication of *Dao Anren nianpu*, Cao published a journal article on the same matter. Hence, the *nianpu*, and the works of Zhang and Cao, laid the foundation of the ongoing historiography that recognises Dao Anren as the defender of China’s territory, a great revolutionary, and a faithful disciple of Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of China’s Republic.¹¹ This new discourse has not yet completely overwritten the previous narratives on Dao Anren; however, it has successfully influenced the records found in some PRC local gazetteers and internet sources for historical literacy.¹² More importantly, this narrative contributes to the historiography that emphasises ethnic groups’ collaboration in China’s nationalistic revolution and frontier defence and construction.¹³

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⁹ “The Foreword” and “The Afterword,” in *DARNP*, 3, 125.
¹⁰ “The Foreword,” Ibid., 3 (my own translation).
¹³ In 2010, Cao Chengzhang published a monograph titled *Minzhu geming xianqu Dao Anren* (Dao Anren: The Pioneer of the Democratic Revolution), with elaborated details to develop the
Simply put, Dao Anren had been a traitor and separatist during the early ROC era but a patriot and national hero in current historiography. The reconstructed history of Dao since the 1980s challenges the ignorance and biases against him and the native officials in the traditional historiography of Yunnan. However, having been driven by strong prejudice and hindered by limited sources, both interpretations could not provide a dynamic picture of the borderlands’ development and struggles that involved the native officials and nonethnic elites. Therefore, this chapter compares the reconstructed history of Dao Anren, which emphasises Dao’s leading role in indigenous operations against British imperialism, with the British archival sources and the local historical documents created before 1949.

In addition to the Han gentry, the native officials were also crucial for the Chinese state to indirectly govern its multi-ethnic borderlands and to respond to foreign threats. In the transitional decades from the Qing Empire to the Republic of China, a wide array of native officials and Han elites in western Yunnan actively engaged in border affairs. They formed complicated relationships with the Qing officials, both cooperative and confrontational, to protect their homeland and state territory. To seek autonomy, industrialisation, and prosperity, they would make alliances with new, emerging political forces, such as the Tongmenghui, incorporating their visions of homeland development into larger discourses of nationalism and revolutions (next chapter). However, heavily relying on the post-1949 oral interviews and biased pre-1949 historical documents, the reconstruction main arguments that he had made in 1985. Cao’s book, however, has been challenged by Zeng Yeying, a Chinese historian and expert on the 1911 Revolution, who published two journal articles to debunk some perpetuated myths and false arguments in Cao’s book. Zeng attempted to challenge the conventional historiography of Dao’s role in the Tengyue uprising that had emerged since the 1980s. Zeng questioned many very specific details in Cao’s book, like whether Dao or other revolutionary leaders sent certain telegraphs or contacted the Tongmenghui branch in Burma; whether Dao involved in Dao Shangda’s rebellion; and whether Sun Yat-sen had rescued Dao when the cawfa was imprisoned, a commonly recognised “fact” in the literature about Anren. Overall, Zeng Yeying believes that with the intention of praising Dao, Cao had neglected and even distorted historical facts, giving credit to Dao for what had been contributed and accomplished by other revolutionary leaders in Yunnan. Zeng’s articles and arguments have not received much attention so far. In fact, there have not been enough new academic conversations on this topic in China, and the Western world has paid little attention to the subject. In a non-academic essay on Dao written in 2020, the author still adopts some traditional narratives and arguments. See Zeng Yeying’s two articles: “Daizu Tongmenghuiyuan Dao Anren ‘meng bubai zhiyuan’ ma?” Jindaishi yanjiu, no. 2 (2015): 92–114 and “Sun Zhongshan, Huangxing ‘yingjiu’ guo Dao Anren ma? jianping Cao Chengzhang zhu minzhu gemin xianqu Dao Anren,” Dangdai Zhongguoshi yanjiu, no. 1 (2016): 138–53; Nie Zuoping, “Dao Anren: ‘biansai weinan’ de diedang renshe,” Tongzhou gongji, issue no. 12 (2020): 51–56.
of Dao Anren’s history demonstrates flawed and even distorted narratives that exaggerated Dao’s contribution and neglected that of other native officials and local gentry.

**Border Defence and Negotiations after the Third Anglo-Burmese War**

Listen! The cries of the wicked wolves, from the land beyond the border, through the mountains and rivers.  
Behold! The rolling smoke from the alien land in the south.  
The noise that shakes one’s bosom.  
The haughtiness that was filled with the reek of blood.  
The unjustified provoking,  
The harmful greed,  
Brothers and sisters, who are diligent and brave,  
How can we relinquish our sovereign?  
......  
Elders and brothers led by each native official,  
Sharpen the blades of your yellow bronze knives and tuck them in your waists.  
Hold fast your axes and hammers.  
We are heading to the battlefields, slaughtering the fierce and the unruled.  
Remember, firmly, today’s date,  
This is the eleventh year of Guangxu [1885], the war to counterattack the English [the Third Anglo-Burmese War].

Since the early 1880s, King Thibaw of Burma had adopted foreign policies to challenge British dominance and seek other European allies. In the summer of 1885, French consul Mr. Haas and the Burmese court signed some commercial agreements, which would allow the French government to fund a bank in Mandalay and construct a railway from Mandalay to the British frontier of Toungoo. Hence, the British feared that increasing French interference in Burma’s economy would pose serious threats to Britain’s interests and position in Burma and India. G. D. Burgess, secretary to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma pointed out that the Franco-Burmese

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15 The British Library (BL): IOR/L/PS/7/45, Sec. No. 143, 213, 221.
agreements would enable France and its agents to control the trade along the Irrawaddy River and between Upper Burma and western China, even over the only railway line in the region. Thus, King Thibaw’s continual submission to French influence inevitably led to Britain’s annexation of Upper Burma, along with mounted disputes between Burma and Britain along the border of Manipur.\textsuperscript{16} In certain ways, Haas’s arrival in Mandalay and his plots had become “the direct and chief cause” of the annexation.\textsuperscript{17}

Li Genyuan and Liu Chuxiang noticed that Britain reaped the fruit of the Third Anglo-Burmese War while China and France confronted each other in Vietnam. The Anglo-French rivalry also continued as the British annexed a tributary at China’s own insistence (Burma) and a potential puppet government of France.\textsuperscript{18} Dao Anren \textit{nianpu} recorded that in 1886, a Burmese prince and some cawfas had escaped to Ganya for refuge and brought two elephants as presents.\textsuperscript{19} Governor-General Cen Yuying ordered the native officials at the border to accommodate these Burmese loyalists who later went back frequently to counter the British.\textsuperscript{20} According to the \textit{nianpu}, Dao Anren’s father, Dao Yingting, spared a quarter from his residence to host these guests. The prince brought a dancing girl named Majing who befriended the teenaged Dao Anren. Majing’s deep grief at the fall of her country moved Dao Anren and “inspired him to contemplate many questions” as Ganya had been disturbed by foreign expansion and internal rebellions.\textsuperscript{21}

Later, Dao Anren expressed strong antipathy toward British imperialism and its conquest of Ava in his long poem “Kangyingji” (Records of Resisting the British), which was translated into simplified Chinese and published in 1985. Dao wrote about his confrontations with the British invaders in the poem. The \textit{nianpu} also emphasised Dao’s essential role in deterring the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[16] Ib id., 212, 217; India Army Intelligence Branch, \textit{Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India} (Simla: Government Monotype Press, 1907), vol. 5: 113, 114–16.
\item[17] India Army Intelligence Branch, \textit{Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India}, vol. 5: 116.
\item[18] MGTCXZG, 47.
\item[19] DARNP, 8–9.
\item[20] Dao Anren \textit{nianpu} indicates that Saw Yan Baing took refuge in Ganya as early as 1886 after the fall of Burma. Ibid. Other sources suggest that he fled to Ganya or western Yunnan in 1890 or 1900. James George Scott identified that Chaunwa princes Saw Yan Naing and Saw Yan Baing, grandchildren of Prince Metkaya (killed by King Thibaw in 1879), fled into China. James George Scott, \textit{Burma from the Earliest Times to the Present Day} (T. F. Unwin Limited, 1924), 336; MGTCXZG, 46; Li Genyuan, “Xuesheng nianlu” (XSNL), in \textit{Zhengxuexi yu Li Genyuan}, ed. by Cuncui xueshe (Hongkong: Dadong tushu gongsi, 1980), 37–38. India Army Intelligence Branch, \textit{Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India}, vol. 5: 382–85, 192.
\item[21] DARNP, 8–9.
\end{footnotes}
British and accredited him as the leader of multiple counter-British operations. Dao's involvement in the battle of Pengan (or Ponkan) is among many examples represented in the nianpu, which have been recorded differently in British archival sources and in Yunnan’s local historical documents that were created before 1949. Overall, Dao and his fellow native officials in the nianpu were more active and responsible than the Qing officials and local gentry in border defence.

The nianpu often vaguely cites the pre-1949 local gazetteers and historical records, such as Yongchangfu wenzheng (Literature of the Yongchang Prefect). Compiled in 1941 by Liu Chuxiang, a Tengyue gentry and politician, and Li Genyuan, Yongchangfu wenzheng focused more on the history of the local gentry than the native officials. Li was seven years old when Burma was annexed by Britain. 22 Within a decade, he sought the guidance of famous Confucian masters, such as Du Zitao and Zhao Huilou, who surrounded him with a vast intellectual and elite network of students, colleagues, gentry, and officials. 23 Li’s father assisted the Qing government in surveying the borderlands and locating the Ming fortresses that used to mark the imperial boundary. Li later protested the construction of the Tonkin-Yunnan railway and Yunnan’s loss of mining rights in 1903. He went to a Japanese military academy called Tokyo Shinbu Gakkō in 1904 along with Yunnan’s future political and military leaders Tang Jiyao, Gu Pinzheng, Liu Zuwu, Xie Rulin, and Yu Enci. In 1906, Li joined the Tongmenghui as one of the first thirty-seven members of the party in Japan. He was the chief editor of Yunnan zazhi (Yunnan Miscellany). He also pushed the impeachment of Governor-General Ding Zhengduo of Yun-Gui, who was replaced by Cen Chunxuan, the son of Cen Yuying. 24

In the 1930s and 1940s, in addition to compiling his family and clan genealogies, 25 Li Genyuan became an editor of several local gazetteers,

22 XSNL, 37.
23 Du Zitao came to Tengyue with Zou Xinlan who was appointed to be the Prefect of Yongchang. Ibid., 40. Among Zhao Huilou’s students were Zhang Chenglian and Li Xueshi. Li Genyuan and Liu Chuxiang, ed., Yongchangfu wenzheng (YCFWZ) (Kunming: Yunnan meishu chubanshe, 2001), vol. 3: 2662.
25 In addition to Dieshuihe Lishi jiapu (Genealogy of the Li Family by the Dieshui River), Li Genyuan joined Li Xueshi, his cousin and a leader of the Tengyue uprising, to compile the Li clan genealogy in 1930. The Li clan genealogy, namely Tengchong Qingqi Lishi zongpu (Genealogy of the Li Clan of Qingqi, Tengchong), included Li Genyuan’s own family genealogy, Dieshuihe
including *Techong xianzhigao* (Gazetteer of Tengchong County, 1941), *Yongchangfu wenzheng*, and *Xinzuan Yunnan tongzhi* (New Extended Comprehensive Gazetteer of Yunnan, 1932). Along with other private papers and documents, these sources had provided the foundation of the historiography of Yunnan since the early ROC era. However, like most previous historical documents, these gazetteers had presented the history and societies of the non-Han people from an imperial gaze that was imbued with Han ethnocentrism. More records in these gazetteers focused on the local gentry and scholars’ contribution, struggles, and artistic accomplishments in the Han and Confucian social and cultural discourses. Limited attention was given to non-Han elites except when they had considerable political impact or demonstrated high prestige in Confucian learning and scholarship. A well-known person that fit these conditions was the Cizhu native officer Zuo Xiaochen, whose death in the confrontations with the British army in 1900 resulted in prolonged border disputes and diplomatic exchanges between China and Britain. Nevertheless, the separate but interrelated narratives of the native officials and local gentry demonstrate their shared duty to guard China’s territory as well as their own inherited land. While the native officials confronted the British invaders directly, Han gentry and intellectuals gathered intelligence and assisted the state government with border surveys, mapping, and demarcation.

A few incidents in Upper Burma indicated that the Yunnan military leaders had involved themselves in the efforts to deter the British before the annexation of Burma. In late 1884, a force of over 2,000 men led by Jin Guoyu temporarily occupied Bhamo. According to *Techong xianzhigao* (1941), Jin was a subordinate of Qing army commander Yuan Shan, who had just pacified the revolts in Zhanda in late 1884. Jin was angry about the British aggression in Burma, and he claimed to have received an order by Yuan to occupy Bhamo. However, the merchants in Bhamo feared Jin’s unruly band and petitioned the Qing government to pacify him. Li Zhenguo was assigned to this task. Conversely, *Tengyue tingzhi* (1887), from which Li Genyuan and Liu Chuxiang referenced *Techong xianzhigao*, had identified Jin as a drifting bandit. The 1887 edition indicated that in late 1884, Jin’s force in Bhamo and the rebels in Zhanda cawfa’s dominion were supportive of each

*Lishi jiapu*, as a significant part of its content. See Li Xueshi and Li Genyuan, *Tengchong Qingqi Lishi zongpu* (microfilm), 1930.

26 MGTCXZG, 55–56.

27 BL, IOR/L/PS/7/65, Sec. No. 37., Minute by the Chief Commissioner of Burma, 2 (or 828); MGTCXZG, 45.

28 MGTCXZG, 45.
other. Yuan Shan was incapable of pacifying those insurgents, who almost caused a big disaster in the border region.²⁹

More signs showed that the government of Yunnan had taken active defence and counter-British measures beginning in late 1885. In early December 1885, the Qing authorities in Tengyue and Mangyun had sent officer Li Wenxiu and officer Yin to the border to watch the movements of the British army. By the end of the month, the British had informed these two officers of a lack of interest in invading Yunnan.³⁰ Cen Yuying had dispatched Ding Huai, who had fought in Vietnam, to Tengyue in early 1886 to strengthen the border defence.³¹ Mr. Stevens, a member of the China Inland Mission, travelled between Dali to Bhamo in late 1885. In April 1886, he reported that Commander Zhu Hongzhang remained in Tengyue with 500 men. Li Zhenguo's nephew was stationed in Mangyun with an alleged 200 troops, but perhaps no more than 150. However, most of these troops were gamblers and opium smokers. Ding Huai had led 2,000 troops to Ganya.³² Local gazetteers in Tengchong indicated that Ding Huai's border defence measures required considerable supplies and taxes from the native officials in Tengyue area.³³ Around June 1886, Major Cooke, the deputy commissioner at Bhamo, warned that the Chinese troops had been stationed as far as Manmo (Myne-mow) and that Cen Yuying intended to assault the British at the end of the rainy season. In fact, the late Burmese governor of Bhamo had attempted to seek Yunnan's military aid and invited Governor Cen to Bhamo to accept his surrender. Cooke also observed that “one or more of the Burmese-Shan Chiefs near the Irrawaddy [Wun Tho and Momeit] are making or have made advances and offers of co-operation to be the Viceroy of Yunnan.” By late June, multiple locations on the eastern side of the Kachin Hills had seen the establishment of Chinese outposts.³⁴

Cen Yuying had earlier assigned Commander Yuan Shan to lead a secret mission to infiltrate Burma and fight against the British. However, this operation had failed when Yuan was accidently killed by Zhu Hongzhang (chapter 4).³⁵ After Yuan's death, officer Li Wenxiu proceeded to Burma. Mr. Stevens heard rumours that Li Wenxiu was Du Wenxiu's nephew and was

²⁹ Chen Zonghai and Zhao Duanli, Tengyue tingzhi (TYTZ, 1887), vol. 11, wubeizhi 4, rongshi, 15.
³¹ Cen Yuying, Cen Yuying zougao (CYYZG) (Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1989), vol. 2: 796; MGTCXZG, 47.
³² BL, IOR/L/PS/7/47, External No. 148., 1295.
³⁴ BL, IOR/L/PS/7/47, External No. 148., 1297, 1310, 1315.
³⁵ MGTCXZG, 47. Chapter 4 has more details.
countering the British in Burma.\textsuperscript{36} In the spring of 1886, Li Wenxiu died in a battle in Mogaung. Over 500 of his men had lost their lives throughout the operations in Burma. The rest of his troops, numbering around 400, went to Zhanxi (Sansi) and were led back to Tengyue by Li Genyuan’s father, Li Damao.\textsuperscript{37} However, Cen reported to Beijing that rebellious army officer Li Wenxiu had been killed by the Kachin men as he entered Burma without Cen’s authorisation.\textsuperscript{38}

Moreover, Cen Yuying had appointed an agent named Zhang Chenglian to collect intelligence in Bhamo, especially after the Third-Anglo Burmese War.\textsuperscript{39} Zhang was native to Heshun but had spent many years in Burma since childhood with his Chinese father and Burmese mother. He received a \textit{juren} degree in 1879 and was highly accomplished in researching local history and geography. In the mid-1880s, Zhang went back to Yunnan again to take the imperial examination. However, the Tengyue Magistrate persuaded him to serve the Yunnan government as an agent in Burma, who was later identified by the British documents as Mr. Chang (another way to spell Zhang).\textsuperscript{40} In August 1887, British political officer W. Warry reported from Bhamo that “the Chinese have taken efficient steps to secure the earliest and fullest information of everything that takes place beyond their border.” Moreover, Governor Cen Yuying’s agent at Bhamo had been diligently sending reports to Tengyue every two weeks and was instructed to exert efforts to obtain and report intelligence of all kinds.\textsuperscript{41}

However, the borderlands communities did not all appreciate the arrival of the Qing troops. Local gazetteers and the \textit{nianpu} indicated that the Qing border defence forces and government officials were notorious for causing financial stress and oppressing civilians. In the early spring of

\textsuperscript{36} BL, IOR/L/PS/7/47, External No. 148., 1296. Li Genyuan noted that Li Wenxiu was from Baoshan (Yongchang); however, they did not seem related. XSNL, 38.

\textsuperscript{37} MGTCXZG, 47.

\textsuperscript{38} CYYZG, vol. 2: 814.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 794–96.


\textsuperscript{41} BL, IOR/L/PS/7/65, Sec. No. 37., 830.
1886, Commander Ding Huai and Tengyue’s subprefect Chen Zonghai interfered with the native officials’ power succession in Zhanda and executed over one hundred people to pacify the consequent rebellions. Tengyue yanbian tushuo (Illustrated Records about the Tengyue Border Region), an old archival source that was accredited to Huang Maocai, related that Ding’s defence battalion had extracted supplies from the native officials. Subprefect Chen’s son remembered that the Qing authorities did not interfere but covered up the tyranny of the defence battalion, such as assaulting the civilians and raping the women in Ganya. As a result, many people escaped to the Kachin Hills and Bhamo. The nianpu largely portrayed Ding as an eccentric, ruthless, greedy, and manipulative officer who often blackmailed the native officials. His forceful strategies and coercive manner strained his relationships with the native officials and aggravated local antipathy toward the Qing government. Therefore, according to the nianpu, it was unsurprising that the native officials’ dissatisfaction had grown when they had to confront the British troops directly to protect the imperial territory and oppose the Qing-British border survey and demarcation commissions.

In fact, the Qing government officials and the local elites in Yunnan all demonstrated a considerable level of confusion in the Sino-Burmese border negotiation and demarcation of the late 1880s. Different conceptualisations of the traditional Sino-Burmese boundary and the boundary markers were intertwined with the state powers’ and local elites’ desires for territorial expansion or defence. With unclear geographic knowledge, the Qing officials quarrelled with the British over their trespasses into China’s territory and their mistakes when drawing boundary lines. Aiming to maximise their control in Upper Burma, the British pushed the terms of border agreements signed with China. In this process, local elites, both Han and non-Han, criticised the inept Qing government. The native officials especially grieved.

