Conviviality in Burgaz

Living, Loving and Fighting on a Diverse Island of Istanbul

Deniz N. Duru

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For my children, Antonio Derin and Elena Peri

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About the Author

Deniz Neriman Duru grew up in Istanbul, where she went to Notre Dame de Sion French middle school, and American Robert College. She moved to the UK to undertake her BA degree in Social Anthropology at the SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies), University of London. Upon finishing her degree with first class honours, she started her DPhil/PhD studies in Anthropology at the University of Sussex, where she also taught anthropology courses to undergraduate students. She worked as a postdoctoral researcher in EU-funded projects at the Sociology Department, University of York (UK), and Media, Cognition and Communication Department, University of Copenhagen. Her research interests include conviviality, multiculturalism, diversity, social media, media anthropology, anthropology of Turkey, and migrants and refugees in Europe. She has published book chapters and journal articles in *South European Society and Politics*, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* and the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. Currently, she is a senior lecturer at the Communication and Media Department, Lund University, where she teaches courses on digital ethnography, digital research methods, media and diversity, public opinion building, media content analysis and qualitative methods at undergraduate and graduate levels, and supervises PhD and master's students.

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CHAPTER 1

Introducing Conviviality: *Ebru*-Like Living in Burgaz

Introduction

> "Anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists should come here and see how people can live in friendship and harmony. It is an example to the whole world." Dr. Robert Schild, Burgaz islander. (Hazar 2005)

This call for a social scientist to come and explore how people live together in Burgaz was uttered in the documentary *Nearby Yet Far Away – the Isle of Burgaz* (Hazar 2005). I heard it while watching the documentary at the open-air cinema of the Sports Club, during my pre-fieldwork trip to Burgazadası in the summer of 2008. In the documentary, Burgazadası is talked about and seen as the model of harmony and coexistence of a plural society. This island is home to Jews, Armenians, *Rums*[1] (Greek Orthodox minority in Turkey), Suryanis, Sunni Muslims, Catholics, Alevis and Kurds, who belong to a variety of different ethnic, class and religious backgrounds. While the Balkans and Turkey have long been pathologised as places of ethnic turmoil (Todorova 1997) and un-mixing of people (Hirschon 2003), peace there did not break down despite Turkification policies (Aktar 2021; Güven 2006; Zürcher 1993), pogroms in 1955, (see Güven 2006; Mills 2010; Kuyucu 2005), the worsening relations between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (Örs 2019; Akgönül 2007; Güven 2006; Papadakis 2005; Bryant and Papadakis 2012; Akar and Demir 1994). How did, and how do Burgaz people from different backgrounds live together? How do they

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manage tensions? What makes them bond with each other? How can we describe, explain and conceptualise this?

During my fieldwork, I was struck by the fact that some Burgaz islanders described their diversity as *ebru* (marbling in Turkish; see Fig. 1.1). *Ebru*-like living was contrasted with living like a mosaic (Fig. 1.2), where the tiles, representing many different ethnic and religious groups, live side by side and have distinct borders and hence can fall out of the mosaic. While making a mosaic, you stick together the tiles with a kind of glue, with the hope that it holds them together. In *ebru*, the boundaries of patterns are fused into each other and hence, while you can see their distinctiveness and differences, they are tightly bound to each other and are not prone to separation, nor destruction. While making *ebru*, you throw the colours on the water and with the help of different brushes, you fuse the patterns together, by mingling them without mixing the patterns or melting them together. You, then, put a paper on the water and pull it out, where the picture stays solidly on the paper.

Before my fieldwork, I had read about multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism and coexistence in order to comprehend how people conceptualised diversity and living with difference but there was something different in the ways in which the islanders described and lived like *ebru*. I conducted 14 months of fieldwork between July 2009 and September 2010, trying to understand what is *ebru*-like living and how it is different to living side by side, or living with difference. My exploration of "living togetherness" in my long-term ethnographic and longitudinal research, and analytical journey of 15 years (2008–23) led me to write this book on *conviviality*, a joint-shared life of living, loving and fighting on an island that belongs to a small archipelago, called the Princes' Islands of Istanbul.

In the last decade, there has been a growing interest to explore conviviality, coexistence and pluralism especially in Europe. Academic journal articles and Special Issues on conviviality (Erickson 2011; Marsden and Reeves 2019; Nowicka and Vertovec 2014; Padilla et al. 2015; Wise and Noble 2016) and ethnographic works covering many regions in the form of edited volumes on coexistence (Bryant 2016; Hayden et al. 2016; Albera and Couroucli 2012) and conviviality (Hemer et al. 2020) have emerged; however not in the form of an ethnographic monograph. This field needs in-depth ethnographic and longitudinal analysis in order to give a holistic and contextualised account of how conviviality is practised and sustained during times of political crises. This book aims to satisfy this need by situating conviviality in a historical, political and socio-economic



Fig. 1.1 *Ebru*—marbling (The *ebru* is made by my brother, Can Duru, who gave his consent for it to be published in this book)

context (homogenising Turkey); explores how memory shapes current conviviality; the complex impact of class difference in everyday interactions and the relationship between conviviality, coexistence/toleration and intolerance.

Fig. 1.2 Destroyed mosaic in Agia Sophia (photo taken by the author)

In this ethnography, I narrate stories of conviviality, solidarity and management of conflicts and tension on Burgaz, which is home to more than twenty ethnic and religious groups, who come from different socio-economic backgrounds. The main contribution of the book is the anthropological analysis of pluralism as the embodiment of diversity through shared experiences of sensory diversity to the recently emerging studies of conviviality and to media, communication and cultural studies. Islanders attend each other's religious places, feasts, parties and funerals; experience the island with their senses, while swimming and fishing in the sea, smelling and touching the mimosas, eating the berries and the green bitter plums of the trees, watching the sunset and the sunrise; they also fight with each other about who gossiped about whom, or who beats the carpet and lets the dust fall on the neighbour below. All of these pleasures, joys, conflicts and tensions make the islanders feel that it is *their* island, creating a sense of unity and a strong sense of belonging to the island that overrides ethnic, class and religious identities of individuals at times of crisis and

despite political tension in Turkey. At times of crisis and hardship, survival of the community of Burgaz islanders takes priority over individual or group differences.

Studies of conviviality in Southern Europe have presented an alternative to multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism (Erickson 2011; Duru 2013, 2015, 2016; Heil 2014; Nowicka and Vertovec 2014). In difference to the English meaning of conviviality, as having a good time with others, these studies opted for the Spanish word "*convivencia*," as "a joint/shared life," driving from the verb *convivir*, "to live together" (Overing and Passes 2000; Erickson 2011). Conviviality does not mean continuous harmony and peacefulness, but includes tensions, conflicts and disputes (Karner and Parker 2011; Overing and Passes 2000) as a part of sharing space and living together. Many communities in the Balkans, in Anatolia, the Mediterranean, the Levant and in South Asia, have lived, coexisted for centuries, with and without conflict, prior and after the emergence of nation states (see Bowman 2016a, 2016b; Bigelow 2010; Doumanis 2012; Saglam 2022; Turkyilmaz 2009). What can be considered "new" with the concept of conviviality is that in contrast to the passive, non-interference type of coexistence and/or living side by side that implies and embeds toleration; conviviality is performative and active, and people, who engage with it, practise it, perform it and value it (see Bryant 2016).

What is also new with the concept of conviviality is how it is applied in different contexts. In Northern Europe (especially in the UK), Australia and Canada, conviviality came out as a reaction to top-down multiculturalism, a political project that manages diversity (Wise and Velayutham 2009; Wise 2010; Wise and Noble 2016; Nowicka and Vertovec 2014; Neal et al. 2013, 2019; Gilroy 2004). Multicultural policies were criticised, as not reflecting what people actually do in their daily lives and pluralism in multiculturalism was seen as a matter or rights and duties (Zapata-Barrero 2017; Zapata-Barrero 2018) emphasising how people are different from each other rather than by what they have in common. Therefore, attentions turned into "everyday multiculturalism" (Wise and Velayutham 2009), "interculturalism" and intercultural policies which stressed that community cohesion should focus on the bonds among the people, and what they share in common by highlighting a diversity-based common public culture (Zapata-Barrero 2017). "Intercultural conviviality" was used as a framework to describe the ways in which pluralism was practised by individuals in their everyday life (Harris 2016). During this

"convivial turn" (Neal et al. 2013) scholars investigated friendship among people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds to be able to draw out "affective dimensions of social relations" in the ways in which sociability in friendship builds and springs from what people share in common, in difference to living with difference described as sociality across different ethnic and religious divides (Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2016).

However, conviviality as an analytical framework, a joint-shared life across ethnic, religious divides have not been applied to post-Ottoman contexts. For instance, in Greece, Cyprus and Turkey, "coexistence as toleration" have been dominated and overburdened by ethnic and religious differences, where social relations, cohesion and conflict are seen to be affected by these differences and hence put a shadow on the shared ways of living (Bryant 2016). During and after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, following the national building processes based on homogenisation of the nations, "coexistence" referred to the pre-existing categories of ethnicity and religion. Ethnographies explored bi-communal interaction in the neighbourhood, such as between Muslims and Christians in Bosnia, Bulgaria and Greece (Bringa 1995; Georgieva 1999; Lubańska 2007; Demetriou 2005; Huseyinoglu 2018). In Cyprus, coexistence between "Turkish Cypriots" and "Greek Cypriots" was ruptured (Bryant and Papadakis 2012; Bryant 2007; Demetriou 2007) and new forms of coexistence are limited to border crossings to visit left-behind villages, houses, gardens and objects (Navaro-Yashin 2009; Dikomitis 2012); tourism visits for business, shopping and dining (Scott 2012; Dikomitis 2012); and forced political projects of post-conflict resolution (Scott 2012; Bryant 2016).

My use of conviviality derives less from the English and French meanings that connote feasting and celebration, and more from the Spanish *convivencia*, meaning "a shared life." Expanding on this meaning for their own work in Amazonia, Overing and Passes (2000, xiii–xiv emphasis added) remark that conviviality's "features would include peacefulness, high morale and high affectivity, a metaphysics of human and non-human interconnectedness, a stress on kinship, good gifting—sharing, work relations and dialogue, a propensity for the informal and performative as against the formal and institutional, and *an intense ethical and aesthetic valuing of sociable sociality.*" I would like to put emphasis here on the performative aspect of conviviality, as well as the valuing of "sociable sociality." Sociable sociality, or conviviality in the more conventional English sense, is something that, in this definition, is valued enough to be

produced through performances that involve transforming "the violent, angry, ugly capricious forces of the universe into constructive, beautiful knowledge and capacities" (Overing & Passes, 6). Conviviality, then, is both "sociable sociality," and the production and performance of that sociality, which often also involves control of tensions (see Bryant, (see Bryant 2016, 21). In a Karachi apartment building, Ring (2006) shows that the production of the apartment building as a peaceful space is achieved not only through pleasurable moments but also through the management of tension in everyday interaction and exchange.

I criticise multiculturalism as a top-down, political project, which puts more emphasis on living with difference and which tends to undermine shared ways of living. My approach to conviviality shows the reworkings of "everyday multiculturalism, multicultural living"—living with difference—, with the shared ways of living—living together in diversity—, and illustrates that people negotiate and navigate between these two (Chap. 4). I describe conviviality as shared ways of living, the production of everyday life and a sense of place through embodying diversity, enjoying, performing and valuing it (Chap. 5), as well as letting people, who might have different lifestyles to perform and practise daily life the ways in which they would like to (Chaps. 4 and 6). I suggest, then, that conviviality is not only these ways of living, but a particular *valuing* of sociable sociality in the making of place. It is the sort of "everyday coexistence" (Bryant 2016) but here given "an intense ethical and aesthetic valuing" and self-consciously performed. For those who live there, what makes Burgaz a place with which they identify is precisely this form of sociality; to be *Burgazlı* (from Burgaz) is to experience and value this sociality and to invest in its reproduction. That reproduction involves the performance of particular forms of sociality, as well as the management of tensions. Tension, then, is not absent from conviviality, just as it is not absent from what Bryant (2016, 9) describes as the everyday "labour of peace." Rather, the management of tension is also a way of reproducing conviviality in that it performatively demonstrates the value placed on shared ways of life over other differences.

In much of the literature on peace and conflict resolution in the Balkans, Southern Europe and the Middle East, scholars attempt to analyse cultural plurality using the concept of coexistence. This is a coexistence that is being excavated from the ruins of conflict, with the idea that it may shed light on how people could live together again. Examples of such coexistence include that between Israelis and Palestinians; Greek and Turkish

Cypriots; or Serbs, Croats and Bosnians (Abu-Nimer 2001; Anastasiou 2002; Dayton and Kriesberg 2009; Gidron et al. 2002; Phillips 1996; Wallensteen 2007). This is the coexistence that Bryant contrasts with "everyday coexistence" and notes "the legal, political, and discursive forms of coexistence that imply the 'living together' of millets or ethnic groups within the empire or nation" (Bryant 2016, 8).

This book represents a critical engagement with coexistence in the context of Turkey, where the idea of "living together" has been burdened with concepts of "toleration" inherited from the Ottoman past and inscribed in Republican law. Coexistence, with its connotations of different ethnic or religious groups living together, has no equivalent in Turkish. Rather, the most commonly used term to refer to the interaction of such groups is *hoşgörü*, literally "to see well" and usually translated as "tolerance," which is a word that has been applied in the post-Ottoman Turkish context primarily to non-Muslim minorities whose status as minorities was secured by the Treaty of Lausanne. This does not mean that there have not been concepts of everyday coexistence in operation, especially the idea of *komşuluk* (neighbourhoodliness) and the *mahalle* (neighbourhood) (Bryant 2016). However, these ideas of living together have been problematically projected onto the scale of relations between ethnic and/or religious groups, blurring the scale that equates "the existence of certain neighbourhoods where persons of different religions lived side by side, sharing the responsibilities of the *mahalle*, with the 'peaceful' existence of religious and ethnic minorities within the Empire" (Bryant 2016, 17).

To complicate matters further, this discourse of coexistence, with its blurring of scale, furthermore returns to have real impact on actual everyday coexistence in the present. For instance, in the post-Ottoman context, scholars tend to view coexistence as something that belongs to the Ottoman past, a time before conflict based on ethno-religious identities (see Couroucli 2010). Problematically, this literature tends to view the loss of religious minorities as necessarily creating homogenised nations. Couroucli, for instance, claims that with the departure of the non-Muslim *millets*—the Jewish, Armenian and Greek-Orthodox minorities—Turkey has long ago lost its pluralism. Such assumptions, however, rebound to reinforce the idea that minorities are those non-Muslim millets who are the subject of toleration, thus reducing coexistence to a form of hierarchical indulgence. Moreover, this understanding of coexistence, by equating plurality with those differences acknowledged by the *millet* system of the Ottoman Empire, makes it seem as though other forms of difference, such

as Alevis and Kurds in Turkey today, are not significant and do not require the sort of "labour of peace" (Bryant 2016).

Hence, this monograph shifts the emphasis in this study of post-Ottoman plurality from coexistence/toleration to my conceptualisation of conviviality—that is, ways of both *sharing* and *contesting* particular lifestyles in a place through daily interactions and a sense of belonging (Duru 2015, 2016). I refer to coexistence/toleration to emphasise the complex ways in which local discourses of tolerance are fed by and feed into historical and scholarly understandings of coexistence (see Brink-Danan 2011; Kaya 2013; Kaymak 2017; Oran 2013; Mills 2010). And in my analysis of conviviality, "living together" is understood as sharing the same space and socio-economic resources, and a process that involves both cohesion and tension. The book does not only explore personal disagreements and conflicts but also frictions that are structurally and historically rooted, such as the divisions between seasonal and permanent residents, employee–employer relationships and the interplay between the social capital, income and wealth with differences in ethnicity and religion. While I explore conviviality, its tensions and exclusions due to differences in lifestyle, economic disparities, ideology and class (see also Navaro-Yashin 2006), I also complement it with an analysis of coexistence/toleration, which I understand in the context of Turkey to apply specifically to recognised (former *millets*) and unrecognised minorities (e.g. Alevis and Kurds) who explicitly articulate their identity based on ethnic and religious difference in relation to the Sunni Muslim majority. My study of pluralism in the Turkish context draws attention to the intersection of class with ethnicity and religion (see Smith 2000) through the concepts of coexistence/toleration and conviviality. Throughout the book, I explore three complex impacts of class in everyday interactions: (1) the ways in which belonging to the "same" class creates similar lifestyles and tastes and subsumes ethnic and religious differences; (2) how differences in lifestyle become exacerbated by class difference; and (3) how, nonetheless, class difference and economic mutual dependency may create a sense of belonging to Burgaz, through conviviality. Hard times, tensions as well as sensorial pleasures, produce a sense of place, where the islanders enjoy the shared ways of living in this diverse setting.

While coexistence/toleration places emphasis on the need to share space with persons whom we already presume to be different, conviviality places emphasis on the production of place through shared attitudes and experiences. As I will show, conviviality may be seen as a particular form of

everyday coexistence in which pluralism is self-consciously valued for its own sake. In this context, while memories of coexistence/toleration become a nostalgia for multiculturalism or an irreversible loss of pluralism as a result of nationalist homogenisation (Bryant 2016, 17), memories of conviviality are used to create a sense of belonging to Burgaz. The shared ways of living that create such a sense of belonging to Burgaz include both sweet memories of leisure and also bitter memories of adaptation, hardship, class and lifestyle differences.

Furthermore, the book brings in sensorial anthropology (Feld and Basso 1996; Classen 1997; Chau 2008; Seremetakis 2019; Sutton 2010) to conviviality studies, in the ways in which sensorial pleasures (feeling the breeze, smelling the mimosas, swimming in the sea, getting drunk, liking being exposed to the sun and feeling it on the skin, watching the sunrise) and the performance of conviviality are experienced through sensory diversity (Chau 2008; Duru 2016). Conviviality on the island takes place through embodying the island, embodying the cultural diversity, through shared experiences of sensory diversity, when the islanders feel together the sensory pleasures as well as do hard work, and also perform the labour of peace, by exchanging food, gifts and services (e.g. to help when in need and moral obligations such as attending funerals) (Bryant 2016, 21). Burgaz islanders embody Burgaz through dancing; playing marbles, scrabble and backgammon; eating; walking; and fighting with each other for daily matters. This embodiment and emotions that are shared create a collective sense of belonging and a shared Burgazlı identity. The experience and the self-conscious valuing of diversity makes Burgaz the place that it is and enjoying the cultural and sensorial diversity is what it means to be Burgazlı.

While Back and Sinha (2016) explore tools for conviviality that people use in their individual relationships to fight racism, I explore the mechanisms that enable and sustain conviviality. Furthermore, I investigate not only how conviviality takes place between individuals, in the form of friendships, but also the collective dimension of conviviality, where people bond collectively, have a collective sense of belonging to a place and share a collective identity. I argue that conviviality is the embodiment of diversity through shared experiences as well as living with difference and is a process that involves both cohesion and tension. Conviviality is both sociable sociality where the islanders enjoy each other's company, embody the island and each other's diversity through different senses (sharing food, walking, swimming, fishing, dancing); and a performance of pluralism and labour of peace as conflict solving mechanisms. The mechanisms

that sustain it are shared ways of living and embodiment of diversity, shared memories and an articulation of a shared rhetoric that builds on solidarity and collective island identity that values diversity. The diversity of senses plays great importance in the ways in which the sensorial pleasures, hardship and daily conflicts, while people have fun as well as fight with each other, make people bond to each other, make the island their home. Collective sensorial experiences create emotional bonding among the people. They experience the island through their senses and feel they belong to the island. Acts of solidarity forms a shared rhetoric of what constitutes and takes for one to be a Burgaz islander. Differences are recognised and also appreciated; nonetheless at times of crisis, the sense of belonging, shared memories and rhetoric all weigh more than what separates the islanders; and conviviality acts as a mechanism of resistance and solidarity, where the islanders fight for the survival of the island community.

As a final point, the "convivial turn" has been criticised by several sociologists to have focused on the "fleeting, transient and spontaneous interactions" which happened at some moments (Neal et al. 2013; Nowicka 2020; Lapiņa 2016), and the reduction of conviviality to sociable sociality and amicable relationships, fleeting encounters in urban spaces and hence to have ignored the impacts of racism and inequality (Nowicka 2020; Back and Sinha 2016). This "convivial turn" is in fact not so new. Anthropologists have researched coexistence, intercommunality and conviviality, by conducting more rigorous and complex exploration of living togetherness and intercommunal mixing, its potential and limits. For example, Bigelow (2010), Bowman (2016a) and Ring (2006) explored interactions at private, semi-public and public places by contextualising the socio-economic, historical and political contexts of peaceful coexistence, conflicts and the management of conflicts. Hence, the book contributes to this long tradition in anthropology, by providing a longitudinal perspective of 15 years of research (2008–2023) by assessing the strength and continuity of conviviality, by exploring the islanders' collective resistance and solidarity in hardship and/or at times of crisis. Is conviviality a form of sociable sociality, fleeting encounters and intercultural relations that work when everything seems to be peaceful? What is the relationship between conviviality, solidarity, tolerance and intolerance? Is conviviality ephemeral or temporal and can turn into violence at times of crisis? The findings from Burgaz seek to contribute not only to diverse contexts in small localities, but also to works in cosmopolitan and urban settings in different diverse contexts, in the ways in which conviviality relates to solidarity, coexistence, inequalities, intolerance, racism and nationalism.

Kestane Karasi: Representing Conviviality

After I watched the documentary about Burgaz, I got interested more in how the islanders perceived and represented their diversity. I started reading novels written about Burgaz, as soon as I began my fieldwork. I wanted to understand how the islanders live, what they do, what they think, say, write about Burgaz, which concepts, terms, metaphors they use to articulate their representation of diversity by building on media ethnography (Tufte 2000; Schrøder et al. 2003). Grillo (2007, 981 emphasis added) highlights the importance of "understanding what actually happens 'on the ground', a crucial aspect of which is the subjective dimension, the ideas, models, projects, definitions, discourses etc. that *actors* bring to bear on a situation, sometimes very hesitantly, often seeking to work with (or clarify) concepts that are difficult, opaque, elusive and with multiple contested meanings." Thus, an in-depth, ethnographic exploration of everyday practices of living together in diversity, and exploring how the islanders themselves reflect, represent and conceptualise their conviviality in their media productions (documentaries, novels, memoires) was my response to Grillo's call (2007) for anthropologists to go beyond the normative analysis of multiculturalism and to move away from the philosophical reflections at an abstract or institutional level.

Engin Aktel's novel entitled, *Kestane Karası* (Aktel 2005), depicts life in Burgaz in the 1940s and 1950s. Aktel's grandfather, a Turkish Sunni Muslim, was the head of a district in Thessaloniki and he was assigned to continue his job in Istanbul. He came to Burgaz in 1914, where he was given a house. Engin Aktel, born in 1942, has been living in Burgaz since then. The characters of *Kestane Karası* are based on the people, who lived in Burgaz. He combined his imagination and the island life to tell the story of Burgaz. *Kestane Karası* is the name of the storm. As Burgaz was a "Rum fishermen village," that storm affected the lives of many fishermen and the islanders. In the following, I make a narrative analysis (Hansen and Machin 2013) of this novel to show how a new comer to the island, becomes a Burgazlı. The set of events and how the characters react to these events shed light not only on how the challenges, suspicions, tensions and crisis times are solved, but also on the acts of solidarity and the values of the islanders. Characters in the novel are based on real people, who represent the diversity of Burgaz, which not only is about ethnic and religious differences but includes madness, irratibility, annoyance, physical appearance, funniness, drunkenness and so on.

The novel starts with Stelyo *Reis* (captain), a Rum fisherman, who gets lost while fishing when *Kestane Karası* hits. In the beginning of the novel, a young man, Sami, from Erzincan arrives in Burgaz after the Erzincan earthquake in 1939. As a person who never had any experience of the sea or fishing, he gets fascinated to see the fish that Stelyo caught and displayed in front of *kahve* (coffee shop). Sami starts yelling in front of the fish "alive, alive… fresh these fish" and attracted people to come by, have a look and buy them. Having helped him in this way, Sami walks away without asking for money. Stelyo Reis likes Sami's attitude and employs him to help him fishing and selling fish. They build a father/son like relationship. Sami calls Stelyo Reis' wife Despina "Mama" (mother in *Rumca*). Despina sees Sami as her son, cooks for him and washes his clothes. Despina behaves equally to Elpida her daughter and Sami. Sami and Elpida have feelings of love for each other, but they do not reveal it to each other.

One day in September (1949), Stelyo does not come back from fishing. It is the time of *Kestane Karası*. The whole island tries to find Stelyo in the sea. Stelyo's friends *Topal* (crippled) Ismail, *Arnavut* (Albanian) Muzaffer, *Naylon* (nylon) Mehmet Ali, *Şilep* (ocean carrier) Hasan, *Mülkiyeli* (political science graduate) Muvakkar, *Lüfer* (name of a fish) Mehmet and *Zangoç* (verger) Todori, all gather in Sabri's *kahve* to make a plan. Topal, Zangoç, Sami and Muvakkar go on the sea to search for Stelyo. The others take care of Despina and Elpida. The islanders bring Despina and Elpida to *kahve* to keep company with them while they are waiting. Topal, Zangoç, Sami and Muvakkar search for Stelyo in the storm for days and days and come back to Burgaz with no good news.

After Stelyo's loss, Topal, Zangoç and Muvakkar want to help Despina and Elpida and secretly they gather money from the islanders. However, they know that Despina would not accept the money, so they make a plan. They tell Despina that they will sell Stelyo Reis' old boat and with the money they get, they can buy a new boat so that Sami can go fishing, earn money and take care of Despina and Elpida. After they gather the money, they tell Despina that two people from Istanbul wanted to buy Stelyo's boat. They take Stelyo's boat away and with the money gathered, they get a new boat for Despina, Sami and Elpida.

Elpida talks about her feelings towards Sami to Despina and Despina supports their marriage. Elpida breaks the news to Sami about Despina's approval. Sami becomes worried, because he knows that the Rum community will object this. Elpida offers to convert to Islam but Sami does not want this and they are trying to find out how they can get married

without converting. In the meantime, Muvakkar and Zangoç also feel the love between Elpida and Sami; they want them to get married. However, there were several stories in the novel (as well as in narratives told to me during my fieldwork) about disproving the intermarriage between Rums and Muslims. A Rum lady committed suicide after she fell in love with a Muslim, because the Rum community was against their marriage. Muvakkar and Zangoç do not want this to happen to Elpida and Sami. And something happens … A fire breaks out in the church located at the far north of the island. Sami is the courageous one who saves the priest, *Papaz* Andon, from the church. Sami then becomes a hero. Muvakkar and Zangoç take this opportunity to tell the priest that Elpida and Sami want to get married and the priest approves this. During the Christmas celebration to which all the islanders are invited, *Papaz* Andon announces Elpida and Sami's engagement.

A few weeks later, Sami goes for fishing and does not come back for three days. During these three days, Burgaz islanders express their suspicion towards Sami. Aktel writes that even though Sami had lived in Burgaz for two years, he had not yet become a Burgaz islander. The islanders gossiped that he escaped and that people should not have trusted him. At the end of three days, Sami turns back with three *orkinos* and the rumours come to an end. The islanders look for a nick name for Sami. When you are given a nickname by the islanders, you become an islander, like Topal, Şilep and Naylon. After Sami had caught *orkinos* and proved that he was a proper fisherman, they called him *Banker* (like a banker) which they thought that with the money he will earn from fishing he might have a good life.

Sansar (marten) Nuri is not liked by the islanders because he tries to fish using dynamite and he steals people's lobsters and goods. Like Yuakim, a Rum fisherman, who lost his arm while putting dynamite to a fish nest (where fish live), Sansar also loses his arm. The islanders say that if you go against the sea and nature, sooner or later you will get punished. Sansar had killed a man in his village in the Black Sea region and escaped to Burgaz to survive. The islanders heard the rumour of the blood feud, but they are not sure whether it was true or not until the day two men came to Burgaz to look for Sansar. Even though the islanders do not like Sansar, they still protect him, lie to these two men and send them away. Furthermore, Sansar also harasses Elpida and he gets very angry to hear about Sami getting engaged to Elpida. On Elpida's and Sami's wedding day in July at Paradiso *Gazino*, Sansar comes in with a gun and points it at

Sami, Sami jumps on him and Sansar shoots somewhere else but the bullet hits Despina's leg. Sansar is arrested, and the islanders take Despina to the hospital in Istanbul.

Then a miracle happens. Muvakkar and Sami see Stelyo at the hospital. They cannot believe that Stelyo might be alive and approach the doctor, who tells them that that man was found at the shore and brought to the hospital in Istanbul in September, almost a year ago. Since that time, he was under shock, lost his memory and was not able to talk. When the doctor takes Stelyo to Despina's room, Stelyo's memories come back: he remembers. Sami and Muvakkar take Stelyo and Despina back to Burgaz. The islanders celebrate Stelyo's arrival back to Burgaz in *kahve*. The novel, however, does not have a happy ending. Stelyo realises that he is not as good a fisherman as he had been before. On a day when *Kestane Karası* hits the sea, he gets on his boat and leaves ….

When I read *Kestane Karası* in the beginning of my fieldwork, I felt distant to the life in Burgaz, and did not understand why the islanders were so fond of the novel. This feeling of not being emotionally driven by the novel made me feel like a stranger. For a non-Burgazlı, it is a beautifully written novel about fishing and living on one of the Princes' Islands where the islanders live together, form deep friendships and cooperate at hard times. However, when I read the book again at the end of my PhD thesis, I felt a feeling of warmth. It all made sense to me.

It was a book written for the Burgaz islanders. I could not have understood what it means for a Rum and a Muslim to get married and feel for Sami and Elpida's concerns, if I had not listened to Manos' and Ajda's love story (Chap. 7). Topal, Zangoç, Naylon and Şilep would have stayed as characters in a novel if I had not listened to Orhan's memories (Chap. 5). I would not have sympathised with how Sami felt in order to be accepted by Burgaz islanders, if I had not felt frustrated to meet with the islanders, trying hard to be approved by Burgaz islanders during my fieldwork. After having lived in Burgaz for 14 months, listening to the memories of the islanders, strolling in the streets, sitting in cafes and restaurants, gone to churches, talking for hours and hours, writing and thinking about Burgaz for more than ten years, I have realised that the *adanın tipleri* that Orhan was talking about, the love story between Ajda and Manos, the fun at the *gazinos*, the fish I ate, the trees I passed by, the *kahve* where I sat and watched the islanders play backgammon, the sea in which I swam, were all in *Kestane Karası*.

Kestane Karası is about the representation of Burgaz for Burgaz islanders. It is not about multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism or coexistence of how different ethnic and religious groups live together; it is a book about conviviality, about individuals making the life as it is in Burgaz. The book reflects on the social and cultural values of what it is to be a Burgaz islander. It shows the discouragement of the Rum community for intermarriages, yet it also shows that individuals can negotiate these community boundaries. It gives the message that anyone, regardless of where they come from, can become a Burgaz islander; however, one has to do a lot to become one. It is not enough to spend years. One has to become a part of the island's conviviality and internalise the values of being a Burgaz islander. Sami learnt how to fish, caught *orkinos*, went out in the storm to search for Stelyo, and saved a man from a fire. Only then was he considered a Burgaz islander. Burgaz is not a land of utopia. Even though, Sami was a part of the conviviality, and saved the priest from the fire, he still faced the suspicion from the islanders. The islanders gossip and do not trust and one always has to keep proving oneself. Greedy people who harm nature are excluded, like Yuakim and Sansar, who get "punished" when the dynamite explodes in their hands, while they want to fish more and more.

My understanding of conviviality in Burgaz was similar to Basso's embodied practice and sense of place where the islanders' "relationships to geographical place are most richly lived and surely felt" (Basso 1996, 54). As Basso (1996, 55) points out, people's relationships embedded in place "cannot be known in advanced." This was why, *Kestane Karası* made sense to me *during and after* my ethnographic encounters in Burgaz with the islanders. My fieldwork revealed that people from different backgrounds form relations based on common interests, lifestyles, tastes, and also in order to fight for a common cause (Duru 2013). While the lens of coexistence/toleration searches for cohesion and conflict based on ethnic and religious differences; my take on conviviality explains what people have in common, their shared ways of living and acts of solidarity, and also describes cohesion and conflict, inclusions and exclusions based on tastes, lifestyles, gender, class and ideology. The islanders' conceptualisation of their diversity challenged Taylor's (1992) and Kymlicka's (1995) approaches to recognition of differences as a basis to secure equality and rights, and Joppke and Luke's (1999) description of society in the form of mosaic. As stated by the islanders, the diversity in Burgaz was not only about the identity of different groups. People's ethnicity and religion were recognised, valued and appreciated, but bonding, conviviality, intimacy and solidarity between individuals, and their collective sense of belonging

in Burgaz were equally important. Similar to Valluvan (2016, 218), the islanders were able "to invoke difference, whilst avoiding communitarian, groupist precepts." Some Burgaz islanders described their diversity as "ebru," by challenging a "mosaic" approach to cultures, which assumes that ethno-religious communities are bounded. This also coincides with Durak's (2006) and Altınay's (2006) suggestion to use the *ebru* metaphor instead of mosaic, for anthropologists to criticise essentialist approaches in studying nationalisms, identity and multiculturalism. Hence, my understanding of conviviality builds on Burgaz islanders' use of *ebru* as a metaphor to represent their living together and their diversity.

When I interviewed Engin Aktel in 2009 about his novels, I asked him:

Deniz: In *Kestane Karası*, you describe the life in Burgaz in 1940s and 1950s. In your second novel, *Son Eylül* [Last September], you focus on a specific event, the 6–7 September events. Why?

Aktel: After I retired—I was a journalist—I wanted to write novels about Burgaz. I wanted to narrate how we used to live because life in Burgaz is different today. 6–7 September events were horrible. Istanbul and the other Princes' Islands got destroyed. We had to protect our island. There were only 10 policemen in Burgaz and it was not enough to protect the whole island so the islanders protected the harbours, Indos, the cemetery, the town centre, Kalpazankaya bay and beaches. We managed not to let the attackers set foot in Burgaz. The issues in Cyprus were a pretext for the 6–7 September events and the target was the Rums. The Rums did not lessen in number right after the 6–7 September events, however it was the beginning of an end. As things got worse, the Rums left in big numbers in 1964–68, and in 1974–78.

Deniz: So do you mean that the island life changed because the Rums left?

Aktel: In a way, yes. We used to be *çokkültürlü* [multicultural]. When the Rums left, we lost our *çeşitlilik* [diversity].

Deniz: What do you mean by *çokkültürlü*?

Aktel: *Çokkültürlülük* is *köklü* [rooted] diversity. Multicultural societies *kök salıyorlar* [to root], keep the roots of their different cultures and transmit these differences to different groups in the society and to further generations. For example, the Rum culture, the Jewish culture is in me and you can find the continuation of the Rum culture in people in Burgaz. For instance, Muslims or Jews who grew up with the Rums, learnt *Rumca* while playing with

each other as kids, they know Rum religious days and traditions. Burgaz is more multicultural than Büyükada. Büyükada is *kozmopolit* [cosmopolitan] but Burgaz isn't.

Deniz: What do you mean by saying that Burgaz is more multicultural than Büyükada and not cosmopolitan?

Aktel: Burgaz is not cosmopolitan, because in cosmopolitan societies communities do not leave their impact or transmit their cultures to other groups and to further generations. For example, new migrants, French, Germans and Austrians do not root themselves and integrate their cultures to the society. Cosmopolitan people and communities are distant, more superficial, and temporary, not bonded and are in less contact with each other. Both Burgaz and Büyükada are both very diverse, but people in Burgaz are *kaynaşmış* [blended, commingled, mixed].

When we were talking, Aktel emphasised the continuity of relationships between Burgaz islanders, who left, and those, who stayed in Burgaz. He said: "Just yesterday, I phoned an old friend from Burgaz, who now lives in Athens. We celebrated our 50th anniversary of friendship. Let me tell you, two years ago, Burgazlılar organised a reunion in Athens. 400 Burgazlı turned up. There was no space in the room, not enough chairs. I gave a speech, signed my novels. Now my novels are being translated into Greek and they will be published."

Aktel has a complex and ambiguous view about whether Burgaz is still multicultural today. On the one hand, he says that Burgaz *used to be* multicultural; on the other hand, he says that Burgaz is more multicultural than Büyükada today. His contradiction shows that he acknowledges the departure of the people, mainly Rums from Burgaz. He still associates multiculturality with the *millet* system, stating that diversity lessened in Burgaz when the Rums, people from the Rum *millet* left. However, he uses the dominant discourse of multiculturalism based on the *millet* system to criticise the homogenisation process in Turkey. This is one of the reasons why he wrote one novel about the 6–7 September events, which created discomfort in lives of the non-Muslims.

On the other hand, he also points out that multiculturality is not only about how many people left Burgaz. He draws attention to the fact that multiculturality is about the internalisation and embodiment of different cultures in the self and in the society and that this internalisation cannot be taken away from individuals and societies. The Rum culture is not something exclusive to Rums. It lives in Burgaz islanders and today, the Rum culture continues in

Burgaz not only by the Rums who stayed but by the people who embodied it. Burgaz culture lives in the Rums who now live in Athens. Aktel's perception of intangible heritage echoes that of Alivizatou (2012, 9), in the ways in which "that it is living and taking shape through embodied skills and performance." In his view of multiculturality, communities are integrated with each other and keep intimate relations. In Burgaz, there are intimate relations between individuals, who, then have a strong sense of solidarity and belonging in Burgaz. The diversity in Burgaz includes and appreciates not only the minorities of the *millet* system, where the non-Muslims—Jews, Rums and Armenians—are recognised but also the non-recognised groups such as the Kurds and the Alevis. The characters in *Kestane Karası* show the diversity within *millets*. Sami, like Nuri, Mustafa and many Zaza, Kurdish Alevis from Erzincan also become a Burgazlı through the embodiment of diverse cultures which forms the social life in Burgaz. Throughout the book, I use the double meaning of the term "community" (see Baumann 1996): one refers to an ethno-religious group and their reified identities, including both recognised (such as the Rum community, coming from the *millet* system) and non-recognised minorities (such as the Alevi community); and the second one refers to the island community, where the islanders stress their collective Burgaz identity and fight for the survival of the island community.

Aktel's perception of diversity challenges multiculturalism as a political project, as depicted in Taylor's (1992), Honneth's (2003) and Kymlicka's (1995) works, who put emphasis on the cultural differences and identity of groups. However, according to Aktel, multiculturality is not about the identity of different groups, it is behaviours, shared ways of living together and communal life. A person is recognised as Burgazlı because of being a part of the conviviality in Burgaz. In line with (Örs 2018, 179), who criticises when Rums are depicted "as a vase or a decorative item" in representing the colours of a multicultural rainbow, *Kestane Karası* is not about the Rums or the minorities who appear as symbolic characters, objects or representatives of a multicultural past. As I explore in the next chapters, Orhan, Ajda and Nuri give specific examples from their daily life, moments and anecdotes that they had with their Rum friends. Through their narratives, they make their Rum friends come back to life. Orhan was angry, because his Rum friends left Burgaz. The nostalgia of Burgaz islanders is not an empty and a symbolic one like "a vase or a decorative item." It is about the continuation of internalised and embodied traditions and Burgaz culture, of which Rum culture forms one part. It is about the people in Burgaz, all belonging to different backgrounds, contributing to the diversity of Burgaz with their accents, swear words, jokes, their fatness,

disability, drunkenness, kind-heartedness, tricks and gossip. Burgaz islanders' enthusiasm in preparing the reunion on 24 August 2012, their visits to their friends in Greece and the memoire like novels written by Aktel (2005, 2008) and Berberyan (2010) are ways of keeping connections among Burgaz islanders. In August 2012 reunion in Burgaz, some of Burgaz islanders who left 40–50 years ago returned to Burgaz for the first time since their departure. The story of this reunion is told by Uzunoğlu (2013), in her documentary, *Antigoni, Our Small Island, Our Life*, which I will come back in the following chapters of the book.

Overview of the Book

Chapter 2 gives the historical, geographical, political and socio-economic context of the island and sets out the demographic changes. The chapter documents the Turkification and homogenisation policies during the nation building of Modern Turkey in the ways in which recognised (Rum, Jewish and Armenian) and unrecognised minorities (Kurds and Alevis) were subject to in Turkey and their impact on the changing social landscape of Burgaz. Then, it introduces the reader to the island life, its nature, weather, seasonal population fluctuation and division of labour on the island. I also set out my ethnographic methodology and narrate my entry to the field as an anthropologist.

In Chap. 3, I explore the ways in which the islanders represented/articulated their pluralism by the emic terms, metaphors/allegories they used when we talked about the diversity of the island. Building on media anthropology, media ethnography and cultural studies (see Pertierra 2018; Barker 2012; Lewis 2008; Tufte 2000; Schrøder et al. 2003), I analyse the representation of diversity and conviviality in Burgaz islanders' media productions, conducting expert interviews (Bruun 2016) with the authors of novels and producers of the documentary, and exploring the islanders' reflections on these productions. I then put these emic perceptions in dialogue with etic concepts of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. The diversity of emic terms and concepts give a complex picture of conviviality and hence challenge the literature on multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism and the ways in which the islanders reproduce and challenge the dominant discourse of pluralism that comes from the Ottoman *millet* system.

Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 demonstrate the ways in which conviviality takes place and the mechanisms that sustain it. Chapter 4 explores the negotiation of class differences and its impact on conviviality, by paying attention to the sharing of space. Building on Massey's (2005) "throwntogetherness"

and Lefèbvre's (1991) social use of space and the social division of labour, I explore spatial negotiations, inclusions and exclusions that are drawn by class, ideology, gender, age and socio-economic differences. Chapter 5 illustrates conviviality as the embodiment of diversity through different senses, sociable sociality and shared ways of living. In Chap. 6, I investigate the ways in which the islanders perform pluralism both as sociable sociality and also as doing labour of peace, in the ways in which they control tensions and manage conflicts. Chapter 7 sheds light on the strength of conviviality in Burgaz and explores the dynamics between conviviality, toleration and intolerance by exploring the ways in which Burgaz islanders remember the homogenising Turkification policies (e.g. 1964 expulsion of the Rums with Greek citizenship) and crisis events (1955 pogrom) that impacted their lives. Conviviality in Burgaz acts as a mechanism of resilience and solidarity against public and state violence. At times of crisis, when an individual or the whole island is in danger, the islanders protect each other and collectively show resistance. The islanders use digital and non-digital media to express their memories of conviviality, in critique of Turkish homogenisation policies, to bring back their friends, who had to leave the island. Their memories of the resistance to the pogrom, and different acts of solidarity form a shared rhetoric that gives strength to the continuity of conviviality in Burgaz.

Chapter 8 explores the impact of politics of recognition on conviviality by focusing on two non-recognised groups: The Alevis and the Kurds, in the ways in which they perceived the AKP's democratisation packages and articulated whether or what kind of recognition they wanted. The politics of recognition reinforced a discourse of coexistence where the non-recognised Alevis felt the need to stress their "difference," separate their syncretic religious practices into "Sunni and Alevi components." While Alevis were vocal in discussing politics of recognition by organising panels and memorials, the Kurdish Burgazlı were rather silent.

Chapter 9 is the conclusion. It summarises the main arguments of the book, its contribution and suggestion to studies on diversity and migration, and peace and conflict.

Note

1. The term *Rum* is a Turkish word originating from "Romios" "Roman," referring to the Greek Orthodox subjects originating from the Eastern Roman Empire and Byzantine (see Örs 2006).

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CHAPTER 2

A Diverse Island in a Homogenising Context

Introduction

Burgaz, one of the Princes' Islands, is 30–45 minutes by boat from Istanbul. The geographical location of Burgaz, an island away yet nearby a cosmopolitan city, creates a sense of duality and contrasts between marginality and centrality, temporariness and permanence, winter and summer, escape and "stuckness," freedom and prison for the islanders. Green (2005, 13) draws attention to the fact that the *where* of the place affects the people of that place. What made Pogoni (at the Greek-Albanian border in Epirus) an ambiguous place was not *only* the fact that the place was neither at the border, nor a consequence of its topography, but also the ways in which the relative location of this place created movements, separations, reunions of people which made the place and the people generic. The stories told by these people, whether it concerned their story of moving from one place to another, their contingent identities, or whether this place is at the border, reflected difference yet, similarity. She stated: "In that sense, even the marginality of Pogoni was ambiguous: if the people and place were marginal, it was not the marginality of otherness, of difference, or of distinction; it was more the marginality of being nothing in particular" (Green 2005, 13).

Burgaz is also an ambiguous place, and carries notions of a "marginal hub" (Marsden and Reeves 2019) and of being a small island. The fact that it is a small island, its remoteness, boundedness, smallness and

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connections, the wider socio-economic and political context and its relation with the mainland affect the social dynamics on the island (see Baldacchino 2004; Baldacchino 2006; Baldacchino and Veenendaal 2018; Royle and Brinklow 2018; Skinner 2002; Just 2000). While the fact that Burgaz is an island away from the mainland creates a sense of marginality, the fact that it is connected to the mainland and the other isles by a short boat trip makes this place less marginal and less isolated. For example, the children of the islands go to Heybeliada or Büyükada high schools. There are no ATMs, banks and supermarkets in Burgaz. Burgaz islanders go to Büyükada and Heybeliada to shop for cheaper prices and for their banking needs. This network is also a medium for forming and maintaining friendships across islands. On the other hand, people move back and forth between Istanbul and Burgaz, whether for day trips, for shopping, or for spending a season or two in Burgaz or in Istanbul. This kind of a location, being close to Istanbul, a cosmopolitan city and being separated by it by water, created movements and migrations, which made Burgaz at different times in history, a place of exile, a resort and also a hub of diversity.

This diverse and complex island, a marginal hub, was my field site where I stayed for 14 months from July 2009 until September 2010 and continued my research through short field trips, further semi-structured interviews and analysis of Burgaz islanders' media use and media productions until 2022 in order to explore conviviality. Marginal hubs do not fit into the duality of "urban-rural, mountain-versus lowland, inland versus oceanic, connected versus disconnected, within or beyond the gaze of the central state" (Marsden and Reeves 2019, 774). Burgaz is affected by the wider political situation in Turkey and the neighbouring countries. The islanders feel the political oppression on its non-Muslim communities, and have experienced Turkification policies as "*azınlık, ekaliyet*" (minority) and the anti-Muslim rhetoric in Istanbul and Turkey. Nonetheless, the islanders fight against the national rhetoric that might tend to exclude a particular group, such as non-Muslim minorities or unrecognised Alevis and Kurds.

Burgaz also provides an excellent empirical case study of post-Ottoman conviviality, because the homogenisation process during the nation-building stage of modern Turkey triggered migrations from the island, especially of non-Muslims, yet the island's population retains elements of its Byzantine and Ottoman diversity. In order to understand the historical and political context of this diversity, the homogenization process and how the categorisation of differences were reinscribed during the

transition from the Ottoman Empire to Modern Turkish Republic, in this chapter, I explain the Ottoman Empire's millet system and how the demographics of the island changed following the domestic and foreign policies that oppressed the non-Muslim minorities and the unrecognised Muslims, such as the Alevis and Kurds, in Turkey and on the island. I document the impact of Turkification policies during the building of Modern Turkey and international conflicts between Greece, Cyprus and Turkey on people's everyday life. In Chap. 8, I investigate the AKP's (the ruling party) shifting approach from "democratisation" to intolerance and authoritarianism towards the non-recognised minorities.

The chapter has the following structure: I first describe the island life, its inhabitants, its nature, the seasonal population fluctuations and the division of labour on the island to give a sense of the life in Burgaz. Then, I set the historical and political context of diversity on the island. I end the chapter, by my arrival to the island and describe my methodology and the ethical measures I have taken.

Island Life

Seasonal Population Fluctuations, Class and the Division of Labour

The current population of Burgaz increases from 1500 in the winter to 7000 in the summer. This seasonal change creates complicated dynamics, with economic dependency and tension between the summer residents and permanent inhabitants. The permanent inhabitants run the shops and restaurants, and the summer residents are the customers and sometimes employers, who hire them as cleaners, gardeners, caretakers and so on. The permanent inhabitants, mostly Zaza and Kurdish Alevis as well as Sunni Muslims, have much less work in the winter (between November and April) and thus have less income during that period. In order to earn enough for the whole year and to compensate for the times when they do not earn enough, they raise their prices in the summer. This creates tension between the summer inhabitants, who complain about paying much more for the goods they buy and receiving less for the service they get. These summer inhabitants are wealthy, upper-middle-class business people, artists, journalists, actors, architects and lawyers—Sunni Muslims, Armenians, Jews, Rums,[1] Levantines and Germans—who have been living for generations in Burgaz for three to eight months a year during the

spring/summer season. They usually go to the same foreign schools in Istanbul, they work in similar sectors and hence, they can afford to pay to eat out, or to become members of the social clubs. Sharing the same class creates similarities in lifestyle. In Bourdieu's (1990) terms, they have the social capital and they have similar *habitus*. Their similar lifestyle creates milieu for sociality. Nonetheless, sharing the same class does not only bring joyful times when people eat, drink and laugh together. Belonging to an upper class also creates jealousy and competition, especially within an ethnic and religious group. In the following chapters, I explore the ways in which class plays a significant role in people's social interactions in daily life.

Nature, Weather and the Island Life

Burgaz is more like a small village. You walk on narrow village-type paths. Since no cars are allowed on the island, you are surrounded by sea, green, flowers, trees, berries and animals. Nature is salient for the islanders; it is what makes the island a unique place of living. The nature in Burgaz ties them to the island and when I ask the islanders what Burgaz means to them, they start talking about the nature, the animals and the botany on Burgaz. The nature also forms an important part of the islanders' memories, which I explore in the Chap. 5. When you walk in the streets of Burgaz, you will see many street cats, dogs and sea gulls. Many inhabitants keep the rest of their meals for them. Some will cook extra pasta to give to cats and dogs. Some will buy cat food from shops regularly to feed the street cats. Some will adopt them and have a space in their garden and/or house. You will see people carrying gallons of water to put in big public basins on the street so that dogs, cats and seagulls can drink water during the hot summer days. Some keep a big basin full of water in their garden for animals to drink. You will see a few hedgehogs wandering around the trees. Lots of lizards will run in your garden and on the roads. The mosquitoes are the only creatures that islanders do not like. People watch the migrations of the storks, and from their movement, people understand the beginning and the end of the summer. There is also a myth about the storks; it is believed that storks saluted the saints of Heybeliada. They go to Heybeliada, turn around, rise up and then continue their migratory path. I was also given the scientific explanation by the islanders: At some spots on the earth the air allows the birds to rise up more easily and the

islanders say that Heybeli is one of those spots. They also told me that storks also have their leader and their rules as if they are humans.

Everyone knows each other.[2] Whenever someone moves to Burgaz, sooner or later the islanders learn of the presence of the new comer. While running to catch the boat, shopping at the grocer, going for a stroll, the islanders always see each other and greet each other. Living in a small island creates more milieux for social interaction and intense intimacy (Baldacchino and Veenendaal 2018). However, its small size also creates more tension and more settings for gossip, which is a common situation of small places, like in villages and small islands (see Loizos and Papataxiarchēs 1991; Delaney 2001; Herzfeld 1988; Baldacchino and Veenendaal 2018; Royle and Brinklow 2018). People are always visible. In Burgaz, whenever you go out of your house, you become social, you see many people on the way. If you happen not to see someone and do not greet them back, then that creates tension. Who you walk with and what you do, is always seen by someone. One of my Sunni Turkish summer informants who came less frequently to the island in her 20s because of the lack of privacy, moved back to Burgaz after she got married and had children, in her 30s. She said: "The young people aged between the ages of 18 and 30 leave the island, because they feel they have no privacy. If they flirt with someone, walk alone with a person (from the opposite sex), or kiss someone, it is either your parents, or your parents' friends, the grocer or the neighbours, who would see this and tell everyone." The islanders gossip and also complain about how much gossip is going on the island. Another informant of German descent, whose ancestors moved to Burgaz around 150 years ago, during the Ottoman Empire, said, "Gossip becomes rumors, spreads around, grows and comes back to you as a legend in which you are the hero but in which you actually never played."

The nature and the weather on the island affect the social life of the islanders. The weather, especially the wind, has the power to dictate the island life. Ferries do not work when there is strong *lodos* (wind blowing from the south), because the ferries cannot approach the harbours. Ferries also get cancelled when there is a storm, extreme rain or snow. So, the islanders might get stuck on Burgaz, cannot go to their work in the city; and food, newspapers and goods cannot reach Burgaz. For example, on the 2010 New Year, the ferries did not work for three days due to *lodos*. The bread ran out and people baked their own breads in their houses. On the other hand, Burgazians might be stuck in the city or on another Princes' Island. Hence, they always have relatives and friends in Istanbul

and on the other isles with whom to sleep over. Because of this difficulty, Burgazians are very understanding in hosting their guests who are not from Burgaz due to weather conditions as well as missed last ferries. Islanders are always bound by ferry timetables. The first and the last ferry are the markers of when you can leave the island and by when you should be back.

