

# Translocal Care across Kosovo's Borders

Reconfiguring Kinship along  
Gender & Generational Lines

Carolin Leutloff-Grandits



## TRANSLOCAL CARE ACROSS KOSOVO'S BORDERS

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*Reconfiguring Kinship along  
Gender and Generational Lines*



**Carolin Leutloff-Grandits**



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## ABBREVIATIONS



ESI	European Stability Initiative
EU	European Union
FRONTEX	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FWF	Austrian Science Fund
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP	Gross domestic product
KAS	Kosovo Agency for Statistics
KASS	Kinship and Social Security
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Nongovernmental Organisation
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
UÇK	<i>Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës</i> (Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA))
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo



# INTRODUCTION

## *Kinship and Care across Kosovo's Borders*



### THE STUDY

For decades, many families in Kosovo, especially in rural areas, regularly received remittances from immediate family members and relatives who had migrated abroad. These remittances were not just sign of strong ties with family members in the diaspora, they were also their prime source of social security and care. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, however, which was followed by a string of political and social conflicts, in which former socialist Yugoslavia had been violently dissolved, families in Kosovo faced tightened restrictions on mobility across EU borders, such as the need for a visa and limitations to Western European labour markets. But many fled to Western Europe nevertheless, not least because, in 1998, the ethnopolitical conflict in Kosovo escalated to war.

When NATO intervention ended the war in 1999, these restrictions on the mobility of citizens from Kosovo remained in place and were maintained even after the Kosovo government declared independence in 2008. This had severe consequences. While many migrants from abroad either returned to Kosovo or chose to bring over their spouses and children, remittances were at risk of drying up for residents living in Kosovo who did not have the option of sending family members abroad. Thus, the European Stability Initiative (Hockenoes 2006, 2010) warned that further steps to tighten the EU migration regime and limit mobility options for people in Kosovo wishing to emigrate to Western Europe would amount to cutting the 'lifeline' that transnational family relations provide and further exacerbate the poverty situation in the country.

This study undertakes a fine-grained analysis of the transnational family relations that link villagers in the rural region of Opoja in Southern Kosovo,

about 1,000 meters above sea level, to relatives in urban centres in Western Europe and vice versa, to understand how family relations and care arrangements in the family and among kin, both 'at home' and abroad, are performed, managed, sustained as well as transformed across the Kosovo borders. While labour migration to Western European countries, especially to Germany, Switzerland and Austria, had been the source of family care and social security in Kosovo over decades and establishes the basis of a 'culture of migration', the study shows in which way care arrangements were affected when increasingly family reunification and marriage migration became the only available options for migration. About 70 per cent of all Kosovars who migrated after the war in 1999 sought recourse to these options (Kosovo Agency of Statistics 2014: 26).

By examining the continuing importance of migration in light of changing migration trajectories and, in particular, the new importance of the family within them, I explore the linkages among family and kin members dispersed between different countries and the continuities and changes that occur within these networks, including in terms of family care. These continuities and changes will be read against the meaning of the Opoja region as the locus of the family, and certain kinship patterns such as patrilocality, patrilineal family organization and the cooperation among brothers, but also emancipatory processes, which receive a new meaning in the translocal field. At the centre of this study are the transformative family relations within the translocal field that link Opoja to migration destinations, where various gender and generational views are challenged and partly collide, and which serve as the basis for changing care arrangements across state borders.

'Translocality' was first introduced as a conceptual framework by Arjun Appadurai (1995), who defined it as a space of experience and agency created through social relations among people residing at different locations but who gravitate towards a specific place that they call home. For the purposes of this study, that place is referred to as locality and is a prime point of departure to understand translocal environs (see also Klute and Hahn 2007: 12). As such, locality is not synonymous with cultural rootedness, fixity and sedentariness but signifies a fluid, evolving entity that remains open to the outside world and is constantly reconstituted by multiple translocal, border-spanning relations and transactions (see Peleikis 2003: 16; Leutloff-Grandits and Pichler 2014). In this study, the term 'locality' refers to the region of Opoja as the place from where migrants originate and to which they relate, even from a distance, and the significance of this locality is systematically examined in relation to family and care. In doing so, it ties in with several studies that emphasize the importance that the locality 'back home' has for migrants abroad. As demonstrated by Peggy Levitt (2001) in her seminal book on transnational villagers, linking a village in the Dominican Republic

to migrant destinations in Boston; by Anja Peleikis (2003), linking a village in Lebanon to Côte d'Ivoire; and by Robert Pichler (2016) on the links between locality and migration in Northern Macedonia, migrants continue to exert influence on their home village even if they might have migrated decades ago.

With the focus on the translocal, the aim is to generate cross-cutting and multidimensional perspectives highlighting not only the significance of the European migration regimes and the state as a constitutive frame for border-spanning family solidarity but also the meaning of a rural locality in Kosovo as an important link between the diverse positionings villagers and migrants occupy (Anthias 2006). By tracing individual trajectories of family members in and from Opoja and their divergent social positionings and relating them to wider family dynamics in Kosovo's south and abroad, I present a more nuanced and in-depth understanding of the gendered and generational notions of family, family-provided care and family solidarity across borders. As such, this perspective also allows 'theorising from the South' (Comaroff and Claudio 2015), or also from the 'margins' of Europe (Römhild 2010), as Kosovo is often seen as an underdeveloped periphery of the European centre in relation to global – and more specifically European – processes and entanglements. This feeds into the West-centric and Eurocentric bias that views certain countries and populations as on the fringes of the EU – not just geographically but also culturally (Balibar 2004).

While from a hegemonic Western perspective Kosovo is often regarded as backward, as juxtaposed with the so-perceived modern and emancipated West, and this backwardness is precisely linked to the notion of the strong, patriarchal family structures of Kosovo-Albanians (for Poland, see Pine 2007), this study challenges this binary by showing that the investment in kinship relations and patrilocality is not just a recollection of traditional patriarchal practices. It is also a reaction to limited state support and meagre economic and social opportunities for citizens in Kosovo, which goes together with the precariousness of the relationship between citizen and state (Römhild 2010) as much as an answer to the exclusionary mechanisms against migrants in Western European states and a very modern phenomenon. Moreover, kinship practices have also diversified and transformed. Migrants and villagers invest in 'traditional' family unity along patrilocal kinship notions as much as in romantic and gender-equalitarian partnership relations and expressions of individuality. Within the translocal realm of Opoja, these investments enable a certain continuity of family relations and create notions of care that serve individual as well as collective goals and that renegotiate the boundaries between the two (Gardner and Osella 2003: ix). More broadly, various potential meanings and practices can be subsumed under the terms 'modernity' and 'tradition', which are often contradictory and ambiguous, and the



interrelations between the two terms are far from uniform (Appadurai 1995; Gardner and Osella 2003: xii). While it makes sense to use the term 'modernization' to describe actual processes of change that take place, like urbanization, changing employment forms, new technologies of communication and travel, 'modernity' and 'tradition' rather refer to 'socially located discourses which try to apprehend and direct such processes' and 'a set of imaginings and beliefs about the way life should be, as well as a host of associated practices' (Gardner and Osella 2003: xi). In Kosovo, being modern might mean leaving 'traditional' patriarchal family forms behind, but it can also emphasize the importance of patriarchal structures and family collectively – and as such an investment into what is broadly regarded as tradition (*ibid.*: xii). As family relations change in the face of new societal conditions and hardening border regimes, they can also become strained or even fragment. This can also open up gaps in family care.

The region of Opoja, which is my point of departure for this study, is located in the southern 'tail' of Kosovo. It borders the Republic of Northern Macedonia to the east and south, and Albania to the west, which was sealed off during socialism. In 2011, the region comprised of twenty-one villages, each with a population ranging from 300 to 3,000, mainly Albanian-speaking and of Muslim faith (UNDP Municipal report 2012: 26). Like Kosovo in general, this region is characterized by a young population, and as mentioned, its reliance on migration for family care continues even today. By taking the geographic and geopolitical 'margins' as the centre of my study, I account for the fact that many migrants who move from so-called 'third countries' to the EU originate from rural areas and seek to maintain and develop close links with their home regions. This local perspective, which is largely unknown in Western Europe and lacks scholarly attention (Glick-Schiller 2010), is necessarily expanded beyond the regional and national borders to include the views and realities of migrants from the region who live mainly in urban settings in different European states, such as Germany, Austria and Switzerland. More generally, the translocal approach highlights the subjectivities of the protagonists, their experiences and biographies as well as the cultural imaginaries and agency within these border-spanning family networks and their links to the region in Southern Kosovo and the co-creation of this locality.

My decision to study the Opoja region was not accidental. I had read the Ph.D. thesis of the American anthropologist Janet Reineck (1991), whose fieldwork in Opoja in the late 1980s focused on the links between family, gender and migration from the perspective of villagers. In her Ph.D. thesis, 'The Past as Refuge: Gender, Migration, and Ideology among the Kosova Albanians' (1991: 14–16 and 135–63), Janet Reineck argues that the labour migration of men resulted in the reinforcement of patriarchal family relations and values in Kosovar villages. Owing to long absences of the men,

the joint, patrilocally organized family households remained largely intact. Reineck (1991: 14) even argued that ‘a reliance on out-migration brought about by Opoja’s weak economy has had a profoundly negative impact [on] the accommodation of social change in the area’ and led to a ‘freezing’ of patriarchal family relations. I was convinced that restudying the same locality nearly twenty-five years later enabled me to take a historically informed view that would allow me to unearth transformations in family relations. This perspective would not just help me to link these transformations to the major political and societal changes of the times but also help explain the historical rootedness of present-day migrations and family-based care and to grasp the changes that had occurred along gendered and generational lines.

Following up on the impact of migration on family relations would entail giving voice to women and men from various generations living in different localities – in Opoja and abroad – by scrutinizing their practices and their relations to other family members. Here, the relations between partners and siblings as well as between the generations are equally important to explore. Individual biographies, and the family’s impact on them, connect with the structure of social organization and the materialization of kinship and status in this translocal realm – such as the organization of households, the building of houses and the celebrating of weddings – as well as the selection of marriage partners and the organization of marital life of cross-border couples. These realms are central to family and kinship in Opoja in a translocal perspective and give a nuanced insight into very transformative – and yet stable – family networks, which serve as a basis for care and social security for villagers as well as migrants.

I argue that the combination of globalization and migration, as well as the profound neoliberal transformations in Kosovo but also in Western European countries, have affected families both at home and abroad, leading to a diversification of family roles and models – from patriarchal to more emancipated, and from more collectively oriented to individualized forms. At the same time, through rituals and the building of houses, family members symbolically re-establish patrilocal kinship ties across borders, creating security in a world they perceive as increasingly – or at least partially – insecure. Translocal family networks, which partly hark back to the 1960s when the first villagers left for Western European states as labour migrants, in Albanian called *gurbetgji*, create the semblance of constancy of family relations and patrilocal notions of family and gender, and with this established forms of family-based care.

At the same time, however, translocal family networks involve complex renegotiations of family and gender roles and with this question established forms of family-based care and create new ones (Dahinden 2005a, 2005b; Fouron and Glick-Schiller 2010). The reliance on family networks for care

correlates with the limited access to legal immigration, which has increasingly given rise to undocumented or irregular migration. Family members largely finance these travels and – once the EU border is crossed successfully – provide other forms of support, such as access to employment networks in the receiving country (Moulier-Boutang 2002). But legal pathways to immigration are also increasingly provided by the family: since the new millennium, ‘marriage migration’ and more broadly ‘family reunification’ is one of the few remaining possibilities for legal migration into the EU. This is the case despite family migration being highly politicized and increasingly subject to legal restrictions, not least because ‘cross-border marriages’ are associated with negative and gendered stereotypes in dominant discourses within the immigration countries (Block and Bonjour 2013; Block 2014; Pellander 2015). For many migrants, however, ‘cross-border marriages’ do not just follow or re-establish patriarchal family relations. They also transform family networks and the care practices within them, and they fulfil personal dreams of building a better life abroad.

In the following, I will briefly look at the enormous societal and geopolitical transformations that unfolded in post-socialist, post-war Kosovo as well as within immigration countries in order to provide a nuanced understanding of the broader context of translocal family relations and family-based care arrangements across time. I will then outline the scholarship in the relevant theoretical fields – namely, kinship, family and care in a translocal framework – before I shortly summarize the content of the chapters and outline the methods used.

## MIGRATION, FAMILY AND CARE WITHIN NATIONAL AND GLOBAL DYNAMICS

Statistical data underscore Kosovo’s reliance on migration: Kosovo happens to be among Europe’s poorest countries, with a poverty rate of 18 per cent in 2017 (Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2019: 113). In rural areas, the percentage of the population living in poverty is higher than in urban areas, and in 2015 the portion of the population living in extreme poverty in the countryside was nearly double compared to urban areas (6.2 per cent compared to 3.6 per cent, see Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2019: 113). This goes hand in hand with a high average unemployment rate of 29.5 per cent in 2018, which is especially severe in the 15–24 age group, in which 55.4 per cent are unemployed (Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2019: 100–1). At the same time, Kosovo also has the youngest population of Europe,<sup>1</sup> with 34 per cent under the age of twenty according to the census in 2011 (UNDP Municipal Devel-

opment Plan 2012: 28–31). For women of working age, the employment number was only 18.4 per cent in 2018 (Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2019: 98). Furthermore, only 29.5 per cent of employed persons have permanent employment contracts, while 70.5 per cent have a temporary contract.<sup>2</sup>

The high youth unemployment number is a particularly burning issue and a reason why many young people aim to migrate abroad. More generally, migration ranges high in Kosovo, which is also reflected in statistical data. According to Kosovo's complete population census, in 2011, 21.4 per cent of those born in Kosovo live abroad, which means that of the total population of 1.78 million, approximately 380,000 migrated and live abroad. If children born abroad with at least one parent of Kosovan origin and naturalized citizens of Kosovo were to be included, the 2011 median estimate of persons of Kosovan origin living abroad would rise to around 700,000 (Kosovo Agency of Statistics 2012: 75). According to the Kosovo Agency of Statistics (2014: 21), approximately 180,000 Kosovars born in Kosovo, or 35 per cent of all Kosovar emigrants, migrated to Germany. Following, at some distance, are Switzerland, with approximately 118,000 or 22.94 per cent of all Kosovar emigrants, and Austria (in the range of 50–60,000), Italy (approx. 37,000) and Sweden (25,000). By including those born outside Kosovo, with at least one parent born in Kosovo, the estimated number of Kosovo Albanians is double or triple as high in Germany (350–500,000 persons) and also considerably higher in Switzerland (200,000) (Behar and Wählich 2012: 14) and other immigration countries.<sup>3</sup> Correlating with the enormous size of the migrant population relative to the total population in Kosovo, migrants' family remittances between 2010–2019 are estimated to account for about 17 per cent of GDP, which is nearly double the international donor assistance (approximately 10 per cent of GDP) and is mainly used for general consumption (UNDP 2010; Behar and Wählich 2012: 16). This shows not only the tight relations between migrants and their families in Kosovo, but, given the dire situation in Kosovo, especially in rural Kosovo, also the high level of dependence of Kosovo families on regular remittances (Korovilas 2002). Any changes in the EU border regime, as well as a further decline of cross-border family cooperation and solidarity, could further exacerbate the situation.

In Opoja and more broadly in Kosovo, migration to Western Europe and dependence on family remittances are not recent phenomena (Mustafa et al. 2007). As early as in the 1960s, when socialist Yugoslavia signed formal labour migration treaties with various Western European states, many residents of Kosovo worked temporarily abroad to provide for their families. In Opoja, almost all of them were men who left behind their spouses and children in their parental households, which included the father as nominal

head, the mother, unmarried siblings and often also married brothers and their respective families.

In the 1990s, when the Serbian-dominated political leadership, military and police forces suppressed Albanian inhabitants, who constituted the numerical majority within Kosovo, women and children also started to migrate – albeit in smaller numbers. The ethnopolitical conflict later evolved into a fully-fledged war that led to the expulsion of large parts of the Albanian population from Kosovo to neighbouring Macedonia (FYROM) and Albania, where they found shelter, and from where they were partly temporarily relocated to Germany. Others fled individually to Western European states – often already before the full outbreak of war in 1998. Due to the NATO intervention in the war in March 1999, however, the Serbian regime was terminated within weeks, and the war was ended in June 1999. This was enthusiastically celebrated by Kosovo-Albanians, who hoped for a better future. Serbs and other minorities, on the other hand, were now partly persecuted and began to leave Kosovo in massive numbers.<sup>4</sup>

Given this historical trajectory, during my fieldwork in 2011 to 2013, villagers from Opoja, not unlike vast segments of the Albanian population in Kosovo, saw their life course distinctly divided into the time before and after the war (*para luftës, mas luftës*), between ‘now’ and ‘then’. However, the end of the war did not solve care-related problems, and the post-war reality fell short of the hopes and expectations of many Kosovo-Albanians for economic betterment. While Kosovo had ‘always’ lagged behind other republics of socialist Yugoslavia in terms of economic development, the post-socialist transformations at the end of war did not necessarily bring about the anticipated improvements.<sup>5</sup> As Stef Jansen (2015: 40–44) observed in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina, many inhabitants of Kosovo perceived the reforms in their own society as too slow-moving, or as not necessarily moving in the right direction. In fact, for more than a decade after the war, Kosovo continued to suffer from the breakdown of the socialist economy and the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia, the collapse of the domestic market and a near cessation of production and manufacturing activities, as well as high levels of corruption and generally a weak rule of law. This changed only slowly with the proclamation of an independent Kosovo state in 2008, which received full recognition as a sovereign state by only 115 out of 193 countries worldwide, and by 24 of the 27 EU member countries until 2019.

The Kosovo state has remained a fairly weak provider of social security. After decades of socialism and following the end of war along ethnic lines, Kosovo’s government introduced a liberal social welfare system (Sauer 2002; Cocozelli 2009; Latifi 2016), which was marked by nationalism. This means that while so-called families of martyrs and victims of the ‘war of liberation’ in 1999 have privileged access to social security and pensions (Ströhle 2013),

basic pension payments are only 75 euros a month (Kosovo Agency of Statistics 2016b). Apart from this basic support, there are market-based pension payments following a (neo-)liberal logic, which, however, reach only a small segment of the population (Sauer 2002). Generally, social security provisions for most citizens are meagre, with a minimal amount counting as unemployment insurance and social assistance to the poor (Lafiti 2015: 200–17). Given that public health care is also largely missing or inadequately covered, most people are forced to dip into private funds to pay for medical treatment (*ibid.*: 204–6). This situation has strengthened the need for family-based support, and especially from family members living abroad, who can provide remittances, which again spurs the need for migration (Schwandner-Sievers 2022).<sup>6</sup>

Simultaneously, until Germany introduced the Western Balkans regulation in 2016, the general prospects for emigration continued to deteriorate. The residents of Kosovo, who once benefited from socialist Yugoslavia's bloc-free status and could enter Western European states visa-free (Jansen 2009), lost this privilege in the early 1990s. While Bulgaria and Romania, as well as Slovenia and Croatia, which were a part of Yugoslavia until 1990, became new EU Member states in the new millennium and received expanded mobility rights, Kosovo along with Serbia, Northern Macedonia (then called FYROM), Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania remained outside the EU, which severely limited their travel privileges. In 2010, Kosovo citizens could travel visa-free only to Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia, Turkey and Haiti (Kacarska 2012: 15). In 2011, when citizens of Serbia as well as other Western Balkan states were finally allowed visa-free entry to EU countries, Kosovo was left out. Not recognized by Serbia and single EU member states like France, it was literally 'cut off' from the Western world. As observed by Stef Jansen (2009) for post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo's citizens perceived this downgrading by the European Union as a setback, a falling behind in the spatial-temporal 'ranking' of the various societies in the hierarchy of progress and modernization.

At the time of my fieldwork in 2011–2013, many Opoja villagers were forced to rely on family members abroad for their social security and, in the absence of other options, saw family and marriage migration to a Western European country as the most viable long-term prospect (Kosovo Agency of Statistics 2014: 26). Marriage migration will thus be presented in detail in this book, not least because it changed family, gender and generational relations but also served family care as well as the creation of individual futures.

Family-based care within Kosovo was put under increasing pressure owing to the neoliberal transformation towards individualism and competition that developed rapidly after the war – which was also taking place in other post-socialist countries – as well as to neoliberal trends worldwide. Some of

my interlocutors, for example, were critical of the fact that, after the war, the family structures and the underlying household economy, and with them relations between the generations and the sexes, had enormously diversified. One elderly woman remarked on the diversity within Kosovo's society: 'Since the end of the war, not one hair is like the other any more.' As in other post-socialist countries that underwent neoliberal reforms, the economic reconstructions and societal transformations heightened competition and gave rise to a growing demand for personal accountability and responsibility (Ther 2014; for Poland, see Buchowski 2006). Affirming changes in family conceptions, one young university-educated man explained that lack of time and 'independent lifestyles' had led to a so-called ice age in family relations, where relatives 'no longer care for one another' but rather concentrate on their individual well-being and future. However, family relations were often revitalized by migrants through their visits to their home regions despite prevailing discourses indicating that care and 'age-old' gestures of respect within the family and towards the elderly were on the decline (Leutloff-Grandits 2010). One villager said: 'Migrants keep us together, because as soon as they come, we pay each other visits and celebrate jointly.'

It can be assumed that the interests of migrants from rural parts of Kosovo to remain in touch with those 'at home' and to uphold a connection with their places of origin also depend on their social positionings and prospects in Western European states (Gardner and Osella 2003). Until the 1980s, the translocal household was firmly based in Kosovo, with most labour migrants having no intention of remaining abroad, and they were also the sole mobile members in the family. From the 1990s onwards, with the escalating ethno-political conflict in Kosovo, many Kosovo migrants tried to settle abroad with their families but faced various internal boundaries within the receiving society.

When refugees began arriving in Western European states with the outbreak of war in the various successor countries of former Yugoslavia, immigration was increasingly viewed as a burden on public welfare and a threat to a perceived homogeneity in Western European states. Migrants in general experienced higher levels of hostility and multiple forms of 'othering' and exclusion (Blumi 2003; Schierup et al. 2006: 1–20; Kaschuba 2008; Green 2009; Schwell 2010). Western 'othering' discourses (e.g. Strasser 2008; Scheibelhofer 2011) also ascribed certain cultural markers to refugees arriving from the so-perceived 'periphery' or the 'margins' of Europe (Dahinden 2009). Within these discourses, refugees and migrants from outside the EU were often regarded as having a 'patriarchal' and 'backward' culture, which they 'imported' into the receiving countries in the European Union,<sup>7</sup> and as such as threatening the stability of 'modern' and 'emancipated' families and nations in the European Union. Especially migrants labelled as 'Muslim',

as well as those labelled as ‘marriage migrants’, and thus the large majority of Kosovar migrants,<sup>8</sup> were seen as a menace to a politically and culturally ‘advanced’ sphere. These notions were used to justify tighter entry hurdles for migrants from non-Western states and restrictions to the rights of the migrants in the European Union (Block and Bonjour 2013; Pellander 2015; Bonjour and Block 2016). These re-bordering tendencies thus do not only frame the life worlds of people in the so-perceived ‘margins of Europe’; they also frame the life worlds of those who have moved from the ‘peripheries’ to the so-perceived European ‘centre’, as migrants meet inner boundaries, even when they have established themselves abroad successfully (Blumi 2003).

In analysing translocal family relations and family-based care across borders, it is therefore crucial to link these relations to larger trends within Europe and beyond. This book aims to critically address ‘family culture’ and ‘family-based care’ beyond the binaries of ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’, ‘Albanian’ and ‘German’, ‘Muslim’ and ‘Christian’, ‘patriarchal’ and ‘emancipated’, or ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’, as well as ‘mobility’ and ‘rootedness’ by giving attention to different subject positionings and entanglements between local structures, values and practices within a system of cross-border negotiation. More specifically, the European border and migration regime and the dynamics in contemporary Europe have contributed to family-based migration and family-based care networks. This may lead to a creative recourse to the ‘traditional’ patriarchal family culture prevalent in rural Kosovo. However, with the need for family, family members do not necessarily maintain patriarchal family structures. Rather, they also transform them into more emancipated family roles.

## CONCEPTUAL FRAMES

### *Towards a Translocal Approach to Family and Kinship*

In this study, the terms ‘kinship’ and ‘family’ are partly used interchangeably. With this, I take an emic standpoint, which blurs the line between first-grade relatives, considered family in Western notions, and more distant family members regarded as kin. In the Albanian language, male cousins may also be referred to as brothers (*vëllezërit*) and female ones as sisters (*motrat*), especially when raised in a common household, and all relatives are considered ‘family’ in narrow and broader terms (*familja e ngushtë – familja e madhe*) (see also Backer 2003 [1979]: 193). Following Albanian conceptions of kinship, I also differentiate between patrilocal, descent-based or so-perceived consanguinal kin (*fis* and *farefis*) and affinal kin (*mik*, plural *miqësi*) (gained through marriage), which is also expressed in different terms for maternal and paternal relatives – for example, for the siblings of father and mother.



The study of kinship was at the very heart of social anthropology in the early days of the discipline, but it was then dismissed, as kinship studies were largely based on evolutionist ideas about the hierarchical ordering of family and kinship forms along a West-centric developmental taxonomy of 'modernity' and 'backwardness'. In this reading, kinship, understood as based on so-perceived universal categories of blood and descent, was relevant as a unit of social organization only in 'pre-modern', 'non-state' and implicitly non-Western societies (Kuper 1988), with the justification that modern societies are defined by state structures and civil society and not by kinship, which remained influential only in its reduced version of the (nuclear) family.

With rising criticism of this evolutionist, West-centric and binary notion of kinship and family, kinship studies were largely abandoned in social anthropology from the Second World War onwards. An exception were some British and American sociologists and social anthropologists who explored the meaning of kinship in Europe in the 1950s and who moved away from the idea that only 'pre-modern', non-European societies have 'kinship' and not European societies. Notable is the innovative study of Elisabeth Bott (1971 [1957]) on urban kinship networks in London, following the work of Max Gluckman (1950). Still, this was not the start of a new research paradigm, and kinship studies remained a marginalized field of social anthropological research. Critics of kinship studies, most prominently the American anthropologist David M. Schneider (1980 [1968], 1984), furthermore questioned the universality of blood and descent as main markers of kinship.

In contrast to the marginalization of kinship studies in social anthropology, historians further explored kinship and family formation and distinguished between kinship and family models according to geographical areas and political organization. They placed Eastern and Southeastern Europe – where Kosovo is located – in a 'transitional zone' between Western and non-Western societies (Hajnal 1965; Mitterauer 1980).

Since the early 1990s, historians and ethnologists, especially from Southeastern Europe, have criticized the binaries that these studies produced and the implicit insistence on the 'backwardness' of Southeastern Europe, calling for a more reflexive and inclusive perspective on the region that includes an analysis of power relations and a critical examination of conceptual frameworks (see Čapo Žmegač 1996; Todorova 1997, 2003; see also L. Wolff 1995).

The family historian Karl Kaser (1992, 1995, 2000 and 2008), who undertook extensive historical-anthropological research in Southeastern Europe, systematically elaborated the distinct characteristics of family organization in Southeastern European countries and their entanglements with power relations. Karl Kaser argued that family and household formation in many (rural and mountainous) regions of 'the Balkans', including Kosovo, is his-

torically rooted in customary laws, called *kanun* in Albanian, prevalent during the century-long Ottoman rule within the region. While the Ottoman rule focused on tax collections and forced labour and rarely interfered in family affairs, the *kanun* regulated family and community life. The most influential *kanun*, which Albanians still refer to today, is the *kanun* of Lekë Dukagjini, who lived in the mountainous region of Northern Albania in the fifteenth century.

The rules laid out in the *kanun* and passed down orally for centuries by family and village elders formed the foundation of patriarchal family relationships in which the power of women was severely limited and their positions were seen as serving and re-creating the male-dominated family (Basha et al. 2001; Voell 2004). Across ethnicities and religious affiliations, these customary laws were based on patrilinearity, the notion that men descended from a common (genealogical) ancestor and accordingly women who married in could not pass on kinship. Customary laws also regulated patri- and fratrilocality – that is, the cohabitation of a father with several sons and their families in a joint household, also referred to as the ‘joint family’ (*familja e bashkuar*) or the ‘large house’ in Kosovo (*shtëpia e madhe*), or only ‘the house’ (*shtëpia*). Once the joint households became too complex, brothers customarily founded a new household in close proximity, which built the foundation of patri- and fratrilocally organized *mahallas* (neighbourhoods) (Reineck 1991: 46). In general, social positions were assigned not only by gender (male over female) but also by generation and age, with elders having more power and commanding more respect. The ‘Balkan family’, to use the term coined by Kal Kaser, was thus fundamentally patriarchally organized (Kaser 1995, 2000; King and Vullnetari 2011).

Studies on the historical pattern of the ‘Western’ family system, on the other hand, link it to state involvement, also in jurisdictional matters, characterizing it as offering a higher scope of individualization, alluding especially to the importance of individual property rights as the basis of economic progress and ‘modernization’. Historians explain the ongoing dissolution of patriarchal family structures within Southeastern Europe and their adjustment to the Western family model, which started with the end of the Ottoman rule within the region, with the increasing integration of the region into the world economy and the rise of modern nation states, and more generally with the attempts to catch up with Western modernization (Kaser 1995, 2000). A certain tendency of historical research to rely on modernization theories in kinship studies can therefore not be overlooked.

Different from the larger trends in social anthropology, in the socio-anthropological research in socialist Yugoslavia, family and kinship studies remained influential into the 1980s and provided the conceptual frame for an in-depth analysis of society in the context of modernization and histori-

cal changes. The American social anthropologists Joel Halpern (1967 [1956], 1968) and Eugene Hammel (1972, 1984), who highlighted the uneven transformations in family relations and household formation in the context of urbanization and industrialization from the 1950s to 1970s, showed, for example, that young villagers established a neolocal nuclear household in the town while still cooperating and associating with the patrilocal household in the village. Apart from these social anthropologists who came from Western countries to socialist Yugoslavia, various ethnologists and sociologists from Yugoslavia also studied the continuity and transformation of the patrilocal, complex – or joint – family structures and households under socialism. Among them, Kadri Halimi (1994) and Mark Krasniqi (1960, 1975, 1979)<sup>9</sup> as well as Gjergi Rrapi (2003) explored the economic basis of complex households and the position of single members within them, as well as the role of religion and family values in several regions of Kosovo in the 1980s. Gjergi Rrapi (2003) argued that the 'Albanian joint family' had already been partly transformed into more modern (and less complex) family forms in the course of urbanization and industrialization.

Two studies based on long-term fieldwork within a village offer a remarkable in-depth analysis of family and kinship in Kosovo and are of particular value to this study. The first was conducted by Berit Backer (2003 [1979]), a Norwegian social anthropologist, who studied family and kinship in the village setting of Isnj in the western part of Kosovo in the 1970s. While arguing that the complex household structures based on the notion of common male descent were under severe pressure owing to greater dependence on wage work, the spread of girls' education and growing emancipation of women as well as the decline of agriculture, she also directed her attention to maternal kinship and stressed the role of female agency within the kinship framework, especially in the creation of exogamous marriage alliances (Backer 2003 [1979]: 195 ff.). As such, she followed the French, post-structuralist kinship and family studies led by Claude Lévi-Strauss (1969 [1949], 2004), and later Martine Segalen (2003), which did not limit kinship to consanguinity but also included affinal ties and alliances and integrated their impact on the social, political and religious life. The abovementioned Ph.D. thesis by Janet Reineck (1991) on the links between kinship, gender relations and male labour migration in the region of Opoja in the late 1980s is the most important basis of this study. It advanced the argument that male labour migration had prevented social change 'back home' and led to the freezing of patriarchal relations.

In recent times the study of kinship and family relations of Kosovo Albanians has again become an important field of exploration. The very instructive study of Lumnije Kadriu (2017) concentrates on first-generation migrants from Kosovo who spend their family vacation in Kosovo and partly

also at Albania's seaside, and their ways of linking their lives to their homeland. The dissertations of Tahir Latifi (2015) and Eli Krasniqi (2017), who conducted research at the same time as me under a joint research grant from the Austrian Science Fund and with whom I had many collaborations and lively discussions, also provide historically informed insights into family life, social security and social change in the Dukagjin region and the Opoja region. Last but not least, the research of Robert Pichler (2016) on Albanian translocal ethnic and family networks between Northern Macedonia and Western Europe emphasizes the importance of the home locality in transnational fields and the historically evolved social conditions in which the locality is embedded.

While these studies provide an important backdrop for my analysis of family forms and care among family members living in Opoja and various Western European states, my research is also informed by the 'new kinship studies' (Schweitzer 2000; Schnegg et al. 2010: 10; Alber, Coe and Thelen 2013; Drotbohm and Alber 2015) that have emerged in response to critiques of Western-centred anthropological conceptions of kinship. According to the 'new kinship studies', family and kinship are not given relationships but relationships constituted, produced or affirmed through active social relations and subjective interpretations of interactions, especially those that involve caring practices such as feeding, nurturing or co-habiting or acting as an economic unit (Carsten 1995, 2000; see also Weismantel 1995).

This, however, does not mean a discounting of the differentiation between so-perceived consanguineal and affinal relations as an important emic differentiation in Albanian kinship. The work of the Norwegian social anthropologist Signe Howell (2006: 9), who distinguishes between 'nature, nurture, and law' as notions through which kin relations are created, is foundational to this study. She understands nature as biological, genetic or genealogical relations – that is, the sharing of genes as a basis of 'blood relations' (consanguinity) and descent, while nurture refers to 'kinning' – that is, care and support involving sharing of food, experiences and palpable attention. Law, on the other hand, is the (formal, nation state or international) recognition of relatedness on bonds created through marriage.

This book studies the emic meanings of the so-called patrilineal descent group of agnatic or so-perceived consanguineal kin (*fis*) (see Backer 2003 [1979]: 143) – which is regarded as based on 'blood relations' (*gjak*) among the male members of the family – as well as the meaning of matrilineal and affinal relations (*mik*, *miq*). The book aims to explore the normative notions of kinship that may differentiate between genders and, in particular, between matrilineal and patrilineal kinship, as well as the – sometimes divergent – practices of care within such family networks that are rooted in a specific locality in rural Kosovo but also extend across borders (see also

Leutloff-Grandits and Pina Cabral 2012). By outlining such family and kinship practices in a translocal, cross-border realm, I highlight the perspectives of both villagers and migrants from a gendered and generational perspective and their entanglement with the political, socio-economic and cultural contexts. I want to furthermore relate the different notions of family and kin to – emic as well as etic – conceptions of ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’.

To that end, I propose an entangled perspective on family and kinship that takes into account different scales – not only local, regional and state but also translocal and transnational. Rather than taking kinship relations for granted or glossing over them, I undertake a nuanced analysis of family and kinship relations that traces both patriarchal relations and the changing nature of family roles by relating them not only to tradition and culture but also to the positioning of family members within the current social environs that reach beyond state borders. Such an approach allows the blurring of the binarity of the categories of ‘patriarchal’ and ‘emancipated’, which are often linked to imaginations of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, located at different geographical and temporal poles. I show that migrants and villagers from different places invest in patrilocal kinship relations not least because it creates notions of home and security in an increasingly insecure world but also integrates emancipated relations into this form. They simultaneously invest in what they perceive as ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ in order to secure their livelihoods.

### *Towards a Translocal Approach to Care*

For the conceptualization of family-provided care in the context of this study, I refer to recent studies that emphasize that family care is based on personal relationships involving emotions and concrete care practices within the family and the household (see Keebet and Franz von Benda-Beckmann 1994; Thelen 2014: 23; Drotbohm 2014: 184). Instead of operating within a narrow concept of care that defines it as hands-on and mainly directed at children and the elderly, I refer to a broad concept of care that includes efforts to provide food and shelter, health, education, employment, or even finding a spouse or the opportunity to migrate, as well as material and financial transfers during the life course and through inheritance from one generation to another.

More generally, family care, as understood in this study, includes all forms of care by family members for the well-being and prospects of other family members, as well as for the well-being, continuity and unity of the family as a whole. This wide notion of care is more in line with what my interlocutors consider important in order to achieve social security for themselves and their families. The family care practices described in this study are furthermore not limited to parents and children but can also take place among

siblings and other relatives, and thus relate to the emic concept of family. Nevertheless, they are often gendered and based on a general, time-delayed reciprocity that spans generations. Moreover, my study goes beyond the instrumental and material provision of family or kinship care and also highlights the emotional and moral dimensions of care, in terms of the quality of relationships and the fulfilment of social or familial expectations (Keebet and Franz von Benda-Beckmann 1994; see also Baldassar 2007a: 276). In this context, particular attention should be paid to the processual understanding of care as the production, reproduction and dissolution of meaningful relationships. The latter also highlights the conflictive potential of family care, which can unfold as soon as expectations are not met and as soon as care gaps evolve, which can lead to family members distancing themselves from one another.

While in Western societies the state is often seen as the main provider of social security, relying on welfare policies such as housing assistance, health care and social assistance for the elderly and children, the poor, and the unemployed, several scholars have emphasized the role of the family and family care in the provision of social security and care. Keebet and Franz von Benda-Beckmann's (1994) conceptualization of social security, for example, focuses on the various institutions that provide social security, particularly 'the state' and 'the family', and the modalities of social security provision within these institutions.<sup>10</sup> They stress that the *actual social relationships* – formal, informal or virtual – between social security recipients and providers matter. Others also emphasize that the state and the family are interrelated and can complement each other in the provision of social security, creating a particular mix or bricolage (Kohli 1999; Phillimore et al. 2016). Tatjana Thelen (2014: 245–47) elaborates in her study on caregiving the complex interrelations between the so-called 'private' practices of care and the 'public' conditions. Following this approach, family caregiving in the present study is therefore not only examined in terms of how it contributes to the social security of a family, but also how it is embedded in the social environment.

Furthermore, I also relate family care to the concept of 'solidarity' to highlight normative dimensions of care provisions among people who define themselves as belonging together for various reasons, and who are willing to prioritize collective interests and support the needs of others in the group without expecting *quid pro quo*, but with the expectation of being supported if the situation was reversed (Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger 1992: 14). However, the basis of such solidarity is debated. Emile Durkheim (1977 [1893]) ascribed kinship-based solidarity to 'traditional', 'non-modern', 'non-state', 'segmentary societies' and conceived of it as being rooted in the collective consciousness of its members, and in strong social control that would 'force' its members to commit to certain (often hierarchi-

cal) roles and thus a 'mechanical' response, leaving little space for individualist decisions or identities. Durkheim's 'organic solidarity', on the other hand, is based on rather individualistic groups and 'modern', highly diversified, industrialized and individualized societies. Despite possible differences in the life worlds and strained kinship relations, Durkheim assumes that strong, shared moral values underpin the distribution and assumption of roles, while at the same time being also effective only under particular circumstances.

Sociologists Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash (Beck et al. 1996) have coined the term 'reflexive modernization', moving beyond a taxonomy based on the interrelationships between forms of solidarity and the level of modernization achieved by society. They argue that contemporary societies are characterized by a co-existence of 'old' and 'new' forms of social organization and solidarity that may be rooted in both mechanical and organic forms, which may converge and/or exist alongside one other as complex assemblages (Ong 2006). I find this conceptualization of reflexive modernization helpful in relation to translocal family caregiving because it emphasizes that modernization occurs in different contexts and relates to both local conditions and global processes. Following this line of conceptualization, family care within modern societies is not seen as a contradictory. At the same time, it stresses the selectivity of family care relations based on non-traditional forms of family and kin solidarity, which do not necessarily exclude self-interest or self-care and the realization of individual goals but can be harmonized with them. As requests for solidarity are diverse and unpredictable, and (at least subjectively) the energy and motivation to act is limited, people have to decide where and how to show solidarity (e.g. Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger 1992: 25).

The interdisciplinary research project 'Kinship and Social Security in Europe' (KASS) represents a recent comparative, historical and socio-anthropological study on the notion of social security and the interrelatedness of its main providers, the state and kinship networks, in eight European countries (Grandits 2010; Heady 2010a, 2010b; Heady and Schweitzer 2010; Heady and Kohli 2010). Against the 'evolutionist' thesis that views 'kin care' as 'non-modern' and 'backward', linked to 'non-Western' societies and weak states, and opposed to forms of care and social security provided by the state, the project showed that throughout Europe – and despite the very diverse welfare state models (see Esping-Andersen 1990) and kin models – state and family/kinship were not competing social security providers where relatives withdrew or limited care provision when the state assumed care responsibilities but that they supplemented and supported each other (Segalen 2010).

Within the comparative framework of the KASS research, in which I was personally involved as a lead researcher for the field contexts in Croatia, it

became clear that family and kin care ranged from daily childcare, widespread in Croatia (Leutloff-Grandits, Birt and Rubić 2010; Leutloff-Grandits 2012; Rubić and Leutloff-Grandits 2015) and Italy (Ghezzi 2010), to crisis intervention and to the ritualization of joint holidays in a ‘family house’ at the countryside (more common in Sweden) (Gaunt and Marks 2010; see also Heady and Schweitzer 2010). In fact, family and kinship were re-created and transformed palpably by everyday or ritualized activities and performances, material manifestations, symbols and, last but not least, care. With state-provided social security, family and kin care was partly even strengthened (Kohli 1999). It is, however, questionable whether the reverse argument can also be derived from this, namely that the lack of state-provided social security also weakens kin care, and what role migration plays here. In reference to post-socialist Albania, Ermina Danaj (2014: 117) has pointed to the flexibility of family-based care, which for many was the main source of social security in a collapsing state. But as not all members are treated equally within a family, this also led to an unequal distribution of support – and also to deficits.

In the discourses and practices of my interlocutors in the Opoja region, the Kosovo state remained largely absent as a social security provider, with the family as the main provider and, within the family, migration across state borders became an important strategy of social security. That is why the main focus in this study is on cross-border family relations and their impact on care and social security, but it still explores how family care relates to the states in question. For considering translocal family and kin care between rural Kosovo and migration destinations in the post-industrial, globalized world, I move beyond notions of ‘mechanical mechanisms’ based on strict kinship norms by linking them to notions of modernity and agency, and to contexts of limited state social security and persistent migration in times of tightening border regimes and xenophobia.

### *Towards an Approach to Translocal Family Care*

Sociologist Deborah Fahy Bryceson and the social anthropologist Ulla Vuorela (2002) undertook a more systematic study of the family in so-called transnational, border-crossing social fields. They stress that caring is the essence of transnational families, as these families ‘live some or most of the time separated from each other, yet hold together and create something that can be seen as a feeling of collective welfare and unity, namely “familyhood”, even across national borders’ (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002: 3). Without care practices, they will cease to exist, as neither spatial closeness nor perceived ‘blood ties’ automatically create social relatedness (Drotbohm 2009: 133, 147; 2014: 185–86). And yet, the balance within a transnational family, as



Bryceson and Vuorela (2002: 7) so vividly characterize, is hard to achieve: 'Like other families, transnational families have to mediate inequality amongst its members. Within transnational families, differences in access to mobility, resource, various types of capital and lifestyle emerge in striking ways.' As Carling (2008) has stressed, the logics and effects of transnational caring relations may be based on asymmetries in various fields, such as practices, information and imagination, and which enable, but also question, transnational kinship relations. Financial support in transnational family networks may, for example, be rather one-sided, provided by migrants to relatives at home in the form of remittances. Furthermore, its contribution to the reduction of poverty in home communities or to the development of local economies has been evaluated both positively and negatively. The logics and effects of translocal caring relations are thus often far from clear.

Various social scientists researching transnational families (e.g. Fog Olwig 2007; Drotbohm 2014) have argued that transnational family solidarity is related to restrictive immigration policies of a nation state. Tighter border regimes have had an impact on family relations. The family network spanning across borders has become a predominant solidarity structure on which migrants rely and which at the same time promotes translocal family relations.

The diverse legal positions that migrants hold in immigration countries, or what Anthias (2006) and Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) call 'differential exclusion' and 'differential inclusion' of migrants within receiving societies 'along the lines of gender, ethnicity, class, age and so on' (Anthias 2006: 22), impact family relations and family-based care – not only among those family members 'back home', who have not migrated (yet), but also among migrants. While families are reconstituted through migration and translocal care relations, migration is also channelled and sustained through translocal family structures. Under the umbrella of mobility, migrants may, for example, maintain close contacts with their family members, and thus their home region, as they return to the same locality recurrently to foster and maintain family relations.

In her work on Cape Verdean family networks, Heike Drotbohm (2014) looks at the interplay between border-crossing families and family-based immigration politics. She shows that residence rights or citizenship is a resource in transnational family networks, in that it enables individuals to enter Western labour markets via family reunification (including marriage) or even adoption. At the same time, it strengthens border-crossing support networks and, to that extent, possibly also emotional ties. She argues that the normative categories of administrative decisions on migration have an impact on the social practices within families. In this study, I stress the dif-

ferent legal and social positionings migrants hold in their countries of immigration and ask how this affects practices of translocal care across borders. Especially in a translocal context, family is an institution that links its members not only across state borders but also across legal and social positionings. The family may serve to balance out inequalities among its members and to empower them in the face of restrictive immigration policies.

In my analysis, I go beyond the differential legal and social positionings of family members and emphasize the importance of locality within transnational kinship and family relations. As already highlighted by Doreen Massey (1991: 28), the local also retains its importance as a place that is 'constructed out of a particular constellation of social relations, meeting and weaving together at a particular locus'. As Nina Glick Schiller and Ayşe Çağlar (2009; Çağlar 2013a, 2013b) have pointed out in relation to migrant incorporation in receiving societies, it is important to bring different scales into the analysis. In addition to the sending and receiving countries being scales of analysis, the place from which migrants origin and the place where they have settled also play a role. Indeed, life in a metropolis may be very different from life in a village or in a small or medium-sized town. In regard to Kosovo-Albanians, Janine Dahinden (2010) has argued that Kosovo-Albanians in Switzerland show high levels of physical mobility, as they move back and forth across state borders. At the same time, they stay connected to their 'home' locality in Kosovo, and they do so mainly via family networks. In relation to migrants from Croatia in Germany, Jasna Čapo Žmegač (2009: 267) has highlighted the 'bi-locality' or even 'bi-focality' of migrants, in that

they live in one place and look what is going on in the other, exchanging one for the other for periods of time, striving for betterment in one so that it can have effect on the other. . . . Moving, going back and forth, living in and commuting between two and more places in two and more states appears to be the central theme of the existence of migrant families whose members are divided across borders.

Many migrants create a seemingly seamless connection with family members who reside in their home village, to the extent that the boundaries are blurred, and home localities come to represent an extension of the self. Thus, instead of losing its significance or even disappearing, local connections may be deepened, widened and globalized, with the meaning of locality stretching beyond the bounds of its physical borders. However, that is not a one-way street. Not only migrants but also those who live in the village actively re-envision the meaning of a home locality and what it means to globalize it – not least through social media and virtual communication, which are fashioning the power of social imagination (Appadurai 1996). That means that people everywhere live in a complex and multilayered locality, within which

different spaces of experience and expectations coexist and the relations between these imagined and experienced spaces are renegotiated.

In this study of translocal family care, the region of Opoja in Southern Kosovo provides a common frame of reference to which migrants and villagers 'back home' relate. In translocal family networks composed of migrants and their relatives in the home region of Opoja, the modalities of 'globalization of the local' are central. The specific translocal relationships affirm belonging to a common place and family, thus inserting Opoja into the globalization processes.

These relationships are traced in terms of support received or provided, visits made and received, house building activities, and the location of – translocal – household constellations, wedding ceremonies and other family celebrations. It emerges that the Opoja region in Southern Kosovo is a place where multiple kinship relations cluster, where kinship is localized in the form of households, houses, neighbourhoods and wedding celebrations, and where translocal kinship relations serve as a form of care – both for individuals and for the collective.

Next to the translocal perspective, this study also includes a temporal perspective. It accounts not only for historical changes on a macro- and meso-level but also for changes within inter- and intragenerational as well as gendered roles within the family and within life courses. As shown by Loretta Baldassar (2007a) in relation to Italian migrants in Australia, the different times of arrival within the receiving society influence migrant perspectives and attitudes with respect to families. Furthermore, the time of migration may also differ in regard to the life stage. Persons who migrated as adults, who are commonly referred to as 'first-generation migrants', and those who are born in the receiving country or arrived as children, commonly referred to as 'second-generation migrants' (or as 'one-and-a-half-generation migrants', depending on age at arrival), regard the challenges of 'integration'<sup>11</sup> in different ways (Al-Ali 2002: 92; Vathi 2015), and each generation may also relate differently to their home communities and their relatives at home (see also Bielenin-Lenczowska 2014a).

Time also plays a role on another level. For all migrants, relations with those 'at home' may change during their life course, as they are not just bound to past experiences, but also to future plans and personal needs as well as political, economic and social circumstances that may change. In this context, the increasing feminization of migration from Kosovo to Western Europe cannot be ignored. Different from studies that focus on a specific 'generation' of migrants, this study offers a multipositional and diachronic view of translocal family and kin networks that span generations and state borders in order to trace kinship and family forms and new care demands that have emerged, not least through cross-border marriages, and which link

back to a specific locality in Kosovo. As I argue in this book, there are shifts in gender and generational relations and forms of family-based care, as well as new challenges and sometimes gaps in care.

Kinship practices and kinship care are highly dynamic and reconfiguring, even if on the surface they seem predictably rooted in patriarchal traditions or in conformity with images culturally fed to us. The formation of translocal family networks demonstrates the importance of locality while being embedded in, but also exposed to, larger geopolitical trends and the spread of a neoliberal consumer culture across state borders.

## OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS AND METHODS

The first chapter describes Opoja as a translocal region that has developed into a unique locality in a country with minimal state social security and increasing migration of villagers to Western European countries. The diverse ties that villagers have maintained with family members in these Western European countries, as well as progressive modernization and globalization, have led to a mixture of old and new concepts of life – with all their ambivalent internal dynamics. In addition to the diversification of gender and family roles, in which patriarchal roles coexist with increasingly more emancipated ones, it leads to an even greater dependence on, but also desire for, migration.

The second chapter highlights the different migratory paths that Opoja villagers have taken to EU countries since the 1990s, relating to labour migration, flight or family reunification, and the diversity of migrants' legal positioning abroad, from full citizenship to undocumented status. This shows that the category of 'Kosovar Albanian migrants' does not represent a unified collective. At the same time, migrants have used family ties to assert themselves in response to ever-tightening legal and social conditions. Recourse to the family partially mitigates differences between family members across geographic and social spaces, but family-based migration also brings with it a set of peculiarities and problems between family members that develop along gender and generational lines.

Chapter 3 focuses on the translocal household and analyses how gendered and generational positions within such households across borders affect care relationships between migrants and their relatives in rural Kosovo. Despite the persistence of patriarchal norms of care, care relations between migrants and their relatives in the village have diversified. This is due in no small part to the fact that the legal rights and socio-economic positions of migrants abroad are not homogeneous, and in addition more women have migrated. Even if it is difficult to meet the norms of care under these circum-

stances and gaps open up, as in the case of care for the elderly, for example, it is not possible to speak of an absence of care relationships. Rather, established care practices are being challenged and other forms of care relationships are being created in which individual family members – and especially females – are taking on new roles.

Chapter 4 explores the symbolic and emotional meanings of migrants' house building activities in Opoja and other social and material investments migrants make in rural Kosovo to strengthen ties with relatives and within the family and to create a proxy presence in the local village community. This is especially true for male migrants. Such investments are signs of belonging and tradition, of care for the village and family, especially if they are realized along patrilocal norms. At the same time, they symbolize the status of migrants and the desire to bring modernity to the village. However, the investments in the village also highlight gender and social differentiations as well as the stratification of the village community and are therefore not free of ambivalences. This chapter analyses different positions of family members on these investments, pointing to antagonisms within family and gender and generational relations.

Chapter 5 addresses the issue of spousal choice in translocal family networks and discusses two interrelated areas: the importance of 'family-framed' marriages in relation to 'individually framed' marriages, on the one hand, and the practice of cross-border marriages between migrants and partners from Southern Kosovo who then migrate abroad. Young people who want to leave their village to build a brighter future see this possibility in a cross-border marriage. Migrants may choose a spouse 'from home' to improve their position and the degree of freedom they enjoy in society and/or to meet perceived cultural and family norms while reshaping them. For both villagers and migrants, relatives are a rich, more secure and familiar source for finding the right mate across geographic distances, but this does not impede free choice.

Chapter 6 focuses on weddings in the Opoja region as a culmination of community and family life, in which migrants take a prominent role – as guests but also as family who finance the wedding festivities, or as bride or groom. As this chapter shows, wedding celebrations often serve contradictory patterns of social organization: wedding celebrations strengthen kinship ties across state borders, not least because the traditional rituals also help to reconstitute patrilineal kinship and restore patriarchal gender relations. At the same time, migrants and villagers are introducing 'Western' notions of marriage that emphasize romantic love relationships between the couple and greater gender equality, reshaping gender and family relations in ways that offer greater opportunities for emancipation and individualization. Costly wedding celebrations also reinforce existing social stratification

within the village and translocal network and increase pressure on young male villagers to move abroad and take up wage employment as soon as possible – in part hindering further education and the social advancement that education affords.

Chapter 7 deals with the realities of cross-border marriages. It looks at gendered family and partnership constellations and critically addresses mainstream Western discourses that disdainfully categorize such marriages as ‘ethnic’, ‘patriarchal’ and partly even ‘forced’ as a way to legitimize restrictions on marriage migration. The chapter traces such marriages from the moment the couples have to overcome the administrative hurdles of marriage migration to the practices of married life in receiving societies. It shows that cross-border marriages often cannot rely on traditional gender and family roles. Apart from the risks they entail, which especially burden the migrating partner – male as well as female – they may bring about upward social mobility and allow more emancipated gender roles – often with the help of family members. The book ends with further reflections and perspectives on translocality, kinship and care relations along gendered and generational lines and in regard to current transformations of the EU border regime.

Studying translocal care practices in kin and family networks between the Opoja region and various migration locations entailed tracking mobilities, interactions and exchanges (Clifford 1997: 23–27). Starting in Opoja in the south of Kosovo, participant observation of the everyday life, as well as narrative, family-centred and biographical interviews offered rich perspectives on values and habits and the interrelations of life worlds in their more global environments, as well as on the strategies and capacity of my interlocutors to actively shape their own life and future despite structural constraints. The contextualization of these different perspectives within a translocal social field, where different (nation) states build an important but not the sole frame, was a paramount goal of this translocal ethnography (Lauser 2005).

My study draws on the stories of generations of villagers and migrants from the Opoja region who have faced different circumstances in Kosovo as well as diverse migration regimes. These women and men of different ages and family stages, hailing from diverse social milieus, live in or are linked to the Opoja region because they have family and kin members there. During participant observation and in my interviews, I took into account their gendered and social positions both within the economic and legal spheres and within the family setup and tried to analyse them in respect to their intersectional entanglements (Anthias 2006; Yuval-Davis 2006; Clarke 2011; Bürkner 2012). Instead of regarding gender as an essentialist category, I took account of the everyday practices and discourses of migrants and villagers and linked them to the widely accepted gender norms and state policies that shape gender roles within translocal family networks (Kligman and Gal 2000). This en-

abled me to take care of power relations that co-constitute gender relations (Butler 1991; Yuval-Davis 2006; Scheibelhofer 2011: 154–55).

My fieldwork in the Opoja region began in early March 2011, at that time together with Eli Krasniqi, one of the two Ph.D. students of our project, who took a deeper historical perspective on transformations within the region from the 1950s onwards, and who later moved to another village in the Opoja region. The decision to undertake seven consecutive fieldwork stays in Kosovo between 2011 and 2013 (each lasting about three to four weeks) allowed me to observe and grasp changes within the family and society as they were happening. Young people, whom I first met as teens, were getting engaged or married, others were moving abroad or returning, children were being born, houses built, and households were being divided.

My fieldwork was assisted by Blerina Leka, a student of philosophy from the University of Prishtina, who provided me with interpretive support, as my Albanian was quite basic when I arrived. During our stays in Opoja, Blerina and I were taken in by a family that was an extended household (*shtëpia e madhe, familja e bashkuar*) comprised of a middle-aged couple with two married sons and a couple of grandchildren as well as an unmarried son abroad. Thanks to their openness and hospitality, we not only joined them during their meals but were also introduced to their network of relatives. They invited us to join them for various visits to their relatives living in the immediate neighbourhood or in neighbouring villages, and even generously allowed us to accompany them to numerous communal activities and weddings, including the farewell parties (*kënjagjegji*) before marriage of the girls of the *mahalla* (neighbourhood), which consisted mainly of agnatically related families. The wedding celebrations were an occasion to meet many family members and villagers (again) and understand the structure and meaning of family and kinship as well as marriage connections.

