The Routledge Handbook of Transregional Studies

Edited by Matthias Middell
The Routledge Handbook of Transregional Studies brings together the various fields within which transregional phenomena are scientifically observed and analysed. This handbook presents the theoretical and methodological potential of such studies for the advancement of the conceptualization of global and area-bound developments.

Following three decades of intense debate about globalization and transnationalism, it has become clear that border-crossing connections and interactions between societies are highly important, yet not all extend beyond the borders of nation-states or are of truly world-wide reach. The product of extensive international and interdisciplinary cooperation, this handbook is divided into ten sections that introduce the wide variety of topics within transregional studies, including Colonialism and Post-Colonial Studies, Spatial Formats, International Organizations, Religions and Religious Movements, and Transregional Studies and Narratives of Globalization. Recognizing that transregional studies asks about the space-making and space-formatting character of connections as well as the empirical status of such connections under the global condition, the volume reaches beyond the typical confines of area and regional studies to consider how areas are transcended and transformed more widely.

Combining case studies with both theoretical and methodological considerations, The Routledge Handbook of Transregional Studies provides the first overview of the currently flourishing field of transregional studies and is the ideal volume for students and scholars of this diverse subject and its related fields.

Matthias Middell is professor of cultural history at Leipzig University and its Centre for Area Studies. He has written extensively on the global implications of the French revolution, the history of East Central Europe since the eighteenth century, and on the transformations of the field of global history since the late nineteenth century. He is editor of Comparativ – A Journal of Global History and Comparative Studies.
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Edited by
Matthias Middell
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Transregional phenomena have, for a long time, captured the attention of scholars. Even the mobilities of humankind’s direct ancestors have been analysed as transregional phenomena, and recent DNA sequencing has allowed for astonishing new insights into how far reaching such mobilities have been. Debates on Black Athena and Alexander the Great’s march into India may serve as signs of the transregional connections during antiquity. Arab seafarers exploring the Indian Ocean, Tamerlan’s westward expansion from Central Asia, or the many confrontations between autochthonous populations and invaders from different continents in the Caribbean and Central America are other prominent examples that are closer to our times. Such happenings are evidently marked not only by a fast-growing number of transregional connections but also by the legacy of remembrance of previous ones – often presented in a Eurocentric manner that places their origins and impetus in the so-called Western world.

When examining the Ngramm Viewer’s results for ‘transregional’, an initial interest is observable in the 1940s, a revival in the 1950s, and a massive upward trend in the 1980s that even accelerated in the 1990s. Transregional phenomena were eagerly addressed in many academic disciplines, and more recently they have been accepted as an important part of our lives, irrespective of whether we are from and/or in the West or not. Following the end of the Cold War, transregional phenomena increasingly drew attention within academia specifically, as well as society in general, because they connect seemingly separate worlds – read as world regions – transcending them and contributing to their transformation.

From this increasing awareness, transregional perspectives emerged – that is to say, new narratives primarily placing emphasis on the connectedness of such worlds or even on the relative disappearance of their borders. Again, traversing and transformation of something that is called a region seems to be the main attribute of transregional perspectives. These perspectives can be found across the humanities and social sciences as well as in the natural sciences (when we think of climate change research) and life sciences (for example, research on the flows of viruses across their original habitat). However, occasionally emphasizing transregional phenomena and underlining the importance of adopting a transregional perspective in the organization of empirical research might not suffice to systematically study transregional mobilities and ties as well as transregionalism as some sort of political reaction to the growing importance of transregional flows connecting, transcending, and transforming regions. At the same time, and this looks at the flip side of the coin, such an approach encounters difficulties during the discovery
stage, a point when empirical research is often just beginning to identify the transregional character of the subject under investigation, and the larger picture – which becomes a precondition for developing typologies – is still missing. The time, however, seems ripe to make an initial attempt at an overview of recent research tendencies toward transregional phenomena and perspectives in order to ask if this already forms a coherent field of transregional studies. Such an endeavour does not have to provide as its main goal a definitive answer to the question what transregional studies are, but it does have to illustrate and take stock of what it means to do transregional studies. This handbook is intended to identify and examine a series of approaches and topics that exist across disciplines and area studies dealing with transregional phenomena as well as promoting a transregional perspective. This scholastic undertaking aims to raise the question of whether all these efforts profit as well as offer an added value when taken systematically together as transregional studies.

This added value goes beyond the additional competences developed within disciplines that cooperate together: as an example, think only of the both politically and academically discussed new presence of China in Africa (Taylor 2006; Alden et al. 2008), a topic that certainly intrigues scholars in African studies. These scholars contribute with their observations of contacts not only between Chinese and Africans (Fijałkowski 2011) but also between former Chinese and other Asian immigrants to Africa as well as more recently arrived groups. They also study the attitudes of African political leaders, entrepreneurs, trade unionists, and many ordinary people toward the Chinese presence in Africa as well as their effects on infrastructures, technologies, political regimes, wages, and the availability of goods; they also examine the circulating ideas about alternative societal models, aesthetics, and daily life practices (Goldstein et al. 2006; Brautigam 2009). All this knowledge production requires cooperation with Chinese studies to better understand the other side in this intensified contact, to analyse the political and economic strategies behind the new run for African resources, and to examine the influences these new and massive entanglements have on Chinese society (Anshan 2015). But cooperation across the boundaries of individual area studies is only one piece of the picture.

The mutual interest from two area studies is complemented by a comparison with the interest of other Asian as well as non-Asian powers in African affairs (Cheru and Obi 2010), by a discussion of new world orders emerging in international relations (Murithi 2014), and by historical comparison with the colonial age and the role European powers played under postcolonial conditions. Economics are needed owing to the fact that the new Chinese-African axis is a powerful one, recalibrating the weights in the world economy and rebalancing the focal points of world trade and the infrastructure for traffic across oceans (Carmody 2010). Knowledge is also needed from other area studies – or the social sciences, often serving area studies within the Western world – to comprehend disrupted spheres of interest as well as consequences for global migration regimes, just to mention again only exemplary dimensions of the phenomena under investigation. When talking about area expertise, we have to consider another dimension. This topic certainly does not belong to either Eurocentric or postcolonial area studies in the West; both Chinese and African scholars have developed their own perspectives on the subject, while other people from around the globe take it as a compelling case study in South–South relations or with the new patterns of transregional entanglements set up by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). These examples are just two selective illustrations from many more available narratives about the current world order.

Transregional flows, as we can observe in many other cases, are confronted with regional or regionalizing reactions in order to control and contain these flows. Border regimes and the reordering of value and commodity chains are expressions of such attempts at control. However, we should not limit ourselves to a simple confrontation between the two, considering the
fact that neither the flows nor the control mechanisms remain unchallenged and unchanged through these processes. Transregional studies observe, first, the traversing of regions by border-crossing activities and, second, the transformative power of such multidirectional interaction where almost everybody and everything is ‘becoming’ someone or something other than they were before (Espagne 1999). Third, transregional studies concern the relativity of the ‘region’ because transcending the region also means often going beyond the reference to regions or the emergence and symbolic invention of new relevant spaces – be they called regions or not.

Transregional phenomena and perspectives figure prominently on different disciplinary agendas. Integrating these crossings into a systematic approach is the ideal of emerging transregional studies. Some might see transregional studies as closing a parenthesis that opened around 1900 when history, area studies, and social sciences started to split in reaction to the then dominant patterns of globalization. However, the challenge is not simply to overcome past disciplinary configurations but rather to use their enormous potential in forms of theories, research competences, and methodological skills and tools for new, post-disciplinary strategies.

Transregional studies can and will take inspiration from many strands of globalization as well as transnational research when it comes to comprehending the deterritorializing tendencies and effects of border-transcending entanglements. As part of the broader effort to escape from conceptual Eurocentrism, transregional studies give more prominence to area expertise and specifically to interdisciplinarity, which has long comprised practices from area or regional studies. These practices, notably, contain inspiration for the future institutionalization of transregional studies, which is currently in its infant stage with small- and large-scale research centres being established in many different countries but transregional studies not yet sufficiently anchored in the curricula of universities.

In the following text, we will first discuss questions of terminology because, as already stated, transregional phenomena and perspectives are part of many disciplines and approaches. These questions bring together diverse, new approaches in upcoming research, and the resulting terminological confusion is probably a signal of the highly productive debates and enthusiasm for innovation. The second section of this introduction provides a short overview of the inspirations transregional studies make use of from many scholarly approaches in other disciplines and fields. Furthermore, it discusses the issues of shifting terminologies used to observe transregional phenomena and of establishing the application of transregional perspectives in more systematic ways. A third and final section presents the aims and the structure of this handbook, which is the product of a collective effort by authors from around the globe.

**Terminology and inspirations**

Although the term transregional studies might be relatively new, the phenomena it describes are evidently not. Mobilities of all kinds have a long and influential history – be it people, goods, currencies and capital, cultural patterns and ideas, viruses, or winds and waters across the borders of large spatial entities, called either regions, continents, or civilizations. It is, first, rather the compartmentalization of knowledge production at times when conceptual Eurocentrism and a focus on the ‘West’ were on the rise that has moved this transregional experience into the background. Second, traversing borders became a less compelling subject when scholars placed territory and boundaries at the centre of analysis or even sided with the goal of state stability or of segregating cultural communities. Third, the emergence of separate academic fields or disciplines that deal with different regions – such as Sinology or Indology, as well as African, Southeast or South Asian, and Latin American studies, not to speak of East European studies and often reduced to Russian studies – became an invitation for further compartmentalization.
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With their necessary specialization in the (linguistic, cultural, environmental, political, etc.) characteristics of such ‘areas’, the capacity, or even willingness, to analyse phenomena transregionally has decreased more than is necessary and/or appropriate. Social sciences, in contrast, were less concerned with civilizations and their long roots in an extensive history and more in comparing societies, (modern) states, and political systems in order to generate universally applicable generalities for the use of prognosis. This methodological nationalism came under attack in the 1990s, being replaced in the first instance by globalization theories that assumed the world to be flat (Friedman 2005) as a result of global market forces being stronger than protectionist attitudes. The dominant assumption was that these forces would make the nation-state obsolete, with global governance likely emerging and soon building on the already established forms of international organizations. Research on regionalization also appeared at this time, but it was seen as building subordinated blocks for the highly welcomed and embraced perspective of global governance. As a consequence, one main line of research continued to look at national developments, whereas the other escaped to the largest possible and most abstract level – the global – which became a buzzword for almost everything beyond the ‘established’ national.

Of course, there was an interest in migration, in environmental issues, in conflict scenarios, in fashion trends, and in a series of other border-transgressing and border-undermining phenomena; nevertheless, they were often bound by and to the two dominant framings: the national and the global. Propositions to connect the traditional and the newly discovered as in Robertson’s glocalization (Robertson 1995) were welcomed; notwithstanding, they did not have much of an influence on concrete research designs beyond the rather banal insight that the abstract has to be investigated also in the real world, that the mega trends are somehow related to the lifestyle of individuals, and that the hidden hand of globalization has an effect on local affairs.

Even the study of seas and oceans – conceptualized by historians such as Fernand Braudel (1949) or Kiriti N. Chaudhuri (1985) as principally connecting various coastal societies from different regions – has not completely escaped from compartmentalization, and new areas of investigation, such as the Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, the Indian Ocean, or the Pacific Rim have emerged as separate fields, which have been brought together in only a few cases (Gabaccia and Hoerder 2011). Kären Wigen has proposed a typology of how maritime places have been conceptualized over the past half millennium by geographers, historians, and other scholars: seas and oceans (1) as extensions of imperial or national territory; (2) as arcs or bands facilitating flows of people and commodities; (3) as zones of contact, interaction, and exchange; and (4) as parts of one single global ocean that can be perceived as the highway of globalization (Wigen 2011). It is obviously easier to see seas detached from territory and regulated as something shared that cannot be placed under the sovereignty of a single state and therefore facilitates the interaction between the various coastal societies. As such, maritime history serves as more than a marginal metaphor in the emergence of transregional studies (Bentley et al. 2007). Although there is a well-rooted tendency to investigate them separately, irrespective of the flows of water and the growing ship traffic connecting them, the term transregional studies did not make its early steps by chance in exactly this field.

The two volumes to which Wigen contributed, first with her essay on oceans and second as a co-editor, were edited by leading scholars in the fields of world history, human geography, and international relations, making ‘transregional perspectives’ popular at the beginning of the new millennium. A joint initiative of the American Historical Association (AHA) and their peers representing the many area studies in the US resulted in a series of conferences around the year 2000. The point of departure was, on the one hand, the diagnosis of a crisis within area studies and, on the other hand, the continued willingness of the Ford Foundation to
spend money on innovative thought concerning large-scale processes (Ford Foundation 1999; Loschke 2017). The terminology, however, remained fuzzy, with ‘transregional’ being used to invite scholars to study processes that go beyond the limits of a single continent and to systematize their causations, features, and consequences.

The conceptual background of the area studies crisis was identified at that time in the following four points: (1) area studies are too closely related to American hegemony during and after the Cold War and thus are compromised by the confusion of sharing an academic and a political agenda; (2) parts of area studies tend to perpetuate Orientalist approaches and discourses; (3) area studies often are descriptive rather than analytical and therefore not very well suited to closer cooperation with so-called systematic disciplines; and (4) area studies remain too much focused on ‘their’ region instead of placing it into comparative and global contexts (Bentley et al. 2005).

This self-criticism went hand in hand with an explicit expression of dissatisfaction with the functional value of area studies for orientating the Americans in a world that came closer to them. At the same time, financial stress was growing at many universities as their area studies activities – supported by both the state-funded Title VI programme and contributions by the Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie foundations – were being questioned due to the political elites’ (and the leadership of the Pentagon as well as of the secret services) public criticism of the utility of area studies after they had not been able to forecast the breakdown of Moscow’s power position, 9/11, or the new phase of the Middle East conflict (Szanton 2004; Engerman 2011).

The new trend, though, has not only concerned the outlook on Asia, Africa, or Latin America, but has also targeted the USA. A parallel initiative of the AHA to the above-mentioned discussion about area studies brought together specialists of North American and global history and asked about the consequences of the new interest in global connections and how to present the history of the US in the future. While authors such as Ian Tyrrell concluded that the history of the country was more transnational in the nineteenth century than it was in larger parts of the twentieth (Tyrrell 2007), a volume edited by Thomas Bender translated the so-called LaPietra report, which resulted from a series of conferences between 1997 and 2000 commissioned by the AHA (Bender 2000), into a collection of inspiring essays framing national history globally (Bender 2002).

The initiatives had different organizational backgrounds and their activists used different terminologies. Jerry Bentley (1993), long-time editor of the Journal of World History, argued for taking cross-cultural interactions as the core of a renewed world history that should overcome the rather additive way of portraying civilizations; he then gave examples of such dialogues across cultural boundaries and developed a methodology to see them less as the result of diffusion and more of appropriation. Ian Tyrrell, instead, used the term transnational, which had again gained prominence (Patel 2004) after it had already come into use after the First World War and in the late 1960s had denoted the traversing of borders by companies, churches, and international organizations. Bender preferred addressing the new context in which units of investigation were analysed. The term ‘global age’, which was not developed without any inherent ambiguities when it comes to periodization (see below), has not changed the status of the USA per se but has put – or should, as laid out in the LaPietra report – other dimensions of its history and present action at the centre of analysis.

The terminological field has not yet been described in its entirety through the three notions of cross-cultural, transnational, and global. Cultural studies have addressed the pressing importance of border-crossing identities in terms of hybridity and located them in a ‘third space’ (Bhabha 1994; Bachmann-Medick 2006). Cultural history has become internationally interested in a research approach established by French scholars since the mid-1980s under the
concept of cultural transfer, addressing in a methodologically more nuanced way the problem of appropriating ‘foreign’ cultural patterns, which also attracted the engagement of Bentley and other world historians (Espagne and Werner 1987; Espagne 2013). This approach stimulated a fruitful debate on the relationship between the prominent method of comparison and the study of connections across the units of analysis (Espagne 2013). A new political geography heavily criticized the territorial trap and the overemphasis given to territory in past analyses of modern societies, especially in the discipline of international relations, whose state-centrism no longer seemed appropriate (not to say that it ever was) (Agnew 1994; Brenner 1999). This resulted in a description of global processes as dialectics of de- and reterritorialization (Tuathail and Luke 1994). Whereas some studies have invested much more energy in examining flows, others as part of the newly emerging discipline of global studies have begun to investigate the search for new methods of control over such flows (Sassen 2008). The most prominent field of investigation was probably the history of migration, where new configurations challenged traditional border regimes and led to new ones, which again were taken by migrants as a challenge to overcome, or better, to circumvent (Schiller et al. 1995; Hoerder 2002; McKeown 2008). The assumption here is that the world is neither becoming borderless (as it has not been in former, pre-national times) through global connections, nor can the new global forces be accommodated within the old framings and borders of a world order that has collapsed (as many had before) (Middell 2014).

When looking back at these tendencies in various disciplines, one would have expected a rapid convergence, but interdisciplinarity often does not work that easily. While some disciplinary alliances came into existence rather fast – such as the one in the USA between global and transnational historians on the one hand and area studies people on the other – the ongoing dispute between cultural historians and political scientists about the role of comparison, versus connections and shared histories, reminds us of persisting effects of completely different points of departure.

The terms global and globalization gained enormous momentum in the 1990s (Steger 2008; Bach 2013; Sidaway 2013; James and Steger 2014; Rosenboim 2017) but met increasing resistance after 2000 because plans and hopes for analytical clarity became muddled. One of the results of such frustration was terminological proliferation since many authors were inspired to express their own answers to the evident vagueness of the notion globalization, and others attacked the entire concept of globalization (Held and McGrew 2007).

Things are even more complicated when we take into account that the debate had not only occurred in North America. For example, the area studies crisis was much more moderate in Europe for various reasons. (1) Historically, the institutionalization of classical regional studies was stronger in West European countries due to being anchored in enlightened anthropology and nineteenth-century colonial studies. (2) This resulted in a stronger focus on linguistics, cultural studies, and anthropological as well as historical approaches than on current politics in the various areas – which resulted in the studies being criticized for their academic ivory tower character and rather ignoring the lack of exposure to projections of political institutions on the immediate use of the knowledge provided by these regional studies (which only started in the 1990s to hesitantly identify themselves as area studies) (Sidaway 2013; Sidaway et al. 2016). (3) State policy for research in a couple of countries was willing to extend funding for the often quite marginal area studies (called ‘orchids disciplines’ in comparison with the flowers’ rarity and beauty) given that the swelling globalization discourse was seen as a proof for the need of further knowledge about other areas of the world (Middell 2013; Mielke and Hornidge 2017). While area studies in some parts of the Anglophone world seemed to follow the American model (Jackson 2017), in other parts the investigation of other regions and continents was
just emerging and on its way to becoming institutionalized (Engel et al. 2017; Naumann et al. 2018). And these differences were not only valid when it comes to institutionalization but also with regard to different views on what region is relevant for one’s own continent and why so. As a consequence of these differences (and many more we are not going to detail here due to the lack of space), the following conclusion can be made: ‘There is no such thing as a globally valid knowledge about globalization’ (Randeria and Eckert 2015).

Despite, on the one hand, a large growing interest in global connections, transnational ties, and cross-border mobility, on the other hand expectations for a more and more homogeneous world were frustrated by the increasing awareness of fragmentation and particularisms. The terminology used so far was criticized for various reasons. To call everything that transcends borders global seemed less and less satisfying since empirically flows going beyond the limits of a single state or continent were most often not having a reach that spanned the planet. In addition, the confusion between globalization as an abstract term for the totality of mobilities and the political project of removing certain political and economic borders to the profit of hegemonic powers – often characterized as neo-liberalism (Harvey 2003, 2011) – was difficult to overcome.

The debate on transnationalism – which led to impressive elaboration with regard to methods and theories and was strongly anchored in empirical studies by social scientists – came under attack for its anachronistic and too general reference to the nation-state. Ulrike Freitag points out:

By turning traditional perspectives upside down, historical structures and events are not taken as the precondition but as the result of geographical mobility. Translocality, therefore, is a relational and not an absolute concept, and it puts emphasis on the transcendence of borders and the resulting tensions.

(Freitag 2005)

Michel Ben Arrous adds that the common denominator of the many definitions of translocality would be ‘the travel of places and their reciprocal fertilization’. That being said, he also continues critically that its success among scholars is mainly due to the lack of precision of what the term exactly depicts and explains (Arrous 2004). The term has the advantage to be not bound in the same way as transnationality to a certain historical epoch; all the same, it seems to circumscribe the difficulties of giving larger entities of analysis a name rather than to solve the problem.

There are two other terms that are located at the other end of the spectrum when it comes to such solutions: civilization and culture. Both have been very much present at least from the eighteenth century onwards in analysing the world; although they became problematic in the 1990s (Fisch 1992; Inglebert 2014). With Huntington’s influential book forecasting clashes along the dividing lines between supposedly well-established civilizations the term came under heavy attack as essentializing historical legacies and underestimating the fluidity across the not-so-fixed borders between such civilizations. The same holds true more or less for culture, which became the topic of a highly elaborated theoretical debate among scholars insisting on the constructedness of culture as a symbolic system of intentionally produced and unintentionally emerging temporal coherence. In both cases, the resistance to a connection with spatial dimensions of societal development was very explicit and was based on a series of convincing arguments. Territorializing civilizations or cultures was rightly rejected as an intellectual technology that helps communities of all kinds – national, ethnic, racial, as well as, of course, political – to strengthen their exclusionist capacities.
Similarly, having no direct connection to a specific historical epoch is the reference to continents. Yet, as geographer Martin Lewis and historian Kären Wigen rightly demonstrate through a historical approach to the seemingly unchanged basic geographical divisions and spatial frameworks through which we perceive the world – and that have been at the origin of some but not all constructions of ‘areas’ in area studies – there are a lot of arguments against the (often unconscious) identification of cultures with geographical subdivisions of the planet (Lewis and Wigen 1997). Moreover, Robert Yearwood convincingly shows that the assumption of a ‘global geographical framework in use today [which] is essentially a cartographic celebration of European power’ (ibid.: 189) has to be differentiated considering that it is not only Europeans that position themselves in the world with the help of the continental division of the globe (Yearwood 2014).

It is as if, after a long-lasting struggle, there is only one remaining actor on the battlefield who survived in the shadow of other heroes who were more exposed to attacks from all sides. The term region is not in such a position for the first time. It has a long reputation for successfully filling a gap when there is either not yet enough knowledge available to characterize the newly discovered lands, as it was in many frontier expansions into lands not yet known. The term region has proven to have an astonishing flexibility in naming not only very large but also very small territories – we know regions both above and below the level of statehood. Furthermore, it has secured a rather neutral reputation compared to the development from empire to nation(-state); and in the differentiation between the two, it is a component of both semantic fields. Think only of the border region as an important characteristic of empires and the regional level of the nation-state’s administration and subdivisions. In its dominant use, it is a land-related term, but it is also – together with area – in use among seafarers to name parts of an ocean. It has a long-standing relationship with a type of space that is best qualified as territorial, but it is not limited to it (Elden 2010). It has, therefore, thanks to geographers such as Ansii Paasi (Paasi and Metzger 2017), survived the troubles of the recent spatial turn (Döring and Thielmann 2008; Warf and Arias 2009; Middell and Naumann 2010) when constructivism undermined the validity – or better, the supposed eternity – of geographical terms that had been in use by historians and social scientists without considering their man-made nature and thus their dependency on historical configurations.

**Transregional phenomena, regionalization, and global order**

This flexibility turned out to be an advantage during a time when all other notions that could help to overcome the oversimplifying split between the global and the local were themselves under critique. The term transregional has not yet become the object of a larger debate across involved disciplines. This is astonishing because the number of studies addressing the transregional character of their objects is fast increasing, yet often not using the term explicitly. Concurrently, the regionalization of the world became for various reasons more focused upon. In political science, for example, the emergence of regional organizations found growing interest, particularly with the European Union (EU) as one possible model for regional integration and, soon after, with an eye on similar – yet in form, dynamics, and consequences quite distinct – developments in Latin America with the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), Africa with the renewed African Union (AU), Asia with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as smaller ‘subregional’ models (Hettne and Söderbaum 2000; Börzel and Risse 2016).

For a while, when the United Nations under Kofi Annan as secretary-general engaged in reforming the Security Council and the entire UN system, a new world order based upon regional representation instead of the one that had emerged from the Second World War
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seemed possible (Müller 2016). The fact that this reform failed has not changed the growing prominence of the very idea that large-scale regionalization is an important, if not the dominant, feature of recent globalization. In addition to the observation of political regionalism, the emergence of trading blocs, most often regionally organized, has attracted attention (Yeung et al. 1999). Such regions sometimes coincide with what traditional scholarship perceives as spheres of large-scale cultures or civilizations characterized by a certain setting of religious communities and other cultural features or media systems; that being said, the relationship between the highly dynamic new regions and the other ‘sedimentary’ constructs of former geographies is most often much more complex. We certainly live in a world that is undergoing massive processes of regionalization; at the same time, the criss-crossing of, and between, these regions has also gained importance.

The focus on regions and their inherent transregionality in the conceptualization of border-crossing mobilities is also helpful with regard to a specific problem in the history of globalization. As many global historians have pointed out, globalization is not a new phenomenon but has deep historical roots. Nevertheless, there is a qualitative change that happened between the late eighteenth and second third of the nineteenth century; despite some variations in periodization, there is growing consensus among global historians about the transformation itself. Christopher Bayly calls the globalization before 1800 ‘archaic’ and characterized it as multiconetic. This means that it happened in various regions independently from each other (as Braudel’s concept of économies-mondes had already suggested) and that it was also driven by (rather sparse) transregional connections that were motivated by the aims to universalize (within the limits of the reachable) kingship, to expand religion, and to import exotic plants to improve nourishment and medicine (Bayly 2005). With the Asia–Europe trade routes (Osterhammel 2013), the exportation of bullion from Latin America to East Asia, and the plantation economies based upon the slave trade both in the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean, stretching from Virginia in the north to Brazil (Zeuske 2013), a kind of world-spanning economic mechanism emerged. However, the fundamental change only occurred with the transition from proto-industrialization to industrialization using coal and the resulting steam to fuel machinery (Bin Wong 2016). Then – and only then – had the world transformed economically, albeit slowly, into one integrated by stock exchanges circulating capital globally according to precise information quickly available by the telegraph and according to the availability of goods due to steam ships and railways. Prices converged slowly beginning in the 1820s (O’Rourke and Williamson 2002). As Charles Bright and Michael Geyer (2012) argue, this came not as a peaceful process but was full of violence in the form of civil wars, revolutions, and international warfare, indicating that the emerging global condition includes patterns of dominance, exploitation, and exclusion, as well as of integration into regional economies and into commodity chains. The most important such pattern was the one centred around cotton, for example, stimulating new ways of textile production, which became the leading sector of the first wave of industrialization in north-western Europe, with connections to various regions in the world (Beckert 2014).

A new type of regionalization was emerging, which affected the character of transregional relations as well. The world was divided according to various specializations that caused increasing productivity. Some regions started to provide goods for more than the consumption at home, and in turn collected raw materials from others. After Western Europe and North America, one-third of industrial production emerged in Japan; other regions took their own paths, concentrating on food production and related industries, for example East-Central Europe, parts of Russia, Latin America, and Canada.

With the terms of trade remaining volatile at least during the nineteenth century (Williamson 2011) as well as arising political conflicts and world wars, seemingly marginalized regions
temporarily gained opportunities for taking on the role of exporter to the paralysed centres. Regionalization has resulted in a much less clear division of the planet between core and periphery than world-systems analysis assumed. Over the second half of the twentieth century, however, we observed a consolidation of regions around the three hubs of the nineteenth-century industrial world, but all three of them have shown both internal dynamics and a tendency to expand wherever there was an opportunity. The most striking feature of these two interconnected processes of re-regionalization, having massive effects also on the transregional relations with other areas, is the ascendance of China after 1982. Notwithstanding, contrary to what optimistic globalization discourses promised, we are still in a situation where intraregional economic links, priorities with regard to trade, and joint innovation strategies dominate and drive political regionalism as well. This makes the study of regions and their transregional connections so compelling for our times.

In sum: the term region also has, among many other advantages, the one benefit that it allows distinct historical configurations to be described without privileging the most recent one or being fixated on the national since the last period of the nineteenth century. It is flexible enough to address a fundamental change from a world of regions, where these regions had not been connected but were worlds of their own, into a situation where they are no longer separate worlds but more and more interacting parts of a system, communicating by migration regimes, capital flows, cultural transfers, etc. Politically speaking, these regions have not become entities of agency in their own right, remaining overwritten by empires and alliances of nation-states, and later also by blocs stretching across continents. The same holds true for the socioeconomic developments, with some parts of the world becoming rich and others remaining, for an extremely long time, poor. The division into First, Second, and Third Worlds was another layer of regionalization – regardless of the fact that military alliances and economic integration worked for a while along the borders of these ‘worlds’ – that has not resulted in a stable spatial world order.

Aims and structure of the handbook

Transregional studies fill the gap left by area studies and their examination of regions only as isolated cases by responding to the agenda of a historically informed investigation of the reach of flows and control mechanisms that go beyond the limits and boundaries of single empires, continents, regions, or cultural spheres. Sharing with many other approaches the aim to overcome a container-like understanding of society as well as of regions, transregional studies focus on connections between regions, on flows transcending regional boundaries, and on societal transformation resulting from transregional entanglements. This inclusive spectrum is grounded in the competences developed within various disciplinary approaches. The main objective of our handbook is to bring together the various fields within which transregional phenomena are scientifically observed and analysed. With the aim to present the theoretical and methodological potential of such studies for the advancement of our conceptualization of global and area-bound developments, the handbook combines case studies with theoretical and methodological considerations.

The following observations are the points of departure shared by the interdisciplinary group of scholars who have worked together on this handbook:

(1) Knowledge produced by area studies is becoming ever more important for orientation in an increasingly connected world, and many of these connections are best characterized as transregional while others might be transnational or translocal in nature. Over the past
20 years or so, research has focused on mobilities of all kinds, highlighting that the seemingly faraway becomes the surprisingly close by. Of note, a wide range of funding initiatives have expressed this societal demand for not merely up-to-date knowledge about other parts of the world but also for insights into how these world regions are connected and how they are connected with us. The particular expertise only area studies can provide makes them appealing due to their centuries-long preoccupation with their focus areas as well as due to a series of developed competences such as the linguistic skills, the deep understanding of cultural features as a result of long field-work experience, and the close connection to local academia. To this extent, area studies are the basis for transregional approaches.

At the same time, area studies have been criticized for the limitations that seem to be inherent in the approach, where the area is the defining factor for the understanding of its subject. This critique is based upon the observation that an increasing number of the mobilities mentioned above do not adhere to the clear-cut borders of an area but cross and transcend these borders. Consequently, the question has been raised if area studies are likely to become global studies. Notwithstanding this hypothetical proposal, the counterpoint is also valid that border-crossing processes – including all shapes, sizes, and speeds – will not completely erase the regions defined by these borders. Transregional studies bring something new to their object and are not simply a repetition of what combined area studies provide.

Transregional studies take inspiration from the spatial turn in the humanities and social sciences, which insists on the fact that the ‘areas’ in area studies are historically constructed and therefore the ever-changing products of their times. As a consequence, different generations of area or regional studies not only coexist but also interact, and successive historical eras brought about new kinds of areas as well as reflexive reconfigurations of old ones. In an actor-centred approach, transregional studies look at those individuals and groups, movements, and institutions that aim at producing new spatial frameworks for social interaction by going beyond the well-defined borders and limitations of the thus far relevant space or region.

All these three observations lead, in our view, to the conclusion that transregional perspectives renew the relationship between area studies and macro-interpretations as developed in global studies, global history, or the interpretations of global processes within the social sciences and those systematically developed in the field of transregional studies.

Therefore, transregional studies are not replacing area studies but adding urgent and necessary new perspectives, subjects, and eventually new methodological approaches. As a result, area studies are being brought into closer contact with each other as well as with global history, migration studies, globally comparative urban studies, international studies, and the investigation of international organizations as well as far-reaching commodity and value chains. Area studies are also becoming connected to other offshoots from traditional social sciences and humanities that are reacting to the same challenge of studying entanglements.

In terms of methodology, transregional studies can build upon achievements made during the debate on transnationalism in many scholarly disciplines (Iriye and Saunier 2009; Saunier 2013). Nevertheless, we have to simultaneously be aware that the context – institutionally as well as epistemologically – is somehow different for the reason that transregional studies emerge in the environment of area studies and not primarily in the context of traditional methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002), as was the case with transnational history, politics, or sociology. A separate methodological reflection is therefore necessary to make transregional studies more than an ambitious programme.
The handbook is a response to the increasing interest in both the epistemological transformations of regions or areas as well as the empirical entanglements and interactions between them. The character of the intended publication is envisioned as an overview and a critical assessment of the most recent research efforts in order to paint a picture of an increasingly interwoven world without losing sight of inequalities, cultural particularity, and deep historical roots. The handbook addresses a wide audience across area studies and all those disciplines integrating knowledge about different world regions into their theories and narratives.

The handbook is meant as a reference point in a process that is already under way – transregional studies are neither a completely new thing nor are they already completely established as a paradigm or an approach. On the contrary, transregional studies have long traces back to the study of cultural encounters, becoming more prominent at least since the eighteenth century onwards, and they are institutionalized in very different ways as part of area studies or in separate research centres and departments. Also, some disciplines remain more resistant to transregional perspectives than others.

Given the specific nature of its subject, the handbook’s ten sections, containing six to nine medium-length chapters each, are not presented with the intention to cover everything that can be studied in a transregional mode or perspective. Rather, we see this handbook as an open invitation, and hopefully inspiration, for further effort. Each section is introduced by a short text that situates the opportunities and challenges of transregional perspectives in the respective field; it further locates the chapters selected for this handbook while indicating what could be further avenues of interest and research as well as what are the links across the sections of the handbook to underline its interwoven character.

Part I addresses the roots of transregional studies in the long history of dealing with other parts of the world and the methodological challenge that arises with a shift from traditional area to transregional studies. Part II discusses in greater detail how post-colonialism impacts transregional studies, while Part III continues with the constructedness of spatial frames used in area studies, which must be considered when moving toward a transregional approach. Parts IV and V of the handbook look at economic entanglements and the political reactions to transregional ties within international organizations, respectively. Part VI focuses on migration and the people crossing the borders of various regions as well as diasporas living transregionally, with religions and cultures being addressed as transregional phenomena in Parts VII and VIII, respectively. The last two sections are devoted to the influence transregionalism has on knowledge production. Part IX focuses specifically on the wide range of topics that are challenged by transregional mobilities, from developmental studies to global health, and from conflict studies to education. As a conclusion, Part X asks how the interest in transregional studies might conflict with existing societal theories and grand narratives about the globalizing world or how, on the contrary, they might support these theories and narratives with new empirical evidence.

Each section is headed by one or more editor(s), who had been in constant contact with the authors, discussing the linkages between the sections and guaranteeing similar standards in the editorial process. The introductions to the ten parts of this handbook should be read as complements to this general introduction and as a sign of the pluri-perspectivity of our collective endeavour.

The idea behind the handbook is that the chapters together form a coherent unity. Parts I and X connect the analysis of multidisciplinary roots with the location of transregional studies in the field of societal theory. Parts II and III deal with the epistemological foundations of transregional studies, and Part IX asks about the many domains where knowledge concerning transregional phenomena is already used or at least potentially needed. In contrast, Parts IV to VIII present the main areas within which transregional studies have already achieved convincing empirical results on how transregionalism impacts economies, politics, religions,
cultures, and social mobility. Owing to the fact that transregionalism crosses borders between areas, a series of topics is dealt with in various sections; for example, special economic zones, the subject of Chapter 21, are presented as a spatial format, but the chapter is also part of the argument made in Part IV. Similarly, the international organizations discussed in Part V are strongly connected to the knowledge production presented in Part IX, and so forth. The cross-references will add, we expect, a particular strength to the handbook.

The selection of chapter topics has been an object of collective discussion for several months and is the basis for such a collective editorial approach that makes use of the diverse disciplinary backgrounds of the section editors.

The handbook is a product of extensive international as well as interdisciplinary cooperation with a core team coordinating the ten sections being located at the Centre for Area Studies at Leipzig University, which started its research programme on transregionalism in 2009. Preparatory workshops and individual research by the editors of the different sections were funded by a grant coming from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research meant to strengthen the cooperation among area studies as well as area studies with the social sciences, cultural studies, and historical investigations. We speculate that the concept of transregional studies is one possible avenue for cooperation, and Leipzig’s research cluster on global connections and comparison has proven successful under this paradigm in producing new stimulating questions and formulating answers to them.

The first two decades of the twenty-first century have developed into an age of handbooks, and this in itself is probably a sign of the increasing demand for transregional coordination of knowledge production since a globalizing world cannot remain content with the current dominance of knowledge production from only select parts of the globe (UNESCO 2010). Area studies in particular are well aware that scholars do not have the same insights, perspectives, and focal points across different countries and continents. We, therefore, have been very attentive to securing international authors as much as possible. Our intention was to confront results of thinking about the transregional from all continents and to make the possible differences explicit. Scholars from Africa, Asia, Australia, North America, Western as well as Eastern Europe have accepted invitations and with this composition of authors we hope to address the expectations of a global audience.

We have to thank a series of people who made this handbook possible. Forrest Kilimnik, Megan Maruschke, Gilad Ben-Nun, Julia Yakovleva, Ulrike Luttenberger, Ana Ribeiro, and Tayyibe Armagan contributed in crucial ways to the copy-editing process of the handbook, the chapters of which were written by people from various academic backgrounds, both in terms of languages and disciplines. Allie Tichenor translated a series of articles from German into English. Eve Setch guided the process from the publisher’s side with high professionalism. The team at the Centre for Area Studies at Leipzig University was the only environment within which I could imagine such an endeavour would be successful, and without a single negative emotion, this has proven correct.

Leipzig, December 2017

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Transregional studies


PART I
Histories of area studies and methodological approaches

Introduction

Steffi Marung and Matthias Middell

Transregional studies do not replace area studies, but they (re)introduce fruitful perspectives on the relationality of world regions and on processes connecting and transcending them. That being said, there is a certain risk this section has to deal with: falling into the trap of presenting a teleological story about the rise and decline of area studies, which has resulted in the rise today of transregional studies. As has been argued in the general introduction to this handbook, transregional studies themselves have a long tradition that predates the formation of area studies as disciplines, a tradition that appears to have been interrupted for about 150 years by the strengthening of academic formations that privilege containerized spaces as the objects of scientific studies. In this section, in addition to sharing an understanding of area studies as providing an important basis for and being key partners of transregional studies, we go a step further in illuminating this relationship by illustrating how the emergence of these disciplinary formations has itself evolved as a transregional process, as Steffi Marung argues in Chapter 1.

If transregional perspectives rearrange the relationship between area studies and macro-interpretations as developed in global studies, global history, or interpretations of global processes within the social sciences, this communication can only be successful on the basis of a better understanding of the multiple histories of area studies and the methodological challenges that they share with their transregional counterparts. As further chapters in this section demonstrate, the histories of area studies are transregional in several ways. For this reason, their trajectories direct the awareness toward the contingencies and paradoxes of transregional processes, which not only lead to transregional ‘outcomes’ but can also result in delimitations, separations, and even isolations. The history of area studies demonstrates to a great degree this apparent contradiction.

If one understands transregional studies as an investigation of processes connecting (i.e. transfers, interactions, circulations), transforming (i.e. respatializations), and transcending (i.e. going beyond the region as a frame of reference) the region, then area studies and their histories can be understood as transregional in all the three ways. First, area studies are, to a large extent, products of transregional encounters and dynamics. Their institutionalization, professionalization, and research agendas were often shaped by the – sometimes frustrating – encounters with and the transfer of ‘foreign’ models, concepts, and knowledge originating in other world regions – not limited to but also including those being the object of study. This trans- and international community of scholars participating in the strengthening of their disciplines, with
regard to definition of academic standards and competition about resources, was far from being homogeneous. On the contrary, they were characterized by cleavages, hierarchies, and further inequalities and thus displayed historically changing geographies. The transregional quality and effects of knowledge circulation and the central role of mobile actors in shaping transregional processes and spaces are spelled out in more detail for other fields in further sections of the handbook. This section specifically investigates these circulations with regard to the formation of these disciplines.

Second, area studies are transregional in practice, although again in historically changing ways as they have required strategies of encounters between the researcher and ‘the other’ that he or she was investigating. And third, area studies are transregional in the sense of ‘inventing’ as well as transforming regions: they produce world regions, delimit them, fill them with meaning, and provide narratives for them, which has led to a pluralization of the spaces forming ‘areas’ both diachronically and synchronically. The fact that ‘areas’ or world regions are historically contingent, changing over time, socially produced, and politically institutionalized spaces in the plural has also been demonstrated in a number of contributions to this handbook (see Parts II and V in particular). In the specific academic expression of these processes, the dynamics and different historical formations of (post-)colonialism played a central role, as Part II also demonstrates.

Against this background, this section addresses a number of specific challenges in the histories of area studies at the interface between academia and society. First, it is far from possible to establish a single concept of ‘area studies’ in the first place, thus addressing the histories of area studies in the plural is not an easy task to carry out: what actually are ‘areas’ and what then are ‘area studies’? What is referred to with these concepts has varied in time and space and, indeed, the initiative here did not only involve scholars but also many other actors. A possible indicator of this is the conceptual variations in different academic settings. In this direction, as Steffi Marung demonstrates in Chapter 4, there is historically more at stake than a mere play with words in the American use of ‘area studies’, the German ‘Regionalwissenschaften’, or the French ‘aires culturelles’. Diachronically as well, area studies did not remain the same. German nineteenth-century African studies pursued a different academic agenda than it did in the 1970s. US Middle Eastern studies underwent decisive shifts throughout the second half of the twentieth century. And Soviet African studies removed itself from Soviet Oriental studies in the early twentieth century; the latter was then transformed into a vivid academic-political enterprise in the 1960s, increasingly marginalizing historical and linguistic agendas, and finally declined over the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, what specialists for a specific area investigated as ‘their field’ in one country had different limits for their colleagues in other contexts. Therefore, a blurring of borders between ‘areas’ and an overlap of different conceptualizations become evident when comparatively and historically exploring the construction of ‘areas’ in different national contexts, which is especially evident when looking at the frontier between the ‘Middle East’ and ‘Africa’. And, finally, what was assembled under the umbrella of ‘area studies’ also exhibited profound variations. In Europe, ‘Europe’ has rarely been qualified as an ‘area’, while ‘Eastern Europe’ has been institutionalized separately in the historical disciplines but not in the framework of ‘Regionallwissenschaften’. In contrast, ‘Soviet studies’ has clearly been characterized as an area study in the US.

As Prasenjit Duara demonstrates in his chapter with regard to the transformation of Asian studies, we have to be aware of the multiple origins of specific area studies formations – in his case ranging from pan-Asianism to national projects inside the region, such as in Japan or China as well as outside the region, such as in the US. He also demonstrates the effects of the end of the Cold War and the role of post-colonial critique for the transformation of area studies agenda.
Part I Introduction

and institutionalization. In his case, the discrediting of leftist ideologies after the end of the Cold War has led to a multiplication of approaches and, more specifically, to the strengthening of perspectives and themes of intraregional circulations. ‘Asian connections’ have become the foundation of new critical Asian studies inside and outside the region.

A second challenge for the writing of the histories of area studies results from the prevalent interpretation often focusing on the Cold War period. This is a consequence of the obsession with the US model – from which we can hardly escape linguistically when referring to the English term. But even this history dates further back than 1947, and for European area studies this is even more the case. One needs to consider the ebb and flow of the academic as well as political interest in ‘the world’ and its regions, which have since the late nineteenth century been closely related to an increasing awareness of global interconnectedness, the search for a position within these global constellations, and the breakdown and re-emergence of world orders. French, German, and British scholars could be considered pioneers in the field, owing to the spread and transformation of the regional studies model in the US and the Soviet Union due to the circulation of scientists and ideas in both directions across the Atlantic. The academic migration and exchange across the – later to be erected – Iron Curtain might also illuminate the emergence of the field, which seems to have been more transnationally constructed than often assumed. Moreover, the migration of scholars from the academic system of the Global South to that of the Global North has left traces in the academic fields of the former metropoles that are difficult to ignore. Finally, the third challenge that is to be tackled in this section is that comparative approaches need to be combined with the investigation of transfers and entanglements as decisive motors for the production of the knowledge order, which has come under pressure at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Therefore, not only national borders but also the borders of the two blocs and the Global South need to be transcended. How and through which channels did knowledge about ‘how to do area studies’ as well as particular methodological and theoretical paradigms circulate? Whom was it searched for and mediated by? And how did these circulations affect the development of area studies in different national contexts? What comes into play here is the different point of departure scholars take when embarking into the large sea of transregional studies. While people with a social sciences background stick to the tradition of comparative studies but try to elasticize it as much as possible – for example, in the form of comparative area studies as explained by Andreas Mehler in his chapter or by turning the directionality of comparativism as in the reciprocal comparison promoted by Kenneth Pomeranz or Garreth Austin – they now encounter the efforts of people with a cultural history background to emphasize intercultural transfers, entangled and connected histories, or the culturally hybrid character of modern societies. The contribution by Antje Dietze and Matthias Middell provides an overview of this emerging field of new ways to deal with the historicity of connectedness that comes to the fore as the main characteristic of our world today.

The often dominant Cold War lens finally leads to the fourth challenge that needs to be confronted, that is to say the oversimplified assumptions about the relation between political and academic fields. Recently, a growing number of studies draw more attention to this intricate relationship. Especially when it comes to Soviet and US area studies, the nuanced interpretation that describes area studies scholars as servants of political interests seems to be especially flawed. Again, this can only be solved by looking historically and comparatively at different constellations: the room for manoeuvre that scholars have vis-à-vis their power of political instrumentalization might have fluctuated considerably, but it is also clear that scholarly activities are not occurring in a vacuum, they depend on resources and they address societal needs for orientation and therefore reflect what society (e.g., politics, military forces, companies, international organizations, etc.) demands. However, with the multiplication of area studies
centres, scholars, and activities, it becomes more and more difficult to fit all of these entities into the same box of relations between research and its societal use. One might even doubt that a national framework alone is appropriate to analyse area studies activities. Undoubtedly, funding is often organized nationally, and universities as well as research centres depend primarily on the support of regional and national institutions as well as that of private donors who not only fund their buildings and staff but also expect something socially useful for the respective society in return. Nevertheless, the case with area studies is more complicated than that since often the transregional character of area studies involves a two-directional activity. On the one hand, scholars in area studies contribute from outside to the scholarly self-inspection within the regions under investigation. Interestingly, they are often more interested in the scholarship in the region itself than in the general debate about social theory in their home country. Often, they have a transnational existence also due to the high value that is attributed to long-lasting field trips as a characteristic of area studies. On the other hand, it is also true that they are often taken at their home base for a representative of the region they are specialized on. Either way, they work as intermediaries, bridging two or more – not only academic – communities, and it is no wonder that this experience allows them a self-reflexive position toward the degree, tradition, and pitfalls of transregional connectedness. A special case are those who change from the position of an area studies person in a country far away from the region to one of an immigrant scholar of the region within the region but nevertheless sticking somehow to the outsider’s perspective. This diversity of careers within the field itself reminds us of the fact that transregional connections can also be studied from the angle of social and cultural history as a framework for mobile biographies, which are not simply related to one place but to many. In his chapter, Christoph Dejung shows the many possible angles from which such a social history of transregional existences can be investigated and written. He also makes clear that we are at the very beginning of such an exercise, which is an interesting contrast to the enormous prominence social history – and sociology – had and still has in the understanding of modern societies.

The number of the above-mentioned regional specialists serving outside their original academic context has been growing recently, not only because job opportunities for area studies scholars are diverging between the academic systems, but also, above all, because in many countries the interest in knowledge about the world and other world regions is mushrooming. Area studies are no longer the privilege of a few countries but have now expanded over to Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

This transforms the function of area studies massively. It is no longer reduced to the production of knowledge from the West or the North about the non-Western world, but, on the contrary, it now reflects the increasing interest in transregional ties between almost all parts of the world. This is what makes area studies truly transregional. But if we dig a little bit deeper, we become aware that, even for this very recent process, there are forerunners and pioneering projects. In his chapter, Bogdan Iacob looks at the emergence of Balkan studies and puts the story into the context of the support of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for transnational academic communities and area studies just after the famous year of independence in Africa 1960/61, which went far beyond Africa, reaching Oceania, Latin America, and the Mediterranean world. He shows in detail how scholars from different backgrounds joined forces to establish a new and positive narrative for South-east Europe – as a ‘peninsula of hope’ – even under the difficult conditions of the Cold War. However, it is also interesting to see that these achievements have not continued as cooperation went into decline in the 1980s, ironically in the decade when the Cold War tensions had softened.

As already said, the second section of Part I is devoted to the methodological challenges transregional studies are confronted with and which they aim to solve also against the background
of the transregional trajectories of area studies. Since transregional studies have for a very long time been part of area studies – often in a marginalized manner – they share some of the methodological concerns of this inter- and pluridisciplinary configuration. In this sense, transregional studies look at phenomena transcending the borders of a seemingly well-defined area/region or investigate interactions between two or more such regions. At the same time, transregional studies are influenced by more recent discussions about transnationalism, cultural encounter, and interaction as well as creolization and hybridization. While some transregional studies are more anchored in cultural studies, others are more related to social sciences, which become critical toward methodological nationalism or move generally toward essentializing units of analysis. In her chapter, Helena Flam shows a series of innovative approaches developed in sociology to investigate movements that emerge, grow, and act transnationally and transregionally. A third branch that stimulates transregional studies is the renewal of comparison in parts of the social sciences, anthropology, and history writing. Transregional studies are currently not yet at the point where all these inspirations have resulted in a homogeneous methodology that provides scholars with a common identity of the field. However, as the sections in this handbook demonstrate, there are so many people and projects on their way that we can trust in the further creative development of the field and disciplinary ossification is probably not what is needed at the moment.

Note

Throughout the handbook, we have made the editorial decision to use the singular form for ‘area studies’ when it refers to these formations in relation or in comparison to, for example, ‘global studies’ or ‘transregional studies’. In the chapters by Steffi Marung, however, we have deviated from this rule, since what stands at the centre of the argument is the plurality of these formations and their histories.
The history of area studies is itself transregional, and this in two ways. Area studies have, first, produced regions and developed narratives about transregional connections by suggesting not only ‘conceptions of geographical, civilizational, and cultural coherence that rely on some sorts of traits’ (Appadurai 2000: 7) but also by assuming certain relationships between them. From a diachronically and synchronically comparative perspective, the dynamic nature of these regional imaginations becomes visible, into which the United States (US)-American Cold War formation has to be embedded. Appadurai contrasts such trait geographies with new ‘process geographies’, thus temporalizing a differentiation that has been rather influential in the emergence of area studies formations from the start. In contrast, it is argued here that processes have, from early on, been driving the academic conceptualization of world regions. In particular, these have been processes of colonization and decolonization – not only in empires and post-imperial societies such as Great Britain, Germany, and France, but also in societies without overseas or landed colonies, such as Hungary or Czechoslovakia. In these processes, colonial fantasies in the early twentieth century and the effects of decolonization in its second half have provided incentives for the professionalization of area studies research and teaching, as did later efforts to reposition area studies against the background of socialist internationalism (Koscev 2018 [forthcoming]; Křižová 2018 [forthcoming]). In addition, area studies in some academic communities have grown in the context of transregional formations, such as the unification of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, into one larger space of knowledge, in the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union in particular (Krauth and Wolz 1998). Furthermore, there have always existed competing or diverging projects in parallel to area studies in the USA. And while security policy considerations during the Second World War and its aftermath have certainly played a crucial role in the USA (Szanton 2004), both the contribution of European academic emigrants and the observation and discussion of European projects of knowledge production about non-European parts of the world, including its philological and historical focus, have also shaped the American variant (Marung and Naumann 2014). Accordingly, the layout of area studies in France, Germany, or the Soviet Union has produced different spaces (see Chapter 4 by Marung). As area studies have spatialized knowledge in world regions, they co-produced and transformed them.

The second way in which the histories of area studies in different parts of the world have to be understood in a transregional way is in seeing them as the result of transnational and transregional exchange, and again this is in multiple ways. On the one hand, academic emigrants, transnational
and transregional funding initiatives, as well as scholarly communication have resulted in the circulation of concepts, institutional models, and the resistance to such circulations. Russian Oriental studies had very much profited from academic emigrants and visiting scholars from Germany as well from training in the German-speaking parts of nineteenth-century Europe (Schimmelpenninck van der Oye 2010; Tolz 2011). The founding father of Soviet African studies, Dmitry Ol’derogge, was first trained in Berlin in the 1920s with Diedrich Westermann so he could come back and develop a new strategy for Leningrad’s ethnographic museum, before becoming the first professor in African studies in the Soviet Union (Marung and Naumann 2014). He held not only (corresponding) membership at the Soviet Academy of Sciences, but also membership in the International Africa Institute in London, the French Society of African Studies, as well as a (corresponding) membership of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in 1968 (Davidson 2003). One of the key actors driving the turn toward the social sciences at London’s SOAS in the 1960s was the US-trained Edith Penrose, who had worked at the International Labour Organization’s offices in Geneva and Toronto during the 1940s, leaving the US in the 1950s under pressure of McCarthyism for Australia and Iraq, from where she went in 1960 to the UK to become head of the SOAS’s newly established economics department (Brown 2016: 165ff.). Such academic biographies were far from exceptional among scholars interested in or becoming interested in the study of world regions – mostly as the ‘European other’ – and such examples demonstrate that the transregional dimension of the formation of area studies through the academic trajectories of its scholarly actors goes beyond, or is combined with, a colonial geography that has certainly underpinned the dynamics much into the early twentieth century. Fernand Braudel, for example, being, among many things, one of the initiators of a new area studies formation in France (Popa 2018 [forthcoming]), taught in Algeria and Brazil. The SOAS’s first director, Edward Denison Ross obtained his PhD in Persian in Strasbourg, became principal of the Madrasah Muslim College in India and assistant secretary in the Department of Education, combining expertise in Islamic as well as Indian studies and Sinology. The roots of European area studies in colonial studies are certainly operative (see Chapter 12 by Brahm); however, they are also complemented by transnational circulations of academics in the centres of excellence of their time as well as by the transregional initiatives of US–American foundations, such as Rockefeller and Ford, after the Second World War, which promoted the establishment of centres of area studies in London and Paris, where the funding was appropriated and translated into domestic agendas by scholars and political decision-makers in various ways (Brown 2016; Popa 2018 [forthcoming]). In addition, the engagement with the region of study, through fieldwork and academic communication in particular, has in some of the disciplines in the area studies formation, such as ethnology (Guyer 2004), driven the rethinking and adapting of theoretical frameworks (Marung 2018). The academic mobilities of scholars from the regions of study have added to such tensions. Many of the African specialists in the history of the continent have been trained in France (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1999), and they have profoundly contributed to the reputation of the francophone field, such as Boubacar Barry or Ibrahima Thioub in Dakar. A considerable number of area studies specialists in the US came from the core regions of interest, such as the Lebanese-born Philip Hitti, one of the co-founders of US Middle Eastern studies. Others initiated movements of critical rethinking of area studies through post-colonial or subaltern perspectives – scholars such as Dipesh Chakrabarty in Chicago, Arjun Appadurai, or Ali Mazrui in New York – which have not only profited from their position in a hegemonic anglophone community, but also profoundly contributed to its transformation and stimulated discussions globally. In turn, the entanglements of European scholars with colleagues and institutions in the former colonial territories have, similarly, initiated new research agendas and conceptualizations of the ‘European other’. The critical positions, which some leading area
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studies scholars have taken, have either been prompted or fuelled by the experiences they had in the regions for which they later became experts. A few, but prominent examples are the French Charles-André Julien, an anti-colonial militant since his time in Algeria in the 1920s and a specialist for North Africa, appointed chair for colonial history at Sorbonne in 1947; the British Terence Ranger, a specialist in African history after his PhD teaching in Rhodesia from where he was expelled for his anti-colonial criticism, leaving for Dar es Salaam to contribute to one of the most active groups of scholars of a new African history; and the French Georges Balandier, a specialist in sociology and anthropology of Western Africa, spending many years in the region as staff member of the Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-mer (ORSTOM), a French colonial research institute, becoming one of the founders of a critical French anthropology of Africa, proposing, among other things, with Alfred Sauvy an emancipatory concept of the ‘Third World’ (Kalter 2013).

Furthermore, it is not only the transregional trajectories of scholars that have been inscribed into the emergence of area studies since the end of the nineteenth century and their shifting positions in academic and non-academic communities. It is also the emergence of international arenas of scholarly exchange, which have been a formative element in the emergence of the field, reflecting the complex interplay between ideas of scientific universalism, colonial and post-colonial projects, as well as national ambitions to dominate academic interpretations of the world regions. The international congresses of Orientalists – beginning in 1873 in Paris – are the most influential and earliest manifestations of these dynamics. Until the First World War, they only took place in European major cities (with the exception of Algiers): London (1874), St. Petersburg (1876), Florence (1878), Berlin (1881), Leiden (1883), Vienna (1886), Stockholm–Christiana (1889), again London (1891), Geneva (1894), again Paris (1897), Rome (1899), Hamburg (1902), Algiers (1905), Copenhagen (1908), and Athens (1912) (Rabault-Feuerhahn 2010). The geography of the congresses certainly reflected the gravitational fields of European overseas colonialism, with London, Paris, Leiden, Berlin, and Hamburg representing the aspiring metropoles of European imperial projects in Africa and Asia. At the same time, these metropoles were the hubs of the Orientalist academic field at the time, together with Vienna and St. Petersburg, which were in turn positioned in a different way in the colonial geography at the end of the nineteenth century, and in which an Orientalist academic agenda was shaped by the close contact these societies had with their ‘objects of study’. Both for the Habsburg and for the Russian Empire, having no overseas colonies, the world of the Orient was either adjacent to or part of its imperial geography with, for example, the Balkans or Central Asia. In Geneva or Stockholm, in turn, academic centres aspired for a place on the Orientologist map, which represented states with no colonial complementary spaces at all. The academic interest for the Orient hence was shaped and inspired not only by concrete political projects of colonialism or imperial experiences outside of Europe, but also by a pan-European Orientalist movement as well as by entanglements with the world that had been mapped as the ‘Orient’. It was therefore almost evident that it had been at the Congress of Vienna that transregional themes received particular attention, as the exchanges and communications between the ‘Orient’ and the ‘Occident’ were stressed. Here, the peculiar Habsburg experience was translated by the congress organizers into new academic agendas.

More generally, a particular interplay between intercultural and international dynamics evolved at the congresses, as scholars struggled not only to develop a common understanding of the right way to study the Orient – which, as they emphasized, could only be done in a multidisciplinary way – but also to claim a central position for their respective national academic community to define the boundaries and rules of the field. This pan-European,
multidisciplinary project included few scholars from the region under investigation before the First World War; if representatives from the ‘Orient’ were invited at all, they were mostly not scholars but rather diplomats and politicians. The international academic Orientalist field was furthermore not only clearly confined to the ‘Orient’, but also denied the academic community across the Atlantic a central role. It would be only in 1967 that the congress took place in the US (Shaw 1968). Hence, the transregional exchange, which had contributed to the professionalization and expansion of Oriental studies, was a fragmented, unequal one, with its own centres and peripheries. That being said, they were not completely congruent with the geographies of political colonialism at the time. When the congresses were resumed after a long break in 1928, this geography seemed to have initially been confirmed with Oxford (1928), Leiden (1931), Rome (1935), Brussels (1938), and Paris (1948) as the next congress venues. Only in 1951, with the onset of the tightening Cold War, the congress moved to Istanbul, and it took another 13 years until the international community would convene in Asia. The uniqueness and importance of this meeting in 1964 in New Delhi (Wheeler 1964) for the decolonizing parts of the world, which started to claim their own voice in the formation of area studies, was symbolically reflected in the issuing of a commemorative stamp on the occasion of the congress by the Indian government. The earlier congresses in Cambridge (1954), Munich (1957), and Moscow (1960) had not only become meeting places for scholars across the Cold War divide, but had also intensified the discussion about the emancipation of African studies as a separate formation, in parallel to a respatialization of the field also through the strengthening of Asian studies as a new area of investigation (see Chapter 3 by Duara). This dynamic was driven by post-colonial political and academic actors, who aimed at institutionalizing forms of knowledge production reflecting a world after empire, exerting pressure that led, for example, to the foundation of the International Union of Orientalists at the 1951 congress in Istanbul, which would become the organizational backbone of the Oriental studies congresses and renamed in 1974 the International Union for Oriental and Asian Studies (UOAS). Such transregional efforts of the decolonization of Oriental studies overlapped with the new competition – no longer between different empires but between the rising superpowers of the Cold War, for whom international academic arenas became an important battlefield to win supremacy in the interpretation of the post-imperial world (Kemper and Kalinovsky 2015). The International Association of Asian Studies was founded in 1941 in Ann Arbor, USA, and profited from the support of the Rockefeller Foundation. It would become successful not only in representing US Asian and Oriental studies but in also expanding to make its conferences one of the most visible and successful meeting places for the international community. This new geography of the international field was reflected in the convening of the 27th International Congress of Oriental Studies in 1967 in Ann Arbor – the first time that the congress was held on this side of the Atlantic – and the 28th in 1971 in Canberra, Australia. Being a result of transregional exchanges and competitions, this signalled both the demise of the European supremacy in Oriental studies and the reorganization of the field – the respatialization of the ‘Orient’ and the integration of new academic and political actors from the US as well as from the Global South.

A similar transregional dynamic led to the emergence of African studies as an international field, a process in which again the Cold War competition became entangled with the complexities of decolonization, that is to say the rise of an African intellectual elite, which was in many cases transregional itself, circulating both in old imperial infrastructures and creating new institutional frameworks to develop independent agendas. Launched by a joint Soviet-African initiative at the 25th International Congress of Oriental Studies in 1960 in Moscow (Kemper 2015), but also going back to a competing US-American venture, the 1st International Congress of African Studies was held in 1962 in Accra, supported by the Ford Foundation and the United
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Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the second followed in 1967 in Dakar, and the third in 1971 in Addis Ababa. These congresses started off ambitiously with the aim to ‘Africanize African Studies’ and were unique as they exclusively took place in African metropoles, and the supremacy of African scholars as intellectual and organizational masters of the meetings was – after internal struggles between Soviet and US-American as well as Soviet and French and British officials – stipulated in the statutes. Together with parallel efforts of UNESCO to establish new institutional and publication frameworks for scholarship on Africa, such as its General History of Africa Project (Vansina 1993; Maurel 2014), the congresses articulated individual scholarly criticisms on a global scale and gave important impetus to the transformation of the field of African studies, for example by promoting African scholars as actors in the field, creating documentation centres to facilitate the collection and securing of sources and data, and pushing for new research agendas with themes such as pre-colonial or social and cultural history. Hence, the Africanization of African studies, meaning the redefinition of a region and the narratives associated with it, was spurred by transregional dynamics – and not only by exchange and cooperation but by misunderstandings and competition. Competing Soviet and American ambitions to dominate the field in order to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the African colleagues were supported by the respective governments as well as, in the case of the US, by powerful transnationally active research foundations. These Cold War dynamics overlapped with the legacies of the world of empires, as British and French scholars still played an important role, including the post-imperial networks in the formation of a new African academic elite. This resulted, for instance, in heated discussions about the preparatory procedures for the first congress. Kenneth Onwuka Dike had been elected in absentia as head of the preparatory committee. Dike, as the founder of the Ibadan School and being one of the most influential African historians of his time with a transnational academic biography at universities in England, was the first Nigerian scholar to hold a professorship in history at the University of Ibadan and, in 1960, became the first Nigerian vice-rector of the university. Later he created – with British support – the Nigerian national archive; he was the first president of the Historical Society of Nigeria and, with the journal of this society, published considerably upon the African historiographical landscape. In the early 1970s, he left Nigeria to become the first Mellon Professor for African History at Harvard. This kind of transregionally mobile and internationally recognized personality might have been slightly astonished when he was confronted with the stubborn position of the leading Soviet Africanist Ivan I. Potekhin, who urged him to hold all meetings in preparation for the congress – not only the congress itself – on African soil. This created additional logistical troubles for Dike, who actually spent the summer of 1961 in London at the International Africa Institute – and not in Nigeria. However, Potekhin insisted on the Africanization of all meetings also in a geographical sense, probably in addition with the aim to loosen the connections between the African scholars and their British and French colleagues, and he was successful. At the preparatory meeting in Ibadan in 1961, the decision was taken to hold the congress in Accra, and to apply to UNESCO for additional funding. Not only UNESCO but also the Ford Foundation supported the congress financially, complementing the contributions of the governments of Nigeria, Ghana, Libya, and Sierra Leone. The Soviet government did not offer additional funds; even the financing of their own participants created a number of difficulties.

Transregional dynamics of this kind have been an undeniable major dimension of the emergence of area studies in different parts of the world throughout the twentieth century. Yet, they have not resulted in a homogenization of the institutional formats, methodologies, geographies, and agendas of area studies, as is exhibited in other chapters of this handbook (see Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 12 by Iacob, Duara, Marung, and Brahm, respectively).
Steffi Marung

Notes


Select bibliography


2

BALKAN COUNTER-CIRCULATION

Internationalizing area studies from a periphery during the Cold War

Bogdan C. Iacob

Introduction

This chapter turns to the academic knowledge production about a world region – the Balkans – whose geographies and related narratives are often not self-evidently included in the list of area studies. However, the ‘imagining’ and the study of the Balkans provide fertile ground to demonstrate the transregional dimensions of area studies in multiple ways while further highlighting the extent and ways in which the emergence of area studies has been often related to questions about Europe and Europeanness (Todorova 1997). The history of Balkan studies during the Cold War, as a history of transregionalization and internationalization, reveals conflicting and critical narratives about ‘Europe’ and ‘its others’. The history also demonstrates the competing spatialities in which area studies emerge as well as which area studies they help produce. The Cold War narrative about the emergence of area studies becomes further complicated here, as Balkan studies did not, in the first place, emerge as an effort to ‘know the enemy’ but as a way of showcasing academic achievements as part of Cold War competition as well as of carving out internal differentiation in the two camps.

The chapter will shed light on how the Balkans was shaped as an object for area studies during the Cold War in a process that crossed the East–West as well as North–South divides. It was, to a large extent, promoted by international organizations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In this analysis, it becomes visible that UNESCO was an international and transnational arena in which area studies rose in the second half of the twentieth century. Also due to this context, a peculiar and often overlooked cross-fertilization between Balkan studies and African studies – each emerging as an international research field since the 1960s – each emerging as an international research field since the 1960s – was fostered. This further demonstrates the transregional character of Balkan studies, which emerged as an international field as the result of intense transregional communication across Europe, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Mediterranean Sea.

Where – as well as what – the ‘Balkans’ to be studied were, was a highly contested subject, with narratives being created outside and inside the region. This intricate diversity became, at the same time, the basis of the conceptualization of the region: The Balkans were considered diverse and in-between, closely connected as well as networked both transregionally and
internally, and a product of overlapping spatial formats and competing scales of empires and nation-states as well as local, regional, and international processes. This in-betweenness was complemented by narratives about its peripherality, which simultaneously became an enormous driver for institutional and conceptual innovations.

The chapter examines how Southeast European scholars created a specialized organization and a milieu of interaction that generated a counter-circulation of self-representations projected beyond national and regional confines (Tolz 2008). The institution that mediated these dynamics was the International Association of South-East European Studies (AIESEE), created in Bucharest in 1963. After it was established, the organization advanced and supported discourses and conceptualizations that rejected approaches deemed to colonize or marginalize Southeast Europe in the past and present. It defied Cold War fault lines while ironically remaining dependent on the politics of the post-war order. Its anti-hegemonic agenda was inspired by the push toward democratizing the humanities, being impacted by the processes of decolonization, within UNESCO and the International Council for Philosophy and Human Sciences (ICPHS).

Balkan scholars came into contact not only with their Western and Central European, Soviet, or North American peers, but also with those from the Global South. This extra-European connection served to reinforce, for a while at least, the AIESEE’s regionalist agenda. Overall, however, this Balkan counter-circulation remained Eurocentric: it employed transregional links as a means to advance its own cultural readings of Europeanness.

The emergence of AIESEE

Before the Second World War, Southeast European epistemic exchanges hardly went beyond the limits of their own geographical region. There is a significant pre-1945 history of collaboration in the creation of regionalist narratives. During the interwar period, the institutionalization of Southeast European studies and Balkanology in Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece generated its own ‘counter-hegemonic thrust’ centred on the idea that ‘the Balkans are and should be treated as a subject’ (Mishkova 2012). The Institute of Southeast European Studies and the Institute of Balkan Studies (founded in Bucharest in 1913 and 1937, respectively), the Balkan Near Eastern Institute in Sofia (1920), and the Institute of Balkan Studies (1934) in Belgrade advanced ‘national and (meso) regional perspectives to history’ (Mishkova 2010: 60). Special reviews and established scholars produced knowledge that collectively affirmed national and regional canons in order to counterbalance Western-produced Balkanism. They defended the centrality of their respective national cultures as the nucleus of the symbolic geographies they advocated.

The Second World War and the early years of the Cold War interrupted the solidification of political and epistemic imaginations of the area. With the exception of Greece, where an Institute of Balkan Studies was created in Thessaloniki in 1953, academic regionalism initially faded into the background of East–West antagonism. Nevertheless, owing to the fact that many of the high-profile representatives of post-war area studies had been socialized in academic environments before the Second World War, interwar traditions remained the legitimizing bedrock for the rise again of interest in and enthusiasm for Southeast Europe by Greek, Yugoslav, Bulgarian, Romanian, Turkish, and even Albanian intellectuals and politicians. When the geopolitical climate and the United Nations (UN) system shifted toward peaceful coexistence and greater diversity, past initiatives were appropriated according to the expanding horizons of local self-representations in European and global contexts. In the 1960s, these initiatives found a global stage in UNESCO, which also became a bridge between Southeast Europe and the decolonizing world.
The return of Balkan collaboration was part and parcel of the long European détente (mid-1960s to mid-1970s). In parallel, when decolonization impacted the UN, the ‘Third World’ carved an intermediary space between the two ideological camps. Within these shifting hierarchies, the dialogue among political and intellectual elites from Southeast European countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia) intensified.

The trigger event for AIESEE was a UNESCO-sponsored colloquium on Balkan civilizations organized in 1962 in Sinaia, Romania. It was convened as part of UNESCO’s Major Project on the Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values (East-West-MP), which had been launched in 1957 in response to non-European countries calling for a greater role in UNESCO’s programmes. The East-West-MP morphed into an agenda to democratize research and discourses about Europe’s relationship with subregions, extra-European regions, and world traditions (‘Orient’ and ‘Occident’) (Wong 2008). As the geocultural balance within UNESCO tilted in favour of the Global South, the ‘East’ turned into a catch-all conceptualization of alterity, of non-Westernness.

The meeting in Sinaia reflected the open-endedness of UNESCO’s vision of a programme of area studies as well as the emphasis on in-betweenness by the hosts, the Romanian commission for UNESCO. Fifteen of the 18 invited national commissions joined the meeting. Besides the six Balkan countries, representatives from Austria, France, Hungary, Italy, Iran, Lebanon, Poland, Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union participated. Iraq, Egypt, and Syria declined the invitation. The idea of creating ‘a space for Balkan studies’ was put forward by Ronald Syme, at the time the ICPHS general secretary. It was quickly agreed to establish a non-governmental entity that would facilitate academic exchange beyond ideological and national borders (ICPHS 1962: 189).

In effect, AIESEE was created a year later with UNESCO sponsorship, which grew from USD 25,000 to USD 50,000 in the second half of the 1970s, in addition to significant funding from Balkan academic establishments as well as commitments from other participating non-Balkan institutions. Also in the second half of the 1970s – its heyday – AIESEE brought together 24 national committees of Southeast European or Balkan studies from Europe, North America, and the Middle East. During its various conferences, symposia, and congresses, it boasted participation from African, Latin American, East Asian, and Australian scholars.

Romanian archaeologist Emil Condurachi – a former collaborator of Nicolae Iorga, the founder of the Romanian Institute of Southeast European Studies – served as the AIESEE general secretary until his death in 1987. The creation of AIESEE generated a region-wide process of establishing area studies institutions: 1963 in Bucharest, 1964 in Sofia, and 1969 in Belgrade. The Centre for Neo-Hellenic Research was established in 1970, followed by the Centre for Southeast European Studies in 1973 in Athens. These were complemented by the Institute for Southeast European Studies in 1970 in Edirne, under the tutelage of the Turkish Historical Society.

AIESEE’s first president, the Greek Dennis Zakythinos – head of the Institute for Byzantine Studies at the National Hellenic Research Foundation in Athens and general secretary of the International Association of Byzantine Studies – voiced the main goal of the organization at its founding session. He argued against a Balkanism, which he considered to be both prejudiced knowledge about the region and proliferation of nationalist historicisms. He proposed that the association should pursue a wider geography mindful of the connections of Balkans with ‘old Europe’ and the Near East or with the countries at the Pontic, Mediterranean, and Carpathian periphery (the Adriatic would soon be added) (Zakythinos 1963: 3–6). The term ‘Southeast Europe’ meant an open-ended conceptualization of the region, liberated from the narrow geography of the peninsula.
Bulgarian and Yugoslav scholars insisted on the name Association of Balkan Studies instead of the International Association of South-East European Studies. They were opposed by Greek and Turkish representatives while also encountering resistance from UNESCO officials (ICPHS Archive: box 152). There are three explanations for these tensions: epistemic traditions in Romania and Greece were constructed on imaginations about Southeast Europe or the Mediterranean world; Turkish scholars followed flexible territorializations drawing on the Ottoman legacy in the Middle East and North Africa; and UNESCO favoured transregionalism. Ultimately, ‘Southeast’ remained the term of consensus, but it was not binding.

AIESEE, as an associate institution of the East-West-MP, adopted several central ideas that combined pre-war regional discourses and global themes within the MP: the focus on individuality and originality of ‘small’ cultures; the critique of hegemonic models in history; deperipherization by emancipation from imperial/colonial legacies; and the significance of national/regional civilizations in the concert of world civilizations. From these ideas, scholars within AIESEE followed two trajectories of integration. The first was regional. According to the Bulgarian Nikolai Todorov – director of the Institute of Balkan Studies in Sofia and president of AIESEE between 1974 and 1979 – Southeast Europe, as a micro-universe, was conceived as ‘a community of material and spiritual life, of economic, social, political, and cultural phenomena... a community established by History’ (Todorov 1969: 63–4).

At the macro level, AIESEE had to flesh out the Balkans’ place within the general unity of human societies. To quote the Romanian Mircea Berza, director of the Institute of Southeast European studies in Bucharest, this was to be achieved by identifying ‘what we received and assimilated, what we created ourselves, all which resulted in an original synthesis that holds an honorable place among the general accomplishments of humanity’s history’ (AIESEE 1966: 9).

AIESEE was fundamentally interdisciplinary. During the 1960s, its activity was constructed in accordance with the research programmes set up by seven commissions specialized in archaeology, post-Byzantine art, socioeconomic history, history of ideas, folklore, Ottoman archives, and linguistics. By the mid-1970s, two further bodies were created: one dealing with modern and contemporary history (from the late nineteenth century onwards), a proposal initially put forward by UNESCO; and another focusing on comparative history of Southeast European law. The commissions were chaired only by Balkan scholars, and the coordinating bureau of the international committee comprised one president (only a Southeast European, position held by rotation), four vice-presidents (later eight as the organization expanded, academics both from within and outside the region), and a general secretary.

A model for other area studies promoted by UNESCO

AIESEE, as an internationalized institutionalization from the margins, made waves within the ICPHS, its other tutelary forum. Through the 1960s and 1970s, the ICPHS leadership struggled to expand its geographical scope to reflect the impact of decolonization on the humanities. In this context, AIESEE appeared as a successful model of area studies initiated by locals, a break from the dominance of Western scholarship. In 1967, the ICPHS held its general assembly in Bucharest. On this occasion, AIESEE organized a showcase in the form of a colloquium on ‘Tradition and Innovation in the Culture of Southeast European Countries’. After attending the proceedings, the Senegalese Alassane N’Daw, secretary general of the International Congress of Africanists, remarked that African scholars could emulate AIESEE’s focus on the history of ideas, traditional culture, or linguistic unity as bases for their political regionalism (N’Daw 1969: 138–9).

In April 1975, AIESEE Secretary General Emil Condurachi, was, as well as its vice-president, ICPHS’s representative at the colloquium ‘The Place and Role of the Humanities in
Contemporary Africa’, held in Accra. Attending in September the ICPHS’s general assembly held in Dubrovnik, he argued for an interdisciplinary approach to the topic, emulating the enterprise initiated in the Balkans. He insisted that the ICPHS expand its activities to Africa because the latter ‘was one of the most important centres from the standpoint of the evolution of the human space’ (ICPHS Archive 1975: box 11, 19). During the 1970s, Condurachi advocated the creation of area studies associations outside of Europe, which put him at odds with some of his Western colleagues, such as Michael François, secretary general of the International Committee for Historical Sciences (ICPHS Archive 1973: box 11, 21–22).

In the same vein, AIESEE organized international congresses of Southeast European studies every four to five years. They took place, by rotation, in Balkan capitals: Sofia in 1966, Athens in 1970, Bucharest in 1974, Ankara in 1979, Belgrade in 1984, and again Sofia in 1989. The first four were impressive events, bringing together one thousand participants on average from more than 20 countries. The last two reflected the gradual demise of AIESEE’s international clout, with considerably fewer participants from outside of the host country or with whole delegations from the Balkans withdrawing.

Congresses were opportunities to exhibit competing national epistemic narratives about Southeast Europe while simultaneously pushing for grander themes reflective of AIESEE’s role in UNESCO’s programmes. In his opening address to the first congress in Sofia, René Maheu, director-general of UNESCO, described the Balkans as ‘the peninsula of hope’ (AIESEE 1967: 28). At the second congress in Athens, the gathering defined the state of the art in Southeast European studies. At the third in Bucharest, AIESEE embraced a broader geography: the relationship between the Balkans and the Mediterranean. At the fourth in Ankara, the emphasis was on connections with Anatolia and the Near East.

By the 1980s, the association strengthened its Eurocentrism as the congress in Belgrade concentrated on the links between the Balkans and Central Europe. The September 1989 event in Sofia ironically dwelled on European progressive traditions since it was connected with the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution.

AIESEE was conceived as a ‘common effort to reintegrate this part of our continent [i.e. the Balkans] in the great European family’ (Condurachi 1989: 47). This ‘return to Europe’ was premised on the in-betweeness of the Southeast. Scholars within AIESEE embraced the idea of an area that defied regional classifications, encouraging UNESCO’s push to tie it to extra-European spaces via the Mediterranean and its Ottoman legacy. This allowed them to challenge the hegemonic claims to universality either from the West or the East (i.e. the Soviet Union).

Connecting the Southeast to the Mediterranean, Byzantium, and the Ottoman Empire broke down the bipolar division of Europe. Most importantly, Southeast European area studies were based on claiming continuities, as well as anachronistic décalages, and imperial contexts. Historical models functioned as legitimizing bases for present national and regional identity narratives. This echoed UNESCO’s encouragement of developing countries to discover their own canons rather than imitate those of developed ones.

In this vein, AIESEE fostered a regional agreement about the continuity of autochthonous populations by the early 1970s. Indigenous contributions were proclaimed to dominate external influences in civilizational evolution. The region was described as the homeland of two grand civilizations: Thracian and Illyrian. They cross-fertilized with the Greek-Roman one and later with other migratory groups. Hence, the Balkans’ ancientness was founded on the so-called Balkano-Anatolian and Balkano-Carpathian ‘complexes’ (Garašanin 1970: 102–9). These narratives fuelled competitive narratives about the multimillennial existence of ancestors (Greeks, Thracians, Daco-Getian, Illyrian, and Turkic tribes). Internationally, however, consensus and rivalry were not mutually exclusive because AIESEE cooperated with colleagues from Thracian and Illyrian studies.
Furthermore, AIESEE contested the label of backwardness stamped on Balkan societies by recontextualized *décalage*. Local academics argued that regional syntheses between exogenous influences and endogenous *permanances* (traditions, peoples, values) produced historical cultures that could not be judged on a spectrum of advanced to backward. The ‘delays’ of a region/society were seen as too mechanical interpretations of the diffusion of ideas across time and space.

The Greek historian C. Dimaras, director of the Centre of Neo-Hellenic Studies, preferred the term ‘coincidences’ to ‘influences’, while Romanian A. Duţu opted for ‘contacts’. Processes in the region were seen as synchronous with the main European cultural currents of the Renaissance, Enlightenment, Romanticism, or the Baroque period. This echoed UNESCO’s emphasis on endogenous development and the unfeasibility of modernity with traditions (Droit 2005). At the same time, intra-Balkan emulations and potential hierarchies were hotly debated within AIESEE. This revitalized academic debates from before the Second World War, including the influence of Hellenism over the region, the impact of ‘old Bulgarian culture’ on other Slavs or the Romanians, and preservation of Roman heritage within Romanian lands.

**Locating the region within transregional geographies**

AIESEE advocated for the improvement of the Balkans’ relative socioeconomic underdevelopment. It was argued that exploitation by the Ottoman, Russian, and Habsburg empires and by capitalist penetration had triggered historical *décalages* and societal imbalances. Overcoming such legacies required national, progressive forces within Southeast European societies to steer modernization; their failure or success depended on how decisive these legacies were locally. Turkish scholars reinterpreted the demise of the Ottoman Empire by claiming that the empire had forsaken its own identity under the influence of Western European economic and political imperialism, domestic (often foreign) compradore classes, as well as Arab–Islamic traditions that crushed Turkish vitality. Such appropriations of imperial legacies were significant. AIESEE’s flexible geographies were operationalized primarily by reassessments of the Byzantine and Ottoman empires in the region’s history. Tensions emerged from descriptions of the Ottoman influence on non-Muslim Balkan peoples. Turkish scholars countered accounts of oppression with narratives of the empire as a commonwealth of Arabs and non-Muslims joining its Turkish founders. They argued that the empire had facilitated Balkan societies’ communication with Europe and the world.

A common ground within AIESEE was the rejection of the empire’s marginality as compared to Europe (AIESEE 1975: 13). Others criticized the resilient cliché that disentangled the empire from European history. Yet, Turkish and non-Turkish scholars remained at odds about the political and economic relationships between Muslim and non-Muslim populations. Although AIESEE facilitated dialogue, Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek, Romanian, and Yugoslav academics expressed Ottoman experiences through the lens of local societies segregated along ethnic and religious lines and estranged from their ‘normal’ European links. Still, the Ottoman Empire was seen as a carrier of Byzantine traditions – a thesis contested in Turkey, especially if Ottoman specificities were ignored/downplayed – augmented with its own ‘Oriental’ universality, adding value to Southeast originalities.

Extolling Byzantium as the ‘second Europe’ was an equally important core concept in Balkan studies, with its emphasis on the Western narrative rooted in Roman heritage. This theme also produced competitive appropriations of the imperial legacy in national contexts. Historians in Sofia emphasized a Byzantine-Slav synthesis (Tăpikova-Zaimova 1980: 32–7). In Belgrade, the school created by Russian émigré George Ostrogorsky ‘considered the Slavs to be a, if not the, principal external force that shaped the Byzantine state’ (Ricks and Trapp 2001: 33).
Those in Bucharest continued the interwar narratives, branding the Romanian principalities as carriers of post-Byzantine civilization (Mishkova 2015: 253, 259). Those in Athens presented Byzantium and its legacy as the missing link in Hellenism’s endurance until Greece’s independence – a foundational continuum for Greeks’ Europeanness (Liakos 2010: 216–19). The ethos of communality-cum-competitiveness that characterized AIESEE was the primary self-representation of the region during the Cold War: unity in diversity. Symbolic geographies and the past were sources for sets of national and translocal differentiae specifica that internationally legitimized contemporary Balkan societies.

UNESCO’s attempts to push AIESEE into transregional initiatives materialized not only in self-centred discourses but also in projects that brought Southeast European academics closer to their peers in Western Asia and North Africa. One example is the colloquium ‘Istanbul at the Intersection of Balkan, Mediterranean, Slavic, and Oriental Cultures’ (October 1973). It brought together four epistemic groups: AIESEE, specialists in Slavic and Central Asian studies, the International Committee of Maritime History, and Arab scholars. In addition, the association was tasked by the ICPHS in 1974 with coordinating a specialization course for young archaeologists from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. The programme was an outgrowth of UNESCO’s ‘Save Carthage Project’. Condurachi and Garašanin represented AIESEE and partnered with École Française de Rome, where, during the late 1970s and mid-1980s, young North Africans took up residence while also visiting excavations in the Balkans.

In a similar vein, the International Information Centre on the Sources of Balkan History—created in 1976 in Sofia as Todorov’s brain child in a transregional way – focused on ‘information on Spanish and Arabic sources of Balkan history, with a view to encouraging Balkanologists to take an interest in little-known and hitherto unused documents dealing with . . . relations between the Balkan peoples and the Mediterranean region’ (Todorov 1981: 24). While the Yugoslav commission for UNESCO had lobbied for such an institution in Belgrade before, the centre demonstrated further cleavages in area studies communities in the Balkans, with a distinct Yugoslav agenda of internationalization that competed with that of AIESEE.

By the end of the 1970s, AIESEE was an internationally visible, UNESCO-validated, epistemic interest group. Consequently, Southeast European scholars became active contributors to UNESCO’s second edition of The History of Humanity: Scientific and Cultural Development (the second draft initiated in 1978). Core themes, such as the Balkans as a bridge between the Orient and Occident, as a historical laboratory, or the ostracisms of past histories, became part of the discussions around UNESCO’s History of Humanity. The macro-universes of the Southeast – the Mediterranean, Byzantium, and Ottoman Empire – as springboards of regional originalities found their way into the volume’s agenda. Narratives about the Southeast’s ancientness were adopted in the published edition, together with the motif of the ‘second Europe’ as a metaphor for the Southeast’s reclamation of its counter-hegemonic Europeanness as well as representations of the Ottoman world as empire by consensus and superpower with an original, syncretic civilization, the closest of all Asian societies to Europe’s.

Paradoxically, as its representatives participated in this major UNESCO project, AIESEE fought for survival. UNESCO cut its budget to USD 10,000 for the 1982/3 biennium, with further reductions up until 1989. In addition to being a victim of the organization’s financial difficulties, the association’s problems were compounded by the very nature of its activities. As it did not respond sufficiently to UNESCO’s transregional objectives, it suffered from the shift of UNESCO’s funding priorities to extra-European regions during the 1980s. With diminishing funds and interest from UNESCO, local political support for the association dwindled as well. Between 1990 and 1991, the association did not receive any UNESCO support. In 1992, once UNESCO restarted its funding, it was woefully insufficient. Despite its continued existence to this day, AIESEE never regained its former visibility and dynamism.
As AIESEE was premised on historiographical coexistence – that is to say competing national self-representations derived from a regionalist episteme complemented AIESEE’s agenda of communalities – the worsening of bilateral political conflicts in the area with their counterparts in symbolic politics had a lethal effect on this modus vivendi. In 1986, Condurachi and Todorov found themselves at a loss in imagining AIESEE’s future in terms of ‘overcoming the contradictions between Bulgaria and Turkey, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece’ (MAE-AIESEE 1379–1986).

The principle of ‘unity in diversity’ fostered by AIESEE was challenged also from outside the region by American scholars, in particular during the 1980s. For instance, historians Peter Sugar and Radu Florescu pleaded for more syncretic, intra-Balkan approaches. They accused previous interactions of having national and ideological biases and lamented the disconnectedness of the Southeast from Central European and Russian/Soviet studies. They proposed a division of labour within common editorial enterprises: locals would deal with national case studies, while foreign academics would take on the task of generalists – translators of regional specificity into broader European and world contexts (Sugar and Florescu 1984).

Conclusion

The internationalization of Southeast European studies from the margins reached an impasse in the 1980s. Local establishments increasingly pursued their own epistemic policies abroad, independent of UNESCO or the ICPHS. Non-Balkan scholars, spurred by financial and institutional circumstances at home, imagined the southeast part of Eastern Europe’s geographies. AIESEE’s difficulties signalled that local scholars were gradually losing the initiative in the production of regional representations to Western peers (Zub 1987: 131).

AIESEE’s internationalization of regional specificities dependent on flexible geographies and its counter-hegemonic surge had morphed into transnationally projected ethnocentrisms. This trend was aggravated not only by UNESCO’s own crisis but also by shifts within Europe and in the Balkans. Such changes included, among others, the economic downturn of socialist states, the worsening of minority/national issues among the region’s countries, the symbolic hegemony of Western European integration, and the rise of ‘Central Europe’, which affirmed similarity with – rather than distinctiveness from – the West. However, the fate of AIESEE, and the scholarly circulation it triggered, forces us to reinterpret Balkan studies during the Cold War. It was a product not only of regional or European entanglements, or a story of resilient self-representations, but also of transregional connections and transformations initiated by international institutions and decolonization.

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Area studies of Asia can be said to be a product of the post-Second World War new world order under hegemony of the United States (US). Certainly, it was owing significantly to the Orientalist scholarship conducted under the auspices of the older colonial regimes in the region that in turn left a substantial mark on the study of the classical traditions of Asia, histories of the states, and, not least, ethnology of indigenous and tribal peoples. Some of the colonial scholarship, such as phrenology, eugenics, and even linguistics – the nineteenth-century king of the classical disciplines – did not survive well in the post-war period; nevertheless, the legacy of the others was still perceptible until the turn of the twentieth century.

Post-war area studies represented a massive expansion and systematization of the older categories of Western knowledge of Asia, particularly along the areal boundaries of older colonial formations, but, as we will see, these areas became increasingly reshaped by the new realities of nation-states that emerged during this era of the United Nations. Thus East Asia was still understood in civilizational terms as shaped basically by Confucian and imperial Chinese culture, South Asia by Indo-Islamic traditions, and Southeast Asia by a combination of Indo-Chinese and Islamic cultures. The Middle East was defined and shaped by Islamic civilization and ambivalently related to the rest of Asia. Indeed, the flagship organization in the US, the Association for Asian Studies (AAS), does not include Central and West Asia, which has its own association without links to AAS.

While classical studies of civilizations continued to flourish through the study of philosophy, literature, the arts, and history, within area studies these became increasingly amplified by anthropology, political science, sociology, and development economics until the 1990s. First, the modernization paradigm began to shape not only the social science disciplines but also fields such as history, literature, and philosophy, where there were efforts to show that modernity or its offshoots could be found in early history, such as the ‘economic revolution’ in Song China or in Moghul India, or Confucian liberalism and the roots of democracy in ancient India, etc. Second, although these studies in Europe and the US were conducted under the rubric of area studies, in reality these increasingly became nation-based studies. Accordingly, while PhD students in Chinese or Japanese history or literature were expected to learn and use materials in both languages and cultures, in practice most scholars neglected the study or use of the non-national language. Similarly, few students of history or literature in Indian studies studied Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan, Nepali, or Pakistani works and materials. The dominant paradigm thus became a national modernization paradigm.
In this respect, Western scholarship might have been following the trend established within Asian societies, which in this early post-colonial stage focused almost exclusively on national studies, except perhaps in the study of international relations. Japan was an important exception to this phenomenon partly because it rapidly rejoined the ranks of advanced economies; however, this might be more because of its history of pan-Asianism. Even though pan-Asianism had, without a doubt, been seriously tainted by its role in the Pacific War, Japanese scholarship inherited an enormous apparatus and infrastructure of research concerning many parts of Asia, both historical and twentieth-century. Pre-war Japan had the largest research organizations of its time in the world – for example, the South Manchurian Railway Company’s (SMR) research organizations – and the bulk of these researchers were engaged in work on Asia, both practical and textual, from Siberia through China to Southeast Asia, to South Asia, and even to the Middle East (Young 1966). There were many fields in East Asia – especially China and Inner Asian studies – where Japanese scholarly knowledge continued to remain superior to any other in the world until the 1980s. Unfortunately, since most Japanese scholarship is in the Japanese language, research in much of the rest of the world was unable to build sufficiently upon it, and in Japan itself, scholarship became highly insular.

The national modernization paradigm continued to dominate scholarship on Asia within developing Asian nations. Very few, if any, regional and national universities contained programmes of Asian studies, let alone area studies. If other parts of the world were to be studied in history or literature, it would usually be a course about the West, which, of course, was the model for national modernization. Occasionally, at a metropolitan university there might have been a programme created about some other part of Asia, such as the Centre for East Asian Studies established in Delhi by the Ford Foundation – in part to advance its Cold War agenda. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences also funded a small number of researchers of other Asian countries in its metropolitan centres, but their research scope was highly circumscribed. Certainly, there was much advancement of national knowledge within decolonized nations, and in countries such as India there was also considerable advancement in conceptual knowledge within several disciplines, such as history and anthropology (which was typically not distinguished from sociology).

The end of the Cold War, particularly in the West by 1990 (some argue that it ended earlier in East Asia with the US’s recognition of China and the end of the Vietnam War), spelled important changes in the intellectual paradigm of Asian studies. Several forces coalesced to form this trend. The urgency to fund social science area studies in the West diminished even as American social sciences, in particular, began to consider themselves to be scientific disciplines that were not dependent on the study of languages and contexts. Language, history, and context were, undoubtedly, the main foundations of area studies as it was known until then, and as the renunciation of social scientific reliance upon them grew, the number of social scientists engaged in area studies – particularly economists, sociologists, and political scientists (in that order) – declined very rapidly, for instance in the membership of the AAS. It should be noted that the lead discipline that influenced the other social sciences was economics with its growing mathematical and rational choice orientation; it can also be noted that social sciences in other parts of the world also gradually came under the influence of the hegemonic ‘rational choice’ and equally context-independent ‘experimental’ methodologies.

Another trend that emerged more prominently at this time was the leftist and post-structuralist movements in the US. This critique from the left somewhat belatedly discovered the roots of area studies in Cold War ideology, which, grounded most importantly in Edward Said’s classic Orientalism (1978), followed the contours of colonial knowledge production. But while there might have been a brief period of coming together during the late 1980s between
the Marxists and post-structural and post-colonial critiques enabled by Said’s work and that of the subaltern historians of colonial India – such as Ranajit Guha (Guha and Spivak 1988) and Dipesh Chakrabarty (1992) – by the mid-1990s this consensus in the critical study of Asian society and history began to come apart.

The second half of the 1990s was filled with often sharp debates between more traditional Marxist critics, such as Aijaz Ahmad (1995), Harry Harootunian (1999), and Arif Dirlik (1999), directed against a range of newer approaches to critical theory informed by post-structuralism and post-colonialism, or rather, the post-colonial stance. By post-colonial stance, I refer not to a theory but to an assumption that the modernizing nation-states of the post-war era, despite the heroic rhetoric of liberation and solidarity, continued to build upon the racial and exploitative epistemology of the colonial masters. These nation-states were designed to become like their colonial masters, whose imperialist character was ultimately inseparable from their national structures, which were shaped to advance global mastery in a competitive system. Progressive Hegelian history is the ur-form of both imperial and national histories. This ‘post-colonial’ assumption was compatible with many different theories, including Marxism among thinkers such as Gayatri Spivak (Guha and Spivak 1988) or environmental historians.

The traditional Marxist critique was launched on various fronts. Thus the then emergent theory of globalization associated with anthropologists such as Arjun Appadurai (1996) and Ulf Hannerz (1996) was seen as the successor to Cold War modernization theory. Globalization was denounced as the new ideology of the victorious Western powers over the Soviet bloc because it was founded upon new forms of capitalism that sought to conquer the world by developing transnational modes of production and strategies of accumulation. The work of Homi Bhabha (1994) on ‘hybridity’ and ‘colonial mimicry’, which suggests subtle modes of inverting colonial hierarchies, was critiqued for ignoring class and structural problems. Harootunian’s critique of Bhabha (1999) was contained in the same volume of the journal *Postcolonial Studies* as the exchange between myself and Arif Dirlik (1999) regarding my 1995 book, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*.

*Rescuing History* makes the argument that modern, linear history was coproduced with nationalism and the former sought to depict the history as having a continuous ‘national subject’ progressing through linear time despite the absence of such consciousness and realities in earlier periods. Moreover, the narrative structures and rhetorical strategies of a national history sought to appropriate the dispersed past, often suppressing different living forms of community life and identities for the sake of its project. The book tried to recover dispersed histories and trace counter-narratives of the past in China and India.

Arif Dirlik’s critique of this book begins with ‘the identity of postcolonial criticism’. He presents two arguments: First, post-colonial scholarship becomes involved in the multicultural celebration of identity and, as such, does not reflect upon the structural conditions (capitalism as a totality) that engendered it. It is therefore used by capitalists and fascists for their purposes. Second, by abandoning foundationalism and the search for a subject of history, post-colonialism systematically contributes to the erasure of the revolutionary narrative and thus also ends up serving fascism and other reactionary forces.

With regard to the first point, I agree with Dirlik that all scholars, whether or not they employ the post-colonial perspective, should be more attentive to material circumstances, and I would urge him in this direction as well. But post-colonialism is radically different from multiculturalism in that it is committed to the deconstruction of identity and critiques the latter’s identitarian politics. It is even more particularly opposed to the reifications of national culture by fascists and other ultranationalists (Duara 2001). Whereas scholars such as Aijaz Ahmad
continue to insist on a return to a Marxist revolutionary view, most scholars, including Dirlik, are much less sanguine or desirous of returning to the revolutionary narrative.

Critical Asian studies has encountered a world in which the possibilities of non-capitalist emancipation has receded and one where revolutionary states have been discredited. At the same time, capitalist globalization continues to widen the gap between the powerful and the powerless while the erosion of a national society itself unleashes a reaction that results in still more violent and exclusive reifications of nation, race, or culture. It is thus at an impasse. There is no master narrative to organize these effects and resistances to the national modernization paradigm, which has led to considerable confusion about the goals of research programmes in both Asia and among scholars of Asia in the West. But even if we have to wait for new theoretical clarities, there is no shortage of pressing historical problems.

Since the early 2000s, two relatively new fields of enquiry that might suggest new horizons for research – at least for Asian studies – have opened up. The first of these is the study of circulations and connections, especially within and with Asia under the broad title of ‘Inter-Asian Connections’ or more simply ‘Asian Connections’. The second is the problem of environmental sustainability, which will be touched upon in the last part of the chapter. Although the organizing ideas of circulations, flows, supply chains, and networks became popular with the advent of theories of globalization over the last 25 years or so, they also began to penetrate different disciplines, particularly in Asian studies.

Among the most important pioneers in this field was Indian Ocean historical studies. While the original studies of the Indian Ocean – which was, out of necessity, transregional and transnational – by leaders such as Kirti N. Chaudhuri (1985), Janet Abu-Lughod (1989), William Atwell (2005), and Hamashita Takeshi (on the South China Sea, 1994) were inspired by Braudel’s work on the Mediterranean, the next generation of Indian Ocean scholars took it to a completely different level, revealing how these flows of goods, bullion, ideas, doctrines, and microbes effected major changes within societies from very early on. Archaeologists and anthropologists such as Jack Goody also showed that Eurasia was a highly connected zone from the Bronze Age (2006). The early technological revolution enabled intensive agriculture that permitted surplus accumulation, class stratification, literacy, bureaucracy, urbanization, and interlinked city-based civilizations across the zone. The new field of connected and circulatory histories has by now critiqued methodological nationalism at its very roots.

Indeed, these intellectual developments have been underscored by the resurgence of a connected Asia. The post-Cold War advent of globalization itself appears to be mediated by regionalisms, as we see by the appearance of many global regionalisms such as the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, the European Union, the Latin America with the Southern Common Market, and others. Within East and Southeast Asia – and more recently in India – Asian economic integration has increased significantly, principally after the end of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. The economic integration of East, South, and Southeast Asia, which had grown steadily under imperialist dominated trade, declined precipitously at the end of the Second World War. Intraregional trade began to pick up in the 1980s but it was the Asian financial crisis – the shock of the common crisis – that seems to have awakened the states to the reality of regional networks and focused their attention on cooperation (Duara 2010). Today what the Asian Development Bank (ADB) calls ‘integrating Asia’, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, Japan, Korea, India, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, conducts over 50 per cent of its trade with itself in comparison to trade with the outside world, and compared with only 33 per cent in the 1980s (ADB 2008). Population mobility – especially labour transfers between developing Asia and developed Asia – has also been growing very rapidly. Finally, there is greater integration through tourism, people-to-people relations,
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religion, and both high and popular arts. Note for instance, the huge popularity of Korean TV serials and Japanese manga or anime.

Six major indicators of interdependence tracked for the 16 Asian economies have increased markedly in the ten years since the financial crisis. The most important factor behind the increased economic activity is the participation of these economies in a regional supply chain production network. Production is divided up into smaller steps and each part is assigned to the most cost-efficient producer (ADB 2008: 70, 97–8). Accordingly, for instance, an electronic product might be produced or assembled in China with hardware from Taiwan and software from India. Indeed, much of this type of vertical integration of production has been enabled by new information and communication technologies and open markets. At the same time, the bulk of these goods have been produced for consumption in Europe and North America. The present crisis in consumption could well lead to deepening markets for these goods within Asia. In recent years, ASEAN has developed free trade agreements with each of the East Asian nations and India.

Macro-economic interdependence in the region is also indicated by the co-movement of macro-economic variables. For instance, the correlation of gross domestic product (GDP) among many of these states over three-year moving averages is very strong. The GDP correlation coefficient has gone up from 0.07 before the crisis to 0.54 after the crisis. Price movements are similarly correlated and price shocks in one area are being transmitted to other areas with greater intensity. With the growth of macro-economic interdependence, a growing need to manage it has appeared. For instance, exchange rates require monitoring and coordination so that central banks do not shoot each other in the foot (ADB 2008: 153–5).

The study of Asian connections has also witnessed major institutional build-up. Apart from the increase in the available number of faculty positions in a connected study of Asia, there are several institutes and centres devoted to such study, such as the India China Institute at the New School in New York. The Social Science Research Council (SSRC) in the US has led a consortium of universities in Asia, Europe, and the USA in the eight-year project on ‘Inter-Asian Connections’, which has held five international conferences and sponsored over 90 junior research fellowships in the research of ‘Asian Connections’. In Europe, Heidelberg University has pioneered the Europe-Asia Asymmetries project, which conducts the connected study of Europe and Asia over a long historical period. They have also launched a publication series. Similarly, Cambridge University Press has already published several volumes in its series of Asian Connections. Institutions in Asia that have been most active in this field are the Asia Research Institute in the National University of Singapore and Hong Kong University’s Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences (SSRC 2015).

The second area of enquiry that has emerged is the study of the environment and research projects focused on the crisis of sustainability in the planet. Indeed, the study of Asian Connections has also been moving to address this fundamental issue. One of the most important imperatives to coordinate and manage interdependence in Asia arises from the common and linked set of problems faced by the region in the realm of climate change, environmental degradation, water scarcity, and public health, among others. The provisioning of these items, which the ADB dubs ‘regional public goods’, is evidently urgent. Consider a colossal and dire public goods problem that cannot be managed without a concerted regional effort. The Himalayas and the Tibetan mountains plateau are the source and watershed of ten major rivers that provide fresh water to many different countries in South and Southeast Asia in addition to China. Climate change and environmental degradation have depleted the water resources available in all these countries and it is particularly extreme in north and north-west China which is suffering the most severe drought in the last half century, with precipitation levels of 70–90 per cent below normal and water tables depleted from excessive well drilling (Selden 2009).
China has been building dams not only on the Yangtze River, but has also built three more on the Mekong River to produce hydropower for its south-west border regions. About 12 more large dams are expected to be built on the Mekong (or Lancang) alone. Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia have expressed grave concerns over water diversions, shortages, and ecological imbalances in the region. Although China and some authorities assert that the impact of Chinese dam building has not affected downstream waters significantly, the Chinese government has not been very forthcoming with the data on the dams and has also not permitted independent scientific studies of the dams. Greater regional efforts must begin with pooling all the necessary data (Gunn and McCartan 2008). Recently there has been a proposal to divert the waters of several Tibetan rivers, including the Yarlung Tsangpo, and the Brahmaputra in India and Bangladesh northwards to irrigate the north China plains. Needless to say, the effects of this diversion on South Asia could well lead to unprecedented water wars (Chellaney 2007). To be sure, the countries in Indo-China and South Asia are also building dams and destructive infrastructure projects without much heed to the grave environmental damage that these can bring.

In this scenario of increasing interdependence, as well as rising tensions over regional public goods and territories, the nation-states in the region have to adapt – if not compromise – their conceptions of territorial sovereignty. Perhaps the most advanced subregion within Asia in developing this responsive – rather than merely adaptive – strategy has been Southeast Asia. ASEAN has created several regional platforms, such as ASEAN itself, ASEAN +3, the East Asia Summit, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Moreover, although ASEAN is not often effective in achieving its proclaimed goals in particular areas such as energy conservation or educational development, it has been much more successful in developing the basis of an open and inclusive regionalism that creates commitments to regional prosperity and peace.

The ASEAN strategy echoes, to some extent, the situation at the cross-roads of the vast regional maritime trade networks of the early modern period before European domination since the eighteenth century. Neither the vast regional trade nor the networks was controlled by a single power. Just as importantly, there was no state domination of identity within the regional sphere. Today, within the loose network of economic actors, ASEAN seeks to deploy a regional strategy that involves the major powers engaged in the region. According to Evelyn Goh, ASEAN has succeeded in integrating China as a regional power, a tier below the US. Meanwhile, Japan and India are integrated at a next lower tier of regional powers and are enmeshed in the developing regional security and economic architecture, while ASEAN retains a central role in the regional institutional process.

(Goh 2007/8: 154)

Thus, if ASEAN is engaging in balancing power, it is doing so with a more complex strategy in view (Goh 2007/8). This strategy can be differentiated from the process of integrating the European Union, in that it builds upon the pre-existing networks of private, public (non-governmental organizations), and intergovernmental agencies rather than integrating nation-states as such. Circulations and networks of interdependence remain key to understanding these processes.

This is not to say that there are no challenges to the ASEAN project. In recent years, it has been confronted by the resurgence of nationalist and global ambitions of the People’s Republic of China, particularly in the South China Sea. Until recently, China’s attitude toward its Asian neighbours in the south had been most amicable and it had been among the first signatories of
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the ASEAN rules of the regional game. China’s recent challenges to ASEAN countries over environmental issues and the waters of the South China Sea have troubled the unity of ASEAN. Its turn to the US, which has fashioned the latter’s strategy as the US ‘pivot to Asia’, has perhaps further complicated the situation at present.

But the most powerful challenge to Asian connections, in reality and in scholarship, will be to respond in time to the crisis of sustainability. The national modernization paradigm, with its restricted emphasis on GDP growth and allied fields of knowledge production, will have to yield to a different vision of human and planetary flourishing. The humanities and social sciences have historically contributed to the creation of paradigms of knowledge such as civilizational or modernization theory. Also, in the contemporary world, there are many situations where groups, organizations, networks, and vulnerable communities in Asia as well as allied forces across the globe – non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental and transnational organizations, scientists, religious groups, publicists, and other activists – are making an effort to bring global awareness to issues of climate change, resource conservation, and responsible use of the commons (Duara 2015). By raising the profile of circulatory histories to their true role and by identifying those groups and networks that are still – or have more recently become – committed to the inviolability or even sacrality of the commons, we can try to overcome the disastrous consequences of the national sovereignty paradigm and collectively tackle the crisis of an unsustainable planet.

Select bibliography


The respatialization of area studies from a bird’s-eye view

Steffi Marung

The spatialization of knowledge about the world into geographically and epistemologically defined compartments, around which academic institutions, research agendas, and curricula are organized, has been part of the professionalization of academic communities in Europe and the USA since the nineteenth century. The humanities and the later emerging social sciences – from history, geography, and ethnology, to philological and cultural studies, to political science and sociology – have implicitly or explicitly always been tied to ‘trait geographies’ (Appadurai 2000). These geographies have been built from different spatial formats, and they could be more or less territorialized, privileging different scales of scientific enquiry: while, for example, historiography, geography, or sociology co-produced the modern European nation-state, anthropology either addressed the non-territorial (vulgo: non-European) local level or pursued its integration into a territorial scalar logic. ‘Cultural traits’ could be either ascribed to the national compartment or to the regional. These projects, in turn, were embedded in specific ‘metageographies’, as a ‘set of spatial structures through which people gain their knowledge of the world: the often unconscious frameworks that organize studies of history, sociology, anthropology, economics, political science, or even natural history’ (Lewis and Wigen 1997: 9; also see Chapter 16 by Ben-Nun). This metageography has been far from stable since the end of the nineteenth century; however, in the case of what is in contemporary English subsumed under ‘area studies’, it has been less unconscious and rather explicitly conceptualized and institutionalized (Lockman 2004).

Area studies seem to be based upon a recent Western cartography of large civilizational masses associated with different relationships to ‘Europe’... and a Cold-War-based geography of fear and competition in which the study of world languages and regions in the United States was legislatively configured for security purposes into a reified map of geographical regions.

(Appadurai 2000: 8)
More abstractly, area studies are conceptualized as the study of ‘areas or regions in the sense of midrange scales of analysis, knowledge, and representation. These include a variety of levels and categories: national- and state-level, wider linguistic cultural areas (as, say, predominantly or lingua franca Arabic-, Turkish-, Russian-, or Swahili-speaking societies) or geopolitically determined domains, such as South East Asia, the southern cone of Latin America, or southern Africa’ (Sidaway 2013: 985). In many efforts to come to terms with the spatial and epistemological nature of area studies in a more generic way, the underlying empirical historical materials are the specific institutional and intellectual projects pursued in the United States after the end of the Second World War.

This concrete historical experience is in many of the contributions – which after the end of the Cold War have critically reviewed the agendas, ambitions, and effects of area studies (Bates, Mudimbe and O’Barr 1993; Wallerstein 1997; Mirsepassi, Basu and Weaver 2003; Szanton 2004; Schäbler 2007), often with the aim of redefining them vis-à-vis (the study of) globalization processes – translated into a universal, supratemporal model, against which processes in other national and regional academic communities and during other periods of academic professionalization are measured. As David L. Szanton claims in an influential contribution to the debate in 2004: ‘Even if still a debated domain, the extraordinary growth and worldwide coverage of Area Studies scholarship and teaching in the USA has no equivalent elsewhere in the world’ (Szanton 2004: 8), thus suggesting that neither before nor elsewhere have capitalized area studies ever existed. In a complementary way, both scholars and policy-makers outside the USA have referred to this model to legitimize reform agendas for the study of world regions in the social sciences and humanities in a world increasingly described as ‘globalized’ (Sabouret and Gorshenina 2010; Middell 2013).

This United States (US)-centrism as well as Cold War-centrism has produced profound confusion both in the historiographical and in the political debate about the past and the future of area studies, with different national or local trajectories either being described as ‘deviations’ and detours from this main route, or their histories being written backwards from the moment of convergence with this model. This obscures, however, how the efforts to spatialize knowledge about the world in ‘regions’ have been reactions to changing and different kinds of challenges, hence producing a plurality of answers, of which area studies formations in the USA in the second half of the twentieth century has been just one – although certainly a prominent and powerful one – among many. The transformation and dissolution of different types of empires in the first half of the twentieth century – from the Russian, to the Ottoman, to the British, French, or German – has been one of those challenges. The Cold War competition and decolonization resulted in further dramatic transformations. Furthermore, the ‘shock of the global’ of the 1970s (Ferguson 2010) marks another caesura. To all these crises affecting the production of knowledge about the world were added social, intellectual, cultural, and academic transformations and ruptures during the twentieth century – from the rise of the social sciences, or the challenges of post-colonial theory, to the expansion of higher education as part of Cold War modernization projects as well as their later crises in many parts of the world.

This chapter aims to shed light on different spatialization and conceptualization of area studies research and institutionalizations, going beyond both a US-centrism as well as a Cold War-centrism. With its perspective on the terminologies and spatialities in the histories of area studies, the chapter neither presents a teleological narrative toward transregional studies nor does it position area studies as the failed effort to be overcome by new spatializations of knowledge production. A productive lens through which to look at these variations is a comparative perspective on the respacializations of area studies, or more precisely the variable ways in which the spaces of areas are defined.
Most familiar are the histories of Cold War area studies in the USA, which are said to have developed on the basis of a geopolitical and territorial spatialization of areas, defined in relation to the tides of US-American political interests, and connected to its global ambition to shape the post-colonial transformations in newly independent states along the lines of the rising modernization paradigm – competing both with earlier European projects of colonial development and with Soviet agendas to implement a socialist modernity. Groups of states were integrated into areas such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, for which experts were required, proficiency in the respective languages, as well as the ability to collect and interpret information of the transformation of these countries after the Second World War. The secret service, with the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services; the military, with its Army Specialized Training Programs; private foundations, mostly the Rockefeller and Ford foundations; as well as academic organizations, most prominently the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council have been identified as the main actors in the 1940s and 1950s, whose interplay drove the institutionalization of area studies (Engerman 2009; Loschke 2018; Naumann 2018). Profiting from major government support through the National Defense Education Act of 1958 – which stipulated in its Title VI the extension of funding for the study and training at colleges and universities in area-based centres – interdisciplinary and multi-area centres mushroomed across the USA to become the often cited model in the Western hemisphere. Whereas the critical revision of area studies in the USA during the 1990s emphasized the politicization of these academic enterprises, describing them as children of the Cold War, the recently booming historiography of area studies in the USA has unearthed the multiplicity of traditions of US area studies – philological, ethnographic, as well as geographical academic formations in the USA and Europe – and has emphasized the role of inner-academic dynamics and the role of foundations setting their own agendas of area studies formations, and accordingly started to nuance the Cold War determinism (Engerman 2003).

The division of the world into areas has also, in the USA, not ushered in a complete and coherent mapping of the whole world at the same time, but resulted in an unequal geography, in which different world regions received varying degrees of attention. Whereas the concept of ‘Latin America’, for example, found its way into the US-American conceptual toolkit only in the second half of the twentieth century, taking up the French tradition of the nineteenth century, previously ‘Hispanic America’ was used to describe the cultural difference to the southern part of the double continent (Loschke 2018). The transformation into a ‘Latin’ neighbour reflected the complex interplay between a perception of this region as a space for the unfolding of a US-American hegemony and its perception as being culturally closer, given its ‘Latin’ – hence European – origin. The construction of the Middle East as an area for scholarly interest, in turn, had been driven in the USA in the nineteenth century less by philological and historical agendas like in Europe, but by religious motives, and was at the same time entangled with the European Orientalist movement, conceptualizing the region as culturally inferior and as a space for imperial domination (Lockman 2004; Kirasirova 2015).

The rising power of modernization theory, which had similarly identified nation-states as the key spaces to which its claims were addressed, has likewise shaped the conceptualization of world regions as areas composed of states. However, also in the USA, where these multiple pressures toward a territorialized and politicized conceptualization of, for example, the Middle East had gained particular strength – due to the centrality that the region gained in geopolitical terms as well as due to the challenge to replace the rapidly fallings stars of European colonialism in the region – philological, cultural, religious, and historical traditions in the study of the region never completely disappeared. Instead, they seem to have gained new importance in the discussions how to reposition area studies of the Middle East in particular after the end
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of the Cold War, also in relation to transregional and global studies (Mitchell 2003; Schäbler 2007; Derichs 2017).

In Russia and the Soviet Union, again, ‘Orientology’ – as one can accurately translate the Russian Vostokovedenie (Kemper and Kalinovsky 2015) – was rooted in different trajectories. As a highly transnational endeavour from its early beginnings in the eighteenth century – with a considerable import of German scholars (Tolz 2011) – Russian pre-revolutionary Oriental studies remained, on the one hand, closely entangled with the Western academic community and enjoyed an excellent reputation. They shared a philological and historical orientation with other European Oriental studies. Furthermore, Russian Oriental studies have been firmly connected to the Russian imperial project ‘in the East’, and displayed a missionary dimension as the early American projects did, but here directed toward the conversion of the non-orthodox populations of the eastern and southern peripheries of the empire, which academically translated into the interest in the study of religions (Kirasirova 2015). At the same time, however, the region under study was not a distant other, but both part of the imperial space as well as its immediate neighbour. As the ‘East’ was both ‘the other’ and part of ‘the self’, this resulted in agendas for scholars, which differed from those of their Western colleagues. Russian Orientology could be both the academic foundation for a Russian civilizing mission in the East, as well as the critical revision of Western European assumptions about the inferiority of the region (Schimmelpenninck van der Oye 2010; Tolz 2011). This double role remained a feature for Soviet Oriental studies as well, being ‘involved in defining cultural and historical identities at home’ (Kemper 2013: 4). The October Revolution was, then, as much a caesura as it was not. The new Soviet Orientology flourished both due to the personnel continuities across this divide and due to the key interest the Communist International (Comintern) movement, and in particular Soviet actors, took in the peoples of the East. Whom to support in their anti-colonial struggle (in China in particular) as well as in their post-colonial transformation (in Central Asia in particular) became the driver for new institutionalizations of research and teaching about the East, such as the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV) under the auspices of the Comintern.

This respatialization, in turn, was not under complete control of Soviet communists but to a large extent shaped by the redefinitions of actors in the ‘East’ themselves: how students at the KUTV’s Eastern section started to appropriate this space ‘as a unique form of socialist subjectivity . . . and as a space for self-realization both inside and outside Soviet borders’ (Kirasirova 2017: 13) was but the first complication in the emergence of Soviet area studies (Marung 2018). They continued to unfold in the context of heated discussions about the role and outlook of Soviet Oriental studies and the subsequent differentiation into Asian and African studies in the late 1950s and early 1960s. These were not only byproducts of the ‘interlocking’ of Orientologies during the Cold War (Kemper and Kalinovsky 2015). The repositioning of Soviet Oriental studies was to a large extent driven by academic and political actors, who originated from the Russian East, such as Bobodzhan Gafurov, the director of the Institute for Oriental Studies after 1954. Although the ‘integration of “Orientals” is certainly another characteristic feature that sets Orientology in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) apart from the discipline in any other countries’ (Kemper 2013: 11), the role of such ‘Oriental Orientalists’ (Kemper 2015: 174) was less that of research informants and more of academic counterparts and influential policy-makers for the scientific community. Gafurov had been a key driver for a profound redesign of the institute, ousting his predecessors from their position in the directorship with the argument that they were neither able to recognize the centrality of research on contemporary issues nor to establish a valuable relation to the peoples of the foreign and domestic East. This criticism was gratefully taken up at the highest political
level, culminating in Anastas Mikoian’s famous harangue at the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, that there ‘is an institute that works on the questions of the Orient; but one has to say that while in our days the Orient is waking up, this institute is still in slumber’ (cited in Kemper 2015: 173).

This ‘waking up’ happened to African studies as well and resulted in increased political support for the establishment of area studies departments and centres at universities and the Academy of Sciences since the late 1950s (Davidson 2003). The study of Africa had been pursued until the early 1960s under the umbrella of Oriental studies, and had received considerable promotion during the 1920s under the auspices of the Comintern, but these early endeavours to emancipate African studies had, like many other academic undertakings, to suffer from Stalin’s violent campaign against ‘cosmopolitanism’. With the incipient decolonization on the continent and increasing Cold War competition exported to these world regions, these roots could be cultivated again. Surviving scholars of this era such as the historian Ivan I. Potekhin and the linguist Dmitry A. Ol’derogge could also profit from the support of African-American actors such as W.E.B. DuBois, who lobbied for the establishment of a separate institute on his visit to the Soviet Union in 1959. In contrast, Gafurov struggled to keep it under his roof. A third alternative was suggested by Nuritdin Mukhitdinov, a high-ranking Uzbek party official, who wanted such an institute to focus on contemporary questions. Although the institute had been created in the 1960s following Potekhin’s suggestions, after criticism from party officials it was transferred from the department of historical sciences to the economics department of the Academy of Sciences in 1962, a shift that marked a move toward economic and political research on contemporary issues, which was cemented by the recruitment of the economist Vassili G. Solodovnikov as new director after Potekhin’s death in 1964. Notwithstanding, historical, ethnographic, and cultural studies did not disappear from the institute agenda (Marung 2018).

While this trajectory of Soviet African studies seems to confirm the conventional Cold War narrative of their politicization, the shift toward contemporary topics and the rise of the social sciences as the hegemonic disciplines of area studies, the spatialization of the area under study as well as the conceptualization of Africa reveals the tensions between the dynamics in the USA discussed earlier. First, Soviet African studies identified the entire continent as the region of study, thereby not reproducing hierarchical differentiations of both Western discourses and inner-African debates between the Africa north and south of the Sahara. This had to do with the Soviet conceptualization of the ‘East’ and of the decolonizing world more generally – being seen as a potential space for the unfolding of an anti-imperialist project and of a socialist modernity, which was not to be fragmented along racial, cultural, or nationalist lines. It was, second, a result of the roots of Soviet African studies in Oriental studies, from where a large number of scholars moved to the newly established field, whose specialization in the languages and the histories of northern Africa and the Middle East became the seed capital for the professionalization of Soviet African studies. And, third, this conceptualization turned out to be productive owing to the fact that it created a common space in which actors from the Soviet East and South could circulate as mediators of a Soviet modernization project more easily (Kirasirova 2011; Kalinovsky 2013). In effect, Soviet Central Asia would become part both of the ‘Orient’ and of ‘Africa’. This spatialization was also based on the entanglement of narratives about how to overcome ‘backwardness’. Soviet Africanists and Orientologists have been most active in presenting the modernization of Soviet Central Asia as a model of development in the decolonizing world, with the October Revolution being turned into a caesura not only for Soviet history but of the Global South more generally (Marung 2017). The envisioning of a common socialist world-system resulted in the conceptualization of a common space in which Africa, Asia, and the socialist countries of Europe would share the benefits of socialist development.
Other European socialist countries followed this model. The national area studies communities in, for example, the Germany Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, however, were rooted in diverging traditions. With the exception of the GDR, most of these countries were not colonial but subject to landed empires in the past and could hence, even more evidently than the Soviet Union, claim to never have had colonial ambitions or colonies. Yet, scholars from these parts of Eastern Europe had been part of the Oriental studies communities in, for example, the Habsburg, German, and Russian empires, and they could therefore also dispose of the cultural capital acquired in these communities. In the interwar period, again, in many of the newly emerging nation-states, colonial dreams were part of the search for a new position in a European order, which was dominated by overseas empires and in which the access to colonies or imperial complementary spaces was perceived as an element of 'Europeanness' as well as a strategy to strengthen the nation and to survive in a globally connected economy (Hadler and Middell 2017).

Polish aspirations for colonial spaces overseas were reflected most prominently in the foundation of the Maritime and Colonial League in 1930, engaged in educational initiatives to globalize the outlook of the Polish public as well as actively supporting the creation of a Polish navy as well as the acquisition of Polish colonies in Africa. The Polish venture in Liberia was one of the ambitious but ultimately failing examples (Puchalski 2017). Also in Czechoslovakia, public debate ideas of how to create colonies in Africa – yet, in a 'better' way than the major European colonial powers – were considered (Havlasa 1919). Such ambitions had also led to the promotion of Oriental studies in these countries in the interwar period; however, the considerable expansion of area studies only began in the 1960s. In the GDR, in turn, emerging post-war area studies could resort to a much broader professionalized and institutionalized field of the study of the non-European world, with German colonial studies and Auslandskunde having been one of the pacesetters of European area studies before the war (Stoecker 2008; Brahm 2010). The GDR, accordingly, did not start from scratch when creating area studies expertise but had to balance its past as a colonial state with the newly formed agenda of socialist area studies as promoted by the Soviet Union. The expansion and restructuring of area studies research in the GDR has, however, to be understood not only against the background of the older German imperial tradition and the more recent integration into the socialist camp, but also with regard to the fragile position the GDR held internationally until the 1970s, as it struggled for diplomatic recognition. The engagement with the decolonizing world was perceived as one avenue to gain international recognition and, therefore, to secure the very existence of the state. This hints again at the diverse conditions under which area studies emerged and expanded as distinct spatializations of knowledge about the world, themselves rooted in different spatialities – beyond a world of empires and the Cold War.

A unique feature of area studies in European socialist countries were the early initiatives to foster cooperation between different area studies specialists, thereby not only strengthening the multidisciplinary character of the study of one specific world region but also establishing connections and comparisons across their borders. This was facilitated by a common understanding of scientific enquiry, based on Marxism-Leninism, which manifested itself in the GDR in the creation of a council for the study of Africa, Asia, and Latin America; in the Soviet Union in various overarching councils at the Academy of Sciences, where, for example, under the auspices of Institute of World Economy and International Relations the developing world was investigated as a whole; or in Hungary with the foundation of the Centre for Afro-Asian Research at the Academy of Sciences in 1963, which would be transformed into the Institute for World Economics (Koscev 2018 [forthcoming]). This resulted in early initiatives for transregional studies, for example with the foundation of a Centre for Research on Asia, Africa and
Latin America in Leipzig in 1965 and a Centre for the Comparative Study of Revolutions in 1969, which pursued a transregional programme developed by Walter Markov (Middell 2013). GDR ‘regional studies’, without a prior area specialization, provided multidisciplinary as well as language training and offered specialization in selected world regions (Schelke 1998).

Such national initiatives were complemented by multilateral projects across the socialist camp since the early 1970s, for instance with the multilateral commission on the study of problems of the countries of Africa. This commission was created in 1972 at a conference in Tashkent, on the initiative of Soviet Africanists and led by the Soviet economist Gorgoriyevich Solodovnikov. Starting as a one-area commission, it was transformed two years later into the multilateral commission on the study of problems of economy and politics of developing countries of the socialist academies of sciences, and headed by the Soviet economist Viktor Tiagunenko who was followed by Jevgenij Primakov, at that time head of IMEMO but before becoming director of the Oriental Studies Institute in Moscow. Although the leadership of the commission reflected the Soviet ambition not only to coordinate but also to centralize research on the developing world across the bloc, the changing area and disciplinary specializations of the commission’s heads also testify to the transregional flexibility of area studies in the socialist world.

This systematic transregionalization of area studies differentiated the socialist formations from their counterparts in the USA as well as in Western Europe, although, particularly in France, approaches transcending the boundaries of separate regions also played an important role in the emergence of the field. While the professionalization of academic knowledge production about non-European world regions was, both in the UK and in France, firmly rooted in the colonial past (Brahm 2010; Singaravélou 2011), in the latter case transdisciplinary movements in France as well as transregional initiatives of US-American foundations shaped the field to a considerable extent after 1945. Philological and historical, as well as the ethnographic and geographic, disciplinary traditions contributed to a spatialization of the world divided into ‘civilizations’, which were conceptualized as the association of specific spaces, societies, economic conditions, and cultural traits, emerging from a longue durée historical development (Braudel 1993 [1963]). In the wake of the Second World War, academic and political actors became increasingly aware that both the geography of area studies knowledge and the disciplinary foundations for its productions would come increasingly under pressure, as the French Empire found itself in a process of massive reorganization. Even though the colonial geography had profoundly shaped the professionalization of area studies until the war, the onset of decolonization and the rise of the USA and the Soviet Union to new global powers with the ambition to reorder the world brought about questions about how to position the French academia in such a massively changing landscape.

One of the most influential answers to these intricacies was the conceptual innovation of ‘aires culturelles’, further developing older concepts of ‘culture’ or ‘civilization’ of the colonial grammar without completely shaking off its traces. The historian Fernand Braudel combined in his ‘Grammaire des Civilizations’ (1993 [1963]) different modes of spatializing world regions: based on religion – the ‘Muslim world’; on racial attribution – the ‘black continent’; on continents – ‘Europe’ and the ‘Americas’; on political or ideological arguments – ‘Russia, the Soviet Union’. Such conceptualizations of cultural areas – although Braudel’s concept went considerably beyond the identification of cultural traits with geography – had been developed earlier by geographers on both sides of the Atlantic – with Carl O. Sauer in Berkeley and his disciples in particular, where it became the foundational narrative for a new school of thought and sub-discipline of its own – regional and cultural geography (Lewis and Wigen 1997; Claval 2002). Braudel’s initiative was, however, not only an intellectual project, but one of an ambitious
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institutionalization, supported by political decision-makers in post-war France as well as by the Rockefeller Foundation (Popa 2018 [forthcoming]). Participating in the revision of French research and education in 1956, where he was responsible for reporting on the humanities and social sciences, he called for the complex study of world regions. As the head of the Sixth Section of the École Pratique des Hautes Études (since 1975 the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociliaes, EHESS), he started to profoundly transform this section. This Area Studies Division had been created in 1947 to integrate distinct area studies programmes across disciplinary boundaries and test approaches and themes that would cross the boundaries of regions. Founded by the historians Charles Morazé and Lucien Febvre, the division had received considerable financial support from the Rockefeller Foundation and profited from the more general restructuring of social sciences in France. As an institutionalization of the programme of the Annales school, it was hence the result of domestic as well as transregional dynamics. Although its ambition was to represent the whole world in its area programmes, the foci of its activities reflected the heritage of French dealings with the non-European world, as the Far East, Eastern Europe, and Black Africa were endowed with more personnel and financial resources than, for example, the study of North and South America.

The division attracted many of those French scholars for a part of their career, who were central in the shaping of the studies of individual regions, such as the sociologist and specialist on Africa Georges Balandier, the historian Henri Brunschwig, the Swiss-American ethno- grapher and specialist on South America Alfred Métraux, who played an important role in large international ethnographic research projects of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and became the director of the organization’s programme on the question of race in 1950 (Maurel 2017), or Basile Kerblay, the French father of development economics and specialist for Eastern Europe. At the same time, the division’s integrative approach remained unique in France, where individual regional studies programmes rather tightened the boundaries of their areas and where the discussion for a transregional repositioning of area studies would resume in the early 2000s (Sabouret and Gorshenina 2010). Its multidisciplinary approach, however, would be made productive for the development of the study of individual regions, promoting its transformation from French colonial (Singaravélou 2011) to area studies (Coquery-Vidrovitch 2010). To interpret this transformation as well as the respatialization of the world in cultural regions in France as the mere adoption of the US-American model would therefore be a simplification that ignores the multiple intellectual and political dynamics which have shaped the unequal geography of French area studies.

The shift from a focus on colonial learning to scientification had characterized the development of area studies also in the UK, where the label ‘area studies’, however, is only cautiously applied to older and influential formations, which are institutionalized, for example, in the renowned School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London. More recently, the terminology of ‘area studies’ is used in the British context to describe new study programmes, probably also to attract an international student body whose expectations have been formed by the dominant US-American nomenclature. Established in 1916 as an institution to train colonial administrators in the languages and cultures of the British Empire, the school increasingly turned toward the development of scholarship in the 1930s, yet still connected to the political ambition to strengthen Britain’s global position in economic and political terms, in particular in Africa and Asia (Brown 2016). This professionalization and scientification of area studies at the school was not initiated by the emergence of a new global order after the war but – as in the French context – by the reorganization of the empire beginning in the interwar period. The 1950s and 1960s, again, witnessed a well-known trend of the expansion of the social sciences in the approaches to the study of non-European regions, which was also promoted by initiatives of
US-American foundations, the Ford Foundation specifically. After the war, the school increasingly created regional studies departments, in which the relation between disciplines to the area of investigation was redefined. Supported by the funding of the Ford Foundation, two new departments were established at the school, in which this redefinition materialized: the Department of Economics and the Department of Political Studies. As the empire came to an end, the school had to redefine its role, responding to new demands for knowledge, which was necessary to reposition Britain globally. The economics department in particular not only provided an interdisciplinary framework for the study of non-European world regions, but also fostered the communication across the boundaries of areas. Its first director, Edith Penrose, had been educated in the USA, worked during the war for the International Labour Organization and moved to London in order to escape the pressure of the McCarthy era in the USA. She promoted the recruitment of scholars with transregional careers, crossing the boundaries between academia and politics, such as P.J. Vatikiotis, a political scientist and specialist on the Middle East, and Stuart Schramm, a political scientist and specialist on China, educated in the USA, with career steps in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and at the EPHE in Paris. In the British case, as in the French, the reorganization and dissolution of the empire overlapped with the dynamics of the Cold War, with the emergence of new transregional academic networks and with the reorganization of the social sciences and humanities.

Such a cursory bird’s-eye view provides us at least with hints at the complexities, fragmentations, and inequalities in the respatialization of knowledge production on the world. We can observe different modes of spatialization, from territorialized logics in the US-American area studies to the transterritorial focus of the French ‘aires culturelles’ or the transregional of socialist ‘Regionalwissenschaften’. The new geographies of areas with its specific centres and peripheries furthermore were related to older imperial ones and were connected to narratives of closeness and distance, such as in the case of Soviet Oriental and African studies, where a socialist global vision created a common space. Finally, the transformation of area studies was not only a respatialization of knowledge to be compartmentalized in specific world regions, but also a respatialization of disciplines, with sociology and political science being associated predominantly with the European, and ethnography with the non-European world.

This, however, was complicated by the emergence of area studies formations in the decolonizing world and the internationalization of area studies through international organizations and congresses. Here, the association of specific disciplines with geographical areas received increasing criticism. These debates were furthermore rooted in the long and protracted relation between area studies and colonialism, which took shape in different academic communities in variable forms. The colonial experience could motivate scholars in the European imperial societies to engage in a critical reform of area studies formations, as in the French case. Finally, in societies with imperial trajectories of landed empires, such as the successor states of the Habsburg Empire or the Soviet Union, the entanglement with the former colonial spaces could lead to different conceptualizations of the ‘non-European other’. While the Cold War has certainly been a formative period for area studies on both sides of the Iron Curtain as well as in formerly colonial societies, it translated into different approaches. Whereas in the USA and in the Soviet Union new grand narratives – modernization theory and Marxism-Leninism – provided a common language with which area studies could operate, the demise of European empires was an equally dramatic incentive to rethink area studies formations: for the former colonial powers on the search for a new role in the changing global order, and for the new socialist European states to reposition themselves as anti-imperialist partners vis-à-vis the Global South.

And although in the context of European colonial projects area studies were also instruments for making decipherable and opening up spaces for colonial control, during the Cold War they
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were often providing intellectual means of containing these spaces – ‘knowing the enemy’ has been an important motivation not only for US-American Sovietology (Engerman 2009) but also for the study of communism in Africa, for example (Ottaway and Ottaway 1981).

Still, the specific processes of institutionalization and professionalization of area studies in different academic communities were never the result of politicization only, but instead they arose always from a combination of projects of diverse actors – from the military and secret service, private foundations, universities, state agencies, and, not least, scholars and students. In most cases, the histories of area studies had an influential transregional dimension, resulting from the mobility of scholars and students as well as from the ambitions of academic entrepreneurs to implement hegemonic agendas globally.

In turn, area studies in different academic – mostly national – communities as they were presented here, were all but coherent within the respective territories. In many cases, a specific division of labour – and competition – emerged within national communities, for example with Moscow, Leningrad, and Tashkent in the Soviet Union; Leipzig, Berlin, and Rostock in the GDR; Paris and Bordeaux in France; Cologne and Hamburg in the Federal Republic of Germany – each developing different specialization in terms of geographies and methodologies.

The emergence of area studies formations in the non-European world has often been a reaction to a changing world order and the efforts to reposition post-colonial societies in it, such as the rise of African studies in China. At the same time, the efforts to reconquer the production of knowledge about world regions by actors who have for long been the objects of such studies, goes back to the first decades after the Second World War, and have found their expression, for example, in ambitious UNESCO projects to Africanize African history or in the foundation of regional scholarly organizations such as the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). The crisis of universities and academies in the post-colonial world has often interrupted these beginnings developing in the 1960s; however, they re-emerged due to different reasons after the end of the Cold War. Ambitions of individual states to gain centre stage in new regionalisms has, for instance, promoted the emergence of new regional and transregional expertise, such as the formation of Indian Ocean studies in South Africa (Hofmeyr and Williams 2011; Cornelissen 2016). The combination of pan–African and national efforts to resist a Western academic hegemony has been combined with new strategies of the internationalization of African universities (Baumann 2014) and with the efforts to attract students from Africa and other world regions, by claiming to offer more suitable and universally viable knowledge about the continent on the spot (Olukoshi 2012).

Such dynamics not only emphasize the necessity to go beyond a US-centrism and Cold War-centrism in the approach to the histories of area studies, but also demonstrate that the emergence of both area studies formations and transregional studies more recently can be interpreted as variable reactions to the global condition by defining and redefining appropriate spatial formats for the production and communication of knowledge about the world.

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Steffi Marung

The respatialization of area studies


A fully developed set of methods often define a well-established discipline. It is therefore no wonder that transregional studies, being in its infant stages and continuously exposed to serious quarrels about its subject, are not yet at the point where such a complete methodology is available. This has to do with at least three points:

(1) Area studies, on which transregional perspectives are based to a great degree, took different pathways in their development – depending on the place and national academic context. Through this development, area studies came under the influence of anthropology, social sciences, or history. In some cases, these intellectual inspirations came together in a coordinated way, but more often than not area studies have presented themselves as mixtum compositum with a large and rather unorganized toolkit in which contrasting disciplinary approaches remain unreconciled.

(2) Transregional studies are part of a broader intellectual movement, starting from the assumption that interactions between societies are no less important and influential than those within societies. This assumption clashes with what previous social science research emphasized, namely a national framework of analysis. As a consequence, methodological nationalism came under critique and a space opened for increasingly nuanced investigations of border-crossing and border-transcending phenomena.

(3) Such interactions across the boundaries of seemingly stable spatial entities (territories) drew additional inspiration from the spatial turn that taught researchers to see space as the product of human interaction. Therefore, transregional studies research has investigated such intersocietal interaction not as occurring between fixed entities but, on the contrary, as producing new spatial constellations. However, since methods have often been developed in reference to particular spatial frameworks, the discovery and analysis of new spatial formats remain difficult tasks.

Each of these points is addressed in sections of this handbook and shall not be argued more extensively here. But taken together, it becomes clear that there are, for the time being, more discouraging challenges than satisfying answers. Even the term ‘method’ might be a matter of dispute. It might refer to very different epistemological points of departure, where realities are observed with the help of well-defined methods in order to understand their objective
character, or where scholars will, rather, insist on multiperspectivity and the implication of placing him- or herself into these perspectives. Likewise, preferences between empirical depth and theoretical abstraction differ widely. Accordingly, it is important to remember that it is not necessary that all scholars in transregional studies share the same basic assumptions and methodologies.

That being said, it does not mean that we are without any lessons on how ‘to do’ transregional studies; these lessons have been learned from excellent scholarship that is already published and from an extensive theoretical debate about what transregional studies should be and where these trends can lead us. The method of intercultural transfer provides an especially insightful entry point not only into a variety of transregional interactions, but also into the methodological debates on how to study them.

The legacy of comparison

Comparative historiography – particularly prominent in the 1970s and 1980s when coming into contact with comparative sociology (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Skocpol 1984) and the then newly emerging subdiscipline of international relations called comparative politics (Lim 2006) – forms a solid basis for the more recent interest in transregional studies. Exploring so far neglected areas, transregional studies aimed at using such regional case studies for generalizations based upon a more and more sophisticated methodology. Proponents insisted on its cosmopolitan agenda, seeing themselves as forerunners of transnational and global studies (Haupt and Kocka 2009). Notwithstanding, this view has aroused substantial criticism that has pointed out that comparison as practised in the social sciences and historiography over the twentieth century has contributed much more to the essentialization of (national) borders than to their transcendence. According to the critique, comparison tends to invent, out of necessity, the entities it compares instead of asking what might constitute them and how they are co-constituted by interaction (Espagne 1994). In fact, when reading Marc Bloch’s famous keynote for the International Congress of Historical Sciences in 1928 one becomes aware that even the pioneer of historical comparison brought a lot of paradoxical distance between himself and naive confrontational comparison. He insists on two arguments. The first is that the ideal comparative approach can only be applied to two or more societies that have nothing in common and are not bound to each other by connections and interactions. When Bloch refers to situations far back in history, the historian of medieval times indirectly makes clear that such a condition cannot be met in more recent times. The second is that he strengthened this argument by pointing out that the language with which scholars describe and analyse the two or more cases to be compared is necessarily infected by the experience of one (or both) of these cases and thus necessarily not neutral as assumed by many comparatists (Bloch 1928).

This is particularly true for comparisons between Western societies – dominating the categories with which current scholarship tends to study societal phenomena – and ‘the Rest’; this had already been shown for the English-French comparison of Middle Age economic history Bloch had in mind. Others have argued that such a normative bias is not necessarily part of the comparative strategy or have proposed ‘reciprocal comparison’ as a solution to the problem. This means, for example, not to take Europe but Africa as the point of departure for a comparative design so that the normative load of categories used is turned upside down. Instead of observing states failing in Africa when measured against states functioning in Europe, the question should be how African societies deal with certain challenges and to ask further how their European counterparts react to similar problems (Austin 2007). Kenneth Pomeranz suggests a similar scenario for new approaches to the ‘Great Divergence’ – the debate among
Antje Dietze and Matthias Middell

economic historians about the causes and consequences of the different performance of societies in Asia and Europe during the period between proto-industrialization, in the late eighteenth century, and the mid-twentieth century (Pomeranz 2000; see also Chapter 24 in this volume, by Rössner). But changing the direction of comparison does not solve the fundamental problem that comparative studies remain somehow incompatible with the aim of transnational and transregional studies to emphasize the interaction between people from different locations, whether nation-states or regions.

This resulted in a decade-long quarrel about the relationship between the study of connections and comparison. The formula many scholars nowadays prefer is that the study of connections and comparison complement rather than exclude each other. This, in our view, describes a stalemate rather than a well-developed solution for a dilemma with which everyone who studies border-transcending processes is confronted. Jürgen Osterhammel once insisted on the fundamental difference between the two approaches when decontextualizing for the purpose of generalization (comparison) or recontextualizing with the aim to better understand the co-constitution of seemingly different entities (Osterhammel 2003). But the two methodological approaches are not only different; they are also dependent on each other. First, intercultural transfer always starts with a comparative look at foreign configurations and achievements by the involved actors in order to identify those references they would like to incorporate into their own culture. Comparison – which is an everyday practice and should not be reduced to what some social scientists consider a tool for producing objectivity – is thus a part of the historical phenomenon that is analysed as intercultural transfer. Second, even though specific intercultural transfers can be isolated for analytical purposes, they overlap, conflict, and mix up with others occurring at the same time. The comparison of intercultural transfers has led to the discovery of triple and quadruple configurations of transfers, meaning multisided interactions between several communities or societies that, in the end, might add up to the notion of an interconnected world.

The main conclusion of the debate was that in contrast to a naive comparison, which took its units of analysis for granted, the investigation of interactions between societies and its relationship to the study of bounded spatial formations such as empires, nation-states, or regions has to be conceptualized in a much more nuanced way. It also became clear that such interactions produce new spaces and are not likely to solely follow predetermined pathways within given spatial frames (Middell 2018).

Intercultural transfer between France and Germany

It was long before the hype around words such as transcultural, transnational, translocal, or transregional that the idea of intercultural transfer was developed. When the empirical investigation of intercultural transfers first took shape in the mid-1980s, it was above all about the rediscovery of entanglements between national cultures. The central idea of Michel Espagne and Michael Werner (1987) was to give priority to the study of all kinds of foreign cultural elements in one’s own culture – including the actors and media involved with cultural appropriation – instead of following a diffusionist paradigm. The two French cultural historians and specialists of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German literature further strengthen this agenda by not taking the influence of dominant French culture over other cultural spaces as a starting point, but by initially focusing on the construction of references to German culture in France. A new interest in mutual interactions between cultures grew, and the more empirical studies on different kinds of transfers were available, the clearer it became that the selection of what is appropriated depends on tangible actors of transfer becoming interested in the ‘foreign’ and having a chance
to act as intermediaries. These cultural brokers feel encouraged to invest their time and capacities in the ‘discovery’ of something they consider missing in their own culture and to argue for its inclusion. Mastering different languages and a variety of media for translation plus often (but not always) a high degree of mobility across borders qualified them as intermediaries (for more details, see Chapter 53 by Dietze).

The term ‘transfer’ has sometimes led to misunderstandings, especially in the German- and English-speaking worlds, where it resulted in confusion in relation to diffusionist approaches. Yet it was intended to place emphasis on the active reinterpretation and transformation of foreign cultural elements in host cultures. The paradox of intercultural transfer, however, is that what was perceived as foreign and what attracted curiosity in the first place – exactly because it seemed to be foreign – is often considered later as having belonged to the host culture for a very long time or even forever. The typical cycle of intercultural transfer follows here: it first starts with the insistence on a deficiency in the culture at home, which inspires the search in other cultures for something that could fill the identified gap. In a second step, translation and mediation take place. And in a third and final step, integration into or adaptation to the new context occurs. Each step can be isolated for analytical purposes, and such studies help us to understand the particular role of cultural brokers, media, semiotics, and societal recontextualization.

When the method of intercultural transfer was applied to other cases – first to interactions of more European cultures, and then to other world regions – its origin in the study of German and French cultural encounters in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries raised concerns. The most problematic aspect was the assumption – relatively obvious for France and Germany but more disputable in other contexts – that cultures are relatively distinct entities that enter into contact as foreign with each other. For several reasons, both French and Germans have for a long time imagined their cultures as relatively homogeneous and as being the product of a long-lasting history while neglecting the effects of cultural contacts, imperial and transnational relations, and migration. This national homogenization was in both cases supported by the emergence of a sophisticated infrastructure consisting of broad and differentiated cultural industries and media systems, as well as state subsidies for producers of cultural artefacts. Not least important is the monolingual character of these cultures, even when considering the role of the many minority or regional languages and dialects for the support, and sometimes the dispute, of the nationalizing culture by different subcultures. While the state played a very different role in this process in France and Germany, the result was the same: cultures that were perceived both from inside and outside as well defined and strongly related to a fully territorialized nation-state.

The impetus of the intercultural transfer approach, however, is to deconstruct this notion of homogeneous national cultures and to rediscover their hybridity. It demonstrates that references to other cultures play a fundamental role in the management of both internal differences and of external boundaries of these national cultures, and that they co-constitute each other in dynamic interactions. But still, the Franco-German entanglements took place between relatively distinct and territorialized cultural spaces. The question whether this was rather an exceptional case or the rule and whether this particular point of departure of intercultural transfer analysis limits its wider application has engaged a widespread debate and led to further adaptations of the concept.

From the transnational to the transregional

Building on the achievements of the discussion about intercultural transfers, Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann (2006) proposed *histoire croisée* as a new approach. They question the spatial and temporal units of analysis of comparison, transfer, and connection studies from a more
theoretical angle, arguing for a more open perspective that reconstructs the relevant spaces and scales from the situation of interaction itself. Drawing on these suggestions, other authors have argued that intercultural transfer should not be solely bound to transnational constellations. They consequently insist on the term translocality because such processes of exchange and appropriation include various kinds of connections beyond the local, as research on Africa, Asia, and the Middle East has shown (Freitag and von Oppen 2010). This provides nineteenth-century Western European nationalization in transregional processes a less prominent role while integrating those histories of cultural encounter that are not marked by strong and consequent territorialization. It does not, however, solve the problem of the spatial reach of ‘culture’. Without any doubt, cultural phenomena can most easily be observed at the local level, but the local relates to very different spatial formats – from empire to nation-state, from trade networks to production chains, from virtual communities to diasporas, etc. The shift toward the translocal is important to overcome the priority that was given to the transnational in the early 2000s but helps also better understanding the impact of cultural encounter, exchange, and appropriation on transregional connections.

A different line of enquiry focuses on the concept(s) of culture as the basis for the study of intercultural transfer. When the approach was applied to colonial societies in the Americas, it added new empirical evidences to earlier attempts to overcome dichotomies between Europeans and indigenous people. Here, fundamentally different cultural constellations emerged, and the concept had to be adjusted to complex interactions between highly mixed, fragmented, and hybrid cultures (Turgeon, Delâge and Ouellet 1996). One example is the colonial intervention into the Caribbean, where, on the one hand, the autochthonous population was exterminated by epidemic diseases and warfare, and, on the other hand, the slave trade brought a massive influx of new people to the region, creating a sort of hybrid culture. Such processes of métissage raised scholarly attention not only as a region-specific phenomenon (Gruzinski 1999) but also as a fruitful metaphor to be used to conceptualize more recent effects of globalization on places of high mobility and on social groups that seem to be no longer territorially bound. Post-colonial concepts of cultural hybridity since the early 1990s tried to deepen multicultural awareness with this insistence on the co-presence of different groups due to the colonial past.

What we can see are two tendencies that are incorporated into the debate about hybridization and métissage. The first tendency educates us about massive regional differences concerning the homogeneity of cultures – or even the historical possibility to develop such homogeneity – and this can become the point of departure for further methodological consideration. Furthermore, it can serve as an invitation to overcome the normative trend toward the celebration of cultural homogeneity as the benchmark for all regions of the world and a teleological end in itself. The investigation of intercultural transfers has to be further nuanced in this regard.

The second tendency is inspired by the same post-colonial intention to no longer put Western European experience at the centre of world historical narratives and to no longer treat it as a norm for cultural politics. In a more generalized way, this reorientation has led to another trend that takes hybridization, diasporic forms of identification, and the recent focus on global mobility as a new cultural norm. It claims the emergence of transnational social spaces as the indicator of a fundamental change toward a world beyond territorialized identification and the homogenizing capacity of culture. While such expectations were widespread in the 1990s, they have encountered rising scepticism since, as opposition from the political left as well as from right-wing populists has grown against a globalization project that seems to make borders, territory, and related identification processes meaningless. Meanwhile, research on cultural interaction and globalization has increasingly focused on the fact that deterritorialization goes dialectically hand in hand with reterritorialization and that connections and transfers also produce new cultural boundaries, differences, and exclusions.
The question is therefore not if cultures are hybrid or homogeneous and if they allow people to protect themselves behind the walls of national or regional identities or to engage in cultural encounters. Instead, intercultural transfer analysis investigates who are the actors that promote the one or the other trend and what are their chances of being successful given the historical trajectories and societal conditions in the one or the other place and space.

A closer look at the agents and mediators of intercultural transfer can indeed open up new research avenues against this background of debates over its presumed spatial framework and cultural norms. It is probably in the empirical investigation of the particular actors and mechanisms of interaction that the intercultural transfer approach has its greatest strength. In investigating both the reinterpretation of foreign cultural elements and the conditions as well as agents and societal effects of this intermediation, the hermeneutics of cultural history are brought together with the tools specific to social history used to investigate professions, media, institutions, and the building of groups and milieus. In contrast to often vague descriptions of circulating ideas and cultural strands, which are difficult to pin down, the intercultural transfer approach highlights the role of individuals and particular social groups in the transfer itself. The study of such intermediaries became key to understanding intercultural transfer since it turned out to be much more difficult to start such an investigation from the result or from the beginning. The first is complicated because the foreign origins of the transferred cultural elements are often hidden after successful appropriation, and the second is troublesome since it is similarly problematic to decide whether the one or the other attempt to identify cultural features and models for transfer will, later, be successful or not. Focusing on the potential intermediaries in their efforts to make translation and dissemination a business, and investigating their biographical and societal background, also proved to be an efficient way to re-evaluate what relevant spaces and forms of culture are involved in the process of transfer.

This actor-centred perspective has become part of a larger ‘biographical turn’ in the study of transnationalism and transregionalism (see, e.g., Lambert and Lester 2006; Panter, Paulmann and Szöllösi-Janze 2015). Living between societies, territories, and cultures as a particular way of life has attracted scholarly interest as it opened up a whole sphere of social activity that had been formerly neglected in research. The discovery and exploration of a variety of intercultural transfers has ultimately contributed to the emergence of a social history of intermediation, mobility, and circulation. Investigating those actors living within and moving around different – and not necessarily territorially connected – spaces has also been used as an analytical tool to re-evaluate the scales and spaces of analysis. Following these actors as they cross the boundaries of nation-states, move between imperial metropolises and colonies, or establish transnational organizations and movements has proven invaluable for the research of transregional processes.

**Regionalization and space-making**

Whereas all studies of intercultural transfer depart from the idea that the foreign culture and one’s own culture constitute each other mutually and therefore cannot exist independently from each other even though they remain distinct, culturally defined spaces are not, as the original concept might have suggested, nationally defined. The debates about translocality and métissage and the emphasis on the social history of intermediation have strengthened the concept of intercultural transfer in many respects. They reveal that intercultural transfers are complex interplays between the various scalar levels of territory and that they also encapsulate other, non-territorial formats of space. Intercultural transfers could occur between territories, places, and networks. The term culture does not necessarily suggest a close relationship with the one scale of territory that is the nation.
The study of intercultural transfers has thus revealed a differentiated landscape of historically changing entanglements between different kinds of places and spaces that merit more systematic investigation. Further advancements of the concept demonstrate that national cultures did not necessarily come into close contact per se, but that encounters happen locally and regionally to become eventually nationalized only afterwards – and by no means necessarily, since many transfers have not played out on that scale. Moreover, some smaller or bigger regions are much more active in appropriating foreign cultural elements than others (Espagne 2013). This, of course, can be the result of intense comparison between transfer activities in different regions or simply the effect of a biased research situation and different degrees of knowledge about such regions. But irrespective of the fact that not all regions have been subject to the same intensity of research, it seems that there are substantial regional differences in the willingness and capability of communities and regions to enter the world of intercultural transfer. These communities and regions form a network of transfer regions transgressing the borders of individual states or even of continents.

Identifying such regions exposed to strong contact with other parts of the world, which are ready to make use and profit from such contacts while establishing a long-term regional characteristic out of them, relates the research on transregional intercultural transfers to the investigation of portals of globalization (Baumann, Dietze and Maruschke 2017). Such portals are not only places of intense global flows – such as port cities, metropolises of colonial empires, special economic zones, etc. – but are also hubs of a transregional consciousness and memory. They are, accordingly, often equipped with institutions that support transregional – often colonial – knowledge production, such as museums, botanic gardens, or institutions of higher education with a special emphasis on area studies. The subsequent question for transregional studies, then, is to what extent such portals of globalization are connected to productive hinterlands and in what way do regional developments impact them. This means one must also investigate (1) how people living in such hubs developed a unique curiosity for what happened in the world and how they looked for objects that could be subjects of intercultural transfers into their own community, and (2) who profited from such cultural innovation and how far reaching was it?

Against this background of local and regional differentiation, it becomes clear that the transfer itself is a space-producing activity. It privileges some places over others, creates lines of circulation, and builds networks of brokers and intermediaries. Here, it nearly excellently connects with the multifaceted research undertaken in sociology, economics, anthropology, and history on networks (as an overview, see Holton 2008; and as an excellent example for a longue durée approach to networks, see Bhattacharya, Dharampal-Frick and Gommans 2007). During this time, intercultural transfer becomes methodologically highly sophisticated, going global and transregional in many different ways.

It is therefore worth investigating the geographies of cultural interaction, including the networks and institutions, media and industries, and policies and regulatory frameworks that demarcate the transregional limitations, both stretching and contracting, of intercultural transfers (Rabault-Feuerhahn 2014). In this way, intercultural transfer analysis becomes the point of departure for investigating both regionalizations and transregional interactions.

The intercultural transfer approach has not developed into a general theory applicable everywhere. On the contrary, it is rather a key for the discovery of new research constellations, open for investigation and productive appropriation. This makes the approach so compelling for the growing interest in global history, which is in need of an appropriate methodology to conceptualize interactions across borders of regions and continents as a result of global processes. The turn from transnational toward transregional processes was inspired, on the one hand, by the growing importance of post–colonial perspectives and, on the other hand, by the various
shifts emerging of the changing world order, and it has consequences for our understanding of transregional relations in a broader perspective. It becomes clear that the distinction between the West and ‘the Rest’ of the world no longer serves as a valid epistemology, and that we need to investigate regional differences from multiple perspectives. Intercultural transfer analysis, with its impetus of overcoming diffusionism and its strength in exploring intermediations and appropriations in empirical depth, can help to explore interactions across and between those hemispheres in more detail. On the one hand, this includes conceptions of imperial entanglements such as the historically grown culture of a nation-cum-empire construct, which was as much influenced by its colonial past in the former colonies as it was by the colonial past in the former metropoles (Cooper and Stoler 1997; Stoler 2016). On the other hand, researchers have started to focus more on mechanisms and infrastructures of South–South communication and encounter both in its material and its intellectual dimensions, such as Chinese-African transfers or the newly found role of Brazil in the Portuguese-speaking world.

One can clearly state that the research into intercultural transfer is entering a new phase in its development. Not only the discovery of the fundamental mechanisms of transfer but also the improvements that had been achieved since the 1990s will remain very useful in this new period. There are, however, also critical challenges that have not been addressed properly. One is the overlap between the colonial and the post-colonial past of today’s transregional interaction. This results in asymmetries that are both lived and perceived. They often bring the European past or the period of North American hegemony back into the analysis but not necessarily as the point of departure. A second challenge is the term ‘region’ itself, since it turns out that the regions we might, these days, take for granted are the product of specific historical interactions – be it the race for Africa between the European colonial powers in the late nineteenth century, the need of American troops during the Second World War to organize intelligence into manageable units, or the search of the Soviet Union for its place in this world of regions. This understanding of the constructedness and historical trajectories of regions will most probably be taken further by the current emergence of area studies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This respatialization of area studies will certainly produce new concepts of regions and transregional interaction, and the method of intercultural transfer might be especially helpful in this regard.

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Introduction

Comparative area studies (CAS) endeavours to create a bridge between classic area studies and what is called systematic disciplines – perhaps foremost one between area studies and comparative politics.\(^1\) The constitutive elements of CAS are (a) context sensitivity/expertise that entails giving attention to history, culture, and regional factors, and (b) an explicitly systematic and empirical comparative approach (e.g. Lijphart 1971; Sartori 1994). CAS requires cognisance of the issues associated with using the concept ‘area’. This includes an awareness of the potential variable geometry of region depending on the exact research question as well as a constructive acknowledgement of well-founded criticisms of certain traditional notions of spatiality (Mehler and Hoffmann 2011; Holbig 2015).

Generations of scholars in the field of area studies have long grappled with the limitations of their approach, which became globally evident during the debate on Orientalism that was sparked by Edward Said’s 1978 critique of the occidental world’s essentialist constructs of the ‘Orient’. It is also largely undisputed that current popularly accepted regional and subregional divisions of the world reflect the political baggage of the colonial past and the interests of the two Cold War superpowers. As early as the era between the first and second world wars, area studies centres, predicated on these political interests, were established in the United States (US); these centres, in turn, had a decisive impact on the subsequent development of the field. In this respect, there has been a high degree of ongoing critical (self-)appraisal. Whether the area ‘container’ does, or does not, fabricate artificial unity, overlaps between areas are representative of the era of globalization; accordingly, transnational linkages constitute a more effective indicator than what transpires within a region.

It should be kept in mind that the homogeneity of a region can never simply be assumed; affiliation with a supranational organization is only one of many factors that must be taken into account. Moreover, the attributing of territories to a region – and the excluding of others – can constitute a subtle form of exogenous intervention, thereby influencing research findings. More recently, regional affiliation has been shown to have greater explanatory power for internal state developments than generally supposed. But this is valid only if regions are treated as theoretically grounded categories of analysis rather than as immutable or innate geographic entities (Ahram 2011). For regions to qualify as the former, they must be grounded
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in processes – economic, political, and cultural – of exchange and differentiation, which over time create, in multiple respects, cohesive spaces. This understanding of region as ‘processes involving the communicative construction of social relations’ (Holbig 2015: 28) allows us to identify and explain important aspects of global variance. For example, Bunce points to regional effects on global processes of democratization (2000: 722); in Latin America, she shows that democratization proved more successful in those nations that ‘bridged’ the old and new orders. In Eastern Europe, by contrast, the most successful democratic consolidations were characterized by an abrupt break with the previous authoritarian order. Similarly, concomitant economic reform facilitated democratic transition in Eastern Europe; but in Africa, the stress of economic reform seemed to endanger this transition. As Dirk Berg-Schlosser (2012: 2) notes: ‘[H]aving a deeper knowledge of regional and cultural particularities, of their historic origins and development, has lost none of its meaning and charm.’

Also of potential significance for comparative politics is area studies’ perennial drive for interdisciplinary work. Although the disciplines involved in area studies vary according to their chosen world region, scholars from anthropology, history, religion, and literature are well represented. Political scientists, however, are less likely to be involved. Interdisciplinary collaboration between specialists from related fields working in adjoining geographic spaces is a constitutive part of area studies, or at least is perceived as such; within such spatially defined shared areas of interest, productive interdisciplinary collaboration has frequently developed. Another feature of area studies is its consistently strong emphasis on intensive field research, in which the focus is on understanding the actors, systems, and other objects of investigation in the area; notwithstanding, on-site research should not be unilaterally equated with participatory observation.

Positioned between classic area studies and political science, CAS can contribute to broad disciplinary and theoretical debates as well as develop improved insights into systematically selected case studies. Thus, the epistemological interest of CAS encompasses generalization and specification. Why is this dual focus important for comparative politics?

**Comparative politics: a European and North American science?**

Comparative politics is – despite an occasional break – very strongly dominated by a focus on the transatlantic space, essentially Europe and North America. This occidental focus creates the risk of drawing systematically false conclusions about global principles and trends. This issue manifests in central concepts, theories, and empirical findings appearing in the relevant publications:

(a) The central concepts of political science were developed using European history as the model, but often have been applied unreflectively to other world regions with significantly different developmental paths. This would be less problematic if regional variations, for example from the Western model of state formation, were not always analysed as deficiencies.

(b) The ethnocentric orientation of core theories is most apparent in modernization theory, which for years viewed industrial society as the only appropriate endpoint for all societies. But developments in non-European countries have since disproved some of the basic assumptions of the twentieth century, including the idea ‘the richer, the more democratic’. A quarter century after the democratic surge in Africa, the countries of Benin, Ghana, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Senegal consistently rank among the most democratic states in Africa; yet, as measured by gross national product, these nations are economically
outperformed by several undemocratic states, including Angola (authoritarian regime), Swaziland (antiquated type of monarchy), and Equatorial Guinea (arguably the cruellest dictatorship in Africa). In a similar vein, China’s rapid economic boom has not led to Western-style democratization, contrary to some predictions.

(c) An analysis of the leading journals of comparative politics reveals a striking contrast between the heavy coverage of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development world and that of other world regions (see Munck and Snyder 2007: 10). Although strides have been made in covering other regions, it will take time to overcome decades of marginalization. But it is becoming increasingly clear that the corpus of knowledge accepted by political scientists has only been sufficiently tested in a minority of cases and for a small portion of the world population. Additionally, transregional connections have received only minimal attention.

A breakthrough in this disciplinary ethnocentrism took place in the context of research on authoritarianism in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in Latin America. This focus was possibly also inspired by US political practice; Washington policy-makers viewed the persistence and overthrow of authoritarian regimes as posing similar challenges to stability in the region. Dating back to Juan Linz’s influential study, in which he distinguishes between personalist and bureaucratic authoritarian regimes (and most helpfully within the latter a corporatist subtype), studies of this epoch in Latin American history have led to valuable new insights into the functioning of non-democratic regimes. These studies on authoritarianism represent a significant broadening of political science’s field of enquiry, which until the 1990s had frequently been characterized as the study of democratic theory and practice. These new works made it possible to explain how authoritarian regimes legitimized and reproduced themselves. Nevertheless, until the 1990s, political science only marginally covered a multitude of world regions; Africa, the Middle East, and vast parts of Asia, for example, received little attention. This lack of coverage reflected the limited global political importance of these regions up until this time. However, in the last two decades the status of these regions has changed significantly. Regional powers, such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, have ascended to the global political stage. Additionally, increased interest in certain aspects of globalization (e.g. climate change and the effects of weakened state sovereignty) has brought attention to world regions that previously had gone largely unnoticed. In terms of knowledge production, it is essential to ‘confront the hegemonic power, style of knowing and epistemological imperatives of knowledge deriving from one part of the world’ (Derichs 2017: 5). Yet, still today European and North American political scientists overwhelmingly dominate the discipline even as comparative politics claims to be a universal science.

Requirements for an inclusive comparative politics

The number of works by European and North American political scientists that delve deeply into political phenomena in Africa, Asia, and Latin America remains negligible. Political science centres and faculties for these regions are likewise weak, which might possibly be due to the small number of conceptual counter-projects originating from Africa, Asia, Latin America, or the Middle East; for example, dependency theory is strongly rooted in Latin America.

This situation, we can assume, will gradually change and improve. At least within the world’s more democratic states, political science has turned again to the study of democratic theory and practice. Political parties and parliaments recognize that it is in their interest for policies and actions to be informed by sound expertise; consequently, social demand for political
science – or rather its translation into advice or even a plan of action for both local and foreign affairs – has risen. Shifts in regional conflict systems have led to crises in faraway regions of the world, such as in Yemen in 2015 and in South Sudan in 2013, which have had an immediate impact on Europe. Additionally, in nations where political science is not a well-anchored university discipline, governments and the public are increasingly looking at similar electoral contexts for institutional solutions to problems, such as minority inclusion, electoral system requirements, and the relationship between the judiciary and the executive. Therefore, it is not unrealistic to expect political science to increasingly be open to transnational questions. If infrastructure and the conditions for knowledge collection and production for all world regions improve, then political science can achieve this end. The quest for universal laws – inherent to political science – practically demands research on previously ignored world regions, since theoretical conclusions can only be generalized in proportion to the scope of empirical research. Data collection for societies in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East has improved significantly, although substantial concerns about data quality still exist. Nevertheless, this expansion in data collection has meant at the very least that statistical methods can now be applied to many ‘under-researched’ areas.

Advantages and forms of CAS

In world regions where the conditions for traditional political science research are unfavourable – that is to say, low data availability, few local partners, and insufficient infrastructure – political scientists have turned to methods from neighbouring disciplines. From this borrowing, innovative approaches and a self-reflexive drive have emerged. Classic area studies has always viewed a multidisciplinary lens as essential, since no single discipline can capture or convey the totality of any given society. Area studies, however, should not be viewed as a unified field of enquiry; individual fields within area studies differ significantly in their intellectual and institutional histories as well as in their relationships with disciplines. Depending on the world region, different disciplines have taken centre stage (e.g. anthropology in African studies; literature in Latin American studies; and Islamic studies in Middle East studies). This disciplinary arrangement, however, has not come without a price.

Comparative methods, being at the heart of comparative politics, have not found a home within classic area studies; this failure opened area studies to criticism that it was merely ideographic and thus could not contribute to theory building. In response, some proponents of area studies argued that comparative methods ignored the contextual features that bound political behaviour, thereby overlooking the most important features of social change. This debate about area studies’ raison d’être, which was most acrimonious in the US in the 1990s, has since largely subsided; today, representatives from the core social science disciplines and area studies often cite each other. Yet, comparative methods, as defined in political science, still have not established a firm footing within area studies, even though an explicitly comparative approach could also advance what for years was area studies’ primary epistemological goal: individualization or ‘thick’ description. However, in practice this has rarely been the case, as evidenced by the infrequent contributions to top area studies journals that take an explicitly social science-based comparative approach. Since 9/11, the demand for ‘profound’ area knowledge and ‘thick’ description of politically relevant phenomena in regions, such as Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, has increased significantly. However, knowledge of individual cases alone cannot assist with classifying phenomena.

CAS, unlike classic area studies, foregrounds comparative research strategies because even the uniqueness or specificity of individual cases can only be identified through comparison
Comparative area studies

Three distinguishable forms of comparison are inspired by methodologies developed in social sciences:

**Cross-regional comparison**

Cross-regional comparison, that is to say the comparison of analytical units across regions (Basedau and Köllner 2007), requires extensive field knowledge and methodological rigour. While the comparison of only a small number of cases (small-N comparison) is largely unavoidable, it can be justified methodologically (Sil 2009). Case selection based on clear analytical objectives is critical owing to the fact that regional homogeneity, as a criterion of similarity, does not apply. In this comparative form, the regional context is subordinated to other contextualized conditions. The sheer span of history and geographic knowledge involved in such contextualized cross-regional comparisons requires collaboration between multiple research teams with various national and area expertise.

**Intraregional comparison**

Intraregional comparison involves the comparison of ‘aspects or phenomena of different geographical entities within a given region’ (Basedau and Köllner 2007: 111); this means that CAS can be pursued within one region. Intraregional comparison typically has the analytical advantage that a number of background conditions pertaining to geography, climate, history, and culture can be quite similar. Yet clearly this comparative form can produce only ‘bounded generalizations’ (Bunce 2000); nevertheless, it can serve as a stepping stone for research that moves beyond this framework.

**Interregional comparison**

In interregional comparison, whole areas or regions are taken as units of analysis; this comparative form typically endeavours to identify regional patterns and compare them with each other (Basedau and Köllner 2007: 116). Interregional comparison primarily serves to describe and analyse similarities and differences in the paths, sequences, relevant actor constellations, and outcomes of global political dynamics (e.g. democratization processes and constitutionalism). It is also useful for assessing which explanations are truly universal and which are bounded by regional or other contextual factors. Thus, interregional comparison can also be useful in delineating features specific to an entire region or, alternatively, in supporting or challenging existing area boundaries.

These various forms of comparison could also be utilized together in research exploring processes of norm diffusion. An interregional comparison of cross-border mobilizations of protesters in states from different regions with similar political systems could easily be carried out. However, there would be variations within a given region, such as in authoritarian regimes’ sources of legitimation, which would require an explanation. This could be accomplished by incorporating an intraregional comparative model. Integrating cross-regional comparison could also provide additional insights into processes of diffusion, as evidenced by Aham’s study (2018) of cross-border diffusion during the ‘Arab Spring’. His comparison of the effects of the Arab Spring on Israel and Mali has proven helpful in identifying which elements of the Arab Spring were truly ‘Arab’. This same study also incorporated an interregional approach, which, although less developed, pointed to alliances of actors from within and outside the region in order to explain which groups were in a better position to resist regime oppression – thus
more of an entanglement argument. An intertemporal comparison between the 2011 uprisings and earlier distinctive regional waves of democratization (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe in 1989/1990) would be an even more interesting approach.

CAS is also based on the understanding that concepts, analytical frameworks, and methodological toolboxes from different disciplines should work together. This emphasis means that confidence in newly available data on previously under-studied world regions will remain low so long as institutional trust in panel surveys and other types of surveys from those regions is lacking. In many cases, certain types of surveys can only (validly) be carried out in open societies. As a result, qualitative methods, including methods from neighbouring disciplines (e.g. focus group discussions and participatory observation), are of crucial importance for CAS.

Contextual sensitivity/expertise should be foregrounded when determining the reach of ‘travelling concepts’. Only ‘thick’ contextual knowledge of the cases being studied can help in determining if only terms vary but meanings remain the same, if functional equivalence applies to certain institutions (i.e. different institutions take on roles and activities to broadly fulfil the same functions, thus achieving the same as the above), or if concepts and institutions coincide with the national and international level (and, if applicable, local level) but have different meanings in different contexts. Thus, CAS can make a significant contribution to theory testing as well as to the advancement of a comparative politics based on substantive knowledge of all world regions.

**Conclusion**

CAS combines the disciplinary openness of area studies with the comparative drive of comparative politics. It is an analytical perspective that combines context sensitivity with explicit, systematic comparison – typically through comparisons that utilize a small number of carefully selected case studies. Thus, it brings into dialogue two fields that for many years were viewed as incompatible (Szanton 2004). CAS advances the notion that the comparative method is useful for individualization and generalization. The strengths of CAS – contextual sensitivity and openness to the methodologies of neighbouring disciplines – are most apparent in its engagement with world regions that have received only limited coverage in traditional comparative politics.

Intra-, inter-, and cross-regional comparisons differ in their requirements and objectives, but all three could play a vital role in theory building in comparative politics. However, this can only happen if a productive tension between the requirements of area studies and those of comparative politics is maintained; in other words, ‘comparison’ requires the conscious reduction of complexity – the opposite of classic area studies – while, at the same time, remaining open to neighbouring disciplinary approaches and to inductive approaches – the opposite of traditional comparative politics. Regrettably, this intermediary position occasionally has been called into question. An attentive, maintained, or even institutionalized reception of topics and research findings ‘from the periphery of political science’ would advance the demand for this approach – a role that could be fulfilled by professional associations and scholarly journals.

**Note**

Select bibliography

Global historical and transregional approaches have fundamentally transformed historical research in the past decade. However, there has been a remarkable conceptual vacuum in literature produced recently. The concept of ‘society’, which had been at the centre of many theory-based historiographical endeavours two or three decades ago, is scarcely used today. Global historians and scholars in area studies are primarily interested in imperial expansions, global regimes of racism, and transnational networks; however, they barely connect these topics explicitly to the examination of a particular social order or the concept of class. Jürgen Osterhammel (2001: 475) therefore points out that most global and transregional approaches are lacking a sociostructural foundation. Scholars such as Patrick Manning (2003: 201–13), Jürgen Kocka (2007), and Lynn Hunt (2014) likewise lament the neglect of the social in global historical accounts. And Kenneth Pomeranz (2007: 70) maintains that ‘world history has much to gain from developing research agendas with a strong social history component and from thinking of social history in broad terms’. Notwithstanding, none of these scholars have brought forth more than some general proposals on how to link social history more profoundly with global historical approaches.¹

To be sure, various accounts such as world-system theory (Wallerstein 2004) or studies in social imperialism (Wehler 1969; MacKenzie 1984) examine global interaction in terms of class analysis and economic materialism. However, these approaches are only somewhat adapted to reflect current transregional and global historical scholarship. That being said, explicit social historical approaches would be suited to investigating the extent to which classes, milieus, and social groups can be interpreted as a consequence of transregional entanglements, or to exploring the extent to which these groups had to adapt to global transformations in order to maintain their status within local societies.

Even if certain social groups – such as merchants, intellectuals, or political activists – might have had a global horizon and even if certain milieus were influenced by processes that emanated from halfway across the globe, they generally were socially embedded in particular localities. A transregional study of class and social groups will therefore need to explore the extent to which such groups were shaped by both global processes and local conditions; it will, in other words, have to pay particular attention to processes of glocalization (Robertson 1995). The consequence of such an assumption is profound. If the claim holds true that global interaction had a fundamental impact on social structures in different world regions, the question would...
no longer be whether transregional approaches might be expedient for social history. Rather, we would have to state that there is no way of doing social history without considering transregional and global processes.

The following contribution will propose some suggestions concerning how this claim could be realized methodologically. It is organized in three sections. The first will argue that various social groups that were important for the history of the long nineteenth century were shaped by, if not the consequence of, transregional entanglements. The next two sections will present two theoretical approaches for transregional approaches to social history: world-system theory with its focus on global economic integration and the macro-sociological approach of world society, which focuses on the emergence of a worldwide sphere of communication after the eighteenth century. None of these approaches shall be used as a methodological one-size-fits-all approach to a transregional examination of class but rather a heuristic tool that allows social historical research trajectories to be addressed in an explicit manner and an overarching analytical framework to be conceptualized. The conclusion will call attention to some of the limits and the inherent bias of such an approach and discuss possible solutions.

**Sociability and transregional interaction**

A first possibility to study class, social groups, and milieus in a transregional perspective is to examine the extent to which the emergence and transformation of certain social groups can be considered the result of transregional connections. Such an emphasis on sociability can benefit from the fact that both global and social historians share an interest in the ways specific structures are shaped by social interaction. Global connections and entanglements have been keywords in global historical studies over the last decade and a half (Subrahmanyam 1997). Even though the nature of such entanglements is often only superficially defined, there seems to be a consensus among scholars that interconnectivity is the *raison d’être* of transregional and global historical studies and that the ever growing density of long-distance interconnection – both by face-to-face encounters and by acts of communication – can be considered evidence for the emergence of a globalized world. A similar interest in interaction can be observed in social history. In contrast to Marxist analysis, which considered class formation as a direct consequence of materialist structures, social historians began to focus increasingly on the ways the affiliation to particular classes was, at least partly, an outcome of the self-fashioning and strategic behaviour of social actors after the 1960s. In his seminal study on *The Making of the English Working Class*, E.P. Thompson (1963: 194) points out that ‘[t]he working class made itself as much as it was made’. In a similar perspective, Georg Simmel (1908) argues that social theory should focus on processes of *Vergesellschaftung* (sociability) as he perceived social order neither as static nor as the function of specific income structures but a process-related issue and the result of social interaction.

Global historians, on the contrary, have presented various examples that highlight the role of transregional interconnection for both the emergence and transformation of particular social groups. Global labour history has explored the interconnection of labour regimes in different parts of the world. Forced and ‘voluntary’ migration – such as the transatlantic slave trade, the Asian coolie trade, and, after the turn of the nineteenth century, the emigration of millions of European poor to the Americas and to Australia – brought about the emergence of new labour communities in different parts of the world (Drayton 2002; van der Linden 2003). Even if they often lacked a certain class consciousness, they can be perceived as distinct social groups, sharing similar conditions of life and a fate that was influenced by unique political and economic structures.
Likewise, studies on the history of aristocracy have revealed how, in the age of empire, both European and non-European rulers were compelled to reconsider their social position in the face of an ever more globalized world, which was increasingly coming under European dominance. Oriental rulers such as the Persian shahs or the king of Hawai'i aimed at coping with the rise of the West by establishing links to European monarchs (Motadel 2011). European aristocrats, on the contrary, not only encountered differences in terms of culture and skin colour when looking at the non-European world, but they also detected remarkable similarities in terms of social structure. All over the world, so it seemed, societies were organized hierarchically with chiefs and emperors and princes on top (Cannadine 2001). Such global analogies not only confirmed the belief of European monarchs in the universalism of the aristocratic order, but also provided a cultural basis for establishing ties with rulers from the extra-metropolitan world.

While both labour and aristocracy were social groups that existed long before the intensification of global interaction during the long nineteenth century, the bourgeois middle classes were a social group that emerged precisely in that period and came into being, at least partially, as a product of globalization and colonialism. As the global historical examination of the rise of middle classes is exceptionally well suited for discussing the pros and cons of global social historical approaches, it will be presented in more detail in the following.

For a long time, social historians were convinced that there were no social formations beyond the North Atlantic world that could be compared to the European or North American bourgeoisies and middle classes, respectively (Siegrist 2001: 1312). Recent scholarship, however, has identified the emergence of social formations that can be compared to the Euro-American middle class in places as different as India, Peru, Egypt, and sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. West 2002; Watenpaugh 2006; Pernau 2013). A fundamental challenge to these studies was the creation of a worldwide applicable definition of middle class. In contrast to the aristocracy or the working class, the bourgeois middle class could neither be characterized by well-defined privileges acquired by birth or a particular political agenda, nor could they be distinguished clearly from other social groups by their socioeconomic status. This problem was already debated among social historians of Europe during the twentieth century; it has today grown even more acute in global historical accounts. European social historians, however, also presented a pragmatic solution to this dilemma. They pointed out that the affiliation to this social group depended not least on the acceptance of a specific moral-cultural canon and a certain way of living. It was the adoption of particular manners, specific clothing, the development of an individual personality, and the belief in progress that resulted in the merging of professionals, intellectuals, and businessmen into one discernible social cohort (Hettling and Hoffmann 1997; Young 2003). Such a perspective proves to be suitable for transregional approaches as well. Middling sorts throughout the non-Western world have been successfully compared to the Western middle classes in terms of their cultural orientation in recent studies (López and Weinstein 2012; Dejung 2014).

The bourgeois middle classes that emerged throughout the long nineteenth century were intrinsically linked to globalization. On the one hand, they were the product of global entanglements. This is certainly true for middle classes in European colonies, which generally had been educated in missionary schools or local schools modelled on the Western archetype. Taking the emergence of the Indian middle classes as an exemplary case, scholars from subaltern studies expound that this middle class had developed their hegemony within local society from a position of colonial subalternity. And they further claim that the social identity of these groups relied primarily on an imitation of Western archetypes; Partha Chatterjee (1993) argues that it had to be perceived as a ‘derivative discourse’. This notion has been challenged lately. Sanjay Joshi (2001) argues that the emergence of an Indian middle class cannot be reduced to an adoption of Western discourses of progress and modernization. Such a notion in his eyes disregards the agency of this
social group. What is more, it does not take into account the fact that their self-fashioning relied on vernacular notions of political and social organization. Similar processes can be perceived all over the non-Western world. Accordingly, the emergence of non-Western middle classes can be interpreted as a hybrid mix of local traditions and influences from abroad. A similar case can be made for the European middle classes. New imperial history argues that their cultural canopy had a global horizon indeed (Stoler and Cooper 1997). Business elites, which were an integral part of the European bourgeoisie, generally were part of global economic networks (Dejung 2018). What is more, bourgeois culture relied on the consumption of commodities imported from colonial possessions, such as sugar, tea, cocoa, coffee, or silk, and it involved the contemplation of exotic plants and animals by visiting zoological and botanical gardens (Hall and Rose 2006).

The emergence of middle classes in different parts of the world can thus be analysed as a consequence of global entanglements rather than the diffusion of a European bourgeois lifestyle all over the world. This exchange process, however, did not take place on a level playing field, but in the context of Western dominance and imperialism. Colonial middle classes, time and time again, saw their claim for political rights and their aspiration for being part of a global process of modernization flawed by imperial hubris and racism. And whereas colonial middle classes generally took the European middle classes as a yardstick, this was obviously not the case the other way around.

On the other hand, it was the middle classes that brought many of the global entanglements of the long nineteenth century into being. What is particularly striking is the fact that middle-class actors from areas as different as European metropoles and colonial peripheries shared specific cultural traits that allowed them to establish transregional networks even in the age of empire. In the world of business, for instance, European and American trading houses were regularly on par with Chinese, Indian, or Arab merchants with which they liaised when doing business outside the North Atlantic area. Western and non-Western businessmen disposed of similar business practices and a similar mercantile culture, which is why they have been described as joint members of a cosmopolitan bourgeoisie (Jones 1987; Dejung 2011).

The realms of scientific knowledge also saw the emergence of global networks that were set up by members of the educated middle classes from different parts of the world after the late nineteenth century. Membership in scientific societies and the exchange of ideas in scholarly publications and at international conferences led to the emergence of a global republic of letters in which, at least in theory, geographical origin was of minor importance (Gänger and Lewis 2013). Nonetheless, non-European scholars often found that their research was not taken seriously in the Western world, despite all their effort. The global world of ideas hence was characterized by processes of both inclusion and exclusion.

Another case of global sociality can be observed in politics. Notably the resistance against colonial rule caused the emergence of cosmopolitan thought zones, which allowed intellectuals from different parts of the world to create an anti-imperial repertoire of ideas (Boehmer 2002; Bose and Manjapra 2010; Manjapra 2010). Most of these intellectuals can be ranked among the educated middle classes. European and non-European middle classes thus could have much more in common than has long been assumed; even in the colonial period, they were able to collaborate with the aim of realizing common cultural, economic, and political projects.

Taken together, recent research in global labour history and transregional studies on both aristocracy and middle classes have provided ample evidence for the claim that these social groups shaped, and were being considerably shaped by, global entanglements. To be sure, all of these groups were also influenced by local conditions and power struggles, and the relation between these local conditions and global influences have to be examined in each and every case by meticulous research.
Analytical framework I: world-system theory

A challenge confronting the transregional examination of particular classes and social groups is exploring whether the history of these groups can be integrated into an overarching framework. Conventional social history could use the nation-state as a historiographical laboratory to study the relation between economic development and social stratification. A world society – which could be compared to national and regional societies – would be difficult to conceptualize as there are no institutions, associations, and political parties on a global level that could be compared to those established within distinct nations. Nevertheless, it might be worthwhile to consider whether particular concepts of global social integration can be adopted for such an approach – not in the hope of acquiring an all-inclusive theory but in order to describe more precisely what we mean by global entanglements and how they influence local societies.

A first candidate for such a trajectory is world-system theory (Wallerstein 2004). To be sure, the main argument of this approach – that is to say, the emergence of a capitalist world-system has to be considered the result of an integration of ever larger parts of the world into a European core – seems no longer viable. Recent research has recognized that the global economy has by no means been dominated by Europe since the early modern period. On the contrary, we have to acknowledge a remarkable equivalence between European and Asian economies until the late eighteenth century (Pomeranz 2000) and to consider the impact of non-European actors, such as Asian and Middle Eastern merchants, on the emergence of modern capitalism (Raj 1995; Markovits 2013).

Nevertheless, a revised version of world-system theory could be used as an analytical framework for understanding the emergence and transformation of particular social groups such as the bourgeoisie or the working classes after the eighteenth century. Such an example is Sven Beckert’s book *Empire of Cotton: A Global History* (2015). Even though Beckert refers to Wallerstein’s theory only in passing, his study is an exemplary case of how the examination of class relations can – and has to – be linked to the analysis of global capitalism. In his study, Beckert demonstrates how, among others, the global cotton economy shaped agricultural labour and can be seen as the primary reason for the emergence of industrial capitalism. As a consequence, it can be connected to the transformation of labour regimes all over the globe and is one of the reasons that such a thing as class society came into being. Furthermore, the empire of cotton also relates to the emergence of a global bourgeoisie of merchants and bankers, a group that Beckert describes as a ‘cosmopolitan community’ and a ‘social class’ that ‘often had closer connections to people far away than to people in their home cities or immediate hinterlands’ (Beckert 2015: 234–5). Beckert’s study may thus confirm the claim that social history can – and perhaps has to – be written in a transregional perspective; or to put it differently, it argues for global and transregional history to be considered an integral part of social history.

Analytical framework II: the theory of world society

A second established approach to examine the emergence of social order in a transregional perspective is the theory of world society (Luhmann 1975; Heintz 1982; Stichweh 2000; Greve and Heintz 2005), whose influence has been limited to German-speaking academia so far. The theory emanates from the claim that modern societies have to be perceived as communities that are structured by acts of communication. World society theory stipulates first that a worldwide sphere of communication emerged with the advent of the modern period, and second that processes on the local and national level were influenced – if not determined – by global developments. Several critics point out that the theory has some flaws. On the one hand, it is
unspecific about the impact of inequality – both within local societies and between particular world regions – on the global web of communicative interaction that is world society. On the other hand, there is a debate about whether or not this worldwide entity really can be considered a ‘society’ given that on the global level there is no authority that could govern social processes to a similar extent as state politics did within nation-states. Nevertheless, the theory could facilitate exploring the structuring effects the intensification of communication had on a global level after the turn of the nineteenth century.

Studies in global intellectual history, for instance, have explored the transregional movement of ideas and their transformation across borders and cultures (Moyn and Sartori 2013). A social historical perspective of such processes could reveal how, after the late eighteenth century, such intellectual entanglements resulted in the emergence of transregional social networks, whose members used the social capital gained from such interaction to maintain their social status.

