

Roman Ingarden

# Controversy over the Existence of the World

Volume I

Translated and annotated  
by Arthur Szylewicz

**Polish Contemporary Philosophy and  
Philosophical Humanities**

Edited by Jan Hartman

Volume 6



PETER LANG  
EDITION

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**PETER LANG**



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*This translation is dedicated to the Memory  
of Izchak Miller and Dallas Willard*



## Translator's Note

Roman Ingarden's *Controversy over the Existence of the World* (it has become "canonical" to omit the definite article from the English translation of the book's German title) appeared in 3 versions during his lifetime:

- A) *Spór o istnienie świata*, Vols. I/II, Kraków: PAU, 1947/48;
  - B) *Spór o istnienie świata*, Vols. I/II, Warszawa: PWN, 1960/61;
  - C) *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*, Bd. I/II, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1964/65.<sup>1</sup>
- A fourth version (a hybrid that splices passages from B and C), as edited, and with German passages translated into Polish, by D. Gierulanka, appeared as *Spór o istnienie świata*, Vols. I, II, Warszawa: PWN, 1987.
- B is a "corrected [or improved]" version of A.
- C is a revised edition of B, partially translated and partially rewritten by the author.

In the translation at hand, C is the main text, and those who wish to get a straight reading of Ingarden's "definitive" (because it was his last) statement can do so by ignoring all "markings" in the body of the text other than **bold-face footnote numerals** (which also indicate translator's notes). All the rest is for those who for untold reasons may wish to delve into a comparative reading of B and C. The style adopted for enabling the reader to do so resembles those of the AB edition of Kant's main *Critique* and of the *Husserliana* edition of the *Logische Untersuchungen*. My project differs from these, for one, in that *not all* changes are accounted for in the translation, but only those with "significant philosophical currency," as deemed by the editor. A comprehensive accounting of all changes, on the model of the mentioned editions, would be impracticable for the two editions of *this* book.

The "critical" apparatus provides 3 main features:

- a) passages in *Spór* (A) (ranging from a single word to entire paragraphs) that were altered or entirely replaced in *Streit* (B) – footnotes attaching to passages enclosed by semi-brackets, [ ], refer to the corresponding passages from *Spór* given in the footnote, likewise enclosed in semi-brackets, or to an *Appendix* (for the lengthier passages);

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1 [A and B will henceforth be abbreviated by *Spór* (followed by the year, if relevant), and C by *Streit*. The title of the English translation will be abbreviated by *Controversy*.]



- b) passages in B that were omitted from C – these are signaled by footnotes, located where those passages would have fit into C, and are also enclosed in semi-brackets in those footnotes;
- c) indications of passages added in C.

Changes or omitted passages that occur within footnotes are treated in the same way as in the main text, but signaled by asterisk(s), \*\*. Occasionally, if in a footnote an omitted passage either opens or concludes the footnote, it is simply attached, in the usual enclosure.

Chapter and Section (§) numbers referenced to B have been conformed to their numeration in C.

Any and all insertions in full brackets, [ ], are the translator's, and, since readers often wonder about parentheses, any text enclosed in them – outside of translator's notes, obviously – is Ingarden's.

In cases where I felt the need to cite a Polish term, I included a German "equivalent" (the = sign should not be taken too literally) for those who might benefit from that.

Chs. VII – XVII (§§ 34 -81) of *Streit* are contained in Vol. II, which will go unmentioned in the references.

For the sake of easier readability, I have violated some mild linguistic conventions (e.g., by leaving un-hyphenated a number of compounds that normally are hyphenated: coexist rather than co-exist; selfsufficient vs. self-sufficient, etc.), have invoked with respect to some of Ingarden's terminology editorial practices (abridgements, abbreviations) that will be noted as they occur in the text, and have minimized my tinkering with Ingarden's punctuation. Sentences have seldom been broken up, even when rather convoluted.

All translations of quotations from German texts are my own, and I have retained Ingarden's Latinate interjections without translation. Where possible I have corrected, completed and/or updated Ingarden's bibliographical references. Ingarden does his share of misquoting; I checked and, where needed, corrected his quotations in all instances but one [Wundt]. Full bibliographical data are for the most part included only at the first reference to a text.

Ingarden had his own "philosophy of translation," well illustrated in practice with his masterful translation into Polish of Kant's main *Critique*, and with his student and assistant, Danuta Gierulanka's equally superb translations (with Ingarden's "unofficial" collaboration) of Husserl's *Ideas I* and *II*. It is this kind of work, in the spirit of that philosophy of translating, that I tried to execute here.

Ingarden's language is understandably in good measure Husserl's language; that, given the unsteady state of Husserl translation, provided a fair share of the

challenge in translating this book. In that regard, I am surely influenced in my terminological choices by Ingarden's own grappling with Husserl's jargon as he was coining Polish terminology for it and for phenomenology generally. Not all may be pleased, but I have (and often give) my reasons.

My own work benefitted considerably from Helen R. Michejda's fine pioneering effort in her translation of an abridgement of *Spór* (1960): *Time and Modes of Being*, Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1964, from D. Gierulanka's translation of portions of *Streit* into Polish in her edition of the book, from the writings in English of numerous commentators on Ingarden, and especially from scholars who were either students of Ingarden's or in the post-War circle of phenomenologists in Poland: Andrzej Póltawski and Władysław Stróżewski, among others.

Valuable suggestions toward improving the final visage of this product came from thorough scrutinies of the translation by Ronald McIntyre and Daniel R. Siakel, to whom I am deeply grateful. Perry Bennett was very helpful in dealing with various German quandaries, as was Jan Woleński with both German and Polish, for which I hereby express my appreciation. Indeed I am most indebted to Jan for initiating the project, and for his unstinting counsel and support throughout it. Łukasz Gałeczki of Peter Lang and Jan Hartman of the Jagiellonian University showed finite but generous patience in the face of my seemingly endless delays, for which I also thank them.

My heartfelt thanks to Marek Camerac in Paris, Carole and George Lebecki in the Algarve, and Jan and Maria Woleński in Sucha Beskidzka, for their hospitality, generosity, and optimal conditions for doing some of this work during my stays with them.

At home, I could not have done without the technical and material support from Guy Campbell, Jacqueline Nguyen, and Jeffrey Felburg, whom I also thank.

*Moorpark, Ca.*  
*April, 2013*



# Introduction

Jan Woleński

Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland

Roman Ingarden (1893-1970) studied with Husserl in Göttingen (1912-14) and Freiburg (1916-18); before going to Göttingen, he studied one semester at the University of Lvov (in Ukrainian, Lviv) under Kazimierz Twardowski, the father of Polish analytic philosophy. In 1918 Ingarden obtained his PhD on the basis of a dissertation on intuition and intellect in Bergson. His habilitation defense, based on the book *Essentiale Fragen* (Questions pertaining to Essence), took place in Lvov in 1926. Ingarden was appointed Professor of Philosophy at Lvov University in 1933, where he taught until 1941. He moved to Kraków in 1945 and became Professor at the Jagiellonian University. In 1950, his teaching duties were suspended by the Polish communist authorities. Ingarden returned to normal academic activities in 1957, which continued until his retirement in 1970.

Ingarden belongs among the most distinguished representatives of the phenomenological movement. He became famous for his works in aesthetics, particularly in the theory of literary works; the book *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 1931 (*The Literary Work of Art*, 1973) presents his original, some commentators even say revolutionary, theory of the literary work as a structure composed of a number of layers or strata. This account made it possible to clarify several philosophical difficulties traditionally discussed in the philosophy of literature: for instance, the nature of the realities presented in literary works; the role of language (in fact, *The Literary Work of Art* proposes a complex and sophisticated theory of language); spatial and temporal aspects of events presented in literary texts. Although literary works have several strata, Ingarden shows that their complex structure is consistent with their unity as a kind of objects. Yet his theory is anti-reductionist, especially anti-naturalistic. Ingarden extended his account of literary works to other aesthetic domains, for example, musical works or photography (Ingarden himself was an excellent photographer). In general, Ingarden defended objectivism and absolutism in aesthetics. He developed similar views in ethics and philosophical anthropology.

Ingarden was a very faithful student of Husserl. In particular, Ingarden followed Husserl's view that philosophy must be presuppositionless, because that is a *conditio sine qua non* of its scientific character. Furthermore, philosophy must be completely independent of the special (positive) sciences, formal

(mathematics) as well as material (physics), because philosophy as *the mathesis universalis* provides foundations for any concrete scientific field. Ingarden applied this methodology to many issues, including epistemological ones. He considered epistemology independent of any other philosophical results, even those achieved in ontology. This perspective was used by Ingarden in his analysis of the famous problem of *petitio principii* in the theory of knowledge. In works published at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Leonard Nelson argued that epistemology is impossible, because it inevitably suffers from the *petitio principii* fallacy. Nelson's argument was explicitly directed against Husserl's analysis in *Logische Untersuchungen*. The phenomenologists took very serious note of the objections raised by Nelson. In fact, Husserl's idea of philosophy as strict science (*Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*) can be considered as a defense of epistemology against the objection of a *petitio principii* fallacy. Ingarden's analysis of the place of epistemology in philosophy supplemented Husserl's corresponding discussion.

However, Ingarden disagreed with Husserl on one essential point or, to put it more radically, on one point of the utmost importance. The issue concerned the realism–idealism debate. As we know, Husserl's seminal *Logische Untersuchungen* adopted the realist standpoint. Husserl radically changed his earlier views for numerous reasons, and gravitated toward transcendental phenomenology (this is not the place to enter into details). It happened around 1910 – that is, still in Göttingen. The first full exposition of Husserl's new way of thinking was presented in *Ideen I*, 1913. Thus, Ingarden himself witnessed the ascent of transcendental philosophy. When he came to Freiburg in 1916, this version of Husserl's philosophy dominated the phenomenological circle. In fact, the phenomenological movement split into two principal camps: realist and transcendental (idealist). Most of Husserl's Göttingen students remained realists, but his Freiburg pupils followed the new idealism of the master. In the course of time, this latter drift of phenomenology became the dominant one.

Ingarden belonged to the realist wing, and he never accepted transcendental phenomenology. He tried to explain Husserl's motives in several writings published since the 1930's. In 1967, Ingarden delivered a series of 10 lectures at Oslo University, a transcription of which was published in book form under the title *Einführung in die Phänomenologie Edmund Husserl (Introduction to Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology)*, Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1992 (available in a superb Polish translation by Andrzej Póltawski already since 1974). These "Oslo Lectures," as they have also come to be known, may well offer the best survey of Ingarden's account of the changes in Husserl's philosophical thought. This book, incidentally, is one of the best and clearest monograph accounts of the origins and development of Husserlian phenomenology. As I already said,

Ingarden was very faithful to his master's ideas. As concerns transcendental phenomenology, Ingarden understood Husserl's reasons for abandoning realism and passing over into idealism. Ingarden saw clearly the internal difficulties in realist phenomenology that led Husserl to transcendentalism. In particular, he agreed that Husserl's corrections (in *Logische Untersuchungen*) of Brentano's treatment of the intentionality of consciousness are not sufficient for an effective defense of realism. The *epoche*, transcendental reduction, which replaced the eidetic reduction, led Husserl to a new account of the relation between consciousness and the real world. The solution to the problem was, according to Husserl, that the former constitutes the latter. In Ingarden's judgment, Husserl's conceptual framework for the realism/idealism debate was incomplete and required a more detailed and careful analysis.

Ingarden intended to give a systematic account of realist phenomenology in a work with the general title *Spór o istnienie świata* (Controversy over the Existence of the World). He projected five volumes, but completed only three. Volumes I and II appeared in 1947-48. The 2<sup>nd</sup>, corrected (and supplemented by additional notes) edition of both volumes was published in 1960-61. In 1964-65, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Ingarden's life-long publisher, issued a German "translation" (by Ingarden himself) as *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*, Vol. I: *Existentialontologie* and Vol. II: *Formalontologie, Welt und Bewusstsein*. On Ingarden's own admission, it was not a straightforward translation, but involved considerable revision – especially in Vol. I. The same house published Vol. 3 (*Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt: Über die die kausale Struktur der realen Welt*) in 1974; this volume deals with the causal structure of the real world. The last Polish edition of Vols. I and II of *Spór* appeared in 1987 in an edition that represents a splicing by Danuta Gierulanka, Ingarden's assistant, of the Polish and German versions; her Polish translation of Vol. III of *Streit* appeared in 1981.

Ingarden made a sharp distinction between ontology and metaphysics. Whereas the former elaborates various possible ontological models, the latter investigates which model is satisfied in reality. Vol. III provides the first step toward metaphysics. Vols. I and II deal with ontology. As the subtitles indicate, Vol. I is devoted to existential ontology, but in Vol. II Ingarden offers a treatment of formal ontology understood as the theory of features of objects determined by their form, and of the relation between consciousness and the real world. Ingarden's objective was to provide a systematic investigation of the various possible ways in which the real world and consciousness can be mutually related. According to Ingarden, in his analysis Husserl overlooked some possibilities that lead to realism as a solution of the problem. Ingarden offered a combinatorial analysis of all ontological possibilities and argued that the realist

standpoint is coherent and cannot be excluded *a priori* as philosophically unsound. He intended to show in his metaphysical investigations that ontological realism is also correct as the very philosophical theory of the actual world, but he only took the initial step toward that goal in Vol. III. Speaking methodologically, Ingarden wholeheartedly trusted the eidetic reduction as employed in Husserl's early work (that is, *Logische Untersuchungen*), but considered the transcendental *epoché* as a method that – although original and ingenious – is not philosophically sound, and therefore leads to dubious results.

Vols. I and II of *Spór* are unanimously regarded as Ingarden's *opus magnum*, and as one of the most important ontological treatises in the history of philosophy. Father Józef M. Bocheński used to say that *Spór* cannot be compared with any other book on the foundations of ontology in the Western philosophical tradition. The fragments of this book that were published in English (translated by Helen R. Michejda) as *Time and Modes of Being* were not sufficient to present the richness and depth of Ingarden's thought and the actual importance of his results. Although the German edition made this work partially accessible to non-Polish readers, the absence of a complete English translation was keenly felt. Attempts to fill this gap in the world's philosophical literature were undertaken several times, but something (political circumstances prior to 1990, financial difficulties, the size of the book) always prevented the task from being completed. The present edition in Arthur Szylewicz's excellent translation includes only the first volume of *Streit* (with annotations from the 2<sup>nd</sup> edition of *Spór*), but we hope that other parts will also be published. This project was supported by the National Program for the Development of the Humanities under the auspices of the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education, as well as by the publisher, Peter Lang. The book is included in the series *Polish Contemporary Philosophy and Philosophical Humanities*, edited by Jan Hartman.

**ROMAN INGARDEN**

**CONTROVERSY OVER the EXISTENCE  
of the WORLD**





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## Preface

I spent many years preparing to write this book – basically, ever since I became convinced in 1918 that I cannot share Husserl’s transcendental idealism with regard to the existence of the real world.<sup>2</sup> But to not be able to embrace a particular point of view, and to find another with an even tolerably satisfactory grounding – those are two different things; especially since we are dealing with a problem that has been so exhaustively treated in the philosophical literature and yet, despite so many attempts to solve it, continues to remain a *problem*.

⌈At first I tried to attack the entire problem-complex from an epistemological perspective, having worked between 1918 and 1923 on the analysis of outer perception and on problems of constitution. It slowly began to dawn on me that the epistemological approach to the problem of the existence of the world (which in fact is the issue in the old controversy between idealism and realism) is not the correct one, since it leaves unresolved and neglects to consider a host of unclarified issues in formal and existential ontology. It became gradually clearer to me that I needed to carry out a series of preliminary investigations, proceeding both in a positive and negative direction.<sup>3</sup> At the forefront of these

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2 ⌈ In the summer of 1918, I wrote Husserl a letter of several dozen pages in which I explicated my reasons for being unable at the time to agree with the standpoint of “transcendental” idealism – which shimmered through in at least some of the statements in his *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie* [henceforth, *Ideen I*] [*Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung* [henceforth, *Jahrb.*], v. I/1, Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1913]. Eng. trans. [henceforth, *Ideas I*]: *Ideas* [:] *General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, tr. W. R. Boyce Gibson, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931; *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological philosophy: First Book*, tr. F. Kersten, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982. ⌋

3 ⌈ But I soon began to realize – i.e., around 1921 – that subjectively oriented investigations will not suffice here, that a number of issues need to be clarified pertaining to the form and mode of being of the world whose existence is the focus of the controversy. In particular, it occurred to me that the sense of the several “categories” needs to be clarified (that is, of the basic structures of a real object) which Kant endorsed as subjective forms of the intellect\* without at the same time having carried out any detailed investigations of them. Following various inquiries into sensory perception (which were never completed, and a minute fragment of which comprised the paper “*Czy i jak można wykazać obiektywność spostrzeżenia zewnętrznego?* [Can the Objectivity of Outer Perception Be Demonstrated, and If So – How?],” read in 1923 at the First Polish Philosophical Congress in Lwów)\*\*, I proceeded to analyze the basic categorical structures; in particular, I dealt with the identity of the individual object, which was initially sup-

belongs my habilitation treatise, *Essentielle Fragen* (1925)<sup>4</sup>, which, among other objectives, set itself the tasks of sharpening the contrast between individual object and idea and of establishing the sense of the essence of an individual object. My “*Über die Stellung der Erkenntnistheorie im System der Philosophie* [On the Position of Epistemology in the System of Philosophy],” published the same year<sup>5</sup>, headed in a negative direction in the sense that in this essay both the problematic proper to epistemology and the possible efficacy [*Leistung*] of the latter were significantly constrained. Two works written simultaneously then exerted a positive effect: the book *Das Literarische Kunstwerk* (1931)<sup>6</sup> and the essay “*Bemerkungen zum Problem Idealismus-Realismus* [Remarks on the Idealism-Realism Problem]” (1929)<sup>7</sup>. Although on the face of it the book was simply devoted to working out the philosophical foundations for a theory of the literary work of art, it in fact represented the first step toward differentiating real and purely intentional entities – and this on the basis of a fundamental distinctness in their form. Both the literary work itself and the entities represented in it are ex-

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posed to be the theme of my habilitation treatise. But these investigations proved to be more complicated than appeared to me at first glance. Other perhaps even more fundamental ontological problems emerged in conjunction with this endeavor, and from a different perspective I slowly arrived at a deeper awareness of what may be required of a theory of knowledge.

\* [*intelekt*: the word on which Ingarden settled as a “compromise” to render Kant’s *Verstand* in his translation of the main *Critique* while rendering *Vernunft* by ‘reason,’ although he lobbied with the editors for precisely the reverse: ‘intellect’ for *Vernunft* (possibly preceded by ‘speculative’) and ‘reason’ for *Verstand*. Cf. I. Kant, *Krytyka czystego rozumu*, tr., R. Ingarden, Warszawa: PWN, 1957, p. 14, n. 1.]

\*\* [Published in *Przegl. Filoz.*, v. 30, 1927, n. 4, pp. 303-05] <sup>7</sup>

- 4 <sup>7</sup> *Pytania esencjalne* ([originally] written [in Polish] in 1923, issued [, with the original Appendix, in *Z teorii języka i filozoficznych podstaw logiki* [Studies in Theory of Language and Philosophical Foundations of Logic], Warszawa: PWN, 1972, pp. 327-482, and then translated (but also considerably revised) by the author] as *Essentielle Fragen*, [*Jahrb.*, v. VII,] 1925 [pp. 125-304 [, without Appendix]]. Reprinted in, R. Ingarden, *Über das Wesen*, Peter McCormick, ed., Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag WINTER, 2007, pp. 1-192) <sup>7</sup>
- 5 [Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1925. Reprint in R. Ingarden, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 6, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1994, pp. 277-309.]
- 6 [, Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1931. 2<sup>nd</sup> extended and revised ed., Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1960. Eng. tr. by George G. Grabowicz: *The Literary Work of Art* [henceforth, *LWA*], Evanston: Northwestern U. Pr., 1973.]
- 7 Cf. *Festschrift, Edmund Husserl [zum 70. Geburtstag gewidmet, Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung, Ergänzungsband]*, Halle, 1929 [, pp. 159-190] [Reprinted in, *Über das Wesen, op. cit.*, pp. 193-226. Henceforth: “*Bemerkungen*”].

amples of purely intentional objects, whereas the objects depicted in some works (say, scientific or historical works, in particular), objects to which these works ultimately refer, are instances of real entities. The stage was thus set for the conclusion that purely intentional objects have a form which is radically different from that of real objects, a form therefore that renders impossible the frequently attempted idealist reduction of the latter to the former. The cited essay, on the other hand, attempted to sort out the various groups of problems that as a rule are conflated in the course of dealing with the idealism/realism problem; for the most part it was merely meant to sketch out a general problematic and its various branchings. The task of an essay entitled “*Niektóre założenia idealizmu Berkeley’a*” [Some Presuppositions of Berkeley’s Idealism] (available only in Polish thus far)<sup>8</sup> was to spell out how certain thematically vague yet dogmatically embraced (though merely implicit) ontological presuppositions forced Berkeley into his idealistic commitment. The essay “*Vom formalen Aufbau des individuellen Gegenstandes* [The Formal Structure of the Individual Object]”<sup>9</sup> signaled a further step toward the preliminary framing of the problem-context; it tried to set forth the fundamental form of any individual, existentially autonomous object, and to offer therewith a core fragment of formal ontology. In the thirties I labored over an as yet unpublished work, entitled *Wstęp do teorii poznania* [Introduction to a Theory of Knowledge]<sup>10</sup>, whose purpose was not only to explain the epistemological enterprise in its proper sense, but also to demonstrate the possibility in principle of a theory of knowledge within its legitimate bounds.

By around 1935 it seemed to me that I was already sufficiently prepared to commit to paper the book dealing with the idealism/realism problem, and so I began to formulate its first chapter, which was initially projected as just an expanded version of my “*Bemerkungen*” from 1929. The project became all the more urgent for me, since, with the appearance of his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl had come to espouse a radical, all-encompassing transcendental idealism that seemed to me far more unacceptable than the merely symptomatic idealist tendencies of *Ideas I*.<sup>11</sup>

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8 [Księga pamiątkowa polskiego towarzystwa filozoficznego, Lwów, 1931, pp. 215-258.]

9 Cf. *Studia Philosophica, Commentari Societatis Philosophorum Polonorum, vol. I*, Leopoli, 1935 [, pp. 29-106. [Reprinted in, *Über Wesen, op. cit.*, pp. 227ff.]

10 [Part I appeared as *U podstaw teorii poznania* [Foundations of a Theory of Knowledge], Warszawa: PWN, 1971. Ch. IV of this book appeared in my English translation as “Theory of Knowledge as Phenomenology of the Essence of Cognitive Experiences and their Correlates,” *Aletheia*, v. IV, Bern: Peter Lang, 1988, pp. 1-106.]

11 I did not conceal this fact from Husserl. Following the appearance of the *Meditations* he sent me the original German draft (in typescript), along with a copy of the French edition, and asked for my critical remarks because he was planning at the time an entirely new

Meanwhile, I was soon forced to interrupt this work, since due to an initially altogether extrinsic circumstance an entirely new sphere of problems had opened up: the problem of the possibility of an intersubjectively secured cognition of a text fixed in literary form, which appeared to me as the problem of the possibility of intersubjectively secured science *in general*. This became the principal theme of the book *O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego*, which I published in 1937.<sup>12</sup> The attendant aesthetic problems had to be taken into account once again in this book. Then, in the spring of 1938 Husserl passed away, and the possibility of any direct discussion concerning idealism was buried along with him. But the full impact of the problem itself had nonetheless remained with me.

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German version of the book. I wrote down my remarks to the first four Meditations and sent them to Husserl, but I then realized that isolated objections to particular passages in Husserl's text would not do at all, and that the whole problem had to be restructured from the ground up. Husserl had repeatedly requested that I also write my remarks to the Fifth Meditation, and reacted adversely when I informed him that I could not do so for lack of time. He was simply of the opinion that I should always have time for him. I had in fact just begun to write the new book\* for *him*, this being the reason for writing it in German. But it required years to complete that project, whereas an impatient Husserl wanted to have my critical remarks *immediately*. That to some degree he both valued and needed them I could substantiate from his letters. But no extensive substantive discussion ever again developed between us. I did actually visit Freiburg in January of 1936, but the circumstances of such agonizing times for Husserl did not permit us to devote any tranquil time to purely theoretical matters. Besides, I had to leave Freiburg after two days, and never saw Husserl again. My "Remarks" did, however, surface once again and – to be sure – in a distorted form: a selection of them, not of my choosing, was appended to the German edition of the *Meditations*. A number of crucial objections against transcendental idealism were deleted by the editor. Perhaps the time will yet come when the full text of those "Remarks" will be able to appear.\*\* [1962]

\* [Since Husserl's requests and Ingarden's "Remarks" date to 1931, this would appear to contradict the above statement that he started to commit "the book" to paper around 1935. However, Ingarden is referring here to a preliminary version of "the book": "*Beiträge zum Problem Idealismus-Realismus* [Contributions to the Idealism-Realism Problem]." Cf. R. Ingarden, *Erläuterungen zu den Briefen Husserls* [Clarifications to Husserl's Letters], in: E. Husserl, *Briefe an Roman Ingarden* [Letters to Roman Ingarden], Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968, p. 179, clarif. 71.]

\*\* [Ingarden's full remarks did appear in the form of notes to the Polish translation of the *Cartesianische Meditationen: Medytacje Kartezjańskie*, tr. Andrzej Wajs, Warszawa: PWN, 1982, pp. 237-291, and subsequently in the original German, in R. Ingarden, *Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 5, Schriften zur Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls*, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1998, pp. 55-111. ]

12 [Lwów: Ossolineum. Eng. tr.: *The Cognition of the Literary Work* [henceforth, *Cognition*], trans. Ruth Ann Crowley and Kenneth R. Olson, Evanston: Northwestern U. Pr., 1973.]

In order to orient myself anew toward its ontological treatment, and by way of preparing myself for an analysis of the fundamental questions of ontology, I devoted the year between 1938 and 1939 to a thorough study of a series of arguments in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. I discussed these with my philosophical colleagues and students of the time in an open seminar during the 1938/39 academic year. I also scheduled a special seminar devoted to the idealism/realism problem for 1939/40.

Then came the War. At first it looked as if pursuing philosophical endeavors would no longer be possible. In spite of this, however, "after some two years"<sup>13</sup> I had resolved against all hope to resume my philosophical efforts – at first, simply in order to sustain myself spiritually and thus be able to survive. But remarkably enough, I then proceeded to work almost without interruption, and often in quite dire circumstances, until the beginning of 1945, at which time our overall situation had begun to change radically. When I arrived in Cracow in January 1945 in order to resume my academic activity at the city's University, both of the first two volumes of the book pertaining to the "controversy over the existence of the world" were completed. But it took another two years before they could be readied for print: the first volume appeared in 1947, the second in 1948 – issued by the Polish Academy of Sciences in Cracow.

I wrote the book with virtually no confrontation with other books. In the last year of its writing I was not even allowed to access my private library. I was also unable to discuss its main theses with my friends, since no open discourse was permitted. And many of my younger friends had perished. Of course, none of this did my book any good. But since contrary to all expectations the opportunity to publish it did materialize, I decided that at that point it would not make sense to confront its findings *ex post* with the conceptions of other philosophers. For the essence of this book does not consist in rethinking anew and testing the cogency of the conceptions of others, but in letting certain fundamental problems of philosophy blossom in full independence out of my own reflective gestations, in setting them before my mind in this fresh vitality, and in forging their solution by means of radical thought. I was not counting on having any readers at the time. I wrote only for myself, since thoughts sometimes ripen in the course of writing; they certainly first gain their precise imprint through linguistic formulation.

There is of course no doubt that I had predecessors in numerous particulars. Accordingly, over many subsequent years of prescriptive [*rezeptiver*]<sup>14</sup> work I

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13 " in October 1941 "

14 [It is my best guess that this adjective, added in the German version to the otherwise unaltered corresponding Polish sentence, is coined by Ingarden from the German word



also endeavored to become conversant with the main currents of the European philosophical tradition. Where I was aware of my indebtedness to others, and deemed it significant, I did not hesitate to acknowledge it. But in its principal lines of reasoning, my book sought to forge new paths, and it seems to me that in this respect it is independent of other investigations. Let it therefore be released, without any further augmentation, in that form into which the War and the fate of Poland during those years had molded it.

Besides, the War did not exert only a negative influence on the book. The War – whose true countenance was certainly for the first time fully disclosed in Poland, which in its most dangerous form had to be lived through in our country, and which could only be endured through inner, spiritual fortitude – demanded of us not only courage and daring resoluteness in the making of decisions, but also an unshakable moral posture. Such a posture in turn demanded that we invest everything into clarifying our own understanding of the world in its innermost depths. An end had to be put to the sort of shirking and evasion of ultimate theoretical commitments that was so characteristic of “various philosophical circles before the War”<sup>15</sup>. Out of these inner, in the deepest sense practical, yearnings and necessities of personal, spiritual living was born the desire to reach a decision concerning ultimate questions that could no longer be evaded, a desire that enabled me to write this book – although the two volumes thus far completed represent no more than the *prolegomena* to these ultimate questions. For its part, work on this book enabled me to live through perhaps the most difficult of times.

The two volumes I hereby present to the public constitute but a fragment of the analyses needed to bring to a resolution the controversy over the existence of the world. They do, however, deal with a sphere of intimately connected problems which, when solved in a particular way, contribute to narrowing the scope of possible options relative to the mode of existence of the real world, so that the further course of research begins to be more sharply delineated. In that sense therefore the two volumes constitute a unified whole containing a closed range [*Umkreis*] of findings that may prove significant for future research.

*The Author*  
*Cracow, August 1946*

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for a medical prescription –*Rezept* – to convey the notion that he felt the need to remedy the gap occasioned by the War in his acquaintance with the philosophical literature.]

15 “many currents in [early] 20th century European philosophy, and especially so of the Neopositivism promulgated in Poland in the 1930s”

## Addendum to the German Edition

Nearly half of these two volumes – written during the War – I wrote both in Polish and German simultaneously. Later I completed only the Polish version, and in the post-War years continued to work on the German edition only sporadically – to the extent permitted by other concerns. Only last winter did the possibility of issuing the German edition materialize, indeed through the friendly initiative of my faithful publisher, Dr. Hermann Niemeyer. I therefore applied myself to completing the German version. Since the initial publications in 1947/48 of the two volumes by the Polish Academy of Sciences in Cracow, I was compelled to complete and prepare for print several other works, large and small; consequently, the planned continuation of this book could only proceed slowly. The *Material Ontology of the Real World*, which had initially been envisioned as the third volume, had meanwhile to be postponed, because it turned out that a yet more extensive formal-ontological analysis of the world had to be undertaken relative to its causal structure. Thus, I spent the years 1952-54 working on a third volume that was devoted to the problem of causation. The purely ontological treatment of this problem (as a problem pertaining to the structure of the world) had also been concluded sometime toward the end of 1954. But these ontological conclusions have to confront the findings of contemporary natural science. And this I have not yet managed to do. Hence, this volume will still have to wait for some time before being completed and published.<sup>16</sup> For the time being then, the first two volumes make their appearance (as three volumes in the German version) as a self-contained whole, and may they pave the way for further investigations into the entire problem-complex.

The present German version coincides in substance with the second Polish edition issued by the Polish State Publishers in Warsaw, in 1960/61. It does, however, contain various augmentations and minor corrective revisions in formulation; its verbal expression has also been simplified in many places. Several substantive flaws have likewise been eliminated. It does not therefore represent a straightforward translation of the Polish text, but rather a distinct version of the third edition of the book.

Miss Anni Best was extremely helpful to me in improving the syntax of the text, for which I here offer her my deepest gratitude.

*The Author*  
*Cracow, Summer 1962*

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16 [Vol. III of the *Streit* appeared as *Über die kausale Struktur der realen Welt*, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1974.]



# Chapter I

## Preliminary Reflections

### § 1. Introduction

It is common knowledge that the concept “idealism” had many different significations throughout the history of philosophy, even though these significations were not differentiated sharply enough. Consequently, its disparate meanings are themselves not well-defined. As a result, a variety of doctrines are regarded as antitheses to idealism<sup>17</sup>. This situation is linked to the ambiguity of the term ‘idea’ that has evolved in the course of the history of philosophy.

It was Plato, as we know, who originally introduced the concept of the “idea,” and this primarily<sup>18</sup> for the purpose of designating what later came to be called “the universal” – which was understood to include both “general objects” and “pure”<sup>19</sup> ideal qualities. But this designation was not unequivocal even vis-à-vis the extension of the concept, given that on some occasions Plato embraces with the term ‘idea’ both the mathematical and what is called a general concept, whereas on others he leaves both of these outside its scope. This usage of the term ‘idea’ [that Plato introduced] denotes only one type of “idealism”: anyone who admits the existence of “ideas” alongside and apart from the real world (the world of particulars) is considered to be an “idealist” in this sense. Plato himself was therefore an “idealist” of this sort. But in some circles it has become customary to regard Plato as a “realist.” This, however, no longer happens with regard to the<sup>20</sup> domain of objects whose existence Plato endorses, but rather with a view to the mode of being which he would appear to ascribe to ideas. Yet even this is not unambiguous. Some consider him a “realist” because in his later years he (allegedly) attributed to ideas the capacity to affect individual things, and precisely in this way consigned ideas back into the realm of particulars. Others regard him as a “realist” because he attributed to ideas “a mode of being more perfect than that of particulars”<sup>21</sup>, and because this mode of being (according to

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17 “, be it so-called realism, itself of various types, or, say, materialism”

18 “Primarily,” because the term is already ambiguous in Plato.

19 “supratemporal”

20 “special”

21 “the perfect, fullest being”

his interpreters, and not Plato himself) is supposed to accrue precisely to real, individual entities. The idealism/realism juxtaposition is therefore determined in this case not by an opposition of two *domains of being*, but by a distinction in the *modes of being* of “ideas” and “particulars.”

We arrive at entirely different, historically familiar significations of the term ‘idealism’ if we take the word ‘idea’ in the sense it first assumed for Descartes, and then (following certain modifications by other philosophers) most importantly for Locke and Berkeley. With Descartes, the term ‘idea’ began to designate conscious experiences, whereby of course both the extension and content of this concept had undergone various fluctuations, designating in opalescent fashion now the “immediate” object of conscious experiences, now the concept (that of ideal entities, in particular), and then the corresponding *act* of consciousness as well. It is on this<sup>22</sup> interpretation of the term ‘idea’ that Berkeley then bases his conception of the material thing as a combination of “ideas,” or as a complex idea – a material thing whose *esse* is tantamount to [*gleich*] its *percipi*.<sup>23</sup> It is this very doctrine that got branded “idealism.” Ever since then it has become customary to speak of idealism whenever no longer just the physical world, but the real world in general, is regarded either directly as a manifold of conscious experiences (sometimes – of their “contents”), or as an assortment of concatenations of such experiences (“monads” in Leibniz’ terminology), or finally as some peculiar construct [*Gebilde*] of the latter. At the same time, the mode of being of the real world (or of the entities belonging to it) is somehow demoted in all these cases in comparison with the mode of being of consciousness. On this view, there is properly no real world at all in the sense of absolute being, and only consciousness exists – either as the so-called universal consciousness, or as the individual consciousness of individual monads, or, finally, as the consciousness of the absolute spirit [*Geistes*] (ego [*Ich*], God). But the world exists as well, in a weakened, relative sense “– conditioned somehow by the being of consciousness (of the pure ego)”<sup>24</sup>. Realism of one sort or another then constitutes the antithesis to the idealism so understood, a realism according to which the existence of the real world is also admitted alongside and independently of the existence of consciousness. In this case, therefore, what is at issue in the controversy between idealism and realism is the existence of the real world – and a specific mode of this existence at that – as well as the existential

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22 “, let me call it subjectivist, ”

23 Locke already writes in numerous places that a thing is a complex idea, but it is Berkeley who first expressly contends that the material thing is altogether nothing other than such an idea, and that it can exist in no other way except that its *esse* = *percipi*.

24 “, e.g., [in the sense] of that *esse* = *percipi* ”

relations between the world and consciousness, which as a rule is here termed “pure consciousness,” “absolute ego,” and the like.

But the term ‘idea’ in the sense of a conscious experience leads to another interpretation of the heading “Idealism.” In this new interpretation it signifies a conception according to which consciousness, or that which somehow bears the character of consciousness, is regarded as the fundamental factor in real being, as its “substance,” and indeed independently of whether this consciousness-bound or spiritual factor is taken to be the substance of God or of an individual mind-endowed [*psychische*] subject. An idealism in this sense is therefore identical here with spiritualism – be it of a monistic or pluralistic variety – and comprises the antithesis to any and every kind of radical or moderate materialism. To be sure, in this case, too, the dispute pertains to the real world (⌈the physical world, in particular<sup>25</sup>), although then it no longer focuses on its existence (which, for materialists especially, is well established from the outset) but on its nature – whether the latter is spiritual or material, or partially spiritual and partially material, or, finally, somehow neutral vis-à-vis both of these natures. And the conflict in this context frequently revolves around which of these possibly world-constituting elements plays the preeminent or foundational role in this world – or even a creative one.

By linking the spiritual with the problem of values, moral values in particular, one frequently comes to regard as “idealistic” those doctrines that accept the (autonomous) existence of values, doctrines that are inclined to assign to values at least a significant role, if not a crucial and leading role, in man’s life and in the travails of the real world at large. In this instance we have a case of so-called “axiological” idealism. And since Plato sees the highest idea in a specific value<sup>26</sup>, it becomes relatively easy to find one’s way back from axiological idealism to the Platonic idealism of general ideas.

All of these idealisms and their antitheses are metaphysical (that is, what is always at issue in them is the existence of some sort of world)<sup>27</sup>, and how the latter truly is in its essence. However, these metaphysical idealisms and realisms are frequently confused with the so-called “epistemological” ones. As we know, in modern philosophy it was Descartes’ *Meditationes de prima philosophia* that made a vital contribution toward generating the controversy over the existence of the world.<sup>28</sup> ⌈ A conclusion of these *Meditations* is that positive reasons can

25 ⌈ of individual things ⌋

26 ⌈ (καλοκάγαθία) ⌋

27 ⌈ (of individual things or of universals) ⌋

28 [Ingarden himself often abbreviates this “title”-expression, ‘controversy over the existence of the world,’ with the abbreviating term *Streitfrage*. I shall employ the term ‘Controversy’ for both.]

be set forth against the indubitability of knowledge pertaining to real entities, and consequently against its certainty.<sup>29</sup> To this uncertainty and dubitability Descartes opposes the absolute validity and indubitability of the knowledge of one's own *cogitationes*, and, at one with it, [the indubitability] of the existence of these *cogitationes* and of one's own ego. Starting with him, and indeed through Berkeley, Hume, Kant and the Neo-Kantian idealists, all the way to the transcendental idealists of our times, the conviction became increasingly more entrenched that not only does the problem of the existence and nature of the real world follow from epistemological reflections, but that at bottom it is itself an epistemological problem. Of course, the aversion toward metaphysics that has been steadily growing since Kant's times has also contributed to this conviction. One of its consequences is the belief that all claims concerning the real world – its existence or non-existence, its distinctive mode of being, its form and material attributes [*Beschaffenheit*] – must be formulated exclusively by means of concepts drawn from the epistemological analyses of those acts of consciousness in which cognition of any and all real particulars occurs, and that these claims should be accepted solely on the basis of assertions concerning this sort of cognition. In this context, the sole existent that is admitted absolutely and without reservations is the philosopher's own *ego* with its *cogitationes* – which are grasped in immanent perception. This commitment is the ultimate point of departure and support for all analyses, as well as the bare minimum in existential presuppositions. The existence and material endowment of every entity (of the real world, in particular) that differs from consciousness must somehow be derived with the aid of epistemological analyses from the existence of the *ego* and from the way its experiences run their course. The (realist or idealist) commitments arrived at from such derivation are ordinarily regarded as comprising not a metaphysical resolution of the Controversy (which, after all, they *de facto* are), but an epistemological one – although this resolution is subjected to a metaphysical interpretation. This latter is the so-called “transcendental” analysis of the existence of the world. Methodologically, it passes for the exclusively correct way of analyzing this problem, and is supposed to guarantee optimum validity for the results acquired.

The numerous attempts to arbitrate the Controversy on this [transcendental] terrain almost invariably culminate in an idealism that manifests itself in one guise or another – which cannot inspire a great deal of trust in the legitimacy of this approach. Besides, this version of transcendental idealism forms a hybrid

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29 「 As a result of questioning the *veracity and certainty of the cognition of real objects*, he puts in doubt the factual existence of the real world (indeed, of the material world in particular). 』

borderline case between purely metaphysical and strictly epistemological idealisms. Only epistemological issues have a place in the latter. These can go hand-in-hand with establishing a particular brand of metaphysical idealism – but they cannot compel it.

In the analyses to which this book is devoted I concern myself strictly with the question pertaining to the existence of the real world<sup>30</sup>, and indeed, in the final reckoning, with precisely that world which is given to us in direct experience in the form of countless things, processes and events, and which contains both purely material entities and psycho-physical individuals. This controversy certainly plays the role of a central problem in contemporary philosophy, a problem with which the greatest minds have grappled. It has nonetheless remained unresolved to this very day, interesting and profound as some of the attempted solutions have surely been. Two warring camps continue to exist, and – what is worse – in their discussions they often speak past each other, since each fails to understand the other. On closer inspection, there are actually several camps. For there are many different variants of the so-called “realist” or “idealist” solution to this principal problem. Moreover, instead of simplifying and clarifying the problem-context in the course of the debates, we wind up with increasingly more complicated theories and a progressive convolution of the problems. This situation has led some investigators to deny the existence of the problem itself or, as R. Carnap has done – to declare it nonsensical.<sup>31</sup>

The fact that no significant progress toward a resolution of the Controversy could yet be achieved suggests that some sorts of unexposed errors have been committed at the very inception of such drastically divergent conceptions. But what, if not the question itself, could serve as the point of departure for an analysis? It seems, therefore, that some sort of vagueness or confusion of problems must inhere in the way the [main] problem is formulated. A thorough and unbiased inquiry into the various doctrines does in fact enable us to recognize with ever greater clarity that a host of diverse, undifferentiated problems lurks behind the various theories, problems that have never been clearly grasped – and never examined with a view to their interrelationships. It seems useless under such circumstances to seek yet another solution to the Controversy without first attempting to scrupulously clarify the essential content and various ramifications of the problems themselves, and of the fundamental concepts underlying them. Hence, we set ourselves the initial task of systematically laying out the complex of

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30 From now on, I speak of “idealism” or “realism” only in this sense, and under this restriction.

31 Cf. R. Carnap, *Scheinprobleme der Philosophie* [, Berlin: Veltkreis Verlag, 1928. Eng. tr. in *The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy*, tr. by Rolf A. George, Berkeley: California U. Pr., 1968, pp. 301-343.]



problems which is pertinent to the overall idealism/realism controversy, and we aim to do so on the basis of the most far-reaching analysis of the states of affairs [*Tatbestände*] which make up the substantive foundation for the ultimate, basic concepts that determine these problems. Only from this sort of beginning can we sketch the basic contours of a course of inquiry that is aware of its presuppositions and suited to its purpose. It will turn out that just to formulate the principal problems correctly requires answers to a relatively large number of basic questions, that a comprehensive and laborious preliminary investigation is therefore necessary before we can attend to the main problem. New errors are of course also possible in the course of this preliminary investigation. 'Hence, the greatest possible caution is called for.'<sup>32</sup> But perhaps at least some of the guidelines in our inquiry will prove to be tenable and contribute to promoting further research.

## § 2. The Presuppositions of the Controversy and its Provisional Formulation

<sup>33</sup>No matter how hard we try to divest ourselves of historical influences, and to let ourselves be guided strictly by the substantive concerns at hand, we must nonetheless – in the ancillary phases of the analyses – connect to some particular, historically extant theoretical doctrine, so that we may begin by formulating the problem in some provisional way. We take our start from certain notions of Edmund Husserl, since his transcendental idealism represents the deepest and most serious attempt to settle the idealism/realism dispute that I know of within the framework of twentieth-century philosophy.<sup>34</sup> I do not, however, intend to reproduce Husserl's expositions in fullest detail, or to submit them here to a critique. I confine myself to the sheer articulation of the problem, and thus hold not so much to a literal rendition of his arguments as to the core of his thought.

Like any other, so also our controversy stems from a series of presuppositions, some of which inhere only implicitly in the fundamental concepts em-

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32 'I therefore have no illusions that not a few things in my development of the controversy-problematic will in the future need to be corrected, changed or deepened. '

33 'In reality, every analysis, even if carried out in the most radical fashion, represents only a transitional phase in the evolution of an investigation. Consequently, its results are always only provisional and its point of departure depends on the theoretical context to which it attaches. Therefore, '

34 'To avoid misunderstandings, I must at once note that it seems to me highly unlikely that the solution proposed by Husserl could be correct. '

ployed. It will prove useful to explicate them here, and indeed – to begin with – in that form in which they emerge from Husserl’s arguments.<sup>35</sup>

At least two realms of being are to be distinguished for individual entities: the realm of pure consciousness and the real world.

By “pure” consciousness in Husserl’s sense we mean those configurations of consciousness [*Bewußtseinsbestände*] that lie within the purview of active and possible immanent perception<sup>36</sup>, and which – after having eliminated any and every apprehension that is alien to and does not originate from such perception – must be taken exactly as they present themselves in this perception. There are various sorts of apprehensions that are foreign to immanent perception, and to which pure consciousness is susceptible when the orientation of the agent of cognition is altered.<sup>37</sup> On the other hand, when immanence is strictly adhered to,

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35 Those writings of Husserl’s that are the most relevant in this context include: *Ideas I* (1913), *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929) and *Cartesian Meditations* (1929). In these introductory expositions I confine myself to *Ideas I*, since the problem context is more clearly and simply laid out in this book<sup>†</sup>. Let me touch on just one issue from the *Meditations* at this point. As we know, there is a shift in Husserl’s views with regard to the real world that has led to various discrepancies among the relevant claims. This is not the place to go into the matter in greater detail, since Husserl’s standpoint is not the intended focus of our deliberations, but rather their impetus. Husserlian idealism is the theme of several of my papers, now assembled in a volume entitled *Z badań nad filozofią współczesną [Investigations in Contemporary Philosophy]* [Warszawa: PWN, 1963].<sup>‡\*</sup>

\*<sup>†</sup> than in his later works, even though his position [in *Ideas I*] is still unstable, but not as radical as, e.g., in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. In the following I do not always adhere strictly to Husserl’s formulations, but I do make the effort to remain faithful to his thought. <sup>‡</sup>

36 Cf. Husserl, *Ideen I*, p. 68: “In the case of an [...] *immanent ... perception, perception and perceived form an essentially unmediated unity, that of a single concrete cogitatio*. Here, the perceiving harbors its object in itself in such a way that it can be severed from it only by means of abstraction, only as [*something*] essentially *non-selfsufficient*.” [Ingarden’s ellipsis omits ‘(so-called “inner”)’ which he justifies by the following\* qualification in the Polish version:]

\*<sup>†</sup> Immanent perception should not be identified with the inner perception in which our mental states and attributes are given to us. Besides, this distinction is already to be found in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* – in the guise of a different terminology. <sup>‡</sup>

37 “Inner” perception in the strict sense is directed primarily not toward pure conscious experiences, but rather only to what of one’s own mind [*das Eigen-Psychische*] manifests itself in those experiences, such as, e.g., a firm conviction, an emotional stirring of love, or even some particular character trait of one’s personality [*Eigenperson*]. Only against the background of this something mental can “inner” perception be deflected, so to speak, onto conscious experiences, which must then naturally be conceived as activities emanating from the person’s inner being [*Innern*] and as giving expression to that

these apprehensions simply remain outside the scope of this perception and consequently fall by the wayside on their own.<sup>38</sup> Among the most important of these [non-immanent apprehensions], we mention in the first place the apprehension<sup>39</sup> of the conscious experience as a symptomatic manifestation of the being and life of some definite, real, psychosomatic individual. This real individual is in no way a genuine constituent of pure consciousness, but rather finds in the latter only a manifestation of its own self. That is to say, the real individual is object of a particular sort of experience [*Erfahrung*] that occurs in pure consciousness. Secondly and intimately bound up with the first, we mention the apprehension of consciousness as a “real” process that belongs to the totality [*Gesamtbestand*] of the real world at any given time, † a process that is linked by multifarious relations to other mental and material processes and things of this world. This apprehension also has a reflexive character that settles onto pure experiences

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person. Only perception held in strict immanence can strip off or neutralize this apprehension. According to Husserl, however, this transition can only be achieved by implementing the phenomenological Epoche. But if this Epoche is strictly adhered to, the issue of the validity of the said apprehension can in *no* sense be resolved. Whoever regards it as a mere “intentional” product [*Leistung*] of inner perception – as appears to be the case for Husserl\* – forges the path to a particular cast of idealism with respect to the being of personality; on the other hand, whoever resolves the issue at hand in the sense of an objectively valid cognition of personality has already committed himself to a particular sort of realism. I bring this up at this juncture in order to point out at once that not only the “outer” (in particular, physical) but also the “inner” (mental and personal [*eigenpsychische*]) world is involved in the controversy over idealism and realism. This of course should not be taken as my having decided that these two “worlds” are bound by some necessary connection. This is an issue onto itself.

\* This, incidentally, is a point on which Husserl betrays his principle of Epoche – in *Ideas*, but also later. For he treats this apprehension from the outset as capable of being stripped away [*abstreifbar*] and relative\*\*, as an apprehension, therefore, that needs to be eliminated in the course of a definitive investigation that aims at disclosing what is absolutely valid. This can of course be done in principle [*an sich*], but only as an end result of a critical investigation. Yet Husserl does not give us this investigation – neither in *Ideas*, nor in his later published writings.\*\*\*

\*\* † to inner perception †

\*\*\* † It may well be that investigations pertaining to this topic are to be found among the manuscripts left behind by Husserl. But for the time being, no such analyses have been discovered in the manuscripts released in recent years [prior to 1948]. †

38 † However, it is not so easy to achieve pure immanent perceptions. For this reason it is important to become aware of these apprehensions. †

39 I utilize Husserl’s manner of speaking. In fact, two things need to be distinguished here – even in Husserl’s sense: 1) “apprehension [*Auffassung*]” as a subjective operation; 2) a certain conceptual character [*Auffassungscharakter*] of what is given in perception as a result of that operation.

[*Erlebnisse*] as a result of the previously named apprehension – that is, as a result of the link between conscious experiences and the attendant psychosomatic individual, and as a consequence of the real relations between this individual and the real world surrounding him<sup>40</sup>.

In both of these apprehensions the conscious experience is given in “inner” perception<sup>41</sup>. The ability to eliminate or at least neutralize them in the course of effecting immanent perception shows (according to Husserl) that they do not belong to the ownmost essence of the conscious experience – the “pure” one. If one insists on having it in its “purity,” one must accept it just as it offers itself in immanent perception. After eliminating or neutralizing the said apprehensions, the conscious experience unveils itself (according to Husserl) as an<sup>42</sup> existent that is radically different from and existentially independent of any real entity. It is for this reason that in *Ideas I* Husserl labeled these experiences as “irreal entities” [*Irrealitäten*]<sup>43</sup>. Thus, immanent perception, in contradistinction to outer and inner perception, leads us to a sharp and radical distinction of the two domains of being: the real world and pure consciousness.

This radical dissimilarity of the two domains of being<sup>44</sup> does not of course preclude quite specific, as yet to be clarified – possible or actual – relations from obtaining between them. Indeed, one of the tasks within the scope of the “idealism/realism” controversy is the painstaking clarification of these relations. But this task cannot be undertaken until a number of other problems have been solved. It would appear that these relations must be of a completely different nature than the ones that can obtain among the elements of the real world, or among those of pure consciousness.

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40    “ , and in particular as a certain *mental* process, being the discharge of the given person’s life and attributes, but at the same time conditioned by processes transpiring in the physical world – in the given person’s body, especially. This apprehension is intimately connected with the preceding one. A real process, which consciousness is now taken to be, is integrated into the totality of the world as its constituent by means of multifarious real connections with other mental and real processes ”

41    “ , ordinarily employed for the purposes of empirical psychology ”

42    “ individual ”

43    “ (cf. *Ideas I*, *op. cit.*, Introduction) ”

44    “ [Ftn. in Polish:] The reader will kindly bear in mind that in giving an account of others’ views I must frequently give voice to assertions which in my own positive deliberations I shall later question. To such assertions belongs, e.g., the just stated thesis concerning the radical dissimilarity of the two realms of being: the world and pure consciousness. It represents the point of departure for the entire transcendental treatment of the problems pertaining to the Controversy. Indeed, toward the end of Vol. II this thesis will become the theme of analyses which aim at putting it in doubt. ”

“Pure consciousness” may be taken to mean either the single stream of consciousness of the very *ego* that philosophizes or an open set of streams of consciousness, each of which belongs to a different *ego*. Which of these possibilities is chosen will have a decisive impact on the further course of analysis;<sup>45</sup> therefore, at this point we ought not to reject either of them. However, the manner in which the demarcation of the real world from pure consciousness had been effected<sup>46</sup> entitles us to initially restrict the domain of pure experiences to those of the solitary *ego* that actually does the philosophizing. At any rate, there must be some phase in the course of a transcendental analysis (which we are about to discuss<sup>47</sup>) in which only the existence of a single, indeed “one’s own,” stream of consciousness can be admitted – and everything else only to the extent and insofar as it can be brought into some specific relation with that stream of consciousness. Only after this phase of analysis has been completed does the question of the possibility, or even necessity, of admitting an *alter ego*<sup>48</sup> open up. But the question entails its own peculiar difficulties, as Husserl’s analyses in the *Cartesian Meditations* demonstrate<sup>49</sup>.<sup>50</sup> Still, it is only along this path that the radical rigor [*Reinheit*] of the transcendental method can be achieved.

The real entities belonging to the real world are given *via* manifolds of a specific sort of conscious acts of so-called experience [*Erfahrung*]<sup>51</sup> – and more specifically, one that occurs in the so-called “natural standpoint [or orientation]”

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- 45    is of paramount significance for many reasons. In particular, it is important for epistemological investigations,
- 46   – namely, by resorting to immanent perception and by consigning to pure consciousness everything that lies within the scope of that perception’s possible application –
- 47   and which many, including Husserl, consider the only rational manner of dealing with the problem of idealism and realism
- 48   other subjects (Husserl says “*alterego*”)
- 49   demonstrated by the theoretical troubles which Husserl attempts to overcome in his *Cartesian Meditations*
- 50   Alfred Schütz has convincingly pointed out these difficulties and dangers in the paper he delivered at the 1957 Phenomenology Conference in Royaumont [“*Le problème de l’intersubjectivité transcendentale chez Husserls*,” in *Husserl, Cahiers de Royaumont*, Paris: 1959, pp. 334-365; Eng tr. F. Kersten in collaboration with A. Gurwitsch and Th. Luckmann in A. Schutz, *Collected Papers III*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, pp. 51-83.]
- 51   [ Since *Erfahrungen* are a species of *Erlebnisse*, I shall henceforth for the most part let the context resolve the ‘*Erfahrung/Erlebnis*’ distinction by simply rendering both with ‘experience,’ and clarifying with the German term where needed. An alternate rendering of this pair of terms has been ‘empirical experience’ for *Erfahrung* and ‘lived [or conscious] experience’ for *Erlebnis*, which I may also employ. Ingarden gives his own specific definition of ‘*Erfahrung*’ at the end of this paragraph.]

[*Einstellung*]<sup>52</sup>. These entities are given viscerally [*originär*]<sup>53</sup> as themselves, as existing, and as being endowed with this or that assortment of attributes. The acts of empirical experience are themselves pure conscious experiences. At the same time, “experience” is not to be understood exclusively as the so-called sensory experience, but right from the outset we have to reckon with the possibility of several different modes of such experience. Therefore, let “experience [*Erfahrung*]” denote for us nothing other than *the consciousness that presents [gebende] a transcendent object itself*<sup>54</sup>.

Real entities, including the real world in its entirety, are “transcendent” vis-à-vis the experiences of pure consciousness in which they are given. That means that no element of the real world – be it a thing, the material attribute of a thing, a process, or an event – is an intrinsic [or inherent] [*reeler*]<sup>55</sup> part of the conscious experience in which it is given; and conversely, no element of this experience is an intrinsic part of what is given in it.<sup>56</sup>

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52 [To my mind, the “canonical” (as K. Schuhmann termed it in a private communication) rendition of this term by the word ‘attitude’ bears too pronounced a psychological connotation that is misleading. It suggests a deliberately adopted stance, which is precisely what it is not in Husserl’s notion. Even ‘stance’ would in fact be an improvement. Ultimately, the same can be argued against the alternate option, including mine – but to a lesser extent, I think.]

53 [The “canonical” term is ‘originarily’; Ingarden sometimes uses the term ‘*leibhaft*’ (motivating my choice), and on occasion the locutions “in person,” “in the original” and “in its self-presence.” “In the flesh” and “first-hand” have also been proposed.]

54 □, “in the original” □

55 [‘*effektiv*’ and ‘*echt*,’ just mentioned as synonymous to ‘*originär*, function as synonyms in two other contexts: with respect to ‘*reell*’ and ‘*aktuell*.’]

56 Ultimately, Husserl gives no detailed characterization of the concept of transcendence. What has been said here does, however, seem to me to be wholly in line with his thinking. But as we shall presently show, one unmentioned condition must still be added here in order to obtain a precise formulation of □ this concept<sup>7a</sup>. According to H. Conrad-Martius, the feature that also belongs to this concept is that at the instant of its execution, the act of consciousness, in particular the act of intending an object [*das gegenständliche Vermeinen*], is incapable of intruding into the vicissitudes of the real world.\*<sup>b</sup> Meanwhile, this claim presupposes a certain commitment concerning the essence of pure consciousness that is inadmissible in the initial developmental stage of the “idealism/realism” problematic. To begin with, therefore, in the sequel we exclude this feature from the concept of transcendence. One should also not reckon among the features of the concept of transcendence any of the other features that have been attributed to it in the history of philosophy, such as, e.g., that of its unknowability, which has frequently been included in it as something self-evident by Neo-Kantian philosophy.<sup>c</sup> – We shall later have occasion to distinguish *several* concepts of transcendence.

For reasons we shall not go into here, the being of pure consciousness is indubitable; the being of the real world, on the other hand, or of its constituents – the individual things and processes – is in principle open to doubt, and the circumstance of their being given viscerally as self-present in acts of experience can in no way interdict against this doubt. But the being of the real world is not “dubitable” in the sense of specific *positive grounds* being available within the framework of what is experienced that would speak against recognizing the world’s existence, grounds which would at the same time be insufficient to deny this existence. Rather, it is subject to doubt in the sense that its non-existence is in principle not ruled out even in the presence of all the very same episodes [*Verlaufe*] of pure consciousness that do in fact transpire, and precisely as they transpire. It is the very structure of experience that allows for such a possibility. That is because every real thing – which is material, or has something material as its founding stratum – can only be given in a manifold of outer perceptions, each of which does indeed bring the respective thing to a visceral self-presentation [*leibhaften Selbstgegebenheit*], but at the same time in virtue of its essence always presents the thing only from one side, and in a single aspect which brings it to appearance. The thing is always given through “adumbrations [*Abschattungen*]”<sup>57</sup> – as Husserl used to say in *Ideas* – but never as directly as, say, an immanently perceived conscious experience is given in the perception apprehending *it*. Every outer *perception* is at the same time motivationally connected to other perceptions that refer to the same thing, so that what is given in the active mode [*das aktuell Gegebene*] is with respect to some of its features accountable to, and accounted for by, what was presented on some earlier occasion. And every perception’s claim to show the thing in its selfhood [*Selbstheit*] and material attributes may be just as well confirmed as discredited [by other perceptions]. Hence, the positing of a particular thing’s existence and attributes [*Seins- und Soseinssetzung*] to which erstwhile empirical experience has attained may be discredited by subsequent experience of the very same thing. The validity of this thesis is therefore always contingent (limited) and relative. The thing – despite all prior motivationally consistent experience – may after all not *exist*.

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\* Cf. H. Conrad-Martius, *Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt*, Jahrb. F. Philos. u. phänom. Forschung, Vol. III [, 1916, pp. 345-542.].

a<sup>†</sup> one of the concepts of transcendence <sup>†</sup>

b<sup>†</sup> Conrad-Martius calls this sort of transcendence “real [*realnq = reale*] transcendence.” <sup>†</sup>

c<sup>†</sup> Hence, the concept of a “transcendent” object in the sense established here has in principle nothing in common with the Kantian concept of “thing in itself.” <sup>†</sup>

57 [According to Ingarden, this replaces the term ‘*Ansichten*,’ normally translated by ‘aspects,’ which Husserl favored in the *Logical Investigations*.]

The fundamental difference in mode of being between the two realms of entities (or their constituents) – between that of reality and of pure consciousness – consists in a fundamental and essentially different mode of presentation, each of which is, so to speak, inoperative with respect to the elements of the other sphere. That is to say, what is real cannot be given immanently, and pure consciousness cannot be given by way of transcendent perceptions founded in adumbrations. The dissimilarity in mode of presentation, according to this Husserlian doctrine, first implies the dissimilarity in mode of being: on the one hand – absolute, indubitable being; on the other – relative being that in principle admits of non-being.<sup>58, 59</sup>

Having presupposed all of this<sup>60</sup>, the “idealism/realism” Controversy appears at first glance to be extremely simple. It concerns the existence or non-existence of the “real world” and follows from the difference in the dubitability or indubitability of the existence of the two domains of being we have distinguished, or from the transcendence of the real world vis-à-vis the pure experiences which are themselves given immanently. If we could show that no real world did in fact exist even though all conscious experiences remained unaltered in the way they actually occur, then there would be only the one sphere of being – that of pure consciousness. The so-called “idealists” would then be right. In the opposite case, the view of the so-called “realists” would be the correct one. But as we shall presently show, this simplistic contradistinction will not do.

In the opinion of many modern researchers, Husserl among them<sup>61</sup>, the contradistinction of the two realms of being<sup>62</sup> at the same time specifies the type of analysis with which the entire problem ought to be treated. It needs to be the “transcendental” mode of analysis we have already mentioned. Having once

58 In fact, the pretension of Husserl’s transcendental idealism as reflected in the writings subsequent to *Ideas I* goes much farther. He allows the real world to be “constituted” in pure consciousness, which is ultimately tantamount to the creation of this world by means of a certain kind of conscious episodes [*Bewußtseinsvollzüge*]. But this need not concern us for the moment.

59 [The passage spanning “It is the very structure...admits of non-being.” (including fn. 42) was added in the German version.]

60 ▮ [Ftn. in Polish:] These are of course not *all* of the presuppositions of Husserl’s (or of other authors’) transcendental idealism. Nonetheless, this idealism does already represent a certain determinate *resolution* of the controversy. Here, however, only those presuppositions are chosen which lie at the basis of the *problem* comprising the focus of the controversy. They do not single out the nature of its resolution. ▮

61 ▮ (who devoted numerous incisive inquiries to working out the method for addressing this matter) ▮

62 ▮ , with the simultaneous discovery that one of them, i.e., pure consciousness, is given in immanent perception, which guarantees the absolute indubitability of its existence, ▮



gained the sphere of indubitable being in the pure experiences of the philosophizing *ego* (following Descartes' initial efforts) – and the stock of cognitions that are immune to any doubt whatsoever which comes with that – there have been repeated attempts to pose the problem of the existence of the real world on this solely secure foundation, and to solve it by means of an equally indubitable method. As we have said, “transcendental” in this sense is what we call an analysis which takes as its sole point of departure and support the domain of the pure experiences that can be grasped in immanent perception, and which seeks at the same time to find the cognitive basis for recognizing<sup>63</sup> every non-immanent entity exclusively in the configurations and episodes of pure consciousness, in order to be able to secure in this manner the ultimate, directly attainable legitimation or discreditation [*Berechtigung oder Nichtberechtigung*] of every cognitive finding that pertains to such entities. All principles for assessing the legitimacy of the cognitive findings, every step in which the process of gaining knowledge of a particular entity is disclosed, as well as every step in subjecting to a critical scrutiny the scope of the validity of the results attained in the process, are to be moored (in the course of the transcendental analysis) in that “absolute” foundation – and these findings have scientific value only when the analysis can be carried out in a foolproof manner. Any reference to the existence of a non-immanent object in order to explain or demonstrate the existence of the real world, a reference that has not itself been shown to be legitimate in pure conscious episodes, is inconsistent with the tenets of transcendental analysis, and as such – inadmissible. Failure to adhere to transcendental analysis – as in Husserl's opinion is the case with Descartes – gets censured as a relapse into the dogmatism of traditional metaphysics.

In this connection one seeks to work out a very subtle, but also rather complicated, method of transcendental analysis, which, for Husserl, among others, consists in a series of steps of the so-called<sup>64</sup> “phenomenological reduction”.<sup>65</sup><sup>66</sup>

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63   ┌ the existence of ┐

64   ┌ phenomenological ἐποχή, also called ┐

65   ┌ [Ftn. in Polish:] Husserl first published his analyses on this topic in *Ideen I*. But almost throughout the quarter century of work that was left him following the publication of *Ideen*, Husserl was involved in working out the method of the phenomenological “reductions” in greater detail and in perfecting the transcendental method. The results of these analyses have not been published by him. I know of their existence from conversations with Husserl. In 1950, Husserl's lectures from 1907 were issued (entitled *The Idea of Phenomenology*), in which I believe the idea of the “phenomenological reduction” becomes crystallized for the first time. But the formulation offered in *Ideen* (1913) seems to me considerably more mature. ┐

The ultimate goal of all these procedures is a flawless “deduction” of the existence of the real world out of the existence and episodes of pure consciousness<sup>67</sup>. The path to this goal seems to be difficult and complicated, but the final target quite simple and easy to understand: namely, the epistemic demonstration of the existence or non-existence of the real world.

A closer inspection shows, however, that this goal, too, is characterized by considerable complexity since one must reckon with a far greater number of possible solutions than would appear to be the case at first glance. Let us proceed to that.

### § 3. The Requisite of Sorting Out Various Groups of Problems

As we have just indicated, on closer inspection the purported simplicity of our Controversy disappears for the following reasons.

The fundamental ability to doubt the existence of the real world is grounded in the peculiarities of the direct experience of the entities belonging to that world; in particular, it is rooted in the traits specific to so-called “sense” experience, both outer and inner, which appears to provide the ultimate basis of justification [*Begründungsgrundlage*] for the legitimate knowledge concerning this world. We still need to supplement the peculiarities of outer experience already mentioned (transcendence of the self-given object, one-sidedness and inadequacy of its presentation *via* adumbrations) with the following features – and this on strictly substantive grounds, although still with reference to Husserl’s analyses:

The transcendence of what is given *vis-à-vis* the perceptual experience is to be further characterized by pointing out that what is thus presented – the thing, in particular – does not form a unified [*einheitliches*] whole (or any other kind of whole) with this experience, that it therefore constitutes a second, self-contained whole over against the latter. But as concerns the effective presentation [*effektive Gegebenheit*] through adumbrations (aspects, appearances), which is always only one-sided, while various [other] moments of the thing are simultaneously implicitly presented [*Mitgegebenheit*] (the projected [*vermeinte*] inte-

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66    ⌈ According to Husserl, it is an indispensable condition for properly conducted transcendental analyses, and relies foremost on neutralizing a belief in the existence of the real world that we constantly nurture in our natural orientation. And indeed, if ⌋

67    ⌈ , therefore this whole derivation ought to proceed without accepting anywhere along the line the existence of the world, that is to say – by exercising the *ἐποχή*. More detailed analyses show, however, that this *ἐποχή* consists of a system of interrelated operations that perform various functions. Under these conditions, ⌋

rior, the thing's attributes on the side just now turned away from the perceiver), these other moments can be effectively presented only in other (prior or subsequent) perceptions, whereby a different ensemble of the same thing's attributes are in turn merely implicitly presented. In view of the thing's ability to undergo change, there is always in principle the possibility that it may be qualified differently than is suggested [*mitgegeben*] by the currently occurring perception – which, incidentally, can never be securely verified, since the thing might well have changed by the time we execute the next perception. It may also change at some future time in such a way as to possess attributes that will be presented authentically in this forthcoming perception, but which are now merely implicitly presented [*mitgegeben*] and which it does not in fact possess during the current perception, even though they are implicitly given in it, so that the subsequent verification [*Ausweisung*] of these attributes is not valid for the present instant. Conversely, it is also not ruled out, though it is not necessary, that experience will continue to consistently demonstrate this [thing's] being qualified otherwise [than it is now], or even [its] non-existence – and that the relevant object does nonetheless in fact exist. Since none of these possibilities is accidental, but rather dictated in an essential way by the structure of outer perception<sup>68</sup>, it follows that the fundamental dubitability applies not only to the factual existence of the real, perceived object – or more generally, of the real world at large – but also to its qualitative endowment [*Beschaffensein*]<sup>69</sup>. Similar considerations are also applicable to inner perception. These result in the finding that even the existence and qualitative endowment of the perceiving subject's mind and soul [*Seele und Geist*] are in principle susceptible to doubt.

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68 † [Ftn. in Polish:] Both Husserl and his students tried to show this in numerous analyses of sensory perception. It must be said, however, that the phenomenologists' consideration of these possibilities acknowledged only those conditions that delimit these possibilities, which [conditions] are discoverable by *restricting* deliberations to the *immanent* analysis of outer perception, but did not inquire into the conditions of the very *genesis* of these perceptions – especially those conditions that would obtain in the states of affairs *transcendent vis-à-vis* the stream of pure consciousness. This procedure seemed the only correct one while effecting the phenomenological *ἐποχή*, for acknowledging any sort of transcendent conditions would appear to violate the principle of the *ἐποχή*. However, a decisive step was already tacitly being taken here toward an idealist commitment. – This issue needs to be revisited in positive epistemological analyses. A way out needs to be found there that will at once not violate the principle of the *ἐποχή* and not circumvent the issue of conditioning the genesis of certain outer perceptions. Perhaps it will then turn out that some of the possibilities discussed in the text above need to be eliminated. But the path to get to that point is long. †

69 This “qualitative endowment” is of course at this stage only a preliminary abbreviating designation that will later be differentiated into various moments.

The first notion to be questioned in view of the above is the demarcation between the real world and pure consciousness, which belongs among the premises of our Controversy, but then also the concept of the real world acquired on the basis of experience, and of its reality [*Realität*] as a specific mode of being. If the real world or its elements can be altogether differently qualified than appears to be the case on the basis of erstwhile outer or inner perception, then *one* member of the opposition “real world – pure consciousness” has not been definitively established as to its qualitative endowment and mode of existence. It becomes questionable, in turn, whether our partition of the two domains of being does not rely on those very characteristics of the real world that are indeed open to doubt. Hence the partition itself must be submitted to a new critical examination. The concepts of the real world, of individual real entities, and of their very reality as a distinct mode of being – concepts that were formulated on the basis of experience and its structure – must now be critically reexamined.

Husserl would no doubt agree with this. But he would probably have added that a constitutive analysis is what is called for in order to resolve the doubts that have arisen here. This analysis would have to be carried out in pure immanence<sup>70</sup>, and would for this very reason presuppose the partition of the two domains of being.

Meanwhile, this analysis, which by the way has never been actually and conclusively carried out by Husserl<sup>71</sup>, can at best offer us the essential and necessary rationale [*Gründe*] for the particular constitution of a particular entity, but it can never provide us with a definitive proof for the legitimacy of the consti-

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70 Restricting analysis to pure immanence certainly has its good reasons within epistemological methodology, although the concept of immanence needs to be clarified and tightened, which may perhaps lead to the recognition of a variety of levels of immanence. But this restriction also has its darker sides, which should not be ignored. To wit, the question may arise whether the factual occurrence of certain perceptual episodes which lead to determinate constitutive results can truly be traced back in every case to purely immanent conditions grounded in the pure ego – as philosophers going all the way back to Fichte have attempted to assume, and which led to various constructions; or whether in at least some cases these perceptual episodes do not of themselves [*von sich aus*] point back to *transcendent* grounds or conditions. This question, which Husserl once touched on under the title “teleology” and promptly dropped, is excluded from consideration under the banner of the phenomenological reduction – as a matter of principle, so to speak. It will be necessary to find here a methodologically irreproachable way to avoid abandoning this important basic question, and avoid any fundamental epistemological error at the same time.

71 That is how things look, at least on the basis of those of Husserl’s writings that have been published thus far [1964]. But as far as I know, there are still many important writings among his unpublished manuscripts that deal with this theme.

tuted, object-determining senses [*gegenständliche Sinne*] as they relate to a real entity that may possibly exist in itself. For the extent to which these object-determining senses (which, in view of the essence of the manifolds of experience in question, are necessarily constituted) preserve their validity vis-à-vis the transcendent entity that may exist in itself always remains an open issue. The more the transcendence of the real world is stressed over against the immanently occurring, empirically-oriented conscious experiences [*Erfahrungserlebnisse*], and the more emphatically the radical dissimilarity between the immanent realm of pure consciousness and the transcendent domain of the real world (or some other arbitrary sphere of transcendent being) is underscored – the more loudly registers the doubt as to whether the object-determining senses constituted in immanence correspond adequately to what in the given case exists in fact.<sup>72</sup>

As a further consequence, the initial formulation of the “idealism/realism” Controversy becomes itself questionable. Thus, we are faced with the task of reexamining the total context of our starting point, and of circumscribing anew the sense of this issue. A separate preliminary inquiry is necessary toward that end.

But there are also other reasons that compel us to reexamine the entire matrix of problems. The initially simple and sharp contradistinction of the two possible, mutually exclusive replies to the question concerning the existence of the real world loses its simplicity as soon as we ask about the *mode* of being of the “real world” whose existence in the given case is to be acknowledged, and about its existential relations to pure consciousness. The straightforward opposition between being and non-being does not suffice here. A more extensive differentiation of possible cases is called for. And we can already see this requirement lurking in the fact that many eminent proponents of so-called “idealism” most emphatically reject the reproach of having denied the existence of the real world. One generally introduces in this connection the distinction between an existence of the “real” world that is dependent on pure consciousness and one that is independent of it. But introducing this distinction would yield at least three rather than two possible solutions of the Controversy. (Besides, as Max Scheler has already correctly emphasized, the term “existentially dependent” is still ambiguous enough to elicit widespread confusion.<sup>73</sup>) A detailed scrutiny of the possible modes of being will show, however, that the number of *a priori* possible solutions to the problem of the “existence” of the real world is even

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72 [These last two paragraphs were added in the German version.]

73 Cf. Max Scheler, *Idealismus-Realismus*, Philosophischer Anzeiger, Bd. II, 1927 [Eng. tr.: “Idealism and Realism,” in *Selected Philosophical Essays*, Evanston: Northwestern U. Pr., pp. 288-356.].

greater. In conjunction with this, the entire problem-context of the Controversy must undergo a corresponding differentiation.

As we have already indicated, our controversy is rooted in the 'dubitability'<sup>74</sup> of the existence of the real world, which for the time being is conceded by all the conflicting parties. For its part, this dubitability traces back to certain peculiarities of the empirical mode of cognition relating to this world. It would appear, accordingly, as if motives of a strictly epistemological nature led to this problem concerning the existence of the real world, a problem which is at bottom metaphysical. Consequently, the solution to this problem has often enough been sought along epistemological lines. Meanwhile, the dubitability of the existence of the real world is grounded in that world's transcendence vis-à-vis conscious experiences, a transcendence which in its essence is an ontological issue. In view of this circumstance, the problem-context gets complicated in a new way: in addition to epistemological issues, purely ontological questions must also be reckoned with for the purpose of defining and solving a metaphysical problem.<sup>75,76</sup> The diversity of factors leading to the Controversy and contributing to its solution also leads to a differentiation of the disputed issue itself. The *one* question must be decomposed into many different questions, and even groups of questions. Nor is it irrelevant to which *type* of questions a particular substantive issue may lead us. If a problem is metaphysical, say, then the mode of cognition and the method that leads to its solution must also be metaphysical. If it is epistemological, then entirely different modes of cognition and methods must be applied, and so on. There is a rigorous correspondence between the nature of a problem-domain and the cognitive measures that govern this domain. Hence, in order to bring clarity and legitimacy into the course of the investigation, problems must be clearly grasped not only in their content, but also in terms of their fundamental character and placement in the appropriate problem-domain. And so, a preliminary investigation would appear to be indispensable also for this reason.

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74 ' fundamental uncertainty\*

\* I speak of a given object's fundamental uncertainty of existence whenever there is in principle a possibility of doubting its existence or its qualitative endowment. ▽

75 The scope of ontological issues that come into play is in fact much more extensive, but it will not be possible to show this until later.

76 ' These ontological problems must also play a vital role within the problematic of the controversy because the concepts leading to the demarcation of the real world from pure consciousness – which, as I pointed out above, became doubtful the instant the empirical shakiness of their foundation became manifest – need to be elucidated and established anew. ▽



## Chapter II

# Partition of the Three Major Problem Groups

### § 4. Introductory Remarks

In order to unravel the whole gamut of problems that interest us and to partition them into sharply distinct groups, it is first of all necessary to distinguish the basic types of philosophical problems, whereby their fundamental distinctness from the problems belonging to the special sciences must also be explained. However, the history of the idealism/realism Controversy indicates clearly enough that this problem has to be developed on the terrain of *philosophical* reflection. But could not those “positive” special sciences that pertain to the real contribute something toward the solution of our Controversy? We must respond that these sciences always address factual [or: matter-of-fact] situations [*faktische Tatbestände*] within the real world, and never concern themselves with the world *as a whole*.<sup>77</sup> Indeed, they never make the existence of the latter into an issue, but rather tacitly presuppose it. In their individual studies they simply investigate whether and under what conditions this or that particular fact obtains, and inquire into the lawful regularities that govern the processes and occurrences in the world. But all of this can go neither toward substantiating the tacitly acknowledged existence of the world, nor toward casting doubt on it.<sup>78</sup>

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77 Even the cosmological problems that have recently surfaced on the terrain of astronomy and astrophysics pertain at bottom to only a *part* of the cosmos: the material world. But on this terrain they are getting decidedly closer to metaphysical problems.

78 [Accumulating an increasingly greater quantity of facts and discovering further regularities in the course of various processes within the realm of “inanimate” or “organic” nature (including “mental” facts, in the latter), or, finally, establishing an interconnection among all of these – and that is all that the special sciences could provide us with in their subsequent evolution! – can neither confirm nor undermine the conviction assumed in advance in the sciences that the real world exists. As long as the special sciences engage in the tasks proper to them, and neither take over certain problems from philosophy, nor attempt to adapt their results to one philosophical current or another, they conduct their research on the basis of the same “naive” conviction concerning the existence of the world that we all nurture in everyday practical life. They, too, neither attempt to place it in doubt, nor to understand the exact sense in which the real world exists for us.]



And quite naturally so. For the "natural sciences"<sup>79</sup> generally build their results on the basis of data provided by outer and inner perception<sup>7</sup>; all of these perceptions are effected in the so-called "natural standpoint," and therefore have at their foundation the basic "naive" conviction that the world does exist. And even if in some problem-contexts these sciences go beyond the matter-of-fact situations given in them and substitute other entities in their stead, they do so only either because they employ a more rigorous empirical approach than that of everyday practical endeavors (and take into account a far greater number of empirical findings than individuals are able to do), or because in the course of researching the grounds of certain lawful regularities within what is given in perception they wind up postulating other entities (e.g., the atomic world). In conjunction with this, they arrive at an interpretation that demotes the perceived objects to the status of phenomenal relativity, without thereby undermining in any way either the fact of the existence of the world *at large* [*überhaupt*], or the fundamental validity of empirical experience.<sup>80</sup> So the special sciences of the "real" can only instruct us better than can everyday experience about which matters-of-fact and lawful regularities obtain in the real world. They are completely useless, however, if our purpose is to resolve the issue of whether and in what sense the *real world* exists. Hence it is only natural that certain proponents of the "positive" sciences deny altogether the cogency and meaningfulness of the idealism/realism Controversy. But as soon as this problem is posed, the sphere of analysis suited to the special sciences is abandoned, and we cross over into philosophy.