So, for the permanent inhabitants, the disruption of ferries and being away from the mainland turn the island more into a place of stuckness and prison. For example, health becomes an issue. There is a small health centre with one doctor and a nurse and two pharmacies. When women give birth, people have heart attacks or break their bones; they have to reach the main land. Rapid health boats cannot always reach on time. There have also been several fires on Burgaz and other Princes' Islands. Some were due to the *günübirlikçi* (day-trippers) who left glass bottles, cigarettes, or barbeques. Some islanders think that it was a sabotage of people outside of the island, even from the council or the borough to create forest fires in order to build more houses. The fire on Burgaz in October 2003 was traumatic as most of the forest was burnt and many animals died. People become very sad when they remember this event. They cannot walk in the bush anymore and the island looks bare from the ferries. Furthermore, the Princes' Islands are very near the fault line. After the 1999 earthquake, the summer inhabitants, who have both a summer house and a winter house in Istanbul had the option to leave the island. Some of them either sold their houses or stopped renting, and the house prices fell down. However, the permanent inhabitants did not have such a luxury. Health and safety issues make the islanders cooperate at times of crises and situations when people's lives might be in danger.

For the summer inhabitants this rupture in the transport is sometimes perceived as a romantic feeling of being stuck on an island and also as an escape from the hectic life of the city. They enjoy the ferry ride to/from the island, which they much prefer to being stuck in the car in Istanbul for a few hours to get to work. Furthermore, they can always go to the city and spend some days in their winter houses. They enjoy the fact that everyone knows each other on the island. So, they feel like going to their village to feel the cosiness of friendship. However, the permanent inhabitants cannot escape: they are stuck on the island, must bear all the gossip and see the same people over and over again.

Yet, for both the permanent and the summer inhabitants, Burgaz is a place of freedom. One of my informants who has been a summer

inhabitant since birth and who has now been living on the island permanently for several years said that "the island starts when I put my foot on the ferry from Istanbul and the ferry takes me to the place of freedom." The islanders highlight that many diverse groups of different ethnic and religious backgrounds live together on the island, that they all have a worship place for their own religion, and that everyone is free in how they want to live their life. They add that if you are not tolerant and embracive towards differences, the island will not accept you. The collective Burgaz identity is based on embodying and valuing its diversity.

The Historical and the Political Context of Diversity

Byzantine and Ottoman Times and the Millet System

During Byzantine times, the Princes' Islands were inhabited by fishermen and Christian priests (Schild 1999). Later on, the islands were used as prisons for exiled people (Schild 1999; Deleon and Işın 2003). Istanbul and the islands were conquered during Fatih Sultan Mehmet's reign in 1453 (Behramoglu 2010; Deleon and Işın 2003). The Ottoman population was not divided according to the subjects' ethnicity or nationality but into millets: Muslims, Rums, Armenians and Jews. The millet system was a legal–religious functional structure in the empire (Sugar 1977). Even though Islam was seen as superior, every millet was autonomous in its religious and legal practice. According to Karpat (1982, 142), the *millet* system was a constitutional, social and administrative unit based on religious communities. The *millet* system emerged in the mid-fifteenth century, after the conquest of Constantinople by Mehmet II (Karpat 1982, 145). Communities were divided by religion and their religious authorities such as kadis, bishops and rabbis were responsible for their own communities (Mazower 2000, 64). The clergy was powerful and in charge of the church organisation, the schools and the legal and court system as well as church and *vakf* properties (Karpat 1982, 145). Karpat (1982, 143) argues that *millet* system emphasised religious unity and superseded the ethnic and linguistic differences. According to Lewis: "In the Empire, there was a Muslim *millet*, but no Turkish or Arab or Kurdish *millets*; there were Greek and Armenian and Jewish *millets*, but as religious communities, not as ethnic nations" (Lewis 1961, 329). Greeks, Bulgarians,

Serbians, Albanians, Wallachians, Moldavians, Ruthenians, Croatians, Caramanians, Syrians, Melkites Arabs were registered under the Greek *millet*; Armenians, Syrians, Chaldaeans, Copts, Georgians and Abyssinians were registered under the Armenian Millet (Ormanian 1955, 61 cited in Karpat 1982, 146). The Empire did not aim to convert people to Islam (Mazower 2000, 58; Anderson 2008b). However, this tolerance towards different religions was opportunistic and functional. As long as Christians paid their taxes, they were self-governing within their communities (Mazower 2000, 58). There was discrimination between Christians and Muslims. Christians were treated as second-class in comparison with Muslims. As Christians did not perform military service, they paid more taxes. Thus, in order to profit from being Muslim, some Christians and non-believers converted to Islam (Mazower 2000, 57). Nonethelesss, in that period, 80% of the population in Ottoman Europe was Christian (Mazower 2000, 58).

By the seventeenth century, the population of the Princes' Islands was mostly Rum (Deleon and Işın 2003, 149). Likewise, during the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires and in the early years of the Turkish Republic, the majority of Burgaz islanders were *Rum* (Greek Orthodox minority in Turkey). Starting from the period of Westernisation from the nineteenth century onwards, French, British and Ottoman elites used the islands as resorts (Deleon and Işın 2003, 154–155). The Austrian Catholic Chapel and the adjacent residence for nuns and priests were built in 1905 on Burgaz (Tuğlacı 1992, 267–268). Germans, who worked under the Ottoman Empire as gardeners and architects, as well as Askenazi Jews, who migrated from northern and eastern parts of Europe to Ottoman lands, bought property on the island to use as summer resorts.

Emergence of Modern Nation States: Homogenisation, Population Exchange and the Treaty of Lausanne

While the population of Burgaz was getting more diverse, the period between the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century was characterised by the creation of "homogenous" modern nations (Hirschon 2003, 3) through the construction of a unified national identity against external and internal others. As an outcome of the violence between Greeks and Turks during the Turkish War of Independence of 1921–22 in Asia Minor, both countries agreed on the compulsory exchange of populations to bring a cessation of hostility between these "unmixing people" (Hirschon

2003, 4). Ismet Paşa wanted to have a complete population exchange both because, the Great Powers were intervening in Turkish foreign policies in terms of dealing with the minority issues and because this would bring a more homogenous population (Oran 2003, 99). However, he wanted to exclude the Turkish minority of Western Thrace in Greece from the population exchange and instead to ask for a plebiscite in the region (Oran 2003, 100). Similarly, Venizelos wanted Greeks to remain in "Constantinople" as a reminder of the *Megali Idea* and to prevent the need for the *Rum* Patriarchate to be relocated from Istanbul to Greece (Oran 2003, 99). As a compromise between Inönü's and Venizelos' aims, the *Rums* of Bozcaada, Gökçeada and Istanbul (whose total number exceeded 100,000) and the Muslims of Western Thrace (numbered about 124,000) in Greece were excluded from the compulsory exchange of populations (Akgönül 2004; Bahcheli 1990; Oran 2003; Mazower 2000; Hirschon 2003).

The population exchange between Turkey and Greece and the rights of the remaining minorities formed a part of the Treaty of Lausanne. The Pact of Lausanne signed on 30 January 1923 agreed that religion would be the criterion of nationality, so that the Muslims of Greece would count as "Turks" and were sent to Turkey and that the Orthodox of Turkey would count as "Greeks" and be sent to Greece. For instance, in Crete and Macedonia all the Muslims were considered to be "Turks" regardless of their ethnicity or language (Güven 2006, 107). As Cowan (2008) argues, despite the fluidity and the multiplicity of identities of the people, their identities were ethnically and nationally fixed at the moment of deportation. 400,000 Muslim-Turks left Greece and 900,000 Rums left Turkey (Zürcher 1993, 171). However, Greece received a total of 1.2 million refugees after the Asia Minor Catastrophe following the defeat of the Greek army in Izmir in 1922 (Oran 2003, 100). The immigrants of both countries had to leave everything behind (e.g. properties, friends, jobs) and were not welcomed in their new country (Oran 2003). Many of the new comers to Greece spoke Turkish and they were not considered "fully Greek" by the Greeks (Hirschon 1989); they were "Turkish seeds" (Mazower 2005, 360). The population exchange between Turkey and Greece in 1923 was a homogenisation project which had significant consequences for the displaced people as well as for the remaining internal others—the minorities—in these two countries (Keyder 2003). The outcomes of the population exchange were worse than expected (Oran 2003, 101), because it demonstrated that the "other" had to be sent away

(Hirschon 2003, 10) and it reinforced the sense of otherness for the remaining minorities in each nation (Güven 2006, 108).

Thus, the Treaty of Lausanne turned the non-Muslim Ottoman millets—Armenians, Rums and Jews—into recognised minorities in modern Turkey; nevertheless, linguistic and ethnic differences (Kurds, Zazas, Laz) and religious denominations (Alevis) among the Muslims remained unrecognised and were subject to Turkish Sunni Muslim domination (Çarkoğlu and Bilgili 2011). In the Treaty of Lausanne, non-Muslims were given minority status in Turkey and Turkish government agreed to assure the protection of life and liberty of all its citizens, including the minorities (Turlington 1924, 700), while the Muslims in Greece were given a minority status in Greece (Huseyinoglu 2009). Therefore, Rums, Armenians and Jews legally counted as minorities of the Turkish government. This implied that the logic and the bureaucracy of the *millet* system of the Ottoman Empire was incorporated in the Treaty of Lausanne and persisted in recognition of non-Muslims as minorities in the Turkish Republic. The Rum, Armenian and Jewish *millets* of the Ottoman Empire were now the Rum, Armenian and Jewish minorities of the Turkish Republic.

Turkification and Homogenisation Through Domestic and Foreign Policies

Restrictive domestic and foreign policies during the building of the Modern Turkish Republic formed a part of the homogenisation and the Turkification of the nation and impacted both recognised and non-recognised minorities in Turkey. This Turkification, unification and homogenisation was political, legal, economic, cultural and also pedagogical. Inspired by Western European liberalism and following secular and national ideologies, the government was centralised and authoritarian (Zürcher 1993, 176). With Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the first president and Ismet Inönü as the first prime minister, the Republican People's Party (RPP, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP) in Turkish) came into power in 1923 (Zürcher 1993, 174). Both were former members of the CUP, Committee of Union and Progress among the Young Turks (Akdeniz and Göker 2011, 319). For instance, Muslim law was replaced by Swiss, French and Italian law; Arabic script changed to Latin alphabet; Islamic clothes like the fez (for men) and the veil (for women) were banned (Özyürek 2006, 14). These modernist and European reforms formed the foundations of Kemalism, an ideology named after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which

had six principles: nationalism, republicanism, statism, populism, revolutionarism and secularism (Özyürek 2006, 14).

The CHP government implemented policies of "Turkification" which was the process of unifying the Turkish nation by creating a Turkish bourgeois class with a stronger socio-economic power. The Turkish government tried to Turkify the bureaucratic system by following a nationalist approach during industrialisation[3] (Güven 2006); between November, 1922 and March 1923, 110 *Rum* and 21 Armenian enterprises were closed (Güven 2006, 109); people were also encouraged to consume "Turkish products" (Güven 2006, 112); enterprises started to replace non-Muslim employees with Muslim ones[4] (Kuyucu 2005; Aktar 2021). Thus, Jews, Rums and other non-Muslims started to emigrate from 1934 onwards. 9000 Rums emigrated from Turkey in 1934.

Furthermore, Atatürk and Kemalists took on board Ziya Gökalp's "one nation, one education" theory and in 1924 the education system was unified under one code of practice (Kaplan 2006, 41) through unitarian nationalist education policies (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu* in 1924) (see Kaya 2013, 108). To build Sunni–Muslim–Turkish identity, unrecognised Muslim minorities, such as the Kurds were denied education in mother tongue, and places and surnames were Turkified (Kaya 2013, 108). The Latin alphabet started to be used; Persian and Arabic words were taken out of the language and new Turkish words were created from Turkic root words. These changes aimed to break the Ottoman connection and hence strip the language from Persian and Arabic words as well as changing the Arabic alphabet to the Latin one. This Turkification of the language also had further nationalistic consequences. There were campaigns such as "Speak Turkish!"—which aimed to discourage the non-Muslim minorities to speak their native languages such as Rumca, Ladino, Armenian, Arabic in public places such as restaurants and theatres in the 1930s (see Güven 2006; Kuyucu 2005; Aktar 2021). Recognised minority schools did not receive enough financial aid and the number of students lessened day by day (Güven 2006).

Ideologies of secularism and nationalism based on Turkish identity had also sever impacts on the non-Turkish Muslims, namely, the Kurds, Zazas and Alevis, who showed resistance to Turkification, and the centralisation of the state. Bearing in mind that these groups form the majority of the permanent island inhabitants, it is important to understand the complexity and the diversity within the Alevis, Kurds and Zazas in Turkey, and the political oppression they experienced during the building of modern

Turkey in the eastern and southern parts of Turkey, notably, Dersim and Solhan, where most of them originate from.

Zazas, Kurds and Alevis are not three distinct groups separated from each other. For instance, Dinç (2018) draws attention to the multilingual community of Dersim, speaking Turkish, Kurdish and Dersimce (also referred to as Zazaki/Dimilki/Kirmancki). Despite Dersim being a multilingual community, its majority is Alevis. To complicate the matters further, Zazaki is also spoken by the people, who originally come from the regions of Dersim and Solhan, in the eastern part of Anatolia, and they separate into Sunni Zaza Kurds and Alevis Zaza Kurds (Kaya 2011; Efe and Forchtner 2015). About half of the Zazas in eastern Turkey are Sunnis/Shafis, and the other half are Alevis (Kaya 2011, 191). While the region surrounding Dersim's inhabitants are mostly Alevis, those in Solhan and Diyarbekir are Sunni Shafis. These two groups share common Kurdish/Zaza ethnicity and language, however differ greatly by their religions. While the Sunni/Shafi Zaza Kurds follow the orthodox and conservative variant of Islam; Alevis follow the eclectic and syncretic religious practices from Anatolia, synthesizing Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Zoroastrianism and shamanism and support the secular ideology in opposition to the dominance of Sunni Turkish Islam (Kaya 2011, 191). This opposition rooted in ideological and religious difference created antagonisms between Alevi Zaza Kurds and Sunni Zaza Kurds.

One can trace this difference in history, in the 1925 and 1938 rebellions in the Dersim region. The resistances from the Sunni Kurds and Alevi Kurds against the central government were due to different ideologies: the former group fighting against secularism and Turkification, while the later fighting for secularism, and against Turkification and Sunni dominance. Discontented by the abolition of the caliphate and the repression of Kurdish language, Sunni Kurds rebelled in 1925 but were repressed by the government (Zürcher 1993, 178; Anderson 2008b; Ahmad 2002, 75; Efegil 2011, 27–28). This rebellion also referred as Sheyh Said rebellion took place in eastern Anatolia, in the region covering Elazığ, Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, Mardin, and Muş.

Later on, in 1937–38, Alevis in Dersim region resisted the centralisation of government. During the Ottoman times, Dersim used to have an autonomous, feudal mode of self-governance. The Dersim region is made of valleys surrounded by high mountains. Due to its geography, it remained isolated, and hence the inhabitants kept their traditional tribal ways of living (Öz 2008, 130). It was ruled by the sheiks and its economy relied on

plunder (Öz 2008, 131) and there were always conflicts between the region's sheikhs (Öz 2008, 176). During the foundation of the Turkish republic, Dersim's inhabitants did not change the way they lived. The sheiks and the inhabitants were not registered as tax payers and did not pay taxes (Öz 2008, 135–137). In 1935 and 1936, the Turkish government wanted to take control of the region by building hospitals, roads, government buildings, bridges and schools to "modernise and civilise" the region which aimed to "pacify" and "discipline" the peculiar life in the region (Dinç 2021, 56, 2017, 146). This was contradictory to the ways in which the sheikhs lived their lives, which challenged their authority in Dersim (Öz 2008, 176–177). In 1935, Dersim's name was Turkified and became Tunceli (Dinç 2017, 146; Efe and Forchtner 2015, 240). In 1937 and 1938, there were conflicts between the sheikhs and government authorities. The sheikhs that were caught were executed (Öz 2008, 180). The conflicts reached their peak in 1937 and 1938, whereupon the army intervened, and destroyed the villages in Dersim (Öz 2008, 194–195; Anderson 2008b; Dinç 2021); 10,000 people died (Öz 2008, 195).

Kaya (2011, 148) reminds that Alevi Zaza Kurds did not join the Sheyh Said rebellion of the Sunni Kurds in 1925, but rather helped the government in suppressing it. Similarly, in the 1937 Dersim uprising of the Alevi Kurds, the Sunni Kurds helped the government to suppress it. Hence, one can see the ideological opposition between the Alevi Kurds and Sunni Kurds in building on modern Turkey and also among the Alevi Zaza Kurds and Sunni Kurds. It is not only an ideological difference, but also seen in the social life and the interactions between these two groups. The Alevis, who come from Erzincan (near Dersim) and the Sunni/Shafi Kurds who migrated from Muş and Ağrı have different social circles. While Alevis from Zaza, Kurdish, Turkish backgrounds, who migrated in the 1940s onwards from Erzincan to the island, hang out with each other and support secularism; the Sunni/Shafi Kurds, who migrated from Muş and Ağrı in the 1980s onwards, follow more orthodox Islam and rather prefer to hang out with each other and Sunni Turks, who practise Islam. It is more common to see Alevis supporting the Republican Party, some the Communist party, some HDP, while the Sunni/Shafi Kurds tend to support the AKP or HDP.

After having outlined the homogenisation and the Turkification process, I would like to indicate the demographic changes on Burgaz in the first decades of the Republic. As the Rums of Istanbul and the Turks in Western Thrace were excluded from the population exchange, the Rums

of Burgaz (as an island in Istanbul) stayed on the island and were still in majority. However, during this Turkification process, some government jobs became available on Burgaz. Sunni Muslim families moved to Burgaz to take these jobs, such as working as a police officer; and Sunni Muslim elites also bought properties in Burgaz to use as summer resorts. In the 1930s, Sunni Muslim captains from the Black Sea coast of Turkey, mainly from Ordu and Trabzon, settled in Burgaz for employment reasons. In the 1940s, the island started receiving small-scale migration from Anatolia. Some Alevis from Erzincan came to Burgaz to work temporarily in the summers. Therefore, Burgaz which used to be a "Rum fisherman village" started to be a more diverse place for the remaining Rums, the new non-Muslim and Muslim settlers.

Unlike the calm and peaceful life in Burgaz, the 1930s and 1940s were periods of authoritarian rule in Europe (Zürcher 1993, 193). Salazar in Portugal, Franco in Spain, Metaxas in Greece, Mussolini in Italy (Zürcher 1993, 193–194) and Hitler in Germany were among these authoritarian/fascist leaders. Inspired by these authoritarian/fascist regimes, Inönü was more restrictive than Atatürk (Ahmad 2002, 88; Zürcher 1993, 193). During the Second World War, Turkey was suspicious towards not only the minorities but also the foreigners who worked in the country (Akgönül 2007, 108). ID checks were very frequent and the minorities were taken back to do military service even though they had just returned back from it (Akgönül 2007, 109). In 1939, the law that the minorities would be taken to do military service was passed (Akgönül 2007, 99, 406), whereas before that time, they had not been allowed to do military service, or to be in the army. In 1941, non-Muslims were taken in groups to do military service separately from Muslims (Akgönül 2007, 99, 406). The CHP (Republican Party) government of Inönü passed the *Varlık Vergisi* (Wealth Tax) law in 1942 and explained that *Varlık Vergisi* aimed to redistribute the capital that was unequally and unfairly distributed during World War II (Ökte 1951, 15 cited in Güven 2006, 135; Kuyucu 2005, 370). As non-Muslims were well ahead in status, wealth and business; this tax aimed to weaken their position and increase Muslims' wealth. *Dönmes* (non-Muslims, mostly Jews, who had converted to Islam) were supposed to pay double and non-Muslims had to pay ten times more (Güven 2006, 139, 141). If they were late to pay *Varlık Vergisi*, the interest was high, and if they could not pay, they had to go to work camps (see Güven 2006; Kuyucu 2005; Aktar 2021), which counted as military service where they

built roads and government buildings in order to compensate for their unpaid tax. From 1943 onwards, non-Muslims started to sell their property and enterprises. Because of the economic restrictions in Turkey and following the building of Israeli state, in 1948–49, 30,000 Jews emigrated to Israel (Bali 2003, 528 cited in Güven 2006, 146).

Registered in 1946 the Democratic Party started off as a reaction against the policies of the Republican Party (the CHP) (Zürcher 1993, 221). In contrast to the Kemalists, who had military, commercial or bureaucratic backgrounds, the democrats had more modest backgrounds, some without a university education (Zürcher 1993, 231). The democrats appealed to the farmers and peasants who formed the majority of the population (Anderson 2008a; Zürcher 1993, 234); they built new mosques and allowed the opening of religious schools (Zürcher 1993, 224; Anderson 2008a). They encouraged free markets and liberalised the economy (Zürcher 1993, 234).

The minorities of Burgaz also got affected by the treatment of Inönü and Menderes governments. *Varlık Vergisi* of the Inönü government made them lose a significant amount of their economic capital. Nonetheless, the liberalisation of the economy and free markets of the Democratic Party worked in favour of the minorities. For instance, the Jewish community of Istanbul became wealthier and started to rent or buy properties in Burgaz. Furthermore, during the 1940s and 1950s, there were internal migration from eastern villages of Turkey to big cities, like Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir (Keyder 1999; Çelik 2005). The migrants from eastern villages, who came to Istanbul found jobs on the Princes' Islands. Similarly in 1940s and 1950s, Burgaz started to receive migrants from Erzincan, a city in the eastern part of Anatolia. Zaza Alevis from Erzincan worked in Burgaz in summers as menial workers. They helped the Rum fishermen, worked as gardeners for the summer inhabitants, waiters and helpers in restaurants, helped in maintaining and fixing the Rum Orthodox churches and drove horse-carts. For instance, many Alevis worked for the Garipi Monastery in Ay Nikola area in Burgaz. They painted the walls of the church and refurbished different parts of the church and the monastery. The priest at that time allowed the Alevis to construct accommodation places for themselves in Ay Nikola while they were working. Slowly, Alevis made small houses in Ay Nikola, then settled and brought their families. These houses grew bigger and bigger, while more family members moved to Burgaz.

Worsening Greek and Turkish Relations: 6–7 September 1955 Pogrom and 1964 Expulsion of the Rums with Greek Citizenship

According to Güven (2006), in early 1950s Turkey, Greece and NATO maintained good relations. However, due to the Cyprus issues in the mid-1950s, their relations worsened and this had a great impact on the situations of minorities in Turkey and Greece (Güven 2006, 162–163). Greek and Turkish Cypriots, who lived rather in peace, started to see each other as enemies, due to the British propaganda in 1950s (Akar and Demir 1994). In 1955, Greek-Cypriot national activism began. Greek Cypriots and Greece had been supporting *Enosis*, the movement that aimed to free Cyprus from the British rule and to unite it with Greece (Güven 2006; Kuyucu 2005). Inter-communal violence took place between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. When the nationalist organisation EOKA started attacking British officials and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, Britain[5] invited the Turkish and Greek governments to the London conference on 29 August 1955 to solve the problems (Güven 2006, 196). Before the London Conference, Menderes and the media spread the word about a potential massacre against the Turks in Cyprus, thus creating more tension in Turkey, provoking anxiety and hatred. *Rums* were assumed to be on the Greek side (Kuyucu 2005, 376).

On the 6th of September 1955, *Istanbul Ekspres* newspaper, published the news that Atatürk's house and the Turkish embassy in Thessalonica had been bombed (Kuyucu 2005, 361). This triggered riots against non-Muslims in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara. The riots were organised by Menderes government (Mills 2010, 119) but they did not expect the escalated consequences of these riots, in the ways in which they turned into such destruction and vandalism. According to the Istanbul Consulate reports, the riots were initiated by organised groups of people (Istanbul Consulate reports 1955 cited in Güven 2006, 26, 28; Kuyucu 2005, 362). The rumours of riots started to spread before the 6th of September 1955. The non-Muslims were warned by their Muslim neighbours not to go in the town in Istanbul on the 6th of September (Güven 2006, 96). While the attacks were being carried out, the police men were quite passive because they were told not to stop the attacks unless people were in danger of dying (Yassıada court and Istanbul Consulate reports cited in Güven 2006, 33–35; Kuyucu 2005, 362). The bombings in Thessalonica, the organised groups in Istanbul and the discussion of Cyprus at the London Conference combined to mobilise Muslims to exert violence on

non-Muslims in Istanbul. Muslims attacked the stores, houses, places of worship and schools of non-Muslims; and they stole or broke and destroyed anything they found (Güven 2006, 29). Between 11 and 15 people died (Güven 2006, 55).

Menderes (Turkish prime minister at that time) claimed that the attacks were spontaneous (Güven 2006, 14). Later on, he contradicted himself and said that it was planned by the Communists (Güven 2006, 14). Scholars like Dosdoğru and Toprak and the *Tarih ve Toplum* institution accused the government of organising the riots (Kuyucu 2005, 363). During the Yassıada trial, Menderes and his government were alleged to be guilty of the riots[6] and were prosecuted (Kuyucu 2005, 362). Güven states that the Democratic Party (DP) government, MIT (*Milli Istihbarat Servisi*, National Intelligence Organisation), the *Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti* (Cyprus is Turkish Organisation) and the student union organisations were responsible for organising the riots (Güven 2006, xi). Todorova (2004, 4) argues that people are not gullible, passive and open to manipulation of the government, "why do people *hear* the message at a particular time" should be analysed. Similarly, Kuyucu stresses that rather than distinguishing between the state and the public, and blaming the government for causing riots, this should be seen as a result of the economic, social and political context that motivated people at that particular time and as a consequence of the othering process of the minorities during the creation of the nation state of Turkey (Kuyucu 2005, 363).

It could seem that the Democratic Party had a relatively more democratic attitude towards the minorities than the Inönü government. For instance, they ended *Varlık Vergisi* (Güven 2006, 150) and the restrictions on minority schools and education (Güven 2006, 156). However, the disputes over Cyprus brought an end to the DP's tolerance towards minorities (Güven 2006, 162). The September 1955 riots against non-Muslims in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara were an attack on the socioeconomic power of the non-Muslims, which made them feel like others within. The 6–7 September events were mostly a "shock" for the minorities (Akgönül 2007). While these riots took place in different parts of Istanbul (including the Princes' Islands), Ankara and Izmir, Burgaz was not affected. The islanders of Burgaz protected the island from the rioters by not letting them enter the island to cause destructions. Even though no destruction took place in Burgaz, the fact that some of the Burgaz islanders had houses and stores being attacked in Istanbul, and their friends' and

relatives' properties destroyed created anxiety and fear (see Chap. 7 for Burgaz islanders' memories of the pogrom).

In 1957, minorities still voted for the Democratic Party and the DP won the elections again (Akgönül 2007, 211). Akgönül relates the result of the election to the fact that the responsible people for the 6–7 September events were still not known, and thus the DP government had not yet been accused of being responsible for the riots until the Yassıada trials in 1960s (Akgönül 2007, 211). Furthermore, the minorities were still cautious towards the Republican Party because of the Wealth Tax (1942) and the Turkification policies of the Inönü government. The DP had non-Muslim MPs in the government until the 1957 election (Akgönül 2007, 211). Akgönül compares the population census in 1950 and 1960 and points out that the Orthodox population in 1950 was 86,625, and in 1960, 106,612 (Akgönül 2007, 221–223). Although the 6–7 September events did not trigger an immediate emigration of the Rums from Turkey; it was a big crack in the wall and a loss of trust towards the Muslims.

The DP triggered its own failure. On the one hand, the economic developments were done too quickly and were not sustainable: the agricultural growth focused on extending the area of farming and the use of machinery, but was sustained with improved agricultural techniques (Zürcher 1993, 228). With the help of good weather in the early years of the DP, while the harvest was extensive, the bad weather brought again the need for import, such as wheat. The economic growth dropped from 13%, to 4% in 1955 (Zürcher 1993, 228). Inflation went from 3% in 1950 to 20% in 1957 (Zürcher 1993, 239). The financial problems were not solved by a readjustment of taxing, instead extensive money was borrowed from the US, European countries, the IMF and the Central Bank (Zürcher 1993, 228–229). The external debt reached $1.5 billion by 1960 (Zürcher 1993, 239). On the other hand, Menderes regime grew more and more authoritarian, with increased control of the press and by expelling people who were critical of him from their positions in the party (Zürcher 1993, 230). With the worsening of the economy, inflation and authoritarian tendencies, Menderes kept losing support from the intellectuals, bureaucrats and the military (Zürcher 1993, 230). In 27 May 1960, the army overthrew the DP government. They were accused of being responsible for the 6–7 September events (Akgönül 2007, 246, Bahcheli 1990, 173), and of corruption and violation of the constitution (Zürcher 1993, 260). Vice-President Adnan Menderes, Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu were executed (Ahmad

2002, 164). In 1961, Inönü and his CHP government were elected again (Akgönül 2007, 248).

The political tensions between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus affected to a great extent the situation of the Rum minority in Turkey as well as in Burgaz. When Cyprus got its independence in 1960, Makarios became the president and Fazıl Küçük, the vice-president. The constitution was based on a bi-communal government. In 1963, Greek Cypriot nationalists were oppressing the Turkish Cypriots (Akgönül 2007, 256). Makarios wanted to lessen the power of the Turkish Cypriots and increase the power of the Greek Cypriots by changing from a bi-communal system to majority rule. In order to stop the oppression against the Turkish Cypriots, the Turkish government "warned" the Greek government by "punishing" the Rums in Istanbul (Akgönül 2007, 252–254, 263, 267). In daily language, the term *Yunanlı* was used for the Greeks of Greece, and *Rum* for the Greek-Orthodox minority of Turkey and *Kıbrıslı Rum* for the Greek Cypriots (Akgönül 2007, 252). The Rums of Turkey were divided into two categories: Rums with Turkish citizenship (*Türk uyruklu Rumlar*) and Rums with Greek citizenship (*Yunan uyruklu Rumlar*). When the *Kıbrıslı Rumlar* (Greek Cypriots) exerted violence against the *Kıbrıslı Türkler* (Turkish Cypriots), the Rums of Turkey, including the Patriarchate, tried to give the message to the Turkish government that the Rums of Turkey were different from *Kıbrıslı Rumlar* (Akgönül 2007, 258). For instance, in the media, the Patriarchate constantly reprimanded the atrocities of the Greek Cypriots against the Turkish Cypriots (Akgönül 2007, 258). However, the political tension between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus started to blur the distinction between the *Rums* of Turkey, and *Yunanlılar* and *Kıbrıslı Rumlar* (Akgönül 2007, 252). The Rums of Turkey with Greek citizenship were blamed for helping the Greek Cypriots economically (Akgönül 2007, 267) and also to be on the Greek side (Akgönül 2007, 252).

The Turkish government held responsible the Greek government for the changes that Makarios implemented and in return, did not renew the Seyrisefain pact, which was signed between Turkey and Greece in 1930, and which gave residence and free movement to Greek citizens in Turkey (Akgönül 2007, 86–87; Alexandris 2019, 142). With this pact, the Rums, who had migrated to Greece during the population exchange, and who had become Greek citizens were allowed to settle back and work in Turkey (Akgönül 2007, 87). Work permits, freedom of movement and residence of Rums with Greek citizenship were cancelled (Akar and Demir 1994). In

March 1964, the Inönü government decided to expel the Rums with Greek citizenship (Akgönül 2007, 257, 409). Those who were expelled were given 48 hours to leave Turkey with $20 and 20 kilos of luggage (Örs 2019; Kaliber 2019). They were not allowed to withdraw money from their accounts or sell their property (Kaliber 2019, 52). Rums who wanted to sell their properties had to get permission from the Turkish government (Akgönül 2007, 318). Many did not have the time to sell their properties and just left. If the taxes on these assets were left unpaid for more than ten years, the Turkish government took over their property (Alexandris 2019, 146; Akar and Demir 1994, 160).

Furthermore, this expulsion would make the Rums of Greek citizenship lose their jobs thus enabling the Turks to take their places (Akgönül 2007, 261, 265). This would also "solve" the unemployment problems of the immigrants from the Anatolian villages to cities (Akgönül 2007, 265). Furthermore, non-Muslims were aimed to be excluded from the labour market. In 1934, by law number 2007, non-Muslims were not allowed to take some public job positions (Katsanos 2019, 83). This heightened up in 1960s along with the pogrom and the expulsion of the Rums and many more non-Muslim enterprises were closed and non-Muslims were exempt from even regular jobs like shoemaking and tailoring (Katsanos 2019, 98). The Turkish government also wanted to control the flow of the Rums' capital and the properties (Akgönül 2007, 318). In 1935, the Law of Foundations declared all foundations, including those of minorities, to be under the authority of the General Directorate of the Foundations (GDF) (Soner 2010, 30). In 1936, GDF required all foundations to register their unmoveable properties (Akgönül 2007, 319). Some Rum foundation properties were given by the Sultan's edict in the Ottoman times (Soner 2010, 30; Akgönül 2007, 319) or were donated by Rums, so these properties were not registered. In 1972, when GDF requested the registration documents from the foundations of the minorities (Akgönül 2007, 319), the foundations and properties of the minorities that were not on the register became the property of the government (Akgönül 2007, 320).

Inönü knew that the cancellation of the pact would have an impact on the Rums with Turkish citizenship as well, because for years, the Rums with Turkish citizenship and the Rums with Greek citizenship intermarried and formed close friendship and family bonds (Akar and Demir 1994, 14). The 1965 population consensus affirmed not only that 11,000 Rums of Greek citizenship left, but that they had taken their families with them; 30,000 Rums of Turkish citizenship left as well (Akgönül 2007, 284)

adding up to around 40,000–42,000 Rums (Themopolou 2019, 124). After 1964, the Rums of Turkish citizenship started to get very uncomfortable and lost their trust in Muslims. *Enosis* activism from 1963 onwards (Akgönül 2007, 300), the murder of Cypriot Turks on Christmas day in 1963 (Oran 2003, 104, Kaliber 2019, 46) and the Greek Cypriot attacks on Turkish villages in Geçitkale and Boğaziçi in Cyprus on 15 November 1967 (Akgönül 2007, 301) created anxieties for the Rum minority in Turkey (Oran 2003, 104; Akgönül 2007, 301). In contrast to the 6–7 September 1955 riots, the invasion of the Turkish army in Cyprus in 1974 did not mobilise crowds to take action against the Rums (Akgönül 2007, 317). However, the previous events had already scarred the Rums, whom kept leaving the country of their own accord.

Some of the Rums of Burgaz left their properties and left the island; which later became properties of the government; some of them sold their shops and properties at low prices to the Alevis, who were their helpers and waiters for years. Therefore, the Alevis, who had been saving money while working as employees under Rums bought their properties and shops. From 1980s onwards, the change of demographics on the island became more visible. Many shops and restaurants were run by Alevis; the Ay Nikola neighbourhood became an Alevi neighbourhood. I heard two conflicting views of this change of property. When I was having tea with a few secular Sunni Muslim summer inhabitants in one of the coffee shops, one female informant said, "they [newcomers, mainly Kurdish and Alevi Zazas] bought these houses with our money," stressing the fact that the permanent inhabitants overcharged the summer inhabitants, which helped them to buy property. On another occasion, a Sunni Muslim summer inhabitant told me that "I have seen how much they [new comers, mainly Kurdish and Alevi Zazas] have been working since they moved to the island. They have deserved every bit of the house they own." This shift to property ownership also triggered a shift in the economic status of the Alevi and the Sunni communities in Burgaz.

1980s Coup and Its Aftermath

The instability of the Turkish government did not provide grounds for living with peace of mind. The fights between leftists and rightists in the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the intervention of the army in 1971 and 1980 (Akgönül 2007, 294) made all the citizens of Turkey uncomfortable. But, surely, the minorities and the left were more prone to

be victimised. First of all, the 1980 coup brought a halt to the lives of Turkish citizens. The military council brought restrictions to voluntary organisations, associations especially the leftist ones (Şimşek 2004, 111–112).

Nonetheless, the political climate in Turkey started to change significantly from 1980s onwards. It was under Özal's government that liberation started both economically and politically. Like his contemporaries Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, Özal promoted neoliberalism, privatisation, free-markets and economic liberalism (Zürcher 1993, 301; Anderson 2008b). He promoted Islamic revivalism and removed the ban on using Kurdish in private (Anderson 2008a; Zürcher 1993, 305). In 1981, Özal removed the blockade that concerned the properties of the Rums who were expelled in 1964 (Akgönül 2007, 411; Bahcheli 1990, 184). In 1988, he passed the law that enabled Rums to reclaim back their properties (Akgönül 2007, 411). He also removed the visa prohibition on these Rums (Akgönül 2007, 411). Even though, this liberation took place, still the Rums did not want to come back due to what they had been through during the previous decades in Turkey (Akgönül 2007, 327).

From 1980s onwards, feminism, human rights activism, Islamism, environmentalism and Kurdish and Alevi activism were among the social movements in the country. The PKK, *Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan* (the Kurdistan Worker's Party), started a guerrilla act against the government for a free state for the Kurds in 1984 (Zürcher 1993, 313). During successive clashes between the PKK and the Turkish army, many people lost their lives or were displaced (Zürcher 1993, 313). Following the forced migration, evacuation of villages by the military, the pressure of the PKK and the ongoing clashes between the military and the PKK, many Kurds migrated from their villages in south-east to big cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana (Çelik 2005, 139–140). In addition to the political tensions, there was also economic scarcity in the southeast. In the 1990s, Sunni Kurds from south-eastern Turkey moved to Burgaz to undertake menial labour (such as driving horse carts, waiting tables and gardening) having been driven from their villages in Muş and Ağrı by Kurdish insurgency, poor economic conditions and kinship tensions.

2000s and Onwards: The AKP, Its Democratisation Packages and Their Failure

The EU required Turkey to recognise social diversity, to improve the treatment of the recognised minorities and to recognise both the non-recognised Muslim and non-Muslim ethnic, religious and denominational groups. In order to meet the criteria to become a member of the EU, the AKP worked on implementing the so-called democratic policies. In 2011, Erdoğan declared that the minorities' foundations could claim back their confiscated properties (Abanoz 2011). Erdoğan worked on reopening the Greek Orthodox Seminary in Halki, in Heybeliada, one of the Princes' Islands of Istanbul (Soner 2010). Erdogan initiated Jewish and Armenian opening, such as reconstructing places of worship and offering condolences for the pains that the Jews and Armenians suffered from (Aktürk 2018). This positive attitude of the AKP towards the non-Muslims enabled them to gain votes from the non-Muslims, especially from Greeks and Armenians (Soner 2010). However, the Jewish minority remained suspicious (Soner 2010, 28) due to tensions between Israel and Turkey and Erdoğan's anti-Zionist attitudes and rage in Davos in 2009. Furthermore, the secularists were also apprehensive about the reopening of the Seminary as an autonomous theological institution because this would also allow Muslims to open religious institutions and pursue religious activities without the control of the state (Soner 2010, 38). The anti-secular and authoritarian acts of Erdogan in the last years also made the non-Muslim minorities turn away from the AKP. Secularists became anxious when the AKP challenged the building blocks of Kemalism: a strong secular army to ensure secularism, a lack of public expression of religion and an emphasis on a unified Turkish identity denying the existence of a Kurdish identity (Akdeniz and Göker 2011, 321). Erdoğan reduced military autonomy (Akdeniz and Göker 2011, 326), and opened a dialogue with the Kurds; and with the passing of the referendum in 12 September 2010, the power of the governing party in the legal constitution increased. While these acts were seen as democratic initiatives by the EU and the liberals in Turkey; they were perceived as threats to the unity of the nation and to secularism by the secularists in Turkey.

Prior to and during the fieldwork years (2009–2010), the discourses of differences in Turkey revolved around three issues: the relationship between secularism and Islamism; the recognition of Kurds and Alevis and the current situation of non-Muslim minorities. During my fieldwork, the

AKP came up with "democratisation packages" by pointing out the faults of the previous Kemalist and secular regimes and claiming to be correcting the mistakes of the previous governments. However, their attempts at democracy were criticised that these democratisation packages were not implemented (Efegil 2011; Soner 2010; Soner and Toktaş 2011; Karakaya-Stump 2018; Bardakçı 2015; Özpek and Mutluer 2016; Kardaş and Balcı 2016; Toktamış 2019; Kayhan Pusane 2014; Aktürk 2018). They were "empty promises" to gain votes in order to become an autocratic political power and to satisfy the international opinion (Head 2011; Çakır 2008) to "look democratic" rather than "being democratic." In Chap. 8, I elaborate and scrutinise the failure of these democratisation packages.

Furthermore, the financial crises in 2001 in the country due to the bankruptcy led to increased interest rate and inflation; the stock market fell and the Turkish lira devalued. This has made it difficult to keep a flat/house in Burgaz for the summer inhabitants in Burgaz. Among the wealthy summer inhabitants, some of the Jewish residents preferred to go to the south of Turkey for vacations or to spend time in Istanbul, rather than renting flats on the island. Furthermore, the worsening relationship between Israel and Turkey, as indicated by the bombings of synagogues in Istanbul in 2003 and the Mavi Marmara incident in 2009, made the Jewish community feel ill at ease. Some of them stopped renting houses or sold their properties in Burgaz. Even though the Jews of Burgaz still feel relatively safe in Burgaz, their discomfort continues. Following the 2008 financial crisis in Europe, especially in Greece, some Rums who had left with their accord and some Greeks moved to Burgaz to live during the summer time. On the other hand, from 2000 onwards, Armenians from Kınalıada, another of the Islands, moved to Burgaz. They did not like the increase of day-trippers and picnickers back in Kınalıada. From 2000 onwards, workers from Central Asia started to come to the island for temporary work such as taking care of the horses and helping grocers to deliver goods to island customers. Currently, Burgaz is home to more than twenty different ethnic and religious groups from different socio-economic backgrounds.

Methodology and Entering the Field

As a trained anthropologist, I believed that ethnography was the valid methodology to understand what occurs on the ground (Cowan 2006), and to investigate what people actually do. I focused on the

"multicultural" as an adjective to describe plurality on the ground—in opposition to multiculturalism as a political project, that is, as top-down approaches (characteristic for policies, politicians, political theorists) that focused on how people should live together and what policies or laws should be used in order to manage diversity.

I took the boat from the Anatolian side (Bostancı) of Istanbul to Burgaz on 1 July 2009 to begin my fieldwork, as a 25-year-old, single woman, nervous yet excited about how I would manage to meet and socialise with islanders from diverse class, linguistic, ethnic and religious backgrounds. In order to build relationships with individuals belonging to various groups, I relied on various aspects of my upbringing and multiple identities, though at the same time it was difficult for me to negotiate and challenge these. Being Turkish, and a native Turkish speaker, and having grown up in Istanbul until the age of 21 were advantages for me undertaking anthropology in this region; however, I was not a Burgazlı, which automatically made me an "outsider." Burgazlı possess a strong sense of belonging to the island, and I needed to work hard to be accepted by them. Furthermore, even though I was born and registered as a Turkish Muslim (of Sunni sect), a subject belonging to the majority, I was still a *göçmen*, a migrant from the Balkans, a post-Ottoman production, a production of Balkan conflicts, migrations and love. My grandfather from my father's side, Recep, was a refugee, who fled from Kırcaali/Kardzhali in Bulgaria to Edirne in Turkey in the first years of the republic, alone at the age of 14. His wife, Neriman, whose name I carry on, had her parents migrate from Komotini/Gümülcine in Greece to Turkey, before the population exchange in 1923. My mother's grandmother was an Albanian Muslim, born in Tirana. She fell in love with an Ottoman Turkish medical doctor, who brought her to Istanbul. My maternal grandmother, Perihan, had ancestors from Central Anatolia, Niğde. These historical and geographical traces were revealed in my slant, Central Asian–shaped, blue eyes and light brown/blond hair, which was told to me many times in Turkey in the form of "you must be a *göçmen*, where do your ancestors come from? Balkans?" and in Europe "you don't look like Turkish." I grew up in a secular family, whose cosmopolitan world view and values were more important than being Turkish or Muslim. I had acquired knowledge of Islamic practices and values from the obligatory religious classes in my schools. Sometimes, I had much less common with practising Sunni Muslims, with whom I shared the same ethnicity and religious categorisation, and I had to confront this lack of knowledge. On the other hand, the

French and the American high schools I attended in Istanbul are where minorities choose to educate their children. So, the fact that we went to the same schools created a sense of familiarity between us. I relied heavily on the languages I speak to gain access to and the trust of my informants. Even though everyone speaks Turkish, people also use their native languages within their family and community.

Apart from Turkish, I spoke French and Spanish with my Jewish informants, who speak Ladino (a mixture of old Portuguese and Spanish) or French at home. I spoke Rumca[7] with the Rums. I began learning Zazaki to converse with my Zaza Alevi informants. I spoke French, Turkish, or English with the Austrians, Italians and Germans, depending on which language they preferred. After my fieldwork, I learnt Italian (through my husband), Danish (as we live in Copenhagen) and Swedish (as I work and teach in Sweden). While growing up and playing together, the islanders picked up each other's languages, so that many of them speak Rumca, Italian, Armenian, French, or Ladino. Being a polyglot made me feel very close to the islanders, in a similar way that they felt closer to me. It made me realise that being multilingual was also a form of symbolic capital for the islanders.

In order to understand how the islanders live together, I lived on the island and conducted 14 months of ethnography (July 2009–August 2010). I used participant observation, casual chats with the islanders, and 44 semi-structured interviews. My project received two ethical clearances, one before going on fieldwork and the second one in the final examination of my doctoral thesis. I have followed the Ethical Guidelines of the Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and of the American Anthropological Association[8] regarding the consent and the anonymity of my informants and sharing my findings with them. When I first got to Burgaz, I introduced myself as the PhD student in anthropology and received their consent in writing about the island life in my thesis and publications. I started attending the Orthodox mass on Sunday with my Rum Burgazlı friend from my French middle school. She introduced me to the organiser of the church and to her friends and acquaintances from different ethno-religious backgrounds, who socialised in mixed social clubs. Every new person I met, introduced me to another one, which helped me greatly. I learned about demographic changes on the island and how Burgaz islanders live together and represent their conviviality through snowballing and chained relationships by attending places of worship, the two social clubs (where people swim, suntan, play games and socialise) and the embroidery class for women. I was invited to join meals at restaurants

and have tea and coffee at coffee shops and patisseries. The islanders also invited me into their homes. During the first eight or nine months of my fieldwork, I collected their narratives in the form of unstructured interviews, taking notes in my ethnographic diary every day. During the last five or six months, after the islanders had got used to my presence and felt more comfortable in confiding their life stories, I recorded the interviews. I have used pseudonyms throughout the book to keep their anonymity. I also did production interviews conducted with "exclusive informants" in Bruun's (2016) terms. I interviewed the authors of books written by Burgazlı (Engin Aktel and Robert Schild) as well as the directors, scenarists and the actors in the documentaries shut by the islanders (Nedim Hazar, Nilufer Uzunoglu, Tilbe Saran) and received their consent in using their names in my publications. Building on media ethnography, media, communication and cultural studies methods (Pertierra 2018; Barker 2012; Lewis 2008; Hansen and Machin 2013), I have explored the islanders' narratives, representations and the discourses on diversity in their cultural productions pertaining to different genres, such as documentaries, novels and memoires. I aimed for a polyphonic representation of the islanders and paid attention to the metaphors, allegories and terms they use to understand their descriptions and reflections on conviviality, which showed diversity (see Chap. 3). Nonetheless, my ethnography, like other ethnographies, are limited to my perceptions and interpretations of what I have seen, observed and experienced (Candea 2007; Geertz 1973; Clifford 1986). At the end of my fieldwork, I made two public presentations on Burgaz, to the Burgaz islanders, when I presented them my raw fieldwork data and thanked them for making me a part of their life.

Since the end of this ethnographic fieldwork until the pandemic in 2020, I followed my informants through Facebook and did short fieldwork trips as much as I could, to keep in touch with the islanders. These fieldwork trips were also occasions where I shared with the islanders my publications (Duru 2015, 2016) and talked about this book that I am writing, which they were very much looking forward to and hence updated me with the new changes on the island. The islanders could meet my husband, Giovanni, and our son Antonio (born in 2017) as well as my family and friends who joined me in my post-fieldwork trips to Burgaz. I also had the intention to do longer field trips in 2020, while I was writing this book, however I gave birth to our second child Elena, in October 2020 in the middle of the pandemic, where both Turkey and Denmark (where we currently live) had lockdowns. Turkey had several lockdowns and severe

long-term restrictions, such as not being allowed to leave the house, followed by hourly allowance to leave home for different age groups, and lockdowns at the weekends. There were further restrictions for the Princes' Islands. During the full and partial lockdowns, only those islanders with permanent residence on the islands were allowed to come and go to the islands. The islanders have special islander transport cards, and hence were checked when they took the boat. Even the islanders, who live on the islands in the summer and have permanent residency in other parts of Istanbul were not allowed to visit Burgaz. During the pandemic I was only able to get back to Burgaz in the beginning of January 2022. Thus, in 2021 and 2022, I conducted online, follow-up interviews when some Burgaz islanders reflected on the changes on the island. Despite not being able to do longer field trips and the lockdown due to the pandemic, the combination of long-term ethnographic data, followed by short field trips and online interviews until today made me able to give a longitudinal perspective on conviviality on Burgaz and to follow the changes that took place.

Notes

1. The term *Rum* is a Turkish word originating from "Romios" "Roman," referring to the Greek Orthodox subjects originating from the Eastern Roman Empire and Byzantine (see Örs 2006).
2. Because of the small size of the island, you *are always seen* or *could be seen* by anyone. In terms of its small size, where everyone knows each other and where everyone watches each other and knows what they are doing, Burgaz is similar to Meganisi (Just 2000, 17).
3. The National Turkish Commerce Union founded in 1923 and funded by the government, aimed for Turkish business men and bankers to secure their place in the industry (Güven 2006, 109).
4. In December 1934, the new commercial law entitled "Türk vatandaşlarına tahsis edilen Sanat ve Hizmetler Hakkında Kanun" implied that non-Muslims would be able to do menial work such as being a butcher, grocer or baker (Güven 2006, 111).
5. For Britain not to be considered a colonising power, Turkey needed to take a more dominant status (Güven 2006, 196). The 1955 riots worked to Britain's advantage because the fact that both Turkey and Greece were mistreating their minorities supported the argument that Cyprus should either remain under the control of Britain or become independent (Güven 2006, 196–199).

6. Rather than dealing with the issues of the 6–7 September riots, the riots were just used to justify the 1960s coup in order to find Menderes' government guilty (Güven 2006, 100–101). Finally, at the end of the trial, three members of the DP, including Menderes himself, were executed (Kuyucu 2005, 362).
7. I took Modern Greek classes at Boğaziçi University in Istanbul for a several months during my fieldwork, which helped me to understand and converse in *Rumca* with my Rum informants. Romeyka (*Rumca* in Turkish) refers to the language used by the Rums (Greeks) of Ottoman Empire and contemporary Turkey (see Saglam 2022).
8. https://www.americananthro.org/ethics-and-methods, https://www.theasa.org/downloads/ethics/asa_ethicsgl_2021.pdf.

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CHAPTER 3

Representing Conviviality: Emic Concepts Versus Etic Ones

Introduction

In this chapter, I explore the ways in which the islanders represented/articulated their pluralism by the words and metaphors/allegories they used when they talked about the diversity of the island. Grillo (2007, 981 emphasis added) highlights the importance of "understanding what actually happens 'on the ground', a crucial aspect of which is the subjective dimension, the ideas, models, projects, definitions, discourses etc. that *actors* bring to bear on a situation, sometimes very hesitantly, often seeking to work with (or clarify) concepts that are difficult, opaque, elusive and with multiple contested meanings." Thus, an in-depth, ethnographic exploration of everyday practices of living together in diversity and exploring how the islanders themselves reflect, represent and conceptualise their conviviality was my response to Grillo's call (2007) for anthropologists to go beyond the normative analysis of multiculturalism and to move away from the philosophical reflections at an abstract or institutional level.

Building on media anthropology, media ethnography and cultural studies (see Pertierra 2018; Barker 2012; Lewis 2008; Tufte 2000; Schrøder et al. 2003), in this chapter, I analyse the representation of diversity and conviviality in Burgaz islanders' media productions, conducting expert interviews (Bruun 2016) with the authors of novels and producers of documentaries, and exploring the islanders' reception of these productions. In order to shed light on the islanders' perception of conviviality and

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diversity, I structured the chapter according to the emic terms, such as metaphors and allegories they use—ebru, mosaic, live open-air ethnographic museum—and concepts—multiculturality, cosmopolitanness, monoculturality—and put these emic perceptions in dialogue with etic concepts of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. The diversity of emic terms and concepts give a complex picture of conviviality and hence challenge the literature of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism and the ways in which the islanders reproduce and challenge the dominant discourse of pluralism that comes from the Ottoman *millet* system.