Then again, such an approach also needs to take into account that various communities throughout the world had invented forms of knowledge that differed from metropolitan scientific knowledge, which had become hegemonic in the nineteenth century. Such deviation from metropolitan knowledge can be found in both the Western (Brändli 1990) and the non-Western world (Raj 2007; Sivasundaram 2010). If these communities are not to be reduced to charlatans or mere informants of metropolitan science, it has to be acknowledged that not all communities across the globe fit into the class system of Western social theory. Such discrepancy in a metropolitan claim to represent the embodiment of modernity certainly calls for a cautious adaption of any overarching theoretical framework as well, as has to be respected in any further conceptualization of global social history (Connell 2007; Comaroff and Comaroff 2012).

Conclusion

This contribution identified several possibilities of how the emergence of social groups and class can be interpreted in a transregional perspective. The main advantage of such a research trajectory is that it allows the role of social hierarchy within particular areas to be the main focus, while investigating the extent to which specific social groups and milieus shaped, and were shaped, by transregional entanglements. It emerges from the assumption that there might be cases, even in the age of empire, in which social ranking was as important as – or even more important than – the geographical or ethnic origin of social actors.

However, this approach involves at least two fundamental problems that have to be taken into consideration. First, there is an implicit teleology in many global historical approaches, especially in macro-historical and macro-sociological approaches such as world-system theory and theory of world society. According to these approaches, historical development seems to have a tendency to become ever more global over time and to finally culminate in the establishment of a globalized world. Frederick Cooper (2001) rightly warns against such a teleological bias and argues that historians have to be open for discrepancies, asynchronies, and dead ends in global entanglements. Second, not all historical actors fit nicely into concepts of class that were formulated within Euro-American social theory. As has been exhibited through the example of global intellectual history, there might be actors that relied rather on vernacular traditions than on the global circulation of goods and ideas. The fact that not all historical actors participated in global exchanges, however, is not an argument against a transregional approach to social history. Instead, it is a reminder that theoretical approaches should be used primarily in a heuristic manner and always need to be adapted to and challenged by empirical evidence.
Notes

1 Important exceptions are, however, Osterhammel (2014: chapter XV) and Osterhammel (2016).

2 Bourgeois and middle classes will be used synonymously in this chapter.

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Transregional and transnational mobilizations are nothing new. It suffices to mention the missionary, anti-slave, peace, working-class, women’s or even the scout movement. However, sociological research on transnational social movements is present-oriented, relatively recent, and scarce. Although research on transregional and transnational movements is expanding, it is still very modest. It is spread across disciplines such as geography, ethnography, sociology, political science, and international relations. This chapter recounts a variety of mainly qualitative methods applied in studying contemporary transregional movements without claiming to be exhaustive. The presentation follows social movement chronology and includes several world regions. Concluding remarks discuss some shortcomings and gaps arising from the use of such methods.

The anti-apartheid movement: the spider in the web as a key informer

The anti-apartheid movement constituted the first post-Second World War transnational movement subject to systematic research. It took Swedish local groups and national anti-apartheid campaigns as a point of departure but moved on to the movement’s epicentre, the United Kingdom. It exemplifies multisited research concerned with transnational ties, calling for a particular reading of the archival material and locating key informers. While working in the archives, Hakan Thörn (2006) paid special attention to all correspondence and documents conveying information about transnational contacts. He also found the ‘spider in the web’ – a key informer who knew the history and who-is-who of the anti-apartheid movement well. Such ‘gatekeepers’ are invaluable because, if their trust is won, they identify and ease contacts with other key activists. Their support reduces the time necessary to find with whom to conduct subsequent, either autobiographic, narrative, or expert interviews. Such interviews are essential to construct a narrative about the movement, since they tell when and how activists had their first encounters with the movement, how they framed the issues, as well as how they financed and coordinated activities, events, and campaigns across borders over time.
The fair trade movement: catching both ends of the commodity and decision-making chain

The fair trade (FT) movement constituted another early transcontinental solidarity movement. In Europe in the 1960s, Christian activists and Marxists alike wanted to show their solidarity with the exploited peoples of the Third World. After selling handicrafts and trinkets for a while, the European activists heeded the voices of cooperative representatives from the Global South and began to sell farming products, such as coffee and sugar, offering fair terms of trade. Today the movement is still vibrant, even expanding, in countries of the Global North, such as the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany. Yet scientific literature is scarce. To throw some light on the history, development, institutional structure, and current issues of this movement, Valerio Verrea (2014) relied on triangulation, that is, on a number of methods. Early on, his research showed that FT was split between the original FT and the relatively new FT-Label movement. Therefore, while attending fair trade conferences, he collected documents and conducted a large number of expert interviews among and about FT and FT-Label decision-makers in Europe. He also investigated retailers selling FT and FT-Label products in the UK, Italy, and Germany. This research phase was followed by multisited field work in Mexico and Peru, where producers of coffee — a prime world trade and fair trade commodity — are numerous. Non-participant observation and standardized interviews focused on their living conditions and their views on the costs and benefits associated with FT and FT-Label.

The anti-debt campaign: process tracing and expert interviews

The last quarter of the twentieth century was marked by a debt crisis primarily associated with Latin America, which, however, also enveloped Africa, socialist Poland, and the capitalist Philippines. The crisis officially started in August 1982, when Mexico, a major debtor, admitted it could no longer service its debt. This also happened to be the case with many other countries of the Global South. The issue gave rise to one of the best-sustained, longest-running transnational campaigns to date, bringing together people from across six continents.

Somers (2014: 76–8) wished to reflect upon the sources of tension and weakened cooperation within the movement at the turn of the last century. Having spent 12 years as an activist in a transnational anti-debt campaign, she had considerable insider knowledge as well as documents collected during various campaign events, including those in the Global South. Her research in the archives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and universities in Europe turned up Global North and South documents revealing NGOs’ strategic thinking: newsletters, plans, evaluations, funding applications, meeting minutes, and correspondence. Media archives were also helpful, as they included unpublished texts assembled by news services. For more recent years, Internet archives were plentiful. Rounding off the material, Somers undertook semi-structured expert interviews. She conducted them mostly by phone with individuals who had played central roles in anti-debt campaigning, either in the debtor or creditor countries. Among the latter, she covered European countries both inside and outside the Group of Seven (G7). She selected debtor countries on which much information could be gathered and key informers were available.
Human Rights NGOs: experts, UN registers and a mailed survey

The Helsinki Accords of 1975 marked the onset of a new, transcontinental human rights (HR) era. By the mid-1980s, politicians, social movements, and international organizations (IOs) – such as the United Nations (UN) – heralded the triumphal global march of HR. The number of NGOs greatly increased, and they came to play a crucial role in developing international HR laws and institutions. They embraced their role as watchdogs, monitoring various governments and institutions and setting up reporting procedures for HR violations. Many acted across national and regional borders, deserving the label of transnational NGOs (TNGOs). The contributions of TNGOs to world politics became undeniable.

In this context, a team of researchers decided to go beyond scattered case and national studies. They mailed a survey to nearly 300 HR TNGOs, receiving responses to more than half (Smith, Pagnucco and Lopez 1998: 381–3; Smith and her students continue to grapple with transnational social movements to the present day). The survey had been developed after consulting advocates, international relations scholars, and specialists on HR via organizational surveys. The team relied mainly on the Yearbook of International Organizations for years 1993/4 and 1995/6 to generate a list of pertinent TNGOs. In addition, they used the conference registrant list from the 1995 UN Fourth World Conference on the Status of Women in Beijing; a directory of NGOs compiled by the International Service for Human Rights (Geneva, Switzerland); participant lists in regional meetings in preparation for the 1993 UN Second World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna; the NGO directory produced by Human Rights Internet; and the Encyclopedia of Associations.

NGOs take on a variety of forms and pursue a great number of issues – it is debatable whether all citizen initiatives, watchdog organizations, advocacy groups, humanitarian or HR organizations, service-providing organizations, etc. should be understood as social movements. However, on the assumption that the NGOs included in the survey by Smith and her colleagues (1998) were involved in activism and mobilization efforts with a view to social change, these can be treated as identical to social movements.

The survey showed, among other results, that a quarter of the respondents had emerged before 1969, half after 1979, and one-fifth after 1988. Nearly half of the TNGOs surveyed were located in Western Europe (46 per cent), followed by North America (21 per cent), and Asia (17 per cent) (Smith, Pagnucco and Lopez 1998: 387). This fits other sources of information showing that TNGOs from the Global South constituted only about one-third of all HR TNGOs.

Transnational alliances: surveys and face-to-face expert interviews

Since the end of the 1980s, both North and South America have witnessed not only increasing contentious action against trade negotiations, but also the growing participation of civil society organizations (CSOs) in policy-making processes. This has been the case in part because the Americas have a long history of bilateral and regional trade agreements and also because of unprecedented efforts to construct social movement transnational coalitions aiming at influencing North–South trade negotiations. Von Bülow (2011) investigated, among others, the emergence, transformations, and demise of such coalitions. By definition, these coalitions bring together organizations lacking resources and distrusting each other. That is why the role of brokers becomes central. In 2004 and 2005, von Bülow received back 123 questionnaires from CSOs in Brazil (28), Chile (24), Mexico (30), and the USA (41). Once she had analysed the data, she followed up in 2008 with 87 face-to-face, semi-structured, in-depth interviews with
The study of transnational movements

key CSO representatives in these countries as well as in Canada and Peru (but please note that expert interviews can be conducted by email or, alternatively, as online surveys). Her aim was to discuss and clarify her survey outcomes. This allowed her to explore the organizational dynamics of the first multisectoral hemispheric social alliance (HAS), which was created in the late 1990s, and by 2010 featured national chapters in 19 countries in both North and South America. Moreover, von Bülow looked closer at two of the most active national chapters of CSOs. These were the Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC), established in 1991 to coordinate the hemispheric fight against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Brazilian Network for the Integration of the Peoples (REBRIP) set up in 2001 to mobilize against the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Both these ‘chapters’ were in fact coalitions bringing together myriad social movements, labour unions, labour organizations, NGOs, small business associations, and other CSOs (von Bülow 2011: 167). Von Bülow explained how each worked and why their brokers differed.

**Diffusion of global values and discourses: armchair research**

The 1990s also awoke to the great importance and influence, in domestic as well as world affairs, of transnational cooperation between national social movements, or NGOs, and transnational advocacy networks (TANs). A path-breaking text pinpoints the spread of shared human rights values and discourses across the globe; it emphasized the political benefits of transnational cooperation, moving discourses, know-how, and funds between the Global North and the Global South (Keck and Sikkink 1999).

The text argues that recalcitrant national governments can be compelled to reform through a ‘boomerang effect’ resulting from transnational cooperation. In it, a TAN takes on the issues pursued by a local or national movement so far unsuccessful in opposing an intransigent state. This TAN can then apply pressure on the recalcitrant state and thus help the domestic movement achieve its goals. A local or national movement might connect with the TAN and in this way acquire power to push for reforms. The TAN might also gain the support of a prestigious IO, such as the UN, which will then pressure the said state into making concessions.

This pioneering text generated a large number of investigations, mostly enquiring into the internalization of global issues by domestic movements and, vice versa, the externalization of local issues to TANs. Critics of this pioneering text could point to the Global North-centrism in part because they went beyond discourse analysis to do on-site research and worked either from a national or a regional perspective in Latin American or Asian countries. They showed that local and national movements found that their agendas were ignored and/or twisted to fit the frames generated by the TANs allegedly coming to their rescue (Widener 2006; for TANs as gatekeepers, see Carpenter 2011). Newer research also shifted attention to local mobilizations linking up across a region, or to transnational movements or TANs, without necessarily succumbing to their control (Matsuzawa 2011; Quinsaat 2009: 77–80). Earlier an EU-focused study on sexual harassment – including a discussion of the influence of the discourse of the US women’s movement on its European counterpart – discovered a ‘ping-pong effect’ rather than a ‘boomerang effect’ within the EU (Zippel 2004).

**Global justice movements: ‘in-situ’ research**

After the first greatly surprising and successful protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting held in Seattle in 1999, a number of similar counter-summits – such as in Prague, Gothenburg, and Genoa – ensued (Juris 2008). However, the violent clashes with
the police, ordered by the authorities keen to protect the summits, led to a process of intra-
movement reflection, which generated new forms of transregional and transnational activism.

In particular, transnational social forums such as the World Social Forum (WSF) were
classified as meeting spaces free from state and capitalist interventions, and thus suitable
for asserting, envisioning, and practising the motto ‘an alternative world is possible’. While
enthusiastic supporters have heralded all such instances of the forum as true sites of deliber-
ative democracy, transnational solidarity, and future-oriented networking, it also has its crit-
ics. Employing mostly participant observation and logic-of-argument methods, such critics
have pinpointed the continued dominance of middle-class representatives from the Global
North as well as of resource-rich TNGOs among WSF participants (Cumbers, Routledge,
and Nativel 2008).

An early quantitative study focuses on online connectivity among 222 social forum web-
sites of local WSF chapters that were selected by snowball sampling for the early years of the
forum’s existence (2001–5). The study explores network factors such as cohesion, central-
ity, structural equivalence, and homophily (Vicari 2014). It shows many intracontinental and
language-related interactions as well as low interrelatedness and few reciprocated ties across
continents. The strongest contacts were found between the most transnational nodes in the
network. Ethnographers, geographers, sociologists, and political scientists have done extensive
on-site empirical research on the WSF. Exemplary ethnographic research, all apart from tracing
the history of these protests, was conducted from a single-actor perspective (Juris 2008; see also,
e.g., Redfield’s (2005) exemplary research on Doctors without Borders).

By contrast, in their efforts to claim at least a modicum of generalizability for their data, soci-
ologists and political scientists focusing on the European Social Forum (ESF) or the WSF, if in
possession of enough resources to hire assistants or able to draw upon support networks, distrib-
uted questionnaires among the participants to collect information about their socioeconomic,
national, and political background as well as about their participation motives (Della Porta
2009). Guided by their research question, they selected the sessions they wanted to observe and
secured the cooperation of other researchers to record the ones they could not attend (Doerr

These research activities were complemented by the observations and expert interviews
conducted with the participants possessing long-standing experience and prestige – that is to
say, those capable of sharing their deep knowledge about its history, participation patterns, and
organizational dynamics. The assembled knowledge allowed for an informed pursuit of such
questions as ‘[u]nder what conditions is a democratic discussion undermining global North-
South differences of language and status possible?’ and ‘[w]hat is the role of translators therein?’
(Doerr 2008, 2014). Another such question was ‘[w]hat forms of democracy are practiced,
discussed in sessions devoted to democracy and envisioned by individual participants in the
WSF?’ (Fiedlschuster 2018).

**Transregional environmental NGOs as whistleblowers and policy-shapers: process tracing**

Research on TANs and trans-movements stresses shared discourses and actions. However,
there is also research on how transnational civil society organizations use, for example, the
North American environmental side agreement to NAFTA as a mechanism to pressure Canada,
Mexico, and the USA into complying with their respective environmental laws. Yet little has
been written on cooperative knowledge-sharing among NGOs as a step toward coalition-
building with the aim of policy change.
Pacheco-Vega (2015: 146–8) fills this research gap. He focuses on how transnational coalitions of environmental NGOs (ENGOs) in North America share and strategically use their knowledge in order to influence environmental policy across the Canadian, US, and Mexican borders. For his project, among others, he followed the development of TANs across North America for over a decade; conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with ENGOs and government experts in all three countries; and collected national and intergovernmental documents, including relevant resolutions of the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NACEC or CEC) for 1994–2014.

Using process tracing as a method (see also Bennett and Checkel 2015), he could also establish when ENGOs shared information, created knowledge-sharing platforms, and moved to pressure industry. This, once measured against other sources of information, allowed Pacheco-Vega to check whether there was a causal relationship between ENGOs’ actions and policy outcomes.

**Transregional humanitarian intervention in conflict zones: IO registers and expert interviews**

By now, many handbooks in international relations and political science recognize that (T)NGOs are making a major contribution to world politics, which raises the question of how and with what results they do this. This is also the point of departure for Irrera’s research, which concerns humanitarian organizations and their contribution to peace-building and conflict resolution on various continents. Irrera worked with the UN documents, statistics, and tables to document the shift from peace-keeping to peace-building in the UN missions, and to situate humanitarian NGOs in this context. Similar procedures allowed her to narrate the EU’s recent history of humanitarian interventions. Inspecting the UN and EU registers, she selected the initial set of humanitarian NGOs and chose from this set 28 NGOs that had participated in peace operations in the field, including, for example, Médecins Sans Frontières, Oxfam, War Child, Save the Children, and the Initiative for Better and Humane Inclusion. The information about diverse roles NGOs play in peace operations is based on a survey Irrera (2013: 3, 111, 116–23) conducted with the representatives of these NGOs in Geneva and Brussels, where they have their headquarters.

**North–South activism: interrogating activists of the Global North**

Neither being an activist nor travelling to the Global South is a necessary prerequisite of research on transregional solidarity movements, as Mahrouse’s (2014) research shows. For a critical analysis of the ways in which racism and power asymmetries shape the reflections and emotions of the Global North activists, it is sufficient to interview these activists either before and after, or soon after, their visits to the Global South. Mahrouse also engages in a close reading of strategically selected, printed or online, statements of Global North NGOs to point out the multiple ways in which racist, ‘feel good’ North-centric activism compromises solidarity in Global North–South relations.

**‘We are all Khaled Said’ and neo-Nazi movements: tracing mobilization via visuals**

Similarly, it is sufficient to have access to Internet to be able to trace how online visuals travel across countries, regions, and continents to create collective ‘trans’-mobilization. In various
research projects, Doerr (see Flam and Doerr 2015) and Olesen (2013) did just that. It is, however, advisable to accompany or follow up online surfing in the pursuit of visuals by talking to their creators. Also media text analysis helps ascertain that the chronology and creator intentions in one’s analysis come close to the facts.

**Summing up**

Research on (dis)similar discourses or on their transformations over time demands relatively little funding. A few visits to document and press archives suffice to collect the necessary body of material. Alternatively, repeatedly accessing the homepages of the pertinent mobilized groups or organizations helps generate the relevant material corpus. Comparing such homepages yields information about the (dis)similarity and transformations of their respective discourses, and even about their networks and donors. This allows for tentative arguments about the direction of change and influence to be developed.

One obvious shortcoming of relying on social movement archives and Internet pages is that this leaves out movements and organizations that do not rely much on the Internet or leave no traces in archives. This type of research has a clear technological bias, also in the sense that search engines in the Global North are biased toward entries giving more weight to Northern movements and organizations. Knowing languages other than those of the Global North and relying on different search engines can help to somewhat correct this bias.

If one wishes to go beyond (dis)similarities and discursive transformations related to time and ‘trans-cooperation’, one can overcome the bias based on the analysis of documents, press releases, and homepages by conducting interviews with key movement representatives. The latter can help to (dis)confirm what one learned about discursive transfers, discursive transformations over time, networking, donors, campaigns, and events via Internet and archival research. One can also reverse the research steps, conducting interviews first and later analysing archival and homepage materials.

As Thörn’s anti-apartheid study highlights, locating ‘spiders in the web’ is extremely helpful in identifying key informants. However, as Somers’ research on the anti-debt campaigns reminds us, insider knowledge or sifting through the accumulated material accomplishes the same. Assembled documents and interview materials are usually sufficient to sketch out separate and interrelated histories of each pertinent mobilized movement and organization, in addition to depicting the ups and downs of their cooperation, as well as the resulting – centrifugal and centripetal – activities.

As research by Smith et al., della Porta, von Bülow, and Irrera shows, standardized and semi-structured surveys (whether posted, e-mailed, or conducted face-to-face) help gather basic information about activities and organizations involved in transregional and transnational mobilizations. It is advisable to conduct semi-structured interviews in person or to follow standardized surveys with expert interviews in order to deepen one’s knowledge and clarify issues that otherwise might remain obscure. Autobiographic, narrative interviews – such as the ones Thörn employed in his study of the anti-apartheid campaigns – offer similar information as well as inform about the experiences, reflections, and frames of key activists.

It is worthwhile noting that in-situ research (e.g. on the WSF or the ESF) defines transregional or transnational movements by the immediate on-site agenda and the characteristics of the participants. This is not self-evident, especially knowing the self-selection bias in participation. Mostly resource-rich individuals and organizations can afford participation and thus predominate over other participants in the WSF. Hence, even though some resource-poor participants attend and argue against the participation biases, this does not change the fact that
research focusing on in-situ participants and processes leaves out all those who would like, but cannot afford, to participate, or who would decide against it out of conviction.

A multisited critical case or contrasting case research design that would reveal differing self-exclusion and other exclusion methods prior to a forum event would help to answer the question of which issues and actors are (self-)selected prior to the event. Analysing their characteristics, concerns, and resources as well as the exclusion processes themselves is called for in order to fully grasp the global justice movement with all its lights and shadows. Such research would also help to better grasp what is specifically transregional or transnational about these movements. A forum’s agenda is also the result of a long selection process. Accessing online lists of topics suggested for the forum to see which are later dropped, with or without discussion, and which end up on the agenda would offer additional information about the excluded parts of the transnational justice movement.

Similarly, there is relatively little research on the consequences of each forum. If they are generative of new strategies, issue campaigns, or ideas about democracy, this ideally should be included in the research design and conclusions about a forum. However, these effects – in the form of emerging networks and issue campaigns – are usually studied separately (Terhorst 2008). It would also be interesting to find out whether the World Social Fora generate conflicts or simply antipathies that dissuade from further participation.

Archives, Internet pages, various types of interviews, and in-situ research do tell us quite a bit about very different aspects of mobilization – that is to say, how discourses travel and change over time; what activists, organizations, and campaigns do; what reflections are behind their strategies; and what leads to successes in cooperation as well as to fragmenting tensions. But an apparent shortcoming of this type of research is the gap they leave in our knowledge about whether they have had any effects on institutions or practices, technologies, or architecture.

One has to round it off with policy analysis to find out whether and, if so, in what ways original mobilization and its aims have influenced actual policy-making. This is where process tracing, here best exemplified by Pacheco-Vega’s study, is very useful as a method.

Select bibliography


PART II

Colonialism and post-colonial studies

Introduction

Geert Castryck

Whereas the previous section concentrated on histories of area studies from a transregional perspective, this section situates transregional studies within the broader historical context of colonialism, decolonization, and post-colonial studies. Underpinning this section is the observation that the regions or ‘areas’ in area studies are historically constructed and therefore the ever-changing children of their times. As a consequence, different successive generations of area studies not only coexist but also interact and live through family and generational conflicts among each other. New historical eras lead both to new kinds of areas and to adaptations or reflexive reconfigurations of old ones. Colonialism serves as a key vantage point to assess the imagination, representation, and organization of the world in discrete regions, each with ascribed features. The different stages of colonialism provide a useful historical reference to frame the production of regions, the interconnectedness and confrontations between them, as well as the transgressions and contestations of regional demarcations. Post-colonial studies, in turn, help us to assess the construction, transformations, and fundamental critiques of different divisions of the world.

Colonialism was, in its own right, a particular kind of interest in the wider world and of increased interaction between different parts of the world. Colonization produced and was premised on power asymmetries, economic inequalities, and cultural stereotypes that underpinned the definition of parts of the world as regions, allegedly with specific characteristics and set relations to other regions – first and foremost to Europe. At the same time, the development of science and academic disciplines both pushed colonization forward and built on the knowledge produced in colonial expeditions and under colonial rule. A plethora of explanations for colonization exists, ranging from European dependence on resources and produce from elsewhere, technological innovations and industrialization, the search for markets, legal systems, military power, adventurism, racism, private or government initiatives, strong or weak polities, etc. Either way, the eventual outcome provided the basis for a world order and a hegemonic understanding of the world, which has lasted for a very long time, and to some extent until today. Likewise, a division of the world into regions and the knowledge production of these regions were two sides of the same colonial coin. In short, the spatial understanding of the world has been grafted upon colonialist imaginations, colonial power relations, and their scholarly underpinnings and translations.

As the colonial era drew to a close by the mid-twentieth century, the world order of the Cold War provided a new framework to underpin the division of the world into areas, still
characterized by asymmetries and allegiances, inequality and dependence, and stereotypes and prejudices. Whether adopting a political, an economic, or a cultural perspective, or whether building on colonial or Cold War divisions of the world, words like Latin America, Middle East, Third World, the West, Francophonie, and Commonwealth – remarkably for the most part written with capital letters – entered our vocabularies. All of these terms are historical constructions from a specific vantage point. The corresponding regions, however, overlap, interact, and eclipse as the mirage they, to some extent, all are.

While colonialism has been crucial in reinforcing regional relations and a dominant spatial understanding of the world, it has also been the object of radical epistemological criticism. Post-colonial studies took apart colonial reasoning, its impact beyond colonial spaces, and its ongoing legacies beyond colonial times. Post-colonialists fundamentally challenged the hegemonic understanding of the relations between parts of the world and exposed blind spots in the continued colonial – racist, oppressive, exploitative, exclusive – functioning of world affairs. Post-colonial studies thus disassembled the colonial(ist) basis of how the world is perceived and how this perception is constructed. This includes an awareness of spaces and scapes that underpin our interpretations and practices. As such, the spatial imagination itself becomes an arena of global social action. As the concluding Part X of this handbook is dedicated to the dominant narratives of globalization, a chapter specifically dealing with post-colonial approaches of space and transregional studies (Chapter 68, by Watson) is included in that section. In the present section, all chapters address the colonial underpinnings of regional transformations and connections, as well as post-colonial reflections on the limitations and legacies of colonial-borne and region-based knowledge production.

Oceanic worlds provide an insightful entry point into the analysis of the vagaries of what transregional means. When starting from a terrestrial or continental understanding of region, the Atlantic, Pacific, or Indian Ocean worlds connect landed regions, and, hence, are ipso facto transregional. At the same time, these oceanic worlds constitute areas sui generis, generating their own academic institutes, associations, research traditions, that is, their own area studies of maritime regions. In this Handbook of Transregional Studies, a third level of analysis is applied to oceanic (trans)regions, displaying how regional logics are transformed and transcended in Atlantic, Pacific, or Indian Ocean studies, thus moving beyond a narrow understanding of transregional as mere connections between regions. As the transregional origins, dynamics, and study of these oceanic worlds are profoundly entangled with the history of colonialism, they are dealt with in this section on colonialism and post-colonial studies. However, as seascapes, these oceanic worlds also address the focus of Part III: spatial formats in area studies and in the study of world regions.

Based on successive instances of historical connectivity, of which colonization has been a decisive driving force, layer-upon-layer of trans-regions came into existence over time and space. As a case in point, multiple trans-regions can be discerned stretching across the Atlantic. From the triangle trade of archaic globalization, over the Black Atlantic of pan-Africanism and the North Atlantic of the Cold War, to South–South relations between Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, the construction, coexistence, coalescence, and confrontation of multiple Atlantics become apparent. Atlantic studies became a leading research domain when it comes to transregional dynamics. Notwithstanding, Susanne Lachenicht calls to mind six challenges with which Atlantic studies is confronted: to overcome the dominant focus on the British Atlantic; to do justice to transnational and transimperial interactions between different Atlantics; to increase and enhance interdisciplinary approaches; to include the self-perception and self-representation of people of the Atlantic world; to draw parallels and comparisons with regions beyond the Atlantic worlds; and to question the alleged uniqueness of the Atlantic experience.
Contrary to the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean world has a history of connectedness reaching deep into pre-colonial times. Its history can be approached through multiple centres of gravity, reaching from East Africa to East Asia and beyond, and driven by inter alia the spread of Islam and Buddhism, commercial and social integration, human–environment interactions, and rivaling imperialisms. Depending on the geographical or thematic focus, different strands of Indian Ocean studies emerge. Geert Castryck analyses the transition from imperial histories of maritime trade, over decolonized histories of cultural exchange, to global Indian Ocean studies transcending the basin and the regional confines altogether. Paradoxically, despite the prominent role of Indian scholars, post-colonial studies had a late and limited influence on Indian Ocean studies. Tracing the convoluted transfer of post-colonial ideas to Indian Ocean studies helps to understand its transregional character.

Looking at the Pacific, Christa Wirth explores the Pacific as a site of knowledge encounters. The history of science increasingly adopts a scope that crosses national borders, continents, and oceans. Central to these transnational frameworks are questions of circulation. A focus on circulation reveals how knowledge is created through interactive processes, how it travels and is altered within global networks, and how it is transformed as it meets resistance and power. This contribution reconstructs the invention of a Pacific space by European explorers and colonial sciences, as well as interpretations and knowledge circulating among people living and travelling in the Pacific. The analysis both includes a systematic post-colonial critique on the colonial construction of knowledge about the Pacific and addresses the transregional interactions with scholarship in thalassological (primarily Atlantic) and global studies.

After having scrutinized colonial knowledge production in the context of Pacific knowledge encounters, Chapter 12 reconstructs the development of a specific field of colonial studies. Colonial knowledge production led to national expertise on certain world regions, to the institutionalization of bodies of knowledge, and to networks of experts that survived decolonization. Felix Brahms argues that colonial studies combined the ambition of academic rigour and recognition with an agenda to strengthen the colonial project based on expert knowledge. The main European colonial powers each had their colonial studies institutes, both in the metropole and in the colonies. Also imperial Japan joined the project of ‘scientific colonialism’. Special attention is drawn to transimperial cooperation, the exclusion or erasure of colonial knowledge production by colonial subjects, and the post-colonial legacies of applied colonial sciences. A similar argument can be developed for ethnographic museums and colonial collections. The material collections of colonial origin not only represent and (re)produce regions but also recontextualize and connect them, provoke contestations and confrontations, and underpin imaginations of the world until today.

Between colonial and post-colonial knowledge production, there is both continuity and rupture. Although colonial epistemologies persist, post-colonial studies has raised radical critique. Whereas colonial studies tended to extol European scholars and eclipse the significant role of colonial subjects, subaltern studies turned the tables. A group of Indian historians revisited the historiographies of Indian anti-colonial struggle, bringing the agency of the presumably weak or invisible actors to the fore. Christopher J. Lee illustrates the development of subaltern studies since the early 1980s, which in the end, revolutionized not only South Asian historiography but also the epistemologies of European, imperial, and global history – if not of history in general. The post-colonial transregionalism introduced by subaltern studies is one of human (inter)action and interpretation (pre)conditioned by inequalities.

Whereas the previous chapters deal with scrutinizing how colonialism produced the dominant spatial understanding of the world and how this history can be reconstructed and deconstructed with post-colonial and transregional methods, the remaining chapters address the transformations
of the regional divisions of the world in the time period of decolonization and Cold War. The Third World is both an invention of the era of Cold War and decolonization, and a product of economic development thought, which is in itself a late colonial form of modernization thought. However, this externally defined ‘Third World’ was also a space of agency and transregional connections in itself. Hubertus Büschel explains the invention of the Third World in relation to the concepts dependence and development. He calls to attention the fact that the concept itself is transregional in its relation to the alleged First and Second Worlds, that historical actors gave substance to the Third World through their own agency and transregional alliances, and that it provided the basis from whence other transregional categories such as Global South developed. The paradoxical relation between Third World, development, and dependence is further illustrated through the career and thinking of Walter Rodney.

The final chapter of this section takes up the division of knowledge production in allegedly separated ‘worlds’ in order to substantiate the failure of colonial and Cold War academic knowledge. Putting the Non-Aligned Movement and its inherent thwarting of colonial and Cold War divisions of the world centre stage, Christopher J. Lee invokes that a range of transregionalisms (Afro-Asianism, Tricontinentalism, pan-Africanism, pan-Arabism, etc.), stemming from parts of the world academically covered by area studies, confronted the epistemological limitations of area studies. Paradoxically, the area studies were only beginning to be institutionalized as disciplines firmly entrenched in academia at about the same time. Likewise, the worldwide establishment of the nation-state as the principal spatial-political form of the post-colonial world order coincided with the spread of transregional movements defying that order.
This chapter discusses the construction, coexistence, and confrontation of multiple Atlantics over time and space. Historically, an Atlantic World came into being from the fifteenth century onwards, connecting regions, people, goods, and ideas in Europe, Africa, the Americas, and the Caribbean. Around the First World War, Atlantic history and Atlantic studies emerged as an intercontinental form of area studies. The emergence of Atlantic Worlds and the rise of Atlantic studies as a subject were intricately connected to pan-African, Cold War, and South–South relations, making it a prime example of transregional dynamics.

Historians of the Atlantic World claim that between the 1400s and the 1800s a new world emerged. It connected people, knowledge, and goods on a scale previously not known in these parts of the world. Bernard Bailyn, one of the most prominent exponents of Atlantic history today, holds that ‘experiences in the Atlantic realm – in trade, in governance, in social and cultural life – were . . . essentially different from those elsewhere on the globe’; the early modern Atlantic World had ‘distinctive characteristics that shaped the course of world history’ (Bailyn 2009: 4). Other scholars call the early modern Atlantic World ‘the first global imperial age’ (Bayly 2004: 42, 44–5). Is this alleged ‘essential difference’ indeed one with the rest of the world or, rather, with previous times in all regions concerned?

From the 1400s onwards, Europeans entered ‘a maritime sphere without competition – without the adversaries of the eastern oceans: Arabs, Chinese, Malays, and other maritime traders and pirates’ (Bailyn 2009: 6), and thus opened up a new Atlantic World. The reorientation of pre-existing slave markets in West Africa was foundational to the construction of this Atlantic World (Thornton 1992). Between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, more than 12 million Africans were transported to the West Indies and the Americas. Beginning in the early sixteenth century, frequently guided or aided by indigenous allies, Europeans destroyed powerful Native American empires such as the Aztec and the Inca. Imported European pathogens were a major player in the destruction of indigenous populations, environments, and cultures. In contrast to European expansion in the East, most colonial empires established in the West were settlement colonies or colonial schemes where Native Americans and Africans were, to a large extent, integrated into imperial systems. Forced and voluntary migrations induced by European expansion in the Atlantic World produced mobility on a scale previously unknown in the early modern period (e.g. Wokeck 1999; Lehmann, Wellenreuther and Wilson 2000). Colonization, slavery, indentured servants, as well as the exchange of agricultural and botanical
knowledge and goods sparked new developments in the sciences (e.g. Parrish 2006; Delbourgo and Dew 2008; Saifer 2008); shaped European and indigenous consumer habits; and fostered proto-industrial processes of production, first in slave plantation societies in the Caribbean.

From the nineteenth century onwards, the Atlantic World, due to increasing interconnectedness with other parts of the world, became a less coherent space. The historical Atlantic World disintegrated in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as ‘globalization really took off’ (O’Brien 2006: 11). At the same time, fragmentation grew with the rise of more powerful nation-states in Europe and independence movements in the Americas. The Atlantic Revolutions fostered the end of the early modern Atlantic World (Bender 2007: xx; Canny and Morgan 2011: 13–17; see also O’Rourke and Williamson 2002, 2004).

Atlantic studies emerged in the early twentieth century, as symbolized by the statement by journalist Walter Lippmann in The New Republic that the United States (US) had to ‘fight for . . . the common interest of the western world, for the integrity of the Atlantic Powers’ (Lippmann 17 February 1917: 60). In 1917, the latter excluded Germany. After the Second World War, in 1961, the Atlantic Council of the US was founded. Established to forge and tie together a ‘pan-Atlantic power elite’ (Bailyn 2005: 10) of politicians, military leaders, journalists, bankers, academics, and others, the Atlantic Council promoted the Atlantic community as ‘historical civilized communities’, ‘Western Civilization’, and the ‘free world’ (Bailyn 2005: 8–10, 12). Through the Enlightenment and the American and French Revolutions, the North Atlantic area had become a space impregnated by freedom and democracy – so the story went. In the twentieth century, these auto-ascribed values had to be protected against a world under control of its enemies: communism and socialism. Historians on both sides of the Atlantic helped promote these ideas: for instance, French historian Jacques Godechot with his Histoire de l’Atlantique (1947) and US historian Robert Palmer in his The Age of the Democratic Revolution (1959–64). Other historians such as Pierre and Huguette Chaunu or Charles Verlinden joined the chorus of historians celebrating the emergence of Atlantic or Western civilization (Bailyn 2005: 15–30; Canny 2018 [forthcoming]).

Atlantic studies and Atlantic history, as its early modern predecessor, have more often than not been accused of prioritizing the North Atlantic, that is to say those nations that make up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and of treating the ‘South Atlantic (Africa, the Caribbean, and South America) . . . at best as a junior partner in Atlantic history as well as in the alliance’ (Bender 2007: xvii). Already by the late eighteenth century, black intellectuals have been aware of African Americans’ or the African diaspora’s transnational and Atlantic history, continued through the Harlem Renaissance, pan-African ideas up to the African-American civil rights movement. However, historians of the ‘early Americas’ – the period from 1492 to 1776 – conceived of their nations’ history in its Atlantic transnational and transregional dimensions mainly from the 1960s onwards (Cañizares-Esguerra and Seeman 2007: xxiii–xxiv). The ideological baggage of Atlantic history and Atlantic studies remains persistent today. Hubs of economic, social, and cultural change, such as the Caribbean in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, are still not studied to the same extent as the so-called British Atlantic and Britain’s North American colonies. While the latter might have become more important in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – especially considering commerce and trade – major changes in the economy and in Atlantic societies took place much earlier and not in the North Atlantic area but, rather, in the South Atlantic.

The concept of Atlantic studies became challenged from within. Early modern studies on the Atlantic slave trade, Atlantic economies, and the Atlantic Revolutions made clear that the Atlantic World had emerged from slavery and violence against Africans, American indigenous people, and – to a lesser extent – Europeans, rather than from ideas of freedom and democracy (Bailyn 2005: 32–4; Canny and Morgan 2011: 7; Canny 2018 [forthcoming]). From the 1960s
onwards, historians Bernard Bailyn and Jack P. Greene developed an approach to the Atlantic World with the aim to move beyond justifying Cold War connections and its historical predecessors (Greene and Morgan 2009: 3).

Multiple Atlantics emerged in the same period with studies on the Spanish and Portuguese Atlantic empires and their economies (e.g. Chaunu 1955–9), as well as with studies on African slavery (e.g. Eltis and Jennings 1988). Since that time, historians have researched imperial Atlantics such as the Portuguese (e.g. Russell-Wood 1992; Paquette 2014), Spanish (e.g. Elliott 2006), English/British (e.g. Armitage and Braddock 2009), French (e.g. Havard and Vidal 2003), and Dutch (e.g. Israel 1989; Emmer and Klooster 1999). The Black Atlantic – with its focus on slavery, slave trade, slave societies, and the middle passage – became a major theme in Atlantic history (e.g. Eltis and Jennings 1988; Thornton 1992; Gilroy 1993). More recent research has emphasized how much the Atlantic slave trade depended on African rulers and their willingness to sell slaves from the continent’s interior to European merchants (e.g. Heywood and Thornton 2007). Other researchers have focused on slave societies in the Caribbean and the Americas and how they brought about ethnogenesis, racial consciousness, African-American cultures, and diasporas (Canny and Morgan 2011: 4–5). The Black Atlantic is intricately connected with the Atlantic of commerce and trade, where national and imperial boundaries barely played a role (e.g. Hancock 1997; Canny and Morgan 2011: 10–11). More recently, a Red Atlantic has been talked about, which incorporates the development of indigenous American cultures and societies during the second millennium in a Native American perspective (Restall, Sousa and Terraciano 2005; Weaver 2014). Other scholars have become increasingly concerned with what we might want to call the Atlantic from below, that is to say the history of ordinary seamen, pirates, creoles, and maroons (e.g. Rediker 1987). Some have studied the Green Atlantic, that being the migration of the Irish to the Americas (Griffin 2001). Other Atlantics transcend imperial and national boundaries, for example the Catholic Atlantic with its local, translocal, and global networks established by Franciscan friars or the Jesuits (e.g. Greer and Mills 2006), or the Protestant Atlantics of the Moravian brothers, Halle Pietists, or Quaker communities, which – as much as Catholic orders – had local, translocal, and global interconnections, interdependencies, and interactions as well (e.g. Carte-Engel 2009; Wellenreuther, Müller-Bahlke and Roeber 2013). There is also a Sephardic Jewish Atlantic, which shows how the Portuguese diaspora shaped the Atlantic World and became ‘agents and victims of empire’ (Israel 2002: 1; Kagan and Morgan 2008). For most of these Atlantics, it is obvious that they were neither homogeneous nor self-contained. Many had multiple transregional dimensions, some even on a global scale (Cañizares-Esguerra and Seeman 2007; Morgan 2014, 2018).

Without explicitly using the concept, many historians of the Atlantic World interpret the latter as a trans-region. They emphasize that the Atlantic World was never entirely autonomous, never wholly discrete, self-enclosed, or isolated from the rest of the globe. In every major area – economic, cultural, political – there were extra-regional contacts, other worlds ‘impinging on and often shaping developments’ in the Atlantic world. The question is not whether Europeans, Americans, and Africans had contacts and involvements in other regions of the globe – of course they did – or even whether those extra-Atlantic links did not at times significantly affect the West. How could they not?

(Bailyn 2009: 3–4, see also Greene and Morgan 2009: 6)

Bailyn goes on questioning ‘whether experiences in the Atlantic realm were not essentially different from those elsewhere on the globe’ (Bailyn 2009: 4), a question that can only be properly addressed if other parts of the world and all parts of the Atlantic are seriously taken into consideration.
Atlantic history did not start out with a coherent concept of space, enquiry, or methodology. As Bailyn writes, Atlantic history ‘emerged from a plethora of scattered, localized studies and casual terminology to become a defined subject’, and ‘the Atlantic region [can be considered] as a coherent whole’ in which ‘otherwise limited, local studies gain heightened meaning at a more general plane of significance’ (Bailyn 2009: 1–2). Coming from this ‘very set of localized studies’, Atlantic historians suffered ‘from a shock of recognition, as population we assumed to be insular, and whose events we therefore explained in terms of local dynamics, are revealed to be above-water fragments of . . . submarine unities’ (Putnam 2006: 617). Atlantic history, therefore, is about putting together, linking, and comparing pieces of an ever-growing jigsaw, which in turn helps us to understand processes of change – of crucial change – in a very dynamic area of the world, that is to say of the Atlantic between 1400 and approximately the beginning of the nineteenth century. Atlantic history ‘is still emerging – shifting, quickly moving, and responsive to the impact of new information’ (Bailyn 2009: 2).

Atlantic history today is, as I have demonstrated, an organizing concept for the study of the Atlantic Ocean rim. It emphasizes interregional and international comparisons and draws attention to historical phenomena that transcended national borders and thwarted continental divisions. It is the history of discoveries; of the building of overseas empires such as the Spanish, the Portuguese, the first British, and the French; of migrations, including the forced migrations of African slaves; of new and old economies; of the so-called Atlantic Revolutions and nation-building; of the exchange of knowledge, mentalities, and goods; and of perceptions. Furthermore, Atlantic history is about the effects all of this had on peoples, societies, politics, economies, the environment, and cultures. Change in the Atlantic World not only had repercussions in a circum-Atlantic perspective but also for the hinterland. Change in the Atlantic World was also brought about by regions that were not, or only loosely, connected to it. Atlantic history analyses innovations, transportation, media, knowledge-building processes, ideologies, identities, and discourses. The field of Atlantic studies has been very productive for about a generation now. It has produced original studies, new ways of looking at familiar objects, and tools for examining objects hitherto overlooked by traditional, nation-centred historiographies. Additionally, there has been much methodological reflection. The field of Atlantic history, accordingly, is vast and ever-increasing (Lachenicht 2014: 9; Morgan 2014, 2018 [forthcoming]).

Considering the breadth of Atlantic history, it responds – in theory – rather well to the challenges of ‘increasing interconnectedness and persistent inequalities’, at least for the early modern period. It is tempting to believe that the genesis, concept, and methods used in Atlantic history could serve as a model for modern area studies. As an ‘open concept’, with its claims of ““horizontal”, trans-national, trans-imperial, and multicultural views’ (Bailyn 2009: 2), it invites researchers to move beyond the Atlantic World and apply ‘Atlantic ways’ of enquiry and analysis to other world regions or other areas in different time periods.

A closer look at Atlantic history, however, reveals a set of six interrelated problems that have to be overcome. First, a large number of studies up to the present day still focus on the British Atlantic. The French and Dutch Atlantics have drawn much attention to their empires as well; the Spanish and Portuguese attract more and more scholars, for example as the applications of North American and European PhD students to the Summer Academy of Atlantic History clearly indicate (see www.fruhe-neuzeit.uni-bayreuth.de/de/tagungen-workshops/Summer-Academy-of-Atlantic-History/index.html). That being said, the South Atlantic is not yet fully integrated into Atlantic history, and South–South connections still lack the scholarly focus they deserve.

Second, imperial history is much in vogue. Of course, imperial history is of interest for Atlantic studies, yet scholars of imperial and national histories often neglect links and connections between and within the different Atlantics. The history of empires and nation-states
Multiple Atlantics

cannot be written without looking at transnational interactions, interconnectedness, and inter-
dependencies (Bender 2007: xviii).

Third, many studies in Atlantic history are less interdisciplinary than their research topic
would require them to be. For example, scholars studying colonial bodies are lacking medicinal
or literary studies knowledge, as well as theory and methodology; scholars of religious minori-
ties need more economic or theological expertise. Atlantic history has to open up more to other
disciplines such as medicine, botany, literature studies, geography, musicology, anthropology,
ethnology, architecture, and others in order to understand the scope of change occurring within
the early modern Atlantic World.

Fourth, questions of whether people of the Atlantic World thought of themselves as being
part of one Atlantic World have rarely been addressed. Greene and Morgan have called the
Atlantic World an ‘anachronistic concept’ (2009: 8). They rightly claim that studies must look
for ‘contemporary connotations’ and ‘early modern interactions’, and distinguish between
‘early modern understandings’ and ‘modern cultural constructions’ (2009: 8). Historians of the
Atlantic World need to become more aware of their historical subjects’ own perspective. For
people of the Atlantic World, for example Native Americans, the Atlantic World might have
mattered less than other concepts of space, areas, and belonging. Atlantic historians have to be
careful not to define areas from their own historical and geopolitical – more often than not
Eurocentric – perspective. Scholarly definitions of areas and regions often have little to do with
areas, centres and peripheries, or boundaries and frontiers as defined and lived by the people we
are studying (Gould 2007; Lachenicht 2014).

Fifth, Atlantic history claims to be geographically open. Notwithstanding, only more
recent studies have brought together the different regions that formed European empires (e.g.
Bowen, Mancke, and Reid 2012), and very few studies have drawn comparisons between
empires, both within the Atlantic World (e.g. Elliott 2006) and with continental empires such
as the Habsburg or Russian (O’Reilly 2002; Lachenicht 2016). Moreover, although studies
on African, American, and European hinterlands increase in numbers, we need more research
on the linkages between peoples, knowledge, and goods of the Atlantic World with peoples,
knowledge, and goods of other world regions, and how they affected each other (e.g. essays in
Kupperman 2012; Lachenicht 2014). This should by all means not foster new hierarchies that
understand, for example, other world regions solely as hinterlands of the Atlantic World.

Finally, comparisons between non-European expansions or European expansion to the east
and the European expansion in the Atlantic World have seldom been drawn. They might,
however, challenge or confirm the alleged uniqueness of the Atlantic experience.

Finding out what – if anything – was essentially different in the Atlantic Worlds requires not
only the further elaboration of inspiring research on multiple Atlantics but, equally, to over-
come this cluster of challenges.

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This chapter, based on a brief overview of approaches in Indian Ocean studies, depicts the Indian Ocean world as a historical and epistemological trans-region, as a space of transfers between and transformations of regions, and as an area that transcends its confines. In so doing, the Indian Ocean serves as an entry point for applying different transregional perspectives.

**The Indian Ocean: historically connected**

Although this chapter primarily deals with the academic field of Indian Ocean studies, it is important first to introduce the Indian Ocean world as a naturally and historically integrated space. Despite its vast extent, the Indian Ocean world for a very long time has shown signs of intense integration.

In the realms of religion, trade, mobility, and politics, the connectedness across this ocean has a time-depth of several millennia, unprecedented on this scale in the world. In a topical way of addressing the history of the Indian Ocean world, Gwyn Campbell’s (2016) focus on human–environment interactions indicates that scholars consider the Indian Ocean world as a space that is, at least partly, given or codetermined by nature. The research focus on the dynamics of such interactions is new, but structurally the role of the monsoons and ocean currents – which have allowed the ocean to be navigated since time immemorial – is an environmental feature figuring prominently in most seminal writings about the Indian Ocean.

Considering that navigating the ocean not only requires winds and currents but also technology and infrastructure, it comes as no surprise that this is a prominent research theme in Indian Ocean studies. Whether *dhow* sailing ships and navigation skills, Zheng He’s expeditions and the gunpowder-armed vessels of Dutch and British companies, steamships, the Suez Canal, or global airport hubs, technology and infrastructure are omnipresent when trying to make sense of the Indian Ocean world (Parkin and Barnes 2002; Gilbert 2004; Liu, Chen and Blue 2014). The focus on maritime technology and infrastructure is part of a long-lasting tendency to prioritize maritime history in Indian Ocean studies, to which I will return in the next section.

Equally relevant to grasp the unity of the Indian Ocean world are ideology and institutions, which likewise figure prominently in Indian Ocean studies. Buddhism and Islam as well as the East India companies and colonial rule, including their respective legal norms, all to
some extent created and held together different Indian Ocean worlds (Risso 1995; Pearson 2003; Vink 2015). The integration of these Indian Ocean worlds – in itself and globally – built upon the material, technological, and natural ‘world of the possible’, and took shape through movements of people, goods, and ideas. These movements should not be understood as simple transportation from A to B, but also as a process of translation and negotiation. Such a process alters the goods, people, and ideas being moved, and influences the origin, the destination, and the character of the movement itself. Not only the places concerned are transformed, but also how they relate to each other (Ghosh and Mukherjee 2016).

The mobility of people, goods, and ideas in its own right, and migration in particular, are vital for Indian Ocean history. This includes, among others, travelling merchants, itinerant scholars, traded slaves, and (indentured) labour migrants (de Silva Jayasuriya and Pankhurst 2003; Aslanian 2011; Machado 2014). Being primarily concentrated in a number of port towns around the ocean, the academic focus on mobility led to a special interest in urban centres. Relevant in this regard are not only ‘global’ port towns such as Mumbai, Kolkata, Singapore, Jakarta, Mombasa, and Cape Town, but also many smaller towns and cities that lost importance in the course of history (Worden 2007; Hall 2008). Even places such as San Francisco or Bradford are migrant destinations within this scheme, taking the Indian Ocean world well beyond its physical coastlines.

Although research about mobility and migration often focuses on numbers, trajectories, and societal dimensions, the creation of a transregional Indian Ocean world is also the product of creativity, memory, and imagination. Diaspora communities imagine their connected world through rituals, sports, culinary habits, as well as different kinds of writing (e.g. songs, memoirs, and letters). Along these lines, biographical approaches and research based on personal writings have gained importance in Indian Ocean studies (Ho 2006; Larson 2009; Hofmeyr 2010; Anderson 2012; Ali 2016).

In addition, novelists from the area (or from elsewhere) have contributed to the imagination of an Indian Ocean world by writing it into (literary or literal) existence. Amitav Ghosh and V.S. Naipaul are examples of authors who have done so. Ghosh has written from the area about the area, paying attention to peripheries and the ‘transes’: transportation, transformation, transfer, and transcendence (Hofmeyr 2010; Machado 2016). Naipaul, on the other hand, already wrote from the trans-area. As an exponent of an Indian Ocean world reaching into the ‘West Indies’ (used here for rhetorical purposes), Naipaul, in his novel *A Bend in the River*, describes a transregional world where the Indian and Atlantic oceans meet over land. The African town in his book is based on the Congolese town of Stanleyville/Kisangani in the 1960s, and thereby depicts a historically accurate transregional reality. These authors represent and imagine an Indian Ocean world as a connecting referential, which, as the lived world of their protagonists, is one and all-encompassing.

All of this makes it reasonable to consider the Indian Ocean as historically connected. However, does adopting the Indian Ocean itself as a frame of analysis sufficiently provide a transregional perspective, or is the Indian Ocean world just a region of another kind, which incidentally happens to be maritime? In order to tackle this question, it is worthwhile to look at the academic activities subsumed under Indian Ocean studies.

**Indian Ocean studies: an epistemological trans-area**

Indian Ocean studies shows features of an established area studies while at the same time remaining unsettled, both as far as the ‘area’ and the ‘discipline’ are concerned. Gradually, Indian Ocean studies is being institutionalized into an academic field of its own. It is showing
signs of academic discipline-building in the form of associations, networks and their events, journals, book series, and handbooks (e.g. the Routledge Indian Ocean series), study programmes, and professorships. Furthermore, if not an own methodology, then at least some dominant or innovative approaches characterize the field of study (see below). At the same time, Indian Ocean studies connects with and provides bridges between disciplines and more established area studies.

Literary studies scholar Isabel Hofmeyr (2012) makes sense of Indian Ocean studies as a relevant example of post-area studies scholarship. Adopting an Indian Ocean studies perspective makes networks and connections visible beyond the epistemological templates and territorial confines of nation-states as well as beyond the conventional areas of area studies. Thus, it enables transnational and transregional comparative research to be carried out within the Global South. Markus Vink makes a plea to move away from relative immobile, essentializing 'trait geographies' – values, languages, material practices, ecological adaptations, marriage patterns, and the like – towards 'process geographies' with various kinds of action, interaction, and motion... in which regions can be conceptualized as both dynamic and interconnected. (2007: 52)

Sugata Bose (2006) ventures beyond the shores of the Indian Ocean, piecing together interdependence around this ocean in economic, political, itinerant, imaginary, and literary terms. As mentioned before, Campbell stresses the importance of human–environment interactions in order to understand the history of the Indian Ocean world, thereby both underpinning its interconnectedness and transcending its confines. This ‘environmental turn’ upsets the delimitations of areas as well as the question of spatial and temporal scale in Indian Ocean studies. The interrelation between large-scale climatologic, oceanographic, or geomorphological phenomena, on the one hand, and the haphazard occurrence of natural catastrophes, the local histories of human and animal behaviour, and the micro-histories of events, on the other, are often at odds with geopolitical divisions of the world in regions. Adopting an Indian Ocean perspective thus entails transcending it, looking at relations between areas of different kinds, and challenging the confines of areas as well as confining areas as such.

Hofmeyr’s argument is not false per se. Indian Ocean studies is indeed building on area studies legacies, and some leading Indian Ocean scholars indeed want to move beyond such legacies. One example has been the invitation to ‘challenge conventional temporal (e.g. “early modern”) and “area studies” paradigms’ in a call for papers for the inaugural issue of the Journal of Indian Ocean World Studies. Indian Ocean studies departs from a contained understanding of area by dissipating a clear delineation of the space under scrutiny. Whereas coastal confines might seem as clear a delimitation as one can get, Indian Ocean studies, in practice, primarily focuses on land. This includes islands, coasts, as well as hinterlands – which, as Vink and Bose argue, can go as far as the ‘process geographies’ or their interdependence reach. Epistemologically, Indian Ocean studies scholars perpetuate the area studies’ multi-disciplinary character and its empirical ‘long-term commitment to place’ (Guyer 2004), while at the same time adopting and developing approaches that go beyond area studies. Post-area studies seems an appropriate characterization for all of this.

Nevertheless, it is more illuminating to understand this approach as an example of trans–area (or transregional) studies than one of post-area studies. Being tributary to area studies can just as well entail a mission of enhancing area studies and inviting area studies scholars, rather than getting beyond – that is to say, ‘post’ – area studies. This chapter evokes the emergence of an
Indian Ocean worlds

academic field that connects, transforms, and transcends regions, and develops a perspective that draws on sundry disciplinary influences.

The ambivalent relation between Indian Ocean studies and area studies

Several pioneers in the field did not originate from area studies, having developed their interest in the Indian Ocean world within the research tradition of early modern maritime and mercantile history. In order to reconstruct the genealogy of Indian Ocean studies, the historiography of Portuguese explorations, the Dutch and British East Indian Companies, and South Asian port towns and trading regions are as relevant as area studies legacies. Paradoxically, while the Indian subcontinent was central to research on the Indian Ocean, that ocean remained marginal in South Asian studies (Arasaratnam 1990).

The flip side of the relative lack of interest within ‘terrestrial’ area studies was Indian Ocean studies’ preferential orientation toward the sea and the focus on the insular and the littoral at the expense of relations with landed empires and state formation (Risso 1995; Pearson 2003). For a long time, South and Southeast Asian ‘hinterlands’ were primarily a passive backdrop, and Africa and China were all but absent from Indian Ocean studies. It is, in this regard, remarkable that an African studies scholar made an early plea for more research taking the Indian Ocean world as a cohesive unit of analysis (Alpers 1976). The relation between Indian Ocean studies and area studies is ambivalent, at the very least.

Kirti N. Chaudhuri (1985) and Philip D. Curtin (1984) wrote seminal works for the field of Indian Ocean studies. Both were less concerned with linking up with Asian or African area studies than with adopting a world history perspective, and this global orientation of Indian Ocean studies remains prevalent today (Alpers 2014). Curtin’s book, *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History*, includes chapters on different periods and parts of the world, including several chapters about maritime trade across the Indian Ocean. Although he treats maritime and over-land trade separately and does not systematically connect African, Indian Ocean, and Central Asian trade systems, his effort is global in scope. As a scholar of African and Atlantic history, he sheds light on the Indian Ocean world and focuses on the entanglement of culture and commerce. This makes his effort transregional, regarding both his own academic trajectory and his empirical combination of areas and thematic angles. As a matter of fact, Indian Ocean studies often draws heuristic inspiration from dominant themes in Atlantic studies, in particular from research on the slave trade and diasporas (Alpers 2000; de Silva Jayasuriya and Pankhurst 2003; Campbell 2004; Mann 2011; Harms, Freamon and Blight 2013; Allen 2014).

Other transregional sources of inspiration are equally important. In his *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean*, Chaudhuri draws directly from Fernand Braudel’s *méditerranée* focus on different temporalities or modes of historical time, on the dynamics between micro-analysis and vast spatial entities, and on a holistic approach to different dimensions of life. Following Braudel’s example, Chaudhuri analyses the Indian Ocean as a historical unity in its temporal, cultural, social, and economic dimensions. Both building on and dissociating from his background in the above-mentioned mercantile and maritime history of early modern times, he thus contextualizes and relativizes the role of European trading empires and companies. He attaches due importance to the natural environment of the Indian Ocean; to long-term political, cultural, and commercial histories of the area; to institutions and technology; and to the rise of Islam in particular. Within this context, he still pays substantial attention to the European seafaring empires and enterprises, which had hitherto dominated most of the literature on the macro level of the ocean. The link between the mercantile and maritime approaches, on the one hand,
and culture and civilization, on the other, provided the opportunity to integrate Indian Ocean studies and the surrounding landed area studies. This obviously does not mean that there had not been research on maritime cultures and societies in relation to the ocean before. What was new was the decolonization of Indian Ocean studies. The separation was overcome between colonial history approaches to Portuguese, Dutch, and British trade and rule in the Indian Ocean basin, on the one hand, and ethnographic or area studies research about people and places in distinct areas around that ocean, on the other (McPherson 1993; Sheriff and Ho 2014). In this regard, Indian Ocean studies transcended and transformed discrete regions and fields of knowledge production well before it could reasonably be interpreted as post-area studies.

The decolonization of Indian Ocean studies

Islam occupies a special position in this transition of Indian Ocean studies. It is a transition from an arena of colonization and commercial integration to a ‘world’ that was home to cultures or civilizations on and around that ocean. The history of Islam and the Indian Ocean can be told according to both these narratives. The Islamization of large parts of the Indian Ocean world can be understood as a hegemony in its own right, in much the same vein as how European colonial rulers understood their own domination during the second half of the past millennium. However, the Islamization around the Indian Ocean was as much driven from within as it was imposed from outside.

For Chaudhuri (1985, 1990), the rise of Islam was a decisive caesura in his analysis of an integrated Indian Ocean world. Equally drawing on Braudel and on world-systems analysis, Janet L. Abu-Lughod (1991) makes a case for an Islamic world-system around the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea ‘before European hegemony’. Thus, both Chauduri and Abu-Lughod analyse the Islamic Indian Ocean on the same macro level as the histories of European colonialism and capitalism; however, the agency lay with people and polities from the Indian Ocean world, who would typically be studied by area studies scholars. The transregional character of Indian Ocean studies here lies in the interface it provides between different area studies and between micro and macro, thereby considerably tempering the allegedly demiurgic role of Europe.

Patricia Risso (1995) takes the interplay of Muslim trade and religion in the Indian Ocean as a starting point. She comes to the conclusion that the Indian Ocean system was primarily littoral, functioning largely in parallel to the great Islamic land-based empires, which received the bulk of the research attention in area studies. Around the ocean, Islam was ‘a unifying, but not uniform, culture’ (Risso 1995: 106), meaning that Islam did spread, but not in a diffusionist way: in the process, Islam adapted to local circumstances and the cultures around the ocean modified in response to the increased entanglements. Her work thus illustrates the transregional character of Indian Ocean studies, as it addresses transfers across the ocean, transcends regional frames of reference, and transforms a conception of areas that used to give priority to landed empires at the expense of supposedly peripheral littoral zones. At the same time, though, the Indian Ocean world is conceived as a new area, vaguely ending where the littoral fades out into the land.

There is an inherent tension in decolonized Indian Ocean studies, oscillating between the establishment of a maritime area studies, including the insular and littoral lands around the basin, and transcending regional containers altogether. Abdul Sheriff (1987) finds an empirical way out of this paradox by shifting the scales of analysis between Zanzibar, East and Central Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the capitalist world-system during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A detailed local analysis of Zanzibar’s political economy allowed him to explain both the central position of the island and town within the Western Indian Ocean world – resolutely
including East Africa – as well as its increasingly peripheral position within the capitalist world-system. His research was possible because he deliberately chose not to assess local, regional, and global levels as discrete spatial scales, but as mutually constitutive. ‘Constantly shifting the scale of analysis from the most spatially specific . . . to the most spatially diffuse’ (Cooper 1994: 1539), Sheriff’s work thus belongs to African, Indian Ocean, urban, Arab (Omani), as well as global studies, but above all it thwarts the supposed divisions evoked by these distinct academic fields.

Two decades later, Jeremy Prestholdt (2008) made the reverse exercise, demonstrating how East African consumers were not merely on the receiving end of globalization, and instead that their preferences affected production and patterns of distribution around the globe. More than just transporting consumer goods, an actual cultural transfer took place, including a negotiation and translation process. Not only did Zanzibaris consume products from global markets, they also influenced production and gave local-annex-global meaning, thus altering the product and the places of origin and destination.

Post-colonial studies and Indian Ocean studies

As mentioned before, India occupies a central position in Indian Ocean studies as well. This is not only true empirically, but also when it comes to the transregional epistemological impulses stemming from subaltern and post-colonial studies (on subaltern studies, see Chapter 13 by Lee; on post-colonial studies, see Chapter 68 by Watson). At about the same time Indian Ocean studies was ‘decolonized’, the colonial imprint of knowledge production more generally was being heavily critiqued. As can be read elsewhere in this handbook, Indian scholars played, and continue to play, a crucial role in the formulation of this critique. The subaltern studies critique on the perseverance of colonial cognitive schemes and power asymmetries in Indian national(ist) historiography was initially formulated within a strictly Indian frame of reference, largely ignoring the almost simultaneous decolonization of Indian Ocean studies (Guha 1982). Subaltern studies and more broadly post-colonial studies were picked up in academia worldwide, transcending its Indian area of origin, and transforming knowledge production globally.

The above quote from Frederick Cooper, for instance, comes from a 1994 special issue of the American Historical Review discussing the influence of the Indian school of subaltern studies on colonial history and post-colonial historiography in India, Africa, and Latin America. However, despite the thoroughly transregional character of both post-colonial and Indian Ocean studies, the strands developed independently of one another. The linking of Indian Ocean studies with area studies around the ocean was redundant for the fundamental critique on the continued colonial knowledge production in academia in general.

Indeed, Indian Ocean studies was transregional rather than post-area. However, post-colonialism did influence Indian Ocean studies and became particularly prominent in literary and cultural studies. This helps explain why the characterization of Hofmeyr’s own discipline as post-area studies may be appropriate after all, albeit indicating that post-colonial studies has been productively applied to Indian Ocean studies, rather than showing that Indian Ocean studies would intrinsically be post-area studies.

Select bibliography

This chapter explores the ‘Pacific’ as an inhabited, geographically conceptualized, historicized, academically scrutinized, and imagined space and investigates how these ideas shape research within the history of knowledge and science. In recent years, historians of science have applied the transregional paradigm by following people, ideas, and instruments as they move across regional and national borders as well as across continents and bodies of water. Science is interpreted as the result of interactive practices, which are exercised simultaneously at specific sites and within asymmetrical global networks. Rather than presenting a comprehensive history of ‘the scientific Pacific’, this chapter considers discussions about the encounters, creation, and circulation of knowledge within a (post-)colonial framework and within Pacific histories.

Definitions and research institutions

Apart from the fact that the concept of the ‘Pacific’ as a cohesive unit is a European invention that resulted from Ferdinand Magellan’s circumvention, the range of definitions of Pacific regions reveals multiple understandings. The ‘Pacific Rim’, emerging from policy discourse in the 1950s, includes East Asia, mainly China, Japan, and Korea, and often implies a Californian perspective gazing across the ocean (Borofsky 2000: 25; Gulliver 2011: 84). Others add America’s West Coast to their understanding of ‘Rim’ (Ward 1989: 242). ‘Asia-Pacific’ can be used synonymously with ‘Asia’, though at times it encompasses Australia or the North American West Coast, leaving western and central Asia out. Oceania can mean the Pacific Islands, which are made up of Micronesia, Melanesia, and Polynesia, and it can also include Australia and New Zealand (Gulliver 2011: 86).

To a certain degree, definitions of geographical areas reflect institutional and historical fault lines: The scholarship on Pacific history is fragmented in terms of methodology, analytical conceptualization, and regional segmentation. Whereas academic institutions in Oceania, most notably in Canberra and Hawai‘i, include Polynesia, Micronesia, and Melanesia as inhabited by Pacific Islanders and belonging to the ‘Pacific’, North Americans, especially in California, tend to connect the west coast of the United States with the ‘Pacific Rim’ of East Asia.
Knowledge in the Pacific

2000: 25). These three Pacific powerhouses each have established publishing outlets that, to some extent, mirror this geographical and methodological framing of the Pacific: The Australian National University’s *Journal of Pacific History*, the University of Hawai‘i by means of its university press, and the University of California Press’ *Pacific Historical Review*, which advances an understanding of the Pacific as a continuation of the American frontier (Armitage and Bashford 2014: 11–13).

Additionally, there is a Euro-American perspective, which has produced a historiography on ocean crossings through discoverers, adventurers, missionaries, military men, scientists, traders, and migrants, with a focus on histories of empire in relation to the Pacific. However, these Euro-American narratives have been challenged by academics who follow a methodology that entails ‘thinking outward from Islanders’ (Matsuda 2006: 759) and their respective oceanic cultures. These scholars’ emphasis lies on anthropological approaches and they have, in general, thematic interests in sovereignty, culture, and local knowledge (Matsuda 2006: 759). Investigating, for example, traditional dance or tattoos to access performed and embodied histories can make Pacific history go beyond received epistemologies based on archival work (Matsuda 2017). Epeli Hau’ofa’s *Our Sea of Islands* most forcefully undermined ‘derogatory and belittling’ (1994: 148) Western imaginations of oceanic minuteness, dependency, or disconnection by means of his post-colonial perspective on the richness of oceanic cultures: Pacific Islanders shared entangled histories of seafaring, kinship, and ancestry long before Captain Cook’s imperial endeavours in the second half of the eighteenth century (Hau’ofa 1994).

**Writing Pacific histories into a global space: a new thalassology**

Recently, some scholars of the Pacific have been aligning their work with the ‘new thalassology’ in historiography. This methodological approach explains history in terms of large areas of water, one that comprises movements across rims and basins, littoral interactions, and beachcombers’ adventures. Taking inspiration from the work of early thalassologist Fernand Braudel, the Indian and Atlantic Oceans have sparked a new epistemology of transnational, world, and global histories. In the same vein, David Armitage and Alison Bashford emphatically and controversially propose a ‘new thalassology’ in the case of the Pacific with their edited volume, *Pacific Histories: Ocean, Land, People* (2014). Armitage, who specializes in the British Atlantic, and Bashford use Atlantic historiography as a backdrop against which the ‘Pacific’ can be encountered by historians and thereby sewn into global history (Armitage and Bashford 2014). *Pacific Histories* aims, first, to locate Pacific history in global history by means of a new thalassology; second, to reconfigure Pacific history; and third, to test the applicability of the analytical unit ‘Pacific Worlds’ (Armitage and Bashford 2015: 238). In order to achieve this reconfiguration of the Pacific, they included authors that have a wide range of expertise from oceanic and Pacific Islander studies to the history of empire. Accordingly, in relation to the third goal, *Pacific Histories* relies on Matt Matsuda’s analytical concept of ‘Pacific Worlds’ in his authoritative monograph – a tour de force that combines Pacific Island history with the Pacific Rim, thereby overcoming the ‘Islanders–rim dwellers’ dichotomy (Matsuda 2012).

With its attempt to weave together local cases with Pacific and global history, *Pacific Histories* stirred up some controversy. Some critics argued that the book was too regionally fragmented, not able to bridge the gap between the inner and the outer areas of the ocean, as well as entailed an explicit or implicit comparison to the Atlantic that could only fall short as it does not echo the ‘distinctive traditions of work in Australasia and the Island Pacific’ (Ballantyne 2015: 233). In their reply to this piece of criticism, Armitage and Bashford argued that the thalassological and global turn in Pacific studies is here to stay (Armitage and Bashford 2015: 239). Other
authors, including Katrina Gulliver and Damon Salesa, paved the way for treating the history of the Pacific as a global history in its own right (Gulliver 2011; Salesa 2012). Matsuda shifted his notion of the Pacific over time from a more bottom-up perspective of the Pacific Islands (Matsuda 2006) to ‘Pacific Worlds’ where, in the manner of ‘trans-localism’ (Matsuda 2012: 5, original emphasis), multiple sites interconnect through history and ocean cultures. Most recently, in the concluding chapter in Pacific Histories, he states that the combination of all the diverse contributions together ‘illustrate globality’ (Matsuda cited in Armitage and Bashford 2014: 332). Islanders’ and Australasians’ scepticism toward global narratives stems from dismay over having been served old wine in new bottles, which is to say that historically the Pacific as a comprehensive unit results from European imagination.

From naming the Pacific to the age of empire

In the past, Europeans imagined the vast body of water that covers one-third of the globe’s surface – together with its approximately 25,000 islands, the environment that thrives and that is threatened, and the people that inhabit it – as a single space that was meant to be traversed. European Christian imagination declared the circumnavigation of the globe by the crew of the Portuguese seafarer Ferdinand Magellan – who died en route in the Philippines – and his crossing of the Pacific a ‘discovery’ in spite of the fact that ancient seafarers from the islands today conventionally called Polynesia had already established a triangular route between (and beyond) New Zealand, Rapa Nui/Easter Island, and Hawai‘i. Melanesian and Asian mariners also had cruised the waters of what today is referred to as the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, Mediterranean Jewish and Muslim Arab scholars as well as scholars from around the Indian Ocean had known about Pacific routes prior to Magellan’s adventure (Hoerder 2011: 28; Matsuda 2012: 3, 19, 55). In 1519, Magellan set sail in search of a western route to the Spice Islands while in the service of Spain. He pushed through a strait at the southern tip of Latin America, which thereafter would bear his name, into smooth, ‘pacified’ waters – hence the name ‘Pacific’.

However, Magellan’s descriptor was less grandiose than ‘South Sea’, a term that was generally used until James Cook’s three famous voyages between 1768 and 1779, after which the name ‘Pacific’ prevailed. ‘South Sea’ goes back to the Spanish explorer Vasco Núñez de Balboa, the first European documented to have seen the Pacific in 1513. Balboa had followed his fellow conquistadors to the New World to control and take advantage of the local populations and riches of the Tierra Firme that stretched across the northern coastline of South America. North of it lay what the Spanish referred to as the Mar del Norte, a geographical term that eventually was expanded to mean the entire Atlantic, as recorded in maps from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The native inhabitants of Tierra Firme enlightened Balboa about the vast waters beyond the region and when the Spanish imperialist went on an excursion farther south in search of treasures of gold, he arrived at the Bay of Panama, on the Pacific Rim. As the Mar del Norte was located at his back and he was looking out over the water in the south, Balboa called it the Mar del Sur – ‘South Sea’ (Peterson 2005).

Balboa’s sighting on the isthmus between the Atlantic and Pacific did not herald the beginning of European conquest and discovery that teleologically led to empire. On the contrary, European sailors up to the 1750s failed to carry the torch of supposed European scientific and civilizational dominance into the Pacific basin, and more often than not found themselves ill-fatedly drifting across the waters and in dire physical and mental conditions. These early European navigators depended on the skills and knowledge of Pacific populations, that is, if they were able to make contact with them at all. Europeans proved to be inept at finding or
maintaining contact with the major islands (for example, Polynesia); at the same time, they experienced limited engagement with the Asian side of the Pacific due to imposed entry restrictions on Westerners for security and trade reasons, and failed to maintain ties with Australia and New Zealand (Chaplin cited in Armitage and Bashford 2014: 53–4, 64). In the late 1500s and early 1600s, Álvaro de Mendaña de Neira and Pedro Fernández de Quirós initiated ‘contact’ with Islanders when they slaughtered inhabitants of the southern Marquesas Islands and in their colonizing attempts killed many in northern Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, and Santa Cruz, where they recorded their lengthiest visit of 47 days (Dening 1980: 9–11; Thomas 2010: 13).

In this period, up until the second half of the eighteenth century, additional Dutch, British, and Spanish seafarers navigated across the Pacific with infrequent encounters with Islanders. Some of these sailors had set out to discover a non-existent southern landmass, the so-called Terra Australis, which the Western imagination placed somewhere in the southern hemisphere.

As Nicholas Thomas points out, European narratives frame those experiences as ‘first contacts’; nevertheless, from the point of view of the natives, the confrontations were hardly the start of their history. Not only did the European adventurers fail to understand the Islanders, they also floundered when it came to the exact cartography of the area; their navigation tools failed them to the point that they were unable to relocate the islands (Thomas 2010: 13). Their subpar scientific knowledge about places and people reflects this time period of European non-empire in the Pacific. As European travellers simultaneously pursued their ambitions in the name of science on the old continent and the colonized areas of the world, they framed their expeditions between 1500 and 1800 within an awareness of a natural world that they intruded upon and attempted to understand by the means of science. The specificity of the Pacific, however, lies in the discrepancy between European scientific curiosity and social and imperial non-control over the peoples and environment (Chaplin cited in Armitage and Bashford 2014: 65). It was not until Samuel Wallis made the first official landfall at Tahiti in 1767 – with Louis-Antoine de Bougainville following on his heels – that Europeans were brought into lasting contact with the Islanders. It took France another 70 years to make the imperial claim more official in the form of sovereignty over Tahiti (Chaplin cited in Armitage and Bashford 2014: 53–4, 64). Yet the voyages of Wallis, John Byron, James Cook, George Vancouver, and additional French and Spanish explorers between the 1760s and the early 1790s introduced a new epoch of engagement with Polynesian peoples, science, and empire (Thomas cited in Armitage and Bashford 2014: 77).

The Pacific as a closely connected, economically integrated world did not emerge until the late eighteenth century. The earlier Manila galleon trade (1565–1815), which at times is mentioned as an early expression of a united Pacific world, merely left thin traces of trans-Pacific crossings as one to two ships per year sailed from Acapulco to the Philippines carrying Mexican and Peruvian silver and returned with Asian spices and silks (Peterson 2005). James Cooks’ celebrated excursions between 1768 and 1779 particularly mark a turning point. Tongan anthropologist Hau’ofa criticized Western historians’ obsessive and hagiographic involvement with Cook (Hau’ofa 2008: 65); nevertheless, Cook’s entry onto the Pacific stage decisively shifted its dynamic (Thomas 2010: 14). His voyages were unique inasmuch as they went beyond exploring waters and lands by also demonstrating a keen interest in natural history. As Thomas (2010: 14) writes: ‘Coasts actually were traced systematically, lands and islands were visited and studied, resources were observed, and plants and animals collected.’ Also, Cook’s crew members completed in-depth studies of the Islanders’ worlds, traditions, and knowledge (Thomas 2010: 14). Europeans came to see the Pacific as their scientific laboratory (Chaplin cited in Armitage and Bashford 2014: 55), although the living, breathing human beings and the environments that they inhabited in the Pacific were subtracted.
The idea of the Pacific as a barren space that provided Europeans the opportunity to run scientific experiments survived down to the more recent present in which the United States, the United Kingdom, and France conducted their nuclear tests in the Pacific waters and islands, far away from the alleged centre of the world, i.e. North America and Europe (Sivasundaram cited in Armitage and Bashford 2014: 254–5). The idea that the Pacific Ocean represents the ‘back’ of the planet, illustrated for instance by the International Date Line running through the Pacific basin, is distinctly European (Bartky 2007).

Intermediaries at work: knowledge collaboration in asymmetrical imperial relationships

Scholars in the history of science more recently emphasized how brokers and go-betweens create crucial networks and expedite the circulation of knowledge in a global world (Schaffer et al. 2009). In the case of the Pacific, historians of science in the last 10 years have uncovered the influence of non-European experts and knowledge producers who contributed to imperial science, thereby making an argument for a science production that resulted, at least partially, from fruitful European-Islander collaborations. Europeans depended on Islanders to make sense of the worlds they encountered: Cook relied on Tupaia, a Ra’iatean priest who had been living on Tahiti, as an intermediary and navigator. Bougainville relied on the oceanic and island knowledge of the Tahitian man Ahu-turu, who had joined the crew willingly, to navigate away from Tahiti. Both Ahu-turu and Tupaia were outstanding navigators, and Tupaia enabled Cook’s contact with the Maori by serving as a translator. Tupaia’s geographical expertise made it possible for Cook to create maps of the region, as proven by a contemporary source ‘A Chart representing the Isles of the South Sea . . . collected from the Accounts of Tupaya’ (Chaplin 2013: 128).

On Cook’s extraordinary extensive voyages, non-violent contact with Islanders allowed him to gain oceanic knowledge along with the food and water supplies necessary for survival. Cook’s *Endeavour* was packed with scientific instruments and naturalists who set out for the Pacific to witness a couple of transits of Venus across the Sun. Nowhere else did this spectacle promise to be as observable as in the Pacific (Chaplin cited in Armitage and Bashford 2014: 68), and Tahiti was chosen as the site from which the astronomical project was to originate. From there Cook sailed his ship around New Zealand where he anchored at multiple places and had encounters with Maori. Cook’s voyage received instant acclaim in Europe and the texts that stemmed from these trips became popular and influenced European thinking about Oceania for a long time thereafter. When Cook and his crew set out for a second voyage, they were hoping to finally make landfall on the ominous southern continent, Terra Australis, yet were caught up in the freezing Antarctic and forced to return to the more pleasant climate of the Pacific Islands. He returned to Tahiti, the Society Islands, and New Zealand and pushed on to other islands, including Rapa Nui, the Marquesas, Tonga, New Caledonia, and Vanuatu. Perhaps his most famous ‘first contact’ was on Hawai’i, where, on his third visit, he was killed on the beach by Hawaiian chiefs after dragging King Kalaniopuu on board his ship (Thomas 2010: 15–16; Matsuda 2012: 141). Cook’s voyages tied the islands together and connected them to the rims, which marked the beginning of an integrated Pacific world. As Gulliver argues: ‘Thus, whereas the Atlantic World was born of slavery, the Pacific world was born of science’ (2011: 89).

Theorizing the Pacific as a living space

Historians of science have shifted their focus and scope from locally circumscribed practices of science within narrowly defined communities to mobility, circulation and transfers of ideas,
people, and instruments across regions, nations, empires, continents, and waters (Roberts 2009: 24). Questions of how knowledge, technology, and practices travel and change in different social situations and within asymmetrical power relations are critical (Raj 2013: 337–47). These developments in the history of science have replaced obsolete paradigms of ‘diffusion’ by which science emerged in the West, from where it spread to the rest of the world. Instead, in a global context science and knowledge move in a polycentric world at multiple sites and within a multitude of networks (Raj 2007: 344–5). Thus, the concept of European science and technology rushing into the Pacific periphery needs to be challenged.

The idea of the Pacific merely serving as a sterile laboratory for European, male agents armed with technology who documented the Pacific in order to develop knowledge that relates to Western centres has come under scrutiny (Sivasundaram cited in Armitage and Bashford 2014: 237). Sujit Sivasundaram makes an argument for the Pacific as an agent that impacts knowledge creation: ‘[S]cience is not formed in full in Europe, it develops through fluid encounters in a range of sites of interaction. The Pacific is and has always been alive’ (Sivasundaram cited in Armitage and Bashford 2014: 238). This ‘dynamic role’ of the Pacific calls for theorization, and Sivasundaram presents an example of its application through the intellectual debates about coral reefs as a site where thoughts about the relations between water and land manifest themselves. Methodologically, he relies on ‘cross-contextualization’, which involves integrating sources that do not fulfil the narrow criteria of traditional (European) science. Thereby a decentring of the European history of science can unfold (Sivasundaram 2010). By applying a wider concept of science across cultures and perspectives, he includes indigenous knowledge, bringing into dialogue texts of genealogy entailing indigenous contents about earth history and geology. Under the threat of Western intrusion in Hawai’i in the late 1880s, King Kalākaua appointed a ‘Board of Genealogy of Hawaiian Chiefs’ to document genealogies which, in turn, strengthened threatened Hawaiian identity. Among other things, the publication of the *Kumulipo*, a 2,000-line prayer that tells the history of the Hawaiian chiefs as a mythical genealogy, resulted from this appointment. One line reads: ‘Born was the coral polyp, born was the coral came forth’ (Sivasundaram cited in Armitage and Bashford 2014: 240). Corals, therefore, create land. Similarly, the evolution of islands and lands in the Pacific was met by Western scientists with perplexity and presented a central scientific question to them. The political ambition behind the publication assigned by Kalākaua was to pursue the convergences between Hawaiian tradition and Western science, and thereby make the argument that Western science can prove what has been common Hawaiian genealogical knowledge for generations (Silva 2004: 97–104).

Sivasundaram argues, additionally, that Western scientists did not rely on cosmographic tales surrounding the Pacific any less than their Hawaiian counterparts because the case of the conjured southern continent, Terra Australis, had vexed Europeans from antiquity to the middle of the nineteenth century. Once the puzzle of the southern land had been solved, European scientists turned their attention to the mystery of the formation of coral atolls. Here a parallel between indigenous knowledge about the birth of islands, as presented in the *Kumulipo*, and European narratives about land rising up from the water seemingly out of nowhere, found in Dutch and Portuguese sources, is illustrative. Similarly, Charles Darwin became obsessed with wanting to explain the rise and fall of land in the Pacific. In this manner, Sivasundaram does not want his argument to be understood as a comprehensive history of science in the Pacific, but as an intellectual thrust in the direction of reading a variety of sources against and with each other.

This chapter adopted a post-colonial approach to knowledge production in and of the Pacific, which led to a better understanding of the transregional, interactive and asymmetrical production of various Pacific worlds. Research with a focus on gender has led to similar insights, demonstrating how both sexualized and racialized Western representations of women
have been an integral part of imperialism in the Pacific (O’Brien 2006). A native Hawaiian feminist academic and activist, Haunani-Kay Trask, boiled it down to the essence: The post-colonial perspective in the Pacific demonstrates how the often racist and sexist presuppositions of Western academics have shaped epistemologies into the late twentieth century and thereby perpetuated the colonization of the Pacific Islands (Trask 1999: 121–34).

Select bibliography

Matsuda, M. (18 December 2017) ‘In search of the Pacific: revisiting the other one-third of the globe’, lecture, University of Zürich.
This chapter examines a specific field of knowledge production that emerged in both Europe and Japan in the late nineteenth century under such headings as ‘colonial studies’, ‘colonial science’, and ‘imperial science’. Colonial studies – the umbrella term I use to address this phenomenon – were as much a political and business-related project as they were an academic endeavour to create expertise on the colonies and to benefit from strong, although temporary, financial support. Considering this view, I highlight, in particular, the transimperial features and post-colonial implications of this field of study.

Academically, colonial studies never gained full recognition within academia and, seen from today, it might appear as a temporary oddity. Nonetheless, for various reasons colonial studies deserve historiographical attention: colonial studies experts created a knowledge corpus that was highly valued by different actors engaged in the colonies who were hoping to make colonial government more efficient, to foster economic exploitation, and later also to fulfil the ‘promise of development’. Colonial expertise was widely exchanged between empires, challenging to some extent the historical narrative of competing imperial powers. At the same time, the field of colonial studies was exclusive, and it was only at the point of political decolonization that students from the colonies gained broader access to metropolitan institutions doing research on their home regions. By then, some of the institutes of colonial studies, which had for a long time played a role as training centres for colonial administrators, took up a significant role in the formation of a post-colonial administrative elite. Last but not least, colonial studies are of interest as forerunners of area and development studies: respective institutes partly survived decolonization, and related spatial units and paradigms influenced later adopted academic approaches to the study of non-European areas of the world – either as a continuation or a deliberate delimitation.

**Science and empire**

At the same time that colonial studies disappeared in the late 1960s, a new strand of historical research interested in the relation between science and empire began to take shape. Even though the quality of this relation remained controversial and the modalities of knowledge transfers are still a subject of discussion, this dynamic field of international research has in many cases demonstrated a close entanglement of scientific knowledge production and empire-building
European overseas expeditions and presence in the early modern period served as a boost to several natural sciences and the humanities, and it paved the way for empirical methods more generally (Brendecke 2009). Botany, for example, flourished against the background of overseas expansion, spurred by scientific curiosity and new opportunities to gain a scientific reputation. At the same time, it was accompanied by strong political and commercial interests (Schiebinger and Swan 2005). It has been argued quite plausibly that Europe’s unprecedented expansion over the globe in the nineteenth century depended on (a handful of) technical inventions (Headrick 1981) and that colonial administration – best researched for the case of India (Baber 1996; Bayly 1996; Cohn 1996; Arnold 2000) – relied heavily on knowledge ranging from precise maps and language skills, to studies of customs and religions and information on existing administrative structures and techniques. Such useful knowledge was – deliberately or not – provided by researchers from both the metropoles and the colonies. Indeed, collaboration with local experts was eventually so close that one can hardly call these projects European undertakings (Raj 2007). However, the readiness of European scientists to acknowledge the part that non-European scholars played in their research decreased in the second half of the nineteenth century (Schröder 2011).

Given this background, we should question if we can speak of ‘colonial studies’ without falling into the trap of reiterating its underlying colonial episteme. For good reason, Helen Tilley (2011) has argued against the term ‘colonial science’ because it suggests a differentiation within knowledge production – both geographical and epistemological – that never existed between ‘colonial’ and ‘metropolitan’ or ‘Western’ science. I fully share these arguments. However, it does make sense to address colonial studies as a specific field of expertise that was institutionalized as such at a specific period in history. This allows us to examine the (self-)designation and establishment as colonial studies in the context of a new colonial policy, to analyse the concepts and practices of this field of study, and to better understand processes of transition from ‘colonial’ to ‘area’ and ‘development studies’.

‘Scientific colonialism’

Relatively little research has addressed the nineteenth-century development of colonial studies (Morando 2007; Ruppenthal 2007; Singaravélou 2011). One precursor of the field, particularly for teaching purposes, was the earlier training programmes for colonial officers set up in several European countries during the nineteenth century. In the Netherlands, special programmes and schools to train future colonial officers for the Dutch East Indies were established as early as 1842 in Delft and 1865 in Leiden. Their curricula included languages, Islamic law, regional and ethnographic studies, and land surveying (Houben 2004). In the United Kingdom, following the educational programme provided by the East India Company College in Haileybury, a handful of universities (London, Oxford, Cambridge, Dublin, Glasgow, Aberdeen, and St Andrews) were granted the right of training future colonial officers in 1858. Alongside a general education, the focus was on ‘oriental’ languages (Sanskrit and Arabic), Indian history and geography, and horse riding (Ruppenthal 2007). In France, the School for Oriental Languages (École (impériale et) spéciale des langues orientales) provided a non-obligatory training for future colonial administrators both in languages and in regional studies.

But it was only during the course of European and Japanese colonial expansion in Africa and Asia from the 1880s onwards that research and teaching on the colonies grew extensively. When trying to understand this development, it is necessary to consider a new colonial science policy that was adopted in various colonial empires, a strong belief in science and technology and their promotion in national science policies more generally, and the evolving, but hierarchical
university system that encouraged young scientists to enter new fields of study. British colonial secretary Joseph Chamberlain, who promoted a ‘constructive imperialism’ (Worboys 1996), sketched out this new colonial science policy in the 1890s. According to Chamberlain, colonial government should draw on expert advisors, and all investments in the colonies should take advantage of the findings of sciences such as agriculture or the emerging field of tropical medicine that Chamberlain himself promoted so strongly. Investing in colonial research, it was widely hoped, would help to ‘open up’ and to ‘civilize’ colonial territories. In a contemporary understanding, this included economic penetration and infrastructural modernization while simultaneously minimizing the health and monetary risks for the Europeans involved.

Institutional foundations that responded directly to the renewed colonial expansion in the 1880s were, among others, the Seminar for Oriental Languages (Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen) in Berlin (1887), offering both language studies and regional studies (Günther 2008); the Imperial Institute in London founded in the same year with the mission to promote ‘useful’ research on the colonies; and the Colonial School (École coloniale) in Paris, opened in 1889, which introduced for the first time in France a formalized training programme for future colonial administrators (Cohen 1973). The main disciplines that began to place a special emphasis on research and teaching in the field of ‘colonial problems’ were agriculture and forestry, economy, law, geography, language studies, and anthropology. Sometimes even specific research fields such as ‘colonial geography’ or ‘tropical agriculture’ (referring to the fact that the vast majority of contemporary colonies lay in tropical zones) were created. However, it was tropical medicine that profited most from colonial science policy around 1900 (Bashford 2004; Neill 2012).

This new medical specialty evolved academically in the 1890s, with new discoveries in bacteriology and the spectacular (partial) discovery of the double life cycle of the malaria parasite in both mosquitos and human beings. Institutes dedicated more or less exclusively to tropical medicine and tropical hygiene were created both in metropoles and in the colonies, including, among others, those in Paris (1888); Tunis (1893); Algiers (1894); Liverpool (1898/99); London (1899); Leopoldville, today Kinshasa (1899); Hamburg (1900); Rio de Janeiro (1900), being a rare exception as a foundation without a colonial context; Kasauli (1900); Kuala Lumpur (1900); Khartoum (1902); Lisbon (1902); and Manila (1902). Tropical medicine and tropical hygiene received strong state financing, and the principal task of such institutes was to serve the European population in the colonies and support colonial economies by improving the health of workers. To be sure, in the long run, the introduction of medical services and vaccination programmes could serve colonial societies as a whole; nevertheless, historicizing tropical medicine also reveals how medical and hygienic knowledge production on the colonies (re)produced racial paradigms that triggered or legitimized social and racial segregation (Vaughan 1991). It was a long time before candidates from the colonies were allowed to acquire a higher medical education than that of ‘medical assistant’ (Iliffe 1998).

The institutionalization of colonial studies was, however, not just a national project. Particularly in France, colonial institutes were principally being founded in port cities where they were mainly embedded in local rationalities. In two phases, around 1900 and around 1930, colonial institutes were established in Marseille, Lyon, Bordeaux, Le Havre, Nantes, Nancy, Nice, and Montpellier (Morando 2007). A closer look at, for example, the Colonial Institute in Bordeaux reveals that the main driving forces behind the institute’s foundation in 1900 were the university, the chamber of commerce, and the municipality. It was financed by the latter two, with additional funds from the Colonial Ministry in Paris and occasional subsidies from the prefecture and from governors of French overseas territories. The main purpose for its foundation was the anticipated positive impact on the regional economy of the Gironde department by encouraging commercial relations with overseas territories. To this
end, the institute promoted scientific research through applied approaches and offered practical help for entrepreneurs. It equipped two major expeditions – one to study coconuts and one to study rubber – to learn more about the production, different qualities, and trading routes. It ran a commercial and colonial museum and garden, provided training in tropical medicine, and offered an information service for companies and business persons. From the mid-1930s onwards, the Colonial Institute in Bordeaux lost its popular attraction and was eventually integrated into the university, where its resources significantly strengthened the new research field of tropical geography (Brahm 2010).

Close ties with, or even the integration of colonial studies into, the universities is also evident in Japan and Germany. In Japan, colonial expansion was embedded in an imperial ideology and empire-building was accompanied by the more general adoption and promotion of ‘Western’ science (Chikara 1992; Mizuno 2009). Under a colonial science policy adopted in the 1900s under spiritus rector Gotô Shimpei, special professorships for ‘colonial sciences’ were created at several universities from 1908 onwards (Conrad 2005). Turning to Germany, an especially interesting case of a (partial) merging with a university is the Colonial Institute in Hamburg, which was founded in 1908 following an initiative launched by Colonial Secretary Bernard Derburg, a former bank manager who responded to critics of economic inefficiency and brutal regimes in the colonies by calling for ‘scientific colonialism’ (Ruppenthal 2007). The newly created Colonial Institute was intended to provide better training for future colonial administrators, businessmen, and colonists. It comprised a Central Department (Zentralstelle) that engaged in colonial propaganda, ran an information service – similar to the institute in Bordeaux – for entrepreneurs, and established several new professorships. One of these, the professorship of ‘colonial languages’, became an important starting point for African language studies in Germany. After the First World War, the Colonial Institute was closed down, but its professorships formed a nucleus for the new university founded in the city with a strong focus on the overseas world, and the Central Department continued its work under a different name (Hamburgisches Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv), providing mainly business information concerning the overseas world.

In Great Britain, a renewed colonial science policy in the mid-1920s emphasized individual funding. The Empire Marketing Board also financed a network of research stations, and strongly supported research at existing institutions; examples of the latter are projects on refrigeration and storage techniques to make it easier and cheaper to transport perishable crops; on pest and weed control; on husbandry, breeding, and dietetics; on mineral surveys and forestry; and on road vehicle research (Worboys 1996). This policy was also adopted in Germany, where, despite the ‘loss’ of the colonies, colonial studies were continued with the strong support of the German Research Foundation (Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft/Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) during both the Weimar Republic and the Nazi regime (Stoecker 2014).

Transimperial cooperation and colonial exclusion

Whereas scholarly cooperation on a local level in the colonies had decreased during the second half of the nineteenth century, colonial studies exhibited a high level of cooperation between scientists from Western empires. Although colonial studies focused largely on the respective national colonies, there was a strong interest in comparative studies right from the beginning. Both trends can be seen clearly in the Institut Colonial International (ICI), an association of colonial studies founded in 1894 with a permanent secretariat in Brussels. The ICI held international conferences on an annual or biennial basis with experts from (mainly) European empires,
and it engaged in extensive publication activities producing transnational comparisons and discussing questions of labour regulation in the colonies, tropical hygiene, monetary policy, forms of colonial administration, and trade politics (Lindner 2015). Although it is difficult to pinpoint how far the exchange of knowledge shaped concrete colonial politics and practices, the ICI is a striking example of interimperial cooperation in the field of colonial expertise in times marked by both scientific internationalization and political rivalry.

Whereas colonial studies offered a welcome and apparently ‘apolitical and neutral’ area for cooperation (Worboys 1996), it was at the same time a field of exclusion. This also applies to the ICI, which excluded delegates from the Ottoman Empire and – until 1931 – from Japan (Lindner 2015). But marginalization and exclusion were much more systematic for scholars from the colonies. For example, in 1932 the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures – a more academically focused cooperative founded in London in 1926 – debated whether scholarships should be granted to African applicants. It decided against this, rejecting the application of the later Nigerian president Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe (Stoecker 2008). At the Seminar of Oriental Languages (Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen) in Berlin, to provide another example, African scholars were employed as ‘language assistants’. However, they had no further educational and career opportunities and even suffered discrimination compared to other language assistants by receiving the lowest salaries (Stoecker 2008).

At the École coloniale in Paris (renamed École nationale de la France d’outre-mer in 1934), applications from ‘colonial candidates’ did not become a controversial issue until after the Second World War. During a new but highly contradictory colonial policy, the École had to open its gates for ‘autochthonous’ candidates in 1957. Only two years later, in the course of decolonization, the École was transformed into the Institut des hautes études d’outre-mer, becoming a school almost entirely for students from overseas. Its educational objectives, however, remained the same: the creation of an administrative elite – but now for the post-colonial state (Brahm 2011).

Decolonization and post-colonial continuities

In the 1930s, and specifically after the Second World War, research on the colonies experienced a late boom. Politically, this process was triggered by the attempts of the remaining colonial empires to create legitimacy through promising development and welfare in their colonies – which was hoped to simultaneously strengthen the metropole – and by offering ‘technical assistance’ by experts and ‘help for self-help’ (Büscher 2014). Since the 1930s, economic depression and unrest in the colonies had shifted scientific attention toward social, economic, and political problems. A good example of this is the British ‘African Survey’ published in 1938 (Schuknecht 2010; Tilley 2011). ‘Development’ became the buzzword of colonial science policies and the main research fields addressed in this context were agriculture, sociology, economics, demographics, engineering, education, and medicine. Alongside national funding schemes such as the 1940 and 1945 British Colonial Development and Welfare Acts or the 1946 French Fonds d’investissement pour le développement économique et social, US-American foundations, international organizations, and private companies played an increasingly important role as financiers of research projects on the colonies along with modernization and development projects. This developmental surge notwithstanding, large-scale post-war infrastructure projects, such as the Volta River Project or the Kariba Dam, often led to lasting social, political, and ecological problems (Tsikata 2006; Tischler 2013).

New institutes dedicated to colonial studies were founded in this period after the Second World War: smaller ones such as the Institute of Colonial Studies in Oxford (1945) followed
by the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in London (1949), and very large ones such as the Office of Colonial Scientific Research (Office de la recherche scientifique coloniale), later to become the Office de la recherche scientifique et technique outre-mer (ORSTOM) in Paris, which established several branches particularly in Africa. The term ‘colonial studies’, however, was then often replaced by terms such as ‘tropical’, ‘overseas’, or ‘commonwealth studies’ – a process that reflects both gradual political decolonization and conceptual reorientation. In this transitional phase, two conceptual as well as spatial reconfigurations were most influential: first, there was the orientation toward the US-American model of area studies which constructed world regions such as ‘sub-Saharan Africa’ or ‘Latin America’ as fields of study on a geographical and cultural basis, thereby emphasizing area-specific problems and interdisciplinary ‘teamwork’; and second, there was the orientation toward development studies, which concentrated on sociological, economic, and political problems in the ‘Third World’. Whereas colonialism itself had become a new topic of sociological research in the 1950s (Cooper 2002), colonial studies in the older sense disappeared during the 1960s. Some of its most important paradigms, however, survived decolonization – notably the differentiation of a ‘non-European’ or ‘tropical world’ and the focus on modernization and development with a strong belief in technical and scientific solutions.

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Colonial expertism's post-colonial legacies


Subaltern studies is a school of historical thought established during the early 1980s. Originally comprised of scholars of South Asia, specifically India, it has since evolved to influence and include different intellectual genealogies and regional configurations around the world. Beginning with a premise of writing history ‘from below’, drawn from the scholarship of social historians based primarily in Great Britain, members of the Subaltern Studies Collective demonstrated equal intellectual facility with and concern for the ideas and approaches of such disparate thinkers as Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Mao Zedong, and, above all, Antonio Gramsci from whom the defining term ‘subaltern’ was adopted. These wide-ranging references informed the eventual appeal of subaltern studies to an international audience. Scholars of Latin America, for example, have embraced the methods and political ethos of subaltern studies as exemplified by the founding of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group in 1992. Similarly, historians, anthropologists, and geographers working in African studies have been attentive to this vein of scholarship, as have specialists on North America and Europe. Consequently, subaltern studies has been viewed as an exemplary case of social theory produced outside the Euro-American academy that profoundly influenced Western thought and historical reason. Yet this common perception overlooks a set of entangled intellectual genealogies that complicates a clear binary between Western and non-Western thought vis-à-vis subaltern studies. Though this school of history continues to be identified principally with South Asia, its origins as well as its impact in other fields has rendered it as a global formation, rather than one delimited to a particular national or regional historiography.

This chapter presents a brief outline of subaltern studies. It provides a short history of this school of thought, including its political and intellectual beginnings, its turn toward more transparent, theoretical concerns during the late 1980s, and its gradual decline since the 1990s. In performing this task, this chapter highlights the key figures of the school, as well as the edited volumes, articles, and books that gained particular influence in capturing the ethos of the collective. Furthermore, it discusses how different members of the collective addressed questions of the peasantry, the working class, gender, and nationalism, among other themes, in addition to evolving theoretical engagements with Marxism and post-structuralism. Pertinent to this handbook, this chapter also examines the global impact this school of historical thought has had. Though the Subaltern Studies Collective and its book series is moribund at present, many of its original members remain active scholars and continue to push the boundaries of research.
From the village to the world

on South Asia and post-colonial historicism more generally, reshaping the possibilities of global knowledge production and its shifting geographies. Indeed, subaltern studies as both a critical intervention and a historical practice demonstrates the constant need for intellectual adaptation and evolution, combined with the importance of spatial and interpretive scales – from the village to the world.

The beginnings of subaltern studies

Though the Subaltern Studies Collective has included a number of scholars over the course of 12 volumes of essays, the founder and central figure of the movement was Ranajit Guha, a historian of India who has held positions at the University of Sussex and the Australian National University, both of which provided institutional settings and a distinct international dimension for the emergence of the collective. Though subaltern studies by reputation and practice has foregrounded local histories and the importance of knowledge from the margins, it must be recognized as having cosmopolitan qualities from its inception. Before becoming a historian, Guha had spent his early adult life as a left-wing political activist in India, with his eventual decision to enter academia informed by this experience. After receiving an appointment at Sussex, he began to fold this past political involvement into his scholarship (Seed 2005: 109). Influenced by the preceding work of British social historians such as E.P. Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm, and particularly Eric Stokes (1978), Guha and the early membership of the collective – including Partha Chatterjee, Gyanendra Pandey, and Shahid Amin, all of whom would later gain prominence – set out during the late 1970s and early 1980s with the intention not only of decentring Western perspectives on South Asian history, but equally of challenging internal nationalist visions of India’s long anti-colonial struggle that privileged the role of elites and ‘great men’ such as Mahatma Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Instead, the collective would foreground the critical views and political agency of peasants and workers. The first volume of subaltern studies presents this agenda in its opening chapter, entitled ‘On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India’. Despite the modesty conveyed, the essay itself mounts a sharp critique of the elitism – both ‘colonialist elitism and bourgeois-nationalist elitism’ – that defined India’s post-colonial historiography. Guha saw the two forms as connected, with the perspectives of colonial administrators being imitated by scholars in post-colonial India (SAS I 1982: 1). He thus called upon historians to restore the ‘politics of the people’, which he viewed as ‘autonomous’ – neither derived from nor dependent on elite politics, while also not ‘traditional’ in the sense of being ‘outmoded’ (SAS I 1982: 4). Engagement with this complex set of politics could help explain the ‘historic failure of the nation to come to its own’ – that is, to transcend a colonial past as well as experience a modern revolution that would end class oppression and the exploitation of the peasantry (SAS I 1982: 7). Concerns at the time thus not only looked toward the colonial past, but also a political present that had been shaped by the authoritarian government of Indira Gandhi during ‘the Emergency’ (1975–7).

This opening chapter by Guha is therefore nothing less than a manifesto. Indeed, his numbered points stylistically indicate this genre. He underscores the deep political nature of subaltern studies that defines its critical historicism. The term ‘subaltern’ itself further captures this agenda. Drawn from the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, whose writings from the 1920s and 1930s became popular among Anglophone scholars during the 1970s, the word, in plain speech, refers to a military officer of lower rank (Gramsci 1971). In Gramsci’s usage, however, it refers to subordinate social groups that manoeuvre under difficult conditions of class and cultural hegemony established by elites and their state control. Gramsci’s terminology and arguments consequently emerged from Marxist thought, but without the class and historical determinisms

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that frequently inhabited such thought – an analytic capaciousness that held appeal for scholars working beyond Europe. However, despite the embrace of Gramsci, the use and meaning of ‘subaltern’ remained in question. As a report of the conference for the third volume attested, the term ‘subaltern’ was a source of discussion and debate. Sumit Sarkar, for example, held that the conceptual advantage of ‘subaltern’ over already existing class categories is that it did not presume a specific or static notion of class consciousness. Critiquing a practice of using ‘subaltern’ interchangeably with the ‘masses’ and the ‘peasantry’, Chatterjee further argued that the former expression captured a dialectical ‘relationship of domination’ rather than simply a social category. Dipesh Chakrabarty concurred with the added provision that ‘subaltern’ was not meant to be ‘all-embracing’. Marking a slight differentiation from Chatterjee, Guha asserted that subaltern groups did maintain a semblance of autonomy, thus developing his later arguments regarding dominance without hegemony (Special Correspondent 1983: 299).

These deliberations over ‘subaltern’ would continue to inform the subaltern studies book series with its diverse case studies that continually tested the content and parameters of the collective’s agenda. The volumes themselves mark a hybrid form, being at once edited collections of essays, but also forming part of a continued series similar to an academic journal. This consistency of purpose and publication served to give shape and depth to the collective’s identity and intellectual production. A number of essays emerged as defining examples of subject matter, political concern, and interpretive technique. Beyond his manifesto against India’s existing historiography, Guha’s most significant contributions include ‘The Prose of Counter-Insurgency’ (SAS II 1983) and ‘Chandra’s Death’ (SAS V 1987), each of which examines the ways colonial documentation could be read against the grain in order to understand the nature of political resistance and marginal lives, respectively. These concerns for colonial erasure and the limits of archival evidence can also be found in the essays ‘Conditions for Knowledge of Working-Class Conditions’ by Chakrabarty (SAS II 1983) and ‘A Literary Representation of the Subaltern’ by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (SAS V 1987), which apply a similar critical consciousness to working-class conditions and literary analysis. Meanwhile, other scholars, such as Chatterjee (SAS I 1982 and SAS III 1984), Amin (SAS III 1984), Pandey (SAS I 1982 and SAS III 1984), and Sarkar (SAS III 1984) engaged with the politics of the people by examining such issues as communalism, anti-colonial nationalism among the peasantry, and local perspectives on figures such as Gandhi. Not to be overlooked are the contributions of David Arnold (SAS V 1987), David Hardiman (SAS IV 1985), and Ramachandra Guha (SAS IV 1985), which explore neglected themes of medicine, leisure, and the environment, thus adding new dimensions and depth to understanding the cultural life of subaltern communities. All of the abovementioned chapters appeared in the timespan from 1982 until 1987, innovatively blending primary source research with the theoretical insights of structuralism and post-structuralism. It was the defining period of the collective’s intellectual production.

This wide-ranging empiricism demonstrates the capacity of ‘subaltern’ as a critical concept that can cast light on experiences and power dynamics that remain hidden from view due to limitations of evidence or misplaced politics. It is also important to note that this edited series was complemented by more extensive research monographs. Guha’s Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (1983), Chakrabarty’s Rethinking Working-Class History (1989), and Amin’s Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura, 1922–1992 (1995) are key examples of these lengthier studies that expand on themes found within the book series. Guha’s text presents a provisional taxonomy for approaching the complexity of peasant political consciousness, while Chakrabarty’s study challenges many determinist assumptions of world systems analysis to argue that the development of working classes in places like Bengal was shaped as much by local cultural dynamics as by the spread of global capitalism. Amin’s history undertakes a different
agenda, examining the contested meanings of an episode of civil disobedience and anti-colonial violence in northern India. In addition to these book-length works, the most influential piece of writing by a member of the collective to emerge is Spivak’s ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ (1988), an essay that focuses on gender and the practice of sati – in which a widowed woman commits suicide either by force or consent after the death of her husband – but expresses broader theoretical concern about the impossibility of retrieving the self-conscious intentions of such marginalized figures. Drawing upon both Marxism and deconstruction, Spivak’s assertions about the limits of method and the silencing of the ‘Other’ stirred considerable debate and controversy, with claims of overblown pessimism on the one hand and contentions of continued Western biases on the other. Nevertheless, Spivak’s polemic proved to be a touchstone for subaltern studies, serving to further popularize its ethos and agenda.

The globalization of subaltern studies

The wider circulation of subaltern studies can largely be attributed to the publication of Selected Subaltern Studies (Guha and Spivak 1988). This collection of essays draws from the first five volumes with many of the most important essays by Guha (SAS I 1982 and SAS II 1983), Chakrabarty (SAS II 1983), Pandey (SAS III 1984), Amin (SAS III 1984), and Chatterjee (SAS II 1983) included. As a defining demonstration of importance, Edward Said, by then a leading post-colonial critic, provided a foreword for the book, noting the politically ‘combative aspect’ of the collective and its ‘self-reflective, theoretically self-conscious dimension’, thus placing subaltern studies within a global project of post-colonial scholarship (Said in Guha and Spivak 1988: vii, ix). Other scholars around this time also embraced subaltern studies for their own purposes. James Scott, for example, whose work on peasant resistance in Southeast Asia produced such books as The Moral Economy of the Peasant (1976) and Weapons of the Weak (1985), cites subaltern studies as informing his celebrated book Domination and the Arts of Resistance (1990). Terence Ranger, one of the early practitioners of post-colonial African history, contributed an essay on Zimbabwe’s history to Subaltern Studies VII (1992), in addition to writing a review article on subaltern studies, thus helping introduce the insights of the collective to an African studies audience (Ranger 1990). Shula Marks, a prominent historian of South Africa, similarly published an edited volume with Dagmar Engels, a scholar of South Asia, which compares situations of hegemony and protest in Asia and Africa, taking its cue from the preceding work of the Subaltern Studies Collective (Engels and Marks 1994). In these ways, the critical agenda of subaltern studies began to circulate to other academic fields and parts of the world.

However, the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group is the most distinctive formation outside of the original collective. In retrospect, it was a relatively short-lived endeavour. Founded in 1992, it reportedly experienced early internal conflict, peaking in 1997, due partly to tensions between scholars based in the United States versus those based in Latin America (Verdesio 2005: 6). Despite its brevity, the collective reflected ambitions that approximated those of the original South Asian group. Indeed, Latin American subaltern studies emerged out of a similar set of concerns over the political and intellectual uses of Marxism and its limits – a reflection of Latin American politics during the 1980s and 1990s, as well as shifting academic methodologies from structuralism to post-structuralism during the same period (Beverley 1999). Ileana Rodríguez, for example, who was a founding member of the group, had served as a vice-minister of culture for Nicaragua’s leftist Sandinista government (Seed 2005: 110). Rodríguez went on to edit The Latin American Subaltern Studies Reader (2001) – a culminating statement by the collective – in which she explains that one catalyst for the group’s formation was the 1990 electoral defeat of the Sandinista government. In her introduction to this volume, she further describes the
interdisciplinary nature of the group, as well as its North American inception that occurred in ‘three stages’ through meetings at George Mason University and Ohio State University, and in Puerto Rico (Rodríguez 2001: 7). Similar to its South Asian counterpart, the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group was committed to ‘a radical critique of elite cultures, of liberal, bourgeois, and modern epistemologies and projects, and of their different propositions regarding representation of the subaltern’ (Rodríguez 2001: 9). It insisted that new perspectives could be reached from people and cultures that had been negated. Furthermore, the group believed in the importance of comparative study between different ‘post-(ne)colonial situations’, such as those in Latin America and South Asia (Rodríguez 2001: 9).

Nevertheless, the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group was criticized for borrowing concepts, with the employment of the term ‘subaltern’ resulting in disregard for the particularities of Latin American histories and cultures. Indeed, the globalization of subaltern studies has not only resulted in its embrace, but it has also generated debate and criticism as to its uses and application within South Asia and beyond. In a sensitive review essay, Rosalind O’Hanlon (1988), for example, raises questions as to whether the subaltern studies project unwittingly reinforced Eurocentric biases by arguing for the autonomy and, thus, ‘difference’ of subaltern subjects, in addition to essentializing subaltern agency as always being in terms of ‘resistance’. As she writes, why is it ‘that the process by which the insurgent actually arrives at a sense of himself is through negation’ (O’Hanlon 1988: 204)? A debate between Gyan Prakash (1990, 1992), a later member of the collective, and O’Hanlon and David Washbrook (1992) further addresses these tensions over method, specifically whether a theoretical and political incompatibility emerged through scholarship that drew upon Western theory in order to restore agency to non-Western subaltern peoples. A broader discussion also occurred in *The American Historical Review* with contributions by Prakash (1994), the Latin American historian Florencia Mallon (1994), and the African historian Frederick Cooper (1994), each of whom cites the critical intervention that subaltern studies offers for different parts of the world, but also note the theoretical and political limits of the project that require constant attention. Cooper expresses misgivings that subaltern studies places too much stress on the ‘local’ and ‘resistance’ at the expense of understanding a greater variety of historical and cultural agency, as well as broader and more complex political imaginations that extended well beyond the village, trade union, or colony. Though not dismissive of the collective or its agenda, subaltern studies did experience a critical reception that forced the collective’s members to defend positions and rethink assumptions, while also welcoming popular global acclaim.

**Subaltern studies today**

The original Subaltern Studies Collective has experienced a decline since 2000, largely through the gradual dispersal of its original members and their pursuit of other agendas and projects. Many, perhaps ironically, have since received positions at elite universities in Europe and North America. Founding members such as Chakrabarty take note of this decline through essays that, as an act of caretaking its legacy, summarize this school of history (Chakrabarty 2002: ch. 1). The book series itself concluded with a twelfth volume in 2005. Yet the influence of subaltern studies has never entirely dissipated. Several omnibus collections by Guha (1997), Vinayak Chaturvedi (2000), and David Ludden (2002) have canonized the intellectual production of the group. More important, the work of members such as Chatterjee (2006), Pandey (2013), Guha (1998 and 2003), and Chakrabarty (2000) has continued to apply a subaltern approach to wider conditions. Guha and Chakrabarty in particular challenge the concept of ‘historicism’ itself as a Western idea and concern, raising the question as to whether it is
possible to write ‘history’ beyond Europe. Guha (2003), for example, tackles the Eurocentric universalism of Georg W.F. Hegel to argue that not only is a history beyond Europe possible, but that it should embrace the everyday and thus restore a sense of wonder and soulfulness to the practice of history. Chakrabarty in complementary fashion appeals for the need to ‘provincialize Europe’ – not to disregard its ideas and their utility, but to locate and minimize its intellectual hegemony over the rest of the world. He calls for the recognition of at least two patterns of history – what he terms ‘History 1’ and ‘History 2’ – that identify the mutual importance of global capitalism and its effects as well as local histories and their resilience, respectively. Both are in ‘a state of permanent tension’ (Chakrabarty 2000: 254). Guha’s and Chakrabarty’s critiques thus reposition the subaltern agenda on a global scale, by subverting still remaining intellectual legacies of global imperialism while, in the same stroke, situating European knowledge as a form of local knowledge. Through these provisional summations, subaltern studies remains an important critical reference point for locating regional histories and their transregional intellectual circulation today.

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The Third World never existed as a social, political, or economic phenomenon. It was an idea, a construct and concept of (mainly Western) politicians, economists, development experts, and leftist intellectuals between the 1960s and 1980s (Escobar 1988, 1995). The term Third World was intrinsically tied to the concepts of dependence and development, which were also constructs. In the intertwinement of these constructs we can see geopolitical world orders in two dimensions: these concepts brought up thoughts about spatial divisions and unique regions of the world, on the one hand, while being transregional, on the other. The conceptual triad of Third World, dependence, and development always had the entire globe in mind, asymmetrically dividing it into a First, a Second, and a Third World, following the belief that the Third World was both underdeveloped and dependent on the First and the Second World. Quantitative and qualitative measurements of political and economic conditions came together with ideas about stages of modernization in line with the dominant understandings of the economic, social, and political conditions of the First World. Development was seen as the tool to reach the stage of the First World (Pletsch 1981; Escobar 1995; Mason 1997; Kalter 2011; Dinkel 2014).

As analytical categories, the concepts Third World, dependence, and development are – each in their own right as well as in connection to each other – highly controversial if not outdated (Worsley 1979; Harris 1986; Tomlinson 2003; Dirlik 2004). Nevertheless, they have been very prominent in public discourses and policy all over the world for at least 20 years; and they are occasionally still in use in the twenty-first century (Ibister 2003; Prashad 2007). This chapter investigates the historicity of the three concepts and their entanglements. It will deconstruct their geopolitical impact by showing their ideological and Eurocentric determination and discuss how the concepts have always referred to transregional categories, both by constructing and transforming transregional arenas and by forging unequal relations between them.

The history of the concept Third World

The French demographer, anthropologist, and historian Alfred Sauvy was, as far as we know, the first to use the term Third World (Kalter 2013: 25). On 14 August 1952, he wrote in
the French magazine *L'Observateur* about this ‘ignored, exploited, scorned Third World’ in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia. Sauvy paraphrased a sentence from the French Revolution about the Third Estate: ‘because at the end this ignored, exploited, scorned Third World like the Third Estate, wants to become something too’ (1952). As such, already when the term Third World was coined, it was connected with dependency and development. Furthermore, Sauvy warned of the revolutionary potential of the Third World and the related danger of it becoming socialist. Hence, from the onset it was also related to the geopolitical order of the Cold War.

Following Samir Amin (1989), we can say that Sauvy shared the typical Eurocentric beliefs of Western intellectuals about the pre-eminence of European culture, politics, and economics. This becomes visible in the prevalent use of concepts such as dependency and development. As the head of the French Institut National d’Études Démographiques (INED), Sauvy had a high-ranking position among the French elite, which without a doubt helped in spreading his term Third World (Kalter 2013: 215). The sociologist, anthropologist, and Africanist Georges Balandier, who worked with Sauvy at the INED, was the first to introduce the term as a concept in the social sciences (Balandier 1956). In 1956, he edited a collective volume with the title *Le ‘tiers monde’: Sous-développement et développement*. Though none of the authors in this book used the term, it was the first time the Third World appeared on a book cover. Based on his elaborate empirical research, Christoph Kalter (2011, 2013) demonstrates how the term gained currency in the 1960s in scientific and journalistic publications all over Europe, in the ‘Third Worldism’ of anti-colonial activists such as Frantz Fanon, and in the so-called ‘New Radical Left’ around Jean-Paul Sartre, who also wrote the famous preface for Fanon’s manifesto *Les Damnés de la Terre* (1961). Fanon and Sartre connected the concept of the Third World with underdevelopment resulting from colonial exploitation and neo-colonialism; nevertheless, they claimed that the potential to create a ‘better’ (whole) world lay in the hands of the people in the Third World. From 1961 onwards, more and more articles in France bore *tiers monde* in their titles; in the years following, the term also spread into other language areas (Kalter 2011).

As we can learn from historians who trace the term back to its origins and investigated the political background of its popularization, the Third World was – in the words of Kalter (2013) – a ‘shared space of imagination, communication, and action’, a product of intellectual and political discourses of Western or, in the case of Fanon, Westernized intellectuals. Max Elbaum (2002: 53) points out how in the course of the late 1960s ‘Third World Liberation’ replaced Marxism and Leninism. Indeed, in the liberation and solidarity movements as well as the anti-Vietnam War movements we can find an increasing use of the term Third World. African countries in their struggle for independence and development during the 1960s became patterns for Western political movements (ibid.).

Mark T. Berger and Cynthia A. Young highlighted the political impact of the rise and popularization of the label Third World and claimed that historians, anthropologists, and sociologists should stop using the concept of the Third World as an analytical category and rather critically analyse the concept itself (Berger 1994; Young 2006). With the end of the Cold War and the growing importance of post-colonial critics, the label Third World has become more and more unpopular and has mainly been replaced by the concept of the Global South. However, Arif Dirlik insists that we should not forget about the anti-colonial movement itself and the self-constructions of intellectuals in this Global South: using the term Third World also stood for intellectual emancipation (Dirlik 1998).

What has not yet been thoroughly investigated and debated in the historiography of the term and the concept Third World is how it could be established as an epistemic ‘truth’ and how this ‘truth’ was intertwined with categories such as dependence and development without any
remarkable resistance or critique. Following Michel Foucault, we can say that during the 1960s the Third World became a dispositif – an apparatus and netting of discourses, strategies, and practices with an immense tendency for social inclusion and exclusion, suppression, and even mental as well as physical violence (Foucault 1980; Agamben 2009: 14). While many attempts to structure the world into areas reflected scientific and geopolitical interests, for example in area studies, the concept of the Third World was based on structural differences and subordination. Indeed, many people who used the term in solidarity movements, in anti-colonial resistances, or for humanitarian reasons were not aware of its underlying structural violence.

At the heart of this epistemic and discursive violence is the belief that it is possible to divide the world into regions according to qualitative scales of economic, social, and political development. By its Western protagonists, the First World was seen on the highest level of this development as industrialized, wealthy, and (mainly) democratic. The term Second World referred to the Eastern bloc and the communist or socialist countries, which were seen as fundamentally lacking democratic qualities, economic growth, and free markets. This ‘second stage’ of development was attributed to communist or socialist mismanagement based on an ideology that gave no incentives to work hard because there were no possibilities to profit from efforts made for private purposes (Pletsch 1981). The Third World was deemed to be on the lowest level of economic, social, and political development. Furthermore, there was a deep suspicion that a Third World government would not have the will or ability to perform ‘well’ in the sense of Western democratic values.

The tendency to categorize the world into spatial arenas of development and underdevelopment was even shared by the most prominent protagonists of anti-colonial policies – the so-called Non-Aligned Movement, whose members saw the blocs of the Cold War as a danger for neo-colonial, at least in an ideological sense, occupation (Rossi 1963).

In April 1955, delegates from 29 of these so-called Third World countries met for a diplomatic conference in Bandung, Indonesia (see Chapter 15 by Lee). The Bandung Conference was transregional in different regards: first, the delegates claimed to be defining new directions for a world after colonialism, thereby transforming the regional make-up of the post-colonial world order. Second, the inhabitants of the 29 Asian and African represented countries made up around two-thirds of the world’s population, which gave the statements of their delegates a transregional if not global impact. Third, speakers at the conference – including Ahmed Sukarno from Indonesia, Jawaharlal Nehru from India, and Gamal Abdel Nasser from Egypt – declared that it was time to establish transregional solidarity in the face of the Cold War policies of the First World ruled by the USA and the Second World ruled by the Soviet Union (Wright 1995; Macie 2005). Taken together, the delegates claimed the need of forming a new world after the old empires and against the new ones. They did not, however, use the term Third World. Three odd years after Alfred Sauvy came up with the term, it was not yet sufficiently established to be used by the speakers of this Third World. However, it already hung in the air as an entity avant la lettre and was – at least in Bandung – connected with the idea of (in)dependence.

Dependence: quintessence of the Third World

Since the late 1950s, representatives of the so-called Third World as well as an increasing number of Western intellectuals, anthropologists, and leftist politicians held the opinion that colonial exploitation ended up in the unavoidable and fundamental dependence of Third World countries on the industrialized states in the First and Second Worlds. Patterns of interactions among nations were analysed and political, social, and especially economic differences were explained, premised on a belief in the structural inequalities between these nations (Ferraro 2008). Following Theotonio Dos Santos (1971), dependency was seen as a ‘condition which
shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favours some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economies’. Already in the 1940s, the Argentinian economist Raúl Prebisch saw the reason for the dependency between the Global North and South in the unwillingness of Europe and the USA to share their technological, scientific, and industrial expertise (Sunkel 1969).

In 1969, the German-American economic historian and sociologist André Gunder Frank pointed out what is generally taken as the slogan of the dependency theory between the First, Second, and Third Worlds: He wrote that the developed status of the First World was structurally linked to the underdevelopment of the Third World, much like ‘the opposite sides of the same coin’ (Frank 1969: 33). Frank was the most prominent Western scholar who connected dependency theory with thoughts about different qualitative levels of the world. As a typical Western Cold War intellectual, he used some Marxian concepts on political economy, but rejected Marx’s stages of history.

Talking about the dependence of Latin America, Africa, or Southeast Asia vis-à-vis Europe and the USA was not new in the 1970s. Already in the late nineteenth century, colonized local elites, anthropologists, missionaries, and even colonialists quite often and openly criticized the economic, political, social, and cultural dependence between the colonies and their ‘mother countries’ (Cooper 2005: 9). Reflections on the increase of the economic output of the colonies were based on the belief that the colonial economies were connected to the ‘mother country’ and had to be skimmed for the benefit of the latter (Sarraut 1923). These reflections are sometimes clad in discourses about humanitarian activities or the civilizing mission. Frederick J.D. Lugard, who held several leading posts in British colonies in Asia and Africa before he was appointed as the governor of Nigeria and the British representative on the League of Nations’ Permanent Mandates Commission, wrote in 1926: ‘As Roman imperialism laid the foundation of modern civilization, and led the wild barbarians of these islands along the path of progress, so in Africa to-day we are repaying the debt’ (Lugard 1926: 618).

Like many other representatives of the colonial empires, Lugard saw in the ongoing exploitation and the asymmetric dependency of the colonies on the ‘mother countries’ the inherent danger of a constantly growing revolutionary and emancipatory potential of the colonized people. Development became central to the colonial ideologies – as a tool both to avoid political riots and to raise the profits for the colonizers. In colonial times, the opposite of development was thought of as un-development – not underdevelopment. Underdevelopment is fundamentally different from un-development. The concept of underdevelopment refers to the conditions of the results of colonial exploitation. It refers to a situation or an interpretation in which economic resources are used solely for the benefit of dominant states and not for the countries from which these resources are taken. In colonial times, there was not much awareness of the role of colonial exploitation as the basis for underdevelopment. Nevertheless, colonial experts already defined un-development as a significant lack and as a barrier to economic prosperity. They talked about the importance of sustainability and believed in broad measures and categorizations. Hence one can say with good reason that the Third World and its entanglement with dependency thinking in the 1960s were not new. It was rather just another, and more politically correct, version of older colonial thoughts about primitiveness and the civilizing mission.

**Spatial regimes and the discourse of development**

Development became a further example par excellence of the construction and invention of areas in our world: the dichotomy between developed and underdeveloped areas or in the
The invention of the Third World

words of Stuart Hall ‘the West and the Rest’ (Hall 1992). In the course of the first visions of decolonizing the former German colonies under the mandate of the League of Nations, development became more and more central. In the late- or post-colonial period, we can see a global and fundamental transformation of the spatial ordering and spatial division of the world. The system of colonial empires and their colonies mutated into a system of developed and developing countries based on unequal development between these two hemispheres. The military, economic, and governmental dependency between the colonial metropolis and their periphery became an economic, social, and political dependency with strong asymmetries between the First and the Third World.

James Ferguson wrote about the colonial tradition of development:

Like ‘civilization’ in the nineteenth century, ‘development’ is the name not only for a value, but also for a dominant problematic or interpretative grid through which the impoverished regions of the world are known to us. Within this interpretative grid, a host of everyday observations are rendered intelligible and meaningful. (Ferguson 1990: xiii; Kößler 1998: 11–58)

Seeing, tracing back, and contextualizing the epistemic power of development can help us to see the continuing strategies to distinguish the world between a ‘more’ and a ‘less’ – ‘from past colonizers to today’s military, coca bosses, guerrillas, and development experts’ (Herzfeld 2001: 167).

The (epistemic) power of development thinking comes – as Arturo Escobar convincingly points out – from the fact that this concept was mainly taken as an undisputed economic, social, and political reality: it is its ‘neutral language that can be utilized harmlessly and put to different ends according to the political and epistemological orientation of those waging it’ (Escobar 2001: 195). Jonathan Crush argues that critical (cultural) analysts should ‘make the self-evident’ impact of development discourse ‘problematic’. With this operation we can see how the discourse of development establishes ‘its authority – the manner in which it constructs the world’ in a way usually seen as ‘self-evident and unworthy of attention’ (Crush 1995: 3).

The entanglement between the beliefs in the epistemic value of development and dependency on the one hand and the Third World on the other created a long ongoing transregionally shared ‘truth’. This ‘fact’ was transregional in three ways: First, it transformed and redefined regional divisions – from the colonial powers to the developed donor countries, from the colonies to the underdeveloped receiver countries, from the ‘civilized’ world of the former empires to the First World, and from the ‘primitive’ world of the colonies to the Third World. Second, it transcended previous ordering principles such as continents and colonies into spatial concepts like the Third World and the Global South. Third, it established transregional shared beliefs, visions, and ideologies helping to construct and consolidate these newly defined ‘world regions’.

Only since a few years ago have scholars proclaimed a post-development age, highlighting again and again the colonial and arrogant connotations of the term development. Indeed, we should not forget that the programme, or even ideology, of development and modernization in a Western style was largely shared between the former colonial empires and some newly independent former colonies – the post-colonies. We should also not forget that the entanglement of the concepts of the Third World, dependency, and development was not just a product of European and North American experts. Scholars who claimed to be protagonists of the Global South were also part of the epistemic and ideological construct.
The paradoxes of deconstruction and perpetuation: Walter Rodney

By way of conclusion, we zoom in on the intriguing figure of Walter Rodney, who exemplifies the struggle against exploitation and Third World dependency as much as he embodies the predicament to overcome the ‘self-evident’ discourse of development. Rodney was a prominent Guyanese historian, intellectual, and political activist who was born in 1942 into a working-class family in British Guiana (now Guyana) and assassinated there in 1980. He studied at the University College of the West Indies in Jamaica and graduated with a first-class degree in history in 1963. Just three years later, Rodney received a PhD in African history at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. He became a lector and later a professor at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, which was the most important place for critical historiography in sub-Saharan Africa at the time. As a political activist, Rodney was also a strong opponent of capitalism and argued for socialist ways of development (Lewis 1994; West 2005; Bradford 2013). He was involved in the pan-African and Black Power movements and in several groups of activists against global neo-colonialism and imperialism. In 1972, Rodney published his most influential book *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (1972). Here he drew a picture of an Africa that had been exploited by European imperialism and colonialism, which had led to the underdevelopment of most of the continent.

Beyond the insightful analyses of agricultural African societies, it is remarkable that Rodney shared the common beliefs of his opponents about the existence of a First, Second, and Third World and about development as a phenomenon inseparably connected to economic progress and dependence. Rodney constantly ‘travelled’ along the crossroads of critical reflections on the ‘birth’ of the Third World and was very aware of the Eurocentric categorization of adopted concepts like dependence and development, transforming and pushing them forward into the transregional agenda of the Global South. Surprisingly, however, Rodney could not avoid using the concepts he criticized in his writings about Africa. By doing so, he consolidated and even perpetuated the theoretical entanglement of the concepts of the Third World, dependence, and (under)development. He was just one of the thousands of dedicated representatives of the Global South who stood up against Eurocentric world views and against the tendencies of spatial and regional categorizations, but he could not avoid following the dispositif of the connection between the Third World, dependency, and development. Here we can see the epistemic power of these concepts and the impossibility to communicate beyond established categories. This in turn reminds us of the ongoing need for historians, anthropologists, and economists to historicize, contextualize, and deconstruct the Third World and beliefs in dependency and development in order to establish new analytical frameworks that can lay bare transregional power relations in epistemic knowledge, discursive agendas, and policy-making.

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The invention of the Third World


Since the end of the Cold War during the late 1980s and early 1990s, scholars in a number of fields have called for new research that looks at transnational processes (e.g. Appadurai 1996; Clifford 1997), diasporic connections (e.g. Gilroy 1995; Ho 2006), and the global circulation of knowledge (e.g. Cooper and Stoler 1997; Moyn and Sartori 2013). These appeals were made with the purpose of challenging what has become known as ‘area studies’ (e.g. Szanton 2004). This post-Cold War agenda consequently reflects the new form of neo-liberal globalization that emerged in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union and much of the former socialist world, albeit with key regional exceptions such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Cuba (e.g. Harvey 2007). However, this evolving phenomenon also served as a reminder that globalization was not new but an ongoing process in the longue durée, defined by such factors as European imperialism and popular migration – forced and unforced – alike. Differences in academic discipline and method have, as a result, surfaced over the meanings of contemporary globalization. The cultural anthropologist Arjun Appadurai, for example, seeks to position present-day globalization as an intersection of older processes, such as migration, with new factors of mass communication and attendant claims of cultural universality in the name of a global ‘modernity’. Assisted by technology, individual and collective imaginations enable such sweeping affinities and connections between the local and the global to occur. This exercise of imagination, as Appadurai writes, is ‘neither purely emancipatory nor entirely disciplined but is a space of contestation in which individuals and groups seek to annex the global into their own practices of the modern’ (Appadurai 1996: 4). The historian Frederick Cooper (2001), in contrast, insists that globalization is not new and that the term ‘globalization’ itself tends to obscure the unevenness and multidirectional nature of global economic, political, and demographic processes. Too often overused, the term implies coherence and direction for widely dispersed phenomena that might be more regional and local than global and universal.

This chapter is situated within this ongoing discussion about the uses of ‘globalization’ and the significance of qualitative differences over time. It specifically examines the appearance and role of transregional formations during the period of the Cold War. Rather than construing globalization as ‘old’ or ‘new’, this chapter argues that globalization be understood as a layered phenomenon with evolving empirical differences over time. Similar to Cooper, it challenges assumptions regarding globalization as a recent phenomenon. However, rather than drawing upon an older imperial past, it examines a more recent period particularly defined by global
decolonization and the agency of newly independent nation-states to create alternative political communities. The rise of the nation-state as the principal political form during the Cold War distinguishes this half-century period from the preceding era of empires (Cooper 2005: 11–12) and a present characterized, in part, by nation-state weakness and uncertainty over its longevity (Appadurai 1996: 19). In this respect, following Appadurai, this chapter also embraces the importance of political imagination as a vital element within processes of national and transregional community building, in addition to parallel motivations of economic interest and security concerns. Such practices of vision and innovation were not fixed by the boundaries of the nation-state (Anderson 2006).

This chapter therefore confronts the epistemological limitations of area studies. Area studies – defined provisionally as the division of knowledge of the world into constituent, continentally determined parts – was established in Euro-American academia during the Cold War period of global decolonization, when a former imperial geography was disappearing and a new international order was developing, specifically through the United Nations (UN) and an escalating great power rivalry between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union. But an underlying paradox of area studies materialized during this time of political and geographic flux. Put simply, area studies marked an attempt to reclassify and stabilize the world in a manner arguably more consistent with an imperial past than with the rapid changes of a Cold War present (Dirks 2004: 355). As a result, this chapter ultimately concludes that recent calls for transregional and global analysis reflect not so much newly emergent trends in the world, but instead a long-term failure of Cold War academic knowledge and its imperial underpinnings.

**Area studies, global decolonization, and the rise of the nation-state**

In an important edited volume on the state of area studies, David Szanton argues that the broad intention of area studies in the US has been ‘to deparochialize US- and Euro-centric visions of the world in the core social science and humanities disciplines, among policy makers, and in the public at large’ (2004: 2). He further writes that area studies has been committed to generating ‘new forms of knowledge for their intrinsic and practical value’ and to decentring ‘the formulations and universalizing tendencies of the US social science and humanities disciplines which continue to draw largely on US and European experience’ (Szanton 2004: 2). While he acknowledges that these progressive intentions have not always succeeded, area studies has nevertheless remained a dynamic set of regional fields that have been internally heterogeneous, committed to local histories and cultures, and evolving in their scope, content, and method. Indeed, Timothy Mitchell suggests that a common functionalist perspective of the rise of area studies being due to US hegemony after the Second World War (e.g. Rafael 1994; Katzenstein 2001) is too monocausal and instrumental. In his view, area studies is part of a longer-term attempt ‘to create a sovereign structure of universal knowledge – itself part of the project of a globalized American modernity to which the Cold War also belonged’ (Mitchell 2004: 86). Zachary Lockman has recently concurred with a similar view, asserting that area studies cannot be reducible to ‘only, or even mainly, a Cold War form of knowledge’ but must be situated within a complex institutional landscape including philanthropic bodies and state intelligence agencies, in addition to universities (Lockman 2016: xiii). Such discussions over the complex origins, definition, and future of area studies have subsequently informed attempts at redrawing continental boundaries (Lewis and Wigen 1997), accounting for oceans as sociohistorical spaces (Bentley, Bridenthal and Wigen 2007; Greene and Morgan 2008) and reclassifying historical narratives by tracing ‘cross-cultural interactions’ to arrive at transregional perspectives (Bentley 2005: 2). These recent agendas have revisited the roles of space and scale from local to regional
and global dynamics in order to confront and build upon the gains made by area studies, rather than simply doing away with such pre-existing knowledge in a nihilistic fashion (e.g. Applegate 1999; Rafael 1999; Wigen 1999).

However, the shifting status of area studies from its bureaucratization within universities to recent crisis and redefinition over its future, is symptomatic not only of the end of the Cold War, but more importantly the failure of area studies to account for ongoing transregional global processes initiated during, not after, this period. Without question, the groundswell of global decolonization beginning in the late 1940s – most notably with the independence of India and Pakistan through partition in 1947 – transformed the existing political geography from one of empires and their colonial possessions to a new Cold War political geography of independent nation-states. These new sovereign states possessed their own agency to generate new forms of transregional political community. The UN was vital in legitimating this emergent political landscape of multiple state actors. Officially established in October 1945 following the devastation of the Second World War, the principal purpose of the UN was to prevent the occurrence of such global destruction from happening again. Indeed, tentative negotiations for the establishment of the UN as a replacement for the League of Nations (1920–1946) were initiated as early as the start of the war, with the Atlantic Charter signed by President Franklin Roosevelt of the US and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain. The Atlantic Charter set out to define the intentions of the US and Britain in the face of war, going so far as to outline eight shared principles for a post-war order. Though largely speculative in scope, given that the war was still ongoing, the Atlantic Charter in particular reinforced the idea of self-determination, albeit primarily intended for Europe, which had served as a founding principle of the League of Nations as articulated by US President Woodrow Wilson (Mazower 2012: 250). Self-determination as an idea was not exclusive to Wilson, having been embraced by other political figures such as Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin (1914 [2004]). But Wilson’s advocacy took on a life of its own, with Wilsonianism providing an international ethos that rationalized and legitimated nationalist struggles for self-determination across the world, especially those located in territories under colonial control (Manela 2007). Though anti-colonial activism had been well under way in many parts of the world, the influence of thinkers such as Wilson and Lenin, as well as institutions such as the League of Nations and the UN, sustained nationalism as the dominant force in the shaping of global politics during the twentieth century.

The emergence of anti-colonial nationalism in Africa and Asia during the early to mid-twentieth century consequently provided a key thrust for generating post-colonial geographies. Nationalism and the founding of independent nation-states comprised a crucial step in this broad process of remapping the world. It is important to stress that, given the magnitude of the topic, nationalism does not lend itself to a single framework of analysis. In truth, the problem of nationalism as a subject of study rests precisely on the diversity of forms it has taken, being dependent on factors of demography, geographic space and location, culture, and historical timing, among a number of other possibilities (Gellner 1983; Greenfeld 1992; Hobsbawm 2012). Put simply, though nationalism has become a ‘modular’ form in world politics, to cite an argument by Benedict Anderson, it is nevertheless a historical formation and is thus shaped by a range of contingencies, whether in terms of international shifts in institutions or ideologies, as mentioned, or through grass-roots conditions, which typically inform local meanings of nationalism (Anderson 2006: 137). However, while ‘primordial’ arguments have been put forward for interpreting the origins of nationalism (Smith 1986), nationalism across these continents must be recognized in the first instance as modern and primarily the outcome of Western imperialism and a logic of anti-colonialism that responded to political and economic measures that denied popular will and sovereignty (Kedourie 1970; Chatterjee 1993b). Furthermore,
such forms of nationalism must be approached as having been articulated in different ways by intellectuals who described its ‘national’ content, thus positioning such politics as qualitatively different from purely reactionary measures that sought to restore an earlier pre-colonial political order (Chatterjee 1993a).

Nationalism in Africa and Asia must also be comprehended as a process that continues after political independence. Indeed, nationalism often served to consolidate political interests and consent after decolonization, thus averting possible counter-revolutionary measures. This post-independence maturation of nationalism at times stabilized chaotic political situations in beneficial ways. At other times, it strengthened the position of ruling elites to the detriment of popular needs (Fanon 1961 [1963]; Guha 1982). Nationalism must be situated in time and place in order to grasp its significance and meaning. Moreover, such placement permits an approach for addressing how nationalism and the nation-state provided an indispensable foundation for transregional connections to emerge.

Transregional formations of the Cold War

In April 1955, delegations from 29 countries in Africa and Asia convened in Bandung, Indonesia, to confront pressing issues their continents faced during the early Cold War period. Formally called the Asian-African Conference, the Bandung Conference, as it is more commonly known, was the largest diplomatic meeting of its kind, ostensibly representing 1.4 billion people, or almost two-thirds of the world’s population by some estimates. Only the UN, which had 76 members in 1955, was larger in numeric representation and in terms of geographic magnitude. The Indonesian conference offered a global stage for such statesmen as Sukarno of Indonesia, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and Zhou Enlai of the PRC, all of whom promoted personal, national, and international interests. Sponsored by Indonesia, Burma (now also called Myanmar), Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka), India, and Pakistan, official delegations in attendance came from the PRC, Egypt, Turkey, Japan, Libya, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Nepal, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, North and South Vietnam, the Philippines, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast (present-day Ghana), Sudan, and Liberia. Though regional conflict in Southeast Asia between North and South Vietnam provided an immediate catalyst for the conference, the programme included broader issues regarding American and Soviet influence in Asia and Africa, the consequent importance of post-colonial sovereignty, and questions over the surge of decolonization, particularly in Africa. The origins and purpose of the meeting were ultimately multifaceted, geographically and politically, reflecting the expansive continental representation at hand and the political changes then occurring across the world.

The Bandung meeting also reflected the transformation of anti-colonial nationalism from a strategy to achieve nation-state sovereignty to a post-colonial discourse that enabled the building of transregional connections of political solidarity. Indeed, the continuation of anti-colonial sentiment after political independence is important to grasp, particularly for the first generation of post-colonial leaders, many of whom actively led liberation struggles. Anti-colonial nationalism as a political approach and worldview did not subside but took on a new shape to inform the international politics of the post-colonial period. Diplomatic occasions like that at Bandung occurred during a critical period of transition between colonial and post-colonial worlds, amid a passing era of European imperialism and a new era of Cold War rivalry and intervention. Post-colonial diplomacy and statecraft consequently developed during a time of both uncertainty and opportunity. These conditions perpetuated nationalism as part of a need for Asian and African countries to secure sovereignty, resist foreign intervention, and participate in the
global politics of the day more generally. The threat of neo-colonialism through trade agreements, security arrangements, and other political alignments encouraged the persistence of anti-colonial rhetoric to protect political independence. International meetings and membership in global institutions such as the UN presented public occasions for reiterating self-determination and the right to sovereignty. Additionally, post-colonial leaders substantiated these claims by enabling transregional networks of trust and community, drawing from and aggregating forms of political and economic capital. Indeed, the rapid emergence of the conference format among newly independent countries after the Second World War can be understood through these incentives, given the relative weaknesses they individually maintained as new nation-states and the immediate possibilities of collective strength through group alignments. Transregional diplomatic meetings provided alternative venues for affirming political recognition and strengthening relationships among peers, beyond the immediate purview of former colonial powers. Summitry – defined as the institutionalized practice of heads of state meeting on a routine basis – exhibited post-colonial autonomy in its most conspicuous form.

Unquestionably, the 1955 Asian-African Conference was far from isolated. Preceding and later meetings, including the 1947 Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, the 1953 Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon, the 1956 Asian Socialist Conference in Bombay (present-day Mumbai), and the 1958, 1960, and 1961 All-African People’s Conferences in Accra, Tunis, and Cairo, respectively, enabled new patterns of transregional political networking among states and remaining liberation movements during the early post-colonial period. The location of these conferences in cities in Asia and Africa indicated a new autonomous political geography that had emerged from the shadows of Western colonial rule. Yet, these meetings also continued a chronology of conferences during the early twentieth century, including the Pan-African Congresses and the 1927 League Against Imperialism convention held in Brussels, Belgium. While these preceding efforts ultimately failed, their historical significance persists due to their facilitation of geographically dispersed people to meet, converse, and produce transregional political solidarities that were anti-colonial in orientation. Though attended by persons without any official capacity, they nevertheless engaged with self-determination and acquired symbolic value through broadly conceived political imaginations anchored in shared experiences of racial discrimination, cultural prejudice, and political repression.

Post-colonial diplomacy thus highlighted a fundamental shift from these earlier events. The involvement of autonomous states facilitated a set of different possibilities to come into view that reflected political independence and the resources that went with it. Indeed, post-Second World War conferences like the Bandung meeting proved to be generative in scope, producing multiple transregional connections in their wake. If the geographic balance of the 1955 meeting tilted toward Asia, the future of Asia-Africa relations soon shifted to the African continent. Nasser positioned himself as a leader of the Third World, a status enhanced by the support Egypt garnered during the 1956 Suez Crisis. In December 1957, the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) was established in Cairo, marking a new intercontinental endeavour in the aftermath of Bandung. AAPSO had wider involvement, including a range of organizations, rather than solely official state delegations, from Asian and African countries. The conferences it organized during the late 1950s and 1960s continued the ‘Bandung spirit’ through professional exchange, cultural promotion, women’s coalitions, and youth participation. Furthermore, its meetings were held within an expanding range of locales, including Ghana, Guinea, and Tanzania. By the mid-1960s, the transregional solidarity movement had also expanded to Latin America, with the founding of the Organization of Solidarity with the People of Asia, Africa and Latin America (OSPAAAL) and the organization of the Tricontinental Conference in Havana, Cuba in 1966.
Arguably the most significant outcome during this period, however, was the birth of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned States that convened in Yugoslavia in September 1961 formalized this political coalition. Key figures included former Bandung participants such as Nehru, Nasser, and Sukarno, along with new figures such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia. Zhou and the PRC were notably absent – an indication that transregional political solidarities did not necessarily endure. In this specific case, tensions and eventually conflict – the 1962 Sino-Indian War – put an end to good relations between India and the PRC. But a second NAM conference was held in Cairo in October 1964 with delegations from 47 states in attendance, a numeric growth assigned to the wave of decolonization in sub-Saharan Africa. NAM ultimately superseded the 1955 Asian-African Conference – drawing upon it symbolically, but marking a different configuration of nation-states that would meet routinely in the decades ahead.

Conclusions

Ever since, transregional connections have continued to take form. Indeed, the birth of non-alignment symbolized the emergence of new and evolving transregional ideologies during the Cold War era. Non-alignment itself had circulated earlier as an idea before it became a transnational practice, specifically through the diplomatic efforts of Nehru and India’s UN ambassador V.K. Krishna Menon. It also originated in part from Nehru’s experience with the strategy of non-cooperation before India’s independence. Nonetheless, in addition to intercontinental Afro-Asianism, ideologies of pan-Africanism, promoted by Nkrumah, and Pan-Arabism, promoted by Nasser, marked efforts to unite different regional states under the banner of broadly construed cultural and historical identities positioned against the Euro-American West. The 1963 founding of the Organisation of African Unity (the present-day African Union) and the establishment of the United Arab Republic (1958–61), which briefly united Egypt and Syria, manifested these ideas institutionally and territorially. In a separate vein, leaders such as Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and Léopold Senghor of Senegal articulated forms of African socialism that blended local cultural practices with introduced ideologies like Maoism – yet another form of transregional intellectual and developmental exchange – which aimed to make their respective countries economically independent from former colonial powers. Overall, such transregional networks between states, institutional bodies, and varying civil rights and liberation struggles would continue – generating new forms of political community while also posing a challenge to area studies paradigms in the present.

The dynamics and composition of these forms of post-colonial transregionalism have only recently gained renewed research attention as part of an effort to historicize contemporary globalization as mentioned at the start. Concern for local languages, histories, and cultures within area studies, as cited before, has created empirical blind spots that have limited acknowledgement and understanding of these preceding transregional efforts that did not conform to either imperial or area studies frameworks of knowledge. Nevertheless, these versions of Cold War transregionalism still inform the present – from China-Africa relations to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) economic bloc. Tracing the complex genealogies of these present-day formations requires not only further empirical research but also a continuing reassessment of the epistemological limitations and failures of Cold War knowledge production in the Euro-American academy.
Decolonization and Cold War geographies

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The discussion about relevant spatial formats has become reanimated in recent years. This undoubtedly reflects the reorganization of the political and economic world order in which states, albeit still of great importance, no longer solely define the spatial order. In fact, new spatial formats, such as special economic zones, are acquiring increasing visibility and significance. The ‘discovery’ of the ‘transregional’ also occurred in this context once it became clear that globalization did not mean the end of geography. According to this extreme view that dominated in the 1990s, all previously relevant spatial formats would dissolve into a comprehensive globalism, where the only counterpole would be the local, that is the space in which the global manifested. However, this simplistic view could not account for the increasingly complex, diverse, and, at least to date, non-hierarchical spatial formats that have rapidly been emerging. Their emergence has catalysed new conflicts and challenges of orientation, such as the confrontation between new regional constellations and megacities over the control of global flows and the profits from those flows. The same applies to global governance, where new actors such as non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization coexist, cooperate, and compete with traditional state actors to advance international agreements, such as those within the framework of the United Nations system. However, varying combinations of these actors might also join forces in ad hoc coalitions or enter into alliances with semi-state actors (e.g. the United States’ alliance with Kurdish militias in the Syrian conflict) in order to realize more short-term goals. Moreover, the view that imperial regimes would, in a quasi-teleological way, be replaced by a world of democratic nation-states, in which the right to self-determination exists for all people, has proven to be unfounded. The persistence of imperial patterns (e.g. inequalities in centre–periphery relationships, including social justice issues) as well as the demand by some for a partial restoration of imperial patterns (e.g. the call for frontier zones within which individuals can be intercepted and repelled both within and beyond the clearly delineated national borders) can also be observed.

The spatial order of the early twenty-first century is by no means shaped by the actions of political actors alone. In fact, business enterprises that have networks that extend across regions are acquiring growing significance. They create production spaces and virtual spaces that span continents and initiate migrations of highly skilled workers as well as those with minimal training. However, these migrations involve more than a physical change of location; people are also moving between stations in their respective professions. This physical, economic, and social
mobility produces increasingly complex and interdependent transnational and transregional spaces. For example, when migrating workers send a portion of their earnings to their place of origin, these remittances, in turn, generate their own economic spaces.

Of particular interest for transregional studies are those spatial semantics and formats that express or bolster the trend toward the regionalization of the world and that concomitantly highlight cross-border connections between such regions. While other sections of this handbook examine relevant spatial formats (such as those arising from the actions of political actors, migrants, cultural operators, religious communities, etc.), this section concentrates on spatial semantics and formats that have a strong bearing on the contradictory (trans)regionalization of the world in the early twenty-first century.

Spaces are not simply there; they are more than the containers in which social actions and practices take place. Furthermore, they are made and irrefutably transformed by people. Nonetheless, in both the production and transformation of spaces, processes of formatting and thus distinct patterns are recognizable, which can be described as spatial formats resulting from stable practices and interactions, that is to say that have remained active and present over time and, thus, have left a footprint in the space-making processes of a society or across the borders of more than one society. The most important indicators of the emergence of new spatial formats are empirically observable, widespread changes in regionalization practices. These new spatial formats break with the heretofore accepted notions of spatial ordering and reorganize the ‘world’ to provide new perspectives on, and timely answers to, current challenges of globalization.

The contributions in this section address different variations of such transformations; they also delve into the social science concepts that have been (and are still being) used to depict changing ideas about regions and to map the transregional transcendence of space. One of the oldest of such concepts is that of civilization, which endeavours to integrate such diverse aspects as cultural imprinting, population, and territory into a cohesive narrative. In his chapter, Gilad Ben-Nun delves into the relationship of ‘civilizations’ to the division of the world into continents, being both vague and fixed in that each refers to the other. The congruence of the two concepts bears the imprint of older power relations, such as the formation of empires and the separation of the metropole from its colonies. In its eighteenth-century form, the concept of civilization became closely associated with temporalized sociocultural and economic differences. By the nineteenth century, it had become the ideological salve that allowed Europeans to justify imperialist ambitions as belonging to a ‘civilizing mission’. This imperialist perspective continues to colour contemporary attitudes about other civilizations and is reflected, at least in part, in present-day attitudes of racial superiority. It is no wonder in recent years that the concept of civilization has been the object of harsh criticism. Its continuing impact and potential perniciousness are evidenced by the intense debate surrounding Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis, that is the idea that superpower rivalry will give way to a civilizational contest between Western universalism, Islamic militancy, and Chinese assertiveness. This explanatory model, which sees the most important conflicts of the future as occurring along cultural fault lines, has over the course of the last 20 years had a tremendous impact on perceptions of transregional relationships, connections, and migrations. Within the various forms of right-wing populism that have taken shape across the globe, calls for limiting or even severing transregional connections can be heard. But, above all, right-wing populism has advanced the demand that people return to their ‘ancestral’ spaces. At the other end of the spectrum is a cosmopolitan attitude that not only sees migration as inevitable, but that also credits it with having the potential to produce new identities capable of disrupting the congruence between civilization and continent. This debate remains unresolved, but it is one that has become highly politicized and that has mobilized large groups of voters.
The chapter on Francophonie by Jürgen Erfurt describes the effort to create a non-contiguous region based on language policy and the institutions aimed at promoting that policy. This effort, which originates from the decolonization of the French Empire, gave rise to a series of comparable efforts to create a transregional spatial format based on cultural, linguistic identities, for example Hispanophone, Lusophony, and in some ways even the Commonwealth. However, this spatial format has proven fragile, experiencing multiple reformulations. This would suggest that both its founding principle and its criteria of inclusion and exclusion remain in flux. This makes this spatial format intriguing, and it has prompted state and semi-state institutions to join this effort at organizing the world across contiguous political spaces. However, it is also clear that such new spatial formats are not free of asymmetries of power.

As discussed in the next chapter by Stefan Troebst, similar challenges also apply to mesoregions, a heuristic device developed by social scientists for the purpose of analysing deterritorialized, yet time-specific, conceptual units that traverse the boundaries of states, societies, and even civilizations. It is no coincidence that this concept originated in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, an area whose history has been shaped by imperial rivalries and conquests (the most recent being its inclusion in the Soviet-led, post-1945 Eastern bloc) and by its confrontation with a ‘Europe’, whose identification with the north-west of the continent appeared firmly established. From this perspective, the development leading to the establishment of ‘areas’ is firmly grounded, on which modern regional sciences is based. All these processes of regionalization are aimed at creating demarcated units to which precisely defined characteristics can be attributed. Yet, their creation stems from an effort at positioning that also points to transregional interdependence.

Borders are not natural, but rather are the outcomes of specific historical conditions. As such, the chapter by Paul Nugent examines the multitude of borders, which can be used to distinguish territories (irrespective of size) as well as non-territorially organized spatial formats. Historically, the territories of empires were often bounded by indistinct and porous frontiers, rather than by the clearly delineated boundaries that today we imagine nation-states having. In the case of networks, borders are primarily based on function, and geography only plays a secondary role in their determination. The idea of an emerging borderless world, dominant in the 1990s, has failed to materialize. In fact, what we have seen is a process of global re-bordering. This process, long ignored by traditional area studies, led to a significant expansion in the new field of borderland studies. This new field examines the production of difference caused by transnational and transregional mobilizations and contributes to the analysis of emerging new spatial formats.

The same can be said about the study of global cities, the topic of the chapter by Ursula Rao, which builds on urban studies and on the geographic interest in megacities, but which also introduces a new theoretical framework in which global cities are part of a spatial reordering of global capitalism. Global cities, like special economic zones (examined in the next chapter), are nodal points in the transregional flows of capital and information and as such are the sites at which strategic efforts at controlling these flows take place. To attract the social groups whose skills are necessary to achieve this control, these global cities must have a broad range of functionalities, from optimal transportation linkages to a differentiated entertainment industry. Consequently, these cities are becoming, in many sectors, trendsetters of global cultural development – not least because they become hubs of transregional encounters or continue this characteristic of their history. With the migration of traditional industries from the Global North to parts of the Global South, the historic centres of capitalism are changing. Consequently, in Europe and the United States this process of transformation has been at the centre of debates on global cities and localization. Indeed, since the turn of the millennium, there has been a rapid rise in cities in the
Global South that can be classified as global cities and which, in some cases, are challenging the supremacy of Western global cities. At the same time, the concentration of the urban population in so-called megacities has abated in several places, while medium-sized cities – those with a population between half a million and a million – are experiencing the most growth. This phenomenon also points to a broadening of transregional connections, rather than their concentration in only a few places.

A similar development can be seen in the number of special economic zones, which have skyrocketed in recent years. Although these zones, which Megan Maruschke investigates in her chapter, have retained their comparative advantages over their respective hinterlands and therefore continue to attract investment and manpower, they are no longer sufficiently ‘special’ to play as dominant a role in the global economy as they did in the 1990s. Instead, a transregional web of such zones is slowly emerging that connects one with another and facilitates the formation of transregional value-added chains.

Finally, this transformation in the traditional centres of capitalism is being advanced by the development of transregional infrastructures that do not primarily serve the interests of industries in the Global North, but instead, thanks to massive Chinese investments in recent years, are introducing a new orientation. These transregional infrastructures facilitate the emergence of a new, multipolar type of transregional economic relations, and as the lifelines of a transregionally interconnected world, concomitantly strengthen the corridors through which they pass. Infrastructures of transportation and communication are essential for transregional processes, as Uwe Müller argues in his chapter. They are more often transregional than worldwide, gaining a prominent place in narratives of globalization. In fact, they connect regional centres of production and hubs of transregional trade rather than simply making the world one homogeneous space. Historically, although certain infrastructures emerged within a relatively short period of time (e.g. the railway system), they determine for a much longer period where transregional ties are woven and where not. Infrastructures obviously connect as well as leave holes of disconnected regions.
The terminological problems implied in the concepts of ‘continents’ and ‘civilizations’

Since classical antiquity, the terminological construction of geography has divided subject matters into two conceptual groupings: geographical containers and their ontological content matters. Containers are demarcated special realms. Contents are the objects existing within these demarcated special containers, be they natural or human-made.

Regions, countries, continents, cities, or areas such as ‘the tropics’ (between the Cancer and Capricorn latitudes) are all containers. Mountains, rivers, architectural objects, peoples, tribes, animals, and flowers are all content matters, placed as they are within geographical containers. Continents, as in Africa, Asia, and Europe, are commonly referred to as ‘spatial containers’. Civilizations, such as Western, Chinese, and Islamicate, are commonly seen as ‘contents’ within continental containers, as in ‘Western culture’, which is situated in Europe and North America.

This chapter examines the intellectual weaknesses inherent in the constitution of ‘continents’ as legitimate containers and ‘civilizations’ as their respective content matters. It makes an important contribution to the study of transregionalism by uncovering how distortions borne by the terms ‘continents’ and ‘civilizations’ prevent us from treating different world regions and cultures as being comparable. As this chapter demonstrates, both terms are laden with Eurocentric and indeed colonial connotations, thus rendering them flawed for the promotion of self-reflective area studies. Given the improbability of a terminological return to the usage of concepts such as ‘regions’ and ‘cultures’, the chapter provides a conclusion with some ideas on how to better formulate our usage of these terms.

As Lewis and Wigen argue, the viability of continents as legitimately discernible geographical containers is highly questionable (1997). Contrary to objective criteria such as geographical navigational coordinates or long-standing recognized regions (‘the Sahara’ or ‘Khorasan’), the continent is a deeply contested concept because these ‘containers’ lack any common definition. As Hodgson points out, while ‘Europe’ is in fact an indivisible part of the ‘Afro-Eurasian landmass’, it

is still ranked as one of the “continents” . . . . By making it a “continent” we give it a rank disproportionate to its natural size . . . . we thus justify ourselves in evaluating
Gilad Ben-Nun

it on a far more detailed scale than other areas . . . . Western Europe may be admitted to be small geographically, but all history is made to focus there.

(Hodgson 1993: 4)

No less problematic is the term ‘civilization’ as opposed to ‘culture’. As Fisch masterfully demonstrates, whereas both terms were synonymous in their linguistic usage for almost a thousand years, from the late seventeenth century onwards – and especially during the nineteenth century – the notion of civilization has been inextricably associated with the claim for European cultural superiority over all other cultures (Fisch 1992: 773). In crude opposition to the term ‘culture’, ‘civilization’ implies a hierarchical ordering of the world’s societies, with European culture at their helm and Australian aboriginal culture down at the bottom. This view of Europe’s alleged superiority has also manifested itself in the shifting of the focal points of maps and geographical imagery. Europe now located itself at the centre of world maps, with Mercator’s projection conveniently, and artificially, dwarfing the size of other world regions – most notably Africa and South America – in favour of the Northern hemisphere (Hodgson 1993: 29–34).

In the late twentieth century, this false imagery would become intimately related to the Huntingtonian notion of ‘the clash of civilizations’. Its correlative underlying assumption conflates civilizations with living creatures, thus endowing them with facultative powers so as to actively ‘clash’ with one another (Huntington 1993, 1998). The possibility is grossly undercontemplated that ‘civilizations’ – such as ‘the West’ or ‘Islam’ occupying, as it were, continents such as ‘Europe’ or ‘Asia’ – might in fact amount to intellectually dishonest euphemisms of imagined entities that ontologically do not exist.

The dualistic legacy of antiquity: scientific versus narrative geography

In his seminal study of Greco-Hellenistic and Roman geography, van Paassen distinguishes between two fundamentally different strata of the geographical ordering of knowledge by the ancients: scientific geography and narrative geography (van Paassen 1957: 33–64). Aristotle’s Meteorology served as the intellectual bedrock for scientific geography, with its first theoretical division of the Earth into lateral climatic regions. Aristotle’s successor, Eratosthenes, was the recognized ‘father’ of geography, the one who allegedly first coined this term. Eratosthenes was also the first paradigmatic protagonist of the ‘scientific geographical’ stratum, thanks to his ground-breaking articulation of mathematical-geodetic measurement methodology (Romm 2010).

Some four centuries after Eratosthenes, Ptolemy built upon his predecessor’s geodetic achievements to elaborate what was to become the geographical gold standard of knowledge for almost a thousand years. Rather than Eratosthenes’ original five, the Ptolemaic world projection now included seven climatic zones (klimata). This was complemented by the first exhaustive attempt to order the known world into geodetic containers, defined through an extensive set of coordinates. It was in these rubrics that the world’s contents, both natural (e.g. mountains, rivers) and human-made (e.g. cities, famous buildings, cultures), were set.

Narrative geography – also referred to by van Paassen as ancient geography’s ‘historical tradition’ – essentially mixed fact and fable (van Paassen 1957: 65–198). Texts under this stratum departed from strict tenets of scientifically proven content matter. They then mixed established geographical data with fictional and imaginary materials, such as fabled animals and Homeric literary characters, working in their imagined geographical whereabouts. Romm considers Herodotus to be the ancestral forefather of this school, with Isocrates and Haecateus as his successive ‘narrative geographers’ (Romm 2010: 259–62).
The most paradigmatic protagonist of this stratum during late antiquity was Strabo of Amasia (Dueck 2011). Strabo’s most significant contribution lies in filling the containers already established by his predecessors from the scientific geographical school with narratives and geographical contents. While his long survey of peoples, places, and cultural objects – some real and verified, others mystical and magical – resulted partly from information gathered during his own travels, much of the survey results were anecdotal and based upon custom and local tradition.

At the heart of the division between ‘scientific’ and ‘narrative’ geographers lay the criteria according to which one determined what ought to be regarded as legitimate content matter. Scientific geographers tended to exclude materials they could not independently verify. In contrast, narrative geographers were far more accommodating as to what they deemed worthy of inclusion in their accounts. Nevertheless, toward the end of antiquity, the ordering of geographical knowledge was certainly not exclusive to any of these schools.

Populated by the known cultures of the world, Ptolemy’s ‘climatic zones’ bore a striking resemblance to the cultures mentioned in Strabo’s accounts some two centuries earlier. Thus, they provided a synthesis of the scientific and narrative geographical strata under the ancients (Dueck 2010: 240–1). At its peak, Hellenistic geographical knowledge featured a mixture of discernible knowledge with Homeric and biblical mythical accounts describing what exists in each climatic zone (Yearwood 2014: 335). This amalgamation of scientific and narrative geographical knowledge was largely adopted without alteration by subsequent generations of Eastern Roman and Byzantine thinkers; however, the notion of ‘continents’ certainly befitted the narrators of geography more than its scientists.

With Roman geographers largely engaged in practical applications of geography – as in developing maritime navigational charts and roads to facilitate the governance of their empire – ‘few Romans concerned themselves with continental divisions’ (Yearwood 2014: 334). The ancient ‘continents’, as in ‘Europe’, ‘Asia’, and ‘Libya’ (later ‘Africa’), were inconsequential, useless concepts for the Romans since they could not cover the entire territorial scope of the world, but merely indicate some of its better-known parts (Lewis and Wigen 1997: 23). Their terminological usefulness was no more than that of the most generic coordinates – north, south, east, and west. They certainly did not qualify as legitimate geographical containers because they lacked any sort of objectively verifiable definition (Yearwood 2014: 332).

Islamicate ‘scientific geography’ under Al-Biruni and Al-Idrisi: bearers of the Greek torch

The term ‘Islamicate’ was first coined by Marshall Hodgson to denote a larger cultural-geographical scope than that implied by the terms ‘Arab’ or ‘Muslim’. Much of what we today refer to as ‘Arab science’ was in fact undertaken by non–Arabs (in the strict sense of this ethnic term), and in many cases by non-Muslim thinkers, all of whom resided and operated under the aegis of Muslim cultural influence and political rule (Hodgson 1972: 59). The shift of scientific leadership – from Latinized Hellenism toward the Islamicate world from the eighth century onwards – brought about a further sharpening of the distinctions between scientific and non-scientific geographical knowledge. A comparison between the most advanced stage of third-century Hellenistic geography (Ptolemy) and early thirteenth-century Islamicate geographical knowledge (Al-Biruni and Al-Idrisi) is impressive in two regards.

First is the qualitative change in the nature of geographic containers. In 1025, Al-Biruni completed his important treatise On the Determination of the Coordinates of Cities, where he explained for the first time his geometrical method for measuring heights and the Earth’s
circumference (Al-Khalili 2012: 181–8). Thanks to Al-Biruni’s revolutionary geodetic measurements and his breakthroughs in mathematics and surface geometry, geographical knowledge now acquired a truly global purview. His measurement of the Earth’s full circumference, in addition to his measurement of heights (hitherto unattainable), catapulted scientific geography into the three-dimensional realm we know today.

Al-Biruni supplemented his mathematical-geographical writings with a vast corpus of works in which he attempted to compile all the socio-anthropological knowledge he could acquire concerning the peoples and cultures which, to the best of his knowledge, inhabited the world (Starr 2013). Of these works, only his *Chronology of Ancient Nations* and his *History of India* have been translated (Al-Biruni 1879, 1888). In these works, Al-Biruni’s depiction of other cultures was always strictly descriptive and non-judgemental. They included only information he unequivocally verified, either through his own first-hand experiences during his extensive travels, or through cross-examining and comparing materials against other credible sources.

He repeatedly demarcated ‘regions’ by mentioning their urban centres, together with the coordinates of these centres and their peripheral delimitations. His optical perspective, which now comprised the entirety of the Afro-Eurasian landmass, precluded the usage of the term ‘continent’. This term hardly appears in Al-Biruni’s works owing to the fact that it lacked any scientific qualities and, as such, was useless to his scientific purposes.

His scientificness comes across sharply in the geographical predictions he did allow himself to make. His first prediction – which would materialize under Portuguese navigator Bartolomeu Dias some 450 years later – envisages the existence of a maritime link between the Indian and Atlantic oceans, around the Cape of Good Hope (Hall 1998: 38). His second prediction is even more outstanding as he foresees the existence of an additional landmass between the eastern shores of China and the western coast of the Iberian peninsula – thus anticipating the existence of the American landmasses in the Western hemisphere (Starr 2013: 375–8).

Al-Biruni’s radical transformation of the geodetic foundations of geography opened the door for the second major breakthrough of Islamicate geography, two centuries later: the creation of the first science-based comprehensive world map, the Tabula Rogeriana. Undertaken by Muhammad al-Idrisi upon the invitation of the Christian Sicilian king, this remarkable world map consisted of clearly demarcated climatic zones, with defined regions and subregions. They covered the entire Afro-Eurasian landmass, from the Iberian peninsula’s west coast up to the Chinese eastern shoreline, along with the islands of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea (Khair et al. 2005: 92).

The exaltation of verifiable coordinates alongside Al-Idrisi’s map significantly advanced land and maritime navigation capabilities across the Mediterranean and Indian oceans because they provided a visual connection of that entire space and its trade routes (Hall 1998). The Tabula Rogeriana would turn out to represent the most advanced corpus of geographical knowledge for roughly 400 years, until it was replaced by Waldseemüller’s map of 1507 (Yearwood 2014: 342).

The gleaming absence of any reference to ‘Asia’ or ‘Europe’ in Al-Idrisi’s table of contents is striking. When ‘East Africa’ was mentioned sporadically, it denoted a region then detailed with known places of human habitation, mountain ranges, plains, and the like (Jaubert 1836: 26). Other content matters within Al-Idrisi’s geographical containers also included socio-anthropological knowledge, as he told his readers he had decided to include in his work ‘the arts and customs in which peoples excelled, their articles of export and import . . . the state of populations, their exterior appearance, their mores, their customs, their religions, clothing and speech’ (Khair et al. 2005: 92).

The advancement in the nature of geographical knowledge under the Islamicate vanguard was the result of a combination of factors. The rapid spread of Islam ‘from Morocco to Java
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and from Kazan to Zanzibar’ resulted in its direct contact with the great Greek and Roman centres of learning: Alexandria, Edessa, Jerusalem, and Damascus (Hodgson 1993: 15). Rather than destroy these learning centres (as was done in much of Vandal North Africa and Germanic Transalpine Europe), Islam embraced and cherished them. The Islamic conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries could well be considered among the most tolerant geopolitical transformations ever experienced.

Recent archaeological surveys and the introduction of biochemical methods into contemporary archaeology have drastically recalibrated our understanding of the transition from Byzantine to Islamicate rule (Avni 2014: 11–39). Contrary to the exacerbated portrayals of havoc in contemporary medieval chronicles, excavations in more than 400 archaeological sites in the Near East over the past two decades have yielded neither traces of destruction nor carbon imprints that could point to arson. Instead, new Byzantine churches, including a new wing of Jerusalem’s Church of the Holy Sepulchre, were constructed after the Arab conquest of Jerusalem (Avni 2014: 128–30). The Arab conquest also brought about the renewal of Jewish life in Jerusalem, and the construction of the first synagogue in this city after over four centuries of Roman and Byzantine prohibition (Avni 2014: 308).

The transregional shifts that did take place were mostly related to trade. While, for instance, wine and olive oil used to be exported west toward Greece and Cyprus, agricultural exports now shifted east, toward new destinations within the Muslim hemisphere. These included Iraq and Egypt, with newly grown crops such as cotton and citrus fruits (Avni 2014: 194–207).

The tolerance amid the Islamic conquests of the seventh century ensured that the Hellenistic heritage of learning would continue. By the mid-eighth century, the translation of Greek knowledge into Arabic in the newly established Abbasid capital of Baghdad was well under way (Gutas 1998). The majority of the early translators were not Muslim, but rather Syriac Christians, Mesopotamian Jews, and Persian Zoroastrians, whose linguistic knowledge and intellectual merits earned them a respected welcome in the Abbasid courts (Al-Khalili 2012: 35–48). One important example of this trend was the translation of Ptolemy’s geographical and astronomical works by the Jewish Persian sage Rabban al-Tabari, which appeared in Baghdad in the early ninth century (Al-Khalili 2012: 44–5; Gutas 1998: 161–2).

Facilitating the Arabic translation movement – and the related Islamicate learning spree – was yet another transregional development, this time in the form of a technological medium: paper. Arab armies first came into contact with Chinese paper following the Abbasid victory over Chinese armies near Samarkand. Soon, Baghdad saw the construction of multiple paper mills along the banks of the Tigris (Al-Khalili 2012: 43). The oldest surviving (1325) manuscript of Al-Idrisi’s Book of Roger, deposited at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, is made of 353 sheets of the very same cotton-based paper the Arabs borrowed from the Chinese (Jaubert 1836: 24).

Al-Biruni and Al-Idrisi’s achievements must be seen within their transregional biographical contexts. Al-Biruni was born in Khiva and educated in Persia, and yet worked in what is today Afghanistan and travelled extensively between Byzantium and India. Al-Idrisi was born in what is today Morocco, and studied in Spain. The multicultural and multilingual palace of Christian King Roger of Sicily – and his warm welcome to this great Muslim scholar – furnished Al-Idrisi with the material resources and scientific environment he required for the creation of his world map.

By the fifteenth century, Al-Idrisi’s Arabic text, which initially accompanied the Tabula Rogeriana, had ceased to be translated from the Arabic into the European vernacular languages (Drecoll 2000: 59). The images in Al-Idrisi’s maps – massively reproduced thanks to the invention of the printing press – became the testimony of a bygone multicultural and multilingual world where a Christian monarch could commission a Muslim scholar to compose a world
view, accompanied by a multilingual index. With Al-Idrisi’s text and its scientific geographical containers and contents now lost, narrative geographical concepts plagued with political myths placing Europe centre stage (as with Jerusalem in early medieval maps) returned to the fore.

The fallacies of ‘the West’: ‘the clash of civilizations’ revisited

The terminological shift from Al-Biruni and Al-Idrisi’s geographical containers (‘climatic regions’) to ‘continents’ happened in tandem with the infusion of the term ‘civilization’ with a hierarchy qualifying and ranking different ‘cultures’. The notion of ‘continents’, rejected by scientific geographers from Ptolemy to Al-Idrisi, came to the fore with the rise of European map production from the sixteenth century onwards. Under these Eurocentric maps, Al-Biruni’s ‘Khorasan’, ‘Timurid lands’ (Khiva and Samarkand), and ‘land of the Baluch’ (Baluchistan) could now be reduced to geographical containers such as ‘Central Asia’. Non-Muslims aside, Al-Biruni’s long exposition of the different Islamic strata of Sunna, Shi’a, Ismailli, Druz, Alawite, and Sufi religious cultures and their geographical locations could now be bulked together as the ‘Islamic civilization’.

To this, one must add the sociolinguistic developments the terms ‘civilization’ and ‘culture’ would undergo between the eighteenth and late twentieth centuries (Fisch 1992: 731–74). As Fisch so eloquently notes, the ancient Greeks did not possess either of these words, since both originated from Latin (Fisch 1992: 682–9). During the Middle Ages and up until the eighteenth century, the words were synonymous and merely came to denote human-made achievements over nature, much in line with Geertz’s usage of the term ‘culture’ (Geertz 1973). Indeed, neither Al-Biruni nor Al-Idrisi ascribed any qualitative difference between these terms; they simply made use of the Arabic *thaqafa* (ثقافة), properly translated as ‘culture’.

As Fisch clearly shows, the Eurocentric overtones implied in ‘civilization’, and the very clear hierarchical qualitative order that it assumes concerning the world’s diverse cultures, are relatively new etymological developments. These developments are mostly associated with nineteenth-century colonialism, and especially with Otto von Bismarck’s 1884–5 Berlin Conference, held in order to partition Africa under the hands of European military powers (Fisch 1992: 745). This linguistic historical perspective helps explain why the founders of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) opted to do away with the term ‘civilization’ and its negative colonial implications, instead choosing to use ‘culture’ in the name of the new UN agency (Fisch 1992: 773).

According to Hodgson, ‘[t]erms are the units by which one constructs one’s propositions, the terms one uses determine the categories by which one orders a field’ (Hodgson 1972: 45–6). It is here that one should contemplate Samuel Huntington’s tacit choice of terminology, which facilitated the rise of his false and dangerous concepts. ‘The clash of civilizations’ is thus premised upon a nineteenth-century ‘electrical charging’ of the term ‘civilization’ with violent colonial overtones, coupled with a clear hierarchical supremacy attributed to ‘the West’. It then calls for a corresponding static geographical container in the form of ‘continents’, so as to create seemingly real ‘fault lines’ between civilizations. Housed within ‘continents’, they are now objectivized by their seemingly innocent and ‘scientific’ representation on a map (Huntington 1993: 30).

In its most developed and vicious form, Huntington’s theory falsely construes six ‘cultural contents’ (Islamic, Sinnic, etc.), set within their respective ‘continental containers’ in the author’s well-known map of civilizations (Huntington 1998: 26–7). The icing on the cake of this fallacy then calls for its embellishment with factual data, such as demographics, statistics, and gross domestic product figures, so as to further obfuscate the theory’s pseudoscientific foundations (Huntington 1993: 27–8).
The cardinal term underpinning the entire Huntingtonian worldview is ‘the West’, which now, as if scientifically established, is pitted against everyone else as in ‘the West against the Rest’ (Huntington 1993: 39–41). Hodgson’s thoughts regarding the term ‘the West’, drafted some three decades before Huntington’s writing, are worth noting here:

[All the lands of the ‘mainstream’ are sometimes identified with the ‘West’. Classical Greece is called ‘Western’, though Byzantine Greece is often included in the ‘East’ . . . . All the other civilizations of the Eastern Hemisphere are lumped together under the heading ‘East’ [or] ‘Orient’. This concept in history is the equivalent of the concept ‘Asia’ in geography. It enables us to set up our West as conceptually equivalent to all other civilized regions taken together – ‘Asia’. . . . Hence such a conception of Eurasia allows us to erect a classic ethnocentric dichotomy in the main part of the world – ourselves and the others, Jews and Gentiles, Greeks and Barbarians, ‘West’ and ‘East’.

(Hodgson 1993: 7)

The widespread usage of the terms ‘continents’ and ‘civilizations’ represents a scientifically retrograde step in our geographical and geopolitical terminologies. ‘Continents’ as overstretched, undefined landmass containers and ‘civilizations’ with their intrinsic etymological Eurocentrism are not qualitatively different from the magical creatures Strabo chose to include in his writings. That terms such as these – which the Islamicate scientific geographers rejected outright due to their lack of scientific merit – predicate mainstream terminology in our age of the so-called ‘triumph of the sciences’ questions just how ‘developed’ this world view really is.

So where to from here? A good starting point would be to reduce our tendencies for generalization in favour of precision. Here, an increase in the usage of the terms ‘regions’ and ‘cultures’ would do well. Where a reference to continents is obligatory, one could opt for the UN subdivisions based upon more specific regional groupings, such as ‘Southern Asia’ or ‘West Africa’. Concerning ‘civilizations’, one would be better off with Toynbee’s division into 21 world cultures, rather than Huntington’s reductio ad absurdum of six civilizations. Scholars would do well to exhume Toynbee’s eight-volume masterpiece, or even its abridgement, and reintroduce it to their students (Toynbee 1987). A further blessing would be to finally translate all the works of Al-Biruni and Al-Idrisi, and more importantly their geographical treatises. Their scientific geographical objectivity is in bitter need of resuscitation in our day and age.

**Select bibliography**


In August 2014, the influential French intellectual Jacques Attali submitted a report to François Hollande, president of France, titled *La francophonie et la francophilie, moteurs de croissance durable* (Francophonie and Francophilia, a driving force for sustainable growth). The opening synopsis began with two claims – the meaning of which, and even more so the relationship between, was not immediately apparent: ‘The economic potential of the French-speaking world is enormous and insufficiently exploited by France. The ongoing effacement of national borders requires identifying other criteria of belonging: language and culture now constitute the new geography.’ The report aimed to demonstrate to French government representatives how ‘Francophonie and Francophilia’ could serve to advance the economy and social development. The report made 53 recommendations on the role of state, the French language, and Francophonie in securing economic growth. The final recommendation (no. 53) proposed abolishing the politically oriented International Organization of La Francophonie (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, OIF) and replacing it with a francophone economic union modelled on the European Union.

This chapter takes as its subject the phenomenon of ‘Francophonie’ in relation to transregional processes. This includes determining what ‘francophonie’ means and how it can be represented in the context of language and culture as well as the constitution of spaces. It goes without saying that the concept of language, for this purpose, cannot be reduced to a system of signs and rules, as typically done in twentieth-century mainstream linguistic studies. Rather, language is explained as a form of human activity that is embodied in linguistic action. This conception encompasses language for the purpose of ‘communication’ and ‘demarcation’ (Kremnitz 2001) as well as language as ‘symbolic power’ and as ‘market’ (Bourdieu 2001).

**What does ‘francophonie’ mean?**

Having been assigned a multitude of meanings in various contexts, the term ‘francophonie’ has caused much confusion. To alleviate this problem, the journal *L’année francophone international* (AIF) delineated in 1994 the following meanings:
a) *La francophonie*, spelled with a lowercase ‘f’, signified populations or groups of speakers who always or sometimes use French to communicate with others in their daily lives (Viatte 1969; Chaudenson and Rakotomalala 2004; Castellotti 2013; Klinkenberg 2015).

b) *La Francophonie*, spelled with an uppercase ‘F’, referred to all governments, nations, or institutions that utilize French in their work and/or in their relations with other nations. Nowadays, this term is used almost exclusively to denote the OIF (Tétu 1992; Provenzano 2011).

c) *Espace(s) francophone(s)* differs from both the above definitions in that its meaning is neither geographically, politically, nor linguistically determined. Instead, its meaning is cultural, encompassing all those who demonstrate or express an affinity for the French language or for francophone cultures, regardless of their actual heritage (Slavic, Latin, Germanic, Creole, etc.). Thus, with this definition, the anthropological dimension of cultural identification acquires a special significance.

Since this elucidation, the AIF’s system of definitions has found widespread acceptance and has been repeated in numerous works. However, its suitability for scientific description is limited (Erfurt 2013), especially when it entails making French-speaking populations the focus of transregional research. One must also keep in mind that ‘francophonie’ is a zone of cultural contact and of pluri-/multilingualism (Bisanswa and Tétu 2003). For example, in many African countries, whose official or co-official language is French, large parts of the population have little or no knowledge of the French language, meaning, as a phenomenon, that francophonie is one of social elites.

**Languages and spaces**

Do languages have space or territory? The French linguist Jean Sibille (2013: 53) provides two answers. First, he states that languages a priori have no territory; the only place they occupy is in the human brain. His second answer suggests the exact opposite. A language, he asserts, requires a territory, mediated by its speakers; a language’s territory consists of those areas where the people who speak that language live. But even this answer is inadequate, given that technological innovations – for example, book printing, printing press, radio, film, television, and the Internet – have increasingly deterritorialized language. Linguistic artefacts, such as books, newspapers, and other texts, circulate across borders and can be read in the most remote areas of the world. Radio, film, and television, whose initial range was local, now reach global audiences via the Internet, and the Internet has qualitatively and quantitatively transformed communication. It has generated new communicative methods (e.g. email, instant messaging, blogs, social networks, etc.) and advanced the dissemination of languages, so long as the respective language groups have access to this form of communication. This dissolution of linguistic barriers and growth in networking between speakers of different languages has been paralleled by immense growth in human migration and mobility. This change, according to Anthony Giddens (1990), Doreen Massey (2005), and others, has resulted in a ‘high degree of space-time compression’. The linguistic and cultural anthropologist Marco Jacquemet described the consequences of this phenomenon as follows:

This compression has transformed the geography of social relations and communication, leading many scholars to focus their studies on the transnational nature of late-modern communicative environments. These studies have linked the emergence of transnationalism with the post-industrial wave of migration, a wave characterized by people able to forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations across geographic, cultural, and political borders.

(2010: 50)
To describe this growing diversity, taking place particularly in urban spaces, Steven Vertovec (2007) coined the concept of ‘super-diversity’. Spaces, even those of languages, are created by human activities. As Henri Lefebvre (1974) showed, people appropriate spaces; since antiquity, this appropriation has manifested itself as the ‘mastery’ of space, which in the modern era has become even more pronounced.

The reconfiguration of space in colonialism and imperialism

Robert Phillipson (2012: 203ff.) offers numerous examples of how, since the time of the Roman Empire, the conquest of territories has been secured through the dissemination of the conqueror’s language and the suppression – and oftentimes eradication – of indigenous languages. Already in 1492 – a historically momentous year marking the official end of the Reconquista of the Iberian Peninsula and the beginning of ‘New World’ conquest – the importance of language for the empire had been recognized. In the prologue of his Gramática Castellana, dedicated to the Castillian Queen Isabella, Antonio de Nebrija wrote: ‘Language has always been the consort of empire, and forever shall remain its mate.’ Nebrija’s words proved prophetic. The European powers – first Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands and later Germany, Belgium, and Italy – conquered or acquired geographic spaces in the ‘New World’ and utilized language as a means of control. Colonial expansion led to what Daniel Schreier describes as ‘an explosion of space’ (2010: 451ff.), which had a profound impact on the domain of language. In the new territories, European languages – such as Spanish, Portuguese, English, and French – coexisted alongside indigenous languages and sometimes other colonizing languages. However, they did not share the same status. The colonizing languages were used for administration, military, and other official domains; mastering the colonizer’s language was essential for the upward mobility of colonial subjects. In contrast, indigenous languages were socially marginalized, devalued, and excluded from important language domains. According to Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson (2010), a line aimed at ‘cultural homogenization’ extended from colonialism to linguistic imperialism to corporate globalization; the result has been the endangerment or extinction of many languages (Calvet 1974; Skutnabb-Kangas 2000). The past provides an exception to this model; at the end of the eighteenth century, the Habsburg monarchy recognized the languages spoken in its multiethnic empire and advanced multilingualism – this model later would inform Soviet language policy (Budach, Erfurt and Kunkel 2008). Since the 1980s, Francophonie has also taken a new direction, in contradistinction to its traditional approach, that is the marginalization of other languages. Instead, it has recognized linguistic diversity in francophone spaces and promoted African and creole languages as part of francophonie plurielle (Chaudenson 2001).

Francophonie and other ‘phonies’

Similar to France, other European powers in the post-colonial era have utilized their national languages as a cultural resource for redefining international relations and linguistic spaces (Wright 2004; Mufwene 2008). Emerging from the British colonial empire, the Commonwealth is an association that today includes 53 states, accounting for roughly 2.2 billion people. In its social, economic, and demographic composition, the Commonwealth is as heterogeneous as the OIF. Although a past colonial tie to Great Britain is the primary criterion for membership in the Commonwealth, its membership is not synonymous with the Anglophone world. The United States (US) – independent from Great Britain since 1776 and the largest English-speaking nation in the world – is not a member of the Commonwealth, nor is the Republic of Ireland,
which won its independence from Great Britain in 1921. The Commonwealth also differs from
the OIF, in that it places a stronger emphasis on economic and commercial relations than does
its French counterpart.