The entire unprecedented stock of acquisitions afforded humanity by the special sciences in the past several hundred years should not of course be simply cast aside if we desire a comprehensive treatment of our problem-complex in all its ramifications. It will turn out in the course of our deliberations (within the framework of the material, ontological and metaphysical inquiries) that it is possible to take stock of scientific findings without lapsing into the epistemologically flawed errors in methodology that the trained philosopher finds so unpleasant when he encounters them in works by philosophically-minded physicists and biologists who have no inkling of philosophy. *How* to account for these scientific findings within the wider context is a question that will not surface until much later, and it has no bearing on the fact that the central problem of our Con-

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79 "special sciences pertaining to real objects, "external" or "internal," "

80 "At best, they correct certain of these data by employing more subtle methods of perceiving with the aid of special apparatus. This gives them access to a broader range of perceptions than that which individuals have at their disposal in everyday life. "

troversty extends beyond the bounds of the special sciences and requires an essentially different approach.<sup>81</sup>

In other words, we can count on a satisfactory resolution of our Controversy only if we are able to find a style of analysis different from that employed by the positive sciences. But the possibility of such an analysis has often been emphatically denied by representatives of the special sciences and by positivism (which is so in vogue among natural scientists) without their realizing that they have already entered the terrain of philosophical problems by virtue of this very denial. Yet the champions of philosophy's specific distinctiveness and independence frequently leave us in the lurch by not grounding their standpoint on a solid enough foundation. Let us then eliminate this serious defect insofar as that can be accomplished in short order.<sup>82</sup>

## § 5. Science and Philosophy

*Science and Ontology.* We are entitled to contrast philosophy with "science"<sup>83</sup> (in the sense of all the special sciences<sup>84</sup> collectively) only if at least two funda-

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81 " , and this precisely because the natural sciences (more broadly, the sciences pertaining to facts within the framework of the real world) ultimately rely on the empirical experience which, in the inaugural phase of philosophical considerations concerning this matter, has been cast in doubt. "

82 " , who have already on more than one occasion laid claim – in a manner so little thought through and scientifically responsible! – to having a voice in the matter of the possibility or impossibility of philosophical investigations conducted *independently\** of the special sciences, and in a *manner different* from theirs. Toward that end it will also prove indispensable to come to grips with the features characteristic of scientific cognition, in order to be able to clearly contrast two different types.

\* That is to say, in such a way that the findings of the special sciences do not consist of *unchecked premises* of philosophical assertions, but this does *not* at all mean that philosophy should altogether *ignore* the accomplishment of the special sciences. "

83 " Husserl ruminated over the ideal of philosophy "as rigorous science." But in this context, "science" signifies no more than a responsible theoretical research employing rigorous method and substantiating its claims, uninfluenced by mundane interests. Husserl had undoubtedly himself acknowledged the split between the special sciences and philosophy in the sense advocated here. "\*

\* " The words 'science' and 'scientific' are frequently used in a considerably *broader* sense than the one employed by us here. It is then understood to mean *all responsibly substantiated and disinterested knowledge*. Every serious, adequately precise and substantiated philosophical inquiry is also "scientific" in this sense. Moreover, in its fundamental quest the latter even desires to be "scientific" to a degree higher than the special sciences are capable of achieving. Hence the sometimes manifest requisite of a

mentally different types of problems can be distinguished among purely theoretical ones – along with the cognitive devices and methodological procedures that correspond to them and lead to their solution. In order to make this clear, let us consider – by taking as an example the extant special sciences – what it is that essentially characterizes their problems, the solution of these, and the pertinent modes of cognition.

As we know, there are several types of special sciences. We should certainly not deny the difference between the so-called natural sciences and the humanities [*Geisteswissenschaften*], but that cannot help us to draw the distinction between philosophy and the special sciences. It is much more advantageous to divide all the special sciences into the sciences of facts (empirical sciences [*Erfahrungswissenschaften*]) and those sciences that occupy themselves with supratemporal entities (“*apriori*” sciences), of which mathematics is the chief representative.<sup>85</sup> For it will turn out that an analogous division can also be made within philosophy, and that its contradistinction vis-à-vis the special sciences remains intact nonetheless.

The *sciences of facts* are characterized by the following features:

- a) The primary objects of these sciences (i.e., the ones with which scientific research begins) are always the individual objects (events, processes, things) that go into making up the real world<sup>86</sup>. These can be grasped in their sheer individuality only by means of direct experience. But if they are to be grasped in these sciences by means of concepts and propositions, then even a complete account of their absolute qualifications does not suffice to speci-

“philosophy as rigorous science.” Cf., e. g., Husserl, E., “*Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*,” *Logos*, [1910-11, pp. 289-341. Eng. tr.: “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” in E. Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, trans. Quentin Lauer, New York: Harper & Row, 1965, pp. 71-147, and in *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, Vol. I, trans. Marcus Brainard, Seattle, Noesis Pr., 2001, pp. 249-95.] ʘ

84 ʘ [Ftn.:] Whether science in the narrower sense is merely an agglomeration or indeed a system of special sciences is an issue unto itself, which I am unable to take up here. ʘ

85 ʘ It does appear at first glance that it would be easiest to oppose philosophy to the special sciences by saying that philosophy concerns itself with ideas, hence a particular kind of a-temporal, and at the same time general, objects, whereas science investigates facts within the realm of individual objects. But that is incorrect. ʘ

86 ʘ , in that sense, of course, which is gradually constituted in prephilosophical cognition. But only a philosophical analysis can lead to a clarification and precise definition of this concept. ʘ\*

\* ʘ These can also be objects that are merely correlated to this world: various cultural products, works of art, and the like, with which a variety of likewise special sciences occupy themselves. ʘ

fy them uniquely. To achieve the latter goal a specific time coordinate must also be provided, as well as a well-defined system of spatial coordinates in the case of an object that exists in space.

- b) In the empirical sciences [*Tatsachenwissenschaften*] it is not only the individual assertions that always refer to individual entities, but also the particular and general ones. The “general” assertions are in turn always just generalizations – or better put, summative statements – which always ultimately have their necessary if insufficient basis in the corresponding assertions pertaining to individuals. The extension of these “general” assertions is at least in principle determined by the factual range of objects about which they predicate something, and in practice it is always fringed with a certain greater or lesser vagueness.
- c) Every problem in the empirical sciences has as its premise (ordinarily not even explicitly formulated) the thesis [*Feststellung*] of the existence of the real world, along with a series of substantive commitments which, among other things, are implicitly contained in the primary concepts that are uniquely suited to the relevant object-domain<sup>87</sup>.
- d) The cognitive device which always comprises the first line of attack (or may even serve as the highest court of appeal) for both discovering and solving these problems is empirical experience in one of its variants. The final validation of all claims made by the empirical sciences also always belongs to the latter, since it is both the device for formulating assertions pertaining to individuals and the tool for their confirmation.
- e) Differentiating an investigated object’s properties into essential and inessential plays no decisive role within the realm of empirical sciences. For both have to be equally acknowledged as facts, irrespective of how much more important or interesting the essential properties might be in a particular instance. We must stress in addition that empirical experience itself neither instructs us of this distinction, nor permits us to grasp the necessary interconnections among an object’s essential moments. “That is not to say that both cannot be discovered in the raw material provided by experience, provided the appropriate orientation is adopted. But this standpoint is already something that is not characteristic of empirical sciences.”<sup>88</sup>
- f) The empirical sciences’ ultimate goal is to solve purely theoretical problems, irrespective of how extensive or important the practical application of their findings may be in all the technological disciplines.

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87 “ (e.g., physics, chemistry, psychology, and the like) ”

88 “ Hume was correct in this regard. ”

In contrast, the special sciences that address themselves to supratemporal objects (the so-called “*apriori*”<sup>89</sup> *sciences*) are characterized by the following features:

- a) The objects of their studies are always determined in their general qualification by a system of axioms and by foundational definitions. These objects do not belong to the real world, but rather to a realm of objects specified by the relevant axiomatic system. The objects may be either individual or general.<sup>90</sup> Their individuality, however, where it is present, is essentially different from the individuality of objects belonging to the empirical sciences. This distinction finds its expression, among other ways, in the fact that in order to determine a supratemporal individual object uniquely, it will suffice to unequivocally specify a finite number of its suitably chosen absolute characteristics. To specify some sort of time coordinate in this realm is superfluous, and altogether impossible<sup>91</sup>.
- b) The general assertions in the *apriori* sciences may appear in two forms: either “the A is b” (e. g., “the equilateral triangle has property b”), or “Every A is b” (“Every congruent triangle...”). In the first case, these assertions refer directly to certain universal objects (of some particular level of generality), and can be applied only in a derivative fashion to individual objects, or to objects that are subordinated to more general ones. This application then transforms them into general assertions of the second form.

The general assertions are either themselves axioms or ultimately follow from them. The epistemic basis for such assertions poses a problem that we shall presently address. Their logical basis, however, never consists of assertions that pertain to some specific, individual objects (to the extent that these sorts of assertions occur at all in the *apriori* sciences). In contrast to the empirical sciences, in the *apriori* sciences assertions pertaining to particular, individual objects (insofar as they are formulated there at all) always possess their logical basis in some specific general assertion. The range of the general assertion is never determined here by any factual domain of real entities; rather, it is always specified in the definition of the concept to whose objects the respective general assertion refers. The epistemic basis of such “definitions” is once again a problem, one to which we shall yet have occasion to return in the sequel.

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89    ⌈ [Ftn.] Instead of “*apriori*,” in Poland we frequently say “deductive,” but that characterization is too narrow. As we know, the term ‘*apriori*’ in its contemporary usage should not be understood in the Kantian sense. ⌋

90    I shall later perform a thorough investigation of what it means for an object to be “general,” and what consequences this has for its form. Cf. the chapter pertaining to “ideas.”

91    ⌈ , and a set of spatial coordinates relative to some system of axes that would be situated in the *mundane space* is not adduced even where – as in analytic geometry – the properties of spatial shapes are studied with the aid of coordinates ⌋

- c) Every problem in the *apriori* special sciences has as its premise the existence of the pertinent domain of objects (or of the axiomatic system that determines it), and addresses itself either to the existence of some object within this domain, or to whether the latter is qualified in some particular way, or, finally, to the relations this object may have to other entities within the same domain. But none of these problems presupposes the existence of the real world.
- d) The fundamental cognitive operations invoked by the particular *apriori* sciences are intuitive apprehension [*intuitive Erfassen*] – which leads to the foundational definitions and axioms – and deductive reasoning, which ultimately derives a particular assertion from the corresponding system of axioms. Empirical experience, on the other hand, primarily in the sense of outer or inner experience, does not offer in any of its variants the substantiation of even a single assertion that belongs in the *apriori* sciences.<sup>92,93</sup>
- e) All interconnections discovered in the *apriori* sciences are – on the basis of the corresponding axiomatic system – necessary. And here, too, the split between an object’s essential and inessential properties plays no role, although for different reasons than in the empirical sciences.
- f) Solutions to purely theoretical problems that have an epistemically sound basis are also the ultimate goal of investigation in the *apriori* special sciences.

On the basis of the theses we have just set forth, the following assertions may be advanced as valid for *all special sciences*:

- a) Disregarding all possible practical applications (technology, education, etc.), the acquisition of purely epistemically grounded solutions to theoretical problems is the ultimate goal of all scientific endeavors. It is precisely in this sense that the sciences pursuing them are “theoretical.”

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92 I am not forgetting that at present other conceptions of the epistemic basis of *apriori* disciplines predominate; I shall have occasion to deal with this in the sequel.

93 <sup>†</sup> This also applies to axioms. What sort of cognitive act leads to establishing axioms and bears responsibility for their cognitive value is a controversial point among theoreticians of the *apriori* sciences. There are two diametrically opposed resolutions of this issue: on the one hand the conventionalist outlook, according to which axioms are the results of a *consensus* arrived at by scholars; on the other, the “intuitionist” position in the sense of Descartes. According to Descartes there exists a distinct type of acts of direct *rational* cognition in which the occurrence of the state of affairs specified by the axiom is ascertained. This matter calls for more detailed examination. But the very existence of this controversy, which does not show up in the first group of special sciences, attests to a fundamental difference between these two types of sciences. It is therefore certain that axioms are not discovered in either sensory or inner experience. <sup>†</sup>

- b) The inquiries of all special sciences are bound by certain highest presuppositions whose validity is not questioned within these sciences, and which often are not even mentioned by them. These presuppositions secure the “fact” (in a broadened sense) of the correlative area of research, within the bounds of which the problems belonging to the respective special sciences arise. In this sense – despite all of their critical apparatus – all special sciences are “dogmatic.”
- c) In this connection, all problems in the special sciences (no matter how general) refer to certain elements (“particulars”) belonging to the area of research. Their solutions are either overtly existential assertions or are equivalent to certain such assertions. Here “existence” is always taken to mean existence within a particular domain (regardless of its mode of being). It is in this sense that they are “special [*besondere*]” sciences or sciences “that pertain to particulars [*Einzel*”-*Wissenschaften*].”
- d) The disparity between the essential and inessential properties of an examined object is of no consequence in the special sciences. “This distinction is in fact frequently overlooked – sometimes even expressly rejected – even though it is in principle not inaccessible.”<sup>94</sup>

The conception of the *apriori* sciences presented here will surely be opposed by some philosophically-disposed mathematicians. Various 20th Century conceptions of mathematics with a predominantly positivistic or skeptical bent will be advanced against it – starting with the so-called “hypothetical” view, through the various conventionalistically nominalist, or empiricist, interpretations, all the way to the neopositivistic view, according to which mathematics is no science at all, but merely a system of tautologies that serve to transform scientific propositions and to establish the relations between them.

I have no desire to defend my own view of mathematics here (since this is not the place for it), or to refute the views of others. But even if my view proved to be mistaken, the fundamental schism between the sciences and philosophy would not be affected in any way. For even my prospective opponents in the conception of the *apriori* special sciences would have to concede that the prob-

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94 “ [Ftn.] Surely such is the case when assertions are derived from an already established set of axioms. But the question arises (to which Dr. D. Gierulanka had called attention) whether taking essential characteristics into account – be it of particular objects of mathematical investigations or of interconnections amongst them, or of an entire system of them – does not play a role in the selection of axioms, in the manner of their formulation, and in establishing certain definitions. It seems, however, that it is precisely certain philosophical problems – involving the foundations of mathematics – which enjoin mathematicians to reckon with the difference between essential and inessential characteristics. This matter calls for more detailed investigation. ”

lem as to which from among the many current views of mathematics is the correct one is itself no mathematical problem, nor does it belong in any other special science. And the conceptions of mathematics just mentioned are themselves no mathematical theories (diverse as may be the interpretations of a mathematical proposition that they entail) – and they are not because, if for no other reason, they themselves are not [systems of] mathematical axioms and do not follow logically from such axioms. Such conceptions have been fondly termed “metamathematical,” and rightly so (although this term was introduced only in order to avoid the word ‘philosophical’). Even if the solutions to all the mathematical problems that are possible in the various axiomatic systems were known, certain theoretical problems would still remain that belong neither to mathematics nor to any other special science.<sup>95</sup>

What are the problems that give rise to the various current conceptions of mathematics? They all stem from – among other sources – difficulties with the question as to whether, and how, it is at all possible to demonstrate the truth of a mathematical axiom. No axiom, *ex definitione*, follows from some other proposition of the given deductive system. Despite familiar attempts, J. S. Mill’s for example, it is at the same time impossible to appeal to any variant of empirical experience for an authentication [*Erweis*] of its truth – not even by eventually bringing in some process of abstraction. The truth of axioms in mathematics and in other deductive sciences must pose a true riddle to anyone who recognizes (a) just this or that variant of empirical experience and (b) reasoning (inferring, in particular) as the only two types of cognitive operations. But we are not at the moment concerned with solving this riddle. The only matter of concern is to grasp the *specific character of the problem itself*. To begin with, it does not matter here whether a particular axiom (for example, the axiom that one and only one straight line can pass through two points in a plane) is in fact true. At issue is whether, *quite generally, something like an axiom can be true at all*, and, if that is the case, whether *it is altogether possible to demonstrate its truth* – and this quite apart from whether anyone in the history of science had ever *in fact* stated some axiom or other, and somehow proved its truth. As we can see, these are problems of a completely different sort than the ones that belong to the special sciences, problems nonetheless that are quite meaningful and call for a solution.

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95 One may now perhaps readily consider them to be “linguistic” problems, since they presumably relate to mathematical language. Meanwhile, a “linguistics” that would differ from all other “linguistic” deliberations in the true sense would be quite strange. After all, the latter are empirical investigations, relating to certain cultural facts, whereas nothing of the kind is indeed applicable to metamathematical considerations. Nor is metamathematics any sort of distinct special science, as every linguistic study after all is, but rather a quietly oriented philosophy at best.



Meanwhile, false impressions concerning the character of the problems we have touched upon may arise even after the above exposition. This may happen along two different directions:

A. One may for example conjecture that the distinctiveness of the above problems consists in the fact that while the initially discussed problems address *objects* of knowledge, these new problems pertain to the *knowing* of these objects. But this notion would be misguided. That is to say, even though the distinction we have just mentioned does in fact *also* hold in the *example* we employed, it is not the distinction that is here at issue. For even problems that pertain to cognition can be of a sort that would place them in some special science. For example, when one asks whether, and if so to what extent, a particular scientific finding (e.g., Archimedes' Principle) is true, or which of Archimedes' cognitive acts in fact led him to discover his Principle, or finally what physical methods have been employed in European physics since Galileo's time, and the like – in the last analysis, what is ordinarily being asked about in the first case is some physical circumstance, and in particular about a substantiation of Archimedes' Principle; in the second case we are talking about a problem in the psychology of cognition by an individual; and finally, in the third example, we are posing a problem from the history of science. In each case therefore we are dealing with a problem that belongs in an empirical science. But there *are* of course also problems that pertain to the knowledge of something, but which nonetheless do not belong to the special sciences. And it is not the fact of these problems' pertaining precisely to knowledge that is decisive for their not belonging to the special sciences, but rather their peculiar character – which we now wish to clarify. Namely, when someone asks (as before, relative to the axioms) how it is in general possible for a principle of physical science to be true, or how it is altogether possible to discover and establish such a principle, what cognitive acts have to be performed in order to discover the facts of physical science – we are then already dealing with that fundamentally new type of problem which is wholly distinct from the type of problems dealt with in the special sciences.

One may conjecture that the specific feature of these new problems is that they revolve around a value. In the problem concerning the truth of axioms, truth would be that very value. Attempts have been made, as we know, to differentiate philosophy from the special sciences by allotting to the latter all objects that are in a manner of speaking “devoid of value [*wertlose*],” and to philosophy – values and that which has value [*das Wertvolle*].<sup>96</sup> But this way of separating philosophy from the special sciences is also not what we have in mind. For

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96 † [Ftn.] In particular, currents under Fichte's influence (e.g., the so-called South-German school) conceive of the scope and tasks of philosophy in this way. †

problems concerning valued objects or those very values also come up in the humanities without stripping them of the character that makes them special sciences. In the humanities one asks, for example, what economic values played a role during the Second Republic in France under its particular political, economic and cultural conditions – or, what artistic or aesthetic values do in fact accrue to Rembrandt’s works, or, finally, what moral values were in fact espoused by Julius Caesar, or by the Gaelic legions he battled. Even though all these problems involve values, they are problems that belong to the special sciences. If, on the other hand, we ask what moral values are altogether *possible* – whether, say, only Good and Evil, or also a host of other values, such as justice, courage, responsibility, and the like – then once again we are dealing with that wholly different type of questions we have talked about, which no longer belongs to the special sciences. The same holds of the question, to give another example of the latter type, as to whether a particular aesthetic value must necessarily occur in unison with some moral value, or whether such values are in their very essence independent of one another and can appear separately in different objects.

On the other hand, both of the types of problems we have distinguished can occur relative to objects that are devoid of any value at all. For example, it is a problem of physical science whether matter – whose separate parts are given to us in sensory perception as things – is composed of a multiplicity of “substances” that are qualified by this or that set of properties, or whether it is simply a manifold of processes (waves) that occur without any substantial [*substanziellen*] bearer. And alongside this one, we have a question of a fundamentally different nature: what categorial structures pertaining to objects (as for example the formal structure of a thing (of “substance”), the formal structure of a process, and the like) are altogether possible? Or: is a formal structure of a process altogether possible that would not require the structure of a substantial bearer, or is there a necessary existential bond between both of these structures, so that neither one can subsist at all without the other? And if there is such a necessary bond between them, is it, so to speak, “reciprocal” or only “unilateral”? Thus, is it for example the case that a process cannot occur without a substantial bearer, nor the bearer subsist without the process; or is it rather the case that a process cannot indeed occur without a substantial bearer (possibly of a very specific nature) while a substantial bearer can well exist without participating in any process?

These are all meaningful questions that require an answer, and require it quite apart from how things really are [*in Wirklichkeit*]. <sup>†</sup>Even had we established through an empirical inquiry into facts that in our world processes always occur only in conjunction with specific substantial bearers, the problem of the possibly necessary existential link between the said formal structures would in no way

have been solved. These are very basic problems of a fundamentally different character, and are independent of each other besides.<sup>97</sup>

Precisely for this reason, a new "purely theoretical inquiry"<sup>98</sup> is called for which is totally different from and independent of the special sciences. All the examples cited here belong to one and the same type of problems. They all pertain to pure possibilities or the strictly necessary connections between merely possible moments, or between entire ensembles of such moments. I shall call them here "ontological" problems, and shall try to characterize and differentiate them somewhat more sharply.

*The Special Sciences and Metaphysics.* There is yet another group of problems that are neither ontological nor belong to the special sciences, but which are kindred in a particular respect to the problems of the latter. They are at the same time intimately bound up with ontological problems. I shall call them *metaphysical* problems since it seems to me that they have been at the center of metaphysical studies since time immemorial, irrespective of the fluctuations in the conception of metaphysics through the ages. Let us shed light on the sense of these problems by means of a classic metaphysical problem.

Suppose that both physiology and psychology have advanced in their research to the point of enabling us to assert – at least with a high degree of probability – that every mental process is in fact linked to some organism in which well-specified physiological processes transpire, of which we can give an accurate account. This would be a fact that would simply have to be acknowledged, and its discovery – as well as the substantiation of the corresponding claim – would be a task for the said special sciences. The latter can accomplish nothing more in this regard. Nonetheless, the following question unavoidably arises: Does it belong to the factual essence of the mental processes which are in fact transpiring that they are, among other things, the externalization of specific sorts of physiological processes, or is that simply a fact that is not anchored in the essence of these processes? And analogously: Does it belong to the factual essence of the physiological processes transpiring in the human organism that they must

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97 " These questions do not belong to any science of facts, nor to any special science, but the problems designated by them call for a solution, and therewith for a purely theoretical, cognitive treatment.

Perhaps these examples will suffice for accepting the claim that *alongside* the problems of the special sciences other problems – *fundamentally different from these* – are also possible, which no special science solves or can solve. Nevertheless, they insistently demand a cognitively responsible answer, and concern, if not the same objects with which the special sciences deal, then at any rate something that is somehow closely related to them. "

98 " "science" "

manifest themselves in well-defined mental processes, or could they, to the contrary, transpire in accordance with their factual essence without having to find any expression at all in such processes? In the latter case, the actual concomitant occurrence of both processes in one and the same psychophysical individual would indeed be a fact, but it would nonetheless be a “mere” fact – it would have its cause in some third factor which is contingent vis-à-vis the essences of these processes.

Consider a similar problem: Does it belong to the factual essence of the organisms given to us in experience that their vital processes are terminal, or is that once again just a brute fact that is somehow engendered due to circumstantial contingencies of life, say, “but which could in principle be eliminated if only those circumstances could be altered”<sup>99</sup>? What is it about the factual essence of these organisms that affords them this or that life-form and duration?

The several special sciences are incapable of solving these problems, and indeed not because they have not yet matured sufficiently and are yet to perform far more sophisticated experiments, but purely and simply because the sense experience and inner experience “through which the entities in question are given to us”<sup>100</sup> are not of themselves capable of differentiating their properties into essential and inessential. Consequently, the problems mentioned do not belong to these sciences, but that does not mean that they are altogether unsolvable, or even “senseless” – as the neopositivists would have it. Actually, it does not even matter whether we humans will ever be in a position to solve these problems. The only thing that matters is that the sense of these problems differs essentially from that of the problems in the special sciences, that this sense is in itself wholly intelligible and rational and hence demands a type of research – precisely “metaphysics” – through which these problems could be solved.

In the metaphysics understood in this sense therefore, as in the special sciences, the focus is on discovering certain facts, but not just bare rationally unintelligible facts that follow from other equally opaque “facts”<sup>101</sup>; rather, the focus is on *essential*<sup>102</sup> facts, which – in the necessity of their factual subsistence – are grounded in the essence of the correlative entities, and which are fully intelligi-

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99 “due to not altogether appropriate nourishment, or due to the existence of *bellum omnium contra omnes*”

100 “which we employ in the scientific study of organisms and of the physiological or mental processes occurring in them”

101 “causes”

102 “[Ftn.] It is of course necessary to establish what the essence of a particular object is as such. This is, however, not an issue that could be settled by adducing some nominal definition, say, but is one of the basic problems of formal ontology. I shall deal extensively with this problem in vol. II of this book.”

ble via rational insight into the ideal interconnections among pure qualities.<sup>103</sup> These facts therefore point beyond themselves into the sphere of the ideal, of the non-actual, and it is only from the perspective of that sphere that their essential character can be correctly grasped. The difference between that which belongs to the essence of something and that which is only “contingent” – hence, is not rooted in that essence – does undoubtedly show up within the real entity itself, but this difference can only be demonstrated on the basis of analyses that pertain to the ideal relations and interconnections among pure qualities (*Wesenheiten*), or that pertain to the ideal contents of ideas. Only along this path can the properties of individual, empirically [*erfahrungsmäßig*] given objects be differentiated in what is given via experience into those that belong to their essence and those that do not. Metaphysical analyses are therefore bound up with ontological investigations on the one hand, and on the other they must take into account the findings of the several empirical sciences. To be sure, metaphysical analyses pertain to exactly the same entities that the special sciences investigate, but they differ from those of the empirical sciences in their attempt (under the dictates of ontological analysis) to grasp the essential properties in these entities instead of resting satisfied with just any characteristics that might accidentally fall within the purview of what is empirically given.

It is not yet advisable to attempt an answer to the oft-asked question of whether a wholly *distinctive*, special sort of *experience* [*Erfahrung*] needs to be admitted that would be characteristic for metaphysical inquiry, an experience which, as is sometimes claimed, would not only augment the experience achieved in the special sciences, but would also discover entirely new and different facts. This notion does not at any rate appear absurd, and it will have to be carefully considered once we attend to analyzing the metaphysical problems involved in the controversy over idealism. On the other hand, considering the relatively advanced research into outer and inner experience, and in view of the unsuccessful search for a specific sort of metaphysical experience, the likelihood of this possibility does not seem to be especially great. It may well be, however, that the solution to the problem of how a metaphysics of the real world can be established ought to be sought along a completely new path. But for the moment it is enough to heed the specific character of metaphysical *problems*. For this character does not rule out the possibility that empirical findings acquired within the framework of the special sciences might play a significant role in metaphysics. It does, however, demand that these findings be more deeply explored and properly sorted out.

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103 It must of course be conceded that the exact sense of metaphysical problems cannot be adequately grasped until the idea of the factual essence of an individual object has been clarified. To this end, see §§ 56 ff.

To put it more precisely, this character of metaphysical problems demands that the findings of the special sciences be properly interpreted by *extracting the essence* of the investigated object out of the total multitude of properties given in experience or simply inferred from it. Only should it prove that the experience employed in the particular empirical sciences in some way distorts or conceals the essence of the object – and indeed precisely that essence which it might be possible to discover by means of a specifically metaphysical experience – would metaphysics have to represent not only a completion of the empirical special sciences, but also be their essential corrective [*Korrektur*]<sup>104</sup>. And perhaps the reason philosophers have in the past arrived at so many debacles and disappointments is precisely because they often meant to provide such an essential corrective by means of their metaphysical analyses, or because they expected metaphysics to show us a picture of the world entirely different from the one offered by the empirical sciences. It may be for this very reason that in our days metaphysics has acquired a reputation so negative that even its problems have been rejected as “nonsensical.” One forgets in all of this that genuine metaphysical problems frequently arise precisely on the basis of findings in the natural sciences. The annals of 20th century physics offer the best proof for this, which is not to say that the method invoked by contemporary physicists toward solving these problems is beyond reproach. At present we are not nearly prepared to solve in a sound manner any of the problems that pertain to the possibility and methods of an irreproachable metaphysics. For the time being we can only say that, owing to the peculiar character of its problems, metaphysics surpasses the realm of investigations and findings in the special sciences because it strives to grasp the *factual essence* of its objects of study and to embrace the totality of beings. From a different perspective, we may also state that it transcends the sphere of ontological analyses by leaving the domain of the [ideal] contents of ideas and the pure possibilities that follow from them, and encroaching into the sphere of *factual being*. But whether metaphysics can be realized at all by means of our human faculties is a question that has yet to be broached.

## § 6. Further Characterization of Philosophical Problems

- a) *The Ontological Problems*. Ontological deliberation consists in the *apriori* analysis of the contents of ideas.<sup>105</sup> It has its ultimate foundation in the pure

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104 Of this mindset is, e.g., H. Bergson, who regards “intuition [*Intuition*]” as this sort of specifically metaphysical experience.

105 I deal at great length with the formal structure of ideas in Vol. II. For the moment, I must ask the reader not to reject out of hand my arguments concerning ideas merely be-

apprehension of the most primitive ideal qualities (of “pure *Wesenheiten*”) and of the necessary interconnections binding them. On the other hand, it proceeds to an analysis of pure possibilities that follow for the individual being from the interrelations ascertained to obtain within ideas’ contents. Ontological analysis does not presuppose *any matter-of-fact* pertaining to objects in the *broad* sense; that is, a sense that encompasses both the real world with the entities that may happen to be present in it and the domains of individual entities that are defined by a correlative axiomatic system.

Relative to the findings of the special sciences, the solutions to ontological problems are a) theoretically prior, and as such independent of scientific findings, b) more general than the latter, and c) imply *no* positive assertion *whatsoever* concerning individual, real matters-of-fact – for which they merely define the limits of possibility. They provide theoretical foundations for the *apriori* special sciences (e.g., mathematics) by clarifying their “primitive” concepts and authenticating their axioms.<sup>106</sup>

To clarify what we have said, ontological problems pertain to pure possibilities and to the necessary interrelationships among ideal qualities, or among the elements of the ideas’ contents, and finally they also pertain to the relations among the collective ideal contents belonging to different ideas. We must first of all introduce into the framework of the real world the distinction between pure and empirical possibilities:

A state of affairs  $X(t')$  from within the real world’s sphere of being, and in the future relative to time instant  $t$ <sup>107</sup> (more accurately, a state of affairs that has neither obtained before instant  $t$  nor obtains in that instant), is empirically possible at instant  $t$  if and only if a) at that time states of affairs  $Y$  obtain in the real

cause of being inclined to identify “ideas” with Plato’s ideas, or because of having learned from positivistically disposed empiricists that the entire platonic doctrine of ideas is untenable. For apart from the issue of the historical fidelity in transmitting Plato’s doctrine, and from the sustainability of the objections leveled at him, one must above all decide for oneself whether my expositions relating to ideas coincide with the platonic conception or are substantially different from it. This cannot be dealt with at present. The assertions now pronounced in the text will be later more fully clarified and justified. For now let me just emphasize that the “ideas” with which I am dealing are also different from the “ideas” of a Descartes, Locke or Hume\*.

\*  $\Gamma$ , and are simply certain “general objects.” Readers familiar with *Essentiale Fragen* will have a considerably easier reading of these introductory remarks.  $\Upsilon$

106 This authentication [*Erweis*] is of course no proof [*Beweis*] [derived] from other propositions, but a check of their validity by tracing back to intuitively grasped states of affairs.

107 The time-instant of  $X$ ’s emergence can either be exactly determined, hence, e.g., a specific  $t' > t$ , or only situated in some approaching interval.

world that either singly, each for itself alone, or collectively constitute a necessary, but at instant  $t$  insufficient, condition for the emergence of  $X$ , and b) if at instant  $t$  states of affairs  $Z$  obtain that are indeed capable of preventing the occurrence of  $X$  at time  $t$  but do not rule out its emergence at some later time  $t'$ , and this for two possible reasons – either because they themselves will no longer obtain at time  $t'$  and can therefore pose no obstacle to the emergence of  $X(t')$ , or because at time  $t'$  they will combine with other states of affairs, in conjunction with which they no longer hinder the emergence of  $X$ . The empirical possibility of  $X$  at time  $t$  is therefore always determined by the real facts of that moment, and is relative to it. What is empirically possible at instant  $t$  may be impossible at some other instant  $t'$ .<sup>108</sup>

⌈In contradistinction, a state of affairs  $X(t')$  is empirically impossible at instant  $t$  ( $t'$  being later than  $t$ ) if a state of affairs  $Z'$  obtains at time  $t$  that rules out the occurrence of  $X$  at  $t'$ . This may happen in two different ways: either a state of affairs  $Z'$  obtains at time  $t$  that will also obtain at  $t'$ , and is mutually exclusive with  $X(t')$ , or a state of affairs [ $Z'$  obtains] whose consequents  $Z''$  hinder the occurrence of  $X(t')$  at instant  $t'$ .

But the empirical possibility of a state of affairs  $X(t')$  differs not only from *actuality* and from the *impossibility* of other states of affairs, but also from the possibilities of *the same* state of affairs  $X(t')$  that are relative to time instants *other* than  $t$ , say, to  $t'$ . And in one respect these latter possibilities do differ from each other in their being relative to a different present, whereby different configurations of states of affairs of types  $Y$  and  $Z$  generally come into play, but in another respect differ from each other by virtue of the *degree* of possibility. The same  $X(t')$  can for example be possible to a higher degree relative to time  $t$  than relative to  $t'$ . The degree of the empirical possibility of  $X(t')$  is in turn determined by the relationship of those states of affairs  $Y$  that obtain at time  $t$  – and constitute the necessary but *insufficient* condition for the occurrence of  $X(t')$  – to those states of affairs  $Y'$ <sup>109</sup> which *complete* ensemble  $Y$  into a *sufficient* condition of  $X(t')$ , but which have not yet been realized at time  $t$ . Generally, this relationship cannot be established quantitatively, for whether or not the complementary but unrealized states of affairs  $Y'$  suffice to bring about the occurrence of  $X(t')$  in conjunction with the already prevailing states  $Y$  depends not only on their *number* but also on their *kind*. One could perhaps then say that the degree of an empirical possibility depends on the assemblage of states of affairs

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108 [A lengthy footnote appears in the corresponding spot of the Polish text. That footnote is followed there by text which, together with the footnote, was replaced by the next two paragraphs. The footnote and replaced text appear in Appendix A.]

109 [Reading  $Y'$  for  $Y$ .]



that have not yet been realized, but which complete the already actualized ensemble of necessary conditions into a sufficient condition. Given that the ensemble of states of affairs that have indeed been realized and are instrumental to the emergence of  $X(t')$  changes from instant to instant, there is a corresponding change in the degree of empirical possibility of  $X(t')$ . Something highly remarkable happens in conjunction with these changes: the smaller grows the difference, established in a given instant, between the realized ensemble of conditions necessary for  $X(t')$  and the ensemble of complementary states of affairs that are yet *to be* realized<sup>110</sup>, the larger grows the degree of possibility of  $X(t')$ . But if at some instant  $t'$  this difference becomes zero, at that moment the full, sufficient condition for  $X(t')$  has been realized, and that means nothing other than that state of affairs  $X(t')$  has become actual, and is no longer merely possible. The highest degree of empirical possibility understood in this sense – the full possibility, one might be inclined to say<sup>111</sup> – is not a possibility, but the actuality of  $X(t')$ . “Realizing” a possible state of affairs is nothing but its “actualization;” that is, the transformation of its empirical possibility into its actuality. But what has the possibility of becoming reality [*das real Mögliche*]<sup>112</sup> differs from what is actual not only because the latter actually occurs as a consequence of the appropriate sufficient condition having been realized, while the former, in the context of an insufficient condition, is merely available [*vorhanden*] for being actualized, but also because the two differ in their *mode of being*. What is possible is not autonomous, but rather is relative to that condition which is insufficient to bring about the something actual corresponding to the possible, and it is in a

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110 [Ingarden appears to have misstated his point here. As in the contrasting case of the difference growing larger, below, the comparison intended is between the prevailing states of affairs and the ensemble of states sufficient to realize  $X(t)$ , i.e., the phrase ‘ensemble of complementary states of affairs that are *yet to be* realized’ should have been replaced, as in the subsequent case, by the phrase ‘the states of affairs that constitute a sufficient condition for the occurrence of  $X(t)$ .’]

111 As we know, there is a *variety* of concepts of possibility which, if not clearly differentiated, were at least somehow glimpsed already in antiquity – in Aristotle and the Megarian school. N. Hartmann has dealt extensively with these various concepts of possibility (cf. his book *Wirklichkeit und Möglichkeit* [Actuality and Possibility] [, Berlin: De Gruyter, 1938].

112 [In the sense of “what has the possibility of attaining the mode of reality.” I am forced to avoid the more natural translation of this phrase by “what is really possible” in order to forestall an equally natural misinterpretation that such a rendition would suggest: ‘really’ could in this case be too easily taken to be synonymous with ‘truly’ or imply a degree of likelihood, while Ingarden is intent on referring to a *mode of being*. Likewise with other synonymous phrases Ingarden employs in the remainder of this paragraph: ‘*reale Möglichkeit*,’ ‘*real möglich*,’ ‘*real unmöglich*.’]

specific way heteronomous. For this reason, one is not fully justified in saying, as we have done above, that the actual is the highest level [*Stufe*] of what has the possibility of becoming reality, but should rather hold that what has that possibility never attains this highest level because it is already occupied by the actual. If, on the other hand, the difference grows between the states of affairs that constitute a sufficient condition for the occurrence [*Bestand*] of  $X(t')$  and those that have already been realized by instant  $t$ , then the possibility for a future occurrence of  $X(t')$  diminishes. All that we have said is of course meant to apply on the assumption that no state of affairs obtains at time  $t$  that rules out the actuality of  $X$  at  $t'$ . For otherwise, at instant  $t$  it would be impossible for  $X(t')$  to become reality [at  $t'$ ], as we have already established. Let us note that at instant  $t$  it can be impossible for  $X(t')$  to become reality [at  $t'$ ] in another way – if not a single component of the sufficient condition for  $X(t')$  has been realized by time  $t$ , that is when nothing yet intimates  $X(t')$ . Finally,  $X(t')$  is no longer possible at the instant  $t'$  in which it has been actualized, since it is indeed actual. The sphere of empirical possibility is situated between these two limiting cases of the impossible and the no-longer-possible (because *actual*). Its relative status vis-à-vis some particular configuration of facts at a particular time, its variability with respect to degree [of likelihood], and finally also its peculiar mode of being – these are all characteristic of empirical possibility. It has to be contrasted with the otherwise understood “possibility” of that which has just been made possible [*ermöglicht*] and is precisely for that reason “actual.” The transition from “what has the possibility of becoming reality” to the actual (the “realized”) is no doubt very interesting from the vantage point of existential ontology. And if something were to rule out that transition, then what has the possibility of becoming reality would also no longer be such [*würde auch das real Mögliche nicht real möglich sein*]. Nonetheless, it is inadvisable to unite the two concepts of possibility into a *single* concept, and merely regard the “realized” as a limiting case of what has the possibility of becoming reality.<sup>113</sup>

Let us give an example of empirical possibility. I am writing this text during the War, at a time when its outcome is not yet decided. Right now, for example, that some professor at a Polish university, who is at present no more than 62 years old, will in three years become the Rector of his university [has the possibility of becoming reality]<sup>114</sup>. The fact that someone is a tenured professor at a Polish university, that a specific election process is in place, that he is not too old to qualify for election in three years, and the fact that at present no state of affairs prevails that would rule out such an election (an example of [which

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113 [ See Appendix A. ]

114 [ is empirically possible ]

would be an already concluded peace agreement that would be unfavorable to us<sup>115</sup>) – all of these facts afford the election of a professor so qualified the possibility of becoming reality, although the degree of likelihood of this possibility being realized is difficult to assess.<sup>116</sup>

*Pure* (hence, not empirical) possibility, on the other hand, is not determined by any matter-of-fact within the real world. It is also not relative to any particular instant of time, nor is it subject to fluctuations in degree. It would be altogether absurd to speak of a greater or lesser degree for a pure possibility. †One can at best infer from a prevailing matter-of-fact that there is a pure possibility corresponding to it and that, precisely because this pure possibility obtains, a factual state of affairs which corresponds to that pure possibility is “possible” – in an entirely novel sense.<sup>117</sup> It is “possible,” in this [novel] sense, that something like a concrete color can be extended in two or three dimensions. It is likewise “possible” that something like sound has varying pitch, and consequently that a concrete sound also has some particular one of these pitches. The possibility for something like a sound to have a pitch is precisely a case of “pure” possibility, whereas it is impossible for something like a sound to be extended in two or three dimensions (in a spatial sense). “Pure” possibilities (and we wish to stay with these primitive instances here) have their basis or source

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115 † such a case could be the conclusion of a peace treaty that would provide for abrogating the existence of a Polish state, and therewith the existence of Polish universities, or the fact that the war will last more than three years from the present moment †

116 I wrote this in the Fall of 1941. Whether the end of the war in three years becoming a reality was possible at that time could not be decided until the *erstwhile* situation could be precisely assessed. The mere fact that it did not end before four years does not yet speak against it [the original empirical possibility], since it is not ruled out that certain events which only later transpired delayed the end of the war until 1945. – The remarks offered here concerning empirical possibility should only serve to demarcate it from “pure” possibility, and not to ground a satisfactory theory of empirical possibility. That would require extensive and, it would seem, at least in part difficult investigations, which would take us too far afield from our main theme. It should only be noted in addition that what was said here concerning empirical possibility does not clarify the specific mode of being of the empirically possible, but simply sets conditions under which something is empirically possible. A lecture I delivered in 1951 at the Polish Academy of Sciences represents a certain augmentation of the remarks offered here. Cf. “*O możliwości i warunkach jej zachodzenia w świecie realnym* [On Possibility and the Conditions of Its Occurrence in the Real World],” *Sprawozdania PAU*, v. 52 (1951) n. 2, pp. 123-27.

117 † Now, as far as actual facts are concerned, it can at best be inferred from them that, insofar as they are actual, certain ensembles of qualities occurring in them are admissible in virtue of pure possibilities, which, for their part, are specified by corresponding pure qualities. †

not in the matters-of-fact within the real world, but solely in pure qualities and in the contents of ideas. ¶ It is indeed the specific character [*Eigenart*] peculiar to ideal qualities that determines the lines along which they may possibly interconnect – or the realm of what is ruled out for such interconnections.<sup>118</sup> ¶<sup>119</sup>

Three fundamentally different realms of being have to be distinguished in the totality of what exists [*im All des Seienden*]<sup>120</sup>: the realm of individual entities, the domain of ideas, and the sphere of pure qualities (Jean Hering called them “*Wesenheiten*”).

The distinction relatively easiest to draw is that between individual entities and general ideas – that is, for example, between a specific person (say, Peter the Great) and the general idea “any human being,” – or, in a similar sense, between some specific individual square of Euclidean geometry, to which countless other likewise individual squares are congruent, and the general idea “any square.” But the contradistinction of “individual object” to “idea” would not have been properly specified in this manner. For there are also particular ideas alongside the general ones, and these, too, need to be distinguished from individual objects. And so beside the set of congruent individual squares with a specified side-length<sup>121</sup>, a set which is in principle infinite, there is the *one* particular idea under which [all of] the single congruent squares fall.

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118 I shall still find occasion in the sequel to return to issues that are connected with this.

119 ¶ *Ipso facto*, what is “purely possible” is not yet thereby empirically possible. On the other hand, what is “purely” impossible is not empirically possible either. A more thorough understanding of “pure possibility” can first be attained on the basis of the analysis of ideas, to which I shall only be able to attend later, § 50). Also, it will only later be possible to substantiate the assertion stated a moment ago. These issues are difficult and require substantial preliminaries; unfortunately, no significant progress has been made since the times of Plato, who inaugurated this entire problematic.\*

Since I shall have to deal with ideas later, I confine myself at this point to the following indispensable remarks:

\* This applies to Husserl and N. Hartmann, among others. ¶

120 ¶ [Ftn.:] It must be emphasized at once in this connection – in order to avoid misunderstandings – that we can and ought to speak in various senses about the “existence” of something: different, say, for individual objects, and *different* for ideas. Even within the realm of individual objects different modes of existence need to be distinguished. A major part of the considerations in Vol. I of this work is dedicated to an analysis of various concepts of existence. Cf. Ch. III, ff. ¶

121 ¶ [Ftn.:] Plato initially confused these objects with ideas, although he later distinguished the latter from the former by contraposing that which is “mathematical” to ideas. He did not, however, instruct us sufficiently as to the reasons for this distinction. ¶

Every idea is distinguished by its peculiar bilateral [*Doppelseitigkeit*] formal structure.<sup>122</sup> On one side of that bilateralness, an idea has a stock of properties that characterize it *qua* idea, on its other side it harbors within itself a content [Gehalt] in which occur ideal concretizations of pure qualities in well-specified manifolds, owing to which [concretizations] the idea acquires a reference to possible individual entities. With a view to this content, the idea has been regarded ever since Plato's times as the prototype [*Urbild*] of (real) individual objects – without any accompanying awareness of its bilateral structure. Some of the ideal qualities (*Wesenheiten*) concretized in ideas' contents – as are, for example, the so-called “sense qualities” – also admit of being actualized in individual, real objects of a specific type; others can achieve concretization only in individual ideal (say, mathematical) objects.<sup>123</sup> Hence, there are the authentically mathematical ideas whose content-elements are not realizable in the strict sense (in full adequation). Accordingly, they have their ideal correlates only in the individual mathematical objects.<sup>124</sup>

If we consider, say, the general idea “any man,” then to its properties *qua* idea belong invariance, atemporality, generality, the bilateralness of its formal structure, the property of possessing a content, and so on. On the other hand, constituents of this idea's content are, for example, “vitality,” “vertebrateness,” “bipedness,” “rationality,” and the like. But these constituents are no properties

122 I have first attempted to advance the characterization of ideas offered here in my *Essentielle Fragen* [*op. cit.*, cf. Preface]. I shall still return to this in the sequel. Cf. Ch. X.

123 <sup>†</sup> [Ftn.:] When speaking of concretization or realization of a particular pure quality, the relation between the pure quality and “its” concretization should not be conceived in the sense of the Platonic μεθεξίς, since that leads to difficulties well-known since Aristotle's times. Nor should it be assumed that there exists only a *single* form of concretizing ideal qualities, namely, that which is manifested in *real* objects. Generally, in terminology employed thus far, when there is talk of something “concrete” – one has in mind something real. But this terminological habit has its source in taking the concept of “concreteness” solely as the opposite of “abstractness” – even though the foundations for specifying these concepts are entirely different. The issue of different possible “concretizations” is intimately connected with the various modes of existence. And so, it will first be possible to characterize more precisely the particular types of “concretizations” on the basis of the analysis of the various modes of existence. The considerations in Vol. I of this book serve as preparation for this. <sup>†</sup>

124 It should be stressed that – at least in his early dialogues – Plato understood by “ideas” not only pure (ideal) qualities and ideal individual entities, but ultimately also “ideas” in the sense espoused here. As we know, he later banished the “mathematical” from the realm of ideas – in his sense – although his reason for doing so is not clear. Plato's entire “doctrine of ideas” is still in an altogether very primitive state, and is therefore susceptible to various justified objections. But it does not follow from this that every *other* conception of “ideas” should also be rejected as allegedly “platonic.”

of the idea itself<sup>125</sup>; they are instead the ideal correlates of the properties belonging to the individual objects (particular people that fall under the idea), provided they do exist *realiter*. The factual existence of the individual objects that fall under the idea is in no way "required"<sup>126</sup> by the content of their idea. We may not therefore conclude that only those general ideas exist whose individual objects exist in the mode of reality or ideality.<sup>127</sup>

Although the content of an idea is that in it which since Plato has been regarded as the so-called "prototype" for individual objects, there is in fact a radical difference between the ideas' content and individual objects<sup>128</sup>. While the latter (provided they are existentially autonomous<sup>129</sup>) cannot be undetermined or ambiguously specified in any respect relevant to them, special sorts of constituents occur in an idea's content that we call "variables."<sup>130</sup> For example, every individual person has at any stage of her or his life a specific skin complexion, no matter how much it may change during the course of that life. The content of

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125 " ", irrespective of the formal role they play in its content. On the other hand, the *occurrence* of just these rather than other constituents in the content of a given idea does constitute its property. As to the constituents themselves "

126 " specified (decided) "

127 Consequently, it would be more correct to introduce the constituents [*Elemente*] of the content of an idea without reference to " the individual entities falling under it. But this encounters various difficulties that "\*" are bound up with the problem of the possibility and manner of cognizing an idea's content. We cannot go into it in greater detail at this stage. In order to introduce the constituents of an idea's content, I have here conveniently resorted to individual objects. Suffice it to note, therefore, that we do *not* come to know ideas – both *qua* idea as well as in its content – in some "other world" by means of "recollection," as Plato would have it.

\* " the properties of real objects, for it is something coincidental to these ideas that in some of them these properties are the ideal correlates of certain real objects. Hence, the above manner of introducing the constituents of an idea's content should only be regarded as a convenient device in cases where we are dealing with objects that exist in the mode of reality. However, construing the concept of a constituent of an idea's content independently of its reference to real objects meets with various difficulties that cannot be discussed in these introductory chapters, in which the sole task is to introduce a certain problematic. Therefore, while signaling the existence of these difficulties, I rest content for the time being with this technically convenient manner of talking about the constituents of an idea's content. These difficulties "

128 " ", a difference which has not been pointed out to this very day "

129 I shall presently attempt to clarify the concept of existential autonomy. [Cf. § 12.]

130 I have for the first time alluded to the "variables" in the idea's content in my *Essentielle Fragen*. H. Spiegelberg has adopted this notion (Cf. "Über das Wesen der Idee [On the Essence of the Idea]," *Jahrb.*, vol. XI [, 1930, pp. 1-238]), but has considerably altered the concept of "variable" – not to the benefit of the theory, in my opinion.

the idea “any person,” in contrast, has only the variable “having *some* skin complexion.” “Some,” rather than specifically this or that one: precisely therein resides the variables’ peculiar mode of “variability.” Similarly, every individual square (in the geometric sense of squares that are congruent to each other) is characterized by a specific side length. In contrast, in the content of the general idea “any square” (one could also say: *d a s Quadrat*)<sup>131</sup> occurs the variable “having some side-length.” In addition to “variables,” “constants” also occur in the content of every idea. A constant belonging to an idea’s content is the ideal concretization of a quite specific ideal (pure) quality. In the idea “any square” occur the constants ‘squareness,’ ‘quadrilateralness,’ ‘equilateralness,’ ‘orthogonality,’ and so on.<sup>132</sup> That the diagonals intersect *at some angle* is a variable in the content of the idea “any parallelogram” (in the Euclidean sense), whereas it belongs to the ideal content of the idea ‘square’ that the diagonals intersect *at right angles*, etc. A “variable” in an idea’s content consists in being the concretization of a pure *possibility* of making some ideal quality concrete (that is, realizing it) in an individual object, where the ideal quality comes from a domain of pure qualities which is specified by the constant factor corresponding to the given variable, or even by the [other] constants belonging to the same idea-content. To be more precise, both a constant factor and a variability factor (one might even say: possibility factor) are to be distinguished in every variable belonging to a content. The concretization of a pure, generic [*artmässigen*] quality constitutes the constant factor, while the variability factor is the concretization of a pure possibility, the very possibility of making concrete in an individual object some particular species [*Spezialfalls*] of that generic quality. In our first example, ‘skin-complexion’ constitutes the constant factor in the variable ‘some skin-complexion,’ whereas the possibility-factor of this variable is indicated with the word ‘some’: that possibility-factor belongs to the content of the idea ‘any man,’ and is the concretized possibility that particular people may have this or that concrete skin-complexion: “black,” “white,” etc. On the other hand, that people are living beings, vertebrates, have spiritual characteristics, and so on – that belongs among the constants of this idea’s content; consequently, individual

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131 [As Ingarden repeatedly emphasizes, an idea is *not* an *individual* entity; therefore, the notion of individuality that the term ‘any’ may suggest to the reader should be set aside.]

132 † [Ftn.:] As far as I know, I was the first to call attention to the occurrence of “constants” and “variables” in the content of the idea, taking therewith a stand against the traditional Platonic conception, and making it possible at the same time to sustain a theory of the idea free from the objections that have been leveled at ideas ever since Aristotle’s times, or rather – since the times of Plato’s *Parmenides*. Cf. *Essentiale Fragen*, *op. cit.* †



people, if they exist at all and are truly “people,” must have among their properties (common traits) the individual instantiations of these constants.<sup>133,134</sup>

The content of an idea is the sole locus within the entire universe of existents where pure possibilities that have their basis in the characteristics peculiar to ideal qualities<sup>135</sup> are concretized.<sup>136</sup> But not everything that belongs in the realm of ideal being consists of<sup>137</sup> possibilities. Such, for example, is *not* the case for the properties of all ideal individual objects, or for the constants in the content of every idea. In a manner of speaking, these latter constitute the sphere of the “actual” [“*Wirklichen*”] (the active [*Aktuellen*]) within the domain of ideal being<sup>138</sup>. In this case, this [realm of the] “actual” forms at the same time the sphere of necessary interconnections among the coexisting moments, say, among the “constants” of an idea’s content. Such for example is the case with the necessary, existential interconnection between ‘trilateralness’ and ‘triangularity’ in the content of the idea of a triangle, or with the necessary interconnection between ‘trilateralness’ and the existence of the four  $\Gamma$  points of intersection (of the [centers of the] inscribed and circumscribed circles, and of the three altitudes and the three normals)<sup>139 140,141</sup>.

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133  $\Gamma$  Similarly, in the content of the general idea of a parallelogram (in Euclidean geometry) the variable occurs: the diagonals intersect at *some* angle, in the rhombus and square at a right angle, in rhomboids and rectangles at *some* acute or obtuse angle. The constant factor of this variable consists of: intersection of the diagonals at an angle; the purely variable factor: at *some* angle, i.e., in *individual* parallelograms various angles of intersection of the diagonals are possible. Etc.  $\neg$

134 W. Schuppe remarks in his *Grundriss der Erkenntnistheorie und Logik* [Basic Outline of Epistemology and Logic] [Berlin: Weidemannsche Buchhandlung, 1910], p. 69: “Possibility has the sole sense of a particular relationship among specified qualities as such: that **a** surely requires neither precisely **c**, nor **d**, nor **e**, nor does it by itself exclude any of them, but that it does indeed, in virtue of its nature, necessarily [*durchaus*] require one of them, that likewise **c**, and **d**, and **e** require an **a**, and therefore have its presence [*Anwesenheit*] as a condition of their appearing.” And on the same page: “Assertion of possibility therefore implies [*meint*] a lawful relationship among qualities, not the existence of a condition.”  $\Gamma$  Hence, Schuppe had in mind here something very similar to what reckons into the variables and constants of the idea’s content.  $\neg$

135 [Reading ‘to ideal qualities’ (with the Polish) instead of ‘to this quality’ – which seems to be a misprint (there appears to be no referent for the indicative)]

136 This, incidentally, agrees with the thesis advanced by Husserl that possibilities are situated within the realm of ideal being, but only insofar as the concept of possibility is restricted to pure possibilities $\Gamma$ , which does not seem correct  $\neg$ .

137  $\Gamma$  pure  $\neg$

138  $\Gamma$  : the concretization of particular cases specified by pure possibilities  $\neg$

139  $\Gamma$  singular points  $\neg$



However, the circumstance that there are pure possibilities in the content of an idea – but then also pure necessary existential interconnections among the constants, as well as various possible dependencies between the former and the latter – opens up the prospect for the existence of a separate set of theoretical problems, those being indeed the very problems that we have just contrasted to the problems of the special sciences. Accordingly, ontological inquiry has the totality of the contents of ideas as its domain of objects. Ontological analysis and inquiry into the contents of ideas (in particular, into the necessary interconnections [*Notwendigkeitszusammenhänge*] and possibilities that obtain within these contents) – that is one and the same thing.

The relations between the contents of ideas and the corresponding individual objects, real or ideal, make possible an easy transformation of propositions that pertain to the contents of ideas into propositions that establish the possible and necessary states of affairs within the realm of individual objects. That is to say, it follows from the indicated structure of a variable in the content of an idea that it defines *generically* [*artmässig*] a range of (possible) individual attributes [*Bestimmtheiten*] that *can* accrue to the individual entities that fall under the respective idea; attributes, however, that do not *have to* accrue to them, even though some *single* one of them always *must*. Thus the variable in the content of the idea determines those attributes in the correlative individual objects that do not belong to their “common” traits, but comprise rather their *individual* variants.<sup>142</sup> These variants – as indeed follows from the variability character of the

140 † In mathematics we express these necessary connections in the form of general theorems, e.g.: “Every triangle has four singular points.” “In every isosceles triangle all the singular points lie on the same straight line (on the altitude),” and so on. It is precisely the task of geometry to discover the necessary connections among the constants of the geometrical ideas’ contents, as well as the connections between the constants and variables of these contents. Nonetheless, geometry comprises only a *special* case of considerably more general analyses. †

141 [Ingarden’s geometry is a bit muddled here. He is referring to the four “classical” points (others have been more recently found) for (non-equilateral) triangles, all of which lie on the same line (which has come to be known as the “Euler line”). To begin with, in the case of the inscribed and circumscribed circles, it makes no sense to speak of “points of intersection.” Secondly, it is not the center of the inscribed circle that lies on the Euler line, but the center of the so-called “nine-point circle.” Finally, since the center of the circumscribed circle coincides with the point of intersection of the normals (perpendicular bisectors of the sides), he has in effect named only three of the four singular points – the fourth is the point of intersection of the medians.]

142 † [Ftn.:] Besides, we need to bear in mind that both the “constants” and “variables” of an idea’s content can have varying degrees of generality. That is a separate theme for inquiry. †

variable – are not unequivocally determined in their lowest qualities by the “common” traits, but are only circumscribed and permitted by them in their *general* [*generellen*] type. Hence even in an ideal individual being a certain contingency is present. From the standpoint of general ideas, not everything is necessary. On the other hand, the so-called “common” traits belonging to individual objects that fall under an idea – traits which also make up their “constitutive” characteristics – are determined by the constants of the correlative idea, and must occur in these objects insofar as they do fall under that idea. In other words: assertions that refer to the constants and variables of an idea, and to their interrelationships, are amenable to being transformed into assertions about the “common” and individual characteristics of the corresponding *individual* objects. But since their factual existence cannot be described from the content of an idea, these assertions can only prescribe *ideal* [*ideelle*] possibilities for these objects, should the latter happen to exist at all. These assertions that are directed at something individual we shall term “applied” ontological “propositions.” They are always equivalent to certain ontological propositions about the contents of ideas.<sup>143</sup> But since they are often much easier to formulate linguistically than propositions concerning the contents of ideas, we shall primarily make use of these applied ontological propositions in the sequel.

The solutions to ontological problems are theoretically “prior” to all claims by the special sciences, in the sense of not being constrained by either the subsistence of any particular real fact or the ideal existence of objects established via some particular axiomatic system. Ontological investigations are therefore undogmatic. They remain valid even if by way of some other, non-ontological approach it were to be shown that the entities corresponding to some specific idea do not at all exist *in fact*. Conversely, however, ontological findings are *binding* on the deliberations of the special sciences to the extent that the bounds of pure possibility established by ontology cannot be trespassed by those sciences. But in particular, ontological findings are “prior” vis-à-vis the *apriori* special sciences in the sense that, among other things, they pertain to “those essence-dictated states of affairs [*Wesensverhalte*] which are captured in the axioms that govern the respective object-domain.”<sup>144</sup> It is therefore in ontology that we find

143 Cf. E. Husserl, *Ideas I*, § 5: “To put it more precisely, at issue is the difference between judgments *about* essence and judgments, which, in unrestrictedly general fashion and untainted by positing [the existence] of what is individual, do nonetheless judge *about something individual, but purely as instantiation of the essence* – [i.e., judge] in the mode: *any... whatever* [*Überhaupt*].” Husserl employs the word ‘essence’ in an ambiguous manner. In this case, he takes it to mean what I here call “idea” with regard to its content.

144 “states of affairs” whose clarification leads to the discovery of axioms “

the place for the correctly understood “foundational research [*Grundlagenforschung*]” which in the *apriori* sciences has occupied so many eminent logicians and mathematicians in the past several decades.

The solutions to ontological problems are in various senses *more general* than the findings of the special sciences. First of all in the sense that all facts – be it in the *real* world or in a domain of objects defined by an axiomatic system – comprise the “realization,” or better yet – the “instantiation,” of only a *single one* from among the various pure possibilities or networks of possibilities [*Möglichkeitsbeständen*], whereas in ontological deliberations possibilities that will never be “realized” or “instantiated” are also taken into account. Secondly, however, they are more general in the sense that the extension of general ontological concepts and propositions is never restricted to the range of objects and facts that may factually exist in the real world, but comprehends all those individuals that are in a pure sense possible – with the sole proviso that they satisfy the defining criteria for their species [*Art*]. Ontological concepts and propositions are therefore always more general than the corresponding ones in the empirical sciences. Of course, their greater generality does not yet by itself suffice to set ontological analyses apart from [those of] the special sciences.

The most general concept of ontology follows from its defining characteristic as a purely *apriori* analysis of the contents of ideas. Every mathematical (purely formal,<sup>145</sup> or even material – say, geometrical) discipline, for example, insofar as it inquires into the contents of ideas, is ontological in this sense, as are also formal logic and – at least in its principal foundational segment – epistemology. But since *ideas of ideas* also exist, the analysis of the contents of these sorts of ideas also comprises a part of ontological analysis. Hence, the very deliberations we are now conducting are also ontological. However, claims concerning ideas that pertain to their properties, formal structure, etc. – and that establish the possible and necessary interconnections among their constituents, or among the ideas themselves – must be kept strictly apart from those claims that assert the *existence* of ideas generally, or of ideas of this or that particular sort. These latter claims are no longer ontological, but at least in principle – metaphysical. That is to say, since the existence of entities that fall under *any* idea (including the idea of an idea) does *not at all* follow necessarily from the content of the respective idea, so too the analysis of the content of the idea of an idea (just as in any other case of ontological analysis) cannot lead to any existential assertions pertaining to ideas, not even to claims that would imply these sorts of existential assertions.

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145 † e.g., general set theory, †

Therefore, the statement we have just made about there being ideas of ideas is<sup>146</sup> a metaphysical statement. †But when we here discussed the formal structure of an idea, we did so on the basis of having analyzed the content of any [*überhaupt*] idea at all, and consequently our discussion was ontological. †<sup>147</sup>

Ordinarily, however, the concept of ontological analysis is employed in a much narrower sense. Indeed, in this narrower sense only those *apriori* items of knowledge are deemed ontological which can be acquired by means of a directly intuitive analysis of the content of ideas, without the aid of any deductive operations (such as those that are predominantly applied in mathematics, for example). In that case, out of the whole of mathematics only the so-called “*Grundlagenforschung* [foundational research]” – which culminates in the formulation and clarification of axioms, and possibly of a number of definitions – fits into the framework of ontology. The mathematician’s strictly deductive work, on the other hand, already belongs to mathematics as a special science.<sup>148</sup> Another frequent way to restrict the concept of ontology is to allot to it only those analyses that pertain to the content of the idea of some particular sort of being, or better put – of some existent<sup>149</sup>, irrespective of whether ideas of existentially self-sufficient individual objects are involved or ideas of their non-self-sufficient moments.<sup>150</sup> Consequently, both formal logic and all of epistemology get excluded

146 † no longer an ontological, but †

147 † Obviously, in the above text it was solely a matter of distinguishing general ideas of individual objects (of a particular type) from ideas of ideas (i.e., in the first case, what falls under a certain idea owing to its content is individual objects – in the second, however, it is ideas). If, on the other hand, it were essentially a matter of affirming the *existence* of ideas and ideas of ideas – then it would at the same time have had to be established in what sense, or in what manner, each of them are to “exist.” But these are subsequent issues. †

148 It is indeed ordinarily overlooked that there is a fundamental, essential difference in mode of cognition, such that intuitive-*apriori* work is work that is *philosophical* in the genuine sense, whereas the deductive-*apriori* is work that already belongs to the special sciences. Not only a conceptual confusion as to the difference between philosophy and the special sciences follows from this\*, but also a fundamentally flawed approach to the problems belonging to “foundational research.” The numerous, rather desperate efforts that have been undertaken on this terrain in recent decades by “formalists” of various persuasions, and especially by neopositivist logicians, may all serve as examples of a radical violation of correct method in that foundational research. It is therefore no wonder that – despite the ingenuity of particular researchers – these efforts could only contribute to the emergence of a foundational *crisis*.

\* †, and an obliteration of the difference between them †

149 †, and thus, some *object* in a broad sense of this term †

150 The concept of being, or of the existent, that is at issue in this setting is not so easy to articulate precisely, although at first glance it appears plausible to contrast logical struc-

from “ontology” so understood, since these do not pertain to any existent for itself, but to the logical structures or operations that refer to such existents.

The restriction of the concept of “ontology” we have just indicated is not of course the result of any individual researchers’ whims, but grows out of definite, more or less important substantive reasons into which we need not delve any deeper here. But even this restricted concept of ontology is broader than Husserl’s. For it encompasses all “ontologies” in Husserl’s sense, along with his “phenomenology” as the *apriori* doctrine of the contents of the ideas of pure experiences.<sup>151</sup> Why Husserl sets this notion of phenomenology in opposition to the “ontologies” is an entirely separate issue; the reasons are both of a general philosophical and methodological nature, as well as most intimately bound up with his transcendental idealism in particular. We cannot go into this in greater detail at this point. But precisely because we cannot presuppose here Husserl’s idealistic commitment, we must adopt a concept of ontology broad enough to also embrace Husserl’s phenomenology.

b) *Metaphysical Problems.* Doubt has frequently been expressed as to whether metaphysics is at all “possible.” But such doubt has ordinarily been accompanied by an ambiguous concept of metaphysics and of its possibility. As to this “being possible,” philosophers had in mind either the question of whether the so-called “metaphysical” claims can satisfy the criteria of truth and demonstrability that metaphysics itself elevates to the status of belonging to its very sense; or a question that is wholly different from the first – whether we human beings do in fact have at our disposal cognitive faculties that would enable us to state valid “metaphysical” judgments and to substan-

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tures [*Gebilde*] or cognitions, as something “non-existent,” to the existent to which they refer. But if we note that these entities [*Gebilde*], too, must “be” or “exist” in some broadened or figurative sense in order to be able to relate at all to the existent to which they refer, then we encounter difficulties in attempting to articulate precisely the concept of “being” at issue. This, however, is already a separate matter that we need not pursue here in greater detail. It is clear at any rate that in this context “existent” cannot be taken in the broadest possible sense.

151 The term ‘phenomenology’ has different meanings not only for Husserl himself, but also for his several students, which meanings, incidentally, have not been well worked out. Those remote from the phenomenological movement have frequently assigned wholly fantastic meanings to the terms ‘phenomenology’ and ‘phenomenologically’\* – especially when phenomenology was in vogue, which luckily is already over! Husserl himself protested against this, much too late unfortunately. We must therefore give at least a few indications in the text toward lending the term ‘phenomenology’ some precision.

\* Γ, so much so, that they had nothing or very little in common with phenomenology in Husserl’s sense 7

tiate them legitimately.<sup>152</sup> Without getting involved in sorting out the various historically extant concepts of metaphysics at this point, and without resolving the issue of the possibility of metaphysics (however it may be understood), we still wish to devote a few sentences here to those problems that we have already termed “metaphysical” – problems that, it seems to us, persist quite independently of whether we humans will ever succeed in obtaining irreproachable solutions to them. In other words, at this stage we simply plead for the recognition of a distinct *domain of problems*.

Among the most important of the problems that are “metaphysical” in our sense<sup>153</sup> are those that pertain to the *factual existence of the world* in the sense of the *totality* of any and all *existents whatsoever*.<sup>154</sup> The *basic* claims of metaphysics are therefore primarily and foremost *existential* judgments. But not all existential judgments are metaphysical. We are not dealing with a metaphysical existential judgment unless the existence of some object is conceived as either in itself *essentially necessary*, or at least as capable of being set into relationship with some ultimate, essentially necessary fact that could serve as the ultimate ground on the basis of which this existence could be proved in a rationally insightful manner [*einsehbar erwiesen*]. This of course does not preclude the factual occurrence of an entity which would for essential reasons prove to be altogether *contingent* in its existence. Its existence would nonetheless simply have to be accepted in such a case, although its *Why* would then remain an unresolved problem, an ultimate metaphysical mystery. But it is precisely such a result,

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152 There are radical opponents of metaphysics who claim that metaphysics is impossible in the sense of there being no true and demonstrable metaphysical assertions whatsoever, since concepts occur in such propositions which are fundamentally flawed, and which consequently preclude the verifiability of the said propositions. I have no doubts that the domain of metaphysics can be\* so stupidly constructed that it becomes easy to assert its “impossibility.” But should this be done *cui bono*? *Notabene*, the chief adversaries of metaphysics are precisely those who are themselves encumbered by a crude, tacit metaphysics.

\* ▮ deliberately ▴

153 When I speak here of metaphysics “in our sense,” that is not meant as any sort of claim to exclusivity. For many researchers have no doubt subscribed to a similar conception of it. I am unable to go into this from a historical perspective. “In our sense” is merely meant to refer the term ‘metaphysics’ to the characterization presented earlier in the text.

154 In this sense, God would belong to the world. This should of course be taken only as a linguistic abbreviation. The expression ‘real world’ must be contrasted to this sense of the term ‘world.’ This [real] world undoubtedly does not encompass the totality of what exists [*die Allheit des Seienden*], in particular – neither the realm of ideal objects, nor that of ideas.

culminating in a debacle that offers the best hint to the peculiar sense of metaphysical questions, questions with which we aim to clarify *essentially necessary facts* or *factual interconnections among essences* [*wesensnotwendiger Tatsachen bzw. tatsächlicher Wesensbestände*]. For as we have already remarked above, in the course of presenting examples of metaphysical problems, there is a further group of metaphysical questions that pertain to the factual *essence* of the objects which in the basic metaphysical assertions have been presumed as factually existent, [that pertain,] in particular, to the essence of the factually existing “real” world and its constituents [*Elemente*]. Moreover, questions concerning the various relations among existing entities belong here, relations that follow from their factual essence; and these relations, too, must be considered from the point of view of some *essence-determined fact* [*Wesenstatsache*]. The judgments comprising the replies to these questions are therefore always *categorical*: they imply – by means of the concept in the proposition’s subject – the factual existence of the object about which the judgment is made [*beurteilten Gegenstandes*], and they refer to factually obtaining interconnections among essences. Should a *hypothetical* judgment occur within the framework of a metaphysical assertion, which of course is quite possible, then it always forms a constituent of the metaphysical theory only if a categorical judgment pertaining to essence – a judgment that ascertains the factual occurrence of the state of affairs posited by the antecedent of the respective hypothetical judgment – is also a part of that theory.

A separate group of metaphysical problems consists of questions that concern the *ground* [*Grund*] of the factually existing world. These questions already presuppose commitments with respect to the existence of the world and the interrelations of essence that obtain in it. It is precisely the fact that neither the existence of real individual objects, nor the factual accrual of absolutely individual attributes, can be derived from the content of the correlative *ideas*, or to put it another way, it is the fact of the real world’s *non-necessity* vis-à-vis its idea – both as regards its existence and its complete qualitative endowment! – that leads back to the question of *why* a real world that has one or another set of properties does in fact exist, and of what constitutes the ultimate *ground* of this world’s existence, a ground, to be sure, that would be situated within the bounds of *individual* being. Indeed, the search for such a ground in the contents of ideas is doomed from the outset. Even if this question were altogether unanswerable for us, as some philosophers hold, the question does nonetheless remain, and ultimately leads back to the problem of God, or at any rate to the problem of an *existentially original* being.<sup>155</sup> What further metaphysical questions may open up

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155 Concerning the concept of existential originality, cf. § 13, below.



here depends on the manner of solving the metaphysical problems we have already singled out. Hence, these latter are the fundamental problems, "and are the ones that determine the special sense of the metaphysical enterprise"<sup>156</sup>. Let us add by way of elucidation that the question concerning the *ultimate ground* of the real world should not be confused with the totally different *cosmological* problem of the origin of the world. At issue in the cosmological problem is *the earlier state from which the world that we presently encounter as empirically given had originated*. It is, when fully grasped, a problem that belongs in the special sciences, and which is now in fact being addressed within the circles of physical astronomy. There can be no doubt, however, that this problem is intimately connected with metaphysical questions<sup>157</sup>. To have gained an appreciation of this intimacy is a notable achievement in the evolution of modern natural science, which only several decades prior was obsessed with keeping itself as distant as possible from any sort of metaphysics<sup>158</sup>.

The totality of true judgments that constitute the answers to metaphysical questions we term "metaphysics."

The principal difference between ontology and metaphysics is that the former inquires into the contents of ideas, whereas the latter investigates *individual* objects, or even ideas – but taken only *qua idea*. In this connection, ontological judgments are, as already mentioned, free of any positing of being (and, indeed, even of ideal being!)<sup>159</sup>, whereas metaphysical propositions are either directly existential propositions or categorical ones.

Let us give an example. In analyzing ontologically the content of the idea 'any material thing,' we make no decisions at all concerning whether a material thing had ever actually existed, nor which real conditions would *in fact* have to be satisfied in order to enable such a thing to exist. We simply state that it belongs to the content of this idea that a material thing is, say, space-filling,<sup>160</sup> and the like. Only in a metaphysical analysis are we concerned with the factual existence of a material thing, and attempt to ascertain whether, say, those things that do in a particular case exist are *in fact* "spatial" *in accordance with their*

156 " which does not yet mean that one can *begin* metaphysical inquiries with these problems "

157 " , and in particular with the question of why the real world exists *at all*, if it exists and if its being does not follow from the content of the idea of what is real, hence [, it is connected] with the question of the ultimate ground of its existence "

158 " (although various metaphysical positions were advocated surreptitiously, most frequently – a rather primitively conceived materialist metaphysics) "

159 Meinong claims that his theory of objects (which corresponds to formal ontology) is an "existence-free [*daseinsfreie*]" science.

160 " that it creates a gravitational field, "



*essence* and, should they be, whether they possess the spatial structure that corresponds to the demands of a Euclidean geometry or to those of a Riemannian one, etc. Throughout this analysis we take our departure from *what is* ultimately given [*Gegebenheiten*] and remain bound by it. In other words, we cannot simply operate with pure possibilities but must reach out beyond every possibility and penetrate into the sphere of facts in order to ascertain there the realization of one of the<sup>161</sup> possibilities. But since we are at the same time attuned to what belongs to the essence of the encountered entities, and are supposed to establish precisely by this means what special properties a particular object (in our case, the factually existing material thing) *must* have as belonging to its essence, given that it has just *this* materiality and *this* spatiality<sup>162</sup> – we must have at our disposal toward that end an overview of the necessarily interconnected possibilities. In other words, we must be acquainted with the interconnected networks of constituents that belong to the content of the idea under which the given object falls. On the one hand therefore metaphysics is the necessary complement to ontology, whereas on the other hand it has its indispensable preparation, and in some sense also its presupposition, in ontology.

And indeed ontology is foremost a genuine presupposition of metaphysics when it sets forth negative judgments which, on the basis of grasping the content of the idea in question, exclude from the realm of factual being as impossible certain configurations of factual states of affairs [*Tatbestände*]. Furthermore, the basis for metaphysics must be comprised of all those ontological propositions which specify the necessary coexistence of certain sorts of moments. If the existence of one of these moments becomes established along some metaphysical path, then on the basis of the relevant ontological proposition the existence of the remaining ones must also be accepted. But ontology is also a preparation for metaphysics, and indeed in the sense that it supplies the latter with rigorous concepts of possible individual objects and with concepts pertaining to their individual and general [*generellem*] essence, and provides it with a set of *apriori* 'laws'<sup>163</sup> pertaining to the possible relationships among the respective individual objects. Ontologically acquired concepts go into metaphysical questions alongside purely metaphysical concepts and help in this manner to prepare the solutions to metaphysical problems. But wherever a metaphysical commitment is to be made, a purely metaphysical cognition (an ultimate metaphysical experience [*Erfahrung*] – if there is such a thing) must be achieved independently of any

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161 'pure'

162 ', and what properties it merely has in fact, even though its essence does not necessitate them'

163 'truths [*prawd*]' [The change may either be a glitch, or reflects a typo in the original: if the letter *d* is omitted from the Polish word, it then becomes 'laws.']

ontological knowledge. Ontology is indeed just a preparation [for metaphysics]; it "does not by itself suffice for making any metaphysical commitment"<sup>164</sup>. Once it has been metaphysically established that a particular individual object X does "in fact [*tatsächlich*]"<sup>165</sup> and indubitably exist (which already exceeds any purely ontological knowledge), then in conjunction with this it must at the same time be established what makes up its *individual* nature<sup>166</sup> and, concomitantly, under which of the available ideas object X falls as an individual. Once we have accomplished this along a metaphysical path, then we have at our disposal the corresponding "applied ontological propositions"<sup>167</sup> that decide which collection of properties must accrue to object X if it has nature X' – pre-given in metaphysical experience<sup>168</sup>. But this "being-at-our-disposal" of the ontological judgments does not yet mean that one can simply consider them to be applicable to object X without reckoning with what is given in metaphysical experience. On the contrary: it must be *demonstrated* in metaphysical experience that object X has *in fact* the individual or general essence<sup>169</sup> predetermined by the corresponding ontological judgments. "The ontological judgments only facilitate for us here the search for and discovery of the stock of essential properties in each individual case; they give us guidelines along which the inquiry must proceed. But the final decision is here reserved exclusively for metaphysical experience."<sup>170</sup>

In order to prevent misunderstandings, let it be expressly stressed once more that no commitment has been made here regarding the possibility of a distinct metaphysical experience. "Should it turn out in the appropriate epistemological analysis that there is no such metaphysical experience, then metaphysics as the totality of valid judgments that solve metaphysical problems is altogether impossible. But should this sort of experience prove not to be theoretically [*ihrer Idee nach*] ruled out, but is a mode of cognition that is inaccessible to us humans, then metaphysics is not impossible *as an idea* [*der Idee nach*] but only *in*

164 " cannot *replace* it " "

165 " *actually* [*rzeczywiście = wirklich*] " "

166 Concerning the concept of individual nature, cf. § 36; I have first tried to articulate this concept in my *Essentiale Fragen*.

167 " ontological judgments (in the form of judgments pertaining to the contents of ideas or in the form of applied ontological judgments) " "

168 " , that is, in the experience that will have to be employed in metaphysics " "

169 Concerning " essence "\*, cf. Ch. XIV.

\* " the individual and general essence of an object " "

170 " These judgments only *facilitate* the task for us here, by enabling us to differentiate among the properties of the individual object those that are essential to it from those that are not. They therefore help us to understand the role that particular properties play in the object. These properties must, however, be *given* in and of themselves in metaphysical experience – which is first capable of resolving the issue. " "

*fact* inaccessible to us humans. In that case we could also not decide whether metaphysical propositions (even if we were familiar with such) are valid. It would also be impossible to do metaphysics<sup>171</sup> if it were not possible to apply the conclusions of ontology to what is given in, so to speak, “ordinary” experience, in particular if it were not possible to discover in this experience what individual nature a given object X possesses in fact and indubitably.<sup>172</sup> This point must be emphasized in our later epistemological deliberations<sup>173</sup>. But the prospective factual undecidability of metaphysical problems for us – possibly related to our actual psycho-somatic organization – does not at all do away with these as problems, and need not make them unintelligible to us, not to speak of rendering them “senseless.”