Burgaz Is a Live/Open-Air Ethnographic Museum

The Modern Turkish state inherited the legal recognition and categorisation of "minorities" from the *millet* system of the Ottoman Empire (see also Chap. 2). Under the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman subjects were divided into *millets*: Muslims, Orthodox, Armenians and Jews (Sugar 1977, 273). The *millet* system was a legal-religious functional structure in the empire (Sugar 1977, 272) where the population was not divided according to the subjects' ethnicity or nationality. The *millet* system aimed to maintain the central power of the sultan, to administer the different religious groups and hence it helped to keep the non-Muslims (*zimmi*) connected to the empire (Sugar 1977, 274). Even though Islam was seen as superior, every *millet* was autonomous in the way they practised their religion and managed their legal issues. Thus, there was not a concept of majority versus minority (Sugar 1977, 274). After the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the "minoritisation" process (Cowan et al. 2001; Cowan 2001; Alioglu Cakmak and Huseyinoglu 2020), the concept of "majority" and "minority" came into the Turkish and Greek legal systems. The Rum, Armenian and the Jewish *millet*s turned into the recognised non-Muslim minorities of the Turkish Republic, while all the Muslims were categorised to be the majority. Nonetheless, ethnically Turkish Sunni Muslims have been dominating other Muslims of different ethnicity and mother tongue (e.g. Kurdish, Albanian, Laz and Zaza) and of different denominations of Islam (e.g. Alevi, Sunni). The dominant discourse of pluralism in modern Turkey have embraced the recognised non-Muslims as contributing to the multiculturality of Turkey, but not the non-recognised minority groups among the Muslims such as the Kurds, Laz, Alevis, Sunni Ṣafis and many more.

This dominant discourse is articulated as "Neo-Ottoman Nostalgia," which refers to, according to some scholars like Papadopoulos, Keyder and Fisher-onar, as the "Belle Epoque period" or "the golden era" of the Ottoman Empire, notably in the second half to the late 19th, glorifying the coexistence of different faiths, notable the *millets* and the European cosmopolitans, whose presence was seen in Istanbul and port cities of the Ottoman Empire (Keyder 2018; Fisher-Onar 2018; Zubaida 2018; Örs 2018a; Doumanis 2012; Papadopoulos 2019). This nostalgia is at the same time sadness and mourning for the non-Muslims, who had to leave, were forced or expulsed to leave as an outcome of the homogenisation during the construction of the Modern Turkish nation. Neo-Ottomanism was introduced by Özal in 1980s as a mentality and strategy of embracing Ottoman heritage that embedded in itself the cultural pluralism of different ethnic and religious groups (Çolak 2006, 587). Advocates placed Islamism and legal pluralism of different *millets* in the framework of Neo-Ottomanism (Çolak 2006, 588). Whereas the Kemalist modernisation project had rejected anything Ottoman and was based on a secular and unified Turkish identity, neo-Ottomanism reacted to the Kemalist hegemony and brought into the scene counter-memories such as those of Kurds and Islamists (Çolak 2006, 589). As a solution to the Turkish identity crisis, Özal appealed to the cultural pluralism within Islam, as practised in Ottoman times, where Islam included Albanians, Bosniaks, Turks, Kurds and Alevis from different ethno-religious backgrounds (Çolak 2006, 593). Later on, the Welfare Party appealed to Ottomanism and the religious plurality of the Ottoman *millet* system in order to reject Kemalist secularism's repression of religious practice (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 140–141). This attitude was adopted by the AKP, and neo-Ottomanism became more of an Islamist revivalism (see Aktürk 2018). Couroucli (2010) argues that this kind of Ottoman multiculturalism praised by the (Muslim) bourgeois class and the politicians in Turkey is like Herzfeld's structural nostalgia: it refers back to the plurality of the Ottoman Empire to state that Turkey is still multicultural now in order to "promote minority and human rights" for Turkey's entrance to the EU.

Robert Schild, a Burgaz islander since 1988, was fascinated by the diversity of the island and told Nezim Hazar, a documentary maker, who lived in Burgaz since the 2000s, that a documentary about the diversity in Burgaz and representing the multicultural aspect of Turkey might benefit the country's bid to enter the EU. They shut the documentary in 2004–2005, with the help of Burgaz islanders, especially the famous

actress, Tilbe Saran and actor Cüneyt Türel. The documentary was supported by several Turkish and foreign, public and private institutions,[1] to which the islanders had connections with. The documentary was collectively shut, Burgaz islanders and the ones who worked for the shooting and editing, did it voluntarily. Schild was more interested in the numbers, and counted more than twenty different ethnicities and religions living on Burgaz and also wrote a book later on (Schild 2021). In the documentary, while Robert Schild wanted to emphasise the diversity in Burgaz, Nedim Hazar wanted to focus on the friendship between Emilios, a Rum Burgazlı, who left Burgaz and came back to visit the island, years later, and Cüneyt Türel, a secular Sunni Muslim. Hazar told me, "I wanted to give the message that friendship was above everything."

In this documentary, at least one person from each ethnic, linguistic and religious group is shown (Ashkenazi Jew, Sephardic Jew, Karayim Jew, Rum Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Kurd, Alevi, Levantine, German, Macedonian, Austrian, Sunni Muslim etc.) and they talk about who they are, where they come from and which language they speak. Different religious rituals at different religious places are filmed (in the synagogue, Orthodox Church, Catholic, Chapel, mosque and Alevi gathering house). The documentary challenges the dominant discourse of pluralism based on the millet system. It did not have an emphasis on only the recognised minorities: Rums, Jews and Armenians, who were the non-Muslim *millets* of the Ottoman Empire. The documentary demonstrates the events, which made the Rums leave, like the 1955 pogrom and the expulsion of Rums with Greek citizenship, but it was not trapped in the romanticism of the *millet* system. It gave the message that the island belongs to all the people from different ethnic and religious groups. Within their discourse of pluralism, they gave place for the diversities within the non-Muslim *millet* (like Suryanis, Keldanis, Levantines) and the Muslim *millet* including the non-recognised Alevis and Kurds. As Couroucli (2010) argues in her work, Schild and Hazar are among those ones who would like to promote Turkey's entry to the EU and they had a political aim in representing the diversity of Burgaz: to give the message that Turkey is multicultural. However, they challenge Couroucli (2010)'s statement that only the non-Muslims—Rums, Armenians and Jews—could make a Muslim country multicultural. Schild and Hazar show the diversities within *millets* and the non-recognised Alevis and Kurds as also contributing to the diversity in Turkey. For instance, Alevi *cemevi* is shown as a place of worship equal to a mosque, a synagogue and a church.

When I talked with Hazar in 2010 about the reactions that the documentary received, Hazar showed me his file, where he kept the critiques and appraisal, he said that the documentary was shown widely on the TV and festivals (also available on Youtube) and was mostly well received. Nonetheless, it was also critiqued to be "utopic" in a conference about minorities held at Bilgi University. He responded to the critique by arguing that the documentary also showed that 6–7 September pogrom and the expulsion of the Rums, narrated by the islanders. He then explained to me that the documentary focuses on the friendship, despite these painful memories. The audience as well as the islanders get swept away by the strong emotions of friendship above everything and by "island romanticism" and tend to forget the painful memories, while they live on the island. As we will see in Chap. 7, the islanders articulated both memories of intolerance (in Istanbul and Turkey) and of conviviality (in Burgaz). In Uzunoglu's documentary (2013), one can clearly see the sufferance and the pain that is ingrained in the islanders' memories, as well as the joy that is experienced during the islanders' reunion and the stories of friendships that go above everything. Those, who left the island uses structural amnesia, by suppressing the memories of intolerance and holding on the memories of conviviality in Burgaz.

For these reasons, Schild uses the term "open-air ethnographic museum" and in my interview with him in 2010, he explained like this:

> Let me first tell you about my theory of diversity in Burgaz. I have found the multicultural aspect of Turkey in Burgaz. Before I wanted to make a documentary/film about Burgaz, I wrote a few articles in the Radikal newspaper and *Istanbul Dergisi* [1999] about Burgaz being "an open-air ethnographic museum". What I argued with this allegory is that Turkey had been multicultural for centuries but it had long been losing its diversity. When one came to Burgaz, one could still see a sample of each group within this diversity.

Schild points out that Turkey is still diverse. Yet, as the number of the Rums, Jews and Armenians as well as Keldanis, Germans, Macedonians and Levantines lessened to a great extent, he describes these people as "museumised." During the interview, when Schild explained how the number of these people decreased, he talked in great depth about the Wealth Tax in 1942, the 6–7 September events, the expulsion of the Rums with Greek citizenship, and the non-Muslims, who left to other countries.

As, this demonstrates, he does not in any way ignore the homogenisation process. To the contrary, he shows the ways in which these policies and political events had an important impact which triggered migrations from Turkey.

The islanders reproduce the dominant discourse of pluralism to criticise the homogenisation that took away their friends, not with the aim of ignoring the new settlers of Alevi and Kurdish descent. For instance, Aktel says, "We used to be multicultural and we lost our diversity, when the Rums left" to stress that the homogenisation lessened the diversity of the island. Nonetheless, he still says that the island is still multicultural, and in his *Kestane Karası*, he narrates Sami's story, an Alevi man from Erzincan, who becomes a Burgaz islander through working for the island and falling in love with an islander woman, who happened to be Rum. Live ethnographic museum, "we used to be multicultural," Schild's "Osmanlı tortusu," residue from the Ottoman Empire are different versions of the reproduction of the dominant discourse of pluralism based on the *millet* system, which criticise the Turkish state that used homogenisation policies to send away the recognised non-Muslim millets. These reproductions of the dominant discourse based on the millet can be seen similar to how Couroucli' refers to the Princes' Islands as the "empire dust" (2010, 220–221) by arguing that in contemporary Turkey, the pluralism is the remnant of the coexistence that existed under the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires. Nonetheless, the islanders do not reduce diversity to the millet system and in their media productions, the non-recognised groups, notably the Alevis and Kurds are an important part of the island conviviality.

Couroucli explored the Saint George pilgrimage in Ay Yorgi, Büyükada, the biggest of the Princes' Islands. The Rum Orthodox Church, Ay Yorgi, is visited by thousands of people, mostly Muslim, during that day, where the visitors draw their wishes, light candles and roll a threat from the bottom of Ay Yorgi Hill, up to the church (see Figs. 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, when I participated in the pilgrimage in 23 April 2010). Couroucli explored ethnographically this pilgrimage but has not explored the daily life of the Büyükada islanders, or other Princes' islanders, through long-term ethnography. Nonetheless, she concludes that today it would be wrong to treat the lifestyle on the Princes' Islands as "cosmopolitan" (Couroucli 2010, 220–221). She distinguishes between "cosmopolitanism, a spirit related to the lifestyle of the minority elites of the Ottoman society, and the reality of religious plurality and tolerance in Ottoman society, which allowed shared practices at certain moments" (Couroucli 2010, 234). She

Fig. 3.1 Saint George day Ay Yorgi, Büyükada (photo taken by the author)

indicates that these syncretic practices such as Ay Yorgi day[2] do not now exist in the everyday life on the Princes' Islands. She notes that most of the non-Muslims had already left Turkey and the Princes' Islands. She sees these islands as places of residence for the elite, educated upper-middle-class people, most of whom are non-Muslims. She states that Istanbulites' nostalgia for the coexistence of Ottoman times does not reflect today's reality. Couroucli's conceptualisation echoes the dominant discourse of pluralism: Ottoman times were multicultural, because there were people from different *millets*: Orthodox, Jews, Armenians and Muslims. According to her view, when most of the non-Muslims left Turkey, then, Turkey was no longer multicultural. This is why she calls the Princes Islands "empire dust" (Couroucli 2010). The dominant discourse is problematic and reductive; because it limits diversities to the *millet* system and does not take into account the non-recognised groups such as Alevis and Kurds. Couroucli only focuses on who left the Princes' Islands, but not who subsequently settled on the islands. Schild and the documentary, to the

Fig. 3.2 Saint George day Ay Yorgi, Büyükada (photo taken by the author)

contrary, challenge the dominant discourse by including Alevis and Kurds and the diversities within the *millets* to point out that the island is still diverse.

Burgaz Is Not Cosmopolitan

Burgaz islanders do not think that Burgaz is cosmopolitan, however their argumentation is very different than Couroucli's. Here is what Aktel and Schil said about cosmopolitanism when I asked them which terms do not fit to Burgaz, in the two interviews I conducted with them in 2010:

Aktel: Burgaz is not cosmopolitan because in cosmopolitan societies communities do not leave their impact or transmit their cultures to other groups and to further generations. For example, new migrants, French, Germans and Austrians do not root themselves and integrate their cultures to the society. Cosmopolitan people and communities are distant, more

Fig. 3.3 Saint George day Ay Yorgi, Büyükada (photo taken by the author)

superficial, and temporary, not bonded and are in less contact with each other. Both Burgaz and Büyükada are both very diverse but people in Burgaz are *kaynaşmış* [blended, commingled, mixed].

Schild: It [cosmopolitanism] just means diverse people living in a place, does not give the message of wholeness, togetherness and solidarity as the term mosaic. Cosmopolitanism is about London, Paris, many people living together. However, in these cities there is only one *medeniyet* [civilisation], in Istanbul or Turkey there are many *medeniyet*. This is why I used the allegory of "open-air ethnographic museum".

Both Schild's and Aktel's use of the term "cosmopolitanism" is similar to Sennett (2002)'s, who states that in a cosmopolitan city, cosmopolitans do not interact with each other. Racial, class, ethnic and religious differences bring indifference between individuals. Schild's cosmopolitanism is almost "eaten" by globalisation, which turns cities of London and Paris

into “one civilisation” and where people are individualistic and less engaged with each other. However, in Burgaz, one can find many different lifestyles (see Chap. 4). Aktel and Schild do not think that “cosmopolitanism” suits to Burgaz, because in the case of Burgaz, people are not distant to each other, neither they are indifferent to people’s ethnicity and/or religion. People, like Schild and Aktel, recognise, respect and appreciate ethnic and religious differences, but they also highlight strongly the bonding of the island community, the blurring/porousness of the ethno-religious community boundaries and the internalisation of diversity. They reject cosmopolitanism, because it implies an individual engagement with an Other, as postulated by Hannerz (1990) and Radice (2016); cosmopolitans are footless, rootless and deracinated people (Keyder 2018; Zubaida 2018), who engage with others, but they do not embody people’s diversities and leave their cultural traces in the locality. In that sense, their understanding of cosmopolitanism is similar to that of Radice (2016), where cosmopolitanism refers to an individual’s engagement with others, while conviviality refers to collectivity, solidarity and a sense of togetherness as well as rooting, blending and sense of belonging in a place.

In that respect, refined conceptualisations of cosmopolitanism, such as Örs (2018a)’ emic cosmopolitanism, rooted cosmopolitanism (Appiah 2005; Werbner 2008) can come closer to the understanding of conviviality on the island. In contrast to older versions of cosmopolitanism (see Zubaida 2002; Beck 2000, 2002; Calhoun 2002; Hannerz 1990), which see mobility and border-crossing as making a person cosmopolitan and the city diverse, it is not the mobility but the daily engagement with local diversity that makes a person cosmopolitan (see Örs 2018b; Jones and Jackson 2014; Glick Schiller et al. 2011; Appiah 2005; Werbner 2008). Rooted cosmopolitanisms do not describe cosmopolitans as “footless, rootless” people (Hannerz 2004) but as people, who have a sense of belonging in the diverse land, where they grow up, and have “cosmopolitan belonging” (Jones and Jackson 2014). While in cosmopolitanism literature, the self engages with an Other (see Hannerz 1990, 2004), in conviviality, this distinction is blurred: the islanders recognise difference, but they also internalise difference, and they produce together the island culture. Conviviality, hence highlights that people are on the same boat and, it is not simply engaging with an Other, but internalising and living with differences, making things work out, managing tensions and conflicts, as well as emotionally connecting and rooting on the island. Thus, the islanders’ *ebru* allegory and the emotional aspect of mosaic, which I will explore in the next subsection, gives the message of wholeness, togetherness and conviviality.

Another important aspect of conviviality in Burgaz is the cross-class relations. As I will show in the next chapters, the islanders, who belong to different social classes, have close relations. Client-customers relations blur into friendship relations, which are also reflected in *Kestane Karası* novel (Aktel 2005), Berberyan's memoir (2010) and Hazar's documentary (2005). Pluralism in Burgaz not only is about the elite, non-Muslim minorities, but includes everyone, who contributes to the island conviviality, notably the lower-middle-class permanent islanders of Kurdish, Alevi and Sunni Muslim descent. When I had talked to Schild in the beginning of my fieldwork, he had told me "you should also interview the current permanent islanders, who are mainly Alevis and Kurds, who work in the shops and restaurants, who drive horse-carts." Schild concurs with Werbner (1999), who challenges the perception of cosmopolitanism as being exclusive to upper-class elites and intellectuals. Werbner (1999) criticises Hannerz's distinction between transnationals and cosmopolitans; because according to Hannerz, transnationals are working-class labourers while cosmopolitans are educated, upper-middle-class, business men and women who "engage with Other in order to make business" (Werbner 1999, 17–19). Werbner shows that middle-class transnationals could also be cosmopolitans through "engaging with the 'Other'" (Werbner 1999, 20).

Schild challenges Freitag's (2014) convivial cosmopolitanism and the older debates where cosmopolitanism is mainly about elites and intellectuals, who migrated to big cities such as Cairo and Istanbul during the Ottoman Empire (Zubaida 2002). Scholars frequently refer to the upper-class sociality of the Ottoman context as cosmopolitanism, a word with connotations of urban cultural pluralism (see Zubaida 2002; Driessen 2005; Gekas 2009). In contradiction to this, Ulrike Freitag argues that the political normative understanding of cultural pluralism implied in cosmopolitanism does not apply to the daily interactions among non-elite Ottoman subjects, which she describes as a form of conviviality. She shows that craftsmen and traders, who belonged to different corporate organisations or guilds (Arabic *tai'fa*, Ottoman *sınıf*) engaged with each other in structured quotidian rituals in order to sort out tax collection (Freitag 2014). Locals and strangers socialised in coffee houses, taverns and bathhouses, while families went on excursions together or visited each other's homes (Freitag 2014). Freitag's (2014) analysis is useful for thinking about how belonging to the same or similar classes intersects ethnic and religious differences. However, her analytical framework neither explains

the negotiations between different classes and socio-economic groups nor explains the ways in which people from different classes negotiate ethno-religious differences. In Chap. 6, we will see from Zümrüt and Niko that the blurred boundaries of client/customer relationships across class cooperation and friendships form a part of Burgaz conviviality.

Burgaz Is *Çokkültürlü* (Multicultural), But Is It a Mosaic or *Ebru*?

Burgaz islanders' use "multicultural" as an adjective to refer to the diversity on the island and as a characteristic of Burgaz islanders to be "multicultural" (*çokkültürlü*). The word *Çokkültürlülük* refers to multiculturality as a state of pluralism rather than as a political project of liberal multiculturalism. It stresses the embodiment and the internalisation of diversity, as I will explore in Chap. 5. Aktel defines multiculturality like this:

> *Çokkültürlülük* is *köklü* [rooted] diversity. Multicultural societies *kök salıyorlar* [to root], keep the roots of their different cultures and transmit these differences to different groups in the society and to further generations. For example, the Rum culture, the Jewish culture is in me and you can find the continuation of the Rum culture in people in Burgaz. For instance, Muslims or Jews who grew up with the Rums, learnt *Rumca* while playing with each other as kids, they know Rum religious days and traditions.

As explored in the Introduction of this book, Aktel's view on conviviality on the island challenges Kymlicka (1995)'s liberal multiculturalism and Joppke and Lukes (1999)'s mosaic multiculturalism. Aktel's description of multicultural societies does not refer to coexisting groups, which live side by side, where the boundaries of ethno-religious communities are clearly defined. Multicultural societies are those, who embody each other's differences. Aktel's perception of intangible heritage echoes that of Alivizatou (2012, 9), in the ways in which "that it is living and taking shape through embodied skills and performance." The islanders use the allegories of mosaic and ebru (marbling) to present their conviviality. Their use of "mosaic" is different than mosaic multiculturalism, because they give importance not only to living with difference, but also to the mosaic as the picture of the island, where different groups as a whole make Burgaz multicultural. Hence, the bonding of different communities, the embodiment of diversity and shared ways of living make it a mosaic that stands together.

Multiculturalism as a political project, stresses more on the differences and identity politics, and protection of rights to "sustain" the ethno-religious communities. Sustaining the pieces of the mosaic, according to the islanders, is not living side by side and drawing ethno-religious boundaries, but it is through sharing and internalising these differences, as well as living with difference. Therefore, some islanders use the allegory of the *ebru*, to refine their representation of conviviality. Robert Schild criticises mosaic multiculturalism by introducing the allegory of *ebru*, which is similar to Benhabib's criticism of mosaic multiculturalism, who argues that "cultures are complex human practices of signification and representation" (Benhabib 2002, ix) and that "Cultures are formed through complex dialogues with other cultures" (Benhabib 2002, ix). Hazar uses the term *ebru* for Burgaz, and said that "the main colours remain, but the boundaries of the colours fuse into each other," similarly to how Schild argued why ebru fitted better to Burgaz, when I interviewed him in 2010. Schild said:

> I do not like the allegory of the mosaic because it puts boundaries between groups, and like the people who do not like the term mosaic, I prefer the term *ebru* [marbling, Figure 21]. In *ebru*, patterns fuse into each other with blurry boundaries. The stones in the mosaic could fall as the pieces are separated from each other but in *ebru* the patterns fuse into each other thus *ebru* is more permanent and solid. So, an *ebru*-like society has more cohesion between different groups and it is more solid. Do you know the famous quote "Ne mozaiği ulan?" from Alparslan Türkeş?[3] The nationalists are against the mosaic of differences. Nonetheless, I like the metaphor of the mosaic because it conveys an *emotional* [he said emotional in English] message; because each stone does not have significance unless all the stones in the mosaic are put together and form a meaningful shape. Both *ebru* and *mosaic* appeal to the wholeness of the picture. There are still distinct patterns in *ebru*; however; the boundaries of the patterns are not clear-cut like in the mosaic, so *ebru* suits better to Burgaz than mosaic.

Ebru is a very good allegory to represent conviviality, because it embeds in itself, living with difference, where once can see the distinct patterns of the main colours; yet it also shows the embodiment of differences and diversity, where the boundaries of the patterns fuse into each other. This fusion of boundaries gives a stronger unity and sense of Burgaz identity based on diversity. If we were to explore different ethno-religious groups with the allegory of *ebru* and colours, we can depict Muslims as red, Rum Orthodox as yellow, Jewish as blue and Armenians, let's say as green; and

the state has recognised these colours, based on the *millet* system. If we were explain the friendship between Hamdi (Sunni Muslim) and Pandelis (Rum Orthodox Christian) in Chap. 6, with colours, we can depict Hamdi as red and Pandelis as yellow. When they hang out together, watch Fenerbahçe matches, they become orange. Pandelis does not want to make Hamdi yellow, or impose yellowness to him, he offers tea and non-alcoholic beverages. Nonetheless, we cannot just depict Hamdi as red and Pandeli yellow, because they not only are religious beings but have multiplicity of characters and identities. For instance, Fortune (Jewish), is depicted as blue. When she fasts like a Muslim, she combines blue with red and turns purple. I have seen Fortune, in all the colours of the rainbow, as she is everywhere with every one of the island. The islanders can be many colours, with darker and lighter shades and also mixed colours, but what is important is that they can perform to be the main distinct colour, whenever they want to and they can also choose to change colours, through living together and internalising each other's differences. They can also just be any colour, and make and mix colours organically. Hence, it is difficult to say what the colour of fishing and dancing together is. Rainbow? What colour(s) is/are Burgaz culture then? What is the colour of class? What is the colour of men, women, the young and the elderly, refugees, migrants and those who belong to the LGBTQ+? It is difficult and very complex to colour code people and cultures, which is also explained in the ways in which Schild approaches culture and multiculturality of the people. Schild said in his interview in 2010:

> Culture does not have an authentic meaning or notion or definition or content. For example, I am multicultural as I am Austrian, Ashkenazi Jew, who was born in Istanbul, who speaks many languages, who went to German school. In Burgaz, you can find many multicultural people like me. Let me give you an example of a non-multicultural person. I know a Sephardic Jewish woman in Istanbul, who only goes dancing and does not know what is going on around her, in the city or country. Both of us are Jewish, but she is stuck in her own bubble and life.

Like Engin Aktel, Schild sees multiculturality as the internalisation of different cultures; a person is multicultural when they "break out of their own bubble," and do not see themselves, or perform as the only colour that is "assigned to them." If one is to use *ebru*, then one can pay attention to the making of *ebru*, where the colours are on the water, fluid and

changing, instead on being fixed and imposed by the state. There are also different tones and shades of main colours, like dark blue, turquoise and so on. Hence, it becomes problematic to depict the colours of Alevis, and their practices, as some Alevis might describe themselves as pink, some orange, based on the syncretic practices they perform, based on the ways in which they see what Alevism is, but the Turkish state sees them as red, as a part of the Sunni Muslims. The politics of recognition restricts the Alevis. When they perform Sunni Muslim practices and want to be a more reddish orange, the politics of recognition encourages them to go back to being orange and separate red components out. As we will see in Chap. 8, Alevis also see themselves as a part of the majority and reject liberal multiculturalism, would not like to be recognised as a minority but rather have specific demands, such as the recognition of the *cemevis* as places of worship. Hence, they do not want to see the Muslims as red, but maybe as orangy red, or pink tinted colour, which includes their demands within the majority.

Burgaz Is Monocultural *(Tekkültürlü)*

One of the controversial debates about the diversity of Burgaz revolves around whether Burgaz is monocultural or multicultural. There are two discourses of monoculturalism in Turkey. One discourse of monoculturalism and anti-multiculturalism draws its roots from the hegemony of Turkish nationalism, which Schild had mentioned referring to Alpaslan Türkeş' attitude against "mosaicness." Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (the MHP, Nationalist Action Party) is the only party, which is sceptical and critical about Turkey's entry to the EU (Canefe and Bora 2003, 127). They have anxieties that the EU has a hidden agenda and that the EU is to bring turmoil through promotion of minority rights, human rights, crystallising ethnic, linguistic and religious differences, making them obvious so that Turkey will have inner-conflicts and disintegrate. The current head of MHP, Devlet Bahçeli criticises the EU for imposing its own solutions about how to solve the Cyprus issue without recognising the point of view of the Turkish state and blames the European countries for not recognising the PKK as a terrorist group (Canefe and Bora 2003, 136). These two points Bahçeli makes, back up the MHP's scepticism that the EU challenges the national security in Turkey. However, Canefe and Bora (2003) point out that although the MHP plays a leading role in expressing Euro-scepticism, they are joined by a new generation republicans

who—despite being less nationalist than the MHP—are also uncomfortable with Europe's attitude to Turkey and sceptical about Turkey's entry into the EU. Kemalists were influenced by European countries' legal and political systems to rule the nation. However, the new generation republicans argue that Turkey has no need to copy Europe, nor to be a member of the EU; because Turkey has been becoming a self-sufficient country (Canefe and Bora 2003, 138). In Burgaz, it is this second discourse of monoculturalism which is articulated by the monoculturalists, who respects diversity and a range of different political views.

For instance, some monoculturalists in Burgaz told me that even though I was a good person who wanted to do research in Burgaz, articulated that British universities gave me funding and supported it; because they wanted to know how people live happily, in harmony all together on the island so that they could "divide and rule" as they did during the colonial times. This implies a conspiracy theory-like scepticism: European countries, like Britain, would want Turkey to enter the EU, they would first want Turkey to disintegrate and accept the "western part of Turkey" (see Yılmaz 2011). Furthermore, the fact that the negotiations for Turkey to join the EU were going badly made these new generation republicans sceptical about what the EU wants from Turkey. For instance, some do not want Turkey to join the EU and be under the EU's hegemony. Unlike those, who favour Turkey's entry to the EU and promote minority rights, human rights and praise the multiculturalism of Turkey, these monoculturalists believe that multiculturalism emphasises differences, ignores the shared values and hence hinders the cohesion within the society.

For instance, Hazar's documentary (2005) received both appreciation and criticism from Burgaz islanders, especially the monoculturalist ones. Several islanders, including male, female, Rum, Alevi, Sunni, Kemalist and Jewish also expressed their criticisms. One summed up their criticism by saying "The documentary was superficial, it talked about who is who, and how diverse the island is; but it did not tell what kinds of relationships people have with each other. The documentary was also too positive. Yes, we are happy on Burgaz, but we also gossip behind each other's back; we are jealous of each other, there are some rich, some poor people. You have to write all of these in your book." The islanders wanted their conviviality and daily life to be represented as realistically as possible including people's worries, tensions and jealousies. For them, conviviality in Burgaz was

not only about happy moments, but also about economic tensions, daily conflicts and jealousy.

One group of monoculturalists frequently socialise at one bay. They were mainly leftist secular Muslims from different ethnic origins. Some of them liked communist and Marxist ideology. Some were strong Kemalists and secularists, who supported the CHP, read the leftist nationalist Kemalist journal *Cumhuriyet* (Republic). One common point between all these people were that they all enjoyed drinking by the bay and eating together in restaurants. I was introduced to this group by an Armenian lady whom I met at another bay and whose neighbours socialise at this bay. I explained my research topic to them and they asked me "Do you have a political agenda behind doing this thesis?" I answered them "I am not supported or funded by a political party or organisation. I am doing research on diversity in Burgaz for my anthropological doctoral thesis, funded by a British university. Hmm... I have seen the documentary of Burgaz and was interested to know what kinds of diversity are in Burgaz and how people interact with each other" When I mentioned the documentary of Burgaz, one lady became very annoyed and said:

> *Mozaik, mozaik*! *Çokkültürlülük*, *çokkültürlülük*, *çokkültürlülük*! That documentary was shot only to show that Burgaz is multicultural. Multiculturalism emphasises the differences. Here in Burgaz there is only one culture and it is the culture of Burgaz! It is not *çokkültürlülük*, it is *tekkültürlülük*! No one talks about what we share on the island! Yes, people have different religions and they practise them in their places of worship, but in life, daily life, we all live together. We share so much and no one talks about it! I was born in Burgaz. We grew up on this island and we live the same life!

A Marxist man jumped in and said: "The concept of *mozaik* and the promotion of differences are "wrong" divisive ideologies. You know, that documentary was made to support the reopening of the closed Rum Orthodox Priest School in Heybeliada. The European Union supports its reopening." A Kemalist man added, "It is the AKP who promotes the reopening of the Priest School because that also implies the opening of Muslim religious schools, Koran courses and Muslim religious cults. This will in the end ruin the secularism and Kemalist ways of governing the country." The EU required Turkey to recognise social diversity, to improve the treatment of the recognised minorities and to recognise both the non-recognised Muslim and non-Muslim ethnic, religious and denominational

groups. In order to meet the criteria to become a member of the EU, the AKP worked on implementing the so-called democratic policies. Erdoğan worked on reopening the Greek Orthodox Seminary in Halki, in Heybeliada, one of the Princes' Islands of Istanbul (Soner 2010). The secularists were apprehensive about the reopening of the Seminary as an autonomous theological institution because this would also allow Muslims to open religious institutions and pursue religious activities without the control of the state (Soner 2010, 38).

This heated conversation was very interesting because, on the one hand, these monoculturalists used the discourse of monoculturalism to emphasise the shared ways of living. On the other hand, they did not ignore religious differences. They highlighted that when multiculturalists talked about differences, they ignored what people share with each other. The monoculturalists emphasis on what they had in common in Burgaz, as a distinctive identity—being Burgazlı—rather than focusing on the religious, linguistic or ethnic differences between them has a similar aspect with the "authentic hybridity" that Ballinger (2003) developed with regard to Istrian[4] identity. Her informants in Istria stressed, "We can't distinguish ourselves as Croat or Slovene or Italian—rather we are Istrians" (Ballinger 2003, 254). Yet, Ballinger also pointed out the inclusions and exclusions which are embedded in what constructs the authentic hybridity of Istrian identity. The "genuine Istrians" include the Latin-Slav cultural fusion, however, the newcomers, such as the Serbs, Bosnians, Kosovars and Albanians are excluded from the "authentic hybridity" of Istria (Ballinger 2003, 245–265). Yet, in Burgaz, the new comers such as the Armenians, Jews, Alevis and Kurdish settlers, as shown in *Kestane Karası* and the documentary of Burgaz and are included in the collective Burgaz identity, which is stressed by the monoculturalists.

The Kemalist man used the monoculturalism discourse to criticise the AKP government. He was sceptical about AKP's pro-EU attitude because he believed that the AKP had a hidden agenda in promoting the rights of the non-Muslims in order to open the religious Koran schools and increase his power. Interestingly, when the Rum Orthodox Priest School was reopened for the first time to the public to display an exhibition, one year after our heated conversation, that Kemalist man and his wife went to see the exhibition. I went with them to the reopening and they were excited to see the school and the exhibition and took many photos. So, these

monoculturalists did not use the discourse of monoculturalism to argue for a radical nationalistic view, they do not ignore people's differences but they do use it to emphasise what people have common in Burgaz and to defend secularism against the AKP's religious agenda.

Their monoculturalism discourse challenge multiculturalism, as a political project, which has a coexistence approach towards cultural pluralism and conceptualises society as divided into "coexisting groups." As postulated by mosaic multiculturalists, Joppke and Lukes, society is formed not only of individuals but also by social groups which have "their own culture and ways of living" (Joppke and Lukes 1999, 5 cited in Cowan 2006, 11). Supranational organisations like the UN and UNESCO see culture as *difference* (Eriksen 2001, 131) and cultures as islands, archipelagos or peninsulas, a mosaic put together (Eriksen 2001, 127). Their mosaic approach to culture and society puts boundaries between "social groups," essentialises "their culture" and assumes that "social groups"—whether ethnic and/or religious—are homogenous within themselves and are separated from each other (Brubaker 2002). Such an attitude fails to see the content and degrees of interactions across communities and the intercultural and intercommunal dialogues; fails to acknowledge the heterogeneity within these groups and neglects the dynamic and organic aspect of culture as a practice and way of living. Similarly, Baumann (1996) also challenges the dominant discourse in British politics, which equates ethnicity, community and culture to each other in a reductive way, yet the way people behave shows that people do not "have" or "own" culture but "make" culture (Baumann 1996, 6). The dominant discourse, rooted in the colonial period, sees communities as separate and distinct entities and affirms that ethnic minorities are defined by their reified cultures and cause social problems for the nation. That kind of reification has the danger of essentialising cultures and equating culture with ethnos implies that cultural differences come from ethnic, biological differences (Baumann 1996, 12). However, descent and race are not biologically but, rather, socially constructed (Baumann 1996, 17). Baumann (1996) criticises this dominant discourse through showing the workings of alternative discourses he defines as demotic where culture is contested within communities, that there is no homogenous shared culture, that culture is contested (Baumann 1996, 2) and that communities are not bounded.

Concluding Remarks

I would like to end this chapter, with one of my informants, Zeynep's, of Keldani Arab origin, discussion of the terms monoculturalism versus multiculturalism on Burgaz. She said:

> If monoculturalism emphasises the solidarity between the islanders and means that we are all equal, then it is a good attitude. However, this monoculturalism should not dominate multiculturalism with the aim of ignoring differences; because for me, Burgaz is the land of freedom, of diversity and togetherness. Burgaz is both monocultural and multicultural, because we all follow our different religions and we all share Burgaz culture.

Liberal and mosaic multiculturalism, and coexistence/toleration see ethno-religious communities as distinct, confined cultures, like archipelagos and mosaics put together and they imply side-by-side living (Keyder 2018; Eriksen 2001; Kymlicka 1995; Taylor 1992; Benhabib 2002). Baban (2018) uses the terms pre-modern multiculturalism to describe the Ottoman social fabric in the nineteenth century, by arguing that during that time, members of the *millets* lived side by side in different neighbourhoods in Istanbul without interacting with each other. Keyder (2018) rather disagrees with this view and uses the term "cosmopolitanism," when he describes Istanbul, its past and present. In cosmopolitanism, communal boundaries are porous, one observes intercommunal mixing, and individuals interact organically with each other. Keyder (2018) sees cosmopolitanism as a resilience mechanism against assimilation, nationalism, homogenisation and authoritarianism. Nonetheless, cosmopolitans are seen as footless and deracinated people (Keyder 2018; Zubaida 2018). Their differences are almost invisible in the ways in which they mingle in the city (see Biehl 2018) and they lack the solidarity and collectivity as they are merely seen as individuals engaging with each other (Radice 2016). Social cohesion is usually related with nationalism and ethnic engineering, which artificially aims to homogenise the diversity within the nation, by creating a superimposed collective national identity and monoculturalism (Larsen 2013). In the case of Turkey, Sunni Turkish Muslim identity was meant to glue the people together, after the collapse of the multicultural and plural Ottoman Empire. An imposed national identity to create social cohesion backfired in Europe and in the Balkans during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the case of Burgaz, it was not the national identity that has created solidarity among the islanders, but the sense of belonging in a local place, shared local identity and shared ways of

living. A national Turkish identity imposed by Turkish governments in order to unify the nation oppressed minorities and non-recognised groups.

Conviviality as a concept that I have developed based on the ethnographic data and interviews with Burgaz islanders, put these terms "multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism and social cohesion" in dialogue with each other and challenges the problems that come with the implications of these terms. Conviviality in Burgaz, on the one hand refers to living with difference, where the islanders perform their differences, whether it is about going to their place of worship and practising their religious rituals, they speak the language they would like to, they can identify themselves as Rum, Jewish or Alevi and articulate their sense of belonging to an ethno-religious community and their difference is appreciated and respected. This refers to the coexistence and multicultural aspect of conviviality as living with difference. Conviviality is also the embodiment of diversity and shared ways of living, when the islanders produce the island culture, through dancing, singing, fishing, working, as well as fighting with each other, or working for the island, by providing services, all of which make them feel as a Burgaz islander and articulate their sense of belonging to Burgaz. Collective embodiment of the island through the diversity of senses is one of the mechanisms of conviviality that "glues" or bonds the islanders to each other. The social cohesion, solidarity and Burgaz identity is based on both being able to live together, embodying diversity, performing syncretic religious practices as well as being different and being appreciated for being different. Hence, multiculturality is the embodiment of diversity, unlike side-by-side living as postulated by mosaic and liberal multiculturalisms. Social cohesion and solidarity are constructed through shared ways of living and living with difference, where multicultural and monocultural living coexist, unlike and in opposition to a superimposed national identity (see Chap. 7). To the contrary, national homogenisation and any attack to the diversity of the island is resisted by acts of solidarity; and conviviality acts as a resilience mechanism for the attacks that puts in danger an islander or the island. Like cosmopolitans, the islanders mingle together, but they are also rooted in Burgaz and articulate a strong sense of being Burgazlı, and show acts of solidarity during crisis times. Embodiment of diversity, shared ways of living and living with difference, all together, enforce social cohesion because the islanders can be different and also embody diversity, form collectivity and articulate a shared Burgazlı identity that is based on diversity, by valuing it, performing it and reproducing it.

Notes

1. NTV, Metro Group, Darussafaka Association, Izel—Levi Coskun, Elba Bant San ve Tic A.S. Istanbul Bilgi Universitesi, Kavaklidere Wines, Goethe Institute Institute, Swedish Consulate Istanbul, Austrian College Association, T.I.T Tekstil, Ilta, Stage Music, Fincan Café, Burgaz Island Police Station, Municipality of the Islands, The islands' Water Sports Club, Burgaz Island Cemevi.
2. Saint George's Day takes place in Ay Yorgi Rum Orthodox Church in Büyükada, the Princes' Island of Istanbul. The majority of the visitors on that particular day are Muslims from Istanbul.
3. Alpaslan Turkes was the previous head of the nationalist MHP. In his quote "Ne mozaiği ulan??" he implies "How come you talk about a mosaic? We are all Turks!"
4. Istria is in western Croatia, bordering Slovenia and the Gulf of Trieste, Italy.

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CHAPTER 4

Exclusions of Conviviality: Negotiation of Space, Ideology, Class, Gender and Lifestyle Differences

Dönüş: Returning to the Island

Every time I go back to Burgaz, I think of Sait Faik's *dönüş* (return) story. When Sait Faik got on the boat, he felt like returning to his home, the island. When I take the boat from Bostancı, a warm feeling, tingling in my stomach starts with the "brum, patapatapata" sound of the boat engine and peaks with the sound of the boat siren. I usually see a few similar faces from Burgaz on the boat. Then the seagulls start following the boat. Some people throw *simit* (a sort of sesame bagel) that they have just bought at the harbour to the seagulls. Leaving Istanbul and returning to Burgaz, makes me feel as if I am going to meet a childhood friend, or visiting an old school or playground. At the back of the boat, the propeller hits the sea and makes the waves, that go wider and wider, distancing the boat from Istanbul. The smell of salt burns my nostrils. The air gets fresher and fresher, and saltier. I leave the seagulls floating on the sea. The boat takes us first to Kınalıada (another Princes' Islands), where some people get off. Then the boat approaches Burgaz. My stomach gets squeezed when I see the bays, trees and rocks of Burgaz, the mosque, the church, the big and finally the small harbour.

While studies on coexistence and toleration describe cohesion and conflict based on ethnic and religious differences (see Chap. 1), in this chapter, I explain cohesion and fragmentation based on negotiations of space,

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class, gender, ideology and different lifestyles, in the ways in which ethnicity and religion intersect with these. I do so, by first taking you for an island tour.

Going for a Walk on Burgaz

You see a line of restaurants (Fig. 4.1) on your right as soon as you jump from the Mavi Marmara boat, few big buckets with *lüfer* (bluefish) swimming in them, sailing and fishing boats, and seagulls floating on the shore. Lots and lots of cats sit, walk and play at the harbour, in between the restaurants. There were not so many cats on the island, neither in Istanbul, in 2009, when I did my long-term fieldwork, but now their numbers have increased incredibly. The restaurants owners yell to invite and attract customers, especially those who visit the island from Istanbul, the non-islanders.

If you do not take the street of the restaurants, but keep going straight into the island, then towards the left, it gets quieter and quieter. Daytrippers do not know much about this part of the island. There is Cemevi (Alevi gathering house) with its tea garden, which is very much liked by the islanders. If you keep going, the streets get narrower, and the houses more asymmetrical. You will see damp, colourful clothes hanging on ropes in

Fig. 4.1 Burgaz seaside, in between the two harbours (photo taken by the author)

between two trees and it looks like a small village (see Fig. 4.6), with chickens and roosters walking hastily, little chicks running and a donkey roaring. You can see seagulls, cats and crows eating together cat food left by the islanders.

If you walk along the line of the restaurants and follow the coast, the noise and the rush of the daytrippers continue, especially when the weather is good. A few years ago, when you passed the patisserie, the grocery shops, a playground, you would start smelling the horse poo. The smell would get very intense when you passed by the horse cart parking slot. However, the horse carts, and the smell of the horse poo, which used to be one of the symbols of the islands, were decided to be taken away by the Istanbul municipality, due to horse plague that spread among the horses. We also heard the rumour that the horses on the islands, especially in Büyükada were treated badly and this had an effect on this decision. The horse cart riders in Burgaz protested that they took very good care of the horses. This created further rumours on the island that these horses were left to die, after the removal of the horse carts. The horse cart riders were compensated by a big lump sum for the loss of their job and means of earning. Instead, electric cars, were implemented to provide transportation within the island. There are mixed reactions to these electric vehicles. For the elderly and those who have difficulty with mobility, these were very convenient as they were cheap and very functional. For some others, that is having a negative impact as it fastens the pace of the island, lessens the opportunity for the islanders to walk on the paths of the island.

Behind the street of restaurants, there is the *çarşı* (shopping area): four small grocery shops, two patisseries, one post office, two grocers, water and gas sellers, some small snack and sandwich places and one pharmacy. When you go straight from the harbour towards the centre, just around the newspaper kiosk, there are stands of cheap jewellery, clothes, second-hand books and souvenir-type objects displayed and sold mainly during summer. The clients are usually the non-islander tourists, who visit the island on day trips. However, summer inhabitants also drop by to have a look. The centre is a place where people stroll, look at stalls and bump into each other near restaurants and cafes. Thus, there are always groups of people standing and chatting, and time is extended on the island, because you will always see someone you know, stop to talk, join people's tables or join people for a stroll. There are also some benches at the edges of the centre so that people can sit, drink beer or eat sunflower seeds.

The centre is inhabited by all different ethnic, class and religious groups. The neighbourhood immediately behind the harbour and the centre itself, close to the restaurants and the two social clubs, are areas inhabited by Jews, Sunni Muslims, Germans and Armenians, most of whom are summer inhabitants. The centre, the left side from the harbour, all the way to the peak are prestigious neighbourhoods. Among the summer inhabitants some prefer to be closer to the centre and the social clubs, while some prefer to live higher up, to enjoy the serenity, away from the crowd, watching the panorama of the other two Princes' Islands, Heybeli and Kaşıkadası. Most of the old wooden mansions (see Figs. 4.2 and 4.3) are owned by these summer residents. These mansions were designed and built by Armenian and Rum architects, mostly at the end of the nineteenth century (Tuğlacı 1992). They are spread in between the centre and the peak of the island. When you keep walking towards the right of the harbour, the roads will go higher up and will take you to Ay Nikola, whose name is changed to Turgut Reis (In Turkish), where the inhabitants are mainly Zaza and Kurdish Alevis and Sunni Muslims. The houses in Ay Nikola are concrete constructions, most of them built by the permanent inhabitants themselves. While the population lessens in the neighbourhoods close to the centre in winter when most of the summer inhabitants move back to Istanbul, the population in Ay Nikola remains almost the same.

If you go further up towards the peak of the island, the neighbourhood is composed of mixed summer islanders such as Sunnis, Armenians and Suryanis. When you go all the way up, you pass by the Austrian chapel, and then you reach Hristos, whose Rum name is changed to Bayraktepe, which mean the hill of the flag. You see a Turkish flag up there. There is the Metamorphosis church and the Rum Orthodox cemetery there. Every time I climb up, I feel the leg muscles getting tenser and tenser and when I wake up the next day, the soreness in my leg muscles remind me that I have been to Hristos. Despite the Turkification of the names in the case of Ay Nikola and Hristos, most of the islanders, use the older versions of the names (see Saglam 2022). When you walk to the back of the island, there is Kalpazankaya. Its name comes from the big rock at the shore, where according to a legend, people use to forge fake money. Today, there is a restaurant nearby, where one can watch a beautiful sunset (Fig. 4.4) and look over the two inhabitant islands, Yassıada and Issıada.

One of my female Rum informants said when we were having lemonade in one of the social clubs said: "Space is important. Where you live on the island hints your status. If you lived in a poorer neighbourhood and

Fig. 4.2 A mansion (photo taken by the author)

Fig. 4.3 Another mansion (photo taken by the author)

Fig. 4.4 Sunset from Kalpazankaya (photo taken by the author)

move to a richer one, the islanders will remind you "You used to live in Ay Nikola? Now you live higher up near the Catholic church." Bearing in mind my informant's quote "space is important," in this chapter, I explore the sharing of space, spatial negotiations, inclusions and exclusions that are drawn by space, class, ideology, gender, tastes and differences in lifestyles. I begin by exploring the islanders' memories, the social use of space and the social division of labour (Lefèbvre 1991), and the ways in which class difference is experienced on/in people's bodies. Lefèbvre suggests that every society produces its own space through appropriating and modifying it (Lefèbvre 1991, 31, 35). He uses the analysis of social space "as a tool for the analysis of society" (Lefèbvre 1991, 34) and states that as "space embodies social relationships" one can explore space to analyse the social relations that are embedded in it (Lefèbvre 1991, 27). Inspired by Öz and Eder (2018), I question whose norms, ideologies, values and hegemonic claims mark spatial exclusions and inclusions, and how these are negotiated. I, then, explore how Burgaz islanders differentiate

themselves from non-Burgazians and articulate a shared Burgaz identity, performed through their collective Burgaz habitus. Building on Doreen Massey's (2005) "throwntogetherness," I dig into the ways in which the islanders use public and open spaces, and contest and negotiate spatial boundaries of closed places.

Who Owns the Sea, the Sun and the Summer?

In this section, I explore the islanders' memories to document changes in demography, in the division of labour and social life on the island. According to Orhan and the summer inhabitants, whose parents lived on Burgaz during the early years of the Republic, in the 1920s and 1930s, most of the island population used to be Rums. The permanent inhabitants of Burgaz, such as restaurant and coffee shop owners, storekeepers, fishermen, bakers and grocers were all Rums. The government officials and civil servants, who were very few in number, were Sunni Muslims and were referred to as "Turks." The summer inhabitants, were mostly Rums, Ashkenazi Jews, Germans and Austrian nuns. Jewish *Burgazh* (of/from Burgaz) were upper-class elites compared to the Jewish middle-lower/working-class *esnaf* (small business owner) of Heybeliada (another Princes' Islands). *Burgazhlar* (plural of *Burgazh*) were also productive and self-efficient in the sense that they did fishing, gardening, beekeeping and growing flowers, vegetables and fruit. The Austrian nuns produced dairy products. One of my Rum informants, Niko, said that whatever was produced on the island was consumed on Burgaz and the excess of the flowers were sent to Istanbul to be sold. Some of these producers were also highly educated, such as Taso, the Rum gardener, who was a graduate of the private German high school, which is one of the best private schools in Turkey. The permanent inhabitants produced, and the summer inhabitants enjoyed whatever the permanent islanders could offer them. There were small business owners like *bakkal* (grocer), and water seller. There were five *gazinos* (taverns), where the islanders ate, drank, danced and had fun.

The Rum permanent inhabitants of Burgaz and the elite summer inhabitants socialised regardless of class differences, which I refer to as "classless sociable sociality." For instance, in Bercuhi Berberyan's (2010, 176) memoire book on Burgaz, she wrote: "There was, in fact, no class difference. Rich, poor, medical doctor, artist, the anchor man … you name it … like going to fish together, drinking at the same tavern, play together,

singing together on the street … can share the same pleasure/joy in its deepest sincerity (my own translation)." She recalls that the son of the shoemaker (Alevi from Erzincan), the Jewish, Rum and Muslim summer inhabitants played together, while the Rum fisherman (lower socio-economic background) and wealthy Jewish, Muslim summer inhabitants ate and drank together in the harbour or in their homes. The Rums took the lead in the making of the island culture, and the islanders from different faiths and classes kept it as a cultural heritage. There were only Rum Orthodox churches as places of worship (the mosque was built in 1953). The Sunni Muslims, who were in charge of the security and who held public positions like the police and the postman, also enjoyed this cultural heritage and saw themselves as the protector of these, such as protecting the island, from the invaders coming from Istanbul, during the 6–7 September 1955 pogrom. This cultural heritage is embodied, performed, is still alive and incorporated in different forms in people's everyday life (see Alivizatou 2012; Saglam 2022). Whoever migrated to the island, embodied the island life and its cultural heritage.

While Bourdieu's (1990) habitus is class bound and rather homogenous, in the sense that a particular class internalises the rules of the game, the social order and then reproduces it, the habitus of Burgaz islanders is heterogeneous. It is heterogeneous in the sense that the summer inhabitants from different ethno-religious backgrounds bring in their diverse habitus to Burgaz life, while at the same time they embody and reproduce Burgaz culture, such as the collective dancing, fishing and drinking that will be told in Orhan's narrative in Chap. 5. Hence, the summer islanders have a complex set of habitus, influenced by their upbringing in Istanbul, their family, school and social life in Istanbul as well as the island life. This heterogeneous habitus values "exclusive diversity" (Örs 2018) of permanent Burgaz islanders and of those urban Istanbulite summer inhabitants. In the 1950s, Sephardic Jews from Heybeliada and different parts of Istanbul started to move to Burgaz as summer inhabitants. They signed up to the only social club on the island, the Blue Social Club. Even though they were not as upper class as the Ashkenazi Jews as Burgaz, they were from Istanbul and they adapted rather easily to the island. Being a member of the social club, where the members were from diverse ethno-religious background helped in their integration to Burgaz life. As their numbers kept increasing, they also got the permission to have a synagogue built and running in the summer months of 1968.