43 Guangxi-born Yunnanese scholar Huang Chengyuan included “Tengyue yanbian tushuo” in his Diannan jiewu chendu (Past Memorials on Southern Yunnan’s Border Affairs). Yongchangfu wenzheng suspected that Huang Maocai travelled to Yunnan and recorded the events that occurred in 1889. YCFWZ, vol. 4: 3634.
44 Huang Maocai, “Tengyue yanbian tushuo,” 3631.
45 DARNP, 9–11.
46 Back in 1874, Commander Yang Yuke detained Dao Yingting, father of Dao Anren, for failing to counter the Muslim rebels. The Qing troops later arrested and executed the Kachin men to settle the Margary incident. Ibid., 2.
that their lands of inheritance were arbitrarily ceded to Britain by the Qing government. These elites’ vision of the state and local (their homeland’s) territoriality seemed somewhat detached from the visions of the Qing and British diplomats, who mainly relied on diplomatic negotiation to mesh the frontier space with their ideal paradigms of the borderlands’ construction.⁴⁷ Therefore, when the diplomats debated and battled against each other’s dominance across Upper Burma and western Yunnan, this region was incorporated into the imperial competitions, and, consequently, into the contest between the state and local actors.

The border demarcation with China was inevitable after Britain established its sole suzerainty in Burma. The Qing government relied on the Han gentry and, sometimes, the native officials to assist with the border surveys and demarcation. In 1894, W. Warry, then the chief secretary to the chief commissioner of Burma, reported that Peng Jizhi, the Chinese member of the Qing-British joint border survey commission, “lost no opportunity ... of giving sound advice to the Chinese and Chinese-Shans with whom he was brought into contact.” It seemed to Warry that most of Peng’s audience was “totally ignorant of the relations between England and China, and the greatest surprise was everywhere shown at representatives of the two countries being found in company.”⁴⁸ However, instances showed that the native officials had attempted to interfere with the state border survey and negotiation as soon as they became aware of the situation. Their subsequent confrontations with the British army also demonstrated that the native officials were not all ignorant and that their loyalty and obedience to the Qing government could be contingent. To protect their own territory, the native officials could challenge Qing sovereignty and defy the state order and international treaties. As a result, their skirmishes with the British army were not necessarily a result of their ignorance of Qing-British relations and border negotiations but a conscious choice of self-defence when state protection had failed.

Before the Third Anglo-Burmese War, the British Indian government had begun inquiring about China’s attitude toward a potential annexation of Burma. In July 1885, G. D. Burgess proposed that Britain should

⁴⁷ Bussche points out that both the Qing and Britain employed the same strategy to construct their paradigms of territorial sovereignty and space based on maps, surveys, gazetteers, and international law. These two paradigms emerged in their negotiations and further reconciled to the reality in the borderlands. Eric Vaden Bussche, Contested Realms: Colonial Rivalry, Border Demarcation, and State-Building in Southwest China, 1885–1960, Ph.D. Dissertation (Stanford: Stanford University, 2014), 18.
⁴⁸ BL, IOR/L/PS/7/73, Sec. No. 25, 642.
appease China’s opposition by letting the old overlord “occupy and keep Bhamo, with a suitable slice of territory on the left bank of the Irrawaddy River.” This strategy, according to Burgess, could potentially create an alliance with China and benefit the future consolidation of Burma. However, the Zongli yamen “had said nothing” on the matter until late October 1885 when the Qing ambassador Zeng Jize in London also enquired after the matter. Zeng indicated that as the overlord, the Qing government was willing to send officials to Burma to mediate the disputes between its tributary and Britain. Nevertheless, the British government proceeded with the plan of “punishing” King Thibaw first and discussing “the legitimate rights of China” later.

After the Third Anglo-Burmese War, Britain made a serious effort to investigate the status quo of the Sino-Burmese relations. Colonel Sladen, who had once travelled to Yunnan in the late 1860s, reported that despite China’s frequent demands, Burma had never sent any tribute to Beijing, except for exchanging small presents between the two countries every ten years. In fact, Sladen stressed that his trustworthy sources in Burma had convinced him that “Burma has never been tributary to China” or “is not, and has not, for one hundred years, been tributary to China.” Li Genyuan and Liu Chuxiang later pointed out that from the 1860s to the 1880s, China had given up all its suzerainty in Burma when the British established a residence in Rangoon and when Burma secretly signed agreements with France. Further, these investigations and reports triggered debates among the British officials and laid the foundation for the Foreign Office to formulate its policies. In their consequent negotiations in 1886, the Qing and British governments competed over their rights in Upper Burma in conjunction with the French influence in the Indochina Peninsula. The status of Bhamo, the east bank of the Irrawaddy River, and the Shan states became the centre of the bargain.

Nevertheless, through its communications with Ambassador Zeng Jize, Robert Hart, and Halliday Macartney (the English secretary to the Chinese legation in London), the British government realised it had underestimated the Qing government’s reaction. China still insisted on its suzerainty over Burma and on the regular tribute that Burma was obliged to send to

49 BL, IOR/L/PS/7/45, Sec. No. 143., 219.
50 BL, IOR/L/PS/18/B34/1., 1–3.
51 BL, IOR/L/PS/7/46, Sec. No. 23., 421, 424.
52 Ibid., 421–22.
53 MGTCXZG, 47.
54 BL, IOR/L/PS/20/MEMO27/2, 3–10.
Beijing.\textsuperscript{55} In response, the British Foreign Office counteroffered that Burma could regularly provide ritualistic presents. Further, Britain was willing to let China establish its sphere of protection in an area from the east bank of the Lu River (or the Salween) in Upper Burma to the lower Mekong, as well as from Yunnan’s southern border to the northern Siamese border. Sensing what China could gain by enclosing Laos and the Shan states as its protectorates under this plan, Zeng Jize pushed to seize Bhamo and extend China’s control to the Irrawaddy River. Britain thus suggested that China could take Old Bhamo, a city eastward of Bhamo, which would also promise rich trade revenue. Therefore, Britain and China could share the Irrawaddy River as a boundary and divide the profits yielded in Upper Burma.\textsuperscript{56} The Qing official and diplomat Xue Fucheng (1838–1894) later pointed out that Britain’s reconciliation came from a careful calculation of the cost of fully consolidating the new frontier. The indigenous revolts, Chinese interference, and unceasing investment of manpower and money would bring Britain tremendous difficulties in administration, especially the pacification of social unrest. Therefore, behind Britain’s “courtesy” of dividing Upper Burma with China was a strategy to calm China’s protest by allowing its territorial expansion into some previously untamed areas.\textsuperscript{57}

With some assurance over the negotiation, Zeng Jize passed the duties to his replacement, Liu Ruifen.\textsuperscript{58} In June 1886, China and Britain signed a convention to recognise Britain’s occupation of Burma, Burma’s obligation to send presents to China, and the needs of future border surveys and demarcation. The British considered this convention a neutralization of the Yunnan-Burma frontier in the name of free trade that was protected and encouraged by both states.\textsuperscript{59} Seven years later, Xue Fucheng complained that in 1886 both countries recorded only vague terms of border demarcation, and neither put their words into practice.\textsuperscript{60} Li Genyuan and Liu Chuxiang also criticised the fact that, since these agreements were never implemented, Britain had gained momentum when China recognised its suzerainty in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{55} More details see BL, IOR/L/PS/18/B34/1, 9–19.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Xue Fucheng, \textit{Dianmian huajie tushuo} (Taipei: Chengwen Publishing Co. Ltd, 1974), 1–2. The same content had also been abridged in \textit{Tengchong xianzhigao} (1941); MGTCXZG, 47.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 1, 9.
\item \textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 2
\item \textsuperscript{59} See Ch’ing Dynasty and ROC Treaties and Agreements Preserved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (MOFA), 910000015–002, “The Convention relative to Burma and Thibet between China and Great Britain.” Also, India Army Intelligence Branch, \textit{Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India}, vol. 5: 467–68.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Xue Fucheng, \textit{Dianmian huajie tushuo}, 3.
\end{itemize}
Burma, whereas China merely received empty promises of receiving tribute from Burma. 61 Indeed, without codifying China's interest in Old Bhamo and the east bank of Irrawaddy, 62 the British border surveys and military advancements in the 1890s would begin eliminating the buffer zone that used to exist between Qing and Burma. China's claim of territorial control in Upper Burma would begin when the British Indian Army later marched into the Kachin Hills and the Shan states. These operations and consequent clashes between the British troops and local population forced the Qing government to clarify its inaccurate geographic knowledge and controversial jurisdiction over the alleged imperial territory.

More border negotiations occurred in the 1890s, as Xue Fucheng intended to deter British encroachment on the Burma-Yunnan borderlands and expand Qing territory in the same area. 63 Xue searched through some dusty documents in the Chinese Legation in London and found out more about China's “lost rights.” In his memo to Beijing, Xue subtly criticised Zeng Jize's ambiguous arguments, hesitations, and soft stance, which cost China the opportunity to expand their territory. 64 He realised that the east bank of the Irrawaddy River that Britain had been willing to concede four years ago could cushion Yunnan from direct British exploitation as the latter prepared to build a railway to Yunnan. 65 However, Xue believed that the inaccurate Chinese sources on the geography of the Burma-Yunnan border region and his reliance on the British maps had hindered his bargain with Britain. 66 He decided to conduct a survey of this border region and entrusted the mission to Yao Wendong (1853–1929), a diplomat who had served in Japan, Germany, and Russia. 67 In contrast, the British had already mapped Bhamo and the area leading to Tengyue more than fifty years ago. They considered the Chinese maps and measurements problematic, with

61 MGTCXZG, 48.
62 Ibid., 47–48. From the angle of international relations, Eric Bussche has specifically addressed the Sino-British border negotiation conducted by Xue Fucheng. Eric Vanden Bussche, Contested Realms. This chapter addresses the same subject, however, by focusing on the participation and attitude of the local elites in the corresponding border surveys and demarcations.
63 Bussche argues that “Xue Fucheng’s insistence on resolving the Sino-Burmese border dispute rested on two concerns: first, that the increase in British surveying and mapping activities since the signing of the Burma Convention of 1886 threatened further encroachment on Yunnan; second, that border demarcation was an opportunity for colonial expansion.” See Bussche, Contested Realms, 34.
64 Xue Fucheng, Dianmian huajie tushuo, 8–9.
65 Ibid., 1–3, 24.
67 “Yungui zongdu pian,” in Yao Wendong, kanjie choubianji, 1, 3.
outdated geographic knowledge. In the later border demarcation in 1897, they would continue to complain that the “Chinese Commissioners seem to have no maps of any importance and to be very ignorant of the country.”

Surveying the Yunnan Borderlands

Before Yao Wendong had set off for Yunnan, the British Indian government had organised a mission to explore Burma’s vast border with China, or the trans-Salween region. The mission aimed to collect intelligence about those Shan states that were directly or indirectly loyal to China. Yao contacted Zhang Chenglian, the Yunnan government’s agent in Burma, and instructed Zhang to collect intelligence about the British mission. In late 1890, Zhang assigned the task to his own brother, Zhang Chengyu, and his cousin, Zhang Dexin. They posed as porters and accompanied the British on two survey routes through the Kachin Hills and toward Xishuangbanna. To avoid suspicion, they documented the trip in Burmese and then translated their journals into Chinese. They also incited the natives to obstruct the British movements. Yao later combined these reports into one document, called Zhentanji (Scouting Journal).

Zhang Dexin and the survey mission left Bhamo on December 19, 1890, with over seventy Gurkha troops and a caravan run by an exiled Hui rebel from Yunnan. In January 1891, the mission came across the paths leading to Guyong and Xidong (Sadon, now in Burma). Zhang persuaded the British not to enter the Qing territory, especially Sadon, where thousands of troops were found to be under the command of the native official of Zhanxi and the Qing army. He also encouraged the Hui caravanners and some Kachin headmen to stop the British. After a few more local obstructions in the

68 Bussche, Contested Realms, 55–56.
70 “Zhentanji,” and “Foreword for Zhentanji,” in Yao Wendong, kanjie choubianji, 229–30, 307, 310; “Zhang Chenglian,” in Qingdai difang renwu zhuanji congkan, ed. Jiang Qingbo (Yangzhou: Guangling shushe, 2007), vol.10: 669. Zhang Dexin’s journal was also known as Da Jinshajiang shangyou xingji (Travelogue along the Da Jinshajiang) whereas Zhang Chengyu’s journal was known as Luijiang xiayou yidong zhi Jiulongjiang xingji (Journals Travelling from the Lower Luijiang to Jiulongjiang). Both journals were included in Yongchangfu wenzheng. YCFWZ, vol. 4: 3665. Li Yi had a brief account on the Zhang family’s espionage activities. Li Yi, Chinese in Colonial Burma, 39–42.
71 BL, IOR/L/PS/7/62, Sec. No. 22., 577; “Zhentanji,” 232.
Kachin Hills during February and March, Zhang instructed the Kachin men to convince the British not to go to Sima (Xima in the Chinese documents). Zhang Chenglian later left his post in Burma and accompanied Yao Wendong to explore the borderlands until they reached Kunming. In the spring of 1891, Yao arrived in Tengyue and had a long conversation with Li Damao, a lower-rank army officer and the father of Li Genyuan. Li Damao informed Yao of the British advancement in Mengmi (Mongmit), Mubang (Hsenwi), Mengmao, and Longchuan, as well as the situation at the old Ming gates. Previously, Li Damao had been assigned by the local and provincial authorities to inspect Mongmit and Hsenwi, where the Qing Empire had restored its nominal control after the war with Burma. Li Damao had also been instructed to locate the ruins of the old Ming gates.

Concerned by threats from the Taungoo Empire, the Ming government established eight frontier gates and stationed the military in a broad region stretching from the Kachin Hills to the Shan area of Hsenwi. By 1771, the native officials, such as in Husa, Lasa, Nandian, Ganya, Longchuan, and Zhanxi, had been commissioned by the Qing court to assign their own troops to guard the gates in the region and protect Tengyue. These frontier gates served as the landmarks of China’s imperial power and symbolised China’s control over the trade routes. Nevertheless, these gates had lost their intended functions by the 1890s as China had not exercised consistent control in the region: the Hanlong and Huju Gates had been in Burmese

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73 “Zhentanji,” 258, 261–62. Sima, or the place Xima (昔马) in the late Qing documents, is different from the Xima County that is currently situated in Yingjiang, Yunnan. According to Huang Bingkun, the Subprefect of Tengyue who inspected the border gates in 1890 and 1891, Xima (昔马) was also known as Xima (息麻), a stronghold the “wild men’s” (the Kachins) territory, and was across the river of Sadon in the Kachin States. Huang further recorded that “foreign troops” (British army) had attacked Sima in the winter of 1891 and stationed 300 men here. Xue Fucheng reported that the British attacked the “wild men” (the Kachins) in Sima to claim their territory. Moreover, the British recorded difficult military operations in the Sima area, a strategic post barred by the Kachin Hills from Chinese territory. In his survey report on the border region in 1910, Li Genyuan also noted that Sima, known as Dazhai, was not Ximajie (the Xima market) and had been occupied by the British and renamed Sima. See Huang Bingkun, “Xima tushu,” in “Xijie chendu” ed. Huang Chengyuan, in Yunnan beijie kanchaji-Appendix, ed. Yin Mingde (Taipei: Wenhui chubanshe, 1970), 334–35; MGTCXZG, 50; Li Genyuan, “Dianxi bingyao jiewu tuzhuchao,” in YCGWZ, vol. 4: 3736.

74 See Yao Wendong, “Foreword to Zhentanji,” in Yao Wendong, kanjie choubianji, 229. Also, BL, IOR/L/PS/7/65, Sec. No. 37, 830, 841.

75 XSNL, 40–41.


77 Bussche, Contested Realms, 45, 50–51.
territory since the Qing-Burmese Campaign, and the five gates within China's territory had mostly become ruins. 78 Li Damao found four ruins that were situated to the southwest of Tengyue. The steles of the Tiebi and Huju Gates were still recognizable. However, the inscriptions on the stele of the Huju Gate had worn away, and the structure had largely collapsed. Moreover, the roads leading from Tengyue to these gates had been neglected and were full of thistles and thorns. 79 In addition, the native officials also found it difficult to command many of their disobedient subordinates and troops to maintain order and control in the region. 80 In 1893, Qing border survey commissioner Peng Jizhi admitted that “China had once paid great attention to the Eight Gates, but that when Burma became a tributary nation (in 1788) there was no longer any need for vigilance on the border.” Therefore, except for the protector of the Tiebi Gate who still bore the title, “the gates were neglected and the ‘Protectors’ in some cases disappeared.”81

With the new knowledge obtained from the Tengyue gentry and officials, Yao Wendong wrote *Yunnan kianjie choubianji* (Surveys and Strategic Reports on Yunnan's Border). This report further inspired some of Xue Fucheng’s arguments when he attempted to force the British to fulfil their previous agreements with Zeng Jize. Yao’s information was also crucial, in Xue’s consideration, in recovering China’s control over the Ming frontier gates. 82 Li Genyuan and Yin Wenhe pointed out that Zhang Chenglian, however, was mainly responsible for the composition of Yao’s reports. 83 Zhang’s views on China’s territorial expansion beyond the Kachin Hills were the same arguments as those in Yao’s reports. In September 1891, the British also heard from Zhang that “it was essential for China to possess a station on the Irrawaddy” and “that Bhamo should be annexed [by China].”84

From Li Damao to the men of the Zhang clan, the Tengyue gentry and merchants as well as their kin in Burma provided crucial information and insights that shaped the Qing-British border negotiations. Their service to the state “promptly and consciously identified themselves with the long-established, albeit waning, influences from Beijing in the form of growing
patriotic enthusiasm.”85 The experience of Zhang Chengyuan and Zhang Dexin further demonstrated the complexities that existed between the Europeans and their indigenous collaborators. Instead of merely serving the Europeans with their local knowledge as the collaborators commonly did,86 the men from the Zhang clan utilised their language skills, local knowledge, and connections to spy on the British and obstruct the border survey. Whether living in Yunnan or sojourning in Burma, these elites remained faithful agents of the Chinese state. Moreover, the collaboration of these state agents and Qing officials would be crucial in southern Yunnan’s border survey and demarcation.87 Ma Jianxiong points out that taking advantage of their locality, the elites in southern Yunnan possessed the ability and skills to manipulate the state’s political resources and culture. Therefore, government officials and scholars had to rely on the local elites’ network and knowledge to accomplish their assignments in border affairs and diplomatic exchanges. Overall, from western to southern Yunnan, the state agents’ interactions with the local population, state authorities, and foreign powers had a long-term impact in shaping political relationships and ethnic identities in the borderlands.88

Behind Yao Wendong’s Yunnan kanjie choubianji was the collaboration between the Qing government officials and the state agents across the Burma-Yunnan borderlands. The effort was also a collective exploration of the geographic landscape and geospatial relations in the region. Eric Bussche argues that Yao deviated from the traditional perception that identified the Ming gates as spatial markers of the Qing administrative boundary and believed that the Qing Empire could extend beyond the Kachin Hills to the Irrawaddy River.89 Thus, he reminded Xue Fucheng that, ideally, China should seize Bhamo and the east bank of the Irrawaddy River, which would maximise China’s geopolitical and commercial interest in Upper Burma. China should at least occupy the Kachin Hills. The bottom line was to secure

85 Li Yi, Chinese in Colonial Burma, 39.
86 Stevan Harrell points out that the indigenous collaborators, such as “interpreter, companion, or research assistant” had played a crucial role in the fieldwork conducted by Euro-Americans. In China’s southwestern and western borderlands, native labourers and scholars formed different relationships with the westerners, ranging from paid help to “true and equal collaboration” for academic projects. See Stevan Harrell, “Introduction: Explorers, Scientists, and Imperial Knowledge Production in Early Twentieth-Century China,” in Explorers and Scientists in China’s Borderlands (1880–1950), ed. Denise M. Glover et al (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2011), 18–20.
87 See Ma Jianxiong, “Bianfang sanlao.”
88 Ibid., 88–89.
the eastern rim of the Kachin Hills as a potential defence line for China’s border region, especially Xishuangbanna, to guarantee Qing dominance in transnational trade.90