On the other hand, metaphysics differs from the so-called “positive” sciences, and especially those sciences that pertain to the real world, first and foremost because in its very idea metaphysics comprehends the *totality* of all existents, whereas the various positive sciences always investigate only a *limited* domain. It is for this reason that some researchers have branded them “special [*besondere* (*Spezial-*)]” sciences. But the much more important distinction resides in the fact that metaphysics strives for *absolute* knowledge (that is, knowledge whose validity is in principle *incontestable*) of the factual *essence* of the investigated object, whereas the “positive” sciences are not especially interested in elucidating its *essence*, but rather presuppose it in an unexplicated state and wish to apprehend what is given in its full *contingency*.<sup>174</sup> It is precisely for this reason that, alongside metaphysics and ontology, the “positive” sciences have their own peculiar problems that only they alone can solve<sup>175</sup>. On purely epistemological grounds, therefore, their aspirations are not only legitimate but requisite. They constitute a theoretically *necessary* complement to ontology and metaphysics. Nor do they evade the possible relativity of their findings, “but are frequently quite well aware of it”<sup>176</sup>. We must here set aside the issue of whether the conception is correct according to which every bit of “scientific” knowledge is relative in the sense that the positive sciences are ultimately geared entirely toward

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171 “ . It may well be that there is no such metaphysical experience. It is, however, important to recognize that metaphysics would be impossible as a responsible theoretical inquiry not only if this sort of experience did not exist, but also ”

172 “ For only then would it be impossible to apply the results achieved in ontology to a concrete case given in [empirical] experience. ”

173 “ pertaining to the possibility of metaphysical cognition ”

174 “ At the same time, they make use of an [empirical] experience whose certainty is always limited and whose results can be put in doubt in subsequent experience. ”

175 “ , and none of these three branches of knowledge can dispense with the other two ”

176 “ insofar as it truly follows from the essence of the experience they employ ”

practical aims – say, dominion over nature – and therefore regard reality at the outset from a perspective that is relative to their aim, as for example Henri Bergson and Max Scheler, among others, would have it. At any rate, it belongs to the idea of metaphysical questioning that it strives to achieve not only absolute but also “pure” knowledge – “disinterested” knowledge, as Bergson puts it<sup>177</sup>.

## § 7. Theory of Knowledge and its Problems

In contrast to the *psychology* of knowledge and the *history* of knowledge, both of which belong to the special sciences, the theory of knowledge – with a view to its type of problems and ultimate goals of investigation – is a *philosophical* discipline. In one part of its analyses the theory of knowledge is ontological, in another – metaphysical. That is no accident, but follows rather from the sense of its problems and tasks.

Every epistemological doctrine ultimately aims at achieving a *critique* of *factually* acquired knowledge. “Critique” is thereby understood to mean the assessment of the epistemic *value* of epistemological findings. But in order to enable this task to be carried out without fundamental errors, certain theoretical foundations for such a critique must be procured. Consequently, the entire epistemological domain decomposes into three different, though interrelated, partial domains, to which correspond three constituents of the theory of knowledge as a whole. To wit:

1. *pure theory of knowledge* as the doctrine of the *contents of the primitive epistemological ideas* (ontology of knowledge). It finds its apex in the exposition of a system of epistemic *principles*<sup>178</sup>;
2. *criteriology*, which sets up, on the basis of the disclosed principles, a system of “epistemological criteria”<sup>179</sup>;
3. epistemological *critique* proper, which assesses the epistemic *value* of the *factually* acquired epistemological findings. An objectively valid apprehension of the essence of the *factually* effected epistemic operations and their results, to which the discovered criteria are to be *applied*, must of course constitute the presupposition of such an assessment. Hence, a *metaphysics* of knowledge makes up an essential part of the critique of knowledge.<sup>180</sup>

177 “ , and therefore free from adapting the course of its research, and the acquired results, to practical demands ”

178 “ (epistemological axioms) ”

179 “ *criteria* for assessing the epistemic value of the results of cognition ”

180 In this regard, cf. my essay “*Über die Stellung der Erkenntnistheorie im System der Philosophie* [On the Status of Epistemology in the System of Philosophy]” (1925). I

The goal of the desired critique of knowledge confers on epistemological inquiries a particular direction and specifies the form of their problems, and this goal must at the same time impose its own unique *method* on the analysis. As in every science, so too at no stage of epistemological investigation should *petitio principii* be committed. Consequently, no judgments should be made within the whole of epistemology – on the *basis* of the mode of cognition *subjected* to *critique* – that make any claim at all concerning the *existence* or *properties* of the *objects* of the critiqued cognition. The very sense of epistemological problems prevents a theory of knowledge from being *any* theory concerning that *existent*, or its *being*, to which the critiqued epistemic operations – or the cognitive results achieved in the same – refer. It has certainly happened often enough throughout the history of epistemology that in order to substantiate particular claims about a specific sort of *cognition* (say, empirical experience), philosophers have resorted to certain claims concerning the properties of the *objects* of that cognition (for example,<sup>181</sup> to claims concerning the properties of material things that affect our “senses”). It has been claimed, for example, that light is “truly” a wave motion that acts upon light-sensitive substances in the retina and as a result causes light-*phenomena* to be given to us – in particular, “colors” (which indeed are so very different from waves!). All the while it has been forgotten that everything we know about material processes, and about light waves in particular, we ultimately know on the basis of visual perception of colored and illumined things. Similarly, it has also been claimed that so-called “inner perceptions” are<sup>182</sup> incapable of affording us any “objective” knowledge of our conscious states and of the mental, since these states are distorted in an essential way by the intrusion of any sort of new factor – of inner perception, for example – into the confines of the stream of consciousness. We can therefore never attain a knowledge *via* inner experience [*Erfahrung*], so went the argument, about what kinds of properties our [mental] states “in

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have worked for a long time on a sizable work devoted to laying the foundations for a theory of knowledge and the development of its problematic. The problems and assertions only mentioned here will be developed and substantiated in that work. ¶ I presented its main theses in a paper entitled “*Metodologiczny wstęp do teorii poznania* [Methodological Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge],” which I read at a session of the Wrocław Scientific Society on April 16, 1948, but I was unable to publish the book itself at the time. ¶ [Ingarden is referring to a work only Part I of which, along with a collection of related essays, was published under the title *U podstaw teorii poznania* [Foundations of a Theory of Knowledge], *op. cit.*

181 ¶ in the course of studying sensory experience, when assessing its so-called “subjectivity,” they resorted ¶

182 ¶ “introspection” is ¶

truth” possess; but there is in fact *no other* way to get to know these states, and in particular of ascertaining the purported fact that our mental states are subject to essential alterations in wake of the occurrence of “reflection,” etc. Now, every such grounding effort must be avoided in theory of knowledge since it does indeed involve a vicious circle.<sup>183</sup> And it is precisely this requisite that imposes on epistemology a quite specific method of analysis which, incidentally, has not been adequately worked out to this very day; it is this method that one ordinarily has in mind when speaking of the so-called “*transcendental*” method.<sup>184</sup> In this connection, existential or categorical judgments<sup>185</sup> are admissible *only* within the framework of the *metaphysics* of knowledge, and even in this case its objects can only be epistemic operations and results<sup>186</sup>. For these epistemic operations and results are no doubt also existents of a quite specific type and must be apprehended in their *factuality* [*Tatsächlichkeit*] in the metaphysics of knowledge. On the other hand, all *other* factual being remains beyond the scope of epistemology.

This remark is not superfluous. For to this very day many works with ‘epistemology’ in their titles deal with a series of problems which in fact belong either to ontology or to so-called “natural philosophy,” as for example the problem of time, of space, the problems of the continuity of matter, the problem of causation, and the like. This is partially the consequence of the various ramifications of Kantian philosophy, but also partially a manifestation of the collapse of philosophy in the latter half of the 19th century. For a long time it looked as if, of all the philosophical disciplines, epistemology alone could be “scientifically” pursued, so that various questions that did not belong to the rubric of epistemological problems were treated under that very heading.<sup>187</sup>

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183    ⌈ [Ftn.:] Husserl has repeatedly emphasized this.    ⌋

184    ⌈ [Ftn.:] M. Scheler occupied himself with it; cf. *Die transzendente und die psychologische Methode* [Transcendental and Psychological Method] [, Jena: Verlag Dürr,]1900. Husserl devoted numerous inquiries to working it out. Cf. foremost the two volumes of *Erste Philosophie* [First Philosophy], *Hua*, vols. VII and VIII. Haag, 1956 and 1959.    ⌋

185    ⌈ based on experience    ⌋

186    ⌈ , but not the objects of these operations    ⌋

187    ⌈ Consequently, the entire epistemological problematic gradually suffered a total distortion, and so much so, that epistemological problems proper almost vanished from the purview of its inquiries.

I shall later present more detailed remarks concerning the problematic and method of a theory of knowledge.    ⌋

## § 8. Transition to Further Problems

Having at least crudely bounded off from each other the problem domains of ontology, metaphysics and epistemology, it is now time to give a survey of the issues that are especially important to the idealism/realism problem. Three groups of problems must also be distinguished among these, corresponding to the partition of the overall terrain of philosophy. In view of a great multitude of interrelated questions that also depend on each other in various ways, it may be advisable already at this stage to get oriented about their differing characters. It is clear that the core of the entire Controversy is a particular *metaphysical* problem which, however, can neither be properly formulated nor successfully attacked without appropriate ontological preparation. After all, at issue in the Controversy is the factual existence or non-existence of the real world and the disclosure [*Entdeckung*] of its<sup>188</sup> essence, which would make this existence intelligible to us. Even though the initial stimulus for developing the main query resides in certain epistemological problems, we shall have to begin here with certain ontological problems and states of affairs [*Sachlagen*]. For only along this path will it be possible to develop in a systematically appropriate manner the overall problem-complex pertaining to the existence of the real world.

Let us note in this connection that *two* levels of development will have to be distinguished for this problem-complex. The first is a relatively naive level on which the questions that make up the starting point still consist of imprecise, critically unscrutinized formulations. These initial questions have the advantage of being the very questions that for the first time place us before the problem of the existence and essence of the real world. But they do so in an imperfect fashion. Whoever simply adopts them uncritically and tries to answer them immediately will be led astray, and frequently face wholly nebulous situations that will be impenetrable without setting altogether aside the question that led us to them, and without targeting a host of distinctions and elucidations by means of new, positive analyses that will first enable us to elevate the entire study onto the next, higher plateau. Not until that second level do we attain to a formulation of new questions and an understanding of their interrelationships – which then holds out the prospect of taking at least the initial steps toward a resolution of the entire Controversy. The first level of deliberation, in a much abbreviated form, we already have behind us. In its fully evolved form it lies before us in the annals of ‘modern philosophy’<sup>189</sup>. But even a far-ranging historical account of the various attempts at a solution would not elevate us to a higher level of analysis. Only a systematic penetration into the entire problem-complex and a deeper

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188 ‘factual’

189 ‘the conflict between idealism and realism’

understanding of the individual problems would enable us to see correctly through the intricate pathways along which the historical battle between the so-called “idealism” and so-called “realism” has until now been waged, and to interpret substantively the several theoretical commitments. But this would also entangle us in a discussion of various errors and pseudo-solutions<sup>190</sup>, which, if the objective is to clarify the problems and their cogent solutions, would only allow us to advance slowly. I have therefore decided to forgo this long historical path, and restricted myself to tying onto a *single* substantively and historically important example in order to get our first bearings within the problem-complex – so that we can immediately move on to a strictly substantive analysis of the problems themselves. Accordingly, our most immediate task consists in addressing the ontological problems of the Controversy.

## § 9. Three Groups of Ontological Problems

First of all, we must divide all ontological questions into a) existential-ontological, b) formal-ontological and c) material-ontological.<sup>191</sup> We carry out this division only in a provisional manner. For only the rigorous concepts of existence, form, and matter to be attained in the subsequent analyses will allow us to correctly interpret and substantiate the partition we now offer. But in order to grasp this partition somewhat more concretely already at this time, let us add the following:

Every object (any something whatsoever) can be regarded from three different points of view: first, with respect to its existence and mode of existence; second, with respect to its form; third, with respect to its material endowment.

*ad* 1. First of all, as far as existential problems<sup>192</sup> are concerned, two questions must be kept apart: a) Does an object in question (a thing, a human being, the

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190 [Reading ‘*Scheinlösungen*’ for ‘*Seinslösungen*.’]

191 [The compounds “existential-,” “formal-” and “material-ontological” as referring to analyses, reflections, results, findings, etc., will begin to appear progressively more frequently in the rest of the book. Eventually, they take on an air of redundancy, since Ingarden’s entire enterprise is ontological. Therefore, I shall henceforth drop ‘-ontological’ in numerous instances.]

192 In order to avoid misunderstandings, it must be immediately stressed that the existential-ontological reflections in the sense espoused here have nothing in common with the so-called “existential philosophy” of M. Heidegger and his epigones, both German and French. It would take us too far afield had I wished to analyze and clarify the ambiguous Heideggerian concept of “existence” at this point. The word ‘existence’ (also ‘*Dasein*’?) signifies there either a quite peculiar object (human beings [*Menschen*]) or a



world) in fact exist in a manner proper to it<sup>193</sup>? b) Which mode of being is it that is proper to it; that is to say, is prescribed by its essence – irrespective of whether it actually exists that way or not?

The first question is either metaphysical or belongs to the special sciences, the second one, on the other hand, is ontological<sup>194</sup> and requires for its answer, before all else, a strictly ontological analysis of the idea of existence in general and of the ideas of the particular modes of existence, as well as an analysis of the object at issue, and indeed with regard to both its form and matter.

*ad 2.* When the form of something is involved, the questions to be answered are questions like “Is the respective something, as regards its form, a thing, a process, or, say, a relation?” We can ask about that in both a metaphysical and ontological sense. But in order to be able to ask about it at all, one must first explain what form – as opposed to the matter of something – is in general and then sort out the general form of an object, [explain] what primitive structural components it harbors within itself, and what modifications then allow it to mold itself into the form of a thing, or of a process, or perhaps of a relation, etc. A broad field of various sorts of structures opens up here which have never been systematically treated in previous inquiries, and have received rather scant attention altogether, even though the first formal analyses are already to be found in Aristotle – in his *Metaphysics*.

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wholly distinct mode of existence or being that is characteristic only of human beings. Meanwhile, for me the word ‘existence’ never signifies an object, but rather only its being or mode of being, and indeed in a very broad sense. I attempted to determine the sense of existential-ontological investigations in my “*Bemerkungen zum Problem Idealismus-Realismus* [Remarks toward the Idealism-Realism Problem] (1929). N. Hartmann has later developed an analogous problematic under the designation “modal analysis” in his book *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit* (1938).<sup>7\*</sup>

\* <sup>7</sup>. I developed the sense of these problems for the first time in my “*Bemerkungen*,” which, as already mentioned, serves in general as the guiding thread for the present inquiries. N. Hartmann calls existential-ontological investigations “modal analysis” (Cf. Vol. II of his *Ontologie*, entitled *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit*, *op.cit*). Existential-ontological reflections have nothing in common with French “existentialism,” with which I could not become acquainted until after I had written this book. French existentialism – which, incidentally, shows up in various guises – is overwhelmingly influenced by Heidegger, and is foremost a certain form of metaphysics dealing with the essence of the human being and his fate in the world; on the other hand, it *does not* deal with the problem of the existence, and its modes, of any entity in general. This will become apparent on the basis of the analyses carried out here. <sup>7</sup>

193 [in *eine ihm eigene Weise*: added in *Streit*]

194 <sup>7</sup> (even though formulated in such a way that the answer to it will have the form of an *applied* judgment, and not of a judgment pertaining to the content of an idea) <sup>7</sup>

ad 3. The third respect in which an object can be analyzed is the total ensemble of its *material* (“qualitative” – Husserl says “*sachhaltigen*”) determinations.<sup>195</sup> Every form of something is in its essence the form of an entity that is *materially* determined in some fashion. Without this material “filling-out,” without a qualitative determination in the broadest sense of the word, it would be just an artificially conjured up abstraction that could not at all exist [*vorhanden sein*] on its own, and conversely the qualitative determination cannot subsist [*bestehen*] on its own without form. There are also essential relationships between an entity’s form and material endowment. This endowment must therefore be clarified by a thoroughgoing knowledge of the entity. Besides, it is this qualitative endowment of an entity that catches our eye before all else. Hence, the third problem-domain opens up before us, which for its part can in turn be interpreted in a metaphysical or an ontological sense.<sup>196</sup> And here once again ontological investigations move to the fore, investigations whose goal is to elucidate the material constants and variables of the corresponding idea’s content. We shall only turn our attention to the most indispensable of these<sup>197</sup>.

An *exhaustive* comprehension [*Erkenntnis*] of an entity must be conducted in all three of these directions, both metaphysically and ontologically. For only existence in a specific mode of being, form, and material endowment constitute an entity’s totality of being [*das All einer Gegenständlichkeit*].<sup>198</sup>

“But in order to avoid a misunderstanding that to this very day is almost universally subscribed to, let us at once emphasize<sup>199</sup>: not each and every feature that is distinguishable in an entity constitutes one of its “properties” (“characteristics [*Merkmale*]”). Kant has already made this point relative to the existence of an entity by pronouncing the well-known statement: “Being is ... no real predicate.” But he attached to it a frequently quoted explanatory statement that occasioned to new misunderstandings. He said, namely: “And so, the actual [*das Wirkliche*] contains nothing more than the merely possible. A hundred real [*wirkliche*] thalers contain not the least more than a hundred possible ones.” (*Kr. d. r. Vernft.* II. B 627). This

195    ⌈ [Ftn.:] The reader will find a detailed explanation of the various concepts of “form” and “matter” in Ch VII.    ⌋

196    ⌈ [Ftn.:] The empirical special sciences deal above all with the material endowment of the investigated objects.    ⌋

197    ⌈ , those that are relevant to the conflict between idealism and realism    ⌋

198    These three “aspects [*Seiten*]” should not be regarded as playing an equally important role in the object. The very talk of “aspects” is already no more than a crude first approximation which is to be set aside once we manage to penetrate analytically into each of them.

199    ⌈ However, in order that some misguided, though to this very day universally accepted, views not block the course of our investigations, we have to note certain reservations from the outset that we shall only later manage to substantiate in detail    ⌋

is perfectly correct if one takes this “more” that – according to the view Kant rejects – would have had to be contained in the “real” hundred thalers in comparison to the “possible” ones in the sense of a *property*. “Real” thalers do not in fact differ from merely possible ones in virtue of any *property*. And it appears that Kant did indeed set forth this statement in this sense. But it has frequently been interpreted in an entirely different sense, to which the following assertion of Kant’s may well have contributed: “In the sheer concept of a thing no character of its existence [*Daseins*] is to be met with.” (ibid., B 272).<sup>200</sup> That is to say, the claim is made<sup>201</sup> that existence is nothing at all distinguishable in the object, and that *for this reason* it cannot be “conceptualized.” But from this it would follow that 1) objectively it makes *no* difference *at all* whether an entity exists or not, and that 2) the question concerning an entity’s existence – even for a cognizing subject who could attain to absolutely objective and exhaustive knowledge – is completely undecidable and cannot even be adequately formulated. Yet both [inferences] appear to be completely false. It is therefore necessary 1) to restrict the Kantian proposition about

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200 ¶ In what sense this Kantian thesis is to be understood in order to be deemed legitimate is to be gleaned from our deliberations pertaining to the existential variables and constants in the content of ideas.\* See also the expositions pertaining to the full signification of names in my book *The Literary Work of Art*, § 15. On the basis of the reflections carried out there, we could formulate Kant’s cited thesis in the following manner: “Neither the sense-determination of its existence [*Dasein*] nor the moment of existential positing can be discerned in the material content [*Inhalt*] of a thing’s name.” Understood in this way, Kant’s thesis appears to be correct. Now the first of these existential moments does certainly belong to the *full* signification of the name taken in isolation, the second, however, not until the name is employed as subject of a categorical proposition. Should one therefore wish to relate the Kantian thesis to the *full* signification of the name and say that *no* intensive moment [*Intentionsmoment*] of this signification determines the existence of the name’s object, then it would be false. Before Kant, as we know, it was Hume who dealt with the problem of the existence of the idea, or of the “impression” of the existence of the relevant object (cf. *A Treatise on Human Nature*, vol. I, pt. II, Sect. VI). Given his sensualism, it is both understandable and characteristic [of his position] that Hume should reject such an “impression.” For Hume sensualizes from the outset the content of direct experience (of the “impression” of the senses) and regards as its constituent only that which can be grasped as “sensory impingement [*sinnliche Empfindung*].” Everything else simply vanishes from his purview. But since the existence of any arbitrary object is no “sensation [*Empfindung*],” Hume’s contention pertaining to the absence of any distinct impression of existence is from his standpoint quite natural. But it does not at all follow from this that an object’s existence ¶ cannot be apprehended in primary experience [*ursprüngliche Erfahrung*] ¶\*\*.

\* (cf. § 46)

\*\* ¶ were not anything at all that could be singled out in an existing object ¶

201 ¶ in conjunction with this thesis – imposing thereby an interpretation on Kant’s position that, it seems to me, is alien to him – ¶

the 100 thalers exclusively to their properties and 2) to concede that not absolutely everything that can be distinguished in an object is a property of it. And in particular, not only existence (more accurately: mode of existence), but every formal moment is distinguishable in an entity, yet neither comprises any of its properties.<sup>202</sup> We cannot give a more detailed substantiation of this claim at this stage.<sup>203</sup>

And one more comment: Existence or mode of being is always the mode of being of something, and not something isolated onto itself. Hence, talk of the idea of existence (of a specific mode of being) should not be misunderstood to the effect that only a single solitary constituent, namely “existence” (or “mode of being”), is contained in the content of this idea. There is altogether no idea of this sort, and there cannot be. There are only ideas of an existing (in one way or another) something, in particular, say, the idea of a real something. *Various* elements are contained in its content, but all of the formal and material elements of its content are *variable*<sup>204</sup>; only the existential elements are *constant*. In the content of the *general* idea of any existence at all, some of the existential elements are also variable. Accordingly, the idea of reality [as a mode of being] is strictly speaking the idea of<sup>205</sup> a real something that is at least within certain bounds arbitrary with respect to its pure form and its material constitution.<sup>206</sup>

Following these introductory remarks, we can proceed to the treatment of specific problems that already target directly the Controversy over the existence of the world.

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202 As far as I know, O. Selz  $\Uparrow$  has already protested  $\Uparrow^*$  against this false interpretation of the Kantian thesis in his paper “*Existenz als Gegenstandsbestimmtheit* [Existence as Determinant of an Object]” (*Münchener Philosophische Abhandlungen*, Leipzig, 1911). But Selz regards the object’s “existence [*Dasein*]” as its *principium individuationis*, which does not appear to be correct.

\*  $\Uparrow$  was the first to protest  $\Uparrow$

203 Cf. § 38.

204 So it seems at least upon the initial contrast between the idea of mode of being and both material and formal ideas. And this is in fact correct if the idea of an entirely arbitrary mode of being is involved. But as soon as we switch to ideas of particular (possible) modes of being, a modicum of caution is called for. Namely, it turns out on closer inspection that the form of an object is intimately connected with its mode of being, and that therefore not all formal constituents of the content of the idea of a specific mode of being are unrestrictedly variable, but rather that their variability is either limited or that some of them are constant. But these are all issues that cannot be fully understood until formal and material analyses have been carried out.

205  $\Uparrow$  the existence of  $\Uparrow$

206  $\Uparrow$  In this context, however, arises the very difficult problem of how to draw the boundaries of the variability and material endowment of what is real. That is one of the principal tasks of a material and formal ontology of the real world.  $\Uparrow$



Part I  
**Existential-Ontological Problems  
of the Controversy over the Existence  
of the World**



## Chapter III

# Basic Existential Concepts

### § 10. The Problem of the Possibility of Analyzing Existence

Following the preliminary formulation of the problem, the question we face is whether to accept a real world that is “existentially independent” of pure consciousness, or one that is “existentially dependent” on it<sup>207</sup>. It is therefore necessary to clarify the content of the idea ‘being-real’ as a distinctive mode of being on the one hand, and to investigate the various meaningful ways of speaking about existential dependence or independence on the other. Only after clarifying these issues will we be in a position to consider the further question as to whether a “real” world (or any “real” entity whatever) can be “existentially independent” of, or “dependent” on, pure consciousness, and in what sense that can be so. To that end, of course, the idea of the distinctive mode of being of pure consciousness must also be investigated – provided there is such an idea at all. And we must also take into account the ideas of all the remaining possible modes of being. For, a consistently and radically worked out transcendental idealism is inclined to reduce to pure consciousness not only the real world, but *all* other realms of being as well.<sup>208</sup>

The objection may perhaps be raised that it is impossible to clarify the content of the idea of being-real and to articulate it conceptually. Something like “being-real” [the argument would run] is something manifestly simple and absolutely unique [*Eigenartiges*]. Thus, it could not be reduced to simpler components out of which it could be composed. And it would appear that such a reduction would have to be carried out in order to capture conceptually the being-real of something. At best, all that could be achieved in this regard would be an “intuitive glimpse [*Erschauen*]” into being-real, the result of which could presumably not be given an adequate verbal articulation.

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207 □, or, finally, whether to reject its existence *altogether* □

208 See, for example, Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic* [Eng. tr. D. Cairns, The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1969; henceforth, *FTL*] in which an attempt is made to existentially relativize even logical structures and ideal entities to acts and act-manifolds of pure consciousness.



We respond as follows. We certainly cannot speak of the “composition” of being-real out of elements or moments. But not everything that is not “composite” is thereby absolutely simple in the sense that nothing at all can be gleaned [*erschauen*] and distinguished in it by means of abstraction. The color orange, for example, is certainly not composed out of redness and yellowness; it is something unique onto itself, and yet it is possible to distinguish within it the two moments in virtue of which it is similar to the color red on the one hand, and to the color yellow on the other. Perhaps the situation is similar with being-real. In any case, we are not entitled to presuppose the alleged absolute simplicity of being-real, and close off therewith any access to clarifying its idea. Indeed, let being-real be intuitively discerned in its uniqueness. But it is precisely this discernment that may compel us to distinguish more primitive, non-selfsufficient moments within it. This may enable us to better understand it, as well as disclose its kinship to other modes of being. The necessity of grasping being-real intuitively does not of itself exclude either its conceptual articulation, or the intersubjective sharing of what has been discerned. To be sure, the endeavor meets with difficulties that should not be underestimated. But they can be overcome, at least to some degree.

Let us then assume that simpler moments can be discerned in the content of the idea of being-real. These can only be *existential* moments. For even being-real itself, once it is contrasted with, say, the being of consciousness (as Husserl does) or with being-possible or being-ideal, is only *one* of the various modes of being. If the result of grasping being-real intuitively is to be conveyed to someone else linguistically, it must be articulated in suitable propositions. But if there are *several* modes of being or existential moments (which in fact is the case), then all verbs that function as predicates in the proposition become ambiguous, especially the word ‘is.’ And indeed this is not accidental, but follows from an inner necessity. Concentrating here on the word ‘is,’ we know that four meanings or functions of this word have already been identified – which does not exhaust the multiplicity of its meanings. Namely, one distinguishes:

- 1) the meaning it has in performing the so-called assertive function in a categorical proposition<sup>209</sup>, and which Russell, for example, expresses by means of the special “assertion” sign;
- 2) the meaning it has in performing the so-called *predicating* function<sup>210</sup> in the proposition, which (within the framework of the categorical proposition)

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209 † [Ftn.:] Cf. the so-called “assertive function” in Pfänder (*Logik*, [*Jahrb.*, Vol. IV, 1921], pp. 180 ff.). †

210 † [Ftn.:] Cf. in Pfänder the so-called “predicating function” in two forms: positive and negative, *ibid.*, pp. 182 ff. †

still admits two distinct variants: a) the function of *determining* the object designated by the subject-term of the proposition<sup>211</sup> by means of some characteristic (for example, “Sulphur is yellow”) and b) the function of “*subsumption*,” which consists either of subordinating the subject’s object under some class or in apprehending this object as an exemplar of some species or genus (for example, “the eagle is a bird”<sup>212</sup>);

- 3) in conjunction with the word ‘is,’ as in “this is...” (For example, in definitions), it performs the function of “identification”; and finally,
- 4) it has the *existential* meaning, in which “is” is tantamount to “exists.”

After introducing the various modes of being and existential moments, the word ‘is’ is ambiguous above all in its existential meaning. But then *this* ambiguity is not without consequences for the meanings of ‘is’ in all of its other functions; indeed, there are functions of this word that have not yet been mentioned here. In addition, the word ‘is’ frequently performs in the proposition *various* functions *simultaneously*  $\Upsilon$ , and perhaps it *must* even do so.<sup>213</sup>

This ambiguity of the word ‘is’, and indirectly of all verbs with respect to the existential and logical-syntactic moments inherent in their meanings, will present numerous difficulties in the existential analyses. But one may perhaps suggest that it is possible to distinguish terminologically among the various meanings of this word, and in this way eliminate its ambiguity. However, the difficulty of this approach lies precisely in the fact that the meanings of the terms to be newly introduced can only be given in propositions that contain the word ‘is’ (or the corresponding verbs) in all its ambiguity. It is certainly possible to help the reader grasp the new sense of this word (or of the correspondingly modified verbs, in accordance with *their* meaning) by means of various qualifiers. However, this sort of device does not always work. Suitably chosen examples might offer us another device. But the role of examples toward this end should not be overstated; they do have their natural boundaries, which ought not to be trespassed. We have learned this, for instance, from the various examples employed in Scholasticism for the purpose of clarifying the different meanings of *esse*. Indeed, we must keep in mind that it is frequently characteristic of the moments to be distinguished that they always appear together. It is then impossible to give an example in which moment A were to be present

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211 [*Subjektgegenstand*: this term, along with the entire differentiation of the meaning of the copula is adopted by Ingarden from Pfänder’s *Logik*. Ingarden uses this full-blown expression – ‘the object designated by the subject-term of the proposition’ – to render this term in *Spór*. I shall henceforth abbreviate it by ‘the subject’s object.’]

212 In this connection, see Pfänder, *op.cit.*

213  $\Upsilon$ . Actually, that case is the norm.  $\Upsilon$

without moment B. To grasp one of these moments correctly is made especially difficult by the fact that one is not sure what to focus on in the given example. Moreover, in a scientific treatise the example can only be conveyed by means of words. Precisely that moment must be singled out in the total context of the example which is actually at issue, and a grasp of which will first enable the reader to understand the meaning of an already extant or new word. How can one point out precisely that moment with a word that is indeed still missing or unintelligible? Of course, it is not ruled out that the reader may grasp the pertinent moment by accident even in the case of a vague example. And this in principle offers the opportunity of reaching an intersubjective understanding even in the most difficult and subtle situations. But a lucky hit is not after all what one wishes to achieve with the aid of methodical means. Even if we assume that the reader has the skill and requisite erudition to make subtle distinctions on the basis of the intuitive material provided by the example, and to bring to intuitive transparency [*intuitiven Erschauung*] what has thus been distinguished, he is still not *compelled* to follow our distinctions on the basis of a verbal presentation of the example, or on the basis of purely conceptual determinations. Of course, there is still the possibility of pointing out the moments to be distinguished by means of words that refer to these moments only *indirectly*, or of determining them by means of approximating expressions, descriptions, comparisons and the like. But these are all exclusively devices that merely *facilitate* for us an understanding of what is at issue, but do not compel it ineluctably.

The indicated difficulty exists in all fundamental investigations that pertain to primitive moments and simple relations amongst them. The ground-laying existential analyses constitute in this respect only one special case among many that we have to deal with in philosophical research. And we should not be deterred by such difficulties, blocking thereby the path to any essential progress in such research right from the outset. We should simply not set for ourselves demands that are too exacting, and realize that even the little that can be achieved in fundamental research in the face of all the attendant dangers does, despite everything, play the role of a decisive factor in the advance of human knowledge. Thus, even though our analysis of the primitive existential moments lays no claim to offering rigorously unequivocal and exhaustive definitions, and is simply meant to aid the reader in carrying out acts of intuitive apprehension [*Erschauung*] of these moments, still, such analysis is indispensable since it is of fundamental significance for our subsequent explications.

## § 11. Modes of Being and Existential Moments

First of all, we need to distinguish *modes of being* from *existential moments*.

The  $\ulcorner$ being-real [*Real-Sein*], being-ideal [*Ideal-Sein*], being-possible [*Möglich-Sein*] of something<sup>214</sup>, and the like, are modes of being of this something.<sup>215</sup> Non-being, on the other hand, is no mode of being, but rather the outright *privation* of all being. Whenever we deal with an existing object, we are also involved with its existence; that is, with its being and its mode of being. But this is not stated altogether correctly. For, strictly speaking, we “deal with something” only when we direct our attention to it. Meanwhile, when we are dealing with an object (say, with a thing), we attend to *it* and not to its *being*. Nonetheless, being is not something separate from the existent.  $\ulcorner$ When an existing object is given to us in experience, its being and mode of being are also somehow present [*verbleiben*] within the scope of this experience, even if only – shall we say – peripherally.<sup>216</sup> We can never be given an existing object<sup>217</sup> *without* its being and mode of being. And just as little can we be given the being or mode of being of this object without the latter.  $\ulcorner$ But their co-occurrence is of an entirely peculiar sort, which is wholly different from the co-occurrence of two different material moments that are necessarily bound together. The being of an object and this object itself are not two different entities that happen to occur, so to speak, *alongside* each other, as are, say, the being-red and the being-soft of a rose. Nor

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214  $\ulcorner$  the actuality [*rzeczywistość* = *Wirklich*] of something (reality [*realność* = *Realität*]), real existence), the ideal existence of something, the possibility of something  $\urcorner$  [Ingarden often appears to use *Wirklichkeit* and *Realität* synonymously (especially in *Spór*), but he does not always do so – hence, I reserve for them ‘actuality’ and ‘reality,’ respectively.] For this reason I could not employ ‘actuality’ for *Aktualität*, which is certainly not to be identified with *Wirklichkeit*, as evidenced by expressions such as *aktuelle Wirklichkeit* (later in the section), and settled on ‘activeness’ for *Aktualität*.]

215 Whether the being-possible of something is to be set on a par with the being-real of something, or with being-ideal, is a question with which we shall yet have to deal. It does, however, appear at the onset of existential investigations that being-possible is one of the modes of being.

216  $\ulcorner$  In dealing with an object, I have *eo ipso* its existence within the scope of my experience. It would seem, therefore, that it suffices to simply direct ourselves to it attentively in order to become clearly aware what the mode of existence is of an object that exists in one manner or another. And surely such is the case. However, because the existence of something differs *specifically and radically* from any material determination and from the form of anything whatever that is (exists), and because at the same time in a beguiling fashion it, as it were, permeates everything that is – we shall encounter considerable difficulties in this context, and can become cognizant of what we here call the “mode of existence” of something only by means of a certain mental experiment.  $\urcorner$

217  $\ulcorner$  in experience  $\urcorner$

are they even juxtaposed in the manner of the red color of this rose and the concrete extension of this color, which are amalgamated [*verschmolzen*] with each other, and indeed in such a way that every part of this extension is saturated by the red color and from the other perspective this redness or red-coloration [*Rotfarbigkeit*] is in itself extended. Still, the extension does not permeate the red color (and conversely) in that peculiar manner in which the existing object is permeated by its being. Nor is this being separate from the object as something that can be grasped in and for itself. It is perhaps for this reason that Hume rejects the notion of a *distinct* [*eigene*] “idea” of the being of an existing object. In a way, he searches for being as something that would occur, as it were, *alongside* the existing object, and that could be grasped for itself; needless to say, he encounters nothing of the sort. He is thus convinced that he has only “ideas” of existing objects, but not of their existing. But it is not true that there are only “ideas” (in our language: concepts) of separately existing entities; for if that were the case, we would not be able to distinguish, say, the coloration of a color from its “redness” and brightness, or from its glare, nor could we hold these conceptually apart. But we *are* able to do this, and it is much easier to do than to distinguish the being of an existing thing from that thing, or to articulate each of these conceptually for itself. In this latter case we must be focused on something that is much more thoroughly interpenetrating than the interpenetration of the redness and extension of a color. To be sure, we cannot say that the given thing “permeates” “its” being. But for all that, one can rightfully say that the thing is permeated by its being: the thing is in all its parts and moments something that exists. It swallows up [*verschlingt*]<sup>218</sup>, as it were, the being that permeates it. Being and that which is (e.g., a thing, a process, an event) are also not moments of *the same order* [*gleichgeordnete*] that would be “knotted” together. If they were “equiordinate,” then we could just as well apply the “category” of being to the existent as to its being. In other words, we would be able to say of both that they exist. But we cannot say of being (of existence) that it is, that it exists. And so it is extremely difficult to get a clear grasp of the being of an existing object. Perhaps success can be achieved only by means of a thought experiment in which, starting from some existing object, we concentrate on its being, while also concentrating on grasping its mode of being.<sup>219</sup>

218 [The word I chose is etymologically closest to the original; other options for rendering this word include ‘engulfs,’ ‘soaks up,’ ‘absorbs’ or ‘imbibes.’]

219 † We frequently encounter among qualitative moments such an intimate connection between two moments *a* and *b* that the one cannot exist without the other. We shall have more than one occasion to deal with that connection. But with all of its tightness, when it occurs between two qualitative (“material”) moments, these generally remain *external to each other*, even when they are mutually modifying, hence when – as I shall later ex-

Say, we set our sights on some specific lamp with certain well-defined properties and imagine that at this very instant it ceases to exist, hence is “not present” any longer. And indeed let it – taken exactly as it presently is (exists) – not *change into* something *else*, but simply “vanish” altogether, be “annihilated” along with all of its properties. If it did in fact happen this way, there would simply remain a “nothing” in its place. Its place would of course be immediately occupied by something *else*, say, by air or by some other thing. But it itself would not, as it were, “vacate” this place, as it would if it were transferred from this room into some other. Rather, it would be totally annihilated. In vacating some spot, it simply shifts in space along with all of its properties, but it remains as it was; by occupying a different location in space it changes at most in some of its properties. But in the case at hand it does *not change*. It simply *ceases to exist*.

This radical transition from being into non-being is at bottom incomprehensible to us. We only understand to some extent the *change* of an entity in some particular respect, or its *transformation* into some other entity. But even in the case of such transformations, entity A, which is transformed into entity B, is “no longer there” at the instant when this conversion has already been accomplished (when, say, a table has been made out of a tree trunk, or when a butterfly evolves out of a caterpillar). It no longer exists; only entity B exists. Hence even in cases of a “transformation” something occurs that is very difficult to understand, or is altogether incomprehensible. “Just a moment ago [*soeben*]” the lamp (the caterpillar, the trunk) was still present, just a moment ago – *while* [*indem*] it was being transformed into rubble and ashes, say, by being burned – it was still there, but in some particular phase of “being transformed,” at some point in the *midst* of [*mitten drin im*] being transformed, *it is* no more. It also no longer exists after all of this had transpired. What is left over – a heap of brass, glass, etc. – is not a “lamp” any more. The lamp, along with all of the properties which a moment ago it still “possessed,” has vanished. Somewhere within this process of

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press myself – a functional unity obtains between them. Nonetheless, what obtains between anything that exists and its existence is something wholly *exceptional*. Here, it is as if that which exists “imbibes” its existence into itself, or conversely – as I have already expressed myself – existence completely “permeates” that which exists; it is not something *alongside* the latter that is merely “bound” with it – no matter how tightly. We can also say that the existence of something and that which exists are not two “same-level [*równorzędne = gleichgeordnete*]” moments that merely happen to coexist. Existence, hence also mode of being, as well as what I shall call existential moments, are not something about which it could be correctly said that they either “exist” or “do not exist.” To put it another way: the “category” of existence cannot be applied to existence. It can only be applied to that which exists. <sup>7</sup>

annihilating transformation a radical *rupture* of being occurs, a radical *leap* by the lamp into a nothing, from being into non-being, irrespective of how difficult it might be for us to grasp the “locus” of the rupture, of the leap, and how difficult it might be to comprehend the sense of that “transition” from being into non-being.<sup>220</sup>

We can make two attempts to overcome this difficulty, at least to some extent. In the first we hold firmly in mind a “lamp”<sup>221</sup>, fitted out with certain specific properties and having some particular formal structure, that *does not exist*, and contrast it with a lamp, which with respect to all of its properties and form is exactly the same, that *does exist*. At this point the rather naive question is ordinarily raised as to what would have to somehow be attached to that non-existing “lamp” in order to get it to exist. What distinguishes it from the existing lamp? There is only one possible answer to this question, which was given by Kant (and actually, already by Hume): *no new* property and *no new* formal moment attaches to that non-existent “lamp.” And yet something ultimately primitive, though not quite absolutely simple, makes itself obtrusive [*bemerkbar*] in the most remarkable fashion in everything that constitutes the existing lamp, in everything that characterizes it and belongs to its form: that it does indeed exist – and it is precisely this, and only this, that distinguishes it from the non-existing “lamp.” Now it is the totality of what makes the existing lamp differs in this remarkable manner from the non-existent “lamp” (while holding firmly fixed in our mind all of the latter’s material and formal moments) that we term its *mode of being*.

The second attempt proceeds in the opposite direction. It passes from a wholly determinate existing lamp, with all its properties and formal moments, to what would be left over, as it were, of *the lamp itself*, were it to cease to exist. In what way would it differ [as existing] from the “nothing” that we would be faced with following its annihilation?

The answer is that it would differ in *everything* that goes into constituting it. Every formal moment, every property (more generally, every material determinant), all interconnections among its properties as well as all relations among its

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220 Because this is indeed so difficult to understand, we are inclined to believe that something of the caterpillar is retained in the butterfly, that a portion of the tree trunk is still present in the table, etc. I shall return to this issue in my discussion of the identity of an object that persists in time.\*

\* † See Ch. XIV. †

221 I include quotation marks throughout because this putative lamp that does not exist is no lamp at all, since it is altogether nothing. Only of the “mentally entertained,” “envisaged [*vermeinten*]” lamp can it be said that it “exists” in some modified sense. I shall return to this point in my discussion of purely intentional objects.



parts, but also all its relations to other things, and the relative characteristics that follow from these – *all of this* is separated, in virtue of the lamp's existing, from that radical nothing that results in relationship to the lamp itself following the annihilation process.<sup>222</sup> This “transformation,” radical in the highest degree, to which *everything* in the object succumbs once it passes from being to that pure nothing, [is what] constitutes that enigmatic *rupture of an object's being* when its total material and formal endowment is subjected to annihilation. But nothing is severed from the object in the course of the transformation, none of its properties, no formal moment – so as to leave it without these, in a manner of speaking. *It itself* simply ceases to be.

Talk of a “transition” from being to non-being is also, strictly speaking, not quite fitting. For in the case of a “transition,” in the case of every change in the strict sense, whatever undergoes it is always one and the same before and after. It exists in *the same* way in *both* phases, and only differs with respect to some of its properties or states from what existed prior to the change. We can say nothing of the sort in the case of an object that ceases to exist. Here that radical rupture occurs, that termination of being, and therewith – of the object. Following this rupture, it is not as if the same thing as before were to be found, but in some other state (perhaps in some other mode of being). There is, rather, *nothing* at all. That is why, at the same time as we are talking ourselves into the fact that it does not exist, we have to secure an artificial, a *mental*<sup>223</sup>, presentation of the “non-existent lamp” if we are to be able to carry out any kind of comparison between the two cases, even a crude one. In the case of its non-being, we can only grasp *the absolute absence* of the object relative to what once existed. In contrast, we can have no presentation at all of the absolute “nothing,” *for itself*, that “looms [*sich auftut*]”<sup>224</sup> following the annihilation of a thing.<sup>225</sup>

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222 † Existence permeates, as it were, everything in the object, but it itself is *nothing new* – no part, property, or formal moment of the object. †

223 † or imaginative †

224 † “remains” – which is only a very crude and imperfect manner of expressing ourselves! – †

225 Cf. K. Twardowski's *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, [Wien: Hölder,] 1894 [Reprint: München: Philosophia Verlag, 1982; Eng. tr., *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, tr. R. Grossmann, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1977]; besides, I cannot go along with the whole of Twardowski's argument with regard to this matter.\* One is reminded here of the Eleatic proposition that there is only being, that there is no non-being, and that the latter cannot be conceived. I shall return to the problem of non-being when I discuss negative states of affairs.

\* † Bergson, in his *Creative Evolution*, also does not acknowledge absolute nothingness. †



Strictly speaking, there is also no (continuous) “transition” of an object from one mode of being into another. In other words, one and the same [entity] cannot first exist in one mode of being and then in another; the disparity [*Verschiedenheit*] in mode of being excludes the identity of the object. A *real* lamp and a<sup>226</sup> *possible* lamp with all the absolutely same properties and formal moments – those are *two different* entities, and the first cannot be “transformed” into the second while preserving its identity. Certainly, we do often express ourselves as if such a transformation had taken place. We say, for example, “The case that had only been possible previously has now become actual.” But this is just a manner of speaking that should not be taken literally. The authentic meaning of such a statement is that a case is now actual whose total stock of properties is *the same* as for a case which until now had only been “possible.” Taken *literally*, such a statement<sup>227</sup> would amount to an absurdity. It is indeed the peculiar feature of every mode of being that for every object existing in it there is at most a radical “leap”<sup>228</sup> into nothingness [*das Nichts*], but no continuous transition into some other mode of being.<sup>229</sup>

When at the beginning of existential-ontological investigations we encounter for the first time the idea of an entity’s mode of being, something else also appears to make up a characteristic feature of this mode of being. Namely, every object appears to be able to exist in only *one* mode of being, in the sense that anything at all that can be distinguished in it (hence, in particular, all of its properties) exists in *the same* mode of being as the object itself.<sup>230</sup> As we shall presently see, the situation is different with regard to the existential *moments*. Along this path we could arrive at a convenient distinction between the mode of being of something (*modus existentiae*) and the existential moment<sup>231</sup>. However, the claim we just made concerning the modes of being of objects does raise certain doubts which dictate caution, and will ultimately force us to narrow the scope of this claim. But before we are in a position to deal with this matter in detail – and

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226 ʘ lamp merely entertained in thought as a ʘ

227 ʘ pertaining to the transformation of a possible case into an actual one ʘ

228 ʘ , that absolute “break” from the given mode of being ʘ

229 ʘ We transfer from one mode of being into another only *mentally*, and this transition blurs to some extent the radical inability of an entity to transition from one mode of being into another, or into nothingness. ʘ

230 ʘ [Ftn.:] This statement leads to certain complications in the case of the mode of real being, but the issue will get cleared up after the various existential moments and the idea of an entity’s real being will have been discussed, and when the various types of an entity’s characteristics get differentiated within the context of formal ontology. Cf. Chs. VI and VII. ʘ

231 ʘ (*momentum existentiale*) ʘ

that will not be possible until we have gained a much deeper understanding of existential issues! – let us for the time being get clearer about the exact sense of this claim and the difficulties associated with it. To wit, when it comes to a mode of being such as, say, the being-real or the being-ideal of something, then it is impossible for something which is real to have some parts or properties that would exist in it in the mode of ideality. If something is real, then *everything* in it is real (apart from being-real itself, of which it can obviously not be said in any way that it “exists” in some sense or other). This appears obvious to the point of being trivial.<sup>232</sup> Yet certain difficulties do still arise in this connection. Thus, initially it seems as if “being-real and being-possible”<sup>233</sup> are two different modes of the being of something. But if, in accordance with the above claim, we concede that everything attaching to [*an*] a real object is real, then nothing attaching to [*an*] it could be possible in the sense of the empirical possibility we have established. And this all the more so, given that being-real and empirical being-possible are mutually exclusive modes of being. But then would there be any empirical possibilities at all in the real world if they could not occur as attaching to the objects of this world? However, when we earlier contrasted being-real and being-possible, the point we made was that *one and the same* state of affairs or object cannot be simultaneously (in its full being) both real and empirically possible. But now something else is at issue, namely whether *within* the confines of one and the same object *all* properties, *all* states of affairs, *all* parts, relations, etc., exist or have to exist *in the same mode*. If that were so, it would preclude two *different* properties of the same object from existing in different modes; e.g., it would prevent *one* property from being real while several others are merely empirically possible. But how could this be reconciled with the fact that we attribute to individual, real objects properties or states of one sort or another – and rightfully so, it would seem – that are merely empirically possible, one or another of which are then actually realized? We say, for example, that an acquaintance X of ours is currently 50 years old, and that since he has never before been seriously ill, and feels relatively well, it is possible that he will live for many years to come. Thus, his “advanced age” constitutes already now one of his “possible” properties, which, with respect to their mode of being, differ distinctly from his property of being 50 years old. Analogously, we can point to many merely possible properties which the man in question does not at this time [*aktuell*] possess in the mode of reality, but which he *can* possess under the pre-

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232 “*Nota bene*, everything that is ultimately primitive [*pierwotne = ursprünglich*] and essentially necessary is trivial; however, we only too infrequently have a clear awareness of what is primitive and necessary.”

233 ““actuality” and “possibility””

vailing circumstances. At some future time he may possess them as real properties, but today they are only “possible.” And can it indeed ever be otherwise, given the concept of empirical possibility we have introduced? Can it ever be that real objects possess *no* merely possible properties, when, in accordance with our earlier considerations, *every* configuration [*Bestand*] of real circumstances determines unequivocally a specific configuration of (empirically) possible states of affairs? We have to reject this. Every object, and every real thing in particular, introduces into its surrounding world, *vía* its collective stock of properties, a certain configuration of real circumstances; thus, to every real object belongs a specific range of empirically possible states of affairs, and of its empirically possible properties in particular. Hence, either the considered claim that every object can exist in only *one* mode of being is false, or empirical possibility does not constitute a mode of being that is distinct relative to being-real. Is it perhaps only an existential moment? In order to render a decision on this, we must first deal in greater detail with existential moments and at the same time become better cognizant of the essence of being-real and of being-possible. Perhaps only now do we get a feeling for how unclear and insecure our current knowledge still is concerning being-real or being-possible. For the time being only so much appears to be clear: a) “empirical being-possible” and “being-real” differ from each other; b) one and the same entity cannot at the same time exist in both the one and the other sense, and this – if for no other reason – because only something that will occur in the future [*das Zukunftige*] relative to some specific present can be empirically possible, whereas only something that takes place, or has already occurred, in some *present* (it seems) is “real.” Only relatively few real facts arise out of a multitude of empirically possible states of affairs. In relative terms, the world of empirically possible states of affairs appears to be relatively much richer than the world of the real.

┌Let us attempt a strictly general reading of the proposition at issue concerning a *single* mode of being for an object, and refrain from considering empirical possibility as a mode of being.<sup>234</sup> Perhaps the reality [*Realität*] of something is a mode of being that on the one hand embraces, so to speak, what we have in mind when we speak of “active” actuality [*aktueller*] *Wirklichkeit*] in the present, and on the other also everything that is empirically possible but that has not yet been “realized,” although it gravitates (leans), as it were, toward being-real, toward being-active. Or to put it another way, perhaps the transition from empirical possibility into “active actuality,” and subsequently into what has already

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234 ┌ It may well be, however, that the proposition under discussion concerning an entity’s single mode of being is strictly binding in general, but we incorrectly regard empirical possibility as a mode of being. ┘

occurred and passed, is that sought mode of being that we term “reality [*Realität*].” “Possibly-being-real” [*Real-Möglich-Sein*] would then be, if we may put it that way, only a “partial” mode of being which always encompasses only *some* properties and aspects of the real object, which [object] at the same time would have to be “actively actual” in its other properties in order to be able to exist and be real at all, and to possess, among others, those merely empirically possible properties. The real world would in this fashion be, so to speak, interlaced [*durchwoben*] with what is empirically possible. Particular groups of empirically possible states of affairs would then be allotted to particular effectively actual objects and states of affairs which would not only predetermine them, but also serve as their existential basis.

Could it be, however, that the claim “under discussion”<sup>235</sup> is only valid for certain specific pairs of modes of being? And might it not be that it is indeed “being-real”<sup>236</sup> and empirical being-possible to which it is not applicable? On the other hand, if we consider being-real and being-ideal, it is altogether ruled out that a real object could possess any ideal properties or that an ideal object could possess any real ones. In this case, entire domains of being “remain completely unrelated”<sup>237</sup>.

We cannot yet resolve which of the “possibilities” – we see how ambiguous this word is – just considered obtains<sup>238</sup>. For only now do we begin to realize that “being-real or being-ideal are not as simple and easy to grasp as might have appeared at the start of such deliberations”<sup>239</sup>. Let us therefore set aside “the claim we have been discussing, and therewith also the definitive, rigorous definition of the concept of a mode of being, and attempt to arrive at that concept along some other path”<sup>240</sup>.

Despite the currently still vague concept of a mode of being, we are nonetheless justified in stating at this juncture that existential moments can be con-

235 “concerning a *single* mode of being for the *entire* object”

236 “(effective) actuality”

237 “would remain entirely *exterior* to each other”

238 “prospective conceptions of actuality is the correct one”

239 “that which in everyday life, or even in the framework of the special sciences, appears to be so “straightforward” and “clearly intelligible” – namely, that we know what the “actuality” of a particular real thing is, or what the “ideality” of existence of a particular mathematical object is – that is indeed not at all clear. To the contrary, it is immensely difficult to come up with an account of what “actuality,” “possibility” (in an empirical sense or in the sense of pure possibility), “ideality of existence,” and the like, are”

240 “for the time being the dubious issue of whether necessarily *every* object can exist in only a single mode of being throughout the entire scope of its existence, and turn meanwhile to another matter, namely, to distinguishing existential moments from modes of being”

traped to a mode of being, say, being-real, and indeed [existential moments] as that which can be intuitively discerned and grasped in a mode of being by means of abstraction – by means of a higher order abstraction, so to speak – inseparable as these existential moments might be from the latter.<sup>241</sup> We may also say that no existential moment suffices by itself for the existence of an entity in some particular mode of being. “By their very essence, the modes of being”<sup>242</sup> require no completion by any other modes of being or by existential moments that are not [already] “contained” in them, whereas each and every existential moment – once again in accordance with its essence – will always have to be completed by certain other existential moments. To put it another way, if we take some individual object and attempt to grasp its full “existential aspect,” so to speak, we always encounter some specific mode of being, whereas in every case we encounter the existential moments only as something within the total framework of that mode of being. And indeed a number of existential moments can always be intuitively discerned in every single mode of being. However, “existence” overall is only a general idea, of which the several modes of being are the differentiated species.

It appears possible in the case of existential moments that within the framework of one and the same individual object, not all of the object’s moments<sup>243</sup> have to subsist [*bestehen*] in the same existential moment, but can, depending on their form and matter, occur in different existential moments.<sup>244</sup> But this, too, we shall only be in the position to discuss later, since a certain insight into the form of the object and into the moments of that form is indispensable for that purpose. At this time, we must attend to clarifying the specific existential moments.

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241 “For the mode of existence of a given object is [also] inseparable from that object, and conversely. [To assume the contrary of] [T]he one and the other is an absurdity and would force us to accept such internally contradictory propositions as that the mode of being of something exists apart from that something of which it is the existence\*, or that a given object exists without its existence. The existential moment, however, is characterized by inseparability of a higher order.

\* That is why a literal reading of the existentialist thesis that “existence” precedes “essence” appears to be an absurdity. It is difficult to say, however, what it is supposed to mean in a figurative sense. ▽

242 “Only the modes of being are mutually *relatively* “selfsufficient,” i.e., ▽

243 “(properties) ▽

244 [The formulation of this sentence is somewhat obscure; however, I left it as is, since both the Polish and German versions are in agreement here. It would read more plausibly if the words ‘moment’ and ‘moments’ that appear in succession were replaced by ‘mode’ and ‘modes,’ respectively. The sentence would then read: “It appears possible ... not all of the object’s moments must subsist in the same existential mode, but can... occur in different existential modes.”]

The “existential dependence” of the real world on pure consciousness has been a frequent topic of discussion. And here the history of the problem is telling with regard to the ambiguity of this expression. In conjunction with this issue, I shall initially distinguish four different pairs of opposite existential moments:

1. autonomy – heteronomy;
2. originality – derivativeness;
3. selfsufficiency – non-selfsufficiency;
4. independence – dependence.<sup>245</sup>

The juxtaposition of these opposed existential moments attempts to set sharply apart certain concepts that have been confusedly employed by various camps in the history of philosophy, to clarify each of them, and – insofar as that is feasible – to articulate them rigorously.<sup>246</sup>

## § 12. Existential Autonomy and Existential Heteronomy<sup>247</sup>

An entity (in the sense of any something at all [*irgend Etwas überhaupt*]<sup>248</sup>) exists autonomously (is existentially autonomous) if it has its existential foundation within itself.<sup>249</sup> And it has it within itself if it is something that is immanent-

245 [Each of the terms in 1-4 is prefixed by the qualifier ‘existential [Seins -],’ which, to avoid repetitiveness, I shall likewise frequently omit in the sequel. I shall comment further on each pair of terms as each comes up for discussion in the next four sections.]

246 I differentiated these existential moments for the first time in my “*Bemerkungen*,” *op. cit.*. In the present work I am simply making an effort to spell them out in greater detail.

247 [*Seinsautonomie und Seinsheteronomie*: the corresponding pair of terms employed by Ingarden in *Spór* are *samoistość/niesamoistość* – self-existence/non-self-existence in Michejda’s translation, although she changes the title of the section to reflect the terminology preferred in the German; *autonomia/heteronomia*, the Polish correlates of *Autonomie/Heteronomie*, are already quite prevalent in *Spór*.]

248 I am not forgetting that the broadest concept of “any something at all”<sup>\*</sup> is threatened with the danger of antinomy.<sup>\*\*</sup> But we are here making use of an expression that would encompass not only individual objects and their properties, but also states of affairs and relations, as well as ideas and ideal qualities. The point is simply to have a convenient abbreviation without prejudging whether a consistent [*einheitlicher*] concept of “any something at all” can be constructed.

\* [henceforth, ‘any something’]

\*\* ⌈ It is questionable whether a broad enough concept of “any something” (an “object”) can be formed whose extension would encompass *everything* that exists in some fashion. ⌋

249 I distinguish terminologically between “existential foundation” [*Seinsfundament*] and

ly determined within itself. On the other hand, an entity is existentially heteronomous (exists heteronomously) if it has its existential foundation  $\ulcorner$ outside of itself $\urcorner$ .<sup>250</sup> Let us clarify.

First of all, “existential autonomy” in the sense espoused here is not to be identified with the “*Daseinsautonomie*” which H. Conrad-Martius maintains to be characteristic of the real world.<sup>251</sup> For with this term she has in mind either being-real as a distinctive mode of being, or that existential moment that we designate further below as “independence.” There is rather more of a kinship between the existential autonomy in the sense I advocate here and certain moments of being-real advanced by H. Conrad-Martius in her *Realontologie*.<sup>252</sup>

In order to compare our concepts, we must first of all note an essential difference between H. Conrad-Martius and myself in the posing of problems. Mrs. Conrad-Martius begins with a preestablished phenomenon of being-real [*des Realseins*] and seeks to exhibit simpler moments in it. She does this, by the way, without having conceptually distinguished between modes of being and existential moments. In doing so, she presupposes that being-real does “contain” within itself precisely such moments. In contrast, I am here forging a path that proceeds in the opposite direction. Initially I set aside the unanalyzed phenomenon of being-real and try to clarify the primitive existential moments, in order to pose the question only afterwards as to whether, and if so how, being-real can be characterized as a mode of being by means of a suitable assortment of these existential moments, provided<sup>253</sup> we have achieved a direct intuitive apprehension of this mode of being as a unitary phenomenon [*Gesamtphänomen*]. For the time being we shall leave the answer to this last question unresolved.

H. Conrad-Martius distinguishes four moments in the phenomenon of reality [as a mode of being]: 1. *die Selbstträgerschaft*<sup>254,255</sup>; 2. *die Eigenposition*<sup>256</sup>; 3.

“existential basis” [*existentielle Grundlage*]. The reasons for making this distinction will be given later.

250  $\ulcorner$  not within itself,  $\urcorner$  in something else  $\urcorner$

251 See, H. Conrad-Martius, *Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt*, *op cit.*

252 See H. Conrad-Martius, [*Realontologie, Jahrb.*, Vol. VI,]1923, pp. 159 - 333.

253  $\ulcorner$  that as a check of that characterization  $\urcorner$

254 This is rather a moment of the *form* of the object, as opposed to being an existential moment.

255  $\ulcorner$ , which we could express with the words that something is a *subject in and for itself*, a bearer  $\urcorner$  [Other English renderings could be: “self-bearing” or “self-sustenance.”]

256  $\ulcorner$ , which could be rendered in the following fashion: that something has its own existential basis within itself (is such that it manages to be founded within itself)  $\urcorner$  [Like Husserl, Ingarden generally uses ‘*Position*’ as equivalent to ‘*Setzung*.’]

*die prinzipielle Tangierbarkeit*<sup>257</sup>; 4. *die Leibhaftigkeit*<sup>258</sup>, whereby this last is supposed to comprise the “general character of reality” which “is constituted in and with them as the grand ontic resultant, as it were, of these individual formative moments.”<sup>259</sup> Without resolving here whether autonomy in *our* sense is to be encountered at all in the unitary phenomenon of reality, or is even characteristic of it, we feel justified in stating that it is intimately connected with H. Conrad-Martius’ “*Eigenposition*” and “*Leibhaftigkeit*.” Or to express this better, what H. Conrad-Martius appears to have in mind “with *Eigenposition and Leibhaftigkeit* taken together”<sup>260</sup> is in truth one simple, primitive, existential moment that we term “autonomy.” Admittedly, the latter also appears to occur in cases where H. Conrad-Martius “, relative to the moments distinguished by *her*, would deny its occurrence”<sup>261</sup>, but this “, is not yet enough to prove my claim false”<sup>262</sup>. Hence, for example, every pure *Wesenheit* (pure ideal quality), say, “redness in itself,” is autonomous. That is to say, “redness in itself” has its existential foundation within itself in the sense that *in itself it is through and through* what it is, [in the sense] that it is *determined* by something which is wholly *contained* within itself, indeed, by what it *itself is*.<sup>263</sup> But it is not real in the sense we are yet to establish. Thus, according to H. Conrad-Martius, it could not be “visceral.” Besides, the term ‘*Leibhaftigkeit*’ is much too ambiguous in all of this and is ordinarily employed in a sense that has a different and narrower orientation. As we know, it was introduced by E. Husserl for the purpose of designating a particular feature of what is perceptually given. Thus, according to Husserl, something real that is merely *imaged* [*vorgestellt*] is no longer given “viscerally.” Besides, it was originally an epistemological concept of phenomenology and not an ontological one. H. Conrad-Martius was the first to use it in an ontological sense. To be sure, she takes great pains to “make it more tangible”<sup>264</sup> by means of examples and descriptions, and to impart to it a much broad-

257 “, hence, the circumstance that something is in itself in principle accessible to something else and capable of being affected in its properties “

258 “, that could be rendered by “viscerality [*cielesność=Leibhaftigkeit*]” or by “saturation of viscerality [*pełnię cielesności = Fülle der Leibhaftigkeit*] “

259 [“*sich in und mit ihnen als das ontische Gesamtergebnis gewissermassen dieser einzelnen Gestaltungsmomente konstituiert*” (Ingarden does not translate quotations from Conrad-Martius into Polish in *Spór*.)]

260 “ when analyzing *both* of these concepts *in conjunction* “

261 “ would deny the presence of the moments of “viscerality” and “self-positing [*auto-pozycji*]” (“*Eigenposition*”) “

262 “ only addresses the issue of the scope of the occurrence of existential autonomy, but does not infringe on my conviction as to what it properly is “

263 “ An ideal quality is perfectly its very self and nothing more. “

264 “ establish its meaning “



er sense than it had for Husserl, but it still remains encumbered by considerable lack of clarity. We therefore prefer to free ourselves of these conceptual constructs, and attempt to elucidate the concept of autonomy on our own, in accordance with the characterization given above.

Just as the ideal quality “redness in itself,” so too an object would be autonomous if it were<sup>265</sup> “red” in the sense of *wholly* containing in itself the *concretization*<sup>266</sup> (of a particular sort) of the ideal quality “redness in itself,” and if at the same time that object were to contain [only] concretizations (of the same sort) of other ideal qualities for *all* [the rest] of its attributes [*Bestimmtheiten*]. Its red-attribute, just as anything at all in virtue of which it were autonomous, would have to be wholly *immanent* to it, *constitute* [*aufbauen*] it in the “genuine [echten]<sup>267</sup> sense. *This consummate [vollkommene] immanence of the attributes of an entity is the essential condition of its existential autonomy*: the attributes that are wholly immanent to the entity make up the very existential foundation that is proper [*eigen*] to it, and determine its structure [*bauen es auf*]. Still differently put: the genuine, consummate immanence of the attributes confers onto an entity its existential autonomy. Autonomy is, so to speak, the<sup>268</sup> “expression<sup>269</sup> of this immanence. Where this immanence is lacking, the respective entity cannot be autonomous, and is for this very reason heteronomous – insofar as it exists at all.

It seems that autonomy is an existential moment that can be exhibited within being-real, although it is not<sup>270</sup> characteristic for it. Hence there appears to be no difference with respect to autonomy between “the being-ideal of a pure<sup>271</sup> quality (redness in itself) and a real thing that harbors the concretization of this quality within itself, and – in this specific case – “is red” as a result. If, for all that, there is an essential *existential* difference between the two entities – and there can be no doubt of that! – it must be based on *other* existential moments. Let us note, moreover, that redness plays a different formal *constitutive role* in

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265 I invoke the conditional here, because at this point I do not wish to make a commitment as to whether any red objects do in fact exist or, correlatively, whether “redness” is or can be wholly immanent to any object.

266 By “concretization” of an ideal quality we understand that existentially constrained form of a quality which it displays once it appears in some *particular, individual* mode of being. The *realization* of an ideal quality comprises a particular case of concretization. We discuss ideal qualities, ideas and individuality in Part II.

267 “strict, primary [or original]”

268 “external”

269 “manifestation”

270 “exclusively”

271 “a pure ideal”

the pure ideal quality “redness in itself” than it does in a “red” object. “Concretized redness accrues<sup>272</sup> to the latter only as *qualitative determination* of one of its *properties* – as, say, in a “red fabric” –<sup>273</sup> whereas as an ideal quality redness is simply *itself*. Only in “this latter case could one speak of the ideal quality<sup>274</sup> being perfectly itself [*selbstherrlichen Selbstsein*]<sup>275</sup> without something else participating in its being and in how it is [*in ihrem Sosein*], and also without it itself partaking in anything else. Precisely therein lies the essential sense of the “purity” that must be affirmed for an ideal quality, without our having to resolve thereby whether the “pure” ideal quality is only some sort of “abstraction” – hence, as we frequently put it, a “construct” of our abstractive thinking – and whether it concretizes only “*in concreto*,” that is, by partaking in something else – as Aristotle once claimed – or whether, on the contrary, it exists in and for itself in this selfhood [*Selbstheit*] and certain solitariness [*Einsamkeit*] – as Plato once maintained. That is already a question of a metaphysical nature. Besides, it is intimately bound up with certain problems in *formal ontology*, with which we shall deal later. Here, on the other hand, I am only interested with the eventual *mode* of the being of a pure ideal quality, *if* it were to exist for itself alone.

One may well surmise that the immanence of the “material” attributes of something is the necessary condition for the existence of *every* entity *in general*. Yet strangely enough, such is *not* actually the case. The non-immanence of the attributes of an entity and its very existence are not mutually exclusive. We can even cite certain specific cases of existentially heteronomous entities. Namely, every *purely intentional* entity is heteronomous, hence an entity which draws its being and its collective stock of attributes from the enactment [*Vollzug*] of an intentional<sup>276</sup> conscious experience<sup>277</sup>, which in a specific integrated fashion is endowed with a content, and it would not exist at all without this enactment. “But this<sup>278</sup> entity<sup>279</sup> must be sharply distinguished from those entities, likewise

272 This has not been expressed quite correctly, since it is not the qualitative determination of a property that “accrues” to an object, but rather this property itself, precisely because the latter is that which accrues [*das Zukommende*] as such. See Ch. IX. [The phrase ‘precisely because ... as such’ was added in *Streit*.]

273 “Redness concretized in the latter occurs solely as *qualitative determination* of one of its properties, and only in this role and form does it *accrue* to it.”

274 “the case of a pure ideal quality can one speak of.”

275 “and *exclusively itself*.”

276 That is, an experience that harbors an intention within itself.

277 (“act”).

278 “A purely intentional.”

279 We shall discuss purely intentional entities, and their form in particular, in Ch. IX. See also *LWA*, § 20.

often called “intentional,” that are indeed *struck* [*betroffen*] by the intention of a conscious act, but for which this being struck is entirely *accidental*, since, if they exist at all, they exist and are what they are *in themselves* without having been so struck.

In drawing this distinction, I am by no means presupposing that any objects at all in fact exist for which this contingency would obtain. Were I to do so, I would have *eo ipso* resolved the controversy between idealism and realism in favor of a particular type of realism. But I have no right to do this at the current stage of the investigation. Thus, I am simply claiming that if these sorts of entities exist at all, this contingency of being struck by an intentional act could only have its source in the fact that their mode of being enables them to be characterized by a peculiar independence of whether or not they actually happen to be struck by an act-intention – that they therefore are what they are also without the latter, i.e.: that they are autonomous.

Only a strict differentiation of those entities which are merely contingently struck by the intention of a conscious act – and are for this reason only secondarily [*sekundär*] intentional – from the purely and primarily [*ursprünglich*] intentional entities can unveil the peculiar heteronomy of the latter.

In contrast to our conception, one may adopt the standpoint of existential monism. This view subscribes to only a single sense of being, that of existential autonomy, but in doing so makes no use of this concept, not to speak of its ever being clarified. On this view, of course, all heteronomous entities are regarded as non-existent<sup>280</sup>. Despite this general stance and by a strange twist, in a number of particular cases existential monism does not lead to an outright rejection of the existence of certain purely intentional objects, but rather to a radical distortion of their meaning which enables them to be regarded as a certain sort of autonomous objects. But this is only accomplished at the cost of interpreting away everything that is specifically characteristic of them. In the face of all theory, the force “of the givenness of certain objects”<sup>281</sup> – such as, say, literary works, musical compositions, social and national institutions, legal statutes, etc. – is so great that one is disinclined to deny their existence in a particular case. Instead, in order to rescue their existence, one *psychologizes* them. The psychologization of an entity consists in falsely attributing to it the general essence of a mental state, or of a psychologically interpreted conscious experience, no matter how strenuously its own concrete and individual properties protest against it. There was a time – in the second half of the 19th century – when under the im-

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280 “, which obviously is already a mere tautological consequence of the point of view adopted in advance ”

281 “ with which certain purely intentional objects impose themselves on us ”

press of positivist skepticism a good number of basic types of purely intentional, and even existentially autonomous, entities were psychologized, with logical structures at the head of the list. At this juncture we do not wish to engage in a polemic against the various psychologistic theories. This has already been done on numerous occasions.<sup>282</sup> But it is precisely the crude “misunderstandings and absurdities to which the various psychologistic theories fall prey”<sup>283</sup> which best show that they have a common source of errors – existential monism. Indeed, this monism is nothing other than a firmly rooted prejudice which, if consistently upheld, would not only literally annihilate (make-into-nothing) almost all cultural products, but would also make science impossible.

The purely intentional objects are by no means an *utter nothing*, as they would have to be if existential monism were correct. They simply have no *essence of their own* [*Eigenwesen*] in the strict sense, as E. Husserl has so convincingly argued in his *Ideas I*.<sup>284</sup> Only autonomous entities can have a proper essence [*Eigenwesen*], an ensemble of qualifications<sup>285</sup> (attributes) that are wholly *immanent* to the given entity. Naturally, such *immanent* qualifications are not present at all in the content of a purely intentional object. All of the material attributes appearing in its content, as well as the formal and even existential moments, are merely “allotted” to it, “intended”, but not “embodied” [*verkörpert*] in it in the genuine sense. When, for example, in a poetic mindset we conjure up some specific human character which is to have such or such properties, live here or there, do this or that, we obviously conjure it up as an entity that “exists in the mode of reality” [*real existierende*]. We ascribe being-real to it. But all of these properties, ways of behaving, real existence, etc., are after all merely “intended”: the invented young, strong man *is* not “actually” young (in the existentially autonomous sense), *is* not<sup>286</sup> strong, *is* “no”<sup>287</sup> man, but is merely so “imagined,” so “portrayed.” Something is simply “imputed” to him that he cannot, so to speak, “fulfill” [*erfüllen*], and certainly cannot “fulfill”

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282 As we know, Frege and Husserl have done this relative to logical entities. As concerns literary works and works of art, I have attempted to do it in my book *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, *op. cit.*\*

\* “With regard to other works of art, I tried to demonstrate this in my *Studia z estetyki* [Studies in Aesthetics], vol. II [Warszawa: PWN, 1958].”

283 “nonsensicalities and factual errors to which the psychologistic conception of the cited entities leads”

284 *Op. cit.*, 1913, p. 93.

285 “[Ftn.:] Cf. § 43.”

286 “actually”

287 “not ‘truly’”

it<sup>288</sup> *out of himself*, precisely because he displays no immanent attributes in himself. His “being-real” is only allotted to him, granted him by “the poetic will”<sup>289</sup>. The status of reality [*Realitätshabitus*] is only “simulated here”<sup>290</sup> owing to the phantasizing activity, just as is his youth, humanity, etc. The source of this simulation lies in the meaning-intention [*Vermeinung*] contained in the creative acts of consciousness. But these acts are able to bring forth nothing other and nothing more than merely “imputed”<sup>291</sup> youth, imputed reality, etc. It can impose no immanence on the imputed attributes of the projected [*fingierten*] object, not even – as happens in some cases – when this immanence is indeed expressly intentionally allotted to the projected object. In other words, the poetic, creative act of consciousness can produce [*schaffen*] no existentially autonomous object.<sup>292</sup> That act is “impotently creative” – what is produced by it lives by the grace of the conscious act producing it, and it cannot make itself “self-willed” [*eigenwillig*], “independent,” “sovereign [*selbstherrlich*]”<sup>293</sup>.<sup>294</sup> It can-

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288 “muster”

289 “an act of will and poetic fancy”

290 “imputed to the intentional object and *illusorily elicited*”

291 “ascribed, intended”

292 H. Conrad-Martius seems to maintain a different position in this respect when she claims that Hamlet can no longer be annihilated (see her *Realontologie, op. cit.*, p. 182). But a more thorough discussion of this issue would be necessary. On the other hand, it does seem certain that Mrs. Conrad-Martius has keenly grasped in at least one particular case what we have termed here the “existential heteronomy” of the purely intentional object – in the case of “what is hallucinated.” Concerning this case, she writes: “...and in this respect what is hallucinated is indeed necessarily accessible and affectable [*tangierbar*] in its being. It does not partake of that primitive remoteness [*Entzogenheit*] of that which exists only *idealiter*. Nonetheless, this affectability [*Tangierbarkeit*] is not direct, as in the case of genuine reality: the hallucinated lion, the dreamed city, is indeed manifest to the person who is hallucinating, but the *complete* “nothingness,” and, in turn, the corresponding *immanent lack of self* [*Selbstlosigkeit*] of their being, makes it in principle impossible to run into them ‘somehow and somewhere.’ For *in themselves they are nothing*. God himself could only withdraw their being from them by intruding into the dreaming or hallucinating mind [*Geist*], or into the physiological underpinnings of this mind. And indeed only here are they accessible. [*Aber von hier aus sind sie auch erreichbar.*] The triangle, on the other hand, or the poetic Hamlet – ‘out of nowhere’...” (*ibid.*, p. 183) And further: “Both the genuine real entity and what exists *idealiter*, in fundamental opposition to the hallucinated construct, possess formal objectivity [*Objektivität*] and existential independence [*Seinsunabhängigkeit*] (*Daseinsautonomie*), whereas one can designate what is hallucinated as what in principle is “immanently fallible [*Hinfällige*]” *because it stands and falls not owing to itself, or owing to a being that is its own, but owing to something else* (the hallucinating mind).” (*ibid.*, p. 184)

293 “autonomous”

not “rebel” against the corresponding acts of consciousness – it can have no properties, no self-chosen vicissitudes of its own, other than those that are allotted to it. Indeed, it has no existential foundation within itself; its existential foundation inheres in the act of consciousness that produces it intentionally, or in the mind [*Geist*] that performs this act.

Not every purely intentional object has its *immediate* existential foundation in an act of consciousness. Or to put it more generally, the immediate existential foundation of an heteronomous entity need not necessarily lie in an autonomous entity.

In particular, there are *derivative* purely intentional entities whose immediate existential foundation inheres in turn in an heteronomous entity. Thus, for example, the meaning of sentences belonging to a literary work is an intentional product that issues out of specifically structured sentence-building operations. But this sentence-meaning determines *out of itself* the objects presented in the given sentence (people, things, animals, events, etc.), which themselves are also purely intentional. Their *immediate* existential foundation lies in the corresponding sentence-meanings, which for their part refer back to the *further* existential foundation that generally already winds up being an autonomous object, and indeed [in the case at hand] it is the sentence-building operation, or the corresponding agent [*Subjekt*]. The reason for saying “generally” is that there are sentences which are themselves uttered by a person who is merely presented in the literary work, a person which, as presented, is indeed only purely intentional, and refers back to other sentences that first project it. But there is the binding ontological law that every heteronomous entity ultimately – sometimes along a quite convoluted path – refers back to an autonomous entity in which its existential foundation is to be found. So, for example, a literarily presented entity, and indeed one projected by sentence-meanings, ultimately refers back to the creative operations of the author’s consciousness, out of which the given work has issued and which, for their part, are autonomous.<sup>295</sup>

At this stage, I do not wish to resolve the issue as to whether there are heteronomous entities (always in accordance with their idea) that do not belong among the purely intentional entities which have their source in the operations of consciousness. This requires further investigations. But we must mention that

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294 We do not mean to imply with this that every conscious act without exception is equally “impotently-creative.” We are simply claiming that, in accordance with the idea of them, there are such impotently-creative acts of consciousness. We can only state here with some degree of probability that our human consciousness is characterized by this impotence.

295 All this is only briefly sketched here. It was all examined in great detail in my *LWA*, *op. cit.*

the empirically possible<sup>296</sup> objects and states of affairs that are predetermined by the states that at any time effectively prevail in the real world do appear to belong among the heteronomous objects – so long, of course, as they have not been realized.

### § 13. Existential Originality and Existential Derivativeness<sup>297</sup>

An entity is existentially original if, in accordance with its essence, it cannot be produced [*geschaffen*] by any other entity. In contrast, an entity is existentially derivative if it can be so produced. If an original entity exists at all, that is only because it is incapable of not existing in virtue of its very essence – provided there is such an essence, and more precisely, such an “ideal ‘quiddity’” [*Washeit*] as determines its nature [*Natur*]<sup>298,299</sup> (concerning which we render no decision here). And *if* it is so, then its own proper *essence* forces it to exist. That is to say, it somehow contains the source of its being within itself. It follows from this that if an existentially original entity does exist, it cannot be annihilated by any other object. That is to say, it is existentially *durable* [*dauerhaft*]. If, on the other hand, an entity is existentially derivative, then it is also inherent in *its* essence that it can or does exist in virtue of having been produced by some other object. This represents the absolute, unconditional existential derivativeness of an entity. It is to be distinguished from *contingent, empirical* derivativeness. The negation of derivativeness can signify either the relative non-derivativeness of an object with respect to some other *specific* object X, or originality. The latter does not necessarily follow from the former.<sup>300</sup>

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296 「 future 」

297 [*Seinsursprünglichkeit und Seinsabgeleitetheit*: most commentators opt for ‘derivation’ – in rare instances, for ‘derivativity’ – as the rendering of *Abgeleitetheit*, which in the more commonly accepted rendition does not do grammatical justice to the original. The pair ‘primitivity/secondarity’ has also been proposed. To be [*seins*]abgeleitet has also been translated as to “have consequent being.”]

298 Concerning the nature of an entity, cf. Ch. VIII, § 38. [*Natur* is a technical term in Ingarden’s ontology; the English term is exclusively reserved for it throughout the translation, even when it does not function in its technical role.]