However, for the Alevis who migrated from Erzincan, Eastern Anatolia to do menial jobs in Burgaz, in the 1940s and onwards, their adaptation to the island life and its exclusive diversity, was more difficult due to rural-urban, education and class differences between themselves and the islanders. The differences in reflecting on the 1940s and 1950s in Burgaz concurred with Passerini's (1987, 1992) statement that masses of people do not remember the same way, the same things. Passerini (1979, 1987) has a neo-Marxist, Lukacsian and Gramscian emphasis, while investigating memories of fascism in Italy through the experiences of Turin's working class. Passerini (1987, 1992) shows the ways in which the memories and reflections of the past of the oppressed class differ from those of the dominant class. While the years prior to the 1950s (before the 1955 pogrom) are remembered mainly as joyful and harmonious times for the non-Muslims and the Sunni Muslim summer inhabitants, like Orhan; these were class-based memories and it was not the case for the male Alevi workers, who came to Burgaz to do menial jobs. Those, who migrated from Erzincan, referred to themselves and were also referred by the island inhabitants as Alevis or *Erzincanlı* (from Erzincan). Depending on the context, if they would like to emphasise their Alevi identities, they refer to themselves as Alevis, and if they would like to highlight the locality where they come from, then they talk about themselves as *Erzincanlı*. For the Alevis/Erzincanlı, the 1940s and 1950s were years of hardship, adaptation and suffering. After the 1938 uprisingin Dersim (see Chap. 2), the devastating 1939 earthquake and the following economic scarcity, many people in the region started migrating to big cities. First, a couple of Alevis/Erzincanlı families, then, more male migrants came from Erzincan to Burgaz in the 1940s. They worked during the summer season and took back what they earned to their families in Erzincan. The Alevis/Erzincanlı men did menial jobs, such as helping the Rum fishermen reel in nets, when they came back from fishing. They worked as *hamal*, carrying the furniture of the summer inhabitants, when they moved to the island in the summers, and when they moved back to Istanbul for the winter. The Alevi men also built and restored houses, and worked as waiters and helpers in grocery shops, restaurants and cafes. The building sector in Burgaz had been increasing; there was also a sewage project in Burgaz (see Chap. 8) and new job opportunities came up. They worked as doorkeepers and gardeners in Rum houses (especially in the Ay Nikola area, which is higher up, away from the town centre), where they were given rooms or flats in which to stay. The *zangoç* (verger) of the Rum Orthodox churches in

Burgaz explained to me the story of how Ay Nikola became an Alevi neighbourhood. He said: "Alevis came to work temporarily in summer. Most of them worked in Garipi monastery, in Ay Nikola, painting walls, and fixing things for the church. The priest, who was in charge of the church at that time, let the Alevis settle in the Ay Nikola area, near the Garipi church. Hence, they built small houses and made them bigger when they brought their family to the island." Thus, Ay Nikola started to become an Alevi neighbourhood.

My male Alevis/Erzincanlı informants always began their migration story with the difficulties they faced, when they started working. The tensions that arose between the Rums and the Alevis were triggered by class differences as well as lifestyle differences. The Istanbulite summer inhabitants and permanent Burgazlı, did not first appreciate the presence of an Anatolian culture on the island. What people wore in Istanbul and Burgaz, and in Erzincan, and how people talked in these two different regions were markers of difference. The summer people in Burgaz wore bathing suits and modern European clothes such as shorts and t-shirts. When women went out in the afternoon, they wore perfume and elegant evening dresses. The non-Muslim women used to go to the harbour in the evening with their children, dressed-up and with full of perfume, to welcome their husbands, who came from their work in Istanbul. The islanders, especially the Sunni Muslims and Alevis/Erzincanlı recall that the air smelled perfume as the non-Muslim women walked down the harbour. The Alevis/Erzincanlı grew up in villages in Erzincan. They wore modest and comfortable clothes to work in the fields and did not have elegant or fashionable outfit. There were also differences in accents. Alevis from Erzincan spoke Zazaki and a version of Turkish that has a harder accent, in which letters like "k" and "g" are emphasised and syllables are rolled in their throat. In Istanbul, these letters are softer and the syllables are rolled in the mouth. In Burgaz, people sprinkle their speech with many Rum and Ladino words, as well.

Nuri (one of the previous heads of the *cemevi*/Alevi gathering house) commented that in the times of his father's generation, there was tension between Rum employees and Alevi/Erzincanlı workers. The Rums, who worked in the building sector, constructing walls and painting, employed Alevis/Erzincanlıs as their assistants. His father's generation wanted to have more experience in the building sector. The Rums gave menial jobs to Alevis, such as carrying the cement, while they (Rums) performed the main duties of making the walls. Some of these Alevi male workers

complained that when they wanted to learn to paint the walls, the Rums did not let them. The Alevi men with whom I spoke, interpreted this as "the Rums did not want us to learn more and be better, because we might take their jobs." Nuri and Mustafa said that their fathers were among the first Alevis to come to work in Burgaz and were looked down upon because they did menial jobs. For instance, Mustafa, whose father was a shoemaker, said: "The Rums used to call us 'kıro.' When we passed near them, they said 'To kıro einai' [He is *kıro*], and we started fighting with each other." Although the sentence was in Rumca, the word *kıro* comes from Kurdish and is used in Turkish as a derogatory term for someone uneducated and ill-mannered. These two Alevi informants recall that when they were children, the rich Rum children used to exclude them because they were *kıro*. Nuri said:

> When we wore shorts, t-shirts, and sunglasses, they [Rums] used to belittle us and make fun of us. I was very upset about this because it was as if we did not have the right to wear these clothes and accessories. The Rums behaved as if they owned the sun and the summer.

Those, who make the hegemonic claims in Burgaz are those, who "own the sun, the summer and the sea." Similar to Öz and Eder (2018); Celik (2017); Çelik and Gough (2014), who build on Lefèbvre's (1967) right to the city; Burgaz islanders ask, "who owns the sea, the sun and the summer?" While the permanent Rum inhabitants could balance labour and leisure, such as fishing, then eating and drinking and having fun in *gazinos*, the Alevis/Erzincanlı could only work and missed out from the fun. As there were more work in the summer, they missed out the most from the summer fun, the sun and the sea. They had very long hours in doing a set of menial jobs back-to-back, helping the fisherman and then carrying luggage and boxes of the summer inhabitants and so on; they did not have the time and the energy to enjoy the island, such as swimming. As they came from Erzincan, which is formed of mountains, hills and valleys, where people do agriculture and farming, they also did not know the life of the seamen. Alevis/Erzincanlı's embodiment of Burgaz was different than the rest of the islanders. They embodied Burgaz through labour, hardship and tensions. They have also learnt labour from the Rums, such as how to fish, how to cook it and serve it, how to make mezes and so on. They have embodied Burgaz through fighting with other kids, when they played marbles on the street. Many Erzincanlı also recall that they used to

speak Rumca. The islanders, regardless of their faith and class, all knew Rumca. Nuri also recalled that Rum women treated them well, giving food and clothes to them and being hospitable towards Alevi children. This also raises a significant gender issue, because, while there was tension between the male Rum employers and the male Alevi employees, the Rum women apparently behaved in a maternal way towards Alevi children. While Nuri articulated that it was hard for them to adapt to island life and that there was tension between the previous settlers and themselves, he also emphasised that he was a part of the island conviviality, attending church, playing marbles and fighting with Rum children. All of these class-based bitter-sweet memories of conviviality comprised of labour, hardship and some fun, made Burgaz his home. The frictions and tensions are not attributed to ethnic and religious differences, as they would be referred in practices of coexistence/toleration, but to differences in socio-economic backgrounds and lifestyles. In that sense, the conviviality that Nuri was part of was not a passive, non-interference type of coexistence/toleration, but is an active interaction and bonding that was learnt through playing, participating as well as fighting.

Similar to the relationship between the Rums and the Alevis/Erzincanlı, the Kurds (from Muş, Van and Ağrı), who settled to the island later (in 1980s onwards) had frictions with the Alevis/Erzincanlı. While some Alevis/Erzincanlı, share similar ethnicity with the Kurds from south-eastern Turkey, they differ in terms of faith and lifestyle. Alevis (of Zaza, Kurdish, Turkmen descent) from Eastern Anatolia, like Dersim, are mostly Kemalist, secular, more left wing and progressive, while most of the Kurds from the South-Eastern Anatolia (Muş, Van and Ağrı), are Sunnis, and can be more conservative in lifestyle, practising religion and supporting the AKP, for instance. Those from Erzincan are mostly Alevis, and those from Muş, Van and Ağrı are mostly Sunni Kurds, and when each group would like to mark the difference in lifestyle and religion between them in a reductionist way, they might use the binary of "us" and "them." For instance, when a Kurdish Alevi from Erzincan/Dersim region reflects about their way of living, their Kemalist and secular ideology, the importance of women in the society; they might talk about the Sunni Kurdish man or woman from Muş, Ağrı or Van as "*they* are more conservative" or "*they* have less gender inequality." One can hence mark socio-economic, religious and lifestyle differences between these two groups, when they talk about each other. In a similar way to how Alevis/Erzincanlı felt some kind of oppression from the Rum inhabitants, the Sunni Kurds from

south-eastern Anatolia were also challenged by the Alevis/Erzincanlı. In this way, oppression of the new coming migrants from lower-economic status and their upward social mobility through hard work, savings, buying property and then passing the oppression to the next set of migrants is "*nöbetleşe yoksulluk*" (taking turns in poverty) (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu 2012). Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2012) conceptualised this phenomenon as such, when they explored gentrification and the migration from rural Anatolian villages to urban settings, in Istanbul. New migrants go through the same patterns of poverty, work, oppression and when they move upwards, and behave similarly to the new settlers.

And still today, power is negotiated between those, who has the right to the sea, the sun and the summer, and those do not. Those who "own the sun, the sea and the summer" are wealthy summer inhabitants from all ethnic and religious backgrounds. They own or rent the most beautiful houses on the island, and most of them have a membership to one of the two social clubs on Burgaz. These two social clubs are near the harbour and in a way block the entry to the sea. Before these clubs were built, the islanders swam in the sea, right there. The enclosure of space (see Jeffrey et al., 2012) blocking the access to the seaside and the exclusive membership of these social clubs are apprehended by those, who cannot afford membership. One of my Alevi informants, who cannot afford this price, told me with contempt: "people built the clubs at the best places on the island and exclude other people from using that space. Those people block the access to the sea, why do they have an exclusive right to the sea and to the beauty of the island?" In the next section, I explore exclusions of conviviality and the negotiation of space, class, ideology and hegemonic claims among the islanders.

Social Clubs: Class Difference, Inclusions and Exclusions

Bourdieu (2010) in his *Distinction* argues that tastes and lifestyles are class bounded and that those who have high level of cultural and economic capital have similar tastes, lifestyles activities and hobbies that they can afford and enjoy. Building on Lefèbvre (1991) and Bourdieu (2010), what I would like to show in this section is that those, who are from the upper-middle class make hegemonic claims in terms of who have access to the social clubs and what kind of club lifestyle they should have.

Nonetheless, unlike in *Distinction* (Bourdieu 2010), the upper-middle-class inhabitants have a variety of tastes and lifestyles on the island. Around seventy percent of the summer inhabitants pass their time in the two social clubs. The common ground among members is financial status and education, both of which provide access to similar professional and social opportunities. Those summer islanders, who choose not to join the clubs either cannot afford their fees or do not like the "club style" of living, in which members spend the entire summer in one bounded, modern construct and in which one socialises with the same people every day. For example, some actors, journalists and writers (who have the cultural capital and who might also have the economic capital) often prefer not to join the clubs. Instead, they choose less visible and less crowded places to socialise, and to enjoy the sea and the sun. They might choose a bay, sit or lie on the rocks on the shore, and swim in various entry points to the sea.

The physical boundaries of the social clubs translate into social boundaries between members and non-members. This social division may also be perceived as a class division, as many people perceive the failure to join a social club as an inability to pay its fees. As the summer is the time for the permanent inhabitants to make money, even though some of them can afford it, they do not have time to relax in social clubs, hence they cannot be a part of the club lifestyle. While the summer people enjoy the sea, relax and use the clubs as leisure places, these are places of work for the permanent inhabitants. The social division of labour prevents the permanent islanders to take part in the sociable sociality of the summer inhabitants. This is something that we can see in the social clubs, where the summer inhabitants are bathing, chilling and playing games in their tanned skin and bathing suits, while the permanent islanders are working, sweating in their t-shirts and pants/shorts attached to their untanned skin. The people who work in the social clubs as waiters, cleaners and security are among the permanent inhabitants and are mainly Sunni Turks and Kurds, and Alevi Zazas and Kurds. The differences between the club members, who lounge and sunbathe and the waiters, who serve them in t-shirts and trousers become etched on their skin through the evenness or not of their suntans. They also become visible as bodies in motion: While the members relax and nap, swim or suntan, the waiters whirl around them, serving teas, refreshments, sandwiches, salads and snacks. Even though, we see the exclusion of the permanent islanders from the sociable sociality of Burgaz, they are still a part of the island conviviality, because their bodies experience the hardship of work, of running under the heat, serving food and

drinks and hence they know that they produce the food and the services for the islanders and then in winter it will be their time to relax and enjoy the calm of the island, while the summer inhabitants will be back at work.

Once I was on the boat from Burgaz to Istanbul to go to a concert and I saw a few Burgazlı, whom called for me "come Deniz sit here, join our *muhabbet* (chat)." One of the organising committee members of the social club (Sunni Muslim), Onur, was sitting next to Hüseyin, one of the workers (Zaza Alevi). Hüseyin works for some of the inner constructions of the club. Onur told me "Deniz, meet Hüseyin, he is one of the *eski* (early settler) islanders. Hüseyin and I can tell you how the island used to be." Hüseyin said, "My family moved to Burgaz in the 1960s form Erzincan when I was 14. Since then, I have done all sorts of work." Onur jumped in "yes Hüseyin is very hardworking." Hüseyin continued: "After having lived in Burgaz for 41 years on the island, it was the first time I have climbed to Hristos." Hristos is at the peak of the island, has an amazing view over the Princes' Islands and Istanbul (Fig. 4.5) and it is a place,

Fig. 4.5 Sunset from Hristos (photo taken by the author)

where the islanders go for a picnic, chill under the trees and enjoy the view. Onur joked: "you people of the centre, you never go up and to other places on the island and enjoy the nature and the beauties of the island!" Hüseyin replied: "I have been working like a donkey and never had the time for such pleasures." Onur said in a quieter and embarrassed tone "yes, you are right…" This conversation marks the ways in which Burgaz is experienced as a space of leisure by the upper-middle-class summer islanders, while it is a space of work for the permanent inhabitants. Sometimes, the summer inhabitants might forget this difference.

In terms of conviviality, the social clubs on the one hand try to create a collective space where the islanders can socialise and raise their children together. The children of Burgaz can be members without paying the fee, if they swim or play water polo for the Sports Club team. If they play until the age of eighteen, then they become permanent members without paying the membership (one off lump sum), however they still need to pay the yearly fee, for every year they want to come to the social club. For instance, the Burgaz islanders with lower socio-economic backgrounds, who moved to Burgaz for employment reasons could not afford to be a member of the club. However, their children, who played for Burgaz team became club members. During the 30 August Victory Day races, the non-member parents go to cheer up their children during the races. This shows the club's appreciation for sports and for raising the island's children together. Children learn to compete with each other and become lifelong friends. This highlights the importance of bonding, of Burgaz children to grow together, of building solidarity through playing and competing against each other and of becoming more than friends, almost like kin. This also reflects their self-representation of being Burgazlı as being a part of a big family.

On the other hand, the social clubs imply exclusive conviviality by promoting a club lifestyle, which is rather luxurious and excludes lower-class, lower-income islanders from being part of the club sociable sociality. The social clubs then strive to create an environment that reproduces a sense of privilege. Those, who run the clubs decide on the rules of inclusion and exclusion based on their values and political ideology. For instance, they value sports and would like all Burgaz children to grow together. The organising committee members of the Sports Club (SC) are mostly Kemalists, sometimes nationalists. They stress their Kemalist ideology, which includes following Atatürk's reforms such as secularism, and being attached to the Turkish nation and to the Turkish Republic (Ahmad 2002,

81). SC organises concerts, music and dance nights, 30 August Victory Day parties and dinners, and celebrations of the foundation of the SC. All the children of the island compete in swimming races on the victory day, 30th of August each year, the last day of "kicking the enemies out of the country" in 1922. The organisers of the SC give emotive talks on the Victory Day about the end of the Turkish independence war. As everywhere in Turkey, the national anthem is sung. All the children have Atatürk pictures and Turkish flags in their hands. Many workers and waiters in the club are Alevis, who also support the secularist ideology. For instance, Alevis consume alcohol, do not wear headscarf, do not fast during Ramadan, are fond of Atatürk and secularism, and politically object to the dominance of Sunni Islam. In a way secularism is a resistance mechanism for the Alevis to fight against the domination of Sunni Islam. Hence, Alevis also "fit" very well as members, workers and waiters in the club.

I came across a rule of exclusion to the SC, at the end of my fieldwork in 2010. I gave two presentations about the raw findings of my fieldwork data to the islanders in August 2010, before I left to the UK to write up my PhD thesis. One presentation was at the SC club and another one in Ay Yorgi. One of my embroidery class friends, a woman in her forties, who wore a headscarf, came to listen to my fieldwork presentation in the SC club. The security told me that normally she (or anyone who wears a headscarf) would not be allowed there, but they let her in as she was there to listen to my presentation. Not allowing women with headscarf can be/is articulated as a discourse of intoleration; nonetheless, when it comes to practice, this is not strictly applied. Nobody has reminded of "such a rule of exclusion" to my embroidery class friend with the headscarf, who entered the SC and listened to my presentation.

Debates between secularists and Islamists revolve around the issue of women's dress. The contestation between these two groups has made women the centre of attention of politics of gender (see Göle 1997; Kaya 2013). In 1924, the Kemalist government implemented a dress code law, prohibiting all public display of religion, rejecting the veiling of women, with the aim of Westernisation and modernisation of the citizens of the Republic (Kaya 2013, 161). This prevented women with veil or headscarf to work in public institutions, or study, for instance. Since then, headscarf has been a point of contestation of power and polarisation among Islamists and secularists. The governments at different times inserted and lifted the ban of headscarf in public places (see Kaya 2013 for the changes of law regarding headscarf ban). During the years of my fieldwork (2009–2010),

the headscarf was discussed in a heated way. Right before my presentation in the SC, in July 2010, the Board of Higher education had lifted the headscarf ban at universities, with the argumentation that it prevents women to get education and that the ban is against the fundamental rights secured by the constitution and the European Constitution of Human Rights (Kaya 2013, 165). Following that, while some universities lifted the ban, some kept it. Today, even though there is no headscarf ban, it is a social issue of contestation in between those, who consider themselves to be secular and those religious ones. Some secularists see the headscarf both as a symbol against Kemalism and Atatürk, and as a display of Islamist political ideology. For instance, secularist women refer to Atatürk's change of dress code, banning veil and headscarf and stress that Atatürk liberated women from the constraints of religion (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 21). Nonetheless, wearing a headscarf can have many different underlying reasons, such as being modest, conservative, traditional, or to wear it for working in the field. Nonetheless, wearing a headscarf cannot be reduced to the display of modesty; as an over focus on the politics of the headscarf as a symbol of negotiating modesty in public undermines the different forms of modesty regarding women's visibility in the public, such as manners, behaviour, body language posture, and language used (see Sehlikoglu 2021).

On the island, those who were referred as "Second Republicans (*Ikinci Cumhuriyetçiler*)" had a more liberal attitude towards wearing a headscarf and support more freedom regarding the minorities, Kurds and Alevis. The committee of SC was not in agreement with the Second Republicans in Burgaz. The committee had a rather exclusive attitude towards women with headscarf. Being a devout practising Muslim man or a woman was not the issue of toleration for the social club. There are people, who pray namaz and or fast, and refuse drinking alcohol and they can be a member or they can enter the club after 7 pm, when the SC is open to everyone. Having a Muslim life is perfectly fine in the SC, as long as it is not "too visible," like wearing a headscarf. As Kaya (2013) argues the headscarf debate focused more on the appearance of women in the public space, evokes a discourse of toleration as allowance rather than evaluating it as an issue of freedom of religion.

Nonetheless, both exclusions, the one due to class difference and the one due to political ideology were negotiated: the club doors are open after 7 pm, and all day long in the winter time; non-members can have tea, eat or to just hang out in the evening. Everyone can watch movies (both

foreign and Turkish films) that are screened for free at the SC every Tuesday evening. Hence the non-members can join the conviviality in the clubs in the evenings. Nonetheless, this rule still prevents their access to the sea in the day time during the summer time. My friend from the embroidery class, who wore a headscarf could still enter the SC club to listen to my presentation, where members, non-members of the club and some people from the organising committee were also present. In SC, there are battles of egos especially among the men. When men disagree with each other about rules and regulations in the SC, about discussing political news they have read in the newspaper, or about daily matters, they can quarrel with each other. These battles of egos and power sometimes include ideology disagreements, which can trigger discourses of intoleration; but they are negotiated as practices of everyday coexistence, because they still allow people to share the same space even though temporarily. Exclusive conviviality limits the time of contact with those from different classes and ideologies, nonetheless, the tensions and frictions that are caused by it are negotiated and solved. I have not come across the headscarf to be an issue of exclusion in other places on Burgaz, especially among the permanent women Burgaz islanders. I attended the embroidery class that runs throughout winter. The attending women were permanent Burgaz islanders, who ranged from wealthy Kemalist women, to Sunni Muslims of Turkish and Kurdish ethnicity with different socio-economic backgrounds. Some wear a headscarf and some do not. There are also money or gold rotating groups, which are a type of rotation credit associations (see Ardener 1964; Khatib-Chahidi 1995), where a group of women agree on a sum of money or a small piece of gold; who and how many people join this rotation group; how often they meet/make a reunion (e.g. one a month, or every two weeks): they take turns in hosting the reunion at their home, cook and prepare food and refreshments; every woman gives the agreed amount of money (or piece of gold) to the host. In Turkey and Cyprus, the reunion day is called "*gün*" (day) (see Khatib-Chahidi 1995). For instance, if they agree in bringing, each, 200 liras for every *gün* to give to the host, and there are ten women in the rotation group, then the host gets 2000 liras on the day when she hosts the reunion. Like this, each host, when it is their turn, get 2000 liras. This helps each woman to save money and use it for whatever they need (e.g. buy a new washing machine). I also observed one money rotation group among Sunni Muslim women, who practised Islam, and they were a mixed group, some with a headscarf, some without. I did not participate in the exchange

of money; however, I tried to attend every *gün* as possible, brought something to eat and share, helped the host to prepare, played with the small children of the guests or the host, and helped cleaning up. During both the embroidery class and the rotation group, the women enjoyed sociable sociality.

The SC is still one of the most mixed places on the island. Rums, Armenians, some Jews, Suryanis, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Italians, Levantines, Muslims and Germans are among the 2000–2500 members of the club, who are willing and able to pay the steep membership costs. They use the swimming pools, benefit from the facilities, swim in the sea, sunbathe, eat, drink and socialise. Permanent/life-long membership cost 22,500 TL in 2019 (3000 GBP in 2019), which is quite high for a country where the minimum monthly wage used to be around 2500 TL in 2019. Once you become a permanent member, you only pay 1500 TL (200 GBP) per season for each member of your family. The parents, the spouse and the children count as family members; however, siblings or cousins do not. If you want to become a member for one season only, it cost 5000 TL (650 GBP) per person. Whenever the members have guests, the guest has to pay around 100 liras (12 GBP) during weekdays, and double the price at the weekends. Thus, if you are not a member or you do not know anyone who can let you in as a guest, you are not allowed to enter the club during the daytime. Joining the club is also one way of building friendships and perform sociable sociality, so some new summer inhabitants become members to meet people and build networks.

One might expect the SC members to be rather homogenous in terms of having similar tastes and lifestyles as they belong to upper-middle class, like in Bourdieu's Distinction (2010). However, we rather see many different fragmentations of people, who cluster in groups of similar age, political views, gender and tastes. For example, a section of the club that is covered and looks like a green cage is the area primarily used by the organisers and committee of the SC. The "green cage" is at the very end of the club and relatively detached from the rest of the club. Most of those, who use the "green cage" are men, who read newspapers and work on their laptops. Their small talk tends to be about politics and football. Their wives are divided into two groups, the ones who prefer the shade and the ones who want to suntan and become as dark as they can. The women who prefer the shade pick the "green cage" or the tables underneath the huge parasol. They play scrabble, talk about daily news, politics and gossip or use their laptops to check Facebook, Instagram and Twitter.

Older people choose to sit next to the café, because it is shaded and cooler, the chairs are more comfortable, and they can order teas, refreshments and snacks more easily. The women, who are fond of sunbathing sit in the sun away from the huge parasol. The people with children sit by the children's swimming pool at the entrance of the club. The young people prefer to lie down on big cushions or chaise-longues at the edge of the swimming pool, which is distant from the children's pool, the cafe and older people. This part is not under the shade, thus young people sunbathe there. Friendship groups are ethnically and linguistically mixed, nonetheless, people, who speak the same languages and who are from the same ethnic and religious backgrounds also sit together. While passing through different tables, I heard Armenians, Germans and Rums speaking in their own language to each other. People mostly speak Turkish, but people, who grew up together on Burgaz are polyglots, and they switch between Rumca, Italian, French, German and Armenian. Those, who know each other from the church also sometimes sit together. For instance, after having been to the Rum-Orthodox mass on Sunday, some Rums might sit together in the club and converse in Rumca, and some Catholics might sit together as well. People change language according to the linguistic knowledge of the ones who join. These groups do not always remain the same. Depending on the activity, scrabble, embroidery or having tea, people hop around from one group to another. These friendship groups are organic in the sense that people hang out with those they have something in common, which could be liking the sun, or disliking it, sharing similar ethnicity, language or religion, being of the same age range or having small children.

The Blue Social Club has different patterns of conviviality than the SC. The BC members have a more luxurious lifestyle. The members can cluster themselves into groups of similar age, gender and liking similar games. In the morning, the elderly people sit at the entrance of the club, where it is quieter and shadier or play cards or billiard on the second floor. "Oldies but goldies" slow songs in French, Spanish and English are played in the morning. After 2–3 pm, when it gets very hot and the music gets louder, the elderly leave. More upbeat tracks start being played and the music is much louder than in the SC. Young people in the BC come to the club to have fun, dance, drink and socialise. People dance on the chaise-longues and couples kiss each other. It is a bit like Bodrum, a touristic place in south-western Turkey. The people act more freely in the BC. You would not see couples kissing each other in the SC or so visibly on the

streets of the island. In the evening, the music turns into disco/club music. It is said that young people go there to find a boy or a girlfriend. People like to display their wealth, with the clothes they put on, and the brands they use. Once, I met with my high school friend at the BC. Two of her friends (young men in their mid-twenties) wanted to have barbeque in the garden of their house in the evening and needed to get some meat. Instead of buying the meat from the butchers on Burgaz, as an act of showing off, they paid an extravagant price to hire a Jet Ski. They jumped on the Jet Ski in front of the BC, so that the other young people see them get on it and they went to Bostancı, on the Asian side, to buy some meat.

The BC is exclusive to non-members, and have only some occasions for non-members such as breaking the fast dinner (*iftar*) during Ramadan for Muslims of Burgaz. Holding iftar meal at the BC is performance of pluralism in the form of labour of peace (see Bryant 2016 and Chap. 6). The BC organise more concerts, events, costume parties for children, charity events, discos and national victory day dinner. Permanent membership of the Blue Club is more expensive than in the Sports Clubs and cost around 4000 GBP in 2019. There are 2500–3000 members in the BC. The daily guest visitor price is a little bit less than the SC. The BC was built in 1934 by Sunni Muslim elites, who settled on the island as summer inhabitants. They wanted to have a social place, and see their children grow up together. According to what Orhan said, his father, one of the club founders, recalled that they were not able to get enough members, so when they kept asking people around to sign up for free, many Jewish Burgazlı became a member. While more and more Jewish people migrated to Burgaz, they kept signing up. In 1964, the Sports Club was founded as a reaction to the Blue Social Club, as a club that promoted sports instead of having fun, playing cards, games and so on. Hence, Blue Social Club was not built by the Jewish people, with an intention to be a Jewish club, but it was founded as a mixed club and continued to be a mixed club until 1964 when the SC club opened. The BC members, who wanted a sportier lifestyle, hence joined the SC. The Jewish people had been enjoying the "sosyetik" (which means *haute societé*), posh and chic atmosphere of the BC, so they remained in the BC club. However, this luxurious lifestyle, higher socio-economic status along with the *kal* door and the club door being closed (see Brink-Danan 2011 and Chaps. 5 and 6) makes the Jewish be seen as a closed community in Burgaz. Here, exclusive conviviality based on luxurious lifestyle overlaps with the discourse of coexistence/toleration, in the sense that the Jewish people in Burgaz socialise

more intensely among each other as most of them are members of the Blue Club and that they spent the day time there.

Nonetheless, the club members of BC and SC have various habits of socialising outside of the clubs. Some club members only hang out with their club friends in the club and not outside the clubs. One of my SC informants told me that she wanted to invite her club friends to her house and one woman replied her that on the island people do not go to each other's houses. They feel that as they spend already a lot of time together in the clubs, then they do not wish to spend additional time with their club friends outside of the club. Some others socialise outside of the club. They play cards at *kahve*, they go out for dinner, they invite each other for meals, to visit other islands and Istanbul for concerts and exhibitions and they meet up in winter.

In the next section, I explore the ways in which Burgaz islanders cluster into different groups based on common tastes, lifestyles, gender, class and ideology and share the space on Burgaz. I also investigate the exclusivity of Burgaz islanders towards the non-islanders, to describe the ways in which they distinguish themselves as Burgaz islanders based on their conviviality, collective Burgaz culture and habitus.

Being Burgazli Versus Others: Exclusive Diversity

Within their sense of belonging to Burgaz and their identity of being Burgazlı, the islanders articulate some contempt towards the tourists, the *günübirlikçi* (day trippers), who come to visit the island for a day. The islanders complain about those, who come to swim at its bays, and those, who come for gastronomy tourism (see Schild 2021). This contempt is an important exclusion of Burgaz islanders, because these daytrippers are not part of the conviviality of the island; they have not embodied the diversity of the island and they do not value it. This is very much similar to Örs' (2018, 72) "exclusive diversity" of the Rum Polites, who, on the one hand, value cosmopolitanism and openness to diversity, as those, who have lived in the "Polis" (Istanbul, the City), who have the knowledge and experience with living with diversity, who, on the other hand, are selective of which kinds of diversity forms a part of this cultural diversity. For instance, for the Rum Polites, while urban lifestyle is a part of this valued diversity, Anatolian rural lifestyles are "out."

The summer inhabitants despise the daytrippers for "invading" their island and filling its restaurants, especially during the weekends, forgetting

the realm that the salary of the permanent islanders depend to a great extent on the daytrippers, in the spring, summer and autumn. The summer inhabitants point out that daytrippers are mostly after consuming food with their friends, or swimming in the bays, or eating some of the fruit growing on the trees, or ripping off the mimosas, when it is mimosa time. While their time is squeezed to one day, it is more about getting as much as they can, as quickly as possible. However, for the islanders, time is extended, you do not need to rush, and one is gentle and protective of the island, whether it is its bays, beaches, fruit, flowers or trees. Burgaz survived several fires and it is believed that some were due to the rubbish and glasses left by those daytrippers. Some islanders even speculate that these fires are planned by those who are jealous of Burgaz. Many islanders articulate that "bad things come from outside of the island, not within or from the islanders" ("*Kötü şeyler dışarıdan gelir, adanın içinden olmaz, adalı yapmaz*" my own translation).

The islanders complain about two types of daytrippers. The first type is those, who come with their mats and food, and lie down to sunbathe and swim. Similar to the "*yabancılar* (strangers) [who] include a wide range of groups (itinerant merchants, travelers, street beggars and many others whose members are typically known both to reside outside of the town and to cross community boundaries" with whom the town inhabitants do not have to interact with (Ilcan 1999, 244), the islanders refer to the daytrippers as "*dışarıdan*" meaning people from outside [the island]. They leave the bays messy and dirty. Some wear baggy trousers and swim with their clothes on. Wise uses the term "haptic habitus" to refer to the "sensuous and embodied modes of being" (Wise 2010, 917). The manners of these daytrippers, the food they eat, the loud *arabesk* or pop music they listen to, and their clothing, their Anatolian lifestyles clash with the "haptic habitus" of the islanders. In contrast to the "strangers […] pleasing to the eye" (Ilcan 1999, 244), these daytrippers do not please the islanders' eye or ear. These *günübirlikçi* are similar to the "heterogeneous immigrants from Anatolia" (Keyder 1999; Geniş 2007), whom the inhabitants of the gated communities in Istanbul would like to avoid.

The second type is formed of those, who have the money, and who come for "gastronomic Burgaz" as named by Schild (2021, 27), a type of daily tourism based on the consumption of food and drinks. They eat at the restaurants and hence at weekends or winter days when the weather is good, they "invade" the restaurants. The restaurant owners make special cheaper prices for the islanders, while the prices are higher for the tourists.

They "occupy" the places, where the islanders like to eat and have tea and coffee and spend their time with friends. Many islanders had even told me "Deniz, in your book, write bad things about Burgaz (*Burgaz'ı kötüle*), so that others do not come here, so that *ada* (island) remains untouched (*ada bozulmasın*)."

The division between Burgaz islanders and "others" reflect the cultural intimacy (Herzfeld 2005) among Burgaz islanders and the islanders' sense of belonging in Burgaz. Similar to the other small islands like the Greek islands Kalymnos (Sutton 2001) and Meganisi (Just 2000), Burgaz islanders have a strong sense of community in the ways in which they differentiate themselves from other Princes' Islands for being more diverse and showing a stronger sense of community solidarity. They see Büyükada, urbanised, neoliberalised and lost in cosmopolitanness, and Heybeliada to be more nationalist and intolerant towards diversity. Importantly, while some of the working-class Sunni and Alevi inhabitants of Burgaz have their origins in the same regions as the daytrippers, who come to the bays, the Burgaz Alevi and Sunnis are Burgazlı, because they are part of the Burgaz conviviality; they live, work and engage in economic and social relations with the inhabitants. Within the *usta/çırak* (master/apprentice) relationship between the Rum shop owners, and Sunni and Alevis, the latter have learnt how to cook mezes and fish in the Rum way, while some also learnt to converse in Rumca. They internalised Rum ways of cooking, talking and eating, who perform Rum ways of eating and drinking, especially in the restaurants they run.

Following the migrations from rural parts of Anatolia to bigger cities in Turkey, there has been an increasing literature on gated communities in big cities, for instance, in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir (Keyder 1999; Geniş 2007; Aksoy 2012). This literature explored the ways in which the middle-class inhabitants of the cities, who could not want to deal anymore with the working-class migrants from Anatolia in their neighbourhoods and work places, moved to suburbs to live with people, who belonged to the same middle class, and who, shared similar life styles. The migrations from Eastern and South-eastern Turkey prior to 1990s were motivated for economic reasons, while after 1990s, the insecurity due to Kurdish insurgencies forced the migration of Kurdish inhabitants from their region of origin to big cities in Western Turkey (Keyder 1999). Furthermore, since the mid-1980s, the physical landscape of Istanbul, affected by globalisation and neo-liberal trends, has changed through gentrification of old neighbourhoods, the construction of malls, shopping centres, gated

communities and *gecekondus* (squatters, literary translated as built over night). The neo-liberal policies of the state in Turkey affected the housing sector and the new real estate agents promoted gated communities in Istanbul such as in Zekeriyakoy, Bahcelievler, and Kemer country as a solution to the chaotic life in the city (Geniş 2007). The prestige gated communities (upper-income people where the exclusivity is based on status) and lifestyle gated communities (both upper and middle-income people based on life style choice in a socioeconomically homogeneous environment) show local appropriations of the effect of globalisation (Geniş 2007). These gated communities were formed of homogeneous groups sharing similar economic, social and cultural capital and lifestyle, coming from similar socioeconomic, educational and political backgrounds—modern, secular, middle-class, highly educated, high-status people—who wanted to escape the sociocultural and socioeconomic diversity of Istanbul.

Because of the location of the Princes' Islands, the presence of old mansions with sea views, and the high number of wealthy non-Muslim inhabitants, non-islander Istanbul residents often depict the islands as upper-class, elite and exclusive, and hence it is tempting to compare them to the new phenomenon of gated communities. This discourse of Princes' Islands to be upper-class, elite resort places is also present in Couroucli's research (2010) as well as in Edgü and Cimşit's (2011) paper, where the latter hypothesises the Princes' Islands as gated communities due to their being islands and where middle-class people (mostly summer inhabitants) have similar lifestyles away from the chaos of the city.

One should explore the effect of islandness in the ways in which I attempt to do in this book, by paying attention to how its smallness, the intensity of intimacy, its boundedness and connections with wider national and global networks and politics have an impact of the social relations, sense of community, belonging and Burgaz identity (see Baldacchino 2006; Baldacchino 2004; Baldacchino and Veenendaal 2018; Royle and Brinklow 2018; Just 2000; Skinner 2002). It will not be right to describe Burgaz and other Princes' Islands as gated communities for the following two reasons. First, there is no control or check on who comes to the island. Whoever buys the ticket of the boat, or has the Istanbul public transport card, can get to Burgaz within 30 minutes from Bostancı (Anatolian site) and about an hour from Kabataş (European side). Especially, Büyükada and Kınalıada receive an excessive number of day-trippers. The only time when entry to Burgaz and to other Princes' Islands

was controlled was during the Covid-19 pandemic, when a set of curfews and lock-downs were implemented by the state to every citizen. Controls were also done at the harbours, such as checking the residence of the people. Those, who had permanent residence on the islands were allowed to come in and out of Burgaz. For instance, many summer inhabitants, whose residency is in Istanbul could not enter the island.

Secondly, Burgaz, like the other Princes' Islands, does not have the same class and lifestyle homogeneity as in gated communities. To the contrary, island population is heterogeneous not only in terms of ethnicity and religion, but also in terms of class difference and different lifestyles. Waiters, seasonal workers, those who used to be horse cart drivers and menial laborers are mostly of Kurdish origin from south-eastern Turkey or of Turkic nationalities (e.g. Azerbaycan, Turkmenistan). Stablehands, who used to live in the *ahır* (barn) area, further up and towards the back end of the island, were dominated by these groups. While it is accurate to state that the parameters of the Princes' Islands, their small size, their liminality and their reachability being restricted to the schedules of ferries might increase a sense of belonging to the island (see Edgü and Cimşit 2011), the islands differ from gated communities in terms of the diversity of lifestyles. While the inhabitants of gated communities shop from supermarkets, play golf, go to fitness by leading a more "Western," luxurious and urban upper-middle-class lifestyle (Geniş 2007, Aksoy 2012), Burgaz island life more closely resembles to village life as described by Herzfeld (1988) and Delaney (2001), where people shop from grocers, small shops and fishermen, and drop by to chat with the shop owner. The islanders appreciate the modesty, simplicity, the rough nature, marginality, even sometimes the lack of good internet or phone signals on the island, in opposition to a more comfortable, modern, urban life. The producers, service providers and consumers form intimate friendships, which challenge the boundaries of client/customer relations (see Chap. 6). Islanders' everyday interactions across classes, between summer and permanent inhabitants, customers and clients of restaurants and shop owners, form an important part of conviviality on the island. Different lifestyles coexist in Burgaz. One can live a socially intense and luxurious lifestyles at the social clubs, where membership is compulsory. One can also live a modest, simple and even an isolated lifestyle, by hanging out at various bays on the island, in their garden, veranda or terrasse. One can also pursue a village life. When you walk behind the Alevi Cemevi, you will see distorted, small pathways, muddy and soily roads, tiny houses, chickens and roosters

Fig. 4.6 Village life on Burgaz (photo taken by the author)

running around, washing including pants, shirts, skirts, underwear hanging out in the garden. (Fig. 4.6)

The islanders choose *where* to hang out according to the affordability, but also according to the activities that are offered in different places of commensality. The islanders form cleavages based on gender, age, ideology/political view and lifestyle. Restaurants and cafes have their tables on the streets, which create fluidity between the clients and the strollers. These restaurants and cafes face the sea. They get very busy after dinner, usually 9 p.m. onwards, when people start strolling on the restaurant street and also sit for some time to watch others strolling. These are places where you go to see people and to be seen. People wave at each other, bump into friends, go from one table to another, from one cafe to a restaurant or vice versa, gossip about who is wearing what, who was seen with whom, who has not been around for a while, who does not talk with whom anymore, who dates whom, who cheats on whom, broken friendships, new friendships formed, they laugh, and make each other jealous showing off new clothes.

To eat in a restaurant by the sea cost around 500 TL (25 GBP), which was very expensive taking into account that the minimum monthly wage was around 6000 TL (in 2022). People, who eat at the restaurants are usually the summer inhabitants, consisting of members of both the majority (Sunni Muslim) and minority (Rum, Armenian, Jewish) populations, as well as day visitors. People dress well to eat out. Women have their hair up, wear make-up and perfume, and sometimes high heels. Men dress in a casual smart way, by wearing a shirt and jumper from well-known brands. Some of the restaurants have their "permanent clients" who eat breakfast, lunch and dinner there every day. Jewish, Rum and Armenian groups have dinner with their family or groups of friends but also in mixed groups: people from different ethno-religious groups, with members and non-members of the social clubs. At this point, high economic capital intersects ethnic and religious cleavages. These mixed groups share a similar lifestyle, eating out at restaurants and not cooking at home for instance. Sociality is about consuming food together outside the house. *Who* you socialise with depends on the sharing similar tastes and lifestyles. For instance, one of the restaurant owners told me that in Ramadan (the holy month during which the Muslims fast), she prepares an *iftar* table for Sunni Muslims in the evening, when they break the fast, and a drinking menu for the next table where a mixed group of Sunni Muslims, Jews, Armenians and Rums have dinner. She gave this example to highlight the mutual tolerance between the fasting Muslims and the non-practising Muslims and non-Muslims. In some places in Istanbul, fasting Muslims would not want to go to a place, where people consume alcohol when it is Ramadan. Some restaurants might not even serve alcohol during Ramadan. However, in Burgaz, the islanders emphasised that in Burgaz, people let each other do as they wish in terms of practising or not practising their religious duties and to lead a lifestyle they would like to have and this is also why they feel free and at home in Burgaz.

The islanders follow their religion, with different variations and degrees and lead different lifestyles. Some male Sunni Muslims, who go to the mosque for the Friday prayer, drink alcohol regularly. Some do not drink for the whole month of Ramadan, but then drink for the rest of the year. Some Sunni women wear bikinis and swim, while they fast during Ramadan. Some Sunni Muslims do not drink alcohol at all, but sit at the same table with their friends (regardless of their faith), who drink. Some Sunni Muslim women wear headscarves and many do not. Many Alevis do not fast during Ramadan. Some Rum Orthodox and Catholics go to the

church on Sunday, some only go at important days and some do not go at all. There is a small portion of Jewish people who go to the synagogue. These are only a name dropping of different degrees, shades and ways of practising religion and ways of living. People also take religious practices from different faiths, which I will explore in the next chapter.

The teahouses, sandwich places, cafes and patisseries are frequented almost every hour of the day. In these places, you can find people from all different ethnic, class and religious backgrounds sitting both in winter and summer. One of the reasons of this heterogeneity is the length of consumption and the affordability of what is consumed. While a meal takes a few to several hours in a restaurant, eating a sandwich, drinking a cup of coffee or tea could take as little as 15 minutes to half an hour. Hence, even the ones who work during the summer can take a break and drop by a café to have tea. Unlike in the restaurants, where people go dressed up, the clients at the cafes wear casual and sportive clothes, such as t-shirts, shorts and jeans, sandals or comfortable flat shoes. You would see people wearing a variety of types of clothing ranging from light beach dresses on top or their bathing suits or bikinis, short skirts and shorts, sleeveless tops to long trousers, long sleeves, long skirts, or more conservative clothing, and/or headscarf. There are only a few of these cafes and patisseries open throughout the whole year. One of them is a very cosy place to pass the cold days of winter by reading newspapers, having breakfast and hot drinks, and chatting to the permanent inhabitants. The waiters, grocers, chefs who have been serving throughout spring, summer and autumn will have time to sit, have tea, enjoy *simit* (Turkish bagel) with the summer inhabitants, who visit the island to breathe away from the hectic life of Istanbul. During my fieldwork, the winter was the time for me to have longer chats and interviews with the permanent inhabitants, who had more time, as they had less work, who told me their narratives of moving to Burgaz from different parts of Turkey, which Rum employer they worked with, what they learnt and how they bought their current work place and also their current relationships with the customers. We will see in Chap. 6, that depending on the frequency of the customers, the customer/client boundaries do get blurred. The owner might address the clients with their first name. When the class difference is significant, for instance between the waiter and the regular customer, the waiter might address the customer as “Ahmet Ağabey” (elder brother) or “Ayşe Abla” (elder sister), to show respect, to acknowledge the status difference.

At cafes and patisseries, whose clients are socio-economically heterogeneous, there are cleavages based on tastes. People, who like to play backgammon or cards socialise at *kahve* (coffee shop), which is open to everyone in summer throughout the day and night. In difference to the coffee shops, as settings of masculine socialities, where men socialise, spend an important part of their day, by playing backgammon, cards or *okey* (a sort of rummikub game), discussing all sorts of matters ranging from news, politics, football, economics and where women's presence is not permitted (see Saglam 2020), in Burgaz, during the summer time both men and women play backgammon or cards in *kahve* until the early hours of the morning. There is much less gender segregation between the summer inhabitants (upper-middle class), and sociality is enjoyed in the company of both men and women in summer, and more among the permanent inhabitants (lower-middle and/or working class). Similar to gendered sociability in the Mediterranean (Kennedy 1986; Cowan 1991; Herzfeld 1988; Dubisch 1986; Loizos and Papataxiarchēs 1991; Papataxiarchis 1991; Mitchell 2002), men and women tend to socialise separately, in Burgaz, while the permanent female inhabitants hang out with each other in houses doing embroidery, or in cafes; men work or hang out with their friends during the day and watch football games in the evenings. *Kahve* is used exclusively by men in winter. In *kahve*, the shop owners usually have tea, play backgammon, cards and *okey*. When there are fewer jobs and clients on Burgaz in winter, the permanent male inhabitants socialise in *kahve*.

The ones who are not members of the social clubs hang out in the bays. Bays have very limited facilities; hence the activities and commensality depends on the people, who use these bays. Opposite one bay, there is a café, which has tables and chairs, some bean bags, parasols. A few bays rent chaise-longues and parasols but no food or drinks are offered. Some bays have nothing but rocks and some pine trees. Hence, depending on the taste of the person, whether it is lying on hard rocks under the shadow of a pine tree, eating the peach you have brought; or sitting on a beanbag and having your Turkish coffee served at you, you pick which bay to spend your time and form relationships with people, who have similar tastes, political ideology and habits. The islanders choose their friends not according to their ethnicity or religion, but for various reasons, such as liking to drink during sunset, enjoying lying and tanning themselves or swimming together and sometimes also sharing similar political views. Some people, who are sensitive to sunlight sit together under the shady areas, read

novels. People borrow each other's newspapers, bring fruit, food, wine and cheese, and snacks every day to share with each other. If you normally eat three prunes, you would bring five to offer to those who sit near you. If three women are giving a chocolate cake recipe, it is normal for a fourth one who hears the conversation to add a speciality of her own to the recipe and start a conversation. Islanders extend these bay-friendships to having dinners, brunches and drinks, organising and taking part in social activities such as organising flamenco nights and going to exhibitions in Burgaz and other Princes' Islands.

Concluding Remarks

The crucial point in this chapter is that Burgaz islanders have the right to live the ways in which they want and this echoes very much Lefebvre's (1967, 35) right to difference in the ways in which the right to difference is not a celebration of diversity, through giving people spaces where they could live parallel lives, or side-by-side living, but where people can live different lifestyles in proximity, such as in the same neighbourhood (see Dikeç 2001; Dikeç 2002; Öz and Eder 2018), or at the same table in a restaurant. For instance, Öz and Eder (2018) describe problems of spatiality, in the ways in which the inhabitants of Tophane, a district in Istanbul, where contestations and violence (such as attacking and injuring people) occur among its diversity of inhabitants (artists, elites, students, unemployed youth, pious inhabitants). Drinking on the street or showing intimacy like kissing a beloved one is seen not compatible with pious and modest ways in living. Öz and Eder (2018, 1035) highlight that contestations should not be reduced to politics of identity and binaries such as "seculars vs religious/pious/Islamists" or "rich versus poor" but one should understand the complexity of "clashes of norms, resources and political power" in the ways in which people can manage or solve tensions or not.

From what I have seen in Burgaz during my fieldwork and post-fieldwork trips, the islanders respect people's having different lifestyles and political ideologies, even if they disagree. Exclusions of conviviality, such as in the social clubs, are generated by different political ideologies (e.g. exclusion of headscarf) and class difference (exclusive membership fee). Nonetheless, the tensions and frictions that arise from exclusive conviviality are negotiated and solved as practices of everyday coexistence. For instance, social clubs are exclusive to members who can afford; however, their doors are open to Burgaz children, who play water sports and to

non-members in the evenings, and in winter. The islanders form organic groups of friendship based on common tastes, lifestyles, gender, age and political views and choose where to socialise based on these commonalities, at social clubs, bays, cafes, restaurants and in each other's homes. The new comers become a part of the conviviality through learning, working, sociable sociality as well as through fighting. The islanders negotiate and navigate in between and around different exclusions of conviviality, whether it is class based or affected by ideology. Conviviality as *both living together in diversity* and *living with difference* is internalised, and is practised and performed in their everyday life. For instance, the islanders change from one language to another, when another person joins their conversations, sometimes without even realising it. The habitus of Burgaz islanders is heterogeneous and their practices of conviviality show their ability of sharing the way of living, producing everyday life and a sense of place through embodying diversity, enjoying, performing and valuing it (such as in this chapter and the next one), as well as letting people, who might have different lifestyles to perform and practise daily life the ways in which they would like to (such as in this chapter and in Chap. 6).

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CHAPTER 5

Embodying and Performing Diversity Through Senses

Introduction

I met Orhan, a Burgazlı then in his mid-80s in 2009, who was introduced to me by the security officer of one of the social clubs. The officer gave him my mobile number, and Orhan called me to arrange a time to meet. On the phone, I explained to him that I was doing doctoral research about the memories of Burgaz islanders currently living on the island. I added that as he was one of the oldest inhabitants in Burgaz, I would be very grateful for an interview with him. When he arrived for our morning meeting at the Blue Club, one of the island's social clubs, he brought along sheets on which he had listed names of friends, activities, events and the poems he wrote about Burgaz. I did not expect that he came so well prepared, and I was happy that he was eager to talk to me. When I took out my small notebook, he exclaimed, "What, how can you write all the memories of many years in such a tiny book! Go get a proper notebook!" So, I went to the security desk and asked for a stack of A4 sheets and came back prepared to write, as he preferred me to take notes rather than to record the interview.

I begin this section below with a long vignette from the uninterrupted stream in which Orhan narrated me his story of Burgaz. I then complement Orhan's memories with the islanders' current daily practices in the ways in which they embody the island and internalise islands' diversity. Orhan's memories and the islanders' daily life show that collective

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embodiment of the island through multisensorial experiences is one of the mechanisms that bonds the islanders together. These collective experiences such as dancing, swimming, fishing and drinking are embodied, enjoyed, shared and performed, and make people Burgazlı. This chapter illustrates the ways in which collective embodiment of the island through a diversity of sensorial pleasures bond together the islanders and form the sociable sociality of conviviality. I show the ways in which the islanders embody each other's diversities, and hence call themselves "multicultural." I explore this embodiment by investigating daily activities as well as syncretic religious practices performed collectively and/or individually, where islanders make their own way of integrating practices from different faiths. Nonetheless, I also show the complexity of separating cultural practices into "Jewish, Rum or Muslim practices" due to the fact that many daily activities are performed collectively, demonstrate the porousness of ethno-religious boundaries and form the collective Burgaz culture. When one returns to the allegory of ebru, these ethnographic examples show that the boundaries within the ebru pattern (Fig. 1.1) fuse into each other, and unlike the stones in the mosaic, they are not separated in a clear-cut way.

Memory, Bodies and Senses

Orhan narrated:

> Burgaz was an island of Rum fishermen. The permanent inhabitants of Burgaz, such as restaurant and coffee shop owners, storekeepers, fishermen, bakers, and grocers were all Rums. My father was one of the first Turks, who came to Burgaz between 1915 and the 1920s. They were governmental officers, doctors, or lawyers, and the majority of them used the island as a *sayfiye yeri* [summer resort place] and were very few in number. In the 1930s and 1940s, summer inhabitants, such as Ashkenazi Jews and Germans, were rich and elite. The Jews of Burgaz were upper class in comparison to the Sephardic Jews who were lower middle class and who lived in Heybeli, another Princes' Island. The Jews of Heybeli and Istanbul used to come for a day trip to Burgaz as they could not afford to have houses in Burgaz. These Sephardic Jews became richer when the Democratic Party was in power between 1945 and 1960. Thus, from the late 1940s onwards, the Jews from Heybeli moved to Burgaz and the ones in Istanbul either rented or bought property in Burgaz.
>
> This island was the island of fish. Rums were very into fishing.