However, Xue Fucheng’s goal of expanding Qing imperial control in Upper Burma encountered opposition at the negotiation table.91 More practical obstacles emerged as the British conducted border surveys and set up military posts in the Kachin Hills. In 1888, the British had received word from Zhang Chenglian, the Yunnan government’s agent at Bhamo, that “there was no dividing line between Burma and China.” The “Chinese territory was usually held to begin beyond the Kachin Hills,” whereas “the country up to the foot of the Kachin hills was generally considered Burmese.”92 In late 1891, the British troops had reached the Nampaung River at the tip of southwestern Yunnan and established a post at its west bank.93 Li Genyuan and Liu Chuxiang pointed out that the British had since enclosed the west of Nampaung as its territory.94 In 1893, Xue reported that the British entered and scouted the Kachin Hills throughout the autumn and winter of 1891, and they eventually entered Yunnan in the name of border surveying. The British also regularly stationed troops in the Kachin Hills, especially in Sadon beyond the Shenhu Gate and in Handong (Hanton) by the Tiebi Gate. Governor-General Wang Wenshao of Yun-Gui alerted the Zongli yamen of the matter, and Xue pressed the British to withdraw. Xue believed that the Kachin Hills were not under Burma’s jurisdiction and should be divided between China and Britain according to international law. Zeng Jize intended to argue this point with the British but never followed through. However, the British had no intention of conceding the Kachin Hills but rather, intended to compensate China with the lands southeast of the border of Yunnan.95

Xue Fucheng also reported that the British Foreign Ministry and British Indian government had agreed to cede several places to China, including

90 Yao Wendong, _kanjie choubianji_, 32–33, 61, 154–55.
91 For Xue Fucheng’s negotiation with the British Foreign Office, see Bussche, _Contested Realms_, chap.1.
92 BL, IOR/L/PS/7/65, Sec. No 37., 830.
93 The Nampaung River was also known as the Hongbang River, the Hongbeng River, or the Nanben River. See “Establishment of a British Post on the West Bank of the Nampaung River, Jan 1892. 16 Mar.1892,” in BL, IOR/L/PS/7/65, Sec. No. 44.
94 _MGTCXZG_, 48–49.
95 Xue Fucheng, “Dianmian fenjie dagai qingxingshu,” in YCFWZ, vol. 4: 3683–84; _MGTCXZG_, 49. The British believed that the Qing government had no jurisdiction over Sadon. Halliday Macartney, the English Secretary to the Chinese Legation in London, pointed out that China performed intermittent authority over the region and “only interfered with the tribes when necessary.” See BL, IOR/L/PS/18/B65, 3.
Kegan (Kokang or Maliba), which belonged to Kengtung (Mueng Khuen cawfa's territory), Xishuangbanna (Jianghong), and Menglian, as well as the area between Mengmao (now Ruili) and Kokang by the Salween River. These terms established the framework of the Qing-Burmese Convention signed in 1894. With the convention, Britain agreed to give up Hsenwi and Kokang, although with the argument that these areas used to pay tribute to both Burma and China. Further, Britain recognised China's sovereignty in Xishuangbanna and Menglian, with the condition that China should never cede these areas entirely or partially to a third country without Sino-British mutual consent. In addition, China would resume its jurisdiction over the Tiebi and Tianma Gates, while the Huju Gate would be assigned to Burma. In the meantime, sovereignty over the Hanlong Gate would depend on future border demarcation.

Increasing French and British competition in the region followed the signing of the convention. To appease France, China ceded Mengwu and Wude, a part of Xishuangbanna, in June 1895. Thus, the British considered that China had violated the Qing-British Convention of 1894, and signed a modified version with China in February 1897. Under this modification, China had to give Hsenwi and Kokang back to Britain and allow Britain to permanently lease a triangle area to the south of Mengmao and centred by Namhkam. Moreover, Britain would establish consulates in Tengyue, Shunning, and Simao. China also agreed to the construction of railways to connect Yunnan to Burma. In the long run, these controversial or “undivided” areas, such as the northwest of the Longchuan plain and the

96 Xue Fucheng, "Dianmian fenjie dagai qingxingshu," 3684.
97 MOFA, 910000020–001. Bussche points out that the native officials’ “dual allegiance” had become a common rhetoric for the British to obtain territorial concessions as it expanded into the Kachin Hills and Shan states. The Qing-British border agreement, argued by Fang Guoyu, only confirmed the Qing’s original sovereignty in this area. Zhu Shaohua points out that Kokang had been China’s territory until the native officials in this area succumbed to the enticement from Hsenwi and submitted to the British. Bussche, Contested Realms, 53; Fang Guoyu, Zhongguo xinan lishi dili kaoshi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1992), 1242–47; Zhu Shaohua, “Xue Fucheng yu Dianmian bianjie tanpan zaiyianju,” Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu, no.1 (2004) 1: 43–51.
98 MOFA, 910000020–001.
north of the Jiangao Mountain (or the high conical peak\textsuperscript{102}), would become the sources of skirmishes between the natives and the British, as well as fuels for anti-Qing sentiment among the Han and non-Han elites in Yunnan.

**Facing British Expansion: Han Gentry and Native Officials**

Oh, you court officials with renowned names,
Why didn't you keep the border people in your heart?
In front of the foreigners, you were rats who stole food.
In front of the people, you were ferocious tigers and wolves.
This is the gate of China's lands.
This is the place of the Tai who laboured and lived for generations.
Five hundred years ago, the Ming emperors appointed the Pacification Commissioners.
Five hundred years ago, ten tusi were designated of their dominions and lands of defence.
Why did the Qing dynasty officials surrender our lands to others?
How does the Qing court have the face to justify [this failure] and speak?

For six years or seven, our warriors have been guarding the borderlands.
With every grass and tree, they have developed a deep bond.
With people of all groups, they share friendship that is profound.
With their fathers and brothers, they guard their homeland.
The hills and valleys measure the warriors' sweat.
The soldiers and people are as close as one.
To the mountains and rivers, the fearless fighters vowed:
We shall never return home if the foreigners withdraw not.\textsuperscript{103}

According to the *nianpu*, Governor-General Cen Yuying convened with western Yunnan's native officials in Dali in 1888 and encouraged them to safeguard the border and state territory. In 1889, the Qing army uprooted their camps in Ganya and returned to Tengyue, leaving the native officials

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\textsuperscript{102} The British documents adopted the term “high conical peak” for Jiangaoshan. An example can be found in the “Burma China Convention of 1\textsuperscript{st} March 1894, Article 1,” in BL, IOR/L/PS/18/B109.

\textsuperscript{103} Dao Anren, "Kangyingji," 18–19 (my own translation from the Chinese script).
to respond to the British expansion in the Kachin Hills alone. The *nianpu* recorded that in 1891, the British invaded the Tiebi Gate that belonged to Ganya’s traditional dominion. After alerting the Qing officials of the incident, Dao Yingting asked his son Dao Anren to counter the British. Xue Fucheng reported that British troops were being regularly stationed in Handon by the Tiebi Gate and in Sadon by the Huju Gate but did not mention the counter-British resistance led by Dao Anren. In late 1891, the native official of Zhanxi reported that the British invasion of Sadon had countered a small resistance force led by two native leaders named Zaozhuang and Zaoxin. In his poem “Kangyingji” (Chronicles of Fighting the English), which was full of vengeance and hate toward British imperialism and the Qing officials, Dao narrated the battles he and an array of border civilians fought against the foreign invaders. He emphasised the great contribution he and his fellow native officials had made to defend China’s territory and their own lands. According to the *nianpu*, toward the end of 1891, he had mobilised 400 to 500 Tai, Lisu, Han, Kachin, and Burmese men at a campsite by the Tiebi Gate. The exiled Burmese loyalists in Ganya and some Kachin tribes by the Huju Gate also joined this counter-British league. They successfully ambushed and defeated the British throughout 1892. In “Kangyingji,” Dao Anren wrote that he and the native warriors trod through the mountains and woods on the *renchen* day of the ninth months in the eighteenth year of Guangxu (October 27, 1892). They were preparing to attack the British who would cross the border the next day. He lost five men in the battle, as told in a “glorious chapter” in which Dao Anren, seven other native officials, and border civilians cooperated to fight off the invaders.

At the centre of these skirmishes were the Ming frontier gates, the essential element for both the Qing officials and the borderland elites in constructing their perception of as well as establishing their control over the imperial and local territoriality. However, the efforts of native officials and local officials appeared futile in front of the treaties signed by the Qing and British governments. The British had collected sufficient information on the Ming gates, and they understood the history of these border markers and

104 *DARNP*, 11–12.
105 Ibid., 14.
108 *DARNP*, 14–16.
the Chinese attitude on the matter. Therefore, to challenge this traditional, China-centric premise of the Sino-Burmese boundary, the British employed the testimonies of the Burmese officials as well as some Kachin and Shan leaders who had raised questions about the effectiveness of the Qing’s control. Britain intended to identify the practical boundary of China’s imperial outreach and utilise that default line to divide Upper Burma and expand British control over trade.110 The result of the British inquiries into local knowledge and history of the de facto Qing-Burmese boundaries ran counter to the Qing government’s strategic claims of its imperial territory based on vague geographic knowledge. The understanding of the default line of the Qing’s practical control further affected the scale of Britain’s military operations in the Kachin Hills and the Shan states. For instance, advancement into Ponkan was justified because the British considered Ponkan and the area around the Huju Gate to be outside Chinese territory.

In the long run, strong local resistance from Sima to Pansè to Ponkan would teach the British to always bring strong forces into the Kachin Hills.111 At present, local opposition had enabled Qing ambassador Xue Fucheng to force Britain to reconcile its position in Sadon, if not to immediately withdraw its troops. In September 1892, Xue informed the British that the withdrawal of the British force from Sadon was his condition for further border negotiations. As leverage, Xue also discussed China’s potential tighter control over the “tribes on the east of the Irrawaddy and north of the Burmese limit of jurisdiction.” Xue further promised that China would “be responsible for preventing any raids into Burmese territory or other annoyances.”112 Xue sounded confident about their ability to restrain these tribes that Beijing had little control over due to their tradition of seeking assistance and advice from the Qing government.

While Xue Fucheng’s promise failed to guarantee the end of local opposition, British aggression in the region did not cease. Yongchangfu wenzheng recorded that in 1893 the British accused the headman of Ponkan of paying tribute to those Yunnanese officials who further encouraged the native official of Maoxiu not to pay taxes to Britain. To investigate the situation, Li Genyuan’s father, Li Damao, led over one hundred troops to the Tianma Gate and to the Hanlong Gate that had been occupied by the British.113 In Huang Chengyuan’s compilation of government papers

110 BL, IOR/L/PS/7/65, Sec. No. 37., 831.
112 BL, IOR/L/PS/18/B65., No. 2, 3.
113 YCFWZ, vol. 4: 3644.
and a survey called *Diannan jiewu chendu* (Past Memorials on Southern Yunnan’s Border Affairs), three reports from local Tengyue officials in around October 1893 provided more details on the situation in Ponkan. These reports indicated that Ponkan belonged to the jurisdiction of Longchuan and was a newer settlement that had been established by Officer Duan, who was Han, over a hundred years ago. Fearing harassment from the “uncivilised wild barbarians,” Officer Duan allowed some “wild men,” who swore never to betray China, to settle down and farm, eventually resulting in approximately 400 to 500 households. The British had been trying to subdue Ponkan since the Third Anglo-Burmese War and had caused tremendous numbers of deaths and casualties. These reports did not mention Dao Anren’s involvement in Ponkan’s 1893 battle but recorded that the British army took over Ponkan with assistance from the Wa bandits.\(^{114}\)

With reference to *Diannan jiewu chendu*, the *nianpu*, however, constructed a different narrative, which identifies Dao Anren’s essential role in the native resistance against the British and the border demarcation. The *nianpu* narrates that in the beginning of 1893, commissioned by local Qing authorities, Dao Yingting called the Tai and Kachin leaders to convene in Ponkan by the Huju Gate to discuss the defence of the Ming frontier gates. In this meeting, the twenty-one-year-old Dao Anren shared his counter-British experience and remarked that they would defeat the invaders. Later, Dao Anren assisted over 1,000 Kachin men and killed more than 1,000 British troops who invaded Ponkan. However, the British carried out a sneak attack in the same year, burning down all the houses and killing most of the warriors in Ponkan. In 1893, Dao Yingting and Dao Anren were assigned to locate the Hanlong Gate. After a month’s search, they arrived at the ruins south of the Ruilijiang River (the Shweli River, also known as the Longchuan River or the Luchuan River), where they encountered the Sino-Burmese border survey commission. Dao Anren was able to find relics of the gate to prove its existence, though the British commissioner of the Sino-Burmese survey team argued the opposite.\(^{115}\)

\(^{114}\) *Diannan jiewu chendu* had three volumes, including “Xijie chendu” (Past Memorials on Western Yunnan's Border Affairs) that was focused on western Yunnan. See “Tengyue zhenting fudian,” “Shu Tengyueting Wu Guanghan bing,” and “Tengyue Zhenting dian” in “Xijie chendu” ed. Huang Chengyuan, in *Yunnan beijie kanchaji-Appendix*, ed. Yin Mingde (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1970), 313, 339–43. *Yongchangfu wenzheng* included one of the reports drafted by Wu Guanghan. See Wu Guanghan, “Hujuguan, Pengan qingxing,” in *YCFWZ*, vol. 4: 3639–40.

\(^{115}\) The *nianpu* references a report in *Yongchangfu wenzheng*, which was a part of *Diannan jiewu chendu*, regarding the British sneak attack of Ponkan. Wu Guanghan, “Hujuguan, Pengan qingxing,” 3639–40; *DARNP*, 16–18.
Nevertheless, popular local historical records created from the 1890s to the 1940s did not acknowledge much of Dao Anren’s specific contributions to the events as claimed in the *nianpu*. Peng Jizhi’s own report in 1894 confirmed that Dao Yingting, the native official of Ganya, spent over a month looking for the Hanlong Gate with some Kachin men he had hired. They diligently explored an area of 300 li that in some parts had not roads. Dao Yingting and the border survey commission’s interpreter Ju Yucong both located the Hanlong Gate ruins. According to Peng, the British commission members intended to falsely identify the site as the ruins of an ancient Kachin village. However, this attempt was discouraged when some relics of the gate were found. Unlike the *nianpu*, Peng’s record did not mention Dao Anren, which suggests three possibilities: that Peng had failed to document him for certain reasons, that he had not been involved, or that he had been involved but had performed different roles than finding the relics. Another record on the native officials’ involvement in the border survey was contributed by Qing official Huang Bingkun. According to Huang, in the spring of 1894, the native official of Nandian had investigated the situation in Mangyun and at the Tongbi Gate, which were under his jurisdiction. He pleaded to the Qing government to clarify the imperial boundary regarding these locations before the border demarcation. Regardless of the uncertainty of Dao Anren’s specific role in the border surveys, it was clear that the native officials in the Yunnan borderlands had actively assisted China’s border affairs while attempting to negotiate with the Qing government on their own behalf.

The heroism of Dao Anren and his fellow native officials, however, was accompanied by the *nianpu*’s portrayal of inept Qing officials who bent to the British will and jeopardised China’s sovereignty. According to the *nianpu*, persistent resistance against the British at the Tiebi and Huju Gates had claimed the lives of over one hundred of Dao’s troops prior to the 1897–1898 phase of border demarcation led by Herbert Thirkell White, James George Scott, Liu Wansheng, and Peng Jizhi. When the border demarcation commission penetrated to the inner Longchuan (Möngwan) plain in 1898, the British launched an operation to forcefully install a border marker. Local native officials fearlessly fought back and prevented the Sino-Burmese boundary from being drawn in their lands. Oral histories in Longchuan illustrate a

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117 “Shu Tengyueting Huang Bingkun bing,” in “Xijie chendu,” 345–46. The same document is also found as Huang Bingkun, “Nandiansi jixi zhi Da Jinshajiang,” in *YCFWZ*, vol. 4: 3641.
heroic scene in which a Kachin headman charged into the enemy’s front with a long knife and captured an invader on horseback. In contrast, Liu Wansheng was intimidated and manipulated by the “old English spy” James George Scott, Deputy Commissioner of British Burma, and shamelessly traded the Tiebi Gate for some captives. “Following the will of the imperialists,” Liu ordered Dao Anren to withdraw his troops from the Tiebi Gate. Dao refused and insisted that Ganya had been guarding the gate for twenty-three generations. It was unacceptable for him to retreat from the Xipa River (Chapak River), the boundary mark with Burma. Nevertheless, Liu forced Dao to comply by threatening to charge him with the crime of “deceiving the emperor,” which would lead to the execution of his family. These specific records supplemented Wang Du’s brief account of Dao’s counter-British operations in the region, which has been adopted by most Chinese scholars and western historians, such as Roger Des Forges.

Popular local historical documents created from the 1890s to the 1940s usually did not mention the battle in the southwestern Longchuan plain in 1898 or the argument between Dao Anren and Liu Wansheng. Qing official Chen Can, who participated in later phases of Sino-Burmese border demarcation in southern Yunnan in 1900, documented an incident when the British commission members, without the protection of the native official of Mengdong (in present Cangyuan), suffered attacks from the Wa people. James George Scott later avenged these attacks and killed two Wa men with his troops, which triggered assaults from over 2,000 Wa troops and prolonged confrontations between the Wa and the Qing army as well as the militia in Mengjiao and Mengdong. Chen Can also complained that British officials, such as Scott, were very cunning, coercive, and greedy, and consistently scraped more lands from the hands of Chinese commission members. In fact, the British and Qing officials who conducted the Sino-Burmese border demarcation did not retain a good reputation in Chinese historical documents. Local

118 DARNP, 20–21.
119 Ibid., 21–22.
121 Guangxu Tengyue bingshiji, written by Li Guozhong from which the nianpu references some historical facts, had no record of the invasion of Nongzhang. Yongchangfu wenzheng in general, and the historical documents it included, did not mention this invasion. Tengchong xianzhigao also had no record of the incident.
gazetteers and documents compiled by Li Genyuan and other intellectuals contained harsh criticism toward Qing officials, especially Liu Wansheng, which was shared by Dao Anren. After native official Zuo Xiaochen of Cizhu died in the clash with the British in 1900, Li Genyuan proposed that General Feng Zicai, who was assigned to inspect Tengyue, punish Liu Wanshang for losing the imperial lands in the earlier border demarcation. Later, Li included the historical records on the border survey and demarcation in *Yongchangfu wenzheng*. He intended to remind later generations about unforgivable officials such as Liu Wansheng, Yang Farong, and Chen Lida, who managed to get into the business of border demarcation but ended up losing China’s lands and rights.

The British documents, however, contained some different accounts regarding some of the previously mentioned events and people. Although their intention was to obstruct the British, the native officials who interacted with the British in the process of border survey and demarcation were more diplomatic and less confrontational, unless the need for confrontation arose. In mid-November of 1893, when the border survey commission first located the site of the Huju Gate in Ponkan, the British claimed that they did not see oppositions from nearby Kachin leaders who only came to inform the commission about the history of the gate. Nevertheless, complaints and opposition emerged as the native officials became aware of the situation. On December 9, 1893, Peng Jizhi accompanied the native officials of Ganya, Zhanda, and Mengmao (Maingmaw) on their visit to Commissioner Warry. Disapproving of the British encroachment into his territory, the Mengmao cawfa recounted the instances when the British officers threatened his subjects into paying tribute and trespassed the Shweli River to arrest people within his territory. The Zhanda cawfa mainly grieved the loss of land due to the British occupation of Sima and had sought aid from Governor-General Wang Wenshao of Yun-Gui. However, Wang said that he trusted the British and rebuked the cawfas instead. The Ganya cawfa had nothing to complain about, and he impressed Warry by being “the most genial and cheery man.” This cawfa, Dao Anren's father, was bald and had a long, thick beard that made him look like a Catholic priest. After the meeting, Peng suggested that they should bring the Zhanda and Ganya

123 XSNL, 47; MGTCXZG, 55–56. This chapter will not discuss the death of Zuo Xiaochen in detail. Specific records and the Qing-British exchanges on the matter can be found in a wide range of sources such as *Yongchangfu wenzheng* (vol. 4: 3696), *Tengchong xianzhigao* (55–56), as well as multiple dossiers of the British Foreign Office.