Furthermore, I made acquaintance with several migrants during their visit to the village, and in between my field visits to Opoja, I accepted invitations to their homes in Germany and in Austria. Getting acquainted with the everyday realities of migrants from Opoja in Western European countries, and looking at village life 'back home' from their point of view, helped me to contextualize their actions, attitudes and discursive positionings towards their relatives in Opoja and relate these views and practices to their legal status and social milieus as well as family relations. By following a multisited ethnographic approach (Marcus 1998) and documenting the views of villagers living in Opoja, as well as of family members living abroad, I could cross-cut perspectives about the translocal family relations. This opened up new insights into the positionings of different family members and into the social grid of family relations, and it also unfolded new ambiguities and complexi-

ties. In my analysis, I contextualize these emic perspectives within the larger societal dynamics and the power relations they entail.

Notwithstanding, there are also limitations to my study. Focussing my fieldwork on the Opoja region, the migrants I included in my study were those who regularly came home, while it was difficult to establish contact with those who had disrupted connections to their relatives in Kosovo. Their voices are therefore largely absent in this study. Because I already knew many members of the family in Opoja, conversations with migrants, furthermore, easily focused on their relations with those in Opoja as well as other family members, while relations to non-family members, especially in the migration context, could not be addressed as easily, even if I also asked in our conversations about non-kin-related persons who were important to them and had helped them.

Writing an ethnography, furthermore, means homogenizing different voices not least through the body of theory I used, which set the analytical frame and which I outlined earlier (see Clifford and Marcus 1986; Abu-Lughod 1990; Rosaldo 1993). A reflexive approach also entails reflecting on my own roles and positionings in the fieldwork at the intersections of gender, age, education, location and nationality. Rather than stable, these positionings were relational and shifting – as they depended on my interlocutors' roles and positions, too – and created various forms of possibilities and limitations. Given the patriarchal norms widespread in the Opoja region, according to which the house is not only synonymous with the patrilineal family but also a protective space for women from which non-kin-related men are largely kept away, being a woman in the field enabled me – most importantly – to be taken into a family.

The hospitality and openness of my host family allowed me to develop a certain 'cultural intimacy', to use a term coined by Herzfeld (1997), which is paramount to the study of family care. At the same time, it is clear that being hosted by a family also sheds special light on their perspective, as well as their social and family network. Given the gendered nature of the social space in rural Kosovo, conversations with men beyond the close family circle often took place in the local coffee houses – where women were largely absent – and assumed a more formal character; talks with women took place in their homes and in a more informal manner. Blerina's company also contributed to the establishing of deeper relations with women of various ages, as we had complementary roles with respect to our interlocutors.

As a scientist from Germany, I was often also met with a certain degree of familiarity, as Germany is the number one migration destination for villagers migrating to Western Europe, and a considerable number of the older, male villagers had already been migrants in Germany before returning to



Opoja. Simultaneously, my interlocutors were often especially open to explaining certain practices to me, as they assumed that I was not familiar with the local customs. Blerina, on the other hand, was one of 'them', as she was a Kosovo-Albanian woman to whom they did not have to explain the basics of social conduct and who acted as a bridge of sorts between the families and individuals in Opoja and me, although she was not from the same region and Catholic. Due to her young age, younger, unmarried women tended to see Blerina as their acquaintance and shared with us their views on entering marriage and other life plans. The fact that we both were guests of a well-respected family in Opoja, however, was the main basis for the openness of villagers towards us, as their status and the historically rooted trust relations they had in Opoja was extended to us during the fieldwork.

When my husband, Hannes, and our children visited at an early stage of my fieldwork, I also became aware that my ability to shift gendered boundaries while talking to my interlocutors was limited. I realized this soon after their arrival, when the men in the family and Hannes found themselves in deep discussions about politics and other topics that had been only marginally addressed when talking to me. In fact, I had already wondered about the lack of political conversations in this region, and I was reminded again that the information I received (and did not receive) was also bound to my gendered positioning. However, their visit also enhanced the prospects of my being accepted there, as it created relations not only between individuals but also between families. It became clear to me that my position as a 'Western scholar' interested in their region had granted me a special social status, but I was, somehow, also perceived as a satellite from nowhere. That it became graspable that I also had family roles as a wife and mother, and thus seemed more 'down to earth' and accessible to the people there, improved my standing within the local parameters. One of the host family's relatives said he could see I had achieved a lot in my life, that I was an esteemed scholar and that he wished me a lot of success in my career but that the biggest success of my life was my family.

Next to my gendered and professional position in the village, my social position was also framed by the power hierarchies of the nation states and the supranational entity of the EU, of which Kosovo was not – and is still not – a member. This became clear to me when I visited a female relative of my host family in Opoja, who, during a light-hearted conversation, unexpectedly asked me how it was possible that I visited them and they could not visit me, thus highlighting the fact that they as Kosovo Albanian citizens could not cross EU borders without a visa, which was difficult to get, while my possibilities to travel across EU borders were much more privileged. She then continued by stating that 'we' (likely meaning me and my co-nationals and EU fellows) depended on 'their' presence in Europe and not the other

way around. With this, she had managed to overcome her possible degradation as a ‘second-class European’, particularly under the European immigration laws, reversing the hierarchy and empowering herself. Within my fieldwork, I became aware of the various power asymmetries and their situational reversals between migrants and those in Opoja, as well as in gender and family relations.

In my case, I very much relied on the hospitality of my hosts and the families in Opoja to conduct my research and also for my personal well-being, and in our conversations, my interlocutors easily took it upon themselves to introduce me to their family and kin networks in the Opoja region – while it was not so easy to reciprocate this hospitality appropriately. Following social science research ethics, and owing to my position as a guest of my host family and the deep respect and gratitude I have for this family and all my interlocutors who shaped this research, my thinking and the manuscript, it is paramount that this book explains the – diverse – positionings in translocal family networks while not having any negative effects on my interlocutors. In order to protect the identities of the villagers and migrants, names, including place names in the destination countries, as well as various other personal details of the persons mentioned in the book have been omitted or changed.

#### NOTES

1. The average age was 30.2 years in 2012, and 28 per cent of the total population was younger than 15 years, and half of the population was younger than 28.2 years (Kosovo Agency of Statistics 2013: 26; Latifi 2015: 199).
2. See for a good analysis of the labour market also Latifi (2016).
3. However, as Kosovo is internationally not fully recognized as an independent state, it is often not listed as a country of origin in the statistics but subsumed under Serbia. Similar difficulties appear when stating Albanian nationality as migrant origin, as Albanian nationality is not restricted to Kosovo but also includes migrants from Albania, Montenegro and Macedonia.
4. Due to the boycott of many Serbs and other minorities of the Kosovo Census of 2011, the exact numbers of non-Albanian inhabitants cannot be given in detail (UNDP 2012: 135).
5. As all this happened despite the strong international engagement (in 2008, UNMIK was replaced by the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX)), Kosovo’s citizens started to regard the international presence as a reason for Kosovo’s slow progress in many realms. The negative attitude towards the international engagement with Kosovo finds expression in the political movement Vetëvendosje (self-determination), which came into being in 2005. Led by Albin Kurti, a former student leader, it aimed to end the international mission and to achieve independence for Kosovo. In 2021, Vetëvendosje received most of the votes and thus established

the government, and Albin Kurti became prime minister. See Calic (2008) for more information about the precarious legal, political and social situation in Kosovo after the war in 1999. See also Roth (2008) for a reflection on the critical attitudes towards the engagement of the European Union in Southeastern Europe.

6. See Danaj (2014) for similar observations in neighbouring Albania in the 1990s, where the situation was even more problematic.
7. See Green (2005) for an in-depth discussion on the relational meaning of 'margins' of Europe and its link to notions of movement.
8. According to the 2011 census, 95.6 per cent of Kosovo's population identifies as Muslim, 2.2 per cent as Roman Catholic, and 1.4 per cent as Serbian Orthodox. Census categories for 'Other', 'None' or 'No Response' each constitute less than 1 per cent. See United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2012).
9. See also Popovci (1973) and Sylejmani (1985); for newer studies on the Albanian family see also Xhemaj (2005).
10. More generally, providers of social security may be manifold and pluri-agent and may be private, state, or religious institutions (Thelen, Leutloff-Grandits and Peleikis 2009) as well as friends and colleagues.
11. The concept of integration is highly controversial in social science and public discourses. In the latter, the onus of integration is often solely on the migrants, in terms of language, economy and education, as well as in taking up 'sociocultural' values and practices of the majority society, and finally in cultivating feelings of belonging. This process could last decades or even generations. However, such a one-dimensional concept of integration has long been criticized in scholarly discussion. Instead, scholars call for the interaction and participation of migrants within various sub-groups within the majority society and not at the expense of their own identity, and thus they regard integration as an achievement that must also be accomplished on the part of society (Pries 2015: 27; Bommers 2002).

## CHAPTER

# 1

## TRANSLOCAL FOUNDATIONS OF A KOSOVO VILLAGE



### INTRODUCTION

When I first met then 17-year-old Vlora in 2011, she spoke at length about her extended family network spread over Serbia, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Germany and Sweden. Very early on, I realized that her own life story and her vision for her future also stretched far beyond the bounds of the Opoja village, where she shared a home with her parents and her brother. Although she spent most of her leisure time at home, she was largely influenced and informed by her translocal environs, not least because the family was in regular contact with her uncles and aunts and cousins, via Skype or Messenger. Their interaction intensified during the summer months, when family members typically arrived one by one from several different countries for their annual visit to their village. This was also the time of the year when weddings, often of an Opoja migrant to a villager, were lavishly celebrated (see Chapter 6) and when the translocal community reaffirmed their Opoja village as their ‘home base’.

As Vlora described the migratory movements of her extended family during a conversation, I realized my challenge was twofold. I sought to link the chronology of her family history with the historical developments in Kosovo to understand the different generational and gendered positionings therein. Like many heads of village households in the 1960s, Vlora’s grandfather had worked in Belgrade<sup>1</sup> to support his family – his three sons, among them Vlo-

ra's father – and subsequently their wives and children. Having begun work in Austria in the early 1970s, he finally returned to the village for good upon reaching retirement age in the late 1980s. Vlora was born around the time of the intensification of the ethnic conflict in Kosovo in the 1990s. That was when Vlora's father left for Austria to provide for his family; increasingly in the face of the escalating conflict and violence in Kosovo, entire families were leaving for Western Europe. Not too long after, Vlora, her siblings and her mother also sought to join her father in Austria. However, that plan took an unfortunate turn when their travel was interrupted in Hungary, and they were sent back to Kosovo within a few weeks.

With the end of the war in Kosovo, villagers widely abandoned agriculture in favour of employment, but at the same time, the ongoing neoliberal economic restructuring increased unemployment numbers. As a livelihood in the Kosovo village environs was difficult to secure even after the war, migration from Opoja to EU countries continued to be vital to the livelihood of the household. This trend did not abate after the declaration of an independent Kosovo nation state in 2008, and despite limited migration options to the EU, the emigration rates remained comparable to the years before 2000 (Kosovo Agency of Statistics 2012: 25). In Opoja, the percentage of migrants was slightly higher than the national average and reached nearly 25 per cent of the overall population in 2011 (*ibid.*: 19), and Vlora and her brother, like many of her other relatives and friends in that age group, were also looking for ways to migrate. Statistics show that for most Opoja migrants, Austria ranks the highest in the scale of preference for migration destinations, followed by Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, respectively. Furthermore, even rural regions in Kosovo, like Opoja, were increasingly inducted into the global trends of consumption and media flows, which in turn increased the desire to emigrate in order to better participate in consumer culture.

Underpinning these mobilities is the more general link between Opoja and the Western European destinations dating back to the 1960s, when international migration started to become integral not only to the social security of village households but also to the life course of villagers and the village culture in general. This phenomenon affected broader sectors, such as agriculture, economy and education, but within these fields also gender, family and community relations. In this chapter, I examine how after the war ended in 1999 these sectors were reconfigured in Opoja in line with the wide-ranging national and global transformations that Kosovo underwent but also in line with the long established 'culture of migration'. In particular, I pay attention to the ambivalent processes that these transformations unleashed in the form of 'rescaling' of village life – the repositioning of individual villagers within a new 'hierarchy of wealth and power' – and in relation to hegemonic notions of periphery and centre (Çağlar and Glick Schiller

2011b; Duijzings 2013: 16). Last but not least, I show that these transformations affected forms of modernization and ideas about modernity within the Opoja locality: desiring to break with various historically grown values and practices, there was an active rejection of practices seen as outdated and, as a corollary, an active embrace of what came to be seen as progressive and modern, in part through the creation of new 'traditions'.

Following Doreen Massey (1991), who argues that 'places can be conceptualized in terms of their social interactions which they tie together', I argue that Opoja's social space combines village and global processes that link it to Western destinations. Together, villagers and migrants seek to re-create their locality and renegotiate the borders of their own community, in part because of an expanded, yet connected, social imagination (Appadurai 1996). They link to Western destinations as much through historical experiences and norms as through the larger phenomena of post-war, post-socialist transformations – which have entailed a strengthened move to a neoliberal culture of consumption, the foundation of the Kosovo nation state – and not least through globalization and the changing migration regimes of Western European states for migrants from Opoja. These processes transform the Kosovo society at a rapid speed and create new subject categories and intersectionalities (Binder und Hess 2011) while simultaneously also blocking other developments and transformations.

As described by Ger Duijzings (2013: 12), 'the end of socialism was a triumph for the neoliberalist project – an alternative future was eliminated'. In Opoja, local assessments of the transformations are, however, rather ambivalent, or even contradictory – mainly because local livelihoods no longer offer the security or not yet the desired 'modern life'. While most villagers claimed, for example, village life had changed profoundly since the end of the war, especially in terms of gender and intergenerational relations, others stressed that life had generally remained the same – that is, rather stable – especially with regard to gender relations. The latter is also mirrored outside the region, as Opoja is known for its 'traditional' family and gender relations throughout Kosovo. The concept of global assemblage (Ong 2006), which describes the multiple interlinkages of humankind, knowledge and technology, accurately reflects the modalities of the links between the Opoja region and the globalized world as well as the migrants abroad. Global assemblage, defined as such, not only contributes to the creation of a unique locality in Kosovo that stretches beyond the borders of the local village but also a highly diversified region that only at first glance seems homogeneous. While historical customary norms are still very influential and respected by the majority of Opoja inhabitants, there is a general embrace of what is regarded as 'modern', whereby definitions of modernity are personal and local and may also include the cherishing of 'tradition' as a way of positively relating to

an imagined past. Moreover, the norms differ according to gender and age, education and social status.

Starting from Opoja and incorporating a diachronic perspective that goes back to the socialist era, the chapter traces the gendered and generational experiences, practices and positioning of the villagers. The elements of a translocal village analysed here include interconnected domains such as agriculture and economy, education and religion, and the use of new media. These elements constitute what Pierre Bourdieu (1993) called a 'social field', which villagers navigate by taking on particular social positions. In Opoja, this field is established as both transnational (Carling 2008) and translocal, as cross-border dynamics and relationships play an important role.

### THE DE-AGRARIZATION OF VILLAGES

Village households ensconced in spectacular nature, with deep green meadows and hilly areas surrounded by mountain peaks, evoke the familiar image of a daily life deeply embedded in nature. However, in a trend that gained momentum during and in the aftermath of the 1999 war, most villagers were no longer engaged in agriculture and husbandry. At the time of my fieldwork, only very few families, mainly families with a joint household structure, still kept sheep. In comparison, more families kept cows and produced their own dairy and meat, and even more had a vegetable garden to reduce the household expenses, especially since families in Kosovo on average spend nearly half of their monthly income on food (Republic of Kosovo 2015).

'Before the war, every centimetre of land was used', one villager explained to me, and agriculture and husbandry were – next to remittances – still the basic sources of livelihood for most households. Villagers kept sheep and cows and worked their small, scattered plots to grow wheat and vegetables for their own needs (Reineck 1991: 30). The socially-owned enterprise 'Sharr Prodhimi/Šar Proizvodi' established in Opoja during socialism helped private sheep breeders by marketing their farm products, and in that sense, private farming and the former socialist enterprises functioned symbiotically. The predominantly male labour migration did not lead to a cessation of farming and animal husbandry. Instead, land prices increased as many heads of families invested a part of their remittances in landed property – not least because the size of land ownership traditionally represented wealth and class. Yet, already under socialism, most migrants did not see a future in agriculture. They discouraged their children from deeper involvement in agriculture and encouraged education.

After the war, most village households finally (and rather suddenly) abandoned animal husbandry, and in 2011, only 3.5 per cent of all farms in the Dragash municipality generated produce for the market and only one per cent



**Figure 1.1.** Landscape of Opoja in summer (© Carolin Leutloff-Grandits)

of the registered businesses in the municipality related to agriculture, forestry and fishing (UNDP 2012: 104, 115). This was in part because of the post-war and the post-socialist realities. Villagers fled without their livestock during the war and found a very small number of animals upon return. After the dissolution of the socialist enterprise, they furthermore lacked the facilities to market and process agricultural products in the Dragash area (ibid.: 109).

At the national level, Kosovo's weak position in agriculture (and production) was attributed not only to the neoliberal restructuring of the markets in Kosovo but also to migration's domino effect. As remittances from abroad greatly enhance the local purchasing power, imports rather than exports dominate international trade. Also owing to low import taxes, local products often cannot compete – a phenomenon known as 'Dutch disease' (Mustafa et al. 2007). A highly successful butcher's shop in Opoja, established in 1992, is a case in point. Although Opoja is surrounded by green hills and pastures, the local owner started to import meat from abroad, even from overseas, as there was not enough slaughter cattle available on the local market, not least because the price he paid for slaughter cattle was not attractive to the local farmers.

Since the end of the war in 1999, local inhabitants have been generally unwilling to invest in agriculture or buy new livestock for market production. They are even exultant to finally get rid of agriculture and husbandry. Instead, they invest in building new, individualized and 'modern-style' homes with an open-plan American kitchen mainly financed through remittances, savings and/or bank loans, despite the high mortgage rates.<sup>2</sup> House building activities, willy-nilly, often lead to the division of joint households into nu-



clear ones (see also Chapter 4), and as younger women in the nuclear households are less inclined to engage in the malodorous job of caring for cattle, typically small-scale husbandry and farming are devalued or have been completely abandoned. Newly built houses thus no longer accommodate a stable for livestock. Other villagers explained to me that as they did not own enough land (often less than one hectare), it was no longer economic to work the land. While Janet Reineck (1991: 30) writes about an average landholding of 1.5 hectares per family in the late 1980s, this is reduced with the division of households and the simultaneous division of land among sons, who habitually receive an equal share of it.

Generally, this retreat from agriculture is regarded locally as a blessing in disguise and an escape from the challenges of village life. Internalizing the widely shared view of the urban inhabitants who pejoratively call them *katunarët* (villagers) (see Paca 2015: 3; H. Schneider 2017; E. Krasniqi 2017; Blumi 2003), as in other Southeastern European contexts (for Bulgaria, see Schubert 2020), villagers see abandoning agriculture as a pathway to becoming more 'civilized' and as a step towards 'modernization'. The intention behind a 'post-peasant' life (Duijzings 2013: 16) is to reduce the difference between urban and rural life – at least from the village perspective – and to move towards modernity (for Poland, see Pine 2007). This has enormous significance for everyday life. In our conversations, elderly women, for example, often stressed the hardships they went through in their youth. Women had not only performed household chores like cooking, cleaning and washing (often without home appliances), caring for the elderly and rearing children, often more than a handful, with men often on *gurbet/kurbet* (labour migration), they, and their children, also shouldered the highly labour-intensive responsibilities for their agricultural farms. Thus, the declining dependence on agriculture signalled progress. Especially middle-aged and elderly women seemed happy that their daughters(-in-law) could enjoy better living conditions without such encumbrances. But the retreat from agriculture and husbandry has created a parallel economic pressure – including on women – to take up wage work, whereby the lack of jobs in the region has fostered the pressure to migrate. This has led to wide-scale migration and the emergence of the 'post-peasant subject': 'that is, the rural inhabitant who tries his luck elsewhere and adopts a transnational identity' (Duijzings 2013: 16).

### THE ASPIRATION OF OUTMIGRATION IN LIGHT OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

The desire for outmigration among young men and women alike stems from the meagre economic opportunities and the high unemployment rate at home. In Opoja, the unemployment rate rose above the country average of

35 per cent in 2015, and unemployment among young people was generally even higher in Kosovo. This difficult economic situation dates back to socialism, or even earlier, and led many families to send at least one member abroad to receive remittances. Landholdings and husbandry alone could not ensure a livelihood, and with public institutions as the main employers, jobs were scarce. In socialism, the municipality of Dragash was among those with the lowest number of employees in all of Kosovo. In 1981, of the 35,054 inhabitants in Opoja, only 1,434 persons had formal employment. In 1982, a textile factory that opened in Dragash employed about 500 persons at low salaries, whereas the agricultural firm 'Sharr Prodhimi/Šar Proizvodi' employed approximately 200 persons (Reineck 1991; Reinmüller 2015: 43–44; Halimi 1999: 32). The dire economic situation in Opoja was also linked to a steady population growth until 2008, registering an increase of 300 per cent between 1921 (when demographic data first became available) and 1981, which reflected the overall situation in Kosovo. Since then, population growth has slowed down because of emigration and declining birth rates (UNDP 2012: 26). Prior and parallel to the trend towards international migration since the late 1960s, male inhabitants of Opoja took up work in other regions within Yugoslavia, particularly the northern ones, which were better developed, and in Belgrade, where they took up blue-collar jobs in socially owned firms, often in the construction sector. In many cases, the family remained in Opoja and the migrant ties to the home region remained strong.

Still, during the socialist era, there were some important achievements in the Opoja region, largely thanks to its geopolitical location. Owing to Opoja's proximity to the Albanian border, the villages in Opoja and Gora received an electricity supply as early as the 1960s, after the installation of the hydroelectric plant in Gora in 1953 – which happened later in other regions. The electrification of the Yugoslav border regions was a sign of the Yugoslav supremacy over socialist Albania, which pursued its own kind of socialism. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, most villagers received running water through a new water pipeline system. Roads also started to be paved in 1973, while other rural municipalities within Kosovo received their first paved roads only in the 1980s (Reineck 1991: 27–28). Apart from this, Opoja had a well-developed health care system with medical ambulances in various villages – for some as early as the 1960s – as well as a hospital in the small town of Dragash, the municipal centre of the Opoja and Gora region since 1969 (Reineck 1991: 28–29; Qaflehi 2011; see also Islami 1985 for the development of rural regions in socialist Kosovo).

Still, despite those achievements under socialism, most villagers I met regarded the overall development during socialism as slow and complained that jobs at all levels had been scarce in the Opoja region. Only people aged over forty, who were young during the era of Tito, the president of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from its founding in 1944 un-

til his death in 1980, embraced a somewhat positive image of socialism and cherished Tito's achievements in the education, labour and health sectors. However, as the population in Kosovo is mainly comprised of people under thirty, who do not have first-hand experience of socialism under Tito (as they were not yet born or under the age of 10 at the time of his death), the positive vision of socialism was not very widespread. Instead, they mainly remembered the brutal and ethnically discriminatory government of Slobodan Milošević from the 1980s (Schwandner-Sievers and Ströhle 2007), when many Kosovo-Albanians were dismissed from their state jobs and experienced long-term unemployment. From the 1980s on, but especially in the 1990s, a considerable number left Kosovo to escape political pressure and economic deprivation. In Opoja, jobs in the public sector were then taken over by the Slavic-speaking Gorani, an autochthonous group living in the neighbouring region of Gora.

With the end of the war in 1999, this situation was partially reversed. While the inhabitants of Opoja largely regained their jobs, Gorani became unemployed and experienced discrimination. Still, with time, interethnic relations improved again in the Dragash municipality, partly because of international pressure.<sup>3</sup> However, unemployment could not be solved in Opoja and other regions of Kosovo. In fact, it actually peaked a few years after the end of the war as the privatization process of the former socially owned industry gathered speed, leaving the manufacturing industry in shambles (UNDP 2012: 103).

Since then, the main employer in Opoja, a former socially owned textile factory, has massively reduced its workforce, and the agricultural industry has perished. In 2012, the number of available, albeit poorly paid, jobs was a modest 380 (with an average income of 200 euros per month; see UNDP 2012: 103) – significantly less than in the 1980s. Some villagers also commute daily to Prizren for work. Moreover, in large parts of Kosovo, and especially in economically weak areas with a tight local state budget such as Opoja, there is a lack of major state-led economic investment, and the public sector remains the main employer (UNDP 2012: 111).

In addition, many villagers run diverse small private enterprises, like carpentries, mechanical workshops and hairdressing salons, as well as restaurants, shops, café bars and construction-related services. While some were established in the 1990s, when private entrepreneurship (especially in trade and services) became the main form of income-generating employment next to agriculture (Clark 2000: 113–14), many private businesses opened only after the war, in the new millennium. Like before, however, most of these businesses and services continue to be male-dominated, and almost all their employees are from within the family circle. Many operate seasonally, mostly in the summer when migrants return, ready to exercise their purchasing power. Even the construction of new buildings and the interior



**Figure 1.2.** Landscape of Opoja in early spring (© Carolin Leutloff-Grandits)

architecture, for which local construction firms and carpenters are engaged, is mainly commissioned by migrants, not just in Opoja but all over Kosovo, where ‘foreign direct investments fuelled construction activity’ (IMF 2011; see also Behar and Wählich 2012: 16; see also Chapter 4).

As Vlora’s story revealed to me, village life gathers pace in summer months, when migrants visit. They invite their relatives to coffee bars and restaurants that burgeoned after the war (see also Chapter 5). Furthermore, migrants largely also finance huge wedding celebrations in the region (see Chapter 6), which provide an occasion for everyone to get together and where cooks, hairdressers and musicians find seasonal employment. If only seasonally, the circulation of migrants’ money keeps the local economy running, and for a limited time Opoja seems to become the ‘centre of the universe’ for the translocal community. As Ger Duijzings (2013) observes for rural locations in various places in post-socialist Europe, these translocal connections have played an important role in ‘rescaling the locality’. ‘They led to the blurring and partial collapse of spatial categories such as “centre” and “periphery”, “rural” and “urban”. These distinctions have become fuzzier and continue to fade as travel and communication become easier’ (Duijzings 2013: 17). In the ebb and flow of economic life, the pace of life in the villages slows down enormously in the winter months, and the villages seem to fall into a slum-

ber. When snow falls, it may even become difficult to reach villages located at 1,000 meters or more above sea level. That is when Opoja again gains distance to the cities and the migrant destinations across the national borders, and peripheralizes again.

While most migrants invest mainly in real estate 'back home' (see Chapter 4; Havolli 2009), some also look for possibilities to open businesses that might enable families to return or facilitate opportunities for close relatives to earn a livelihood. Recently, the local authorities also started to support (migrant) entrepreneurship by offering investors landed property for commercial investments and access to infrastructure, like electricity supply. However, many migrants maintain that the support of the local government is minor or too slow (e.g. the instalment of electricity may take years), or they do not see the potential for economic investments. Thus, the number of such businesses founded by migrants remains insignificant compared to their other investments, and in a sense, they do not resolve the dire economic situation. In the private sector, many employees work without a formal contract, receive low wages (in the textile factory, for example, 170 euros in 2012) and might not be paid at all. Approximately 40 per cent of Kosovo's employment is informal – often because the low income that the firms generate cannot pay for the legal costs (UNDP 2012: 110). Jobs in the public sector are more secure, and salaries are often better – police officers or teachers were, for example, earning up to 350 euros a month in 2012. Thus, employers in Kosovo prefer public-sector employment.

Generally, despite or maybe because of the emergence of the neoliberal order, they need connections to secure a job, a phenomenon Čarna Brković (2020) discusses in the context of post-war, post-socialist Bosnia-Herzegovina. In short, a considerable segment of the population in the Dragash municipality, but also in other parts of Kosovo, lives on a relatively low income and has significant job insecurity. In many cases, villagers are convinced that the situation is not necessarily improving for the better and attribute this to the dysfunctional state, which does not care enough for its citizens, and to the widespread existence of corruption and clientelism in Kosovo as well as the ongoing neoliberal transformations, which have marginalized large parts Kosovo's population, especially in rural areas.

Under these circumstances, translocal, family-based support becomes very important. In fact, the share of the population relying on remittances is substantially higher than those receiving social assistance from the state. Remittances received by rural households all over Kosovo average 2,800 euros per household (1,500 euros in urban areas) – that is three times higher than the average financial support from social protection schemes by the state (UNDP 2012: 109–10). Thus, when remittances shrink, or a household 'lacks' a family member abroad, the only economic option is outmigration,

either of a household member or of the complete household. It goes without saying that young people with a better educational background also want to start a better life in Prizren or in Prishtina, where they expect to have more economic opportunities as well as more liberties compared to the Opoja village life.

## EDUCATION

The idea of education as a means of modernization and a possibility to socially upgrade was not only strongly supported by the socialist state but has also influenced villagers in Opoja for decades. While illiteracy in Kosovo stood at 62.5 per cent in 1948 (Schmitt 2008: 238), with a much higher percentage in the rural parts, after the Second World War, four-year primary schools were built in Opoja as a part of the great alphabetization campaign of socialist Yugoslavia. At that time, schools began to offer instruction in the Albanian language. In interwar Yugoslavia, instruction within Kosovo's schools was generally in Serbian only, except for the very small percentage of religious schools. In socialist Yugoslavia, schooling was also supposed to include girls – a position not shared by all villagers at the beginning but which became increasingly widespread thereafter. Gradually, larger villages began to offer eight-grade schools, and in 1969, a secondary school was founded in Dragash (Qaflehi 2011: 196). Higher education in the Albanian language became possible with the opening of the University of Prishtina in 1971 (Schmitt 2008: 239), and thanks to the state-supported education system, which included merit-based scholarships from the state, a limited number of talented Albanian-speaking students, even from poorer families, were able to attend university (Kostovicova 2005).

Within socialism (and beyond), however, the prospects for higher education depended also on various factors within the families: the degree to which individual families valued education, the established family and gender roles as well as family and household solidarity. Owing to lack of funds and the societal and family expectation to marry 'in a timely manner' (early twenties) and take on family responsibilities, in the 1970s and the 1980s, nearly all young women and most young men were not able to pursue education. Young women were expected to work in the household and take care of their children after marriage, and young men sought paid employment – partly abroad – to finance the costs of lavish wedding celebrations and to support the family.

Some enjoyed better prospects to complete their education. Among them were those whose family members (often fathers or older brothers) worked abroad and (co-)financed their higher education and their wedding. *Gurbet-*

*gji* (labour migrants) from Opoja believed they could achieve progress and modernity by educating their children – mostly sons – or brothers, as education would give them the tools for upward mobility and a better life. As such, labour migration from the late 1960s onwards was also linked to a rise in the education profile of the Opoja villages. However, as the availability of highly skilled jobs was very limited in Opoja, educated villagers often moved to the urban centres, such as Prizren and Prishtina, in many cases with their entire families. Especially from the 1980s onwards, it was not rare for a family living in Opoja to have relatives that worked in blue-collar sectors in Western countries but, due in large part to the financing from the labour migrants, also educated relatives who were teachers, medical doctors and lawyers in Prizren and Prishtina. Family members were both geographically dispersed and had diverse social, educational and professional profiles.

The growing economic and political crisis within socialist Yugoslavia started with the death of Tito in 1980 and was followed by the escalation of the ethnic conflict in Kosovo from the late 1980s onwards, which interrupted the social upswing. As Albanians were excluded from schooling and university education at the University of Prishtina, the only university in Kosovo at that time, schooling and education began to be privately organized and paid for – largely also through remittances. While the primary school buildings available in the villages of Opoja could still be used, as the villages were inhabited more or less exclusively by Albanians, the secondary schools were located in the ethnically mixed towns of Dragash and Prizren and could no longer be used by Albanians, so classes had to be held in private houses. Throughout the 1990s, the quality of the education was poor, and the dropout rate for girls from school, even elementary school, was especially high. After socialism under Tito propelled gender equality, the rise of Slobodan Milošević within the 1980s and the emerging ethnic conflict led to a reverse development. While in the late 1970s, about 40 per cent of the pupils in secondary school were female, by the late 1980s, this number dropped to 4.5 per cent. Barely one in five girls who began primary school in the rural areas of Kosovo in the 1980s finished the eighth grade (for the general picture in Kosovo, see Vickers 1998: 252; Clark 2000: 99; Pichler 2008; for Opoja, see Reineck 1991: 167–68). Moreover, Albanian pupils have not been taught Serbian at school since the exclusion of Albanians from public education in Kosovo in the early 1990s. Thus, during my fieldwork, mostly only men over thirty-five could speak Serbian, the lingua franca in socialist Yugoslavia, which they had learnt at school and used during their military service in the Yugoslav People's Army.

After the end of war in 1999, (higher) education assumed greater significance again, not only in Opoja but in Kosovo in general, and in 2012, 8.2 per

cent of the population (and 3.2 per cent of women) had a university degree (UNDP 2012: 39). With the reopening of the University of Prishtina – with instructions offered exclusively in the Albanian language – and with the emergence of various public university campus sites and new private universities across various towns, among them in neighbouring Prizren, the percentage of students among young Kosovo-Albanians – including women – rose steadily. In 2010, women even made up 51 per cent of the student population, pointing to their emancipation (UNDP 2012: 39; World Bank 2012: 2). In Opoja, new school buildings, including a secondary school, were opened after the war (Qafleshi 2011: 197–99). Like elsewhere in Kosovo, girls here were increasingly inducted into higher education, although the percentage of females finishing secondary school in Opoja in 2012 stood at 37 per cent (UNDP 2012: 91, 154). While the Serbian language is no longer spoken among the younger generation, German is the most widespread foreign language spoken in this area – due to migrants returning from German-speaking countries but also because young people are interested in moving to a German-speaking country abroad. Some teenagers even manage to learn the language via TV, without having travelled abroad.

According to a survey I conducted in 2011 among ninth-grade learners at the elementary school in Opoja, in which I asked students to write about where they envisioned themselves ten years from now, almost all – boys and girls alike – said that education constituted the basis for a good life, with many having concrete professional goals. Albana wrote:

We need to plan our goals carefully so that we can realize them. We need to be attentive to our past, because it makes the days still ahead of us more secure. We all have the wish to achieve a lot of success in our life. But success can be manifold; it can appear as short- and long-termed. What we can do is only learn, and then our future is secure. . . . I have always dreamed of continuing with school, to become a dentist so that I can help others and secure my own life. The place I want to receive education and live in is Prizren. If we want something that we never had, we need to do something we have never done. After 10 years, we must have made a good choice, and we must be secure about the choice we have made and must be able to earn a living with it. . . . The future of a person depends on the life she/he has – as soon as we have an education, we will have a happy life. To conclude: One needs education in order to have a better life.

In this essay, the pupil expresses her attentiveness to the past to build a good future but regards education as key to realizing her plans. The fact that teenage girls very confidently want to take up professions such as dentist and doctor and earn their own living shows that gender images have changed again since the war. A considerable number of these young people also asserted in their writing that they planned to go abroad temporarily, a goal among the youths throughout Kosovo as well as in the neighbouring coun-



tries (for Serbia, see Erdei 2011). For many young people from Opoja, temporary migration is linked with their plans to travel and study abroad before returning to Kosovo to take up a good job, although at that time maybe only a handful from Opoja were actually studying abroad, and visa restrictions made travel to the EU nearly impossible. Fifteen-year-old Valon wrote this:

My life will look very different in 10 years, as I will have finished studying my electives. I like studying engineering or architecture the most. These professions, I think, suit me best. One of these subjects I will finish studying in a European country. As others say it is better to study there. After ten years, I think I will live in Prishtina as this is the capital of Kosovo. But when I have the possibility, I could also see myself living in another European country. I will definitely marry, but not before I finish my bachelor's and master's degree. I also like the German language. Together with my study, I want to learn the German language. These are my most important goals.

Like Valon, various other pupils said they wanted to start a family only once they had finished their studies and were able to support one financially. These new visions raised the marriage age to a new average of 29.8 years in Kosovo in 2016 (males 31.6 years and females 28.1 years) (Kosovo Agency of Statistics 2016a). While in the parent generation an early marriage (early twenties) for men and women alike was regarded 'a must', for the younger generation, especially men, achieving a level of education and financial security through gainful employment has become a precondition for marriage. Agon, father of teenagers, declared: 'Here, they also have started to marry only after completing schooling, university or securing a workplace.' In numerous families, the parents, and other family members also, financially support their children in their effort to gain higher education – often with the help of remittances from relatives abroad. But not all families can afford these costs, as Opoja pupils in the middle and secondary schools need about 50 euros a month to cover public transport and snacks, which makes it especially expensive for families with two or more children. For students studying in Prizren or Prishtina, costs for commuting or lodging are much higher. However, given the high unemployment numbers and widespread clientelism where employment decisions for university graduates are not based on merit, some young people are also ambivalent about the value of higher education. As one of the pupils expressed in his essay, some finish education only to fulfil the wishes of their parents. Especially male teenagers imagine themselves working abroad, no matter if it was in the blue-collar sector, as 'good money' can be 'made' compared to what could be earned in Kosovo. Citing cases of highly educated migrants whose qualifications are often not recognized abroad, forcing them to take on blue-collar jobs, they argue that education is not a precondition to finding work and income opportunities abroad.

## GENDER ROLES AND FEMALE EMPLOYMENT

As Reineck (1991) observed in the late 1980s, parents in Opoja tended to marginalize their daughters where higher education decisions were concerned because of financial constraints as well as the patriarchal gender and family values. This prevented many women from taking up employment and rendered them dependent on their natal families, husbands and in-laws. A rapidly dropping fertility rate since the late 1980s, from an average fertility rate of 6.7 children per woman in rural households in 1981 (Malcolm 1998: 332) to an average of about two children in overall Kosovo in 2011 (see KAS 2013 and Latifi 2015: 13) and even less than two children per woman in 2019 (Kosovo Agency of Statistics 2020), probably also contributed to the lowering of the dropout rate of girls in school. Nevertheless, at the time of my fieldwork in Opoja, various parents and husbands did not want their daughters or wives to seek employment. They were convinced that female members of the household taking up employment would damage their reputation, as men outside the family circle might approach them, or female employment might create the impression that they had been pressured to work because of the family's difficult economic situation.

In regard to his then eighteen-year-old daughter, who recently graduated from secondary school, Agon remarked: 'It does not make sense for her to work, she will only lose; she cannot gain anything (with work).' Based on these notions, it is still common for female teenagers and young women in Opoja to stay home, especially after finishing the nine years of elementary school, at age fifteen, or after the twelfth grade in secondary school – at age eighteen. That is different in other rural regions of Kosovo, where a larger percentage of girls were undergoing higher education already in the 1970s, and a far higher percentage of women were employed at least from the 1980s onwards. In this sense, Opoja is more conservative than other regions in Kosovo – especially the urban centres.

In Opoja, gender relations are also spatially pronounced. Boys and young men meet for soccer or basketball in the yard of the primary school. Often, they can also be seen lingering or chatting in the streets. Alternatively, they congregate in a coffee bar, where they have access to the internet and TV. At the time of my fieldwork, most *vajzat*, the Albanian word denoting adolescent unmarried girls, were discouraged by their parents and the *rrethi* (the social circle) from being seen by themselves in the streets or coffee bars. Twelve-year-old Valentina said, for example, that girls are not supposed to sit in a café: 'I take the coffee home. I could go to the café, but this is embarrassing, as the others ridicule me. The adults have always said we should not sit in the café.' However, gender relations and gender positionings are far from clear cut in Opoja. For instance, on festive days like the day of *verza*

(celebration of the start of spring), teenage girls are even 'expected' to dress up and team up in groups to take a stroll up and down the village street, to attract the gaze of young men. Some male teenagers do the same but in neighbouring villages, as village exogamy is still the rule. Most young men get a ride in a friend's car to visit a neighbouring village, where they check out other girls on the stroll, call out to them and try to involve them in short conversations from the car windows.

Female teenagers and young women in Opoja who stay home after finishing school spend time on the internet, help their mothers with household chores, or also concentrate on needlework to make their marriage trousseau (*qejz*), a practice that has a long tradition in the region. The *qejz* is, among other things, an assortment of intricately embroidered tablecloths. The female guests of the family usually inspect the needlework to express their appreciation for the girl's diligence and skilfulness. But the village community also accepts that girls who pursue higher education lack the time or interest to engage in needlework. Thus, life worlds and gender roles and values in Opoja are gradually becoming more diverse, and young women striving for emancipation live alongside those who conform to patriarchal role models.

Given the practice of village exogamy and the expectation that sons will remain in their parents' household for at least a short period after marriage, women are often integrated into this household and are expected to adapt to their role as newly in-married woman, which follows certain patriarchal rules. Customarily, this also happens on a symbolic level. Once married, parents-in-law – and often also other family members of the groom – refer to the newly in-married woman as the 'bride of' the groom (e.g. *nuse Agonit*, or *nuse Valonit*). At the time of my fieldwork, married women were often more or less confined to the house and the yard, and various young married women told me that it was considered improper to walk the street without an escort.

Many young women – and men – regard this control over married women as 'unmodern', 'outdated', 'fanatical' or even 'uncivilized'. They highlight the many recent transformations towards more egalitarian gender relations and/or are convinced that such transformations will take place in the region within a few years or decades. Most young women still feel incapable of transgressing these boundaries set by the *rrethi* as they do not want to provide fodder for village gossip, which could reflect negatively on their families. As soon as they leave Opoja, however, for instance for a shopping trip in the town of Prizren, which not only has an old bazar but also large shopping malls with 'modern' coffee bars, women from Opoja walk alone freely and enjoy stopping by for a coffee and spending some leisure time there. This double standard that splits the village as a patriarchal community space from the city environs, which are largely freed from such confinements, is common and accepted.



**Figure 1.3.** Village street in Opoja (© Carolin Leutloff-Grandits)

Most married women, however, are not as free to leave Opoja, and they spend their time mainly in the company of other women from within the household or the *mahalla*. Apart from their household chores and caring tasks for the children and the elderly, many commit much of their leisure time to needlework and embroidering intricate flower decorations on blouses as well as the headdress to match the *dimia* and *dallama*, the traditional costume worn at wedding ceremonies (see also Chapter 6). Married women often also take orders for these hand-embroidered vestments from migrants. With this, they could earn up to 1,000 euros for a hand-decorated blouse – the work of several weeks – which they may use, amongst other things, to finance their children’s education or buy them clothes. This means that even in the patriarchal setting of many Opoja households women can become economically active.

According to UNDP (2012: 41), the number of ‘economically active’ women in Opoja was still small in 2011 – about 25 per cent of the overall female population of working age – which reflected the overall picture in Kosovo (but it is not clear if women who sell embroideries are included in this number). The number of employed women, amounting to only 3 per cent, was even smaller. In various cases, the opportunities were seasonal. A female hairdresser, whose husband supported her work and helped her set up a beauty salon in the yard of the family home, operated the salon only during the summer months to serve women planning to attend wedding celebrations, as the demand was otherwise low. Of the very few women in the region with salaried jobs, some worked as primary school teachers and



**Figure 1.4.** Handmade tablecloths in Opoja (© Carolin Leutloff-Grandits)

nurses – thus in fields that reflected the national standard.<sup>4</sup> More recently, village women have begun to work in a textile factory and as cashiers in a large, recently opened modern supermarket in Dragash – which is different from the relatively small village shops in Opoja, where only men work. This indicates a (renewed) shift in the acceptance of women as part of the general workforce. So far, however, women who work in public administration in Dragash are not from Opoja but from the town of Prizren and often do a daily commute to their workplace, underlining the gap between urban areas and the rural region of Opoja in terms of gender roles.

Young women from the village who finish vocational training or even university education in Prishtina or Prizren often do not return but remain in the urban environs to take up employment there – for instance, in the banking sector. Women from the Opoja villages have also increasingly been taking jobs in Dragash. However, owing to the lack of childcare facilities in the Opoja villages and in the town of Dragash, married women with children (which many have soon after marriage) who work outside their home depend on the support of their in-laws or other family members, but their way of life is seen as disentangled from the local community. Liridona, for example, whose in-laws take care of her children, has a distinct place in the village community as she is the only woman in the village who works for an international organization in the local municipal town. While she contributes part of her income to the joint household expenses, she keeps some for herself as savings in case they move again and want to buy a flat or build a house somewhere else, as she explained to me. Liridonra's way of life is ac-

cepted among villagers, but some middle-aged villagers do not consider her a role model for women in Opoja. They explained that she originates from a different region and met her husband during their study years in Prishtina and does not follow the regional customs or local values of the village *rrethi*.

Liridona's way of life has not strongly influenced other women of her age – not least because Liridona does not socialize much with other village women – owing to time constraints. Still, women from Opoja who study and work in Dragash, Prizren or Prishtina, sometimes also after marriage, and even if they are no longer in regular contact with their village peers at 'home', as well as those who move abroad and take up salaried work there, are gradually managing to change people's opinions about gender roles. With this, they contribute to women in Opoja imagining new roles for themselves. Based on family status and education, or to what extent one is perceived as an in- or outsider, accepted gender roles in Opoja could be very diverse. As such, there is no palpable uniform or homogeneous 'moral code' within the village but rather several relational codes that inform gender, kinship and local relations in a translocal space.

### ISLAM AS A FACTOR OF CHANGE

Questions about the impact of Islam on family relations that were posed by a largely Western audience when I presented my fieldwork findings revealed stereotypical ideas about Islam being based on 'backward' 'patriarchal' family values. Those who knew about Islam in Kosovo highlighted the fact that Opoja has been known for its religiosity throughout history. Given that Islam had re-entered the region with new force in the 1990s, first with the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia and, subsequently, after the war in 1999, and that fundamentalist Islamic streams from abroad (e.g. Sunni Islam from Turkey but also Wahabism from Saudi Arabia) gained influence in Kosovo (Bougarel 2005: 11; Hening and Bielenin-Lenczowska 2013: 1; Elbasani and Roy 2015), they wondered why I had barely mentioned the role of Islam and its impact on family relationships.

Contextualizing the role of Islam in Opoja, its long-standing influence is evident in the visual appearance of the villages, as each has a mosque with a minaret, which was built before Kosovo became part of socialist Yugoslavia (Qafleshi 2011: 162–63). In the 1990s, keeping with the trend all over Kosovo, almost all mosques began to be renovated, a process that lasted well into the new millennium. After the end of war in 1999, now keeping with the trend of mosque building, a new, large mosque with four minarets funded mainly through migrant remittances was built in one of the villages. But what was the significance of Islam on the ground – was it based on a new

form of religiosity that emerged in Kosovo and Opoja after socialism, or was it primarily a marker of identity? And in what ways did it influence gender and family relations and family care?

During my fieldwork, the role of Islam was hardly mentioned by my interlocutors. Only when I asked them directly did they tell me that they considered themselves Muslims, often without distinguishing between different Islamic directions or emphasizing that they, like the majority of Kosovo Albanians, followed the Hanafi (Sunni) school of Islam. They saw Islam as part of their local identity and considered it important that their spouses were Muslims, too.<sup>5</sup> Still, many stressed the need for tolerance and openness towards Christians and often highlighted in our conversations that Albanians are not all Muslims but also Catholic or Orthodox Christians (although, in Kosovo, the number of non-Muslim Albanians is less than 5 per cent) (see US Department of State 2012). Others even stressed that their own ancestors had been Christians who had converted to Islam during Ottoman rule.<sup>6</sup>

For my interlocutors, Islam did not necessarily have practical implications for family life and gender roles. For this reason, I did not use it as a category of analysis (see Brubaker 2013). The way Islam is practised in everyday life varies, however, from village to village, from family to family and person to person. As Islamic prayers are in the Arabic language and public schools do not offer religious education, even after Kosovo's independence was proclaimed in 2008, the knowledge about Islam is limited and not all families have preserved the age-old tradition of chanting prayers. Although the local *hoxha* offers voluntary religious education for girls and boys in the *medrese* (Islamic school linked to the mosque) during the summer break, only a small number of pupils attend. The number of men who attend the daily mosque services tends to be small, too, while women only frequent, if at all, the new mosque, which has a special section reserved for women. Still, some women and men pray daily in the privacy of their homes, and women teach and encourage their (grand-)children to pray and the girls to wear a headscarf during the prayers.

Islam is more influential in the month of Ramadan, when especially the women observe fasting from dawn to sunset, and no weddings are celebrated during that month. For the *iftar*, the breaking of the fast after sunset, relatives are occasionally invited. In recent years, the imam has always invited male community members to a joint *iftar* outside the mosque. Family members, and especially women, normally meet up for a joint meal (*syfyr*) shortly before sunrise, at which time a procession of boys beating drums goes through the village. For the main Islamic festival of Bajram at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan, numerous migrants travel to Opoja, and those who cannot attend the festivities communicate with their families digitally.

During my fieldwork, the headscarf (Arabic *hijab*), which is known as the *havale* in Kosovo (Reineck 1991: 103) and is a prominent symbol of adherence to the Islamic faith, was hardly seen in the larger towns in Kosovo, although it has become more fashionable again for some of the younger women. In Kosovo, as elsewhere, the meaning of the headscarf has changed throughout history – not least owing to its politicization (Ghodsee 2008, 2010). While the headscarf had been an omnipresent feature in Kosovo in the pre-socialist era, under socialism, the Yugoslav state had forced women to get rid of the headscarf, which was also seen as symbol of ‘backwardness’ and female oppression (Popovic 1986; Clayer 2010; Clayer and Bouragel 2013; Sadriu 2015). This was not completely successful – as photos from the time of socialism document. In today’s Kosovo, the main political parties also partly reject the headscarf, arguing that it does not fit into Kosovo’s notion of an Islam that is ‘soft’, ‘European’ and ‘modern’ and that rejects patriarchal values (Bougarel 2005, 2007; Clayer 2010; Sadriu 2015). In accordance with the constitution, which prescribes state secularism, the wearing of headscarves has been banned in public institutions. Still, in today’s Opoja, most elderly women habitually wear smaller headscarves and long coats when they step out of their home.

Younger women have partly started to wear the headscarf in adherence to more orthodox notions of Islam in terms of patriarchal norms that ascribe different roles to men and women in public and private realms (Kaser 2021: 66). But the wearing of a headscarf does not necessarily have to clash with notions of modernity and education. Young women from Opoja who wear the *havale* consider this practice modern and not regressive. These women, as well as the men, see the *havale* as protecting women from being seen as sexualized objects, a trend they believe is especially prevalent in Western, capitalist societies. Within this logic, some women emphasize that wearing the *havale* is consistent with the emancipated role of women, as the headscarf would give them more freedom to be active in public spaces.

### NEW MEANS OF STAYING CONNECTED AND THEIR EFFECTS ON VILLAGE LIFE

While (out)migration has become more permanent since the 1990s, the start of the new millennium heralded the era of ‘new communication technologies’ and thus increased possibilities for staying connected. This has helped villagers to maintain links with dispersed relatives. At the time of my fieldwork, nearly every household with relatives abroad also had a computer, often bought by the migrants, with internet connectivity that allowed them



to stay in touch without spatial mobility, and nearly free of cost (Levitt 1998; Vertovec 2004). In Opoja as well as abroad, the computer is often placed in the living room and connected to the internet all day long, showing the importance of staying in contact with relatives abroad and their willingness to communicate throughout the day. I also variously observed villagers use an integrated computer camera so relatives abroad could see children of the family at play or virtually take part in family gatherings. This also included me: when I stayed in Opoja, family members introduced me to relatives abroad during a digital conversation and similarly when I sat with migrants from Opoja in their living room in Germany or Austria who were using Skype I got to meet family members from back home.

The use of social media like Facebook to remain in contact across territorial distances delocalizes the village while at the same time creating a translocal space within which various localities bundle. Villagers as well as migrants upload photos showing their children or newborns, or they post about graduation parties, engagement ceremonies or weddings. More generally, the virtual connections, and the information and pictures shared, became 'the social glue' of translocal relations, to use Steve Vertovec's expression (2004; see also Levitt 2001: 22–23; Baldassar 2007b: 389).

The villagers emphasize that this possibility to stay in contact with migrants abroad is a big difference from pre-war times, when telecommunication was a rarity, and calls were very expensive. In 1953, the first public telephone was installed in one of the villages, followed by another village and Dragash in 1974, but private phone lines were never installed, not even after the war in 1999. Apart from sending letters, Opoja villagers relied on relatives living elsewhere, mainly in the town of Prizren, for a private telephone connection. Vlora's father Agon said that during his stay abroad in the 1990s his sister-in-law's parents in Prizren were the only ones with a home phone, so he was mostly only able to stay in contact with his brother and mother and not his wife. With the introduction of internet connectivity and later, around 2010, of smartphones, virtual lines provided more privacy to geographically distant family members and made it possible for villagers and migrants to maintain intimate relations over long distances. Some households have more than one computer, and young people whose partners are abroad are supplied with a laptop or a mobile phone to facilitate close contact and ensure privacy. Again, villagers evaluate this in positive terms, and especially women see this as a big advancement.

Visits to Kosovo have also become easier since the end of the war for a variety of reasons. In the 1990s, many migrants with pending asylum cases could not travel back and forth (see Chapter 2), and many male migrants additionally feared military drafts and even persecution as soon as they entered Kosovo. Since the 1990s, and even after the 1999 war, most Kosovo-



**Figure 1.5.** Buses en route from Austria to Opoja near the Serbian border  
(© Carolin Leutloff-Grandits)

Albanians have sought to avoid potential conflict with Serbian authorities or extremists by travelling to Kosovo through Northern Albania. As the streets in the mountainous regions of Albania were in a very bad state, travelling was considerably dangerous and took days. With the completion of the new highway from Albania's coast to the border with Kosovo in 2010 (see Hemming 2014), most took advantage of this more expedient route. From 2011, when ethnic conflict was calming down and Serbia started accepting identity cards for adults and birth certificates for children from Kosovo as travel documents (Republika e Kosovës 2011), Kosovo-Albanian migrants started travelling to Kosovo via Serbia again, the easier and faster way. Progress was also been made when a highway was finished in 2013 in Kosovo, linking Prishtina to the south of Kosovo and the border with Albania. From Vienna, Opoja is now reachable in less than fifteen hours instead of the forty plus hours it previously took via Albania.

Apart from the necessary road infrastructure and legal conditions, new bus connections have created an easier link between villagers and migrants. Several bus companies in Opoja offer daily rides to Belgrade and once or twice a week to various Austrian towns – based on the seasonal needs –



**Figure 1.6.** A local bus company operating between Opoja and Austria (© Carolin Leutloff-Grandits)

and since employees and travellers often know each other, the service has a rather intimate feel. Migrants and their families who ‘return home’ for a visit use these buses particularly in the summer months, when schools in the migrant destinations are closed. Not only passengers but also goods travel in both directions. Migrants send envelopes with money and parcels with clothes and other items to family members back home, while the villagers send homemade dishes. Most common are *flia*, a very labour-intensive national dish cooked in a pan on an open fire that requires stacking several layers of pancakes with yoghurt and buttercream spread between them, or *pite*, puff pastry with a filling.

The irrevocable introduction of the internet in village households, and its widespread use after the war, has unsurprisingly also affected the life of children and the youth. From pre-school age, most village children are acquainted with YouTube videos and films, as well as computer games. Boys often play motor races and other action games and girls play with digital Barbie dolls, which they dress following the latest American fashions and styles, or with digital ‘dress-up’ houses consisting of numerous rooms, among them children’s rooms, which they can furnish with Western housing equipment. The virtual reality to which they are now accustomed is a lot different from the world in which they live, as numerous children do not have their own room, for example, but sleep either with their parents or grandparents, or, when older, also in the living room. Nevertheless, the declared aim is to own such materialities and create these living worlds.