299 「 ensemble of ideal qualities that would so determine it 」

300 I am fully aware that there may be well-founded doubts as to whether it is possible to achieve an intuition of an entity’s originality, and therewith also doubts as to whether the *idea* of such an existential moment exists. It is, however, instructive that the concept of originality does appear with a greater or lesser degree of explicitness in various systems of European philosophy, and that the influence it often exerts on final metaphysi-

It is self-evident that an original entity must at the same time be autonomous, but not conversely. A derivative entity, on the other hand, can be either autonomous or heteronomous. Of course, the [sort of] producing from which an autonomous entity issues must be altogether different from the producing of one that is heteronomous – of a purely intentional one, in particular.

As we oppose to each other the existential moments currently in focus, the reader will no doubt recall the familiar Scholastic distinctions of “*esse a se*” (that is, existential originality) and “*esse ab alio*” (that is, existential derivative-ness), or of “*natura naturans*” and “*natura naturata*.” Some may perhaps also be reminded in this context of the concept of “substance” which played such a major role in the beginnings of modern rationalism – Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz – and which one is inclined to identify with existentially original entities. I cannot resolve the true status of this issue at this juncture, since any decision in this regard could only be reached on the basis of extensive historical investigations. The upshot of such an enterprise would probably be that the kinships and differences between the concepts at issue would be greater or lesser, depending on the philosophical system in which the historically extant concepts appear. And it would also probably turn out that we would never find them to completely coincide anywhere, since these historically extant concepts always engender

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cal commitments is all the greater, the less its content is comprehended and distinguished from other existential concepts. It is most frequently associated with other metaphysical concepts, such as, say, *causa sui*, *substantia*, and the like. So, for example, we read in the very first definition of Part I of Spinoza's *Ethics*: “*Per causam sui intelligo id, cuius essentia involvit existentiam; sive id, cuius natura non potest concipi, nisi existens*” [By that which is self-caused I mean that whose essence involves existence; or that whose nature can be conceived only as existing], or in proposition VII – “*Ad naturam substantiae pertinet existere*” [Existence belongs to the nature of substance].\* Thus, it is impossible not to invoke this concept wherever it is necessary to take account of all the prospective existential moments and concepts that may come into play in existential commitments. All the more so as the concept of original being obtrudes itself upon us in conjunction with a basic metaphysical question, namely, the question of why anything at all exists rather than there being simply nothing. One can of course entertain doubts as to whether we human beings will ever succeed in answering this question, but the existence of this question cannot be denied. Whereas the concept of *causa sui* does in the last analysis appear to be contradictory (to which I shall still return), that is not so with the concept of originality as an existential moment, and it must therefore be formulated as a limiting concept. The skeptically disposed reader might therefore acknowledge this\*\*, and at least consider originality as a purely rational possibility [*Denkmöglichkeit*].

\* [Eng. trans. from Spinoza, *Ethics*, tr. Samuel Shirley, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1992, pp. 31, 34.]

\*\* ⌈ concept ▾



various moments that result from their multifarious entanglements with the web of other concepts and theorems belonging to the respective system. Our intent, however, is to grasp these existential moments purely in and for themselves, and entirely independently of any other concepts and theories. Hence, no matter how great the kinship might be between our concepts and those transmitted to us by the history of philosophy, we must nevertheless point out the fundamental differences that follow. To fail to take these differences into account would result in a misinterpretation of our view.

The Scholastic concepts of *esse a se* and *esse ab alio* are metaphysical concepts. Whenever they are employed, they appear in propositions that affirm "this sort of entity [*Seiende*] as something that in fact exists"<sup>301</sup>. Our concepts, on the other hand, are *purely ontological*: they are acquired solely on the basis of grasping the corresponding ideas, and their use here presupposes nothing about the factual existence of original or derivative entities. In maintaining our purely ontological orientation, we do not wish to decide whether such entities had ever in fact existed, do exist, or will exist. Ontologically considered, their factual existence and non-existence are *equally possible*, and no existential-ontological *proof* can be adduced *pro* or *contra*. For it cannot be shown within the scope of purely existential analyses that there is some material determination of an entity's essence which would compel it to exist. Only an analysis within the framework of a material ontology could offer certain indications in this regard.

The Scholastic concepts under discussion are metaphysical in yet another sense. In particular, the concept of "*esse a se*" is most intimately bound up in Scholasticism with the concept of divinity [*Gottheit*]. Irrespective of how the concept of God might otherwise be positively defined, or [remain] undefined, God is always conceived as that which exists "*a se*"<sup>302</sup> and also as the *sole* existent "*a se*." And it is for this reason, conversely, that "*esse a se*" acquires the character of exclusively divine being. "*Esse ab alio*," in contrast, is *ipso facto* identified with the being of the world created by God. Meanwhile, originality in our purely existential sense has initially nothing to do with the essence of God or with divine existence as such. It is not conceived from the perspective of *what* does or can exist in this manner, but strictly as an existential moment for itself.

Another adulteration threatens our concepts of originality and derivativeness if one takes them in light of the opposition "*Natura naturans*" – "*Natura naturata*" (*Creatura*). Namely, there is the danger of regarding from the outset entities

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301 "The factual existence of this sort of objects" [In both versions the indicative 'this' does not have any obvious antecedent reference. It may be inferred from what follows that it refers to "original or derivative entities."]

302 "[Ftn.:] I am of course omitting Greek anthropomorphizations. I have in mind only those metaphysical theories which made use of the concept *esse a se*."

that exist in this fashion as terms of a *causal* relation, which would be totally misguided. But the formation of the concept “*causa sui*” (Spinoza), which is most intimately connected with the “*ens a se*,” is the best proof that the “*ens a se*,” or the “*Natura naturans*” (always closely interwoven with the concept of God or “substance”), has frequently been considered under the aspect of a causal connection. As a consequence, the purely existential distinction immediately takes on the complexion of a material-ontological or metaphysical one, which is precisely to be avoided here. Of course it is not to be denied that: 1) a material-ontological opposition can, or even must, be associated with the existential opposition between originality and derivativeness; 2) causal relations can obtain, although “they do not *have to*”<sup>303</sup>, between an original object and a derivative one.<sup>304</sup> But the existential opposition that we have in mind here must first be grasped for itself, without being influenced by material-ontological or metaphysical considerations. Proximally, it has nothing to do with the causal relation; that is, with the opposition between “cause” and “effect.” In order to be convinced of that, we must bring to light at least in a preliminary fashion certain characteristic features of the causal relation. This will also be useful in view of our subsequent deliberations in formal and material ontology.

The causal relation is often identified with a relation between something that conditions something else in its existence, and something that is conditioned [*zwischen dem Seinsbedingenden und dem Seinsbedingten*]. No further clarification is offered concerning the manner [*Art*] of this conditioning, except to restrict its meaning by saying that it is sufficient. But this conception of the causal relation is much too broad. Strictly speaking, the causal relation obtains between a C and an E if and *only* if:

1. C is individually *different* from E;
2. C does indeed condition E, but without E conditioning C in the same way;
3. both C and E are, with respect to their form, either events or processes (possibly phases of processes);
4. E sets in [*eintritt*] *simultaneously* with the onset [*Eintreten*] of C;
5. both C and E are *real*<sup>305</sup>.

These five points do not of course suffice to “strike at the core of the essence of the causal relation, or that of cause and effect”<sup>306</sup>. For the peculiar manner in which the “effect” is here being conditioned by the “cause” has not been set

303 “that is doubtful”

304 “But these are further issues that already presuppose the distinction between originality and derivativeness.”

305 “(actual)”

306 “capture the essence of the causal relation in its most characteristic moment”

forth. We ordinarily say that the cause “brings about” the effect, but it is not easy to say exactly what that means. Connected with the [problem of the] essence of original conditionality [*ursprünglichen Bedingtheit*] is, among others, the problem of the so-called “necessity” of the relation between cause and effect. What sort of “necessity” this is supposed to be, and to what extent it accrues to the causal relation, has become a hotly disputed problem ever since Hume’s celebrated assault on causality, but no significant progress toward the solution of this problem has been made since his days. The reason for this may lie in the fact that the question concerning the character of this necessity has never been made into a central issue. As a result, investigators have also failed to notice that Hume<sup>307</sup> had a quite special necessity in mind, insofar as he appealed to “relations of ideas”<sup>308</sup> in this context and had mathematical relations expressly in view<sup>309</sup>. The denial of *this* necessity, the mathematical one, in dealing with the causal relation is of course correct, and it is to Hume’s credit to have stressed this emphatically. But its absence from the causal relation does not yet rule out the presence of a necessity in some other sense. However, this issue was circumvented, and the debate simply revolved around the presence or absence in the causal relation of a necessity that was not examined or defined in any detail; ordinarily philosophers immediately moved on to other problems, say, epistemological (as in Kant) or metaphysical (as, for example, in the controversy over the universality of the principle of causality or the possibility of free will).

We, too, shall not be in a position to discuss this problem here<sup>310</sup>, since we are only touching on the problem of causality by way of contrast with the origi-

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307    ⌈ – who, in the final analysis, denies necessity to the causal relation – ▾

308    [The expression ‘relations of ideas’ is given by Ingarden in English.]

309    ⌈ one that, as may be surmised, obtains according to him only in that which he called “relations of ideas” ▾

310    As I prepare ⌈ this German redaction ▮\* for print, I already have in my possession extensive investigations into the existential causal relation [*kausale Seinsbeziehung*]. They constitute a continuation of the analyses in this book, and will be published at some future time. [They were published posthumously as Vol. III of *Streit: Über die kausale Struktur der realen Welt*, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1974.]\*\*\*

\* ⌈ the 2<sup>nd</sup> [Polish, 1960] edition of this book ▾

\*\* ⌈ Here, I reproduce the text of the first edition without any substantive changes, realizing how very inadequate it is. The views presented here make up the content of a paper read at the International Congress in Rome (1946), an abridgment of which appeared (in French) in the Acts of that Congress, and the full text of which was subsequently published in *Studia Philosophica*, v. III under the title “*Quelques remarque sur la relation de causalité.*” In 1959, Mario Bunge’s book *Causality* (Harvard U. Pr.) appeared in the U.S. It contains a number of theses pertaining to the causal relation that are very similar to the position I hold here. ▾

nality/derivativeness opposition. Besides, the treatment of this problem requires special preparation that we shall first be in a position to offer in subsequent analyses.

Despite all of this, the concept of cause, or causal relation, is *restricted* in an essential way by the five points given above, and in particular, certainly, in comparison with the concept of sufficient conditionality. At the same time, it has thereby been stripped of certain false conceptions which appear in the philosophical literature to this very day.<sup>311</sup> Let me still add the following remarks in connection with these five points:

*ad 1.* The distinctness of the cause, C, and the effect, E, is indispensable for the causal relation. This means that the Scholastic concept of “*causa sui*,” which also appears in Spinoza, is already absurd for this reason alone. But this distinctness of C and E does not preclude their occurring within the framework of *one* object, of a *single* whole. But both the manner in which C and E “occur in a single whole” and the possibility of such occurrence will only become fully intelligible in the context of the remarks that address the remaining points of our tabulation.

*ad 2.* If (2) is to hold, both C and E must be taken in the sense of *individual* names. For if C and E were *general* names, it would not be true that only C always conditions E, and that E never conditions C<sup>312</sup>. An  $\ulcorner$ entity $\urcorner$ <sup>313</sup> E<sub>2</sub> of *type* E, of which a specific exemplar E<sub>1</sub> is in some particular case the effect of C<sub>1</sub> can rather in some other case be the cause of<sup>314</sup> C<sub>2</sub>, which is of the same type C as C<sub>1</sub>. Let us give an example. In one case, the motion of a generator is the cause of inducing an electric current in the attached conductor. In another case, however, it is the electric current, even in the same conductor, which is the cause of motion in the given generator as *its* effect. But it is not the same (identical) current as in the first case, but an individually different one, except that it is<sup>315</sup> of the same *type*. On the other hand, an individually determinate process (or event) that causally evokes some other individually determinate process<sup>316</sup> cannot be caus-

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311 As we know, the literature pertaining to this problem is inordinately rich. I can neither cite nor discuss it here. However, may I at least take this opportunity to mention the names of the Polish writers who have dealt with the problem of causation. They are, among others: Wartenberg, Łukasiewicz, Zawirski, Metallmann, Gawecki, Kreutz.

312  $\ulcorner$  in the same manner  $\urcorner$

313  $\ulcorner$  event  $\urcorner$

314  $\ulcorner$  event  $\urcorner$

315  $\ulcorner$  a process or event  $\urcorner$

316  $\ulcorner$  or event  $\urcorner$

ally evoked by the latter, and therefore cannot  $\ulcorner$ itself be its effect $\urcorner$ <sup>317</sup>. The causal relation is asymmetric, even if in certain cases it is reversible with respect to the *type* to which the terms of that relation belong.<sup>318</sup>

*ad* 3. Both cause and effect are essentially (or, purely ontologically speaking: in accordance with their idea) an event or a process, hence a temporal object of some sort.<sup>319</sup> This has not only been frequently overlooked in the conceptual formulation of the causal relation throughout the history of philosophy (though not in scientific practice, of course), but there are statements to be found in the literature that directly contradict our conception by passing off [a notion of] cause, or effect, as a thing or substance, which was particularly applied to God as the cause of the world<sup>320</sup>. But even in everyday life it is often stated that the architect is the cause of his edifice, such as a cathedral; that the field commander is the cause of the victory, etc. The last example already shows that at least as far as the “effect” is concerned, it need not always consist of a thing, or a “substance,” but that often – and in my opinion, always – consists of the onset of a state of affairs, of an event, or of a process. Indeed, this holds quite generally, and applies to the “cause” as well: it is not the architect, but the creative *activity* through which he, say, projects the plan of the cathedral,<sup>321</sup> that is the cause (in this case, indirect) of the cathedral’s *coming into being* [*Entstehens*], and not of the cathedral itself. It may be a problem (which we do not wish to resolve at this point) as to whether a process (or event) that constitutes the cause of something *always*, and indeed in accordance with its formal essence, requires for its existence an object in the sense of a thing (a “substance”), that is to say, whether a

317  $\ulcorner$  be the effect of its effect  $\urcorner$

318 The case of the so-called “reciprocal effect” must be dealt with separately.

319  $\ulcorner$  Hume had already gained an insight into this  $\urcorner^*$ , although he did not especially emphasize it. Later, this is asserted by Wundt, for example (Wundt, *Logik*, [?], p. 596)\*\*. Concerning temporal objects\*\*\*, see below, Ch. V and Ch. XV, § 56.

\*  $\ulcorner$  This is already clear in Hume when he repeatedly speaks about “things” as terms of a causal connection  $\urcorner$

\*\*  $\ulcorner$  : “*Die Veränderung ist also die Bedeutung der Kausalität, diese bezieht sich nicht auf Dinge, sondern auf Ereignisse.* [Change is therefore the meaning of causality, which does not relate to things, but rather to events.]” I was unable to locate this edition, and so take Ingarden’s quotation at his word (although he is not always reliable in this regard). However, in the 4<sup>th</sup>, revised edition of his *Logik*, Stuttgart: Verlag v. Ferdinand Enke, 1919, pp. 585-6, this sentence reads: “*Veränderung ist also die erste Bedingung der Kausalität: diese ... Ereignisse.*” [Change is therefore the first condition of causality: which ... events.]

\*\*\*  $\ulcorner$  in the narrow sense of the expression  $\urcorner$

320  $\ulcorner$  (in both Scholasticism and, e.g., Spinoza)  $\urcorner$

321  $\ulcorner$  and then some other *activity*, through which he *realizes* his plan,  $\urcorner$

process takes place only if at the same time something exists from which this process emanates [*ausgeht*], or in which it partakes.<sup>322</sup> That is a problem which is of particularly vital importance to every form of Heraclitism and for modern microphysics. But no solution to this problem – no matter what it may be – can have any influence on the answer to the question concerning the *essence* (or concerning the *idea*<sup>323</sup>) of cause, and cannot at any rate lead to the answer that the cause is a thing, or a “substance.” At best, a *positive* solution of this problem leads to a new problem, namely: what is the type of relation between a process and its prospective substantial bearer. Surely, *this* relation is not causal.

But even if we concede that the creator of a work is not its “cause” – in the strict sense here established – but rather that the creator’s *activity* is the cause of the work’s *genesis* [*Entstehung*], a necessary conceptual distinction comes to the fore that will enable us to tease out more precisely the concept of “cause” in the precise [*prägnanten*], narrow sense that we primarily have in mind here. The doings of the architect that have “caused” the genesis of the cathedral are quite diverse, just as are the activities of the workers who have participated in the building of it, and they are composed not only of many individual phases but of many *disparate* tasks. Thus it was first necessary to generate the “rough” draft of the cathedral in a series of acts of thought and imagination – that is, the plan of the cathedral *as a whole*, without going into all the specifics. This plan, initially only contemplated and imagined, had to be “executed” in the sense of completing the appropriate drawings (diagrams, cross-sections, perspectives, etc.). This encompasses a second series of complex activities which are entirely different from the first, although they are closely connected to these and often even intertwine with them – namely, when the completion of the blueprint demands an improvement or change in the original conception of the cathedral. Nonetheless, the transactions of the second series are wholly separate from those of the first in that they occur by means of certain physical activities and movements that are frequently carried out by an entirely different work-force (by “technicians,” “draftsmen,” and the like). Then follows the phase of working out a “detailed” blueprint of the given cathedral – a plan in which the individual parts and specifics are projected separately. This “detailing” often takes place when the “building” phase has already commenced. All those activities that have creating the design as their goal must be set apart from the complicated system of activities through which the “realization” of that design is carried out – that is, the “building” itself of the cathedral – which first leads to its coming into being. Each of these three systems of activities – a) conception of the de-

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322 See § 56.

323 We are obviously not concerned here with a terminological issue, but a substantive one.

sign, b) drawing up of the crude and detailed blueprint, and c) realizing the plan in the concrete construction – leads to the genesis of *one* particular product [*Gebilde*], which is correlated to a specifically ordered multiplicity of transactions. In the first case that product is the simply conceived and imagined design, in the second – the drawn blueprint<sup>324</sup>, and finally, in the third, it is the cathedral itself. The genesis of each of these products proceeds in a series of individual steps – events or processes. All of these steps are constituents of a *single* whole, indeed, of the genesis of the respective product. Now in the practice of everyday living, and even in science, we are accustomed to expressing ourselves in two different ways, which correspond to the two different ways of conceiving “cause” and “effect”: that is to say, either (a) the entire first system of activities (conceiving the design) is considered as the cause of the genesis of the design in the sense of a whole composed of individual steps, which whole is regarded as the “effect” of this cause (and likewise in the two other cases), or (b) the individual activities that go into projecting the design are considered as the causes of the individual steps through which the genesis of the merely conceived or imagined design is carried out. In practical terms, both ways of expressing or conceiving “cause” and “effect” are admissible. It is simply necessary to be clearly aware in each of these cases what one has in mind, and not to confuse it with the other. But in theoretical terms, it is very important not only to clearly grasp the distinctness of these conceptions, but also the fact that the relation between the “cause” and its “effect” in the first way of conceiving it obtains only insofar as the relation between “cause” and “effect” obtains in the sense of the *second* conception. Strictly speaking, it can only be said of the *individual* activities of conceptualizing [*Entwerfung*] the design in relationship to the appropriately correlated *individual* steps (events, processes) of the genesis of the envisaged design, that the former “evoke” the latter, that they “create” (form) them. Only owing to the mediation, as it were, of the strict *existential connection* that obtains in *this* case between “cause” and “effect,” and *without* which there would be no *causal* relation at all, does it come to a “linkage” (better put, a correlation) of that system of activities that constitutes the conceptualization of the design to that system of events and processes which comprises the genesis of the initially merely contemplated design. This linking of a multiplicity of activities and events into a single system and the correlation of the same to some other system is “derivative”<sup>325</sup>, and first becomes inevitable once the following conditions are satisfied: a) a series of ex-

324 It does not matter in this connection whether the blueprint consists of a single drawing or several. If it is a “detailed” blueprint, it surely consists of several drawings, but it still constitutes a *single* whole for itself, which consists of a number of parts that belong together.

325 “ a *secondary phenomenon* ”

istential connections between suitably chosen pairs of “cause” and “effect” (in the sense of the *second* conception) has been consummated; b) a specifically structured *substantive affiliation* (which, if we may put it that way, is “meaningful” [*sinnvoll*]) obtains between the members of the series of causes – in the sense of particular activities involved in conceptualizing the design – the consequence of which is that all of these activities *can* be conceived as *members* of a single system and, correlatively, an analogous substantive affiliation occurs between the individual effects, which, for its part, has the consequence that the individual effects can be regarded as “members”<sup>326</sup> of the single “genesis” of the design. Generally, this “substantive affiliation” is in itself no *existential connection* at all between the elements that it governs. It is therefore also feasible where a complete (temporal, spatial and “material”) separation obtains between these elements, hence, where the latter do not comprise members of a single, original whole.<sup>327</sup> On the other hand, it can also occur where the members of the whole are tightly bound to each other and the whole forms an original – in particular, an “organic” –whole.<sup>328</sup> This substantive affiliation need not, however, govern in every series of activities that are “selfsufficient [*selbständigen*] relative to”<sup>329</sup> each other. Not every such series has to form a *system* of activities. Consequently, that *derivative* causal relation need not occur in every case in which the individual activities comprise a series of causes for corresponding events and processes – “causes,” indeed, in the strict, original sense. If it does happen that *both* conditions, (a) and (b), are satisfied, then, as we have already mentioned, the *derivatively* causal relation does come about. Its subsistence is existentially connected with the onset of both these conditions. But not every existential connection constitutes a causal relation. Thus, one may not say that the subsistence (or onset) of the derivatively causal relation is itself the “effect” of the onset of those two conditions. To put it another way, and *a fortiori*: there is *no* causal connection between an originally causal relation and a (corresponding) derivatively causal one.

The analyses we have just carried out allow us to restrict the popular concept of causal relation to the existential connection of the *originally* causal relation. In the sequel, it is only this existential connection that we shall refer to as the “causal” relation, and its terms as “cause” and “effect.” It is only relative to *this* relation that the five points we have summarized above apply.

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326 “phases”

327 [Ftn.:] Such is certainly the case where the conceptualization of the cathedral’s design occurs over a longer period of time.

328 Concerning “organic” whole, See § 39.

329 “separated from”



ad 4. In connection with the simultaneity of the cause and its effect, let us first of all distinguish between “direct” [*unmittelbarer*] and “indirect” [*mittelbarer*] cause or effect. Namely, if a finite *interval of time* lies between the onset of E and the onset of C, during which C no longer obtains but E has not yet set in, then E is no effect of C, but at best of some other C', which for its part is the effect of C or of some C'', which in turn is the effect of C or of some C''', and so on. We say in this case that E is an indirect effect of C. In the contrary case (i.e., when there is no such time interval), we speak of the direct effect (or cause), or simply of the straightforward [*schlechthin*] effect (or cause). For only a cause and its direct effect are bound by that existential connection that we referred to above as the causal relation.

But is it true that cause and effect are simultaneous?<sup>330</sup> We often say that a cause occurs, or must occur, prior to its effect. This has almost become a dogma, particularly ever since Hume's times. Hume maintains that the onset of the effect after the cause is the sole empirically given relation between cause and effect, and traces back the necessity – according to him, illusory – of the primitive relation to the regularity of repetition [*regelmäßigen Sich-Wiederholen*] of pairs of ‘successive events’<sup>331, 332</sup>. For example, we say that *first* we must turn on the electricity, and only then will the lamp light up. This is correct, of course, provided that by “turning on” we mean both the movement of the hand that flips the switch and the movement of the switch. But in this case, the “cause” in the strict sense of the lamp's lighting up – hence, the direct cause – is not these movements; at best, it is the “contact” induced by those movements at the appropriate spot in the switch, provided at the same time that the given electrical device is in a particular state at this moment. For its part, the device existed *prior* to the effect (prior to the lighting of the lamp), but it existed in a state in which the lamp's lighting-up was ‘impossible’<sup>333</sup>. Only bringing about [*Herstellung*] con-

330 The oldest text I am familiar with in which the question is raised regarding what sort of temporal relationship obtains between a cause and its effect is to be found in Sextus Empiricus' *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*.\* Hume, too, considers the question of whether the cause is not simultaneous with its effect, but winds up rejecting this option – ‘and indeed for a reason that we are about to discuss’\*\*.

\* ‘Prof. I. Dąmbska called my attention to this.’

\*\* ‘unable as he is to deal with the difficulties to which it leads’

331 ‘the same phenomena in the same temporal order’

332 Hume also attaches the condition that the cause and effect (as two processes) be contiguous [*sich berührt*] in time. But when considered along with the continuous character [*Kontinuierlichkeit*] of time, this leads to serious difficulties that we cannot go into here.

333 ‘“impossible” (which means that it was “possible” in the sense of empirical possibility: it could occur in the *future*, but could not occur in the present, precisely because that “contact” in the switch was missing)’

tact in the switch  $\Gamma$  produces that total state which<sup>334</sup> – according to conventional wisdom – is the cause for the electrons' motion in the conductor. This motion (the electric current) is the cause of elevating the temperature in the filament of the bulb, and a particular phase of this rise in temperature finally comprises the cause of the process that we refer to as the lighting-up of the electric lamp. If one calls bringing about contact in the electrical device the “cause” of the lamp's luminescence, then one in fact has just an *indirect* cause in mind. And in the majority of cases where there is talk of “causes,” it is in fact only *indirect* causes that are involved. In our case, one either has in mind the *overall* state<sup>335</sup> constituting a sufficient condition for the effect, or only that state of affairs [*Tatbestand*] (in our case – implementing contact) *which completes* this [overall] state into being a sufficient condition, without reckoning into that state of affairs the constant conditions that are “built into” the electrical device. Thus, according to the last-mentioned conception of the matter, cause would be the “completion [*Ergänzung*]”<sup>336</sup> of the already prevailing circumstances into a sufficient condition of the effect.<sup>337</sup> And correlatively: “effect” is not the *overall* new state of the electrical installation (more generally – of a particular configuration of things [*Sachen*]) that  $\Gamma$  ensues<sup>338</sup> at the instant of the cause's coming into being, but only that constituent of this new state by means of which that state is distinguished from the previous, the one that prevailed in the given installation prior to enacting [*Vollzug*] the cause.

If, however, by “cause” we understand an *indirect* cause, then it is obviously correct that it occurs earlier than one of its indirect effects. But this concept of causal relation – to which a difference in time is integral – presupposes the concept of a *direct* cause, a cause therefore, in accordance with our conception, which is *simultaneous* with the effect. For if the cause is truly the completion of the *sufficient* condition for the effect, then the question comes up as to how it would be possible for the cause to exist for a stretch of time without the effect

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334  $\Gamma$  completes the state of the electrical device in such a way that this new state  $\Gamma$

335  $\Gamma$  of the electrical device  $\Gamma$

336 [As translator, I am obliged to preserve here the well-known ambiguity (action vs. product) inherent in substantives ending in ‘ung.’ The Polish word *Ingarden* invokes here – ‘*dopełniacz* – is unambiguously on the product side, which I would have rendered by ‘complement.’]

337 It seems that this is what was involved in the use of the old expression “*causa efficiens*.” But my view appears to differ from the traditional\* in two respects: first, that I attempt to spell out this concept in greater detail; second, that I wish to avoid other frequently employed concepts of “cause” that are not adequately enough distinguished from this one.

\*  $\Gamma$  only  $\Gamma$

338  $\Gamma$  obtains  $\Gamma$

having set in, thus for the cause to have occurred at some time in which its effect was not yet present. Hence, there must have been some special reason for the onset of the effect, which<sup>339</sup> is not identical with the already prevailing [vorhandenen] “cause.” But then this “cause” could not be the completion<sup>340</sup> of the sufficient condition for the effect, thus [could be] no cause at all. Cause would then be not it, but something altogether different, in particular, that [other]<sup>341</sup> reason for the onset of the effect, which would then in turn have to be simultaneous with the effect. We are therefore compelled to accept the simultaneity of the (“direct”) cause with the effect.<sup>342</sup> The direct cause is at the same time

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339   ⌈ having arrived at the onset of the effect only some time after the annexation of the “cause,” a reason that ⌋

340   ⌈ complement ⌋

341   ⌈ special ⌋

342   Chr. Sigwart basically holds this view (cf., Sigwart, *Logik*, vol. II, [Tübingen: Verlag der H. Laupp’schen Buchhandlung, 1878,]§ 73, pp. 124ff.), except that he employs the word ‘cause’ for something else. Whereas what I here call “cause,” Sigwart terms “the action of the cause” [“*das Wirken der Ursache*” or “*Aktion der Ursache*”], and refers to effect in my sense as the “origin of the effect [*Entstehung des Effekts*].” And then Sigwart asserts: “... there is simultaneity in the strictest sense of the effectuality [*Aktivität*] of the cause and the origin of the effect.” (*ibid.*, p. 140) But it is not quite clear what it is that Sigwart expressly terms “cause.” At first it seems that by “cause” he understands the thing from which the activity that affects something else emanates (so, for example, the colliding ball in the event of the collision of balls). But later it would appear that he means by it the totality of conditions on which the occurrence and properties of the result [*Wirkung*] (the lasting effect [*Effekts*]) depend. In the first case the “cause” would be a thing, in the second it would be the sufficient condition for the effect. In both these cases Sigwart’s ⌈ position ⌋\* differs from the one that I am here trying to establish. At any rate, Sigwart belongs to the advocates of the view that closely links the concept of cause with the concept of thing or substance, and in this respect he expressly opposes W. Wundt. At the same time, Sigwart also has in view the existential connection that I consider to be crucial for the causal relation, except that he names it differently than I do. In connection with this topic, see also M. Wartenberg, *Das Problem des Wirkens und die monistische Weltanschauung* [H. Haacke, 1900. Reprint: Kessinger Publishing Co., 2009].

Things are at bottom not much different with Kant’s position relative to this question, even though he frequently speaks of the effect occurring later than the cause. But he distinguishes the “causality of the cause” [*Kausalität der Ursache*] from the cause itself. And in conjunction with this, he writes in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (B 248): “The greater part of efficacious [*wirkenden*] causes in nature is simultaneous with their effects, and the temporal succession of the latter is only occasioned by the cause’s inability to exert its entire effect in a single instant. But in the instant in which the effect first arises, it is in every case simultaneous with the causality of its cause, for had the latter ceased an instant earlier, the former would not have arisen at all.”

\* ⌈ conception of cause ⌋

cause in the “original” sense. And conversely, cause as term of the original causal relation is “direct” cause of its effect. The indirect cause of a particular effect E, on the other hand, is a more remotely situated member in the sequence of “direct” causes, whereby it itself is no original cause of the effect E – it is not the indirect cause which elicits this effect, but rather something else that may possibly have been evoked by it.

Accepting the simultaneity of cause and effect does, however, lead to considerable difficulties. For we are then faced with the danger that the temporal difference between (indirect) cause and its effect will also vanish for all merely *indirect* causal relations. For how would one arrive at an effect that occurs *later* than its indirect cause if only *simultaneous* causal relata [*Glieder*] were to occur among all the mediating members of a sequence of indirect causes?<sup>343</sup> This unpleasant difficulty could be easily eliminated if we were permitted to adopt the concept of an “instant that is the direct successor of some other instant.” But we know that this is ruled out once we accept the continuity of time, since the concept of “adjacent positions” within a continuum contradicts the essence of a continuum. Thus a different path must be sought to remove the difficulty at hand.<sup>344</sup> But it leads to a conception of causal relation, or of cause itself, that differs radically from the heretofore commonly accepted theories of causality, and may consequently meet with resistance on the part of the reader.

Our thesis concerning the simultaneity of the direct cause and its effect leads to the difficulty just mentioned only when certain *complementary* claims are tacitly accepted that at first have nothing to do with the essence of causality, although they do exert a vital influence on the conception of the causal relation. And indeed one accepts as self-evident: 1) that the causal relation is an *instantaneous* event, hence, one that requires no *lapse* of time<sup>345</sup>; 2) that in the case of two events A and B, of which A is the indirect cause of B, and is thereby separated from B by a multiplicity [*Mannigfaltigkeit*] of mediating, temporally ordered events  $E_n$ <sup>346</sup>, the entire time interval  $[t_A, t_B]$  is densely filled throughout by causally related events  $E_n$ , and that consequently this multiplicity of  $E_n$  has the

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343 † [Ftn.:] Hume is already aware of this difficulty in *A Treatise on Human Nature* (cf. [Oxford U. Pr., 1978,] vol. I, p. 76), but, unable to overcome it, he ultimately settles on accepting the thesis that the cause *precedes* the effect. *Nota bene*, he thereby presupposes that a relation of temporal *contact* and spatial *contact* obtains between cause and effect, unaware of the once again unpleasant consequences of this commitment. †

344 † And it would appear that a possibility for its removal actually exists. †

345 † for its enactment †

346 † [Ftn.:] That means that for each event of the given multiplicity there exists another event from that multiplicity which is the direct cause for the former – it is at the same time in a different instant than the former. †

force of a continuum. In other words, there is *no* state S in the entire interval [A,B] (or  $[t_A, t_B]$ ) that would *endure* (last) *unchanged* during some  $\ulcorner$ temporal phase $\urcorner$ <sup>347</sup>. If we are dealing with a *change* of state of affairs A into state of affairs B, both of which are linked together only *mediately* and exhibit therewith a temporal difference, then this change is *continuous*. By accepting a *direct* relation between cause and effect, as well as the simultaneity of its terms, it then follows from the presuppositions we have just cited that A and B would also have to be *simultaneous*, and therefore that *each and every change*  $\ulcorner$ is *instantaneous* $\urcorner$ <sup>348</sup>. If in addition one endorses the Heraclitean – or, if you will, the Bergsonian – position, and asserts that the world is in perpetual flux, then one must come to accept the atemporality or the instantaneity of the entire world-process [*Weltgeschehens*].

Perhaps now we begin to sense the reason for the difficulty and the possible ways of eliminating it. It springs from the intersection of two trains of thought: from the characterization of the causal relation, which in its ultimate essence is formal and would therefore as such need to be treated later, and from *metaphysical* presuppositions concerning the factual *essence of the real world*. In all this, it is the material world that is kept in view, not exclusively, to be sure, but certainly predominantly, and serves in a way as the model for every other real being<sup>349</sup>. These metaphysical presuppositions are closely connected with certain basic theses of material ontology which pertain to the material essence of what is or can be involved in a causal relation. They are further enmeshed with a particular conception of time as an unidimensional continuum, in which instants of time are precisely temporal points, hence loci within a time-continuum. All mathematical concepts and theses concerning the unidimensional spatial continuum are made to apply to time itself and<sup>350</sup> to the process occurring in time, so that both are subjected to a geometrization<sup>351</sup>. The process, and in particular the material process, is now also held to be continuous, and the manifold of world-events to be everywhere dense. There is no longer any discontinuity in<sup>352</sup> the world-process.

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347  $\ulcorner$  *period* of time  $\urcorner$

348  $\ulcorner$  – irrespective of the extent of mediation between the extreme states A and B – *would have to occur instantaneously* (in a single moment)  $\urcorner$

349  $\ulcorner$  (whether correctly, that is a separate issue to which I shall return in the material analyses)  $\urcorner$

350  $\ulcorner$  to that which constitutes the filling-out of time, and hence  $\urcorner$

351  $\ulcorner$  – as Bergson correctly noted  $\urcorner$

352  $\ulcorner$  time or in  $\urcorner$

Which of these presuppositions can and must be abandoned in order to eliminate the indicated difficulty<sup>353</sup>? Is it not precisely the simultaneity of the terms of the direct causal relation that must be relinquished? That is to say, if cause and its direct effect were to be assigned to two different instants of time such that  $t_c$  preceded  $t_e$ , then a temporal difference would also obtain between indirectly linked causes and effects.<sup>354</sup> One would then not be forced to arrive at the paradoxical acceptance of the instantaneity of the entire world-process. If at the same time, in concert with the remaining theses, the instantaneity (temporally pointillist character [*Punktualität*]) of the cause is accepted, then the objection also appears to fall by the wayside that the cause, by occurring temporally earlier than the effect, could not be the  $\ulcorner$ completion $\urcorner$ <sup>355</sup> of the sufficient condition for the latter. If the cause occurs in a temporally pointillist event and the effect follows it immediately, then nothing stands in the way of its being the completion of the sufficient condition for its effect.

$\ulcorner$ Meanwhile, this attempt at a solution violates the theory of the continuum $\urcorner$ <sup>356</sup>, since it obviously assumes *adjacent* time instants to which the immediately successive terms of the causal relation are supposed to be assigned. For there are no adjacent points within the continuum. In that case, should one abandon direct causal relations in order to avoid this contradiction, and allow exclusively indirect ones? But is not the notion of an indirect causal relation indeed contradictory when the possibility of any direct causal relation is denied?<sup>357</sup>

A more promising line of reasoning would be to relinquish the uninterruptedness of occurrence [*Ununterbrochenheit des Stattfindens*] of causal relations.

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353  $\ulcorner$  , and hence to avoid arriving at the thesis concerning the instantaneity of every process, to the essence of which – as we shall yet see – in fact belongs that it transpires, or “extends,” in time  $\urcorner$

354  $\ulcorner$  Even on admitting the remaining theses cited above concerning happenings in the world  $\urcorner$

355  $\ulcorner$  complement  $\urcorner$

356  $\ulcorner$  Unfortunately, this attempt is equivalent to abandoning the concept of a direct causal relation  $\urcorner$

357  $\ulcorner$  [Ftn.:] That would assume a temporal *distance* (gap\*) between cause and effect, and would therefore amount to accepting some sort of *action in distans*. That seemed to me so impossible at the time of writing this book that I regarded anyone’s seriously adopting such a position as ruled out. As it turned out, I was wrong. In 1956 I read E. Dupréel’s *La cause et l’intervalle en ordre et probabilité*, Bruxelles, 1933, who adopts the very position that a certain “interval” obtains between cause and effect, to wit, a temporal gap. Let me note, in acknowledging this, that I am unable to discuss this topic here. I shall do so in a different place.  $\urcorner$

To that end, we must first of all make a distinction within real being<sup>358</sup> between two basically different states of affairs [*Tatbeständen*]: between persisting [*Verharren*] in a state  $\ulcorner$  or<sup>359</sup> process and the transition from one state into another. We are primarily dealing with persisting in the case of things that undergo no change  $\ulcorner$  at all<sup>360</sup> for a stretch of time.<sup>361</sup> But not strictly in their case. The rectilinear, uniform motion of a  $\ulcorner$  point-mass<sup>362</sup> is precisely such a case of persisting in a state. The so-called principle of inertia states nothing other than that cases of persisting are admissible within  $\ulcorner$  the actuality of physical science [*physikalischen Wirklichkeit*]<sup>363</sup>, and it makes the possibility of passing from *one* [state of] persisting into *another* depend on a special factor termed “force” or “impulse.”

It is precisely therewith that the disparity is conceded between persisting<sup>364</sup> and passing from one state into another as two basic forms of individual being.<sup>365</sup> Hence, cause<sup>366</sup> has its place within being only where a transition takes place from one existential state into another. Indeed, the onset of this transition must have a “basis” [*Grund*], a “cause.” It is embodied in the onset of the completion of a condition that is indispensable to being sufficient for the new state. It is none other than this completion that evokes the new state within the scope of which the “effect” is to be found. And it is precisely at this point that the physicists introduce “force” (“impulse”) as the effectuating agent [*das Bewirkende*], as that which brings forth this transition, this change. Meanwhile, persisting in a state need not have any<sup>367</sup> “cause” whatsoever;<sup>368</sup> that belongs,

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358 Here, that is, within the framework of ontological analysis; [we mean] within being that is contemplated as real, but is not  $\ulcorner$  assumed or posited [*gesetzt*] as such  $\ulcorner^{**}$ .

\*\*  $\ulcorner$  yet acknowledged in its factuality  $\ulcorner$

359  $\ulcorner$  even if it is some  $\ulcorner$

360  $\ulcorner$  at least in some respect  $\ulcorner$

361 To wit, we are not asserting here that there are in fact such non-changing things in the real world. This would amount to either a purely empirical claim, or a metaphysical one, neither of which we are entitled to make here. Here we are solely concerned with the content of the idea of persisting, or with the content of the idea of an absolutely immutable thing, in particular, therefore, with whether the idea of a thing allows for its absolute immutability.

362  $\ulcorner$  material point in empty space, *not* occupied by any force field (say, a gravitational field)  $\ulcorner$

363  $\ulcorner$  material actuality  $\ulcorner$

364  $\ulcorner$  in a single state  $\ulcorner$

365  $\ulcorner$  This enables us to form a new concept of cause.  $\ulcorner$

366  $\ulcorner$  in this sense  $\ulcorner$

367  $\ulcorner$  new  $\ulcorner$

368  $\ulcorner$  it simply requires *preserving* those conditions that gave rise to the new state. And the preservation of these conditions does not call for some new cause. In both cases – re-

as it were, to the primal structure [*Verfassung*] of being, or at least of material being<sup>369</sup>. Or to put it still another way: the earlier phases of a persistent state are not to be construed as “cause” vis-à-vis the later ones. In other words, for a thing to persist in its state for some period of time in a closed system requires no special “sustaining” force within that system. It “sustains” itself. There is a primal “inertia” of the existent: it simply remains changeless in its state so long as it is not jarred out of this state by something that intrudes from the outside. A change comes about only because the closure (isolation) of the given system is in some respect, at some spot – compromised, disrupted. Some external factor destroys the equilibrium of the system and shifts it into a new equilibrium in which it persists as long as no new perturbation factor intrudes into the system. This perturbation is precisely nothing other than that which is to be called the “cause.” If the perturbation does occur, it penetrates into a system that for a while, at least in some respects and to some degree, was closed or, better put, isolated, whereby the “effect” also “immediately” – and that can only mean “simultaneously” – sets in.<sup>370</sup> But this “effect” can be nothing other than the totality of states of affairs that distinguish the new state from the previous, already disrupted one, and so not the overall new state itself. And it would be just as mistaken to consider the entire elapsed, already disrupted state of the system as the “cause” of the “effect,” instead of restricting this concept to the

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maintaining in a certain state and preserving its conditions – we are dealing with something 7

369 7, to what may be termed the inertia of being 7

370 It is precisely at this stage that the problem of a “relatively isolated system” gets brought into the analysis of the causal existential connection. The concept of a “relatively isolated system” – in contradistinction to the “absolutely closed system” and the “open system” – has later proved to be especially important. I first presented this concept and its essential connection to the problem of causality at a 1943 session of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lwów. I then spoke about it at the International Congress of Philosophy in Rome, in 1946, hence prior to the publication of the first edition of this book in 1947. It was then helpful to me during the years 1950-54 for displaying an entirely new role of the causal existential connection in the structure of the real world as a region of being. I presented a portion of these results in 1954 to the Polish Philosophical Society in Kraków. The general theory of systems has flourished in recent years and has proved crucial for various biological problems, and in cybernetics. But emphasis has never been placed in these contexts on the fact that “relatively isolated,” and at the same time “open,” systems must be involved. Only “open” systems were always discussed, without pointing out the necessity of a relative closure or isolation, which is precisely the *conditio sine qua non* for the subsistence [*Bestehens*] of a system. [This footnote was added in *Streit*.]



“perturbation” alone, or to the completion factor of the condition that is sufficient for the onset of the effect<sup>371 372</sup>.

We should not, however, relapse into old errors in all of this. For the following line of reasoning is suggestive: the “effect” obviously depends in its particulars not only on the type and properties of the “perturbation,” but also on the overall stock of properties of the elapsed state of the system, which was disrupted by the emergence of the new “efficacious [*wirksamen*] factor” (the “cause” in the sense just introduced). But this relation of dependence should not be confused with the relation between cause and effect. For it is precisely this confusion that leads to a relapse into the old – and to my mind, flawed – concept of cause. As a result of this confusion, the cause is conceived as the overall state of the system that precedes “a state just setting in, which is about to become the new state”<sup>373</sup>. But then not only is the state present just prior to a transition conceived as cause, but so is *every earlier* state of the system in general. With this, the possibility of the system’s persisting [in the same state] is at bottom denied. We then find ourselves in the very position that leads to insurmountable difficulties.<sup>374</sup>

The new conception of cause that we have introduced here, cause as the intrusion of a perturbation into a system that had heretofore persisted in equilibrium and had been isolated in some particular respect (but whose isolation can be breached)<sup>375</sup> involves the following essential features: a) the causal<sup>376</sup> relation is

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371 “ . To put it more precisely, however: the effect is the *onset* (consummation, genesis) of that totality of facts which distinguish the new state from the previous, but are themselves different from the cause. ”

372 Indeed, therein lies the crux of the new conception of the causal existential connection that enables us to overcome the difficulty indicated above. Another attempt to overcome the difficulties posed by the traditional concept of cause was undertaken by B. Russell in his *Analysis of Mind* [, London: Allen & Unwin, 1921] (cf. Ch. V, “Psychological and Physical Causal Laws”).

373 “ *Its overall current state*, taken as the *effect* ”

374 “ [Ftn.:] The cited position also does not agree with the actually prevailing state of affairs in these cases in that *not the entire* encountered state of the system is destroyed by the “cause” as perturbation, but ordinarily only some constituent of it; and, secondly, in that not the entire remnant from the preceding state of the system must necessarily play a role in *determining* the new state of the system, but only some of its constituents, whereby the assortment of these constituents can vary – depending indeed on the “cause” that transpired. ”

375 “ , as well as [the new conception] of *the effect as the onset in the given system of states of affairs that differentiate its new state, elicited by the cause, from the preceding state*, ”

376 [*ursprüngliche* – this is probably a typo. I translate in agreement with the Polish edition, where *przyczynowego* [= *ursächliche*] appears.]

not to be simply identified with the relation of sufficient conditioning; b) the concepts of the terms of the causal relation implicitly [*aus sich aus*] prescribe a *twofold discontinuity* in the structure of the world in which causal relations are indeed to be present<sup>377</sup> – the discontinuity in that which exists simultaneously [*in dem Gleichzeitigseienden*] and the discontinuity in what exists in [temporal] succession [*im Nacheinanderseienden*].<sup>378</sup>

*ad a)* The cause, in the sense here introduced, is not in itself the sufficient condition of the “effect”: on the one hand, it is less than this condition by virtue of being merely the *factor that completes* a state into a sufficient condition for the effect; on the other hand, it is more than that condition by virtue of being precisely a “perturbation” – and at the same time also a creative factor of sorts: it “*brings forth*”<sup>379</sup> the effect.<sup>380</sup> In other words, it is the *effectuating* [*wirkende*] factor, which is not only, so to speak, the emanation of some force, but which, in the occurrence of an event, is rather in itself the cause, or contains within itself a moment of effectuality [*Aktivität*] when occurring as part of the evolution [*Sich-Abspielen*] of a process<sup>381</sup>. On the other hand, the sufficient condition as such need not at all be something creative or “effectual [*Aktives*].” It also occurs in an ontic sphere in which there are no “transitions” of any sort; nor can there be, as in the realm of ideal individual being, such as the mathematical. The last step in the theory of causality, which we are not in a position to take here, would

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377    ⌈ being   ⌋

378    As we shall see, this agrees with certain results in formal ontology that pertain to the form of a region of being, and of the world in particular. See Ch. XV.

379    ⌈ , produces   ⌋

380    ⌈ [Ftn.:] It is well-known that Hume took a stand against the thesis that the cause “produces” or “elicits” the effect, declaring that such a pronouncement explains nothing, since that [production] is synonymous with being a cause, or is something else that calls for a separate explanation. Subsequently, the positivists have ordinarily interpreted this as claiming that “producing” should not be invoked at all in a discussion of “cause,” since nothing of the sort is given in experience, and therefore is altogether absent from the causal relation. Meanwhile, Hume makes no such claim. On the contrary, he so thoroughly endorses the effect’s being “produced” by the cause in every case that he *identifies* “being a cause” with “producing an effect.” His objection is directed only at regarding that “producing” as the *defining* moment of a cause, but does not deny the occurrence of that moment in what a cause is or in what performs the function of a cause. It can therefore not be *circumvented* in an explanation of what a cause is, even though we need to agree with Hume that it is inordinately difficult to *elucidate* the concept of “producing.”   ⌋

381    ⌈ rather contains in itself a moment of activeness in the occurrence of an event which is the cause, or in the evolution of some process   ⌋

be to clarify the essence of this bringing forth; of this, as I have characterized it, creative moment in the cause.

On the other hand, we must point out one other moment of the cause. We wish to call it the moment of the indirect efficacy [*Wirkhaftigkeit*] of the cause. And indeed, although the cause is merely the completion of the sufficient condition, it is not it alone which is “efficacious.” It “activates,” if we may put it that way, *all* the other partial conditions that go into making up the overall ensemble of the sufficient condition<sup>382</sup>, since they all *determine more precisely* the properties of the effect. The conditions that existed in a particular system of states of affairs prior to the onset of the cause were in themselves inefficacious, i.e., they did not call forth the respective effect. Nonetheless, the effect brought forth by adjoining the cause is not entirely independent of those conditions: just as soon as the cause occurs, the hidden powers of those partial conditions are animated [*erwachen*], as it were, so that their overall ensemble, cause included – thus, the complete sufficient condition – determines *what* sort of effect comes about. But it is the occurrence of the cause in my sense which decides *that* the effect comes about. From this it follows that all those who are interested in the so-called “causal laws,” hence in the problem of *which* properties of the effect are determined by “some”<sup>383</sup> given ensemble of states of affairs comprising the sufficient condition of that effect, are inclined to conceive the causal relation in the sense of a<sup>384</sup> dependence on the sufficient condition of what is conditioned by the latter. However, they overlook that special role of the cause in our sense which consists in calling forth the effect and in effectuating [*Aktivierung*] the overall ensemble of factors that determine it more precisely.

*ad b)* The first discontinuity resides in what exists simultaneously, indeed, in the sense that relatively isolated (in part, mutually separated) systems must exist in the world in order for some ontic causal connection to be possible: to wit, a system that remains in equilibrium for a period of time and is at some instant compelled by some “cause” to leave its state and pass over into some other state, and some other system to which belongs the “force”<sup>385</sup> that penetrates into the first system. These two systems must be kept apart by something, must be segregated from each other, if there is to be some interval of time during which no interaction between them occurs, a time therefore during which there is no “efficacy” of the force, no conversion of it into a cause. This “being kept apart” need not of

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382 “ [Ftn.:] Which does not at all mean that these are to be *all* the moments that go into making up the *full* state of the given [antecedent] system. ”

383 “ *which* ”

384 “ relation of ”

385 “ , more precisely, the factor ”

course be understood in a spatial sense, although spatial separation also belongs here. Generally speaking, it is the presence of some barrier [*Isolator*] that is at issue, a barrier that bounds off the two systems from each other for a time, and is “broken through” at some particular instant.<sup>386</sup>

The second discontinuity lies in what exists in [temporal] succession, in the sense that there exist in systems phases of persisting [in the same state] which are separated by instants in which the transition from one state into another occurs. These phases of persisting in the same state are indeed made possible by the isolation of the one system from other systems, and they come to an end once a particular isolation of the one system vis-à-vis the others is indeed breached by the perturbation. That is when the transition from one equilibrium state into another takes place. The transition itself – provided it is a *single* transition – occurs momentarily, instantaneously  $\Uparrow$ . But it may also be an entire transition process, in the sense that a sequence [*Kontinuität*] of transitions occurs which lasts for a period of time. Of importance to us, however, is that there can be several temporally separated transitions that are separated by phases of persisting [in the same state], which ultimately amounts to a discrete manifold of quantum [*sprunghaft*] transitions.<sup>387–388</sup>

We are making a claim here that appears to be in conflict with centuries of natural science tradition. It has been customary, at least since Newton’s times, to treat all processes that occur in nature as structures that are continuous in a mathematical sense. Meanwhile, according to our claim some processes – for example, the motion of a body along a curved path, say, in a circle – would not be continuous, in the sense that change in the direction of motion occurs *incessantly*. To be sure, the motion itself would not suffer any interruptions, but it would not occur along a strictly circular path. Rather, it would occur in the manner of a system of discrete [*sprunghaftien*] changes in the direction of motion. And the same would hold with respect to accelerated motion: it would increase its velocity in a quantum fashion [*sprunghaft*]. The so-called uniformly accelerated motion would be a motion whose discrete increases in velocity would always be equal, and so on. Consequently, one could not characterize uniform motion as a “change of position” in space, but would have to consider it as

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386 Whether at this instant the prevailing discontinuity is eliminated and both systems coalesce into *one* system cannot be resolved at this stage. It would appear that there is a broad variety of possibilities. I deal with this issue elsewhere.

387 Once again, various cases that cannot be examined here are possible.

388  $\Uparrow$ , but *between* two transitions there is a break in the changeover filled with *enduring in the same state*. Every transition that “lasts for some time” – as we ordinarily express ourselves – is composed of a differentiated manifold of transitions which transpire, as it were, by leaps.  $\Uparrow$

a state of *continual* [*beständigen*] passage through points in space. There is no doubt that this point of view leads to an entirely different picture of nature than the one to which we have grown accustomed. On the other hand, it is suggestive that this result has a kinship to the quantum [*quantenhaften*] conception of material processes in modern physics. These are all issues that call for further investigation. And we will indeed be forced to reckon with them in detail within the framework of our subsequent expositions. At any rate, we must provisionally emphasize that the standpoint that we have here adopted by no means rules out the possibility of continuous processes. It only implies that if they are in fact strictly continuous and last over some interval of time, then they are no “transitions.”

Accordingly, uniform motion – insofar as it does take place – is no “change” of any sort, no “transition” in the sense we are employing, but rather a persisting in an unchanging state<sup>389</sup>. It is a fact, however (although a fact that is irrelevant within the scope of purely ontological investigations), that it is empirically very difficult to bring about and sustain an absolutely uniform motion. But this implies nothing other than that the empirically given material world – provided experience  $\ulcorner$ preserves its truth-value<sup>390</sup> – appears to contain only very weakly segregated, relatively isolated systems. Should that prove to be the case, it would be  $\ulcorner$ a fact<sup>391</sup> that<sup>392</sup> would in no way discredit our conception of cause and effect. It would show at the same time that the onset of causal relations, the determination of their terms, and, finally, their very distribution in the world, is dependent on a more detailed exposition of the structure and qualitative endowment of what exists in that world. Thus, only within the framework of a world that already exists and is qualified in a particular way does it make sense to speak of causal relations, and precisely therewith of something like a “cause” and “effect.” The last point of our conception of the causal relation is connected with the above, namely, the point that both cause and effect must be equally real. But before I move on to a more detailed discussion of this point, let me substantiate in yet another way the claim that causal relations occur exclusively within the framework of the real world.

This claim is intimately connected with our conception of cause as a completion factor. It completes an ensemble of conditions (states of affairs) that obtain within a system of things and processes into a sufficient condition<sup>393</sup> of the effect, and *eo ipso* calls forth this effect. One may say that as long as the cause C

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389  $\ulcorner$  of motion, of a uniform traversing of space  $\urcorner$

390  $\ulcorner$  is trustworthy  $\urcorner$

391  $\ulcorner$  an empirical fact to which we cannot appeal here and  $\urcorner$

392  $\ulcorner$  in and of itself  $\urcorner$

393  $\ulcorner$  for the onset  $\urcorner$

does not yet obtain, the effect E still belongs to the future, and comprises an empirical possibility. That is to say, at time instant *t prior* to the onset of cause C it is empirically possible, and it is so in respect of the series of conditions that are necessary to state E, but which are not yet sufficient for the onset of the latter. The condition for cause C of effect E to set in is that the configuration of the system which is to lead to the onset of effect E – due to a disruption of equilibrium owing to the onset of cause C – can contain no state of affairs that would be incompatible with C or E, or that would contradict them.<sup>394</sup> One may therefore say that the cause C is a factor that transforms a particular E which is merely possible into one that is actual, i.e., into the actual occurrence of an event that comprises effect E. In other words, the cause is the factor that brings about the realization [*Realisierungsfactor*] of the effect, which, prior to the cause setting in, was merely<sup>395</sup> possible.<sup>396</sup> At the same time, it is that which presupposes two systems of things and states of affairs in the real world<sup>397</sup> that for a period of time are relatively isolated from each other in some respect, but are capable of interacting; in particular, however, it presupposes the presence of a select group of conditions in one of these systems that it completes into a condition that is sufficient for the effect E. Thus, it itself “encounters” a world within which it occurs, just as the effect that is brought forth by it comprises a constituent of the very same world. Neither the one nor the other is something that could occur outside of the real world. The causal relation is an *intraworldly* relation.

*ad 5)* One may perhaps consider this last condition, namely, that both terms of the causal relation must be real, to be trivial or “self-evident,” although it has not always been heeded in philosophy and may even meet with opposition from some readers. Effectively, it comprises a further essential restriction of the concepts of cause and causal relation. For it is only by means of this restriction that the causal relation presents itself not only as intraworldly, one that can only occur between terms having the *same* mode of being (indeed, that of being-real), but also as a relation that simply does not exist in some of the instances in which we ordinarily speak of a causal relation in everyday life. Such is the case, for example, in the instance where the putative “cause” is an autonomous entity

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394 To put it more precisely: that which in this state will remain unaffected by the occurrence of C, contains no state of affairs that precludes E.

395  $\lceil$  empirically  $\rceil$

396 For some other concept of “possibility” – in the Megarian sense – it is precisely that which ultimately “makes” the effect “possible.”

397 The concept of “world”\* is a formal concept and will be clarified in subsequent investigations.\*\*

\*  $\lceil$  specifies a certain structure of it, and to that extent  $\rceil$

\*\*  $\lceil$  Cf. Ch. XV  $\rceil$

(say, an act of consciousness) and the putative “effect” is an heteronomous entity (say, a purely intentional state of affairs [*Tatbestand*]).

But let us now return to our main theme, i.e., to the distinction between originality and derivativeness. This distinction is a purely existential-ontological one and has, in itself, nothing to do with the distinction between cause and effect. Consequently, we are not *ipso facto* entitled to conceive the original object as the cause of the object that is derived from it, and the latter as the “effect” of the former. Our expositions of the causal relation now make it clear why this is the case. In order for something to be a “cause,” it must fulfill a series of conditions that need not be fulfilled by an original entity. Thus, it is not at all intrinsic to the essence of an original entity that it must<sup>398</sup> be temporal – and in particular, a temporal object (an event or a process) – nor that it be “real.” Existentially original and derivative entities have also been distinguished in the history of philosophy (even if, in fact, without due conceptual precision) without assuming causal relations between them. This ought not to be done also from a strictly substantive point of view. We may invoke as an example the opposition set up by Plato between the Ideas and individual entities: the latter were supposed to be derived from the former. But Plato did not assume any causal relation between them. Perhaps something similar could be said of the Aristotelian “form” and individual things. But we must also reject the contention that the relation between God, conceived as existentially original, and the world created by Him<sup>399</sup> is to be construed in the sense of a causal relation. This already follows from the fact that neither God nor the world possibly created by Him is an intraworldly event or process<sup>400</sup>. They were not at any rate conceived as such entities by those thinkers who, like, say, Plotinus or the Scholastics, dealt with God and His relation to the world.<sup>401</sup>

The following may be stated toward detailing a positive characterization of an entity’s existential originality. An original entity is singled out in its being by its absolutely own positing of itself [*durch eine absolute, selbsteigene Position*], by an absolute grounding-of-its-being-within-itself [*In-sich-selbst-gegründet-*

398 [Reading *muß* for *kann*.]

399 † – e.g., according to Neoplatonic conceptions – †

400 †, and the connection obtaining between them is not an intraworldly connection †

401 † Thomas Aquinas did of course maintain that God was the cause of the existence of the world, but this can only be explained by the fact that he did not clearly grasp the essential distinction between existential originality and being-a-cause. †\*

\* † If God was nonetheless spoken of as the “cause” of the world – e.g., in Thomas Aquinas – that was either because the concept of cause was broadened too much or because the causal relation was not adequately enough distinguished from the relation that can obtain between a being that is original and a being that is derived (from it). †

*Sein*]. Provided it exists, it is a “*proto-thing*” [*Ur-Sache*] in the purely etymological sense of the word, a thing, therefore, which can indeed provide an existential origin for other entities, but which has no external source of being for itself outside of itself. Its ownmost material essence [*materiales Eigenwesen*] must be such that it cannot *not* be. In this respect – provided there is such a singular essence – it is in itself grounded in its being, and indeed exclusively within itself, in its ownmost material essence. It is precisely for this reason that, once it exists, such an entity could not be annulled [*aufgehoben*] or “destroyed”<sup>402</sup> any more than it could begin to exist owing to any external grounds. This means that an original entity – provided it exists at all – would have to be “eternal” in accordance with its very own essence, i.e., it would have to be without beginning or end in its being.<sup>403</sup>

But it must be expressly emphasized that within the confines of an existential investigation there is no place for a discussion of the factual existence of any original entity whatever. And this is indeed so because no decision can be reached within the framework of such an investigation as to whether there are types of material ideal qualities [*Wesenheiten*] that would of themselves “<sup>404</sup>compel the original existence of an individual entity that is determined by “means of their concretizations.”<sup>405</sup> We are simply stating here that the idea of an original entity needs to be explicated in the way that we have just done it – in accordance with the content of that idea.<sup>406</sup> At this point, we are not saying anything at all about the eventual metaphysical or material resolution of this issue.

The eternity that is intrinsic to the essence of an original entity makes it understandable why<sup>407</sup> every religion or metaphysics that has superseded the stage of anthropomorphizing God, and that simultaneously accepts an individual God, has implicitly or explicitly integrated eternity and originality into the concept of

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402 “suspended” [*zawieszona* – which could be a typo, since it resembles the Polish word for ‘destroyed’: *zniszczona*]

403 No ingredient [*Moment*] of temporality occurs in this concept of “eternity” which is bound up with existential originality. Nor does an original object need to be in time. It is not even certain whether originality “can be linked up”<sup>\*</sup> with an object’s temporality. These are all questions concerning which nothing can be decided at the moment.

\* “is compatible”

404 “is a type of material essence that would of itself”

405 “it [essence]”

406 “Only a material investigation could first discover and elucidate the idea of an object that has such an essence. At the moment, the sole matter of concern is an original object’s existential character, and of what kind its essence would have to be functionally in order for the object to be at all possible as factually existing.”

407 “almost”



divinity. This also applies to corresponding metaphysical systems<sup>408</sup>. On the other hand, originality does not of itself compel a material<sup>409</sup> essence for divinity, nor does it “somehow presuppose the same”.<sup>410</sup> So, for example, “an atheistic”<sup>411</sup> materialism that<sup>412</sup> rejects the existence of a spiritual God, and of any God at all, and which only accepts an “increate” matter, does ascribe existential originality to this very *matter*, and therewith also eternity.<sup>413</sup>

In contrast, that absolute, intrinsic positing [*selbsteigene Position*] of itself, that “grounded-within-itself-being, [*In-sich-selbst-gegründet-Sein*]” is absent from a derived entity. Once created, a derived entity can be autonomous, which is to say that it can therefore be characterized by that immanence of its determinations that we have already discussed, but its *being* (as the being of a derived entity) does nonetheless have its *origin* in some *other* entity; the mere immanence of the qualitative, material determinations does not yet suffice for the originality of the object. “That is to say, not only is the *material* essence of a derivative entity not of a sort that would at all compel its existence, and therewith only makes its derived being *possible*, but it is intrinsic to its very mode of being that, if it exists, it can only exist as “created,” as having its existential origin in some *other* entity.”<sup>414</sup> At the same time, it is characterized not only by a relative positing [*Position*] that stems from the outside, but also by an *imperfection* of being. To exist in a derivative manner is tantamount to existing as merely something created, i.e., to be condemned to having the source of its origination in something else, and indeed precisely because of lacking that “groundedness-within-itself” [*In-sich-selbst-Gegründetheit*] which is characteristic of the original object. The existential imperfection also becomes obtrusive in something else, to wit, in a peculiar frailty or brittleness of being: *no* derivative object *must* exist in accordance with its material essence, but once it has originated (for whatever reason) and does exist, it can always cease to exist, for its own materi-

408 “, even though for the most part they have not teased out the concept of existential originality”

409 “ (qualitative) ”

410 “ imply any conclusions concerning the existence of God ”

411 “ a dialectical ”

412 “ categorically ”

413 Besides, an inconsistency may be inherent in such a materialism. But we cannot resolve this issue here. For the time being, it is simply a matter of a historical fact.

414 “ An object’s derivativeness is intimately related to its material essence: it is indeed such that in and of itself – if we may put it that way – it does not compel the existence of the object endowed with it, which thereby *can*, but *does not have to exist*; whereas if it does exist, the reasons for this should not be sought within itself, but rather *outside of itself*. Or differently put: in order for it to exist, some factor situated outside of it is required that would “create” it. ”

al essence does not sustain it in being, if we may put it that way. Once created, it exists – if it continues to exist at all – only owing to the inertia of being. But even this inertia of being follows neither from its derivativeness nor from the material determination of its essence, but rather solely from the immanence of its determinations, provided such immanence does at the same time characterize it, hence, from the autonomy possibly prevailing in the derivative object. But as I have already noted, not every derivative object must simultaneously be (or, is simultaneously) autonomous. It can also be heteronomous. In the latter case, not only does the *source* of its being inhere in some other object, but also the *foundation* of its existence. Consequently, a derived and heteronomous object exists subsequent to its coming into being only insofar as the object creating it, or some other object, *sustains* it in its being.<sup>415</sup> The form and material endowment peculiar to it are incapable of accomplishing this; they are incapable of bestowing on it that existential inertia I had just spoken about<sup>416</sup>, since they are not contained in it immanently, but rather are only conferred or bestowed on it; and if, in particular, it is a purely intentional object, they are intentionally conferred upon it. The “creation” of the purely intentional object consists here of this intentional bestowal, whereas the being of such an object consists of “being-intended” [*Vermeint-Werden*], and in particular of “being-perceived” [*Wahrgenommen-Werden*]. *Esse* is here in fact the same as *percipi*, as Berkeley has correctly formulated it. The only remaining question is whether he correctly imputed this type of being to the material things in the real world.

Both originality and derivativeness are something absolute in the mode of being of the respective entities. The concept of derivativeness also contains an indicator of relativity [*ein relativer Bezug*], and indeed one that has reference to that from which the derivative object has been derived. But whether this indicator is unequivocal, so that we might know precisely from where the respective

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415 † [Ftn.:] As we know, there are metaphysical theories which proclaim for the real world the necessity of so-called *creation continua* (e.g., Descartes). We do not know what this sort of thesis is based on – whether on the conviction that divine omnipotence is unbounded (which would appear to be limited by the mere fact of the world’s existing even for an instant without the need of intervention by the divine will), or on the belief of the real world’s existence being so severely “brittle” or frail that it requires an ever renewed act of supporting it in being despite its autonomy, or, finally, on endorsing the real world’s heteronomy. But in both of the latter cases this imperfection of the real world’s existence would also attest to the *limitation* of divine power, to a certain kind of impotence on His part. Irrespective of how that may turn out, it is apparent that a preliminary condition for these kinds of considerations is to explicate the sense of the real world’s existence, hence, to elucidate which existential moments can be disclosed in the reality mode of existence. †

416 † in the context of autonomous objects †

object was derived, or whether it is indeterminate in this respect, is an issue that must be deferred to subsequent investigations. If, however, this indeterminacy were to be conceived in the sense of an unrestricted variability<sup>417</sup>, then one would be forced to speak of the respective entity's absolute relativity of derivativeness. Yet the reason why an object is derivative in a particular manner must be sought in its<sup>418</sup> essence. Nothing is contingent in this regard, not even that every derivative entity exists "contingently," namely that it does not have the indispensable source of its being in its own material essence but has it rather in some convergence of external circumstances that is independent of this essence. To its essence belongs only that it allows for [zuläßt] an existentially derived being, and that it requires an external basis for its origination.

Existential originality and existential derivativeness are mutually exclusive and exhaust all possible cases. "But it will prove useful"<sup>419</sup> to also introduce the concept of existential non-derivativeness", and indeed for those cases where it has been confirmed that a derivative entity  $G_1$  was not derived from some particular object  $G_2$ .<sup>420</sup>

The following assertions can be stated as the result of these admittedly only introductory deliberations:

1. The opposition between originality and derivativeness is not identical with that between autonomy and heteronomy.
2. Heteronomy excludes originality.
3. Autonomy is consistent with both originality and derivativeness.
4. The originality of an entity necessarily implies its autonomy.
5. If it were ascertainable about a particular object X that it exists and is absolutely derivative, then there also exists some original object which is the source of existence of object X.<sup>421</sup>

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417 " of the indicator with respect to the source object "

418 " material "

419 " Every object is therefore *either* original *or* derivative. There are, however, problematic situations in which we must invoke a third, wholly negative and relative, concept. Namely, it is necessary "

420 " of something from a particular object X. *It is not meant to be equivalent* to the concept of originality. It is simply supposed to indicate that it is entirely *irresolvable* – with regard to some object of which we predicate that it is not derived from X – as to whether it is in the absolute sense existentially original or existentially derivative, yet it is certain that it *does not issue* from some *determinate* thing X. "

421 [Assertion (5) was added in *Streit*.]

## § 14. Existential Self-sufficiency and Existential Non-self-sufficiency<sup>422</sup>

An entity is existentially self-sufficient if in accordance with its essence it requires for its being the being of no other entity which would have to coexist with it within the unity of some whole, or, in other words, if its being involves no necessary coexistence with some other entity within the unity of a whole. In contrast, an entity is existentially non-self-sufficient if, as implied by its essence, its being involves a necessary coexistence with some other entity (which may have to be quite specifically qualified in its material essence) in the unity of a whole.<sup>423</sup> Thus, for example, the moment “redness”<sup>424</sup> is contained in a non-self-sufficient manner in the whole: “red color,” since it must coexist with the moment “coloration” that occurs in the same whole. Not only is it impossible for any “red” object to exist in which “redness” would indeed occur without “coloration” (both taken as individual moments), and in which this “redness” would occur as something entirely separate [*Abgesondertes*]<sup>425</sup> onto itself, but moreover, wherever “redness” and “coloration” do occur in the unity of *one* whole, an altogether peculiarly intimate unity of coexistence obtains between the two (one frequently speaks of an “amalgamation” [*Verschmelzung*])<sup>426</sup> in such cases.<sup>427</sup> At this point, we shall not take up the question of whether this particularly intimate unity is necessary in every instance of non-self-sufficiency. We do need to emphasize, however, that in the case of non-self-sufficiency, at issue is not a merely factual coexistence, but rather a necessary coexistence within the unity

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422 [*Seinsselbständigkeit* [= *samodzielność*] und *Seinsunselbständigkeit* [= *niesamodzielność*] – this pair of terms has enjoyed success with two English alternatives: foremost with Michejda’s rendition of the Polish terms by ‘separateness/inseparateness,’ and with some – ‘distinctiveness/connectiveness.’

423 † As far as I know, † Edmund Husserl was the first to offer foundational inquiries into an entity’s self-sufficiency or non-self-sufficiency (cf. *LI*, vol. II, Invest. III). But he treated this opposition as formal, whereas it is existential and is only in some cases intimately bound up with certain formal issues. Aside from that, two oppositions need to be kept apart – the one dealt with here and that between independence and dependence, a distinction Husserl does not acknowledge.

424 These moments as determinations of a concrete whole are to be sharply distinguished from the pure ideal qualities “coloration” and “redness” in themselves.

425 [This was in all likelihood the motivation for Michejda’s rendering of *Selbständigkeit* and *Unselbständigkeit* by ‘separateness’ and ‘inseparateness,’ respectively.]

426 † “smelting” † [Most translators render this term by ‘fusion,’ which to my mind does not convey the original term’s connotation of the homogeneity of the resultant whole.]

427 Cf. Hering, “*Über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee* [On Essence, Ideal Quality and Idea],” *Jahrb.*, v. IV †, pp. 512 ff †.

of *one* whole, the issue of an essence-dictated incapacity-to-exist-apart [*wesensmäßige Abgesondert-nicht-existieren-Können*]<sup>428</sup>.

We encounter a different case of non-selfsufficiency in the being of the “red color” as property of a red-colored individual object (say, of a thing). Here, too, this “red color” cannot exist separately for itself without the respective object whose property it is, but only in coexistence with that object itself. It is at least likely that we cannot speak of an amalgamation between the “red color” and a red thing that is as intimate as the one that obtains between redness and coloration in the red color. But this does not diminish the non-selfsufficiency of the red color in relationship to the red thing, say, to a red fabric whose color it is.

The non-selfsufficiency of an X relative to a Y with which X must coexist within the unity of *one* whole, W, presupposes nothing concerning the type of being of this whole, W. More specifically, W, for itself, can be either selfsufficient or non-selfsufficient. The essence-governed law does, however, obtain that if this whole W is autonomous and non-selfsufficient, then there must exist some other selfsufficient whole, W', in the unity of which the whole W (say, “red color”) must occur<sup>429</sup>, if moment X (say, “redness,” taken as a moment<sup>430</sup>) is to exist at all as something individual.

There are various types of non-selfsufficiency. And this is important, since it implies that an X which is not non-selfsufficient in one sense, is not yet thereby necessarily selfsufficient. In particular:

1. First of all, various *degrees* of non-selfsufficiency can be distinguished. For example, the entity “red color” as property of an individual whole is non-selfsufficient *to a lower degree* than the red-moment occurring in it, or its coloration. This red-moment is – if we may put it that way – more non-selfsufficient than the “red color,” and that is so because it requires for its being not only the being of some substantial bearer<sup>431</sup>, as does the being of its property “red color,” but also [the being] of “coloration,” with which it must coexist and be smelted into a peculiar unity. On the other hand, the property “red color of something” – if it exists as something individual and autonomous – is indeed also non-selfsufficient, but it requires only a substantial bearer for its existence, and not yet some other determinate qualitative moment that occurs outside of it.<sup>432</sup> And it is an altogether different

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428 ⌈ (“for itself”) ⊔

429 ⌈ and coexist with some Z ⊔

430 ⌈ of a concrete red color ⊔

431 ⌈ (the subject of the property) ⊔

432 Now if someone says that the red color requires some determinate extendedness with which it coexists, that is true, but is no objection against the stated claim, since extend-

matter that this *bearer* must be somehow qualified aside from all this, and that *for its part* it requires the concretization of the appropriate ideal qualities. This, however, is bound up with the *form* of an individual object as a subject of properties, and not with the non-selfsufficiency of the red color as a property of a concrete thing. We shall still delve into this in greater detail.

2. The non-selfsufficiency of an entity is characterized by a peculiar relativity: a non-selfsufficient X is always non-selfsufficient relative to something. But this relativity can be of different sorts. Thus, for example, “redness” is not non-selfsufficient in the same sense as “coloration” (both taken as individual moments). And indeed, the red-moment requires quite *unequivocally* the moment of coloration, whereas the moment of coloration requires for its completion, and thereby also for its existence, only *some one* of the various color qualities – “red,” “yellow,” etc. *Both* moments are non-selfsufficient, and in both cases their non-selfsufficiency is in virtue of essence *materially* conditioned (founded in material-ontological states of affairs [*Tatbestände*]). But the relativity of the non-selfsufficiency is different in the two cases: in the first case, we have a *univocal* [*eIndeutige*] non-selfsufficiency; in the second – a *multivocal* [*vieldeutige*] one. Univocal (or univocally relative) non-selfsufficiency occurs wherever an S, if it is to be able to exist at all as something individual, must be completed into *one* whole by an S' that is qualitatively totally and unequivocally specified, and is therefore *unique*<sup>433</sup> with respect to this qualitative endowment. In contrast, multivocal (or multivocally relative) non-selfsufficiency occurs whenever an arbitrary moment from some *class* containing a *plurality* of mutually exclusive moments can comprise the completing component of moment M, which simultaneously always requires *one* of these moments as such a component. A borderline case of multivocal non-selfsufficiency – in which instance we wish to speak of an “*absolute*”<sup>434</sup> non-selfsufficiency – would be the case in which the non-selfsufficient entity, owing to its qualitative determination, requires *no special*, but rather a *wholly arbitrary*, completing entity, hence when it must coexist within the unity of a whole, it does so with *some* arbitrary, *unrestrictedly general*, something. It is not easy to proffer an example of such an absolute non-selfsufficiency. For this poses the difficult problem of whether qualities are governed by *absolutely* [*durchgängig*] universal, necessary complementarities [*Zusammengehörigkeiten*], or whether, conversely, only

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edness constitutes in the given case only *one* moment within the whole: “red color” – among many other moments, incidentally, such as brightness, for example.

433 Unique – in *its type* [*Art*], i.e., that it can still occur in multiple individual exemplars, if the occasion arises.

434 Or, more precisely: “absolutely relative.”

*some* qualities are of a type which of themselves determine a *sharply restricted* range of other qualities with which they can, or must, coexist within the unity of a whole.

3. Non-selfsufficiency yields another distinction with respect to the ground *in which* the non-selfsufficiency of an entity G has its basis. As we have already mentioned, the non-selfsufficiencies of the moments “redness” and “coloration” that were discussed above are grounded in the *material* (qualitative) peculiarity of these moments. To put it more precisely, they are grounded in the singular peculiarity of the ideal qualities whose concretizations determine the said moments materially. But not all non-selfsufficient entities must be non-selfsufficient for this reason *alone*. To wit, non-selfsufficiency can have its ground in an entity’s *pure form*.<sup>435</sup> Thus, for example, every *property*<sup>436</sup> is as such non-selfsufficient in accordance with its *formal essence*<sup>437 438</sup>. On the other hand, every individual, autonomous object in the strict and well-defined sense of a subject of properties comprises *along with* these properties a whole which – again in accordance with its purely formal essence – is formally selfsufficient, and is indeed so even if it were non-selfsufficient on some *material* grounds. In this connection, we distinguish between *formal* and *material* non-selfsufficiency.
4. In the case of *univocal* non-selfsufficiency, we must distinguish between *unilateral* and reciprocal non-selfsufficiency. If, say, S is univocally non-selfsufficient relative to S', and vice-versa, then we have the case of a *reciprocal* non-selfsufficiency. Thus, the form of [being] the property of something and the form of [being] a subject of properties are reciprocally – and indeed univocally – non-selfsufficient. *Unilateral* non-selfsufficiency occurs between an M and an M' if M is indeed univocally non-selfsufficient relative to M', but not the other way around. Whether M' must be altogether selfsufficient in the latter case, or perhaps only multivocally or even absolutely<sup>439</sup> non-selfsufficient, is an issue with which I do not wish to deal at this juncture, since a clarification of this matter requires separate and extensive in-

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435 This may be the reason why Husserl treated the distinction between “selfsufficient” and “non-selfsufficient” parts as *an analytically-formal* *\* issue*.\*\*

\* *an analytically-formal* *issue*

\*\* *Of course, we are here speaking of “form” in a wholly special sense. This word is highly ambiguous, as I shall demonstrate in Ch. VII. One of its meanings specifies the “analytic” form, which is precisely what is involved here.*

436 *(or characteristic) of something*

437 *essential form*

438 In this regard, cf. Ch. IX.

439 *relatively*

vestigations. Hence, for example, the moment of redness of a red thing (say, of a red rose) is unilaterally non-selfsufficient relative to the coloration of this thing.

5. Finally, the non-selfsufficiency in the sense here established is to be distinguished from the merely factual coexistence of particular entities within the unity of some whole. For as long, say, as a particular rose remains “red,” a merely factual coexistence undoubtedly obtains in the unity of the same object between “redness” and “rose-hood” [*Rose-heit*]<sup>440</sup>, and there is likewise a factual coexistence of all those qualities that comprise the qualifications of the properties that do in fact accrue to the given rose.<sup>441</sup> But the given rose need not be red, and it is not once it wilts and changes its coloration. But even “redness” *in genere* is not non-selfsufficient relative to a particular rose, since in concretion it can be the redness of this rose just as well as that of a flag, say. There is therefore no necessary coexistence<sup>442</sup> of “redness” and “rose-hood,”<sup>443</sup> nor of the rose and redness: “redness” is not non-selfsufficient relative to “rose-hood,” although both of their individual concretizations do in fact coexist within the “unity of a whole”<sup>444</sup>, and even though both the redness and the red color are non-selfsufficient, the former in a material sense relative to the latter, the latter, on the other hand, formally – as property of the rose – relative to the subject of properties.