124 YCFWZ, vol. 4: 3738.

125 BL, IOR/L/PS/7/73, Sec. No. 3., [No. 26], 77.
cawfas to search for the Ming frontier gates.\textsuperscript{126} During the search, the British met the native officials of Zhefang (Sefan) and Ponkan, who never had seen foreigners before. For the British, Zhefang cawfa was “almost a professional dacoit” who was the enemy of many other native officials and had instigated some attacks on the British before the 1893 border survey.\textsuperscript{127} Nevertheless, the British claimed to have received friendly treatment from every Kachin they had met, which surprised the Chinese commission members. According to the British, the Kachin headmen said that they had always been friendly to the British, but the Chinese were not aware of this.\textsuperscript{128}

The British records on the phase of Sino-Burmese border demarcation that began in late 1897 indicated that the demarcation commission split into a northern party and a southern party. Qing commissioner Liu Wansheng and Herbert Thirkell White joined the southern demarcation team that headed to Lwéleing, while James George Scott and Chen Lida were in the northern team heading toward the Nampaung River.\textsuperscript{129} In the British accounts, Liu Wansheng refused to cooperate and was responsible for the commission’s withdrawal from the Longchuan plain as well as the temporary suspension of the demarcation. Commissioner White and Intelligence Officer Captain Norie also complained that Liu was ill-prepared and unfit for the job. He came with copies of border treaties and the *Zongli yamen*’s memorial. Worse, he did not have useful maps or a sure knowledge of the border region.\textsuperscript{130} In his report to the chief secretary to the government of Burma on December 30, 1897, White complained that the Chinese government had failed to give any instructions to Liu. He believed that Liu’s and the local officials’ lack of awareness about the significance of the 1897 agreement had caused the British members many difficulties.\textsuperscript{131}

Their key disagreement in this phase of demarcation centred on the location of Walan Ridge in the Chinese edition of the 1897 agreement, which had been written as Lwalaing Ridge in the corresponding English copy (Map 2).\textsuperscript{132} Liu insisted that the British version of Lwailaing did not match

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., “Extract from the Diary of W. Warry, Esq., Adviser on Chinese Affairs,” 86.


\textsuperscript{128} BL, IOR/L/PS/7/73, Sec. No. 3., [No.26], 78.

\textsuperscript{129} “Diary of Events,” in BL, IOR/L/PS/20/81, 2.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid. Commissioner White often adopted Captain Norie’s notes in his diary. See BL, IOR/L/PS/7/99, 4 M, no. 154IB., “H. Thirkell White...No. 40–I1 C. F., dated December 30, 1897,” 1, 4.

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{132} For the Chinese edition of the amended 1894 Convention, see the second article in MOFA, 910000023–001, which stated (transcribed in simplified Chinese): “自太平江及南奔江相会处 [·] 此线顺太平江到瓦兰岭相近处 [·] 由此顺瓦兰岭及瓦兰江至南碗河 [·] 顺南碗河至该河与瑞丽江(即龙川江)相会处...” For the English edition, see “Article II-The Taping to the Shweli
the Chinese location of Walan. Further, the location of Lwailaing in the British records was a place named Namwa. This mistake would result in the loss of a large slice of Longchuan cawfa’s dominion and a large part of Lwelongatong, as well as the Tiebi Gate, Hanton, and the Hujü Gate on China’s map. Due to the disagreement, the commission withdrew to the British territory of Lwélon for further instruction.

The controversy began when the fourteen-year-old native official of Longchuan sought Liu Wansheng’s help on December 22 to save his lands from being demarcated as Burmese territory as the commission ascended to the plain of Longchuan. Four days later, Liu brought up his disagreement on the identification of Lwailaing and Walan. He insisted that the commission should seek the terms from the original 1894 Convention and should not detach the land from the Longchuan cawfa’s territory. On December 28, Liu sent White a formal letter of protest, along with a petition from the Longchuan cawfa. Liu stated that the British had trespassed and entered China’s territory, further penetrating into Kachin territory and disturbing local civilians with a large company of armed escorts and mapping equipment. He rebuked the British for not following the 1894 convention and the 1897 agreement because they intended to annex more Chinese lands and occupy all the Ming frontier gates. For Liu, the British showed their unwillingness to cooperate when they dismissed the Zongli yamen’s memorial and the Chinese copies of the border agreements. He again urged the British to be generous to the native official of Longchuan, and he stated that he could not assent to the British demarcation agenda.

In “vehement” and “very unbecoming language” to White, Longchuan cawfa’s petition directly criticised the British “greed for territory.” The cawfa was determined to defend his territory. Although the cawfa did

River,” in BL, IOR/L/PS/18/B109. The English edition therefore stated: “From the junction of the Taping and the Nampaung streams the frontier shall follow the Taping to the neighbourhood of the Lwalaing Ridge; thence a line running approximately along the Lwalaing ridge and the Lwalaing stream to the Namwan; thence the Namwan to its junction with the Shweli.” James George Scott pointed out that Loileng was another name for Lwelaing (Lwalaing). See Mitton, ed., Scott of the Shan Hills, 254–55, 258–59.


135 Ibid., “Telegram from H. Thirkell White...No. II., dated December 28, 1897,” 1–2.


137 Ibid., “Telegram from H. Thirkell White...No. II., dated December 28, 1897,” 1–2.
not want to jeopardise "the good relations of England" and "China," he and his subjects would choose to fight if the British were going to encroach on the Tiebi and Huju Gates as well as 109 li of China's territory, affecting 120 large and small Kachin villages.\textsuperscript{138} White learned that the cawfa had alerted the Qing authorities in Tengyue about the British expansion in the Kachin Hills since its annexation of Burma. However, he and his people assumed the responsibility of protecting the "Emperor's dominions" when no positive response and support had come from Tengyue. Hence, White had the impression that the Qing government's control over Longchuan was nominal, and the native official was "imperfectly acquainted with the nature of the Agreement between the two countries."\textsuperscript{139}

On the following day, a survey team sent by the commission was intercepted by a group of Kachin men who had just visited Liu Wansheng at the campground and admitted that they had followed the order of the Longchuan cawfa. The headman of the party informed the British that "neither Chinese nor British had any right to interfere in the Shan State of Mōngwan [Longchuan]."\textsuperscript{140} He said that they had come straight to the British because Liu had dismissed such an argument.\textsuperscript{141} The incident aligned with the information the British had received earlier, which implied that the native officials of Longchuan, Husa (or Hosa), Lasa, and Mengmao had decided to resist the British encroachment on their lands as a result of the demarcation.\textsuperscript{142} Commissioner White originally reported that Longchuan cawfa had "openly defied" Liu and stopped the survey party that both Liu and the British had agreed to send out.\textsuperscript{143} A day later, White changed his mind. He believed that "it was extremely probable that General Liu was cognizant of the whole affair and that the survey party, which proceeded with his free consent, was stopped with his approval."\textsuperscript{144} Intelligence Officer Captain Norie also believed that there was little doubt that the Kachin men were sent by Liu.\textsuperscript{145}

The incident and potential violence prompted the commission to withdraw the British territory of Lwélon, as Liu refused to proceed with

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{139} Ibid., “H. Thirkell White...No. 40–I C. F., dated December 30, 1897,” 3–4.
\item \textsuperscript{140} Ibid., “From H. Thirkell White ...No. 40–I C.F., dated December 30, 1897,” 1.
\item \textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 2
\item \textsuperscript{143} Ibid., “Telegrams from Thirkell White" No. 13–I C. F., dated December 29, 1897, 1.
\item \textsuperscript{144} Ibid., “From H. Thirkell White to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Burma," No. 40–I C. F., dated December 30, 1897, 1.
\item \textsuperscript{145} See, "Diary of Events," in BL, IOR/L/PS/20/81, 6.
\end{itemize}
the demarcation process and could not guarantee the safety of the commission members. As the British actively verified their correct geographic knowledge with the local Kachins to dispute Longchuan cawfa’s claims to Lwaiwaing, Liu Wansheng found Walan but repeatedly failed to persuade the British to survey its location. In the meantime, the Zongli yamen refused to judge the controversy of Lwaiwaing and Walan from a distance and instructed the commission to draw the boundary based on friendly terms and local knowledge. Further, Governor-General Cen Yuying had instructed Liu not to leave this section of border demarcation and insisted that the boundary should conform to the eight Ming gates.

On January 1, 1898, Peng Jizhi and Dao Yingting visited the British camp in Lwélon. Dao told White that the mother of Longchuan cawfa, whose daughter had married his son, was the source of opposition. Dao still appeared as the cheery man with a long beard who was apologetic about the manoeuvres against the commission. However, this very cheery man would become “the most actively hostile” native official among all the “Seven Sawbwas” who were against the British. He and the Longchuan cawfa carried out some counter-British operations in the Kachin Hills by the Tiebi Gate. In mid-January, the British heard that a group of Chinese had crossed the Kulong River, which marked the boundary between Longchuan and Bhamo District. They appeared to be constructing a road in the area of Sadon and Seingmye. Over twenty days later, the British confirmed that the party that had been active at the east side of the Kulong River came from Ganya. They had built stockades and stopped the residents in a nearby village from cutting wood or farming in an area between the Kulong and Chapak Rivers.

147 Ibid., 11–16.
148 “Diary of Events,” in BL, IOR/L/PS/20/81., 6. Dao Yingting’s son who married the sister of the Longchuan cawfa may or may not be Dao Anren. According to the local sources on the native official of Mangshi and the nianpu, Dao Anren married the daughter of the Mangshi cawfa. See Kuang Dayi, ed., “Mangshi tusi shiliao zuanbian (chugao),” in Dehong shizhi ziliao, ed. Dehong shizhi bianwei bangongshi, vol. 7 (1986): 14; DARNP, 13. However, the Chinese translation of the names of both places by which the nianpu adopted, Mengwan (Longchuan) and Menghuan (Mangshi), are very similar.
149 The Seven Sawbwas governed Nandian, Zhanda, Husa, Lasa, Ganya, Mongwan, and Longchuan. Captain Norie pointed out that these cawfas were not in a solid coalition, and the Husa cawfa was not at all hostile. See “Diary of Events,” in BL, IOR/L/PS/20/81., 17.
150 Ibid., 6. Both the British and Qing officials recognised the Kulong River as a state boundary maker. See “From N. G Cholmeley to the Sessions Judge,” dated April 25, 1898, and “From Wei, Wun of Momein, to the Deputy Commissioner,” dated May 6, 1898, in BL, IOR/L/PS/7/107, 172, no. 283.
Dao Yingting argued that his men were operating within Chinese territory since the boundary tract was very obscure. Commissioner White pressed Liu Wansheng to order Dao to withdraw. However, Liu indicated that the native official was “merely there to maintain order in his own territory,” and he was repairing the old trade route and protecting it with stockades. As the British kept protesting on this matter, Liu implied that he had no authority to command the Ganya cawfa who had formally protested against Liu's interference “in the matters that did not concern the demarcation of the boundary.”

On the other hand, Dao Yingting’s son, who appeared pleasant and intelligent, was working with Mr. Hertz at a different location and did not visit the British camp until early March 1898. It was unclear whether this son of Dao Yingting documented by the British was Dao Anren. In late March, two days before the arrival of the British government’s order to withdraw the commission and suspend the demarcation, Dao Yingting’s son accompanied the mother of the Longchuan cawfa (his mother-in-law) to see Commissioner White. She requested that the British not draw the boundary through any part of Longchuan. In the same month, more men were sent across the Kulong River by Dao Yingting, as they confessed themselves, to oppose the British in the area. They built stockades in Sadon and Seingmye and threw large trees across the road to obstruct the agenda of the demarcation commission.

Two days after the disbanding of the demarcation commission on April 1, Dao Yingting’s men were involved in a violent clash with the British army that ordered them to withdraw. As a result, four of them were killed, and fourteen were captured by the British. Later, the sub-prefect of Tengyue requested that the British release these captives. He explained that all the stockades were located within Chinese territory with the purpose of providing protection against Kachin raids instead of resistance, and “not a single spot” on the British side had been “either trodden or crossed.” He reasoned that since Dao Yingting and the British all agreed on the terms to protect trade in the demarcation process, the stockades set up by Dao
would actually benefit Britain. The Longchuan cawfa also had the intention
to “protect the delimitation line and to prevent the Kachins attacking the
Commission escorts when they arrived in that neighbourhood.” In addition,
the men sent by Dao never instructed the Kachins not to pay taxes to the
British.\textsuperscript{157}

These accounts in the British sources contradict but clarify the vague
narrative of the border demarcation in Longchuan as found in the \textit{niannpu}. The British files also challenge the stereotypical description of the inept and
fearful Chinese border demarcation commissioners that was prevalent in
China’s local historical documents. In addition, these records indicate that
the old Ganya cawfa Dao Yingting, instead of Dao Anren, had been active
and decisive in driving the native officials’ negotiations and clashes with the
British. His strategies and operations were not all confrontational and were
diplomatic when necessary. Behind Dao Yingting’s unyielding opposition
to the increasing British influence in Upper Burma was a coalition of some
Tai and Kachin leaders who were connected through kinship ties and their
shared opposition to British encroachment into their dominions. The Qing
commissioners especially utilised such local opposition to force the British to
temporarily withdraw from the border demarcation. It is uncertain whether
Dao Yingting’s son in the British documents was Dao Anren. It is possible
that, drawing from oral historical records and Dao Anren’s poems, the
\textit{niannpu} recorded some specific details about his counter-British activities
that were not recorded by the British or other Chinese sources. Nevertheless,
the young Tai Saopah would embrace another stage of reform and revolution
in Ganya in the early twentieth century.

\textsuperscript{157} “From Wei, Wun of Momein, to the Deputy Commissioner,” dated May 6, 1898, in BL, IOR/L/PS/7/107, 172, no. 283.
Modernisation or Separatism?
Competing Narratives of the Revolution

Abstract
Chapter 8 discusses the reconstruction of Dao Anren's role in Sun Yat-sen's revolution and the Tengyue Uprising in 1911. Paying attention to the power relationship between the Yunnan warlords and the gentry in western Yunnan, this chapter sheds light on how the Han-ethnic division affected power struggles within Tengyue as well as the writings of non-Han elites in China's revolutions.

Keywords: Tengyue uprising; 1911 Revolution; Tongmenghui; Zhang Wenguang; Sun Yat-sen; Zhao Fan

The great Ming Empire was what Zhu Yuanzhang had established. In the vast imperial domain, abundant grains and livestock were found. People in the borderlands guarded this sacred territory. When wise monarchs succeeded the throne, Glorious black hats and purple robes were given to the leaders of the frontier. With the golden seal, Came with the orders to protect the fortresses and borderlands, Generations after generations. Oh, the Pacification Commissioners who have been showered with the imperial grace, Their shoulders carried the rolling rivers and majestic mountains. The black hats and purple robes, glorious and glittering, Were the authority and dignity of the emperor and his court. Peace and tranquillity were all that were wished for by [our] fathers and brothers. The native officials, magistrates, and attendants were all praying,
That the country would be in harmony and the people were sound.  
That the Ganya valley we have been ministering for generations,  
Would have beautiful scenery and boundless grandeur.¹

British influence in the western Yunnan borderlands grew over the years along with the relocation of its consulate from Mangyun to Tengyue in 1897 and the opening of the Tengyue Customs Service in the spring of 1902. Under the tenure of Governor-General Xiliang of Yun-Gui (1907–1909), the surveys for the Burma-Yunnan railway that the British had been advocating were also finished in the same year, with one route to potentially connect Ganya to Bhamo. Dao Anren nianpu portrays a young, patriotic Tai cawfa who held great hatred toward British imperialism and the inept Qing government. In 1899, the British pacified a Burmese resistance force in Bhamo that had drawn the participation of over 20,000 men and the exiled Burmese royalty in Yunnan. Dao finished his long poem titled “Kangyingji” as the British searched rebels within the Ganya cawfa's territory.² According to the nianpu, from 1900 to 1902, Dao's patriotic undertakings included organising an anti-British militia that was hindered by his clansmen and holding a memorial service to mourn those soldiers who had died in the operations against the British.³ In 1905, another round of Sino-Burmese border demarcation would allot British Burma more lands in western Yunnan, including Pianma, Gangfang, Yutong, Cizhu, and Pailai.⁴ It was around this time that Dao Anren appeared in the British documents with a clear recognition of his identity as well as a hint of his desire for better local infrastructure and modern industrialisation.

This chapter draws attention to the different historical narratives of Dao Anren’s journey to become a Tongmenghui member and a leader of the Tengyue uprising in 1911. Dao’s imprisonment and the debates over whether he was a separatist who intended to purge the Han in the borderlands will not be discussed in detail since Zeng Yeying has already researched the question thoroughly and launched a debate with Cao Chengzhang on the matter.⁵ Nevertheless, the power relationship between the Yunnan warlords and the local gentry as well as their impact on the Tengyue uprising still need

³ Ibid., 23–24.
⁵ See chapter 7 for more details.
careful evaluation, which will shed light on the revolutionary participants’ writings about each other in the early twentieth century.

From border demarcation to the revolutions in 1911, shared kinship and economic ties, common anti-Manchu sentiment, and the desire for freedom and prosperity had enabled the local actors in Yunnan to negotiate and cooperate with each other to shape the future of their homeland. However, such conversations and collaboration faced the barrier of Han ethnocentrism that distinguished the Han and Confucian-educated non-Han elites from the rest of the ethnic population whom the Han considered barbaric. Therefore, selective Han-ethnic cooperation, as seen in the course of the 1911 Revolution, continued to reinforce intergroup inequality in the borderlands’ power relations and perpetuate ethnic divisions and confrontations.

The documentation of local history and the creation of local historical records further reflects such ethnic divisions and confrontations in the mental and intellectual realm. In other words, the subjectivity of the historical sources and historical writing becomes another indication of local power relations and intergroup relations. Therefore, the value of the nianpu and similar literature lies in several aspects. First, they challenge the Han-centric conventional historical documentation and writing that perpetuated misconceptions and biases toward non-Han groups. Second, they aimed to reverse non-Han groups’ long-term and even institutionalised political and social disadvantages that were reinforced and reflected by Han-dominant literature and historiography. Third, the emphasis on the non-Han groups’ contribution to China’s counter-imperialism and anti-Qing revolutions further contributes to the CCP’s discourse of ethnic unity and collaboration against feudalism, capitalism, and imperialism.

To establish or negotiate their relationship with the dominant political power, from the 1911 revolution to the reconstruction of Dao Anren’s history, local elites, both Han and non-Han, entered another contested field to seize the initiative and dominance in writing about themselves and the others. A middle ground for different discourses and narratives of local history, however, seems impossible because long-term prejudice and ideological confrontations had driven the intellectuals into an agonising and profound social and cultural division.

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6 An example of Han elites’ double standards in judging the non-Han elites can be seen in their relationship with renowned Confucian scholar and statesman Zhao Fan, who was Minjia and was praised for his great political and literary achievements. See Deng Bangshu, “Wenyi xiansheng Zhaogong zhuanshu,” and Jin Tianyu, “Wenyi xiansheng jianchuan zhao gong mubei,” in Xu Diannan beizhuanji jiaobu, ed. Fang Shumei (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1993), 417–20, 421–25.
Studying in Japan: In Search of Modernisation

In 1904, George John L’Establere Litton, Britain’s acting consul in Tengyue, mentioned Dao Anren in his report about the administrative and trade affairs of the Yunnan-Burma border. Litton considered Dao and the Nandian cawfa very capable—much more worthy of their positions than the leaders of Mengmao and Longchuan. Dao Yingting, the old cawfa of Ganya, had retired and fully immersed himself in Buddhist worship. However, his son, as Litton observed, was “an intelligent and kind hearted young man of 26,” who owned “a good reputation among his people,” and who often amused Litton “by his caustic criticism of the Chinese methods of administration in general and supervision of Shan dependencies in particular.”

Litton had a close view of the situation in Ganya and around the Taiping River valley. Deteriorating infrastructure was a common problem in the border region. Floods and landslides covered Ganya’s fertile rice paddies with boulders and sands every year, and a great destruction of farmland occurred in 1903. However, fearing local Qing officials’ financial extraction, the Tai cawfas were reluctant to invest in public infrastructure and expose their financial capacity. These officials would say to the cawfas, “If you are rich enough to make roads and bridges about which we are not interested, you are rich enough to pay us ‘squeeze about which we are’.” Litton believed that the floods could be controlled and that a greater level of prosperity could be achieved if Ganya was managed by the British. He also “felt sure” that the native officials of Ganya and Nandian would welcome and assist any roads or railway construction initiated by British Burma in the Taiping valley.