As most children and especially teens have their own social media accounts, they use digital platforms to create their personal identity, express their dreams and link up to the globalized world. As a lot of people do in social spaces across the globe, they curate their digital profile with personal photos and a variety of links to music and images, as well as comments, which they often post daily (see also Krasniqi 2017; Chapter 4). Expecting responses from peers in the village as well as abroad, girls, for example, publish pictures of high heels, IKEA bedrooms and wedding dresses – both tying themselves into the increasingly universal world of consumption while assuming gendered roles. Male teenagers share photos of international soccer teams, glamorous cars, ‘cool’ guys and ‘hot’ girls. Both also share photos of romantically involved young couples, swimming pools in Kosovo or wellness spas and beaches in Albania and around the world, as well as actors of famous telenovelas or Hollywood films and proverbs, slogans and images they consider ‘cool’ or humorous. The internet thus contributed to what Beck, Giddens and Lash (1996) call ‘a reflexive modernization’, in that certain notions of Western modernity, but also notions of modernity in other places in the world, such as Turkey, became an integral part of the life worlds of villagers from Opoja and shaped their gender roles. This happened, though not always consciously, through multiple flows in a translocal realm, of which the internet was only one of many.

In the digital age, Opoja villagers, especially teenagers, have succumbed to the global phenomenon of digital addiction. Images jokingly disseminated online among young people include a gravestone of a teenage friend, who, according to the inscription posted online, died of Facebook withdrawal. No different from Western Europe, many parents complain that school children, particularly those in their teens, ‘waste time’ (*hup kohë*) in front of the computer or phone instead of learning, but they are often not resourceful enough to offer them alternative leisure activities.

The visual as well as virtual spheres have taken on more importance because they open up alternative spaces where divisions and hierarchies can be more easily suspended and new social relations can be created that impact real life worlds and influence personal communications and styles in the village, especially among young people. A growing acceptance of the ‘power’ of teenage self-determination is one of the developments that has convinced the older generation that everything has indeed changed since the war. Children, and especially teenagers, dress up to be seen as fashionable and attractive by their peers. Many teenage girls today have taken to wearing tight trousers and shirts and wear make-up – often for school as well. Schools are considered a meeting point where teenagers may fall in love with a prospective marriage partner. Some parents, therefore, only allow their daughters to use make-up and wear certain clothes after they

graduate from school, as they do not want them prematurely engaging in a love affair.

As shown by Anja Peleikis (2003) for Lebanon and Miller (2012) for Trinidad, the use of social media creates new spheres of freedom and intimacy and accelerates transformations in social relations. Teenagers in Opoja can now exchange intimate thoughts and arrange secret dates with someone they like. Even parents who want to restrict the use or possession of a mobile phone, especially for their daughters, cannot really curb this trend because of their teenagers' peer pressure. During my fieldwork, I observed the rapid dissemination of mobile phones, and in summer 2013 nearly every household member from the age of fifteen upwards, including female teenagers and unmarried women, had their own mobile phone. At about the same time, smartphones became extremely fashionable, and male teenagers as well as male adults were the first to receive a phone as a gift from relatives abroad, as only a handful in the region could afford them.

Last but not least, a very important technology that links the village to the globalized world is still the 'old-fashioned' television. Television was introduced to the village during socialism but is now a common household item in the main living room, often on permanently on mute, and household members and visitors may view it passively to pass time. Very popular are telenovelas from Turkey and other places around the world with Albanian subtitles, but also entertainment series like 'Big Brother Albania', which is watched across gender and generational lines. Among the youth, furthermore, American and German TV channels like Nickelodeon or KiKa are popular. Male teenagers and men also watch international soccer games on big flat screens in the nearby café bars.

Even elderly and middle-aged villagers use social media like Messenger and Facebook to remain connected to children and relatives abroad, but also for internal village concerns, such as to announce their visits or exchange news. At the local family-owned store, the computer is a multifunctional tool, used for calculating the purchases of customers, but also for entertainment – for instance, music and wedding videos on YouTube, or online chess – to shorten the long working hours (8.00 AM to 10.00 PM). Furthermore, it enables the shopkeeper to receive orders from customers via Facebook and Messenger, which he then delivers to the customer. That this has a gender dimension became clear to me when the local shopkeeper, after having invited me for a cup of coffee in his nearby bar, called my attention to this service. He added that I would no longer need to physically visit the store, which was, in his view, especially inconvenient for women, as it entailed walking through the village. In fact, in Opoja, the use of social media could lead to an emergence of emancipatory spaces that could foster the transformation of gender relations and positionalities towards more gender equality, but, as already observed by

Miller (2012) for other parts of the world, social media are also used to exercise a certain degree of social control, as they set norms and a code of conduct and even re-establish patriarchal relations and role models.

## CONCLUSION

Opoja has been affected not just by the war, which ended in 1999, and the declaration of Kosovo's independence in 2008, but also by post-socialist, neo-liberal transformations, ongoing globalization and, finally, the decade-long migration processes that have expanded kin networks and households beyond state borders. This has led to the emergence of 'global villagers' (Levitt 2001), who not only rely on translocal connections but are also perpetually linked to a translocal locality no matter where they live. As this chapter has shown, there are very ambivalent and internally differentiated dynamics that unfold in different spheres within the Opoja region, like in agriculture, economy and education. These dynamics impact the livelihoods of villagers, their social security strategies and life perspectives, as well as the structuring of gender relations. Villagers link these dynamics to their own notions of modernity and progress as well as tradition and backwardness, according to which they shape their life trajectories and future visions.

Since the end of the war, many households are no longer economically bound to agriculture and/or husbandry, because dependency on such economies is largely considered regressive, and especially younger people want to embrace a modern lifestyle, which they actively express through fashion and house building and decorating styles. With this, the binaries of urban and rural, as well as centre and periphery, are largely dissolved. In line with the parental generation, most young people also believe in the progressive force of education to enhance employment opportunities, even though education is no longer the guarantor of achieving a better life, as evidenced by the high unemployment rates even among the educated and the widespread clientelism. All this, however, has also increased the dependency on remittances and migration as a source of livelihood and results in an ongoing outflow of village migrants to Western European countries. With this, the differences between the centre and the periphery are simultaneously re-established.

The diverse regional interconnections with a globalized world, including the massive use of social media such as Facebook and Messenger, have given rise to a common refrain among Opoja villagers that village life has changed enormously and created new living worlds in which various localities are integrated. This includes the redefinition of gender and generational relations, even if these changes are not always clearly visible. Even as girls in increasing numbers complete secondary education and aspire to wage employment,

most women remain at home, not least because villagers continue to adhere to various patriarchal norms that influence gender and family relations as well as community life – even if they largely regard these norms as outdated. At the same time, women – and men – also use alternative digital spaces that may intersect with or influence real life worlds. Young women who have completed education and/or taken up wage employment follow more emancipated gender norms and lifestyles – which in turn is accepted in the village context. Other women leave the region for higher education or opt for international migration. As a result, divergent life worlds exist next to each other in Opoja, sometimes creating a larger impact on each other.

As the old and new life concepts mix or simply coexist, Opoja can be seen as taking a new position in relation to hegemonic notions of periphery and centre. This also blurs the boundaries of centre and periphery, rural and urban. While these boundaries take on a distinct meaning situationally, and in some contexts, Opoja seems more peripheral than ever, in other contexts the distance between the centre and the periphery, as well as modernity and backwardness, has narrowed, and it is not clear who sets the scale and how it is measured.

#### NOTES

1. For labour migration from Kosovo to Belgrade and other towns in Serbia in the 1950s and 1960s, see Vickers (1998: 159).
2. Those who found their houses damaged by the war also received donations from international organizations. In the Opoja region, this affected only a small number of families.
3. This can be seen in the re-establishment of the common municipality of Gora and Opoja, where the Gorani occupy about one-third of the seats in the local parliament and the employment share of Gorani and Albanians in public sector employment mirrors approximately the ethnic structure in the municipality (36 per cent Gorani and Bosnijak, 59 per cent Albanian) (UNDP 2012: 38; Schmidinger 2013; Reinmüller 2015: 80–85). However, about 62 per cent of the registered inhabitants of the Gora region lived abroad in 2007 (UNDP 2012: 35). Still, the relatively good interethnic climate is an example of good practice in Kosovo, as in other regions interethnic cooperation is barely attainable.
4. During the violent conflicts of the late 1990s, a nursery school opened in one of the villages, and the women working as nurses enjoyed a good reputation in the community, as they achieved power and status based on their earnings and their work for the community. Thus, not only in urban areas but even in rural Opoja, the conflict years created a space for emancipation for at least some women – although in general, the conflict tended to foster patriarchal gender norms as a byproduct of nation making (Luci 2005, 2014). This is, however, not specific to Kosovo but was observed also in other war regions in former Yugoslavia and beyond (see, for Croatia, Basić 2004). Currently, the most important sector for female employment in Kosovo is

- education (21 per cent), trade (18 per cent) and health and social work (15 per cent) as well as public administration (13 per cent) (UNDP 2012: 41–42).
5. For religious tolerance and diversity in (pre-)socialist Kosovo and its politicization in the 1990s, see Duijzings (2000), and in the border region of Albania and Montenegro from the 1990s also Tošić (2017) and Hysa (2015), who observed and analysed interethnic marriages between Serbian men and Albanian women in the Albanian Montenegrin borderland.
  6. For more insights into the history of Opoja and Gora from medieval times onwards, see Qaflehi (2011). For information about the historical roots of Christianity in Kosovo, see Vickers (1998: 159).



## CHAPTER

# 2

## MIGRANT TRAJECTORIES

### *Shifting Relations of Translocal Families*



## INTRODUCTION

Migration routes and mobility patterns are part of almost every family history in Kosovo. They have also generated rich translocal family networks. As if to reiterate that point, Fatos, aged seventy, who migrated to Austria for work in the 1970s and 1980s while his parents, wife and three children stayed home, introduced me to his extended family through the migration histories of each family member. His children left Kosovo with the intensification of the ethno-political conflict in the early 1990s. As at that point, it was no longer possible to enter the EU legally without a visa, as Fatos had done, one son used the family reunification programme, while another took advantage of the support of his extended family to cross the borders without documentation before he applied for asylum in the receiving country. His daughter married an Opoja migrant and moved to Austria through marriage migration. His family history shows that the timing of migration is quintessential, as the border regimes and immigration policies determine the modality of migration. While migration continued to be an important source of livelihood in the 1990s and in the new millennium, migration modalities and experiences have changed enormously. This has given rise to differences between the generations. But, at the same time, these differences in experiences and modalities are, in part, also bridged within the family framework. To that extent, the family emerges as an institution that paves

the way for migration. More generally, migration trajectories in Kosovo are influenced by two factors: the sociopolitical and legal framework and family and kinship relations.

Instead of regarding migrants as a single, homogeneous group based on nationality and ethnicity (for a critical approach, see Glick Schiller 2014: 157–59; Römhild 2014: 259; Vertovec 2015), this chapter sheds light on the interplay between the migration management of Western European states and the border-crossing family network in the construction, regulation and management of different migrant trajectories. It also points to diverse intrafamilial dynamics that unfold in biographical narrations, especially in relation to gendered and generational positionings at different locations and across nation state borders, which also impact on each other – thus also creating translocal positionings (Anthias 2006). Stories of migrants who traversed established migration trajectories and assumed the mantle of responsibility to perform ‘expected’ family roles contrast with those that pursued novel trajectories and family roles abroad.

Among studies highlighting the interlinkages between law and family relations on migrant trajectories, Heike Drotbohm’s (2014) work frames the trajectories of migrants from Cape Verde as a response to immigration policies, which impact the migrants’ potential to enter the workforce and secure residency rights or more generally their capacity to ‘do things, get things, be socially mobile’ (see also Frings et al. 2014; Vertovec 2015). Drotbohm also shows that the migration project is a quintessentially family project that enhances the family’s social security. Who counts as family and can access the right to family migration, however, depends not only on the intrafamilial dynamics and emic notions of family, but often on the legal framing. In Western states, family migration is largely limited to spouses and underage children, and thus generally to the nuclear family. Still, as shown by Karolina Bielenin-Lenczowska (2014b: 517) in her research on migrants from Macedonia in Italy, families can establish a strong border-crossing network, with individual family members occupying different positions of influence in different social contexts and nation states.

‘Family’ is expected to show ‘border-crossing solidarity’ to newly arriving migrants in the form of financial, logistical, physical or informational assistance. Such translocal solidarity mitigates the effects of the pronounced territorialized economic inequalities between the Global North and the Global South and improves the positions of individual migrants in the migration destinations (Moulier-Boutang 2002). Cross-border family networks often counteract the inadequacies of the prevalent migratory legal framework through new forms and systems of family cooperation and communication beyond the migration regime of the single nation states or supranational institutions like the European Union. Family thus contributes to what Manuela

Bojadzijeve and Serhat Karakayali (Bojadzijeve and Karakayali 2006; Bojadzijeve 2006) have called the 'autonomy of migration'. However, migration is not an autonomous process affecting merely the individual but one that relates to the global framework of power relations and reshapes the processes of place making, state making and region making, as Ayşe Çağlar and Nina Glick Schiller (2011a: 149) have pointed out. It is therefore important to contextualize migrant agency and vulnerabilities within global power relations and to point to individual positions of migrants in different localities (ibid.: 150).

While the support family members offer within the migration project is often indispensable, the role of the family is double-edged. The support extended by the family network is based on gender and generational norms and concerns, as well as the community and family histories, beyond the availability of economic and social resources. As various social scientists have shown (e.g. Herzowitz-Emden 2000; Six-Hohenbalken 2009; Fourn and Glick Schiller 2010), family may not only smoothen the migration project but may also pose a barrier by creating pressures and divisions along gender and generational lines.

Building on this literature, this chapter aims at contextualizing migrants' agency and vulnerability within the global framework of power relations to underscore migrants' individual positions and agency in different localities. More specifically, this chapter analyses migrant agency along gendered and generational positionings in translocal family networks. It highlights the importance of family support in the migration project but also the ambivalences that arise from it. In order to discern such differentiations, interrelations, dependencies and agencies, the chapter adopts a diachronic perspective on such positionings in cross-border family networks. It highlights three time frames in which migration options shifted significantly, and with that also the migration channels and family relations (Mustafa et al. 2007). It starts with shifts in labour migration from the 1960s to the 1990s before addressing other migrant trajectories, like family reunification and asylum applications in the 1990s. It then outlines migrant trajectories that have gained in significance in the new millennium, when flight migration ceased to be an option, especially return migration or more permanent resettlement, as well as undocumented and seasonal migration.

## FROM LABOUR MIGRATION TO FAMILY REUNIFICATION AND FLIGHT MIGRATION

In Kosovo, the 'first phase' of international migration started in the 1960s, when socialist Yugoslavia signed labour recruitment agreements with Austria (in 1961, 1964 and 1966), Sweden (1966) and Germany (1968), and with

other Western European countries (Bauböck and Perchinig 2006), seeking industrial labour to support accelerated industrialization. This was seen as a temporary win-win situation for both the sending and receiving countries, as accelerated rates of industrialization in Western European states after the Second World War generated a greater need for industrial labour force, while Yugoslavia – despite mounting industrialization – was struggling with high unemployment rates (Sundhaussen 2012; Grandits 2015). At that time, international labour migration became the central feature of the Yugoslav economy and household (Brunnbauer 2009; Novinščak 2009: 122; Ivanović 2012).

The global economic crisis led to the termination of recruitment agreements for migrants in 1973, but this did not prevent the continuing surge of migrants from Kosovo, where economic development was even slower than in other parts of Yugoslavia, and where a high fertility rate and a subsequent demographic rise of the (mainly Albanian) population led to a spike in unemployment numbers from 12 per cent in 1960 to 20 per cent in 1970, and finally to 27 per cent in 1987 (Reineck 1991: 120). Based on the geopolitical status of socialist Yugoslavia as a block-free country that Western European states and the US were courting, migrants from socialist Yugoslavia could use their Yugoslav ‘red passport’ to travel visa-free to Western Europe (Janzen 2009: 821–23). They found predominantly blue-collar jobs with the support of relatives and acquaintances abroad, who actively provided contacts to prospective employees (Blumi 2003: 960).

In contrast to labour migrants from Turkey or migrants from other constituent republics of socialist Yugoslavia, such as Croatia or Serbia, who either returned to their home country or brought their families into the receiving country from the 1970s onwards (Bauböck and Perchinig 2006), many Kosovo-Albanian labour migrants took a different route. Even after living for decades in Western European countries they remained an active part of a household in a village in Kosovo, normally comprised of their parents and their spouse and children and partly also their brothers’ families (see Reineck 1991; Aarburg and Gretler 2008; Pichler 2016). Without family dependents in the receiving countries at that time, migrants from Kosovo – then an autonomous province within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) – were often labelled as ‘Yugoslavs’ in the country of immigration, and the fact that many spoke Albanian, not a Slavic language, went largely unnoticed (Blumi 2003: 952; Aarburg and Gretler 2008: 2). This was fostered by the lack of policies and measures to socially integrate the so-called labour migrants (and subsequently their family members) or even grant them permanent residency, let alone citizenship. Instead, the receiving countries assumed that labour migration was temporary. This contributed to the emergence of a new social underclass in Western (European) market

economies, composed of migrants without citizenship, whose prospects for work and social mobility were and are limited (Faist 1993; Szelenyi 2001; Glick Schiller 2014), and the emergence of migrant communities in the receiving countries, whose members largely socialized among themselves, often along village and regional identities based on their places of origin (Blumi 2003: 953).

The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 brought about the violent dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and transformed the world map. This also had serious implications for Kosovo and ushered in the 'second phase' of international migration from Kosovo. The empowerment of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia in the second half of the 1980s as the central figure of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) from 1987 to 2000 spurred conflicts between the Serbian minority and the Albanian majority, which made up 77.4 per cent of Kosovo's population according to the 1981 census (see Republic of Kosovo 2015). In addition, changed demographics and a dramatic decline of the Serbian population exacerbated the conflicts. According to the 1948 census, Serbs made up 27.5 per cent of the Kosovo population, while in 1981, the Serbian population stood at 13.2 per cent. This decline was attributed to a higher Albanian birth rate, as well as the Serbs' emigration to Serbia (Schmitt 2008: 300), which was again politically interpreted. From 1989 onwards, the Serbian government annulled Kosovo's autonomous status and fully (re)integrated it into the Republic of Serbia within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In its aftermath, Albanians were systematically excluded from state institutions and public welfare services (including health care and education) (Vickers 1998: 262–63). As a result, increasingly young men left Kosovo to escape a variety of circumstances: persecution and draft into the Serbian-dominated army, discrimination, unemployment – then up to 70 per cent among Albanians – and the generally declining living standards (*ibid.*: 272–78; Clewing 2006: 125). The 'second phase' of international migration from Kosovo thus also greatly impacted family relations as family members in Kosovo became increasingly dependent on relatives abroad and migrants left Kosovo primarily for security reasons, in addition to intensifying economic reasons.

The ethnopolitical conflict in Kosovo received relatively little attention in Western European media for a long time, mainly because of its nonviolent character. In contrast, the bloody wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the first half of the 1990s, which followed the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1990, garnered much more international attention. Because of these wars, and more broadly because of the post-socialist transformation, Western European states experienced a strong influx of refugees and migrants from post-socialist countries, especially the war-torn successor states of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia –

first of all Bosnia-Herzegovina but also Croatia and the then so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which comprised the former socialist republics of Serbia including the former autonomous province of Kosovo and Montenegro. Compared to other regions in Kosovo, Opoja was never a hotspot of the conflict, likely also because Opoja's Albanian-speaking inhabitants had long maintained good relations with the Gorani, an autochthonous Slavic-speaking group<sup>1</sup> of the neighbouring region of Gora (UNDP 2012: 18–19), with whom they share not only their Muslim faith but historically also their lifestyle – with husbandry, pastoralism and migration forming the economic core for many centuries. Yet, in the 1990s, relations between the two population groups became tense, and the inhabitants of Opoja experienced discrimination on a regular basis and were suspended from their jobs. As violent incidents against them increased (see Meleqi 1994: 119–20, 2009; Reinmüller 2015: 47–48),<sup>2</sup> more and more left Kosovo, joining the refugees from other former Yugoslav republics. In response, especially from 1993 onwards, countries such as Austria, Switzerland and Germany tightened their asylum policy and introduced quota regimes for foreign labour and those seeking family reunification (see Fassmann and Münz 1996: 219–20; Bauböck and Perchinig 2006). For the (former) Yugoslav citizens, among them many Albanians from Kosovo who were fleeing persecution and (violent) attacks, the possibility of travelling to Western Europe without restrictions had vanished.

### *Gendered and Generational Challenges of Migrating Sons in the 1990s*

In the early 1990s, numerous – predominantly male – youngsters, several well educated, joined their fathers and other relatives who worked as 'Gastarbeiter' ('guestworkers') abroad, either via family migration or as undocumented migrants. This severely impacted the gender and generational relations within the families and across locations. At the same time, it shattered some cherished goals, not least because those who had worked abroad since the 1960s had not planned on bringing over their sons and other family members (see Aarburg and Gretler 2008: 281, 287; Pichler 2009a on Albanian migrants from Macedonia). For most migrants from Opoja and the Albanian migrants from other regions in Kosovo and Macedonia, the village remained their 'epicentre' (Dahinden 2010: 64), their 'home' to which they planned to return someday. Their plan to work abroad for years or even decades was aimed at building a better family life back home through their accumulated savings (Von Aarburg and Gretler 2008: 287; Pichler 2009a; Dahinden 2010: 64; Bielenin-Lenczowska 2014b). The remittances of Opoja migrants represented a considerable portion of their salaries, which family heads, commonly their fathers, received with the freedom to use as they

chose – to buy land, build houses and finance wedding celebrations. Simultaneously, migrants sought to improve living conditions so that their sons could be spared the experience of migration and the sacrifices it entailed for the sake of the family (see also Reineck 1991). Instead, they wanted at least one of their sons to succeed in creating a better future in Kosovo through educational and professional achievements (ibid.: 166). Agon, born in the 1960s, whose father had first worked in Belgrade and then moved as a labour migrant to Austria in the early 1970s, while Agon spent his childhood in Opoja, reminisced as follows: 'He [my father] said that he had worked hard [as a labour migrant abroad]. He had worked in canalization. He said that it was better to stay here [in Opoja], finish the school and find a workplace.'

Labour migrants sought to orient their life purpose towards Opoja, primarily to ensure a better future for their children and other family members in the village. But the practice of sending remittances, and the goal to build a life 'back home', sometimes remained unsuccessful if, for example, their sons cultivated different aspirations, which was especially the case in the 1980s, when socialist modernization no longer had a firm grip on how people imagined their futures, and many young villagers started to dream of the 'Golden West', where they would have the possibility to own or consume Western products, ranging from sweets to 'original' Marlboro cigarettes to televisions (see also Leutloff-Grandits 2017). Ylber, reminiscing about his childhood in the 1980s, explained:

In every third house there was someone abroad. And we went to these houses and asked when they would come home. We wanted to see them. When they came for a visit, we would come to visit them in the evenings. We received biscuits. The one who came from Berlin was like an astronaut for us. A pilot. We thought that Berlin was somewhere outside, in an empty space. Then he came home and brought the first television. And I asked myself how is this possible, how is it possible that humankind is creating something like that?

In the wake of the political crisis in Kosovo in the 1990s, belief in a bright future at home was further undermined, and many young people welcomed the opportunity to join their fathers and travel abroad. However, that posed new intergenerational challenges, mainly as contact between fathers and sons had often been limited to the annual visits lasting a few weeks. During their short visit home, when fathers were also busy meeting with other relatives and working on the farm, their relationship with the sons remained distant, which hindered communication of perspectives and experiences. Thus the 'coming-of-age' experiences of sons when they joined their father abroad were not unproblematic (Burri Sharani et al. 2010: 59–61). Murat, for example, remembered that when he joined his father in Hamburg at the age of sixteen, he had to smoke secretly, since smoking in his presence was

considered disrespectful. Upon arriving in Germany, he got up early in the morning to secretly go out and buy some cigarettes. Though this was tricky, to him it was worth it, not least because it brought him what he had dreamed of in his village. He described the experience of being on his own for the first time in this foreign country:

I tried to remember my way, and when arriving at a supermarket I only said 'cigarettes', as I did not speak a word of German. Someone then gave me a packet of Marlboros. I wanted to pay, but I did not understand anything. He said something, but I did not know what, I only realized that he had given me the cigarettes and went away. It was a packet of Marlboros. To smoke Marlboro was a dream for me. Everyone [every male in the village] wanted the best.

Murat's father, like many others who had established themselves abroad, had limited time and resources to support him in his attempt to adjust to the new situation and integrate into the new society, and he showed little understanding of Murat's needs and problems. What could strain a relationship even further was that many fathers and sons had to manage the household without female members. Cleaning, washing and cooking were (and are) exclusively female tasks in Opoja, and abroad men were thus left to their own devices.

The trajectories of the sons who followed their fathers were diverse. They ranged from settling into a joint household with their father to starting an independent life of their own, or even returning to Kosovo. Some joined the schools in the destination country but had problems passing their exams, predominantly owing to language barriers. Most started to work soon after arrival, often not in well-paid jobs and with limited opportunities for growth and advancement (for the situation in Switzerland, see Burri Sharani et al. 2010: 44–70). That was especially the case where migrants were fifteen or older and had already undergone their school diploma in Kosovo (after eight/nine years), which in most cases was not recognized in the Western European countries. Compared to their fathers, who often had a relatively stable workplace, these young men often dealt with insecure job conditions. Still, their fathers asked them to work harder as 'they had done themselves' – advice that sons found inappropriate and that exacerbated intergenerational tensions.

Still, some who managed to move abroad as teens or as young men in the 1990s were economically very successful. In part, this had to do with intra-familial dynamics and proper support from fathers and relatives abroad. In various cases, sons closely cooperated with their fathers and often started work at the same firm, or they went on to establish a firm together. In families with several sons, this could lead to a strong family enterprise, often built on respectful relations with the father and solidarity between brothers.



Based on such experiences, migrants and villagers increasingly came to view family unity as key to success abroad. With this, Opoja migrants were no exception, as in the (neo)liberal market economy, migrant businesses relied on the flexibility of family members to meet the demands of customers (see, for example, Portes, Guarnizo and Haller 2002; Sequeira, Carr and Rash-eed 2009; Portes and Yiu 2013; Selcuk and Suwala 2020). Some younger migrants saw lack of family cohesion as the reason for their failure to succeed financially abroad. They blamed their fathers for not opting for family reunification earlier, for not bringing over all the children (especially the sons) and for not contributing towards their social integration abroad.

### *Asylum Migration, the Duldung Status and the Impact of Family Considerations*

An increasingly large number of teenage boys and young men, but partly also women and girls, went abroad without the legal option of family reunification, because they were already too old to qualify for reunification or their father or spouse had already returned or had never been abroad. As many could not apply for asylum until after arrival – which was often unsuccessful – border-crossing efforts and life abroad were replete with complications, risks and different sorts of insecurities. With tightened immigration and asylum regulations in Western Europe after 1992, asylum seekers were at pains to prove their own persecution in their home country in order to be granted asylum, and most asylum applications were subsequently classified as ‘unfounded’ (*unbegründet*). Within Western European countries during the 1990s, the Kosovo conflict remained largely unnoticed and was only recognized when it turned into a full-scale war in 1998. As a result, most refugees of Kosovo, and generally those from former Yugoslavia, received a ‘temporary suspension of deportation’ or *Duldung*, renewable after six months. This meant that most of them received a chain of such temporary suspensions (*Ketten-Duldungen*), which kept them in limbo with limited prospects.

Unlike the asylum status, which automatically grants refugees the right to work in European states, a ‘temporary suspension of deportation’ comes with more restrictions, and these vary not only between EU countries but also between the decision-making authorities in the German context, namely the federal states. While in Austria refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and some from Kosovo in the 1990s (Stacher 2000) with a *Duldung* were later granted the right to work, in Germany there was no consensus on this among the individual federal states (Koser 2000: 28–33). A few federal states with greater labour demand – like Bavaria – granted refugees with a *Dul-*

*dung* the right to work in certain professions, based on labour market needs, and bound to a specific employer. Most other federal states – like Berlin and many eastern German federal states – did not.

In Germany, Austria and Switzerland – the main migration destinations since the late 1960s for migrants from Kosovo – those with a *Duldung* or a pending asylum case also did not qualify for family reunification. For those who arrived without their family, family life became practically impossible, as migrants were not allowed to visit Kosovo. From the institutional perspective within the receiving states, family members ‘back home’ were largely simply not taken into account.

Migrants with a *Duldung* and without family in the destination country were not allowed to rent private accommodation and were thus forced to remain in refugee accommodation separated from the receiving society (see, generally, Koser 2000 for Germany; Stacher 2000 and Strasser and Tošić 2014 for Austria; and Aarburg and Gretler 2008 as well as Burri Sharani et al. 2010 for Switzerland). More generally, as a *Duldung* targets a speedy return as soon as circumstances in the country of origin allow, it does not foster ‘integration’ into the receiving country. As Rozita Dimova (2011) has argued in relation to war refugees from war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina who sought a safe haven and a better future in Germany, refugees often perceived their situation abroad as a second trauma, as high levels of uncertainty and a lack of planning opportunities thwarted individual plans for the future and disrupted family relationships.

Most refugees from Kosovo, however, were either internally displaced within their own country or had to flee to neighbouring states. At the height of the war in spring 1999, about 900,000 Kosovo Albanians had fled mainly to neighbouring Albania and Macedonia; another 600,000 or so were internally displaced (Goeke 2007: 583). Western European states accepted a small percentage of them as *Kontingent-Flüchtlinge* (contingent refugees), a status that gave them temporary asylum rights. In 1999, Germany granted this temporary residence permit to only 14,726 Kosovo refugees (Pro Asyl 2005: 2). But during that same period, the large majority of refugees from Kosovo in Germany, about 180,000 persons who had arrived in Germany individually and often irregularly, had been granted a *Duldung* only.

In the main Western European destination countries such as Germany, Austria and Switzerland, many migrants managed to develop individual strategies to cope with the situation, which included receiving support from relatives abroad and offering support to those back home. Men who migrated in the 1990s stressed the need to send back remittances, as their fathers and other male relatives had done, mainly to mitigate the effects of the escalating ethno-political conflict in Kosovo, which had negatively impacted

the economic possibilities for Albanians in Kosovo. Gazi, who left in October 1998, when the war had already started, said this:

I had thought about outmigration for a long time and always dreamed about it – as I had not experienced it on my own. I always wanted to go abroad. Here you did not have a future. I never imagined living here. It was impossible. One needed to have relatives or acquaintances in order to receive a job, or one needed to pay a lot of money for it. I did not have that kind of money, and the only place one could work here was the textile factory. It could not employ all people in the need of a job, and the salaries were very low. I followed the path of my brother. I did well in the primary school. But as none of my family had enrolled into university, I also did not want to, although my father [who was abroad] always wanted me to go on with higher education. But my friends did not go, and so I did not do it. Once the violence started, I decided to leave.

This quote shows a mix of political and economic considerations as well as the existence of a historically grown culture of migration that affected Gazi's migration decisions and strategies.

The story of Agon, who initially migrated to Austria in 1991 in his mid-twenties and returned for good in 2000, shows that migration motives, trajectories and family situations do change over time, which in turn affects a migrant's decision to come home. The family, however, often ranked highest as a reason for remigration. For Agon, the reason for going to Austria in 1991 was to access his retired father's pension, an important income source for the eight-member household in Opoja. His father had worked as a labour migrant in Austria for decades and returned to Opoja after retirement. However, pensions were no longer transferred to the Yugoslav bank accounts due to a Western embargo on Serbia for its role in the war following the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia (Vickers 1998: 276). Agon successfully returned with the money, but when the situation worsened in Kosovo and bank accounts remained frozen, Agon left for Austria a second time to collect more of the pension. This time, instead of returning immediately, he stayed on with a cousin and took up undocumented work, even overstaying his visa. He returned to Opoja after seven months upon hearing about his father's death but soon after travelled to Berlin with a relative. Despite applying for asylum, like many other migrants from Kosovo, he was issued only with a *Duldung*, without a work permit (Pro Asyl 2005). In the 1990s, as ample labour opportunities on construction sites opened up in Berlin, especially for migrants, he took up undocumented work at one of the construction sites.

Even if Agon's migration situation was much more fragile than that of his father, who had benefitted from a stable and legal employment that provided him with an old-age pension, this option allowed him to fulfil his family obligations back home. He regularly sent part of his salary to his older brother, who oversaw the joint village household, comprised of Agon's mother, his

wife, his three children as well as his two brothers and their families. However, his *Duldung* did not allow visits to Kosovo or entitle him to use the family reunification programme in Germany. Although Agon knew that he would lose his *Duldung* status, he returned to his family after two years. He said:

I returned in 1995, in May or June. I went home because of my wife. She told me: 'You come home, or I leave, I join you.' But I could not bring her over. . . . They would not give a visa for the whole family – only single persons received a visa. Without a visa, the trip to Germany was very long, expensive and also dangerous. I went home when [my brother] Qerim married. You know. He married in 1995. I went for him. I also contributed financially to the wedding.

Agon's reasons for returning home related to his family: to pressure from his wife, who had not seen him since he left – underlining her influence and the importance of maintaining intimate relations – and to his brother's upcoming wedding, an event at which his presence was symbolically important to cement the patrilineal family bond. The urge to prioritize family relations, in his case, led to his decision to give up his *Duldung* status in Berlin.

Despite the critical political situation, which posed a threat to him and his family, Agon stayed on in the village for about two years before he again migrated because of the further deterioration of the political and economic situation in Kosovo. Agon relied on an invitation letter from the father of his brother's wife, who had gone to Frankfurt as a labour migrant in the early 1980s. He said:

Then my sister-in-law sent me to Germany. She asked her father to arrange for a visa for me. He sent the invitation, and I went to Belgrade for one month to get the visa. Then I took a bus from Belgrade to Frankfurt. [My younger brother] Qerim and [his wife] Ariana did not come along; they sent me instead. I had already been there, and I wanted to go. I already knew the country and the language. I knew that I could earn money, and I also fought for the papers – the right to stay. This was in April 1997.

As exemplified in this quote, Opoja migrants did not necessarily rely on patrilineal kin. Kinship ties established through marriage could prove to be important for being able to work abroad. As Agon was already acquainted with Germany, his chances of success were higher than those of his two brothers and he thus volunteered to return abroad as the breadwinner of the household in Opoja, which encompassed not only his parents, his wife and children, but also his brothers with their wives and children. However, in what was an acutely tense situation with the approaching war in Kosovo, especially from the autumn of 1998 onwards, couples and even entire families crossed the border in great number as undocumented migrants or with fake documents, often paying exorbitant sums (from 2,000 DM per person in the

mid-1990s up to several times more in 1999) to human smugglers with the help of their relatives abroad – partly also maternal ones.

Migrants like Agon, who left the receiving country to finally reunite with family members in Kosovo and then migrated again, could experience racist insults when they applied for refugee status a second time in the host country. Agon reported the following experience with the German authorities: ‘A policeman asked me why I returned. He said: “Why did you return, you pig?”’ Such experiences with bureaucracy must also be understood in the context of the xenophobic atmosphere in Germany at that time (Plamper 2019: 146ff). Despite Agon’s difficult legal positioning and the experiences of xenophobia in Germany, his knowledge and individual agency as well as the support he received from other migrants and his extended family – including affinal relatives – played a role in making his stay easier.

Within Agon’s family, Agon’s younger brother Qerim and his wife finally left for Germany in autumn 1998, once the Kosovo war reached a new level of violence. Like Agon, they took the help of Qerim’s father-in-law in Frankfurt, a labour migrant for many years, who paid 6,000 DM to the human smugglers. Qerim aimed to repay the sum once he began earning. In a rather unusual gesture in the context of the patrilocal norms prevailing in Opoja, Qerim’s father-in-law took in Qerim and his wife for a month upon their arrival in Frankfurt. However, this was acceptable in light of the political persecution and violence in Kosovo as well as the strict EU border regime. Qerim’s father-in-law supported them beyond that month, but the roles reversed when he suffered a heart attack. Qerim and his wife filed a claim successfully to remain in Frankfurt in order to care for Qerim’s father-in-law and were placed in a refugee hostel close to him. Unlike Qerim, many asylum seekers did not have the option of choosing their place of residence; therefore, since the 1990s migrants from Opoja have been more geographically dispersed within the destination countries and throughout Western Europe than at any other time.

Despite having a place to stay, Qerim faced many work challenges. Like many others, Qerim only received a *Duldung*, and without a work permit, he could only work as an undocumented labourer. While this brought him earnings and social contacts, it did not increase his chances of securing residency rights. On the contrary, his undocumented work meant he could have been deported to Kosovo if found out. However, in his view, it was a risk he was willing to take, because he wanted to repay the money his father-in-law had paid to the human smugglers for undocumented border crossings and organize the remittances for his family in Opoja. In short, his family concerns put him at high risk of losing residency abroad. Still, the integrative force of relatives abroad cannot be underestimated. Many new arrivals in the 1990s could rely on family members who had already established themselves

abroad – be they from the maternal or paternal side. That help ranged from financing the border crossings, taking them in for the first days and weeks, or helping them out with the asylum applications. Once the migrants managed to be placed in refugee accommodation close to their relatives, they also helped them get settled or find (undocumented) work.

Migrants often also established ties with other migrants from their home region as well as from other Eastern and Southeastern European countries, among them the successor states of socialist Yugoslavia. Within such networks, migrants shared information about ways to achieve residency and other rights, and about jobs or better accommodations. These contacts were thus often important for improving one's position. Serbian was the official administrative language in Kosovo until the late 1990s, though most Albanians born after 1975 had not learnt it for political reasons. However, outside Kosovo, in the immigration context, mastering the Serbian language could help them to communicate and get along with colleagues or bosses at work.

Janine Dahinden (2005a, 2005b) has argued that for Kosovo migrants in Switzerland, peers across ethnic and family boundaries were often a more important source of social security than family members in Kosovo, as the latter were often too restricted and/or too far away to be able to help. Whenever Agon spoke about his years in Berlin in the 1990s, he stressed how much he liked the place, and particularly the scale of freedom he had experienced there, which according to him had contributed to his personal growth and a greater degree of self-empowerment – despite the legal challenges and the partly xenophobic reactions he faced. This freedom had eluded him in Opoja.

This does not mean that migrants 'forgot' their families back home and the obligations they had towards them. For decades, migration had been a vital means of supporting the family back home, and such values also influenced the mind-set of the migrants of the 1990s. Especially when struggling to maintain contact with family during the grim years of conflict and war some had felt the guilt of having left their nearest and dearest back home to fend for themselves and felt a renewed sense of duty to send remittances. Some also expressed having supported the UÇK (*Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës*, Kosovo Liberation Army), founded in the early nineties. It comprised of Kosovo Albanian underground militia, who opted for violence to fight the political and economic suppression of Albanians in Kosovo. While many made financial contributions to the UÇK, some even returned to Kosovo to join the underground militia.

Due to the dangerous political situation back home and the political organization of Kosovo Albanians abroad, many Kosovo migrants, especially those who migrated in the 1990s, developed a 'diasporic identity', which combined political agitation from afar with a strong sense of solidarity with

those back home (Kretsi 2008; Dahinden 2010, 2014b; Krasniqi 2017). Not least because the family was often seen as equivalent to the nation, conflicts within families were quickly smoothed over. As Nita Luci (2005, 2014) has described for Kosovo in the 1990s, reconciliation took place not just within but also between families, with thousands of 'blood feuds' (*gjjakmarrje*) – long-lasting and sometimes deadly conflicts between families – settled. Various Western scholarly studies (see, for example, Boehm 1984) link blood feuds to archaic forms of justice outside the realm of the state or within a state that did not interfere with family affairs, such as the Ottoman authorities in the era of the Ottoman Empire, to which Kosovo belonged from 1455 to 1912. In contemporary Kosovo, the state's role has changed and so has the meaning and social integration of 'blood feuds', which needs to be critically reflected upon (Schwandner-Sievers 1999 and 2001). Furthermore, it is important to consider the limits and gaps of translocal kinship relations during the 1990s. With a yearlong absence of migrants, kinship relations to those back home could also become strained, especially when expectations concerning the size of the remittances or the question of bringing over family members could not be resolved.

### *The Outmigration of Women and Children within Legal and Family Frameworks*

During the political turbulence of the 1990s and owing to the deteriorating security situation in Kosovo, an increasing number of male migrants departed from the tradition of leaving their wife and children in Opoja and instead brought them over. The re-establishment of family life was often experienced as a blessing, as also observed by Werner Schiffauer (1991: 50–83) in relation to labour migrants from Turkey, who began to bring over their spouses in the 1970s. But it also gave way to new economic and social challenges for families (for Switzerland, see Aarburg and Gretler 2008: 290–93). Saimir, for example, had left the village in 1985 at the age of twenty-four and brought over his wife and two sons in 1995, when his sons were thirteen and fifteen years old, respectively. While he recalled being happy about being reunited with his wife and sons, he confessed to the challenge of having to meet the living expenses of his family in Austria. Saimir also said that, for his sons, the first few months abroad were extremely difficult, as they had to go to school before they had mastered the German language. Saimir was not able to help much, having neither had the time nor the resources to support them in their day-to-day challenges at school.

However, many migrants who wanted to bring over their spouse and children encountered various legal barriers. Especially those with a pending asylum case, or on a *Duldung*, did not have the right to family unification.

Others who might have qualified failed to meet other requirements, such as a job with the requisite level of salary or 'adequate' housing for a family. Many migrants who did not fulfil the criteria thus resorted to irregular ways of bringing their family members across the border, although expensive, dangerous and not always successful. At the beginning of 1999, when the war had already peaked, Agon also tried to bring over his wife and small children. His hard work had allowed him to pay the smugglers, but he could only passively observe as his family embarked on the dangerous border-crossing journey. His wife, who had scarcely travelled out of Opoja and only spoke Albanian, set out with their small children on fake Croatian passports. She was apprehended at the border and imprisoned in Hungary before being returned to war-ridden Kosovo.

Other migrants who had applied for asylum in the 1990s were more successful. They reunited with their family members; however, this was often only after a period of years-long separation, as with Saimir. Furthermore, migrants often did not bring over all their children at once. While sons were given preference, daughters (and often also the wife) were brought over later. The reasons for this gendered differentiation are manifold: in times of escalating ethno-political conflict in Kosovo, many families considered male family members at risk of being drafted into the Serbian army, while girls and women could remain within the domestic sphere. Furthermore, many families believed it was easier for male members to cross the borders undocumented, and while abroad, they had a better chance of getting a job and being able to prepare for the arrival of their female family members – if a family reunion was planned at all. Furthermore, the 'migration culture' in Opoja at that time was associated with male household members, especially with their role as economic providers for the translocal family (for Albania, see King and Vullnetari 2011: 213–14). While it was deemed normal and necessary for men to migrate, for women, 'immobility' – that is, remaining in Opoja rather than migrating – was the norm, and the idea of girls and women migrating and living abroad, especially if unmarried, challenged the normative gender order in Opoja. Still, this norm came under increasing pressure owing to the security threat posed by the political situation and dreams of pursuing other modalities of living that the village environs did not allow.<sup>3</sup>

When Emir crossed the border over to Germany, without documents, in 1994, he had left behind his pregnant wife and two daughters, aged four and seven, respectively. In the ensuing five years, not only did they not see one another, they also rarely talked because of a lack of phone lines in the village. It was not until 1999 that Emir finally organized an irregular border crossing for his wife and small son, who had been born in his absence. However, the daughters remained with their grandparents. Emir argued that the trip was



expensive and dangerous and that his flat was too small for a family of five. In another case, before sending for his daughters, a father had felt obliged to bring not only his own sons but also the sons of his brother, who had been part of a joint household in Opoja. This decision was made for safety reasons and in line with traditional gender and generational expectations within a family. In the Opoja region (and more generally in Kosovo), a man – including a migrant – who shares a village household with his brother(s) is supposed to treat the brothers' children (especially the sons) as his own.

However, younger generations were more likely to prioritize female family members, particularly their spouses, in terms of migration. Several male migrants who had married before leaving Kosovo told me they would have brought over their spouses immediately had their parents not obstructed it. The parents had argued that the daughter-in-law had to care for them and that sending her abroad would result in higher living costs and lower remittances or would conflict with the gendered family values (for similar discussions, see Krasniqi 2017). In other cases where the sons had left Kosovo in their teens and been too young to marry before leaving, the families involved themselves in the bridal search in their home region (see Chapter 6). In the 1990s when travelling back to Kosovo was very dangerous and often legally impossible, sometimes marriage decisions were made and even weddings were conducted in the absence of the groom, and the newlywed bride would later join her husband abroad. Marriage migration is, however, not solely a female undertaking. Increasingly, men are also migrating to join their wives abroad. As later chapters describe in greater detail, marriage migration became more widespread among villagers in the rural south of Kosovo, especially after the new millennium, as one of the only options for migrating for the long-term, owing to the tightened European border regime – at least until the so-called Western Balkans Agreement, which came into force in 2016, creating new legal channels for labour migration to Germany. As will be shown, this has also affected gender and generational relations, as well as the caring roles within the family.

## MIGRATION IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

After the end of the Kosovo war in 1999, those who had fled to neighbouring countries of Kosovo soon returned (Goeke 2007: 584). Many Kosovo Albanians who had migrated to Western Europe also returned to Kosovo – however, not always voluntarily. Others managed to obtain residence rights and stay abroad, as well as achieve family reunification, which, however, remained incomplete sometimes. At the same time, legal migration opportunities to Western European countries decreased again, leading to new waves

of ‘undocumented migration’ but also temporary mobility via a Serbian passport and seasonal work. In what follows, I outline these migration paths and link them to family and social security considerations, in particular gender and generational roles.

*Beyond Duldung:  
Between ‘Voluntary’ Return and Permanent Resettlement*

After the end of war in Kosovo in June 1999, about 200,000 Kosovo-Albians who had received a *Duldung* in the 1990s in Germany were ordered to return with the justification that their lives were no longer under threat in their home region (Koser 2000: 40). In some federal states, German state authorities even started to deport Kosovo migrants. Before 2002, about 96,000 refugees from Kosovo had left Germany again, of which about 11,000 had been deported (*abgeschoben*). But also those who had reportedly returned ‘voluntarily’ did so under considerable pressure from the German authorities (Dünnwald 2008; European Stability Initiative 2015: 4), as those who did not return ‘voluntarily’ could expect a knock on the door from the police in the middle of the night and be escorted out in handcuffs or taken into custody awaiting deportation. After being deported, they were prohibited from entering Germany for up to five years (Pro Asyl 2005: 14). In Austria, migrants with a *Duldung* faced similar conditions, but they could be granted permanent residency by demonstrating adequate housing and presenting employment documentation, which they could partly manage to secure, not least because many already had a work permit.

In Germany, 7,200 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and about 12,500 refugees from Yugoslavia (later called Serbia and Montenegro, which included Kosovo at that time), who had entered Germany before the war ended in 1999 and who had a *Duldung*, became eligible for a two-year residence permit,<sup>4</sup> thanks to a new legal amendment in 2001, and some federal states in Germany – but not all – also issued them an employment permit. To be granted a more long-term or permanent residence permit in Germany required refugees to prove they had a stable job and private accommodation to ensure they were not depending on welfare support. However, this was often difficult to achieve. Under the legal framework of their *Duldung*, which restricted them from legal employment options, many were dependent on welfare. Others also fell casualty to the vicious cycle of residency rights being hinged on a work permit and vice-versa, so that neither could be secured (Pro Asyl 2004a: 24).

Migrants from Opoja and Kosovo in general had very different prospects depending on their legal status and the region in which they lived abroad. Agon, who lived in Berlin with a *Duldung* (1993–1995 and 1997–2000), was

among those who left Germany 'voluntarily' in 2000, soon after the war, as he could not obtain a work permit and thus had no prospect of being able to stay. His brother Qerim, who had come to Frankfurt in 1998 and received a *Duldung*, used the help of lawyers to secure a legal work permit a year after the war ended, in 2001, and soon found regular employment at a construction firm led by a Croat. In 2002, when Qerim was informed that Kosovo-Albanians with a regular employment contract and decent accommodation could apply for residency, he desperately began looking for a flat because his *Duldung* status had not provided for subsidized housing, and affordable private housing was scarce. What made the difficult situation even worse was the fact that house owners were reluctant to rent their flat to refugees without residency, as they could be forced to leave the country at short notice. It took Qerim two years to find a small one-room apartment (36 sqm) at a monthly rent of 500 euros, which he considered expensive, but it enabled him to secure the requisite residency rights.

Migrants on a *Duldung* with good education had considerable difficulty finding a job that corresponded to their qualifications or the profession they had practised in Kosovo. Their degree certificates were often not acknowledged, and often many years had passed since they last worked in their respective professions. A case in point are Endrit and his wife Maja, who had jointly fled to Germany in the late 1990s. Although both had university degrees, Endrit worked in construction, while Maja worked for a cleaning service for over ten years after their arrival. Endrit, who had worked as a medical doctor in Kosovo, could not find a job in his sector despite a belated recognition of his medical degree. For teenagers and young adults who had arrived in the 1990s and had not yet finished their education back home, the *Duldung* status often prevented them from participating in higher education or training programmes that required a more stable residency or labour permit (Mielast 2006: 8).

For migrants who had successfully mastered the difficult pathway to a legal residence permit in the receiving country, returning was no longer an option – at least not in the short-term – despite the euphoria linked to the end of war and the withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serb forces from Kosovo. Their decision to stay abroad often felt validated when they returned to Opoja for a visit after many years. Qerim, for example, said he cried when he saw that the household was in such poor condition: what seemed normal when he left now seemed a site of poverty, chaos and underdevelopment. He said: 'I cried a lot, like a child. Today, I am better prepared. Do you understand, [by migrating] I went into another world, into a more organized life.'

Qerim and other migrants stressed that they had better social security abroad, including good access to doctors, health insurance and pension payments. They added that their children also had better prospects abroad than

in Kosovo. Perspectives had shifted: while the former guestworkers, the *gurbetgji*, had envisioned building a future for their family ‘back home’, many migrants who had left during the 1990s now wanted to build a new home abroad – despite the manifold challenges in terms of employment and integration prospects in the receiving country. Various migrants who had come abroad in the 1990s took advantage of the family reunification scheme once they achieved a secure legal status. However, even in the new millennium, family reunification sometimes remained incomplete for reasons similar to those in the 1990s.

### *New Waves of ‘Undocumented Migrants’ and their Translocal Entanglements*

Years after the war, undocumented border crossings of villagers who found themselves in a difficult economic situation increased again. In early 2015, this number peaked when entire families left Kosovo and claimed asylum in Germany and Austria, even though the chances for obtaining asylum were very slim. However, over the years, most of the undocumented border crossers were middle-aged fathers who had returned ‘voluntarily’ in 1999 but had not managed to find a stable job in Opoja, as well as young and unmarried men who lacked prospects in their home country. Some were captured at the border and sent back; those who managed to successfully enter the European Union usually remained undocumented for the entire duration of their stay, sometimes years, as they knew that their asylum claim would be unsuccessful. During that time, migrants took up undocumented jobs and often, at least initially, relied on the help of relatives living abroad to establish themselves.

Florim, for example, lived as an undocumented migrant in Germany for more than ten years. Throughout the 1990s, when Florim was still a teenager, his family was in a very difficult economic situation, which worsened when his father died of an illness. In 1999, at the height of the Kosovo war, sixteen-year-old Florim fled with his mother to Albania. Upon return, their economic situation was even more fragile, as their house had been devastated and the livestock had died or disappeared. Florim then started to work full time, but he was not paid regularly – a new normal after the war, as he said. Faced with this tenuous situation, Florim decided to look for work in Germany. The undocumented border crossing cost him about 2,000 DM – which he borrowed from an uncle living in Germany. His relatives abroad also took him in during the first weeks and found him a job in a German, family-based firm, where he was also provided with boarding and lodging. In our conversations, Florim stressed that he had worked very hard, which enabled him to send remittances home. He also learned fast and had almost

led a normal life. The family that employed him was a surrogate family for him, and he was able to make friends within the community. He was thus able to cultivate stable social relations despite lacking a legal status. But he also had to conceal parts of his identity and his illegal status to most acquaintances and remained dependent on his employees, who never tried to legalize his immigration status. In addition, access to such basic things as medical care was problematic, leading Florim, for example, to seek medical help only when the pain was no longer bearable or when his condition did not allow it otherwise.

Florim's case exemplifies the extent to which undocumented border crossing was and still is an important strategy for translocal family care, but one that also creates considerable vulnerabilities. As already observed by Nando Sigona (2012: 55), who studies migrants in the United Kingdom, the undocumented status keeps migrants in a liminal state and reduces the possibilities to plan a future and develop a life trajectory. The undocumented status and the lack of citizenship rights are 'inscribed in the lives of undocumented migrants, gradually permeating their social worlds and social and community networks' (ibid.: 50) and experienced as fear, illness, pain, stress and even shame (Khosravi 2007: 331–32).

This state of exclusion, however, extends across the borders and includes relations to one's home region: in addition to limited possibilities to build a future abroad, undocumented workers also encounter difficulties when they want to visit their relatives and acquaintances back home. In Florim's case, the undocumented status even prevented him from visiting home for over five years. Each border crossing was not only expensive but also dangerous, as it entailed the risk of being arrested, imprisoned and prevented from returning to Germany. This also threatened his livelihood and opportunities to earn money for his family in Opoja. More generally, undocumented status prevents migrants from establishing intimate relations – both abroad and back home – and leads to a form of fragmented existence, not least because migrants are forced to systematically conceal information about their 'other' life – back home and abroad.

Still, the risk of deportation sooner or later increases the dependency of undocumented workers on relatives back home and pressures them to stay connected to them. Florim created a proxy presence in the village by regularly sending money to his mother and marrying a young woman from the region. He returned for the first time in 2007 for his own wedding, which he had self-financed, to celebrate in the circle of numerous relatives and neighbours lavishly. In our conversations about the wedding, he stressed that the lavish wedding was for his mother, who always dreamed of such a wedding, adding that 'one marries only once in lifetime' and that this marriage would set the course for his future. Still, some months after his wedding, he went

to Germany again, while his wife remained with his mother. The household income in Opoja depended on his earnings from abroad and the terms of his stay in Germany excluded family reunification. When he finally returned for good, his son, who was born during his absence, was already several years old and his attempts to legalize his stay in Germany and fetch his family had failed. To conclude, the undocumented status renders the individual migrant more vulnerable and could lead to multiple forms of fragmentation within the translocal family network. Simultaneously, it can also strengthen the relations of migrants with relatives back home, not least because it envisions a complete return, which could be – sometimes forcefully – realized sooner or later.

### *Temporary Mobility via a Serbian Passport and Seasonal Labour*

During my conversations in one of the coffee houses in Opoja at an early stage of my fieldwork, I learnt that some men regularly travelled to Belgrade. That was a surprising detail considering the recent war along ethnonational lines, the forced migrations, and the ongoing political conflict between Kosovo and Serbia over territory and border issues. Although I was aware that many Kosovo Albanians had worked in Serbia until the 1990s and several also had owned property there, I had not realized that many still had family members in Serbia, reaching back to the socialist era, and sometimes even a job. Many who travelled regularly had kept their Serbian passport next to the one Kosovo had issued.

Since 2009, Serbian citizens have been allowed to travel visa-free to EU countries for three months once they have new biometric passports. Thus, the Serbian passport has become useful for navigating the mobility regimes. As Serbia has an inclusive approach to citizenship for Kosovo citizens and residents, because the Serbian state does not officially acknowledge Kosovo's independence, some Kosovo Albanians have also started to apply for Serbian passports for easier access to the European Union, to legalize their temporary stay there. Up until February 2015, the Serbian Ministry for the Interior counted 60,000 passport applications from Kosovo, among them also from Opoja. When the EU then urged Serbia to introduce 'second class' passports for citizens residing in Kosovo without the right to visa-free entry into the EU, many applicants managed to provide a residential address in Serbia (Lapins 2015).

Sitting at a coffee bar on a Saturday afternoon in Vienna, I talked to a middle-aged migrant relaxing over a beer. He came to Austria as a tourist with his Serbian papers and was working without a work permit under rather precarious conditions, spending the mornings on special street corners in the town, where day workers wait to receive an offer for manual work, of-

ten, however, in vain. He would have to avoid the police patrol at work if he found a job, and he lacked health insurance or insurance to cover occupational accidents. Other migrants I met were there for seasonal work for a couple of months a year, in sectors that lacked the necessary workforce and where firms were allowed to employ non-EU nationals on a temporary basis. They often deliberately worked as much as possible within a short time frame to be able to cover expenses for the entire year, as they were unemployed back home. While they were aware that they were a secondary force in relation to workers with full rights in the EU, the migrants remarked that it was still better than their position back home. For many migrants, working abroad, even under precarious conditions, is the only option given the negligible job prospects in Kosovo and the lack of social benefits back home. Like undocumented migrants, seasonal migrants maintain their life and family in Opoja and visit the migration destination only to earn their income. While this seems to resemble the life of labour migrants in the 1970s and 80s, the degree of legal precarity and dependency on employers – but also on family members and acquaintances – is considerably higher.