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440 “being a rose”

441 This “factual” coexistence of an individual “redness”\* with the “red rose” cannot, however, be torn asunder, and this in contradistinction to the “rendability [*Zerreißbarkeit*]” of the parts of this-here rose, say, of its petals, which can be severed from the rose, but also from each other, and indeed to such an extent that the rose actually ceases to exist, although the individual petals can indeed continue to exist for a while after being severed. Nothing of the sort is possible with respect to the redness or red color of the individual petal\*\*\*. The factual coexistence of the color and the petal is nonetheless necessary, and this necessity follows from the absolute non-selfsufficiency of every color and of every individual redness as a concrete moment of the concrete color relative to any individual colored thing. And this absolute non-selfsufficiency of the coloration is founded *materialiter* in the ideal quality “coloration,” and *formaliter* in the coloration’s being a merely determining moment of the concrete color of something. The situation here is very complicated, since we are dealing with an interlacing of different modes of non-selfsufficiency.

\* “of a concrete moment of a given determinate rose”

\*\* “this-here”

\*\*\* “,and [with respect] to the petal itself”

442 “dictated by the material essences”

443 “within the framework of one and the same whole”

444 “same rose”



Ultimately, therefore, the following variants of non-selfsufficiency are to be distinguished:

- A 1. higher/lower level,
- 2. univocally/multivocally/absolutely relative,
- 3. material/formal,
- 4. unilateral/reciprocal, and
- 5. genuine/merely factual coexistence in the unity of a whole.
- B. Selfsufficiency in the above established absolute sense is to be opposed to all of the above.

If the various non-selfsufficiencies are not scrupulously distinguished, then we become very easily exposed to the risk of committing crude errors, since, as we have said, the denial of non-selfsufficiency to some M is not equivalent to asserting its selfsufficiency. This equivalence would obtain only if this M were not to be non-selfsufficient in *any* of the senses we have distinguished. But that is not at all necessary. A particular entity can fail to be non-selfsufficient in *one* sense, and yet be so in some *other* sense. For example, “redness” (as ideal quality) is not formally non-selfsufficient; nonetheless, it is, in concretion, materially non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis “coloration,” and it is indeed univocally non-selfsufficient. It is also very likely that multifarious intersections can occur among the various non-selfsufficiencies, whereby rigorous, *a priori* law-governed regularities determine which non-selfsufficiencies are compatible, and which are ruled out. But we cannot go into that here in greater detail, although it had to be mentioned. In the course of deliberating which lawful regularities govern entities that are selfsufficient and non-selfsufficient in the various senses, we must be attentive to whether the entities in question are at the same time autonomous or heteronomous. For even though the opposition between heteronomy and autonomy is entirely different from that between selfsufficiency and non-selfsufficiency, and [the former] is in itself independent of the latter, it is not altogether obvious that<sup>445</sup> the same lawful regularities must govern entities that are autonomous, whether selfsufficient or non-selfsufficient, as [must govern] the corresponding heteronomous entities<sup>446</sup>. The opposition between autonomy and heteronomy is so radical that nothing can be automatically transferred from the one sphere into the other. We cannot delve into this more deeply at this point.

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445 「 exactly 」

446 「 obtain between autonomous objects that are selfsufficient and those that are non-selfsufficient as between heteronomous and selfsufficient objects and those that are heteronomous but non-selfsufficient 」

## § 15. Existential Dependence and Existential Independence<sup>447</sup>

Another important existential distinction still needs to be noted *within the compass* of selfsufficient entities. Namely, it is possible for an entity to be selfsufficient and still require, in virtue of its essence, the existence of some other *selfsufficient* entity for its own  $\lceil$ continued subsistence [*Fortbestehen*] $\rceil$ .<sup>448, 449</sup> We then refer to the first entity as *existentially dependent*. In conjunction with this, that second, required entity can either have a material essence that is completely specified, or it can be quite arbitrary in this respect.<sup>450</sup> The case of a reciprocal existential dependence between two or more entities is also possible. In all of these cases, however, the two entities – of which the one is dependent on the other, or which are both dependent on each other – comprise *two* wholes that are reciprocally bounded off [*gegenseitig abgeschlossene*].<sup>451</sup> Dependence is therefore starkly different from non-selfsufficiency. On the other hand, if in virtue of its essence a selfsufficient entity requires the existence of *no* other *selfsufficient* entity for its own existence (and hence, of no other entity whatever), then it is independent in the absolute sense. Absolute independence is therefore something more, so to speak, than selfsufficiency.

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447 [*Seinsabhängigkeit und Seinsunabhängigkeit*: the alternative ‘self-dependence/contingency’ pairing was ushered in by Michejda; ‘self-dependence/other-dependence’ has also been used.]

448  $\lceil$  existence  $\rceil$

449 I.e., [it requires the existence of the other object] for its existence in the sense of continuing to exist [*Fortexistierens*] (of its further subsistence [*Weiterbestehens*]), rather than in the sense of coming into being [*Entstehens*]. This qualification is necessary, otherwise there would be a danger of confusing the concept of dependence with that of derivativeness.

450 Whenever the first case obtains, we are dealing with a *relative* dependence. An entity A is then dependent on a B that in accordance with its essence is wholly *particular*, whereas it is relatively independent of a C that has a different essence; it is not, however, independent [of that C] in the *absolute* sense characterized above. Now, should the second case occur, then we are dealing with an *absolute* dependence.

451 One may of course claim that a pair of dependent entities form a new whole. However, what is essential in this instance is that this new whole is a whole of a *higher order*\*, which does indeed have its own special properties, but which at the same time comprises just a *manifold* of selfsufficient entities. This manifold is relative to its “elements” in the sense of derivativeness, quite independently of whether its elements are or are not themselves derivative. Concerning a higher-order whole, cf. § 43.

\*  $\lceil$  (it is, as I later express it, a *derivatively* individual object)  $\rceil$

All selfsufficient objects whose constitutive nature<sup>452</sup> harbors within itself an essential relativity to other objects are dependent (e.g. father/son, husband/wife, and the like). One may raise the objection that the son can after all die, while his father lives on, and conversely, and that there is therefore no dependence here. But strictly speaking that is not [a faithful representation of] the situation. Only the *man*, who until his son's death was also a "father," continues to live. Similarly, in the other cases that were adduced. Hence, following his wife's death, the "husband" becomes a "widower," and the man in question lives on. The cases of dependent objects are not of course restricted to such instances of relativity as we have just cited. But it is difficult to come up with concrete examples, since we are precluded in this context from appealing to merely factual situations [*bloße Tatsächlichkeiten*]; on the other hand, extensive investigations are needed in order to exhibit a genuine dependence that inheres in the essence of the entity in question. We shall later display formal structures of objects from which follow certain relative dependencies of the objects that are so structured. But in order to give just a single illustration at this point, let us assume by way of example that it actually belongs to the *essence* of the human organism to be able to live only within a narrowly bounded range of temperature changes. Hence, this organism would be dependent relative to a particular heat source that, all other conditions being equal, would be capable of providing just these temperatures. Something similar could be argued in relation to the human organism and oxygen. We would have a different case of dependence if it could be shown that the purely intentional (and therewith, heteronomous) object (a) requires certain acts of consciousness not only for its coming into being, but also for its existence (more precisely: for its continued subsistence), and that (b) it is selfsufficient (hence, "transcendent") vis-à-vis these acts. But all of these examples would have to be examined in greater detail in this respect within the framework of both formal and material deliberations.

I do not wish to address the issue of whether there are various types of dependence (say, for example, dependence of varying degree, having various levels of constitution, and the like). That is, however, one of the themes of existential ontology, a theme, by the way, that needs to be treated along with corresponding problems from formal and material ontology.

The opposition under discussion has a close kinship to the opposition between [the] qualification [of an object] as to [its] properties [*Soseinsbedingtheit*]<sup>453</sup> and [its]<sup>454</sup> lack of qualification as to properties [*Soseinsunbed-*

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452 Concerning the constitutive nature, cf. § 38.

453 「 by other objects or states of affairs 」

454 「 total 」

*ingtheit*]. But we shall not be able to return to this before we have clarified certain complicated formal issues. Likewise, the existential distinction between an individual and a non-individual mode of being will also not be discussed until later. For the time being, with the aid of the already distinguished existential moments, I proceed with the attempt to construct a series of modes of being (whereby we shall of course not yet succeed in achieving *full* modes of being).

## § 16. Absolute Being – Relative Being

“Absolute being” has for ages been a topic of discussion, and has been set in opposition to “relative being.” To be sure, this was always done in the context of *metaphysics*, and the factual existence of the absolutely existent was either affirmed or denied. At the same time, the concepts of absolute or relative being were never clarified and fixed. On the basis of our distinctions of the various existential moments, we are in a position to give a rigorous definition of both these concepts – only in the *ontological* sense, of course. Namely, if an entity is *simultaneously existentially autonomous, original, selfsufficient and independent*<sup>455</sup>, we say that it is *absolutely existent*.<sup>456</sup> If, on the other hand, an entity exhibits in its mode of being even a *single* opposite of the existential moments just enumerated, then its being is *relative*. Of course, the concept of existential relativity differentiates itself in accordance with which “negative” existential moments occur simultaneously in the respective “relative” mode of being. The various laws pertaining to the mutual exclusion [*Ausschlußgesetze*] of existential moments must certainly be obeyed in the course of setting up the various concepts of “relative” being. To wit, the following pairs are mutually exclusive: existential

1. autonomy and heteronomy,
2. originality and derivativeness,

455 † in the absolute sense †

456 † Of course, other concepts of absolute being can also be constructed, and such have been frequently utilized in the annals of philosophy. However, ordinarily it has not been expressly stated how such concepts are to be understood. It would lead us too far afield to compare our concept of absolute being with those employed in the history of philosophy. The only thing of importance is that the reader keep to the determination of the concept given here, and not interpret it in terms of this or that philosophical tradition. †\*

\* † I am obviously not denying that other concepts of absolute being may exist. Hence, e.g., the Husserlian concept of absolute being of pure consciousness differs from the concept given in the text, although this cannot be said with full certainty, since Husserl never explicated the content of his concept. – The concept of absolute being will have to be further restricted once we have taken account of additional existential moments. †

3. selfsufficiency and non-selfsufficiency,
4. dependence and independence,
5. originality and heteronomy,
6. independence in the absolute sense and non-selfsufficiency,
7. non-selfsufficiency and dependence,
8. heteronomy and independence in the absolute sense.

Even  $\tau$ so<sup>457</sup>, the number of *possible* concepts of “relative” being is quite substantial, especially if we take into account that there are various modalities of existential non-selfsufficiency and dependence. It is therefore no wonder that the various historically extant analyses that have operated with an unclarified concept of “relative being” have culminated in a variety of conceptual confusions and in the resultant difficulties, unsolvable problems, etc.

Setting aside the peculiar complications that follow from taking into account the various modalities of non-selfsufficiency and dependence, we arrive, on the basis of the differentiation of existential moments we have carried out, at a total of *eight* admissible *concepts of being*:

**A. Absolute Being**

I.

Autonomy  
Originality  
Selfsufficiency  
Independence

**B. Relative Being**

II.

Autonomy  
Derivativeness  
Selfsufficiency  
Independence

III.

Autonomy  
Originality  
Non-Selfsufficiency  
—————

IV.

Autonomy  
Originality  
Selfsufficiency  
Dependence

V.

Autonomy  
Derivativeness  
Selfsufficiency  
Dependence

VI.

Autonomy  
Derivativeness  
Non-selfsufficiency  
—————

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457  $\tau$  by limiting ourselves to the four pairs of existential moments we have discussed  $\tau$

VII.	VIII.
Heteronomy	Heteronomy
Derivativeness	Derivativeness
Selfsufficiency	Non-selfsufficiency
Dependence	—————

Other combinations of the existential moments considered here are contradictory, and, as such, have been omitted. Nor do I give here any proofs of the non-contradictoriness of the individual concepts. These can be carried out on the basis of the characterizations of the individual existential moments presented above. We may, however, offer the following remarks relative to the concepts just put forth:

1. In concert with what we have said at the beginning of the existential analyses, one should not imagine that the modes of being we have distinguished are “composed” of the existential moments that have been singled out for each respective case. Since the concepts we presented have been initially acquired in a constructive fashion (that is, by a combinatorics [*Kombination*] of the respective existential moments) and not by means of a direct analysis of encountered modes of being, these concepts are “real” – to employ this antiquated mode of expression which goes all the way back to Kant – only insofar as, by reverting through direct analysis from the abstract to the concrete, we come upon concrete modes of being from which the existential moments we have adduced can be intuitively gleaned [*intuitiv erschauen*], and indeed as “smelted into” [*eingeschmolzen*]<sup>458</sup> these modes of being. However, I cannot carry out “such an”<sup>459</sup> analysis at this point. One should also not suppose that only the four (three, in some instances) proffered existential moments can be discerned [*herausschauen*] in the concrete modes of being, that the combinations we have set forth are therefore no longer in need of any supplementation, and are [of themselves] capable of constituting [*bilden*] a concrete mode of being. To the contrary, all of these combinations are only certain abstractions that would first be completed into “full”<sup>460</sup> modes of being by taking into account additional existential moments. Thus, no existential moments appear in the concepts set forth that are intimately connected with the existence of entities in time. Only a separate analysis of concrete time will lead us to these moments. In view of this, the concepts of the eight “modes of being” we have presented are purely provisional, and it

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458 “the wholeness of”

459 “this intuitive”

460 “concrete”

would be premature to wish already now to discern [*erschauen*] via intuitive analysis the concrete modes of being that correspond to them. By setting forth these eight concepts of being as mere logical possibilities, we are also not prejudging that all of these concepts are “realizable,” in the sense that for each of these modes of being it would be possible to come up with concrete examples of entities that exist in the respective mode. At this point, we do not wish to go into the purely *metaphysical* question as to whether *all*, and perhaps *only*, those modes of being that we have here set forth do *in fact* obtain within the framework of the *factually* existing totality of beings. For it may well be that the *factual* “world” – in the sense of the totality of existents – is considerably less diverse existentially than would in principle be possible from a purely ontological standpoint on the basis of the analysis of the ideas of existence. However, in view of the existential moments that have not yet been accounted for here, it may be vastly richer with respect to the diversity of modes of being – by also including entities whose modes of being have thus far not been included. It may also be that it contains only some of the modes of being that have been set forth, on the one hand, as well as such that have not yet been introduced here, on the other. These are all<sup>461</sup> possibilities that can first be resolved in metaphysical reflections after our existential deliberations have made much greater progress. In fact, we are only at the entrance to existential ontology. One should bear in mind that we are not here interested in offering a systematic presentation of existential ontology, but rather only a selection of those existential-ontological problems that are important for our Controversy.

2. The concept of “absolute being” here set forth is in a way an “optimum” of the existential moments that have thus far been taken into account. On the basis of the concepts discussed thus far, an entity that would exist in this mode would be an existent that is more “independent” than any other: it could exist in this mode even if nothing else existed. That does not yet amount to claiming that there could not be an existent that would be more perfect or fuller in its being. Certain perspectives along this line will open up before us once we discuss the mode of being of temporally determined entities. Talk of the “perfection” or “optimum” of being should not of course bring into the existential analysis any valuation of the being or of the existent [in that mode of being]. Nonetheless, it seems possible to order the particular modes of being into a sequence by taking account of the existential moments that occur in them, whereby “absolute” being in the sense put forth

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461 「pure」

would then have to be situated at the head of that sequence, even though it would contain still other “positive” existential moments<sup>462</sup>.

3. Of the seven relative modes of being, there are five that are characterized by autonomy. Only two relative modes of being are possible in which the moment of heteronomy occurs. It must be emphasized, however, that as far as applying the latter to purely intentional objects is concerned, which make up a special case of heteronomous entities, such application can pertain to<sup>463</sup> these objects only *qua intentional* entities, since a variety of modes of being – anywhere from “relative”<sup>464</sup> to heteronomous – may appear in the *content*<sup>465</sup> of these intentional objects, but always only as intended<sup>466</sup>. This will become intelligible once we define the concept of the content of a purely intentional object within the framework of formal investigations. For the time being, it may perhaps suffice to show by way of example that Hamlet, say – as a character portrayed in a Shakespearean drama – is a purely intentional entity that is directly specified *vía* the meanings of the sentences and sentence-complexes that occur in the drama, but indirectly *vía* the intentions [*Intentionen*] of the writer’s creative acts. As such, Hamlet is a heteronomous object. Nevertheless, as Hamlet, as a Danish prince who performs such and such deeds at the king’s court, he is intended and portrayed as if he were a real man. On the other hand, the spirit of his father – which, as a constituent of the stratum of represented entities that goes into constituting the drama, is also heteronomous – is at the same time heteronomous as a phantom, as a figment (or more precisely: as object) of his son’s, of Hamlet’s, imagination. This example illustrates that what comprises the *content* of a purely intentional object can appear in altogether different *modis existenti-ae*,<sup>467</sup> whereas the purely intentional objects are always heteronomous in their intentional structure. Moreover, the heteronomy of intentional objects is unaffected by whether they are specified and projected directly through an act of consciousness, or indirectly with the aid of some meaningful linguistic structure, or, finally, whether they are formed by an act of consciousness which is itself heteronomous in its “intentional structure”<sup>468</sup>, as is the case in the instance where the spirit of Hamlet’s father is a product of Hamlet’s imagination.

462 “ that we have yet to discuss ”

463 “ that ensemble of their features which characterize ”

464 “ absolute ”

465 Cf. § 43.

466 “ , ascribed ”

467 “ which, in any case, are always likewise merely ascribed or bestowed ”

468 “ structure *qua* intentional object ”



4. The particular modes of being are closely interconnected with the form of the entities that exist in the respective modes. That is to say, specific *apriori* laws govern what the formal structure of an entity must or can be in order for it to be able to exist in one of the differentiated modes of being, and conversely: which modes of being are acceptable to a particular form belonging to an object. We are unable to develop these laws at this juncture. But even after settling the formal problems that are of concern to us, we shall be able to indicate only some of these laws. Only an exhaustive solution of these problems (or at least of the main ones) would enable us to establish with satisfactory completeness and rigor the laws that govern the links amongst existential and formal situations.

The interconnections between an entity's mode of being and its form may appear to be quite unexpected at this point, since, in the course of discussing the concepts of the particular existential moments, we have always spoken only of the entity's "essence" having to be bound up with some existential moment or other. But the term 'essence' has thus far been employed in a somewhat vague sense (a precise determination of the concept "essence of something" will not be attempted until later!)-<sup>469</sup>. Consequently, one should not presume that in the context of speaking about "essence" it was always a question of dealing exclusively with an object's purely "material"<sup>470</sup> moments, as if the form of an object did not belong to its "essence." As we shall convince ourselves later, these issues have a different complexion for different types of entities. In this connection, it will also be necessary to distinguish various concepts of "essence,"<sup>471</sup> among them also variants in which the form of the object belongs to its essence. The manner in which I expressed myself while discussing the concepts of the particular existential moments does not rule out that the form of an entity might be significant for the mode of being in which an entity having a quite specific form may exist. Further reflections will bring to light that we do actually encounter here a series of *apriori* lawful regularities that govern the relations and interconnections between the form and mode of being of an object.

However,<sup>472</sup> we must already now reckon with the fact that the laws that govern<sup>473</sup> interconnections<sup>474</sup> have a different structure [*sich anders gestalten*]

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of an object is still being taken here rather loosely, since thus far I have also not had the opportunity to elucidate this formal concept ▯

470 ▯ ("qualitative") ▯

471 ▯ the essence of an object ▯

472 ▯ in order to avoid possible objections, ▯

473 ▯ *apriori* ▯

474 ▯ between the form and the mode of being of something that exists ▯

when *individual* entities are at issue from the one they have when entire *domains* of being are involved. Thus, for example, entities that display *different* modes of being can occur in *one* and the same domain, even though the *entire* domain is characterized by only *one* fundamental mode of being.<sup>475</sup>

5. The modes of being and moments that we have distinguished here do not yet exhaust the whole gamut of possible modes of being. Hence, we must first of all point out the opposition between *individual* (and in particular, originally individual) entities and those that exist in various non-individual modes of being (such as ideas). The issue in the idealism/realism controversy does indeed concern<sup>476</sup> exclusively individual entities, which is precisely why the concept of an individual object must be sharply articulated. We shall therefore be forced to deal with it again.<sup>477</sup>
6. In the case of an entity's existential relativity, the question always arises: with respect to which other entity is it relative? In order to answer this question, it is generally necessary to examine *both* of the involved entities. Not only their mode of being, but also their form and material essence must thereby be taken into account. It is therefore necessary to conduct the existential investigations in close touch with the remaining ontological reflections, and to take our start from the larger object-contexts [*gegenständlichen Sachlagen*] in which the investigated entity occurs as a constituent. This circumstance complicates considerably the course of the investigation.

## § 17. Outlook on the Existential-Ontological Questions Relevant to the Problem of the Existence of the World<sup>478</sup>

The following existential-ontological questions that are relevant to our principal problem emerge on the basis of the investigations we have carried out:

The foremost question to arise is whether there is an existential distinction between the real world and pure consciousness, and if so – of what sort it is. This distinction is accepted by all philosophers who ascribe absolute existence to pure consciousness (as a rule, incidentally, without having clarified the sense of this absoluteness), and who regard the real world as existing “relatively.”

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475 † I shall have more to say concerning this issue. †

476 † foremost, and perhaps even †

477 † And yet, in order to arrive at the individual (singular) mode of existence, entirely different existential moments still need to be worked out – apart from those already considered. We shall encounter here enormously challenging difficulties, which thus far in the history of philosophy have not been successfully managed. †

478 [This section begins Ch. IV in *Spór.*]

Moreover, the very sense of this opposition wavers in accordance with the philosophical standpoint [that advocates it]. In contrast to our purely ontological concepts of the modes of being, in making this distinction one generally employs concepts for characterizing this opposition that often reflect a strong epistemological hue. This applies to a good number of idealistic systems that arrive at their solutions by starting out from epistemological problems. The commitments  $\ulcorner$ made in this context $\urcorner$ <sup>479</sup> frequently emerge quite unexpectedly and without a clear grasp of the crux of the problem, as well as without whittling out the relevant existential concepts. Thus, the first step toward clarifying the situation is the precise formulation of the problem itself. There are primarily two questions that need to be answered here:

1. What – in accordance with its idea – constitutes the full phenomenon of real-being as [the phenomenon of] the mode of being of the real world?<sup>480</sup>
2. What – in accordance with its idea – constitutes the full phenomenon of the being of pure consciousness?

Now, question (1) can be understood in two different ways: either a) What belongs to the  $\ulcorner$ idea of real-being as such $\urcorner$ <sup>481</sup>, and in contradistinction to other modes of being, without any initial commitment as to the factual mode of existence of the world that we encounter, the world that in everyday life is conceived as  $\ulcorner$ “real” $\urcorner$ <sup>482</sup>?; or b) One can adopt the position that the mode of being of the world that we encounter *vía* experience is from the outset *called*  $\ulcorner$ “reality [*Realität*],” and we are simply inquiring what, in accordance with its idea, it genuinely *is*.<sup>483</sup>

Both  $\ulcorner$ questions $\urcorner$ <sup>484</sup> can be understood purely ontologically, without presupposing the metaphysical or purely empirical existence of the world. However, the first [1(a)] interpretation of the question is the more fundamental and is not bound by any restrictions<sup>485</sup>, since it takes as its point of departure the analysis of the various ideas of the possible modes of being, and has as its only task the

479  $\ulcorner$  pertaining to the mode of existence of the world and its existential relation to pure consciousness  $\urcorner$

480  $\ulcorner$  Or to put it differently: What is actuality [*rzeczywistość* = *Wirklichkeit*] as the mode of existence of the real world?  $\urcorner$

481  $\ulcorner$  *idea* of actuality in itself  $\urcorner$

482  $\ulcorner$  “actual” (“real”)  $\urcorner$

483  $\ulcorner$  “actuality.” In the second case of question (1) it may merely be a matter of what belongs to the essence of *this or that sort* of mode of existence of the world as is *in fact* given to us; we can then not bother at all about the content of the idea of actuality.  $\urcorner$

484  $\ulcorner$  senses of this question [(1)]  $\urcorner$

485  $\ulcorner$  [Ftn.:] Even if this were to be a restriction that follows solely from the factuality of the world’s being given to us through experience in a particular mode of being.  $\urcorner$

clarification of the content of those ideas, without its having thereby been presupposed from the outset as to which of these is precisely the one that fits the mode of being of the world that is encountered in fact. To be sure the question appears to be much easier to answer when taken in its second [1(b)] interpretation. †Still – even if the effort was made to conceive this question purely ontologically – it is nonetheless encumbered in advance by the commitment that we already know in what mode the world encountered by us exists. Yet, to the contrary – this is first precisely the chief question in the metaphysical reflection on the world. And if one wished to appeal to experience [*Erfahrung*] as the basis for coming to know what that mode of being is, without having to resort to metaphysics, then one would have indeed thereby presupposed that this "experience" is indubitable and that its results are simply to be accepted, as the empiricists would have it. It would also have been decided without any investigation that every other mode of the world's being but the one ostensibly given to us in (prescientific) experience is ruled out.

That is a dogmatism to which we cannot accede here. By posing the question according to interpretation 1(a) it is precisely various possibilities that we wish to leave open, without of course prejudging from the outset that only *one* idea – somehow dogmatically selected – is exactly *the* idea of "real-being." We take into consideration various ideas of modes of being, provisionally only as possibly admissible, and attempt with the utmost clarity to isolate from amongst them that one which appears to us to resemble as closely as possible the existential character of the encountered world, as that character delineates itself in prephilosophical cognition. We are thereby always prepared to suspend decision concerning which mode of being accrues essentially to the real world (provided it exists at all) until after a metaphysical analysis has been carried out. For only in this metaphysical analysis might it be exposed that the real world, insofar as its existence has been definitively established, exists in a mode that is entirely different from the one suggested by prephilosophical cognition, and that we must then apply to it a different existential concept than we initially anticipated. However that final decision may turn out, thanks to our existential analyses we shall always be in a position to apply to the world the appropriate existential concept. If, on the other hand, we immediately carried out our analysis in accordance with interpretation (b), then we would have only *one* concept of mode of being at our disposal and would be faced with just two eventualities in our metaphysical reflections: with a straightforward "yes" or "no." And in the case of the negative option, we would not be in any position to say whether the world might not after all exist in some other sense. For at that point we would not have

any other existential concepts at our disposal. Only the first way of proceeding prepares us to face any eventuality.<sup>486</sup>

The situation is different with the<sup>487</sup> question concerning the idea of the being of pure consciousness. Here we must take our start from precisely such pure experiences [*Erlebnisse*] as we in fact live through [*durchleben*]. † And only after we have grasped the content of this idea, are we in a position to ask what sort of mode of being is suitable for something that is qualitatively endowed in this manner<sup>488</sup>, should it exist at all. In other words, the pure conscious experiences in fact lived through by us comprise something that is ultimately pre-given, and no longer subject to doubt. These pure experiences constitute the basis for unfolding the entire<sup>489</sup> idealism/realism controversy †, as happens in the case of all transcendentalists – perhaps all the way back to Descartes.<sup>490</sup>

† But it is not in vain that we have introduced the concepts of the existential moments – instead of talking about the modes of being – and only then, with their aid, attempted to form the initial, still schematically conceived, preliminary concepts of the modes of being. We have done so in the conviction that it is easier to grasp the particular existential moments than it is to begin by grasping the particular modes of being without [having] the concepts of the existential moments. Likewise, it seems to me easier – instead of immediately undertaking the effort to grasp the various modes of being (of the world and of pure consciousness) *via* concrete phenomena – to begin with the concepts of the existential moments that we have thus far distinguished, and to first ask the following questions<sup>491</sup>:

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486 [See Appendix B]

487 † sense of the †

488 † And we must ask ourselves what sort of mode of being is it that something must or can possess, which has *precisely such* properties as our experiences †

489 † problematic of the †

490 † . (Descartes, but in a more deliberate manner – Husserl!)\*

\* This does not of course rule out that the analysis pertaining to the essence of the experiences that we actually live through might lead us to the result that not everything in them is essentially necessary, and that not only entirely different variants of conscious experiences are possible, but also that there is a *general* idea of conscious experiences under which our experiences fall as just a particular case. This also has great significance for the problematic of the controversy over idealism, but for the time being this issue has to be deferred to the future. †

491 † After arriving at an answer to both questions, we need to pose further existential questions, but in such a way that in doing so we do not presuppose the solutions to those other questions. We also need to reckon with all possibilities, hence likewise with the possibility that the mode of being of pure consciousness is identical with actuality, as well as with the possibility that it differs from the latter in an essential way. Under these conditions, there arise four groups of four questions each, which on the one hand pertain

- I. 1) Does it belong to the idea of the real world that this world is existentially autonomous, or that it is existentially heteronomous?
- 2) In the latter case, is the world relative in its heteronomy with respect to pure, individual consciousness of a particular type, or with respect to something else?
- 3) Does it belong to the idea of pure consciousness (of the type pregiven to us) that it is autonomous, or that it is heteronomous?
- 4) If pure consciousness is heteronomous, then, the question arises, with respect to what is it heteronomous?
- II. 1, 2) Does it belong to the idea of the real world that the world is original, or that it is derivative? If the latter applies, then the question arises whether its being is derived from pure consciousness or from something else.
- 3, 4) The same questions need to be posed with regard to pure consciousness.

Should both the real world and pure consciousness, in accordance with the idea of each, be derivative, then at least one of them (if not both) can be derived from some third entity. Then the problem would arise – a problem, by the way, which is not insignificant for our controversy – as to what this third entity might be.

To pose these questions is not yet to presuppose at all that they can be answered on the basis of the ideas of the real world or of pure consciousness, respectively. For these may well be matters that can first be resolved along a metaphysical path.

- III. 1) Does it belong to the idea of the real world that it is existentially selfsufficient, or – to the contrary – that it is non-selfsufficient<sup>492</sup>?
- 2) The same question is to be applied to pure consciousness.
- 3, 4) If both are non-selfsufficient, then the question arises as to whether the non-selfsufficiency of the real world and of pure consciousness is reciprocal for the both of them, or if it is only relative to some third entity. An analogous question arises if only one of the two entities, in accordance with its idea, proves to be non-selfsufficient.
- IV. 1) Does it belong to the<sup>493</sup> idea of the real world that the world is existentially independent, or that it is existentially dependent?
- 2) The same question is to be directed at pure consciousness.

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to the content of the idea of a real world, and on the other to the content of the idea of pure consciousness. They are the following ʹ

492 ʹ (and eventually, in what manner) ʹ

493 ʹ content of the ʹ

- 3) If the real world, in accordance with its idea, is dependent, then the question arises whether it belongs to its idea, or to the idea of pure consciousness, that the world is dependent on pure consciousness or on some other entity.
- 4) The same question relates to pure consciousness, should it be existentially dependent.

⌈All of these questions follow as a necessary consequence of the existential analyses that we have carried out.⌋<sup>494</sup> The number of questions to be posed is actually much greater, since some moments have not yet been accounted for in the given roster. In particular: first, that of the opposition between [the] qualification [of an object] as to [its] properties and [its total] lack of qualification as to properties<sup>495</sup>; secondly, that of the various cases of non-selfsufficiency; and thirdly, that of the opposition between individual and non-individual being.<sup>496</sup> ⌈These, however, are issues that will not have significance for us until later. Much more important would be yet additional existential moments, specifically, those that are bound up with temporal being and its antithesis – extra-temporal being. To begin with, however, it will prove useful to give a survey of the cases that are possible on the basis of the existential moments that have already been accounted for.⌋<sup>497</sup>

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494 ⌈ The posing of all of these questions does not stem ⌈ from some sort of peculiar pedantry, but is necessary on purely substantive grounds. Existential-ontological states of affairs are of a sort that compel the asking of these questions and demand their resolution with regard to the points raised.\*

\* Obviously, all of these questions can be posed in a more concise formulation and we can ask, e.g., whether it belongs to the idea of the real world that its being is absolute, or whether it is relative in one of the defined meanings – and likewise with regard to pure consciousness. But in order to answer these questions, we need to return to the questions posed in the text. ⌋

495 [*zwischen Soseinsbedingtheit und Soseinsunbedingtheit*: I have explicated these terms in English as Ingarden did in the Polish.]

496 ⌈ [Ftn.:] This latter claim is important for all those “idealisms” which, in contrast to Husserlian idealism, attempt to resolve the controversy by making their point of departure the concept of “consciousness in general” (e.g., Marburg Neokantianism). *Nota bene*, further questions emerge after taking into account existential moments that are bound up with the eventual temporal existence of the real world. ⌋

497 ⌈ An analysis that would aim to exhaust the ensemble of extant problems would also have to take into account these [three] issues. It would be possible to show on the basis of the various attempts to resolve the controversy between idealism and realism throughout the history of European philosophy, that behind the individual attempts lurk commitments – ordinarily, without any clear awareness – with regard to the problems raised here, even though the latter were never clearly posed nor distinctly differentiated. ⌋

## Chapter IV

# ┌Provisional Survey of the Currently Feasible Variants of a Solution to the Controversy┐<sup>498</sup>

### § 18. Introduction

It would of course be premature to wish to give already at this time an exhaustive survey of the existential-ontological solutions to our main question that are in principle possible. All the same, a provisional survey will enable us to rule out certain cases, and thus to pass from the initially unsettling multitude of prospective solutions to a significantly smaller number of surviving cases, and in this way to prepare for the more concrete treatment of the latter. It will also prove useful to cast a glance at the attempts that have been made in the annals of philosophy to solve the idealism/realism controversy relative to each of these cases. As constrained as we shall be in the course of such a retrospective to the barest references and allusions<sup>499</sup>, it will still help us to become secure in the fact that the cases of possible solutions we have differentiated are “real” in the sense of having provided a guiding light to the various researchers, although they were not entirely lucid concerning the existential-ontological distinctions given here and did not come to appreciate their significance for the main problem of the existence of the world. Let it also be noted in conjunction with the historical indicators given here that not only the purely existential commitments are pertinent to the success of the various attempts at a solution, but also the formal and material parameters, which we shall not deal with until later.<sup>500</sup>

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498 ┌ Preliminary Survey of the Possible Existential-Ontological Solutions of the Controversy over the Existence of the World ┐

499 It would be necessary to carry out an extensive historical [*geschichtliche*] investigation in order to do this in a historically [*historisch*] and substantively satisfactory manner. This is not possible here; otherwise my book would be transformed into a historical work instead of representing an effort to attain new, positive results. Besides, such a historical inquiry could not be consummated until after all of the substantive results given in this book could be taken into account.

500 ┌ it may perhaps prove useful to get oriented in a *provisional* manner, as to what possible resolutions suggest themselves under certain assumptions. This will convince us how far removed from the true state of the problematic is the simple opposition that is



Taking all possible cases into account makes the number of solutions extremely large. It will thus prove useful in this provisional survey, the purpose of which is orientational, to make certain simplifying commitments that pertain to pure consciousness. These commitments accord with what is given in immanent perception and emerges from the concrete essence-analysis of the pure consciousness that is accessible to us.<sup>501</sup>

In particular, let the subsequent analyses be restricted only to those cases in which the following assertions hold concerning pure consciousness:

1. The experiences of pure consciousness are individual<sup>502, 503</sup>.
2. Only those experiences are considered in the sequel which interlocks into *one* stream of consciousness  $\ulcorner$ , and which – at least, generally  $\neg$ <sup>504</sup> lead to the constitution of coherent object-oriented meanings [*zur Konstituierung einheitlicher gegenständlicher Sinne*].<sup>505</sup>
3. Only experiences of that general type will be taken into consideration which manifests itself in *our* experiences – those of the philosophizing subject.
4. The pure experiences under consideration are *autonomous*, and the stream of consciousness that constitutes itself in them is *selfsufficient* vis-à-vis the real world (everything considered in accordance with its idea).<sup>506</sup>
5. The existence of the pure experiences  $\ulcorner$ lived through by an ego<sup>507</sup> is – in accordance with their idea – indubitable.
6. The question concerning the possible originality<sup>508</sup> of pure consciousness is suspended here relative to the case involving the possibility of pure con-

ordinarily entertained between “realism” and “idealism.” Moreover, the survey which I shall now attempt to give will later enable me to forge the paths for subsequent considerations.  $\urcorner$

- 501 One may of course claim that not everything that is given is essentially necessary for any and every sort of pure consciousness whatever. However, the other essentially possible cases can be omitted for the time being.
- 502  $\ulcorner$  in their mode of being  $\urcorner$
- 503 The concept of individuality poses great difficulties. For the time being, I ask the reader to take this word in that vague signification that it has in colloquial language. Stipulation (1) is important since, as we know, an interpretation of Kant's *Critique* was undertaken in the Marburg School, according to which that book is supposed to deal only with so-called “consciousness in general.”
- 504  $\ulcorner$  in which particular manifolds of experiences  $\urcorner$
- 505 It is not necessary to wind up with such [a unified stream of consciousness]. Various “pathological” cases of dissociation of consciousness [*Bewußtseinsspaltung*] attest to this. See also some of the arguments in Husserl's *Ideas I*.
- 506 The time will come when we drop this assumption.
- 507  $\ulcorner$  during the very phase of their occurrence  $\urcorner$
- 508  $\ulcorner$  or derivativeness  $\urcorner$

consciousness having been derived from something other than the real world<sup>509</sup>. Consequently, let the following possibilities be entertained in this context: a) that pure consciousness is existentially ‘derived’<sup>510</sup> from the real world, or from some particular part of the same; b) that it is<sup>511</sup> dependent on the real world<sup>512</sup>. Each of these options must be separately combined with the stipulations given under (1) – (5).

However, as concerns the mode of being of the real world, let its possible existential relativity be considered here only with respect to pure consciousness, while its possible relativity to something else is not taken into account. A further, important complication [*Komplikation*] of the problem-context that should be bracketed at this stage is bound up with the question of whether the eventual relativity of the real world obtains with respect to one *solitary* stream of consciousness (“mine”), or with respect to an open multiplicity of such streams.<sup>513</sup>

But why have we not taken into account here the possible originality of pure consciousness? It is not of course ruled out that there might exist some special type of pure consciousness (in accordance with some idea) in which [type] it would be original. Now, this appears to be improbable relative to our pure consciousness, and this indeed in view of the possibility – bound up with the phenomena of falling asleep and waking up – that consciousness can be completely extinguished. As we have already stated, originality rules out the possibility of the non-existence [*Nichtsein*]<sup>514</sup> of the original entity. Thus, derivativeness appears to belong to the idea of a consciousness that is in itself extinguishable.

By adding each time to the first five stipulations concerning pure consciousness one of the possibilities indicated under (6), we obtain a series of different

509 ‘ (e.g., from God) ’

510 ‘ either derived or not derived ’

511 ‘ either independent of or ’

512 ‘ , whereby we also need to acknowledge the possibility that the eventual dependence of consciousness occurs only relative to some *partial* segment of the real world (e.g., relative to the material world, or relative to a mind-endowed individual) ’

513 ‘ [Ftn.:] As we know, Marburg Neokantianism tried to relativize the real world vis-à-vis so-called “consciousness in general” – hence, at any rate, vis-à-vis only *one* [consciousness]. Likewise, based at least on some of his pronouncements in *Ideas I*, it seemed that Husserl relativizes the existence of the real world vis-à-vis only a single “pure ego” and its stream of consciousness; on the other hand, in *Cartesian Meditations* he attempts to consistently carry out this relativization vis-à-vis a certain (though indeterminate) plurality of subjects. This issue, too, will have to be discussed at the appropriate moment. But I circumvent it for the time being in order to simplify the problem-context. ’

514 [‘*Nichtsein*’ replaces the phrase ‘cessation of existence’ in the Polish version. If the latter were retained, this sentence would read: “... originality rules out the possibility that an original entity cease to exist.”]

groups of possible solutions to the controversy over the existence of the real world. I shall proceed to sketch them in sequence.

## § 19. Group I of Possible Solutions of the Controversy

*Point of departure:* In addition to the first five stipulations given above, let us also assume that pure consciousness is neither derived from the real world, nor dependent on it.

In view of the existential moments that have thus far been taken into account, the following possible solutions of the problem concerning the existence of the real world then emerge:

1. **Absolute Realism**<sup>515</sup>. According to this conception, the real world<sup>516</sup> is, in accordance with its idea, autonomous and original, while being simultaneously existentially selfsufficient and independent vis-à-vis pure consciousness.

This resolution of the problem does not prejudice the case in favor of the world's also being selfsufficient and independent vis-à-vis some arbitrary, third factor, in favor; that is, of its "being absolute in the absolute sense"<sup>517</sup>. But this possibility is not ruled out by the thesis of "absolute realism."

When we search the history of philosophy for concrete examples in which "absolute realism" would be advocated, we find in this case (as in other cases to be discussed later) nothing but certain resemblances to the standpoint at hand. Agreement can only be ascertained with respect to a certain nucleus of the entire conception, whereby the historically extant conception is always characterized by a series of particulars that make it deviate from our position. This should not, however, be at all surprising, given that the idealism/realism problem is usually

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515 The names of the particular standpoints are here adapted to the content of the existential commitments concerning the real world. It makes little difference whether they happen to agree with the historically extant names. "Nonetheless, at least some of these names are compatible with the historical tradition. "

516 When we speak here of the "real world," we mean something like the "material world" in which living creatures, and in particular psycho-physical individuals (human beings and animals), are also to be found. Now, whether this world also embraces something like cultural entities (for example, works of art) is a problem that should merely be noted here. This issue can only be resolved by means of material-ontological reflections [on the one hand], and by metaphysical considerations on the other. At the moment, it is simply a matter of an existential-ontological resolution [of the problem], a resolution whose range of validity still remains open.

"existence being strictly absolute "

entangled with numerous other problems which themselves differ from standpoint to standpoint, and which affect in various ways the solution of the main problem and its substantiation.<sup>518</sup> Here, on the other hand, only certain existential-ontological possibilities for a solution are initially defined, and rendered independent of all external influences. Moreover, they are circumscribed with the aid of a series of basic existential concepts that have never been sharply differentiated in the annals of philosophy, although they did lurk in an unripe state, as it were, behind the analyses that were carried out and exerted an unspecified influence on the final resolution [of the problem].<sup>519</sup>

We can take monastically atheistic materialism as an example of a position that is close to “absolute realism,” while omitting [from this comparison any of] the historically contingent variants of the same.<sup>520</sup> Its kinship with absolute realism consists precisely of the fact that it ascribes to the material world (to so-called “matter”) the mode of being of absolute existence in the sense we have specified, even though no existential-ontological concepts of the existential moments have been introduced into any of the historically known forms of ma-

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518 ¶ This influence frequently extended to the very formulation of the main problem. ¶

519 ¶ I am simply establishing the sense of various possibilities in order to get my bearings amongst them and then find paths along which one of them could be chosen, or even arrive at the conviction that none of them is suitable as a definitive solution. Secondly, I have defined existential concepts – provisionally to be sure, and as a rule in a rather foggy state – and tried to conceive the problem to the extent possible independently of peripheral influences. It is therefore natural that historically kindred positions deviate in various particulars from the position defined here. This, however, is testimony neither against an essential kinship between the views, nor against the correctness of the formulations I am advancing. Besides, historical examples are only supposed to tease out the fundamental thought of the given position, and I present them as briefly as possible; moreover, they are supposed to show experimentally, as it were, that the conceptual differentiations I have carried out and the set of possible existential solutions of the controversy that follow from them are not some whimsical fancy on my part, but have a certain purely substantive basis in a problematic that others in the history of philosophy have also encountered, even though it had all too often slipped through their fingers. The juxtaposition of certain views known from the history of philosophy with a series of positions derived from establishing the concepts advanced here, positions that are candidates for a possible solution of the controversy, may ultimately cast an interesting light on these positions. It may enable us to understand better than before their essential sense as well as the hidden coils that catapulted researchers to the solutions they proposed. Obviously, we must confine ourselves to the briefest remarks on this theme, neither developing them here nor carrying out our own historical *investigations*. It would be good to write a comprehensive work on this theme on some other occasion. ¶

520 To be sure, it will turn out further below that monastically atheistic materialism lies closer to another variant of absolute realism.

terialism. I believe, however, that if a materialist of the type just mentioned were to be confronted with questions that ask whether matter is, say, original and autonomous, and the like, he would have to endorse these questions as being compatible with the spirit of his own position. On the other hand, he would protest vehemently against imputing to him the presuppositions of our entire set of problems, as well as the ontological sense [*Deutung*] of our characterization of absolute realism. And his protestations would be to the point in the sense that there are in fact vast differences between absolute realism and the variant of materialism at issue. To begin with, this materialism is tantamount to a metaphysical commitment in our sense,  $\ulcorner$  in that it simply declares [*feststellt*] the existence of the (material) world. Indeed, he himself opposes “metaphysics,” but only because by “metaphysics” he understands something different than we do here, namely, [he takes it to mean] any theory that contains even the slightest tinge of a spiritualistic or dualistic tendency.<sup>521</sup> It is precisely because of this that he refuses to acknowledge a pure consciousness  $\ulcorner$ , and he rejects it either in a radical sense, by simply denying [the existence of] any and every consciousness, or at least in some weaker form, by denying the selfsufficiency and independence of pure consciousness vis-à-vis “matter,” as well as its non-derivativeness from the latter.<sup>522</sup> The development of the problem of existence of the (material) world that starts out from an epistemological problem-domain is also alien to this materialist. Nor does he accept pure consciousness as a region of being whose existence is indubitable, and is thereby the unassailable residuum of every attempt to put it in doubt. In order to arrive at an articulation of the entire problem in this guise (that is, to develop it in the spirit of some sort of transcendentalism), one must pass through the phase of skeptical, or at least critique-oriented [*kritizistischen*], epistemological considerations – say, in that form that we find in Descartes or Kant. But this is indeed something that is thoroughly alien to the form of materialism now under consideration.  $\ulcorner$  It has in its very essence a dogmatic disposition, and also opposes any epistemology that strives to

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521  $\ulcorner$  whereas absolute realism in our sense is no more than a certain *ontological* commitment, following which, of course, a metaphysical commitment should be sought after finding the appropriate means for achieving it. The materialism repeatedly advanced throughout the history of philosophy differs from the solutions considered here in generally having no great theoretical scruples, and in ordinarily *beginning* with the thesis of the existence of the material world, whereas in my analysis that would have its place at the *conclusion* of the controversy.  $\urcorner$

522  $\ulcorner$  independent of the material world. Consequently, he attributes that absolute being not to the *entire* world, but only to matter. He thereby goes beyond a purely *existential* thesis, to which I confine myself here for the time being, and makes a claim to certain material commitments.  $\urcorner$

be anything more than a psychological analysis of cognitive functions. It turns out, despite all of these unquestionable differences, that it is precisely existence as understood by absolute realism that is attributed to “matter” – which is identified with the world in general. And existence is denied [*abgesprochen*] to all other entities precisely because – as appears to be the case from the materialist perspective – one cannot ascribe to them existence as understood by absolute realism.<sup>523</sup>

As another example of absolute realism we may submit here atheistic dualism, which admits two “substances: matter and spirit. It would merit consideration as an instance of absolute realism only if “spirit” were to be identified with pure consciousness. In that case, “real world” would have to signify only the material world. If, on the other hand, spirit were to be distinguished from pure consciousness, then one would at bottom be dealing with a trichotomy [*Trialismus*] rather than with a dualism, whereby the two “substances,” matter and spirit, would have to make up the “world,” whose mode of being would be in agreement with the conception of absolute realism (and of course the question would have to be answered in what way these *two* substances could make up the *one* world), and indeed the one world that would be set in opposition to pure consciousness. Thus, a problem emerges here that is of vital importance in various historically espoused metaphysical conceptions of the world, and which frequently leads to an “idealistic” solution – it is the problem of the unity of the world, or of what exists in general. It is especially the heterogeneity of the qualitative endowment of the “substances” (such as “matter” and “spirit,” or “matter” and “consciousness”) that makes us sensitive to the necessity of presenting some rationale to explain the coexistence of the heterogeneous factors. This is especially so when the particular “substances” are supposed to be existentially independent of each other. And it is so to an even higher degree when the non-derivativeness of these “substances” is conceived not only in the sense of their reciprocal existential relation, but is understood in the absolute sense of existential originality. In this last case, the coexistence of several existentially original and qualitatively heterogeneous substances appears to be an incomprehensible wonder that is not readily accepted.

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523 “ Meanwhile, materialism is generally rather dogmatically advanced (however sharply it opposes so-called “metaphysics”). This becomes apparent, among other ways, in its frequently explicit rejection of any epistemological inquiries. Indeed, basing the entire problematic on accepting the existence of a pure consciousness would be in sharp conflict with its main tendency to deny existence to anything non-material – to anything conscious, in particular – and [is] at least [in conflict] with the tendency (in moderate materialism, with which we are now most often confronted) to weaken as much as possible the existential character of consciousness. ”

To be sure, atheistic dualism has hardly been advocated in the annals of philosophy. For no sooner was one compelled to acknowledge [the existence] in the world [of] a spiritual being alongside matter, one was at once also forced to acknowledge [the existence of] God. Consequently, the two “substances” now had to be conceived as not derived from each other, but rather as both being simultaneously derived from God as the sole original existent. But it is not existential motives that lead to this [implausibility of atheistic dualism], but rather either material or metaphysical, or – insofar as the problem of the unity of what exists, or of the world, is at issue – formal ones. Atheistic dualism does not appear to be contradictory from a purely existential perspective, and is identical with absolute realism provided the identity of the spiritual “substance” with pure consciousness is acknowledged and the real world is regarded as equivalent [*gleichsetzt*] with “material world.”

If, on the other hand, one yields to the material-ontological or metaphysical motives and ascribes only relative reciprocal non-derivativeness to the two (finite) substances, then one obtains a weakened absolute realism – under the assumption that the *res cogitans* is identical with pure consciousness. That would be a more or less Cartesian conception of the world, whereby we would also have to emphasize that for Descartes this is a metaphysical commitment. Meanwhile, in the case of (weakened) absolute realism, only an existential-ontological conception is involved. Moreover, the real world would have to be identified with the material world.<sup>524</sup> The reciprocal independence of the *res extensa* and the *res cogitans* does not emerge altogether clearly in Descartes. His underscoring of the substance-character of both these *res* appears to point to their reciprocal independence, but allowing causal relations between them

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524 † “substances”: 1) multiple streams of consciousness; 2) so-called matter. Here the material world is regarded not only as independent of pure consciousness, but as independent in the absolute sense. The non-derivativeness of both substances is also taken here in the absolute sense, hence as originality. Just as materialism, so too this position is a metaphysical commitment.

Descartes’ style of dualism differs from atheistic dualism only in the particular that Descartes considers *rem extensam* and *rem cogitantem* (as finite substance) as existentially derived from God. *Res cogitans* is certainly not yet clearly conceived as pure consciousness in today’s sense, although this can be divined in the *Meditations*. Yet, a consequence of this is that the relation between pure consciousness and the real (in particular, the material) world is also not precisely and clearly defined. In conjunction with this, Descartes arrives at an opposition of pure consciousness not to the *real* world at large, but only to the *material* world.\*

\* Not until Kant, owing to the differentiation of an “inner sense” from “transcendental apperception,” does the distinction begin to become apparent between pure consciousness and the mental (as a certain “thing in itself”).<sup>7</sup>

threatens "with certain dangers"<sup>525</sup> – to which even some of his contemporaries were alert. Thus, it becomes understandable, even on the basis of the concepts of the existential moments that we have differentiated, why subsequent research had focused on precisely this point " , and led to occasionalism, on the one hand, and to the Spinozian monism of the one substance and the two attributes, on the other. "

The unclarified existential relation between the two attributes of the same substance then leads to new difficulties in Spinoza's system, difficulties that preclude Spinoza's system from being considered as a possible existential solution of the idealism/realism problem. "Only one thing appears to be clear and certain: namely, that Spinoza's substance can be regarded existentially as the absolute being in our sense, which is to say that all the positive existential moments considered thus far could be attributed to the Spinozian substance."<sup>526</sup>

2. **Absolute Creationism.** According to this conception, the real world is existentially autonomous, selfsufficient, and independent, while being simultaneously derived from pure consciousness.

In this case, the real world would be strictly speaking created [*geschaffen*] by pure consciousness (hence the title of this position). One would therefore have to attribute to pure consciousness a genuinely creative [*schöpferische*] power, which – if, as presupposed, it is a matter of the consciousness that is in fact experienced by us – is surely not seriously done by anyone. Hegel's so-called "objective idealism" could be construed as one instance of a metaphysically interpreted absolute creationism, but it must be borne in mind that Hegel's pure ego "is not to be identified"<sup>527</sup> with the "pure ego" of the concrete, pure experiences of consciousness, and that it therefore does not satisfy the conditions imposed

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525 " their reciprocal independence "

526 " If we take note that Spinoza's substance is original (as *causa sui*), and that it is independent, and, as subject of the attributes, selfsufficient, and – as we can surmise – autonomous, while being at the same time identical with "nature" (real world?), then Spinozian monism can be regarded as one of the metaphysical variants of "absolute realism" in the sense advanced here, although the entire Cartesian problematic of starting from *cogitationes* was completely circumvented by Spinoza, and therewith the world is *not* opposed to pure consciousness.\*

\* It is interesting to think through Spinoza's axiomatics in Part I of his *Ethics* from the point of view of the differentiation of existential moments carried out here. One then sees clearly how these moments have an impact on the definition of concepts and on the axioms even when they are not clearly articulated conceptually for themselves. I attempted to carry out this sort of interpretation of the system of axioms in Part I of the *Ethics* in my seminar of Fall 1939. "

527 " has nothing in common "



here<sup>528</sup>. Acceptance or rejection of absolute creationism depends in the first place on material or metaphysical assumptions pertaining to the essence of pure consciousness. Consequently,<sup>529</sup> this creationism is fully admissible as a purely existential conception that is governed by the distinctions made thus far.<sup>530,531</sup>

3. **Dualist Unity Realism** [*Der dualistische Einheitsrealismus*]. According to this conception, the real world is existentially autonomous, original, and non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis pure consciousness.

In concert with this conception, the real world forms a whole with pure consciousness (and in particular, with every act of consciousness in which some segment of the world would be given). The real world and pure consciousness would have to coexist within the unity of this whole. However, if one assumes the transcendence of the real world or its elements vis-à-vis the acts of pure consciousness (in the sense of the concept of transcendence circumscribed earlier, whereby a “transcendent” object comprises a *closed-off* whole vis-à-vis the pure experiences of consciousness), then this conception is untenable. In order to avert the imminent contradiction, one would have to either abandon altogether the transcendence of the world (or of its constituents), or possibly weaken considerably the concept of transcendence<sup>532</sup>, and indeed in the sense that no ele-

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528 † “pure subject of consciousness” of acts of consciousness of the type lived through by us human beings †

529 † here, where only the existential-ontological point of view is decisive, it cannot be rejected as one of the possibilities for resolving the Controversy. Or, to put it differently, †

530 † Those who accept God as a purely spiritual and conscious being, and claim at the same time that God created the world strictly by means of His “pure thought,” are at bottom proclaiming nothing other than an absolute creationism in its metaphysical/theological interpretation.\* However, their conception differs relative to the plateau of problems on which we are deliberating our particular solutions because their point of departure is not transcendental. For they themselves are situated beyond Divine consciousness, and that consciousness – as anthropomorphized as it ordinarily is – can surely not be of the same type as the pure consciousness we live through. But even in this case, accepting a particular purely existential solution of the controversy depends on a certain material-ontological commitment, and ultimately on a metaphysical one. Still, it appears likely to be impossible to select some one of the existential solutions of the controversy without transferring our inquiries onto this new terrain.

\* So-called “Christian philosophy,” e.g. in its Thomistic formulation, will refuse to concede to the real world independence relative to God. We shall encounter this variant of creationism in our subsequent expositions as one of the existential-ontological possibilities. †

531 The extent to which this conception can be transformed, and then advanced in the guise of a theological metaphysics is a problem onto itself, one which I cannot go into here.

532 † relative to these acts †

ment or moment of the real world (or of any of its elements) comprises an element or moment of the corresponding act of consciousness – and conversely, which does not preclude the two from belonging to the unity of a single whole.

It must be noted, however, that in the case of dualist unity realism we would be dealing with just a unilateral non-selfsufficiency of the real world (or of the particular real objects) vis-à-vis the pure experiences of consciousness, since we have assumed above that the stream of consciousness is selfsufficient relative to the real world.<sup>533</sup> In other words: the real world would have to coexist with pure consciousness in the unity of a single whole, but there would be no necessity for this consciousness to coexist with the real world (or with the real things) within the unity of a single whole. Pure experiences could either coexist with something other than the real things within the unity of a whole – or they could exist without any complement at all. The fact that pure experiences are possible which refer to wholly fictitious entities attests sufficiently to the possibility of such a unilateral relation of existential non-selfsufficiency between the world and pure consciousness. But in order to be able to embrace such a solution, one would have to know the basis for such a unilateral non-selfsufficiency of the world. This basis could reside either in the form, or in the essence-dictated, material determination of the two regions. A purely existential analysis cannot provide a definitive resolution here. It does no more than prepare for it, and must be conducted in close conjunction with the remaining ontological reflections.<sup>534</sup> But should the solution that we are here considering fail to be substantiated in any and every formal or material context, then it would be ontologically unintelligible – provided one refused to be satisfied with a mere possibility.<sup>535</sup>

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533 Schuppe's philosophy of immanence would differ from dualist unity realism to the extent that it not only claims that the so-called "contents" [*Inhalte*] cannot exist without a subject, but that the subject also cannot exist without the "contents," whereby those "contents" are supposed to be something to which the things are reducible, or with which they are to be identified.

534 Formal analysis will first show that the form of the world precludes the non-selfsufficiency of the same in relation to anything else. Thus, the possible solution being discussed here will fall by the wayside.

535 ⌈ and in transitioning to the metaphysical investigations the rejection of this solution would have to be considered, or even that we have encountered here, in its essence, a *contingent* fact that could not be comprehended purely rationally. This, incidentally, would well agree with the uncertainty of the existence of the real world vis-à-vis the certainty of the existence of pure consciousness that has sometimes been pointed out by the transcendentalists.\*

\* [Ftn:] At any rate, similar eventualities also obtain for other of the solutions discussed here. 7

⌈Now, there is a situation inherent in the conditions listed for a dualist unity realism that makes the possibility of this realism highly questionable.<sup>536</sup> That is to say, according to this realism the real world is supposed to be original on the one hand, but non-selfsufficient relative to pure consciousness on the other. ⌈In this connection, consciousness is certainly assumed not to be derived from the world, but it is unlikely to be original. The original world is therefore supposed to be non-selfsufficient with respect to the non-original consciousness. Hence – although original, thus in itself necessarily existent – it would still have to be conditioned in this necessary existence by some factor which does not itself necessarily exist. Now, should that factor not exist, its non-existence would have to imply the non-existence of the real, necessarily existent world, which amounts to a contradiction. In order to be able to rule out this situation, it would have to be shown that pure consciousness is not indeed in itself original, but does necessarily emanate from an originally existing being. This would make consciousness itself necessarily existent, although it would not draw this necessity of existence out of its own essence, but rather out of an existential relation to a being that is in itself necessarily existent. The danger of an existential threat to the original and simultaneously non-selfsufficient real world would then indeed be eliminated. Nonetheless, from a purely existential point of view, there would be an inner conflict in the essence of the mode of existence of the world that would be, so to speak, artificially covered up. In other words, the originality of the world and its unilateral existential non-selfsufficiency are mutually exclusive; dualist (asymmetric) unity realism so understood must therefore be rejected on existential grounds. “Symmetric dualist unity realism” – if we may put it that way – would still need to be considered, but does not belong to the group of possible solutions of the main problem presently under consideration.<sup>537,538</sup>

4. ***Dependence Realism.*** According to this conception the real world would be existentially autonomous, original and selfsufficient, while dependent on pure consciousness.

The world would here comprise a second whole vis-à-vis pure consciousness, although it could only exist on the condition that pure consciousness exists ⌈. In comparison with the dualist unity realism, it would be, as it were, existentially stronger vis-à-vis consciousness, but this is not enough to eliminate the difficulty that we encountered in the unity realism, namely: that the original world

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536 ⌈ There is, however, yet another reason why, under the prevailing assumptions, it is impossible to resolve at the moment whether the solution under discussion is existentially admissible. ⌋

537 ⌈ See Appendix C ⌋

538 ⌈ See Appendix D ⌋

would be dependent in its being on something that does not in itself appear to be original. Hence, dependence realism must likewise be rejected from an existential standpoint. It is even questionable whether it could be salvaged, so to speak, if one were to assume that pure consciousness is also original. For we would then have to combat a difficulty that is similar to the one that forced Spinoza to admit only a single *solitary* “substance.” To be sure, the existential concepts are not worked out with sufficient clarity in Spinoza. Consequently, it is not transparent what Spinoza’s concept of “substance” ultimately shelters. At the same time, however, it appears to be certain that – all differences in the formulation of concepts aside – “substance” is conceived by Spinoza as existentially original, and that it is precisely this originality which rules out its being contingent on something else (thus, in particular, on some second substance). On returning to the characterization of our concepts, and upholding the commitment that the originality of an entity follows from the entirely specific qualification of the nature [*Natur*] of this entity (although it would not be correct – as Spinoza would have it – to search in this nature for the cause, the “*causa*,” of the existence of an original entity), which makes its non-existence impossible, we must ask whether it belongs to the sense of originality that *only* the nature of the existentially necessary entity makes its existence necessary, so that any and every sort of dependence of the latter on anything else is ruled out. Is it not implicit in this necessary existence [of the entity] that it cannot be dependent on something else? For would it not mean, if this dependence were to obtain, that the nature of the entity at hand does not at all make its existence necessary, but that it contributes to it, at most? It does not yet follow from this, it would appear, that there cannot be any other original entity, but only that this other original entity could not condition the existence of the first. This, in turn, does not rule out that the two possibly coexisting original entities could affect each other in their qualitative endowment. If the latter turned out to be the case, it would have to follow from the inner material structure of the two entities<sup>539</sup>, and not only from their existential character.

It appears, therefore, that dependence realism would be impossible even if both the real world and pure consciousness were existentially original.<sup>540</sup>

5. ***Realist Dependence Creationism.*** According to this conception the real world would be existentially autonomous, selfsufficient, and both derived from and dependent on pure consciousness.

Here, therefore, the world would in the rigorous sense of the term be created by pure consciousness, while at the same time the former would comprise a self-

539 Compare the later analyses pertaining to the essence of an object.

540 † See Appendix E. †

enclosed, though dependent, whole vis-à-vis the latter. As a consequence, pure consciousness could not be situated within the confines of the world; it would have to be “transmundane.”<sup>541</sup> If consciousness itself were derivative, the entity from which it was derived could not itself be derived from the real world.

Dependence creationism differs from the absolute creationism already discussed by virtue of the fact that in dependence creationism the real world would not only be created by pure consciousness, but would also have the support for its being and continued existence in the latter.

There is hardly a system to be found among the metaphysical systems of European philosophy that would espouse realist dependence creationism relative to our human type of pure consciousness. There are, however, metaphysically theological systems according to which a personal, purely spiritual God has created the world by means of His (conscious?) act of will, and sustains it in its existence. In particular, all of Christian metaphysics subscribes to this conception. If the divine consciousness, and in particular also the act of creation, could be regarded as an instance of pure consciousness, then one would obtain in this case a realist dependence creationism linked [*bezogen*] to God, irrespective of how dubious it might be relative to human pure consciousness. But it is no longer pure existential analysis that has the last word on this issue, but rather the material consideration of pure consciousness.

Realist dependence creationism does not, however, appear to be ruled out from a purely existential perspective.

6. **Realist Unity Creationism.** On this conception, the real world would be existentially autonomous, while being at the same time derived from and non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis pure consciousness.

In this case, too, the real world would be created by pure consciousness in the rigorous sense of the word, but it would differ from the case just discussed under (5) by forming a *single whole* with pure consciousness. Of course, this says nothing concerning the formal type of this whole, nor concerning the form and material qualification of the bond that would in this case have to obtain, or that could obtain, between the real world and pure consciousness. It may well be that this solution is altogether impossible from a formal point of view. That will have to be decided later. It must also be stressed in this connection that the real world is supposed to be a total region of being, which must intrinsically impose certain formal conditions on the entities that might eventually coexist with it.

7. **Idealist Dependence Creationism.** This conception would dictate that the real world be existentially heteronomous, derivative, selfsufficient, and dependent on pure consciousness.

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541 † It would not thereby itself have to be original. †

This is the position that E. Husserl appears to adopt in his “phenomenological, transcendental idealism.”<sup>542</sup> In order to substantiate this in detail, one would have to submit Husserl’s works to an extensive, critically interpretive investigation – which cannot be done here. But since we are here merely concerned with certain examples from the history of philosophy, it will perhaps suffice if I confine myself to the following points:

1. According to Husserl, every real object is a (purely) intentional object of a particular type. But every purely intentional object is a *product* [*Gebilde*] of a determinate manifold of acts of consciousness<sup>543</sup>; that is – as Husserl puts it – it “constitutes” itself in these acts, and is completely determined by them as to its properties, its form, and its existence [*Sein*]. In particular, it is determined with respect to its properties by the so-called “content” (sense) of the acts. Its existence, however, it draws from a “positing” [*Seinssetzung*] – as Husserl calls it. According to Husserl, this “positing” is not supposed to be just a simple conviction that the object exists, but also a certain *decreeing and fixating into existence* [*Statuierung und Befestigung im Sein*]. This latter point does not come clearly to the fore in all of Husserl’s texts, but it is the unquestionable underpinning of his expositions on this topic. (Real) being, in virtue of its own sense – I would even say: in virtue of the existential moments that are immanent to it – is always a “being for” someone, and indeed either for the given pure ego that performs the manifold of acts which constitute the corresponding object, or for a multiplicity of “monads” that perform such acts. It seems beyond doubt that the real world – as Husserl understands it – is existentially derivative

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542 † Of foremost relevance in this context are his *Ideas I, Formal and Transcendental Logic* and *Cartesian Meditations*. †\*

\* † I was writing this when, of those works of Husserl’s published to date [1960], I was not yet familiar with *Ideas II and III, The Idea of Phenomenology, Erste Philosophie* [First Philosophy; Hua VII and VIII] or *Crisis* [Hua VI]. I do not believe I would feel any compulsion to alter my arguments in this book with regard to Husserl’s position after having become acquainted with these works. He undoubtedly changed various views in the course of his life, as well as the several formulations of his transcendental idealism. And if it came to writing a history of the evolution of his idealism, these various changes would have to be taken into account. However, the only thing at issue here is to bring into focus an example of a solution that falls under the rubric of idealist dependence creationism. And precisely such a creationism shows up at a particular phase in the evolution of Husserl’s views, whereas the fact that changes of one sort or another later occurred in it does not in the least affect the possibility of a solution here. †

543 In the first place, acts of experience [*Erfahrung*] come under consideration here, but then also various acts of thought, perhaps even acts of emotional and volitional consciousness.

in relationship to pure consciousness<sup>544</sup>, although Husserl does not utilize this concept. At any rate, the concept of derivativeness is wholly consistent with the existential character that Husserl attributes to the being of the real world.

2. Husserl frequently emphasizes that the individual real object, just as the whole real world as a region of being, is *transcendent* in relationship to the acts of consciousness constituting it. Therein is already inherent the condition of what I here call the object's selfsufficiency, although Husserl does not employ this concept. The concept of "*Selbständigkeit*" that Husserl introduced in his *Logical Investigations*<sup>545</sup> is rather a formal ontological concept, and he fails to set it apart from the concepts of the existential moments in general, as well as from those concepts with which it coalesces [*zusammenfließt*] for him. Consequently, Husserl cannot apply this concept directly to the real world in its mode of existence and in its existential relationship to pure consciousness. It is subsequently replaced to some extent by the concept of "transcendence."

Indeed, Husserl states expressly: "Reality, both the reality of the thing taken singly as well as that of the whole world, lacks *Selbständigkeit* essentially (in our rigorous sense)"<sup>546</sup> – and this appears to contradict our stipulation that what is transcendent is *eo ipso* selfsufficient vis-à-vis the acts of consciousness in which it is given. Meanwhile, it is very difficult to say in which "rigorous sense"

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544 I adopt here the exclusive stance of purely existential analyses, and am for the time being forced to neglect formal and material considerations. Consequently, my investigations do not delve into the problem of the relation of pure consciousness to the so-called pure  $\ulcorner$  ego  $\urcorner^*$ . It is for this reason that I speak here solely about the real world being derived from pure consciousness, without deciding whether that is already identical with being derived from the pure  $\ulcorner$  ego  $\urcorner^*$  that performs the respective act of consciousness. This, too, will have to be taken up later.

\*  $\ulcorner$  subject  $\urcorner$

545 Cf. Husserl, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, Invest. III.

546 Husserl, *Ideen I, op. cit.*, p. 93 f.: "*Realität, sowohl Realität des einzeln genommenen Dinges als auch Realität der ganzen Welt, entbehrt wesensmäßig (in unserem strengen Sinne) der Selbständigkeit.*" [I have retained the term 'Selbständigkeit' in my English translation of this sentence precisely in order to preserve the ambiguity that Ingarden attributes to Husserl's use of it. Interestingly enough, this ambiguity is resolved by the two translators of *Ideen I* in a way that reflects the two distinct concepts which Ingarden claims are conflated by Husserl in the one term: Gibson renders it by 'independence'; Kersten by 'self-sufficiency.' As the remainder of the sentence suggests, Ingarden imputes to this term of Husserl's the same sense as it has for himself. That is already interpretation, which exceeds my bounds as translator.]

Husserl is speaking there about *Selbständigkeit*<sup>547</sup> ʀ. That he does not do it in the sense introduced in the *Logical Investigations*, is certain<sup>548</sup> 549 Husserl under-

547 [It is not at all transparent from the syntax of this sentence that ‘in our rigorous sense’ does refer to ‘Selbständigkeit.’ I tend to agree on this point with Kersten’s reading, *contra* Ingarden – namely, that it refers to ‘wesensmäßig.’ Gibson settles the issue by leaving this parenthetical phrase out of his translation altogether. Even if I am right, and this *is* a misinterpretation on Ingarden’s part, it in no way discredits the detailed account that follows, which is meant to demonstrate the *lack of rigor* of this term by tracing its *ambiguity* through Husserl’s various expositions.]

548 ʀ, precisely because the concept of “*Selbständigkeit*” – in that form in which it appears in *LU* (and Husserl did not take up this concept thereafter!) – vacillates, as it were, between “selfsufficiency” and “independence” in the senses I have assigned them, whereby Husserl never gets around to differentiating purely existential concepts (of autonomy and coexistence) from formal ones (of being a whole and being a part) ʀ

549 Unfortunately, Husserl made frequent changes in his terminology (from work to work) without expressly calling attention to them. In the *Logical Investigations* the concept of selfsufficiency [*Selbständigkeit*] is not distinguished from the concept of (existential) independence [*Unabhängigkeit*], i.e., the two concepts are conflated. It can be easily shown on the basis of Husserl’s texts how he passes from the one concept to the other. ʀ E.g., in *LU*<sup>1</sup>, vol. II, p.232, we read ʀ\*: “The sense of separability [*Trennbarkeit*] is exclusively inherent in the thought: *no dependence on other contents is grounded in the nature [Natur] of the content itself; it is what it is irrespective of all other contents.*” “And correspondingly, the sense of *non-selfsufficiency* [*Unselbständigkeit*] inheres in the positive notion of *dependence* [*Abhängigkeit*].” In the 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., p. 236: “The content is in its essence not bound up [*nicht gebunden*]\*\* with other contents; it cannot exist if other contents do not exist simultaneously with it. It need not at all be emphasized in this connection that they form a *unity* with it. For can there be essence-dictated coexistence without a combination or “amalgamation,” even if ever so loose? Hence, non-selfsufficient contents can only exist as *partial contents*.” ʀ And then on p. 236 of the 1<sup>st</sup> ed.: “*Non-selfsufficient object are objects of such types [Arten] as are governed by the law that, if at all, they exist only as parts of more comprehensive wholes of a particular type.*” Or, finally, on p. 245 of the 1<sup>st</sup> ed.: “The concept of non-selfsufficiency coincides in essentials with that of the lawfulness in unitary contextures [*einheitlichen Zusammenhängen*]. If a part is involved in a lawful rather than a merely factual contexture, then it is non-selfsufficient.” The characterizations are in a certain respect more precise in the 2<sup>nd</sup> edition of the *Logical Investigations*, but neglecting to differentiate the oppositions “selfsufficiency/non-selfsufficiency” and “independence/dependence,” and failing to connect these issues with formal problems, remains without change. ʀ

\* ʀ Circumscribing the sense of self-sufficiency by means of the concept of “separability,” Husserl states (*LU*<sup>1</sup>, Vol. II, p. 232) ʀ

\*\* It would appear that this is a typographical error, and that the word ‘not’ should be deleted. However, this “error” was not corrected in the 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. ʀ Hence, it was either overlooked or there is emphasis on “*gebunden*.” ʀ [According to the editors of *Hus-*



scores<sup>550</sup> the transcendence of real objects vis-à-vis the corresponding conscious experiences, while emphasizing simultaneously that these objects are intentional products of acts of consciousness. This strongly suggests that in saying that what is real lacks “*die Selbständigkeit*” essentially, that it is therefore in virtue of its essence [*wesensmäßig*] “*unselbständig*,” Husserl has in mind nothing other than precisely the existential dependence of the real.<sup>551</sup> Unfortunately, the inexactness of the sense of transcendence (which Husserl nowhere analyzes), and in particular, the failure to distinguish the stronger and weaker notions of transcendence, impedes the resolution of the problem also in this case. The question concerning existential non-autonomy also exacerbates the complexity of the problem. For when Husserl claims in *Ideas I* that the being of the real world is only a “being for a consciousness” (cf. p. 93), one can discern in this claim an expression of “heteronomy”<sup>552</sup>; that is, of the dependence of the real world on consciousness. One can therefore surmise that a being that is “relational” [*relationales*] in some special sense is involved here, a being that subsists [besteht] solely in relationship to consciousness. But one can also infer that a symptom of the world’s “heteronomy”<sup>553</sup> is involved in this claim, since Husserl stresses in direct conjunction with it the pure intentionality<sup>554</sup> of the real world.

3. Despite the obscurities to which we have alluded, Husserl often emphasizes quite expressly that the being of pure consciousness is a<sup>555</sup> condition for the existence of the world. And this being cannot be that of just any arbitrary consciousness, but of one in which manifolds of acts occur that harmoniously [*einstimmig*] constitute the constituents of the world, and the world as a whole. “If we cancel consciousness, then we cancel the world” is that famous dictum frequently employed by Husserl in his University lectures. In view of the simultaneously asserted transcendence of the world vis-à-vis the acts [of consciousness], it would appear that this dictum means nothing other than this: that the real world is existentially dependent on pure consciousness. Conversely, at the same time, pure consciousness is not supposed to be

*serliana*, this was corrected in the 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, but reverted to the original reading in the 4<sup>th</sup>.]

550 “in *Ideas I*”

551 “which would rather indicate that, in speaking in *Ideas I* of the “*Unselbständigkeit*” of that which is real, he has in mind not the “*Unselbständigkeit*” in the sense established by him in *LI*, that is in the sense of “being in virtue of essence a part of something,” but rather “dependence” in the sense I have established above.”

552 “non-selfsufficiency”

553 “non-selfsufficiency”

554 “of the existence of”

555 “necessary”

dependent in its being on the real world. This is supported in the first place by the circumstance that Husserl foresees the possibility of the existence of a sort of<sup>556</sup> conscious experiences that would not culminate at all in any real objects (and in particular – things) being constituted.<sup>557</sup> Further testimony for consciousness not being dependent on the real world is that Husserl attributes to pure consciousness “absolute” being in the sense of that which “*nulla re indiget ad existendum*”.<sup>558</sup> Whether absolute being in the sense of “autonomy”<sup>559</sup> is at issue in this context, or in the sense of independence, or, finally, in the sense of the “absolute” being that we circumscribed above – that again is undecidable, since Husserl just applies in this case a traditional expression stemming from “17th”<sup>560</sup> century European metaphysics, without making any attempt to specify its signification.

4. Husserl does not deal with the concept of existential autonomy in the sense I have specified here. As a result, it could hardly be demonstrated on the basis of his texts that real objects are “heteronomous” within the framework of his theory [*seiner Auffassung nach*]. His *Ideas I* (and other works as well) are replete with quite explicit statements to the effect that real being is a purely intentional being. For example, on p. 106 of *Ideen I* we read: “All *real unities* are ‘unities of sense’... An *absolute real entity* [Realität] is just about as valid as a round square. “Real entity” [Realität] and “world” are here simply headings for certain valid *sensible unities*; that is, unities of [precisely] ‘sense’ [, headings] that refer to certain concatenations [Zusammenhänge] of absolute, pure consciousness which, in accordance with their *essence*, confer sense and legitimate its validity in precisely the way they do, and no other.” Or on p. 94: “It [reality] is not in itself something absolute and [something] that secondarily links itself to something else, but it is nothing at all in the absolute sense, it has no ‘absolute essence,’ it has the essence-character [*Wesenheit*] of something that is in principle *only something intentional, on-*

556 “episodes [przebiegów = Verlaufe] of ”

557 Such would be the case in the instance of a consciousness in which the manifolds of transcendently directed experiences [*Mannigfaltigkeiten der Erfahrungserlebnisse*] would not lead to coherent senses of objects being constituted [*zur Konstituierung einheitlicher Gegenstandsinne*], hence in a situation in which all senses would continually “explode,” as Husserl puts it.

558 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 92: “*Immanent being is therefore undoubtedly absolute being in the sense that in principle nulla ‘re’ indiget ad existendum.*” And the immediately preceding sentence states: “*Thus no real being, none that presents and legitimates itself via consciousness by means of appearances, is necessary for the being of consciousness itself (in the broadest sense of a stream of experiences).*”

559 “selfsufficiency ”

560 “XVIII ”

ly something of which there is consciousness [*Bewußtes*], something that is presentable via consciousness [*bewußtseinsmäßig Vorstelliges*], something that appears [*Erscheinendes*].”<sup>561</sup> “From the other side of the coin, the whole spatio-temporal *world*, to which the human being and the human ego are considered to belong as subordinate individual real entities [*Einzelrealitäten*], is, in its essence, merely intentional being, of a sort, therefore, that has the mere derivative [*sekundären*], relative sense of a being for a consciousness. It is a being that consciousness posits in its experiences [*Erfahrungen*], a being that is in principle intuitable and determinable only as something identical [that results] from motivated manifolds of appearances – but beyond that it is a *nothing*” (p. 93).<sup>562</sup>

Thus, when we juxtapose the characterization I have labeled here as “idealist dependence creationism” with what we find in Husserl in the form of assertions that he actually articulated, and if, at the same time, we ponder on the ultimate aims toward which his investigations gravitate, we must arrive at the conviction that idealist dependence creationism amounts to precisely that position which Husserl endeavored to ground. We must bear in mind in this connection that the existential-ontological concepts of the existential moments that I apply here are much more differentiated and rigorously circumscribed than the concepts employed by Husserl. Apart from that, there are also certain theoretical differences that should not be left unacknowledged. The following are the most important:

- a) In Husserl, we are at bottom faced with a metaphysical commitment [*Entscheidung*] – in contrast to my purely ontological reflections. To be sure, Husserl would not have been inclined to concede this. For Husserl would have claimed that he carried out his analyses on the terrain of the so-called “phenomenological reduction,” which precluded him from making categorical judgments concerning entities given in empirical experience (more generally: in direct cognition). Still, the express formulation of his claims concerning the real world and its existential dependence on pure con-

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561 This is the passage in *Ideas I* that perhaps indicates more clearly than any other in all of Husserl’s writings that he was no stranger to the phenomenon of existential heteronomy.