Lusophony is mainly a legacy of Portuguese colonialism and consists of those states whose
official language is Portuguese. Its institutional pillar, the Community of Portuguese Language
Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, CPLP), was founded in Lisbon
in July 1996 and was modelled on Francophonie. It is worth noting the remarkable demo-
graphic relationship that exists between the motherland of Portugal and its former colonies.
Portugal has an estimated population of 10 million, while Brazil’s population is roughly 205
million; Angola’s population is 24 million and Mozambique’s is 25 million. Also falling within
Lusophony is Equatorial Guinea, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe, East
Timor, and Macao (in China).

The Arab League, unlike the Commonwealth, Francophonie, or CPLP, consists of 22 states
situated within a geographically compact region. Initially called the League of Arab States, it
was founded in March 1945 in the wake of the collapse of colonialism in the region. Other
countries from the Middle East, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa have since joined the
alliance first created by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and North Yemen. In con-
trast to its French and Portuguese counterparts, the Arab League is not an instrument for the
dissemination of the Arabic language.

The 21 nations that once made up the Spanish colonial empire and in which Spanish remains
the official or co-official language have no organizational structures comparable to the OIF or
CPLP. That said, hispanophone – analogous to francophone – is gaining widespread accept-
able as the designation for Spanish-speaking nations and cultures. At the same time, the older
designation of *Hispanidad* is rejected in most Latin American nations because of its associa-
tion with Francisco Franco’s fascist regime (Valle 2007).

In 1991, five independent Turkic- (and Russian-) speaking nations – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – were formed following the Soviet Union’s disso-
lution. The next year, the leaders of these new nations, along with President Turgut Özal of the
Republic of Turkey, met in Ankara for the First Summit of the Presidents of Turkic Speaking
States. The goal of the Summit was to create a community dedicated to the development of
linguistic-cultural, economic, and political ties between Turkic-speaking states on the basis of
their shared cultural and linguistic heritage. In 2009, this goal was finally realized when at the
Ninth Summit of the Presidents of the Turkic Speaking States a treaty was signed establishing
a permanent structure for the cooperation of Turkic states – the Cooperation Council of the
Turkic Speaking States (Turkic Council 2017).

In addition to the language communities discussed above, Russian, German, Chinese, and
Dutch number among those languages that are spoken in multiple states and act as identifi-
ers between communities. Russian is widely spoken in many of the 15 successor states of the
Soviet Union, while German is an official language in five countries and is spoken by minority
populations in more than 25 states. With over 1 billion speakers, the Chinese languages are the
most widely used languages in the world; in addition to China, they are commonly practised
in Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, as well as in other destination countries of migra-
tion. Finally, in this framework, one must also mention Dutch. The Dutch Language Union
(Nederlandse Taalunie, NTU) consists of the Netherlands (including the ABC [Aruba, Curacao,
and Bonaire] islands), Flanders (Belgium), and Suriname, as well as having contacts with South
Africa and Namibia. Yet, none of these linguistic spaces and alliances posses the same high
degree of institutional organization or structures as Francophonie, and thus their ability to dis-
seminate the language and culture associated with the ‘new geography’ pales in comparison.
Globalization and languages

Salikoko Mufwene, a linguistics professor at the University of Chicago, draws parallels between English as the new language of globalization and Latin as an ‘earlier example of a “global language”’ (2008: 36) in order to differentiate the concept of ‘world English(es)’ from that of ‘global English’. He defines ‘world English(es)’ as the diverse and legitimate variations in modern English as spoken around the world today. Thus, ‘world English(es)’ or ‘glocalized English’ describes a phenomenon comparable to the variations in spoken Latin that developed in Europe after the collapse of the Roman Empire. European elites spoke classical Latin, while the common people in different regions used various vulgarized Latin(s) that evolved into the modern Romance languages. In contrast, ‘global English’ signifies English as a universal language; it assumes that as globalization advances English will become the world vernacular. Mufwene dismisses this claim by showing that neither the history of Latin nor of English supports an evolution toward linguistic uniformity.

These discussions of the relationship between globalization and languages have led to the emergence of two paradigms, with some overlap between the two. The first paradigm emphasizes the growing dissemination of English while also acknowledging Mufwene’s distinction between ‘global’ and ‘glocalized English(es)’. In keeping with this first paradigm, Anglophone nations, such as the United States and Great Britain, have downplayed in recent years the need for state school systems to teach foreign languages. The second paradigm highlights growing heterogeneity and ‘super-diversity’; thus it prioritizes the promotion of multilingualism for individuals and societies as well as in media spaces (Blommaert 2010; Blommaert and Dong 2010). Proponents of this approach stress the significance of supranational language and education policies, such as those of the Council of Europe, whose aim is to promote plurilingual and pluricultural competence (e.g. Coste, Moore and Zarate 2009). Jonathan Pool details ‘strategies for a panlingual globalization’ that utilize new technological possibilities for developing multilingual translation programmes (2010). Within this multilingual paradigm, the central role of English as an ‘additional language’ remains indisputable. The central questions for this paradigm are rather the following: Which domains will the various languages occupy? Which communicative functions will they have? And with respect to the first question, how will they compete? Mufwene and Vigouroux (2014: 18) point out that in Africa the colonizing languages of English, French, and Portuguese have not replaced African languages for two reasons. First, the African languages occupy different domains from the colonizing languages, and second, the colonizing languages are limited to social elites.

Francophone spaces and transregional processes

The following section details two transregional dynamics with reference to francophone spaces. The first dynamic concerns the ‘nationalization’ of the Francophonie and its emergence as a global actor. The second dynamic relates to mobility and migration, specifically how they create new systems of space and language. By no means do these two dynamics represent all transregional dynamics, but for reasons of space, other dimensions of transregional processes (e.g. military and economic) cannot be discussed here.

Processes of institutionalization and the reorganization of political spaces

As noted above, the term ‘Francophonie’ is widely used to denote the OIF – an international organization, which now (October 2017) includes 84 states and governments. Of those, 54 are
classified as member states, four as associate member states, and 26 have observer status (Thailand’s observer status was suspended in 2014). Since its founding in 1997, the OIF has absorbed many earlier Francophone organizations and associations, including the Agency of Cultural and Technological Cooperation (Agence de coopération culturelle et technique, ACCT, est. 1970), the Association of Partially or Entirely French-Speaking Universities (Association des universités partiellement ou entièrement de langue française, AUPELF, est. 1961), TV5 Monde (est. 1984), and many others. The Summit, the OIF’s highest-ranking authority, meets biennially and brings together the heads of states and governments of all members. In November 2016, Madagascar hosted the Sixteenth Summit. These biennial meetings address the most pressing political issues of the day. Past topics have included democracy and human rights, international cooperation and solidarity, and the role of youth and women. In fact, its themes reflect those on the agenda of the United Nations (UN) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The OIF sees itself as a global actor, particularly since its 1997 Summit in Hanoi. There, it adopted its current pyramidal structure and implemented the long-overdue reform of its programmes and sphere of action (Erfurt 2005: 119–58).

The First Summit (1986), held in the Palace of Versailles on the initiative of French President François Mitterrand, brought together 41 heads of state and government, representing French-speaking countries or countries that had a previous colonial relationship with France. In 1989/90, the power vacuum resulting from the end of the Cold War pushed competing powers, including France and the United States, to take action to secure their sphere of influence in Europe, Africa, and Asia. In 1991, Bulgaria, Romania, and Cambodia became the first non-French-speaking nations affiliated with the OIF. Since then, the OIF has continued its development along these lines; with the exception of Switzerland, none of the 39 nations that have joined the OIF since 1990 have been French-speaking. These new members include Central and East European nations, as well as many Asian countries; thus the OIF’s old francophone identity has been superseded by a new emphasis on the cultural diversity of *francophonie plurielle*. Consequently, by becoming an institution where member states opt into, and adding to its plurielle character, the OIF embodies a counter-narrative to American globalization and homogenization.

The OIF has three key features. First, from an organizational and social perspective, it is a project of political elites who see in language – and its cultural dimensions – a criterion for developing zones of political influence and, more recently, for cultivating zones of economic reproduction. As early as 1987, the Canadian Jean-Marc Léger challenged the elite character of OIF’s political structure, criticizing the organization’s corps of diplomats and officials from nation-state apparatuses for having long ago lost touch with the everyday realities of French-speaking communities. In particular, he took issue with their failure to grasp the day-to-day struggles of French linguistic minorities in Canada and elsewhere for cultural, political, and social recognition. As the OIF has increasingly fashioned itself as a political actor in international relations, this 1987 criticism has become even more relevant.

Léger’s critique also provides insight into the topography of OIF’s political action and thus its second salient feature: the OIF is a top-down organization; various francophone services, media, and products are created by state and parastatal institutions for distribution and consumption at lower levels. The public television station TV5 Monde and its ten regional channels, broadcasting French-language programming throughout the world, exemplifies this top-down approach, as well as the Association of Francophone Universities (Agence universitaire de la Francophonie, AUF).

The third crucial feature of the OIF is that temporally and historically it is the product of France’s weakening global hegemony – a comparable argument can be made about Great Britain and Portugal. Correspondingly, many countries have chosen to join the OIF because of their relative position of weakness in global relations, including its African member states, Quebec, and...
Central and East European states, despite in some cases their weak ties to French culture. But it is from this diversity that the OIF derives its legitimacy as a multilateral organization for cooperation and development, making it a counterpoint both to the hegemony of the United States and to France’s policy of bilateral cooperation with individual nations from its past colonial empire.

**Mobility and migration**

With the annulment of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 by Louis XIV and the expulsion of the Huguenots from France, the relocation of this group can be considered a prototype for subsequent transregional movements and the establishment of new language spaces. Resettling in Great Britain, Switzerland, Holland, and South Africa (Vigouroux 2014) as well as Hesse, Prussia, and other countries (Böhm 2014), the Huguenots brought their language and culture into new areas. In 1755, British troops deported thousands of Catholic Acadians from New France (later called the Great Upheaval). Expelled for religious reasons, those Acadians who resettled in the Mississippi Delta created French-speaking Louisiana. In the twentieth century, the French, francophone Belgians, and North Africans (especially from the Maghreb) immigrated to the Jewish state of Israel, where they established francophone networks and institutions (Ben-Rafael and Ben-Rafael 2013).

The infamous lifestyle of the French aristocracy produced a different prototype. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, aristocratic classes throughout Europe endeavoured to recreate French court life, and in the nineteenth century, sections of the middle class made similar efforts (Brunot 1966, 1967; Rjéoutski, Argent and Offord 2014). As France’s prestige grew, French became a universal language, sparking a new form of mobility and migration – elite migration. Educated French speakers found employment across Europe in courts and in the homes of the upper middle class, as tutors, educators, secretaries, musicians, consultants, etc. (Östman 2014). At the same time, a reverse migration developed as aristocratic and upper middle-class families from other countries sent their children to study in France (Mihaila 2014). In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, many skilled and professional workers migrated from France and other francophone nations to Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States to pursue their careers (for Canada, see Forlot 2008). Today, an estimated 200,000 French citizens live and work in London alone (Attali 2014). As this migration progresses, French and bilingual schools (Duverger 2016), francophone associations, and other infrastructures and spaces supporting French-speaking life pop up in the new places of settlement. A third prototype of francophone migration has its roots in French and Belgian colonialism. In the post-colonial era, France and Belgium became the destination of immigrants from the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa, the Congo, Vietnam, Cambodia, and other former colonies. In these cases, humanitarian catastrophes, wars, or poverty in the countries of origin often triggered these migrations. Many of these immigrants found employment in low-paying or illegal labour markets (garbage disposal, unskilled jobs in construction and agriculture, etc.) and have transformed many French and Belgian neighbourhoods into sites of multilingualism and multiculturalism. For more skilled workers who migrated from these countries, France was frequently seen as a staging post for continued migration to Canada, where they could find acceptance as members of a nouvelle francophonie (Langlois and Létourneau 2004). Finally, Cécile Vigouroux’s research on West Africans migrating from the capitals of Abidjan, Brazzaville, Dakar, and Kinshasa to South Africa suggests yet another prototype – that of African intracontinental migration. As Sabine Kube’s study of Abidjan demonstrates, these West African capitals self-identify as zones of contact between francophone and African culture, where processes of cultural and linguistic hybridization are the order of the day (2005).
Conclusion

As illustrated above, the relationship between spaces and languages is neither static nor finite. It is better understood as a dimension of social and transregional dynamics, in which actors divide the world from the perspective of power and hegemony into ‘spheres of interests’. It can also be seen as spaces of social reproduction that must continually be negotiated anew and differently. In this division and negotiation, language and culture have a central role to play.

In France, the notion of placing language at the service of national economic development, as recommended in Attali’s report, is new. Will France follow through on what is already self-evident in the Commonwealth and in the United States? Should the Union économique francophone be the Social Democratic response to the failed Mediterranean Union proposed by former Conservative President Nicolas Sarkozy? It is worth nothing that within this framework, new concepts of geographical and social space are being developed, and, at the same time, thought is being given to which actors will shape, occupy, and bind these spaces together. That these deliberations have not stopped at France’s national borders is nothing new. But in France, abolishing the OIF is seen as disempowering the most important global actor of the French-speaking world. To date, there are no signs that France will implement Attali’s recommendations or that the country wants to get into a power struggle with the OIF or with any of its member states. This discussion is symptomatic of the OIF’s seeming weakness compared to new regionalisms and their actors, for example the African Union in Africa, the Southern Common Market trading block in Latin America, and even the European Union. Many French political groups do not believe that the OIF has much political clout and consequently do not take it seriously. Hence, the OIF is constantly making adjustments in an effort to fulfil the unmet expectations of its members. Still, the OIF exerts a form of role modelling for transregional cohesion that is applicable to other geographically discontinuous language spheres, such as Lusophony, the Dutch Language Union, and the Turkic Council.

Notes

1 ‘Le potentiel économique de la francophonie est énorme et insuffisamment exploité par la France. L’effacement progressif des frontières nationales impose d’autres critères d’appartenance identitaire: la langue et la culture constituent la nouvelle géographie’ (Attali 2014, Synthèse).
2 ‘Mettre sur la table un projet de remplacement de l’Organisation internationale de la Francophonie par une Union économique francophone sur le modèle de l’Union européenne’ (Attali 2014: 79).
3 ‘Siempre la lengua fue la compañera del imperio; y de tal manera lo siguió’ (Nebrija, 1980, Prologue).

Select bibliography


What is a historical meso-region?

The research design of historical meso-regions is a transnationally comparative method resembling a middle-range theory. It was developed by historians of, in, and from East-Central Europe. The concept is also employed by art and literary historians dealing with this part of Europe, and has attracted intermittent interest in general history, historical sociology, and social anthropology.

Meso-regionalizing historical concepts – ranging from ‘East-Central Europe’ and ‘the Balkans’ to a ‘Monde méditerranéen’ and a ‘Black Sea World’, even to ‘Eurasia’, an ‘Atlantic World’, and ‘the Indian Ocean’ – identify, by way of construction, non-territorialized units connected by time that cross the boundaries of states, societies, nations, and sometimes even civilizations. Such units provide a working hypothesis for a comparative historical analysis that aims to detect and delineate specific clusters of structural characteristics over longer periods.

Historical meso-regional constructs of this type are constituted by specific combinations of a larger number of markers rather than by one or a few individual characteristics. They are ‘fluctuating zones with fluid borders’ and can be arranged into centres and peripheries (Strohmeyer 1999: 47). Here, too, the specific is unimaginable without the surroundings. One historical meso-region can only be understood in the context of others.

Correspondingly, transregional relations and interregional interactions complement the internal structure of a historical meso-region. Thus, a meso-regional historical concept can be defined as a research strategy with built-in control mechanisms arising from a solid foundation in the sources and an empirical dimension. The concept is, at the same time, an investigative framework as well as a heuristic artifice, both dialectically related to real-time historical processes.

Four concepts of historical meso-regions: East-Central Europe, the Balkans, Europe, Eurasia

Although the concept of historical meso-regions is of universal applicability, it is the product of a transnational discussion between Polish, Czechoslovak, and German historians in the 1920s and 1930s, first on ‘Slavdom’ and ‘the Slavs’ and then on ‘Eastern Europe’ (Wandycz 1992).
After the Second World War, Polish historian Oscar Halecki, now an émigré in the USA, turned his views into a model that covered all of Europe. In his book *The Limits and Divisions of European History* (Halecki 1950), he differentiates not only between an ‘old Europe’ based on the ancient world and a ‘new Europe’ beyond the historical boundaries of the Imperium Romanum, but also between four modern European historical meso-regions with roots in the Middle Ages: Western Europe (France, Spain, Great Britain, Italy), West-Central Europe (Germany, Switzerland, Austria), East-Central Europe (Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, the Balkans), and Eastern Europe (Muscovy/Russia/Soviet Union). His main goal was to mark out a cultural boundary between Western, West-Central, and East-Central Europe. On the one side, such a boundary was characterized by Western churches, and on the other, by the Orthodox Church dominating Eastern Europe. Simultaneously, he attempted to relativize the dividing line between East-Central and West-Central Europe, a theme to which he gave greater emphasis in his broad study *Borderlands of Western Civilization: A History of East-Central Europe* (Halecki 1952).

Halecki’s influence shaped the development of West German research on Eastern European history, which to a certain extent also drew on earlier concepts, such as that of (more localized) ‘historical landscapes’ and indirectly the (highly ideologized) ‘culture areas’ (Jordan 2005; Schultz 2009, 2013). The result was the development of the meso-regional historical categories of ‘East-Central Europe’, ‘Southeastern Europe’, ‘Northeastern Europe’, and ‘Eastern Europe’. The latter was used to refer to the East Slavic realm and as an overarching supracategory (Zernack 1977, 1993; Müller 2003).

Just as Halecki was being read in the new German Federal Republic, his ideas were also beginning to exert a veiled influence on the Soviet bloc (Małowist 1973; Kula 1983; Sosnowska 2004). In Hungary, historian Jenő Szűcs adopted Halecki’s concept of ‘East-Central Europe’ in a modified form (Szűcs 1983). Like Halecki, he sought to identify structural factors that remained influential over a longer period, normally for several centuries. In reference to the Middle Ages, Christianization, the creation of nation-states, Magdeburg Law, Ashkenazi Jewish settlements, and German internal colonization were highlighted. For the early modern period, Szűcs and West German historians concerned with Eastern Europe focused on the high percentage of nobles, the potential of the diocese-university-court triad as metropole, libertarian corporate societies, and refeudalization.

In reference to the nineteenth century, these scholars chose great power domination by the great powers and linguistic nationalism. For the twentieth century, they depicted a ‘realm of petty states’, National-Socialist domination and occupation, Soviet hegemony, mass movements of refugees, deportations, expulsions, ethnic cleansing, Holodomor, Holocaust and Porajmos, and Sovietization. They also referred to Catholic and proletarian opposition, political-intellectual dissent, and, ultimately, the epochal turning point of 1989. The latter featured genuinely East-Central European innovations such as the Round Table, the Velvet Divorce, and the cooperation of the Visegrád Group of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (later the Czech Republic and Slovakia).

Most importantly, Szűcs simplified Halecki’s model by combining West-Central and East-Central Europe into what he, again, called (somewhat incongruously) East-Central Europe. His own pattern of the ‘three historical regions of Europe’ (Western, East-Central, and Eastern) remains influential today. Like Halecki, Szűcs used the division between Orthodoxy and Catholicism to separate Eastern Europe (i.e. Russia) from East-Central Europe.

The Hungarian historian also saw an obvious socioeconomic and cultural line dividing East-Central Europe from Western Europe. In his view, this cleavage exerted significant influence on the region from the beginning of the ‘second serfdom’ in the early modern
period up to the Cold War. ‘East-Central Europe’ quickly received wide acceptance as a meso-regional historical concept in the context of the East–West conflict, both in a narrower Polish-Bohemian-Hungarian sense and in a broader perspective including Byzantium, the Ottoman Empire, and the post-Ottoman Balkans.

However, the meso-regional concept of ‘Southeastern Europe’ and the overlapping term ‘the Balkans’ became the subject of fierce debate as a result of the wars arising from the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. German historian Holm Sundhaussen disputed Maria Todorova’s rejection of a regional concept of ‘the Balkans’ and her ‘revelation’ of it as an exclusionist stereotype. This provoked an intense discussion, as a result of which the differences between the positions were noticeably reduced: while Sundhaussen continued to speak of the Balkans as a ‘historical meso-region’ (Geschichtsregion) (Sundhaussen 1999, 2003), Todorova offered a compromising formula of a region with a common ‘historical legacy’ (Todorova 2002, 2005a). By this, she meant the long-term impact of Byzantium and the Ottoman Empire, which still shape the European territories of these sunken empires up to the present and make them into a historical meso-region.

Alongside regionalizations – which refer to historical, cultural, economic, religious, social, linguistic, and political geography – mental maps heavily intrude upon meso-regional historical concepts. In this vein, Holm Sundhaussen warns against the ‘intermixture of mental map and historical region’ (Sundhaussen 2005: 30). Thus, ‘the Balkans’ is, on the one hand, the designation of a historical meso-region, and on the other, the label of a negative cultural stereotype. The same goes for ‘Eurasia’ (Hann 2016) or ‘the Levant’ (Schwara 2003). But this dual mechanism can also work the other way around; for example, the historical meso-region of ‘Northern Europe’ (‘Scandinavia’) carries positive connotations related to welfare statism, egalitarianism, consensus orientation in politics, high educational standards, etc. (Götz 2003; Stråth 2010).

Yet, next to mental maps, (geo)political terminology also produces confusing effects on the humanities and social sciences when it comes to historical meso-regionalizations. For example, in 1990, Charles Gati published an article on the events of 1989 – metaphorically entitled ‘The morning after’ – in the authoritative journal Foreign Affairs. The political scientist and expert on communism opened his article, somewhat enigmatically, with the sentence ‘Eastern Europe is now East-Central Europe’ (Gati 1990: 129). What Gati meant, of course, was the end of Soviet hegemony over the satellite states from Poland to Bulgaria. While the then still existing Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was labelled ‘Eastern’, the European Warsaw Pact member states were terminologically moved from the very East to an east-of-centre position – in line with Halecki’s divisions.

An even more drastic example combining mental maps and political language is Paul R. Magocsi’s seminal Historical Atlas of East Central Europe, first published in 1993. When the second edition was published in 2002, the title was changed to Historical Atlas of Central Europe. In the preface, Magocsi explains this change in the following way:

It has . . . become clear since 1989 that the articulate elements in many countries of the region consider eastern or even east-central to carry a negative connotation and prefer to be considered part of Central Europe. . . . If Central Europe responds to the preference of the populations of the countries in question, this would seem to lend even greater credence to the terminological choice.

(Magocsi 2002: xiii)

It would, however, be rash to assume that all historians dealing with the region succumb to political or populist pressure. Quite a number of them have tried to make a distinction between
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the use of one and the same regional term in politics and history, thus avoiding the dilemma of multiple connotations.

In 1990, Michael Müller declared the German equivalent to East-Central Europe (Ostmitteleuropa) to be an exclusively academic term by labelling it ‘an artificial terminological creation – a synthetic term to be applied most of all by scholars’ (Müller 1990: 2). Later on, in 2004, Polish-British art historian Katarzyna Murawska-Muthesius turned to an even more radical terminological measure by replacing the denomination ‘East-Central Europe’ with the fantasy term ‘Slaka’ (Murawska-Muthesius 2004). The latter is the name of a fictitious Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) country in Malcolm Bradbury’s novels Rates of Exchange (1983) and Why Come to Slaka? (1986). Bradbury’s ‘Slaka’ combines typical features of Poland, Bulgaria, and Vietnam.

Notwithstanding the danger of terminological and conceptual mingling and even collusion, geography-based regionalizations still seem apt to name historical meso-regions. Due to its heuristic value, this concept is on the march in academia.

Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, a German historian of Russia, sets out five innovative benefits of meso-regional historical concepts that reveal the possible uses and insights to be gained for the historian’s trade:

1. the overcoming of limitations of national history through transnational comparison;
2. the dynamism and flexibility of such concepts over time;
3. the approach’s ‘clinically pure’ character and its comparative and analytical framework largely (though of course not completely) free of contamination by ‘historical reality’;
4. its immanent self-critical reference to the self-fulfilling prophecy of concepts of region; and
5. its applicability to Europe as a whole, that is to say the implicit historical region that is so often seen as written in stone (Schenk 2004: 23–24).

Schenk’s second point, the factor of ‘time’, requires further explanation, or indeed expansion. Despite the fact that different meso-regional historical concepts focus on specific and structural references to space, one cannot ignore their chronological nature and thus the dimension of time. Wolfgang Schmale, therefore, suggests incorporating Reinhart Koselleck’s model of ‘temporal layers’ (Zeitschichten). In doing so, he adopted Norman Davies’s concept of a ‘tidal Europe’ – a Europe whose form and content from the ancient world to the present has pulsed, becoming sometimes larger, sometimes smaller (Schmale 2003: 196; Koselleck 2004; Davies 1996: 9).

Using the example of nation-building processes in East-Central Europe, Maria Todorova demonstrates that the use of a longue durée time frame relativizes the differentia specifica of the historical meso-regions under study when compared to the ‘genuine’ Europe – that is to say, ‘Western Europe’ – even if it does not remove them entirely (Todorova 2005b). The non-simultaneity of the simultaneous is not compellingly non-simultaneous when it refers to a period in time, in the sense of a historical process or an epoch, instead of a point in time. This seems to be a particularly promising dimension for a future approach to meso-regional historical concepts. Such an approach would undertake an intra- and, above all, interregional comparison – primarily synchronically but also diachronically – along parameters such as modernization and state- and nation-building as well as less well-tested, such as legal culture, political culture, industrialization, and urbanization.

It is obvious that ‘Europe’ is an implicit historical macro-region that also requires critical reflection. Additionally, a study of the subregions of Europe’s East, above all Northeastern Europe, Southeastern Europe/the Balkans, and Russia, would carry additional benefits. All these border on other historical meso-regions not only within ‘Europe’ but also beyond it, such as ‘Eurasia’ and ‘the Arctic’ as well as the ‘Black Sea World’, the ‘Levant’, and the ‘Near East’.
Therefore, one can agree with Jürgen Kocka, who perceives ‘East-Central Europe as a challenge for a comparative history of Europe’ (Kocka 2000: 166). This is true for both the historical meso-region of East-Central Europe as well as in general for approaching meso-regional historical concepts. The approach is indeed becoming increasingly attractive for historians outside the field of East European history.

For instance, in a survey of seven historiographical ‘models of Europe’, Jürgen Osterhammel presents a ‘model of cultural spaces that incorporated a “model of historical regions”’ (Osterhammel 2004: 167–8). Similarly, cultural historian Hannes Siegrist talks of ‘historical spaces’ as the central object of study for comparative history, alongside ‘cultures’, ‘societies’, and ‘paths of development’ (Siegrist 2003).

Meanwhile, in an essay on ‘regions and worlds’, Johannes Paulmann tries to bring together regional and global history by leaving out the levels of national and European history. While he rejects the political notion of a ‘Europe of regions’, he considers the concept of historical meso-regions helpful for analysing the history not only of Europe but also of other parts of the world:

The analytical frame of historical meso-region (Geschichtsregion) offers insofar connecting possibilities for the study of regional relations on a global scale as transitions to other ‘meso-regions’ are perceived as being fluid. Historical meso-regions are to be understood as exclusively context-bound, internal relations and external ones are considered to be constitutive for them. So far, historical meso-regions of this type are studied primarily in the European context. Yet since in principle they are relational to other regions not only the relations to neighbouring regions, but also the ones to more distant parts of the world should be taken into account.

(Paulmann 2013: 666)

A partly similar perception of ‘regional history’ figures in a recent article by Diana Mishkova, Bo Stråth, and Balázs Trencsényi on the impact of meso-regional historical concepts on the national historiographies of Central, Southeastern, and Northern Europe. However, in looking at discourses of historians from the mid-nineteenth century to the post-1989 period, the three authors include not only ‘supranational/transnational regional history’ whose ‘narratives ... try to subsume the competing national vision under a common macro-regional umbrella’, but also ‘subnational regional history’ of ‘micro-regions that were eventually nationalized’ (Mishkova, Stråth and Trencsényi 2013: 257). They demonstrate that historiographic concepts like ‘Scandinavia’, ‘Norden’, ‘Mitteleuropa’, ‘the Balkans’, and ‘Southeastern Europe’ carry (geo)political connotations more often than not, thus becoming influential particularly in times of crisis. At the same time, the authors stress that concepts of this type are among ‘the most important and promising tools of historical projects trying to question or relativize the nation-centric narrative’ (ibid.: 304).

A recent phenomenon is the interest of historically inclined sociologists in the ‘historical regions of Europe’. Johann P. Arnason, whose field of research is the comparison of civilizations, has placed the increasing interest in meso-regional historical concepts in the context of the debate on the ‘unique course’ (Sondenweg) of European history:

Regional divisions have probably been more salient and their meaning more contested in Europe than in any other part of the world. The debate on this subject is complementary to the ongoing dispute of European exceptionalism, seen as a macro-regional or civilizational feature, and it is not more likely to be settled in definitive terms.

(Arnason 2005: 387)
In Arnason’s view, however, ‘Oskar Halecki’s seminal reflections on “limits and divisions” . . . do not go far enough’:

They do not do justice to the domains or dimensions within which the dividing lines are drawn. If we pursue this line of reflection and link it to available concepts, we encounter categories open to differentiation, but at the same time grounded in specific patterns of unity and adaptable – albeit in varying degrees – to perspectives on Europe as a whole. Four main foci of this kind have served to make sense of European unity and divisions: civilizations, religions, regions and nations.

(Arnason and Doyle 2010: 2, original emphasis)

More recently (and inspired by Arnason), Gerard Delanty, another sociologist interested in intercivilizational comparisons, discovered the concept of historical meso-regions. In his 2012 article ‘The historical regions of Europe: Civilizational backgrounds and multiple routes to modernity’, he comes up with ‘a six-fold classification . . . to capture the diversity of Europe’s historical regions’:

[T]hese [European historical regions] should be seen in terms of different routes to modernity and have broad civilizational backgrounds in common. The forms of modernity that constitute Europe as a world historical region correspond to North Western Europe, Mediterranean Europe, Central Europe, East Central Europe, South Eastern Europe, North Eastern Europe.

(Delanty 2012: 9)

And after going through the history of his six historical regions of Europe, Delanty arrives at an overarching conclusion:

The six historical regions . . . are historically variable and overlapping. They do not simply overlap with each other, but are also closely linked spatially and culturally with areas that lie outside the European region as a whole. The paper has stressed in this regard the formative influence of the east in the west, and the importance of the Russian and Ottoman-Islamic worlds in the making of Europe. This serves in part to correct the older eurocentric view of the making of Europe that tended to see Europe as shaped by itself and to define all its regions in terms of their relation to the North West. In approaching the question of the historical regions of Europe from such an inter-civilizational perspective, it may be possible to avoid an account that sees unity only as possible in face of a common enemy, for . . . there was neither one enemy that predominated nor was there a single core that gave to Europe its identity. To the extent to which it is possible to speak of the ‘idea of Europe’, this must be found in the plurality of its regions, which offer an alternative to accounts of European history in terms of national narratives. The emphasis on a plurality of regions with their own civilizational backgrounds and routes to modernity does not, it must be noted, mean that there is no unity since all these regions interacted with each other and ultimately such interaction made possible the genesis of modernity and the formation of Europe as a world historical region.

(Delanty 2012: 23)
In Delanty’s as well as Arnason’s view, the meso-regional structure of Europe, from a historical perspective, is one of the unique characteristics of the ‘half’ continent in comparison with other parts of Eurasia and the world (Arnason 2010; Delanty 2013: 195–214). This perception is also shared by social anthropologists such as Christian Giordano. The latter defines ‘Europe as a system of historical regions: Centre, peripheries and external regions’ (Giordano 2003: 121) and lists, similarly to Delanty, ‘Northwestern Europe’, ‘Mediterranean Europe’, ‘Central-Eastern Europe’, ‘Southeastern Europe’, and ‘Eastern Europe’ (Giordano 2003: 123–30; Delanty 2013: 197). The historicity of this meso-regional structure, according to Giordano, explains Europe’s ‘present socio-economic gradient’ (Giordano 2003: 130).

Also taking place recently is an international debate among social and cultural anthropologists on ‘Eurasia’, triggered by Chris Hann. To Hann, this term renders ‘Europe and Asia as constituting equivalent “continents”’, and as ‘a spatiotemporalization with a reference in materialist realism, a thing . . . that has existed in the world for a very long time’ (Hann 2016: 1; see also Hancock and Libman 2016). His ‘Eurasia’ is a “supracontinental” unity forged over the past three millennia’, consisting of

the largest landmass of the planet . . . i.e., Europe + Asia . . . including large islands such as Great Britain and Japan [as well as] the southern shores of the Mediterranean, in other words, the northern zones of the continent known as Africa.

(Hann 2016: 2)

Despite ‘a distinguished academic pedigree’ claimed by Hann (Hann 2016: 9), his concept of a Eurasian longue durée reaching into the present and his hope that it will reach into the future have received severe criticism, including being called a scholastic ‘utopia’ (Schlee 2015, 2016: 18), as well as by constructive critique such as ‘What’s good to think may not be good to build’ (Pomeranz 2016).

Transregionalism and historical meso-regions

The fact that one historical meso-region is constituted, among other factors, by ‘neighbouring’ historical meso-regions is only one of several transregional features. The others are flows of ideas, people, goods, etc., from one historical meso-region to another, and this not only within Europe. For example, the process of adopting constitutions in the newly founded states of Southeastern Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was strongly influenced by West European models, and in the case of Greece also by the Greek diaspora in the USA (Spiliotis 1998: 211–314). On the other hand, ‘socialist’ Eastern Europe under Soviet hegemony left visible traces in the infrastructures, agricultures, industries, education systems, etc. in the Global South and China. Furthermore, post-socialist East-Central Europe witnessed a re-migration of political émigrés, who shaped the newly emerging political landscapes of Poland, Ukraine, Latvia, and other countries of the region (Marung and Naumann 2014). The very term ‘Ibero-America’ for those parts of the Americas that had been colonies of Spain and Portugal stands for transregional influence.

Still, research combining two or more historical meso-regional concepts in a transregional perspective is only at its inception. Of course, there is Jack Goody’s The East in the West (Goody 1996), a ‘classic’ by now, which in fact served as the blueprint for Hann’s timeless macro-region ‘Eurasia’ (Hann 2016), as well as for an ‘anti-Eurocentric’ contribution to the
debate on the divergence between ‘Western Europe’ and ‘East Asia’ (Pomeranz 2000; O’Brien 2010). Moreover, there are seminal case studies focusing on networks that tie historical meso-regions together, such as Sebouh David Aslanian’s monograph on the economic activities of the Armenian merchants of Isfahan between Amsterdam and Manila, from the early seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth century (Aslanian 2011).

Recently, Maria Todorova and Karl Kaser have claimed that ‘Europe’ in general and ‘the Balkans’ in particular are bound together by ‘historical legacies’ due to a ‘shared history’ (Todorova 2007; Kaser 2011); and Marie-Janine Calic set out to write ‘the global history of a region’ called ‘Southeastern Europe’ (Calic 2016). Yet, a transregional history combining, say, East–Central Europe with the Balkans or the Black Sea region with the Levant, is still missing.

Bringing together the concept of historical meso-regions and transregionalism is an intriguing challenge yet to be mastered by scholars in the humanities and social science. Endeavours in this field require interdisciplinary and transnational cooperation as well as a historical depth of focus on several centuries, if not millennia, as with Chris Hann’s work.

Select bibliography


Historical meso-regions & transregionalism


The prediction that processes of globalization would inexorably lead to the diminished significance of international borders now seems decidedly misplaced. In fact, the most profound issues of our times are framed by the stubborn persistence of international borders in some places and their reconfiguration in others. Some of the issues relate to the positioning of the borders, while others concern the movement of people (e.g. migrants and refugees) and commodities (e.g. narcotics and pirated goods) through them. The process of global rebordering has been so rapid in the past five years that, inevitably, academic analysis is struggling to catch up.

Whereas there is often a problem in defining the limits of an academic field, there is actually substantial consensus when it comes to border(land) studies. But if the field itself is clearly bounded, it would be difficult to identify a unified approach, far less a grand theory. In fact, most boundary scholars have eschewed any such agenda (Paasi 2005: 668). Border studies straddles the core disciplines, and mediates between them, but it does not seek to replace them. Hence, it makes little sense to reinvent development economics or mobility studies in order to make sense of border flows. But because there are always at least two – and sometimes three – sides to any set of borders, they can serve as a kind of social laboratory for understanding the production of difference – whether with respect to governance structures, the economy, or cultural norms. Some of the research that is carried out in border locations is not explicitly positioned as border(land) studies. For those who regard themselves as contributing to such a defined field, much of the appeal lies in the opportunity to escape the tyranny of the disciplines and the confines of area studies. It also lies in finding common ground with researchers who have quite different regional specialisms.

Because international boundaries tend to throw up cognate phenomena, they lend themselves to larger comparisons. For example, comparing migratory flows or small-scale trade across the United States (US)–Mexico and South Africa–Lesotho borders can be extremely enlightening (Coplan 2009), even if logistical difficulties mean that there are relatively few comparisons of this kind. But a sensitivity to the benefits of comparison is hardwired into border studies scholarship.

In order to provide a rounded account of the varied approaches to the study of borders across the world, it is important to take into account the different dimensions in which research is conducted as well as the themes that are more or less evenly distributed across them. Here, I will offer a broad overview, while drawing on some specific examples. Many of these are African,
partly for the reason that this happens to be my own area of specialism, but also because this has been one of the undoubted growth areas in recent years. However, I will also have recourse to the findings of scholars working on Europe, Asia, and the Americas.

**Viewing borders three-dimensionally**

Border scholars grapple with very different bodies of material, which is in part a function of disparate disciplinary starting points. An area that used to be the preserve of geographers, historians, and international lawyers is now shared with political scientists, anthropologists, sociolinguists, and students of cultural studies. In addition, a field that used to be dominated by studies of the US–Mexico border and Europe has become much more variegated as insights distilled from other regions of the world have gained traction. For some, the research in question might consist of burrowing through administrative and legal archives in national or regional capitals, or engaging with policy-makers in centres of decision-making such as Brussels and Washington; for others, it is made up of a fine-grained analysis of dynamics in notionally remote fieldwork sites.

When sources converge and corroborate each other, the researcher is lucky indeed. However, it is more commonly the case that materials reach the researcher in very different registers, highlight different phenomena, and are sometimes flatly contradictory. The dimension(s) that the researcher chooses to emphasize inevitably involve choices, and these in turn have a bearing on the shape of the data that are collected.

However, one advantage that border scholars can exploit is that they are able to mine perspectives from either side of the line. Archives tend to offer a dual perspective on the same set of issues, but this is no less true of oral informants who interpret reality in the light of circumstances on their own side of a given boundary line. For the purposes of this discussion, I will focus on three dimensions – namely, temporality, space, and scale – and the disciplines to which they are generally related.

**Temporality**

As political geographers have repeatedly reminded us, the notion that there are natural boundaries that manifest themselves in the contours of state borders is deeply problematic. Borders are the work of human decisions rather than Mother Nature, and to that extent are the product both of grand design and messy compromise. For historians, the meaningful questions are why borders have emerged in particular places, according to which logics, and with what consequences.

In Europe, boundary-making and state formation have generally been treated as closely related historical processes, in which contested frontier zones have sedimented as international boundaries – as in the case, for example, of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Sahlins 1989). Europe also provides striking examples of the manner in which warfare – and even more often peace-making – has led to the abrupt repositioning of established borders, as happened in Europe and Africa after both world wars. These realities should lead one to be sceptical of the notion that borders emerged organically in the Old World context, whereas in the colonies they were externally driven.

Although some colonial borders were the consequence of international agreements made in distant European capitals, they also tended to slip into the grooves created by pre-colonial frontier zones (Nugent 2019 [forthcoming]). Although Africa has commonly been regarded as the continent afflicted by the most ‘artificial boundaries’, there is now an accumulating body of
research that indicates that there was no colonial ‘big bang’ moment and that pre-existing spatial logics exercised a decisive influence (Nugent 2019 [forthcoming]; McGregor 2009).

The question of temporality is no less important for understanding the reconfiguration of borders after 1945. The implosion of European empires, and the closely associated outbreak of the Cold War, led to the emergence of new and often rather hard borders in Asia: most notably between North and South Korea and between India and Pakistan. In Europe itself, the disastrous record of conflict in the twentieth century was part of what motivated the push toward continental integration, in which the erasure of divisive borders and the ending of zero-sum politics was an explicit objective. With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the borders of Eastern and Central Europe were reconfigured in a manner that turned back the clock. Equally, the implosion of post-1919 borders in the Middle East is a further indication that, nearly a century later, history refuses to lie down.

**Space**

The study of international borders is very obviously about the making and remaking of space. The often imperfect relationship between cartographic representation and the realities on the ground has been of particular interest to historical geographers. Whether contemporary satellite imagery is any more conducive to establishing objective truths is a moot point because they are partial representations in their own right.

The demarcation of an international border necessarily creates its own dynamic because it creates sites where one regime of governance notionally ends and another begins. Whereas border/boundary studies concerns that which takes place at the line of separation, borderland studies is concerned with what unfolds in zones of engagement located on either side of a given line. These can evidently extend well beyond the physical border.

On the basis that borders are a state effect, there has been a growing tendency, especially among anthropologists, to focus upon ‘bordering’ processes located further still from the borderline. This would include international airports, seaports, and remote locations identified as migrant/refugee processing centres. Islands present their own unique challenges in that the entire coastline typically represents a physical border – albeit one that does not need to be physically demarcated.

**Scale**

Since the 1990s, there has been a movement within critical geography to question a tidy conception of the world as a series of nested Russian dolls, often expressed as the international, the national, the regional, and the local. A vast literature on ‘assemblages’ seeks to understand how, at a given moment, norms with very different scalar origins may come into contact (Allen and Cochrane 2010).

If the scales are really so interwoven, some scholars have raised the question of whether it is meaningful to think in terms of scales at all. However, this risks throwing the baby out with the bathwater given that bureaucracies, for example, are evidently arranged in a scalar fashion. The alternative is to take scales as a starting point and then to explore the manner in which they play off each other – as Brenner (2004) has proposed in relation to urban policy in Europe.

However, it is important to add that the scales relating to governance do not necessarily map onto those that are associated with, for instance, trade or religion. Coming from a rather different angle, a recent trend in anthropological research has tended to treat the lowest scales as constitutive of administrative practice. The idea is that what happens on the ground, in
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everyday interactions, is every bit as decisive as decision-making conducted at a national or international level (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014). This is an insight that need not stop with officials, because what any border means is bound up with daily practices of moving through border spaces. Whether crossings are mundane or unusual, relaxed or fraught, has a crucial bearing on the manner in which the lines of division are internalized by border populations themselves.

Themes

*International organization, regional integration, and cross-border cooperation*

After 1945, there was a proliferation of international organizations pushing for the introduction of common norms and standards governing the global community. Some of these have had a very direct bearing on borders as sites of governance: the most obvious examples are the World Customs Organization (WCO), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). In addition, states have come to their own bilateral and multilateral agreements designed to facilitate the management of border flows. The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), which binds Canada, the United States, and Mexico, is perhaps the best-known example of a limited attempt to facilitate trade across state borders. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in 1967, was intended to promote interstate cooperation across a wider front. The various regional economic communities (RECs) that have proliferated in Africa have followed a similar template, although this has included the right of military intervention.

The European Union (EU), by contrast with NAFTA, has been far more ambitious in pushing for integration across the board, including the introduction of a common currency and the shared Schengen immigration regime (albeit with some country opt-outs). In Africa, hybrid forms have emerged: while some RECs like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have actively promoted freedom of movement and progress toward a common currency, others have focused more on trade harmonization. The African Union (AU) itself envisages continental integration somewhat along the lines of the EU model. The relationship between the RECs and the AU is not always an easy one because of the sometimes competing priorities. The picture is further complicated by virtue of the fact that a number of the RECs have overlapping memberships.

The question of who has the right to initiate cooperation across state borders is a delicate one. In Europe, much of the impetus has come from below, with the often grudging acceptance of member states, as associations of border regions and metropolitan areas have secured EU funding to support their own agendas – a classic instance of assemblages at work. Meanwhile, in Africa, there are very few cross-border initiatives from below that are officially sanctioned, precisely because governments have been so jealous of their sovereignty. Paradoxically, the African Union Border Programme (AUBP) has made border demarcation its priority, whereas RECs have shown greater interest in promoting practical forms of cooperation. But the latter has been based on the expectation that states should take the lead, bringing in border populations only as and when deemed necessary.

Be that as it may, anthropological research has shed light on what is sometimes described as cooperation from below. The focus here is on the ways in which border populations have cut their own deals and established their own mechanisms for managing the resources arising from the existence of the border. This has included dealing with cross-border crime such
as cattle rustling, taxing trade, regulating transport, and controlling access to land. A less state-centric approach reveals a more complex set of cross-border engagements than might at first meet the eye.

The environmental consequences of boundary-making have created some incentives for cross-border cooperation at the interstate level. Because so many international boundaries follow watercourses, water management is inherently contentious – and especially so in areas of unstable rainfall. The virtual drying up of the Rio Grande (US–Mexico border) and of the River Jordan (Israel–Jordan border), partly by virtue of the diversion of water flows, provides a salutary reminder of what can happen when states compete. Cooperation in the management of shared water resources has featured prominently, for example, in West Africa: such as in the shape of the Senegal River Basin Development Organization (Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du fleuve Sénégal, OMVS) and the Gambia River Basin Development Organization (Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du fleuve Gambie, OMVG). Waste management has also provided some of the impetus for neighbouring cities on the US–Mexico border to work together even when the national governments have not seen eye to eye. In Southern Africa, a recent development has been the proliferation of transfrontier parks in which the objective is to reconcile the expansion of cross-border tourism with more effective conservation.

A body of literature on ‘the everyday state’ or ‘states at work’ focuses on how officials working within customs, immigration, and other state agencies interpret directives and fashion their own norms at the border. The mismatch between the international agreements on the freedom of movement of people and goods and the realities on the ground can often be very stark indeed.

In West and East Africa, coalitions of interested parties that campaign for more open borders have compiled detailed data on border delays, the payment of bribes, and the number of legal and illegal checkpoints per kilometre, both at the border and along the main transport corridors. Their findings underline the need for borders research to take the lower scales seriously when considering the practical realities of border governance.

Agreements signed in Brussels and Abuja might signal a desire by policy-makers to render border management less intrusive, but these count for little unless they are actually given practical effect at the border. Where state officials feel that they are left out, or that they are located at the sharp end of governance reforms, cross-border cooperation is likely to stall.

Security

Security is an issue that has become one of the most important foci of borders research over the past decade, reflecting the ways in which governments across the world have responded to an accumulation of perceived threats. First of all, wealthier states have asserted the need to exert tighter control over what passes through their borders because of the potentially harmful consequences thereof. The key perceived threats are narcotics and weapons. The US–Mexico border has become one of the battlegrounds between rival drug cartels and the state agencies operating on either side of the border (Payan 2006). Over the past decade, much of the Colombian drug trade destined for Europe has been rerouted through West Africa. But as pressure upon Guinea-Bissau has intensified and border enforcement in Nigeria has become more effective, the trade has shifted to The Gambia and Ghana, respectively.

Increasingly, the imagined threat to security includes people on the principle that migrants and refugees threaten the lifestyles of the wealthier countries – for example by placing pressure on overstretched health services or increasingly on the suspicion that they might harbour terrorist intentions. This has provided part of the rationale for Israel’s attempts to create an
almost impermeable border with the Palestinian settlements. It has also been the justification for President Donald Trump’s attempts to bar entry to the US from targeted Muslim countries.

Along the US–Mexico and the Spain–Morocco borders, fences and sophisticated surveillance equipment have been used to exclude access. Fences and walls are blunt instruments, and migrants have tended to find their way both around and under them. Governments have therefore invested heavily in new technologies of surveillance. The EU has also engaged in a strategy of displacement by pushing the frontier of control well beyond its own physical borders – as the role of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) in Africa illustrates.

In Africa itself, there is an unresolved tension between a desire to facilitate freedom of movement and to exercise better surveillance in order to forestall terrorist attacks by organizations like Al-Shabaab. In Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, military insurgencies have found a fertile breeding ground in the borderlands where the control of the central authority is often weak. The manner in which the Islamic State was able to gain control of large swathes of Syria and Iraq has provided an inspiration for movements such as Boko Haram on the border between Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad. A growth industry within political science and anthropology alike is the study of conflict dynamics in border zones. A more specialist concern within border studies concerns the technologies of border surveillance, which ranges from the routine use of biometric data at the border to the use of drones.

**Borders and self-determination**

There has been a resurgence of secessionist movements, stretching from Scotland and Catalonia in Europe, to western Zambia and coastal Kenya in Africa. Although many of these movements are committed to peaceful means, some defend the right to resort to arms as a last resort. In Africa, the particular manner in which South Sudan achieved its independence — that is, through a referendum won through the blood of thousands — seems to impart a clear lesson that sound arguments alone count for little.

International legal experts and national governments debate the basis on which any group of people can claim a legitimate right to self-determination. In Europe, for example, the Spanish authorities insist that there is no constitutional basis for permitting a referendum in Catalonia. Meanwhile, the insistence of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on the intangibility of inherited colonial boundaries in a couple of resolutions in 1963/64 is widely considered to have blocked the redrawing of the map of Africa after independence.

But secessionist movements learn from each other and exploit precedents that will advance their cause. South Sudan has created a precedent in Africa in the manner that Scotland might well have done in Europe. Needless to say, the creation of breakaway states inevitably means the introduction of new sets of borders and associated controls.

**Border disputes**

Although many of the world’s borders are not considered contentious, there are some that are hotly disputed between states: such as Kashmir between Pakistan and India, or Badme between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In some of these cases, there have been violent conflicts at the border, followed by periods of relative peace when the border typically becomes a relatively hard one. An extreme case is the border between North and South Korea, which appears to have ossified.

For anthropologists, the interest lies in the institutionalization of abnormality, whereas political scientists tend to be more interested in the reasons why disputes lie dormant for long periods of time before flaring up. Much of the answer lies in the manner in which alliances are
Border studies

made and unravel within the borderlands. In other cases, such as the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over Bakassi, or between Mali and Burkina Faso, the cases have been decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The discovery of oil across much of Africa over the past decade has led to a proliferation of new disputes, which is likely to increase the load of the ICJ in the years ahead.

(Im)mobilities

There is a formidably large body of literature concerned with the passage of migrants and refugees across international borders. The attempt by governments to draw a sharp distinction between these two categories has largely broken down at the external borders of the EU, where the flows of large masses of people on the move – escaping violent conflict, avoiding political repression, or simply seeking a better life – have merged into one another. The desire of EU member states to prevent the influx has led to the unprecedented decision by member states to erect border walls, the most controversial instance being the decision of the Hungarian authorities to construct a 175-kilometre fence along the border with Serbia.

Britain’s vote to (Br)exit the EU in 2016 was driven in part by a popular belief that the country would be better placed to defend its borders against a migrant influx if it was located outside Europe – although this presumes that the French authorities would be inclined to cooperate from their side of the Channel. Scholarship in the future will no doubt be forced to consider whether the migrant crisis has served to unravel the pan-European project.

In a world that is more unequal than ever, borders have been used to build better synergies on the inside and more rigid controls at the margins. This has been especially true of the US and the EU. Finding a way through the cordon has created a premium associated with human trafficking in all of the regions where hard borders represent an attempt to perpetuate marked inequalities.

The border crossing often comes at an enormous human cost – as is exemplified by the thousands of deaths of Africans seeking to cross the Mediterranean each year. Although the borders between the US and Mexico, and between the EU and its neighbours, have attracted the greatest attention, a substantial body of work points to the existence of flows of people within the developing world. South Africa, for example, has been a focus for millions of migrants drawn from across the continent – even as it has ended the systematic recruitment of labour for the gold mines of the Witwatersrand from countries such as Lesotho.

Historically, borders have been operationalized as cordons sanitaires to prevent the transmission of human and animal diseases. Restrictions on the movement of cattle across the colonial border between Kenya and Uganda, for example, were designed to prevent the spread of sleeping sickness. More recently, the outbreak of the Ebola virus in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea has led to the closure of land borders in West Africa and to more stringent surveillance at ports of entry across the world.

Most countries have also adopted strict controls on the movement of meat products and plant materials across international borders. In a country such as Australia, this particular aspect of border policing is taken extremely seriously.

Trade and transportation

The question of scale assumes a particular significance in relation to issues of trade. Signatories to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the WCO are formally committed to removing discriminatory tariffs and applying a single set of customs values. In addition, economic communities generally seek to remove internal tariff barriers in order to promote trade between signatories.
These conventions are generally intended to cater to the needs of large economic players, and take little account of the dynamics of small-scale trade. Across Africa, these initiatives have been pursued in tandem with ambitious infrastructural investments in port facilities, roads, and one-stop border posts. There are also active plans for the creation of integrated border management systems that will enable customs and immigration authorities in neighbouring countries to share information.

But across much of the world, borders are also the locations where small-scale trade accounts for substantial proportions of the overall flow – much of it in the shape of contraband. In Africa, official statistics on regional trade have consistently underestimated the total volume of regional trade. The gendered nature of this trade has a particular bearing on the relationship between trade and livelihoods.

**Urbanism**

One of the many effects of boundaries across the world is the flourishing of urban settlements that feed off border dynamics. The twin towns of the US–Mexico border, in which the larger sibling is usually found on the Mexican side of the line, is well-documented. Trade and the possibility of migration are what attract people to the Mexican ‘trampoline towns’.

In Africa, a disproportionate number of capital cities are located either on, or close to, an international border. The cities of Kinshasa and Brazzaville, which are home to some 11 million people, provide the world’s only case where capitals face each other across a border.

Although border towns have generally not grown faster than the national average, hubs within regional trading networks have often experienced the most prolific expansion of all (Soi and Nugent 2017). In such urban locations, the livelihoods of large numbers of people are bound up with the dynamics of cross-border trade.

In the EU, some of the most important showcases for cross-border cooperation have involved the formal twinning of border towns. Even where formal arrangements do not exist, it has become common practice for people to work in one city (e.g. Geneva) and live in another – often taking advantage of national differences in pay scales and national/municipal taxation.

**Border cultures**

Whereas much of the social science literature is concerned with processes of regulation, there is a substantial anthropological corpus that grapples with two other questions: namely the difference the existence of a border makes to the everyday lives of ‘borderlanders’, and how far a border culture itself could be said to emerge within these exceptional spaces.

The vast literature on the US–Mexico border has explored the complex relationship between Mexican populations on two sides of the line, in which commonality and difference are simultaneously produced. An emergent body of work on African borderlands is coming to comparable conclusions about the double-edged effects that borders create.

The debate about the conditions under which distinct border cultures arise has yet to produce a clear-cut set of answers. However, there is an emergent strand on cross-border festivals that points to the ways in which actors seek to mediate the differences that national processes have tended to instil, including language, food and drink, music, literature, and dress. The difficulty for actors has resided in the desire to reconcile the elements that are held in common with an acceptance of the reality that the influences emanating from the national centres have created genuine differences.
On the interface between francophone and anglophone states in West Africa, something as simple as bread – baguettes versus sweetened bread – point to the manner in which borders serve to engender difference. In the everyday, researchers can point to some of the ways in which macro- and micro-level processes are interwoven.

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GLOBAL CITIES

Ursula Rao

Defining the global city

Global or world cities\(^1\) are hubs for the coordination of global economic flows. This thesis is at the core of a debate that emerged in the mid-1980s (Friedman 1986; Knox and Taylor 1995; Sassen 2000) about the changing world capitalist system (Wallerstein 1984). With the outsourcing of industry to low labour-wage countries and export processing zones, the traditional centres of capitalist production undergo major change. Industrial decline is counteracted by the growth of the financial markets and the centralization of management. World cities serve as headquarters, coordinate financial transactions, and channel transnational flows into regions. The number and centrality of functions they fulfil will determine their position in the hierarchy of cities as ‘basing points’ of global capital (Friedman 1986). Global cities are internally heterogeneous and sharply divided. A growing number of well-paid managers and professionals are serviced by a fleet of low-paid unskilled workers. The growth and professionalization of the high-end service industry is coupled with the informalization of reproductive services. Migrants and women frequently fill badly paid and insecure positions as cleaners, nannies, and cooks (Sassen-Koob 1982).

This initial understanding of the global city has diversified immensely in the course of the 30-year-long debate on the global city. More detailed analysis of multiple transnational, trans-regional, and trans-oceanic relations has generated a deeper understanding of the processes that turn cities into global hubs and that determine their position in the capitalist system. Vehement critique against a predominant emphasis on economic developments has led to detailed analysis of other forces driving globalization. Together, these studies form a large body of work on global cities as locations in which globalization is firmly established, shaped, and made palpable. While the global cities debate defies any simple demarcation, the term can be seen to perform two important analytical functions, adamently formulated by Friedman (1995) ten years after his influential article. The notion of the global city is ‘a heuristic, a way of asking questions about cities in general’ and ‘a statement about a class of particular cities – world cities – set apart from other urban agglomerations by specifiable characteristic’ (Friedman 1995: 21). Economists, geographers, and political scientists in particular have invested in the latter approach and developed criteria for the demarcation of specific cities as world cities (Brenner 1998; Clark 1996; Amen, Archer and Bosman 2006). The notion of the global city has also
gripped the imagination of policy-makers who actively promote processes that may strengthen a locality’s control function (Olds and Yeung 2004). Finally, there is continuous effort to classify and hierarchize cities.

Prominent are the league tables of the Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) Research Network (see, e.g., GaWC 2012). Their approach entails a methodological innovation that advanced transregional studies. Prior world city hierarchies were based on attributes and characteristics of specific cities, such as the location of the headquarters of multinational corporations, the presence of finance or other control centres, and the cities’ roles as hubs of innovation (Hall 1966; Reed 1981; Friedman 1986; Sassen 1991). In turn, the GaWC team from Loughborough University employed measuring linkages. In this context, global cities present us with a paradox. While globalness captures the character of a particular place, it is an outcome of this place’s participation in intercity networks (Beaverstock, Taylor and Smith 2000; see also, Allen, Massey and Pryke 1999). Measuring movement and linkages permits a fine-grained appreciation of cities in the middle-range. While most authors agree that New York, London, and Tokyo (Hall 1966; Sassen 1991; Llewelyn-Davies 1996) form the apex of the global hierarchy, there is much debate about the criteria that might determine the position of the next lower ranks. The GaWC inventory considers corporate service industries in the fields of advertisement, accounting, banking, and legal services (Beaverstock, Taylor and Smith 1999). Cities are grouped into categories of α, β, and γ depending on how many of these four services they provide, the density of transregional networks, and level of operation. On this basis, GaWC provides biannually updated rankings of cities (GaWC 2012).

Measuring the globalness of cities, however, tells us little about the kind of social space world cities might be. Critiquing the narrow vision of the world-systems approach, qualitative sociologists and anthropologists have begun studying the multiple experiences of people living in dense and thoroughly globalized spaces (Eade 1996; Mathews 2011). Rather than treating globalization foremost as economic phenomena, the analysis considers other motors of globalization – such as migration. The image of global cities as centres of command and control has begun to crumble (Smith 2014). Power is dispersed and has multiple centres. Thus, once unpacked, concepts such as command and control have little meaning in a highly complex globalized economy. Seeking a novel vantage point in a debate he perceived as redundant and stuck in the mid-1990s, Nigel Thrift insists that cities matter not because they direct flows, but because they are ‘sites of social contact and narrative innovation, . . . places where this new world presents and represents itself, . . . places for story telling rather than strategy’ (Thrift 1993: 233). In the last 20 years, a proliferating number of studies have fleshed out how cities mediate globalization. An initial bias of urban studies toward the cities in the West has given way to a much broader and inclusive set of investigations. Importantly – and as I will demonstrate below – they highlight more than official statistics and elite opinions. Social science analysis, as will be shown, has created a deep understanding of the multiple flows supported by global cities and the tensions they promote.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will highlight the productive role of class struggle and cultural identities for shaping the character of global cities. It means interlacing two pertinent perspectives on the global city. While some treat the world city as a microcosm that enshrines the whole globe, others emphasize the significance of global cities in coordinating global flows and communications. Both positions depend on each other. Urban ethnic heterogeneity is augmented not just by migration but by the continuous refreshing and reframing of cultural and social identities through transnational networks and global conversations. Similarly, the ability of global cities to function as headquarters for the coordination of long-distance transactions is contingent on assembling not just executive leaders and top-end service providers, but also cheaply paid labourers who will maintain the infrastructural conditions for their work.
Taken together, the global city is not simply a world in itself nor a place related to the whole world. It is a densely networked place that depends on lived networks for its reproduction. They perform historically emerging concrete transregional, transnational, and transoceanic relations. To investigate these relations, I move through three argumentative steps. I begin by presenting two sets of scholarly discourses that consider concrete historical renderings of sharp economic disparity and cultural heterogeneity as universal features of global cities. I then show how more recent works combine cultural analysis with a study of inequality and power relations for a multidimensional understanding of the urban dynamic. The final section summarizes three case studies that highlight lived connections, thereby illustrating the significant role of transregional linkages for making and maintaining the heterogeneous space of the global city. Links manifest as competition among elite cities, networks of individuals, and companies as well as connections to multiple hinterlands. Qualitative analysis illustrates how such elements correspond to one another – that is to say, how a city can be simultaneously in the world and an emblem of the world.

Heterogeneity and conflict in the global city

Contemporary urbanity no longer embodies the utopian vision of the city as a place for collective advancement. It rather reflects the demise of the modernist ideal of equality by unilaterally placing the costs of development on the service class. The poor are left unprotected in the ‘post-justice’ city (Soja 1989; Minca 2001; Wacquant 2008; Rao 2010, 2013) while capital continues to push them to the fringes (Harvey 2008). This neo-Marxist diagnostic hints at neo-liberalism. It also finds broad application and resonates particularly well with global city scholars. Since its inception, the sociological analysis of the global city has highlighted the extreme clash between affluence and poverty (Sassen 1996, 2000). Inequality promotes the entrenchment of boundaries via racial discrimination, gentrification, and cultural purification (Mabin 1999; Hansen 2001). These trends embody the desire to cleanse the city of the frustrating mayhem of multiplicity. It results not just from class rifts but also from intense transregional and transnational migration a (global) city attracts. Segregation is advanced by skyrocketing property prices and, importantly, also by a burgeoning class of well-off citizens that seek calm and gentrified living spaces modelled on globally circulating (media) images of modern urbanity. Their lifestyle choices foster building enclaves of gated communities, shopping malls, and amusement parks. These are highly standardized spaces designated and globally recognized as adequate and safe places for exclusive sociality (Davis 1990; Low 2001; Koonings and Kruijt 2007; Legg 2007).

These disturbing accounts of intensified class wars form the background of a soaring debate about human rights and the city (Lefebvre 1974; Harvey 2008). Holston and Appadurai (1996) argue that cities have become the key locations for recrafting citizenship. In a rapidly changing world, cities ‘engage most palpably the tumult of citizenship’ (Holston and Appadurai 1996: 188). Typically, academics highlight two interrelated contact zones that impact practices of contemporary urban citizenship: the intersections between global and local and the negotiations between legal and illegal populations. Urban spaces are shaped by the strained relations between cosmopolitan elites, national decision-makers, legal and illegal migrants, and long-term inhabitants. While the making of multiscalar urban cultures leads to the violent reinscription of social boundaries, it also fuels demands for inclusive cities based on human rights discourses and notions of social justice. A case in point is Holston’s (2008) study of a bottom-up process of demanding a more democratic city in São Paulo:
The same forces that effectively fragmented and dominated the rural poor by reducing their existence to a ‘mere life’ incite the urban poor to demand a citizen’s life. It is an insurgence that begins with the struggle for rights to have a daily life in the city worthy of a citizen’s dignity. Accordingly, its demands for a new formulation of citizenship get conceived in terms of housing, property, plumbing, day-care, security, and other aspects of residential life. Its leaders are the ‘barely citizens’ of the entrenched regime: women, manual laborers, squatters, the functional literate, and above all, those in families with precarious state in residential property. These are the citizens who, in the process of building their residential spaces, not only construct a vast new city but, on that basis, also constitute it as a *polis* with a different order of citizenship.

*(Holston 2008: 313, original emphasis)*

Holston views the broad popular participation in the framing of a new constitution for Brazil in 1988 as a high point in urban mobilization that powerfully reinscribes the voices of the marginalized into the national script. Here is an alternative to Wacquant’s (2008) grim image of the urban margins as ghettos of destitution. Struggles for participation in the political processes and economic flows of the global cities manifest, for example, as movements for just distribution and access to infrastructure (Swyngedouw 2004; Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer 2012; Bjorkman 2015; Rao 2018), anti-capitalist movements (Harvey 2012), pirate modernity (Sundaram 2009), or open-source urbanism (Jiménez 2014).

In contrast to approaches that prioritize class conflict as a primary lens for understanding life struggles in the global city, a debate emerges about cultural diversity. Appadurai’s (1991) notion of ethnoscapes paved the way for retheorizing the relation between culture and territory. In a globalized world, cultures move with people. They are de- and reterritorialized and dynamically shaped through the intense transregional and transnational links between countries and their multiple diasporas. Dürrschmidt (2000) considers the world city as an assemblage of heterogeneous cultures. It hosts the entire wealth of networked cultures, and, thus, is a microcosm of the world. Accordingly, living in the global city requires navigating a confusing plethora of cultural milieux. Indeed, Dürrschmidt (2000) defines milieu not as ghetto, but as dynamic cultural space made up of people who share traditions, understandings, and passions. A sense of neighbourhood can result from spatial proximity, yet, more importantly, it is the outcome of a sense of cultural nearness in networks that might span the city or the globe. There are great individual variations in the way people make a home in these fragmented urban spaces. They might ignore diversity, relish the dispassionate consumption of difference, or zealously defend the supremacy of their own culture orientation. An analysis of contextualized identity politics illustrates the confusing diversity of overlapping cultural worlds (Eade 1996; Abu-Lughod 1999; Benton-Short, Price and Friedman 2005).

As an example, Gerd Baumann (1996) studies the everyday life of South Asian migrants in Southall London. Cultural identifications and demotic politics produce multiple fractures between country of origin, religion, linguistic community, ethnic group, caste, or class. A person might identify as Muslim in one context and Pakistani in another. He might be a speaker of Urdu/Hindi, consider himself a South Asian, or more generally Asian. With notions of community and belonging constantly expanding and contracting, cultural boundaries are rendered highly flexible.

More recently, some studies attempt a synthesis between a culturalist and class perspective. While policy-makers have long appropriated the slogan of ‘the world in one place’ by way of marketing world cities as multicultural spectacles, as a tool for analysis it falls short. It ignores
what Vertovec (2007) calls super-diversity. People are not distinguished just by their ethnic identities or countries of origin. Their experience of living in the global city and their locations in it are also determined by ‘differential immigration statuses and their concomitant entitlements and restrictions of rights, divergent labour market experiences, discrete gender and age profiles, patterns of spatial distribution, and mixed local area responses by service providers and residents’ (Vertovec 2007: 1025). Through this lens, a different set of transnationally mediated inequalities becomes apparent.

The concept of super-diversity draws attention to unequal chances for social mobility depending on education, status, or ethnicity. It spotlights class divisions between people of shared origin, conflicts between legal and illegal migrants, differences in educational status, and the ability to access the infrastructures of a city. This understanding reintroduces questions of power and rights into debates of the global city. These debates do not appear in the form of a macrosociological statement about the hourglass structure (Chiu and Lui 2004) of global cities’ social make-up, in which many high earners live among an equal number of poor people with few inhabitants mediating the class rift (Baum 1999). Rather, there is a demand for a more careful analysis of how legal status, economic capacity, and gender identity impact spatial mobility, access to urban resources, and a sense of social stability and protection. These require a differential analysis of the networks that make and refresh populations and relations in the global city. Case studies are particularly suited to this task of understanding concrete dynamics that mediate the relation between class and culture, centre and margin, flow and boundary.

Social practices and the making of the global city

The following three examples from Singapore, Hong Kong, and New York speak of the transregional and transnational dynamics that organize tangible intersections between ethnicity, class, and power in the global city. Singapore’s leadership consciously intervenes into the city space and manufactures a differential cosmopolitanism to consolidate the city-state’s position in world city rankings. In New York, middle-class activists help a disadvantaged Latino community to fend off real estate developers and stay in control of a traditional market in Brooklyn. In Hong Kong’s underprivileged quarters, a motley crowd of informal traders from Asia and Africa engage in low-end commerce that supplies cheap consumer products to the global underclass. The variable use of top-down and bottom-up analysis, exemplifies multiple dimensions of a social politics of globalization. Global cities enshrine the world and are in the world. Their internal heterogeneity, together with the dense networks that extend from multiple layered centres to manifold peripheries, mediates and amplifies global flows, social conflicts, and economic competition.

Creating a global city is a policy objective for many governments. Singapore is a frequently invoked model case (Baum 1999; Yeoh 2004; Benton-Short, Price and Friedman 2005). Like other Asian examples, the city serves to demonstrate that becoming a global hub is predicated on more than liberal economic policy. It requires cultural labour to attract global elites and to win fierce competitions in order to draw the attention of major economic players. Ley speaks about a ‘croissants and opera’ strategy (Ley 1996: 9–10; cf. Yeoh 2005: 946). Design policies develop the urban space for high-end consumption and for hassle-free mobility of privileged groups, thereby turning it into a hub for attractive mega-events. Self-orientalist stereotypes are used generously to produce exotic beauty. They foster a form of multiculturalism that is bereft of any reference to real people or deeply felt passions, instead serving as colourful foreground that hides ethnic exclusion and class discrimination. In Singapore, high-skilled foreign workers are welcomed and invited to ‘sink roots’ and enrich the ‘gene pool’ (Yeoh 2004: 2439)2 of the...
Global cities

local populations, whereas migrants from the low-skilled servant class are rendered insecure and expected to leave the national space quickly when their service is no longer required. A regime of differential visa status is a powerful tool to enforce discriminatory cosmopolitanism. Yet, despite the ambivalent relation of cosmopolitan elite to itinerant poor, low-end globalization continues and fosters alternative routes for transregional and transnational circulation (Vora 2013). The case of Hong Kong is instructive.

In the shadow of a desired and officially manufactured globalization grows another informal economy in the ‘ghettos at the centre of the world’ (Mathews 2011). Chungking Mansion in Hong Kong is such a place. Here, Gordon Mathews meets African traders, South Asian businessmen, and representatives of Chinese manufacturers. They buy or sell mobile phones, computers, MP4 players, DVD players, CDs, software, watches, and clothes. These goods are new or recycled, sold to customers first-, second-, or third-hand. They are branded originals or forgeries, bought officially or traded informally. The activities in hundreds of shops create channels for the distribution of cheap consumer products to places left blank in official maps of globalization. Rather than as a centre for command and control, here the global city functions as a distributive hub and transnational meeting space. Cleaners, cooks, and servants from the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, and Bangladesh meet traders from China and customers from Kenya, Tanzania, or Togo. They communicate in English about products they all recognize as status symbols of global modernity. If taken together, official and unofficial economy can provide a more complete description of the division of labour of the world systems.

World systems analysis considers the relation between the world’s economic core of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, the top end of economic powers; the semi-periphery of China, India, and Brazil, the rising middle aspiring to reach the top of the economic pile . . . and the extreme periphery, the poorer societies in the developing world. Much of Africa represents the extreme periphery along with a number of South Asian and other societies. It is ‘off all kinds of maps’ [Allen and Hamnet 1995: 2], particularly the map of globalization. China in effect puts Africa on the map again, as Africans go to China or to China’s entrepôt, Hong Kong . . . to buy manufactured goods that their fellow Africans can afford.

(Mathews 2011: 208)

The social differential of the global city, its ruptured social spaces and unequal power relations fuel tensions. The case of Moore Street Market in Williamsburg/Bushwick Brooklyn illustrates the uneasy compromise between different needs and their negotiation among hierarchically distinguished stakeholders (Low 2014). Moore Street Market is a traditional market founded in 1941. Today it offers moderate income opportunities for second- and third-generation migrants from Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, and Nicaragua. However, the city administration frowned on the market. They saw a run-down place unable to support itself and thus announced in 2007 that it would be torn down to make space for new low-cost apartment buildings. Locally, the plans caused anxiety among migrants who had built humble businesses through life-long hard labour. They found sympathizers among civil society activists and left intellectuals. The Public Space Research Group from the City University of New York (CUNY) and critical reporters from The New York Times defended the status quo and argued that a market is more than a polished place for consumption. It is a live cultural place filled with activities and memories. It gives a city texture and people an identity. Collective mobilization sought to save the market while preserving its Latino character, avoiding a typical gentrification process that turns historical markets into posh boutique space for high-income customers (Low 2014, 2017).
Summary

The global city debate is a vast field without clear boundaries. While it has long outgrown the limits of the world-systems theory, some scholars continue to provide updated measures of the role individual cities play in global commerce. Global city maps highlight the outstanding significance of urban centres in the United States, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific region for coordinating the flow of finance and commodities. The notion that these commercial centres effectively control and command globalization has been critiqued in qualitative studies about the multiple power contestations that shape transnational relations. Global cities are hubs for top- and bottom-end globalization, as a jumble of criss-crossing transregional, transnational, and transoceanic relations. They are enshrined in and reach out from the tight territory of the global city. Inequality and super-diversity lead to clashes between classes, identity groups, new and old migrants, permanent and shifting inhabitants, and legal and illegal populations, among others. In this sense, global cities are not only at the centre of transregional flows but embody more broadly the global condition as characterized by the dialectics between flow and boundary, exchange and conflict, prosperity and poverty.

Notes

1 While a few authors distinguish between world and global cities (Dürrschmidt 2000), the two terms are mostly used interchangeably. In turn, the notion of global/world city is set apart from the term megacity. The latter is based on quantitative measures, while global city theorists propose that a world city is set apart from other cities by the quality of its relations to the world. It is a hub of and control centre for global flows.

2 Yeoh here quotes from George Yeo, who is quoted in The Straits Times, 5 March 2001, in his capacity as chairman of the Singapore Talent Recruitment (STAR) committee.

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Interest in zones – export processing zones (EPZs) and special economic zones (SEZs) – has grown since China implemented its SEZs in 1978. This interest was rekindled when India announced its 2005 SEZ policy and when the government of China began to pursue Chinese zones in Africa. Zones are usually enclosed areas in which a state develops a specific legal code, one that is generally more lenient toward foreign corporations than in the rest of the state. Import and export tariffs on goods and other taxes are reduced or removed, leading some to associate zones with tax havens that have taken on a spatial, physical quality rather than a purely legal one (Palan 2003).

While EPZs throughout the 1990s were more typically associated with state investment in the zone’s infrastructure, some current zones, such as India’s SEZs, are also financed by private developers. In 1975, the International Labour Organization (ILO) recorded 79 zones in 25 countries (Senga Boyenge 2007). Two 2015 articles in The Economist put the current estimate at 4,300 operational zones (The Economist 4 April 2015a; The Economist 4 April 2015b). Though three out of four countries in the world host them, certain countries in Asia tend to use zones more extensively.

This chapter will first highlight the research on transregional trends associated with the proliferation of the zone – EPZs and SEZs – during the Cold War period. Specifically, the zone was associated with the US construction of regional markets amid the fight against communism in East Asia and South America and the emergence of a new international division of labour. These zones then enabled the shift of Western and Japanese businesses to developing countries, as has been well researched in the literature on zones.

The second section of this chapter departs from this understanding by considering the zone as a spatial format that also exists apart from US and United Nations (UN) policy prescriptions. The zone is connected to state spatiality and allows the state to bypass its own territoriality to forge connections beyond its immediate state space.

The chapter then proceeds to highlight two trends to support the transregional dynamics of such state spatiality. First, China and India have both used zones within their territory to connect their diasporas’ business practices back to their home countries, thereby profiting from the dispersal of their respective ‘nations’. Second, both China and India have begun to use zones abroad in their own foreign policy practices. These practices may challenge both our ideas of regions in area studies and traditional concepts of state spatiality, which is not confined
Regional strategies and global economic restructuring

Throughout the 1960s, economic geographers researched the emergence of zones in individual contexts and measured their effects on local economies. By the end of the 1970s, critical research on zones, though often still focused within one country, acknowledged that zones were connected to other economic spaces, including transnational supply chains and regional trade agreements. This emerging research was partly enabled by the most comprehensive critique of zones and their place in the global economy: the new international division of labour (NIDL) thesis (Fröbel, Heinrichs and Kreye 1980).

The NIDL researchers witnessed a shift whereby Western and Japanese firms relocated their manufacturing to so-called Second and Third World countries. For these authors, the zone was a pivotal legal and spatial feature facilitating this shift, which consequently relocated competition for wage labour from a national to a global scale. The notion led to their book’s main concern: the loss of labour rights and the rise of unemployment in developed countries.

The NIDL thesis is related to the assumptions associated with world-systems theory. Therefore, it uses developmental divisions and, additionally, the nation-state as the main spatial and economic units of analysis. In this thesis, a single, capitalist world system appears to be both the structure and the agent driving structural change on a global scale, whereas governments and corporations act in response to these changes.

At the time the NIDL was published in the late 1970s, Japanese scholars published a similarly in-depth exposé of free trade zones in East Asia, which they considered spatial and juridical neo-imperial tools used to relocate US and Japanese businesses to the region to prevent the spread of communism (Takeo 1977). Rather than simply an outcome of a structural change in the global economy, the authors of this edition pinpoint specific policies and actors responsible for this change.

Following the Second World War, Japan had lost nearly all its regional markets as its former colonies were unable, or unwilling, to trade with them. By the early 1960s, the USA began to pursue a regional strategy in Asia in conjunction with Japan. The USA and Japan used zones to increase investments and trade in the region, aiming to instigate a process of regionalization by increasing trade ties between East Asian countries and by increasing their ties to the West. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) assisted in establishing the Kaoshiung Free Trade Zone in Taiwan (1966). Japan and the USA, using Kaoshiung as a model, then set up Masan in South Korea in the years following the normalization of relations between Japan and South Korea in 1965. In the aforementioned journal issue (Takeo 1977), these Japanese scholars outlined the spread of this policy to Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia as well as the US attempt at establishing a zone outside of Saigon shortly before its capture.

Recent historical research, however, shows that the Taiwanese government had been considering a zone since the mid-1950s to boost their alliance with the West. While governments in Asian states were concerned with the perceived loss of sovereignty associated with foreign concessions – that is to say, neo-imperialism – they perceived other political threats, namely from communist China, as a greater risk to their security than economic concessions to Western and Japanese firms (Miller 2015).

The NIDL was a thesis on global economic restructuring. In contrast, works centred on the zone as a neo-imperial feature of American and Japanese designs focused on the zone’s regional effects. These authors also highlighted that what started as a regional phenomenon in East Asia
SEZs and transregional state spatiality

was spreading globally through institutions like the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), which supported the implementation of zones in developing countries (Takeo 1977).

Despite the opening of a dialogue between these authors with those of the NIDL, important criticisms of the NIDL thesis emerged from feminist perspectives. While the NIDL thesis only explains shifts in manufacturing locations between countries, gender and immigrant statuses help explain disparities within countries as well as why manufacturing still takes place in developed countries (Fernández Kelly 1989; Rosen 2002). Feminist criticisms helped to shift terminology in the study of zones away from binary or trinary studies where states fit into clear developmental categories, but they did not – nor did they seek to – overcome the perception that zones are Western strategies to extract wealth from non-Western counterparts.

Recently, historical works have begun to specify the zone’s policy origins (Orenstein 2011; Neveling 2015). In contrast to the NIDL thesis that locates zone origins in ‘a single capitalist world system’, these works show that specific policies, firms, states, and even individuals played a strong role in the dissemination of the zone, which has reinforced the work by Marxist Japanese scholars in the 1970s. Thus we are confronted with the fact that not all zones have their origins in these policies, nor do all zones conform to the model spatial formula: Western or Japanese investment in developing countries, which then re-export the goods to the West or Japan.

I now proceed to discuss the transregional state spatiality of zones in China and India, two countries that, above all others, have most readily implemented zones. This study is influenced by research on the spatiality of the zone and the engagement it enables in multiple economic and political spaces, thereby situating the zone within generalized discussions on uneven patterns of development and enclaved spaces. The global connectedness the zone facilitates is not thought of in scalar terms. Instead, ‘global’ describes the particular type of connectivity stimulated through these spaces (Opitz and Tellmann 2012), which we might otherwise think of as ‘transregional’. Research from China and India focuses on zones as active state-rescaling strategies rather than passive reactions to crisis. Such strategies are related to broader state-rescaling initiatives that may use neo-liberal logics as a tool for increased central government intervention (e.g. Ong 2006; Kennedy 2014).

Transregional state spatiality

The history of the zone is not confined to its association with US foreign policy and UN agencies. The zone has also emerged on its own in individual contexts around the world, connected to changing strategies of state spatiality (Maruschke 2017). Neither of the two countries with the largest zone policies today – China and India – began their zone practices in relation to US foreign policy pressure or UNIDO assistance (for China, see Crane 1990: 27; Reardon 1996: 285–90; for India, see Maruschke 2017). Rather, these zones emerged out of attempts to reshape and reassert state space to manage the state’s national development and its connectedness with the global economy.

Territory is a bundle of political technologies and practices for measuring and controlling space. The zone is a space of de- and reterritorialization that gives the state flexibility in reshaping and reasserting its state spatial form, especially in relation to active state-rescaling strategies (Kennedy 2014). The zone is therefore a state territorial practice that augments state space in a way that is not exclusively territorial. The zone is a feature of state spatiality that can serve specific de- and reterritorializing functions (Maruschke 2017). It can be used to strategically reconnect (specific) emigrants back to the state and to connect the market to these individuals abroad.
Furthermore, the state and businesses seek to use these migrants’ mobility and transnational family ties to transregionalize their trade and business networks, thereby respatializing familial, corporate, and state space.

In the following, I briefly illustrate how China and India actively use zones as state reterritorialization strategies that seek to forge new connections within and beyond the state’s territory. The governments of China and India are using zones to promote their regionalization and globalization strategies – strategies that might challenge regional categories for both policy analysts and area studies specialists.

**Reconnections**

China’s SEZs emerged in 1979 as a reterritorializing compromise. They ‘allowed reformers to pursue their foreign and domestic economic policies, yet zones would be limited enough so that they would not pose a great risk to the national economy, allaying the conservatives’ concerns’ (Crane 1990: 29).

Chinese officials considered zones in discussions on how to develop the Guangzhou region of southern China by linking it with Hong Kong. As China could not send officials to study Taiwan’s zones, they relied on networks of the business elite in Hong Kong, who developed some key ideas for the policy. The goal was to connect this region of southern China to ‘Chinese’ foreign investment in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia, where there are large Chinese populations.

During the two decades following the so-called opening of China that started in 1978, ‘tycoons’ from Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia generated an estimated 70 per cent of China’s investment and foreign trade. The high degree of ‘Chinese’ investments in the zones’ initial years helped assuage fears within China about an opening toward foreign investors (Miller 2015: 246). These practices of using zones to reconnect cultural spaces to state or economic spaces can be seen as an interplay between state reterritorialization and regionalization strategies (Ong 2006: 97–118). As Aihwa Ong highlights, the zones are ultimately (re)integrating these varying degrees of independent states – Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and even Singapore – with mainland China. Questions remain as to how the overseas Chinese are currently being tapped to lead China’s current ‘One Belt, One Road’ policy, which includes coordinated investments in infrastructure around the world.

The history of India’s zones has received less attention than China’s, even though the current SEZ policy, enacted in 2005, has generated considerable interest. Initial plans for a free trade zone in India began shortly after independence in 1947, but the first zone was finally implemented in Kandla, Gujarat, in 1965. The main purpose of this space of exception was, ironically, to better connect this remote, coastal location near Pakistan with India’s territorializing state space. The remoteness of the location also served the purpose of shielding the rest of the state from the connectivity generated in the zone (Maruschke 2017).

As in China, India used zones to target investments of ‘non-resident Indians’, a category of citizenship introduced specifically to extend the reach of the Indian economy around the globe. The zone’s tax regime enabled non-resident Indians to invest in India’s zones while maintaining their foreign tax status. The government of India particularly targeted Indians living in the USA who had knowledge of both the US and Indian markets. Family ties played an important role in India’s zone investment, with the majority of ‘foreign’-owned businesses operated by families with transnational ties. Yet, instead of using these ties to export Indian manufactures to the USA, these families used India’s trade agreements with the Soviet Union to export Western and Indian products from the Kandla Free Trade Zone to the Soviet Union. More recently, the
government of India has again sought to tap the Indian diaspora’s settlement patterns as export destinations for foreign firms. Following the 2005 SEZ policy, the government of India has marketed the Indian diaspora as potential export markets for Indian manufactures and services. This has helped generate investment in Indian zones from Japanese firms expanding to markets where many overseas and non-resident Indians have settled, namely the Gulf states and Africa, which have strong business ties with India.

**New connections**

Both China and India have recently begun implementing zones abroad as part of their foreign policy, which challenges the ‘West to the Rest’ diffusion narrative that has remained dominant in research on zones. Since the late 1990s, the perspective that China’s SEZs were the impetus for China’s economic upswing pushed China’s Ministry of Commerce to consider implementing up to 50 SEZs abroad. Such zones would host Chinese firms, starting with a minimum of ten, as part of its *zouchuqu* (going global) strategy.

At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2006, Hu Jintao announced three to five zones that would be allocated to Africa. Since then, this global strategy has been closely connected with debates on ‘China in Africa’ as well as with broader debates on South–South cooperation, the presence of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) in Africa, and the Global North/South divide (Bräutigam 2010). These themes suggest a need to rethink assumptions in the fields of international relations and international political economy and focus more attention on South–South relations.

Moreover, the zone concept is being remade through its implementation in African countries, as not all have prior experience with it. Though ‘Chinese zones in Africa’ are often discussed as a specific policy, China is not implementing the policy; rather, the host countries are. Zones are taking on different forms in each case, ranging from Ethiopia’s industrial zone (without added incentives) to the robust Egypt Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation zone. What is a zone from China’s perspective – and China provides numerous incentives for Chinese firms to relocate to these ‘Chinese’ economic spaces abroad – is in fact not always a zone in the host’s national context. Furthermore, though these zones are given life as foreign policy initiatives, zones emerge as business deals between Chinese firms and local governments. Also, Chinese SEZs in Africa are only one subset of a much larger policy.

China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy seeks to integrate Asia, Europe, and Africa with China through Chinese infrastructure investment; Chinese zones in Africa are one part of this strategy. These zones are both a symptom of China’s changing position in the global economy and part of a larger project to actively reposition China in a global economic and political environment. After all, as labour in China becomes more expensive, Chinese manufacturing moves abroad, often in zones, following in the footsteps of American and Japanese firms half a century ago.

Meanwhile, the government of India has recently begun using zones abroad as part of a regional strategy to position itself centrally within greater Asia. To the ‘Look East’ campaign to increase ties with East Asia, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has added the slogan ‘Link West’: both campaigns now fall under the ‘Make in India’ drive to increase manufacturing in India. Since Modi’s election in 2014, the 2005 SEZ policy has been reinvigorated with numerous trade corridors, port development, and the multiplication of zone types within India (for the 2005 policy, see Aggarwal 2012). The government of India also has been pursuing closer trade linkages with Afghanistan, due mainly to interest in broader access to Central Asia and in certain mineral resources in Afghanistan.
Though India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are all members of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), India is unable to trade with Afghanistan over Pakistan’s territory, due to India and Pakistan’s long-standing rivalry. Hence, the government of India needs to pursue extra-regional arrangements to facilitate subregional engagement. As a solution, the government of India has agreed to develop Iran’s Chabahar port, soon to be Iran’s first deep-water port, and has built roads in Afghanistan that connect to infrastructure in Iran terminating at the port. Chabahar also hosts an SEZ for Indian and Afghani firms to facilitate their ‘free’ regional trade in an extra-regional setting.

India and Iran, which host the two largest Shia Muslim populations, have rhetorically used their commonalities to quietly pursue a strengthened relationship, which culminated in a trade agreement between Iran and India in 2016. Such agreements, which challenge the borders and meaning of South Asia, are moreover linked to the planned North–South trade corridor. The latter is a multimodal transport agreement to shift Arabian Sea–Eastern European trade from the Suez Canal to an overland route through Iran to Central Asia, and ultimately to Russia.

**Conclusions**

These examples from China and India underscore several points of reflection concerning larger debates on state spatiality, globalization, and regionalization. As a spatial format that enables processes of de- and reterritorialization, the zone is actively linked to the respatialization of the state as well as other spatial formats such as regions, supply chains, and migrant spaces. That is, zones allow for a specific transregionality run by various actors in addition to states and regional institutions – namely corporate, entrepreneurial, and diasporic actors. The flexibility the zone enables may also result in unplanned, new spatialities that emerge from these actors’ initiatives. Research focused on zones as transregionalizing spatial formats can therefore elucidate border-transcending phenomena, resulting in an active respatialization of states, regional frameworks, and other spatial formats.

**Select bibliography**

SEZs and transregional state spatiality


TRANSREGIONAL TRADE INFRASTRUCTURES IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

Uwe Müller

Introduction

Technological advances in products and processes – particularly in the fields of communication and transport technologies, that is to say the Internet and the digital revolution, global air traffic, and the containerization of cargo transport – are viewed alongside economic, demographic, and political processes as primary causes of present-day globalization. Today, 90 per cent of the world’s trade is carried out on the seas (North 2016: 293). Yet, as the late maritime historian Frank Broeze noted: ‘Although globalization has become a household word, there is little recognition that our world could not function without the complex system of maritime transport sustaining intercontinental and regional trade’ (Broeze 2002: 1). The formation of transport infrastructures, thus, rarely plays a role in the multifaceted, often contentious debates on the positive and negative effects of globalization. This means that efforts at blocking or at least imposing stricter regulations on globalization are largely directed elsewhere, such as policies on trade, financial markets, and immigration.

This lack of attention paid to the infrastructural basis of globalization essentially creates the paradoxical situation in which even ‘space’ has no prominent role in globalization debates. In reading studies on globalization, one often gets the impression that space is shrinking. The borders that once separated remote parts of the world have disappeared and peoples now belong to a metaphoric ‘global village’. This metaphor, advanced in media studies for years, has also been used in transport science (Grübler 1990: 177; Broeze 2002: 2; McLuhan 2011).

But appearances can be deceiving. The reduction in transport costs owing to the expansion of transport infrastructure and increased efficiency in transport services has not made ‘space’ irrelevant. However, it changes the relations between spatial units. If we consider product-market integration, this becomes abundantly clear. When transport costs decrease, production costs become the primary determinant of a product’s competitiveness. A sudden and relatively large drop in transport costs opens new markets for imported goods. Lower production costs might mean that prices for imported goods are lower than the prices for locally produced products, allowing foreign producers to dominate markets in once remote or poorly developed areas. Having lost their ‘natural protection from imports’, local producers of the same or
similar goods face financial ruin. This is especially true for so-called homogeneous products, where potential buyers can easily discern differences in quality.

This loss of natural trade barriers has greatly affected commodities such as raw materials and foodstuffs. Multiple economic studies have shown that between 1850 and 1914 (and after 1950) the world’s most important trading centres experienced commodity-price convergence (Williamson 1996). This convergence was primarily due to the decreasing influence of transport distance on a product’s retail price (Kaukiainen 2012: 80). As a result, natural monopolies disappeared and opportunities for multi-vendor competition increased. Under these conditions, production costs largely determine competitive outcomes (Findlay and O’Rourke 2007: 402–7).

In earlier eras, the displacement of local goods by imported goods was typically not widespread since modes of transport expanded linearly, thus limiting the ability to form networks. Taking over regional markets necessitated complementing modes of transport, which often were less efficient. In addition, the transfer of goods between different modes of transport increased costs and could only be carried out at certain points, such as train stations and ports.

Technological progress, therefore, does not make space irrelevant, but it does change the relationships between spaces by creating new spatial hierarchies. Changes in transport infrastructure, thus, are of political and economic significance and should be analysed from a political economy perspective. These changes are also of sociocultural significance since they have an immense impact on people’s everyday lives (Laak 2017).

But most importantly, a historical perspective can improve our understanding of infrastructures and their impact on transregional trade. This is, first, because the state, that is to say public authorities and institutions, plays a major role in building and forming infrastructures. Second, the construction of infrastructures is usually capital intensive. And, third, in comparison to other technological systems, infrastructures have a very long useful life, so that problems of path dependence are particularly pronounced. Historical research has shown that temporal ‘windows of opportunity’ exist for the development of certain infrastructures. The fact that infrastructure development is time dependent has been used, among other factors, to explain variations in the significance of railways in different parts of the world; latecomers to the railroad boom simply could not re-create the same developmental trajectory as those countries that developed railroads earlier. (Grübler 1990: 99, 125). Transport history also points to a host of unrealized visions for promising transport systems; their development was halted due to individual events (Dienel and Trischler 1997).

Utilizing a historical lens also highlights how technological innovations in one transport sector affect other modes of transport. For example, the nineteenth-century railway boom in Europe had a negative effect on the construction and use of roads and inland waterways. Intercontinental air traffic, after 1950, practically eliminated passenger transport by ship in the North Atlantic; however, in recent years the growing popularity of cruise tourism in some parts of the world has boosted the construction and operation of ocean-going passenger ships. In the 1980s, motorized private transport seemingly won the ‘battle between rail and road’ in Europe. However, since 2000, rail passenger transport in Europe and even in the United States has experienced a renaissance. Meanwhile China has launched multiple intracontinental railway projects in Asia and Africa. These rail lines facilitate the transport of raw materials and advance more general geostrategic interests (Foster et al. 2012; Badenoch and Fickers 2010; Reuter 2010; Divall and Roth 2015; Lacher 2016).

As the above examples indicate, the development of transport infrastructures has never been driven solely by technological and economic factors. The history of the two transport revolutions of the modern era highlights the complex processes informing the development
of transport infrastructures. It is no coincidence that these two revolutions coincided with the so-called first (1850–1914) and second (1950/1970–present) waves of modern globalization. During both phases, there were significant changes in transregional traffic between continents.

After briefly discussing the historiography about transport, the periodization of ‘globalization’, and the technological and economic dimensions of the two transport revolutions and its general economic effects, this chapter then outlines the impact of the two transport revolutions on relations between world regions. This impact is examined, on the one hand, in terms of the importance of Europe within the global shipping industry, and, on the other hand, of ports in changing transregional relations. Because the effects of increased traffic in persons and information merit separate consideration, this chapter’s focus is limited to cargo transport and its relation to economic globalization.

Key topics in transport history

For years, research on the history of transport centred on the development of new modes of transportation, such as railroads in nineteenth-century Europe, within the framework of individual nation-states and their national economies. However, in recent years, transnational phenomena, such as the contribution of railroads to the development of empires and to the integration of Europe, have become major topics of enquiry. Research on the twentieth century has concentrated on automobility and, in some cases, on public transport, since the points of intersection of these topics with social, cultural, and environmental history are immediately apparent. Although there are case studies on advances in aviation, pipelines, and inland waterways, they are seldom referenced in more mainstream historiographic discussions (Mentzel 2006; Merki 2008; Duc et al. 2014; Schiefelbusch and Dienel 2014).

‘Maritime history’ occupies a unique position within the field of transport history. The establishment of the International Commission for Maritime History in 1960 gave maritime history an institutional foundation. This foundation was reinforced in 1988 with the founding of the International Maritime Economic History Association, which regularly holds international conferences and publishes the International Journal of Maritime History (Williams and Scholl 2012: 11–12). For years, research on maritime history focused on the history of exploration. Consequently, the early modern era was better researched than the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—a rare phenomenon within the historiography (Osterhammel 2009: 157, 162; Harlaftis, Tenold and Valdaliso 2012: 1). More recently, a growing number of researchers from ‘maritime history’—and from global history—have suggested that ‘the emergence of a world economy was based largely on maritime patterns’. Thus, they argue, ‘[w]orld history requires maritime history as a research field in order to understand global dynamics’. They further stress that one of the ‘advantages of maritime history is its ability to connect the local and national with the global’ (Polónia 2010: 13–15).

The periodization of globalization

Some historians label interconnections that existed between Greeks, Persians, Romans, Arabs, and Chinese prior to 1500 as ‘archaic’ globalization. Transregional trade relations between South Asia and East Africa as well as between China and Southeast Asia already existed at this time. The term ‘proto-globalization’ is often used to describe the expansion of global connections to the ‘New World’ between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Advances in cartography, navigation, and shipbuilding provided the technological foundation for European transoceanic exploration. This development led to the establishment of trading posts and
colonies that facilitated trade in luxury goods, such as gold, spices, and sugar, as well as in slaves (Bayly 2004; Findlay and O’Rourke 2007).

Modern economic globalization, most researchers agree, unfolded in two phases. The first phase (1850–1914) saw the emergence of global markets for bulk commodities: foodstuffs (e.g. grains and rice, and to a lesser extent meat), raw materials (e.g. cotton, coal, and timber), and industrially produced textiles. A second phase began around 1950–1970. During this phase, the integration of product markets progressed to the point that global production chains emerged, and the exchange of information and data intensified. Post-1970, one also saw an exponential increase in financial transactions.

The transport revolution and transregional trade during the first phase of modern economic globalization

Thanks to technological advances, economic historians estimate that maritime transport costs at the end of the nineteenth century were one-sixth those recorded in 1800, while land-based transport had been reduced by 90 per cent (Kenwood and Lougheed 1999: 12–15; Crafts and Venables 2003: 325–31). Although this estimate does not account for regional variations and cannot claim absolute accuracy, it is indicative of an extraordinary change in transport costs over the course of the nineteenth century.

The transition to railroads was the primary reason for increased efficiency in land transport. The first railroads were built in the 1820s in England, and before the middle of the century, railroads had already spread to every European nation as well as to North America. However, the global distribution of railroads remained uneven circa 1900 – a situation fundamentally unchanged today. In Europe, railways integrated the emerging national economies and soon large parts of the continent. In North America, the development of the continent by white settlers was closely linked to railroad construction. On the Indian subcontinent, British colonial rulers had built roughly 40,000 kilometres of rail lines by the eve of the First World War. In Latin America, Asia (i.e. China), and Africa, branch lines were created that connected the seaports with the hinterlands; however, on these continents, railroad networks, with only a few exceptions, remained weak. One exception was a large network in Argentina centred around Buenos Aires (Davis 1991; Osterhammel 2009: 1018–23). Only railroads connected to seaports had significance for transregional traffic.

The one exception was the Trans-Siberian Railway, begun in 1891 and largely completed by 1904. With connections to Manchuria and Korea, the Trans-Siberian Railway played a critical role in Russian (and later Soviet) trade with China, Korea, and Japan. It was also used by other European states for trade with East Asia during the two world wars and the Suez Canal closure (Sahi 2015). The Soviet Union’s unique geographic situation, not its socialist economic system, explains why between 1930 and 1990 it was the only state that carried out extensive new railway construction. In contrast, European and North American railway expansion reached a saturation point and some routes were closed. Only a few regions where railways had not existed prior to 1914 managed to close the gap in the twentieth century (Grübler 1990: 107–15).

The development of transregional, intercontinental trade, therefore, depended primarily on ocean shipping. By the 1870s, the cost of transporting goods by sea was decreasing in Britain much faster than the cost of transporting goods by railroad (Kaukiainen 2012: 64). This increased efficiency was primarily due to the transition from wooden sailing ships to iron-clad steamships and later steel ships. Steamships had several advantages over sailing ships. First, they were less at the mercy of the weather, particularly wind. Consequently, travel times could be calculated more accurately, making them more suitable for scheduled shipping. Second, they
could transport significantly larger and heavier loads than land vehicles. Third, steamships meant lower labour costs for shipowners, as they demanded fewer experienced sailors than sailing ships. Although steamships required a few skilled machinists, they mostly relied on stokers – a job that required only muscle power and stamina (Merki 2008: 37; North 2016: 248).

Despite these advantages, the nineteenth-century transition from sail to steam was a relatively slow process. By 1807, the first paddle steamers were navigating the Hudson River, and over the next four decades steamships came to dominate numerous rivers in North America and Europe. However, it was not until the 1840s that a steam engine was developed that allowed steamships to traverse oceans. Even then, long-distance steam travel was often unprofitable because a large portion of the ship’s space had to be allocated for storing the ship’s fuel (coal). It was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that more efficient steam engines requiring less coal and having greater range were developed. Thus, sailing ships were not immediately abandoned. Until at least the 1870s, advances in sailing ships continued to be made and they competed on an equal footing with steamships. Thus, Canada’s merchant marine in the late nineteenth century was the fourth largest in the world, despite being exclusively composed of sailing ships (Osterhammel 2009: 1014; Williams and Armstrong 2012: 44).

Between 1870 and 1890, the dynamic between sail and steam ships shifted significantly in favour of the latter. This is especially true if one uses transport quantities rather than the number of ships as the measure. This development was a direct effect of changing transregional trade relations. Prior to the 1860s, US shipping had dominated Anglo–American trade, and steam had accounted for less than 10 per cent of trade on the North Atlantic. But with the onset of the American Civil War (1861–5), British steamships displaced US sail ships in Anglo–American trade. Steam now dominated both inter-European sea traffic and North Atlantic sea traffic. In the North Atlantic, steamers were now used for transporting raw materials to Europe and for transporting emigrants in the opposite direction. Additionally, the construction of the Suez Canal in 1867 promoted the use of steamships by creating a much shorter route between Europe and Southeast and South Asia (Williams and Armstrong 2012: 48–57; North 2016: 247–8).

Steamships subsequently also dominated ports on the North American Pacific coast. By 1910, steamships accounted for 90 per cent of the world’s ocean shipping. (North 2016: 245). But sailing ships continued to operate in certain market segments. They concentrated on carrying lower value goods where speed was not a major economic criterion. Ironically, one of these goods was coal for steamships (Grübler 1990: 83–5). Sailing vessels were also used to transport grain and wool from Australia to Europe, since the Suez Canal did not shorten the route significantly. Additionally, the export of saltpetre from northern Chile to Europe was handled by sailing vessels developed for this purpose. Specifically, Germany utilized saltpetre in the production of nitrogen-based fertilizers. After the First World War, the transport of saltpetre by sailing ships around Cape Horn resumed and did not end until the refinement of the Haber-Bosch process made possible the mass production of synthetic ammonia (Scholl and Slotta 2014).

Economic historians and technology historians rightly emphasize that the selection of the mode of transport is largely determined by economic criteria and by preferences for various transport quality features, such as speed, safety, punctuality, and performance – and not the mode of transport’s ‘modernity’. This was also true for the transport revolution of the nineteenth century. In choosing steam or sail, the critical factors were steam engine efficiency, the distance and duration of the journey, and the type of cargo (Williams and Armstrong 2012). Furthermore, spatial constellations and historical contexts, such as the construction of shipping lanes and Great Britain’s position as the dominant sea power, also played a role.
The nineteenth-century transport revolution with its intracontinental railways and transregional steamships had a significant economic impact. First of all, it created global markets for various commodities. For example, in the 1870s and 1880s, the cost of transporting grain and cotton between the United States and Europe was cut by more than half, and sometimes by as much as 90 per cent. At roughly the same time, an international rice market developed in Asia. Burma, Siam (present-day Thailand), and Indochina (comprising today’s Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) exported rice, while China, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies (later Indonesia) imported it. This development is frequently used by scholars to counter the long-held argument that nineteenth-century globalization was driven solely by European and North American industrialization. Instead, these scholars argue that it was propelled by various transregionally oriented projects initiated by groups of merchants (Osterhammel 2009: 1030–1). In the 1890s, a transregional market for meat developed thanks to advances in refrigeration. Refrigerated ships could now link meat-producing countries in South America, such as Argentina, to Europe (Greenhill 1994: 417–18). In each of the above cases, the development of markets led to an intensification of agriculture in some regions and crisis-driven structural change in others. Most European governments reacted to increased competition from overseas with agricultural protectionism; today, these protectionist policies are advanced within the framework of the European Union (O’Rourke 1997; Kenwood and Lougheed 1999: 68–76).

Railways and ocean steamships also contributed to the establishment of joint stock companies and to advances in communication technologies such as telegraph, radio, and radar. They also became spheres of operation for international insurance companies and standardization organizations and provided the foundation for international trade union movements.

The transport revolution and transregional trade during the second phase of modern economic globalization

After 1914, the shipping industry’s share in global trade continued to rise. Today, 90 per cent of the world’s trade is carried out by sea (North 2016: 293). Theoretically, the cost of transporting a cargo load weighing one ton by land would be twenty-five times more than by sea. The lower cost of shipping by sea is primarily because sea vessels can carry much larger loads than land vehicles. Thus, advancements in shipbuilding primarily involved building increasingly larger ships. In 1880, seagoing vessels had an average capacity of 700 gross registered tons (GRT); in 2008, that number had reached 24,000 GRT. Yet, while the size of ships increased thirtyfold, the average speed ‘only’ increased fourfold (Merki 2008: 37; North 2016: 281).

In the nineteenth century, ship sizes first grew on the North Atlantic, where larger passenger ships were introduced. Post-1945, the introduction of larger cargo ships was tied to the rapidly growing demand for oil, which was transported primarily by huge oil tankers and, to a lesser extent, via pipelines. Two historic events also played a role: the Korean War and the nationalization of the oil industry in the Persian Gulf region, which prompted Great Britain to close oil refineries there. The 1970s oil crisis halted growth in tanker tonnage for several decades; only in 2004 did tanker tonnage regain the 1980 level. Already by the late 1960s, ore-bulk-oil carriers had been designed that could carry wet or dry cargo loads; due to the oil crisis, these combination carriers have been primarily used to transport dry goods. Overall, dry bulk tonnage grew by 75 per cent between 1980 and 2008 (Kaukiainen 2012).

But the real twentieth-century revolution in maritime transport was the introduction of containerization for general cargo. The simple idea at first glance of reducing transfer costs between different modes of transport by utilizing standardized containers to transport goods
from the site of production to the site of consumption became a very complex innovation. Like the transition to steamships in the nineteenth century, containerization had a long pre-history. As early as 1900, railways and trucks had used box containers and moving crates to transport goods, and in the 1930s, US railway cars were loaded for the first time onto ships. However, there were unresolved legal issues: ‘Land and sea freight forwarding services were not legally allowed to be combined, a restriction which served to greatly increase costs’ (Broeze 2002: 9; Klose 2009: 162–9; Levinson 2016). The intermodal container was born in 1956, when Malcom MacLean founded a company offering door-to-door transport between Boston, Massachusetts, and Newark, New Jersey. But the real breakthrough did not occur until the mid-1960s, when container transport was used to supply American military forces during the Vietnam War and the International Organization for Standardization established set standards for two types of containers (Levinson 2016: 170–253). Within a few years, ‘non-bulk trade’ in Europe, North America, and East Asia switched to using intermodal containers. In 2000, 13.5 million of these ‘boxes’ carried 90 per cent of the world’s ‘non-bulk trade’ (Broeze 2002: 1).

Containerization’s economic impact was first evident at ports, where employment dropped 5 to 7 per cent. This had dramatic social consequences for port cities (Kukiainen 2012: 71). A similar development took place on ships. Circa 1800, a ship with a capacity of 400 tons employed 13 sailors; today a ship carrying 14,000 containers, i.e. a cargo of approximately 420,000 tons, also only needs 13 sailors. The reduction in the need for skilled labour has also lowered labour costs. Today, 25 per cent of the world’s sailors come from the Philippines (North 2016: 283).

Increased efficiency in transferring goods has also significantly decreased the layover time of container ships. Along with better utilization of ship space, this development has transformed maritime traffic; for example, today ‘one dedicated container carrier could replace seven vessels on the same route’ between Australia and Japan (Lin 2015: 121). Container shipping today still relies on economies of scale. Unlike bulk transport, where ship size (especially for tankers) has reached its limit, the capacity of container ships continues to grow, fuelled by massive investments in infrastructure, the construction and expansion of container ports, and even the expansion of the Suez and Panama canals.

Container traffic allowed for the distribution of production sites along supply chains through just-in-time (JIT) production, that is to say production with minimal warehousing (Levinson 2016: 355–74). But containerization also had implications for other sectors of the economy and for infrastructures. New designs for vessels and cargo-handling facilities, global door-to-door delivery, the early use of computers and the Internet, and new forms of enterprises, such as consortia, alliances, and international mega mergers are also associated with JIT production: ‘Through the creation of global networks, enlargements of scale and worldwide investments by both shipping and port management companies, the container industry, from being a helpmate to globalization, became one of its major exponents’ (Broeze 2002: 3).

**Transport revolutions and relations between major world regions**

The temporal parallel between the two modern phases of globalization and the transport revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is clear. From the 1870s to 2000, trade multiplied by a factor of 140; world population grew sixfold and world output grew roughly sixtyfold. Thus, the share of world exports in the global gross domestic product increased from 4.6 per cent to over 17 per cent (Maddison 2008). Because this tremendous absolute expansion in the exchange of goods (and considerable relative expansion) requires a material basis,
all representations of globalization(s) identify the above-mentioned processes of the transport revolutions as among its most important foundations.

A closer look, however, reveals that the intensity of connections differs by region. Thus, it is more accurate to speak of transregional interdependence, rather than of globalization. Similarly, the effects of increasing global or transregional ties on the development of national economies are known to vary greatly. Although numerous academic and political debates have addressed this issue, the critical role of the shipping industry in producing and maintaining this regional inequality has not yet been adequately explored (Harlaftis, Tenold and Valdaliso 2012: 2).

Regional inequalities occur at different levels. The next two sections will focus on two levels: the hierarchy of continents and/or states and the changing significance of individual ports. Although the above have very different spatial dimensions, they are related.

**Europe’s position in the shipping industry**

According to most histories, Europe accounted for roughly two-thirds of all world trade during the first modern phase of globalization (Kenwood and Lougheed 1999: 78–92). However, the methodology behind this figure is problematic for at least two reasons. First, one can assume that some foreign trade went unrecorded and that the proportion of unrecorded trade was higher for outside Europe. Second, the size of foreign trade is always dependent on territorial structure, that is to say the size of states and thus the number of borders. A small country, such as the Netherlands, will always have a higher percentage of foreign trade than its much larger neighbour Germany. Similarly, most European nations would always export and import more in proportion to their national product than massive countries like Russia, China, and the United States. Thus, if the European Union were classified as a single domestic market, Europe’s share of foreign trade would change dramatically.

Despite these objections, it cannot be denied that European hegemony indelibly shaped nineteenth-century globalization. Statistics on the transport of goods via railways and seagoing vessels support the view that until 1914 Europeans, particularly the British, dominated global trade: ‘World shipping was centred upon Europe, both with regard to the production of transport and with regard to the production of ships’ (Ojala and Tenold 2017: 843). Indeed, in the two decades before the First World War, British shipyards constructed over 60 per cent of world tonnage’ (Slaven 2013: 46). Over half of this tonnage was for the British shipping companies – a testament to the United Kingdom’s hegemonic role in shipping at that time (Broadberry and O’Rourke 2010: 80).

Commerce in the North Atlantic, as well as in the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and the Western Pacific, was dominated by Europe and the United States (Osterhammel 2009: 1015). Outside of these regions, only Japan had modern ships and a competitive fleet in 1918; but the range of the Japanese fleet was only regional (Howe 1996: 268).

In the decades prior to the First World War, Europe, or more accurately Great Britain and Atlantic Europe, dominated global foreign trade, the construction of seafaring vessels, and maritime traffic to an extent never seen before or since. As noted earlier, this dominance was the product of nineteenth-century technological advances in iron-clad steamships. Politically and economically, however, it was the culmination of a development that had begun with European expansion circa 1500. By contrast, between 1100 and 1500, the Indian Ocean had been the world’s most heavily travelled ocean (Pearson 2015).

In 1888, the largest port cities were London, New York, Liverpool, and Hamburg. Hong Kong, in seventh place, was the only top ten port located outside the North Atlantic. Besides North Atlantic traffic between Europe and North America, there were only four other shipping
routes: through the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, around the Cape of Good Hope, between Europe and Brazil, and between California and Japan. Together, these routes accounted for almost all intercontinental traffic (Osterhammel 2009: 1016).

British hegemony was the product of a combination of favourable conditions. It had access to raw materials, a developed industry, and significant access to investment capital. It also had a global empire and thus was the primary beneficiary of the steam engine’s triumphal advance. Shipping, as an important part of the service sector, also developed prior to 1800 in European nations where conditions for agricultural development were unfavourable. This was the case for Norway and Finland as well as for Greece, where the long-term impact was the greatest. For centuries, Greek merchants controlled the grain traffic on the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Based on these transregional experiences, Greek shipowners in the twentieth century developed a global orientation, becoming leaders in international tanker shipping. The shipping industry accounted for up to one-third of Greece’s national income. Here is an almost classic case of cluster origin and path dependence (North 2016: 246–7).

Over the course of the twentieth century, the distribution of world trade between continents became more balanced than it had been circa 1900. The European share dropped to ‘only’ 50 per cent in the interwar period (Kenwood and Lougheed 1999: 211). At first glance, the European share of the shipping industry appears to have fallen much lower than is the case; this seeming discrepancy is due to the business practice, known as ‘flags of convenience’, whereby ships are registered to domiciles other than those of their owners. The primary motivation for this practice is to reduce labour costs and taxes, as well as to avoid having to meet European and American safety standards. For example, differences between trade share and tonnage share for North America and Africa can be explained by the high number of US company-owned ships that are registered in Liberia (Carlisle 1980: 175–91). Liberia ‘owns’ 95 per cent of African shipping tonnage, and thus since 1967 possesses a larger fleet than Great Britain (DeSombre 2006). Travel under ‘flags of convenience’ expanded during the last third of the twentieth century. The enormous discrepancy between South America’s share of world trade and shipping tonnage largely can be attributed to Panama’s popularity with shipowners as a flag of convenience. Nominally, it has the largest fleet in the world, accounting for 22 per cent of ship tonnage, followed by Liberia with 11 per cent, and the Marshall Islands with 6 per cent.

However, ‘looking at the flag of the ship does not necessarily reveal the “realities” in world shipping’ (Ojala and Tenold 2017: 852). If one considers that approximately 60 per cent of ships owned by Europeans today are registered in countries outside of Europe, it becomes clear

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Transregional trade infrastructures

that Europeans still control a large share of global merchant shipping. Great Britain has lost its leading role, accounting for only 2.3 per cent of merchant shipping. Today, shipowners from Greece, Japan, China, and Germany account for half the world’s trading fleet (measured in deadweight tons) (UNCTAD 2010).

Sea ports as junctions of transregional relations

The rise of East Asia, especially China, in world trade and maritime transport becomes even clearer if we look at another indicator: the development of ports (Erickson, Goldstein and Lord 2009). Already the expansion of bulk goods transport in the late nineteenth century had led to a massive revaluation of ports within global and national spatial structures. On the one hand, these had to be adapted to the growing size of ships and to new transshipment techniques. Larger merchant ships needed coal storage, and ports were often supplemented with repair docks and military bases. On the other hand, the ports channelled the now increasing exports of the hinterland, so that often inland infrastructure systems had to be adapted to the location of the ports. In some cases, completely new port facilities were created, such as the coal ports in the Canary Islands and Cape Verde (Bosa 2014: 3). The conversion and extension of the ports were very complicated and expensive. They could only succeed if state and local authorities functioned well and had sufficient capital or were able to borrow it. A classic case for a purposeful national infrastructure policy, which also aimed to fundamentally improve the material conditions for external economic relations, is the Freycinet Plan in France, according to which extensive state investments were made between 1878 and 1914 not only in railways and inland waterways but also in maritime ports – both in France itself and in the colonies, for example in Casablanca (Bosa and Maziane 2014).

In the independent states of the Global South, the adaptation of ports to the requirements of steamship transport was usually done not by state but by private, often foreign, investments. From 1869 onwards, Brazil awarded concessions to private port operators. The extent to which a port could evolve into a portal of globalization depended crucially on whether the port managers were willing and able to organize the flow of goods and services to and from the hinterland with other regional and local authorities and merchants. These regional territorialization projects were often confronted with the geostrategic interests of imperialist powers, who at various conferences allocated the harbours in China (1879), South Africa (1886), and northern Brazil (1895) to their various spheres of influence (Bosa 2014: 4; Qing 2015).

The growth in the size of bulk carriers, and above all the switch to container transport since the 1960s, once again required large investments in port infrastructure (see Chapter 27 by Stenmanns and Boeckler). The container terminals often originated on the edge of the old ports or in completely new locations. So there has been a ‘transformation from conventional liner networks to hub-and-spoke models with a worldwide sprinkling of superports and pure entrepots’. Technical, political and economic mechanisms produced here a ‘massive centripetal power of such hubs’ (Broeze 2002: 4).

This process was most dynamic in the two Southeast and East Asian city states of Singapore and Hong Kong, which became the largest ports in the world. Since the 1990s, China has invested large sums of money in the development of its port infrastructure, and since 2002, this area has been opened to foreign capital (Ng and Tam 2012). The result was the concentration of foreign trade good flows in a few huge sea ports in East and Southeast Asia, and especially in China, the region where the largest ports in the world have been located for some years.
Conclusions

The transport revolutions of the second half of the nineteenth (rail) and the second half of the twentieth centuries (automobiles) have not only radically changed domestic and transnational traffic but have also massively influenced parallel globalization processes. The following conclusions can be drawn from a more detailed and historical analysis of the gradual introduction of new technologies, of their fundamental economic effects, but above all of the related processes of spatialization.

First, as growing interdependence is a result of improvements in transportation infrastructure, market integration – due to decreasing transport costs – cannot be adequately described with the idea of globalization encompassing the entire globe. More realistic is the reconstruction of the interdependencies of specific regions, which differ significantly in their intensity.

Second, changes in spatial hierarchies result from intrinsic logics in the transport sector; they are, furthermore, the result of economic potential and power as well as political will. Third, despite dynamic changes in the course of the transport revolutions, considerable persistent forces affect both technological change and the positioning of individual regions. This was true both for the approximate century-long transition from sailing to steamboat and for the still strong position of some European countries in the shipping industry.

Select bibliography


Transregional trade infrastructures


This section starts from a dual understanding of transregional studies as being both a response to an empirical observation – that is the existence, and perhaps increase, of transregional phenomena – and as being an analytical perspective on the world. Based on this understanding, two approaches to global economic entanglements emerge. First, the section holds that empirically, economic activities – that is, broadly speaking, all those activities that relate to the production, distribution, and consumption of (im)material goods – are increasingly transregionally organized and, thus, play an important role in an ever more interconnected and integrated world. Transregional studies should thus give special attention to global economic entanglements and their historical as well as emerging trajectories. The section addresses transregional economic exchange processes by specifically asking for the continued respatializations of the world they generate, namely the building of regions, spatial orderings, as well as the deterritorializations and reterritorializations they produce. Critical questions that guide the section are therefore what kinds of economic activities have paved the road to what we currently call the ‘global economy’, and how have these economic entanglements, flows, and interactions shaped the current form of the global economy along with its dominant patterns? Furthermore, how do current and emerging economic activities (re)structure the world, what dynamics are of special importance, which driving actors can we identify, and what parts of the world are being included or excluded within this process?

Second, the section is concerned with the additional insights the transregional perspective as an analytical lens – understood as a perspective that emphasizes self-reflexivity and positionality – holds for the study of global economic entanglements. Employing transregional studies as an analytical lens entails reflecting upon, challenging, and deconstructing those concepts and notions that have been used to study the ‘economy’. Further, and in addition to approaching space not as a pre-given, fixed entity but as a product of social relations, the transregional lens also means to pay special attention to the use of spatial categories and the implicit orderings that go along with our spatial imaginations and representations of the world. What is more, and with regard to knowledge production, special emphasis is placed on the continued need for grounded, place-specific empirical research. Hence, a series of further questions guide the section: How have economic concepts shaped the way in which the ‘economy’ has been measured and studied, and how have these simultaneously shaped the way in which we have come to understand and construct economic activities? What are the implicit and explicit ideas about
the spatial organization of the world that are conveyed in these concepts? And what is the role of place-specific knowledge (production) and, more generally, the traditional expertise of area studies knowledge – language, culture, history – for studying transregional economic activities?

To address these issues and bundles of questions, the chapters collected in this section combine the historicization and spatialization of economic processes with a critical reflection and repositioning of our understandings of these processes. The first perspective allows the authors to detect the continuities and ruptures, the persisting as well as newly emerging power structures, inequalities, and relations of (inter)dependency that are produced by and embodied within economic activities. The second perspective, in turn, reveals how economic actions and interests have contributed to the existing division of the world into ‘spatial containers’ of nation-states, regions, and areas while paying special attention to the continued undermining as well as reification of these ‘containers’. The third perspective explores how our understandings of the economy have produced and shaped the economy while pointing to the specific spatializations they entail. Within the framework of one section of a handbook, such an undertaking can obviously not be exhaustive. Instead, and following the credo of the handbook to explore what transregional studies can do, this exercise is done by using specific examples and by drawing on exemplary empirical cases that reflect the expertise and interests of the authors. As a whole, however, the section offers a vivid picture of the additional potential the transregional perspective brings to the study of economic activities, opening up multifaceted avenues for further research and enquiry.

The first three contributions specifically address economic concepts and ideas. Gordon M. Winder and Philipp Robinson Rössner investigate the concepts of the ‘world market’ and the ‘Great Divergence’, respectively, and their still dominant conceptualizations within neoclassical economics. By tracing the emergence of the idea of the ‘world market’, Winder demonstrates how not only terms but also meanings of economic relationships have been established and have allowed for certain calculations, such as economic growth, to take place. The concept of the ‘world market’, he argues, also conveys the (non-)desirability of certain market segments and is thus a term loaded with manifold assumptions, valuations, and implications. Rössner challenges the construction and measuring of global inequality as expressed in the notion of the Great Divergence. He points to the implicit world orderings the idea of the Great Divergence implies – namely the supremacy of the European trajectory toward economic success and the teleological assumptions about the ‘one path’ associated with it – as well as the various flaws in how parameters for transregional comparison are constructed. Concerned with the nexus between the ideological construction of the myth of ‘perfect property’ born out of the liberal paradigm and its application for the commodification of land as a central element in the global expansion of capitalism, Hanne Cottyn’s chapter traces how land reforms have functioned to successively implement and legitimate private property-based land regimes across time and space. Yet, existing land tenure regimes are by no means a uniform representation of the paradigm of perfect property but rather exist as complex and multilayered spaces of ‘un/commodified coexistence’ – posing a constant challenge to capitalist accumulation.

The section then continues with two chapters that both engage with issues of materiality and their structuring as well as enabling functions for transregional economic activities. Roland Wenzlhuemer holds that the relation between structure and agency is a crucial question also for transregional approaches. He tackles this relationship through the lens of infrastructure as representing the material manifestation of human action that stores, conditions, and shapes as well as facilitates agency – however, never in a neutral way. Wenzlhuemer highlights this dual function of infrastructure and the role it has played for transregional projects by investigating the histories of the global telegraph network and the integration of Mont Cenis. Julian
Stenmanns and Marc Boeckler then take ports, containers, and dashboards as empirical examples to explore infrastructures and, their more recent companions, logistics and supply chain management technologies within contemporary supply chain capitalism. By drawing on the concept of ‘global territory’, they not only highlight the interdependency of global flows and local territory but also reveal how infrastructures and logistics work to manage this specific interdependence between flow and territory.

The three last chapters of the section address three key areas of the contemporary global economy – the food system, the natural resource boom, and preferential trade agreements – and ask what these tell us about global power structures and the possibilities for change. Fuchs and Gumbert show that the sociospatial analysis of the power of transnational corporations in the global food system adds another layer to our understanding of power structures as they help to uncover the spatial reorderings they produce. The financialization of the agrifood system and the proliferation of trade agreements, they argue, foster the homogenization, subordination, as well as ‘recoding’ of agrifood spaces toward increasingly finance-economic rationales in the interest of corporate actors suggesting ever more unified future trajectories. While Fuchs and Gumbert consider the challenges these developments pose for alternative forms of transformation and resistance, the room for contestation and the potential value of transregional linkages for mobilization and protest become prominent in the chapter by Kristina Dietz and Bettina Engels and that by Cornelia Reiher. Based on their research on conflicts over mining in Colombia and Burkina Faso, Dietz and Engels investigate the relationship between the global resource boom and the emergence and patterns of the local conflicts they trigger. One key insight emerging from this transregional comparison is that the actors, issues, and strategies involved in these conflicts show both local particularities as well as remarkable resemblances across regions. Both of these need to be taken into account to reach a comprehensive understanding. The transregional dimension, however, not only applies to the global scope of the multinational corporations involved, it can also be used as a resource for alliance-building to increase the potential to, at least temporarily, shift existing power asymmetries – a dimension that is further pursued in Reiher’s contribution. Using the case of the negotiation of preferential trade agreements in East Asia, Reiher argues that these mainly state- and corporate actor-driven trade policies not only foster a particular kind of economic integration across regions, they also (and importantly) give rise to a transregional integration of civil society as actors become increasingly aware of the similarities between global policies and their national and local manifestations, ranging from lack of transparency and exclusion of democratic participation to environmental and health issues. The transregional perspective thus helps to integrate these dynamics without losing sight of local and historical particularities.
In the field of economics, growth in world trade is considered a driver of growth in the world economy and a force leading toward convergence in commodity prices across geographically dispersed markets. Moreover, growth in the value of market transactions indicates the commodification of further parts of the world economy. Both statements relate to the ‘world market’ and this chapter explores these ideas by first outlining the discursive framework within which the world market – a term from neo-classical economics – was set to work. The chapter then identifies critical responses to the concept from within the social sciences that either focus on the implications of the assumptions underlying the concept or rely on the alternative framework of the ‘capitalist world-system’. A summary of the periodization of the development of world trade that emerges from this alternative framework is then provided in order to highlight the ways in which forms of integration and geographies of trade have shifted. Finally, I advocate a transnational approach to cope with the problems that the term world market generates.

The ‘world market’ in economics

The world market is a term with two meanings within economics: the total of world trade and the total market value. First, the term refers to the amount – as well as the geography – of international trade. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the growth of the world market – that is to say, the amount of international trade – could be measured and its dominant national players could be identified by assembling trade and shipping records. Historical data sets have since been developed to show the growth of world trade (Findlay and O’Rourke 2003) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) now authoritatively maps dynamics in world trade. In this framework, the ‘international’ or ‘global economy’ – that is to say, world trade – is separated from ‘national economies’ and is referred to as the world market.

For economists, the world market also refers to total market value, meaning the total of both international trade and domestic transactions. Economists then differentiate between total market value and the world economy, which refers to the aggregate of separate country measurements of all forms of production, use, and exchange of goods and services, including production for subsistence, gifting, and non-monetary, unofficial or illegal exchange. In this sense, the world economy is necessarily larger than the world market, and the extent to which the world economy has been handled in markets can be assessed. Thus, there can be times when
growth in the world market, as market value, is faster than growth in the world economy, a situation in which non-market exchanges are converted into market transactions, that is a time of increased market integration.

These two senses of the term are related. Systematic publication of figures on world trade and the gross national product (GNP) of national economies allows estimates of economic growth and growth in trade to be made and ideas about their desirability to be established. An increase in world trade is a sign of increasing market integration within the world economy, and growth in trade helps to drive the growth of the world economy. Thus, the world market, as world trade, is a term loaded with assumptions, valuations, and implications within a framework of meanings. When a producer targets export markets rather than the domestic market, a desire to be competitive is assigned, and this could be supported by either free market policies abroad or by government assistance at home for those exporting. Such an aim is implicitly set against a retreat to the domestic market, perhaps buttressed by protection policies and subsidies, thereby being associated with a non-growth, non-competitive, and ultimately failing strategy for the producer as well as the national or regional economy in which the enterprise is embedded. Each actor must develop a strategy related to the size of the world market and the actor’s own competitiveness within this market. Thus, the world market is intrinsically linked to the logic of comparative advantage: by stimulating specialization, increasing trade maximizes world output and promotes efficiency as well as a tendency toward equalization of commodity prices and wage rates among trading countries as trade develops (Bordo, Taylor and Williamson 2003). This tendency toward factor-price equalization points toward growth in trade as a force working on economies: the division of labour is limited by the extent of the market; when the market grows, the division of labour is extended (Smith 1982: 121–6).

Curiously, the assertion of one world market implies a permanent state of imperfect integration, marked by integrative processes and projects (e.g. globalization, market integration, mercantilism, imperialism, and free trade), counter projects (e.g. protectionism, isolationism, communism, and alternative development), and by changing geographies of difference (e.g. core vs. periphery; specialized, abandoned, outcast, or dependent regions; and areas focused on self-reliance). Economic historians note that there are different patterns of trade, for example, in commodities, labour, and finance (Findlay and O’Rourke 2003). However, even though many types of markets in which market integration might have different meanings and consequences function at the same time, the one market ideal is still asserted.

Estimation of world trade for national comparative purposes requires aggregation into monetary units and this produces the illusion that all goods and services are exchangeable and that all production, potentially, can be exchanged in markets. This aggregation simultaneously masks the terms of exchange or the basis for the distribution of income. The process of estimation necessarily privileges the official and legal market economy over other economies, such as gifting, illegal, illicit, and in-kind exchange, and military production and spending. Simultaneously, the discourse perceives the environment, nature, ecosystems, geography, even resources and technology to be factors that might or might not influence the patterns of growth in the world market.

Thus, the world market is an imaginary that works within a discursive framework of economics. The central narrative of this framework is that growth in world trade and market integration drive growth in the world economy, a narrative that legitimates free trade and free market policies precisely because they will foster market integration (Bordo, Taylor and Williamson 2003). Whereas growth in the world market implies the commodification of more parts of the human provisioning and welfare systems, growth in world trade implies the internationalization of those systems. It is now conventional within economic history to
name growth in world trade and growth in the world market as globalization, so that periods of globalization and deglobalization can be identified (Bordo, Taylor and Williamson 2003). Further, the assertion of one world market and one world economy allows the problems to be framed for the imagined collectives: some countries are less well integrated than others, because of barriers to trade, market integration, population growth, natural endowments, geography, or technology. In this framework, increased trade between countries is seen as a positive development because it fosters the desired outcomes of market integration and economic growth.

Critical social science responses

The discursive framework of the growth of the world market within economics emphasizes the positive results of the growth in trade and economic growth at the global scale, that is to say, from ‘the perspective of the world’. But this framework is viewed critically by many social scientists who draw inspiration from Marxist, feminist, environmentalist, or humanitarian thinking. A diverse literature challenges the focus on economic growth by contemplating alternative foci for narratives, such as poverty and vulnerability reduction, livelihood security, happiness, human health, ecosystem resilience, and sustainability. Social science critiques focus on the scale at which the narrative works; the categories used; the unequal power relations involved in trade, market integration, and globalization; and the limited theorization of the environment and resources. From a political economy perspective and for historians, the most important response to orthodox economic theories of the role of trade in the growth of the world economy has been the development of world-systems theory (Wallerstein 2004). In contrast, social scientists emphasize the changing terms of engagement between cores and peripheries and the unfairness of historical forms of market integration. Each of these issues listed above is briefly discussed below.

In order to acquire information about world trade and GNP, we rely on nation-states to compile data. This presets the analytical scale of the economy and results in problems and expectations of performance. For instance, trade figures for some countries are unreliable, some components of trade are not classifiable into national totals, and it is difficult to map trade because of the enormous differences in the size of national economies and because of never-ending changes in the territories allotted to nation-states. Estimation of the world market is often accompanied by league tables showing the changing wealth of nations, trade power, and the designation of types of countries, ranging from trade dependent and highly protected to developed and developing, each related to assessments of their national pattern of integration into the world market. In recent years, social scientists have called for studies that go beyond the nation-state as the spatial container for economies in order to reveal transnational and local networks, flows, and activities, which are better understood at other scales (Taylor 1996; Brenner 2001; Sheppard 2002).

By breaking with the categories of the world market, for example by researching regional or household economies instead of national economies, social scientists revealed alternative forms of transnational networks and flows other than those associated with transnational corporations. Livelihood studies – in which the vulnerability of households is assessed by estimating their total array of resources for sustaining livelihood – emerged as a critical response to the understanding of development and economic growth in predominantly national, monetary, and commodity terms (De Haan 2012). Recognition of the roles of remittances, work migration, and new forms of mobility and exchange in household economies transformed thinking on globalization and trade. Globalization is understood within the social sciences as a set of processes working at
multiple scales, including, for example, ‘globalization from below’, South–South trade, ownership and use of second homes, the mobilization of diasporic communities and networks, as well as regional economic integration through the workings of the European Union (EU) or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These processes seriously compromise any declaration of globalization as an eighteenth-century project, any reliance on national statistics to acquire information about forms of cross-border integration, or any reduction of globalization to market integration.

Trade involves power relations and these are obscured in the comparative advantage logic. Comparative advantage assumes that all nations have access to the same choice of production technologies, that productive resources are fully employed in each nation and are not internationally transferable, and that factors of production can be easily switched between sectors of each domestic economy (Todaro 1977). While the idea of the world market emerged from prospects in an era of imperial rivalry and emerging trade relations, the roles of governments and transnational corporations in commodity trade were obscured in formulations of trade theory. In liberal economic literature, comparative advantage was used to legitimate manufacturing specialization in core regions and to restrict periphery economies to primary commodity exports. In contrast, dependency theorists viewed international trade as beset by unfair trade practices – artificial and worsening terms of trade, unequal exchange, intra-multinational trade and transfer pricing, unfair debt relations, and tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade – that prevented the periphery from developing (Brookfield 1975; Amin 1976; Frank 1978). As deindustrialization gripped the industrialized countries and a new international division of labour was discerned in the early 1980s (Fröbel, Heinrichs and Kreye 1981; Bluestone and Harrison 1982), the roles of transnational corporations in world trade and development, already a matter of concern (Hymer 1976), came under increased critical scrutiny (Dicken 1986), and the fairness of trade was questioned.

While the discursive framework from economics stimulates debates over the roles of natural resources, innovation, population growth, and imperialism in trade, development and economic growth, the environment played almost no role in this line of thought. Trade is stimulated by different geographies of demand for and supply of natural resources, but trade is also accelerated by the historical energy transition to large-scale use of fossil fuels (McNeill 2000; Richards 2006), by agricultural and industrial revolutions, by the mechanization of transport, and by imperial frontier projects such as those in mining, plantation, and settlement – which together bound tropical and temperate regions into new trade relations (Moore 2010a, 2010b). Population growth might stimulate trade but the relationship is by no means constant over time and space. When the Club of Rome published its influential book-like report *The Limits to Growth* (Meadows et al. 1972), the positive role of trade in development was already in question, as signs of resource scarcity, fossil fuel dependence, unchecked population growth, rising pollution effects, and the increased vulnerability and immiseration of millions of people were reported as associated phenomena. Subsequently, the World Commission on Environment and Development’s report *Our Common Future* (1987) turned the framework on its head, arguing that, rather than relentless expansion of the world market, sustainable development was needed. Whether the expansion of world trade is a promise of further development or a fundamental problem remains contested, and disillusionment with economic growth has set in because of its environmental consequences among other things.

Beginning with *The Modern World-System* (1974), Immanuel Wallerstein lays out an alternative framework for the history and geography of the ‘capitalist world-system’, which he sees as a hegemonic and now globe-spanning ‘world economy’. For him, the capitalist
Conceptualizing the world economy

world-system is based on a hierarchy of zones marked by unequal terms of exchange and a spatial arrangement. Trade occurs among types of regions: core, periphery, semi-periphery, and external arena. A dominant capitalist city always lies at the centre but leadership often changes and the power of individual cities waxes and wanes. Further, world economies – there are several historical examples – were indelibly marked by imperialism and by ‘weapons of domination’: shipping, trade, industry, credit, and political power (Braudel 1985: 35). Wallerstein interprets trade within a Marxist framework, and his work informs that of many historians, geographers, and sociologists addressing the issue of whether the growth of trade and the historical expansion and intensification of the capitalist world-system have had desirable effects. As the following summary of their multidisciplinary account reveals, their answers emphasize the uneven experiences of trade and the crucial role of the expansion of Europe overseas through imperialism, colonialism, and associated violence – facts that remain only partially acknowledged in the discursive framework used in economics.

Development of the ‘capitalist world-system’

Scholars from the social sciences, including those drawing upon the world-systems approach, offer less positive assessments of the growth of world trade than those economists working through the discursive framework promoted within economics. In what follows, I will try to summarize some of the key findings from within this multidisciplinary social science scholarship, which highlights the roles of power and geographies in increasing trade and in the making of economies, thus offering a critical understanding of the world market.

From the sixteenth century through to the late seventeenth century, both trade within Europe and trade between Europe and ‘the rest of the world’ increased; Wallerstein understands these developments as the growth and development of a ‘European world-system’, binding together a changing network of cities each competing, innovating, and expanding its trade. Outside Europe, expansion was organized through ‘transoceanic rim settlements’ consisting of trading stations, entrepôts, colonial headquarters for tropical plantations, and gateway ports for settler colonies. Trade was coordinated through mercantilism, which combined state, military, and merchant activities, to force trade on unequal terms. Using the terms of neo-classical economics, Paul Bairoch describes the world trade scene in 1815 as ‘an ocean of protectionism surrounding a few liberal islands’, but argues that imperial powers forced trade upon large sections of the world’s populace (1993: 16).

World trade grew, albeit slowly, during the second half of the nineteenth century under the auspices of imperialist projects backed by industrialization, urbanization, settlement, and militarism in some parts of the world, as well as by ideas about modernity and civilization. What was striking about this period was the development of the infrastructure for trade – the ‘annihilation of space by time’ through investments in railways, steamships, and telegraph lines and cables (Wenzlhuemer 2010) – an interpretation acknowledged by Findlay and O’Rourke (2003). In parallel, ‘webs of enterprise’ developed to manage production, trade, and the integration of economies (Winder 2006), and modern nation-states emerged equipped with new agencies such as departments of agriculture, networks of trade consulates, and arrays of trade and economic statistics, which worked in support of modernization, economic policies, and trade initiatives. Institutions such as patent bureaus, world fairs and agricultural and industrial exhibitions, stock exchanges, international banking, commodity exchanges, and reinsurance markets further supported commodity trade. New national and international standards were installed to facilitate trade in, for example, cotton, timber, or grain (Cronon 1992). Atlases showed the world’s resources and industrial regions on one map so that commercial geography
could inform business of where the markets and resources were and how to access them. There were rival imperial networks and tensions among the trade consuls of different nations. The world federation of co-operative societies met in the hope of consolidating a co-operative alternative to corporate domination of international production and trade. There were also meetings to discuss the possible harmonization of international law. Influenced and inspired by the prospects of a growing world market such institutions and activities, at the same time, established world markets.

Industrialization within parts of Europe intensified trade within this emerging system. Manufactured goods and new raw materials were incorporated into trade and more complex markets developed. Urbanization became a driving force in trade. Industrialization occurred through successive waves of industrial and technological development in highly localized regions (Pollard 1981). In world-systems theory terms, the capitalist world economy, even though it was the dominant world-system in 1900, cannot be said to have affected complete global integration of the world’s regions through trade at this stage (Map 23.1). In most regions, the bulk of productive activity targeted domestic markets. The spine of the world market remained the shipping infrastructure of European powers, especially that of Great Britain. Nevertheless, industrial development and agricultural modernization induced interregional trade, integrating and transforming the environments and societies of many previously poorly connected regions (Evans 2007).

Growth in imports led to growth in gross domestic product (GDP) in France and the United Kingdom (UK) from 1720 to 1820; in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the UK from 1820 to 1870 and from 1870 to 1913, and in the USA after 1950 (World Bank 1987: 40). But Paul Bairoch (1993: 51) interprets this as economic growth driving trade and not the other way around. Growth in GNP occurred, but the average 1.1 per cent per annum rate for 1800–1913 among selected industrialized countries for which data are available was too low by post-1945 standards. Transport improvements, a growing trade in precious metals, farm mechanization, population growth and urbanization, and the British promotion of free trade all encouraged growth in world trade. But Bairoch, using the terms anachronistically as he strove to communicate with the proponents of the competing framework, notes that the developed world did not depend on imports of raw materials from the Third World, and, in fact, exported coal and other materials. The terms of trade for tropical and agricultural products did not deteriorate in the period 1870–1940. Most manufacturers in Western Europe and North America did not rely on Third World markets. In these circumstances, ‘protectionism led to, or at least was concomitant with, industrialisation and economic development’, and, except in the case of Britain, ‘liberalism’ (in the context of imperial policies) led to ‘very negative consequences’, such as the destruction of textile industries in Latin America, the Middle East, and India (Bairoch 1993: 54). Imperial trade policies oppressed the peoples of large parts of the world while making London rich but not contributing greatly to the wealth of other imperial centres such as Vienna or Paris. The period was marked by divergence in GDP, insofar as this can be measured.

Economic historians interpret the years 1913–1950 as a disruptive period in which wars and the Great Depression as well as the nationalist and imperialist policies of diverse states destroyed the workings of the world economy formed in the period 1860–1914 (Findlay and O’Rourke 2003). Curiously, the period featured efforts at the League of Nations to harmonize practices and standards – asking whether the world economy can be measured and if so on whose terms – attempts dogged by disagreement and rivalry (Bemmann 2015). The period was formative for new and competing ideas from economists ranging from John Maynard Keynes to John Kenneth Galbraith to Gunnar Myrdal to Friedrich Hayek about the roles of governments
Map 23.1 Export power (1900). The British Empire was very important in world trade in 1900: of the many countries, colonies, and territories listed in The Statesman’s Yearbook, 32 exported over GBP 5 of merchandise exports per capita, with only 13 of these lying outside the British Empire, which accounted for 28.5 per cent of world exports. The United States (US) and its territories accounted for another 17.8 per cent of world exports. Fifty-nine per cent of the world’s population resided in territories that recorded less than GBP 1 of exports per person (Keltie and Renwick 1902).
and corporations in the economy, the mechanisms of markets, and the architecture of the world economy.

After 1950, growth in exports led to growth in GDP in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the USA, and the UK (World Bank 1987: 40), but this was by no means a return to nineteenth-century trading conditions because in the post-war era, a new international architecture framed world trade (Dicken 1998). The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International Labour Organization, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Food and Agriculture Organization, and other agencies of the United Nations worked to harmonize, standardize, and develop trade relations and opportunities. The Bretton Woods Conference of July 1944 established the working atmosphere of this post-war cooperation, which was to increase world trade. However, the GATT proved to be a weak arm of these initiatives: its work was divisive, controversial, and incomplete. Moreover, the agreements it did broker favoured exporters of industrial products, including countries industrializing through export orientation and not exporters of commodities. Significantly, the originally envisaged agency designed to handle trade disputes and to promote trade finally materialized only in 1995 in the form of the WTO.

With transnational corporations dominating world trade, internal pricing, management barriers to trade, and government barriers against factor movement took on increasing importance. Moreover, the Cold War divided the world into separate world markets – capitalist and communist – with superpower rivalry taking place throughout the Third World in the form of projects, development aid, and war and military aid, which established conditions concerning trade opportunities. The local effects were, at times, astonishing: within the USA, Cold War politics were used to erect a protectionist wall against Cuban sugar, behind which subsidies and investments transformed large parts of Florida’s Everglades into a monoculture sugar production region, which, ever since, has resisted efforts at global free trade in sugar while having adverse local environmental effects (Hollander 2008).

The era of trade globalization only began in the 1980s. At the start of that decade, authors noting the deindustrialization of Western Europe signalled the emergence of a new international division of labour. The economic geographer Peter Dicken (1986) documented the emerging ‘Global Shift’ that was occurring, its dynamics, and the factors behind it in his book with the same title. Key roles were attributed to multinational corporations, which, by way of their coordinating efforts often internal to the organization, transformed market integration through trade among separate enterprises into managed control over production, distribution, and related services within the corporation, or what Peter Dicken calls deep integration. The spectacular growth of the four Asian Tiger economies (i.e. South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore) and the Tiger Cub economies (i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) – on the back of export-industry policies advantaged by new trading opportunities, low-cost labour, and the activities of transnational corporations – was instructive for other industrializing countries. Export enclave economies and tax and banking havens operating under free trade and low tax rules proliferated. By following such policies and opening its economy to trade with and investment from the West, China’s communist government transformed world trade. Regional economic integration through the expansion of the EU or the projects of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, NAFTA, and the Southern Common Market in Latin America, reinforced the trend toward US transnational governance promoting trade. Containerization, larger ships, and computerized logistics transformed transport by reducing costs and stimulating massive investments in infrastructure.

The end of the Cold War in 1989–91 coincided with the declaration of Chicago school doctrines of trade liberalization, and ushered in a so-called ‘Great Convergence’ as growth
Conceptualizing the world economy

rates in GDP in many developing countries surged ahead of those in developed countries, buoyed by faster population growth and by trade liberalization, allowing a ‘catch-up’ (Grinn and Korotayev 2015). The Cold War categories of ‘Second World’ and ‘Third World’ have been unmade (Escobar 1994) and replaced by categories of ‘emerging markets’ and the ‘less developed countries’. World Bank reports declare that national economies are now fragmented and polarized throughout the global economy: a new geography of poverty has emerged. In a separate development, the livelihood approach emerged within development studies, and broke with national economies as the containers for thinking about development, sustainable development, poverty, or vulnerability (De Haan 2012). For Joseph Stiglitz (2002, 2006), the regime under which world trade takes place remains unfair. The current world trade scene is in flux. New multiparty trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership promised to continue the long-term remaking of territories, authorities, and rights through globalization (Sassen 2006), but the activities of the WTO are protested at every turn. Amid rising international tensions, the US government now threatens to renegotiate NAFTA and to impose tariffs on a range of imports from trading partners.

New geographies of trade are emerging. Between 2000 and 2010, the distribution of export power was substantially transformed (Maps 23.2 and 23.3). China’s share of world merchandise exports surged from less than 4 to 10.6 per cent, and Brazil, as well as the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Middle East, and Africa regions also increased their shares at the expense of established industrialized countries. At the same time, the least developed countries claimed just 1.1 per cent of world exports in 2010. Global trade flows were dramatically reduced by the financial crisis of 2008/9 but rebounded, indicating unexpected volatility in world trade. In addition, there were surprising, if fleeting, increases in the relative pricing of primary commodities against manufactured goods. In these ways, the nexus between trade and economic growth, far from declaring itself through a straightforward relation with one driving the other everywhere, has taken on new and unexpected aspects.

As this account reveals, the changing size of the world market is now understood as comprising four periods. (1) A situation of limited international trade following the realignment of trade routes caused by the conquest and colonization of the New World by Europeans was ended by the agricultural, industrial, and energy revolutions in Europe. These ushered in (2) a period of slow growth of international trade under European leadership, marked by imperialism and colonialism. This period is contrasted positively with the slowdown in trade growth from 1914 to 1945 – (3) a period of ‘de-globalization’ marked by intense interimperial rivalries. It is also contrasted negatively with (4) the period of globalization after 1945, when Western capitalism progressively opened markets and freed trade, eventually ending the Cold War barriers to global market integration. UN agencies and especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and later the WTO are given prominent roles in this last period. We are now witnessing a new international division of labour inscribed by fundamentally different forms of integration – ‘deep integration’ as geographer Peter Dicken (1998: 5) calls it – than ever before. In economic terms, growth in the world market was associated with a divergence of national economic growth rates during the second period, a set of discrepancies that remained intact during the third period, only to be overturned by apparent convergence – that is more rapid growth in developing countries than in developed economies – at the end of the 1980s. However, as a comparison of Maps 23.2 and 23.3 suggests, the emerging geographies of trade are dynamic and the general patterns for each period were not experienced everywhere. In fact, behind the world totals hides a remarkably persistent geographic fact: for around 500 years, world trade has been dominated by apparently wealthy and densely populated countries – that is to say, by the ‘triad regions’ of Europe, North America, and East and Southeast Asia along with Australasia.
Map 23.2  Export power (2000). Generating on average USD 3,201 of merchandise exports per person, developed economies were responsible for 67 per cent of world merchandise exports but only 21 per cent of the world population. The 15 members of the EU averaged USD 5,897 of exports per person, the NAFTA economies USD 2,983 and ‘developed Asia’ USD 2,858, all well above the world average of USD 1,182. In contrast, African countries averaged USD 168 per person, China USD 200, ‘developing Asia’ USD 361, the Commonwealth of Independent States USD 565, while South and Central America managed USD 901 (World Trade Organization 2011).
Export power (2010). Between 2000 and 2010, as world exports grew from USD 6,276 billion to USD 14,855 billion, China (up from 4.0 per cent to 10.6 per cent of world exports) replaced the USA (down from 12.4 per cent to 8.6 per cent) as the leading national exporter, and both NAFTA (down from 19.5 per cent to 13.2 per cent) and Europe (down from 42.0 per cent to 34.7 per cent) found their share of world markets slipping (World Trade Organization 2011).
Within this stubborn pattern, trade has been dynamic: the rise of Europe to trade dominance was a historical anomaly, China’s recent dominance is not (Findlay and O’Rourke 2003).

Ways forward

The discursive framework economists constructed around the idea that growth in world trade has driven world economic growth can only be a starting point for further analysis, at best. Each period had distinctive geographies of market integration and trade. At no time has there been uniform market integration across the globe. Different forms of integration articulated diverse periphery regions into core regions and produced uneven development. There were multiple markets for finance, for materials, for food, and for industrial products. The world market was, and remains, subject to competition among investors, and, arguably, an arena for imperialisms. The prospects for disarticulation from the world market, and the persistence of regions that are not well integrated into the world economy highlight problems with this globalizing narrative.

This means that a transnational approach to thinking about trade and development – one that breaks with the economists’ discursive framework – might be productive. Multiple perspectives and scales of enquiry are required if the relations between market integration and trade are to be understood. The geographies of the world market in terms of channels, transit points and nodes for trade, centres of calculation, as well as barriers to trade need to be mapped out and linked to the analysis of customs, biosecurity, quarantine, embargo, and the risks of trade. Equally, we need better histories of trade institutions: for example, world fairs, trade consulates, the League of Nations, the GATT, the International Labour Organization, the WTO, the WB, and the IMF as well as the institutions behind the illegal, illicit, informal, and personal transfers that have long shaped trading. We also need to pay more attention to the competing moral economies of trade, and the alternative and diverse markets that have been at work. Furthermore, we need business perspectives on trade; on making, entering, and leaving markets; on knowledge production related to trade; on building and maintaining trading networks and strategic alliances.

As climate change threatens our production systems, we become increasingly aware that the discursive framework that asserts trade as the driver of economic growth treats the environment as an afterthought. In fact, it deliberately separates human economy from nature, geography, environment, and ecology. For this reason, we need more analyses on the changing environmental terms of trade, the transformation of environment wrought by trade, and the effects of environmental transformation on trade. In what is now being called the Anthropocene, continuing to increase world trade in order to expand the world market through comparative advantage will run headlong into the natural limits of global economic growth.

Note

1. Estimates of the world economy involve translation of currency into a single monetary unit. Today’s best practice uses gross domestic product in USD expressed in terms of purchasing power parity.

Select bibliography


Introduction

Since the times of Adam Smith, David Hume, Karl Marx, and Max Weber, social scientists and historians have studied the origins, causes, nature, and consequences of global economic disparity. While there is still considerable debate as to the exact timing, nature, and extent of such divergence, the general parameters seem reasonably clear: (1) The last four or five centuries saw one of the most fundamental economic transformations in recorded human history (industrialization and the rise of modern capitalism); (2) they first occurred in Europe and (3) accounted for a significant world-historical gap or advantageous position, which (4) the Asian economies have only recently been able to start catching up on.

This chapter provides a brief overview on the state of historical debate regarding the timing, nature, and extent of the Great Divergence, especially in the light of new and critical research regarding the ‘computability’ of economic divergence and interpretative problems inherent in some modern models that describe economic divergence in quantitative terms by borrowing from the toolkit of neo-classical economics. This toolkit, when accepted uncritically, is likely to yield distorted, and partly teleological, views on processes of global economic divergence.

Traditional approaches and explanations

Between circa 1500 and 2000, the most commonly accepted variable for cross-sectional and inter-temporal comparisons of economic wealth – Western European per capita gross domestic product (GDP) – grew by a factor of at least 20, perhaps more. By far, the lion’s share of this growth fell in the post-1800 industrial period. Between 1820 and 2000, world population increased by 500 per cent and world GDP rose by 800 per cent, amounting to a previously unheard of expansion not only of overall economic wealth – as well as social inequality – but also of human productivity. Although over the past two centuries all world regions have experienced significant increases in income, notable world regional differentials have also emerged. The fastest growth rates were probably witnessed in north-western Europe and North America. Between 1800 and 2000, the income gap between the United States and the African average (by conventional measures) widened from a factor of about 3 to 20. While at the dawn of the early modern age (1500) Europe and China might have stood head-to-head in terms of productivity and economic wealth, a wide gap had opened up...
by the twentieth century, with north-western Europe being five or six times as wealthy as China. This gap is determined according to standard historical ‘calculations’ of GDP, which are inherently questionable. Only the broad dimensions seem uncontroversial; since the onset of industrialization, the income gap between China and Europe. These transformations – known variously as the ‘Industrial Revolution’ (after circa 1750), the ‘Great Divergence’ (Pomeranz), or the ‘European miracle’ (Jones) – are often presented by historians as intrinsic features of economic modernity and the rise of the modern world economy.

Some (Landes 1998; Jones 2003) have speculated about an inherent cultural-economic superiority of Europe due to the fact that the first transition into an industrial economy occurred in Western Europe and not in Asia. The most recent attempt at explaining such global divergences in the long term has come from Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), who claim that it was inclusive (read: ‘superior’) economic institutions that were more beneficial for economic growth than other factors. They maintain that the origins of modern economic growth, that is to say the type of trajectory that would eventually lead to industrialization, is in those world regions that first implemented inclusive (i.e. non-extractive) economic and political institutions – in other words, post-1688 England and then north-western Europe. Here, it was England, and later other European regions, that came first (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).

Others have highlighted cultural bifurcation in social norms and kin structure, considered to have affected the nature of contract enforcement and thus later processes of divergence between China and the ‘West’ (Greif and Tabellini 2010). Europeans’ cultural inclination to economic and military competition, manifested by the market and the tournament, respectively, has likewise been cited as a crucial factor that set Europe apart from ‘the Rest’ (e.g. Hoffman 2015). Other narratives mention the rise of ‘bourgeois values and dignity’ (McCloskey 2006, 2010, 2016) and the eighteenth-century Enlightenment as a revolution in attitude toward more rational thinking about the economy and the market (Mokyr 2009). The implicit conclusion of these interpretations seems that (a) Europe’s path to the modern age was the optimum one or best-practice model and (b) there was preordination in this, that is to say a ‘law’ of some sort that modern economic growth had to be European not Asian. This, however, borders upon metaphysics, chasing a Hegelian Weltgeist or a general force that drives all human history along lines that are predetermined by necessity as well as moral and cultural superiority. In what follows, this chapter argues that there are problems with this narrative about global inequality.

**Modern measures of inequality do not work for deep historical time**

‘Economic supremacy’, as it is conventionally defined, is not unproblematic (Maddison 2003, and database of the Maddison Project [University of Groningen 2018]). The commonly chosen cross-sectional and intertemporal comparative standard is per capita GDP – often expressed in terms of 1990 purchasing power parities (PPP) (Geary-Khamis dollar) – which seemingly allows for global historical comparisons. Nonetheless, this rationale rests upon at least two misleading assumptions.

First, money, markets, and monetary transactions are assumed to have been equally important at any time during the last millennium for people in either world region. This inherently questionable proposition lies in the assumption of the ‘market’ as being the main or even major ‘clearing agent’ for economic transactions across all countries, societies, and times (see, e.g., Temin 2013; Neal and Williamson 2015). Recent studies on the history of European development as well as general work relating to modern developing or least developed countries, however, suggest that this is too simplistic. Non-marketed transactions and non-monetized sectors of the economy might be as significant in terms of their contribution to overall economic activity as the ‘market’, especially within least developed economies (Boldizzoni 2011). But
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even in modern industrialized economies, the role of non-monetized economic transactions is still considerably important.

Most scholars would probably agree that per capita income measured by conventional standards, even when expressed in terms of PPP across several countries, is not the most helpful comparative standard for accurate comparisons of wealth, productivity, and well-being for any time prior to the 1900s. On the other hand, historians have failed to come up with a more convincing alternative. One such commonly selected alternative is real wages, which have been subjected to global and long-term historical comparison by historical economists who reduce them to a common denominator: a ‘gram of silver’ (e.g. Allen 2001). But this comparative standard for global differences in purchasing power only works if all people have valued silver similarly across all world regions and at all historical times. Historians specializing in the monetary history of medieval and early modern Europe and of regional contexts outside of Europe have convincingly demonstrated that there were vast ‘global divergences’ in people’s valuation of silver, with gold-to-silver ratios varying greatly across world regions over time (Flynn and Giráldez 2002). In the early modern age, for instance, silver was, when measured in gold, twice as valuable in China as in north-western Europe. Even within Europe, there were considerable variations in the gold-to-silver ratio, the commonly accepted dummy variable for the price of silver. Thus, someone earning the equivalent of about half the sum of silver (in grams) earned per day in China in comparison to Europe actually would have been – following this reductionist economistic logic of ‘real wages’ – as well off as their northern European counterpart. Silver wages in Europe, however, cannot simply be compared to silver wages in Asia because degrees of monetization, monetary, cultural systems of labour, payment, and exchange were different. And so was the price of silver as a commodity.

Second, the ‘reconstruction’ of a historical time series based on per capita GDP since the birth year of Christ for the entire world – as suggested by Maddison (2003) – can be questioned on ontological grounds. Only if GDP ‘existed’ as a concept or measurement during the time for which it is applied does it serve as a meaningful comparative standard over time. That being said, the obvious problem is that GDP and the conception of the ‘economy’ as a macro-economic entity were simultaneously ‘invented’ around 1930, which, in a performative way, also changed the nature, type, and scale of extracting economic data (Philipsen 2015; Schmelzer 2016). The aim to calculate or at least estimate the GDP, and per capita GDP, in deep historical time thus places in front of the historian a number of unresolvable methodological issues, often leading to meaningless proxies ‘measuring’ economic growth and divergence over time when neither modern economic growth nor entities – such as fully integrated national market economies – existed that could be analysed and measured that way.

Europeans had a limited understanding of national economies and means of measuring economic activity before 1900. Figures derived from pre-1900 national income accounts and related materials are unlikely to generate meaningful results when applied as measuring tools of global economic diversity or economic growth over time for any period before circa 1900, especially when applied to societies that were neither fully industrialized nor fully ‘marketized’. The methods and types of data collected were radically different from the data – especially concerning prices, wages, and incomes from labour and capital – that are used nowadays to measure the value of individual income streams and market transactions, which in turn generate national income accounts. Since proxies are difficult to formulate, scholars sometimes have used urbanization figures instead (see Acemoglu et al. 2011). Additionally, such methods of data collection do not provide meaningful ways of linking our contemporary economy with the European economy in, say, 1600 or 1700, or for comparing ‘China’ with ‘Europe’ as based on the same logic of measurement.
This has grave implications regarding the long-term comparison of economic trajectories over time and in a cross-sectional perspective, such as the Great Divergence in income wealth and productivity between Western Europe and Asia since the early modern age. Historical national income accounts of and projections looking backwards on modern measurements developed for modern countries suggest comparability of patterns of social existence, economic mentality, and economic life over long stretches of time where no such comparability or continuity exists, strictly speaking. In this vein, Maddison (2003) and his followers presented a comprehensive list of figures for per capita income for the ‘world’ since the birth of Christ, suggesting, for instance, that modern sub-Saharan African countries enjoyed incomes and living standards comparable to the late Roman Empire in 400, that is to say shortly before its implosion. The data also confirm the pattern of a Great Divergence as early as the 1500s. But as growth rates for European countries and China in these studies were obtained using circumstantial and non-quantitative documentary evidence either based on proxy data (such as urbanization figures), or non-quantitative evidence drawn from the ‘European miracle’ literature, such calculation exercises yield, at the very best, shaky and very impressionistic pictures of global economic divergence with error margins probably too large to yield reliable frameworks of analysis.

Lastly, the mere implication that some nations ‘fail’ in terms of economic and societal development (however defined), while others do not, is likewise inherently questionable. It implies that there are ‘wrong’ or suboptimal trajectories in world history as opposed to ‘good’, ‘right’, or ‘correct’ ones, that is to say best-practice paths of development that can be studied, mapped, and then followed by any country or society if only people would choose to follow these good prescriptions. This story rings a familiar bell. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was in vogue among development economists and economic historians to interpret history as moving along invisible yet somewhat evidently inevitable trajectories – or ‘laws of history’. These trajectories had only to be uncovered so as to make the future foreseeable and to enable the historian to explain the ‘blank spots’ in history that were not covered by the written and non-textual sources, thereby using a deductionist – and reductionist – approach in favour of standard historical methods such as inductive reasoning. Rostow’s stages-of-growth-theory published in 1960 is a popular example; however, there are several other culprits of this paradigm on the Marxist side as well, against which, ironically, Rostow had developed his ‘non-communist manifesto’ in the first place.

In recent decades, scholars have become sceptical of such teleological or ‘Whig’ approaches to history (e.g. Wong 1997; Pomeranz 2000; Parthasarathi 2011). Instead, they have stressed aspects such as idiosyncrasy (time-space contingency) and path dependency, that is to say the accumulation of critical steps or events over time until what is sometimes called a ‘critical juncture’ has been reached that makes certain outcomes impossible and others inevitable, thereby channelling history and development into a certain direction. In contrast to this view, societies and their potential to experience or generate economic growth should be interpreted and judged on the basis of their own idiosyncratic location(s) in time. Scholars have now advanced from geo-deterministic approaches (see Parker 2013) to aspects such as interaction and connectivity of people, groups, and diasporas or human interactions with the physical and material environment as possible causes for divergent patterns of development.

**Apples or oranges? On choosing the right comparative standard**

The challenge of investigating global inequalities, however, does not end here. In fact, there is still much room for further discussion and clarification with regard to how this question can and should be addressed. A study on early modern England and India has recently stressed that China by no means represents the only or even the most obvious starting point for a global
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comparison (Parthasarathi 2011). Notwithstanding, the European standard – England – still remains in this comparison. But what about other ‘Europes’, such as the early modern German states, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, or the Iberian peninsula? What about the region as the crucial factor? If we replace ‘country’ with ‘region’, we can also do away with the nation-state or Weberian Machtstaat as a historical, yet anachronistic, actor. In fact, there is still a lack of stringency and consensus on what constitutes such ominous macro-regions as the ‘West’, ‘Europe’, or the ‘East’. Scholars such as Gerschenkron (1962), Abramovitz (1986), or more recently Magnusson (2009) have advanced our understanding of differential growth trajectories within the modern European industrial economy by calling attention to the fact that there was a ‘small divergence’ within industrializing Europe. Magnusson, for instance, acknowledges that there was a prehistory of this process, dating back to the early modern period. These perspectives have, however, not (yet) been integrated earnestly enough by historians. Even the most recent work on the Great Divergence (Vries 2015) starts from the assumption that there were notable differences between England and China during the early modern and early industrial periods in terms of states governing and interfering with the economy. The book further argues that it is this differential framework of states as economic actors that caused economic divergence in the end. Again, England is portrayed as more proactive and interventionist than China, safeguarding and nurturing economic growth early on. Thus, scholarship has not moved on to broader intra-European comparisons and ‘small divergences’ within the Great Divergence since the last millennium. England was, since the seventeenth-century Restoration (1660) and Glorious Revolution (1688), clearly an exceptionally wealthy and exceptionally powerful state, and unlikely to have represented the European norm. All in all, it is not an ultimately useful representative of ‘Europe’ in global comparison.

Moreover, there is room for further debate, especially on questions such as governance, agency, and geographical coverage. Some recent contributions have studied individuals’ (or large aggregates of individuals) choice (e.g. Pomeranz 2000), implying that we can study the interaction of individuals with markets on many layers, from the micro and meso to the macro level. Popular metaphors, or key terms, are Smithian growth, proto-industrialization, or industrious revolution. Others stress the role played by states and governments, as well as state and governmental intervention, in the process (e.g. Parthasarathi 2011; Vries 2015). The major question raised by these works is should we adopt top-down or bottom-up rationales when studying and explaining economic divergence? Are we talking about markets or individuals, about merchant networks or states? And what is the ‘state’? Or rather, who is the ‘state’? Which tension fields, conflicts of interests, and competition for scarce political, social, and economic resources (capability) existed within each world region or society that make up the fabric of states? Do they make a difference in terms of the formulation of an overall economic strategy of political economy and economic development? How did other regions, for example the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century German states under the political economy paradigm of Cameralism (Rössner 2015, 2016, 2018), contribute to the process we have come to know as the Great Divergence? Also, as some contributions (Reinert 1999; van Zanden 2009) show, some European best-practice models – again mainly exhibited by England and the Netherlands – have their roots in the Middle Ages. Therefore, a starting point for discussions of global economic divergence in, say, 1750 or 1800, might be too late to yield meaningful bases for comparison; moreover, a focus on England (itself a country with great internal economic diversity) or the Yangtze River Delta might also lead to a somewhat biased picture.

Lastly, an important perspective for rethinking the history of the Great Divergence is the problem of measurement and operationalization. Are we talking about incomes? Living standards? How do we measure and compare economic and societal development over time and
across space? As demonstrated above, the attempt to compare local wage series according to their silver base (i.e. silver content of circulating currencies) is problematic as it relies on the incorrect assumption that silver was equally valued over time and around the globe. How helpful are monetary figures expressed in and calibrated according to modern, that is to say twentieth- and twenty-first-century, concepts of measurement developed for fully integrated market societies (GDP, PPP, etc., see above)? Can we – or even should we – compare medieval or early modern China with medieval and early modern Europe? Can we project evidence that we have on incomes and living standards, which have become more and more reliable for some regions in Europe since the eighteenth century, backwards into the Middle Ages? Should we do the same with Asia? Or are there other more meaningful variables – measurable as well as non-measurable – that could be substituted for the figures on prices, wages, and incomes for international or global comparison?

What role did ideas play in processes of global economic divergence?

Another fundamental – and yet almost completely ignored – methodological vantage point for studying global economic divergence is the realm of economic thought or reasoning about the economy. Sometime after 1500, 1700, or 1800 Europe turned into the richest region on the globe, with the income gap to the rest of the world steadily widening in subsequent centuries. Hardly any attention has been paid to the economic ideas that were important in this process (see Rössner 2016; see Chapter 23 by Winder). Which theories and belief systems guided such processes of growth, transformation, and divergence over the last millennium? How did modern economic theory and modern economic policy become shaped and influenced by ‘older’ ideas? There was, arguably, a lot of interaction between economic policy and theory since the beginning of the early modern period (often but not ultimately helpfully labelled ‘Mercantilism’ and/or ‘Cameralism’). And to what extent were the different approaches between Western European states and China toward ‘managing’ markets and the common wealth during the last 500 years informed by different ways or traditions of economic reasoning? Some have seen Confucianism and non-intervention paradigms as forerunners of eighteenth-century physiocracy and thus modern economic liberalism. To what extent did these differences in economic paradigm cause different policies and different economic outcomes in the long term? These questions still need to be investigated.

Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of the different methodological and epistemological approaches to the problem of global economic divergence and argued that global inequalities have a long history that reaches far beyond nineteenth- and twentieth-century England or China. A number of main points call for a critical re-evaluation of past contributions to debates on global economic inequality and the origins of the Great Divergence of wealth between Europe and Asia: the lack of reliable data, changing ways of conceptualizing and modelling the economy according to the modern concept of GDP, divergent manifestation of market economies across Eurasia over space and time, and ahistorical definitions of wealth and economic prosperity as universally applicable, and thus comparable features, across the entire globe during the last millennium.

Future research studies and narratives on global economic divergence – and confluence – should therefore include stories told by social and economic, financial, global, Asian/European, colonial, and political historians. Such narratives should also address the history of modern capitalism in a
long-term or deep historical perspective, going at least back to the age of the Renaissance. We should also be aware of the discursive nature of the topic, especially the problems that arise in terms of the scope and focus of each individual narrative, depending upon each author’s methodological instruction, training, and background when studying the Great Divergence. It all hinges upon definitions of the crucial parameters used to measure divergence, and the resulting biases that might be added to the story plot. We should especially highlight the fact that within the greater geographical areas referred to as ‘Europe’ and ‘Asia’, there were markedly different levels of social and economic development at any point in the past. There were considerable changes and different trajectories within Europe over time, which cannot be grasped with such a somewhat brief reference framework as the Great Divergence starting in or after 1750 or 1800. Moreover, debates on divergence should not be too closely or exclusively modelled on an economic rationale. Factors such as culture, migration, and networks were also significant to this process.

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PROPERTY DEMYTHOLOGIZED

Historical transformations and spatial hierarchies of land regimes

Hanne Cottyn

Introduction

Over the last five centuries, the commodification of land has fundamentally helped and shaped the expansion of global capitalism. In this process, land reform has been deployed as an essential mechanism in the struggle over the allocation of, and rights over, resources. Closely linked to the project of European imperialism, land reforms have been used to progressively (re)organize the multiplicity of existing land regimes into land regimes based on private property instrumental to the expansion of centralized state power and the accumulation of capital. This chapter approaches the global diffusion and implementation of private property-based land regimes together with the resulting commodification of land from the angle of its most important tool: land reform. Land reforms can be considered as political projects in an ideologically coloured, conflictive, and essentially uneven transition process that is central to the expansion of global capitalism. Land regimes, in turn, can be understood as the temporal and spatial outcomes of that transition, namely the process of land commodification as well as its complex co-evolution with persisting communal systems.

Although land reforms have a long history that can be traced back to the Greeks and Romans (Tuma 1965), it is especially from the late eighteenth century onwards that land reforms have acted as a strategic tool in the globalization of one specific type of property relation that was inspired by the idea of ‘perfect property’. The ‘myth of perfect property’ is by far the most powerful idea that has informed modern land reforms (Congost 2000). The emergence of this concept first in seventeenth-century Britain, with Enlightenment political philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, up to its global influence under neo-liberal adjustments since the 1980s (Linklater 2015) is buttressed by neo-classical economists’ (de Soto 2000) and international development institutions’ (Deininger 2003) depiction of a linear process of ‘perfection’ toward concretely delineated, private, legal and written, and hence marketable titles to the ownership over a piece of land (Araghi and Karides 2012: 1). From this perspective, processes of legalization (also referred to as ‘formalization’, see, e.g., de Soto 2000) are used to classify, replace, and incorporate ‘imperfect’ property into a dualist scheme that feeds the expansion of a commodified land regime (see Ubink, Hoekema and Assies 2009). Being at the
heart of historical capitalism, this chapter argues that this incorporation needs to be seen as a historically and spatially uneven and contested process. The chapter intends to deconstruct the development paradigms and master narratives that have informed the transformations of land rights since the long sixteenth century and especially from around 1850 onwards while examining how these paradigms and narratives are currently being reproduced and globalized within the context of neo-liberal policies.

To this end, the chapter starts with a critique of the idea of ‘perfect property’ as a still prevailing underlying concept of land control and reveals that it is an ahistorical proposition of a seemingly universal and ever existing category of property. This is followed by two steps. First, private property is ‘historicized’ into different phases of shifting concepts and transformations of land regimes. Second, this same trajectory is ‘spatialized’, thereby demonstrating that land reform is a historical and transregional political project and that land regimes are embedded into a transregional order.

**Demythologizing the idea of ‘perfect property’**

In its current and strictly juridical definition, ‘perfect’ property refers to a bundle of rights that is enforceable against all others. The absoluteness, or exclusiveness, of this ideal type of rights lays in its registration through legal instruments. However, this process of ‘perfection’ is foremost an act of juridical classification pretending to replace the ‘real’ underlying dynamic and conflicting relations of owners with their property. The impossibility of this absoluteness invokes the idea of a myth built upon the modernization paradigm that emerged with and disseminated through the French Revolution. As Rosa Congost contends, it has been kept in place until today by a remarkably firm consensus over absolute property rights as a formative element in the liberal juridical order of modern nation-states (2000: 61). Within the order of modern nation-states, the mythical superiority and universality of private property rights seems logical and even inevitable, and is reinforced by the dual assumption about perfect property relations as being the outcome of an idealized linear evolution from relative, negotiable rights to exclusive, delineated rights and a causal link between property and progress.

Crystallized in Enlightenment writings by liberal thinkers such as John Locke and written down in liberal constitutions in France and the United States (US), the centrality of perfect property rights continues to condition contemporary neo-liberal policies. However, the liberal paradigm of perfect property is a historical construct that, when put into practice, appears to be an illusion. Communal ownership presents a fundamental challenge to capitalist accumulation strategies because its intrinsic plurality in land relations denies the exclusiveness and absoluteness of private property without, however, denying private property as such. In contrast, the myth of perfect property fails or refuses to grasp the value and ‘normality’ of complex land tenure relations. The communities, which today manage an estimated 65 per cent of the world’s land area under customary tenure regimes (Alden Wily 2011), are hence reduced to an anachronism desperately searching for the way to ‘progress’.

The critique of the liberal argument states that commodifying operations rarely produce the aspired uniformity and replicability of norms or foster the desired social effects (Gilbert 2002; Ubink, Hoekema and Assies 2009: 9; Otto 2009). First, assumed ‘imperfect’ ownership – in communal, public, or feudal structures – can offer a basis for increasing technical and productive improvement. Moreover, abundant but generally overlooked evidence demonstrates that – in contrast to commodifying claims – it is not the persistence but the erosion of this ‘imperfection’, that is to say the inherent pluralism of communal land systems, that reinforces marginalization and impoverishment of communities (Ostrom and Schlager 1996). Such a situation has especially
been reported upon in countries in Africa (Cousins 2000; Ubink Hoekema and Assies 2009: 7–8). Second, the outcome of commodification rather is a hybrid and uneven institutional control over land sometimes with victories and other times bitter setbacks for communal and indigenous land rights in relation to the development of technology and political ideas (Maier 2016). Visualized through the LandMark initiative (LandMark 2018), common lands and institutions still figure as a key pillar in many rural societies. Empirical studies have demonstrated that such ‘persisting’ community-based land tenure regimes are the product of co-evolution and reinvention and not the residual of a transformation process (Ostrom 1990; Godden and Tehan 2010).

The unevenness in the globalization of a specific land regime and the implied fate for peasants and communities is thus still poorly understood, and moreover obscured by the still overarch-ing ideological dominance of the liberal paradigm in current policies. Although current land policies witness an increased openness, particularly in relation to collective property regimes, the orthodox idea ‘that complete property rights . . . are the cornerstone of successful economic activity’ (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2011: 4, emphasis added; see Deininger and Binswanger 1999) has far from lost its attraction in times of neo-liberal globalization. Harold Demsetz (1967), member of the Chicago school of economics, developed a highly influential theory on property rights that appropriately portrays private property as a possibility for dealing with resource over-exploitation. However, presented as the only solution to solve issues of over-exploitation, this approach discredits state regulation and ignores what Ostrom demonstrated as the common property option.

While Demsetz is a key point of reference in academic debates, Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto has played a direct role in designing and implementing neo-liberal property politics as a World Bank, United States Agency for International Development and government advisor around the world since the 1990s. In The Mystery of Capital (2000), he identifies informally held property – mostly in developing countries – and labels it as ‘dead’ capital that can only become productive through titling and legalization. Influenced by these neo-classical assumptions depicting a linear causality between legalized private property and poverty eradication, the idea of absolute property has remained in place as the magic ingredient of social and economic progress. This chapter takes Demsetz’s and de Soto’s neo-classical theories as ‘invitations’ to historicize and spatialize the formation and spread of private property-based land regimes via land reforms. This has implications for how we understand land rights, land reforms, and land regimes in relation to capitalist expansion.

**A historicization of land commodification**

Essentially transatlantic, the formation and spread of property-based land regimes, together with the process of land commodification, started symbolically in 1492. This interpretation amplifies the notion of primitive accumulation in time and space from the eighteenth-century English enclosures to the systematic dispossession and displacement of European and American peoples since the late fifteenth century (Marx 1867; Araghi and Karides 2012). A world-historical framing allows for land commodification to be periodized, starting with the long sixteenth-century transition from land control functional to a feudal system, to land control at the service of increasing labour productivity within an emerging world market (Moore 2016: 91). This first phase paved the way for an intensified transformation of land relations into commodified rights in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, followed by a twentieth-century developmentalist phase, and then a last phase of neo-liberal globalization projects (Araghi and Karides 2012). Rather than providing an all-encompassing overview, the following historicization of land
commodifications emphasizes the unevenness and interconnectedness of national and regional trajectories of the transformations of land rights over the last two centuries.

The liberal revolution

Roughly between 1750 and 1840, during the period when the European population doubled and the land ‘brought under the plough’ was significantly enlarged, a combination of enhanced mobility of knowledge, skills, and technology and the interventionist state brought about an Agrarian Enlightenment (Jones 2016: 2). This was the prelude to the profound liberal/(neo-) colonial reorganizations of the modern land rights regime that converted legal obstacles into legal instruments for land dispossession (Marx 1867: 512). Late eighteenth-century Habsburg ruler Joseph II was the first head of state to actively intervene in landlord–peasant relations in the name of individual private interests, avowed as the guarantee for a more rational land use (Wauters 1928: 35). Arguments that linked the defence of private property directly to (national) progress crystallized in constitutions – particularly the US Declaration of Independence (1776), the Napoleonic Code (1804), and the Cortes de Cádiz (1812) – and propagated through revolutions and wars, with Napoleon Bonaparte and Simón Bolívar taking on the protagonist roles in Central Europe and Latin America, respectively.

The translation of liberal arguments – by liberal and conservative governments alike – into commodifying land codes gathered momentum around the middle of the nineteenth century. Measures seeking to replace corporate holdings by individual title were promulgated in Prussia and the US as well as the newly independent states of Latin America, first targeting the Church and later (indigenous) communities, and, in a mixed European-Islamic style, in the Ottoman Empire (Wauters 1928; Linklater 2015; Maier 2016). On paper, these reforms subjected land to the law of value, promoting the creation and multiplication of private proprietaries. In practice, however, the implementation of liberalization and alienation proved to be much more difficult due to financial constraints and unintended outcomes that offered the perfect breeding ground for popular unrest. Contrary to the aim of the capitalist transition to establish a land market with individually operating smallholders, Austria witnessed a reconcentration of land, while Latin American desamortización (confiscation) measures generated a massive expansion of the semi-feudal hacienda system. The open denial of and resistance to plural customary land systems across Latin America, just as in several parts of Europe, was the response by the landlord class as well as by rural communities, which often managed to impair the restructuring of local land systems and the organization of a ‘standardized’ land market. In other cases, such opposition led to protracted violence. Even where institutions were strong – as in Belgium and other West European countries, which witnessed the greatest disappearance of collective lands in the second half of the nineteenth century – the legal alienation of communally held lands oscillated between consecutive successes and resistance (Demélas-Bohy and Vivier 2003).

Developmentalism

The twentieth century can be seen as the century of land reform par excellence. Initiated by the Russian Stolypin land reform (1906–17) and the Mexican Revolution (1910), the developmentalist shift – referring to the economic theory of desarrollismo that developed in Cold War Latin America, which promoted strong state policies for autonomous economic development, instead of being developed – steered state policies toward a more radical and planned redistribution of land. In the interwar period, the newly created successor states of Central and Eastern Europe witnessed a shift to land politics where expropriations were undertaken by dominant
Property demythologized

ethnic groups (Wauters 1928). In the post-Second World War world, land reform became an issue of the ‘developing world’, including both state redistributive and pro-market reforms (Lipton 2009). Pushed by peasant, nationalist, and anti-colonial movements in a reaction to exaggerated inequality and unfree labour, and strategically played out in the Cold War context, access to land became an explicit political priority that was translated either into collectivization or privatization programmes. Land reforms were enacted through coercive land reform programmes, such as in Asia and the Middle East in the 1950s (Warriner 1969) and in Latin America from the 1960s to the 1970s (Teubal 2008). In its revolutionary forms, as in Bolivia, Cuba, or China, or in more moderate forms elsewhere, land reform increasingly became an economic planning method. The adoption of the social function of the land as a guiding principle for the implementation of expropriation measures demonstrates how the modernization paradigm became essential for the containment of social discontent and the prevention of revolutions. Supranationally as well, social demands were built into bilateral and multilateral relations through programmes such as the US–Latin American Alliance for Progress and the integration of land reform in the United Nations and World Bank agendas. The net result of this developmentalist phase was a contraction of land rights, with the number of people losing their legal access to land being higher than the number of land rights expanding through land reform (Araghi 1995).

Neoliberalism

In the 1980s, land reform lost its economic and sociopolitical appeal, resulting in active reform processes being placed on standby, for example in Indonesia and Bolivia. Throughout the 1990s, however, land-based demands re-emerged on national and international development agendas (Borras, Kay and Lahiff 2008). On the one hand, the World Bank in particular promoted market-led land reforms, which were adopted specifically in post-conflict and ex-Soviet countries, and in turn having different results. On the other hand, counter-enclosure movements of the Zapatistas in Mexico, the Brazilian landless peasant movement Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), or the international peasant movement La Vía Campesina emerged and protested against neo-liberal market solutions for their land demands (Rosset et al. 2006).

Global neoliberalism has brought the modernization paradigm back in by approaching land regimes through a linear evolution scheme comprising property deeds, taxes, and cadastres as tokens of advancing legibility and modernity. Although less reluctant to recognize communal arrangements, contemporary development policies reduce poverty challenges to a matter of ‘securing’ access through property titling, thereby facilitating the inflow of capital investment (Deininger 2003). The assumed causal link between the legalization of property rights and pro-poor change, in turn, omits the role of the state as well as the importance of gender and elite relations (Nyamu-Musembi 2007).

At the start of the twenty-first century, and especially since the 2007–8 food price hikes, commodification strategies have been increasingly overlapping with processes of financialization (White et al. 2012; Gertel and Sippel 2016). The re-emergence of land and land reform as a development strategy has been driven by a growing financial interest in farmland (see Deininger et al. 2011). Large-scale purchases of and speculative investments in land, particularly in the Global South, have been identified as a neo-colonial global ‘land grab’. In the same fashion as late eighteenth-century land sales and implemented in the name of rationalization, the neoliberal prioritization of large-scale investments over local communities’ land use has accelerated processes of land commodification and privatization, resulting in intensified displacements of rural communities worldwide. The overall increase in land ownership concentration and
consolidation has fostered the depopulation of the countryside, thereby transforming subsistence peasants into wage workers relying on market participation for their livelihoods.

A spatialization of the global land regime

The formation and expansion of a commodified land regime around the notion of ‘perfect property’ can be traced not only historically but also spatially in how it produces and, at the same time, hierarchizes regions and regional connections. The transregional project of land reform is only partly captured by nation-based typologies, which are generally confined to one particular world region or the category of ‘developing countries’, and which predominantly focus on the twentieth century (see de Janvry 1981; Lipton 2009). While land reforms are indeed mostly enacted nationally, the logic that models the political-economic programme and juridical-technical tools of land reform transcends the national level. It pushes and legitimizes, on a systemic level, the dissemination, reproduction, and generalization of private property across ever larger transregionally connected spaces in a dialectical, negotiated way. In the process of incorporating new spaces and peoples, the restructuring of property relations is closely entangled with labour exploitation, territorial control, ethnic reconfigurations, and ecological change.

Being an essentially transatlantic project from the onset, the commodification of land seizure practices was transregionally transferred from the Iberian peninsula to European overseas territories in a mutually influential way (see Herzog 2015). First in the Americas, and subsequently in Asia, Australasia, and lastly Africa, land was (re)concentrated in either feudal-like structures or export-oriented monocultures at the expense of communal, tribal, and peasant groups, which were enclosed in racialized and gendered land and labour regimes. Where states were weak and elites strong, communities were often dispossessed through primitive accumulation, as evidenced by the auction policy in the Andean countries, or through impoverishment and feudalist absorption, as in pre-1917 Russia. Europe, in turn, experienced a stronger capitalist transition of land systems with land being redistributed from semi-feudal relations to formal land rights in the hands of a class of individual smallholders – in contrast to the ‘weaker capitalist’ transition from semi-feudal relations to large farms as in the Latin American haciendas or in pre-1917 Russia – with a large portion of the rural population moving to urban areas and becoming proletarianized wage labour (i.e. cut off from non-market access to land and food).

In the Cold War context, the breaking up of communal land regimes and the incorporation into homogenizing ‘individualist versus collectivist’ land regimes were channelled by bilateral (US and Soviet) relations and international institutions (the League of Nations, Food and Agricultural Organization, and World Bank). Under neo-liberal policies, this state-dominated dualism has been increasingly replaced by a global individualized property rights regime that is multicentric and market-dominated. Fuelled by rising transnational commercial agro-food interests, land (mainly non-private) is being sold and leased at a larger scale and faster speed than ever. This process is currently reconfiguring the global hierarchy of colonially and Cold War-rooted transregional patterns of access to and control over land, with the rise of new regional protagonists such as the Gulf states, China, and South Korea, and a couple of emerging countries in the Global South, connected to enduring North Atlantic power and new sources of capital – mainly biofuel – in alliance with national government and elite ventures.

The overall impact of this globalizing land regime is a serious reduction of autonomous spaces for so-called imperfect (ambiguously defined, extra-legal) tenure relations, as land is increasingly hedged by standardized state categories and never completely out of reach of market-driven...
reconfigurations. Still, this process has no uniform outcome, not even in Europe where this evolution is presented as ‘concluded’ by institutionalist historians and economists (Congost 2000: 68–9). Advancing commodification processes are rather expressed in the constellation of interconnected ‘archipelagos’ unevenly expanding within oceans of cheap ‘uncommodified’ inputs for capitalist accumulation (Moore 2016: 90). Instead of a sharp contrast, this un/com-modified coexistence should be envisioned as a continuum of mixed imperfect-to-perfected land tenure forms.