## CONCLUSION

A diachronic study of migration from Kosovo's Opoja region sheds light on an impressive diversity of migration trajectories and the impact of changing border and migration regimes of EU countries. Until the 1990s, in the 'first phase' of migration from Kosovo to Western Europe, migration could mainly be classified as based on labour, and migrants could enter Western Europe without a visa. During the 1990s, the states of the European Union hardened their border and migration regimes, but migration numbers from Kosovo increased, owing to the ethnopolitical conflict and war as well as its weak economy and young demographic. In this 'second phase' of migration from Kosovo to Western Europe, migration trajectories highly diversified and included family reunification, marriage migration and asylum migration, often following an undocumented border crossing.

The end of the Kosovo war in 1999 marked the start of the 'third phase' of migration from Kosovo to Western Europe. While legal migration opportunities further diminished and were limited to family reunification, otherwise only undocumented and other forms of temporary migration remained, in some cases with Serbian passports, in which support from family members often played an important role. Reflecting on these changes in migration regimes, it becomes clear why Opoja migrants, and more generally migrants from Kosovo, cannot be seen as a homogeneous group: they not only took different migration trajectories but also held – and still hold – diverse legal

positions in the respective country of immigration, which affects their access to the labour market and possibilities for family reunification. The reasons for migration during this phase diversified, ranging from better earning possibilities abroad to security reasons, and to realizing individual aspirations to provide for the family in Kosovo or to unite with family abroad. Often, migrants had more than one reason for going abroad.

As has been shown in the chapter, migration practices and trajectories of individual migrants are simultaneously influenced by not only changes in the geopolitical constellation in terms of changing legal migration frames, but also by family considerations and family solidarity. With the lack of economic possibilities, social rights and partly also security in both their home country and to some extent also in the destination countries, family plays a central role in migration facilitation and management. Family members occupy different social positions, in Opoja as well as abroad, and through cooperation and exchange may seek to use these positions to bridge some of the divides and inequalities within the family unit to create better prospects.

The roles family members take up are in part in line with gendered and generational norms. Especially male family members are expected to migrate and send remittances as their fathers had done, to prevent further fragmentation and conflict within the family and to maintain Opoja as the locus of the family. On the other hand, women are expected to fulfil family care obligations in the home region, and thus are restrained from migrating. However, these roles have increasingly come under pressure. Already in the 1990s, intergenerational conflicts and the impetus, especially among male migrants, to forge new individual pathways, led to creative solutions and sometimes also fragmentations within the family setting; for example, to counteract increased insecurity in the job market in Kosovo as well as in the receiving countries, some migrants successfully established family-based firms abroad. Furthermore, since the 1990s, the increased migration of wives and daughters within the framework of family reunification has practically shifted the locus of the nuclear family to the migration contexts. While that has not necessarily diminished the importance of the family, with the changing societal context, intergenerational as well as gendered roles have constantly been renegotiated.

With hardened border regimes for a larger strata of Kosovo migrants in the new millennium, the locus of the family in the Opoja region has regained significance. Furthermore, the family acts with a certain degree of flexibility in order to establish an important source of support in situations where migrants face tight legal boundaries and a variety of social barriers, and the reliance on affinal relatives – next to patrilineal ones – has become more important. At the same time, individual family members, and the family as a unit, are exposed to even greater challenges. How these situations are man-



aged within families and households across borders, what kind of support individual family members provide and also what conflicts arise will be explored in more detail in the next chapter.

#### NOTES

1. Inhabitants of Gora refer to their language as 'našinski' ('ours'), which is a mixture of Bosnian, Macedonian, Serbian and Turkish.
2. This situation reversed in the 1990s after the war. After a first phase of violent excesses against the Gorani (see Reinmüller 2015: 70–78), interethnic relations were slowly re-established, and in 2011, interethnic tolerance was higher than in most other places in Kosovo. However, as the schooling system is divided and young Albanians no longer learn Serbian communication between the two groups is limited.
3. Similar observations were made by Bielenin-Lenczowska (2014b: 521) for Slavic speaking Muslims in Macedonia.
4. However, the actual number of refugees from Yugoslavia with a *Duldung* status in 2004 stood at 83,000 persons – which means the large majority did not receive the right to permanent residency (Pro Asyl 2004b: 14).

## CHAPTER

# 3

## FAMILY ROLES IN CARE ACROSS TRANSLOCAL HOUSEHOLDS



### INTRODUCTION

Although Bashkim has been living and working in Germany since the 1970s, he continued to be regarded as the head of the household in Opoja. With the money he had earned in Germany, Bashkim financed a new house in Opoja, several stories high, where his wife and two of his sons and their families live, to whom he was sending remittances regularly. Two other sons, who had joined him abroad in the early 1990s, where they also established their own families and households, were also considered an integral part of the household in Opoja. When they visited during annual holidays, they were given their own bedrooms. Indeed, more than a decade after the war in Kosovo in 1999, it was not uncommon for villagers and migrant family members to see themselves as constituting a translocal household based in Opoja, even if they had established their own families and a separate household abroad.

In order to shed more light on family care across geopolitical borders, this chapter takes a closer look at the translocal household as a joint economic and social unit of families. It zooms in on the gendered, generational and locational positionings of migrants and villagers within translocal families and households in Opoja after the 1999 war, and their caretaking roles across the borders as brothers, sisters, fathers, mothers, or as sons and daughters (see King, Castaldo and Vullnetari 2011: 399; King and Vullne-

tari 2011; Thelen, Alber and Coe 2013). Many studies on remittances (see Hockenos 2006, 2010; European Stability Initiative 2009, 2014, 2015; for critical reflection, see also Mata-Codesal, King and Vullnetari 2011) focus solely on migrants' financial transfers to family members in places of origin and ignore non-monetary care arrangements. This chapter, however, also explores the instrumental and emotional dimensions of care and how they unfold across borders (see Franz and Keebeth von Benda-Beckmann 1994; Baldassar 2007b; Levitt and Deepak 2011; Thelen 2014). I ask if within a border-spanning family network the different care dimensions overlap with and reinforce one another or fall short, and how they are divided between various members and across locations. Finally, I ask if migrants perform 'normative duties' in caring for family members and how family care is seen: as a form of sacrifice, as a balancing act between family and individual goals, or an opportunity for self-realization.

The translocal household, as conceptualized here, refers to a comprehensive unit that also includes separate households established abroad by members who cooperate with the family in rural Kosovo in various activities, like production, consumption, investments, or childrearing and elderly care. A translocal household, whose members often have distinct roles according to gender, age and their cross-border location, has normative and practical dimensions. In Opoja, such a household is comprised of 'cooperating members', who are nearly always related through the patriline, with in-marrying women constituting affines. In rural Kosovo, the family establishing the household often goes beyond the nuclear family, and it can reach a certain level of complexity. Historically, parents established a joint household with their married sons and their families, which formed the basis of its size or complexity (Kaser 1995). Households, however, transform – expanding when children are born or when a grown-up son marries and shrinking when family members die, leave the household or as members decide to divide the household (Hareven 1982). Within the household – and the close family – the functions and roles of individual members change with time.

When considering transformations within households, the factors of historical, family and individual time must be given special consideration, not least because they may intersect. Historical time is marked by changes in society as well as in the migration regime, which 'affects the life experiences of different age groups' (Hareven 1994: 438), or as defined by Karl Mannheim (1928), certain 'generations' – i.e. people born in a certain time frame who share a similar age and may relate to historic experiences in a similar way. Family time registers changes within the family, like births, marriages and deaths. Within family time, shifts in intergenerational relations gain special meaning. Family time may also document household cycles – that is, the founda-

tion of a new household and its subsequent division. Finally, individual time concerns the individual life course. According to Hareven (1994: 438–39, see also 1991), individual time intersects with family time and historical time, as individuals make their decisions based on family considerations as well as changes in society. As such, individual life transitions are synchronized with collective family ones and they ‘impact on intergenerational relations’.

The type and quality of care that individual household members provide varies not only between individual caregivers but also within a life course, based on family and gender roles and priorities – for instance, as a result of parenthood or grandparenthood (Dannefer and Uhlenberg 1999; Drotbohm and Alber 2015; Coe 2015; Segalen 2016). Furthermore, within a family, the support given or received often has a reciprocal character, even if time delayed and not necessarily balanced, and is based on certain roles within and between generations linked through affinal or consanguineal ties (Kohli and Heady 2010). This means that the roles individuals take up may shift in a single lifetime from care-receiver to a caregiver, or vice-versa.

Migration often demarcates a turning point in the development of the household, as it is central to family-based household and care arrangements. Caring strategies within the household and the role of individual household members change with migration – even if migrants do not completely withdraw their household membership. Furthermore, migrants’ roles vary depending not only on the distance from home and the length of their absence. Their life contexts and positions abroad, which are framed by their legal status, their ability to bring over family members, their prospects, employment status and property ownership, also influence the roles they take on (Drotbohm 2014). The question of whether migrants envisage a possible return, are required to return or a return is not at all feasible, must also be taken into account (Al-Ali, Black and Koser 2001). Moreover, migrants tend to respond to new societal conditions within the social networks in which they are embedded (Massey 1991).

As Harper and Zubida (2014) have shown for temporary labour migrants in Israel, it makes a difference if migrants live with their nuclear family abroad, or if the nuclear family is still placed in the sending country, across the state border. In this context, I argue that the migration of a family member changes the family setup, and that normative visions of family and kinship support that have evolved over time need to be harmonized with individual perceptions of self-realization. This impacts family-based care, as it can bring about conflict and fragmentation within translocal family networks, leading to care gaps, which thus leaves some villagers – old and young – in precarious conditions. However, as I will show, this may also pave the way for new care arrangements along gendered and generational lines. Unlike in traditional caring norms and practices, women increasingly take

on care responsibilities within their natal family and their role of caretakers is valorized within translocal families and communities.

To grasp the changing household and the caring roles of individuals whose families are dispersed between two or more states, this chapter, firstly, analyses the diversity in configurations of the village households in one *mahalla* and the migrants' place in them. It then turns to the migrants' perspectives and explores the conditions under which migrants provide care for relatives across national borders and how that impacts the caregiving roles of those back home. Here I differentiate certain inter- and intragenerational family roles – as a parent, sibling or child – and link the roles of caregivers to their individual life course, their position within the family and to larger societal developments. The viewpoints of villagers who chose to cut ties with their family members in Opoja after going abroad are not presented here. Their behaviour is regarded locally as shameful, and they were not spoken about in the village, and so it proved difficult to establish contact with them during my research. For the villagers, not mentioning these people also ensures that those who cut contact with relatives do not receive attention and therefore cannot be role models for others in the translocal community.

### HOUSEHOLD PROFILE OF A *MAHALLA* IN OPOJA

In order to evaluate the impact of migration on caring relations within families in Opoja, I conducted a survey of all households within one *mahalla* (a neighbourhood in which households are mostly related by patrilineal kinship – at least in rural settings in Kosovo). I have taken a single *mahalla* as the unit of analysis and focused on the households therein to survey the differences in their complexity and structure, their translocal activities, their income sources and economic status. My thinking was that an in-depth analysis of household structures and the helping relations among its members could highlight specific problems and challenges prevalent within families across rural Kosovo today that would otherwise remain overlooked. Still, one single *mahalla* is not necessarily representative of an entire village.

The *mahalla* I selected in 2011, compared to others in the region, was of medium size and consisted of twenty-four households with 193 members. This makes a mean household size of 7.7 members, which exceeded the average household size of 5.5 persons for Dragash municipality at the time (UNDP 2012) as well as the national average in Kosovo of 5.9 (Kosovo Agency of Statistics 2011). The mean household size in 1981 (the last available census that included the Albanian population before the outbreak of war in 1998) was 6.9, which showed that it had since diminished (Latifi 2015: 77). For Opoja, Janet Reineck (1991: 27) even spoke about a mean house-

hold size of approximately ten members in the late 1980s. Thus, in the 1990s and the new millennium, the mean household size in Opoja had considerably dropped. Likely, this was because of a lower fertility rate and a faster rate of household division among brothers.

Within the *mahalla* I selected for my survey, the household sizes were very diverse and ranged between three and twenty-two members.<sup>1</sup> They included members living abroad still considered household members. In fact, about 60 per cent of all households (14 out of 24 households) had members abroad, and in three of these households, all members lived abroad for the most part. More specifically, 51 out of the 193 household members of this *mahalla* lived (more or less) permanently abroad. Representing a little over 25 per cent of all members, this is higher than the national average of about 20 per cent (Havolli 2009: 2). Twenty-five family members were living in various locations in Germany (from 6 households), eleven in Austria (from 5 households), ten in Italy (from 2 households), and five in Sweden (from a single household).

As for the structure of the households, six of the twenty-four households in my *mahalla* sample constituted a joint or complex household. Also called *shtëpia e madhe* (the large house) or *familja e bashkuar* (the joint family), they consist of two or more married brothers (aged 30–50 years) and their children, and the elderly parents. During my fieldwork, the joint households ranged from seven to twenty-two members. However, five out of these six joint households were translocally constituted, which means that one or several household members resided abroad for most of the year. In Opoja, they were considered a part of the village household, even if it did not constitute a joint economic unit. Unless migrant family members dispute being part of the Opoja household still, villagers consider even those who relocate, either to a town in Kosovo or abroad, as members as long as the male family members hold landed property in the village collectively. Several male migrants who lived abroad with their own nuclear family said that they were happy to remain part of the village household as long as their father heads it. For migrants, remaining in a household is a sign of respect towards their father and brothers and is a way of following the patrilocal tradition without it necessarily having financial consequences for them and their families abroad.

In fact, villagers did not mention sharing resources such as income as a necessary criterion for such a translocal household union of the *shtëpia e madhe* or *familja e bashkuar*. On the contrary, they reported that often those members with a household abroad had full authority over their own money. Thus, the local understanding of a *shtëpia e madhe* or *familja e bashkuar* is based primarily on the existence of an immovable property, such as a family house and land, jointly held among the male members of the family. That continues to apply even though the landed and residential property in the

paternal village represented security and a good life to a greater extent in earlier times than today. A good life has increasingly become contingent on gaining a secure and well-paying job (often service-oriented) through good education or connections but more often through migration. Still, landed or residential property in the paternal village has a social, emotional and symbolic value and underscores one's belonging to a place and within a family. This holds especially true for migrants who live abroad with their families, and who use their village home only during the annual holidays. As Jasna Čapo Žmegač (2009: 282) has claimed for Croatian migrants in Germany in the 1990s, 'it might be hypothesized that precisely because it is dispersed across long distances the family needs to construct its unity (emotional if not physical) and therefore presents itself as integrated and reconfigured.'

In the patrilocal, descent-based conception of Albanian kinship, the house (*shtëpia* or *shpia*) is regarded as the physical locus of the patrilocal family. Patrilocality refers to a kinship system in which the father is habitually seen as the transmitter of name and blood (*gjak* in Albanian). Habitually, sons establish their families within the confines of the parental household and remain within the household for an extended period, whereby women marry into this household. The house is often named after the eldest male member, the *zoti i shpisë* (household head), and is, in Albanian language, often synonymous with the patrilocally headed household. The joint household structure was historically widespread in various regions of the Balkans and was not based on religious or ethnic affiliation but rather on a largely pastoral economy and patrilineality (Kaser 1995, 2000).<sup>2</sup>

In earlier times, and often still in the new millennium, once households were divided, the sons, as co-owners, received an equal part (*hise*) of the immovable property, and new households were often built in the immediate vicinity and formed the basis of patrilineally organized *mahallas*. Daughters historically neither inherited property nor received a dowry – that is, a material transfer to the daughter by her parents at marriage (Kaser 2000). This trend persists in Kosovo despite conflicting with Kosovo laws stipulating that daughters also inherit (Krasniqi 2014a). This is due to underlying gender relations and traditional family values, in which men are seen as the material providers and women as the social and emotional caregivers of the family. This system also leads to early marriages and the (relative) universality of marriage. Finally, it also leads to the relative complexity of households, as parents remain in a household with married sons – at least for some time. The household thus builds a strong base of inter- and intragenerational relations – between parents and children (in-law) and between siblings, especially brothers, as well as cousins who grew up in the same household. The complexity of the household depends among others on how long parents and married sons remain in a common household, but also at what point

a joint household is regarded as divided. The latter is open to interpretation. When I asked villagers about the number and names of households at the time of my fieldwork, they named some households after the household head even after he was deceased and the household had been divided among the sons. This indicates that mindsets about the composition of a household are slower to change than the practices within households and families.

Apart from the joint households, nine of the twenty-four households in my *mahalla* survey comprised a married couple, living with at least one parent and possibly children and/or a sibling. In scientific literature (Mitterauer 1990; Kaser 2012b), such households are also called stem family or extended households. In various cases, the household had been divided relatively recently (often after a son's marriage), and one son had remained with the elderly parents. Of the four families that were 'translocally' established, three lived abroad with all members for most of the year but they owned and maintained a house in the village.

Finally, there were also nine families in the surveyed *mahalla* comprising parents with mostly one or two unmarried (and in one case also divorced) children, called *familja e ngushtë* or *familja e vogël* (close family, small family) in Albanian. Often, after property division, elderly parents decide to live with one of the sons, allowing the other married sons to establish a nuclear household. In these households, it was common to hear about one or several members having been in Western Europe for different lengths of time, but as they had been granted only temporary residency permits (if at all), they had returned. In other families, the migration of a family member was in the works.

In the village household, having relatives abroad is often considered key to social security and family prosperity, as state-provided social welfare is almost non-existent in Kosovo, and families thus seek to send additional family members abroad. Only families with a successful business setup in the Opoja region, or in Prizren, or well-educated professionals, such as doctors or advocates, do not depend on migrant remittances. Families from different social backgrounds rarely interact, except if they have close kinship ties, which in the case of patrilocal kinship often relates to having grown up in the same household or *mahalla*. In the broadest sense, the family views the household and the *mahalla* as essential for cultivating kinship belonging and where solidarity and cooperation balance out economic differences.

## PARENTS AND SPOUSES AS CAREGIVERS ACROSS BORDERS

According to Tamara Hareven (1994: 448–49), who studied families in the United States in the early twentieth century, during the era of industrialization:



the family was the most critical agent in initiating and managing timing of life transitions. . . . Mutual assistance among kin, although involving extensive exchanges, was not strictly calculative. Rather, it expressed an overall principle of reciprocity over the life course and across generations. Individuals who subordinated their own careers and needs to those of the family as a collective unit did so out of a sense of responsibility, affection, and familial obligation, rather than the expectation of an immediate gain.

While this generally also holds for translocal families across the Kosovo borders, responsibilities are allocated based on gender and generation, whereby the role of migration therein is critical. In Opoja, in the 1990s and later, a translocal household, following a patrilocal pattern with its nerve centre in the village, could only be maintained on the strength of gendered caring roles. Frequently this meant that couples remained geographically separated – often for a long period. At the time of my fieldwork, several male migrants who had gone abroad in the 1990s were the proverbial breadwinners while their wives took on multiple caring tasks in the parents-in-law's household (see Chapter 2).

Ilire, aged sixty, who was living with her divorced daughter in a house in Opoja at the time of my fieldwork, is a case in point. It was the only house in the village where, locally, only female members were present. During my first visit, however, Ilire clarified that the household was nominally headed by her husband Artan, who had migrated to Germany in the 1970s. The geographic distance required dividing up care responsibilities. Where Ilire's husband sent remittances from abroad, thus providing financial care, Ilire took on the responsibility of providing instrumental and emotional care for her parents-in-law and the five children, only occasionally visiting her husband on a visitors' visa. In the mid-1990s, when her only son followed his father abroad and subsequently all four daughters had been married off, her care responsibilities were directed solely to the fragile and ill parents-in-law. After the death of her parents-in-law, she was obliged to remain with her daughter-in-law, a young woman from a neighbouring village, who had moved into Ilire's house after the wedding, as was the custom in rural Kosovo, and was waiting for a legal permit to join her husband. After three years, in 2002, when her daughter-in-law finally received her papers through family reunification and moved abroad, Ilire could have joined them abroad but had to postpone her outmigration when one of her daughters returned to her parental home after her divorce. Again, she saw it as her task to stay with her. In our conversations, she said:

I feel better in Germany because my husband lives there. My life is there. If I did not have to care for my daughter, I would stay most of the time in Germany. But I cannot leave her on her own. . . . It is a bit difficult. But we are patient. I hope that my daughter will marry again. I have to wait for my husband for two months, or five. When I was young, I even had to wait for ten months; he would not come home for 10 months.

The care of her daughter/-in-law was not the only obstacle to her joining her husband abroad. In our conversation, Ilire stressed that while she was looking forward to joining her husband and son and moving there for good, she had limited options to do so on the basis of family reunification as this required her to pass a German language test despite her advanced age and limited schooling (see Chapter 7). She thus feared being left on her own in Opoja. Ilire said:

I hope that my husband returns. He can return as soon as he retires, which would be in two years. My son lives in Germany, too, but I hope that my husband returns. As soon as he returns, we would commute between Germany and Opoja. I do not know how this will work out, but I hope that is how it happens.

Ilire knew deep down her husband would not return for good as he had been abroad since the 1970s. However, she hoped that she and her husband would remain mobile and maintain a bi-local household. Ilire's case shows that once women finally reach a point when their caring obligations in Opoja are fulfilled and they could in principle join their husband and children abroad, they risk facing legal barriers that hinder family reunification (see also Chapter 7). Because of that, they can only join their husbands for shorter periods on a visitors' visa, and mobility becomes a permanent modality of living for various household members. More generally, due to structural barriers and the often decades-long gendered and generationally divided caring tasks across borders, family reunification remains partly incomplete and cross-border mobility and bi-locality become a part of life, even for couples in advanced or retirement age.

Barriers to outmigration are not only faced by married women. Middle-aged male migrants are sometimes unable to bring their children over through family reunification (see Chapter 2). When grown-up children who remained in Opoja are unable to earn their livelihood independently, most fathers not only send remittances but also seek ways to establish a stable source of livelihood for their children in line with gender norms. That could entail setting up a home business for their sons or investing in the children's education (less so their daughters') or renewed attempts to relocate them abroad, often via marriage, as this was among the few available options to permanently resettle abroad. For daughters, parents often regard marriage – within the region or abroad – as the main means of social security. They assume that within marriage they will be cared for financially by the husband and his family. Still, especially the son's marriage is regarded as an important achievement in which parents are willing (and expected) to invest (see Chapter 7).

Endrit, aged forty-four, remained undocumented for many years after arriving in Germany in the 1990s. That meant that his wife and children could

not join him via family reunification and had to continue living in a joint household with Endrit's parents, his older brother and the brother's family in Opoja. Endrit sent remittances and was considered a household member. After the war, Endrit and his brother divided the joint household, because it had gotten too big, as he put it. Endrit then financed the construction of a new house for his wife and children in the direct neighbourhood of his brother's house, but he remained abroad to earn money for the family members. A new challenge came up when his wife got seriously ill and eventually died. As Endrit's brother and his wife lived next door, they cared for the daily needs of his four children, aged between ten and nineteen, while Endrit stayed abroad. On his part, Endrit continued to finance the village household where his children lived and made arrangements to ensure that his eldest son would marry soon. He reckoned that the new daughter-in-law would then run the household and care for his youngest children. Endrit financed his son's costly marriage, paid for his university education in Prizren, and bought him a nice car, which raised his social status, also allowing him to commute to the town. Endrit also took into consideration the future of his daughters and supported their plans to marry. All the care he provided depended on his enduring absence from Opoja. As Jasna Čapo Žmegač (2009: 278) writes in her work regarding Croatian migrants who care for relatives at home, a migrant

may take satisfaction in what he perceives to be his very successful role as breadwinner and caretaker and takes pride in the way he has fulfilled his parental duties, which he sees as catering for his family's material welfare and security . . . . This demonstrates a cultural system in which the father's physical absence from the family household is accepted and the parental (paternal) role fulfilled in securing a house and generally material welfare for the family.

On the flipside, border-spanning family relations in these bi-local households, with their main residence in Opoja nominally headed and financed by a migrant, could also become tense. The continued dependency of family members in Opoja on remittances sent by members abroad re-perpetuates cross-border relations without necessarily strengthening emotional ties and the respect between distant family members. In fact, it may have the opposite effect. This became clear to me on one of my visits to Opoja, when Desa, a young woman with two small children, whose husband was unemployed, spoke about her father-in-law, who had migrated to Germany in the mid-1990s and continued to send remittances to his wife and his four children. In her opinion, Agim, her father-in-law, had 'no better way' to spend his money than on his family, suggesting that the family was very much in Agim's heart but also that Agim's help was taken for granted by dependent family members in Opoja. When I met him during his visit to Opoja, he mentioned being

fed up with his family's apathy and complained that he was expected to solve all problems at home every time he returned.

This case echoes the tenuous relations among fathers living abroad and their grown-up children/-in-law in Opoja. While the latter partly fail to acknowledge the support of their father/-in-law and show little motivation to become independent, migrants, on the other hand, feel somewhat overwhelmed by their never-ceasing responsibilities and are unhappy about the lack of recognition. They argue that family members in Opoja are too passive to take their future into their own hands and should work harder to supplement their household income by, for example, taking up seasonal work in the construction business, instead of expecting to live on the constant flow of remittances. Thus, expectations within family networks could differ on both sides. While receivers might take financial remittances and material gifts for granted, the senders sometimes perceive the care responsibilities as a burden and as unrealistic (see also Drotbohm and Alber 2015). This could strain the relations among translocal family members and their notions of belonging and solidarity, sometimes also leading to the termination of remittances and cross-border care.

### SIBLINGS AS TRANSLOCAL CAREGIVERS

Translocal care within a family can be intergenerational and intragenerational. In the latter case, caring relations across borders may develop especially between siblings. As Cati Coe (2013: 124) writes, intragenerational care can in particular be found 'in communities where sibling relationships have conceptual and practical importance' historically. In rural Kosovo, shared values of patrilinearity and relatedness, especially among brothers – and male cousins – are cultivated when growing up together. For brothers, sharing a joint household even after marriage, at least for a certain period, is not uncommon. When a male member migrates, the roles of brothers may be considered complementary. While the migrating brother is expected to send remittances for daily expenses, and as such to financially care for family members at home, the brother who remains in Opoja is expected to take over other aspects of care for the (elderly) parents and possibly also the brother's wife and children in return, at least temporarily. This again strengthens the patri- and virilocally organized household structure. But shifts in the possibilities for and the motivations of migrants abroad partly alter the normative framework and the remittance and care practices among the brothers. When migrants who left in the 1990s managed to bring over their spouse and (most of their) children, remittance payments often terminated and intra-familial cross-border care patterns risked breaking down. That gave rise to conflicts

within translocal families and new forms of vulnerabilities and poverty, especially when remittances represented an important financial source.

While the scientific and policy advisory literature (Hockenos 2006, 2010) address the problems associated with shrinking remittances, they do not account for the resulting emergence of new care patterns that are accepted and recognized by family members in the village as well as abroad. As highlighted by Tatjana Thelen, Erdmute Alber and Cati Coe (2013), kinship relations, and especially relations among siblings, may change within the life course. They may fragment, but they may also assume new forms of solidarity and reciprocity. As I argue, this is especially the case when family members live in two or more states. When migrants send less remittances, other forms of care and support across borders might be found and integrated into the family cycle that may contribute to harmonizing family relations.

The story of Veton and his brother Yll, both born in 1960s, illustrates this point vividly. In Opoja, they jointly own a house built by their father in the early 1970s and consider themselves a joint village household, although at the time of my fieldwork in 2012 fifty-year-old Veton lived with his wife, two adult sons and a daughter in Duisburg, while his brother Yll, a few years younger, lived with his wife and three teenage sons in the parental home in the village. Over the past twenty-five years, there had been dynamic changes in the household situation and spatial arrangement. The changing societal conditions had transformed their lives and impacted relations within the family and towards each other.

Veton had left Kosovo as a young man in his late twenties in the early 1990s. His wife and his three children remained at home with his parents along with his younger brother and his wife and children. Attributing that move to intensifying political pressure, which left him without a job at home, he sought job prospects abroad to support the household in Opoja. Even when Veton brought over his wife and his two teenage sons in 2005, when his father had already died, he continued to financially support his unemployed brother and his family, not at least because Veton's daughter, who was too old to be eligible for a family reunification visa, had to remain in the village household with her father's brother and his family. When she finally married a migrant and moved abroad, the two brothers continued to be regarded as a joint household in the village, as they still had not divided the parental property. In preparation for the wedding of his first son in Opoja, Veton also financed the joint family house renovations in Opoja to give it a modern appearance and a new interior, all of which improved the living conditions for Yll and his family.

Veton's sons' weddings represented an important turning point in the care arrangements between the two brothers. Faced with a bank loan to cover high wedding costs (see Chapter 6) and the costs of his sons' higher

education in Germany, Veton stopped sending remittances to his brother. This suddenly left Yll in a difficult situation, as he had relied on his brother's remittances to support his family for years. Forced to make ends meet, Yll and his teenage sons began to run a small shop owned by another family in the *mahalla* for a total monthly salary of 200 euros. But it soon became clear that working at the shop all day long left no time to prepare for school, and this job offered no prospects.

Although the remittances had dried up, the brothers remained in touch and continued to cooperate. In my conversations with him, Yll expressed his compassion for his brother having to divert his resources to support his sons. Veton also continued to visit with his family in Opoja for four weeks every year, when both families shared the house and re-established their joint household. Yll's sons still maintained close relations with their cousins, with whom they had grown up in a joint household before moving abroad. As is customary for first grade cousins in Kosovo, they call each other brother (*vëllai*). As also shown by Pauli (2013: 31) for sibling relations in Namibia and México, growing up together and sharing childhood memories strengthened their connection. The cousins often also chat on Messenger, and each summer, Veton invites his nephews to spend their seaside holidays with him and his sons. As shown by Lumnije Kadriu's work (2017) on migrants' relations to family members in Kosovo, the joint holidays at the seaside, for which migrants invite family members from Kosovo, enhance the attachment between family members.

However, lacking earning opportunities in Opoja, Luan, Yll's oldest son, considered taking up an undocumented job abroad. His aim was to create enough savings for a future back home, and although aware of the risks this entailed, he stressed that he had no alternative and other family members shared this view. Eventually, he managed to cross the EU's Schengen border when hundreds of thousands of Syrians and migrants from other war-affected countries took the so-called 'Balkan route', which formed a kind of open corridor in autumn 2015 – only to be strictly controlled again shortly afterwards. Once abroad, a new form of caring relation emerged between the two families across borders, as Luan stayed with Veton and his family. The care provided by his uncle can be seen as a time-delayed pattern of reciprocity, as Luan's father had cared for Veton's sons and daughter when Veton was abroad – and Luan's parents still care for them when they come home in summer. More broadly, Luan refers to his uncle and cousins as family – not differentiating between kinship grades.

This case illustrates that over time care relations and arrangements within various translocal families shift during the life course with changing geopolitical realities. As stated above, while remittances among brothers may dry up, new forms of care and solidarity may be integrated. Here, again, it is im-

portant to look at various dimensions of care. While reports from think tanks such as the European Stability Initiative (Hockenoes 2006, 2010) tend to foreground financial remittances and highlight the drying up of remittances, especially among brothers, there are other forms of care relationships that could renew solidarity across borders, including support for emigration, and intergenerational dimensions need to be looked at more closely as well. This again can sustain the local model of migration as family-based care, as it enables a new family member to migrate abroad in order to earn money and send remittances to family members back home. In Veton's case, for instance, the focus shifted from sending remittances to his brother and his family in his home village in Kosovo to financing the education and wedding of his own children. But that did not mean the end of brotherly solidarity, as he offered accommodation and connections abroad when his brother's son chose to migrate.

These new forms of support, which develop over distances and over time, affect family and kinship relations. While these new forms support the continuation of the 'culture of migration' as a form of family care, some of them also challenge traditional family roles. Different from male migrants who extended financial support mainly to their brothers in Kosovo in the 1970s, 1980s and often also in 1990s, migrants now also support their sisters' education to enhance their prospects. Support is, thus, based more on emotional ties and migrants' own personal convictions about family care and a good future and is not dictated purely by their normative duty. This shift in emphasis from duty to personal ties and convictions has led to subtle shifts in gender and generational roles in Opoja.

Furthermore, not just male migrants but increasingly female migrants take care of their siblings and their nieces and nephews in Opoja. A case in point is Teuta, aged thirty-five, who lived with her husband and three small children in Linz and supported her married sister in Opoja financially from her earnings as a part-time cleaner. She also bought valuable presents for her sister's children, such as quality school bags, which were difficult to buy in Kosovo. Compared to women who have married within the Opoja region and remain largely without a salaried job, women who have married abroad and have taken up a job may obtain a special position within their family of origin, especially as they can send valuable gifts. This has challenged the gender-specific roles within the family in Opoja. Migrants and especially female migrants can thus act as transformers of gender relations and care models 'back home', which can be decisive for the education and social advancement of siblings who live there (for rural China, see Obendiek 2013). As observed by Mirjana Morokvasic (2004: 7), for many migrants from former socialist countries in 'post-wall' Europe, i.e. after the fall of the Iron Curtain, migration is meant to 'improve or maintain the quality of life at home'. This

is surely also the case for many villagers from Opoja who migrated in the 1990s and the new millennium. While it does not necessarily imply a plan to return, it is at least directed at sustaining ties with and extending care for their family members, and here especially parents and siblings – back home.

### A NEW GENERATION OF TRANSLOCAL CAREGIVERS

Like Luan, various young men went abroad after the 1999 war, while their fathers and other family members remained at home. The extent to which newly migrating sons are able and willing to support their families in their home region varies, depending on economic opportunities as well the extent of the constraints they faced abroad. Furthermore, it also depends on the needs and goals of family members in Opoja and if migrants are willing to direct their actions towards those needs; if they can harmonize both individual and family goals. The use of remittances ranges from financial support for living expenses or medical treatment of family members in Opoja to financing one's own wedding, that of a brother, house renovations or construction projects, or other material investments. Again, obligations towards family members in Opoja may shift with time and changing family constellations. For example, after Artan started studying medicine in Prishtina, he got engaged to a young woman, and his parents urged him to marry sooner rather than later. As Artan's father, a seasonal worker, could not cover all the wedding expenses, Artan interrupted his studies and took the help of a cousin in Italy to organize a job for him. After a year, his wedding took place in his parental home. Still, after his wedding, Artan went abroad again to pay off some loans his parents had taken up for the renovations of the house, and to finance the education of his younger brother, who also planned to marry soon. Artan's wife had initially remained in the household of Agim's parents and siblings, but after living apart for a year and a half, Artan was allowed to apply for family reunification and could bring over his wife and his then nearly one-year-old daughter. That was also the time when responsibilities towards relatives at home reduced, as Artan's brother also went abroad and managed to find work there, if only to cover his own wedding costs.

What becomes clear is that some of Artan's savings goals were aligned with both individual and family interests – and that included his plan to marry. In other instances, such as when he financed his brother's education, he placed the interests of his parents and siblings in the village home ahead of his own individual goals. When he pursued more personal goals, bringing his wife and child over via family reunification and setting up a separate household abroad, Artan still sent remittances to his parents regularly, which enabled his parents to pay back the home renovation loan. He was un-



certain if he could hold on to his job in Italy or would have to return sooner or later, which may also have factored into his readiness to send money. But the practice of sending remittances was not purely 'strategic'. Artan's remittances were also an expression of his emotional attachment to his family and home region and his wish to return one day. More generally, the size of the remittances is negotiated to create a balance between individual and family considerations, which transform within the life course and with changing family constellations as well as with normative duties in the community and affective ties.

Legal security abroad could even give rise to an increased engagement of migrants with their home regions. This finding is also supported by a comparative study on Bosnian and Eritrean refugees (Al-Ali, Black and Koser 2001) and on immigrant communities on the East Coast of the US (Portes 2001). Alban, for example, who went to Germany through marriage and managed to secure a good job abroad, also supported his family by contributing towards repairs and renovations of the parental house. Although his parents declared they did not want to interfere in his life, Alban stressed that he was prepared to financially assist his parents in their old age, given the meagre pension they drew in Kosovo. But beyond taking care of material needs and expectations, Alban maintains strong emotional relations with his parents, with whom he speaks two or three times a week via messenger and visits every summer.

However, the normative expectations of the village community, which Alban cannot escape when he visits his parents, threaten to undermine these relations. During one of his visits, neighbours asked Alban if his car was a gift to his father, which he had not intended as such. Alban, feeling pressured to provide certain forms of parental and family support and burdened by the expectations of others, had reduced the frequency and duration of his visits to two or three weeks in the summer every year. Alban is not alone here, as such strategies of avoidance and distancing by minimizing visits are not rare. Alban was also convinced that he will not have to (nor does he want to) rely on his own child(ren) for economic support in his elderly years, as he plans to continue to work in Germany and will be able to live off his pension and his savings. The system of time-delayed reciprocity in terms of financial care for elderly parents, passed down from parents to children, and from generation to generation, has thus become fragmented (Hareven 1994: 454). This may have also contributed to his refusal to adhere to the expectations of the community, at least partially. In fact, migrants with legal security abroad and who are less dependent on the family at home have greater scope to refuse certain obligations or find creative solutions.

As said, with the outmigration of in-married women and children, women have also started to provide financial support to family members in Opoja,

especially to their parents and siblings. However, as also identified by Russel King, Adriana Castaldo and Julie Vullnetari (2011), who study remittance behaviours in neighbouring Albania, female migrants from Opoja seem to still play a rather marginal role as remittance senders. Remittances sent by female relatives to parents and brothers might, however, also remain invisible, as the receivers may downplay the contributions or do not acknowledge them, as such remittances may carry the implication that the male relatives are unable to provide for their family. Still, in connection with the patrilocal family norms that prevail in Opoja and more generally in rural Kosovo (and in Albania, as observed by King, Castaldo and Vullnetari 2011; King and Vullnetari 2011), the financial support provided by female migrants to their own family members back home may be interpreted as an altruistic gift, or a 'gift of love' (Read 2009), as it is not based on the expectation of receiving time-delayed compensation in the form of, for example, inheriting the family property. But as already observed by Mauss (1968 [1923/24]), even 'free gifts' do not remain without a counterpart, as the support provided is a way of maintaining valued relationships (Heady and Ou 2010) and also enhances the status of the giver, as is the case in Opoja, which has an impact on local gender relations.

### THE GAP IN ELDERLY CARE

In Opoja, and more generally in Kosovo, intergenerational caring relations are also challenged by a strongly declining birth rate. While the fertility rate in rural Kosovo averaged 6.7 in 1981 (2.7 in urban areas) (Malcolm 1998: 332) – in part owing to the widespread conviction that a large number of children, especially sons, would signal the strength of the family and serve as old-age security – in 2003, the fertility rate started to sharply decline, reaching an average of 2.9 (urban and rural), an average of 2.2 in 2011, and an average of only 1.97 in 2019 (see Kosovo UNFPA Country Office 2017; Kosovo Agency of Statistics 2013). During my fieldwork in Opoja, parents explained that they wanted fewer children because it was financially challenging – their material desires and educational needs having increased exponentially. While nowadays many families in Opoja are content to have just one son, families continue to believe that children, and especially sons, are essential for old-age security, as state-based social security – financial but also physical elderly care – is largely absent throughout Kosovo (Vathi and Black 2007: 6; Jerliu et al. 2012). As basic pension adds up to 75 euros per person per month, most elderly people rely on their children's support to supplement their pension. Furthermore, couples without a son fear they will lack the necessary physical and instrumental care in their old age, as daugh-

ters sooner or later marry and then move to their husband's home and care for the husband's parents. This view continues to put pressure on women to give birth to a son – with consequences for women, their daughters and the entire family.<sup>3</sup> Based on a noticeably higher proportion of male births (1.06 male to 1.0 female children in 2014, and 1.08 male to 1.0 female children in 2020), some couples likely opted for selective abortion after finding out that a daughter was on the way and not a son (see Latifi 2014: 196, 2015: 89; Kosovo Agency of Statistics 2020).

At the same time, an increasing number of aged parents whose sons and daughters-in-law are abroad lament the lack of physical and instrumental care. That includes cooking, washing and other household chores and help with keeping appointments and accessing services for them – traditionally the responsibilities of the daughter(s)-in-law (Krasniqi 2014a), based on the patrilocal residence patterns and gender norms. While this system worked until the late 1990s, when women did not join their husbands abroad – partly because they were expected to care for the elderly – with the outmigration of their daughters-in-law joining their husbands, the situation of elderly care had become a pressing issue (for Albania, see Vullnetari 2004; for Moldova, see Grant, Falkingham and Evandrou 2009). The need to financially support parents has bolstered youth outmigration and at the same time intensified the problem of physical care. While elderly parents hope or even expect to be taken care of by their children, especially by their sons and daughters-in-law, and most are willing helpers, these expectations cannot be fully met owing to geographic separation. This also leads to many conflicts and disappointments.

In most cases I observed, elderly people who are fragile and needy mostly still have a son and a daughter-in-law at home to take care of them, even if other sons have migrated – either to urban areas in Kosovo or abroad – and daughters have married out. In contrast to the established norm in Kosovo, according to which the youngest son cares for the parents and in return also inherits the house after household and property division among the sons, care practices have become more flexible and are based on factors such as time and physical presence as well as closeness and intimacy. In various cases I observed, it was the youngest son who had moved to the town, or abroad, while the older one stayed back with the parents. But sometimes when all sons – or increasingly due to falling birth rates the only son – migrate(s), a 'sudden' need for care of the elderly parents presents a challenge. This often also creates concerns for the children, who worry about their parents' situation. Fifty-year-old Saimir migrated in the mid-1980s and had recently bought a house in Switzerland and planned to take his parents in. However, his father refused that offer and remained in Opoja. Saimir was conflicted as he wanted to remain close to his sons in Switzerland and their wives and children. His case illustrates not only the bind that many migrants

in Western European countries find themselves in but also the widening care gap across Kosovo when the elderly stay behind or return to an empty nest. Beyond isolation and loneliness, this gives rise to a lack of physical care.

Werner Schiffauer's study (1991) of Turkish migrants in Germany and Austria since the 1970s argues that bringing their families over put migrants in a kind of sandwich situation, having to live up to their parents' expectations back home and cater to their children's future abroad. This is what may have led to a break with relatives in rural Kosovo or, conversely, also to increased – even uncontrolled – financial support for them. Geographical remoteness and extended periods of physical absence make it difficult to respond to parents' needs and expectations, which migrants usually compensate for with material care. Various Opoja migrants sent remittances to relatives at home while investing in their own children's education abroad for extended periods. Others, however, overburdened by this situation, chose to focus on their own nuclear family.

The problematic situation of the elderly in the village whose family members are abroad is exacerbated by the fact that there are no alternative providers of care for the elderly in rural Kosovo, as private caregivers outside the family circle are unheard of. The only public nursing home in Kosovo, in Prishtina, carries the stigma of sheltering only those elderly who are abandoned by their families – a stigma that would also be attached to other public residential care homes if they were to be built in Kosovo. Ultimately, elderly people who cannot rely on relatives are left to provide for themselves. It can, therefore, be said that the lack of state care in Kosovo has in some cases led to deficient family care. That is very different from Western Europe, where state social security provision functions as a kind of catalyst for kin-provided care, enabling families to fulfil other dimensions of care and thereby strengthen intergenerational relations (Kohli 1999).

In Opoja and across Kosovo, various migrants have tried to come up with new solutions for elderly care. In some cases, married daughters living in a neighbouring village are asked to visit the parents daily and cook and care for them in addition to taking care of other household chores. Thus, daughters sometimes replace the absent daughters-in-law. That, however, does not necessarily change widely practised 'customary' inheritance rules, according to which daughters are excluded from inheritance (Voell 2004; Bardoshi 2011; Krasniqi 2014a; Latifi 2015: 100).<sup>4</sup> In individual cases, brothers financially compensate their sister. If daughters only provide such services on a somewhat irregular basis – for instance, only when the parents are ill – they do not see it as an obligation for which they need to be compensated but rather as a 'gift of love' (Read 2009). Such 'gifts of love' are made to parents in need, whom they regularly visit after marriage, if good relations persist. Sometimes, women in Opoja are also involved in caring for the households

of brothers in need – for instance, when the female members of the household become ill or incapable. Again, this is seen as a ‘gift of love’ – but it could also relate to ensuring that they will find the doors of their parents’ and brothers’ house open, as a customary right, if they want or need to return home – for instance if they split from their spouse (Krasniqi 2014b; Bardoshi 2016).

In other cases, elderly parents move in with a son who has migrated either to the city or to a Western European destination (in the latter case, only temporary based on visa restrictions). Describing this phenomenon, Vullnetari has called them the ‘zero generation’ (Vullnetari 2004; Vullnetari et al. 2014) because these migrants are the parents of first-generation migrants. In such instances, the patrilocal care pattern is abandoned, and the son’s neo-local residency gains in importance. This challenges the concept of sedentarism, of being locally rooted, as even elderly villagers start to have a mobile life, spending some months abroad with (one of) their child(ren) and grandchildren, and some months in the village family house. While abroad, they can receive better medical care and hands-on help from their children(-in-law), but they can simultaneously also act as caregivers to their grandchildren. This has manifold benefits: once the elderly are in good health, migrant couples with young children can work full-time. As such, elderly mobility feeds into the increasing relevance of grandparenting in contemporary Europe (see Thelen and Leutloff-Grandits 2010; Rubić and Leutloff-Grandits 2015; Segalen 2016). In families whose members are dispersed across borders, grandparents can encourage the use of Albanian as a family language while caring for their grandchildren and cultivating close relations with them (Vullnetari et al. 2014). Thus, the elderly become active agents in the migratory project, and the customary notion of intergenerational care can again be upheld (*ibid.*: 132) and family values can be passed on, which may expand the Opoja culture across the borders. Still, that does not always work out as smoothly, and elderly persons who move in with their children (on a temporary basis) partly also suffer from loneliness, extreme dependency and helplessness, being in an environment where they will likely experience language barriers and have no acquaintances other than their immediate family.

## CONCLUSION

Within translocal family networks stretching from Opoja to migrant destinations, family-based care practices and care moralities are in constant transformation, leading to a diversification of migrants’ caring relations towards family members in the village. The special mix of care provided by single family members – ranging from financial to physical and emotional – is in-

fluenced by gendered norms, needs and legal and economic circumstances. The household survey shows that Opoja has a remarkable variety of household forms, and members abroad are often a viable source of livelihood, although it is not always possible to avoid care gaps. The migrants' position within the household in Opoja and the migrant households' composition abroad matter and impact the special mix of care provided. A gendered and inter- as well as intragenerational perspective, starting with the translocal household in Opoja as the main angle of analysis and then differentiating the various positionings of single family members in Opoja or abroad, also in terms of the timing of migration, has proved to be especially fruitful for learning about household and family dynamics as well as care provision in a translocal social field.

Even after the end of the war, remittances from male migrants have remained crucial, often over extended time frames, especially where several or at least one of the sons or unmarried daughters live in the common household in Opoja. Wives, on the other hand, who did not leave the local Opoja household, often have multiple and extended roles as physical and emotional caregivers, towards children (-in-law) and parents-in-law. Family care across borders also carries ambivalence. Remittances sent over extended periods increase the likelihood that relatives in Opoja will depend on them. At the same time, such caring arrangements from a distance do not necessarily strengthen emotional relations between couples and generations. While migrants often attempt to invest in solutions that will eventually allow dependants to become self-reliable, expectations on both sides can diverge, leading to intergenerational or also partnership tensions.

Not only married couples but also brothers cooperate across the borders, often for an extended period and by taking up complementary roles. Especially when they regard themselves as a joint household, family care may range from sending remittances to emotional and practical care for dependent family members, depending on location and needs. Still, caring forms have tended to be very diverse, changing with time and over different life stages. Remittance amounts reflect not only the needs of the family in Opoja but also the life situation of the migrants and their families abroad, including their prospects for staying abroad and the marriage or higher education of the children – which may be reasons for the termination of remittances. But the termination of financial support among brothers does not necessarily mean the termination of caring relations in general, for migrants keep emotionally connected and offer logistical support when other family members outmigrate. Care practices thus shift rather than end, creating a new mix and new family relations.

Sons who move abroad tend to follow established family norms and offer their parents and brothers back home financial support, more so when they

themselves have received help from family networks, or when they need a place to return to because of an insecure legal status abroad. Those with a secure legal position and financial security in the receiving state have more freedom. Yet, this does not necessarily lead to a general abandonment of care for parents and brothers, as they may actively decide for whom to care and how. They may choose to support sisters in their pursuit of higher education and thus positively impact local gender relations and open up prospects for young women in Opoja. Due to the increasing outmigration of women who join their husbands or parents abroad, women have become remittance senders too but on a smaller scale compared to men. Their care decisions are based on their emotional relations to members of their own natal family, which has transformed local gender norms. Outmigrating women can, however, no longer fill their role as instrumental caretakers for elderly parents-in-law in the village. This can lead to a care gap for the elderly in rural Kosovo but also to new forms of care based on the redefined role of daughters, who partly assume the responsibility for their parents' instrumental care. It may also lead to the temporary and cyclical relocation of elderly parents into the households of their sons (and daughters-in-law) living abroad.

In short, the care that migrants provide to relatives at home in a translocal context can by no means be easily classified as 'lacking' or a leftover tradition. This chapter has shown a more complex picture of translocal caring relations, which entail a special mix of financial, instrumental and emotional care, while also taking a closer look at the changes that have transpired in gendered and generational relations. While migrants foster their relations to Opoja through the care provided to family members, they also maintain the 'culture of migration' and mobilities from Opoja to Western European countries. However, the nature of such care practices and mobilities is changing, in effect, to include migrant women as well as the elderly, and individualized forms of care alongside customary ones.

#### NOTES

1. More specifically, there were twelve households that had three to six members, eight households that had seven to ten members and four households that had fourteen to twenty two members.
2. In the scientific literature on family relations in the Balkans in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, joint patrilocal households were also referred to as 'zadruga' and often depicted in an idealized and exoticizing manner (Vickers 1998: 111). A new generation of anthropologically oriented historians gathering around Karl Kaser, like Ulf Brunnbauer, Hannes Grandits, Sigfried Gruber, Gentiana Kera, Enriketa Pandelejmoni and Robert Pichler, expanded on his findings by concentrating on micro-studies and combining qualitative and quantitative approaches (see Pichler 2002; Grandits 2002; Brunnbauer 2004; Gruber 2004; Kera and Pan-

delejmoni 2008; Kaser 2008; Papa-Pandelejmoni, Kera and Hemming 2008). They showed that in Southeastern Europe family and household organization underwent both macro and micro economic and ecological transformations.

3. This also describes the situation in Armenia and other Caucasus states, as well China, which leads the list of countries with gender-biased abortion practices (see Cassano 2017).
4. Although this is illegal by state law, women often give up their rights to inheritance, especially if it requires going to court to make a claim (Latifi 2015: 100–1) This, however, is not only prevalent in Kosovo but in other parts of the Balkans too; for example, in rural Croatia (Leutloff-Grandits 2006).



## CHAPTER

# 4

## HOME AND INVESTMENT

### *Shifts in Perceptions and Their Material Manifestation*



## INTRODUCTION

Infrastructure and housing investments have been booming in Kosovo since the war ended in 1999. The numerous construction sites for fancy housing and commercial projects and the endless stores selling construction materials and furnishings create the impression that Kosovo is flourishing. Yet, these enormous housing constructions in Kosovo are largely financed by migrants, and although vital to migrants and non-migrants alike, they do not stem from or signal Kosovo's economic resurgence. Similar infrastructural and housing construction projects in other countries, such as Macedonia (Pichler 2009a), Albania (Dalakoglou 2009, 2010), rural Romania (Călinescu and Hodoiu 2013) and also other parts of the world such as Southern Ecuador (Boccagni 2013) or rural Mexico (Pauli 2008), are undertaken mainly by migrants in their home region. As 'elephants of stuff' (Miller 2010: 81), houses 'form the main materialization of migrants' remittances' (Dalakoglou 2010: 766) and ideally provide their owners with a deeper sense of home, belonging and relatedness. As Esin Bozkurt (2009: 13) writes about Turkish migrants in Germany, investments back home, in Turkey, are built on and shift boundaries and binary oppositions between 'modernity and backwardness, of the individual and the collective, as well as the local and the foreign'. 'Home' expresses a variety of personal, social and cultural processes that in-

fluence identities and plans for the future, as well as links to people, communities and localities and the boundaries between them.

The notion of ‘being home’ (*në shtëpi*) and the materiality of the ‘house’ (*shtëpia*) are closely interrelated in the Albanian language. It is not just the materiality of the home but also the everyday life lived within the house that makes up the notion of home (Papa-Pandelejmoni, Kera and Hemming 2008: 11; Dalipaj 2013: 29). In practice, however, the interconnections between the material house, the household and the family tend to be quite diverse – especially when house owners and household members are migrants. Sharing food and dwelling – even if only for a limited period – strengthens bonds and renews family and kinship ties. Especially migrants who have moved out of the local community attach great importance to this.

As already shown by Claude Lévi-Strauss (1987), Pierre Bourdieu (1973, 1979), and later by Frances Pine (1996), among others, houses represent material expressions of social organization and often also kinship. Analysing the architecture in his classic study on the Berber house, Bourdieu argues that the house is a signifier of family and gender relations. As house building may aim to divide a larger household or create a new nuclear unit, it poses anew the question of household structures and economies. Often it requires a wider pooling of resources among household members, whereby the underlying family and gender relations play a dominant role.

This chapter is concerned with the conditions, social meanings and ramifications of migrants’ material investments in Opoja to create a feeling of home and community or to establish social boundaries. Such investments might carry ambivalence as whilst they are often intended to support relatives and other community members back home, the success of such investments is dependent on their cooperation. This chapter also explores the effects of these investments on family relations and in particular on gendered and generational relations across national borders and their local manifestations. It shows that migrants’ investments in Opoja tend to be both past- and future-oriented, reconstructive and transformative. House building projects, and the social relations materialized through such projects, point to the future of the family and the community in environments, contexts and situations increasingly perceived to be uncertain. Investments in the material locus of the family and the household create meaningful social relations, strengthening the ‘roots’ (*rrënjët*) of migrants to Opoja even for the next generation. While migrants’ house building activities demonstrate care for oneself, the family and the kin group, they also challenge these notions, as well as gender and generational relations. The chapter shows that house building stands as much for patrilocal tradition, fraternal unity and the family collective as for modernity and individuality. Houses form a bridge across

the borders and between family members and generations while at the same time creating conflict and ambivalence.

The initial sections in this chapter address the said migrants' house building activities in Opoja and how they envision the household setup – as a joint establishment to strengthen the unity of the extended family, or as a separate setup for the nuclear family only. This provides insights into the materialized concepts of family, kinship and gender in the translocal realm spanning Opoja and migration destinations. It focuses on the style of houses and the different household concepts that express family care and solidarity. The links between the houses and the social status of migrants within the local community are also covered. Further sections analyse alternative forms of migrant investments and their contribution to homemaking and social relations in Opoja, with the last sections showing that house building projects attempt to establish more permanent links to Opoja, especially for the next generation. The perspectives of the migrant children are related to those of the local youth, taking into account their gendered positions within the family and the communities – in Opoja as well as abroad.

### HOUSES AS SIGNIFIERS OF FAMILY UNITY

The various house building projects of migrants back home, in Opoja, shape the notions of 'home', community and family care. Such projects range from houses shared among brothers, even if inhabited by only part of the family for most of the year, to those built specifically for the migrant family to be used only during their annual visits to Opoja, thus remaining largely empty throughout the year. Some migrants who have resettled their families engage in mutual house building with their brother(s) and parents in the village as a gesture of care. The newly built village houses also symbolize the union of patrilocal family despite the absence of migrants for most of the year. However, the ideal of this materialized union is difficult to live up to during the visits as well as when abroad. As Robert Pichler (2009a: 234) writes for houses built by Albanian migrants in the neighbouring Republic of Macedonia:

The deeply rooted desire for familial reunion, as expressed in the architecture, does not match the social reality. People are aware of this discrepancy, as they too are aware of the social dynamics of current emigration, which will most certainly continue in the near future. The construction of large houses, therefore, appears as a compensation for the loss of family co-residence and as a reaction to social and political insecurity. The ideal of a co-residential household community corresponds with the desire to bring together all those members of the family, who live scattered in different places far away from home.