According to the nianpu, the increasing British influence had shocked Dao Anren and prompted him to travel to India and Burma in 1905, seeking ways to “solve the internal strife and external threats.” Inspired by the Chinese merchants and revolutionaries in Rangoon, he contemplated challenging the Qing government and establishing a military school.

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7  “Memorandum on Frontier Affairs,” February, 1904. In BL, IOR/L/PS/7/164, Reg 898, no. 16M, 3.
8  Ibid.
9  Ibid.
10  DARNP, 27.
11  Ibid., 27–28. The Chinese in Rangoon mainly belonged to two groups known as the “long and short coats,” who were from Guangdong and Fujian. By 1905, prominent Chinese merchants were related to both the Qing reformers and the revolutionaries. The British Deputy Commissioner of Rangoon reported that Kang Youwei had come to Rangoon in 1903. He had established a branch of the Baohuanghui (the Chinese Empire Reform Association), with the intention of uniting the Chinese who had been divided because of “the localisation of interests and the prevalent parochial ideas.” Kang was anxious to build an Anglo-Chinese school, with Mandarin as the
made new friends in Zhuang Yin’an, Xu Zanzhou, and Chen Ganquan, who later recommended that Hunanese revolutionary Qin Lishan run a military academy in Ganya. Qin Lishan came to Rangoon in May 1905, with the purpose of waking up the Chinese in Burma. He converted Zhuang Yin’an, Xu Zanzhou, and Chen Ganquan into the revolutionary camp through his own grievous experience with the reformers. Qin was the editor for the Yangguang xinbao (New Rangoon News) owned by Zhuang, Xu, and Chen. The trio also commissioned Qin to revise the charters of a Chinese school, incorporating more revolutionary and nationalistic elements. However, the attempt failed due to opposition from the Qing government and its supporters on the schoolboard. When Dao visited Rangoon, Qin was travelling in Mandalay and Lashio to meet two Yunnanese men and enquired after the revolutions in Yunnan. Later, he was convinced to go to Ganya instead of assassinating some high-profile officials in Beijing.

The nianpu records Dao Anren’s close friendship with Qin Lishan, especially to dispute Zhang Taiyan’s (or Zhang Binglin) charge that Dao had murdered Qin in 1906. It was Qin who encouraged Dao Anren to study in Japan and then introduced him to Sun Yat-sen and Huang Xing. In early January of 1906, Dao Anren left for Japan with his brother Dao Anwen and a dozen men and women. He stayed in Rangoon for over twenty days, where he reunited with his old friends and sought more assistance and resources to modernise Ganya. According to the nianpu, Dao had asked these friends to help him invest in the construction of the Burma-Yunnan railway. He also needed more instructors to help Qin Lishan at the military academy.

official language, which had drawn the donation and fellowship of many wealthy Chinese. “China: Movement of Kang Youwei,” July 23, 1903, in BL, IOR/L/PS/7/156, Reg 1090, no. 30M.


13 Travelling to Beijing had become difficult due to tightened surveillance across the country after the bombing at Beijing’s Qianmen Railroad Station. See Feng Ziyou’s articles: “Qin Lishan shilüe,” and “Miandian Huaqiao,” in Geming yishi, vol. 1: 74, 343; “Zha Qing Wudachen Zhe Wu Yue,” in Geming yishi, vol. 2: 520.
and investors to industrialise Ganya. Later, when Dao reached Singapore, he explored rubber and silkworm cultivation as well as the possibility of building textile and match factories.\textsuperscript{14}

While travelling to Japan, Dao wrote another long poem, called “Youliji” (Travelogue). In the 1980s, the translators of this poem argued that “Youliji” expressed Dao’s admiration of the prosperity of the “capitalist material life,” such as in Burma and Hong Kong, as well as the desire to make Ganya great and powerful:\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{quote}
Tokyo, Japan deserved its reputation, 
In the palace, the divine and mighty Tennō [the Japanese Emperor] dwells. 
Ever since the Meiji Restoration, 
The Tennō had become the symbol of this rich and powerful land. 
Many people come to study from all over the world. 
Japan is the model for them to build their homeland. 
In this new era, this country shines as a pearl in the East, 
Lighting the road for the small and weak nations to become strong.
\end{quote}

... 
The small and weak groups at our Chinese peripheries, 
To seek the truth, they have been through strife and trials. 
Having been touring in Tokyo for ten days and more, 
[We] walked into the examinations to seek for school. 
With the guidance of respected teachers, 
[We] marched into the new-style classroom. 
Oh, our hearts that yearned for diligence and progress, 
They were blooming like the sakura [cherry blossoms] under the sun. 
Seeking intellect, we open our wings, 
We are soaring across the sky and through the clouds of knowledge. 
Oh, my brothers and sisters back in the homeland, 
We will fulfil the dreams beings chased for many years.\textsuperscript{16}

In May 1906, Dao Anren finally arrived in Yokohama. Later, he found Sun Yat-sen and Huang Xing in Tokyo. Tōten (or Torazō) Miyazaki, a fervent supporter of Sun, arranged a house for the company from Ganya. Sun and Miyazaki helped Dao Anren enroll in an accelerated course at Hosei

\textsuperscript{14} DARNP, 30–31; Dao Anlu, “Qian Langban huiyi pianduan,” in DARNP, 113; Dao Anren, “Youliji,” in Kangyingji, 66. 
\textsuperscript{15} See the Epilogue for the Chinese Translations, in Kangyingji, 105. 
\textsuperscript{16} Dao Anren, “Youliji,” 71–73 (my own translation).
University while his brother Dao Anwen, clansmen, and maids attended other schools. Dao Anren and Dao Anwen both joined Tongmenghui on May 31. According to Dao Anwen’s wife, Qian Langban, Sun was their family doctor but acted more like a patriarch. Dao Anren sought Sun’s counsel on almost everything and even entrusted Sun with the stipend sent from Ganya. It seemed that several large sums of donations that the Tongmenghui received in 1906 and 1907 came from the sale of Dao Anren’s property tax rights in Ganya. Dao also frequently hosted other Tongmenghui members, such as Wu Yuzhang, Ju Zheng, Song Jiaoren, Hu Hanming, Zhang Taiyan, Lü Zhiyin, Li Genyuan, and some non-Han students. Their long conversations had educated Qian Langban on the popular political dialogues, such as anti-Qing revolution, the republic, equalisation of land, and the equality of the Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Hui, Tibetan, and Tai.

A poor student from Tengyue named Li Genyuan frequently visited Dao Anren, joining him for dinners and borrowing his money. Qian believed Dao Anren and Li Genyuan were very close, and she could not comprehend why Li later turned against Dao.

By 1907, Sun Yat-sen had envisioned a borderlands strategy of mobilising the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and turning China’s southern and southwestern borderlands into revolutionary bases. However, his uprisings in southern and southwestern China as well as his mobilisation in Southeast Asia suffered strong criticism from colleagues, such as Zhang Taiyan, Song Jiaoren, Zhang Ji, Hirayama Shū, and Tao Chengzhang, which accelerated the process of the Tongmenghui’s internal split. His earlier strategies anticipated French aid even at the cost of China’s territorial

21 Ibid., 115.
22 In early 1907, Sun expressed enthusiasm for the idea of using the uprisings in Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, and Sichuan to form the foundation for a broad revolutionary mobilisation in the nation. See Sun Yat-sen, Sun Zhongshan xuanji (Beijing: renmin chubanshe, 1981), vol. 1: 332–33, 336–39, 342–47.
concessions and disintegration, which contradicted the pursuits of those revolutionaries who had actively protested the construction of the Tonkin-Yunnan railway and France's seizure of mining rights in Yunnan.

Before and after the establishment of the Tongmenghui, Li Genyuan and fellow Yunnanese students immersed themselves in various revolutionary publications and organised the *Yunnan zazhi* (Yunnan Miscellany). The heated discussions on nationalism and state sovereignty in this journal often deviated from Sun's revolutionary pragmatism in seeking Western aid. From 1906 to 1908, the Yunnanese and non-Yunnanese revolutionaries frequently wrote about the threats of French and British imperialism as well as their economic exploitation. They believed that protecting Yunnan was an important step to save the entire nation of China. The Vietnam-Yunnan railway, French explorers and missionaries, and French military movements had been the focus of many articles published in *Yunnan zazhi*. Donald Sutton points out that “Yunnanese nationalism” and anti-French sentiment ruled the pages of *Yunnan zazhi*. The journal was instrumental in promoting the campaign to recover Yunnan's railway and mining rights, as chief editor Li Genyuan imbued every issue with “a sense of crisis, deep concern for the future of China and particularly Yunnan, and the worst suspicions of the great powers.”


member Cun Haiting (or Cen Zunfu) funded *Yunnan zazhi* and other organisations and publications in Burma, such as the *Guanghua News*. After the failure of the Hekou Uprising (1908), he also accommodated the troops who retreated to Burma. From 1905 to 1910, many Tengyue revolutionaries joined the Tongmenghui in Burma, among them the Tengyue gentry and merchants Li Yuegai, Yin Zizhen, and Zhang Chengqing. 28

Like the Chinese revolutionaries and the Qing government, Sun Yat-sen sought allies in Yunnan 29 and, with this foundation, continued to shape China's future when Beijing's power crumbled in the empire's borderlands. Dao Anren was among a wide league of political allies sought by Sun to facilitate his revolution. According to the Hui oral history records, Sun reached out to Yang Huiting, the nephew of Du Wenxiu, who lived in Burma with his mother under British protection. Sun failed to encourage Yang to lead a revolt by promising him the position of governor of Yunnan and an official bronze seal. 30 Cao Chengzhang stresses that Sun valued Dao's alliance because of Ganya's geographic location and Dao's title of native official. 31 Dao was one of Sun's diverse contacts within his wide base of mobilisation, to whom he could offer a share of the anticipated triumph. 32 Long Xiaoyan and Duan Libo point out that Sun's blueprint of establishing a federal system in China was perhaps most appealing to Dao, who sought a balance between his identification with the Tai and the Chinese state. 33

The *nianpu* portrays Dao Anren as an active follower of Sun Yat-sen's borderlands strategy who decided to prepare Ganya as a revolutionary base for the Tongmenghui while modernising his homeland with newly fashioned banks, firearms, and machinery. The Xincheng Bank, as imagined by Dao, would issue its own currency and banknotes for a future military government in western Yunnan. Sun Yat-sen, Huang Xing, and Tōten Miyazaki welcomed this plan. Miyazaki found a Japanese company to invest in Ganya's


31 Cao Chengzhang, *Genming xianqu*, 262.


33 Long Xiaoyan and Duan Libo, “Dao Anren yuan’an,” 39.
industrialisation and the cultivation of rubber and silkworms. Sun encouraged Dao to return home early and prepare for a revolt, so Dao prepared more money to purchase firearms and sponsor the Tongmenghui. In the spring of 1908, Dao arrived in Ganya with two Japanese experts (on agriculture and light industry), one teacher, and over ten technicians. Ganya began seeing machines, a bank, a power plant, and mulberry and rubber plantations. Sun continued to facilitate exchanges between Japanese experts and Ganya via Zhuang Yin’an and the Tongmenghui’s branch in Rangoon, which would expand to 500 members in early 1909.

Dao’s anti-Qing activism and Ganya’s modernisation caught the attention of the provincial government. In the autumn of 1908, Xiliang, the governor-general of Yun-Gui, sent a memorial to Beijing vaguely reporting that ever since Dao had come back from Japan, he had been changing all sorts of local rules without the government’s authorization despite the rebukes and criticism from officials in Yunnan. Xiliang had heard many rumours about Dao’s “unpredictable intentions.” He once considered the removal of six native officials in western Yunnan, including Zhenkang, Nandian, and Ganya. However, his shortage in military force, funding, and capable officials would not overcome the convoluted connections, such as geographic interdependence and marriage ties, between the native officials. Therefore, he gave up the agenda of gaitu guiliu in western Yunnan despite strong requests from the local gentry. Instead, he cultivated a friendship with the Tai native officials and sought the Ganya and Zhanda cawfas’ assistance in pacifying rebellions and resisting the foreigners. As Xiliang had led these native officials away from their previous anti-Qing agenda, he distanced them from the mobilisation of the Yunnanese revolutionaries.

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34 The firearms, however, were confiscated by the custom service in Singapore. DARNP, 39–40.
Moreover, Qin Lishan had died of an illness before Dao Anren returned, which later led to antipathy toward Dao from the Yunnanese revolutionaries in the future. His death and his relationship with Dao had been interpreted differently by the KMT officials. Feng Ziyou, Ju Zheng, and Chen Zhonghe wrote that Qin's death was a result of the mistreatment of a malaria outbreak. Cantonese revolutionary Sun Zhongying recorded that Qin was murdered without naming who killed him. In “Qin Lishan zhuan” (Biography of Qin Lishan), intellectual and revolutionary Zhang Taiyan implied that Qin was murdered by Dao. According to Zhang, Qin, who disconnected himself from Liang Qichao, advocated for Han nationalism and autonomy. He found the periphery a hiding place, and hoped to overthrow the Manchu and restore the Han dominance in China. Zhang wrote that Dao “belonged to the yi zhong [barbarian race]” and “had been away from China and remained self-reliant.” Qin rebuked Dao's disloyalty toward the country, and he knew that Dao would not support his undertakings. Qin thus frequently wrote poems to express his grief and anger. Zhang commented that “over time, [Qin] was unsurprisingly murdered” by Dao.

In “Kangyingji,” Dao Anren presented his sacred duty to guard the borderlands that the Ming dynasty emperors had entrusted to his ancestors. Dao declared his loyalty to the Chinese state and his devotion to Ganya, which showed little difference from the Han gentry’s allegiance to their current homeland in Yunnan and ancestral lands in China Proper. Dao talked about his Han lineage with people in Tokyo, such as Tōten Miyazaki’s wife and Song Jiaoren, a KMT leader who would be assassinated in 1913.

Song visited Dao in November 1906 and consistently referred to him as Hao Peisheng, the Tai cawfa's Han name. Dao told Song that Ganya was not quite

40 DARNP, 35–36.
41 Ju Zheng and Chen Zhonghe, “Ji Qin xiansheng Lishan wen bing xu,” in Huaqiao yu Xinhai geming, 163–64; Feng Ziyou, “Qin Lishan shilüe,” 76.
44 Ibid.
civilised because of its overwhelming non-Han population, the Baiyi (Tai), with whom the Han considered too barbaric to interact.46

Dao Anren poised himself as more Han than Tai, which appealed to Han chauvinism, the very root of popular anti-Manchu sentiment at the time. However, Dao’s Han lineage was not always recognised and appreciated by other Chinese revolutionaries. The popularity of revolutionary leaders such as Zhang Taiyan, who came from a Ming loyalist family and had high prestige as an intellectual of Chinese learning,47 demonstrated the prevalence of the Chinese nationalism that was imbued with traditional Confucian education, Han superiority, and anti-Manchu sentiment.48 By calling out Dao’s “barbarian lineage,” Zhang had dismissed Dao’s claim of Han ancestry and Ganya’s loyalty to the same Ming Empire and Chinese state that were revered by popular Chinese revolutionaries. To some extent, the Han ethnocentrism and distrust toward non-Han people could potentially have affected Zhang’s interpretation of Dao and his role in the Tengyue uprising in 1911.

Writing about Dao Anren in the Tengyue Uprising

In 1940, Li Genyuan and Liu Chuxiang included Zhang Taiyan’s “Qin Lishan zhuan” in Yongchangfu wenzheng.49 Li had been Zhang’s close friend since 1906, and Zhang had been composing memorial texts for Li’s father and families over the past decade.50 Zhang’s narrative on Dao Anren’s crimes could trace its origins to the Tengyue revolutionaries’ accusations against the cawfa after the uprisings in 1911. The Yunnan revolutionaries’ records

46 Ibid., 293.
47 After 1900, revolutionaries such as Zhang Taiyan, Chen Tianhua, and Cai Yuanpei energised young Chinese minds with their publications that combatted constitutional monarchists and condemned the Qing’s loss of sovereignty to foreigners. For more details, including Zhang’s philosophical background, see Jiang Yihua, Zhang Binglin pingshu (Nanjing: Nanjing daxue chubanshe, 2002), 13–14, 19; Wong Yong-tsu, Zhang Binglin, viii, 5; Jin Chongji and Hu Shengwu, Xin’ai geming shigao, vol. 1: 163; Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen, 279, 363; Shimada Kenji, Pioneer of the Chinese Revolution: Zhang Binglin and Confucianism, translated by Joshua A. Fogel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 5–13, 109.
back then rarely mentioned Dao’s contribution except for his involvement in anti-Han rebellions. *Tengchong xianzhigao* (1941) briefly noted that after the uprising in Tengyue, Dao took a multitude of native troops, occupied the office of the western Yunnan circuit, and claimed himself the commander-in-chief.\(^{51}\) Records about Dao Anren remain minimal and negative in other compilations of local historical documents such as *Dianfu xianshilu* (Records of Yunnan’s Restoration),\(^{52}\) *Xishi huilüe* (Brief Compilation of Western Yunnan’s Affairs),\(^{53}\) *Xing’an riji* (Diary of Xing’an),\(^{54}\) *Yixipian* (Papers on Western Yunnan),\(^{55}\) *Yongchangfu wenzheng*, and *Xu Yunnan tongzhi changbian* (Continuation to the Extended Chronicles of Yunnan, ~1948).\(^{56}\) Individual historical records documented Dao in the same fashion. For instance, Tongmenghui members, such as Zhang Dayi (Yunnan) and Sun Zhongying (Guangdong), included Zhang Wenguang but excluded Dao in their accounts about the revolutionary leaders in Tengyue.\(^{57}\) Other records such as “Xinhai Yunnan guangfuji” and “Tengyue guangfu jilüe” also portrayed Dao as a rebel and an opportunist who occupied the government office during the Tengyue uprising and claimed to be the commander-in-chief. He then blackmailed Zhang for firearms and encouraged other native officials to rebel against the new provincial government.\(^{58}\)

The creators of these documents were mainly local Han gentry or non-Han elites who were accomplished in Chinese learning. They were concerned

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\(^{51}\) MGTCXZG, 65–66.

\(^{52}\) *Dianfu xianshilu* was a compilation of the government papers, correspondence, and notices issued by the new Tengyue government during the Tengyue Uprising. See Dianjun diiyun dudu bianxiu, Introduction to “Dianfu Xianshilu” in *Yunnan wenshi ziliao xuanji* (YNWSZLXJ), vol. 17 (1982): 1.

\(^{53}\) *Xishi huilüe* includes the correspondence between Li Genyuan and the local authorities in western Yunnan. See “The Editor’s Notes,” *Xishi huilüe*, in *Yunnan Xinhai geming ziliao*, ed. Xie Benshu (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1981), 492.

\(^{54}\) *Xing’an riji* was Zhou Zhongyue’s diary. Zhou served as the chief secretary of the Yunnan government after the 1911 Revolution. “The Editor’s Notes,” *Xing’an riji*, in *geming ziliao*, 221.

\(^{55}\) *Yixipian* was written by Zhang Zhaoxing who had received a *xieyuan* degree from the imperial examination. Later, he studied in Japan and served as county governor in multiple areas after the 1911 revolution. “The Editor’s Notes,” *Yixipian*, in *geming ziliao*, 475.

\(^{56}\) From 1931 to 1948, the Yunnan provincial government employed various writers and sources to compile *Xu Yunnan tongzhi changbian*, with the intention of supplementing the *Xu Yunnan tongzhigao* (Extended Comprehensive Records of Yunnan, 1901) and cover the history since 1911. See “Foreword and Publication Statement,” *Xu Yunnan tongzhi changbian* (XYNTZCB) (Kunming: Yunnan shengzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui bangongshi, 1985), 1–4.