**Conclusion: #LandRightsNow, but not just anyhow**

This chapter presented land commodification as a frontier of capitalist expansion. This frontier moves forward as customary land tenure relations are transformed, incorporated, and legalized within dualist and exclusivist frameworks. Within this context, land reforms served as key tools: they are diachronic and transregional political projects that have been legitimized by and transmitted through the ‘myth of perfect property’, thereby fuelling the expansion of private property regimes. Originally transatlantic, private property-based land regimes can be traced back to the long sixteenth century, emerging from the French Revolution and widening through European colonialism, to eventually become truly global with a deepening through a shift to financialization. The chapter thereby demonstrated how land reforms act as a power-attributing change that, either in its strict or broader (‘agrarian’) form, puts much more than the allocation of land and technical-juridical redefinitions at stake (Borras 2007: 22–3). Increasingly since the eighteenth century, new public regulations pertaining to land use have been adopted as the primary tools for opening up access to labour and commodity production through internal restructuring (land redistribution, legalization, and rationalization) and external reallocation (invasion and seizure). In enabling the deepening and widening of centralized land regimes, land reforms have driven a key process in making plural societies ‘legible’ and operational terrain for ‘modernity’, materializing in property deeds, new fiscal categories, and cadastres. While promoting a decisive change, in line with certain political land and development paradigms, their outcomes always remain a matter of degree. In general, the diversity of land regimes has, however, been reduced through the replacement and encapsulation of custom-based tenure systems within a uniform legal-economic framework that takes private property as its standard.

Currently, the ‘securing’ of land rights – namely legalization, that is to say giving legal recognition to land access within the confines of standardized state law – is being advanced by international development institutions as the suitable answer within the established transregional liberal land order. Such legalization aims at reducing the vulnerability of communities through land titling. This allows communal tenure systems to persist in manifold forms and places, but confines their plurality to ‘legible’ categories confirmed by official documents, thereby ‘fixing’ their trajectory of co-evolution. The historical and global analysis of the transformation of land rights demonstrates that a proper understanding of why land titles matter implies a concern with how land titling works. In terms of research challenges, this advocates a framework for comparative, diachronic, and transregional analysis in order to break up the overly twentieth-century and spatially segregated perspective on land reform processes. In terms of policy challenges, the outcry for #LandRightsNow by grassroots movements and international development institutions alike must be matched by a critical deconstruction of the myths through which the end and mechanisms of land redistribution and titling are inscribed within a commodifying logic.
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THE ROLE OF INFRASTRUCTURE IN TRANSREGIONAL VENTURES

Roland Wenzlhuemer

Introduction

Our attempts to understand and explain social phenomena, that is to say phenomena emerging from the coexistence of and interaction between human beings, necessitate us to think about the formative role of both human actors and social structures. The most insightful are all those approaches that try to bridge the gap between the two by looking at their relation and interplay. Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration (1984) is one of several attempts to understand and explain the degree of agency that humans have in the light of the collective actions of others; these actions are stored in and represented by different forms of structures (reference could also be made to Archer 1982 or Bourdieu 1977, 1984). Central to Giddens’ theory is the idea of the duality of structure, the notion that ‘the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize’ (Giddens 1984: 25). Simply put, this means that individuals, through their actions, reproduce social structures that in turn guide and influence individual actions. A good grasp of the relation between agency and structure also plays an important role in transregional approaches. Transregional studies and their neighbouring fields are interested in both the emergence and the sociocultural significance of transregional or global connections (Wenzlhuemer 2016: 163–6). Larger guiding questions are how actors create such connections and how these successively influence human thoughts, feelings, and actions. In this context, transregional connections can be conceptualized as particular forms of social structures. The frequent use of metaphors such as entanglement, interwoven-ness, or network, which all exhibit a distinct structural quality, also point to this structural aspect. Understood in this way, transregional studies seek to understand and explain the relation between these structures and the actors embedded in them.

This chapter aims to exemplify this relation and, more generally, the role of structures in transregional studies by focusing on infrastructure. Infrastructure is still a relatively young term. During the railway age, it was used by engineers and administrators to describe the very underlying parts of the railway as a technological system, for instance the acquisition of land, embankments, bridges, and suchlike (van Laak 2004: 17). Since then its meaning has changed and expanded in the course of the twentieth century to describe broadly the technological structures that provide essential services to the population. More specific definitions of infrastructure are, however, so manifold that historian Dirk van Laak suggested to not add another definition but,
rather, to think of infrastructures as primary media of integration (‘Integrationsmedien erster Ordnung’, van Laak 2001: 368). Infrastructures can thus be seen as representing both the material manifestations of collective human action as well as their technological fundament. They are storages of agency and guide all further human actions in a particular context. Infrastructures are one specific variant of socioeconomic structures. As material carriers, they play a crucial role in the establishment and support of global connections. Due to their materiality and tangibility, infrastructures can serve as vivid examples to highlight the more general interplay between agency and structure.

In the following, two historical case studies will be given to illustrate the role of infrastructures in transregional ventures. The first case study reveals how the emergence of a global telegraph network brought a new quality to the relation between transport and communication that can hardly be overestimated regarding its significance in the history of globalization. The second case study examines the infrastructural integration of Mont Cenis into an intercontinental transport axis between Europe and Asia, which serves as a case in point to demonstrate how structures can seemingly develop a life of their own. Both examples come from a European (colonial) background merely as a result of the author’s field of study. Examples from other times or regions could be just as illustrative. The chapter further employs a global history perspective, equally reflecting the author’s training and research interest.

The global telegraph network

In the year 1837, Samuel Finley Breese Morse and Alfred Vail in the United States as well as William Fothergill Cooke and Charles Wheatstone in the United Kingdom demonstrated for the first time publicly their fully functioning telegraph instruments. Their designs had been developed independently from each other and employed different methods of encoding and decoding information. Both models, however, used an electromagnetic device to detect electric current. After the practicability of their designs had been tested and proved in the early 1840s, the United States and United Kingdom were gripped by a telegraph mania that lasted at least for the rest of the 1840s and the 1850s. Reasonably tight national telegraph networks started to emerge during this time, first in the United States (John 2010; Hochfelder 2012) and the United Kingdom (Kieve 1973), but soon also in other, mostly European countries. Already early in this process, the first steps were taken at internationalizing the system. In 1851, England and France were successfully linked by a submarine telegraph cable across the English Channel. In the following years, other cables between the British Isles and mainland Europe followed. In 1865, Europe for the first time came into direct telegraphic contact with India. And a year later, the transatlantic cable connection – which had already been working for a few weeks in 1858 – was eventually established for good. The telegraph network had practically gone global.

The reason for the rapid expansion of the telegraph was that telegraphy had proved to be efficient and useful for several groups of actors. The business community (e.g. merchants, bankers, and private investors) was among the first to benefit from telegraphic communication. But the military and the administration also partook in telegraphy – especially in an imperial context where large distances needed to be covered. The original momentum, however, with which the initial inertia was overcome came – at least in Britain – from a cooperation with the railways. In 1843, Cooke was finally able to convince the Great Western Railway company to let him expand the telegraph along their tracks from Paddington to the town of Slough near Windsor. Cooke paid all expenses out of his own pocket and was eventually gratified by the public and financial success of the line. The Great Western Railway – and later the London and
Blackwall Railway – also benefitted greatly from the telegraph, which proved to be incredibly useful for the management of ‘ancillary single lines where traffic did not justify double track, by enabling them to be operated safely and efficiently’ (Kieve 1973: 33). It was this fruitful symbiosis between the railway companies and the telegraph that, among other factors, triggered the expansion of the telegraph network in the 1840s and 1850s – and that best illustrates the new quality of communication the telegraph brought about.

By the turn of the nineteenth century, a worldwide global telegraph network had come into existence that connected all continents and their landline systems, and had brought most of the important population and business centres in direct touch with each other (Hugill 1999; Winseck and Pike 2007; Wenzlhuemer 2012). This network had a strong bearing on the perception of the world at that time. Contemporary observers often summarize this by saying that telegraphy had ‘annihilated space and time’ (Morus 2000: 456–63; Stein 2001: 108). This phrase expresses the widespread notion that the telegraph had brought the different corners of the world into such instant contact that distance did not seem to matter anymore. While this claim might catch the sensation of a small, privileged group of telegraph users, it is only of limited use for analytical purposes. A more appropriate perception sees the telegraph as a technology that altered the relationship of space and time and that while transforming existing spaces also helped to create new ones (Wenzlhuemer 2012: 37–50). This alteration of the interplay between space and time is ultimately the consequence of the telegraph’s capacity to transform the relation between communication and transport through the dematerialization of long-distance information flows (Wenzlhuemer 2012: 35). The telegraph made it possible to encode information in immaterial electric impulses that could then be sent along a conductor, usually a wire or a set of wires. Technically, the dematerialization of information transmission led to the movement of information being detached from the movement of people, animals, or things, all of which consist of matter and, therefore, adhere to certain rules of material movement. In short, it led to the large-scale detachment of communication from the means of transport it had been relying on before (Carey 1983). The fact that telegraphy achieved its technological breakthrough in the United Kingdom by courtesy of the railways stands as testimony to the significance of this detachment.

Due to the separation of communication from the existing means of transport, telegrams were fast, mostly disregarded geographical distance, and by far outpaced other forms of communication – but they had their drawbacks and limitations, too. The technology nevertheless depended on the existence of a suitable material infrastructure, which was expensive to erect and to maintain. Moreover, the message capacities of national and intercontinental connections were usually limited. Hence, telegrams (particularly international ones) were expensive to dispatch – much more so than letters. These high costs and the capacity utilization on the trunk lines made it advisable to keep telegraphic messages short in order to keep costs low and transmission times short. Brevity was essential and soon became one central qualifier of telegraphic communication. In ‘telegram style’ every word counted. Telegrams could often be short to the point of incomprehensibility – or at least ambiguity. Thus more extensive background information, personal letters, and the like were usually not suited for telegraphic communication. Furthermore, the technology encoded information in electric impulses with the help of a code system. Only signifiers, such as letters, numbers, or other signs, could be represented by code. Information encoded in material form could not be transmitted. This limited the nature of information that could be sent.

When it came to the establishment and maintenance of long-distance connections, these aspects of telegraphy could pose formidable problems. The high costs associated with the telegraph excluded many people from partaking in telegraphic communication. And due to the
large infrastructural investments necessary, the network itself was, for a long time, only une-
venly spread across a country – and even more so across the globe. The need for brevity made
the technology almost completely unsuitable for exchanges that required communicational
depth or breadth. Telegrams only contained the bare gist of a certain topic. Finally, only certain
forms of information could be transmitted at all. This is one reason why telegraphic communi-
cation throughout its existence never made letter writing obsolete. Rather, telegrams and letters
coexisted and served largely different purposes.
In this way, the infrastructural characteristics of the worldwide telegraph network had a
decisive impact on who was able to use it and on what could be communicated. The technol-
ogy’s power to detach long-distance communication from transport and its potential to coor-
dinate and control other processes rendered the telegraph practically without any alternative
for all those who wanted to successfully participate in global trade or imperial administration.
At the same time, the rationale of telegraphic communication – created by its limited capacity
and the need to encode information in electric impulses – had important implications regarding
the selection and presentation of information. It crucially impacted nineteenth-century com-
munication culture: it was relevant for how people would communicate over great distances,
which topics they chose to talk about, and which information they privileged. In this way, the
technology unfolded a much more complicated influence on long-distance communication
than merely speeding it up. Telegraphy undoubtedly had a decisive influence on communica-
tion practices and thereby on nineteenth-century processes of globalization. It did so not by
overwriting other technologies and infrastructures but by embedding itself in an existing infra-
structural pattern.
Looking at the structures of the nineteenth-century global telegraph network and of today’s
fibre optic connections that form – among other things – the backbone of Internet communica-
tion, we find that both are surprisingly similar, for instance in their asymmetries. It seems that
today’s persisting digital divide resembles the asymmetrical pattern of the nineteenth-century
telecommunication network in both structure and actual information flow. With the very
notable exception of the economic boom regions of East and Southeast Asia, the two are prac-
tically alike. The same world regions are at the centre of the network and feature an extremely
high connectivity, while other regions have remained at the fringes of the net of communica-
tion and have not been able to utilize the technological advances of the twentieth century to
place themselves more centrally. Even the main routes and pathways of information flow have
only changed a little and in a number of cases the landing sites of the fibre optic cables are
still located at the very same places at which the submarine telegraph cables of the nineteenth
century emerged from the sea. This supports the point that the evolution of larger infrastruc-
tures exhibits a certain degree of continuity and path dependence. One explanation is the
often incremental nature of technological change, where new developments build on existing
structures and, thereby, perpetuate them. Another one rests on the persistence of the cultural
practices evolving around such infrastructures. It illustrates how structures, or, in the case at
hand, infrastructures, can develop shaping powers of their own.

**Integrating Mont Cenis**

Another example emphasizing the integrational capacity of infrastructures rather than their per-
sistence is the infrastructural and communicational conquest of Mont Cenis. The case vividly
illustrates how transregional infrastructures can influence human action over great distances and
in different regions of the world. Mont Cenis is an Alpine mountain massif separating the regions
of Savoy and Piedmont. As such, it has always impeded contact and exchange between these two
regions. Since the early Middle Ages, there has been a pathway over the mountain, but transregional trade and communication remained difficult until Napoleon Bonaparte had a fortified road built over Mont Cenis in the early years of the nineteenth century (Peters 1996: 133). Traversing the mountain became more regular and efficient with the pass road in place, but was still not without problems. Especially in winter, the time it took to cross Mont Cenis was hard to predict and could range from a few hours to several days. Therefore, Mont Cenis remained an obstacle for communication and transport in the region well into the second half of the nineteenth century.

What is more, Mont Cenis became a communicational hindrance of truly global dimensions around that time as well. Traditionally, communication between Europe and Asia, and more specifically between Great Britain and its Asian colonies, had relied on the circumnavigation of the African continent by sailing ship. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Cape route had mostly fallen out of use for postal and passenger transport (while still important in the East India trade). The fastest and most efficient route between Europe and Asia now ran via the Mediterranean, Egypt, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Since the 1830s, railways had started to traverse the European continent and had created a quick and relatively easy connection between the British Isles and the Mediterranean. Around the same time, steamships facilitated the navigation of the Red Sea, which was notoriously difficult for sailing ships. By the 1850s, there was hardly a practicable alternative to this route via Egypt and the Red Sea as far as postal and passenger traffic was concerned.

The European part of the route, however, constantly shifted during the middle of the century due to the ongoing expansion and upgrading of the continental railway network. Originally, passengers would take the train to Marseilles in France and change to a steamer to Alexandria. But when the railway to Modane in Savoy was completed, which then continued south of the Alps to Bologna, changing to a steamer in an Italian port became the most attractive option. Around the late 1850s and early 1860s, only two major obstacles remained on the integrated steam route to India: the crossing of the Egyptian desert and that of Mont Cenis in the Alps. With the construction of the Suez Canal looming large, the pressure to overcome Mont Cenis as the final obstacle on the way to Asia rose significantly, at which point the parliament of Piedmont-Sardinia voted for the building of a tunnel through the mountain. Construction started in 1857 and the tunnel was opened for railway traffic in autumn 1871, much earlier than originally expected and only two years after the completion of the Suez Canal (Huber 2013). The steam route to Asia was thus complete.

In the story of the Mont Cenis tunnel, the integrative potential of communications infrastructure becomes tangible. Infrastructural projects all along the intercontinental route were interlinked and served as parts of a bigger venture. Communication with India could only be as fast and reliable as the weakest link on the route. Therefore, the expansion of the railway infrastructure on the continent, the development of steam shipping in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea and finally the construction of the Suez Canal rendered the mastering of the last remaining stretch over Mont Cenis non-negotiable. Again, the existing infrastructure acquired a strong guiding power over the actors involved and almost developed a life of its own.

How pressing the desire to conquer Mont Cenis had become by the middle of the nineteenth century can be seen even more clearly in the construction of the Mont Cenis Pass Railway (Ransom 1999), a railway that, indeed, ran not under the mountain but over it. Between 1866 and 1868, about 80 kilometres of railway tracks were laid over the Mont Cenis massif, mostly along the existing road. At that time, the tunnel works were already far advanced and it was public knowledge that the tunnel would be opened early in the 1870s and that this would immediately make the pass railway obsolete. However, neither the provisional character nor the high costs of the venture would prevent a group of mostly British engineers and investors from realizing the
project. The pass railway was in operation for about three years between 1868 and the completion of the tunnel in 1871. During this limited stretch of time, it worked as envisaged and made the crossing of the mountain fast and calculable. The Mont Cenis Pass Railway, thus, made a short, but valuable contribution to the integration of the steam route between Europe and Asia. At the same time, the provisional and temporary character of the project stands testimony to the structural pressure that the involved actors experienced when it came to the mastering of Mont Cenis. Although everybody knew that the tunnel would be completed within a couple of years and that it would then make the pass railway useless, the expected infrastructural benefits outweighed these considerations. In this way, both the construction of the Mont Cenis tunnel and, in particular, the parallel project of a railway over the mountain serve to illustrate how (infra)structures and their rationales can guide, influence, or limit human agency and actions.

**Conclusion**

According to sociologist Manuel Castells, ‘structures do not live by themselves; they always express, in a contradictory and conflictive pattern, the interests, values, and projects of the actors who produce the structure while being conditioned by it’ (Castells 2004: 24). These lines express a view of the interplay between structures and actors similar to the approaches put forward by Giddens and others since the 1980s. They can be understood as accurately describing structure–actor relations in a general sociocultural context. In particular, however, Castells had digital information networks and their interplay with network users in mind. Thus, when formulating the sentence above, he specifically thought about the patterns and structures of transregional or global connections, the reasons for their emergence, as well as the influence these structures could have over the actions of the actors embedded in them. The two examples of the global telegraph network and the integration of Mont Cenis briefly introduced in this chapter both illustrate from the perspective of global history how and for which reasons actors in the nineteenth century have invested in transregional infrastructures. As can clearly be seen, they not only invested time, money, and effort in these projects, they also invested agency, which these infrastructures stored, combined, and eventually exerted as if they had a life of their own. In the case of the telegraph, its power to coordinate and control other forms of transport and communication were so promising and beneficial that users would accept the drawbacks of high prices and limited capacities. Willingly or not, whoever wanted to use the telegraph had to adapt to a new style of communication. In the case of the Mont Cenis tunnel, the expansive rationale of infrastructures becomes tangible. Infrastructural projects all over Europe and Asia were interlinked and, thus, influenced the actions of politicians, investors, engineers, and travellers in distant places. Infrastructural technologies such as the telegraph, the railway, or steamships had a shaping influence regarding the emergence and support of transregional connections. In many ways, they conditioned, to borrow Castells’ term, the behaviour of the involved actors, making some options easier or more attractive than others. Transregional studies should, thus, examine such infrastructures not merely as neutral carriers and facilitators but as the technological fundament of collective human action exerting agency. The agency, however, that such structures exert is not their own. It is always stored and recombined human agency.

**Select bibliography**


SUPPLY CHAIN CAPITALISM AND THE TECHNOLOGIES OF GLOBAL TERRITORY

Julian Stenmanns and Marc Boeckler

Introduction

For almost a century, area studies, just like any other social science, depicted the world as a natural arrangement of bounded societies surrounded by national borders. Surprisingly, for a short time the world resembled this geographical imagination. During the post-war period, the states in the Global North were busy reconstructing their shattered societies in terms of spatial cohesion, and the post-colonial independence movements in the Global South were adopting the idea of national sovereignty by folding land and territory into a state. Consequently, economies were predominantly national economies. However, since the 1970s, this spatial figuration of Fordist production has been reconfigured by an efficacious assemblage of neoliberal policies, financialization, and increased shareholder pressure toward short-term profits, innovation in transport and communication technologies, as well as new master narratives. Management professors at powerful business schools called on struggling Fordist corporations to globalize their nationally enclosed factories. The firm-specific challenge of ‘global strategy formulation’ is... to determine where the value-added chain would be broken across borders’ (Kogut 1984: 151). Multiple rounds of outsourcing, subcontracting, and offshoring have merged the world’s economic activities into a functionally integrated global economy (Dicken 2011). Largely facilitated by the birth of logistics, we have witnessed the advent of the age of ‘supply chain capitalism’, namely a specific conjuncture of capitalism, in which the sphere of circulation takes over the lead from production and manufacture. Firms compete through spatial arbitrage and the efficient spatio-temporal orchestration of commodity chains across uneven geographies (Busch 2007; Tsing 2009).

This chapter investigates the spatial patterns of supply chain capitalism through an engagement with infrastructure, logistics, and supply chain management technologies. In so doing, we draw on the concept of ‘global territories’, a term that puts ‘the global and the territorial into one conceptual coinage’ (Opitz and Tellmann 2012: 262). This reading of global economic entanglements is exemplified by three brief empirical cases from Ghana and Sierra Leone: (1) the ‘zone’ of deep-water ports; (2) the ‘contained borders’ of mobile territories; and (3) the ‘distributed place’ of the logistics control tower. By turning to the borderlands of contemporary capitalism, we try to avoid the reaffirmation of generic cases and implicitly claim that globalization processes are indeed global.
Global territory, logistics, and infrastructure

On 26 April 1956, a hybrid vessel with the telling name *Ideal X* set a course from Port Newark for Houston, Texas. The rebuilt tanker was equipped with a special deck that was a raised platform carrying 58 trailer trucks. After arrival in Houston, the trailers were attached to fresh running gear and transported to their final destination without the laborious and time-consuming task of manual unloading (Cudahy 2006: 6). Container ships and the intermodal transport era were born. But containers alone did not revolutionize world trade. They demanded an infrastructural overhaul of the world’s ships and ports, and they were embedded in new sociotechnical systems of circulation, the calculative arts of logistics, and supply chain management. This interplay of infrastructures, containers, and management technologies simultaneously relies on fixity and motion, a spatial figuration we label as ‘global territory’ (Opitz and Tellmann 2012).

The contradictory metaphor of global territory has a threefold sensitizing purpose. First, it claims that global flows and local territories are inextricably interdependent. Emerging global orders are territorial and the territories of contemporary economic entanglements are global. Second, it reminds us that this specific nexus between flow and territory is managed by logistics and materially articulated through infrastructures, which necessitates, third, a topological engagement with the global economy. Highlighting questions of connectedness and interoperability, a topological perspective observes the heterogeneity of the connective arrangements of supply chain capitalism (see also Collier 2009; Tsing 2009).

The logistics revolution of the early 1970s entailed a radical reorganization of production and supply and mobilized a different spatial choreography of trade. New forms of cargo mobility and spatial arbitrage became the new norm through the creation of the global flow. The transformation of the infrastructural means of commerce implemented a global network of flexible production and supply both inside and outside of the confines of the assembly halls of the Fordist era. Upon sorting out the logistics of one single ship with 18,000 containers, the sheer dimensions of this puzzle box become visible. The starting and end point of consignments multiply by a thousand. All these containers are meant to be moved and transferred to different locations. This enterprise entails more than just a reorganization of the transportation of goods, it deals with the ‘cradle-to-grave analysis of the ordering, transport, and storage of the product or service being produced and of the inputs required to produce it’ (Allen 1997: 110). As such, logistics is not only a novel form of analysing and calculating the myriad trajectories of trade flow. A novel space was thoroughly produced through a set of related technological, infrastructural, scientific, and entrepreneurial fields, all ‘dedicated to flows’ (Cowen 2014: 8).

The end of the national system of Fordist production also put an end to social sciences’ methodological nationalism. The unquestioned assumption of society as always being territorially bounded was empirically outdated by globalization processes. In turn, new spatial categories with an emphasis on flows and transnational interconnectedness have been offered to conceptualize the messy spatial order of the global contemporary. But ‘flows’ also depend on territories. They need to be stabilized; they need to be secured and controlled. The perspective of ‘global territories’ relates these network spaces of flows to the notion of territories through an infrastructural reading of global space.

If territory is a political technology of governing modern states (Elden 2010), then global logistics – materialized through the shipping container and the dashboard, being their iconic infrastructural and logistical figures – might be understood as political technologies of governing the transregional. Logistics and their infrastructures serve as an epistemological point of departure to think about the spatial assemblage of the global contemporary (see von Schnitzler...
Supply chain capitalism & global territory

2008, 2015). With infrastructural inversion (Bowker 1994), we foreground the backstage elements of global space and excavate the ‘system of substrates’ (Star 1999: 380) of global economic entanglements. Infrastructures are matter moving matter (Larkin 2013: 329); they are the backbone of contemporary supply chain capitalism. In our work, we add the register of logistics to the perspective of infrastructural inversion. Only with the operations of logistics (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013) can global territory take shape, evolve, and develop its rhythm. Even though infrastructures rust and splinter (Barry 2015) and logistical operations are prone to disruptions, they remain powerful solutions not just to functional questions (how to cross a border?), but also to political problems (how to secure and securitize international trade? How to fortify the border?). Logistics and infrastructures are political matters because of their operational and material capacity to connect distant elements. What topologies are folded into the technopolitics of infrastructural and logistical connectivity?

Port zones

Our empirical investigation into the materializations of contemporary global territory starts with Tema Port and the shifting technopolitical function of ports from the fortification of national territories to trade facilitator in the age of supply chain capitalism. When Ghana’s main deep-water seaport was opened in 1962, it was the largest man-made, artificial harbour on the African continent. Liberated from colonial dominion, the newly independent Ghanaian state apparatus was in full control of its own means of trade with the rest of the world. Disrupting the colonial pattern of commerce, the port’s new quays, breakwaters, and warehouses were part of a national plan of infrastructural modernity, based on the rationale of spatial cohesion to create an independent post-colonial territorial economy (Chalfin 2010). Nevertheless, as infrastructures age, corrode, and break outdated equipment – together with technical hitches, political turmoil, and a lack of financial means – the port was turned into a brake pad to trade over the course of the following decades. Cargo dwell times were long, goods often disappeared during customs, and there was a lack of spare parts for maintenance works.

The port was a slow gateway to the Ghanaian economy. But as a gateway and fiscal choke-point that both enabled and disrupted the ingoing and outgoing flows, it was in line with the state’s intention to exercise its post-colonial sovereignty. Threats from the outside would be contained and the movement of goods and people would be controlled and governed. In fact, this situation did not present a major issue in the early 1960s when production was mainly a national affair based on a concentric industrial model. Cross-border integration in terms of production and circulation was ‘shallow’ (Dicken 2011: 7) and the economy was considered to be organized around territories, areas, and regions.

The situation changed with the rise of supply chain capitalism and its demand for accelerated flows between distant and yet infrastructurally linked places. Logistics served to mobilize uneven geographic positions by connecting them through chains. However, mobilizing these diverse positionalities involves arduous work (see Tsing 2009). Tema Port is instructive in this case. In exchange for a loan of USD 50.5 million, in 1998 the World Bank demanded structural reforms of the port and most importantly required increased private sector participation and the conversion of the public port authority into a landlord port authority (World Bank 1998: 7; Chalfin 2010).

Traditionally, ports were organized around the model of a service port, run by a government, a large company, or imperial powers. The landlord port model, in contrast, entails the concession of a profitable container, break bulk, or oil terminal to a private operator for time periods of up to 50 years. In this terminal, the private firm brings in the
superstructures such as cranes, workforce, and organizational culture, whereas the public port authority remains the owner of the immobile assets and infrastructures such as the land, quays, and fenders. With the emergence of global terminal networks, an administrative and spatial fragmentation of formerly state-run public monopoly ports was triggered.

As the case of Tema shows, the public port authority lacked the funds to modernize the outdated container terminal on its own. The World Bank, however, demanded the implementation of the landlord structure in exchange for a loan. Therefore, in order to remain an active, rather than only supervisory, actor in the port environment, the Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority proposed the formation of the parastatal joint venture Meridian Port Services (see Chalfin 2010), involving APM Terminals and Bolloré Africa Logistics (a company that nowadays dominates port operations in the region). This joint venture had the funds, experience, and strong political backing to completely overhaul the outdated facilities. Together, Meridian Port Services refurbished the terminal as a visibly reoriented, delimited corporate zone with modern superstructures that connected the port anew to the circuits of world shipping rather than to the urban setting of the surrounding city.

Further west, in Freetown, Sierra Leone’s only deep-water port, a similar development was spurred. Although the port authority used Tema as a blueprint for their organizational transformation, it had to give up its position as an active cargo handling entity due to the devastating economic situation in the port and concessioned all container operations to Bolloré Africa Logistics. In the months following the concession, the port community in Freetown experienced significantly reduced turnaround times of vessels and a boost in container movements per hour. Four years later, during a visit to the port, the harbour master of the public port authority pointed his finger at the concessioned terminal and explained in an almost topological twist: ‘You see over there, this is now where Europe begins’ (interview with harbour master, Freetown, 2014). With this comment, he provided an interpretation of the landlord port structure that goes beyond the discussion of ‘terminalisation’ in port geography and beyond (see Olivier and Slack 2006).

The organizational endeavour to terminalize the port has repercussions that go far beyond an economistic take on port geography. In the cases of Tema and Freetown, the port’s spatial reorganization into a node of global shipping transformed the ports from gateways to national territories into distributed ‘technological zones’ with ambiguous sovereignties. Following Andrew Barry (2006: 239ff.), technological zones are neither territorially bounded nor outright global, and yet they are of global significance. Technological zones gather and assemble different elements, such as common standards and security protocols as well as technical practices, into a specific set of relations. State borders can, for example, be seen as a series of interconnected technological zones that simultaneously extend beyond and into the national territories they used to simply demarcate. If seaports are considered to be important sites of the sovereign post-colonial state, then they are currently the prime movers of a transregional order that connects and entangles the Global South and Global North. The modern technological zone is thus not situated solely outside of a national territory where laws or taxation of one territory are exempted. Within ‘global territories’, the infrastructurally stabilized zone allows port developments to be undertaken by state, parastatal, extra-state, and private operators, that resemble in many ways the construction of specific sites beyond a territory.

**Contained borders**

Although technological zones extend beyond national territories, they remain attached to the state apparatus (Chalfin 2015: 104). Hence, entities such as customs and border police remain proto-sovereign bodies mandated to interrupt illegitimate border crossings or unauthorized
access into the circuits of international commerce. This is a delicate project as establishing and verifying consignments represent a laborious task that disturbs the rhythm, pace, and velocity of supply. In short, control might itself become a threat to the logic of flow and geographic arbitrage. The conflicting logics between control and circulation have generated a productive tension in the era of supply chain capitalism (also Cowen and Smith 2009). Bodies such as the World Customs Organization have put emphasis on reshuffling the representation and materiality of borders from fixed sites of disruption to a productive threshold that turns movement into value. This has led to the emergence of new borderlands. A container that transports boxes of fresh produce from a factory field in rural Ghana will be loaded in a secured, verified area and sealed afterwards under the supervision of a customs agent. Miles away from a physical state border, this place can be a distribution centre, an export-processing zone, or an inland terminal. It is at the precise moment when the container is closed and its door is sealed that the box legally passes into the jurisdictional space of its point of destination. This makes the container a critical boundary object. Insofar as the container no longer belongs to the customs territory of its origin, it can be topologically understood as a contained, yet connected, place of its ship-to location within the now foreign territory of its origin. This spatial simultaneity is further complicated by the different mobilities at stake. While the shipping container is fundamentally a mobile object, territory is still ideologically and materially constituted as state space grounded in soil.

The sealed container, mobilized through the infrastructural logic of supply chain capitalism, thus links national territories to global territories and together both spaces evolve into globally dissected borderlands. Within borderlands, it becomes obvious how containers – the containerized cargo circulation – contradict and question the idealized modern container space of the territorial nation-state. In contemporary trade, fences and gates at the border are seen as obstacles to trade as well as national development. Hence, to deal with this contradictory object that is moved, forwarded, carried onto ships, reloaded onto feeder vessels, and finally discharged to be transported to its place of destination, the practice of bordering work is becoming increasingly mobile and dynamic (Walters 2008: 12).

A container becomes an object of concern when its shielded walls could contain unwanted intruders. If a container seal is believed to be tampered with, if the weight on the bill of lading and the weight on the weighing scale differ, or if a truck’s GPS signal reveals that the consignment made an unscheduled detour, the secured border is called into question. Traditionally, this doubt would bring customs agents again on the scene to open and unload the full container in order to inspect its contents. But as a customs officer in Freetown explained, ‘physical examination is challenging, it is labour intensive, especially the unstuffing. If you start midday, you will be working there until the next day’ (interview with customs officer, Freetown, 2014). Referring to this procedure of physical examination, a French executive from a private operator in Freetown irritably said, ‘come here on Friday afternoon for the examination, it will be like a bazar’ (interview with deputy general manager, Freetown, 2014). In this description, the customs examination is compared to ‘le Marché aux Puces de Saint-Ouen’, Europe’s largest flea market, and featured as a social event during which petty crimes occur and goods from containers disappear amid the state’s supervised examination.

In order to bypass such cumbersome, time-consuming, and loss-intensive processes, container scanners have been deployed on most port terminals. Instead of the physical examination by a person, now a scanner operating with gamma rays or x-rays provides a visual representation of the container load’s densities on a control screen, which is checked by an image analyst for possible deviations or other irregularities. Scanner and control screens also provide a preliminary technopolitical termination of the tense relation between control and circulation. If nothing
seems conspicuous (or if the analyst is bribed), the cargo is good to go. In so doing, the scanning apparatus stabilizes the fragile immutability of contained borders and mobile territories.

**Distributed places**

While the screen of a container scanner reveals the contents of individual containers, another tool of legibility has been developed to track the trajectory of the entire flow. Logistics companies increasingly face the demand to provide means for the acceleration and securitization of the disseminated flow. The drive for increasing revenues has thus led to the creation of a new space technology of visibility: the dashboard.

If a shipping container would have a fixed schedule, a fixed route, and a fixed load, its move could be orchestrated and monitored as part of a fixed arrangement. Since contemporary procurement rejects such constraining arrangements, a new mode of tracking and monitoring flows has emerged. This recent mode of ‘infrastructural’ or ‘circulatory’ control (Luque-Ayala and Marvin 2016) is taking shape as a heterogeneous assemblage of various data. It not only allows for flexibly tracking single consignments across the different stages of transportation, it also allows for identifying and (if necessary) bypassing the critical frictional nodes that might slow down circulation at a particular point. By collecting geo-referenced data, supply chain visibility programmes create a space of temporary logistical integration that can be monitored from a central hub; this is often devised through a ‘global supply chain control tower’ comprised of consultancy firms specialized in supply chain management.

In this context, the whole supply chain, including containers and the sites of transit, are temporarily integrated into a control tower’s dashboard. The dashboard itself is connected to, and at the same time makes visible, the hidden backstage while its control room remains spatially isolated and operates from a bird’s-eye view. This backstage is the conflictive space that might include strikes, quotidian traffic congestion, border controls, transnational crime, bad weather, political tensions, or, as in the case of West Africa, the outbreak of the Ebola haemorrhagic fever in March 2014. In the latter case, the British Standards Institution, through its website, provided current geo-referenced incident updates concerning both local and global supply disruptions, primarily caused through precautionary security measures in ports around the globe (BSI 2014). By bringing the complex backstage infrastructures of global trade to the surface, dashboard solutions reveal the possible interferences and threats to individual consignments. In so doing, industry leaders that provide the tools for managing entire supply chains are now advertising dashboard solutions as a strategic way to turn potential disruptions into advantages. Those who gain precise end-to-end visibility can react more quickly to individual disruptions to flow.

By now it is convention to conceptualize place not in terms of boundedness, but in terms of an intersection of myriad flows and strands (Massey 2005). But what if we turn this heuristic of following the constitution of a place through flows upside down? Then the control tower exists and extends across manifold spaces and produces a temporary distributed place (Cidell 2015) that stretches across regions and networks as well as territories and zones. This lies on the surface of the tower’s dashboard, where information about port zones, customs controls, and many more parameters are bundled into a new space of interaction. Taken alone, the diverse sites exist in different spatial registers – be it the mobile but contained container territory, or the disconnected but transnationally linked port zone. However, by tracking the movements and connecting the different sites along a circuit, the control tower creates a temporary space of connectivity that exists across many other places, areas, and territories. This is yet another articulation of temporary global territories produced through infrastructural means.
Conclusion

Transcending the linchpins of traditional conceptions of ‘the economy’ in and beyond area studies, the global territories of supply chain capitalism enact new configurations of sovereignty, technology, and space. Traditional understandings of the interior and exterior makeup of territories are no longer valid categories for the contemporary modes of governing space, with containers becoming temporarily mobile but contained territories. The case of concessioned ports shows how state governments are increasingly fractured, variegated, and mixed up with parastatal and private involvement. Here, new sovereignties and selectively territorialized forms of ‘extrastatecraft’ (Easterling 2014: 27) evolve as fragmented sites of global economic space. Infrastructure and logistics delegate questions of proximity and distance to the technopolitical production of (dis)connectivity and in this way are becoming the primary means of binding, ordering, and placing these sites within uneven global territories. As ever more complex supply networks via land, air, and most importantly sea routes become manageable, the local materializations of global territory result in fast-changing topologies. Port zones, contained borders, and distributed places are therefore nothing but transient spatial manifestations of an already fading moment in the ongoing transformation of supply chain capitalism.

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Introduction: the changing nature of the global food system

The global food system has been undergoing tremendous changes since the beginning of the twentieth century. With the production, distribution, and consumption of food being today globally integrated, these processes connect diverse and remote localities with global markets. The growing complexity of the global food chain, the increasing volatility of food prices, and the serious aberrations of overproduction and overconsumption of food products in the Global North vis-à-vis malnourishment and hunger in the Global South are only some characteristics of these wide-ranging changes and their impacts. Transnational corporations (TNCs) are the central architects of the contemporary shape of the global food system. From the production and trade in food and agricultural items to the level of processing and manufacturing and subsequently retailing and providing these items, business dominates the provision of food. Although international governing efforts provide some degree of regulation with regard to the activities of agrifood corporations, through various practices and mechanisms these corporations themselves play through various practices and mechanisms, a central role in the establishment of the rules that are supposed to monitor and control them (Clapp and Fuchs 2009).

Transnational corporate practices that were previously limited to a large extent to supply chains now reach deep into other domains, such as political decision-making structures and financial markets. The practices of shifting, outsourcing, scaling, intensifying, or accelerating the production, distribution, and consumption of food are at the same time practices of ordering, thereby producing specific overlapping spaces and dissolving existing boundaries. Here, space is understood as the ‘sphere[s] of the continuous production and reconfiguration of heterogeneity in all its forms – diversity, subordination, conflicting interests [which ultimately invokes] a relational politics for a relational space’ (Massey 2005: 61). Since heterogeneity can be understood as one end of a continuum with homogeneity as the opposite end, we suggest ‘plurality’ as the more general concept to describe what is being produced and reconfigured within spaces. At its core, space is here emphasized in its socially constructed nature; being reconstituted through social, economic, and political practice and behaviour (Clark and Jones 2013: 307).

Arguably, many developments and effects related to the power of TNCs are threatening the plural character of spaces in the food system. Such pluralism, be it biodiversity (the ecological synergism of multiple species’ interactions) or the sustainability of smallholder subsistence and
farming communities, is paramount to food security, food sovereignty, and the quality of life of people everywhere. Pluralism safeguards the reproductive forces of nature against the subordination to one, or only a few, dominant values or principles. While economic rationalities generally set out to homogenize processes to reduce transaction costs and thereby generate a more efficient food system, the ‘true social and environmental costs are occluded by the very globalized and generic nature of the industrial food system’ (Marsden, Murdoch and Morgan 1999: 298). A critical perspective suggests that the loss of plural forms and the transformation of former sociopolitical spaces are blurred – and sometimes overwritten – by corporate rationalities, while the results are masked by management logics and technological optimism, often ‘sustain[ing] the unsustainable’ (ibid.). The activities and operations of TNCs, therefore, can be seen as contributing to the (re-)making of spaces (and by extension regions) in both scope and character in the global agrifood system.

This chapter starts out by taking a closer look at the relevance of TNCs within, and their impact on, the agrifood system and related governance efforts. Building on this, it conceptualizes how companies shape and influence the global food system with a short overview of different dimensions of business power. Following this section, the chapter describes restructurings of spatial orders in the food system by examining the complex of financialization and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations as two of the most paradigmatic examples of emerging patterns relating to business power. The chapter concludes with an assessment of how the power of TNCs is restructuring spatial orders in the global food system.

**The power of transnational corporations in the food system**

The current state of the agro-industrial food system and how it came into being cannot be understood without looking historically at the impact that transnational corporations have had on the system. The most fundamental changes in global food production originate in the late 1940s, when new production practices and technologies (i.e. the replacement of rural labour through machinery, the use of chemical fertilizers, monocultures, and, more recently, biotechnologies, etc.), together with large subsidies in Europe as well as food aid policies in the United States (US), directed farmers to produce the maximum possible amount of food, resulting in a regime of excess food. TNCs started to supply the food system upstream with machinery, fertilizers, seeds, and other goods while downstream processing and manufacturing most of the foodstuffs that are used for human consumption.

Today’s largest global agrifood companies each have annual sales revenues greater than the GDP of many countries and the market share in important global supply chains is distributed among a very small number of companies. Three to seven global companies usually control market shares of 50–90 per cent in many segments. To give just two examples of the oligopolistic structure of the food system, the global trade in grain and oilseeds (mainly corn, wheat, and soy) is controlled (around 70 per cent of market shares) by just four trading firms (Archer Daniels Midlands, Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus); concentration in the meat industry is national and regional rather than global, with four firms in the US (Tyson Foods, Cargill, Swift & Company, and National Beef Packing Company) making up 85 per cent of the market in beef processing (Clapp 2016: 105–7). Such companies are vertically integrated up and down commodity chains, engaging in a host of other activities such as futures trade in commodities, financial services, risk management, etc. (ibid.).

And yet, the enormous impact of the growing economic power of big TNCs can only be understood when considering how classical hierarchical forms of state regulation have been driven back in the global agrifood system. The political and institutional capacity of the state to
use certain steering instruments is increasingly being undermined by private business actors as well as an international knowledge elite, which not only influence public regulation but also design and implement rules themselves (Kalfagianni and Fuchs 2015: 135). Private governance – that is to say rules and institutions developed by private actors to structure and direct conduct in specific policy arenas through different mechanisms, such as corporate social responsibility reporting, codes of conduct and private standards, and certification schemes – has rapidly spread throughout the global food system, from inputs to production to sale.

TNCs have thus found different ways to translate their economic dominance into political clout to stabilize or even expand their sphere of influence. A key aspect when looking at the various channels of corporate influence is that companies project ‘power without borders’, that is to say the ability to achieve their own goals while simultaneously circumventing, avoiding, diverting, rewording, rewriting, annulling, or otherwise rendering ineffective the governance efforts implemented to regulate and limit corporate conduct. These political and economic entanglements are not just phenomena in themselves, they also implicitly restructure spatial orders through the (re)direction of flows, the creation of relationships between actors along (and beyond) specific value chains, and the emergence of new global patterns of political and economic activity. In this sense, the ‘power without borders’ of TNCs and the consequences must not be understood solely as taking negative forms – restricting, prohibiting, or negating certain practices – but, on the contrary, as being emergent and productive, bringing forth new interactions and constellations. Only then are we able to adequately describe and capture the power of transnational corporations in the global food system in its entirety.

To study how economic power – such as market share, turnover, or resources in terms of money and workforce – of transnational companies can be transformed into political power, we differentiate between various dimensions of business power. These differ according to the sources of power from which they draw as well as the channels through which power is exercised (Fuchs 2013: 77). Existing conceptual approaches within the research on power can generally be divided according to the differentiations they make. Some differentiate between actor-specific and structural sources and forms of power, and others between material and ideational sources and forms (Fuchs and Glaab 2011; Fuchs 2013).

Actor-centred approaches tend to assess power in terms of directed influence from one actor upon another, that is to say the instrumental ability of the actor exercising power. Accordingly, such approaches are often called instrumental approaches. Actor-specific approaches might focus on material dimensions of power, insofar as they explore the role of financial capital in politics (e.g. lobbying or campaign finance), that is material sources that are deployed to influence decisions (particularly of formal political decision-makers) through specific channels. Actor-specific power can be described as being ideational (or discursive) if the legitimacy of an actor’s communication results from trust placed in this actor specifically due to certain characteristics (most likely in the case of persons), rather than due to the actor’s role or place in a system.

In contrast to that, structural approaches place greater emphasis on factors of influence that are preceding individual choice and action and are thus able to limit or facilitate decisions. Structural perspectives focusing on material sources of power analyse financial and organizational structures that shape actors’ choice sets and delimit the political and economic scope of action. For example, they focus on the position of corporate players within politico-economic processes that supersede national legal frameworks and/or foster the dependence of politicians on private-sector profitability (e.g. investment and jobs). Ideational-structural factors describe discursive and normative conditions that prevent or enable the use of specific power resources (Fuchs 2013: 80). Actors refer to and are referenced — and enabled and constrained — by common or expert bodies of knowledge, social values, different identities, etc. in efforts to influence
directly or indirectly decision-making processes. This is illustrated, for instance, by the rise in political legitimacy that market actors have been able to draw on and foster against the era of neo-liberalism.

None of these sources of power and their corresponding strategies occur empirically in pure forms. The dimensions interact continuously and are mutually supportive of one another, a fact that renders a detailed study of the power of TNCs all the more complex. And yet, a theory-based analysis must, nonetheless, try to map the different dimensions according to the varying uses of resources and frames of reference to get a grip on the means and ends of global business conduct as well as to address the challenges associated with it.

**Restructurings of spatial orders in the food system**

Jessop, Brenner, and Jones suggest that sociospatial theory is most powerful when it '(a) refers to historically specific geographies of social relations; and (b) explores contextual and historical variation in the structural coupling, strategic coordination, and forms of interconnection among the different dimensions of the latter' (2008: 392). To discuss and track how the plurality within spaces is changing, the authors conceptualize different principles of sociospatial structuration: (1) bordering, bounding, parcelization, and enclosure (as principles of territory); (2) proximity, spatial embedding, and areal differentiation (as principles of place); (3) hierarchization and vertical differentiation (as principles of scale); and (4) interconnectivity, interdependence, and transversal or ‘rhizomatic’ differentiation (as principles of networks/reticulation).

Applying these different principles to the power of TNCs allows for their specific practices and the associated sociospatial effects to be analysed while, at the same time, demonstrating the difficulties in adequately limiting corporate conduct. Corporate power can have a territorializing effect (e.g. enclosing global commons), but it transcends the bounding to territory. Corporate power can have a differentiating effect according to place (e.g. fixating or moving local industries), but it transcends such spatial embedding. Corporate power can have a vertical differentiating effect (e.g. creating and transforming specific supply chains), but it transcends such hierarchization. Lastly, corporate power can create networks and expand interconnectivity (e.g. the proliferation of network governance and the appreciation of business actors), but it transcends such connections in terms of interdependencies since corporate actors can often withdraw from networks without consequences.

Research that connects these aspects of sociospatial theorizing with the conduct of TNCs is scarce but, nevertheless, it is important work to be done to get a more thorough grip on how the food system is being transformed through different corporate activities. In the following, two examples are given to illustrate recently emerging power structures in the global food system and the spatial restructurings they are producing: the financialization of the food system and the emergence of new trade agreements.

**Financialization of the food system**

The global food crisis in 2008 broke with the idea that food prices would continually get cheaper and would benefit the poor. Hand in hand, the global financial crisis of the same year signalled that trading in food commodity futures can potentially have severe ramifications on the global food supply. The combination of both crises dissolved assumptions taken for granted about the cost and secure supply of food. These developments are not mere crisis phenomena that constitute an exceptional case, but are instead connected to the complex and multifaceted role of financialization, understood as the ‘increasing role of financial motives, financial
markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies’ (Epstein and Jayadev 2005: 3) in the agrifood system today. Internationally, the market has increasingly come to dominate questions of food availability through the commodification of food and thus the production of tradable objects, which benefits those with money while ignoring debates on the right to food (Fuchs, Meyer-Eppler and Hamenstädt 2013). In this respect, the financial system is not just an intermediary and allocation system to determine prices based on the ‘objective’ forces of supply and demand, but rather (re)produces its own distortions and power asymmetries.

A decisive aspect of financialization is connected to the changes in corporate strategies to influence food markets and the expansion of businesses’ profit sources (ibid.). Agricultural commodity markets have become dominated by speculators and investors instead of actors directly involved with such commodities (Clapp 2016). Although numerous factors have been identified, such as rising global demand for agricultural products, agricultural export restrictions, and rising energy prices (Ghosh 2010) that added to the unfolding of the food crisis, the role played by speculation and the search for profit in affecting food prices is seen as having been an important catalyst (Clapp and Helleiner 2012). Food retailers have increasingly focused on financial assets rather than on tangible assets in order to improve financial stability and to increase the share of profit distributed to shareholders (Fuchs, Meyer-Eppler and Hamenstädt 2013). Since domestic markets are highly competitive and saturated, they have internationalized by expanding to foreign markets and by shifting activities toward the financial realm. Simultaneously influencing the public discourse on food-related matters – such as lifestyles, tastes, values, identities, etc. – food retailers have further enhanced their power vis-à-vis both consumers and suppliers.

Politically, agricultural commodity exchange markets have been substantially deregulated while, at the same time, traditional regulations have been circumvented by frequently granted exemptions (Clapp and Helleiner 2012). Agrifood lobbies are strongly present at all levels of governance, from the national arena to the United Nations and European Union (EU) and their sub-organizations. They lobby on specific issues, such as food aid and the regulation of genetically modified organisms, as well as on broader topics, such as trade in agricultural commodity futures. Moreover, futures and derivatives trading has become so complex and virtual that policy-makers increasingly rely on business actors that represent themselves as experts in the field, often sharing the same world view and economic beliefs (self-regulating markets, growth imperative, etc.), which makes political institutions highly susceptible to direct political influence (Tsingou 2006).

The focus on power structures helps to identify the various strategies of influence at work – agenda-setting, rule-setting, lobbying, and altering expert and public discourses – while considering these developments according to sociospatial categories makes the question more receptive to what is being restructured and how and where this restructuring is unfolding. In the case of financialization, it becomes obvious that questions of the right to food and of securing and stabilizing food supply in different regions are overwritten by the demands of globalized financial market forces. These forces further the erosion of the notion of food as a global common good and fundamentally affect local and regional food provision, production, and supply chains.

**Trade agreements**

Similar characteristics can be observed within the politics of trade and their wide-ranging impacts on the agrifood system. The proposed TTIP between the EU and the US is described by its proponents as the biggest free trade deal in history, with goods and services worth USD
2.7 billion traded bilaterally each day (HLWG 2013). Apart from the removal of tariffs and customs, the proposed policy options in seeking out mutually beneficial investment opportunities comprise improved regulatory coherence as well as improved cooperation in respect to setting international standards. Critics argue that this search for economic growth will not only increase corporate interests within transatlantic trade relations but also protect them against governments trying to effectively govern public goods (Trew 2013).

Public discourse in most European states have focused on the threat TTIP poses to European Food Standards, that is to say the suspected harm of US products for the European public and the environment. As the debate has evolved, the topics of the institutionalization of arbitration and the investor-to-state settlement (ISDS) within TTIP developed momentum. The ISDS is seen as operating in the interests of private companies that seek assurances of their presumed profits against the democratically legitimate, legal policy of nation-states. This runs counter to the widely held belief that public interests should not be restricted by non-state authorities.

It has regularly been reported that the negotiations themselves are a closed shop. Privileged access is given to approximately 600 official consultants and big business representatives, mostly from business lobbies such as BusinessEurope, the Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), or the Transatlantic Policy Network. In 2012 and early 2013, meetings and consultations of the European Commission were lobbied by 298 ‘stakeholders’, 269 of which were representatives of the business sector, with lobbyists from agribusiness being the largest group by far (CEO 2014). Business groups have actively been encouraged to get involved in the negotiations, while trade unionists and public interest groups have been kept out of the loop.

Apart from various instrumental strategies of influence, such as lobbying, the increase in rule-setting power can be observed when taking a closer look at the EU’s position on regulatory initiatives. The European Commission plans to inform stakeholders about regulatory initiatives through an ‘early warning system’ that would enable them to consider proposed measures well in advance before legislative drafts, thereby providing them with even more ‘privileged access’. Furthermore, there have been talks of establishing a Regulatory Cooperation Body (RCB), which would be compelled to give ‘careful consideration’ to proposals of interest groups.

As in the case of financialization, we see with regard to trade agreements that the plurality of spaces in the food system is increasingly threatened by corporate influence. Current developments foster homogenization, rather than heterogeneity, through investor-driven interest in the harmonization of standards and the entanglement of political interests with corporate interests.

Conclusion

Returning to the definition of ‘space’ as producing and reconfiguring plurality in all its forms, we see that this plurality is actively being threatened by different developments in the food system. At the heart of both financialization and the spread of free trade agreements (FTAs) as forces increasingly directing and structuring governance within the food system, we identify the economization of sociopolitical spaces of formerly non-economic spheres and practices as a crucial development that requires further scrutiny. In this regard, economization can be understood as a ‘process of remaking the knowledge, form, content and conduct appropriate to these spheres and practices’ (Brown 2015: 31). The financialization of the food system marks a fundamental shift from the productive and entrepreneurial nature of capital within food production and consumption toward the increasing dominance of financial and investment capital logistics. Strategies of ‘risk management, capital enhancement, leveraging, speculation, and practices designed to attract investors and enhance credit ratings and portfolio value’ (ibid.: 34) severely threaten the plurality of spaces in the food system, making nature and human communities less
resilient in the process, even rendering traditional capitalist economic forms such as market exchange and commodification less important. FTAs (such as the TTIP) spread these logics across regions, across industry sectors, and among individual actors in the food system. Here as well, sociospatial restructurings are not just geographic flows of information and standards, but are also recodings of sociopolitical sites in the food system with economic rationalities for ‘hedging in’ the ability of the public to autonomously decide upon possible trajectories toward a future food system. The execution of business power in its various – and combined – forms and channels is a central driver to this end and thus deserves special attention.

The recoding of spaces in the food system, however, cannot be seen as following a unidirectional process; in reality, it is accompanied by the emergence of new subjects, new conducts, and new relations. Various social networks do not only, to cite a frequently used idiom, ‘think globally and act locally’, but increasingly try to produce and develop global forms of action when they voice demands for equity, social justice, and autonomy from below, thus creating spaces of (and for) resistance, in great part, but not exclusively, against TNC efforts to restructure the food system. Such practices of power, meaning the transformation of spaces and resistance to it, acquire their own distinctive geographies, linking local actors to non-local actors and establishing the terms upon which these actors interact with and relate to one another in the global food system.

For these reasons, it is necessary to trace through historically specific contextual case studies the corporate conduct in various spaces and its effects on the food system. An analysis of different power dimensions is one distinct approach to access and make visible these difficult and complex interconnections.

Note
1 Since late 2016, with the beginning of the Trump presidency, negotiations have been halted, but are expected to resume in the coming years. In any case, the developments up to the year 2016 are already indicative of the multi-dimensional nature of corporate power in the field of international trade.

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CONTESTED EXTRACTIVISM
Actors and strategies in conflicts over mining

Kristina Dietz and Bettina Engels

Introduction
In the period 2000–12, high prices on the world market and increasing demand for raw materials, accompanied by insecurity on the financial markets, led to a worldwide resource boom. This boom was notably reflected in the mining sector. Increasing investment and production resulted in a historically unique level of growth in this sector (ICMM 2014: 10). Most investments went to states in the Global South. Pressured by the neo-liberal structural adjustments endorsed by the international financial institutions, many national governments supported the mining sector through legal reforms and policies of liberalization and privatization. National reforms, in combination with increasing investments, resulted in many states expanding the mining sector into territories that up until then were assumed to be ‘unproductive’ (Svampa 2012: 14). This expansion is linked to comprehensive sociospatial transformation processes. The existing land uses, land regimes, and property relations of lands are changing; access to water and land are transforming; new material infrastructures, such as paved roads and harbours, are being built; socioeconomic expectations are being created; and social relations, such as labour, gender, and class relations, and political power relations are being restructured (Peluso and Lund 2011: 668). Since the 2000s, the expansion of the mining sector has triggered diverse social conflicts involving an increasing number of different state, non-state, and private sector actors.

Up until today, numerous studies have investigated single cases of conflicts over mining in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. However, hardly any attempts have been undertaken to systematize contemporary conflicts over mining and to gain insight across nation-states on how the global resource boom has led to local conflicts. To this end, this chapter addresses the questions of which actor constellations, conflict issues, and repertoires of contention can be identified in current conflicts over mining and how variation between cases can be explained. Based on existing case studies and our own research in Colombia (Dietz 2016) and Burkina Faso (Engels 2017), we examine the issues at stake in conflicts over large-scale mining, the strategies applied by local actors, and the factors influencing their actions. We draw conclusions both from a perspective of transregional studies and from a framework of emancipatory action in conflicts over mining. All over the world, the current ‘mining boom’ has led to conflicts structured by unequal power relations between the actors involved. While actors, issues, and strategies regarding these conflicts vary, the transregional perspective demonstrates
that they do so less between world regions and more between nation-states as well as local contexts within the states. At the same time, mining conflicts lead to protests and alliance-building across local, national, and international levels, with transregional dimensions of exchange and mobilization potentially playing an important role for the success of these movements (see Chapter 30 by Reiher).

**Issues at stake and actors involved in conflicts over mining**

Based on research in Peru, Javier Arellano-Yanguas (2012) identifies three reasons for conflict: (1) the (expected) negative impacts on local livelihoods (loss of settlements, agricultural land and pasture, and territorial autonomy rights); (2) the claims for compensation, employment guarantees, and funding of local development projects by the mining companies; and (3) the ways in which state rents are distributed and used. Conflicts can occur at different levels of administration and government within a state – local versus central government – or between social sectors on one level (Arellano-Yanguas 2012). Furthermore, rights of democratic participation in decision-making over land use and resource policies as well as working conditions are contested. There is a wide range of strategies and repertoires of contention, including lobbying and public relations, referenda and petitions, demonstrations and strikes, as well as confrontational tactics such as blockades and sabotage. Issues and strategies vary depending on political context conditions, power positions, previous land use, and actor constellations. These factors are not independent but mutually influence one another. They are neither historically nor spatially determined, but contingent.

In the 2000s, mining conflicts were primarily characterized by labour struggles and conflicts between trade unions, on the one hand, and governments and mining companies, on the other (Bebbington et al. 2008: 901ff.). The current expansion of industrial mining – for example, into indigenous territories and areas with small-scale agriculture and livestock farming – has resulted in both a shift and an expansion of actor constellations in conflicts over mining. Moreover, the range of subjects has widened with conflicts over working conditions and the development of new mining areas. Linked to these conflicts over mining are conflicts over territorial control and access to water and land, which affect local livelihoods, gender relations and ecosystems, as well as conflicts over government regulations concerning the conditions for mining activities and the distribution of profit and tax revenues (cf. Bebbington 2012; Bebbington and Bury 2013). Conflicts over the expansion of industrial mining occur when local actors perceive mining as a threat to their livelihoods – for example, farming or artisanal mining – and to their territorial, cultural, or political rights (Rasch 2012). A wide range of actors from different political factions and social groups are involved in these conflicts: companies, state actors, local governments, ethnic and peasant organizations and movements, artisanal miners, national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and agro-industrial actors, whose farming activities are likewise concurrent with mining. This range of actors have varying opportunities and means at their disposal to voice their demands and interests, which depend on their positions in a social field structured by power relations.

The conflict constellations depend on previous forms of land use, property relations, and land right regimes in the respective mining areas. Large-scale mining does not expand into ‘unused’ land or ‘empty spaces’. In contrast, the various existing forms of land use – agriculture and forestry, agro-industrial production, herding, settlements, artisanal mining, and many other purposes – and the cultural, spiritual, and social meanings and relations linked to them, structure the conflicts that can occur when a company is granted a concession to explore or extract resources. Furthermore, conflict constellations are influenced by the historical meaning of artisanal and/or industrial mining in a specific sociospatial context.
Contested extractivism

Beyond the opposition between capital and labour, contestation between artisanal and industrial mining represents a major line of conflict connected to the expansion of industrial mining in many contexts worldwide (Bush 2009; Vélez-Torres 2014). Industrial mining comprises formalized mining projects by companies that, in addition to a high input of capital and technology, formally employ a large number of people. Semi-industrial or small-scale mining comprises small mines that are equipped with permanent, yet minimal, conveyor technology, the production of which does not exceed a fixed amount laid down in the respective mining laws. Artisanal mining is poor in terms of capital and technology, is largely informal, and is based on the employment of only a few people, often family members. Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) is frequently done without any formal (state) concession (Tubb 2015).

In many cases, mining companies apply for exploration concessions for areas where artisanal mining is taking place because its presence indicates potential resource deposits (Luning 2014). Artisanal mining thus sometimes involuntarily provides initial exploration for the companies free of charge. As ASM is mainly conducted informally, artisanal miners in many cases do not have access to compensation and consultation. Empirical studies have demonstrated that access to land for artisanal miners is restricted by state policies that favour large-scale industrial mining, by criminalization, and by unclear land tenure regulations (Carstens and Hilson 2009; de Theije et al. 2014). The lack of legal guarantees for artisanal miners and other land users often leads to forced relocation and insufficient compensation (Lange 2008). In many cases, this results in conflicts.

Case study: Colombia

Colombia is one of many countries in the Global South where considerable investment in the recent past has led to a historical rise in gold production in terms of volume and value as well as an unprecedented spatial expansion of mining into areas hitherto sparsely exposed to capital forces. Between 2002 and 2015, more than 9,000 mining titles were granted to private persons and national and transnational companies, covering a total area of more than five million hectares. Most of these titles were granted for gold mining. Although most of the gold extracted in Colombia still comes from small-scale mines that are not legally regulated, large-scale industrial mining is under way. Colombia thus presents an ideal case to study contestation within the current global resource boom between traditional ASM and the rapid expansion of its industrial counterpart.

In the Afro-Colombian community of La Toma, Suárez district in Cauca province in Colombia, conflicts over industrial and semi-industrial gold mining can be observed that present an example of artisanal versus industrial mining as a major line of conflict and of place as a source of cultural identity. The Afro-Colombian population of La Toma identifies itself as *agro-mineros*, whose livelihoods rely on small-scale farming combined with artisanal mining. According to the Colombian Constitution of 1991, and Law No. 70 of 1993 on the protection of black communities, La Toma is acknowledged as an Afro-Colombian community with the right of political representation; however, the community is not granted the right of territorial autonomy. In 2000, the Colombian national mining authority started to grant concessions for the exploration and extraction of subsoil resources to individuals and transnational companies in the area (Vélez-Torres 2014: 68). In 2008, the South African company AngloGold Ashanti was granted two concessions for exploration and extraction, encompassing large parts of La Toma’s territory.

In 2009, the mayor of the municipality of Suárez gave the order to evacuate the settlement to clear the way for AngloGold Ashanti’s extraction plans. The population resisted the evacuation and brought an action to the Colombian constitutional court against the national
government, arguing that it had granted extraction concessions in an Afro-Colombian territory without previous consultation and consent of the communities. According to Convention 169 (Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention) of the International Labour Organization (ILO), which Colombia ratified in 1991, mining concessions can only be granted in the territories of acknowledged indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities under the precondition of free, prior, and informed consent by the local population. The constitutional court, in its decision on 25 April 2011, suspended the concessions granted to AngloGold Ashanti in La Toma (ANM 2013; Vélez-Torres and Varela 2014).

**Case study: Burkina Faso**

Burkina Faso, which has one of the fastest-growing industrial mining sectors in sub-Saharan Africa, is another example of a conflict involving artisanal miners. Within the country, there is a broad range of well-organized social movements that respond to the expansion of industrial mining through various repertoires of contention at both the local and the national level (Engels 2015).

At the local level, conflicts take place specifically between artisanal miners and state and private security forces. The best-known example is the conflict over a concession area belonging to the Burkinabe company Société Minière Kindo Adama (SOMIKA) in the province of Yagha, lying in the north-east of the country on the border with Niger, which escalated at the end of October 2014. In 2006, the company was granted a mining concession in an area where artisanal mining was already taking place. Guarded by units of the national police, SOMIKA asserted its claim to the area and the gold reserves to be found there. Critics accuse the company as well as the state and private security forces of driving artisanal miners from land that did not fall within SOMIKA’s concession, of threatening and intimidating them, and of enforcing the exclusive purchase by SOMIKA of the gold mined by the artisans at prices far below the market value (ODJ 2014). On 30 October 2014, the protests against SOMIKA in Yagha escalated in a violent struggle with private security forces in which five young demonstrators were shot and killed.

The timing of this escalation was anything but random. On the same day, the national parliament voted to pass a constitutional amendment intended to allow the former president, Blaise Compaoré, to run for another term in office. Thousands of people demonstrated in the capital city Ouagadougou against the amendment. Observers considered the confrontation in Yagha to be mirroring national conflicts. From the perspective of the artisanal miners, SOMIKA’s owner, Adama Kindo, represented the powerful elite close to Compaoré that controlled both the economy and politics. Most of the protesters in Yagha were young and economically marginalized people trying to make a living in the informal sector, seeing no prospects for themselves in a state that had been controlled by the same powerful elite for decades. The conflict between them, on the one side, and SOMIKA and the state security forces, on the other, is a case in point for weakly represented social groups who do not have any effective institutional means at their disposal and, as a consequence, rely on unconventional and confrontational repertoires of contention such as unannounced demonstrations and riots.

**Strategies and repertoires of contention**

The strategies and repertoires of contention of local actors in mining conflicts encompass, among others, legal actions, petitions, demonstrations, strikes, occupations, and sabotage (Geenen and Claessens 2013; Anyidoho and Crawford 2014). Which repertoires are applied in
which conflict situations is far from arbitrary. Actors do not choose their strategies of action in a vacuum; they instead consider social, cultural, and political contexts. At the same time, not all actors are capable of relying on all strategies to the same degree. Which strategies and means are available to the actors depends on their position in the social field, which is structured by power relations (Dietz and Engels 2014: 82).

Many conflict contexts are characterized by the lack of participation and representation of local land users and local residents in the processes of granting concessions for exploration and exploitation. Typically there are neither institutional channels nor de facto ways to make diverse claims or interests, or these demands are neglected by the state and private actors. In consequence, actors who are weakly represented in existing institutions often rely on unconventional and confrontational strategies of protest, such as occupations, blockades, and riots (Wilson 2009; Engels 2015, 2017). These spontaneous and ‘uncontrolled’ demonstrations are limited in time and space, break with the institutional rules of political protest, and are sometimes accompanied by material damage.

A current example of a more or less spontaneous and ‘violent’ escalation of conflicts related to the expansion of industrial mining are protests by villagers in Burkina Faso against the True Gold Mining company’s Karma project, a planned gold mine near the town of Ouahigouya in the province of Yatenga in the north of the country. At the public hearings – a compulsory part of the impact assessment studies that must be carried out before the granting of extraction concessions – considerable reservations and demands were expressed by inhabitants of the local villages concerned with the possible effects on health, damage to the environment, the loss of land for cultivation and pastures, and the loss of places and animals of spiritual importance. Demands were voiced for the continuation of artisanal mining opportunities and for permanent employment opportunities for local workers in the mine to be established. Without addressing these concerns and demands, the licence for the mine was granted to the British mining company True Gold at the end of 2013 for an area of 85 square kilometres, which includes 28 villages where artisanal mining is central to local peoples’ livelihoods. From 14 to 16 January 2015, during the course of spontaneous demonstrations in which artisanal miners were key actors, extensive material damage was done to the mine, which was in the process of being built. True Gold stopped work on the mine on 15 January.

In addition to demonstrations, opponents of industrial mining also rely on conventional repertoires of protest by referring to rights granted by the respective national constitutions or communal laws. In several Latin American states, popular consultations (consultas populares or comunales) recently became important instruments in conflicts over mining; these consultations call for local people to vote in favour of or against mining projects in their communities. In a first attempt to systematize experiences with these consultations across states, Mariana Walter and Leire Urkidi identified 68 referenda conducted during the period 2002–2012 in five Latin American states, most of them in Guatemala (Walter and Urkidi 2015). In almost all of the cases analysed, new alliances between non-state actors and local state actors played a decisive role in the choice of strategy. Non-state actors included anti-mining movements, indigenous organizations, and small-scale peasants, and local state actors included local governments and communal parliaments. In all cases, the vast majority (80–100 per cent) of participants voted against industrial mining in their communities. Central governments and companies usually did not accept the referenda. They argued that conducting of these consultations is illegal and in contradiction to mining laws and national constitutions. Nevertheless, the consultations were effective in terms of political mobilization and as lobbying and publicity instruments. In many cases, the planned establishment of an industrial mine was stopped or the project was obliged to make alterations to its plans.
The popular consultation in the municipality of Piedras, Tolima province, in Colombia, that took place on 28 July 2013 is one case of the relatively successful use of non-confrontational repertoires of contention based on instruments of direct democracy (El Espectador, 28 July 2013). Piedras is located around 80 kilometres from the La Guala Mountain (municipality of Cajamarca). In 2007/8, AngloGold Ashanti was granted several concessions for exploration and the extraction of gold deposits in the mountain area. It was initially planned to transport the mining waste (the soil that remains after gold has been separated chemically and mechanically from the rocks) through a tunnel system to Piedras in order to store and dispose of it there. In contrast to Cajamarca, the territory of Piedras is flat and thus topographically suitable for such a system. Piedras is among Colombia’s most important rice farming municipalities. In January 2013, when villagers from Doima, one of the villages in Piedras, became aware of the first exploration works for the establishment of the pithead stocks, they blocked the only bridge that accessed the area. The blockade lasted several months and was essentially supported by landowning rice producers. While blockading, the protesters succeeded in persuading the mayor to conduct a consulta popular. They referred to Colombian municipal law, which foresees direct participation when mining projects essentially affect land use in the community concerned (Law 136, Article 33). In the consulta of 28 July 2013, 99.03 per cent of the participants voted against mining projects in their community, though neither the national government nor the mining companies have, until recently, recognized the consultation’s result. AngloGold Ashanti finally reacted in 2015 when the company came up with a new project design that no longer includes waste disposal in Piedras.

Conclusion

This chapter has investigated how the global resource boom is linked to conflict actions that play out on both local and national levels. While there is no linear causal relationship between resource boom and conflict, social conflicts over mining are increasing worldwide. The issues, strategies, and actor constellations of these conflicts vary depending on political contexts, previous land use, land rights regimes, and the historical relevance of the mining sector in the respective state or region. Nevertheless, the following key mechanisms can be identified across regions. Where mining has a long tradition and strong mining unions exist, labour relations and labour conflicts often play an important role. Where artisanal mining is traditionally central to local people’s livelihoods, conflicts occur between artisanal miners and the actors who are engaged in mining through capital and technology. Conflicts also emerge because alternative ways of securing livelihoods (e.g. in agriculture) and territorial or communal rights of participation are not guaranteed. Most importantly, this chapter has demonstrated that local conflicts over mining are embedded in global processes – the resource boom – while simultaneously being closely intertwined with national politics as well as the symbolic and material meaning of specific locations. Factors such as political programmes, institutions, laws, regulations, changes in government, and regimes are thus pivotal to local conflicts. A further characteristic is the particular meaning of specific places. These are shaped by the physical-material existence of resource deposits as well as by various cultural attributions. The meanings of places have become a key element in the demands and strategies of collective actors and often appear as important reference points in the protesters’ claims.

From a transregional studies perspective, it can be concluded that while mining conflicts differ with regard to the issues at stake, actor constellations, and repertoires of contentious action, differences do not exist so much between world regions, but first and foremost between nation-states and sometimes between local sites. For instance, whether a state has a tradition in
industrial mining (such as South Africa or Argentina) or in artisanal mining (such as Colombia, Senegal, Ghana, and Burkina Faso) matters more for how conflicts play out than in which world region they are located. This also applies to other relevant factors, such as mining laws and political regimes.

With regard to emancipatory action in conflicts over mining, the following conclusions can be drawn. These conclusions point to a further transregional dimension in regard to mining conflicts, namely the emerging transregional alliances and spaces for contestation against neo-liberal globalization they generate (see Chapter 30 by Reiher). Conflicts over mining are structured by unequal power relations between the actors involved. However, depending on the issue at stake, local movements and groups have the potential to at least temporarily shift existing power asymmetries by entering into alliances with politically influential and resource-strong actors. On the local level, this includes actors whose economic or political interests are similarly affected by a mine, such as land and shop owners, entrepreneurs, politicians, and political parties. Potential allies at the national level can be national NGOs, churches, trade unions, and opposition parties. On the international and transregional levels, local movements can gain support from think tanks, NGOs, and activist networks. As such alliances are equally shaped by power relations, relatively weak local actors run the risk of being instrumentalized by their allies for aims that are not necessarily in agreement with those of the local movements or that are even opposed to them. Nonetheless, being involved in broad networks is important for successful actions. Without such networks, multiscalar strategies, which are pivotal in conflicts over mining, can hardly be put into effect. Local groups clearly have more chances to effectively make their demands known vis-à-vis the state and mining companies when they strategically use the political opportunity structures across various levels. Thus working at various levels and engaging in transregional networks and alliances is of strategic relevance because such collaboration allows for the timely exchange of information concerning opportunities for protest. When they act strategically and in networks, even actors who by themselves have little political influence and few resources at their disposal can extend the spaces of democratic participation and challenge existing power relations.

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Kristina Dietz and Bettina Engels


TRANSREGIONAL PROTEST AGAINST PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS

Cornelia Reiher

Tokyo, Berlin, Lima, Seoul, Vancouver . . . during the last two decades, sometimes tens of thousands of protesters have rallied in the streets of these cities against transregional preferential trade agreements (PTAs) such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the European Union (EU) and the United States (US), or the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada. Some transregional PTAs have been in effect for more than two decades, while others are currently on hold or still under negotiation. In opposition to these PTAs, broad alliances of farmers, consumer rights activists, environmental organizations, labour unions, and opposition parties repeatedly reclaimed urban spaces and engaged in protests often organized by transregional networks.

Transregional protest campaigns represent a countermovement to neo-liberal globalization and an increasing concentration of power in the hands of multinational corporations (MNCs), who more and more define the conditions under which trade takes place. Protests against PTAs resist a type of ‘globalization produced by neoliberal ideas, policies and institutions’ (Peet 2009: 4) and are inseparably intertwined with a transregional economic integration brought about by PTAs. Therefore, in this chapter, I argue that the recognition of the transregional protest movement is crucial to understanding transregional PTAs. Such a recognition would bring back into the analysis the perspectives and agencies of those whose everyday lives are affected by PTAs, yet who are excluded from the negotiations: that is to say, the perspectives and agencies of the citizens of the states negotiating PTAs. By inspiring transregional protests, PTAs not only become important drivers for transregional economic integration, but also for a transregional integration of civil society. By taking a grass-roots and a transregional perspective on PTAs, I will stress the increasing inequalities between governments, civil society, and the private sector and analyse how innumerable people across continents mobilized against PTAs. In order to acknowledge the transregional character of PTAs, in addition to analysing PTAs and protests against PTAs in particular national contexts as well as their comparison, I will emphasize the entanglement and mobility of people, ideas, and resources across nation-states and regions.

This chapter introduces PTAs and protests against PTAs as transregional phenomena, with a focus on East Asia where a new generation of high-quality PTAs has emerged recently. In contrast to prior PTAs, these new treaties do not simply aim at lowering or abolishing tariffs and quotas, but also address a broad range of non-tariff barriers to trade. Accordingly, they inspire
protest with regard to diverse issues, from food, agriculture, and health care systems specifically to transparency and democracy in general. Drawing on the example of protests against the TPP – the most ambitious of these new PTAs, from the perspective of Japan – I will start out with an area studies approach to analyse how transregional integration through protest against PTAs arose.

**Preferential trade agreements**

PTAs emerged more than 50 years ago and since then have coexisted with the multilateral framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). To form a PTA, two or more countries decide to open up their domestic economy to a certain degree, which is defined by contract on a preferential basis (Kowalczyk and Riezman 2011). While it is the goal of the WTO ‘to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible’ (WTO 2014) among all of its member states through the norm of non-discrimination, the central feature of PTAs is the preferential market access that each member grants only to other member states. Although GATT and the WTO allow member states to form PTAs under the condition that trade barriers to all trade among its members are eliminated and that they do not increase protectionism against non-members, trade barriers within preferential arrangements are almost never completely eliminated and PTA members frequently raise trade barriers to products from non-members (Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003: 829, 831–3).

During the second half of the twentieth century, PTAs emerged in two major waves, the first occurring from the late 1950s through the 1970s, the second in the late 1990s (ibid.). The number of PTAs significantly increased after 2000, particularly in East Asia. Until the 1990s, PTAs were mainly concluded between countries located in the same geographical region. Whereas European and North American countries pursued transregional partnerships from the late 1990s onwards after they had solidified their regional trade agreements, East Asian countries only just started concluding PTAs in the early 1990s and thus, simultaneously pursued intraregional and transregional PTAs (Solís and Katada 2008: 4–6). The coverage of PTAs, initially confined to bilateral tariff concessions in merchandise trade, has been expanding since the 1990s, and even more significantly in recent years. They increasingly move beyond their WTO commitments in addressing ‘beyond-the-border’ issues that affect domestic regulation and standard-setting. With the EU and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) starting this development, PTAs now incorporate a multitude of issues that go beyond standards negotiated in multilateral trade rounds. They range from provisions for investment, competition, and government procurement to intellectual property rights and migration (Kowalczyk and Riezman 2011).

The main intention behind the establishment of PTAs is to provide a facilitation of trade and investment flows, and hence, to bring about stimulating effects on the economy. As multilateral trade rounds decelerated noticeably since the 1990s, WTO member states also subsequently decided to make use of regional arrangements to safeguard against possible failures of trade rounds as well as to push for trade liberalization at a faster and broader pace (Peet 2009). States form PTAs to ensure the greatest possible gains from the multilateral regime itself. A PTA can increase a state’s bargaining power in multilateral trade rounds as well as its market power. As more PTAs emerge, it is likely that those countries that do not belong to the same PTA will establish one in response (Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003).

PTAs’ impact on global welfare and regional integration is disputed. Underlying the assessments of economists regarding the global welfare implications of a PTA is the question of
Transregional protest against PTAs

whether it creates more trade among members than it diverts from efficient producers located outside the arrangement. However, PTAs affect the welfare of its members also by influencing foreign direct investment or the governance of international economic relations. While some argue that particularly those PTAs formed in the 1990s have promoted economic welfare (Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003: 833), the so-called multilateralists of the 1990s suggested that although regionalism might increase trade, its effects on welfare and on the world trade system are likely to be harmful. They assumed that PTAs would be diverting trade away from the most efficient global producers in favour of regional partners, which could reduce welfare and at the same time might hinder multilateralism through trade blocs that maintain high external trade barriers (Baldwin and Freund 2011: 121). Yet, many countries have simultaneously relied on both multilateralism and regionalism (Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003: 857) and only little evidence suggests that regionalism is bad for the multilateral trade system (Baldwin and Freund 2011: 137).

East Asian countries started to join the global bandwagon of proliferating bilateral trade agreements comparatively late (Baldwin 2011). By the late 1990s, East Asia began to experience an increase in regional cooperation against the backdrop of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the dissatisfaction with multilateral trade rounds, and the fear of trade diversion caused by the proliferation of the regional PTAs of European and North American countries (Solís and Katada 2008: 7). Especially since the early 2000s, many Asian governments have concluded PTAs to enhance their own competitiveness and to achieve better market access (Smeltzer 2009: 13). The numerous PTAs in East Asia overlap with multilateral and domestic regulatory governance, but also increasingly with transnational regulations, leading to a ‘noodle bowl’ of increasingly complex agreements in the region (Baldwin 2011). The Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement (KOREU) and the Korea-US Trade Agreement (KORUS), enacted in 2011 and 2012, respectively, are among the largest trade pacts in the world since the establishment of NAFTA in 1994 (Flamm and Köllner 2012).

However, the TPP, a PTA between 12 Pacific Rim states, including economically powerful states such as the USA, Canada, and Japan, is surely the most ambitious PTA of this kind due to its comprehensive liberalization agenda and economic and transregional scope (Solís 2012). The TPP was originally formed in 2006 as the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership – a free trade agreement between Singapore, New Zealand, Chile, and Brunei. Between 2008 and 2013, the USA, along with Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia, Canada, Mexico, and Japan entered TPP negotiations. The TPP agreement was reached in October 2015 in Atlanta, signed by all parties in Auckland in February 2016, and in the same year ratified by New Zealand and Japan. Since the current US president, Donald Trump, withdrew from the treaty in January 2017, the remaining member states are currently negotiating the future of the trade agreement without the US. Because of its transregional character and the large protest movement it has inspired in many of its member states, the anti–TPP movement will be analysed more closely here, after a brief overview of the transregionalization of protest movements against PTAs in East Asia and their history.

Transregional protest movements against PTAs in East Asia

While many economists, government officials, and representatives of the institutions governing global trade seem to operate on the assumption that the liberalization of trade contributes to economic growth that benefits everyone, the alter-globalization and the anti-PTA movement are challenging this assumption. With the protests against the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle in 1999, trade liberalization, as one of the leading aspects of the post-war economic regime, became the focus of the alter-globalization movement (Peet 2009: 178). Protests against
PTAs emerged from and are part of this alter-globalization movement. In East Asia, protests against the global trading system began in the early 2000s. The transregionalization of this movement was stimulated by several domestic movements, which experienced the impact of similar global policies and developments on local and national conditions, and which decided to act together to change this trade system (Martínez-Torres and Rosset 2010: 151). Protests against the WTO in Seattle, Cancun, and Hong Kong provided occasions for activists from Asia to meet activists from other continents; to build networks; and to exchange opinions, experiences, and ideas (Pye and Schaffär 2008). Therefore, the experiences of participating in transregional alter-globalization protest were as important as similar local experiences with neoliberal trade governance.

Anti-PTA campaigns in many East Asian countries have addressed problems such as tariffs for industrial and agricultural products, consumer protection standards, genetically modified organisms spread by MNCs, environmental laws and pollution, intellectual property rights, workers’ rights, and social and food justice. PTAs are considered to threaten the livelihoods of farmers and workers, welfare systems, environmental and food safety laws, and the sovereignty of states (Pye and Schaffär 2008; Smeltzer 2009; Kim 2014; Jamitzky 2015; Reiher 2017). All protest campaigns against the WTO and PTA negotiations have criticized their lack of transparency and have claimed that PTAs are threatening democracy because citizens and delegates of parliaments are not involved in the negotiations (Della Porta et al. 2006: 3).

Many of the issues addressed in protest campaigns against PTAs as well as the actors involved in them show similarities within and across countries and regions. Food safety and agriculture are prominent issues and therefore organizations like La Vía Campesina (LVC), the world’s largest transregional peasant organization, aim at the exclusion of food and agriculture from the WTO and PTAs in general (Burmeister and Choi 2012: 247). Therefore, farmers and consumer organizations are involved in anti-PTA protests everywhere. Anti-PTA movements in many countries have also brought forward the argument that PTAs will increase the dominance of MNCs (LVC 2015). Especially in developing and newly industrializing countries, criticism of MNCs relates to intellectual property rights. For example, in Thailand and Malaysia, AIDS patients and the pharmaceutical industry mobilized against PTAs to ensure access to affordable generic medicines and drugs (Pye and Schaffär 2008; Smeltzer 2009).

A common feature of many movements against PTAs is nationalism, which appears in East Asia often in conjunction with anti-Americanism. East Asian protest movements have identified the US, MNCs from the US, and global governance institutions presumably dominated by the US as the actors responsible for PTAs and their negative effects. In Thailand, anti-PTA protest rhetoric was closely tied to the logic of national sovereignty versus US and MNC dominance, and people were mobilized to defend the nation (Pye and Schaffär 2008). In Japan and South Korea, earlier trade confrontations between both countries and the US, as well as the presence of the American military, contributed to a rise in anti-Americanism during protests against the TPP and KORUS negotiations (Burmeister and Choi 2012: 253; Reiher 2017). Joint protests of Korean, Canadian, and Japanese farmers against the TPP in 2015 showed that anti-Americanism as well as anti-capitalism can function as means to mobilize people.

In summary, domestic protest movements against PTAs in and beyond East Asia share many similarities, such as the issues addressed, actors held responsible for PTAs’ negative effects on citizens’ everyday lives, the nationalist and often anti-American rhetoric, and the forms of protests and arguments. This is because PTAs are often similar in scope and design and because many of the protest movements are connected with and through transregional networks that organize joint campaigns reflecting the transregional scope of the PTAs they oppose. The transregional dimension of protests against PTAs and the mobility of people, ideas, and resources
became especially evident in the protest movement against the TPP. As I will elaborate in the following section, Japanese farmer and consumer organizations played an important role in the transregional anti-TPP movement connecting activists from all countries negotiating the TPP.

**The transregional dimension of protests against the TPP: perspectives from Japan**

Japan is a member state of 15 PTAs and is involved in 7 PTAs that are either under negotiation or signed but not yet in effect (MOFA 2017). The TPP is the most ambitious PTA Japan has negotiated over the past years. In 2011, Japan’s then prime minister, Yoshihiko Noda, announced that he had decided to enter into consultations toward participating in TPP negotiations, and in March 2013, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe declared that Japan would join TPP negotiations in July 2013. Since 2011, a broad alliance of opposition parties, labour unions, and consumer and agricultural organizations have rallied against the TPP. The Stop TPP Network, founded in 2011, organized many of the rallies. Just like in other countries, the movement against PTAs in Japan is grounded in the alter-globalization and anti-WTO movement that started in the 1990s. Grass-roots organizations that opposed the WTO participated in rallies at WTO summits and advocated policy proposals ‘to monitor the impact of trade liberalization and investment . . . on the lives and labor conditions of global citizens, on human rights, and on the environment’ (Chan 2008: 28, 123).

TPP opponents feared the demise of Japanese agriculture and a degradation of food safety standards, among many other problems, and especially stressed that the TPP threatens farmers’ livelihoods by abolishing tariffs on rice, beef, pork, sugar, and dairy products (Reiher 2017). While many member organizations of the Stop TPP Network perceived the TPP as a problem related to the neo-liberal trade system and MNCs, they simultaneously fell into a rather nationalist and anti-American rhetoric (Reiher 2017). Movements against the liberalization of food additives or the rice market in the 1980s and 1990s had used this kind of rhetoric before (Maclachlan 2002: 191).

Responding to the transregional character of the TPP, the movement also organized intraregionally and transregionally. It could already build on transregional networks created earlier at anti-WTO protests. The consumer organization Nihon Shōhisha Renmei (Consumers Union of Japan, CUJ) for example, invited international trade specialists to Japan to discuss the TPP, and CUJ members participated in TPP negotiation meetings. Access to negotiations by one of CUJ’s members was possible through help from Public Citizen, a US non-governmental organization with which CUJ cooperates. Individual organizations from countries negotiating the TPP formed a transregional anti-TPP network that also consists of civil society organizations (CSOs) from Asian countries that have rallied against other PTAs before. Members include Thailand’s FTA Watch, Oxfam, and the Consumers Association of Singapore, among others. Since most of these organizations have only limited financial resources, members cannot always travel to the negotiation meetings. Thus, network members who attended the special events for civil society stakeholders share information via mailing lists. The network’s member organizations also planned joint advocacy strategies and protests (Uchida 2013: 3). Although South Korea was not involved in TPP negotiations, members of Japanese consumer organizations frequently travelled to South Korea to speak with activists about their experiences with KORUS to learn from their experiences and their mobilization strategies and to draw conclusions on the possible impacts the TPP could have on Japan. According to Korean activists, KORUS has major negative effects. The Korean activists not only called for a joint Japanese-Korean movement against the TPP, but Japanese organizations also based their arguments against the TPP on the Korean experiences (Ōno 2013; Yamaura 2013). Farmers’ organizations from Canada, Korea, and Japan also joined protests organized by the transregional farmers organization LVC.
The case of the anti-TPP movement shows that protests against a transregional PTA is a transregional endeavour. Transregional networks organized rallies at PTA negotiation meeting sites where activists from several countries participated as well as protest rallies that simultaneously took place on different continents. They initiated joint petitions, published information materials on PTAs that were disseminated via the Internet and invited guest speakers to share their experiences. Transregional financial flows provided CSO members from different countries with resources to travel to the negotiation meetings of the trade agreement. In addition to domestic campaigns that were supported by transregional organizations, local groups also individually connected within and across regions. In short, people, money, information, and other resources were set in motion both across country borders and across regions to protest against the consequences of transregional economic integration.

Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates how PTAs and protests against PTAs generate transregional spaces. I suggest that a transregional research perspective is required to adequately investigate the economic entanglements intensified through PTAs and the transregional dimension of social movements that emerged to oppose them, because PTAs and the protests against PTAs are inseparably intertwined. Through transregional PTAs, geographically faraway economies and protest movements move closer together. People, capital, commodities, and information cross national borders and regions, challenging the seemingly clear-cut definitions of nation-states and regions. On the one hand, PTAs can threaten the sovereignty of states by implementing more and more 'beyond-the-border' issues, such as by declaring environmental laws as non-tariff barriers to trade. On the other hand, local resistance against trade liberalization not only takes the shape of a transregional protest movement based on shared experiences with PTAs that evoke solidarity, but also appears as nationalisms that simultaneously occur with their own locally specific character.

A transregional research perspective on PTAs takes into account both transregional dynamics as well as local particularities and their histories. Analysing and comparing country cases enables us to acknowledge similarities; however, without a transregional perspective focused on entanglements an analytical tool to explain how these similarities emerged is lacking. To study PTAs, I suggest starting out from an area studies perspective and following the actors, ideas, and things that travel across all kinds of borders (Latour 1999). That being said, from a methodological perspective, limitations to an area studies approach exist. The case of anti-TPP protests from the perspective of Japan points to linguistic and practical difficulties in striving for a transregional perspective. For example, when only sources in Japanese and English are taken into account, the perspectives of the Korean, Malay, or Peruvian anti-TPP activists, for example, vanish. Therefore, research on transregional PTAs should be carried out by teams of researchers with different area and language expertise. An area-sensitive perspective takes into account national contexts, local particularities, and original language sources, but it does not neglect the macro perspective of the global trade regime and the regional and transregional dynamics that emerge and spread through PTAs.

Note

I use the term preferential trade agreements (PTAs) to emphasize that these trade agreements are not about free trade, but instead offer trading partners only partial trade liberalization in selected fields. However, the term free trade agreement (FTA) is part of the official names of some of the PTAs this chapter deals with, thus, in these cases, I use the official denomination.
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PART V

International organizations

Introduction

Ulf Engel and Katja Naumann

In this section, the interface between international organizations and transregionalism is analysed from different angles. We understand this juncture in at least two ways: first, international organizations – which include institutions that represent all or most sovereign states, institutions that aim to or already do operate globally, as well as those bodies that are active on an (inter)regional level – have been established, and are most likely to emerge in the future in order to deal with challenges that transcend (state and regional) borders as much as the regulatory efforts and their effects that are put in place to deal with these challenges. Second, international organizations – even when using a universalistic language – often only address a certain geographically limited area with which they identify and toward which they aim at exercising regulatory power. In the first case, international organizations take regions for granted and act transregionally, that is to say, they transcend regional borders. In the second case, existing spatial patterns are questioned or even contested and new transnational spaces are created through their ambitions, intentions, actions, and claims of international organizations – said otherwise, regions are transformed.

‘Global challenges’ (see Chapter 70 by Engel) are calling for, and are producing, regulation and forms of governance for which transregional dynamics are identified and placed in relation to other spatial levels employed in the respective issue-area. Since the early nineteenth century, different institutional mechanisms have been established by a variety of actors in order to meet various global challenges – for example, bi- and multilateralism, conference/commission diplomacy, club diplomacy, and regional and international organizations – each transforming existing social space(s) and introducing new one(s). The Congress of Vienna (September 1814–June 1815) can serve as a point of departure for such a perspective on international organizations: during the deliberations, various transnational challenges were identified and addressed by the final documents or subsequent meetings. Additionally, participants of the congress discussed the (trans)regional reach of their ambitions to create both a stable post-revolutionary and post-war order. Since then, we assume that international organizations have triggered region-transcending dynamics that, in turn, have had effects on their policies.

The end of the Cold War and the many transformations around the year 1989 constitute another moment where an (already contested) world order collapsed, providing different actors that are active at different spatial scales opportunities to produce new, and often competing, visions of world order. We assume that under these circumstances transregional efforts of
regulation and governance have increasingly expanded, challenging the spatial configurations within the issue-areas. And, finally, we question persistent claims of newness by historicizing the post-1989 spatial reordering and assume that current transregional forms of governance need to be linked to previous efforts of regulation, with their territorializing and deterritorializing effects. That is to say, analysing today’s efforts of regulating global challenges and visions of world order needs to consider their multilayered and complex character as they are building on earlier experiences (positive and negative) and learning processes of actors dealing with the respective issues in the past.

The following eight chapters provide an analysis of transnational and global challenges and their respective policy fields, starting with the period after the end of the Cold War. Authors were asked to compose their chapters so that the following issues were included: (1) a description of the post-1989 developments with an emphasis on the kind of regulation(s) and the instruments employed to address the particular issue-area; (2) an explanation of the role, shape, and function of the transregional dynamics in this issue-area and constellation; and (3) a historicization of the subject matter and its efforts toward regulation.

In the first chapter of this section, Ulf Engel looks at the field of ‘peace and security’, with an emphasis mainly on ‘non-global’ international organizations and their transregional activities. The period after 1989 is marked by a brief boost of new, post-hegemonic approaches of conflict intervention led by the United Nations that quickly failed. Instead, old and new transregional actors have taken centre stage. Many conflicts have developed into transnational conflict complexes. Engel focuses on transregional peace and security interventions and deployments, emphasizing the role of constructed world regions as actors. Furthermore, he discusses examples of interregionalism with a focus on emerging transregional peace and security practices around Africa.

The issue of ‘trade transregionalism’ is addressed by Theodore H. Cohn in the second chapter. He examines how transregional trade is occupying a growing space between regional and multilateral trade. Cohn’s chapter evolves around five focal points: historical examples of trade transregionalism, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) vis-à-vis transregionalism, trade regionalism and transregionalism, private–public interactions, and the role of geopolitical factors in transregional trade agreements. He is mainly concentrating on the dramatic increase in transregional preferential trade agreements, which are the result of the conflicting views of the GATT’s Uruguay Round and the failure to conclude the WTO’s Doha Round.

In the third chapter, Jan Aart Scholte analyses ‘transregionalism and Internet governance’ while exploring the spatial ontologies and methodologies as they relate to Internet governance. The chapter, first, reveals that the geography of digital communications cannot be reduced to territorial grids, and, second, maps governance of the Internet, where ‘governance’ is understood in a broad sense to cover processes of societal ordering through rules and regulatory institutions. Here it is noted that, although the governance of cyberspace has important territorial aspects, the overall regime is ‘transcalar’ and in most ways also ‘supraterritorial’.

Since the 2008 financial crisis, the governance of financial markets has received increasing attention. In the fourth chapter, Fabian Scholtes takes a look at the ‘organization and transregional aspects of international financial regulation’, focusing on calls for stronger control and the quite different reality of international financial regulation that is taking place in a network of informal transnational bodies without any authority and between national actors that concede little power to actors at the international level. Nevertheless, he argues that ‘in many instances IFR does transcend the national realm’. The chapter explores how these cases can be viewed from a transregional perspective.
In the fifth chapter, Iris Borowy offers an analysis of ‘global health’, which is seen as a poorly defined, fuzzy field. She takes an interest in the historical contexts in which global health emerged and unfolded and explores some existing theories trying to explain its rise. Arguing that since the beginning global health has been linked to international health organizations, notably the World Health Organization, together with US hegemony in the field, Borowy concludes that global health is still in the process of finding its definition. Accordingly, it vacillates between two approaches: the first is a precept that legitimizes the management of public health in low-income countries for the benefit of Northern academics and institutions under the guise of humanitarian work, and the second is a fundamentally new approach to health challenges around the world, taking a genuinely collaborative and egalitarian approach.

In the sixth chapter, Helena Flam, in collaboration with Katarina Ristic, takes a critical look at the issue of ‘transitional justice’, and the debate on ‘global justice’, with a particular interest in the development of humanitarian law and human rights such as truth commissions (TCs), international criminal tribunals (ICTs), and the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Further emphasis is placed on their relation to international organizations and foundations and, most of all, their cooperation with transnational non-government organizations. Based on an analysis of three contrasting TCs and ICTs – for Guatemala, the former Yugoslavia, and Cambodia – the chapter argues that one cannot speak of ‘global’ but rather of transnational or transregional transitional justice.

The ‘transregional internal dynamics and cultures of international organizations’ are at the heart of the seventh chapter, authored by Bob Reinalda. He identifies moments and actors of transregionalism in the historical process of international organizations, and illustrates the evolution of the community of states, the institutionalization of cooperation, and the emergence of international secretariats. The chapter focuses on leadership and staff culture of international governmental organizations, tensions between universalism and regionalism, and regional differences between the western hemisphere, Western Europe, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Reinalda concludes that despite the seemingly universal nature of an ‘international organization’ and ‘international staff’, a closer look from the transregional perspective reveals underlying differences that are related to an ongoing North–South divide.

In the final, and eighth, chapter, Markus Lederer provides a deep insight into ‘transregional trends in international organizations in the field of climate and energy’. He focuses on the interaction of state as well as non-state international organizations and the resulting inter- and transregional trends that can be observed in both issue-areas. After reviewing pertinent trends and explanations, the chapter considers the role of transregionalism in the context of the concept of the Anthropocene, which is the perception that the activities of humankind are having such an environmental impact that we might now be able to speak of a new geological epoch.

As demonstrated by these contributions, the perspective of transregionalism adds an important dimension to ongoing debates in traditional international relations as well as the newly established field of global studies by focusing on the agency of regions, policy transfers between regions, and the discursive or ‘real’ transformation of regions through transregional interventions and regulatory efforts. These chapters provide a fresh look at important dynamics that are often hidden by the label ‘global’.
Introduction

No doubt, questions of peace and security are extremely relevant and at the heart of public debates in many countries. Today’s concern about the situations in the Middle East, the Sahelo-Saharan region, the Korean peninsula, or the former Soviet territories, as well as terrorist attacks in Europe and elsewhere are cases in point. Many, though not all of these situations, are addressed through discursive, diplomatic, or military transregional practices. In contrast to global or universal peace and security practices – for instance United Nations (UN) peace-keeping missions (with a high concentration on Africa, see Koops et al. 2015) – the former are characterized by the involvement of regional actors, though their speech acts often suggest that they are in fact dealing with ‘global’ issues. The focus of this chapter is on ‘non-global’ international organizations and their transregional activities in the field of peace and security, post-1989 (for an overview on the role of regions per se, see Diehl and Lepgold 2003; Crocker, Hampson and Aall 2011, and with reference to Africa, Söderbaum and Tavares 2011).

What exactly constitutes the field of peace and security is constantly challenged and hence changing. For instance, academic fields that have developed since the end of the Cold War, such as critical security studies, critical terrorism studies, or the emerging ‘intervention theory’ (see Williams 2008; Hönke and Müller 2012), have consolidated perspectives beyond traditional understandings of violent conflict that were said to be characterized by the importance of containerized states, official armies, and regime security. The imagination of so-called new wars in the 1990s (Kaldor 1999) has prompted the development of new humanitarian interventions, based on notions of ‘human security’ and the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P, see ICISS 2001; Barnett 2011; Orford 2011). However, this is not to say that comparable developments did not occur before as evidenced, for instance, by the debate about humanitarian interventions in the Ottoman Empire between 1815 and 1914 (Rodogno 2011) or the many conflicts during the Cold War period from 1947 to 1989 (see Leffler and Westad 2010; Immerman and Goedde 2013). Yet for practical reasons, in this chapter the period of investigation has to be limited to the time since the end of the Cold War (for a global history of peace, see Adolf 2009). This period is marked by a brief boost of new, post-hegemonic approaches of conflict intervention led by the UN that quickly failed, as epitomized by the experience in Somalia from 1992 to 1995. Instead, old and new transregional actors have taken centre stage (see Wolff...
and Dursun-Özkanca 2014). And many conflicts have developed into transnational conflict complexes in which actors change their roles, for instance from insurgent to illegal trader and vice versa, and where the main aim of loosely organized groups is often no longer to capture the capital but to establish control over lucrative trade routes.

In the more than 25 years since, peace and security challenges have been redefined beyond traditional topics such as weapons of mass destruction (see, for instance, Perrin 2012). Some actors, for example jihadists, have been reappraised in the context on the ‘war of terror’ (see Onuf 2009). The discursive ‘securitization’ (Williams 1998; Balzacq 2005) of many issues has added to the complexity of what today is perceived as a peace and security challenge. Therefore, illegal financial flows, transnational organized crime (TOC), and trafficking, as well as infectious diseases and pandemics such as Ebola, to name but a few, are treated by politics and academia alike as peace and security issues (on the discursive framing of transregional security challenges, see Chapter 70 by Engel).

This chapter will proceed as follows: in the second part, transregional peace and security interventions and deployments will be illustrated by recent examples. The notion of ‘transregional deployment’ is inspired by the work of Callaghy, Kassimir, and Latham (2001) on transnationalism and transterritorial deployments in Africa, referring to foreign interventions that keep their original identity as foreign (in their case UN operations, refugee camps, special forces, mercenaries, etc.). In this sense, ‘transregional’ excludes the ‘global’ from ‘transterritorial’, and emphasizes the role of constructed world regions as actors. In the third section, examples for interregionalism will be discussed with a focus on emerging transregional peace and security practices around Africa. This will be followed by brief conclusions on the added value of developing transregional perspectives on contemporary peace and security issues.

**Transregional deployments**

In this part of the chapter, examples of transregional peace and security deployments will be detailed, yet without the aspiration to develop a systematic taxonomy or provide a complete historical account. The world regions successively affected by transregional interventions after the end of the Cold War include the Middle East, the Balkans, South-Central Asia, and Africa (here and in the following, see HIIC 2017; IISS 2017; SIPRI 2017; and UNSC 2017). The intervening forces are mainly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Interestingly, other international organizations – for instance, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of American States (OAS), or the post–Soviet Union Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – intervened only, if at all, in their respective regions, but not transregionally.

Post-1989 transregional interventions started with the first led by the United States (US) in Iraq (see Hurst 2009). Following the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in August 1990, the US organized an international coalition – though not an international organization – including France, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom to liberate Kuwait (Operation Desert Storm, from January to February 1991, which was diplomatically supported by Russia and financially assisted by Germany and Japan). The next US-led intervention in Iraq followed in March 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom), this time actively supported by the United Kingdom, Poland, and Australia. Allegedly the invasion was about disarming Iraq of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In hindsight, it turned out that this allegation was fictitious and meant to create the legitimacy for getting rid of President Saddam Hussein. Following regime change in early May 2003, US forces remained in the country, which was increasingly disintegrating – finally allowing the Islamic State, or Daesh, to take over parts of the country. The US interventions,
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to some extent, can be compared to the Russian interventions in Georgia (1991–3, and again in 2008), Abkhazia (1991–3), Transnistria (1992), North Ossetia-Alania (both 1992), Tajikistan (1992–7), Chechnya (1994–6, and again 1999–2009), Dagestan (1999, and again since 2009), Ukraine (since November 2014), and Syria (since September 2015), though this somewhat stretches the notion of ‘transregional’ as most Russian interventions were carried out in territories that were formerly part of the Soviet Union.

In most post–Cold War transregional interventions, NATO and/or the EU has played a crucial role. Typically, these interventions were referred to as ‘out of area’ operations, that is, operations transgressing the territory of the organization’s member states. The second major region of post–Cold War Western intervention was into the Balkans after Yugoslavia had fallen apart in the early 1990s (see Gibbs 2009). In July 1992, NATO foreign ministers agreed to assist the UN in monitoring compliance with sanctions imposed against Serbia, and embarked on a maritime operation off the coast of Montenegro. In April 1993, NATO began to enforce a UN no-flight zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation Deny Flight). In August/September 1995, the organization, without the approval of the UN Security Council (UNSC) though in support of the UN Protection Force, intervened again with airstrikes to protect UN-designated ‘safe areas’ against the Bosnian Serb Army. Finally, in 1999, NATO launched another air campaign to stop the conflict in Kosovo (Operation Merciful Angel). In addition, the EU launched police and/or military interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2003–12) and Macedonia (2003, 2003–5, 2005–6). The European Union is still active in post–conflict situations in Moldova and Ukraine (since 2005), Kosovo (since 2008), and Georgia (since 2008) (see EUEA 2017).

Another US-led NATO intervention was launched in Afghanistan in October 2001, following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC, on 11 September that year (Operation Enduring Freedom). This time the international alliance to fight the Taliban and al-Qaeda included among others France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and 20 other countries (see Coll 2004; Rynning 2012). This operation was officially ended in December 2014, but there are still some 10,000 plus foreign troops in the country (now called Operation Freedom’s Sentinel). The ‘format’ was continued in other ‘wars on terror’ in Kyrgyzstan (2001–14), the Philippines (2002–15), Georgia (2002–7), and Somalia/Horn of Africa (since 2002, see below). In 2004–5, the EU ran a ‘rule of law’ mission in Georgia. In addition, it played a role in this part of the world in monitoring the implementation of a peace agreement in Indonesia (2005–6) and training judges and magistrates in Iraq (2005–13). The EU is still supporting the police in Afghanistan (since 2007).

The fourth theatre for post–Cold War transregional interventions was Africa, starting in 2003 with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and after a decade of withdrawal from African conflicts. A new competition for natural resources and increasing competition with the People’s Republic of China have pushed for this move. Authorized by the UN, the EU deployed troops in northeastern DRC to end massacres in the Ituri region (Operation Artemis). The operation was seen as a test case for rolling out the European Security and Defence Policy and some of its logistical concepts, such as the EU Battle Groups. Often aligning itself with French geopolitical and economic interests, the EU also intervened in, again, the DRC (2005–14 police mission, 2006 military mission), Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR, 2008–9), Guinea-Bissau (2008–10), Mali (2012), South Sudan (2013–14), and, again, CAR (2015–16). Joint EU–NATO interventions also took place in 2005–7 in support of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The most dramatic transregional intervention took place in Libya, starting in March 2011 when a US-led coalition of some NATO member states and allies enforced a UNSC resolution on a no-flight zone to protect civilians; in addition, NATO took control over an arms embargo (Operation Unified Protector). Ultimately this led to regime change, the
death of Gaddafi, and the disintegration of the whole region (see Engelbrekt 2014). In order to foster the legitimacy of its intervention, which internationally was met, at best, with widespread reservation, NATO tried to mobilize another international organization, the League of Arab States, to support its intervention.

Ongoing EU missions in Africa include the security sector reform in the DRC (since 2005), a military support mission in Somalia (since 2010), capacity-building in Niger (since 2012), military training in Mali, and post-conflict reconstruction in Libya (both since 2013). In addition, off the Somali coast along the Horn of Africa transregional interveners have, since 2008, engaged in fighting piracy (Operation Atalanta) and strengthened maritime capacities of countries in the Horn of Africa and the West Indian Ocean (EU operation Nestor, since 2012). These activities are supported by naval forces from the EU, the US, and NATO, together with such diverse countries as China, India, Iran, Japan, South Korea, and Russia, to name but a few.

Finally, within the African continent, regional economic communities have become transregional interveners in their own right, for instance in regional ‘counter-terrorism’ alliances (such as the recent so-called Nouakchott and Djibouti processes), or in attempts to develop armed response capacities to violent conflict (for instance, through the Rapid Deployment Capacity or the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises [ACIRC], established in 2013).

*From interregionalism to transregionalism*

In the following section, examples of interregionalism, that is, relations between international and/or regional organizations, will be discussed – the first two with a focus on peace and security partnerships around Africa, and the last one dealing with cooperation between international organizations that fight drug-trafficking between Latin America, Africa, and Europe. While the first two examples highlight the initial development as interregional practices between two international organizations, over time the need and opportunities arose to harmonize and coordinate between the two interregionalisms, making it a truly transnational triangle – although not a global practice. The last example reveals the strong elements of transregional cooperation right from the beginning more than two international organizations (on the conceptual difference between interregionalism and transregionalism, see also van der Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffmann 2013; Ribeiro Hoffmann 2016).

After the transformation of the Addis Ababa-based Organisation of African Unity (OAU, 1963) into the African Union (AU) in 1999–2002, and the subsequent and still ongoing implementation of a complex African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the union developed strategic and sovereignty-boosting international partnerships with the UN and the EU, respectively. In both cases, and despite ongoing disagreements about some political questions (for example, the NATO intervention in Libya in 2001), considerable efforts have been made since the mid-2000s to institutionalize interregional relations at many levels. Beyond peace-keeping (see Adebajo 2011; Boutellis and Williams 2013), both strategic partnerships have an important impact on financing AU activities and building capacity to deal with peace and security issues.

Since 2006, annual consultations have been held between the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the UNSC (here and in the following, see Engel 2018a). There are regular meetings between the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the African Union and the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security. In addition, within this framework the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa was established. In 2010, the Joint Task Force on Peace and Security was launched to foster coordination and collaboration. In addition, there are the biannual desk-to-desk meetings. In New York, the UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa organizes an annual event held during Africa
Week, every year in October, at the edge of the UN General Assembly’s debate on the development of Africa. Since 2009, the AU has maintained a Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations, and in 2010 the UN established an Office to the African Union (UNOAU). Systematic communication and policy harmonization between the AU’s structures in New York and Addis Ababa and also among member states remain a major challenge.

In 2014, the UN and the AU established a joint framework for an enhanced partnership in peace and security. The framework highlights an increased common understanding of the causes of conflict in Africa and details areas of cooperation, such as early warning and conflict prevention as well as preventive diplomacy. Furthermore, it outlines various ways to jointly address conflict and engage in peace-building. Finally, four partnership review mechanisms are specified (the UNOAU-AU, the Joint Task Force, desk-to-desk meetings, and annual meetings between the PSC and the UNSC).

Interregional cooperation between the AU and the European Union is based on the 2007 Joint Africa-Europe Strategy (JAES) and the Plan of Action that was adopted at the second EU-Africa Summit held on 8–9 December 2007 in Lisbon, Portugal (here and in the following, see Engel 2018b; for the historical background, see also Adebajo and Whiteman 2012). The partnership involves all 28 EU members and all 54 African states. The current roadmap for the partnership sets out concrete targets for the period 2014–17 within five priority areas: peace and security; democracy, good governance, and human rights; human development; sustainable and inclusive development, and growth and continental integration; and global and emerging issues. Within this framework, regular meetings are being held at the level of ministerial summits between the two commissions (called ‘college-to-college’ meetings), the PSC-to-Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee (EUMC), and the AU Military Staff Committee as well as crises management teams on both sides (the Joint Africa-EU Expert Groups, JEGs). In addition, regular consultations between African and EU Heads of Delegation in Addis Ababa, Brussels, and New York take place. Over time, the two strategic partnerships maintained by the AU have called for closer coordination and harmonization, in particular because of the interventionist role of both the UN and the EU, as well as because of their complementary efforts in financing the AU’s peace and security activities (see Engel 2018d). Thus far, it seems that the interregionalisms in the field of peace and security in Africa are converging.

The third example presented here refers to the interregionalism of international organizations that cooperate in the fight against trafficking. Here a complex network of interorganizational relations has been developed to address the issue of transnational organized crime and drug-trafficking from Latin America via Africa to Europe, which is one of the many illegal transregional practices, including trafficking in humans and especially migrants, firearms, environmental resources, counterfeit products, money laundering, etc. (see UNODC 2010). According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in 2010 cocaine trafficking between South America and West Africa constituted the single most important threat in this regard, worth USD 1 billion in the region with a retail value of almost USD 7 billion in Europe (UNODC 2010: 233). However, production and consumption figures are volatile, and regional patterns are fluctuating constantly (UNODC 2016). The fight against drug-trafficking involves various transregional activities coordinated between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), and the EU as well as a South–South cooperation, for instance between Brazil and Guinea-Bissau. Cocaine trafficking is a good example of a transregional problem in which the different regions are unequally affected and, hence, their preparedness to intervene differs.
The common denominator of all three examples is that politically organized world regions are developing interregional practices that can best be studied through a transregional perspective. In all three examples, member states of international organizations are challenged by processes of deterritorialization, in these cases either through violence or through drug-trafficking. These challenges threaten the sovereignty of states and their intergovernmental organizations. Therefore, they are engaging in region-building and collective region-crossing practices that, if successful will have reterritorializing and sovereignty-boosting effects (see Engel 2018c). In the end, there seems to be a conversion trend toward developing transregional practices that link different, initially distinct, interregionalisms.

Conclusions

This chapter started with some observations on the dynamic field of peace and security, both as a practice and as an academic field. Two main issues were at the forefront of the discussion: first, transregional peace and security interventions and deployments by international organizations (mainly NATO and the EU) and, second, African interregional practices that seem to develop into truly transregional peace and security practices.

The territorialization of dynamics in the field of peace and security has been described in terms of ‘security assemblages’ (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009), ‘transnational entanglements’ (Hönke and Müller 2012), or ‘new regionalisms’ (Kelly 2007). Transregional studies introduces another perspective; it adds value to global studies and international studies because it provides a focus on the agency of regions and policy transfers between regions as well as the discursive or genuine transformation of regions through transregional interventions, and the intellectual or practical transcending of regions as a point of reference. Thus, transregional studies critically add to existing perspectives on ‘the international’, ‘the global’, and ‘the regional’, in particular when and where transregional actors claim global roles and responsibilities.

Select bibliography


Transregional trade agreements have proliferated in recent years, and they are occupying a larger space between multilateral and regional trade agreements. Before discussing this issue, it is necessary to define several terms. Multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs) liberalize trade at the global level. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), are multilateral trade organizations; all countries that fulfil the membership requirements can join the WTO. By contrast, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are discriminatory because they limit membership. PTAs exist at various stages of integration. They might simply lower tariffs, virtually abolish tariffs (a free trade agreement, FTA), or abolish tariffs among members and impose a common external tariff on outside countries (a customs union, CU). The integration of the European Union (EU) goes beyond the CU stage; it also involves the free movement of labour and capital (a common market), the harmonization of many economic policies (an economic union), and 19 of the 28 EU members use the euro as a common currency (a monetary union).

Whereas some PTAs such as the EU and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) include countries in only one region, others are transregional. Transregionalism here refers to the creation of common spaces among regions in which state and non-state actors have economic and also often institutional, cultural, and social linkages. For example, the EU has bilateral FTAs with Mexico and South Africa, and the United States (US) has bilateral FTAs with Singapore and Chile.

This chapter examines how transregional trade is occupying a growing space between regional and multilateral trade. The chapter has five focal points: historical examples of trade transregionalism, the GATT/WTO and transregionalism, trade regionalism and transregionalism, private–public interactions, and the role of geopolitical factors in transregional trade agreements.

**Historical examples of trade transregionalism**

Trade transregionalism reaches far back into the history of humankind, which can be observed throughout the centuries in different forms and projects. For example, the Roman Empire fostered trade transregionalism from the first to fifth centuries CE in the Mediterranean littoral, including parts of North Africa, the Middle East, and Europe; and the spread of Roman law...
and Latin as a common language in major outposts provided stability for this trade. Thus, Egypt exported grain and flax to Italy and other parts of Europe, and imported metals, wine, and olive oil. British imperialism also used transregional trade as a means of commercial domination and integration. When Great Britain responded to the 1930s Great Depression by imposing a ten per cent tariff on most imports, it adopted an imperial preference system with the Dominions at a 1932 conference in Ottawa, Canada. This formed the basis for the British Commonwealth preference system as decolonization proceeded (McCarthy 2006: 12–15, 22–32).

France also offered its overseas territories tariff preferences to promote economic integration, along with a mission to spread the French culture and language. When the European Economic Community (EEC) was formed in 1957, France insisted that its African territories be given trade preferences as associate members. Part 4 of the Treaty of Rome, signed on 25 March 1957, called for the gradual removal of tariffs between EEC members and the associates through a non-reciprocal agreement, which permitted the associates to retain some tariffs to protect their infant industries. When the associates gained independence, the EEC structured these trade preferences through two Yaoundé Conventions; and when Britain joined the EEC in 1973, its Commonwealth preferences with developing countries also had to be accommodated. Thus, the EEC signed four non-reciprocal Lomé Conventions with the associate African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group of states. The GATT/WTO permits developed countries to provide trade preferences only if they are offered to all developing countries, but EU members were discriminating in favour of their ex-colonies. Thus, the EU eventually responded to outside pressure and negotiated the Cotonou Agreement, which replaces the non-reciprocal preferences with reciprocal PTAs with the ACP states over a 10–12-year period. In sum, British and French transregional trade relations with their colonies have evolved with decolonization (Matambalya and Wolf 2001: 123–44; Holland 2002: 25–32).

The GATT/WTO and transregionalism

The GATT/WTO and PTAs have a highly interactive relationship. Following the Second World War, the US, as the post-war global hegemon, strongly favoured multilateral trade under GATT. GATT was committed to limiting government actions that interfered with market forces, and the Soviet Union did not seek membership. Czechoslovakia was a founding member and remained in GATT even after it became Communist, but its membership was largely inactive. Other Eastern European countries did not begin to join GATT until the 1960s–1970s, and Russia did not join the WTO until 2012. Developed countries (the North) were the main participants in post-war trade negotiations, and developing countries (the South) had only limited involvement in GATT from the 1940s to early 1960s (Cohn 2016: 234–7). Whereas the US preferred GATT multilateral trade, Britain wanted to preserve its discriminatory imperial preferences, and many states wanted to join PTAs. For the most part, the US view prevailed, and GATT Article 1 enshrines the unconditional most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle, which stipulates that every trade advantage a WTO member gives to any state must be extended, immediately and unconditionally, to all other WTO members. However, GATT Article 24 permits countries to form PTAs that do not adhere to MFN treatment if they are more trade creating than trade diverting. To increase trade creation, PTAs should eliminate tariffs on substantially all trade among the members; and to decrease trade diversion, PTAs should on average not raise tariffs for countries outside the agreement. Whereas individual members of an FTA are not to raise their average level of duties before the CU was established (Cohn 2016: 265).
The GATT articles reflect the liberal economic view that multilateralism is the best route to freer trade, but that more open PTAs are the second-best route when multilateralism faces obstacles. The conflicting views of the GATT Uruguay Round and the failure to complete the WTO Doha Round have, in fact, contributed to the proliferation of PTAs. The Uruguay Round took seven years to complete (1986–93) because GATT’s membership was increasingly diverse, and the negotiations involving behind-the-border measures, such as intellectual property rights (IPR) and services trade, infringed on domestic regulatory systems. Many more developing countries actively participated in the Uruguay Round negotiations, and with the end of the Cold War, Eastern European countries also became more actively involved. As a result, the WTO, which was formed as a result of the Uruguay Round, was a larger, more truly global organization. However, with a growing membership, there were also more divisions in the WTO. After the Uruguay Round, the South realized that it ‘had accepted fairly weak commitments in agriculture and textiles while making substantially stronger ones, especially in . . . intellectual property’ (Watal 2000: 71–2). The North wanted further integration in IPR, services trade, and investment; and to get the South’s support it called the WTO Doha Round (launched in 2001) the Doha Development Agenda and promised special attention to the least developed countries. However, North–South differences have prevented completion of the Doha Round, and countries have increasingly been turning to PTAs. PTAs can result in deeper integration than the WTO because they require agreement among a smaller group of states. For example, NAFTA served as a precursor to the GATT Uruguay Round in services trade, investment, and IPR. NAFTA goes beyond the WTO in these areas, and it set an important precedent for other PTAs that have ‘WTO-plus’ provisions. In sum, by legitimizing PTAs in Article 24, GATT inadvertently enabled PTAs to supplant the WTO as the preferred route to deeper integration. Today, many states view PTAs as the centrepiece of their commercial policy, and preferential trade now accounts for more than 90 per cent of some WTO members’ total trade (WTO 2005: 67–8).

Trade regionalism and transregionalism

There have been two major waves of PTAs since the Second World War. The first wave in the 1950s–1960s was limited in scope because all the PTAs were regional, and were either North–North or South–South agreements. The second wave, which began in the 1980s, has been more widespread and durable for several reasons. First, transregional PTAs have proliferated. Second, the US reversed its position and has joined comprehensive PTAs with a number of countries. Third, NAFTA was the first reciprocal PTA between developed (the US and Canada) and developing (Mexico) countries, and many bilateral PTAs today are North–South agreements (Cohn 2016: 259–65). Jagdish Bhagwati (2008: 61) warns that the proliferation of bilateral PTAs has produced a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of ‘crisscrossing PTAs, where a nation had multiple PTAs with other nations, each of which then had its own PTAs with yet other nations’. Efforts to untangle the spaghetti bowl of overlapping PTAs was a factor in US President Barack Obama’s effort to negotiate mega-transregional PTAs such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the EU (Elms 2013: 29–30). President Donald Trump has ended any US involvement in such mega-transregional PTAs, and he is threatening to withdraw the US from NAFTA. It seems that the Trump administration would prefer bilateral PTAs where the US can dominate. However, some efforts are continuing to take the mega-transregional route. In Asia, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam are trying to revive the TPP (now renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,
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CPTPP) without the US. The CPTPP was signed in March 2018, but has not yet been ratified. In Europe, the EU and Canada have concluded an FTA (the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, CETA); and in December 2007 the EU and Japan finalized a much larger transregional FTA which still must be ratified. Despite these agreements, Brexit and increased US protectionism point to the fact that there is resistance to both mega-regional (e.g. EU) and mega-transregional PTAs.

Private–public interactions and transregional trade

Developed and developing countries often attempt to achieve their trade objectives by *forum shifting*, that is, by not limiting their ‘negotiating agenda to one international forum’ (Blaas and Becker 2007; Drahos 2007: 33). Many countries try to engage in forum shifting, but the US, as the largest economy and a major trader, has been the most effective in this area (Sell 2011: 447–78). When the US has been unable to get the multilateral agreement it wants, it has either attempted ‘to shift decision-making to an alternative multilateral forum’ or has shifted ‘to a sequence of bilateral deals with other key states. These accumulated bilaterals often later set the framework for a new attempt at multilateral agreement’ (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 28–9).

The EU as a major international trader has also been an effective forum shifter. This section focuses on three areas where the US and EU in concert with large private actors have shifted from the WTO to transregional PTAs in order to achieve their trade objectives: IPR, the use of developing countries as export platforms, and investor-state dispute settlement provisions.

Governments grant IPR to innovators to enable them to limit the use of their creations by others. The IPR might take the form of copyrights, patents, trademarks, geographical indications, or industrial designs. US, EU, and Japanese efforts to strengthen IPR have been strongly supported by multinational corporations (MNCs) in the North. In March 1986, 12 executives of US-based MNCs created an Intellectual Property Committee (IPC) to develop support in the Uruguay Round for multilateral protection of IPR. Recognizing that most developing countries opposed an IPR agreement, the IPC executives in meetings with their European and Japanese counterparts ‘stressed that the issue of intellectual property was too important to leave to governments’. Accordingly, these executives had a major role in gaining support for the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement in the 1994 GATT Uruguay Round Agreement (Sell 2003: 105).

However, US industry executives and the US government have shifted forums and pursued ‘TRIPS-plus’ agreements in PTAs because of dissatisfaction with the TRIPS’ shortcomings and the failure to conclude the WTO Doha Round. For example, the US pharmaceutical industry has supported TRIPS-plus ‘provisions intended to prolong monopolies, support high prices and frustrate entry of generic medicines’ (Lopert and Gleeson 2013: 199). Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) oppose ‘PTAs that go beyond WTO commitments . . . in the areas of services, investment, government procurement, intellectual property and competition policy’, viewing them as ‘a threat to people’s rights to livelihoods, local development and access to medicines’ (Perez-Esteve 2010: 305–6). However, business organizations have much more influence than NGOs over government policy-making. Thus, the US has concluded ‘14 FTAs with 20 countries which generally include IPR commitments exceeding obligations under the TRIPS agreement’ (Akhtar and Fergusson 2014). Developing countries often agree to these TRIPS-plus provisions in PTAs in return for US foreign investment and better access to the US market for their exports.

Although the US has been the main advocate of TRIPS-plus provisions, the EU has also been a strong supporter. For example, the EU has negotiated association agreements with a
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number of Arab countries that include TRIPS-plus provisions in exchange for market access, financial aid, and technical assistance. The EU and US TRIPS-plus objectives differ in some respects. For example, ‘the EU has been historically active in strengthening the protection of geographical indications ... while the US focus has been directed more towards implementation and enforcement of IPRs’ (El Said 2007: 162). Geographical indications protect distinctive products from a particular region, such as parmesan cheese, Tuscany olives, sherry, and cognac. The EU has concluded transregional PTAs with significant protection for geographical indications with South Korea, Singapore, Colombia, and Peru, and Central America. Although the EU and US both support stronger IPR, they disagree on some issues such as geographical indications (Irace and Akhtar 2016: 8).

A second area in which private–public interactions have a major role in transregional trade involves the use of developing countries as export platforms. As a former WTO director-general stated, ‘businesses now trade to invest and invest to trade – to the point where both activities are increasingly part of a single strategy to deliver products across borders’ (Ruggiero 1997: 4). Foreign direct investment (FDI) by MNCs has been a major factor explaining the rapid increase in PTAs. Regional PTAs among developed countries with a large consumer base improve the competitiveness of MNCs because they benefit from ‘the larger regional markets as their base rather than just the home market’ (Busch and Milner 1994: 270). Regional and transregional North–South PTAs are especially important to vertically integrated MNCs, which geographically separate different stages of production to gain the benefits of comparative advantage. For example, a vertically integrated electronics firm can lower production costs by locating assembly operations in low-wage developing countries, chip production in higher-income countries such as Singapore, and high-end R & D operations in California. PTAs enable MNCs to export products and components duty-free among the members, and to use developing countries with cheaper labour costs as export platforms to developed country markets. NAFTA, for example, enabled automakers and parts suppliers to use Mexico as a low-wage export platform in North America, and this helped restore some competitiveness to the US auto industry.

Businesses have pressed for a wide range of trade agreements, and they often prefer PTAs to global trade agreements because they can gain a competitive advantage by raising trade barriers to MNCs from non-member states. For example, FTAs require rules of origin to prevent importers from bringing goods in through the lowest duty member and then shipping them duty-free to other FTA members. The rules of origin determine whether products have undergone enough processing within the FTA to qualify for the trade preferences. This discriminatory feature can make FTAs very attractive to MNCs, which often pressure FTAs for more protectionist rules of origin against outsiders. An MNC outside an FTA might, therefore, pressure its home country to form its own FTA with the developing country(ies) from which it is excluded, and this is one factor explaining the proliferation of transregional PTAs (Manger 2009: 3–19).

A third private–public factor behind the formation of transregional PTAs relates to investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). The WTO has procedures for settling trade disputes among members, but only states can be directly involved in the dispute settlement cases. NAFTA, by contrast, was the first FTA to give private investors access to binding international arbitration in disputes over a government’s investment measures. ISDS provisions in PTAs have been highly controversial. Whereas MNCs view NAFTA’s Chapter 11 ISDS provisions as an innovative mechanism that protects them from discrimination from states, neo-mercantilists see them as ‘a vehicle for investors to harass governments whose policies they dislike’ (Johnson 1994: 512). In several high-profile cases, opponents argue that ISDS provisions have allowed MNCs to challenge governments’ ability to enact provisions designed to protect the environment and public
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health. MNCs have actively sought ISDS provisions in PTAs, and NAFTA has set a precedent in this regard for US PTAs with a number of other countries, including Singapore, Chile, Morocco, and the Dominican Republic (Capling and Nossal 2006: 151–2). US President Trump has expressed opposition to ISDS provisions in the NAFTA, arguing that they force the US court system to relinquish control over disputes to an international tribunal, that foreign companies can challenge US laws, and that the provisions threaten US sovereignty. A number of Europeans and Canadians are also concerned that ISDS provisions can prevent governments from promoting the public welfare. However, MNCs in the US and other developed countries support ISDS provisions, and it is likely that they will continue to play an important part in transregional PTAs (Chase 2015: 217–29; Irace and Akhtar 2016: 8).

Although private investors back PTA agreements mainly for economic reasons, it is important to note that cultural and historical factors have also affected the formation and characteristics of some transregional PTAs. For example, Spanish banks have a competitive advantage in Mexico because of historical, cultural, linguistic, and legal linkages. They invested heavily in Mexico and sought a PTA because they could provide financing for investment by European firms in the region, and they would also benefit from service sector liberalization with Mexico. In 1999, the EU’s first transregional FTA was with Mexico. The same two Spanish banks that invested heavily in Mexico also invested in Chilean banks, and this was one factor affecting the negotiations and nature of the 2002 EU–Chile FTA (Manger 2009: 96–103, 161–3).

### Political security, geopolitical factors, and transregional trade

Although countries negotiate transregional PTAs primarily for economic reasons, political security and geopolitical factors also might have a role. For example, the US negotiated PTAs with Israel and Jordan partly as a demonstration of support for them. The 1985 US–Israel FTA was the first comprehensive FTA negotiated by the US. The agreement was signed in part to solidify the bilateral relationship, strengthen the Israeli economy and decrease its dependence on US foreign assistance, and give Israel more secure access outside the Middle East because of the Arab boycott. The 2001 US–Jordan FTA was negotiated partly to reward King Hussein for his cooperation in the Oslo peace process, to keep Jordan involved in peace-making, and to eliminate any discrimination against Jordan resulting from the US–Israel FTA (Rosen 2004: 51–62).

The Obama administration viewed the TPP partly in strategic-security terms as a means of helping the US regain the initiative in global trade policy, strengthening the economies of Asian states near China, and providing a counterweight to China’s growing influence in Asia (Tellis 2014: 93–120). With the US, the TPP would have covered about 40 per cent of the world economy. From Obama’s perspective, failure to negotiate a TPP could have major implications for its economic influence in Asia, partly because there is an alternative agreement under negotiation. In May 2013, a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was announced, which involves the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which includes Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam – and six other countries in the region: China, Korea, Japan, India, Australia, and New Zealand. The proposed RCEP would be much less ambitious than the TPP in terms of the scope and depth of liberalization. Most importantly, the RCEP would marginalize the US, hence the role of the TPP in giving the US a continued strong economic presence in East Asia (Solis 2012: 319).

After President Trump withdrew the US from the TPP, China’s President Xi Jinping tried to accelerate the RCEP negotiations; but a final RCEP agreement has not been concluded. China, as the largest economy in RCEP, has disputes over territory and history with Japan and
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India; and developed economies such as Japan and Australia have major differences with developing economies such as Laos and Cambodia (Mathieson 2017). As discussed, a revamped TPP without the US will have less economic influence. The geopolitical implications of changing trade patterns in Asia therefore remain uncertain. However, there are concerns that the US withdrawal from the TPP will contribute to China’s ascendancy in Asia in geopolitical terms.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the dramatic increase in transregional PTAs because of the failure to conclude the WTO Doha Round. The Trump administration turned against the TPP and NAFTA, and now it is also criticizing the WTO (Swanson 2017). Trade transregionalism will continue, but in the absence of US leadership (of uncertain duration) the main question is the form this transregionalism will take. Will other developed countries fill in the leadership gap? In Europe, the EU has negotiated FTAs with two Group of Seven countries, Canada and Japan (still to be ratified). The EU–Japan FTA will comprise a trading area about the size of NAFTA (Rao and Ewing 2017). However, the EU has its own internal problems stemming from such issues as anti-free trade populist movements and the Brexit negotiations. In Asia, Japan is leading attempts to ratify a revamped TPP without the US. However, Bhagwati’s ‘spaghetti bowl’ of conflicting PTAs raises uncertainties, because Canada and Mexico are reluctant to approve the TPP’s auto trade provisions while auto trade is such a contentious issue in the current NAFTA negotiations. If other developed countries cannot assume leadership, will the RCEP negotiations fill the gap, giving China major trade advantages in Asia? A third alternative is that the US and China will dominate other countries in a wide range of bilateral transregional trade agreements. The biggest challenge for the future is how to combine the best elements of trade transregionalism with the unifying, non-discriminatory effects of trade multilateralism; this will not be an easy task.

Select bibliography

INTERNET GOVERNANCE

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Introduction

‘Transregionalism’ joins an expanding thesaurus entry alongside terms such as ‘translocal’, ‘transnational’, ‘transworld’, ‘transplanetary’, ‘transscalar’, ‘globalization’, ‘world society’, and more. All of these words – most of them coined recently – convey in their various ways a sense of the historical contingency and conceptual limitations of modern territorialist constructions of social space. Ontological and methodological territorialism assumes that social geography can be mapped wholly and solely in terms of bounded parcels of land (e.g. districts, countries, and regions). In contrast, post-modern reconstructions such as transregionalism suggest that social relations involve more complex spatial assemblages.

Indeed, so much in contemporary society defies being simply or solely mapped onto territorial units. Examples include climate change, digital communications, electronic finance, world literature, neoliberal discourses, and global social movements. An alternative social geography is wanted in which ‘place’, ‘distance’, and ‘border’ can be understood in non-territorial as well as territorial ways. ‘Transregionalism’, and the associated transcendence of ‘area studies’, can be appreciated as one such reimagination of social space.

This chapter explores these issues of reconstructed spatial ontologies and methodologies as they relate to Internet governance. The following discussion first indicates that the geography of digital communications cannot be reduced to territorial grids. The chapter then maps governance of the Internet, where ‘governance’ is understood in a broad sense to cover processes of societal ordering through rules and regulatory institutions. Here it is noted that, although the governance of cyberspace has important territorial aspects, the overall regime is ‘transcalar’ and in major senses also ‘supraterritorial’. The chapter’s conclusion identifies various promises and problems with the transscalarity of Internet governance.

As this discussion will indicate, transcalar Internet regulation includes an important role for regional constructions. However, regions do not stand on their own in cyberspace. For one thing, when Internet governance is regionally institutionalized, it is usually in a context of interregional relationships rather than through individual separate regions. In addition, the regional in Internet governance is always interconnected with arrangements on other local, national, and global scales.

To this extent, ‘transregionalism’ might not be the most apt label to describe the geography of Internet governance, inasmuch as the word confers a certain implicit privilege to the region. That
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is, the term speaks of ‘transregional’ rather than ‘translocal’, ‘transnational’, or ‘transworld’ spaces. In contrast, the vocabulary of ‘transscalarity’ – as preferred here – places the focus on combination and complexity, without building in any particular ‘level’ as the primary reference point.

**Internet spaces**

Few contemporary developments manifest the deficiencies of ontological and methodological territorialism as starkly as the Internet. Born of the United States military in the 1960s and diffused across the wider society from the 1980s onwards, this arena of digital communication by 2017 linked 3.6 billion persons through more than 20 billion devices across the planet (Statista 2018a, 2018b). Between them, regular Internet users in 2015 had 5.3 billion email accounts, exchanged 127 billion emails and 800 million tweets per day, maintained over 5 billion web-pages, and uploaded 300 hours of YouTube videos per minute (IGF 2015). Substantial portions of social life – indeed, large shares of many people’s waking hours – now transpire ‘online’.

The geography of the Internet is ‘more-than-territorial’. The online world has many spatial descriptors, including websites, email addresses, domain names, and cyberspace. Yet none of these ‘e-locations’ is territorially rooted or contained within territorial boundaries. Even the Chinese government’s digital Great Firewall can be readily breached by those with elementary technical know-how. Nor is the duration of transmission of Internet communications a function of territorial distance, as it effectively takes the same (instantaneous) time to transmit messages between adjoining rooms or between far-flung continents.

This is by no means to suggest that Internet spaces have no territorial qualities. For example, the 930 instances of Internet root servers are each sited at a distinct territorial location (Root Servers 2018). Fibre-optic cables, which transmit over 99 per cent of Internet communications, are mapped out on grids of longitude, latitude, and altitude (TeleGeography 2017). Likewise, devices on the Internet, even those that are mobile such as laptop computers and cellphones, usually (except when airborne or at sea) occupy a territorial position at the given moment. Meanwhile, territorially bounded nation-states – especially those with substantial surveillance capacities – have large influence over Internet content within their respective jurisdictions, even if this government oversight is not all-controlling.

Thus, to say that the Internet is ‘transregional’ – or ‘transscalar’ – is not to say that cyberspace is non-territorial, but to affirm that the online world mixes territorial and supraterritorial geographies. On the territorial side, users (except during air and marine travel) access the Internet from certain territorial – local, country and regional – places. Likewise, Internet service providers (ISPs) and Internet exchange points (IXPs) operate from territorial locations. On the supraterritorial side, Internet addresses are situated in planet-spanning electronic networks. Moreover, the speeds and routes of Internet communications unfold more or less independently of territorial distances and borders. Hence, the geography of the Internet involves complex intersections of territoriality and supraterritoriality.

This quality of intersectionality is key. Internet spaces are not *either* territorial or supraterritorial, but are a combination and interplay of both. Accordingly, the territorial and the supraterritorial aspects of the Internet cannot be disentangled from each other and measured separately. For example, a Facebook account cannot be defined as being a certain per cent territorial and a certain per cent supraterritorial, adding up to 100 per cent. Rather, the geography of cyberspace always comprises inextricable interconnections of territorial and supraterritorial conditions.

A number of terminological innovations have attempted to capture this quality of ‘territorial-together-with-more-than-territorial’ space. Options such as ‘translocal’, ‘transnational’, and ‘transregional’ convey the ‘more-than-territorial’ dimension with the prefix ‘trans’. However,
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As already noted, it could be objected that such words privilege one scale of territoriality: the local, the national, or the regional, respectively. Concurrently, other labels such as ‘transworld’, ‘transplanetary’, and ‘global’ could be criticized for emphasizing the encompassing universal sphere while neglecting contextualizing geographical subspheres.

The vocabulary of ‘transscalarity’ – however jarring the word might sound at first – offers a channel between the territorialist Scylla and the globalist Charybdis. ‘Scalarity’ identifies the generic importance of geographical spheres, without invoking any particular ‘level’ – local, national, regional, global, or other – as the primary reference point. Meanwhile, the prefix ‘trans’ builds intersectionality into the heart of the terminology. The rest of this chapter explores insights that transscalar spatial thinking may yield regarding governance of the Internet.

Transcalar Internet governance

Although the Internet substantially defies territorial geography, it does not mean that the planet-spanning realm of digital communications is unregulated. Cyberspace is not ‘free’, in the sense of lacking rules and ordering processes. Indeed, the Internet offers a prime illustration of the maxim that ‘governance’ entails more than ‘government’: that is to say, that societal regulation involves more than the state. Thus, if the geography of the Internet encompasses more than territory, then it might be expected that, correspondingly, governance of the Internet encompasses more than territorially circumscribed regimes, such as local governments, national states, and regional authorities.

The next paragraphs survey the many institutions that participate in the transcalar regulation of cyberspace.1 In this discussion, organizations are often described in terms of their primary scale of operation, whether it be local, national, regional, or global. However, it is vital to remember that individual agencies can and do work across several scales, and that the overall apparatus of Internet governance is transcalar. Regulation of cyberspace does not occur through one institution at a time; rather, it transpires through complex networks that interconnect the many agencies across scales and sectors. This condition might be called ‘polycentrism’, a term that conveys the diffuse character of the institutional assemblage as a whole.2

Regional and interregional arrangements

For a handbook on transregionalism, it would seem suitable to begin a survey of Internet governance institutions with those that have a primarily regional remit. In this regard, several prominent regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have made rules, inter alia, regarding Internet content, e-commerce, and certain domain name questions. The European Union (EU) has been especially active in this regard as well as, although less intensively, the African Union (AU), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In addition, senior officials of EU member states as well as Norway and Switzerland advise the European Commission through a High Level Group on Internet Governance (HLIG). Further regional intergovernmental input concerning Internet governance has come from the Council of Europe (through, inter alia, the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime), the Euro-Asian Council for Standardization, Metrology and Certification (EASC, which provides certain technical specifications for the Commonwealth of Independent States), the Inter-American Telecommunication Commission (CITEL), and the Nordic Council.

Other prominent regional institutions in polycentric Internet governance have a private character. In particular, it was decided early on to allocate Internet Protocol (IP) addresses (i.e. the unique numerical identifiers of websites, email accounts, etc.) primarily through regional
instead of national or global arrangements. For this purpose, Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) exist for Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia (RIPE, founded in 1989), North America (ARIN, 1997), Asia-Pacific (APNIC, 2001), Latin America and the Caribbean (LACNIC, 2002), and Africa (AFRINIC, 2005). In addition, regional network operator groups (NOGs) – which are informal but influential forums of technical experts on the running of the Internet – have emerged since 1996 for Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Eurasia, Latin America, the Middle East, North America, and the Pacific. Internet exchange points operators – who connect sub-networks within the Internet – are regionally organized in Africa, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean. The same four regions also have private regulatory associations of the managers for country code top-level domains (ccTLDs): respectively, the Africa Top Level Domain Organization (AfTLD), the Asia Pacific Top Level Domain Association (APTLD), the Council of European National Top-Level Domain Registries (CENTR), and the Latin America and Caribbean ccTLDs Organization (LACTLD). Thus, for example, the operators of ‘.de’, ‘.es’, ‘.fr’, ‘.se’, ‘.uk’, and so on work together through CENTR.

Several private regional agencies in Internet governance have developed institutions for interregional collaboration, thereby, in a transcalar fashion, combining regional and global scales of operation. For instance, the RIRs created a global Number Resource Organization (NRO) in 2003. The regional IXP operator associations formed a global Internet eXchange Federation in 2012. In addition, staff members from the five RIRs normally attend each other’s biannual meetings for purposes of communication, coordination, and mutual learning. In all of these instances, regional bodies in Internet governance have seen benefit in sharing experiences and standardizing certain policies on a global scale.

Another transcalar global-regional interplay is evident when governance institutions with a global remit organize their involvement in Internet regulation partly on a regional basis. One example in this regard is the United Nations (UN), which sometimes addresses Internet matters through its five regional economic commissions. In another case, the private Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the principal regulatory body for the domain name system (DNS), operates partly through regional hubs in Brussels, Istanbul, Montevideo, and Singapore. Moreover, several stakeholder constituencies at ICANN (including the Address Supporting Organization [ASO] and the At-Large Advisory Committee [ALAC]) organize themselves in terms of regional subgroupings. ICANN’s Government Advisory Committee (GAC) works partly through regional mailing lists. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the main site for the development of protocol parameters (technical standards that permit devices on the Internet to exchange data), rotates its triannual meetings on a regional basis. The public policy arm of the IETF, the global Internet Society (ISOC), maintains six regional bureaus. For its part, the deliberative non-governmental Internet Governance Forum (IGF) has convened regional gatherings in 13 world areas.

Diverse rationales have driven this regionalization of Internet governance. In part, the logistics are technical. For example, in engineering terms, it is more effective to site blocks of IP addresses within the same region, rather than scattering sequences of Internet numbers randomly across the planet. Further, it is more efficient to allocate IP addresses through five regional organizations than through several hundred country-based institutions. Alongside technical advantages, regional institutions are generally better able than global agencies to accommodate broad cultural differences, including language and negotiation style, while again avoiding the logistical challenges that would face coordination among several hundred separate national regimes. Politically, the regionalization of Internet governance in Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America–Caribbean has facilitated a measure of ‘decolonization’, creating spaces of greater autonomy from North American and European actors, who tend to dominate the global institutions of Internet governance.
Global arrangements

However attractive regional options might often be, operation of a single global Internet also requires substantial measures of transplanetary governance. As already seen, much of the regional activity in Internet governance unfolds under the umbrella of global institutions. In addition, global nodes in polycentric governance of the Internet also sometimes work without a pronounced regional suborganization.

Many global regulatory arrangements for the Internet relate to technical standards. For example, the IETF operates largely on a global basis, since protocol parameters need to be the same across the world in order that devices everywhere on the planet can communicate with each other. Global coordination of various other technical functions of the Internet is achieved through the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Unicode Consortium (which develops non-Roman scripts on the Internet), the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), and the misnamed European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), which actually works across five continents.

ICANN operates globally, especially in relation to its regulation of generic top-level domains (gTLDs). Suffixes such as ‘.com’ and ‘.org’ lack a territorial designation, and thus want substantial supraterritorial regulation. In fact, ccTLDs, in spite of their territorial referents, also operate across the planet. Indeed, several country codes such as ‘.co’ (Colombia), ‘.nu’ (Niue), and ‘.tv’ (Tuvalu) attract more subscribers outside than inside the designated territory. ICANN also oversees Public Technical Identifiers (PTI) – previously the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) – which on a planetary scale implements IP address allocations, changes to the root zone file (the apex of the DNS), and IETF-approved protocol parameters. Global management of the root zone file itself is done by Verisign, the largest company in the domain name industry, under contract with ICANN.

Global IGOs also play notable parts in Internet governance. True, long-running demands from some government and civil society quarters to place the IANA functions under control of the UN have borne no result. Still, the UN convened the important World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2003 and 2005, as well as its ten-year review (WSIS+10) in 2015. The UN has also hosted the vibrant IGF process since 2005. The ITU, a UN specialized agency, has spearheaded certain global technical standards for information and communications technologies, and also undertakes various digital development programmes in the Global South. Another UN specialized agency, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), addresses various global aspects of copyright and trademark issues with relevance to the Internet.

Further Internet governance transpires through global economic institutions. For example, several councils of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have, since 1998, developed measures regarding e-commerce. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has several committees, task forces, and working groups dedicated to Internet matters. The OECD has also convened Ministerial Meetings on the Future of the Internet Economy in 2008 and the Digital Economy in 2016, as well as issuing ‘Principles for Internet Policymaking’ in 2014.

Persistence of the national scale

Although the suprastate – regional and global – institutions described above play a large part in polycentric Internet governance, they have by no means removed the national sphere of regulation. For example, to take another significant instance of transscalarity, national states provide major input to regional and global intergovernmental institutions. In addition, much
of the non-governmental involvement in IGOs comes from country-based business and civil society actors. To this extent, many suprastate arenas of Internet regulation are very much ‘inter-national’.

Some private regional and global governance of the Internet also has elements of national suborganization. Earlier mention was made of the GAC, which brings over 170 states into ICANN. Likewise, the global ccTLD stakeholder group at ICANN is composed of country-based members. Certain countries in the Asia-Pacific and Latin America-Caribbean regions have national registries of IP addresses, such that requests for Internet numbers can go to a national bureau as well as directly to the RIR. Meanwhile, the Internet Governance Forum has some 40 national gatherings alongside – and interrelated with – the regional and global IGFs. Also, multiple national NOGs work alongside, and with, the regional NOGs.

Then there is considerable Internet governance that lies with individual nation-states, particularly regarding the regulation of online content. Governments generally cannot deviate very far from regional and global arrangements for engineering infrastructure, since countries would thereby be cut off from the Internet. However, states have more leeway to devise their own distinct rules regarding the data that pass through Internet channels. On matters of online content, it is often national legislatures that enact laws, national executives that implement those rules, and national judiciaries that review and enforce the measures. That said, the regulation of Internet content often draws on norms and standards that have been formulated in regional and global arenas (e.g. regarding cybersecurity, data protection, e-commerce, and intellectual property). Moreover, in Europe regional agencies also play a major part in drafting regulations for Internet content.

Within the national scale, a state is made up of many bureaucratic parts, and the various government departments do not always present a united front with respect to Internet governance. For instance, it is quite common for a national government’s communications and technology ministries to hold positions on Internet regulation that differ from those of its foreign and security services. Furthermore, these ministries might be at odds with economic ministries, whose positions might, in turn, clash with those of justice ministries. Thus, different parts of the same state might take contrasting positions on Internet policy at, say, ICANN and the UN.

To counter such inconsistencies, several governments around the world have created mechanisms for interdepartmental coordination on Internet policy. For example, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) has substantially centralized Internet governance in Beijing. In India, the Prime Minister’s Office has set up an interdepartmental committee on Internet matters, overseen by the deputy national security advisor. The US government has a DNS Interagency Group convened by the Department of Commerce, as well as a coordinating Internet Policy Board at the White House. Meanwhile the Brazilian Internet Management Committee (Comitê Gestor da Internet no Brasil, CGI.br) assembles officials from multiple government agencies together with representatives from the country’s business, civil society, and technical circles. Yet, in spite of such coordination efforts, the various departments of a nation-state still tend to operate with contrasting commercial, diplomatic, technological, and security logics when it comes to Internet governance.

Local arrangements

Rounding off this picture of transcalar institutional polycentrism in Internet governance, it is important to note that some regulatory activity also occurs through bodies with local remits. For instance, several dozen ccTLDs across the world (e.g. in Egypt and Jamaica) are operated through universities. The local is also evident in Internet governance when individual states within the USA have varying regulations regarding, for example, online gambling (which is
permitted in Delaware and New Jersey, but outlawed elsewhere). Hong Kong is a member of the GAC at ICANN, in addition to the central government in Beijing. The state of Tamil Nadu in India is a member of the Unicode Consortium, given its particular interest to promote Tamil script on the Internet. The Freifunk grass-roots movement in Germany develops cost-free local wireless networks. In countless other cases, local actors implement Internet rules that have come from national, regional, and global arenas.

In sum, institutional polycentrism entails that Internet governance is scattered across a proliferation of agencies operating on local-to-global scales. This transscalarity means that regulation of the online world is not neatly distributed between distinct ‘levels’, whereby global institutions, regional bodies, national agencies, and local bodies each take on a separate set of tasks. On the contrary, the preceding discussion has addressed interconnections across scales as much as the scales themselves. As seen, there are local-to-global IGFs, local-to-global arrangements for ccTLDs, local-to-global state involvements in Internet regulation, and so on. With institutional polycentrism, Internet governance consists not of separate scalar parts, but of a complex transcalar whole.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the relevance of transregionalism – interpreted here with an alternative vocabulary of transscalarity – for understanding the geography of the Internet and its governance. Online worlds are seen to transcend not only country–nation-state units, but also, to notable degrees, territorial geography more generally. Cyberspace thereby defies territorialist constructions of place and shows that geographical terms cannot be taken as unproblematic givens. On the contrary, making sense of the Internet requires major paradigmatic adjustments to the ontological and methodological premises of social research and public policy.

Post-territorialist geography is also evident more particularly in the governance of the Internet. Not only do rules and regulatory processes for the online world work through institutions with varying local, national, regional, and global remits, but moreover these agencies in practice often operate across scales, and are densely networked together. In this way, governance of the Internet arises not just from territorial logics, but also from complex regulatory wholes – here termed polycentrism – which substantially transcend territorial places and borders.

Constraints on length mean that this chapter cannot further explore the crucial question of the consequences of transcalar geography for the quality of policy processes and outcomes regarding the Internet. What kinds of promises as well as challenges does institutional polycentrism involve for governance of the Internet (and indeed other issue areas as well)? Should regulation through post-territorialist assemblages be embraced or rejected?

Prima facie, institutional polycentrism would seem, in principle, to offer at least seven major potential benefits, namely:

- rich input (given the many participating governance sites);
- creative policies (given the many and ever-changing combinations of regulatory agencies);
- speed (given the relative absence of rigid bureaucratic procedures);
- adaptability (given the fluidity of the policy networks);
- responsiveness (given that issues are less likely to slip through the cracks when many agencies are involved);
- relevance (given that polycentric policy-making generally involves technical experts and end users); and
- democracy (given the generally reigning ‘stakeholder’ principle that all affected parties should participate in policy-making).
Yet, one can also identify at least nine significant potential problems for transscalar institutional polycentrism, namely:

- retooling (as existing education through schools and the media has not prepared policy-makers and citizens for polycentric governance);
- navigation (as high levels of resources and political astuteness are required to engage effectively with transcalar regulatory processes);
- cultural diversity (as participants bring widely varying life-worlds to polycentric networks);
- coordination and control (as institutional complexity means living with considerable inconsistency and unpredictability);
- efficiency (as polycentrism readily generates overlapping mandates and duplication among institutions);
- compliance (as institutional polycentrism lacks a single coercive apparatus and must substantially rely on collective consent);
- special interest capture (as powerful parties have the resources to manipulate the complexities and informalities of polycentrism to their narrow advantage);
- access (as deeper social structures can limit the involvement in polycentric governance from the geographical and social margins, such as the Global South and subordinated classes);
- accountability (as institutional polycentrism is not amenable to the kinds of democratic mechanisms used in the modern nation-state).

Given this mix of possible benefits and challenges, transscalarity in Internet governance is neither a panacea to be uncritically embraced nor a bane to be categorically rejected. Yet, for better or for worse, institutional polycentrism – working as it does through and across local, national, regional, and global arenas – is the prevailing way of regulation in the large online spaces of contemporary society. Much more academic research and policy experience are needed to learn how to maximize the gains and minimize the problems.

Notes

1 Owing to word limits, this chapter considers only the immediately visible actor-institutional aspects of governance and omits the deeper governance of social structures such as capitalism and gender.
2 The term ‘polycentric governance’ is usually attributed to Elinor and Vincent Ostrom, but this author also developed it independently: cf. Scholte 2004.

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Introduction

Since the 2008 financial crisis, the governance of financial markets has received increasing attention. Calls for stronger control have included proposals for an international organization with the authority to enforce regulations in countries that are finding themselves more and more interdependent. Reality today looks quite different though. International financial regulation (IFR) is taking place in a network of informal transnational bodies without significant authority and national actors that concede little power to the international level. Nevertheless, in many instances IFR does transcend the national realm. The chapter explores how these cases can be viewed from a transregional perspective.

IFR and its international organization today

Through financial regulation, rules are made and implemented for what financial actors are allowed to do, such as restrictions on investments, and what they have to do, such as reporting or maintaining minimum capital. Keeping control over financial markets involves a key trade-off: Regulation aims to prevent misconduct and hazardous risks and to promote stability while not over-restricting markets. Internationally speaking, there is a related trade-off between costs and benefits of financial mobility and interdependence. Costs include, among others, exposure to cross-border shocks and contagion as well as reduced autonomy, which also includes the autonomy of regulators and how much they can control capital before it moves to less regulated markets (regulatory arbitrage). Benefits include larger markets, more efficient distribution of savings toward investment, etc.

IFR involves coordination between regulators for the implementation of similar domestic regulations – to avoid arbitrage and to enable international flows by reducing transaction costs from diverging rules – and of more effective regulations. Importantly, coordination comprises the development of international standards and, in turn, their domestic implementation as well as cross-border supervision and enforcement. Such international standards are produced in transnational organizations that make up the core structure of IFR, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Organization of Securities Commissions, and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, all hosted by the Bank for International Settlements.
Acting beyond the level of the state and across states, these organizations are transnational. However, they are not based on treaties but are rather informal and are often characterized as obscure expert clubs. Members of these organizations are specialized agencies rather than governments. The organizations have no coercive power, and the standards they propose are non-binding, that is to say, soft law. They may nevertheless exercise power when national regulators effectively enforce these standards in their jurisdiction, when international institutions with formal authority take up these standards (e.g. when the International Monetary Fund [IMF] makes them a condition for financial assistance), or when financial markets themselves demand compliance with these standards as indication of the soundness of an investment (Young 2014: 309).

Accordingly, IFR takes place in a network of informal transnational actors and formal national actors. There is no supranational agency with regulatory authority such as a ‘World Finance Organization’. The IMF has a mandate to assist countries in danger of default, but it has only a limited role in IFR, which consists mainly in monitoring national financial systems and their implementation of international standards. The role of the World Bank Group is even more limited. Authority and control remain with domestic regulators, which results in varied implementation of international standards across countries.

Developments since 2008 have not altered but rather confirmed this governance structure. Heads of states and governments decided that the Group of Twenty (G20), an informal platform for central bankers and finance ministers, would become the main forum for coordinating crisis response and reform. The Financial Stability Board was formed to foster domestic implementation of international standards; however, it was only given limited resources, let alone formal power, to ‘harden’ the soft law of IFR (Helleiner 2013). The standard-setting bodies expanded in terms of membership but did not change in terms of authority or transparency. Nation-states remain the key pillars of IFR (ibid.: 563). There was an upward shift in policy-making, but in the form of internationalization rather than centralization (Mayntz 2015: 9).

**Perspectives on IFR and some resulting key aspects**

The financial crisis of 2008 revealed that the fragmented structure of IFR and its soft law character were part of the crisis’ problems. Notwithstanding, it still prevails. But why? And more generally, what characterizes IFR today? Conventionally, IFR is viewed in a standard economic perspective: states support a regime based on cost–benefit considerations. Accordingly, IFR based on soft law and on a network structure as described above is considered useful for various reasons, including that it is fast and easy to negotiate; works because markets prompt states to comply with it; offers gains from knowledge sharing; draws on technical expertise instead of relying on bureaucracy; and preserves the flexibility of regulators to adapt it to financial innovation and to features of their jurisdictions.

This standard economic perspective has been debated. One issue is whether assumptions (e.g. regarding market pressure) hold true. Another is that this view is too narrow. Other perspectives are broader, for instance that of Political Economy, which emphasizes interests and power relations, with a key point being that regulation always involves politics. Sometimes, this view links well with the standard economic one. For instance, when the first Basel Accord was issued in 1988 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, United States (US) regulators had to respond to the US Congress, which at the time was demanding stronger regulation, and to banks, which demanded the opposite. Tightening regulation worldwide – or at least in member states of the Basel Committee, from which came the main competitors to US banks – solved this dilemma (Young 2014: 311). The regulators thus undertook a strategy in line with the
economic perspective, but for the political reason of reconciling the expectations of Congress and the banks. More generally, regulators prefer to remain flexible, so that they can respond to such contradicting expectations, and to avoid legislative intervention. The soft law regime enhances their authority, discretion, and flexibility.

The example also points to global politics. Network-based IFR does not mean that there is a lack of hierarchies (Oatley et al. 2013). Dominant states do not exercise power via voting rights but via size, connectedness and relevance of the markets they supervise. Hierarchy segregates the field into centre(s) and peripheries as rule-takers. There are few studies on interstate relationships in IFR. As a general picture, however, IFR is or at least used to be mainly driven by Western powers, just as competition for financial leadership has until recently been mainly between Western powers (Verdier 2013: 1435).

Since the end of the Cold War, the global power balance has not fully changed; however, new actors have gained ground. One reason why global leaders chose the G20 for coordinating crisis response was to involve important players other than the Group of Seven (G7) but without creating too much diversity and conflicts through wider participation. This especially concerns Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), which push for greater voice in institutions that exist in the current IFR system, like the IMF, as well as explore alternatives to that system (Riles 2018).

In a transnational governance perspective, the choice of the G20 and today’s IFR are symptomatic of a general phenomenon (Viola 2015): the complexity of policy issues and heterogeneity of actors have increased the importance of ad hoc, informal clubs of common interest, based on expertise and driven by members rather than by an international organization with its own competencies and agenda. It is not only an effect but also a function of such networks to limit participation to a sufficiently broad, yet homogeneous group and to protect states from the institutional power of a ‘corporate’ actor (ibid.: 28) such as the IMF. The G20 is a ‘nodal actor’ that ‘orchestrates’ the network (ibid.: 25ff.) and that calls upon other actors, such as the IMF as intermediaries, to carry out tasks, without delegating decisions to them.

Political economy also examines the interests and power of other actors, in particular those in the private sector, which sometimes have substantial influence on how they are regulated (Young 2014: 316). Lobbying is the most obvious source of such regulatory capture. Another is ‘the “revolving door” between . . . regulators and the private sector, and the interrelationships among transnational elites in finance’ (ibid.: 315). The latter especially concerns standard-setting bodies. These bodies not only have limited transparency and a lack of accountability, but they also comprise highly specialized experts – a homogeneous, technocratic epistemic community that shares specific beliefs and assumptions, based on which problems are defined and rules are produced (ibid.: 312).

Considering the multifaceted aspects of IFR, international financial regulation needs to be understood as a specific social arena. Riles (2018) suggests putting more emphasis on less conventional approaches, such as, among others, that of social studies of finance and anthropology of finance, as well as law and development. She stresses, for instance, that finance is increasingly based on sophisticated technologies and models of calculation and surveillance, which adds to the relevance of expert communities, be it in the private sector or on the regulator side. These approaches view IFR as a field where finance, technology, expertise, and calculation constitute social practices. They contribute to a richer picture of IFR and of soft law production in expert networks.

These and related aspects also feed into decidedly critical views. According to such views, IFR is paradigmatic of neo-liberalism, considering that market actors and technocratic experts drive regulation behind closed doors while global finance, including its fundamental crisis and
distributive effects, is depoliticized. Pagliari (2012) holds that in post-crisis IFR regulators might have increased their grip on financial markets but market discipline, nevertheless, remains key in many ways. Another critical perspective focuses on the fusion of transnational financial and security governance, for example via the standards of the Financial Action Taskforce for combating terrorist financing; the point is, put bluntly, that financial regulation becomes part of a toolbox for warfare. There is also comparative research that emphasizes differences between national systems, including different cultural attitudes toward bankruptcy. Continued domination of the US not only means that specific US policy preferences are prevalent, but also more generally that Anglo-American concepts dominate and are imposed on, in particular, developing countries. International financial institutions have been criticized for their ignorance of (other) financial systems (Riles 2018).

Cutting across the aforementioned views, a historical perspective is important. Its significance goes well beyond finding that the 2008 crisis – preceding financial globalization, deregulation, ‘folly’ (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009), and the regulatory aftermath – is less unprecedented than often claimed. Historical views also offer alternative explanations as to why IFR looks the way it does (Verdier 2013). For instance, the Bretton Woods system was primarily about creating monetary stability and free trade through fixed exchange rates and currency convertibility. It allowed for capital controls since unrestricted capital flows were considered destabilizing. When fixed rates were abandoned, capital controls were also alleviated. International capital flows intensified and concerns about cross-border risks and the international banking system in general grew. Since there was no regulatory regime in place or in sight, central bank governors formed the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as the first of those transnational regulatory networks that, instead of a supranational agency, ‘became the backbone of IFR’ (Verdier 2013: 1417). In light of this view, today’s IFR results from contingent path dependence instead of, or rather in addition to, actors’ choices.

This example is one of putting choices into historical context and perspective. Another example of that is Lee’s finding that when a leading financial power is ‘ailing’ (Lee 2014: 364), financial deregulation offers a way to ‘stave off’ challengers and keep the rents from financial leadership (such as by being the most attractive market and the safe haven when crisis sets in), a pattern that Lee finds in various crises since 1850.

Transregional issues

On the one hand, these perspectives show the primacy of domestic politics in IFR. ‘[S]tates prefer, if at all possible, to act unilaterally’ (Verdier 2013: 1437). Domestic regulation usually takes a territorial approach: regulators enjoy a regulatory monopoly over the geographical space of their national jurisdiction (Brummer 2012: 35). On the other hand, and especially in a perspective focusing on global power and politics, there are transnational groupings, such as countries of Anglo-American regulation vs. ‘the Rest’, US vs. EU, and so on. The section below explores more generally how IFR involves, affects, and traverses regions and discusses related transregional aspects.

General aspects

When foreign actors comply with host country rules, domestic regulation of that host country works internationally. The reach of US regulation, for instance, produces a specific financial area in which this particular regulation affects firms and other actors of very different contexts. Thereby, this area extends radially across the world and traverses geographical regions, such
as Europe, as well as regions constituted by cross-border regulatory harmonization that differs from US regulation, such as the EU. This production of space starting and spreading from one country and the traversing of otherwise established regions differs from the rather top-down transregional production of space through global IFR, which involves a global centre of dominating states; a periphery of countries where international actors of financial sector development promote the adoption of IFR rules; and an intermediate space – the G20 – that provides a broader basis to IFR rules and their entry into other regions such that, according to IFR rationale, harmonized standards produce the global public good of mobile but stable finance.

These two transregional dynamics – the one starting in a country vs. the one evolving from IFR – can also be distinguished in terms of whether they are by intention or by effect. Applying one’s own regulation to external actors might primarily aim to control financial risks in one’s own jurisdiction, leading to transregionalization of domestic regulation by effect. IFR, on the other hand, is transregional already by intention. As a combination of the two cases, there might be efforts to bring one’s own regulatory preferences into IFR, and thus other jurisdictions (‘uploading of policy preferences’, see Benz and Mayntz [2015]). This is transregional by intention – even if the intention is only to make sure that IFR does not contradict one’s own regulation (a defensive move) as opposed to making sure one’s own regulation is in force everywhere else (an expansive move of territorialization).

Transregional aspects of post-crisis reforms

This ‘uploading’ of policy preferences has been analysed in the context of post-2008 IFR reform (Benz and Mayntz 2015). The results add further complexity to the transregional dynamics of IFR. First, policy preferences in this reform process were issue-specific. Two countries might have been in agreement on some issues but not on others, which is why loose and varying coalitions formed. As a result, ‘regulatory regions’ overlapped. The United Kingdom would side with the US in some respects, advocating Anglo-American liberal regulation opposed to more conservative preferences in continental Europe. In other respects, the EU, including the UK, and the US would be opposed to one another.

Second, IFR goes beyond a simple two-level – national and international – coordination problem (Benz and Mayntz 2015). The most advanced case of regional financial regulation is the EU. In the post-2008 reforms, the EU played a mediator role both upwards and downwards:

EU decisions have been shaped by the preferences of – different coalitions of – member states, but they have also taken into account the reform plans of dominant non-EU countries, such as the US, and the reform plans and principles formulated by international bodies.

(ibid.: 167)

Reforms emerged from a ‘policy coordination across territorial levels, although these levels do not constitute a coherent governance structure . . . [they] demarcate scopes of action rather than jurisdictions, and relations between levels are defined in functional terms rather than by formal rules’ (ibid.: 164). Regional coordination as an intermediate level corresponds to the ad hoc, loosely coupled character of IFR in general. Still, the EU was neither an independent driving force nor was it merely an upward transmission belt for national policy preferences.

Regions overlap or are traversed in other ways. There are initiatives of regional IFR as means to mediate incompatibilities of G20-IFR and non-G20 states, for example in the context of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, see below) and partly even ASEAN+3.
Transregional aspects of IFR

(including China, Japan, and South Korea). Thus, member states of the G20 and even of the BRICS or G7 are also part of a region of alternative IFR and of IFR periphery.

Another transregional dimension of IFR is social and cognitive. The global elite of financial experts share a similar repertoire and mind-set across countries that are also embodied in the promotion of financial regulation by financial sector development agencies such as those of the World Bank Group. Even if states have different financial systems and policies as well as pursuing alternative IFR – for example, on a regional level – this transregional cognitive homogeneity could reduce differences considerably.

Regional financial integration

Efforts to promote regional financial integration, for instance in sub-Saharan Africa, illustrate this reduction of differences. A study by the African Development Bank (AfDB) argues that a key problem of financial systems in sub-Saharan Africa is their limited size and the resulting lack of economies of scale. A first argument for regional integration to include finance is that this would allow domestic finance to become competitive enough for the global market. Moreover, financial integration in this region is a private rather than policy-driven phenomenon to the extent that it originates from foreign banks entering the region and positioning themselves as regional institutions (AfDB 2010: 29). The connections of these banks to global markets increase the exposure of the domestic systems to these markets. A second argument for regionally harmonized regulation is therefore that it would be a remedy to this exposure without causing competition for these banks among regulators in the region (which could take the form of a race-to-the-bottom deregulation).

Despite the focus on intraregional coordination, this regional project is clearly embedded in an international context. The regulatory repertoire to be realized is that of global IFR. The accords of the Basel Committee and other standards guide the catch-up development framework. Ultimately, regional integration serves as a step toward going global. In a postscript to the aforementioned study, implications are considered of the effects that the crisis (at the time of writing) had on the countries studied. Unsurprisingly, the study stipulates that African countries must move even more vigorously toward regional financial integration in order to withstand shocks from, as well as integrate into, the global economy (AfDB 2010: 134) – the very economy where shocks generated in the first place.

Compared to this ‘going global via regional’ proposal, in the ASEAN regional financial integration has been discussed in a more defensive transregional perspective. Because Southeast Asia is highly interdependent within the region as well as with global markets, it is exposed to external shocks and to subsequent contagion in the region – the last crisis being a good reminder of this fact. According to Kawai and Morgan (2014), this exposure, rather than a vision of further ‘going global’, is the motive for regulatory integration. They emphasize that the region could learn from the integration experiences of Europe but that it differs from the EU in terms of both economic diversity and institutional capacity, including the lack of an overarching structure. Due to these barriers, ASEAN only aims for general harmonization and for mutual recognition of national systems that leaves more discretion to domestic regulators, rather than for fully harmonized laws and regulations as in the EU approach. While not denying references outside the region (e.g. to the EU), the authors emphasize that ‘a global regulatory approach of “one size fits all” may not be appropriate for Asia’ (Kawai and Morgan 2014: 4). This particularistic view diverges from conventional IFR in that it refrains from integrating fully and fast but does not amount to an alternative approach to international financial regulation.
Transregional remittances regulation

Somalia receives an estimated USD 1.3 billion in remittances annually. Two out of five Somalis rely on this money to meet their basic needs. Much of this comes from diasporas in the US and the United Kingdom. While Somalia’s money transfer system is relatively affordable, the country has no functioning commercial banking system. There are no foreign banks or money transfer operators (MTOs), such as Western Union. The only alternative formal institutions are Somali MTOs, which need to have bank accounts in the sending country. However, banks in the US and other countries with Somali diasporas increasingly consider money transfer a high-risk sector and Somalia a problematic destination because of its weak regulation and the risk of the money financing groups that are listed as terrorists. Even at the height of the drought from 2010 to 2011 in the Horn of Africa, banks in the US announced that they would close Somali MTO accounts in response to international standards against money laundering and terrorist financing (Oxfam 2015).

Losing their bank account obviously curtails the ability of a Somali MTO to manage the remittance lifeline, thereby affecting the survival of recipients in Somalia. Such measures actually backfire to the extent that remittances, as a result, go through informal networks inaccessible to regulation. Furthermore, the remittance corridors constitute specific financial spaces that cut across different regions – North America or Europe and the Horn of Africa – which have distinct states of financial development and regulation. These financial spaces are predominantly subjected to particular standards developed by the Financial Action Taskforce, standards that follow a security rationale more than a financial rationale. Through their application, these standards regulate not only the financial risk management of banks but also Somalis’ access to the remittance lifeline.

Alternative financial regulation? Islamic finance

IFR can be seen as pragmatic effort to keep financial systems functional. However, it is ultimately based on the broader normative system of economic liberalism, suggesting that capital ought to be able to move freely (be it for the sake of free choice or for the efficiency this is expected to generate). The most prominent alternative financial rules based on such a system are those of Islamic finance. They derive directly from sharia, a norm system that is much older than modern global finance. Proponents consider Islamic finance a veritable alternative to conventional finance. They claim that it has stronger ties to the real economy, thus reducing speculation; that it is based on partnership and involves risk sharing rather than risky opportunism and free-riding; and that it is more accessible for employment-intensive small enterprises, thereby contributing to poverty reduction. Islamic financial regulation not only prohibits *riba* (interest or usury) but also excessive risk and gambling – both of which are considered key drivers of the last crisis – as well as the financing of religiously forbidden products.

Khan (2010) suggests, however, that Islamic finance has not yet lived up to the promise of being an alternative. There are several financial products compatible with such regulation and Islamic finance has grown strongly in the last decades, even during the 2008 crisis. However, many of the transactions are in the form of *Murabaha*, which effectively is not very different from conventional interest rates. Islamic banks place much of the deposited money in non-Islamic banks so that large parts of it, probably, are not put into sharia-compliant investments. Finally, Islamic finance competes with conventional banks for customers, making emancipation from conventional finance and fulfilling Islamic standards difficult. At the same time, according to Kuran (2010), a key purpose of Islamic finance is to assert Islamic identity and establish an alternative to Western leadership more generally.
Transregional aspects of IFR

Taking into account the points above, Islamic finance can be seen as an attempt at alternative financial regulation, but in a wider context of world politics. It spreads across a global landscape of conventional finance, with its own centre in countries predominantly with Islamic banking – and possibly sharing a basic Islamic identity – as well as extending to other countries where Islamic banks operate next to conventional ones or where Islamic products are offered by conventional banks. While the latter countries are at the periphery of Islamic finance, they might be centres of conventional finance. The resulting space of Islamic finance is further entangled with the space of its counterpart – conventional finance – in that Islamic banks are linked financially to conventional banks and financial markets and because key countries of Islamic finance, such as Indonesia and Turkey, are part of the G20 where global IFR is negotiated.

Concluding considerations

Today’s organization of international financial regulation in transnational regulatory networks can be explained through the various angles discussed above, including that IFR encompasses a general trend in transnational governance. At first sight, a specific feature of finance might be that the object of regulation – such as capital, financial instruments, and innovation – follows a particular, powerful, and transcultural logic. This would suggest a strong drive toward universalization and transregional convergence in IFR. Possible areas or sources of alternative IFR, such as regional financial regulation and Islamic finance, have turned out to be effectively embedded in global conventional finance and IFR.

At the same time, there are obvious instances of particularism. National regulators maintain authority and discretion, and alliances are specific and dynamic. IFR is designed for transregionally similar financial practices, but even when rules are rather specific, social contexts of implementation differ across countries, regions, etc. While there are relatively coherent descriptions of (fragmented) IFR itself, more research is needed of how IFR is translated into domestic contexts, what the effects of this are, and how this differs across countries or groups of countries more closely linked with each other. These questions, together with their answers, would make a transregional perspective on IFR more complete, including not only how international financial regulation links and crosses regions but also which effects and changes this produces in those regions.

Moreover, in addition to cultural and other differences between financial systems today, the question of what a bank or a financial system actually is or could be, in light of recent digital innovations, has become even more valid. Considering that this innovation takes place to a considerable extent at the periphery of IFR (mobile banking in sub-Saharan Africa being a case in point), transregional perspectives can encompass financial developments on a global scale but with emphasis on historical contingency and local particularity across regions rather than framing IFR as a global phenomenon.

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GLOBAL HEALTH
A concept in search of its meaning between Northern dominance and egalitarianism

Iris Borowy

Introduction

As Koplan et al. have already argued,

Global health is fashionable. It provokes a great deal of media, student, and faculty interest, has driven the establishment or restructuring of several academic programmes, is supported by governments as a crucial component of foreign policy, and has become a major philanthropic target. However, although frequently referenced, global health is rarely defined. When it is, the definition varies greatly and is often little more than a rephrasing of a common definition of public health or a politically correct updating of international health.

(Koplan et al. 2009: 1993)

Even experts have not necessarily been clear about what exactly global health is supposed to mean. When the United States (US) Institute of Medicine conducted a survey among 29 international health leaders at the turn of the last century, asking what difference they saw between global and international health, some thought that global health responded to an increased awareness of globalization and global interdependence, while others felt it was merely a new word (Macfarlane, Jacobs and Kaaya 2008: 386). Some years later, Janes and Corbett (2009: 168), doing a PubMed search using ‘anthropology’ and ‘global health’, found ‘a dizzying array of subjects, ranging from the narrowly epidemiologic to the broadly programmatic’. This lack of precision might explain why a relatively large percentage of publications addressing global health are editorials, adding their considerations to a cacophony of voices, all trying to make sense of this increasingly ubiquitous expression and/or to appropriate it for their specific purposes. Even today, numerous publications on global health begin with a reference to its poor definition. In practice, global health is used in a variety of meanings, ranging from the actual health of people worldwide to a political or developmental goal to a practice of public health to a discipline of research and teaching.

Despite – or because – of this ill-defined meaning, ‘global health’ is a firmly established term, widely used in academia and in popular media. This broad use is noteworthy because it is a relatively recent phenomenon: ‘global health’ is a fledgling term. An Ngram search, counting
references in books published by google online, shows the term’s quasi-non-existence until 1970, its emergence and slow growth in the 1970s and 1980s, and its steep upsurge in use after approximately 1995. A search in the more strictly academic PubMed paints a very similar picture: 455 publications used ‘global health’ in 1995, rising to 1,091 in 2000; 1,625 in 2005; 2,860 in 2010; and 8,433 in 2015, a 21-fold increase within 20 years. This development is in contrast to that of ‘tropical medicine’ and ‘international health’, terms whose meanings overlap with that of global health (see below) and which had been well established long before ‘global health’ emerged on the scene. According to Ngram, neither expression disappeared. Both retained a position in the health-related discourse, though ‘tropical medicine’ has somewhat declined. Probably by some combination of replacing the older terms and of occupying additional ground, the usage of ‘global health’ surpassed both expressions by or shortly after the year 2000 and continued a truly astounding upward trend, thereby dwarfing both predecessors. Clearly, both academia and lay books have seen a growing need for the term ‘global health’ in recent years, a need that was not satisfied by existing terms.

This chapter looks at the historical contexts in which ‘global health’ emerged and unfolded and explores some existing theories trying to explain its rise. Though the term was a rare expression before 1970, it did exist, and in some ways early examples predicted later usage. The handful of occurrences were concentrated in the US, where it was employed in ways that reflected an optimistic post-Second World War notion of a new international (health) order in which the US assumed a leading and responsible position. A 1948 publication insists that ‘[u]nderstanding global health problems’ is essential for ‘exercising controls and assisting, educationally and materially, in the reduction of disease throughout nations of the world’ (Calderone 1948: 37). The World Health Organization (WHO) propagated its malaria eradication programme as ‘global’ (Brown, Cueto and Fee 2006: 62), which, while perhaps reflecting the important role of the USA in the campaign, mainly underscored the idea of a shared initiative of an organized worldwide community of nations, supposedly gaining control over infectious diseases. Meanwhile, in 1953 a professor of public health at the University of Minnesota declared that the position of world leadership obliged Americans to ‘think of global health problems’ since ‘world leadership’ had ‘brought with it a responsibility for world health’ (Anonymous 1953: 203). Thus, since the beginning, global health has been linked to international health organizations, notably the WHO, and to US hegemony in the field. Both aspects would prove formative again after 1990.
Taking a different perspective, some authors do not search for the beginning of ‘global health’ as an expression but for the use of the underlying meaning it conveys. This approach doubts that global health really introduced a new concept and instead considers it as little more than old wine in new bottles. Using a broad, albeit implicit, understanding of global health, Jeremy Greene et al. argue that

> notions of global health have influenced imperial ambitions, international relations, and global commerce for millennia. A concept of global health surely motivated hygienic reformers of the Roman Empire – when it constituted, at least in its own view, most of the known world – to standardize aqueducts and sewer systems and seek management of pestilential diseases across its many provinces.

(Greene et al. 2013: 33)

There is something to be said for this interpretation. After all, concepts are not identical with the terms by which they are described, and a change of terminology does not automatically warrant the assumption of a similarly clear change in policy. The view that global health is largely a new, supposedly more fashionable word for long-existing practices is supported by the finding that there continues to be a broad field of overlap among academic programmes named either tropical medicine, international health, or global health. All profess a commitment to addressing inequities in health outcomes and in access to health care and to focusing on low-income countries in the Global South (Macfarlane et al. 2008: 391). Nevertheless, it seems counterintuitive that a new term was invented in the 1990s for no reason. More plausibly, the emergence of a new expression reflected some degree of change in meaning or connotation and/or changes related to circumstances, which made existing terms appear inadequate.

The aetiology of the other expressions might help to clarify the field. Tropical medicine was largely a European phenomenon with clear links to colonialism. Unknown until the late nineteenth century, tropical medicine was born when Europeans found a range of unknown – to them – diseases in the territories over which they sought control in Asia and Africa, and they founded specialized medical schools in order to study these illnesses. After 1898, schools of medicine carrying ‘tropical’ in their names emerged in Liverpool, London, Hamburg, Berlin, Brussels, and elsewhere, all dedicated to studying diseases whose effects stood in the way of colonial expansion. Some decades later, these schools usually managed to transform by offering medical education to aspiring doctors from new countries in Africa and Asia as well as supporting political independence from former colonial powers while maintaining scientific and cultural connections. Meanwhile, the term ‘international health’ emerged in the context of international organizations, whose ostensible commitment to a new world order based on equality and on the cooperation of nations as partners required some degree of semantic distancing from a colonial world view. International health alternatively denoted a component of international policies, a new subfield of public health and, sometimes, also the health status of people worldwide. The term reflected the increase in organized cooperation in the health field, not only in international organizations such as the League of Nations’ Health Organization before, and the WHO after, the Second World War, but also in the private Rockefeller Foundation. Most institutions pursued a mixture of vertical and horizontal programmes, drawing on experiences made in colonial medicine and in domestic public health in countries in the Global North. Gradually, the field gave rise to education and research programmes in academia.

The term global health rose during the 1990s, at a period of profound political, economic and ideological upheaval, which affected, among others, international organizations. Therefore, Brown, Cueto, and Fee (2006) see the WHO as the driving force behind the rise of global
health. They argue that the WHO, although it did not invent the term, substantially contributed to the spread of the term by endorsing it in its publications, using this shift in terminology as a way to reinvent itself in the face of declining financial and political resources and growing competition from the World Bank. Gaining leadership in an emerging field of ‘global health’ promised perceived institutional renewal and, ultimately, survival.

This argument is plausible, but it seems to provide only part of the picture. It overlooks the extent to which the rise of global health was tied to developments in the US, notably in American academia. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how global health could have assumed its present position without its explosive growth in university programmes in the USA. As recently as 2008, global health continued to be an overwhelmingly North American phenomenon in that 87 per cent of papers found in PubMed when searching for ‘global health’ and ‘university’ derived from a North American institution (Macfarlane et al. 2008: 389). Elsewhere, the terminology of health work beyond borders has become fuzzy, as demonstrated by the Network for Education in International Health, a European initiative registered as an association in Germany. Under the abbreviation of ‘tropEd’, it presents itself as ‘an international network of member institutions for higher education in international/global health from Europe, Africa, Asia, Australia and Latin America’ (see Network of Education in International Health website; www.troped.org/). Of its 27 member institutes or programmes, 18 of which are located in Europe and none in the US, eight carry a title that contains the word ‘tropical’ (related to medicine or diseases), five refer to international health, four to global health, and nine to public health. Some refer to none of the above and some to several. In that sense, global health programmes can be seen as filling a niche in US academia that tropical medicine had already filled in Europe. In that vein, European institutions that had been founded in relation to tropical medicine have often retained their original name instead of changing it to global health. Thus, in part, global health represents a transformation of an academic discipline, adjusting the field to changing circumstances and to a broadening field of actors. This transformation, however, ties into a larger context of globalization and national political interests.

The rise of global health coincided with intensifying globalization at large, a concept that is equally ill-defined but in some ways depicts changes in increased interactions and interdependencies on a worldwide scale affecting many spheres of life, including health. This is not to argue that, historically, the interaction of people’s health with factors beyond their immediate local surroundings was a new phenomenon. Important components of health and diseases, notably epidemics, have always spread across countries and continents, making health a long-time global issue. Pandemics such as the plague of the fourteenth century, cholera of the nineteenth century, or the Spanish flu of the twentieth century made this fact powerfully clear. Similarly, the health of people at one place has frequently been affected by developments having a large geographical reach, such as the arrival of new sources of food through the Columbian exchange, slavery, industrialization, or natural disasters, for instance droughts or the eruption of volcanoes.

The beginning of international cooperation in the health field – involving Sanitary Conferences held since the mid-nineteenth century and the creation of organizations like the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau, the Office International d’Hygiène Publique (OIHP) or the League of Nations’ Health Organization between 1902 and 1921 – testified to the increase in such perceived health risks. In the late twentieth century, however, the degree to which human agency came to affect the health of populations in many other parts of the world reached a new level: several man-made factors began affecting health on a global scale, influencing an unprecedented number of people and turning into an inherent and permanent feature of modern lifestyles. Issues such as transboundary pollution, climate change, the depletion of mineral and biological resources, energy-demanding food habits, and mass consumption together with
changes in medical knowledge and technological application can no longer be attributed to a specific place, neither in cause nor in effect, since both the origins and repercussions of such factors are truly global in character.

To a certain extent, these new developments were not adequately captured by ‘international health’. After having dominated health policies beyond national borders for almost a century, the reliance on narrowly medical and often bilateral development aid as well as the focus on tropical diseases and on other health issues specific to countries in the Global South could be seen as an inadequate approach advanced by international health to a situation in which the health of people at one place depended on the actions of people at many other places (Cabane 2013). This perceived flaw applied even more to tropical medicine, a field that some saw as tainted by its colonial past and by an increasing scepticism whether there even was such a thing as a ‘tropical’ disease or whether the illnesses in question were tied to poverty and social exclusion rather than a particular geographical location. Accordingly, Macfarlane et al. (2008: 389) see global health in part as a response to more public awareness of the vulnerabilities to disease shared by disadvantaged groups worldwide as well as to ‘discomfort that there were huge inequalities in disease burden between rich and poor countries and between rich and poor people anywhere’. The surge in academic programmes, therefore, can be interpreted as a widespread desire to better understand the reasons for such inequalities. Furthermore, the interest in such programmes among people from many disciplines, including law, economics, and environmental sciences, can be viewed as a recognition of the need for interdisciplinary approaches.

Despite such increase and interest, current processes of globalization come with additional and less altruistic repercussions. An important component is the fading control of the state. When Lee, Fustukian, and Buse (2002: 5) argue that international health ‘becomes global health when the causes or consequences of a health issue circumspect, undermine or are oblivious to the territorial boundaries of states and, thus, beyond the capacity of states to address effectively through state institutions alone’, they refer to a new condition of the world in which a growing number of determinants of health are functions of worldwide developments beyond the reach or control of individual countries. This anti-statism weakens the role of the state in both obstructing better cooperation and strategies in health as well as protecting against the anti-social elements of free markets, notably the Structural Adjustment Programmes and their often devastating effects on public health systems. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, authors such as Poku and Whiteside (2002) warned that ‘global health’ represented in part a shift in perspective in which social justice and public health services had come to be regarded as obstacles to development instead of essential components of sound developmental and health policies. Their view is shared by authors who see the introduction of Disability-adjusted Life Years (DALYs) as the strategy in which the economization of health took hold (Kenny 2015). DALYs have been contested owing to their application of economic calculation methods such as age weighting and future discounting to health, which many have found objectionable. Nevertheless, they have also drawn attention to neglected health problems including mental diseases and road traffic injuries.

This shift away from public health spending did not equate to an overall decrease in health expenditures. On the contrary, the rise of global health has coincided with an unprecedented growth in international health funding, increasing from USD 5.82 billion in 1990 to USD 28.2 billion in 2012 (Hoffman and Røttingen 2013). However, a lot of this money was not spent by, or through, governments or public institutions but through private programmes. The use of global health as a guiding concept was in part tied to the privatization of health work through the rise of private philanthropy, which in turn became a formidable player. Again, the phenomenon as such is not new. During the first half of the twentieth century, the Rockefeller
Iris Borowy

Foundation, due to its extraordinary financial power, was propelled into the position of a dominant health agency active on a global scale. Recent years have seen the increasingly important role played by private foundations financed by people such as Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, Michael Bloomberg, and Mark Zuckerberg. Generally speaking, all foundations have tended to privilege vertical approaches, focusing on single, high-profile disease programmes and sponsoring related research and technical approaches. But while the ‘International Health Board’ and the ‘International Health Division’ of the Rockefeller Foundation, established in 1913 and 1927, respectively, self-evidently referred to the ‘international’ character of its work to indicate its worldwide reach, more recent foundations have favoured describing their work under the label ‘global’ health. Taking this development to a new level is the growing list of foundations in the health field where a handful of very rich people dominate decisions over policies that affect the lives of millions.