In Opoja, although migrants express the idea that brothers could reside in a single house jointly and closely cooperate in the future, houses are often built such that each brother and his family could occupy one floor, in anticipation of the division of a household. Exemplifying this model is the case of forty-year-old Agim, who graduated from the university in Prishtina before leaving for Germany with his wife in the late 1990s. Agim had financed the building of a new, three-storey house on the parental plot, intended for his brother's use and his own. While Agim's brother resides there with his family for the most part, Agim, his wife and children join them during their visit over the summer, when they live as a joint household, eating jointly prepared meals. However, as the families occupy different floors, they are also free to establish two separate households. The first two floors of the house have a similar floor plan, with a kitchen, two living rooms, a bedroom, and a bathroom, and the third floor of the house has various formal rooms to host guests and relatives.

The house Agim built signalled a form of cross-border solidarity between brothers that allowed for the nuclearization of the households. The fact that Agim reserves a floor in the joint house for his own family can simultaneously be seen as an expression of his intention to return home for good one day in the future. As Müller (1995) has shown for migrants from Turkey, Üllen (2006) for migrants from post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina, Pichler (2009a) for Albanian migrants from Macedonia and Gregorič Bon (2017: 146) for migrants from Albania in the new millennium, the house built back home creates a form of 'presence in absence', or what Dimitris Dalakoglou (2010: 761) also calls a 'proxy' presence. In Agim's case, the house links the two fraternal nuclear families under one roof in the home region. Thus, it bundles together notions of home and family unity in the present as well as in the future while at the same time making space for nuclearization and individualization.

Migrants like Agim, who finance the building of a house that is jointly used by parents, brothers and their nuclear families, said explicitly that they were not interested in separating from their brothers and wanted to build a house that would help to keep the family unity. In some cases in which all brothers migrated, they invest in a common house in the home village. This is the case for forty-two-year-old Hadi and his three brothers. Although they have lived in separate households in Austria for twenty years, they jointly built a new three-floor house next to their old parental house in Opoja, in the vicinity of their relatives' homes in the *mahalla*. This was based on the idea of spending more time in the circle of their relatives during their visits to the village. For Hadi and his brothers, the house embodies their wish to stay connected as a family and linked with their (agnatic) relatives in the home region. It serves as an antipode to life abroad, where brothers and their families are dispersed across different cities.



**Figure 4.1.** Twin houses built by two brothers (© Carolin Leutloff-Grandits)

Yet in various other cases, brothers living abroad invest in houses in Opoja designed only for their nuclear family, especially when the parental village property is already divided and apportioned amongst the brothers. Migrants, at times, also finance or help finance their brothers' house building projects that can facilitate household division. They often build houses in a row on their parental landed property, which is divided among the brothers for this purpose. It is common in Opoja and across Kosovo in general to see extensive complexes of two, three, four or even five houses built side by side by brothers and which are often equal or at least similar in exterior, size and style, like twin or triplet, quad or quintuplet houses. Nebi Bardoshi (2016) and Lumnije Kadriu (2017), who studied house building activities in Albania and of migrants in Kosovo, respectively, argue that such houses represent a material expression of unity and equality among brothers. While I agree with this, it must be added that the assumption of unity and social cohesion among brothers on that basis is sometimes misleading, for often a house building project is advanced by the division of parental property and with the division of the joint household among brothers, resources are also no longer pooled. In that sense, building similar houses continues to be a representative act of demonstrating brotherly unity; however, in and of itself that does not guarantee future solidarity and cooperation among brothers.

Moreover, many such houses remain uninhabited for the most part, as their owners reside abroad in separate households. According to available statistics for 2011, one-third of the buildings in Kosovo remain empty for most of the year, and in the Dragash municipality, specifically, to which the



**Figure 4.2.** Triplet houses of brothers on the outskirts of a village in Opoja  
(© Carolin Leutloff-Grandits)

region of Opoja belongs, about 39 per cent of dwellings were either vacant or only temporarily occupied (UNDP 2012: 63). This number may, however, be explained by the high outmigration numbers (even higher than in Opoja) among the predominantly Slavic-speaking population of the Gora region, also part of Dragash municipality. Furthermore, the brotherly unity as expressed as a chain of identical houses is undermined by the fact that one or several brothers living abroad may decide not to invest in housing in Opoja or at least build a house that is smaller than the others.

Other migrants and returnees sometimes renounce their share of the inheritance and leave the parental house to the brother(s) residing there while they build a new house for themselves. For example, Qerim, who moved abroad in the 1990s, agreed that his older brother, who was unemployed with two sons, should take over the parental house, while he used his savings from abroad to build a new house in the direct vicinity. In this and similar cases, property division and house building projects were premised on continued brotherly solidarity, regardless of their unequal social and economic positions. Taking over the parental house, however, often also comes with the responsibility of caring for elderly parents until they die (see also Chapter 3). This implies that those who inherit the house also have more practical caring obligations.

In short, house building activities resemble very different imaginations of family unity and family care. While fraternal solidarity may be materialized via house building, houses may not be the most accurate or sole indicator of unity.

## HOUSES AS SIGNIFIERS OF INDIVIDUAL STATUS AND MODERNITY

Houses built by migrants signify social status beyond the local village, in the translocal space (see also Morokvasic 1987; Goldring 1997; Portes 2001; Al-Ali and Koser 2002; Pichler 2009a; Nieswand 2011). The fact that migrants proudly put their house building activities on display on social media, like Facebook, shows the border-spanning significance of houses. More broadly, a new, modern and large house represents commitment to hard work and the resultant success garnered abroad. Houses within a compound in diverse shapes and sizes may express the differential status of the owners, within the family and in the community at large. Residents of Opoja aspire to the shiny houses of the migrants, which stand for a (better) life abroad and for the limitations they currently experience in the village.

Qerim's house, for example, stands out because of its windowpane mirrors and the 'American' kitchen with its sizable flat-screen television, which his brothers, who reside next door with their children, cannot afford. As Qerim and his family make only rather short annual visits to the region lasting less than a month, his brothers and their families assume the care obligations for the house, and especially its interior. They check on it from time to time, and the children then admire the modern household equipment. As such, the houses and household interior create dreams as well as a proxy-presence of otherwise absent migrants among kin member at home.

As Arjun Appadurai (1996: 177ff) describes, what is 'local' receives new meaning in times of increased migration and globalization that compresses time and space. Houses built by migrants are material expressions of their belonging to their home locality and community from afar, 'cementing' a lasting relationship to them (see also Schweitzer 2010: 478). For Ylber, who went abroad as teenager, the house he built for his nuclear family, not far from his parental home in the village, demonstrates his strong relationship to his home village and the translocal community. While he considers it important to be a house owner in his home village, in Vienna he lives in a rented flat and does not intend to buy or build a house despite spending most of his time there. He emphasizes that he has adapted to life abroad and that he has managed to overcome a steep learning curve in Austria that would eventually serve him well 'anywhere', but he acknowledges very little emotional attachment to Austria. His relationship to his home region, on the other hand, is closely linked to his nostalgia for family, home and his childhood – to an idealized space in his imagination to which neither the present time nor the future could ever live up.

Houses link to a lost past as much as they are sites of permanent engagement, designed to signify not only modernity and progress but also the status

of the migrant abroad. Contrary to the notion that the building project ends once the house is completed, and with it one's own active commitment to it, house building often turns out to be a lifelong process, binding the owners to the village in a way that it becomes central to their social life (Carsten and Hugh-Jones 1996). In Opoja and elsewhere, many migrants build their houses incrementally over many years. After the initial building period, they modify and add an extension to the house, seeking to integrate new ideas, designs and objects that could raise their social status and bring to the fore the 'good life' they will lead in the years to come. As houses are quite stable, capable of surviving over decades and generations, they not only have a history but also demarcate a 'future-oriented temporality' (Roth 1983). A house has the potential to establish a home and provide security and care for the times ahead; it embodies a 'sense of promise for the future', as Sherry Ortner (2016: 52) puts it. Similarly, for Ylber, his newly built house in the village is a promise of a good life in the near or distant future, and especially after retirement. As he showed me his house, he explained that he was planning to build a bedroom and a bathroom on the ground floor to avoid having to climb the stairs in his old age.

As Dimitris Dalakoglou (2010: 763) and Robert Pichler (2009a) suggest, houses also dynamically link two (and more) spaces and life worlds through architectural elements, building materials or imported furniture, symbolizing back home the life of the migrant abroad. While the migrant's house building activities may signify their intimate links to their home locality, to their 'roots' (*rrënjët*) and the local community there, paradoxically, such activities rely on migrancy – that is, being distant from their home village. Even the architecture and style of the houses are deeply influenced by their migration experience. Building such a house requires the migrants to inhabit a socio-economic context abroad that is relatively more lucrative than the one back home. In expressing this connection to their roots, migrants suggestively try to give the house a more 'modern' appearance, incorporating architectural elements from abroad. While building a house that is distinct from others in the neighbourhood, they also build a bridge between their localized 'roots' and their present locations (Dalakoglou 2010: 773).

Ylber, for example, designed a 'Western-style' house with 'Western' technology, partly using 'quality' construction materials imported from abroad, as he explained to me. He also had to return often to supervise the house building, as local contractors had problems implementing his plans. In seeking to distinguish his home from the older houses in the village in terms of style and architecture, Ylber is not different from other migrants. While older buildings only have one or two floors and are often hardly visible from the main street due to the surrounding walls, most new houses are eye-catching – multistoreyed, with large, reflective glass windows, stainless



steel bannisters and balconies. Often migrants even forego the traditional boundary walls built around the houses – as if openly wanting to exhibit their wealth to enhance their social status, or also as an expression of new, more egalitarian gender norms, as the walled courtyards of the houses traditionally served as a space where the women of the houses were protected from the gaze of the men who were not part of the family.

Older family houses are often demolished to make space for new houses. As traditional architecture is largely not cherished, only a few architectural traces of historic houses can be found in Opoja, mostly in very bad shape. All over Kosovo, the newly built migrant houses along the narrow streets of the village centre, and in the village outskirts, transform the village streetscape. While they symbolize the attainment of a new level of ‘modernity’ and prosperity, they also indicate a vanishing village life – slow in most instances but rapid in some. Similar processes can be evidenced elsewhere, as in the Albanian settlements in Northern Macedonia (see Pichler 2009a), in the migration-dominated villages in Romania (Călinescu and Hodoiu 2013), or essentially wherever migrants choose to invest in houses in significant numbers.

Like Caroline Humphrey’s (1997) characterization of the ‘villas’ of the ‘New Russians’, most of the newly built houses in Opoja break the link to the past through their new architectural styles and new, modern furniture inspired by Western European home and design magazines. The shiny, even clinical, exteriors and interiors of the new houses give them a rather ahistorical and delocalized character. Inside the houses, everything is in order, as the women of the house take care to put things away immediately after use – including the guests’ cups. In line with gender norms for the region, women are habitually responsible for the household and for hosting the guests, proving respect for the guests with their hospitality, but also that they are well-mannered members of the household. Yet, the new interiors, where space is divided on different terms, also serve as an expression of transformed gender and family relations, merging various gendered and spatialized assignments within the household. While older houses have a living area separate from the kitchen, which was traditionally the designated female realm, in the years since the war, a spacious living room with an integrated ‘American kitchen’ has become increasingly fashionable.

Families who do not have close relatives abroad also aspire to build new houses, but not all of them can afford to, and certainly not such large and ‘modern’ ones. Against the new houses, the older houses seem to be characterized by ‘backwardness’ and poverty and instantiate the increasing social stratification and fragmentation of the village community. Still, the lines of division between the old and the new, the modern and the backward are not clear cut. Families with few means to build a new house try to compensate

by renovating their homes; for example, by building a new facade or tearing down the inner walls to build an American-style kitchen. To sum up, the new houses are increasingly a marker of modernity, individualism and often more emancipated gender relations – which indicates the higher status of the owners. Whilst migrants have the means to make such investments and thus link to the village from abroad, this is done partly without taking equal care of brothers who remain in the village and thus the social unity of brothers and of the village community is increasingly undermined.

### HOUSES AS SIGNIFIERS OF GENERATIONAL AND GENDERED FUTURES

Houses create a future vision for migrants, as they materialize family relations and the family future. Commonly owned by male family members and passed on to their sons, new houses (and house building projects) have a gendered potential to channel the future of the next generation. Various migrants, especially fathers of sons, have stressed that building a house ensures a place for their son(s) back home in Opoja. In line with the norms and traditions of patrilocality and male inheritance prevalent in rural Kosovo, the sons, along with their father, are regarded as lifetime co-owners of the house and gain full ownership upon the death of their father. This again explains why migrants strive to build bigger houses. These houses symbolize a materialized link to their home region in Kosovo also for their children's generation. They are intended not only for the use of the migrant's nuclear family but also, down the line, for the families of their children, mainly that of their sons. House building is thus a sign of paternal care for the children, and especially the sons, and links the migrant children to the place of their fathers' origin.

Edona, a young migrant woman I met during her visit to Opoja in summer 2012, invited me to the recently finished, spacious house of her father, who had migrated in the 1990s. Edona explained that her father had started to build their house some years before the war, after dividing the parental property amongst the three brothers. Edona's father sold some of the land he inherited to build their house close to the parental house, which now belonged to one of his brothers. His second brother – also abroad – had already built his house in the same neighbourhood. The three houses had different designs and shapes, but they were located inside a common yard and surrounded by a common wall, highlighting they belonged to a single family. Although Edona told me that it is unlikely that her father will return to the village after retirement, she agreed with this investment. She explained that her father had used the property and the resources he received from his fa-

ther to build it, and this money had to 'remain home', in Opoja. Following the widely shared patrilocal family norms, she assumed that her brother would eventually be considered the co-owner, and later the sole heir to the new village house. In her view, and that of most Opoja villagers and migrants, local house building is a gendered act that reinforces the bond between fathers and sons – a tradition that has hardly been challenged. This also illuminates why in Opoja house building activities are less pronounced among families with 'only' daughters. Moreover, house building also reinforces the bonds of patrilocal kinship, as house building among migrants is typically undertaken in the village of the male spouse. Often the house is built on land held in the patriline for generations, and frequently also next to the houses of brothers – a practice that stresses fraternity. As an effect, the ties of the family of the female spouse are diminished – this is an observation also shared by Jasna Čapo Žmegač (2003) for migrants building houses in rural Croatia.

However, not everyone in the village views the prevailing patrilocal gender norms positively. Especially women are critical of the house building projects in the husband's village, where they feel more restricted if the house is built jointly with the husband's brothers or in the direct vicinity of the husband's brothers' houses. Generally, migrants have the ability to transform gender relations by realizing their own visions about the house and its location – not just in Opoja. As Julia Pauli (2008) describes for Mexico, women prefer to build their houses separate from their husband's relatives, to gain greater agency. In Opoja, various migrant couples compromise by building their houses outside the village *mahalla* where there is more space but still door to door with the husband's brothers. Some couples also opt to buy property in Prizren instead, often at the insistence of the female spouses. Other migrant women prefer to make their housing investments abroad – not least because the patrilocal gender norms embedded in notions of house building and ownership do not apply there. Edona, who lives in Germany, stressed that her father supported her plans to move out of the parental house and had helped her set up a separate household with her husband, which, however, they rent. She also stressed that her brother had to rent a flat for himself abroad, too, whereas in Opoja parents would be expected to provide housing for their son on their property, so rentals are rarely, if at all, available. Edona sees this as positive – not only because it means that her brother and she are treated equally in Germany but also because renting his own apartment has helped her brother to become more independent and self-reliant, as she says.

But not just migrant women are agents of change. Women living in complex households in Opoja often push for a household division to focus on their nuclear unit, which means cooking only for their own nuclear family or supervising and educating their natal children only. As women responsi-

ble for complex households comprising several nuclear families complained, they spend most days at home with no rest (Reineck 1991: 59; Krasniqi 2016: 198), adding that, in such households, ‘crowding’ is a problem (*kallabëllëk*, deriving from Turkish, meaning ‘too many people’). Elderly parents, on the other hand, are often less in favour of it, as they want to preserve family unity and exert their authority. Some thus fault their daughters-in-law for selfishly striving to divide their household (see also Krasniqi 2014a: 206). Yet, many middle-aged and elderly parents, understanding that the times and values have changed, do not interfere with the plans of the younger generation. Some also enjoy a less crowded house in which they live with only one son and his family and in which they have more peace and time for rest. But various other factors, including the number of sons, the economic situation of the household, which is often related to remittances from family members abroad, as well as the number of decision-makers also impact the household division.

### HOUSES CHALLENGING NOTIONS OF HOMECOMING

Although the migrant’s home investments embody their wish to strengthen their link to their home region, their homecoming experiences are rather ambivalent. In our conversations, middle-aged migrants often recalled the times in their childhood in the 1970s and 1980s when a homecoming migrant was lavished with enormous respect and attention, and all children – including themselves – gathered to welcome the relative from abroad. Some contrasted this to their own experiences of being hardly welcomed at all nor bid farewell when they left. They explained that these days villagers were immersed in their own projects and problems and lacked the time. Migrants were often disappointed to realize that times had changed as far as their position ‘back home’ was concerned.

The homecoming experience is also closely connected to the houses migrants build for their nuclear families. Despite all material investments, an ‘empty’ house with no family members waiting to make their homecoming more pleasant is like an empty shell that creates a different picture of village life. Instead of participating in joint meals and receiving assistance with daily chores, visiting migrants are forced to organize their own household, buy groceries upon arrival to fill up their empty refrigerators and cook for themselves. Moreover, housecleaning as a chore is a source of discomfort.

Accompanying Bekime on an initial visit to her sister, who had arrived from Austria with her family a few days earlier, the teenage children conceded that due to the large size of the house, which remained uninhabited for the most part of the year, they had to get to work immediately upon their

arrival each summer to get rid of dust and dead insects before they could welcome relatives and guests. Maintaining a house that is uninhabited for most of the year can thus become burdensome. As observed in various other regions of the world, migrants not only have to worry about the uninhabited house while they are abroad but must fix and clean the house during their visits (see Bendix and Löfgren 2007: 8; Dalakoglou 2010: 772; Călinescu and Hodoiu 2013). The worry intensifies if the house is away from the village centre and thus from locally present relatives who might otherwise be willing to assume care responsibilities. There could be severe consequences for homes lacking caretakers if migrants are away for most of the year. As Bekime's sister told me, their house had been broken into while they were abroad.

Generally, there is no fear of theft in Opoja, and trust levels within the local community are so high that villagers often do not even lock their doors. The fact that thieves broke into a migrant's house suggests that migrants are partly regarded as community outsiders to whom local norms do not apply. The theft could even have been interpreted as morally legitimate, for only portable heaters were stolen, and migrant owners who visit Opoja only in the summer are not affected by the cold winters at 1,000 m above sea level, which Opoja villagers must endure in homes that generally do not have proper heating.

Houses built by migrants who have resettled abroad with their nuclear families do not necessarily function as a bridge to their relatives back home. Some villagers are even highly critical of the separate housing properties of migrants in their home villages, especially if they have no intention of permanently returning. Instead of symbolizing kinship unity and equality, such houses mark the migrants as 'selfish'. A villager critically noted that his brother had moved 'voluntarily' to Germany with his wife and children to realize 'personal goals' and earn money for himself and his nuclear family unit. He pointed out that, in contrast, the earlier generation of labour migrants (until the early 1990s) had saved a good part of their salary for family members back home. His brother used the money he earned to build a huge and modern house in Opoja, designed solely for his nuclear family, which he uses only in summer. He had decided to leave the fraternal unity and invest in his own fortune, without respecting the equality among brothers.

Today, he went on to explain, families are divided at a much earlier stage than in former times, when the ability of families with several sons to 'remain united' in a single household was considered a strength. In response to my question about potential conflicts among migrants and villagers related by kinship, he acknowledged that an unequal economic standing could cause greed and create disputes within families, especially between brothers. He explained that family members were at times jealous when one segment of the family was more affluent than the other, to the extent that brothers

even stopped speaking. He averred, however, that he loved and respected his brother irrespective of whether his brother lived in a small or big house when he returned for his holidays. And yet, instead of acknowledging that his brother's house symbolized his success, he countered: 'an empty house is a poor house'. For the house stood empty for most of the year, pointing to his brother's absence and his voluntary departure from the local community and the symbolic fraternal unity.

More generally, houses of migrants embody the ambivalence of their presence and absence and their belonging within the local community, even from afar. The ambivalence of migrants' investments in large and modern houses that they hardly use is underlined by the fact that the vast majority of migrants do not see an economic basis in the village to return for good – at least not before retirement age. Investment in houses then becomes part of a consumer culture that follows the growing trend of conspicuous consumption and that is mostly not characterized by solidarity within the larger family. Yet, a growing fraction of Opojans are invisible: Opoja migrants who decide not to invest in a house back home in Opoja. One of them is Alban, who went abroad via marriage and finished his studies there. As he intends to live in Germany for the rest of his life, he prefers to invest his money there. Especially younger migrants share his view – but many are already provided a house in Opoja by their parents.

## THE ANTAGONISMS OF HOME INVESTMENTS

One of the annual highlights for migrants from Opoja is their summer 'home' visit to their village in Opoja, and most prepare carefully for it. Buying gifts for family and relatives, mainly clothes and electronic goods and devices, is integral to preparation. With the economic liberalization and globalization since the end of the war, in Kosovo, a wider range of consumer goods, including electronic devices, have become available but are neither affordable or of good quality, which makes goods from abroad all the more desirable and appreciated by the villagers. Bringing such gifts is also an expression of care and emotional closeness. However, many migrants also feel pressured to arrive with the 'right' gifts. That this is not specific to Opoja migrants but is also found in other contexts of migrants visiting their relatives in the homeland is shown by Jasna Čapo Žmegač (2006) with Croatian migrants in the 1990s, who complained that the presents they are expected to bring must include the newest brands and the latest fashions.

Migrants' preparations for their visits 'back home' also include investments into their own appearance, like the purchase of new clothes for themselves and the children and a visit to the hairdresser, manicure and similar. Expenses

do not decrease even after they arrive, which is when a very active season of socializing begins for the migrants and the villagers, mainly among relatives. Migrants invite family members and friends for drinks at various coffee bars or to other locations or into their homes in Opoja and in turn visit them. Investments in special social events and celebrations commemorating birthdays, anniversaries and especially wedding celebrations 'back home' are common, and they help to (re-)establish family and kinship ties, as most guests are related by consanguineal or affinal ties (for wedding festivals, see Chapter 6).

During his recent summer visit, Qerim invited all 'close' family members – especially the families of his two brothers and of his two male cousins, who were all living in the same *mahalla* – to a picnic in the mountains on the day before Ramadan. The group of about thirty people spent the entire day grilling meat, and they even brought cradles along to ensure their infants and toddlers slept intermittently. As he spoke to me about the picnic, occasionally showing me photos, Qerim said that these moments warmed his heart and allowed him to feel he was finally home, and he was thus happy to cover all the expenses for the picnic. He said he enjoys being home, in the circle of his relatives, where he spent his childhood, and it is the place his heart longs for. He went on: 'I miss it in Germany – that is, to go out with my family, to spend together a day outside.' Being at home in Opoja, being with the family and spending money were closely linked.

As also observed by Robert Pichler (2009b) for Albanian migrants in Northern Macedonia, many migrants, especially women, also participate in the numerous weddings that are mainly celebrated in the summer months (see Chapter 6). In fact, their participation in weddings and other family festivals as well as their visits to relatives are among the dominant experiences of being 'back home'. Some migrants even partake in 'wedding marathons', attending up to five to ten weddings during their visit. This is not uncommon for rural communities where family social security is largely based on migration, as is the case in rural Romania, where migrants sometimes claimed to have attended as many as twenty weddings during their summer visits home (Călinescu and Hodoiu 2013), or migrants from rural Kyrgyzstan, who invested in large weddings during their home visits (Rubinov 2014). In Opoja, various migrants, especially those who were on a *Duldung* and could not return 'home' for many years, underscored their longing for such family gatherings and rituals. Apart from weddings, they also celebrated other life-stage ceremonies within the family and village community settings, including the circumcision (*syneti*) for boys. Forty-year-old Nderim told me, for example, that he had decided to combine the *syneti* ceremony of his two sons with the sons of his brothers in his home village, in the circle of the wider family, even if that meant he had to cover a significant portion of the overall expenses.

The longing for intense quality time within the circle of family members partly relates to diminished family life within nuclear households and limited personal interactions with other compatriots from Opoja abroad. Mostly, the number of migrants from Opoja living in a certain locality abroad is simply too small; Linz, however, is referred to as ‘small Opoja’. Still, everyday life is so busy with work and family obligations that many migrants have no time for socializing with the community regularly. Others, especially migrants with higher education, maintain a certain distance to other families from Opoja to avoid the community’s pressure to conform to patriarchal gender norms that tend to transgress state borders. In this way, they also establish boundaries towards fellow migrants from Opoja (see Chapter 7).

Migrants whose legal and economic position abroad is relatively secure do not necessarily rely as much on (strong) translocal networks. But often they still maintain translocal subjectivities: the translocal dimension is vital to their identity, and they constantly contrast their life abroad with the life in Opoja (for general considerations, see Dahinden 2014b). For forty-year-old Ylber, who lives with his wife and three teenage children in a nuclear household in Vienna, life abroad is good but boring. Over and above his regular job, like many other male migrants he also works privately for extra income to pay for investments in Opoja and Vienna. Reflecting on life in Vienna, Ylber said that he is content to enjoy a sense of security and to make a good living, but the days and weeks look alike; everything is predictable, with no room for manoeuvre due to his many obligations. He looks forward to holidays in Kosovo, where life is less structured and where he can relax while socializing with peers, family and relatives.

Like Ylber, various middle-aged migrants draw a stark contrast between life back home – in Opoja – and life abroad, especially in attitudes towards their family and their readiness to spend money. Back home, in Opoja, they readily spend money on socializing with a wider circle of family and friends or on house building activities. In contrast, the everyday life in the migration destinations abroad is marked by (hard) work and a withdrawal into the nuclear family to save money. After finally receiving his work permit and finding a relatively well-paid job, 45-year-old Qerim initially set the goal of saving up to 1,000 euros each month to renovate, rebuild and furnish his house in his home village, even if that meant living as modestly as possible in a one-room flat with his wife and child:

We save a lot of money abroad . . . I mean, in Germany, I do not have so much time for social activities. For many years, I never went for a coffee. I thought I better drink my coffee at home. This costs me three cents, while outside it costs two euros. Or food. We never go out for dinner.



Many migrants from Opoja only have to spend a small part of their income on food abroad, as they buy groceries in one of the larger discount stores at a cheaper rate. In contrast, Kosovo families typically spend a large part of their income on food and non-alcoholic beverages; in 2016 this was 42 per cent. In order to save for house building and other investments in Opoja, Qerim also took care of all home renovations by himself and frequented sales to buy clothes and household equipment. Other everyday saving strategies, especially among middle-aged migrants, include low-cost housing abroad. Thus, many migrants live in rather small, sub-standard flats with older fittings and fixtures than in the houses they build in Opoja, which they only use for a few weeks every year. The cramped housing conditions and the urge to save money again influence their social life abroad, as it restricts the possibility of inviting other relatives and acquaintances from abroad or visiting them. Forty-five-year-old Veton, who lives in Essen, recalled visiting his cousin Qerim in Frankfurt on his return trip from Kosovo. Qerim's family had to be split up to accommodate him and his family in Qerim's tiny one-room apartment. The women remained in Qerim's apartment, and the men were sent to Qerim's friends. Qerim again explained that he did not visit his brother in Northern Germany much due to the high cost of travel and the cost of gifts, since one cannot arrive empty-handed. The high savings goals impinge on their everyday life and limit their socializing, especially when that entails long-distance travel and overnight stays. Instead, migrants wait to see one another in their home region in Kosovo. For example, Qerim and Veton see each other frequently as next-door neighbours in Opoja on their annual summer visits.

### FROM ASYMMETRIES OF STATUS AND EXPECTATIONS TO FRICTIONS AND RELOCATIONS

The building of nice houses or buying gifts for relatives and paying for social activities 'back home', at times stretching beyond their financial capabilities, enhances the migrants' social status in Opoja and often belies their life abroad. Many migrants who went abroad in the 1990s as young adults only had limited access to the labour market and/or could only take up low-paid blue-collar jobs in the cleaning services or at a factory, as their degree certificates were not recognized. Still, as argued already extensively by Mirjana Morokvasic (1987), Nina Glick Schiller et al. (1995), Boris Nieswand (2011) and Remus G. Anghel (2013), the low social status as well as failed aspirations and societal marginalization abroad sometimes even contributes to their willingness to remain connected with their home region. That is also true for some of the migrants from Opoja. Investments in Opoja serve to create social status in the home context when such a goal is blocked in the

receiving countries, and to create notions of belonging when experiences abroad are marked by disappointments and struggles.

At the same time, the limited avenues for social mobility abroad can limit the migrants' opportunities to invest in projects and achieve a certain status 'back home'. Qerim, who could not find a stable job abroad for a long time and received social transfer payments, complained about his inability to buy a new car, specifically because that impacted his status in Kosovo, where migrants typically show off their flashy cars during their visits. As long as he received social transfer payments, Qerim was also not eligible to invite family members from Kosovo for a visit, if only for touristic reasons or to take up undocumented work. That affected his family relations in the village, for he lacked the asset that ranked very high among kin members (Carling 2008).

While migrants earning low wages or receiving social benefits are unable to upgrade their status abroad and feel that their aspirations for a better life for themselves cannot be fulfilled, in Opoja they tend to disguise their difficult situation abroad and are rarely critical of their new homeland because their status as beneficiaries of a Western lifestyle is an asset that the young generation in the villages in Opoja aspires to. During conversations with relatives in the home villages in Kosovo, they often stressed their success and highlighted the high salaries they and others can earn abroad. Cleaners working for the city administration do not specify their exact job position, stating only that they work for the city council. Undocumented workers concentrate on the positive side and keep other stories to themselves, also because no one asks about the details.

But this positive picture of 'the glorious West' also raises the expectations villagers have towards migrants and their possibilities to finance necessities or social activities. This could be the expectation of being invited to a (fully financed) holiday to the seaside in Albania – often nurtured by reminiscing about joint trips to the seaside in previous years – or having their various expenses covered in Opoja. Migrants are aware of such expectations, which many try to fulfil. In most cases, however, financial investments are related to creating basic social security for family members at home. On his annual visits with his wife and three children every summer, Nderim, for example, covers the unpaid bills of his mother and two brothers in the neighbouring grocery shop, pays for car and house repairs or also bills related to health care. Ultimately, migrants are willing to spend a considerable amount of money on their family members back home in order to provide them with a secure base or even to establish greater material equality among family members. But, as Jørgen Carling (2008) writes, based on the asymmetries of information and expectations between migrants and non-migrants, migrants are partly also insecure about whether the care they provide and the money they spend has fulfilled the expectations of relatives at home. In some

cases, asymmetries in money spending and expectations in this regard on both sides lead to hidden tensions between migrants and non-migrants, which become palpable during visits home and counteract the idealized image of a harmonious family home.

Packing their holidays with social events, as well as with spending sprees to meet everyone's demands, including their own, migrants sometimes find vacations stressful and exhausting. This is exacerbated by the long drives to Opoja, ranging from 1,000 km (Vienna to Opoja) to 2,000 km (Hamburg to Opoja) or more (from Sweden), as flying is rather expensive and often not an option for family travel. In order to rest from their 'home visit' in Kosovo, many migrants desist from spending their entire vacation in Opoja and depart earlier, to have some days to themselves before returning to work. Others divide their time between the village and the Albanian seaside. While some invite close relatives from Opoja to join them for their seaside vacation (Kadriu 2017), others take a break from the intense family life in the village and the exhausting travel, keep to themselves and relax with their nuclear family. In many cases, migrants only spend ten days with their village relatives (instead of the normal two- to three-week holidays in salaried positions). In the short time they spend with their relatives, they attend a flurry of social events and invest more money than usual, especially in gifts. If at all, only women with small children, who are not engaged in wage labour, spend the entire summer in Opoja, often for the sake of their children, who are happy to stay. They then stay with the husband's family for some time, but they often especially enjoy the time spent within the fold of their own natal families in their parental home villages.

The accelerated pace of social events in Opoja every summer, which goes hand in hand with the reduced time migrants spend in the villages, arouses the ire and criticism of the villagers. Some villagers say that migrants, especially those who went abroad as teenagers or children, need stimulation because they get bored easily and often indulge in consumerism – for example, drink coffee three times a day (instead of a small cup once a day, as local people do), dine out and commit to many other social activities in Opoja. Others criticize the migrants for their 'lavish' spending in Opoja, as well as for bragging about their life, although villagers sometimes suspect that migrants are merely compensating for their underdog status abroad. More critical voices can be heard complaining that some migrants disrespect Kosovo's traditional or customary code of social conduct. They blame them for bad habits, like throwing garbage out of the car as soon as they cross the border over to Kosovo, suggesting they behave as they wish because of their money, or dangerous speeding and overtaking others on local roads, which could cause accidents. These stereotypes underlie the villagers' claim that migrants are uncultured or even harmful to the local village community. In our conver-

sations, this gave rise to questions directed at me as to why ‘we’ (the Germans), who claim to be civilized and to even have an ‘advanced civilisation’, did not manage to educate ‘them’ (the migrants) more appropriately despite their long stay abroad, or why migrants forget their good manners when they cross the border to Kosovo, as if ‘civilization’ could be discarded at will. With these notions, villagers resort to discourses of Western superiority to devalue migrants and to place their code of conduct above that of the migrants. In fact, the villagers consider some of the migrants to be particularly conservative, as if they have not developed since moving abroad, whereas their own communities – and Kosovar society more generally – and they themselves have been developing and embracing modernity and change.

Migrants, however, engage in similar forms of reassessment and boundary drawing. They see that some villagers find their behaviour inappropriate and that their many challenges abroad are not fully understood, which alienates them from village life and their relatives in rural Kosovo. They similarly regard their home region as unorganized or even backward and reproduce a West-centred taxonomy of progressivity and underdevelopment. A middle-aged migrant being annoyed about the behaviour on the roads exclaimed, for example, that Albanians are ‘*ein dreckiges Volk*’ (a dirty nation). Thus, migrants increasingly construct boundaries between Albanians in Kosovo, who they consider ‘uncivilized’ or even ‘dirty’, and nations in Western Europe, which they perceive as more ‘civilized’. They do so although abroad, in Western countries, they are regularly seen as Albanians – and/or refer to themselves as such and are thus subject to the same negative stereotypes they ascribe to villagers in Opoja and to Albanians in general. This, in turn, underscores their own fragmented identity and the racist devaluation they have experienced and in part also internalized in the countries of immigration (see also Dahinden 2014a).

### ‘HOMECOMING’ OF MIGRANT CHILDREN

Many migrants regularly visit their home village so that their children can develop a close connection with the region. Nderim, for example, asserted that while he could spend his money on luxury holidays with the whole family at a nice resort in Turkey or Egypt, he wants his children to be close to his home culture and family. In a similar vein, Alban visits Opoja each summer mainly so that his daughter ‘knows where she is from’. The costly visits ‘home’ also represent an investment in the future of the children. Put differently, the children play an indirect yet important role in building translocal relations, as investments in home visits are often made ‘for the sake of the children’ – to connect them to their roots.

Many migrants believe they have succeeded and claim their children – regardless of where they were born – are excited about spending their holidays in Opoja and feel closely connected to it. Like their parents, various migrant children I spoke to painted their time in the village in bright colours. Contrasting their summer visits to their life abroad, in the immigration context, they addressed the daily family dynamics: several claimed that their life ‘abroad’ is marked by a lack of parental time and attention, with parents very busy with earning money, while life in Opoja is organized mainly around family and the members with whom they stay or visit. In addition, many have close relationships with cousins of their own age and look forward to seeing them again each summer. Their relations to Opoja thus also depend on being integrated into a large family and sometimes also a complex household, often in contrast with their nuclear family abroad. The optimistic view of migrant children towards Opoja is partially linked to the quality of their holiday time spent in Opoja, which many regard as cheerful. Having almost no duties or obligations, they often spend their days as they wish, while they see life abroad through the lens of school and homework.

Twelve-year-old Bartha, who moved to Linz, Austria, at the age of seven, talked about the difference between her life in Linz and her experiences in Kosovo as she sat next to me during our twenty-hour bus ride mid-summer from Vienna to Opoja. She was filled with excitement about spending her holidays in Opoja, stressing that life there is, in many respects, more enjoyable for her, as in Linz she lacks time to meet with friends outside of school, and even time spent with family is minimal. She stays at afterschool care until 5.00 PM. every school day, as her mother often works from early afternoon until nine in the evening as a cleaner in a hospital. She does not like the fact that she does not see her mother until bedtime, and her father, who starts work at 7.00 AM, is tired by the time he returns and just manages to heat up the meal her mother cooks in the morning. Bardha’s father works occasionally during weekends, to earn extra money, which makes weekends often even more boring than schooldays, as Bardha is left to her own devices.

In contrast, Bardha experiences her time in the village as fulfilling and exciting, not least because she spends a lot of time with her cousins. In fact, Bardha and her family stay with her grandfather, who heads the household of his four married sons, their wives and many children, who are Bardha’s cousins. During her holidays, Bardha shares a room with her cousins, and they spend the days together. Bardha also likes the fact that she can stay awake until late, often nearly until midnight, while bedtime in Germany is 8.00 PM. She insists on spending the entirety of her summer holidays, about eight weeks, in Opoja, and had discussed this at length with her mother, who would rather return earlier. Bardha’s enthusiastic view of village life is quite

common among children of her age. As summer approaches, some count down the days before they get to return to the village.

But not all the migrant children I met were excited about Opoja. Some children and teenagers expressed a more critical viewpoint with respect to village life and had greater difficulties connecting with villagers and relatives. This is especially the case when their family house accommodates only their nuclear unit, or when no relatives of the same age are around. Eleven-year-old Fitore, who was born in Germany and whose parents have university degrees, said that the time she spends in the village is rather boring, as she does not have many friends there. In Germany, in contrast, she has many school friends, whom she meets after school.

The viewpoints of migrant girls about the village are also coloured by their gendered positionings abroad. Teenage girls, who tend to be restricted in their movements abroad, as their parents fear that a too liberal attitude might encourage them to enter a love relationship too easily or too early, sometimes enjoy the possibility of moving around more freely in Opoja, as parents have less concerns about the dangers and may even welcome their daughter falling in love with a young man from the home region. This contributes to a rescaling of locations – meaning that for these female migrant teenagers, their home region becomes a place of many possibilities in contrast to the environs they live in abroad. However, migrant girls with more freedom abroad, who pursue vocational training and take up employment after secondary school, tend to be critical about the lack of economic opportunities open to Opoja girls and women, not to mention the restrictions to their movements. Twenty-year-old Maja, who worked at a fashion store at one of the large Western brands admired by local youth, had distanced herself from village life even further. She said that life in Opoja is very different from life in Austria, and while she enjoys being ‘home’ in Kosovo and feels close to her cousins, she ‘cannot stand’ being in Opoja for more than two or three weeks in a row, as she feels constricted and overwhelmed by the village and family life.

The differences in life experiences and perspectives of the teenagers in Opoja and abroad also lead to negative stereotyping and boundary drawing between the local youth and the migrant youth. Teenagers living abroad are not used to the conservative attitudes of some of their peers living in Opoja, while Opoja teens view negatively migrant teens showing ‘too liberal’ attitudes in Opoja. Emina and Arbnora, sixteen and eighteen, respectively, are a case in point. They followed their parents to a medium-sized town in Austria seven years ago, where they were allowed to join a sport club and started vocational training after finishing secondary school. Emina and Arbnora return to their home village in Kosovo each year for their holidays, where they

stay in the household of their two uncles. As they do not have many cousins in their age group in Opoja, they spend a considerable part of their time in the village on Facebook and other social media, where they have more than 1,000 friends, among them some from Opoja. Although Emina and Arbnora try to respect what they perceive as local gender norms, their Facebook pages exposed much about themselves and their life abroad. Through their Facebook presence, they were subject to diverse reactions from village teenagers, both on and offline. The girls said that some local boys seek to attract their attention and throw their phone numbers at them when they walk down the street; others verbally harass them. This again makes them critical about life in the village and the gender relations there. At the same time, however, teenagers like Emina and Arbnora also challenge the local gender norms and open new possibilities to their peers in Opoja to imagine their life differently.

In contrast to the teenage girls, teenage boys are inevitably less restricted, both abroad and in the village (see Chapter 1). Like adult male migrants, younger male migrants spend the days with their peers at coffee bars or cruise around in their father's car, which is often an appreciated brand. With the possibility of spending more money than the local youth, they enjoy inviting their friends for drinks, and they can also go to Prizren or visit a swimming pool near Prizren without much ado. Male migrants thus have an easier time accepting gender norms and clearly enjoy being 'back home' even as they get older.

Still, even those male and female young migrants who are excited about life in Opoja admit that life abroad has its advantages and that life in Opoja can be restrictive. Bardha contrasted the nice bathrooms abroad to the stink of the outdoor toilets in Opoja, which some houses lacking a proper sewage system still use, or the glossy shopping malls in Linz, so 'much more modern' and 'nicer' than in Kosovo (however, huge and modern shopping centres have been built close to urban areas especially since 2010). Other young migrants, including migrant children, are critical of their own parents and relatives and, more generally, people in Opoja and in Kosovo, whom they perceive as backward. One migrant in his mid-twenties even told me, nervously, that he 'gets crazy' when he observes his father (a migrant himself) and other relatives back home, who are in his view incapable of learning and behaving 'in the right manner'. Following this logic, these young migrants try to distinguish themselves from the villagers and sometimes from other migrants and family members who are a generation older than themselves by disparaging the habits and 'culture' of Albanians. In doing so, they overlook the fact that many of them themselves have been confronted with such negative stereotypes, common in Western countries, about Albanians in the immigrant society and do not seem to be aware of the fact that by attributing

these negative stereotypes to Albanians they are helping to perpetuate them (see on similar processes among Pakistani migrants Charsley and Bolognani 2016).

Again, villagers are not unanimous in their positive views about the new generation of migrants visiting from abroad. Unlike the earlier migrant workers, known in this region as *gurbetgji*, in reference to a century-old mode of migration to earn money for the family ‘back home’, who were considered integral to the economic stability of families in Opoja, this new generation of migrants from the 1990s, and especially their children, yet another generation, are considered as ‘coming from outside’ (*jashtë*), and their belonging to the region is questioned and must be confirmed through multiple actions – symbolic and material. Within Kosovo, migrants are sometimes also called by the German term ‘*Ausländer*’ (foreigners), suggesting differences in membership and marking migrants as not belonging to the national (and local) community. Alternatively, they are also called ‘*Schatzi*’, a derogatory use of the German word ‘Schatz’ (treasure), the German equivalent of ‘darling’ or ‘sweetheart’ (Behar and Wählich 2012; Paca 2015: 8–14). In Kosovo, ‘*Schatzi*’ is widely used to refer to Albanian migrants from a rural background who, despite migration, allegedly remain ‘uncultured’ or lose their ‘culture’ through migration. They are belittled, as Dafina Paca (2015: 11–14) writes, even though they are simultaneously the ‘cash cows’ of Kosovo, who send remittances and invest and are expected to ‘pick up the tab’ during their stay back home. This boundary drawing affects the identities and images of both villagers and migrants, and it became clear that parental attempts to facilitate their children to connect with village life are not always successful.

## CONCLUSION

Migrants are the lead investors in houses in Opoja. What they are looking for is not just housing but material manifestations of their social relationships in a physical place that connects to their past ties to the community, family and kinship, and at the same time represents a promise for the future. Investments in housing are, however, strongly gendered and tied to a specific generation. Especially male, middle-aged migrants who left as teenagers or young adults in the 1990s invest in a house in Opoja, as they often yearn for Opoja as representing a lost past and where they want to return to after retirement. While their life abroad is dominated by work to save for their trips and their real estate investments back home, Opoja, on the other hand, represents a place where they spend money and enjoy their leisure time, and where they can dream of a ‘good life’ after retirement. Those who can afford it build enormous houses, often in a Western style with modern equipment –



not least to create a place for their children and especially their son(s), and as such take care of their children's connection to the place and family. The newly built houses with the technical innovations testify their success abroad and their modernity and advancement, as well as their plans to return to the village.

In Opoja, houses are also markers of the male migrant's family and kinship ties, and of care and solidarity within this family network. The choice of location and the size of the houses may emphasize patrilocality and the close and cooperative kinship relations between male family members – often between brothers – and thus have a gendered, inter- and intragenerational dimension. Many male migrants who live in nuclear households abroad invest in joint family homes with their brothers and enjoy sharing a common household with their close relatives while in Opoja. A special architectonic feature exemplifying fraternal unity are the many twin, triplet, quadruplet or even quintuplet houses dominating the landscape in Opoja region, as in rural Kosovo in general. They create a perception of equality, family unity and respect among brothers and are a sign of brotherly care and selflessness, as those abroad often co-finance the house investments for their brother(s) in Opoja. But within the house building projects, brotherly unity is also contested, as households are divided, and material equality does not necessarily imply cooperation beyond the house building project. Moreover, many such houses remain empty for extended periods, and notions of solidarity and unity are not necessarily linked to everyday life or other activities beyond the dwelling.

An increasing number of migrants also build houses for their nuclear families in the village without seeing to it that the brothers have equal housing conditions. Often, these houses assume distinctive forms, expressing the status of migrants. However, such houses do not necessarily help them to socially integrate into the kin and village community. Instead, some villagers, and often also close kin members, view individual house building as selfish and detrimental to solidarity. This has provoked a certain antipathy of the villagers towards these migrants and has led to their social marginalization in the village or to a distancing within families. But patrilocality and brotherly solidarity are also partially contested by the wives of male migrants, who may prefer to build a house for their nuclear household at the margins of the (husband's family) village or prefer not to invest in a house in Opoja at all.

Beyond the controversial investments in houses as the material locus of the patrilocal family and as an embodiment of their roots in the village, migrants also choose other ways of investing in and caring for kin members back home; for instance, by bringing presents and inviting relatives for coffee and other social activities. Again, ambivalent and partly contradictory social and temporal processes are at stake in which locality matters and the

two locations, Opoja and the places of residence in the receiving country, are often seen as binary opposites but are complementary within the life of migrants. Many middle-aged migrants focus on their work and saving abroad and limit their social contact in the migration context, leading a family life that is mainly confined to the nuclear household. In contrast, their time in Opoja is characterized by their generous spending and plenty of free time, where they enjoy the larger family setup and the manifold family and kin gatherings with parents, siblings, cousins, aunts and uncles, nieces and nephews and other relatives. Yet such 'home visits' are not free of stress and fatigue for the migrants, who will often cut short the time spent in Opoja but without limiting their activities or spending.

Moreover, migrants' investments are also directed at their children and have thus also a clear intergenerational dimension. Migrants invest in house building and other social activities as a way to establish a lasting link to the home region and to sustain the patrilocal family line beyond their own generation, for their children, especially their sons. With their material and social investments and activities back home, many migrant children develop deep affection for Opoja and their relatives there and idealize it as a place with the feel of 'home'. But not all children are positive about this 'homecoming' ritual – which also depends on their social positioning abroad. Adapting to dominant discourses of the West, for many, Opoja comes across as 'backward' and 'regressive', while they themselves live in societies that they perceive as modern. That also has a gendered component, as especially girls criticize the patriarchal gender norms restricting their movements in Opoja once they reach puberty. This colours their view of Opoja and prevents them from imagining living there permanently. In short, home investments are meant to foster or restore migrants' ties to their villages and their families living there and are an expression of self- and family care. They create links between migrants and villagers along kinship, family, gender and generational lines, but are not without controversy. Migrant investments can also create divisions and transform the family and community relations – not least on the basis of a greater need for individuality and an increased emphasis on consumption and status that accompanies neoliberalism. In this respect, these investments demonstrate the migrants' desire to be united with family in Opoja as much as the transformations taking place within the translocal family network.

## CHAPTER

# 5

## SEEKING A FUTURE AND FORTUNE

### *Partner Selection in a Translocal Space*



## INTRODUCTION

An officer in the municipality of Dragash claimed in March 2013 that nearly half the marriages registered in the region of Opoja at that time were cross-border marriages. In these marriages, migrants from Opoja living abroad married a partner from their home region, who then prepared for outmigration from Opoja. Not just young women in Kosovo saw cross-border marriages as a means for migration to the West (Europe and overseas) but also young men, who accounted for just under 30 per cent of migrating spouses from Kosovo to Germany in 2015 (Grote 2017: 19). Both men and women lacked other options for remaining abroad long term. In 2010, Kosovo was the third most important country of origin for family-based migration to Germany, with altogether 2,875 migrants, ranking behind Turkey (8,366 migrants) and the Russian Federation (3,646 migrants) (ibid.: 57). Considering Kosovo's small population size (less than 2 million inhabitants compared to more than 80 million in Turkey), family-based migration in Kosovo is more than ten times higher than in Turkey, indicating the great importance for family-based migration in Kosovo. In 2014, the number of family-based migrations from Kosovo to Germany even increased to 3,766 (Grote 2017: 53). In Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Great Britain, numbers of marriage migrants from Sri Lanka, Pakistan or Morocco are high, reflecting important migrant communities in these states (Straßburger

2001; Charsley 2005; Beck-Gernsheim 2006, 2007; González-Ferrer 2006; Timmerman 2006; Schmidt 2011).

More generally, cross-border marriages are increasingly common because of tightened border regimes and especially since there are hardly any migration alternatives for citizens from non-EU countries. Cross-border marriages are also fostered by globalization and capital flows, by possibilities afforded by electronic communication, and the emergence of what Arjun Appadurai (1996) calls a 'global imagination'. Simultaneously, in mainstream Western discourses, immigrant-related cross-border marriages are often culturalized and problematized as well as gendered. They are often linked to patriarchal family arrangements that may go so far as to undermine the free will of both or at least one of the marriage partners (see Strasser 2009, 2014; Leutloff-Grandits 2014c; Pellander 2015; Bonjour and Block 2016). It is assumed that especially women experience family pressure to marry a country fellow and enter into such cross-border marriages (see for a critical discussion Straßburger 2001; Razack 2004; Timmerman 2006: 125–26; Beck-Gernsheim 2007; Schrötle 2007; Schmidt 2011: 56; Gutekunst 2016); some would even be forced into such marriages.

Scholarly discussions, especially within theories of modernization, have tended to cast 'love' and 'arranged' marriages as dichotomous, especially in terms of gender and family roles, and as indicators of backwardness or progressiveness in an imaginary modernization process. Anthony Giddens (1992: 2–3, 38–41), for instance, links 'arranged marriages' to pre-modern, kin-centred societal arrangements based on economic necessity and male privilege, and 'love marriages' to highly individualized and modernized societies that offer more gender equality.

This chapter will take a differentiated and diachronic perspective that goes beyond such binaries prevalent in mainstream Western discourses influenced by modernization theory, in that it addresses the aspirations and expectations of young women and men seeking a marriage partner across borders, as well as the family's role in it, and relates it to emic discourses and imaginations of modernity and tradition. This chapter argues that cross-border marriages are not necessarily following tradition but represent a strategy to meet the demands of modern, neoliberal times in a globalized world – in a sense to create the best possible conditions for both partners involved. As this chapter shows, in the context of Kosovo, cross-border marriages are often synonymous with good prospects, for the individual partners, but, partly, also for the families involved. Furthermore, the contact between future spouses is often initiated with the help of family members, not least because young people place great trust in their family networks, especially when marrying across borders. Exploring these dimensions, this chapter undertakes an intersectional analysis of the process of partner selec-

tion within cross-border marriages, taking into account gender, geographic location and the role of the family.

The chapter builds on research that has shown that the imaginations and socioculturally influenced desires of those desiring marriage may differ based on gender and geography and may carry paradoxes (Constable 2005: 7; see also Beck-Gernsheim 2011: 60). As Andrea Lauser (2004, 2005) shows in relation to women from the Philippines who came to Germany via marriage, translocal marriages create 'marriage-scapes' across state borders based on social, economic and political relations among people whose positions depend on their level of access to power and their participation in political and societal realms (see also Massey 1991; Appadurai 1996; Constable 2005: 14). As Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (2006: 117) has put it, the geographical distance between the country of origin and the country of migration spurs such marriages. In cross-border marriages among migrants from Pakistan, young men choosing to marry a woman from Pakistan often expect to find a 'more traditional' wife, while women from Pakistan choose a spouse from abroad hoping for a 'progressive' partnership (Charsley et al. 2016: 41). However, such differences in expectations are not bound to 'co-ethnic' cross-border marriages only. Nicole Constable (2005: 3–4) has argued that men in the US want to marry a woman from Asia because they regard them as more family-oriented and more 'traditional' in their values than women in the US, whom they see as materialistic, feminist and career-focused. According to the same study, women in Asia assume American men are more modern and open to emancipated gender roles than local men.

In cross-border marriages that link Opoja villagers to migration contexts, such gendered and locational paradoxes are also in place. But, as I show, they are less clear-cut, not least because men also want to migrate for marriage (Leutloff-Grandits 2014a, 2018, 2019). Often, both partners are aware of the widespread gendered stereotypes and actively adopt strategies to avoid disappointments. Here, class, education and not least family are significant factors prospective marriage partners pay attention to in order to find the right spouse. But family also often facilitates the search for suitable spouses and creates more security for migrating partners and the family as a whole.

In the search for the right partner, the family takes on the role of intermediary and caretaker, and the marriage often meets both individual as well as family aspirations. As the strict lines between 'arranged' and 'love marriages' are becoming blurred, the varied roles of the family and the emancipatory aspirations to reach a greater potential for individualization, self-realization and freedom of choice within cross-border marriages are coming to the fore.

The first section describes the forms and meanings of spousal choice in the Opoja region in the past and in the present. It links the different types of marriage unions to family and society against the backdrop of profound soci-

etal changes that have altered the scope of marriage perspectives. Along the lines of gender, generation and geographic location as intersectional analytical categories, the next sections of the chapter describe the different motives of young people and their families for opting for a cross-border marriage.

## PARTNER SELECTION IN OPOJA, PAST AND PRESENT

In order to understand today's cross-border marriages linking Opoja to migration contexts, and the logic and meaning of the family and family-based care in spouse selection, it is important to take a diachronic picture and consider the rapid changes that took place in rural Opoja after the war. By observing the gender relations and marriage norms in the villages of Opoja as well as listening to stories about engagements and weddings, I realized that partner selection has been approached in multiple ways since the war and continues to undergo deep transformations today. These changes are blurring the patriarchal marriage pattern that had been prevalent in rural Kosovo and giving more agency to prospective spouses and their aspirations.

As described by Janet Reineck (1991) and confirmed by my village informants, in the 1990s and earlier, spouses were chosen by parents without really consulting the young couple involved. Commonly, female relatives of the groom's family, who according to the pattern of village exogamy typically married into families from other villages, were asked to look for a match. Once a suitable partner had been found, the next step was for a *msit*, a matchmaker, in most cases a male relative, to approach the potential bride's family to ask for her hand in marriage. At the official betrothal ceremony held to seal the engagement, which involved only the men in both families, a white towel bearing the embroidered embellishments of the bride (locally referred to as *mahrma* or *peshqir*) was handed over as a sign of consent by the bride and her family. As Janet Reineck (1991: 65) wrote about for the 1980s, it was considered shameful (*marre*) for the young, betrothed couple to interact before the wedding. Sometimes, girls were too frightened to speak with or even look at their prospective husband before marriage, fearing for their reputation. This corresponded to the favoured qualities attributed to young marriageable Opoja women, like being morally 'pure' – for which virginity was a paramount measure – as well as being hard working and docile, in order 'to provide an extra arm for work, to ensure that there are enough women to see the needs of men, guests and aging parents, and to increase the size and strength of the family by creating an additional nuclear unit' (ibid.: 66).

At the time of my fieldwork, young and old in Opoja regarded such marriage practices as outdated when speaking to me. Several middle-aged and

older women recounted their own negative, sometimes even traumatic, experiences during this phase of their lives. One middle-aged man noted rather critically that marriage for young women previously meant that heaven would descend on earth. He added that he was glad that people in Opoja, across all generations, now view the increased freedom in choosing a partner and the opportunity to engage in a romance with the partner before and during marriage as an improvement and key to greater marital stability and happiness.