\(^{58}\) Chen Chunsheng, “Xinhai Yunnan guangfuji,” in *wushinian wenxian* (2), vol. 3: 299.
more about political stability and the expansion of their local control. They appreciated the reforms to undermine and break through the native officials' territorial dominance, which, in their mind, would bring a higher level of political and economic integration in the future. Therefore, these historical documents largely praised revolutionary leaders and gentry such as Zhang Wenguang, Li Genyuan, and Zhao Fan, especially in their efforts to restore order and initiate reforms such as *gaitu guiliu* in Tengyue. “Tengyue guangfu jilüe” further recorded local gentry’s contribution in running the Tengyue government after the uprising as well as their support of Li Genyuan and Zhao Fan.\(^5\) In the long run, the missing and negative historical records on Dao Anren and the overall label of separatist prompted the composition of *Dao Anren nianpu*. The creation of Dao’s anti-Han and separatist profile during the early ROC era would also see challenges from the local PRC gazetteers that favoured and followed the narratives established by the *nianpu* and similar historical writings on the Tai cawfa.

Largely based in Japan and led by revolutionaries such as Li Genyuan and Lü Zhiyin, the Yunnanese Tongmenghui members had little involvement in Sun Yat-sen’s manoeuvres in Vietnam and Burma. In 1906, Yang Zhenhong, a Tongmenghui member from Kunming, returned to Yunnan from Tokyo for revolutionary activities. However, Yang struggled to mobilise the urban dwellers.\(^6\) He was also unsuccessful in recruiting Dao Anren and the Zhanda cawfa. In fact, Roger Des Forges points out that despite strong concerns about Dao’s anti-Qing agenda, Governor-General Xiliang deviated from the process of *gaitu guiliu* and sought the native officials’ aid in countering the rebels and foreigners. As Xiliang drew closer to the native officials and swayed them away from rebellions, Yang turned to other possibilities.\(^7\) According to *Xu Yunnan tongzhi changbian* (1948), *Tengchong xianzhigao* (1941), and *Yongchangfu wenzheng*, when Yang came to Burma and western Yunnan for mobilisation, he met Zhang Wenguang and encouraged him to join the Tongmenghui.\(^8\) Zhang was a Tengyue native and had not received much education. He owned a business in Burma and would exhaust his wealth to recruit revolutionaries. After Yang died in 1909, some revolutionaries considered him “the sole hope” of

\(^{5}\) Cao Zhiqi, “Tengyue guangfu jilüe,” 330–32.

\(^{6}\) *XYNTZCB*, vol. 1: 2, 7–10; *Yunnan jindaishi bianxiezhu*, ed., *Yunnan jindaishi* (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1993), 214–18.


their future.\textsuperscript{63} He organised the Tengyue zizhi tongzhihui (Comrade-hood of Self-government of Tengyue) and worked closely with Tongmenghui member Liu Fuguo.\textsuperscript{64}

\textit{Dianfu xianshilu} noted that Zhang Wenguang had once found refuge in Ganya while escaping the Qing government’s warrant in the summer of 1911. Dao Anren appreciated Zhang’s great ambition, and they decided to organise an uprising based on the instructions in Sun Yat-sen’s letter and a pamphlet called \textit{Geming fanglüe} (Revolutionary Stratagems).\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Dianfu xianshilu}, \textit{Tengchong xianzhigao} (1941), and other records indicated that Zhang led the Tengyue uprising on October 27 and was elected commander-in-chief. He informed the British consulate and customs service on the matter and promised to protect foreigners’ safety and properties. After the uprising, Zhang’s fellow revolutionaries and the gentry in Tengyue and those sojourning in Burma, such as Cun Haiqing, came forward to aid the management of civil affairs. Local scholar Liu Chuxiang, who later collaborated with Li Genyuan to compile local gazetteers, performed an essential role in assisting Zhang in the uprising and government administration. On the other hand, \textit{Tengchong xianzhigao} (1941) noted that Dao had once assisted Zhang and claimed to be the commander-in-chief after occupying the bureau of the western Yunnan circuit with his troops. These sources also identified the date of Dao’s arrival in Tengyue as November 4.\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Xing’an riji} further recorded that Zhang and Dao both claimed to be the government head and competed to seize power.\textsuperscript{67}

Other local historical records showed that Tengyue’s military force, known as the Western Yunnan Army, began conquering cities northward, aiming to reach Dali and Kunming. Peng Ming assaulted Yongchang. Li

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{63} \textit{XYNTZCB}, vol. 1: 7; \textit{MGTCXZG}, 65.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Li Genyuan credited the organisation of Tongzhihui to Zhang Wenguang. See \textit{MGTCXZG}, 65; Cao Chengzhang disputes popular arguments about Zhang’s role and stresses that Dao established Tongzhihui and was its main leader. Cao Chengzhang, \textit{Geming xianqu}, 271–74.
\item \textsuperscript{66} \textit{Dianfu xianshilu}, 9–10, 26, 29–31, 36, 149; Yin Wenhe, \textit{Qiaoshangshi}, 217; \textit{MGTCXZG}, 65–66; \textit{XYNTZCB}, 8; Zeng Yeying points out that the \textit{nianpu} adopted Xu Zhanzhou’s narrative and pushed the date for Dao Anren’s arrival in Tengyue to October 28; however, the British archives indicated that Dao did not come to Tengyue until November 4. Zeng believes that Xu distorted the facts with the intention of promoting the leadership status of Dao and himself. See Zeng, “Daizu Tongmenghuiyuan Dao Anren ‘meng bubai zhiyuan’ ma?” \textit{Jindaishi yanjiu}, no. 2 (2015): 96.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Zhou Zhongyue, \textit{Xing’an riji}, 225.
\end{itemize}
Xueshi (a cousin of Li Genyuan) operated in Shunming. Liu Desheng headed toward Yunlong. Chen Yulong marched to Dali. Unrestrained by Zhang Wenguang, Chen Yunlong’s force quickly expanded and recruited members from the Gelaohui. Later, his skirmishes with Dali’s army would cause widespread panic in western Yunnan.\footnote{MGTCXZG, 65–66; XYNTZCB, 8.}

In the meantime, the revolutionaries seized Kunming under Cai E and Li Genyuan’s command and then launched campaigns in Guizhou and Sichuan. On November 30, Li Genyuan became the chief commander of the National Army of Western Yunnan and was appointed to lead the Second Division of the Yunnan Army. In early December, Li left for western Yunnan to meet Zhao Fan, whom he respected as his mentor, to settle the conflicts with Tengyue. Zhang Wenguang, the officers of the Tengyue army, and the local gentry seemed willing to submit to Li and the new provincial government. Sensing that he could not win support from the troops and the civilians, Dao Anren retreated to Ganya.\footnote{Xu Yunnan tongzhi changbian, 91, XSNL, 77; MGTCXZG, 65–66. Yixipian recorded that seeing no hope to become the chief commander, Dao had fled before the arrival of Li Genyuan’s army. Zhang Zhaoxing, Yixipian, 486.}

The nianpu largely disputes these conventional records and emphasises Dao Anren’s leadership as well as his legitimacy that came directly from his appointment by Sun Yat-sen and the Tongmenghui branch in Rangoon, which occurred before the Tengyue uprising. In the summer of 1910, Sun had encouraged Dao Anren to overthrow the Qing court, which would eventually lead Ganya to modernisation. In July 1911, Dao held a meeting to plan a revolt in autumn, which was attended by Liu Fuguo as well as the representatives of Zhang Wenguang and the Tongmenghui in Rangoon. Each leader received their assignments of mobilisation, with Dao focusing on organising the native officials and a revolutionary army in Ganya.\footnote{According to the nianpu and similar records, Dao consistently followed the guidance of Sun Yat-sen and the Tongmenghui in Rangoon. In contrast, Zhang attempted to take away Dao’s leadership position by seizing Sun’s Revolutionary Stratagems, a token of the revolutionary leadership that Dao possessed. Zhang also demonstrated considerable incompetence in}

According to the nianpu, the Tongmenghui in Rangoon had recognised Ganya as the headquarters of the uprisings in western Yunnan since 1908, because of Ganya's geographic location, Dao Anren's experience of studying in Japan, and his advantage in ethnic mobilisation. After the Guangzhou uprising, the Tongmenghui in Rangoon entrusted Liu Guofu to strengthen the connection between Dao and Zhang Wenguang. The July meeting in 1911 also assigned Liu to work with the Qing troops in Mangyun, Xima street, and Husa. Zhang would recruit lower-ranking Qing army officers through the network of the Tongzhihui. See DARNP, 43–44, 49–51, 54.
running the new government and in restraining his subordinates, such as Chen Yunlong. The Tongmenghui in Rangoon had a list of charges against Zhang, including harassing civilians, seeking personal fame and gain, and cutting off Tengyue’s communication with Rangoon.\footnote{Zhang Tianfang, “Daizu aiguo lingxiu,” 234; \textit{DARNP}, 54–67; \textit{XSNL}, 76; Feng Ziyou, “Miandian huaqiao yu Zhongguo geming,” in \textit{Geming yishi}, vol. 1: 349. Zeng Yeying points out that the \textit{nianpu} made a false observation regarding Zhang’s communication with Rangoon. See Zeng Yeying, “Daizu Tongmenghuiyuan Dao Anren,” 97–98; \textit{Dianfu xianshilu}, 92–93.}

The British archival sources recognised Dao Anren’s temporary leadership in the new Tengyue government, though without specifically describing his duties and obligations as the \textit{nianpu} and Cao Chengzhang did.\footnote{The \textit{nianpu} argues that Dao took the major responsibilities of running the Tengyue government because Zhang Wenguang was inept and illiterate. Cao Chengzhang adopts the same narrative in his book. Zeng Yeying challenges this interpretation of both leaders’ roles. He argues that Cao had distorted the historical records and gave Dao credit for what Zhang Wenguang and other local elites had contributed. See \textit{DARNP}, 57–59; Cao Chengzhang, \textit{Geming xianqu}, 317–47; Zeng Yeying, “Daizu Tongmenghuiyuan Dao Anren,” 92–107.} Zeng Yeying points out that Dao became a self-proclaimed commander-in-chief on November 8, 1911, who then released himself on December 3.\footnote{Zeng Yeying, “Daizu Tongmenghuiyuan Dao Anren,” 104.} Acting Consul C. D. Smith of the British Consulate in Tengyue identified Zhang Wenguang, Dao Anren, and Li Hanxing as three main revolutionary leaders in the city. However, the power competition between Dao and Zhang would imbue the city with a “strong feeling of insecurity,” especially toward late November.\footnote{“Smith to Jordan–Dated 29th November 1911,” in BL, IOR/L/PS/11/3, P 286/1912, 1.} Smith, too, often criticised Zhang as an ill-educated, foolish, barbaric, and “hopelessly incompetent” leader who was also “ignorant, vacillating, and utterly uncivilised.”\footnote{Smith talked about the foolishness of Zhang and his barbarity. Zhang opened a brothel for the troops and forced women from the neighbouring villages into the brothel. No. 168-P.-1-C.-44, in BL, IOR/L/PS/7/253, Reg 2061, no. 1; IOR/L/PS/11/8, P 777/1912; IOR/L/PS/11/9, P 937/1912, 7; IOR/L/PS/11/3, P 286/1912, 7.} Dao was “on the whole to be preferred to his colleague.” However, the pressure of debts probably was an important consideration for Dao in participating in the uprising and retrieving “otherwise hopelessly involved fortunes.”\footnote{BL, IOR/L/PS/11/3, P 286/19127.}

Both Zhang Wenguang and Dao Anren adopted Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary writings in their separate communications with the British authorities in Burma. On November 5, 1911, addressing himself as “the Governor-General of Yunnan,” Dao issued an English declaration to the British administration in Rangoon: “I have the honour of sending you a copy of our declaration of the Revolution enclosed. Our Revolutionary movement
is anti-Manchu, and so I assure you that we will try our best to protect the foreigners from any danger in our province.” The declaration was based on the *Junzhengfu xuanyan* (Declaration of the Military Government) found in *Geming fanglüe*. The same content was also adopted by a public declaration issued by the Tengyue government in late October. James Fraser (known as Fu Nengren), who was serving in Tengyue under the China Inland Mission, received a letter that was dated October 27, which promised protection from the revolutionaries who were going to overthrow the Manchu dynasty. Tongmenghui member Chen Chunsheng’s also recorded that Zhang Wenguang led the revolutionary government and issued a formal declaration (October 28) to the British officials and missionaries in Tengyue, encouraging them to continue their normal activities that would be protected by the new government. This situation indicated that Dao, Zhang, and potentially other revolutionaries in the area had access to the Tongmenghui’s popular revolutionary guidelines. The popularity and accessibility of *Geming fanglüe* made it difficult to argue that the possession of it meant the legitimacy of the revolutionary leadership.

On November 20, Zhang issued a declaration to Consul Smith, claiming that he had received a secret instruction from Sun Yat-sen to organise the revolution throughout western Yunnan with seven terms of foreign policies. Four days later, with the title “the General of the Chinese,” Zhang notified the British deputy commissioner in Bhamo of the purpose of the Tengyue uprising and the new government’s foreign policies that were found in *Geming fanglüe*.

By the end of November, Consul Smith observed that “the respectable people of Tengyue and the neighbourhood, however, were not prepared to submit to the rule of a barbarian sawbwa [Dao Anren].” The voice calling for Dao Anren to leave became louder, but the cawfa refused and got into a quarrel with Zhang Wenguang. According to Smith, the old brigadier-general

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77 No. 168-P.-1-C.-44, in BL, IOR/L/PS/7/253, Reg 2061, no. 1.  
81 *Dianfu xianshilu*, 14–17. It was very likely that Zhang Wenguang’s declaration followed the newer edition of *Geming fanglüe* that was revised by Sun Yat-sen, Hu Hanmin, and Wang Jingwei in 1908 which demonstrated some subtle language differences from the early edition written in 1906. See Sun Yat-sen, *quanji*, vol. 1: 296–98; Sun Yat-sen, *xuanji*, vol. 1: 77–79.  
82 “Smith to Jordan—Dated 1st, December 1911,” IOR/L/PS/11/3, P 286/1912, 1.  
83 *Dianfu xianshilu*, 8; Sun Yat-sen, *xuanji*, vol. 1: 310–11.
of Tengyue, who was not actively serving in the current government, became the meditator to maintain the peace with his personal influence in the city.\(^8^4\) By December 4, the conflicts between Zhang and Dao were temporarily solved when Dao returned to Ganya and prepared a trip to Hubei with Li Hanxing.\(^8^5\) Zhang remained in power in Tengyue although he was “looked upon with an unfavourable eye” due to his ambition of expansion and his displeasure in submitting to Dali and Kunming.\(^8^6\) Smith looked forward to the coming of Zhao Fan and Li Genyuan, whom the Yunnan government appointed to handle its relationship with the Tengyue government. He heard that when Zhao and Li came, both Zhang and Dao would be dismissed and resume their occupations from before the revolution.\(^8^7\) It appeared that for both the British consul and Tengyue gentry, Zhang and Dao had challenged the previous local order and that Zhao and Li’s coming signalled the restoration of the lost norms that had been preserved and would continue to sustain the Han homelands through political successions. These developments indicated that after the revolutions in 1911, local gentry and their traditional networks and influence across Yunnan still played essential roles in the government affairs. Consul Smith was on a routine business trip in Burma and returned as soon as he was informed of the outbreak of revolution in Tengyue. He believed that Frontier Deputy Zhao Kaixun, however, was in charge of the administrative duties. Zhao was a native Hunanese who would be appointed to oversee Tengchong briefly and then to handle the affairs of the native officials in 1912.\(^8^8\) Smith entertained the idea that “no doubt that it is owing chiefly to him that general tranquillity has been so successfully restored.”\(^8^9\) Indeed, there were traces of the local gentry’s active participation in the Tengyue government. Cun Haiting, Liu Chuxiang, and other gentry and merchants in Tengyue and Burma provided Zhang significant assistance and donations.\(^9^0\) Zhang hired Li Genyuan’s father Li Damao to be a counsellor due to his prestige and experience.\(^9^1\)

84 Smith did not specify who the brigadier-general of Tengyue was. “Smith to Jordan–Dated 29th November 1911,” IOR/L/PS/11/3, P 286/1912, 1.
86 IOR/L/PS/11/2, P 155/1912, 218.
88 MGT/CXZG/153.
89 No. 168-P.-C.-44, in BL, IOR/L/PS/7/253, Reg 2061, no. 6.
91 Dianfu xianshilu, 81.
Further, Zhao Fan’s prestige in western Yunnan and Li Genyuan’s network in Tengyue would play an essential role in transforming Tengyue and Ganya. Zhao had fought against the Dali Regime in a militia he and his clansmen organised in 1869. He had served under Yang Yuke, Liu Changyou, and Cen Yuying, and was involved in the pacification of two rebellions in Yunzhou and Shunning, as well as the *gaitu guiliu* in Shunning. He was close to Cen Yuying’s son Cen Chunxuan. After Cen Chunxuan became the governor of Sichuan in 1902, Zhao received a crucial position to oversee the provincial sale of tea, salt, and the collection of *likin* taxes. In 1910, he returned to his hometown of Jianchuan. In the autumn of 1911, he received Governor Li Jingyi’s invitation to come to Kunming for business and was caught in Dali when the revolutions swept Wuchang and Kunming. Zhao then assisted in organising a new government in Dali because the local gentry saw the expediency of cooperating with the revolutionaries. Due to Zhao’s reputation, Cai E appointed him to oversee the civil and military affairs in western Yunnan and maintain order in Dali. As the tension between Tengyue and Dali increased, the new Yunnan government depended on Zhao to attend to the emergencies.

“Tengyue guangfu jilüe” further praised the local gentry for running the Tengyue government and facilitating the conversation between Tengyue and Kunming. They welcomed Li Genyuan’s appointment to oversee Zhang Wenguang’s negotiation with the new government of Yunnan. According to Li Genyuan, Zhang and the gentry in Tengyue entrusted his father, Li Damao, to mediate with him and Zhao Fan. Li Damao corresponded with Zhao to establish specific steps for the negotiation with the Tengyue government. Li Damao also contacted his son and informed the Tengyue government of some of their communication. In one private letter, Li Damao included

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95 *Dianfu xianshilu*, 82.

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a list of instructions for Genyuan to follow. Li Genyuan was expected to always listen to and respect Zhao’s advice, to be careful when selecting local officials, and to give preference to or promote the participants of the uprising. According to Li Damao, potential candidates for promotion were Peng Ming, Li Xueshi (Li Genyuan’s cousin), Qian Taifeng, and Liu Desheng. He further admonished his son to consider the civilians’ interests. Finally, he urged Li Genyuan to bring a large number of troops to deter the Tengyue government and to disarm the Tengyue troops with appropriate solutions and extreme precautions. While restoring the local militia and the baojia system, a mechanism of population and neighbourhood management, Li Genyuan was tasked with pursuing gaitu guiliu and selecting capable native officials for civil offices. Li Damao repeatedly admonished his son to disregard popular criticism against Zhang and to instead recognise Zhang’s contributions, especially in protecting the local gentry.97

With this groundwork set, Li Genyuan arrived in Dali on November 27 and convened with Zhao Fan. He expressed his willingness to follow Zhao’s instructions on any issues regarding the administrative and structural reforms in Tengyue.98 The Tengyue government sent some gentry representatives northward to welcome Li and Zhao and prepare for the negotiation.99 Li informed these representatives of his proposal regarding military disarmament, taxation, and civil bureaucracy. Zhang Wenguang quickly approved these terms. In early January 1912, Li reported to the Yunnan provincial government and secured Zhang’s primary leadership in Tengyue.100 Then Li Genyuan and Zhao Fan came to Tengyue on February 1, 1912, with two to three thousand troops. Zhao Fan contacted Consul Smith the next day to propose a meeting on February 4. In the meeting, Zhao “expressed himself in the most cordial manner” and pointed out the urgency of returning Tengyue back to its normal order, including the functioning of the Tengyue Customs. Li called Smith on February 5 in a very friendly manner.101

People in Tengyue had been expecting that the confrontation would be solved more easily because of the coming of Li Genyuan. Among the revolutionary leaders and gentry in Tengyue, Li Xueshi, Peng Ming, and Liu Desheng had considered Li Genyuan their mentor from the time they were trained in the Yunnan Military Academy.102 Soon, Li Genyuan and

97 XSNL, 78–79.
98 Ibid., 79–80.
99 Xishi huilüe, 514.
100 XSNL, 79–80; DARNP, 61.
101 BL, IOR/L/PS/11/9, P 937/1912, 2–3.
Zhao Fan disbanded Zhang Wenguang’s troops and largely deprived him of his power.103 The government of the native officials in the area was being transformed into a civil administration.104 Zhao Fan later declared Tengyue a prefecture, under the name of Tengchong fu, an old designation under the Ming dynasty. Zhao Kaixun, who had been disfavoured by Zhang, was appointed to be the new prefect. Consul Smith believed that Zhao Kaixun’s “ability and the confidence reposed in him by the gentry and people made him indispensable.” Smith considered this appointment very satisfactory, and Zhao Kaixun would be able to exercise influence with the esteem he had earned as the frontier deputy.105

On the other hand, Dao Anren was sent to Wuhan to report the situation in Tengyue, which, according to the nianpu, was a trap set up by Zhang Wenguang and the Yunnan provincial authorities to get rid of him. Since mid-November, the Tengyue government had received reports about the rebellion of cawfa Dao Shangda of Zhenkang, who intended to restore the government of native officials. The Han gentry petitioned the Tengyue government to punish Dao Shangda, who had been ruthless and threatened their lives. By mid-December, Dao Shangda’s rebellion had been pacified.106 However, on December 10, Chen Yunlong reported that, with the ambition to seizing all of Yunnan, Dao Anren had sent a man to Dali to acquire firearms and gain the cooperation of the Dali army.107 Later, information about Dao Anren’s possession of the Tengyue government’s firearms and instigation of rebellions also gradually emerged. Li Genyuan ordered Zhang Wenguang to pacify Ganya in order to retrieve the firearms if Dao refused to comply.108

Sharing some similar accounts, the historical documents that emerged during this period would seal Dao Anren’s anti-Han and rebellious profile.