In a more mundane sense, globalization transforms academic education and careers, spurring the rise of outward-looking new disciplines that compete for instructors and students. It also reinforces the competition between academic institutions for paying students, strengthening the commodity character of university education that needs to cater to the interests of customers. In this context, global health not only satisfies the desire of students to have interesting topics, with an option to do field work in exotic places, it also promises a way to demonstrate relevance. In the logic of North American universities as economic institutions, attracting students increases their market value, so that the endorsement by actual and potential students alone is sufficient to guarantee an increase in programmes that promise an education in ‘global health’ regardless of what it meant (Macfarlane et al. 2008: 391; Cabane 2013).

The popularity of ‘global health’ programmes in Northern universities has raised concern about apparent Northern-centric tendencies. The concentration of programmes in Northern universities, particularly in North America – often without a clear definition of the object and methodology of those programmes – has risked confirming conventional Eurocentric approaches of health work, based on one-sided, Global North–South flows of ideas and lessons, apparently for the benefit of low-income countries but without true Southern collaboration. Some discussions of global health focus more on the field of promising job opportunities for Northern public health experts than on health needs of people in different parts of the world. Worse, by putting a strain on Southern institutions expected to mentor the US students, global health programmes might actually be a burden rather than a help to Southern health systems.

Global health research plays a particularly questionable role in the context of recent public health challenges. Under the impression of HIV/AIDS, whose growth as a high-profile new health threat coincided with that of ‘global health’, Northern interest in health circumstances in impoverished communities in low-income countries in Africa increased without, however, affecting concomitant research and publication practices. Thus, African physician-researchers, working under conditions of poverty as well as shortages in staffing, medication, and equipment, found it difficult to meet the scientific and ethical standards required in Northern journals. In addition, when their research questions differed from those of their Northern colleagues, their writings risked being categorized as irrelevant. As a result, only in exceptional cases have African physician-researchers managed to publish results from their own countries in international global health contexts. Ironically, it was precisely these conditions of poverty and deprivation that enabled Northern researchers to obtain funding for well-endowed global health programmes (Crane 2010). This situation has not been limited only to HIV/AIDS. Generally, the growth of global health programmes has resulted in ‘the virtual invasion of Africa by international scholars’ so that ‘the continent’s new export was information for university-based researchers and pharmaceutical companies’, leading to ‘a new form of colonialism: extending
uses of sites in the Global South to study their disease burdens to satisfy the needs of science (particularly, these days, the AIDS industry) to find new subjects and explore new problems’ (Janes and Corbett 2009: 176).

The fact that this effect of ‘Global Health’ as an avenue for the commodification of Southern disease conditions for the benefit of Northern research and researchers was especially influential in the US was supposedly rooted partly in the stronger tradition of higher education as a marketable good. However, it might also have been influenced by the way the term could draw on its early and rare, but existing, origins in the country. Comparing the first examples of global health, mentioned above, to usage after the remarkable increase of the term in the 1990s reveals some parallels. Both times, the US emerged victorious from a worldwide war, even though in 1989 it was only a Cold War, and both times, health became part of a foreign policy rationale. Global health was not only about the health of people worldwide, it was also about how addressing these people’s health would or could affect the position of the US in the world. A case in point is a document entitled *America’s Vital Interests in Global Health: Protecting Our People, Enhancing Our Economy, and Advancing Our International Interests*. This report, published in 1997 by the Institute of Medicine Board on International Health, one of the National Academies of Sciences, constructed emerging infectious diseases as a security threat to the US and, conversely, ‘global health’ as an entity in which the US should be actively involved due to enlightened self-interest. These interests focused on economic and political prosperity, and in view of their scientific competence, US institutions were to become natural leaders (King 2002). Inevitably, this line of argument has strengthened criticism of global health as a component of continued Northern hegemonic policies toward low-income countries under the guise of humanitarianism.

In short, global health invokes radically different meanings, ranging from a profound commitment to an egalitarian approach to health as a human right for people around the world to a worldwide challenge that caters to Northern academic and political interests and world views. Several researchers and activists have called for ways to reconcile these contradictions, that is to say to bring the broad appeal and the ethical claim to egalitarian globalism in line with tangible agency. In this vein, Macfarlane et al. (2008: 392) cite ‘a very narrow window of opportunity for global health to become the exception to the rule, where institutions from the Global North usually control the process’, and provide a series of suggestions about what should be done to make global health live up to its name and be truly global. One main suggestion is to establish collaborations between institutions in Southern and Northern parts of the world to design programmes aimed at decreasing health disparities both between and within countries as well as at educating health workers able to address health challenges wherever they occur.

Similarly, in the introduction to their recent edited volume on global health, Paul Farmer et al. (2013) insist that global health is not (yet) a discipline at all but rather a set of questions. They argue that global health, because of its commitment to global equity, must focus on low-income countries in the Global South and that its approach must be eminently interdisciplinary, that is to say that it must integrate, at least, medical, public health, environmental, and economic policies. Ironically, this approach of health being part of virtually all fields of life is very close to the social medicine approach propagated, among others, by the League of Nations’ Health Organization during the 1930s. Arguably, global health is more global than pre-Second World War social medicine, but it caters to the same underlying idea of health as a profoundly social phenomenon.

A tangible initiative in this sense has been the activism toward a Framework Convention on Global Health. First proposed by Georgetown University professor Lawrence Gostin in 2007, it has been widely discussed and is at present being actively pursued through a Steering
Committee and Advisory Board, most of whose members come from Southern institutions (Gonzalez-Martín, Gostin and Burci 2007). At the time of writing of this chapter, the exact text is still being debated, but the main elements and the purpose are well defined. The convention would be a global treaty that defines standards for health care and underlying determinants of health as well as arranging an international and domestic financing framework to provide necessary funding. Its main purpose would be to establish accountability in the health field while pursuing policies aimed at increasing national and global health equity (see Framework Convention on Global Health). The outcome of this initiative is still unclear, and a critical analysis has identified possible limitations, including duplication, lack of feasibility, and questionable impact (Hoffman and Røttingen 2013).

Conclusions

In the middle of the second decade of the twenty-first century, some 25 years after its emergence on the scene, global health is still in the process of finding its definition, vacillating between two approaches. On the one hand, it is a precept that legitimizes the management of public health in low-income countries for the benefit of Northern academics and institutions under the guise of humanitarian work. On the other hand, it is a fundamentally new approach to health challenges around the world, taking a genuinely collaborative and egalitarian approach. It still remains to be seen how global health will eventually play out.

Select bibliography


TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Helena Flam and Katarina Ristić

Introduction

This chapter focuses on institutions of ‘global justice’ – that is to say, on institutions dealing with humanitarian law and human rights such as truth commissions (TCs), international criminal tribunals (ICTs), and the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. It also throws some light on their relation to international organizations (IOs) and foundations and, most of all, on their cooperation with transnational non-government organizations (TNGOs). This is, relatively speaking, an under-researched area of study. The first aim of the contribution is to highlight the role of under-highlighted actors and foundations while recounting some familiar narratives about the emergence of the ‘global justice’ institutions since the 1980s. In particular, this chapter pinpoints the role of jet-setting diplomats and Global North-based foundations in promoting transitional justice. Empirical references will buttress the view that we cannot speak of ‘global’ but rather of transnational or transregional, at any rate pointillistic, transitional justice. The text will briefly present three contrasting TCs and ICTs – for Guatemala, the former Yugoslavia, and Cambodia – to underscore the highly contingent outcomes of experiments in transitional justice.

The global justice movement is said to have originated in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, when the Allies instituted the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg as well as the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal to deal with atrocities committed by the Axis powers, namely Germany and Japan. But the movement really took off in the 1980s in response to the repressive authoritarian regimes responsible for organizing persecution, massive political killings and disappearances, torture, genocide, etc. While in the 1970s most of the Soviet bloc countries mainly relied on arrests, imprisonment, and various psychological forms of repression focusing on prominent dissenters and dissenting groups, several Latin American countries – to take a prominent contrasting case – committed atrocities within a shared framework known as Operation Condor. Within this framework, military dictatorships of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Brazil (Lessa 2015) spread political terror. State repression was methodically advanced by a secret transnational network of intelligence and counterinsurgency targeting political opponents in exile. The USA provided technical and military support.

In these diverse repressive contexts, new regional and transregional dissenting movements emerged (Neier 2012). The movements defended regime victims, whether in Latin America or in the Soviet bloc, in the new language of human rights (HR). They heralded the Helsinki
Accords (1975) – signed by 35 states, including the USA, Canada, and nearly all European states – as a grand victory, mainly because Article VII affirmed respect for HR and fundamental freedoms, notably the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief.

Although the Helsinki Accords did not manage to reduce Cold War tensions much, they did successfully launch a new era of global HR rhetoric. Amnesty International (AI), established in 1961 in London, and the Workers’ Defence Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników, KOR), established in 1976 in Warsaw and soon renamed the Committee for Social Self-Defence (Komitet Samoobrony Społecznej), adumbrated the Helsinki Accords. In contrast, Human Rights Watch (HRW), whose original name was the Helsinki Watch, established in 1978 in the USA, followed and amplified their concerns.

AI and HRW, later joined by many other TNGOs, focused on Article VII in their work. For the last several decades, they have monitored HR violations with the aid of local and regional informers. These TNGOs have become powerful actors in the process. Their more recent, concerted efforts will be depicted below.

In the 1980s, the United Nations (UN) – joined by the European Union (EU) in the mid-1990s – also began to step up its efforts to promote HR and democracy. It actively organized many HR conferences across the globe and fostered close cooperation with thousands of (T)NGOs, most of which defined themselves as humanitarian or human rights organizations. With the transformation of several Latin American and Asian authoritarian regimes into democracies, as well as the breakdown of the Soviet bloc, the triumphant onward march of HR transmuted into a seemingly ‘global’, transitional justice discourse that merged the rhetoric of HR and democracy. It fused together concerns over post–conflict and post–dictatorship peaceful transitions to democracy with demands for the truth about the past top–down atrocities and justice, that is, punishing the impudent elites guilty of mass atrocities.

These demands were often blocked or minimized by the perpetrators and their economic and political allies, whether at home or abroad. Nevertheless, the calls for justice and for war against elite impunity led to the institutionalization of what one could call a transitional justice family of institutions. These include about 50 truth or truth and reconciliation commissions, several international or hybrid criminal tribunals, and the ICC in The Hague.

**Truth commissions**

TCs appeared in larger numbers in Latin and Central American countries emerging from civil wars and dictatorships, as a result of which tens and hundreds of thousands of citizens had been imprisoned, tortured, disappeared, or killed. While most TCs were set up by democratically elected governments under pressure from their civil societies, others were set up by the UN or with its backing (Hayner 2011 [2001]). In 1983, the Argentinian democratic government pioneered in creating the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, CONADEP). Since then, Argentina has pursued truth, justice, and reconciliation in many different institutional forms. In Chile, President Patricio Aylwin established a National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in 1990. The (UN) Commission for the Truth for El Salvador followed in 1991.

The next on this continent was the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (La Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, CEH, 1997–9). The case of this commission will serve to make three points: (i) many such commissions are sustained by transregional efforts and (ii) are unable to achieve their aims without the assistance they receive from transnational, national, and local NGOs. And (iii) even a very successful commission guarantees neither peace nor democracy.
The agreement to establish the CEH was signed in Oslo in 1994, thereby revealing the important role countries such as Norway and Sweden play as consistent supporters of peace and reconciliation initiatives in Central and Latin America. After civil society and victims of atrocities vehemently opposed the narrow mandate the negotiating parties wished to impose on the commission, the commission managed to gain their support (Hayner 2011 [2001]: 32–5). This was accomplished by relying, once again, on transregional cooperation.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Christian Tomuschat, a German law professor and an expert on Guatemala for the UN, as the commission’s chair. Tomuschat decided on the highly legitimate choice of two other commissioners. With the assistance of an NGO from Washington, DC, the CEH was able to secure a de-classification of pertinent files in the US and thus gained access to thousands of vital documents. The commission also relied on a massive data supply from a Catholic and an indigenous NGO which each collected thousands of statements. This compensated for the reluctance of the Guatemalan armed forces to release records. CEH staff included both Guatemalans and non-Guatemalans, who went into the most remote regions to collect victim and witness testimonies.

After the commission concluded its devastating report – documenting 600 massacres, hundreds of burned-down villages, and the fact that most victims were civilians and children who were maimed, raped, burned, killed, and thrown into shared pits – one more attempt at transregional cooperation took place. In it, an indigenous leader filed a case in Spain against the president of the Guatemalan congress for his involvement in the atrocities in the early 1980s, submitting the full report of the commission to back up her case. While this led to an international arrest warrant and extradition order by the Spanish courts, the Guatemalan courts refused to enforce it. Although this point cannot be developed here, it has to be stressed that, although the commission was a great success, it did not bring either democracy or peace to Guatemala.

Moving now across the Atlantic to the remnants of the Soviet bloc after its breakdown in 1990, it can be noted that the issue of whether, how, and in what form to address the past impunity of the elites also emerged in Central Europe (e.g. Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the former German Democratic Republic). Some countries set up so-called ‘lustration commissions’ to consider individual cases (Lavinia 2009; Nalepa 2010; David 2011; Pakier and Wawrzyniak 2015).

Also in the 1990s, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SA TRC 1995) became iconic. To its distant advocates, it seemed to succeed in simultaneously squaring the circle of pursuing truth, justice, and reconciliation (Rotberg and Thompson 2000; Engel 2017). Like the subsequent TCs, it called for victims and perpetrators to tell the truth about past crimes, since this truth was seen as a necessary precondition for reconciliation and a shared democratic future. The SA TRC promised amnesty to the perpetrators of politically motivated crimes who fully confessed atrocities and thus prompted several thousand applications to testify (Hayner 2011 [2001]). However, the SA TRC had to reject around 4,500 applications to testify before it on the grounds that it could not find political motivation behind the committed crimes. SA TRC heard and granted amnesty to 2,500 perpetrators. In contrast, the SA TRC heard 21,000 testimonies from victims and witnesses (see Flam 2013 for some criticisms).

Neither the SA TRC nor the subsequent TCs acquired their iconic status on their own (du Bois-Pedain 2011). There were many charismatic elite figures and ‘believers’ advocating them. For example, Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu played a key role in setting up the SA TRC. On Tutu’s advice, Rwandan, Irish, and many other countries he personally visited also decided to set up TCs. Annan, who as UN under-secretary-general for political affairs did not hinder the international community’s failure to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, in his capacity as the
seventh UN secretary-general and also earlier as a head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and later as a head of the Kofi Annan Foundation, has advocated a wide variety of reconciliation processes and institutions, including TCs.

In 2001, political scientist Priscilla Hayner – a ‘believer’ and co-founder of the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) – published *Unspeakable Truths*, her book on transitional justice and TCs. Its 2011 edition features a recommendation by Annan. From its opening pages, TCs are exhibited as the only viable way out of bloody conflicts and toward reconciliation. Already back in 2001, Hayner offered her consulting services to all interested post-conflict governments. She served as director of the ICTJ’s Geneva office until 2010, financed by international donors such as the Hungarian-American investor and philanthropist, George Soros, and his Open Society Foundations (Dibley 2014).

Similarly, law professor Juan E. Méndez, former UN special rapporteur on torture and Annan’s adviser on the prevention of genocide, was actively involved in the process of establishing the regional TC in the former Yugoslavia. To this TC we turn next. This case clearly exemplifies a failed effort to achieve transitional justice despite much transregional support. It also highlights some bottom-up motivations and efforts to have TCs set up.

This regional TC, the Regional Commission for Establishing the Facts about War Crimes and Other Gross Violations of Human Rights Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (RECOM, or REKOM, as it is known in the region), started its activities in 2004 after several NGOs from Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia agreed on regional cooperation. They were looking for a means of breaking through the wall of denial about the past crimes in the region (Kostovicova 2012). As the sole actors in the region, they recognized that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague (ICTY) as well as national court cases did not manage to generate either the truth about the past or any willingness to achieve reconciliation. In several workshops, ICTJ advisers, such as professor Méndez and an HR lawyer, Mark Freeman, manager of the ICTJ programme for the former Yugoslavia, shared their expertise on TCs.

The participating NGOs agreed to coordinate their strategic lobbying for a TC to be established as a mechanism that would complement the work of the ICTY. RECOM was supposed to adopt a ‘victims-centred’ approach to transitional justice. It was sponsored by a generous grant from the Dutch embassy and the European Commission (EC), amounting to EUR 2.35 million. The initiative resulted in the creation of a network of 1,900 NGOs and associations of victims and veterans, and was also supported by individual artists, journalists, and academics. Ten regional – later international – forums of transitional justice were organized from 2005 onwards, and served as a main meeting point for the members’ organizations, opening debates about the past and on finding proper mechanisms for truth-seeking processes.

The forums also served to showcase the support received for a regional TC from international players (e.g. ICTJ experts and ICTY judges) and from the public (the aforementioned artists, journalists, and academics from the region and Europe). Politicians used them to seek political legitimization (e.g. a Croatian president opened the second forum and the president of the Serbian National Assembly opened the third).

RECOM was officially launched in 2008. While the consecutive parliaments of the Council of Europe (CoE) and the EU supported it strongly, domestic political support remained wanting. The regional petition to establish RECOM ended with 545,000 signatures, although the aim was one million. Nevertheless, the RECOM statute proposal was adopted in 2011. Its strongest political support came from the EC, which included the RECOM initiative as one of the conditions in its Enlargement Strategy. This only reinforced the ongoing political rejection of the RECOM in the region, however.
As this example implies, although many TCs fail to reach their goals, they are pursued by local actors, not least because IOs and (T)NGOs press for them and they bring with them international funding, public recognition, and opportunities to perform or take on the role of a public intellectual. The most recent TCs were set up in Brazil in 2012, Tunisia in 2014, and Nepal in 2015.

ICTs and the ICC in The Hague

As part of the transitional justice movement, the international or hybrid criminal tribunals and the ICC in The Hague have a history that is usually traced back to the declarations on HR and the concept of humanity that re-asserted themselves in the wake of the Holocaust and the Second World War (Mazlish 2009: 18, 26, 31–2, 36). These declarations define all human beings as equal and as such entitled to the protection of their rights, independent of their class, ‘race’, gender, sexual preference, etc.

The promoters of criminal justice see the Nuremberg tribunal and court cases against Nazis in West Germany as the legal precedent establishing the practice of post-war criminal justice, departing from unsuccessful attempts to legally punish perpetrators after the First World War in Leipzig and Constantinople (today: Istanbul) (Bass 2000). However, it was actually the Eichmann and Auschwitz trials in the early 1960s that coincided with a generational shift, enabling a new politics of memory in Germany: West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s politics of forgetting – entailing a superficial process of lustration and inconsequential war crimes trials – had set the tone until Fritz Bauer, a Hessen state prosecutor, conceived and orchestrated the so-called Auschwitz trials, against much explicit legal and political opposition (see, e.g., Langenbacher 2003).

While trials against war criminals had taken place in Germany and (less intensely) in Japan, similar trials were envisioned but never realized in Italy. This accounts for considerable differences in official accounts about the Second World War, as well as in self-definitions and official views on the need for education on national responsibility for war crimes and war-related atrocities (Langenbacher 2003). These differences made the Nuremberg trials highly visible – although, as stated above, it was actually the Eichmann and Auschwitz trials, and their left-liberal proponents, that in the long run modified the national narrative.

These facts notwithstanding, the ICTs and the ICC in The Hague have the International Military Tribunals (IMT) at Nuremberg and the IMT for the Far East in Tokyo as their institutional predecessors. However, they are separated by several decades during which war crimes, crimes against humanity, and breaches against HR went unpunished. During the Cold War, the only attempt to subject war to moral, if not legal, rules, was the Russell-Sartre Tribunal, which put the USA on mock trial for its conduct in Vietnam in 1967. Controversial in absentia tribunals against perpetrators of genocide in Cambodia in 1979 (Selbmann 2016) took place as well. They point to an important, yet unexplored, research niche that could reveal more about the pre-history of transitional justice courts and tribunals.

The long Cold War impunity period ended when the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established the ICTY in 1993, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) a year later. Legally, these new institutions operate within the framework of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and the Geneva Conventions (1949) and its Additional Protocols (1977). IHL applies legal rules to armed conflict, protecting civilians, other non-combatants, and prisoners of war while imposing some limited restrictions on the use of weapons. The crime of genocide, as defined in Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), was introduced in all subsequent institutional
Truth commissions and the ICC statutes. Contrasting with these, the ICC in The Hague is the first permanent international criminal court based on an international treaty, known as the Rome Statute of 1998. It establishes four core international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.

The noble heritage of the ICC should not obscure the power asymmetries within the ‘international community’ of states, or the Realpolitik behind the creation of the ICTs and the ICC. The first ICTs were set up in the 1990s not so much because of concern for truth and justice, but instead because of indifference toward and hesitation about what to do about the ongoing mass killings. From the point of view of its many internal and external critics, the West failed to prevent or intervene quickly enough in the genocide taking place in Cambodia, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, for example. Smith (2010: 178–9) stresses that European governments in the end acknowledged genocide in Rwanda but ‘limit[ed] their response to declaratory measures, humanitarian aid and support for a process of justice’, thus failing the spirit of the Genocide Convention.

The actual inaction in the face of the Balkan and Rwandan conflicts appeared hypocritical in light of the transregional human rights discourses of the UN and the EU, UN regional and transnational conferences on HR, and the UN’s mobilization of NGOs for HR. Under pressure from outraged public opinion and some left-liberal politicians, several European governments and the UN launched investigations into their pre-1995 failure to deploy military forces to stop the mass killings. Self-critical debates ultimately prompted these governments and the UN to abandon the comfortable principle of non-intervention in other states’ affairs and to intervene to protect HR (Smith 2010: 127–9, 174–5, 179–80).

Simultaneously, after 1996, many concerned IOs and TNGOs, as well as prominent politicians, joined a transnational campaign that became known as the ‘War against Impunity’. These included the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), AI, HRW, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders), and key UN representatives such as Annan as well as a number of foreign ministers, such as Lloyd Axworthy (Canada), Joschka Fischer (Germany), and Robin Cook (the UK), to name just a few (Leebaw 2007: 228–9; Axworthy 2008; Smith 2010: 180).

This campaign was an unprecedented attempt by a coalition of highly respected IOs, TNGOs, and left-liberal ‘dove’ politicians from the so-called ‘Like Minded States’, such as Canada, Norway, Germany, and the United Kingdom, to circumvent big powers, such as the USA, Russia, and China. The latter have been blocking initiatives for peace and disarmament within, but also beyond, the UNSC (Glasius 2006; Axworthy 2008: 234–7; Schiff 2008; Struett 2008).

Very quickly, the ‘the War against Impunity’ coalesced around the responsibility to protect principle (or R2P). The basic idea is that the international community should grant not to the states but to their inhabitants the right to international protection, even against states – foreign or their own – that endanger their security and well-being (Smith 2010: 17–29, 63–4; Rodrigues 2012: 3).

These principles and the coalition around them led, inter alia, to the establishment of the ICC in The Hague in 2002 (Glasius 2006; Schiff 2008; Struett 2008; Dezalay and Garth 2010). Owing in part to the power void back home, the Russian vote supported the ICC Statute. But one should not forget the leading role of the Caribbean states (e.g. Trinidad and Tobago) and the courage of the African states in resisting US (under President Bill Clinton) pressures not to sign. On the last day, even the US representative signed, although up to date this has remained the only US endorsement gesture. The ICC Rome Statute was ratified in July 2002 by a required number of 60 states.
Major texts on the negotiations leading up to the signing of the Rome Statute stress the enormous contribution to this success by the well-orchestrated (T)NGOs. They provided daily information updates and put delegates under much pressure. These original (T)NGOs as well many newcomers are, today, part of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CfICC), which includes 2,500 members from 150 countries. The CfICC continues to network and offer support to the ICC by looking for additional signatories and ratifiers. The (T)NGOs support the ICC by identifying and locating perpetrators as well as finding, convincing, assisting and preparing witnesses for trial. Surprisingly, there is a giant gap in research concerning their transregional activities and their interactions with the ICC in The Hague.

Hundreds of (T)NGOs and similar actors are involved in propagating and offering consulting services in the area of transitional justice and helping prepare cases as well as prosecute perpetrators. Those with high visibility are all involved in transregional operations. Many feature maps on their homepages showing where they are active. Among these we find not only IOs and (T)NGOs such as the ICRC, AI, or HRW, but also foundations with headquarters in the USA or Europe, with which they are intertwined. Some are listed on the homepage of the US Department of State and are led by well-known diplomats such as Kofi Annan. Others are financed by financial investors and philanthropists, such as George Soros, or famous foundations such as the Ford Foundation or the Rockefeller Foundation. There is no doubt about their Global North character:

- Open Society Foundations, www.opensocietyfoundations.org, was established in 1979. It is financed by Georg Soros, currently directed by James Goldstone, and was made global in the early 1990s by the former president of the HRW and the American Civil Liberties Union, Aryeh Neier;
- The Center for Justice and Accountability (CJA), http://cja.org/, (for a map of its cases see www.cja.org/section.php?id=5) was established in 1999, founded by AI and the UN, and headquartered in California;
- The International Center for Transitional Justice, www.ictj.org/, was established in 2001, financed by the Ford Foundation, Carnegie Corporation, Rockefeller Foundation, etc. It has headquarters in New York and Geneva;
- Kofi Annan Foundation, www.kofiannanfoundation.org, was established in 2007 by Annan, and has headquarters in Switzerland.

Such foundations find their counterparts in (T)NGOs such as No Peace without Justice (NPWJ), www.npwj.org/, established in 1993. Founded and directed by Emma Bonino, a UN and EU politician, it is headquartered in Brussels and closely linked to the ICC in The Hague. This NGO emphasizes its International Criminal Justice Programme which, inter alia, involves propagating transitional justice and working for the ICC’s further ratification, cooperating with the ICC and ad hoc courts or tribunals, national prosecution entities, or other accountability programmes.

While proponents of HR, humanitarian action, and war justice speak of ‘global justice’, the old opponents of these discourses and of the ICC as such, for example the Arab states, as well as its new opponents, such as the African states, equate it with ‘racist’ justice or the justice of the Global North. These opponents speak for the regions from which they come and point to the geographical location of cases on the agenda of the ICC to dismiss it as racist. While the speakers for the Arab countries never wished to have the atrocities committed on their territories addressed, the African spokespersons conveniently ‘forget’ that several African leaders had been instrumental in pushing through the ICC Rome Statute. At any rate, their discourses engage regional and race imaginaries against the ICC.
Finally, the (T)NGOs promoting ‘global justice’ speak in highfalutin terms about the need for democracy, truth, justice, and reconciliation in post-violent conflict societies. But their engagement is far from global. For example, the just mentioned CJA lists the following countries as places of their involvement: Bosnia, Cambodia, Chile, China, Columbia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Peru, Somalia, Syria, East Timor, and the USA.

The few places of involvement peppered about, help to make the point that there is no ‘global justice’, only rather modest achievements in establishing its scattered and mostly very shaky strongholds. Two contrasting case studies will be presented next to underscore that (i) the idea of ‘global justice’ is far from legitimate also at the national level and (ii) a highly contingent, complex process decides whether or not regional and interregional cooperation addressing past crimes will ultimately acquire legitimacy.

**ICTY in The Hague and the former Yugoslavia**

From the moment it was established, the Tribunal was burdened by the tension between the international and domestic arena, on the one hand, and its judicial and political function, on the other. Questions of jurisdiction, procedures, interstate cooperation, application of the IHL, and consistent prosecutorial strategy often meant that the ICTY was ‘navigating unchartered waters’, as one of the judges noted (Kerr 2004: 211). Moreover, the Tribunal constantly had to struggle to gain political and financial support from the UN and its member states. The Tribunal’s lack of enforcement power turned the process of cooperation into an almost two-decade play involving the Balkan states, the international community, and the ICTY itself (Peskin 2008). Nevertheless, at the international level, its legal and historical contributions have been praised.

The general failure of the ICTY to contribute to the process of dealing with past atrocities can be explained in terms of the hostile political elites and nationalist media strongly opposing the trials, but also other factors. The ICTY’s outreach office was first established in 1999 to inform the countries of the former Yugoslavia about legal cases and the work of the ICTY in general. Its delayed activation contributed to information deficits and the generally poor level of legitimacy of the ICTY in the former Yugoslavia (Orentlicher 2008; Clark 2014). In all post-Yugoslavian countries, the ICTY’s decisions became subject to nationalist interpretations, a phenomenon Subotić (2009) calls ‘hijacked justice’. Media remained highly nation-centric, converting court judgments into narratives about a victimized present and heroic past (Džihana and Volčič 2011; Ristić 2014). Numerous opinion polls show that people in the former Yugoslavia still see the ICTY as biased, illegitimate, and established solely to punish their own state’s citizens (Gordy 2013). Political elites – asked to arrest and transfer some of the accused former high-level politicians, military, and police commissioners – managed to reduce the issue of war crimes to the question of cooperation, or the ‘Hague question’. The EU made the cooperation with the ICTY a primary condition for the EU accession, and this further helped to deprive the trials of any moral meaning. In the end, the ICTY was effectively portrayed as a hostile institution, an obstacle to the political and economic development of the region.

Exceptions amid this anti-tribunal sentiment have been the HR NGOs in the region. From the very beginning, they have assisted the ICTY by promoting its work, monitoring trials, and translating the tribunal’s judgments into the different languages of the region. The NGOs did not win any popular support for the tribunal, however, since they themselves have been marginalized in their societies. In Serbia, for example, they were dismissed as traitors of the nation because of their anti-war stand and of being financed by the EU and the USA, and widely blamed for supporting anti-Serbian politics, especially after the NATO intervention in 1999.
These organizations did not manage to break through the wall of unwillingness to deal with one’s own past war crimes and massive HR violations.

Several controversial acquittals by the ICTY in 2012–14 jeopardized even this support from NGOs. Several NGOs wrote to the UN secretary-general, questioning the legality of these acquittals and asking that political pressures behind the ICTY’s decisions be investigated. In July 2013, the Hague branch of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (MICT) was officially established to gradually take over from the ICTY, after two decades of work that has been both highly praised and bitterly criticized.

Cambodia and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia

Unlike in the case of the former Yugoslavia, it was the Cambodian government itself that wrote the letter asking the UN to help bring to justice those responsible for genocide and crimes against humanity in Cambodia. The appeal was sent in 1997, just a year before the death of Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot (Fichtelberg 2015). Following a positive response from the UN, an international expert team from Australia, the USA, and Mauritius was established to review evidence and a potential transitional justice mechanism. While this team debated the merits and shortcomings of several models of international criminal justice, reluctance was building up in Cambodia toward the international tribunal owing to its questioning of the sovereignty of the national courts and the arrogance displayed by the outsiders claiming to know better what type of justice would be appropriate. In the end, the national government prevailed, and a national court with international judges was adopted establishing a so-called ‘hybrid model’.

The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), set up in 2001, was to apply Cambodian law and to rely on international law only where domestic law fell short. At the outset, it had 17 Cambodian and 12 international judges. It served as a model: several such courts were established with the support of the UN after 2000, in, for example, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Kosovo. This model reduced UN costs related to the long duration of trials, while improving community outreach and granting some ‘national ownership’ and participation to the political elites and citizens (Cohen 2007).

The ECCC was situated within the state’s domestic legal system with the aim of prosecuting persons accountable for mass deaths during the Pol Pot regime. Its critics feared that it would lack independence, educated lawyers, and immunity against widespread corruption (Cohen 2007). They also criticized it for taking on just a few cases. A new perspective on the ECCC posits it as a success story, because it takes as the main evaluation criterion not the number of sentences but rather the involvement of society in debates about the past.

HR NGOs and victims’ organizations in Cambodia have been actively included in the process of supporting and assisting the court, especially in outreach, victims’ assistance, and monitoring trials (Cohen 2007; Stover, Balthazard and Koenig 2011; Sperfeldt 2012). Since the legal system grants voice and some intervention rights to victims as civil parties at trial, it facilitates their active participation in the court proceedings. The HR NGOs and victims’ organizations play an important role because they knew to jump at this legal opportunity: they identify victims and encourage them to present their narratives, pose questions, and raise their accusations in the court. As the court proceedings have been transmitted directly by TV and, with the help of NGOs, recorded and spread as videos, the ECCC as well as the NGOs have been credited with launching a widespread process of remembrance and discussion regarding the crimes of the past.

While strongly supporting the court, HR NGOs and victims’ organizations, as well as the larger international community, have increasingly been confronted with Khmer Rouge
Truth commissions and the ICC

supporters, young disinterested people, and critics who would rather fight poverty and build the future (Fredy 2015). Governmental support is slowly draining and the international donors are showing fatigue. That being said, the ECCC deals with crimes committed 30 years ago. It is less about justice and more about establishing facts, archival work, and successful outreach (Fredy 2015). On these criteria, it is a success.

Conclusion

This chapter departed from the standard narrative on the emergence of ‘global justice’ by deflating its claims. Highlighting that ‘global justice’ in fact has a transnational or transregional character and a punctual national anchoring, we presented contrasting TCs and ICTs – for Guatemala, for the former Yugoslavia, and for Cambodia – to underscore the highly contingent outcomes of experiments in transregional transitional justice. Even under the best conditions of transregional cooperation, they guarantee neither justice nor democracy, neither peace nor reconciliation, as shown by the case of Guatemala, a country with the highest murder rate in the world. The text also departed from standard narratives glorifying ‘global justice’ by illuminating the role of jet-setting ‘reconciliation missionaries’ such as bishop Desmond Tutu and Kofi Annan in the transfer of particular models of TCs.

What at first appeared to be a mobilization for ‘global justice’ in the area of transitional justice transpired as a left-liberal ‘dove’ idea propagated by powerful individuals, foundations, (T)NGOs, and IOs located mostly in the Global North. To the standard list of (T)NGOs actively promoting the imaginary of global transitional justice – such as the ICRC, AI, and HRW – the text added the unexplored CfICC and NPWJ, and, in addition, drew attention to foundations such as the ICTJ, Open Society Foundations, Kofi Annan Foundation, and CJA to underscore the Global North character of the ‘global justice’ promotional effort.

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Introduction

The emergence of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and transregionalism, as understood by the editors of this handbook, went hand in hand. They relate transregionalism to the capacity of institutions and persons to transcend and also transform given spatial categories, such as the ‘national’ and the ‘regional’. Practically speaking, this is a laborious process, as is illustrated by the freedom of navigation of ‘international rivers’, a new norm set by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. It took the members of the first IGO, the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine (established by the same congress), 17 years to reach an agreement about how the organization would function and to issue its first act. These years represented a thorny learning process among diplomats, who needed to cooperate in an institutional context despite different national or imperial interests. However, the outcome transformed a series of national arrangements by riparian states into a single ‘international regime’ for promoting water transport and governing the traffic on this now open waterway.

This chapter identifies moments and actors of transregionalism in the historical process of international organization. It portrays the evolution of the community of states, the institutionalization of cooperation, and the emergence of international secretariats. It focuses on leadership and staff culture of IGOs, tensions between universalism and regionalism, and regional differences between the Western hemisphere, Western Europe, Africa, and Southeast Asia.

Community of states

The evolution of states toward sovereign nation-states with clear borders and strong demands for national identities did not prevent the growth of multilateralism and international cooperation. Citizens behaved transnationally by setting up transnational advocacy networks (e.g. in favour of abolishing slavery or promoting gender equality), international private associations, and border-crossing companies. Governments addressed the regulation of transboundary issues at repeated multilateral conferences and also, once institutionalized, within ‘public international
unions’ (later called IGOs). This system of states was open for the reason that private associations felt free to address these conferences and institutions with ideas and expertise.

Although ‘European’ by origin, this system of states gradually expanded beyond Europe. The number of non-European states at the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 was restricted, partly because states not accredited to the court of the inviting Russian tsar were absent, while Mexico and the United States (US) were supposed to represent the entire American continent. Rather than leading to a multilateralism that in essence would be a great power affair (as in the older Concert of Europe), this restriction at the Hague Peace Conference led to the issues of involving all existing states (their number had risen from 23 in 1815 to 42 in 1900) and of participation on an equal footing. International controversies concerning trade and arbitration helped construct ‘pan-Americanism’ in the late 1880s, resulting in the creation of the Union of American Republics. Disagreement about an arbitration procedure among American republics led to the 1901 decision to make all American republics signatories to the 1899 Hague arbitration convention, which implied that Latin American states would adhere to the, by then functioning, community of states. In 1907, almost all states from the American continent attended the second Hague Peace Conference.

The new international relations also affected imperial rule. The General (since 1878 Universal) Postal Union, for example, accepted colonies as voting members. Similarly, while British dominions shared a common allegiance to the British Crown, their room for international manoeuvre as colonies with self-rule became greater over time, being granted independent status in 1926 and becoming members of the British Commonwealth in 1931. The 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations was open to such a shift from colony to eventually independent state, as it made provisions for the admission of fully self-governing states, dominions, and colonies (Article I.2). The League also created a mandates system to administer territories and colonies taken from Turkey and Germany under the tutelage of certain ‘advanced nations’ ‘on behalf of the League’ (Article XXII.2). The United Nations (UN) followed up with a trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of colonial territories until their populations would achieve self-determination (Chapters XI–XIII). The formal end of colonialism and the goal of universality are represented in UN membership growth: from 51 states in 1945 to 193 in 2011.

Institutionalization of cooperation

An IGO is an institution created by states, who are very much aware of national interests, to solve certain transnational and international problems. Finding out how to do that depends not only on its founders and member states but also on the competence and creativity of the ‘international staff’. When multilateral conferences began to be institutionalized in the 1860s, general assemblies started to meet regularly and permanent secretariats became responsible for the institutions’ day-to-day running. Concerning the latter, although providing information to member states was their primary function, secretariats became more and more responsible for preparing the agenda and performing roles that foreign ministries previously used to play. The institutional memory related to these roles and the accumulation of expertise by professional staff members enhanced the position of these secretariats almost unnoticeably, as growth was a gradual and evolutionary process, with experiments and copying of best practices.

The custom of locating secretariats within the foreign ministry of certain internationally oriented countries (Belgium, France, and Switzerland) was eventually abandoned because organizations preferred to control their own bodies rather than depend on staff appointments by one national government. In 1890 the Secretariat of the Union of American Republics
was multinational because staff members represented different nationalities, whereas the International Institute of Agriculture in 1905 in Rome had a mostly Italian staff (80 per cent), which proved an obstacle to satisfactory international action. Since around 1910, most secretariats were multinational, thereby contributing to trust in the organization and the regular payment of member states’ dues.

**International secretariats**

When the League of Nations was being designed in Versailles in 1919, the principle of ‘international civil servants serving the IGO’ was established. Concerning the Secretariat of the League, one position in the debate going on among the founders reflected upon the experience of the inter-Allied war councils of 1917–19 and favoured a secretariat based on a few national officials who would be loyal to and be paid by the member states. However, this model of the war councils was rejected in favour of the establishment of a truly ‘international secretariat’, whose members had to distance themselves as far as possible from national ties and devote themselves solely to the League’s aims. They also needed to be capable persons with broad vision and flexible minds, and they would be paid by the organization. This ‘international secretariat’ became the dominant model for IGOs, with a unitary staff that is multinational in composition and that is headed by a secretary-general (or a similar title) – overall, a body responsible to the IGO and functioning independently of national governments.

Setting up the Secretariat of the League was a journey into unexplored territory, with Eric Drummond, the League’s first secretary-general, bringing in both a Weberian understanding of bureaucracy and British imperial government traditions. Appointments were made only after the administrative need had arisen, with everyone having to be appointed by the League. Drummond chose carefully since appointees had to be acceptable to their home governments. Senior positions were earmarked for nationals of leading states and persons of the same nationality often occupied new positions. Smaller states were thus excluded and national preferences remained present in this international body.

Drummond’s successor, Joseph Avenol, brought the secretariat closer to French bureaucratic procedures: more top-down, with the so-called Central Section for coordination purposes and less scope for staff initiatives. Albert Thomas also exhibited French conduct when he became the director of the International Labour Office. Given the support of the workers in the tripartite structure of the International Labour Organization (ILO), he managed to establish within the various bodies a position for the director that was similar to that of a minister introducing and defending proposals in parliament. He furthermore invested in motivating staff members to find arguments and ways to convince and help national governments in the implementation of ILO rulings. Thomas’ successor, Harold Butler, a former British civil servant, changed the leadership style because he believed that the governing body, rather than the director, should be formulating policies.

These examples demonstrate that IGO bureaucracies thus rest on bureaucratic traditions brought into the organization by the first executive head and then are mixed with other traditions.

**Leadership**

Fridtjof Nansen, the League’s High Commissioner for Refugees, had a small staff and exhibited entrepreneurship and creativity by developing a practice of handling ‘displaced persons’ after the First World War, a new issue that was not discussed or regulated in Versailles. He succeeded
in drawing up a definition of the legal status of refugees, which was expressed in a new identification document: the Nansen passport. His work laid the basis for future international refugee policies. Because many refugee groups did not fall under the mandate of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, August Lindt succeeded in having the UN organize the World Refugee Year (1959–60), which resulted in widening the 1951 refugee convention.

Relevant here is that an IGO’s executive head, in order to be successful, must be both a strong *internal* leader that can mobilize staff and expertise as well as a strong *external* leader with political qualities, such as the ability to assess power relations and acquire support from a variety of international actors. Among the external qualities of an executive head is the necessity to maintain good relations with the heads of other IGOs, which is relevant for both collaboration (the creation of a division of labour) and the settlement of boundary conflicts. The latter can occur in cases where mandates overlap or the relation becomes unbalanced between larger and smaller IGOs, or groups of economically different states such as industrialized and developing ones.

Regional tensions and divides set limits to what could be done. Ludwik Rajchman of the League’s Health Organization, who had built up regional health cooperation in Central Europe after 1919, succeeded in bringing health and economic activities to East Asia, where the League’s presence was negligible and political opposition from the region put an end to his efforts in the mid-1930s. Raúl Prebisch was a strong and charismatic leader of his staff with well-elaborated ideas about improving the Latin American economy, but his regional policies were relatively unsuccessful due to power relations in the North–South divide.

**International staff culture**

The Secretariat of the League had 660 staff members in 1930 (38 nationalities); the UN Secretariat had 1,500 staff members in 1965 (107 nationalities) and 8,600 in 2000 (170 nationalities). In spite of concern to ensure an equitable geographical distribution, the composition of the Secretariat of the League was overwhelmingly European, which was in line with the actual recruitment policies of senior staff as based on high educational standards in Europe. The Middle East was almost completely neglected and Latin America was under-represented. Recruiting Indians proved difficult because the Indian civil service offered high salaries to qualified Indian graduates; furthermore, a League position required the (tacit) consent of the British foreign ministry. However, the League offered citizens from British dominions, such as New Zealand, ‘backdoor’ professional opportunities, since for them traditional career prospects as British diplomats were limited. Seconding from national administrations was done only on a short-term basis and without pay from their home countries.

Being an international civil servant required specific qualities, not only having an open mind and a distinctively international outlook, but also practical competences such as language skills. Because an international secretariat is a milieu in which different national and cultural traditions are brought together and mixed, the common culture that develops is new, with a rapprochement that bridges linguistic, racial, and gender differences between ‘European’ diplomatic traditions and ‘non-Western’ ones. Living together in one city (Geneva), which soon had its international club in town, enhanced this process of forming a new elite with an international or cosmopolitan outlook. Work relations did not remain restricted to the League but included relations with other IGOs, domestic institutions, and other countries. These relations resulted in transnational networks of people who knew each other personally and as representatives of international and national institutions or as experts in specific fields. Frank Moorhouse’s novel *Grand Days* (1993), based on historical research, describes this intermingling. When the UN in New York decided to take over the League’s buildings in 1946, Geneva received another
incentive to develop itself into an ‘international’, or cosmopolitan, city, later followed by other ‘UN cities’ such as Vienna, The Hague, and to a lesser extent Nairobi.

For the League, idealistic cosmopolitans and persons without roots in their own country proved unpractical recruits because understanding national feelings and having contacts in the domestic political system were essential resources for establishing and implementing international decisions effectively. While a positive attitude toward the IGO was obvious among the original staff, this attitude or even enthusiasm could no longer be taken for granted when the number of nationalities increased over time. The introduction of a declaration of fidelity to the League in 1932 had little practical importance, but Herbert Lehmann found himself in different circumstances when he noticed in 1943 that the Allied forces formulated severe national restrictions on the newly established UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). He then ensured that all UNRRA staff members signed a loyalty statement attesting that their actions would reflect the organization’s needs and not those of their states.

The UN Secretariat followed the model of the Secretariat of the League, with the employees of the former taking an oath not to seek or receive instructions from any government or outside authority. Accordingly, the independence of the UN Secretariat has remained an important principle, although politicization has continued to influence both the IGO and its secretariat. With many governments establishing permanent diplomatic missions accredited to the UN, a direct channel of communication emerged between the organization and its member states. Generally speaking, individuals, irrespective of their regional background, with a particular set of values and motivations are drawn to work in IGOs and selection processes attract applicants with similar configurations of values. In the decades following the establishment of the UN, the recruitment of professional staff by geographical distribution resulted not only in ‘desirable ranges’ for the geographical distribution, but also in complaints from the Group of 77 (G77) about the dominance of nationals from Europe and North America, particularly in senior positions, and stronger awareness of the concerns of the industrialized world.

Universal versus regional

In order to develop regional responses to economic and social challenges, the UN Economic and Social Council contributed to regional definitions in international relations (including name changes following protests) by creating five UN economic commissions: one for Europe (1947), Asia and the Far East (1947, since 1974 Asia and the Pacific), Latin America (1948, since 1984 Latin America and the Caribbean), Africa (1958), and Western Asia (1985). Geographical groups of states were also formed within the UN, such as those of the African, Asian, Latin American, Eastern European, and ‘Western European and other’ countries. These caucus groups, not mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter UN Charter), gained acceptance over time and due to issues in the preparation of UN decision-making. A group that transcends these geographical borders is the G77, which soon represented more than 77 developing states. UN treaties helped define the global commons such as seas, polar regions, and outer space.

The UN Charter defines the hierarchy between ‘universal’ and ‘regional’ action in Chapter VIII. While in San Francisco in 1945 the Latin American states oriented toward pan-Americanism insisted on provisions allowing regional organization and dispute settlement, the US and other states feared that they would undermine UN authority. Therefore, Article 52 is a compromise, allowing states to take a dispute to either a regional IGO or the UN Security Council. However, because regional organizations and actions must be consistent with the aims and principles of the UN, regional IGOs are effectively subordinated to the UN’s universalism.


Regional or world health?

Health became part of multilateralism due to efforts to combat transboundary epidemics. A series of nineteenth-century health conferences resulted in the founding of the International Office of Public Health (1907) in Paris. The Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB, 1902) displayed ‘New World self-importance’ by suggesting that European states adopt American regulations so that their colonies in the Western hemisphere would be in compliance. However, both organizations continued to pursue their own agenda, as did the League of Nations’ Health Organization (1921). In 1926, when the Paris-based organization suggested regional collaboration over the collection of health statistics, the head of the PASB expressed disdain but nonetheless agreed.

When the UN was established in 1945, the three organizations were each represented. Brazil and China jointly proposed the creation of one international health organization. Because Brock Chisholm, who would become the director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO), had not served in the previous organizations and used his talent as the visionary orator of an organization that would be more than international, he succeeded in steering the difficult process of designing and setting up the WHO in 1948, with the word ‘international’ being replaced by ‘world’. Whereas the initiatives for cooperation in the field of health prior to 1945 had largely come from developed states in the North and aimed to protect them from diseases of the poorer states in the South, the initiative in 1945 was taken up by developing states with the broader aim of attaining the highest possible levels of health for all peoples.

However, regionalism continued to exist within the WHO as the PASB adamantly defended its existence. This resulted in an agreement with the WHO, which recognized the newly renamed Pan American Health Organization as both an independent entity and a regional WHO office for the Americas. WHO Director-General Marcolino Candau managed this double allegiance effectively and set up an organizational scheme with six regional offices in the 1960s. However, the way in which this was achieved to a large extent depended on the local interests the WHO had built up, making it difficult to coordinate between regions in the world and leading to a wasteful duplication of efforts. Halfdan Mahler’s strategy called ‘Health for All by the Year 2000’ also suffered from the regional offices’ quasi-autonomy, which demonstrates the difficulty of changing an organization’s geographical configuration.

Continental differences

Regional allegiance is invented and politically constructed, with external challenges and strategies acting as driving forces behind the creation of regional IGOs. This is true for both river commissions (e.g. for the Rhine, Danube, and Congo) and the first regional organization of states on the American continent, which was driven by the US and used in conjunction with the Monroe Doctrine (1823) and the binding strategy of the Union of American Republics (1890). This hegemonic behaviour also produced a North–South binary, with the US as the dominant actor and Latin and Central America as its subordinates. Latin American proposals to let the South participate in the world economy on fairer, more equal terms were rejected at the Bretton Woods conference (1944), which prioritized ‘European recovery’ over ‘Southern development’. Until 1944, when Argentinean economist Prebisch started to work for the Mexican central bank and visited several states in the region, he had viewed Latin America from the perspective of Argentina’s national interests, with little knowledge of the continent. His new engagement allowed him to develop a region-wide vision. Unlike John Maynard Keynes, who focused on the developed world, Prebisch elaborated a global perspective with...
the ‘centre-periphery’ concept and a proactive strategy of import substitution industrialization combined with regional trade integration, which played an important role in the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (1950). Efforts to strengthen Latin America’s position in the world economy through regional cooperation, such as Latin American and Caribbean free trade associations and later arrangements such as the Andean Group and Southern Common Market, proved a slow and thorny process. Politicians, particularly presidents, and international staff again and again had to learn to think in terms of regional integration – that is to say agree on policy goals, distribute costs and benefits, and avoid politicization – rather than in terms of national interests.

Thus, Latin and Central American regionalism has its own roots and forms and is not a copy of Western European integration, as sometimes is assumed. In the emerging Cold War, the US urged Western European states to cooperate through Marshall aid and its condition of a common plan, followed by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman’s 1950 insightful and perceptive strategy for cooperation between the European coal and steel producers as well as for placing their industries under the control of a ‘supranational’ high authority, with the aim of integrating isolated Germany into Western Europe. This resulted in a complicated, both intergovernmental and supranational, political arrangement with majority voting, an executive commission, and a parliamentary body independent of national control, as well as an independent court whose jurisprudence is nationally binding. Directly related to the development of the institutions, a European staff emerged, sharing enough common attitudes and values to speak about a European civil service. Role model figures such as Walter Hallstein and Sicco Mansholt inspired motivation and enthusiasm internally. They also elaborated an external trade policy, based on trade liberalization between developed states and special trade arrangements favouring developing countries, which created a North–South relationship through trade and assistance with African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, all former colonies of the member states of the European Communities (to become the European Union). Within Europe, an internal division exists between northern and (perceived as weaker) Mediterranean members. While pan-European ideas have been less strong, they can be found in the UN Economic Commission for Europe (1947), the Council of Europe (1950), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (1990). The so-called Europe Agreements resulted in enlarging in 2004 (and then 2008 and 2013) the EU to include Central and Eastern European countries, which, however, had to transform their economic and political systems after the end of the Cold War to become members.

African regionalism, in turn, was rooted in the older pan-Africanism and focused on the principles of the ‘Westphalian’ state while it struggled with young states, or those still in pursuit of independence; differences between English and French colonial history; Arab and non-Arab cultures; differing foreign orientations; as well as the South African apartheid issue. The problem for Robert Gardiner – the second executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA, 1958) – was the scarcity of highly qualified African economists and civil servants, which called ECA’s status as an ‘African’ organization into question. It forced him to ‘Africanize’ the organization and its knowledge base. The claim by the newly established Organisation of African Unity (OAU, 1963) to be a ‘genuine’ African organization contributed to the weakening of the ECA and the fostering of a rivalry between the two executive heads. The OAU’s founders favoured a weak and apolitical secretariat or, according to President Léopold Senghor of Senegal, a body that implemented decisions but did not make them. With leadership in Africa being a matter of the heads of state, they wanted to avoid the impact of the OAU’s executive head and limited the secretariat’s potential influence further by not providing sufficient resources. By the end of the Cold War, African countries were suffering from
an increase in internal conflicts. The situation enabled Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim to propose a reform agenda to transform the OAU into the relatively stronger African Union (2002). Due to conflicts and the low level of intraregional trade, regional economic cooperation remained limited, even in the Nigeria-led, weak but firm Economic Community of West African States (1975).

The problem of Southeast Asian regionalism, which has different roots, was the lack of trust between weak ‘nations’ in a climate of strained relations in the 1960s. Prompted by a UN team’s economic advice and inspired by the Non-Aligned Movement, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in 1967. The association possessed a limited organizational structure based on traditional ‘Westphalian’ principles (sovereignty, non-interference) and ‘Asian values’ (dialogue, consultation, and consensus). Although they look informal, both ASEAN and its Regional Forum are strongly institutionalized as well as exhibiting a growing sense of regional identity. Originally, ASEAN had no secretariat. Later a secretariat without any executive role was set up. In the late 1980s, the role of ASEAN’s Secretariat changed when it built up a trade-related role of its own. As is the case in other international organizations and in negotiations with the EU Commission, ASEAN had to adapt to global market and monetary developments. These interorganizational developments gave the secretariat a sense of importance and urgency and its agency became visible in its external role as a global negotiator and its internal role as the necessary coordinator. Initiatives made by high-ranking staff enhanced the bureaucratic machinery and turned ASEAN’s Secretariat into a common international secretariat.

Conclusion

Although terms like ‘international organization’ and ‘international staff’ seem universal, a closer look from the transregional perspective reveals underlying differences that cannot be neglected when analysing their internal dynamics. These are related to an ongoing North–South divide; a barely visible hierarchy, that is to say regionalism subordinated to universalism; and continental differences in views and experience regarding the creation of regional organizations and allegiances.

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TRANSREGIONAL TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FIELD OF CLIMATE AND ENERGY

Markus Lederer

Introduction

The history of human civilization has been strongly influenced by climatic events. For years now, a growing body of scientific work has been analysing in detail nature’s role in global history (McNeill 2012). From the ice ages to the ‘medieval climate optimum’ around the first millennium, changes in temperature have had an undeniable effect on how people interacted within as well as between specific regions (Glaser 2008). There is also no doubt that the way humans have used energy is a significant determinant of history, and although fossil fuels were used elsewhere as well, its massive exploitation was one element fuelling the Industrial Revolution and Europe’s, and later on the United States’ (US) and the Soviet Union’s, global ascendancy (Stokes and Raphael 2010). It is thus no surprise that academic as well as popular works speak of ‘Climate Wars’ (Welzer 2008) or ‘Blood Oil’ (Wenar 2016) to highlight the political aspects of climate and energy.

The following chapter cannot do justice to the broader analysis of the politics of climate or energy; therefore, it focuses on the interaction of state as well as non-state international organizations and the resulting inter- and transregional trends that can be observed in both issue areas. In following the definition of transregional studies as developed in the general introduction to this handbook, the chapter will first review bi- and multilateral interregional relationships where the question of the region as a territorial space is not questioned and, second, examine transregional connections that transcend the idea of a territorially defined region. To do so, the first section recapitulates the history of how national civil society organizations in particular, and later on intergovernmental actors, placed environmental, climate, and energy issues on the top of the political agenda, resulting in the notion of global climate or energy governance. In this development, bi- and multilateral interregional aspects played some role, although much more on an intergovernmental than transnational level. In the next section, the chapter will focus on evolving transregional fora, such as climate or energy clubs, city networks, or indigenous forest communities. These fora – no longer understood as being territorially bounded – represent transregional spaces in their own right. However, considering the newest developments in global climate politics, the question arises whether a return of state-led bottom-up processes is
leading to a new form of multilevel governance. The conclusion will shortly discuss the role of transregionalism in the context of the concept of the Anthropocene, that is to say the perception that the activities of humankind are having such an environmental impact that we now should even speak of a new geological epoch.

The evolution of transnational and international climate and energy governance

The history of energy and climate governance has been written more by international and transnational actors than by regional ones. The following will briefly summarize the most important events and explain in which aspects regional developments nevertheless played a part. In the 1960s, the metaphor of ‘Spaceship Earth’ became influential for highlighting the high degree of independence of human societies during a time when environmental destruction became a common theme in most parts of the world. Since then, a global perspective on climate and energy policies has been dominant. Certainly, environmental concerns were raised much earlier; the idea of protected areas in particular was born during the nineteenth century and not only in the US as the usual story goes (Gissibl, Höhler and Kupper 2012). Although the League of Nations, and later on the United Nations (UN), undertook some steps toward global environmental protection, these were institutionally much weaker than those in the fields of security or economy (Hale, Held and Young 2013). It was civil society-led environmental activism in the US and Europe in the 1960s that pushed protecting nature to the top of the agenda of international conferences and international organizations, especially within the UN system. A first highlight was the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, which can be seen as the first important instance of the UN institutional system dealing systematically with environmental issues. This resonated with an increased awareness concerning pollution issues, energy shortages due to the 1973 oil crisis, and the debate on the limits of growth. Simultaneously, national environmental civil society groups were taking up global issues and were partially starting to transnationalize (e.g. Greenpeace was founded in 1962 and Friends of the Earth in 1969). Ever since the 1970s, environmental politics have had a transnational flavour, and civil society has played an important part in it (Wapner 2011).

From an interregional perspective, it is interesting to note that during this time regional cooperation or diffusion only played a minor role, with some regional leadership emerging in the US and then in Europe. However, as soon as environmental politics left its ecological niche and became a political issue, the first polarization between the ‘North’ and ‘South’ set in. This was already visible at the 1972 Stockholm conference, where governments from the Global South were sceptical of whether the notion of protecting the environment would not be a decoy for a neo-colonial attempt of Northern countries to hold the South back economically (Bauer 2013). When it became clear that some institutional forum for discussing environmental issues would be needed, it became evident that such a United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) would have to be located in the Global South and thus Nairobi became the host of UNEP in 1972 (Ivanova 2010). Despite such a move, the antagonism between North and South is still dominating climate and energy issues today. One such example is the fact that all working groups in the official climate negotiations, as well as in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), are always co-led by one delegate from the North and one from the South.

The next important step was the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, better known as the Rio Summit. As the title shows, the summit took place in Brazil, a country of the Global South, and the issue of development was perceived as just
as important as that of climate. The Rio Summit became the official starting point for global climate politics, with one of its outcomes being the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Surprisingly, energy at this point played a minimal role, with environmental and climate issues still being perceived as issues that could be solved at ‘the end of the pipe’. The UNFCCC process culminated in the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, when, for the first time, the international community agreed on binding emission reductions. Focusing again on regional aspects, it is noteworthy that the UNFCCC process first of all reinforced the notion of North and South by, for example, differentiating between Annex I and II countries in the Kyoto Protocol, the former having legal obligations to set binding emission targets, whereas the latter having been exempt from any binding targets (Grubb, Vrolijk and Brack 1999). A related element is that the global negotiations catalysed regional alliance-building: although at the very beginning these alliances were mostly based on geographical and economic proximity (e.g. the G-77 or the China or the African Group), since the 2000s alliances of regionally distant countries with similar interests have also become influential (e.g. Like-Minded Developing Countries or the Environmental Integrity Group, including countries as diverse as Mexico, Switzerland, South Korea, and Monaco). Within existing regional organizations, climate politics also became more important. For instance, member states coordinated their input toward the global climate negotiations regionally. A good example of such efforts is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), where the more prominent inclusion of forestry on the global level since 2005 led to a considerable rise in regional forest policy.

In the field of energy, three trends are remarkable for the purposes of this chapter. First, there has been much less involvement of civil society actors and, at least until recently, energy has been dominated by a network of businesses and governments (Yergin 2011). There has been some opposition from civil society groups to nuclear energy arising in the 1980s, but this was primarily oriented toward the national level and there is only weak transnational contestation of nuclear energy. Second, energy issues are regulated to a very limited degree on an international level, and the International Energy Agency (IEA), established in 1974, has not become the centre of global energy politics in the same way that the UNFCCC has evolved into the core institution of the ‘regime complex for climate change’ (Keohane and Victor 2011). We thus have a much more fragmented international architecture in this policy field (van de Graaf 2013). Only for the nuclear energy sector does a strong international organization exist: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established in 1957, has been able to streamline some of the research and the regulation in this policy field. Since 2011, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) has been hoping to become the complement of IAEA for the field of renewables, but it is too early to say whether it will succeed in doing so. Finally, energy has been affected more than the climate field by a regional organization. Found in 1960 by Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) did not play a major role in the 1960s but was a major arena for coordinating oil policies from the 1970s onwards and thus became instrumental during the first and second oil crises. Although OPEC has a regional core in the Arabian Peninsula, countries geographically as distant as Venezuela, Russia, Angola, or Indonesia are, today, members of the organization. However, OPEC’s overall importance should not be overestimated because it has little influence over member states anymore (Colgan 2014).

There were highly global dynamics in the field of energy and climate throughout the 2000s, but similarly to other policy fields, a ‘gridlock’ developed (Hale, Held and Young 2013). The symbol of this failure of global governance was the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen (COP 15), where it became apparent that the so-far dominating global top-down approach had run its course as well as that the European Union (EU) was no longer exerting.
its leadership function. Furthermore, emerging economies, specifically Brazil, South Africa, India, and China (the BASIC countries), formed a new and at this point rather uncompromising interregional alliance. Accordingly, the global regime complex for climate change (Keohane and Victor 2011) became ever more fragmented vertically as well as horizontally (Biermann et al. 2009; Fariborz and van Asselt 2015) and more and more scepticism was expressed whether global governance could deliver. Thus, in both energy and climate governance, calls for using different fora have been voiced from policy-makers as well as from academic circles. How far this has led to the evolution of new transregional aspects will be examined in the next section.

Transregional fora of current energy and climate politics

Climate and energy policies are currently being debated, regulated, and implemented in various transregional fora. Although climate and energy issues are regularly discussed as being global phenomena that call for global solutions, the transregional level is becoming more important. When it comes to intergovernmental regional aspects, the EU in particular has been perceived as a front runner in both policy fields (Dupont and Oberthür 2015); accordingly, attention has been paid to how far diffusion within the EU, as well as from European countries to others, has taken place. Lately, Mexico, the US, and Canada have also been singled out as a promising way of reterritorializing climate politics (López-Vallejo 2014). When it comes to Latin America, forests and climate are seen as the major link that binds the region together (e.g. Hall 2012). For other regions in the Global South, there have been fewer wide-ranging treatments and the Global South is mostly perceived as a victim of climate change and energy politics (e.g. Roberts and Parks 2007). Accordingly, the intergovernmental regional level is of some importance in discussions of climate and energy governance.

After the failure of the climate conference in Copenhagen in 2009, policy-makers and some scholars argued that small clubs of countries or coalitions of the willing should be set up (Victor 2011). The question most debated has been whether these clubs should replace the UNFCCC process (Eckersley 2012) or whether such minilateralism would provide important input to the global level and thus be of a more transformative nature (Falkner 2016). An example of such a club approach was the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, which existed from 2005 to 2011 and which can be interpreted as a failed attempt at sideling the global process within the UNFCCC arena. Although in practical climate politics these large transregional clubs play less of a part, they are still being debated within the literature as a rational way to overcome collective action problems. In energy politics, we have lately seen the evolvement of clubs for the initiation of renewable energy such as the International Solar Alliance, centred in India but supported by various Western donors, or the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative, trying to bring sustainable electricity access and rural development to some of the most underdeveloped regions of Africa. Mirroring the more narrow sectoral approach within this policy field, these alliances have less agenda-setting power or regulatory influence and therefore can be interpreted as a form of donor coordination and cooperation. Whether the notion of clubs of countries really goes beyond such coordinating mechanisms and thus adds an interesting twist to transregional climate politics is still an open question at this point. Of more relevance are non- or substate transregional fora.

In the field of climate and energy, civil society as well as business organizations have been engaged either on local-level lobbying for, for example, more sustainable development projects, or they have directed their activities toward global negotiations or pointing out the injustices within the global regime (Ciplet 2014). Only within Europe can one see a systematic attempt of these actors to also influence or to substitute regional governmental actions. However, various
new transregional spaces of governance experiments, both within climate as well as within energy, have evolved over the last couple of years (for a good overview of these ‘climate experiments’, see Hoffmann 2011). Two examples are of particular interest.

First, urban climate and energy governance have turned into a major driver for policymaking on all levels and scales. Whereas at the beginning it was only a few climate-smart cities in the Global North, such as Copenhagen or Toronto, today cities all over the world and no matter whether small or big have started to take climate change and energy policies seriously, engaging in mitigation and adaptation actions (e.g. Bulkeley 2014). Although ‘only’ about 50 per cent of the global population lives in cities, this population is responsible for about 70 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions and many of the mega cities of the world are extremely vulnerable to the effects of climate change, especially sea level rise (UN Habitat 2011). Cities, for this reason, have started to coordinate their actions through global networks like C40 or Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI), and they are no longer only active observers of UNFCCC conferences, but now also claim an official seat at the table. Whether mayors should really ‘rule the world’, as Barber claims (2013), might be debatable; nevertheless, cities have certainly established themselves as a political space also for climate and energy.

Global forests in the tropics are a second example of an evolving transregional space. The reason for their relevance is that deforestation and degradation of these forests cause between 12 to 17 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions. Since 2005, the international negotiations have attempted to set up a results-based payment scheme for avoiding deforestation, called Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation but known under its acronym REDD (Pistorius 2012). Important from a transregional perspective is that the first countries where there are large tropical forests are not only undertaking close cooperation within their regions – for example, within ASEAN or within the Central African Forest Commission (COMIFAC) – but are also organizing, as well as perceiving, themselves transregionally on a global level, for example within the Rainforest Coalition. Furthermore, this form of coordination transcends the intergovernmental level as indigenous peoples living within the forests are forming coalitions and have evolved into political agents within global negotiations (Schroeder 2010). With great potential, these interactions not only create a new political space for formerly disadvantaged groups but also might feed new ideas and practices into the international level that provide an alternative to hegemonic Western approaches. An example of such an idea is the notion of nature being ‘Mother Earth’, which has long been believed by communities in South America. This notion was incorporated into the constitution of, for example, Ecuador and is now also being discussed as a new paradigm within the Northern non-governmental organization community.

The above fora reveal that the policy areas of climate and energy are not only highly dynamic but also that transregional spaces are evolving. The actors in these fora – political agents in their own right – have been successfully lobbying for change. Nevertheless, both policy and academia have doubts about the effectiveness of these new transnational and transregional initiatives and ask whether a return to a more state-centric approach would not be more appropriate. One example where this has become apparent is market-based instruments. Although in theory it would be best to establish a global carbon tax or a global cap and trade system for greenhouse gas emissions, we have a patchwork of a true regional market (in the EU), markets covering one country (in South Korea), as well as markets covering only a few subnational states (in the US and China). There have been arguments for linking these markets; with such an aim, an interregional link between the EU and North American or the Chinese markets would increase the economic efficiency and most likely also the ecological effectiveness of these approaches. However, without strong public oversight and state-led regulation, these markets cannot work (Lederer 2012). A similar trend of relying on national government intervention was observable in the run-up to the Paris
Agreement at the end of 2015 (COP 21). After the high hopes of a top-down approach à la Kyoto Protocol failed, a bottom-up attempt has been agreed upon where countries are voluntarily pledging nationally determined contributions. Thus for now, transregional initiatives have to be understood as representing only one element of a highly complex web of governance that transends a clear top-down or bottom-up logic (Zürn 2013; Hickmann 2015).

Conclusion: transregionalism in the era of the Anthropocene

The chapter began by stating the fact that human civilization has always been influenced by climatic events. I will conclude by tracing the importance of the fact that today this influence is also reciprocal and that through our massive use of fossil fuels and land-use changes human-kind is now altering the climate. This, together with our (mostly highly negative) impact on ecological systems (e.g. Kolbert 2015), has led to the notion that we live in a new geopolitical epoch, the Anthropocene (Crutzen 2002; Hamilton 2017). We are on the edge of an era where human interferences are starting to determine geography and are thus, for example, opening up new shipping lanes in the Arctic. This will most likely have profound consequences for global security politics. What role could transregional processes play in this coming era of the Anthropocene, and how will the idea of the Anthropocene change transregional spaces?

The evolving world order will certainly depend to a large extent on how climate and energy issues are being (un)governed over various scales and levels and which international organizations and/or transregional fora dominate. It is very likely that global economic integration and the concurrent rise of movements of goods, capital, people, and knowledge will continue while at the same time specific regional identities will become more important. This will reflect geographic boundaries (e.g. the Global South or the EU as an Energy Union), economic aspects (e.g. least developing countries), as well as those who identify with their specific spatial identity (e.g. peoples that depend on forests). Studies of transregionalism should, therefore, be aware that particularly in the field of climate and energy the region is a highly dynamic concept that is becoming, not only as an idea but also in its material geography, more and more a cultural artefact. At the same time, the concept of the Anthropocene brings in a new material dimension in the form of planetary boundaries that studies of transregionalism cannot ignore. Walking this fine line between spatial imagination and material reality is thus at the core of transregional energy and climate politics.

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PART VI

Mobilities, migration, and diasporas

Introduction

Sarah Ruth Sippel and Steffi Marung

Looking at the manifold mobilities of people across space, this section addresses a topic that has, since the middle of twentieth century, received enormous attention not only within the social sciences but also within history or cultural and area studies. Mobilities of people are one of the most important factors of cultural encounter, transregional interaction, and the co-development of societies or regions. From the crossing and management of boundaries to the integration of people into a new context up to its possible transformation due to their prolonged presence, the process of migration reveals how regions are connected, constructed, maintained, or transcended and has thus become a prominent, almost an obvious, topic of transregional studies.

Within this context, the debate on global mobilities of people has moved from originally employing rather static theories referring to, for example, ‘push-pull’ factors between spaces that are taken for granted, to more dynamic approaches that emphasize networks and the ‘being in-between’ places as an inherent part of many people’s lives. In the process, the study of the various aspects of migration on different levels has gradually led to a more detailed understanding of complex migratory regimes. These are composed of individual migration trajectories, spaces, networks, and mechanisms of migration and its regulation, knowledge transfers, public perceptions, and arenas of conflict, including shifting concepts of belonging and identity such as in diasporic, immigrant, or hybrid cultures.

In line with considering people’s mobilities as a highly dynamic as well as constantly contested process, the section approaches mobility from two complementary perspectives, namely as a process that is characterized by the tension of being created ‘from below’ while at the same time being subject to efforts of governing ‘from above’. In other words, in looking at how mobility is perceived and utilized by a multitude of actors, the section is particularly interested in the perspectives and agency of the involved actors while recognizing that mobility can be both a way of living by choice as well as a result of force (e.g. due to flight or displacement) or socioeconomic needs. At the same time, actors are seen as being embedded within the broader contexts of the interrelations and mutual interactions taking place between the political and public policies and discourses that are seeking to shape, determine, and govern mobilities. Here, the section considers critical developments, such as the establishment of national and international border regimes and their increasingly militarized and extraterritorialized control and enforcement. These developments are, however, complemented by addressing the strategies people develop to oppose migration control with their own claims about how migration should be dealt with in social and political relations.
In addition to the continuous ambivalence that emerges out of this tension, the section considers the mobility of people as a long-term historical process. Migration, as has been shown by an increasing body of historical research, is not at all a recent phenomenon but has occurred in waves of higher or lower intensity throughout history. A transregional perspective can be especially insightful for an understanding of different trajectories, mechanisms, and effects of migration across and between world regions while investigating how it shaped different realizations of how mobilities have come to be understood and defined. Along these lines, last we consider that the public, political, and academic debate on people’s mobilities is a contested field. This is due to the fact that crucial terms such as ‘migration’, ‘migrants’, and ‘refugees’ entail normative claims as well as theoretical assumptions with regard to issues such as territoriality and border regimes, citizenship and human rights, and sovereignty regimes and social relations. Therefore, it also seems to be necessary to turn this problematic into a question for analysis and exploration pursued in this section.

Against this backdrop, a series of questions have inspired the section: what has influenced and driven people to be mobile over large distances in different periods of time, and how have these mobilities crossed regional demarcations, shaped transregional relations, as well as constituted and contributed to the creation of regions? How have means of governance impacted mobilities, by what means and with what implications, and how have people reacted to, resisted, enforced, or reshaped these means of governance? How, and from which motivations, do actors become actively involved in creating and crafting transregional spaces? And last, what are the concepts and terms that are employed in studying people’s mobilities, how useful are they to aptly analyse the host of social realities involved, and what can the notion of the ‘transregional’ in particular add to this field of enquiry?

The section begins with three historicizing insights into the emergence and unfolding of global movements of people and their interlinkages with region-building processes and transregional connections and dimensions. Dirk Hoeder provides an overview of transregional mobilities from around 1500 through to our present time, especially carving out how they influenced knowledge about particular regions and regional differences and how knowledge transfers between migration regions played out in the process. In sum, he concludes that both the agency of people as well as shifting political and economic power structures have led to a constant redefinition and re-creation of regions. Michael Zeuske, who covers an equally long period of time, specifically focuses on forced mobilities, taking the slave trade as the epitome of forced mobilities across space and time. In his global account of several centuries of slave trade he demonstrates that the slave trade needs to be seen as a truly global phenomenon that affected various world regions, albeit in different and locally specific ways. He especially emphasizes forms of slave trade that occurred before colonialism, and the variety of transregional forced migrations that took place outside of Europe or the Atlantic slavery network. Summing up this historical perspective on people’s mobility, he concludes that the history of transregional mass mobility up until the mid-nineteenth century has, indeed, to be read as a history of forced rather than voluntary mobility. Like Michael Zeuske, Gilad Ben-Nun investigates non-voluntary forms of mobility in focusing on refugees. In addition to a brief historical overview, he argues that the figure of the ‘modern refugee’ is closely connected with the emergence and proliferation of the nation-state. Today, he suggests, three key factors are crucial to understand refugee flows, namely the heightened means of mobility, the impact of Internet Communication Technologies (ICTs), and climate change.

The section continues with four chapters that take a closer look at contemporary mobilities and the way they are conceptualized within migration studies. Jenny Kuhlmann traces the historical emergence and semantic development of the terms exile, diaspora, and transmigration.
She points to the similarities as well as differences in the use and application of these terms over time and discusses them with regard to the more recent turn toward transregional approaches. While underlining the importance of recognizing the historical origins and key differences between the concepts, she advocates developing a terminology that is both flexible enough to give justice to the diversity of phenomena involved while simultaneously capturing their particularities and nuances. Adèle Garnier’s chapter then investigates efforts to control and govern mobilities from ‘above’. She does this by comparing the migratory regimes in two regional contexts, the British as exemplary for the European context and the Australian within the Asia-Pacific. Her focus is on the turn from ‘responsibility-sharing’ to ‘responsibility-shifting’ in international migration policies and the various control measures that have been employed in the two cases. By establishing extra-territorialized spaces, such as offshore processing centres, she shows the detrimental way in which migratory regimes reposition countries within their regional contexts.

Finally, the last two chapters of the section employ a notably actor-centric perspective, scrutinizing how these forms of mobility are best addressed in analytical terms. Drawing on her research on Senegalese entrepreneurs in China, Laurence Marfaing argues that the terms ‘migrant’ and ‘migration’, as understood in migration research, do not grasp these forms of business-related mobility networks spanning economic centres. Instead, she suggests that the concept of ‘transregionality’ is better positioned to address these processes of networking, relations, and exchange of goods and ideas across regions, which are rooted within the individual, creative, and transformative mobility of actors. This, in turn, creates, as she puts it, a new ‘dialogue between world regions’. Sabine Hess and Serhat Karakayali take the massive crossings of European borders by migrants in 2015 as a starting point to enquire into the relationship between mobilities and borders from the perspective of resistance, explicitly refusing to conceptualize ‘the migrant’ as structurally powerless nor as the culturalized ‘other’. Rather, they suggest conceptualizing migration through the prism of ‘autonomy’. From this perspective, the border emerges as a site of constant encounters, tensions, and contestations, with people’s mobilities becoming a co-constituent of that very border, constantly challenging, crossing, and reshaping it. This, they contend, has broader implications, allowing us to consider migratory mobility as a prism for a situated post-national knowledge practice that challenges the constitution of geopolitical and cultural hegemonic projects, such as the process of Europeanization.

In sum, the section illustrates, in a long durée perspective, how mobilities – including the practices and socioeconomic conditions, imaginations and narratives, national and international regulations, as well as cultural and political forms of belonging and identification – have been, on the one hand, a crucial, but often contested form, of relating regions, and, on the other hand, have resulted in the making of new spaces transcending and challenging regions. The chapters demonstrate how this ‘transregional’ quality of mobilities needs to be understood as a problem of concepts as well as of practices and regulations.
While regional studies as a field emerged in the late twentieth century, geographically defined regions and the human conceptualization of regions itself – in contrast to bordered polities and circumscribed areas – have been part of human life from the proverbial time immemorial. But it is a matter of interpretation when and to what degree knowledge about a society’s own region as well as distant ones became part of a ‘global condition’.

People living in 1500 BCE had knowledge about region-specific luxury products from far away, with ornamental shells from the Indian Ocean reaching as far as the Alps for trade. Tools made of an Aegean Sea island’s obsidian were found in the same alpine mountain region, indicating that long-distance trading routes also existed for practical products.

The tricontinental Africa-Eurasia, the so-called ‘Old World’, would become a merely hemispheric one after the ‘New World’ had been added to the Europeans’ knowledge base. Regions of natural resources, regions where they were adapted for human use, and regions of consumer demand were connected ‘globally’ in the two worlds of the time.

This chapter will first present a brief perspective on interregional, or transregional, connectivities and mobilities up to the turn of the fifteenth to the sixteenth century. Second, it will suggest a conceptualization of regions in terms of trading networks and mobilities of different social strata. Third, the macro-regional migration systems existing in the nineteenth century will be discussed with a forward glance toward the period of the Great Depression and the Second World War. While some of those systems already began in the sixteenth century, all were interrupted in 1914. The fourth section will cover the remainder of the century from the 1960s up to the financial crisis of 2008, moving through 1989 with some adjustments. In conclusion, the chapter will offer perspectives on transregional connectivities at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

**Interregional networks, contacts, migrations to around 1500**

Historical memory, as taught in Europe, begins with the Fertile Crescent as a region of agricultural production for human survival and enjoyment of food. In terms of spirituality, a region of veneration of fertility, expressed in female figurines, extended from southern Siberia via the Black Sea basin to the Eastern Mediterranean and the peoples of the alpine mountain range – or spread from one of these regions to others. A sociocultural group with a particularly intense
written memory – if much of it produced in retrospect – lived in the wider region around the Nile valley. Via the deserts of Sinai, they went to Syria and to Babylon, moving forcibly or voluntarily to specific micro-regions within the macro-region.

Finally, the group became smaller and settled in a specific small segment called Canaan. The Canaanite community, which came to call itself the Israelites, kept in contact with the Babylonian one. Such connectivities existed to varying degrees in all parts of the globe.

Sources on the histories of these millennia have usually paid attention to interregional networks while overlooking intraregional networks and the movements of long-distance traders. For instance, when trade items were passed on, they incorporated traders’ knowledge about neighbouring as well as distant regions. When Etruscan urbanites developed a taste for urban Greek pottery, merchants and sailors supplied it, until the artisans themselves migrated to Etruria to cut out the middlemen.

Such interconnected regions of trade and migration reflected land-scapes, that is to say mental views of resources, skills, and consumer demand, as well as of routes and obstacles. Voyaging across seas required different skills from those used for navigating rivers, and moving along caravan routes differed from crossing mountainous territories. Transregional moves also required familiarity with the languages and customs, and the possible hospitality or aggressiveness of the peoples in the regions to be traversed.

Beyond the small number of traders and their sizeable personnel of sailors and pack animal drivers, larger social groups moved as communities. This tended to happen when their natural environment proved insufficient for the number of mouths to feed, when a neighbouring region seemed to offer better prospects, or when hostile neighbours exerted pressure. This required exploratory travel or information from mobile traders. Thin but reliable webs of information transmission preceded the establishment of robust networks or, in terms of quantity of people moving, of transregional mobility or expansion.

In the Mediterranean (western) part of Eurasia – connected to Africa, South Asia, and East Asia via the hinge region of Syria, Gujarat, and Central Asia – a polity emerged that came to call itself the Roman Empire; in the eastern part, the Chinese Empire had existed for centuries. Both polities stretched over defined areas that they constantly redefined via military expansion. Neighbouring peoples contested borders and imperial-scapes.

Historical maps colour-code the extent of an empire and emphasize dividing lines; traditional rule-centred narratives concentrate on a place, the capital, or the court. However, expanding and contracting empires function through a diaspora of administrators socialized in the core. They govern culturally and economically specific regions with units of soldiers recruited from many regions of the polity. This was also the case in the seventh-century empire of Islamic rulers.

Soldiers who settled in the micro-region of Al-Andalus (Iberia) in the eighth century connected to their families in specific micro-regions of Syria. In the same century, when soils and thus living conditions deteriorated in the Chinese Empire’s original core (the Yellow River region), information on fertile soils to the south impelled millions of peasant families to move to the Yangtze valley.

In the African section of this tricontinental world, people speaking variants of the Bantu language migrated in stages from a western sub-savannah region ever further south. They added regions rather than imperially annexing them, and differentiated culturally as well as linguistically in the process. Their language region reached its apex around the year 1000.

The views of peoples on the extent of regions and their usability are related to their interests. Through their agency, they continually form new regions depending on needs and perceived opportunities.
Historical perspectives on migration

In this tricontinental mosaic of regions of material and spiritual cultures, traders and political elites knew of each other, if often only vaguely. In contrast, the sociocultural groups in the other hemisphere – the dual continent to be named ‘the Americas’ – traded with each other from the far north to the far south, with the most important nodes of exchange being in the central region. But they seemingly had no concept of the whole of ‘their’ section of the globe.

Exactly when some Norse warriors and Chinese traders came to know of this second, internally global world, remains a matter of debate. By the year 1500, Iberian seafarers, not knowing of the other ‘New World’ up north, unintentionally connected the two separate sections into one. This ‘first’ globalization as a process was region-specific, Iberian and Caribbean at first.

Conceptualizations of ‘regions’

From the foregoing, it is obvious that ‘regions’ can be of vastly different extent, being shaped by mobile people’s own life experiences and conceptualizations. In modern language usage, the largest units are ‘continents’, defined by fixed physical geography rather than human conceptualization. Thus, the concept provides no more than a crutch to denominate, via fixed geography, the part of the globe one is talking about and its human beings as Asians or Europeans. This makes no sense unless racialization is intended.

The ‘continentalization’ of terminology excluded connecting seas – sea-scapes – from consideration, although the Baltic Sea or the Indian Ocean littorals and routes have actually been the cores of their respective regions. It also transposed the fixity of continents onto ever dynamic human agents, for example ‘the Africans’. Africans located in the sub-Saharan savannah lived in this macro-region according to specific ‘local’ natural circumstances and adapted these to their habits. They moved to a neighbouring region if options were better, and if those who considered the destination possessively as ‘their’ region did not bar entry.

Agrarian cultures have experienced their specific region as the one feeding all – until a surplus of births turns it into a cramped, insufficient one. They have then turned to neighbouring or more distant regions that might be fertile but more difficult to till. Examples include southern Siberia for peasants in the Tsarist Russian Empire in the nineteenth century, and the North American hills and plains for those living in Western European (overseas) empires.

Traders and seafarers have conceptualized regions differently. Through networks of routes, they have connected regions of surplus and of demand, and defined crossroads or ports as exchange nodes. There have been, for instance, the caravan cities at the two ends of the Silk Road, the ends of the ‘sea lanes’ travelled by Arab and Gujarati seafarers, the Rhine-Danube-Rhône riverways, and the Casa Grande at the juncture of central and northern routes in the Americas (today’s northern Sonoran Desert and Arizona). While land-based traders developed expertise on the connections between such nodes, sea-based traders mapped coasts in portolan charts, including known anchoring points and dangerous reefs. They connected nodes through geographic expanses into human regions. Their specific needs determined how both natural and human geography were ‘fixed’ on paper, on maps.

These fixed images of regions, however, are mental maps that reflect any region only at a certain point in time. Sandbanks or hostile regimes might make transregional routes impassable; supply and demand might change, and a central exchange node becomes a marginal one. Changing circumstances and interests equal changes in the conceptualization of regions.

One oft-cited seafarer, Christopher Columbus, was socialized in one of the declining port cities in the former core region of the Mediterranean. He then migrated through existing networks to the Iberian port cities, as a new core formed and expanded. Finally, he sailed outward to an island region that, for lack of a reliable portolan map, he thought to be India.
Regions might best be differentiated as macro-, meso-, or micro-regions. In the expanse of a (macro-)language region, people develop their lives in economic meso-regions, such as in ore-rich mountainous ones, fertile lowland ones, or urban, riverine, or coastal ones. They connect them according to demand. At the same time, sedentary families socialize their children in a micro-region – whether in a village or urban neighbourhood – and in a socio-scape according to the family’s position in the respective social hierarchy.

Mobile families, often labelled ‘nomads’, socialize their children in circuits of travel. As young adults, the children begin to make their own living and might choose to stay put instead, that is if the region offers enough subsistence and options, or might move on to explore neighbouring regions.

For agriculturalists prior to the nineteenth century, the ‘neighbouring’ region was usually a physically and culturally contiguous one; for sailors in Shanghai, the neighbouring region might have been a port such as Singapore or Batavia. Hence, professional proximity also defines regions. Given their different lifeways, mobile agriculturalists, itinerant craftsmen, transregional traders, and long-distance merchants would define the very same regions as scapes of different extents – sometimes overlapping, sometimes distinct. Regions could also overlap if traders or migrants arrived from two or more directions and interacted at the ‘meeting point’, which, in fact, was – and is – an exchange zone.

Nineteenth-century migration regions and changes through the mid-twentieth century

Migrants might move between distinct regions (interregional), or within a region (intraregional), or create a partially integrated sphere (transregional). The ‘trans’ (transit, transport) reflects migrants’ experiences. While crossing social, cultural, and political borderlines, they establish communities – usually not enclaves or ghettos – that do not divide their lives. Instead, they tend to fuse their socialization in their region of birth with the societal frames of their region of destination.

The emigrant–immigrant dichotomy is a divisive stateside categorization. As a matter of fact, migrants emphasize life course continuities and shed some old constraints while selecting some of the new options. The transition between regional lifeways has to be negotiable for the individuals involved.

The first globalization – Iberian exploration – did not immediately change the character of transregional migratory connections; however, over time, the global frames of power did. Iberian merchants and monarchs forged an alliance, an armed complex, and seafaring merchants annexed ports, conquered territories, and drew borders. People long settled in the respective regions of arrival either fled (involuntary intra- or interregional migration), were deported as slaves (forced interregional migrations), or migrated toward the economic opportunities opened by colonial power and demand. Europe’s other imperial powers followed the Iberian model, with the Ottoman, Tsarist, and Ming and Qing Empires imposing their own land-borne power frames.

Migrants forcefully displaced from their region of socialization – deposited into a culturally different and distant region – faced massive obstacles in living transculturally. To this point, once transported to the Caribbean plantation regimes, West African slaves coming from many different cultures experienced a break in their personalities or identifications that was almost impossible to overcome. Angolan slaves in Brazil, on the other hand, arrived after a comparatively short journey in large numbers and could establish an Angolan-Brazilian transcultural region.
Some imperial administrations moved their ‘subjects’ from their region of socialization to a region in which their labour was needed. The Ottoman Empire tended to do this with agriculturalists, while the Ming and Qing Empires focused on craftspeople. They provided support for resettlement with as few disruptions as possible, offering economic incentives at the destination in hopes that the involuntary migrants would come to prefer the new location and, in turn, call on kin and acquaintances to join them. Such transregional mobility usually led to transregional cultural practices.

By the close of the nineteenth century, and amid the ‘second’ globalization process, the colonial powers had divided much of the continental economic spaces among themselves as imperial macro-regions. The fixed geographies, through human migratory agency, became spaces defined by economics and culture.

State and investor interests created regimes that either attracted or repulsed migrants. In the first half of the century, a segmented, nearly global region of agricultural settlement had emerged, including south Russia, North America, Argentina, and Australia. Migrants from multiple regions in Western and Central Europe migrated to the latter three, with migrants from south-eastern Europe moving along the connecting Danube corridor to Russia.

These so-called ‘free’ migrants had to leave their micro-region of socialization because of a lack of land to farm as well as the fact that neighbouring intrastate or intraimperial meso-regions did not provide job options. They aimed for a micro-region of destination where neighbours or family had migrated earlier and sent back information about options. No one ever migrated ‘to America’ or ‘to Australia’ (as a figure of speech), but to a social space about which information was available. Similar to seafaring merchants, they sought out social and economic ‘anchor points’. The sum of such micro-regional connectivities became, for example, a meso-region of settlement and cultivation within a macro-region of global grain production. Like in coastal portolan maps, *Homo* and *Femina migrans* created mental maps of routes in flexible economic and life course geographies.

Already in the first half of the century, but more so from the 1860s onwards, underemployed (and often underfed) men and women began to move en masse away from the rural sector, toward increasingly industrial jobs in towns and cities. Simultaneously, migrations continued or emerged in five transcontinental and transoceanic macro-regions. These were the ‘Black Atlantic’ of forced slave migrations and a free African diaspora (up to the 1870s); the ‘White Atlantic’; the Indian Ocean–Southeast Asian region; the Russian–Siberian region; and, from the 1880s onwards, a North China–Manchuria (rural and industrial) migration process. In each case, demand for labour at the destination coincided with lack of life course options in the region of departure.

In their own words, many migrants who did not name a place or continent as destination said that they migrated ‘for bread’. Like the migrants forming regions, they moved in sequential (‘chain’) migrations from a micro-region of origin to a micro-region of destination. Examples include, respectively, migration from Tarnów, south-eastern Poland, to a compatriot-settled Polish-language neighbourhood in Cleveland self-described as ‘Tarnów’. Another example is migration from a specific location in South China via Singapore, as a turntable to a specific mine in the Malaysian peninsula. The aggregate of the latter moves made South China–Malaysia a meso-region of miner migrations. A variation of these migrations was people migrating from the same origin and along the same route, but with the goal of reaching rubber plantations in Malaysia as part of the imperial (British) macro-region and frame of power.

While these ‘big’ migrations caught the attention of contemporary observers and historians, each and every town and city at the migrants’ place of origin was surrounded by regions of short-distance out-migration regions for urban jobs. The cities of the German Ruhr mining region, as well as Hong Kong and St Petersburg, Russia, can serve as examples. In addition, many migrants
sought out places where they could communicate – thus, regions of a common language or, more specifically, of common dialects, seemed to circumscribe their choice of destination.

Through webs of routes, migrants connected the southern Chinese dialect region with urban quarters throughout Southeast Asia and, later, with port cities of the Pacific Coast of the Americas. Cliché designations such as ‘Chinatown’ and ‘Little Italy’ refer to a place of settlement only. ‘Chinatown’ itself refers neither to a region of origin (originally the surroundings of Guangdong), nor to the web of shipping lanes and information flows, nor to the transregional and transcultural merging of lifeways.

For example, in Cuba, bound workers imported from China mingled with migrants from Spanish-speaking regions of Europe, with enslaved migrants from west-central Africa, and with the ‘first peoples’ (labelled ‘indios’). Three transoceanic migration regions of global extent coalesced in Cuba’s foreign investor-funded plantation regime. Cuban culture emerged from such transculturation, and later migrant men and women carried it to specific micro-regions, such as Ybor City, in the US state of Florida. These migrants made the region reaching from New Orleans to Miami to a part of the Caribbean a transcultural world.

Parallel to the cross-border and transregional mass migrations of people in need of bread and better options, elites and middle classes of the states or empires of departure and destination forged an anti-transcultural ideology: nationalism. By then, most states had residents with cultural practices other than the ‘national majority’. They were labelled ‘minorities’ and pushed to exit their traditional home region: the newly invented nation-states. The resulting administrative and ideological apparatus changed migrants’ access to bordering states, which began to require passports and visas. Scholars buttressed the new regime by developing bordered ‘area studies’, ‘foreign studies’, and introspective ‘national culture studies’.

Elites subsumed micro-regions, so important for people’s life course decisions, under one single nation-state territory. While the new power frame made migration more difficult, collapse of the empires and breaking apart of imperial macro-regions forced people to flee from cultural discrimination or face expulsion and deportation.

From 1914 to 1945, Europe became the largest refugee-generating region of the globe. A decade after the vast refugee migrations of 1914–18, migrants and potential migrants faced the global economic crisis of 1929, the Great Depression. For some, the region of socialization and family networks appeared more secure than hostile host societies in which options to earn a living were disappearing. So they returned. After the second global war crisis – which began in 1937 with Japan’s attack on China and ended in 1945 – new political and economic regimes, closed borders, and international terms of trade changed the global mosaic of regions that were both attractive and accessible to migrants.

From war crisis to financial crises: 1950s–2008

Far more than the West–East division, decolonization and labour demand determined the emergence of eight new macro-regions of migration in the 1950s and the 1960s. The Central and Eastern European states, which closed their borders to emigration but permitted internal migration, were not the only macro-region of migration affected by the collapse of the communist governments in 1989. The integrated Europe–North and South America macro-region lost its migratory cohesion, and transatlantic migrations subsided. Meanwhile, transpacific migrations to North America increased, surpassing the former since the mid-1980s. Western Europe and Anglo-Saxon North America, both with a high demand for workers, attracted ‘guest workers’ migrating from Mediterranean Europe and from Hispanic North America (the Mexican braceros). These were two distinct macro-regions with South–North migrations.
Both Canada and the USA came to understand that reservoirs of manpower and brainpower lay in the decolonizing societies. They changed their immigration regulations from preferring people from the regions of white-skinned (‘pale-faced’) populations toward global openness. By contrast, governments in Europe and European Union (EU) institutions intensified the control of outer borders while permitting free circulation within. However, this ‘fortress Europe’, as the region is sometimes called, has had permeable entry gates.

In the shift from colonial imperial macro-regions to independent bordered states, some inhabitants from the formerly colonized regions kept, at least for a few decades, the right of entry into the former colonial cores, particularly Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands. Colour-coded regions (white, black, yellow, brown) began to overlap. This was not altogether new, since personnel among the white colonizers had penetrated the regions of people of other skin colours before. Unwittingly, they had established routes of transition between regions of power and regions of exploitation, and expanded the linguistic regions of English and French. Both permitted formerly colonized men and women to migrate as citizens to the post-colonial, meso-regional cores within ‘fortress Europe’. Far more decisive changes happened in Central and Latin America, North, Central, and South Africa, and the five Asias (West, South, Southeast, East, and the Siberian North).

In another misleading figure of speech, the whole region opposite Europe has been lumped together as the ‘Southern hemisphere’. But this ‘half of the globe’ begins south of the Himalayas, spanning the Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, and equals about three-quarters of the globe. Since the 1960s, migrations within and between segments of this vast region, together with migrations northwards to the ‘one-quarter hemisphere’, have accelerated. The ‘third’ globalization process began with these inter- and transregional migratory connections, though publicized discourse has dated it to the outsourcing of investments and jobs from the capitalist West of the globe to its low-wage regions from the 1990s.

In the self-decolonized segment of the globe, the meso-regional migration system emerged into centres of fast economic development. This happened internally in Brazil, in the vast regions of India and Indonesia, across borders in Ghana and South Africa, in South Korean industrial complexes, in ‘free enterprise’ zones (with no rights for labour migrants) in the Philippines, and in Hong Kong and Singapore, among others. One region, comprised of the oil-producing states of the Strait of Hormuz, gained independence from big oil-consuming powers amid the 1973 struggles. It has since become a labour-importing region, with a recruitment region extending from Algeria and Egypt via Pakistan to Bangladesh.

The rearrangement of macro- and meso-regions of migration did not change the actual connectivity between micro-regions. Migrants from a particular region of socialization still inform kin and acquaintances of job options. However, once people no longer leave a region – whether it is depleted of (wo)manpower or develops an economic dynamic of its own – other regions are tapped or establish migratory contacts on their own. As in other phases of migration, scholarship reflected the new developments: nation-state historiography declined, ‘multicultural’ studies increased. Their subjects are transregional migrants from many cultures in one society.

Another important migration-inducing (but more gradual) global development is climate change, which has begun to be noticed in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Environmental refugees from particularly affected regions now number in the millions.

**Conclusion: 2008 and its aftermath**

This worldwide order of macro-regional migratory transitions received a rude shock with the 2008 financial crisis, which started in the USA and then went global. The systemic
mismanagement by a tiny group of economically powerful people, and the resulting economic recession, pushed 200 million men, women, and children into (even worse) precariousness. All of them would have been potential migrants to regions that provide better options, unless they became too poor to afford the cost of transit.

The ‘Great Recession’ resulting from the failure of the financial regime has prompted emigrations from the European economic core, for example from Portugal to Portuguese-speaking Angola and Brazil. Formerly colonized and linguistically adapted regions thus have an impact on present-day regions hit by the recession.

In East Asia, China’s ‘continuous urban-industrial leap forward’ – combined with an investment policy aiming to ‘keep the countryside backward’ – has turned the state into a vast rural-to-urban migration region. More than 200 million men, women, and children have been on the move in the second decade of the twenty-first century.

Systemically, a long-range, migration-inducing power regime is represented by the global terms of trade. It is imposed by the political-economic – and not merely the military-industrial – complex. This, in turn, refers to the highly capitalized actors in the Europe-North American region imposing their terms on all societies with lower material standards of living.

To summarize, the agency of migrant men and women and changing frames of political power and economic investment constantly redefine and re-create regions. Meanwhile, shifting micro-regions of socialization continue to circumscribe which knowledge-related resources and capabilities migrants can carry to the regions they choose as destinations. In this process, they create *inter*regional connections and *trans*regional individual and family lives. Scholarship – first focusing on countries and areas, and presently transregional and multicultural studies – has followed suit.

**Select bibliography**


FORCED MOBILITIES
Slave trade and indentured migration

Michael Zeuske

Introduction
The history of the slave trade has been described from different perspectives. Contemporary sources tended not to address the topic from the perspectives of mobility, migration, or diaspora. Well into the twentieth century, many were directly employing terms such as ‘negro trade’ (trata de negros), criminals, banishment or deportation, slave trafficking in areas of ‘non-civilization’, ‘coolie trade’, and even ‘house girls’. Only recently, historians have started to treat the transportation of enslaved and indentured labourers as transcontinental or global migration or mobility, and examine the transregional diasporas that have emerged from these mobilities. Apart from enslaved and indentured servants, other authors address the case of globally recruited servants (housekeeping personnel) and of victims of transcontinental banishment as part of state penal systems. I suggest that the history of transregional, as well as transcontinental and transoceanic, mass mobility should be read as a history of forced mobility, lasting up until 1830/40. Paradigmatic is the history of Atlantic slavery – which resulted in some 12 million Africans being abducted and taken across the Atlantic Ocean during 1500–1870. Until 1830, 6 to 8 million people had been displaced from Africa to the Americas, whereas only 2 to 3 million people had migrated voluntarily from Europe. But also prior to 1500, there had been large networks of forced mass mobility in world history, especially in terms of slaves and prisoners of war trafficking. Following the emergence of a new order of relations between world regions – from the twelfth century onwards – forced mobility occurred from the Mongols to the Mamelukes (1250–1350), from Transoxania (today covering much of modern-day Central Asia) to the Islamic Caliphate and Hindu India to the north, and through the Hindu Kush to Persia and Central Asia, as well as from the border expansion of Yuan China (1279–1368), specifically in the southward expansion phase, to around 1300 (conquest of Yunnan) and again in the seventeenth century.

Slave trade as a more-than European and pre-colonial undertaking
The history of Atlantic slavery (ca. 1450–1888) is written mainly based on European sources. For Africa, where most of the transregional enslavement and forced migration occurred between 1700 and 1870, this is ‘pre-colonial’ history because, apart from relative regional
exceptions, neither Iberians nor other Europeans or Americans could gain a foothold in continental Africa until around 1880. The Iberian colonial powers of Portugal and Spain established a modern system of subjugation via the transregional mobility of ships, captains, and passengers, including conquistadores, merchants, colonial officials, and settlers. Colonial spaces spanned the Americas – where the large autochthonous empires had collapsed by around 1570 – as well as the Atlantic Ocean and parts of the Pacific Ocean, especially the islands and enclaves in or near the great Asian empires. With the founding of Manila in 1571, together with the intertwining of the world’s seas and ports, the composed world was truly global: the ‘big island’ of Australia was brought into this globality through transregional deportations spawned by the anti-colonial revolution in the USA.

For the great agricultural empires of Eurasia – that is to say, the Habsburg Austria, Muscovite Russia, Ming and Qing China, Mogul India, Safawid Persia, and (later) Tokugawa Japan – parallel expansions started in the seventeenth century, with quantitatively similar, but procedurally different, transregional (and less known) migrations. For the Ottomans, this process had already begun in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. With that said, one should not be too impressed by the term ‘agrarian empires’. First, extensive expansions and ‘discoveries’ took place – at least from the perspective of the respective centres. Second, caravan transports (and caravan-like river transports) also played an important role regarding, for example, the mass mobility of enslaved people between empires. Consequently, enormous transregional forces and realities came into play (frequently described through the example of the Silk Road). This also applies to the Russian Empire, such as in the Volga slave trade from the north, or in forced mobility connected with its expanding boundaries, that is into the Caucasus. Third, the European-Asian core imperium of the Ottomans (from the fifteenth to seventeenth century), in parallel with Iberian expansion or, particularly, the Portuguese expansion to the Indian Ocean, exerted supremacy over many systems of mobility over that ocean, which had been ongoing since the conquest of Egypt. They also controlled raids and slavery systems in the Mediterranean through to Algiers, as well as raids and slavery systems in the Red Sea (East Africa), in the Persian Gulf, and especially in the Black Sea (Crimea). However, nowhere else were the slave trade and transregional maritime mobilities so concentrated – and so well known and documented through the emergence of the modern fiscal state – as in Atlantic slavery (1450–1870).

It is known that caravan trade, river transport, and transregional mobility taking place outside the Atlantic slavery network concurrently played an important role. Major river systems of Africa – the Senegal, Niger, Congo, and Zambezi rivers – and Asia – for instance the Dnieper river off and on since the tenth century, the Volga, Don, Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, Mekong, Yellow, and Yangtze rivers – were instrumental in access to and movement of peoples. The total number of slaves of the Atlantic trade might even have exceeded 12 million. However, this speculation lacks systematic documentation and studies due to the shadowy aspects of human smuggling, notably in the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. Even for the micro-region of the Atlantic and beyond, we do not have exact figures; however, very well-reasoned quantitative estimates have arisen since the 1970s. So far, 35,000 journeys have been documented, of 41,000 estimated voyages, involving ships carrying abducted and enslaved persons from Africa to the Americas (The Transatlantic Slave Trade Database 2013). This pertains only to the Atlantic empires of Europe: Portugal, Spain, England, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark, as well as other Baltic territories such as Brandenburg Prussia and Sweden. On the basis of this slave trade the most important economic institutions (commercial houses, usurers or banks, and debt and insurance systems) were created and claimed for ‘Western’ capitalism.
Forced mobilities

**European expansions and the capitalization of human bodies**

Europe had remained marginal in the sixteenth and well into the seventeenth century despite the ‘first Iberian Atlantic’ (Portugal, Spain, and Genoese) and the Portuguese Empire in the Indian Ocean, which are described to an extensive amount. The number of (transregionally) displaced persons across the Atlantic was relatively small compared to those enslaved by Barbary slavers, and those displaced to Morocco. The height of the aforementioned ‘sea empires’ of Western Europe began in the seventeenth century, together with the participation of the Baltic regions, certain cities and regions in Switzerland, the Holy Roman Empire, as well as Italy. This time marks the extreme dynamization of the ‘merchant empires’ (or ‘Atlantic empires’), which were emerging as global empires, relying on the slavery and slave trade systems and the ‘capitalism of human bodies’. The increase in value through and in the transregional mobility of the enslavers – and the forced mobility of the enslaved – was decisive in this regard.

This system reached its peak in the Atlantic in the eighteenth century – about 6 million people displaced from Africa, about 2.5 million by British slavers alone – and its global climax in the nineteenth century – in spite of, or precisely due to, discourses on ‘abolition’ and ‘civilization’. Slave trades still played a key role in the nineteenth century because, despite abolition policies, as this time the ‘hidden Atlantic’ appeared, in which illegal forced mobility was officially tolerated. Between 2 and 3 million people were displaced from Africa within the ‘hidden Atlantic’, an increasing number being young people and children, specifically to Brazil and Cuba (that being the ‘third Iberian Atlantic’ or ‘Outlaw Atlantic’ according to Marcus Rediker).

In the Americas, and possibly other areas of the world, the ‘second slavery’ period began, with enormous internal slave trade systems mainly operating in the USA, Cuba, and Brazil and using industrial production methods. Around 1840, the great coolie flows had begun and also the ‘voluntary’ migration of Europeans. The transregional transport of coolies is comparable to the slave trade. They emerged (mostly) out of local slaveries or forms of bondage, and were combined with a variety of regional slaveries, thereby forming a mass of global slavery: the ‘second slavery’ of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The nineteenth century saw also the development of ‘kanaka’ slavery (blackbirding), with workers from Polynesia and Micronesia in British Columbia, the Pacific coast of the USA, Australia, Fiji, Peru, and Chile.

The two most important ‘slave production areas’ and the regions of origin of transregional forced migrations in global history were located in Eastern Europe, mainly in the South Russian-Ukrainian steppe regions, in the Balkans and the Caucasus, as well as in sub-Saharan Africa. These macro-regions were the originating and delivery areas (slaving zones) for transregional slaveries of men and women, in particular enslaved men from Africa, until the nineteenth century, when young people and even children of both sexes began to be increasingly incorporated into the slavery system.

Locally organized slaveries were prevalent in macro-regions, comprising possibly a considerably larger number of slaves and varied forms of slavery. Such regions include China and areas within Africa, India, and on the borders of Central Asia and the Malay world. Smaller groups of people (compared to the shiploads of the Atlantic slave trade), were transported across the Indian Ocean, marginal seas, or peripheries of the Pacific to other regions. However, their total number in sum was probably larger than that of the Atlantic slave trade owing to the fact that those processes were running over longer periods of time and prior to European expansion and also parallel and after it. Excluding raid-related and frontier slavery as well as special expansion phases, these regions were rather clearly concentrated translocal infrastructures (including transport systems and various facilities processing slaves), without
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highly concentrated forms of slavery (plantations, mines, state-sponsored slavery as in the case of the Atlantic slave trade). Empires such as China have long sought to prevent emigration of Chinese people in whatever form.

Periodizing slave trading

In the sixteenth century, the main area of transregional slave trade concerning the Atlantic hemisphere was in the marginal seas of the Atlantic basin, within the Americas, and on the coast of West Africa, which was advanced by the Iberians as transregional slave trade. Furthermore, the focus lay on massive human hunts between the circum-Caribbean coasts of the New World and on the Spanish islands of the Greater Antilles (especially La Hispaniola, Cuba, and Puerto Rico), as well as within Central America and Peru. There were also large transregional forced migrations in Africa itself, involving its eastern coast (Indian Ocean) as well as its north and north-east (historical Sudan). Islamic regions and the Ottoman Empire, Saudi Arabia, the Middle East, Central Asia, the Mediterranean Sea, and regions of the Black Sea were also all involved in slave trade systems.

Among India, China, and Japan, as well as between other East Asian and Southeast Asian regions, human trafficking and transregional forced migration played an important role, mainly due to the Indian-Muslim trade expansion and extensive piracy in the South China Sea and in the Yellow Sea. Portuguese Macao was an important hub of transregional-global migration, as was Manila under Spanish control. The slave trade also involved the Viceroyalty of New Spain (Mexico) and took place among the southern Philippine Islands, the ‘Christian’ northern islands, and the Sulu Sea. With the connection of Manila and the Philippines to New Spain via transregional slavery trade, the globe was encircled by transregional steps.

Amid the great European crisis of the seventeenth century, Spanish global hegemony and the ‘first Iberian Atlantic’ broke down around 1640–50. The quantitative dimensions of transregional forced migrations were still greater in other macro-regions of the world. In connection, there was piracy throughout the western Mediterranean and on the Atlantic coasts of North Africa, and terrestrial slave raids took place in the Ukraine, Romania, the Balkans, and the Caucasus-Criman region, Arabia-East Africa, India-Persia-Central Asia, and on and around the territory of present-day China with the Qing expansion.

New links across the Atlantic, tied to global transregional forced migrations, resulted from Dutch expansion, particularly, at first, toward Brazil (and other ‘Portuguese’ areas, for example in West Africa) and to ‘India’ (Moluccas, ‘Dutch’ India and Indonesia, and occupation of the south African cape area). After the Anglo-Dutch Wars, as well as the rise of mercantilist shipping and state monopolies (e.g. the British Navigations Acts and the French exclusif), Britain and France as well as the Baltic powers vehemently engaged in the growing transregional forced migration systems. The Atlantic slave trade was divided into an African-Iberian-Portuguese South Atlantic as well as a North-Western European Central and North Atlantic. Its global-spatial structure was flanked by the starting and ending points of the routes of Arab or African river or land caravans from the coastal hinterlands of slavery trade centres in Africa. The ending points of the routes fanned out like gigantic estuaries around the Spanish regions in the Americas and the Caribbean, where Europeans and Americans monopolized violence and slave-trading infrastructures.

In Spanish America, the slavery of indigenous peoples, called yndios (including the population of the Philippines) was terminated by a kind of formal ‘abolition by the crown’ around 1670. Nevertheless, the demand for slaves remained high in Spanish America, and the world currencies of silver and peso de ocho/piastre allowed this demand on expanding markets to be
Forced mobilities

met. This led, on one hand, to massive smuggling, mainly in the Caribbean, Central America (Portobelo, Panama), and Buenos Aires between 1670 and 1790, and, on the other hand, to the development of predatory colonial subimperialisms involving slave raids and transregional slave trade (e.g. the Comanches, mainland Caribs in Guayana, and English, French, and Dutch enclaves in the Americas).

Other transregional migration systems on the basis of (mostly) enslaved people also grew (as in East Africa/Ethiopia), but the European Atlantic system was the most developed, with the privatization of the monopolies (e.g. trade companies) that had hitherto been in place, first by the Dutch and then by the English. Meanwhile, trade company monopolies remained predominant in the Iberian area until the end of the Seven Years’ War, and with the British East India Company (EIC) in the Indian area until the nineteenth century.

By the end of the seventeenth century, there might have been more ‘white’ persons forcibly displaced in the slavery societies of Islamic North Africa and Central Asia, more enslaved indigenous peoples in the Americas, as well as more bonded peasants in serfdom in ‘Christian’ Russia than human beings from Africa in the New World. In sub-Saharan Africa, on the contrary, there were hardly any ‘white’ slaves, with only a few exceptions, that being primarily persons with European ancestors such as ‘Portuguese’, for example Lançados, Atlantic Creoles, and Luso-Africans). However, there were probably more enslaved persons in sub-Saharan Africa than in the Americas.

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries became the peak of transregional forced migrations, from which merchants, captains, shipowners and equippers, financiers, states (‘crowns’), officers, crews, and assistants such as cooks, doctors, and craftsmen on the Atlantic benefitted. This was particularly the case for Europeans, mainly in the eighteenth century, and Americans (in the full meaning of the word, from the USA to Cuba and Brazil to Uruguay), especially in the nineteenth century.

Of the 11 to 12 million people who had been displaced from Africa, between 8 and 9 million arrived via transregional forced migrations to the Americas. Among the latter, only 6.8 million were sent to the Iberian territories (Spanish America and Brazil), about 2 million to British territories (especially Barbados and Jamaica), and only about 250,000 to 400,000 to the USA.

Upon industrialization, the ‘second slavery’ period in the Americas became the foundation for independent modernities and imperial nation-states (the USA and Brazil), with transregional networks of forced mobility (steamers, railways, telegraphy, and newspapers). This modernized slavery expanded into the interior of large islands (Cuba) or the interior of entire continents (southern Brazil and the southern states of the USA), despite, or even due to, the efforts of abolitionists.

Plantation slavery became global, mainly focusing on the production of sugar, carnations, cloves, nutmeg, cotton, coffee, tobacco, cocoa, dyes, and tea. Recipient macro-regions of transregional mobilities arose concurrently in East Africa, on islands of the Indian Ocean (particularly Mauritius but also Madagascar, Seychelles, and Réunion), and later Southeast Asia, North India, and Indonesia. In addition, especially following the Opium Wars, formal slavery mobilities converged with new mobilities of contract slaves (coolies). The ‘treaty slaveries’ were mostly based on local slaveries acting as recruitment centres and ‘slavery production zones’. The process of transporting the coolies was often even more terrible than in the Atlantic slave trade. It was less controlled, and their labour and lifestyle as well as their status in the recipient regions were worse than those of the enslaved among private owners.

The Pacific became a region of new slave raids, such as blackbirding, on people from Oceania, who were dragged into sugar or resource production (guano) in Australia, Fiji, or New Caledonia, or to the Americas. In the interior as well as in the surroundings of ‘national’

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colonial empires (e.g. Indonesia, the Congo, Angola, Mozambique, India, French West Africa, and Southeast Asia), new forms of collective forced labour slaveries were organized, mostly based on local mobilities, but also on transregional forced mobilities, some being temporary.

Due to the abolition policy and the formal abolition of the great slaveries in the Americas and the Atlantic slave trade (until 1888) as the paradigmatic and best-known transregional system of forced mobility, free wage work replaced slave work. This led to the emergence of the ‘world economy’ (ca. 1880). On the one hand, slave status and labour were retained informally or pushed to the peripheries. On the other hand, the discursive repression of ‘small’ house slavery and the slavery of women and children in the ‘old traditions’ (with other ‘names’ and cultural encoding) remained. In some production areas, specifically the ones exploiting tropical resources, a combination of transregional forced mobility with ‘voluntary’ mobility of ‘emigrants’ or ‘immigrants’, depending on the perspective, had a formative influence until about 1960. Since the First World War and the Russian Revolution, great forced mobilities into camps and ‘non-free labour’ (e.g. gulags and concentration camps) came into play.

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Introduction

The migration of humans between different world regions is inextricably intertwined with the very notion of human development since prehistory (Hoerder 2002). Within this longue durée perspective, the identification of refugees as a distinct category of migrants has gradually come about, and was at least partially recognized as early as the sixteenth century. The feature that sets refugees apart from other migrants is the persecution they are subjected to on account of their religion, ethnicity, social class, or gender. This persecution, which in turn triggers their flight from their places of dwelling toward places where their lives, freedoms, and identities can be secured, distinguishes refugees from other migrants. While the grounds for the persecution of refugees vary, one recurring feature has been their targeting as a distinct human group rather than each as an individual. Consequently, contemporary international legal efforts to curb the persecution of refugees and accord them international protections all hinge upon an unequivocal refusal to consider group identities as grounds for persecution, and the strict demand to consider each refugee first and foremost as a rights-deserving, individual human being.

This chapter explores the interconnectedness between refugees and transregionalism, that is between the group-based persecution of people and the connections in and between regions that their flight to safety brings about. It contextualizes the rise of the modern refugee between state-based entities and regional bodies (empires in the past and regional organizations nowadays), and demarcates three cardinal factors that underpin contemporary transregional refugee flows: heightened means of mobility, the impact of Internet Communication Technologies (ICTs), and climate change. It concludes with some ideas as to the nexus between these factors and legal stipulations concerning the international refugee regime.

Refugees and the rise of modern nation-states

The transregional forced movement and consequent exile of peoples has been well-known since late antiquity. In contrast, refugeeness has implied the removal of a certain designated group within society, rather than the society in its entirety. Thus, in contrast to Nebuchadnezzar’s expulsion of the entire population of Judea in 576 BCE to Babylon, the expulsion of the Jews of Spain in 1492 can be considered as a paradigmatic example of refugeeness, precisely because
the group identification destined them for deportation due to them being a religious minority – that is to say, a partial segment of the then Spanish society. The same holds true for the expulsion of French Protestant Huguenots during the late seventeenth century following the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989: 5). In both cases, the deliberate actions undertaken by a centralist nation-state resulted in a refugee flow, giving rise to Zolberg's important understanding that the establishment of nation-states, in many cases, entails the immanent risk of generating more refugees (Zolberg 1983).

The terminology of transregionalism, or the interconnectedness between different regions, is well suited for understanding the flow of refugees, as it places the individual perspectives associated with actions undertaken by nation-states side by side with the regional dispersion often implicit in refugee flows. French Huguenots found some refuge in Europe, most notably in Switzerland and the Germanic principalities; however, by and large, their absorption went hand in hand with their advancement into world regions hitherto not settled by Europeans, whether in Canadian Quebec, the winelands of the South African cape, or the American shores of Louisiana. The Jews of Spain, being expelled from that country, received the regional welcome of the Ottoman Empire, from Morocco and North Africa, through the Ottoman-controlled Balkans, up until the eastern shores of Asia Minor. Contrasting the differences in the regional absorption of refugees between Europe and the Muslim world, the eminent Middle Eastern historian Bernard Lewis notes that:

Perhaps the most notable amongst the differences is the movement of refugees. In the twentieth century this movement was, overwhelmingly, from East to West; in the fifteenth, sixteenth and even in the seventeenth centuries, it was primarily from West to East. Surely, the Ottomans did not offer equal rights to these subjects. . . . They did however offer a degree of tolerance without precedent or parallel in Christian Europe. Each religious community . . . was allowed the free practice of its religion. Most remarkably, they had their own religious chiefs, controlling their own education and social life, and enforcing their own laws, to the extent that they did not conflict with the basic laws of the empire. While ultimate power – political and military – remained in Muslim hands, non-Muslims controlled much of the economy, and were even able to play a part of some importance in the political process.

(Lewis 2002: 37)

Modern refugees and the emergence of the international refugee regime

As mentioned above, the rise of the modern refugee has been intimately connected with the proliferation of modern nation-states especially from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards (Marrus 1985; Gatrell 2013). Because ethno-religious and linguistic homogeneity became synonymous with the fulfilment of national aspirations, exclusivity and the rejection of any kind of human difference meant that states were now poised to act violently so as to achieve ethnic homogeneity through the removal of minorities and social groups now not considered as a legitimate part of their national collectives (Weitz 2008). Lord Acton’s chillingly prophetic prediction that nation-states will not be able to accommodate human difference, and that these could be skilfully managed only within regionalist entities as in the empires of his age (Habsburg, Tsarist, and Ottoman), gradually materialized (Acton 1907).

By the late 1920s and certainly by the 1930s, the idea of states expelling their ‘unwanted’ populations, and the notion that these could alternatively be cared for by the League of Nations
was firmly in place (Skran 1995). What was initially seen as a tragic yet abnormal state practice against Russian, Armenian, Chaldean, and Nestorian refugees from 1919–28, steadily became the acceptable international legal norm of removing minorities and groups of difference, and rendering them refugees for the emergent international community to care for (Skran 2011). Although certain principles such as interstate burden-sharing of refugee flows emerged during this period, it nevertheless culminated in the unprecedented scale of human uprooting associated with the Second World War (Caestecker 2017).

The newly established United Nations (UN) triggered the creation of most of today’s international legal bedrock through its respective set of ‘treaties after trauma’: the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter the Genocide Convention), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (the 4th Geneva Convention for Civilians), the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention), and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (the Convention against Statelessness). The 1950 establishment of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), who now enjoyed a universal mandate under the purview of a global international refugee regime, consolidated for the first time a basic set of non-derogable international protections for refugees (Loescher 2002). These included the three fundamental principles applicable to all and under any circumstances: non-discrimination, non-penalization, and most importantly non-refoulement. Non-discrimination (Article 3) sets upon states the active duty to apply refugee protections without prejudice and without regard to religious, ethnic, gender-based, or social group considerations (Ben-Nun 2014). Non-penalization (Article 31) safeguards refugees who, in their flight from persecution, unlawfully transgress the national borders of countries from criminal prosecution for this act of flight and.border-transgression under duress (Goodwin-Gill 2001). The non-refoulement clause (Article 33), already considered by the Holocaust-surviving drafters of the 1951 Refugee Convention as its most important clause, absolutely prohibits ‘in any manner whatsoever’ the return of refugees into the hands of their tormentors, or to places where their lives or freedoms would be endangered (Ben-Nun 2015a).

Recent human displacement: regional refugee flows, enhanced mobility, and ICTs

Since the end of the Cold War and the American-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and even more so after the subsequent destabilization of Syria and Libya, global human displacement figures have surpassed 50 million people for the first time since the Second World War (UNHCR 2016). Granted that the end of the Cold War in 1989 brought about significant instabilities and a renewed impetus for ethno-religious conflicts, these instabilities – in and of themselves – fall short of explaining the dramatic increase in human displacement from 1994 onwards. Beyond these regional war-based instabilities, this steep rise in global human displacement should be taken as an amalgamation of the age-old tendency to expel those perceived to be ‘the other’

Figure 41.1 Growth of the world’s population of refugees and displaced persons: 1945–2017 (in millions)
coupled with three factors that act as multipliers to refugee flows: regionalized persecution, the rise of ICTs as facilitators of refugee movements, and the increase in the means of human mobility across geographical distances. One of the key developments that has vigorously arisen from the mid-1990s onwards is the phenomenon of regionalized refugee persecution. Be it the targeting of Tutsis across the African Great Lakes region (as opposed to just Rwanda), or of Yazidis across the entire Fertile Crescent (as opposed to just in Iraq), refugee persecution is gradually (and alarmingly) metamorphosing because it acquires a regional rather than a single-state character.

During the early modern era the Jews expelled from one state (Spain) were received by an entire region (southern and eastern Ottoman Mediterranean basin); today’s refugees, such as Yazidis who are regionally expelled from the Fertile Crescent, are often cared for only by single states such as Germany, as regional burden-sharing systems become dysfunctional. The epitomic situation of this pattern from the regional to the single-state level can be observed in the failures of the Dublin system of the European Union (EU), which was supposed to regulate refugee burden-sharing across the EU’s member states and to ensure a more even shouldering of that burden. So, while entire regions (the Middle East) move into refugee flows, the Dublin system still adheres to a distribution according to the first country where these refugees disembark, rather than truly thinking in European regionalist terms, thus further reinforcing the state-based ‘perverse logic that underpins it’ (Ciampi 2015: 9).

Another factor that has contributed to the steep rise in transregional refugee flows concerns the rise of ICTs. The cell phone, the Internet, text messaging, location services, the immediate availability of maps that show geographical routes including satellite imagery, and especially social networks such as Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter have all become a sine qua non for refugees on the move away from harm’s way as they attempt to navigate their way to safety (Wilding and Gifford 2013). In the aftermath of the Second World War, Jewish refugees relied on bodies such as the Jewish Brigade and the Jewish Agency to liaise between them and their kin across Europe and throughout the post-war makeshift refugee camps; nowadays, Syrian families connect electronically with their kin who are already safe and who direct them to border openings and to facilitators for their cross-border transfer. The immediacy and availability of online electronic payment and cell phone credit systems such as M-Pesa in Kenya or Western Union electronic cash mean that refugees no longer require long intermediate stops en route away from danger zones, and can even rely on their social and family networks to supply them with the wherewithal and resources required for their journey.

The final factor that facilitates the contemporary rise in refugee flows is the availability of faster and more accessible means of travel across longer geographical distances. The migration of refugees during the early modern era was largely confined to immediate or intermediary geographical proximities that could be reached on foot or by horse and cart. Certainly, there were sporadic groups of early modern refugees who travelled transregionally, be it the journey of Sephardic Jews to New Amsterdam (New York), or that of Huguenots to the South African Cape of Good Hope. Yet these geographically remote, transregional refugee flows were, by and large, the exception to the norm, as the majority of refugees tended to flee until they arrived in the first place that offered them political and religious asylum. In contrast, given the contemporary refugees’ ICT access to information about remote places as well as the infinitely faster modes of ground transportation, today’s common refugee routes might easily entail travel across several geographical regions before reaching their target destination. The habitual refugee journey to Europe these days entails the crossing of anything between 3,000 to 8,000 kilometres, and can begin as far south as Kampala, or as far east as Kandahar (IOM 2017).
New transregional challenges: refugees on the high seas and environmental displacement

Nowhere are the transregional dimensions of refugee flows more apparent than in two recently growing phenomena: refugees at sea and environmentally driven displacement. While the arrival of refugees by sea is certainly not new, the sheer dimensions and their exponential rise in numbers have placed seafaring refugees at the forefront of global attention. Be it Haitian refugees trying to arrive at American shores, Asian refugees en route to Australia, or African and Middle Eastern refugees charting their way through Mediterranean waters toward southern Europe, the challenges posed to modern nation-states by the flight of maritime refugees is considerable. Between morally repulsive options – such as leaving refugees at sea to their fate and the prospect of the loss of control, and consequently sovereignty, over who enters one’s country – the dilemma facing states in recent years vis-à-vis seaborne refugees has only become more acute (Mann 2016). One of the most important arenas where this dilemma of states between refugee protection and guarding sovereignty has played out is in the nexus between the geographical and legal spheres, questioning whether the non-refoulement principle applies at sea in the same way as it does on land, and whether it applies ex-territorially, that is beyond the boundary of a state’s territorial waters.

Despite the fact that the drafters of the 1951 Refugee Convention clearly and certainly intended for its non-refoulement principle to also apply to refugees at sea (Ben-Nun 2015a: 100–2), both the US and the Australian supreme courts have consistently refused to accept its applicability on the high seas (Ben-Nun 2015b). In contrast, the European Court for Human Rights (ECHR), in its historic decision in 2012, effectively reversed the EU’s policy of refugee ‘push back’ operations, and has broken rank with its English-speaking peers, accepting in full non-refoulement’s maritime applicability (Glynn 2017). What was less noticed in the ECHR’s 2012 decision, however, was that it in fact fell in line with the long-standing policies of another regional organization, namely the African Union (AU). Since its 1969 enactment of the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the AU (then still the OAU) and many of Africa’s most prominent states (Ethiopia, South Africa, and Senegal) have stood at the very forefront of refugee protection, to the extent that African hospitality practices toward persecuted refugees have foreshadowed the morally repulsive conduct of many Western states, most notably from Eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) not to mention the English-speaking world (Ben-Nun and Caestecker 2017: 13–15).

A second key transregional generator of refugee flows is climate change. While the considerable impacts of climate change, such as the dwarfing of the Kilimanjaro glacier or the drying up of the sub-Saharan African savannah belt have been well documented (IPCC 2007), the carry-over effects of these radical changes into the field of refugee studies has only recently begun to take shape. The 2016 establishment of the Hugo observatory at the University of Liège, dedicated solely to scientific research on environmental migration, has facilitated an important broadening of our understanding regarding the impacts of climate change on forced migration (Gemenne and McLeman 2018).

The first clear effect of climate change, which gets to the heart of the matter of the steep rise in African forced migration to Europe, is the catastrophic halving of the African sub-Saharan savannah belt, and the reduction of its valuable agricultural land and grazing grounds, into arid desert soil (IPCC 2007: 458). This loss of grazing grounds has driven pastoralist societies away from their natural habitat as they migrate mostly southwards in search of better grounds to secure their livelihoods (Hendrix and Salehyan 2012). In turn, a two-pronged catalyst for human displacement emerges while climate change effects dovetail with ethnic tensions that
erupt as societies collide in their scramble for diminishing resources such as drinking water and farmable land. In 2017, South Sudan, which topped the list of the world’s gravest refugee concerns, where one out of every four South-Sudanese persons had become forcibly displaced, served as the epitomic example of the catastrophic nexus between climate change effects and ethno-religious persecution (UNHCR 2016: 31). A different kind of environmental effect of climate change, that is the rising levels of sea water, has also begun to trigger waves of refugees fleeing their natural habitats, this time mostly from Pacific and Indian ocean islands (Wyett 2013). In 2017, New Zealand became the first country in the world to officially recognize climate change-induced migration as a legitimate category of forced migrants meriting international protection, and consequently has begun allocating specific immigration quotas for these displaced migrants.

**Conclusion**

In all likelihood, the impacts of climate change, improved means of human mobility, and ICTs as enhancers of refugee flows are probably only going to increase in the coming years. As things stand today, the incompatibilities of state-based thinking in the face of rising transregional refugee flows has already been glaringly exposed. In a world impacted by the persecution of humans on a regional basis, responses premised upon individual state actions and policies make very little sense. Faced with uncontrollable refugee flows, and in lieu of adequate regional responses, states will most probably resort to the only action they can take on their own accord – shut down their borders as hermetically as they can and abandon refugees to their fate.

Yet alternatives to this sombre scenario do exist, and they require first and foremost a change in our meta-structural thinking, and a substitution of our thought categories, from the state to the region. Durable developmental solutions to specific effects of climate change, for example in the narrowing of the African sub-Saharan savannah belt, could have a direct causal impact toward the reduction of resource-based conflict, thus alleviating some of the tensions in these regions and reducing the lure of people to flee their natural habitats and become refugees. Yet these developmental solutions cannot be thought of on state-based levels, both because this problem is a regional one and because the human migrations caused by the green savannah belt’s reduction are not confined to one state but, rather, are constantly in a regional state of flux.

Much of the same holds true for the application of the international legal regimes for refugee protection. It is hardly surprising that in regions sufficiently unified under the aegis of respected regional organizations that have actively adopted and embraced regional legal instruments for refugee protections, such as the EU or the AU, the legal domain is most favourable in terms of refugees’ human rights. Nor is it surprising that it is in areas where regional organizations have done little in the way of adopting regional refugee conventions, as in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the League of Arab States, that refugee persecution is most rampant. The absence of regional courts in ASEAN and the Arab League, as opposed to the ECHR for Europe and the African Court of Justice and Human Rights for Africa, established in 2004, means that both East Asia and the Arab world lack any real capacity to hold their states accountable when they violate global refugee protection norms. The fact that ASEAN has to date not even bothered to adopt any human rights convention for its members cannot be disassociated from the appalling conduct of its members vis-à-vis refugees, as seen in the current Rohingya persecution and exile from Myanmar. Between global legal instruments such as the 1951 Refugee Convention, which are all too often disregarded by individual states, and state practices, which are all too often hostile to refugee rights, regional legal instruments have proven to be rather effective in securing some protections for refugees while providing
a sensible bridging faculty between the global and the local. If refugee problems are nowadays regional, and their flows essentially interregional in character, then the answers and remedies to them ought to be construed on regional terms. Therein lay the secret of the Ottoman success in the absorption of sixteenth-century Jewish refugees from Spain. And that lesson, along with the richness and prosperity that the Spanish Jews brought with them to their newly acquired places of asylum, applies today just as forcefully as it did back then.

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In a connected world, research takes a special interest in the mobility of ideas, goods, capital, as well as people. Mobility of people takes on various forms, and the diversity of migrants reflects this heterogeneity. Searching for analytical concepts to examine and describe the experiences of migrants, the terms exile, diaspora, and transmigration have become central to migration research and have attracted a lot of attention across disciplinary boundaries, including political science and sociology, ethnology and anthropology, and cultural studies and geography.

Exile and diaspora are historical terms, and diaspora, in particular, has become increasingly common in academic debates since the 1960s. The idea of transnational migration, or transmigration has been popularized since the 1990s. In contemporary migration studies, all three terms are commonly used. Though sometimes used synonymously, the (ideal type) concepts of exiles, diasporans, and transmigrants are not interchangeable. Exile and diaspora both refer to groups that share the historical experience of persecution or forced emigration from their home country and thus describe a geographical displacement or dislocation of people, identities, and cultures often leading in one way or another to resistance and hybridity (see Hall 1990; Gilroy 1991). The concepts differ, however, with regard to their conceptions of home and foreignness; their ties, including identity and loyalty, to their countries of residence and origin; as well as their sense of marginalization and hybridity.

Since the 1990s, debates about the classic definition and meaning of diaspora have resulted in a broadening of the concept. Scholars from different disciplines began to attribute less significance to the exile-related characteristics of diaspora, such as forced migration, persecution, suffering, and the wish to return. Instead, they emphasized transnational activities and practices that connect the diasporic communities in different host countries with each other as well as with their home country. More recently, transregional approaches have been suggested to better include the transregional and translocal dimensions of mobility.

In the following sections, the chapter examines the terms exile, diaspora, and transmigration from a semantic and historical perspective and identifies their shared as well as distinguishing characteristics. Based on that, the chapter hints at the potential transregional perspectives offer to migration studies.
Exile and diaspora

Like migration, the terms exile and diaspora are commonly used and even prevalent outside of academic discourses. Nevertheless, they are not easy to define. There are many different interpretations of diaspora and exile. Exile (Latin *exilium*, from *ex(s)ul* [banished]) generally conveys displacement or ‘banishment from a particular place in an institutional act of force’ (Israel 2000: 1). By contrast, diaspora (from the Greek verb *diaspeirein* [scatter, disperse]) can be understood as the dispersal of a community from its original homeland to two or more foreign regions. Yet exile and diaspora describe not only forms of geographical dislocation but also emotional and mental states that are closely related to questions of identity and belonging. In the general migration literature, both concepts have been used to refer to people who share the painful experience of having been driven away from their homes and are now living in another country, separated from the people and culture that define their identity and to which they feel they belong. Thus the two concepts describe people who (have to) live outside of their country of origin, have a strong homeland orientation, and whose lives in the foreign country are, albeit to differing degrees, socially and culturally segregated from the host society.

The meanings of both terms are closely linked semantically and historically, and their definitions overlap, particularly with regard to the elements of displacement and the relationship to the homeland. It is therefore neither possible nor useful to draw a clear distinction between the two concepts.

The concept of exile forms part of many definitions of diaspora. Social scientist Robin Cohen (1997: ix), for instance, describes diaspora as a collective trauma, a banishment, in which longing for the homeland collides with life in exile and which contributes to the maintenance of strong collective identities as a community of suffering. If we look at the history of the two concepts, the fact that many definitions link exile and diaspora is not surprising, the latter being closely entwined with the history of the Jewish people. The dislocation and dispersal of a people as the result of a traumatic historical event and the concept of exile are central to the narrative of the experiences of the Jewish diaspora.

The meaning of the term diaspora, or *diaspeirein*, has undergone a number of changes over the course of its semantic history (see Baumann 2000). It originally only meant the process of physical dispersion. The translation of the Hebrew Scriptures in Alexandria in the third century BCE then brought about a semantic transfer, with diaspora – now referring to a social group – being used to describe the situation of the Jewish people outside the Promised Land (Krings 2003: 139). The Septuagint (the translation of the Hebrew Bible, which was to become the Old Testament, into the vernacular Greek of the time), however, does not equate the Hebrew terms *galût* and *gôla* (meaning deportation, exile, banishment, captivity) with the less negatively connotated Greek word diaspora. Instead, the Hebrew-Greek translators made a distinction between *galût*, *gôla*, and diaspora to reflect the historical experiences of Babylonian captivity in the sixth century BCE and subsequent migrations and circumstances outside Palestine, which were not necessarily based on coercion or oppression but were sometimes a matter of choice (Krings 2003: 139; see also Baumann 2000: 316–17). In the centuries that followed, the meaning of the terms continued to widen, with diaspora coming to describe the situation of the Jewish population outside Israel in general – whether it was based on displacement and dislocation or on more or less voluntary migration for economic reasons. Tölolyan (1996: 11) sees the subsequent semantic ambiguity of the term diaspora originating from these early examples of ambivalent usage.

Though closely related, on closer inspection there are subtle but significant distinctions between the two concepts, which make it clear that exile and diaspora are not synonymous. These are as follows:
Collectivity versus individuality: One distinction evident in the literature lies in the fact that exile – unlike diaspora, which is basically regarded as a collective situation – tends to be considered an individual experience (Clifford 1994: 308, 329; Brah 1996: 193). Said (1994: 140) describes exile as ‘a solitude experienced outside the group: the deprivations felt at not being with others in the communal habitation’. On the other hand, by definition diaspora refers to a group of people.

(In)voluntary nature of existence in the foreign country: One characteristic common to diasporans and exiles is that their migration was caused primarily by circumstances in their homeland that are not related to the desire to begin a new life elsewhere. The literature highlights the element of coercion or force for both concepts, in particular in terms of the causes and the process of migration. However, with regard to the condition, that is to say a life in exile or in the diaspora, the involuntary element is more strongly emphasized for exile. Much like diaspora, exile is generally a long-term separation from the homeland as a result of banishment, displacement, expatriation, political or religious persecution by an authority (e.g. the state), or intolerable (political) conditions. In both terms, therefore, the reason for leaving the homeland involves coercion. While the literature nevertheless considers the ensuing life in the diaspora to some extent as voluntary, this is generally not the case for a life in exile.

Conception of home and belonging: One fundamental difference between exile and diaspora lies in the conception of home. Members of a diaspora have a close (emotional) tie to their country of origin, regard it as their true home, and cultivate their own (cultural) identity. Notwithstanding, they are able to come to terms with a life elsewhere, that is to say outside of their homeland; to establish social and symbolic ties to their country of residence; and to allow this to become, to some extent, a home away from home. For exiles, in contrast, life in their host country remains a provisional, temporary stay as a foreigner ‘always out of place’ and ‘outside habitual order’ and their host country itself a ‘territory of not-belonging’ (Said 1994: 140, 143, 149). Their loyalty remains centred on the homeland. Unlike diasporans, they are not able – or willing – to put down new roots (Said 1994: 140; Brah 1996: 197).

Wish to return: Exile and diaspora also differ in their understanding of return. Unlike for exiles, the homeland does not necessarily represent a place of immediate physical return for diasporans. Rather, it provides an important (psychological) point of reference for the individual and collective identities as well as sense of belonging. In principle, diasporans do aspire to return; their thoughts are firmly anchored in their homeland and they identify with it. But if it is unattainable, no longer exists, or can no longer be identified, they are able to accept that a physical return might never be possible. Diaspora is a constant, if not permanent, condition that can endure for generations. Exile, oppositely, though in principle also a long-term phenomenon, is understood by exiles themselves as merely a temporary condition. For them, the homeland is a physical place to which they intend to return as soon as conditions allow, that is to say as soon as the causes of their forced migration from the homeland have been removed. Exile is thus accompanied not only by a longing for the homeland, but also by the ever-present aspiration to actually return there soon (see Ghorashi 2003: 133–4).

Identity: Although diasporans, like exiles, identify strongly with their historical, religious, cultural, linguistic, and national roots, their identity formation is also affected by their experiences linked to the process and outcome of their migration. The identities of diasporans
are, therefore, often described in diaspora research as hybrid or fragmented. These identities are seen as being the product of various influences and of the development of a sense of multiple affiliations here (country of residence) and there (homeland). By contrast, the attributes of hybridity and heterogeneity are less often ascribed to exiles. Said (1994: 140) describes exile as a fundamentally ‘discontinuous state of being’, resulting from the exiles’ forced separation from their roots, their land, and their past. Exiles see themselves as doubly excluded: they are excluded from life in their community of origin in the homeland and they do not belong to the society in which they (have to) live. Their identity is clearly aligned with their homeland, without the need to acculturate to a host society in which they are forced to live as guests and toward which they feel no sense of belonging.

Transnationality: Diaspora is generally understood in migration research as a network of different communities with a common origin that is located outside of the homeland. This network encompasses the triadic relationships between the (globally) dispersed diaspora, the various host countries, and the homeland. As a specific form of transnational communities maintaining significant social and symbolic ties to both their homeland and their country of residence, diaspora differs from exile, where the homeland forms the primary point of reference (see Faist 2000: 197).

Political activities: Although both diaspora and exile generally imply a political context of forced migration from the country of origin (banishment, displacement, or escape from political persecution), the concept of exile in particular has a strong political connotation. Empirical exile research and historical and contemporary exile literature identify numerous examples of exiles whose lives were, and are, defined by political struggle and the strong desire, if not indeed the sense of duty, to return after the period of exile. As a result, exile is often discussed conceptually in connection with political activism in the homeland or discourse about political changes to be achieved in the country of origin. Political scientist Yossi Shain (2005: 15), for instance, sees exiles as people who have been displaced from their homelands and who seek to create the conditions for a fast return by engaging in political activities directed against the policies of the home regime, against the home regime itself, or against the political system as a whole. Although diasporic communities are also politically active, the political context is not as central to the concept of diaspora as it is for exile.

The concepts of exile and diaspora should not be understood as being static. Just as they overlap semantically and conceptually, they are not fixed categories, meaning they can also converge. Accordingly, diaspora can be regarded as a possible progression from exile, that is to say exile can become diaspora over time if the longed-for return to the homeland continues to be denied. This is the case, for example, when there is no political change in the homeland over a long period of time and exiles abandon their hope of returning to the homeland or become reconciled to the idea of returning some day. Gradually, mentally and physically, they come to accept a life in their country of residence, to allow a renegotiation of home despite their desire to return, and to feel capable of putting down roots in a place that had previously seemed purely provisional and temporary (Calandra 2013: 320; see also van Hear 2003: 1). Moreover, it is not inevitable that the exilic identity of the first generation – which entails corresponding patterns of social, cultural, and political interaction, practices, and identifications – be perpetuated in the following generations (Olsen 2009: 660). Indeed, some scholars believe exile is an appropriate description for the experiences of the first generation only and that all following generations can more adequately be understood as diaspora (see Butler 2001: 192).
In the context of debates around globalization theories and phenomena of transnationalism in the early 1990s, the term diaspora, which traditionally held a negative connotation, became semantically dissociated from the historical experiences of the Jewish exile, which had hitherto been the model for the many definitions that used to describe what constituted a diaspora. Criticism of the essentializing use of the term – that is to say, limited to the Jewish and very few other historical experiences (see Sheffer 2003) – went hand in hand with the tendency to use diaspora as a catch-all term for a wide range of different phenomena, practices, and forms of migration observable since the second half of the twentieth century. This usage also included immigrants, refugees, migrant workers, and ethnic minorities. In this context, the question of the voluntary or involuntary element of the migration process was a key consideration in the discussion about moving away from the conception of a diaspora as an exile community. Scholars such as Reis (2004: 47) argue that while exile, traumatic experiences, and collective identity were central to classical diasporas – such as the Jewish diaspora or the African diaspora brought about by the transatlantic slave trade in the sixteenth century – the migration of contemporary diasporic groups does not necessarily mean a permanent separation from the homeland or an extreme dislocation. Such a definition therefore, in their view, did not reflect the experiences of contemporary diasporic groups.

The term diaspora was increasingly framed in the semantic context of the concept of transnationalism, or transmigration, which gained popularity in the 1990s. The term transnational migrant, or transmigrant, is widely used today in migration research to describe a migrant who builds and maintains many different relationships that connect the societies of the countries of origin with those of the countries of residence (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton 1992). Unlike immigrants, transnational migrants do not leave their homeland behind and assimilate into the host society. Rather, they act beyond economic, social, cultural, ethnic, political, and national borders in a transnational space that includes the country of origin and the country of residence. Their sense of belonging, thus, is not limited to their place of origin. Whereas diasporans already possess a specific, homeland-oriented identity that distinguishes them from the host society and which they seek to maintain or revive in contradistinction to the host society, the identity of transmigrants encompasses the affiliation to both places, here and there. Transmigrants do not need to put down new roots, as they were never uprooted. Both physically and in terms of their identity, they are at home in both countries.

The debates about a paradigm shift in the literature away from a rigid conception of diaspora as a ‘nation-in-exile’ and toward a semantic broadening of the term, however, left migration research with a multitude of imprecise attributes for diasporas in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Characteristics such as the dispersal of a group of common national, cultural, or ethnic origins to two, or more, different countries as well as the maintenance of network relationships between these different places, together with the symbolic or real ties to the homeland, apply to many different forms of migration, including transmigration. Consequently, warnings grew louder about the inflationary use of the term diaspora and its uncritical and unreflecting application to any kind of global dispersal or form of migration (see Evans Braziel and Mannur 2003). The general criticism from scholars was that with such a vague list of characteristics, the concept of diaspora lost its meaningfulness as a theoretical definition and its usefulness as an analytical tool. Any conceptual distinction between transmigrants and diasporans almost becomes impossible if key aspects – such as the distinct cultural identity, symbolic affiliation, loyalty, and emotional ties or bonds with the homeland – lose their definitional meaning.
Safran’s (1991) frequently discussed suggestion that the exilic nature of diaspora be retained as the defining criterion in order for the term to remain useful as an analytical category was largely seen as too rigid and limiting. Nevertheless, there is broad agreement in current diaspora studies on the necessity of defining the concept of diaspora sufficiently clearly to distinguish it from transnationalization and transmigration.

**From transnational to transregional perspectives?**

Compared to transnationalism, transregional approaches have been less prominent in migration research. That said, scholars concerned particularly with (labour) migration in the context of the enlargement of the European Union and the financial and economic crises since 2008, as well as historians, suggest complementing the concept of transnationalism with a transregional lens. Such a lens will help to better understand the spatial and social contexts of migrants’ interactions between their region of origin and destination. With its restricted spatial perspective, the concept of transnationalism alone is considered insufficient for the analysis of migrants’ activities and their impact below the level of the nation-state as it neglects central elements of spatial diversity, including translocal and transregional features (see Hoerder 2012; Göler and Krišjāne 2013, 2016). In the case of stepwise movements, for instance, Hoerder (2012) points out that intermediate spaces as well as local and regional connectivity are involved that necessitate analysis and theorization on these levels.

As a missing link between internal and international migration, the transregional approach to migration aims to broaden the conceptual research perspective to better capture the spatial diversity of changes of migration systems as well as the complexity of migration patterns, which include forms of mobility combining overlapping elements of temporary, permanent, and circular migration (see Göler and Krišjāne 2013, 2016). In addition, a transregional perspective on migration might not only be beneficial for the analysis of historical migration dynamics during past centuries when states, immigration restrictions, and migration control systems were of limited importance. The ‘scholarly disregard for the regionality of moves’ even concerning contemporary migration appears surprising given the fact that the vast majority of migrants – for instance, on the African continent – migrate intra- and interregionally (Hoerder 2012: 79).

Therefore, recent scholarly work calls for a departure from the common view of migration as taking place between nation-states and suggests considering specific regional frames, such as labour markets, as spaces of migrants’ interactions. Since migrants move and interact on national as well as subnational levels to mitigate risks and vulnerabilities, it needs to be acknowledged that their mobility transgresses and questions rigid concepts. As such, migration research needs to think beyond the national dimension and state territories as the predominant spatial scales of analysis when investigating different forms of mobility. A new approach that includes transnational, transregional, and translocal perspectives might comprehend, as Hoerder puts it, ‘the multiple internal and cross-border spaces created by migrants’ (2012: 83).

**Conclusion**

Despite – or precisely because of – the semantic and conceptual similarities between the terms exile, diaspora, and transmigration, one important task of contemporary migration research is to point out the key differences between them as important categories in this field of research. In addition, it is worthwhile to examine the potential of transregionalism in migration research.
and to think beyond categories of borders and nations. A typology is needed that is not – and cannot be – rigid. Through its flexibility, this typology would allow theoretical and empirical migration research to better represent and understand the diversity of global movement experiences and to meet the challenge of a nuanced understanding of historical and contemporary migration phenomena.

Select bibliography


Analytical concepts in migration studies

RESPONSIBILITY-SHIFTING AND THE GLOBAL REFUGEE REGIME

Adèle Garnier

Introduction

One of the key problems of the global refugee regime is the absence of binding mechanisms for ensuring international cooperation with regard to the protection of people fleeing persecution. In the last decades, wealthier countries have deployed responsibility-shifting policies aiming to restrict their international obligations to help refugees without officially breaching these obligations. These countries have done so both reactively, via the considerable expansion of a migration control apparatus, as well as proactively, through the co-optation of other countries in the provision of protection. Responsibility-shifting policies have had severe and harmful political and policy consequences at the domestic, regional, and global levels. This chapter investigates these policies and their consequences by focusing on the United Kingdom (UK) in the European context and Australia in the Asia-Pacific context. Today, both the UK and Australia are at the forefront of responsibility-shifting and have developed complex relationships with institutions managing their borders and internal geography. The chapter contributes to transregional studies by emphasizing similarities and differences in the development of such ambivalences, by historicizing them, and by highlighting policy convergence and divergence within limited policy norms at the global level.

The next section presents responsibility-shifting measures in a historical and transregional perspective. The next part comparatively explores a range of political and policy consequences: harm to people fleeing persecution; political delegitimization of asylum; cost-shifting and cost-hiding; and detrimental regional and international cooperation. The chapter concludes with perspectives to be applied in transregional research.

Responsibility-shifting in a historical and transregional perspective

According to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (hereinafter the Refugee Convention), people fleeing persecution in their country of origin have the right to seek asylum in another country and cannot be returned to their country of origin. This is the principle of non-refoulement. The principle implies that a person seeking protection (an asylum seeker) has been recognized by competent authorities as a refugee with a
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well-founded fear of persecution as defined in the Refugee Convention and in other human rights treaties such as the Convention against Torture. However, the Refugee Convention does not stipulate where protection should be provided to refugees. This shortcoming has given various states the opportunity to legitimize measures aiming to restrict the spontaneous arrival of asylum seekers on their borders while purportedly respecting the international legal framework of refugee protection (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway 2015).

The UK and Australia, both early signatories of the Refugee Convention (in 1954), have been at the forefront of such developments, which have played out differently in part due to different regional environments (Kneebone and Rawlings-Sanaei 2007). The UK is – still – part of the European Union (EU), the world’s most integrated regional organization. As an EU member state, the UK is a party to the European Charter of Human Rights, which has been incorporated into the domestic Human Rights Act. All of its neighbours, comparatively wealthy countries, are also parties to the Refugee Convention.

In contrast, Australia’s regional context is divided between member states of Pacific Islands and Southeast Asian regional organizations, of which none is as integrated as the EU. Australia is a member of the Pacific Islands Forum and has a strategic partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Many of Australia’s neighbouring countries have not ratified the Refugee Convention, including Indonesia and Malaysia. Others have ratified it with significant reservations, such as Papua New Guinea, or are late ratifiers, such as Nauru (2011). There is no regional human rights framework in the Asia-Pacific. One of a few exceptions among industrialized countries, Australia does not have a domestic human rights bill, yet it has incorporated the non-refoulement provision of the Refugee Convention into domestic law.

From responsibility-sharing to responsibility-shifting?

Australia was significantly involved in collective action aiming at resettling refugees fleeing the Indo-Chinese crisis of the 1970s and 1980s. This involvement was not only due to domestic political leadership but also due to a favourable international and domestic policy environment (Viviani 1984). At the three refugee conferences in Geneva in 1979, several Western countries agreed to engage in maintaining cooperation for admitting relatively large numbers of Indo-Chinese who had fled to Southeast Asian countries of first asylum, that is to say, to resettle these refugees. Australia was one of the major resettling states and the operation had domestic bipartisan approval. Indo-Chinese refugee resettlement was also the impetus for the establishment of the country’s formal humanitarian programme. Australia was one of the states driving the adoption of the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chinese Refugees in 1989, which further codified the refugee resettlement from countries of first asylum in Southeast Asia as well as the orderly return to Vietnam of people not recognized as refugees (Davies 2008).

The UK’s international refugee cooperation efforts during the same period cannot be considered as successful. This can be attributed to both the international and the domestic context. The 1960s witnessed an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment arising from the arrival of British subjects of Indian origin living in Kenya and Uganda that were threatened by increasingly aggressive nationalism in both countries. To impede their arrival in the UK, the Wilson government attempted to convince other Western countries to admit significant numbers of ‘East African Asians’. Most countries refused, arguing that these refugees were British citizens and should receive protection in the UK (Hansen 2000). Ultimately, the UK resettled far larger numbers of ‘East African Asians’ than any other country. While Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher strongly supported the 1979 Geneva conferences, her government engaged considerably less than other Western nations in Indo-Chinese resettlement.
Following increases of asylum claims and the nascent politicization of asylum in the early 1980s in the UK and in the late 1980s in Australia, both countries concentrated on responsibility-shifting. Controversially, undocumented asylum seekers were increasingly detained in both countries (Garnier and Cox 2012). While the British government seemed ambivalent toward European institutions and refused to ratify the Schengen Agreement aiming to end border controls within the European Economic Community, it was a party to the Dublin Regulation, which aims at preventing multiple asylum applications in EU member states (Ette and Gerdes 2007). Both countries also became members of the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees, which expressly focuses on bureaucratic exchanges regarding enforcement of migration control. In 1999 both the UK and Australia resettled thousands of residents from Kosovo who had fled the war in Kosovo to Macedonia and other neighbouring countries. Research on the UK’s and Australia’s responses highlight divergent attitudes toward resettled refugees, who were generally welcome, and toward asylum claimants, especially claimants coming by boat in the Australian case and on foot or by lorry via the Channel Tunnel in the British case. Such spontaneous movement triggered the development of bilateral border cooperation between Indonesia and Australia on the one hand, and between France and the UK on the other (Schuster 2003; Nethery and Gordyn 2014).

**Responsibility-shifting in the twenty-first century**

Responsibility-shifting took a different dimension following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. Australia’s Howard government started what came to be called the ‘Pacific Solution’. This initiative involved the interception of all boats carrying asylum seekers en route to Australian shores, and the removal of claimants to the Pacific states Papua New Guinea (Manus Island) and Nauru. The latter had not yet ratified the Refugee Convention at the time. The Australian government indicated that it would never admit recognized refugees in Australia, yet ended up doing so after other countries refused to step in (Taylor 2005). The Howard government was considerably involved in regional and multilateral fora on migration control, for instance with the establishment of the Bali Process in 2002 (Nethery and Gordyn 2014). The British government of Tony Blair, likewise, promoted responsibility-shifting through regional avenues. Copying Australia’s offshore processing centres was advocated by the conservative opposition, yet immigration bureaucrats considered the European human rights framework too strict for such replication. At the Thessaloniki European Council in 2003, Tony Blair suggested the establishment of ‘regional protection areas’ at the periphery of the EU to promote the orderly arrival of people fleeing persecution. As a consequence, the European Commission suggested the establishment of regional protection zones in Africa and the Ukraine, as well as a joint EU resettlement programme. Both were eventually implemented, albeit at a very small scale (Garnier 2014). In parallel, the UK adopted most of the EU’s rights-restricting directives on immigration and asylum, but barely any of the EU’s rights-expanding directives (Ette and Gerdes 2007). The Sangatte camp was closed in 2002 and the UK established a formal national resettlement programme in 2003. Both Australian and British politicians advocated in the early 2000s a reform of the Refugee Convention for preventing what was perceived as ‘abuse’ by asylum claimants. This, in the Australian case, was part of greater scepticism toward international law and the United Nations (UN) (Charlesworth et al. 2006).

In the context of decreasing asylum claims in both the UK and Australia in the mid–2000s, political attention shifted away from asylum claimants. However, EU immigration has since become increasingly politicized and is considered as one factor contributing to the outcome of the Brexit referendum (Somerville 2016). At the same time, the UK became one of the
four EU member states overseeing the implementation of the EU-Turkey deal (European Commission 2016). The UK also nationally increased the admission of Syrian refugees due to the Syrian crisis.

Australia’s offshore processing centres were officially closed in 2008. Yet as boat arrivals and asylum claims again began to increase, the Australian government attempted to implement a ‘swap’ deal with Malaysia in 2011. The deal would have had Malaysia accept asylum seekers intercepted en route to Australia in exchange for the resettlement of refugees hosted in Malaysia. However, the High Court of Australia deemed the deal unconstitutional because Malaysia was not a party to the Refugee Convention (Garnier 2016). A new version of offshore processing in Nauru and Papua New Guinea started in 2012, after Nauru’s adoption of the Refugee Convention the previous year.

Australia’s reiteration to not admit refugees who had come by boat to Australia led the country to persuade Nauru and Papua New Guinea to permanently admit intercepted refugees on their territory; to enter into partnership with Cambodia in 2013, also aiming to permanently settle intercepted refugees there; and, from 2014 onwards, to systematically return all intercepted boats en route to Australia to countries in the region (Gleeson 2016). In 2016 the US government of Barrack Obama agreed to resettle intercepted refugees living in Nauru and Papua New Guinea in exchange for the resettlement in Australia of Central American refugees then living in Costa Rica. This de facto ‘refugee swap’ started being implemented in 2017. Since October 2017 it has been impossible for people with no legal right to be in Australia to make an asylum claim on Australian territory (Refugee Council of Australia 2018). Australia has increased its admission of Syrian refugees in response to the Syrian crisis, yet it has been accused of preferring Christian minorities, and has refused to engage in the admission of Muslim Rohingya refugees from Burma (Vit 2016).

Political and policy consequences of responsibility-shifting

An expanding body of literature highlights the severe and harmful consequences of responsibility-shifting (e.g. Taylor 2005; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway 2015; Cosgrave et al. 2016; Hargrave and Pantuliano 2016). This section compares the political and policy consequences in the British and Australian cases, with particular attention to their multilevelled nature.

Harm to people fleeing persecution

The physical and psychological harm caused to people fleeing persecution and kept in Australia’s offshore processing centres as well as in Cambodia has been well-documented (e.g. Gleeson 2016). Facing years of uncertainty concerning their status, many, including children, have experienced chronic depression. There have been many incidences of self-harm as well as violence toward others. Security guards have been accused of physical harm, including child abuse, toward those they were supposed to oversee. The Australian government has long insisted that such issues were for the hosting countries to solve.

In the British case, the situation in migrant camps close to the Channel Tunnel has been that of a humanitarian emergency both between 1999 and 2002 at the Sangatte camp and in the re-established makeshift camp, the Calais ‘Jungle’ camp, between 2014 and its closure in late 2016. This has included harm caused by failed attempts to cross the tunnel on foot at night by unaccompanied minors, among others, aiming to be reunited with family members living in the UK (Gentleman 2016). Certainly, the extent of harm was under-reported given the refusal of authorities to take responsibility for the camp population. Successive British governments
repeatedly argued that this was an issue for the French authorities, who in turn claimed that the migrants refuse to register in France since they aim to reach the UK (Schustet 2003).

Beyond the camps, the migration control measures associated with responsibility-shifting have not prevented people fleeing persecution from leaving their countries of origin, but rather have pushed them toward more dangerous migration routes. For instance, following the adoption of the EU-Turkey deal, migratory patterns have shifted from the Eastern toward the Central Mediterranean, which has witnessed a significant increase in fatalities in 2016. Furthermore, stronger border controls in wealthier countries have triggered the adoption of more stringent border control measures in countries in the periphery, potentially resulting in dangerous attempts by migrants to cross heavily weaponized borders (Hargrave and Pantuliano 2016).

**Political delegitimization of asylum**

Political discourse promoting responsibility-shifting initiatives has challenged the genuineness of asylum seekers. In Australia, they have been dubbed ‘queue-jumpers’, a term used for the first time in parliamentary debates regarding Indo-Chinese claimants that since has become widely used. The term is part of a political and media discourse contrasting asylum seekers with the allegedly more legitimate resettled refugees arriving in an orderly manner (Every 2008). In the UK, ‘asylum seeker’ became a derogatory term in political and media discourse in the 2000s, and more recently ‘refugee’ has also take on a negative connotation. The delegitimization of asylum has had restrictive policy consequences, which have negatively impacted the integration of refugees in the UK, being not only a source of concern for individual refugees but also a challenge for regional and local authorities managing integration.

In Australia, there has for years been a false perception that ‘stopping the boats’ is a legitimate way to solve the ‘asylum crisis’ because it prevents deaths at sea (Garnier 2014). This perception has contributed to the increase in the Australian public’s sensitiveness to any boats arriving and carrying asylum seekers in the vicinity of Australia’s shores. Former Prime Minister Tony Abbott has actively promoted this approach in Southeast Asia and Europe; a similar humanitarian language has been used by European leaders to promote the EU-Turkey deal (Garnier 2016).

**Cost-shifting and cost-hiding**

With the rising popularity of neo-liberal practices across the globe since the 1980s, responsibility-shifting measures were adopted against a backdrop of new public management approaches focusing on reducing administrative and judicial costs (Kapucu 2007). In the 1990s and early 2000s, British and Australian parliamentary committees and national audit agencies scrutinized the cost of asylum procedures. In both countries, asylum claims go through a first stage of administrative decision, which can be contested at administrative tribunals and eventually by courts of justice. It was noted that pressure to cut costs at the first stage resulted in poor administrative decisions, which in turn resulted in asylum seekers being allowed administrative and judicial appeals, thereby increasing the cost of the entire asylum procedure. Pressure to reduce the cost of appeals played a role in the adoption of both responsibility-shifting and deterrence measures toward asylum seekers.

Notwithstanding, such measures incurred considerable costs, including the management of offshore facilities and the training of staff involved in deterrence measures overseas, as well as the cost of treatment for the above-mentioned harm done to people fleeing persecution and other types of payments made to persuade governments to host such centres (Nethery and Gordyn 2014; Cosgrave et al. 2016). Accountability is hard to achieve for two main reasons. On the
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one hand, domestic watchdogs as well as the media face practical as well as judicial obstacles when investigating the cost of policies in foreign countries. On the other hand, governments devolve the operation of offshore facilities to private actors, whose accountability practices are characterized by poor standards – a phenomenon that also characterizes private immigration detention at the domestic level (McPhail, Ochoki Nyamori and Taylor 2016.

**Detrimental regional and international cooperation**

Responsibility-shifting has complicated the involvement of the Australian and British governments in regional and international politics. The UK’s ambivalent attitude toward the EU goes far beyond immigration and refugee policy. Nevertheless, domestic hostility toward people fleeing persecution has been a source of bilateral tensions between the British and the French government in regard to the Sangatte/Calais situation, and the UK’s refusal to participate in initiatives aiming at a more equitable repartitioning of refugees within the EU has contributed to increasing tensions between southern and northern EU member states. In the early 2000s, the promotion of ‘regional transit zones’ by the Blair government was closely followed by then UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Ruud Lubbers, resulting in the suggestion of similar schemes by Lubbers. This decision proved very controversial within the UN refugee agency and challenged its legitimacy in the eyes of refugee advocates who deplored a legitimization of northern states’ deterrent approaches contrary to the UN Human Rights Council’s (UNHRC) protection mandate. The UNHCR has been equally ambivalent toward the failed Australia-Malaysia swap as well as, at least originally, the EU-Turkey deal, the implementation of which is subsequently strongly criticized. It has been argued that it would be very difficult for the UNHCR to bluntly refuse to engage in initiatives promoted by major financial contributors and involving major refugee-hosting states (see Garnier 2016).

Nonetheless, the UN refugee agency has repeatedly denounced Australia’s offshore processing centres after swiftly ending its first involvement in 2002; this was followed by the UN Commission on Human Rights and the UNHRC. Australian governments have successively replied to criticism from the latter by arguing that human rights breaches of UNHRC members were far worse than its own. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), which managed the Pacific Solution’s offshore processing centres until 2008 despite the fact that the IOM does not have a protection mandate, refused to manage the centres that reopened in 2012.

At the regional level, Australia’s official development aid to Nauru and Papua New Guinea has considerably increased since the opening of offshore processing centres, hence reinforcing the two countries’ external financial dependence. Responsibility-shifting has increased local social tensions because of the pressure on infrastructures caused by hosting forced migrants as well as associated staff and because of the severe and harmful impact on local populations of systemic abuse in the centres (Opeskin and Ghezelbash 2016). Other Pacific Islands governments have been very critical of Australia’s policy to not only process asylum seekers, but now to also pursue the long-term resettlement of refugees in the Pacific region, as this could increase sociocultural tensions with regard to scarce resources (Warbrooke 2014).

**Perspectives to be applied in transregional research**

Even though Australia and the UK are embedded in distinct regional dynamics, this chapter’s transregional perspective has systematically highlighted how the strenuous relationships between both countries and their geographic regions has contributed to the development of responsibility-shifting in the Asia-Pacific and the European contexts, respectively, thereby going beyond a mere
national focus on such severe and harmful policies. This perspective has also highlighted how the limited extent of the global framework on non-refoulement not only results in considerable harm to people fleeing persecution, but also contributes to the development of parallel regional dynamics further undermining this limited global normative framework.

To further expand our transregional understanding of the policies investigated here, future research could explore personal connections between political, administrative, and private actors fostering past and contemporary transregional exchanges. This would not only allow for a more nuanced understanding of transregional dynamics, but also for a clearer identification of continuities and ruptures in the development of such practices over time. More comparative research is also necessary in regard to the impact of responsibility-shifting practices on host populations. In addition, following Kneebone and Rawlings-Sanaei (2007), the impact of responsibility-shifting concerning the conceptualization of world regions could be further explored. One aspect of such exploration could be the impact of incentives to adopt instruments of international law, such as the Refugee Convention in the case of Nauru in 2011. Finally, research could investigate in a comparative and regional perspective the impact of the increasingly difficult acceptance of refugees and their long-term integration into host countries.

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Responsibility-shifting and the global refugee regime


TRANSREGIONALITY OF AFRICAN ENTREPRENEURS

Laurence Marfaing

Introduction

African entrepreneurs play a role in globalization processes. Among other things, their mobility is linked to business strategies. These are, in turn, inherited from generations of traders who maintain networks throughout their careers and along their travels from Africa to the Global North and hubs such as Jeddah, Istanbul, Dubai, Bangkok, Hong Kong, and Guangzhou.

Such African entrepreneurs, often mistaken for migrants, follow international networks through their mobility. These networks are perpetually renewed depending on economic opportunities, family ties, and migration strategies. This phenomenon of mobility creates transregional spaces in every continent. Today, the reality of mobility, being linked to globalization, is buried as catastrophic scenarios regarding refugees at the doorstep of Europe flood the front page of newspapers, with every person originating from Africa or the Arab world being taken, at the same time, as a potential migrant. And apart from migration propelled by war, climate change, economic difficulties, and, more globally, harsh living conditions, many people simply realize the opportunities inherent in globalization and, in turn, adapt to the lifestyles it brings forth.

The terms ‘migrant’ (to name the stakeholder) and ‘migration’ (to describe the phenomenon) are employed to such an extent that they are not suitable for these business-related movements. The term ‘transregionality’, as dealt with in this chapter, offers a broader approach that can reinterpret such international business strategies. Here I aim to determine whether this concept can lead to a better understanding of the mobility of African entrepreneurs. Hence, I will review the terms ‘migration’/’migrant’, ‘mobility’, and ‘transregionality’, and then explore the patterns of West African business people’s international journeys between important economic centres. I will use the case study of the Senegalese in China as a way to assess whether the term ‘transregionality’ would be more suitable and useful for this type of mobility.

Mobility culture: migration vs. transregional mobility?

In West Africa, where natural and financial resources do not always ensure a family’s survival from one year to the next, mobility has been – from even before colonial times – a strategy to access natural resources in a subregion that was favoured by agricultural complementarity...
Transregionality of African entrepreneurs

Daily life is based on a combination of sedentariness and mobility, depending on distance, duration, and regularity. The related mobilization of social, family, and religious networks facilitates survival via the channelling of individual capacities as well as sociability.

In some West African societies (e.g. Senegal), this mobility is a necessity for entering adulthood. Once insecurities are overcome, travel is seen as a new potential that adds to the social ability (compétence, Bourdieu, 1982) of the social individual, to be used in case of need. These strategies are assimilated into what is called a ‘culture of mobility’ (de Bruijn and van Dijk 2001; Hahn and Klute 2007; Boesen and Marfaing 2014). The community, village, or family pays to send a chosen person abroad, who will later have to reinvest the borrowed money back into the place of origin (Marfaing 2011).

The regional behaviour and conditions in which these mobilities are organized are in line with the general observation that ‘information, networks, and a certain amount of money are needed in order to leave’ (pour partir, il faut de l’information, des réseaux, un pécule, Wihtol de Wenden 2009). The idea of migration connects with the idea of leaving to find something better somewhere else. The term ‘migration’ is difficult to use in the present context, however, due to the connotations it conveys. It is not the term ‘migrant’ that has changed, based on definitions offered by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) from the 1980s up until today (IOM 2018). It is rather the connotations themselves that have changed, given the development of the phrase ‘illegal or irregular migration’.

A series of events propelled this development. In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam formed a common European policy in terms of visas, asylum, immigration, and the movement of people. Then Frontex was created in 2004 to regulate this policy, followed by the events at Ceuta and Melilla in 2005 (Marfaing 2011). In a lot of academic papers about migration, irregular or not, from Africa to Europe, as well as in the media, the perception of migrants in Europe is not free from ideologies and stereotypes. It disseminates images of misery and catastrophes. Thus, in Europe, the idea that every African met outside Africa wants to come to Europe illegally has been spread through political discourses transported via the media.

West African entrepreneurs’ mobility strategies and geographic expansion – in order to horizontally expand their businesses – should be distinguished from West African migration strategies. Even though many migrants organize their own migration individually or in secrecy, they have a particular social goal: to improve the life quality of their family or village. Furthermore, they must repay the debt to their immediate circles by sustaining their family back home through money transfers, with the view to support real estate investments or to create job opportunities within the community. When they return, they will be expected to get involved in organizing the migration of the younger chosen ones.

Some studies have tried to update the catch-all term of ‘migrant’ for businessmen and women, which is more and more limited and in need of precision to be operational. Among the not-so-convincing attempts are terms such as ‘migrant-entrepreneur’ (Bertoncello and Bredeloup 2009), ‘itinerant merchant’ (commerçant itinérant), and ‘adventurer merchant’ (commerçant aventurier, Coloma 2010). Also inadequate is the idea of ‘transmigrants’, which includes ‘migratory cosmopolitanism’ (cosmopolitismes migratoires, Tarrius 2010) or ‘circulating migrants’ (circulants, Le Houerou 2007).

The common point between the businessmen and women found in China is that they are mobile. They circulate between regions on a more or less large scale, sprinkling their journeys with interim stops. There, they maintain their networks and business relations, and take part in investments. They then bring their experiences (back) to their area of residence, on an economic as well as social level.
As I will explain, this behaviour corresponds with the concept of ‘transregionality’ used in this handbook. It is a process of networking, relations, and exchange of goods and ideas between big regions – no longer only at the state level, but also at the level of the individual mobility actors. These individuals transform their environment and create the potential for new identities.

Via the concept of ‘transregionality’, we will bring to light the development of a new form of dialogue between the world regions. This new dialogue is led by the African entrepreneurs and merchants who create innovative collaborations according to their individual abilities, and thus ‘invite [one] to transcend the established order’ (Milliot 2004: 41–2).

Transregional entrepreneurs

Geographical expansion through pilgrimage and migration roads

By the 1960s, Senegalese merchants in Marseille had started taking advantage of boats stopping by along the pilgrimage route from Casablanca to Mecca (Marfaing 2012). Marseille – alongside Bordeaux – had in fact been a great harbour of the colonial industry since the mid-nineteenth century, and the city where the French chambers of commerce originated.

Different people have settled there: sailors, soldiers from both world wars, and the first migrant workers (especially harbour handlers) in the early 1960s (Tall 2001). They established communities over time – especially around the dahiras – and reproduced the sociability and habits of Senegalese life (Ebin 1993: 106). The following decade, Marseille became an important marketplace for Senegalese traders, as well as a hub for supplying provisions coming from all over Europe (Schmidt di Friedberg 2000: 42; Bava 2002: 581–3).

The West African migrants settling in Marseille in the 1970s became bridgeheads, so to speak, and hence intermediaries to introduce newcomers to the big metropolis and local producers. Thus, Senegalese traders could seize new international business opportunities, thereby enriching their family, religious, migration, and business networks. These are characterized by their transnational dimension, the great mobility of their members, and their specific organization in welcoming travellers. Since then, the business strategies between different members of these networks in different trading spaces, as well as their flexibility in adapting to the local context while occupying the space, have been extensively studied (Salem 1981; Ebin 1992; Diouf 2000; Schmidt di Friedberg 2000; Marfaing 2007).

With the introduction of visas in Europe at the end of the 1980s, such traders withdrew to destinations that were more flexible in their visa regimes and freedom of movement policies. Starting out by engaging in subregional West African migration, many people availed themselves of new business opportunities offered, for instance, in New York City, delocalizing their business habits while perpetuating their life habits and business customs when meeting their fellow citizens, students, or already settled migrants (Ebin 1992, 2008; Diouf 2000; Evers Rosander 2005). Simultaneously, new routes opened via pilgrimage networks through Eastern Europe, especially to Istanbul (Ebin 1992; Delos 2003). Finally, the emergence of the United Arab Emirates in the 1990s drew traders to Dubai and its first duty-free zone, which rapidly became the ‘temple of the informal’ (Marchal 2001). It paved the way for their route to Asia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Bangkok, and, from the 2000s onwards, to the People’s Republic of China (Bertoncello, Bredeloup and Pliez 2009; Bertoncello and Bredeloup 2009).
Expansion due to organization and business strategies

For those traders who wanted to internationalize their businesses, Nouakchott in Mauritania or Banjul in Gambia, followed by Casablanca in Morocco, have long been top transregional destinations. This expansion strategy follows a concentric model that progressively extends the scale of the business. This process depends on the accumulated capital, the information gathered on the state of business in a given place, the available commodities, and the contacts facilitating the traders’ stay and business on the ground.

When the trader – after a long period of reflection – finally decides to internationalize and to find a new destination for this purpose, he or she has to integrate another network in the chosen destination. The accumulation of destinations – the ‘stops’ (escales), as they are called, where the trader has his or her habits and contacts – enables different networks to be connected. It is the result of adaptation strategies, know-how and expertise, as well as practices (Müller and Wehrhahn 2011: 3). It builds on the trader’s social and religious affinities as well as on the family networks. In this way, migration and business networks become integrated, giving traders the opportunity to go from one network to the other, depending on the location and business opportunities (Marfaing 2014).

The very first access to business networks is directly linked to a given apprenticeship in a Senegalese business environment. There, the norms that regulate market access, as well as business itself, originate from social, religious, and commercial practices deeply rooted in sociability and behaviours. Traders have a moral and commercial responsibility to support the movement of others (Tarrius 2010: 421). Training by a local business person guarantees the transmission of expertise, the accumulation of capital, and thus the access to tools to build one’s own business (Marfaing and Sow 1999: 170). Such training takes place not only in Senegal but also during stays abroad, when the apprentice accompanies his or her boss during international journeys, where he or she will be introduced to new contacts.

This transmission is considered a long-term investment. Trained in this manner, the apprentice can assist his or her boss in conducting business, giving the boss the opportunity to continue travelling to diversify the commodities being sold. Furthermore, the young sponsored apprentice can, if necessary, represent the boss abroad and spare him or her a journey. In the longer term, the apprentice will also be able to manage a branch office in a transit area.

New destination: China

Guangzhou is famous for its international fair, which many traders started frequenting in the late 1980s. By the early 2000s, it had become a major point of contact for African traders (Martinez 2008; Le Bail 2009; Bodomo 2010; Müller and Wehrhahn 2011; Marfaing and Thiel 2014). The trend was followed a few years later by Yiwu, further north in Zhejiang province. An international and giant retail market opened there in 2002. The market comprises 7,000 square metres, is distributed across five pavilions on four floors, and welcomes 170,000 visitors a day, of which 2,000 are foreigners. A trading district with a strong Muslim influence has emerged there, mixing in the African traders.

As a destination, China has indeed transformed trade schemes, though not wholly. The mode of long-distance trade has carried over from the described ‘caravan era’, in which expansion strategies were developed by going from stop to stop. Many entrepreneurs keep integrating the different stops they created during their international activities, where they left a relative or business partner as a local manager. In this way, they retain relations with those locations on the way to China.
However, today, many entrepreneurs also travel directly from Dakar to China, even without knowing anybody in particular in China, contrary to other business destinations (Marfaing and Thiel 2015). Furthermore, the migrants already in China are no longer the bridgehead to welcome the traders, but instead the traders are themselves. Aiming to reduce the number of journeys between Africa and China, traders already with business in China decide to open advisory offices for African traders there. African traders in China hold business or student visas, or temporary residence permits linked to their businesses, renewable each year if their company does well. Thus, newcomers to China can look for a more seasoned (Senegalese) intermediary who will connect them with suppliers selling or producing the desired commodity, and who can help them with the delivery process and freight formalities.

China as a new destination has also brought other changes. In light of the rapid Chinese economic success and the numerous new possibilities to produce commodities in all price ranges, many West African entrepreneurs question their own business strategies and look for ways to adapt. There are many new opportunities linked to transregional business mobility, ranging from shipping to providing African entrepreneurs with advice and contacts. The latter can pertain to checking the status of Chinese production facilities, or can also relate to connecting African entrepreneurs looking for joint ventures in China with Chinese entrepreneurs willing to invest in Africa.

Not only does the Chinese experience bring new business opportunities, it also increases awareness that Africa, following China’s example, should and is able to produce – not only import – all kinds of products. In the process, African traders are looking to invest in facilities and infrastructure together with the Chinese or, according to their stop habits, in networks within their internationally spread family structure or communities.

Through this current search for opportunities in West Africa, the import industry is becoming solidified as it becomes more suitable to the demands of West African consumers while representing global modernity and leading to new commercial expansion in the whole subregion. It is not unusual for African entrepreneurs to establish exclusive partnerships with Chinese producers to foster the manufacture of goods better adapted to the modern world and the purchasing power in West Africa, such as sewing machines, electric meters, solar panels, air-conditioning units, and sanitation systems. African-Chinese partnerships are being extended into other sectors as well, such as agriculture, construction, and fishing.

New investments in African agriculture focus on crops such as cassava, peanuts, and cashews. There are also ongoing imports of mechanical devices better adapted to the African labour force. The latter are less fragile than the expensive and sophisticated devices imported from Europe, and usually made for the larger-scale production of consumer goods such as soap, shoes, toothpaste, and cotton buds.

Transregionality and translation in African society

Many studies about Africans in China talk about ‘migration’ and ‘migrants’ (Cissé 2013; Bredeloup 2012; Dittgen 2010; Li and Desheng 2008). They also speak of ‘South-South migration’ (Cissé 2013) or of the ‘spaces of migration’ where these people are supposed to live (Le Bail 2009; Shao 2012). However, putting the actors described above in the category of ‘migrants’ (people who move to a given country where they were not born), on the pretext of using a logic of spatial mobility, is not convincing.

As we saw in this article, these businessmen and women have sometimes used migration as a springboard to develop their business and ensure its horizontal and/or vertical expansion.
Transregionality of African entrepreneurs

However, this process does not make them ‘migrants’ with all the connotations the term conveys, including the negative ones. The term does not give any information on their status or activities; nor does it specify their mobility or business strategies.

This mobility is better tackled via ‘transregionality’, which has always been part of the West African mobility culture, whether for city dwellers or nomads. We can observe the mobility of entrepreneurs starting on a small scale, and then developing into cross-border activity that later turns into mobility between bigger world regions. In searching, finding, and implementing business opportunities, African entrepreneurs act like many other international entrepreneurs around the world: they travel and nurture their international and transregional relations. They are, to be sure, major agents of globalization.

Via China and in elaborating new schemes, these agents become transregional entrepreneurs. Through their individual initiatives, they seize opportunities of expansion during their international travels outside of traditional networks and common habits while adapting and integrating them into new processes. They are also transregional to the extent that they bring back ideas concerning urban infrastructure, business management, and a sense of citizenship that are less influenced by Western values and can be more adapted to African values. All these initiatives change the urban realm. The consumption habits of populations encourage new forms of business that are integrated into modernity via globalization.

Note

1 The Tidjanes created the ‘dahira’ (ou da’ira) in 1940 in Dakar to welcome travellers and visitors. It was a meeting point for corporate prayer as well as a place to stay for those who wanted to settle. The system today is extended to all Senegalese brotherhoods, Mouride as well as Tidjane. They exist in almost every big city where followers of these brotherhoods are present. Even though they also have a business purpose today, they maintain their religious anchoring.

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MIGRATION’S LINES
OF FLIGHT
Borders as spaces of contestation

Sabine Hess and Serhat Karakayali

Introduction

In the summer and autumn of 2015, the reality of cross-border migration became overwhelming. Thousands of migrants and refugees were literally ripping down the fences of the European border regime and were demanding the right to cross the borders of Europe. They camped wherever, jumped on ferries and trains, and if security agents got in their way, they marched hundreds of kilometres to the next national border and protested over their right to proceed. This collective, unorganized uprising increased international public awareness when thousands of refugees were blocked at the main station in Budapest in early September of 2015 and in turn launched the ‘March of Hope’. The pictures of these people marching along motorways toward Western Europe became iconographic images of protest and resistance against the European border regime.

These more or less spontaneous forms of action by migrants are not new, but they have taken place on a regular basis over the past few years (see Ataç et al. 2015), although in fewer numbers and with less resounding success. Among them are numerous attempts of sub-Saharan migrants to climb over the militarized fences of the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla, where many became stuck and seriously injured in the barbed wire. Notwithstanding, hundreds have succeeded in entering the European Union year after year (Heck 2010; Tagesschau 2014). There have also been demonstrations and riots over the past years in refugee camps set up by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, such as the repeated protest of Syrian refugees against the enforced internment and living conditions in the camps in Jordan (The Guardian 2014). Beyond these common forms of collective resistance, there are numerous examples of more individual and clandestine acts of borderland resistance, such as sanding or scraping away fingerprints to fool the fingerprint machines as well as the so-called EURODAC system (the large database connected to the Dublin Regulation that designates that refugees have to apply for asylum in the first EU or European country they enter [the latter includes non-EU states that have implemented the regulation] (Tsianos and Kuster 2013)).

In what follows, we will address how these manifold practices of migratory resistance as well as general practices of border crossing can be placed in a border theory that assesses the social and political power of migration as well as analytically takes the expansion of the border regime into account. In doing this, we draw on the theoretical perspectives we have been
developing over several years within the Transit Migration Research Group (Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe 2007). We start by outlining how the relationship between border and migration is conventionally conceptualized in scholarly works and public discourse. The shortcomings of these conceptions serve as a starting point for an outline of our understanding of migration, which has been inspired by the post-operaist stance of ‘autonomy of migration’. We suggest that it is best to think of borderlands as products of conflicting forces and as emergent results of constant struggles between escape/flight and enclosure. Based on that, we explore how this changes the production of knowledge in the field of border studies.

The primacy of resistance

Although migrant resistance is often practised individually, it is nevertheless embedded in the social networks of transit migration, drawing on the wisdom and collective knowledge of diasporic border-crossing communities, which Asef Bayat describes as ‘nonmovement’ (Bayat 2010). Bayat uses the notion of ‘nonmovements’ to refer to the collectivized mass actions within the context of the Arab uprisings, which were not formally organized and did not follow one single ideology or political project. Rather, everyday practices of refusal were performed by many people at once. Although fragmented, together they exceed the sum of their individual parts – that is to say actions – and can trigger social transformations.

These forms of resistance were more intensively discussed after September 2015, when refugees succeeded in demanding the Austrian and German governments to open their borders. This was made possible by the manifold activities of refugees, supporters, and volunteers in the preceding months, staging a highly visible ‘welcoming society’ (Karakayali and Kleist 2015). On the contrary, interpretations of migration are often imbued with entirely different images and narratives, such as those of overloaded, sinking ships in the Mediterranean Sea and corpses lying on the quay. These representations primarily indicate a discourse of a solid border around the West (Andreas and Snyder 2000). In this perspective, migrants and their border-crossing endeavours are presented as victims at the mercy of the atrocities of the border control policies and practices.

In international border studies, the relationship between migration and the border is often understood in a way in which migrants as a social group, movement, or network have practically no agency at all. In this way, researchers contribute to the epistemological reproduction of the structural dominance of migration control devices. This does not mean that one should ignore institutional power due to politically generated optimism. Deleuze’s famous statement of resistance having ‘the last word’ of power (Deleuze 1986) instead points to the wilfulness of resistance. Resistances are not simply the consequences of the exclusion of marginalized groups or lifestyles; they should be analysed with regard to their productivity, thereby highlighting the outcomes and effects they have on continuously changing social fields (Deleuze and Guattari 1992). This entails interpreting resistance practices not solely as epiphenomena, but as intrinsic structural elements of the production of the social and political world.

The dominance of the border paradigm

Attributing primacy to migration control might indeed seem plausible in light of current developments. The increasing boat tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea and the re-emergence of high fences, walls, and deep trenches long before the Balkans route was closed off in spring 2016 suggest a border paradigm rather than the ‘power of migration’ (Glick-Schiller 2009). These material architectures of re-bordering even seem to be anachronistic considering the myriad more
or less invisible, technological border devices the EU has been pushing for in the last decade, such as the digital and intelligent border patrol surveillance technologies, which construct ‘networked fences’, as established by the European Border Surveillance system (EUROSUR), the Maritime Surveillance project (MARSUR), or the common information-sharing environment (CISE). Carrera and den Hertog (2015) describe these as ‘the surveillance race’, as evidenced by the creation of highly spatialized and digitalized borders, leading to a ‘ubiquity of borders’ (Balibar 2002: 84). Thus, it would be unfruitful to describe the events of the long ‘summer of migration’ of 2015 (Kasperek and Speer 2015) as a simple negation of these processes. We suggest that it is best to understand border regimes as spaces of constant tension, conflict, and contestation, thereby incorporating the agency of migration movements into a theoretical account of the border without denying its militarization and brutality (Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe 2007).

This understanding raises fundamental questions about the nature of the political. In line with Bayat’s notion of ‘nonmovements’, we aim to overcome the sharp separation of the political from the economic, everyday, and private spheres. This separation has been prevalent in political discourses of migration; take, for instance, the categorical distinction between ‘refugees’ and ‘migrants’ or the definition of ‘the migrant’ as being a purely economic actor (cf. Piore 1980). In conceptualizing migration as more than a mere object, we strive to not only highlight common political practices and their effects on the formation and restructuring of control practices, but also to propose an understanding of migration and politics as a continuum of merging strategies for action, in which migrations can be understood as acts of ‘flight’ and elusion/evasion from the existing conditions of life (Papadopoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos 2008). This approach is inspired by the Italian post-operaist debates on autonomy and the concept of auton-omy of migration, which was first formulated by Yann Moulier Boutang and which has since been further elaborated upon in various academic and activist contexts (Bojadžijev, Karakayali and Tsianos 2001; Bojadžijev and Karakayali 2010; Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe 2007; Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2008; Hess and Kasperek 2010; Heimeshoff, Hess and Kron 2014).

From push-and-closure models to humanitarianism

Scientific representations have far-reaching implications for the perceptions of the subjectivities of migrants, which can be shown by the push-and-pull model that is currently being transformed into more of a push-and-closure model. This concept distinguishes between, on the one side, a more or less monolithic apparatus – willing to call or to stop, hinder, exclude, suppress, and/or exploit migration – from, on the other, the migrants as ‘victims without agency’. In this setting, the fact that borders in many cases successfully fulfil their mission of stopping people from crossing leads to an outright epistemological elimination of migrant agency. Such victimization, furthermore, is reinforced by advocacy groups, which have a tendency to emphasize the migrants’ powerlessness (Karakayali 2008). Resonating with an overall Western understanding of justifying migration only if caused by force (see Boltanski and Thevenot 2007; Forst 2014), this depiction has recently been reflected in the refugee crisis, where the terminology of ‘migrants’ is used to imply economic motives and the freedom of decision and choice in contrast to the term ‘refugee’, which implies no such choices at all. One of the effects of these classic scientific conceptualizations is the reproduction of an asymmetrically constructed relation between Western reflexive (caring) subjects, on the one hand, and dependent victims, on the other.