However, when I asked about the percentage of 'arranged' marriages (*martesa me msit*) and 'love' marriages (*martesa me dashni*) in Opoja, villagers and migrants typically gave me different numbers. On the process of finding a spouse in Opoja, some stressed the importance of family involvement, arguing that many young people in Opoja sought the assistance of a *msit*, a marriage broker. Others highlighted the value of individual opinions, desires and prospects of young people, pointing out that arranged marriages are rare now. I realized only later that my question derived from widespread Western discourses presupposing a strict dividing line between love and arranged marriages, and my informants had played along, positioning themselves in favour of one or the other. That categorization, however, blended out widespread hybrid forms of marriages in the translocal space that entail both romance *and* family involvement.

Rethinking this in the turn of my fieldwork, I realized that family counselling continues to play a key role in spousal selection and marriage decisions in Opoja, especially for cross-border marriages, and that many traditional elements of the engagement ritual still exist, but their meaning has changed somewhat. For example, at wedding festivities in neighbouring villages, mothers of teenage sons perform 'kin work' (Di Leonardo 1987) to learn more about suitable young women who might be a good match for their son – if he agrees to parental involvement. As in former times (Reineck 1991: 82), parental involvement also involves contacting sisters or aunts abroad who may know of the prospective young person and his/her character and family background. Yet, the final decision is in the hands of the potential partners, often after several private meetings arranged by family members in 'neutral' places, away from the eyes of the village, such as at a restaurant in a neighbouring town.

The young couple's decision to marry is then often followed by the traditional engagement ceremony in the house of the bride, which is generally attended by men from both families. However, the traditional aspects of the ceremony are complemented by some new rituals that emphasize the couple's romantic relationship. Often the young couple visits a restaurant the next day, where they have their picture taken, and then meet regularly until the wedding day. In short, family involvement is central and builds the ini-

tial basis for the relationship, but it does not preclude romance between the partners ahead of the wedding. Similar observations about the importance of romance in so-called ‘arranged marriages’ have been made by Kimberly Hart (2007) with respect to a Turkish village in the arid and mountainous Yuntdağ in Western Turkey in 2000 and 2001, by Assa Doron (2012: 429) for India, and by Alison Shaw and Katherine Charsley (2006) for Pakistan. In scientific discourse, this hybrid form of love and arranged marriage has also been called a ‘love-arranged marriage’ in order to stress that it combines independent selection with accountability to the family (Doron 2012; Hyndman-Rizk 2016).

In a growing number of marriages in Opoja, the initial contact of the partners was not arranged by family members, as the young prospective partners fell in love outside the family context. Nevertheless, some patriarchal gender norms still exist, and parents of schoolgirls in particular tend to be critical of privileging independent choice and encouraging romance because of the risk that the relationship will become public knowledge, gossip will ensue, and the girl and her family will suffer disgrace if a wedding does not take place. Based on these considerations, young people keep their relationship secret for as long as possible. Once the love relation becomes public, the young people often feel pressured to formalize their relationship, and families often resort to the tradition of involving a *msit* to facilitate an engagement contract between the two families. For example, Desa and her boyfriend had managed to keep their relationship secret for some time, with all the thrills that came with it, but she decided to disclose her relationship to her mother after Desa’s eldest male cousin found out about it and began to pressure her to give up the relationship. As expected, her parents wanted her to marry her boyfriend as soon as possible. The engagement ceremony then largely resembles those where family counselling plays a central role, to the extent that it is often difficult for those outside the immediate family circle to discern how the selection was made.

Moreover, one may wonder whether the distinction between the Western categories of ‘love’ and ‘arranged’ marriage is still helpful; my interlocutors were unclear about this. I met a young woman who insisted that her marriage was based on a family arrangement – with a *msit* – although I had heard from others that the couple had been dating long before the families got involved. Others insisted their relationship started as a love connection, although the initial encounter was arranged by the family or occurred in a family setup. Instead of differentiating between ‘love’ and ‘arranged’ marriages, which happen to represent opposite poles in the Western imagination, it is more accurate to differentiate between a ‘family framed encounter’, deriving from meetings arranged by parental friends or family gatherings, and an ‘individually framed encounter’, where spouses meet without family assistance at



diverse venues, like schools, clubs or bars (Topgül 2015). As far as family involvement is concerned, the question is not whether the family becomes involved but how or at what point in time. The location and the framing of the initial meeting assumes greater importance than the involvement of the family per se.

The modalities of spousal search are also influenced by certain social features and gendered and educational positionings within the village and the family. Young women with merely a primary education tend to stay at home once they reach the age of sixteen and are frequently married off with the help of the family, as they have limited opportunities to meet someone on their own. The higher the level of education or the longer they attend school, the more options, and opportunities, open up to meet and interact with others of the same age, and the more likely they are to fall in love with a schoolmate that might lead to marriage. Especially young university students, who leave the village for higher education, are often expected to find a marriage partner independently. At the same time, marriages based on a family-assisted encounter are not necessarily related to education level. Some educated young men also deliberately decide to involve relatives in the partner search. Furthermore, a family-assisted marriage does not necessarily imply more traditional gender roles in the spousal relationship, as in some of these marriages husbands support their wives' ambition to take up employment.

### IMAGINATIONS AND STRATEGIES OF CROSS-BORDER MARRIAGES FROM THE VILLAGE PERSPECTIVE

Individual motives that influence marriage migration are, needless to say, very complex. They are guided by individual goals and family considerations, by the prospect of love and romance, and are spurred by imaginations about life within a cross-border marriage. Furthermore, they relate to socio-economic, legal and historical frames both on the macro- and micro-level. For prospective marriage migrants from Opoja, these include the gap between economic opportunity structures in rural Kosovo and abroad, restrictions within migration regimes of Western European countries, and gender roles and family values, which, however, may differ not only between Opoja and migrants' destinations but also from family to family. Moreover, individuals follow their own logic and have their own aspirations. Instead of generalizing the perspectives and views presented here, I outline various considerations influencing marriage choices to show that individuals involved in cross-border marriages assume various positions based along gender, generational and geographic lines.

### *Women's Perspectives*

Young women inclined to marry someone abroad often link that to their desire to create material prosperity, comfort and a better future for their children – that is, good schooling, healthcare system and state social security. That a 'brighter future' is a common reason for migration from a poorer country to a more prosperous one, also through marriage, is substantiated in the studies conducted by Arjun Appadurai (1996, 2004), Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (2006: 117; 2011: 62) and Christiane Timmerman (2006). In Opoja, young women sometimes also hope to achieve more individual freedom, take up employment or even pursue their education and career or financial goals – a life that is difficult to achieve in Opoja but is considered 'modern'. Equally important is the desire to cultivate a harmonious partnership with their prospective spouse and personally contribute to the household income. The young women hoping to marry abroad see it as a reaction to the limited economic opportunities in Opoja and the prevailing patriarchal gender relations that firmly 'cement' the woman's place as in the home, despite the significant strides made in Opoja in the post-war period. Based on media reports and narratives from migrants, young women learn that elsewhere it is possible to leave traditional roles and enjoy more freedom (see Chapter 1), which motivates their desire to marry a migrant. Again, this is not exclusive to women from Opoja in Kosovo but is also described as the case for women from India (Bhalla 2014) and more generally for Asian women, who prefer to marry a groom in the United States (Constable 2005).

A case in point is Besa, who stayed home after completing secondary school at eighteen as her parents could not afford university education but also did not want her to work. Although she considered herself too young for marriage, she said that marrying abroad would allow her to leave village life, which she found restrictive. Marrying a young man from a neighbouring village was out of the question for her. If she had wanted to, she said she could have had many opportunities to enter a relationship with a handsome and intelligent boy in school but had been put off by a close friend. This friend had married a schoolmate with whom she had fallen in love but found her marriage life boring and felt that marriage had ensured her life was over before it had even begun. In other words: her best friend did not have a fulfilling life even though her marriage was based on 'love'. She was a housewife who had to obey traditional gender norms, which meant accepting that her place was in the home. Although she had excelled in school and her parents had always emphasized that they would have had financed her studies, when she married, she had no choice but to move into her husband's house, where she spent most of her time with her in-laws. Her position was further cemented when she gave birth to her first child a year after marriage. Given her

best friend's experience, Besa was sure that this was not what she wanted for herself. She felt that marrying abroad would give her more opportunities for entering a 'modern' partnership and the life she aspired to. She counted on the support of her family in finding potential marriage partners. The referral of potential marriage candidates by a relative or acquaintance from abroad with roots in Opoja represented a safer and more promising path for her than contacting men via Facebook without family involvement.

Besa was not alone in her opinion about the potential of cross-border marriages and the importance of family as a resource in this matter. For young women who want to marry abroad, the prospect of entering a serious relationship with a 'complete stranger' also comes with risks: fake identities, empty promises about a better life abroad, or worse human trafficking and forced prostitution, all of which have been amply covered in national media in Kosovo (for women from neighbouring Albania in Great Britain, see Schwandner-Sievers (2010)). Aware of such risks, young women in Kosovo partly rely on family counselling, especially for cross-border marriages, and welcome the advice of family members who have information on the prospective grooms and their families. While social media has become a valuable resource to identify potential grooms and enter into more intimate conversations and possibly a romance, it is used in combination with family counselling (Doron 2012; Krasniqi 2017). As Kimberly Hart (2011) also points out in relation to young women in rural parts of Western Turkey, who aimed to leave the village via marriage to achieve 'modernity' – in this case especially migration into urban centres, family counselling became important for getting to know the prospective spouse. The 'traditional' practice of family counselling thus serves to find a spouse who is open to a 'modern' partnership and who can provide the aspired future.

Young women also invest time in checking out the family of the prospective groom and the household arrangements. This enables them to scope out their future role in the household, as young women are aware of the dangers of a possible mismatch. They assume that not all migrants abroad live what they call 'modern lives' and seek gender-egalitarian partnership roles but still pursue family models that can be described as conservative or patriarchal. They are partly convinced that many migrants expect a bride from Opoja to be submissive and not well educated. Shpresa, aged twenty and engaged to a man in Opoja, said: 'They take a bride because they think that she is stupid.' They thus find it necessary to discern if the groom is looking for an obedient wife or, even worse, if parents want to find a submissive wife ready to serve all household members.

Adelina, aged thirty, had got engaged to a migrant in Germany, introduced to her by a relative, and had had similar worries to those of other young women in Opoja when faced with a choice of a marriage partner

from abroad. She had turned down several marriage proposals that did not meet her expectations. She wanted to marry someone from abroad who was family-oriented but not strongly influenced by his parents, work-shy or a responsibility dodger. She wanted to learn German in order to take up a job and thus contribute to the household income, and she hoped for better educational and professional opportunities for her children. The proposal that finally met her expectations was from an Opoja migrant in his late thirties running a successful business abroad. She outlined that they would be able to establish a nuclear household because he had no relatives abroad, which meant that Adelina would not have to live with his parents or fear their influence on her. She was also happy he was not wearing earrings – which in her view was a sign of extreme Westernization – or a beard, which she associated with Islamic fundamentalism. Following a few meetings between the families organized during the migrant's home visit in Opoja, both agreed to get engaged. Her firm determination to adhere to her selection criteria allowed Adelina to develop a certain degree of agency by rejecting proposals that that did not correspond to her ideas of a life abroad.

The fear that men's (and their families') aspirations might not match those of prospective brides who aspire to migrate is, however, not limited to Kosovo-Albanian co-ethnic cross-border marriages. Nicole Constable (2005: 3–4) has shown that so-called mail-order bridal agencies in the US that broker marriages between white American men and young women from the global Southeast present women as materialized objects, only a mouse-click away, waiting to fulfil the patriarchal phantasies of 'white' men – often to the distress of the women expecting more emancipated partnerships. But instead of blaming Western men for using marriage migration to establish their power over non-Western women and criticizing such agencies for presenting women as objects, public Western discourses often accuse the women from poorer countries of not marrying for love but using marriage migration to gain upward mobility. Here, female agency is seen in a negative light, as misleading towards their partners (Beck-Gernsheim 2006).

Given the objectification of women by the commercial agencies, women from Opoja have good reason to avoid them and prefer using family networks to help them find a suitable match. Of course, mistakes are still possible. But even within these scenarios, women are not necessarily victims but can develop a certain kind of agency. Valbona, for example, got engaged through family networks to a man in Austria, who she thought would support her aspirations. But after a while of communicating to him over distance, she realized that her fiancé was under parental influence and not supportive of her plans and so she chose to dissolve the engagement. Her fear of entering a marriage that would subordinate her to her in-laws and that would possibly hinder the development of an intimate partnership was central to her decision.

Still, not all young women approach a potential engagement with as much clarity and certainty as Adelina and Valbona but rather prefer to follow their parents' advice. However, in this case it may be that young women may not openly address their objections to a marriage if there is psychological, social or emotional pressure from parents and other family members to get married. The line between coercion and pressure and choice and consent remains blurred (Straßburger 2007; Riaño and Dahinden 2010: 34–36). The ability to voice objections to marriage also depends heavily on whether people have access to other alternatives and exit options. In Opoja, alternatives and exit strategies are limited for women because women (and men) are expected to marry sooner rather than later, and family influence on marriages is still relatively strong.

### *Men's Perspectives*

Many young men also seek to marry migrants from the region to build a better future abroad. In light of the gendered expectation that men will take on the breadwinner role in the family, not to mention the high unemployment rate and low earnings potential all over the country, economic aspirations are more of a reason to marry abroad than they are for women. This means that young men with or without good educational qualifications link marriage abroad with better earning opportunities. This is also nurtured by the culture of male labour migration to Western European countries, which was widespread from the 1960s to the 1990s before such pathways were closed. As such, the lines between marriage migration and labour migration and even educational migration are far from clear-cut, although each type of migration is seen to represent a different category of migrants within immigration countries.

The economic aspirations of prospective marriage migrants, however, also differ. Christiane Timmerman (2008: 590) discusses young prospective grooms who blot out negative factors linked to migration (in this case from Turkey to Flanders), which is also the case for young men from Opoja. While some are willing to take up 'any kind of job', others hope to be able to continue their studies abroad after marriage and receive a well-paid job thereafter. To that extent, they link class expectations to migration. Twenty-eight-year-old Alban, for example, one of six siblings in a family that is well-educated and ambitious, but moderately prosperous, had finished his BA with the best grades. Yet he was convinced that the culture of clientelism and corruption in Kosovo would make it impossible for him to get a job. This propelled him to continue his education abroad. His aspiration to study abroad seemed more feasible when a relative introduced him to a young woman living abroad, which blossomed into a romance, and they soon agreed to marry.

Family considerations also play a role. Young men could be expected to establish a nuclear household with their wife after migration, as it is against the Kosovo-Albanian tradition of patrilocality to move into the household of the bride's parents. In Opoja, most young men remain in the household of their parents and unmarried siblings or of their married brothers and their families owing to financial reasons, until they can build a new house (or several of them), likely in proximity of their parents. Until then, they have to adhere to the authority of the household head. Young men regard this as problematic in part, as the life worlds of young people and their parents have diverged, especially with the use of electronic media, and they would therefore prefer to establish an independent household. For that reason, they maintain that marriage migration offers greater independence and choice to build their lives, often even with the financial support of the bride's parents.

Driton, a seventeen-year-old pupil who was in the eleventh grade at the secondary school in Dragash, is a case in point. His moderate grades and the considerable time spent on social media and computer games occasionally led to conflict with his father, who criticized him for wasting time and called him a 'Facebook junky'. If Driton was to marry a woman from a neighbouring village, he would remain in his parental household, as the house is new and large enough to accommodate another married couple. He would also likely remain financially dependent on his father. While his father had managed to obtain a secure position in public administration, Driton had no prospect of employment. For Driton, therefore, marriage migration was associated with the hope of becoming independent and – if everything went well – even supporting his family financially and committing to his parents.

The examples of Alban and Driton show that also young men associate cross-border marriages with a vision of a better future abroad. This includes starting a family and securing economic prospects to build a professional future abroad. However, there are not only self-centred reasons for wanting to marry abroad. Many young men also hope to be able to fulfil caregiving obligations expected of sons, in terms of financially supporting elderly parents (and siblings) living in Kosovo, where state social security is at a rudimentary level (see Chapter 3). Thus, cross-border marriage is associated with the hope of combining gendered notions of family care with the creation of social security for oneself and the realization of one's own personal aspirations.

### *Parental Perspectives*

Parents who do not see good prospects for their children, especially sons, in Opoja, or more generally in Kosovo, often support marriage migration. This sometimes also comes with the realization that migration – especially of sons – can contribute to the social security of the family in Opoja, as par-

ents see their sons as traditional caretakers, especially in financial terms, and providers of old-age social security (see Chapter 4). Driton's mother Feride commented on the question of her son's possible outmigration, making it clear that she supported his plans and was already in touch with relatives abroad who could propose a suitable partner for him. Instead of worrying that the departure of her only son would mean that they as parents would remain alone in the village, Driton's mother jokingly explained that since she and her husband were still young, they looked forward to some time to themselves. She told me that her son's plan to live abroad suited her well, as she planned on visiting him abroad regularly. She imagined her daughter-in-law as a modern and self-confident woman from Opoja, embodying the ideals she had not been able to live up to in Opoja. She would even be willing to 'learn' from such a woman. With the prospect of marriage migration of young men, mothers like Feride, who in their own marriage life had to be obedient and submissive to their mothers-in-law and generally show respect and devotion to their in-laws, were ready to change their attitude towards their daughters-in-law and were prepared to open new pathways for intergenerational relations. Likely, their children's prospect of a better, more secure future abroad inspired them (see also Chapter 3). The readiness to change also indicates the wish to remain united – even if under different circumstances. As Peggy Levitt (2009: 1232) writes, 'Preserving the group and fulfilling obligations across borders require a re-scripting of ritual and responsibility and subtle shifts of power. Most families, and communities in general, want to remain cohesive.'

Daughters' intentions to marry abroad, however, are more controversial, partly because of concerns about their safety and well-being but also because the benefits of their migration are smaller for the family, as daughters are not expected to send remittances (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, many parents seem comfortable with the prospect of their daughter's outmigration. In the patrilocal tradition, it is common for daughters to leave their parental home after marriage. Although marrying abroad involves bridging a greater geographic gap, new communication technologies and better travel options mean more ways of keeping in touch (see Chapter 1).

Many middle-aged and elderly mothers, having experienced sharing their households with their parents-in-law whilst their husbands were abroad, envision a more fulfilling married life for their daughters. Many mothers responded with a rather relaxed attitude to the question of whether their daughters could become alienated from their own natal family and culture if they moved abroad. Some argued that the lifestyles of the young women did not change considerably abroad, for migrants abroad were even more 'conservative' than Opoja villagers. Others argued that they wanted a 'modern' lifestyle for their daughters. This points to the rather diverse imagina-

tions about the life of young Opoja women after joining their respective husbands abroad, and more generally the awareness of the diversity of lifestyles abroad, and the possibility to choose someone with a suitable family background. In short, many parents are often optimistic about the prospect of their daughter seeking a better future abroad through marriage, but they also hope that this will create a new, supportive family bond across borders.

### IMAGINATIONS AND STRATEGIES OF CROSS-BORDER MARRIAGES FROM THE MIGRANT'S PERSPECTIVE

Having discussed why young people in Opoja choose to marry someone abroad, I now turn to Opoja migrants in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria and their reasons for seeking a spouse from within the 'home context' of Opoja. However, it must be prefaced that not all migrants are willing to do that. Some also opt for partners residing in another region of Kosovo, and an increasing number chooses a Kosovar migrant living abroad with whom they share similar experiences of socialization. Still others opt for a non-Albanian partner – either a migrant from a different country than Kosovo or someone from the majority society. In the two latter cases, it is likely that spouses get to know each other in venues like school, clubs or bars, without the involvement of family members. Ceren Topgül (2015) shows that about four-fifths of second-generation migrants from Turkey in Switzerland, men and women alike, meet their partner in 'individually framed encounters', and we can assume the same tendency among migrants from Kosovo in Western European countries. Still, the parents remain influential, as the family matters in marriage choices. This is, however, not only a non-Western or migrant phenomenon. Also in Western societies children internalize parental expectations, and many young people seek to align their marriage choices with their family values (Ruenkaew 2003: 37). Still, in cross-border marriages, the involvement of the family seems to be especially important. How the embeddedness of migrants and their children in multiple contexts shifts the intersectional constructions of gender, class and nationality shall be discussed in the following sections.

#### *Perspectives of Male Migrants*

Male migrants who had married a woman from Opoja had not necessarily planned to marry someone from their home region but fell in love during their holidays in Opoja. Others again deliberately decided to marry a partner from their home region. Several of them conceded that their interest in their 'own culture' and in marrying a woman from Opoja had developed only at



a later stage, and that before seeking to marry and start a family with a partner from the 'home context' they had had other love relationships with non-Albanian women in the country of immigration, which had not led to marriage, owing – as they said – to various reasons. Two male migrants recounted negative encounters with their girlfriends' parents, who suspected them of marrying for papers only, or perceived their background as not 'appropriate'. Some of my interlocutors also cited problems with their own parents, who wanted them to marry an Albanian partner – with a Muslim background – and ideally from their home region. In extreme cases, they even pressured them to end a relationship that did not meet these requirements. Indeed, when migrants entered into a serious relationship with a woman abroad and started to think about marriage, the nationality and religion of the chosen partner seemed to play a role, especially for the parents' generation. Some migrants who married a partner from Opoja were also clearly beyond the average local marriage age (generally under thirty years, even for men, but on the rise in recent years).

Some male migrants who had rarely visited Opoja and had not maintained close contact with family members there sometimes started to rediscover their 'roots' and the associated moral values of family and partnership once they approached 'marriage age' or when they faced a specific challenge to their status within the receiving society. As described by Gaby Straßburger and Can Aybek (2015), a low social and economic positioning abroad might contribute to their openness to a spouse from Opoja, where their status as a migrant seems valuable (see also Beck-Gernsheim 2006: 122–23).

Some told me that marrying a woman from the majority society was not an option because they perceived the gender norms and marriage ideals in the country of immigration as too liberal and the women as too self-confident, independent and 'selfish', chasing individual fulfilment. They worried that these characteristics would lead to marital conflicts and even to divorce, while they regarded women socialized in Opoja as better behaved, morally 'purer' and more family-oriented. Among other things, they believed that Opoja women would 'preserve their virginity', and thus their purity, innocence and self-restraint, while they suspected women in the receiving society of having engaged in premarital sex and considered them 'impure' or even 'sluts'. Such contrasting views about women from the home region and those in the immigration country can also be found among Turkish migrants in Austria (Six-Hohenbalken 2009: 242), Germany (Straßburger 2001; Beck-Gernsheim 2006: 124) and Belgium (Timmerman 2006). The fact that in rural Kosovo 'virginity' is assumed, not least because of the strict social control based on patriarchal relations to which girls and young women are subjected once they enter puberty (see Chapter 1), is less critically discussed.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, some migrants who endorse such pa-

triarchal gender relations and associate them with rural Kosovo react with some astonishment to the ongoing and visible change in gender relations in Kosovo, including in rural areas, and in some cases reject girls in Opoja who dress as ‘liberally’ as the women in ‘the West’.

Such dichotomized views about women in geographically distant places have also been observed by Charsley (2005) for British Pakistanis. According to this study, Pakistani migrants in Great Britain complain that a ‘typical’ young British Pakistani woman ‘wants to go out all the time, might be loud and argumentative, ‘does fashion’ and might have indulged in immoral activities’, while girls from the home country were ‘quiet, co-operative, sheltered’, which make them ‘a good mother’ (ibid.: 386). Similarly, migrants seeking a wife from Opoja compare Kosovo Albanian women abroad with those who live in Opoja. The locational gap of being ‘here’, in the receiving context, and ‘there’, in Opoja, seems to be much more important to them than nationality or religion in attributing specific characteristics to women. This shows that migrants also tend to assign ‘culture’ to a geographically bounded space – a practice that is widespread in Western European countries, but where the Western position is always seen as the superior and most advanced. Migrants thus remain within this system of categorization but partly turn it around for themselves by idealizing the patriarchal gender relations that they believe prevail ‘back home’.

My interlocutors also emphasized the importance of the ability of their prospective wife to speak the Albanian language and be aware of the local traditions, so that their children would one day know ‘where they are from and where they belong’. For some, competence in the Albanian language was important for interacting with family members – in the immigration context as well as during the annual visits to Opoja. This does not mean that prospective husbands are not willing to choose a wife themselves. Rather, it means that they also want to base their decision on the compatibility with and preferences of their parents, thereby showing loyalty to them and maintaining family unity (Beck-Gernsheim 2006: 120–21).

The experiences of these young migrants during their holiday visits to Opoja tended to have a positive impact on their attitude towards marrying a partner from home. Many who migrated as children or as teens were also influenced by their experiences in the early years of childhood (see Chapter 4). As the young men often visit Opoja for only a few weeks at a time, they often turn to relatives or friends to help them find a partner. Fully aware of the prevailing ‘Western’ discourses that portray cross-border marriages as arranged or even forced by family networks and as an expression of traditional patriarchal gender relations, Gazi, a migrant in his mid-thirties, explained to me that marriage counselling is necessary – that is, neither negative nor atavistic – because migrants like him do not have the opportunity to find the

right woman during a short vacation. They rely on family to arrange meetings with potential marriage candidates, which may happen in a café-bar in the city of Prizren or another place outside the region, away from the gaze of villagers who would analyse every interaction.

However, as said, the intention to choose a wife from the home region is by no means representative of all migrants from Kosovo. Moreover, as also observed in other migrant communities (Beck-Gernsheim 2006: 120–21; Neubauer and Dahinden 2012; Topgül 2015: 53), men may be pressured by their parents to marry a 'good match' from their home village and thus conform to parental expectations of gender, family and partnership relationships. Yet, most young men I met mentioned such pressures only indirectly, or they seemed to have balanced their own wishes and expectations with those of their parents. Anna Neubauer and Janine Dahinden (2012) also argue that men are much less likely to see themselves as victims of so-called forced marriages than women because they are more interested in presenting themselves as self-determined and capable of taking action and often also have more leeway within a relationship than women (see Chapter 7).

Men may also rebel against the pressure of their parents – although this can lead to strong tensions within the family. A case in point is twenty-five-year-old Endrit, who agreed to meet a woman his father had proposed to him during one of his visits to Opoja. Without knowing it beforehand, he was solemnly betrothed during another visit to the family of the woman, and he could not refuse, because that would have meant publicly contradicting his father and bringing shame on the family. Endrit's family left for Austria again and frequently sent costly presents to the fiancée – mainly clothes (*teshat*) in 'traditional' style and 'modern' evening dresses, as well as the customary gold jewellery, the costs of which ran up to a few thousand euros. One year after the engagement, Endrit finally built up the courage to speak to his father and dissolved the engagement from abroad, explaining he did not want a future he had not created for himself. Endrit's relationship to his father suffered a further setback as Endrit's family was forced to pay a financial compensation to the bridal family. When I met him about two years after the dissolution of the engagement, Endrit still had a fraught relationship with his father, to whom (and to all inhabitants of Opoja) he ascribed negative stereotypes about Albanians – akin to discourses he likely himself had been exposed to in the immigration county.

Marriage preferences are also related to the educational level of migrants. Some better educated migrants emphasized that they did not want to 'start from scratch' again and assist their partner with the language or with navigating the new environment – therefore, they preferred to marry someone living abroad. Others chose a woman from Opoja but deliberately tried to avoid a stereotypical patriarchal migrant marriage and stressed to me that

their own marriage was 'modern' and based on a 'love relationship'. Wanting their wife to be emancipated, some look for an educated young woman or someone seeking further education, especially language training, and usually encourage her to take up employment abroad.

In short, migrant men who marry a partner from Opoja act within the framework of certain gender perceptions, some of which are prevalent in their own migrant community and some of which relate to prevailing Western discourses about gender and family relations as perceived in migrant communities. While it is common for men who want to marry a woman from Opoja to expect these women to conform to certain patriarchal norms, this is not a motive for marriage for all of them.

### *Perspectives of Female Migrants*

Like many young male migrants who marry a woman from Opoja, young women who are second-generation migrants or had moved from Opoja as adolescents and who decided to marry someone from the 'home region', or at least from Kosovo, cited family, language and culture as their main reasons. Again, their gendered positionings within families that followed certain patriarchal family norms were also crucial. Some spoke about parents who monitored their movements and limited their social contact, wanting them to marry a compatriot and ideally someone from their home region. Still, most young women did not always comment negatively on this form of control, arguing that what they valued was that such a union held the family together.

Thirty-five-year-old Dafina, whose father had been one of the few labour migrants to bring over his wife in the 1980s, was born in Germany. Growing up with a father who 'strictly practised Albanian culture', as she put it, she was not allowed to go out like many of her classmates. She lived in two different communal and moral settings simultaneously, making it difficult for her to fit in easily. Her parents would also not accept a non-Albanian partner. When she met her husband on one of their annual visits to relatives, they liked each other from the start, and she was able to reconcile her family's wishes with her own aspirations. He was from the same region as her parents and had come to Germany as a refugee. In contrast, her younger brother, who married a German woman, had strained relations with his parents. As his wife does not speak Albanian, he also lost ties to his 'Albanian culture', a turn that Dafina did not approve of.

Nevertheless, not all young women from Opoja living abroad are positive about or approve of (family framed) cross-border marriage. Like men, women may feel pressured or even forced to conform to their parents' marriage norms. Some agree to a marriage proposal to avoid conflict with their

parents, while others decide against family counselling, even if it means going against their parents and thus creating potential family discord.

However, marriage to a man from the country of origin does not mean that young women want to be subordinate to their future partner. Several teenage girls I spoke with had already been living abroad for several years and had consolidated their position in their own families and in the host society. They were self-confident and had gained enormous life experience by offering valuable support to their parents and younger siblings. Dafina had learned German at an early age and supported her parents while growing up because her mother had never really learned German. Because of her language skills, she always had more family responsibilities than other girls her age. She assisted her parents in administrative matters and with hospital and doctor visits. At the age of sixteen, she had also helped female relatives give birth in the delivery room by translating. Young women like Dafina who moved abroad as young children or were born there are often shaped by their supportive role in the family. This has made them family-oriented while giving them the confidence to pursue professional qualifications and possibly even a career.

When choosing to marry a man from Opoja, some migrant women seek partners who are educated or skilled enough to be willing to continue with their educational pursuits in the future. Twenty-five-year-old Drita, who followed her parents to Germany at the age of thirteen, wanted to find a husband on her own. Still, her parents did not close the door to their relatives and acquaintances who sent marriage proposals from Opoja. However, they declared that their daughter was still too young to marry and postponed the decision. When Drita first met her husband, Alban, at a family gathering in Opoja, one of the things that attracted her was that Alban had finished his studies in Prishtina and wanted to continue studying in Germany. She told me that Alban was different from the 'average' Kosovo-Albanian living in Western Europe who according to her view takes up a blue-collar job, does not integrate easily and embraces a patriarchal culture.

As Stefan Wellgraf (2011) has shown in his ethnographic research on the intersection of migration, class and masculinity in a secondary school in Berlin with a high proportion of pupils with migration background, young and socially deprived male migrants often adopt a 'macho habitus' in order to achieve a certain status in an environment in which they have little to no opportunities for social advancement. This, however, does not necessarily meet with the approval of female classmates and young women, who are expected to take a subordinate position and whose behaviour is controlled and evaluated by men. Young migrant women from Opoja, like Drita, hope for social advancement in the migration context and a more emancipated

position in marriage, and therefore do not necessarily opt for a young man in the migration context. Instead, they are interested in marrying someone from their home region with a high level of education and with higher ambitions, believing that this will also enable them to advance (Beck-Gernsheim 2006: 124–25). As John Lievens (1999: 717) writes: ‘Women may marry an imported partner in order to satisfy “modern” goals.’

### *Perspectives of Parents*

It has already become clear that parents who live abroad with their children often have considerable influence on their children’s marriage decisions. Among my interlocutors, many who migrated in the 1990s hoped that their children would marry a partner from Opoja, or at least from Kosovo, to maintain contact with the ‘Kosovo-Albanian tradition’ and the family and kin group. Many migrant parents from Opoja also give their children the impetus to integrate family considerations into their marriage plans (Fog Olwig 2002). As Peggy Levitt (2009: 1228) writes for migrant communities in the US: ‘[A] transnational moral economy often involves putting the family first – for example, pursuing kin-based strategies for collective mobility or marrying into the right kinship network in order to accumulate social capital in the host society.’

Nevertheless, not all parents emphasized the importance of marrying a partner from their home region when asked about the marriage of their adult children. But those who did were often critical about marriages with non-Albanian partners, fearing such marriages would result in conflict sooner or later.

Parents hope that a partner from their home region will stabilize relations between parents and their children, and mothers of sons imagine that they will get on well with their daughter-in-law. Most of all, they hope for a stable and happy married life for their children, which many believe can only transpire with a partner from their home region, or at least from Kosovo. That mindset is not specific to migrants from Opoja; for example, Indian and Pakistani migrants in Great Britain (Charsley 2005), as well as migrants from Cape Verde in Europe and the US (Drotbohm 2014: 191), share these notions. As Peggy Levitt (2009: 1232) writes about migrants from the Dominican Republic in Boston:

Their logic is that, if you marry someone who shares your culture and values, your marriage is more likely to succeed because he or she has been raised like you. Since marriage is understood to be between two families as well as two individuals, the prospects of success are better if the potential partners come from the same group.

Villagers and migrants in Opoja tend to take regional differences within Kosovo seriously and are convinced that marrying a partner from another region would be less beneficial, as regions have their own customs and rules of behaviour. In Opoja's cross-border networks, therefore, translocal rather than transregional or transnational marriages are the preferred cross-border marriages.

While some parents hope their children have developed a positive relationship with their home context (see Chapter 4) and fall in love with someone while on vacation in Opoja, various interlocutors have argued in favour of family counselling, convinced that family-framed marriages are more stable, while individually framed marriages, emphasizing individual choice and affection, are insecure and prone to conflict and therefore will likely be short-lived. They argue that young people tend to be short-sighted and emotional, which renders them incapable of independently making such an important decision, which must take into account the family background and the character of the prospective spouse. Parents, on the other hand, would be more experienced and discerning in assessing the potential of a prospective spouse. In support of this, people told me stories about young couples who had once been madly in love and celebrated their wedding lavishly only to divorce soon after. Others pointed to the fact that in Western European countries, where marriages are individually framed, divorce rates are high, while in Kosovo, where family-framed marriages dominate, divorce numbers are still very low (Kosovo Agency of Statistics 2020).

Several middle-aged men whose own marriages were arranged by their families stressed that their marriages worked well and that the partners always behaved respectfully. For example, Qerim, who met his wife through a proposal brought in by a family member, is convinced that family counselling provides a better basis to make an informed choice concerning marriage. He said:

In Kosovo, marriages with counselling are the most secure. In order to find a woman for a family, and not a wife who is for nothing. In order to find a good woman – I have studied the case very well and have thought about it – it is better to stick to counselling than not get counselling. My aunt knew the sister of my wife and she knew her [my wife's] character.

Others also argue that involving parents or relatives in marriage decisions and the marriage itself means there is someone there to help with mediation in marital conflicts and that there will be support for an exit strategy for the daughter should a marriage fail. This line of thinking is also common among migrants from Lebanon in Australia (Hyndman-Rizk 2016) and in transnational Pakistani marriages (Charsley 2005: 385). Its underlying social secu-

rity logic is based on a gender model that views women as economically and socially dependent on their spouse, a widespread phenomenon in Opoja. However, it does not necessarily reflect the realities of migrant women, as many are self-confident and have salaried professions, and thus could also live independently even after a divorce. The low divorce rate in Kosovo is in part bound to the fact that many women remain economically dependent on their husbands or families and would face multiple social consequences if they chose to divorce. They are therefore more willing to compromise and endure a bad marriage, a fact that is rarely taken into account by the older generation when evaluating the stability of marriages.<sup>2</sup>

## CONCLUSION

The cross-border marriages analysed in this chapter can also be considered translocal marriages, as they create a connection across borders between individuals and their families, who either still live in Opoja or have roots there. However, the notion of a happy and successful marriage follows gender, generational and locational logics that are different across borders and has led to a need to consider both individual and family concerns in decision-making.

For villagers in Opoja, translocal marriages offer an important means to cross state borders and create long-term prospects in an EU member state (or the US or Canada) for themselves and their families back home. Since the end of the war-related emigration boom from Kosovo in the 1990s, and since new immigration barriers for non-EU citizens were erected with the fall of the Iron Curtain and in the new millennium, emigration from Kosovo to the EU has been sustained mainly through marriage migration.

For migrating young men, the aim to migrate via marriage entails not only the aspiration to earn a living abroad – and thereby establish a household independent of their parents and achieve for themselves a level of material prosperity and security – but to financially support their parents in Kosovo, thus continuing the tradition of male labour migration well as the morality of gendered translocal family care. In this way, both individual and family aspirations can be reconciled. Gender and class, in particular, are addressed here as they create new – and sometimes ambivalent – subject positions. The possibilities for personal fulfilment and the hope of earning a higher salary and establishing greater financial security also make marriage migration attractive to young men with higher education, for whom migration is often linked to downward mobility in terms of societal status, as it may be difficult for them to find a job that matches their qualifications, or these are not recognized.



Young women from Opoja often hope for a more secure future and better prospects – not least through participation in the consumer world. Often, they also seek a more gender-egalitarian partnership in which they can explore employment possibilities and thus create a certain degree of material independence within the marriage.

More generally, these marriages represent better prospects for the future for the individual partners and often for the families involved, as they seem to fulfil a variety of interests and goals, some of which are complementary and some of which are contradictory. As Gaby Schmidt (2011: 58) writes, 'while for some a transnational marriage is a pathway to improvement and change, for others it is a means to maintain stability and connectedness.' For villagers in Opoja, a translocal marriage should ideally provide both – the opportunity for change and personal growth, and the opportunity to stay connected to and care for family – albeit from afar.

For young people living abroad, a cross-border marriage is often a conscious decision to stay connected to the 'Albanian culture and tradition' and to choose a partner who fits into the family framework. Gender and class positionings play a role here. Since migrants have to position themselves within the dominant discourses of the majority society, according to which cross-border marriages are suspected of being arranged, backward and patriarchal, they deal with this partly through idealizing 'traditional' gender roles and supporting family counselling. Others, however, enter into cross-border marriage to facilitate egalitarian partnership relationships that they see as modern and progressive – and thus contrary to the stereotypical reading of cross-border marriages as patriarchal. This is especially the case with migrant women who marry a man from Opoja. With this, they may adhere to family expectations, but they also hope that their choice will liberate them from the 'macho' culture sometimes found among the disadvantaged and lower-class migrant men in the destination countries, and will enable them with upward mobility.

In Opoja itself, as abroad, local marriages based on 'individually framed encounters' are becoming the new normal. But across territorial distances, marriages based on 'family-framed encounters' have taken on a new meaning and significance. While they follow the long-established cultural practice of marriage counselling, this not just a 'traditional' phenomenon but a way of providing security and predictability in the context of neoliberal developments and territorialized socio-economic inequalities. Such marriages are entered into in the hope of a better future and of creating a fulfilled and happy marriage and family life. Yet, such a marriage is also seen as a stabilizer for spatially fragmented families, as family and kinship bonds can be strengthened across distances. Rather than seeing themselves as victims of prevailing 'archaic' or 'pre-modern' social structures, prospective spouses

who rely on family networks and family support hope to create new spaces of action, romance and self- realization that simultaneously align them with broader family considerations.

#### NOTE

1. As observed by Scalco (2016: 329–33) for urban Turkey, social status matters, meaning that premarital sexual intercourse must be kept secret especially within the family and the kin group. It has to have taken place ‘away from home’ and may not be mentioned to a potential marriage candidate. This also impacts on the quality of relationships, sexual practises, including contraception measures, and the position of unmarried women who become pregnant. Furthermore, surgery to ‘reinstall virginity’ via hymen reconstruction in order to be ‘marriageable’ has become increasingly widespread. Similar trends were reported for urban Kosovo.

## CHAPTER

# 6

## WEDDINGS AS AFFIRMATION OF THE TRANSLOCAL FAMILY AND KINSHIP



### INTRODUCTION

Weddings are the most significant life-stage celebrations in Kosovo. They are celebrated in the company of large groups of relatives and friends with music, singing and dancing. In Opoja villages, the attendance of migrants is highly desired at wedding celebrations, which often happen in the summer months when migrants are visiting. Summer is when villages take on a new look and a lively atmosphere, as multiple wedding celebrations can be held within a single week. Each wedding celebration lasts up to three days, with loud music blaring across the yard from the groom's house, culminating in the arrival of the bride in a festive motorcade that has escorted her through the narrow village streets, causing numerous traffic jams (E. Krasniqi 2017). These motorcades feature the shiny cars belonging to migrants, whose contribution to these wedding celebrations is apparent on many levels. They may also be the ones getting married, as younger migrants, even those raised abroad, are brought up with the idea of staying connected with the Kosovo-Albanian culture and with relatives 'back home', and a considerable number also choose to marry a partner from Opoja. Many celebrate their weddings in the circle of relatives in their home village – in the *mahalla* or, increasingly, also in the highly luxurious wedding salons that are cropping up on the outskirts of Prizren and the Opoja villages.



**Figure 6.1.** A festive motorcade in Opoja (© Carolin Leutloff-Grandits)

In my conversations with migrants and villagers, which often revolved around weddings, they interpreted the meaning of wedding celebrations differently. Some proudly emphasized the traditional nature of weddings in Opoja, which were celebrated in accordance with decade- or century-long patrilocal customs and the agreements made between families. Several of my interlocutors also claimed that weddings in Opoja lasted longer than in other regions of Kosovo. However, other villagers also acknowledged that the way weddings are celebrated has changed greatly and that the focus is now on individualized practices and consumption. In addition, they criticized the enormous scale of some ceremonies, which they said were beyond the economic reach of many community members. Thus, in their view, weddings are also events where the competitive spirit of the collective comes to the fore.

This chapter takes a closer look at these ambivalent statements and examines the extent to which weddings celebrated in Opoja centre on the family as a collective, following patriarchal and patrilocal patterns, and/or the extent to which they centre on the romantic relationship between the couple, and how wedding celebrations have changed in recent decades. It also examines the extent to which weddings create or reaffirm family and kinship relationships across state borders that form the basis for translocal caring relations. More specifically, it addresses the ways in which weddings create or reinforce ties between Opoja villagers and migrants and within the family and wider kin group, and the ways in which weddings also create an arena for competition and conflict. In order to understand the expressions of kin-

ship and gender relations in the various rituals of wedding celebrations, the analysis of the dimensions of materiality and consumption within weddings is of central importance.

Like other life-stage rituals and highly ritualized rites of passage, weddings represent certain family and partnership values. They often evoke strong emotions, and the shared experiences and memories can create a lasting bond between those involved in a wedding. Wedding ceremonies can serve as a 'social glue', to use the term coined by Steve Vertovec (2004), to strengthen family ties and help restore the 'lifeline' between villages and migration destinations (see also Leutloff-Grandits 2014b). At the same time, the status of individual community members and families can also be renegotiated, not least to enhance the status of the bride and groom and their respective families and relatives. With their potential to channel social change (Van Gennep 1960 [1909]; Fog Olwig 2002; Turner 2005; Holm Pedersen and Rytter 2017), weddings can restore and reshape social structures and values. But as Julia Pauli (2011) notes, once weddings become sites of social distinction and conspicuous consumption, they can also have a fragmenting effect on the community.

Rituals can also contribute to 'placemaking' by expanding the landscape of 'home' beyond the actual place of residence, in the village or abroad, where feelings and practices of belonging can be collectively enacted. Weddings also provide ample space and opportunity to express and renegotiate gendered and generational relations within kin groups and the broader community. As various scholars such as Peggy Levitt (2001), Levitt and Nina Glick Schiller (2004), Ruba Salih (2002), and Marieke van Houte and Tine Davids (2018) have shown, migrants take a very active role in renegotiating these relations by simultaneously investing in and creatively shifting the lines of what is perceived as 'modernity' and 'tradition'.

As a participant observer at numerous weddings in Opoja during my fieldwork, I had the opportunity to grasp the different elements of weddings and to analyse their meaning in relation to kinship and gender roles, individual and family affairs, and notions of 'modernity' and 'tradition'. Furthermore, the analysis relies on numerous conversations about weddings – including those that took place at the joint viewing of the wedding DVD. In fact, the production of a professional wedding DVD is of great importance within the translocal community, as copies can be distributed among relatives and guests and viewed together long after the wedding (Mand 2012). As such, wedding DVDs can bridge time and space. Janet Reineck's (1991) Ph.D. thesis, which documents the period of the late 1980s, has allowed me to grasp diachronically the complexity of weddings in the making of the community.

This chapter argues that in Opoja wedding celebrations can become a unifying force for villagers and migrants alike. However, this is not primarily

done through the use of national symbols and discourses, as Robert Pichler (2009b) describes for Albanians from Veleshta, Northern Macedonia, of whom many live abroad and resort to regional and national markers to bond their geographically dispersed group vis-à-vis their Macedonian neighbours. In Opoja, weddings primarily create an arena in which villagers and migrants reconnect with the family and kinship groups and where new ties are created across geographical locations and state borders by connecting the local to migrant places. The home region and the groom's house are of paramount importance, and this patrilocality is reaffirmed through differentiating between the groom's and the bride's side in ways that reconfigure the gender and kinship roles of the bride and groom. As will be shown, kinship and gender relations are expressed primarily through the clothing worn by women at weddings, as well as through the gifts given to the bride and, more generally, through the costs incurred for the wedding and the perceived or desired social status associated with it. The willingness of family members to use and sometimes pool their financial resources to organize a wedding with hundreds of guests – among them mainly relatives – can also be seen as an expression of specific kinship and gender relations.

A new aspect of the 'modern' wedding is the addition of a celebration in a restaurant or a 'wedding saloon' (*salloni i dasmave*), to prioritize the romantic dimensions of the occasion, and to which also the brides' relatives are invited, which expresses a new balance within the kin group and between individual aspirations and family matters. Migrants are especially active in organizing and financing these weddings, and also in reconstituting and redefining kinship and community relations. However, the high costs associated with such large weddings in Opoja and the increasing importance of consumption as an indicator of social status also reflect neoliberal transformations in Kosovo and around the world. The high costs put pressure on villagers to migrate and families to act as a unit; it can also thwart the plans and ambitions of individual family members and lead to conflict within family and kinship groups, as well as within the local community.

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section describes the preparations ahead of and during wedding ceremonies in the Opoja region and some key elements of the festivities. I will refer to the family and gender roles of villagers and migrants as well as the challenges of maintaining or enhancing social status through a delicate balance between upholding notions of tradition and modernity/innovation. The second section focuses on the dresses worn at weddings as markers of gender and generational relations within the kinship and community group. This analytical line is continued in the third section, which deals with the climax of the wedding, the so-called bridal-fetching ceremony. The fourth section then analyses the social economy of weddings and the links between wedding celebrations, migration

and prospects. The final section focuses on a relatively new development in the Opoja region, namely weddings celebrated at 'modern' venues, such as restaurants and wedding salons, and the resultant modifications made to 'traditional' wedding rituals.

### THE STAGING OF A WEDDING

Jetmir, who had been living abroad for almost ten years, celebrated his wedding in Opoja in the summer of 2011. He had met his bride through a cousin from one of the neighbouring villages in Opoja; she had caught his eye during a visit in 2008. Since Jetmir had to return to Germany after the engagement to earn enough money for the wedding expenses, the preparation of the wedding was largely in the hands of Jetmir's family in Opoja. Jetmir's parents envisioned a wedding according to local customs, similar to their other sons' weddings a few years earlier, celebrated in their courtyard in the company of about 300 relatives, which included the patrilineal and patrilocal relatives (*fis*), the daughters of the house and their families, as well as the relatives of the in-married women (*miqësi*). In line with traditional customs, which are still largely followed in Opoja, the bride's family and relatives are not invited to the wedding festivities at the groom's place. Instead, the bride's family organizes their own traditional rituals and gatherings in the bridal home until the bride is sent off to the groom's family. The celebrations in the groom's home with his family are to welcome the new bride and are generally joyful and exuberant, while the celebrations at the bride's house are modest in comparison. In what follows, therefore, I will focus mainly on the preparations and celebrations on the groom's side and only occasionally turn the focus to the celebrations at the bride's house.

Jetmir's family had to make vital decisions about the financing of the wedding and started preparations months ahead of the celebration while Jetmir was still abroad. Jetmir's brothers and his father spent weeks renovating the house and adding an extra bedroom. His brothers also assisted financially with the costs of the bridal gifts and other wedding expenses. Jetmir's two sisters-in-law went on several shopping sprees to the nearby town of Prizren (occasionally in the company of the bride) for the bridal gifts and necessary bridal outfit. In addition to a very elaborate white wedding dress, they also bought a second, more moderate white dress and a 'traditional' wedding costume as well as several elegant evening gowns and ensembles as a part of the bridal trousseau, which the bride could wear after the wedding to welcome the guests of her in-laws, or to attend other wedding celebrations in Opoja. This consists of Turkish-style pants made of several meters of white lace (*dimia*), a long, embroidered velvet jacket (*dallama*), a short, embroidered

velvet jacket (*jelek*) and a blouse, which brides wore mainly until the 1980s, and occasionally in the 1990s, and which are now worn by wedding guests.

All in all, the groom's family tends to spend a few 1,000 euros on clothes and diverse items such as shoes, gold jewellery, underwear, nightgowns, bedding and makeup for the bride. Within Opoja's translocal community, these gifts from the groom's family to the bride symbolize the 'value' or status of the bride and the success and status of the groom's family and are therefore indispensable. In addition, Jetmir's sisters-in-law and his mother immersed themselves in their knitting and embroidery projects for the accessories, such as the complex floral decoration for the blouse and the headdress for the traditional bridal gown. Although this work is a relatively new invention, it is considered a speciality of the region and greatly valued by the migrants, who buy these handmade pieces from village women (see Chapter 1).

In Opoja, the wedding festivities organized by the groom's family begin with the arrival of the groom's close circle of relatives a few days before the groom's family picks up the bride from her parents' home, which marks the climax of the wedding. The wedding festivities are accompanied by the distinct sound of Turkish-style wedding music, which resounds for many hours a day from loudspeakers in the groom's family courtyard and can be heard throughout the *mahalla*. In addition, girls and women from the *mahalla* who are related to the groom's family periodically dance in a circle and sing wedding songs praising the groom, his *farefis* (close male kin group), his *fis* (wider male kin group) and the entire village. The women sing to the rhythmic beat of the *def* (tambourine), which is common in all Albanian-speaking regions and of which there is also a variant in Greece. The singing and dancing inside the yard and in front of the house add to the cheerfulness of the wedding festivities, lasting days.

As a part of the community-building process, such performances also enhance the status of the groom's family. Most impressive, however, is the music performance of a band of musicians from Prizren, who belong to a subgroup of Roma in Kosovo, locally (and often pejoratively) called *magjup* (Malcolm 1998: 2005; Lichnofski 2013, 2015), and are famous for this style of music. The band comprises one or several musicians playing the *curle*, a kind of loud and penetrating oboe found mainly in this region. In addition to the *curle* players, two or three musicians play the *tubana* or *lodra*, a larger cylindrical drum, which punctuates the festivities with a loud banging sound and is thus significant as an accompaniment to the local dances.

The *magjup* band also accompanies the singing, dancing and screaming of the men of the groom's family and extended kin, which is performed on the street closest to the groom's house, offering a public expression of the unity among the male relatives and within the common patriline. This also allows various male community members to enhance their own social sta-





**Figure 6.2.** *Magjup* musicians playing at the bride's arrival (© Carolin Leutloff-Grandits)

tus. Some men in the family beckon the *magjup* musicians to play for them individually. The *magjup* musicians then organize performances dedicated to them and in dialogue with them, honouring their special status on this occasion and in the community. At the end of the performance, the person commissioning the show affixes an amount of money he deems appropriate to the musicians' headdresses in full view of all the guests. Since the musicians receive advanced payment for the music played at a wedding, this extra money highlights the payer's personal status and the importance he attaches to the festivities.

At the wedding celebrations I observed, the amounts of money given ranged from five euros to 100 euros, and in rare cases more, for a music show, even though they lasted only a few minutes. Villagers expect migrants to finance such a show, which puts pressure on them to 'buy' their way into their own kin group and village community. The musicians often know who has money because they play at the various weddings in the region and are therefore well acquainted with the families in Opoja, including the migrants. They therefore approach these people with their music and put on a show – a couple of songs – in their honour. The fact that male migrants and non-migrants come together in a competitive spirit to 'waste' money



**Figure 6.3.** Relatives dancing the *valle* at a wedding (© Carolin Leutloff-Grandits)

on these music shows indicates the status it holds. Such spending sometimes puts villagers in the difficult position of not being able to participate or having to go into debt.

Generally, the *magjup* musicians perform in the village street for the male members of the family and kin group, as mentioned. Inside the yard, the *magjup* musicians accompany the traditional circle dance (*valle*) headed by a close member of the groom's family and including many guests and family members, especially women and girls. The circle dance goes on for hours, some dropping out of the chain and others joining in. The never-ending circling with repeated movements has the effect of creating a bond between the dancers and merging them into a community. When migrants take an especially active role in the dance and celebrate exuberantly, for instance, by paying the *magjup* musicians to play extra hours, they show their special appreciation.

On the second day of the wedding, the men in the family – the groom's father, brothers, uncles and cousins, but not the groom himself – bring bridal gifts over to the bride's home. In exchange, the groom's relatives receive a trousseau from the bride, which mainly consists of handmade tablecloths and a gift for each member of the groom's household. Women who continue with their education and therefore do not engage in needlework before marriage also adhere to that tradition, for which they rely on close female relatives, like their mother, aunt or even sister, who produce these handmade items for them, or they buy such items in town. It is the groom's 'best men' that return with the trousseau to the groom's home, often accompanied by music, singing and dancing and a joint meal with the present guests.



**Figure 6.4.** Exhibition of gifts during the *kënjagjegji* (© Carolin Leutloff-Grandits)

Simultaneously, as mentioned above, the bride's family conducts festivities in her natal home separately. With the help of her girlfriends and female relatives, the bride will arrange the gifts she has been receiving from the groom's family since the engagement, in the living room. All village girls are invited to view these gifts. As already observed by Janet Reineck (1991: 80–91) for the late 1980s, exhibiting the groom's gifts forms part of the bride's farewell ritual from her home (*kënjagjegji*), which she celebrates with her female relatives and her close, mainly unmarried, girlfriends and other women of her *mahalla*. The guests' inspection of the groom's gifts – for their size, quality and taste – is a crucial moment in renegotiating and reshaping the status of the bride's and the groom's family.

On the third day, the wedding festivities reach their climax when the groom's family and relatives pick up the bride from her home and bring her to the groom's house. On this very day, hundreds of guests, mainly the groom's relatives, arrive late morning at the groom's house to participate in this ritual. The sequence of the entry of the guests and their positioning or seating upon arrival are organized according to gender and family status. The women enter first and remain in the yard of the groom's house, while the male guests gather in the courtyard of a relative next door, usually a pater-



**Figure 6.5.** Women and children having lunch together at a wedding in Opoja (© Carolin Leutloff-Grandits)

nal uncle (*xhaxhai*) of the groom. Although, or precisely because, family members are dispersed across borders, and family life is fragmented and rife with competition and individualism, the groom's family relies on the unity of their extended family (*shtëpia e madhe*) and on their relatives' support in organizing the wedding in the yard and serving lunch to all guests.

Migrants play an important role in revitalizing and transforming wedding festivities and the social roles ascribed therein. The *vallja e burrave*, a sophisticated group dance exclusively for men based on elaborate step configurations and rhythms that demonstrate male seniority, honour and skill, exemplifies the difference migrants make. For the dance, the men of the groom's *mahalla* usually gather in the courtyard of a paternal relative during the wedding, with no female spectators; the dance is specific to the region, although it varies from village to village.<sup>1</sup>

The dance I observed as a researcher at the invitation of the men included a young migrant along with only a few other, mostly elderly men. The latter expressed their respect for the dance and for tradition in the way they synchronized their movements to the beat set by the most senior man, while the migrant's dance moves conspicuously set him apart from the others. He was not well-versed in traditional dance, and his general conduct was at odds with the other men, who exuded calmness as they followed the lead of the main dancer. Flamboyantly dressed, with sunglasses, the migrant performed his own version of the dance, mixing it with some new movements. At times he even managed to convince the others to imitate his movements. Even

though he expressed his enthusiastic appreciation for the traditional dance, he also undermined its rhythm and cadence through his improvisations. While his performance may have irritated some, especially younger spectators reacted with a surprised smile. In the end, this young migrant gave 100 euros to the *magjup* musicians, a much higher amount than what the others gave. It seemed both a way of compensating for undermining the seniority and skilfulness of the other dancers and expressing his appreciation for the dance. As also shown by Ruba Salih (2002: 219) in relation to Moroccan migrants who perform rituals 'back home', migrants 'develop a creative interplay with "traditional practices" by subverting, reformulating and giving new creative shape to their meaning and content.'