562 My book *The Literary Work of Art* and the short essay “*Bemerkungen*” first tried to show that the purely intentional object exists heteronomously and has no essence embodied in it in the absolute sense. Husserl read both works, but had nothing to say to me concerning whether he endorsed the cogency [*Richtigkeit*] of the concept of existential heteronomy. He only wrote to me in a letter that he considered my essay to be “one of the most important of those included in the *Festschrift* dedicated to his 70th birthday. At any rate, he raised no objections to the articulation of my existential-ontological concepts” perhaps.

sciousness (that I cited above) does entitle us to pass this sort of judgment about it [commitment]. †This metaphysical character of his transcendental idealism emerges especially clearly when we note that<sup>563</sup> Husserl carries out his entire investigation in a stance that is oriented toward the essence of both acts of consciousness and real objects, and affirms expressly the absolute existence of pure consciousness and the relative existence of the real world with respect to the latter. Thus, he does not stay within the confines of purely ontological deliberations in my sense, while at the same time – in his probings into the essence of entities – exceeding decidedly the bounds of purely empirical inquiries. Moreover, he also trespasses the self-imposed bounds of the phenomenological reduction.

This metaphysical character of Husserl's assertions<sup>564</sup> distinguishes his investigations from the current phase of our deliberations. Nonetheless, it does accord with the fundamental position adopted by me here: that the crux of the controversy over the existence of the real world between so-called realism and idealism is of a metaphysical nature. The metaphysical deliberation over the main problem must, however, be appropriately prepared ontologically, and indeed in a manner that is free of any sort of metaphysical coating.

b) In the later phase of his idealism, especially since the *Transcendental and Formal Logic*<sup>565</sup>, Husserl linked the existential relativity of the real world not only to a single solitary consciousness – as has been assumed here for the time being – but rather to a plurality [*Vielheit*] of conscious monads.<sup>566</sup>

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563 † Husserl does not say that this or the other belongs to the *idea* of the world, or of a real object, but refers his assertion to the world itself, in an “eidetic” orientation, to be sure, and therefore a stance which attempts to establish the *essence* of the real world, but with an accent of factuality nonetheless, which trespasses the boundaries of pure ontology. †

564 † [Ftn.:] This does not of course apply to all of Husserl's assertions in *Ideas I*, in which the main drift of the deliberations has undoubtedly the character of ontological inquiries. †

565 [Ingarden means *Formal and Transcendental Logic*.]

566 *Nota bene*, Husserl nowhere characterizes this plurality in detail. But this [omission] is not without significance, especially for the standpoint of transcendental idealism. For the world could be constituted altogether differently as a straightforward [*einfache*] correlate of a manifold of constituting experiences, depending on the scope [*Umfang*] of this plurality, and especially on the type of consciousness-endowed subjects [*Bewußtseinssubjekte*] and the modality of their experiences – and it is a weighty question whether this constitution could be coherently effected at all in the case of a totally unbounded plurality of subjects. Or, to put it differently: would one not be forced to restrict this multiplicity in some fashion from the outset, if this coherence were to be achieved? But what else could this restriction signify if not some determinate selection of the consciousness-endowed subjects that are at issue – and if a selection, then per-

This is no doubt a significant step forward in the treatment of pure consciousness as an agency that we humans possess and that governs our relationship to the world, and thereby indeed a step toward a concrete treatment of the entire problem of the consciousness-governed [*bewußtseinsmäßigen*] constitution of the “real world” as a correlate of intersubjective knowledge. But this step comprises a systematically later phase of the whole analysis – a phase, to be sure, in which deliberations that refer strictly to “my ego” have already been expanded by overcoming the enclosedness [*Abgeschlossenheit*] of the ego within the confines of its own empirical experiences. Nonetheless, it has no significance for the current endeavor to give a survey of the possible solutions to the problem that is basic for the entire controversy.

- c) Husserl does not carry out any existential-ontological analyses, at least not in the writings that have been published thus far [1962], and – as far as I know – not in the unpublished works either. As a consequence, the mode of being of the real world was also not sufficiently clarified by him, although he lays great stress on the difference in mode of being between the real world and pure consciousness. Those of his deliberations that are relevant to this contrast are tinged with a distinctive epistemological – so to speak, Cartesian – hue. As a result, he brings into the foreground the “indubitable”<sup>567</sup> certainty of the being of pure consciousness in contradistinction to the fundamental dubitability, and therewith also uncertainty, of the existence of the real world. There is no doubt that other moments play a role in the Husserlian concept of the “absoluteness” of the being of pure consciousness. Husserl does not examine these moments in detail, even though they could have been analyzed more thoroughly on the basis of his expositions. Among other things, it is the impossibility of annulling the positing of the being of pure consciousness that plays an essential role in this context. This feature brings the concept [of “absoluteness”] into direct proximity to the concept of originality. Husserl’s contention that pure consciousness “*nulla re indiget ad existendum*”<sup>568</sup> simply appears to be a different formulation of the claim that this consciousness is original and inde-

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formed in accordance with what fundamental principle? To begin with, some sort of typology of consciousness-endowed subjects would have to be elaborated here, from which would first evolve some definite phenomenological sociology of consciousness-endowed subjects who live together and communicate in some specific fashion, and in particular a sociology of knowledge that would determine the conditions for the constitution of a “world” that corresponds to the given community of knowledge. No perspectives of any kind were opened onto this set of problems by the *Cartesian Meditations*.

567 “absolute”

568 Cf. Husserl *Ideen I*, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

pendent, which goes even beyond the presuppositions of our first group of attempts at a solution of the controversy.

- d) Crucial motives for accepting phenomenological idealism inhere for Husserl in the epistemological domain, and indeed to an extent that causes his entire problem context to differ fundamentally from ours. In concert with his idea of philosophy as “rigorous science,” Husserl is on a search for an indubitable knowledge [*Wissen*] whose ideal seems to him to be ultimately realizable only in eidetically oriented immanent perception. This gives rise to a certain kinship between the Husserlian transcendental idealism and the Cartesian position, a kinship that Husserl stresses so emphatically in the *Cartesian Meditations*. It has already been indicated<sup>569</sup>, however, that the entire gamut of problems surrounding the Controversy must be framed altogether differently<sup>570</sup>, but this will be shown in detail later – in the part devoted to the epistemological problems of the controversy.

As concerns other historically extant “idealist” solutions of our Controversy, separate detailed investigations would have to be carried out in order to show to what extent they accord with idealist dependence creationism. In the majority of idealist systems, especially in those having a post-Kantian or neo-Kantian imprint, the core thought is doubtless preserved, the thought, namely, that the real world issues out of subjective operations of consciousness, and indeed not as an existent-in-itself [*An-sich-Seiendes*], but rather as a bare phenomenon behind which there is “nothing to be sought,”<sup>571</sup> and whose phenomenal being is contingent on the being of consciousness. Depending on the historical situation and the aim of the philosopher by whom the particular system is being molded, various peripheral motives orchestrate that core thought and produce a variety of modifications in the idealist solution. For instance, in Berkeley it is the theological motive that leads to the conception of things being ultimately God’s composite ideas. This of course weakens considerably the moment of the real world’s emergence [*Hervorgehens*] out of the conscious processes of finite “spirits”<sup>572</sup>, i.e., it leads to a shift of the problem to divine creation, whereby the things still remain ideas for which *esse = percipi*. A consequence of this shift is to restrict the entire problem to the material world, as is also the case with many other philosophers. The various epistemological standpoints and conceptions out of which the idealism/realism problem develops are also capable of modifying the

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569 ¶ in the introductory considerations ¶

570 ¶, and in particular that a considerably more modest role will have to be allotted to epistemological reflections in the whole complex of problems than is done by Husserl ¶

571 ¶, and hence no “thing in itself,” ¶

572 [‘Spirits’ appears in English in Ingarden’s original.]

existential-ontological aspect of idealist dependence creationism. Hence, for example, Berkeley's one-sided sensualism in his doctrine of external perception vitiates strongly the selfsufficiency of material things. The upshot of this doctrine is a demotion of the perceived thing to a "bundle" of ideas. By this means, its genuine transcendence vis-à-vis the [process of] perceiving is relinquished, "and with that – its selfsufficiency"<sup>573</sup>. In contrast, Husserl rejects the sensualist standpoint in the analysis of external perception and seeks to implement instead a stratified constitution of the perceived entity by means of various manifolds of "adumbrations" (aspects). In this way, the real thing is<sup>574</sup> set apart from any sort of "bundle" of "ideas,"<sup>575</sup> and its transcendence vis-à-vis the [process of] perceiving is emphasized to the point of its<sup>576</sup> becoming a Kantian "idea." With this, the selfsufficiency of the real vis-à-vis consciousness is strongly emphasized, and at the same time its independence from the latter is underscored in equal measure.<sup>577</sup>

We should still mention here the case in which the real world would be taken to be heteronomous, derived, selfsufficient and at the same time independent of pure consciousness. The resolution of the question as to whether this case is admissible on existential-ontological grounds depends on the solution to the problem of whether an heteronomous object that derives from the enactment of certain experiences of consciousness requires this enactment only for its genesis [*Entstehung*] or for its continued existence as well.<sup>578</sup> "But the answer to this question appears possible only on the basis of a material analysis of pure consciousness (and eventually of the different possible variants of the same), and can therefore not be offered here. The possibility or justification of idealist independence creationism must therefore be set aside at this point."<sup>579</sup>

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573 "although this is not entirely clear in Berkeley, since we do not know exactly what the relation is between the "perceived [*percypowaną = perziperte*] idea" and the "perception" itself (the *percipere* itself) "

574 "radically "

575 "and for Berkeley, as well as for many other investigators (e.g. Mach), this ultimately means: sensory data, "

576 "ultimately "

577 I have given a more detailed presentation of the problem complex in Berkeley in my essay "Some Presuppositions of Berkeley's Idealism" (in Polish, *op. cit.*, 1931). "However, in writing it, I did not yet have at my disposal the systematic concepts I now employ. "

578 This problem is of particular importance for [the problem of] the existence of various cultural products such as language, art, positive law, and the like.

579 "Without being able to carry out here the appropriate material analysis, I can only bundle conjecture that the problem at hand should be solved in the sense of the *second* of the indicated possibilities. Consequently, we bypass here idealist independence crea-

8. ***Idealist Unity Creationism.*** According to this conception, the real world would be existentially heteronomous, derived, and non-selfsufficient – all relative to pure consciousness.

In contradistinction to dependence creationism, the real world (or at least the individual real objects) would here comprise one whole with pure consciousness. As concerns the problems of unilateral or bilateral non-selfsufficiency of the two spheres and their reciprocal disparity of essence, questions emerge here that are analogous to those that crop up in the case of unity realism. A question that also plays a crucial role here is whether two *regions* of being can be existentially non-selfsufficient in relationship to each other, and indeed with respect to their form. That is an issue that we shall have to deal with.

In view of Berkeley's identification of things with "bundles of ideas," and of the frequently advanced claim that Berkeley's "ideas" are to be identified with data of sensory impressions [*sinnliche Empfindungsdaten*]<sup>580</sup>, one could regard his idealism as a case of idealist unity creationism if at the same time it could be shown on the basis of his expositions that the perception [*Perzeption*] (*percipere*) forms a single whole with the perceived [*perzipierten*] idea, and indeed does so not contingently, but on the basis of the essence of the "idea."

Of the other known attempts at a solution [that fit under the rubric of idealist unity creationism], the "philosophy of immanence" associated with Kaufmann and Schuppe (perhaps even that of the American "neo-realists") would merit consideration here. But this [proposal] requires a more thorough investigation, and this indeed because the philosophy of immanence could – on rather sound grounds – be regarded as a case of unity realism. One factor that allows this philosophy to be taken as an example for such opposed views is its unity-character; another is the fact that it has not yet been settled whether those elements of the sphere of immanence that are supposed to belong to the world, or to comprise [*bilden*] it, and which are in fact nothing other than sense data, should be regarded as something existentially autonomous that is simply encountered by the

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tionism as probably impossible. For it appears to be existentially ruled out that something be *independent* and require some other object (pure consciousness) for its existence. <sup>7</sup>

580 The recent investigations by Jessop have certainly put this [contention] into question. But it is difficult to decide who is actually right, since the concept of "idea" that Berkeley took over from Locke is extremely ambiguous, to which Husserl has already called attention. Unfortunately, Husserl's claims in this regard have not been fortified with a concrete analysis of Locke's texts.



cognizing ego, or, to the contrary, as something heteronomous that is intentionally created by the ego.<sup>581</sup>

A particular difficulty attaching to the solution under consideration is inherent in the question whether from the standpoint of existential ontology it is possible for wholes to exist in which elements are contained that are both autonomous and heteronomous. For such indeed would have to be the case in idealist unity creationism. In the spirit of this conception, the experiences of pure consciousness would be autonomous, whereas the things (= ideas) knotted together with them into a unity would be heteronomous, with their *esse = percipi*. A dual disposition is manifest in the evolution of idealist tendencies having a sensualist complexion – that is, tendencies that strive to identify the perceived things with a manifold or complex of sensory impressions: on the one hand, [there is the disposition] to simply *deny* the existence of material things (in the sense of perceived things – of seen stones, trees, houses, etc., or of the merely inferred objects of “physical science” – of atoms and atomic clouds); on the other, to ascribe to things in the sense of complexes of sensations precisely the same existential character as is ascribed to the experiences that are intimately bound up with these complexes. The tendency of the so-called American neo-realism, or of the neo-realism to which B. Russell<sup>582</sup> subscribes (which, by the way, is just a transformation of Mach’s position), inclines in this direction. However, we must stress at the same time that, given their sensualist orientation, these allegedly “realist” conceptions are inclined to overlook the existence [*Vorhandensein*] of acts of consciousness altogether, and to reduce sensory perception to mere successions of the data of sensory impressions. These conceptions – like Mach’s – then proceed to regard the latter as “neutral” elements that are neither mental nor “physical”<sup>583</sup>. Strictly speaking, these “realisms” are no longer akin to idealist unity creationism, but belong rather to a distinct group of conceptions that I term the “negative solutions” of the controversy.

9. **The Negative Solutions.** Finally, the completely negative solution is also possible to the effect that the putative real world does not exist in any sense at all, and that means neither the directly perceived world of things nor the “physicalist” world of atoms (ultimately, of elementary particles). But this not only says that the collective experience of the real world, or of the things and processes that occur in it, is a colossal illusion, but also implies a particular commitment relative to pure consciousness. One would then have to

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581 ¶ It is not, however, easy to answer this question on the basis of Schuppe’s or Kaufmann’s texts. ¶

582 Incidentally, B. Russell has altered his philosophical views so often and to such an extent that it is difficult to say what position he actually holds.

583 ¶ “material” (that is, neither subjective nor objective) ¶

concede that pure experiences are not creative [*schöpferisch*] even in the sense of allowing heteronomous entities to emanate from them. This of course is not ruled out in principle as a possibility with which we have to reckon prior to carrying out the relevant material investigations. For only those manifolds of conscious acts lead to the constitution of heteronomous entities, which – synthetically linked together – give rise to [*aufbauen*] a coherent object-determining sense. In general, however, this [coherent synthesis] is not at all necessary,<sup>584</sup> even though in the vast majority of cases it does appear to be consistent with *our* pure consciousness. Pure consciousness would therefore have to be altogether lacking in intentionality, which in the limiting case would only be possible in the case of purely passive reception [*passiven Erleben*] of bare [*ursprünglichen*] sensory data<sup>585</sup>, or it could only contain the sort of manifolds whose sense would [continually] “explode,” as Husserl occasionally put it. A perpetually discordant sense-succession could not culminate in a cohesive episode of intending an object that would sustain the identity of that object. But pure consciousness would have to be conceived in this manner only if the existence of the real world were to be denied in every sense. For should it only be denied in the sense of autonomy, that would not rule out the admission of an heteronomous world. If, at the same time, one were compelled to recognize autonomy as being necessary to [the mode of] being real, then the world that were eventually to be accepted as heteronomous would not be real. In that case, however, one could not preclude pure consciousness from having some sort of creative power, nor would one have to regard empirical experience as a deception. For a deception would result only if the real world did not in fact exist even though it were given in experience as existing in the mode of reality, and if at the same time it were falsely identified via the acts of this experience with that world that possibly exists heteronomously.

Mach’s position in *The Analysis of Sensations* can be regarded as a case of a “negative solution” of the Controversy. But Mach’s expositions are not sufficiently unequivocal. This manifests itself, among other ways, in the fact that some researchers consider Mach’s position to be a materialism, whereas from the opposite side the materialists themselves combat it as an “idealism.” What I am about to say concerning this position must therefore be viewed as one inter-

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584 「 i.e., it neither belongs to the content of the idea of pure consciousness, nor does it follow from it, 」

585 「 Cf. § 44. 」

pretation of Mach, the one that seems to me to be the most compatible with his 'arguments'<sup>586</sup>, but which is nevertheless not the only possible one.

A peculiar conception of what other researchers refer to as so-called pure consciousness forms the basis of Mach's fundamental tenets. Namely, he regards that consciousness as a manifold of "elements." It is not quite clear what one should take Mach's "element" to mean. He also employs the term "sensation," and, given the orientation of the psychologists of his times, this so-called "sensation" had to be regarded as something "mental."<sup>587</sup> Yet Mach himself rejects this conception, and even replaces the word itself with the "neutral" 'element.' However, this again does not contribute much to clarifying what exactly is to be understood by "element." For the examples that he provides in support of this, which – following the old tradition of citing Locke's examples of the so-called simple "ideas of sensation" – are ambiguous, help us very little in this regard. In general they are names of the properties of things, such as "red" or "loud" and the like, so that there is no way of knowing whether it is actually bare sensory data that are involved, or indeed the moments that accrue to things [*dingliche Momente*] and which are merely conceived as something "mental" because one has from the outset adopted the standpoint of so-called "critical realism," and is convinced that something like color cannot indeed accrue to the things themselves, and is consequently nothing other than so-called "sensation." There is no trace in Mach of the sort of analysis that we find, say, in Husserl or in H. Conrad-Martius, in which the bare sensory data are indeed distinguished from both the aspects of various strata and the moments that accrue to things. In this respect, his *Analysis of Sensations* has not superseded the experimental psychologists of the latter half of the 19th century even by a single step. Ultimately, it is entirely unclear what Mach would have us understand by "element." And it would lead us too far afield at this point if on the basis of isolated fragments of Mach's texts we wanted to come to grips with what exactly it is that we are dealing with when he speaks about "elements." It is, however, a material-ontological, or – if one wishes – a psychological or metaphysical, problem, and must as such be relegated to later analyses. Now, insofar as we confine ourselves solely to Mach's existential commitment, it can be interpreted in the following manner:

That real world of whose existence we are convinced in our everyday life (and even in natural science) – the world of intuitively given things and living creatures – does not exist at all. And the same holds relative to atoms, which, as

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586 ' theoretical intentions ']

587 ' We may surmise that these are the sensory data (at least Mach's term '*Empfindung*,' as well as a number of his arguments, justifies us in doing so) ']

we know, Mach as physicist had contested. In the spirit of our §2, this negative thesis can also be viewed as a case of “idealism.” But alongside this negative thesis, another conception appears in Mach, positive on the face of it, but which is invested with so many “antimetaphysical remarks” that it once again amounts to a negative commitment. It reads: both in everyday life as well as in science, we consider the things – indeed, both the physical and the mental (mind [*Seele*], spirit [*Geist*], person) – to be something distinct from the experiences of consciousness. In truth, however, they are nothing but *complexes* of “elements.” It is some arrangement of these complexes that in actuality comprises what in everyday life we call the material world, and a different arrangement of these complexes (or even other complexes) comprises what we refer to as mind-endowed individuals. Nonetheless, this “world” and these individuals are only a “metaphysical” illusion, just as it is a mistake to believe that those complexes somehow exist in or of themselves. The delineation of boundaries for the individual complexes as well as the linkage of elements into isolated “bundles” is “in truth” arbitrary, and depends on circumstances pertaining to the “economy of thought.” As a result, their alleged existence is just a correlate of our habits or of the requisites of the economical thinking that is useful for our everyday transactions. We could, as it were, surreptitiously whisper to Mach that his complexes are nothing other than purely intentional objects that comprise the correlates of certain of our cogitative operations, and are heteronomous. But Mach is an existential monist who (consciously) admits only *one* mode of being, and – as one may surmise – that is none other than precisely existential autonomy. “In truth,” therefore, in the spirit of a fundamental – even if only tacit – tenet of Mach’s, these complexes *do not exist* either, which also wipes out the fundamental disparity between the physical and the mental. The second, seemingly positive, solution is therefore at bottom also *negative*. To admit the purely intentional existence of the complexes would likewise have been a false “metaphysical” commitment for Mach. In the final reckoning, with any sort of “metaphysics” in Mach’s sense having already been excluded, *only the elements* “truly” exist – exist, we would add, autonomously – and in their material, qualitative endowment, they are ultimately (according to Mach) something that is neither mental nor physical, but strictly “neutral.” That appears to be the sense of Mach’s so-called “neutral monism,” although it is actually a pluralism of elements.

If Mach were inclined to use the term ‘idealism’ in the sense employed by some interpreters to oppose it to “materialism,” whereby they refer to “idealism” as that standpoint which attempts to reduce the real, and in particular the material, world to certain sorts of experiences, or at least to some elements of consciousness, then, precisely with respect to the contention that his “elements” are “neutral,” he would defend himself against the reproach of [being a proponent

of] such an idealism. Nevertheless, those who – all of his cautions to the contrary notwithstanding – do see in Mach’s “elements” the data of sensory impressions which comprise the non-selfsufficient basis of certain pure experiences, and who at the same time do employ the term ‘idealism’ in the sense just indicated, do consider Mach’s position to be “idealist.” If, to the contrary, we take the term ‘idealism’ in the sense of an ontological or metaphysical *existential* commitment – as is our principal tendency to begin with – then Mach’s position is “idealist” in a *double* sense. And indeed: a) in the sense of *rejecting* the (autonomous) existence of the world of things and humans as an entity [*Gebilde*] that is different from the manifold of “elements” of pure consciousness; b) in the sense of admitting the relativity of the existence of the “complexes” in reference to the “economy of thinking” – while simultaneously rejecting the legitimacy of the concept of heteronomy, and renewing concomitantly the rejection of the existence of the complexes themselves. In my opinion, neither Mach nor the “neo-realists” influenced by him can be considered realists because they delegate<sup>588</sup> existence exclusively to some of the non-selfsufficient constituents of certain experiences of pure consciousness. For – as we shall still see – although autonomy is to be attributed to “being-real” as a distinct mode of being (which does not, incidentally, yet suffice for its characterization), it must nevertheless be noted that the evolution of the problem of the existence of the real world did not at all involve ascribing or denying to pure consciousness itself or to any of its elements or moments, and in particular to the manifolds of sensory data acquired *vía* experience, one sort of existential character (say, autonomy) or another, and [did not involve] accepting these data as existing in one way or another. This was precisely that region of being (or a segment of it) which lies outside the scope of the problem. Thus, irrespective of how one resolves the issue of the existence of pure consciousness or of any of its elements (and particularly that of the existence of the manifolds of sensory data), this commitment does not at any rate belong to the controversy over the existence of the<sup>589</sup> world, and does not in itself constitute either “realism” or “idealism.” Discussion of the existence [*Dasein*] of “these manifolds of sensory data”<sup>590</sup> instead of [that of] the real world – which, at best, achieves concrete appearance in that partial domain of it referred to as “matter” with the aid of such data-manifolds, but which is still something altogether different from these – represents nothing more than a de-

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588 “(autonomous)”

589 “real” [This adjective occurs in *Spór*, but is dropped in *Streit*, on numerous subsequent occasions. Those will go without comment.]

590 “pure consciousness or some sphere of its constituents”

tour from the original problem-context, but signifies no “realism” of any sort within the framework of this context.

Since I am here confining myself to just roughly outlined examples of the possible solutions to our Controversy that have surfaced in the history of European philosophy, let me now return to discussing further possibilities that follow on the basis of our existential concepts and the assumptions we have made. For we should not forget that at the beginning of this section we have made certain simplifying assumptions pertaining to pure consciousness that do not appear to be necessary, and can be replaced by others. But that would alter both the set of problems itself as well as the resultant set of possible solutions. We therefore proceed now to consider those possible solutions of our Controversy that do follow from a different ensemble of premises pertaining to pure consciousness.

## § 20. Group II of Possible Solutions

In addition to the assumptions pertaining to pure consciousness enumerated in § 18, we now assume that pure consciousness is not existentially derived from the real world – but is dependent on it.<sup>591</sup>

This assumption makes impossible the wholly negative solution to the idealism/realism problem discussed in the previous section  $\lrcorner$ , since the dependence of pure consciousness contradicts it $\lrcorner$ <sup>592</sup>. As concerns the remaining possible solutions, I shall here discuss them in turn.

1. *Modified Absolute Realism*. Under the assumptions just made<sup>593</sup>, the absolute mode of being of the real world may first of all be deemed admissible, at least in that weakened sense introduced in the first group of solutions in which the selfsufficiency and independence of the world are understood [to obtain] only relative to pure consciousness. Therefore here too we could speak of an absolute realism, but one which differs in certain details from the realism dis-

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591  $\lrcorner$  This assumption may perhaps appear to some readers arbitrary and curious. Nonetheless, once we choose to concede that the human mind [*Seele*] or spirit [*Geist*] is identical with pure consciousness (as, after all, many psychologists and philosophers rightfully or wrongfully assume), then in many theologically infused [*bedingten*] world-views, in the Christian world-view foremost, the same contentions are surely assumed as those advanced here: the human mind is indeed directly created by God, and is therefore not derived from the world, but it is at the same time dependent on the world since it is subject to the effects of this world.  $\lrcorner$  \*\*  $\lrcorner$  In making this assumption we are not in conflict with the point of departure for the entire problematic of the existence of the world.  $\lrcorner$

592  $\lrcorner$ . For to acknowledge the existence of pure consciousness as dependent on the real world, the existence of that world must have already been admitted in some sense  $\lrcorner$

593  $\lrcorner$  concerning pure consciousness  $\lrcorner$

cussed in the first group of solutions. A consequence of the reciprocal independence between the real world and pure consciousness there assumed is that in absolute realism there is no necessary linkage between the two domains of being. From an existential point of view it is also unintelligible in that absolute realism why they both actually do exist together, and so one must seek a ground for this outside of these domains. Here on the other hand, the dependence of pure consciousness on the world does point to an essential linkage of the two domains of being. For the ground of this dependence can only be sought in the form or even in the material determination of pure consciousness, or possibly also of the real world. Hence, accepting this solution depends on subsequent formal and material findings. From an existential standpoint, however, this variant of absolute realism is not necessary. Given suitable formal and material substantiation, this solution would have the great advantage with regard to the metaphysical resolution of the Controversy over other solution attempts that – if the essentially factual appropriateness of the assumptions made here with reference to pure consciousness and its factual and indubitable existence<sup>594</sup> were metaphysically confirmed – the<sup>595</sup> existence of the real world would be proven without further ado. And it would then only have to be shown *vía* metaphysical analysis that this world in its already proven factual existence is indeed absolute. This advantage, by the way, would be had by all the existentially admissible solutions in this group. Besides, this is just the reverse side of the claim already made that the absolutely negative solution in this group is indeed ruled out. Of course it would have to be shown in every case<sup>596</sup> – apart from the existential analyses yet to be carried out – that the results of our deliberations thus far are consonant with formal and material findings.

2. *Absolute Creationism*. †According to this conception [in Group I], the real world is supposed to be autonomous, selfsufficient, and independent, but at the same time derived from consciousness. Only the conditions that existentially determine pure consciousness change in the solutions of Group II. Namely, to repeat, the latter is indeed supposed to not be derived from the real world, yet be dependent on it. The question arises whether absolute creationism can be existentially admissible under these conditions. The difficulty to be overcome here is contained in the requirement that pure consciousness be dependent on a world that it has itself created. Is that not ruled out?

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594 †, as well as its dependence – in accordance with its factual essence – on the real world, †

595 † factual †

596 † of an existentially admissible solution †

That is to say, according to this requirement pure consciousness would have had to exist without a created world in order to be able to create it, but it could not exist without a created world since it is supposed to be dependent on this world that it had created. For the act of creating – which is a transferring of something from non-being into being – presupposes the existence of the entity that does the creating. In addition, the world derived from consciousness would be existentially stronger than consciousness since it would be independent of it. Therefore the world could exist even if consciousness – which after all is not existentially original – ceased to exist. Consciousness' non-existence would in no way threaten the existence of the world derived from it. In contrast, the non-existence of the (let us say, once created) world would entail the non-existence of pure consciousness, even though the latter is not derived from the former. This last may be strange, or unfavorable to consciousness, but it does not rule out absolute creationism. It is, however, ruled out on the basis of the first line of reasoning and must be rejected, regardless of whether “consciousness” is understood as the pure consciousness accessible to us in immanent perception, or as some other – say, divine – consciousness, such as might perhaps be proposed by a theological worldview. The existential situation would be even more difficult in the case of divine consciousness since we could not deny it originality and since originality is mutually exclusive with dependence.<sup>597</sup>

It should be added for the sake of completeness that if we were to replace the requisite of pure consciousness being dependent on the real world with the condition that it is supposed to have its *material* qualification stipulated by the world it had created, we would not run into the difficulty discussed above – but then we would not be dealing with an absolute creationism belonging to the second group of solutions.

3. *Dualist Unity Realism*. According to this conception [in Group I], the real world is supposed to be autonomous, original, and non-selfsufficient with respect to pure consciousness. In addition, in this second group of solutions pure consciousness would have to be non-derivative with respect to the real world, yet at the same time dependent on it.

But the solution proposed here is untenable from the existential point of view. For it would be possible for pure consciousness to be dependent on the real world only if both domains of being were selfsufficient relative to each other, which clashes with the conception of unity realism.

4. *Modified Dependence Realism*. In the sense of this conception [in Group I], the real world is supposed to be autonomous, original, and selfsufficient – but at the same time dependent on pure consciousness. This [modified] real-

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597 † See Appendix F †



ism would differ from the solution advanced in the first group only in the respect that pure consciousness, too, would be dependent on the real world, so that the two domains of being would be dependent on each other.

⌈The solution proposed here becomes untenable when the real world is supposed to be original in the strict sense, and yet be dependent on pure consciousness. For as we have already established, both these existential moments are mutually exclusive under these conditions. But it will prove useful to say here why these existential moments appear to exclude each other. Now we do not know – as we already stated earlier – whether there are in fact any sorts of original entities. For we do not know whether there is a constitutive nature that would of itself [*von selbst*] necessitate the existence of the entity constituted by it. “Of itself” – which is to say that the existence of these entities does not depend on any other condition. If one nevertheless demands that this entity be dependent – and that on some other entity, which though not derived from the world is at the same time (probably) not original – it would still depend in its being on something that is different not only from the nature of this entity, but from the entity itself. If the pure consciousness on which the world is supposed to depend were to cease to exist, this would of itself annul the existence of the world – which, after all, is supposed to be existentially original – hence the world could not be original, contrary to the assumption.

Modified dependence realism would therefore not be inadmissible only if we took it in a weakened version; that is, only required of the world that it not be derived from pure consciousness. As to which case actually obtains, whether that of originality or that of merely not being derived from pure consciousness, can first be decided in a material investigation. To that extent, this case is to be considered as only possibly not inadmissible from the existential point of view.<sup>598</sup>

5-8. All these solutions, which in the first group we have shown to be admissible, are encumbered with a contradiction in the second group of solutions and as such must be rejected. And indeed solutions 5 and 6 (*realist dependence creationism* and *realist unity creationism*) must be rejected for the same reason as the standpoint of absolute creationism in the second group, and solutions 7 and

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598 ⌈ From a purely existential perspective such a solution is undecidable, though at the same time not ruled out. If it were to be ultimately admitted, we would have to look for a substantiation of it in material reflections, and show that consciousness is not derivative not only with respect to the real world, but also that it is altogether non-derivative, and at the same time show that this solution is compatible with formal findings pertaining to the formal structure of an existential region. It should therefore be deferred to a further analysis. ▽

8 (*idealist dependence creationism* and *idealist unity creationism*) because pure consciousness, which is now supposed to be autonomous and dependent on the real world, could not be dependent in this way on a world which is itself supposed to be heteronomous and derived from pure consciousness.

Thus in Group II we have only two solutions that are not inadmissible in accordance with existential criteria.

## § 21. Group III of Prospective Solutions

Contentions 1-5 [from § 18] pertaining to pure consciousness remain in force here, and it is assumed besides that pure consciousness is existentially derived from the real world and is independent vis-à-vis that world.

1. *Modified Absolute Realism (in weakened form)*. This solution is admissible on purely existential grounds, but it would of course have to be consistent with formal and material findings. In particular, the material analysis would have to explain what accounts for pure consciousness' being derived from the real world and what its independence from this world is based on.

At first glance it appears that the variant of absolute realism now being discussed does not have the advantage it enjoyed in the second group of solutions. For from pure consciousness' having been derived from a world, on which the only demand is that it itself not be derived, it does not yet follow that an essential ongoing simultaneous existence of the real world and pure consciousness – a consciousness, however, that is supposed to be independent of the world – must be accepted.<sup>599</sup> If it were to be established<sup>600</sup> that pure consciousness does exist and is derived from the real world, this would only imply that the real world must have once existed, namely when the derivation was occurring, but not that it must still continue to exist at every instant of affirming [*Feststellung*] the existence of pure consciousness. Not until this realism were taken in its stronger interpretation – not until it were shown<sup>601</sup>, therefore, either that originality belongs to being-real as such or that the real world is existentially original by virtue of its material essence – would it follow from this originality of the real world and from the factually existing pure consciousness' having been derived from it, that the world persists in its existence.<sup>602</sup> Hence, it is along this path that

599 「 The derivativeness of object A from object B, implies that – given the existence of object A – B must have existed at the instant of A's *genesis*, but it does not follow that B would also have to exist later, for as long as A exists. As applied to our case: 』

600 「 (confirmed along a metaphysical path) 』

601 「 within the confines of an ontological treatment of the existence of the real world 』

602 「 After all, once an original object exists, it cannot cease to exist. 』

the existential interconnection<sup>603</sup> between pure consciousness and the real world can first be utilized toward the metaphysical proof of the latter's existence. Here, as incidentally already in group II of solutions, a significant role may be played by the circumstance that pure consciousness is in respect of its form a process<sup>604</sup> – as will still emerge in the sequel<sup>605</sup>. For one must reckon with the possibility in the case of the derivativeness of a process that it requires for its continued subsistence [*Fortbestehen*] the continued 'duration [*Fortdauer*]'<sup>606</sup> of those entities from which it is derived. And that, even if these entities were in turn derivative (vis-à-vis some other entities). 'Hence special formal analyses are still needed in this context.'<sup>607</sup>

The mode of being of pure consciousness we are now examining would be of a weaker type than that of the real world. Two material-ontological problems arise in this connection, the clarification of which is imperative for the purpose of a metaphysical resolution: 1) Is pure consciousness, in accordance with its idea, existentially derived from the real world in its totality or only from some special constituent part of the same (e.g. from the material world or from the organic world, as materialism claims<sup>608</sup>); 2) What is it about the material essence or form of pure consciousness that despite having been derived from the real world it is nonetheless, or is supposed to be, independent of that world?

2 and 5-8. In all these attempts at a solution discussed in the first group, the existential moment of having been derived from pure consciousness is attributed to the real world. They are all now inadmissible from an existential standpoint, since in the third group of solutions both of the domains of being would have to be derived from each other – which is ruled out by virtue of essence. Thus all forms of creationism fall by the wayside. The two idealist variants of creationism [7 and 8] had to be abandoned for the additional reason that in them the pure consciousness that is autonomous and independent of the real world would at the same time have to be derived from that world – a world, moreover, which is supposed to be heteronomous. And this is ruled out 'on existential-ontological grounds'<sup>609, 610</sup>.

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603 ' – which [interconnection] would have to obtain between them according to the currently considered variant of absolute realism – '

604 '(an episode [*przebieg = Verlauf*], a happening [*dzianie się = Geschehen*])' '

605 Cf. § 28, below, and §§ 60, 74 and 75.

606 ' existence '

607 ' This issue can be resolved by a special existential investigation that will rely on the findings of a formal analysis of the structure of a process, and – in application to pure consciousness – also on the findings of the relevant material investigations. '

608 ' – or even from mental-spiritual individuals '

609 ' if its heteronomy were to stem from pure consciousness '

3. *Modified Dualist Unity Realism*. Based on the assumptions now made pertaining to pure consciousness, this unity realism appears to be inadmissible on existential grounds. Speaking against it foremost is the circumstance that the existential basis of pure consciousness is supposed to be here a world that is autonomous and original to be sure, yet non-selfsufficient with respect to that consciousness, while the latter is itself supposed to be independent – which presupposes its selfsufficiency vis-à-vis the world. †Thus a selfsufficient whole would be derived from a non-selfsufficient something, which is at the same time supposed to be original. A whole is therefore supposed to owe its existence to something that in virtue of its essence is a non-whole, but with which it would not have to exist within its own unity. That means that consciousness could (in view of its own selfsufficiency) exist without that non-whole [world] from which it is supposed to be derived. But this something non-whole (non-selfsufficient) would have to be together with consciousness within the unity of a whole – the unity of consciousness, to be precise – in order to be able to exist. Yet it is supposed to be original, and thus not beholden for its existence to anything other than itself alone (or to its own constitutive nature). It is therefore either original, in which case it cannot owe its existence to the other whole, or it does owe its existence to that other whole, in which case it cannot be original. But it is impossible to have both options simultaneously.<sup>611</sup> Moreover: the †derived whole (consciousness) could also not exist

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610 † But even if we were to assume that the real world is heteronomous – because it is, e.g., an intentional object specified by some other consciousness (divine, say) – even then solutions 7 and 8 are impossible, since, according to the assumptions adopted in this group, pure consciousness is itself autonomous. And something autonomous cannot be derivative vis-à-vis something heteronomous. †

611 † Despite this, however, this seems not to be ruled out, though highly unlikely. We would only have to concede that this world, non-selfsufficient on some material or formal grounds, somehow creates out of itself from the “first” instant of its existence a creation (i.e., pure consciousness) that completes it into a selfsufficient whole; it is thereby quite natural then, though not necessary, that this completing factor is in itself selfsufficient, for it is thus somehow easiest to attain the selfsufficiency of the whole. We would have to assume at the same time, and this in accord with the current assumptions, the eternity of pure consciousness, which under these circumstances would be a *necessary* condition for the existence of the world – and this, in concert with the current assumptions, [would be] a merely *derivative* eternity, not an original one. But it would be undoubtedly curious that this *derivative* completing creation is at once selfsufficient and independent of precisely that factor from which it is derived. That which is *original* (the real world – still in accordance with the considered solution) would under these assumptions be *weaker* with regard to other existential moments than that which is *derivative* (pure consciousness). †

since it is not original, but its non-existence would entail the non-existence of the non-selfsufficient original entity (the world), which contradicts its originality.<sup>612</sup>

Hence this case of dualist unity realism is to be rejected  $\lrcorner$ . It would still remain to consider whether it would be tenable in a weakened form (by simply assuming the world's non-derivativeness from pure consciousness).<sup>613</sup> Meanwhile, it will later turn out that there are formal-ontological reasons which expose this solution as untenable.

4. *Modified Dependence Realism* is likewise untenable in this group, and indeed for similar existential reasons. For in the sense of this conception [in Group I] the world would have to be dependent on pure consciousness, whereas consciousness is supposed to be derived from the world.  $\lrcorner$ But given the world's originality, not both are simultaneously possible.

Weakened dependence realism, too – in which the world is regarded only as not derived from pure consciousness – appears here to be untenable from the existential perspective. The world would be dependent here on the consciousness that is derived from that world, and yet is independent of it. The contradiction between originality and dependence on a non-original factor certainly falls by the wayside here. The difficulty, however, is contained in the incompatibility between the world's dependence on consciousness and the derivativeness of the latter from the world. We have already encountered this difficulty before and need not develop it further here.<sup>614</sup>

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612  $\lrcorner$  completing factor, as derived, could in virtue of its essence be *annihilated* by some third factor, in which case the real world, despite its originality would have to be able to cease to exist, and this – given the current assumptions – is impossible.  $\lrcorner$

613  $\lrcorner$ , since the originality of something, of the real world in particular, *rules out* from a purely existential perspective the world's being simultaneously non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis a derivative object.  $\lrcorner$

614  $\lrcorner$  Just as in the previous case, the implicit circumstance that pure consciousness would have to be eternal along with the original world is not sufficient. A certain existential connection of the world with pure consciousness would certainly manifest itself in this dependence of the world, which would point to a particular *material* kinship or formal affiliation to each other of these two regions of being. And such a kinship – the possibility of which would first have to be ascertained in material investigations – could be interesting from a metaphysical perspective, and could even methodologically facilitate obtaining a resolution to the Controversy. But looking at it from a strictly existential point of view, this entire option needs to be *rejected*. For the derivativeness of pure consciousness does allow for its non-existence, possibly its annihilation by some third factor (which is to say, that it would not even have to be the real world that would be called upon to bear this burden!). But in such a case, the real world would have to be threat-

In this manner, we obtain in this group only one new solution for our Controversy that is not inadmissible on existential grounds.

## § 22. Group IV of Prospective Solutions

As in all previous groups, assumptions 1-5 [of § 18] pertaining to pure consciousness remain in effect also here. However, we assume in addition that pure consciousness is derived from and dependent on the real world.

Here, too, just a single one of the possible eight solutions will be admissible. Solutions 2-8 fall by the wayside for<sup>615</sup> the same reasons as in Group III. Only the standpoint of absolute realism is admissible from an existential point of view under the current assumptions. And indeed, as before, [is admissible] at least in its weakened form. The following still needs to be noted in this connection:

<sup>616</sup>Pure consciousness – if such a one exists – is involved here in an even tighter existential bond with the real world than in the case admitted in Group III, since it would be both derived from and dependent on this world. Only its autonomy and selfsufficiency still vouch for the positing of its existence [*Seinsposition*]. At the same time, it would not be ruled out on purely existential grounds that a world could exist without any pure consciousness whatsoever existing – at least of our type.<sup>617</sup> The factual existence of pure consciousness (as assumed here), which might eventually be metaphysically ascertained, would be a pure fact that would either be altogether inexplicable by rational means, or whose explanation would at any rate have to be sought in something lying *outside* of the real world. Given the absolute being of the real world, this something would have no impact on it, so to speak.<sup>618</sup> Pure consciousness' derivativeness

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ened in its existence despite the originality attributed to it here, which is ruled out. Originality rules out the dependence of the given object on any derivative object.\*

\* [Ftn.:] The status of a possible dependence of an original object on some other *original* object is a whole new issue which need not be resolved here, and which is not so easy to resolve. Spinoza, who – as we know – rejected the possibility of the existence of more than one “substance,” would surely have rejected the notion that something original could be dependent on anything at all. It is not certain, however, that Spinoza would have been right about this. ▽

615 ▽ generally ▽

616 ▽ *ad* 1. *Absolute Realism* of type III. ▽

617 This remark also applies in other cases of admissible absolute realism. But other perspectives still need to be taken into account\*.

\* ▽, which possibly do not allow for this ▽

618 From the standpoint of absolute realism in the rigorous, stronger sense. For absolute realism in the weaker sense it could be otherwise.

vis-à-vis the real world would not at all of itself explain the *fact* of its existence, for this derivativeness would only imply that *if* pure consciousness were to exist in fact, it would be derived from the real world. But such a derivation need not at all occur in fact. And it is this factual occurrence [*Zustandekommen*] of this derivation that calls for a further (metaphysical) explanation. The fact that here as elsewhere the questioning concerning the essence of being-real, or even concerning the factual existence of the real world (as is the case in the context of metaphysical discussion), sets out from the *methodologically axiomatic fact* [*Urtatsache*] of the existence of pure consciousness<sup>619</sup>, does not at all rule out (on the assumption of pure consciousness being derivative) the possibility that at one time this consciousness did not exist but – in accord with absolute realism – the real world did exist nonetheless.<sup>620</sup> What we are here pointing out is that absolute realism does allow for this possibility<sup>621</sup>.

If we look around for a historically extant conception that is relatively closest to the "existential solution"<sup>622</sup> now under discussion, what comes to mind is that materialist world-view, which – as it was frequently customary to say in the second half of the 19th century – saw in conscious experiences "mere epiphenomena" of material processes. From this standpoint, what exists absolutely is supposed to be solely the material world, i.e., "matter" as understood by (then contemporary) physics. One also considers it quite certain that it is not some special organization inhering in the *essence* of that matter which leads to such remarkable consciousness-like "epiphenomena," but rather that it is some simple *happstance* [*Zufall*] that leads to just such a configuration of material states of affairs which produces those epiphenomena. This is also what first and foremost distinguishes that [19th c.] form of materialism from the existential commitment of the "absolute realism" at issue here.

The fact that materialism avoids and even argues against employing the concept of essence<sup>623</sup> is bound up with the *empiricist* character of materialism's

619 Whether no other legitimate path opens up from a methodological standpoint for laying out the problematic of the existence of the real world is something we shall still take up in the latter parts of this work.

620 At first glance it would appear to be self-evident that it would have to have been a purely material world. This is, nonetheless, not self-evident, since it still depends on accepting two claims: first, that the mental must manifest and discharge [*außern und entladen*] itself in conscious experiences, perhaps more simply put – that it must be conscious; second, that objects are impossible which would be neither material nor have at least some necessary connection with pure consciousness. Both claims – even if they were in fact true – call for a separate material-ontological or metaphysical substantiation.

621 " from a purely existential point of view "

622 " variant of absolute realism "

623 " , and it is in this regard that this materialism differs from the position considered here, "

epistemological convictions. It seems therefore that this is not necessary for the metaphysical standpoint of materialism. It is possible to modify the materialist standpoint in such a way that it becomes fully consistent with the absolute realism of the type here under consideration. But the conjoining of the empiricist standpoint in epistemology with materialism is not purely accidental. It ultimately emerges from materialism's *metaphysical* presupposition that apart from matter there is in fact absolutely nothing else that exists selfsufficiently, and in particular that there are no ideas in the Platonic sense (or to put it better: in a sense akin to Plato's). Rejecting them leads materialism ineluctably to the sensualist-empiricist banishment from the realm of real being of every necessity issuing from the essence of the object [which dictates] that such and such properties or processes have to appear together in the object.

But does materialism have to reject ideas? Does it really follow from the basic premise of materialism that matter is what is foundational, even original, in the real world? It is reasonable to conjecture that materialism, and especially Marx's dialectical materialism, rejects Platonic ideas<sup>624</sup> because – following Augustine – it regards ideas as God's thoughts. Yet it contests the existence of God *ex principio*. Meanwhile, the Augustinian interpretation of Platonic ideas is not at all necessary. It is possible – and perhaps this is the only cogent [*richtige*] conception – to admit ideas and ideal objects without identifying them with God's thoughts, and without regarding them as something dependent on or even derived from God. And it would perhaps even be fundamentally false to so regard them. Without, however, wishing to meddle here in theological problems, it does appear at any rate that – in consequence of endorsing matter as the foundational, and perhaps even original, being in the real world – materialism is not in the least compelled to reject ideas and ideal objects  $\ulcorner$ , since they are not at all allowed to be regarded as some sort of intraworldly entities<sup>625</sup>. In conjunction with this, materialism is also not compelled to deny the existence of the essence of real entities, nor the occurrence of necessary interconnections within the framework of the real world. That it does in fact do so owes more to the historical conditions in which it developed during the 19<sup>th</sup> c. than to purely systematically necessary interconnections.

However, because materialism does in fact reject ideas, as well as essential interconnections within reality [*Realität*], it is not metaphysical in its assertions pertaining to the nature of the real world in that sense of “metaphysical” that I have established here.<sup>626</sup> Nor are its theses to be interpreted in the sense of an

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624  $\ulcorner$  mainly  $\urcorner$

625  $\ulcorner$  as something *extraworldly*  $\urcorner$

626 It is, however, “metaphysical” in a different sense, and indeed in the sense that it is a theory of real being which is regarded as definitive, or, as at least some materialists claim, foundational for the natural sciences.



existential or of some other ontology in the sense established here, and it would not wish to knowingly avail itself of our existential-ontological concepts. Nonetheless it does apply them – instinctively, as it were, and in a rather nebulous fashion – by declaring a radical difference in mode of being between matter and (pure) consciousness. Materialism is headed in the opposite direction from idealist creationism, e.g., Husserl’s transcendental idealism. While Husserl in a way weakens the mode of being of matter, or of the real world at large, in relationship to the mode of being of consciousness, materialism, to the contrary, sees in the mode of being of pure consciousness (insofar as it accepts it at all) a *minorum gentium* being, so to speak, a being of an “epiphenomenon.” It is of course not possible from the standpoint of materialism to determine rigorously the exact basis of this distinction. Materialism does not spell this out precisely because it has no existential-ontological concepts at its disposal. And it does not, because it does not permit any ontology, since, as we have already mentioned, its standard orientation is radically empiricist, and often even sensualist; but it also does not have them because existential analysis in our sense is already too subtle for materialism: materialism is not inclined to engage in the analysis of very subtle distinctions or moments, because it is generally disposed to make do with a conceptual apparatus that is to a high degree popular. But when we attempt to delve into the intentions undergirding the variant of materialism now under discussion – intentions of which there is no clear awareness, yet which are nevertheless in fact nurtured – it seems that we shall not be mistaken in claiming that the mode of being that materialism imputes to matter *implicite* is nothing other than the absolute being in the sense established here, and that the mode of being that it ascribes to (pure) consciousness is nothing other than a being that is derived and dependent on (some) material processes. It is also not ruled out, however, that it did occur to some materialists to impute to conscious experiences only a heteronomous being. I shall still return to this.

On the other hand, the variant of absolute realism we are here considering in its existential-ontological guise comprises nothing more than a preliminary stage toward attaining a metaphysical resolution. It is therefore not in these points that the difference ought to be sought between the variant of absolute realism now at issue and 19th c. materialism<sup>627</sup>. This difference lies above all – as I have already indicated – in materialism’s inclination to allot absoluteness of being not to the *whole* real world, but only to matter, and in its being disposed from the outset because of that to “acknowledge”<sup>628</sup> the dependence and derivativeness of consciousness relative not to the whole world, but only to its material stratum. It

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627 “ , dialectical materialism in particular ”

628 “ demonstrate ”

is for this reason foremost that it is materialism, and only secondarily “absolute realism”<sup>629</sup>. Thus it is not so much demonstrating [*Erweis*] the factual existence of the real (material) world that materialism is interested in – this interests it only insofar as it has a certain fear of idealist and creationist commitments, whereas it generally from the outset dogmatically accepts the existence of “matter” – as above all in the tendency to show that (pure) consciousness, which it identifies with the mental and the spiritual, is existentially relative vis-à-vis matter. What it principally wants to contest is the independence, and even more so originality, of consciousness in relation to the material world. It also develops a problematic that is entirely different from the transcendental, which latter is paradigmatic for us in the current phase of the analysis. Nonetheless, a certain kinship between the two standpoints cannot be denied. However, at the moment it need not be demonstrated any further that the variant of absolute realism now discussed does not have to be materialist.<sup>630</sup>

In all the cases considered thus far it was assumed that pure consciousness is autonomous, and selfsufficient vis-à-vis the real world. But from a strictly existential point of view, this is not at all necessary. In order to account for all the cases admissible from this standpoint,<sup>631</sup> the following four cases must still be considered:

- V. pure consciousness is autonomous, non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis the real world and not derived from it;
- VI. pure consciousness is autonomous, non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis the real world and derived from it;
- VII. pure consciousness is heteronomous, and is selfsufficient, derived and dependent vis-à-vis the real world;

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629 ¶ of a particular type ¶

630 ¶ *ad* 3. The assumptions for the solutions of Group IV – in particular, presupposing the *dependence* of pure consciousness on the world – rule out the case in which the real world would be at once autonomous, original and non-selfsufficient. For this dependence demands *ex definitione* selfsufficiency on the part of the second term [world] of the opposition. The mutual exclusion of the originality of the existence of the world and its non-selfsufficiency vis-à-vis pure consciousness – which, in accordance with the assumptions valid in Group IV, would have to be derived from the world – also argues against this solution.

*ad* 4. A similar reason, and the same as in Group III, enjoins us to reject in Group IV a correspondingly modified *dependence realism*. Here, too, an original, real world would have to be dependent on pure consciousness, which – as I have already indicated – is impossible. ¶

631 ¶ and in conjunction with acknowledging the exclusionary laws listed above that govern existential moments, ¶

VIII. pure consciousness is heteronomous, derived from and non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis the real world.

Hence, all in all, 32 cases of existential-ontological resolutions of our Controversy must still be considered. But in 16 of those cases pure consciousness is supposed to be heteronomous, which, relative to the 'consciousness accessible to us in immanent perception'<sup>632</sup>, does not appear to be valid. I shall therefore<sup>633</sup> confine myself to just a few remarks with regard to them.<sup>634</sup>

### § 23. Group V of Prospective Solutions

In addition to assumptions 1,2,3 and 5 [of § 18] pertaining to pure consciousness that were made in discussing the previous four groups, it is now also required that it be existentially autonomous, non-selfsufficient relative to the real world, and not derived from the same.

In all the cases that will prove to be admissible in Group V, it would follow from the factual existence of pure consciousness eventually having been affirmed that the real world exists, since it is the condition for consciousness' existence. In addition, it is at least probable that pure consciousness, in view of its non-selfsufficiency vis-à-vis the real world, exists in the same way as that world, hence is itself real should the world be truly real, or if it happens that consciousness is not real, then the same also holds of the world.<sup>635</sup> If this is valid, then those cases in Group V would have to fall by the wayside, or at least be improbable, in which a difference in mode of existence is called for between the two realms of being. This refers to those cases where the world is taken to be

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632 'conscious experience of the type that we live through'

633 'not discuss these 16 cases in detail, and shall in the sequel'

634 'On the other hand, I shall still briefly discuss the remaining cases.'

635 'For on the one hand the non-selfsufficiency of consciousness means that it must coexist with the real world within the framework of *one and the same* whole, while at the same time it is likely (though at the moment not definitively decided) that the difference between a mode of being and an existential moment is that the *entire* object exists in only *one* mode. In other words: pure consciousness would itself have to be real [*realny = real*] if the world were real; or, in the event that the mode of being of pure consciousness which follows from the assumptions were to differ from actuality, the world coexisting with consciousness within the framework of one whole would not be actual [*rzeczywisty = wirklich*].'<sup>7\*</sup>

\* [It is not uncommon to translate '*Wirklichkeit*' by 'reality,' thus erasing the *Wirklichkeit/Realität* distinction; I have adhered rather rigidly to the terminological distinction – both translator and reader must decide for themselves if and when they are synonymous.]

original but consciousness, to the contrary, derivative – or conversely. †Of course, the existential moments that have been taken into account throughout this entire deliberation do not yet exhaust the *full* modes of being of the entities being discussed. Thus, it cannot even be said yet whether, e.g., the distinctiveness of two entities in their full modes of being can be inferred from those entities' differing in only a single existential moment.<sup>636</sup>

1. According to *absolute realism* [in Group I], the world is supposed to be autonomous, original, selfsufficient vis-à-vis pure consciousness and independent of it. Is this compatible with the assumptions pertaining to pure consciousness that have been just made?

†The cases to be discussed in this group meet with various difficulties. The first question to arise is whether the existential moments that are here ascribed to pure consciousness are not mutually exclusive. It is required of consciousness in these cases that it not be derived from the world, yet at the same time be non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis that world. To say that G' is non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis G, means that in its very essence G' must be together with G within a *single* whole, and thus exist only in this togetherness. This whole would in our case encompass both the real world and pure consciousness. A peculiar asymmetry would, however, obtain within its existential structure (if it be permitted to come up with this sort of concept), and indeed in such a way that to the non-selfsufficiency of consciousness would correspond the selfsufficiency of the world; consciousness would then have to exist together with the real world within the confines of a single whole, but the world would not have to exist together with consciousness – it could in principle exist *without* this existential bond with consciousness. For the world, this existential bond would amount to a coincidence whose contingency would certainly follow from the character of the world's being, but whose occurrence cannot follow from its essence and factual being. In contrast, the existential bond with the world would be outright indis-

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636 † To be sure, if we assume that pure consciousness exists autonomously, non-selfsufficiently vis-à-vis the real world, and is not derived from it, we have not yet thereby determined the *full* mode of its existence. In doing so, we have only decided in the *absolute* sense concerning its autonomy. Both of the remaining existential commitments determine its being only *in relation* to the real world. It remains an open issue as to what other absolute existential moments must be attached in order to constitute, together with those already assumed, a *full* mode of being, and whether the cited *relative* existential moments are already adequate for this. But then all of the reflections pertaining to the existential solutions of our controversy are only provisional, and are simply a means for eliminating cases that are inadmissible or contradictory already in the current stage of deliberations.

Let us proceed to a discussion of the particular solutions. †

pensable for consciousness, which could not exist without it, and this incapacity-to-exist [*Nichtexistieren-Können*] is inherent precisely in its non-selfsufficiency vis-à-vis the world. Admittedly, such an asymmetric existential bond between the world and consciousness is not ruled out, as follows from the analyses pertaining to existential moments that have already been carried out. Nevertheless, in order to make sense of the entire situation, the indicated contingency of the existential structure of the whole points to some third factor being in play here. This turns out to be requisite for yet another reason. Namely, consciousness is supposed to not be derived from the world in this case. Consequently, the existential bond between consciousness and the world seems to be loose – despite consciousness' non-selfsufficiency relative to this world. The question arises not only as to why the world actually does in fact exist, together with pure consciousness within the confines of one whole, when this is not a necessity; but also at the same time as to how consciousness, despite being non-selfsufficient can yet be not derived from the world. There is also the question of what formal guise consciousness takes on within this whole in which it coexists with the world. Is it a non-selfsufficient moment that comprises the matter of some property of the world, or a property of this whole that supervenes over [*sich aufbauenden über*] the world? Or is it a process that is non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis the bearer within the compass of which it transpires? Would it not then have to be derived from the world in both cases, contrary to the assumption concerning consciousness in the solutions of group V? And in general: does not every G' that is non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis some other G have to be derived precisely from that G? If this were actually to hold quite generally, it would at the same time point to a tighter existential bond between G' and G (and conversely) than appears to obtain in our case with regard to the world and consciousness, where the world is supposed to be selfsufficient vis-à-vis consciousness – and consciousness not be derived from the world. If this tight existential bond is lacking between the world and consciousness, then the presence of consciousness in the whole consisting of the world and itself must have its basis outside of this whole. That is, this confluence of facts – that pure consciousness does indeed find in the world the existential support that complements it and which is in harmony with its own essence, that it is existentially bound to precisely a world that does not require coexisting with it – must (should it be at all possible) have its basis in a factor which is different from the world and from consciousness, but which implies both the existence of pure consciousness and its coexistence with precisely *this* world. If this consciousness is to exist in this relation that is not necessary for the world, then it must be derived from this third factor, and indeed also be derivative in its attachment to the world [*Gebundenheit an die*

*Welt*]. It is precisely for this reason that it can be non-derivative vis-à-vis the world with which it coexists in accordance with its essential nature.

Naturally, this existential possibility opens up broad perspectives on difficult metaphysical problems, theological ones especially. But acknowledging some third factor – which would have to be conceived as original and as creating pure consciousness – is indispensable here in order to render this entire complicated existential situation transparent, and to not dispatch it with a hasty deliberation. This quite remarkable existential bond between the real world and consciousness in the case at hand cannot be understood in terms of their relation alone. And if the third existential factor is not acknowledged – to begin with only as an existential-ontological possibility, of course – then the demand imposed on consciousness to be at the same time non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis the real world and not derived from it appears to be contradictory, which it *de facto* is not if some new factor is taken into account.

In concert with the earlier deliberations, in the case of absolute realism, the real world can be conceived either as original or – in the weakened form of this realism – only as not derived from pure consciousness. This would not entail any essential change in the existential relation between the world and consciousness. It is clear, however, that – in view of having to acknowledge a third factor in the overall deliberation, and an original one at that – it is likely that the real world should be conceived here only in the sense of not having been derived from pure consciousness.<sup>637</sup>

Both in this and all the other cases in this group that are not being rejected, the subsidiary question arises, although it is very important for the overall con-

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637 † It would appear that this question needs to be answered in the affirmative. One could certainly have reservations in this regard in view of the independence of the real world postulated here on the one hand, and of the non-selfsufficiency of pure consciousness on the other. The question arises, namely: does not the independence of an object demand selfsufficiency on the part of all objects that would have some sort of existential bond with it? Yet this does not appear to be necessary. Just as the selfsufficiency of an object P can obtain even though some other object P' is non-selfsufficient in relation to it, so the independence of P is compatible with the non-selfsufficiency of some P''. For the concept of the independence of an object P only implies that P does *not require* for its existence the existence of any other selfsufficient object. That a certain object P'' may exist within the framework of P which belongs to P owing to its [P''] non-selfsufficiency does not disturb the independence of P in relation to P''\*. From the perspective of P, its bond with P'' within the framework of one whole is then something wholly contingent. Only from the standpoint of P'' is its coexistence with P a *necessity* dictated by its essence. The possibility of such an asymmetrical existential bond between two objects is consistent with our characterizations of the existential moments. †

\* [Reading P'' for P']

ception of the world, namely: to what is the non-selfsufficiency of pure consciousness supposed to be related here – to the whole of the world or only to some constituent contained in the same, to the material world – or to a part, a physical object, to the living body [*Leib*] with which the conscious subject is “bound together”? Or is the non-selfsufficiency involved here of a kind that might possibly obtain between the act of consciousness and the object intended or given in it, or, say, between “the full conscious experience”<sup>638</sup> and what is expressed in it of the mental or spiritual? Or between the conscious experience and the “subject which is its bearer”? Or does something still altogether different come into play here? There is no doubt that the resolution of these issues is of decisive significance for the eventual metaphysical solution. But they can first be resolved on the basis of a material-ontological analysis of the general [*generellen*] essence of any<sup>639</sup> consciousness whatever, and in particular of the type of consciousness that is “accessible to us in immanent perception”<sup>640</sup>. Here it is simply necessary to point out that these questions open up on their own as soon as we turn to talking about the non-selfsufficiency of consciousness vis-à-vis the real world.

Let us still add for the sake of completeness that the above deliberation pertaining to the acceptability of absolute realism must still be supplemented by a formal analysis which addresses the possible form of an entity that is non-selfsufficient relative to something else. In particular, various cases of “characteristics [*Merkmale*]” will be distinguished there and investigated as to their derivativeness or non-derivativeness with respect to the object to which they accrue. This analysis will open up possibilities that are different yet from the ones we have already pointed out.<sup>641</sup>

2. *Absolute creationism* [in Group I] conceives the world – let us recall – as existentially autonomous, selfsufficient and independent, and at the same time derived from consciousness, which now – in the solutions of group V – is supposed to be autonomous, not derived from the real world but non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis that world.

But are all these conditions compatible with each other? How can something that in itself is non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis the world create it as something selfsufficient and independent of consciousness? And looking at it from the other side, how can the world simultaneously be derived from consciousness and be selfsufficient and independent from it? To be sure, what is non-selfsufficient

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638 “this act”

639 “pure”

640 “embodied in the conscious experiences of a philosophizing subject”

641 Cf. § 58.

requires for its existence the existence of some other object relative to which it is indeed non-selfsufficient. But in order to be able to create that other object, it must have already existed without the latter, hence not be non-selfsufficient relative to it, contrary to assumption. And how could the world derived from consciousness be independent of and selfsufficient with respect to it? If it is independent of consciousness, this would mean precisely that it could exist without it. Is this compatible with the world's having to be derived from consciousness? To this, one actually has to respond in the affirmative since the world, in conformity with the assumption, requires consciousness for its genesis, but it does not follow from this that it would also have to need consciousness for its continued existence, and would therefore be incapable of being independent of it. The first objection does, however, appear to be valid and thus implies that absolute creationism is not acceptable in this group.

3. *Dualist unity realism* does indeed require that the real world should be existentially original and autonomous, but at the same time non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis pure consciousness, whereas consciousness in Group V is for its part supposed to be non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis the world and not derived from it.

The existential relation between the world and consciousness is more symmetric here than in the absolute realism of this group, since a non-selfsufficiency prevails here on both sides (and indeed a reciprocal one). Meanwhile, it is this very symmetry that evokes reservations as to whether this case is admissible. For consciousness is supposed to not be derived from the world, even though it is non-selfsufficient relative to it; but since the world is likewise non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis consciousness, the latter is something that the world necessarily requires for its existence; would one not have to say here that it is the world that creates consciousness for the sake of its own existence? Would one not have to abandon here the non-derivativeness of consciousness from the world? And one more thing: the world is supposed to be original; could it then at the same time be non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis consciousness? Would that not speak against its originality? Why its very nature would have to compel its existence here; if, however, the world still required consciousness in order to have to exist together with it within some whole, would that not mean that the world's nature does not at all of itself compel its existence, but rather still requires the existence of consciousness to achieve that end?

Thus it appears that this case must be rejected, and that just on existential grounds. Formal grounds will later still be attached to these – when we insist that the world is not a simple individual object, but is rather an entire domain of being. But we will discuss this matter later<sup>642</sup>

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642 Cf. Ch. XV.



4. *Dualist dependence realism* requires of the real world that it be original, autonomous, selfsufficient and at the same time dependent on consciousness, whereas consciousness in Group V is supposed to be, among other things, non-derivative and non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis that world. But this appears to be impossible here. If the world is to be original, it cannot at the same time be dependent on consciousness, since on account of its originality it would owe its existence only to its own nature, whereas in accordance with the second requirement it would still need the existence of pure consciousness. Hence both conditions could not be satisfied simultaneously. One could, however, advance a variant of this realism in weakened form, i.e., by replacing the world's originality with its non-derivativeness from pure consciousness. Yet this, too, would not suffice to make this variant of realism possible from an existential point of view, since dependence requires the selfsufficiency of both what is dependent and of that on which what is dependent depends, whereas here consciousness is supposed to be precisely –non-selfsufficient.<sup>643</sup>

5. *Realist dependence creationism* – in which the world is supposed to be existentially autonomous, selfsufficient, but at the same time derived from pure consciousness and dependent on it, while consciousness is supposed to be autonomous, not derived from the world, as well as non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis that world – is unsustainable from an existential standpoint for the same reason as in the above case.

6. *Realist unity creationism* in this group differs from absolute creationism (V,2) because now a *reciprocal* non-selfsufficiency is supposed to obtain between the world and consciousness. But does that enable the non-selfsufficient consciousness to let a world issue out of itself? For in order for the world to be able to find the basis of its existence in consciousness, the latter would have to exist; as non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis the world, it could not do so without the world's subsistence. Their mutual non-selfsufficiency can be seen as basis for *both* – world and consciousness – having to coexist; but that in doing so there should also obtain an asymmetric existential relation, is something that cannot be discerned from an existential vantage point. Some sort of material or formal grounds would ultimately have to be sought for this, so this case cannot be decided without further investigations. The existential bond between the world and consciousness would in this case be much more intimate than in absolute creationism, and would for that very reason set special demands on the form and the matter of both domains of being. It would still have to be shown in this connection that the reciprocal non-selfsufficiency is of such kind that the need of being completed by the opposite factor is fully satisfied, so that a selfsufficient entity

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643 † See Appendix G †

can emerge therefrom without some additional third factor being necessary. This too calls for further investigations. *Notabene*, it can already now be noted that analyses of the form of the world will make this case questionable.<sup>7644</sup>

7. *Idealist dependence creationism* must be rejected here, and that for the same reasons as was the case with realist dependence creationism (V,5).

8. *Idealist unity creationism* [in Group I] demands of the real world that it be existentially heteronomous and derived from consciousness, as well as non-selfsufficient with respect to it; but in this group it is demanded of consciousness that it be autonomous, not derived from the world and, finally, be non-selfsufficient with respect to it. Pure consciousness' need for completion which stems from its non-selfsufficiency would have to be satisfied here by something that is not only itself derived from it, but is also itself heteronomous, and this appears impossible without further presuppositions.<sup>7645</sup>

## § 24. Groups VI – VIII of Prospective Solutions

VI. In addition to requisites 1, 2, 3 and 5 already adduced earlier [in § 18] with reference to pure consciousness, we assume here that it is autonomous, non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis the real world, and derived from it.

As in the solutions of Group V of, it holds also now for all solutions admissible from an existential point of view, that, should the existence of pure consciousness be ascertained, this would entail the existence of the real world.<sup>646</sup>

1. The *absolute realism* of this group is admissible from an existential standpoint. According to this conception, pure consciousness would comprise a non-selfsufficient and derived component of the real world with which it would have to coexist within the unity of a single whole, without that being necessary for the real world, however, since the latter is selfsufficient vis-à-vis consciousness. But that consciousness does nevertheless derive from the real world would either follow from some special moment of its material essence or would have to be a purely contingent fact that at its core is unintelligible. In addition, it would still have to be clarified from which existential stratum of the world consciousness would be derived – whether, say, from the material world, or from the possibly prevailing mental-spiritual principle. In the first case one would be dealing

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644 † See Appendix H †

645 † See Appendix I †

646 † Secondly, it would seem that pure consciousness, in view of its non-selfsufficiency vis-à-vis the real world, would have to exist in the same manner as the world – would therefore have to be real. We need to bear this in mind when considering the several possible solutions. †

with a solution frequently espoused by materialism, without its ever having grasped the existential-ontological situation presented here. The materialist solution is not, however, the sole possible one, nor is it from an existential-ontological point of view any more likely than the conception opposed to it, according to which pure consciousness would be dependent on or derived from the mental-spiritual component of the real world. Only a material or metaphysical consideration is first capable of bringing this to a resolution.

2., 5., 6., 7. and 8. are all different variants of creationism, whether of a realist or idealist bent<sup>647</sup>. None of them is possible here from an existential standpoint, since consciousness' derivativeness from the world precludes the world's derivativeness from consciousness. There are still other objections against these solutions, but it is superfluous at this stage to go into them in greater detail.

3. *Dualist unity realism* is likewise untenable in this group from an existential standpoint, for – just as in some of the cases discussed earlier – the world's originality rules out its non-selfsufficiency relative to pure consciousness, which in this group is moreover supposed to be derived from the world.

4. Finally, *dependence realism* is not possible in Group VI, and that from a purely existential standpoint. The dependence that is supposed to obtain between the two domains of being would postulate their selfsufficiency, contrary to the presupposition of Group VI.

I do not wish to discuss Groups VII and VIII here in their individual variants. In both, pure consciousness is regarded as heteronomous, which does not appear to be valid with regard to the consciousness accessible to us in immanent perception. Nonetheless, I shall here append some remarks pertaining to particular solutions.

First of all, all variants of *realist creationism* are ruled out in these Groups (hence 2., 5. and 6.). It is inconceivable that a heteronomous consciousness would be capable of projecting out of itself an existentially stronger (autonomous) world. Dualist unity realism is ruled out because 'a heteronomous consciousness could not coexist with an autonomous world within the confines of *one whole*'<sup>648</sup>. That would only leave the two variants of realism, absolute and dependence (1. and 4.), and at the other end the two modes of idealist creationism (7. and 8.).<sup>649</sup> Both of the latter fall by the wayside<sup>650</sup> because pure con-

647 ' , and irrespective of whether they are unity or dependence theories ' ʘ

648 ' it is not possible for an original world to be at the same time non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis a pure consciousness that is derived from it and is heteronomous ' ʘ

649 ' In both of the *latter* cases some sort of *third, autonomous* entity would have to be admitted from which both of the existential regions (the world and pure consciousness) would be derived. ' ʘ

650 ' , in *both* Groups VII and VIII, ' ʘ

consciousness is conceived here as derived from the real world, which conflicts with any type of creationism. In Group VIII, dependence realism is irreconcilable with the non-selfsufficiency of consciousness, whereas in both groups the existentially original world cannot be dependent on the derivative consciousness, which is heteronomous besides. Hence, this solution falls by the wayside in *both* groups.

Finally, *absolute realism* is admissible in both groups on purely existential grounds, quite irrespective of what formal and material ontology might have to say on the subject. A form of materialism shows up in the annals of philosophy, especially of the 19th century, in which consciousness is not only regarded as derived from the material world (and not from the real world at large), but also as something whose existence is considered in some indeterminate sense “meaner [*schlechter*]” or “weaker” than the existence of matter. “It is said in this connection<sup>651</sup> that consciousness is a kind of “phosphorescence” of “matter”<sup>652</sup>, an epiphenomenon of the latter, or even a “function” of the highly organized matter. “Yet what this is all supposed to mean is neither stated, nor further investigated. One also does not employ the concept of heteronomy in this context, and this for the sole reason that materialism does not carry out any sort of analysis of mode of being. Despite this, it would appear that the dominant tendency in materialism is to essentially degrade the being of consciousness in comparison with the being of matter.”<sup>653</sup>

## § 25. The “Double-solutions”

We cannot complete this survey of prospective solutions to our Controversy without still mentioning the noteworthy, historically extant “double-solutions.” They have shown up in various guises ever since Kant’s times, and have assumed too important a role in the history of philosophy to be ignored. They also fit throughout within the framework of the possibilities we have distinguished, except that every one of them embodies not just a single possible solution, but two of them. They acquire their character as a result of incorporating epistemo-

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651 “Materialists make use of various picturesque turns of phrase in this connection, such as ”

652 “material processes ”

653 “It is certainly not clearly stated that one is dealing in this case with a heteronomous entity, but this simply happens because modes of being and existential moments have not been analyzed at all. All the same, it seems quite likely that the materialist world-view is headed in the direction of conceiving consciousness – in opposition to the real (material) world – as something heteronomous. ”

logical problems and motives within the total problematic of our Controversy. As example we can take first and foremost Kant's standpoint in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1st ed.)

With Kant, perhaps for the first time in European philosophy, pure consciousness is contrasted to the mental or spiritual [*Seeelichen bzw. Geistigen*], although this distinction is not worked out in any separate investigation. At the same time, the existence of the real world – and indeed of the material as well as the mental world – is admitted by Kant within the totality of “things in themselves.” The world of “appearances” is opposed to this real world, where by “appearance” is understood not a manifold of aspects (“adumbrations” in Husserl's later terminology), but rather the “phenomenally”<sup>654</sup> given thing, or something mental ([in the guise of] the concrete mind-endowed individual [*psychische Individuum*]) given phenomenally to the inner sense. The things in themselves are admittedly declared to be unknowable, but are nevertheless posited as the authentic actuality, as what exists absolutely, and that – as it seems to me – in complete agreement with “absolute realism.”<sup>655</sup> But rather than being rejected, the phenomenal world is also accepted. To the contrary, it comprises *the* world in which we in fact live and act, even though it is only a phenomenal one. The principal task and the achievement of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is to demonstrate the objectivity [*Objektivität*] of this world, and therewith also its existence. But in a way, this phenomenal world is a second-grade reality<sup>656</sup>, which – according to Kant – following the cognizing subject's affectation [*Affektion*]<sup>657</sup> by the “things in themselves,” emerges out of episodes of experience [*Erfahrung*] governed by *a priori* rules<sup>658</sup>, and is thus distinctly derivative. On strictly substantive considerations, though not in the spirit of the Kantian conceptual apparatus, one could say that this world of phenomena is nothing other than the totality of the purely intentional objects of our experience (in Kant's sense) and that it exists heteronomously.<sup>659</sup> Acceptance of the world of phenom-

654 “intuitively” (“phenomenally”) □

655 “In order to demonstrate this effectively, one would have to carry out a detailed analysis and interpretation of Kant's various pronouncements on this issue, which would exceed the scope of our investigation. Hence my statements pertaining to Kantian philosophy are only to be understood as probable conjectures. □

656 “(of a meaner quality, as it were) □

657 [Kant translators render this term by “affection.”]

658 “of our cognition □

659 It is noteworthy that Kant speaks of “existence” with respect to both “appearances” and “things in themselves,” yet it does not occur to him that various concepts of existence or being need to be distinguished. This surely has its basis in the fact that in the final analysis Kant conceives appearances as our presentations [*Vorstellungen*], and therewith makes them into something “mental [*Psychischem*],” without having become aware

ena then happens strictly in the sense of idealist dependence creationism, whereby its existence emerges with necessity out of the essence and process [*Vollzug*] of pure experiential consciousness [*Erfahrungsbewußtsein*].<sup>660</sup> We are therefore dealing in this case with a peculiar combination of two of the solutions we have distinguished. Post-Kantian idealists have abandoned this double-solution, and Kant himself has subverted it in the second edition of the *Critique* through essential modifications of his standpoint, although he did not retract it. Nonetheless, it was advanced more than once in various forms later on.

We can submit Bergson's position as another example of a double-solution. The world given in intuition [*Intuition*] or in "pure perception" (*perception pure*) has the character of an absolute reality [*Realität*] and is seemingly accepted as the sole actuality. Yet we do encounter alongside this world the world of "things" which are given in "concrete" perception that is relative to action [*Handlung*] and then grasped by the intellect – just as from another side [one encounters] the mental world appearing in its "static" aspect, which is to be distinguished from the mental that occurs in its dynamic aspect and consists of pure duration. This second world does not emerge for Bergson out of the immanent, *a priori* lawful regularity of our cognition<sup>661</sup>, but rather simply out of the contingent circumstances of the practically oriented mode of cognition "with vested interests"; and it is much more forcefully disdained [by Bergson] in its existential character than [is the phenomenal world] by Kant, and Bergson in effect writes it off from the standpoint of absolute reality: in the final reckoning, abso-

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thereby of the consequences of this subjectivization of the phenomenal world. If one rejects this subjectivization, and therewith – despite all protestations – this psychologization of the "appearances," it will then have to occur to one to differentiate concepts of existence, and as a consequence of this to assign to appearances a different mode of being than to the world of things in themselves. [This note added in *Streit*.]

660 Still in Kant it is stated that the categorial form of appearances and the forms of intuition of time and space follow from the essence of our cognitive experiences, whereas the "matter" of the appearances, in contrast, stems from the "affectation" of "our senses" "by the things in themselves. But already in Kant's immediate successors, in Fichte\*\* e.g., the *entire* phenomenal world is derived from the pure ego [*Ich*] "and its experiences [*Erlebnisse*], and the thing in itself is abandoned, since Kant is seen as being inconsistent in his assumption of the latter. Precisely therewith, the Kantian double-solution is transformed into a simple solution: the phenomenal world remains over as the only one, whereby, *nota bene*, its "phenomenal character" becomes essentially modified, although this is not acknowledged in any way.

\* " the cognizing subject " ▽

\*\* " or Hegel " ▽

\*\*\* subject

661 " (of our empirical experience, in particular) ▽

lute reality exists only in pure duration and is grasped by intuition.<sup>662</sup> Yet despite everything, the world of things and static “states of consciousness” does after all also exist in some relative sense and – as Bergson concedes – exerts considerable influence on our practical life. Moreover, special subjective faculties and operations are needed in order to escape this action-relative world and to reach via intuitive apprehension the genuine, absolute actuality<sup>663</sup>. In sharp contrast to Kant’s phenomenal world, this second world of Bergson’s can in principle be done away with, whereby the absolute actuality – as opposed to the world of things in themselves – comes to be known at the same time. Insofar, however, as we are unable through some exceptional effort to liberate ourselves from the shackles imposed on us by the world of things<sup>664</sup>, this world exists for us and constrains us to an extent sufficient to subject us to its stringently lawful regularity and prevent us from being free.

If Bergson were consistent, he would have had to arrive at the existential pluralism in the sense here espoused, and make the attempt to determine the mode of being of the world of things that are relative to possible action, and “[the mode of being] of static states [of consciousness]. Strictly speaking, he would even have to distinguish various modes of relative being, depending on the degree of transactional engagement [*Handlungs-bezogenheit*] with the corresponding “things,” and depending on the “*tension de la durée*” in which the respective entities find themselves. At least in one case of these relative modes of being, we would be faced with the one we have here specified as the existential moment of heteronomy, and would have to search for heteronomous entities among those things that are constituted for us in the course of concretizing pure perception. The general type of double-solution is the same for Bergson as for Kant, with the one – but very essential – difference that in Kant the phenomenal world cannot be done away with, since it is the outcome of necessary *apriori* forms, whereas for Bergson it can indeed in principle be disposed of, since the various general forms under which we apprehend the world are bound up not with our cognition but with the demands of our practical transactions, and they simply fall by the wayside when cognition becomes disinterested.”<sup>665</sup>

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662 This is of course an oversimplification of Bergson’s position, which, especially at the time of *Creative Evolution*, is much more complicated, and does indeed distinguish various types of reality, depending on the “*tension de la durée*.” But we are not concerned here with these details. Cf. in this connection my treatise “*Intuition und Intellekt bei H. Bergson*,” *Jahrb.*, Vol. V (1921).