Didier Fassin (2011) and Miriam Ticktin (2011) interpret this relation as ‘humanitarianism’ or ‘humanitarian power’, which with the end of the Cold War conflict has especially become hegemonic and has put forth a new militarily inclined humanitarian complex (Moyn 2010).
Under the rationale of humanitarianism, we can also speak of a political economy of ‘humanitarian crisis’ based on the ability of the European border regime to depict incidents as emergencies (Calhoun 2004), calling for ad hoc and unprecedented governing. This could be witnessed in the summer and fall of 2015, when numerous politicians in Germany, including Chancellor Angela Merkel, demanded an overruling of standards pertaining to the construction of housing and minimum wages. The same rationale determined the restabilization of the border regime in the Aegean region by the EU–Turkey Statement of March 2016, which stipulated that all refugee migrants arriving on the Greek islands must be returned to Turkey by suspending all international legal protection regimes such as the Geneva Convention on asylum, thereby producing a space of exception. Didier Fassin characterizes such exceptional politics as a central dimension of humanitarianism. And, indeed, when looking back, this kind of emergency policy was highly productive and one of the main driving forces in developing Frontex into a big organization with a large budget (see Heimeshoff, Hess and Kron 2014: 1ff.). At the same time, migrants also draw on this humanitarian logic when referring to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and ‘European values’ in their demands for better living conditions and an end to violence.

The autonomy of migration approach as critical intervention into border studies

What changes in regard to our understanding of the border, border control policy, and migration if we refuse to conceptualize ‘the migrant’ neither as structurally powerless, nor as the culturalized Other? And what real alternatives lie beneath the promises of conceptualizing migration as it is expressed within the notion of the autonomy of migration? Still, autonomy of migration is often quite incorrectly equated with autonomous migrants and as a simple inversion of the border paradigm. Just as border studies conceptualize the border as an institutionalized and absolute sovereignty, migrants are thought of as having absolute and sovereign freedom of movement. This is not surprising due to common notions of autonomy referring precisely to the fiction of the subject being isolated from its social and material surroundings.

Our understanding of the autonomy of migration is based on the Italian political-theoretical movement of operaism of the 1960s. It strives to reposition migration within the history of labour, capitalism, and modern forms of governance while highlighting the capability of living labour to resist and to escape from the conditions of (re-)production (see Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). Accordingly, our approach is about politics and policies canalizing the strength of migration movements into ever new institutions and modes of governance, which need to successfully transform resistance from “I would prefer not to be ruled” into “yes”, or “who is not against it, is for it” (Boutang 2006: 172, author translation).

Boutang draws heavily on the theoretical traditions of operaism. Operaismo emerged both from a political movement and from political theory in Italy in the 1960s opposing the economically deterministic Marxism of the Third International. Two essential insights of operaism are of central importance concerning the shift of perspective in the autonomy of migration approach.

First, capitalist transformations and dynamics are not driven by a supposed ‘logic’ of capital. Capital essentially consists of the relation between ‘living’ and ‘dead’ labour, where living labour is thought of as the exclusive resource for economic growth in Marxist terms. The autonomy of migration approach thus focuses on the representations and manifestations of this living labour. However, what is important for this concept is that living labour cannot be reduced to a sociologically defined social group. The production of living labour consists instead of an endless chain of social connections, resources, knowledge, sentiments, and environments, which can by no means be relegated to the ‘productive sphere’. This leads to a historically specific and
variable excessiveness. In this perspective, for example, industrialization (i.e. the emergence of the factory as an institution) appears as a compromise for dealing with substantial flight from the rural regions.

Second, operaism reconceptualizes ‘resistance’ in a more empirical way by stressing the silent and daily ‘small’ forms of subversion and evasion, for example expressed in slowing down work. Social developments are not led by abstract dimensions, such as sinking profit rates, but are seen as the effects of constant attempts to regain predominance over the existing desires and capabilities of living labour to resist and escape the conditions enforced on it (see Boutang 2006; Papadopoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos 2008). Thus, the autonomy of migration approach does not stop at the insight that migration is an active force and that it is to be understood as a form of everyday silent resistance. Rather, it continues and asks how migration intervenes in the very centre of our knowledge production (see Hess 2015). Kasparek and Schwertl summarize the theoretical intervention evoked by the notion of the autonomy of migration as follows: ‘The Autonomy of Migration is less a conclusion to arrive at but a perspective that opens up new ways of interrogation and doing research. Or, to quote Moulier Boutang, autonomy of migration is not a slogan, but a method’ (Kasparek and Schwertl 2014).

The autonomy of migration as a prism

To conceive of the autonomy of migration approach as a method or a prism not only accentuates new aspects but also constructs research objects in a new way. To fundamentally discard the human subject as an unquestionable entity and ‘atom’ of the social (as claimed in other contemporary approaches of social theory in reference to Deleuze; see Haraway 1991; Latour 2005; Barad 2012) makes understanding migration and mobility as a social movement possible and thus an inherently political, social, and transformative practice. Migration therefore does not imply the sum of all migrant individuals nor their spatial movements or subjective ‘motives’ for migrating. Rather, migration refers to a subcutaneous, non-localizable reconfiguration of life and its conditions. We conceptualize migration as an active transformation of social space and as a world-making practice. Subsequently, viewing the border and the migration regime from the perspective of the autonomy of migration approach changes our conceptualization of the border and hence of the state and sovereignty as well. The once monolithic border apparatus deteriorates and falls apart into multiple factors. Actors, practices, discourses, technologies, bodies, effects, and trajectories become visible, with migration being one of the driving forces (Heimeshoff, Hess and Kron 2014: 13ff.). This conceptualization of the border rejects clear-cut or binary models of structure versus agency.

The ethnographic border regime analysis developed by the Transit Migration Research Group attempts to translate these theoretical insights into a research methodology (Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe 2007; Tsianos and Hess 2010). Drawing on Foucault as well as studies in political science concerning the conceptualization of ‘regimes’, the ethnographic regime analysis takes a multiplicity of actors, institutions, and other non-human and human factors into account without reducing the diverse forces to a single logic or hidden agenda. Instead, the ethnographic border regime analysis starts with the empirical as well as theoretical understandings of the border as a site of constant encounters, tensions, and contestations whereby migration becomes a co-constituent of the border. Hence, the regime approach primarily reads the constant and structurally conflicting reconfiguration of the border as a reaction to the forces and movements of migration that challenge, cross, and reshape it.

This conceptualization of the border can be distinguished from most of the existing contemporary constructivist approaches in border studies, which also conceptualize the border
as a result of a multiplicity of actors and practices, for example as expressed in the notions of ‘doing border’ or ‘border work’ (e.g. Rumford 2008; Salter 2011). However, many of these approaches either completely erase migration as a constitutive force or conceptualize the migrant anew as a passive victim. By contrast, the autonomy of migration approach puts the ‘border struggles’ at the centre of the analysis, as done by Mezzadra and Neilson in their book *Border as Method* (2013: 13f.).

In this view, it is the forces of migration that produce the social and economic phenomena of the borderland: borderlands are the products of the collectivized excessive will to pass the border, of the networks of people on the move, as well as of their shared knowledge practices of border crossing (see Fröhlich 2015). For resistance to be possible, it is crucial to go unnoticed, and then to pass and immerse oneself into the big migration hubs and the (internationalized areas of the) economies of the new transit cities. This also necessitates one to be flexible and take on different social roles as a student, tourist, labourer, or asylum seeker along the route and to be able to tactically adapt one’s own biography to the demands of the border regime. And last but not least, this requires seizing any opportunity as soon as it arises (Hess and Karakayali 2007). It is this generative excess that various state agencies and policy schemes subsequently try to control, manage, and make use of the border, thereby exhibiting the border as a stable, controllable, and manageable tool of selective or differential inclusion.

Although the border regime cannot stop the movements, it nevertheless is highly productive in transforming the legal status of the people crossing the border, such as robbing them of the basic right of citizens to have rights by categorizing them into predetermined categories of migration governance. In this sense, the border is a huge transformation regime, which produces new hierarchies of people by categorizing and processing mobilities as ‘migration’, ‘flight’, etc. However, the struggles of migrants in Hamburg, Berlin, Munich, Hungary, Serbia, Turkey, or elsewhere for the right to flee, to stay, and to move freely within Europe show that also those people excluded from full citizenship enact post-national visions of citizenship rights on a daily basis (see Hess and Lebuhn 2014; Köster-Eiserfunke, Reichhold and Schwiertz 2014; Nyers and Ryygiel 2014).

A consistent implementation of the autonomy of migration approach has far-reaching repercussions for our general knowledge production. Migration ceases to be the culturalized object of our scientific scrutiny and starts to become a method, a perspective, and a prism for a situated post–national knowledge practice that itself is only thinkable as a way of resistance and criticism of the hegemonic and objectifying mode still deeply entrenched in the post–colonial order of knowledge (see Hess 2015). It challenges us to analyse the constitution of geopolitical and cultural hegemonic projects, such as the process of Europeanization, as contested spaces from a perspective of the ‘margins’, depicting borders, as Balibar (2002) has put it, as the borders of democracy.

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Migration's lines of flight


Historically, religious individuals and institutions take a special position among social actors contributing to global flows and the transregional dissemination of cultural and material goods. The role of religions in regard to their inherent tendency toward transregionalism, however, has always been ambivalent. As Thomas Tweed so aptly put it in his book *Crossing and Dwelling* from 2006, religions have always crossed borders, on the one hand, and made homes, on the other. Individual actors such as missionaries and refugees, as well as institutional actors such as religious organizations (often on behalf of states) contributed immensely to cultural flows across political and geographical borders. In pre-modern times, they were the most important factors in the transregional dissemination not only of religious ideas, symbols, artefacts, and institutions but also of architecture, literature, art, technical and administrative skills, medicinal practices, astronomical knowledge, and others. Due to the holistic, universal claims of the so-called ‘world religions’ (i.e. Buddhism, Christianity, Islam), and the preeminent role of religious experts in pre-modern societies as producers and interpreters of social realities, the spread of specific religious systems often entailed the diffusion of entire cultural systems. Likewise, however, religious traditions insolubly embedded in a given culture tend to spread in conjunction with all kinds of material and immaterial cultural goods, which can hardly be disentangled from religious elements in the strict sense.

Long before the so-called age of (European) discovery/expansion, religions – that is the representatives of complex sociocultural formations called religion today – travelled around the globe. Already before the Christian era, Buddhism spread from the northern parts of India to the west (today’s Pakistan and Afghanistan), where it encountered the Hellenic culture, and from there along the ‘silk road’ via Central Asia to East Asia until it finally arrived in Japan in the sixth century ce. Following roughly the fifth century ce, as a result of intensified trade relations between South and Southeast Asia, Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms were established in Siam, the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, Bali, and Cambodia. Early Christians left Judea, settled in Greece and Rome, and finally spread Christianity throughout Europe. Nestorian missionaries and Manicheans left Syria and Persia, went east and were a common sight in Chang’an, the capital city of the Chinese Tang Empire (618–907). Due to the campaigns of conquest led by Muslim rulers from the seventh century onwards, Islam spread throughout Northern Africa and the Iberian Peninsula. The Ottoman Empire expanded to Southeast Europe in the fifteenth century, and in the seventeenth century, Islam was recognized as a European religion. Finally,
from the sixteenth century onwards, European powers started to send their missionaries to the Americas and Asia, simultaneously as a counter-reformatory measure and as a colonization strategy. The Roman Catholic Church, as a centralized organization, could be considered the first true ‘global player’, which contributed substantially to the history of global entanglements.

Moreover, the missionaries’ reports to Rome greatly enhanced knowledge about the cultural and natural conditions in many parts of the world. As providers of information on ‘remote’ regions, religious virtuosi have always played an exceptional role, since they were often less restricted in their mobility than ordinary people. In some cases, for example in the case of Buddhist monks from China such as Faxian (c. 337–c. 422), Xuanzang (c. 600–664), and Yijing (653–713), they also probably served as spies who gathered first-hand information on the political, cultural, and geographical situation in the kingdoms to the west of China. Consequently, in the seventeenth century, Chinese immigrant monks in Japan were suspected of being agents of the early Qing government in China.

Evidently, the history of religions is an entangled history, therefore the study of religion as an academic discipline (Religionswissenschaft) has always transcended the methodological nationalisms characteristic of most humanities of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Religious studies were transregional studies from the very beginning. Furthermore, the inherent transregional nature of the so-called world religions manifested itself not only by way of the diffusion of specific cultural goods but also by providing an epistemological framework in which the notion of humanity in the singular became conceivable and plausible. History up to the present shows, however, that religions have ‘made homes’ and ‘drawn borders’, to at least the same degree, as they have ‘crossed borders’. Ironically, especially under the global condition, religions often serve as identity markers and contribute to the formation of alternative identities competing with national or ethnic identities. While religiosity as an identity marker might strengthen and sacralize national or ethnic identities (e.g. in Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and India), it can likewise function as a major building block for imagined communities and transregional identities (e.g. the global ummah of Muslims, the Buddhist ‘śaṅgha of the four directions’ [cāturdiśa-śaṅgha], and the Christian Ecumene) and thereby challenge national or ethnic identities.

The six chapters in Part VII address these transregional aspects of the history and sociology of religions. The first essay, by Manuel A. Vásquez, serves as a general introduction to basic theoretical questions in the study of religions as transregional phenomena. Vásquez argues against traditional notions of religions as closed (or sui generis) systems. Instead, he argues that religion, as a key ingredient of globalization, needs to be studied as a dynamic and inherently translocal process. He combines Thomas Tweed’s ‘hydraulic model’ of religions as flows of ideas, practices, and institutions, which merge with (and separate from) other flows as they move from place to place, with Marxian attention to the power relationships structuring such flows and the similarities and linkages between the flow of commodities and religions. At the same time, he reminds us not to underestimate counter-movements that seek to stem and channel flows perceived as threatening local cultural identities. Building on Bruno Latour’s actor-network approach, he proposes that complex processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization are studied best from a network perspective applied simultaneously on several levels (i.e. scales) of religious interaction. In his view, such ‘multiscalar analysis’ is best suited to the complex processes characterizing ‘religions on the move’.

After this theoretical and methodological introduction, the following five chapters focus on specific themes exemplifying transregional religious flows. The thematic focus areas include religious non-governmental organizations (Stensvold), mission (Jahnel), migration and diaspora (Baumann), global religious organizations (Hermann), and globalization and glocalization.
(Dessì). A certain amount of overlap and duplication among the chapters is not just inevitable, but actually intended as it demonstrates the interconnectedness of the processes to be analysed and thus supports Vásquez’s call for a multiscalar networks approach. Global religious organizations develop mission strategies, often involving the use of migrants as agents and diaspora communities as ‘beachheads’ away from the home base. The transcultural flow of religious ideas, practices, and institutions necessitates negotiations and translations, which are also embodied by the term used by Dessì: ‘glocalization’. Finally, religious non-governmental organizations registered with the United Nations are often functionally differentiated organizations linked with global religious players and integrated into their mission strategies. In this way, each thematic focus implicates the others so that these five essays together present a complex picture of transregional religious dynamics both past and present.

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THE ‘TRANS’ IN THE STUDY OF RELIGION
Power and mobility in a multiscalar perspective

Manuel A. Vásquez

Setting up the problem

Traditional modernist approaches to religion have tended to characterize it in static and essentialist terms. Clifford Geertz (1973), for example, conceptualizes religion as a self-contained and relatively coherent system of symbols through which individuals located in particular settings respond to the challenges of suffering, intellectual bafflement, and moral ambiguity. Mircea Eliade (1959), for his part, sees religion as the patterned experience of ‘hierophanies’, expressions of the sacred that create space and time, unique events that generate a centre and origin to which the believer wants to return.

Classical sociological theories of religion also tend to underplay the dynamicity of religion, viewing it as central to primarily small-scale, undifferentiated, ‘cold’ societies. This is certainly the assumption behind the association of religion with mechanical solidarity (Durkheim 1995), Gemeinschaft (Tönnies 2001), or traditional authority (Weber 1946). Concerning Weber, while he recognized the contributions of the Protestant ethic for the emergence of modern capitalism, he foresaw the waning public influence of religion as part of an inexorable process of rationalization and secularization. In this view, religion could only persist either in a privatized and disenchanted form or as a desperate, often irrational reaction to modernity’s ‘iron cage’.

The current phase of globalization has dramatically exposed the limitations of traditional approaches to religion. Religion is very much a key ingredient of globalization, travelling with transnational migrants and itinerant religious entrepreneurs and being beamed globally through electronic media, from TV to the Internet. This is demonstrated by the explosive growth of evangelical Christianity, particularly Pentecostalism – not only in the Global South but also in the USA and Europe – and by the dissemination of Islamic reform movements throughout the world.

More often than not, the religion that circulates through these media is not a privatized, rationalized ‘rumor of angels’ (Berger 1970) but a vital public force that offers viable forms of selfhood and ways of life that are in tension as well as cross-fertilize with modernity. By calling attention to the ‘processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together societies of origin and settlement’ (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc 1994: 7), the growing literature on transnationalism has contributed substantially to our understanding of religion on the move. However, as we shall see below, we need a thicker
understanding of the ‘trans’, which enables us to examine the ‘dialectics of flow and closure’ (Geschiere and Meyer 1998) within and across multiple scales, including regions, while not ignoring the continuing centrality of the nation-state.

Religion, commodities, and flows

How, then, can we develop more nuanced and dynamic accounts of religion? One potentially productive possibility is to explore the connection between religion and economics, especially capitalism, the realm of human activity that has played a key role in the process of globalization. Karl Marx associated religion with hegemony, or the ‘ruling ideas’ advanced by the ruling class, a notion that reproduced many classical sociological prejudices about the conservatism and staticity of religion.2 Moving beyond this, we could focus on the relationship between commodities and religious worldviews and practices.

Such a focus would be warranted for our intents and purposes since Marx argues that in capitalism the value of a commodity does not issue from the essence of the object, or even from the labour that goes into producing it, but from its dynamic relationship with other commodities. This takes place within shifting but power-laden fields of appropriation and consumption.

In other words, commodities are all about mobility, power, and relationality—the very dimensions of religion that we want to foreground. Thus, while ‘a commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood’, a close inspection ‘shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties’ (Marx 1978 [1867]: 319). Commodities are the material outcomes of the physical labour of individuals engaged in particular, asymmetrical relations of production with each other. However, once they circulate in a capitalist economy, the

definite social relation between men . . . assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men’s hands. This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities.

(Marx 1978 [1867]: 320)

Marx’s analysis of the fetishism of commodities is arguably now more relevant than ever, at a time when we are not only surrounded by a flood of goods that circulate globally, but also awash in endless streams of images that seductively urge non-stop consumption. In this ‘enchanted, perverted, topsy-turvy world’, it is not just ‘Monsieur le Capital and Madame la Terre [who] do their ghost-walking as social characters’ (Marx 1998 [1867]: 817). Now, popular culture, media, and knowledge have become key sources for the extraction of surplus, producing an interminable ‘procession of simulacra’, as Jean Baudrillard (1983) puts it, which take over the global scene, creating hyper-realities that blur the distinction between physicality and virtuality.

Marx sees the relationship between religion and capitalism as more than a mere analogy:

The religious world is but the reflex of the real world. And for a society based upon the production of commodities, in which the producers in general enter into social relations with one another by treating their products as commodities and values,
whereby they reduce their individual private labour to the standard of homogeneous human labour – for such a society, Christianity with its cultus of abstract man, more especially in its bourgeois developments, Protestantism, Deism, etc., is the most fitting form of religion.

(Marx 1978 [1867]: 326–7)

If Marx’s account of the relationship between religion and capitalist economics is on target, then that would mean that religion is not simply an anachronistic phenomenon bound to disappear with the coming of modernity. Rather, it is a dynamic reality that is part and parcel of the current phase of globalization.

This is, in fact, what John and Jean Comaroff (2001) propose in their analysis of the pervasiveness of what they call ‘occult economies’, which include the global explosion of a Pentecostalism that advances a gospel of health and wealth. (Neo) Pentecostal theology does not see a contradiction between salvation in the beyond and well-being and economic success in the now. In the context of a ‘casino capitalism’, the Comaroffs see a messianic and millennial capitalism . . . that presents itself as a gospel of salvation; a capitalism that, if rightly harnessed, is invested with the capacity wholly to transform the universe of the marginalized and disempowered . . . . Magic is everywhere, the science of the concrete, aimed at making sense of and acting upon the world – especially, but not only, among those who feel themselves disempowered, emasculated, and disadvantaged.

(Comaroff and Comaroff 2001: 2, 27)

They further state, ‘[a]s the connections between means and ends become more opaque, more distended, more mysterious, the occult becomes ever more appropriate’ (p. 27) to get rich fast. Thus,

occult economies, including neo-Pentecostalism’s gospel of health and wealth, are a response to a world gone awry, yet again: a world in which the only way to create real wealth seems to lie in forms of power/knowledge that transgress the conventional, the rational, the moral – thus to multiply available techniques of producing value, fair or foul.

(Comaroff and Comaroff 2001: 26)

While neo-Marxist approaches like the Comaroffs’ acknowledge the dynamicity and continued relevance and vitality of religion, they evince several limitations. For one, they seem to ignore the fact that ‘health and wealth’ have been major concerns for religions across the world since time immemorial. The connection among relics, patronage, and transregional Buddhist networks that I will discuss below clearly shows this. Thus, the relationship between religious (dis- and re-)enchantment and the generation of wealth neither begins with, nor is unique to, capitalism or even Western modernity. More importantly, for all their strengths, neo-Marxist approaches still partake in some of the same prejudices of modernist theories – prejudices that impede a full recognition of the generative power of religion.

If neo-Pentecostalism is ultimately ‘the religious logic of late capitalism’, to adapt Fred Jameson’s (1991) famous characterization of post-modernism, then religion is not only the reflection of deeper, more ‘real’ social processes, but also the result of a social pathology. In other words, religion’s dynamicity is negative; its principal function is compensatory or augmentative to the underlying structures of contemporary global capitalism.
In light of the limitations of neo-Marxist approaches to religion, we need to develop non-reductive perspectives that take into account the complex relations of reciprocal influence between dynamics in the global religious field and processes of social and economic change. Drawing from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Thomas Tweed (2006: 59–60) offers a ‘hydraulic model’. This model is an ‘itinerant, ambulant science’ that views religions not as ‘self-contained traditions chugging along parallel tracks’. Instead, ‘each religion is a flowing together of currents – some enforced as “orthodox” by institutions – traversing multiple fields, where other religions, other transverse confluences, also cross, thereby creating new spiritual streams’ (p. 60).

Tweed’s model is fruitful in several ways. First, it ‘avoids essentializing religious traditions as static, isolated, and immutable substances’ (ibid.), rejecting the sui generis arguments that have vitiated approaches such as Eliade’s and, to some extent, Geertz’s. Moreover, Tweed offers a non-reductive, non-totalizing understanding of the interactions between religion, culture, and society. In his words,

religions cannot be reduced to economic forces, social relations, or political interests, although the mutual intercausality of religion, economy, society, and politics means that religious traditions, as confluences of organic-cultural flows, always emerge from – to again use aquatic images – the swirl of transfluvial currents.

(Tweed 2006: 60)

Finally, Tweed’s hydrodynamics highlights the spatial dimensions of religion in relation to mobility, opening up the possibility of studying the roles it plays in the contested construction, maintenance, and crossing of local, national, regional, and transnational spaces. Extending Arjun Appadurai’s theory of global ‘scapes’, Tweed calls religious flows ‘sacroscapes’. These sacroscapes

move across time and space. They are not static. And they have effects. They leave traces. They leave trails. Sometimes those trails are worth celebrating . . . Sometimes those trails are sites of mourning . . . So this term, sacroscapes, invites scholars to attend to the multiple ways that religious flows have left traces, transforming peoples and places, the social arena and the natural terrain.

(Tweed 2006: 62)

**Bringing back the ‘trans’: networks and multiscalar analysis**

Despite the undeniable theoretical and methodological payoffs of Tweed’s hydraulic model of religion, I have argued elsewhere that in a world characterized not only by widespread mobility and hybridity but also by persistent efforts to reinforce old boundaries and exclusionary identities and to create new ones, this model runs the risk of being excessively anti-structural (Vásquez 2011). Castles and Miller (2009: 2) contend that a

defining feature of the [present] age of migration is the challenge posed by international migration to the sovereignty of states, specifically to their ability to regulate the movements of peoples across their borders. The extensiveness of irregular (also called undocumented or illegal) migration around the world has probably never been greater than it is today.
Zembylas (2010) argues that, as a result of this challenge to the modern principle of sovereignty, immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers have become key figures in a new ‘fearism’ that enables their complete dehumanization as a way to deny them any right to dwell among juridical citizens. Along the same lines, Bauman (2006: 96) refers to a pervasive ‘liquid fear’ of a ‘wholly negative globalization’ as ‘the spectre of vulnerability’ hovers over ‘the negatively globalized planet’, bringing ‘experience of heteronomous, vulnerable populations overwhelmed by forces they neither control nor truly understand, horrified by their own undefendability and obsessed with security of their borders and of the population inside them’. Religion has been a chief component of this liquid fear, with refugees and asylum seekers from war-torn countries in the Middle East and North Africa often being associated in the United States and Europe with jihadist terrorism.

In response to globalized fearism, we observe ubiquitous processes of ‘rebordering’. Whereas borders

have long been associated with the military defense of the national territory from opposing, often neighbouring armies . . . [and] have a history as privileged sites of commercial regulation . . . today . . . borders are becoming more and more important . . . as spaces and instruments for the policing of a variety of actors, objects and processes whose common denominator is ‘mobility’. . . or more specifically, the forms of social and political insecurity that have come to be discursively attached to these mobilities.

(Walters 2006: 188)

Accompanying this rebordering, there has been an explosive ‘growth of detention structures along transnational routes traveled by migrants in their journeys through northern Africa, Eastern Europe, Indonesia, and Central America to countries where they hope to make asylum claims’ (Mountz et al. 2012: 523).

The most recent example of this is the ‘migrant crisis’ in Europe, in which large numbers of people fleeing countries such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea, and Pakistan have led to an European Union (EU) agreement, which in effect has turned Greece and Turkey into giant detention centres. The difficulties in reaching this agreement – as each country along the route to Germany, the preferred destination of migrants and refugees, erected its own borders and balked at accepting EU-wide proposals for settlement – throw into high relief the challenges that transregional and global flows pose to nation-states and regions.

Indeed, the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels reveal how fearism has severely undermined the ideal of intraregional mobility upon which the EU is founded, leading to the sharp and defensive reaffirmation of national security and identity. Furthermore, fearism has fuelled virulent nativist movements at the level of the nation, such as Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident (PEGIDA) in Germany, the Independence Party in the UK, and ‘Trumpism’ in the USA. Nativist movements can even operate at the subnational level, mobilizing local, ethnic, and/or religious identities. The conflicts and genocides in Rwanda, Kenya, Syria, the Central African Republic, as well as in former Yugoslavia are cases in point. The most recent example is the Vlaams Belang, which blames the attacks in Belgium on the EU’s policies regarding immigration and multiculturalism and seeks Flemish independence from what it perceives as a failed multiethnic Belgian state (Laible 2010).

In tandem with the increasing prominence of nativist movements, fearism has also been the main ingredient in the growth of transnational terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda, al-Nusra, and the Islamic State (ISIS), which advocate apocalyptic visions of the violent demise of impious
Western modernity. In particular, ISIS’s brutal executions purveyed online play to the most visceral dimensions of liquid fear and the most seductive aspects of a global culture of excess and extremity. While these transnational religious networks hark back to an imagined patriarchal golden age, they may be understood as the underside of globalization. For instance, they often use the latest development in electronic communications to recruit foreign fighters – often disaffected youths from the Global North – for regional conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa. In the case of ISIS, the movement offers an unbounded religiously inflected ‘regionality’, a worldwide caliphate, as an alternative source of collective identity vis-à-vis the Western geopolitical spaces of the nation-state, the region, and the globe.

At the heart of the new fearism is the emergence of a new ‘panopticon’, a quest for a hyper-visibility that is part of a ‘paradigm of suspicion that conflates the perceived threats of crime, immigration, and terrorism’ as ‘integrated risk management’ through advanced, virtual technologies of biosocial profiling’ (Shamir 2005: 200). The neo-liberal state’s new technologies of power to regulate mobility and belonging are no longer just the militarization and securitization of borders. They now include new biometric technologies that allow data mining and the deployment of a new ‘nano-physics’ power that are capable of penetrating into the deepest capillaries of everyday life, with far finer granulation and more pervasive reach than the micro-physics of power that Michel Foucault (1977) saw as part of the birth of modernity. Serving as counterparts to this new panopticon are the various social media and personal encrypted electronic devices that terrorist and criminal groups use to communicate, recruit, and coordinate their activities.

To deal with all of this complexity – with processes of both de- and reterritorialization, which characterize the current phase of globalization – I suggest a networks approach. Such an approach retains the emphasis on mobility, space, and relationality present in Tweed’s hydrodynamics. However, it also allows us to foreground how religion is involved in the exercise of domination and resistance, often operating simultaneously at multiple levels and with contradictory and paradoxical effects. In other words, a networks approach affords a richer exploration of the ‘trans’ aspects of religion – that is, its inherent but often constrained dynamicity within and across scales. Within this multiscalar analysis, a networks approach enables us to unravel the specific entanglements and vectors of power as well as the actors who both deploy these vectors and are constituted by them. We could, for instance, explore the relations between commodities, capital, and sacred objects (and beings) that Marx underlined in a rigorous, yet non-reductive manner.

Following Bruno Latour and other actor-network theorists, I define networks as contested, open-ended, yet relatively stabilized assemblages through which a variety of ‘actants’ – humans and non-humans – interact with and upon each other to produce efficacious phenomena. As Latour (2005: 129) puts it, network does not designate a thing out there that would have roughly the shape of interconnected points, much like a telephone, a freeway, or a sewage ‘network’ . . . . It qualifies [rather] its objectivity, that is, the ability of each actor to make other actors do unexpected things.

In other words, while networks do exhibit varying degrees of structural obduracy, marking exclusion as well as inclusion and shaping the speed and direction of the circulation of their components, they are not ontological entities – that is to say, fixed structures that exist independently of the practices and interactions that constitute them. Networks are concatenations of diverse elements that, in acting upon each other and in summoning each other as efficacious
operators, generate relatively stable and binding social outcomes. Defining networks thus makes it possible to eschew essentialism, without falling into an excessive fluidism that renders the study of processes such as rebordering difficult.

Indeed, because networks assume multiple configurations, scopes of activity, and varying degrees of stability, we can and must engage in rigorous multiscalar analysis. We can explore how particular crisscrossing networks constitute locality, nationhood, region, transnationality, and globality, directing, facilitating, and controlling flows within each scale and among them. Understanding networks in this fashion also leads to expanded and more flexible notions of agency, beyond the narrow domain of human rationality and intentionality. It further enables us to capture empirically the contributions of non-humans – whether it be animals, things, or landscapes – in the production of social and religious realities:

Often in practice we bracket off non-human materials, assuming they have a status which differs from that of a human. So materials become resources or constraints; they are said to be passive; to be active only when they are mobilized by flesh and blood actors. But if the social is really materially heterogeneous then this asymmetry doesn’t work very well. Yes, there are differences between conversations, texts, techniques and bodies. Of course. But why should we start out by assuming that some of these have no active role to play in social dynamics?

(Callon and Law 1997: 168)

The bottom line is that a networks approach rematerializes the study of society and religion, laying the groundwork for empirically and theoretically rich perspectives.

Building on Latour, Matthew Day (2010) calls for an understanding of various religions as evolving, agentic, heterogeneous networks. These might involve not only priests, prophets, monks, missionaries, immigrants, pilgrims, healers, tourists, and scholars, but also texts, relics, icons, money, embodied habitus, architectural styles, and notions of honour and prestige as well as ‘transcendental beings’ such as gods, spirits, and impersonal forces.

Complementing Day’s call, I argue that approaching religions as networks will help us explore the emergence of a ‘new polycentric global cartography of religion’ (Vásquez and Rocha 2013: 24). Such cartography is constituted by networks of varying intensity, extensivity, morphology, and durability, going not only from North to South, as theories of globalization as Americanization tend to posit, but also from South to North and South to South. In this new global religious economy, there are command centres such as New Delhi and Mumbai in India and Beijing and Shanghai in China, which have long been central in the production of ‘world religions’ such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism. However, this global geography of the sacred contains other nodes of religious production, such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Salvador in Brazil, Lagos and Ibadan in Nigeria, Accra in Ghana, Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Johannesburg in South Africa.

Although always connected in a subaltern position to the world capitalist system through slavery, colonialism, and the African diaspora, these latter nodes have only recently begun to play leading global roles. They highlight new forms of transregionality through the proliferation of multidirectional and multiscalar religious networks, as immigrants and religious entrepreneurs from the Global South reverse missionize, exorcise demons, summon ancestor spirits, or clean karmic residues in the metropole. In this process, despite the pressures of secular (late) modernity, they contribute to religious diversity and vitality in places such as London, Paris, Amsterdam, New York, and Atlanta.
In the emerging, lumpy global religious landscape, to study religion is to ask

‘[w]ho are the key actors involved in transnational, global, and diasporic religious networks? Are they religious elites, missionaries, itinerant pastors, pilgrims, and/or religious tourists? In what spatiotemporal scales do they operate? By what specific mechanisms? Informal exchanges or formalized chains? What kind of media are involved (from familial or kinship-based networks to electronic media)? What is flowing? Is it commodities, gifts, texts, relics, saints, theodicies, (video)taped sermons, money, or bodies?

(Vásquez 2011: 302)

How do these materialities change their ability to merge – with commodities becoming sacred artefacts or art objects and vice versa – as they circulate among different ‘regimes of value’ (Appadurai 1986: 15)? What are the contested but binding techniques of ‘singularization’ that give a particular sacred thing its ‘specialness’? In what ways does the thing-in-its-materiality afford or constrain this singularization? In what ways do the techniques of singularization overlap with the operation of panoptical nation-states, ‘fortress’ regions (like the EU), gathering nativist movements, intensifying transnational terrorist organizations, and global neo-liberal capitalism?

Applying the networks approach

A networks approach evinces a wide range of applications, some of which have been vividly illustrated by empirical research. As the cases that follow show, the approach is useful not only for understanding religion in the contemporary scene, but also for developing nuanced historical studies of the changing dynamics of religious production, circulation, and practice. Jason Neelis (2011), for example, has studied the transmission of Buddhism in South and Central Asia across transregional trade and administrative networks, which included systems of patronage as well as the active participation of itinerant Buddhist monks and nuns in commercial exchanges. According to him, a ‘symbiotic structural exchange of material donation for religious merits directly connects the establishment, maintenance, and growth of Buddhist monastic institutions to networks of social and economic support’ (p. 17).

In particular, Neelis shows the key nodes in the networks that facilitated the expansion of Buddhism across the Indian subcontinent, Persia, and China. The most prominent Buddhist monasteries, shrines, and stupas were located along trade routes and important cities and fertile agricultural areas. Neelis even shows how the main flows took place along well-established routes along the Silk Road, with a ‘capillary’ dissemination into the mountains of Pakistan, a zone rich in precious stones and metals. What circulated in these networks were manuscripts, inscriptions, coins, images, rituals, and relics that contributed to the articulation of particular local and regional lineages and canons. Since the flows and networks that Neelis maps out preceded the formation of nation-states, his work illustrates the payoff of a thicker understanding of the ‘trans’ – in this case as applied to the transregional processes – whereby we follow assemblages of actants wherever they take us, without presupposing that identities, boundaries, and territories apply for all times and places.

Networks have also been used to understand the Atlantic trade, in which slaves were forcibly brought from Africa to the Americas while raw materials such as sugar, cotton, and tobacco flowed from the Americas to Europe, and guns, textiles, and other factory goods were exported back to Africa and the Americas. European colonizers and African slaves also carried across
The 'trans' in the study of religion

the Atlantic religious beliefs, symbols, practices, and sacred objects, which mixed with those of native populations, giving rise to rich hybrid religions, such as Candomblé, Santería, Palo Monte, Vodou, and Obeah.

Clarke (2004), for example, shows how the intentional community of Oyotunji was created in the 1970s in South Carolina as part of a transnational Yoruba revival movement that linked black nationalism in the Americas with West Africa through travel and the circulation of scholarly and self-help books and videos. The community has become a popular tourist spot, with its thriving hospitality industry and the sale of heritage souvenirs, which generates sustainable income. Moreover, Oyotunji has now become a key node in a dense assemblage of ‘inter-ethnic and transcultural associative networks’ (Jules Rosette 1989: 157), linking trans-regional Santeros in New York, Miami, and Cuba with Candomblecistas and Umbandistas in Brazil and Uruguay, Garifuna shamans in Honduras, and practitioners of traditional religions in Nigeria (Olupona and Rey 2008). To characterize the creative, yet power-laden transcultural and transregional networks and flows that emerged from colonialism and the slave trade, scholars have used the term ‘Black Atlantic’ (Gilroy 1995). The label is suggestive, as long as we do not forget the diverse actants and polycentric, multilayered, and multidirectional networks involved. For, in addition to showing how religion is intertwined with colonialism and imperialism, the Black Atlantic illustrates the intricate interplay of maritime, overland, and electronic networks.

Other examples come to mind. Transnational Pentecostal churches such as the Brazilian Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus), which claims to have churches in close to 100 countries across the world, from South Africa to the USA and from the UK to Australia, all connected through ‘a globally integrated network’ of weak links that allows ‘the personal experience of routinized spiritual services made in Brazil but which can be deployed in multiple spaces and times’ (Mafra, Swatowiski and Sampaio 2013: 65). Such flexibility is very advantageous in the midst of our liquid modernity. Or think of Ayahuasca religious networks, such as Santo Daime and União do Vegetal, which have taken practices from indigenous peoples in the Amazon involving a psychoactive substance not only to Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo but also to the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, and the USA (Labate and Jungaberle 2011).

All of these examples demonstrate the need to develop nuanced multiscalar approaches to the ‘trans’ of religion and the promises of a strategic focus on networks in the study of the dialectics of flow and closure that characterize the present age.

Notes

2 See Marx (1947: 64).
3 Going beyond the world-systems approach, Appadurai (1996) argues that it is more fruitful to see globalization as the disjunctive, perspectival, and paradoxical outcome of five cultural flows of ideas, media, finance, technologies, and (ethnic) identities. Somewhat reproducing modernity’s blinkered view of religion, Appadurai does not consider religion as a major dimension of globalization.
4 Zembylas borrows the term from Fisher (2006), who defines it as ‘a process and a discourse hegemony [which] creates the experience of fear that is normalized . . . keeping the cultural matrix of “fear” operative and relatively invisible’.
5 See BBC News (4 March 2016) and Reuters (8 April 2016).
6 Riesebrodt (1993) makes this point, calling these movements neo-patriarchal in the sense that they seek to recover an idealized hierarchical ‘personalistic’ and religiously sanctioned order disrupted by modernity’s impersonal and bureaucratic secularity, using the public spaces and media generated by modernity.
In another paper, I write that Foucault operated with a methodological nationalism that did not allow him to see the transnational and global dimensions of biopolitics. Nor did he theorize about borders and their role in consolidating the identification of territory with imagined communities. [...][W]e may be witnessing the rise of a new bio-politics, a new transnational, flexible panoptical regime that seeks to manage unruly flows that are part and parcel of the current phase of globalization.

(Vásquez 2014: 86; see also Walters (2011))

Latour uses the word ‘actant’ to expand the notion of agency beyond the anthropocentric bias in the term actor. An actant is anything that acts upon and modifies other participants in interlocking webs of relationships, which make particular (social) phenomena possible.

In that sense, my approach is different from that of Manuel Castells (1996), who thinks of networks in a more structuralist sense, as morphologies that are already given and are based on microelectronic technologies that determine not only the interaction of various nodes but also the overall operation of society. As this piece shows, I agree that informational microtechnologies play a central role in contemporary societies. However, I do not subscribe to Castells’ technological determinism.

As Appadurai puts it,

we have to follow the things themselves, for their meanings are inscribed in their forms, their uses, their trajectories. It is only through the analysis of these trajectories that we can interpret the human transactions and calculations that enliven things. Thus, even though from a theoretical point of view human actors encode things with significance, from a methodological point of view it is the things-in-motion that illuminate their human and social context.

(1986: 5, original emphasis).

As Kopytoff (1986: 73) writes:

[I]f, as Durkheim saw it, societies need to set apart a certain portion of their environment, marking it as ‘sacred,’ singularization is one means to this end. Culture ensures that some things remain unambigously singular, it resists the commoditization of others; and it sometimes resingularizes what has been commoditized.

Ann Taves (2009) has sought to avoid the essentialism of traditional definitions of religion by heuristically understanding religious experiences through shifting indexes of specialness.

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The ‘trans’ in the study of religion


Non-governmental organization (NGO) is a fluid term. Depending on their field of interest and range of activity, NGOs can be local, national, or international. In a seminal article from 2003, Julia Berger defines religious NGOs as ‘a unique hybrid of religious beliefs and socio-political activism’ (2003: 1). The historical origins of NGOs can be traced back to the founding of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 (Article 71, UN Charter, UN 1945), when the term ‘non-governmental organization’ appeared for the first time (Willetts 2002: 16). Historically, the roots of NGOs are found in engaged citizens in the nineteenth century, the most prominent being the anti-slavery movement. This movement consisted of several organizations across the Western world, and was especially strong among Evangelicals (DeMars 2005: 84). The reason for including NGOs alongside government actors at the UN was to secure grass-roots information and expert advice on social and economic issues. In this way, a new opportunity for political influence was opened up to civil society actors, including religious organizations. In order to illustrate some political aspects of religious NGOs, I shall start with a story.

In 2001 several Christian groups were obliged to leave Morocco on suspicion of having used social outreach programmes as a cover for missionary activities. Sometime later the National Association of Evangelicals, an influential American NGO, proposed a meeting between United States (US) diplomats, Christian and Muslim leaders, and Moroccan state representatives. The chosen theme was climate change, since this was a neutral topic (Marshall 2013: 145).

This story highlights several key elements associated with religious NGOs. It highlights the close association between religious social work and missionary activities as well as providing a telling tale about NGOs as political actors and their close cooperation with state actors. It also demonstrates the complexity of interreligious relations and how religious NGOs operate within the context of international relations.

Looking at religion from a global perspective, Peter Beyer observes that religion is subject to the same historical changes as other social institutions and that since the onset of modernity has gone through processes of differentiation and specialization (Beyer 2013). Inspired by this observation, this chapter considers religious NGOs to be a result of functional differentiation, whereby religiously motivated social work is differentiated from other religious activities and organized as more or less autonomous institutions. Religious NGOs are a part of civil society and distinguish themselves from other organizations not so much by the way they work but by their motivation.
Using Beyer’s observation of functional differentiation as a lens, the chapter traces the role and function of religious NGOs at the intersection of religion and politics. Starting with a brief account of different types of religious NGOs, the chapter then takes a look at the political impact of religious NGOs at the UN. It concludes with a look at various forms of cooperation and entanglement among religious NGOs and government actors.

A new type of religious organization

The first decades after the Second World War saw the rapid growth of NGOs with roots in secular-liberal ideology and linked with humanitarian activism (e.g. Amnesty International 1961 and Human Rights Watch 1978). From the 1960s and 1970s onwards, however, political activism once again spread to the religious field, resulting in a rise in the number of religious NGOs (Lehmann 2016).

Concerning the designation of religious NGOs, there is some disagreement among scholars over the correct term. Faith-based organization (FBO) seems to be the preferred term of many scholars, while others use the term religious NGO, or the acronym RNGO (Berger 2003; Juul Petersen 2010; Lehmann 2016). Terminological debates aside, the main point in the present context is that religious NGOs differ from traditional forms of religious organizations such as churches, sects, or cults, although they often have their roots in such organizations. Unlike traditional religious organizations, religious NGOs are dedicated to enhancing the social aspects of human life.

Like their non-religious counterparts, religious NGOs typically originate as lay organizations. Many religious NGOs are founded around special interest groups. Pax Romana is an illustrative example: It started out in the 1920s as an umbrella organization for Catholic students in Europe (Lehmann 2016) and was accredited to the UN in 1948. Pax Romana is strongly committed to the UN human rights agenda (Lehman 2016: 152) and pursues its own policy rather autonomously, although it has strong formal and cultural links with the Catholic hierarchy. Other religious NGOs are the fruit of ‘one man’s vision’, such as the Al-Hakim Foundation. This Muslim NGO was founded by Iraqi Shi’ite cleric and politician Ammar al-Hakim and is one of the largest NGOs presently working on humanitarian assistance, development, and human rights in Iraq.

Religious NGOs usually identify with one of the so-called world religions – Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, or Judaism – and usually have more or less formal links to particular congregations or faith communities. However, there are exceptions, such as the American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ), an Evangelical NGO, which is organized as a law firm specializing in pro bono cases. It has deep roots in American Evangelicalism, but this is not mentioned in the organization’s self-presentation, which states that it is an independent actor without formal ties to any specific church (Trangerud 2014). Another example of implicit religious roots is Brahma Kumaris, an NGO based in India with 8,500 meditation centres across the country, which identifies as a ‘spiritual’ NGO and does not mention Hinduism. It is dedicated to interreligious dialogue, and is accredited to the UN, where it collaborates Mostly with feminist NGOs. There are 8,500 Brahma Kumaris centres dedicated to peace and interreligious dialogue across India (Marshall and Keough 2005: 102).

When a religious NGO avoids faith statements and does not identify openly with a particular religious tradition to which it belongs, either culturally or because of strong personal ties of its board members or employees, identification becomes problematic. Tied to this situation, there are also certain methodological difficulties in identifying religious NGOs. The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) database offers numerous search criteria, but the various names...
of religious NGOs make it impossible to create common clusters in which they can all be correctly identified. The information on each NGO is arbitrary and does not necessarily reflect the motivations and goals of the NGO. To some extent, this might explain the difference in the number of religious NGOs listed by various scholars. My own list based on 2014 numbers counts 350, while Lehmann (2016) identifies 200. Juul Petersen (2010) relying on data from 2008 counts 320 and Haynes (2014) estimates around 300.

There might be various reasons why a religious NGO chooses not to identify itself as such. With certain reservations, it might, for instance, be an indication of the willingness to adapt to the secular environment of international politics. For example, World Vision, a giant religious organization, does not advertise its Baptist roots (it was founded in 1947 by a Baptist minister, Robert Pierce). In fact, because it is institutionally independent, one has to dig deeper in order to learn that it identifies as Christian. In fact, there seems to be a stronger tendency among Christian NGOs to understate religious affinities. Islamic Relief, for instance, is a relief organization based in Great Britain that clearly identifies as Muslim, both by name and in its mission statement. Islamic Relief was established in Birmingham in 1984. It has national branches in many countries, and also has a strong presence at the UN (Marshall 2013: 156–63). However, a name indicating a religious identity should not be taken too literally either, as illustrated by the Red Cross or Red Crescent, which are non-religious NGOs, although the former originated in a Christian context and the latter focuses its activities in Muslim countries.

What is new about NGOs, then, when compared to other types of religious organizations such as churches or religious communities, are two things: first, commitment to social work as a part of a religious world view, and second, participation in civil society, where they operate under the same conditions as other (non-religious) NGOs.

### Religious NGOs at the United Nations

According to William DeMars, NGOs are committed to ‘spreading their universalist faith’ (2005: 8). DeMars identifies four features: commitment to global moral standards (e.g. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)); a tendency to favour technical solutions and overlook local knowledge; pragmatic attitude to political regimes; and finally, a moral authority based on a claim to speak for the grass roots. If we transpose this observation to our topic, what is the ‘universalist faith’ of religious NGOs? In the UN context, this claim can be conveniently defined as commitment to the UDHR. However, among religious NGOs this commitment is often partial and selective. For example, when large religious actors such as the Catholic Church and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation go against the grain of the UDHR by replacing gender equality with gender complementarity, serious doubts are raised concerning the universality of the UDHR. Article 6 of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam states that (a) woman is equal to man in human dignity, and has rights to enjoy as well as duties to perform; she has her own civil entity and financial independence, and the right to retain her name and lineage; and (b) the husband is responsible for the support and welfare of the family (Organisation of the Islamic Conference 1990). Likewise, the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* states:

> Everyone, man and woman, should acknowledge and accept his sexual identity. Physical, moral, and spiritual difference and complementarity are oriented toward the goods of marriage and the flourishing of family life. The harmony of the couple and of society depends in part on the way in which the complementarity, needs, and mutual support between the sexes are lived out.

*(Catholic Church 1993: §2333)*
Interestingly, the Catholic Church and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation have privileged positions as permanent observers to the General Assembly of the United Nations, and the Catholic Church is recognized as a state, and enjoys a status as a permanent observer state.

But there are other facts that point to actual commitment of NGOs to UN goals, notably their persistent participation in United Nations fora, and frequent references to human rights in their discourse.

A formal system of accreditation for NGOs to participate in the UN system was put in place in 1950. Because of concerns about Western dominance, the criteria were revised in 1996, when, in an effort to strengthen the presence of NGOs from developing countries, national NGOs were granted access (Willetts 2000: 196). The criteria of accreditation are strictly formal, allowing, in principle, all non-profit organizations that acknowledge the UN’s goals of peace, justice, and development to apply for registration. One example of a religious NGO denied UN accreditation is Human Life International, a conservative Christian anti-abortion actor that was barred because of ‘extremist anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim statements’ (Butler 2006: 95). Christian Solidarity International had its accreditation withdrawn in 1999 after guerrilla leader John Garang spoke on its behalf to the Commission on Human Rights (Willetts 2002: 5). However, there are still practical impediments (e.g. expenses of keeping a New York office and professional staff) that hinder a fair geographical or religious distribution among NGOs at the UN. All in all, the net result is a persistent over-representation of US-based and affluent Western NGOs. Among the 350 religious NGOs I identified in 2014 in the ECOSOC database, there are 127 NGOs based in the USA, and 129 in other Western countries, 73 per cent of the total. It should be noted that several Muslim NGOs, as well as some Buddhist and Hindu NGOs, are based in Western countries.

Still, starting in the 1990s, there was a marked increase in NGOs at the UN (DeMars 2005: 34). This change is usually ascribed to the new political climate after the fall of communism. In 1999, there were a total of 1,701 NGOs, a decade later this had almost doubled to 3,183; all the same, the percentage of religious NGOs remained roughly the same, about 10 per cent (Haynes 2014: 21). Nevertheless, we can say with certainty that there has been a decisive increase of religious NGOs over the last two decades, and that many of these newcomers pursue a conservative value agenda that challenges the dominant liberal development agenda toward gender equality and social justice. They first made their presence felt at the International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo in 1994 (Buss 1998) and the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995, where conservative religious actors for the first time presented a united front challenging the feminist agenda pursued by Western democratic countries. Prior to the Cairo conference, the Catholic Church and a number of conservative Christian NGOs partnered with Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Libya) to stop what they saw as the spread of immorality promoted by liberal Western states. The ad hoc alliance proved successful and has since made a significant impact on UN policies. A striking example is the veritable taboo on legal abortion in UN circles and the conservative family values agenda promoted by Russia and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (Horsfjord 2017).

Civil society, Western dominance, and democracy

Religious NGOs are present in every country and all major religious traditions, but the largest number is, by far, found in Western countries with long-standing democracies and well-developed civil societies. DeMars, describing the Western dominance, distinguishes between large international and national NGOs. Whereas the former are based in ‘prosperous Western countries’, the latter are small, ‘local or “grassroots” organizations working directly with the
Religious NGOs

Peter Willetts is not so categorical and points out that there are ‘tens of thousands of NGOs in countries such as Bangladesh and India, while there are relatively few in Iceland and Finland’ (2002: 13). He confirms the link between democracy and a vibrant civil society, however, and argues convincingly that (religious) NGOs are fundamentally important actors in democratic societies: ‘Democracy is not just the holding of elections every four or five years. It is also the continuous process of debate, in which legislature, the political parties, the media and society as a whole put questions on the political agenda’ (Willetts 2000: 18).

A significant trait of (religious) NGOs is their claim to represent a large constituency and speak for the grass roots (DeMars 2005: 25). For instance, Franciscans International claims on its website to represent 1.2 billion Catholics worldwide. Obviously, this claim lacks any basis, first because it is but one of several Catholic NGOs, second because Franciscans International is not a democratic body, and third because the organization’s gender bias is structural and means that women are systematically under-represented. The question of representativity notwithstanding, the claim is clearly used as a strategy to bolster the organization’s legitimacy.

Whereas religious authority is usually interpreted in terms of access to sacred truth, authority in religious NGOs is a different matter. These organizations are for the most part lay organizations, which do not rely on priests or religious professionals to perform or sanction activities. Moreover, their main concern is human society, not gods or a ‘supernatural realm’. Like any other civil society organization, religious NGOs rely on the support of members and sympathizers. And whereas churches and other faith communities are recognized as legitimate if they conform to established (recognizable) religious norms, religious NGOs are legitimized by moral standards. For instance, the ACLJ mentioned above, which specializes in pro bono cases concerning freedom of religion, abortion, and parental rights, receives economic and moral support from the large constituency of American Evangelists that endorse these values.

Religious NGOs, like other non-profit organizations dedicated to social work, rely on economic support and external funding from ‘mother organizations’, private companies, and governments that wish to be associated with their work. In fact, NGOs often receive financial support from governments and cooperate closely with state bureaucracies. This demonstrates the importance of NGOs as providers of social services. In many states across the world – either for political reasons or due to the lack of economic resources – social services such as schools and healthcare are run by religious NGOs. As DeMars observes, the NGO label bestows a certain degree of respectability to any charitable organization (2005: 2). If an area is in crisis after an earthquake, NGOs will offer their help by seeking government endorsement and working with local authorities. A religious NGO specialized in relief work will typically form partnerships with local religious NGOs and other religious organizations. While a Muslim or a Buddhist NGO will sometimes cooperate across religious and denominational divides, more often than not they will engage with local Muslim or Buddhist organizations and networks.

Formal and informal relations

In spite of the fact that the so-called world religions are organized in radically different ways, NGOs are a common organizational form among them. When it comes to distribution of NGOs among the world religions, Christian NGOs are overrepresented, or as Marie Juul Petersen puts it: ‘Christian NGOs make up the majority of organizations, while both Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist NGOs are grossly under-represented compared to the number of adherents to Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism worldwide’ (Juul Petersen 2010). Even though religious NGOs are perceived as autonomous organizations, they are often entangled in complex relations with other religious organizations (e.g. temples, churches, mosques, and monasteries). In a similar manner,
the complex organizational structure of many international NGOs reveals another problem regarding NGOs and their entanglement in complex relationships with external sponsors of varying types, from governments to private sponsors and ‘mother organizations’. Operating at the intersection of the religious and the political field, religious NGOs are often umbrella organizations. For instance, Caritas Internationalis, the world’s largest religious relief and development organization, presents itself as an autonomous organization that ‘shares the mission of the Catholic Church’. On the national level, however, Caritas is owned and run by the national Catholic churches, and board members are appointed or approved by the ruling bishops (Vik, Stensvold and Moe 2013: 13). Another example of a complex organization is World Vision, with 44,000 employees worldwide, which is a typical umbrella organization that enters into partnerships with national branches to secure a shared set of values and goals (Lehmann 2016: 161–2).

Religious NGOs typically adopt two main strategies to gain political impact: they form alliances and they specialize (Haynes 2014: 3). The two strategies are often combined, as in the case of the ACLJ, which creates collaboration networks around its niche specialty (religious law suits). Starting out as an American NGO, it has since established a European branch that tries cases in the European Court of Human Rights. It also lists the Organization for Legal Aid in Pakistan as an important affiliate engaged in the protection of Christian minorities.

Although a vibrant civil society with a host of NGOs is a democratic ideal – reality is different. Undemocratic regimes are known to encourage the establishment of NGOs supportive of the regime, usually known as GONGOs, or government-controlled NGOs (DeMars 2005: 42). Formally, many Catholic NGOs with strong ties to the Vatican could be categorized as GONGOs in the UN context. Furthermore, NGOs can also serve as vehicles of political critique, as exemplified by the Turkish government’s recent attempts to repress a moderate mainstream Muslim civil society web associated with the Hizmet movement and its leader Fethullah Gülen (DeMars 2005: 43). NGOs can also effectively become dependent on government funding. Even in the USA, a nominally secular state, religious NGOs receive large amounts of government funding and collaborate extensively with state actors. For example, during the George W. Bush presidency (2000–2008), religious NGOs received special government funding for sexual abstinence programmes in lieu of sexual education and contraception (Rose 2005).

Concluding remarks

Starting out as a strictly descriptive term, NGO has now become a noun referring to a specific kind of civil society organization (Willetts 2002). The inclusion of religious organizations within this category is historically significant since it implies that religion is not regarded as something that requires special treatment or is set apart as holy. More significantly, since NGO is used as a self-designation by religious organizations, it shows that they accept such a status. In this sense, therefore, the spread of religious NGOs can be seen as a secularizing tendency within all the world religions.

Since the 1990s, religious NGOs have had substantial impact at the UN. By engaging in debates and cooperating across religious divides on shared values and policy issues, religious NGOs have obtained concrete political influence, mostly in coordination with conservative governments. Lehmann sees the rise of religious NGOs as a sign of increased civil society activism among religious actors (2016: 184). It could also be a sign of a religious differentiation where social activism becomes an institutionalized part of religions worldwide. This is not to mean that an increased number of religious NGOs reflects increased religiosity. What it does indicate, however, is a change in the religious realm that reveals that religions – like other institutions – adjust to the prevailing sociopolitical conditions.
Religious NGOs

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MISSION
Claudia Jahnel

Mission as an object of interdisciplinary study

In a comprehensive understanding, mission drives multifaceted and reciprocal religious change on the individual, social, cultural, political, and economic levels and oscillates between regional and transregional dynamics. This understanding of mission questions two common assumptions. The first is that there is a distinction to be made between missionary religions, which have a universal vision and a fundamental claim to all humankind, and non-missionary ‘primal’ religions, which have a limited call to a certain tribal or ethnic group (Sundermeier 2004: 38–49). The second is that a process of religious change can only be called mission if it is an intentional act.

This broader, more inclusive understanding of mission originates in recent changes within the conceptualization of mission and religion as transcultural phenomena. This understanding also derives from developments in the field of mission studies, with a shift from the focus on Christian missions in practice and theory toward intercultural theology and cultural studies. The word mission – deriving from the Latin word missio, meaning ‘sending’ – has been used from the sixteenth century onwards as a specifically Christian term to designate the intentional and institutionalized dissemination of the Christian faith to the non-baptized. Because of the close ties between mission and European colonial expansion, the term always implied to some extent the elimination of non-Christian religions. Seen as a tool for proselytizing, missions were seen as threats to other religions and were therefore rejected by their practitioners. Notwithstanding, Christian missions also contributed to a changing self-awareness within non-Christian religions, including what some have come to call ‘primal’ religions, which led to modern missionary activities of their own. This inclusive understanding of mission allows for comparisons between missionary activities of various religions to be made in spite of the fact that they hold different conceptions of mission, which are rooted in different discourses. Examples of this are the Muslim term da’wa (Wrogemann 2006) or the Buddhist understanding of the dispensation of sāsana. To only focus on intentional missions would be to relapse to a Christian notion of the term, which would exclude ways of communication that are not institutionalized.

In this inclusive understanding, mission is the object of investigation of various academic disciplines and cross-disciplinary research. Through synchronic and diachronic perspectives, many regional studies have highlighted specific missionary encounters and religious changes. Their
findings constitute the core of the cross-disciplinary research field, as references given in this chapter
demonstrate. However, the forces released by globalization also draw attention to cross-religious
investigations that focus on the adoption of methods and strategies of dissemination of one religion
by agents of another. Last but not least, this leads to the question whether the dynamics will result
in a plural glocalization of religions, or rather in the uniformity of only one global religious system
and one ‘conservative or orthodox or fundamentalist’ global mission (Berger 1999: 6).

Mission as a transcultural phenomenon

In the last few decades, the fields of cultural and religious studies have undergone a paradigm
shift in how religion and culture are perceived. Former assumptions defined cultures and reli-
gions as given, static, and closed entities, with some being more developed than others. These
ideas were replaced by the view that religions and cultures are transcultural phenomena, char-
acterized by processes of interaction in the ‘contact zones’ of cultures, that is to say, in the
‘social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly
asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination – like colonialism, slavery, or their
aftermaths as they are lived out across the globe today’ (Pratt 1992: 4).

Missionary activities are part of reciprocal transcultural religious interactions and entangle-
ments. They are infused with powerful interests that comprise not only the ability to assert the
missionary religion or religious tradition, but also the ability to modify the shape of open or
hidden acts of resistance, of camouflage, of hybrid contestations, or of the revitalization of the
local pre-missionary religious traditions. This transcultural dynamic advanced through mission-
ary activities has been explored in many regional studies:

Plebeian ritual practices even raised the eyebrows, and the ire, of several of the Sufi
sheikhs themselves. The Qadiri leaders intended to win new converts to the faith
and to intensify the religious devotion of people who hitherto had been marginal to
established religious institutions. But once such people had been brought into the fold
as active participants in the Sufi orders, they tended to alter Islamic rites in ways that
the sheikhs never intended. Some Sufi clerics complained that in the hands of women,
slaves and urban newcomers, zikr [Sufi ritual] had become dangerously disruptive of
what they considered legitimate religious authority, including their own.

(Glassman 1995: 143)

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Oman Empire under Sultan Said ibn Sultan Al
Said defeated the Portuguese rulers and settled as a colonial power in East Africa, specifically
along the Swahili coast and in Zanzibar. This change in political and religious authority fostered
a relaunch of the social, political, and religious design of the regions under Omani control.
Furthermore, it was accompanied by a wave of missionary activity on the part of Sufi brother-
hoods, for instance, of the Qadiriyya from Somalia and the Shadhiliyya from the Comoros,
among others (Scharrer 2013: 36–8). The Sufi brotherhoods appealed to many African Muslims
because they integrated East African religious rituals better than the official Arab Islam. Yet the
syncretistic amalgamation of local practices and Islamic beliefs did not suit every Qadiri leader.
The passage quoted above reveals phenomena of deculturation and neoculturation: the Islamic
rituals were interpreted and performed in a new manner, thereby changing the content of ritu-
als or creating new rituals with new meanings. The Sufi mission in East Africa in the nineteenth
century paradigmatically illustrates that mission stimulates a process of reciprocal transfer and
acculturation of religion and culture, thereby proving the assumption that cultures are hybrid, interdependent, dynamic, and always changing (Hock 2002).

Contemporary Christian missiology discourse discusses the perception of mission as a transcultural phenomenon, along with models of acculturation, accommodation, inculturation, or contextualization (Schreiter 1985). However, unlike the religious studies discourse, the concern in this discourse is not only to understand and to describe the dynamics of religious change. The question of how to preserve Christian identity and the universality of Christian faith and dogma in particular contexts is of special interest. Thus the theological discourse still includes critical theological evaluation of religious changes.

The invention of religion and the adoption of mission strategies

Within the analysis and assessment of religions as transcultural phenomena, the term religion has come to be perceived as a Western concept, a ‘product of the scholar’s study’ (Smith 1982: xi). At the time of the colonial and missionary expansion of the West in the nineteenth century, protagonists projected Western religious desires and a Western concept of religion onto other cultures, a concept that was far from innocent in terms of being neutral and universally valid. One prominent example was the desire for a rational religion that was fulfilled in the portrayal of ‘Buddhism’ scientific religion (see, e.g., Lopez 2008). Being compared to Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, and traditional African faiths, for example, were regarded as religions. In turn, the Western concept of religion was adopted by local intellectuals, religious and political leaders, and practitioners.

These processes of adopting Western categories of knowledge, in particular the concept of religion, went hand in hand with the adoption of missionary strategies. Changes in the way religions understood themselves became linked to changes in the way of disseminating religious and cultural world views. This dynamic is demonstrated, for example, by the shuddhi movement. Shuddhi Movement in India, R. K. Ghai’s prominent study, shows how the shuddhi ritual changed in the course of interaction with Christian missions and colonial rule. Originally performed for the purpose of purification and ‘cleansing of one’s body from pollution caused by everyday acts through rituals and recitation of the sacred mantras’ (Ghai 1990: 1), shuddhi evolved into a ritual of reconversion and conversion to Hinduism in the late nineteenth century. This change in the meaning of shuddhi goes back to the time when Muslim power was on the rise in India, which had led to the conversion of many Hindus to Islam. The rise of British colonial rule in India was, in turn, accompanied by Christian missions and the clash of Western culture with the caste system. In the 1920s, in the western districts of Uttar Pradesh in northern India, it provoked the emergence of a massive campaign to convert and reconvert Muslims and Christians to Hinduism. In order to confine the conversions to Islam and Christianity, Swami Dayan and Saraswati, the founder of the Hindu reform movement Arya Samaj, installed shuddhi, which became ‘the basis for innovation which would transform Hinduism into a conversion religion, equal institutionally to its competitors’ (Ghai 1990: viii). Ghai concludes:

Unique in nature and character and incompatible with the Hindu tradition, the shuddhi was the product of historical situation comprising of the strands of reformism, revivalism and nationalism. It was adopted as an instrument of defence and consolidation of Hinduism against the proselytizing efforts of Christianity and Islam. A double-edged weapon, it, on the one hand, aimed at organizing the Hindu community by dissolving caste rigidity and hierarchy from within and on the other defending it from external danger by adopting the same strategy with which the proselytizing religions threatened it.

(Ghai 1990: 160)
Mission

Ghai’s conclusion shows that the *shuddhi* movement was not only a religious one but also a sociopolitical movement of resistance and liberation that came into being as a response to the far-ranging political, social, economic, and cultural transformations under Muslim and later European power. The new, though not uncontested, self-understanding of Hinduism as a religion, which was developed in resemblance to the model of the ‘world religions’ of Christianity and Islam as well as the new religious practice of *shuddhi* as conversion, served in particular to reassure the identity, if not superiority, of Hinduism.

This idea of the superiority of Hinduism that counters the Western evolutionary rhetoric of the superiority of Christianity and Western culture has been prevalent in Hindu mission since at least the Parliament of the World’s Religions held in Chicago in 1893. In his famous speech, the Hindu monk Swami Vivekananda criticized Christian missions for their intolerant attitudes toward other religions and presented Hinduism as a tolerant, all-inclusive, and therefore superior religion:

I am proud to tell you that I belong to a religion into whose sacred language, the Sanskrit, the word exclusion is untranslatable. I am proud to belong to a nation which has sheltered the persecuted and the refugees of all religions and all nations of the earth.

*(Quoted from Lüddeckens 1998: 307)*

Hinduism has since then developed vibrant missionary activities not only in India but also extensively in the Western world. Reform movements and neo-Hindu sects – such as the Ramakrishna Mission, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, or the Divine Light Mission – seek to attract not only, and sometimes not even primarily, Hindus in India or ‘diasporic Hindus’; they have turned Hinduism into an international religion whose target groups are often Western religious seekers. Because of the global dispersion of Hinduism and the persistent challenge that Hinduism does not consist of one single tradition but contains many internal variations and differences, international journals and online platforms have become important media outlets for Hindu missions, some of which are pursuing a pan-Indian or pan-Hindu vision. For example, *Hinduism Today* posted its mission on its website under the heading ‘Our Global Mission’:

1. To foster Hindu solidarity as a unity in diversity among all sects and lineages;
2. To inform and inspire Hindus worldwide and people interested in Hinduism;
3. To dispel myths, illusions and misinformation about Hinduism;
4. To protect, preserve and promote the sacred Vedas and the Hindu religion;
5. To nurture and monitor the ongoing spiritual Hindu renaissance;
6. To publish a resource for Hindu leaders and educators who promote Sanatana Dharma.

*(The guidelines were published on Hinduism Today, 22 February 2008. Hinduism Today was founded on 5 January 1979)*

**The invention of religion and mission to the West**

The example of Hindu missions illustrates the phenomenon of how the Western category of religion invented religions and contributed to changes in the meaning and practice of religions, which, among other things, evoked a reversal of missions to the West. This phenomenon is, though in a different way, familiar to modern Buddhism and modern Buddhist missions as well. Much research has been done on the conceptualization of Buddhism as a religion in the work
of a number of European scholars who were enthusiastic about the Pali texts, as well as on the presupposition that Buddhism is an essentially atheist, rational-scientific religion without a dogma, belief, or ritual, as well as a ‘peaceful’ religion. After being adopted by Buddhist intellectuals and politicians, this conceptualization led to profound changes in the redefinition of Buddhist identity, doctrine, and tradition in the social structure of Buddhist communities and in the political sphere (Kirichenko 2009: 23–45).

At the same time, the ways of disseminating Buddhism have changed, together with the target groups; Buddhist ‘philosophies’ were written in order to demonstrate to the Western scientific world that Buddhism complied with Western scientific standards as well as to attract Western converts. Another model of modern Buddhist missions arose in the form of various meditation movements. In Burma, for instance, a lay meditation movement emerged due to socioreligious transformations caused by British colonial rule. In 1911, the first Lay Meditation Center was founded by Mingün Sayadaw, whose disciple Ledi Sayadaw published the first book on Vipassana meditation in 1914. Since then, Vipassana has become popular in Burma, where it was accompanied both by political interests, such as support for the establishment of a Buddhist socialist state after independence, and by aspirations of the resistance and democracy movement during military rule (Jordt 2007). It has also spread into the Western world, where it is was made famous by Satya Narayan Goenka. More recently, it became the foundation of the so-called ‘mindfulness meditation’, which is evaluated and advertised today not only as a method of meditation but – again – as a scientifically proven psychological method of stress reduction.

There is an ongoing debate over European influence on the meditation movement (Sharf 1995: 258; Houtman 2014) as well as on many other Buddhist reform movements in Southeast Asia and India, which are the starting points of (what are called) modern Buddhist missions in the nineteenth century. The term ‘Buddhist mission’ originated from the encounter with Christian missions and the West and it was influenced by both, even up to the extent that methods and institutions applied have been modelled after Christian examples. A case in point is the display of ‘Buddhist Bibles’ in rooms of hotels worldwide by the Japanese missionary association Bukkyō Dendo Kyōkai (Kleine 2011). Yet it is evident that the conception of mission in modern Buddhism and the pre-nineteenth-century Buddhist history of the dispensation of the sāsana are incommensurable because they belong to very distinct contexts and discourses (Kirichenko 2009: 25).

Mission, media, and globalization

The reciprocal missionary influence of religions and the cross-religious adaption of missionary activities are reflected notably in the use of modern media. In Christian missions, the written and oral word in the form of the Bible, preaching, and education has played an important role. Therefore, translation into vernacular languages for the transmission of the message has been crucial for mission work and was the starting point for the emergence of the manifold local forms of Christianity. In this context, the role of native language translators and linguistic assistants for the translation work of European and North American missionaries has undergone a re-evaluation in recent decades. Scholars have underlined the missionary agency of the native translators as well as the revitalization of vernacular languages by Christian missionary activities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Sanneh 1989). Despite that, post-colonial theologians (Sugirtharajah 1998; Dube and Stanley 2002) critically comment that the Bible as a product of and medium for the preservation of European culture was also used to legitimize imperial power and to preserve relations of power and inequality.
Mission

Emphasis on written text utilized in Christian missions has brought attention to written resources, especially the sacred texts in other religions and their missionary activities. An outstanding example of how written texts were evaluated as canonized sacred texts is the monumental 50-volume series *The Sacred Books of the East*, compiled between 1879 and 1910 by the German scholar Friedrich Max Müller. Sacred texts have become instruments in an ongoing competition of religions. The Vedic mission of Krishna Dharma, for example, stresses that the sacred texts of Hinduism, the Vedas, are the world’s oldest writings, which implies that they contain special – and probably superior – truth and wisdom (Krishna Dharma 2006).

The translation of the Bible into vernacular languages by missionaries contributed to translations of the Qur’ān into vernacular languages. Notwithstanding the claim and widespread assumption that the Qur’ān is not translatable, the twentieth century witnessed several translations of the Qur’ān into Swahili and other sub-Saharan languages, which were accompanied by a struggle over the power of interpretation (Holway 1997; Lohmeier 2001). The first translation of the Qur’ān into Swahili dates back to the year 1923 and stems from a Christian missionary, Canon Godfrey Dale of the Universities’ Mission to Central Africa. The fact that the 542 pages of the Swahili text of the Qur’ān are followed by 142 pages of explanatory comments by Dale and his colleague Gerald Webb Broomfield demonstrates that the main intention of the translation was to create Christian apologetics against Islam. Accordingly, the translation was rejected by Muslims. The second translation of the Qur’ān into Swahili, done by the Ahmadiyya movement and published in 1953, was motivated by the intention to confine the growing number of Christians due to Christian missionary activity. The third translation by Sheikh Abdallah Saleh al-Farsy, presented in 1969, was a critical reaction to the Ahmadi translation and was intended to rather defend the orthodox Sunni against the Ahmadiyya position than to confine the Christian mission in East Africa.

Reciprocity in the mission of religions in and through the use of media is also illustrated, for instance, by their way of communicating the message in preaching and public displays. Preachers of the Association of Muslim Preachers of Comparative Religion (Umoja wa Wahubiri wa Kisilamu wa Mlingano wa Dini), for example, an organization that is active in East Africa, and Christian evangelists use the same public places such as the market, bus stations, or stadiums; the same communication form of preaching and instruction; and the same method of a form of public pedagogical theatre in which the Bible and Qur’ān are compared in order to prove the superiority of the one or the other (Scharrer 2013: 104–11).

This equalizing tendency is reinforced dramatically by the global transformation of the media in the last two decades, which has made it possible to cross national and cultural frontiers virtually – often unchecked – and to engage in missionary activities in the global public space. The many missionary and conversion activities that compete for the same TV channels and social media to conquer the public arena prove that religions play an ongoing role in the public discourse. The equalizing effect of modern media can be observed, for example, in displays of personal conversions or religious instructions on YouTube, which follow the rules of public media rather than the mission strategy model of one particular religion. Thus, we can observe parallels in the presentations of the German convert Salafi Muslim Pierre Vogel, of Lama Ole Nydahl from the Karma Kagyu school of Tibetan Buddhism, or of Pastor Joseph Prince from the New Creation Church in Singapore. They appear as knowledgeable teachers, experienced religious leaders, and upright reliable public figures tackling religious issues in everyday language. It is remarkable and adds to the analysis of the equalizing dynamics in missionary activities that the presentations especially, but not exclusively, of Salafist preachers perpetuate a comparative rhetoric, like the above-mentioned comparison between the Bible and Qur’ān (Bruk 2015).
Conclusion: global mission, global religion?

In the field of Christian religion, evangelical and charismatic Christianity has reshaped the religious landscape by using media technology and popular culture and has, in turn, been shaped by both popular culture and the media technology. For instance, the prosperity gospel grew wings because it came with an elaborate media representation, including electronic communication designed to reshape religious consciousness and theologies.

(Kalu 2010: 37–8)

Similar dynamics can be observed in other religions. There is a growing uniformity in the intentional missions of religions, leading, as the quote above by Berger says, to one ‘conservative or orthodox or fundamentalist’ global mission. Notwithstanding, there are also dynamics reshaping the religious landscape and the forms and contents of missions that contribute to diversification and plural glocalization rather than to uniformity, such as the mobilization of religions for national interests and continuous transnational migration whereby the migrants become the new missionaries carrying the contextual variation of their religion with them to another context while still maintaining the links between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ world. In face of these manifold dynamics of religious change, the field of mission studies remains an inspiring intellectual challenge.

Select bibliography


Throughout history and still today, migration has significantly changed areas and territories, including the structure of their populations. While some people consider migration a curse that jeopardizes long-established ways of life, others value migration as an indispensable gain that brings fresh labour forces, new skills, and support for imbalanced pension schemes. Religious individuals such as monks and missionaries migrated to new parts of the world to spread their ideas and practices, disseminating Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and other faiths far beyond their regions of origin. Migration has thus changed the local, regional, and national make-up of religions and cultures in these distant lands. The term diaspora, for a long time indissolubly linked with the history of the Jewish people, more recently has become used for any migrant people living in a new country that retain their religious practices, beliefs, and communal life.

This chapter first explains the term migration as well as the main theories and empirical processes associated with it. The second part expounds the notion of diaspora, including both its origin in Jewish doctrine two millennia ago and its expanded use in the humanities and social sciences since the 1960s.

**Migration: scope and theory**

Migration spans areas, territories, and continents. Social scientists Reinprecht and Weiss (2012: 15) define migration as the spatial move of individual persons and of peoples from one place to another, their stay ranging from short-term to permanent settlement. Migration occurs within territories and states and traverses state boundaries. Migration can imply regular returns and takes different forms of flight, labour migration, as well as regular and irregular migration.

**Migration as a universal phenomenon**

Throughout the history of mankind, migration has taken place. In prehistoric times, *Homo erectus* and, later, *Homo sapiens* migrated from eastern Africa to different parts of the African continent as well as to northern and eastern regions of the world, today called Europe and Asia. Later, seafaring people populated the islands and territories of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean, while others reached the American continents via Siberia and Alaska (Fagan 1990). In archaic times (800–600 BCE), Greek emigrants founded trading posts and colonies throughout the Mediterranean Sea and the
Baltic Sea. The colonizers transferred their skills, customs, favoured rituals, and gods as well as political structures while keeping close ties with the metropole. Though settling in faraway geographic regions, relations with each other were maintained through visits to pan-Hellenistic sanctuaries and the Olympic Games (Fossey 1991; Buckley 1996). Other emigrants, whether intending to spread their faith, tempted by making a fortune, coerced, or forced by poverty, left their regions for long periods of time and rarely returned. Examples are numerous: Muslim traders and armies spread to the Mediterranean and North Africa, Normans came to present-day north-west France and England (900–1100 ce), and large-scale emigration brought tens of millions of people from European countries to the two Americas (Segal 1993: 10–17). It is remarkable that the first emigrants from Europe to the present-day East Coast of the United States were the Puritan Pilgrim Fathers. They left Great Britain as religious dissenters and came to the ‘Promised Land’, present-day New England, to build the New Jerusalem. Emigration has continued on all continents up until the present day, raising the number of international migrants from 75 million people in 1965 (2.5 per cent of the world’s population) to about 214 million in 2010 (3.1 per cent of the world’s population) (Reinprecht and Weiss 2012: 14). Therefore, Castles and Miller (2014) call the current period an ‘age of migration’, highlighting the various implications for a nation-state’s politics and society, and the quest for control.

It is noteworthy that ideas, technical skills, and religions have also migrated across areas and continents, with or without the accompanying people. Buddhist monks came to China in the first century ce and were raised to serve as advisers to the Chinese emperor centuries later. Huguenot Protestants, driven out of monarchical Catholic France in the late seventeenth century, were skilled manual workers and brought expertise on working with metals, textiles, paper, silver, and glass. As their professions included clockmakers, weavers, tailors, potters, bakers, farmers, tobacconists, and brewers, those countries that accepted and invited the Huguenot refugees in profited widely from their skills. The settlement of Huguenots often resulted in a push for economic modernization. The Huguenot example also points to the close correlation between migration and economics, potentially turning into a win-win situation for both the migrants and the host society. In this regard, countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia favour the immigration of skilled migrants, whereas they strive to keep unskilled migrants at a distance.

**Theoretical approaches**

Theoretical approaches to migration commonly differentiate between forced and voluntary migration, traditionally employing the so-called push-pull model. Push factors include job scarcity, famine, persecution, displacement, and war, all of which are factors that force people to leave their country of origin. For example, Jews in the late sixth century BCE had been displaced from Judea to the ‘rivers of Babel’ (Old Testament, Psalm 137.1) and forced to live in exile in Babylonia. Cyrus’ edict (538) ended the banishment of the Jews. However, only a minority returned to Judea as the once displaced had become well settled, some even rich. The previously forced exile had turned into a stay by choice. Considering another time and place, mid-nineteenth-century British colonial administration in India introduced the system of indentured workers in order to recruit a work force for plantations in the Caribbean, southern Africa, and the Malay-Pacific region. Due to droughts, famines, and social pressures resulting from the caste system, numerous men and women felt compelled to sign the contract and to be shipped overseas.

Pull factors encompass employment opportunities, possibilities for good education, socio-cultural liberties and chances, and freedom of religion. These form positive incentives to leave the home region and to emigrate. For example, the change in immigration laws in Canada, the
USA, and Australia in the 1960s opened the borders to skilled workers from Asian countries. Many saw better chances for their families and settled in these countries for educational and employment opportunities. This influx of Chinese, Koreans, Indians, Filipinos, and many more people also had a lasting effect on the religious landscape. Buddhist pagodas, Hindu temples, Muslim mosques, Sikh gurdwaras, and other religious buildings sprang up in Los Angeles, Vancouver, New York, Perth, and Sydney. The migrations since the 1960s, significantly facilitated by the improvement of travel and the shortening of the duration of long-distance journeys, have contributed to the globalization of once regionally and nationally bound religions.

Notwithstanding the descriptions above, as well as general academic convention, the strict distinction between forced (push) and voluntary (pull) migration is too schematized. It does not account for the multiple economic, sociopolitical, and personal factors and motives involved. Each life situation entails its own set of obligations, constraints, and pressures. Therefore, Richmond suggests differentiating between more (proactive) and fewer (reactive) options in an individual’s decision-making. Reactive migrants are displaced persons and refugees, at times having very few options in view of oppression and violence. Proactive migrants are workers, family members following their spouse, and emigrants in search of better living conditions. In this regard, scholars can find varying rates of pressure and motives to leave. Richmond’s (1994) theory proposes a spectrum of choices and a certain number of options, freedom, and agency on the side of the potential migrant. Other theoretical approaches put emphasis on the analysis of networks and ‘transnational communities’ (Portes et al. 1999). These communities comprise family ties, business ties, and cultural-religious ties, clearing the way for the arrival and settlement of new immigrants (Castles and Miller 2014: 39–45).

Contextual factors

The processes of migration and settlement are subject to diverse contextual factors. Based on differentiations proposed by Knott (1991) and Vertovec (1997), I distinguish between four factors. First, there are the conditions of emigration, that is to say the constraints and motives involved. Do the migrants come as refugees, as persons able to organize their emigration well, or as skilled workers, tradesmen, or students?

Second, there is the composition of the migrant group, which has a lasting influence on subsequent processes of settlement and integration. Do the migrants arrive with their families or on their own? Most importantly, what kind of social capital do the migrants bring – that of a skilled worker, of a person with a university degree, or of a person with no specific qualifications? In the past, Huguenots had been welcome due to their skills and ambition, just as engineers and information technology specialists today are sought after. In addition, what is the size of the migrant population – does it constitute a small group of only several hundred or several thousand, being able to secure various forms of cultural maintenance in the country of settlement? To what extent is there a parity or disparity among the sexes? Often, men outnumber women when migrating, with women and children following only several years later. Finally, is the migrant group more or less homogeneous or divided into groups that can be sub-differentiated according to language, culture, religion, and class? Williams (1992), for example, points out that because authorized immigration determines the skills and the high level of education required for entry into the USA, a specific type of Hinduism is dominant in the country, making vernacular and lower caste forms of Hindu ritual conspicuously absent.

Third, the legal, political, and social situations in the host country strongly affect the settlement and the activities of immigrants. Laws and legal provisions might disperse migrants throughout the country in order to prevent amalgamations of people and the emergence of
so-called ‘parallel societies’. Restrictions might also delay taking up employment and could limit the stay of people who are considered ‘guest workers’ according to contract arrangements. Politics can either create more welcoming conditions for refugees and labour migrants or they can tighten asylum laws and restrict work permits during economic crisis. Such decisions are more often the result of domestic policies than international crises and developments. Most importantly, politics establish the conditions in which immigrants can acquire citizenship and thus participate in political processes. Social conditions might take the form of engaged volunteers in civil society who support refugees and pave the way for easy integration processes. Certainly, there are less welcoming people and organizations that prejudge immigrants on the basis of their skin colour, appearance, and religion. Remarkably, in the early twenty-first century, religious belonging has developed into an important social marker of immigrants, with Muslims and Islam being stereotyped in some countries as threatening while Buddhists and Buddhism are praised as peaceful and exotic. The socially constructed image of a religion can hinder or ease integration processes and endeavours, for example to construct a publicly visible mosque or pagoda (CTM 2016).

Fourth and finally, developments in the migrants’ country of origin can strongly influence their attitudes and perspectives. Such an example is the demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, North India in 1992, which led to violent tensions between Muslims and Hindus outside of India, for instance in Britain. Likewise, the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka with the defeat of the paramilitary Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 2009 raised hopes among the several hundred thousands of Tamil refugees for a possible return. Many increased remittances to build new houses for relatives, to renovate Hindu temples, and to invest in businesses.

Such transnational flows of tensions, feelings of identifications, money, and people – brought about by migration – span regions and maintain interconnected developments. The numerous transregional migration processes have led to the establishment of cultural, religious, and political diasporas in the country of residence. Diasporic communities form a bridge between the home region they left and the new country of residence.

**Diaspora**

Processes of migration and settlement are the preconditions for forming a diaspora. From its origin, the term diaspora is closely linked to the Jewish people and their history of living outside the Promised Land. Since the late twentieth century, scholars and writers have increasingly employed the term to designate any ethnic, national, and cultural migrant group settled in a foreign land. This loose usage, however, undermines the descriptive and analytical value, turning the term into ‘one of the buzz words of the postmodern age’, as Cohen warns (1998: 3).

**Diaspora, the word history**

The noun ‘diaspora’ is a derivation from the Greek composite verb ‘dia-’ and ‘speirein’, meaning ‘to scatter’, ‘to spread’, or ‘to disperse’. The verb became more widely used among classical philosophers and Hellenist writers as early as the fifth century BCE. The notion had a negative connotation implying processes of dispersion and decomposition, a dissolution into various parts without further relation to each other. As van Unnik (1993: 86–7) states, diaspora had an ‘unfavourable, disastrous meaning’ and was in no way used to imply a geographic place or sociological group. In the third and second centuries BCE, the Alexandrian Hebrew–Greek translators of the Hebrew Scriptures adopted exactly these disastrous connotations of the philosophical
discourse current then. Remarkably, in the edited Septuagint text, ‘diaspora’ and ‘diaspeirein’ were coined as *termini technici* to interpret Jewish existence far from the Promised Land through an encompassing soteriological pattern. Fundamentally, the term took on a spiritual and soteriological meaning that expressed the ‘gathering of the scattered’ by God’s grace at the end of time. ‘Diaspora’ formed an integral part of a fourfold pattern: the course of sin and disobedience of Jews against God/the Law, scattering and exile as punishment of God, repentance and renewed moral life, and finally return to and gathering in the ‘Given Land’ (van Unnik 1993: 113–19, 134; Tromp 1998: 18–19).

Later, in the first century CE, early Christians adopted the term and associated with it the missionary meaning that Christians living in dispersion would form the ‘seed’ for disseminating the message of Jesus. The Christians’ home, however, was the ‘heavenly city Jerusalem’, the soteriological aspiration of Christian pilgrimage. What is more, patristic writers polemically co-opted the term diaspora to degrade Judaism: the destruction of the Second Temple and the dispersion of Jews was punishment by the Christian God for the Jews’ non-recognition of Jesus as the Messiah. Christian polemics devalued the fourfold Jewish soteriological concept on purpose, suppressing the important aspects of redemption and return.

Though the Christian idea of a sojourning people of God over time vanished, the term diaspora was confined to the histories of Jewish and Christian traditions and their diasporic communities until the 1960s. The broadening of the semantics of the term began in African studies. Shepperson argues that similar to the expulsion of the Jews in early times, the dispersion of sub-Saharan Africans through the colonial slave trade can be considered an enforced expatriation. According to Shepperson (1966), the African slaves form an African diaspora that longs to return to their homeland. For example, the Rastafarian movement, which emerged among black people in the 1930s in Jamaica, advocated the concept with the belief that a charismatic African king will be crowned and will lead people of African origin to their own ‘Promised Land’. The restoration to power of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1941, crowned in 1930, strengthened the Rastafarian movement tremendously. His visit to Jamaica in 1966 was considered by Rastafarians as God incarnate; the Lord of Lords was coming to visit them.

Ethnographers and sociologists followed suit, employing the term’s emotion-laden connotations of homesickness, precariousness, and uprootedness as an explanation for migrant groups’ enduring and nostalgic loyalty to the cultural and religious traditions of their country of origin. The term, once removed from its restriction to Jewish history and soteriological semantics, was increasingly used to refer to any processes of dispersion and to relate to countless so-called dislocated, deterritorialized communities and people. In addition, post-modern authors and cultural critics, such as Stuart Hall, Paul Gilroy, and James Clifford, adopted the term to designate a specific type of experience and thinking, that is to say ‘diaspora consciousness’. The writers conceived of ‘diaspora consciousness’ as a specific awareness, supposedly a characteristic of people living ‘here’ and relating to a ‘there’. The ‘consciousness’ is considered to carry a creative power and ability, questioning configurations of power and the hegemony of the all-pervasive, normative nation-state (see in detail, Baumann 2000: 315–25; Krings 2003: 138–46).

The rise and wide popularity of the term diaspora resulted in a semantic broadening of the term, threatening its ability to designate specific groups and their situations. Tölölyan warned that the term ‘is in danger of becoming a promiscuously capacious category’ (1996: 8). Ironically, the popularity of the term led to the dissolution of semantics, leading to ‘decomposition’ and evoking exactly the early Greek philosophical connotation of breaking up into various meanings without any relation to each other.
Diaspora: definitions

Scholars have suggested different definitions of ‘diaspora’ in order to retain the term’s comparative and analytical potential for the study of migrant groups and communities. Commonly, scholars have given real definitions with multiple characteristics. Safran’s definition is widely quoted. It encompasses six aspects emphasizing characteristics of dispersion: the maintenance of a collective memory, the emigrants’ belief of not being fully accepted in the host society, the idea of a later return to the homeland, the emigrants’ commitment to the restoration of their homeland, and the emigrants’ continued relationship to the homeland (Safran 1991: 83–4). Cohen enlarges Safran’s list of characteristics to include nine ‘common features’, specifying aspects such as dispersal, collective memory, and a strong ethnic consciousness (1997: 26, adopted by Mayer 2005: 13). Chaliand and Rageau (1995: xiv–xvii) in their Atlas of Diasporas provide four criteria: dispersion, collective memory, survival as a minority, and time. Later studies, such as those by Rocha and Vásquez (2013: 3), Adogame (2014), Subba and Sinha (2016: 2), and numerous others, to some degree explicitly build on the definitions proposed in the 1990s.

Rather than providing a list of characteristics, my own approach stresses a specific relation with only a few components. In this regard, diaspora consists of a perpetual recollecting identification with a fictitious or faraway existent geographic territory and its cultural-religious traditions. If this recollecting or rebinding identification, expressed symbolically or materially, is missing, a situation and social form shall not be called ‘diasporic’. Most importantly, a diasporic dimension is not a quality per se, but a nominalistic assignment by a scholar to a national, cultural, and/or religious migrant group (Baumann 2000: 327).

Diaspora: an analytical tool

As an analytical tool, diaspora allows for transcultural comparison based upon the triangular relation between diasporic group, country of present residence, and land of origin. Between these ‘poles’, numerous processes of adaptation, rejection, and identity maintenance take place, strongly influenced by the contextual factors outlined above. Systematizing these relations, Saint-Blancat (1997) suggests a comparative fourfold model that focuses on diasporic groups’ relational attitude to the land of origin and to the country of residence according to distance and proximity. Over time, diasporic groups might intensify bonds and processes of adaptation with the country of residence (proximity), gradually enlarging a distance to the cultural, religious, and political bonds with the land of origin or vice versa. For example, since around 2000, the Turkish Muslims in Germany have gradually developed an increased interest in German affairs, relaxing their ties with Turkey. The politics of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, however, have emphatically attempted to maintain the bonds. It is most likely that national and religious ties between Turkey and the Turkish Muslim diaspora in Germany will be reinforced after the coup attempt in July 2016, tying the diaspora more tightly to the country of emigration.

It is important to remember that there is not only one singular diasporic group but several diasporas in different countries. Each diaspora preserves relations with the land of origin and often with other diasporic communities as well. For example, Tamil Hindu spouses have migrated from the German Tamil diaspora to the Canadian diaspora with its centre in Toronto. Rather than thinking of a relational triangle, many globally distributed diasporas constitute a diasporic network with joint venture points and various gravitational centres.

Upon taking a closer look at diasporic groups and communities, it is striking that they quickly set up various institutions, including, among them, cultural, religious, educational, and other associations. Often the first institutions set up are religious sites, such as Islamic
prayer rooms and mosques, Christian churches, Hindu temples, Sikh gurdwaras, and others. The religious sites provide room for prayer, rituals, and devotional services as well as for the celebration of the various calendrical festivals. In addition to religious functions, these sites provide space for social gatherings and tightening bonds with people of the same background. These sacred sites quickly develop into places of a home away from home, where the religious rites and cultural customs of the land of origin are celebrated. Here, individuals are offered a place where they can find their footing in the country of residence. In addition, they receive psychological support, everyday knowledge, and an empowerment of individual strength and self-consciousness (Warner and Wittner 1998; Portes and Rumbaut 2006: 301–42; Kniss and Numrich 2007: 79–94; Baumann 2014; Nagel 2015). Beyond these important religious, social, and emotional roles, immigrant communities with a collective structure often offer various forms of services: they provide counselling, extended learning, information about the country of residence, sports, and leisure activities, and much more.

Portes and Rumbaut (2006: 332), for example, highlight the vital role of the Catholic Church in the nineteenth century, as their elementary and secondary schools formed a ‘mobility machine’ for the Irish and Italian immigrants for their social integration into mainstream culture. In the same way, Kniss and Numrich examine the civic engagement of a neo-Pentecostal Hispanic church that ‘focuses on the rehabilitation of drug addicts, gang members, and prostitutes in its southwest Chicago neighbourhood’ (2007: 54). Neither the police and the courts nor the government could deal with these issues, ‘only Jesus can’, as Pastor Castros asserts (ibid.). In the same line, Mayer’s (2005: 49–59) description of the Jewish communities in Mediterranean regions in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries and Nagel’s (2013: 11–23) analysis of various immigrant congregations in contemporary Germany emphasize that these diasporic communities formed networks beyond their group as well as contact zones of exchange, dialogue, and alliance. Notwithstanding these findings, Kniss and Numrich (2007: 79–80) conclude that diasporic communities do not primarily engage in the provision of social services and civic initiatives. Likewise, Baumann (2016) analyses the efforts of religious immigrant organizations in Switzerland to promote social integration. With the exception of religious leaders and board representatives, ordinary members and affiliated persons rarely benefitted from the social and civic services provided for social integration.

Migration and diasporic groups inherently comprise transregional characteristics and can serve as exemplary cases of the transgression of confines. They build networks and interconnections between different geographic areas. The maintenance of cultural and religious dimensions of migrant groups and diasporic communities serve to plant different regional cultures and religions in new areas and geographies.

**Select bibliography**


Migration, diaspora, and religion

Organized religion is a common feature of contemporary global society on local as well as on regional and transregional scales. However, long before the contemporary period, religious actors attempted to organize their activities worldwide, with the Roman Catholic Church and its religious orders being the most prominent example. This chapter explores the existing theoretical literature on (global) religious organizations and discusses some historical and contemporary examples from four periods of globalization.

In recent years, scholars have advocated that ‘religion has always been global’ (Juergensmeyer 2011: 458) and that religious communities are ‘among the oldest of transnational entities’ (Cherry 2013: 2). At the same time, current debates about the ‘world religions paradigm’ ( Cotter and Robertson 2016) and the global applicability of the concept of ‘religion’ (Dubuisson 2007) have led to the emergence of a perspective that sees today’s ‘world religions’ as not only appearing on the scene conceptually after 1800 (Masuzawa 2005; Bergunder 2014), but as actually having been constituted in their current forms only through processes of globalization since that time. While it is certainly possible to question these assumptions from both a theoretical and a historical perspective (Kleine 2013), it seems clear that something noteworthy took place over the course of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Bayly (2004: 325, 332) describes this as the emergence of ‘empires of religion’, referring to the ways in which religious traditions worldwide ‘sharpened and clarified their identities’ after 1815, drawing ‘great areas of decentralized spirituality’ into the orbit of their ‘organizing and categorizing power’. Even if his perspective might be seen as theoretically insufficient, he draws attention to the important role modern forms of organization have played in the global history of religion.

‘Globalization’ as a concept rose to prominence in the 1980s and in the beginning referred mostly to economic processes of global capitalism (Beyer 2007: 444). Only later did it come to be seen as having a longer history, which gave rise to the idea that religions (rather than markets) are ‘the original globalizer[s]’ (Lehmann 2002: 345). To explore these issues further, I will distinguish between four periods of globalization: pre-modern, early modern (1500–1850), modern (1850–1945), and contemporary (1945–) (Held et al. 1999).

**Global religious organizations: theoretical perspectives**

‘Organization’ has never been a central topic for religious studies or even for the sociology of religion (Petzke and Tyrell 2012: 286). For example, no systematic treatment of religious
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Organization(s) can be found in the over 10,000 pages of the second edition of the Encyclopedia of Religion published in 2005. There have of course been extensive debates about the collective aspects of religion, most prominently concerning the classical typology of ‘church’, ‘sect’, and ‘cult’, which later was expanded to include the ‘denomination’ (Dawson 2009). However, while such typologies represent a ‘religious’ perspective on collectives and groups, organization – from a sociological point of view – is a neutral concept that can refer to economic, scientific, legal, artistic, as well as religious institutions, thus making a comparative evaluation of its role in these different contexts possible (Petzke and Tyrell 2012: 277–8).

Following a distinction proposed by Luhmann and others, organizations can be seen as a third ‘meso’ level of sociality next to the individual and the society (Geser 1999; Seidl and Mormann 2014). Having the ability to control their inner structures and external actions to a high degree through collectively binding decisions, organizations achieve this distance from the macro level of society by restricting themselves to a specific membership as well as clearly articulated goals, and from the micro level of the individual through formal rules and sanctions that address members not as individuals but in their organizational roles (Geser 1999: 40).

Much of the existing literature is concerned with the specificity of religious organizations in comparison with other types (Jeavons 1998; Petzke and Tyrell 2012: 289–95). One point often repeated is a certain reluctance of religious institutions to understand themselves as organizations (Luhmann 1972; Petzke and Tyrell 2012: 275). This ‘problem’ of the (in)compatibility of religion and organization also leads some authors to assume an unavoidable drive toward secularization that results from organizing: if religious enthusiasm and originality are understood as individualistic and charismatic impulses, organization will always only be secondary. Furthermore, many religious organizations display a twofold nature within their membership: notwithstanding a hierarchy with specific functional roles (the clergy, etc.), the vast majority of members do not fill such roles and therefore might not be subject to the same rules and effects of organizational decision-making (Petzke and Tyrell 2012: 291).

Equally important is the idea that religious traditions might differ in their potential for formal organization. Geser (1999: 41–2) argues that Christianity has a ‘particular affinity’ toward organization, while Islam is more concerned with the macro level of society, and other religious traditions (such as Buddhism) focus on ‘microscopic teacher–pupil relationships’. Even though in the contemporary period since 1945 most religious traditions have established (global) organizations, there is a much longer history of Christian organizing.

While organization in general can be understood as one of four major ways in which religion gains form in today’s world (the other three being ‘social movement religion’, religion thematized in other societal function systems, and ‘social network religion’ (see Beyer 2006: 108)), this chapter exclusively examines global religious organizations. One of the few existing studies on this topic from a historical perspective is a short chapter by Boli and Brewington (2007), who make use of data from the 2001–2 edition of the Yearbook of International Organizations to explore the history of religious international non-governmental organizations (or RINGOs) over the course of 1,700 years. In their view, ‘international and transnational religious organizing was for a long time the almost exclusive province of the Catholic faith’, with religious orders being ‘virtually the entire INGO population before the 19th century’ and Western Christian organizations still dominating the field today (Boli and Brewington 2007: 218–19).

Religious transregionalism in the pre-modern world

It is difficult to argue that any global religious organizations existed in the pre-modern period. Nevertheless, some Catholic orders such as the Franciscans or Dominicans that emerged in the Middle Ages can be seen as forerunners of such organizations. Likewise, the sangha, the
Buddhist community of monks and nuns, established wide-ranging transregional connections and a shared world of religious practice throughout Asia (Collins 1998). Equally impressive were the networks of the so-called ‘Nestorian’ Church of the East and other ‘religions of the Silk Road’ (Foltz 2009), with the first East Syriac ‘Nestorian’ missionary arriving in the capital city of Xi’an in the north-west of today’s China in 635 CE (Koschorke 2009; Ertl 2015: 45).

Although none of these pre-modern examples really amount to the establishment of global organizational structures, pre-modern social worlds nevertheless did not completely lack examples of organization (Tyrell 2010: 202). Almost from the beginning, ekklesia, the term the Christian Church adopted to describe itself, referred to three different levels of sociality: the meeting of the individual congregation, the local church as a particular organization in a plural environment of other churches, and the universal ‘Catholic’ Church defined by its claim to reach the ends of the known world (Tyrell 2010: 204–6). In contrast to the religious ‘market’ of antiquity with a multiplicity of suppliers and their more or less uncommitted clients, the Christian Church as a ‘membership organization’ relied on exclusive belonging established through baptism. Along with this went the development of a highly complex theology and an organizational structure unique in the ancient world (Kehrer 1982: 103).

Religious organizations in the context of early modern globalization

Around 1500, European expansion led to the first attempts at establishing truly global networks of communication and religious exchange. Although the Roman Catholic Church has been labelled as already ‘highly organized’ in medieval times (Mitterauer 2003: 152), scholars are not fully convinced that it should necessarily be understood as a singular ‘global organization’, especially before the nineteenth century (Petzke and Tyrell 2012: 281). Nevertheless, in the early modern period it provided the environment for the emergence of global Catholic missionary orders.

The Jesuits as a global religious organization

The global mission of the Church was carried out by different orders in competition with each other, especially by the Society of Jesus, which not only defended Catholicism in Counter-Reformation Europe but also was a central vehicle for its worldwide expansion (Tyrell 2004: 91; Ditchfield 2015). Officially established in 1540 by Pope Paul III, its organizational particularity was threefold: a geographically immobile centre in Rome allowed for the construction of a centralized hierarchical structure; leaders in important positions (in particular the superior general) were appointed for life, resulting in a high degree of personal stability; and the central hierarchy was given the power to make the most important decisions with almost complete autonomy (Friedrich 2012: 83). This resulted in a strict hierarchical organization where all decisions about personnel and strategy were (at least in theory) to be made in Rome. At the same time, the Jesuits instituted a global structure of communication, with provincial representatives constantly travelling in their area of influence, visiting local institutions, and reporting to Rome (Friedrich 2012: 86–7; Banchoff and Casanova 2016). With this structure in place, the Jesuits developed a truly global missionary network. Francis Xavier reached Goa, India, in 1542, only two years after the founding of the society, and landed in Japan in 1549. Missions to Brazil (1553), Florida (1566), Mexico and Peru (in the 1570s), as well as to China (1579), Congo (1548), Ethiopia (1555), and Tibet and Vietnam (1624) attest to the global reach of the order within 150 years of its establishment (Ditchfield 2007: 55–6).
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After their suppression in 1773, followed by their restoration in 1814, the Jesuits were quickly active worldwide once again. The suppression had made them even more global, as some members expelled from Austria headed to Australia, some from Spain to Colombia and the Philippines, and some from Germany to England and Ecuador (McGreevy 2016: 5). While the Jesuits were not the only Catholic missionary order with a global vision, ‘no other group possessed the Jesuit reach, from the Roman Curia to hundreds of schools and colleges and far-flung mission stations’ (McGreevy 2016: 2).

Protestant missionary societies as global religious organizations

Next to the Catholic orders and the global community of the Moravian Brethren established already in the eighteenth century (Mettele 2009), a significant number of Protestant missionary societies that emerged after 1800 can be seen as global religious organizations. Their rise was the main precondition for the worldwide spread of Protestant missions over the course of the nineteenth century, culminating in the 1910 World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh (Stanley 2009). Despite their pioneering character, the Pietist Danish-English Halle Mission to South India (Gross, Kumaradoss and Liebau 2006) and the earliest organizational initiatives led by the established British churches achieved only limited results. The modern missionary movement is, therefore, often said to have begun with William Carey’s founding of the Baptist Society for the Propagation of the Gospel among the Heathen in 1792 (Cox 2008). In 1795, the London Missionary Society was established, followed in 1799 by the Society for Missions to Africa and the East (renamed the Church Missionary Society in 1812). The first North American society, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, was founded in 1810. Additional societies emerged in Scotland, the Netherlands, Germany, and Scandinavian countries, with the interdenominational Basel Mission (founded in 1815) being the first modern one in a German-speaking country. The new form of ‘organized mission’ was not the result of a centralized organizational effort, but rather a case of the parallel founding of a plurality of societies in ‘friendly competition’ with each other – one of the main differences from the re-establishment of Catholic missions in the second half of the nineteenth century (Tyrell 2004: 101–2).

As voluntary lay associations, these missions mostly relied on donations and were independent from state and church hierarchies. Their networks of mission stations soon stretched all across the globe. Although many societies were founded along denominational lines, others were interdenominational and regionally oriented or followed a functional specification (for example, the British and Foreign Bible Society) (Tyrell 2004: 102). In their local mission fields, they often helped to bridge doctrinal conflicts and contributed to a growing ecumenical spirit of cooperation (Osterhammel 2014: 891). They relied on transcontinental structures, with European (or North American) headquarters making decisions about personnel, controlling resources, and being in charge of strategic and structural decisions. The missionaries had to report to these headquarters and were bound to follow their directives. What emerged, in most cases, was therefore a clear hierarchical structure of a rather large number of native local ‘workers’ (teachers, catechists, and hospital staff) under the administrative control of the Western missionaries (Tyrell 2004: 70).

The success of the societies constituted an ‘organizational field’ that provided the conditions for the emergence of other forms of global Christian organizing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, from the Young Men’s Christian Associations (YMCA) to ecumenical bodies such as Faith and Order, Life and Work, and the International Missionary Council (formed in 1921), which later were incorporated into the World Council of Churches (see below).
Religious organizations in the context of modern globalization

After 1850, global organizing became a staple for a larger variety of religious traditions that until this time had not been particularly concerned with establishing such organizational structures.

Early forms of globally oriented Islamic organizing

Concerning the Islamic context, it is argued that the social form of the organization was historically not as prevalent (Beyer 2006: 180). Nevertheless, around 1900 various attempts at creating a more global reach for Islamic institutions took place. Minority reform movements such as the Ahmadiyya modelled their mission on Christian missionary societies and set their sights on Europe (Jonker 2014). Its printing presses in Lahore produced English, Dutch, German, Albanian, Hungarian, Italian, and French literature, financed mission journals, and worked toward the translation of the Qur’an. Islamic ‘mission stations’ were established at Woking (south-west of London), Berlin, and Vienna in the 1920s and 1930s.

At the same time, Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood (founded in Egypt in 1928) combined political activism with charity work and quickly expanded regionally (Wickham 2013). After initial repression in Egypt in the 1950s, it has become arguably ‘the most successful Islamist group in the world’ (Rubin 2010: 1). Over the course of the twentieth century, Islamic organizing continued to expand and other types of organizations emerged with one central global institution today being the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Founded in 1969, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation currently consists of 57 member states across Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America and is modelled after the United Nations (UN) (Kayaoglu 2015).

Religious modernisms around 1900: Hindu and Buddhist organizing on a global scale

In reaction to the activities of Christian missionaries in India, organizations such as the Brahmo Samaj (founded in Calcutta [today Kolkata] in 1828) and the Arya Samaj (established in Bombay [today Mumbai] in 1874) proclaimed a reformed Hinduism. They reached a global audience at the World’s Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893 where Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902), the ‘first Hindu guru to have a global impact’ (Jacobsen 2015: 360), presented Hinduism as a universal religion. The Ramakrishna Mission, founded by Vivekananda in 1897, understood itself as a vehicle for the global spread of Hinduism and today runs around 150 centres worldwide (Beckerlegge 2004), with the first branches in the United States (US) founded in New York in 1894 and San Francisco in 1900 (Jackson 1994).

In the Buddhist context, Ceylon (today Sri Lanka) was a particular hotbed for organizational efforts around 1900. The reformer Anagarika Dharmapala started the Maha Bodhi Society in 1891 with the original purpose of re-establishing Bodh Gaya, the site of the Buddha’s enlightenment, as a pilgrimage centre and universal Buddhist shrine. For many years, it published a journal called The Maha Bodhi Society and the United Buddhist World with the goal of ‘drawing Buddhists into a pan-Asian community linked to supporters in Europe and America’ (Kemper 2015: 8). In 1898, the members of the local educated elite in Colombo founded the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA). Mirroring Christian missionary endeavours, it spread to other Asian colonial cities and beyond, with branches soon being established in Calcutta, Rangoon, Tokyo, Singapore, and San Francisco as well as in cities in England (Frost 2002:
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959–60; Bhutia 2016: 127–8). Even though each local association had its own priorities and the organization lacked a centralized administration, all participants understood the YMBA as an expression of a global Buddhist community (Bhutia 2016: 128). In Japan, a Far Eastern Buddhist Conference, with over 1,300 participants, was held in 1925. It saw itself as a forerunner of similar future meetings that would include Buddhists from India, Ceylon, Siam (Thailand), and Burma as well as from Europe and North America (Snodgrass 2015: 160). Another important organization is the Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai (Society for the Promotion of Buddhism). Founded in Tokyo in 1965, it is known for its support of academic activities and the worldwide distribution of a collection of basic Buddhist scriptures translated into a large variety of languages (Dessì 2013: 94–5).

In 1950 in Colombo, 129 delegates from 29 countries founded the World Fellowship of Buddhists (WFB). It quickly became the principal advocacy organization for international Buddhist cooperation, holding a conference biannually. Of the 42 initial WFB regional centres created in the 1950s, 23 were located in Asia, one in US state of Hawaii, four in the continental Americas, and nine in Europe (including one in the Soviet Union). Additionally, a centre was located in Africa and in Australia (Masatsugu 2013: 147).

Christian internationalism and the global spread of Christian associations around 1900

Equally impressive is the variety of ‘Christian internationalisms’ (Koschorke 2014: 190) around 1900 and the proliferation of globally oriented organizations during this period (Robert 2002). Many, such as the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, were closely linked to specific efforts, for example in ‘global anti-vice activism’ (Pliley, Kramm and Fischer-Tiné 2016), whereas others followed a more general programme. Such organizations, including the Young People’s Society of Christian Endeavor, were quickly able to build a global presence. By 1886, branches had been established in Syria, Japan, China, Spain, Scotland, and England as well as in Africa and Micronesia, turning it into one of the largest of such associations worldwide, with 71,000 societies and almost 4 million members by 1909. Other Christian organizations were able to diversify their membership and administrative staff even further. One prime example is the YMCA. Founded in London in 1844, it was exported to the US and then spread further with the first Asian association being established at Jaffna College in Ceylon in 1884. Targeting college students, the YMCA soon had a strong presence in India, South Africa, China, Japan, and Korea. Its work in Asia was ‘thoroughly transnational’ (Tyrrell 2010: 86), employing not only American, British, and Canadian advocates but also many native workers as well. By 1904, YMCA foreign secretaries, responsible for maintaining contacts between the local associations and the YMCA headquarters, had been appointed to China, Argentina, Brazil, Ceylon, Cuba, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Korea, and Mexico. The Young Women’s Christian Association and the World Student Christian Federation, which developed in connection with the spread of the YMCA, were equally successful.

Religious organizations in the context of contemporary globalization

While many of the organizations that have emerged in the modern period continue to spread globally, in the contemporary era of globalization since 1945, at least three additional forms of global religious organizations can be identified: New Religious Movements (NRMs), religious non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and secular/atheist organizations.
New religious movements as global organizations

The International Society for Krishna Consciousness was founded in New York in 1966 and soon established a wide-ranging presence in North America and Europe (Neubert 2013). Drawing on the teachings of early modern Gaudiya Vaishnavism, its main objective is the global spread of Krishna consciousness. Already in 1970, the founding document of the organization’s Governing Body Commission mentioned 34 centres worldwide with 23 located in the US, an additional six in Europe, three in Canada, and one each in Japan and Australia. Other temples opened in India and Singapore as well. After 1990, a broad organizational transformation took place after a series of severe accusations concerning the authoritarian structure of the movement, the treatment of children in its schools, and charges of psychological and sexual abuse of female devotees (Rochford 2007).

Another contemporary New Religious Movement that can be seen as a global religious organization is the Church of Scientology. Originally intended as a new system of mental therapy based on the 1950 publication *Dianetics: The Modern Science of Mental Health* by American author L. Ron Hubbard, the first Scientology church was established in California, in Los Angeles, in 1954. Scientologists believe that through counselling in so-called ‘auditing’ sessions they can be transformed from a ‘pre-clear’ to a ‘clear’ state, now fully able to realize their spiritual potential (Lewis 2009: 5). Following the formation of the Sea Organization – the Church’s ‘monastic wing’ (Hellesøy 2014: 264) – in 1969, Hubbard and his close associates travelled aboard several large ocean-going ships for a number of years. In 1981, Hubbard’s successors created the Church of Scientology International as a global umbrella organization and set up Scientology Missions International (Rigal-Cellard 2009: 326).

By the end of the 1970s, the organization had spread beyond the English-speaking world, with churches being successfully established in various European countries including France (1959), Sweden (1969), Germany (1970), Holland (1972), and Italy (1978). By 1992, Scientology reported a presence in 74 countries, including all of the former Soviet bloc (Melton 2009: 29). In the 1990s, efforts were also made to reach out to places in South America, Africa, Southeast Asia, as well as in China and India (Kent 1999: 159). Recently, however, the number of adherents seems to be in decline, as the central leadership is criticized more openly and the so-called ‘Free Zone’ of independent scientologists expands (Lewis 2014). Current global adherents are estimated between 75,000 and 100,000 (Kent 2011: 114). Throughout its history, Scientology has been a highly controversial movement as its methods of recruitment, its authoritarian structure, and the economic dependency of its members have come under close scrutiny, particularly in the US, Germany, and France.

Global religious NGOs and the UN

The period after 1945 saw a distinct reaction of the Roman Catholic Church to the acceleration of globalization in the shape of the Second Vatican Council 1962–65 (Nacke 2010) as well as the establishment of a large variety of Christian global religious organizations, most famously the World Council of Churches (WCC) in 1948. Uniting Protestant, Anglican, and Orthodox Christians, its foundation was the result of prior ecumenical networks and organizations that had emerged since the mid-nineteenth century (see Chapter 47 by Stensvold). As a transnational umbrella organization, the WCC currently represents more than 572 million Christians across all continents. Since the 1960s, it has been transformed ‘from a formerly Western organization into a global community’ (Kunter 2015: 2911).

After the Second World War, the WCC, in cooperation with the International Missionary Council, founded the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, which became one
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of the first Christian NGOs at the UN (Lehmann 2016: 80–119). Today, over 1,000 NGOs are registered with the UN, of which around one-fifth can be described as religious or faith-based. Some of the most important of such organizations provide humanitarian aid, health services, and development assistance on a global scale, including World Vision and Islamic Relief (Barnett and Stein 2011). While historically most religious NGOs were linked to Christian traditions, at the moment around half (ca. 130) come from a Christian background. Additionally there are 31 Muslim, 12 Jewish, nine Buddhist, and seven Hindu organizations, as well as 15 interreligious NGOs (Lehmann 2015: 2932) registered. Some of them have also established interreligious coalitions, for example the Committee of Religious NGOs at the UN, which has been meeting since 1972.

Global atheist and secular organizations

Following recent proposals to also take into account the ‘religion-related field’ in studying modern religion (Quack 2014), an additional type of organization should at least be mentioned. While local and regional organizational efforts of freethinkers, atheists, and secularists have long existed (just like some attempts at a more global organizing, for example the foundation of an International Federation of Freethinkers in Brussels in 1880), the contemporary period has seen the first largely successful efforts to organize non-religious activists on a global scale. One important umbrella organization is the International Humanist and Ethical Union founded in Amsterdam in 1952, which represents organizations in nearly 40 countries (Gasenbeek and Gogineni 2002).

Conclusion

Formal organization is one of the central ways in which religion takes form on a regional as much as on a transregional scale in today’s world society (Beyer 2006). This chapter sheds light on global religious organizations in four different periods of globalization. Although pre-modern transregional exchanges did not lead to stable forms of organization, in the early modern era Catholic orders and Protestant missionary societies developed structures that might justify referring to them as global religious organizations. The modern period after 1850 saw a proliferation of such organizations, including the emergence of globally oriented non-Christian organizations, for example in the context of Hinduism and Buddhism. After the destruction of two world wars, the period of contemporary globalization after 1945 is characterized by the rise of new forms of global religious organizations, in particular global NRMs and religious NGOs.

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Adrian Hermann


Global religious organizations


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In the last few decades, the idea that we are living in an interconnected world has become increasingly familiar to people in many contemporary societies, and ‘globalization’ has acquired wide currency as one of the key terms of our time. Not unexpectedly, there is no general agreement on what globalization should mean, and references to this term are often marked by ambiguity and a tendency to take it as self-explanatory. As Jan Scholte puts it, ‘if asked to specify what they understand by “globalization”, most people reply with considerable hesitation, vagueness, and inconsistency. Moreover, much discussion of globalization is steeped in oversimplification, exaggeration and wishful thinking’ (Scholte 2005: 1).

Characterizations of globalization found in the media most often refer to the worldwide spread of free trade and the financial markets. In this popularized form, globalization is an updated version of the narrative of modernity, which revolves around the ‘inevitable’ worldwide spread of capitalism (Massey 1999) and the unequal opposition from the ‘anti-global’ movements. Another example of how ideologically charged the idea of globalization might be is offered by Samuel Huntington’s thesis, which postulates that this new phase of world history will be characterized by a ‘clash of civilizations’, and ‘a central focus of conflict for the immediate future will be between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states’ (Huntington 1993: 1, 48).

Such approaches to globalization have been subject to critical scrutiny from different perspectives. George Ritzer’s ‘McDonaldization thesis’, for example, warns against the risk that the worldwide rationalization of the economic sphere might lead to a ‘global cultural homogenization’ (Ritzer 2010: 263). Another influential sociologist and proponent of the ‘multiple modernities’ theory, Shmuel Eisenstadt, argues that world civilizations, rather than being ‘closed’ (à la Huntington), actually attempt ‘to appropriate modernity on their own terms, and articulate – in different historical settings – the antinomies and contradictions of modernity’ (Eisenstadt 1999: 293).

The relevance of processes of cultural hybridization has been emphasized by other scholars in several important contributions. Although they might disagree on the relationship between modernity and globalization, and focus on concepts as diverse as hybridization, glocalization, and creolization, they share the basic idea that elements of global culture are adapted in distinctive ways in different cultures. Examples of such scholars of globalization include the following authors. John Tomlinson (1996) argues for the capacity of non-Western cultures to appropriate...
elements of Western culture actively and indigenize them. Ulf Hannerz (1996) has, in various ways, elaborated upon the idea that world culture is the result of the interplay of different local cultures. Arjun Appadurai (1996) proposes to replace attempts to frame the global cultural economy in terms of centre-periphery models with his well-known theory of five dimensions (ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes, and ideoscapes) of global cultural flows. Roland Robertson (1992, 1995) introduces the concepts of globality and glocalization into the debate, which point to the interdependence and synthesis of the global and the local, and changes in consciousness within contemporary societies. Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2003) draws attention to both the synchronic and diachronic aspects of global hybridization, of which Western culture is just one of the many constituent elements.

Although the role played by religious studies in the aforementioned seminal discussions on globalization and culture has been marginal at best, there has been a growing interest in religion and global dynamics since at least the 1990s, to which the early work of Peter Beyer and the worldwide success of Pentecostalism have largely contributed.

Religion and globalization

One had to wait until the mid-1990s to see the first published monograph on religion under globalizing conditions. Beyer’s grand theory, illustrated in Religion and Globalization (Beyer 1994), is primarily inspired by Niklas Luhmann’s work on social systems. Here, Beyer postulates a twofold typology differentiating between the liberal and the conservative option, and applies it to several case studies ranging from the New Christian Right to the Islamic Revolution in Iran. As is well known, Beyer’s liberal option implies the acceptance by religion of functional differentiation, pluralism, and the core values of globalization. The conservative option opposes functional differentiation and strongly emphasizes sociocultural particularism (Beyer 1994: 86–93). In this book, Beyer also elaborates on Luhmann’s reflections on religious ‘performance’ by analysing religion’s engagement in various ‘residual problems’ left unsolved by the dominant systems (Beyer 1994: 105–7). In more recent contributions, Beyer explores the historical implications of his systemic approach in order to illustrate how religions worldwide emerge as a part of the process of functional differentiation (Beyer 2007). Beyer’s pioneering work is important in various respects, not least because it provides a framework that meaningfully relates secularization (i.e. functional differentiation) and globalization, and helps to understand, among other things, the increasing impact of religiously oriented non-governmental organizations active worldwide.

Therefore, it is rather surprising that, to date, very few attempts have been made at applying Beyer’s theory to different religious contexts. Among the exceptions, the work on the Baha’i religion by Margit Warburg (1999) is worthy of mention. As she observes, Baha’i officially embraces pluralism based on the belief that all religions share the same essence. This choice for the liberal option, however, is not without ambiguities. In fact, Warburg notes, Baha’i also manifests a certain tendency to dedifferentiate the political and religious systems, which makes her conclude that this religion rather sticks to the conservative option ‘in the long run’ (Warburg 1999: 54).

As mentioned above, another factor behind the development of the field of studies on religion and globalization has been a general interest in the worldwide trajectory of Pentecostalism. Because of its rapid expansion, Pentecostalism has offered to interested scholars a powerful example of a transnational religious community. Moreover, the awareness of being part of a global community, manifested by many members of Pentecostal churches, has provided another topic of interest. Among the scholars who have explored these themes, Ruth Marshall-Fratani
focuses on Pentecostalism in Nigeria from several perspectives: as a battle against evil forces that resonate with local traditions; as a heavily mediatized phenomenon positively identified with the forces of modernity; and as an actor in the transnational conflict between Christianity and Islam (Marshall-Fratani 2001: 85–103). A multidimensional approach to Pentecostalism is also found in the work of Asonzeh Ukah (2008). In his study on the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG), Ukah sheds light on the practice of globality in this Pentecostal church, and its local and overseas adaptations. Moreover, he has provided a detailed analysis of the diversity of attitudes toward the religious Other found within the RCCG, ranging from the acceptance of other Pentecostal churches to the complete rejection of the Aladura churches. As Ukah illustrates, there is a strategic search for legitimacy underlying these representations, which is most evident in the backstage claim that the RCCG is the ultimate ‘ship’ for the salvation of humankind (Ukah 2008: 281–98, 313–42). Among other scholars of Pentecostal Christianity, Joel Robbins argues that the global success of Pentecostalism also derives from its double move, consisting in the preservation/reversal of the spirit world found in local religious cultures. This dialectic of divine and demonic, he suggests, allows for minimal accommodation without denaturing the core religious message of Pentecostalism (Robbins 2004).

Robbins’ observations resonate with Thomas Csordas’s discussion of ‘portable practices’ and ‘transposable messages’, which can facilitate the global diffusion of religion. Portable practices refer to rites ‘that can be easily learned’, whereas transposable messages, Csordas argues, are characterized by the way in which ‘religious tenets, premises, or promises can find footing across a diversity of linguistic and cultural settings’ (Csordas 2009: 261). By focusing on the plasticity of religious practices and beliefs, these reflections certainly contribute to clarify the processes of preemptive selection that regulate the access of religious meanings to the network of global culture.

The transnationalism of religion is intimately related to processes of deterritorialization, which figure prominently in the work of Olivier Roy (2004). For Roy, the phenomenon of re-Islamization certainly represents a reaction to the secularization trend in many modern societies. However, he notes, it is also an effect of deterritorialization, which he understands as the disjunction caused by globalization and migration flows between Islam and any specific territory (Roy 2004: 4, 18). This also has implications for the religious identity of ‘true believers’, since Roy notes that there has been a ‘shift from self-evident universal religions embedded in given cultures, to religious communities surrounded by secularised societies’ (Roy 2004: 36). The ongoing reconceptualizing of the umma has also been approached by another scholar of contemporary Islam, Peter Mandaville (2001). For him, globalization and translocality not only increase the awareness of internal differences but also facilitate interactions. In this sense, they ‘are both constitutive of a single process leading Muslims towards greater “globality”’ and foreshadow the realization of the umma as a social reality (Mandaville 2001: 187).

Religion and glocalization

It is significant that both Roy and Mandaville often relate their analysis of deterritorialization and translocality to the decline of traditional religious authority and processes of creative adaptation. Roy provides several examples of what he considers the progressive Westernization of Islam, including the meaningful dependence on Western sources of the attitudes toward violence and anti-Semitism found in various Islamic radical movements (Roy 2004: 43–9). Mandaville similarly notes the emergence of marginal but nonetheless hybrid religious forms within contemporary Islam, such as the case of ongoing discussions on doctrinal concepts and gender issues (Mandaville 2001: 137–42).
Similar occurrences of religious hybridization have long attracted the attention of scholars specialized in different traditions. In this respect, one of the earliest examples is offered by Inoue Nobutaka’s work on religion in Japan, which initially focused on the phenomenon of ‘neo-syncretism’ (Inoue 1990, 1997), and, more recently, on the category of ‘hyper-religions’ (Inoue 2007). For Inoue, hyper-religions, such as those emerging in Japan in the 1970s–80s, are different from older new religions and are a typical product of the global age, in that they adopt elements from various sources and are generally indifferent toward traditional religion (Inoue 2007). Another important contribution to this subfield of studies is given by Cristina Rocha in her monograph on Zen Buddhism in Brazil (Rocha 2006). Written from an Appadurain perspective, Rocha’s work focuses on the role played by imagination in the construction of Brazilian Zen, from the earlier dissemination among and through orientalist intellectuals to the media-related creation of a trendy concept and symbol of social refinement (Rocha 2006: 152). All in all, Rocha characterizes her work as an attempt to shed light on the complexity of the global dynamics of religious change and on how ‘global flows acquire local forms’ (Rocha 2006: 3).

Within the context of Christianity, a revealing example of global hybridity is presented by Manuel Vásquez and Marie Marquardt in their work on the Rainbow Madonna in Florida (Vásquez and Marquardt 2000). In their analysis of this Marian apparition, Vásquez and Marquardt illustrate how pilgrims ‘are drawing from a global script to construct their local sacred space’, the working of Appadurain mediascapes in the creation of a global community of sentiment, and the role played by the Vatican’s New Evangelization project ‘as an example of how global processes impress themselves on the local’ (Vásquez and Marquardt 2000: 128–33). Elsewhere the two sociologists have explored similar dynamics in their study of the hybrid practices at the Catholic Basilica of Our Lady of San Juan del Valle on the border between the United States and Mexico, and in other Latino churches in Atlanta (Vásquez and Marquardt 2003: 65–91, 145–70). Michael Hill’s (2010) analysis of the New Age Andean religion offers another interesting case study for the understanding of these dynamics. He shows how various brotherhoods of urban mestizos in Peru have incorporated elements from Catholicism and New Age spirituality to reconstruct a narrative that bypasses the colonial period and links them directly to the Andes as a repository of ancient wisdom. Through this idealization of things Inca, Hill notes, they attempt to ‘rewrite the script of globalization so that it is grounded in Andean locality and place’ (Hill 2010: 282).

A diachronic approach to the glocal has been recently attempted by Victor Roudometof in his discussion of ‘multiple glocalizations’, through which he aims to provide ‘a historical interpretation of the intertwining between world religions and local cultures’ (Roudometof 2013: 238). In Roudometof’s model, universalism and particularism are identified with Christianity and the role played by local cultures, respectively, and four distinct forms of glocalization are illustrated, including vernacularization, indigenization, nationalization, and transnationalization (Roudometof 2013: 227). Still another flexible application of the term glocalization is found in the recent work by Beyer (2007). Consistent with his systemic approach, he observes that the phenomenon of glocalization is related to the pluralization of religion in global society. That is to say, for Beyer the worldwide spreading of functional differentiation has prompted other cultures to reimagine their religious traditions as one of many religions, thus leading to the ‘glocalization of this initially Western model of what religion was’ (Beyer 2007: 110).

Integrated approaches

The examples outlined above suggest that there is no uniformity in the use of the key terms globalization and glocalization and their application to concrete case studies. This is partly due to the fact that scholars have viewed these dynamics from different angles and given emphasis to
specific problems related to the globalization of religion. However, there have also been some attempts to approach the subject from a more comprehensive perspective that might take into account a wider variety of underlying factors and processes.

Perhaps the first serious attempt to develop a comprehensive model for the study of religion under globalizing conditions was George Van Pelt Campbell’s (2005) work based on his observations on Evangelical Christianity in North America. Campbell’s model focuses on the effects of cultural relativization on local traditions and distinguishes between closed, open, reinvention, and exit responses (Campbell 2005: 83–91). Closed responses are characterized by Campbell in terms of rejection of other traditions (Campbell 2005: 84). As for the open responses, he distinguishes three different subtypes. The first two are the openness to rethinking the original tradition and the restoring of tradition. The third open response postulated by Campbell is characterized as the realization that ‘one cannot be secure in any tradition because any tradition can be relativized’. However, he specifies that this response might take the shape of a tolerant attitude that ‘views one’s tradition as a “preference” and views other traditions as “true” for others’ (Campbell 2005: 85–6). Campbell’s three kinds of reinvention responses are reinvention by selection, by deletion, and by addition. The first one, he argues, can often be ‘unconscious and unintentional’ and implies the defence of a portion of the tradition. In the second case, parts of the tradition are intentionally rejected to meet the expectations of a particular audience or ‘to keep in step with the contemporary world’. The third type of reinvention involves the addition of new elements in order to improve the tradition (Campbell 2005: 88–9). Finally, he postulates two types of exit responses, namely, adoption of other traditions and abandonment of one’s own (Campbell 2005: 90).

In his work on Japanese Buddhism, Shintō, and new religious movements, Ugo Dessì (2016) calls attention to a certain conflation of levels of analysis found in Campbell’s and Beyer’s works, and proposes an alternative model that accounts for the global repositioning of religion at three different levels. Based on a working definition of religion revolving around the concept of authority, and the idea of two main sources of relativization (i.e. the global cultural network and polycentric functional differentiation), Dessì contends that religion can be relativized by the authority of other religious systems, by religious/non-religious elements circulating in the global cultural network, and by the authority of other social systems. These varieties of relativization elicit three corresponding modalities of global repositioning, which occurs (a) at the inter-religious level (exclusivism, inclusivism, pluralism, and multiple commitment/ conversion), (b) at the discrete-elements level (anti-homogenization, chauvinistic glocalization, glocalization, and homogenization), and (c) at the inter-systemic level (anti-secularization, conditional secularization, secularization, and the stopgap function). Dessì argues that this model is integrated in different respects. In particular, he shows that the process of global repositioning is underlain through the operation of four factors (i.e. global consciousness, resonance/affinity, decontextualization, and quest for power) that play an analogous role at the inter-religious, discrete-elements, and inter-systemic levels; and that actors within the religious system can be simultaneously affected by relativization at these three different levels, and can switch back and forth between one modality of global repositioning and another (Dessì 2016).

Still another attempt to develop a comprehensive approach to the study of religion under globalization is Tulasi Srinivas’s (2010) analysis on the Sathya Sai movement based on the four stages of cultural translation: cultural awareness and disembedding; codification and universalization; latching and matching; and contextualization and re-embedding. As Srinivas illustrates, at the beginning of this process founder Sai Baba is related to divinities from other religions worldwide and disembedded from his religious culture (Srinivas 2010: 331–5). In this ‘portable’ shape, Sathya Sai can more easily reach other cultures and be adjusted to the extent that
‘the imported cultural forms match certain desires or needs in the host society’ (Srinivas 2010: 335–8). Srinivas’s work is a fine example of how globalization theories can be operationalized, although those dynamics of religion under conditions of globalization that do not necessarily lead to overseas transplantation remain unthematized in her model.

The discussion above also suggests that there is always a certain degree of tension between ethnographic/archival work and theory in the field of religion and globalization. Indeed, the accuracy of the research depends on the extent to which it can be grounded in concrete case studies and rely on primary sources. However, this does not guarantee that the same dynamics and factors can be found at work in other religious cultures. The attempt to solve this dilemma can potentially lead to a higher level of abstractness but also (in the view of the present author, more appropriately) to a deeper engagement with a comparative approach, which is regrettably still underdeveloped in the field of the study of religion and globalization.

**Conclusion**

At the end of this chapter, it is legitimate to ask whether it is possible to clearly distinguish between the globalization of religion and its glocalization. For many scholars, glocalization and similar terms such as hybridization usually refer to the creative adaptation of global cultural elements for local use. In this sense, glocalization qualifies as being a subcategory of globalization distinct from other aspects such as functional differentiation and pluralism. However, this is not necessarily the case if one takes seriously contemporary discussions on the couple global-local. As was already suggested by Robertson in his early work, the two aspects do not oppose one another but are rather characterized by ‘simultaneity and interpenetration’ (Robertson 1995). In a similar vein, the global and the local are described as ‘interpretive frames’ (Gibson-Graham 2002) that do not refer ‘to any specifically describable spatiality’ (Dirlik 1999: 38). Indeed, if we approach the global and the local as processes and not locations, ‘globalization at work’ can only be found within the myriad practices and interactions that, at any given moment, constitute the very tissue of global society. In this broader sense, a wide range of phenomena of global religious change – such as those characterized by cultural hybridization, the functional differentiation of social systems, and adaptations to the challenges of religious pluralism – is eligible to be classified under the category of glocalization.

**Select bibliography**


Religion

PART VIII

(Trans)cultural studies

Introduction

Matthias Middell

The problematic nature of an essentialized concept of culture that is closely associated with territories has already been critically and thoroughly discussed in other places in this handbook (see the general introduction and Part III on spatial formats). Still, research on cultural history, despite legitimate concerns about equating culture with region, has made an impressive contribution to the study of transregional relations and circulations. Given it would be impossible to trace all facets of this contribution within the space of a few chapters, we have selected a few of the well-researched fields to demonstrate the advantage of adopting a transregional perspective to cultural history.

The theatre, being the topic of the chapter by Nic Leonhardt, is an important (albeit not the only) branch of the entertainment industry. In recent years, the mobility and coordination of theatre companies by specialized agencies as well as the cross-cultural exchange and transfer of repertoires has garnered attention and can be labelled truly global occurrences. Additionally, the paths taken by directors, actors, stage designers, authors, artists, and other persons involved in the creative industry are comparable to trade routes. However, global theatre is more than the mere cultural accompaniment to the seemingly more important processes of globalization. It follows its own logic and shapes the landscape of transregional cultural interactions through its hubs and through the areas impacted by its trends.

Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the exchange of specialists from various cultural sectors intensified thanks to the emergence of an entertainment industry dominated by cultural brokers, who were most often not artists but acted as agents on behalf of artists. To meet the growing demands for actors in operatic, theatrical, and variety shows, these cultural brokers formed regional, national, and even transregional organizations that allowed them to mediate exchanges across national borders and even oceans, which Antje Dietze evaluates in her chapter. Thus, these agents needed to develop familiarity with the tastes of audiences in distant parts of the world. They also had to assume the financial risks involved at a time when growing urbanization not only increased demand but also sparked competition between cities for visibility and recognition. They became trailblazers of a cultural transregionalization that reached a new level owing to the mass migration between Europe and colonial settlements, the growing traffic between the large port cities, and, after 1880, the emergence of an elite tourism to and from the various imperial capitals. Since then, this transregionalization of cultures has experienced multiple waves of expansion.
The link between theatre and place was eventually overcome by film and later television. In the meantime, books and music achieved transregional circulation much sooner as a result of book fairs and radio. This raises the issue of canon creation. For years, the contribution of literature and music in shaping and affirming national identities has been studied. Recently, however, scholars have turned their attention to the development of musical tastes transcending national borders, to audiences’ preference for film productions by certain studios, and to the popularity of some literary works beyond their place of origin – all made possible by mediums of transregional dissemination. Even here, the formation of individual and collective tastes is not a neutral process, rather it is about the creation of a canon shaped by specific, identifiable factors, that is to say the power of producers, distributors, and related industries (e.g. journalism, commissions of experts, trade fairs, and academic commentary on cultural products). David Simo’s contribution to this volume calls attention to the differing perspectives in the debate on world literature. While some argue that a work’s inclusion in a list of transregionally accepted ‘world literature’ can be taken as evidence of that work’s aesthetic quality, others deconstruct that same canon to highlight asymmetrical influences. For example, post-colonial scholars argue that the current structure of the cultural market provides for the continuation of colonial dichotomies; thus, it facilitates transregional circulation but does not promote an equitable flow of products.

This cultural transregionalization raises the following question: in which language or languages should negotiations take place? Already at the time of the French Revolution, the idea of monolingualism as an essential condition for national cohesion and popular sovereignty had been proposed. However, language-based nationalism did not take hold until the late nineteenth century, when emerging nation-states succeeded in instilling nationalist ideology through educational policy, mass markets, and institutions such as the military that promoted unity. Whereas imperial regimes of the pre-1800 era utilized language policy only to ensure administrative efficiency where multilingualism was commonplace, colonizing nations of the nineteenth century promoted a coercive policy of linguistic assimilation. Still, the stridency of these language policies varied significantly. In Africa, Great Britain only enforced mastery of English for a small elite, whereas France made French the basis of a colonial school system, albeit a rudimentary one. Consequently, any advancement of transregionalization in the context of colonization and the territorialization of empires was associated with a language policy that minimized or eliminated multilingualism. An alternative was the construction of a new language, such as Esperanto, which connected peoples of different languages without recreating asymmetries of power; but this did not prevail.

In Klaus Bochmann’s chapter, he considers the recent trends toward uniformity have involved multilateral agreements on language standards that allow for the use of new technologies for exchange (and transfer) across borders within individual world regions. At the same time, English is becoming more important as a language of communication at the gateways between regions. Its emergence as a new lingua franca is limited to populations that are multilingual and use this multilingualism to engage in transregional activities – whether in the realm of economics, research and education, culture, or politics. This leads to the coexistence of language policies that advance differing strategies for dealing with transregionality: the adoption of a single language (English), bilingualism (in which English is the lingua franca for transregional communication), and multilingualism (whereby the dominance of English is reduced).

Over the course of the nineteenth century, the circulation of transregional ideas became an issue requiring regulation. Industrialization fuelled the demand for the transformation of scientific knowledge into useable technologies, which in turn sparked controversy over proprietary rights: who owned the invention; and what was a reasonable compromise between the financial interests of inventors and those of the industrialists, so that inventors were motivated to
make new discoveries and industrialists were motivated to adopt them quickly? Growing state
regulation, in turn, fuelled the demand for bilateral or multilateral agreements with other states,
since the legal protection provided to inventors by individual states did not extend beyond the
national borders. This demand led to a transnational copyright regime, for which the 1886
Berne Convention was the prelude.

However, the transregionalization of this regime proved much more difficult to realize.
Initially, the United States refused to accede to the Berne Convention, opting instead to apply
its copyright law to the hemisphere in which it exercised a dominant influence. Equally prob-
lematic was the fact that intergovernmental agreements did not affect the internal relations of
empires. In the twentieth century, the speed of technological innovations increased the entan-
glement of Western European and North American markets and soon compelled a compromise
between members of the Berne Convention and those of the Havana Charter. By contrast, only
the decolonization and the subsequent entry of the former African and Asian colonies into the
United Nations (UN) system facilitated a gradual shift toward a genuine transregional copyright
regime. Yet, even today, how indigenous knowledge can be protected and to whom it belongs
remain subjects of much controversy.

Intellectual property rights – the focus of Hannes Siegrist’s chapter – have two distinct
mechanisms of transregionalization. The first is the extension of supranational regulation and
the creation of new spaces, in which international agreements are valid. This, in turn, involves
the transregionalization of commodity chains and of markets for creative industries. It also
allows for the integration of far-flung regions of the world into a system in which the logic of
modern capitalism is applied to intellectual works. In the case of the second mechanism, it is
about creating a space of resistance to this capitalist logic and advocating for (spiritually moti-
vated to some extent) alternative forms of ownership (i.e. collective rather than individual).
This concept of communal property, in which nothing is privatized, is not limited to Africa,
Asia, and Latin America (a theme addressed in this section and in Chapter 25 by Cottyn). The
two concepts of ownership do not occupy discrete transregional spaces, as clearly evidenced by
complaints filed by indigenous populations against assaults on biodiversity by large industries
(e.g. pharmaceuticals and large-scale agriculture). Moreover, the dividing line between these
two outlooks on property no longer coincide with the old divide between a metropole and
its colonies. In fact, the politicization of this conflict has also created transregional alliances
between producers and consumers.

The educational sector likewise has experienced multiple respatializations. In the nineteenth
century, a process of nationalization took place that gave states considerable regulatory power
over school systems within their borders. Since the 1980s, however, interest in cross-border
initiatives has increased, largely due to two processes: the growing importance of academic
mobility and the deregulation of education systems as part of the neo-liberal agenda. The latter
has had very different consequences for Ivy League universities in the United States seeking
to become global players and higher education systems in Africa, Latin America, and Asia that
have been hit hard by the decline in government spending.

To direct the flow of students, international ranking systems for institutions of higher learning
were created. It is no coincidence that the Shanghai Ranking became the most famous system,
given that it promised a rapidly growing Chinese middle class guidance in selecting the univer-
sity that would guarantee the success of the next generation. With the decline of state regulation,
new transregional approaches to public service management have been introduced that aim at
creating universal standards for higher education or, at the very least, at guaranteeing the com-
parability of university programmes and degrees offered across the globe. International organi-
zations, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, have been at the forefront of this process, which to date has failed to produce the promised global standardization of higher education. It has, however, succeeded in creating transregional spaces of higher education in which the comparability of academic standards promotes the mobility of a skilled workforce. Branch universities and the growing internationalization of faculty at many colleges have facilitated this circulation of knowledge and methodologies. This development – accompanied by providers seeking new markets for related educational materials (in book form or as Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs)) – is often described from a diffusionist perspective as the extension of existing paradigms into regions that had previously been mostly unaffected. However, an examination of the curricula makes clear that this diffusion seldom involves a process of appropriation through which intellectual imports and indigenous perspectives are creatively combined.

Claudia Baumann considers the two trends in higher education and how they produce a complex mix of universalist ambitions and post-structuralist critiques of such grand narratives. But they are also blind both to the persistence of national specificity and to local openness to transregional approaches. The result is a fragmented university landscape in relation to structural and regulatory mechanism as well as intellectual agenda. Individual universities, through their strategies of internationalization (some spanning the entire globe), are becoming actors, just like scientific associations, relevant ministries, and even employers who look to universities in search of skilled workers. To this one can add organizations for development cooperation, regional organizations such as the European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development and the African Union, UN organizations, and many others.

The fact that the transregionalization that emerges here is only around for a comparatively short time, soon replaced by new actors and their attempts at respatialization, makes it no less worthy of study. The study of transregionalization processes shares with transcultural studies an interest in border crossings, in border formation, and in mapping the geographic reach of cultural patterns. By concentrating on geographic scope, they develop a specific focus that might make it easier to observe the interplay of cultural, political, economic, and social actors across spatial formats.
Context

Theatre is commonly thought of as (a) an immobile architectural building, (b) a play, (c) drama or performance (i.e. dance, music, or opera) put on stage, (d) an art form that epitomizes a particular culture at a specific point in time, and (d) belonging to a certain local or national arena. The notion and concept of global theatre history, or transnational theatre history, critically negotiates and questions this alleged immobility, the national character, and the idea of aesthetic representation. Such a concept seeks to illuminate the mobility, border-crossing qualities, and transnational or transregional artistic and aesthetic interweavings of theatre in historical times, particularly since the ‘first phase of globalization’ in the early nineteenth century. Global theatre history, or transnational theatre history, is a fairly new field of research, having entered historical theatre and performance studies less than a decade ago. It is still being established in the scholarly discourse of theatre and performance studies, and it is slowly being incorporated into the curricula of theatre and drama departments.

The understanding of what is historical and how to write (the Greek term graphein) history depends largely on the temporal and cultural setting of societies. Against the background of increasing globalization and transnational as well as transregional mobilities, the traditional Eurocentric writing of history needs to be re-examined. Although the term ‘globalization’ was coined in the twentieth century, the economic, social, and aesthetic phenomena it describes had existed for much longer. Within the larger scientific framework of global, transnational, or transcultural studies, as well as history – which in recent years have experienced a renaissance in departments of history departments and the multitude of social sciences – the research agenda has shifted from a local or national focus toward the study of connections, transregional or transnational exchange, networks, and mobility. During the past two decades, the radical compression of space and time in the context of contemporary globalization has necessarily attracted scholarly attention. Christopher A. Bayly, in *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914* (2004), or Jürgen Osterhammel in *Die Verwandlung der Welt* (2009), to name only two important writers of global history, have reminded us of the dynamics of transnational and transregional mobilities and cultural interweavings that are characteristic of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A plethora of other economic and cultural historians, as well as the work of research centres in the humanities, particularly in Europe, have elaborated on this shifting focus, and,
by doing so, have challenged the traditional, long-standing national and local approaches to the study of culture and history defined by geographical and political borders. This transnational, or global, shift went hand in hand with increased scrutiny regarding the impact of industrialization and innovations in the transport sector, such as the construction of the first railways, or the role of the press, telegraphy, as well as of cultural mediators or diplomats. Cities, too, have increasingly attracted scholarly interest within the larger framework of transnational history and theory, because they function as hubs and contact zones for people from different social groups and cultural and geographical origins, thereby providing spaces for border-crossing markets and entertainment.

Global history and historiography is less the history of globalization than the study of the increasing importance of global networks, beginning with the early modern period. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries are particularly valuable periods to study from a global perspective, because translocal and transnational circulation and exchanges occur more frequently and on a much broader scale, facilitated and fostered by new media, technologies, and means of transport. In the late nineteenth century, for example, a reader, consumer, or theatre enthusiast could conceive of her-/himself as belonging to what Benedict Anderson (1983) calls an ‘imagined community’ – a participant in an ‘imagined world community’. Anderson describes how the distribution and commodification of the printed word enabled an increasing number of people to recognize that there were other people in other places who shared many of the same opinions or taste, but who would not be recognizable as such through mere personal contact. Ulf Hannerz goes one step further, arguing that the continual circulation of printed matter in the historical phase of the formation of nations ‘may have marked the most inclusive social space within which people could engage in a common intelligibility, and thus develop the sense of “we-ness”’ (Hannerz 1996: 21). At the same time, however, the spread of news reports and stories about other regions highlighted differences and furthered the idea of the uniqueness of one’s own nation – a dichotomy of ‘we here’ and ‘they there’. In the words of the historian Sebastian Conrad: ‘Not despite, but because globalisation around 1900 brought the political, economic and discursive order of this world of nations into disarray, it actually contributed to the boom in ideas of national distinctiveness’ (2010: 9).

In his book *The Birth of the Modern World: 1780–1914*, the British historian Christopher A. Bayly (2004) uses the formulation ‘paradox of globalization’ to describe what initially seemed to be two contradictory processes of globalization in the nineteenth century. As Bayly has it, the consolidation of borders between nation-states after the second half of the nineteenth century led to increased efforts of establishing connections, channels of mutual communication, and influence. On the one hand, the period from the mid-nineteenth century up to the First World War saw the formation of political, economic, and ideological views of the sovereign nation-state. On the other hand, there was significant global interdependency and international cooperation, as well as an awareness of the increasing and dynamic global interconnectedness. Sebastian Conrad elaborates on the ambiguity of global history:

On the one hand, one can read the emergence and development of the modern world as a ‘common history’, in which different cultures and societies constituted the modern world through their interactions and relationships, and in which homogenizing effects were observed through processes of reciprocal appropriation. On the other hand, the increasing circulation of goods, people, and ideas brought not only commonalities, but at the same time demarcations, breaks and the need for particularity.

*(Conrad 2010: 10–11)*
With regard to theatre and theatre history, this paradox or ambiguity of global history is reflected in the dual role that the theatre plays in the context of this global expansion. On the one hand, it is a place for the (aesthetic) negotiation of current and specific ideas and concepts such as nation, politics, ethnicity, and gender; on the other, it is the beneficiary and promoter of cultural mobility and dispersion.

Global theatre history: subjects of research

Where is theatre situated in these recent processes of writing history from a geographically and politically broader perspective? According to Hannerz, in the context of cultural encounters, two aspects need to be distinguished: ‘the mobility of human beings’ and ‘the mobility of meanings and meaningful forms through the media’ (Hannerz 1996: 19). This bifocal approach to cultural encounters across borders seems particularly applicable to the study of performative cultures and phenomena. To an even larger extent than literature, music, or the visual arts, theatre plays a special role in the context of this multidirectional mobility and cultural globalization. Jürgen Osterhammel begins his comprehensive history of the nineteenth century, *Die Verwandlung der Welt*, by examining an art form that is typical of this century as perhaps no other: the opera. Taking it as a starting point for his study, he asserts that from the middle of the century it began an early globalization, radiating outwards from Paris as its ‘global centre point’ (Osterhammel 2009: 28). As early as the 1830s, ‘performances of European operas took place in the Ottoman Empire’, and ‘Giuseppe Donizetti . . . was appointed as music director to the court of the Sultan of Istanbul, tasked with building a European orchestra’ (ibid.: 28ff.).

As with global history, global theatre history does not claim to study the theatre histories of the entire globe. Instead, it addresses the multidirectional mobility of theatre. The ‘global’ in global theatre history is often put into perspective and replaced by ‘transnational’ (between nations), ‘transregional’ (between areas and continents), or ‘translocal’ (between specific cities or places) movements of artistic personnel, works of art, aesthetic notions, concepts, and more.

Global theatre history does not seek to replace regional, local, or national approaches to phenomena of past theatrical cultures, but offers an additional reading adapted to the present understanding of the world as such. Technological developments, demographic changes, and the prioritizing of global identifications to national ones facilitate and demand new shifts in how we focus on the past. Against this backdrop, the research aims of global theatre history manifest themselves in the following epistemological enquiries:

- What role does theatre play in the context of the dynamics of globalization?
- Which transnational connections and networks arise through theatrical exchange, and how is such exchange motivated (e.g. politically, economically, or infrastructurally)?
- What part did theatre play in (a) processes of modernization in non-Western regions (e.g. institutionally, aesthetically, or ideologically); (b) the emergence of transnational (urban) publics; and (c) aesthetic, cultural, and institutional networks of theatre personnel on a local and translocal level?

Although many studies and publications have, for a long time, approached theatre history from perspectives other than just national or local ones – investigating parameters such as economy, gender, post-colonialism, etc. (see, e.g., Zarrilli et al. 2010) – it was not until the early twenty-first century that global theatre history began to evolve as a scholarly avenue within theatre and performance studies. The research project ‘Global Theatre Histories. Modernization, Public Spheres and Transnational Theatrical Networks 1860–1990’ in Munich advocated this approach
by discussing issues of globalization and cultural mobility in theatre history beyond national narratives and paradigms. It has now developed into the first Centre for Global Theatre History and one of its major outcomes is the first Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) on ‘Theatre and Globalization’ (Balme 2014) in 2015. At the same time, the International Research Centre ‘Interweaving Performance Cultures’, established in Berlin in 2008, addressed similar questions of interweavings and global cultural entanglements, yet from a more contemporary viewpoint.

Global theatre history relates to and is theoretically and methodologically based on concepts and perspectives from four fields: global (i.e. transnational and world) history, transnational/transcultural theory, anthropological and sociological approaches to cultural mobility (both contemporary and historical), and (historical) network analysis. The agenda of global theatre history is aligned with the teachings of transnational studies and history as illustrated above, and is often characterized by an interdisciplinary approach that also includes theories and methods of (media) anthropology, the social sciences, economy, law, and others. For the researcher, this multiperspective approach requires the consultation and consideration of highly diverse and multilingual source materials. The ongoing digitization of primary sources in libraries, archives, and collections has made corpora of archives virtually accessible to researchers worldwide. One could even argue that studying performance history from a global perspective would not be possible without digital resources.

Just as global history investigates global connections and exchanges, global theatre historiography is concerned with cultural links, interweavings, and encounters more than it is with formal and aesthetic analyses of individual works of art. In contrast to the theatre historiography, which is traditionally aligned with national or local boundaries, global theatre history focuses on transnational, regional, or even global dynamics and on the circulations of genres, institutions, ideas, actors, theatre managers, and productions that make them possible.

Although the study of historical source material and a ‘cross-reading’ of secondary literature on theatre in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries clearly illustrate the dynamics of exchange and mobility throughout the period, theatre historiography has been written from local or national perspectives for more than a century. To a larger extent than nationally oriented studies on the theatre of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries allege, theatre is transnationally mobile. Not only have performing artists travelled between cities in Europe, Asia, and the United States since the mid-nineteenth century, but theatre texts, productions, and formats have also travelled transnationally. The frequent engagements of French actress Sarah Bernhardt (1844–1923) outside France are well known; yet even before Bernhardt, the Austrian dancer Fanny Elßler (1810–84) made a name for herself in the United States, where she toured in 1841. The Australian dancer Saharet (1896–1917) appeared around the turn of the century on famous vaudeville and variety shows in Europe and America, and the Russian dancer Anna Pavlova (1881–1931) as well as the Italian actress Eleonora Duse (1858–1924) regularly toured the continents on both sides of the Atlantic. The Japanese performer Sada Yacco (1871–1946) performed in Europe as well as in Japan, and only shortly after the first publication of Henrik Ibsen’s plays and their first stage productions, they were distributed and performed in numerous other countries. The circulation of artists, as well as dramaturgical texts, stage productions, aesthetic concepts, and architectural theatre styles grew rapidly from the nineteenth century onwards. The global circulation and proliferation of theatre was essentially dependent on the available methods of transport (e.g. railway and steam ship), and the communication media of the day (e.g. newspapers, illustrated newspapers and magazines, and telegraphy). New media formats, such as the advertisement, stoked the interest in consumer products and popular entertainment. In addition to media and transportation facilities and devices spanning geographical and cultural boundaries, the dynamization of artistic exchange was linked as well to the growing
expansion of cities and the development of urban cultures, which created topographical as well as cultural spaces for theatre. The theatre and entertainment venues in the metropolises became contact zones for artists and theatre of different cultural and geographic backgrounds, and sites for introducing, among others, different forms and formats of theatrical entertainment, such as operetta, dance, vaudeville, and drama, circensic and acrobatic acts. This emergence of a differentiation in the forms of theatre can be observed in every theatre metropolis in Europe and North America as well as in cities such as Shanghai, Yokohama, Calcutta, Havana, and Buenos Aires. It is closely connected to the understanding of theatre as a commercial undertaking – a business. The concentration of urban populations and urbanization as outcomes of new industries and markets went hand in hand with the emergence of an international entertainment market, which is an important subject of global theatre historical studies.

Methodological challenges for writing global theatre historiographies

An approach to theatre history that focuses on mobility, interlacing, and exchange requires the consultation of heterogeneous sources. What makes them heterogeneous – and diffuse – is the multitude of media types and formats that reflect the diversity of media available at the time under investigation: correspondence, stationery, telegrams, brochures, business cards, picture postcards, contracts, theatre programmes, newspapers, photographs, biographies, passports, and passenger lists. Digitization plays an eminently important role in the exploration of the boundaries of cross-border connections. Over the last decades, the collections of libraries, private collections, and companies in different parts of the world have been digitized and made accessible to the public through digitization measures. Nowadays, digital databases enable researchers to work transnationally and transtemporally and to retrieve their data within a much shorter space of time than ever before.

Methodologically, global (transnational) theatre history is characterized by an interdisciplinary approach that demands the consultation of (digital) newspaper archives and ancestry databases; requires an increased awareness of the structure of archives and provenance as well as competent multilingual language skills; and benefits from a collaborative way of working. As mentioned above, a global history approach to theatre history moves away from a national historiography with an aesthetic focus by instead considering issues such as theatre economies and trade routes, mobility and mobilization (of theatre practitioners, concepts, and business models), institutionalization (of theatres in non-Western regions); the intertwining of theatre with social practices, modernization tendencies, and new aesthetic configurations; and the understanding of theatre as a constituent of transnational (urban) publics. Research in this field is characterized by a search for less obvious connections and hidden traces – that is to say, the investigation of transfers and circulation of models, concepts, relationships, objects, and actors in different directions, be they temporal, spatial, or intellectual. It also identifies a detailed and comparative study of transnational human mobility, taking into account its physical, infrastructural, and institutional conditions of movement (see Greenblatt 2010); a careful analysis of the historical context (of the researcher and the research subject); an exploration of social connections, channels, and flows of capital, goods, information, concepts, and images; as well as a critical enquiry into colonial and political agendas.

Exemplary case studies

Considering the mobility and variability of cultures, historical network research has in recent years focused on researching networks between persons and institutions. The connection lines
and intersections between instances were analysed with the help of digital technologies and visualizations. Christopher B. Balme, in his research on global networks, investigates the British theatrical agent and impresario Maurice E. Bandmann and discusses the theatrical circuit and transnational activities of this mediator through the use of disparate source material (Balme 2014; Leonhardt 2015b).

Not expressly embedded in a discourse about global theatre history, but nevertheless relevant in the context of cultural mobility and cultural encounters, is Frederik Schodt’s 2012 investigation of the impresario Professor Risley: Professor Risley and the Imperial Japanese Troupe: how an American acrobat introduced circus to Japan – and Japan to the West. Schodt traces the travels of the American impresario and his Japanese acrobatic troops and explains the organization and financing of his undertakings in America and Japan.

In Transatlantic Broadway: the infrastructural politics of global performance (2015), theatre historian Marlis Schweitzer offers a historicization of the transatlantic infrastructural conditions of theatre around the turn of the century. She pays explicit attention to New York City’s Broadway theatre, which was in constant exchange with the European continent from the late nineteenth century until the early twentieth century. By applying Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory, Schweitzer uses the infrastructures of theatre ‘for thinking about how objects both facilitated the expanding transnational trade in theatrical commodities at the turn of the twentieth century and functioned as actors themselves in the multiple actor-networks that extended across the Atlantic Ocean’ (Schweitzer 2015: 11; Leonhardt 2018).

In studying documents such as newspapers and theatre journals from the nineteenth century, it is surprising that the amount of travelling on the part of those engaged in the cultural sector should be so great in these early years of global transport. The theatre plays a special role in the context of this multidirectional mobility and cultural globalization of the nineteenth century. Stages and theatres in metropoles around the world became contact zones for artists from different cultural, geographical, and professional backgrounds and origins. Their programmes were multifaceted and awakened the interest of theatre directors in other cities and countries, who travelled far to see for themselves the newest performances, about which they had read in newspapers.

Transnational historical comparisons with theatre and dance have often occurred in fields outside of theatre studies. Historians focusing on metropolitan cultures have frequently highlighted the translocal or transnational relationships and interdependencies between different cultural metropoles in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The exploration of the lively exchange between the European cities and New York in the musical theatre sector around the turn of the century, for example, has mainly been conducted by Tobias Becker, David Linton and Len Platt. In The Popular Musical Theater in London and Berlin, 1890–1939 (2014), they discuss the exchange of repertoire, the staff, and the influence of the music theatre on the local cultures of the cities of Vienna, Paris, Budapest, London, and New York, all of them connected through a transnational network. Becker et al., for example, explore the cities of London and Berlin from a comparative perspective that contributes ‘not only to our knowledge of the theatre history of this period’, but also ‘to our understanding of the wider cultural histories of these cities. Perhaps even more importantly, it sheds new light on European cultural relations’ (Becker, Linton and Platt 2014: 2). Musical theatre is one of the most important popular cultural forms of the nineteenth century, which in turn promoted the modernization of the theatre, by repertoire and form and by the promotion of new urban architectural forms, organizational structures, and the administration of the theatre (see Yamomo 2018).
Global theatre history

Outlook

It is to be expected that the research field of global (transnational) theatre history will be expanding even further in the decade to come. The revision of theatre history – against the background of a closer study of cultural entanglements and interweavings that takes mobility and infrastructural politics of the performing arts into account – is expected to also forge closer connections with related disciplines such as history of music, art, literature, media and film, and even law and economics.

Select bibliography

The figure of the cultural broker or mediator has gained remarkable prominence in transregional studies as well as in transnational and global history over the last decades. It has been used to study all kinds of cultural entanglements, ranging from early modern cultural encounters and exploration to the formation of colonial empires as well as of post-colonial nation-states. They also include the co-evolution of civilizations or national cultures, the circulation of knowledge, and social relations in culturally diverse societies. Thus far, across the diversity of research fields, no consolidated usage or systematic differentiation of the terms ‘mediator’ or ‘broker’ – and also intermediary, go-between, passeur, Vermittler, etc. – has been developed. However, all those notions point to a facilitating role in transmission or transaction and thus to the basic function of those individuals or groups in different kinds of interactions. These interactions would not take place, or would at least face great difficulties, without their support.

The term ‘broker’ invokes a background in trade relations. It was originally used to describe a middleman between buyer and seller who serves as an agent, a retailer, or more broadly as the facilitator of a deal. ‘Mediator’ indicates the more general role of a medium (from Latin: ‘middle’), meaning an agency or substance that intervenes to make communication and exchange possible in physical, technical, or social relations (Williams 1985: 203–4).

Among those brokers and mediators, we find translators, merchants, diplomats, engineers, missionaries, intellectuals, administrators, educators, artists, and many others. In transregional studies, investigating the role of these actors has allowed scholars to take a detailed look at how exactly entanglements of regions emerge and evolve, what conditions and practices enable them, and how they impact communities and societies. Empirical research on the concrete agents, infrastructures, institutions, and mechanisms of interaction and exchange has been instrumental in attempts at overcoming methodological nationalism and Eurocentrism, as well as abstract notions of diffusion within, beyond, and between regions. The perspective on brokers and mediators has thus not only helped to explore previously overlooked kinds of actors and their arenas of activity, but also to fundamentally reconfigure concepts and narratives of regionalization and transregional interaction.

This chapter will first give an overview of research on brokerage and mediation in different transregional and transnational constellations. It underlines that mediators do not merely operate between different cultures, but that they also engage in a diversity of spatial arrangements and carve out arenas of action in which new cultural practices and boundaries are produced.
Second, it will turn toward a more general discussion of the different aspects of mediation as a complex field of activity that should not be narrowed down to connection and transmission. Last, this contribution will examine the difficulties that remain in connecting individual agency and structural changes that occur by way of transregional interaction.

**Brokers and mediators in different transregional and transnational constellations**

Cultural brokerage has not been studied systematically across world regions, historical periods, or spatial scales. The following examples from different strands of the fragmented empirical research show how brokers and mediators became necessary to arrange contact, provide access and information, translate, conduct negotiations, and facilitate transactions in various transregional or transnational constellations. In many cases, the figure of the broker or mediator has, in addition, served to revisit existing research concepts and narratives in the respective field, and has even become an element in profound shifts of notions of culture, on the one hand, and of transregional interaction, on the other.

Cultural mediation research has diverse origins in studies of the long history of cultural interaction. Some of the most influential approaches have been developed in anthropology and have travelled to other disciplinary contexts from there. Brokers started to attract considerable interest from anthropologists in the 1950s and 1960s in their research on the nationalization of societies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, in particular in the course of decolonization (Wolf 1956; Geertz 1960). A new social function emerged as religious leaders, teachers, unionists, entrepreneurs, and community leaders brokered relations between the nation-state and the local community. These brokers were ‘Janus-like’ (Wolf 1956: 1076), turning in two directions at once, becoming specialists in mediating the interests and expectations of both sides and thus facilitating the social integration of complex societies on different levels. In the context of modernization and development theories, they were often conceptualized as transitional figures in the process of social integration and the emergence of the modern nation-state. This perspective has helped to move anthropological research beyond its focus on the internal structures of bounded communities toward the ways in which communities become integrated into larger systems (Lindquist 2015).

Another influential field of cultural mediator research is situated at the intersection of history and anthropology. Studies on the role of brokers in early contact and colonial peripheries in the Americas, in particular, had a profound impact on historiographical narratives and concepts of regional interaction. Since the 1980s, researchers in this field have become increasingly aware of relatively unknown and marginal figures who pioneered and facilitated encounters and conflicts between Europeans and indigenous groups. These brokers served as guides and informants, traders, interpreters, and negotiators, and they could come from either side of the encounter. Studying them has allowed for a better understanding of how cultural encounters were possible and unfolded and has also been led by a fascination for these adventurous personalities acting ‘between’ cultures (Connell-Szasz 1994).

As research moved on from encounters of individuals or small groups to larger historical arenas and longer processes of intermediation, it revealed wider ambivalence and contradictions in concepts of cultures and in dichotomies of self and other. Notions of brokerage between self-contained cultures and of cultural boundary crossing were gradually replaced by a stronger focus on the situation of brokerage as a theatre of complex and innovative cultural practices (Hinderaker 2002). While in first encounters, cultural differences and boundaries might have been more obvious, regular exchanges or prolonged coexistence – for example, in trade
networks, settler colonies, and in contexts of slavery and forced migration such as the Black Atlantic – created arenas of intermediation where interactions became routinized or institutionalized, leading to new cultural forms and practices and to the formation of mixed populations. From notions of the frontier as a moving boundary of westward expansion, the focus shifted to the space and time of interaction that was an arena not only of violence and displacement, but also of native agency and mutual accommodation.

A classic example is Richard White’s ‘middle ground’ of the Great Lakes region (1991), where, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Algonquians and French cooperated as trading partners and allies in a situation of co-dependence and continuous mediation. These were not relations between two coherent cultures; the cultural world that had existed before the encounter, White argues, had already been destroyed by then. From the remaining fragments as well as through interaction, Native Americans and Europeans created a new culture of shared meanings and practices. The middle ground is, however, not only a concept of cultural co-creation, but also a specific historical space that results from it. It relied on a certain balance of power and on blurred boundaries in the Great Lakes region and started to disappear in the Age of Revolution, with the transition from imperial rivalries to competing nation-states.

This research has re-evaluated concepts of colonial history and European expansion. It reveals that mediation practices could constitute specific times and spaces of dynamic cultural change beyond a colonizer/colonized binary, and that they have not necessarily led to cultural assimilation. Focusing especially on the complexities of sustained contact of different indigenous, European, and African groups in colonial Latin America, Serge Gruzinski (2001) highlights the fact that thinking of their interactions in terms of distinct, coherent cultures, or dichotomies of European and indigenous peoples dramatically reduces our ability to analyse those processes. Not only are both sides diverse with regard to local, regional, social, family, and other ties, but the cultures and identities are also formed through relations and interaction. Cultural métissage is not just a transitory phase before the restoration of a new order; it challenges one to develop new thinking on cultural and ethnic mixing. Therefore, Gruzinski argues for a closer investigation of the mechanisms of exchange, entanglement, and intermediation by looking at passeurs culturels, who operate in spaces of intermediation with moving cultural and ethnic boundaries.

Both the middle ground and métissage are concepts developed from a specific historical and regional perspective, and they do not necessarily lend themselves to generalization in other contexts. However, they were important steps in the wake of a thorough revision of concepts of culture in anthropology and other disciplines. This shift was inspired by the critique of holistic notions of culture in anthropology and by contemporary debates on multicultural societies and cultural hybridity from a post-colonial perspective.

Cultural brokers and mediators have also started to play a larger role in transnational and transregional history. Since the 1980s, and more so the 1990s, historians have promoted a move away from writing history within the confines of the nation-state. To this end, for example, attention shifted toward cultural interactions between societies and civilizations, such as long-distance trade, migration, the exchange of knowledge or technology, religious missions, and colonial campaigns.

In American world history, the notion of ‘cultural encounter’ became prominent (Bentley 1993) and inspired studies on the mechanisms of transregional interaction and on the syncretism resulting from it. A larger debate opened regarding the growing relevance of external relations for the development of societies and regions. In addition, the argument gained ground that interactions between regions and civilizations should not primarily be researched from the perspective of the West or in terms of diffusion. The notion of cultural encounter has been
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one aspect in a renewed interest in the field of historiography toward transregional processes. A parallel, very influential strand that places the agents of these exchanges at the centre of analysis was the intercultural transfer approach (see Chapter 5 by Dietze and Middell). It was developed in France in the 1980s by historians and literary scholars Michel Espagne and Michael Werner (1987). They analysed how elements of German culture were selected, reinterpreted, and legitimized in France during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The point here was to reverse assumptions of cultural influence and diffusion from one dominant or higher developed culture to another, and instead to look at how mediating actors in the receiving context constructed references to other cultures to serve their own purposes and interests. Examples are the brokering role of Heinrich Heine in Paris, the reception and reinterpretation of the works of Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Hegel in France, and the mediating activities of printers, teachers, translators, and intellectuals in general.

Cultural mediators not only facilitate exchanges between cultures but also actively shape and influence these interactions in multiple ways. They become participants in the production of culture and the continuous construction and reinterpretation of cultural boundaries in the co-evolution of nation-states. Espagne and Werner call attention to cycles of cultural transfer, meaning an ebb and flow of intercultural exchanges. The need for foreign cultural references can grow and wane, or it can shift in other directions. Another possible end of a cultural transfer can come when the foreign cultural elements have been fully appropriated and incorporated, not being perceived as foreign anymore. No more mediation is needed until the next transfer and reinterpretation cycle starts.

The cultural transfer approach has generally contributed to a better understanding of the external entanglements and internal heterogeneity of cultures. This was further explored in studies on multilingual and multicultural societies, such as Belgium in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Verschaffel et al. 2014), and in a variety of other national, regional, and urban contexts. Cultural transfer studies have thus moved from transfers between distinct cultures toward multipolar cultural settings in which mediators play a multiplicity of roles in diverse networks and spatial constellations.

Historical studies of cultural encounters and intercultural transfers have paved the way for studies on brokers or go-betweens and transboundary biographies, which played an increasingly transformative role in transnational and transregional history. Some striking examples come from the fields of imperial and colonial history. In new imperial history, since the mid-1990s, the investigation of mobile biographies has been used to promote a revised concept of the British Empire that goes beyond a dichotomy of metropolitan centre and colonial periphery toward an understanding of imperial space as a dynamic and heterogeneous network. People with imperial careers moved along these interconnections, mediated between multiple sites, and thus played an important part in sustaining the imperial web (Lambert 2014). This perspective has inspired research on other imperial constellations, such as the multiethnic and multinational continental empires of Russia and Austria-Hungary (Buchen and Rolf 2015), followed by the study of interimperial mobility and comparisons among empires.

Go-betweens and colonial intermediaries are now seen as indispensable for the history of colonialism and imperialism owing to the fact that they enabled conquests and colonial governance, long-distance trade, and cultural exchanges. Western explorers were only able to undertake their expeditions with the help of indigenous guides, interpreters, porters, and other local experts (for Australia and Oceania, see Konishi, Nugent and Shellam 2015). Brokers thoroughly shaped the production and circulation of knowledge in imperial and national settings, from the late Enlightenment through the early nineteenth century (Schaffer et al. 2009).
Informants, agents, merchants, and administrators across the Atlantic, South Asian, and Pacific regions played a crucial role in the construction of modern science. Through their practice, modern science emerged not as a diffusion from the West but as the result of a co-production in imperial interactions and circulations. It was profoundly shaped and redirected by local and non-Western expertise and by the capacity of brokers to define, select, and adapt objects of knowledge; to frame, package, and circulate them; and to influence technical innovations, business strategies, and common standards in cartography, astronomy, botany, engineering, translation, and so on. Cultural brokers are thus not representations of the other but are figures of interaction (Schaffer et al. 2009: xiv) in a globally connected modern world as a ‘brokered world’.

At the turn of the nineteenth century, Western colonial and national institutions were gradually taking over some brokerage functions. The role of individual brokers became obscured and erased from memory in the development of modern science, imperial museums, and universal exhibitions. But intermediaries did continue to exist in transnational and transimperial constellations, and in all kinds of overlaps between the two. Governance by go-betweens such as civil servants also played an important internal role, from colonial statehood to decolonization (Lawrance, Osborn and Roberts 2006), being then taken over by the above-mentioned nation–community brokers.

Overall, these studies reveal a complicated picture of cultural interaction, in which both intra- and intercultural mediation practices can create new historical spaces and cultural repertoires and become drivers of transregional interaction. However, in discovering more, and larger, zones and processes of intermediation, from individual encounters to contact zones to hybrid societies, one risks being left with an abstract notion of generalized mediation under the global condition – or of a universal celebration of all that is transgressive, hybrid, and mobile.

In fact, brokers are not always needed or welcome in cultural relations. The examples have shown that their role can be highly restricted or come to an end if the conditions for mediation cease to exist, or if the forms of interaction change. In those cases, the mediators, as well as the zones of intermediation, disappear after a while. Moreover, for the individuals and groups that engage in brokerage, this is often only one role among others, or a temporary engagement. Their forms and strategies of mediation differ according to the mode of transregional interaction and to their own particular positions in each historical and regional setting. Mediation has been described as a transitory phase in the entangled development of societies or as a fundamental aspect of cultural relations that is constantly changing its form and function.

Mediation and brokerage: into the middle of things

Studies on cultural brokers and mediators have had a strong empirical focus, over time leading to a reorientation of concepts of culture. These have evolved from an analysis of encounters between distinct cultures and their representatives to a performative understanding of culture that takes the situation of brokerage as the point of departure and analyses how it becomes an arena for the production of new cultural practices and boundaries. Cultural mediator research has, however, been very little connected to insights from media theory. This section briefly introduces overlapping, and sometimes contradictory, usages of the terms ‘medium’ and ‘mediation’ while showing how they relate to the field of transregional mediation practices.

The different meanings of the term ‘mediation’ stem from varying historical usages and philosophical traditions. Cultural theorist Raymond Williams lists the most common uses:

(1) the political sense of intermediary action designed to bring about reconciliation or agreement; (2) the dualist sense, of an activity which expresses, either indirectly or
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deviously and misleadingly (and thus often in a falsely reconciling way), a relationship between otherwise separated facts and actions and experiences; (3) the formalist sense, of an activity which directly expresses otherwise unexpressed relations.

(Williams 1985: 206)

The first meaning is most commonly used today in reference to mediators in conflict resolution; however, it also applies to diplomats and go-betweens in general and to interpreters in negotiations, such as those between Europeans and indigenous groups in early modern cultural contact. The second usage points to mediation (Vermittlung) as a basic concept in philosophical thought, especially in idealism and Marxism. It refers to the interaction – and possible dialectical reconciliation – of opposites. In this context, the notion of mediation has also been used to emphasize indirect, and thus potentially false and misleading, relations. Along these lines, one of the central issues around cultural mediation has been that the medium or mediating agent – as the above-cited ‘intervening agency or substance’ – both connects and divides the two sides of the transaction. This fundamental ambivalence has maintained much of the fascination with cultural brokers.

Brokers and go-betweens were often seen as untrustworthy. The suspicion that they could distort the message, take sides, or pursue their own agenda has been consistently found in historical sources. Mediation does not merely mean transporting something from sender to receiver, or from one culture to another; it also includes actively shaping and redirecting the transaction. In this process, the mediated is translated, adapted, appropriated, and transformed – sometimes beyond recognition. Mediation is a relation that produces differences because it includes spacing and displacement (Mersch 2016: 651). It does not only foster connection and exchange, but, as every form of cultural contact, also plays an important part in (re)drawing the boundaries between spaces, societies, and cultures.

Brokers could produce divisions and exclusions as they used their intermediary position to disconnect networks, prevent transfers, or filter and control what could enter and be admitted into a given society or social arena. They might actively keep spaces and contexts separated and preserve differences in order to be able to mediate between them. By reducing or fuelling the tensions between spaces, they actively shaped their own position and function in this constellation.

Some studies on transregional brokerage illustrate this point by using Georg Simmel’s reflections on formal sociology. He analysed the triad as a social form in which the intermediary as the third element not only facilitates an agreement but can also take sides, gain power over the other parties, and even dominate or divide them for his or her own benefit (Simmel 1950 [1908]: 145–69). Such a view is especially useful when studying brokers in situations of conflict or in power asymmetries, for instance in colonial settings.

This growing sense of the agency of the mediator in the process of mediation provides a gradual transition to the third meaning of mediation, which is not dualistic (or triadic) but performative. In this view, mediation does not play out through a more or less neutral instance between opposing concepts or forces; instead, the interaction is direct and material, taking on its own form and substance and transforming that which is mediated (Williams 1985: 205–6). Approaches such as the co-production of a culture of encounter in White’s middle ground, or the co-production of knowledge in the interaction of European and indigenous peoples during explorations, would be examples of this. They are part of a shift in research toward a concept of mediation as a process that is not situated in an abstract in-between or beyond but which occurs by means of tangible, material practices (Mersch 2016: 673).

Focusing on mediation implies analysing a process of communication from its middle, not the ends. This perspective has gradually led to an understanding of intermediaries as potential
change agents who engage in the production of culture and of cultural boundaries, who might become builders of spaces of interaction.

**Systems of intermediation and brokered worlds**

One of the fundamental problems of cultural mediation research is how to deal with the tension between the agency of individual mediators and the larger influence they have — or do not have — on social and cultural change. Brokers often operate at the margins of societies: they are from mixed heritage or ethnic minority groups, located in specialized milieus or peripheral areas. This is one reason why they have been overlooked; they did not seem to be lead characters in the dominant narratives about nation-states, empires, or regional development.

Yet, it is hard to reconcile this observation on the fragility and marginal status of mediating agents with their supposed fundamental impact on modes of interaction, the co-evolution of cultures, and the construction of spaces. As they had remained hidden for a long time, there is now the danger of overestimating these intermediaries’ role in transregional social structures and spaces. Therefore, a methodically sound way of analysing different types of intermediation is needed, also considering their boundedness in space and time.

After an initial phase in research was dedicated to the discovery of brokers and fuelled by a fascination with their complexities and ambivalences, there has been a general shift from micro-studies of individuals and mediating groups to more systematic assessments in wider contexts. These studies try to grasp the impact brokers have had on societies as well as their transregional entanglements. An important element in this is investigating the conditions, infrastructures, institutions, and perceptions of mediation. This had already been part of earlier approaches that suggested focusing on the social history of mediators and the way they built lasting structures of connection and intermediation.

The field of cultural transfer studies, for instance, has gradually widened the focus to include larger and more varied groups of mediators and their growing networks of exchange in order to follow the professionalization and institutionalization of mediation practices and to understand cultural transfer as multilateral process (Espagne and Werner 1987). Another example is research on cultural translation in early modern Europe, which likewise places emphasis on the way mediators are integrated into historically changing ‘regimes’ or ‘cultures of translation’, characterized by certain conditions, rules, and effects of translation (Burke 2007: 11). Translators have played a fundamental role in the circulation of knowledge, and thus in larger cultural shifts such as the Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, and Scientific Revolution.

Such endeavours strongly resonate with recent considerations in global and transnational history to overcome abstract notions of connection and circulation in favour of a stronger focus on the specific mechanisms of entanglements on multiple scales. Focusing on transnational or transregional actors — and investigating their biographies in larger social and spatial contexts — has been among the most widespread methods of tracing relations across spatial boundaries.

These agents have become part of sets of connections that form specific ‘systems of intermediation’ (Saunier 2013: 44). More generally, they have helped to establish stable conditions, patterns, and spaces of circulation or ‘circulatory regimes’ (ibid.: 59). Applied to cultural intermediaries as specific types of transregional actors, this would mean not only focusing on the way they act between cultures but also examining the opportunity structures and forms of social integration and public recognition that allow them to achieve significant impact upon societies and communities.

Moreover, looking at the systems of intermediation and brokered worlds that mediators build and inhabit provides a direct link to reflections about the construction of regions and of
transregional relations. As the above-mentioned examples from different research fields show, cultural brokers can, under certain circumstances, play an essential role in the emergence and transformation of historical spaces of interaction. However, not only are we still lacking consistent definitions and typologies of mediators across different eras and locations, but comparisons of those various forms and spaces of intermediation are also still rare.

This makes it hard to bring the fragmented research strands about a diversity of transregional constellations into conceptual dialogue or to integrate them into a larger historical narrative. Mediating actors have each been embedded in entanglements of different kinds of spaces: localities, regions, imperial, and national spaces as well as transboundary networks, which formed historically changing and regionally different sociospatial orders (Dietze and Naumann 2018). Describing these different settings from a spatial perspective could help to differentiate and relate various modalities of mediation and the particular forms of ‘culture’ involved.

Starting from the middle – the workings and mechanisms of brokerage in different spatial constellations – provides a detailed understanding of regionalization and transregional interaction without necessarily presupposing certain kinds of relations, hierarchies, or trajectories. That is why studies of mediators and systems of intermediation have been so useful not only in analysing the historical emergence and transformation of regional entanglements, but also in revisiting assumptions about conquest or diffusion, about Western dominance or intercultural relations, or about the prevalence of certain spatial orientations, such as national and colonial ones. This research includes a dual aspect: it gives insights into the often messy and ambivalent agendas and practices of historical actors who enabled and influenced transregional interaction, and assigns them a function as main characters in changing the narratives and concepts of an entangled world.

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Throughout the lifespan of the short twentieth century, tidal waves of sounds hitherto unheard of swept through a rapidly globalizing world – disturbing, exciting, and potentially endangering seemingly calm waters. These waves mostly originated in the USA or in Great Britain. Their impact lessened with the distance they crossed, but at least some ripples would reach nearly every corner of the inhabited world. At times, their impact created reverberations, whether in the form of sources incorporating foreign material, or in the form of the original impulse, transforming and flowing back.

It has become commonplace to state that orchestral and concert music as an art form has been particularly affected by processes of globalization since the nineteenth century (Müller and Osterhammel 2012) – an approach that sometimes overshadows the fact that the geographic distribution of composers/producers, performers, and audiences mirrored global power relations in the age of imperialism and culturalist hierarchies (Said 1991). The same has been said for pop music as a transnationally produced and globally distributed commodity (Laing 1986; Garofalo 1993). It has sometimes been noted that music as an agent of (sub)cultural communitization as well as collective and individual identity building has never been so strong as in the ‘long sixties’, when some forms of popular music were way more than just a simple background noise to the ‘cultural revolution’ that has been diagnosed for the years between 1958 and 1974.

Although the last couple of years have been marked by an increasing number of sometimes excellent studies on youth cultures and/or the music they listened to, in most cases the reasons and ways in which music and revolt interconnected – the ways in which the changing mode of the music actually shook the walls of the city – are left aside. Furthermore, studies on the development of musical modes themselves too often neglect the social and cultural conditions and effects of such developments.

But while the musical idioms touched upon – European art music and pop music – claimed (and claim) universal significance, with the intention to distribute them globally, this was not originally the case with the musical idioms discussed here. Although transregional in nature and exceedingly transnational in their reception and practice – as most folk music forms were – they developed from local and regional, sometimes ethnically and socially contingent, albeit always hybrid musical practices (cf. for the USA Nettl 1962, or for a seemingly unambiguous idiom like Irish folk music Ó Hallmhuráin 2017). It was actually this very birthmark that made it possible for subcultures (typically obsessed with authenticity as opposed to sociocultural alienation)
to claim these musical idioms as their own and thus make them significant, thereby enabling their development and differentiation.

The last couple of years have witnessed an ever increasing number of sometimes excellent studies on youth cultures in Europe and Northern America, mostly focusing on the ‘long sixties’ and emphasizing a major sociocultural shift at least in the Western industrialized countries – a shift sometimes labelled as a ‘cultural revolution’ (Hobsbawm 1994: 287–343; Marwick 2000). Eastern Europe seems excluded from this development, as – according to most studies – stubborn communist bureaucracies blocked the influx of the new ‘sounds of freedom’ as long as they could and prevented a similar sociocultural development until the breakdown of state socialism in 1989 (Starr 1983; Pickhan and Ritter 2016). The same goes for the Tricont – the term used at the time for the continents of Africa, Asia, and Latin America – which is at best appreciated as a source and inspiration for musical ideas, but not as a playground for often very similar sociocultural – and musical – developments.

This master narrative not only downplays the cultural change that actually also occurred in the East and its specific contexts, while neglecting efforts to prevent this change in the West, it also disregards striking similarities. Concerning music, it ascribes some strangely intrinsic qualities that were not innate to it. Jazz (and later rock) did not simply ‘develop’ naturally and inevitably from ethnic (although hybrid) folk music into dance and pop music, and then finally into an art form or into the ‘music of freedom’. It was made so on a performative and a discursive level. Its development depended on actors, their spaces of experience, and horizons of expectation. Contexts and actions were both highly transregional. The main concern of the following pages will thus be to outline how and why certain kinds of music were attributed an unprecedented social and cultural significance from the Jazz Age until the late 1970s, at least in the North Atlantic world. This chapter will also look at how its appeal changed significantly, when jazz, and later rock, were transformed from scandalons into art forms.

**Hybrid origins and significations**

What we know today as jazz was born when socioethnic musical practices from the rural south of the USA were transferred to northern industrial cities, most specifically to Chicago, to satisfy the recreational desires of black Americans who had migrated there. In a very short time, this kind of musical practice, relying heavily on syncopated, very danceable rhythmic concepts and on collective melodic improvisation, found interested parties that its creators had not expected: white audiences who longed for the authenticity and intensity they found in the often shady clubs where members of the black community would dance and pass their leisure time. With that came a group of – also mostly white, often Jewish – musical entrepreneurs that hired these musicians for recordings. These records not only rendered jazz tranethnic, they also made it transregional. Jazz records were distributed everywhere in the USA and after 1918 in Europe, where they were copied and adapted immediately – most notably in the Soviet Union after the civil war, where it became one of the musical expressions of modernity, often played by Jewish musicians who were used to improvisation in Klezmer (Starr 1983), and in France, where musicians such as Django Reinhardt combined what they heard from American musicians with Balkan musical languages that also included improvisation. French dance orchestras adopted jazz as biguine, a style developed in the French Caribbean and then reimported into the USA (Balen 2003; Jackson 2003). In Cuba, Afro-Cuban musical forms combined native music and jazz following the 1920s to a style then adopted by swing and bebop era composers and jazz-rock (Acosta 2003). Even in Turkey – to add a less commonly known example – traditional and classically trained musicians embraced playing and composing techniques up to a point that
made them interesting for US players such as Don Cherry as early as 1969 (Anderson 2007; Zaborowska 2009) – not to mention that Turkey-born Nesuhi Ertegün in the 1940s and 1950s became one of the foremost producers and promoters of new jazz styles in the USA.