103 BL, IOR/L/PS/11/9, P 937/1912, 4.
104 Ganya, Zhanda, and Longchuan would be transformed to prefectures. Husa and Lasa were to be combined with either Longchuan or Ganya. BL, IOR/L/PS/11/9, P 937/1912, 5.
105 Ibid., 92.
106 Dianfu xianshilu, 72–73, 93–97.
107 Ibid., 92.
108 See the correspondences between Zhang Wenguang and Li Genyuan in YCFWZ, vol. 3: 2708–09 and in Dianfu xianshilu, 124. Zhang and Li’s correspondences recorded in Dianfu xianshilu, however, were different from the records in Yongchangfu wenzheng. The records in Yongchangfu wenzheng added the information that indicated Dao Anren’s instigation of the rebellion. Cao Chengzhang points out that in Yongchangfu wenzheng Li Genyuan forged his correspondence with Zhang Wenguang in order to incriminate Dao. Cao Chengzhang, Geming xianqu, 356–58. In contrast, Zeng Yeying believes that after Zhang was stripped of power, he sympathised with Dao Anren, who was in prison. Therefore, he removed the evidence of Dao Anren’s involvement in the rebellion in Dianfu xianshilu, which, however, had been sent to Li Genyuan earlier. Zeng Yeying, “Daizu Tongmenghuiyuan Dao Anren,” 114.
Xu Yunnan tongzhi changbian recorded that in taking advantage of the social chaos after the uprising, Dao blackmailed Zhang Wenguang for firearms and supplies, incited the native officials to rebel, issued a tremendous amount of paper currency, and finally escaped. Yixipian also noted these details and pointed out that Dao left an unmanageable mess when he fled. In “Tengyue guangfu jilüe,” Dao Anren forced the civilians to use the new currency he issued, burned government documents, and incited Dao Shangda to kill government officials. “Xinhai Yunnan guangfuji” agreed that Dao Shangda’s violence was a result of Dao Anren’s manipulation; however, Dao Anren’s intention was to rebel against the Han and become the head of the region.¹⁰⁹ Revolutionaries and Tongmenghui members such as Yang Dazhu and Chen Chunsheng also wrote about Dao Anren’s ambition to occupy Tengyue and, eventually, the entirety of Yunnan.¹¹⁰

In February, Dao Anren met Sun Yat-sen in Shanghai and sought official recognition of his status and a position in the state military. Sun issued two executive orders on March 5, 1912, confirming that the central government would oversee the reforms of the rule of native officials in Ganya. Further, the Nanjing provisional government had granted Dao’s request to receive military ranks, uniforms, and official seals.¹¹¹ However, in March, Dao was arrested in Nanjing and charged with instigating rebellions to eliminate the Han.¹¹² The nianpu narrates that Sun Yat-sen, Huang Xing, and Song Jiaoren managed to rescue Dao from jail in September 1912. In contrast, an early ROC record indicated that Zhu Jiaobao, Ding Huai, Yan Zhongliang, Chen Dengshan, Song Jiaoren, Chen Huan, Jiang Zuobin, Chen Bokai, and Zhang Tianduo advocated against the wrongful charges against Dao. Later, Yuan Shikai granted Dao a position and kept him away from Ganya.¹¹³ In late March of 1913,

¹⁰⁹ See Xu Yunnan tongzhi changbian, 9; Zhang Zhaoxing, Yixipian, 488; Cao Zhiqi, “Tengyue guangfu jilüe,” 333–34; Chen Chunsheng, “Xinhai Yunnan guangfuji,” 302.
Dao died. His son, Dao Jingban, believed that Yuan Shikai had poisoned his father. 114

This book does not examine the details of Dao Anren’s arrest, imprisonment, and death in the following years, for Chinese scholars such as Zeng Yeying, Cao Chengzhang, and Pan Xianlin have thoroughly researched the matter. Zhang Tianfang and Cao Chengzhang believe that Cai E, Wu Tingfang, Li Genyuan, and Zhang Taiyan were all behind the incrimination of Dao Anren and the creation of the anti-Dao Anren rhetoric. Pan Xianlin points out that Li Genyuan and the new Yunnan provincial government had extreme distrust toward Dao due to his position in the Tengyue government and his military power, as well as his connections with Sun Yat-sen and the Tongmenghui in Rangoon. 115 Zeng Yeying’s two journal articles challenge Cao’s arguments and sources, debunking some “myths” Cao has promoted since the 1980s. For instance, Zeng points out that it was possible that Sun approved Dao’s arrest, with the evidence that Dao sent a letter to Sun’s rival Zhang Taiyan, instead of Sun himself, to seek help when he was in prison. 116 Nevertheless, Dao did give the Yunnan revolutionaries a rebellious impression, Long Xiaoyan and Duan Libo argued, due to prevalent Han chauvinism and the cawfa’s actions to seek ethnic autonomy. Although his autonomous vision might have worked under Sun’s plan, it violated Cai E’s ambition for the unification of China. 117

115 Pan Xianlin, “Xinhai geming shiqi Yunnanjun dudufu minzu zhengce xilun,” Journal of Yunnan Nationalities University (Social Sciences), vol. 28, no. 6 (2011): 38–44.
116 Zeng points out that three primary sources provided the evidence that Dao Anren was rescued by Sun. These sources are Wang Du’s Dao Anren zhuans, Qian Langban’s recollections, and “Dao Anren’s” of an anonymous writer. Zeng largely suspected the credibility of these materials. See Zeng Yeying, “Sun Zhongshan, Huangxing ‘yingjiu’ guo Dao Anren ma?” 140.
117 Long Xiaoyan and Duan Libo, “Dao Anren yuan’an,” 42.
Conclusion

From Wu Sangui’s rebellion (1673) to the Qing-Burmese campaigns (1765) to Du Wenxiu’s Rebellion (1856), big and small revolts occurred in the interlude between these major events in Yunnan and continued after the collapse of the Qing Empire in 1911. For over two centuries, the Manchu rulers depended on the Han, Hui, Tai, and other ethnic elites to cooperate with the imperial officials and govern this tumultuous multi-ethnic border region. This book has identified these local elites as the state agents who acted on their own behalf or on the behalf of their communities while assisting the state in governing its borderlands. The key difference between the state agents and the representatives of the state, who were often government officials assigned to Yunnan, lay in that the former prioritised local interests whereas the latter emphasised the state’s agenda. More importantly, the latter relied on the former to fulfil their duties because of their limited knowledge about the place and their restricted means of mobilising local resources. There was not always, however, a clear distinction between the state agents and the state representatives, especially after the mid-nineteenth century when the local elites became government officials or state military leaders to pacify rebellions across the province. Due to this reason, the state government fostered closer relationships with local actors in Yunnan, and, through the state representatives, mobilised more state agents to serve in various venues of state affairs that were not limited to intelligence collecting and border surveys. These state agents were not necessarily Han; however, the Han in particular, and some Confucian-educated non-Han elites, stayed closer to state power, possessed more privileges and upward mobility, maintained a higher level of social and economic status, and established cultural hegemony as well as dominance in literary traditions and local historiography.

Long before they served the Manchu rulers, the local elites in Yunnan had served the Yuan and Ming Empires with or without official titles such as government officials, military leaders, and native officials. While the Hui gentry largely traced their roots back to the Mongols’ Central Asian allies, many Han gentry and even Tai native officials claimed to be the descendants

DOI: 10.5117/9789048558995_CONC
of the Ming army officers who had come from China Proper. These local actors, who might or might not have been newcomers and who were not limited to the Hui, Han, and Tai, had found homes in Yunnan and transformed parts of the borderlands into their new homelands that were far away from their places of origin. Through the compilation of gazetteers and genealogies, both Han and non-Han groups recorded and narrated their stories of generational migration and settlement. Oral traditions therefore combined with written documents to cultivate their collective identities and cultural influence and to demonstrate complicated networks necessary to maintain their social control.

The local actors were crucial in the state’s consolidation of the border regions especially during China’s dynastic successions. They also became more enduring and consistent forces, especially in comparison to state power, that could be new, collapsing, and overall fragile in its frontier. By the mid-nineteenth century, internal revolts and European expansion in the Indochina Peninsula had destabilised the Qing Empire’s foundation in its southwestern borderlands and tributary states. When the state authority weakened, the local actors primarily focused on defending homes, communities, and even a larger territory to sustain their social and economic activities. The Black Flag Army, for instance, fought rival bandit groups and the French to secure a space in the upper Red River. Fundamentally, when the state institutions failed to address social conflicts and crises, local actors depended on their own means and created their own mechanisms to preserve their communities. They further contributed to sustaining the weak state authorities. For example, when the Qing legal system failed to address intensified intergroup competition in Yunnan’s mining areas, the construction of the Hui-Han division facilitated social mobilisation along ethnic lines and enabled the civilians who belonged to these two vague identity groups to group with each other and seek social justice through direct revenge. For these reasons, Du Wenxiu called on those people who were oppressed by the Manchu, including the Han and non-Han civilians, to restore the Chinese state. In turn, the Han and some non-Han gentry in western Yunnan raised militia forces and engaged in warfare against Du Wenxiu’s army for more than a decade.

Not all local actors in Yunnan would become state agents. In the meantime, as the book title suggests, the loyalty between the state and its agents remained contingent and conditional. For instance, many Han and non-Han elites as well as civilians who had had loyalty crises when the Manchu took over China, were, at some point, anti-Manchu. They remained committed to their own country—the Chinese state inaugurated with Confucian
and Han norms—as the Manchu adopted the same institutions to govern the country and facilitate the upward social mobility of these elites. They would cooperate with the Qing government if the latter could serve as the vehicle to meet their needs of survival, prosperity, and relative autonomy in the imperial borderlands. Many Han and Hui gentry in western Yunnan continued to take the imperial examination and serve the Qing government. The native officials, such as the Dao family in Ganya, kept their hereditary titles during the Qing and continued to oversee the Ming frontier gates and China’s territory. Nevertheless, as shown by Du Wenxiu’s Rebellion, Dao Anren’s ambition to become independent from the Qing, and Li Genyuan’s anti-Manchu revolutions, their patriotism toward the Chinese state remained consistent and was not necessarily transferred to the Qing government. Nor was such patriotism equal to their contingent loyalty to the Manchus.

The state, on the other hand, maintained conditional allegiance toward its agents in the borderlands unless such an alliance was crucial in the state’s territorial expansion and consolidation. The state authorities selectively sponsored or collaborated with the local actors to expand their influence and control. The worth of the selected state agents, therefore, depended on the judgement of specific state authorities who might possess different visions than their peers. In this case, the Yunnan and Guangxi military’s contradictory attitude toward Liu Yongfu indicated that the status of enemy or ally was subject to state interests and the interpretation of state interests at the time. The marginalisation and the construction of the Hui-Han division in Yunnan in the nineteenth century further revealed that the Han had viewed the Hui as “the others” despite the latter’s successful political participation and integration into Confucian-oriented social and cultural norms. The Hui embraced the Chinese language, adopted Han customs, followed the Han’s tradition of genealogy composition, and engaged in Confucian learning. Confucianism had become an essential part of their education and an important element of the Islamic culture in the late imperial China. Like the Han, the Hui had also made the Yunnan borderlands their homelands with significant influence from both the Islamic religion and Confucian norms. However, in comparison to other groups that also had an anti-Manchu profile—especially the Han,


2. Ma Jianxiong, “Introduction: Hui Communities from the Ming to the Qing,” 2.
who had persistently rebelled against the Qing government since the seventeenth century—the Hui, contemporary Hui scholars argue, had suffered widespread discrimination and persecution. In the nineteenth century, Hui-Han competition in Yunnan’s mining and trade ignited and accumulated conflicts, which further resulted in the identification of the Hui as rebels and even in Hui genocide.

The shift in the Hui’s relationship with the Qing government further suggested that political and cultural alienation could be manipulated by the state and its allies. In the Han-dominant social and political discourse, the conflicts between the Han and certain non-Han groups had been tactfully framed as or escalated to, often by Han intellectuals or officials, the conflicts between the state and those non-Han groups. Such prejudice and rhetoric profoundly affected local officials’ attitudes toward and policies on Yunnan’s intergroup relations, which, over time, exacerbated the social and economic inequalities between the Han and Hui. In many instances, such rhetoric and tactics were adopted to alienate the non-Han groups and exclude them from the centre of local and state political authorities. The Tai, who had formed strong and wide religious, kinship, and political ties with the Shan communities across Yunnan’s border with Mainland Southeast Asia especially, were also suspected of disloyalty toward the state and suffered discrimination due to such a suspicion and Han ethnocentrism. Though he had shown his devotion to the same Chinese state and Ming Empire glorified by the early twentieth-century Han nationalists, Dao Anren was considered a barbarian by many Han intellectuals and revolutionaries. Dao’s intention of independence and his conflicts with fellow revolutionaries in Tengyue were framed as anti-Han. To cripple his power, the revolutionaries, politicians, and warlords in and outside Yunnan promoted a popular narrative of Dao’s rebellions and his ambition of launching Han genocide in western Yunnan.

Fundamentally, the state and its agents maintained contingent loyalties toward each other because of their competition in the borderlands’ physical space and social control, which made conflicts unavoidable and cooperation possible. This phenomenon revealed that in a region identified as the imperial borderlands, the fundamental interests of the state and of the state agents could be heterogenous in their nature, which, however, was not necessarily demonstrated nor resulted in direct confrontations. In other words, though the agendas of the state and of the state agents might vary or become fundamentally opposite, their priorities were adjustable, which gave room for negotiation and collaboration in fulfilling both parties’ interests to a certain extent. Structuralised and institutionalised mechanisms of
Cooperation could appear to deter the centrifugal force that could alienate the alliance between state and the state agents. Hence, the heterogeneous nature of their coexistence could be concealed by their conditional cooperation. More specifically, the state agents primarily served their own and local communities’ interests before they advocated for the state. From this perspective, collaboration occurred when the demands of the state territorial enclosure would not pose a serious threat to or would even boost the state agents’ local control. Collaboration could also follow violence through which the state established its overall dominance whether in the forms of indirect or direct rule. Essentially, confrontations were expected, as shown in the Ming and Qing policies of gaitu guiliu, because at certain points, the state agents had to reconcile and then transfer a certain form of their power, partially or entirely, to the state, in exchange for other forms of privileges to maintain their social status. After all, indirect administration was an expedient step in the overall process of state expansion and ultimate agenda of direct rule.

Modern Yunnan saw diligent Muslim merchants and caravanners running urban shops or traversing across the mountains; devoted Han gentry building Confucian academies and ancestral halls; fierce bandits and “wild men” fighting against the European troops; and the Tai and Kachin native officials guarding the Ming frontier gates. All these frontier inhabitants required their corresponding physical and social spaces for survival or for prosperity. While the Chinese merchants across Upper Burma and western Yunnan sensed threats from foreign capital in cross-border trade, the Black Flags felt that their survival space was endangered by French expansion. The space of the borderlands, therefore, had been conceptualised and divided into various physical and social territories, inevitably accompanied by peaceful or violent exchanges as these territories overlapped in many ways. Robert Sack points out that territory formation is also the process that creates a place that needs constant care for its establishment and maintenance. John Agnew also argues that “humanly constructed settings for social and political action” turn the space into a place or “lived space.” In this process, a space is translated from an abstract category into a certain human territory and becomes “a socially meaningful quotidian reality.”

5 See the arguments Vaccaro, Dawson, and Zanotti derived from the scholarship of Delaney and Storey. Ismael Vaccaro, Allan Charles Dawson, and Laura Zanotti, “Negotiating Territoriality:
Therefore, various human territories have become corresponding places especially when specific territoriality endows a space with certain values by sculpting its spatial relations. Whether they were centuries-old settlers or recent bandits and drifters, the inhabitants of Yunnan turned the imperial frontier into places more or less their own, with unique, dynamic spatial relations and cultural distinctions. Their territorial demands and control satisfied the space and the resources they needed for spatial socialisation and identity construction.

Hence, in the process of creating a place, people, institutions, and cultural discourses converged and shaped their desired territorial control and order. Sharing the common historical memory of military relocation dating back to the early Ming dynasty, the Li clan that settled along the Dieshui River of Tengyue and other Han gentry created their own Han homelands in a certain space of multi-ethnic Yunnan and Upper Burma. While the Tai cawfas and other native officials in the same region continued to govern their hereditary dominions that were granted by the Ming emperors, they formed closer bonds with the same language, cultural, and religious groups across the Yunnan-Burma frontier. With greater mobility, the Black Flags and those merchants of both civilian and military backgrounds expanded the conception of territoriality and spatial relations beyond the traditional restrictions of a native-place or the state boundary. These territorial arrangements were turned to the local actors’ advantage to serve the Qing government and its tributary states that stood as the fanli (meaning fence) of China’s borderlands. In the meantime, both the state and its various state agents became pragmatic and resourceful in coordinating their demands as well as their convoluted relationships. The Guangxi military and the Qing court sponsored Liu Yongfu’s operations in Vietnam. The Vietnamese court tolerated and manipulated the Black Flags’ expansion in the upper Red River. The Han gentry and military men embraced the policy of *gaitu guiliu* to expand their control into the native officials’ dominions, and some of them took possession of the Hui’s properties in the process of pacifying the rebels in the nineteenth century.

Nonetheless, not all local actors’ actions would consistently conform to the state’s agenda of border consolidation, national defence, and diplomatic relations, as demonstrated by the Tengyue gentry’s and militia’s...
involvement in the Margary Affair as well as Dao Yingting’s obstructions in the Sino-Burmese border demarcation. Such contradictions, however, further confirmed that local actors prioritised their own or community interests, and that their understanding of border, state, and international affairs could differ from the visions of state officials. As examplified by Dao Yingting’s actions in hindering the Sino-Burmese border demarcation in the Kachin Hills, the local actors could possess the autonomy to violate the state’s policies and interfere with the state’s diplomatic relations. In another contradictory case when Liu Daoheng sought British support to counter the Qing government, Du Wenxiu, the head of the Dali Regime, who remained loyal to the Chinese state, denied the legitimacy of Liu’s manoeuvres. Other cases, such as Hui general Li Guolun’s collaboration with the Sladen Mission to restore trade between Yunnan and Upper Burma as well as Yunnan officials’ short-lived collaboration with Jean Dupuis, suggested that exceptions occurred due to individual interests, expediency, or pragmatism.