Istavrit, uskumru, palamut, lüfer, torik, lapin, mercan, karagöz, orkinos, sinarit, kılıç balığı [names of fish varieties] … there were so many fish that the fishnets used to break. When there was excess fish, the fishermen used to throw the excess back to the sea. The fishermen used to compete with each other in order to catch the biggest fish, especially *orkinos.* The fish caught were always displayed and sold in the market. The fishmonger used to mark the name of the fisherman on the *orkinos* caught, thus you would know who caught it and see the pride in the eyes of the fisherman when he walked in the market. Now, there are fewer and fewer fish in the sea. People are not as careful as the fishermen of the old days. The new generation put dynamite in the fishes' nests and fish when the fish were reproducing. Now the seagulls are hungry. I used to go fishing with my summer Rum friends. They had boats. We used to go to Sivriada and Yassıada [the uninhabited islands]. These islands were a heaven of fish and mussels. We used to go there in the afternoon, fish and eat the fish there, get drunk and sleep and come back in the morning. *Sivriada geceleri* [the nights of Sivriada] …

These times were the times of *bolluk* [abundance, prosperity]. The rich Rums had big gardens. For example, Taso's garden was full of fruit and vegetables. Quince, plum, lettuce, onion … Mimi had a flower garden. In Foti's garden there were almond trees. They used to sell their fruit, vegetables and flowers to the islanders. Have you been to the Austrian chapel, high up in Burgaz? [I said "yes."] Good. The Austrian nuns used to sell the spare produce to the islanders. They had cows and chickens. The yogurt, cream, cheese, and milk that came from them were the best I have eaten in my life.

Do you know Kalpazankaya? [I said "yes, I have been there."] Do you know the *Hişt* story from Sait Faik?" [I said, "Yes I have read it."] Sait got inspired to write the story on the way to Kalpazankaya. He lived in Burgaz, he was much older than me but he was my friend and Burgaz is known as *Sait Faik'in adası* [Sait Faik's island]. In the story, Sait is on the Kalpazankaya road, he hears *hişt hişt* [similar to the "psst" sound that one person whispers to another to get their attention] but he cannot tell where it comes from. A plum tree? A hedgehog? A person? A bird? The sea? Saik writes it so well. It does not matter where the sound comes from. It is the sound of what makes you feel alive. He says in the end that if you do not hear *hişt*, *then* it matters. In Burgaz, you constantly hear a *hişt* sound, whether it is a person, a tree, the sea, the nature, an animal; these things keep you alive.

The times of the Rums were the times of fun. I loved attending the church at Christmas and on important Rum Orthodox religious days. They offered pastry, biscuits, cookies, and meals at the church. There was not a mosque on the island until 1954. I did not care about the mosque. I did not care when it was built. I am not interested in religion, but I enjoyed attending the church because it was good fun to socialise with my Rum friends.

> There were five *gazinos* [dancing and drinking places] in Burgaz. In *gazinos*, Rum and foreign music played, sometimes live, sometimes from the gramophone. We danced day and night—tango, slow, swing … The Rums knew how to drink. There was always one person at the table who would control anyone who was getting too drunk. Now, people do not know how to drink. They get drunk and they start fights.
>
> *Adanın tipleri vardı* people with unique characteristics. You know, every place has its own unique people. Ali Rıza Kondos. *Kondos* means short in Rumca. Ali Rıza was a short drunkard. He had built a cave for himself in Burgaz. When we saw him, we used to yell *pırr*, which would make him so angry; he would throw stones at us and run after us. And then Şilep [Ocean liner] Hasan … He was so huge we used to call him Şilep. The islanders used to give names to these unique people. Now, people are boring. The island was more diverse in the old days, we had *adanın tipleri* and everyone had a particular character, fault, weakness, funniness, craziness that made Burgaz a place of fun. Now, everyone is the same. People watch TV, they go to work. They do not have fun in their lives. There are no *adanın tipleri* anymore.

When he paused for a minute, I asked Orhan: "You talk as if all these things do not exist anymore. What happened? What has changed? You said there were many, many Rums? Where are they now?"

Orhan:

> The Rums left. They went to Greece, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. *Varlık Vergisi* [the Wealth Tax], the 6–7 September events in 1955, the 27 May 1960 coup, the Cyprus events scared them all. They said: "Every twenty-five years, something will come up, the government will do something, we better leave." The government did many things wrong. My father had a Jewish friend, who was required to pay such a high *Varlık Vergisi* that it was impossible to pay, thus he was sent to do military service in Aşkale. When my father's Jewish friend came back from Aşkale, my father lent him some money that helped him reconstruct his business. *Varlık Vergisi* made the *ekaliyet* [an older term used for minorities] suffer economically. Furthermore, the Rums had many shops in Beyoğlu, they all got destroyed during the 6–7 September events. Here in Burgaz nothing happened. We protected the island and no one could enter. However, what was happening in Istanbul and in Turkey was scary enough for them to leave. And they left. They sold their properties at a low price to Erzincanlı Alevis, who were working for them. Erzincanlıs had saved money while working so Erzincanlı bought these properties. Now the permanent inhabitants are Alevis and Kurds.

When Orhan was talking about the years between the 1920s and the 1950s, he jumped from people to places, from activities he did, to Sait Faik's story, to *adamın tipleri*. These five themes that emerged in his vignette also came up in the narratives of the islanders I talked to, when I did semi-structured interviews; when I listened to people's conversations in cafes, restaurants and the social clubs; when I listened to my elderly friends in the embroidery class. For instance, *Adamın tipleri* appear in Berberyan's (2010) memoirs and Aktel's (2005) *Kestane Karası*. During my fieldwork in 2009–2010, a male Sunni informant of mine (aged 75, at that time) had talked in depth about the times in *gazinos*. Two Sunni Muslim informants of mine, both female architects in their 50s, told me about *adamın tipleri* and Sait Faik's stories about Burgaz. The Sunni grocer and the Sunni pharmacist (in their 70s) who have lived on the island for about 50 years, my Rum informant Niko (aged 67), a male German informant (in his mid-50s) and Ajda (70) who both grew up in Burgaz, all told me about the abundance of fish, fruit, vegetables and flower gardens. Ajda also said:

> I cannot tell you how much I enjoyed going to the church to hang out with my Rum friends, when I was a kid. I also loved the farm and the garden at the Austrian chapel. With my friends, there, we used to run around and play in that garden for hours, until my father got worried about where I was and went around Burgaz trying to find me. It was a hard thing to find me, because I could have been on top of a tree, at the peak of Burgaz, at the Austrian chapel, in the sea … I was a very naughty girl [she laughed].

My informants' and Orhan's memories are memories of conviviality, and they take their sources from the shared life in Burgaz. Orhan began the story of Burgaz with the Rums, Turks, Ashkenazi Jews, Sephardic Jews, and Germans, which shows that ethnic and religious differences were acknowledged, not as "coexistence/toleration" but as part of what it meant to live in Burgaz. Orhan, like many of my Jewish, Muslim, German, and Armenian informants, joined and enjoyed the sociality at the churches. Rum rituals added to the richness of Burgaz. The luxurious summer lifestyle—full of discos, music and fun, drinking, and fishing lifestyles—brought people from different ethno-religious backgrounds together to socialise.

He has embodied Burgaz through dancing, fishing, drinking, attending church, socialising with his friends, and having fun. Orhan's memories are

of what Chau (2008, 489 emphasis in original) calls a "social sensorium," a term he uses to refer to "a *sensorially rich social space* such as found at a temple festival, a busy market, or a packed dance floor." However, while Chau (2008) explores "red- hot sociality," or the way that sociality is produced through a type of heated frenzy, Orhan refers to the way that a sense of the social, of what it means to be a Burgazlı, is produced through the experience of sensory diversity. Orhan's concept of *bolluk*, abundance and prosperity, includes a diversity of people, animals, and natural beings. The "*Hişt Hişt* story of Saik Faik Abasıyanık (1993) that Orhan referred to indicates that Burgaz—with its people, nature, animals, tastes, trees, and its sea—whispers into islanders' ears. The experience of diversity is what makes Burgaz the place that it is, and enjoying diversity is what it means to be Burgazlı. "As place is sensed, senses are placed; places make sense, senses make place" (Feld 1996, 91).

Classen (1997, 402) draws attention to the ways in which "We experience our bodies—and the world- *through* are senses." And that "sensory meanings and values form the sensory model espoused by a society, according to which the members of that society 'make sense' of the world or translate sensory perceptions and concepts into a particular 'worldview.'" According to the islanders, like Orhan, collective embodiment of the island through the diversity of senses is one of the mechanisms of conviviality that "glues" or bonds the islanders to each other. During sociable sociality, the islanders enjoy each other's company, embody the island and each other's diversity through different senses (sharing food, walking, swimming, fishing, dancing). When Jackson (1983, 331) observed girls' initiation rites in the Kuranko village in Sierra Leone, he marked the importance of doing the activities for the "enjoyment" of doing it all together, that "the performers were simply contributing to the enjoyment of the occasion." Similarly, like Orhan, the islanders did things together and while doing these things, they enjoyed what they were doing. Basso (1996, 56–57) marks that "relationships to places are lived most often in the company of other people, and it is on these communal occasions—when places are *sensed* together" (emphasis in the original). The island was embodied all together and this embodiment had a great sense of enjoyment and sensorial pleasures, such as being immersed in Burgaz' nature, its bays, seas, and hills. This enjoyment of nature together with its people is what keeps people alive like the *hişt* sound in Sait's story. It is a form of having butterflies in the stomach, which is caused by a sensory pleasure, whether a bird's voice, sound of sea waves, or a person or any

living creature of Burgaz, like a plum tree, which makes the Burgaz islander feel alive.

The fact that he remembered what kind of fruit and vegetables grew in which garden, which dairy products came from where, and the names of particular fish shows that the tastes of these foods are significant elements that tie him to the island. Sensory aspects of food create a sense of belonging (Sutton 2010). Through the memories of his senses, Orhan tells the story of Burgaz. The older days in Burgaz in his words, were "abundant and prosperous" because of the diversity of living creatures, like types of fish, flowers, vegetables, fruit and dairy products. This nostalgia around the diversity of tastes is similar to Seremetakis' (2019) *nostalghia* in the Greek sense, in difference to the English meaning of nostalgia that is tinted in romantism. The Greek nostalghia refers to "the desire and longing with burning pain to journey" (Seremetakis 2019, 4). The Rums contributed to the diversity of the island and to the sensorial pleasures. With their departures, along with the change of social and natural life in Burgaz, came also a loss of the diversity of tastes. Like Seremetakis, who could not find the same taste of the particular peach "the Afroditis' breast," called *rodhakino* in Greek, that she ate when she was a child in her village; Orhan could not find the same taste of the cream, cheese produced by the nuns in his childhood, neither the different types of fish. Orhan was angry with the "new generation" who was greedy, who put dynamites to fish excessively. He stressed that the Rum fishermen of his youth used to throw back, to give back to the sea the excess fish they had caught. In other words, they were thoughtful, thankful and grateful for what the island had offered them and hence they returned what they did not need. They cared for the nature on and surrounding the island. Orhan criticised the greediness of the new generation fishermen with dynamites as one of the reasons, which decreased the diversity in nature. Later on in the interview, he was also sad and angry for the Rum friends, who left the island. Life did not "taste" the same to him, after their departure. As Classen (1997) would argue, Orhan expressed his perception of the loss of diversity through the loss of the diversity of senses, the diversity of the bodily activities that he did with his friends and through the loss of the diverse types of islanders. Orhan's perception of human diversity was not limited to ethnic and religious differences. People's particularities, stories of craziness, anger, and jokes made Burgaz diverse, joyful and fun for him, while today, the island is more boring to him.

Furthermore, Orhan also criticised the use of technology and the media as what reduced the diversity on Burgaz. According to him, when people watched TV or played with their mobile phones and laptops, they became more individual and monotypical. Hence, islanders started less and less being in contact with the nature in Burgaz as well as doing activities collectively. Carpenter (1976) and his friend, Mcluhan (2002) drew attention to the social changes that came with new technology and media. Mcluhan (2002, 18) put it that any medium and technology is the extension of ourselves, of our senses. Carpenter (1976) argued that media changes people's perceptions: when Papua New Guineans first saw their photos, they ducked their heads and showed shyness and embarrassment due to a sudden self-awareness. Except seeing their images on reflections of water, it was the first time they had seen their full bodies on a printed photo, which they could hold and touch. When they heard their voices being played back after being recorded on a tape, this confused their sense of time (Carpenter 1976). According to Orhan, media and the technology changed the social life on the island, because they changed the ways in which people embodied the island with their senses. According to Orhan, watching TV at home instead of the open-air cinema on the island lessened the fun that people used to have on the island. It made people and their bodies distant from each other in opposition to watching the movies together in the open-air cinema, making jokes to each other (like throwing eggs to piss off some of the audience) or sharing one pack of sunflower seeds, passing from hands to hands, and inserting their palms one by one to the pack of sunflower seeds.

Nilüfer Uzunoğlu, a Burgaz islander for generations, (the director of the 2013 Burgaz documentary, a graduate from Marmara University Communication and Journalism), agrees with Orhan and would agree with McLuhan by saying that the change in the transport system on Burgaz and other islands will change the social life on Burgaz. In the last few years, the horse carts were replaced by electric transport vehicles, at low cost for the islanders. In my interview with her in 2022, she said, "This (electric) bus, taxi, minibus, according to me, will change very much the island. Maybe in the future, we will talk about how much the life and people's relationships have changed. I think that this rhythm is bad." When I asked her why this change was bad, she clarified:

> If those people who move to the island (summer inhabitants for instance or new permanent islanders) would want the same comfort in their lives, this

would be very dangerous for the island life, then it will not be an "island" anymore. The rhythm will change. They call these "*vızır vızır* (a sound of the buzzing bee, that signals speed) electrical". They light their lights, they make accidents. Like this, the life on the island changes totally. The people will not get/feel any benefit from what the island offers to them. In the old days for instance, our elderly, for example, my grandmother used to count "I bathed in the sea 40 times or 60 times this year". It was very important to bath in the sea to pass a healthy winter. However, what I see today is that people do not even walk, let alone swim. Walking is very good for one's health, to get fresh air and so on, yet people do not walk, they would rather take that electric thing. This island then turns into a city with these electric vehicles. Like this, the island changes, the rhythm of the island changes, the islanders change and the island life changes.

In the old days people used to escape from the city to come to the island, to relax and to detox, but now they are bringing the city to the island. For instance, to have better reception, a lot of receivers are installed on the island. People want to have better signal and internet connection. When people would like to have comfort, then, the island life changes. In the past, people did not spend that much time in their homes, because it was not comfortable, hence everyone was outside. Now for instance, children do not get out of their houses. They are sitting in their garden, in the fresh air but in a sitting position, connected to their internet. We used to have a lot of action and movement in our lives. What I mean by "us" is the people my age and even some younger ones. When the internet was not that spread and overtaking; people and children were much more active and did a lot of things outdoors, in the nature.

Thus, according to Orhan and Nilüfer, the use of people's bodies, the movements that the bodies do, especially together and the contact of the bodies with the nature, especially with the sea, makes the social life on Burgaz. Similarly, to what Carpenter (1976) argues, Nilüfer is expecting a change to the "expanded and relaxed" concept of time on the island. The electric vehicles will bring higher speed and pace to the islanders' perception of time. They will also have less bodily contact with Burgaz. Instead of using their feet and legs on the paths, rocks, grass, soil of Burgaz, walking and taking sideways, twists or concrete stairs that connect some streets, they will take the assigned paths of the public electric vehicle and get to wherever they plan to reach, faster. Thus, Nilüfer hypothesises that the changes in perception and bodily experiences will also change the social life on the island.

Embodying and Performing Diversity

According to Orhan as well as other Burgaz islanders, like Engin Aktel, the islanders are multicultural, as they have embodied each other's diversity. As Aktel says in the introduction of this book that the Rum and Jewish culture lives in him, it is very difficult to understand exactly what this Rum or Jewish culture is and whether one can separate a kind of "Rum or Jewish" culture from each other. The complexity of this is that, the islanders, like Orhan, have embodied the island through the diversity of the senses in the everyday practices that they did together. Thus, the sociable sociality that they produced is produced all together. Hence, it is not possible to separate what in these activities of fishing, eating, drinking and dancing is Rum (or Jewish or Muslim), for instance, except the religious activities that are done at the Rum Orthodox church.

Nonetheless, this naming and separating what Rum culture was, was understood and reflected upon, after the departure of the Rums. It was, in fact, when the Rums left, that the remainder Burgaz islanders, like Orhan, understood and became conscious that the dancing in the gazinos, the fishing and getting drunk together with friends started disappearing. It was after the departure of non-Muslim islanders, especially the Rums, that the islanders realised that the "Rum culture" included fishing, rowing on a boat, drinking *rakı*, swimming, dancing and eating. The departure of the Rums made a mental break of "coexistence" in the heads of the remainder Burgazlı that when the Rums left, those joyful moments, sensorial pleasures and togetherness which included swimming, drinking and dancing started disappearing, for instance, the *gazinos* closed. When I asked Orhan what had changed, he referred to policies (the Wealth Tax in 1942), the riots on 6–7 September 1955, the coup in 1960, and events in Cyprus as what changed life in Burgaz. All of these were a logical consequence of what I refer to here as coexistence/toleration, or the management of difference. In this case, that difference was "managed" by the state as a form of homogenising social engineering. For Orhan, it appeared as the distinction between the conviviality that he remembered and related with such fondness, his eyes sparkling as he looked dreamily towards the horizon, and the management of difference that led to his friends' departure and the political tensions, which he related staring at the ground and with much reticence. It was clear in his mind that government policies had brought a rupture to people's daily lives. Through those policies, the identity of the religious minorities was crystallised around their difference. The

sense of coexistence/toleration appeared in Orhan's narrative in the form of the homogenisation process that took away his friends. In opposition to the memory of coexistence and homogenisation, Orhan articulated his memories of conviviality in Burgaz, in the ways in which his father helped a Jewish friend in Burgaz, and how the islanders did not turn against each other during the riots. On the contrary, the islanders cooperated with the police on Burgaz and protected the island from an outside attack, by waiting at the bays, scaring away the invaders, who could not get to the island. The memory of the 1955 pogrom was articulated as a memory of conviviality and act of solidarity by the Burgaz islanders, which I will return in Chap. 7.

After having explored the ways in which Burgaz islanders internalised and embodied the diversity of cultural practices, I now turn my attention to syncretic religious practices, which I have attended and hence experienced it with my own body together with the islanders, as well as witnessed the ways in which Burgaz islanders talked and reflected on their individual syncretic religious practices.

Agios Fanourios kai Fanouropita

One of my closest friends from the French Middle School, Notre Dame de Sion, Despina lives in Burgaz as a summer inhabitant. She moved to the island in her mid-20s, after getting married to Panos, who grew up in Burgaz. Despina and I were very good students. We became good friends in the first months of the middle school, when we were 11 years old, since the teacher made us sit next to each other. Our teacher, Madame Pascale (we always called our teachers with their first name instead of their surnames) had made a ranking of the students, by allocating the students in terms of their performance in the class. She made those who were doing very poorly sit in the first raw. The better students performed, the further back they were seated by the teacher. She had made me and Despina sit at the very back next to each other. Since then, we encouraged each other to do well, to explain the rules of the grammar, the homework and so on. We were also "friends in rebel." As a part of the school uniform, we were given a ribbon-tie-bow to put on our collar. Some parents even do not buy it, as it is not mandatory to put in on. Those, who buy it then take it off after a couple of days. In short, nobody cares about it. However, due to our being stubborn, Despina and I decided to wear it all year long. Even if our friends or older students joked about our ribbon, we still kept it.

This was in fact a special bonding between us. At the end of the of the first year, we decided to take it off, which came as a surprise to the other students. Wearing this ribbon was in a way our way of fighting the pressure that could come from other students and friends. We liked the ribbon, so we wore it.

When my mum and aunt asked me who my close friends were at the school, I said Ece and Despina. Ece was my friend from kindergarden, who also happened to go the same middle school. When my aunt, Sevim, told me: "Despina is a Rum name. Rums are lovely people. We used to have such great Rum neighbours in Yeldeğirmeni (a multicultural neighbour on the Asian side of Istanbul). They are great cooks; they are very hospitable and very clean. They are *hamarat* (an adjective used for someone who is very good in many things especially with cooking, cleaning, working and multi-tasking)." I was very puzzled, because Despina and I were so similar, I could not understand why my aunt was talking about her as "different." As my family was not religious, it was difficult for me to understand what religion was. When I moved to Burgaz for my fieldwork, I was utterly happy that Despina lived there. She introduced to me many people on the island, took me to the Rum churches, to the social clubs, introduced me to Engin Aktel. Through attending the Rum masses together as well as other important religious rituals, I was introduced to religious practices by Despina.

On the 26th of August, she invited me to the Agios Fanourios, the day when women bake a special cake called *Fanouropita*, to make a wish. This religious ritual was at 16.30 in the afternoon. So, we met prior to lunch to bake a cake. Despina told me that this cake had to be vegan, so no animal products. As there were no eggs in the cake, it was equally difficult to make it expand and rise. One should put 7 or more ingredients, but the total number of ingredients had to be an odd number. We put orange juice, vegetable oil, cinnamon, walnut, sugar, raisins, baking powder, self-raising flour and hazelnut. Despina explained to me that if an unmarried girl puts a piece of this cake under their cushion, then it is believed that she will see the one who she will marry. This, then, turned out into a wish day, where unmarried ones wish to find their love, or those without a job to get a job, or sick ones to have their health returned back, in sum whatever they wished and baked the cake for. While baking the cake and mixing all the ingredients, you make your wish. Together with Despo, we baked two cakes, one for her and one for me. She had baked one in the morning but the cake got stuck to the cake mould. Rum women give a lot of

importance to how their cake looks like. This is also the same with anything they cook. It has to look and taste great. As Despo was newly married, and the cake did not turn well, she disregarded it not to get criticisms and hence we baked another two, which turned out rather well. We had asked our friends and neighbours that we were going to bake *fanouropita*, the wish cake, and if they had a wish, they told it to us and we will repeat it while baking the cake. We also had some wishes: I wished for my PhD to finish and for it to become a book, for example. While baking the cake, we repeated these wishes. It made an hour to bake the cake. While baking it, we had coffee, and chatted. We then went to the social club, where we swam. In the club, I told the women I saw there, especially the Rums that we made *fanouropita* with Despina. They were surprised that I also baked a cake.

Whenever I participated to any religious or social event, the islanders were surprised because there were so many things happening on the island and I managed to be there. I must have seemed like a mouse in their mind, as one islander joked with me that he had seen me in every hole on this island. They were surprised at my pace of joining so many events, very quickly and to do exactly what the islanders were doing. For instance, I went to the Catholic mass high up on the island, at the Austrian chapel at 9 am in the morning on Sundays. The Catholic masses were attended by a variety of Catholics, Suryanis and Keldanis of Arab decent, Rums, Armenians, Italians, French, Germans and Austrians (mainly nuns) and also halfies, such as half Catholic-half Muslims, and half Rum Orthodox, half Catholics. The priests for every mass used to change, for instance, there were sometimes a Spanish priest, sometimes an Austrian. The Catholics had complained about the fact that the Catholic chapel did not have a permanent priest assigned. The masses were done in Latin, German and Turkish. The audience, who spoke so many different languages, came up to the alter to read a piece from the Bible in Greek, or in French or in whatever language they felt they wanted to express themselves. For instance, there was a Rum Catholic couple, who lives in Canada in winter and who speak French. They sometimes read the Bible in French. After the mass, the participants offer cookies, cakes and börek (a savoury type of pastry) they make. Catholics do not share the communion bread with the non-Catholics. Zeynep, a Keldani islander, explained to me that there is bowl at the altar, where there is the holy bread. It is not a piece of bread but a special type and when a Catholic enters church, before the mass, he or she goes near that bowl and takes his or her piece and puts it on the

"mass bowl." Like this, it is as if all the Catholics who will get the communion "reserve" their piece of bread and when the priest does the communion, then he gives the body of Jesus, blessed, to the Catholics. This is another way of separating the Catholics from the non-Catholics who are entering the mass, during the communion. Even though the communion excludes non-Catholics, the mass is open to whoever who would like to attend.

After the mass and the refreshments offered at the Catholic Chapel, then I used to go down to the Rum Orthodox mass which also starts at 9 am but then goes even until 12.00. As it is very long, sometimes the Rums also come to the mass late. The Orthodox are also diverse in terms of their ethnicity and languages. Rums are in majority, but there are also Bulgarians, Macedonians and some Armenians. Armenians do not have a church of their own, but those who are of Gregorian Orthodox sect attend mostly the Rum Orthodox masses and those who are of Catholic descent attend the Catholic mass. Nonetheless, during special religious days, especially of the Rum Orthodox religious calendar, and weddings and funerals, the church is attended by everyone and hence the islanders perform syncretic practices. *Agios Fanourios* is one of these days, which is attended by many islanders from different ethnic and religious affiliations. Those attenders, not only the Rum Orthodox, but everyone believes in the power and the blessing of the ritual. The power of *Agios Fanourios*, for instance, of making the wishes come true is believed by the participants, who bake a cake and make their wishes. What I would like to argue with this ritual is that it is both an *embodied collective practice*, during which people embody each other's differences, and it is also a *performance*, the islanders self-consciously perform this ritual, enjoy and value the sociable sociality in the production of place.

I wanted to use my body and feel the island in the same way the islanders did. I wanted to do everything together. This, on the one hand, is very difficult because of the fact there are so many things happening at the same time on the island. On the other hand, it is also difficult how to do participant observation. When one participates and tries to feel the movements and the actions and through the senses, it is equally difficult to observe things. Because, observing and the use of the eyes eliminates the perception through other senses and hence when I focused on my own body, how can I observe and understand what is going on around me? Jackson (1983) argues that it is crucial to do and experience everyday practices together with the informants, in order to understand this

practice, to feel it within one's body instead of *only* asking the informants many questions of reflections such as: Why do they do like this? How do they feel when they do like this? Or what is the meaning of this practice or ritual? He writes:

> [T]o participate bodily in everyday practical tasks was a creative technique which often helped me grasp the *sense* of an activity by using my body as others did. This technique also helped me break my habit of seeking truth at the level of disembodied concepts and decontextualised sayings. To recognise the embodiedness of our Being-in-the-world is to discover a common ground where self and other are one. By using one's body in the same way as others in the same environment, one finds oneself informed by an understanding which may then be interpreted according to one's own custom or bent, yet which remains grounded in a field of practical activity and thereby remains consonant with the experience of those among whom one has lived. (Jackson 1983, 340)

He adds that rituals and everyday practices are somatic, bodily experienced and enjoyed together. Doing these things together contextualises these practices, in opposition to only asking or interviewing informants to reflect on these practices after or before they do that. When one does the same things and uses his or her body in the same way as others do, this collective embodiment also breaks the boundaries of the self and the other, the environment is experienced together with bodies. Therefore, in the beginning of the fieldwork, when I was more anxious to understand what is going on, I did more observation than participation, on what people did with their own bodies, and what they said. Later on, through attending regularly the churches, *kal* (the Burgaz Jews called the synagogue, *kal*, which comes from the word *keila/kehila* in Ladino, that means gathering, a gathered mass of people) and the mosque, I focused more on how I felt and how *we* felt together. Knowing the rules of the game, in Bourdieu's (1990) words, then, lessened my anxiety and helped me in the feeling of what was going on and made me feel as a part of the whole. For instance, in the *kal* when we were singing in Ladino from Torah, I was able to follow it, understand the words and enjoy the singing together, saluting the people I know, joking with the people after the synagogue and so on. And when someone got lost, for instance, during the singing in Ladino, I was able to show them what we were singing from the Torah. Hence, the Jewish were joking that I was more Jewish than them, and the Rums were

saying that I have become a Rum girl. During Agios Fanourios, I focused on the enjoyment of doing things during this ritual together with the other Rum women and Despina. I cannot explain the joy and the excitement I felt in the speedy movement of this ritual.

Agios Fanourios was brilliant. I was a bit late. There were around 50 women and two men among the participants. All the women, who baked, left their cake on the big table (Fig. 5.1).

There were around 25 cakes. Not everyone had baked one. Despina was right in being concerned about how her cake looked like, because when we went to the church, and put the cakes on the table, the women started judging how the cakes looked like. There were, for instance, two cakes, very well risen, which were highly criticised, because it meant that the women had put eggs in them, which they should not have done. I did not know that we were supposed to write names on the cake. We made one column for the deceased ones, to send prayers to their souls, and another one for those who were living to pray for the health and

Fig. 5.1 Agios Fanourios (photo taken by the author)

well-being. So, I wrote the names of my grandparents, Recep, Neriman and Şehabettin, who were no longer alive in one column and my family and friends on another column. One male priest, two young boys and the organiser of the church were singing and guiding the prayers. Then the priest yelled out all the names, written. I got emotional to hear the names of my grandparents. Then I also realised the diversity of names pronounced by the priest: Rum, Bulgarian, Italian, Muslim and so on. Among the participants, I had seen Armenians, Catholics, Sunni Muslims and Alevis whom I had met in various religious and non-religious occasions. My very good Armenian friend, in her 70s then, was also there with her cake. She had baked a cake the previous year, and her wish had come true. She told me that after your wish comes true, you bake another cake the following year, to show gratitude and to thank *Agios Fanourios.* Other Rums also said the same thing. Then the priest makes a cross to bless the cake and hence cuts the cake in four pieces. At the end of the mass, women bring their blessed cakes to the garden. There you cut your cake into many small pieces and the speedy movements start. Women snatch pieces from each other. They do that as quickly as possible. This movement and speed of cutting and snatching cakes from each other makes the event so vivid, so shared, as well as fun. You try to exchange as many as you can, with whoever is there. You hold your cake on one hand, and you try to snatch a piece from the cake of another. Your eyes are trying to catch a cake that you have not gotten a piece from yet, while trying to hold your cake so that it does not fall. It is a bodily movement, where you constantly move among the women, hence bump or hit each other while trying to reach a cake. You also can eat a piece as you go along. You hear small talks in Rumca and in Turkish: "This one looks good." "I want to try this one." "Have I gotten a piece from you?" and you smile and laugh as well, as you enjoy the fast pace of the ritual, of the snatching which feels like a game. I snatched around 20 pieces. The best-looking cakes or smaller ones usually disappear as people try to snatch a piece from it. You give from your cake also to people you did not bake a cake, or they also come and take from yours. Children or anyone who passes by, drops by the church garden and eat from the cakes. People wish each other that God may make their wishes come true. Some people also expressed their surprise, with an approving smile, that I managed to bake a cake too. In the end, your tray of cake looks like a variety of cakes that look like left overs, as they are all in pieces. On my way home, I distributed the pieces of the cake to whoever I met. It was also Ramadan, so those who were not fasting, took a piece at that

moment and those, for instance, fasting Muslims of the teacher's house where I stayed, some of them ate after they broke the fast.

Agios Farounios is a collective, gendered, embodied practice, where women take part in it with their bodies, both in the baking of it, in the sharing and snatching of it at the church and when they distribute it after the church to their families and friends. It is very much similar to the embodied dimension of ritual practice (Hirschkind 2006) and "ritual sociality" (Erickson 2011), which makes the participants feel a part of the community, by sharing sensory and affective experiences. During Agios Farounios, you use your eyes to catch and snatch the cakes. You hear the prayer, the names of the dead and alive being blessed, you touch each other's bodies during the snatching, you eat and taste a variety of cakes with a variety of tastes. You feel the heat. When you eat the cake, you also smell the different ingredients, some put cloves, some put hazelnuts or other nuts. Some cakes are softer and lighter, some are heavier and denser. This ritual is hence embodied collectively through diversity of senses. The tastes of cakes are also distributed and shared with those who did not attend the church, by giving a piece of the cake to the non-attenders. It is also a performance, as people who participate in it are performing by baking, by displaying the cake and by snatching from others. They repeat it, if possible, every year, to make a wish for themselves or to eat a piece from somebody else to help their wish come true. The more your cake is eaten, the more it is believed that the wish comes true. Some people just attend to be part of the collectivity, to enjoy each other's company and taste different cakes. It is hence a syncretic practice, embodied and performed by the islanders from different religions. This is similar to how Engin Aktel expresses that the Rum culture lives in him, or how Orhan and Ajda emphasise how much they enjoyed attending the rituals in the church and this is also how Nuri, an Alevi from Erzincan, articulated that it is also his church because he went to weddings and religious days since he was a child.

I suggest, then, that conviviality is not only the ways of living that Orhan remembers so fondly but a particular *valuing* of sociable sociality in the making of place. It is the sort of "everyday coexistence" discussed by Bryant (2016) but here given "an intense ethical and aesthetic valuing" and self-consciously performed. For those who live there, what makes Burgaz a place with which they identify is precisely this form of sociality; to be Burgazlı is to experience and value this sociality and to invest in its

reproduction. Conviviality is practiced not only in everyday activities such as dancing, drinking, talking, having a coffee, swimming but also during syncretic religious practices.

Building from Mauss and Bourdieu, Bowman (2016, 259–260) argues that social practices such as interactions and negotiation of space are embodied through tacit knowledge, learned through imitation, practice and repetition. In the practice of everyday pluralism and intercommunal mixing, then Bowman (2016, 261) confirms that "sharing in religious celebrations and festivities is an extension of the *habitus* of a shared communal life." Burgaz islanders, having grown together on the island, having shared daily life, enjoyed and embodied the island through different senses, having attended each other's religious rituals, share *Burgaz habitus*. Bowman (2016) stresses the difference between practices during pilgrimages where sacred places are shared by tourists in other words by "strangers" who do not share the communal life but happen to "co-exist" in the same place, in difference to the syncretic practices in plural places where the inhabitants share the daily life. Bowman (2016) separates "syncretism" from "mixing" and "sharing." Syncretism implies inauthenticity, contamination, creolisation and hybridity of a practice, where identities are transformed (Bowman 2016, 197). During the "mixing," the participants of different faiths do not take practices from each other. For instance, Muslims will attend a Christian religious activity in the church but will tell Muslim prayers (Bowman 2010, 208). During the "sharing," Muslim participants can imitate or borrow Christian practices during the ritual however, they will not make a cross, for instance. "Shared practices at mixed sites mail entail antagonism and may forge novel identities, but neither is necessary; sharing may just well be the practice of a moment engaged by persons who return, after that 'communion' to their traditional selves and ways" (Bowman 2010, 198). Agios Farounios is then not "mixing" nor "sharing" according to Bowman's definition, but it is a syncretic, embodied and performed ritual, where the participants enact and reenact collective Burgaz identity. Nonetheless, this syncretism is not seen as inauthenticity, nor as contamination, neither as creolisation nor as hybridity; it is valued as what makes one Burgazlı, a collective identity that is based on diversity, of being "multicultural."

For instance, the Saint George's day, Agios Georgios celebrated in Büyükada, the biggest Princes' Islands, which I attended on 23 April 2010, can then be considered a shared practice, according to Bowman's definition, where thousands of people, mostly Muslims from different

parts of Istanbul attend by taking a rope from the bottom on Agia Georgi hill, up to the church. It is incredibly packed in the sense that people push each other, in such a way that I saw people's candles being broken on the way. The attenders draw their wishes near the church and light their candles when they reach the church. In Bowman's terms, these people are "strangers" to each other, who do not share the same space: they do not live together. Couroucli (2010) is right in the sense that the practices of Agios Georgios are only "moments" and do not reflect everyday practices of pluralism, because thousands of Muslims who join the pilgrimage come from Istanbul, engage in this Rum Orthodox religious practice only one day. Thus, they can "go back to their traditional selves and ways." Unfortunately, Couroucli (2010) has only explored Agios Georgios day in Büyükada and hence it would be wrong to conclude that Princes' Islands or Istanbul do not have syncretic practices in their everyday life. For instance, Agios Fanourios in Burgaz, is embodied, practiced and performed by the Burgaz islanders, who also share the daily life. According to my interpretation, Agios Fanourios, is an example of a syncretic practice as the participants from different faiths, follow and practice the ritual collectively through their bodies and this embodiment transforms, produces, reproduces and strengthens their Burgaz identity, based on diversity. The embodiment, the collective enjoyment, the sensorial experience and the collective bodily practice makes and remakes the islanders Burgazlı.

Having explored the collective embodiment, performance and production of diversity through Agios Fanourios, in the next section, I investigate the ways in which Burgaz islanders reflect on their personal syncretic religious practices in the ways in which they take, share and integrate practices from different faiths in their individual religious practices.

"I am Jewish but I fast like a Muslim"

On Burgaz, important religious days, religious rituals and practices are occasions where the practitioners discuss their religious beliefs and interpret the meaning of rituals in and outside religious places. When I analysed the discussions between people from different faiths, I found out that the islanders were interpretive, critical and questioning about their religious practices. Hann and Goltz (2010) criticise anthropologists of religion, who are trapped in the dichotomy of "scriptural versus popular" and "doctrine versus practice" (Hann and Goltz 2010, 15). They suggest that "instead of opposing beliefs to practices and theological to practical

religion case by case, analysts might instead begin to recognise more complex combinations of beliefs and practices, varying between different social groups, but also between individuals, and contextually variable for the individual" (Hann and Goltz 2010, 16). Burgaz islanders' practices of religion challenged orthopraxy (correct religious practices based on the doctrine). The practitioners made sense of the religious practices, sometimes they rejected parts of the doctrine; sometimes they referred to it and followed it. Building on Hann and Goltz' approach of not opposing belief and practice, and exploring conviviality, I analysed the ways in which individuals practise religion and the ways in which individuals from different faiths negotiate which each other their ways of practising religion. I found out that the islanders were open about how one practises religion, that they discuss different ways of practising a ritual. Some were also syncretic in the ways in which islanders combined practices from different faiths to make their own religious practice.

I came across some of these conversations about religious practices at Zeytin restaurant, during the Yom Kippur evening, one of the two most important holy days in Judaism. Yom Kippur is the atonement day, which takes place 10 days after Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New Year and during which the Jewish people fast for about 25 hours. Yom Kippur is the day when people reconcile and also ask forgiveness from God. In the *kal* of Burgaz, the shofar, a Jewish religious instrument was played. The prayers were about "God is the forgiving one, we have sinned and we are asking for forgiveness." Igal, who helped in reciting some of the prayers and in interpreting them to the audience, explained that first they pray in *pluriel* (said in French, meaning plural—"we") which means that they pray all together and reconcile with each other, then they pray in *singulier* (singular—"I") to ask for forgiveness from the God for the self. In between the prayers in the *kal*, Meri, Igal's wife, sat next to me and explained some of the rituals and how practices are done, and also pointed out people could also do things differently than the doctrine. For instance, according to the Torah, on Yom Kippur, one should not put water in the mouth while fasting, take a shower or wear perfume. However, on Yom Kippur day in Burgaz, many women came to the synagogue wearing makeup and perfume. Some, who did not fast because of working or health problems, also attended the prayers in the *kal* during the day.

At Zeytin restaurant, in the evening of Yom Kippur, one Jewish woman told me that they did not want to go to the synagogue (they used the term synagogue, not *kal* while talking in a mixed group) on Kippur because it

smelled, because most do not brush their teeth as they are not supposed to put anything in the mouth. Two other Jewish women said that they brushed their teeth while fasting, because, otherwise their mouth would smell. These are some examples which challenge orthopraxy, where the practitioners do not follow the doctrine word by word; they reject some bits of the doctrine and adjust it to their own way of practising. On that Yom Kippur day, I came across more instances in which Jews and Muslims compared Muslim and Jewish doctrines emphasising the similarities between these two faiths and explained the ways in which they took practices from each other.

Before I analyse my ethnographic examples, it is important to explain the context of Zeytin restaurant, what kind of a restaurant it is, the relationship and sociality between the clients and the owner. Zeytin restaurant's clients are religiously mixed. Similar to the other restaurants in Burgaz, Zeytin is an expensive restaurant to eat in. In 2009, one meal costed between 50–100 liras while the minimum monthly wage in Turkey was 800 liras. The restaurant is owned by a secular Sunni Muslim couple. The clients are wealthy summer inhabitants, who eat there regularly with their friends. They would not have to cook at home or wash the dishes. They just come to the restaurant, order whatever they would like to eat, socialise, drink, laugh and go home to sleep. Thanks to these summer clients, Hakan, like other restaurant owners makes a lot of money. The frequency of the clients eating in the restaurant created an ambiguous client/owner relationship. On the one hand, Hakan and the clients are friends, because they see each other almost every day. Hakan and his wife eat together with some of their regular clients. On the other hand, Hakan is still supposed to serve and collect the bills, and clients pay him for the service they get. The Muslim, Jewish, Rum and Armenian clients who eat regularly at the restaurant share a similar lifestyle. They can afford to "live" in a restaurant, they organise fancy dress parties to which they invite friends from different religions.

Ethel, Orli and Ari (Sephardic Jews), Osman (non-practising Sunni Muslim) and Hrant (Armenian) usually eat together every night, during the summer, at Zeytin restaurant. Fortune (Ashkenazi Jew) and Rayka (Sephardic Jew) also eat there with their friends and family a few nights a week. There is also a non-practicing Sunni Muslim drinking group, who eats there. The customers have "core" friendship groups, with whom they get along well and hence they hang out more. These "core groups" are not divided into different ethnic or religious affiliations; they are mixed.

Even though one might be within a "core group," hanging out at the same table, one can still shift from one group to another, join another dinner table for example, or play backgammon with someone from another table. The tables of the restaurant are very close to each other, and there are lots of inter-table talks. Everyone can hear whatever one says; one jumps into a conversation that is going on at another table, interrupts, comments and shouts. People have backgammon tournaments. People swear. People spend the whole evening and night there. It is not just a place for dining. These regular customers even eat breakfast, lunch and dinner there every single day in summer. For instance, rather than paying a bill every time, they rather have an "account," where Hakan keeps track of food consumed and these very frequent guests pay the accumulated bill every week or so. The customers who attend regularly Zeytin restaurant share similar lifestyle and tastes. While some islanders will not enjoy attending restaurants so frequently or regularly, the frequent customers like that. Similar lifestyle, tastes and frequent face-to-face interaction in this small restaurant and lack of vast space between tables create space and intimacy between people to talk, reason and discuss together about religious practices, politics, news and any other topics. Nonetheless, this also causes a lot of chaos, misunderstandings, tensions, which I will get back in Chap. 6.

After I attended the Yom Kippur prayer in the *kal*, I went to Zeytin restaurant. I was invited to join a table where Jews, Armenians and Sunni Muslims were eating. Ethel, a Jewish lady, had already broken the fast before the Kippur prayer as she became very ill and vomited. There was a heated discussion between two friends, Ethel and Fortune, and Hakan just jumped into their conversation:

Fortune: I am really upset at you because every year, it is the same story! You fast and you get very sick in the end. We told you not to fast and you fasted again this year! Why do you do this to yourself?

Hakan: Ethel was here in the restaurant all day, while she was fasting. I told her to go home and rest but she said she will stay here and keep fasting. Even though she vomited, she still kept fasting! Fasting ceases when you vomit! And I told her that after she vomited, she should eat. She resisted. Finally, Osman, [another Sunni Muslim client], convinced her to eat something until she got better.

Ethel: This rule that fasting cancels when you vomit is for the Muslims not for the Jews. I should not have broken the fast.

Fortune: No! Hakan is right, fasting cancels when you vomit, and it is the same in all religions.

Orli did not fast because of her health problems. Ethel had to break the fast early as she vomited and Fortune broke her fast after the Kippur prayer as stated in the Torah. Jews, Muslims and Armenians who were at the table were surprised that Fortune went to the synagogue and that she fasted on Yom Kippur. Fortune is considered as this unique, vivid, lively and crazy woman. She does not care about what people say. She is highly educated, multilingual and has a demanding job. She loves playing cards and backgammon and does not mind swearing when she plays. On that Kippur night, she told us the story of how she decided to fast on Kippur days:

Fortune: Once, I was eating, drinking tea and coffee and smoking while the other Jews were fasting. The other Jews disapproved of my behaviour. During that year, everything went bad in my life. People reminded me that as I did not fast on Yom Kippur, kept eating while everyone was fasting; I had a horrible year. From that day onwards, I fast on the Kippur day, but I fast in a Muslim way.

While she was supposed to start fasting when the first star (8 pm-ish) appeared in the sky and fast until the first star (8.30 pm-ish) appeared the next evening (about 25 hours), she said:

> I had all the support from [the prophet] Muhammed, I kept eating pasta, boiled eggs, bread anything that made me feel full until 2.00 am like the Muslims do when they fast, and like them, I slept until early afternoon and broke fasting after the Kippur prayer like the Jews.

This particular example of Fortune shows her agency in the ways in which she combined and juxtaposed Jewish and Muslim practices in how she fasted during Yom Kippur. The explanation of her choice is told in a jokingly manner. She mentions that she gets the support from the prophet Muhammed. By doing like this, she compares fasting in these two religions and sees that fasting for the Muslims lasts less hours, however it is also accepted by God and practiced by the Muslims, thus it will equally be

accepted by God, when practiced in Jewish fasting. She still marks that the year when she did not fast on Yom Kippur, was seen as disrespectful by the other Burgazlı Jews. She interprets that this kind of contempt that she received brought her bad luck and misery that year. Hence, she then decided to fast on Yom Kippur, but on her own way, integrating Muslim practices into the Jewish fasting.

Many Burgaz islanders do not follow strictly a particular doctrine; they change and adjust their practices; they compare religious practices with other faiths and take practices from each other. This comparison of fasting in different religions by the restaurant clients shows that Burgaz islanders are very well aware of differences and similarities in religious practices; as well as the flexibility and agency of the individuals in the ways in which they interpret and practice religions. As they have lived together since their childhood, attended each other's religious events, shared the daily life, they collectively reached to an understanding that all religions are equal in the eyes of God, that there are different practices in different faiths but it is totally accepted to syncretise practices from different faiths. Berberyan (2010, 83), a Burgazlı woman of Armenian descent wrote in her memoir about Burgaz, what she learnt from her grandmother: "Regardless of religion, humans are humans, their God is one. Regardless of which language the prayer is uttered, it is a prayer" (my own translation). Berberyan (2010) remarks three things: (a) Burgaz islanders syncretise religious practices, by taking prayers and practices from different faiths; (b) they collectively experience religious events, in the ways in which, they attend each other's religious rituals, eat together and share food during these events; (c) the islanders know the important religious days of every faith as well as what one should do on these days, as they celebrate each other's important days by taking part in it. She recalls that she had one Muslim friend who was scared of many things, in other words, a "coward" she says. She told him that whenever he was scared, he should do the cross three times and say "Hisus Kristos" (Jesus Christ) and that his fear would disappear (Berberyan 2010, 83). Her friend did as she followed: whenever he was scared, he made a cross three times and nobody remarked it as something weird or something that should not be done, let alone despising it. She also recalls that whenever they (Armenians) heard *ezan,* the Muslim call to prayer, they (Armenians) recited the "Hayr Mer" (Our Father prayer in Armenian) and made a cross (Berberyan 2010, 83). She also draws attention that regardless of which religion the children came from, they all ate together all the religious food that was shared

during funerals, weddings, Christmas, Easter, and Bayram (*Eid*). She cites *irmik helvası*, a semolina dessert, or *un helvası*, a flour-based dessert, which were both eaten at the funerals of the Muslims; *koliva*, another dessert served at funerals of Rum Orthodox, done by wheat, dried fruit and nuts; coloured eggs of Easter; the flower-free bread, Matsa, during the *hamursuz* (Passover) of the Jews; the meat from the *kurban*, sacrificed animal during Eid of Muslims, that is distributed to the neighbours; and the olive leaves, distributed to the houses in the neighbourhood during Dzağgazart, the Palm Sunday, in Armenian (Berberyan 2010, 81). Fortune's fasting, and Berberyan's Muslim's friend's doing the cross sign are examples of individual syncretic practices particular to Burgaz islanders, where individuals are free to syncretise religious practices and this is not despised, yet this makes the islanders Burgazlı, who embody each other's differences. These daily and religious practices are extensions of shared *habitus* ingrained in conviviality.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explored Burgaz islanders' memories and current daily practices by paying attention to the sociable sociality aspect of conviviality, in the ways in which Burgaz is embodied collectively through diverse sensorial experiences, such as drinking, dancing, fishing, swimming, eating together, and attending religious rituals. Sharing food and commensality during the religious days as well as in various occasions produces collective memory and shared identity (Seremetakis 2019; Sutton 2001), and hence a strong sense of belonging to Burgaz. Everyday practices are very much enjoyed by the islanders; and collective enjoyment and embodiment of their environment bonds the islanders together and they embody each other's diversity. By participating in each other's religious days as well as by syncretising practices from different faiths, islanders create/invent their individual religious practices and embody the diversity of the islanders.

While it is relatively easier for the islanders to differentiate religious practices from each other, for instance, Rum orthodox Sunday masses or Agios Fanourios from Muslim Bayrams, it is not so easy to grasp or put boundaries to what Rum culture or Jewish culture is, as islanders share Burgaz habitus and construct the daily life in Burgaz together through shared memories and collective embodiment. Thus, the conviviality in

Burgaz differs from side-by-side living, where there is limited interaction among different social classes and ethno-religious groups.

The taking and sharing of practices from different religions in Burgaz resemble to how Mazower (2000) described intercommunal mixing prior to the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, before the spread of nationalisms. At that time period, in Ottoman lands, practices of daily life did not reflect clear-cut religious categorisations despite the existence of the binary distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims (Mazower 2000). Religious difference was recognised. People respected the fact that their neighbours followed their own beliefs, and in times of crisis they asked for each other to pray to their own God and messiahs (Mazower 2000, 65). Christians, Jews and Muslims would use each other's amulets when their own did not work (Mazower 2000, 86). For instance, a Muslim woman would try to get a hair from a Jewish person's beard to reduce fever; Muslim children had Muslim prayers read over them in churches; Christian children were blessed by Muslims hodjas (Mazower 2000, 86). In some parts of Macedonia, people went to mosque on Friday and to church on Sunday and said that they were Muslims of the Virgin Mary (Mazower 2000, 68). Non-Muslims sometimes used sharia law even though no Muslims were involved in the issue (Mazower 2000, 69). People became blood-brothers even though they belonged to different religions (Mazower 2000, 71–72). Intermarriage between Muslims and Christians was not uncommon (Mazower 2000, 70). In a Bulgarian memoir in 1870, it was remarked that Turks and Bulgarians got on well as neighbours in the villages, their children played together; in the neighbourhood, people spoke enough Bulgarian and Turkish to converse with each other; even though both had their own faith, customs and clothing, they accepted belief as it was without making a value judgement (Mazower 2000, 75–76). These older practices in the Balkans can be extended in time and space, as we see in Burgaz, by taking different forms following the homogenisation processes during the nation building stages, incorporated in the intercommunal mixing/relations, where people share a joint life in the neighbourhood, and share religious practices with each other in plural, mixed communities (see Bringa 1995; Bryant 2016; Bowman 2010).

Burgaz does not seem to be a unique place, but one of the many examples across different times periods and contexts, where people of different faiths, took and/or shared practices from each other, and lived together sharing space/neighbourhood. Yet, violence can also erupt in mixed communities. For instance, in a war situation, life-long neighbours (from

different ethno-religious backgrounds) can turn against, even kill each other (Bringa 1995). Bowman proposes not to presuppose Samuel Huntington's (1993) clash of civilisations, nor Hayden (2002); Hayden et al.'s (2016) "antagonistic tolerance" where tolerance refers to enduring the presence of others (without embracing it) as long as one group dominates other(s). Instead, Bowman (2010, 2016) suggests to explore the contexts and the moments when particular practices are shared or mixed, and the ways in which individuals perform and reflect on their practices in order to understand how intercommunal-mixing takes place. Analysis of the context will also allow one to understand the changes, as well the tension, conflicts and even antagonisms in people's social relations, such as the ways in which the bombings of the synagogues and the political tension regarding Turkey-Israeli relations solidified the boundaries of the Jewish community, which I will turn to in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER 6

Conviviality as Performance of Pluralism and Living with Difference: Sociable Sociality and Labour of Peace

Introduction

This chapter turns the attention from the collective embodiment of diversity to the individual performance of pluralism as "living with difference" where differences are not internalised, but they are engaged with, respected, sometimes negotiated and sometimes embraced. Conviviality, here, is then explored in interpersonal relations and friendships between individuals, who belong to different ethno-religious groups. I investigate the ways in which the islanders perform pluralism both as sociable sociality and also as doing labour of peace, in the ways in which they control tensions and manage conflicts. As highlighted in the introduction chapter of this book, my take on conviviality bridges multicultural living (living with difference) with shared ways of living (living together in diversity) and people negotiate and navigate between these two. In the previous chapter, I emphasised the embodiment and internalisation of diversity through shared ways of living, enjoying, valuing and performing it. In Chap. 4 and this chapter, I show the ways in which, when the islanders do not internalise differences, they let each other follow their way of living. Similar tastes and lifestyles bring people of different ethno-religious and class backgrounds together; conviviality is practised both in the form of shared ways of living and living with difference, where people perform labour of peace during sociable sociality and also manage of tensions. The last section of the chapter explores the ways in which discourses of toleration can

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be embedded in the articulation and interpretation of every day tensions due to the tense political context (e.g. between Israel and Turkey) and can be worsened by class difference. Nonetheless, these tensions are solved and managed through labour of peace (talking and reflecting, doing as if nothing had happened, and exchange/transaction of goods). Hence, conviviality, is not passive, non-interference, but is performative and solidaric.