In its perceived authenticity and intensity, jazz became popular with white – and non-American – audiences, which fostered its production and distribution on a mass scale and enticed professional musicians who had not yet played this kind of music to copy and perform it. In this process, jazz changed in several ways, the most obvious transformation being the transition from small ensembles to big bands that entertained bigger audiences and played sheet music instead of improvising collectively. For the musicians, this transition was ambivalent: though they could play more often and were better paid, they did not necessarily play what they liked. The satisfaction of a yearning for ecstatic authenticity and immediacy from a musical idiom that seemed to initiate ecstatic communitarization, actually separated the musical actors from their public – very much like the enlargement and professionalization of the orchestra had done in the nineteenth century (Jardin 2006; Wilf 2014). The relative alienation of the musicians from the music with which they earned their living increased the significance of the jam, the jazz version of informal gatherings where musicians came together after their gigs to play the music they liked for a public consisting of musicians and connoisseurs. More often than not, the atmosphere and mode of these sessions, which were nearly exclusively dominated by male actors, were highly competitive, which induced a new dialect in the jazz language. The integration of ever more complicated chord progressions and faster rhythms in some of the central jam venues of New York encouraged an emphasis on virtuosity and individualism instead of collectivity (DeVeaux 1997). Containing much of the intensity and passion of traditional jazz, the new style – bebop – was contested by some critics, such as the New Orleans revivalists, as a deviation, while younger critics, including Leonard Feather and Marshall Stearns, hailed it as a new, authentically American art form (Sidran 1981; DeVeaux 1997; Gennari 2006). This interpretation was also claimed by a new generation of black, self-conscious musicians, resulting in a transition in jazz venues from nightclubs to European and American concert halls.

This revaluation of jazz corresponded to its discursive significance: although bebop was from its very start in the USA practised by black and white musicians alike, and although it integrated European (i.e. white) musical concepts to a great extent, it was very soon defined as an essentially black form of musical art (Carles and Comolli 1971; Gennari 2006). With this came an additional loss of immediacy and intensity. Cool jazz, which started with Miles Davis and Gil Evans’ Birth of the Cool in 1957, was to be listened to, not danced to; it was designed to be performed in concert halls, not clubs; it concentrated on artistic introspection rather than expressions of anger and sorrow; it developed jazz suites and chamber jazz, bringing jazz very close to the attitudes of the classical concert as it had developed in the nineteenth century (Bödeker et al. 2002). Through the change in the places and modes of its performance, jazz also lost every erotic or wild connotation it had once included, and its musical material was changed. Cool jazz integrated musical motives and practices from European and American symphonic music (cf. Davis’ “Flamenco Sketches” from his seminal 1959 album Kind of Blue, or the music of the Dave Brubeck Quintet) and was the first form of jazz dominated by white players and composers. From there, jazz was further distanced from its ecstatic, popular beginnings. The following modal jazz used approaches of non-harmonic, modal melodic development familiar to Indian classical music instead of playing repetitive chord sequences. This shift simultaneously indicated a claim to be recognized as serious musical artists and a renunciation of Western alienation by orienting itself toward Eastern spirituality and/or toward black revolutionary radicalism. Since 1960, ‘the new thing’ completely abandoned Western rhythmic, melodic, and harmonic structures, and instead initiated an immediate improvisational exchange between the musicians.
By then jazz had lost its appeal to white, as well as black, mass audiences, who shifted to rhythm and blues and rock ‘n’ roll, musical styles that started not as informal, orally transmitted musical practices but as conscious efforts to combine popular black and white elements into new musical commodities. Interestingly, rock ‘n’ roll in particular went through very similar transformations, which we cannot discuss here in detail. That being said, similar to jazz, it very quickly transformed itself and adapted to other musical idioms, especially after the main creative centre of exciting new popular music had shifted from the USA to Great Britain with the advent of beat music in the early 1960s. Interestingly, it was at that moment and in its British form that rock ‘n’ roll became respectable in the eyes of true practitioners and aficionados of ‘authentic’ musical styles that until then had restricted themselves to American folk music styles, especially after lyricist and singer Bob Dylan embraced blues rock and went electric in 1964 (Marcus 2005). The effect was, again, the introduction of rock ‘n’ roll into concert halls. In the second half of the 1960s, pop and especially rock music followed the footsteps of the now respected jazz players, when musicians and critics emphasized musical genius and virtuosity, absorbing any musical idiom that was deemed musically exciting and authentic enough to get involved in a development initiated already by the success of the Beatles as teenage idols and acknowledged artists. Ironically, it was specifically the psychedelic rock of the hippy culture that – though it aimed at creating communal experiences through music, drugs, and sex – actually made the public musically passive, and thus reinforced the barrier between the musician as an artist and the musician as a genius. This was especially the case with the advent of improvisation-based groups such as The Jimi Hendrix Experience or Cream.

As cool jazz had followed bebop, groups including Keith Emerson’s group Nice and later Emerson, Lake & Palmer integrated European classical and modernist material into art rock. Like in jazz, a major driving force were musicians frustrated by the music with which they earned their living, and a developing criticism of rock that introduced and defined standards that tended to equate complexity/originality and virtuosity with quality and authenticity. By this time, rock was established as a form of musical art that had little or nothing to do with its scandalous beginnings. At the same time and under the conditions of a now globalized quest for exciting and authentic material, some Tricont countries transformed from sources of raw music material into exporters of refined products: Brazil added samba and bossa nova to the repertoire of American dance halls and to jazz in the 1960s; Jamaica exported ska and later reggae since Desmond Dekker’s hit “Israelites” in 1968; and India lent motives and musicians to psychedelic groups and listeners. Also the musicians in the core producing countries became more and more transnational: Mexican guitarist Carlos Santana, Czech pianist Jan Hammer, Ghanaian drummer Rebob Kwaaku Baah, Polish violinist Michał Urbaniak and singer Urszula Dudziak, and Indian drummer Trilok Gurtu are examples of transnational musicians that have become major players in North American and European progressive rock and jazz since the late 1960s.

The integration of foreign musical elements into jazz and rock fostered its complete or partial reinvention in countries on the creative periphery after years of mere copying the originals across the Atlantic or – following the British Invasion of the early 1960s – across the Channel. In Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, West and East Germany, Latvia, and Russia, free jazz enabled musicians to re-create jazz and make it their own, often with an attitude of informed underground and subculture (Heffley 2003; Blobel 2011; Brötzmann 2014). In Poland, musicians such as Krzysztof Komeda, Tomasz Stańko, or Michał Urbaniak adopted the structures of cool jazz to integrate motives of nineteenth-century romanticism into jazz. In the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR), highit adopted the musical language of the British Invasion and proceeded from there to jazz-rock and to the creation of a highly specific underground influenced by the Fluxus movement (Kouřil 1999; Esch 2014). In the German
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Democratic Republic (GDR), a heated debate about authenticity, commodification, and the sexual and moral endangerment of youth delayed the creation of modern jazz (Poiger 2003). Free jazz made it acceptable in the early 1970s as a completely abstract art form that was radical in its artistic approach and sometimes wild and ecstatic in its performance, but barely capable of inciting mass rebellion or even brawls.

Jazz-rock, which developed in the late 1960s, musically and discursively contained several elements, including the concept of virtuosity as it was virulent in jazz since bebop and in rock ‘n’ roll since progressive rock, the aspiration for creating popular appeal and danceability, and the very concept of bringing together people and ideas from different areas. Due to these ambiguities, jazz-rock as a globalized idiom was contextualized very differently. In West Germany, France, and the British Canterbury scene, where jazz-rock was picked up by musicians originating from psychedelic and youth revolt milieus, it became the soundtrack of the ‘Freak Left’ counterculture, with its own small festivals, which were sometimes raided by the police. In the CSSR, it became a showcase for highly talented virtuosos of the bigbít, which now performed suites for rock bands and orchestras after the establishment of quality and political control through the Jazzová Sekcja (Kouřil 1999; Briggs 2014).

Agencies, contexts, and ambivalences

The developments sketched above were neither purely musical, intrinsic to the very nature of art forms that only after years or decades were redefined as such, nor were they the work of the musicians alone. They were the result of a process of canonization very similar to that which classical music underwent in the nineteenth century (Geer 2012). The same could be said for the unprecedented significance that music had as an agent of sociocultural change from the 1920s up to the 1970s. Put very briefly, the reason for its significance lay in the need for authenticity, a need expressed with different significations by audiences, critics, and musicians. Authenticity not only constituted the basis for subcultural communitarization, but also its scandalization by cultural agents that were deeply affected by the dissolution of social bonds (Esch 2018). This dissolution, diagnosed after the world wars had radically swept away any certainty about culture, moral values, and Western civilization, was particularly virulent for a younger generation experiencing the growing gap between the values of their parents and the temptations and ambiguities of an affluent society. With leisure time and overall prosperity being the guiding principles, police repression of unwanted subcultures occurred on both sides of the Iron Curtain. However, in the case of the Eastern bloc the initial stimulus was not due to the ‘emptiness’ of consumer society, but due to the continuous state of nannyism and the lack of interesting commodities to consume (Hobsbawm 1994; Chlopek 2005; Franc and Knapík 2013).

Fears concerning the decline and dissolution of civilization and societal cohesion were not as absurd as they might seem, as the longing for authenticity in music was indeed embedded in more general forms of social and cultural unrest. In some ways, supporters and opponents shared the main discursive elements about the music and styles they debated on: jazz, in its original form, was a folk music idiom played by talented but not educated black musicians. As it expressed – musically or in lyrics – the suffering of the marginalized black poor, it was culturally and socially relevant to all those who themselves felt uneasy in the society they knew (Hebdige 1979; Hale 2011). In its emotional intensity, its lyrical depictions of social and emotional issues, and its invigorating rhythmic qualities, it was charged sexually – not least because of its connection to discourses about the sexual virility of the uneducated, primordial, and savage. For this very same reason, Clara Zetkin condemned jazz music and dance styles in the GDR as ‘something we, in our time, did in bed’. Even Reginald Rudorf, who saw traditional jazz as
the blueprint for a new proletarian music in the GDR, perceived bebop and the associated
dancing as ‘anarchic swaying and neuropathic contortions’ (Rudorf 1952; Poiger 2003: 158).
As such, it threatened the basic moral values of Western society – especially since the Jazz Age
created the role model of the socially and culturally independent, sexually active woman with
short hair, who was either highly sexualized or, even worse, wore male clothing (Reynolds and
Press 1996; Poiger 2003). It was also exactly at that point that jazz became a thorn in the side
of not only Western authorities. Since communist regimes in Eastern Europe considered them-
selves to be the culmination of European civilization – and acted accordingly when it came
to unwanted youthful stirrings – it became exceedingly interesting for young bohemians, who
more often than not were actually sons and daughters of high-ranking party members, as well as
for proletarian and petty bourgeois youngsters (Fenemore 2007; Chłopek 2005; Blažek/Pospíšil
2010). Just as their Western counterparts, they claimed a more autonomous and carefree use of
the leisure time post-war societies provided.

In 1956, Elvis Presley’s appearance in prime-time television – and on European stages two
years later – was not criticized for his use of ‘black’ music, but for his stage behaviour reminding
critics of female nightclub dancers. The beat invasion introduced an ecstatic, abandoned, young,
and female public that was in no way compatible with the image of the clean, asexual, married
housewife cultural and pedagogic authorities wanted young girls to become (Heinemann 2011).
It also gave room – in a house still dominated by males – to female performers such as Lesley
Gore, The Ronettes, or Billie Davis who – in songs written by men for a female audience –
claimed female autonomy and sexuality, while singers like Aretha Franklin combined female-
ness with black self-assertion. Psychedelic rock added the idea of free love and drug-induced
ecstasy, combining it with the idea of global revolutionary change through a young generation.
This idea was embraced and developed by critical French, North American, and British Marxist
philosophy that – with the likes of Henri Lefebvre and later the Situationists in France, Herbert
Marcuse in the USA, or the New Left Review group in Great Britain – tried to reconcile their
wish for fundamental change with the degeneration of Soviet communism and the failure of the
workers’ movements to defeat fascism. Also, it was the following renewed interest in a critical
reading of Marx and the integration of anarchist ideas that animated what would become the
global revolt of the late 1960s (Kurlansky 2004; Suri 2005).

Moreover, the opponents shared the belief that the reasons for which they either adored or
condemned the new sounds were both musical and cultural: every musical genre and transfigura-
tion mentioned here was initially described as ecstatically exciting by its defenders and audiences,
and as cacophonous and anti-musical by its adversaries. In both cases, the main tendency in musical
production included its standardization and commodification as well as a professionalization of the
creative process, which added respectability while reducing the emotional – and sexual – charge
it transported. It was at that point that the developments in the West and East of the Iron Curtain
diverged fundamentally. Whereas the commodity nature of economic, cultural, and social life in
the West facilitated the implementation of musical styles when they found a sufficiently big audi-
ence, in the East, culture – including music – maintained the pedagogical tasks it had been charged
with since the early nineteenth century (Bergeron and Bohlman 1992) because cultural bureaucra-
cies had more power to promote them than did their Western colleagues. For this reason – as well
as the exorbitantly high licence fees demanded by Western record companies – cultural bureaucra-
cies of state socialism only reluctantly allowed the importation of Western pop music, but tolerated
and sometimes even supported musical styles that could be integrated into bourgeois/proletarian
high culture or well-mannered frivolity. Hence, the development in the East mirrored the profes-
sionalization process in the West through the integration of popular music into music schools and
the standardization of the output through education and licensing.
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The process of recognizing jazz had serious political connotations. In an effort to counter the Soviet Union’s image campaign with classical orchestras and ballets, black members of Congress suggested the use of jazz as an ‘ambassador of good will’ – a step that was particularly efficient because of the musicians’ capability for improvising with local musicians. It also promoted the acknowledgement of an initially black art form as part of the cultural mainstream – and thus the integration of black people into American society. Although jazz thus effectively became involved in North American politics in the Tricont and could easily be labelled as the soundtrack for reformed imperialism, it had by now become acceptable in the countries of state socialism. The worldwide tours of Louis Armstrong – an icon of traditional jazz – and of Dave Brubeck – the main agent of white, concertante cool jazz – had also covered venues in Eastern Europe (Eschen 2006). Obviously the transformation of jazz from a dangerous and exciting subcultural phenomenon into a transnational art form had disabled it as an inciter of rebellion.

Moral panics and social unrest

By this time, the interest of the disobedient youth had at least partly moved into other soundscapes. In Europe, subcultures such as the Halbstarke in Western and Eastern Germany, bikiniarze in Poland, blousons noirs in France, and mods in Great Britain combined the love of aggressive, loud, and fast music – be it bebop, rock ’n’ roll, or white rhythm and blues – with an exceedingly aggressive behaviour that alarmed cultural and social commentators. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, industrialized Western societies witnessed white youngsters fighting in the streets. Young people were also prominent in the revolts of 1953, 1956, and 1968 in the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. In both Western and Eastern countries that strongly emphasized labour as the main source of human dignity and well-being, the modernization of society resulted in a growing percentage of youngsters who got bored, dropped out, and immediately claimed accessible amenities intended for the now available leisure time in everyday life. Not only an alienated youth but also a cultural and political counterculture starting with the beatniks adopted these new musical languages in their endeavour for authenticity and intensity, especially when a long series of politicized urban unrest started with the black Watts riots of 1965 (Horne 1995). Events like these helped to create a moral panic that constructed youth not as an endangered group, but as a dangerous one. Additionally, national and left-wing armed movements in the Tricont and the Chinese Cultural Revolution, relying heavily on youthful enthusiasm, just barely fell short of creating an atmosphere of global revolutionary change that invigorated youth subcultures and worried established authorities on both sides of the Iron Curtain (Suri 2005).

Music was not only an accompaniment of these changes, but also an integral part of it, its indicator, and sometimes even its motor as it was often at the centre of the definition of authenticity of the subculture that adopted it (Hebdige 1979; Bourdieu 1984; Geer 2012). It was no wonder that the musicians themselves – who often stemmed from the very milieus they played for – felt compelled to take a stand. When Bob Dylan, who had supported the 1962 civil rights march on Washington where Martin Luther King famously declared his dream of a non-racist USA, went electric, he not only incited a new, heated debate about authenticity and sell-out, he also marked the transformation of rock into the music of counterculture (Roszak 1968) and its separation from and confrontation with pop. Rock and the energy and inventiveness it allowed were deemed authentic insofar as the latter was equated with commerciality and artificiality. In the end, only what connoisseurs and critics deemed authentic was recognized as rock (Meltzer 1970; Wicke 1989; Siwak 2001). Jazz musicians and some impresarios engaged in the civil rights struggle (Hershorn 2011). The musicians had their own ‘October
Revolution’ when the angry young men and few women of the free jazz movement organized their own festival against the traditional event in Newport 1964 (Beckett 1965; Anderson 2007). Even the Jazz Ambassadors Program was not simply advertising American values, but was bringing the civil rights agenda right back into the practice of jazz, even politicizing icons such as Louis Armstrong (Eschen 2006). The Woodstock Music and Art Fair of 1969 was forced open by the anarchist collective Up Against the Wall Motherfuckers into a manifestation of hippy counterculture. These events simultaneously incited a tendency to separate a musical – as well as a cultural and political – underground from both the mainstream popular and highbrow culture. The underground organized its own autonomous, anti-commercial, and/or not officially approved festivals, especially in the USA, France, West and East Germany, and the CSSR, eventually closing them down when they became too big and thus commercial. Some musicians formed their own record companies, such as Free Music Production (free jazz) or Schneeball Records (rock, jazz-rock) in West Germany. In Eastern Europe, at least the entrepreneurial aspects of self-organization were blocked by the fact that cultural production was monopolized by state bureaucracies – who were, at best, musical connoisseurs trained in the traditional bourgeois musical canon of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, independent musical production and distribution did set in with the advent of cassette tape recorders in the mid-1970s.

In this respect, as well as in some others, developments were analogous – if not identical – in the West and the East. Alienated and frustrated youngsters, who were the first to spend their guaranteed leisure time and were exceedingly bored by the cultural and sexual rigidity they were forced into, embraced whatever they learned of the new youth movements that were denounced in official youth magazines or the radio. The very fact that rock ‘n’ rollers, rockers, hippies, and finally punks were depicted as manifestations of moral decay and frustration under capitalism made them attractive, as the yearning for intensity and the feeling of alienation were present both under state socialism and under developed capitalism. While in the East the youth found the autonomy they longed for in Western music, in the West the same music was an expression of a similar longing. In some cases, Eastern exponents of counterculture were well aware of that fact. The Czech Plastic People of the Universe, in a productive misunderstanding of the motives of their adapted models, the Velvet Underground and Frank Zappa, formulated a musical programme that – very much aware of the dangers commodification and introduction into canonical art presented to the real underground – established itself against any bureaucracy and establishment, attributing different tasks to its exponents in capitalist or state socialist societies (Esch 2014). Strangely, the impact of police brutality against the youth and their music was quite different in the West and the East. While police attacks and raids of concerts and festivals – particularly when linked to the ‘Freak Left’ – were all too common in France, Italy, and West Germany (Briggs 2014; Kalb 2016; Mrozek 2017), it took only two instances of police intervention in 1974 and 1976 to transform the Plastics into heroes of the anti-communist resistance during their short romance with the dissident group of Vaclav Havel in 1978 (Bolton 2012). An attempted closing of ranks between Czech, French, and English anti-establishment subcultures failed. When the first album of the Plastics was published by the cooperative SCOPA Invisible Records founded by ‘Freak Left’ activist Jacques Pasquier, the anarchist Sex Pistols – who had struggled with stage bans – allegedly refused involvement because they wanted nothing to do with supposed anti-communists (The Merry Ghetto, in: Plastic People of the Universe 1978).

The music of the 1960s and, in a more confined way the 1970s, thus orchestrated stirrings of social and cultural unrest that impacted not only the industrialized countries in the West and the East, but also the Tricont since the 1962 victory of the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale, FLN) in Algeria – a victory that heavily influenced the radical factions of
the black movement in the USA and its musicians (Koerner 2013). Combined with prospects of losing whole generations of young people who refused to become the successors of their fathers and mothers, the 1960s resembled a fermenting pre-revolutionary situation that threatened the ‘establishment’ on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This in turn inclined political, cultural, and economic leaders to preserve the politics of détente, enabling sociocultural reforms that succeeded in preventing revolutionary change.

To paraphrase Erich Mühsam: freedoms were initially taken and lived, but then conceded and thus defused. In this perspective, the transnational adoption of most of these musical styles can be explained not by mysterious intrinsic qualities of the music, but with the specific and similar experiences of alienation, with similar yearning for authenticity, intensity, and free community, as well as the more or less successful strategies of integration into modern society. But in the end, what remained of these decades was the economic and – at least partially – cultural integration of non-European and non-American musical styles and musicians into transregional and globalizing commodity chains.

Select bibliography


The concept ‘world literature’, first coined in the nineteenth century, has over the years been subject to multiple re-conceptualizations as scholars and authors have endeavoured to construct literary spaces and to create spaces within literature. In this chapter, I use the term ‘literary space’ to denote the spaces in which literature circulates, as well as the spatial constitution of literary fields. The latter are areas where various institutions (e.g. literary criticism, publishing houses, literary prizes, research projects, and teaching) attempt to determine the nature, hierarchy, diffusion, function, genealogy, and direction of literature. Thus, literary space encompasses literature’s genesis, reception, and sphere of influence. In referring to the expression of space in literature, I mean the staging of real or imagined spaces, spatial models, or spatial practices within a text.

Like all efforts at spatialization, the various meanings assigned to world literature reflect divergent social and cultural practices, interpretations of the world, and power relations. Hence, the concept is alternately conceived and utilized either as an epistemological, descriptive or performative one. With the introduction of the concept of world literature, the focus of scholarship on literature shifted from the temporal to the spatial. For years, a central focus of literary studies in Europe had been research on the history of literature, specifically the transformation over time of its theories, topics, motifs, poetics, and so forth. This undertaking proceeded from certain ideological, sociohistorical, and disciplinary assumptions.

The assumed space in which literature developed was the nation. The nation provided literature with its spatial framework and also determined its function. As Europe expanded, new territories and their inhabitants were integrated into the pre-existing European worldview (Brunstetter 2010). Thus, evolutionary theory developed to account for human diversity.

As early as the sixteenth century, Las Casas, a Dominican monk, utilized ontogenetic and agro-scientific imagery to argue that despite cultural differences, inhabitants of the West Indies were human and should be treated accordingly. He compared them to children or plants that needed tending if they were to mature (Brunstetter 2010). Evolutionary theory thus gave rise to the idea of a human developmental timeline. To reach the highest level – identified as the European level – peoples from other regions of the world had to make their way through an evolutionary progression. In this way, Europeans turned spatial distances between people into hierarchically ordered temporal categories.
For Foucault, the epistemological rupture with this hierarchical temporal ordering of the world can be traced to the 1970s. The idea of contradictory, coexisting temporal layers (i.e., the simultaneity of the non-simultaneous) was replaced by a spatial world view, in which difference was seen as indicating the side-by-side existence of incommensurable orders. The near and the far became heterogeneous spaces having no temporal relation of succession (Foucault 1984; Hallet and Neumann 2009).

This Foucault-like spatial ordering of the world could already be detected in Goethe’s conversations with Eckermann on world literature. For Goethe, whose understanding of world literature is still influential today, the growing rapidity and intensity of social interactions and contacts – including those prompted by war – marked the emergence of a new epoch, in which the communicative space of literature was no longer the nation. In speaking of world literature, he referred to an international and intercultural network for the reception of literary works (Eckermann 1982). This symbolic communicative network would promote reciprocal learning among European cultures as well as the European reception of literary production from other cultures, namely from China, India, and Iran.

Even before Goethe, Georg Forster had postulated that through the reception of intellectual and cultural products from other parts of the world, Europeans would be able to determine the universal properties of human cognition. Thus, similarly to evolutionary theory and the concept of human rationality, engagement with non-European moral, intellectual, and aesthetic designs was used by Europeans to justify a civilizational hierarchy with Europe representing the pinnacle of human development (Simo 2003).

The spatial model, which Goethe advanced with his use of *Weltliteratur*, is also a symbolic space of exchange that operates exclusively inside Europe; its relationship to other spaces consists of collecting their literary products for the purpose of enriching European material and intellectual life. But instead of discussing whether this spatial model reproduces and legitimizes colonial conditions, I would like to call attention to how it reimagines national borders. Through this model, national borders become places of exchange, rather than walls of separation that prevent the circulation of ideas, people, and material products. In this sense, the term world literature creates the possibility of opening up communication, and perhaps even requires it.

Goethe hence sometimes explicitly used world literature to criticize national literature, or even to move beyond it:

> But really, we Germans are very likely to fall too easily into this pedantic conceit, when we do not look beyond the narrow circle that surrounds us. I therefore like to look about me in foreign nations and advise everyone to do the same. National literature is now rather an unmeaning term: the epoch of world literature is at hand, and everyone must strive to hasten its approach.

(*Eckermann 1982: 199*)

This understanding of world literature as both a distinctive epoch and as a function has led to different interpretations of the term. The following examples showcase how world literature is employed – or rejected – as a central category of literary studies.

**Literary spaces**

As shown above, Goethe primarily viewed world literature as an epoch; yet today it is most commonly understood as a typology. Texts such as *Lexikon der Weltliteratur* and *World Literature: A Reader* present world literature as a corpus, that is to say a collection of works. The criteria
for inclusion in these collections vary greatly, but the primary prerequisite is diffusion. Diffusion
can be measured quantitatively, based for instance on the number of translations or sales of a
given literary work (market factors). Alternatively, it can be measured according to qualitative
criteria, for instance the quality of the translated work or its influence on other literary works
(aesthetic factors). In each case, the central concern is that the diffusion or influence of a work
transcends national borders.

French literary scholar Pascale Casanova emphatically rejects market demand as a criterion
for inclusion in the world literature corpus, even going so far as to label it dangerous:

Even the freest countries in world literary space are . . . subject to the power of inter-
national commerce, which, in transforming the conditions of production, modifies
the form of books themselves. The rise of multinational conglomerates and the very
broad diffusion of internationally popular novels that give the appearance of literar-
iness have called into question the very idea of a literature independent of commercial
forces . . . . A world literature does indeed exist today, new in its form and its effects,
that circulates easily and rapidly through virtually simultaneous translations and whose
extraordinary success is due to the fact that its denationalized content can be absorbed
without any risk of misunderstanding. But under these circumstances a genuine lit-
erary internationalism is no longer possible, having been swept away by the tides of
international business.

(2004: 171–2)

To advance her concept of a ‘world republic of letters’, Casanova draws on two distinct spatial
models that she tried to bring into a fruitful dialogue: Bourdieu’s concept of ‘literary field’ and
Wallerstein’s world-systems model (translated as ‘world structure model’, thereby changing
its meaning). Casanova applied the concept of ‘literary field’— used primarily by Bourdieu to
explain the place and function of literature in French society — to world literature. According

First, it has relative autonomy from other fields, for example from economic, social, and
political fields; so, it operates according to its own rules. For example, unlike other fields, an
inverse relationship exists between literary reputation and commercial success. Second, asym-
metrical power relations are constitutive of the literary field. Because some authors occupy a
dominant position, a power struggle ensues as other authors seek to gain a position of domi-
nance. Furthermore, because power balances can shift and be reversed, this struggle is a constant
feature of the world literary space. Finally, the whole structure functions without any regulating
authority — ‘an orchestra with no conductor’ (Bourdieu 2000: 256).

Starting from this spatial model, Casanova posits a world literary structure that is a single, inter-
national autonomous space in which literature circulates and acquires capital. This structure replic-
ates the emphasis Wallerstein’s model places on hierarchical and unjust power relations. But unlike
Wallerstein’s model, power relations in Casanova’s ‘world republic of letters’ are not mapped
geographically. Rather than describing struggles between a centre and periphery defined by geog-
raphy, she describes struggles between ‘dominant’ and ‘dominated’ authors and literary spaces.
For her, there was no outside or inside, and hence no struggle between subsystems. Thus, contrary
to Wallerstein’s model, the end goal of power struggles in the ‘world republic of literature’ is not
to overturn the system. Instead, actors engage in struggles in an effort to shift the system’s balance
of power in their favour. In short, power struggles create structure; they are not directed against it.

Casanova acknowledges that this is not a sui generis structure. Rather, it is the product of
a history:
This literary space did not, of course, spring into being in its present configuration. It emerged as the product of a historical process, from which it grew progressively more autonomous. Without going into detail, we can say that it appeared in Europe in the 16th century, France and England forming its oldest regions. It was consolidated and enlarged into central and eastern Europe during the 18th and especially the 19th centuries, propelled by Herderian national theory. It expanded throughout the 20th century.

(Casanova 2005: 73)

However, from this, Casanova does not draw the conclusion that the ‘world republic of letters’ reproduced the structure created by the formation of European national literatures, consequently being a product of European expansion in the world. In fact, the relative autonomy of Casanova’s world literary space is dependent on a European model. Because the European origin and character of the current international literary field go unacknowledged in Casanova’s model, it cannot adequately account for the frustration, disquiet, revolt, polemics, and struggles of the actors operating in this field.

At the international level, the ‘Great Game’ of literature has always been rigged. It is a game of striving for symbolic hegemony in the world (Moretti 2000: 64) and a game of resisting some rules. It is a game of attraction and repulsion, of homogenization and differentiation, and of subjugation and emancipation. As follows, its players might sometimes act individually, other times as an institution, and still other times as representatives of cultures, races, and world regions. The world literary scene has always been an arena in which very different types of battles take place, including, of course, those over aesthetics. The complexity of these battles corresponds most closely to the spatial model in Wallerstein’s world-systems theory. Although Wallerstein developed his model to explain the functioning of the capitalist world economy, it is flexible enough to explain overlapping forms of domination (e.g. linguistic, economic, political, and cultural). Using it, one can grasp the spatial doctrine that creates the global unit, the subsystems that are simultaneously geographic, political, and linguistic in nature (or which might only have one of these features), as well as their respective dynamics. Different variants can be distinguished: (a) the binary of ‘the West’ versus ‘the Rest’, (b) the dialectics of national and world literature, (c) the colonial and post-colonial establishment of linguistically bound literatures, and (d) the postulation of a transnational literature.

The West and the rest of the world

The concept of world literature emerged against the backdrop of European imperial expansion and the concomitant formation of a Western modern identity predicated on the notion of European superiority. As noted by Jamaican-born cultural theorist Stuart Hall (1995), Europeans created a discourse of the ‘West’ that juxtaposed a ‘modern’ Europe with a ‘primitive’ rest of the world. This discourse constructed a world where asymmetrical power relations were normalized and the centrality of the European perspective went unquestioned.

For literature, this asymmetrical structure can clearly be seen in statistics on production. The vast majority of literary works are published in Europe and North America. Correspondingly, the most influential publishers, literary journals, and literary prizes are based in these locales. Europe and North America are also the sites of canonization. Authors’ works do not become part of the world literary canon because they are widely read in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, but rather because Western institutions perceive them as such.

The consequences of this model can also be observed in the diffusion of literary genres and in meta-discourses on literature. As Brazilian theorist Montserrat Iglesias Santos has noted, there
is no symmetry in literary interference: ‘[I]nterferences occur most often at the periphery of the system’ (Santos cited in Moretti 2000: 56). Jordanian literary critic Fakhri Saleh reaches a similar conclusion:

Even David Damrosch’s redefinition of the term in his What is World Literature? fails to liberate ‘world literature’ from its points of departure. Damrosch wants to use the term as a category for the production, publication, and circulation of literature, rather than an evaluation. But his understanding of world literature still remains very close to that of Goethe. There is an insistence on the cosmopolitan character of literatures produced by different nations, a search for the common features. Without the hidden agenda of comparability to European, and more broadly to western literatures, the concept of world literature loses its ground, becoming a kind of commodity of the global era. It reverts back to Edward Said’s ‘Orientalism’, wherein the comparatist views European literature as a valid criterion for evaluating non-Western literatures. 

(2011)

The dialectics of national and world literature

Although world literature implies transgressing national borders, it also presupposes the existence of national literatures. Marx and Engels conceived of world literature as part of the superstructure of the emerging capitalist world. In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, they wrote:

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country . . . . In place of old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.

(Marx/Engels cited in Tucker [1978]: 476–7)

For Marx and Engels, world literature was a new attribute of national literature. Like material production and consumption, the latter had been internationalized. Market exploitation by the bourgeoisie produced a convergence of national literatures, making world literature, in their view, an aggregation of similar national literatures.

A century later, German scholar Eric Auerbach (1992) feared that this process of homogenization would lead to a single literary culture with only a few literary languages – or even one. If this trend continued uninterrupted, Auerbach argued, it would bring the realization of world literature as well as its destruction. Like Goethe and many other literary theorists, Auerbach was convinced that world literature is only desirable if the individuality of national literatures is preserved. Casanova has made a similar point, contrasting her ‘world republic of letters’ with the literary ‘melting pot’ promoted by globalization (Casanova 2004: 293). Similarly to the national level, a distinction is drawn between intellectually challenging world literature and a mass-produced, tawdry literature.

Since some national literary works are deemed worthy of inclusion into world literature, the term has an evaluative dimension. Hence, in Casanova’s model, the world literature and
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national literature fields exist in a complex relationship to each other. The ‘world republic of letters’ is concerned with art for the sake of art, free from all political and commercial considerations. Based on this perspective, national literatures are evaluated, categorized, and hierarchized according to their degree of autonomy – with greater autonomy equalling greater literary capital. Casanova contends that older nations, such as France, England, and Germany, have accumulated large reserves of literary capital, which they are able to use to control the means of international legitimation. Conversely, national literatures nearer the heteronomous pole have less capital, thus being less well represented in the world literature field.

Here, Casanova’s theory (2004) borrows elements from Kafka’s notion of ‘small’ literature. Although Kafka never clearly outlined the differences between small and great literature, those differences are apparent in his evaluation of Goethe’s work. Referring to Yiddish literature from Vienna and Warsaw, he characterized ‘small’ literature as a militant literature articulating the political and social grievances of an ethnic group. It has no great authors comparable to German literary icon Goethe, and lacks the tradition, universality, and timelessness of great literature.

Casanova also described national literatures with long traditions – that is to say, the ones with the most capital – as having a distinct literary language, elaborate systems of genre, a recognized body of classics, and well-functioning literary institutions. These features are absent or less well developed in the national literatures still enmeshed in heteronomous networks. In Casanova’s model, the world literature field determines the rank and prestige of national literatures. Only those works that can be denationalized – meaning depoliticized and removed from their social and political context – can be incorporated into the world literary field. In short, decontextualization becomes the prerequisite for universality.

Colonial and post-colonial as world literary spaces

One consequence of imperialism is the expansion of languages into areas beyond their original territories. This expansion creates new transnational language communities, which then produce a corresponding literature, for instance the Francophone, Lusophone, Hispanophone, Arab, and Commonwealth literatures. Since these language communities owe their existence to a violent colonial past, their dynamics are much more complex than the transnational language communities that had already formed in Europe, based on shared languages such as French and German. Despite this traumatic history, decolonization did not uproot colonial languages; in most former colonies, the language of the colonizer remained the official language, the language of national literature, and the language of education. Given that indigenous languages were still spoken in the former colonies – albeit some categorized as endangered – the continued dominance of colonial languages created controversy.

One of the most fiercely debated questions in the immediate post-colonial era in Africa was whether African literary works written in non-indigenous languages should be considered African literature (Wali 1963). Nigerian author Chinua Achebe believed that European languages such as French, English, and Portuguese could be appropriated and made to carry the weight of African experience. In a similar vein, Leopold Senghor of Senegal supported the use of French in former French colonies. Meanwhile, Kenyan author Ngugi Wa Thiong’o argued that using European languages perpetuated the colonization of the African mind. In 1977, he announced that he would no longer write in English; instead, he would write in his native language Kikuyu. A similar debate also took place in India (Rushdie 1992).

The immediate post-colonial era also witnessed intense scrutiny of the relationship between the literatures of the metropole and of the periphery. In 1968, the University of Nairobi
announced that it was abolishing its English department, so that the binary of ‘the West’ and ‘the Rest’ would no longer have an institutional home in Africa (See Ngugi 1972: 114). Such efforts made it clear that Africans were dissatisfied with the persistence of colonial practices in the production, distribution, and assessment of literature. The language of the colonizers dominated transnational literary spaces and reproduced the old colonial power structures.

Newly established literary scenes in former African colonies were too dependent on European centres, for instance Paris, London, and Lisbon, for the material production, dissemination, and recognition of their works. This dependency seriously impeded efforts at emancipation, not to mention the establishment of truly independent literary centres. As a result, international political and economic structures based in Europe – such as the Commonwealth and the International Organization of La Francophonie – played a decisive role in the development of African literature in their respective language spheres. Neither Francophone nor Commonwealth literature encompassed works from France or England, yet they did not function independently of them. Their composition also did not align with the political and economic profile of these organizations. For example, South African literature was classified as Commonwealth literature, but it did not belong politically to the Commonwealth.

This disjuncture led Salmon Rushdie to conclude in 1983 that Commonwealth literature represented no real space of literary practice; it was simply an ideological construct strategically aimed at perpetuating the asymmetrical power relations of colonialism:

By now ‘Commonwealth Literature’ was something very unlikeable indeed. Not only was it a ghetto, but it was actually an exclusive ghetto. And the effect of creating such a ghetto was, is, to change the meaning of far broader term ‘English Literature’ – which I’d always taken to mean simply the literature of the English language – into something far narrower, something topographical, nationalistic, possibly even racially segregationist.

(1992: 63)

Once isolated from British and North American literature, other English spaces were reduced to an exotic, racial ‘Other’, thereby lowering their literary capital and preventing them from infiltrating the English canon dominated by British and North American authors. The process of internationalization described by Rushdie thus differs sharply from that described in Casanova’s model. Here, only literatures from the geographic periphery are targeted for marginalization by international authorities associated with a geographic centre. These international authorities apply a different standard of evaluation so as to achieve a topographical ghettoization that replicates old colonial power structures.

On 16 March 2007, roughly 20 years after Rushdie’s indictment of Commonwealth literature, 44 Francophone authors published a signed manifesto in Le Monde attacking the Francophone system for perpetuating colonial power relations. Like Rushdie, they were convinced that a new world literature was on the horizon. As proof, they cited the awarding of six major French literary prizes in 2007 to French-language authors from outside of France. They believed a revolutionary shift had commenced, from a Francophone literary system to ‘world literature in French’. But what exactly was revolutionary? Neither the procedures of recognition nor the authorities responsible for conferring honours had changed. Parisian institutions still controlled both. It was, rather, the identity of the winners that had changed.

French institutions, the manifesto’s authors asserted, had reached the realization that excellence in French literature was no longer synonymous with French national literature. Herein lay a problem of the manifesto: because it recognized the centre’s ability to identify and promote
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new centres of creativity, it legitimized the existing system. The authors did not call for author-
ity to be invested in other subregional centres, and consequently Francophone literature did not
actually escape the narrowly defined French literary horizon.

Still, the title of the manifesto, Pour une littérature-monde en français (Toward a world litera-
ture in French), suggested a new openness to diversity and the world beyond the Francophone
world. In fact, the manifesto used the phrases ‘ouverture sur le monde’ (opening toward the world)
and ‘littérature transnationale’ (transnational literature). Although derived from an analogous con-
struct (tout-monde, or literally everyone) coined by one of the manifesto’s signatories, Edouard
Glissant of Martinique, its kinship with the notion of world literature is unmistakable.

Rushdie also chose world literature to designate new literary connections and creations
beyond those included in the Commonwealth literary system:

We could appreciate writers for what they are, whether in English or not; we could
discuss literature in terms of its real groupings, which may well be national, which
may well be linguistic, but which may also be international, and based on imaginative
affinities; and as far as English Literature itself is concerned, I think that if all English
Literatures could be studied together, a shape would emerge which would truly reflect
the new shape of the language in the world, and we could see that English Literature
has never been in better shape, because the world language now also possesses a world
literature, which is proliferating in every conceivable direction.

(Rushdie 1992: 70)

Here, world literature is a literature comprising links between authors both in and outside of
national and linguistic boundaries. Thus, real topographies of affinity exist, but they do not
generate centres. They are not discursively or institutionally sanctioned topographies; they
continue, rather, to clash with the dominant practices of spatialization.

Although the histories of the Hispanophone and Lusophone communities in Latin America
differ significantly from the histories of those communities in Africa or India, a similar new self-
awareness developed there. In Geography of the Nation, Mexican author Carlos Fuente wrote:

The old Eurocentrism has been overcome by a polycentrism which . . . should lead
us to an ‘activation of differences’ as the common condition of a central humanity
. . . . Goethe’s world literature has finally found its correct meaning: it is the literature
of difference, the narration of diversity converging in one world . . . . A single world,
with numerous voices. The new constellations that together form the geography of
the world novel are varied and mutating.


These examples show that at the periphery, a strong feeling has developed that the relationship
between centre and periphery is reversing, or at the very least is on the precipice of reversing.
This belief is based on authors’ conviction that they possess a competence that few authors at
the centre have, namely an experience of the world that makes their work thematically and
poetically relevant for an emerging literature of the globalizing world.

The spatialization of the world in literature

Already in 1958, American author Thornton Wilder suggested a new way of understanding and
evaluating world literature:
Goethe spoke too soon . . . It is only now in the second quarter of the twentieth century that we see the emergence of a literature that views the world as an indivisible unity. The entirety of life on the planet has become its object . . . Irrespective of the consequences, this world literature has arrived. Our consciousness is becoming global.

(1958: 4)

Rather than networks or circulation, Wilder proposed evaluating works according to their intellectual horizon. Just as national literature has an intellectual horizon, so too does world literature. In Wilder’s estimation, a world literary intellectual horizon requires the development of world awareness, or in other words, an awareness of the world beyond one’s immediate horizon. This awareness of the world is promoted by globalization.

This different understanding of world literature led Wilder to propose a very different world literary canon. This canon did not include the works of European masters such as Dante, Shakespeare, Hölderlin, Balzac, Flaubert, and Voltaire, because these authors’ works did not demonstrate sufficient awareness of human diversity. For the same reason, his canon did not include Homer’s The Iliad or Virgil’s Aeneid; however, the works of T.S. Eliot and James Joyce did meet Wilder’s criteria.

Wilder notes, with admiration, Eliot’s use of quotations from a dozen languages, and compares Joyce’s use of 20 languages to that of a musician at a ‘keyboard’ (1958: 7). Wilder also calls attention to how Joyce ascribes mythic aspects to his characters in ways that both recognize and challenge the limits of history and realism. For Wilder, awareness of humanity’s immense diversity is an essential feature of world literature; thus, had the works of Salman Rushdie and other new authors from the post-colonial world existed at that time, Wilder would most likely have included them in his canon.

Wilder associated the initial development of world awareness with a new intellectual inquisitiveness in an age of global development that is satisfied through reading. For the authors from the periphery whom we have discussed, world awareness is understood as the product of an experience of the world or a way of living in the world. Thus, they trace their lineage to travel authors such as Humboldt and migrants such as Joseph Conrad, whose works are informed not only by what they have read about the world, but also by their first-hand experiences of the world. Many of these authors are convinced that a new literary development is on the horizon. They view it as providing the basis for an understanding of world literature that is more capable of representing the entirety of the world than current modes of representation. The latter still remain bound experientially and spatially to the nation.

In the language of Bourdieu, such development is about heterodox experiential approaches. In the language of Homi K. Bhabha (1994), it is about a ‘Third Space’ in which new forms emerge and the present is constructed from the perspective of an imagined future. Literary scholarship also tries to grasp this development theoretically, delineating ‘new world literature’ as those texts concerned with multispacial, interspatial, and transspatial phenomena and configurations (Ette 2012), including cultural contacts, intercultural communication processes, transcultural mixings, hybridity, as well as cultural transfers.

In terms of positionality, new world literature includes texts of migrants that are often labelled as binational or multinational (e.g. belonging to Turkish and German literature or French and Algerian literature). When asked about the national identity of his writings, Salman Rushdie noted wryly:

I have constantly been asked, whether I am British, or Indian. The formulation ‘Indian-born British writer’ has been invented to explain me. But, as I said last night, my new book deals with Pakistan. So what now? ‘British-resident Indo-Pakistani writer?’ You see the folly of trying to contain writers inside passports.

(1992: 67)
This phenomenon of ‘writing between worlds’ led German literary scholar Ottmar Ette (2009) to develop the notion of ‘literature without a fixed abode’ or ‘literature in movement’. By identifying transcultural, translingual, and transareal patterns of movement, Ette moves beyond the worn-out, fixed categories of national and world literature and develops a new perspective on European literature, whose cartography has been taken for granted.

European literature(s), he argues, must be understood as literature in movement and as movement. This means that one must take into account the relentless migrations and the shifting borders that have shaped European literature(s), since neither in the national nor post-national space did these literature(s) develop completely autonomously. It also means taking into account vectorial dynamics of space, that is to say, the space(s) created through ‘specific patterns of movement and figures of movement, whereby the continuity of a given space depends upon the very choreographies and pathways that first generate it’ (Ette 2012: 37–8). In other words, should certain patterns stop operating, the corresponding spaces and their boundaries collapse. From this perspective, Europe emerges as a concept without fixed territorial dimensions. It also becomes a space of movement in which people cross borders and borders cross people, so that configurations are always in flux.

In response to criticism made by authors from the periphery, new theories addressing the relationships between literatures had been proposed; these new theories endeavoured to overcome the Eurocentric orientation of earlier spatial models. One approach involved juxtaposing literary works that developed autonomously from each other. Although this approach has become increasingly rare, it does not mean that literatures, especially in their global spatial construction, should not be considered in relation to each other. Rushdie writes:

> It strikes me that, at the moment, the greatest area of friction in Indian Literature has nothing to do with English Literature, but with the effects of the hegemony of Hindi on the literatures of other Indian languages. I recently met the distinguished Gujarati novelist, Suresh Joshi. He told me that he could write in Hindi but felt obliged to write in Gujarati because it was a language under threat. Not from English, or the West: from Hindi.

(1992: 69)

For this reason, some literary scholars suggest the term ‘literatures of the world’ rather than world literature (Ette 2012; Müller 2014). Even if there is a multicultural and multiareal juxtaposition of literary dynamics, intercultural or interregional relations between literatures are unmistakable. Thus, the relationship between literatures can be both conflict-ridden and collaborative. They might inspire each other or they might invoke instances of rejection and writing back. Thus, the translational refers not just to translation but also to transfer, namely the selective transfer, resemantization, and integration into other symbolic orders.

Transcultural and transnational dynamics are also observed with keen interest. Thus, the mixing of disparate cultures in a non-harmonious whole or the negotiation of new cultural spaces is emphasized. We had already seen this fascination with real or imagined ways of living and thinking (Böhler 2002) in ‘literature with no abode’. For many literary critics, the fascination is so great that many only want to see a pre-configuration of the future, where boundaries have been overcome and universality has prevailed. Particularly in Europe, many have described this imagined homogenization in a utopian light, although some have labelled it a nightmare.

In terms of poetic epistemology, this ‘new world literature’ claims to best represent the essence of literature, because it demands of readers a willingness to expose themselves to knowledge from many different societies. Ette writes:
Literature, accordingly, is the arena of manifold meanings, of the polysemic, insofar as it allows itself to move (indeed even creates the necessity of moving) simultaneously along the most divergent lines of logic. Its fundamental capacity for multiple meanings provokes the development of polylogical structures and methods of structuring that are oriented not toward a single, fixed point of view, but toward the continually changed and renewed movements of understanding and comprehension.

(2012: 5)

Thus, through its poetics, literature promotes a mental disposition that is conscious of the plurality of meanings and life forms, and therefore neither loses its orientation nor despairs when confronted with unfamiliar or unexpected situations. The new world literature, accordingly, becomes a school of self-criticism, of self-relativization, and of empathy. Flexibility and a willingness to experiment characterize this new world awareness. Literature becomes the location and the medium of preparation for living together in a globalized world.

Conclusion

As we have seen, world literature has been conceptualized using very different processes of spatialization. Some are fixed and others dynamic, some are characterized by hierarchical and asymmetrical power relations, and others are multicentric and egalitarian. Hence, world literature becomes a phenomenological, descriptive, as well as a performative category through which literary scholars can design future models.

Select bibliography


Introduction

Conceptualizing transregionalism without its corresponding linguistic relations is like attempting to understand content without form, as if one could conceive of ethnic, social, and milieu-specific relations without their linguistic foundations and connections. Transregional contacts take place as communicative, linguistic encounters. Since the advent of discourse theory, one would say that these are discourses that are exchanged across linguistic borders. Against the backdrop of multilingualism, all spaces populated by people – whether within a nation-state, a continent, or between continents – feature regions that are fundamentally affected by differences in language: from the impact of intraregional and international languages on the national language to that of regional variations in the language and local dialects. These regions are perceived as distinct, linguistically constituted language spaces.

The above points raise a series of interrelated questions: How does multilingualism within and between (world) regions affect communication? How can barriers to communication be overcome? And what impact does multilingualism have on language conditions in the various regions?

When communication between regions and their inhabitants develops, or has developed, it arises first from the desire to accommodate those who do not understand one’s language (the speechless barbarian, or n’emetski) and to make each understand one another. Skilled linguists suffice to facilitate short-term contacts, but long-term contacts benefit either from multilingualism on all sides, the voluntary adoption of one language for communication, or the more or less forced assertion of one language at the expense of other languages. Although at first glance this development might seem like a spontaneous process, it typically is the product of language policy actions.

The term language policy usually comes to mind when one thinks of those persons or social groups who speak a language other than one’s own or even those who speak a different variation or dialect of one’s language. If one understands policy in its original sense as acting on behalf of or within the polis – often in the interest of specific individuals or groups within that community – then language policy means enforcing those interests via language. In this sense, the passage from the Book of Judges in the Old Testament, in which Jephthah declares that any man crossing the Jordan River who pronounced the word ‘shibboleth’ in the manner of
Ephraim was an enemy and had to be killed, is probably the oldest example of the use (or abuse) of language in politics – or more precisely of language policy.

At the same time, one cannot exclude from the scope of language policy those actions affecting the standardization of oral and written communication (e.g. grammar, orthography, and lexicography), given that these typically fall within the purview of political institutions. And what about political language, that is to say discourse as forms of linguistic action for political purposes; should not one also include it as part of language policy? Given these various understandings of language policy, this chapter first outlines our approach to language policy before delving into the here especially relevant inter- and transregional language policies.

**What is language policy?**

Explaining how we approach language policy requires first a clear understanding of the concepts contained therein, that is language and policy. What do we mean by language – the general faculty of speech, linguistic actions, or the ensemble of all variations of state, national, and minority languages, language variations, including dialects? And what does policy encompass; does it only include the laws and regulations determined by governments or should it also embrace actions of all possible political actors, such as influential individuals, citizen initiatives and civil organizations, and economic interest groups?

A superficial consideration often leads to a definition that considers language policy simply as governmental policies addressing minority languages or the standardization of language usage. But with this definition, essential aspects of language policy are obscured from view, including policy actors and the motives that inform their actions. As suggested above, the most diverse institutions, groups, and personalities from all spheres of social life act upon language policy. Driven by the widest range of interests, these entities represent a host of positions on dialects; migrant and diaspora languages in education, culture, and the media; attitudes toward foreign languages; the dissemination of indigenous language abroad; as well as all aspects of linguistic standardization, nomenclature, and, not least of all, the definition of relevant political terminology.

The broad spectrum of policy addressing diverse linguistic phenomena led us in the 1980s to formulate a definition of language policy based on the findings of Catalan and French socio-linguists and those associated with the ‘Osnabrück contribution to language theory’ (Glück and Wigger 1979; Kremnitz 1979; Maas 1980, 1989; Marcellesi and Guespin 1986; Bochmann 1991, 1993). Since then, we have modified that definition in order to take into account more recent considerations, defining it as the interest-driven intervention of political actors in linguistic communicative practices and in the linguistic identity of social communities. This definition not only shifts the focus from the vague concept of ‘language’ to linguistic communication as the site of social and practical realization of all linguistic phenomena (varieties, norms, discursive and conversational forms, etc.), which then can be dissected, it also incorporates an examination of the allocation of roles in various upper echelon communication domains such as privilege, discrimination, and marginalization. At the same time, it takes into consideration intellectual consequences, that is to say the ramifications of language policy actions on identity. Additionally, this broad conception of language policy provides the opportunity to discuss who acts in the interest of which language policies – not only which government institutions, such as cabinets, parliaments, bodies of state, or local authorities and their representatives, but also civil actors (groups and individual actors), without whose prior or ongoing collaboration the decisions of state authorities on language policy are generally not made. That being said, civil actors also act parallel to or against the language policy of state actors. Without the inclusion of these civil actors, such as language societies, academies, the initiative groups of language minorities,
influential writers, among others, language policy – in whatever form – cannot be evaluated in any meaningful way.

Thus, on the basis of the statements above, language policy is expressed in four main spheres, the characterization of which can be facilitated through the typology of language planning – a concept first used by Valter Tauli (1968) and later expanded by other linguists (e.g. Ferguson 1977; Haugen 1983). (1) Language status planning – policies regulating the social functions or uses of languages or language variations. Here, language policy concerns resolving language conflicts that have already manifested, or avoiding latent conflicts. For example, certain languages might be promoted or alternatively suppressed or neglected. (2) Linguistic policy at the international level can be seen as a special aspect of the first domain of language planning. It entails the promotion and dissemination of one’s language abroad and of foreign languages domestically. (3) Corpus planning involves norm selection, for example the standardization and codification of languages and language variations, terminology, and nomenclature. (4) Language/discourse regulation as directed by political interests, that is to say the hegemonic control of public – even scholarly/scientific – discourse and terms. The most direct form of this is the control of language by political parties and governments, which is eventually practised by every political regime and is more or less implicitly based on ideological consensus.

Our summary presentation of the extraordinarily broad field of language policy focuses on the functional differentiation of languages in transnational relations. Yet, aspects of standardization and rules of discourse also come into play, and thus ultimately must also be taken into account. As a rule, language policy is carried out simultaneously both discursively and from a practical policy standpoint; both types of action are always at play in the modern era. Also as a rule, language policy action is always prepared and supported by discourse, in the sense that discourse offers explanation, motivation, or justification for actions. Discourse also serves as an act of self-assurance for actors and as a vehicle for winning consensus if not of those directly affected, then of those whose consent is needed for action, for example that of a majority of the population against a minority, or vice versa. The examination of the relevant discourses is important insofar as interests can be clearly identified and any contradictions between official discourse and actual practice can be guaranteed.

The close interaction between discursive and practical aspects of policy is one reason to view language policy – its theoretical and practical dimensions – as a unified whole. There might well be cases where one has little or nothing to do with the other. However, if we leave it at the examination of individual events and do not at least look for deducible connections between various acts of language policy by one and the same actor, then we close the door to important explanatory relations.

Language policy in transregional contexts

‘Language has always been the consort of Empire and shall forever remain its mate’, wrote Antonio de Nebrija in the preface to the first Spanish grammar. The grammar appeared the same year that Christopher Columbus discovered America, as if it was intended to establish the language policy for the development of Latin America. It has almost become a truism that the prevailing language is the language of the ruler (Cuius regio eius lingua) and a similar claim can be made for religion (Cuius regio eius religio). In all large-scale and/or multilingual empires, the dominance of one language became a given, even if only for practical reasons, which in turn could serve as a cover for repressive language policy.

The consort of power – the implementation of a language – often appears to result from a different type of policy action, so that it creates the impression that no language policy exists.
Just as the dissemination of Latin in the Roman Empire had not been mandated, and thus seemed to have occurred spontaneously, so too did the spread of Spanish and Portuguese in Latin America seem to have taken place spontaneously. But one should not lose sight of the fact that the removal, annihilation, or corruption of previous elites antedated this process, so that the remaining population, now leaderless and incapacitated, had no choice other than to subordinate their own language. Indeed, that which was repressed or destroyed was the supporting structure of a linguistically bound culture. Whether or not Spanish and Portuguese conquerors did this with premeditation, it was a serious intervention into the communication habits and linguistic self-esteem of the affected communities. In this context, it seems justified to speak of a language policy by the sword, with Spanish and Portuguese conquistadors not being its sole practitioners; there are many other examples. In the fifteenth century, the Castilian monarchy destroyed the Galician aristocracy (later termed 'the taming and castration of Galicia'), thereby ensuring the decline of the Galician language; and Oliver Cromwell took similar actions in Ireland, laying the groundwork for its Anglicization.

The transnational or national kingdoms that emerged in the modern era adopted various approaches to language policy. Up until the eighteenth century, governments for the most part had not used language to assimilate newly conquered regions; instead, they created the linguistic conditions for effective administration. Following the annexation of Hungary, Croatia, and Transylvania, the Habsburgs promoted the establishment of educational systems in the language of the local population, even as acts of the central administration were conducted in Latin or German. In contrast, Russia, after annexing Ukraine and later other Eastern European and Central Asian territories, instituted a policy of Russification that made Russian the language of education and administration, with some local and temporal exceptions. Russian language policy in Bessarabia is a case in point. Following its annexation in 1812, the reform-minded Tsar Alexander I had pledged generous language rights to the Moldavian boyar class (aristocracy) and to the clergy, and this policy continued until his death in 1825, after which his successors introduced a policy of Russification that, in time, reached all levels of religion and education.

Even after the emergence of colonial empires, differences in language policy can be seen between the different colonial powers. In the British colonies in Africa and Asia, a relatively liberal language policy was introduced that created the conditions for a gradual Anglicization of local elites. However, in territories conquered by the French in the nineteenth century, the use of French as the sole language of administration was strictly enforced and where educational institutions were established, the same held true. This strict application was indebted to the legacy of Jacobin state centralism, so that conflicts over language in the French colonies were dealt with in the same way as those in the French metropole.

Thus, in addition to language policy by the sword, there is language policy that aims at linguistic uprooting or eradication. Slaves who came from Africa spoke many different languages, and thus when intermixed, they could not communicate with each other using their mother tongues, effectively destroying those languages. The result was the emergence of pidgins and creole languages – spontaneous creations derived from elements of the language used by French, Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch overseers and masters and having grammatical systems that might have originated in part from indigenous roots, in part from the language of domination and in part from a purported universal language faculty.

Soviet linguistic policy represents a distinct chapter in the history of transregional language policy. Lenin's policy on nationalities, or national minorities, was based on the principle of nations having the right to self-determination, thus leading to the creation of various unions, autonomous Soviet republics, and autonomous regions and districts established along ethno-linguistic lines. It also resulted in the introduction of writing systems for hitherto purely oral
languages. In official Soviet discourse, the generous funding of nations, nationalities, and ethnic groups was a testament to the regime’s benevolent and progressive character. Yet, already in the 1920s, two realities pointed in the direction of a general policy of Russification. First, Russian-speaking officials occupied most key administrative positions in every region of the empire. Second, the extremely centralized character of Soviet decision-making left little room for the self-assertion of other languages. Ironically, it was Joseph Stalin, a Georgian, who initiated the process of Russification. By the end of the 1930s, this process required, among other things, that the above-mentioned newly created written languages convert to Cyrillic script if they used Latin, Arabic, or other script.

As a large-scale attempt at transregional language policy, the Soviet reconfiguration of discourse is interesting because it shows how language policy can intervene in a linguistic group’s perception of identity. Clearly, the sociocultural distribution of language functions takes place in accordance with the number of speakers and the density of the territory (Dešerijev 1971), so that smaller linguistic groups are excluded from a broad range of prestigious functions. Nevertheless, it was Soviet insistence that wide-ranging areas of social communication be carried out exclusively in Russian – for example, all political communication, both within Russia and in non-Russian republics; instruction at most institutions of higher education; scholarly research, with the exception of the humanities; and all business communications and transactions in the industrial sector – created an atmosphere of linguistic inferiority. Ultimately, this atmosphere was devastating for the union. Nine wars have taken place in former Soviet territories since the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – in each of these wars, linguistic marginalization by those who spoke the language of ‘inter-union and interethnic communication’ has played a more or less prominent role.

Additionally, ongoing tensions between the titular nation and Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic and Caucasus states and in Moldova are rooted in Soviet language policy. Here, the Russian language has become, so to speak, the fetish of anti-Russian sentiment, manifesting in discourse on the threat posed by Russia to the newly independent states – albeit in practice Russian still is used as the language of communication between former Soviet states. The Russian example shows that the long-term consequences of linguistic policy actions and stances need to be considered, especially in relation to linguistic identities.

Today, transregional language policy is actualized primarily through the linguistic strategies of international organizations and more or less permanent alliances of states, such as the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the BRICS Forum (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), and the Eurasian Economic Union. The fact that English dominates as the preferred and at times only language of negotiation is due to various interests. English (or another international language) might be chosen as a quick and efficient solution for effective communication between parties; however, this solution as the ‘simplest’ one (compared to utilizing several languages) also satisfies the hegemonic claim of the stronger party or parties. Certainly, for those parties that submit to the linguistic dictates of the more powerful party, there are advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, they might profit from being integrated into a large network of commercial, political, and military connections. On the other hand, acquiescing to the more powerful party also leaves them linguistically and culturally disenfranchised. Additionally, minority language speakers are always one step behind speakers of the dominant language, as they cannot implement international agreements until those agreements have been translated into the local language. It would be fairer if international organizations used a language that is neither a national nor a state language, such as Esperanto, Latin (Vatican excepted), or something similar. Today it might sound utopian but should one not in principle foster such a hope?
After all, W.F. Haug (2016: 135) has already signalled how transregional language policy in the age of globalization affects even the establishment of linguistic standards:

*Transnational Capitalism* – as global means of production, creates a global language for the exchange of enormous amounts of data worldwide and across business sectors. Under the guidance of the UN Commission for Europe and in cooperation with institutions of standardization from 60 nations, the standard language – Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, Commerce and Transport (EDIFACT) – was developed.

**Note**

1 This might explain why, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Eastern European nations opted in the 1990s to join the International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF) despite having few or no cultural-linguistic ties to the francophone community (Erfurt 2005: 17ff.).

**Select bibliography**

Intellectual property rights have a particular relationship with processes of regionalization and transregionalization, which I will illustrate by connecting the history of the propertization of cultural and scientific relations with the history of regionalization and transregionalization of social, political, and legal orders. By propertization, I mean that the relationships between legal subjects (such as persons, organizations, and states) and objects (such as symbolic forms that are regarded as intangible or immaterial objects) are increasingly conceived and regulated as property-based. Regionalization refers to the making of social, cultural, legal, political, and economic spaces on different scales, as well as to processes of territorialization that aim at defining and establishing a cultural, political, economic, legal, and institutional regime that is anchored in, attributed to, or named after a specific territory or sociogeographic area.

Laws, institutions, and historical narratives

Intellectual property law assigns a bundle of exclusive rights to authors, artists, and inventors. Thus, copyright law assigns, for example, rights to copy, perform, translate, revise, diffuse, and sell certain categories of cultural artefacts, for instance original works of art, designs, texts, and music. Patent law defines and controls the use of new and useful knowledge together with technical procedures. The original holders of such rights can transfer them to third parties, for example enterprises, performing artists, and agents. Legal, social, and cultural histories analyse the varying composition of such bundles of rights and the varying constellations and roles of stakeholders.

Traditionally, the focus of the legal and institutional historiography of intellectual property rights has been placed on the legal forms and political legitimation of intellectual property rights; tensions between exclusive proprietary goods and inclusive non-proprietary cultural commons (ranging from so-called collective public goods to different types of common-pool resources); and on the search for legal, social, and cultural balances of power and interests. Recent historical and social research on cultural industries relativizes and complements the interest for proprietary forms of control by embedding various forms of propertization and depropertization into the wider history of different institutional strategies, national and global interests, political regimes, and intercultural conflicts.
The range of institutional knowledge is broadening and differentiating because the boundaries between ‘free’ and ‘protected’ cultural and scientific knowledge and forms of expression have shifted over the course of history as well as due to transfers between cultures. Intellectual property rights are simultaneously both ambiguous and multifunctional, since the objects, subjects, and media that are regulated by them are manifold and since these rights are used in different social constellations and cultural contexts. The tension between old and new, and indigenous and foreign institutions is becoming permanent. The following historical overview shows that the ability to develop, implement, adapt, and resist proprietary institutions as well as to be able to realistically judge their advantages and disadvantages have become more and more important for social actors.

**Intellectual property and the rise of the national state, society, culture, economy, and law (1770s–1870s)**

The concept of intellectual property was developed in Western and Central European as well as in American states during the great institutional and social revolutions and reforms between circa 1770 and 1870. During the modernization of the territorial state and the often concomitant nationalization of society, culture, economy, and law, the concept acquired a more specific meaning and function. Its rise in use and diffusion was connected with the expansion of trade, liberal markets, industrial capitalism, freedom of speech and press, public sphere, civil society, rule of law, and constitutional regimes. Within nation-states, intellectual property rights were intended to stabilize cooperative and competitive relationships between specific professional and interest groups, which made claims about the use and exploitation of knowledge as well as forms of expression.

Propertization and nationalization of cultural and economic relations were, in many ways, complementary processes. States and social elites used the concept and norms of intellectual property to coordinate their particular interests and then to adapt them to their overarching goal of establishing a national culture, science, and economy. By establishing a unitary national law, they stopped a long tradition of what was seen as ‘unfair’ competition between original printers and publishing houses who held the copyrights and were in a privileged legal and economic position in the political and cultural capital on the one side, and unlicensed reprinters, or pirates, in the provinces on the other side. The first and exemplary national copyright laws, for instance the British Statute of Anne from 1710 and the revolutionary French decree for the rights of authors from 1793, ended the competition between privileged printers in London and Paris and illegal reprinters in Scotland and Lyon as well as other towns within the French periphery.

Many legal, cultural, and economic devices that had been diffused by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire in large parts of continental Europe survived, being adapted for new uses in the first half of the nineteenth century. Such adaptations emerged from conservatives, liberals, democrats, and nationalists who participated in efforts to use and modify proprietary institutions for the sake of cultural, political, and economic stability and progress. Intellectual property rights served as moral and legal tools in processes of cultural, economic, and legal harmonization.

In many European countries, the propertization of culture and knowledge was embedded in the transformation of elites during the transition from the old aristocratic regime of the society based on the estates, to the bourgeois regime and class society. In the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, it was predominantly property-owning and educated bourgeois middle-class circles who took an interest in the protection of intellectual property: employers in
industry, media, and culture; all kinds of authors; performing artists; parts of the public; inventors; engineers and architects; and a small groups of lawyers specializing in copyright, patents, and trademarks in their professional, advisory, bureaucratic, legislative, and executive political functions.

The modern state – governed by the rule of law and based on culture – assigned individual exclusive rights to authors and publishers, inventors, and industrial entrepreneurs for intellectual works and inventions. Across Europe and parts of the Americas the argument gained momentum that intellectual property law could regulate problems that traditional legal instruments and institutions, such as publishing privileges, commercial monopolies, and exclusive rights of guilds, had failed to resolve. These new, exclusive rights in cultural, technical, and scientific areas remained, however, contested for a long time. Gradually, the claims of authors and inventors to a natural right to their works – claims that were initially grounded in pragmatic, moral, or philosophical ideals – were addressed and defined by constitutional requirements, court rulings, standardized forms of private contracts, legal commentaries, and specific legal theories. Although material property rights were a central element of the systematic and theoretically coherent civil, criminal, or public law codes from the very beginning of modern legislation and codification, intellectual property rights were devised mainly within the framework of everyday practice and pragmatically written by courts, legal practitioners, lobbyists, and interested legislators. It was only later that copyright law and patent law emerged as legal fields and specializations.

For a long time, intellectual property law regulated only a few selected functions and uses. Literary and artistic property law standardized functions and relationships in the printing, book, and sheet music industries. Intellectual property rights were implemented mainly in the culture of elites and in industrialized mass culture. In traditional popular culture, whose artefacts could not easily be attributed to an individual author, they were neglected. The law of patents became increasingly important in those fields of industry and science that were technically innovative and economically dynamic, such as the chemical, mechanical, and electrical industries. In both fields, legislators placed limits on individual intellectual property rights with regard to duration and in the interests of the public sphere, the state, and cultural or scientific progress. The interventions of the state for reducing access to protected knowledge and cultural goods were legitimated by changing coalitions of stakeholders from the elites and middle classes. From time to time, the difference between private property on the one side and commons in the sense of common-pool (shared rights for a defined and limited number of members) and public domain (vaguely defined as belonging to a nation, civilization, or mankind) on the other side were blurred and had to be redefined.

Intellectual property rights in the age of internationalization and transnationalization of culture-, media-, science-, and knowledge-based industries (1870s–1970s)

With international exchanges in culture, media, and knowledge industries, balancing interests in cross-border relationships became more intense and pressing. What to do when protected cultural assets were published, processed, translated, and commercially exploited beyond their own territory of origin? Even in countries that already had modern patent laws in place, the ‘first notifier’ could receive a patent for a foreign invention that was not their own. This meant that where intellectual property rights could not be protected explicitly from unauthorized cross-border use through a private contract between the original author, originating publisher, or patent owner and the foreign user or exploiter, any claims consequently evaporated beyond national borders. Those affected by this counterfeiting and reprinting called it piracy; however,
they could do very little about it as the regulatory powers and powers of sanction by the sovereign state stopped at the border of their own country. States and governments that declared intellectual property to be sacrosanct in their own territory adopted an ambivalent position with regard to the claim rights of foreign citizens and businesses. In the competition for political power, cultural influence, economic prosperity, and military strength, exclusivity claims based on foreign law were inevitably settled for the benefit of the domestic nation.

It soon became evident that liberal propertization strategies at a national level were not sufficient. The stated view of the middle classes and liberal society of property owners was that tangible as well as intangible property rights were a question of universal, exclusive rights based on individual work, achievement, and investment – a view that risked becoming no more than fantasy. Legislators at regional and national levels were urged to intensify the search for solutions.

While trade and customs barriers were removed owing to free trade policies, states and national interest groups focused increasingly on the institutions of intellectual property. Copyright, patents, and trademarks, accompanied by a whole raft of derivative, related ancillary rights, were to provide the basis for regulating and sanctioning the competition and cooperation between individuals and organizations even on an international level. A few Western and Central European countries that were both cultural exporters and industrial states determined the standards that were consequently adopted, either voluntarily or under pressure, by other states.

At the same time, entrepreneurs, authors, inventors, and lawyers put increasing pressure on legislators and state administrations to draw up international agreements that would protect private and national interests. In Europe, intergovernmental negotiations regarding standards in bilateral contracts and in property and commercial law initially intensified in the wake of liberalizing and free trade policies in the 1840s and in the 1860s. Large and medium-sized ‘cultural and industrial states’ protected the intellectual property rights of their entrepreneurs, inventors, and authors primarily through a network of bilateral trade agreements, which often confirmed both material and immaterial property rights and regulated the exchange of all kinds of goods. Large states increasingly regarded the protection of intellectual property rights abroad as an integral part of their foreign cultural policy.

In the 1870s, discussions about the international harmonization of intellectual property rights were revived by the great powers in European and global culture-, media-, and science-based industries. These powers namely comprised Germany and France, which had a hegemonic position in many respects on the European continent; Great Britain, with its strong cultural and commercial interests in the colonies and in the United States (US); and Spain, which controlled large parts of the book trade in South America. Additionally, industrial and cultural middle powers such as Switzerland, Belgium, and – at that time – the USA were also involved. After the failure of creating a uniform international standard of protection, European industry- and culture-exporting states subsequently developed modes of protection of literary and artistic works as well as technical inventions through multilateral agreements. The moral, legal, institutional, and organizational foundations were established in the 1880s: the Paris Convention of 1883 regulated international patent protection and the Berne Convention of 1886 regulated the international protection of literary and artistic property.

The international regime of intellectual property was founded thereafter on the principles of mutual recognition of national copyright (reciprocity), the equality of the foreign and domestic parties in the patent and copyright law of each nation (national treatment), and the harmonization of laws. In the case of technical inventions, the criteria by which states awarded their patents were universalized, but individual patents also had to be acquired for each country concerned. These international conventions protected the globalization of the culture, media, and
knowledge industries during the twentieth century and ensured the worldwide dissemination of Western standards in cultural, scientific, and economic relations. However, the implementation of these international standards was not seamless or without problems in Europe or worldwide. European imperial powers such as Great Britain and France also implemented the legal system of the mother country in addition to the international conventions in their colonies while still maintaining a certain preferential treatment for the authors, inventors, and businesses of the imperial motherland. When in 1906 the secretary general noticed with pride that the Berne Union had 15 member countries, which together represented 666 million people, he also mentioned that almost 400 million of them belonged to Great Britain and its numerous colonies and dominions (Röthlisberger 1906: 20).

Even within Europe, the convergence and harmonization of intellectual property rights was massively and repeatedly restricted up until the First World War. Industrial countries – for example, Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands – completely resisted recognizing the international Patent Convention until 1900. Multilingual imperial states such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire and tsarist Russia distanced themselves from the Berne Union in order to protect literary and artistic property since their publishers complained that translation costs and royalties for foreign authors bore no relation to expected returns in light of the limited market in less widely spoken languages. And most of the states of North and South America were not members of the Berne Union, preferring to draw up a raft of multilateral agreements under the umbrella of the Pan-American Copyright Convention, to which they allowed access to non-American states in only exceptional cases.

Despite such tensions, the concepts of intellectual property were diffused to more and more regions of the world. Following the nineteenth century, lawyers, politicians, authors, employees, and officials in international specialized agencies worked on a comparative analysis and harmonization of the situation. National and international standards of hegemony were brought into line with certain relationships and needs on the basis of national and local traditions, mentalities, and interests specific to legal culture. The main legal models for international proper-tization were the Anglo-Saxon concepts of copyright and intellectual property rights and the continental European concepts of literary and artistic property, author’s right (Urheberrecht), moral rights, immaterial rights, and copyright contract law. The development of patent law also specifically followed French, English, German, and US standards. Based on intensive cultural transfers, and despite certain legal idiosyncrasies, harmonization especially occurred in the transatlantic context over the twentieth century.

Around 1900, European imperialist powers and the USA urged Japan and China either to accept the implementation of foreign intellectual property law in their territories by extraterritorial jurisdiction or to introduce their own copyright laws, patent laws, and trademark laws, which would be strongly influenced by the hegemonic Western countries and would be in concordance with multilateral international conventions. The Japanese patent and copyright laws were originally inspired by German laws and later embraced US laws. Japan joined the Berne Union in 1899 in order to strengthen its position in international trade relations despite fears that the protection of foreign works would increase their price and thus hinder Japan catching up with the West. Japan at that time ranked among the world’s leading countries with regard to the number of printed books/published titles per year, but the tradition of individual author’s rights was rather weak. As a consequence, it was suspected by other countries until the middle of the twentieth century that Japan would ignore the rights of foreign authors and composers the state did not sanction.

Many scholars explain the Japanese and Chinese reactions to a Western proprietary and individualistic culture with reference to a traditional preference for cultural continuity, commons, and emulation. Although the cult for novelty, creativity, and the exclusive control of the
original work was not completely absent in the cultures and book trades of Japan and China, deeply rooted religious and cultural styles as well as administrative and political traditions and attitudes had so far prevented the cult for novelty and individual intellectual property rights becoming widely accepted and institutionalized. In China, the development of a proprietary order in knowledge and cultural relations was first enforced by foreign imperial powers who threatened the country with trade or even military sanctions. In the 1920s and 1930s, intellectual property laws were introduced by Chinese governments, which disputed now traditional concepts of bureaucratic control of written and published materials as well as the widely diffused idea that texts and other symbolic forms were rather transmitted than created by the ‘producer’ or ‘multiplier’.

In the early twentieth century, European lawyers were convinced that their intellectual property rights were a universal principle and institution. At the same time, they were inclined to underestimate the problems involved in transferring their law to new contexts and overestimate the usefulness of their own norms and procedures in another legal culture. Thus in countries outside Western Europe and North America, property law often proved to be less robust than in its originating regions. Again and again, hegemonic states and international organizations temporarily lost effective control over the propertization process, which was spreading further and further afield. In this way, hybrid legal patterns and forms of legal pluralism were developing in which traditional and new as well as domestic and foreign norms coexisted.

Convergences and divergences in the twentieth century

A further impetus toward liberal propertization policies came about after the First World War, when Eastern and Central European nation-states that had emerged from the Habsburg Empire acceded to the Berne Union. In the 1920s, a new protagonist entered the scene with the creation of the League of Nations, which systematically integrated propertization and globalization strategies into culture, science, and the economy, and in turn energetically promoted them. At the same time, international cartels of large companies in the chemical and electrical industries used patents and patent pools as instruments of monopolistic strategies and commercial expansion.

After 1917, fundamentally new patterns of intellectual property rights emerged in communist Russia, from where they were exported in the late 1940s to Eastern European countries. Communist strategies of propertization and depropertization prioritized the property claims of the state and adapted the concept of national commons or a national public domain by redefining it as the cultural heritage of the people and the collective cultural property of the socialist nation. Traditional claims and individual exclusive rights of authors and inventors were restricted, recodified, and recontextualized. The rights and duties of authors and inventors were primarily regulated by standardizing publishing and work contracts. Detailed lists were drawn up for the remuneration of different types of intellectual works and different categories of authors, inventors, professionals, and performing artists. Copyright served a supervisory and repressive function and was used to promote state interests within the process of cultural and scientific progress in both domestic and international relations. In some Eastern and Central European as well as Southeastern European countries, authors, composers, and performing artists who succeeded in establishing a certain control over professional affairs in the framework of the existing political system defended, and sometimes even enlarged, the material functions of intellectual property rights.

In China, where patent law and copyright laws were introduced in the 1950s following the Soviet model, such regulations were completely abolished by the Cultural Revolution between
1966 and 1977. Until very recently, the role of intellectual property rights in China was, therefore, much more important in external than in internal relations. In the 1980s and 1990s, China was strongly accused by the leading industrial nations and international organizations of violating international standards. Finally, China developed a functioning intellectual property rights regime in order to strengthen foreign trade relations and the policies of joint ventures with Western partners as well as to protect their own interests.

In fascist and authoritarian states and empires, which controlled large parts of Europe and the world between around 1930 and 1945, the intellectual property laws appeared to be comparatively stable. But their underlying effects were ambivalent and varied considerably depending upon political and economic conditions and often upon arbitrary decisions. The hierarchy and relationship between the strategies of propertization, nationalization, and globalization were radically modified to be in line with dominant political goals and ideologies. Members of discriminated ethnic groups and political milieus were deprived of their individual material and immaterial property rights by denying citizenship as well as civil rights.

After a phase of stagnation and massive setbacks during the Great Depression, in fascist Europe, and above all during the Second World War, the propertization projects of the inter-war years were taken up once again after 1945 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Berne Union, the Paris Convention and leading Western industrial countries, which implemented many such projects between 1950 and 1970. The development was strongly influenced by the USA, which advanced its foreign cultural and knowledge policies within the framework of UNESCO and the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC, founded in 1952) before finally also becoming a formal member of the Berne Convention in 1987. Following the 1960s, ever more countries of the socialist camp and from the developing world participated in the international agreements for the protection of intellectual property. Many of them joined the UCC, which had lower standards regarding protection of knowledge, original works, and cultural artefacts compared to the Berne Convention, thereby reducing the costs for translating and printing scientific works, textbooks for schools, and designs. The UCC was promoted by UNESCO, in which the number of post-colonial member states from Asia and Africa increased rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s. The UCC thus became the arena where the big and middle powers of the Western and Eastern blocs negotiated international standards with representatives of developing countries, who had almost no, or only small, cultural and scientific industries and therefore were forced to import corresponding goods and services from abroad – often from firms in the centres of the respective former empires. Advanced industrial nations, or net exporters, of protected expressions and science-based goods used UNESCO and the UCC for convincing post-colonial states that intellectual property, free trade, knowledge diplomacy, foreign cultural policy, and multilateral international agreements were the best way for steering inter- and transnational flows of knowledge and goods. Post-colonial states further used the arena for debating and settling issues such as justice, restitution, cultural identity, and cultural diversity as well as the value, social recognition, and legal status of so-called native knowledge and forms of expression that were regarded as folklore. There was temporary hesitation whether such cultural works, which were often not systematically defined and fixed and could not be ascribed to an individual originator, were to be protected as private property, public domain, state-owned property, or as a collective commons of a local, tribal, regional, national, or transnational community or legal-political organization, whose membership was defined by criteria of social, cultural, and natural origins.

In 1967, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) took over as the new umbrella organization, consolidating a regime of intellectual property laws that had a global scope and in which the negotiations between old and new interest groups and their specialized
international organizations were coordinated. After the 1980s, new challenges emerged regarding the expectations of intellectual property due to increasing liberalization of scientific, cultural, and economic relationships; the digitization and expansion of cultural, media, and information industries; the collapse of communist regimes in Europe and its far-reaching consequences for the institutional order on a global scale; the political, cultural, and economic integration of new, large industrial states into international conventions for free trade, intellectual property, and so on; and the growing role of European and US media (such as films, DVDs, etc.) and knowledge-based goods in Asian, African, and Middle Eastern markets and societies. Such trends continue to challenge the relative positions between the different regions and powers in an increasingly multipolar world.

In Western and Eastern Europe, intellectual property regimes converged again from the 1970s onwards. Communist regimes in countries with a higher level of industrial and cultural production increasingly used copyrights and patents as unavoidable legal instruments in foreign trade relations and for procuring urgently needed hard currency. They expanded their exports of books, films, designs, patented technical procedures, and textbooks. Consequently, they joined international committees of experts who taught the legal and institutional foundations of intellectual property in African and Asian states. Furthermore, they promised to respect patents, designs, and trademarks in order to make joint ventures with large Western companies. Therefore, the full integration into the harmonized European and global systems after 1990 was for many of them only a gradual shift.

In the last few decades, patent, copyright, and trademark law and related ancillary rights have become central legal, political, and moral institutions of the world economy. In the context of the liberalization of international trade relations, they were imposed and accepted worldwide in order to profit from free trade and predictability in international relations. Since 1994, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has, with the help of the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), increasingly pressured governments and non-state parties that tried to reject or restrict international standards by claiming such standards are unfair. Today, 189 states belong to WIPO and 164 to the WTO; their legal standards seem to be recognized throughout the world. But these standards remain controversial for many reasons. Critics from the Global South accuse patent law of protecting the special interests of rich states and multinational corporations in the knowledge industry rather than the general human right to health and prosperity. Critics at the centre of the globalized world complain that copyright no longer serves workers in the cultural sector, the public, or the culture of a nation, but rather the concerns of the globally operating media. Negotiations over the harmonization of national copyright, patent, and trademark laws to conform with WTO guidelines and European Union directives show that even in those large European states where intellectual property rights are traditionally well established doubts are being expressed over uniform international laws. Conflicts within this topic manifest themselves not only in public protests of civil anti-propertization movements but also in national parliaments and at courts. The search for new forms of understanding and communication are thus once again the key to a renewed public debate concerning material and immaterial property rights.

Conclusions

The concept of intellectual property was originally developed in the context of the nationalization and liberalization sweeping European and American societies, cultures, economies, and political and legal orders. We are still reminded of these roots today by the cyclical revival of standard legal and economic theories, historical master narratives, cultural myths, and political
discourses regarding the affinity between liberal values and individual property rights as well as regarding the balance between private and public rights. Processes of propertization are interwoven with processes of regionalization and transregionalization in manifold ways and on different scales: in region-building on the infra-state and cross-national levels, in empire- as well as nation-building, and in Europeanization, Westernization, Easternization, colonialization and decolonialization, globalization, and so on.

By means of intellectual property laws, the legislators protect not only individuals but also particular interests of regional interest groups, nations, civilizations, as well as international cultural and economic cartels. States and national interest groups propagate the propertization of culture and knowledge within and beyond their own territories in order to increase influence and consolidate power. This leads to tension and conflict between those who export their cultural commodities and institutions on the one hand and those who depend on cultural imports on the other hand.

States and national interest groups use the instruments of intellectual property in order to protect forms of expression and science originating in their region during cross-border activities of exchange and commercial exploitation. In this way, states protect their national interests against third-party states and foreign users. Countries with a higher protection level for intellectual works and inventions have urged and continue to urge states with a lower protection level to adopt their rules. This might also include from time to time the acceptance of compulsory licences. The parties concerned might attempt to convince potential customers, cooperation partners, as well as countries that are not (yet) incorporated into the system of proprietary relations of the moral, economic, and legal advantages of their intellectual property law. In this, they often refer to their own history of progress and success. They present intellectual property law as a universal recipe for the institutionalization of knowledge and culture.

Economically weaker and culturally dependent states become involved when they believe their participation in processes of cooperation, regulated by the property model, will strengthen their general opportunities for action and of becoming suppliers and rights holders themselves. If the expected effects fail to materialize and the chances of equal participation appear negligible, the acceptance of intellectual property laws by the weaker party is, as a rule, minimal. If a vicious circle of depropertization starts in the peripheries of the globalized system of international and intercultural relations, it cannot easily be stopped or reverted to its previous form by the dominant parties at the centre. This leads to anomic conditions as well as conflict, both open and hidden, with arrogance on one side, mimicry and evasion on the other.

Until quite recently, so-called traditional knowledge and forms of expression were seen as assets in the public domain because these assets were not based on individual creative work. But as more and more possibilities of commercial exploitation become available, the intellectual property rights to these indigenous works and cultural items are claimed by businesses and protected by the international regime of intellectual property rights. The question of whether symbolic goods and forms of knowledge can be considered to be property – and are thus protectable as such – has traditionally been decided on the basis of the relationships of power and domination in cultural and intercultural relationships. The discrimination against handicraft, folk, or indigenous cultural goods in the hierarchies of cultural goods was commonplace both within Western countries as well as in their relations with colonized non-Western or indigenous cultures. This situation has currently reached a certain turning point all over the world. In the centres of the global economy, digitization, the Internet, and a universalized idea of individual appropriation and creativity have expanded, and at the same time minimized, the role of individual authorship and authenticity. At the periphery, representatives of so-called indigenous or folk cultures have learned how the ideas of subjective creativity and
individual intellectual property can be used for their own purposes. Current dealings with what are referred to as indigenous forms of expression, traditional knowledge, natural resources, and genes in the peripheral states of India, the Americas, and Africa are regulated more rigorously than ever before according to the property model. It is no longer just globally active Western rights holders, businesses, and states that are involved, but also businesses, governments, elites, interest groups, and local communities from emerging and developing countries. For several decades, stakeholders throughout the world formerly considered to be ‘peripheral’ have been increasingly calling attention to intellectual property when negotiating their moral and legal claims. The ‘international language of intellectual property’ is also sometimes used by the representatives of old or restored tribal communities, ethnic groups, and village communities in order to protect and commercially exploit their distinct knowledge and designs. In this process, however, conflicts over exclusive and inclusive rights of disposal and use are simply brought to global attention in a new way.

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Introduction

In the 1980s, interest in international higher education began to increase against the backdrop of a changing global order and the burgeoning knowledge age. In the field of higher education, the term internationalization started to be used to describe what had moved beyond ‘multicultural’ and ‘comparative’ education. In the 1990s, terminologies expanded, coming to include ‘transnational’, ‘cross-border’, and ‘borderless’ due to the increasing elements of mobility and market-driven activities (Knight 2008).

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the usage of ‘globalization’ began to take off in higher education, with arguments following the general strands of thought about the phenomenon. Those embracing the economic opportunities associated with globalization predicted infinite opportunities, including the recruitment of students, establishing branch campuses, and the emergence of ‘global universities’ (Wildavsky 2010). Scholars who took a critical stand saw universities as being subjected to the global knowledge economy, progressing from ivory towers to oil wells (Ward 2008: 259).

Since the beginning of these debates, the assumption has remained that globalization in higher education has been instigated in an ambiguous West, with American and Western European templates (Naidoo 2011: 48), and by international organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Commission (Münch 2009: 30). Thus, discourses on higher education and globalization show parallels in terms of centring on economic matters and on the question of where globalization originates.

What distinguishes the discourses is the concept of internationalization. In research on globalization, the term prevails among those who argue that the global economy is internationalized and triadic rather than global. In higher education, however, the term keeps on circulating prominently; internationalization is widely perceived as a reaction toward globalization, charged with a significantly more positive connotation than globalization. Globalization and internationalization are coexisting, the latter often associated with how a university shapes its mode of being globally connected (Egron-Polak 2005: 58–60).

Instead of research looking at these modes, patterns, and strategies that individual universities develop, internationalization remains an arbitrary and expansionary concept. Scholars continue to be consumed by researching global higher education as a large-scale and all-encompassing
Claudia Baumann

process. Contrary to this logic, this chapter places concrete sociopolitical arenas in the foreground and discusses universities as portals of globalization. These portals are understood as places where actors with different sets of interests instigate, accelerate, and control academic mobility as well as the exchange and production of knowledge.

Focusing on universities rather than on entire higher education systems sheds light on the nature, intensity, and directionality of connections. Border-transcending connections between universities become empirically tangible, which in turn reveal that connectedness often is rather transnational or transregional than global in its character.

The first part of this chapter demonstrates how universities have acquired a symbolic function as portals of globalization in an increasingly interconnected higher education discourse. The second part underlines how universities have experienced a de facto growth in institutional power, as they have gained a new degree of importance and developed ways of dealing with the ‘global condition’. In this process, the distribution of power between universities and the nation-state has changed fundamentally. Differentiation and ranking in the higher education landscape, as laid out in the third part, has led to an unprecedented exposure of individual institutions that can no longer hide behind the relative insulation of national academic systems. The university’s role in facilitating and steering global mobility is probably the most salient and quantifiable feature of the university as a portal, and thus receives attention in the fourth part. As a place of arrival and departure, the university is a place of transit – and in an atmosphere of heightened border regulation, it can also serve as an attractive gateway for migration, global employability, and even a potential route to citizenship. Access to these sites of global promise is limited, however, and decisions on who is granted admission are not taken arbitrarily – this admission is a decisive factor in steering global mobility. The fifth part deals with the teaching of ‘the global’ through course curricula, an aspect that is rarely touched upon in assessing the role of universities.

Discursive rescaling

My first argument is that a global higher education discourse has developed in a way in which universities have acquired a symbolic function while serving as a focal point through which both hopes and fears in managing processes of globalization are articulated. The university is charged with significantly more importance than in earlier times, and it becomes, through a discursive rescaling, more and more a portal of globalization (Baumann, Dietze and Maruschke 2017).

Despite the university undergoing a phase of unprecedented change – some might even suggest it is ‘in crisis’ as it struggles for survival in competitive higher education markets – government officials throughout the world inflate the role of universities to unobtainable heights. Universities, they argue, are expected to remedy the full gamut of issues, from strengthening the economy, reinvigorating the government, fulfilling social expectations, providing international conflict mediation, healing cultural wounds, and promoting tolerance, and all the while fulfilling its traditional objectives of providing an expansive and quality education to each student. Universities have come to be regarded with almost mythical curative properties whose powers can address all societal ailments.

Government officials employ the university as a platform to construct self-serving narratives that address both internal and external audiences. In this process, reconciling ‘the national’ and ‘the global’ fulfils a double function. In more inward-looking perspectives, it calms the fears of those who see themselves at risk of being changed or absorbed by what they think is globalization; meanwhile, in more outward-looking strands of thought, it helps to orient or assert a position in the reconfiguration of the global political order.
Universities as portals of globalization

Analysing the visions, missions, and strategies set out in presidential speeches and official documents of ministries and national agencies gives an account of the current global higher education discourse and policies related to it. This analysis reveals that there is a hybridization of the discourse of globalization and higher education with a distinct vocabulary (Fairclough 2006: 3). That, however, is only one perspective of the higher education discourse, a convenient and comparatively uncontroversial platform from which politicians pontificate.

On the opposite side of the rhetorical spectrum is the harsh criticism of students and faculty members, denouncing what they see as a violation of fundamental values in higher education, pointedly referring to the university as being ‘in crisis’. Student protests against the economization of universities in many parts of the world are an expression of this discontent. Nested within global higher education rhetoric is a wide array of perspectives: some of them see universities as a key institution for boosting innovation and competition, others prefer to emphasize the conflictive role as an independent research institution with universal values, and others still point to the university as a place where social conflicts and frictions are negotiated. What all of these discursive strands have in common is that the institution of the university stands at its centre, and active measures in contesting and managing its role are expected to continue from all sides.

The empowered university

The question of whether a university has more power than in earlier times is the subject of controversial debates. On the one hand, there are those arguing that the national level renders universities a vehicle for its goals – hence, not powerful per se but subject to power. Conversely, others emphasize that universities have learned to use their ‘wiggle room’ to assert their preferred degree of implementation.

The notion of the empowered university is rooted in the complex landscape of changes in the 1980s and 1990s, when the growing financial constraints of public funding and the associated need for investment created new dynamics in higher education. Public-sector reforms aimed at boosting efficiency and effectiveness, stimulating the emergence of the ‘responsive’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ university in higher education.

Barbara Sporn, for example, speaks of a new distribution of power and responsibility between the state and the university, in which universities have gained considerable autonomy and capacity for self-steering. She adds that this has included greater independence in decision-making over budgets and personnel, and more freedom in designing and positioning the institution internationally while bearing, however, more responsibility and accountability (Sporn 2011: 144–53).

Burton R. Clark describes the developments in higher education as a curious mix of centralizing and decentralizing imperatives. He argues that states take a greater interest in higher education and intend to shape their international involvement through universities. He reckons that in growing institutional complexity, the university level has become a place of interest for the state through which budgets can be allocated and foreign affairs conducted (Clark 2008: 269).

Simon Marginson adds more of a philosophical, place-based approach in emphasizing the paradoxical combination of place-bound concentrations of power, localized resources, and identity with mobile and universal knowledge and discourse. He contends that this ‘antinomy between place and mobility’ was always an integral part of the university, but that now it has moved to a more prominent position in contemporary globalization (Marginson 2007: 4–5).

Anthony Welch describes the development for the Asia-Pacific region, where states retain a strong interest in higher education while simultaneously moving toward ‘devolution’ at the
in institutional level (Welch 2011: 14). He adds that accountability and rule by performance – ‘centralized decentralization’ – might create only the illusion of institutional freedom.

Less developed is the debate about universities in countries that do not match the definition of a classic democracy. In these contexts, it is important to assess the relationships between universities and states under different conditions. Universities might simply be centralized and represent the state, which does not preclude them from being globally involved.

The assessment of scholars regarding the university’s institutional role in shaping processes of globalization is therefore not unanimous. Some argue that university autonomy has increased over the past decades, whereas others emphasize continuous or even heightened national oversight. These discussions can easily slide into equal and mutually antagonistic ideological camps, overlooking what is actually important: a university can be a portal acting on its own account, and it can be a portal if the government wants it to be one. In both scenarios, connectivity to the world can be strategically steered; it might just be a different set of actors with a different set of interests. And again in both scenarios, the university has gained significant importance and can be considered empowered under the global condition.

Global rankings and academic hierarchy

Apart from the dynamics of state and university relations, there is another relevant vantage point from which the ascendance of the institution of the university in a global context can be analysed. With the emergence of the ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘responsive university’ came the need for differentiation and, thus, a system for measuring result and output. Acting as a single institution in a competitive environment has changed the dynamics of higher education considerably. Today, examples can be found all over the world in which governments channel funds into particular institutions, aiming to make them centres of research or world-class universities. These policies mark a significant shift from the traditional emphasis on egalitarianism among universities toward a hierarchical competition. Such a development is further propelled by global rankings, which have become a source of information for students, parents, industrial partners, and philanthropic funding, a policy instrument for governments, and a management tool for universities (Hazelkorn 2009: 9). The emergence of so-called excellence universities and global rankings have led to unprecedented exposure for individual universities, creating a situation in which they can no longer hide behind the protective shields of national academic traditions as the politically heightened role of universities is propelled further.

What is less talked about is who drives the ranking process. Here, too, there is room for debate. Marginson argues that rankings are shifting the power of how a university’s identity is shaped to the ratings agencies and the market, thereby sidestepping national governments along the way (Marginson 2007: 80–1, 98). Although this idea of a ‘market’ might only apply to very specific higher education contexts, Hazelkorn’s perspective of considering universities as ‘fixtures’ of state and national policy that have agency and that can define their own strategies can be applied in a broader context (Hazelkorn 2009: 10, 19). The little attention being paid to individual universities and how they strategically use the rankings should be evident, however, given the fervour with which universities highlight their rankings on websites and other platforms. Adjusting the factors that are used in rankings to increase performance has become part of internationalization strategies, especially for those at the top of these lists.

Similar to what Saskia Sassen states for global cities, one could argue that these elite universities constitute nodal points in the worldwide higher education landscape, just as global cities do in the financial sector (Sassen 2007: 196). They bundle the production and dissemination of knowledge, and they educate an elite in charge of instigating and controlling processes of globalization.
Universities as portals of globalization

One could suggest that these elite universities are probably best suited to be portals of globalization. But in doing so, one creates another Western-centric idea, as the great majority of these elite universities are not located in the Global South (only six of the top 100 universities in the Times Higher Education World University Rankings are not in Europe or the United States). Just like in theories about economic globalization, there is the idea of a global academic core. Higher education on a global scale is often displayed as being divided into an ‘academic West’ and an ‘academic Rest’, in both positive as well as critical perspectives. This bipolar imagination of global academia – steeped in histories of colonial and non-colonial spaces, in the East and West of Cold War times, and in globalization theories essentializing centre and periphery – obfuscates other linkages, such as transnational and transregional entanglements.

Instead of concentrating on a few hallowed universities, looking at individual universities can reveal a very different topography of higher education. Academic hierarchies praising American and English higher education start crumbling as rankings reveal the inequality of institutions within a country. Throughout the world, differences in and funding of excellence and world-class universities change higher education systems, making some universities more important than others. This requires other perspectives from which higher education can be analysed. Portals of globalization can illustrate this development and provide impetus for debates.

Hubs for academic mobility

While migration has often been conceptualized as border-perforating movements visualized through shipping, trade, and travel routes, a focus on those institutions deciding who enters – or who does not – is of particular importance when looking at universities. After all, the most oft-quoted gauge of universities in a global context today is academic mobility. Mobility tracks have become an important requirement in employment. Accordingly, student, staff, and teacher mobility have become key indicators in measuring the global connectedness of universities, and governments consider scholarship and mobility programmes a vital part of external affairs.

A quick look into higher education history reveals that ‘educational pilgrimage’ and travels between ‘ancient seats of learning’ have always been a part of academia, just as scholarships have been used before to steer political foreign matters. Yet, the quantitative contemporary dimensions give universities a greater global significance as the number of mobile students, professors, and staff grows continuously.

The university has become an important actor in steering the flows of students, a group that is increasingly recognized as an important subset of migrant populations. The most common narrative of student mobility is the one about students from big source countries departing for the big host countries. Given the heavy statistical representation of these paths, their prevalence is hardly a surprise. Other perspectives are unjustly forgotten, especially those not aggregated at the national level. The examination of individual universities provides insights into the mechanisms that were developed to steer the flows of academic mobility. Depending on the university in question, these could be mechanisms to increase the intake of international students, limit their number, steer directionality, or oversee the social fabric of the student body.

The first act of intervention is usually applied at the stage of admission. To increase numbers of international students, universities organize recruiting fairs throughout the world or set up fixed recruitment centres abroad where students can take entrance examinations and even be admitted on the spot. Another popular way is admission in absentia, which provides leeway for universities to enrol students who join through exchange agreements, without ever having seen the university before or taken entrance examinations.
To limit the flows of international students, universities often establish quotas to set a maximum total. Negotiating the seats available for students from abroad can be a highly contested issue, similar to conventional immigration debates. Hence, admission offices must tread warily.

Quotas are not just used to limit the number of students, but also to influence their geographical origin. They can be used to achieve a desired level of regional or global representation that meets the ideas of adequate internationalization in the admission offices. Having a diverse international student body is generally considered positive, and statistics about the wide array of global representation are used to brand the university and attract further students from abroad. Further involvement can be seen regarding visas. Here universities have arrangements with immigration ministries, often being involved in negotiations and supporting students in their attempt to obtain a study visa. By doing so, universities have taken on considerable power that formerly lay exclusively in the hands of the state.

Given that the number of students worldwide is expected to almost double within the next ten years, especially through tremendous growth in the Global South, it is reasonable to assume that the number of students crossing borders is going to increase as well. This quantitative argument is further propelled by the ascendance of the knowledge age, or knowledge economy, in which national policies and university strategies are designed to attract talented students and professors from abroad to gain a competitive advantage. Higher education has moved to the forefront of the political agenda and is seen as an instrument to gain power and influence in the global marketplace. Thus, the existence of more students worldwide – in combination with policies trying to steer them into certain directions – has created new, and reinvigorated old, forms of global connectedness in which universities play an important role.

**Shaping worldviews**

Globalization has caused heated debates among myriad scholars for at least two decades now, leaving little doubt about its controversial nature. Debates over the relationship between higher education and globalization are currently culminating, circling around a multitude of diverse approaches. The most challenging part in researching how universities deal with processes of globalization is to look at how ‘the global’ is studied. Course content, literature, positionality of authors, as well as the origins of disciplines are rarely the subjects of investigation, even though it is such aspects that shape the minds of students as well as where knowledge, bias, and perceptions are formed – features that often persist through a lifetime.

It is possible that debates in this regard are overshadowed by the idea that internationalization or globalization of the curricula means that English is used as the language of instruction and publication, inevitably integrating content that originates from the imagined epicentre of global academe: the USA. The Starbucks case study that can be found in economic curricula in English-speaking programmes may serve as a prominent example (Mankiw 2018: 23).

Another direction that discussions about the globalization of the curricula took was the inclusion of what could be called ‘global social competence’. The idea behind this is that global times require ‘global citizens’ and an ‘educated workforce with global competencies’. James Donald speaks of cultural attitudes or dispositions in this regard. He argues that students should learn how to respect diversity and become ‘multiculturally savvy and functional cosmopolitans’ (Donald 2007: 290). To theoretically support these claims, Donald draws from philosophy, a discipline that is believed to have a special border-transcending character. Cosmopolitanism, as Donald argues, is used for its ‘laces with multiculturalism and may thus offer a way of thinking beyond the opposition between “local” and “global”, or between “particular” and “universal”.'
This ‘perspective of heuristic in-betweenness’ is applied to students’ global characteristics and to discussions about interdisciplinarity and its contribution to safely navigating global times (Donald 2007: 292, 305).

Even though there might be inspiration in this field of research, it could also be subject to a bias that is described as ‘scientific universalism’, which dominated the post-war concept of international social science (Kuhn 2010: 379). Instead of transcending disciplines, Michael Kuhn argues that the goal was to overcome spatially limited knowledge, which resulted in the universalization of the parochial Western model of social sciences. Being aware of the methodologically invaded world of science, however, is a starting point for a new period of international collaboration in social sciences (Kuhn 2010: 381–2).

Educational philosophy addresses internationalization and globalization of the curricula by reinterpreting cosmopolitanism and universalism. These concepts, by the very nature of their existence, appear particularly suitable as they avoid borders and claim universal, or global, validity. In approaching the course curricula from this vantage point and extracting recommendations for a set of skills and attitudes to become a global citizen, the most obvious presence of ‘the global’ in the curricula remains unnoticed.

‘The global’ is taught and researched most plainly in area studies, languages, and international studies programmes. It is also, albeit less consciously, taught in many other disciplines such as social science, history, economics, health, and law. In every university, there is a way of systematically organizing, labelling, and presenting the other, the neighbour, the foreigner, and the world to the students. Given the extent of knowledge, no university can teach the entire world. It can only convey knowledge about a limited number of places, societies, countries, and regions. Analysing which parts of the globe are taught, what course curricula look like, and which literature is used is a concrete approach to make the teaching of ‘the global’ visible and researchable.

In approaching the study of ‘the global’, it is therefore important to acknowledge different terminologies and epistemologies and embrace academic exchange between them rather than questioning each other’s legitimacy. In opening up to the idea that the world can be studied more clearly or in a more inherent fashion via the collaboration of all disciplines reveals an entire new world: a world of multiple globals, each unique to the history and interactions of a particular place, with new threads being constantly tied, tangled, and knotted with others as they collide via the university.

**Conclusion**

This chapter argued that a perspective on universities as portals of globalization can be useful to uncover complex respatialization and rescaling processes such as transregionalization. The first point showed how universities receive greater attention through discursive rescaling. A discourse in higher education has developed in which the same set of ideas and keywords can be found all over the world. Universities have ascended in the hierarchy of institutions that are expected to master the challenges of globalization. This is the essence of my first argument: universities are portals of globalization because governments all over the world charge higher education institutions with monumental importance and expect them to ensure the competitiveness of their nations in the knowledge age.

The second argument revolves around a new distribution of power and responsibility between the state and the university. Newly gained institutional power, in combination with increased competition, puts universities at the centre of the political agenda, enabling them to shape their connectivity more than ever before, and in some respects rendering
the national level less influential. Whereas universities have acquired new agency on the global stage, nation-states have developed new strategies of making use of them as portals of globalization.

A third argument looked at the role of global rankings and how they created greater exposure and awareness of individual universities. Propelled by governmental funding of high-calibre institutes, differentiation in higher education continues, raising questions as to how useful aggregated data on the national level still is. Understanding universities and their role in shaping processes of globalization requires institution-specific research. Global rankings and conventional imaginations of academic hierarchies continue to exist, leaving portals in most parts of the world unexplored. This is a missed opportunity, as there are many universities that are highly relevant in shaping national as well as global developments.

The fourth argument concerns student mobility, which has increased significantly, with the university having been brought to the fore as the institution in charge of hosting and sending. The portal is actively used to steer the quantity and directionality of student mobility. Some of the processes are instigated by the universities that strategically shape their international profiles, by focusing on specific regions or disciplines through establishing and negotiating quotas and terms of admission, and by actively looking for cooperation partners. Some processes emerge from the outside, maybe connected to greater political affairs, and are forced upon the university, which then has to deal with such processes. Universities have always facilitated border-transcending mobility, but the significant increase in quantity has made the university one of the most important institutions in channelling and shaping the flow of people.

The fifth argument pointed to the relevance of the curricula and the insufficiency of focusing on English as the language of instruction as well as cosmopolitan understandings of knowledge. Looking at what parts of the world are taught in class, and which ones are omitted, results in a specific imagination that students and graduates keep for a lifetime.

The five arguments of this chapter provide grounds for seeing the university as a vital part in shaping processes of globalization. Depending on the university, there could be limitations, and going as far as calling every university a portal of globalization is probably too absolute. One might be more inclined to see it as a methodological lens rather than a static definition in globalization theory. The benefits of this place-based approach are, however, obvious: there is no getting around the university in understanding how globalization works in the knowledge age.

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Universities as portals of globalization


PART IX

Knowledge production, transfer, and application across areas

Introduction

Ute Rietdorf

The way we think about any scientific phenomenon is essentially driven by our trained understanding of not only how to analyse individual cases but also of how to connect them to examples studied in other disciplines, explored in former times, or investigated by scholars from other world regions, carrying with them different ideas about the realities and consistencies of the world. Recent research on what scholars and administrators alike call the ‘knowledge economy’ makes a distinction between knowledge, which is private, and understanding, which is social. Understanding is an emergent phenomenon arising from the interaction between individuals in specific contexts; it is knowledge that correlates to people. At the same time, understanding is a socially distributed process and, necessarily, characterized by components with great heterogeneity. Knowledge accumulation in society and economy is, thus, inherently unpredictable and uneven across space and time. In addition, the microheterogeneity of individual knowledge and personal creativity are important in the growth of understanding.

Keeping these points in mind as we approach transregional studies, we have to review how we produce knowledge of transregional phenomena, what the channels of knowledge transfer are, and which structures and processes are applied in accumulating knowledge. These include, first, the question of the heterogeneity of the knowledge base drawn upon, and, second, the question of how a shared understanding about transregional phenomena can emerge. In addition, we have to make sure that the development of a shared understanding is actively pushed forward and continuously supported by its proponents. It is not a self-fulfilling prophecy.

As with every new field of endeavour, there are themes and topics that have been part of the established discipline’s research areas, with many of the topics addressed in these volumes within the range of area studies. Nevertheless, transregional studies sets out to capture dimensions that have not so far been easily visible, or that have been barely explored at all. There are parallels with what is discussed as the added value of transdisciplinary research when compared to multi- or interdisciplinarity. In fact, transdisciplinary research is problem based and, as such, concerned with the practical applications of knowledge in the real world. Moreover, research of transregional phenomena also involves the general objective of moving beyond the limits of disciplines and providing new ways of organizing knowledge.

Although the growing synergy effects across disciplines are widely welcomed, they can sometimes be contested territory as well. There are competitive claims of priority due to overlapping objects of study, institutional histories, or individual careers. These claims are accompanied by
more general concerns about budgets for higher education and research, or spheres of public influence. Hence, the discussion of the problems and potential of multi-, inter-, and transdisciplinary knowledge creation is not a trivial issue.

These are research lines, where the hidden potential of transregionalism for adding new perspectives, subjects, and methodological approaches is already very well visible. The following chapters illuminate what transregional studies is essentially about— that is to say, processes of transfer as well as those that transcend established lines of thinking. Transregional studies also offers the opportunity to elucidate patterns of transformation that emerge if subjects of interest are set within a framework of historicization. Likewise, processes of transformation in one region of the world might become intelligible only if the co-evolution and interdependence of the processes in space and time are taken into account.

In the following chapters, individual viewpoints and a diversity of voices not only offer different insights but they also share a common point: one needs different sources of knowledge in coming to terms with phenomena that often transcend well-defined areas. These phenomena reveal unseen scales and scopes of interdependencies and expand the frame of reference of individual sciences. In addition, those research insights liberate local particularities from being perceived as purely random events.

As the example of the Basel Mission archive by Paul Jenkins shows, the regional approach has been traditionally applied to the history of experiences of missionaries in non-European world regions. Yet, a transregional perspective is an innovative and stimulating framework to effectively deal with some of the basic historiographical problems about missions. This is what can be called the ‘transcendence of the regional focus’. Here, the macro perspective in tackling overarching issues should be complemented by a micro perspective of the analysis of concrete interactions. Jenkins’ analysis combines sources illustrating the social history of the region of origin of the Basel Mission with those describing the consequences of that mission’s action in transferring its vision into the Ghanaian context. His research reveals the added value in placing a mission’s own history into the totality of a regional, in this case African, history.

A similar merging relates to transregional phenomena of development, for example entanglements of social inequalities, consequences of resource flows, influences of natural hazards, and the interaction of regional associations. The chapter by Ute Rietdorf about development economics as transregional studies illustrates the intellectual background of developmental thinking as one that has, over the last 60 years, seen changing engagements with area-related knowledge and macroeconomics. Consequently, development economics has been set up as a specialized field of enquiry, closely linked to the definitional hegemony of the Global North and its institutions of knowledge production and dissemination. Perceiving development from a transregional perspective will widen the semantic scope again. Adopting a transregional perspective will also ensure a more pluralistic reading of economic realities across regions, thus giving due appreciation to different kinds of knowledge about how economies develop. At the same time, a transregional approach to development economics also offers the opportunity to develop shared repertoires of knowledge, facilitating a ‘successful translation’ concerning inclusive narratives for a worldwide mutual understanding of the phenomena mentioned before.

Likewise, knowledge production about conflict prevention as an international norm has its own history, which developed as a response to the genocides in Rwanda and the Balkans. The chapter by Ulf Engel shows that three different sites working in parallel—that is, a group of norm entrepreneurs, an alliance of international NGOs, and an academically informed debate—brought about different epistemological approaches that influenced the reconstruction of the notion of conflict prevention into transferable knowledge about early warning. The resulting constructed early warning systems were first established on the African continent, leading to the
African Union’s Continental Early Warning System in 2007. A transregional perspective on the whole process reveals the power of influence of different actors, their cross-border entanglements on and beyond the African continent, and the challenges of harmonizing early warning systems both vertically and horizontally.

In a similar vein, the chapter by Ariel Macaspac Hernández describes how a transregional perspective can illuminate knowledge generation and deployment as well as power relations in climate change negotiations and be helpful in understanding how knowledge becomes a subject of diplomacy. While climate change is a global phenomenon, regional perspectives commonly provide the context of climate change negotiations, and implementation has to be coordinated locally as well. In analysing the working of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the chapter provides insights on how unequal knowledge generation potentially empowers regions for and against advances in global climate negotiations. The chapters on development studies as transregional studies, on early warning and conflict prevention, and on knowledge diplomacy in climate politics also show that an emergence of a transregional perspective is heavily bound to the institutional setting in which it is accepted and nurtured.

The two chapters on brokerage in transnational knowledge networks and on transnational actors and knowledge transfer in education, show how the transnational perspective helped the transregional one. The transnational perspective possibly opened the field for a better understanding by including the perception that, beyond transnationalism, there is something to be gained by dwelling on the spatialities of knowledge and by highlighting the multidirectional interaction in transfer processes at different scales of geographical regions.

Thus, the chapter by Marcelo Parreira do Amaral traces the origins of an analysis of knowledge transfer in education back to the broader research traditions of comparative and international education. Currently, several (regional) international organizations have become important sites of production and transfer of knowledge, significantly shaping education around the world. The framing of research on transnational actors and knowledge transfer in education within the perspective of transregional studies raises awareness about the multiple flows of knowledge on education. It also facilitates an understanding of transnational actors and their roles in knowledge transfer points regarding the multidirectional interaction in transfer processes both at inter- and intranational levels.

The transnational focus is also the starting point of the chapter by Başak Bilecen. Knowledge, networks, and space are already closely linked in current research on transnational knowledge networks. Although researchers have gained important insights, a transregional perspective will offer a better understanding of how geographically distant regions endowed with very different resources and knowledge repertoires came to exchange knowledge. It is equally important to get to know how characteristics of knowledge transfer change over time and what consequences knowledge transfer has so far had for the regions that have been involved in it for centuries.

In conclusion, to explore the potential of addressing the phenomena addressed in the six quite differently oriented chapters through the lens of a transregional perspective means entering a new area of transregional knowledge creation as a form of communicative action not only among the disciplines involved but also – and maybe more importantly – across them. What is in question here is a relational understanding of space, and specifically regions, and with it an understanding that relations among scholars and their research subjects require a kind of self-reflexivity that goes beyond mere self-critique.
OPENING UP TRANSREGIONAL ANALYSIS IN THE BASEL MISSION ARCHIVE

Paul Jenkins

Introduction: regional, transregional

A mission’s archive is generated both by its formal organization and by its character as a social movement. Mission organizations can vary quite widely according to the national and confessional culture of the groups primarily supporting them. In all mission archives, however, the contents — from formal regular minutes and reports to incidental items such as donations of missionaries’ private papers — are usually shot through by refractions of the mission’s own orthodoxy and its own expectations of what it was doing. One innovative Zürich dissertation even argued that the Basel missionaries’ feeling that they were representatives and executives of the missionary perceptions of their home supporters meant that they were hindered in understanding the seriousness of what was really happening around them in China in the first half of the twentieth century in spite of their command of Hakka, the regional dialect (Rüegg 1988).

It is true that serious conflicts can offer the reader in a mission archive a view of differing observations and judgements as to what is happening in an overseas environment. It is also true that when indigenous employees begin to report on their work, new views of what a mission is doing and signifies can emerge.1 But in general, thinking in regional terms — thinking in terms of the whole social and intellectual history of a specific region where a missionary society has been active and its successor church still is — is a valuable way of escaping from pre-set ideas in a mission archive. It raises questions that lead one to read archival documents against the grain; to be alert to spot unexpected, non-orthodox elements in reports and correspondence; and to remember that what you are not reading about in an archive can be as important as what you are. In other words the effort must be to achieve a holistic view of change and continuity — thinking in terms of an overseas region’s entire social and intellectual history. This kind of approach can lead to the production of innovative historical-anthropological literature, like the classic exploration by J.D.Y. Peel of the interaction between the Church Missionary Society in nineteenth-century south-western Nigeria and the development of a new overarching identity among people speaking varieties of the Yoruba language (Peel 2000).

However, truly transregional research — in the sense of the comparative analysis of two overseas regions for which a mission archive has materials — is difficult. Successful examples using a mission archive usually link a comprehensive study of a mission’s home background with an increased understanding of one of its overseas fields. T.O. Ranger — the source for many other
major innovations in research on the history of religions in Africa – already provided in 1985
an example of what this approach could offer: observations on the different characters of three
missionary societies working in the Makoni district of eastern Zimbabwe and the three differ-
ent indigenous groups there that each took up one of these societies, based on the congruence
between what each mission offered as a social vision and the group’s own needs and objectives
(Ranger 1985: 42–4).

This chapter is based on long experience with the archive of the Basel Mission. It dem-
onstrates mainly how, when new material becomes available both on the social history of the
region from which the missionaries originated and one of the regions where they worked over-
seas, important clarifications can emerge, new historical dimensions be sketched, and dynamic
perspectives for further exploration be made visible.

**Linking new knowledge of the Basel Mission’s European
roots with the history of its pre-1914 reception in south-eastern
Ghana and south-western India**

The Basel Mission2 was one of the classical Protestant missionary societies founded in Europe
concurrently with the development of the British anti-slavery movement. Like other German-
language missionary societies, it had a regional, rather than a national, basis of support.3 In spite
of the eponymous Swiss city that permitted its establishment in 1815, half of its overseas workers
came from the German region of Württemberg. By 1914, the organization had developed very
substantial work in what have become the republics of Ghana and Cameroon in West Africa, in
the union states of Karnataka and Kerala in India, in British-controlled Hong Kong, and in some
Hakka-speaking areas of Guangzhou (Canton) province in what is now the People’s Republic
of China. It is clear that for several key decades of expansion in the second half of the nineteenth
century, the directing centre in Basel intended to apply a uniform policy to all these fields.

The best academic introduction to the Basel Mission in English is Jon Miller’s (1994, 2003)
analysis of its organizational structure from the nineteenth century to 1914. Miller’s initial
interest was to study the articulation of an institution over long distances in spite of unreliable
pre-modern communication, settings of unstable power relations, and a staff highly endangered
by disease and death. He found a very hierarchical organization in which the Basel directorate
required frequent updates regarding developments in its mission fields and mission stations, and
in which it attempted to maintain a high degree of control of the overseas work, reserving many
detailed levels of decision to itself. Therefore, the Basel Mission archive, up until 1914, is, in
this view, a body of materials generated by an intensely bureaucratic administration, but no less
interesting because of that (Miller 1994: 179–86).

Working further into Basel Mission history, Miller found, as a central point of interest, what
he calls class collaboration for the sake of mission. The mission’s local anchorage in Basel was
a directing committee of men from the high bourgeoisie of that Swiss commercial and intel-
lectual centre plus the full-time head of the mission staff (the Inspektor), who was always, up to
1939, a theologian from Württemberg, and sometimes one or two other Württemberg theolo-
gians working in the mission headquarters or teaching in the missionary college. The mission-
aries sent overseas right up to 1900 were predominantly village young men who had been put
through a five-year training for their future work under ‘Basel’s’ direction. As we have seen, it
was the Schwabian (a popular adjective that corresponds to the noun Württemberg) missionar-
ies who made up 50 per cent of the overseas staff, and thus form the main focus of this chapter.

On grounds of feasibility, Miller came to restrict his study to relations with missionaries in
one field, that of the Gold Coast, now Ghana. Moreover, he eventually concentrated primarily
on relations between Europeans, in that he became most interested in the Basel directorate’s way of handling deviants among its distant overseas staff and its response to severe issues of discipline that arose.

In surveying the archive, Miller’s project did rescue from oblivion the fact that from about 1850 onwards the Basel Mission was organized according to a couple of hundred printed pages of regulations governing the life of all its congregations worldwide, the conditions of employment it offered to Europeans and indigenous people, and its general administrative procedures (Jenkins 2011: 217–96). However, Miller’s specific research emphases, outlined above, eventually left these documents aside. And so the comparative transregional analyses that might have been applied to the way these regulations were used, in, say, Ghana and India, were not followed up. It has only recently been documented that regional rules were evidently elaborated in Ghana, for example, to tackle specific local problems on the basis of the general regulations promulgated in Basel (see Gilbert and Jenkins (2008: 359–415), especially p. 378 on regulations about compensation for polygamous wives divorced when a husband converted). Thus, fascinating transregional issues await exploration in the history of the dialectic between the missionaries and each regional context in which they were working, and, of course, in the history of the Christian communities that grew up around them. However, it does not take much imagination to see that, unless large bodies of preparatory research have already been completed on the social and intellectual history of the relevant regions overseas where the Basel Mission worked, achieving even-handed comparative bi-regional analyses of the materials the archive has to offer is an almost Herculean task.

This short chapter can go further than Miller in transregional terms, first of all, because of intensive anthropological work by Michelle Gilbert and John Middleton in the Ghanaian kingdom of Akuapem, which was undertaken at the same time as Miller’s project, but which was of comparatively little interest for his concentration on inter-European relations (Middleton 1983; Gilbert 1997; Gilbert and Jenkins 2008). Akuapem was, in fact, the first and longest focus of Basel Mission work in the interior of Ghana, and this chapter presents aspects of the innovative impact of that literature on the history of the Basel Mission and its successor church there.4

We can also consider here the report of a Cambridge project on the social and industrial evolution of Württemberg published as recently as the summer of 2015: Revolution des Fleisses, Revolution des Konsums? (Hirbodian and Ogilvie 2015).5 The question mark in the title gives us a clue as to the project’s main implication for Basel Mission history. In the half century in which the Basel Mission grew to institutional stability (approximately, from 1830 to 1880), the revolution generated by Fleiss (which roughly translates into ‘conscientious hard work’) among individuals and families in Württemberg was still – though decreasingly step by step – inhibited by structural issues of archaic social control and the terms applying to marriage, land-owning, tenancy, and more. And the revolution in Konsum (‘patterns of consumption and life style’) was still inhibited – again, decreasingly step by step – by sumptuary laws and measures preventing specific population groups from participating in particular aspects of trade.

Now, in my opinion, there is in the normal contemporary Schwabian discourse about nineteenth-century economic and social history a serious asymmetry between the ways two central themes are treated. There is, on the one hand, discussion about, and enthusiasm for, the highly impressive second Industrial Revolution (engineering, the motor trade, electricity, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, etc.) that took place in Württemberg from approximately 1890. But there is, on the other hand, only a weak perception and appreciation of the life of the still archaic, pre-industrial, and at least semi-subsistence villages in which the majority of the nineteenth-century Schwabian Basel missionaries had grown up. A transregional approach to the Basel Mission – and its archive – challenges us to apply the implications of the Cambridge study and to attempt a
sharper and more specific chronological and qualitative profile of the Basel Mission at home and overseas in terms of the two phases in the social and economic basis of everyday life implied by these findings. These two phases are the life of archaic pre-industrial villages, on the one hand, and the late nineteenth-century coming of a major industrial revolution, on the other.

The two phases in the social and economic basis of everyday life in nineteenth-century Württemberg and their links with Basel Mission history at home and abroad

The easiest way to link Basel Mission history overseas with economic development in pre-1914 Württemberg is to start with the last couple of decades before the outbreak of the First World War. Young men, who had usually grown up helping their traditional craftsmen fathers on the family Oekonomie (in this context, the Oekonomie was the patch of land around a craftsman’s house on which at least some of the family food was grown), but who themselves had been apprenticed in new engineering workshops, began to join the Basel Mission at the end of the nineteenth century. Congruently, you find that bicycles were becoming the missionaries’ preferred way of travelling in Ghana by about 1900. Soon after, photographs also turn up of light motor lorries that had been imported into Ghana by the Basel Mission Factory (or the Basel Mission Trading Company, hereafter the BMF) to facilitate the movement of cocoa to the ports or to be sold and serviced as part of the BMF’s palette of retail activities. Parallel to the Basel Mission as a missionary society, the same leading circles in Basel had started commercial and industrial activities mainly in Ghana and India, which feature under several names and which were – not always harmoniously – closely linked to the mission until the First World War. A part of their profits was applied to the work of the mission. A little earlier than the turn of the century, the BMF’s tile- and brick-making and weaving activities in India (i.e. Karnataka and Kerala) were being upgraded to factories from the baseline of craft workshops founded in the mid-nineteenth century. The factories each had several hundred workers, and some had a central steam power unit. In relation to India, it seems to me plausible to write that missionaries’ relatives at home were, often for the first time, experiencing the move from workshop-scale to factory-scale production just as in India some of their sons and nephews or brothers and cousins were learning to set up the factories, which are eloquently documented by the Basel Mission’s early twentieth-century photographs, such as those of Kudroli tile works or the knitwear factory (for relevant literature, see Fischer 1978; Raghaviah 1990). Confirmation that modern technical innovation in the Basel Mission in Ghana happened as dramatically as this generational change did at home is also strongly suggested if one traces the history of the technical innovations it brought to Ghana from the end of the nineteenth century back to its effective beginnings in the early 1840s. Before the introduction of the bicycle, the light motor lorry, and the government-organized railway, travelling missionaries were supposed to be carried in hammocks, and coopers trained by the Basel Mission had become well-known as makers of strong barrels that could be rolled along bush paths from the interior for exporting, first, palm oil, and later, cocoa. As late as 1912, a missionary-turned-building-contractor constructed a traditional Central European wood-framed, covered bridge over a steep-sided, narrow river valley, paid for by Ghanaian farmers’ cocoa capital, to facilitate this kind of transport (Hill 1997 [1963]: 233–6). In the 1850s, the Basel Mission had begun to build two-storey mission houses using the similarly traditional rural technology of their home region – use of hand-quarried stone, hand-sawn wood for wood-frame structures and plank floors, and hand-split wood shingles for roofing. The last buildings of this kind were constructed by the Basel Mission both sides of 1900, as the mission established its new station in Kumase. But by that
time Ghanaian craftsmen trained by the mission were also working independently for Ghanaian projects. A typical aim of newly wealthy Ghanaian cocoa farmers at the end of the nineteenth century was to build themselves a two-storey villa based on the model of the Basel missionaries’ houses (concerning Kwesi Fianko, one of the first wealthy Ghanaians away from the coast to build a Basel Mission-type house, see Gilbert and Jenkins 2008: 363–6 and fn. 16).

This emphasis on the change to factory technology and the products of the second Industrial Revolution, from a baseline of the traditional village background and the use of traditional village crafts from Central Europe, offers a precise transregional profile and chronology to the involvement of the Basel Mission in regional pre-1914 economic and social history in southern Ghana and South India. This two-phase transregional model of pre-1914 Basel Mission history concentrating on Schwabian missionaries raises also a number of important questions, some of which we return to later. But for the moment it means that, in this case, we can push aside any kind of loosely defined, century-long relationships that might have been formulated for the relations between mission and modernization. Here, it is clear that at the end of the nineteenth century the Basel Mission, broadly defined to include its sister commercial and industrial organization, became an efficient and, if perhaps paternalistic, relatively non-exploitative channel for the communication, to Ghana and South India, of the new technical possibilities its young men were enthusiastic about. But before then, we are evidently looking at missionaries with a background in an at least semi-subsistence culture that they took overseas with them.

The last few paragraphs have been, at first sight, about technology transfer. But it is also clear from Revolution des Fleisses that village technology in Württemberg was embedded in a distinctive rural culture. Now we can turn to a short discussion of two suggestive cultural aspects of the interaction between Basel missionaries and the population of the southern Ghanaian kingdom of Akuapem, for which, owing to the enhanced literature at hand, two striking dimensions of a transregional approach can at least be sketched.

**Schwabian Realteilung and the town of Akropong**

We first consider the idea that hidden social dynamics in an indigenous church or an indigenous community can be revealed when, as here, comprehensive knowledge of the background of the missionaries can be drawn upon. This specific train of thought begins with the paragraph in translation from the Basel Mission’s congregational regulations from the 1860s that deals with the distribution of property on the death of its owner:

> Any form of wealth a member of our congregations possesses at his [sic] death should be left to his widow and children. Each child should receive an equal part. The property should not be left to more distant relatives . . . as is the case with the heathen.

*(Basel Mission Archive, Q-9.16.12 §131)*

In the nineteenth century, the trend was strong in the Basel Mission, especially in Ghana, to attempt to set up a replacement culture in its mission fields by means of Christian villages (or Christian quarters of existing towns) into which its converts would be incorporated. This ruling about the division of a deceased’s property looks very much to have been influenced by **Realteilung** (the technical translation of **Realteilung** is apparently ‘partible inheritance’), which was an archaic form of family organization that prevailed in many parts of nineteenth-century Württemberg and that was only abolished as a legal form in 1904. Some Schwabian historians argue that Pietism – the pattern of piety from which the Basel Mission drew much of its strength and commitment – was particularly strong in **Realteilung** areas. In **Realteilung**, on the
death of a man or woman, their property (including landed property) was divided up among the surviving spouse and their joint children, the latter all receiving equal shares.

Both in its mission fields in southern Ghana and those in south-western India, the Basel Mission met matrilineal communities, and this certainly applied to Akropong, the capital of the kingdom of Akuapem (Gilbert and Jenkins 2008). The most evident point about this paragraph for a modern reader with an anthropological antenna is that this process was intended to dismantle traditional matrilineal forms of family organization and inheritance. Only the spouse and their joint children benefit while other relatives go away empty handed as ‘[t]he property should not be left to more distant relatives’, which leaves no room for the ‘nephew inheritance’ of the matrilineal family. The kingdom of Akuapem, however, as we shall see, also included patrilineally organized communities. There too, we should not underestimate the clash of cultures that could arise in questions of inheritance, since it will usually have been the people of a whole patrilineal clan (including ‘more distant relatives’) that claimed the right to a voice in negotiations over an inheritance.

The constitution of the Basel Mission Church also established officials who were primarily responsible for seeing that such rules were applied: the church elders. They were local men who knew the family situations in their community intimately, unlike the foreign missionaries, undoubtedly, and unlike most modern pastors, who are posted from place to place, and relatively seldom officiate in their own home towns.

How far were these provisions of the old Basel Mission congregational regulations a long-term factor in the history of this church? John Middleton, a senior British anthropologist who unexpectedly spent time in Akropong in the mid-1970s, became fascinated by the relationships between the Presbyterian congregation and the traditional kingdom and traditional culture. He studied the role of the church elders, and was interested to find that, in most Akropong families, when there was a death, it was a church elder who chaired the family meeting at which the deceased’s properties were divided up among those with a claim to it, and another church elder who wrote down the results in a minute book. Middleton was impressed enough by this observation to refer to the church elders’ ‘jural function’ in the town.

The church elders may have been instituted to promote the patriarchal family model. However, John Middleton observed that, as a rule, people were present in the family meetings in the 1970s both from the patrilineal (‘Christian’ nuclear) family and from the relevant matrilineal clan, and that parts of the bequest were often being assigned to members of the latter, according to need (Middleton 1983: 2–18). By the 1970s, the church elders were, in other words, arbitrating between the claims of the two family systems, and indeed, in general, arbitrating in a very open-ended way between the Akropong tradition and the Basel Mission prescriptions surviving in the regulations of the now independent church.

Our question here is, however, how far this central jural role of the church elders in such family affairs was influenced by memories of the structure of Realteilung on the part of early missionaries. Revolution des Fleisses makes much of the unusual resources Württemberg offers for examining pre-modern social and economic history: the Inventuren und Teilungen (roughly translated as ‘Inventories and [Records of] Sharing’). These were records kept by a communal official, especially in the Realteilung areas, of changes in the assignation of property in case of a death. They offer powerful insights into Schwabian local economic history right down to the family level and all the way back to the seventeenth century (Hirbodian and Ogilvie 2015: 1–54, 91–4, 125–58). With knowledge of this background, a transregional approach to the Basel Mission in Akropong would require knowing about the elders’ minute book mentioned above, which was in use in the 1970s to record the sharing of a deceased’s estate among those with a claim to it. Does the existence of such a minute book go back to the mid-nineteenth
century, when the founding missionary generation was building up its congregational system in Akropong? If so – since these missionaries were mostly from Württemberg and had grown up there from the late 1820s onwards – did they institute a serious written record of property and its division with the example of their home Inventuren und Teilungen in mind, and thus institute a procedure that gave weight and identity to the role of the church elders?

Middleton, whose stay in Akropong was comparatively short, did not clarify the question whether there is a deposit of such minute books in the hands of the church elders going back to the nineteenth century; nevertheless, this seems very likely. He was also not in a position to ascertain whether these provisions were unique to Akropong, or could be found in other old congregations of the former Basel Mission Church. He was, however, convinced of the accuracy and importance of these findings, and they deserve to be included in any further research on aspects of the social history that evolved around the presence of the Basel Mission in Ghana.

Indeed, the introduction of literacy and its local adoption is a major theme in mission history, and the train of thought presented here is not intended in any way to replace our knowledge of the interest people showed in adding written records to traditional oral ways of registering decisions. For the families involved, the logic of using the church elders, under some degree of church supervision, as arbitrators – rather than the notoriously expensive and unreliable systems provided by the traditional state or what was once colonial justice – is also apparent. But the suggestion that the minute book recording the division of a deceased’s wealth has roots going back to the Württemberg system of Inventuren und Teilungen is at the very least well worth holding onto as a hypothesis for further reflection and investigation. Indeed, following up this line of reasoning could open up for us a much wider study of the mutual commitment of missionaries and their environing population at this grass-roots level in the first, archaic phase of their contact. And this could evidently turn out to be a key step in uncovering the cultural and human dynamics in the history of this particular Christian mission and its regional reception in relation to property and family organization, both much neglected in the existing literature.

Württemberg, Akuapem, and ‘the language of the people’

One of the odd features about modern contributions to the historiography of mission is that whereas, up to the Second World War and even later, missionaries were usually people who spoke the language – or one of the languages – used by the people around them, scarcely any of the Western academics who have written about them in recent decades have had this ability, and so they are unable to reach a proper judgement about the quality of missionary language work or the quality of the discourses in indigenous languages in which the missionaries were involved. This creates a vacuum in which, for example, many observers can express warm approval of the idea that missionaries worked to translate the Bible, Christian discourse, and much more into ‘the language of the people’. But, in fact, things were often more complicated than that.

Take Akuapem, for example. The main Basel Mission language expert in nineteenth-century Ghana was J.G. Christaller, who in the second half of the century was the leading figure in deciding, after study and consultation, to use the Akuapem dialect of the Akan language, Twi, as the basis for a standard Twi for the whole much larger Akan world. This was to be, as he wrote at the end of his life, a single language for a unified Christian nation, and a medium in which ‘everything worth to be known by educated men may be duly and fitly expressed’ (Christaller 1893: 51–2). His work on the language itself – a dictionary and a grammar – has been taken as the starting point for every attempt since then to modernize or reform the language as it is taught in schools. But obviously a ‘standard Twi’ will have turned out to be some
distance away from the different dialects of the 'languages of the people', with the dialectical differences in grammar and vocabulary having been ironed out. Critics have noticed how different missionary societies – working with what might be, effectively, dialects of the same language – have developed ‘their’ dialect into a separate language, something that has happened in the circle of Akan dialects to Fante, which was developed as a separate language by British Methodists. Moreover, in Ghana there is now also at least one alternative Twi dialect Bible translation – into Asante Twi. At the time, Christaller chose the dialect of a small Akan kingdom to be the basis for his standard, Twi missionaries were more or less excluded from Asante, which in pre-colonial times was the great and influential centre of the Akan language and culture and has remained as such.

The problem with which Akuapem presents us in this connection is, however, more radical. John Middleton’s wife, Michelle Gilbert, has written a whole string of fascinating papers demonstrating inter alia that she was experiencing Akuapem not as a simple Akan monolithic and monolingual kingdom, but as bi-ethnic and bilingual. The speakers of Twi were originally matrilineal clans, most of whom moved into the region in the eighteenth century and organized an autochthonous people into an Akan kingdom. The autochthonous people are collectively called Guans, and mostly still speak dialects of their own language. To make it quite clear that we are writing about a group with a separate identity from the leadership of the Akuapem kingdom, I should add that Guans are patrilineal in organization, and still retain, alongside the structures appropriate to parts of an Akan kingdom, traces of their original decentralized rule by priests. Gilbert’s publications offer a vivid documentation of the contemporary living existence of Guan communities down to their attempted secession from Akuapem a couple of decades ago, which was resolved in 2014 with the reunification of the kingdom, not least through the reconciliation efforts on the part of senior pastors of the Presbyterian Church.11

So where does this bilingual view of Akuapem leave J.G. Christaller and the ‘language of the people’? Christaller did record the existence of Guan, and wrote about its linguistic characteristics.12 I had originally doubted this, in view of the fact that specific references to the Guan population in the other parts of the Basel Mission archive, which have been sifted through in detail in recent decades, are few and far between. Nevertheless, it seems clear that even if Christaller had a basic understanding of Guan, he and the Basel Mission took a ‘kingdom’ position when thinking about the future of the populations of Akuapem, according to which Twi was the language of the future. Clearly the decisions about Akuapem Twi in which Christaller was involved really pushed Guan to one side, and assumed that the Guan population would become Twi-speaking – something which had, indeed, already happened in one or two Guan communities by the time the first missionaries arrived. But a modern scholar with a Guan background has written an analysis of the negative impact on her people concerning the lack of Christian literature in their language and the way the Basel Mission Church’s successor clearly regards Twi as its ecclesiastical language and its language of piety in this region. In other words, more than a century after Christaller’s death, the future of Guan is still a present issue (Senavoe 2002).

Certainly, even a relatively well-founded missionary society such as the Basel Mission had limited resources of money and personnel, and always had to make a bet on which of the languages or dialects it met in its different fields had the best chance of developing into, or holding its existing position as, a major regional means of communication. In Ghana, Christaller and the Basel Mission placed their bets on Twi and Ga. In the case of Twi, this was not unreasonable. The population speaking Twi dialects was much larger and more extensive than those speaking Guan dialects, and Twi was the language of the Asante kingdom, as we have seen, to this day the major cultural reference point of the Akan population. But nevertheless, it makes more sense to regard Christaller as a ‘cultural engineer’ with new and dynamic intentions for a
language that he was developing, rather than following the easy impression that he was working in the ‘language of the people’.

However, if this is the case, then it brings up a transregional issue. As a cultural engineer, Christaller, along with his indigenous colleagues, was obviously a directing subject of a process that was set in motion to create a universal standard Twi. But had he not himself been the object of a similar process as he was growing up in a small town near Stuttgart? Many of us who try to participate in the German-speaking world south of the Main-Danube line find – initially to our cost, though if we stick to it long enough to our delight – that we live in a world of dialects. German language dialects are rarely, if ever, matters of discussion in the Basel Mission archive. Nevertheless, the likelihood is that Christaller in his early years schwebelte, that is to say spoke a child’s version of the Schwabian dialect, as his mother tongue. He will then have gone through the process of being introduced to a national Hoch- or Schriftsprache (standard written language) in school and church – a process he was instrumental in introducing to what is now Ghana.

Clearly, the suggestion that the German Hochsprache was not Christaller’s mother tongue stirs up opposition among some modern citizens of Württemberg. A former student of mine has urged me to remember that since the national Hochsprache version of German was the language of the Bible and the Hymn Book, it would not have been very strange to a child. One of my most trenchant German friends also told me pointedly that, in public, Pietists in Württemberg never conduct prayers in the local dialect. Nevertheless, to me this seems to be an example of the importance of a sensibility to transregional themes when working on a mission’s history. Furthermore, searching for literature that will extend and deepen our understanding of both regional contexts will encourage us to develop innovative and more concrete ways of thinking about the relations that have existed over decades between specific regionally defined groups of missionaries and the people of regions who have been involved in detailed interaction with them. It might even impact our understanding of an important element in the history of the region from which the missionaries came.

Some final remarks

The Basel Mission archive has potentially dense, if at times patchy, records on the interactions between its staff overseas and their environing societies and cultures. Its size should not be underestimated – the printed guide to its main series of letters and reports from India up to 1913 takes up 80 pages in the printed archive guide, for example, though it only offers detailed information for the correspondence of every fifth year, and that only in the sense of a select list of the most interesting document titles (Jenkins 2011: 21–100, referring to BMA MS Series C-1). It could become a serious resource for transregional studies of the social history around the mission and its successor churches, and of more general studies that find the mission archive’s resources useful.

Studies linking two regions of the non-Western world are an especially attractive idea but are especially difficult to carry through. Having said that, transregional studies involving the comprehensive knowledge of a major group of missionaries’ main region of origin, such as I have presented here, are likely to develop more in the near future with the use of innovative products of the lively regional and local social history research that has been going on in the West for decades now.

It may be objected that this presentation has concentrated too much on the history of the mission and its successor churches. But as a former mission archivist, I would say that the call for regional and transregional studies has been a liberation, a stimulating framework in which the basic historiographical problems about mission can be tackled effectively. The weight of

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traditional mission ‘identity historiography’ in Europe, and its equivalent, the consensual confessional history in the mission’s successor churches overseas, can be reduced by insisting on histories that are placed in the totality of a regional history, tracing, to take a central example, the history of resistance to mission as well as its acceptance and reception. Our American friends’ Tea Party movement, with its strong roots in radical Protestantism, has the financial muscle to try to promote retro- and neo-colonial forms of mission. This is warning enough that wide-angle critical regional histories of missions and their successor churches, inspired partly by the intellectual dynamics of transregional thinking, are very necessary. They can move on to new understandings of the past by discrediting untrue missionary myths, filling in the areas of silence in identity historiography, and attempting new, sober, innovative, and broadly acceptable definitions of the achievements that many missions – seen as non-governmental organizations or civil society organizations of a special category – can show as results of their work.

Notes

1 Paul Jenkins is currently preparing, with Michelle Gilbert, the *Fontes africanae historiae* (new series), an edition of English reports written by the Ghanaian pastor Theophilus Opoku for the Basel Mission 1868–1908.

2 The two main parts of the old Basel Mission are now included as support groups in two multinational mission organizations. That based in Basel is ‘Mission 21’. That based in south-west Germany is Evangelisches Missionswerk in Solidarität, with its headquarters in Stuttgart.

3 Since this chapter was submitted, a German colleague (Herppich 2016) has published a study formulating the common features of German-language Pietism in mission in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries rather than stressing regional differences. The present author was not aware of her work until it was published, so I was not able to make sure she had an opportunity to respond to the argument of this chapter.

4 In the academic literature both the older – Akwapim – and newer – Akuapem – forms of the name of this kingdom are current.

5 It is true that building a bridge from these results to a history of the Basel Mission as a regional phenomenon would be easier if the terminal point of this publication were 1900 rather than 1800. Nevertheless, a detailed preliminary study available online does follow the history of three of the key communities studied by this project covering the years from 1558 to 1914, giving non-specialists important help in understanding nineteenth-century Württemberg (Ogilvie, Küpker and Maegraith 2009).


7 ‘Factory’ is an ambiguous term here, signifying both a trading post (an archaic usage) and a modern production unit (see Wanner 1959; Christ 2015).

8 For lorries carrying cocoa, see BMA Ref. QU-30.003.0390, original caption translated: ‘Dodowa: B.M.F.lorries from Accra c.1910 . . .’, photographer unknown. For motor vehicles on sale in the BMF yard in Accra, and the BMF service station for them, see BMA Ref. D-30.02.015, original caption translated: ‘Basel Mission Factor lorry review, Accra’, photographer unknown, before the First World War; also BMA Ref. D-30.02.016, original caption: ‘Motor repair ship of the Basel Mission Trading Company Store, Accra’, photographer: Rudolf Fisch. If this reference to Fisch is correct, this photograph must be dated to 1911 or earlier.

9 For one of the Basel Mission brick and tile factories, see photograph BMA Ref. QU-30.043.0010, original caption translated: ‘Kudroli Tile Works. September 1913.View from in front of the entrance’, photographer unknown. For a Basel Mission textile factory, probably either in Mangalore or Calicut (Khozhikode), see BMA Ref. QC-30.019.0011, original caption translated: ‘Weaving factory for knitwear (interior scene)’, photographer unknown, dated to between 1900 and 1920.

recent additional regulation, it dates back to the mid-1860s but was almost certainly developed in earlier drafts and discussions.

11 I am grateful to Dr Nana Kwakye for information on the role of the pastors in this process.

12 I am grateful to my colleague Bernhard Dinkelaker for advice on this point. He has recently published a doctoral thesis in the University of Heidelberg effectively on Christian theology in Akropong and the Akan world (Dinkelaker 2017).

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Development economics is a field of expertise that – due to its intellectual history, its efforts to transfer research results across regions, and its widespread acceptance as applied science – lends itself almost naturally to scrutinizing its efforts in terms of transregional sources, influences, and possible futures. As will be shown, the roots and future of development economics can only be understood and/or imagined as transregional studies. Many scholars across times and world regions have shown interest in understanding the workings of society, and of the economy within it. Thus, development has been an object of study for centuries. In his *History of Economic Analysis*, J.A. Schumpeter starts with Graeco-Roman economics, followed by scholasticism and natural law, physiocrats and mercantilists, and entering the first classical situation at about 1790. He identified three techniques of economic analysis: economic history, statistics, and pure theory. Although economics lacks the benefits of exploratory experiments, it enjoys, according to Schumpeter, a unique source of information, namely ‘man’s extensive knowledge of the meaning of economic actions’ (Schumpeter 1994: 16, original emphasis). He also admitted that vision plays a huge role in formulating the way in which economic quantities hang together.

Without a doubt, vision also played a role in applying later theories of economic development across different world regions. When development economics emerged as a distinctive field of knowledge production after the Second World War, it did not take long before theoretical arguments turned into practical prescriptions. Right from the beginning, the range of perspectives on what it takes for a country to develop has been extensive. Based on a wide semantic scope of the meaning of development and related models such as Akamatsu Kaname’s ‘flying geese’ model, Gunnar Myrdal’s model of circular and cumulative causation, and Albert O. Hirschman’s holistic pattern model(s), prescriptions have also been varied. Whereas Arthur Lewis marketed the possibility of an economic development with a supposedly unlimited supply of labour for newly independent countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, Walt W. Rostow claimed a nearly natural necessity of stages to be worked out.

Others were much more sceptical. In view of colonial experiences and institutionalized structures of resource exploitation, academics such as Myrdal and co-adherents to dependency theory viewed global entanglements as an obstacle to any major changes favouring the development of the so-called Third World. In turn, opposing that view in a fundamental way, social scientists such as David Apter and Everett Hagen saw traditional culture and pre-modern norms and values as the most important barriers to progress.
Yet, despite all differences in opinion, there has been the common conviction that development is a phenomenon that can be encountered, stimulated, and managed everywhere in much the same way. Therefore, development economics can be regarded, on the one hand, as transregional in its very nature, and, on the other hand, as most often not resisting a universalistic ambition that contradicts the acceptance of substantial differences between the regions in contact. It struggles with the difficult task of applying knowledge about and experience with economic development gained in one region to another one, or even to a set of other regions clustered into categories such as the Third World.

The formation of development economics proper can be traced back to arguments on how to rebuild war-torn European countries after 1945. In conjunction with the history of economics described by Schumpeter, any development paradigm was thus based on a certain (Euro-American) interpretation of economic history, its various actors, their relationships, and the concomitant perceptions of civilizational hierarchies.

Development theory clearly denied difference in the workings of the economy at the global level. However, it often essentialized difference at other, lower levels of society and the economy (Six 2009). The universalistic claims of development theory were married to approaches to economic development in the societies of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, which explicitly matched the dualistic view mentioned before.

Because the laws of economics were supposed to be all-encompassing, modernization theorists, for instance, held people in the South responsible for changing their mindsets, rebuilding their political systems, and catching up with the North. Even dependency theory stated that the South was held back not only by an unjust global economic system, but also by being tied to their own traditional elites, who were allegedly collaborating with their counterparts across world regions. Although there was early criticism of those assumptions, it often went unnoticed or was sidelined. For instance, as early as 1968, Myrdal, in his publication The Asian Drama, highlights the illegitimate transposition of an assumption from one set of circumstances to another.

At the same time, the very exclusion of the West/Global North (i.e. highly industrialized countries) from the group of countries still developing further inhibited theory building about developmental processes in a general sense, reaching beyond the mere comparative analyses of why some nations ‘developed’ while others failed to do so. Development economics, once established in academia, more or less served the exclusive purpose of explaining the failure of economic development in non-European, non-Northern American regions of the world.

From the 1980s onwards, and despite ever more elaborated growth models, the core of development economics grew ever more static, trying to point out a way to reach the level of economic development in the West as an end in itself. Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, development economics constituted little more than a futile quest for strange exceptions to the rules of mainstream economics. Development ought to be nothing more than the extension of neoclassical orthodoxy to low- and middle-income countries (Barrett 2007).

In view of that, ‘development’ is a prime example of how concepts have travelled across different contexts and been unilaterally translated rather than critically applied and appropriated. The definitional hegemony of the West has critically reduced the semantic scope that early development economists attached to the meaning of development. Worse still, the adherence from the 1980s onwards of development economics to the building of the mainstream economic model has led to a further foreshortening of development as merely growth. In partially trying to catch up with economic model building, or otherwise trying to come up with more generalized insights into the growth experiences of other world regions, development economics has reduced context specificity.
The neglect of local contexts in development economics theories is a serious drawback from its earlier approaches at grasping the distinctiveness of local and regional structures and processes. This ignores how economies came to be what they are, how they are spatially arranged, and how production, exchange, and consumption processes are structured, valued, legitimized, and governed. In short, the field has come to overlook what processes of development look like and how they take place. Instead, local and regional distinctiveness – especially in regression analysis – has often entered economic model building in quite a peculiar way, that is to say, as a dummy variable instead of something that has a history of its own or is worth an explanation in itself.

A most prominent example of that kind of procedure developed with and after Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson’s seminal article on estimating the effect of institutions on economic development. The authors argue that differences in colonial experiences could be a source of exogenous differences in institutions, and that the effect of institutions on economic performance ‘is robust to controlling for latitude, climate, current disease environment, religion, natural resources, soil quality, ethnolinguistic fragmentation, and current racial composition’ (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001: 1395). There is no hint at the interconnectedness of institution-building processes with processes of translation, acquisition, or rejection by local populations; nor that the transfer of specific European rules of the game to other contexts is itself influenced by an inner-European competition over the ‘best practices’ of exploitation. Thus, transregional connections and the mutually constitutive dependency of development(s) in different parts of the world remain at the margins of consideration, rather than constituting central interpretations.

One does not have to contest the formal validity of the models as such to simply acknowledge that they illustrate two points. The first is that these models illuminate that the Third World served as a testing ground for the universalization of economics – with theory production in the West and theory application in ‘the Rest’. Second, by taking Western development experiences as the target, the inclination to link Western social science disciplines with knowledge production about development in other world regions has remained low.

These difficulties in grasping at all the phenomenon of development and in accepting its varied and unpredictable character – especially when transferred to other world regions – have to do with the way in which many social scientists started to analyse it. It also has to do with the possibility that, in this manner, they were stuck in certain episteme as historical a prioris that shape the knowledge and discourse of a certain time as well as represent conditions for the possibility of knowledge.

For instance, there is the much cited ‘invisible hand’ in economics, which assures that the interaction of individuals driven by self-interest brings about a maximum of social welfare as an unintended, but logical, consequence. Thus, development economists’ intellectual endeavours should be channelled in a way that knowledge advancement logically follows for all. However, the generous ‘invisible hand’ might be paired with a likewise ‘invisible backhand’, meaning that the herd behaviour of economic agents as well as of scientists involves informational cascades, network externalities, and path dependency, which might also lead to suboptimal outcomes for all.

Professional networks shape the line of thought in which future disciples or politicians perceive problems and solutions (Mäki 2005). The framing of conditions of knowledge production, therefore, influences and delimits the possibilities of knowing how economic development happens. This mechanism resembles the way in which Thomas Kuhn describes the emergence and change of paradigms (Kuhn 1976). According to him, scientists do not acquire terms, rules, and theories in an abstract way but through concrete examples. This is exactly
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what happened in development economics. Presenting examples through and with their application often meant implicitly adhering to those examples’ historical and intellectual context, mostly the European one.

For students of development economics, the vicissitudes of economies are then explained in terms of reviewing the application of theorems in the sub-Saharan, Latin American, or Asian context. The basic assumptions of such theorems are not at stake in that. They are often ‘inherited’ without being questioned in a fundamental way. Theorems might therefore live a long life, even in the face of growing counter-evidence. As long as some applications seem to work, assumptions stay strong, and deviations are accounted for as specification, amendment, or exceptional circumstances.

In recent years, though, there has been a growing awareness of the intellectual challenge presented to development economists through the increasing use of methods and techniques employed in developed market economies, and through the difficulty in getting a grip on the increasingly complex nature of the relationship between developing countries and the world economy (Tribe and Sumner 2006). Challenges arise, for instance, out of the rapidly changing nature of trade relationships and the difficulties in assessing their causes and effects. Until the 1980s, development economics focused on unequal terms of trade, as well as on issues of the resource curse and ailing infrastructure, but the heterogeneity of experiences since then is tremendous. Recently, trade in services, trade within closely-knit global value chains, and the enormous expansion of South–South trading connections are an indication of different kinds of transregional engagements beyond the export of raw materials from developing countries and their concomitant manufactured imports.

What is currently visible is not only conceptual diversification for coming to terms with ‘development’ and its underpinnings, but also a true quest for theory building regarding economic development beyond either overvaluation or undervaluation of the specifics of an individual case. A recurrence of basic features of ongoing processes is made in an attempt to point out the possibilities and limits of generalization as well as the potential to bring development economics back to its roots as a heuristic intellectual device that explains the consequences of human action in space and time.

This does not imply a ‘wholly relative, context-dependent concept’ of development, but it definitely suggests an ‘engaged pluralism’ (Pike, Rodriguez-Pose and Tomaney 2014). It allows for broader meanings of development to be created, which in turn enlarge the potential for and overlap of areas of interest among area studies, transregional studies, and development studies. One can argue that development economics is more compatible with area studies since they depend on detailed knowledge about the context of economic behaviour and structures in specific regions. Development economics tend to conflict with transregional studies since the latter undermines the fundamental understanding of ‘development’ as following the patterns in the West/Global North. Such binary opposition obviously does not help a lot; instead, transregional studies might influence thinking within the field of development economics toward a more pluralistic reading of economic realities, and a less teleological understanding of the world economy.

The question is what can the study of development (or better, of developments) gain from the inclusion of alternative epistemologies, and what do we lose if we do not include them? The example of applying gross domestic product (GDP) as a universal frame of reference for measuring development in sub-Saharan Africa is highly illustrative.

In the case of GDP, the transfer of not only the methodological considerations of its measurement but of the whole vision for which it stands has set a benchmark for African as well as other economies and contexts that have proven to be unrealistic in the short run and probably
altogether misrepresentative of development potential in the long run. The use of GDP not only blurs the immense complexity and diversity of local, regional, and transnational developments, but also undermines the ability of those countries to counter unified notions of development.

The embedding of GDP measurement in decidedly Western European and North American realms of economic thinking, and its international transfer to other world regions re-established former colonial powers’ control over how development is perceived, measured, and therefore planned. Because of this, African economies have been perceived as being alike in terms of development, while being at a different – yet to be corrected – degree if compared to highly industrialized nations. The GDP as a specific mode of knowledge expressed in an abstraction opened up a universally shared frame of reference in which (a) North–South divide(s) became operational, a global epistemic space reducing local complexities.

The GDP produced a homogeneous space in which it became possible to acquire comparative knowledge about development issues. This line of reasoning did not only generalize specific findings in space but also worked in the dimension of time by linking the past to the present. With the GDP, a shared set of notions concerning economic difference and change gave rise to new global imaginations and new local imaginaries of the world (Speich 2008). Here, the distinctiveness of regions has been functional only insofar as conditions of accurate GDP measurement have been constantly checked against the set of rules established by the System of National Accounts (SNA) since 1947.

In a way, the application of the GDP anticipated the universalism of the market logic long before its triumph in the 1990s. As a social technology, GDP measurement preceded the institutionalization of development economics. Development economists could thus hardly conceive of explaining the world’s diverse development path without it. At the same time, the ‘development machine’ started to bear witness to the high degree of global economic integration that had been achieved step by step. Once developed in an environment of competitive nation states, the application of the GDP for designing development policies and strategies always showed a transregional scale of reference, right from the beginning.

The varied experiences of development cooperation also made visible that development is a multidimensional concept in its nature. It became clear that any envisioned improvement in the realm of income, inequality, or other indicators can occur in different ways and at different speeds as well as be driven by unexpected forces. Additionally, the development of one part of the socioeconomic system might be detrimental to the development of other parts, leading to conflicting objectives and conflicts. Acknowledging that in full, the consequence would mean a different understanding of development and, with it, an attempt to reflect the multiple dimensions in a measurement that allows for variations, unusual combinations, and readjustments.

However, the production and usage of an indicator such as GDP has not only a governance effect but also a knowledge effect, in that it is a distinct form of creating knowledge about other world regions. The unquestioned scientific authority of GDP as an indicator is fundamentally co-determined by the scientific community producing it. Applying GDP unanimously across space and time has made progress in the economics of development conceptually path dependent, that is to say, it made perspectives that varied concerning the central role of GDP in development unimaginable.

Bound to relate its models almost exclusively to the ultimate frame of national accounts, the economics of development became locked in the realm of self-fulfilling prophecies. In largely perceiving development as changes in GDP, development models worked with factors directly linked to components of GDP, making a full circle within its boundaries of measurement. No attempts were made to perceive development, together with the unique developments taking place in other world regions, as inherently open-ended possibilities.
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Reimagining development economics as handling transregional phenomena will surely question established categories, routines, and practices that presently constitute accepted solutions for dealing with issues such as poverty and inequality. It does so by providing rich case evidence and by endowing that evidence with meanings derived from local contexts. Tackling development from a transregional perspective will widen the semantic scope once again because this demands clarification on the meaning of any development process as ‘transregional’, as ‘transcending’, or as taking place between more than one specific regional context. It demands the inclusion not only of knowledge of other areas and world regions but also of knowledge about transregional phenomena of development, for example entanglements of social inequalities, consequences of resource flows, influences of natural hazards, and the interaction of regional associations.

Research on regional and local economic development already applies such insights, often implicitly, sometimes explicitly. Here, the relevance of local social and institutional characteristics is discussed by arguing that favourable conditions for development are the result of a highly context-specific combination of rules, norms, and social relations that encourages and facilitates knowledge diffusion and exploitation mostly on a localized basis. In this respect, evidence is provided about the emergence of spatial inequalities connected to the localized nature of development processes and innovative activities.

The increasing demand for the decentralization of powers and resources from central governments to regional and local administrations in most parts of the world in the last decades can be interpreted as the acknowledgement that regional forces and characteristics are strongly relevant in shaping local development trajectories. For instance, Asia’s rise on the global economic map has necessitated greater interconnection within – and with – the outside world. This development of interconnection is taking place between nations as well as across regions and subregions in Asia.

The concept of the ‘economic corridor’ is used to explain this phenomenon. Whether energy corridors or information technology (IT) corridors, the meaning is the same: economic corridors link economic agents within a country or across regions by providing connections between economic nodes or hubs where economic resources and actors are concentrated (Yhome and Chaturvedy 2017).

In much the same way, research on innovation and collective learning – in principle, core themes in development economics – already has a transregional lens. Localized learning connects to global pipelines because spatial proximity enables the formation of distinctive cognitive repertoires, which then promote and guide learning processes into particular trajectories: the ‘local buzz’.

Global flows of information, knowledge, and technology connect to it in such a way that the two become mutually reinforcing. Because of their potential to intensify local interaction, global pipelines strengthen the internal selection and translation processes to the local milieu (Bathelt, Malmberg and Maskell 2004). Yet, those spatially focused developments also alter the way in which particular regions react to global flows. Here, development as a ‘mirror of changing economic and social capacities, priorities and choices’ (Nederveen Pieterse 2010) is clearly visible in its initially proposed dynamic character. The task is now to design and apply research methodologies that are able to capture dynamic processes of economic development and the transformative potential of events.

What we need is a set of tested instruments to explore phenomena such as the emergence of economic corridors in all its dimensions: geographical, cultural, political, social, and economic. This is similar to the horizontal perspective Halperin demands: it will explore the transnational and cross-regional interactions and connections that brought about the development of
dualistic economies within and outside regions. It will enquire how processes and structures were constantly reconfigured after times of (intellectual, political, economic) crises. That kind of horizontal perspective will also illuminate the synchronic and interdependent development of dynamic focal points of growth throughout the world shaped by translocal interactions and connections (Halperin 2005).

At the same time, a transregional approach to development economics offers the opportunity to develop shared repertoires of knowledge. By investigating how models of development travel and how translations of knowledge take place in border-crossing contexts such as development cooperation, a ‘successful translation’ in terms of inclusive narratives for a worldwide mutual understanding of development becomes possible. It is about social scientific translational knowledge. Whether a transregional perspective will then be brought into development economics or whether emerging transregional studies will partially take over realms of development economics is an open question. Since ‘questioning, rethinking and crises are part of development and not external to it’ (Nederveen Pieterse 2010: 1), development economics will surely be able to re-emerge as the distinctive discipline it was after the 1950s, and still is today, despite all adherence to common macroeconomics. As a discipline concerned with long-term structural transformation, as ‘applied economics’, and as being originally accustomed to multidisciplinary influences from across the globe (Tribe and Sumner 2006), development economics does have the potential to deliver the proof that in the end it has always done transregional studies.

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EARLY WARNING AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

Ulf Engel

Introduction

Historically, with the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the contraction of proxy wars in the Global South, the number of intrastate conflicts has increased: in particular in Africa; in the Balkans and the periphery of the former Soviet Union during the 1990s; in Afghanistan and Iraq with the invasions in October 2001 and in March 2003, respectively, by allied forces; and currently in the Middle East and Central Asia. The nature of violent conflict is also said to have changed (see Chapter 70 by Engel). In Bosnia (1992 to 1995) ethnic cleansing and in Rwanda (1994) genocide were committed, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. According to data from the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer (HIIK 2000–2016), the number of wars in sub-Saharan Africa in the 2000s decreased from six to an average of one to three per year. The number of ‘severe crisis’ remained rather stable at around eight to nine per year. But the number of ‘crises’ after 2004 almost tripled to around 30 and, in recent years, has increased to as many as 50–60 per year. Partly, this trend reflects contagion effects from the popular uprisings and revolutions in the Arab world after the spring of 2011 and in particular the disintegration of Libya and Syria. According to the African Union (AU 2013a), many of the other conflicts are related to ‘unconstitutional changes of government’, such as coups d’état, electoral violence, or heated debates about presidential term limits.

To address these and other conflicts, since 2000 the AU, its member states, and many Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa are strongly pursuing all kinds of activities that – on a continuum from pre- to post-conflict situations – can be grouped from preventive diplomacy and mediation to peace support operations and counter-terrorism policies to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), as well as post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts (AU 2015). Against this background, the idea of systematically engaging in ‘conflict prevention’ through ‘early warning’ has largely gained currency. The simple argument is that early action is far more cost efficient, and also life-saving, than late engagement through mediation, peace support operations, and lengthy conflict resolution. Since 2000, the African Union, member states, and the RECs have been establishing a complex and sophisticated African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which represents a set of new norms, institutions, and practice (see OAU 2000; AU 2002; Engel and Gomes Porto 2010, 2013).
This chapter will first identify three parallel sites of knowledge production with regard to the emerging norm ‘conflict prevention’. Second, the knowledge transfer from ‘conflict prevention’ to the practice of ‘early warning’ will be reconstructed by providing a brief overview of competing epistemological approaches on how to conduct ‘early warning’. And, finally, the application of this particular knowledge will be analysed with reference to Africa as the world region with the most intensive debate about, and rich empirical examples for, these issues.

Knowledge production: the rise of an international norm

The prominence of conflict prevention as an important practice particularly of the AU and the RECs in Africa reflects the rise of an international norm – in this case, a constitutive norm that creates new actors, interests, identities, or categories of action as opposed to a regulative norm that orders and constrains behaviour. In this chapter, norms are treated as shared expectations concerning ‘appropriate’ or ‘proper’ behaviour, involving an intersubjective as well as an evaluative dimension (cf. Checkel 1999; Acharya 2004, 2011; Zürn and Checkel 2005).

In order to explain the rise of conflict prevention as an international norm in the mid-1990s, the norm life cycle model of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 898) will be used as an explanatory heuristic. Assuming that norms emerge, cascade, and then become internalized by the ‘international community’, in the initial phase specific ‘norm entrepreneurs’, who are driven by altruism or ideational commitment, take centre stage. Their efforts to persuade other members of the ‘international community’ rest on organizational platforms. It is only in the second phase of the cascade that states, international organizations, and networks adopt the new norm through socialization, institutionalization, or demonstration.

Triggered by the genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda, various norm entrepreneurs started a debate of what went wrong in these countries and why the ‘international community’ did not intervene in these (and other) cases to prevent genocide from happening. The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda exercise represents an important contribution to this end, which emerged from a consultative meeting held in Copenhagen, Denmark, in November 1994 of international development assistance agencies and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). In this meeting, representatives from 19 bilateral donor agencies from the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), plus the European Union and the OECD Development Assistance’s secretariat (OECD DAC), nine multilateral agencies and UN units, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), as well as five INGOs participated. As a result, a four-volume study was published in 1996, the second volume of which contains a detailed analysis of early warning and conflict management during the development of the genocide (Adelman and Suhrke 1996). The report lists a series of early warning failures that were attributed to institutional, legal, cultural, communicational, perceptual, and other factors. It clearly shows that there was prior knowledge within the ‘international community’ of the imminent violence against what was constructed as ‘Tutsi’ ethnic identities by the Rwandan ‘Hutu’ regime and its militias, and that this early warning was not acted upon.

The second important source of norm emergence was an alliance of government agencies and INGOs, such as International Alert (1995a, 1995b, 1997) or the Dutch National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development (NCDO 1997), whose activities in the field of promoting conflict prevention were loosely harmonized by the then Foreign Policy Unit of the Directorate-General VIII of the European Commission (in those days in charge of development assistance). Based on the findings from INGOs’ workshops and conferences, the
European Commission developed in a ‘Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention’ the concept of ‘structural stability’ – meaning a situation of ‘sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures and healthy environmental and social conditions, with the capacity to manage change without resort to conflicts’ (EC 1996). This policy was confirmed in a ‘Common Position’ adopted by the EU Council (1997) and in another ‘Communication’ (EC 2001). From here, the norm cascaded to various EU member states that introduced the notion of conflict prevention into their foreign policies and development assistance programmes (for instance, Clingendael and Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996; NUPI 1998; ODA 1996; OECD DAC 1997). Later on, the new norm was internalized in most member states by a general process of administrative and operational ‘mainstreaming’ (for Germany see Ropers 2002).

The third source of norm emergence was academically informed debates. Three are to be singled out for their impact on political decision-makers. First, the New York-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a global network of policy research centres, had established a Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. In 1997, it tabled its report ‘Preventing Deadly Conflict’, which drew lessons from, among others, the violence that occurred in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia (Carnegie Commission 1997). Carnegie promoted an international commitment to the concept of prevention, a habit of preventive investment, more effective regimes for controlling destructive weaponry, and a working portfolio of legal standards that rest on a normative consensus regarding the responsibilities of governments to each other and to their peoples.

(ibid.: xvii)

And it distinguished between operational prevention (steps to employ when confronting an immediate crisis) and structural prevention (measures to address root causes of conflict).

Second, collaborative work of the Local Capacities for Peace Project/The Collaborative for Development Action contributed to the rethinking of the role of development assistance in conflict situations. The project, based in Cambridge, MA, and led by economist Mary B. Anderson, involved a number of donor agencies (from Canada, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UN, etc.) and over 100 NGOs. The findings on how ‘to do no harm’ were presented in a booklet (Anderson 1996) and a monograph (Anderson 1999).

And, third, commissioned academic work problematized the same issue: the influence of aid in situations of violent conflict. For instance, Peter Uvin – an area studies specialist on Rwanda (Uvin 1998) – published the findings regarding this question on behalf of the OECD DAC Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (Uvin 1999).

All three debates took part against the backdrop of a more general debate on preventive diplomacy that was driven by the United Nations and their respective African secretary-generals: Boutros-Boutros Ghali (1992–6, Egypt) and Kofi Annan (1997–2006, Ghana). In ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (UNSG 1992), preventive diplomacy was the first pillar of the organization’s peace and security mission, defining it as ‘action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur’. The instruments of preventive diplomacy were defined as (i) confidence-building measures (such as the exchange of military missions, risk reduction centres, information exchanges, and monitoring of regional arms control agreements); (ii) fact-finding; (iii) early warning; (iv) preventive deployments (inserting armed forces before a crisis develops); and (v) demilitarized zones. Over time, however, the secretary-generals have extended the notion of preventive diplomacy to focus on preventive action, a concept wider than preventive diplomacy, as an
attempt to address underlying problems that could contribute to tension and conflict (UNSG 1995: §652). Kofi Annan pushed this agenda further with a view to establishing an institutional ‘culture of prevention’ at the United Nations (UNSG 1998; detailed in UNSG 2001).

**Knowledge transfer: epistemological debates**

Early warning systems (EWS) are meant to close the gap between ‘early warning’ and ‘early action’. They are the technical mechanisms and institutions to translate early warning information into response options for decision-makers. Yet, how exactly to conduct early warning has been a contested issue, reflecting both ‘science wars’ à la Latour (1999) about the right way to construct relevant knowledge about the topic as well as institutional competition in what was conceived by many as an increasingly lucrative commercial market. Critical choices in early warning concern (i) epistemological preferences, that is whether a quantitative or a qualitative approach – or a combination of the two – should be favoured; (ii) the scope of early warning, that is what kind of conflicts are to be monitored; and (iii) the institutional purpose (and subsequent design) of the EWS (see Austin 2004). Thus, some EWS favour correlational models, based on quantitative data; others engage utilizing sequential models based on qualitative data; and a third group prefers conjunctural models in which conditions and events are combined (distinction based on Gurr and Harff 1994). While some EWS focus on specific conflict types (genocide, ethnopolitical conflict, or minorities), others aim at violent conflict in general. The institutional purpose varies between data monitoring and analysis, modelling of data, risk assessments, lobbying, or networking (Austin 2004).

When it comes to existing models of early warning, essentially the divide is between (i) quantitative approaches of modelling, theory-testing, and algorithm-building, (ii) various qualitative forms of conflict analysis, and (iii) systems that create their own events data through incident reports. The former is embedded in a United States peace research tradition. It enjoyed huge funding in the 1960s and 1970s and, with the ‘big data’ opportunities of recent years, has again since the 1990s (Austin 2004: 6). This tradition is associated with projects such as Minorities at Risk (since 1993) and the Global Event Data Survey (GEDS) – both at the University of Maryland, MD – or the Centre for Systemic Peace in Vienna, VA (on related methods, see Jenkins and Bond 2001; on the military use, see O’Brien 2010). In contrast, the quantitative school is mainly based in Europe. It has focused on developing analytical tools that are based on insights from political science, anthropology, and sociology. Initially this part of the debate was more rational choice driven; later on, complementary post-structuralist perspectives were developed. And, finally, there is a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches as represented, for instance, by the Frühanalyse von Spannungen und Tatsachen ermittlung (FAST) – an EWS developed by people around Heinz Krummenacher, Susanne Schmeidl, and Günther Baechler, and run between 1998 and 2008 by the foundation Swisspeace. It combines monitoring, event data analysis, expert networks, and fact-finding missions. The heart of the system is based on incident reports coming from field monitors (see Krummenacher and Schmeidl 2001).

Toward the end of the 1990s, the European strands of the debate were strongly associated with and supported by various national development assistance agencies and/or ministries of foreign affairs. Out of this dialogue, a series of toolboxes for practitioners and implementation frameworks were designed (Spelten 1999; Lund and Mehler 1999; van de Goor and Verstegen 1999; Mehler and Ribaux 2000; Paffenholz and Reychler 2000). However, all these efforts were based on two ‘lurking assumptions: (a) that conflict can be mitigated in the first instance, and (b) that one knows how to mitigate it – both are highly contentious’ (Austin 2004: 15).
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Against the background of what Lund describes as the ‘creeping institutionalization of the culture of prevention’ in many Western agencies (Lund 2000), the analytical tools were refined and developed into a specific method: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments (PCIAs) (Bush 1998; SWP CPN 1999; Leonhardt 2001a, 2001b; Hoffman 2004). On the basis of this methodology, ‘guidance notes’ (DFID 2002) or implementation frameworks (UNDG ECHA 2004; World Bank CPR 2005) were developed to provide practitioners in situations of conflict with the necessary analytical tools and enable them to ‘develop options for more conflict sensitive policies and programmes’ (DFID 2002) or ‘support a conflict sensitive approach to programming’ (UNDG ECHA 2004). In practice, PCIAs were conducted in a number of conflict or post-conflict countries as one-off exercises.

Knowledge application: practices of early warning and conflict prevention in Africa

In a number of related and partly interwoven processes of ‘cultural transfer’ (Espagne 1999), the knowledge produced (conflict prevention) and transferred (early warning and PCIA) was finally applied to construct EWS in Africa. The predominant way of bringing ‘relevant’ knowledge to the African Union and the RECs was by involving Western consultants from all three epistemological traditions in the construction of a tailor-made EWS (the following is based on AU 2008: 24–34 and the websites of the respective institutions). The first two RECs to establish an EWS were the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This was followed by the construction of the AU’s Continental Early Warning System, which has been in effect since 2007.

Since 2002, IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) has focused on cross-border pastoral conflicts in three designated regional clusters (IGAD 2016). The CEWARN Unit in Addis Ababa is the regional hub for data collection, conflict analysis, information sharing, and communication of response options. IGAD utilizes an established system of local information collection networks at a national level, based on field monitors and their situation reports (SitReps) and incident reports (IncReps). In addition, and in each IGAD member state, CEWARN has contracted national research institutes as partner organizations. The two regional CEWARN coordinating structures are the Technical Committee on Early Warning and the Committee of Permanent Secretaries. At the national level, CEWARN builds upon Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs) as focal coordinating units. Each CEWERU is mandated to form a steering committee that brings together governmental decision-makers and civil society representatives. The CEWERUs are the responsible bodies for response initiatives on the country level, to be implemented in close cooperation with local committees or subregional peace councils. Short-term preventive projects are supported (up to a maximum USD 50,000) through a Rapid Response Fund.

At the ECOWAS Commission, starting in 1999, the ECOWAS Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) is implemented through the Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) at the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence and Security in Abuja, Nigeria (ECOWAS 2016). Furthermore, four zonal information and reporting bureaus have been established (located in Cotonou, Benin; Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; Monrovia, Liberia; and Banjul, The Gambia). The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEFP), a civil society network with knowledge of early warning and peace-building, was chosen to partner with ECOWAS. In addition, ECOWAS is working with focal points (monitors) in the 15 member states. It has also recruited 15 civil society focal points that feed the system with information. A total of 30 staff are involved in the monitoring process, aside
from the four zonal bureau heads and the four civil society coordinators, who play the role of quality control of data and analysis. Headquarters comprise analysts, management staff, and other support staff including a civil society liaison officer. ECOWARN is collecting and analysing data, mainly in the form of SitReps. In 2015, ECOWAS started implementing the National Early Warning and Response Mechanism with the aim of launching EWS in all member states.

The AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is located at the African Union’s Peace and Security Department (AU 2016). It evolved out of the Conflict Management Division that was formed in 1993 as part of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of the Organisation of African Union (OAU). Implementation of the CEWS started in 2005 with a roadmap that led to the production of the CEWS Handbook in 2008 (AU 2008). The CEWS is an open source system based on a combination of IT tools for data collection and monitoring and a set of analytical PCIA tools for cooperation and conflict analysis. Among others, the CEWS is producing regular Early Warning Reports; in the future, it will also conduct Country Structural Vulnerability Assessments (CSVA), with a view to facilitating the identification, at an early stage, of a country’s structural vulnerability to conflict, and on this basis work out long-term Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS) (see AU 2013b). In addition, it makes use of scenario-building and horizon-scanning techniques to provide the chairperson of the AU Commission with timely advice and policy options. Additional conflict relevant information is provided to the chairperson by the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services (CISSA), which was established in 2004. Information coming both from the CEWS, CISSA, and other sources is reconciled and coordinated by the Intelligence and Security Committee in the chairperson’s bureau.

Additionally, there are EWS in the making at the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), called COMWARN, with a focus on war economies and mineral resources that propagate conflicts in the region as well as ‘terrorist’ threats; the East African Community (EAC), called EACWARN; the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), with the Early Warning Observation and Monitoring System for Central Africa (MARAC); and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), with the Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC). Out of the eight officially AU-recognized RECs, so far only the Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA) and Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) have not established EWS.

**Conclusions**

This chapter identified three parallel sites of knowledge production with regard to conflict prevention as a norm in international relations that emerged in response to genocides that were committed in Rwanda and in the Balkans. Alluding to competing epistemological approaches on how best to conduct early warning, the knowledge transfer from ‘conflict prevention’ to the practice of ‘early warning’ was reconstructed. And, last, empiric evidence from the African continent was introduced to discuss the application of this particular knowledge. Some African EWS have become operationalized. One of the remaining challenges, apart from issues of quality control and creating or maintaining the necessary feedback loops with decision-makers, is to coordinate and harmonize the EWS both vertically and horizontally, that is to say, within respective institutions and between the various pillars of regional and continental peace and security architectures, as well as between the African Union and the RECs as well as between various RECs.
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Select bibliography


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Since the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988, the relationship between climate research, politics, and public awareness of climate change issues has reached a new level of global interlacing. During the last 20 years, decision-making processes and negotiations to address climate change have become highly dependent on scientific input. Policy-makers have increasingly sought legitimacy for their decisions through evidence-based frameworks. The increasing dependence on scientific knowledge has led to new accountability-related demands to assess how knowledge on climate change is actually generated and applied. In addition, issues of climate protection, especially through the reduction of emissions, have been politicized, and climate change mitigation and adaptation have been used as focal points during electoral campaigns. In general, concerns related to climate change and its sociopolitical, economic, and military dimensions have attracted a different kind of political attention compared to how climate change had been perceived in the 1960s and 1970s. Such dimensions have increasingly become the subject of political calculation, and less so of environmental concerns.

It might be argued that the observable politicization of climate change is inevitable. Political decisions and actions necessitated by effectively addressing climate change will most likely create ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Climate decision-making is thus prone to the risk of political instrumentalization by ‘populist’ political actors seeking to benefit from social anxieties. This means that knowledge, as well as decision tools, provided by scientific communities are now the subject of political scrutiny, whereas the high complexity and uncertainty of climate change issues, the limitations of methodologies, and the often found ambiguity of scientific findings have made these prone to allegations of manipulation.

The so-called ‘climate conspiracy’ has gained significant public support, in particular since a few factual errors and inaccuracies were discovered in the Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, casting doubt on the whole climate science (Cogley et al. 2010). In addition, some political actors have managed to incriminate science by ‘shopping’ for scientific studies that support their political agenda while at the same time defaming studies that are in opposition to their views. Mobilized through the perception of vulnerability or being a ‘victim of the establishment’, and instigated by the political narratives of
climate conspiracy, a significant part of global society now seems to perceive climate science to be based on false and manipulated data that merely aims to suppress dissent. Further undermining the legitimacy and usefulness of climate science is the purported divide between knowledge generated in the North and knowledge generated in the South.

An unequal distribution of resources is translated into the dominance of certain countries or regions in generating scientific knowledge. However, boundaries between the North and South are porous and do not always correspond to geographical regions. The divide is rather driven by identities. Nevertheless, there are tendencies in climate change negotiations to mobilize ‘groups’ based on various ‘identity’ categories that in a wider sense can be understood as regions. Among these groups are the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the least developed countries (LDCs), the European Union (EU), the Group of Twenty (G20) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Group of 77 (G77) and China.

It is a fact that climate negotiations are framed by scientific knowledge that is mainly generated in the North. What are the factors, then, that inhibit knowledge generation in other world regions? What consequences does the hegemony of the North have in terms of the overall quality of the generated knowledge, in terms of the effectiveness of the implementation of climate resolutions, and in terms of the possible failure to acknowledge the local contexts of the majority of the Earth’s population? And how does this unequal knowledge generation actually empower regions, in the sense of mobilizing regional identities for or against advances in global climate negotiations?

The overall question is how a transregional perspective might provide insights into how regions and regional identities can redirect climate change research and reconceptualize climate negotiations to accentuate co-benefits and debar trade-offs not only at the regional but also at the global scale. The answers to this question will be derived from the analysis of processes regarding the works of the IPCC as well as of processes characterizing climate change negotiations.

The central term used here is ‘knowledge diplomacy’. On the one hand, knowledge is an outcome of various processes that are prone to asymmetric power relations. On the other hand, knowledge, or access to knowledge, influences the profile of actors, the range and scope of issues, the design of structures and institutions, the course of processes, as well as the set of outcomes, particularly in climate negotiations.

**Generation of knowledge on climate change: the role of the IPCC and epistemic communities**

Epistemic communities are networks of knowledge-based experts who help decision-makers identify and define emerging problems, formulate various policy solutions available, and assess the outcomes of such policies to decide the feasibility of those to be implemented (Adler and Haas 1992). Such networks of knowledge-based experts also exist regarding climate research. Already in the late 1970s and early 1980s, several scientific communities had expressed their concern about the potential severity of increased carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions. The issue drew political attention in 1978 when the Jimmy Carter administration sought to use domestic coal to solve the energy crisis, prompting early forms of ‘knowledge diplomacy’ in which evidence-based decisions are preferred, in turn leading to consultations with scientific communities. Increased public awareness following prominent environmental problems such as the smog problem in London, the Minamata disease in Japan, and the Waldsterben (dying forest syndrome) in Germany further motivated national governments to listen to scientific communities as concomitant restrictive actions required new bases of legitimacy.
In 1988, the IPCC established the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and
the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in direct response to the increasing demand
for knowledge-guided decision-making, backed up by an exponentially growing number of
studies on climate change. The IPCC is designed to assess the findings of various fields and sci-
cientific disciplines relevant to climate change. It produces assessment reports and special reports
by engaging thousands of scientists and experts worldwide. These experts are either nominated
by their national governments or appointed by the IPCC secretariat. They are committed to
participate in the assessment-writing process without any form of financial remuneration. It is
important to note that the IPCC does not conduct its own studies, and its reports are designed
to reflect the international standard of scientific knowledge at any given time.

When providing a synthesis of available literature, the IPCC assessment reports concentrate
on peer-reviewed materials. However, non-peer-reviewed materials, also called ‘grey literature’,
are included in the IPCC’s reports if it decides that they meet the high quality standards
demanded by the reports’ lead authors. Among such materials are reports and data from interna-
tional organizations (e.g. the United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency),
national governments and their agencies, and also international non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs), such as the International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation
Association.

At first glance, the analysis of the IPCC’s working process suggests that while there is politi-
cal motivation to engage scientific experts from the South, the generation of climate knowl-
dge is still mostly done in the North American and European context, and only partially in,
for instance, Oceania. Among 830 (coordinating) lead authors and review editors of the Fifth
Assessment Report (AR5), only 301 (36 per cent) are from developing countries (including
countries labelled as ‘economies in transition’, such as Russia and Poland).

The regional distribution of all AR5 author teams further highlights the imbalance among
the experts involved: only 8 per cent are from Africa, 16 per cent from Asia, 6 per cent from
South America, and 7 per cent from the Southwest Pacific. Instead, 28 per cent of all participat-
ing experts are from North and Central America and the Caribbean, and 34 per cent are from
Europe (IPCC 2017). Practically speaking, more than 69 per cent of the authors and expert
reviewers of the AR5 are from the North.

This situation is structurally driven and path dependent. Scientists and experts from Africa,
Latin America, and Asia heavily rely on non-peer-reviewed materials due to the widespread
lack of access to journals that mostly require subscription fees. In turn, they do have less oppor-
tunity to publish their works in peer-reviewed journals because of the tendency of journal edi-
tors to reject papers that mostly cite non-peer-reviewed literature.

Because publication in peer-reviewed journals has become a major criterion of research
evaluation in Anglo-Saxon countries and in most of Europe, additional resources, such as lan-
guage editing, are provided by universities and research institutions in the North to boost pub-
lication performance and to secure competitiveness in grant applications. Moreover, journals
that are published in English outside of Europe and the Anglo-Saxon region are most likely
to publish articles written by English native speakers or Europeans, and many of these journals
take on editors originating from Europe or the United States in order to save on the costs for
English-language editing. In most cases, peer-reviewed journals do not offer language-editing
services, and the acceptance of submitted journal articles is significantly dependent on the qual-
ity of the language.

Set against that situation, that the scientific works assessed in the AR5 of the three working
groups were – with few exceptions – required to be peer-reviewed resulted in a serious loss
of possible insights. In addition, because the three IPCC working groups mainly considered
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peer-reviewed journal articles published in English, a rather high proportion of the cited articles had been published in Anglo-Saxon countries. While some lead authors are willing to cite non-English sources, it is difficult for reviewers to assess the quality of the content cited, as non-English studies are only provided with English abstracts. Therefore, the content will most likely not gain support from other lead authors and expert reviewers during the usual multiple draft-writing process and review stages. Most likely, they will not be included in later versions of the final report.

Moreover, the bias against journals not published in English is further exaggerated by the current journal ranking system. In ranking the quality of academic journals, an impact factor serves as a proxy to reflect the importance of a specific journal within its field of research. The impact factor reflects the average number of citations of the articles published in those journals. Because of this, some journals adopt editorial policies to maximize their impact factors, including a ‘by invitation only’ policy, which is based on inviting exclusively senior scientists to publish ‘citable’ papers in order to increase the journal’s impact factor (Moustafa 2015).

In the various AR5 meetings of the different IPCC working groups, these issues were often raised not only by scientists from developing countries, but also by the IPCC secretariat itself. For example, efforts were made to ensure a North–South geographical balance by nominating and appointing Coordinating Lead Authors (CLA) for the different chapters; to this end, at least one CLA from a developing country was required. In addressing those various shortcomings, the IPCC requested that the Inter Academy Council (IAC) perform an independent review of the former’s processes and procedures, after which the IPCC adopted various changes. This, however, resulted in even higher workloads for those involved in preparing the assessments, and they became further dependent on ‘chapter assistants’ provided by OECD countries (Schulte-Uebbing et al. 2015).

Thus, the IPCC process unintentionally reproduces and reinforces structural imbalances and unequal inputs among different world regions in generating, assessing, and distributing knowledge related to climate change. While the transboundary character of climate change demands a global response, the majority of solutions are dependent on regionally and locally managed actions. Decisions again need to be coordinated locally while best practices need to be exchanged transregionally. Generally, a transregional perspective can illuminate knowledge generation and deployment as well as power relations in climate change negotiations, and can be helpful in understanding how knowledge becomes a subject of diplomacy.

Knowledge diplomacy in climate change negotiations

Climate change negotiations relying on assessments from the IPCC, for instance, are a complex process. The challenge lies in coordinating the basic functions of the multilateral negotiation process, which involves building a like-minded community of negotiating parties, accommodating diverging or conflicting interests, effectively organizing procedures, and administering the knowledge base used. A basic characteristic of the workings of knowledge diplomacy vis-à-vis traditional diplomacy is indeed the involvement of experts, NGOs, or business partners as actors in preparing and conducting complex negotiation procedures.