663 “, while liberating our will at the same time ”

664 “ and achieve intuition ”

665 “ of the world of, as it were, immobilized, rigidified mental states. Considering the issue from a strictly substantive perspective (though not in the spirit of Bergson’s conceptual

These two examples may suffice to illustrate the possibility and general type of the – so termed here by me – “double-solutions” to our Controversy. “I shall not deal with them any further.”<sup>666</sup>

## § 26. Summary of Results

It will perhaps prove useful to briefly summarize the results of the deliberations we have carried out<sup>667</sup>. The following solutions of our Controversy are admissible from an existential standpoint, when the concepts of existential moments introduced thus far are taken into account:

*Group I* (pure consciousness existentially autonomous, selfsufficient, and neither derived from nor dependent on the real world):

1. absolute realism – the real world autonomous, original, and selfsufficient and independent vis-à-vis pure consciousness;
2. absolute creationism – the real world autonomous, selfsufficient and independent vis-à-vis pure consciousness, and derived from it;<sup>668</sup>
5. realist dependence creationism – the real world autonomous, selfsufficient vis-à-vis pure consciousness, and derived from and dependent on it;
6. realist unity creationism – the real world autonomous, but at the same time derived from pure consciousness and non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis the latter;
7. idealist dependence creationism – the real world heteronomous, selfsufficient vis-à-vis pure consciousness, and derived from and dependent on the latter;
8. idealist unity creationism – the real world heteronomous, derived from pure consciousness and non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis the latter.

*Group II* (pure consciousness autonomous, selfsufficient, not derived from the real world, but dependent on it):

1. modified absolute realism of type I;
4. modified dependence realism of type I.

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apparatus), we would have to say that the world of things relative with respect to action is heteronomous, exactly like the phenomenal world in Kant, with the sole difference that it does not follow in this case with necessity from the essence of (human) cognition but from the contingent dependence of our cognition on action. <sup>7</sup>

666 <sup>7</sup> It is difficult to predict what possible types of their combination exist, nor does this have any bearing on our subsequent deliberations. <sup>7</sup>

667 <sup>7</sup> , and to add a few general remarks <sup>7</sup>

668 <sup>7</sup> 3. dualist unity realism – (the real world is autonomous, original and non-selfsufficient – this latter vis-à-vis pure consciousness);

4. dependence realism – (the real world is autonomous, *original* and selfsufficient, but at the same time dependent on pure consciousness); <sup>7</sup>



Group III (pure consciousness autonomous, selfsufficient, derived from the real world and independent of it):

1. modified absolute realism of type II.

Group IV (pure consciousness autonomous, selfsufficient, derived from and dependent on the real world):

1. modified absolute realism of type III.

Group V (pure consciousness autonomous, non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis the real world, but not derived from it):

1. modified absolute realism of type IV;<sup>669</sup>
6. modified realist unity creationism of type I<sup>670</sup>.

*Group VI* (pure consciousness autonomous, non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis the real world and derived from it):

1. modified absolute realism of type V.

Group VII (pure consciousness heteronomous, selfsufficient vis-à-vis the real world, dependent on and derived from it):

1. modified absolute realism of type VI.

Group VIII (pure consciousness heteronomous, derived from the real world and dependent on<sup>671</sup> the latter):

1. modified absolute realism of type VII.

Of the 64 cases of prospective solutions, there are therefore only 15 positive solutions that have provisionally shown themselves to be viable from an existential standpoint. In addition, there is *one negative* solution in Group I. We have not considered the negative solutions for the remaining groups. There are also a number of so-called “double-solutions” that have not been given further consideration.

We can also summarize the achieved result another way:

A. *Variants of Realism*<sup>672</sup>:

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669 ¶ 3. modified dualist unity realism of type II ¶

670 ¶ ;moreover, as a dubious case, but existentially not ruled out: 2. modified absolute creationism of type I. ¶

671 ¶ non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis ¶ [Given the classification of modes of being in § 16, the error is on the German side.]

672 “Realism” should of course be understood in the sense established here. It would perhaps be more appropriate to speak\* of theories that deal with the world as *encountered* [*vorgefunden*] by ¶ pure ¶\*\* consciousness, rather than of “realism.” But I prefer to stay with the traditional term.

\* ¶ in case A ¶

\*\* ¶ the subject of ¶

$R_1$  – absolute realism is admissible from an existential-ontological standpoint in all groups of prospective solutions;<sup>673</sup>

$\ulcorner R_2 \urcorner$ <sup>674</sup> – dependence realism is admissible in Group II<sup>675</sup>.

B. *Variants of Creationism:*

1. Realist Creationisms:

$C(r)_1$  – absolute creationism is admissible in Group I;

$C(r)_2$  – realist dependence creationism is admissible in  $\ulcorner$ Group I $\urcorner$ <sup>676</sup>;

$C(r)_3$  – realist unity-creationism is admissible in Groups I and V.

2. Idealist Creationisms:

$C(i)_1$  – idealist dependence creationism is admissible in Group I;

$C(i)_2$  – idealist unity creationism is admissible in Group I.

As the reader can see, I have here partitioned all viable solutions into two major groups: “Realism” and “Creationism” – whereby the latter happens to appear in two different variants: “realist” and “idealist.”

The first major group embraces all solutions according to which the real world is not derived from pure consciousness, whereas the second, in turn – all solutions in which the real world is conceived as derived from consciousness. The realist variant of creationism includes solutions according to which the real world is indeed supposed to be derived from pure consciousness, but is considered to be autonomous regardless. The idealist group of creationisms on the other hand, encompasses solutions according to which the world is not only supposed to be derived from pure consciousness, but is at the same time regarded as heteronomous. It turns out that there are incomparably more variants of “Realism” than of Creationisms belonging to the realist subclass, and only two solutions are “idealist.”<sup>677</sup> Two facts are symptomatic in this connection: firstly, that the creationist solutions impose much more stringent demands on consciousness than the “realist” ones<sup>678</sup>; secondly, however, that the strongest premises pertaining to pure consciousness have the greatest number of admissible solutions.

That we are dealing with so many admissible solutions has its foremost basis in the fact that various aspects of the problem have not yet been taken into

673  $\ulcorner R_2 \urcorner$  – dualist unit realism is possible in Groups I and V  $\urcorner$

674  $\ulcorner R_3 \urcorner$

675  $\ulcorner$  Groups I and II  $\urcorner$

676  $\ulcorner$  Groups I and V  $\urcorner$

677  $\ulcorner$  There are 12 possible variants of realism in all, and 7 possible variants of creationism, of which only 2 are idealist creationisms. However, of these 7 variants, as many as 5 of the solutions fall under Group I, and only 2 under Group V. On the other hand 3 variants of realism are possible in several different Groups, and are therefore admissible by various sorts of mode of being of pure consciousness.  $\urcorner$

678  $\ulcorner$  (i.e., they occur mainly in Group I)  $\urcorner$

consideration, which has left all sorts of things still open. Hence, first of all, not all existential moments have been taken into account, as well as various formal and material issues. It is to be hoped that subsequent analyses will contribute in a big way toward diminishing the number of ontologically viable solutions. But there is no way of foreseeing in advance whether it will be possible to come up with *only one* [ontological] solution, or whether metaphysical reflection will first be able to usher in such an outcome. †If the one and only ontologically justified solution could be found, it would still remain reserved for metaphysics to effect the final factual confirmation of the world's existence. If, however, more than one possibility remained viable as the result of ontological analysis, then metaphysics would have to make a choice – whereby the ultimate fact of the world's existence or non-existence would not be ontologically transparent [*einsehbar*]. But it is still undecided whether we shall arrive at a result where one or more ontological possibilities will have been demonstrated.<sup>679</sup> For it is not ruled out that *none* of the indicated solutions will turn out to be ontologically viable, that therefore all considered options will be exposed as contradictory. This would mean that there is some error at the very inception of the entire problematic and that one is forced to alter the starting point – therefore, e.g., the transcendental point of view – from the ground up. Nothing can be said about this for the moment. But for the moment there is also nothing but to deal with further existential-ontological problems.

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679 † Only in the first case would that which in fact exists be necessary; in the second, on the other hand, a component of something contingent would occur in the totality of being something that would not have its ultimate existential basis in ideas. The rationality – or even the ultimate, ineradicable irrationality – of being is thereby questionable. This issue remains irresolvable as long as one and only one solution is not achievable via ontological reflections. †

# Chapter V

## Time and Mode of Being

### § 27. Introductory Remarks Concerning Concrete Time

We have thus far conducted the existential analyses in such generality that our concepts of being extend beyond the realm of the real world – which is of particular interest to us here. As a consequence, we have not yet touched at all on some existential moments, and it is precisely for this reason that we could not capture the full modes of being by means of the eight concepts adduced above. For one, we have heretofore dealt with the issue as if time had no influence at all on an entity's mode of being, hence, as if “being-in-time” or “temporality [*Zeitlich-Sein*]” on the one hand, and “atemporality [*Zeitlos-Sein*]” on the other, had no bearing on the existence of the entity itself, but only determined the entity along some formal or material lines.<sup>680</sup> The question arises as to whether the opposite is not in fact the case, whether therefore “being-in-time” does not belong to the innermost core of the mode of being.<sup>681</sup> The question at issue here does not belong to a general theory of time or to a general theory of existence, but is rather a problem which in this context – where we examine the ontological problem of the existence of the *real* world – is of vital interest to us. For – true or not! – the real world as we grasp it in pre-philosophical, everyday experience appears to be organized in such a peculiar fashion that anything and everything that occurs within its unity is somehow temporal, or is at least bound up with time. But even if that should turn out to be a transcendental illusion [*Schein*] – say, in Kant's sense – still, the problem of time cannot be left out of account in the treatment of our Controversy. Especially since it can be shown that the very problem has its source in different ex-

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680 As we know, for Kant time is a form – and a form of intuition, at that – but  $\Gamma$  with an obvious transference it is also the form of the phenomenal world, originally of the mental world [*des Psychischen*].  $\neg$ \* This treatment of time as a form of something has for a long time had a damaging effect on the analysis of time. Perhaps to this very day.

\*  $\Gamma$  within the world of “appearances” (*Erscheinungen*)\*\* it shows up as the form of the intuitive manifestation of the thing in itself.  $\neg$

\*\* [“(Erscheinungen)” is Ingarden's insertion in *Spór.*]

681 There is no way of knowing in advance whether there is only *one*, or *several* different, temporally determinate modes of being. Clarity on this issue can only be enhanced by an investigation of the essence of concrete time and its possible variants.

periences [*Erfahrungen*] of time – each of which leads to a different conception of what is itself real, and to the idealism/realism problem.<sup>682</sup> Thus we have to deal with the problem of time at this stage in at least a preliminary fashion, and indeed only under the rubric of the connection between time and the modes of being, and especially of [the mode:] being-real.

The following needs first be noted in order to get us oriented toward the concept of time that we wish to employ here: we speak in the sequel of time in the sense of *concrete* time, in contradistinction to (1) the *abstract* time defined by means of mathematical symbolism, and in particular the time of mathematical physics, and to (2) the *common* (standard) time – hence, to the time that emerges only upon comparing the numerous concrete times of particular entities. At the same time, concrete time is a saturated [*erfüllte*] time in contrast to the *empty* time specified by mathematical definitions. And this concrete time is indeed “filled-out”[“*erfüllt*”] by what transpires, occurs, or persists<sup>683</sup> [*verharrt*] “in it.”<sup>684</sup> Whether it is homogeneous or heterogeneous, lacking in qualities or qualitatively determined – these are all questions that can only be better formulated and solved in a general theory of time. On the other hand, the concrete time with which we are dealing is in some specific sense *absolute*, i.e., it is the time of that entity *itself* which  $\ulcorner$ is in any particular instance under consideration<sup>685</sup> – provided that entity exists at all; it is not a merely subjectively conditioned time-form, just somehow imposed on objects from the outside but intrinsically alien to them – like time in the Kantian sense, for example.<sup>686</sup> In this connection, the frequently discussed opposition between so-called “experienced [*erlebten*]” and “non-experienced” time has no significant impact for us. The concrete time investigated by us is “experienced” if it is in fact the time of some  $\ulcorner$ manifold of experiences<sup>687</sup>; but it is “non-

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682 Cf. the paper I read at the IX International Congress of Philosophy in Paris, in 1937, entitled “Man and Time,” especially in the expanded version that appeared after the War in Cracow, in the journal *Twórczość* [Eng. tr. in R. Ingarden, *Man and Value*, München, Wien: Philosophia Verlag, 1983, pp. 33-52.]

683 [also: ‘abides’]

684 What this “in” signifies in the turn of phrase “being-in-time” is a problem onto itself, which – it seems to me – has not yet been correctly grasped by anyone, not to speak of having been solved.

685  $\ulcorner$  exists in it  $\urcorner$

686 Whether *actual* things and processes exist in such an absolute time is yet another question that we leave unresolved here. I am only speaking here of a determinate idea of time that is “absolute” in the sense specified.\*

\*  $\ulcorner$  Here I am trying to probe deeper with regard to some points, and to grasp more precisely the distinctness of the types of objects being contrasted. I shall return to these issues once more within the framework of formal analyses.  $\urcorner$

687  $\ulcorner$  experiencing subject  $\urcorner$

experienced” if it is the time of an entity deprived of consciousness. It is precisely always the time of the respective temporally determined entity, is as it were immanent to it, belonging to it in virtue of essence, although it is of course the corresponding entity that is situated *in* this time, unfolds or is *in* it – and not conversely. How concrete time in the indicated sense is related to the other “times” we have mentioned here is likewise something we cannot investigate.

All individual entities can be split into two major classes: 1) temporally determined entities; 2) atemporal (in particular, “ideal”). It is not easy to say in a *positive manner* what lies at the basis of this atemporality, and it would take us too far afield from our problem-domain were we to investigate it in detail. Hence, we shall be satisfied at this juncture to clarify the role of time-determination only for the mode of being of temporally determined entities. And we then conceive atemporality in a strictly negative fashion, as the contradictory antithesis [*Gegensatz*] to any sort of time-determination.

But then, among the temporally determined individual entities, there are once again various basic types, leading to a differentiation of the type of time-determination and of both the mode of being and form of these entities. [The basic types] to be distinguished are: 1. objects persisting in time – things, in particular; 2. processes; 3. events.<sup>688</sup>

## § 28. The Mode of Being of Events

An event consists of the occurrence – more precisely: the coming-into-being [*Ins-Sein-Treten*]<sup>689</sup> – of some state of affairs or of some object-involving situation [*gegenständlichen Sachlage*]; for example, the collision of two bodies, the arrival of a train at a station, a lamp’s lighting-up, a person’s death, and the like – these are all events. In common parlance the word ‘event’ is of course employed in a much broader sense. One speaks, for instance, of a battle as of an historic event, of an army’s victory in some field campaign, etc. In all such cases one really has in mind *processes* of relatively brief duration, which display an inner unity (coherence of phases) and are contrasted with longer-lasting processes. However, conceiving of them as “events” happens not with regard to their process-character, but rather with regard to the *occurrence* of these alleged “events” on the one hand, and the state-of-things [*Tatbestand*] realized in them

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688 I have first dealt with the problems associated with this distinction in my paper “*Vom formalen Aufbau des individuellen Gegenstandes* [The Formal Structure of the Individual Object]” (Cf. *Studia Philosophica*, vol. I, Leopoli, 1935 [., pp. 29-106] [Reprint: in R. Ingarden, *Über das Wesen, op. cit.*, pp. 227-301.]).

689 [literally (etymologically): “stepping-into-being [or -existence]”]

on the other, a state-of-things which is particularly important and, as such, is apprehended in and for itself. It is not the *achieving* of victory – by way of numerous, often protracted engagements – that one has in mind in such instances, but rather the final victory itself, the ultimate effect, the end-result of these campaigns. †And for that very reason, the whole – which at bottom consists of several interconnected episodes [*Vorgänge*] – is termed an “event.”†<sup>690</sup> Strictly speaking, however, even brief episodes *last* a certain time, which is exactly why they are excluded from the class of events. For what is characteristic of the latter is the very fact that they have no *duration*. They come into [*treten ein*] [being] – and precisely therewith cease to exist. They are, so to speak, either the end-points or the points-of-inception (sometimes, intersections) of processes.<sup>691</sup> Even the very situation fostered by a process is not an event. For this too can last for a shorter or longer period of time. If, say, a peace agreement between two warring states is concluded which establishes a particular political situation between them, it is not this political situation – that may last for several years after reaching the agreement – which is an event, but rather the *inauguration* [*Eintreten*] of peaceful relations between the two states under the negotiated terms. The coming-into-existence of something itself, the realization of some state-of-things or state of affairs – that, as we said, is an event. And this coming-into-existence can take place only in a *single* instant, which does not of course exclude its being *readied* by means of a rather protracted process; nor does it rule out, on the other hand, that what †has just been inaugurated [*eingetreten ist*]†<sup>692</sup> is a †longer-lasting situation, a state<sup>693</sup>. To the contrary, both go hand in hand with an event. It is quite impossible to have an event that could set in without any antecedent preparation<sup>694</sup>, and which would not lead to consequences.<sup>695</sup> This implies a peculiar non-selfsufficiency of events, to which we shall yet return when we dis-

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690 † But since victory is taken as the culmination of a certain composite process, it is also that entire process leading to the outcome – and hence a certain whole consisting *de facto* of numerous interconnected episodes – which is embraced by the term ‘event.’ †

691 † The process, as it were, leads up to them, and they, in concluding the process, are already something entirely novel in relation to it. †

692 † is realized through the event †

693 † a situation, a longer-lasting state †

694 † through processes †

695 In colloquial speech the word ‘event’ is frequently employed in an entirely distinctive *valuing* sense, as a particularly important event that has significant consequences, or one that is somehow value-laden [*wertvolle*]. Here, on the contrary I am speaking of “event” in † an axiologically wholly neutral †\* sense, without † any regard for its significance-potential [*Bedeutungsmäßigkeit*] †\*\*.

\* † a very broad †

\*\* † regard for any sort of value or importance of events †

cuss their form. For the moment we are only concerned with characterizing an event's mode of being. It consists precisely in that "coming-into-being" and<sup>696</sup> "passing away" – and indeed *both in the same* instant. This does not yet mean – as one could well imagine it might – that the being of an event is "point-like [*punktuell*]".<sup>697</sup> The decision concerning this issue still depends on whether time-instants are mere "point-like" loci in a unidimensional continuum, as required by the mathematical, geometrizing conception, or whether they are, to the contrary, peculiar temporal quanta that are marked-off from each other within the passage of time – without thereby comprising a temporal *point* or a time-*interval*. ⌈Utmost caution is advisable here, and we must still refrain from coming to a decision on this issue.⌋<sup>698</sup> At any rate, the event does not exceed the bounds spanning a *single* concrete Now<sup>699</sup>. One may perhaps prefer to speak of the "ceasing" to exist of an event rather than of its "passing away."

But even there one must proceed with care since there are various conceptions and experiences [*Erfahrungen*] of time, and they lead to different sorts of interpretations of this "cessation" of existence – or of the event, in particular. According to *one* sort of time experience, *every* temporally existing entity is confined to ⌈the (then ordinarily point-wise conceived) Now (present)⌋<sup>700</sup> – beyond which loom two chasms of absolute non-being.<sup>701</sup> In contrast, according to the other experience of time, what is past and what is future [*das Vergangene und Zukünftige*] also exists in some way. Time is no longer a power that annihilates being. The two conceptions of time do not of course play as great a role in the case of the temporally determinate entities which are now under consideration as they do for processes, since events are in their essence such as not to be able to *endure*. However, their cessation in the sense of the *first* experience of time would nonetheless be radically absolute; in the sense of the *second* conception, on the other hand, one would still have to reckon with some sort of existence for events even after they have already taken place. Once they have come

696 ⌈ immediate ⌋

697 Such words as 'Punkt' and 'punktuell,' taken in their strict geometric sense, should not be applied at all to moments in time ("instants"), since time is devoid of any kind of spatiality\*. ⌈ Bergson, as we know, has already protested against the "geometrization" of time. ⌋\*\*

\* ⌈ , and of spatial extension in particular ⌋

\*\* ⌈ Their application to time represents an unjustified *geometrization of time*, which Bergson had once decidedly contested. ⌋

698 ⌈ Indeed, this latter seems rather probable on the basis of the phenomenological analysis of time that is lived through. ⌋

699 [ I capitalize when the word is used as a substantive.]

700 ⌈ one, dimensionlessly conceived "Now" ⌋

701 Cf. Augustine, *Confessions*; also my essay "Man and Time," *op. cit.*



into active [*aktuelle*] being, they do not of course abide in it – they are, as it were, ousted from that being by other events. But once they have taken place, they somehow belong to the world in which they occurred. This world, which is indispensable for their occurrence, contains not only other events – in particular, precisely such as occur “at [*in*] the same time” – to which they are more or less closely interconnected, but also “abiding objects (specifically, things)”<sup>702</sup>, and processes that endure [*dauernde*], though they are likewise transient, and are somehow “bound up” with these events. This world *outlasts* the individual events, but they belong to its history. They occupy a specific locus, so to speak, not only in the respective present, but – following their occurrence – also within the context of everything that “once” was, at the time they had taken place. Except that events – in contrast to enduring entities – no longer exist together with those entities, but, as past, only belong to these entities *via their consequences*, and can perhaps in this fashion be recovered *ex post* from something currently present. *Via* their consequences – and in particular, *via* their effects – they have a stake in determining the state of the world that follows, and attest in this way to their erstwhile, already consummated existence. Since their effective existence is restricted to a *single* instant of time, the essence of concrete time attains only partial expression in their mode of being, and indeed only by means of that peculiar activeness [*Aktualität*]<sup>703</sup> that is distinctive of the present. This activeness “in which everything that is present participates”<sup>704</sup> – not only events – is something that goes beyond an entity’s bare existential autonomy. That is to say, autonomy is certainly an indispensable *condition* for activeness, but it is not sufficient to make something “present”<sup>705</sup>. There are no events on the terrain of individual, *ideal* (supratemporal) objects, and indeed not only because nothing happens and nothing changes there, but also because that peculiar activeness of the present is not possible there – even though we are dealing there with autonomous entities. “Activeness” is also an existential moment and is as such ex-

702 “objects that last for a certain period of time”

703 We make use of this word in order to link up by its means to the traditional expression “*in actu esse*,” but without becoming encumbered with various metaphysical theories that are frequently bound up with this concept. Duns Scotus, among others, employed the concept of “*actualitas*” in a sense that was equivalent to that of actuality, which of course does not come into play here, although this “activeness,” which is essentially bound up with the present, is also somehow connected to being-real. One would, however, have to launch a separate investigation in order to “sort out the concepts that show up in” D. Scotus. This cannot be done here.

\* “establish the relationship of the concept I am here trying to work out to the concept employed by”

704 “permeating everything that is present”

705 “nor does it itself constitute activeness”

tremely difficult to grasp and to describe. Only within the framework of extensive analyses of<sup>706</sup> time – and of what exists in it – could it be intuited and clarified. The primary distinctive characteristic of activeness is that whatever occurs in the present achieves a peculiar *fullness of being* and an *articulation* (or imprint) of its *qualitative makeup*, which – one would opt to say – belong the *genuine* being of something so qualified. What is future [*das Zukünftige*] (as something belonging to the future) does *not* achieve this fullness and articulation, but it is something future only if it, so to speak, gravitates toward – and is, as it were, destined to attain – this fullness and the articulation of its qualitative endowment in some present. What – precisely as something future – is not yet “full” in its being, first gets “saturated” in the present. And what is past has already lost this fullness of being and articulation of qualitative makeup, although it “once” had them, and subsequently bears them within itself like a shadow of its [former] self, or like a reverberation. The activeness that an entity of this sort achieves in the present is like a maximum or peak fullness of being, which it achieves by becoming “actual,” and which it loses once “actualized”: it forfeits [*verwirkt*<sup>707</sup>] its fullness of being. But events have the distinctive feature that they are active through and through; yet for all that, they do exist only within the bounds of a *single* present – and thus imbibe the *uniqueness* [*Einzigkeit*] of this present. Otherwise, however, they display their (past) existence by belonging to a world that outlasts them and contains only their consequences. That is their *second*, derivative, “heteronomous”<sup>708</sup> mode of being.

But does not an entity’s instantaneity, its lack of duration, rule out its temporality?<sup>709</sup> How can something that lacks duration still be considered temporal? Or, conversely: If events are something temporal, must they not then *eo ipso* be regarded as something which does somehow endure – if ever so briefly?

It would appear that the lack of duration of events is unjustifiably being cast in doubt by this question. For instantaneity does not at all rule out the temporal characterization of events. One must simply resist envisaging time and what fills it out as two, so to say, sundered entities that in a certain way exist *outside of each other* – e.g., time as in itself some *empty* tunnel that is to be filled out by some arbitrary object<sup>710</sup>, and the item that fills out time – i.e., events, in particu-

706 “concrete”

707 [D. Gierulanka renders this word in Polish as *zużywa* [= uses up]]

708 “and already inactive”

709 “ [Ftn.:] Dr. I Dąmbska put this question to me after having read these reflections in manuscript, in the winter of 1941/42. Her intention was to cast doubt on the instantaneity of events.”

710 “ [Ftn.:] K. Ajdukiewicz once tried to portray “absolute” time with the aid of this image. Cf. *Księga pamiątkowa dla K. Twardowskiego*, Lwów, 1922.”

lar – as something which is in itself atemporal and indifferent to time, as something itself saturated and insertable at some arbitrary location in that tunnel. The two entities are so disjoint [*entfremdet*] in this conception that they must be brought into a loose and contingent conjunction only as an afterthought. But this portrayal<sup>711</sup> conflicts in the extreme with the essence of concrete time. Time – in accordance with its innermost essence – is not something that can be imposed from the outside onto what exists. It cannot be severed from whatever occurs in it, from whatever transpires or persists in it. If we hold steadfastly to this notion, then it is not difficult to understand how a momentary event – despite its instantaneity – can be something temporally determinate, or [simply] temporal. It is intimately bound up with<sup>712</sup> the instant in which it takes place in a two-fold manner, and bears within itself the stigma of that instant’s singularity and specificity: firstly, by virtue of being integrated into a system of simultaneously occurring events – there are no strictly isolated events in the world, and this belongs to the form of the world as a special sort of domain of beings<sup>713</sup>; secondly, owing to the fact that the respective instant is characterized by an ultimate uniqueness, a specificity that cannot be further clarified or reduced to something else<sup>714</sup>, and it drenches through each and every thing that in any way exists within that instant.<sup>715</sup>

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711   ┌ of concrete time and of what fills it out   ┐

712   ┌ , grafted onto [or fused with],   ┐

713   ┌ [Ftn.:] I shall still discuss this in the sequel. Cf. § 68.   ┐

714   ┌ (it is “one of a kind”)   ┐

715   ┌ [Ftn.:] In contemporary philosophy, A. N. Whitehead makes use of the concept of “event.”\* Unfortunately, his works were inaccessible to me during the War. After the war, I had the opportunity to benefit for a time from his book *Process and Reality* [, New York: The Mcmillan Co., 1967]. As far as I could gather, my concept of “event” – which stems rather from the colloquial sense of the word – does not coincide with Whitehead’s concept of “event”\*, although they are undoubtedly related. Whitehead defines: “I shall use the term ‘event’ in the more general sense of a nexus of actual occasions, inter-related in some determinate fashion in one extensive quantum. An actual occasion is a limiting type of an event with only one member” (*ibid.*, p. 113). “It is sufficient to say that a molecule in the sense of a moving body, with a history of local change, is not an actual occasion; it must therefore be a nexus of actual occasions. In this sense it is an event, but not an actual occasion” (*ibid.*, 114).\*\* Taking into account Whitehead’s definitions of “actual entity” (occasion) and “nexus,” it is difficult to get one’s bearings as to what Whitehead really has in mind when speaking of “event.” It can be surmised, however, that only certain quite complex events, ultimately processes in my sense, would fall under his term “event.”\* At any rate – insofar as I can tell – Whitehead does not touch on the existential distinctness of “event,” “process,” and “thing enduring in time” in my sense. I shall still return to this issue in Vol. II of this book.   ┐

But the essence of concrete time no doubt makes a deeper impress of its stamp in the mode of being of other temporally determinate entities – in that of processes, foremost.

## § 29. The Mode of Being of Processes

The following episodes may serve as examples of processes: a specific, concrete movement of a material mass in space – say, a runner's 100m dash at a track meet; the evolution of an organism; the life of a human being; all activities and transactions of a purely physical (as well as psychophysical) nature; and the like.

In every process (e.g., a well-defined movement) we need to distinguish on the one hand the continually growing totality of phases [*Phasen*], and on the other the object constituted in them in the course of time – as the process' peculiar subject of properties. However, both make up a single something in which they are distinguishable only as two different “aspects.”

The general constitutive property of this process-object [*Vorgangsgegenstandes*] is that the growing totality of phases unfolds in time.<sup>716</sup> This means: 1) From phase to phase – from “inception to conclusion”<sup>717</sup> – the process runs its course in ever new time intervals; 2) the totality of the process-phases grows constantly until its closure, and – in contrast to the event – it cannot in virtue of its essence be contained in a *single* instant, in a *single* “present”<sup>718</sup>. This totality extends beyond every partial time-interval in which the process runs its course. The process runs its course, transpires, in the unfolding of this totality. The totality of phases, made complete by the process' having run its [full] course, consists of these phases as of its potential [*potentiellen*] parts. Moreover, there are simple and composite processes. In a simple process, all the parts of the phase-totality are potential, i.e., without a sharp, mutual demarcation: they continuously pass over into each other. In composite processes, on the other hand, there are always at least two “genuine [*echte*]”<sup>719</sup> parts of the phase-totality that are bounded off from each other. How this partition is marked out is a problem onto itself. A discontinuity in the phase-totality must always be present in such

\* [The word ‘event’ is given in English.]

\*\* [Both quotations are given in English, without translation.]

716 In order to bring out the distinctness of the process from the event, it is necessary to display some features of their form. Further formal differences between them will be examined later. Cf. § 61.

717 “ initial to final phase ”

718 “ ”Now” ”

719 “ ”true” (effective) ”

cases, which is rooted either in a sudden change of properties (in the way of the process' running its course) or in a disruption of the process itself.<sup>720</sup> In this latter case, the time filled out by the process shows a gap in which no phase of the respective phase-totality is present. One may also say that the process then runs its course in several distinctly separate episodes – whereby there must always be some sort of reason  $\lceil$ whose consequence is that these partial processes are after all parts of the same process which is, precisely, “composed [*zusammengesetzt*].”<sup>721,722</sup>

Secondly, every particular process – as the subject of properties constituted with the passage of the phases – has the essential property that the phases that constitute the whole which grows out of the passage of time are *continuously passing away*. *This continuous passing away [Vorübergehen] is a mode of being peculiar to phases*. It is essentially bound up with the temporality of the process, and is singled out by the following features: 1) *one and only one* phase is always<sup>723</sup> active; 2) a *new* phase of the process is always becoming active; 3) the active phase  $\lceil$ *constantly [stetig]* $\rceil$ <sup>724</sup> loses its activeness and, precisely thereby and therein [*dadurch und darin*], the just upcoming phase becomes active; 4) since the currently active phase is in the throes of being enacted, the phases that are earlier in relationship to it no longer exist (more precisely: they are no longer active), but they *have* already existed, and the phases subsequent to the current one do not yet exist, but are *due* to exist (they will be active); 5) once the last phase of the process achieves activeness, the process has<sup>725</sup> *passed [ist vergangen]*. That is not to say, however, that a process must always have a last phase.

The essence of time makes its imprint much more distinctly in the mode of being of the phase-whole of a process – in the phases' passing away, in particular – than in the mode of being of the event, since the phase-whole extends beyond any particular  $\lceil$ now-phase $\rceil$ <sup>726</sup> and spans over a stretch of both the past and

720  $\lceil$  : there are interruptions in it (at least one)  $\rceil$

721  $\lceil$  (possibly a cause: e.g., the action of some force) that justifies regarding these individual episodes as parts of *one* composite process  $\rceil$

722 There are still other ways of “putting” a process “together” out of a number of partial processes which belong together despite their qualitative disparity. It is especially in the domain of organic processes within the living organism that we get many good examples of these sorts of composite processes. But this would already take us too far afield from our theme proper.

723 “Always,” meaning here: during the *entire* course of a process.

724  $\lceil$  *continuously*  $\rceil$

725  $\lceil$  already  $\rceil$

726  $\lceil$  present and the phase contained in it  $\rceil$

the future – provided, of course, that the process is still ongoing. Once it has completely transpired, which is only possible for a finite process, all of its phases belong to the past and none is active.

How we define the mode of being of the phase-whole of a process will depend on which “data [Gegebenheiten] of time experience”<sup>727</sup> will bear out the genuine essence of concrete time. Namely, if through the general theory of time one arrives at the conviction that only what is contained in the present exists in the strict sense – whereas what is both past and future only represents two chasms of absolute “nothingness [Nichts]”<sup>728</sup> – then, when applied to the phase-whole of the process, one would have to say that it “reduces [reduziere]”<sup>729</sup> to the currently active phase, whereby (given the geometrically point-like conception of time) this phase, too, would have to be constricted to a *point-like boundary* between the non-being of the phases that have passed by and the non-being of the phases that are yet to come. There could then obviously be no talk of a growth of the phase-whole during the course of the process, nor of some specific magnitude that it has ultimately attained following expiration of the last phase. One might be tempted to say that the process is then transformed in its phases into a multiplicity of events. But even then, the further attempt to conceive the multiplicity of these events as a manifold, gaplessly distributed in a time interval, hence as an everywhere dense<sup>730</sup> manifold, could hardly be successful, since it presupposes the existence of a “time interval,” whereas, strictly speaking, the conception of time currently under investigation always admits the existence of only *one solitary* time-point – precisely, that of the present [one]. But what would the “transience [Vorbeigehen]” of phases, or of the process, then consist of? There would then of course be no “phases” either, but at best discrete events, which, owing to their peculiar properties, would in their somehow potential multifariousness [Mannigfaltigkeit] be ordered into potential groups. “Transience” would be nothing other than a “coming-into-being” of events in a specific *order* of succession. At bottom, there would then be no continuous process, but precisely only a certain potential manifold<sup>731</sup> of *discrete* events, which, under suitable

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727 “of the experiences of time I have differentiated”

728 “non-being (nothingness\*)”

\* [Ftn.:] This calls to mind Plato’s saying to the effect that individual things are between being and non-being. “

729 “is limited”

730 “or continuous”

731 “Potential” manifold and “potential” groups, because then, out of the entire process, there would always be only *one solitary* event in the activeness of any given present. Only someone who could look back to the non-existent-has-been, and ahead to the non-

ble circumstances, could imitate or feign a process, but would nonetheless differ from it essentially<sup>732</sup>; just as, for example, the lighting-up of a sequence of bulbs appropriately ordered in space and time can give the illusion of a continuous movement of *one* lamp that has been lit for some stretch of time – but can never be identified with it. Besides, as we know, this illusion succeeds only because a *continuous* process plays itself out physiologically and psychologically, and indeed especially psychologically – in virtue of the fact that the “image” of a lamp lit earlier is still retained as an “after-image” for a short time after its lighting, and coalesces with the “image” of the lamp just being lit. Hence, the illusion of a continuous movement succeeds only if what is supposed to be excluded by the conception of time just considered is realized – namely, that what is past as such, though it has ceased to be strictly active, has not on that account been completely annihilated but retains, despite everything, a special, peculiar way of being which does not break off with every new instant of time, but is prolonged into subsequent phases of the same process.

In other words: a rigorous conception of the essence of the process as a constantly growing whole [comprised] of the passing phases of some specific sort of happening (of a movement, say, or of the transformation of one color-hue into another) is only possible with the *second* of the modes of time experience that we distinguished elsewhere, namely, the one according to which the present (or, what is present) is indeed singled out by its activeness vis-à-vis the past (or, what is past), but where neither what is past nor what is future is just some absolute nothing. It is of course extraordinarily difficult – even from our standpoint of existential pluralism! – to capture that ingredient which is specific to the mode of being of what is past. It appears to be essentially different from the mode of being of what is future. Namely, what is past has already passed through the active phase of the present and is that which was once present, whereas what is future has not yet reached the “sphere”<sup>733</sup> of activeness and has precisely for that reason not yet become a fact. What is past is altogether inconceivable as something that would not have been in the mode of activeness in some “past” present. Otherwise, it would not be something past at all. It is precisely the activation [*die Aktualisierung*], a *peculiar sort* of actualization [*Ver-*

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existent-yet-to-be, could constitute for himself a “potential” manifold or group of them, and this, too, as something entertained in thought only, but not existing in the concrete.

732 Let us mention parenthetically that Dedekind’s conception of the continuum as a point-manifold, which reigns in contemporary mathematics, is itself under the influence of the conception of time here under consideration, and is not in a position to convey the genuine essence of continuity.

733 “phase”

wirklichung], that *makes* [macht] it become something past.<sup>734</sup> Transience [Vorübergehen] as a mode of being is not based only on the fact that something else becomes present and active in place of what was just present, but rather and foremost on the *constant* transformation of the being-active of what is present into this puzzling “no-longer-being-in-the-present,” whereby it is nonetheless somehow sustained in being in the past, as something bygone [Vergangenes]. This transformation – comprising the innermost essence of temporality<sup>735</sup> – is of course nothing accidental, but is essentially bound up with a certain deficiency of the entity existing in this fashion: namely, with its inability to persist in activeness<sup>736</sup>, as it were, without “succumbing to passage [Vorübergehen]”<sup>737</sup>. This transformation is readily interpreted in the sense of a transition from autonomy into heteronomy. But this reading of it, so apparently plausible at first glance, is “rather misleading”<sup>738</sup>. It does not, in any event, pinpoint the crux of the matter. To be sure, any entity that is strictly in the present is at the same time autonomous, since its activeness presupposes the latter. But this does not yet imply that the no-longer-present would *ipso facto* have to be heteronomous. This is perhaps more applicable to what is future, and to the future itself – whereby we discover a new type of heteronomous entities: what is future is predetermined and foreshadowed [vorbekannt und vorgedeutet] by what is present (but not only by it, sometimes also indirectly by what is already past).<sup>739</sup>

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734 It occurs to us here for the first time that not *every* activation (or not every being-active) leads to passing away, but only the one *special* mode of activation that is most intimately bound up with being-actual, and which leads to forming the present as well as to transforming the present into the past – and precisely therewith, [leads] to being temporal. This peculiar mode of activeness must be clarified by contrasting it with the time-independent mode of the activeness of being (as a more perfect mode of being, so to speak), if we are to be able to lay bare the essence-nucleus of being-real as a mode of being. Subsequent existential investigations would therefore have to become a factor at this point.

735 “, better: of existence in time”

736 “(to preserve activeness)”

737 “falling into the past”

738 “mistaken”

739 We are speaking here of a strict predetermination *via* facts that belong to *the same* sphere of being, and not of the *intentional* predetermination of something future in an act of expectation. Something of the sort does of course also exist, but not everything future need be expected\*, and thereby be intentionally determined. Nor does this intentional, expectant predetermination present any\*\* new case of heteronomy. Besides, not everything expected is of the future [zukünftig].

\* “(e.g., unrequited hopes)”

\*\* “fundamentally”



Occasionally, something future is predetermined by something else in the future, but this latter must ultimately find its predetermination in something present. At any rate, it has its existential foundation in something earlier.<sup>740</sup> Heteronomy does not yet of course exhaust the mode of being of something future, and is not even characteristic for the latter. But if something future is to be *actualized* in the present, it must lose its heteronomy. What is past on the other hand, which was autonomous in some bygone present, precisely because it was not yet something past, does not and cannot lose its autonomy owing to the transition into the past – only its activeness. Otherwise it would prove itself to be something illusory<sup>741</sup>. In this connection, we can now make an attempt to tease out at least one component of activeness – even if perhaps it does not constitute its full essence. Namely, what is active is distinguished by a *capacity to exert an effect directly* [*direkte Wirkungsfähigkeit*], or, to put it perhaps better: by an efficaciousness [*Wirksamkeit*]. It exists, since it is efficacious, consequent to which it is in a way creative: it can enable some other existent to issue out of itself, although it does not always do so.<sup>742</sup> Only because actuality harbors this efficaciousness within itself can the causal relation attain its status within the framework of ‘‘what is present’’<sup>743</sup>, although – as follows from what we said earlier – not everything that shows up within the framework of the present can be ‘‘cause’’ or ‘‘effect.’’

One might object here that every entity existing in the mode of activeness is certainly characterized by efficaciousness, but that the latter is no existential moment, but already something that belongs to the entity’s *material* essence. Nonetheless, even if we were to concede that the *particular modes* of efficaciousness, which lead to the various ways of exerting an effect, belong to the existent’s material determination, such is not the case with that efficaciousness of the existent which differentiates what is active from what is past or future. We are dealing here with an original existential moment itself, a moment that is

740 † [Ftn.:] N. Hartmann is of a different opinion on this matter in the article ‘‘Zeitlichkeit und Substantialität [Temporality and Substantiality],’’ *Blätter f. deutsche Philosophie*, v. XII, 1938. †

741 † ,that is to say, to have never existed in the mode of reality †

742 This new existent can concomitantly take on various forms. If what is active is an event, then what issues from it is also an event or the beginning of a process. If, on the other hand, what is active is a phase of a process, then the existent issuing from\* it is ordinarily only another phase of the same process. Also, it is an ‘‘other’’ [phase] only insofar as it is *new* in relation to the phase of the same process that brings it forth, but it evolves out of the latter in a continuous fashion, and is precisely thereby a phase of the same process.

\* † (created by) †

743 † the present †

indeed intimately bound up with an entity's particular modes of exerting an effect, but which first enables all those modes to be *actualized* [*verwirklicht*]. It is, as it were, the condition for the possibility of those modes being consummated, but at the same time it reaches beyond the exerting of an effect itself, since it permeates *all* that is active – irrespective of formal or material determination – as something active in the present. Precisely as authentic existential moment, it is no material or property moment of the existent, but belongs rather to the manner in which  $\ulcorner$ what is real $\urcorner$ <sup>744</sup> fulfills its existence by shaping [*Ausgestaltung*] and filling out some present – but in doing so also [immediately] forfeits that existence.

I am not misusing the word in speaking here of a “fulfilling” of  $\ulcorner$ an existent entity in the active present of something real $\urcorner$ <sup>745</sup>. On the contrary.  $\ulcorner$ We often make use of this locution $\urcorner$ <sup>746</sup> when we have in mind that special opposition between the present (what is present) and that which first intimates itself in the future  $\ulcorner$ . The present is the fulfillment, the completion of what is future – which had only intimated itself heretofore. This fulfillment comes about, $\urcorner$ <sup>747</sup> on the one hand, because what in the future (before it realized itself) was only heteronomous attains autonomy in the present  $\ulcorner$ owing to $\urcorner$ <sup>748</sup> the immanence of the qualities determining it $\urcorner$ ; on the other hand, it comes about owing to $\urcorner$ <sup>749</sup> the moment of a peculiar “plenitude of being [*Seinsfülle*],” the moment of being's efficaciousness [*Effektivität des Seins*], and indeed [the efficaciousness] of both what it is and how it is.<sup>750</sup> This plenitude, this efficaciousness of being can be more or less imperfect; it may promptly perish in passing on – as with every temporal being. Nonetheless, for an entity existing temporally it is  $\ulcorner$ the apex of being, a peak that in this form cannot be scaled in any non-present [mode of] being $\urcorner$ <sup>751</sup>.

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744  $\ulcorner$  everything actual  $\urcorner$

745  $\ulcorner$  what is actual in the activeness of the present  $\urcorner$

746  $\ulcorner$  I am connecting to an expression of the living language that we not infrequently employ  $\urcorner$

747  $\ulcorner$  : the future present will be its fulfillment. What in the future only intimated itself is “filled-out”\* in the present  $\urcorner$

\*  $\ulcorner$  [Ftn.:] To this Polish “*dopełniac się* [= *sich erfüllen*] corresponds ever so eminently the Latin “*consummatum est.*”  $\urcorner$

748  $\ulcorner$  , and therewith  $\urcorner$

749  $\ulcorner$  . But this autonomy is only a condition of activeness. Indeed, it seems that in activeness is also contained, in addition to the moment of efficacy (effectiveness),  $\urcorner$

750  $\ulcorner$  This plenitude, this efficaciousness, [the phenomenon] that actuality in the present is a certain sort of “attainment” – “realization,” one is inclined to say – is assuredly what philosophers once had in mind when they made use of the phrase *in actu esse.*  $\urcorner$

751  $\ulcorner$  a culmination, a peak unattainable in any other form  $\urcorner$

The direct efficaciousness which is the trait of all that is active has its basis in this plenitude.<sup>752</sup>

┐I would like to forestall a possible objection by looking more closely into this efficaciousness.<sup>753</sup> To wit, it could be alleged against me that not only what is active in the present is characterized by an ability to exert an effect, for what is past can also “make an impact.” This happens, in particular, in the context of human life – and in organic life, more generally: think of how many decisions (some quite important) we make in our lives under the impress of the past; we are indeed always bound by it, often by episodes that transpired in a relatively quite distant past. Had we not at one time experienced or done this or that, e.g., we would not now be ashamed to behave one way as opposed to some other. We especially feel this personal bondage to the past during historically dynamic and restless times. And when we sever our ties to it, we sometimes experience this as an emancipation, as a liberating deed (that is how Bergson looked at it!), but at other times also as a betrayal: we feel, namely, that we did not manage to live up to the demands imposed on us by the past. It is precisely in these demands, or in that bondage, that the efficaciousness of the past is registered. Hence, either what is past is also characterized by an activeness<sup>754</sup>, or efficaciousness that exceeds the scope of activeness, and would thus not<sup>755</sup> be something characteristic of the latter.<sup>756</sup>

Thus, a certain dose of caution is advisable here. It is difficult to concede that what is past could itself “exert an effect” [“*wirken*”] in the strict sense. Two different issues must be sorted out in this context. Either it is not what is past as such that exerts an effect on us and our current decisions, or it does so – but not directly. What is past itself must be kept apart from the past object given in recollection, which attains as a result of the recollection to a particular sort of appearance. In this last case, recollection mediates, as it were, between what is it-

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752 Hence, *carpe diem* – in the positive sense of the dictum. Be glad with just what you have, with what in fact comes to fruition, ┐ because ┘\* it will never be again, it will never return. This inability-ever-to-return is also something that is particularly characteristic for the temporality of every event and of every process. Even if an exactly alike event, exactly alike process, were to occur, it would still be an entirely new event, new process, and not identically the same.

\* ┐ and pay heed that ┘

753 ┐ I said: what is active is characterized by a *direct* efficaciousness. By means of this qualification I wished to forestall a possible objection. ┘

754 ┐ an activeness, that is to say, which, according to the preceding analysis, is a certain feature of actuality, and would not along with the latter be anything characteristic of the present ┘

755 [‘not’ is missing in *Spór.*]

756 ┐ In both cases we arrive at a contradiction with already established theses. ┘

self past and the new present in which the recollection is exercised<sup>757</sup>. The latter reactivates to some extent what is itself past and the recollection's *own* activeness confers on it<sup>758</sup>, even if not authentic activeness – at least the semblance of such. What is past, once something present had become “something past,” is precisely therewith excluded in a radical fashion from any and every new present, it *can* no longer be [in the] present, and that means, among other things, that it cannot *have a presence* [*anwesend sein*] in any new present. What is past is for all time condemned to a radical absence. And the recollection is merely capable of “making it appear as if it were present” [*vermag es zu “vergegenwärtigen”*]<sup>759</sup>. What is past does not indeed achieve through recollection that self-giveness characteristic of perception, but then it is also something more than appearance<sup>760</sup> in a mere image [*Vorstellung*], no matter how vivid and sharp. Memory makes the attempt, so to speak, to retrieve what is past out of the past, draw it *closer* to the new present, and even though it can never succeed in doing so *realiter* because that contradicts the essence of something's being past – and this shows that time is not merely a form foisted onto an existent, as Kant would have it, but belongs to the mode of being of what is real itself – then at least it brings about a semblance of infusing life into what is past, of resuscitating it. What is remembered as such, as concrete correlate of a present recollection is capable of *indirectly* transporting what is past into a new efficaciousness [*Wirksamkeit*]. But it is not what is past itself, but merely its facsimile [*Vergegenwärtigung*] in memory, the remembered as such. It is the latter that achieves its efficaciousness, and therewith also a certain kind of effect on what is played out in the present. But even this something remembered does not do so directly, but rather only *through* the medium of recollection.

But what is past in the strict sense can of course make an impact [*einwirken*] on the content of a new present in yet another indirect way – without achieving, as something remembered, the *quasi*-activeness of what is recollected – and indeed through mediation by a gapless manifold of present-phases that separate it from the new present, and at the same time bind it to the latter: because what is past *was* once active as something present, it could let a new entity issue out of itself, which in turn bore out of itself a new existent, etc. In this way, what is past comprises the origin of a fact that prevails in a present that is far removed and radically *severed* from it. In this case too, a *direct* efficaciousness of what is

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757 in which also belongs the recollection itself (the recollecting) as something active in

758 in what we recall in

759 in , although it can never make it efficaciously present in

760 in (intuitive manifestation) in

itself past is out of the question, but an indirect one accrues to it only because it was once present, and precisely therewith – something active.

We have gained some insights in several directions as a result of this analysis. On the one hand, that peculiar *efficaciousness* of the active present [*Aktivität der aktuellen Gegenwart*] has been disclosed to us which is<sup>761</sup> lost to (fades out of) what is past; on the other hand, the *radical transcendence* (absence) of what is past vis-à-vis any and every new present has been underscored, a transcendence that cannot be overcome even with the most faithful and true-to-life [*lebhafteste*] recollection. What was once present has *passed away irrevocably* and sinks progressively deeper into the past, i.e., it is increasingly separated from any given new present by successively newer presents that are transformed into pasts. The efficaciousness that was originally specific to it – when it was not yet something past, but still something present – it has lost forever, or yielded it to other presents. *It exists in its special, so to speak, essentially faded mode, only because some actual entity stemming from it is indeed still present, in actu est.* A remarkable reversal of the original existential relation occurs here between what is past and what indeed is present. When what is now past was once still active, it formed the existential source for what was then yet to come, and subsequently be something active and present. But now, when this latter has become active, what is active, despite its having been derived from what is past, has now become an existential support for the latter. It sustains what is past in a non-active, though autonomous, being – and this, as the condition of its own existence. Though radically transcendent vis-à-vis the active, efficacious, present being, what is past does nonetheless remain within the framework of what exists as that which once conditioned and produced that present being, and it exists within that framework as a retroactively [*rückwärtig*] derived being, so to speak, and a being indeed that is retroactively derived secondarily<sup>762</sup> from a being that, in relation to it, is active at a later time. And just as this existential derivation becomes increasingly mediated with the passage of time<sup>763</sup>, so too the capacity to sustain in being what is past increasingly weakens, so to speak. It gradually sinks into the bottomless depths of the *deceased* past, and all the more so the sparser become its “traces” in the present.

The relation between what is past and what is present does not appear equally stringent in all cases. Especially amongst events, the relation appears to be much looser than between individual phases of one and the same process. And to be sure, since events exist only within the confines of a *single* present, it is

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761 「 irretrievably 」

762 「 , moving “backward,” 」

763 「 in relation to what exists in the current present 」

here that identity between what is past and what is present is abrogated. When events occur in what has passed and in what is present, we are dealing with two events, which – even if the first were a condition, say, the mediate cause, of the second – do not constitute any sort of original unity characteristic of a whole. For the phases of a simple process, there are indeed *two* different phases in the case of a past phase and a current phase, but the transition from the one to the other is continuous. In a simple process effectively played out, the phases are at bottom only *potential* phases<sup>764</sup> and belong to a *single* whole. The relation is even tighter in the case of objects persisting in time – in the case of things, in particular. The identity [of the object] over some interval of time is strictly preserved, and consists – as we shall later show<sup>765</sup> – of something different than for processes. On the other hand, there are cases in which what is past stands in no existential connection whatsoever with what is present, namely, when what is present is not derived from the respective past object, and specifically, when it is causally independent of it. Certain lines of evolution are truncated, die out, so to speak: a present later in time vis-à-vis them cannot (in at least one of its constituent parts) be traced back to them.

These are all cases that would need to be discussed in greater detail once we have analyzed the variety of possible formal relations within the bounds of a whole manifold of entities. I only bring them up in this context in order to highlight a remarkable existential distinction between the various entities belonging to the past. Of course, if what is past as such is always an existent that is retroactively derived from what is present, and this derivation varies in cohesion and rigor, then within the realm of what is past as such there are remarkable levels of existentiality [*Existentialität*] or, if we may put it so, levels of the intensity of existence [*Seinsintensität*] – that is, starting from the maximum possible [intensity] of the just elapsed past, which is still bound by a thousand threads with the present moment, all the way to the increasingly weaker, vanishingly small (or perhaps altogether nil) intensity of existence<sup>766</sup> of the past which winds up in

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764 † (parts) †

765 Cf. † below, § 30 and Ch. XIV †\*.

\* † in this connection the subsequent expositions pertaining to objects enduring in time (§ 30) and to the identity of objects (Ch. XIV). It must be borne in mind that statements made here concerning what is past involve either past events, or elapsed phases of processes or, finally, bygone states of objects enduring in time, and do not involve the objects themselves that endure in time and those of their aspects that have lasted through the passage of time up to the current moment. †

766 I employ here the locution “intensity of existence” only for lack of a better one. At any rate, what is involved here is not the various “degrees of being” that were once spoken of in the history of philosophy, and that were integrated into the existent’s stock of

total oblivion [*Absterben*], a past which from some specific present onward leaves behind no traces at all, and can therefore no longer be discovered in the content of this and all subsequent presents.<sup>767</sup> These differences in the intensity of existence are not so easy to grasp in the peculiarity of their essence. And for this reason the concept of the intensity of existence of what is past will perhaps meet with the reader's resistance, especially since this "intensity" is something that cannot be found within the confines of the present, nor does it have any analogue in the latter. But it would seem that we do encounter an analogue to the existential intensity of what is past in the realms of what is possible and what is future, although there we are no longer in the domain of autonomous, but rather in that of heteronomous being. It is for precisely this reason that it is an analogue and not something completely alike [*Gleiches*]. But perhaps it is easier to grasp the relevant distinctions in the domain of the possible since we are accustomed to speaking of "greater" and "lesser," "weaker" possibilities, of weighting them off against each other, and the like.

Let us, however, return for a moment to the definition of the mode of being of the phase-whole of a process that is underway [*im Vollzug begriffen ist*]. From the first instant of a process that is underway, [only] *one* phase of the phase-whole is always to be found in the activeness of a specific present moment, but rather than stay in it, it perishes [*vergeht*] – indeed, along with this present moment itself. But this means, among other things, that its activeness is transformed into some specific degree of existential intensity of something past. From another perspective, a new phase springs forth from the one that is just passing on and unfolds in a new present. The perpetually-passing-away of the phase that has just been active and simultaneous perpetually-newly-springing-forth of the phase just being activated – that is the feature peculiar to the mode of being of the phase-whole of an ongoing process. The phase-whole does not only constantly grow, but grows at the same time in such a way that its active

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properties. Spinoza, e.g., writes in his *Ethics* (Part I, Proposition IX): "The more actuality or being (*esse*) a thing possesses within itself, the more attributes accrue to it." [I translate Spinoza from Ingarden's German rendition. Shirley's version (*op. cit.*, p. 36) reads: "The more reality or being a thing has, the more attributes it has."]

767 \*There is the problem of whether such a total "oblivion" of what is past is possible, that is, whether the erstwhile present and the activeness it then had are not after all assured some sort of minimum of existential intensity – even in that limiting case in which no consequences, and therewith also no traces, of what is past any longer truly prevail in the present. Further investigations would have to be undertaken at this point that could be foundational for clarifying the essence of history and of the science of history. But this would lead us too far astray from our principal theme.

\* ¶ I do not wish to make a definitive commitment in this matter. ¶

phase is always to be found in the lead, that it therefore prolongs itself by an ever new active phase, provided the process is still underway at all. Once the process proceeds to completion, the phase-whole has attained its full-fledged dimension [*voll ausgewachsene Größe*], which can no longer be altered. The lead phase, the active one, which “shines” as it were in virtue of its activeness, and which until then had been constantly shifting onward, loses its activeness [once the process is completed] and ceases to differentiate itself by means of activeness from the phases that had flowed by. *All* phases had then passed away, none is active anymore, and all belong to the past. The phase-whole now shifts as a whole farther and farther into the past<sup>768</sup>, whereby nothing on or within it still changes or can change, either materially or formally, provided the temporal perspective<sup>769</sup> does not elicit some new *relative* features from it. What does, on the other hand, change existentially is the degree of its existential potency [*Seinspotentialität*], which depends on what happens in the presents that follow it.

But as we have said, the phase-whole is not all that can be differentiated in a process. That is only the *one* aspect of it; the other is comprised of the peculiar temporal *object* which is first constituted in the course of the process, the subject of its properties. The mode of being of this object differs in its very essence from that of the phase-whole, although it is most intimately connected with the latter. That is to say, its existence inheres in its *becoming itself* – founded in the continual passage of all of its phases – as a fully determinate subject of properties, whereby it first attains its full determination in the last instant of the process’ consummation. Indeed, the<sup>770</sup> peculiar property of the process as a temporal object is that it is constituted as a<sup>771</sup> subject of properties from the very first instant of the phases’ evolution and onward from there, but then only in the

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768 Someone might prefer to say that it is *we* who increasingly distance ourselves with our\* new present from the already consummated process\*\*. We do after all frequently say that time “flies” or “goes by” fast. To be sure, one may well experience it that way. But the primal [*ursprüngliche*] phenomenon is in accord with what was said in the text: what is past, along with those time-phases in which it transpired, “sinks” increasingly deeper into the past, distances itself more and more from our present, which – though always new – has nonetheless the semblance of always remaining the same, immobile. It would appear, however, that this semblance has deeper ontological roots, which to go into is impossible at this juncture.

\* ⌈ ever ⌋

\*\* ⌈ or past events ⌋

769 On temporal perspective, cf. ⌈ *LWA*, § 36 <sup>76\*</sup>.

\* ⌈ my book *Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, *op. cit.* Ch. II, as well as the already mentioned essay “Man and Time” ⌋

770 ⌈ most ⌋

771 ⌈ separate ⌋



course of time; that is, with the passage of the phase-wholes, does it come to be fitted out with successively new properties. And this not only *during* the execution of the individual phases, but also *on their basis*<sup>772</sup>. The properties acquired by a process *correspond* to the unfolding phases of the phase-whole, and to how they run their course, until it achieves the *completion* of its constitution in the *last* phase. As a bare *subject* of properties, so to speak, it does indeed *exist* from the very start of the progression of phases, along with the properties characteristic of it as process *in general*. But it *becomes* in the sense that through the progression of phases it is formed as precisely this *individual* process, endowed with its own specific properties (e.g., as this 100m dash, which unfolds in such and such a way). Every phase contributes  $\ulcorner$  in a corresponding manner<sup>773</sup> to endowing it with properties. Suppose a 100m dash – as a particular sporting contest – is run in such a way that a given runner gets off to a relatively fast start, but then gets winded and is overtaken by others, which induces in him an adrenalin rush, so that against all expectations he surges to victory over his competitors in the last 20m – then, on the basis of such a progression of its phases, this race acquires a sequence of correlative, fully determinate, but not always so easy to describe properties, some of which are constituted right at the beginning of the race, others in conjunction with these initial phases, and some only at the instant of the entire process' completion. One would truly have to study closely some individual race through its entire course (e.g., on the basis of a video) in order to be able to describe precisely its several properties and the development of their constitution. Luckily, we are not concerned here with the individual case, but rather with the general structure of a process – whose mode of being we are seeking to grasp. And so it holds in general that nothing of what transpires within the bounds of a process' phase-whole can remain without unequivocal consequence for the constitution of the object called “process.” And in particular, not even the circumstance that *during* the course of the process the phase-whole is continually in the throes of growth and incomplete. This indeed amounts to the *incompleteness* [*Unvollendetsein*]<sup>774</sup> that is  $\ulcorner$ peculiar to<sup>775</sup> the

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772  $\ulcorner$ , precisely because they played out as they did  $\urcorner$

773  $\ulcorner$  something of its own  $\urcorner$

774 But this “being-incomplete” should not be identified with the “spots of indeterminacy” that occur in the content of a purely intentional object.  $\ulcorner$  Cf. LKW, § 38, as well as Ch. IX of this work.  $\urcorner$ \*

\*  $\ulcorner$  Cf. § 47. A process, as one of the autonomous entities, does not have this sort of spots of indeterminacy (gaps).  $\urcorner$

775  $\ulcorner$  characteristic and essential of  $\urcorner$

process as an object while the process is evolving.<sup>776</sup> The process (as object) first exists as endowed with *all* of its properties the instant all of its phases, excepting the last one, have already transpired, and the last phase is just then being consummated. But at the very same instant in which it achieves its full complement of properties, and therewith also completes its constitution, it ceases to be active. As finished, fully constituted object, it cannot continue to evolve in time [*dauern*]. It therefore appears with the full endowment of its properties only in the past, as already consummated, and passed on [*vergangen*].<sup>777</sup> Also, only as past can it come to be known in its full constitution as a particular individual: during the development of its phases one can only follow and experience these phases in a peculiar streaming-along [*Mitschwimmen*], but one cannot cognize the properties of a process by way of an apprehending that determines it as subject of properties. *Ex post*, on the other hand, one can grasp not only the process itself but also the manner of its being constituted, when on the basis of a suitable recollection one lets the phase-whole run its course again – as a sort of reenactment, as it were. We also see there, among other things, that the process as temporal object is somehow constituted in a stratified fashion, depending on how the individual phases transpire. In this connection, the particular strata of constitution are branded by the time imprint [*Zeitquale*] of the present in which the phases determining the respective constitution stratum played out. Hence, on the one hand, the respective time interval is entwined in the constitution of the corresponding temporal object, on the other hand every temporal object (process) is for this reason disclosed as *absolutely singular* [*schlechthin einmaliger*]. It cannot repeat itself as its [own] self. Only some other [process], like it in kind, can

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776 In itself this is a formal moment of the process, rather than an existential one. It would appear to have hovered before the minds of the most eminent investigators of temporal happening from Heraclitus to Bergson, but it was never clarified in itself, nor were its ontic foundations grasped. On the contrary, far-reaching but predominantly  $\lceil$  false  $\rceil^*$  consequences have been drawn from its presence in every sort of temporal object – among others, the challenge to the ontologically interpreted principle of contradiction<sup>\*\*</sup>. Irrespective of how that may turn out, great caution is nonetheless called for in this setting. To be sure, it would appear that Bergson only grasps the *growing phase-whole* of the process, whereas the *object* that is constituted in it as *subject of its properties* is held by Bergson to be an intellectual deformation of the actuality that becomes [*werdende*] in pure duration. Without having grasped its becoming [*Werden*] in the course of time and its augmentation with new properties, Bergson regards this object as a stabilization relative to action of what incessantly becomes and flows.

\*  $\lceil$  dubious  $\rceil$

\*\*  $\lceil$  (Hegel)  $\rceil$

777  $\lceil$  [Ftn.:] Various epistemological difficulties pertaining to the manner of cognizing processes follow from this. This is not, however, the place for reflecting on them.  $\rceil$

afterwards pass for its “repetition,” whereby individual deviations are always unavoidable. The evolving constitution of the process on the basis of the transpiring phases also shows how the past still “is” somehow in the present, in that, following the consummation of the several phases of the process, the properties of the process (grasped as an object) in the midst of its becoming – which are founded [*fundierten*] in those phases – attain constitution in the present, and precisely for that reason still *are* in this present.

But the essence of the mode of being of the process, which is perhaps not to be found in any other sort of object, hinges on the intimate connection of the two modes of being distinguished here only in the abstract: on the one hand, of the mode of being of the phase-whole, on the other – the mode of being of the ‘temporal object constituted in the passage and growth of that phase-whole’<sup>778</sup>. The core and uniqueness of the mode of being of the process inheres in the fact that the passage of phases and their receding is foundational for the becoming of the ‘evolving [*vorgänglichen*] temporal object’<sup>779</sup>.

This uniqueness of the mode of being [of the process] also demonstrates best that it is not a difference in gradation [*gradueller Unterschied*] that obtains between the process and the event, but rather a difference in essence. The notion that events are only processes of short duration – or that a process is nothing but a manifold of sequential events – is therefore mistaken. A tight existential connection certainly exists between the two entities: events are indispensable in order to arrive at processes at all, whereas processes always lead to some sort of events. But all of this does not suffice to reduce one of these sorts of objects to the other, as has frequently been attempted in contemporary philosophy. Both in their formal structure and in their mode of being they represent ultimate, original types of temporally determined being, to which is also joined the type: object persisting in time. Every process not only develops through its phases in time, but it also needs time in order to be constituted. This does not apply to the event. It enters into being in a single stroke as already completed entity, and vanishes. It does not take place in the [same] sense that the process does – through the transience of its phases. Even a process of the briefest duration is, so to speak, a being in passing [*Passieren*], in the midst of self-transformation, in transition. In contrast, the event does not contain within itself any moment of transformation, of transitioning from something to something else. From another perspective, every simple process is in its phases a *continuous* whole, and not, so to speak, a pulverized manifold-whole composed of separate, immobile elements (events) which, as tightly packed as they are, are bounded off from each other – for that,

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778 ‘process-object’

779 ‘process-object’

after all, is what it would have to be if it were nothing other than a multiplicity of<sup>780</sup> events. It is clear that there would be no genuine *becoming* in such a case, no *transformation* in the rigorous sense. And it would also be unintelligible how we could arrive at events that were not bound up with any processes at all. The phases 'about which we have spoken thus far'<sup>781</sup> are – as has been repeatedly ascertained – only *potential*, i.e., not bounded off from each other in fact, and to be distinguished from each other *only in the abstract*: there are no breaks in the phase-whole of a simple process; the one phase *prolongs* itself, stretches out [*dehnt sich aus*] into the other, passes into it without<sup>782</sup> interruption. Strictly speaking, one should therefore not even talk of a multiplicity of phases, since multiplicity presupposes the mutual discreteness [*Abgegrenztheit*] of its elements. If a process were to be identified with a multiplicity of events, the latter would have to be regarded as its phases. But that is untenable, because, as it happens, events are bounded off from each other whereas phases are not, because a phase, no matter how brief, does precisely *last*, has a temporally extended evolution [*Verlauf*] – which is ruled out for an event in the pregnant sense. These formal differences between a multiplicity of events and a (simple) process are connected with the already described existential difference between them.

### § 30. The Mode of Being of Objects Persisting in Time<sup>783</sup>

Some arbitrary thing, say, a stone, a house, a mountain, can be taken as example of this sort of objects. Living beings, e.g., a certain tree, an animal (say, my dog Jock), as well as, finally, every specific human being, e.g., 'J. W. von Goethe'<sup>784</sup> or Napoleon I – all of these also belong among the latter. To be sure – as we shall soon show – living beings (especially the multicellular) pose certain difficulties if they are to be sharply contrasted with other temporally determined objects. But it turns out on closer inspection that it is precisely they that enable us to discern the radical distinctiveness of persistent objects from events and processes.

Persistent objects differ from events by *outlasting* the individual instants in which events are confined, as it were, hence, by existing longer than events. But

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780 ' sequential ' "

781 ' of a (simple) process ' "

782 ' any leap or ' "

783 [*in der Zeit verharrende Gegenstände*: this expression, as well as its version in the singular, is frequently repeated in this section. I shall henceforth abbreviate it by 'persistent object(s).']

784 ' Adam Mickiewicz ' "

this also applies to processes, and thus appears not to be anything characteristic of persisting objects. Meanwhile, it is precisely in *how* a persistent object outlasts the individual instants that its deep disparity from processes is exhibited. For a process does it in such a way (as follows from the above deliberations) that its currently active phase passes over into a *wholly new* one – though essentially inseparable from it; the former prolongs itself continuously into the latter. In contrast, a persistent object *remains as identically the same* in the incessantly new instants of time for as long as it exists. If we find something new in it in the newly incipient instants of time, it is either processes that are existentially interconnected with it, which sometimes – as we say – play out in its innards [*Innen*], or certain events that take place in the object. This is to say that both can elicit new properties in it, or entire ensembles of them. But this persistent object itself, which serves as existential basis for the various sorts of entities that frequently coexist with it, remains, so to speak, as the [same] “old” [thing] that already existed earlier, in the previous, elapsed instants.

The objection may be leveled against this distinction that I take into consideration only *one* mode of being of processes – namely, that of their phase-wholes – and arrive in this way at affirming an existential difference between them and persistent objects. Were I not to do so, and were I to compare the latter with the ‘process-object’<sup>785</sup> constituted in ‘the passage’<sup>786</sup> of phases, then perhaps the difference<sup>787</sup> between the two sorts of entities would vanish. Yet that is not how it is. Also ‘process-objects’<sup>788</sup> differ existentially in their essence from persistent objects. The latter *do not become* in time, like the process-objects, but *are* from the very first moment of their existence – and as *fully* constituted entities, at that. Also in every instant of their subsequent existence they exist at any time in their *total* existential scope, hence in *all* the properties that accrue to them at any particular instant, as well as in their *fully* determined individual nature as already constituted, and not as being first constituted, as becoming in the course of time. Montblanc *is* in every phase of its ‘duration’<sup>789</sup> precisely Montblanc, with *all* of the properties that accrue to it in the respective time interval. This is not contravened by its possibly having *different* ensembles of properties in different phases of its existence, therefore by its *changing* in some respect in the course of that existence. This implies only that it either participates in certain processes or that it contains within its own existential scope certain processes, and that events also take place in it. Whereas in the case of the

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785 ‘process as a particular subject of properties’

786 ‘a manifold’

787 ‘in mode of being’

788 ‘processes, taken as objects of a particular kind,’

789 ‘existence’

process the phases that are playing out comprise the stratum (aspect) constituting that process, and the process-object that is just then being constituted is itself founded in them, nothing of the kind takes place in the case of persistent objects. That peculiar two-sidedness of structure and of mode of being that we see in the process is altogether lacking in the case of persistent objects; at the same time, the persistent object does not require for its founding any kind of phase-whole that is characteristic for the process. On the contrary, it is the persistent object that constitutes the foundation for a process, provided the latter has an existential connection to the former. When such is the case, a part of the conditions for the process-phases to play out then hinges on that object, both formally and materially. Formally – as we shall yet show – since the phase-whole requires a persistent object in order to be able to develop at all; materially – because the type of the process, as well as various features of its evolution, depend on that object's properties<sup>790</sup>. In other words: *Without persistent objects there would be, in accordance with their essence, no processes whatever*, whereas the processes, when they transpire at all, modify the persistent objects only in their qualitative endowment; of course, sometimes these processes also destroy them or even contribute to bringing forth new persistent objects, but are themselves no necessary conditions for the objects persisting in the world.

It is an old problem, reaching all the way back to the beginnings of Greek philosophy, but still engaging today, namely: what is the penultimate existentially self-sufficient or independent factor – persistent objects (things, in particular) or processes? And numerous attempts have been made to conceive of processes as what is original and foundational for every thing-like being. Such was already the case with Heraclitus; in our days it happens in Bergson, for example; likewise in modern physics – when "the totality of what is taken by physical science to exist is"<sup>791</sup> reduced to wave-processes.<sup>792</sup> But at the same time there is no dearth of attempts to maintain that persistent objects ("substances" – as they were often enough called) are what is fundamental in being: such is the case not only for the ancient atomists, but also for the modern; just as much in philosophy as in physics, all the way to the corpuscular theory of light. To be sure, this is accompanied by a recurring inclination *to reduce the one type of object to the other*, hence somehow existentially degrade the one in favor of the other and in some cases deny its existence altogether. This last appears to be precipitous. But

790 " (though ordinarily not on the object alone!) "

791 " toward the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the whole being of "matter" was ultimately "

792 It is quite noteworthy that – as we know – there is an effort in contemporary physics to sustain the standpoint that processes and persistent objects (waves and corpuscles – L.de Broglie) are necessarily *complementary* and always occur together. But the definitive interpretation of these tendencies still requires separate investigations.

there is no doubt at any rate that what is involved is a problem 'of *foundations*'<sup>793</sup>, and in conjunction with that problem the question pertaining to the non-selfsufficiency or dependence of the one type of object relative to the other. But ordinarily one does not become clearly aware in this context that *different sorts* of problems are involved, which, despite their kinship, must nonetheless be set apart. We ignore here for the time being that ontological problems must be clearly distinguished from metaphysical ones. It is more important to stress now that both *existential* as well as *formal* distinctions must be taken into account in view of the distinctiveness of processes from persistent objects. At the moment only the existential distinctions are at issue. And when we have just affirmed a certain priority of persistent objects vis-à-vis processes, which is to be understood in the *existential*-ontological sense. Processes are characterized as such by an existential dependence, or perhaps even non-selfsufficiency<sup>794</sup>, which is essential for them and is relative to correlative persistent objects. They must play out within the compass of some persistent object, or be borne [*getragen*] by some such object. As noted, this follows from their formal structure, but it is a moment of their very mode of being. It is precisely because processes, as objects of a special type, are founded in the transpiring phases – which are a pure happening, and as such pass by and incessantly pass over into new phases – that they must have a bearer which remains *identical* despite the passage of time, a bearer which therefore overcomes the distinctiveness of incessantly new time-instants and precisely for this reason “persists.” It is testimony to a keen scientific instinct when in deliberations having nothing to do with existential ontology it is repeatedly stressed that every motion calls for *something* that is moving, every change – for *something* that undergoes change. And even if “everything” should be altered in the course of a change, the *something* that undergoes the change, *that within the compass of which* the change transpires, still continues to subsist [*bleibt bestehen*]. Otherwise, we would not be dealing with any kind of change, but rather only with a succession of free-floating [*losgelöster*] states. The sheer continuity of the phases that pass into each other does not yet of itself suffice to constitute a *change*. It is the identity of the *bearer* within the compass of which the process transpires that is still needed in order to make possible the smooth execution [*einheitlichen Vollzug*] of the change. Persistent objects, on the other hand, require for their being no bearer in this sense. Nor any processes. They could in principle

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793 ' concerning which type of objects is the *basis* for the other type of objects '

794 Which of these cases obtains is yet to be examined in greater detail within the framework or formal-ontological reflections. Nor is it ruled out that in some cases mere dependence of the process prevails, whereas in others – non-selfsufficiency. If this were actually so, it would ultimately have its basis in the *material* essence of the pertinent processes.

simply abide in perfect immutability and survive the "lapse [*Ablauf*]"<sup>795</sup> of time. When they do change, and precisely by doing so are interconnected with processes; that is not owing to their mode of being or form, but rather to some other factor – to their *material* endowment, foremost. Enduring in time and surviving the lapse of time is not yet in itself any change, but then it is no process as such either. It is the plain [*schlichte*] being of a special kind of object.

At this juncture, we are obviously only interested in characterizing the mode of being of persistent objects. However, how it is possible for surviving the lapse of time, or for abiding [*Verbleiben*] as the same in time, to happen – that is a whole different problem. For the time being let us only emphasize that the condition of the possibility of this mode of being for persistent objects does not reside in their form (although they do also differ from processes in their form). Now there are objects that as far as their pure form is concerned are almost completely alike to persistent objects – we have in mind the so-called "ideal" individual objects, like, e.g., individual triangles in the geometric sense, but objects which nevertheless need not persist in time since they are altogether supratemporal. Hence the condition of the possibility of persistent objects must above all be sought in their material endowment, perhaps also in some third factor that is extraneous to them. Ideal objects forfeit in a way on the activeness that is accessible<sup>796</sup> to persistent objects. But it is precisely in view of how the latter attain to the activeness of the present in which they exist that their mode of being is so remarkable, and their persisting in time, subsisting-as-identical in time – so miraculous. For, on the one hand, it is in this way that they participate in the lapse of time, but on the other, they do after all manage to elude it, to overcome it.

But what is involved when we speak of the "lapse of time"? In the case of events, the lapse of time came into play only insofar as it turned out that they – which, in accordance with their essence, are active in only *one* instant of time – do not after all vanish entirely after having taken place, but achieve a certain peculiar intensity of being that is retroactively derivative relative to the new present. Despite this, events in a way succumb completely to the lapse of time: once the instant of time in which they take place passes, nothing of them remains over in the subsequent presents; at most, certain consequences of their erstwhile existence are there played out. In other words: once they have taken place, they have forever departed from active being and assume totally the mode of being of the past. In the case of processes, the situation is different in this regard insofar as in the

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795 " *zmiennosc* [= *Veränderlichkeit*]: (Michejda) mutability; changeableness [Ingarden consistently make this substitution of *Ablauf* for *zmiennosc* throughout the section; the remaining instances will go unnoted.] "

796 [Reading *zugänglich* for *unzugänglich*.]



course of a process still other presents ensue following the *one* present, and indeed a 'continuum of them'<sup>797</sup>, a time interval in the true sense, in which the given process is still active. But it is always a *new* phase of the process that gains this activeness in the midst of passing [*Aktualität im Vorübergehen*]. Nor is there any process at all that, in virtue of its innermost essence, would be active in all its phases and in its *overall* existential constitution *all at once* (simultaneously). It winds its way, so to speak, through the activeness of the present in an ever new instant and in an ever new part of its phase-whole. But they are all *its* parts: of the same process as well as of the becoming phase-whole. In the case of a persistent object, however, it is *it itself* which remains absolutely [*schlechthin*] *the same* in ever new instants of a time interval, although nothing remains any longer of the activeness of the presents through which it had already passed and of the events and process-phases that in the given case have transpired in it and were closely interconnected with it existentially: the persistent object is the same, as if the uninterrupted and irreversible succession of ever new presents could do nothing to it. To be sure, also the persistent object only *passes through* the activeness of ever new instants; yet it does so not with respect to some part of itself<sup>798</sup>, but rather it itself, it in its overall existential scope, is active and present in the individual presents. And similarly, as in the case of a process, there is also now a whole time interval, a 'continuum'<sup>799</sup> of presents in which it – in succession – exists in the mode of activeness. However, in the case of a process running its course, it is the passage of time itself that causes the phases *prior* to the one that is currently active to have already lost their activeness, and [causes] the stock of phases that are yet to be active to be steadily exhausted. And in the case of a finite process there will always be a time in which *all* its phases – and precisely therewith also the process itself – will be done with and completed, and will consequently become *past*. It is in this fashion that the process gradually and steadily succumbs to the lapse of time. The *gradual*<sup>800</sup> transformation of the mode of being of all its phases and of the process itself from activeness into inactiveness, and into the 'mere'<sup>801</sup> retroactive existential derivativeness of the past, belongs to the innermost essence of the process as a *temporal* object. In contrast, a 'passage'<sup>802</sup> of this sort<sup>803</sup> does not apply to persistent objects.

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797 'a whole band of them, as it were'

798 '(as does a process)'

799 'whole band'

800 'and ineluctable'

801 'ever changing'

802 'transformation'

803 ', *gradual* – though in a rather continuous manner – as opposed to transpiring in discrete stages,'

But is this really true? Is the persistent object free of the transformation of mode of being just indicated? Does time and the emergence of incessantly new presents not matter to it, as it were? Does it manage to elude the lapse of time? Is there not always also for it a time interval in which it does not yet exist, then one in which it sustains itself in being, and finally a new time interval in which it no longer exists, in which, therefore, it belongs wholly to the past? Has it not then, as *whole*, taken on the mode of existence of the past? Could one then not say that it too has passed by – exactly like processes?