Some recent anthropological studies have explored labour of peace and solidarity among individuals and in the neighbourhood (Chambers 2019; Heil 2014) where individuals fought against common causes (Harris 2016). Labour of peace refers to duties and responsibilities towards the neighbour for the continuity of peace (Bryant 2016). For instance, Chambers (2019) describes performing conviviality as "bridging difference" through gift exchange, interdependence and labour of peace, in the ways in which Muslims and Hindus avoid and solve tensions and negotiate differences. What I try to do in this chapter is to give a comprehensive view of inter-personal relations in the ways in which people practise conviviality both as sociable sociality, labour or peace and solidarity. Therefore, I argue that conviviality cannot be reduced to only sociable sociality, or to labour of peace, or to acts of solidarity, but that it involves all of these practices depending on the different situations of everyday life. The characters in this chapter perform situational performance of multiplicity of identities in the ways in which they enjoy friendship, show solidarity as well as manage and solve conflicts. As I explore the ways in which common interests, tastes and lifestyles bring people together, I also investigate here the complex role of class in inter-personal relations, both among friends and in between employee and employer.

The ethnographic examples in this chapter overlap with the existing literature on "everyday coexistence and neighbourliness" in the Balkans, Anatolia, the Mediterranean, the Levant and South Asia in the ways in which neighbours, regardless of their ethnicity or religious difference, attend each other's weddings, funerals, important religious days, they eat and drink together, and work together (Bringa 1995; Bryant 2016; Lubańska 2007; Georgieva 1999; Padilla et al. 2015; Ring 2006; Doumanis 2012; Heil 2014; Bigelow 2010; Huseyinoglu 2018; Saglam 2022). In opposition to the term *coexistence* in the sense of *toleration* and endurance of difference (see Kaya 2013), Bryant (2016) describes *everyday coexistence* as everyday practices and performances of living together, which sees conviviality as *living with difference* and "neighbourliness" (see Heil 2014), as well as "intercommunality" (Doumanis 2012) "intercommunalism"

(Bowman 2016, 261) or "intercommunal mixing" (Bowman 2016, 265), and "interreligious relations" and "cohabitation" (Bigelow 2010). Everyday coexistence, conviviality, intercommunality, intercommunalism and intercommunal mixing move away from coexistence as toleration and focuses instead on the practices and performance of pluralism, where individuals from different ethnic and religious backgrounds share space and live together in the neighbourhood. Here again, as in the *ebru* pattern, one can see the distinct or remarkable patterns; ethno-religious differences are not erased, neither ignored; people identify themselves and others as belonging to a particular ethnic and or religious group. Nonetheless, these patterns are not divided into clear-cut compartments, like that in the mosaic. Joys, pleasures, fights and tension are shared and managed. For instance, when a group of islanders from different ethno-religious backgrounds have dinner together in a restaurant, or at home, while some Rums and Sunni Muslims drink alcohol, some Sunni Muslims do not. They still eat together, laugh at the same jokes, and gossip, but consume different drinks. Islanders do not live parallel lives, but their lives cross each other's, especially, when the life of an islander is in danger, such as in the blood feud at the end of the chapter, people from different class, ethnicity or religion protect each other.

The Friendship Between the Imam and the Rum Orthodox Priest

I met, Hamdi, the previous imam of the mosque at the garden of Ay Yanni Rum Orthodox church. He drops by the church quite often, to chat, to have tea and to work out, with those, who run the church, the formalities regarding the church and the mosque such as paying the bills. I got introduced to him by Niko, a very knowledgeable Rum Orthodox man, who is in the church committee. Niko introduced Hamdi to me like this: "Let me introduce you to Hamdi. You cannot find an imam like him in Istanbul. For example, he is very open-minded. 'Another type' of imam would not be able to survive in Burgaz." I then introduced myself to Hamdi *Ağabey* (elder brother) that I was doing research on Burgaz about daily life, different communities living together and their memories. Hamdi *Ağabey* started narrating, right after:

> Write down this anecdote. Five years ago, Dimitra's (the coffee mark reader, the Orthodox Macedonian) husband, Alexandros, had a heart attack on the

> boat which was going from Istanbul to Burgaz. He died at one of the harbours in Istanbul, where he was left. The public prosecutor was called to record that he was dead. The Rum Orthodox priest of Burgaz at that time, Pandelis, phoned me and told me to go to Istanbul with him to take the coffin and the corpse back to Burgaz. We rented a boat, went to the hospital to get the corpse. The policeman at the hospital asked us who we were. When we said that we were the imam and the priest of Burgaz, the police got very surprised because normally every religious head is responsible of their own people. How come the imam also comes to pick up the coffin of a Christian? Such a good act! The policeman said that he had not seen something like this in his 34 years of being a policeman. In order for us to pick up the corpse, some documents were needed to be signed off by a public prosecutor on night duty as it was already 1.30 am. The public prosecutor was also very surprised that I, as an imam, was helping out in the process. He said that he would definitely sign the documents for us but we needed to find the municipality doctor. The municipality doctor asked a high price to come and sign. I bargained and pulled the price down. The doctor finally came in his Mercedes. It was 2.30 am already. By 4.00 am we finally got back to Burgaz. We put the corpse in the mortuary of the mosque. There is only one mortuary on the island and it is at the mosque. Whoever dies, no matter which religion they belong to, they are stored in the mortuary of the mosque until the funeral. This is how we live in harmony on the island.

In this anecdote, Hamdi presents himself as a good Burgaz islander, who helps the priest and he wants to highlight that he is there to help whenever he is needed and this is how one should be in Burgaz, where there is, according to him, a harmonious life among different religious communities. Their faith, in a way, those of Burgaz islanders is tied together, in life and when they die, they are together. In this story, he also positions himself on the side of Pandelis, the priest, against the officials, who are probably of Sunni Muslim origin. The fact that he sides with Pandelis and comes to collect the body of the Christian deceased Burgazlı, is also perceived as "different" by the policeman in Istanbul, because every religious head is responsible of his "own people." Nonetheless, Hamdi also shares the responsibility of picking up Alexandros' body with Pandelis, because they are friends from Burgaz and Pandelis asked for Hamdi's company in order to do this duty. While in Istanbul it is surpising for an imam to company a priest to collect the corpse of a Christian, Hamdi would like to imply that it is not surprising in Burgaz. This anecdote can be interpreted as a performance of conviviality in the form of labour of

peace and solidarity. Here, the imam gives an example of living with difference among the people, who belong to different faiths and in times of need, they share their duties and keep each other company. This was also similar to how the other religious heads, the Catholic one for instance, interacted with Hamdi. The imam's wife, Nurgül, told me for example that the Austrian Catholic priest had paid for Hamdi's education to finish his high school degree as Hamdi had dropped out when he was young. One can also see here that there is inequality in the difference of education as well as socio-economic resources. The Christian priests earn more than the imams, as the minorities' religious duty personal are paid by their religious foundations (vakıf). While the Christian priests completed their education, the imam did not, and the Catholic priest could financially support the education of Hamdi. Another point is that, as Catholic priests are not allowed to marry, they do not have a family, unlike Hamdi, who also takes care of his wife, who is a non-working house wife, and of his two daughters. What is striking is that the Catholic priest performs the labour of peace, to diminish the inequality of education between him and the imam. The Christian priests have intimate and supportive relations with the imam, they perform labour of peace and show solidarity to support Hamdi.

The friendship between Hamdi and Pandelis is not only about "working together as religious heads," neither only performance of labour of peace and solidarity. They also share similar interests and enjoy each other's company. When I went to visit Hamdi's wife, and his daughters, they told me about the friendship between the imam and Pandelis, the previous Rum Orthodox priest. First of all, they were both supporters of Fenerbahçe football team. His wife said that the imam was such a fan that when there was a Fenerbahce match, he prayed and guided the evening prayer rather quickly, reducing it from one hour to 40–45 minutes so that he and the audience could rush to watch Fenerbahçe matches. Pandelis had Cine5 TV (paid channel) in his house. The Imam's family used to go to Pandelis' house to watch Fenerbahçe matches. The daughters liked visiting the priest and his family. Pandelis never offered alcohol to them, they always had teas together. This shows that they recognise each other's religious differences, when they socialise together, and respect each other's way of living their life according to their religion. In contrast to the previous chapter, where islanders embody each other's differences and perform syncretic religious rituals, which I presented there as "conviviality as living together in diversity," this example of the priest not offering alcohol, and

them consuming non-alcoholic drinks together is an example of "conviviality as living with difference" not as toleration, but as practices of everyday coexistence, respecting the ways in which people live their daily life, differently. The imam and the priest share commensality, common interests and hence engage in sociable sociality. It is also not a surprise that Hamdi is not such a close friend with the current priest, because they do not share the same interests and socialise with each other. While Hamdi is still a very good "co-worker" with other religious heads, such as the current Rum Orthodox priest, he is not friends with the current priest, such as going to each other's homes for eating and watching football matches.

The story of the imam gets more and more interesting because he, in fact, came to the island in 1999 from a city close to Istanbul that has a reputation of having religiously conservative Sunni Muslim inhabitants. I listened to the *vaaz* (sermons) of imams in different places in Istanbul such as in Kadıköy and Taksim (diverse and secular quarters) and the ones given by Hamdi *Ağabey*. Hamdi *Ağabey*, regardless of the audience, who are just Sunni Muslims during Ramadan, but who are mixed (Alevis, Orthodox, Catholics and Jews) at funerals and *mevlut*,[1] always refers to all the prophets, who came before Muhammed, names them, brings his gratefulness to Atatürk (who implemented secularism in Turkey) for having founded Turkey and wishes the continuity of peace. In contrast, other imams, to whose sermons I listened, warned the public of the possible sins they might be thinking of doing, telling them not to drink alcohol like *gavurs* (a derogatory term used for non-Muslims) for example. While the sermons in other imams in Istanbul include words of intolerance, those of Hamdi are tailored for Burgaz islanders, where he refers to different religions, their prophets and also show gratefulness to Atatürk. Therefore, his sermons embrace diversity of religions, living with difference and in diversity. We can also see here how he himself internalised the values of being Burgazlı, through conviviality and cultivated Burgaz habitus. By working together with other religious heads, by hanging out with Pandelis he practised and performed conviviality, as sociable sociality, as labour of peace and as solidarity. He has become a Burgaz islander. Niko also marked that another type of imam would not be able to survive on the island. This also hints to us that whoever lives on the island, as well as religious heads should know, practise, perform, understand and appreciate living with difference and in diversity.

Furthermore, the imam's wife said, "The imam is only imam in the mosque but a human being outside." She meant that the imam is a

religious leader in the society, but this is not only, who he is: being a Sunni Muslim and an imam is only one part of his life and in daily life, outside of the mosque, he is a human being like everyone else. His religious identity and religious leadership do not take over his overall character. I hung out mostly with Nurgül, his wife and his daughters and sometimes he also joined us having tea or coffee when he passed by home. It was important for me to understand his multiplicity of identities, as an imam, husband, father, as a friend, as a Fenerbahce fan (in opposition to me supporting Galatasaray) a co-worker, and as a Burgazlı. For instance, with Pandelis, his friend, he performs sociable sociality based on common interests, and also labour of peace and solidarity as a religious leader. With the Catholic priest and the current Rum Orthodox priest, he performs more labour of peace in the form of living with difference.

The fact that the imam is supported by the Catholic priest and the Rum Orthodox people who are in charge of the Orthodox church demonstrates that there are not competitions between these religious heads. While the Orthodox and Catholic religious heads are in support of the imam, the imam is also appreciative of Christianity and makes it explicit when he delivers the sermons in the mosque. While there is competition in the form of antagonistic toleration (Hayden 2002, 205), between the non-recognised Alevis and the Sunni Muslims, who are seen to dominate the Alevis (see Chap. 8), in the case of Christian priests and the Sunni Muslim imam, it is not a matter of tolerating each other, rather it is conviviality as living with difference, an embracement of each other's religious differences and being respectful towards each other. They do not do so only through talking about living together in peace but they also perform it in their actions, through helping each other out. In the following ethnographic example, I delve into employee and employer relations between a Sunni Muslim verger and the Rum committee member, who runs the Orthodox churches.

A Muslim Family Takes Care of the Rum Orthodox Church

I met Zümrüt on a winter day in January 2010, at the embroidery class. The attenders are all women, permanent inhabitants, mainly Sunni Turkish Muslims and a Kurdish woman. While the other women were embroidering flowers and animal patterns on their fabric, Zümrüt wanted to embroider a big cross and she was looking for a cross pattern. I call the elder

women *teyze*, which means aunty, and the younger ones, *abla*, which means elder sister. So, I approached Zümrüt as Zümrüt *Abla*.

Deniz: Zümrüt *Abla*, I can find some cross patterns on the internet, print them and bring them to you. What kind of a pattern do you want?

Zümrüt: Deniz, can you bring me a big cross pattern, not a plain cross but a decorative and elegant one? Thank you so much.

Deniz: Yes sure, what are you planning to do with this cross pattern?

Zümrüt: I want to make a big cross for Niko *Ağabey* (elder brother). He is my boss and he is so nice. If I embroider a big cross on a big piece of fabric, he will be very happy and then we can put it in the church.

Deniz: I know Niko! He is in charge of the churches, isn't he? And how come he is your boss?

Zümrüt: I am the verger of the church on the top of the island. Niko *Ağabey* (elder brother) is in charge of the bills and formalities of the churches. In spring and summer, my family and I, live on top of the island and we take care of the maintenance of the Metamorphosis church and in winter, we live at the centre of the island. You should come visit me on top of the island, it is so beautiful. Especially, in the spring, the poppies grow; the grass is green and smells fresh. It is like heaven on earth. I will show you the church as well.

I did not expect a Sunni Muslim family to take care of the Rum Orthodox Church and that she called her boss *ağabey* which means elder brother. So, I wanted to know how she moved to the island and became the verger of the church. I knew that the churches were only open during the summer time and there would not be a mass on an Easter day in Burgaz. However, the weather was nice, not so hot and it was not raining, so I decided to climb to the top of the island to visit Zümrüt *Abla* on the Easter day, 3 April 2010. When I visited her, she brought me a book, some photocopies and her poetry notebook. She was interviewed a few times by Austrians, Turkish journalists and students as "the Muslim, who takes care of the Rum Orthodox church." When I was flicking through her poetry book, where she wrote about welcoming the spring on top of Burgaz, coincidentally, we heard some people entering the garden of the church. A French tourist couple came to visit the church as the guests of a Turkish

and Greek couple, who lives in Burgaz. I did not know how much this couple knew about Zümrüt and the church but the French couple and I were both interested in finding out how Zümrüt takes care of the church. I found myself in the middle of translating in Turkish and French the conversations between Zümrüt and the French couple.

The French woman (FW): How is it to take care of the church and to live on top of the island with only your family and no neighbours?

Zümrüt: I feel alone sometimes but the nature and looking over Istanbul and to the other islands makes me grateful to have moved to Burgaz and enjoy this panorama.

FW: So where are you from? How come you started to work here?

Zümrüt: When I was young, with my friends, we used to clean the mosque in our village in Sivas, in Anatolia. I married my paternal uncle's son and came to Istanbul as a bride in 1987. While working in Istanbul, my husband developed good relationships with the Rums. These Rums, who lived in Istanbul also had houses in Burgaz. When they proposed us the job of taking care of the church, my husband and I accepted. I said: "both mosques and churches are the houses of God. Why wouldn't we take care of the church?"

When the French woman heard that Zümrüt, as a Muslim, took care of an Orthodox Christian church, she had tears falling down her eyes and she said: "While there are wars between different religions, it is very touching to see a Muslim woman taking care of a Christian church, this is very moving and impressive." When I translated the French woman's response to Zümrüt, Zümrüt did not react as if she was doing something spectacular or extraordinary as a Muslim, who takes care of the church. For Zümrüt, this was not a favour but a natural act.

After the French couple left in awe with their Turkish and Greek hosts, by talking to Zümrüt and visiting her more regularly, I learnt more about the ways in which she did her job and how she changed since she had been doing the work. Through the interactions with the Rums and in order to do the job properly, Zümrüt and her son picked up a few Greek words which are used in the mass, like *ψωμί* (*psomi*—bread), *κρασί* (*krasi*—wine), *νερό* (*nero*—water). They know about what to do with the ritualistic items during the mass. Her little son, aged nine, always puts out the candles of the church, carried the ritualistic items such as the incense, bread or wine

and held the big keys of the church. Zümrüt knows the meaning of rituals, she paints and cleans the church and shows it to visitors. She added: "I clean the diamonds of the chandelier, one by one, I don't even clean my house that meticulously."

After having listened to the story from Zümrüt's side, I also wanted to know how Niko, and the rest of the islanders interpret the fact that a Muslim takes care of the Orthodox Church. The sad part of the story was told to me by Niko. He said, "Today Rums do not want to take the job of taking care of the church." I was surprised and asked why. He explained that "first of all, there are not many Rums left to take care of the church and the ones. Those who remained in Burgaz are all educated, with good jobs and they do not want to do this job." Zümrüt works for Niko and Niko, as well as the Rum community, need Zümrüt to do the job. There is mutual dependency between them. Zümrüt's case of taking a job in Burgaz is similar to other Muslims, Sunnis, Alevis and Kurdish labour migrants from eastern and south-eastern Anatolia, who usually first moved to the big city, Istanbul and then they find links to other places, through *hemşeri*, those, who come from their home town. So, for Zümrüt, she and her husband met their future Rum bosses in Istanbul and then came to Burgaz to take the job. Zümrüt and her husband accepted the job out of necessity. As they took care of the church, they were given free accommodation and salary. Zümrüt articulates that she had very good experiences with Rums in Istanbul, as people and as employers. Zümrüt and his family, greatly respect Niko, their boss, whom they refer to using a kinship term "elder brother" and are grateful for their job and their life in Burgaz. Zümrüt could have just done the basic jobs of taking care of the church; however, she takes care of the church as if it is her own house, through cleaning the diamonds of the lantern one by one. She even wanted to embroider a big cross on a big piece of cloth that would be put on the alter table of the church, to give it as a present to her "boss" Niko *Ağabey*.

Hence, the relationship between Niko and Zümrüt is not only an employee–employer relationship. Niko's wife told me that Zümrüt's son's circumcision ceremony/celebration, which is an Islamic practice, took place in the garden of the church. The Rum community is appreciative of how well Zümrüt and her family are taking care of the Orthodox Church. To thank the family, Rums did the circumcision celebration in the garden of the church. Chambers (2019, 792) points out: "Conviviality can be essential in maintaining labour relations—particularly in contexts where work, labour, production and sociality constantly intermingle" (Chambers

2019, 799). In the relationship between Zümrüt and Niko, we can see that labour, interdependence, and sociality are intertwined. "The salience and strength of conviviality is produced in a non-bounded context that is intersected not only by the social but also by the economic and instrumentality" (Chambers 2019, 792). Nonetheless, the relationship between Zümrüt, her family, Niko and those, who run the church goes beyond interdependence, instrumentality, and bridging difference. Their relationship shows gratitude and embracement of religious differences as a performance of living with difference.

The stories of Hamdi, Pandelis, Zümrüt and Niko are inspiring, nonetheless, there is also a dark side, or a shadow in their story. What Niko said ("there is not many Rums left to take care of the church") is significant to understand the overall embracing attitude of Muslims towards Rums. According to Niko's estimation, there are around 40 Rum families, who live on Burgaz in summer, and maybe about 4–5 families live permanently. As a result of the homogenisation and Turkification policies (see Chap. 2), during the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the building of the modern Turkish nation, the numbers of the non-Muslims, notably the Rum community diminished significantly. Non-Muslim minorities, especially the Rums are no longer perceived as "a threat" by the national authorities. The islanders, especially the Sunni Muslim elites, who have lived on the island for generations are very nostalgic of the good, happy days when many Rums used to live on the island, celebrating all together the religious festivals and days, going to the five *gazinos* all together, hearing Rum music, smelling *raku* (an alcoholic drink similar to ouzo), singing and dancing day and night. I was told by my Sunni Muslim informants that Hristos, where Zümrüt lived alone with her family, was a very active place where people used to go to have picnics, go to masses in the Metamorphosis church and celebrate the grape day, Easter and Christmas. Today, Easter and Christmas are not celebrated as there are not many permanent Rum inhabitants on the island in winter. One of my Rum informants had told me that they used to climb up to Hristos on the 5th of August in the afternoon with food, drinks, blankets, go to the grape mass, spend the night there and wake up to go to the morning mass. Today, there is no big celebration in that church. For example, in 2010, on the 5th of August, we went up to Hristos, there was the mass and we came back down after the mass. Zümrüt as a person, who moved to the island in 2000, found herself in the middle of the embracing nostalgia between Muslims and Rums and became part of the conviviality. As Burgaz islanders lost their friends to

homogenisation, they hold onto the remaining ones, by performing conviviality with an extra care.

In this section, through analysing these examples, I suggested that in daily life and social interactions, religious differences do not always bring tension between individuals. The friendship between the imam and the Orthodox priest showed that, in daily life, individuals form intimate relations because of shared common interests, and their religious differences do not always create boundaries. Even though a Muslim family took the job of taking care of the church out of necessity and for economic reasons, the relationship between Zümrüt and Niko goes beyond employee and employer relationship. In Zümrüt and Niko's interactions, class difference and mutual dependency played a positive role in the ways in which they showed an embracing attitude towards their religious differences. Nonetheless, in the next section, I turn my attention to the management of every day tensions and crisis situations, by embedding them within the socio-political context and tensions on the island.

Tahin-Pekmez Dessert

During my fieldwork in 2009, I had come across several non-Jewish informants, who had articulated that the Jewish community was exclusive. It is important here to address the socio-economic and political contexts, to understand why the Jewish community was perceived to be exclusive. After Israel created walls in the West Bank in 2000 and the continuous violence between Hamas and the Israeli state, some people in Istanbul associated the Jews in Turkey with the Jews in Israel, sometimes, with the Israeli state. In the Turkish press and in public, the violence between Palestinians and Israelis was taken as an issue between Muslims and Jews. On 3 March 2009, a famous female singer, Yıldız Tilbe, in a daily TV women's programme said that she was against Israel attacking Gaza; and even yelled "Damn Israel!". The political tension and the worsening relations between Israel and Turkey [2] (see Brink-Danan 2011, 96) including Tayyip Erdoğan's "one minute" aggression against the Israeli president Shimon Peres in Davos in 2009 (Bennhold 2009) and the Mavi Marmara incident on 31 May 2010 (Booth 2010), when an Israeli navy flotilla attacked Mavi Marmara boat which was bringing aid to the Gaza district and killed 9 Turkish activists, made the Jewish people in Turkey feel anxious and reluctant to talk. One of my Jewish informants in Burgaz pointed

out that 100 Jewish families left Istanbul following the tensions between Israel and Turkey already in 2010.

As Burgaz is not isolated from the political context within Turkey, security control was implemented in the synagogues in Istanbul after the synagogue bombings on 15 November 2003. The same rule applied to the *kal* in Burgaz. When I attended one of my best friends' wedding in Neve Shalom in Istanbul in 2010, I went through the security check, the invitation she sent to me had to be shown with my identity card, and when I passed by the first door, the second door got closed to ensure a stronger security (see Brink-Danan 2011, 84–85). There is no such door system in the kal of Burgaz, but the security stands at the door and knows who is from Burgaz and who is not. The head rabbi of the Jewish community and some other rabbis also visit the synagogue in Burgaz during important Jewish religious days; security checks are conducted at the door. While all the other religious places of worship in Burgaz (the mosque, Catholic chapel, the Rum Orthodox churches and Alevi *cemevi*) are open to everyone, without security checks, and people from different faiths attend each other's funerals, religious days and ceremonies at these worship places, the *kal* of Burgaz is only open to Jews and the non-Jews need permission from the head of the *kal* or to be invited by a Jewish Burgazlı.

Later on, during my fieldwork, I realised that the closeness of the Jewish community as articulated by the non-Jews was more of an issue of class difference than religious exclusivity. The permanent Muslim inhabitants and the wealthy Jewish summer inhabitants had limited interactions, which were mainly economic transactions. This class difference, in addition to the political tension between Israel and Turkey created a divisive effect between the wealthy Jewish summer inhabitants and the permanent working-class Muslims. In winter, when I formed closer relations with the permanent working-class inhabitants, I realised that some of the working class on the island was not happy with the way they were treated by the Jewish inhabitants. I heard from the corner shop owner (a Zaza Alevi Burgazlı) that the Jews in the Blue Club treated the workers in a disrespectful way in contrast to the mixed Sports Club members, who treated their workers in a friendly way. Another time, another two corner shop owners (Sunni Muslims) were gossiping about the Jews and said that even though the Jewish customer saw that other people were waiting to be served, the Jewish one jumped in front of the queue and said that s/he needs to be treated quicklier as s/he was in rush. Another restaurant chef said: "Jews always negotiate and bargain about prices before they eat and

if you want to earn money on the island, you have to know how to treat the Jews."

Discourses of toleration can be embedded in the articulation and interpretation of every day tensions due to the tense political context (e.g. between Israel and Turkey) and can be worsened by class difference. Nonetheless, what I would like to show in this section is that these tensions are solved and managed through labour of peace (e.g. talking and reflecting, exchange/transaction of goods) and that belonging to similar class backgrounds and having a similar lifestyle creates intimacy and shared ways of living among people from different ethno-religious groups. Furthermore, at moments of crisis, when a life of an islander is in danger, differences in class, ethnicity and religion subsume, when islanders jointly offer to help to protect the islander. Hence, practices of conviviality are not passive, non-interference, but are performative and solidaric.

You have already met Hakan, the chef and owner of the Zeytin restaurant and Ethel, Orli and Osman, the clients of Zeytin. This ethnographic anecdote includes them and some of the clients of the restaurant. It was the end of my first summer in Burgaz, October 2009. Orli and I spent the day together in the Social Club and decided to have dinner in Zeytin restaurant with Ethel. In late afternoon, Orli called Gül, Hakan's wife and the cook of Zeytin, to pre-order *cacık* (tzatziki) and shrimp. When Orli and I came back from the SC, in the late afternoon, Orli and I chatted for hours, she showed me her house, pictures on Facebook and we did not realise how the time had flown and that we were late to go to Zeytin restaurant.

We had agreed with Ethel, Gül and Osman that we would come around 19.30 but Orli and I managed to get there around 21.00 and Ethel came even later, which started the night already with a bit of tension. Osman was then sitting with the other table. In most situations, it would have been fine to keep the chef or the cook of a restaurant waiting, especially in Istanbul, but, in this situation Gül and Hakan were also their friends, so it was like keeping friends waiting. That night, I sat with Ethel and Orli. The cook, Gül, had joined the next table, with Osman, Hrant and other non-practising Muslims and was eating dinner with them, while she was also serving at the same time. As these customers eat here very often, the client/customer relationship are blurred with friendship and this brings with it a lot of tension, because it is difficult where to draw the lines between friendship and clientship. Even though, Ethel, Orli and I, were sitting at

two separate tables, the conversations of the two tables were joined. Osman, who was sitting at the other table, joked: "*o cemaatin kadınlarıyla gezme çünkü onlar hep geç gelirler*" ("Do not hang out with the women from that (Jewish) community, because they are always late"). It is a stereotype of Jewish women that they give a lot of importance to how they look and take a long time to put on makeup and get ready. Furthermore, Orli and I did not feel like drinking that night. People from the other table interfered many times asking, "Why aren't you drinking? Come on, have some wine or *rakı*." While we were having our main meal, the next table had already eaten their dessert. They had had *tahin-pekmez* dessert, where you mix tahini and grape molasses. Osman always asked for *tahin* and *pekmez*, mixed them himself and treated friends at the next tables. Osman kept turning towards our table and talking to us, and Orli kept joking and asking him when he would offer us his *tahin-pekmez*. As Orli was asking Osman for *tahin-pekmez*, Osman kept asking Gül, the cook to bring more *tahin* and *pekmez*. Gül was eating at the table of Osman, but also was going back and forth to bring orders. Gül said from the other table "There isn't any *tahin* and *pekmez* left" and Orli did not hear that and kept asking through joking "Osman, when are we having tahin-pekmez?" several times. At one point, Orli and Gül got both tense and Gül came to our table and told Orli: "You are always late and I told you that there isn't any *tahin-pekmez* left anymore and you kept asking. I can offer you another dessert, like rice-pudding or I can go and buy some *tahin* and *pekmez* from the next shop. What would you like?" Orli got offended, she said any other dessert is fine. When Gül left, Orli told me "Gül should have served me more nicely and professionally because I am the customer."

In the meantime, Hakan was having a conversation with Ethel. Hakan was sitting in between the two tables and drinking more than usual. A famous kebab restaurant from Bursa another city had just opened a new branch on Büyükada. Ethel had been there to eat and said: "That restaurant in Büyükada is the same as in Bursa." Hakan kept arguing with Ethel: "No! It cannot be the same as the chef and the ingredients used are different even though it is the same chain!" They both kept arguing over and over the same thing. The tension was building up from that side as well. Orli yelled for Ibrahim, the waiter, to ask something and Gül said: "Ibrahim left to his hometown in Muş, due to family problems." Gül did not explain more. Gül's face and eyes were red, she looked way more tense than a normal day. Maybe she had even cried.

After the meal, Osman and Hrant played backgammon as usual. By this time, the customers on the other table had left and it was only Hakan, Gül, Ethel, Orli, Osman, Hrant and I remained; sitting near each other at random chairs. From the *tahin-pekmez* tension, they jumped to discussing one another's hospitality. The hospitality across tables in the restaurant reflected, on the one hand, the inner calculations of the islanders, which was similar to Derrida's (2000) problematisation of unconditional hospitality. According to him, "Pas d'hospitalité" presents a contradiction because it means "no hospitality" and "step of hospitality" at the same time (Derrida 2000, 75). Therefore, hospitality is not an altruistic behaviour but embeds what goes in the mind of the host and the ones, who accepts the hospitable behaviour, what each thinks the other expects and also the wider political, ethical and social codes of the society (Derrida 2000). On the other hand, hospitality in the form of food exchanges embeds the management of emotions and tensions and the articulation of tensions (Ring 2006, 86). Orli justified herself as being hospitable by saying: "Osman, you, my husband and I are very hospitable to each other. You always offer us *tahin-pekmez* and my husband offers you drinks. The people at that table where you sat, that the group is too much into themselves." The group she mentioned was the ones, with whom Osman and Hrant were sitting. Osman replied back "Orli, you call that group too much into themselves but the Jewish community is also into themselves. Why there are two social clubs on the island, and the majority of one of the clubs is Jewish? Why do Jewish people live like in a ghetto? I know that you, Ethel, Fortune, you guys hang out with everyone, you are open. What I want to say is that this kind of separation of living side by side comes from the Ottoman *millet* system." Orli started to cry in the middle of the conversation and people thought it was due to what Osman had said. Orli then explained (while Gül was in the kitchen) "No, it is not because what Osman said, it is because of Gül. She should have treated me better. She knows the hard times I had recently. I am always nice to her, why isn't she a bit more careful?" The fact that Osman can joke about a stereotype of Jewish women, together with Ethel and Orli, two Jewish women, while they were in a mixed group of Jews, Armenian and Muslims, marks the intimacy between these people. In the previous chapter, Osman, Hakan and Fortune had intervened with Ethel's religious practice that as she had felt ill that then she should not have fasted. People can also insist one other to eat more or to drink more. As these people in the restaurant spend so much time together in a rather intense way, they then give

themselves the right to say whatever they think, to joke about stereotypes and the small tensions of everyday life, such as Orli making Gül wait several times, can build up and accumulate and hence turn into an out spurt of release of awaited emotions that were left on suspense. In this moment when Orli started to cry, the cause of the tension, why Orli had gotten offended, was due to not being treated "professionally and nicely" by Gül. Gül raised her voice, lost her patience and told Orli that she always made her wait, probably because Gül had been seeing Orli like a friend, to whom she can articulate and express her frustration. However, with other customers, she needed to be "professional," not get angry with, or at least not to show it. In contrast, Orli, at that moment saw Gül like the owner of the restaurant and wanted to be treated "like a client," but also, she expected Gül to have recognised the hard times she had and hence to behave more carefully. This tension was caused due to an accumulation of everyday sociality, a blurring of friendship with clientship. But this tension was also misinterpreted by the other people in the restaurant, as a boundary that was crossed by Osman, who had stereotyped Orli's being late as an attribute of Jewish female community, which was then thought of or was interpreted to be offensive. Orli, then, refused to be served another dessert. We finished our meals and Hrant and Osman asked us to go for a walk; they had something to tell us.

When we went for a walk, we learned the main cause of Gül and Hakan's tension at the restaurant. Hrant explained:

> The waiter, Ibrahim, received a call from his father, who told him to leave the island as soon as possible to come back to Muș. Ibrahim's uncle had killed his *kanlı* [the man, with whom he had blood feud] eight months ago. Now, the relatives of the victim are looking for Ibrahim to kill him in revenge. This is why Hakan and Gül were very tense and sad that night. Gül had even cried that Ibrahim was in danger. So don't take Gül's tense attitude personally, Orli. Gül was very sad and tense. I suggested hiding Ibrahim in my house but Ibrahim did not want to and he followed his father's order. Deniz, write this in your thesis. Half of these Kurds who came to the islands were the ones, who escaped from *kan davası* [blood feud]. I was an employer at construction business, and I had a lot of Kurdish employees, who told me that they came to Istanbul in order to escape from the blood feud at home.

Orli, Ethel and I were shocked to hear about the extension of the blood feud to Burgaz. The revengers could have come to the island, to the restaurant, threaten the owners of the restaurant, or maybe kill Ibrahim or

someone else, who knows? We could have found ourselves stuck in the middle of a blood feud. After the walk, Orli wanted to drop by Zeytin restaurant and order and buy the rose jam that Gül makes. Orli wanted to make it up with Gül and told me later on that she especially dropped by Gül to order this jam, not because she needed it but she wanted to end the night with good terms with Gül. I was standing with Ethel, Hrant and Osman waiting for Orli to come back from her talk with Gül and hence I do not know the details of what they talked. At the end of the night, Orli tried to approach Gül to repair the broken moment of tension, and not with Osman as she was not offended by his joke about Jewish women.

Then Hrant dropped Orli, Ethel and me to Orli's house. It was already 1:00 am in the morning. Another argument started between Orli and Ethel. Ethel criticised Orli: "Orli, you are too vulnerable and sensitive. You take everything personally. See they were tense because of the blood feud and you took it personally." Orli replied: "Gül should have been nicer to me anyways, as I am a client. You know sometimes they are also not nice to you either." Ethel said: "I consider them as my friends and I don't mind being criticised or joked about. When you are friends, you joke, you criticise, you yell and it shows intimacy. But as you are vulnerable, you cannot deal with criticism or being told off!" They kept arguing over the same event for couple of hours, raising their voices to each other until Ethel decided to leave abruptly. The next morning, Orli and Ethel called each other and behaved as if nothing happened between them. They also decided not to tell Gül and Hakan that they knew about the blood feud and that they would talk to them as if nothing happened. One way of dealing with these tensions was also pretending as if nothing happened and not to make a big deal out of things.

Ring (2006, 80) describes the suspense and endurance of tension as a mechanism of sustaining peace, instead of the discharge of tension. Ring (2006) argues that there is a lot of emotional labour that goes into the performance of everyday life among the female neighbours in the apartment, where women, through all sorts of exchange, giving and borrowing food, seeing and visiting each other, helping and so on manage and regulate their emotions and hence sustain the daily peace. Violence, instead, is not the resolving of this tension but the refusal of it. For instance, not to visit the neighbours too often, or returning a borrowed item right away instead of holding on to it is a kind of violence, where a woman wants to solve the tension by discharge it and avoid its suspension. Entering into a relationship as a friend or neighbour, exchanging things, visiting and so on

bring out duties, obligations, care and so on. Therefore, conviviality as living togetherness requires the management of tensions, emotions, labour of peace and is different than coexistence as side-by-side living, avoiding contact, exchange and performance of labour of peace. Too much, intense interactions, such as eating 2–3 meals a day in the restaurant, hence, requires a lot of labour of peace, and the sustenance of tension and toleration. In this complicated case between Gül and Orli, Gül was already tense because of Ibrahim's blood feud case, which might have brought a lot of worries, "Is Ibrahim's life in danger? What if those, who are looking for him, come to the restaurant? What will happen to him, now, that he left? How can she manage the restaurant without Ibrahim?" and hence Orli joking at that time and asking, "Osman, when will you give us tahin-pekmez?" could have been the last thing she could have sustained and tolerated and hence she expressed to Orli, all the frustration she had in the form of an accumulation of all the times she has tolerated Orli being late. "Bardağı taşıran son damla" means literally the last drop that made the full glass of water to spill, and in English, it was the last straw. This was the last point of Gül's patience and endurance of the whole situation and Orli happened to be the last drop, the last straw.

Being late for dinner, the exclusive group at the restaurant (regardless of ethno-religious differences), fights among friends, and blurred client/friendship relationship were convivial tensions. Tensions among the friends were managed through articulating and expressing whatever you want to tell your friend and "get it out," without having the need to filter your thoughts or feelings. You do not always need to tolerate and sustain tension with your friends, you can say things that can "hurt" (*dost acı soyler*, "real" friend talks bitter) and then the next morning you behave as if nothing happened. Nonetheless, this tension was also interpreted as a matter of coexistence/toleration. Osman attributed Orli's behaviour of being late as a stereotype of Jewish women. When Orli was talking about being exclusive as a group; Osman referred to the exclusivity of the Jewish community by saying, "Oh, Jewish people are into themselves." When Orli made a similar criticism of the people seated at the other table, she did not suggest that their cliquishness was related to the fact that most of them were secular Sunni Muslims. Orli explained to me later that that particular group, of around ten people, do not include anyone else in their clique, regardless of the ethnicity or the religion of the person. They are just an exclusive group. This was in a way similar to high school dramas, in which people have their small groups and exclude others. Orli defined this

group's exclusivity as a matter of conviviality: people are into themselves not because they share the same ethnicity or religion but the same interests, tastes or ways of being, like an exclusive friendship group. But what is interesting is that after Orli said that "that group was too much into themselves," Osman automatically attributed "exclusivity" as a matter of coexistence/toleration and thought of the exclusivity of the Jewish community, but on the other hand, he also recognised that not all the Jewish people were a closed group, as some individuals—including Fortune, Ethel and Orli—were close friends with people from different religious groups. Every day tensions of conviviality, such as making someone wait, can build up and become more pronounced in tense situations. Despite the fact that these tensions might be attributed as tensions of coexistence/toleration, they are managed and solved through labour peace such as talking and reflecting, doing as if nothing happened, and with small exchanges/transactions.

Concluding Remarks

Glick-Schiller describes conviviality in friendships as mutual sense of humanness and domains of commonality based on cosmopolitan sociability (Glick Schiller et al. 2011; Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2016; Glick Schiller 2016). I depict conviviality in friendship as what friends share in common such as interests and hobbies. Hence, I do not argue for a cosmopolitan ethics drawing on common humanity but I show how people, who share similar tastes, interests and hobbies perform friendship. In Burgaz, sharing common interests brings people together regardless ethnic, religious and socio-economic differences. Therefore, sharing common interests can make us understand cohesion and fragmentation among the people, as a part of sociable sociality and solidarity within conviviality, instead of coexistence and/or toleration between different ethno-religious groups. Therefore, cohesion, fission/groupings and tensions are not necessarily rooted in ethnic or religious difference but in sharing similar interests, tastes and style of living, where class plays an ambiguous role. Sharing similar socio-economic backgrounds transgress ethnic and religious boundaries.

Nonetheless, class difference creates, on the one hand, interdependence between the permanent islanders of Sunni, Alevi and Kurdish backgrounds and the wealthy summer inhabitants from different millets, on the other hand, it exacerbates tensions between wealthy summer inhabitants and lower-class permanent islanders, due to the political tension and issues of

security (after the synagogue bombings). I explored inter-religious, inter-ethnic friendships and employee-employer relationship to show the ways in which sociable sociality, shared practices, interests/hobbies and labour of peace create friendships between the islanders. In the example of the friendship between the imam and the Rum Orthodox priest, I highlighted the arbitrariness and organic aspect of friendships, and of practices of conviviality not as toleration but as shared ways of living based on common interests and tastes, as sociable sociality and also as living with difference, when people do not internalise each other's differences but differences are accepted, welcomed and embraced as a practice of sociable sociality. In the relationship between Zümrüt, the Muslim verger of the Rum Orthodox Church and Niko, who runs the formalities of the church, I explore the labour of peace and embracement of difference, which goes beyond mutual interdependence and instrumentality between employee and employer relationship. I ended the chapter, with a crisis situation around *tahin pekmez* (dessert), when islanders had to control and manage their tensions when Sunni Muslim owners and an Armenian restaurant client protected a Kurdish islander, from a blood feud. In Burgaz, conviviality is not only sociable sociality and fleeting encounters, neither non-interference; people's lives cross each other. At times of crisis, like in the blood feud, the Armenian man, who belongs to upper class, offered to hide the Kurdish waiter, when his life was in danger.

As we have seen and will see throughout the book that political tensions, issues of security and feeling insecure create mental breaks of coexistence/toleration in people's perceptions and hence impact conviviality, in the ways in which the islanders might attribute exclusivity, class difference and convivial tensions to communal boundaries and present it as a matter of coexistence, toleration or intolerance. Even though Osman attributed the roots of the so-called exclusivity of the Jewish community to the *millet* system, Jewish people had not lived in ghettos during the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey, unlike other European cities (see Brick-Danan 2011, 34). Rather the doors of the synagogues being closed was a matter of security, based on the politically tense context of the last couple of decades. The bombings of the synagogue in 2003 and the fact that the *kal* in Burgaz closed its doors to non-Jews, were interpreted almost as an offensive act by the non-Jews in Burgaz. The doors of all the other worship places are open to everyone regardless of religious affiliations. This security issue was interpreted as religious exclusivity and was against the ethos of conviviality in Burgaz, where doors should be open to everyone.

Notes

1. The prayer done with alliteration to birth of the Prophet Mohamed. Mevluts are usually after funerals, death anniversaries or circumcision ceremonies.
2. A similar association occurred during the political tension between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus in between 1955 and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, when the Rum community in Turkey was assumed to support the Greek Cypriots (see Chap. 2).

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CHAPTER 7

Testing the Strength of Conviviality: Love, Intermarriage and Solidarity in Times of Crisis

Introduction

Deniz, before the 1960s, meetings about the issues in Cyprus were held in different parts of Turkey. We used to follow them on the radio and read about them on *Hürriyet* [*a* widely read Turkish newspaper]. The turmoil had already begun before 6–7 September 1955. Hikmet Bil, a journalist in *Istanbul Ekpres*, wrote that a bomb exploded in Atatürk's house in Thessaloniki. Once people read this in the newspaper, they attacked non-Muslims' stores and houses in Istanbul. Rumours from Istanbul about the attacks reached the Princes' Islands before and during the attacks in Istanbul. On the 6th of September, the islanders who went to Istanbul to work and came back told us that different parts of Istanbul were being attacked by masses of people. We got scared that the island might get attacked too. My father was the party leader of the Democratic Party in Burgaz at that time and he was very much appreciated and esteemed by the islanders. He said, "Unless they kill me and step over my dead body, *they* will not be able to put their foot in Burgaz." As Burgaz islanders, we ganged up together to protect *our* island. My father and the policemen of Burgaz and several islanders waited at the harbour and at the bays where the attackers' boats could enter the island. We did not let anyone invade Burgaz. We hosted our non-Muslim neighbours in our houses during the night of the events, in case the island got attacked. The 6–7 September events did not happen in Burgaz. Deniz, on *our* island, not even a glass broke. (Ajda, Sunni Muslim Burgaz islander)

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The 6–7 September events were among the most significant memories that Burgaz islanders recalled. The 1955 riots in Istanbul brought a change to Burgaz islanders' identity. While the islanders collectively resisted the riots and that act strengthened their Burgaz identity, the riots triggered the crystallisation of the ethnic and religious identities of the non-Muslims elsewhere in Turkey. Some Burgaz islanders were in Istanbul when the attacks took place. The islanders' memories of the riots were fragmented into memories of intolerance and violence in Istanbul and memories of conviviality on Burgaz. In this chapter, I compare and contrast the memories of the 1955 pogrom and the homogenisation process in documentaries and research with the memories articulated in Burgaz (in locally-produced documentaries, novels and memoires and interviews with the islanders). In Burgaz, the riots were articulated as memories of conviviality, because the islanders engaged in an act of solidarity and collective resistance against the riots. The islanders used digital and non-digital media to express their memories of conviviality and solidarity in critique of Turkish homogenisation policies, with the aim of reuniting and bringing back the non-Muslim Burgaz islanders, who had to leave the island. In the national framework, the riots were recalled as memories of intolerance because, the non-Muslim minorities' ethnic and religious identities were attacked.

This chapter sheds light on the strength of conviviality in Burgaz and explores the dynamics between conviviality, toleration and intolerance by exploring the ways in which Burgaz islanders remember the homogenising Turkification policies (e.g. 1964 expulsion of the Rums with Greek citizenship) and crisis events (1955 pogrom) that impacted their lives. While some studies (Nowicka 2020) explore conviviality as acts of courtesy and individual interactions, this chapter argues that conviviality in Burgaz is a mechanism of resilience and solidarity against public and state violence. At times of crisis, when an individual or the whole island is in danger, the islanders protect each other and collectively show resistance. Memories of the resistance to the pogrom, and different acts of solidarity form a shared rhetoric that gives strength to the continuity of conviviality in Burgaz.

The islanders, even those who left, see Burgaz as a place of refuge, of conviviality and freedom. In their selective remembering (see Halbwachs 1992), they associate Burgaz with happy and beautiful memories of conviviality and separate those from the memories of toleration and intolerance that they have experienced in Turkey. Both as a physical and an imagined space, the islanders take refuge in Burgaz. Mitchell (2002) sees

memory as an active and social process, which is linked to the production of social identity, building on Halbwachs (1992), Connerton (1989), and Fentress and Wickham (1992). The ways in which the islanders stress their collective resistance to the riots, talk about it, helps to construct a collective Burgazlı identity for the islanders. It is very much similar to Just's (2000) rhetoric of solidarity and community and Mitchell's nostalgic construction of the island community, in the ways in which the islanders narrate the resistance to the pogrom as embodying a "co-operative ethos and a strong sense of solidarity" (Mitchell 2002, 125). The shared memories of daily life and conviviality and solidarity against the rioters have a discursive effect that creates an ideology and sense of belonging to Burgaz.

6–7 September 1955 in Burgaz: "On Our Island, Not Even a Glass Was Broken"

The emergence of diversified identities, public display and expression of memories and the rise of identity politics gained momentum after the 1980 coup, through liberalisation of the economy, privatisation, an increase in import and export, global flows in and out of the country and the increase in consumerism (Neyzi 2001, 422). In the 1990s, NGOs, human rights activists, homosexuals and feminists "came out of the closet" and used the media to express their views (Neyzi 2001, 422) and works on minority history were published about "taboo" topics such as the Wealth Tax, the 6–7 September riots, and the expulsion of the Rums in 1964 (Mills 2010, 19). Furthermore, the rise of Islamism and Kurdish nationalism in the 1980s and the Alevi revival in the 1990s helped to create a kind of political and cultural pluralism (Neyzi 2001; Çolak 2006). Since the 2000s, the public sphere has seen an emerging set of personal memoirs,[1] novels,[2] movies,[3] TV and Internet series,[4] and documentaries,[5] all very critical of past governments, about the Wealth Tax in 1942, the 6–7 September 1955 pogrom, and the military coups of 1960 and 1980. For instance, Başcı (2017) has an extensive study of Turkish popular culture, in which she explored the transformation of Turkish society between 1980 and 2010, through an analysis of telecinematic productions about the 1980s coup, with a cultural studies approach.

People, who experienced the 1955 pogrom were interviewed for documentaries and research (Kuyucu 2005; Güven 2006; Mills 2010; Akar 2007; Dündar 2007). The pogrom was remembered with bitterness, fear and sorrow by Muslims and non-Muslims in Turkey as the event that

caused rupture to harmony. Ara Güler, a famous Armenian photographer, used the terms "*ayıp*" (shame) and "*insanlığın yüz karası*" (opprobrium for humanity) for what happened during the riots (Dündar 2007). Despina (a Rum woman) said, "*Türk kanı olan insan bunu yapamaz.*" (a person who has Turkish blood cannot commit such an act, my translation) when she articulated her shock (Akar 2007). A Muslim woman in Kuzguncuk called the events "sins" (Mills 2010, 124). Mills uses "shame," "trauma," "a sense of betrayal," "shock" and "mental fracture" to describe the feelings of people in Kuzguncuk (a district of Istanbul) towards the riots in their neighbourhood (Mills 2010, 109). While, in the documentaries by Akar (2007) and Dündar (2007), the shared rhetoric and the collective memory of the pogrom embeds shame and fear and the pogrom is represented as stories of intolerance and violence, Burgaz islanders' social memory of the pogrom is that of solidarity and was articulated as a memory of conviviality, because the riots were collectively resisted and no destruction took place in Burgaz. While the riots crystallised the ethnic and religious identities of the non-Muslims in Turkey, in contrast, the collective resistance against the riots solidified more the collective Burgaz identity. The memory of the collective resistance has had a discursive character (Bakhtin 1981), in strengthening the sense of belonging, and the collective Burgazian identity. The Rums of Burgaz got torn between their memories of intolerance in Istanbul and Turkey and their memories of conviviality in Burgaz and their Burgazian identity. The ones whose memories of conviviality took over those of intolerance, stayed in Burgaz. Those who could not bear the intolerance anymore, felt the need to leave.

According to the life stories that Güven (2006) collected and the ones in the documentaries by Akar (2007) and Dündar (2007), people's reactions to the pogrom were quite complex and incoherent. While some Muslims participated in destruction and/or reported their non-Muslim neighbours to the attackers (Güven 2006, 38), some Muslims resisted the riots, for example, by protecting non-Muslims in their houses or preventing people from destroying properties (Güven 2006; Mills 2010; Akar 2007). In *Heybeliada*, one non-Muslim woman said that a Muslim driver stood up at the end of the street and said that the attackers had to kill him first before they could attack the non-Muslims (Güven 2006, 37). One of Güven's *Rum* informants said that the Muslim concierge protected the non-Muslim women of the building by lying to the attackers and telling them that there were no non-Muslims living in the apartment, but then he joined the attackers to wreck other non-Muslim stores. In Kuzguncuk,

while many neighbours protected the non-Muslims, there were also some neighbours who joined the attackers. The silence and the denial of the collective memory of the Kuzguncuklu, (that violence did not take place in Kuzguncuk, even though it did), obscures and conceals the intolerance of the nation. The nation is rather seen as unifying in opposition to being divisive and discriminating (Mills 2010, 110). In Burgaz, the collective memory does the opposite: it critiques the homogenisation process and blames the nation for having taken their friends away.

From what the Muslims and non-Muslims said about the riots in these documentaries and studies, we know that in some parts of Istanbul and the Princes' Islands, some Muslims protected their non-Muslim neighbours. This protective and defiant stand was not uncommon, and often came up in documentaries and research. In Burgaz, the protection of one's neighbour was a collective act, a collective resistance, and it became a collective memory of conviviality in Burgaz, for those who witnessed it. This resistance was also articulated as a social memory, for those islanders who were not there but who moved to Burgaz later on, as this memory was regularly recalled by the islanders as an expression of Burgaz identity.

Burgaz islanders resisted the riots and did not let anybody get to the island and attack (Hazar 2005).[6] When I analysed Burgaz islanders' resistance to the riots, I was influenced by Janet Hart's (1996) approach. When Hart (1996) explored young women's role in the anti-Nazi resistance in Greece between 1941 and 1944, she explored the ways in which women took part, such as cooking, taking care of the injured and wounded, fighting and defending. With a hermeneutical approach, Hart (1996, 45) analysed the ways in which people expressed their individual and group identities and gave meaning to their actions. When I conducted semi-structured interviews, and formal recorded interviews, and listened to people's conversations, my Burgaz informants, regardless of their ethnicity or religion—Jewish, Sunni Muslim, Alevi, Rum, German—all told me the story of how the Burgaz islanders cooperated against the rioters who came to the island on boats. In Burgaz, the collective action of the islanders was very well planned and this plan was excellently executed by the islanders. Plan A was to make sure that no attacker set a foot on the island. So, Burgazlı men waited with guns at the harbours and the bays and fired their guns into the air to scare off attackers. Plan B was to resist invasion, in case attackers managed to get on the island. So, the Muslims took non-Muslim women and children into their houses to protect them (Hazar 2005; Uzunoğlu 2013).[7] One Jew (a male aged 90) and one Sunni Muslim (a

male aged 80) told me that a couple of Sunni Muslims in Burgaz also wanted to cause unrest and possibly attack the non-Muslims, but they were opposed and stopped by other Burgazlı. Hence, Burgaz was protected from internal as well as external violence.