In epistemic communities such as networks of climate change experts, successful knowledge diplomacy will ensure a common understanding of the issues at hand. It is a type of consensual knowledge that is then channelled into negotiation processes and, later, into treaty-making. In the case of the IPCC, knowledge diplomacy is evident in various forms and stages. It ranges from agenda-setting in regional forums (copying practices and informal rules as seen in the IPCC process and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC] meetings
or applying regional practices and informal rules into the IPCC and UNFCCC process), to the proper identification of actors and stakeholders for negotiations and consultations in national policy-making, and, at the meta-level, to the ongoing global convergence of norms and practices.

Concurrently, traditional power politics has increasingly been losing its former importance. Leadership does not automatically translate into privileges. Quite the contrary is observable: powerful states are obliged to shoulder larger shares of the financial burden for measures to mitigate climate change. Sacrifices and restrictions are at stake, with some countries still preferring to identify themselves as ‘developing’ because of the prospective flexibility granted to them in implementing measures. The historical context of greenhouse gas emissions, for instance, set up a different ‘political logic’, defining a changed political framework for climate negotiators.

While a mandate was given to the IPCC to provide reliable and policy-relevant scientific inputs through its various reports, it does not mean that national governments are completely unable to influence the types and scope of scientific knowledge that is codified in the Summary for Policymakers (SPM) during the IPCC approval session. Because this SPM is formally used as the basis for subsequent climate negotiations, most countries are keen on blocking certain content of the SPM that opposes their political interests. For example, Brazil, as a major bioenergy producer, is highly ‘vigilant’ when ‘wordings’ on bioenergy in the SPM are at stake. The same is true with the United States and Austria in terms of nuclear energy. In the approval session of the Third Working Group of the IPCC in April 2014, several countries – such as China, India, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, South Africa, Ecuador, and Bolivia – were ‘unhappy’ with some chapters using country classifications based on income in the context of climate mitigation. These countries argued that presumed political consequences of this reference include the ‘thinning out’ of the ‘historical responsibility’ of developed countries because mitigation actions are no longer defined by past emissions but by the current country’s income.

Most importantly, due to the reliance on science and research when understanding the consequences of decisions regarding climate change measures, most negotiators are themselves required to be experts. In various cases, IPCC lead authors are often invited to be members of country delegations in UNFCCC negotiations. Negotiators need to understand the scientific evidence as well as the methodologies used to come up with certain policy scenarios up for further discussion. The disparity among regions described above is visible here since most developing countries from Asia and Africa without an extensive pool of scientific experts in their countries are unable to send ‘experts’ as negotiators. While some developing countries have decided to hire Europeans or Americans as experts/members of their delegation, others are dependent on their ‘diaspora’, which is usually based in developed countries. Still others have opted to tap ‘patronage countries’ from the North to gain access to scientific knowledge.

The dominance of certain regions in generating climate knowledge is apparent and to a certain degree inevitable considering that this dominance is highly path dependent. From the core–periphery perspective, the patterns of knowledge generation are concentrated in the core, whereas the periphery is confronted by knowledge transfer that is often not applicable in its local context. During the last decades, the importance of regional foci of reference – be it in pooling resources, searching for partners, or strengthening a specific regional case in the international arena – has been the dominant one.

Regional perspectives commonly provide context (and historicity) to climate change negotiations. For example, they can uncover the impulses for identifying ‘climate leaders’ or ‘champions’, or how alternative or complementary ‘climate clubs’ (Hovi et al. 2016) can be formed.

Bridging global climate policy gaps through a transregional lens – quo vadimus?

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Knowledge diplomacy in climate politics

to advance climate decisions. In addition, regional perspectives can define new opportunities
for cooperation, ranging from mere consultations to strategic alliances, and can come up with
new roles for international or regional institutions.

For example, when considering whether a specific mitigation technology (e.g. ocean energy
technology) should target a specific region (e.g. archipelagic region), existing regional institu-
tions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can be tapped. The institu-
tion can not only serve as a forum for negotiations to implement this mitigation technology,
but also embed ‘indigenous modernity’ into the mitigation technology (e.g. self-governance at
the grass-roots level) in order to increase public acceptance.

In addition, due to the potential regional implications of global agreements, many regions
tap into existing regional institutions to prepare for upcoming climate negotiations. Before
Conference of the Party (COP) meetings, regional bodies – such as the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN, and the EU, as well as AOSIS and the African Union (AU) –
often meet to prepare and distribute tasks among their members. Demands and interests in the
various UNFCCC negotiations are ‘packed’ with regional interests to speed up the process.

Commonly, as regions identify the agenda and issues relevant to them, not only do they
‘draft’ their negotiation positions but they also identify relevant knowledge gaps that need to be
further addressed by science and research. These knowledge gaps include both evidence-based
and ideological underpinnings of trade-offs and dilemmas that typically frame climate issues. For
instance, there have been discussions on whether providing access to electricity to 240 million
Indians (Singh 2017) is a ‘good’ decision from the emission reduction perspective.

The trade-off between climate mitigation and providing (energy) access to peripheral regions
becomes apparent, leading to anxieties about correcting regional accessibility disparities. As
access to energy is increasingly considered a right as defined by the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs), protests are issued by developing countries, accusing developed countries of
shifting away from their ‘historical’ responsibility. Nevertheless, the increasing involvement of
peripheral regions is a non-negotiable provision of any future decision-making process.

As shown by the analysis of the IPCC process, there are regionally framed cleavages that
need to be properly addressed by any global agreement. Many stakeholders in global climate
negotiations are organized using regional structures, and they move along regional identities.
Regional groups apply common narratives that summarize identities, fix the set of options they
are willing to accept, and define the types of demand they pursue during global negotiations.
Regional identities often resemble a Schicksalsgemeinschaft (community of fate), with common
grievances and aspirations, as has happened in the case of AOSIS. Thus, a regional perspective
also influences the negotiation process by pointing out how regional identities express common
grounds that could determine the course or direction of negotiations.

Anxiety about global climate decisions can be contained as regions offer the first layer of
conflating global and national/local identities, which ensures a feeling of ‘process ownership’.
Regional groups are therefore used as facilitators and as negotiation vehicles, providing weaker
countries a channel to tap into resources. Therefore, regional cooperation, as the effective inter-
mediation between the global and the national, becomes an integral part of capacity building.
Regions will most likely serve as the ‘launching pad’ of convergence because they offer the initial
space of connectivity and accountability due to already existing regional cooperation mechanisms.

Hence, the success of global climate negotiations hinges on regional forums and regional
cooperation mechanisms. Regions that are able to effectively organize themselves and prepare
for negotiations will be taken as ‘best practice laboratories’, motivating other regions to test
their practices, to evaluate the applicability of informal rules, and to adjust procedures and
structures. Regions can therefore be regarded as agents of tipping points.
That being said, a purely regional perspective will not do to ensure consensus and implement converging measures able to bridge the gap between local contexts and global necessities. It has to be accompanied by a transregional perspective. First of all, climate change is a global phenomenon affecting all regions on Earth, although in different ways. Some of the phenomena endangering millions of people (e.g. rising sea levels) will not only change the outlook of affected national territories, but will also have serious consequences for world trade routes, migration patterns, dynamics of conflicts, and the like. Still, knowledge generated by natural sciences dominates the input into reports, assessments, and scenarios. Transregional studies do have the potential to reveal chronologically ordered patterns of connectivity of climate change-induced movements of people, or of economic turmoil formerly exclusively addressing countries’ economic policies. Likewise, changes in anthropogenic causes for climate change in different world regions will only become understandable if reflected, for instance, against the background of global shifts in the use of technologies. Second, a transregional perspective has to be embedded into the various forms of knowledge diplomacy, paving the way to identify particular knowledge gaps while defining research agendas. The leadership of countries and regions facing particular challenges that recognize and evaluate issues, such as rising sea levels, could scale up the basis for designing novel procedures for cooperation beyond regional identities.

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INFLUENCING THE OTHER

Transnational actors and knowledge transfer in education

Marcelo Parreira do Amaral

Introduction

Knowledge transfer in education has a long history in the field and the broader traditions of comparative and international education. Although the transfer of knowledge across places pre-dates nation-states, the practice rose in importance in the course of the nineteenth century, exerting substantial influence in the shaping of modern national education systems. In addition, transfer processes have undergone substantial change since earlier eras that had been characterized by state-commissioned reports on foreign education systems. Currently, several (Regional) International Organizations, or (R)IOs, have become important sites of production and transfer of knowledge. These transnational actors are thus significantly shaping education around the world, and commanding more research enquires into the nature, consequences, and potential of knowledge transfer. This chapter first contextualizes the topic in the international research literature, particularly in historical terms. Second, it looks into (R)IOs as sites for the production and transfer of knowledge in education, considering specifically the nature, processes, and mechanisms of educational transfer. Third and finally, the chapter discusses the value of global or area studies in terms of enriching understanding of these transregional processes as well as outlining questions and issues meriting future research.

Cultural and knowledge transfer can be traced back at least to ancient Greece, where as early as the fifth century BC, for instance, Herodotus pointed out the Persians’ eager adoption of the customs of foreign nations, and where Plato later resorted to experience abroad as a basis for his arguments in The Republic. Multiple similar examples from throughout the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the eighteenth century reflect that the transfer of knowledge across places and cultures substantially pre-dates the emergence of the nation-state and further characterizes the nation-state’s early history (Fraser and Brickmann 1968). The rise in the prominence of educational transfer and in its importance as a social function became more clearly visible during the course of the nineteenth century. From then onwards, curiosity, civilizational admiration, and missionary outreach faded as the prevailing leitmotifs of educational transfer. The transfer of educational practices and foci began to assert substantial influence on the shaping of modern educational systems.

Two positions concerning the practical purpose and feasibility of educational transfer have prevailed historically. The first one, exemplified by Marc Antoine Jullien (1962 [1817]), was
the belief that not only was the transfer of educational ideas from one country to another possible, but that it was also indeed clearly desirable. Fraser (1964) wrote that, according to Jullien’s outlook, ‘improvements [are] capable of being transported from one country to another’ and give rise ‘to the idea of borrowing from one another what . . . is good and useful’ (1964: 46).

Frenchman Victor Cousin, another major early proponent of ‘educational borrowing’, proposed a three-step process: (1) identify local problems and needs of a particular system; (2) recognize other systems that faced similar problems and successfully solved them; and (3) transfer the adequate solutions from this system into one’s own (see Steiner-Khamsi 2002: 58). A clear intent of educational transfer from this perspective was the solution of identified problems via the adoption of practice gained through ‘useful lessons from abroad’.

Indeed, the study of this melioristic outlook ultimately became one of the prevailing ‘unit ideas’ in the field of comparative and international education (CIE) (Cowen 2002; see also Kaloyannaki and Kazamias 2009). The sociopolitical context of the nascent national societies and later nation-states in Europe had given rise to the common practice of inviting foreign ‘experts’ to advise on organizing or reforming education as well as of commissioning reports on the state of educational development abroad. Horace Mann and Matthew Arnold stand with Jullien and with Cousin as pertinent exemplars of this borrowing tradition in CIE: as figures who acted both as intellectuals and as practitioners or administrators interested in transfer for educational reform in their own countries.

Standing in stark contrast is Sir Michael Sadler’s 1900 lecture titled ‘How far can we learn something of practical value from the study of foreign systems of education?’ (1979). The lecture exhibits pronounced scepticism regarding the desirability and possibility of educational transfer for corrective purposes (in the Jullienian scheme). Sadler specifically argues that:

[w]e cannot wander at pleasure among the education systems of the world, like a child strolling through a garden and pick off a flower from one bush and some leaves from another, and then expect that if we stick what we have gathered into the soil at home, we shall have a living plant.

(1979: 49)

Despite divergent positions toward the feasibility and desirability of transferring educational ideas, concepts, and policies from one place to another, cultural and knowledge transfer remains a ubiquitous trope among policy-makers and continues to command significant scholarly attention from comparativists. As pursued in more detail below, different concepts were coined within the field of CIE that signal not only the different directions of transfer, but also its voluntary (‘borrowing’) or more imposed (‘lending’) nature. More recent scholarship on the topic has shifted focus from pragmatic questions (‘What can be learned?’) to more analytical concerns (‘Why and how has the transfer taken place?’) (see Steiner-Khamsi 2003a: 164; 2004). This analytical shift has also brought into focus the actors involved in these processes, together with their rationales and interests.

Since the time of state-commissioned reports on foreign education systems of the nineteenth century, processes of educational transfer have undergone substantial change. Several (regional) international organizations ((R)IOs) have assumed prominent roles in the production and transfer of knowledge in education. In significantly influencing education across the world, they command more research attention into the nature, consequences, and potential of knowledge transfer. Interest in the theme of transfer in education by (R)IOs can be viewed as related to a wide-ranging political, economic, and social reorganization of the world.
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Scholarly debates on the phenomenon of ‘globalization’ underscore the conclusion that education can no longer be thought of solely in the scope of the nation-state and that it must account for a prevailing current global environment of interdependence. In addition, a close link is visible between education or innovation and economic growth in the socioeconomic imaginary that now prevails regarding the supposed dominance of a knowledge-based economy (Jessop, Fairclough and Wodak 2008; Robertson 2009). Significant interest in the international transfer of policies, of best practices, and of performance assessments aimed at measuring the effectiveness and quality of education as practised worldwide explains much of the attention comparative research is now receiving: ‘The recent popularity of comparative education must be explained through this internationalization of educational policies, leading to the diffusion of global patterns and flows of knowledge that are assumed to be applicable in various places’ (Nóvoa and Yariv-Mashal 2003: 426).

This trend has produced commensurate interest within comparative research in the diffusion and implementation of hegemonic agendas, signalling the need to explore issues related to the selectivity of knowledge and the preferred mechanisms of transfer, as well as those related to power relations. According to António Nóvoa and Tali Yariv-Mashal (2003), comparative research had historically become entangled in societal and political projects, providing throughout recent history both method and frame of analysis: namely ‘knowing the other’ in the 1880s, ‘understanding the other’ during the 1920s, ‘constructing the other’ in the 1960s, and ‘measuring the other’ from the 2000s onwards (Nóvoa and Yariv-Mashal 2003: 424). Hence, it is increasingly pertinent at present to enquire into how knowledge transfer in education has become a means for influencing the other across global regions.

CIE scholarship has yielded useful conceptual tools and methodological insights on important aspects of the topic. The following section deals with (R)IOs as sites of production and transfer of knowledge in education. The chapter then turns to comments on the value of global or area studies in studying these transregional processes and outlines some questions for future research agendas.

Cultural and knowledge transfer in education

‘Cultural transfer’ – a term coined in research on the (historical) intercultural exchange processes between France and Germany in the mid-1980s (Espagne and Werner 1988; see also Middell 2001) – refers to processes understood as the global mobility of words, concepts, and other cultural elements, which are well researched in the humanities and social sciences in general and in CIE in particular. Rather than interest in specifically cross-national comparative aspects of transfer processes, this research strand has emphasized the dimension of translation and explored corresponding forms of cultural mixing, interpenetration, and hybridization. The scholarly focus has therefore been on the interrelationships between regions, on the direction of transfers between them, and on aspects related to influence and power (asymmetry). Focus has been placed on understanding that cultural and knowledge transfer is always a reciprocal and dynamic process that changes both those sending and those receiving (or those borrowing and those lending) knowledge (Espagne and Werner 1988). Accordingly, a major conceptual contribution of this understanding of cultural transfer is its early use of alternative concepts to ‘nation’ or ‘country’, thus countering essentialist notions of national entities and identities.

Adopting the term ‘cultural zones’, for instance, authors in this research field emphasize that terms such as ‘nation’ or ‘country’ substantially obscure important cultural differences and heterogeneity. In addition, the concept of ‘cultural zones’ emphasizes the multilateral nature of knowledge transfer: in reference to Franco-German cultural exchange, for instance, the concept
provides an analytically beneficial reminder of the fact that nations, countries, or even ‘cultures’ are not homogeneous. Hence, any ‘cultural zone’ is the result of the dynamics involved in the mutual mixing, interpenetration, and hybridization of cultural elements.

Indeed, while the early works on this theme focused mostly on bilateral exchanges in Western Europe (in line with the example just provided), perspectives from post-colonial studies have widened the scope of more recent knowledge transfer research into considering more complex spatio-temporal overlaps and dynamic (e.g. global, regional, local, etc.) settings (Werner and Zimmermann 2006; Mitterbauer 2011). Notably, while the term ‘transfer’ in general simply acknowledges the mobility of ideas, concepts, policies, structures, and practices across boundaries, more specific aspects – including the nature and direction, processes, and mechanisms of transfer – have each received substantial attention. In terms of the nature and direction of transfer, scholarship distinguishes between three main forms: imposition, attraction, and influence or persuasion (see, for instance, Phillips and Ochs 2004).

Imposition refers to cases in which an autocratic regime demands the introduction of a particular understanding, feature, or model. Such introduction might be ‘required under constraint’, as in the case of an occupied country adopting certain ideas. Imposition can also refer to instances in which transfer is ‘negotiated under constraint’, as is typical with the conditions stipulated by international agencies and donors granting aid and credit (e.g. Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe 2004).

Attraction includes transfer processes in which educational ideas, concepts, policies, structures, or practices are ‘borrowed purposefully’ on the part of governments due to strategic (political or economic) reasons (e.g. Steiner-Khamsi 2003b; Jansen 2004), or due to the perceived legitimacy of an idea or model, usually associated with a specific country or culture (e.g. Shibata 2005).

Finally, influence or persuasion refers to instances in which ideas, concepts, policies, structures, or practices are discursively and/or institutionally framed as desirable. International ‘standards’ or ‘best practices’ have, for instance, become influential over the past decades due, first, to the general influence of the processes (and ‘forces’) of ‘globalization’ and internationalization in spreading educational ideas and policies. However, second – and significantly – the active intercession of transnational actors has resulted in the establishment of international knowledge banks, in the monitoring of educational development, as well as in the promotion and transfer of targeted ‘best practices’ from one region to another (see Steiner-Khamsi 2009).

Halpin and Troyna concluded that ‘policy borrowing . . . rarely has much to do with the success, however defined, of the institutional realization of particular policies in their countries of origin; rather, it has much more to do with legitimating other related policies’ (1995: 304). Steiner-Khamsi stated more bluntly that ‘educational transfer is used to legitimate contested reforms’ (2003a: 156). Thus, one key insight from research focusing on the nature of policy borrowing and lending is that transfer of knowledge often represents a legitimization strategy – which promotes the importance for research on knowledge transfer to attend to the politics and economics of educational transfer.

Turning to the focus upon the processes of transfer, CIE scholarship has yielded conceptual tools aimed at improving analysis of the phenomenon. David Phillips and Kimberly Ochs (2003) have developed a framework that conceptualizes borrowing as occurring in four stages: (1) ‘cross-national attraction’, (2) ‘decision-making’, (3) ‘implementation’, and (4) ‘internalization/indigenization’. The model provides important analytical distinctions that improve the understanding of knowledge transfer as a process with distinguishable phases (see Phillips and Ochs 2003).
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Cross-national attraction involves two components, consisting first of ‘impulses’ such as political change (as with the apartheid movement in South Africa or with the reunification of Germany, etc.) or social events (e.g. the publication of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) studies) and second of ‘externalizing potential’ such as an educational philosophy or ideology (e.g. child-centred pedagogy or school autonomy) or didactical innovations (e.g. monitory system in the nineteenth century or use of laptops in classrooms).

The decision-making phase concerns measures aimed at initiating change, including ‘theoretical stance’ or focus on a specific orientation or future for change (such as ‘choice’, ‘autonomy’, ‘diversity’, etc.); ‘phony’ instances, meanwhile, may reflect rhetorical allusion to the supposed desirability of ideas or innovations from abroad that are nonetheless not taken up (e.g. constant mention of the American ‘magnet schools’ in British policy debates). The framing of a ‘realistic/practical’ idea refers to models or approaches that ‘have clearly proved successful in a particular location’ (Phillips and Ochs 2003: 455). Finally, the decision-making phase might pivot on the ‘quick fix’, in which an idea, model, or the like is adopted without due attention to the necessary conditions for it to work (ibid.).

Implementation describes the stage in which what is transferred is adapted to the new context. It refers also to the suitability of the context, to issues of support or resistance, and thus often to significant actors involved in the transfer process.

Internalization/indigenization describes the stage in which an idea, model, or policy “becomes” part of the system of education (Phillips and Ochs 2003: 456). Attention here is paid to the impact of the transfer on the modus operandi of the system, to the absorption of external features, to synthesis or recontextualization of the model itself, and finally to the evaluation and reflection of what has been borrowed according to the original expectations (Phillips and Ochs 2003).

An important contribution of research on the processes of transfer relates to understanding the precedents, context, substance, and consequences of borrowing/lending. Research illustrates an abundant diversity of national cases and a multiplicity of variables that need to be focused upon. The pursuit of an enhanced understanding of the role of transnational actors – in contrast to national actors – and the expansion of the research scope to encompass regions, are goals that point to the need to consider the analytical lenses employed.

Research into mechanisms of transfer processes in CIE scholarship has primarily focused on the notions of diffusion and convergence as two sides of one process. This is due, at least in part, to the dominant role of globalization theories in the field, notably ‘world polity’ or ‘world systems’ (Krücken and Drori 2010). The assumption that the increasing global diffusion of international ideas on education leads to a convergence of systems has always been at least implicit in work dealing with borrowing, lending, and transfer in education (Steiner-Khamsi 2003a). Within political science, ‘convergence studies’ provides useful insights into the mechanisms of transfer, focusing on the effects of a change process during which the content of policy becomes more similar internationally.

However, conceptual terminology associated with the study of policy and idea transfers among institutions and systems (e.g. convergence, transfer, learning, and diffusion isomorphism) can sometimes overlap or conflict (Bennett 1991; Rose 1991; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 2000; Heichel, Pape and Sommerer 2005; Holzinger and Knill 2005). According to Bennett, policy convergence, for instance, might mean different things, alternating conceptually among several dimensions: policy objectives, content, instruments of policy, results achieved, or the style of politics (1991: 218). Four specific conceptual tools have emerged as particularly helpful...
for understanding mechanisms of transfer, also according to Bennett (1991): emulation, elite networking and policy communities, harmonization, and penetration.

Emulation is closely related to a policy being spread in processes of ‘lesson drawing’, that is to say, convergence results from ‘the utilization of evidence about a programme or programmes from overseas and a drawing of lessons from that experience’ (Bennett 1991: 221). Convergence can also be the product of elite networking and policy communities, which refers to a distinct group ‘sharing motivation, expertise and information about a common problem [. . . and] results from the existence of shared ideas amongst a relatively coherent and enduring network of elites engaging in regular interaction at [the] transnational level’ (Bennett 1991: 224).

Harmonization, in contrast, results from a broader mutual recognition of the need for shaping a common response to an issue. Last, rather than focusing on the mutual recognition of common problems, penetration as a mechanism of convergence highlights more coercive aspects: for instance, it conforms with common regulatory frameworks in order to participate in common trade agreements (Bennett 1991: 227–8).

In sum, the convergence of policies might be imposed by political demand or pressure, or via legal obligation through international law or regulatory competition; or it can result from international harmonization by mutual adjustment or by competitive pressure. Convergence can also be the product of transnational communication through lesson drawing, joint transnational problem-solving, or emulation and international policy promotion (see Holzinger and Knill 2005: 780). All these constitute forms of activity in which (R)IOs are heavily engaged, as additional discussion in the subsequent section will illuminate.

(R)IOs as sites of production and transfer of knowledge

The term ‘transnational actors’ refers generically to various types of entities such as multinational corporations (MNCs), international foundations or networks, and, above all, international governmental (IGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs).

IGOs are important formal organizations founded for specific purposes through cooperation and through the delegative commitment of member states; they are thus intergovernmental organizations and differ according to their geographic reach (global, regional, and subregional) and according to their areas of activity and objectives (universal or area specific). Some IGOs can also assume the character of supranational organizations in specific fields.

(1)NGOs, on the other hand, are transnational non-state networks that might include more formal or less formal organizations. Barth (2011: §4) distinguishes NGOs as ‘voluntary, non-governmental, non-profit, non-religious and non-military associations’. While distinction between IGOs and NGOs might seem clear, overlaps and ambivalences are striking (Rittberger and Zangl 2003: 26–7).

MNCs, for instance, while clearly non-governmental in nature, are profit-oriented entities operating across national borders. Possible forms of MNCs vary substantially, but their common features are that they are established in one specific country yet develop and project their activities in other states. MNCs represent actors who usually have a strong decision-making centre and coordinate their objectives as well as financial and other resources (Rondinelli 2002).

Turning to the matter of knowledge transfer, such transnational actors are extremely diverse in terms of type and scope. Some — such as the World Bank and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) — tend to span the entire globe with their activities. Others have remained confined to geographic, political, or economic regions or areas — as in the case of the European Union (EU), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
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(ASEAN), and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). But some of the latter have been widening their scope in certain sectors.

In education, the OECD, the EU (specifically through its European Commission), UNESCO, and the World Bank have expanded their activities exponentially in recent years. Evidence of their role as ‘global players’ in the education sector include the OECD’s regularly scheduled international large-scale assessment tests, notably via its PISA; the Bologna Process, largely promoted by the EU; and the ‘Education for All’ initiative operated by UNESCO and the World Bank. These transnational actors, which include (R)IOs, have become key loci for the production and transfer of knowledge in education, moving beyond simple facilitation of the transfer of knowledge about education and toward actively framing and shaping knowledge to be disseminated or transferred.

Thus, far from being mere repositories and providers of knowledge and even beyond serving as ‘catalysts’ (a role the OECD pointedly embraces in its mission statement), these (R)IOs operate more proactively by producing knowledge and then speculating on that knowledge via assertion of organizational influence within identified regions, or even globally. The more specific instruments by which these transnational actors project their influence in the field of education consist of standard-setting, agenda-setting, as well as financing and coordinating activities, each of which receives more sustained attention in the discussion that follows.

Via standard-setting, (R)IOs seek to establish frameworks for government policy, promoting thresholds or benchmarks against which the evaluation of national policy is then encouraged. This, in turn, creates a normative context – that is, the pursuit of ‘best’ or ‘world-class’ practices – that creates and sustains pressure behind national policy-making. Reports such as ‘Education at a Glance’ (published annually by the OECD) and those containing results from international comparisons of school performance – such as PISA and ‘Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study’ (TIMSS) – stimulate and widen discussion on the performance of individual systems, promoting evaluations of their effectiveness in terms of underlying standards.

Since they produce huge databases in the field of education, with whose help ‘standards’, ‘best practices’ and the like become fixed and legitimized, the OECD, UNESCO, and the World Bank alike, as well as also the EU, can be aptly termed ‘international knowledge banks’ (Steiner-Khamsi 2009). The EU’s Eurydice portal and its publications, the OECD’s aforementioned ‘Education at a Glance’, and UNESCO’s ‘Global Education Digest’ represent important sources of present-day data on education. Hence, the creation and diffusion of statistical and other data on education and training systems must be pondered in terms of its function in sustaining a climate amenable to competition and also to the continuing consumption of data and ‘knowledge’ produced by (R)IOs.

Associated with this standard-setting activity is a second instrument of (R)IO influence, namely the ability of these actors to initiate processes of agenda-setting in the different national contexts. Here, agenda-setting refers to the ability of certain actors to direct national attention to new topics. These are concerns that are at once initiated and addressed largely with specific content generated by those same (R)IOs.

In this manner, recent examples of concepts and models introduced via publications and events geared for uptake within public and scientific discourse include ‘lifelong learning’, ‘new public management’, and ‘evidence-based research and policy’. By means of illustration, while debates over what is today known as ‘lifelong learning’ (LLL) surfaced as early as the 1960s, these only gained particular momentum when, in the 1990s, international organizations such as the EU, UNESCO, the OECD, the World Bank, the International Labour Organization (ILO), and numerous NGOs and INGOs synchronized their activities – thereby creating the critical mass necessary to influence national developments. LLL remains one of the main educational programme points of engagement among inter- and transnational actors as well as that of nation-states.
Quite plainly, the successful anchoring of the LLL concept lies in the role played by international organizations in the process of creating and diffusing norms (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

A third instrument of (R)IO influence – the *financing of activities* such as conferences, reports, studies, and projects – is most visibly illustrated through the World Bank. By means of so-called ‘side agreements’ or ‘covenants’ (conditions required to ensure follow-through in the granting of loans), borrowers are obliged to comply with policy priorities stipulated by the World Bank or by other regional development banks on certain policy options. Additional financial tools allow these (R)IOs to further leverage their influence in other ways, by, for instance, providing technical support such as consulting and research services, and also sometimes institutional resources (e.g. staff, conference rooms, etc.).

Finally, and related to this financing instrument, *coordination of activities* plays an important role as a fourth instrument of (R)IO influence. This refers to the ability of certain actors to coordinate processes and procedures, and thus exert influence on the outcome of political processes. These actors gain influence by, more specifically, curbing, accelerating, or shaping processes via use of their infrastructure and manipulation of the resources they control. The provision and withdrawal of staff, the opening of communication channels, and the distribution of resources enabling the organization of conferences and seminars stand as examples of how (R)IOs exercise this sort of influence.

Together, these instruments are marshalled in different ways, to suit different contexts – related, for instance, to variables such as degrees of self-assertion, leadership and management of assets and potentials, and not least to stocks of authority and legitimacy available to different actors. Notably, a change in the instruments used to exert influence seems to accompany an increase in these actors’ activities in the field of education.

Alexandra Ioannidou (2007), through analysis of the instruments used by different transnational actors in their dissemination and implementation activities related to LLL, observes a focus on knowledge-based governance instruments. Regular monitoring and comparison of educational systems, evaluations and ‘reviews’, as well as large-scale international comparative studies are very common in this area and are based on consensus, shared values, and shared knowledge of the subject. Ioannidou (2007) concludes that knowledge, or more accurately expert knowledge, plays an essential role as a source of authority and legitimacy for the activities of these (R)IOs.

**Research on educational transfer and transregional studies**

This chapter explored central elements regarding the influence of regional actors and their specific use of instruments so that they:

- have privileged access to knowledge (expertise, technical know-how, etc.);
- have the financial resources and institutional capacity for the production of new knowledge;
- can disseminate this knowledge effectively (via standards or best practices), thus launching their own agendas;
- may initiate (new) actor constellations and networks around selected themes and ‘belief systems’.

As earlier sections of the chapter pointed out, the transfer of knowledge in the field of education can be traced back to ancient times, and well pre-dates the organization of societies as nation-states. Scholarship in the field of CIE has studied the varying functions that knowledge transfer fulfils, and has also provided insights into the nature and direction of knowledge transfer as well as into its processes and mechanisms. As we have seen, research on educational transfer has yielded important results in terms of understanding the embeddedness, the implications, and the potentials – as well as the side effects – of transfer in the field of education.
Influencing the other

However, much of the work on educational transfer, on the borrowing and lending of knowledge, has long remained couched within a paradigm of the nation-state as the prevailing unit of analysis. A coinciding focus has been on the ‘industrialized world’ and its unidirectional transfer of knowledge to the rest of the globe. Only more recently has research emphasized an enriched international dimension of education policy, enabling concentration on the role and importance of transnational actors as sites of production and transfer of knowledge in education. As such, recent scholarship has challenged the ‘core objects of study in comparative education, “national” “education” “systems”’ (Dale and Robertson 2009: 1113). If the meanings of these terms are taken as unproblematic, constant, and shared, a resulting ‘ontological ossification’ then undercuts the potential of comparative research in education in general and understanding of knowledge transfer more particularly.

In conclusion, framing research on transnational actors and knowledge transfer in education within transregional studies embraces three main innovations. First, it emphasizes the genuine interdisciplinary nature of the topic of knowledge transfer in education, which transcends disciplinary boundaries and requires overcoming the compartmentalization of research practice. Second, it raises awareness concerning the multiple flows of knowledge about education – both from transnational actors and from other groups and stakeholders – as well as the efforts of transnational actors to control these flows and the ways these efforts influence education as a field. Third, and last, the understanding of transnational actors and their roles in knowledge transfer highlights the multidirectional interaction in transfer processes at the different scales of geographical regions, both at inter- and intranational levels.

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Introduction: linking knowledge, networks, and space

In a global context where knowledge plays a crucial role in, among others, economic growth and regional development, migrants, international students, academics, and highly skilled professionals have been increasingly considered valuable human capital for economies as well as for higher education institutions. In particular, regional economic development has gained widespread interest in social science research as well as politics. While knowledge is often concentrated in regional-based technology clusters, dense connections to nearby and faraway actors are of utmost importance. Local-based clusters enabling the meeting of research institutes with firms, venture capitalists, and expatriates have been central to Silicon Valley’s success, for instance. Nevertheless, and despite the global scale of relationships, nation-states – with their related norms, rules, and regulations – play an important role in facilitating knowledge-based industries.

The role of place and space is also highlighted in a related strand of research: the analysis of cross-border knowledge transfer realized through social networks. In early studies on networks of highly skilled mobile populations, structural aspects of networks in (re)producing knowledge were rarely explored. Yet, as networked actors – who transmit knowledge – also connect different regions, cultures, economies, and corporate systems, their function as knowledge brokers is intrinsically tied to their positioning in the network in question. Therefore, not only do inequalities in network positions translate into unequal access to network resources such as information exchange, sharing, and co-development of opportunities, they also have an influence on how transnational networks in knowledge circulation and production emerge and evolve, eventually materializing and becoming industrial growth poles.

These two interrelated aspects, the spatial and the social, have rarely been investigated under a common perspective. Yet, the role of place and space in thinking about the cross-border character of socially constructed knowledge networks is crucial, as is the role of network positions and functions for the spatial distribution of knowledge across regions.

By applying a transregional perspective to the study of transnational knowledge networks, both aspects will be given due attention in highlighting historically grown knowledge disparities between regions, in pointing to regions’ and countries’ conditioning of knowledge exchange, and in analysing the co-evolution of knowledge and industrial production across
regions. Before going any further, there is a need to make clear what is meant by knowledge and networks.

Knowledge is generally seen as a competence generated through learning, experience, using specific languages, and being part of different societal groups. Any knowledge has personal and idiosyncratic elements because it has to be gained, assembled, enacted, and acknowledged both by the speaker and listener, which makes it rather challenging to create and disseminate (Polanyi 1966). Contrary to traditional modes of production dependent on traditionally cited resources such as land, labour, and capital, knowledge exists in the minds, acts, and practices of persons. Knowledge is assembled and disseminated in varied ways depending on personal presuppositions, norms, ideas, beliefs, meanings, culture, class, educational background, age, gender, community belonging, space, place, and channels of communication.

To sum it up, knowledge is enacted and disseminated through a web of elements, including personal relations. Having said that, it is important to study the mode and content of knowledge in order to fully understand its circulation across organizations, institutions, regions, and nation-states. In such a study, a general distinction is made concerning the mode of knowledge: whether it is implicit or explicit. Explicit knowledge refers to the coded information in writing or symbols, which has the quality of being a public good (with the reservation of patents or copyrights). It is considered to be transferable and appropiable, as opposed to the tacit or implicit type. Implicit knowledge refers to ‘knowing-how’ – it is uncodified and is not articulated, and its transfer requires extensive effort, such as close observation, demonstration, or hands-on experience. This pinpoints the importance of the strength of social ties and geographical proximity (Fischer and Varga 2003), which will be referred to later in more detail. Generally, locally concentrated knowledge networks are of particular relevance for the transfer of tacit knowledge.

Thus, carriers of knowledge are key. This is even more so since knowledge is one of the well-established significant desired components for gaining competitiveness and achieving economic growth. Its holders are generally considered to have powerful positions. Seen from this perspective, production, circulation, and the use of knowledge leading to innovation, and thus prospectively to powerful and advantageous positions, have become important foci of research. Investigations include knowledge transfers within and across organizations (Tsai 2001). They also focus on actors involved in knowledge creation, with expatriates among them. Well-educated persons such as experts with scientific, technical, and managerial skills are widely recognized to be carriers of knowledge. As they move from one locale to another, they bring their own social relations, skills, knowledge, and practices.

Related to that, contemporary research highlights the importance of networks in knowledge circulation. Networks are the sum of actors – for example, persons, organizations, nation-states – linked by specific social relationships. The central focus is often on how actors are connected to each other. Yet, there is a widening agreement regarding the importance of not only personal interactions, but also geographical location and space as precursors of the complex and multidimensional nature of knowledge generation and circulation. Where someone is located geographically has multifarious influences, including the person’s socialization, culture, worldview, language, and educational career.

As a consequence, location also matters in terms of with whom persons are interacting and with whom they are building their networks. It is here that geographical location turns into socially constructed space, conceptualized as a result of relations and interactions. Space is thus both a social product as well as an antecessor and regulator of social action (Lefebvre 1991) and also of opportunities to transfer knowledge. Scales ranging from local to regional to national to global have been identified as matrices of knowledge transfer.
Recently, the transnational nature of social spaces has gained prominence in academia. It is argued that ‘transnational social spaces are constituted by the various forms of resources or capital of spatially mobile and immobile persons, on the one hand, and the regulations imposed by nation-states and various other opportunities and constraints on the other’ (Faist 2000: 192). Such transnational spaces are characterized by dense and continuous transactions of ideas, practices, and resources across borders, facilitated by interpersonal, social, and symbolic ties. These ties comprise highly mobile people.

Although previous research on networks of highly skilled mobile populations has acknowledged their role in knowledge transfer across nation-state borders, the structural and functional aspects of these networks – such as (positions for) brokerage in producing and diffusing knowledge – have rarely been explored (exceptions being, for instance, Borgatti and Cross 2003; Reagans and McEvily 2003). There is a need to systematically analyse the conditions influencing relations of knowledge transfer between and across manifold places and spaces. Furthermore, it is necessary to understand not only the dynamics of those spaces, including their social, political, economic, and geographical environment, but also the actors themselves. Only then can we understand the hierarchies and related inequalities across the globe.

**Brokering knowledge across borders**

As knowledge is thought to be a crucial ingredient for innovation and competitiveness, highly educated persons have been considered to possess not only specialist knowledge but also the skills to disseminate it, share it, and develop it further, in close exchange with co-experts. In the 1960s and 1970s, studies were concerned with brain drain effects due to the migration of highly skilled personnel (composed usually of scientists and health workers) from the Global South to the Global North. In the following decades, the intra- or intercompany transfer of experts and managers has been of special interest in research.

Starting in the early 2000s, concrete locations did not matter so much any longer since human capital was seen as a value independent of physical existence. Given the advances in Internet, telecommunication, and transportation technologies, persons did not need to be located in their countries of origin in order to contribute to their home country’s economy. Activities such as consulting, investments, scientific collaborations, and even temporary visits have been acknowledged as being nearly equally as functional to economic progress.

In line with that, studies on international migration and mobility have sought to re-evaluate the developmental effects of diasporas and highly skilled mobile populations between countries of emigration and immigration. Some of the issues addressed have included knowledge spill overs within networks of highly skilled migrants (Koser and Salt 1997), the role of epistemic communities (Haas 1992), the build-up of scientist (Kerr 2008) and diaspora networks (Meyer 2001; Saxenian 2002), and even the positive consequences of expatriation, such as expanding business and service opportunities through direct and indirect investments (Krishna and Khadria 1997). Academic research by Trippl (2013), for instance, has revealed that the mobility and eventual return of trained scientists paved the way to further the mobility of co-scientists and students from their regions of origin. In the meantime, a variety of modes of knowledge exchange have taken place via the joint attendance of conferences and writing of publications as well as common research projects. Likewise, international students have increasingly been considered valuable human capital for the higher education institutions and economies of both sending and receiving countries. In a network analysis of international doctoral students, Bilecen and Faist (2015) highlighted the brokerage function for disseminating academic knowledge, experience, expertise in publishing, and mutual advice.
With the widely accepted argument that any network structure influences the diffusion of information and the transfer of knowledge, manifold studies have investigated the results of network relationships, in terms of access to labour markets and housing, academic outputs, social support, creativity, or registered innovation. Knowledge transfer is essentially a social process, mostly initiated by personal contact and interaction, be it formal or informal.

Being the member of a network provides one with potential channels to be connected to others. According to Coleman (1990), a dense ego network — where most of the actors know, trust, and are emotionally close to each other — enables the ego to cooperate and be supported by others. This is similar to the early notion of social capital. As a contrast, Burt (1992) coined the term ‘structural holes’, where social capital is generated through the absence of ties that can only be bridged by ego positioning. Thus, (missing) connections and patterns of relationships (i.e. the network structure) are the focus. According to that view, social capital is defined as ‘the brokerage opportunities in a network’ (Burt 1997: 355), and it is beneficial for a person to hold a position that potentially connects actors not otherwise connected (Burt 1992, 1997, 2000).

The particularity of the brokers’ role is the potential to activate their contacts and resources at any time, and this flexibility allows them to gain strategic advantages within networks. Brokers might also fulfill a mediation function since they are thought to possess specific knowledge about the network, including cultural norms and actors’ expectations. Above all, they might be able to understand and translate different types of knowledge from one context to another; this is not only due to their level of education, but also to their ability to apply social skills to ‘translating’ technological, managerial, and other specialized knowledge into changing contexts of application.

On the other hand, research about organizations has also shown that brokers might create risks for their institutions. If knowledge brokers leave, the structural holes described before remain unused and often unusable for knowledge transfer. Moreover, the withdrawal of a broker from the network can cause a decrease in connectedness or even disconnect the network altogether. In order to get a full understanding of processes of knowledge transfer, methods of investigation should include network structure as well as social network analysis (Borgatti 2006).

The mechanism of brokerage suggested by Burt is closely related to Granovetter’s argument (1973) on the strength of weak ties. Here, actors loosely connected to others are exposed to various social circles with potentially different kinds of information and knowledge. A body of literature has been produced since then, both for and against the importance of weak ties. Recently, Aral and van Alstyne (2011) argue that both sparse networks with weak ties and cohesive networks with strong ties provide access to new information. What matters is the environment brokers are in. In environments with rapidly changing information, novel information is delivered almost exclusively through strong ties, pointing to the relevance of trusted in-group relationships. This is connected to Burt (1980), who argues that the diffusion of knowledge is influenced by structural equivalence, that is to say the degree of equality in network positions.

Network diversity is equally important since alternative connections can generate access to various pools of new and scarce knowledge, resources, and non-redundant information. In other words,

opinion and behaviour are more homogeneous within than between groups, so people connected across groups are more familiar with alternative ways of thinking and behaving, which gives them more options to select from and synthesize. New ideas emerge from selection and synthesis across the structural holes between groups.  
(Burt 2004: 349–50)
In the analysis of transnational knowledge transfer, brokers have often been ascribed a beneficial role in knowledge circulation between their country of origin and their current country of residence, which eventually leads to investments or flows of capital. However, networks are increasingly dispersed across the globe, and there is a need to do away with all sorts of binary thinking and to add the full variety of possible spatiality into the analysis. This means that ‘transnational’, that is to say the perception of exchange between two different nations, has to be replaced by an understanding of knowledge transfer that spans, connects, and transcends – and as a consequence transforms – the economies of different geographical world regions. In addition, further research designs should take into account not only mobile actors but also non-mobile ones who nevertheless add to overall mobility patterns by technological advances. The question is what role does spatiality play in knowledge transfer, then? A prominent example will illustrate that.

Spatialities of knowledge

Obviously, the location of experts matters whenever frequent face-to-face interaction is a prerequisite for knowledge creation and circulation, particularly for the tacit mode of knowledge. Spatial concentration is also crucial in enabling persons to get together and create a relationship conducive to sharing their knowledge, and thus for the emergence of knowledge exchange and transfer. When expatriates, entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, researchers, international students, and government agencies are in geographical proximity, innovation opportunities arising out of knowledge circulation increase. Prominent examples include the social ties among a variety of actors constituting the rubrics of renowned knowledge concentration areas, such as Bangalore, Silicon Valley, and Zhongguancun.

According to an ethnographic study conducted by Saxenian (1994) – who examined engineers’ network structures located both in Silicon Valley (Palo Alto, CA, across Stanford University) and Route 128 (around Boston, MA) – regional economies’ knowledge networks proved to be of utmost importance. In later research, Saxenian (2002) argues that Chinese and Indian highly skilled entrepreneurs have recognized the importance of geographical proximity on a daily basis, enabling them to tap into necessary knowledge across the Silicon Valley. Nevertheless, those entrepreneurs also stayed connected to their countries of origin.

As production becomes fragmented and the costs of transportation and communication decrease, entrepreneurs could initiate and maintain commercial and professional links leading to developmental influences in those faraway regions – much in line with early research on the possible effects of brain drain and migration. Here, too, the initial binary pattern of describing and analysing processes of knowledge transfer as being exclusively tied to emigration from and immigration to particular countries – with possible remigration to the countries of origin, or onward migration – does not shed light on the manifold processes linking together places of origin, destination, and non-permanent residence. Those highly skilled expatriates mentioned are transnational brokers between different regions of the world, applying their technical, managerial, social, cultural, and place-bound skills. They benefit from a broker’s position, and they exert their influence on a multiplicity of previously unconnected actors.

Nevertheless, the spatiality of knowledge diffusion in the example of Silicon Valley is about its specific location not only as a place but also as a space where a variety of persons have a chance to get together, network, and exchange their knowledge. The latter concerns their highly specialized fields as well as institutional, corporate, and policy know-how, initiating new
economic possibilities. In addition to personal contacts, links are highly supported by local and national authorities as well as the private and financial sectors.

Nowadays, there are also award programmes supported by foreign nation-states targeting their national start-up companies to do networking with others transatlantically. Those programmes vary from short- to long-term stays in their initial phase, enabling their chosen firms to understand how things work and to diversify their networks at an international level. Such programmes aim to open up national firms to international competition and collaboration, which not only makes the firms visible globally, but also allows them to profit economically from possible cross-border collaborations.

An example is a government-sponsored programme known as ‘German Accelerator’, organized by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. Here, start-ups in technology and the life sciences are chosen and sent to Silicon Valley and New York in order to share knowledge, best practices, and innovation as well as expand business. Thus, the nation-state, as argued before, plays an important role in fostering the creation of formal and informal ties for the purpose of knowledge sharing and circulation while grounding its support in a space proven to be productive for such activities.

According to Castilla and colleagues (2000), the same fruitful ground is explored when linking up education and industry. Geographical proximity makes academic research focused on practical issues, and at the same time, industry benefits from state-of-the-art scientific knowledge and debates. Through Stanford University’s affiliation programme, students and faculty establish their own companies, with (foreign) companies sending their employees there for further education.

In addition, informal and decentralized research centres act as brokers or boundary spanners because they facilitate collaboration of university and industry. Thus, despite the globally observable rise in mobility and the whole technological facilitation of transport and communication, spatiality matters. But it matters in varied ways, and it is always closely tied to its social construction at the places where knowledge transfer is initiated, enacted, and maintained by people able to fulfil a brokerage function across networks at different scales, with different scopes and different types.

Conclusion

Knowledge, networks, and space are aspects to look at when it comes to the analysis of processes of knowledge transfer, individually and collectively. As has been shown, these aspects are already linked up in current research on transnational knowledge networks. Authors dealing with specific aspects of knowledge have gained important insights so far by investigating network structure and the workings of various links as well as by analysing successful examples of place-bound and spatially distributed networks connecting higher education institutions, industries, and people on the move.

Nevertheless, we still do not fully understand the patterns involved in all that. How did geographically distant regions endowed with totally different resources and knowledge repertoires come to exchange knowledge? How did characteristics of knowledge transfer change over time, and what consequences did knowledge transfer have for the regions involved? Has there been a transformation through transnational knowledge networks? A transregional perspective on transnational knowledge networks would help make clear why certain types of relationships matter in one place, but not in another, why Silicon Valley cannot be easily moved to a different region, and why regional peculiarities play a role in communicating about opportunities for knowledge transfer.
Transnational knowledge networks

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Transregional studies are part of a larger academic mobilization that simultaneously seeks both to produce knowledge about an increasingly connected world and to overcome the fragmentation of knowledge production. Although global history has convincingly demonstrated that this connectivity or ‘globalization’ – as it has been increasingly labelled since the early 1990s – is by no means new, social and cultural scientists have frequently focused on its recent manifestations and emphasized the innovative nature of their findings. In doing so, some scholars have accused their respective discipline of being too constrained by the national framework and state centrism. For example, proponents of ‘new political geography’ have criticized the study of international relations for being too wedded to territory and the Westphalian system. Without blurring the critical differences between territory and region, they emphasize the applicability of the dialectics of deritropicalization and reterritorialization for interstate and regional relations. The most important of these differences is that regions are not created through constitutional law; instead, a multitude of factors leads to their formation, making their cultural construction more apparent than that of states.

Transregional approaches draw attention to the resilience and transformations of regions; to intercultural transfers that connect, constitute, and modify regions in relation to each other; and to processes and interpretations that transcend regional frames of reference. Adopting such an approach for an analysis of processes of global integration, thus, allows for spatial references to be taken into account that are sufficiently solid on which to build. Moreover, it also allows spatial configurations to be understood as being in constant flux. In new political geography, transregional perspectives are increasingly replacing the objectification of regions as immutable, quasi-naturally constituted geographic units, whose definition and ordering simultaneously reflect hierarchical power relations, that is to say either in the form of the dominance of the West over ‘the Rest’ or the hegemony of a regional power over its surroundings. In contrast, transregional perspectives see global regions – as opposed to world regions – as resulting from a progressive integration of the world that is characterized by consolidation and fragmentation. In this perspective, regions have a continuously renewing role in regulating global integration and have become more important for security issues (broadly defined) and for technological innovation. As histories of the Great Divergence and colonialism have shown, the comparative advantages that some global regions have over others develop over the course of extended
periods. However, global regions do not originate solely from structural factors; they are also imposed politically – at times with the utmost cruelty and with all available means of power. Transregional studies, through this nexus of research into geography and history, gain valuable insights into the entanglement of processes of production in global regions.

A second important insight that transregional studies can garner from new political geography entails relativizing the equation of region and territory. Global regions often exist in the global imaginary as more or less clearly delineated spaces that are frequently identified with continents or parts of continents. However, cultural conventions and religious socializations produce global regions that span multiple such spaces and that can even be interrupted by enclaves in which other conventions are enforced.

Historically, the dissemination of certain methods of payment, such as cowry shells or silver, depended on the availability of the material as well as on the trade routes where it was the preferred medium of exchange. A currency’s acceptance and distribution pattern, thus, frequently linked coastal areas on opposite sides of the ocean, rather than entire hinterlands. The transition to modern industry, characterized by a pronounced spatial division of labour, heightened the importance of supply and value chains, which, in turn, has led to global regions that increasingly do not correspond to coherent territories. For these regions, it is a matter of point-to-point relationships that are held together by increasingly sophisticated logistics as well as of circumventing local regulations through special economic zones as discussed in Chapter 21 of this handbook.

The third insight that transregional studies can draw from new political geography is the inhomogeneity of global regions in terms of population structure, urbanization, resource allocation, political self-organization, and so forth. This inhomogeneity results in an asymmetric ability to respond to global challenges cooperatively or confrontationally.

Though it might seem self-evident, the recognition of the differences between global regions is in fact partially obscured by the terminology of globalization; Ulf Engel illustrates this obfuscation of differences through an examination of the rhetoric surrounding global challenges. Last, the new producers of knowledge that have emerged in the last four decades, such as international organizations that make up the United Nations system, global enterprises, non-governmental organizations, intelligence services, and think tanks, have worked on such an agenda that includes a list (although never completed) of the most pressing challenges confronting humanity. Climate change undoubtedly affects the entire planet, but its effects vary greatly from region to region. Interestingly, as various transregional alliances have formed and reached a minimal consensus on the causes of climate change and the implications of a strategy of containment, negotiations on a global climate agreement have moved forward. In fact, these transnational coalitions were strong enough to sustain this global support despite the decision of the President of the United States to withdraw the country from the Paris climate accord in 2017. Other ‘global challenges’, such as hunger and access to water and medical care, call attention to regional disparities stemming from a transnational history of (post-)colonial inequality.

Transregional studies, thus, need to take into consideration the perspectives of post-colonial studies in which the binary structures of many modern world narratives are challenged: metropole and colony, core and periphery, East and West, and North and South. As many researchers now understand, thanks to Edward Said’s groundbreaking study *Orientalism*, regions are not neutral entities. Through cultural constructs such as the Orient, regions become fixed frames of reference in an imagined geography that is at the heart of the spatialization of colonial rule. Yet, with very little effort, these reference points are uprooted and applied to new transregional constellations. This ease of transfer reflects the persistence of uneven colonial power relations and occurs whenever transregional processes produce hotspots in the conflict between centre and periphery. Homi Bhabha expanded on this understanding of transregional spaces, proposing
that this antagonistic, and unequal, encounter of peoples might open a third space that initiates the possibility of living new forms of identity based on cultural hybridity – or, from the perspective of his critics, the opportunity of having a precarious existence in an interstitial space.

Established in the late 1990s, the new discipline of global studies claims as its purview the analytical interpretation of globally connected societies. Working at the crossroads of multiple disciplines, including new political geography, international relations, and global history, its primary orientation is the study of globalization. Global studies, in particular, shares much in common with transregional studies, so that the two fields could be seen as competing disciplines or, alternatively, as complementary ones, representing two sides of the same coin. In global studies, the primary emphasis is contemporary and historical dynamics of condensing global interdependence, whereas transregional studies focus primarily on specific relationships of exchange and entanglement across territorial boundaries. Other directions, such as translocal relationships that do not necessarily have a global scope, have been pursued particularly in the field of area studies. It is also fundamental for global studies to pay close attention to the ongoing construction and evolution of global regions so that theory does not become divorced from empirical data and findings. Although an absolutist perspective on deterritorialization – that is to say, globalization signalled the demise of the nation-state and the so-called end of geography – dominated global studies in the 1990s, this extreme view has been replaced by a dual focus on processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization under the global condition.

Transregional studies provide the necessary empirical data for this reorientation as well as a way of overcoming the methodological dead end experienced by some global studies specialists, whose research was premised on a radical acceptance of the exclusive regulatory authority of the state. The variety and diversity of processes of regionalization (also researched in global studies) clearly indicate that globalization does not mean a lawless world without boundaries or regulatory authorities. However, regulatory forms do change over the course of history. For many authors, the contemporary crisis derives from the fact that some levels and forms of regulation seem completely new. For example, Saskia Sassen and other scholars see global cities (see also Chapter 20 by Rao), such as New York, London, and Tokyo, as control and command points of a new global capitalism; they are the key locations for leading industries and marketplaces and are the centres of the production and creation of cutting-edge technology and services. As nodes in a global economy, these cities are increasingly separated from the regionalization processes of their respective hinterlands. Value-added chains (discussed in more detail in Part IV) have materialized in special economic zones as well as in cross-border corridors, where entrepreneurs frequently profit from regulatory gaps in taxes, health and safety, and workers’ rights. In these spaces, the crossover between networks, individual businesses, and territorialized economic structures is fluid, such as in the border areas between the United States and Mexico, which became, early on, an example of this type of transnational configuration.

Another new development is the progressive inclusion of other economic areas in major regional centres of the world economy. From a historical perspective, China’s recent emergence as a pole of economic power in the East Asian economy alongside Japan is perhaps not surprising, but it can be interpreted as a return to its earlier global significance and checked for similarities with the emergence of the United States and Japan as global economic powers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Also of note, particularly for transregional studies, are the growth patterns of the global economy if one uses trade balances, capital flows, direct investments, and the intensity of the division of labour as the yardstick. Based on these economic indicators, the global economy has experienced the most growth around regional poles where intraregional networking exceeds extraregional networking. In fact, economic
developments, frequently addressed as elements of globalism, are, upon closer inspection, more accurately identified with transregional capitalism.

This increased networking at regional growth poles has also been advanced through processes of realignment. The BRICS (first Brazil, Russia, India, China, and later South Africa) is one striking example of a new kind of regionalization process. Although ‘invented’ almost two decades ago, this association has gained influence in a multipolar world. Although BRICS has clung to various ineffective strategic narratives, it is not an invention without consequences. Its creation has been accompanied by an intensification of exchanges between countries of the Global South, and it has bolstered the regional and global geopolitical ambitions of its member states. Although initial optimism about BRICS’ economic catch-up processes has diminished and Group of Twenty (G20) meetings indicate the surfacing of another economic structure, the assignment of a special responsibility to BRICS concerning the stability of the global economy and policies has remained largely unchanged.

These examples clearly show that processes of regionalization have both a material and a symbolic dimension. The former entails the constitution of new spaces – not necessarily territories – of social interaction; these spaces might be very small or quite expansive in size or take the form of networks. The latter entails the allocation of a function in the global imaginary. These two dimensions are related to one another, but they can be partially decoupled. Such processes of regionalization serve to transregionalize earlier spatial structures. In other words, these processes describe intercultural transfer between historic and emerging spatial structures, address the resulting transformations of these spaces, and facilitate the mapping of spatial boundary crossings. The term transregionalization also acquires an additional meaning, when it addresses the linking of two or more processes of regionalization within a global spatial order.
GLOBAL STUDIES AND TRANSREGIONAL STUDIES
Collaborators not competitors

Manfred B. Steger

Introduction
Global studies (GS) emerged in the late 1990s as a transdisciplinary field of academic enquiry exploring the many dimensions of globalization. ‘What is there is also here and what is here is also there’ is probably the most succinct and uncontroversial summary of globalization’s central dynamics of interconnectivity, reconfiguration of space and time, and enhanced mobility of people, goods, and ideas (Steger 2013). Although it has been extensively studied in sociology, economics, anthropology, geography, history, political science, and other fields, globalization falls outside the established disciplinary framework. It is only of secondary concern in these traditional fields that are organized around different master concepts: ‘society’ in sociology; ‘resources’ and ‘scarcity’ in economics; ‘culture’ in anthropology; ‘space’ in geography; ‘the past’ in history; ‘power’ and ‘governance’ in political science, and so on. By contrast, GS has placed ‘globalization’ – a contested keyword without a firm disciplinary home – at the core of its intellectual enterprise. The rise of GS represents, therefore, a clear sign of the proper academic recognition of a new kind of social interdependence on a global scale (Steger and Wahlrab 2017).

However, the orientation of GS scholars toward what appears to be explicitly global in scale does not mean that local, national, and regional scales have been losing their significance in the twenty-first century. In fact, as this chapter emphasizes, globalization processes incessantly create new geographies and complex spatial arrangements from within spaces and places that do not necessarily scale at the global level. Some pioneers of GS made this important point as early as the 1990s. For example, Robertson’s snappy definition of globalization as ‘the compression of the world into a single place’ served as the conceptual foundation for developing a spatially sophisticated concept of ‘glocalization’ capable of counteracting the relative inattention paid to globalization operating at subglobal levels (Robertson 1992: 6–7). Similarly, Appadurai articulated subtle insights into what he calls the ‘global production of locality’ – a new spatial dynamic that occurs more frequently in ‘a world that has become deterritorialized, diasporic, and transnational’ (Appadurai 1996: 188). Finally, Sassen (2001) developed a multiscalar ‘global city model’ that offers new ways of analysing the strategic roles of global cities such as New York, London, Tokyo, Shanghai, Seoul, and Paris. Countering established notions that the global economy transcended territory and its associated regulatory umbrellas, Sassen’s work on global
Manfred B. Steger

cities explains crucial processes of ‘deterritorialization’ not as isolated phenomena occurring at the global level, but as evidence for the partial embeddedness of the global in subglobal levels.

But what is the status of the ‘regional’ in this ongoing ‘deterritorialization debate’ in GS? To what extent have transregional perspectives been incorporated into globalization research? The purpose of this short chapter is to demonstrate that influential participants in this deterritorialization debate – despite their significant theoretical differences – have recognized the importance of (trans)regionalism in the making of globality. Their attention to (trans)regional forces suggests that the new fields of GS and transregional studies (TS) should be seen as two related academic initiatives dedicated to the investigation of the profound spatio-temporal dynamics of our globalizing world. Their differences are more a matter of emphasis than of substance.

As global historian Matthias Middell points out in the introduction to this handbook, TS conceptualizes globalization as the ‘interconnectedness of world regions’, which includes neglected non-human ‘regions’ such as oceans, large lakes, and vast mountain chains that were previously not counted among the traditional ‘areas’. Thus, the basic unit of analysis in TS is the region, whereas GS puts worldwide interconnectivity at the centre of its conceptual framework. Similar to GS, however, TS shows a special concern for bringing previously separately studied areas into closer contact with each other by reaching out to other fields such as global history, migration studies, globally comparative urban studies, and other offshoots from the traditional social sciences and humanities reacting to the same challenge of ‘studying entanglements’.

In short, the commonalities connecting these two academic newcomers outweigh their differences. Both fields are deeply critical of methodological nationalism and Eurocentrism, challenging deep-seated Western notions that most worthwhile knowledge originated in Europe and was diffused in a unilinear fashion to the rest of the world. Moreover, neither GS nor TS have fully severed their ties to the conventional framework of ‘area studies’ (AS) – a paradigm that gained popularity and institutional support within the United States (US) academia during the Cold War era. The growth of AS occurred in response to the perceived threat of communism and the establishment of new nation-states in the wake of decolonization. Seeking to thwart the Soviet Union’s involvement in Europe and the Third World, AS scholars in the West often pursued academic and political agendas that benefited from the generous support of US funding agencies linked to the powerful national security establishment headed by the Pentagon, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency as well as philanthropic organizations such as the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller foundations.

As Lie (2012: 9) notes, both the US government and many of the leading private American foundations – especially the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation – promoted an AS perspective that was linked to Western-centric notions of modernization and economic development.

Under the impact of the contemporary wave of globalization following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a growing number of scholars have embraced the new frameworks of GS and TS. They emphasize that ‘areas’ are multicontric, always historically constructed, and, therefore, ever-changing products of their time. While these scholars are aware of the enhanced fluidity and porosity of political borders and civilizational fault lines under contemporary conditions of globalization, they also recognize that the intensification and multiplication of cross-border processes do not completely erase the significance of regions defined by these borders. Moreover, GS and TS share an epistemological and methodological emphasis on the importance of ‘globalization’ as one of the key concepts of our time, in addition to understanding the value of transdisciplinarity, new spatio-temporal dynamics, and critical thinking (Steger and Wahlrab 2017).

This chapter builds on Middell’s astute observation in the introduction to this handbook that TS offers urgent and necessary new perspectives, subjects, and methodological approaches to
the social sciences and humanities. As demonstrated below, GS perspectives have greatly benefited from transregional insights. Indeed, the current transformation of territorial organizations and infrastructures has reoriented much globalization research from an overly narrow attachment to the global scale toward the investigation of subglobal dynamics and practices that shape the emerging network society of the twenty-first century.

**Integrating transregional perspectives into globalization research: the deterritorialization debate**

The concept of ‘territoriality’ refers to the use of territory for political, social, and economic ends. In modern times, the term has been associated with a largely successful strategy for establishing the exclusive jurisdiction implied by ‘state sovereignty’ (Aagnew 2009: 6). State control of bounded national terrain promises citizens living on the ‘inside’ the benefits of relative security and unity in exchange for their exclusive loyalty and allegiance to the nation-state. By the second half of the twentieth century, social existence in such relatively fixed and self-enclosed spatial containers had become normalized, thus striking most people as the universal mode of communal life in the modern world. However, the latest wave of globalization gathering momentum in the 1990s has unsettled the political and methodological territorialism underpinning this highly effective naturalization of territorial states. The intensifying dynamics of ‘denationalization’ and ‘deterritorialization’ have exposed the artificiality of territoriality as a social construct and its historical role as a specific human technique for managing space and time in the interest of state power.

As noted in the introduction, this ‘new spatial agenda’ in the social sciences and humanities involves an important set of issues across all spatial scales: the emergence of a ‘global civil society’; the ‘glocalization’ of economic and cultural phenomena; the solidification of regional trading blocs; prospects for global and regional governance understood as the norms and institutions that define and mediate relations between citizens societies, markets, and states; and the pluralization and hybridization of various identity formations (Castells 2008; Thakur and Weiss 2011; Pieterse 2015). Although most GS scholars agree that contemporary re-spatialization dynamics are profound and accelerating, there remain significant differences between them. In general terms, one can identify two major approaches. One philosophical camp consists of a relatively small band of thinkers committed to advancing a rather extreme thesis of deterritorialization focused on the weakening of the nation-state. The second, somewhat larger group, is made up of scholars holding more moderate and nuanced views. Still, as this section seeks to demonstrate, these camps – made up of what I call ‘deterritorialization extremists’ and ‘deterritorialization moderates’ – equally recognize the significance of regional dynamics in the ongoing processes of globalization.

The arguments of deterritorialization extremists became prominent during the 1990s when worldwide neo-liberal market reforms seemed to diminish the role of the state in the economy. Market globalists such as Japanese business strategist Kenichi Ohmae (1990, 1995) and French diplomat Jean-Marie Guéhenno (1995) focus on the deterritorialization of the nation-state as an irreversible process intrinsically connected to the enlargement of the spatial reach of markets. Moreover, these neo-liberal thinkers emphasize that market relations have been increasingly mediated by cutting-edge computer technology and digital communication systems. They maintain that politics anchored in conventional forms of territoriality is losing out to a seemingly unstoppable techno-economic juggernaut that crushes conventional sovereignty, which is understood as the state’s exclusive control over strict and fixed territorial boundaries. The transnational practices of global capitalism are portrayed as ushering in a new phase in world
history in which the state’s survival in diminished form depends on its satisfactory performance of its new role as a handmaiden to global free-market forces.

Ohmae, in particular, suggests that the deterritorializing effects of global capitalism have already been robbing the nation-state of much of its former glory as the director and regulator-in-chief of the national economy. Less capable of determining the direction of social life within their borders, nation-states suffer from a chronic legitimacy deficit that threatens to weaken people’s feelings of national allegiance while strengthening their incipient transnational identities as ‘regional’ or ‘global’ citizens. The core message of this influential group of deterritorialization extremists is loud and clear: brought on by globalization, the ‘end of the nation-state’ is at hand (Ohmae 1995).

However, it is important to note that Ohmae’s extreme view of a future ‘borderless world’ where national territory would eventually become obsolete is complemented by an equally forceful argument in favour of the rising significance of regional economic blocs. Incapable of functioning along the lines of territorially based units, the concrete forms of political order in the twenty-first century would be determined to a much greater extent by regional economic spaces. Indeed, Ohmae (1995: 79–100) speaks in glowing terms of the ‘flowering of regions’ and the formation of what he calls ‘region states’ – new deterritorialized geographical units that usually would be larger than the conventional nation-state. In some cases, however, these region states would be smaller and nimbler than nation-states. Ohmae argues that this dynamic was already especially evident in the growing economic power of sprawling ‘megacities’ such as Tokyo or Shanghai. Shaping new economic interdependencies across the planet, such ‘economic zones’ of various sizes would eventually be linked together in an almost seamless global web that reaches into the virtual space of global financial markets operating around the clock. For Ohmae, these new (trans)regional infrastructures also extend to the Global South where neo-liberal development policies assume the form of the dominant ‘Washington Consensus’ – a market-oriented form of conditional lending by powerful international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that subject poor countries to ‘structural adjustment programmes’ anchored in the principles of austerity and fiscal conservatism.

Reluctant to accept Ohmae’s radical thesis of the ‘end of the nation-state’, other ‘extremists’ in the deterritorialization debate nonetheless concur with his emphasis on the growing significance of regional deterritorialization dynamics in a globalizing world. For example, the GS scholar Scholte (2005) argues that at its core globalization involves ‘strong’ spatial processes of deterritorialization reflected in ‘the large-scale spread of suprerritoriality’. Elevating the idea of globalization’s compression of space and time to new historical heights in both quantitative and qualitative terms, Scholte’s use of ‘suprerritoriality’ refers to global connections that substantially transcend territorial geography. These connections possess spatio-temporal qualities of ‘transworld simultaneity’ – extension anywhere across the planet at the same time – and ‘transworld instantaneity’ – movement anywhere on the planet in no time (Scholte 2005: 61).

For Scholte, such multiplying suprerritorial forms of globality are evident in countless facets of contemporary life, such as jet travel across any distance on the planet in 24 hours or less, telecommunications networks, global mass media, global financial flows, hybridization of human identities, and so on. In particular, he notes that the weakening – but not disappearance – of the nation-state has tremendous consequences for political globalization. Indeed, the state’s inability to serve as the sole site for the governance of global relations is reflected in the growth of ‘suprastate’ or ‘transworld’ regimes that operate with significant autonomy from the state. In short, the principle of exclusive state sovereignty has given way to new ‘pooled’ or ‘shared’ forms of sovereignty, which, crucially, include new regional forms of governance (Scholte 2005: 190–1). As he emphasizes, sovereignty has increasingly become a mixed spatial practice:
‘Clearly, social space in today’s world is both territorial and supraterritorial. Indeed, in social practice the two qualities always intersect. Supraterritoriality is only relatively deterritorialized, and contemporary territoriality is only partly supraterritorialized’ (Scholte 2005: 77).

Elaborating on this rather abstract construct of ‘partial supraterritorialization’, Scholte notes that these new governance structures often assume the form of ‘regionalization’. He distinguishes between two forms: micro-regionalization within nation-states and macro-regionalization among nation-states – both of which he considers departures from conventional nation-statist practices (Scholte 2005: 202–9). The former involves decentralized structures of transborder substate governance such as the construction of Flemish and Walloon governments in Belgium or regional organizations of urban authorities that are being set up on all continents. Such micro-regions often pursue their own multilateral collaborations that cut across the public–private divide by connecting substate regional governments to transnational corporations. Macro-regionalization, on the other hand, involves (trans)regional projects that acquire a notable degree of autonomy from specific states. Examples for such macro-regional schemes include the Arab League – governance structures focusing more on diplomatic and military concerns – as well as organizations such as the World Trade Organization or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation that exhibit an explicitly economic orientation. Arguing that both forms of regionalization can serve as either ‘stepping-stones’ of, or ‘stumbling blocks’ to, globalization, Scholte (2005: 209) nonetheless insists that multiplication of such regional schemes points to the crucial role of globalization as a catalyst for the creation of new governance structures. Ultimately, the multifaceted analyses of the various ‘glocalized’ spatial relations offered by deterritorialization extremists such as Scholte and Ohmae provide clear evidence of the integration of transregional perspectives in GS.

A more moderate position in the deterritorialization debate has been staked out by globalization scholars who acknowledge the significance of global-scale dynamics while also highlighting the continued importance of spatial processes involving the regions, states, and localities. Saskia Sassen (2007), perhaps the most prominent member of this group of deterritorialization moderates, suggests that globalization is not just about the growth of supraterritoriality but also entails crucial processes and practices of ‘down-scaling’ that occurred deep inside the local, national, and regional.

To properly understand the full extent and impact of denationalization, Sassen advises, GS researchers ought to pay careful attention to social processes that are localized in subglobal settings such as the formation of regional networks connecting multiple local and national processes and actors. Crucially, she notes that global economic networks are still relying heavily on regionalized and localized control and command centres that complete the top-level financial, legal, managerial, and planning tasks necessary for the functioning of global organizations. While local, national, and regional spaces continue to play important roles in the globalization process, the very meaning and perception of these dimensions are changing as a result of globalization. What had previously been experienced as regional, national, and global has begun to incorporate new processes and dynamics that alter the very meaning of these conventional spatial manifestations. In other words, social practices seemingly located at a specific scale – such as the local or global – actually constitute multiscale systems running from the local to the national to the regional and the global. This simultaneity of scales, spaces, and relations becomes especially visible under contemporary conditions of denationalization. As Sassen summarizes:

With the partial unbundling, or at least weakening, of the national as a spatial unit come conditions for the ascendance of other spatial units and scales. Among these are subnational scales, notably cities and regions; cross-border regions encompassing...
two or more subnational entities; and supranational entities such as global electronic markets and free-trade blocs. The dynamics and processes that get territorialized or are sited at these diverse scales can in principle be regional, national, and global.

(2007: 30)

In addition to reconfiguring multiple geographic scales, the spatial dynamics of global modernity also require ‘systemic expulsions’ — socioeconomic and environmental dislocations that involve entire regions while at the same time producing new transregional networks — that cannot be fully understood in the usual economistic terms of poverty, growing inequality, and financial flows (Sassen 2014).

The reason why globalization scholars such as Sassen and urban studies expert Neil Brenner (1999) subscribe to a more moderate position is because they link deterritorialization to the reterritorialization of socioeconomic and political-institutional spaces occurring at multiple geographical scales. Conceding that nation-states have lost their exclusive hold on sovereignty, they nonetheless insist that states remain important actors in the unfolding drama of globalization. In particular, states serve as crucial catalysts of globalization by enabling those major transformations of territorial organization that encourage both the regionalization and localization of social relations. On this point, moderate views dovetail with Scholte’s strong perspective that deterritorialization manifests itself in new regional formations such as micro-regionalizations within states and macro-regionalizations among states.

Perhaps the most critical of these spatial restructuring processes involves the localization of the ‘control and command centres’ of global capitalism in global cities. As previously noted, Sassen’s widely discussed ‘global cities model’ theorizes the multiple spatial scales at which economic and political processes deterritorialize. It identifies global cities as major forces in powerful ‘rescaling’ processes that entail the glocalization of conventional geographical scales. As Sassen (2007: 102) explains, ‘Today we are seeing a partial unbundling of national space and the traditional hierarchies of scale centred on the national, with the city nested somewhere between the local and the region. This unbundling, even if partial, makes conceptualizing the city as nested in such hierarchies problematic.’

Paul James and I extend Sassen’s thesis of the collapse of nested vertical spatial scales to include impacts on the symbolic production of meanings in new discursive environments. We refer to these processes as ‘condensation’ — the production and engagement of discourses, symbols, ideas, spaces, performances, and images that compress and reconfigure familiar local, national, and regional tropes and scalings while orienting them toward the global imaginary (James and Steger 2014: 424). For example, almost all prominent US politicians are fond of the transnational construct of an ‘American Pacific Century’, which plays an important role in the semiotic integration of the entire Asia-Pacific region according to the American conceptual and ideological framework of neo-liberal globalization. But a critical discourse analysis suggests that this new master narrative condenses a variety of meanings associated with subglobal spatial scales that are at odds with the imperatives of globality. The decoding of such processes of ‘condensation’ — such as those at work in the discursive production of an ‘American Pacific Century’ — yields critical insights into the role of regional dynamics in the formation of the rising global imaginary.

As a final example of moderate deterritorialization scholars eager to integrate (trans)regional perspectives in their work, consider the sceptical view of globalization articulated by Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson (1999). In their detailed historical analysis of economic globalization, the British social theorists claim that the world economy is not a truly global phenomenon. Rather, it constitutes a (trans)regional network anchored in Europe, East Asia, Australia, and
North America. The authors emphasize that the majority of economic activity around the world still remains primarily regional and ‘inter-national’ in origin and scope. Presenting relevant data on trade, foreign direct investment, and financial flows, they warn against drawing premature conclusions from increased levels of economic interaction in advanced industrial countries. Ultimately, their argument against the exaggerated portrayal of regionalism as ‘globalization’ is linked to their criticism of the general misuse of the concept. Without a truly global economic system, they insist, there can be no such thing as ‘globalization’: ‘[A]s we proceeded [with our economic research] our scepticism deepened until we became convinced that globalization, as conceived by the more extreme globalizers, is largely a myth’ (Hirst and Thompson 1999: 2).

Ultimately, Hirst and Thompson’s sceptical account not only challenges the basic premise of deterritorialization extremists – that is to say, nation-states no longer matter because they are subordinated to the dynamic of the global economy – but also disagrees with the view of moderates such as Sassen and Brenner that globalization actually consists of complex spatial entanglements across all spatial scales that can be characterized as glocalization. Rather, Hirst and Thompson insist that international economic activity is still rooted in nation-states and thus remains subject to their political power at the national and regional levels. Second, by asserting that ‘global’ capitalism is primarily a regional rather than a global phenomenon, they redefine (economic) ‘globalization’ as a multicentred dynamic of uneven regionalization. In order to provide clear evidence for their thesis, the authors sifted through mountains of empirical data that seemed to suggest that truly ‘transnational’ corporations (TNCs) are actually very rare. Most TNCs not only display considerable national allegiances but also conduct the bulk of their business in select regions, not across the entire globe. Finally, Hirst and Thompson highlight the primary dynamic of regionalization by arguing that the lion’s share of foreign direct investment flows to the major industrial economies of the Global North. Conversely, developing countries in the Global South receive only a small part, thus condemning them to the status of ‘marginalized regions’ in a supposedly ‘globalized’ economy.

To be sure, there also remain a number of problems with the Hirst–Thompson regionalization thesis. As several critics have pointed out, the authors set overly high standards in which the economy can be considered ‘fully globalized’. Second, their construction of an abstract model of a perfectly globalized economy unnecessarily polarizes the topic by pressuring the reader to either completely embrace or entirely reject the concept of globalization. Third, as critics such as William Robinson (2014: 2) note, Hirst and Thompson collected and made sense of their data from within a state- and region-centric framework of analysis, which prevents them ‘from interpreting facts in a new way that provide greater explanatory power with regard to novel developments in the late twentieth- and early twenty-first century world’. For Robinson (2004: 17), the current phase of globalization presents an ‘epochal shift’ from the ‘nation-state phase of world capitalism’ to the ‘transnational phase of global capitalism’ characterized by the globalization of the production of goods and services and the forging of so-called ‘flexible’ capital–labour relations. Moreover, the notion of ‘global capitalism’ is entirely compatible with the emergence of novel ‘glocal’ organizational forms, such as decentralized management techniques, subcontracting and outsourcing, and transnational business alliances.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this chapter, however, is not to engage in a comprehensive critique of globalization theory, but to demonstrate how (trans)regional perspectives have been integral to the deterritorialization debate in GS. Indeed, some influential GS scholars across the extremist/moderate spectrum pay attention to the transregional character of globalization processes,
thereby explicitly addressing the concerns of their colleagues from TS with the enduring significance of regions. Given that a good number of GS scholars still place their primary research emphasis on the global level, TS serves as an important corrective to such limited globalization models.

However, this mutual recognition of the significance of transregional perspectives represents only the first step in the necessary process of bringing these two academic newcomers into even closer contact with each other. The next step involves the intensification of research collaborations. By including contributions from GS scholars, this Handbook of Transregional Studies points us in the right direction. It facilitates what editor Matthias Middell identifies as the main objective of the volume: ‘to bring together the various fields within which transregional phenomena are scientifically observed and analysed’. Collaborators rather than competitors, TS and GS possess a tremendous theoretical and methodological potential for the advancement of our understanding of globalization as ‘glocalization’ – a complex phenomenon that involves and engages all spatial scales.

**Select bibliography**


ECONOMIC ZONES IN A GLOBAL(IZED?) ECONOMY

Salvatore Babones

Introduction

On 15 February 2016 the first regular train service connecting China and Iran arrived at Tehran railway station carrying 32 containers from China’s famous wholesale market city of Yiwu. Billed as a tangible manifestation of China’s ‘new silk road’ across Central Asia, the train crossed through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on its way from East Asia through Central Asia to the Middle East. Pundits heralded a new age in global transportation, the expansion of Chinese influence in the Persian Gulf, and the long-awaited integration of the Eurasian landmass. China’s new silk road would generate massive transregional connectivity that would transform the economies of the Middle East and Western Europe, make Central Asia the most important economic region in the world, and lead to endless growth in China itself.

And yet, Chinese ports handled 181,635,245 containers in 2014; adding in the 22,300,000 handled by Hong Kong brings the total to more than 200 million (World Bank 2015). Even a million trains a year heading west from China would represent only a small fraction of this seaborne trade. For the foreseeable future, seaborne trade will remain far more important to China’s economy than are the tenuous links overland through Central Asia to Europe and the Middle East. At the beginning of the last century, Mackinder (1904: 434) predicted that ‘the century will not be old before all Asia is covered with rail ways’ linking Europe to the Pacific, yet even in the twenty-first century, Central Asia will not become the economic crossroads of the world. East Asia and Western Europe remain, and will remain, distinct economic zones, each oriented to its own ocean.

The stubborn persistence of regional economies contradicts not just Mackinder’s expectations for the future of Eurasia but a generation of globalization pundits’ expectations for the future of the world. From Giddens’ (1990: 64) ‘reconfiguration of geography’ to Chase-Dunn’s (2006: 82) ‘increasing worldwide density of large-scale interaction networks relative to the density of smaller networks’, globalization theorists have understood and sold globalization as a flattening (Friedman 2005) process in which place ceases to matter as individuals and firms come to be integrated in a single, global space. But as Mackinder’s wildly incorrect vision of twenty-first-century Eurasia illustrates, place does matter when it comes to economic output, perhaps more than ever before (Korzeniewicz and Moran 2012).
Research in the global commodity chains tradition demonstrates (Gereffi 1996) that global economic networks are anything but ‘flat’. Instead, global commodity chains, value chains, and production networks are strongly patterned. So are investment flows. For example, the top five sources of foreign direct investment into China over the period 1993–2008 were (aside from tax haven jurisdictions) Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan – and the United States (US) (Zhao, Chan and Chan 2012, Table 3). This seems to reflect regional integration rather than true, generic globalization. Similar statistics for European countries would show even stronger preponderance of foreign direct investment within regions. And, of course, the largest national economy of all – that of the US – includes many economic clusters that just happen to fall under a single political jurisdiction. There are no statistics on interstate investment in the United States, but investment flows originating within the US itself vastly outweigh ‘global’ investment flows coming from the rest of the world.

All this suggests that regional integration is a feature of the contemporary global economy, not a remnant of past economic systems. Economic globalization might have deep roots, extending back to the 1500s (Babones 2015), but globalization as such might have been more a phenomenon of the last 500 years than of the current era. The current era seems to be more characterized by regional integration. Excepting the rise of China, the twenty-first-century shift in global gross domestic product (GDP) from the old developed economies to newly emerging markets that supposedly marked the culmination of globalization has, in fact, been relatively small (Kiely 2015), and the shift to China has been primarily a shift within a region (East Asia), not a shift from the US and Europe as is often assumed. It is perhaps time to reassess the globalization narrative and to consider other narratives that might prove more useful, in particular the narrative of regional integration.

The first step in this reassessment is to lay out economic geography of the three major economic zones of the twenty-first-century global economy: East Asia, Western Europe, and North America. The sheer quantitative disparity in economic output between these zones (roughly USD 20 trillion GDP each) and the rest of the world (less than USD 15 trillion GDP in total) suggests that globalization might have been oversold. Many phenomena that are routinely described as global (e.g. value chains, markets, and trade) might in fact be regional phenomena. The most productive analytical strategies for studying the global economy are thus likely to be regional, comparative regional, or transregional rather than global. In this understanding, the global economy is not ‘flat’ at all: heterogeneous system structures like transregional patterns are features to be studied, not anomalies of globalization to be ignored. Moreover, the world’s three economic zones seem to be large enough that analyses conducted within economic zones – traditional area studies – are likely to remain very relevant indeed.

A global economy of economic zones

The global economy of the third millennium has coalesced around three well-integrated economic zones: East Asia, Western Europe, and North America. Together these zones have a combined GDP of some USD 60 trillion, constituting some 80 per cent of global economic output. While globalization narratives usually imagine the world in terms of a single, integrated global economy, in empirical reality the global economy exhibits a high level of regional clustering. Of course, regional labels are socially constructed and can be understood differently by different people, so it might be useful to define the world’s three major economic zones in terms of countries. In doing so, however, it should be kept in mind that the participants in the value chains that define these zones are not countries as such but firms and individuals, and the activities of these firms and individuals often spill over national boundaries.
The East Asian economic zone consists of high value-added offshore centres such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, combined with the enormous manufacturing base of China. The offshore centres have extensive production of their own and coordinate enormous investments in China as well. Ancillary production also occurs in the Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, but Southeast Asia is, on the whole, marginal to the East Asian economic zone. For example, a typical commodity chain strategy is ‘China plus one’ – a diversification strategy in which a firm from one of the high value-added centres locates roughly two-thirds of its production in China and one-third in a Southeast Asian country. In this strategy, the factories in China typically produce for the Chinese market and for export while the Southeast Asian factories produce entirely for export.

The Western European economic zone consists of high value-added centres such as those located in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, the Benelux countries, and the Scandinavian countries combined with lower-cost manufacturing and services centres in the eastern European Union countries and Turkey. This zone is ‘Western’ European in the sense that it does not include the European countries east of the European Union, which is not well-integrated into the value chains that emanate from the high value-added centres of Europe. Ancillary production for the Western European economic zone occurs in Latin America, Asia, and elsewhere, but this ancillary production is not highly concentrated; the Western European economic zone lacks the kind of strongly patterned networks that characterize the East Asian zone. Where Western European value chains reach outside the Western European economic zone, they seem to do so globally, not with a tendency to concentrate in a single geographical location.

The North American economic zone consists of the high value-added centres of the US and Canada combined with lower-cost manufacturing in the poorer regions of the US itself and in Mexico. Compared to the East Asian and Western European economic zones, the North American economic zone has a high level of political integration: nearly the entire zone is included in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), with the US alone comprising 87 per cent of total NAFTA GDP. Thus in contrast to the other zones, the preponderance of the North American economic zone is governed under a single state – the US – a state that is coincidently hegemonic over the global economic system as a whole. This, combined with the unique history of American dominance of international investment flows (and indeed the global financial system) in the twentieth century has given the North American economic zone a global reach that far outstrips that of the East Asian and Western European zones.

The rest of the world consists of a mix of rich and poor countries, some of them highly productive, but none of them embedded in extensive, highly structured economic zones. For example, Australia is a rich country of 23 million people, but it is not deeply enmeshed in dense transnational production networks in the same way that peer countries such as the Netherlands and Taiwan are. Rotterdam is a container entrepôt for all of Europe; Taiwan has up to 2 million citizens working in China. Australia might have a very productive economy, but it is not fully integrated into a larger, well-integrated economic zone. Although most of Australia’s natural resource exports go to China, it is not very meaningful to think of Australia as being integrated into China-centred production networks. Australian coal enters a global coal market, and the fact that it happens to be burned in Chinese furnaces is not very relevant for understanding patterns of global economic integration. Australia exports to China, but it is not strongly integrated with China.

Similarly, major energy exporters such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela might typically export to particular countries along fixed patterns, but their economies are not deeply integrated into the economies of their trading partners. The countries of Africa, Latin America,
the Middle East, and South Asia are also relatively isolated in economic network terms, tied to the three major economic zones via individual hub-and-spoke connections. India is perhaps large enough (with a population of 1.25 billion) to be considered a minor economic zone of its own, but from a regional integration standpoint it is, nonetheless, a stand-alone economy. Were it considered a global economic zone, it would be a very small one, roughly 10 per cent of the size of each of the other three zones. All other national and regional economies outside the three major economic zones of East Asia, Western Europe, and North America are even smaller. There might be billions of people who live outside the three major economic zones, but most of them are not densely integrated with each other.

Comparative regional versus transregional analysis

Given that the three major economic zones of East Asia, Western Europe, and North America together constitute more than 80 per cent of the global economy, and considering that much economic activity in other zones is, in effect, nothing more than feedstock for these zones (e.g. oil from the Middle East, soybeans from South America, etc.), there is not much space left in the global economy for a globalized sector that is distinct from the regional zones themselves. And, in fact, global markets – the ‘world-market’ of world-systems and related theoretical approaches to the study of capitalism – have virtually disappeared (if they ever existed at all). Few goods are sold at markets in the twenty-first century, and those that are typically offer low value-added commodities such as bulk minerals and basic foodstuffs.

Instead, most international trade today consists of the private transfer of goods or services from one country to another within an internal corporate setting. For example, some 90 per cent of all international trade into and out of the US is ‘related-party trade’ (Bernard, Jensen and Schott 2009), not arm’s length trade on competitive markets. The worlds of international trade and investment are tightly entwined, not diffusely globalized. Partly as a result of such social embeddedness, trade networks are incredibly robust over time. Before the Second World War, the exports of the countries of East-Central Europe were strongly oriented toward Germany and Austria. Under Soviet domination, these countries were forced to export to the communist bloc. But after 1990, their export flows returned to the old patterns of the 1930s (Babones 2013). Geography might be socially constructed, but the social ties that generate geography are strong and durable.

Global economic activity only generates international trade because the three major economic zones happen to span multiple political borders. The heart of the East Asian economic zone spans the hard international borders of the East China Sea, and the heart of the Western European economic zone spans the softer borders of the European Union, yet the heart of the North American economic zone is entirely within the borders of the US. As a result, much of what has been recorded as ‘globalization’ in the international economic data of the last quarter century has actually been driven by the increasing integration of the East Asian and Western European economic zones, both of which expanded dramatically to include China and East-Central Europe, respectively, after 1990. This intensifying economic integration of these two zones has been well captured in the technical international business literature, but neither area studies nor the systematic social sciences has taken full advantage of the opportunities to study East Asian and Western European economic integration as social science phenomena. Furthermore, no literature has conceptualized the industrialization of the southern US as an instance of global economic integration. If well-theorized regional analyses have been lacking, comparative regional analyses simply do not exist. They should. Comparative regional analyses would help elucidate what is
universal and what is idiosyncratic about economic integration. The three different levels of political integration in the three zones – and the ever-changing character of political integration in the Western European zone – provide ample material for comparison. The small N of three zones would limit research to interpretive rather than positivist research paradigms, but the wealth of economic data available for each zone would still support a high level of quantification (if desired). The comparative regional analysis of the structures of the world’s three great economic zones presents a wealth of opportunities for future research into production, consumption, coordination, innovation, learning-by-doing, and a host of related topics.

Opportunities for transregional research on global economic zones might be more limited. The whole point of understanding the global economy in terms of major economic zones is that comparatively little economic activity occurs outside those zones. That is not to say that the non-zonal parts of the global economy are trivial: all of India falls outside the three zones, or at least most of India aside from its services outsourcing sector. Nonetheless, there is an implicit suggestion that the non-zonal activities, however large they might be in absolute terms, are not what the global economy is ‘about’. They occur and should be studied, but their study is unlikely to be the most productive way to understand the global economy as a whole. However tragic working conditions might be in a Bihari brick factory, for example, studying them will not shed much light on the ongoing transformation to tomorrow’s global economy.

**Transregional phenomena as heterogeneous system structures**

Transregional phenomena certainly exist, are common, and are important for many people. That said, in the framework sketched out here they are idiosyncratic exceptions to the general structure of the global economy, not systemic features of the global economy itself. The implication is that, in principle, the global economy could get by without them. Typical transregional research subjects such as Chinatowns in Latin America, Filipina maids in the Middle East, and Halawa remittance transfer networks in Africa might be quirky, fascinating features of the global economy, but they are not very important to the operation of that economy. As transregional research subjects, these could be ideographically interesting in themselves, but they are not specific cases of larger phenomena. They cannot be, because the larger structure of the global economy is regional, not transregional.

An unwanted implication of this is that area studies scholars who specialize in Africa, Latin America, and other marginalized regions might be excluded from the study of the global economy. The fact that this implication is unwanted does not mean that it is untrue. For example, the African slave trade to Latin America was absolutely central to the development of global capitalism in the 1500s and 1600s. But the shift in the locus of surplus generation from the South Atlantic to other areas stripped the South Atlantic of the key role it once played in the operation of the global economy. The South Atlantic regions and the transregional links between them might be very important to the people who live there, but they are relatively unimportant to the operation of the contemporary global economy. The transregional link between West Africa and Brazil, which was once one of the (quantitatively and qualitatively) most important features of the global economy (Blaut 1992), is now little more than a historical curiosity.

If (otherwise marginalized) area studies specialists really do want to shed light on the operation of the larger global economy, transregional phenomena might best be conceptualized and studied as heterogeneous system structures. The three major economic zones are, roughly speaking, homogeneous system structures: they are three examples of the same thing. Transregional phenomena are much more heterogeneous. Their very heterogeneity should generate opportunities for studying how they persist (and even thrive) despite the overwhelmingly larger scale
of the more homogeneous, regional phenomena. To take advantage of these opportunities, scholars of transregional phenomena would have to move from ‘isn’t it fascinating that such-and-such phenomenon exists?’ thinking toward ‘what does this exception tell us about the rule?’ thinking. At a very personal level, the larger system might not be what interests and motivates transregional scholars. But if transregional scholars are not interested in elucidating the character of the larger global economy, then they should not be surprised if their work is lost in the eddies of larger intellectual currents.

**The area studies of economic zones**

For quarter of a century or more, globalization has been a master narrative of the systematic social sciences. Now the process of globalization itself seems to have slowed (and perhaps stopped), and the study of globalization as such is yielding vastly diminished returns. Even the results it did yield in the 1990s and 2000s might be called into question due to serious methodological shortcomings. Given their theory-driven analytical focus on economic globalization per se, many studies might have misrepresented the actual empirical contours of the global economy that underlies it.

In economics, there is a strong bias toward the use of country-level macroeconomic indicators such as trade and investment without any consideration of where that trade or investment is coming from. In sociology, both world-systems analysts and world society scholars have tended to focus on the global macrostructure of the global economy rather than paying attention to still very ‘macro’-regional structures that might be more important. In political science, there has been a tendency to treat countries as pro forma equal, independent units, which they are not. Across all three fields, there is an overreliance on under-identified regression models (Babones 2014) to study generic, ‘global’ phenomena. And all of the systematic social sciences have fallen prey to what might be called the ‘country fallacy’: the treatment of countries as the basic unit of globalization (and the global economy) merely because data happen to be available for countries and not for other units.

The ideographic area studies disciplines have done little better. Often the ‘area’ is defined too narrowly along national or linguistic lines. Chinese studies scholars are notorious for interpreting China’s economic development in a vacuum. China is no doubt a big, important country, but China’s economic modernization was aggressively driven forward by firms entering China from the broader East Asian economic zone and from the US (which is itself home to many participants in the larger Asia-Pacific region). Similarly, writers on India’s economy routinely point to (no doubt real) obstacles to progress in India without noticing that China exhibited the same kinds of obstacles – but benefited from having much more advanced neighbours. Even area studies experts who have multiple comparison cases within their areas (Africanists, Arabists, Latin Americanists, etc.) routinely fall prey to culturalist explanations that would be invalidated by even a cursory glance at other regions. When it comes to economic plagues such as corruption and cronyism, there is nothing new under the sun.

Nonetheless, area studies – properly construed – is what we need in order to understand the twenty-first-century global economy of integrated economic zones. There are gains to be had from comparing major economic zones and (potentially) from studying the transregional structures and processes that connect major economic zones. But the greatest need is for studies of the world’s three major economic zones themselves, including their spillover into the less-organized parts of the global economy. Phenomena such as American illicit drug supply chains extending into Latin America and China’s increasing investments in natural resource extraction in Africa are not really transregional phenomena; they are tendrils of major economic zones that
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extend over the rest of the world. They should be analysed as area studies problems of the dominant economic zone. The asymmetries between the two sides of such phenomena are so large (and so structured) that it is not realistic to treat the two regions involved as equal participants. Western Europe does not get natural gas from Russia because of the unique characteristics of Russian culture. Western Europe gets natural gas from Russia because that is where the gas is.

If there is a ‘crisis in area studies’, it has apparently been in full swing for at least 20 years (Karp 1997). At least so far as the study of economic phenomena is concerned, that crisis probably has more to do with a misplaced unit of analysis than with anything else, which creates opportunities for some and problems for others. Shifting the unit of analysis to the economic zone is an epistemological challenge for Europeanists and Sinologists but an ontological crisis for Africanists and Latin Americanists. Yet the simple quantitative fact is that global trends are leaving less and less material to be studied for experts on African or Latin American economies. Still, the situation is better for area studies than for the systematic social sciences. The economics, sociology, and political science of globalization are becoming less and less relevant as the global economy coalesces around the three major economic zones. The existing tools of the systematic social sciences simply are not fit for this new environment. At least many of the existing tools of area studies are.

Select bibliography

GLOBAL REGIONS IN THE CRITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBALIZATION

John Agnew

World regions such as those used in area studies – Europe, Africa, East Asia, and so on – have been understood by geographers and other scholars in either one of three different ways, none of which, I will argue, is adequate either historically or contemporaneously. The first is as essentially physical-cultural units of the earth that have relatively internal homogeneity with respect to climate, geology, culture, etc., and these characteristics fundamentally condition or determine what we typically think of as political, cultural, and economic life. The second is as narrative constructions invented to make geopolitical sense of the world but that reflect the political dominance of some places, such as the ‘West’ or Europe over ‘the Rest’. The third is as geopolitical regions that are rooted in the historical dominance of different regional ‘powers’ within wider regions, such as the United States (US) in the Americas, Russia in Eurasia, and China in East Asia. If the first of these understandings still dominates much school teaching of so-called world-regional geography in the US (and to a lesser extent elsewhere), the second two have become characteristic (both explicitly and implicitly) of more advanced studies in cultural and political geography, respectively.

Of course, all three approaches have been strongly challenged by the tendency in the social sciences more broadly to assume either universality in ‘human nature’ or a historical trend in the direction of bringing that about, which then is used to explain why people vote, consume, and believe the ways they do. That these might be based on the projection of ‘doubtful particularisms’ from one place to all others – such as the notorious US college sophomores whose attitudes inform much of what goes for common sense in the field of psychology – is rarely noted. The presumed impacts of recent globalization have been particularly important in suggesting that world-regional differences – to the extent that they have existed – are increasingly residual as the universals ‘travel’ across the globe.

My argument is that both traditional thinking about world regions and the presumed universality brought about by recent globalization are equally problematic (see, e.g., Agnew 2011, 2013; Bonine, Amanat and Gasper 2012; Howard 2010). World regions have long been produced transregionally. As a result, the central issues I wish to address are twofold: (1) globalization in terms of an integrated world is not new, and (2) world-regional differences are more an outcome of this historical integration than of some sort of elemental world-regional isolation that has been solely responsible for these differences.

To this end, I first explore the logic of thinking in terms of so-called global regions as the outcome of three complementary spatial processes at work in dividing the world: the
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world-regional, the political-territorial, and the urban-networked. I then pursue evidence for the empirical working of these processes. Finally – by using four empirical examples – I suggest that global ‘gradients’ between regions provide evidence that the world remains divided into global regions even as these regions are the outcome of cross-regional transactions rather than just original differences between regions.

The logic of ‘global’ regions

The logic of thinking about world regions as global regions reflects a world organized around three distinctive spatial processes. First of all, for many centuries world regions and their component political units have not been sealed off from one another, developing along separate political-economic trajectories. They have acquired their differences not only as part of world-regional processes over long historical periods but also as part of global ones, for example, in relation to their specific experiences of colonialism and capitalism. This is the message conveyed in Eric Wolf’s book with the seemingly ironic title Europe and the People without History (1983). Being at different world-region ‘ends’ of the integration process into a global political economy has had quite different consequences as has being incorporated into it at different times. This can be termed a world-regional process associated with the expansion and contraction of the world economy as mediated by dominant states and empires coming from some regions and invading and influencing others.

Second, world regions have long been implicated in global geopolitics and economic interaction and incipiently in novel forms of governance at the world-regional scale in terms of the differential development of states and empires. Beyond this, both narrative construction and geopolitical processes have also been at work in producing reasonably institutionalized world regions as we see them today. For example, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, in their book Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security (2003), point out how much security visions, alliances, and strategic plans of multiple countries are organized around a set of global regions. Amitav Acharya’s Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (2001) examines how much world-regional ‘orders’ have been institutionalized by using an example far from the usual ones of the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement. This is truly a political-territorial process in terms of the emergence of global regions as contexts of differential political-institutional development.

Third, and finally, different experiences of statehood and of city-system organization between global regions are refracted through existing world-regional differences to produce distinctive patterns of governance and conflict, economic activities, cultural attitudes, and environmental conundrums. For example, Prasenjit Duara, in The Global and the Regional in China’s Nation-Formation (2009), shows how the experience of ‘nation-statehood’ is not simply universal but conditioned by the world-regional contexts of city-state and state-core/periphery relationships in which the process takes place. Many studies of the global urban system, in terms of the functions performed by different-size cities and the connectivity between them, are organized around world-regional subsystems that are the building blocks of the larger system. The net effect is to provide different patterns of wider global influences within different global regions as a result of urban-networked effects.

Global regions at work

These three spatial processes that are producing global regions deserve to be spelled out empirically, even if each overlaps with the others. It is important to be clear analytically what distinguishes a focus on ‘global regions’ from one simply on ‘world regions’, as is typically defined.
After looking at each process in a little detail, four brief illustrative examples are provided of how ‘gradients’ between global regions indicate the efficacy of global regions being a way of thinking about the world today.

**The world-regional**

The relative global location of a region signifies how much a given region is central or peripheral to the global political economy and how this has happened. Some global regions such as Europe and North America, particularly through their major cities and the governments and businesses located there, have a continuing centrality that has resulted in their generally higher average incomes and standards of living. This is the outcome of the global division of labour in which relatively more profitable economic activities (research and development of new products, legal and financial services, headquarters functions, etc.) are located more in some global regions than in others. At the same time, some places have relatively specialized, but low, profitability activities (plantation economies, mining, etc.), whose returns in world trade tend to be lower and more volatile than the high-end functions.

The origins of this system of competitive advantage and disadvantage go back to what has been called the ‘Great Divergence’ in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when parts of Western Europe started to develop modern types of commercial agriculture and manufacturing industry while other places – as a result of colonialism and a lack of comparable reforms such as those stimulating private landownership and carbon-intensive industrialization, which had changed the competitiveness of Western Europe – did not. Some of this differential in economic capacity can be put down to the relative intensity of different factors of production (land, labour, capital, etc.), with, for example, land pressure in Europe giving rise to more intensive farming compared to regions where land was less at a premium, and the ready availability of coal fuelling the Industrial Revolution. The longer experience of markets in land and trade in the more politically fragmented Europe allowed for the relatively free accumulation of capital, whose owners then looked for opportunities ‘over the horizon’ beyond home shores.

In turn, this differential was then geopolitically enforced by European states to the frequent disadvantage of regions at the other end of the power spectrum. Very few parts of the world were not faced with European colonialism by the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. So, historically, the pattern of global regions has partly been set by the date, extent, and pace of colonial incorporation and the degree to which political autonomy was somewhat enjoyed or achieved. Africa, beyond its role in the transatlantic slave trade, was a latecomer with regard to colonial incorporation (in the 1870s and 1880s), whereas Latin America and North America had very different trajectories in their relations with Europe. Early political independence in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was crucial for the paths later followed by the US and the new states of Latin America. On the other side of the world, by closing itself off for several centuries and without the resources that colonial powers found attractive, Japan was able to enter the global political economy in the mid-nineteenth century largely on its own terms.

This historical path dependence has still not played out. Contemporary globalization has had to work with and around the pattern of global regions inherited from the past and the continuing structure of the global political economy, which reproduces the relations of dominance and subjugation built up over the centuries. Subsequent sections will show that there are signs that the absolute differences produced by colonialism are under pressure. Europe and North America are no longer as central to the world political economy as they once were. As a result, new global regions are being formed and older ones are being reshaped.
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The political-territorial

In traditional world-regional geography, a central claim about regions is that they are presumably internally homogeneous in relation to various criteria such as language, religion, settlement structure, and so on. The emphasis with global regions is more on the coherence of historical-political experience and patterns of economic-social externalities across a given region. Historically, different global regions have had distinctive geopolitical and economic structures institutionalized to different degrees, sometimes with external sponsors (such as US support for the European Union). Common civilizational histories, in particular the spread of major ur-languages, for example Latin, Sanskrit, and Chinese, from which many vernacular languages descend, and the diffusion of religions, such as Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism, provided a cultural foundation for many subsequent distinctions among regions. Food taboos, for instance, have a continuing relevance, usually being associated with not eating certain animals. Eating pork, as an illustration, is taboo among strict Muslims and Jews. Thus, the world map of pig husbandry somewhat reflects this cultural practice.

Various regional imperialisms both pre- and post-dating European colonialism also have continuing effects. China has again become central to a wider Asia; for example, Southeast Asia and the Pacific Rim have become ‘in-between’ regions subject to cross-pressures from other external powers as well as China. Today, Russia, North America, and Europe are more ‘self-contained’ regions with a single dominant state or supranational organization (European Union) at their heart. Their borders remain contentious. Africa and Latin America, however, remain more fragmented geopolitically, even if Brazil is probably becoming informally the most significant state in its region. Naming global regions is fraught with complications in large part because the names reproduce the geopolitical dominance of the European great powers and the US as it is their terms and the boundaries they draw that tend to dominate usage.

Concurrently, however, regional coherence is also enforced by so-called externality (unplanned or side) effects of an economic and environmental character. Trade between countries still tends to fall off in volume with increasing distance, particularly if trade barriers are reduced within regional organizations or trading blocs; production linkages in manufacturing are often closer across adjacent borders than more distant ones (for example, between Mexico and the US and between Germany and the Czech Republic); innovations (and other ideas) diffuse contagiously across neighbours; diseases also spread contagiously across neighbours; and common rivers, water aquifers, and seas and shared skies bring both territorial disputes and pollution challenges. These externality effects are very important for defining global regions.

These multiple communalities can encourage either competition or cooperation between states and other political actors within global regions. Political competition has historically been more intense among neighbouring countries. It is not hard to see why. Whatever the global region, the oldest most fervent enemies are the ones in the neighbourhood rather than those in distant seats of power. Local nationalisms select one another as the most dangerous. This is how states mobilize their populations and provide a basis for doing so. We, the story goes, are simply the cultural-political opposite of them. Thailand is worried about Cambodia and Myanmar, Malaysia about Indonesia, Argentina about Brazil, Ukraine about Russia, Ireland about Britain, and so on. Old political enemies are thus frequently closer geographically than are friends. This is not necessarily endless. In the face of devastating wars and in light of recent globalization, the trend has been toward regional-level cooperation in managing common threats in a coherent way. Both geopolitically and economically, therefore, common political-territorial experiences have always given rise to distinctive regional forms of conflict and cooperation.
The urban-networked

In some spheres of life, it is harder to discount the impact of recent globalization. Here too, however, the effects are not the same everywhere. The effects of increased reliance on trade and foreign direct investment and the impact of shrinking costs of communication and movement over space are refracted through historically derived methods and practices of political and economic organization specific to different global regions. Global impacts are mediated regionally. From this viewpoint, what are considered common global pressures actually produce distinctive adaptations in different regions. Global regions provide a determinate context of types of states, city systems, and physical infrastructures (Internet connections, shipping lanes, ports, and so on) between global changes, on the one hand, and on-the-ground or local changes, on the other. As a result, effects are not the same everywhere. Karl Marx (1877, cited in Carr 1961: 82), someone not usually cited for his geographical sensitivities, made this point more generally when he remarked:

Events strikingly similar but occurring in a different historical milieu lead to completely different results. . . . By studying each of these evolutions separately and then comparing them, it is easier to find the key to the understanding of this phenomenon; but it is never possible to arrive at this understanding by using the passe-partout [pass-key] of some universal historical-philosophical theory whose great virtue is to stand above history.

We can substitute ‘historical milieu’ with ‘global region’.

The theoretical basis to a part of this spatial process can be illustrated as follows. Consider four global regions. Each is divided into states that provide the major loci for potential political-economic organization. The geopolitical and economic prospects of each region partially depend on the ‘fit’ between states, on the one hand, and the settlement systems and the distribution of ethnic and national groups, on the other. The presumption is that mobilizing populations to meet collective goals is easier if there is a close match between states with an efficient urban system and a single nationality. In different global regions, however, there is a different array of settlement systems and distribution of ethnic and national groups. Assume, for the moment, that these are general empirical trends within world regions. In practice, there is variation in both of them within regions. But the main point is that it is the capacity of the states (or other political units) that determines the ways in which globalization is mediated by different global regions.

Restricting the discussion just to the spatial match of nations and states, in one global region, Europe, the distribution of nations matches closely that of the states relative to some other regions. They are true nation-states. In another global region, there is one large state and several smaller ones. The large one is multiethnic and, because of its size, it also has substantial influence over the smaller surrounding ones where some of its co-nationals might also live – this large state is Russia. In a third global region, state borders cut across the ethnic map to the extent that there is hardly any overlap between the two. Popular loyalty is to ethnic group and thus the states have a serious legitimacy crisis – this global region is Africa. Early post-colonial rulers, such as Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, pushed for pan-African cooperation because they were afraid of this outcome with borders inherited from colonialism. But new elites were seduced by the possibilities of local power rather than by those of wider cooperation. A final global region, across much of which there is really one major ethnic group, the Arabs, is divided into states ruled by elites who exploit external threats
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and religious and ethnic minorities to maintain a set of states that otherwise would have little distinctive ethnic/religious basis to them – this global region is the Middle East. Iran, Turkey, and Israel, of course, also loom large in the region. Recently, their behaviour has served to reinforce the political fragmentation of the Arab part. Each region thus has a very different sort of statehood associated with it in terms of government political challenges, porosity regarding external challenges, and popular sovereignty. As a result, the political-economic capacity to respond institutionally to current global pressures through cooperation versus conflict varies differentially across the global regions.

On the ground, the global urban system also plugs into the urban systems of different world regions that had already developed in different ways prior to recent waves of global integration. In China, for example, the global urban system encounters one that is Beijing-centred even though until recently its main connections have been through Hong Kong and Shanghai. In the US, a relatively decentralized urban system is tied into the global urban system primarily through New York. In Europe, London and Paris as ‘primate’ national capitals have acquired a privileged role globally because of their former colonial significance rather than because they were centres of a pre-existing European-wide urban system. Africa and Latin America are relatively loosely connected into the global urban system compared to other world regions, which reflect their colonial status and subordination, respectively, to European- and US-centred urban connections. Consider the geographical bias of their respective global airline flight connections; for example, Africa is much more connected to European hubs and Latin America to US ones. Flows of immigrants, both permanent and temporary, also tend to follow well-worn paths that reflect the greater density of regional-over-worldwide connectivity (rural to urban within China, Pakistan to the Gulf States, Turkey to Germany, and so on). The entire global infrastructure of shipping routes, railroads, ports, financial centres, and so on creates a systemic bias that either limits global interactions (as with Africa) or facilitates them (as with North America and Europe). In other words, the effects of globalization are managed through world-regional city networks and the history of their relative integration into the larger world.

**Global ‘gradients’ versus global convergence**

The three spatial processes combine to produce ‘gradients’ between global regions that indicate key power differentials across these regions. These global ‘gradients’ are strong evidence that the world is not yet on course to the global convergence as suggested by much discussion surrounding recent globalization. Global regions differ considerably with respect to overall human welfare between one another on average. Of course, there is variation within them, between the fortunes of rich and poor and the rural and urban, but it is overall ‘life chances’ that is the leitmotif of global comparison. Four empirical examples serve as illustrations.

The first one concerns the migration of children from Central America to the US 2014. This would also apply in a somewhat different way to the massive migration of refugees from Syria (and elsewhere) to Europe in 2015. After the global economic crisis began in 2008, a significant number of unaccompanied Mexican children began to cross the US-Mexico border, primarily to south Texas. Since 2012, and with a large spike in 2014, they were joined by thousands of unaccompanied children from the three Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Against the backdrop of declining economic opportunity at home, children were embarking on the hazardous journey through Mexico to cross illegally, without papers, into the US to join family members who had previously made the trip or find some way to prosper on their own north of the border.
Obviously, the contrast in life chances between Central America and the US had something to do with why parents or other family members would send their children northwards. More specifically, however, and something that many family members told US journalists, the breakdown of law and order in many towns and cities in the three Central American countries had much more to do with the migration than the promise of not being deported if the children made it to the US border. This was attributed to the rise of criminal gangs engaged in drug trafficking who recruited in schools and used violence against one another to control territories for facilitating the flow of cocaine and other illegal drugs to Mexico and the US. Murder rates in Central America are the highest in the world. In a sense, therefore, this was a refugee as much as an immigration crisis. The irony was that many of the gangsters had learned their craft in the US before being deported in the 1990s and early 2000s and setting up shop back home. The political-economic gap between Latin and North America is indicative of exactly the sort of regional gradient that continues to matter worldwide. That each side is intimately connected in their differences to the other shows how much these are not isolated worlds.

A second example also comes from the summer of 2014. This one involves a violent insurgency crossing the border from Iraq into Syria and claiming the onset of a new ‘state’: the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS, or Islamic State). A group of radical Sunni Islamists originally from Iraq but fresh from fighting in the Syrian civil war took advantage of the unpopularity of the Iraqi government among its Muslim Sunni minority concentrated in the north and north-west of the country to attempt an erasure of existing borders in pursuit of a larger Islamic Caliphate. Their puritanism and brutality have led Arab religious minorities, such as Shia Muslims and Christians and Kurdish-speaking, religious minority Yazidis, to flee their homes. ISIS claims that the borders between Syria and Iraq were imposed by the external British and French colonial powers and that there was no local agreement after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War. Though claiming to be ‘the’ authentic voice of Islam, ISIS is a thoroughly modern movement in its commitment to establishing a state rather than simply engaging in religious proselytizing or forming a terrorist network. It is also adept at using many of the technologies associated with contemporary globalization, not least the Internet, as a means of disseminating its propaganda and recruiting foreign fighters. Ironically, Hollywood action-film models inform its very modus operandi.

This is only one of a series of insurgencies across the wider Middle East on the back of uprisings against unpopular dictatorships (as in Syria and Egypt) and disastrous US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US interventions, traceable to the desire to counter countries that were judged to be supportive of Islamist terrorism and/or anti-US in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the US, turned out to be recruiting vehicles for groups wanting to reshape the political borders and order of the region. In Iraq, the US replacing dominance by one group (Saddam Hussein and his predominantly Sunni Baath Party) with that of another (the majority Muslim Shia) created the conditions for the sectarian radicalization that has given rise to ISIS.

The final two examples are less dramatic but point to longer-term processes in the workings of ‘gradients’ between regions both adjacent and more distant. One is the story of the tomato paste trade. This might seem like an unlikely topic. Surely, tomatoes are just grown somewhere, turned into paste, canned, and then sold according to what the price will bear? The tomato paste industry has a long history in southern Italy where the agricultural area around the city of Foggia in the south-east is where the tomatoes are grown. Naples is where the paste is made and canned. Containers loaded with cans labelled ‘Made in Italy’ leave from the port of Naples each week for the four corners of the Earth. Some of them now go to Ghana in West Africa, where their successful sale has forced many local tomato growers out of business because their costs of production and distribution are higher than those of the can producers. The Italian, and
increasingly Chinese, producers have ‘economies of scale’ in production (bigger output equals lower unit costs of production) as well as long histories of processing foodstuffs.

Before the 1990s, Ghanaians largely ate fresh local tomatoes. With the advent of a more open economy encouraged by international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, and by governments, such as that of the US, in which lowering tariffs on imports figured prominently, Ghana saw a 650 per cent increase in tomato paste imports from 1998 to 2003. Initially cornered by Italian producers, since 2005 Chinese producers have outsold them. Meanwhile, around Foggia legions of seasonal workers from Ghana, Mali, Senegal, and other parts of West Africa, almost all in Italy illegally, pick the tomatoes and are subject to terrible living and working conditions. Paid ‘off the books’ to evade taxes and social security, the pay is not by the hour but by quantity picked. Tomato production across Europe is heavily subsidized by the European Union to help keep farmers in business. The net effect is to export product to Africa while importing Africans to Europe. Of course, the seasonal workers do send home remittances to help support their families. But it is the steep economic gradient between Africa and Europe that makes this necessary in the first place.

The final example concerns so-called land grabs in which companies, investment funds, or state enterprises from some world regions acquire land in other world regions as ‘banks’ for future needs. This often involves expelling the current small farmers who occupy the land and replacing them with large farms orientated to biofuel and food production for distant ‘home’ markets. The debts that governments in many African and Latin American countries built up in the 1970s and 1980s have often been the pretext for the large-scale expropriation and sale of land. In return, governments acquire cash to pay off their debts.

The largest concentration of foreign land holdings over the period 2001–11 has been in Africa. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Mozambique, and Ethiopia have been the four countries in the region with the largest number of land deals. Some of these involve regional actors, such as South Africa, but China is overwhelmingly the most important source of companies and enterprises conducting land deals in the region, as well as elsewhere (the Philippines and Indonesia). Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Brazil, South Korea, the US, and several European countries make up the other major sources of buyers.

What this amounts to is a refiguring of large parts of Africa as servants of interests elsewhere. Of course, this is not new. It was the essence of colonialism. What is new is that this is happening under the rubric of globalization. Land used for local subsistence and supply of foodstuffs to national urban markets is being sold off to provide for food and industrial demand in other regions, particularly in China, where rainfall deficits and pollution of soils have undermined domestic agriculture. This has happened under the aegis of international organizations and foreign governments encouraging land transactions in return for the promise of debt repayment and the blessings of future borrowing this entails. As a consequence, large swaths of nominally ‘sovereign’ territory have been expropriated by foreign businesses and, lacking some remarkable shift in purpose, removed from serving the purpose of local economic development. Already weak governments and economies are further weakened. The regional specificity, with actors from some regions (East Asia) on one end of the process and those from another (Africa) at the other, underscores the extent to which worldwide economic development is still organized around global regions.

**Select bibliography**


Undoubtedly, a central task of post-colonial studies has been the critique of conceptual divisions that have structured the modern world: metropole and colony, East and West, civilized versus uncivilized, developed and underdeveloped. Such critique has not only entailed a spatial dimension but has also developed, theorized, and put into currency a number of important conceptual spatializations. As Sara Upstone puts it, ‘colonial analysis has seen the spatial as inherent to the questions of identity, power and resistance it often raises’ (2009: 40). In what follows, I sketch out some of the ways the field has approached questions of space, territories, regions, and boundaries. The topics I touch on include Edward Said’s imaginative geographies, colonial urbanism, hybrid ‘third spaces’, global ‘scapes’, and, finally, the Global South. In examining these formulations, this essay traces the ways post-colonial theory has conceived of and critiqued the world’s spaces and regions in relation to imperialism, anti-colonialism, nationalism, diaspora, and globalization. Such spatializations, as we will see, are necessarily transregional in that they transform and transcend regional constructions.

Staging the Orient

In Said’s foundational work of post-colonial criticism, *Orientalism* (1978), he uses ‘imaginative geographies’ to describe the simultaneous production of a spatial and political concept – the Orient. Challenging the empiricism of geographical knowledge, Said shows how European designations of the Arab world attained density through the imaginative dimensions of travel writings, novels, and other texts, such that the space of the Orient exceeds positivist scientific knowledge. Imaginative geographies necessarily underwrite a knowledge performance that at once determines its object and ‘legitimates a vocabulary, a universe of representative discourse peculiar to the discussion and understanding of Islam and of the Orient’ (1978: 71). Drawing from Foucault, one of Said’s profound insights is the imbrication of colonial power with forms of spatializing knowledge. He thus stresses the dual meaning of the term ‘field’ as both spatial and disciplinary:

A field is often an enclosed space. The idea of representation is a theatrical one: the Orient is the stage on which the whole East is confined. On this stage will appear figures whose role it is to represent the larger whole from which they emanate.

(1978: 63)
While Orientalism has become a key term signalling the historical subordination and representational stereotyping of the East, Said also addresses its role in laying the groundwork for contemporary area studies. In 1964, H.A.R. Gibb, a well-known scholar of Anglo-American Islamic studies, uses, as Said refers to it, ‘the ugly neologism “area study”’, indicating to Said that ‘area studies and Orientalism after all were interchangeable geographical titles’ (1978: 53) and confirming the ‘interesting relationship between knowledge and geography’ (1978: 53). In his concluding chapter of *Orientalism*, Said’s rich longitudinal study shifts to the question of ‘Orientalism Now’, as he moves from the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century French and British Orientalists to the twentieth-century institutionalization of Orientalist academic units in the United Kingdom and the USA. Problematically, the earlier ‘dogmas’ of Orientalism remain intact. They include ‘the absolute and systematic difference between the West . . . and the Orient’ (1978: 300); ‘that the Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself’; and, finally, ‘that the Orient is at bottom something either to be feared . . . or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible)’ (1978: 301).

Put differently, Said’s now-classic work contends that scholarly knowledge about the non-West simultaneously studies and produces the region as being subordinate and penetrable, justifying both colonialism proper and ongoing neo-colonial and imperial domination.

Yet, the regionalization of the world that Said traces is both fixed and fluid. While the production of Orientalist knowledge relies on a static repertoire of tropes, ‘imaginative geography’ itself has no stable referent. In accordance with the Cold War formation of area studies, post-war global hegemony of the United States could retool Orientalist discourses for the vastly different geographical territories of East and Southeast Asia, the locus of the Cold War’s violent conflicts (see Klein 2003). Motivated and funded largely by state security concerns, ‘area studies was organized to simplify a region or nation-state into a formula in order to place it in the college curriculum’ (Harootunian and Miyoshi 2002: 7). A further implication is that the imaginative geographies of Orientalism – where ‘backward’ Arabs or Chinese were cast temporally as centuries behind the West – allowed for a hierarchical, civilizational worldview to be readily translated into the unquestioned teleology of modernization. Area studies,

> despite its arrival with decolonization, thus succeeded in reinforcing this imperial-colonial relationship by maintaining that Euro-America was the privileged site of production, in every sense of the word, while the outside was simply the space for ‘development’ which originated elsewhere.

(Harootunian and Miyoshi 2002: 7)

Unsurprisingly, Said’s defining of Orientalism as a tone, mode, and trope of discourse resulted in tremendous influence in the fields of literary and cultural studies. Yet it is in departments of geography and area studies that the critique of Orientalism has remained most trenchant.

### Urban situatedness and interdependencies

Let us now take a quite different perspective on the spatial relationship between the West and ‘the Rest’ – one that focuses less on disciplinary and discursive formations and more on the intimate, often violent, relations of colonial rule itself. For such a view, we turn to Frantz Fanon’s seminal anti-colonial manifesto, *The Wretched of the Earth* (*Les Damnés de la Terre*, 1961). Written in the midst of the global struggles for decolonization and, in particular, the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62), *The Wretched of the Earth* stridently demands an ethico-political resistance to the dominance of imperial Europe. Unlike Said’s careful attention to literary tropes and
discursive formations, Fanon’s critique is grounded in the material realities of Europe’s exploitation of its colonial ‘dependencies’. Through his Marxist perspective, the division of a world unjustly carved up into a prosperous Europe (or America) and impoverished colonies is only an apparent separation: these distinct regions have been brought into a single, capitalist system with the colonial world providing the material wealth for Europe’s opulence. Fanon thus reverses the assumed direction of influence between Europe and the peripheries:

In concrete terms Europe has been bloated out of all proportions by the gold and raw materials from such colonial countries as Latin America, China, and Africa. Today Europe’s tower of opulence faces these continents, for centuries the point of departure of their shipments of diamonds, oil, silk and cotton, timber, and exotic produce to this very same Europe. Europe is literally the creation of the Third World.

(Fanon 1961 [2004]: 58)

Fanon’s argument turns on asserting the dependency of Europe on its colonies, rather than the other way around, as he provocatively casts Europe as the very product of the plundering imperialist system.

In his compelling description of the colonial city, just a few paragraphs into his opening chapter ‘On Violence’, Fanon confirms the all-embracing interdependence of metropolitan and colonial spaces. As I have argued elsewhere, the colonial city can be understood as the topographical node through which metropolitan and colonial spaces were structured in relation to each other (Watson 2011), in other words, as precise locations of transregionalism. Moreover, Fanon offers a reading of colonial urban life that incorporates the psychic experiences of such spaces with a larger critique of colonialism. He writes:

The ‘native’ sector is not complementary to the European sector. The two confront each other, but not in the service of a higher unity. . . . The colonist’s sector is a sector built to last, all stone and steel. It’s a sector of lights and paved roads, where the trash cans constantly overflow with strange and wonderful garbage, undreamed-of leftovers. . . . The colonized’s sector, or at least the ‘native’ quarters, the shanty town, the Medina, the reservation, is a disreputable place inhabited by disreputable people. You are born anywhere, anyhow. You die anywhere, from anything. It’s a world with no space, people are piled one on top of the other, the shacks squeezed tightly together. . . . The colonized’s sector is a sector that crouches and cowers, a sector on its knees, a sector that is prostrate.

(Fanon 1961 [2004]: 4–5)

Fanon’s indelible portrait of the colonial city as a world cut in two halves is at once an empirical spatial observation and a complex epistemological claim. The colonial system relies upon the interpenetrating – but hierarchizing – urban form of ‘settler town’ and ‘native town’, but in the spatial arrangement of a disavowal. The colonial city thus operates as a microcosm of, or bridge between, the colony and metropole and, moreover, is ‘crucial in producing these territorial distinctions themselves’ (Watson 2011: 50). Cantonments, ports, trading facilities, and settler residential sectors metonymically stand in for the colonizing power, and result in a stark spatial disjunction against which the shanty town ‘crouches and cowers . . . on its knees’ (Fanon 1961 [2004]: 5). The colonial city, located at the very juncture between native populations, colonial settlers, and administrators, is a vital, if turbulent, site for the transregional production of the global capitalist-imperialist system itself.
Fanon’s account of the colonial city works through a number of spatializations that remain indispensable to post-colonial studies today. In particular, his attention to the epistemologies and subjectivities produced in the transregional matrix of colonial urbanism has opened up multiple avenues for comparative and interdisciplinary research on (post-)colonial cities (see King 1976; Çelik 1997; Robinson 2006). This research, in turn, has provided the basis for new work that addresses the post-colonial metropolis as the spatial form that, palimpsest-like, must mediate between colonial legacies and global futures (Ong and Roy 2011).

**Between nation and globe**

Although later chapters of *The Wretched of the Earth* are concerned with the urban-rural dichotomy within post-colonial nations – seen especially in the withering analysis of the urbanized native elite who continues to exploit the masses – Fanon nevertheless advocated the Third World nation-state as the appropriate political-spatial form to follow decolonization. As Partha Chatterjee summarizes, following the decades that saw much of the colonial world gain political independence, ‘[t]he nation-state was established as the normal form of the state everywhere in the world. The normative idea was unequivocally endorsed in the principle of self-determination of peoples and nations’ (2005: 489).

Coinciding with the consolidation of the nation-state form for newly decolonized peoples came the bipolarization of the world though the Cold War, resulting in the tripartite regionalization of the planet into the ‘First’, ‘Second’, and ‘Third Worlds’. Although recent scholarship has identified the mutual influences and entanglements across these territories (Buck-Morss 2000; Denning 2004; Westad 2007), the notion of ‘Three Worlds’ as the defining post-war geopolitical organization of the globe until 1989 remains analytically influential.

As a result of the competitions and alignments of the Three Worlds system as well as the enduring legacies of colonial structures of economy and governance, the achievements of the Third World nation-state have been decidedly mixed. Economically, as Vijay Prashad (2007) and Chatterjee (2005) have each discussed, post-colonial nation-states have widely exhibited uneven results. While high-growth capitalist development has transformed sites such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and now China and India, in sub-Saharan Africa ‘the nation-state is said to have utterly failed in delivering the promises made at the time of its birth’ (Chatterjee 2005: 488). High and low performing economies alike have often seen years, if not decades, of authoritarian rule and state oppression, the latter often targeting minority groups.

Inspired in part by these disappointments of the Third World nation-state, many post-colonial thinkers have embraced a transnational and transregional approach. One of the most influential theorists in this vein is Homi Bhabha and his book *The Location of Culture* (1994). Here, Bhabha’s primary critical intervention regarding space and territory is the notion that the ‘non-synchronous temporality of global and national cultures opens up a cultural space – a third space’ (1994: 218) of incommensurability and hybridity. Citing the ‘*in-between* spaces’ of ‘[c]ultural globality’ (1994: 216, emphasis in original), he argues for a kind of ‘translational’ temporality and agency whereby migrants from the formerly colonized world translate themselves, their ‘community’, and the metropolitan spaces they enter. He explains:

Community is the antagonist supplement of modernity: in the metropolitan space it is the territory of the minority, threatening the claims of civility; in the transnational world it becomes the border-problem of the diasporic, the migrant, the refugee. Binary divisions of social space neglect the profound temporal disjunction – the translational time and space – through which minority communities negotiate their
collective identifications. For what is at issue in the discourse of minorities is the creation of agency through incommensurable (not simply multiple) positions.

(Bhabha 1994: 231)

Bhabha’s goal, evidenced by his often slippery language and post-structuralist theoretical leanings, is to destabilize the very geopolitical demarcations between metropolitan and (post-)colonial spaces. The presence of the diasporic, the migrant, or the refugee in the spaces of the metropole render such binary distinctions obsolete.

Bhabha’s work theorizes post-colonial hybridity as both a product of the colonial encounter and resistance to it. For some, this has come to stand for the very essence of the post-colonial project, a field that ‘deploys a variety of conceptual terms and categories of analysis which examine the mutual contagion and subtle intimacies between coloniser and colonised’ (Gandhi 1998: 129). Yet the emphasis on the subversive potential of cultural dislocation and transnationalism has come under scrutiny precisely because of the rejection of the nation-state as the primary spatial coordinate. A powerful voice in this debate is Aijaz Ahmad, who points out that interest in post-modern hybridity and ‘the interstitial’ occludes other – potentially more politically efficacious – spatial categories of class, nation, and history. He especially takes offence at the way the term ‘postcoloniality’ is used in the specific ‘discourse practised by such critics as Homi Bhabha’ (Ahmad 1995: 10), reminding us that ‘the first major debate on the idea of postcolonialism’ took place in the 1970s in reference to the post-colonial state (1995: 5). Questioning the subversive potential of hybridizing ‘third’ spaces, Ahmad argues that political ‘agencies are constituted not in flux and displacement but in given historical locations’ (1995: 16). Moreover, he points out that ‘[m]ost migrants tend to be poor and experience displacement not as cultural plenitude but as torment; what they seek is not displacement but, precisely, a place from where they begin anew, with some sense of a stable future’ (1995: 16).

The debate around destabilizing translational/transnational cultures versus territorial stability is also taken up by Arjun Appadurai in his well-known essay ‘Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy’ (1996). One of the most important conceptualizations of spatiality under globalization, Appadurai’s essay became required reading for a generation of scholars. In it, he supplements reigning conceptions of globalization by world-system thinkers and sociologists with the category of culture, drawing on the critical vocabulary of cultural hybridity and diaspora as developed by post-colonial studies (Gikandi 2001: 629–30). The essay thus posits a model of ‘[t]he new global cultural economy . . . as a complex, overlapping, disjunctive order that cannot any longer be understood in terms of existing center-periphery models’ (Appadurai 1996: 32). He continues:

I propose that an elementary framework for exploring such disjunctures is to look at the relationship among five dimensions of global cultural flows that can be termed (a) ethnoscapes, (b) mediascapes, (c) technoscapes, (d) financescapes, and (e) ideoscapes. The suffix -scape allows us to point to the fluid, irregular shapes of these landscapes, shapes that characterize international capital as deeply as they do international clothing styles.

(1996: 33, original emphasis)

To be sure, Appadurai’s theorization of ‘scapes’ and ‘global cultural flows’ offers a far more dynamic and ‘non-isomorphic’ (1996: 31) configuration of material, ideational, human, and financial interactions than previous Three Worlds, centre-periphery, or nation-state models. He also presciently accounts for the way the pressures of globalization force a new reckoning between the nation and the state – ‘with state and nation seeking to cannibalize one another’
(1996: 39) – rather than simply ceding nation-state sovereignty. Along the way, affiliations formerly assumed to be contained by the nation-state are now understood as deterritorialized and networked, such that ethnic ‘primordia’ ‘become spread over vast and irregular spaces as groups move yet stay linked to one another through sophisticated media capabilities’ (1996: 41). Appadurai concludes that ‘cultural forms in today’s world [are] fundamentally fractal, that is, as possessing no Euclidean boundaries, structures, or regularities’ (1996: 46).

If we thought that the earlier anti-colonial struggles against bounded territorial hierarchies had disappeared with a new era of global flows and scapes, Simon Gikandi – in a gesture akin to Ahmad’s – reminds us that this is hardly the case. That increasing numbers of desperate migrants from the Global South do not subscribe to a liberatory diasporic subjectivity leads Gikandi to question the emphasis on cultural flows in descriptions of the global order and the corresponding neglect of persisting, structural forms of disenfranchisement and exclusion in post-colonial nations themselves. He recounts the tragic story of the two Guinean boys Yaguine Koita and Fodé Tounkara, who froze to death in the landing gear of a plane flying between Conakry and Brussels, and who were found holding a handwritten letter at Brussels airport in August 1999. Gikandi notes the irony that ‘citizens of the postcolony are more likely to seek their global identity by invoking the very logic of Enlightenment that postcolonial theory was supposed to deconstruct’ (2001: 630). His warning is that ‘this optimistic and celebratory view of globalization . . . is constantly haunted by another form of globalization, one defined by a sense of crisis within the postcolony itself’ (2001: 629–30).

Thinking South

The final trans-region I wish to examine is the concept of the Global South, a spatialization that follows the breakdown of the Three Worlds system but recognizes the persistent disparities between developed and developing nations. Isabel Hofmeyr and Michelle Williams trace a key lexical shift at the Tenth Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Jakarta in 1992, where ‘the importance of a North-South axis, as opposed to the East-West Cold War axis’ was affirmed (2011: 17). Caroline Levander and Walter Mignolo, meanwhile, note that its ‘uptake in common and academic parlance has dramatically increased since 1989’ (2011: 7), signalling to the demise of Three Worlds thinking. Less a verifiable place in itself than ‘the way in which it points to other things’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012: 45), the Global South acknowledges a number of historical phenomena: the end of the Cold War and the Soviet bloc, the neo-liberal turn of the Reagan and Thatcher eras, as well as the widespread developmental problems of decolonized countries, signalled most strikingly by the debt crises of the 1980s and the ensuing interventions by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Arif Dirlik writes of the concept: ‘It has some kinship with the idea of “Third World” in its self-assertion. On the other hand, it is also the product of a quite different historical situation’ (2007: 15). If the Third World and non-aligned regions are now subsumed under the Global South – with its implicit counterpart the Global North – what kind of a transregional concept does it signify? And how far have we travelled from previous post-colonial conceptualizations of space and region?

In their 2011 essay, Levander and Mignolo argue for the possibilities of the term ‘as an emergent conceptual apparatus’ that can ‘resist the disciplinary ordering through which institutions have graphed methods of analysis and knowledge production onto stable territorial frameworks’ (2011: 1–2). In that sense, the Global South motivates us toward new comparative and transregional linkages beyond the premises embedded in the nation-state and area studies alike. The post-colonial critique of colonial legacies remains active, since the region is, ‘among other things, a design drawn from and implemented by imperial local histories’ (Levander and
Mignolo 2011: 10). Perhaps most characteristically, the Global South holds a certain tension in play. Configured as ‘the geopolitical concept replacing “Third World” after the collapse of the Soviet Union’ (2011: 3),

the global south is the location of underdevelopment and emerging nations that needs the ‘support’ of the global north (G7, IMF, World Bank, and the like). However, from the perspective of the inhabitants . . . the ‘Global South’ is the location where new visions of the future are emerging and where the global political and decolonial society is at work.

(Levander and Mignolo 2011: 3)

Comaroff and Comaroff go even further by positing an epistemological privilege of the Global South as the site ‘that often is the first to feel the effects of world-historical forces . . . in which radically new assemblages of capital and labor are taking shape’ (2012: 12). In order to understand the direction in which the Global North is going – whether in terms of urbanism, neoliberal economics, debt crises, identity politics, or government – ‘theory from the south’ is ever more necessary. Less optimistically, Dirlik cautions us in regard to the rapid rise of China as the new ‘centre of gravity’ for the Global South. In the new race for development,

the issue is no longer overthrowing colonialism or finding a “third way of development,” but the inclusion of voices of the formerly colonized and marginalized in a world that already has been shaped by a colonial modernity to which there is no alternative in sight – the world of global modernity.

(2007: 19, emphasis added)

The inconclusive potential of the Global South – in which opportunities arise for both transitional solidarities and competition (Hofmeyr and Williams 2011: 18–19) – is precisely why such a concept demands our attention.

To conclude briefly, we might say that one legacy of post-colonial studies is a deep investment in theorizing space as simultaneously a constructed realm of subordination and hierarchy and a space of anti-essentialist, subversive identities. Epistemological attempts to deconstruct and unfix the hierarchical spatial boundaries between Europe and the Orient, or West and East, or North and South at the level of culture and discourse have been profoundly important for a number of humanistic disciplines. And yet, as recent critical voices from and for the Global South indicate, the task of decolonizing thought and practice remains an urgent political and material struggle, albeit embedded in a very different set of global conditions from those in which the debate originated.

Select bibliography


Introduction

Global politics are said to be changing fundamentally. After the end of the Cold War and a brief subsequent period of United States (US) unilateralism, a multipolar world order in the (re)making is being imagined – in particular since the rise in the real, or perceived, importance of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRICs), and that of other so-called emerging countries. Part of the hype is actually discursive rather than substantive, yet, it is clear that world power balances are also ‘really’ changing, as can be seen for the past several years in the South China Sea and in Syria. Accordingly, the ‘American century’ has come to end, being replaced by an ‘Asian century’ (Acharya 2014) dominated by populous China and India – which some scholars view as a déjà vu of worldwide power distributions and relative economic strength dating back to the fifteenth century (on the ‘Great Divergence’, see Chapter 24 by Rössner).

After this short introduction, the chapter proceeds to present the discourse that has helped the BRICs to come into existence in the first place. The next section focuses on the substance and practices of the BRICs in global politics since their official formation in 2009, and becoming the BRICS in 2010 with the addition of South Africa. The third section will briefly look at other newly emerging groups beyond the BRICS. This is followed by tentative conclusions.

The BRICs as discourse

This section briefly recounts the socially constructed nature of the BRICs. The related debate started in November 2001, when Terence James (‘Jim’) O’Neill – at that time head of global economics research at the American global investment bank Goldman Sachs and now Lord O’Neill of Gatley – published figures on economic growth scenarios for a group of ‘emerging economies’. These were namely Brazil, Russia, India, and China – the BRICs. Using different scenarios, O’Neill stated: ‘Over the next 10 years, the weight of the BRICs and especially China in world GDP [gross domestic product] will grow, raising important issues about the global economic impact of fiscal and monetary policy in the BRICs’ (O’Neill 2001: 1).

As a consequence, he argued, ‘world policymaking forums should be re-organised and in particular, the G7 should be adjusted to incorporate BRIC representatives’ (ibid.). On this basis,
two years later, Goldman Sachs came up with another paper, ‘Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050’, which predicted that:

> [o]ver the next 50 years, Brazil, Russia, India and China – the BRICs economies – could become a much larger force in the world economy. . . . If things go right, in less than 40 years, the BRICs economies together could be larger than the G6 [Group of 6] in US dollar terms. By 2025 they could account for over half the size of the G6.

(Wilson and Purushothaman 2003: 1)

These modelled projections were supported by a series of graphs and tables regarding when the BRICs’ combined GDP would overtake the G6. All kinds of media have since reproduced and widely distributed these icons, often without appreciating the methodological basics and rather taking them for granted as facts of a coming future. Subsequently, a number of important international actors picked up and reinforced the theme, including the British Department of International Development (Jenkins and Edwards 2005), the Organization for Economic Development (OECD) (Goldstein et al. 2006), and the World Bank (Broadman 2007). Just six years after Goldman Sachs’ second short report, the countries mentioned actually started formal cooperation among themselves and constituted a club that was to become a global actor in its own right (see next section).

A good indicator for ‘the rise of the BRICs’ narrative in academia is the Online Public Access Catalogue (OPAC) of the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) in Hamburg, Germany. As of 27 August 2017, the digital catalogue showed 1,005 rather broadly defined hits for the ‘BRICs’ (GIGA OPAC 2017a). The entries start in 2005 with one conference report, developing into a hype that peaked in 2013–15. These three years of academic knowledge production on the BRICs alone accounted for almost 40 per cent of all publications registered on the group.

The hype over the BRICs is mainly related to widespread irritation about the nature of the emerging world order after the Cold War (see, for instance, de Coning, Mandrup and Odgaard 2015; Keily 2015; Stuenkel 2015). Commonly, the future economic potential of the BRICs is translated into a threat to established global powers. Observers agree that the decline of a unipolar world order dominated by the US – and implicitly ‘the West’ – has started to give way to a multipolar order, at least for the foreseeable future. They also agree that in the long run, other powers could become dominant.

In the meantime, there is widespread speculation about the implications of the often unquestioned ‘rise of the BRICs’ in terms of changing political and economic dependencies as well as the emergence of new international hierarchies. The current debate concentrates on what ‘the rise of the BRICs’ will mean for global governance and the functioning of multilateral institutions (Herz 2017; Lesage and van de Graaf 2015).

**The BRICS as practice**

In 2006, Brazil, Russia, India, and China – all members of the Group of Twenty (G20) – initiated regular informal diplomatic coordination, with annual meetings of foreign ministers at the margins of the autumn debate of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (for a short history of the group, see Cooper 2016). This format was then upgraded to regular annual meetings at the level of heads of state and government in 2009, with the first one being held in Yekaterinburg, Russia. The subsequent meetings took place in Brasilia, Brazil (2010); Sanya, China (2011); New Delhi, India (2012); Durban, South Africa (2013); Fortaleza, Brazil (2014); Ufa, Russia (2015); Benaulim, India (2016); and Xiamen, China (2017).
There is no permanent secretariat of the group. In each member state, different line ministries have been responsible for dealing with the BRICs. In essence, the BRICs have concentrated on coordinating their economic and political positions in global governance fora, and enhancing multilateral cooperation among each other. Signalling a truly transregional ambition, the BRICs in 2010 invited South Africa to join the club; notwithstanding the underlying principle of regional representation, most African states did not accept the addition. The BRIC group then became BRICS (hence the summit in South Africa in 2013).

Just like the Group of Seven (G7), the BRICs are a heterogeneous group of countries. To start with, they differ in population and land mass.

China and India are the two BRICs countries with the world’s largest populations (1.379 million and 1.324 million, respectively), followed by Brazil (208 million, at rank 5), Russia (144 million, at rank 9), and South Africa (56 million, at rank 24). These countries combined account for almost 42 per cent of the world’s population (World Bank 2017a).

In terms of land size, Russia is the biggest BRICs country (16,376,870 sq. km), followed by China (9,388,211 sq. km), Brazil (8,358,140 sq. km), India (2,973,190 sq. km), and South Africa (1,213,090 sq. km). They collectively make up 29.5 per cent of the world’s land mass (World Bank 2017b).

In addition, there is considerable variation in their Human Development Index (HDI) scores. These scores measure life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rates, GDP per capita, gross national income (GNI) per capita, countries’ share of world trade (imports and exports), as well as the status of political rights and civil liberties as indexed by Freedom House (see Table 69.1). In short, there are measurable differences in economic wealth, economic weight in the global economy, and the quality of the political regimes among the BRICs members.

Despite these differences, the BRICs took up the opportunity to form their own club, and came up with two concrete common activities in 2014. The first was the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB), based in Shanghai and with a branch in South Africa. It is meant to lend money for infrastructure projects (currently the bank’s capitalization is at around USD 50 billion). The bank has been discussed as a South–South competitor to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is basically controlled by the West (Mota Prado and Salles 2014; Cusson and Culpi 2017). In addition, the BRICs members also agreed to the BRICs Contingent Reserve Arrangement in order to provide protection against global liquidity pressures.

Table 69.1 Comparing the BRICs, 2003 and 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>HDI value (2003/2011)</th>
<th>GNI per capita (PPP $)</th>
<th>Share of world trade (in %)</th>
<th>Freedom House rating</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>Exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2003 0.792 (rank 63)</td>
<td>7,790</td>
<td>0.7 (rank 30)</td>
<td>1.0 (rank 25)</td>
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<td>1.1 (rank 25)</td>
<td>1.2 (rank 25)</td>
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<td>1.8 (rank 17)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1.2 (rank 23)</td>
<td>2.1 (rank 15)</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<td>0.9 (rank 24)</td>
<td>0.7 (rank 31)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2015 0.624 (rank 131)</td>
<td>5,663</td>
<td>2.3 (rank 13)</td>
<td>1.6 (rank 19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2003 0.755 (rank 85)</td>
<td>5,003</td>
<td>5.3 (rank 3)</td>
<td>5.8 (rank 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2015 0.738 (rank 91)</td>
<td>13,345</td>
<td>10.1 (rank 2)</td>
<td>13.8 (rank 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2003 0.658 (rank 120)</td>
<td>10,346</td>
<td>0.5 (rank 35)</td>
<td>0.5 (rank 38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2015 0.666 (rank 119)</td>
<td>12,087</td>
<td>0.6 (rank 33)</td>
<td>0.5 (rank 37)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The big question was, and continues to be: What do the BRICS actually want to achieve as a grouping? Some have argued that the overall agenda is twofold, geared first toward (global) redistribution, including systematically reducing the wealth, power, and prestige differentials among states, though not citizens; and, second, in a Fanonian way, toward recognizing past discrimination, disrespect, and humiliation (see Nel 2015; Foreign Policy Analysis 2017; see Gordon 2015).

The global policy fields discussed with a view to developing common BRICS positions are mainly energy (Downie 2015) and climate change. The latter represented the first time the BRICS collectively advocated for a position (at the UN Climate Change Conference held in Durban, South Africa, in 2011) that went against the stated interests of most fellow countries from the Global South (see Hochstetler and Milkoreit 2015). However, beyond these occasions, no real policy convergence between the BRICS can be observed, as suggested by an analysis of voting behaviour of the BRICS on a wide range of issues at the UN General Assembly (see Ferdinand 2014; Hooijmaaijers and Keukeleire 2016).

Questions have been raised as to whether the BRICS format really caters to the different interests of its members (on South Africa, see Cilliers 2017; on China and India, for instance, Cooper and Farooq 2016). Other points of discussion have revolved around whether – in view of the ‘global commons’ – these emerging countries are not being ‘irresponsible’ (Culp 2016), and whether some BRICS members really can live up to the challenge of being an ‘emerging power’ (for instance, on South Africa, see Schoeman 2015).

In fact, the jury is still out on whether the BRICS grouping is a ‘bargaining coalition, [an] imagined community, or [a] geopolitical fad’ (Brütsch and Papa 2013). So far, observers have highlighted that the one thing the BRICS really have in common is their quest for natural resources and energy to fuel their economic development (see, for instance, Wenzel 2014; Wilson 2015). In this respect, particular attention has been paid to the role of China vis-à-vis the African continent, with academic scholarship appearing for the first time over the last ten years or so (see Alden 2008; Bräutigam 2009; Cheru and Obi 2009; Taylor 2009).

In practice, many BRICS policies turned out to be rather bilateral politics. For instance, China is following a grand strategy in Africa that integrates many of its players, from state ministries to parastatals to ‘private’ companies. The comeback of China to the African continent is accompanied by the smart application of ‘soft power’ (see Fijalkowski 2011), for example through the establishment of cultural Confucius Institute branches in many African states (46 out of 500 institutes worldwide are based in Africa; Hanban 2017). The same grand design is applied in the current ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ of re-establishing some sort of Silk Road between China, on the one hand, and Europe and the Middle East, on the other. Within this scheme, a massive investment drive was unveiled in 2013 to build parts of the transregional architecture for China’s global dominance aspirations.

Local area studies and international studies located in the BRICS countries have developed their own perspective on ‘the rise of the BRICS’. It is mainly seen as an opportunity for the members to become part of the dominant club of leading global powers, to increase sovereignty, and to start influencing the global agenda or even changing ‘the global order’ according to their own terms (see, for instance, Titarenko and Petrovsky 2015; Gulez 2017).

Some authors, therefore, already argue that in the end ‘the rise of the BRICS’ will translate into the regionalization of global governance (Krirkovic 2015), while others have drawn attention to the emergence of new ‘diversified dependencies’ within the old Global South (Taylor 2014). In any case, the global financial crisis after 2007–8 seems to have cast doubts on the legitimacy of and also stalled intra-BRICS cooperation (Stuenkel 2013). Based on figures from the late 2010s, the story of the BRICS might have to be rewritten.
Beyond the BRICS

Driven by the parochial interests of investment companies, think tanks, and the media in the Global North, the hype on new actors and related forms of club governance continued unbridled after the initial framing of the BRICS. In 2007, the usual suspects made strong efforts to launch the Next Eleven (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Turkey, and Vietnam), the MIKT (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, and Turkey) in 2012, and the MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey) in 2013. While these framings clearly made reference to economic growth potentials, other think tanks also looked at the geopolitical relevance of certain countries, thereby coining the notion of ‘anchor countries’. The latter are considered to be prime partners in developing solutions for global structural policy questions, based on their economic weight, political influence, and increasing determination to accept global responsibility (see Altenburg and Leininger 2008).

On more practical terms, the Group of Eight (G8), on day two of their 2005 summit, invited Brazil, China, India, South Africa, and Mexico (also called the O5, or Outreach Five), to partake. Then, on day three of the Group of Seven summit in 2009, the heads of state and government of Argentina, Australia, Egypt, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Turkey were invited to join in the club’s deliberations. Although the ministers of the G20 had already met at the level of finance in 1999, it was at the latter summit that the basis was laid for the establishment of the G20 proper.

In addition to the G20, there is the little known D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation (Developing-8), comprising Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey (see D8 2017; no GIGA OPAC hit). This international group of Islamic states (of different kinds) was established in June 1997 to improve member states’ position in the global economy, diversify and create new opportunities in trade relations, enhance participation in decision-making at the international level, and improve standards of living. The D8 has held eight summits since its inception and its secretariat is based in Istanbul, Turkey.

Finally, and very close to the BRICS, there is the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum, comprising India, Brazil, and South Africa. Established in Brazil in June 2003, IBSA is a tripartite platform for policy dialogue and a coordination mechanism among the three countries (see IBSA 2017). Regular summits were held in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, and 2011. In parallel, the member countries’ foreign ministers have met seven times between 2004 and 2011. The 2013 IBSA Dialogue Forum was cancelled, and the next one originally planned for 2017 has been moved again. In contrast to the BRICS, IBSA is considered to be politically more coherent, for instance when it comes to the convergence of positions at the UN General Assembly or Security Council (though with only 28 hits in the GIGA OPAC; see Stuenkel 2014; Husar 2016; da Silva et al. 2016). Among the issues IBSA seeks to tackle in terms of foreign policy coordination and harmonization are reforming the UN; non-proliferation, disarmament, and arms control; as well as international trade and investment. IBSA has launched a special facility to address hunger and poverty alleviation (though it is only supported by USD 1 million per member per year).

Conclusions

This chapter discussed the discursive making and subsequent activities of a group of post-colonial states known as BRICs, and later BRICS. Although many open questions remain – for instance, on the interests of the BRICS as a group and also those of their respective constitutive elements – their very presence alone has, and will continue to, contribute to the imagined and
real respacing of global governance. The discourse on the BRICS has constituted identities and interests, and added one spatial format to the ongoing debate about the emerging post-Cold War world order.

The public imaginary in the Global North is driven by insecurity, sometimes even outright fear: ‘Othering’ the BRICS corresponds with worries about the ‘decline of the West’. Through the discursive authority of graphs, tables, and maps in Western media, the BRICS grouping has become a powerful mindset. Over and above, empirically the grouping is a good example of the failure of premature Western ideas about a universalizing, homogenizing globalization after the end of the Cold War.

The study of this condition lies at the intersection of international relations/international studies and area studies. The former allows for insights into changing global power and governance constellations, whereas the latter produces knowledge about the concrete interactions between single BRICS members and respective world regions. Thus, transregional studies offers a perspective to translate between the two approaches, to bridge the gaps existing between knowledge orders, and to reframe some of the questions one might have on the global order, emerging powers, and shifting hierarchies between the old Global North and the new Global South. The emergence of the BRICS at least demonstrates that there is a transregional ontology that calls for a new epistemology.

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Framing ‘global challenges’

Nowadays, severe problems of mankind are often referred to as ‘global challenges’. First, this is not to say that problems of a transregional, or even global, dimension did not exist before. For instance, infectious diseases and epidemics such as the plague in the sixth century, and again in the fourteenth century, or the Spanish flu pandemic in 1918/19 had already affected large parts of the world long before the concern and resulting discussion about global challenges were introduced. The same certainly holds true for hunger, war, and extreme weather conditions. However, it is only since the publication of the first report of the Club of Rome on ‘The Limits to Growth’ in 1972 (Meadows et al. 1972) that an imagined ‘global’ has become the main point of reference for framing these problems. Second, the very notion of global challenges represents a form of Orwellian newspeak – a controlled language, a euphemism that carries at least two messages: first, that these problems really concern everyone and not simply a specific part of mankind, or one particular world region; and, second, that in spite of the severe nature of the problem at hand, certain institutions can deal with it, manage the ‘challenges’, and create ‘sustainable’ solutions.

What is the scope of global challenges? Obviously because of the constructed nature of global challenges there is no objective answer to this question (on framing ‘the global’, see Kahn 2014). A strong image in this regard has been created by the United Nations (UN) debate on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The UN Millennium Summit of September 2000 addressed the following eight issues: extreme poverty and hunger; lack of widespread primary education; gender inequality and disempowerment of women; child mortality; maternal ill-health; HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; environmental degradation; as well as global inequality (UN 2017). The revised Sustainable Development Agenda (SDG), which was adopted in September 2015, added to these global challenges, among others, the fields of energy, labour, health, water, infrastructure, climate, justice, etc. (UNDP 2017). In the recent editorial to the first issue of a new journal called Global Challenges (published by John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ), the editors claim that ‘[c]limate change, energy, poverty and security, health security and disease, food and nutrition security, and ensuring safe access to water and sanitation are some of humanity’s major challenges’ (Hutton et al. 2017: 3). In fact, discursively framing and intellectually handling global challenges has become a competitive economic
market in which many players are trying to sell their visions of global change in order to gain legitimacy as well as symbolic or financial capital. The Global Challenges Foundation’s annual ‘Global Catastrophic Risks’ report is a good example of this trend (GCF 2017).

The framing of a certain problem as a global challenge takes powerful and resourceful discourse (or norm) entrepreneurs with organizational platforms (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In this chapter, it is argued that these discourse entrepreneurs have risen disproportionately since the early 1970s – in response to a critical juncture of globalization during which the dominant spatialization of global entanglements was called into question and started to be renegotiated (on the concept, see Engel and Middell 2005). Apart from the Club of Rome’s initial report, this first period of framing global challenges also included the Brandt Report on international development issues between the Global North and the Global South (ICIDI 1980) as well as the Brundtland Report on global environmental questions, which coined the term ‘sustainable development’ (WCED 1987). The second period of framing global challenges can be observed after the end of the Cold War, which constituted another critical juncture of globalization. In response to major processes of respatializing global affairs, new horizons of global challenges were explored, mainly, but not exclusively, related to security, environmental, and economic issues. These challenges mirrored a growing quest for certainty and self-assurance in uncertain times. And often the description of these challenges was not really global in the manner they were perceived, but rather represented particular worldviews of interested parties in the Global North. Thus, during the first two periods the label ‘global’ was in fact hiding the ‘transregional’ nature of many problems – ironically it is almost the other way around today, when after the withdrawal of the United States (US) from the 2015 Paris climate accord global climate politics by default have to be organized transregionally. This second period somewhat seems to constitute an interregnum before the third period of framing global challenges started around 2000.

While the first period of framing global challenges was linked to the spread of television as a new communication technology available to the middle class in the West, the second period was closely connected to the beginning of public commercial use of the World Wide Web and the Internet (a technology that was invented by the military in the early 1960s). In both cases, however, it should not be overlooked that these did not constitute truly ‘global’ developments, as the still ongoing debate about the digital divide between the North and South and within the Global South clearly demonstrates. Furthermore, the development of global challenges was not only linked to material technologies but also to advances in scientific technologies of forecasting, scenario-building, and modelling different futures, which originated both in the private sector and the intelligence communities (see Varum and Mello 2010). However, the third period of framing global challenges was not related to technological advances but rather to the successful construction of ‘scientific truth’ about certain global challenges. Such ‘truth’ included the threat of terrorism and violent extremism after the attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington, DC, the developmental challenges outlined in the MDGs/SDGs, as well as the objectification of climate change through the Fourth Assessment Report of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007).

Following this brief history of the making of global challenges, the chapter proceeds as follows: in the next section an overview will be given on the different types of discourse entrepreneurs and the kind of resources they are employing to frame global challenges. In the third section an incomplete typology of major global challenges is developed, drawing on archetypal reports of major framing agencies. This is followed by conclusions in which the role of transregional studies in the framing of and dealing with global challenges is discussed.
Discourse entrepreneurs

Institutions with organizational platforms that engage in the framing of global challenges can be both public or private, state and non-state. It needs to be stressed that the framing processes described below are usually not carried out by ‘global’ or ‘universal’ actors (a few exceptions prove the rule), but by place-based actors which reflect power asymmetries and specific interests. There is no space here to go into the details of framing processes based outside the Global North and to explore in greater detail how actors based in the Global South contribute to, or contradict, the framing of global challenges. Suffice to say that Latin American, Asian, or African perspectives on the same issues might differ considerably. But so far, these voices are not as resourceful and powerful as long-established actors in the Global North – though this is rapidly changing with the rise of ‘emerging powers’ from the Global South, in particular the greatly populated China and India (on the BRICS, see Chapter 69 by Engel).

Obviously, the most universal organization – the UN – plays a pivotal role in framing global challenges. This occurs either directly as the United Nations (see above on MDGs and SDGs) or through its many specialized agencies, including the UN Settlements Programme Habitat (which was mandated by the UN in 1978) with a focus on cities and the ‘unprecedented demographic, environmental, economic, social and spatial challenges’ they are facing (UN Habitat 2017); the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 1945), and the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1988), as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1944), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 1945), and many others. The UN Development Programme (UNDP), for instance, frames global problem perceptions through its annual Human Development Reports, which are always geared toward a specific topic using the Human Development Index (HDI) as its core indicator. In the realm of development, economics, and finance, the International Bank on Reconstruction and Development (i.e. the World Bank) does the same through its annual World Development Reports. And with regard to energy, the International Energy Agency (IEA) releases the annual World Energy Outlook. In addition, annual meetings of political groups or clubs, such as the Group of 7 (1975) and the Group of 20 (1999), as well as gatherings of politicians from line ministries such as the Munich Security Conference (MSC, 1963) or the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland (WEF, 1971), have also developed into influential global agenda-setting events.

The 1990s saw the rise to prominence of advocacy groups in the West with their various campaigns on what they considered to be central global challenges. The spectrum of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) goes from environmentalist campaigners such as the New York-based Environmental Defence Fund (EDF, 1967) and Greenpeace (1971) to human rights activists such as Amnesty International (1961), Human Rights Watch (HRW, 1978), and the International Crisis Group (ICG, 1995). Although in most cases their activities date back many years, the 1990s offered them the technological and effective media platforms to run truly transregional campaigns.

In addition, numerous think tanks and policy research institutes are trying to influence a ‘global agenda’ by launching their particular campaigns in various fields. This includes time-honoured institutions such as the US-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1910), which, for instance, promoted notions of conflict prevention (see Engel on ‘early warning’ in Chapter 61 of this handbook), the Brookings Institution (1916), or the British Chatham House (1920). Some of these think tanks in fact have opened branches in other parts of the world, such as Carnegie, which operates from Washington, DC, as well as maintains offices in Beijing, Beirut, Brussels, and Moscow. Global conflict perceptions, for instance, are mainly

Importantly, think tanks are no longer a phenomenon of the Global North as evidenced, for instance, by the activities of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (1961), the China Center for International Economic Exchanges (2009), the Malaysian Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (2010), or the South African Institute of International Affairs (1934), to name but a few. The Global Go To Think Tank Index Report of the University of Pennsylvania’s Lauder Institute lists some 6,500 think tanks worldwide (out of which 1,835 are based in the US and 1,770 in Europe), some autonomous and independent, some affiliated with governments, and others affiliated with universities, political parties, or corporations (McGann 2017).

Those affiliated with finance are closely connected to the activities of global investment banks and management consultants. For instance, the New York-based Goldman Sachs single-handedly created the BRICS (i.e. the group comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa); from initially just being named as potential economic competitors of the G7 countries (O’Neill 2001), in 2009 these states formed their own club (see Engel, Chapter 69 in this handbook). In another field, McKinsey, also headquartered in New York, has developed a vision of a ‘digital globalization’ (McKinsey 2016), and so on. In some cases, private companies directly engage in the framing of the global and its challenges, for instance the German logistic company DHL through its ‘Global Connectedness Index’ (DHL 2016).

Additionally, private philanthropic foundations have started seizing global attention. A case in point is the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (launched in 2000) with its campaigns for global access to healthcare and education.

Another relevant actor in the framing of global challenges are risk and credit agencies, including the ‘Big Three’ Moody’s Investors Service, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch Ratings. To some extent, they are dealing with the analysis of futures similar to reinsurers, such as the Cologne Reinsurance Company (1846), the Swiss Re (1863), and the Munich Re (1880). These well-established companies all share the risk of backing other insurance companies against natural disasters such as earthquakes or hurricanes, and therefore need to generate knowledge about particular global challenges.

Yet another source of generating knowledge on global challenges are national intelligence services, most prominently the Maryland-based US National Intelligence Council (NIC), which, starting in 1996/7, regularly engages in the production of global policy scenarios (see, for instance, NIC 2012, with a focus on possible global trajectories, called megatrends, during the next 15–20 years).

Furthermore, the good old print media remain a powerful engine in constructing global challenges. Think of the way that The Economist (London, since 1843), Time magazine (New York, 1923), or Newsweek (New York, 1933) cover major annual trends (e.g. ‘person of the year’, ‘Time 100’ on the most influential people worldwide, ‘photo of the year’, etc.). In the same vein, certain media celebrities in the US have achieved the status of interpreters or translators of the global and its trends, for instance Fareed Zakaria (Zakaria 2011) or Parag Khanna (Khanna 2016), both of whom have achieved some global outreach beyond the US.

And last, but not least, epistemic communities are heavily contributing to the cognition of global challenges, as also evidenced in this Handbook of Transregional Studies with entries on, for
Global challenges

instance, ‘global inequalities’ and ‘global resource conflicts’. The new journal mentioned in the introduction, *Global Challenges*, is another case in point. And of course, in their attempts to be relevant or visible, academics often provide the scientific justification for global agendas. In doing so, they develop a specific vocabulary, a symbolic language, and related iconography that more often than not follows a discourse of newness that is void of historicity and is transregional rather than global. In this endeavour, researchers are increasingly supported by national funding agencies, such as the British Global Challenges Research Fund (Research Councils UK 2017), which has put up GBP 1.5 billion for five years to support research into the interface of development aid and global challenges. Likewise, there is an increasing academic post-graduate market developing for summer courses or writing competitions on global challenges. Almost half of the think tanks in North America and Europe referred to above are, in fact, affiliated with universities (McGann 2017).

Some major global challenges

In the following, major global challenges as identified by central framing agencies are listed in four, partly overlapping, fields: development, economy, and finance; peace and security; environment; and humanity. Again, the list of items cannot be comprehensive, and it is meant to be illustrative rather than analytical.

Development, economy, and finance

According to the World Bank’s last 20 World Development Reports, the following issues have been identified as global economic challenges for the so-called developing world (World Bank 2017): knowledge for development (1998–9); the growing economic and political power of cities, provinces, and other subnational entities (1999–2000); poverty (2000–1); weak financial institutions (2002); better policies and institutions (2003); affordable, better quality services in health, education, water, sanitation, and electricity (2004); policy risks, costs, and barriers to competition facing firms (2005); inequality of opportunity, both within and among nations (2006); better education, healthcare, and job training for their record number of young people between the ages of 12 and 24 years of age (2007); agriculture (2008); reshaping economic geography (2009); development and climate change (2010); the nexus between conflict, security, and development (2011); gender equality and development (2012); job creation (2013); risk management and poverty reduction (2014); human behaviour and development interventions (2015); the Internet’s potential impact on economic growth, on equity, and on the efficiency of public service provision (2016); governance and the law (2017); and upcoming education (2018). On the one hand, this wide spectrum reflects an institutional need to come up with one clear-cut issue every year, but on the other, it also represents a spectrum of real problems.

In addition, the IMF in its annual survey Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) examines related trends and risks (IMF 2017). Against the backdrop of the ongoing global financial crisis, these include ‘elevated political and policy uncertainty’, ‘a shift toward protectionism in advanced economies’, domestic imbalances in so-called emerging market economies, and incomplete oversight of the financial system (GFSR 2017). Previous reports have highlighted, among others, ‘the link between corporate governance, investor protection, and financial stability in emerging market economies’ (GFSR 2016), the ‘potential risks stemming from the financial management industry’ (GFSR 2015), and the risks of ‘prolonged monetary ease’ and increasing ‘shadow banking’ (GFSR 2014).
Peace and security

Academically, the changing nature of violent conflict after the end of the Cold War 1989–90 has either been framed as a coming ‘clash of civilizations’ mainly between religious groups (Huntington 1996) or ‘new wars’ between ethnic identity groups (Kaldor 1999). None of these predictions have fully materialized. A comprehensive overview on ongoing conflicts worldwide as well as UN peace-keeping missions – with a strong focus on the African continent – is provided by the UN Security Council in its annual reports (UNSC 2017).

Today’s violent conflicts are mainly, but not exclusively, located in large parts of Africa, the Middle East, Eurasia, and Southeast Asia. They take the form of civil war, interstate war, transnational terrorism, sectarian violence, etc. In recent years, the UN and many regional organizations have identified new peace and security threats, including jihadist terrorism and violent extremism, cybercrime, transnational organized crime (TOC), illicit financial flows, as well as pandemics such as the Ebola viral disease that broke out in West Africa in 2014, etc. (see Chapter 31 by Engel on international organizations in the field of peace and security). In addition, and as demonstrated by the current stand-off between the US and North Korea, the dangers of nuclear proliferation and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) remain a top priority on the global security agenda, that is to say, whereas conventional wars usually have an intraregional or transregional outreach, potential nuclear wars are different.

Environment

The range of global environmental challenges seems ever expanding. The most obvious topic is climate change, that is dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system causing an increase in greenhouse gas emissions, which in turn leads to increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea level. In addition, the European Environment Agency, which is an agency of the European Union, lists, for example, the following issues (EEA 2017): loss of biodiversity; critical pressure on ecosystems; global extraction of natural resources from ecosystems and mines; fragile food, energy, and water systems; as well as overexploitation, degradation, and loss of soils. Further adding to these issues, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP 2017) also looks at the impact of chemicals and waste.

Humanity

Following the analysis that has prompted the United Nations to define 17 SDGs (see UNDP 2017), mankind is also confronted with serious global challenges, inter alia, with regard to:

- **Poverty**: 836 million people live in extreme poverty, and ‘about one in five persons in developing regions live on less than $1.25 per day’.
- **Hunger**: ‘Globally, one in nine people in the world today (795 million) are undernourished’.
- **Energy poverty**: Worldwide, 1.4 billion people have no access to electricity.
- **Child health**: It is estimated that more than six million children a year die before their fifth birthday.
- **HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases**: ‘HIV is the leading cause of death for women of reproductive age worldwide’ and ‘AIDS is now the leading cause of death among adolescents (aged 10–19) in Africa and the second most common cause of death among adolescents globally’.
Global challenges

- **Education**: ‘103 million youth worldwide lack basic literacy skills, and more than 60 per cent of them are women’.
- **Clean water and sanitation**: 663 million people are still without access to improved drinking water sources, ‘at least 1.8 billion people globally use a source of drinking water that is fecally contaminated’, and ‘2.4 billion people lack access to basic sanitation services, such as toilets or latrines’.
- **Cities**: ‘828 million people live in slums today and the number keeps rising’.

All in all, these global challenges are increasingly presented as interwoven and reinforcing each other. There is a nexus between ‘development’ and security, and there is a connection between the way mankind is handling its various economies and environmental developments, despite the fact that they are not truly global, but regional or at best transregional.

**Conclusions**

The way global challenges and their transregional origins are constructed and presented by a variety of public and private discourse entrepreneurs is posing a formidable intellectual challenge. As noted in the editorial to the initial issue of the journal *Global Challenges*:

> We are very aware that, to make measurable progress in the mitigation of global challenges, we need to encourage multidisciplinary conversations between scientific fields and between natural scientists, technologists, social scientists, and those in the humanities, not just act as a venue for broad-casting results and findings. (Hutton et al. 2017: 3f.)

Indeed, it not only takes a multidisciplinary dialogue between the various sciences, but also the active engagement with reflective knowledge from and about different world regions – traditionally areas – to make sense of global challenges confronting mankind and to devise strategies to address them successfully. In this sense, the development of transregional studies marks an important moment in the evolution of science and global knowledge management.

At the same time, the label global challenges disguises the fact that many of the problems discussed here are not really ‘global’, but somewhat ‘regional’ or ‘transregional’. However, globalizing them allows for a better mobilization of political agendas to address these issues. The root causes of the various problems mentioned above are often situated in specific regions of the Global South, though historically caused by unequal relations between the Global North and South. Transregional studies offers an opportunity to identify these causations and discuss their mitigation.

**Select bibliography**


As is well known, ‘globalization’ developed during and after the late 1980s into a central term for the explanation of recent social change. The effect of this development on the academic system was enormous. While the term encroached on at least a dozen disciplines, none of them were able to convincingly claim authorship of a coherent and all-encompassing analysis. The challenge was manifold.

Because globalization was soon after equated with the utopia of a borderless world and governance via international institutions rather than old-fashioned interstate agreements, a whole new geography seemed to be necessary to understand the future (as distinct from the past). As part of this new geography, the question of where ‘globalization’ actually happens gained importance. Even though some claimed that the process was a continuation or replication of earlier modernization processes emanating from the West and more or less naturally expanding into what was called the peripheries of the world-system, other scholars insisted on the emergence of a new world order, including the rise of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the BRICS) and the simultaneous decline of the West after decades of supremacy over larger parts of the world due to industrialization, colonialism, and imperialist expansion.

A similar revisionist view was pronounced on historical narratives beyond the teleology of the nation-state: a new periodization of all of history – with either very long roots of globalization or a clear break between the just started future and all the past – was postulated. Global historians continue to argue about the beginning of current globalization – as opposed to its archaic precedents – but the more fundamental shift concerns globalization as the new criterion for periodization. This challenge to established historical narratives reaches far beyond historiography proper since almost all disciplines are grounded in (implicit or explicit) narratives legitimizing their central categories and theories by referring to its historical emergence.

The fact that globalization was conceived as a planetarian dynamic, which nevertheless plays out in very different ways in specific places, inspired new thinking about the relationship between micro and macro investigations and brought popularity to the term glocalization. However, this also implies that the central term of sociology, namely society, became problematic. Accordingly, it was criticized as an unrealistic container in which old-fashioned social sciences saw everything happening, with interaction across the borders of such imagined – rather than real – entities becoming the focal point.
While in the very beginning globalization was primarily seen as a fundamental change in the economic sphere, soon it became clear that all other social dimensions – from cultural entanglements via transnational spaces as a result of crisscrossing migrations to global infrastructures for new media – were also affected. A long series of propositions were published on how to characterize the new epoch and which developments to emphasize: ranging from network society, hybridization, and a new epoch in the sequence of world-systems to a world of connectivity and the dominance of global cities.

Against this background, the academic world was shattered to some extent. An intense debate started on the future value of area studies. The general consensus that knowledge about far-flung places and societies is becoming more important in an increasingly connected world goes hand in hand with discussions about a crisis of area studies (Appadurai 2000). This crisis had many facets (Harootunian 2002).

The first was the frustration about the failure of area studies specialists in predicting fundamental transformations and events (such as the collapse of the Soviet Union or the terrorist attacks of 9/11), which in turn led to an ongoing debate about the immediate use of area knowledge for the purposes of politics, the military, and intelligence services. This, in some places, resulted in funding cuts rather than expansions for area studies. To put it in other words, the production of area knowledge partly shifted away from academic institutions to those more directly related to the security complex, where funding for all kinds of field manuals, translation, and research activities expanded dramatically.

A second facet of the crisis of area studies concerned the conflict between the focus on a certain area as traditionally developed in area studies, on the one hand, and the need for more knowledge about border-crossing flows, on the other (Sidaway et al. 2016). This led to the unexpected situation that area studies scholars developed at least an ambivalent relationship to the globalization discourse – seeing it as a support for their claims for more resources and recognition and criticizing it as a threat to area-specific knowledge, which was being challenged by a call for more generalized conclusions. Although area studies sees itself as – and still is in many places – a multi- or interdisciplinary conglomerate of expertise from different disciplines, they were confronted with a call for closer integration with the so-called systematic disciplines – mainly meaning the social sciences but in some places also including cultural studies and history. This raised fears about the rise of a new universalism where social sciences without a closer look at area specificities feel responsible for the theoretical conclusions (i.e. ‘nomothetic knowledge’) and where area studies was reduced to the auxiliary function of supplying empirical data and local coloration of the general (i.e. ‘ideographic knowledge’).

The third facet was connected with the debate on area studies as an instrument of the West to order the world and to maintain intellectual supremacy over it. An expanding literature reconstructing the history of area studies as part of colonial and imperial studies illustrates that the study of non-Western regions is not the innocent business that it has sometimes been made out to be. Rather, it has served the specific purpose of training colonial administrators or military officers (Engerman 2007), or more indirectly, although even more efficiently, of serving the aim to order the world and to legitimize Western domination by establishing categories and theories that serve as universal benchmarks for ‘development’. Post-colonial critique went as far as to claim that Europe has to be provincialized (Chakrabarty 2000) and the voices of the supposed ‘subalterns’ had to be recognized as being on an equal footing (Spivak 1999). These intellectual efforts paralleled the growing demand in countries of the Global South for providing original information about the many places these societies were increasingly entangled with. While area studies in the West came under heavy critique and moved into a more self-reflexive mode, new institutions studying world regions from a ‘Southern’ perspective...
Narratives about globalization

have been mushrooming in Asia, Latin America, and Africa (see, e.g., Abrahamsen 2017; Engel et al. 2017).

In combination, these three debates started a development that transformed not only area studies but also its position within academia. In the best case scenario, it has strengthened the ties with other disciplines and brought area studies closer to the centres of research on globalization. In the worst case scenario, it moved area studies into the corner of tearful and defensive claims for maintaining the status quo. Situations differ a lot from country to country, and the criticisms, especially from the humanities, against a possible mainstreaming of regional studies are often more than justified. However, with the talk about globalization, knowledge about the world is increasingly in demand and expertise on areas outside the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development world has become more important for theory building.

In combination, all the above-mentioned trends constitute a substantial challenge to the foundations of many disciplines and more so to the system of disciplines as we know it since the late nineteenth century. This system was developed and institutionalized in Western universities and was then exported to other academic systems. It was influenced by the then prevailing understanding of the global condition, under which knowledge production in general had gained momentum, as underlined by theories on the historical emergence of knowledge societies (Bell 1973; Szöllösi-Janze 2004; Nicolopoulou 2011; Stehr and Meja 2017).

Seeing nationalization as the dominant feature with which Western societies reacted to experiences of globalization throughout those last decades of the nineteenth century was not unrealistic on account of economies developed mainly within national borders and became connected as national economies as a result of the fast-growing world trade. Banks provided the industry and agriculture with the necessary financialization, again to a large extent within national borders. Political participation was organized nationally too. However, this peak time of nationalization was also a period of intense colonialism. It was the nation-state, with its imperial expansionist spaces, that had the greatest impact on knowledge production in all society-related disciplines, including health, psychology, and others. Methodological nationalism, therefore, was closely associated with imperial fantasies about a world of shrinking distances and growing connectedness (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002). The nation was not portrayed as the antithesis of the global but rather as the best way to frame the new challenge emanating from world markets, world politics, and cultural circulation (Conrad 2006). Contrary to what has been said for a very long time, it was not the national lens through which scholars saw the world. Instead, it was the combination of nationalist and imperialist world views that influenced the knowledge emerging over the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The double-edged character of this intellectual perception allowed a distinction to be made between disciplines within the wider spectrum of social sciences and humanities. One group of disciplines dealt with the West, placing nation-building as well as social and cultural cohesion of such nationalized societies, including competition between states and national economies, at the centre of their analysis. Another group was concerned with the ‘discovery’ and description of the non-Western world, which was treated as an object of global forces (i.e. forces represented by the West), following the logics of supposedly pre-modern structures (e.g. ethnicity, pre-industrial modes of production, a non-capitalist understanding of property, the absence of ‘rationality’, and so on). This dual knowledge order was not set in stone; however, it at least acted as the bricks of university buildings that institutionally separated disciplines from each other (McClellan and Dorn 1999).

As a marker of the stress the expanding globalization discourse put on this edifice at the end of the twentieth century, a growing number of dissident movements from within the disciplines to their peripheries and even beyond can be observed, so that new disciplinary configurations such as new political geography, migration studies, transnational and global history, and so
forth gain prominence. The metaphor of cutting-edge knowledge at new frontiers has fascinated more and more scholars and has also raised expectations in society about new insights on the horizon (Wallerstein 1996; McCook 2013). In the following, I will focus on international studies and global studies and ask to what extent the two have helped the field of transregional studies to come into existence.

International studies have a long institutional history within the realm of political science and international relations (IR), with first chairs already established following the First World War. It became a distinct field in its own right as a reaction to post-Cold War politics in the 1990s (Engel 2018). Its institutionalization, especially in the USA, goes back to the split from IR in the 1950s, when a professional organization with annual meetings was also founded. International studies has attracted social science-oriented scholars from North American area studies institutions mainly since the 1970s, a time when the dissatisfaction with the strong focus of political science on the USA grew rapidly and the need to bridge the gap between studies of the West and the rest of the world – represented by area studies – was increasingly considered a necessity. A new terminology of ‘trans’ and ‘inter’ came to the fore, culminating in a critique of the ‘territorial trap’ of IR research (Agnew 1994). With the global change unfolding in the 1990s, new journals were launched within the field, which, however, claimed that it would be a persisting task to ‘deparochialize international studies’ (Miller 2000: XV), and it was only in this period that international studies associations developed outside the United States.

In an often quoted presidential address that somehow summarizes a series of discussions held within international studies, Amitav Acharya (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization chair in ‘Transnational Challenges and Governance’ at the American University in Washington, DC) developed the agenda of new international studies as opposed to old-fashioned and no-longer-sufficient IR. First, with a call for ‘a pluralistic universalism’, he addressed several issues simultaneously, namely multiperspectivity, the influence of postcolonial theories, and the recognition of ‘the diversity that exists in our world’ to be balanced with the search for a common ground to resolve conflicts. Second, he was openly critical of the ahistoricity of IR as practised in universities in the United States, and he expressed the idea that there was a world order before the so-called Westphalian system of sovereign states forming an international system and that there will be one after the world order as imagined by political scientists in the twentieth century. Third, and related to the former point, he rejected the focus on the nation-state as the only valid entity of investigation and called for attention to be paid to regionalism and regional developments as an example of other spatial formats to be integrated into the analysis (Acharya 2014). This was at least a partial answer to the challenges mentioned above, jointly connected with the ambition to form a new all-encompassing narrative that would put politics at the centre but that would remain open to relating to other societal dimensions. Approaching the prospering field of global history (Bentley 2011; Middell and Roura 2013; Conrad 2016) was as innovative as the offer to area studies specialists to take their concern of the Eurocentric trap seriously. International studies, as well as global history, remained bound to the parent disciplines and tried to transform them fundamentally. In doing so, some of their main proponents built strong coalitions with new political geography (as presented in Chapter 67, this volume, by Agnew). This new thinking on processes of spatialization received the necessary attention from these intellectual alliances to transform the central categories of political sciences, especially its state-centredness and methodological nationalism, which had become major obstacles for any conversation with the new trends in pluridisciplinary research on globalization.

In contrast, global studies has a much less illustrious history to offer. The first programmes only emerged in the late 1990s. The term itself reflects the already established globalization
discourse of that time. While some institutions using the label of global studies interchangeably with international studies have a background in political science/IR, the original inspiration for global studies comes from sociology, namely sociology of religious movements. An approach that asked for the increasing relevance of religion and religious communities around the world understandably gained momentum in the early 2000s, when the ‘war on terror’ brought to the attention of a broader audience the supposedly religious motivations of opponents fighting against Western dominance under the global condition. Obviously, global conflicts were not only, or even primarily, related to the competition of governing elites, but the ‘new wars . . . in a global era’ (Kaldor 2001) were fought by many non-state actors. Sociologists have described the new role of religion in seemingly secularized societies as one of the many new trends that came with the border-crossing formation of social groups and identities, with the emergence of transnational spaces and increasing mobility. They became interested in the effects of a capitalism, whose central features have changed in the course of outsourcing manufacture from previously industrial centres, empowering transnational business elites that manage worldwide value chains and providing a new role for financial institutions as opposed to classical industrial policy. Other sociologists were particularly fascinated with the new possibilities of media that easily connect 24/7 the different continents and produce the global village Marshall McLuhan had already envisioned back in 1962 with his book *The Gutenberg Galaxy*. In contrast to the discussion about a changing political world order, the sociological interest was on new societal configurations produced by globalization.

Not long after, however, global studies surpassed this direct link it had with sociology. Institutionally, it merged either with international studies and/or people coming from area studies. This is particularly true for countries where area studies was exposed to the discussion about a looming crisis of their field without stable departmental structures. This might explain why in the USA, as well as in China, global studies took advantage of the mentioned crisis of area studies, resulting in the establishment of global studies departments and programmes, which brought together experts of very different world regions but not necessarily under a common umbrella of methods and theories. In contrast, in Europe area studies was protected by the walls of stronger institutional structures dating back mostly to the late nineteenth century, so that global studies was either the product of a simple relabelling of former social science programmes or an interdisciplinary cooperation between different departments, including history, sociology, international studies, cultural studies, and various area studies.

These different pathways of institutionalization have had an effect on the attention and scrutiny of global studies toward the optimistic view on the world-changing character of globalization and the growing criticism it provoked around the early 2000s. Whereas such critique came first from the political left, which was looking for an alter-globalization, in the 2010s a right-wing populist resistance to neo-liberal globalization gained much more attention. This again has transformed the context for the debate about globalization. Globalization was no longer taken for granted as a quasi-natural process driven by all-mighty market forces overcoming all political resistance and attempts for political regulation. The historical comparison to earlier periods of intense or declining global processes was soon within reach. The major consequence of this shift resulted in an interpretation of globalization as a dialectic of de- and reterritorialization, which, without being reduced to the many forms of global flows, includes the many efforts to control, channel, redirect, regulate, tame, and stop such flows. Two trends went hand in hand here. To understand the historicity of globalization, it was necessary to understand the changing role of historically specific spatial references in social communication and of spatial framings for social interaction. Territorialization has longer historical roots; still, modern territory – with its border and the exercise of control over the land within and the people living
on it – is obviously not only a latecomer in history but has been challenged again by border-crossing mobilities. Notwithstanding, neither has territorialization ever achieved a complete halt to all transnational flows – on the contrary, it was historically hand in hand with the so-called first wave of globalization – nor have the growing mobilities of the more recent times ever completely replaced territory and the resulting (claims for) sovereignty. When qualifying globalization as such, a dialectic of de- and reterritorialization, which concerns all dimensions of social interaction from politics to economics and culture, global studies turns toward the different ways of finding a balance between the two trends. Such a balance does not emerge out of structural conditions only. It is also the product of political decision negotiated within societies and between actors living in different societies. In order to make the difference visible to a rather structuralist understanding of globalization as a quasi-natural process, some authors prefer to speak of globalizations in the plural and others do so in speaking of globalization projects (Osterhammel 2011).

Even though in the first years of globalization research the trend toward homogeneity was probably overestimated, the focus shifted to the enormous plurality of reactions to global flows, assuming that such a plurality was politically possible. This was closely associated with an emphasis on a multipolar world, as opposed to a world dominated by only one remaining super power that came to the fore after the partial failure of the United States in the Middle East and former President Obama’s insight that the capacities of the mightiest army in the world were limited to only engage with a very small number of parallel conflicts. But the term globalization projects does not apply to powerful states only. We can push the argument further since there are projects of globalization pursued by different (groups) of actors, some of them organized as state elites and others as companies, religious communities, civil society representatives, and so on. Globalization, in that perspective, is the result of their interacting, competing, and complementing efforts to deal with the various mobilities that cross borders of all kind. Global studies so far has only started to systematically investigate these processes and their outcome; nevertheless, it is clear that the new field has to mobilize knowledge and methods from various disciplines to accomplish this task.

The idea that the global is simply another scale came under critique as well. There are, of course, global challenges (see Chapter 70 by Engel), especially when it comes to climate change that, however, affects different world regions in different ways. But for most of the things that are characterized as global – often without further empirical scrutiny – we can assume that it is the product of such globalization projects establishing their own spatiality. Most multinational companies are transcending a series of borders but are not global in the proper sense of the word. Their management quite often remains the product of specific socializations at a few flagship institutions of higher education that might use the designation global in their advertisement but are probably less representative of the globe than would be assumed. The same holds true for cultural features. Certain forms of music or films coming from the most powerful studies are often presented as global. The growth of a seemingly global audience, however, is accompanied by a strong insistence on cultural specificities. Together, these reactions lead to a fragmented world of cultural perceptions rather than to homogenization. Spatiality does not mean a trend toward convergence alone. Likewise, it does not mean territory only but also includes non-territorial spatial formats.

It is here that transregional studies enters the game since globalization projects most often concern spaces other than simply the planet as such. As developed already in the introduction to this handbook, the term ‘region’, within the concept transregional, has the advantage of possessing a certain vagueness that refers to a relative (in)stability of the addressed space in time and size. Regions might have a life longer than century-old empires and can be referred
to as a sort of natural environment – while, in fact, being man-made cultural landscapes of a certain durability – but in many other cases regions are very visible products of rather short-term changes. Regions are not only or primarily political entities; the term applies to all kinds of social interaction on space of a minimal size (larger than place). Therefore, it can be used to address regionalist efforts (Börzel and Risse 2016) that target not only continents or larger parts of them with their efforts to integrate politically, socially, and economically (sometimes even culturally), but also economic regions networking via commodity chains over long distances. As Babones argues in this handbook (see Chapter 66), regions are the core units in the current capitalist world-system because they provide the main integration of investment, production, and consumption while the ties between them gain strength as well as importance. The study of both political regionalisms and economic macro-regions deals with regions larger than states; however, we know from research on special economic zones or transnational spaces used by migrants that such regions can also be of smaller size and yet have enormous impacts on global processes or act as their functional cornerstones.

Therefore, transregional studies not only has a growing importance when it comes to the transcendence and transformation of regions that had been separately studied in area studies, but it also helps global studies to overcome an essentialization of what is referred to as global, though it is more often limited in its spatial reach. This allows for a much more specific investigation to be undertaken of the dialectics between flows and control that characterize the different globalization projects. What has so far been called global studies – and rightly so as it had the ambition to define what was and is new with the global – will be in the future probably more and more based upon the investigation of transregional ties and interactions.

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