Even though migrants may be able to introduce new wedding rituals, many still tie in with long-established traditions. Brides and grooms who live abroad receive advice from village relatives on how to behave during the ceremony. Since most weddings in Opoja follow a similar pattern and almost all families in the region invest significantly in their sons' weddings, status differences were once hardly noticeable. However, differences in economic means have become more noticeable in recent years and socially divide the community – a factor that will be discussed in more detail in a later section.

### DRESS CODES AS SIGNIFIERS OF GENDER AND GENERATION, INDIVIDUALISM AND THE PATRILOCAL COLLECTIVE

During the wedding festivities in Opoja, women's dresses and appearance express the individual and the collective, 'modernity' and 'tradition'. As already observed by Bourdieu (1984), dress codes can become a symbolic and visual expression of social status and distinction. In Opoja, that is particularly the case on the day of the bride's pickup, which garners much attention and for which a lot of money is spent. Outfits express the status of individuals and simultaneously the meaning of the patrilocal kin group and the gendered and generational position of individuals within this kinship order.

In preparation for the wedding, various in-married women from the groom's family, as well as all the younger married women among the female guests, visit a stylist, who creates a complicated swept-up hairdo and applies a certain make-up style reserved for married women in the region. The in-married women of the groom's family as well as in the *mahalla* wear the traditional attire prescribed for this occasion, the *dimia*, *dallama* or *jelek* and *këmişë*, a stiff blouse with hand-embroidered flower motifs, which form part of the groom's gift to the bride and cost up to a few thousand euros. They



**Figure 6.6.** Women with handmade headdresses and embroidered blouses at a wedding in Opoja (© Carolin Leutloff-Grandits)

also wear abundant gold jewellery and the handmade flower-headdresses they received at their own weddings. The jewellery and clothing simultaneously emphasize their beauty and marital status, visibly distinguishing not just between unmarried and married women but also between newly married woman (possibly with young children) and women with grown, even married, children.

As a sign of family cohesion and strength, sisters and sisters-in-law sometimes also wear the same traditional costume during wedding festivities. However, most married women wear these traditional costumes only for a couple of hours before changing into a unique and glamorous evening dress, often covered in embroidery and glitter, and combined with high heels. Especially the young in-married women of the house and some female guests repeatedly change their attire throughout the main wedding day. Alternating between Turkish-style *dimias* and Hollywood-style evening dresses makes it possible to blend ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’, cosmopolitanism and localism, family unity and individualism to create a hybrid wedding style, which, however, in its abundance reflects high costs and consumerism.

The sweeping white wedding dress is not only worn by the bride but also by women recently married into the *mahalla*, who sit – and at times also stand – against the wall of the house in a row. This emphasizes their position in the patrilineally related *mahalla* as a *nuse* – that is, a bride or a recently in-married woman. Presented as a collective, they seem to represent the ‘latest achievements’ or the ‘common treasure’ of the groom’s patrilineage



**Figure 6.7.** In-married women of the *farefis* in wedding dresses lining up against the wall of the groom's house during a wedding (© Carolin Leutloff-Grandits)

(*farefis*). Like the traditional attire, the white bridal dress and style of the young women who recently married into the kinship group highlight the patrilineal kinship collective, their individual beauty, and the social status of the families into which these women are married.

Importantly, this collective of the *nuse* also includes migrant women whose spouses are from the groom's *mahalla*. Seated next to each other, the young, recently married women follow a uniform code of conduct that characterizes their gender positioning as well as their position within the family and kin group. With heads humbly bowed, they refrain from chatting or bursting into laughter and wait until other female wedding guests arrive to greet them with their *temena*, a graceful and highly ritualized hand gesture that silently expresses respect for tradition, family and kinship group while also demonstrating the individuality and personality of the young married women. Girls in Opoja learn this special bridal greeting, directed to the women of the groom's kinship group, at an early age (Reineck 1991). Indeed, at weddings, the arriving female guests 'take the hands' (*me marrë dorën*) of the lined-up women in wedding dresses to be greeted by them individually. They then discuss the different bridal and other outfits and either admire or criticize a woman's appearance – for example, as elegant and modern or too urban or not respectful enough towards the groom's family – setting boundaries and assigning her a status within the translocal community.

In contrast to the younger married women, the middle-aged and older women obtain their status through their daughter(s)-in-law rather than their own outfits. They mostly wear a simple white blouse and a black skirt, or a

relatively simple *dimia* with a blouse, sometimes with a headscarf. On the other hand, unmarried young girls wear tight jeans and shirts, or short skirts or dresses, like the teens in Western European countries. Compared to married women, they are not required to invest much in their attire, and they do not have complicated hairstyles and wear little to no make-up. Still, fashion and physical appearance among local youth signal their social status and attractiveness and represent an expression of the lifestyles they aspire to (see also Chapter 1).

Unlike married women, men do not adhere to a strict dress code during the wedding festivities, and, as several men jokingly told me, they often serve as ‘chauffeurs’ for the women of the household. On the wedding, they wake up early to drive them to the hair salons, sometimes as far as Prizren, 45-minutes away, and then later in the morning to the wedding festivities at the groom’s house. In the afternoon, they transport the women from the wedding to the bride’s village, where the bride is picked up to be taken to the wedding festivities in the groom’s courtyard, and in the evening, they drop them off at home. In this way, however, they actively preserve the ‘traditional’ gender and family roles within the patrilocal kinship system.

### CONVEYING THE BRIDE TO THE GROOM’S HOUSE AND AFFIRMING ‘PATRILOCAL’ KINSHIP AND GENDER ROLES

The ritual of picking up the bride from her parents’ home and bringing her to the groom’s house represents the climax of the wedding festivities. Customarily, more than 100 people connected to the groom’s family travel by car to the bride’s family’s home to escort her to the groom’s house. Men who own cars offer to fill them with women and children eager to participate in this cavalcade. Others, often the middle-aged and older people, wait for the bride to arrive in the courtyard of the groom’s house. In accordance with the tradition of village exogamy – that is, of marrying outside the village community, which historically also served the purpose of expanding or consolidating the network of acquaintances beyond one’s own village through affinal kinship ties (*miqësi*) (Reineck 1991: 69) – the bride usually comes from another village in the region.

Upon arriving at the bride’s house, men and women again split into two groups. While men wait in their cars or in a neighbouring yard, the women are welcomed by the female members of the bride’s family and the respective *mahalla* in the bride’s yard. For this welcome ritual, the women of the bride’s family serve as the masters of ceremony, and together with the newly in-married brides of their patrilineal kin group, they greet the female guests of the groom’s family. Two lines are formed: one comprising women from



the bride's family and the *mahalla* to welcome the arriving guests, and the other comprising the guests. The older women of the bride's family offer drinks and some perfume to the guests as a welcome gesture, and in the line formed they are followed by newly married women from the bride's *mahalla*, wearing their white wedding dresses and greeting the guests with a *temena*. Recently married brides from the *mahalla* stand closer to the bride, who stands at the end of the line. The bride wears her luxurious white wedding dress and a red scarf covering her head, which symbolizes her virginity and protection against evil eyes (*syni i keq*). Young women who I had first met as giggling teenagers, sporting tight jeans or miniskirts, had been transformed into 'fairy-tale' brides, expressing elegance and grace. Among these brides are migrant women, who normally live abroad; the ones I met claimed they once knew nothing about the wedding rituals and were critical of the whole ritualized process. At their weddings in Opoja, they metamorphosed into 'proper brides' and blended into the local community – even though some reported the stress of performing the traditional role or refused to perform certain aspects.

During the ritual of taking the bride, the bride traditionally keeps her eyes firmly fixed on the ground as a sign of respect towards the groom's family and as an expression of her sadness at leaving her own family. She is then approached by the mother-in-law, or the eldest sister-in-law, who lifts the scarf for the first time and affixes a piece of jewellery on her. Other close relatives follow to affix money to the bride's hair. Customs are, however, changing as not all brides adhere to the traditions any more. Some do not look down but join others in observing the scene during this ritual. Contrary to the traditions, some even start to smile, but this is liable to be criticized by elderly women as inappropriate behaviour. All in all, however, the festivities in the bride's courtyard represent a highly ritualized ceremony, at the end of which the bride is bid farewell by her relatives – a moment that is even more emotional if she is to travel abroad to join her spouse. With her face again covered, she is brought to the car by her mother-in-law and sisters-in-law to be taken to the groom's family home. In our conversations, some villagers half-jokingly explained that the bride's veil and downcast eyes, especially on the way to the groom's house, historically served the purpose to make it difficult for the bride to memorize the way in case she wanted to 'run home'. It was assumed that brides had suffered in the past from separation from her family and from the servant role she had to take on in the household of her in-laws due to patriarchal customs (Reineck 1991: 68). My interlocutors emphasized that the ritual is still followed but with no practical meaning any more, as circumstances obviously have changed.

The cavalcade of the groom's family and their guests – with the bridal car at the very end – proceeding towards the groom's home is eagerly awaited

by the family and kin members of the groom who stayed behind. The musicians, who create a jubilant atmosphere with their music performance, signal the climax with rhythmic beats, occasionally accelerating their rhythms to intensify the ambience of mirth and cheerfulness when the bridal car approaches the groom's house. The groom's family and guests scream and sing, and girls wave red plastic roses. When the bride finally exits the car, the groom welcomes her by lifting the face covering. Later, the groom and bride open the highly ritualized circle dance with slow, majestic moves. The circle dance is headed by the groom and by various male family members in rotation, but sometimes also by the groom's mother, and they are joined by other guests. This symbolizes the festive welcome of a new member of the family as well as the union of all members of the groom's (patrilineal) family and kin group.

Once the dancing stops, most guests bid farewell, and the groom spends time with his male relatives, while the female members of the family take the bride into the living room of the groom's house and later to the couple's new bedroom, where she can rest until the groom returns. His return to his parents' house late in the evening, accompanied by other male relatives as well as the *magjup* musicians, is another highlight of the wedding festivities. According to local customs, this is also the time when the imam arrives to perform the Islamic wedding ritual in the presence of the groom, his parents and two witnesses, for which neither the bride nor the bridal party is required. Thus, the Islamic ritual strengthens the patriarchal position of men and the groom's family. However, the imam is absent from some marriage ceremonies, which reflects the rather marginal role of Islam within weddings in Opoja, which are usually agreed upon between the families of the bride and groom.

Several – non-religious – wedding rituals further define the spouses' gender-specific roles in the marriage and within the patrilocal kin group. For example, on the morning following the wedding night, the groom and his bride participate in various games in the circle of relatives and guests, such as the bread-breaking game, in which both spouses grab a freshly baked bread at opposite ends to break it, and the one who gets the bigger piece wins. At the one I was present, the atmosphere was not very conducive to the young bride. During the game, the groom's relatives and the youth from his *mahalla* shouted out the name of their village, as if the groom's victory would symbolize the victory of his entire village. It goes without saying that the respectful bride let her groom win. As for the songs sung by the girls of the *mahalla* during the wedding, these and other rituals are generally considered fun, as relics of old times, not meant to offend or to be taken seriously. Still, these rituals support the re-traditionalization of gender, family and kinship roles, emphasizing patrilinearity, patrilocality and the subordination of the

bride under the authority of the groom and the in-laws, at least symbolically. However, such rituals are countered by those others that emphasize the romantic and caring relationship between the newlyweds; for example, when the groom and bride feed each other blindfolded.

## RISING WEDDING COSTS AND THE PRESSURE TO MIGRATE

Invoking Bourdieu, Julia Pauli (2011: 154) has highlighted that weddings in Namibia 'changed into celebrations of class distinctions', starting in the 1970s, to the extent that 'in no other area of life has the emerging elite of politicians and professionals invested as much money and creativity to exhibit and celebrate their distinctiveness as they do in weddings'. Taking up the argument that 'houses are the elephants of stuff' (Miller 2010: 81), Julia Pauli (2011: 164) rightly suggests that 'weddings may be rhinos'. In Kosovo, weddings have transformed over time, and wedding costs are a sensitive issue. As Janet Reineck (1991: 86–87) reports, wedding costs, including bridal gifts, had already skyrocketed in Opoja by the 1980s. She links this to villagers being abroad as labour migrants and sending foreign currency to the village. As this development put many families under severe pressure, there were attempts to limit the costs of bridal gifts – however, unsuccessfully. Villagers also told me that another source of the high costs for the groom's family was that the entire village was invited to the festive lunch. As guests are not expected to bring gifts, the lavish wedding festivities could also be interpreted as a potlatch (Wolf 1999: 84), which 'destroyed' the finances of the groom's family, forcing them to go into debt merely to marry off their son and gain status in the community. In the 1990s, villagers went so far as to cut down the guest list and invited only the families of their own patrilineally related *mahalla* within the village along with the affinal relatives from outside the village. By reducing the guest list to include mainly those in the *mahalla*, they also emphasized the significance of patrilineality and partilocality.

In the 1990s, weddings were also celebrated in a low-key manner due to the intensifying political conflict along ethnonational lines, whereby the Serbian-dominated government took suppressive measures against the Albanian population. At that time, many families in Opoja celebrated without the music of the *magjup* bands, who were believed to be collaborating with the Serbs. One villager reported a case in which the marriage was conducted without the associated celebrations, as all the villagers from Opoja had to flee to Albania due to the advancing Serbian army, and the groom decided to flee together with his bride – from then on they were considered married.

Social life started to flourish again after the NATO intervention in 1999 put an end to the Serbian-dominated regime in Kosovo and the year-long

suppression of Albanians in Kosovo, which enabled the villagers to return to their homes. With that, weddings regained their significance and were celebrated lavishly notwithstanding the rising costs, which soon spiked to over 10,000 euros, about three to four times higher than the typical costs listed by Janet Reineck (1991) for the late 1980s (\$800 for the bridal gifts and \$2,000 for the wedding itself).

However, the more recent rise in wedding costs is strongly linked to migrants' aspiration to gain social status in Opoja and within the translocal kin group while living with their families more or less permanently abroad. The high spending is expected to showcase the migrant's success and modern lifestyle without relinquishing the 'traditional' rituals and family values that connect them to their local community and their sons to the patrilocal kin group. Most parents – abroad but also in the village – are determined to hold a 'proper' wedding for their son(s), even if that entails hardships. Veton, for example, who had emigrated to Germany in the early 1990s and brought his sons over after the war, financed the wedding of his first son to a young woman from a neighbouring village who had moved to Austria with her family when the war broke out. Since the wedding took place in Opoja, Veton was able to invite his large circle of relatives there and spent a total of about 25,000 euros, including the costs of additional wedding festivities at a restaurant, described in the next section. As his regular earnings could not cover the wedding costs, Veton took on an additional part-time job in the evenings and weekends, and his wife and sons worked with him (see also Chapter 3).

While wedding investments are seen to contribute to the reconstitution of the family, the kin group and the community, they may also trigger a form of 'wedding competition' in the community. As social differences have increased since the war, less affluent families – particularly those who cannot rely on migrants for financial assistance – feel pressured by the high wedding standards set by migrant families in Opoja. In order to sustain the homogeneity of the marriage customs in Opoja, various families, even those with migrants, borrow money from the bank and mortgage their homes (Krasniqi 2016: 200) despite the high interest rates on loans. This is a dangerous undertaking that may lead to precarious situations within families. It also deepens the new social divide within the translocal village community.

Moreover, costly weddings affect the prospects of many families in Opoja and their individual members, since money is no longer available to fulfil other goals – thus limiting possible futures. Saimir, who is in his mid-fifties, lives in Opoja and has organized three weddings for his three sons, each of which cost about 10,000 to 15,000 euros. The high wedding costs meant Samir and his wife had to postpone their plans to build new houses that would enable the division of the large household, so they remained sharing a household with their married sons, daughters-in-law and grand-

children. In order to reduce wedding costs, various families in Opoja may host celebrations for two sons simultaneously, possibly forcing those wanting to marry earlier to wait until the time when another sibling is ready.

Most importantly, however, several young men I met felt pressured to migrate abroad to earn the money needed for their wedding and/or the wedding of their brothers, as their fathers were unable to afford the wedding expenses. While this was already the case in the 1980s (Reineck 1991: 90), by 2010, the need to migrate and earn money abroad was likely even more pressing (see Chapter 2). Such a need can also thwart individual plans to achieve higher education. One example is Lirim, who went to Austria on a student visa to complete his master's degree. Instead of postponing his wedding to finish his studies first or having a small wedding, he bowed to his parents' wishes and demands to get married according to their plans for him, which meant earning money instead of focusing on his studies. Lirim agreed, not only out of respect for his parents but also because, as he explained to me, he saw his marriage as an investment in his own future, since it would give him stability, and he would achieve the important goal of starting his own family. In this way, he was able to come to terms more quickly with the idea of postponing his studies.

Others may be critical of the wedding costs, the long guest list or the customs and rituals but to no effect, since the influence of parents and the wider translocal community and the norms set by them are paramount. Osman, a young man from Ojoja studying in Germany who was engaged to a woman from his region, said he was not willing to spend so much money on the wedding. He argued that this would mean he would have to work to pay for the wedding and that he would have limited time to study, which would jeopardize his university plans and any related dreams for the future. Without achieving his study goal, he would also lose his residence permit sooner or later, which in turn meant that he would have to return to Opoja, where there were no job prospects. His parents, however, did not agree with him about keeping the wedding celebrations small, as this would have a negative impact on their status at home. As a result, Osman bowed to his family's expectations on the size of the wedding festivities and bridal gifts and shifted his focus to organizing the financing.

Members of the groom's family, regardless of whether the groom and the groom's parents live in Opoja or abroad, thus, view the wedding as a collective family enterprise. It is a means of expanding and uniting the family, even if this entails restricting the plans and ambitions of individual family members. Sometimes, this leads to conflict between family members, especially between parents and their sons, but sons often give in to these norms and adjust their individual goals. Usually male family members (sometimes undocumented) are sent away simply to finance the wedding costs. As newly

married men may go abroad again after the wedding to continue earning money, this can lead to a longer separation of newly married couples.

Since a large portion of the total wedding costs is devoted to the needs of the female family members, especially the bridal gifts, it can be assumed that women are the driving force behind the high wedding costs. Janet Reineck (1991: 88) has already pointed out that in the late 1980s, women insisted on sizeable wedding gifts as a significant sign of their honour, prestige and social status. Moreover, marriage was for many the only opportunity to acquire personal items, since most women did not engage in wage labour or at least stopped doing so after marriage. While this was largely true during the period of my fieldwork as well, this was not the case for all women. Several educated women, especially migrant women residing in EU countries who were also often employed, stated quite openly that they did not like the expensive gifts and dresses that were customary in Opoja but that their attitude met with disapproval from the groom's parents, and especially the groom's mother, who has the final say in these matters. Edona, who married in Opoja despite having lived abroad for many years, rejected the purchase of lavish gold jewellery but relented when her mother-in-law insisted on gold for the wedding as being customary in Opoja.

Many young migrant women differentiate between the village and the migration context, adapting their respective tastes and styles to places and environments. One of these women for example explained that she used most of the dresses she had received in her bridal trousseau only at weddings in Opoja and not abroad but that she sees that as part of the local culture and tradition to be respected. The fact that women are the centre of attention at weddings in the Opoja region and are paramount in making it an unforgettable experience for the community may have contributed to their positive attitude with respect to high wedding costs and the investment in traditions.

### WEDDING SALONS AS A SIGNAL OF TRANSLOCAL SOCIAL DISTINCTION

In the post-war period, especially since the early 2000s, celebrating weddings in a wedding salon (*salloni i dasmave*) is considered fashionable in Kosovo. Such salons, located on the outskirts of a town and accommodating between 300 to 1,000 guests, are relatively new constructions often resembling columned palaces covered with mirrors. The boom in the construction of such wedding salons was palpable, and in urban areas, most weddings now no longer take place at home but more or less exclusively in such salons and last only one day. This phenomenon is not unique to Kosovo; it is prevalent in other post-Yugoslav post-war societies. As Hannes Grandits (2007) and



**Figure 6.8.** A modern wedding salon on the outskirts of a town in Kosovo  
(© Carolin Leutloff-Grandits)

Robert Pichler (2009b) show, large wedding salons accommodating hundreds of guests, now widely used in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina and by Albanian migrants in Northern Macedonia, respectively, emphasize the increased significance of personal connections in post-socialist and post-war neoliberal times.

As observed by Julia Pauli (2013) for Namibia, weddings are increasingly an arena for emphasizing social distinction because of the extraordinarily high costs of such celebrations relative to the income of many families, and an increasing number of people cannot afford to marry any more. In Kosovo today, marriages are still the norm, in the sense that the number of people who remain unmarried throughout their life is very low. But as marriages increasingly take place in restaurants or wedding salons in the presence of several hundred guests, including relatives, with an emphasis on consumption, they have also become an arena for social distinction.<sup>2</sup>

In the early 2000s, many such wedding salons cropped up in the town of Prizren, approximately a 45 minute drive away, which Opoja villagers have increasingly come to use. More recently, some locals have also invested in wedding salon constructions on the outskirts of the villages. These salons offer not only proximity but also more favourable prices, starting at 15 euros per invited person. In one Opoja village in 2013, seventy weddings took place at a wedding salon that accommodates 300 people. A more spacious wedding salon opened in 2012 in Dragash, the municipal centre of Opoja.

Nevertheless, during my field research, it was not common for weddings in the Opoja region to be celebrated only at a restaurant. The bride was

brought from her parental house to the groom's house, following the rituals described above, such as the display of gifts at the groom's and the bride's house, before the festivities were moved to the restaurant. However, with the rising popularity of restaurant weddings, the celebrations at the groom's house will likely move entirely to the restaurant rather than merely complementing the celebrations at the groom's house. This is already an established practice in other regions. Given the ongoing outmigration of families and the neoliberal changes that are also leading to greater individualization, restaurant weddings also have the advantage of relying less on kinship and community support. In addition, restaurant weddings are also changing gender and kinship relationships. In fact, restaurant celebrations differ significantly from wedding festivities 'at home'. First, in restaurant weddings there is a greater focus on food (especially meat) and catering, which increases the costs. Waiters must be paid, while at home weddings members of the family and the *mahalla* engage in the organization of the wedding on a voluntary basis. This suggests that restaurant weddings do not have the same significance as a family or *mahalla* affair, a topic that is sometimes hotly debated among villagers. Another issue is the guest list. Unlike weddings at home, where invitation cards are addressed to the entire household, sometimes only two representatives per household are invited to a restaurant wedding – especially if they are not close relatives. Many still want to invite all relatives and are therefore in favour of a large wedding in a restaurant.

Some young people, however, prefer a reduced guest list and seek to invite only those relatives with whom they have a significant connection – in addition to important friends. In this way they are actively positioning themselves against 'traditional weddings' celebrated in the wider circle of (mainly) patrilineal kin members. These smaller wedding ideals in part resemble the ideal wedding celebration in socialist Albania, which, according to Gerda Dalipaj (2013: 32), should be 'small, inexpensive and not like weddings in "patriarchal" families'. The guest list of the ideal 'socialist wedding' was not limited to the couple's relatives but also includes friends from the workplace. The socialist wedding also meant that '[t]he socialist bride goes immediately to work after the wedding, unlike before, when she had to stay enclosed in her husband's house for a long time' (ibid.: 323). In Opoja, many young women dream of a honeymoon after their wedding, hoping to break away from the traditional and still widespread practice of brides staying with their in-laws after the wedding and receiving family guests in their bridal attire in the afternoon. However, there has been no linear development towards this kind of modernization.

Restaurant weddings, which have become increasingly common in Kosovo since the turn of the millennium, have also led to further changes



in how the wedding is celebrated. At home weddings, the families of the bride and groom celebrate separately, except for the brief period when the bride is picked up from her parents' home. In contrast, at restaurant weddings, the groom's family also invites the bride's close family and relatives. This indicates a shift in the meaning of kinship and valorizes the bride's relatives. In addition to the bride's relatives, good friends and work colleagues are increasingly being invited, which shows the growing importance of work and friend circles. These changes are especially noticeable at weddings in the city, where the bride and groom have a similar number of guests and sometimes also share the costs.

In Opoja, such weddings are still the exception to the rule. At the restaurant celebrations of families in and from Opoja, only a few tables are reserved for the bride's family, and usually the bride's relatives are the first to leave the restaurant. Nevertheless, the importance of the male kinship group in restaurant celebrations has decreased. While agnatic relatives are indispensable in domestic celebrations, readily providing space and support free of charge, a restaurant wedding is largely devoid of overt family or community support, especially with organizational tasks, as the groom's family pays for these as part of the restaurant package.

Many middle-aged and older people still prefer to celebrate their wedding at home, as they consider the presence of guests a special honour for 'the house' (*shtëpia*) and, consequently, for the family and family hospitality. This was also the case among the older generation in Northeastern Turkey in the 1990s (Bellér-Hann and Hann 2001: 148). On the other hand, young people often emphasize that a home wedding is a significant burden on the inviting family, leaving all members completely exhausted at the end, while restaurant celebrations are more fun, not least because the inviting family is finally able to enjoy the celebration. However, since most restaurant celebrations in the Opoja region are still preceded by lengthy preparations and celebrations at home, family members continue to be overwhelmed and exhausted when they finally arrive at the restaurant.

Restaurant weddings, furthermore, undermine the notion of the wedding as a family and kin affair, as attention shifts to the bridal couple, who take centre stage at the banquet. To celebrate their union as an expression of a love relation, the couple and the inviting family introduced various new rituals, which often take on a 'Western' appearance, resembling Hollywood depictions of weddings. It has become customary for the couple to cut the obligatory five-tiered sugar cream wedding cake together. In one case, the couple marched into a romantic fire installation, where a burning heart lay on the floor. Other new rituals to celebrate the romantic union of the bridal couple include the dance of the groom and bride, often accompanied by applauding guests. That is also the moment when the dance may shift from the



**Figure 6.9.** The seats for the bride and groom in a wedding salon (© Carolin Leutloff-Grandits)

traditional circle dance (*valle*) to a couple dance, which is popular not only among the younger generation but also among the middle-aged. The different dance style corresponds to the changed music style at most restaurant weddings. Instead of the drumbeat of the *magjup* band, Albanian folk music or even globalized disco music is played by the DJs, who are hired by the inviting family. Last but not least, alcohol, especially beer, *raki* (Schnapps) and wine, is served in many restaurant weddings. Although primarily consumed by men, the rising level of alcohol consumption during the restaurant wedding creates an increasingly easy-going atmosphere that is especially appreciated by the young generation. Nevertheless, alcohol consumption also poses a problem, as numerous men are often not used to drinking regularly and may drive their families home drunk after the wedding.

Generally, gender divisions at restaurant weddings are not as clear-cut as at weddings held in the yard of the groom's family, where women usually remain in female company. At restaurant weddings, where couples are seated next to each other, it can suddenly become a problem when women come without their husbands. Dafina, for example, explained to me that she felt uneasy when she had to go alone to the restaurant wedding of a relative because her spouse had to work abroad. She added that a wedding without a man is nothing for a woman –something that would not even be considered at a wedding that takes place in a family's yard, where there is little interaction between men and women. However, it also emphasizes the increasing importance of couple relationships in rural Kosovo.

## CONCLUSION

Owing to the strong involvement of migrants residing in EU countries, wedding festivities in the Opoja region have a kinship- and community-building effect across national borders. Lavishly celebrated wedding festivities in Opoja lead to a convergence of translocal family networks, which can counteract the possible fragmentation of the family and the kin group as a result of the continuing outmigration of villagers and the increased levels of globalization in Kosovo. Wedding celebrations bring together the diverse experiences and perspectives of villagers and migrants to unite in a vision for a shared future. They are therefore an important foundation for the translocal building of kinship care relationships.

Weddings in Opoja are highly ritualized, and both villagers and migrants invest in weddings that they perceive primarily as family and kinship celebrations, sparing no expense. 'Tradition' merges with 'modernity', as such festivities blend local customs with new cosmopolitan fashions. By celebrating in and with reference to Opoja, the translocal family and kinship network is enforced. This can also be seen as a response to the socio-economic challenges in neoliberal times – in Opoja and in various places of migration. Within the wedding rituals, villagers and migrants actively cherish, respect, professionalize and even reinvent the 'traditional' wedding customs that stress the unity of the agnatic kin group, which still finds its spatial expression in the local *mahalla*. Among translocal kinship networks, which have their centre in Opoja, weddings are hosted by the groom's family and often celebrated in a domestic environment, within the yard of the groom's house, but increasingly also at a wedding salon within the region.

The wedding celebrations underscore the importance of patrilocality, the male descent line and the unity of the translocal kin group, in which 'traditional' gender and generational roles are clearly marked and expressed in spatial and visual arrangements. The wedding celebrations thus give patrilocality and gender relations a special meaning. The new elements that villagers and migrants add to the wedding preparation include the complex embroidered patterns for the blouses and hair decoration made by hand by village women and mainly bought by migrants. Gifted to complement the 'traditional' wedding costumes and exhibited during the *kënjegji* as well as in the groom's yard, these embellishments imbue the more predictable or 'traditional' aspects of the wedding with new life. Home weddings are largely organized by the family and the *mahalla*, and migrants appreciate the 'authenticity' of these rituals and performances as an expression of their identity, their 'roots' and their belonging in the local community, in which they financially invest. Often migrants celebrate fervently, spending large

sums of money on the celebrations while enjoying bringing family and relatives together and being part of the village community.

Simultaneously, villagers as well as migrants readily link up to the globalized culture and integrate 'modern' and 'Western' wedding styles into translocal festivities. Inspired by media, they invest in new styles of attire and makeup and introduce new rituals and elements that seek to highlight the bridal couple and their romantic relations. This also leaves space to carve out alternative gender and social relations, often transforming the gendered hierarchy. Weddings held at restaurants, where the hold of the patrilineal tradition and kin group loosens, divert the focus to the future of the bride and groom.

Migrants often dominate the village landscape during their summer visits, not least because they often willingly invest in such weddings. In doing so, they claim their membership and status in the community. But more generally, the lavishly celebrated weddings create a strong sense of family and community, symbolizing stability, security and continuity that ongoing outmigration and severe economic insecurities tend to undermine. As such, weddings amount to a foundational expression of care for the couple, their families and the larger community.

However, such investments in a wedding can divide the community along the predictable fault lines of migration – for those who can afford costly celebrations are usually migrants. The inviting family, which is expected to cover the costs, are pressured into living up to the standard set by migrants, which has led to rising wedding costs. Family members are sometimes forced to migrate to seek work to cover the wedding expenses, often at the expense of pursuing their education. Weddings are, thus, ambivalent investments in the family, kin group and community that can represent or change the social status of individual members and their prospects.

Generational relations are also influential here. The younger generation frequently (still) subordinates their own ideals to parental expectations of lavish weddings, even though this may impact the realization of their plans for the future. But not all families subscribe to this 'wedding competition'. With growing socio-economic differences, the decline of agriculture that localizes the village community, and diminishing respect for the older generation in post-war Kosovo, marriage practices have diversified, and young people may opt for alternative marriage practices. While in the past elopements were sometimes practised when parents were against the spousal choice, there are nowadays individual cases in which the young woman moves into the house of the young man and is thus considered married. In some cases, that may be followed by a smaller wedding celebration involving the immediate families (for Turkey, see Hart 2010).

In line with the findings of Micaela Di Leonardo (1987), who emphasizes the dialectic of competition and cooperation, self-interest and altruism in kinship work, weddings in Opoja are characterized by both competition and cooperation between families and individuals, as well as by the simultaneous investment in tradition and modernity. Weddings in Opoja show how interconnected the spheres of self-interest and kinship care are and the extent to which Opoja emerges as a prominent translocal region that is closely related to migration contexts. In these wedding festivities, notions of patrilocality and patrilineality are given particular importance, even if emancipated gender relations and romance are gaining ground.

#### NOTES

1. Interestingly, the social anthropologist Janet Reineck (1991) learned the dance and also performed it at weddings in the late 1980s. In her role as a 'respected foreign researcher', she was situationally incorporated into the men's group.
2. Recently, some bridal families have also started to celebrate the *kënağjegji* at a restaurant. In some regions of Kosovo, like in Isniq and Gjakova, this is done in the morning of the wedding, so that the bride is no longer picked up from her home but from the restaurant celebrations with her kin before the groom's family then celebrates the wedding in a different restaurant. Families have also started to celebrate circumcision ceremonies in restaurants.

## CHAPTER

# 7

## REALITIES OF CROSS-BORDER MARRIAGES

### *Rearranging Family and Gender Relations*



## INTRODUCTION

I first met thirty-year-old Adelina a year after her engagement to an Opoja migrant in Germany, when she was busy preparing for her German qualifying language exam. Adelina lived with her parents in one of the Opoja villages, and Adelina's exam performance, as she told me, would not only determine her visa eligibility to join her fiancé in Germany but even her suitability for the marriage alliance. In the eyes of her fiancé, it was vital to attend German language courses; in a sense, her fiancé was reiterating the official position of the immigration state, where the knowledge of basic German is a precondition for marriage migration. He thus willingly funded her German language course, which she attended in a neighbouring village along with other young women and a few men also planning to marry and/or work abroad. Adelina had mixed feelings about her marriage. Her general unease about an unpredictable future was exacerbated by the limited interactions with her fiancé, who had returned to Germany, and the prospect of having to leave her family soon and live in a foreign country where she barely knew the language. The year-long wait between her engagement and her wedding, which depended on her passing the language exam before she could finally move abroad, was emotionally challenging. Having left school more than ten years ago, learning German, she said, made her eyes and head hurt and was

making her more and more tense and anxious. Overcoming the challenge of 'relearning to learn', especially in a classroom environment, in order to become 'eligible' to embark on her marital life abroad was entirely on her shoulders (Leutloff-Grandits 2021).

Citizens from Kosovo and from other non-EU-countries who cannot benefit from the privileged migration schemes of EU countries must make do with limited migration channels, namely family reunification and here especially marriage migration. However, the increasingly restrictive family migration measures have made marriage migration considerably more difficult and also slowed it down (Moret, Andrikopoulos and Dahinden 2019). The period of separation and insecurity after couples decide on marriage migration is not only protracted but, as in Adelina's case, often also open-ended, negatively affecting interactions between spatially separated couples and leading to more stress and unease. Even after the marriage migrants have met all requirements and succeeded in entering the EU, they encounter many new challenges of internal boundaries until they reach a secure position, which can take many years (Wray 2012).

This chapter delineates to what extent marriage migration policies influence the experiences and realities of migrating spouses and their sponsors in cross-border marriages linking Opoja to the migrant destinations in Western Europe. It aims to understand the opportunities and challenges of marriage migration and to highlight some developments and turning points within these marriages. Within this frame, the chapter also explores newly evolving meanings of partnership and family relations in cross-border marriages. The underlying question is whether gender roles are reproduced or changed in such marriages, not least because of the spouses' different expectations of each other. Furthermore, the role of the wider family in the spouses' position in a translocal space is analysed (see Chapter 5; Riaño and Dahinden 2010: 33). This also makes it possible to understand the dynamic relations and what is often a balancing act between family considerations and family care on the one hand and the fulfilment of individual desires and self-care on the other.

As I argue in this chapter, cross-border marriages can have both supportive and coercive effects on one or both partners, as they unfold in 'gendered geographies of power', as Sarah J. Mahler and Patricia R. Pessar (2001) put it. Because marriage migration entails crossing great geographical distances and national borders, women and men may experience new forms of empowerment and disempowerment that are not easily discernible at the outset. This type of mobility often facilitates or even necessitates the questioning of established gender boundaries, which can lead to new forms of 'traditional' gender roles and family care but also to emancipated roles and new care relationships. Looking in depth at cross-border marriages, one can

also observe transgressions of ethnic and class boundaries, which are often ambivalently interwoven in Western countries.

To better illuminate the gendered positioning of spouses in cross-border marriages, I explore the influence of migration policies and the institutions of cross-border marriages on the family or household arrangements, which have been largely disregarded in research so far. The wider – translocally situated – family members and their changing constellations and challenges within such family and household networks are important to this analysis, also in terms of the opportunities they offer. To develop the argument, I first outline the discriminatory discourses and legal barriers that marriage migrants face, and the gendered impact of these barriers, particularly on the young people in Opoja waiting to migrate. The chapter then offers a processual perspective on cross-border marriages. Starting with the pre-migration waiting period, which includes preparations for marriage migration, the chapter outlines the actual migration process and then focuses on the couples' efforts to maintain everyday life and partnership relations within the marriage. To understand these processes, the chapter focuses on marriages in which men have migrated, before examining marriage constellations in which women have migrated abroad to join their spouses. It discusses shifts in different gendered and locational positionings during migration in order to highlight the different opportunities and constraints of cross-border marriages. I analyse the often asymmetrical perceptions and expectations of spouses in cross-border marriages (see Chapter 5) and the conditions under which they are met. The role of family and household members, both abroad and in Opoja, the impact of education and class, and the particular challenges of dissolving an unhappy marriage are discussed in more detail.

### DISCRIMINATORY DISCOURSES AND LEGAL BARRIERS OF MARRIAGE MIGRATION

Within dominant discourses in the receiving societies, cross-border marriages of migrants, entailing marriage with a spouse from the so-perceived home country, are often understood as migrants' preference for 'ethnic segregation'. According to this interpretation, marriage migration would have the effect of reproducing or 'rejuvenating' migrant communities, which would postpone or block their social integration, leading to an 'ethnic closure of migrant communities' (for a critical discussion, see Beck-Gernsheim 2006: 111–12). In the 1990s, this conviction found expression in Austria in the politicized slogan '*Integration vor Neuzuzug*' (Integration before New Arrivals). It even led to the approval of a package of integration measures (*Integrationspaket*) by the Austrian government in 1997 to improve 'integration' of



migrants into the receiving society (Strasser and Tošić 2014: 130). However, the integration policy overtly focused on measuring and evaluating migrants' integration efforts. Less importance is generally given to improving the integration measures within the host society, not only in Austria but also in Germany and other Western European countries (Plamper 2019: 279–83).

With the rise of certain hegemonic culturalist discourses in Western European immigration countries in the 1990s, which gained force in the new millennium, objections to marriage migration are increasingly rooted in notions that societies are culturally homogenous entities linked to well-defined geographic spaces and imbued with distinct values on family and marriage. According to this view, cross-border marriages, especially among Muslims, are suspected of embodying 'traditional', 'patriarchal' family norms and arrangements that are at odds with the perceived 'modern' and 'emancipated' family values of Western societies. For that reason, cross-border marriages are considered fertile ground for forced marriages and domestic violence perpetrated 'in the name of tradition' (Razack 2004; Liversage and Rytter 2015; Bonjour and Block 2016: 789; see also Chapter 5). Especially women in cross-border marriages are seen 'at risk' of becoming victims of sexual and domestic violence, even if the woman is the 'sponsor' that is enabling immigration from a non-EU country on the basis of marriage (Block 2010).

Cross-border marriages are often also viewed as 'entry tickets' to Western European countries within dominant Western discourses. The suspicion of seeking access to legal rights abroad through 'marriages of convenience' ('*Zweckehen*') or 'sham marriages' ('*Scheinehen*') (see Pellander 2015: 109 for studies on Finland) legitimizes the state's claim to exert control over the development of such relationships and monitor intimate marriage spaces. Men from so-perceived 'patriarchal cultures' are especially suspected of entering into 'sham marriages' ('*Scheinehen*') and betraying their female partner by concealing their real intentions for marrying (Block 2010; Charsley and Liversage 2015; Andrikopoulos 2019).

Using such 'culturalizing' and gendered discourses about marriage migration, legal requirements for family reunion with a partner from a non-EU country have become increasingly restrictive, although they vary depending on the EU country, and differences are also made regarding countries of origin. For example, these requirements do not apply to partners from countries considered Western, such as the US (Block 2014: 7; Straßburger and Aybek 2015: 84; Gutekunst 2016: 233–34; AGF 2012). These restrictions have been put in place despite the international human rights convention guaranteeing the right to marriage and family life. Following the introduction of the Family Reunification Directive in the EU in 2003, which aimed at harmonizing the family migration policies of EU members and setting a limit for restrictive laws, the legal requirements for marriage migration in most

EU member states were tightened (Block and Bonjour 2013). This poses a challenge to marriage migration and often leads to considerable postponement of the migration or even renders it impossible.

First and foremost, the right to family reunification is not a universal right but is tightly bound to the legal and economic membership of the sponsor in society. In Germany and Austria, only citizen sponsors or holders of a residence permit may apply for family reunification. In most cases, they are required to prove ‘adequate housing’ and meet income requirements that would disqualify them from claiming social benefits (ibid.: 2013: 207; Grote 2017: 26). With this, the receiving state seeks to ensure that the applicants are financially independent and can afford the living costs of the joining family members. The implication is that marriage migrants could become an economic burden on the welfare state in the receiving society. Generally, as Block (2014: 8) writes, ‘citizen sponsors must fulfil fewer conditions regarding housing, employment, and income than foreign resident spouses’, thus making it more difficult for immigrants to bring over their respective spouses. However, as citizens may also include naturalized citizens – that is, persons coming from a so-perceived different cultural background – the requirements for citizens were hardened, too (Bonjour and Block 2016). Moreover, family reunification requirements also have a class dimension, impeding especially sponsors with smaller earnings from qualifying. Women in Austria and Germany, on average, earn about 20 per cent less than men (Danaj 2016), which makes it more difficult for them to meet the economic criteria to sponsor a spouse from abroad and to enter a cross-border marriage. The class dimension thus also unfolds as a gender dimension, disadvantaging women as sponsors of marriage migration.

EU countries justify age requirements for marriage migrants to prevent so-called ‘forced marriages’ under the assumption that more mature migrants would have a greater say in the marriage decision. In Germany, the minimum age for marriage migrants was raised to eighteen in 2007, whereas the marriageable age in Germany remains sixteen (Block and Bonjour 2013: 207; Grote 2017). In Austria and in the Netherlands, the minimum age for marriage migrants was raised to twenty-one in 2004 (Strasser and Tošić 2014: 143; Bonjour and Block 2016: 790).

Furthermore, since 2007, prospective marriage migrants seeking a German visa are required to prove their German proficiency at the beginners’ level (Block and Bonjour 2013: 207; Gutekunst 2016; Grote 2017: 27–28). In Austria, this law was introduced in 2011 (Block and Bonjour 2013: 207). Language proficiency certificates must be presented at the respective consulate or the embassy for the sponsor’s spouse to be allowed to enter the receiving country. To that end, this measure shifts the ‘plea of integration’ to the place of origin or departure, and the responsibility of integration to

the individuals seeking to join their partners, while receiving states assume no responsibilities in providing equal access to such language courses. Generally, such policies are made assuming that language requirements enhance integration chances and prevent forced marriages (Straßburger and Aybek 2015: 84; Gutekunst 2016). However, both in Austria and Germany, the language requirement no longer applies when sponsors belong to the privileged strata of economically preferred migrants. Thus, integration potential is increasingly measured based on class or the economic strength of the sponsor (Strasser and Tošić 2014: 131–33). With unequal requirements for family reunification, the receiving states support what they perceive as ‘desirable migrants’ as opposed to ‘undesirable migrants’.

### THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL BARRIERS FOR MARRIAGE MIGRATION

In the cases I explored in Opoja, the stringent requirements for marriage migration proved to be a barrier, often leading to its postponement and exacerbating tensions among partners on both sides. In several cases, the details of these requirements were not known ahead of the arrangements. This finding is also supported by Strassburger and Aybek’s (2015: 95) case study of marriage migrants from Turkey to Germany. They showed that educationally and economically disadvantaged couples had little knowledge about marriage migration procedures and also lacked a solid network of acquaintances as a reliable source of information.

From the perspective of marriage migrants, the challenges in accessing correct information about the legal measures in the receiving countries also arise from the requirement that – at least in Austria and Germany – the marriage certificate must be obtained before entering the EU. This measure aims to prevent non-EU citizens who wish to marry a partner residing in the EU from entering on a visitor visa. Since it is almost impossible for young, underprivileged and unemployed Kosovars to obtain a visitor visa for one of the EU countries, most prospective marriage migrants cannot visit the country they eventually move to after marriage. As Straßburger and Aybek (2015: 91) argue, this leads to the risk of making a ‘wrong decision’ for migrating partners, who lack ‘a first-hand impression about the living circumstances of their fiancé(e)’, even if they receive insider information about marriage migration by their peers and relatives.

In Opoja, the long waiting period for the visa contrasts with the rather hurried marriage decisions partners of future cross-border marriages have to make in order to allow time for administrative procedures and to enhance the likelihood of being able to leave the country immediately after the wedding. Many register their marriage with Dragash’s municipal administration

at the time of their engagement, as an official marriage certificate forms the basis for family reunification applications. However, the processing of this application can take many months or more, partly due the lack of staff at the respective diplomatic mission (Grote 2017: 29). Many couples and their families wait to hold the lavish wedding ceremony and festivities until after the visa is granted, so that they can leave together shortly after their wedding. That is why many prospective marriage migrants from Opoja like Adelina start learning German with a local teacher soon after their engagement or even earlier to ensure that they are prepared to take the official German language examination at a German institution in Prishtina in order to fulfil all migration requirements before the wedding and thus have the wedding soon.

Western discourses legitimize the language requirements as ‘educational and integrational measures’ that are essential to improving the migrant’s language skills once abroad. It is assumed that marriage migrants with merely a primary education can further their education (which many would not have received otherwise) by learning a new language, thereby increasing their ability to be more self-determined after moving abroad. A compulsory language test is also presented as positive in Barbara von Trottnow’s (2010) documentary about prospective female Turkish marriage migrants enrolled in a German language course in a Turkish city. It showed that the young women developed a sense of camaraderie with other course participants and that language courses taken in the home country offer the possibility to have German grammar explained in their native language – a near impossibility abroad, where German lessons for language learners are often taught solely in German and by a German instructor.

What is neglected in such discourses, however, is fact that the requirement of a language certificate raises the bar for prospective marriage migrants. This has a number of consequences, as shown by various young Opoja villagers, such as Adelina, who complain about feeling stressed, which is similarly reported by prospective Turkish migrants in the film ‘650 Words’ by Martina Priessner (2016). This in turn negatively effects their relationships with their fiancé(e)s or spouses. Marriage migrants from rural areas are also disadvantaged because of limited opportunities to learn German. The design and quality of the language course may not prepare them as well for the official examination as the courses offered in official language schools such as the Goethe institute, which can be found only in larger towns (Straßburger and Aybek 2015). The course and examination fees, for which prospective marriage migrants often rely on family support or even on their fiancé(e) or spouse, add to the difficulties. In addition, the place that offers a private language course in one Opoja village is not accessible by public transportation (Straßburger and Aybek 2015: 84).

Such limitations and burdens tend to exacerbate gender-specific dependencies. In Opoja, women learners in particular rely on their family mem-

bers to drive them to their language classes and to the final examination at the Goethe Institute in Prishtina, as most women in Opoja do not have a driver's license. If the visa is not ready immediately after the wedding ceremony, young women have to stay with their parents-in-law or other close family members of their husband, following the patrilocal tradition, even if they would have preferred to stay with their own parents. In the cases I observed, the young women who moved in with their parents-in-law did not have a clear idea of when they would be joining their husbands, and where they would be living, which intensified their insecurity. This may also lead to a change in attitude towards marriage migration. As 23-year-old Sara put it: 'Before my engagement, I wanted to live abroad, but after the engagement I had a bad feeling.'

In general, the multiple requirements for marriage migration create undue psychological pressure and insecurities, as they cannot be met in a short time. While many prospective marriage migrants initially await marriage with excitement and happiness, the sometimes year-long waiting period leads to endless doubts and worries. Sometimes the interest of one partner (or both) wanes, so the bond is put to the test even before the wedding takes place, or before partners live together. This means that in such preparatory phases, romance often takes a backseat, and the whole idea of a cross-border marriage is put to the test.

As Western European states deem 'love marriages' as acceptable, it seems contradictory that they do not accept 'love' and 'intention' as sufficient reasons for marriage migration. Instead, 'love' is considered secondary or even torpedoed within the legal framework set up to control and channel marriage migration. The fact that partners entering a cross-border marriage are forced to consider legal and technical issues often negatively affects the emotional relations between them. Whether women can meet the requirements imposed by the immigration state often depends on the educational profile of the prospective marriage migrant as well as their financial means and family support – which inevitably has gendered dimensions. For many women who attempt to marry abroad, the bar is set higher than for men, as the requirements lead to greater insecurity and dependency on their partners and in-laws – even before moving abroad.

### REALITIES OF CROSS-BORDER MARRIAGES FOR MALE MIGRATING SPOUSES

For migrating spouses, the main challenges of married life after migration arise from multiple dependencies, especially in the beginning. Their right of residence is initially tied to marriage – and this dependency has intensified

in various Western European countries since the turn of the millennium and especially with the introduction of the EU Family Reunification Directive in 2003, whereupon various countries gradually tightened their legislation. In Germany, prior to 2011, marriage migrants had to be married for two years, and thereafter even three years, before they could apply for their residency rights independently. In Austria, the legal requirements are similar, while in the Netherlands, the probationary period was increased from three to five years in 2012 (Block and Bonjour 2013: 207). In addition to legal dependency, marriage migrants are often initially financially dependent on their spouses. Moreover, marriage migration often creates social and emotional dependencies as well. Individuals, cut off from their natal family and friends in the village, must adapt to a new linguistic, social and domestic environment in which the spouse and in-laws represent the first and sometimes only contacts. The knowledge gap between spouses regarding the multiple legal, financial, social and emotional issues of everyday life in the country of immigration can lead to strained marital relations.

However, the marital dynamics in cross-border marriages are also based on the gender-specific roles that spouses take up abroad. As Patricia R. Pessar and Sarah J. Mahler (2003: 818) describe, the reproduction or redefinition of prevailing gender relations depends on ‘their positioning within multiple hierarchies of power operative within and across many terrains.’ This also affects cross-border marriages between partners in Opoja and EU countries and relates to the social locations of the spouses and the household structure into which the migrating spouse enters, the support he or she receives from his or her spouse and in-laws, as well as education and class. It matters whether the young couple abroad has their own nuclear household or whether the marriage migrants live in the in-laws’ household, which gives the in-laws considerable influence over the marriage. In addition, it matters whether both partners are successful in the job market and are able to move up socially. In what follows, the different roles of spouses within cross-border marriages will be analysed from an intersectional perspective, taking into account gender, education, class and economics as well as the household types.

### *The Shifting Role of Relatives and Locational Gender Positionings*

Carolyn: How did your son get to Austria?

Nazmija: His bride brought him over.

The above is an excerpt from an interview with Nazmija, a middle-aged woman in Opoja, who told me that her son had gone abroad via family reunification. Although marriage migration of men from Kosovo to Germany was

more than 30 per cent in 2015 (Grote 2017: 19; see also Gutekunst 2016: 232), it is still a relatively recent phenomenon that began in the new millennium as a reaction to the restrictive border regimes of Western European states. Nazmija, by saying that her son's bride 'brought him over', indirectly implied that the local marriage patterns had been turned 'upside-down', since in Opoja grooms usually bring the bride into their father's household. For men in Opoja, marriage did not habitually involve movement or relocation (see Chapter 6). The marriage migration of men thus challenges gender relations and family norms in several ways. Although male marriage migrants rarely move into the household of the bride's parents, but establish their own household with their bride, they often live at a close distance from the bride's parents, her siblings and/or other relatives, and often receive support from them in terms of finding a job or dealing with official correspondence. At the same time, the importance of their own natal family line is diminished because of geographical distance.

Lirim and his wife have lived close to his in-laws in a large town in Germany since they moved there in the late 1990s and see them quite regularly – even spending weekends together. With Lirim's own natal family living far away, visits from them are few and far between. When their son was still small, Lirim's wife took up a cleaning job and so Lirim's mother- and sister-in-law took care of the child. This brought them closer together. When I asked Lirim how he felt about the close connection with his wife's relatives while his own family was so far away, Lirim jokingly said that he had been unsuccessful in his attempts to prevent that for years. Elaborating on this, he said that for years his brother-in-law had offered him a flat next door to his own, but he had steadfastly refused it to maintain some distance from his wife's family. He added he had not been interested in living next door and maintaining 'brotherly relations' with him, as was the case for many brothers in rural Kosovo. Instead, he made his own efforts to find an affordable rental. After many years, he finally chanced upon such a flat – without the help of his brother-in-law. However, this flat was also within walking distance to his brother-in-law's apartment, and he jokingly commented that it was his fate to live so close to his wife's family. This geographic proximity, in turn, facilitated their daily visits and collaboration.

In general, migrating men do not always welcome the 'interference' of the wife's relatives, but to some extent they also rely on their support and therefore do not have much choice but to welcome them. Within such cross-border marriages, the family members in close geographic proximity are often involved in childcare, especially when both partners work or want to resume working. Next to practical support, the cooperation and close proximity of family members of the female spouse can also have social and emotional dimensions, especially for the woman. Dafina, for instance, who

grew up in Germany and married a man from her parents' home region in Kosovo, maintains close ties with her sister, who lives in the neighbourhood, and they connect on a daily basis. This degree of cooperation among sisters is rather unusual in rural Kosovo due to the patrilocal family structures, village exogamy and the geographic distance between the villages. Historically, women in Opoja rely primarily on their sisters-in-law or parents-in-law rather than on members of their own family of origin, a practice also prevalent at the time of my fieldwork in Opoja – although women visited their natal family regularly and included them in childcare tasks. When men migrate via cross-border marriages, their wives can more easily rely on their own network of relatives, who can empower her on multiple levels in the partnership and in everyday life.

### *Redefining Partnership and Gender Roles*

Despite the support many immigrant men receive from their wives and in-laws, they often have difficulties adjusting to life in a new environment. As Charsley (2005) argues in relation to male marriage migrants from Pakistan who defy the customary patrilocality when they move to the United Kingdom to join their wives and sometimes their parents-in-law, this generates new dynamics that challenge traditional notions of partnership and masculinity. However, this often goes unnoticed in public discourses and has rarely been explored in scholarly debates and research (Lutz 2010: 1653–54; Charsley and Wray 2015: 403; Charsley and Liversage 2015).

In marriages in which the male spouse migrated for marriage, tensions can arise because the wife wields greater influence: she has deeper knowledge of the majority language, better cultural and local orientation, and, especially in the beginning, often also a higher salary. This can pose particular problems because, according to gender norms prevalent in rural Kosovo, immigrant men from Opoja may expect to assume the dominant role in the family, find a well-paid job and represent the household in public, although this often proves difficult, at least initially. Normative expectations may also leave male marriage migrants with few opportunities to voice their problems or express feelings of anxiety or despair in the translocal space of cross-border family and kinship relations – a situation Katherine Charsley (2005) similarly describes for migrating husbands from Pakistan to the United Kingdom. In what follows, I turn to a few cases that illustrate difficulties faced by men from Opoja after marriage migration and the coping strategies they employ, which in turn challenge the Western image of 'patriarchal' 'Muslim' men who seemingly only rely on strong, male-dominated family relations (Razack 2004).

Twenty-three-year-old Mendim married a woman from Opoja who had lived in Austria since she was eight years old, and he joined her there soon



thereafter. When he spoke to me about his experiences during a visit to Opoja about a year after his wedding, he confessed to me the difficulties he had had in the new environment in the beginning. The initial crisis he experienced came after the first week, when his wife returned to her job in a grocery store while he stayed at home. Finding a job then became a pressing issue for him, and he mobilized his networks of acquaintances from Opoja living in Austria to help him. He was lucky because within a few weeks a friend helped him get a job at a cleaning company about 30 km from his home. But Mendim experienced difficulties at work. He could not speak German, which limited his social contact with colleagues and made him feel insecure about the tasks he had to perform. In addition, he felt exhausted by commuting. After three months, he quit his job and registered at the employment office, through which he was able to enrol in a German language course. Soon after, he found a new job at another cleaning company in the town where he lived. Although the new job was an improvement for Mendim because of the proximity, he was unhappy that this job, where most employees were migrants like him, did not give him the opportunity to improve his German and little time to invest in continuing with a language course. He knew that this would ultimately limit his chances in the job market and make it difficult for him to advance and increase his salary; nevertheless, the most important thing for him was to have a job, even one that was poorly paid and made it difficult for him to save. Many migrants like Mendim find themselves in this limbo with no time or not the right work environment to learn the language in a way that would help them become better providers for the family, as is expected (for male marriage migrants of Turkish background in Belgium, see Timmerman (2006: 137)). For Mendim – as for many other migrants – his limited social life and lack of personal contacts posed another problem. Mendim admitted that he sometimes felt cooped up in the modern two-room apartment he inhabits with his wife on the seventh floor, with no balcony or garden, away from the rural environs of Opoja. He also missed his family and neighbours in Opoja. In other words, life abroad was not as shiny as he had expected.