Some of my Rum informants were in Istanbul at the time of the riots. Some had their stores attacked; some had their relatives' or friends' houses attacked. For instance, Niko, one of my Rum informants from Burgaz, was 7 years old at the time of the riots. He recalled:

> I was in the first grade of primary school. We were in our house in Kurtuluş, in Istanbul, at that time. A well-built, strong Albanian neighbour protected our house by standing outside of the building with an axe. The church next to our house was burnt. My grandmother's house was destroyed and only the walls were left. Nothing happened to her, as she managed to escape to her neighbour's. A line should be drawn from 6–7 September 1955 onwards, because these 6–7 September events were the point when the Rums were shocked and felt a strong inquietude, because they were physically attacked.

Niko's memories of the riots were also fragmented into memories of intolerance and conviviality. On the one hand, as a young boy, he remembers that his grandmother's house was destroyed, but also that the Muslim Albanian and his grandmother's neighbour protecting them. He recalled vividly the axe that the Muslim Albanian showed the attackers to protect Niko and Niko's family and the walls that remained from his grandmother's house. When I interviewed Niko about his memories of Burgaz, similar to Orhan, Niko recalled the fish, the fruit, vegetable and flower gardens. When Niko recalled the riots, he said, "a line should be drawn from 6–7 September 1955 onwards." Niko had mentioned the Wealth Tax as a bitter memory that affected the minorities but he emphasised much more the 1955 riots. The riots were significant, because he experienced them, and the riots were a collective attack that targeted his Rum identity. For this reason, he sees the 1955 riots like the beginning of an end. From that day onwards, the memories of conviviality in Burgaz became mixed with the memories of toleration and intolerance in Turkey, where Rums started to feel strongly that they were not wanted.

Ajda said that the compensation from the government to the non-Muslims for the casualties of the riots was too small. Niko said that even though the compensation was small, still it had a calming and soothing effect on the minorities, but added that Rums started to lose their trust

after 6–7 September events, but they did not yet think of leaving. What Niko said was affirmed by Akgönül (2007), who considered the riots to be a shock to the non-Muslims. Akgönül compared the population censuses of 1950 and 1960, and pointed out that the Orthodox population was 86,625 in 1950 and 106,612 in 1960 (Akgönül 2007, 221–223). Hence, the 6–7 September events did not trigger the emigration of the Rums from Turkey, but they marked the beginning of a period of unbearable coexistence for the Rums. However, in the aftermath of the 1955 riots and following the political tensions between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, the Rum islanders felt torn between their memories of conviviality that tied them to Burgaz, and their memories of coexistence and intolerance that made them uncomfortable, because they were made to feel different. The 1964 expulsion of the Rums with Greek citizenship and events in Cyprus crystallised the Rum identity more and more. In the following section, I narrate the memories of how the non-Muslims tried to cope with intolerance and how they decided whether to stay or leave.

Remembering Love and Intolerance

Ajda (Sunni Muslim woman) was one of my key informants and we recorded her life story over seven hours. Her love for Manos (Rum man) was so strong that it was impossible for her to tell her life story without telling his life story. Ajda had a peculiar position in the way she saw and interpreted the events that happened around her. Her father was an MP from the Democratic Party. While she understood Democratic Party's aims and ways of running the government, she was critical of this party and supported the Republican Party. Ajda's husband, Manos was not a supporter of the DP but was fond of Menderes, the prime minister at that time and the head of the DP. With her love for Manos, Ajda sees events through the Rum's eyes. While Turkification policies (e.g. Wealth Tax, "Citizen speak Turkish campaign"), political oppression, 6–7 September 1955 pogrom wanted to make Manos more and more an Other and try to make him leave the country; his love for Ajda and Burgaz made him stay on the island, where he belonged. While Örs (2018) tells the stories of those, who left the Princes' Islands and Istanbul, Ajda completes the pieces of the puzzle, by narrating the stories of those who stayed, and why they chose to stay.

In 1958, just a few years after the 1955 pogrom, Manos moved to Burgaz as a tenant, in one of Ajda's father's flats. This is how Manos and

Ajda met. They became neighbours in the same building. Manos was married to his second wife; they had one daughter and a son. However, their marriage came to an end with a divorce. Manos became good friends with Ajda's father and they hung out and drank together. When Ajda went to Istanbul for day trips, Manos used to ask her "Where have you been Ajda, what have you done?" She used to call him "Manos *Ağabey*, (brother)" as he was much older than her. Once she asked her father, "Dad, why don't you ask me these sorts of questions that Manos *Ağabey* asks me, such as what I do, where I go?" Her father replied: "Well, Manos has lived in Istanbul and knows how Istanbul is bigger and less safe than Burgaz, and he worries about you." Ajda did not understand that Manos was in love with her until he finally told her, "Ajoula mou, I have fallen in love with you!" She was 20 and he was almost 50 when they got together.

They dated each other secretly for 12 years between 1966 and 1978. This was the time after the 1964 expulsions of the Rums with Greek citizenship, the time when the number of Rum population had been significantly lessened and those who were not expelled were deciding to leave on their own accord. The 6–7 September events, worsening relationships between Greece and Turkey because of Cyprus, and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 was making it more and more difficult for this couple to get married. The Rums and the Turks were losing their mutual trust towards each other. Ajda's brothers and parents were against this relationship because Manos was not a Muslim and he was almost 30 years older than Ajda and were concerned that if Manos had to leave one day, what would have happened to Ajda. As Burgaz is a small place, gossip and rumours spread quickly. This was why Manos and Ajda always had to meet in Istanbul when they used to date. Once in Istanbul they bumped into a Burgaz islander who was having a love affair with someone he should not. When, the other couple cried out "you have not seen us," Manos and Ajda replied, "you have not seen us either!"

Some love stories between lovers from different religions could not go beyond the stage of flirting and/or dating, nonetheless intermarriages were not uncommon in Burgaz. Nükhet Sirman said in her interview with Schild (2021, 136) that there were so many intermarriages that she did not have "straight/pure" Turkish friends. Interethnic marriages were more common than inter-religious ones. In some inter-marriages, when the man was Muslim, and the woman was non-Muslim, the non-Muslim bride converted to Islam. However, on many occasions, that was not the case. One Rum woman married a Sunni Muslim man and he converted to

Orthodoxy; another Rum woman and a Sunni Muslim man married and neither of them converted. Ajda told me of a Sunni Muslim woman and a Rum man, who wanted to get married. Their families did not approve so they escaped to Greece. As the woman did not want to convert, they could not get married in the church in Greece. So, they came back to Turkey to have civil wedding. The Rum husband did not convert to Islam either. In another case, an Alevi woman married an Armenian man and he converted to Islam. An English woman, an Italian woman and a Greek woman (from Greece), all married Sunni Muslim men but none of them converted. There are also many cases of intermarriages between Alevis and Sunnis in Burgaz.

After having seen the love between Manos and Ajda endure all these years, Ajda's family accepted their relationship and they got married in 1978. She emphasised that her husband was very appreciative of her following Islam. Ajda fasts during Ramadan but she also enjoys drinking (except in the month of Ramadan). Manos used to prepare the dinner for her, before she broke the fast during Ramadan. He also used to fast with her on *Kadir* day (one of the most important holy nights in Islam). Furthermore, Ajda also cooked for Manos on Christmas, Easter and on important religious days. Both of them were against conversion and they encouraged each other to practise their faith. Of their years together, she enjoyed the years of marriage the most as they did not have to hide anymore and they could finally live together. She said, "It was great to wake up together, and even though I looked horrible in the morning, he used to tell me that I looked very beautiful when I had just woken up." Unfortunately, six years after they got married, Manos died of cancer. Ajda said that "I could not eat spaghetti for years after his death as I remembered how much Manos loved spaghetti. I visited his tomb every day for a month until the priest told me that I should leave him in peace, and that he was taken care of at the moment and that I should take care of myself." It was very hard for Ajda to accept his husband's death. Even though she does not go to the tomb everyday today; the memories of her husband are vivid in her mind and when Ajda unfolded her story of Burgaz, she did it through her love for Manos.

Ajda's selection of memories about Manos' life was almost like an argument she was trying to convey. With every memory she recalled, she wanted to argue that despite every oppression from the government, and discourses of toleration and intolerance, Manos and his family resisted to stay in the land where they were born and belonged to. This was also her

justification towards her family that Manos would never leave Turkey, nor will he ever leave her. She also wanted to prove that Manos was a proper citizen of the Turkish Republic, did all his duties of military service and paying taxes and he loved his country and Atatürk; however, the government behaved as if he was not, because he was Rum. So, Ajda narrated the memories of toleration and intolerance that made Manos feel as if he was an "Other," by stressing his family's and his resistance and endurance of this intolerance to stay in his homeland.

Ajda said: "Manos' father died in Gallipoli during the First World War because of typhoid, while Manos and his younger brother were a few years old." She wanted to imply that Manos' father was not on the side of the enemy, the Greeks, but fought for Atatürk's army. Manos was born sometime between 1912 and 1914[8] in Mudanya, outside Istanbul, in the south by the Marmara Sea. As Istanbullite Rums were exempt from the population exchange, in order to be excluded from the population exchange, Manos' mother immigrated from Mudanya to Istanbul where her sisters used to live. She wanted to emphasise Manos' parents' resistance to the population exchange. Manos' parents did not identify themselves as Greeks but as Rums. Manos and his family's sense of belonging and identity were not ruptured by the ideologies of modern homogenous nation states. They wanted to live not in the land that belonged to "Greeks" or "Turks" but in the land where people from different faiths lived and shared conviviality. Their sense of belonging and identity is similar to the Rumpolite cosmopolitan identity that was articulated in Örs' (2006, 2018) works. While Örs emphasises a cosmopolitan city identity, that of Istanbul, Manos and his family had a sense of belonging to a land. Manos' family moved from Mudanya to Istanbul to stay in the homeland. Manos' father fought in Gallipoli to protect "the land "from its enemies. "The land" I am referring to is not "Greece" or "Turkey" but an imaginary land in the minds of Manos and his family, where they felt they belonged but which did not belong to a nation. Nonetheless, Ajda stresses that if Manos and his family had to choose a nation, that would be the one that was built by Atatürk.

Ajda kept recalling moments where Rums were treated differently by the successive Turkish governments. She emphasised that even though Manos and his family had mediocre lives in Istanbul, they did not want to leave and tried everything possible to be able to stay in Turkey. Manos came from a poor background, but he managed to become a successful barber. She recalled that "Manos even cut Atatürk's hair and Atatürk gave

one piece of gold to him when Manos had his first daughter, from his previous marriage." When the discourses of toleration and intolerance against the Rums made Rums be seen as an Other, or even as enemies, Ajda wanted to disprove this by stressing that Manos was fond of Atatürk and that he was proud of cutting his hair and the fact that he got a piece of gold from him shows their intimacy. He would never be unfaithful towards Atatürk, the founder of this Turkish nation. Ajda emphasised, "My husband was called *three* times to military service, against his will." She said that first, he did the regular military service that every man has to do. She continued that the second and the third time happened back to back, one after the other. When I asked her, why he went again and again, then she explained that it was due to the fact that he could not pay the Wealth tax and that they had to build roads and work during "the military service." Ajda did not refer to *Yirmi Kur'a Nafia Askerleri*, when non-Muslims were called to "military service" in May 1941, during WWII (Bali 2023). Rather than being given guns, they were sent to build roads and work in other constructions (see Bali 2023). A few months after being released from the so-called military service, those non-Muslims, who could not pay the Wealth Tax were sent to work camps in Aşkale and Erzurum, hence did two times "military service" one after the other. Ajda did not specify the difference between these two times, but referred to them both as "military service" and said *peşpeşe* emphasising that back to back, one after other, with very short internal, they were called back to military, against their will. Ajda emphasised this to show that Manos did all the duties the government asked of him as a male citizen of the Turkish Republic, nonetheless the state did not see him as a "proper citizen" and she still highlighted that no matter how he was treated as a non-citizen, he never thought of leaving this country, his homeland.

Ajda explained to me the psychological oppression that the Rums endured after the 6–7 September 1955 events and the 1964 expulsion. She recalled that people used to warn the minorities, who spoke their native languages by saying to them, "Speak Turkish!" She did not refer to the "Citizen speak Turkish" campaign (see Chap. 2), that took place in 1930s, but she wanted to remark that in the years between 1955s–1964, one could feel the oppression on the minorities, especially the Rums, due to the political tension between Greece and Turkey, around Cyprus. Ajda said, "Rum ayrı, Yunanlı ayrı" (Rums and Greeks are different." As mentioned in Chap. 2, the term *Rum* is a Turkish word originating from "Romios" "Roman," referring the Greek Orthodox subjects originating

from The Eastern Roman Empire and Byzantine (see Saglam 2022; Örs 2006). The term "Yunan or Yunanlı" refers to Greeks of Greece (*Yunanistan* in Turkish) and is differentiated from the Rums/Greek Orthodox living in Turkey and Cyprus (see Saglam 2022; Akgönül 2007). Ajda emphasised that Rums came from the Byzantine Empire, that they have a sense of belonging to the lands, that now belongs to Turkey and they call Turkey their homeland. However, from 1955 onwards, in the eyes of Turkish nationalists, Rums were associated to be on Greece's side. Once, she and Manos were on the boat to Burgaz and Manos said in Turkish with his Rum accent "My wife, *our* islands look so beautiful!" One man commented, "Fatih Sultan Mehmet conquered them 500 years ago!" That man recognised from Manos' accent that he was Rum and wanted to emphasise that the islands and Istanbul were not Byzantine, but that they belonged to the Turks. These nationalistic expressions and attitudes discouraged Rums to speak Romeyka,[9] *Rumca* (in Turkish) and sing *Rumca* songs. On another occasion, Ajda was on the boat again and had a plastic bag with text in Greek letters. A man started to talk about how gloriously they had defeated the Greeks. On the basis of the Greek letters on the plastic bag, he assumed that Ajda was Rum so he wanted to offend her. What Ajda wanted to remark is that *Rums* belonged to Istanbul and they did not belong to Greece, neither they supported Greece and its international policies. What she complained was that Rums were seen as "others," due to the worsening relationships between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus. It was striking that Ajda's specific memories of toleration and intolerance took place on boats, but not in Burgaz. When she talked about Burgaz, she articulated vague memories of discomfort but did not mention any specific events, it was rather silence or denial that discourse of intolerance could exist in Burgaz. Ajda retains the fact that the word "*gavur*," which means infidel and unbeliever was used for non-Muslims in Istanbul and sometimes also on the island. When I wanted to learn more about the contexts in which, the word *gavur* was used, she did not tell me about a specific event, or name people who used that word for the non-Muslims. Rather she said: "*Gavur* means infidel and unbeliever. I find it wrong to call non-Muslims "infidel and unbelievers" because they believe in God; they are not unbelievers."

Ajda described the destruction and the vandalism of Manos' store in Istanbul during the 1955 riots:

> Manos had just opened his little cafe/sandwich place on 6 September 1955, in Beyoğlu, in Istanbul, where the majority of the store owners were non-Muslims. The till Manos had ordered from the US was destroyed. The shutters were ripped off like pieces of paper. Even though Manos was liked a lot in the neighbourhood, his store was still attacked. Manos always said: "Even though I would be exiled and deported by force by train or boat out of this land, I would still jump from the boat or the train in order to come back" Manos never thought of leaving his *homeland*.

Ajda juxtaposed the damage that Manos got in his store with him wanting to stay to demonstrate Manos' resistance to intolerance and that he never thought of leaving his homeland, where he belonged. Their story was a fight for love, against all possible intolerance. In Ajda's eyes, the reason why Manos stayed was for his love for Ajda, for Burgaz and for his homeland, where he belonged. Unlike the landscape of Kuzguncuk, where non-Muslims are absent (Mills 2010), there are many non-Muslims, who still live in Burgaz. Nonetheless, for many Rums and non-Muslims this intolerance was unbearable and holding onto conviviality in Burgaz was not enough for them to stay on the island. In Nilüfer Uzunoğlu's documentary, we find some of the answers for why those who left, decided to leave. In the documentary, Stavros Ignatiadis expresses not being able to see a future to be able to live in Turkey by stating: "We had to leave. Life was in limbo there for us. You know when you are 22, 23, 24, 25 years old, you have to see your future, we could not see it, maybe there was one but we could not see it. That's why we took the decision as a family, of course it was not only us." The homogenisation process including the Wealth Tax, the 1955 riots and the expulsion of the Rums in 1964 made the non-Muslims feel that their difference made them lesser Turks, in the eyes of the political power and the Turkish public. This othering process was expressed in the form of an attack on the economic power of the non-Muslims, which also had an impact on the social life of the non-Muslims. These anxieties of feeling like "others" made the non-Muslims, especially the Rums "voluntarily" leave Turkey. Besides the fear and physical attacks like the pogrom, the cancellation of work and residence permits and the expulsion of those with Greek citizenship (see Chap. 2), the non-Muslims were also discriminated and excluded from taking jobs. Akis Tsalikis said: "Upon completing my military service, I applied for a job as a public servant; they said that I could not be hired because I was not Turkish. Such

things worn me out" (Uzunoğlu 2013). Inequality and discrimination were combined with insecurity and many Rums decided to leave Turkey, even Burgaz.

The Muslim islanders pointed out that Rums left secretly. Some, like Ajda, were disappointed. Ajda said: "Rums were scared to let their planned departure be known, that somehow, they might have been prevented from leaving. For instance, I spent the whole day in Kadıköy (a district on the Asian side of Istanbul) with one of my close Rum friends from Burgaz and he left Turkey the next day, without even telling me goodbye!" Ajda was surprised that the fear and anxiety her Rum friend felt was greater than the complicity of their friendship. The islanders marked that one by one the Rums disappeared, many without saying goodbye. Nuri, Alevi Burgazlı man, narrated:

> I used to play marbles with my friends [probably in the mid-1960s] and realised that my friends were gone. I did not understand why they left, as I was a child. I knew that some Rums never did military service, and later, I understood that these Rums were of Greek citizenship. Some of the ones who left were the ones who did not do military service.

The 1964 expulsion was a memory of coexistence/toleration for Nuri, because prior to that, he did not have in his mind a separate category for "Rums with Greek citizenship" and "Rums with Turkish citizenship." Nuri realised the citizenship differences of his childhood friends at the moment when they left Burgaz. One Rum informant with Turkish citizenship recalled that when he came back from military service in 1971, the island was "empty." For him, the existence of Rums made Burgaz a place with meaning and when many Rums left, Burgaz became empty for him. The departure of the Rum friends, who had to leave because of having Greek citizenship was an experienced consequence of coexistence/toleration, inequality and discrimination.

Burgaz islanders who stayed, both Muslims and non-Muslims argued that conviviality in Burgaz should have taken over intolerance and those who left were better off staying on the island. They articulated that leaving Burgaz made them suffer because of the pain of leaving the island and their friends, and they were treated badly in the places where they migrated. Haris, a Rum woman informant of mine, was not expelled from Turkey in 1964, because she had Turkish citizenship, but she emigrated to Greece from Burgaz with her Sunni Muslim husband because of financial

difficulties in Turkey. Her husband then converted to Greek Orthodoxy and got baptised in Greece. He died there. However, Haris returned back to the island and has been staying in Burgaz every summer for the last several years. Ajda and Haris told me the deportation story of Christina, a Rum woman from Burgaz. Christina was a *rakı* producer, whose *rakı* Atatürk liked very much. Christina had Greek citizenship and when she heard that the Rums of Greek citizenship would be expelled from the country, she could not believe it. Christina said that no one could send her away because she was one of Atatürk's favourite *rakı* producers. Unfortunately, she was expelled in 1964 from Burgaz to Greece. Ajda and Haris told me that Christina committed suicide by hanging herself after she went to Greece. With the story of Christina's suicide, Ajda and Haris wanted to point out that those, who were expelled could not bear the pain of deportation. They indirectly implied that the pains of leaving for those, who left on their own accord were much worse than if they had stayed. Christina might have felt like a plant that was ripped out of the soil where she grew up and whose new place was not home to her.

Some Muslim Burgaz islanders still cannot digest the fact that their Rum friends left and they keep arguing that the Rums would have been better off if they relied on the conviviality in Burgaz and stayed. Like the story of Christina who was deported from Burgaz and committed suicide, Burgaz islanders articulated that the ones who left had horrible lives wherever they went after leaving Burgaz and some died unhappily there. For instance, Ajda said:

> The Rums emigrated not only to Greece but to other parts of Europe and the US. I visited my Rum friends in Greece. Most of the Rum Princes' Islanders, who were expelled to Greece in 1964, were given places in Paleo Faliro, a swamp area, a horrible suburb in the southern part of Athens. The Rums were looked down upon and were treated very badly by the *Yunanlı* (Greeks from Greece). Today if you go to Paleo Faliro, you will hear people speak Turkish in the street.

In this vignette, Ajda highlights that the *Rums* are different from the *Yunanlıs*. This means that sharing Greek ethnicity did not make them get along well. What brings people together is not their shared ethnicity but their conviviality and their shared ways of living in the place where they grow up together. What Ajda said was also confirmed in the academic literature. It was difficult for the Rums who had comfortable lives in Turkey

to restart from scratch (Bilginer 2019). Rums who left played out their differences of being from Istanbul with the Turkish words they inserted in the Greek language they spoke, with the Istanbul Rum food that they cooked (Örs 2006, 2018; Yücel and Yıldız 2019).

Like Ajda, many Burgaz islanders went to visit their Rum friends in Greece. This is significant because Burgaz islanders try to maintain their bonds of friendship. They also make reunions in Greece where Burgaz islanders who left meet and also those islanders who still live in Burgaz reunite with those who left. Orhan was one of those who frequently went to Greece and commented:

> I have been to Greece many times to visit my Rum friends from Burgaz. Once I went to Greece and wanted to visit Dimitri. Dimitri's wife said that he was not at home, that he had gone to the island in Athens. I knew Dimitri was at home but he did not dare come out to see me. He was too ashamed to have betrayed *us*.

Orhan feels that it was a betrayal because in Burgaz, they shared a life together, had enjoyable moments, and they protected each other in times of crisis, like during the riots. Orhan interpreted that Dimitri and the Rums felt as if they (the Rums) had betrayed the Burgaz islanders by leaving their Burgaz friends. As Burgaz islanders never betrayed the Rums, the Rums should not have left Burgaz. Some of the Burgaz islanders who left the island, like Haris, returned back to Burgaz as a summer inhabitant. Today, we can find several Burgazlı who moved to Greece, Israel, the US and other countries, and who returned back to Burgaz as a summer inhabitant. They have left Turkey but they could not live away from Burgaz. As Ajda says: "you cannot divorce from the island (*Adayı boşayamazsın*)."

Reuniting with the Burgaz of Our Heart and Mind

The remaining Burgaz islanders were devastated by the departure of their friends. They sought for different ways to make them come back, even for a visit. They organised several reunions in Greece, where there was a significant Burgaz population. In early 2000s, they started using non-digital and digital media to articulate their memories of "good old days in Burgaz" as well as criticising the oppressive Turkish government policies to say that "we share your pain, we understand why you had to leave, but please come back, life is not the same without you." Across digital and

non-digital media productions, by writing novels, shooting documentaries, distributing them on Youtube and Vimeo, launching a Facebook group of Reunion, the remaining Burgaz islanders aimed to bring back their friends, who left Burgaz:

> Come Yanaki mou, come to the land where you were born,
> Do it one day.
> Bring Eleni, Yorgo, Manolaki with you.
> Don't come alone.
> Bring your childhood with you.
> I know that your heart still beats here.
> I know that you shed secret tears,
> You live in your memories.
> Look, the northwest wind is blowing.
> The sea is heaving its fury like it used to
> The Vartanos lighthouse still flashes seven short and one long beam
> The red brick house which you left behind without a glance still stands.
> Your rowboats made of paper are lined side by side awaiting your return
> Next to the pier.
> Your watermelon lanterns have gone out with the longing for you.
> Your sling still hangs on your bedside, your hoop made of thin wire is no longer round.
> The weight of yearning has crashed it.
> No Yanaki mou, no.
> Things are not the same.
> Without you…
> Engin Aktel (In *Last September*, 2008 and Uzunoğlu 2013)

Engin Aktel's book, Last September (2008) and Nilüfer Uzunoğlu's documentary (2013) start with Aktel's poem (above), which is a call for the Burgaz islanders, who left, to return back, even for one day. In 2010, Niko Tsalikis, a Burgaz islander, who lives in Greece, opened a Facebook group and organised a Reunion event that took place on 24–29 August 2012 in Burgaz. During the reunion the restaurants by the sea united for a collective dinner and the islanders danced all night long, like in the old days. After the reunion, the islanders put photos on the Facebook page, wrote poems about their reunions, expressing feelings of nostalgia, joy and solidarity. Their reunion was also reported by Sonat Bahar (2012), in the national news, Sabah newspaper, on 2 September 2012. Bahar and her colleague Tijen Burultaj, who took photos commented that they had not

seen people who had so much fun together and added that even the pouring rain could not stop their dancing and fun. Nilüfer Uzunoğlu, a Burgaz islander, made a documentary of this reunion.

Today, the group has more than 2000 members, including those, who live in Burgaz and those, who left. Every day, on this Facebook group page, Burgaz islanders, whether they are still in Burgaz or somewhere else in the world, post old photos; share their memories of conviviality; share their news about weddings, graduations, stories of success, and obituaries and celebrate each other's important religious days, share jokes and memes. The Burgaz islanders' memories affect people's present life. Memories of conviviality make the Burgaz islanders, who left, come back. Like Miller (2011) says, Facebook brings back the old village, this Facebook group brought back the islanders together, not only in terms of digital connections but as a physical reunion. The islanders' media productions and the use of digital media does not lead those islanders, who left, to settle back to Burgaz, neither they can bring back the "good old days." Nonetheless, they help to express emotions and affect as well as to deal with the trauma of leaving and the trauma of being left. Through digital and non-digital media, they communicate these with each other, which helps their healing process.

What strikes in the social memories of the islanders, including both those in Burgaz and those who left is that that they put Burgaz at the centre of their lives. This tiny island is very "big" for them. It is a place where they have felt the freest, and they cannot find that freedom anywhere else. The islanders use the words "country, homeland, continent" when they describe Burgaz. In Uzunoğlu's (2013) documentary, we hear these descriptions of Burgaz:

> Orhan Özalp: The island of Burgaz seemed like a continent to me, like Australia, the Marmara Sea an ocean, the small fish in the sea were dolphins. The wall surrounding our yard was the Great Wall of China and I was the little adventurer of this realm.
>
> George Andoniadis: Burgaz is a different nation, this small island is like a country to me, it is my entire life. We lived in an umbrella, where everyone knew us and we were safe. In our childish way we thought that we were free and this was a great feeling for a child.
>
> Roberto Calich: We had too much freedom there. And this freedom has been imprinted into our mind so much that we always miss it, our lives take turns, there are things we can do, and some we cannot, but Burgaz is always on our mind. This is the reason why it is on our mind.

Doumanis (2012), in his important *Before the Nation*, attempts to take seriously the nostalgia of Rums displaced from Anatolia before and during the 1923 population exchange. In that nostalgia, Rums tend to assert a good life before they began to feel the effects of nation-state ideologies. However, while Doumanis sees the interactions of various religious groups in the empire as a form of everyday practice, he is never sufficiently able to solve the puzzle of its nostalgia today. I argue that this puzzle of nostalgia becomes easier to solve when one sees it as a nostalgia for a place to which one belonged that was created out of shared ways of living that encompassed and enjoyed diversity. This is different from seeing it as nostalgia for diversity itself, which suggests that we are nostalgic for specific features of other cultures. The islanders yearn for their childhood when they were all together on the island, enjoying the island life with its nature and its people.

Those who left the island have different strategies of memories and structural nostalgia (Herzfeld 2005; Mitchell 2002) from those who still live in Burgaz. The latter choose to recall and associate the memories of conviviality and solidarity with Burgaz and want to forget the memories of intolerance, which made them leave the island. Nicholas Tsalikis, who opened the Facebook group, says that when he visited Burgaz for the first time after his departure, "I collected stones, and flowers from Hristos Hill and I still keep them at home (in Greece where he lives)" (Uzunoğlu 2013). Roulis Ethnopoulos showed a very long panoramic photograph of Burgaz in his hands and narrated: "I took this photograph on my last day from my balcony, before I left the island. I took the whole view from my balcony and took it home (to Greece). Taking these pictures was like putting all of Burgaz into my pocket … and I put it in my bag and left" (Uzunoğlu 2013). Another informant of mine told me that at the reunion, she saw one of the Rums who came back reuniting and hugging a tree, saying, "the tree of my childhood." They hold on to the pictures of their house, views and objects from Burgaz, which make them recall memories of conviviality.

The islanders, who still live in Burgaz articulate memories of intolerance, violence and oppression (not in Burgaz but outside of the island) to communicate to those who left that they understand their pains and they recall memories of conviviality to bring back their friends. Aktel's novel *Last September* (2008) is written for those who left, especially the Rums. It narrates the strategies of the islanders who did not let the rioters enter Burgaz. The novel aims for one to feel the pains of the non-Muslims

experienced during the destructions of the pogrom. It also blames the Turkish, Greek, British and Cypriot governments for making the Rums of Turkey pay the bill of the political problems. His argument is that no matter what the governments would like to do to divide and rule, to try to make Rums and Turks enemies, war cannot turn two friends from Burgaz into two enemies. Gogo (Rum) and Kemal (Sunni Turk) are blood brothers from Burgaz. In the novel, Gogo had to migrate to Greece and during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, he was sent as a Greek soldier to defend the Greek Cypriots against the Turks in Cyprus, where Kemal was sent as a Turkish soldier. They meet in Cyprus in the war zone during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Kemal risks his own life in order to save his childhood friend, Gogo from Burgaz. Gogo, stuck with his leg almost amputated, tells Kemal (Aktel 2008, 248), "That's the end, Kemal. I, who was expelled from my homeland, I, who was longing for my homeland, I could not shoot as an enemy at the children of my homeland. I couldn't, Kemal. I couldn't" (my translation). Gogo, which is his nickname in Burgaz, chose to die instead of shooting the children of his homeland. Kemal ran in the fields with Gogo on his back, singing in Rumca, despite the warnings of the other soldiers that there were bombs falling in, in order to bring Gogo somewhere safe. Kemal gets shut and both Gogo and Kemal die holding hands like in the old days in Burgaz. This is where the difference of Burgaz lies. In the case of Burgaz, conviviality wins over coexistence and intoleration. On the island, the islanders protect the islanders against crises that come from "outside" and do not let any violence take place. Burgaz islanders, who live in Burgaz and who left it perceive the island as the place of conviviality and differentiate it from the nation that caused intolerance.

Conclusion

The message from Nedim Hazar's documentary, like the novels of Aktel and the documentary of Uzunoğlu is friendship is over everything. Mary Tsilenis said, "you can love a place but people are also the reason" (Uzunoğlu 2013). Burgaz islanders have loved the island for various reasons, ranging from the people whom they loved, to the sea, the nature and the feelings that Burgaz made them feel, like an endless freedom. In Burgazlıs' descriptions of Burgaz, we see the island as a heterogeneous place, a place in its multiplicity, a product of interrelations and space as connected and under construction (Massey 2005). For those who left the island, Burgaz was the place of freedom, in their childhood. Then it

became a place that they had to leave during their youth because of the intolerance and the sense of insecurity that they felt in the nation, where they did not have a place. Today, it is a place of refuge and an amalgamation of memories of conviviality which they try to keep separated from those memories of intolerance. For Burgaz islanders who have stayed, it used to be the space of joy, fun and beauty and for some a space of hardship and labour. The homogenisation process took away their friends and the fun and the joy and they see the island as "empty" because their friends left and the nature is losing more and more its diversity. For some Burgazlı, it is still the place of freedom as my informant Zeynep said to me "the island starts when I put my foot on the boat and it takes me to the land of freedom."

Notes

1. Tanrıverdi's *Hoşçakal Prinkipo: Bir Rüyaydı Unut Gitsin* (2004) narrates anecdotal stories on *Büyükada* and *Atina'daki Büyükada* (2007) is about the memories of departure of Büyükada, who immigrated to Athens. Levi's *Istanbul bir masaldı* (1999) is a novel about nostalgia for the cultural pluralism of Istanbul.
2. Aktel's *Son Eylül: Elveda Antigoni* (Last September: Farewell Antigoni 2008) is about minorities leaving the Princes' Islands after 1955 riots. Aktel's *Kestane Karası* (Storm on Burgazada 2005) is about life on Burgazada in the 1940s.
3. *Salkım Hanımın Taneleri* (Mrs Salkım's necklace) by Giritlioğlu (1999) is about the Wealth Tax in 1942. *Güz Sancısı* (Pains of Autumn 2009) by Giritlioğlu (2009) is about the 6–7 September events. *Zincirbozan* is a movie about the coup in 1980.
4. For example, *Cemberimde Gul Oya* (The Embroidered Rose on my Scarf) by Çağan Irmak (2005) *and Hatırla Sevgili* (Remember Darling 2006–2008) by Burhan and Teber (2006) is about the coups in 1960 and 1980. Kulüp (The Club) by Yüce and Günay (2021) is a Netflix Series about the Wealth Tax and the 1955 pogrom).
5. There are also documentaries on the 6–7 September events critical of the government: *6–7 Eylül Belgeseli* (Can Dündar 2007) and *Unutulmayan iki gün 6–7 Eylül* (Rıdvan Akar 2007).
6. The documentary can be watched on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s4O7FanMBeU&t=296s.
7. The documentary can be watched on Vimeo: https://vimeo.com/846675779?fbclid=IwAR3VJ5fRqWWRFNUTxFRoa2Jb6526HQpRi82HzWTZ0oE_4Sd9FbEjJm6sOWg

8. Lack of knowledge of birth years during the early 1900s and the First World War are very common in Turkey. Ajda said that Manos was 29 years older than her, which would have made his birth year 1912; then she said that he died at the age of 69 in 1983, which would have made his birth year 1914.

   The generation born in 1910–1920s (like my grandparents) had unknown birth dates. The approximate year of their birth can be found if they remember a story from a war (e.g. Balkan wars) or migration from one country to another (population exchange). For example, my father's father (of Turkish origin, born in Bulgaria) remembered the fact that his mother hid him inside her overcoat while they were escaping on a donkey from one place to another during the Balkan wars in Bulgaria. He said that he was around two years old, when this happened, which gives the range of 1909–1910 for his birth year.
9. Romeyka (Rumca in Turkish) refers to the language used by the Rums (Greeks) of Ottoman Empire and contemporary Turkey (see Saglam 2022).

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CHAPTER 8

Problematising the Politics of Recognition and Its Impact on Conviviality: Fixing Ambiguity, Losing Heterogeneity

Introduction

The political context of my fieldwork in Burgaz in 2009–2010 was very much affected by the AKP's democratisation packages. In these years, Erdoğan represented himself and his government as being "more democratic" towards non-Muslim minorities such as in the re-opening of the closed Sumela Monastery, in the Black sea region; and removing the ban on the minority community foundations' right to register the properties currently in use (see Soner 2010, 424). The AKP came up with the "democratisation packages" notably the "Alevi Opening" and the "Kurdish Opening" including freedom of speech, language and giving more cultural rights to Kurds (see Efegil 2011; Kardaş and Balci 2016; Özpek and Mutluer 2016), and initiated a dialogue with the Alevis to discuss what their demands were (Soner and Toktaş 2011; Bardakçi 2015; Karakaya-Stump 2018; Mutluer 2016; Borovali and Boyraz 2015). Aktürk (2018) interprets these democratic attempts as Islamic multiculturalism and Muslim nationalism, through which, Erdoğan tried to give more power to Islamists and initiated a rhetoric that the oppression and the sufferings of ethnic and religious minorities (recognised and non-recognised) were all the faults of the Kemalist modernisation project. Erdoğan was deliberately trying to get the support of the Alevis, because the Alevis support the CHP, the Republican Party, founded by Atatürk. Atatürk is a very important figure for Alevis, because the secularism he brought lessened

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the domination of Sunnis over Alevis. Erdoğan's democratisation packages and attitudes towards Kurds and Alevis (see Arikan Akdağ 2016; Somer and Glupker-Kesebir 2016) were strategic political moves to gain more votes and to support the EU negotiations (see Çarkoğlu and Bilgili 2011; Bardakçi 2015; Kaya 2013).

During the years of the fieldwork, as these openings were at an initial stage, their outcomes were not yet known. In Burgaz, this political context created an atmosphere where the Alevis started to articulate their memories of toleration/coexistence by expressing the ways in which the Alevis had been oppressed during the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. Besides the bitter and sweet memories of conviviality that we came across in previous chapters, Alevis expressed their collective memories of intolerance and sufferance, which reinforced a discourse of coexistence. While Passerini (1987) emphasises the individual differences in remembering, Halbwachs (1992) draws attention to the selective memory of groups. Some events are more significant to one group, while they are less significant to or forgotten by another group. With the emergence of public expression of minority memories, facilitated by neo-Ottomanism initiated by Özal and followed by the AKP government, Alevis expressed more vocally their memories of coexistence, as a part of an expression of their Alevi identity. While the Alevis were vocal in discussing politics of recognition by organising panels and memorials, the Kurdish Burgazlı were rather silent. In my interviews with them and our daily conversations, they stressed their similarities with Sunni Turks rather than articulating their differences, distanced themselves from the ideology of the PKK and articulated that their migration from southeastern Turkey was more due to financial and family problems than the Kurdish insurgency. This rhetoric of distancing from the PKK, emphasising on peaceful relations between Turks and Kurds echoed very much Erdoğan's public speeches (during the years of the fieldwork) where he despised the PKK, its leader Abdullah Ocalan as an anti-Islamic and violent figure, while depicting himself as the unifying and democratising one, who allowed the use of the Kurdish language in TV broadcasting, at schools and universities (see Aktürk 2018).

In this chapter, I explore the impact of politics of recognition on conviviality by focusing on two non-recognised groups: The Alevis and the Kurds,[1] in the ways in which they perceived these democratisation packages and articulated whether or what kind of recognition they wanted. In the first two sections, I focus on the relationships between the

non-recognised Alevis and the islanders, especially the Sunni Muslims, whose domination Alevis would like to resist. The politics of recognition of the Alevis hence complicated relationships among the Alevis and also Sunni-Alevi relations in Burgaz. Taking on board the diversity within Alevis, syncretism of Alevi religious practices, and complexity and multiplicity of Alevi identities, I explore the ways in which the debates on the politics of recognition had an impact on conviviality on the island. While Alevis articulated a discourse of inclusion by emphasising syncretism and similarity between non-Muslim faiths and Alevis; they reinforced a discourse of coexistence, by stressing their "difference," separating their syncretic religious practices into "Sunni and Alevi components." In Burgaz, syncretic religious practices are not uncommon between different faiths (see Chap. 5). Muslims participate in a mass in a Rum Orthodox church, Jews fast like Muslims. However, when an Alevi attended a mosque, such as on Kadir night, she was discouraged by some Alevis. In the third section, I take Amojgar's life story, a Kurdish Muslim man, his migration from southeastern Turkey to Burgaz and the ways in which he positioned himself as a good integrated Kurdish man to Burgaz life, along with his silence on politics of recognition regarding the Kurds in Turkey.

Alevis' Memories of Intoleration and Performance of Difference

Having been suppressed under the Ottoman Empire due to Sunni dominance over the Alevis, when Modern Turkish Republic was built through the Kemalist modernist project, Alevis became hopeful that Turkish secularism will restrict Sunni domination. Alevis were content not to be recognised as a minority as long as the republic did not allow any display of religion in public (Zurcher and Van der Linden 2004, 127 cited in Soner and Toktaş 2011, 421). Under secularism, Alevis felt safer than they used to be in the Ottoman Empire and had been supporter of secularisation and the Kemalist modernisation project. Turkish Republican secularism aimed to keep state control over religious institutions through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*), whose role was rather to control religions than the separation of the state from religions. *Diyanet*, instead of being equally distant to all religions of the Republic, was still Sunni-centric, based on the Hanafi School of Sunni Islam and did not leave space for other Islamic groups, such as Sunni Shafiis, Jafaris and

Alevis (see Öztürk 2018; Soner and Toktaş 2011). From the early years of the Republic and until, *Diyanet* had been reformed following the 1960 and 1980s coup, and under the AKP rule (from 2002 onwards) (Öztürk 2018). Between 1960s until 2000, *Diyanet* played a controlling role in solidifying national unity, due to polarisation of the society under rightest and leftist political movements, which led to the militarist coup d'état in 1960 and 1980. Under the AKP rule from 2002 onwards, *Diyanet*'s control was expanded to intervene social, public and religious life, with legal amendments to the Foundation and Duties of *Diyanet* (see Öztürk 2018). After the victory of 2007 general elections, the AKP, started a dialogue with the Alevis under "Alevi Opening" to discuss Alevis' demands for what kinds of recognition and/or rights. The AKP being a Sunni-centric and conservative entity, challenging Turkish secularism and criticising the Kemalist modernisation project, hence found itself in an oxymoronic relationship with the Alevis, who were supporters of secularism and Kemalism, in this initiation of "Alevi Opening."

In 2009, Erdoğan visited a *cemevi* (Alevi gathering house and places of rituals), recruited Alevis for his party and attended Alevi breakfasts (Soner and Toktaş 2011, 429; Bayındır 2009, 17) as acts of unofficial recognition. Furthermore, the government organised workshops with Alevi-Bektaşi groups to discuss their needs (Soner and Toktaş 2011, 430; Bardakçı 2015), however only two out of the seven workshops were attended by Alevis (see Borovali and Boyraz 2015). In 23 November 2011, Erdoğan apologised for the massacres of Dersim in 1938. Having Atatürk's picture, his own picture and the AKP logo, behind him, Erdoğan apologised by emphasising that these massacres were done under the CHP rule, Atatürk's party and it should have been the CHP party to apologise, but he did it to face the "dark pages in the history" (Efe and Forchtner 2015). This apology was seen both as a "more inclusive understanding of Turkish citizenship" but also as a "calculated manoeuvre in order to sideline with political opponents" (Efe and Forchtner 2015), namely the CHP party and its leader, Kılıçdaroğlu.

The political context (2009–2010) within the "democratisation packages" of "Alevi Opening," mobilised the Alevis in Burgaz to talk within themselves and with non-Alevis about what Alevism was, what Alevis wanted and how they should be recognised. The majority of Burgaz islanders support secular ideology, especially the elite, like the rulers of the Sports Club, who make the hegemonic claims and they resist political Islam and the AKP politics. Sharing secular ideology against the

domination of Sunni Islam was the common denominator between Alevis and the elite. Hence Alevis organised panels to discuss their politics of recognition, which were attended and supported by the many secular Sunni Muslims in Burgaz. This political ambiance opened the space for various views on what Alevism was, what kinds of recognition Alevis wanted, what their demands were as well as their articulation of collective memories of violence and intolerance. These collective memories played a very important role in Alevis' articulation of their identity. On the one hand, they referred to the events dating back centuries, when Alevis experienced oppression from Sunnis. These memories have been transmitted to later generations and talked about in public in Burgaz. For instance, just before *Hızır cemi* took place in Burgaz, I was having a chat with my Alevi informants. They mentioned that the Ottoman Sultan, Yavuz Sultan Selim, won the Çaldıran war in 1514 against the Safavids, who followed Shia Islam, and killed many Shias and Alevis. Alevis were protected by the Safavids. In order to keep control in Anatolia and to diminish Shah Ismail (the leader of the Safavids) Selim killed many Alevis in the region (Finkel 2007). Also, for this reason, the fact that Erdoğan named the third Bosphorous bridge in Istanbul by the name of Yavuz Sultan Selim, was received with uproar by the Alevis (Karakaya-Stump 2018, 58).

Massacres in Dersim, Çorum, Kahramanmaraş and Sivas (Madımak) are significant events among the collective memories of the Alevis (Shankland 1999; Neyzi 2004; Çaylı 2020). During the years of the fieldwork, these memories of intolerance enhanced the reconstruction a collective Alevi identity and solidarity to end the domination and sufferance under the Sunni Muslims. "We are what we remember" (Fentress and Wickham 1992, 7), and "memory is the social construction of a social and cultural identity" (Bahloul 1996, 2) were relevant for the case of the Alevis. The past was being reconstructed with a new purpose in the present (Halbwachs 1992). Alevi identity is built on and transferred from one generation to another through collective expression of emotions of pain, and embodiment of mourning and remembering during the cem ritual as well in other memorials (like Madimak) (see Assmann 2011; Connerton 1989; Taylor 2003). In Burgaz, Alevis were very vocal with their collective memories of these massacres and also their departure from Dersim. Their settlement elsewhere was remembered as difficult times, which they referred to as *sürgün* meaning exile.

On 5 July 2009, Burgaz Alevis conducted their first memorial of the Madımak event in Burgaz. The fire in Madımak, has been interpreted as

an attack on Alevis and secular people in Turkey (2009a, 2009b; Dündar 2002). On 2 July 1993, Pir Sultan Abdal Celebrations took place in Madımak, Sivas in eastern Anatolia. Not all the participants were Alevis; there were also non-Alevi intellectuals and leftists, like Aziz Nesin, who attended the event and stayed at the hotel. The Sunnis attacked the cultural centre, the place of celebrations and made an arson attack to the hotel, which was burned down and 37 people died. During the Madımak memorial in Burgaz, an Alevi journalist was invited to talk about the event and a documentary about the fire was shown. It was held at Ay Nikola tea garden. This memorial was organised by young leftist Alevis, members of the Turkish Communist Party, and about 50 islanders—Alevis as well as some Sunni Muslims—attended. The main message of the memorial was that the people who were involved in organising this fire were not punished and that this event was symbolised as an attack on the leftists, thinkers and secular people, among whom there were Alevis. On 7 July 2012, Burgaz Alevis held another memorial, which was attended by 150 people (2012a). This was an important event because it united secular Sunni Muslims and Alevis around one cause: defending secularists and intellectuals. What was peculiar was that this memorial did not take place in the teagarden of *cemevi* but in the Ay Nikola tea garden. The head of *cemevi* at that time told me that he wanted to keep the "politics" out of *cemevi*. What he referred as politics was leftist and communist politics, as the ones, who wanted to organise this memorial were young Alevis, who supported the communist party. This was one of the examples, which showed that Alevis had differing political views, tensions and disagreements. The politics that was performed at *cemevi* refers to "politics of recognition" in the sense that it served directly and narrowly the Alevi identity. Another reason why he did not want it to take place in the *cemevi* tea garden was that he did not want to take the risk of a provocation. He thought that if there were disagreements and tensions during this memorial, related to leftist and or communist political ideology, then it would have damaged the reputation of the *cemevi*. Hence, he wanted to keep the "politics" out of the "cemevi politics." In fact, there were two attenders, non-Alevis who did not want to stand up during the minute of silence for those, who died and people raised their voices towards each other.

Alevis form about 15% of the Turkish population. Burgazlı Alevis of Turkmen, Kurdish and Zaza descent, draw their roots from Anatolia, by emphasising pre-Islamic traditions from Zarathustrianism, manism,

shamanism, paganism and Christianity (see Karakaya-Stump 2018, 54), to claim that they have already been in Anatolia, well before the spread of Islam. They have esoteric teachings rooted in Sufism and pre-Islamic worshiping. They also have an attachment to Ali and the 12 imams, which they have in common with the Shi'a sect (Karakaya-Stump 2018, 54). Alevis also distance themselves from Sunni and Shia Islam, by emphasising gender equality (Karakaya-Stump 2018, 54), praising the importance and power of women in society, by referring to the gender roles rooted in Anatolia, before the coming of Islam, and by stressing the heterogeneity and the blending (*harman*) of pre-Islamic faiths and Sufism. This *harman* does not make Alevism less authentic; to the contrary Alevis emphasise this to strengthen their distinctiveness (see Karakaya-Stump 2020, for a comprehensive understanding on Alevism and its history). When it comes to practising religion, Alevi religious rituals and practices are different than Sunni Muslims. Sunni Muslims follow the five pillars of Islam: believe in one God, fast during Ramadan, pray five times a day, pilgrimage to Mecca and pay alms. Alevis do not go to the mosque; they do not pray five times a day; they do *cem* rituals in *cemevi*; they do not fast during Ramadan (the 9th month of the Islamic calendar), but fast for ten days during *Muharrem* (first month of the Islamic calendar). In Burgaz, what Alevis collectively wanted to do within this political climate, was to show the difference in performing religion in the *cemevi* and hence to have it recognised as a place of worship. In the following ethnographic observations, I will describe the Sunni Muslim rituals in the mosque and Alevi rituals in the *cemevi*.

I fasted on *Kadir* night,[2] on the 15th of September 2009, the holiest night for the Muslims and went to the women section of the mosque to follow the evening prayer. Muslims repent for their sins. If you wish something on *Kadir* night, it is believed to come true. If a person is very virtuous, people say, "s/he must have been born on a *Kadir* night." In the mosque, men and women pray in separate rooms. During the *mukabele*[3] on the *Kadir* day, there were more than 30 women aged between 40 and 70, and a few young women. They wore simple clothes, no colour coordination, baggy trousers or long skirts which makes it easy to pray. These women looked strangely at Beren, a secular, middle class woman, who came with full makeup and a phosphorescent, fashionable green scarf. One old woman approached her and tucked in Beren's hair inside the scarf. Some Sunni Muslim women were strict about what to wear and how to tie their headscarves in the mosque. Fatma, a Sunni Muslim woman,

redid my scarf and I told her that I could never tie a scarf correctly. After she remade my scarf, she said, "*alışılmadık götte don durmazmış*" ("if your ass is not used to underwear, you will feel uncomfortable wearing it"). We laughed. I didn't expect her to say such a thing in the mosque. With that saying, Fatma made it explicit that she acknowledged I was not a practising Muslim in a joking but also warning manner. During the *Kadir* night prayer, the imam recited parts of the Koran. Except a few Alevi women, all the women were Sunni Muslims. The pray in the mosque was longer compared to other salah (namaz). Some women, who had knee and weight problems, prayed sitting on a chair. At the end of the prayer, chocolate bars and canned soft drinks were distributed to the attendees. After the prayer, I went to Fatma's house to break the fast.

Several months later, on the 18th of February 2010, there was the *Hızır cemi*, at Burgaz Cemevi. C*em* means Alevi gathering to worship and perform rituals, and *cemevi*, is the Alevi gathering house, where they worship and perform rituals. As Alevis are not recognised as a separate religious group, their *cemevi* is not considered as a place of worship. As a part of the politics of recognition within the Alevi opening, Alevis wanted *cemevis* to be recognised as a place of worship and their bills to be paid by the government like the churches and synagogues. I wanted to understand how *cem* was performed and this was the first *cem* that I had ever entered. Alevis use the term "*ceme girmek*" (entering cem), which refers to entering this communal gathering and being a part of it. I had asked Nuri, the head of the *cemevi*, to let me know when there was *cem* in *cem*evi. When he called me to say that there would be a *cem* gathering, he was very happy to see me participating in it. Nuri wants the *cemevis* to be legitimised as places of worship. As *cemevis* are not legitimised as a place of worship, they are registered as cultural foundations (see Özkan 2018). The cemevi in Burgaz is also registered and named as a cultural foundation, but all the islanders call it *cemevi*. It is the only one on the Princes' Islands. As a part of the politics of recognition, Nuri wanted to invite Cem TV channel to broadcast the *Hızır cemi*, however, the TV people could not make it. Nuri wanted non-Alevis to come and observe their ritual and that was why he told me to invite my friends. He publicised the event and invited everyone especially the mayor of Princes' Islands from the CHP party (Republican Party), who also attended. The mayor always came to any cultural and religious event taking place on the island just to keep close with the public and also give the message to the Alevis that the CHP supported them.

After the *cem*, Nuri also put the photos of *cem* on Facebook, under the Burgaz *cemevi* page.

Just before the *Hızır cem* ritual, Alevi women brought *lokma* (a pasty cooked by women, which symbolises anything shared between the people who enter the *cem*) and fruit to distribute at the end of the *cem*. They lit candles at the entrance. Contrary to the mosque, during *cem*, women and men sat together and performed the *semah* ritual (whirling). At the mosque, men and women cannot be in the same room. In the *cemevi*, most of the women wore scarves, which were not tightly wrapped, some also had it lie on their shoulder, and a few women even did not wear it. This was in contrast with how the women were dressed in the mosque and how they corrected each other's scarves.

In the mosque, the imam is the only leading figure and everyone else prays the same way. However, during *cem*, people share the performance and are given different symbolic roles to perform. When I did participant observation during *Hızır cemi*, the people who sat next to me explained these symbolic roles. For example, *kapıcı* (the doorman) welcomed people at the entrance. Two young girls were given the role of being *süpürgecis*, who mopped and cleaned but this cleaning symbolised the spiritual cleaning of the self. G*özcü* (observer/watchman) was responsible of the organisation and sitting arrangement of the room. Furthermore, in Sunni Islam, photos, especially of the religious figures are prohibited; dance and music are not allowed in rituals. However, the posters of the prophet Ali, the Sufi leader Hacı Bektaş Veli and Atatürk are displayed inside the *cemevi*. *Semah* (whirling) and *saz* (the fretted instrument) are at the core of the rituals.