Likewise, the state agents’ spatial relations would not always conform to the state territorial demands and political boundary. Exceptions and contradictions were common, especially in the case of military-merchants, whose cotton, opium, and silk travelled across Yunnan’s boundary with British Burma and French Indochina. The military-merchants actively traded with the European capital they once resisted, and their business enterprises breached the state political boundary they once defended. Their prosperity overshadowed a brutal process of wealth accumulation at the expense of civilian assets, such as those of the Hui. Moreover, the combination of military power and capital further enforced long-term ethnic, social and economic inequality in modern Yunnan.

These exceptions, however, would not necessarily undermine the state agents’ overall commitment to the state and the communities to which they chose to stay loyal. Ideally, the state agents’ judgement on personal, community, and state interests could drive them through course corrections to reach a balance between individual and collective demands. Therefore, exceptions would not significantly deviate the state agents from the main course of protecting the state and communities to which they remained loyal, or in many cases, would not distract them from the main course of territorial expansion and power consolidation. Overall, cooperation between the state agents and the state remained crucial when the two parties shared compatible or similar interests on the same land that bore two natures of territoriality and two systems of spatial relations: the imperial borderlands and the local homeland.
In general, the Qing court developed interdependent relationships with its agents in the borderlands and in the tributary states, which opened a channel for these agents to move into the official bureaucratic and military systems. This upward social mobility challenged the traditional law of avoidance, a means intended to restrain the growth of local power, and increased state agents’ influence in domestic and international affairs. By the mid-nineteenth century, the Yunnan elites’ response in local crisis management had integrated them into a larger, regional platform or even transnational entities that were based on but not limited to lineage, kinship, Confucian institutions, commercial ties, and folk religions. Centuries of construction of the Han homelands across the imperial frontier, in particular, created the most powerful and competitive group of state agents. The Han gentry and those non-Han elites who had conformed to the Confucian and Han norms appeared as the most reliable allies of the state; they cooperated with and promoted the state’s policy of gaitu guiliu that had undermined the native officials’ territory and power; they organised and funded their own militia to counter internal and external threats; and they intervened in Qing international diplomacy. Some of them might have assisted the foreign explorers in survey and investigation missions, however, with more complexities in their intentions, shown by Zhang Chenglian and Zhang Dexin, who in fact spied on and hindered the British agenda of border surveying.

As internal and external turmoil continued to challenge the Qing state’s authority and its vaguely defined state boundary in the nineteenth century, the sense of collective identity and cultural identification played increasing roles in intergroup conflicts and international affairs. Frequent clashes accompanied different groups of local actors’ and state powers’ efforts to dominate the same, or at least overlapping, territories across the border regions of China and the northern Indochina Peninsula. In this process, the Han and some Confucian-educated, non-Han elites grew closer to state power, which would pave the foundation for Yunnan’s power transition after the collapse of the Qing Empire. In the meantime, stronger ethnic distinctions were reinforced in Yunnan, which would perpetuate political and economic inequalities as well as the suspicion of and discrimination

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6 The law of avoidance was shaking even in Cen Yuying’s case. Although born in Guangxi, Cen Yuying came to Yunnan for his education under the guidance of the local scholars. Therefore, when he was governing in Yunnan, outside of his native place, he still served the communities in which he found his social and intellectual roots. Zhao Fan, Cen Xiangqin gong nianpu (Taipei: Guangwen shuju, 1971), 14.
against the non-Han populations, and which would resonate with the popular anti-Manchu Chinese nationalism in the early twentieth century. Specifically, from the 1850s to the 1870s, the Han gentry in western Yunnan considered the Hui rebels no different than the British intruders in the sense that they all had disturbed and threatened the socioeconomic order and norms that sustained the Han homelands. In the same fashion, the Han gentry in western Yunnan would not trust Dao Anren, a Tai, to lead Tengyue into the Republican era and modernise Ganya. These gentry even considered both Zhang Wenguang and Dao potential threats to the stability and order of their homelands. They labelled Dao and other Tai leaders, who were the rivals of the Han gentry and potential obstacles for the Yunnan warlords’ domination of the province, as separatists, and thus, anti-Han. While maintaining their social control, the gentry in western Yunnan adapted a revolutionary outlook in 1911 and cooperated with the new Yunnan government to claim independence from the Qing. In the following decades, they would continue to support the Yunnan warlords’ tireless efforts to consolidate the province and implement direct rule in Yunnan amidst ethnic confrontations and rebellions. In 1947, Tai cawfa Fang Kesheng would encounter “enormous obstacles” when promoting his blueprint to modernise the district of Luxi with “a vision of ethnic cooperation and empowerment for minorities that has only rarely been embraced over the past seventy years.”

Nevertheless, both Du Wenxiu and Dao Anren had expressed their loyalty to the Chinese state along with their antagonism toward the Qing government. Du was accomplished in Confucian learning and conformed to Confucian norms. Du and fellow Hui leaders revolted against the Qing to overthrow Manchu rule and, in Du's words, to restore the Chinese government. Du adopted the Ming style of clothing as well as rituals and ceremonies in Dali. However, the rise of the Muslim army and the Dali regime had damaged the Han homelands in western Yunnan and would continue to threaten the Qing government that the Han gentry relied on to restore their homes and sustain their status. In a similar case, Dao claimed a Han lineage as well as legitimacy and duty to protect the imperial frontier that had been entrusted to the native officials by the Ming emperors. Dao’s father and fellow native officials had actively engaged in operations of countering foreign encroachment throughout the 1890s and early 1900s. They challenged the Sino-Burmese border surveys and demarcation and even directly clashed with British troops. When Dao envisioned a modernised, independent Ganya

prior to the 1911 Revolution, his military mobilisation was meshed into Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary agenda in southern and southwestern China. However, Dao’s blueprint did not conform to the Yunnan Warlords’ timetable of gaitu guiliu and territorial expansion, nor did Dao’s vision complement the Confucian-educated gentry’s effort to strengthen their social control and the Han dominant local power structure.

As elaborated above, the competition between state and local actors in the frontier marked the heterogeneous nature of their coexistence but did not rule out the possibilities of their conditional collaborations. The understanding of such convoluted relationships and complicated power-struggles is crucial to conceptualise the Yunnan borderlands as a converging space for competing territories and corresponding territorialities. These notions further provide the foundation for becoming aware of the discrepancies in the historical narratives that the state and local actors employed in documenting and writing about “us,” “the others” and their exchanges, as well as the impacts that these discrepancies have had in the historical development of the borderlands. The contested nature of the modern Yunnan borderlands, therefore, also exists in the borderlands’ mental space, a place where the state and local actors sought the legitimacy of their presence and control through the construction of history, historiography, and identities.

Among the institutions that contribute to the creation and maintenance of a place, the writing of history plays an essential role in establishing and shaping the mental and even ideological spheres attached to a physical space. From the formation of individual or collective identities to the recognition of the legitimacy of the local and imperial powers, historical writings and documentation about Yunnan have created various forms of collective memory. These narratives corroborate or contradict each other, creating varied interpretations for the local and state powers to explain their roles and claim their legitimacy in the borderlands’ transformation. Therefore, as the creation and maintenance of collective memory have become another arena of competition, it is not surprising to see that those contradictory narratives about the same historical events and figures, such as the records about the Hui, Tai, and Kachin, have emerged from the late nineteenth century and lasted until now. However, it would have been difficult to form a middle ground between different narratives and discourses due to the strong centrifugal forces resulting from long-term intergroup prejudice and profound ideological confrontations.

This phenomenon reveals that, first, as the local power relations realigned with local actors’ competitions and relationships with the state, the Han gentry possessed the literary hegemony to dominate the historical
documentation and historiography of modern Yunnan. These gentry compiled gazetteers, genealogies, anthologies, and private papers to selectively record their life and the life of “the others,” creating stereotypes of heroes and villains in popular perceptions. This literary discourse commemorated the great unification of the empire, the patriotic scholars, the chaste women, the benevolent merchants, and above all, the Confucian gentry who brought light and civilisation to the barbaric frontier. The untold stories of the ethnic civilians or of even those ethnic elites who had claimed the Han heritage have been scattered in segments, here and there, and are scarce to be found. Hence, the Han gentry’s social and cultural control further cultivated and promoted the superiority of Han identity and Confucian norms, which laid the foundation for biased interpretations of the non-Han populations and perpetuated the ethnic and literary inequalities in Yunnan’s mental space. From the Qing court historians’ and local scholars’ records of the Hui-Han confrontation in Yunnan to the accounts on Dao Anren’s operations to eliminate the Han, the standard historical writings on the non-Han people were imbued with discrimination and distrust. This literary discourse and Han-centric historiography continued to justify Han and non-Han distinction and inequity.

Second, the Han gentry’s literary dominance had seen challenges from the non-Han intellectuals since the late nineteenth century and even from their own Han peers, as seen in the writings about the Margary Affair. Contradictory to the voice glorifying Li Zhenguo and the Tengyue gentry, Huang Chengyuan and Chen Du’s narratives on the Margary Affair focused on the collaboration between multiple groups of ethnic civilians in deterring the invaders, which set the precedent for the same interpretation that has dominated the PRC era. Yu Nairen and Yu Xiqian’s research and compilation of primary sources on the Margary Affair in the 1990s as well as the Dehong Prefecture’s newly published compilation of historical documents on the same topic have followed the narrative structure established by Huang and Chen.

Further, more non-Han intellectuals have challenged the Han-dominant narratives of modern Yunnan’s history in the twentieth century and have brought attention to the non-Han peoples’ voices and perspectives by compiling primary sources and revising traditional historiography. The contests in Yunnan borderlands’ mental space have been historical as well as contemporary, and thus a continual process. Generations and groups of storytellers have addressed the same issues consistently, in clarity or in distortion, with the motivations of creating different collective memories, shaping individual and social cognition and consciousness, as well as seeking
new conclusions and platforms for social justice. The development of the historical documentation and historiography about the Hui-Han conflicts and Dao Anren further demonstrate the long process of such confrontations and negotiations.

Specifically, the Hui intellectuals have been battling against the biases perpetuated by the overwhelming voice of the Han storytellers since the nineteenth century. The Hui elites of the 1870s provided abundant materials to Émile Rocher to document the rebellions in Yunnan. In the early twentieth century, the Hui intellectuals in Yunnan organised newspapers and schools to broaden their channels of political participation. The compilation of the Hui historical documents and records in Yunnan throughout the 1950s and 1980s further indicates the Hui elites’ continual effort to draw attention to the untold stories of the Hui and to respond to consistent discrimination against the Hui, especially after the outbreak of the Shadian incident in 1975. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, more Hui scholars such as Ma Jianxiong, Yao Jide, and Ma Cunzhao actively searched historical documents, artifacts, and epitaphs that were created both by the Han and the Hui. They have presented more sources and perspectives to evaluate Hui-Han relations as well as the Hui’s role in the modern transformation of Yunnan.

Likewise, the rewriting of Dao Anren’s history in the 1980s served the same purpose of countering the discrimination and distrust toward the Tai and Tai elites due to the construction of anti-Dao Anren and anti-Tai rhetoric in the early ROC era. Zhang Taiyan’s narrative about Dao in the early twentieth century represented a standardised discourse that forged the image of a power-hungry murderer and an anti-Han separatist who had killed the Tongmenghui revolutionary leader Qin Lishan and would slaughter the Han in western Yunnan to establish his political hegemony. In contrast, Wang Du’s biography on Dao was the dissenting voice to such a conventional narrative and provided the foundation for future historiography about Dao, as seen in the project of contemporary local intellectuals to restore Dao’s reputation. With the publication of Dao Anren nianpu and following academic discussions on Dao beginning in the 1980s, this project has established Dao’s image as a patriotic ethnic leader who defended China’s sovereignty from foreign invasions and as a revolutionary who, under the guidance of Sun Yat-sen, envisioned a modernised and independent Ganya against Qing oppression. Hence, the rewriting of Dao Anren’s history has led Chinese historians to the same sources, Wang Du’s account in particular, that emphasised Dao’s close friendship with Sun Yat-sen and Dao’s leading role in the Tengyue uprising. These stories formed a stark contrast to some popular
historical documents adopted by scholars and officials during the early ROC era and have become more accepted narratives in present-day China.

Indeed, each generation and group of storytellers have been affected by their own historicity, which links them to a milieu of cognitive traditions and value systems embraced by their predecessors, peers, and successors, including the storytellers and the audience, who may share common collective identity and cultural identification. With a perfect understanding of the controversial nature of his life and experience, Liu Yongfu left his own accounts to the judgement of future generations, especially to those intellectuals who would value the Black Flags’ anti-French operations as a beacon of Chinese nationalism amid the Japanese invasion. Zhang Taiyan’s narrative on Dao Anren was embraced by Han-centric intellectuals and politicians who considered the existence of ethnic elites’ local control to be a potential threat to Han cultural and political dominance.

From this perspective, the purposes and results of pre-reflective historical documentation and reflective historiography, whether from top-down or bottom-up approaches, require careful evaluation, especially when the research and reflections that are established on the contemporary discipline of history are missing. For instance, strong Han superiority and the discrimination against the non-Han population were apparent in the historical documents compiled by the Qing court historians as well as local, Confucian-educated Han scholars. These intellectuals also tended to glorify their contribution in local affairs but downplay or neglect that of their ethnic counterparts. Moreover, being subjected to the cultural hegemony and ideological orientation of the current dominant political power—the state, for instance, and its local allies—intellectuals would have contributed their scholarship to the overall political culture that is centred on the state authority and the legitimacy of the government. Therefore, the archives, local gazetteers, genealogies, journals, and private papers composed by the same groups of storytellers as well as their claims of lineage, allegiance, ancestral roots, and patriotism could have only provided many common narratives that conceptualised the state borderlands and annotated its history from limited scopes. In other words, these limited voices, perspectives, and approaches would not have been sufficient to comprehend and interpret the dynamic historical developments of modern Yunnan as well as its close connections and exchanges with the outside world in various broader regional contexts.

Therefore, the history and historiography of modern Yunnan borderlands should have contained more than one standardised narrative and should overcome the effort to establish a unified narrative. The Hui and Tai
intellectuals’ efforts to challenge conventional anti-Hui and anti-Dao Anren rhetoric and to revise traditional Han-dominant recordkeeping and storytelling indicate the existence of alternatives of Yunnan’s history that could not have been Han- and state-centric. Hidden, neglected, or scattered, these alternatives may have existed as segments of historical documents and historical narratives being recorded or told by various agents. This book has endeavoured to piece together some of these segments and to present a non-traditional interpretation to comprehend modern Yunnan, its place, and its people with, still, limited scopes. Nevertheless, the main challenge to such an endeavour still remains in the historical subjectivity and historicity of the sources as well as the narratives that have been constructed thereon. Like the Han-dominant sources and historiography, the non-Han voices and narratives have been restricted by the distinctive subjectivity and historicity of their creators, as seen in the reconstruction of the Kachin civilians’ role in the Margary Affair and the rewriting of Dao Anren’s history.

Taking the rewriting of Dao Anren’s story as an example, two aspects of local involvement in Yunnan’s border affairs and revolutions have been neglected. First, the native officials’ operations and mobilisation in the border affairs in Upper Burma and western Yunnan were not necessarily performed by Dao but have been credited to Dao in the pre-1949 local historiography. Second, western Yunnan gentry’s involvement in the Qing-British border negotiation and the 1911 revolutions received little attention in the post-1949 local historiography. The rewriting of Dao’s history has seen challenges, as demonstrated by Zeng Yeying’s criticism of Cao Chengzhang’s arguments, when the historical sources and narratives were employed and tailored to serve the strong desire and bias toward rescuing Dao Anren from negative historical records.

What is, then, the value of such reconstructed narratives, in conjunction with all the other reconstructed narratives in local historical documents and in the existing historiography? Why is it still important to pay attention to and discuss these equally problematic narratives?

Narratives and narrative structures are intrinsic characteristics of pre-reflective storytelling and reflective historiography. Storytelling and historical writing, therefore, unavoidably involve the construction and reconstruction of narratives with the structures that reflect the creators’ cognition and consciousness as well as the intention to shape the cognition and consciousness of the audience. Thus, this process of writing and intellectual exchange has been restricted by the historicity of the writer, the subject, and the audience. In other words, biases, inaccuracies, and even distortions are the by-products of storytelling. Therefore, critical historical
research within the premise of the modern discipline of history values historians’ consistent efforts to reflect their own and others’ historical consciousness, and thus, to seek objectivity in their intellectual work.\(^8\)

Nevertheless, historians are also confounded by their own historicity, which, as David Carr has pointed out, is not an isolated awareness and mentality, but an accumulative cognitive deposit that relates historians to broader contexts of predecessors, peers, and successors as well as their experiences and reflections throughout time. In other words, though striving for objectivity, historians’ historical consciousness and interpretations of given historical subjects have been more or less affected by pre-reflective storytelling or reflective historiography, whether they agree or disagree and value or downplay the historical narratives they have encountered. Therefore, the reflections on our own subjectivity and on the subjectivity of varied narratives enable us to identify our limits and biases as well as the origins of these issues, and thus initiate course corrections. Such reflections will further allow us to understand ourselves, our identities, our current pursuits, our projections for the future, and, overall, the context of our being and meaning.\(^9\)

Despite the distortion of historical sources and controversial arguments that were driven by a strong desire and eagerness to redeem Dao Anren's negative image in the historical records, the reconstruction of Dao's history and similar historical endeavours have brought our attention to the historical subjectivity and the historicity of the source creators. Specifically, the subjectivity of the reconstructed narrative about Dao leads our attention to the motivation of its creation, which was to counter the long-term bias toward Dao existing in inaccurate historical accounts, and which has also questioned a larger scale of narratives and historiography mainly written by the Han gentry being dominated by their subjectivity. From this literary confrontation that stretched across time, we see that both genres of narratives about the same historical figures or events in modern Yunnan demonstrate a long-term historical evolution of power structures, intergroup relations, political and ideological discourses, as well as literary and cultural traditions. This process of evolution has produced different generations and groups of storytellers with varied historical consciousness and has cultivated more than one alternative to interpret the transformation of life,

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ideas, values, and identities, with varied approaches for understanding modern Yunnan. Ericka Tucker points out that the examination of our historicity allows us to see how “the historical conceptions of the world and ourselves shape our actions, perceptions, and collective identity.”

Thus, searching, exploring, and examining different alternatives of modern Yunnan’s history can be essential for identifying different alternatives of the historical consciousness and for fully understanding their long-lasting impacts. This effort would be a crucial step for comprehending the complicated and dynamic nature of Yunnan not fully presented by the traditional and familiar narratives of this border region.

Further, as storytellers connected their reflections of the present and their projection of the future into the construction of historical narratives, the past, Carr argues, “is involved only in so far as it figures in the larger context which includes present and future.”

From this perspective, the storytellers who have offered various narratives about modern Yunnan were writing about their present situation to negotiate a future through the reflections of the past. When Li Genyuan compiled his family genealogy in the twentieth century, he did not merely recount and commemorate the virtuous men and women of the Li family in the nineteenth century or earlier. More important, Li demonstrated a commonly embraced cultural legacy and legitimacy for his socialisation and the validation of his status in various social and political contexts. The historical consciousness discussed by this book, hence, is no longer restricted to the inaccuracy or the subjectivity of given stories and narratives in pre-reflective or reflective manners. Rather, it is also about the complicated considerations that the storytellers have put into their narratives and narrative structures. It is also about how the creation of these stories and narratives has become, and also has demonstrated, an essential part of modern Yunnan’s transformation.

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10 Ibid., 222.
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From the mid-nineteenth-century Hui rebellions, which challenged centralised state control, to the early-twentieth-century revolutions, which led to Yunnan's decades-long independence, local actors shaped the history of Yunnan through their extensive cross-border networks and contradictory roles in the attempted state consolidation of this contested area. Among the local elites, the state agents, both Han and non-Han, acted on the state's behalf in the borderlands' affairs while seeking balance between the interests of the state and their own communities. The state agents competed with each other while utilising and wrestling with the state authorities. The dynamic relationship between the state and local actors created another contested facet of modern Yunnan's transformation. Competing narratives emerged when local actors negotiated and reconstructed their status within the contemporary Chinese nation-state. Bandits became heroes; separatists became patriots; a vibrant regional center became an isolated, exotic, and marginal province of the People's Republic of China.

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