A cross-border marriage is equally a challenge for the sponsoring partner, who also has to find a new role at work, in society, and with the spouse. Dafina, who grew up in Germany but whose parents are from the same region as her husband Gezim, who came to Germany in 1998, exemplifies the dual challenge. Dafina continued to work as a full-time purchase manager in a local shop after marriage, while Gezim, whose educational qualifications from Kosovo were not recognized, found work as a full-time unskilled labourer without opportunities for social advancement. Since Dafina's salary was higher, she was the main breadwinner, even after Dafina gave birth to their third child after ten years of marriage. As Gezim was still an unskilled worker, Dafina had to resume her full-time work one year after childbirth.

This also affected the family and household dynamics. She put the children into day care and asked her husband to cut back his working hours to be more involved in childcare and household responsibilities. Essentially, when she runs errands she leaves the children at home with Gezim without having to discuss the issue with him in advance or make special arrangements.

In general, most households with a marriage migrant rely on the earnings of two breadwinners to finance their nuclear family and to fulfil the expectations of family and relatives in the village. Many marriage migrants work in low-paying sectors because they either lack the education (beyond the obligatory nine years of school) or because their degrees or professional qualifications are not recognized, meaning some experience downward mobility in the labour market. As with many cross-border marriage migrants (Charsley 2005: 393; Timmerman 2006; Liversage 2012), their partners often earn a higher salary – sometimes even years after the spouse has moved abroad. This affects gender roles. While the wife is the main breadwinner in the household, male marriage migrants are substantially involved in childcare and housework, which is different from the responsibilities of most married men in Opoja.

The shift in gender roles and the power relations and agency within a partnership can, however, become a conflictive issue and affect the self-esteem of the male spouse. When I visited Dafina, she complained that she always had to show initiative and commitment in their partnership, while her husband took a passive stance. In an effort to improve Gezim's financial situation, Dafina had encouraged him to speak up to his boss and demand more money, but her husband was too intimidated to do so. Dafina planned to speak to his boss on his behalf to give him 'a push'. It was questionable, however, to what extent this would further Gezim's position with his boss, and possibly also in the marriage. In other cases, tensions between spouses intensify because the husband cannot find suitable employment or couples have difficulties defining the partnership and household roles satisfactorily. Instead of taking care of the household and children, some men spend time with other migrants in cafés and clubs, although their wives have full-time jobs.

Not all marriage migrants seek or receive support from the Opoja networks or other migrants. Katharine Charsley and Marta Bolognani (2016) found that newly arriving male marriage migrants from Pakistan to Great Britain are downgraded and stigmatized within the migrant community for being 'under the thumb' of their wives and in-laws. Largely owing to their difficult economic and legal status within the receiving country, which pushes them into a subordinate position in society as well as in their marriage, migrating husbands may be unable to fulfil their gendered role expectations. The lack of cultural capital in the receiving society, whether in the form of language skills or cultural knowledge, further exacerbates this

situation. Yet, these liminal positions 'brought about through their specific migratory experiences' (Charsley and Liversage 2015: 501) remain largely invisible – not least because male marriage migrants remain marginal both in their own communities and in society. This marginalization and silencing are also reasons why widespread culturalized assumptions about 'patriarchal' (Muslim) male immigrants from non-Western (European) countries persist among the majority population (Brubaker 2013).

Not just abroad in the receiving society but also in the home context of Opoja these new arrangements within the partnerships and households of cross-border couples remain largely invisible. This is largely the case because marriage migrants and their spouses tend to adopt customary gender roles when visiting their home region. Thus, 'returning' to the home region in the summer months often primarily entails staying with the parents and brothers of the male spouse (see Chapter 4). Women also pay a longer visit to their natal family with the children, but the husband then stays only briefly and returns soon after to his own family. Particularly within the husband's family women try to conform to Opoja's traditional gender norms and role models: they show respect and obedience to the husband's parents, do not go out in the street alone, and above all avoid any kind of behaviour that could cause gossip among the villagers. In addition, to fulfil their ceremonial role during weddings in Opoja, many bring their white wedding dress as well as the 'traditional' one, consisting of a *dimia* with the *dallama* or *jelek*, which they received at their own wedding (see Chapter 6).

There are, however, some women who behave differently, or at least express their discomfort about staying with the husband's family in Opoja and having to conform to customary gender roles. Drita, for example, admitted that she does not like dressing like a local bride with the *dallama* or *jelek*. Dafina, who grew up in Germany and had not visited the home region of her parents and her husband for two years, said she was 'the German' in her husband's family and was blamed for her children conversing in German and not speaking fluent Albanian. She felt like a stranger and was therefore not sure if she would spend the family vacation in Kosovo again.

In general, gender relations shift enormously in partnerships of male marriage migrants, leading in part to the disempowerment of men. However, it is in the translocal setting, in the migration context and in the Opoja region, that these new roles receive little attention, while traditional gender relations, which are partly only superficially maintained, continue to remain in the spotlight.

### *Education as a Way to Redefine Partnership Relations*

In other cases, the subordinate position of immigrant husbands is only temporary, especially when it comes to university graduates or those who pur-

sue higher education abroad to improve their chances of landing a better job in the receiving country. Again, women like Drita are central to their husband's career advancement, providing mental, practical and financial support. Drita came to Germany at the age of twelve and worked hard to overcome various legal and social obstacles to complete her vocational training at a bank. Her husband Alban, who had recently graduated from the university in Prishtina and had migrated after marriage, complemented her own ambitions and hopes for social advancement when he decided to pursue higher studies in Germany, which she willingly financed. Their roles again shifted when Alban found a well-paying job after graduation. Once he became the main breadwinner, they decided to have their first child, and Drita took three years off for childcare.

In a way, Drita and Alban began to follow a rather conservative family and partnership model that can also be found in middle-class Austrian and German families. In the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, until the 1970s there was the so-called housewife marriage, in which the livelihood for a nuclear family was secured entirely or predominantly by the husband's gainful employment, and in return the wife took over the housework and family chores. In today's Germany, married women with children still take over most of the childcare, especially when the children are still small, and contribute on average less than a quarter of the household income (OECD 2017). This also means that many married women are economically dependent on their spouses.

In short, by pursuing higher education and better employment, male marriage migrants may contribute to the continuation of a family model that is still widespread in middle-class families in Austria and Germany. On the other hand, in cases where the immigrating male spouse earns only the minimum wage, women remain the primary breadwinners, even years after marriage, as in the case of Dafina, whose partner also took on a larger share of childcare. It can thus be said that the latter have a more emancipated partnership. This arrangement, however, often remains invisible, not least because these couples do not manage to move up socially. They also do not necessarily consider themselves emancipated and 'modern', because they fall victim to social pressures and marginalization in Opoja and in European Union countries.

In partnerships in which male marriage migrants manage to find a better job with good prospects, the roles in the partnership and towards other family members are not necessarily uniform. Drita still helps her husband fill out forms and takes care of the logistical details within the household. She was accustomed to translating for her parents and was already involved in all administrative tasks within the parental household. She also supports her younger sister financially to enable her to study. Women like Drita have multiple caretaking tasks and use their own finances, education, initiative

and assertiveness to support the social advancement of their nuclear family and other family members, including female ones.

Social advancement is sometimes accompanied by social boundary drawing from other migrants from Opoja and Kosovo who have remained in the lower social class. Because a so-called ethnic underclass has emerged within the German or Western labour market and society that is often subject to negative stereotypes (Esser 2001; Glick Schiller 2014), upwardly mobile migrants sometimes actively distance themselves from their compatriots. As Drita and her husband remarked to me, they rarely socialize with other migrants from Opoja, who, as they put it, have not 'moved up socially' in the context of immigration despite having immigrated long before them. However, by labelling Kosovo Albanian and translocal Opoja communities as 'backward', it creates boundaries that hinder migrants' integration and social advancement in Western European societies. What remains invisible is the fact that Kosovo Albanians occupy different social positions along gender and class that are often anything but clear-cut or traditional.

### REALITIES OF CROSS-BORDER MARRIAGES FOR FEMALE MIGRATING SPOUSES

Cross-border marriages in which women from Opoja move to be with their husbands in EU countries are much more in line with customary notions of patri- or at least virilocal marriages in Opoja, and traditional gender relations are less challenged (see Chapter 1). Although prospective female marriage migrants often dream of working abroad, they do not expect to find employment right away. For the most part, they take on household and childcare tasks, thus also meeting the expectations of their husbands and in-laws. However, as mentioned, these partnership roles are not limited to Kosovar cross-border marriages or cross-border marriages in general where women migrate (Timmerman 2006: 137; Charsley et al. 2016) but can often be found in middle-class households in Germany and other Western European countries; such arrangements, however, are often ethnicized, culturalized and devalued in majority society discourses. The very small number of migrant women from Opoja who wear the headscarf (*havale*) as a sign of their Muslim identity or religiosity additionally run the risk of being stigmatized in the immigration country – as the 'oppressed Muslim women' from 'non-modern, patriarchal families' (Shoorman 2011). The fact that these discourses thus create their own forms of victimization and oppression often remains unconsidered (Abu-Lughod 1990; see also Spivak 1988; Razack 2004; Strasser 2008).

In the context of cross-border marriages, women from Opoja who assume domestic responsibilities abroad do not necessarily feel disempowered because of the childcare and the emotional care they provide and the housework they perform. In return, they also receive recognition from their husbands and family members. Several Opoja men in Germany or Austria married to an Opoja woman emphasized that their well-functioning partnership is based on clearly defined, complementary roles that create mutual rather than one-sided dependencies. Nderim, who went abroad as a teenager, said that most men from Opoja would be quite lost without their wives, as the woman runs the household. He added that many wives, who are responsible for the household and raising the children, have the decision-making power at home, as husbands do not assume these vital responsibilities, and usually do not interfere in them. He went on to say that his wife always decided what their daughter could wear, and she also managed the household budget and made most spending decisions. As Werner Schiffauer (1991: 196–225) noted for Turkish migrant woman in Germany in the 1980s, women who developed an attachment to Islam in the migration context were able to claim moral authority that they could pass on to their children and that strengthened their position within the family. This was also the case with some female migrants from Opoja, who began to become more religious abroad.

At the same time, I met several male migrants married to a woman from their home region who tried to refute the Western hegemonic stereotype that views men with a migration background as ‘patriarchal’. They said they did not go out with friends during the week but returned home after work and prioritized family affairs and family commitments while on weekends they did the weekly groceries and visited relatives and friends together with their wives. Several female marriage migrants I met from Opoja also contribute significantly to the family income, especially where their husbands’ income does not cover the basic household and family expenses. They take up low-wage jobs soon after their arrival – for instance, as cleaners in private households, often with precarious work contracts – regardless of whether they arrive as labour migrants or family migrants (Morokvasic 1987). That way, they gain more power within their own nuclear family and a higher social status in Opoja, as they can support their relatives there. This in turn has implications for gender roles and perceptions across borders (see Chapter 4).

Some female marriage migrants receive considerable support from their husbands, their in-laws and extended relatives to get acquainted with the new living conditions. Being integrated into a close network of family and kinship relations can help them feel at home more easily (Straßburger 2001). Husbands and the in-laws might also encourage them to attend language courses, take up employment or pursue higher education: by offering a ride,

assuming childcare or financing their education. As Block (2014: 5) outlines, various scholars (e.g. Strik, de Hart and Nissen 2013) have shown that

family migrants integrate into host societies better than other migrants since they can make use of the established networks and support, that is, the social capital, of their sponsors. Furthermore, it has been argued that if sponsors themselves are recent migrants, being joined by their family members rather than being socially isolated is likely to enhance their capacity for integration in the host country.

Young migrant women who came via marriage often share the household with their in-laws, and sometimes that includes their unmarried sisters- and brothers-in-law, or a married brother- and sister-in-law with their respective partners and children. In such complex household constellations, the relations of wives to their in-laws and especially to the mother-in-law (among the female members) gain in importance, as women spend a significant amount of time at home and divide the housework among themselves. However, the quality of relationships between marriage migrants and their in-laws varies.

Despite the support women receive from their in-laws, their relations to them can become a burden, as some reported, owing to unending family obligations in the joint household, with barely any time or space for other things. The husband and/or in-laws sometimes also restrict their movements, employment prospects and the possibility of attending language courses, even when solicited by official bodies as a requirement for gaining citizenship rights. Under such circumstances, the realities faced by female marriage migrants from Opoja differ in part from their expectations of life abroad. Twenty-one-year-old Sara hoped to have a better life and more freedom abroad when she married a young migrant who had come to Germany some years earlier with his mother and brother through his father's sponsorship as part of family reunification. However, her mother-in-law restricted Sara's movements and did not allow her to attend a German language course or take up a job. Although Sara had a work permit and was keen to work, she was relegated to household tasks. Additionally, Sara's mother-in-law expected her to wear clothes she considered old-fashioned. Trying to find explanations for this behaviour, Sara said that her mother-in-law had never adapted to life in Austria. She barely knew German and had almost no contact with German-speaking neighbours. Having lived most of her life in Opoja, she had joined her husband, who had lived in Austria for decades, only as an elderly woman. Therefore, she showed no understanding of Sara's ambition to educate herself abroad or her desire to go out.

Mendita, an excellent student from Opoja hoping to study medicine in Germany, was also disappointed with her life abroad. Her parents-in-law did not allow her to attend university courses or even a German course. Instead, they expected her to do the housework for the numerous family members

and take care of the children of her working sisters-in-law. Since her husband spent little time at home, their relationship became strained.

As these two cases show, the difficulties in these cross-border marriages are often related to struggles and conflicts concerning different hopes, perceptions and realities of gender and partnership roles that oscillate between patriarchal and gender equalitarian norms and practices. These roles are defined by the couple, the in-laws and the wider circle of relatives and acquaintances in the translocal network. They also have an intergenerational dimension, as in-laws can have a critical influence on the roles of young female marriage migrants. Some in-laws assign a more subordinate role to marriage migrant women from Opoja than to their own daughters or daughters-in-law who were socialized in the country of immigration. Within these intergenerational family networks, therefore, gender roles are not always uniform – even within the same household, and role assignments sometimes differ along the axes of location and education.

## DIVORCES IN CROSS-BORDER MARRIAGES

Whether and how unhappy marriages are dissolved and what the consequences are differ significantly, with gender and location being important distinguishing criteria. The phenomenon of male marriage migrants returning to Opoja because of a failed marriage was not talked about in Opoja, although problems between partners and with in-laws certainly occur in some of these marriages. It can thus be assumed that men from Opoja who migrated through marriage are reluctant to dissolve their marriages, especially if their right of residence is at stake. As marriage migrants in Germany and Austria must be married for at least three years in order to be granted residence rights independent from the spouse, the existing laws prevent marriage migrants from seeking a divorce.

Although the prospect of having to return to Kosovo and the parental household in Opoja after a divorce is real for both male and female marriage migrants, it is particularly difficult for women to bear. They are then largely dependent on their parents and have little say in shaping their future. Moreover, divorced women are pitied and looked down upon in the village community, and the social shame of divorce extends to the entire family. Most women are therefore reluctant to seek a divorce, even in the case of unhappy marriages.

Blerta had moved to Germany after her marriage and lived with her husband and his parents in Munich, but her husband ended the marriage after a year. She then returned to her parents' home in Opoja. The divorce was essentially a family matter, negotiated between the two families without her



direct involvement. At the same time, it became a village matter, as villagers in Opoja made many assumptions about the failure of the marriage. For some older men, it was clear that Blerta must have been the reason. The fact that the husband's family had spent at least 20,000 euros on the wedding was a sign to them of their sincere interest in the success of the marriage.

Younger women in particular, however, underscored Blerta's role as a victim but also recognized her agency. They said Blerta wanted the divorce because her mother-in-law had disliked her, and her husband had not stood up for her. Whichever version is closer to the truth, it is clear that Blerta suffered the most from the situation. The gossip in the village negatively affected her reputation as well as that of the entire family, which added to Blerta's suffering. In addition, it weighed heavily on her that her dreams for the future were destroyed. Despite the bad experiences she had had in her marriage, many villagers saw that her only option was to remarry sooner rather than later, even if Blerta was not interested in doing so. One of Blerta's friends said the following about her situation: 'As soon as they are legally divorced, she can take back her name. Then she can look for another man.' Having finished school at sixteen, her family did not support her plans to resume her education, which is what she preferred to do. Unable to do much except visit her close friends and relatives, Blerta spent a lot of time on Facebook and other social media, as the digital world provided her with the outlet she desperately needed.

Especially in the first few months after being sent home again she eagerly thought about going abroad but not through marriage. Since Blerta still had a valid visa for Germany, she weighed the option of working abroad and standing on her own two feet. She said: 'The mentality is very different abroad. But if I had the possibility to go and live abroad, I would do it, without my husband. Here people always say something bad about me, and then I feel really bad.' However, her parents did not support her plans, as they did not want to send Blerta abroad on her own, without the 'protection' of marriage or family members.

Another case is that of Florentina, a young woman from Opoja who married a migrant from Kosovo who had lived with his parents near Florentina's parents and brothers in Austria. By the time her parents brought her brothers to Austria, she was already too old for the family reunification scheme. Therefore, she had stayed with her aunt and uncle in Opoja, where she completed her vocational training. When her parents received the marriage proposal of the Kosovo migrant living near to their own place and informed Florentina, she agreed not least because this would bring her closer to her family.

After marriage, Florentina moved to Austria to live with her husband and his parents. However, married life became increasingly difficult, as she felt

confined and unwanted in the household. After a year and a half, Florentina decided to leave her husband and find shelter at her parents' place in Austria, where she received the necessary emotional, financial and hands-on family support she needed to build up a life abroad independent of her husband. Her parents engaged a lawyer to fight for her right to stay in Austria and paid for her living expenses and health insurance payments. Nevertheless, the court proceedings lasted several years, leaving Florentina uncertain about her future. This also had serious consequences for her social relations in Opoja and weakened the translocal family ties, as Florentina was unable to travel to Opoja due the unresolved legal status, even for her brother's wedding. Ultimately, however, she prevailed, and she continued her professional training in Austria, and thanks to the support of her parents, she settled her residency rights. The fact that Florentina was able to continue living in Austria and did not have to return to Kosovo underpinned her decision to divorce.

The two quite different cases show why women who feel trapped in marriage are reluctant to leave, especially if it means losing their agency or having to return to rural Kosovo. In rural Kosovo, divorced women are dependent on the support of their family of origin and often the only option is to move into a new form of dependency by marrying another man, often divorced or widowed, who will then provide the income. Those who will be provided with the means to stay abroad can somewhat more easily take the risk of initiating divorce if it becomes necessary. In this regard, the support of family members or acquaintances who can provide physical and emotional support, help with obtaining a legal right to stay, and also provide support with completing an education and obtaining a profession that makes them less financially dependent on their husband is of central importance.

## CONCLUSION

While various young women and men from Opoja see cross-border marriages as a start to a better future for themselves and their families, the difficulties in realizing their hopes represent the other side of the coin. The restrictive legal framework for marriage migration in EU receiving countries poses a barrier to marriage migrants from non-EU countries. At the same time, as this chapter shows, it also challenges established gender and family relations in different geographic locations and paves the way for non-traditional positionings.

This is especially the case in translocal marriages where the male partner migrates abroad to join his wife, contrary to the patrilocal tradition. While according to widespread gender norms migrating men are expected to become the primary breadwinners, men migrating through marriage depend

on their sponsoring wife and her family long after migration. Sometimes, 'traditional' gender relations are reversed, with women becoming the primary breadwinners and men taking on a large share of childcare. In some cases, this leads to marital conflict. In Opoja, these constellations remain largely unnoticed, not least because the couples often disguise these relations during visits to Opoja.

In some cases, such partnership models are a temporary solution, as men manage to achieve the desired level of upward mobility and assume the role of the main breadwinner for their nuclear family with the support of their wife and often also their in-laws. In this case, the partnership reverts back to the more conservative model, especially when the wife takes over most of the childcare and housework. However, this partnership model is not only a tradition in rural Kosovo but also in immigrant countries such as Germany and Austria. Upwardly mobile couples are also more likely to compare themselves with couples from the majority population. Upward mobility partly means, at the same time, that these migrants distinguish themselves from migrants from the lower classes – sometimes this includes those who came much earlier and who belong to another generation of migrants in the receiving society – who they partly view as backward and patriarchal. Migrants therefore contribute in part to the perpetuation of negative stereotypes against migrants by engaging in these discourses.

Women who migrate after marriage also face ambivalent choices. On the one hand, such marriages can generate material betterment as well as status and power. In nuclear households abroad, they often assume the main responsibility for the household and childcare and can thus gain considerable influence over their husbands and children. Gainful employment enables them to attain a new status and offers greater financial security to their nuclear family and their family members in Opoja. Emancipation in this context means not only independence and an increase in freedom or equality vis-à-vis one's partner and other family members but also a deeper integration into the family structure and a stronger role within the family. In some cases, husbands push their wives to learn the language, take up employment and pursue higher education. They see this as a gain and desire an emancipated partnership. In other cases, however, the expectations women have before migrating fail to materialize. Women are instead subjected to constraint and conflict with partners and in-laws, which they have to endure due to dependencies and a lack of alternatives.

The husband's family plays a critical role in determining the roles available to female marriage migrants. They can help her settle into the new environment, perhaps even support her career goals by providing childcare and offering a new home and emotional support. However, the husband's family can also become a source of conflict and obstruct good spousal relations.

Mothers-in-law who impose 'patriarchal' gender roles have a very strong influence on female marriage migrants when living in the same household.

The consequences of a failed cross-border marriage are manifold. While for male marriage migrants and their families of origin a divorce leads primarily to financial losses, for female marriage migrants and their families of origin it means a loss of status and honour. Moreover, future opportunities for divorced women in rural Kosovo are minimal. They often have no choice but to remarry sooner or later and become newly dependent. The fact that female marriage migrants in particular – but also men – are to some extent socially isolated in the migration context contributes to their difficult situation, not least because they rely on support to improve their position inside or outside marriage. While family members can be a source of conflict and limitation, especially for female marriage migrants, they can also play a supportive role in helping them resolve marital problems or find an alternative future. In this case, the family again functions as a safety net and a source of care. This is especially promising when these family members live in a migration context.

## CONCLUSION

### *Translocal Family Care*



In the autumn of 2021, I visited the family with whom I had stayed during my field research; I had not visited for some time. As is customary in Opoja, I first inquired about the well-being of individual family members, and we talked about how quickly the children were growing up. Children best show how time passes and how relationships change in families and between genders and generations. At the beginning of my fieldwork in Opoja in 2011, the oldest child of my hosts was in primary school and had eagerly explained the customs of the region to me. Now she was a young adult and had enrolled at the University of Prishtina to become a professional caretaker. One of the younger children, who was not attending school at the time of my fieldwork, was now able to communicate excellently in English, thanks largely to young volunteers from an American Peace Corps who had stayed in Opoja for a few years and taught the children. Like her sister, she too wanted to study and become a physical therapist or even a doctor. Both envisioned possibly working in Germany. This indicates not only that migration still plays an important role but also that young women envision migrating for education and work and not just through marriage, and that gender relations have once again changed significantly and become more liberalized and emancipated.

Since the end of my fieldwork, a lot had changed in my host family, and one of the biggest changes concerned the construction of three new houses, which they had started in 2013 in a joint effort on the outskirts of the village – far away from the densely populated *mahalla* in the village centre. By 2020, two of the houses were completed, which then led to the separation of the joint household, the *familia e madhe*, which at the time included a total of fourteen members. The older couple had moved with the younger son and his family into the house that was completed first, and the eldest son and his wife and their children moved into the second, almost identical house a

little later. A smaller house was intended for the youngest son, Jetmir, who had spent most of the last fifteen years abroad and only occasionally visited for short periods. Nevertheless, the houses of the three brothers were in close proximity to each other, symbolizing a close bond between the family members.

Jetmir had lived in Germany for years and had had only limited residence rights. In 2016, he was granted a work visa on the basis of an employment contract, which became possible after Germany enacted the Western Balkans Agreement in 2016, which allowed labour migration even without recognized educational qualifications from Western Balkan countries – a step taken after asylum applications from these countries had increased enormously in early 2015, mainly for economic reasons. The new agreement was intended to reduce hopeless asylum migration and redirect it into migration that could be utilized in the German labour market. After an initial period, migrant workers could also apply for family reunification, and Jetmir fortunately succeeded in this and his wife was able to join him.

Other villagers and immigrants had also built new houses in Opoja, often very impressive in size and shape, making the village look quite rich. However, many of the houses were empty most of the time, as many owners lived abroad. In fact, not only Jetmir but also other young and not so young men in the *mahalla* had gone abroad on the basis of the Western Balkans Agreement or family reunification. In 2016 and 2017, pictures of passport pages with the visa stamp were posted on Facebook, one of which received more than 200 congratulations and ‘bon voyage’ greetings, as a visa represents new hopes for a better life and as such is celebrated in the village. Hoping to reunite with their husbands, young women whose partners had travelled abroad on work visas enrolled in a German language course in one of the neighbouring villages to take the qualifying examination for family reunification, and due to high demand, more language schools were opened in the region. In 2021, several women and their children had already moved abroad to join their partners and in 2022, I heard for the first time that women were also moving abroad on the basis of a work visa to take up professional care work, which is in high demand in Germany, and that their husbands were waiting to follow on the basis of family reunification. Here the gendered migration paths had reversed.

Still others – young men and women as well as entire families – had opted for internal migration. My host’s cousin, for example, had decided to lock up his house in the village and move with his wife and his sons to Prishtina, where they owned an apartment, which again resulted from labour migration: in socialist times, his father had worked in Belgrade and acquired ownership rights to an apartment there, which they then exchanged with an apartment owned by Serbs in Prishtina after the war ended, when Serbs

were leaving Kosovo in large numbers. Years after the Kosovo war, the family had barely been able to make a living in the village, and they hoped that they would find better opportunities than in Opoja to earn a living.

Reflecting on the news from my acquaintances in Opoja, it became clear that migration – and especially international migration – remains the most important path individuals and families in Opoja pursue to build a life and create social security. The importance of migration and the strategies that people from rural Kosovo come up with to go abroad are closely linked to local, global and national dynamics. Kosovo's high unemployment rate, especially among young people and in rural areas such as Opoja, and low and insecure wages make people even more dependent on migration, and many villagers want to emigrate, or expect their children to do so. The desire for international migration is fuelled not only by the many relatives and acquaintances living abroad who share their migration experiences within the translocal community and often paint an overtly positive picture, but also by media and virtual social networks that enable villagers to create spaces in which they can defy local hierarchies and norms and imagine an alternative future abroad.

People's plans and strategies were closely linked to the EU migration regime, which restricts the cross-border influx of 'undesirable' third-country nationals into the EU and which limited migration for many years mainly to family reunification. Starting in 2016, the Western Balkans Agreement created new opportunities for people to work in the German labour market, and those who have found work – often with the help of family members abroad – then often bring over their spouse and children on the basis of family reunification. This has led to a doubling of family reunification figures from 3766 persons in 2014 to 7806 persons in 2019 (BMBF 2021). As a result, the number of emigrants from Kosovo has increased in recent years. In Opoja, this is particularly noticeable in the local school, where the number of pupils halved between 2011 and 2022. The ongoing outmigration of young people and whole families poses new challenges for the local community, the family and family social security, so the impact of the Western Balkans Agreement on living conditions in Kosovo and on families abroad, as well as on translocal family relations would need to be further explored.

This study focused on the existing links between a locality in rural Kosovo, migration and the family after the war in 1999, but before the Western Balkan Agreement came into force in 2016, while considering the historical development of family-based care across state borders. It examined the reconfiguration of a fragile yet highly adaptable family network, especially in terms of care provided within it, and shed light on the opportunities but also the challenges of relationships between dispersed family and kin members living in different countries in Europe, who continue to link to Opoja,

a region in Southern Kosovo. In contrast to a narrow conceptualization of care that is mainly understood as practical or hands-on and aimed at the elderly and children, and as such is unidirectional and assumes a common locality, this study worked with a comprehensive concept of care in a trans-local setting. It explored not only hands-on care but also the financial dimensions of care in an entangled perspective, taking notice of the fact that the outmigration of family members can create a gap of hands-on care in the local community, while it provides financial resources. Rather than reducing caregiving to specific forms and norms that are often Western-oriented and highly compartmentalized, this study aimed to provide a more holistic perspective and highlight what is relevant to villagers and their relatives across borders. Thus, it forced us to rethink family care by considering a translocal framework that includes cross-border relationships, and by including a variety of often unconsidered forms of care that may take on a special significance when other care practices are lacking. In addition, the study focused on the family and the specific family relations related to caregiving. Rather than taking for granted the patriarchal family relationships that are traditional in rural Kosovo and relating family caregiving patterns to patriarchal family norms, a close look was taken at these relationships to identify where gender and generation play a role and how these relationships change.

The translocal ethnography pursued here has helped in the development of a nuanced and in-depth understanding of the impact of neoliberal times and European border regimes on the living conditions of families in rural Kosovo, as well as the transformation of migration strategies and the kind of care provided within the family and across state borders. By exploring the links between the family, migration and care, the study linked micro-processes to larger societal processes that frame translocal families and impact on the relations between family members. At the same time, the study focused on the strategies of families and their individual members across borders. As Alison Shaw (2000: 17) noted in the context of migrants from Pakistan entering the UK, the more the EU restricts the entry of non-EU citizens, the more important the family becomes in migration issues. This is especially true in regions such as Kosovo, where the state provides very little social security and unemployment is high. Over time, Opoja translocal families not only followed a 'migration culture' in order to provide remittances for the families at home, but also developed a kind of 'migration autonomy' through a mix of conventional and innovative solutions to support relatives in the migration project – by financing the journey and/or helping them to obtain information, housing or access to work abroad.

Migration within family networks is determined not only by economic motives but by a variety of family and gender norms and considerations. While certain values and practices upheld in the region can be classified as



patriarchal and are often seen as customary in this region, they are also rapidly changing – but not necessarily in a linear direction. They include simultaneous – and seemingly contradictory – processes of individualization and support of family unity, (re-)patriarchalization and emancipation, as well as modernization and (re-)traditionalization.

Within the framework of translocality, the study delineated the interaction of individuals living in different locations across borders and connected within a family and kinship network. Along the intersecting categories of gender and generation, and with reference to education and legal and marital status, it underscored the agency of individuals in their embeddedness in different and sometimes contradictory power geometries. This also allowed us to rethink central assumptions underlying hegemonic discourses that divide Europe not only geographically, economically and politically but also culturally as ‘progressive’, ‘modern’ and ‘emancipated’ on the one hand and ‘backward’, ‘regressive’ and ‘patriarchal’ on the other.

The study showed that within the cross-border kinship and family relations, the Opoja region takes on a special significance and has remained the centre of translocal family and kinship care, despite women and children having migrated in greater numbers since the 1990s, following their husbands and fathers. Translocality is, however, not a given fact but needs to be reinforced. Migrants’ ties to their relatives in the home region in Kosovo are maintained through support, routines, rituals and material manifestations. These include the regular migrant visits that enliven the villages in the summer, as well as the lavish wedding celebrations and the construction of large and modern houses by migrants in the region. Translocality is also based, in part, on the maintenance or restoration of bi-local or patrilocal households and, in particular, on the care expressed in these relationships.

In fact, despite the outmigration of (some) family members, many migrants do not simply stop caring for family members and relatives ‘back home’. One can even state that with outmigration, many male migrants start to financially support their parents and sometimes their brothers in Opoja, and continue this often over a long period of time. They do this in part because they grew up together with them and often lived with them in the same household after they married, forming close relationships that have endured across borders. In this way, they also conform to the family and gender expectations arising from patrilocal and patrilineal norms that apply within the village *rrethi*. This contributes to social cohesion and family unity across borders, as well as the maintenance of the village communities in Opoja.

The legal status of migrants also affects translocal family relationships with relatives ‘back home’ – but not always unambiguously. Migrants with uncertain or, in some cases, no legal status abroad often show a high willingness to stay in touch and send remittances to their families back home because they

face the prospect of being sent back by state authorities. However, migrants without a work permit also face enormous difficulties in finding steady work and thus struggle with sending regular amounts of money home and getting to a position where they can have other family members – whether spouses or children – join them. In addition, they are often unable to visit family in Opoja because they cannot easily cross state borders without the necessary documents. This can lead to alienation from family members ‘back home’ and an inability or unwillingness to send remittances. On the other hand, secure residency abroad, or even higher education, does not necessarily reduce or weaken the commitment of migrants to family members ‘back home’ in providing translocal care. Rather, a secure base abroad is seen as an advantage, and migrants sometimes even invest more in translocal family networks or might even think of opening a business in Opoja.

Nevertheless, financial support from migrants living abroad to their relatives in Opoja is often temporary. Rather than seeing this as a clear sign of reduced cross-border family support, this study showed that it is important to view support within the migrant’s life course as well as the family and household cycle, and to view financial support in the context of other support as well. Migrants may stop financially supporting the brother and his family as soon as they approach a son’s marriage, as the latter is a major investment. Families in Opoja then find themselves forced to send an additional family member abroad to financially support the household. However, they often resort to the help of other relatives abroad. Migrant family members provide not only the necessary financial support to relatives and family in Opoja – for example, to finance household expenses or the education of individual household members – but also practical support in terms of help with important contacts – among others to employers – for those who want to migrate or have migrated abroad. This means that we need to look at different forms of care, taking place in two or more places, across borders, that can be vital for families in Opoja, but that are often ignored by social scientists who either focus on a special form of care – be it remittances or hands-on care – only or on one locality. In addition, we need to consider the particular mix of care relationships, including on a temporal basis. As shown in this book, migrants’ care relationships with their relatives back home did not necessarily deteriorate after the Kosovo war in 1999 but rather diversified and changed.

Moreover, care provided in cross-border family networks is also not unidirectional. While migrants’ care for villagers is often emphasized in migration studies, the care described in this study also shows villagers’ care towards family members abroad – although it is not always balanced. For example, they stay in touch with migrants abroad via Skype or other social media and sometimes send them home-cooked meals as a sign of emotional connection and caring. Most importantly, they give them a special status when they

come to visit Opoja, rewarding the care they have received from them. This suggests that care provided by migrants to relatives at home is not purely altruistic or a 'free gift' but that migrants also gain something in return when providing care, and might have a self-interest in it. When migrants feel that their care is not recognized, relationships can become strained.

An important focus of this study was to explore the gendered dimensions of translocal family organization and family care. Within translocal families described here, gender relations are far from clear-cut but rather ambivalent and sometimes even contradictory. Families in rural Kosovo historically had a patriarchal family structure, following the principle of patrilineality and patrilocality based on seniority, male inheritance and equality among brothers, with clearly defined gender roles in the household. Newly married women were not only excluded from property and inheritance but often had less of a say until they became mothers and (in-)laws and had authority over their children and children-in-law. According to Janet Reineck (1991), male labour migration, which was widespread in the 1970s and 1980s, perpetuated the patriarchal pattern of families in joint household structures. With the outmigration of women and children, which accelerated in the 1990s, the roles of individual family members in the newly formed households abroad shifted. In some cases, men have become more involved in the household and women have become (secondary or primary) breadwinners.

By analysing the shifting migration patterns from a historically informed perspective, the study showed that also cross-border care relations among family and kin members are shifting. Various (male) migrants support not only their brothers' but also their sisters' or nieces' university education, and thus enable their social advancement and help them to step out of patriarchal gender roles. Increasingly, women who have migrated also tend to send remittances to family members in Opoja but in a more selective manner and often to members of their own family of origin, be they parents, brothers or sisters. This has contributed to a shift in caregiving and gender relations and has increased the social standing of these women in the translocal community. However, the outmigration of women has challenged local gender roles from another perspective. Since daughters-in-law traditionally provided hands-on care for the elderly, their migration has created a gap in elderly care in Opoja. In this situation, parents sometimes rely on their biological daughters when they need care, while in other cases parents go to their son abroad. These dynamics, therefore, challenge the long-practised gendered concepts of care and their link to patrilocality and patrilineality.

In order to maintain a translocal family culture that connects family members living abroad to Opoja, the symbolic and material levels are particularly important, as they help to restore translocality and renew family ties that provide the basis for family care. At the symbolic and material levels, the

dynamic tension between what is seen as modern and traditional, patrilocal and emancipated, individual and collective, as well as Western and local is particularly pronounced. In exploring the translocal family networks linking Opoja to EU countries, my study has paid particular attention to the house building projects of migrants back home in Opoja. After the end of the war in 1999, after a decade of conflict in which investments were put on hold, housing projects experienced a new boom, and many of these houses were built and are still being built by migrants who emigrated several years or decades ago and have resettled their families abroad. The construction of houses in the village reflects the migrants' sense of belonging and emotional attachment to their home region, as well as their wish to materialize this. The houses signal their plans for a return and thus represent a vision of their personal and family future in the region – they are a 'local anchorage', as Janine Dahinden (2010: 53) puts it. As much as houses connect migrants to their 'roots', they also create connections to the migrants' destination country. They are often built with 'Western' architectural details and interiors and thus also transform the appearance of the village and serve as signifiers of 'modernity' and 'progress'.

A village house is also a material expression of the household and the family – it is the family built in stone and an important means of creating relatedness. Many migrants invest in multistory houses designed to provide enough living space for several nuclear families, more specifically the families of brothers and/or sons. Such houses are built primarily in the home villages of the male spouse (rather than the female spouse) in Opoja, and in close proximity to relatives, and are often also built for the next generation and especially for the son(s). Their location and design make them a material expression of patrilocal, agnatic kinship solidarity and care. A series of similarly designed houses, usually found on the outskirts of villages in Opoja as well as in other rural areas of Kosovo, represent icons of 'equality' and solidarity among brothers.

However, this material expression of equality and unity is often only a shell, as brothers commonly will have established their own nuclear households, and day-to-day support among them may even be lacking. More generally, investing in a house in the village can also give rise to various forms of antagonisms – critical views and lines of differentiation – that impact the life of migrants and the community and family life in Opoja. Houses may, for example, signal a lack of solidarity or even represent a boundary between the migrants and their relatives in Opoja – especially if they are larger and more fashionably designed than the houses of their brothers living permanently in Opoja, who cannot afford such houses. Many houses built by migrants for their nuclear family are empty most of the year and thus do not always represent a bridge to relatives at home. Furthermore, conflict can also arise

within the migrant family over the construction of the house. The fact that investing in a house 'back home' often also means that the migrants have to save up or repay a mortgage – a practice that affects everyday life abroad – is not always supported by the migrants' children. The fact that many migrants build a house within the village of the male spouse and in close proximity to his relatives can also create tensions within the partnership.

Equally central to the ritualization and re-creation of the translocal family and kinship relations in Opoja are wedding celebrations. Like house building, they express the symbolic level of family and kinship relations that extends to different places within the EU and beyond and actively participate in rooting the kinship network. Weddings are also an occasion where the smaller family circle (where the translocal care relations are mainly expressed) expands to the larger kinship circle. Celebrated with hundreds of guests, mainly relatives, many of whom come from abroad, weddings fill notions of the family and kin group with meaning. More precisely, weddings bind individual members to the kin group and give them a place within the kinship grid, allowing for cohesion and kinship connections to be re-created. In that sense, weddings can redefine not only the status and position of the entire inviting family but also the gender and social roles of the spouses with respect to each other and within the family as well as of the individual members of the community. In this regard, it is important that wedding celebrations emphasize both tradition, patrilocality and patrilineality and also innovation/modernity and more egalitarian gender and kinship relations. As the study has shown, villagers and migrants alike value markers of 'authenticity' and the revival of 'traditional' customs that symbolize the patrilocal, agnatically organized kinship order, which support the creation of a localized identity and a sense of belonging to the region even beyond state borders. This is especially important for migrants and their children. At the same time, migrants and villagers have introduced new customs according to their perceptions of modern marriage ideals. Such new rituals emphasize romantic love between the couple, equal participation of the bride's family in the ceremonies, and more generally a gender-equalizing approach. Changes are also evident in wedding guest lists, as colleagues and friends are increasingly invited in addition to family members.

As weddings are increasingly held in glitzy and commercialized wedding salons, they can also become sites of conspicuous consumption and markers of income and class. While such new customs may be considered 'Western', they are also genuinely translocal. The high cost of weddings – mainly for the groom's family and which is also related to the abundance of expensive gifts for the bride – also has an economic impact, exacerbating social stratification among villagers. Many villagers in Opoja try to follow the same (trans-)locally defined style of weddings, making social differences between

families largely invisible. However, this has led to some families going into debt, as the capacity to finance such weddings varies from family to family.

The high cost and increasing commercialization of weddings can also affect the prospects of the celebrating family and the new couple. In Opoja, the high costs have pushed young people from less affluent families to take wage jobs early without pursuing education, sometimes against their will, or even to emigrate abroad. Migrants abroad who organize their sons' or also daughters' weddings in Opoja invest in such occasions, and these contingencies often have far-reaching effects on their lives abroad. This can also lead to intergenerational conflicts between parents and children. In some cases, this also leads to alternative ideas about the organization, design and costs of weddings. Despite the diversification and social stratification that weddings manifest or produce, as well as the changing meanings of gender and partnership therein, weddings remain an important means of symbolically connecting two families, creating new kinship bonds and reuniting geographically dispersed kin. As such, weddings can be regarded as the 'social glue' that renews the translocal family and wider kin group.

Importantly, translocal family and kinship ties are also newly established through cross-border marriages between migrants from Opoja and those back home. Depending on the perspective of those involved in cross-border marriages, such marriages are spurred on by a variety of social, economic and family considerations that are linked to global, local and personal affairs. In fact, cross-border marriages have become increasingly important since the end of the war in 1999, as marriage migration represents the most promising route to permanent migration abroad – at the same time facilitating entry into the labour market of immigration countries. Marriage migration can thus be seen as a social security strategy – both for the individual migrant and for his or her family in Opoja in expectation of remittances from the migrating family member.

Macro- and meso-level changes are important drivers for cross-border marriages, as they impact on the strategies of villagers in Opoja. Cross-border marriages, however, also link to migration biographies of families and individuals from Opoja living abroad. This points to the intergenerational dimension of marriage migration that results from different phases of migration to Western Europe. Marriage migration is also fostered by the fact that (some of the) children and young people who went abroad with (one of) their parents during the turbulent times of the 1990s or also after the war in the new millennium have nevertheless grown up with a stable connection to Opoja and thus may also opt for a spouse from the 'home region'. For parents abroad, the possibility of marrying off a child of marriageable age to someone in the home region in Kosovo, thus enabling migration, can be seen as an advantage that improves their own status in Opoja and creates

new relatives back home. Conversely, parents in Opoja may see marrying off a child to a migrant abroad as a social security strategy, as children abroad are seen as the best providers for families in Opoja – at least in financial terms.

In cross-border marriages, the role of the family is also strengthened because spousal choice is often based on family-framed encounters. And although this practice refers back to the tradition of family-based marriage counselling without involving the young people, the practice has changed and with it also its meaning. Instead of being regarded as a backward or regressive practice, it is seen as one which rather promises more certainty about the suitability of the partner and thus offers a greater possibility for fulfilling one's imaginations about partnership and life prospects. In fact, today's 'family-framed' marriages have gained new meaning and acceptance across state borders and territorial distances. They are dynamically spurred on by the corresponding migration regimes as well as by different imaginations of family care and individual life plans – which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Rather, the hope is that marriage will combine the two.

This study also allowed us to rethink the gender norms and relations that shape cross-border marriages. Marriage migrants may position themselves in line with, but also against, widespread gender constructions in their home contexts, and may thus also transform gender and family relations. Next to their wish to start a family, young men from rural Kosovo, who face unemployment and a certain imposed dependence on their fathers, seek such marriages to gain better economic prospects and thus greater agency. Young women who feel limited in their options by local gender roles partly hope that through a cross-border marriage they can gain more agency within their partnership and family than a local alliance would allow. Their goal is, for instance, to take up wage work and/or to educate themselves further. From the perspective of young migrants, the decision to marry someone from their home region (or the region of their parent(s)) in Kosovo can result from wanting a good position within the partnership and to create a harmonious family life where cultural values and their family language can be passed on. For migrant women, this means a more emancipated partnership and sometimes the prospect of a better social position in the host society through marriage to a person from Opoja who has enjoyed higher education. In general, however, such considerations do not preclude romantic unions but may be the basis on which romance is built.

The realities of cross-border marriages may also entail a change in family and kinship organization as well as individual gender and partnership roles within marriage. Here, again, the migration regimes of Western European states play a role, for within this framework family migration and especially cross-border marriages of migrants are culturalized and seen as 'patriarchal',

‘backward’ and ‘problematic’. This has justified state measures against marriage migration, and partners encounter various obstacles when attempting to marry across borders. These obstacles have led to the disempowerment of female marriage migrants in particular.

As the study has shown, migrating spouses often, at least initially, depend on the sponsoring spouse and lack sufficient power and agency to take independent initiatives. Once the EU (and state) border is crossed and family reunification is concluded, spouses may find themselves in positions that partially challenge gender and family norms prevalent in Opoja. Male marriage migrants, for example, leave behind their paternal family as well as their own relatives in Opoja and establish a nuclear household with their wife – often in close proximity to their wife’s family and relatives. This new spatial proximity makes the wife’s relatives more present in daily life, and new care arrangements are made. Both kinship practices and partnership relations are thereby altered on an individual basis, while changes on the normative level tend to be much slower.

Male marriage migrants may be expected to become the primary breadwinners and heads of households abroad as soon as possible and to want to continue caring for family members back home. This is a challenging task that can often be realized only partly, even if their spouse and her relatives support migrating men in achieving such goals. In various cases, gender and partnership roles become adaptable, ambivalent and situational – differing in private and public spaces abroad as well as during visits to Opoja, often also in response to societal expectations. However, education also matters. Marriage migrants who are more educated and able to continue with their education abroad can also achieve a higher degree of self-realization than those who are less educated. This, in turn, affects partnership relationships.

Women from Opoja who have migrated through marriage tend to take on domestic tasks first, as they primarily expect and often want to provide for the household and children. However, female marriage migrants also tend to take up wage work at a later point in time. In addition to the positive financial effects on the household, the woman’s employment also strengthens her position within the partnership and vis-à-vis relatives in Opoja, especially once she starts to support them financially.

Since a significant number of female marriage migrants move into a shared household with their in-laws, the male spouse’s family has a decisive influence on their position. While migrating women may receive support from the spouse’s family in realizing their aspirations, the family may also have a negative impact on the marriage and, in particular, on their ability to realize their dreams of an emancipated partnership. In this situation, some women lack support from their husbands. Nevertheless, divorce is often not a solution for marriage migrant women, as this may entail a return to the



parental household in Opoja, where they do not have many options to shape their future.

More generally, this research has shown that it is the continuous, family-based movement across state borders, between migrants' destinations in Western European countries and the home location in Kosovo, that sustains and invigorates the familial bonds between two or more sites and sustains family care within a translocal social field. Translocal kinship networks spanning rural regions within Kosovo and Western European states are preserved and re-created not merely in adherence to the past but also to ensure a stable home base in a globalized world, in which sending states have increasingly relinquished their role as providers of care and social security and in which options for migration to Western European states have been increasingly reduced or at least diversified and are based on economic needs of the receiving states. Family-based migration and family solidarity is a way to overcome these obstacles, but these practices are increasingly culturalized in the receiving societies. This is especially true for marriage migration, which according to Western discourses is supposed to follow patriarchal norms that undermine equal relations between men and women and generally reduce the choice and freedom of the individual partners, especially of women. But it has been shown that migrants and villagers see themselves as actors within a complex interplay of social factors in which they balance the fulfilment of norms and expectations with their own needs.

An examination of care relations in border-spanning families from rural Kosovo also reveals the complex and ambivalent transformations of gender relations, as they involve emancipatory processes but also re-patriarchalization processes on both sides – in Kosovo as well as abroad. Within translocal family networks, there are multiple notions of modernity and tradition, and collectivity and individuality, which are pursued, criticized and reformulated in the larger framework of a neoliberal, globalized world and specifically – for citizens from Kosovo – within relatively impermeable border regimes, and which find expression in social relations, especially gender and marriage relations, both locally in Kosovo as well as abroad. Depending on the actor's perspective, this goes somewhat hand in hand with a situational rescaling of European regions – in which the rural region of Opoja can suddenly appear to be 'more modern' and civilized than those where the migrants live. This depends on how people experience their own position (and that of others) within a particular locality and is, therefore, always relational.

Cross-border caring relations linking family members in rural Kosovo to migration destinations in Western Europe show not only the importance of migration in sustaining family care but also the complexity and challenges of cross-border family relations. Such relations cannot be understood within a simplified West-centred categorization of space and time, according to

which the global 'Southeast' is based on supposedly 'backward' and patriarchal kinship patterns, and the global 'Northwest' with 'modern' families, within which families in rural Kosovo may be positioned somewhere in-between. Within the framework of neoliberalism, globalization and its associated migration flows, translocal family relations are not necessarily weakening. Rather, they can be sustained in subsequent generations – a finding also supported by studies of migrant communities from Turkey in Germany and Belgium or of Pakistani migrants in Britain (Charsley 2005; Beck-Gernsheim 2006, 2007; Timmerman 2006).

Translocal family relationships can be seen as a way to advance modernization 'back home' and also empower individual actors as well as translocal communities and to challenge hierarchical notions of 'backwardness' and 'modernity', 'periphery' and 'centre' in their geographic, political, social and cultural senses. A translocal perspective on family organization and the negotiation of values and practices in such border-crossing families challenges not least the notion of geographically fixed family cultures.

Within translocal kinship relations that span between Opoja and Austria or Germany, translocal kinship and family care are established at multiple but interwoven layers. These are shared everyday experiences, perceptions and normative expectations within families that affect the rituals and material manifestations of kinship, such as the building of houses and the joint celebration of weddings and other life-stage festivals, as well as cross-border marriages. Often, such translocal family relations undergo dynamic transformations that affect gender roles, as well as inter- and intragenerational relations. With this, family constellations and care arrangements change. How such relations and arrangements are formed is based on individual agency and a complex interplay of political and social factors that influence the positions of individual members within the life course, the translocal family and the translocal community.

Moreover, it is important to note that not all migrants and not all villagers actively participate in translocal family relationships, for they may also choose not to partake in these relationships and instead invest in other assets, social relationships and family models – even if this may result in negative sanctions within the translocal family and community. What strategies and positions are open to those who do not engage in family caregiving may be a topic for future research.

The importance of internal migration from rural areas to cities, and especially to Kosovo's capital Prishtina, which accelerated at the end of the war in 1999, has been only partly touched upon here – but it is likely that it impacts translocal family forms and family care and more generally the rural region of Opoja, too. It could thus be explored in a further study. The future will also show if migrants manage to bring about an economic upswing through

economic investments 'at home'. If migrants successfully establish manufacturing and service-related businesses in Kosovo, the economic imbalances that underpin migration may be reduced, and people might create the livelihoods they desire and the chance for self-realization right where they are. As this is related to an exchange of ideas and new forms of translocal livelihoods that connect various European localities, such translocal dynamics must be further explored. Here again, gender and generational dynamics take on significance. It may matter, for example, whether young women or men choose to launch a business in Kosovo and what different assets and networks they can rely on for that purpose. Translocal family relations may also play a role here.

What remains clear is that all these dynamics take place across two or more states. The lack of social security and opportunities offered by the Kosovo state inhibits many people in rural Opoja, as in other regions, from building up a decent livelihood 'at home'. This includes services such as health care, as well as care for the unemployed and the poor. The high unemployment, especially among the youth, and the lack of state-provided social security pressures families to act as the main provider of social security, and to opt for migration as a way to create better livelihoods. This is the case in Opoja but also more generally in Kosovo. Still, this system of family-based care is by no means a stable and harmonious one, but one in which care gaps and vulnerabilities for single members open up, which often also increases the dependency on (family-based) outmigration.

If the state provided more social security for its citizens and was successful in stimulating Kosovo's economy and creating more promising workplaces – especially also in the rural areas – the need for outmigration would diminish. Migration and translocal family connections would, however, remain. As said, the positionings of migrants in the receiving states also play a role in the maintenance of translocal family connections. The desire to achieve an imagined 'modernity' while simultaneously investing in 'tradition' achieves greater significance and momentum from a geographical distance, across state borders. Local circumstances as well as individual positionings and agency are decisive in cultivating and preserving translocal family ties and in the provision of family care, which are again linked to national and global dynamics.

## GLOSSARY



- Ausländer (Auslander)* – (German term), foreigners
- Bajram* – Eid, Islamic festival at the end of Ramadan, the fasting month for Muslims
- çiftelia* – a ‘traditional’ wooden lute (string instrument)
- curle* (also *zurle* or *surle*) – a kind of clarinet with a double reed
- dallama* – a long velvet jacket with embroidery
- dasma* – the wedding
- def* – tambourine
- dimia* – Turkish-style trousers of nine to twelve meters of fabric
- familja e madhe* – the wider family, also used for relatives/kin
- familja e ngushtë* or *familja e vogël* – the nuclear family
- farefis* – the close patrilocal kin group
- fis* – the wider patrilocal kin group
- flija* – a very work intensive dish made of various layers of pancake with yogurt and cream in between, made in a pan on an open fire
- gjak* – blood
- gjjakmarrje* – blood feuds
- gurbet* or *kurbet* – labour migration
- gurbetgji* – guest labourers, labour migrants
- hanefi* – Sunni tradition of Islam
- havale* – Islamic headscarf
- hise* – share of the parental property equally divided among brothers

- hoxha* – imam
- hup kohë* – you lose time
- iftar* – meal during Ramadan to be taken after sunset
- jashhtë* – outside
- jelek* – a stiff, velvet blazer with embroidery
- kallabëllëk* – a crowd, too many people (from Turkish)
- kanun* – customary law – a frame of reference for local justice dating back to Ottoman rule
- katunar* – villager (sometimes pejoratively used)
- këmişë* – blouse; in Opoja, it is stiff with handmade embroidered flowers
- kënjagjegji* – farewell party of the girls of the *mahalla* the day before marriage
- kepuçë* – shoes
- kulla* – fortified house in the shape of a tower, often with small windows
- kulm* – roof
- kushëri* – cousins of the patriline
- lodra* or *tupana* – large double-headed drum played with mallets
- magjup* – local name for Roma in Kosovo
- mahalla* – neighbourhood; in Opoja, it is the territorial organization of an agnatically based kin group
- mahrama* or *peshqir* – a white towel that has been (at least ideally) embroidered by the bride as a sign of the betrothal
- marre* – shameful, shame
- martesa me dashni* – ‘love’ or ‘romantic’ marriage
- martesa me msit* – marriage with an intermediary, ‘arranged’ marriage
- mas luftës* – after the war
- me marrë dorën* – to take their hands
- medrese* – Islamic school linked to the mosque and run by the local imam
- mik* – friend, also used for a relative from the maternal side
- miqësi* – the relatives of the in-married women, maternal/affinal kinship, also used for groups of friends; friendship)

*motrat* – sisters

*msit* – mediator in an engagement, matchmaker in an arranged marriage

*nuse* – bride

*para luftës* – before the war

*pite* – puff pastry with filling (meat, cheese, potatoes or cabbage)

*qejs* – marriage trousseau

*rrënjët* – roots

*rrethi* – the social circle, the community

*salloni i dasmave* – wedding salon

*shtëpia* or *shpia* – the house

*shtëpia e madhe* or *familja e bashkuar* – the joint family

*syfyr* – meal within Ramadan to be taken before sunrise

*syneti* – the circumcision

*syni i keq* – evil eyes

*temena* – a highly ritualized hand gesture that is the bride's special greeting

*teshat* – clothes

*vajza* – the girl (used for unmarried girls who have reached the age of puberty)

*valle* – traditional circle dance

*vallja e burrave* – elaborate group dance of kin-related men of the *mahalla* that consists of difficult step combinations and rhythms (not necessarily kin related)

*vëllai* – the brother

*vëllezërit* – brothers

*verza* – the celebration of the beginning of spring, 13 March

*xhaxhai* – the paternal uncle

*zoti i shpisë* – the household head

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