Dede is the most important religious leader for the Alevis. *Dede* must have direct blood links to the prophet Ali. He transmits Alevi philosophy, religious and historical knowledge and morality through reciting poems and telling stories by playing *saz*. As there is no *Dede* in Burgaz, the *Dede* comes from another district of Istanbul to the island, to lead the *Hızır cemi*. One of my informants told me that the competency of the *Dede* is judged by his wisdom, proficiency in poetry, music, his knowledge of oral Alevi traditions and his eloquence. The way he tells the stories about religious figures such as prophets and Sufi leaders, about how to be virtuous and good human beings is very important. During the *Hızır cemi* where I participated, through playing *saz, Dede* transmitted the story of *Hızır*, who is an important saint in Islamic-Alevi cosmology but also and ambiguous figure, blurring the boundaries of mortality and immortality. *Dede* narrated:

> God said that there would be a storm and flood and that *Nuh* [a prophet] should prepare a boat and get a couple from each animal species and people of different races. People were too corrupted, that's why God punished them. The storm and the flood started to destroy everything. *Hızır* arrived and stopped the storm and the flood. The purpose of this *Hızır cemi* is that whenever we have a problem, *Hızır* will save us. We cannot see *Hızır* with our own eyes; we can only see *Hızır* with the eyes of an open heart. We, lay people, cannot see him, but in difficult times we feel *Hızır* and we say this person came our way like *Hızır* to solve our problem [*Hızır gibi yetişti*].

Later on, Ali's sons, Hüseyin and Hasan's murder in Kerbela were mourned over and made the *cem* very emotional. The Kerbela war is one of the significant events over which Alevis and Shias mourn during their *cem*. After the separation between Ali and Muaviye, the sons of both claimed to be the Caliphate. In the Kerbela war, Muaviye's son Yezid and his army killed Hüseyin and Hasan's (Ali's sons) followers. For instance, in this *cem*, when *Dede* was talking about Hüseyin and Hasan's murder, the public started to say, "Damn!"(*lanet olsun*). They started to get very emotional, men and women started to cry. People gently sobbed and I saw napkins appearing in women's hands. Men cried openly as well. When the public was singing Alevi songs, they were tapping their knees in a painful and mournful way. Nonetheless, this was not like the Shia morning, in the form of beating themselves up. The way of showing their sorrow was not by hurting their bodies. *Dede* said loudly and provocatively: "We are Alevi and nothing else. Alevis should worry more about being a good Alevi than worrying about the politics of being an Alevi. This emotional bond we have, and our mourning is what it means to be Alevi. We should do *cem* every Thursday." I was very moved by the ambiance and the sense of collectivity during *cem*. It was a collective expression of emotions of pain, and embodiment of mourning and remembering (see Connerton 1989; Taylor 2003; Assmann 2011). Alevi identity builds on the collective sufferance and violence that they faced especially from the Sunnis during the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. As Dede pointed out the collective mourning was strongly related with Alevi identity. They hold on the collective memories and *cem* in the *cemevi* to practise their rituals and to keep away from the domination of Sunni Islam practices.

When people practise religion ("lived religion"), people do so in diverse ways, and during their religious engagement, they sometimes confirm and sometimes disregard religious norms (see Saglam 2018). Everyday practices of Islam take various forms of negotiation, interpretation, and

discursive engagement with religious norms (see Asad 2009; Saglam 2018; Mahmood 2005; Simon 2014). When people discuss their individual or public alterations in religious practices, they might also tend to stand by their practice by articulating why and how they do a certain practice or ritual, in their way. Within this diverse island context, when the islanders practise religion in various forms (e.g. a Sunni Muslim woman swims in the sea in her bikini, while she is fasting, another Sunni Muslim man drinks alcohol in some evenings, but attends also the Friday sermon) as well incorporating syncretic practices (e.g. a Jewish fasts like a Muslim, a Muslim child makes a cross when he is scared), they accept these alterations and syncretic practices without arguing "what is a correct way." Nonetheless, when one group tends to argue that "their way is the correct way," this creates a discourse of toleration. For instance, some Sunnis in Burgaz argue that Sunni Islam is "the correct way" in difference to how Alevis practise religion. I heard Sunnis criticising the ways in which Alevis practised Islam. Once, I went to the money rotation day of a Sunni Muslim women group. Most of those women practised regularly and went to the mosque during Ramadan. They read bits of the Koran during these money days and also talked about religion. One day, one of these women said: "It is important to know *tecvid* [how to read the Koran accurately, with precise pronunciation and intonation], and you know Alevis for example, they do not pray *fatiha*[4] correctly." These conversations highlight that when Sunnis claim that the way they practise is the correct way, Alevis see this as oppression, domination even assimilation.

I wanted to understand what the head of the *cemevi*, Nuri, thought about the situation of the Alevis and *cemevis*. I interviewed him two times and we also had casual chats at the garden of *cemevi*. Nuri articulated that Alevis faced assimilation due to the fact that the Directorate of Religious Affairs did not recognise Alevism as a different sect of Islam. He added that in school religion classes, Alevism and the history of Alevism were not taught and the obligatory religion lessons were saturated with and dominated by Sunni Islam. Nuri also wanted the *cemevis* to be legitimised and emphasised the importance of *cemevi* for the Alevis in Burgaz through saying that "If *cemevi* had not been built and functioning today, *we* [Alevis] would have disappeared." Normally, there should be *cem* every Thursday evening. However, as there was not a *Dede* on the island and it was difficult to invite *Dede* from Istanbul every week, *cem* took place very irregularly. For example, during my fieldwork year, there was *only one cem* performed in Burgaz. In Burgaz, it was not the *cem* in *cemevi* but the

sociality at the *cem* tea place, next to the *cemevi*, that kept the Alevis together. Many Alevis hang out, have tea, play cards, organise social events like *mantı* (tortellini) day and play saz at this tea place.

The building of *cemevi* in 1996 in Burgaz had complicated the relationships between Alevis and Sunnis. On the one hand, some Sunni Muslims reflected that building the *cemevi* divided the Muslim community into two groups. For example, one Sunni Muslim woman said, "Alevis used words like 'we' do it like this, 'you' do it like that more after the *cemevi* was built on the island." She, however, added and emphasised that she never had any quarrels with Alevis and they were very good neighbours. Some other Sunni Muslims said that everyone should be able to practise their religion freely and that it was very good to have *cemevi* in Burgaz so that Alevis could practise their rituals in their place of worship. As *cemevi* is not recognised, it implies that their religious practices "do not count." The fact that some of the orthodox/strict Sunnis claim their practice is the correct Islam, creates tensions, competitions and antagonism between those Sunnis and Alevis, in the ways Hayden (2002); Hayden et al. (2016) argue. To the contrary, as we have seen in Chap. 6, recognised millets' religious leaders, notably of the Sunni Muslims, Jewish and Rum Orthodox, do not show antagonistic tolerance towards each other.

Alevis and Sunnis expressed these tensions towards each other, only when Sunni Muslims claimed that their practice was the correct one. Nonetheless, those who claim the legitimacy of "correct Islam" constituted a very small group in Burgaz. On Burgaz, most of the Sunni Muslims who practise Islam, such as fasting during the whole month in Ramadan and praying five times a day; also drink alcohol except for the month of Ramadan. Many practising Sunni Muslim women do not wear a headscarf, swim in their bathing suits while they fast and vote for the secular Republican Party (CHP). Some Muslims do not practise at all. Some Alevis and Sunni Muslims both drink alcohol during Ramadan, in contrast to the strict Sunni Muslims. I heard from many Sunni Muslims, both the ones who practise and those who do not, that they found Alevi philosophy closer to theirs than that of some Sunni Muslims. They stated that Alevis were open-minded, Kemalist, secular and not "bigoted" like religious devout Sunnis. This is similar to the urban settings in Turkey, where Alevis embraced Kemalism and secularism in order to resist the domination of the Sunni Islamists (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 223). From 1990s onwards, middle-class secularists (most of them being Sunnis) became interested in visiting Alevi places of worship (*cemevi*) to learn more about Alevi

traditions and cultures (ibid., 146). For these secularists, "Alevis constituted the society of Atatürkism" (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 146).

In Burgaz, one can see shared ways of living, and how, common political ideology brings unity among the Sunnis and Alevis. For instance, the regular attendees of the mosque are a minority within the Sunni Muslim community. There are around 3000 Muslims in summer in Burgaz. During the *Kadir* night, around 250 Sunni women and men attended the mosque. The Friday prayers are attended by around 100 Sunnis, who are mainly men and most of them are the sellers in the Friday bazaar, who do not live in Burgaz. In Burgaz, it is common for Sunni Muslims not to follow Islamic rules, such as not drinking alcohol. Many restaurants are owned and ran by Alevis, who serve Rum mezes and alcohol. Sunni Muslims, Alevis and non-Muslims all hang out together at these restaurants and consume alcohol. This is why Burgaz islanders say that "Ramadan passes Burgaz in tangent" as many Sunni Muslims do not fast and continue to drink alcohol during Ramadan. Besides client/owner relationships, these Alevis and Sunni Muslims form and maintain their friendships through hanging out together in cafes and restaurants, through running their restaurants and shops next to each other, or working together as waiters. They play backgammon, watch football matches or go to the bazaar together. Their political views, secularism and keeping away from Sunni religious domination bring together Alevis and Sunnis. This is one of the reasons why many Alevis, like Nuri, are happy to live in Burgaz. Nuri said: "the good relations between Alevis and Sunnis should be an example to all the Alevis and Sunnis in Turkey." Politics of recognition of Alevis bring them closer to the secular Sunni Muslims as they both would like to resist the domination of Sunni Islam and the AKP's political Islam. However, these sometimes might distance the Alevis from the practising Sunni Muslims, if Sunni Muslims argue that their way is the correct Islam.

From the descriptions and analysis of the rituals at the *cemevi* and the mosque, one can observe that Alevis and Sunnis have significant differences in practising and performing religion. Therefore, one can understand that they would like *cemevi* to be recognised as a place of worship, because the religious practices are different, they do not want to be imposed Sunni Islamic practices and be forced to practise religion in the mosque in the ways in which Sunni Muslims do. However, the diverse ways of practising Alevism and the variety of leftists organisations that Alevis are affiliated with made it difficult for the Alevi organisations to unite "Alevisms under one roof" (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 145). Alevis thus

have particular demands, such as the *cemevi* recognition as place of worship, but they do not want to be recognised as a religious minority (Soner and Toktaş 2011; Karademir and Şen 2021), because a group-based minority categorisation will fix and reduce their diversity, and will push them towards an emphasis on the religious part of their identity, while Alevism incorporates a diversity of Alevi cultures, local and vernacular differences in practices, eclectic and syncretic religious rituals, and a philosophy of life. Instead of being recognised as a religious minority, the Alevis, they united under these 4 demands (Karakaya-Stump 2018, 58):

> 1) legal recognition of *cemevis* as Alevis "places of worship", which would make them eligible to receive government subsidies currently granted only to mosques and the few remaining churches and synagogues;
> 2) an end to the compulsory building of mosques in Alevi villages;
> 3) the removal from school curricula of mandatory religion classes, which are based solely on the teaching of (Sunni) Islam; and
> 4) the elimination of Directorate of Religious Affairs, or its reformation, so as to ensure the state's impartiality vis-à-vis all faith groups.

In these demands, the clear message is to end the domination of Sunni Islam imposed on the Alevis. Most of them also requested, as a 5th demand, the transformation of Madımak hotel into a museum of shame to commemorate the lives lost in the attack in 1993 (Çaylı 2020, 7; Karakaya-Stump 2018, 58). The end of domination weighs more than the demand to be recognised as a minority. Alevis do not frame their demands under liberal multiculturalism, which highlights cultural, political and religious differences as a distinct group but they stress their demands as human rights, democracy, equal citizenship, secularism, dialogue, and social inclusion (Karademir and Sen 2021; Özyürek 2009). In the next section, I will problematise the ways in which politics of recognition reinforces a coexistence discourse and explore the ways in which it strengthens Alevi identity but yet it creates disagreements and tensions among the Alevis and hinders conviviality.

Problematising Politics of Recognition and Its Impact on Conviviality

Alevis form a very heterogeneous group (see Navaro-Yashin 2002; Bayindir 2009; Shankland 1993; Özkan 2018; Karademir and Sen 2021). For instance, in Burgaz there are Zaza, Kurdish and Turkmen Alevis, who

differ in ethnicity and in the languages they speak. There are different political views, differences in practising Alevism, and various perceptions of Alevism, which creates tensions and disagreements among the Alevis about how it should be recognised. Especially, in 2009–2010 when it came to the fourth demand of the Alevis (the elimination of Directorate of Religious Affairs, or its reformation, so as to ensure the state's impartiality vis-à-vis all faith groups), Alevis in Burgaz disagreed among each other whether it should be abolished or what kind of reformation it should undergo. Taking into account the heterogeneity, diversity and syncretism of practising religion among the Alevis in Burgaz, the politics of recognition forced the Alevis to make a choice, and to clear out "Alevi components" from the "Sunni components." This then reinforced the discourse of coexistence which required the Alevis to define themselves, fix their multiplicity of identities and reduce their diversity to fit into one box.

In this section, I explore the ways in which politics of difference hinders the embodiment of diversity as a part of performing conviviality. As we saw in Chap. 5, in Burgaz people embody and share different religious practices from each other, and this blurs the boundaries of religious differences. The politics of recognition ruptures this conviviality in an artificial and divisive way. The Alevis, who share practices with Sunnis, are seen to be assimilated by other Alevis. In Alevism, there is a synthesis of many faiths, which they have incorporated in their practices and made it a particular, distinctive faith and philosophy. The politics of recognition and difference then prevents Alevis to share practices with Sunni Muslims, because they need to show how they are different than them. Some Alevis oppress those Alevis who attend and share Sunni practices.

For example, in Burgaz, some of the Alevis (such as the leftist and/or non-practitioner ones) expressed that the Directorate of Religious Affairs should be abolished stating that in a secular state the practices of religion should be private. In their way, it is a criticism of the transformation of *Diyanet* under the AKP rule. This group was not tolerant towards Alevis who shared some Sunni Muslim practices. For instance, during the Kadir night, some Alevis also went to the mosque. These non-religious, left-wing and non-practising Alevis interpreted the attitude of Alevis, who shared some practices with Sunni Muslims as assimilation under Sunnis. After the prayer in the mosque during Kadir night, which I explained earlier in this section, my atheist and communist Alevi friends, who worked for the Turkish Communist Party phoned me. With them, we consumed alcohol, had barbeques and discussed communism. On that *Kadir* night,

they were going to give me the communist weekly newspaper. I told them that I was at the mosque. They did not like this. I met them at *cemevi* tea garden. We played cards together. I told them that I could not stay longer because I was invited to have tea with some Alevi women some of whom were at the mosque. An Alevi girl, Elif, was also in that women's group. They asked me: "was Elif also in the mosque?" When I replied "yes" they were very surprised and said, "this is an example of an Alevi being assimilated in Sunni ways of practising religion!" When Elif came to pick me up, they asked: "was the mosque packed?" in order to annoy her. Elif had told me that she did not approve of their attitude, because they wanted to impose their own atheist and communist views on others. She also said that if there was something in *cemevi* for the *Kadir* night, she would have gone to the *cemevi* but as nothing was organised, she went to the mosque. While in Chap. 5, the Jews and the Muslims showed an embracing attitude of taking and sharing practices with each other, in this case, some Alevis did not appreciate taking and sharing practices with Sunnis. The Alevis who take and share practices from Sunnis see these practices as syncretism; however, the ones who do not share, see it as "assimilation." Even though Alevis performed their agency in sharing a practice—as they are sharing it with the dominant group who does not recognise them—this act was seen as "assimilation" by the Alevis, who refuse to share practices.

In 2009-2010, in Burgaz, some Alevis wanted Alevism to be recognised by the Directorate of Religious Affairs as a separate sect and the *cemevis* to be recognised as places of worship. The head of the *cemevi* in Burgaz, Nuri, also argued that Alevism dated back to thousand years BCE and that Alevism was the synthesis of all the religions of Anatolia and Mesopotamia including Zarathustrianism, manism, shamanism, paganism and Christianity (see Soner and Toktaş 2011, 424). Nuri said that even though, Ali[5] is one of the most important religious figures in Alevism, Alevis are not only the followers of Ali, like the Shi'a Muslims (see Shankland's 1999, 139). The trilogy, Allah, Muhammed and Ali, is important. During the *cem* ritual, Alevis light three candles for them. Nuri told me that the trilogy (God, Jesus and the Holy Spirit) and light are also present in Christianity. This trilogy comparison does not intend to match Ali with Jesus and so on, however Nuri just wanted to show the presence of trilogies in both Alevism and Christianity. Identifying this kind of similarity between Christianity and Alevism was also present among Alevis in Turkey (Shankland 1999, 146). Whenever Nuri talked about Alevism, he always pointed out the similarities between Alevism, Christianity,

shamanism, manism and paganism and singled out some differences from Sunni Islam. In Burgaz, the Alevis, who would like to be recognised as a separate sect stressed that Alevism existed well before Islam and hence should be appreciated and recognised. However, within this group, there were still disagreements. Some Alevis in Burgaz saw Alevism within Islam, so they argued that the government should recognise Alevism as a sect of Islam. However, some argued that Alevism had nothing to do with Islam, emphasising that Alevism existed before Islam as it is a synthesis of all the religions of Anatolia, by emphasising the differences between Sunni Islam and Alevism. Emphasising these differences was a stronger claim of politics of difference; which underplayed, however, the fact that Alevis and Sunnis shared some practices with each other.

Alevis and Sunnis are not only religious beings and many of them share common lifestyle, political views and philosophy of life. Most of the Alevis in Burgaz in fact emphasised that they are not religious. Even though the *cem* ritual should take place every Thursday night, there was only one *cem* performed this year on the island. These Alevis in Burgaz, whether they wanted the abolition of the Directorate of Religious Affairs or the recognition of Alevis as a separate sect, wanted to resist Sunni domination and did not want Sunni practices to be imposed on them or simply did not want to practise religion at all. The process of politics of recognition pressures Alevis to fix ambiguity and heterogeneity of their practices and perceptions of what Alevism is and to stress the differences between Alevis and Sunnis.

In Burgaz, some of the Alevis, who were not religious also saw Alevism more as a culture, tradition (including Alevi literature, rituals and music) and a way of conducting one's daily life (see Shankland 1999, 2003; Karakaya-Stump 2018). They interpreted Alevism as a holistic concept arguing that Alevism was a combination of faith, practices, ethics, philosophy of life and culture. In response to the fact that many Alevis emphasised the cultural side of Alevism, the government had proposed that the issues of Alevis could be dealt with by the Ministry of Culture, which appeared recently again in September 2022, as the AKP proposed to have an Alevi committee at the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. This received another criticism as this implies that *cemevi* would not be recognised as a place of worship.

So, the government used Alevis' diversity of views and their internal disagreements as a pretext to ignore and to procrastinate to respond to the demands of the Alevis, by taking an easy way out and telling the Alevis

to first unite and come to an agreement about what kind of recognition they would want, for instance, whether to grant Alevis recognition, or whether to legitimise *cemevis* under the Directorate of Religious Affairs or under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. These democratisation packages remained mostly symbolic and superficial, as the core issues demanding Constitutional amendment (such as the recognition of the *cemevis* as places of worship, the status of Alevis in the Religious Directorate of Affairs and the removal of obligatory religious classes dominated by Sunni-Hanefi Islam tradition from the educational curriculum) were not handled (Bardakçı 2015, 360). Furthermore, the civil war in Syria in 2011, and Erdoğan's position against the Assad regime and him being a Nusayri within the Shia sect of Islam and Erdoğan's hostile and discriminatory rhetoric towards Alevis loaded the Alevis (Mutluer 2016). In one of his speeches, Erdoğan stated that the AKP was trying to raise a devout religious youth, which reaffirmed his political agenda (2012b). Such a statement created question marks about the genuineness of the AKP's tolerance of Alevis, secularists and non-practitioners of religion. In the following years, Alevis were disappointed by Erdogan's conservative and authoritarian tone, dominated by Sunni-Hanefi values, disregarding Alevi values, traditions and Alevis' demands from the state. With this disappointment and feeling of oppression, Alevis were eager supporters of the Gezi protests in 2013, during which Alevi neighbourhoods faced some of the most brutal and disproportionate police force, where the majority of deaths took place (Mutluer 2016, 152; Bardakçı 2015, 366). Alevis felt again another loss of trust from the state (Mutluer 2016).

While Alevis were vocal about their demands and discussion of politics of recognition, the Kurds in Burgaz were reluctant and silent. What I perceived in these years of fieldwork that being ethnically Kurdish did not unite the Kurds of different faiths, notably Alevi Kurds with Sunni-Şafi Kurds. There was a disconnection between the Zaza-Turkish-Kurdish Alevis, who came from eastern Anatolia (Erzincan, Dersim/Tunceli, Sivas) and the Sunni-Safi Kurds from southeastern Turkey (Muş, Van, Ağrı). The former group came to the island earlier (in the 1950s) and the latter group came to the island in the 1980s and 1990s. These two groups hang out separately and refer to each other as "they" or "other." The Kurdish Alevis hang out with the Zaza, Kurdish and Turkmen Alevis, while the Sunni-Safi Kurds hang out with each other and Sunni Muslims. Coming from the same region and being Alevi trumped the common Kurdish ethnicity. This

also complicates the unity of the Kurds in Turkey, and hence, of the politics of recognition of Kurds as an ethnic minority. In the next section, I explore Kurdish opening in 2009–2010 and the silence of my Kurdish informants in Burgaz about this process.

Kurdish Opening and Silence in Burgaz

When the AKP government took power in 2002, Erdoğan wanted to bring changes for a more democratic government improving the conditions for cultural pluralism and human rights (Kayhan Pusane 2014, 85). He thought that relying on and taking Islam as the connecting common denominator, meeting the cultural demands of the Kurds, granting them rights would not cause fragmentation to national unity (Kayhan Pusane 2014, 85). Kurds had been suffering from the military operations of the state against the PKK as well as from the PKK's oppression (Efegil 2011, 30). The Kurdish "opening" as the "Kurdish democratic initiation package" included economic help to the southeastern region, disarming the PKK, and broadcasting in Kurdish (Efegil 2011, 166). The AKP tried to disarm the PKK and to enhance the region's economy in order to lessen the power of the PKK and the PDP (a Kurdish nationalist political party named DEHAP, which later changed to HADEP) (Efegil 2011, 30–32). The AKP, later, reinitiated a peace process with the Kurds in January 2013 and there were no military/armed conflicts with the PKK until the general elections in 2015 (Özpek and Mutluer 2016, 131).

Nonetheless, the instability of the PKK in starting and stopping violent attacks due to power fights between the jailed founding leader Öcalan and the PKK militants, the disagreements among pro-Kurdish politicians, the AKP's ambiguous political position and the lack of support from the opposition parties, the CHP and MHP, hindered the peace process and the Kurdish opening (see Kayhan Pusane 2014; Toktamış 2019). The Kurdish "opening" was perceived to have failed as it did not handle regional, neither linguistic nor cultural autonomy for the Kurds which required a constitutional change (Kardaş and Balcı 2016). The situation shifted against the Kurds, when the AKP lost its votes to the pro-Kurdish, secular HDP and the nationalist party MHP. AKP's votes decreased from 49.8% in the previous election to 40.8%. HDP party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, Democratic Party of the Peoples) entered the government by passing the threshold of 10%, by getting 13.12% of the votes on 7 June 2015 General elections, while the CHP kept its votes around 25.1% and MHP

increased its votes from 13% to 16.3% (Özpek and Mutluer 2016). The AKP lost its majority in the parliament. In order to gain back its votes, the AKP ceased the peace process and started military actions again against the PKK and jailing HDP members between the two elections, July and November 2015 (Toktamış 2019). Erdoğan in the end, made the party gain back votes from the nationalists and also the Kurds, to whom he promised stability again, and got the majority in the November elections in 2015 (Özpek and Mutluer 2016).

During the fieldwork years (2009–2010), Kurds in Turkey were sympathetic towards the AKP, who followed a peaceful approach towards the needs of the Kurds. During my fieldwork, I did not come across a collective Kurdish activism. The difficulties that my Kurdish informants expressed to me were about the adaptation to the life in Istanbul and hardship while doing menial work as told by my Kurdish informant, Amojgar. What I would like to shed light in this section is the silence of my Kurdish informants during the years of 2009 and 2010 in discussing the "Kurdish Opening" in Burgaz; because it was the time where their linguistic, religious, cultural and economic needs were just being discussed and they were in the "wait and see position," and also maybe because my ethnic background was Turkish. The Kurdish opening had not yet reached a deadlock. Amojgar is of Şafi Kurdish origin from Muş, in southeastern Turkey. His story is interesting because he was one of the first Kurdish people to come to work in Burgaz and he narrated me his escape story from his village and how he ended up in Burgaz. He started his story like this:

> I came to Burgaz first in early 1980s, when I was around 10–12 years old. My family was going through financial difficulties and I had some tension with my family. So, I escaped from the village and came to Izmit first [a city in the Marmara region], which was a random choice. Furthermore, the conditions in my village were very poor. We did not have proper roads and we had electricity and water problems. While I was in Izmit, I visited my relatives, who lived in Istanbul. There, I found out that jobs were available building houses and horse-cart driving in Büyükada [the biggest Princes' Island]. Kurds from other villages of Muş and Van were also doing these jobs in Büyükada. But the conditions were horrible. 7 workers had to sleep in one single bed while working in housebuilding. So, I took the horse-cart driving job. As I was young, I was bullied a lot.

When I asked my other Kurdish informants, who worked as cooks and waiters in Burgaz, they also talked about the poor conditions they had in their village that made them migrate to big cities to earn money. There was a common tone in the way they talked to me. They mentioned being belittled, bullied and oppressed and how they experienced difficulties adapting to the new life and the working lifestyle in the cities, but they never attributed these hardships to their Kurdish ethnic identity.

What I came across on the island is that people who did menial jobs, regardless of their ethnic or religious origin or the time of their arrival, faced difficulties due to the differences in lifestyles and working conditions in the cities and the Princes' Islands which were different from their villages. There was a big contrast in the way the upper-middle class lived their lives and the ways in which Zaza Alevis, Sunni and Safi Kurds lived back in their villages. Amojgar recalled that when he first came to Burgaz, the island was a place of fun. The Rum *gazinos* were open in Ay Nikola, people used to dance and enjoy themselves. Amojgar said that today, he felt sad not to see the Rum dances in Ay Nikola. This nostalgia for the past, and remembering the times of the Rums was also present in Nuri's, Orhan's and Ajda's narratives. Amojgar's recollection of the 1980s was different from the elder generations. While the elderly people of Burgaz, who have lived since the 1940s and 1950s recalled that the life on the island "died" in the 1980s, because many Rums left; Amojgar did not know the old times. Coming from Muş, he found the island "like a luxurious garden in heaven."

Later, some jobs became available in the building of the sewage system in Burgaz. The existing sewage system used to dump the waste in the sea and the islanders wanted to find a solution. One of the civil societies in Burgaz, whose members were mostly upper-class Jews and Sunni Muslims, came up with a new sewage project, raised money from the islanders by organising social events at the social clubs both in the SC and the BC and managed the construction of a new sewage system. Amojgar heard about this job opportunity in Burgaz and started working in the sewage system and also driving horse-carts. The other horse-cart drivers were Zaza Alevis from Erzincan. There was another man from Muş who worked in Burgaz. On the other hand, Amojgar had a relative working in Kınalıada (another Princes' Island), where, there were jobs in the building sector and in laying cables for the post office. Amojgar emphasised that he did not particularly choose to come to Burgaz because of that co-local man (*hemşeri*). *Hemşerilik* plays a role in chain migration, in the ways in which, one

co-local (*hemşeri*), who settles in a city, calls for his relatives from the village of his origin, from his kinship networks, when jobs become available. This man in Burgaz did not call Amojgar particularly for that. Through this network of jobs on the Princes' Islands, he found more jobs in Istanbul such as in the building sector and worked as a chef in restaurants. While he started saving money and send some of it to his family, who had migrated to another city in the Marmara region. He reconciled with his family and started living in the flat below them. However, there was another family problem. He had met his wife, who is also of Kurdish origin in early 1990s, who lived on another Princes' island. They fell in love. However, when his uncle came to visit Amojgar's father, Amojgar learnt about the arranged marriage (*beşik kertmesi*) that he was already destined for. Cross-cousin marriages in eastern and southeastern Turkey are common, and some Alevis in Burgaz also married their cousins. However, the ones who do not want to marry their cousins, especially when they fall in love with someone else, resist the tradition. So, Amojgar had to escape again and came back to Burgaz. He took up the horse-cart driving job again and married his love.

When Amojgar reflected back on the times when he lived in his village, he used the discourse of coexistence/toleration by saying, ""Turks and Kurds had good neighbourhood relations in my village. I, for example, went to the mosque of the Turks and not to the mosque of the Kurds." He wanted to present himself as a very well networked Kurdish person, a part of Turkish culture and networks, and even closer to the Turkish neighbours than Kurdish ones. When we were talking with him and his wife about which languages they speak at home, Amojgar and his wife highlighted that they did not teach Kurdish to their children. Amojgar's wife also stated that her father did not want to talk to them in Kurdish in order for them to learn Turkish. Rather than talking about politics of difference (e.g. ethnicity, language, religion) regarding the demands of the Kurds and the differences between Kurds and Turks, Amojgar pointed out more to the cooperation and good neighbourly relations between Turks and Kurds in his village and he also added, "I do not differentiate between Turks and Kurds" ("*Ben Türk – Kürt ayrımı yapmam*"). The politics of recognition of the Kurds as an ethnic minority was absent in his narrative. Throughout my fieldwork, the Kurds in Burgaz did not mobilise or discussed in public, what kinds of rights they wanted. It is difficult to know, but Amojgar's silence could also be interpreted that by living in a diverse

place as Burgaz, he did not want to get involved or present himself as part of politics of difference and hence in order not to "tint" his life in Burgaz, he might have kept himself away from discussing the politics of recognition and rights of Kurds in Turkey. He mentioned having feared from the PKK for instance, by saying, "The PKK would tell us not to send our children to schools; we were scared, so we did not send children to school"; nonetheless in his narrative, he stressed more that people left their places of origin because of the tensions of kinship they experienced within their families, their poor living conditions and traditions like arranged marriages, that individuals were expected to conform. Because of these kinship tensions and poor living conditions, Amojgar decided to leave and build a life on his own in Burgaz. While he was doing this, he also went through hardship, got bullied for being young and coming from a different setting; however, he married the one he loves, and today, he is happy to have made his decisions for himself. Amojgar finished his story by saying that: "Among all the other islands, I chose to live in Burgaz because I like the intimacy on the island. Today, whenever I go to the pharmacy, grocer or walk on the island, people know me and I feel at home."

Concluding Remarks

As we have seen in Chaps. 4, 5 and 6, in Burgaz, people's differences are respected and different religious communities feel free to practise their religion in various degrees and they also take and share practices in a syncretic way. Therefore, when one sees Burgaz as an ebru pattern, as some islanders do, one can mark that there are distinct patterns, hence differences are not erased but rather practised, respected and valued. Nonetheless, they are not like mosaics, because these community boundaries are not clear cut. As people embody each other's differences, they take, replicate, reproduce and share practices and also share daily life, and these boundaries are fused into each other.

This cultural context gave way for the Alevis to articulate and emphasise their Alevi identity and way of living. For this reason, Alevis see conviviality in Burgaz as an example for intercommunal living in Turkey, where they are free and happy to live, to have their *cemevi*, even though it is not recognised as a place of worship but as a cultural foundation. The political context during the years of my fieldwork was within a flourishing and vibrant context, where the democratisation packages mobilised Alevis in

Burgaz to make panels and invite islanders from all ethnic and religious backgrounds to their discussions about Alevi history, what Alevism(s) was, what they wanted from the government. Hence, this vocality created a greater dialogue between the Alevis and the non-Alevis on the island. One can definitely see that Alevis' sense of belonging in Burgaz gets stronger as they can be Alevis. In other words, the fact that they can be more Alevi, makes them more and more Burgazlı. For instance, as we saw in Chap. 4, Alevis in Burgaz also recalled their bitter and sweet memories of conviviality in Burgaz. Quarrelling, fighting and playing marbles with the earlier established settlers in Burgaz and feeling sad about their Rum friends' departure also signify their sense of belonging in Burgaz. When, at the end of the interview, I asked Nuri what Burgaz meant to him, he said, "I was born in Burgaz and I have 60 years of friendship with my oldest friend. You cannot find these long friendships in Istanbul or somewhere else for example." This demonstrated that he separated Burgaz from everywhere else. His years in Burgaz and his lifelong friends from there made the island a unique place for him. He added:

> [T]he islanders do not know how to walk on the streets of Istanbul. We do not know what traffic is, here on the island, we walk in the middle of the streets. Burgaz is a *büyülü* (mysterious) place; it has its own way of life. Burgaz means the sea, the seagulls and the pine trees for me. Whenever I go outside of Burgaz and I see seagulls and pine trees, it reminds me of Burgaz.

What Nuri said was similar to the memories of Orhan, Ajda, Amojgar and many other Burgaz islanders, whom I met and talked with. These memories and performance of conviviality in Burgaz strengthened the islanders' attachment and sense of belonging to Burgaz. This was also how Amojgar had framed his narrative of Burgaz as a place of beauty and intimacy.

The politics of recognition was approached differently by the Kurdish and the Alevi Burgazlı. My Kurdish informants were reluctant to talk about the Kurdish opening. Amojgar portrayed himself as a well-integrated and networked Kurdish person, and emphasised "peaceful coexistence" between the Kurds and Turks in the region when he came from. His silence and reluctance might also be interpreted as his wish for not articulating a divisive discourse of coexistence, and to hinder his life and conviviality on Burgaz. One should also take into account the difference of positions of Kurds and Alevis in Burgaz. While the Alevis settled in 1940s

onwards to Burgaz, own property and run restaurants and cafes, they have a more established place on the island, compared to the Kurdish who migrated to the island later on, from 1980s onwards as menial workers. While Alevis shared secular ideology with the Sunni-Muslims and non-Muslim summer inhabitants, who make hegemonic claims; Kurdish islanders did not, in the sense that they followed a more conservative and religious life and were closer to the AKP politics in the years of the fieldwork.

In the case of Alevis, they articulated a discourse of coexistence at the cost of practices of conviviality. As Burgaz islanders embody each other's religious practices, the politics of difference forced Alevis to artificially separate "Alevi components" from "Sunni components." Alevism is an unorthodox religion, which has synthesised practices from Manism, Shamanism, Christianity and Islam, and Alevis are a heterogeneous group, with different perceptions of what Alevism is. In Burgaz, the islanders take and share religious practices with each other. Hence, this process of asking for recognition has hindered how Alevis talked and reflected about their syncretic and shared practices. Especially in Burgaz, a Jewish person fasts like a Muslim, or a Muslim makes a cross when he gets scared (see Chap. 5), and these practices are seen as a part of daily life; also, because Christianity, Judaism and Islam are all recognised minorities in the Turkish legal system. However, when Alevis' shared practices with Sunni Muslims, this was seen as assimilation, and oppressed the Alevis, who shared Sunni practices, such as going to the mosque on the *Kadir* night or organising a *mevlut*. Mevlut or Mevlid is the celebration of the birth of Muhammed, which is an Islamic religious custom of the late Ottoman Empire, is re-appropriated in the last 50 years in funerary gatherings as well as in celebration gatherings such as after circumcision of male children. An Alevi informant of mine said that organising a *mevlut* in the Islamic sense is not among Alevi traditions and hence organising a mevlut can also be seen for an Alevi to be assimilated. Nonetheless, I participated in a *mevlut* organised by Alevis, who also invited Sunni Muslims. Burgaz islanders use the term *mevlut*, when they organise a death anniversary of someone, regardless of the religion of the deceased one. I have attended *mevlut* organised by Rums, Jews, Alevi and Sunnis, for the death anniversary of their beloved ones. Organising *mevluts*, and/or attending the mosque is a part of island conviviality. Rums, Alevis, Muslims and Jews attend the church on important Rum Orthodox religious days and this is not seen as being assimilated under a particular religion but it is seen as practising, sharing and

reproducing Burgaz life. However, as Alevis were trying to be recognised, when they share a practice with the Sunnis, this can be seen as assimilation, which goes in contrast with the conviviality on the island.

Taking into account the differences between Sunni ways of practising religion in the mosque and Alevi ways of practising in *cemevi*, one can see how different the religious practices are. As Young (1990) points out, laws which are blind to differences have assimilating and oppressive effects towards the non-recognised groups. This is also shown and felt by the Alevis in Burgaz, who try to resist Sunni domination in various ways (e.g. organising panels, emphasising their non-religiosity, embracing secularism and asking for particular demands from the government). However, this process of asking for recognition was difficult for both the Alevis, who are not exclusively religious beings. Alevis, like everyone else, have multiplicity of character, interests and multiple identities. The politics of difference and recognition, therefore, ruptured people's conviviality, because it undermined what Alevis and Sunnis shared, it forced the Alevis to separate their syncretic practices and lay stress on religious differences between Alevism and Sunni Islam in order to receive recognition.

Young (1990, 166) suggests that the politics of difference strengthens group solidarity. The politics of difference in Burgaz created solidarity among the Alevi inhabitants to an extent; because the debates on politics of recognition created disagreements and frictions among the Alevis. The Alevis, who shared practices with the Sunni Muslims (e.g. going to the mosque) were oppressed by the Alevis who disproved syncretic practices that shared Sunni practices. This complex and ambiguous situation of the Alevis (including their heterogeneity, eclectic and syncretic practices) echoed in Cowan's (2001) problematisation of minority rights discourse concerning the "Macedonian minority" within which ambiguities must be denied and differences should be fixed. Building on Cowan (2008, 12), who criticised Kymlicka's perception that bounded groups already exist in the country awaiting the state's recognition and that minority rights and multicultural policies should protect, and on Karademir and Sen (2021), who showed the deficiency of Kymlicka's (1995) liberal multiculturalism, I problematised the process of asking for recognition. Politics of recognition reinforced a discourse of coexistence and disproval of syncretic practices of certain groups (Alevis should not practise Sunni practices), which hindered the embodiment of diversity in the performance of conviviality. It created the need for the non-recognised group to define, who they were

and categorise their practices in order to resist the domination of the Sunni Muslims and to be recognised by the Turkish government. Alevis are heterogeneous and have different perceptions on Alevism is and disagree among each other (such as whether to abolish the Directorate of Religious Affairs or how to reformulate it and have place for the Alevis there). This works as an advantage for the government to procrastinate, ignore and take an easy way out and not to take any action regarding the demands of Alevis. This ping-pongification or boomerangification of vicious circling then fatigues the Alevis and make them lose more and more their trust from the state.

In Turkey, being a recognised minority does not come with a protection of rights. As Karademir and Şen (2021, 156) argue, the minorities in Turkey do not "enjoy" their minority rights. To the contrary, the recognised *millets* notably, the Rums, Jews and Armenians have suffered greatly from the Turkification and homogenisation policies, which have attacked their economic power and identities and lessened their numbers in Turkey (see Chap. 2). The treaty of Lausanne did not make them equal citizens, rather minorities were pushed into "an isolated, apolitical and marginalised life" (Karademir and Şen 2021, 156). In 2022, when I talked with some of my Alevi informants, they expressed that they would not like to be recognised as a minority. Alevis would like to see themselves as a part of the majority and at the centre of Turkish politics and culture. My Alevi informants articulated that they have always been in Anatolia, and there are the protectors of secularism and follow Atatürk and its republican values. Their approach also implies that if one has to recognise another, that puts the one who recognises on a higher level than the one who is asking for recognition. Hence, Alevis do not want to see Erdoğan as the one who recognises them. I end this chapter with a phrase from an Alevi informant (by referring to Erdoğan), "who are you to recognise me?" (sen kim oluyorsun da beni tanıyacakmışsın?). One can also interpret this as a coping mechanism to deal with not being recognised, but I interpret this more like a demonstration of power, independence and rejection towards Erdoğan, to say that Alevis are not at his mercy.

Notes

1. Alevis, Kurds and Zazas are not three distinct groups separated from each other. There are Kurdish Alevis, as well as Zaza Alevis; Sunni Zazas and Alevi Zazas, Sunni Kurds and Alevi Kurds. For an extensive discussion and

historical overview of these overlapping ethnic, religious and linguistic categorisations, please refer to Chap. 2 of this book.
2. The night when the Quran started to be revealed to Muhammed.
3. Women read pieces from the Koran each day around noon at the mosque during the month of Ramadan.
4. One of the most common and important prayers in Islam
5. After Muhammed's death, Ali was the fourth Caliphate. Ali was Muhammed's cousin and his son-in-law. There was a division between who should be the Caliphate, Ali or Muaviye. This tension separated the Muslim world into two.

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CHAPTER 9

Conclusion

Conviviality, Coexistence/Toleration and Islandness

Throughout the region of what was once the Ottoman Empire, the rise of nationalisms has led to homogenisation and minoritisation processes: the construction of ethnic and national differences led to violence; forced migrations; oppression towards "minorities"; conflicts over territory, shared space, and borders; and changed demographics of the region. Within this violent context, I aimed to look at a place, Burgaz island, and its people, Burgaz islanders, who have not only enjoyed living together for centuries but also managed tensions and conflicts, showed resistance and resilience to the nation's homogenisation processes through different acts of solidarity and an articulation of collective Burgaz identity based on embodiment and valuing of its diversity. The book depicts the evolving social landscape of Burgaz within a homogenising context. While the island's diversity has been subject to demographic changes with those who has been leaving and the newly arriving inhabitants, the conviviality on the island has functioned as a resilience and solidarity mechanism against public and state violence during various crises, such as the 1955 pogrom, staged coup and economic crises.

Some might ask, "but it is because Burgaz is a small island that they live together in peace and have a strong sense of belonging?" My response is that it would be too reductionist to say that the social cohesion and strong sense of community and belonging to Burgaz is due to it being a small

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island. Islands have been places of hell and heaven, of paradise and prison (Baldacchino 2006; Royle and Brinklow 2018). "Islandness is an intervening variable that does not determine, but contours and conditions physical and social events in distinct, and distinctly relevant, ways" (Baldacchino 2004, 278). Small islands have a stronger sense of belonging, solidarity and island identity, where everyone knows each other, however the intensity of intimacy on small islands, can also create conflicts and tensions and it is difficult to manage tensions when one is in close proximity (Royle and Brinklow 2018; Baldacchino 2004, 2006). Islands with diverse populations have experienced inter-communal conflicts, even violence, such as in Cyprus, Ireland, Fiji and Trinidad (Baldacchino and Veenendaal 2018, 343). Violence also took place in the other Princes' Islands during the night of the pogrom, for example.

While Baldacchino and Veenendaal (2018) point out that there is usually a strong presence of the state on small islands, in Burgaz, we see rather an absence of the state. There are very few policemen on Burgaz. During the Gezi Park protests, while the policemen exerted violence such as teargas to civilians, there were no tensions between the policemen and the islanders. On the night of the pogrom in 1955, while the police in Istanbul were reported to be passive in protecting the non-Muslims being attacked (see Güven 2006; Kuyucu 2005); in Burgaz, the police collaborated with the islanders to prevent the attackers to enter the island and cause destruction. This was also another reason, why Burgaz islanders, especially the non-Muslims did not experience the state toleration, neither its intolerance on Burgaz, but they experienced it Istanbul. However, the presence of the state and the military is very pronounced in Heybeliada, another Princes' Island. The military navy school on Heybeliada brings in inhabitants from the military to the island, and there are more nationalists and more Sunni Turkish Muslim presence in Heybeliada.

In order to explain how Burgaz islanders live together and manage tension and crisis situations, I have redefined and showed the workings of two analytical concepts: conviviality and coexistence/toleration. I have described conviviality as shared ways of living and living with difference, which embeds embodiment of diversity through diverse senses, as well as performance of pluralism such as sociable sociality, labour of peace, which embeds the management of tensions. I have approached coexistence and/or toleration as a mental break in the people's perceptions, which categorised themselves and others into different ethnic and religious compartments, to explore the construction and categorisations of differences, and

the crystallisation of these ethnic and religious identities. Political tensions between Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, followed by the Turkish government's discriminating policies on minorities (see Chap. 2) and the riots of 6–7 September 1955 (Chaps. 2 and 7), which were an attack on the socio-economic power of the non-Muslims, were various ways of consolidating the ethnic and religious identity of the non-Muslims and making them feel as though they were "others within." This sensation was, I argued, a local consequence of coexistence/toleration, a creation of an Other and compartmentalisation of people into groups that had to coexist or continue to survive within the majority. That sense of coexistence/toleration and its potential consequences triggered the emigration of non-Muslims, while the sense of conviviality tied the non-Muslim islanders to Burgaz and enabled them to remain on the island. Among those who left Turkey, some returned back to Burgaz as a summer inhabitant. Conviviality also enabled the newcomers such as Armenians, Jews, Alevis and Kurds to adapt and become a part of Burgaz diversity.

I have also investigated the mechanisms that enabled and sustained conviviality, in the ways in which conviviality have always taken over coexistence/toleration and intolerance in Burgaz. These mechanisms are shared ways of living and embodiment of diversity, shared memories and an articulation of a shared rhetoric that builds on solidarity and collective island identity that values diversity. While in Istanbul the riots are remembered as an experience of coexistence/toleration in which the non-Muslims' ethno-religious identity made them the subject of attack by Muslims, in Burgaz the resistance against the riots is collectively remembered as memories of conviviality. Burgaz islanders collectively resisted the riots and protected their island from being invaded by outsiders. *Kestane Karası* (Aktel 2005) and *Son Eylül* [Last September] (Aktel 2008), both novelistic memoirs of Burgaz conviviality, describe how the islanders (both Muslims and non-Muslims) gathered together by ringing the bells of the church and made a plan of waiting and protecting the bays in order to prevent invasion of Burgaz during the 1955 riots. Ajda (Chap. 7) clearly remembers her father saying, "Unless they kill me and step over my dead body, they will not be able to set foot in Burgaz." The shared memories of conviviality as described in Orhan's vignette had created such a strong Burgaz identity that it overcame the crystallisation of ethnic and religious identities in times of crisis. The discursive effect of these memories (Bakhtin 1981, 269) is a type of "Burgaz ideology," a sense of belonging to Burgaz that is also infused with a moral discourse about how a "real" Burgazlı should behave, both in everyday life and in times of crisis.

Can Conviviality Turn into Violence?

Referring to Bringa and Christie's (1993) documentary *We Are All Neighbours* and Zaim Dervis' (2010) film *Shadows and Faces*, Bryant (2016, 1) marks that "many people, under the right circumstances, could become killers." In the contexts of Bosnia and Cyprus, where there was a war, conviviality turned into violence. What I argue in the book, is not so different than what Bringa (1995, 3) wrote when she reflected on the ethnography she conducted before the war: "There was both coexistence and conflict, tolerance and prejudice, suspicion and friendship." In stable, peaceful times, both coexistence/toleration and conviviality coexist, like in Burgaz, and like in Dolina. People are aware of each other's differences, whether it is ethnic, religious or ethno-religious. People also have shared ways of living together such as in the neighbourhood, in the form of *komşuluk* (neighbourly relations), where people visit each other for coffee, chatting, gossiping and so on.

When violence started taking place "elsewhere" such as 4 kilometres away from the village where Bringa did her fieldwork, or during the 1955 pogrom that first took place in Istanbul, the people in Dolina, in Burgaz and also other Princes' Islands and different parts of Istanbul, resisted and showed first resilience to that violence. For instance, in Güven's (2006) book, Muslims protected non-Muslims in their house, and the Muslim doorkeeper sent away the rioters to protect the non-Muslim family by relying on conviviality, their shared ways of living in the apartment, and the employer and the employee relationship; but then took the wood and joined the other Muslims in the pogrom looting on the street, attacking other non-Muslims. In Bringa and Christie's (1993) documentary *We Are All Neighbours*, we see that, in Part One, the Muslim and Catholic neighbours visit each other and say that they will keep having coffee and being neighbours despite there is violence between Muslims and Catholics outside of the village, just 4 kilometres away. We see both coexistence/toleration and conviviality: in their minds, the mental break of the differences of Muslims and Catholics exist; they say they both have their different faiths; but they are neighbours and share neighbourly relations and friendship. They rely on conviviality (shared ways of living) as a resilience mechanism; they keep visiting each other as neighbours.

In Part Two of the documentary, we see a shift in the balance between conviviality and coexistence/toleration. Both Muslims and Catholics start becoming suspicious of each other. Nusreta and Svalak, and Anda and

Remziye's friendship get a pause. Nusreta does not want to leave her village, because she thinks that after the war, she will still live in this house and in the same neighbourhood. She is resisting the mental change, rejecting intolerance by holding on to conviviality, which weighs more than coexistence/toleration at that time. Years of living together and shared ways of living together, do not get blown up right away, because there is violence taking place just outside the village. Nonetheless, we also see the change in the terminology Nusreta use. In Part One, she refers to herself as Muslim, and them as Croats, but in Part Two, where violence starts coming closer, she says that the area is split in Croatian and Bosnian districts/lands, by using ethno-national identifications. At the end of the documentary, under war conditions, the balance between coexistence/toleration and conviviality breaks. Coexistence/toleration turns into intoleration and takes over conviviality. Violence comes to the village, neighbours start killing each other, intolerance turns into violence. At the end, both Croats/Catholics and Bosnians/Muslims articulate that they cannot live together anymore.

My argument in the book, hence, is not that conviviality always wins, but that it has always won in Burgaz and it has not turned into collective violence. This is due to the strengths of embodiment of diversity, friendship, shared ways of living, shared memories and rhetoric that stressed Burgaz identity and sense of belonging to Burgaz. Even though people leave Burgaz, Burgaz culture is in them and cannot be taken away. These memories of conviviality do not remain just as an articulation of nostalgia, but they make Burgaz people who left, return back to Burgaz.

There has not been any war in Burgaz, nonetheless, there were times of crisis both at individual levels (blood feud in Chap. 6), or collective levels, where the pogrom took place in different parts of Istanbul and other Princes' Islands. In these occasions violence could have erupted, such as on the 6–7 September in 1955, where boats from Istanbul came to the island to cause the pogrom. The non-Muslims in Burgaz experienced the oppression and the intolerance of the state, during *Varlık Vergisi* (Wealth Tax 1942) 1964 expulsion of the Rums with Greek citizenship, the 1960s, and 1980s coup and the intervention of the army in 1971, also in the last decade Gezi Park protests and the 15 July 2016 coup attempt/staged coup (2016). The night of the coup attempt brought back memories of the 1955 pogrom to Burgaz islanders, when boats from Istanbul came to the island to call out for the civilians to fight against the army on the 15th of July 2016. Some of my non-Muslim informants were near the harbour,

and told me that they heard the boats reaching the island. A few Muslim Burgazlı yelled "Go! Leave!" to the non-Muslims. Similar to the night of the pogrom, when a few Burgaz islanders wanted to cause destructions, they were suppressed by other islanders. After the outburst of intolerance (yelling) on the 15th of July 2016, Burgaz islanders protested and did not buy anything from the few people who yelled "Go! Leave!". Those who yelled these words then went to apologise to those to whom they had yelled. Intolerance again stayed at an individual level and did not turn into collective violence, because Burgaz islanders suppressed and resisted collective intolerance and violence by relying on conviviality, the collective survival and safety of the island community. Although I argue throughout the book that coexistence/toleration and conviviality coexist in Burgaz, in the title of the book, there is only conviviality. The memories and narratives I have collected, my ethnographic study, the post-ethnographic visits and interviews I have done, so far, have shown that conviviality has always taken over coexistence/toleration in Burgaz, but this does not guarantee that it will always be the case. The failed democratic initiatives as discussed in Chap. 8, Erdoğan's growing authoritarianism, the unknown coup attempt or staged coup on the 15 July 2016, the economic crisis, the increase of inflation and Erdoğan's re-election as the president in 2023, create more and more anxiety for people living in Turkey and Burgaz. Some of my non-Muslim and Muslim informants told me that they started considering leaving Turkey, following the politically tense ambiance and the worsening of the economy.

The world we live in is experiencing and will experience wars, violence, pandemics, crisis situations, population movements due to wars and climate change, as well as acts of solidarity, shared ways of living and fighting for intolerance and against violence. What I want to contribute to peace and conflict; and migration and diversity studies is that one should always explore conviviality and coexistence/toleration together, explore how they take place, how they are related to each other, and analyse the situations in which the balance between them break. The relationship between these two are affected very much by the wider politics, how the political situation manipulates people and the ways in which the people who live in diverse communities react to the wider politics. It gives a wrong picture to focus on coexistence/toleration only, and assume people always have mental categorisations in their heads, and that they constantly categorise each other as how they are different from each other, and how they tolerate each other. It gives equally a wrong picture to explore pluralism by

focusing only on the sociable sociality aspect of conviviality, ignoring social inequalities, racism, as well as ignoring or suppressing ethnic and religious differences. Conviviality is not utopia, nor a romantic view of social life. Conflict, tension, coexistence, toleration, loving and fighting are all part of living together in diversity and living with difference.

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