And yet, though we must concede that it is no longer present [*vorhanden*] once the period of its existence has come to conclusion, we still hesitate to say of a persistent object that it has “passed by” (“run its course”), much as this expression is perfectly appropriate for a process.<sup>804</sup> And surely this is not merely a matter of linguistic custom. To be sure, a persistent object exists in some particular time interval and no longer exists in some later interval. But this does not after all appear to happen as in the case of a process – through a *gradual* transformation of some *part* of it from a present-activeness into a past-inactiveness and absence. It would appear as if it entered into present-activeness and being as whole and all at once, and afterwards made its departure from present-actuality and being all at once<sup>805</sup>. If we concentrate our attention on its persisting (abiding) in time, we get the impression as if the object, as time-persistent, were truly capable of never<sup>806</sup> departing from active being and falling into the past; yet if it does after all do so, that is not owing to its being a persisting object, but to one or another of its imperfections, to some frailty of material essence that is latent in or attaches to it.

But is that not a false impression? For once a persistent object is in some present, and precisely therewith in the activeness of being, does this not also necessarily imply that it is entangled in the lapse of time, and that with time it must indeed at some point belong entirely to the past? Does it not belong to the *essence* of every present that it does not last, that it ceases to be as the present and is constantly transformed into the past? Does that not necessarily leave behind an ineradicable specific trace on the persistent object that has already once achieved present-activeness? Does not the activeness of the present to some extent use up the persisting object? Does not the transformation of present-activeness into past-inactiveness also draw along something of the persisting

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804    ⌈ We say that it [object] exists, or did exist, that it ceased to exist or that it originated in some particular instant. ⌋

805    ⌈ , as *whole* ⌋

806    ⌈ is at the same time *imperishable*, as if it were capable of never losing its activeness, of ⌋

object, *even though* the object abides as the same in this transformation and yet eludes it by entering into a new present?

It is perhaps difficult to answer these questions in complete generality – questions, all of which ultimately aim at the same thing – although it is this generality that would first cast the proper light on the pure mode of being of persistent objects and their relation to time. Therefore, in order to facilitate this task, let us first direct our attention to the fact that it is in principle possible to have various types of persisting objects: from absolutely immutable, through those that change in some manner, to ones that are transformed<sup>807</sup> in a specific rhythm and tempo and in a determinate system of changes, whereby the scope and depth of the transformation can also vary. Against all expectations, the influence of the passage of time on a persistent object seems to be the most difficult to assess in the case of the absolutely immutable objects, for it is on these that the two sorts of experience of time indicated above exercise their relatively most acute modifying role. According to the one conception of time, which confines every temporally determinate being to the sheer present, the transition of something that remains strictly the same from one present into another appears to be unintelligible; the destructive power of time transforms everything that we would be inclined to regard as a persistent object into a manifold of discrete events. According to the other experience of time, in contrast, the immutably persistent object's abiding-as-identical appears to be a triviality. But in the latter case, the distinctiveness of a persistent object from the absolutely atemporal object – such as mathematical entities are, for example – could hardly be defended, since it would then be incomprehensible what the temporal determinateness of the persistent object is properly supposed to consist of. In considering the mode of being of processes, we admittedly saw ourselves rather compelled to favor the validity of the second sort of experience of time, but this did not result from a positive analysis and appraisal of time experience – which would have to burst out of the framework of our current investigations – but rather from the rational insight into the fundamental existential and formal disparity between processes and events. Should there be something like processes at all within the framework of a temporally determined world, then this world must be temporal in the sense of the second sort of time experience. In other words, the time conceived in this sense is the condition of the possibility of processes and – as we shall presently show – also of persistent objects. But the rational insight into this essential interconnection between temporality and the specific types of being of objects – an insight that can only be gained within the framework of an existential-ontological analysis – is in itself equivalent neither to positing temporality

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807 「repeatedly」

of a specific sort, nor to positively demonstrating a particular structure of time (in the sense of the second sort of time experience). Hence, a final clarification is also still missing within the framework of the second sort of time experience for the mode of being of what is past and of what is future. This clarification would in any case have to be carried out far enough and in a direction that would make intelligible the temporal determination of immutably persistent objects. The essence of the mode of being of these objects, and their radical distinctiveness from processes and events, will not be fully penetrated until this has been done.

In the case of objects that undergo changes, in contrast, it *initially* appears to be relatively easily understood and suggestive that, despite persistence in time, they are subjected to transience due to the sheer emergence of incessantly new presents. For the change of a persistent object is to be understood in no other way than that events and processes – hence, in accordance with their essence, temporal entities – are bound up with it in the unity of a whole, thus play out within its framework, or that it participates in certain processes which do indeed exceed its existential scope, but are bound up with it insofar as they also intrude into its “interior.” But in both cases some of its properties perish, while others replace them. For this reason, the being of the persistent object is intertwined in a twofold fashion with the lapse of time: one way, because the events that take place within its framework and the processes that run their course in it are subject to the lapse of time in the manner described above, and so to speak introduce the imprint of time into its existential scope – in particular, the imprint of the present moments in which they transpire; another way, however, because the properties accruing to it at one time and later forfeited by it pass over from the activeness of the present into the inactiveness of the past. The change of the persistent object ordinarily enables us to make the distinction between the changing object and its state. Namely, the total stock of properties brought forth [*hervorgebracht*] in the object<sup>808</sup> by means of a process, and accruing to it in a particular present (or in a particular time interval), is contraposed to the object itself as its “state.” This state must be of greater or lesser duration. For one reason or another, external or internal, it gets eliminated at some particular moment and replaced by another. That is to say, there is a conflict amongst the states of the one object: they cannot all occur in it simultaneously. The object does then indeed remain the same throughout the change, but it takes on successively varying states during its existence. It remains always – i.e., in the incessantly new presents – active, but its states pass over from the activeness of any given present into the inactiveness of the past. The lapse of time entails that the persis-

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808 † during its existence †

tent object cannot continue to possess all of the properties that it ever had during its existence, but rather loses all of the ones that belong to past states and retains only the ones that are active at the given instant. All the while it acquires one more special property, to wit – that it once possessed certain properties, or, to put it more generally: that it had gone through a certain “history.” Thus, on the one hand, an exchange of ever new events that take place in the changing object goes hand in hand with the passage of time, on the other, the progression of the ever new phases of the processes that transpire in its interior, and finally the alteration of the states through which it successively passes during its existence.

At this stage of the investigation, the danger looms of once again having to relinquish the already secured insight into the existential distinctiveness between processes and persistent objects. The first step in this direction seems to consist in the concession that in at least some persistent objects processes transpire which bring about changes in their qualitative endowment. The second may be the concept of state; that is to say, the obvious expansion of this concept to *all* of the properties accruing to the object at a particular time instant, or in some time interval. The state in this sense would therefore embrace not only those properties elicited in the object by means of some process, but also all the remaining ones that would occur in the object simultaneously with them. With this broadened concept of state, the being of the persistent object “disperses into”<sup>809</sup> the subsistence of a multiplicity of states, or into the transitioning [*Übergehen*] of one state into another. But this crossing-over [*Über-Gehen*] is then nothing other than a composite process that issues from the processes running their course in the object (or within its compass). But then the persistent object itself “passes by [*geht vorüber*]: it disintegrates, as it were, into a multiplicity of phases”<sup>810</sup>. So how could one then still speak of *one* object *persisting* in time? For what is it that still persists in it through the lapse of time? Every “state” is then just as *new* in it as the phases in the phase-whole of a process, and there is nothing in it other than such “states.” If one then carries out a geometrization of the time-continuum – as is almost universally customary<sup>811</sup> – in which the continuum is taken to be a point-manifold, then one easily arrives at a dissolution of the persistent object into a manifold of “sections” (“momentary states”), which under the given assumptions come to be regarded as nothing other than certain event-groups.<sup>812</sup>

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809 “ is exchanged for ”

810 “ metamorphoses into a multiplicity of phases of some perhaps very diversified process, and its mode of existence is transience ”

811 “ in the natural sciences ”

812 “ This appears to be Whitehead’s position. ”\* Cf., above all, *Process and Reality*. In Poland, K. Ajdukiewicz was a proponent of this standpoint in the thirties (at least in the lectures he delivered at the time before the Polish Philosophical Society in Lwów).

Now of course nothing should be decided here concerning the factual existence of persistent objects (say, in our real world). Perhaps in actuality there are only such groups of events or systems of processes, but no persistent objects of any sort<sup>813</sup> – in the final analysis that would be a metaphysical issue. At this stage, we are concerned exclusively with the *idea* of the persistent object. And from this perspective we should adhere to the essential distinctiveness amongst the types of temporally determined entities we have contrasted. A multiplicity [*Mannigfaltigkeit*] of successive events, or even of entire groups of events, remains precisely nothing other than a *multiplicity* and does not comprise ‘any’<sup>814</sup> simple, identically abiding object. Of course, every multiplicity is also an object, but an object of *higher* order whose collective stock of properties can certainly not be identified with the totality of the multiplicity’s *elements*, but which does presuppose the existence [*Bestand*] of these elements.<sup>815</sup> The elements of a multiplicity can for their part in themselves be multiplicities, which, as objects, are built up from their own elements. But if that is the case, there must finally be such elements of a multiplicity which in themselves are no longer any sort of multiplicities, and precisely therewith comprise *primitive* [*letzte*] elements, *originally* individual entities. Let us at this point leave aside the issue of the persistence in time of objects of higher order – hence, of multiplicities among others. It is clear that if persistence in time were already impossible in the case of originally individual objects – comprising eventually ultimate elements of multiplicities – the persisting in time of higher order objects, and in particular of multiplicities, would also have to be ruled out. We can therefore restrict ourselves here to the problem of the time-persistence of originally individual objects. Thus to try in turn to reduce the latter to multiplicities, and indeed of event-groups, would be patently absurd. Were the essence of time to entail a necessary discontinuity of what exists temporally, then only events would exist in time, but no sort of persistent objects. But we have already seen in considering processes that

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\* ‘This is a conception that had a number of representatives in the 20<sup>th</sup> c.’

813 Meanwhile, ‘for ontological reasons to which I shall yet return’\*, this [option] appears to be ruled out.

\* ‘in view of the assumption of a fundamental existential bond between the process and the persistent object comprising its basis’

814 ‘one’

815 \* Cf. Ch. VIII, § 43. [This sentence is not altogether transparent on a couple of counts: 1) it would make more sense to compare the properties of the multiplicity to the *properties* of the elements rather than to the elements themselves (in which case, the phrase ‘properties of the’ is missing before ‘multiplicity’s elements); 2) ‘which’ is ambiguous: it could refer to ‘object of higher order’ or to ‘collective stock of properties.’]

\* ‘For my expositions pertaining to an originally individual object and objects of higher order,’

time does not preclude genuine continuity. Nor does it therefore do so relative to the continuity of the persisting of objects that abide. It therefore suffices to find cogent reasons that would forbid the reduction of persistent objects – insofar as originally individual entities are concerned – to some collective ensemble of process-phases. And in this regard, the following appears to us to be of significance:

The phases of a phase-whole that are evolving in time comprise in the case of a simple process potential *parts* from which the phase-whole is *composed*. In contrast, in the case of persistent objects there are no parts *of this kind* that would be distributed over *various* time intervals of its existence and out of which it would be “*put together*.” If a persistent object can be considered at all from the standpoint of the category-pair whole/part – which will first be taken up in detail in the formal considerations (§ 41) – then all the parts out of which it would be composed are always contained, at any particular time, in *the same* present (or in the same time interval). What sense would it make to say that, in some particular time interval of its existence, the *whole* of the object comprises a part – of what, then? Could one claim with any sort of justification that, e.g., Napoleon *is composed* of the child-Napoleon, the teenage-Napoleon, the adult-Napoleon, etc.? If there is a Napoleon at all, it is the one and only, who was *first* child, *then* teenager, *then* the adult in his prime, etc. “Being-child,” “being-teenager,” “being-adult” – those are just stages [*Zuständlichkeiten*], developmental phases of *one* and the same human being: Napoleon I.

The source of error in the view that reduces the persistent object (the thing, in particular) to a complicated process hinges on an articulation of the concept of state that is too *broad*: if not only the new properties of an object that *emanate* from a process are reckoned in a state, but simply *all* of the properties accruing to it in some particular present, then the *object* itself in this present is *identified* with its state instead of being *contraposed* to it. The sole possibility of contraposing the object to its individual states then only consists in regarding it either as the *totality* of these *states* or as the *process* of *transitioning* from one state into another. On the other hand, if one relinquishes the broadened articulation of the concept of state, then another possibility opens up for distinguishing the persistent object from its states, namely, the one we have indicated earlier in this section. The flawed conception of a state leads simultaneously to an unwarranted amplification [*Vervielfältigung*] of the *constant, abiding ensemble* of an object’s properties: that which is one and the same, which with the lapse of time – and correlatively: [with the passage] of the processes that run their course within the compass of the object – sustains itself as *something identical*, is transformed in the conception contested by us into a multiplicity of discrete “sections” ordered in accordance with the succession of presents, as if the mere sim-

ultaneity [of the abiding properties] with passing processes or states on the one hand, and their finding themselves in ever newly emergent presents on the other, by itself destroyed the identity of this ensemble. But such is not the case: this ensemble *sustains itself* in the course of time as the identical nucleus of the persisting object. In other words: time, or the emergence of incessantly new presents, is powerless vis-à-vis the persistent object, or more accurately, vis-à-vis what persists in it; only where the object – in virtue of its essential ‘structure’<sup>816</sup> – is an event or a process does the passage of time entail, so to speak, the full-fledged novelty of events or process-phases.

By means of this diagnosis we have also cast in its proper light the case – which we have previously characterized as the one difficult to decide – of objects that do not change through time yet persist in it, and have struck on a resolution pertaining to the relation of these objects to time: The unchanging, persistent object – should there be such an object for reasons other than those that have been weighed here<sup>817</sup> – is unaffected and unthreatened in its being by the ever newly emerging presents and their incessant transformation-into-the-past. It abides in the ever new presents as simply the same, and sustains the activeness of its being without interruption, i.e., in any given new present, for as long as it still exists. It does not perish in any sense whatsoever. As unchanging, should it ever cease to exist, it can only be destroyed from the outside *all at once*. And it is first then a past object, loses activeness and takes on the mode of being of the past. But as long as this has not yet happened, it does not participate in any processes, no events take place in it, and it itself also has no states of any sort. It forms an individual wholly isolated from other entities (a closed system)<sup>818</sup>. But it is temporally conditioned and determined in a twofold manner: 1. By existing in some *specific* time interval, i.e., it sustains itself in activeness in the presents falling within this interval; 2. By only *passing through* these present moments, always being active in only some *one* of them.

If a persistent object does undergo any sort of changes during its existence, its temporal determination and its being conditioned by time is the same only with respect to the constantly sustained nucleus in it, as in the case of an object that does not change at all; but the temporal determination and conditioning suffers a significant modification with respect to other aspects of this object subsequent to the processes running their course and events taking place in its interior, owing to which a multiplicity of states arises therein: its being conditioned

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816 ‘form’

817 Refer to the formal considerations of Ch. XV for an outlook on the possibility of such an object in a *world*. [This note added in *Streit*.]

818 Cf. Ch. XV, for an outlook on the possibility of the existence of such an object within the framework of a *world*.



by time, or the object's degree of dependence on the lapse of time, is magnified considerably. In this case, the object takes part in the changeover of its states and in its perishing or passing away [*Vergehen bzw. Vorübergehen*] in time. It has its own "history" and is entangled in the history of its surrounding world. Those of its states that are already past and which the object had outgrown – because, as the same, it is active in a new present and finds itself in a new active state – do nonetheless belong to it in the inactiveness modification characteristic of the past, and are sustained in being by the object via the retroactive existential derivativeness [*rückwärtigen Seins-Abgeleitetheit*] for as long as it still exists, i.e., for as long as it still abides in a present as the same as it had previously been. The *boundaries* of the invariant nucleus in the object need not necessarily remain the same throughout its active existence: on the contrary, they are normally variable, and this shows that there is no demarcation (no isolation) between this nucleus and the rest of the object, as there is between the absolutely immutable object and its surrounding world. Even with all the inconstancy of the zone of immutability<sup>819</sup>, however, "a certain limit of variability cannot be trespassed"<sup>820</sup>. The instant this happens – in the instant, therefore, in which that absolutely immutable nucleus is also fully engulfed in the process of change – the process of an object's annihilation has commenced. The object loses its activeness of being, and its last present is transformed into [the] past. The last phase of its active being then also belongs to its history, but everything in it has already passed and its self-identity is broken off when we set it in relation to an active being that follows it. Should it leave behind any traces or consequences of its existence in the active being of subsequent presents, it sustains itself, as well as its history, in the retroactive derivativeness of being. This derivativeness can have a degree that depends on circumstances, and can also range over different degrees.

Obviously, in order to demonstrate the possibility of the changeable, persistent object, it must be shown under which circumstances and within which limits its unchangeable nucleus can be sustained despite the changes occurring in its interior. The condition of the possibility of its identity is most intimately connected with this, and is entirely different from that of the identity of a process.<sup>821</sup> But these are all problems that already exceed the scope of existential ontology, and fall partially within formal, partially within material ontology. We shall have to deal with them separately there. Here, on the other hand, we shall consider one more special type of changeable and persistent objects in order to rebut

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819 " in the persistent object "

820 " this mutability cannot disrupt the cohesion of the object-nucleus "

821 Cf. Ch. XIV.

the last possible objection against our contrast between processes and persistent objects.

One may perhaps lock onto the Napoleon example and attempt to exploit it against our expositions. We have said above that a persistent object differs from a process in that, among other things, whereas this latter is first constituted in the course of time and *becomes*, the persistent object does not *become*, but rather simply *is* as already fully constituted throughout its existence. Does this really apply to Napoleon, e.g., or to some other human being, or to any living being at all? Have we not ourselves spoken of Napoleon's *developmental* phases? Can we not speak with full justification of Napoleon's *path of becoming* as well as of the history of his downfall and his passing? Is he therefore not *first* constituted *in the course* of his life, i.e., in the course of a very complicated, composite process? If Napoleon, like all living beings, is truly a persistent object, then there appears to be no difference between this sort of objects and processes – at least with respect to their mode of being. If, on the other hand, the distinction we have established between the sorts of objects under discussion is to be maintained, it would appear to be necessary to exclude Napoleon, along with all living beings, from the class of persistent objects and assign them to the processes-objects – and indeed all living beings whatsoever, since the same objection could also be leveled with respect to the domain of animals and plants. Of course, we have in mind Napoleon as person, as mentally-endowed being. But he is a psycho-physical being whose body undergoes throughout his life a progression of changes similar to that of his mental properties and structural peculiarities, a progression of changes that is intimately connected with the transformations of his self as a particular person. Where – as is presumably the case with plants – the purely mental (consciousness-bound) component of the living beings is missing, far-reaching transformations of their "material endowment"<sup>822</sup> prevail, which can evoke the same doubt as in the case of particular persons regarding whether we are still dealing there with persistent objects or with complicated processes. But if there is legitimate doubt even in the case of living beings and human persons as to whether they belong among persistent objects as distinguished from complex processes, the question arises as to what still remains over from the types of objects that we believe we encounter in the real world that could be regarded as a persistent object, as distinct from an ensemble of processes? Is the situation any better in this respect with the so-called "inanimate" objects?

To this we have to respond as follows:

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822 " strictly physical properties "

This problem cannot be definitively resolved at this stage, since in order to do so we would have to have at our disposal an insight into the material essence (into the idea) of the person and of any living being whatever. The conclusive treatment of this problem must therefore be deferred to the material portion of our deliberations. There we shall also have to deal with the essence of personal being because it will turn out that the realism/idealism problem is linked in a very special way with the problem of the person. At the moment, only a provisional, hypothetical (probable) perspective can be opened up on the problem of the mode of existence of the living being and of the person.

It would appear that living beings do belong among the changeable, persistent objects. There is a special reason in their case, however, that makes the doubt as to their distinctiveness from processes particularly grave. That is to say, the changes that occur in them in the course of their existence seem to form a *special system*, in which there is an *interconnection* among the individual changes that governs over the contingencies of living, as well as a specific *irreversible order* of succession of those changes – at least, of the succession of a select assortment of them. As a consequence of this, living beings do indeed appear to be much more tightly cohesive unities than the objects of “inanimate” nature, and, in conjunction with this, the individual phases of their lives, along with the characteristic developmental processes transpiring in these beings, seem to have a much more intimate connection with their states and their “qualitative endowment”<sup>823</sup> than is the case for inanimate things. It is their innermost essence, therefore, that appears to consign them to temporal being, and to necessary transience in time. A determinate time span – within vague limits, yet not to exceed a certain measure – appears to be allotted to their life in advance (corresponding to the particular species), and this in accordance with their innermost essence, provided external circumstances in which it was given to them to live do not contribute to further constrain that span. Because the inception of their being and life occurs in a specific moment of time (and, for persons, of history), they are – given the necessity of developing and living out their lives within a restricted period of time – susceptible in much greater measure to the passage of time than “inanimate” material things, to which it is, so to speak, all the same when and how long they exist, since they need not in a restricted time go through the sort of system of changes to which, say, the human being (and similarly other living beings) is subjected in the time of an individual life span. For a human being, however, this is not at all irrelevant. But does it really follow from this that living beings, and humans in particular, are not to be distinguished from processes?

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823 “essential attributes”

The second salient reason for doubting the justification for our contradiction of the modes of being of the types of objects under consideration hinges, in the case of living beings, on the circumstance that everything in the makeup of the living being appears to be subjected to change during its lifetime. It is almost impossible to cite in the concrete case what comprises the immutable factor of the living being in the constant meandering of its properties. Even what is peculiar to a particular person, which forms its individual constitutive nature, appears to be transformed in the course of its life. That, e.g., is exactly what disposes us to distinguish the young Napoleon from the mature Napoleon. And if this holds even for so extraordinarily fashioned an individuality as Napoleon, then it appears to hold to an even greater extent for the average man. But from this appears to follow a *gradual* constituting of the living being during its life, which was indeed supposed to be characteristic of the process-object. Yet is this really so?

The facts at the basis of both objections directed at our conception are generally to be conceded. However, they appear insufficient to compel us to relinquish our standpoint. For firstly, the existence of an intimate interconnection and of an irreversible order in the changes transpiring in a living being makes the latter, and the person in particular, into an object that is in a distinctive sense temporally (and in the special case, historically) determined; secondly, it is precisely this interconnection and this order, this system of typical changes, which – above and beyond the processes that undoubtedly transpire in a living being – point to a *constant*, hence abiding (*characteristic* for it) *essence of an entity at the basis of those processes*. Not only the developmental and degenerative processes that are characteristic and constantly recurrent for the given *biological species*, but also (and perhaps to an even higher degree) the *typical cast* of all the modes of behavior that are vital to living and essential for the respective personal *individual* – by means of which the individual prevails despite all obstacles and catastrophes as a specific, unique (and throughout its entire life the same) person – [as well as] the *one* continually recurring *approach* by which the personal individual solves the most diverse life-problems, often in diametrically opposed situations, shows best that the living being, and the human being or human person in particular, is *more* than the totality of the events and processes transpiring in it. And indeed this “more” is not a  $\ulcorner$ *resultant* $\urcorner$ <sup>824</sup> structure [*Folgegebilde*] – as is the process-object vis-à-vis the phase-whole founding it, and on which it depends *completely* in its individual makeup – but is rather, to the contrary, the *basis*, and also partially the one and only *origin*, of both the species-specific developmental processes and the manner in which the living (and

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824  $\ulcorner$  *derivative*  $\urcorner$

in particular, the personal) individual interacts with its surrounding world. This “more,” this basis of the mode of behavior, comprises not only the *essence-nucleus* of the individual, but at the same time that which *persists* in it, which abides despite all passage of time and the destructive power of history. The existence of such an essence-nucleus<sup>825</sup> in the living being, and in the human being in particular, rules out neither the occurrence in it of entire systems of properties and states which emerge as consequences of the processes transpiring in it, nor the constitution on its basis of corresponding process-objects. On the contrary, both follow precisely from the presence of this nucleus and are essentially influenced by it. In a way, a *stratified* structure of the individual is shaped, in which the upper strata, formed in the course of living, are relative with respect to essence-nucleus and life circumstances of the individual and subject to a more or less sudden demise, whereas the essence-nucleus concealed behind them persists throughout the individual’s life and, depending on circumstances, is more or less dominant in the whole of the individual. If the essence-nucleus is also subjected to dissolution and destruction, then the individual, too, is disintegrated and annihilated as a result.<sup>826</sup>

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825 Is that the “basic essence [*Grundwesen*]” in Pfänder’s conception of the human being? Cf. “*Über die Seele des Menschen*,” Halle: Niemeyer, 1933.

826 Following publication of the first edition of this book in 1947, it was maintained in various quarters that the preliminary analyses carried out here pertaining to the human being and the human person are “existentialist,” and written under the influence of Sartre. – Now, when I was writing this chapter in 1941, I knew nothing of either Sartre or French existentialism. Of course, I did read Heidegger’s *Being and Time* already in 1927. But I doubt that Heidegger’s views influenced me in this regard. At most, Max Scheler might have come into play here, to whom I am much indebted. But even Scheler’s conception of the person – in *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values* – seems to me to be rather remote from what guides me here. *Nota bene*, I have concerned myself with the problem of the person since 7 long ago. 7\* In the Fall of 1913 I approached Husserl with the proposal of writing my doctoral dissertation on the problem of the person. Husserl was positively disposed toward this plan, but he wanted me to work on the problem by applying the constitutive method, and predicted it would take me five years. Since life circumstances made that impossible for me, I decided to write my doctoral work on Bergson’s [concept of] intuition 7, and the problem of the person was set aside for many years. 7\*\* Even today (1962) I am not yet done with it, though I believe that the initial outlines that I am sketching here differ distinctly from Sartre’s conception. In Sartre, the human being is *deprived* of precisely this nucleus I am talking about. In the interior of the human being, at its very bottom, yawns a void 7, which despite all rhetoric (just as for Heidegger) cannot be filled by his self-formation [*Sich-selbst-Erschaffen*]. “The being of Dasein is its possibility” – says Heidegger. But anyone who has even quite superficially dealt with the problem of real possibility knows that it can only emerge out of real, active being and can only be transformed into

This would also partially neutralize the second reason for doubting the cogency of our conception: despite the broad scope for the living being's (person's) ability to change, not everything in it changes and *not everything* is caught up in the flux of process. Nevertheless, the core of the second objection – namely, that the living being, too, like the process-object, is first constituted in the *course* of its active existence – must be examined in detail. In order to find the path to a proper resolution in this regard, we need to distinguish between the *static* and *dynamic* sameness (constancy) of a feature occurring within an object's total scope. We have static sameness when some feature of an object always occurs in it in *total immutability* of its *qualitative* determination. We have dynamic sameness, in contrast, when the qualitative determination of an object's feature is indeed subjected to alteration, but yet only *with respect to the manner and [degree of] perfection of its existential and phenomenal 'manifestation' [Ausprägung]*<sup>827</sup> in the *whole of this feature*, hence when what is specific to this determination, e.g., is initially contained in the respective feature only in an embryonic and ephemeral manner, but later in an increasingly more distinct and pronounced, and more completely evolved, fashion. Development, complete evolution, and at times regression, degeneration of the same [qualitative determination] in many different modalities of manifestness [*Ausgeprägtheit*] and state of embodiment – that is indeed the special, yet at the same time, classical case in which the “dynamic” sameness of some feature in an object shows up. The higher degree of manifestness of a qualitative determination in an object can also entail that what in a less manifest state was still blurred and undifferentiated in it, is now differentiated, stands out more sharply in its inner structure, but it is not something<sup>828</sup> new – rather, something same but in a developed state. The entire development was pressing, so to speak, toward this state of complete<sup>829</sup> manifestation<sup>830</sup>, but having been achieved, we are dealing with absolutely *the same thing* that initially was already there *in nuce*.

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reality out of this full being. Of course, there are human beings who are without core, as it were, but then these people cannot develop into a person. ¶\*\*\*

This must suffice here, and we must forgo a confrontation with Heidegger and Sartre at this point.

\* ¶ my early youth. I read a series of authors at the time (Dilthey, Simmel, and others). ¶

\*\* ¶ . But I never really lost sight of the problems of the human person. ¶

\*\*\* ¶ See Appendix J ¶

827 ¶ *occurrence*, or, if you will, embodiment ¶

828 ¶ *fundamentally* ¶

829 ¶ *embodiment and* ¶

830 ¶ *of the given quality or qualitative ensemble in the object* ¶

Applying this distinction<sup>831</sup> to our problem, we can say: the living being, and the personal human individual in particular, is sustained as something identical through the various transformations it undergoes in its life if, despite all the changes it suffers, its individual, constitutive nature<sup>832</sup> preserves the *dynamic sameness* of its qualitative determination. This dynamically identical individual nature of the living being comprises the qualitative determination of what we have above called its essence-nucleus. In abiding as the same throughout the individual's entire life, this nature does not undergo the process of constitution, since it appears in it from the very beginning. Quite to the contrary, it is this nature which, together with the processes correspondingly fashioned by the inner developmental drive and by life circumstances, decides the type and manner of the constitution of both the essential – thus directly interconnected with the individual constitutive nature – and inessential properties of the living individual. Some of the essential properties – namely, those that are unequivocally determined only by the qualitative moment of the individual nature, but not by the manner<sup>833</sup> of its manifestation and development in any given phase of life – are not indeed first constituted in the course of living, but lie at the basis of every such constitution. In conjunction with this, the features of the living being that underlie constitution are not restricted – as is the case for processes – to the general, the typical, but rather contain within themselves – as the property-equivalent of the *individual* nature of the living being (the person) – what is characteristic and peculiar for the respective *individual*<sup>834</sup> as such. Hence we must concede that to constitution transpiring *in the course* of life are subject only 1) the manner and degree of "manifestation"<sup>835</sup> of the individual nature that are characteristic for the particular life-phase, 2) the living being's essential properties that depend on the stage of manifestation and development of this nature, and 3) the properties that are inessential for the respective individual, but which yet in their general type do belong to the totality of its full qualitative makeup. At the same time, the progress of constitution and the total ensemble of what is constituted in it depends on *various* factors. These are partially what persists in the living individual, but partially what is transient (its states), partially the events occurring and processes transpiring in it, and partially, finally, what does not occur at all in the individual itself, but comprises rather its life circumstances as anchored in the surrounding world. These life circumstances

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831 " of two types of identity "

832 " Concerning the concept of an "individual constitutive nature," " Cf. Ch. VIII, § 40.

833 " and degree "

834 Cf. " the expositions pertaining to the essence of an individual object in " [Vol. II.] Ch. XIV.

835 " the embodiment and evolution "

are for their part partially  $\ulcorner$ persistent $\urcorner$ <sup>836</sup> and partially  $\ulcorner$ transient $\urcorner$ <sup>837</sup> factors which are ultimately grounded in various sorts of specific, persistent entities belonging to the world surrounding the given individual. Therefore, it must surely be conceded that living beings – as a particular type of persistent object – are *in part* constituted in the course of their active existence. But this constitution differs essentially from the constitution of the process-object in 1) that it extends only to a *part* of the object's *individual* qualitative makeup, 2) that, in distinction to the process-object, it is not founded exclusively in process-phases but is grounded rather, in virtue of its essence, in *persisting* (“thing-like”) factors, and indeed in the essence-nucleus<sup>838</sup> of the respective living individual itself on the one hand, and in the persisting entities of the world surrounding this individual on the other. It is only because living beings are *persistent* entities, whose essence allows and demands an internally cohesive system of changes, and because they find themselves in a world containing *persistent* objects, that certain processes can transpire in them and in their compass which within their limits and in their fashion lead to the constitution just described. These constituting processes therefore prove to be *existentially* non-selfsufficient relative to persistent entities, and to living beings in particular: they have at least partially in the latter their “condition of possibility.” Conversely, however, what persists absolutely<sup>839</sup> in the living being is not existentially relative with respect to this constitution and the processes underlying it. Within the realm of what is absolutely persistent in it, therefore, the living being is selfsufficient (or independent) vis-à-vis the processes under consideration, but it is *not* selfsufficient in the *total* stock of its qualitative endowment. For in everything that is subject to constitution during its life, it is in part existentially  $\ulcorner$ non-selfsufficient $\urcorner$ <sup>840</sup> (perhaps  $\ulcorner$ dependent $\urcorner$ <sup>841</sup>) vis-à-vis the processes under discussion that transpire in it or

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836  $\ulcorner$  constant  $\urcorner$

837  $\ulcorner$  variable  $\urcorner$

838  $\ulcorner$  (in the individual nature)  $\urcorner$

839 We are speaking here of what persists *absolutely* in the sense of what in virtue of essential necessity persists immutably throughout the individual's *entire* life, and contrapose it to what persists *relatively*, which certainly does persist for some time during the individual's life but which has first arisen in the course of its life and also passes away after some time  $\ulcorner$ . The relatively persistent is situated within the framework of what is inessential for the individual  $\urcorner$ .\*

\*  $\ulcorner$ , or may even be preserved throughout life, but does not belong to the essence of the given individual  $\urcorner$

840  $\ulcorner$  dependent  $\urcorner$

841  $\ulcorner$  selfsufficient  $\urcorner$



within its compass.<sup>842</sup> Consequently, although “persisting in”<sup>843</sup> time, it is all the same not entirely “supervenient [überlegen]”<sup>844</sup> on time since it first *partially becomes with time* and eventually – to employ Bergson’s term (though not his concept) – “*is undone [entwird]*” [by time]<sup>845</sup>. And since the processes here in question also partially have their basis in persistent entities of various sorts encountered *externally* to the individual living being, the latter also proves to be in part dependent on some persisting objects belonging to its surrounding world.<sup>846</sup> *The living individual’s mode of being is characterized by partial persistence-independence, restricted in the manner indicated to its nature and its individual essence, and by partial dependence on its surrounding world, but at the same time partially by towering over time and [partially by] subjugation to time. Or to put it differently: the living being is a remarkable union of the persisting and of the passing away of its states and processes*<sup>847</sup>.

The entire existential system of the individual living being finds itself thereby in an *unstable* equilibrium, so to speak; the two “aspects” of the individual: the underlying, persisting, “selfsufficient” essence-nucleus and what is “dependent on”<sup>848</sup> its surroundings – the surface stratum of its qualities, which is first constituted<sup>849</sup> and then subject to passing away – steadily maintain each other in equilibrium (although always only up to some point in time) in such a way that the first remains predominant even though it is continually *threatened* by the second.<sup>850</sup> The magnitude of the threat – and correlatively the measure of the essence-nucleus’ predominance – continually undergoes various fluctuations: but *at any time* an instant may arrive in which the threat exceeds an acceptable measure: the equilibrium of the system is disrupted, and a shorter- or longer- lasting process of disintegration begins in which the individual perish-

842 We shall later – in the formal-ontological analyses – consider in greater detail whether the living being along with the processes transpiring in it or within its compass do or do not comprise *one*, formally self-contained sphere of being..

843 “it is capable of outlasting the mutability of”

844 “independent of”

845 “(vanishes)”

846 This, too, will later have to occupy us in greater detail.

847 “(of the abiding of the thing’s essence-nucleus and of the passing away of its states and processes)”

848 “co-conditioned by”

849 “in the course of living”

850 “Cf. in this connection, \**Theoretische Biologie, Bd. I*, by v. Bertalanffy. “I only read it in late Fall ’43. The conception of the living being presented here is in agreement with the conception of the organism in Bertalanffy, even though it is grounded in an entirely different problematic.

\* “I wrote this in Dec. ’41, as yet unacquainted with the book”

es. It is in this that the *essential fragility* [*Gebrechlichkeit*] of being is displayed, and hence a *new moment in the mode of being of living beings*. Even their<sup>851</sup> partial independence, as well as supremacy over time, is *not at all guaranteed* by the (general and individual) *essence* of the living individual. If it sustains itself in life, and therewith in active being, this happens because – for reasons that are ultimately independent of its essence – it has thus far managed to maintain the ascendancy of what persists in it (its essence-nucleus). If the magnitude of this ascendancy is relatively significant and if it sustains itself in this measure for long stretches of its life, then this life is characterized by what we wish to call “organic development.” Disturbances stemming from life’s external circumstances are then incapable of overriding a characteristically evolving life course. This course – precisely the “organic development” – relies on a strict *order* (which is different depending on the type and peculiar individuality of the living being) *being preserved in the succession of transformation-phases, and commencing indeed with the embryonically intimated, almost concealed embodiment* of the quality determining the individual constitutive nature, through its continually *progressing development and differentiation* (which has the emergence of corresponding properties as its consequence), all the way to the *saturation and permeation of the individual’s total being*. The fragility of the existence of the living being consists precisely in the *fundamental* possibility, grounded in its *general* essence, not only of annihilating the individual, but also of *interrupting* or disturbing the organic development by means of external factors: the individual does not then even achieve the maturation and development of its individual nature and passes over into the state of a general stagnation or premature decay.

This fragility of being can be *essentially* magnified. This happens in a *special* type of living being with which we probably have dealings in our world. The general, or perhaps just the individual, essence of the living being is in this case certainly attuned, so to speak, to the “organic development” of its self, but at the same time it ignites *from within itself a process of degeneration that*<sup>852</sup> *follows that development*. This process consists in the gradual *regression* of the quality of the individual nature permeating the whole of the individual, in the *deterioration* of its essence and in the *disintegrating processes* associated with this, and finally in the individual’s *self-dissolution* (in death) – and that even in “favorable” external life circumstances, which are nonetheless incapable of arresting its demise. We are dealing in this case with a living being which in accordance with its essence is *mortal*. The bondage and deliverance to time of

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851 「 selfsufficiency and 」

852 「 normally 」

such a being is considerably greater than for that living being whose existence can indeed be interrupted or arrested by *external* circumstances, but which at least in principle rises above time and its destructive power. For a “mortal” individual *must* “die,” hence exit active being, since its own essence demands it: it perishes because the *inner* lawful regularity of its life consigns to it only a limited duration in time. Precisely because it existed for so long, it has already passed through certain phases of its being and has entered the phase of its disintegration. Its capacity for persisting is limited by both its general and individual essence. The fundamental mortality of the individual does not exclude the fragility of its being, but rather includes it: a mortal being can die earlier, before it has developed organically, before its nature has achieved maturity, but the death that is then in fact approaching is traceable to life’s external circumstances and just happens to be *consistent* with the individual’s essence.<sup>853</sup>

The description of the living individual’s mode of being would not be complete, however, were we not to emphasize another one of its features. Like all persistent entities, living beings too exist in such a way – as already noted – that up to a certain point in time they possess their being by *passing through* the sphere of activeness of an *ever new* present. That of course is how they exist during the *entire* time that they exist, but in accordance with the essence of time any given instance of their active being is always confined to only a *single* present moment beyond the bounds of which they can at no time reach. The activeness of their being spans at any particular time only a single – if we may put it that way – narrow fissure [*Spalte*]. Beyond it in the one direction there is the retroactively derived past being, and in the other the first intimations of the future being. This so to speak “fissure-like [*spaltartige*]” existence is characteristic of every temporally extended being, and of every persistent object in particular. For living beings, however, there emerges against the background of the fissure-like mode of existence an essential modification that somehow enables the living being to *transcend* the activeness-fissure of any particular present, and that is because for such a being what has happened in the past makes its mark in an essentially different and more meaningful way on the structure [*Ausgestaltung*] of what “presently” exists than it does for “inanimate” things. To be sure, it is common to *all* entities persisting in time and changing in it that *not everything* that qualifies them at present stems from the *immediately* preceding activeness-phase. Only

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853 The question everywhere and repeatedly comes up as to *why* a particular living being has such a nature and such an essence that it is fragile in its being, or even mortal. But that is a question that reaches far beyond the context of problems we are now examining, and leads back to basic metaphysical issues.

what comprises a transformation-phase in the process just now transpiring within the compass of the object is grounded in the immediately preceding phase. In contrast, everything else in it that comprises something temporally persistent stems from earlier, in part also quite far-removed, instants of its elapsed existence, corresponding to the temporal points at which events occurred and processes transpired in it. But important disparities emerge on this common basis between the “inanimate” things and living beings. In the case of “inanimate” things, what remains from their past comprises a multiplicity of properties, which, as a fortuitous resultant [*Zufallsergebnis*]<sup>854</sup> of the influences exerted on the respective thing and of the modes of reaction proper to it, can of course be explained by reference to these, but which in their totality comprise a *senseless agglomeration* or particulars that is *in itself* inscrutable and unintelligible. For a living being meanwhile, what remains of its past makes up a *meaningful* unity, a whole that is *in itself intelligible in its “organic” structure*, much as the given living being bears traces of the impact on it during its existence of various *disconnected*, and *accidental* to it, factors that have worked counter to the meaningful unity of the living being and thereby threatened it. At least some of the battles that a living being had to wage against its surrounding world are discernible from the content of what is presently active in it, as is the “ingenious” *mode of its reaction* to the assaults directed at its being – a mode that is characteristic for it, promotes the preservation of its life, and rebuilds its inner structure (in a way that is to some extent creative).<sup>855</sup> The *nexus* we have already stressed above between the individual developmental phases – as well as the interconnection among the living individual’s defense mechanisms for countering the influences of the “external” world which in themselves, and from the standpoint of the living being’s inner lawfulness, are contingent – is expressed synthetically in the living being’s active state and constitutes the *inner unity* of not only the total content of its *present* makeup, but also of its *entire temporally spread out* [*ausgespannten*] being.<sup>856</sup> It is this unity that binds the living being’s past more closely to what is just now active, and that confers a higher degree of

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854 Of course, it is a *fortuitous* resultant only from the standpoint of the *given* “inanimate” thing!

855 To these modes of reaction belong, among others, the regenerative phenomena, as well as the positive, creative adaptation of the living being to the “external” life circumstances initially threatening it.

856 A possibility opens up here for various grades of inner cohesion of this unity, and therewith a perspective on the possibility of overcoming time. We shall still return to this.

intensity on its retroactively derived being. This<sup>857</sup> degree of intensity closes the gap to a certain extent (though never completely) between the living individual's retroactively derived being of the past and the activeness of its current present, and in this way elicits at least the *semblance of an expansion* [*Ausweitung*] of the *activeness-phase* in the direction of the past. The totality of what is past – all the circumstances through which the living being had endured and transcended – is of course no longer in-the-now and present [*gegenwärtig und anwesend*]. This is certainly ruled out by the essence of time or “being-in-time.” Once something is consigned [*verurteilt*] to existing in time, it loses ineluctably and forever the activeness of what it once had. But the apparent expansion of the living being's activeness-phase is nonetheless warranted, since what in the strict sense, and in its full essence-nucleus, exists in the present *is identically the same* as what it once was – and was throughout the course of its life<sup>858</sup>.

From the other side, what is heralded in this same sensible unity of the living being's active existence – and of its temporally expanded being in its creatively clever defense against threats from the outside world – is what we have earlier called the ascendancy [*Übergewicht*] of what persists over the transience [*Wechsel*] of states mitigated by external circumstances. The fragility<sup>859</sup> of the living individual's being is neither eliminated nor diminished by this, but it does, however, prove itself to be a fragility of *what is in itself autonomous, the ground and source of active resistance, a force-center*, from which springs the *creative* overcoming of<sup>860</sup> existential disturbances and of the existential threat emanating from time itself. The proper essence of existential fragility first reveals itself where there is such an autonomy, such a force-center, *selfsufficiency in the conduct of one's life*, and precisely therewith a subjectivity in a distinctive sense: only where we have this can something be “shattered,” – annihilated in its being – and it is “fragile” in its *being* precisely when it allows for this out of its inner *essence*. None of this applies to an “inanimate” thing. Such a thing absorbs defenselessly the transformations inflicted on it by the external world for as long as some remnant of the original ensemble of its properties still subsists, whereby these need not play any special role in it as a whole. A “whole” in the strict sense, as in the case of living beings, is not present at all in the case of “inanimate” things. In their case there is at any given time only a residue of still unaltered properties

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857 *□* higher *□*

858 *□* is *identical* with that which, as enduring or at least relatively enduring, existed in it in the course of its life from the beginning or came into being and is still preserved *□*

859 *□* (brittleness) *□*

860 *□* externally mitigated *□*

which, together with the newly-emerged ones, comprise the totality of the object's being, and which entail a mode of purely *passive* resistance to outside influences<sup>861</sup> that is proper to them all – thus evoking<sup>862</sup> the mere *semblance* of an autonomous force-center. Strictly speaking, in this context one may not even speak of the fragility of being. The “inanimate” thing deteriorates gradually, until some<sup>863</sup> impact [*Einwirkung*] obliterates it completely. Thus the “fissure-character [*Spalthaftigkeit*]” of its activeness is much more radical than in the case of the living being, and it lacks the tight unity of a temporally spread out being.

There is, however, at least one category of living beings – “there is,” i.e., here initially in the sense of an idea! – in which the fissure-character of active being appears to be overcome in a quite pronounced measure, and in an especially distinctive manner: the beings that live *consciously*. They are not existentially less fragile than the remaining living beings, but through their acts of recollection, retention, protention, and expectation they can look out beyond the structure of their current present, and can at least in principle survey the whole course of their lives, just as from the opposite direction they can immerse themselves into the time of their development and its transformational syntheses. They do so only “intentionally,” but even this merely intentional, presumptive [*vermeintende*] intuiting and grasping of what exceeds the bounds of the current activeness-phase entails a jutting out above the uninterrupted lapse of time, an overcoming of transformations bound up with time, and opens possibilities for unifying the individual and strengthening its inner structure, neither of which is possible for living beings deprived of consciousness – if there be such at all. It would take us too far afield at this juncture to expound on this in detail – we shall be forced to return to it later – but it must at least be mentioned here as a special, limiting case of “being-in-time.” Insight into the material essence of the conscious living being can first unveil the modifications of mode of being transpiring in it “against the background”<sup>864</sup> of the mode of being of every single living individual. But that here too no genuine overcoming of the lapse of time has been achieved, no elimination of existential fragility, even though, admittedly, some diminishing of its degree is accomplished – this appears to be beyond any doubt.

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861 This is also the way in which the essence of the given “inanimate” thing *gradually* changes, if it is still appropriate here to speak of an essence. Cf. “*Essentiale Fragen* and the expositions pertaining to the essence of an object in” Ch. XIII.

862 “at most”

863 “external”

864 “on the basis”

Following these considerations, which, though surely inadequate, do at least give us a certain initial orientation into the problem-context “time and mode of being,” we now need to return to our main problem and ponder the consequences that follow from taking time into account for the set of possible solutions to the idealism/realism problem.<sup>865</sup>

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865 The literature pertaining to the problem of time is immense, especially since Bergson and Einstein’s theory of relativity. It is impossible to discuss it here. I have read quite a few works on this theme, and would be hard-pressed to say which of them has exerted an influence on the views presented here. At any rate, the intuitions of the following philosophers have not been insignificant in this connection: Aristotle and Augustine of the older ones, Bergson, Husserl and Conrad-Martius of the newer. Despite all influences that had an impact on me, there seems to be a kernel in the conception I am presenting here that does not appear in any of the other authors. This involves, first of all, the intimate relation between time and mode of being, as well as the various modes of “being-in-time.” As concerns Polish authors who have dealt with the problem of time, let me name foremost [single out ?] M. Wartenberg, Z. Zawirski and H. Mehlberg.

# Chapter VI

## Consequences of the Time Analysis for the Solution Possibilities of the Idealism / Realism Problem

### § 31. Prospective Exclusion of some Possibilities for Solving the Controversy

The most important results for the realism/idealism Controversy we have attained in our last series of analyses can be briefly summarized in the following way:

1. There is one particularly distinctive feature in the whole of temporal being, namely, what is active in the present [*das Aktuelle der Gegenwart*]. Neither what is past nor what is future measures up against it with respect to existential potency<sup>866</sup>.
2. The activeness of [an entity's] being in the present presupposes its autonomy, but not everything that is autonomous need be active.
3. Three basic groups of temporally determined objects need to be distinguished: events, processes and objects persisting in time.
4. Among the types of temporally determined objects, it is those persisting in time that are existentially the most potent, since in abiding they can overcome the lapse of time and can serve as existential support for the remaining two types of temporal objects.
5. Among persistent objects, it is living beings – and conscious beings in particular – that comprise an existentially select group: by preserving strict identity through the lapse of time and by displaying autonomous subjectivity [*Subjekthaftigkeit*].
6. All temporally determined entities exist by passing through an ever new activeness-phase<sup>867</sup>, and they are unable to overcome the “fissure-character [*Spalthaftigkeit*]” of their existence even in the existentially highest form of

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866 □, but [each] necessarily belongs to the active present □

867 □ [Ftn.:] Excluded from this are events, which are incapable of passing through any new present, and are limited in their being to an even greater extent since they are active in only a single present. □



conscious living beings. This exposes the first imperfection of temporally determined being.

7. Even the existentially most potent among temporally determined objects, i.e., living beings, are characterized by a fragility of their existence, which in the particular case morphs into an essentially necessary mortality. Therein lies the second imperfection of the existence of living beings.

We would need to examine whether the existential imperfections of temporally determined objects do not point to their derivativeness. In later analyses we shall be able to exhibit still other imperfections of these entities, so that the problem of their derivativeness and of what they may eventually be derived from will become especially pressing. Its solution is of fundamental importance for our central Controversy.

The existential peculiarities of temporally determined entities come into play for both of our domains of being – the real world and pure consciousness. With no intention of making a metaphysical commitment at this point<sup>868</sup>, it appears to be likely that the real world, or at least what exists in it, is temporally determined. At any rate, time-determination belongs among the primal attributes [*primitiven Gegebenheiten*] of entities existing in the real world, much as it may be no more than a “transcendental illusion” in Kant’s sense. That appears to be highly unlikely in our conception of time. Had we made our start in it from the idea of reality [*Realität*] as a mode of being rather than first striving for its ultimate clarification – as we are in fact doing – we would be in a position to make that commitment already now. But within the trajectory of our analysis, time-determination of the real, and the existential peculiarities following upon that, must be reckoned with as a theoretical possibility, and we must ask ourselves to what extent the necessary consequences bound up with this possibility have an impact on the number and assortment of the solution-possibilities for our Controversy. The same also applies to pure consciousness as the possible factor from which the real world might be derived. For consciousness too appears to be temporal in its essence, and – if this were true purely ontologically for the time being – would have to appropriate the peculiarities of the temporal mode of being. And since in the earlier survey of possibilities for solving our Controversy it turned out that we must reckon with the real world (and possibly pure consciousness as well) being derived from some other, third factor, we have to ask here from the outset whether *an existentially original entity – one that possibly*

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868 We shall of course have to face such a commitment. In this way, the whole problem of  
 √ existence √\* will once again have to enter the purview of our deliberations\*\*.

\* √ time and temporal determination √

\*\* √ and this, as one of the principal metaphysical problems √

*creates the world or at least sustains it in being – can or even must itself be temporally determined, or whether this is ruled out for it.* The greatest difficulty arises in this connection for both the theory of time and for the definitive clarification of being, namely: does time have a *universal* significance for *every sort of individual*, “*insular [vereinzelt]*” being, and is [time] anchored in the *essence of being itself*, or is it a merely *phenomenal* form for a subject endowed with a special cognitive structure (as Kant would argue), or, finally, is it valid only in a *narrowly delimited* domain of individual existence as determination of its mode of being? This difficulty, too, is most intimately connected with our Controversy, as the very history of this problem already shows. But before we press ahead to these last problems, it is necessary to conduct a provisional survey of the possibilities that emerge for us from an existential point of view on the basis of the results attained pertaining to the world’s temporally determined mode of being.

We have assembled above<sup>15</sup> existentially admissible solutions to our Controversy. If, however, time were to belong to the essence of being-real, then the number of these solutions would have to diminish. For the being-in-time of an existent forces it to pass through the activeness-sphere. An existent’s activeness presupposes its autonomy. Hence, if the real world, or what exists in it, were really determined by time, then it would have to exist autonomously. Idealist dependence creationism and idealist unity creationism would then be unsuitable for the real world and would have to be dropped from the list of admissible solutions. If, however, pure consciousness too transpired in time, then<sup>869</sup> the modified<sup>870</sup> realisms in Groups VII and VIII of prospective solutions would also be disqualified. Therefore 11 admissible solutions of our Controversy would still survive following these deletions.<sup>871</sup> It is symptomatic, however, that among them are to be found only variants of realism or of realist creationism. Shrinking the number of solutions acceptable from an existential standpoint therefore depends now on whether the real world is in its essence temporally determined, and on whether such a world exists in fact. This will therefore have to be the principal theme of the metaphysical analysis. But it will turn out already prior to that stage that the number of ontologically admissible solutions must be curtailed even further.

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869 † the initially admitted solutions in which the heteronomy of pure consciousness is accepted, i.e., †

870 † absolute †

871 Of course, the negative solutions as well as the various double-solutions also belong among the admissible solutions. In this accounting [*Berechnung*] only *one* existential moment is taken into consideration in the mode of being-in-time– namely, autonomy. But being-in-time entails still other existential moments, which, when taken into account, will lead to excluding additional solution options.

## § 32. Rebuttal to an Objection

An objection that could be raised against this result is that it is not true that the time determination of an existent can only go hand in hand with its autonomy. Analysis of the literary work of art showed that the entities represented in it, which after all are nothing other than derivatively intentional, heteronomous constructs [*Gebilde*], are nevertheless or can be temporally determined, that, in other words, they are situated in a special time – precisely the one represented in the work. I was particularly keen on demonstrating there that these objects attain representation in their own temporal medium.<sup>872</sup> A study of the work of music also showed that it possesses its own temporal structure, and indeed what is meant by the latter is nothing other than the structure of the literary work in its evolution from beginning to end<sup>873</sup>, even though works of both types are purely intentional constructs that emerge from subjective operations.

Nonetheless, caution is called for here. The time represented in the literary work is completely different from the time in which the happenings of the real world transpire. The former is only an analogue of the latter.<sup>874</sup> In the time of real happenings any given present, and what is present, is characterized by genuine activeness and differs in this very regard from both the past and the future. In the merely intentionally projected and represented time this special distinctive feature is missing. Any given present of real happenings has – as I once expressed myself<sup>875</sup> – “an ontic advantage over the ‘actual’ past and – to an even greater degree – over any given future.” “This ‘*in actu esse*’ in the strict sense is proper only to the present and to the real entity existing in the present.” “It is commencing from there, from the now-phase, that what is past and the past [itself] are first determined, and in another direction the future and what is future.”<sup>876</sup>

“Now, the objects represented in the literary work are derived, purely intentional entities ... Their heteronomy, which only allows them to simulate real being in their contents, also necessarily implies that the time belonging to the represented quasi-real world is only an analogue of actual time. Of course present, past and future must also be distinguished in the represented time, but this distinction stems from the mutual *order* of the represented incidents rather than from all of them passing

872 Cf., R. Ingarden, *LWA*, § 36.

873 Cf., R. Ingarden, *Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst* [Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1962], *Das Musikwerk*, § 4, and *LWA*, Ch. 11.

874  $\Uparrow$  Ignoring other differences that depend solely on the *literary* mode of representing time there is the essential difference between purely intentionally projected time and the time of the real world: that  $\Uparrow$

875  $\Uparrow$  expressed myself in the previous book [the allusion must be to *LKW*]  $\Uparrow$

876 Cf., R. Ingarden, *LKW*, 2nd ed., p. 247.

through the distinctive phase of genuine ‘*in actu esse*’: it is precisely this that is impossible for them in the strict sense, otherwise they themselves would have to be actual. Only that simulated ‘*in actu esse*,’ that simulated ‘present’ (and therewith also past and future) is possible here ... Confined strictly to what is contained in the literary work, the represented present does not ‘have the privileged status of the genuine present’<sup>877</sup> vis-à-vis the represented past and future. Consequently, there is a certain leveling [*Angleichung*] of all temporal instants, similarly to the way this also occurs relative to the erstwhile now-instants of actual time that ‘already’ belong to the past.’<sup>878</sup>

To be sure, I have spoken in the cited passages about the “actual world” and “actual time”<sup>879</sup> in a way that is not permitted within the framework of our current deliberations. For there I have simply declared [*festgestellt*] the real world to be characterized by autonomy, and what is present in it – by genuine activeness ‘, and have set in opposition to this world the represented world with the represented time belonging to it.’<sup>880</sup> In the current phase of our deliberations we are not entitled to accept this straightforward declaration about the real world, ‘correct as it may be in itself and as challenged as I am here to elaborate and substantiate it’<sup>881</sup>. To that extent, the argument pertaining to the essential distinction between “represented” world or time, and “actual” world or time, is also considerably weakened.

There was a twofold essential motive for having once drawn the distinction:

1. There is the purely *phenomenal* difference between “actual” time – i.e., here primarily the time given to us along with the perceptual experience of, and comportment with, the objects that are given to us in the natural standpoint<sup>882</sup> – and that time which is intentionally projected and comes to be represented with the aid of linguistic constructs. In the first case we get the phenomenon of genuine activeness as well as that of the privileged existential status of any particular present over the past and future, whereas in the second we have the phenomenal leveling of all temporal instants with respect to each other. 2. There is an essen-

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877 ‘differ radically in any essential respect’ [This alteration is the result of Ingarden’s “translating” this passage into Polish. The entire book was later translated from the German into Polish by Maria Turowicz: *O dziele literackim*, Warszawa: PWN, 1960. The original German phrase was left intact in Turowicz’s published translation.]

878 Cf., *ibid.*, p. 250.

879 ‘, contrasted the one and the other to the “represented world” and “represented time” in the literary work, ‘

880 ‘. For the issue there was to contrast what *within the framework* of the literary work appears as an “actual” world with what appears in *extra-artistic* actuality. ‘

881 ‘irrespective of whether it is true and whether we ultimately manage to substantiate this position ‘

882 ‘ within the realm of the actual world ‘

tial link between genuine<sup>883</sup> activeness and existential autonomy. Where the latter is missing<sup>884</sup>, so is genuine activeness, and we may at best have an outward semblance of such activeness, a semblance that is evoked ‘in one way or another’<sup>885</sup>.

But what does “genuine” activeness mean here? It means an activeness that is immanent to the mode of being itself of what indeed exists autonomously – which, in other words, occurs autonomously in this mode of being – and not something that is only intentionally ascribed to an entity’s mode of being, and that with the aid of means lying beyond the object whose “active”<sup>886</sup> existence is in fact at issue.

Both these motives can certainly be acknowledged now without prejudging anything concerning the factual existence of the real world, nor concerning what in fact belongs to its mode of being. Nor do we need to decide anything here concerning the content of the idea of being-real. After clarifying the essential distinction between represented and “actual” time, we still have to demonstrate first of all that autonomy and activeness in the genuine [*wahrhaftem*] sense belong to the content of the idea of being-real, and secondly that time belongs to the factual essence of the being of the real world or its constituents, which entails the activeness of the present. It therefore needs to be shown that the activeness of what in fact (if at all) exists in the real world along with the whole of temporality is not something illusory (that is merely evoked by means of some sort of subjective operations), but is rather precisely genuine activeness.<sup>887</sup> As long as this has not been done, the number of 11 existentially admissible solutions remains undiminished in the sense that we are unable to say unconditional-

883 ‘(true)’

884 ‘where, therefore, we are dealing with a merely heteronomous object,’

885 ‘with the aid of the very activeness experienced by us’

886 [“*aktuale*”: this solitary instance of the word in the book may be a glitsch. The corresponding Polish word in this spot is ‘*aktualne*,’ which Ingarden employs as synonymous with the German ‘*aktuelle*.’]

887 It is interesting to see how the Kantian problem of time is indeed turned around in our problem-setting. For Kant it was important to show that time does not belong to the world of things in themselves. Meanwhile it turns out that it is precisely the other way around: the real world will be able to exist – as we ordinarily express it – “independently” of the subject of cognition\* if it can be shown that the entities belonging to it are really in time and are characterized in the present by a genuine activeness of their being. For this turns out to be the sufficient condition of their autonomous existence. We therefore – in direct opposition to Kant – will be intent on proving that time is no subjective form of intuition of our cognitive faculties, but rather has an effective presence [*effektiv auftritt*] within the real world – should the latter exist.

\* (i.e., in my terminology: will be capable of being autonomous with certainty)

ly that the idealist creationisms are ruled out. They only drop out if it can be shown that the real world or its components [*Elemente*] are temporally determined. But above we have asserted exactly that.

Meanwhile, another reproach surfaces against our claim that there is an essential link between an object's activeness and autonomy. It reads: Can really only something autonomous participate in the activeness of the present? What about the occurrence in time of heteronomous entities  $\Gamma$ , and indeed not in merely represented but in "actual" time? Does not their eventual "being-in-time" rule out their heteronomy?<sup>888</sup> Have I not accorded heteronomy to the literary work in my book *The Literary Work of Art*, and yet also claimed that it originates at some particular time, exists for some time and undergoes various changes during its existence, indeed – as a consequence of the manifold relations into which it enters with both author and reader? I have even employed the concept of the "life" of the literary work  $\Gamma$ . It would seem therefore that the "being-in-time" of the literary work (and of other works of art) is to be accepted without question. In this character of the literary work of art was also grounded the argument that such a work is no type of ideal object, as Waldemar Conrad had maintained. Do we not therefore have to relinquish the claim concerning the necessary link between "being-in-time" and the activeness of the present, and precisely therewith [relinquish] autonomy?<sup>889</sup>

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888  $\Gamma$  Can they not exist "in time" and participate in the stream of objects changing in time, and even possibly themselves change with the latter? If it were so, their heteronomy would not exclude their activeness, and our claim concerning an essential (and thereby necessary) link between autonomy and activeness would have to be abandoned. But it seems that such is indeed the case.  $\Gamma$

889  $\Gamma$  and pointed out various facts from which it would follow that the literary work not only changes in the course of time but also that, owing to some of its attributes, it belongs to some specific epoch in human history, that it "ages" with the passage of time, and occasionally even "dies out," and this even if it is a *genuine* work of art, not to speak of the case in which it is an average creation or altogether devoid of value.\* And great works of art fade away in the course of time in such manner as makes it impossible to revive them in any way. This existence in time of the literary work was important to me in various respects. For from this I drew an argument that the literary work is not an ideal object (which, incidentally, could have been proved along a different path). Broad perspectives are also opened up on this basis pertaining to the role of the literary work of art in the evolution of human culture. Moreover, what can be stated concerning this issue with regard to the literary work is also true in reference to other cultural products. This whole problem is therefore of fundamental significance for the philosophical grounding of the specific character of human history and culture. Were we to exclude what is heteronomous from the range of what appears or can appear within the scope of the concrete time experienced by us human beings, we would therewith cancel a certain

On the other hand, the temporality of everything that shows up as real in factual experience does not prevent idealists from claiming that the real world is dependent on the operations of pure consciousness and is nothing other than an intentional construct [*Gebilde*] of this consciousness.<sup>890</sup> "To be sure, the idealists have not become cognizant of the various existential moments and their relations to temporality. "Working out the mode of being of the real world and its existential relativity to pure consciousness was dear to Husserl's heart, yet he did not significantly advance the relevant analyses, and in particular did not work out the concept of existential heteronomy. But he strongly emphasizes the temporality of everything real. At the same time it is very likely that Husserl did after all have the phenomenon of heteronomy within the purview of his inquiries, since he claims, among other things, concerning what is real – which, according to him, is supposed to be "instituted [*gestiftet*]" by pure consciousness – that it has no essence of its own in the genuine sense, which is in perfect agreement with its heteronomy. Hence this too would appear to suggest that we are not on target when we claim here that being-temporal and heteronomy are mutually exclusive.

Nonetheless, on closer inspection we must insist on our position in this matter. Let us for the moment disregard the question as to whether concrete experience, which transpires in manifolds of various sorts of perceptions, rightfully grasps (or, as Husserl would put it, "posits") the things and processes given in it as "real," or whether – through a complicated process of "constitution" – it only leads to a special system of ultimately "intentional" entities. Irrespective of how this may turn out in the end – and withholding this final decision is in perfect accord with our methodical procedure throughout this inquiry – there is no denying that the entities grasped in experience are given not only as temporally determined but at the same time as grounded and determined within themselves, that they give themselves to us as – in a word – autonomous; and they also change in time precisely as autonomous, and as autonomous they achieve the specific activeness of the present. Both these phenomena – temporality with the specific phenomenon of activeness and the temporality of what exists autonomously – are intimately bound up with each other in what is given to us in experience. And precisely this givenness of temporally determined, active and au-

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stratum of the world surrounding man, a stratum that is essential to and characteristic of his mental and "spiritual" life.\*\*

\* Cf. in this connection Ch. XIII of my *The Literary Work of Art*.

\*\* Cf. my article "Man and his Reality," in *Tydzień Polski* [Polish Week], Lwów, 1934, reprinted in the book *Szkice z filozofii literatury* [Sketches in the Philosophy of Literature], Łódź, 1947. †

890 † [Ftn.:] *Nota bene*, is there any analysis of time in Berkeley at all? †

tonomous being constitutes the point of departure for the entire problematic as to whether this world which exists in this way, and is active in the present but also transient, is legitimately such [*so zu Recht besteht*] or only a so projected [*vermeintes*], intentional correlate of certain manifolds of experience. If the latter is the case, then *everything* is only a strange semblance: just as much the being-temporal of what is (putatively) real as its activeness within the present, and ultimately the autonomy of its being. These therefore always go together: effective, genuine temporality, activeness and autonomy – or “putative,” somehow illusory, merely intentional temporality, activeness and autonomy. There is no doubt whatsoever that there can be something like “putative” temporality, putative activeness and, finally, also “putative” autonomy, and it is precisely this that makes the entire controversy between idealism and realism so acute, but then also makes it possible. It is not, however, the business of ontology to decide whether the real world is characterized by genuine or putative (merely intentional) autonomy, genuine or merely putative activeness and temporality – that is the business of a final metaphysical resolution. In contrast, the ontological solution can only decide what of these phenomena must go together and what is mutually exclusive. And in this context, we continue to maintain our claim that genuine temporality necessarily implies the existent’s genuine activeness in the present and that genuine activeness has genuine autonomy as its necessary presupposition. We assert here no more than that, but neither can we relinquish any part of this claim.

When applied to cultural products such as literary works or to works of art in general, this means that as merely intentional constructs (even though with corresponding foundation in reality) they are not situated in the true sense in time, nor do they change, in the strict sense, in time. What exists and passes in time in the strict sense are only the poet’s intentional, creative acts and the reader’s acts of apprehending, but whatever is “formed [*gebildet*]” in these, i.e., the literary work itself, is only “putatively” in time, and the activeness of what is real in the true sense (should something of the sort in fact exist) can never be attained by this putative, heteronomous being. However, its semblance of being situated in time follows from its being the intentional correlate of creative acts of consciousness, which are themselves temporally determined – determined effectively in the true sense. By belonging to these acts, which themselves bear the stamp of the unequivocally determined temporal *quale* of some determinate present, the literary work begins itself (e.g., some particular poem or an object represented in it) to seemingly participate in the temporal character of the respective present. For just as no property or moment of purely intentional entities accrues to them autonomously, so also is it not possible for that temporal *quale* to effectively determine the respective entities. Thus only by correlating various



cultural products (works of art among them) to particular phases of “actual” time and to specific mental structures and processes in the creators and recipients of such products, and that on the basis of their mutual inner kinship, do they achieve the semblance of a temporal determination and belong to particular epochs of historical evolution. This only attests to the fact that not the whole world surrounding us human beings, which appears to us to be real, is “in truth” so. As will later turn out<sup>891</sup>, entire strata and domains of objects can be distinguished in it which do indeed have their existential support in deeper, autonomous strata of the world, but which can themselves no longer lay claim to this character of autonomous being. The task is to demonstrate that the “real world” in the strict sense can be bounded off from this world surrounding us, i.e., a world that is in principle different in its being from the mode of being of cultural products. In the contrary case, the whole world surrounding us would have to be of the same sort in its mode of being as the “world” of our poems, musical works, etc. This constitutes the main point of the controversy [*Kontroverse*] over the existence of the world.<sup>892</sup>

The objection against the claim concerning the necessary link between the activeness and the autonomy of being which is raised on the basis of the putative temporality of cultural products falls by the wayside once it is shown that we have no right to ascribe genuine and effective being-in-time to these products. They are never, in truth, active and for this very reason also never in time – precisely because they are merely heteronomous.

We still need to ask whether both of the imperfections of the existence of temporally determined objects ascertained by me – the “fissure-character” of active being and the fragility of the existence of living beings – are connected with the essence-dictated derivativeness of what exists temporally. “Both [connections] must be affirmed.”<sup>893</sup> At any rate, fragility of being (and to a still greater degree: mortality) rules out originality. For what is original, insofar as it exists at all, is in accordance with its essence “eternal” in the sense that it cannot be annihilated. “It is in accordance with its material essence that it must exist, provided of course that there is such an essence [*Wesenheit*]. The latter would first have to be made intuitively discernible [*einsichtig*] from the qualitative endowment of something that exists in such a way.”<sup>894</sup> However, an existent that in

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891 Cf. Ch. IX, § 47, with regard to the formal structure of purely intentional objects, as well as Ch XV with regard to various domains of being and their interaction [*Verflechtung*].

892 “ See Appendix K. ”

893 “ It appears that such indeed is the case. ”

894 “ Hence, in virtue of its essence, it cannot not exist, and *must* exist as soon as a suitable ideal quality is found (*idealerweise*) that would comprise its nature (which of course could

accordance with its essence admits of being annihilated, and even demands [*fördert*] self-dissolution after a certain time, can be neither “eternal” in virtue of essence, nor existentially necessary. But since originality and derivativeness totally exclude each other, every living being must be derivative no matter the extent to which it may existentially be the relatively strongest among temporal existents – disregarding the absolutely immutable, persistent entities, the possible existence of which within a world appears highly dubious. *A fortiori* all the remaining types of temporally determined entities – the absolutely immutable excepted – must also be derivative.

But the fragility of being presupposes the fissurative character [*Spalthaftigkeit*] of being-active, though not conversely. What is changeable in its essence must at the same time – it would appear – exist in such a mode of being that the individual phases of its fluctuating states must pass through just a *single* phase of activeness and then make room for the other states or phases of the evolving process. It must therefore exist in a fissurative [*spalthafte*] mode. On the other hand, it does not conversely appear to be necessary that something which for some specific reasons exists in a fissurative mode would at the same time have to be existentially fragile, and would therefore have to include within itself the possibility of a change, and even eventually “in fact”<sup>895</sup> change.<sup>896</sup> It would then simply be unintelligible wherein the fissurative character of its being is grounded. But that is an issue onto itself “with which we need not concern ourselves here”<sup>897</sup>.

### § 33. New Concepts of Modes of Being

In deliberating the impact of the prospective temporality of real objects on the set of existentially admissible solutions to our Controversy, I have only taken into account the occurrence of autonomy in the mode of being of what is temporal. If, on the other hand, other existential moments of temporal being are also

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only be demonstrated on the basis of an intuition-driven discovery of such a quality, which is to say – on the basis of apprehending the *qualitative endowment* of something that exists in such a manner!) ”

895 “ effectively ”

896 “ On the contrary, it seems possible for something to exist fissurately [*szczelinowo = spalthaft*] – for it to continually shift through a *bounded* [or *limited*] phase of activeness – and yet remain the same without change in any respect. ”

897 “ ,independent of the relations obtaining between the fissure-character of existence and its fragility ”

taken into account, we can rest assured that the number of these solutions will be further diminished.

Toward that end, it is first of all necessary to formulate new concepts of modes of being that are richer in content. I am not prepared to decide at this stage whether the existential moments employed for this purpose in what follows are sufficient to determine the individual modes of being in full. Further analyses are probably still required here.

A. I. *Absolute supratemporal being*.<sup>898</sup> This mode of being is characterized by the following existential moments: originality, autonomy, activeness, non-fissuration, durability [*Dauerhaftigkeit*], selfsufficiency and independence.

But another variant of “absolute” being – one could say, an imperfect one – also appears to be possible. To wit:

I a) existential originality, autonomy, activeness, fissuration of being, durability, selfsufficiency and independence.

Whether one or another of these variants of “absolute” being does in fact obtain anywhere, whether they are both possible or only one of them, and which one – those are questions that yet remain to be clarified. And they need not be clarified purely ontologically first and foremost. In particular, the question at issue is whether the “fissurative character” of the being of what exists actively can be overcome by means of an unrestricted broadening of the span of the present, if we may put it that way. That this span is alterable only in admittedly very modest measure, is something we know<sup>899</sup> from our daily experience – as Bergson has observed.<sup>900</sup> But whether it is possible to broaden these relatively narrow bounds, and effectuate [*aktivieren*] being in such a way that activeness could encompass the collective past and the entire future<sup>901</sup> – that is one of the deepest and most difficult problems of both existential and material ontology. An af-

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898 Let the names here assigned to the individual modes of being only provisionally express the presumption that the concepts we have constructed correspond to the modes of being of the particular basic types of objects given in immediate experience. Some further formal inquiries are needed to decide whether this presumption is correct. ¶ It seems to me at any rate that the construction of these concepts represents the first attempt to go beyond the vague discourse ordinarily employed in speaking about the various modes of being, and to replace it with rigorous concepts. ¶\*

\* ¶ It seems to me nonetheless that we are already closer to that resolution than we were prior to conducting deliberations pertaining to objects’ temporal determination. ¶

899 ¶ at least purely phenomenally ¶

900 ¶ This also appears to be supported by the facts of so-called “biological time,” which is different for different types of organisms. ¶

901 ¶ , so that along this path everything would somehow become “one instant,” or whether, on the contrary, such a thought brims with absurdity ¶

firmative reply to this question would lead to a special manner of overcoming time. Fissurative temporal existence would then only be the expression of such a weakening of efficaciousness [*Aktivität*], and of the existent's capacity for being apprehended, that different (but not mutually contradictory) qualifications of the existent would be spread out over the different successive instants of time. But if we had to reject this possibility, and be forced at the same time to accept that every existent that must be characterized by activeness in its mode of being must also expand [*sich entfalten*] in a fissurative manner over the different presents, then only the solitary mode of being adduced under Ia) would remain for the "durable" existent – which [latter] is simply a temporal symptom of originality.

We can give a different twist to the problem under discussion, and ask whether everything that exists individually must exist in time or whether that is not necessary, so that [in the latter case] a supratemporal, non-fissurative, individual being would be possible. And secondly, we can ask whether time is one and the same for all variants of individual being, or whether a variety of differently structured times are possible which would be characteristic for the various types of individual being – as Bergson argues. All these questions would have to be considered on their own account, and that in the most intimate connection with material-ontological issues; nevertheless, it is already now useful to have at our disposal certain limiting existential concepts [*existenziale Grenzbegriffe*], and indeed even if it should later turn out that the being corresponding to these concepts is not met with [*nicht vorhanden ist*] at all, or is even impossible on material grounds.

As a second fundamental mode, that mode of being now emerges which does not display within itself the moment of activeness at all. And it does not do so either because this moment is simply missing, or is replaced by some other –by potentiality, for example. We must seek a mode of being that would be proper to supratemporal, "ideal" entities – say, to mathematical objects or ideas. But in this realm we can find nothing that would be characterized by existential activeness – in the sense determined earlier. Yet, neither can we haphazardly claim that in this realm the place of activeness is taken by the pure potentiality of the merely possible, although the history of philosophy is not lacking in attempts to simply set the ideal on a par with the possible. To be sure, the analysis of the contents of ideas – as we initially ventured it – has shown that so-called variables occur in them, which are concretizations of possibilities. However, alongside the variables in ideas' contents there are also the constants, which existentially appear to be something different from something merely possible. †The same also pertains to individual mathematical objects, hence, e.g., individual triangles that are congruent to each other, which likewise are no mere possibilities – namely, as we often say, "ideal," "logical" possibilities – but are rather individual objects with their intrinsic

sically inherent determinations.<sup>902</sup> But I would still not wish at this juncture to resolve this whole difficult issue, which is so fundamental for the philosophical interpretation of mathematics, without more detailed investigation. Besides, the solution of this problem is not vital to our main problem, important as it is from a methodological standpoint. Hence we must here rest satisfied with a merely hypothetically forged concept of an ontologically admissible mode of being. It can be specified in the following manner:

B. *Supratemporal – ideal? – being:*

II a	II b	II c
autonomy	autonomy	autonomy
originality	originality	originality
non-activeness (potentiality?)	non-activeness (potentiality?)	non-activeness (potentiality?)
selfsufficiency	selfsufficiency	selfsufficiency
independence	dependence	—————

We still need to make a couple of remarks pertaining to mode of being B. First of all, it is debatable whether originality is to be admitted into this mode of being or whether it should be replaced by derivativeness. If the former, we would have to prove that everything to be found in the realm of ideal being exists necessarily on the basis of its constitutive nature. But can this be accomplished? Then again, it also does not seem acceptable to regard all ideal entities – mathematical entities, logical structures and interconnections, ideas, ideal qualities (*Wesenheiten*) – as something derivative, so that they would all somehow have to be created by some existentially original being. Christian philosophy was certainly often inclined to regard all of these entities as having been created by God, but this appears to lead to difficulties, such as, e.g., whether supratemporal objects could still have an origin. Perhaps we should distinguish two different variants of supratemporal being: the one in which originality would be included, and the other – characterized by derivativeness. In the first would exist the basic elements of some particular domain of ideal entities, in contrast to the second, in which would exist those objects that are predetermined by, and precisely therewith derived from, these basic elements. Axioms would then govern the first, and the latter, in contrast, would be governed by assertions logically dependent on them. Meanwhile, let this pass for a pure conjecture which would first have

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902 「 On the other hand, it seems doubtful that the existence of mathematical objects – say, of well-defined triangles – could simply be reduced to non-contradiction, as some would have it. 」

to find its confirmation in further analyses. It is mentioned here in order to call attention to how multifarious are the existential problems relating to supratemporal, “ideal” entities.<sup>903</sup>

Our second remark pertains to the three different possible variants of mode of being B. Formal analyses that we shall later lay out will show that these variants are intimately connected with certain formal constraints on individual objects or ideas, and also with certain formal relations that obtain among<sup>904</sup> objects of the same existential domain<sup>905</sup>. “What may here perhaps ring strange, will there come across as quite natural.”<sup>906</sup>

The next mode of being is characteristic of temporally determined objects or those persisting in time. It is prospectively the mode of being of real entities.

C. *Temporally determined (real?) being*<sup>907</sup>:

a) the present

IIIaa	IIIab	IIIac
autonomy	autonomy	autonomy
derivativeness	derivativeness	derivativeness
activeness	activeness	activeness
fissuration	fissuration	fissuration
fragility	fragility	fragility
selfsufficiency	selfsufficiency	non-selfsufficiency
independence	dependence	_____

903 Without a satisfactory clarification of these problems, nothing can be settled regarding the factual existence of “ideal” entities either. The reproach of so-called “Platonism” with which I have occasionally been charged is to be rebutted for the sole reason, if for no other, that the formal analyses pertaining to ideas presented in this book go far beyond anything to be found in Plato. From another perspective, I do not espouse here many of those claims of Plato’s which constitute the core of his metaphysical conception of ideas. Also the notion that ideas are supposed to be cognized in some sort of special recollection could not be further from my mind.

904 “ideal”

905 “say, among objects of mathematical inquiry”

906 “E.g., the notion might be advanced that mode of being BIIa is suitable for particular ideal *objects* (e.g., particular squares), mode of being BIIb would be appropriate to *relations* among ideal objects (e.g., the area of a circle is greater than the area of the square inscribed in it), and, finally, BIIc would work out for states of affairs obtaining in ideal objects or for their properties. However, these are just suggestive conjectures that emerge from attempting to apply the differentiated modes of being to ideal entities. On the other hand, no definitive decisions ought to be taken at this moment. For the time being, we should simply state that such variants of modes of being are possible in type B.”

907 “in three correlative variants”

## b) the past

IIIba	IIIbb	IIIbc
autonomy	autonomy	autonomy
derivativeness	derivativeness	derivativeness
post-activeness	post-activeness	post-activeness
(retroactive	(retroactive	(retroactive
derivativeness)	derivativeness)	derivativeness)
selfsufficiency	selfsufficiency	non-selfsufficiency
independence	dependence	_____

## c) the future

IIIca	IIIcb
heteronomy	heteronomy
derivativeness	derivativeness
empirical possibility	empirical possibility
selfsufficiency	non-selfsufficiency
dependence	_____

These three arrays of possible variants of mode of being C belong together. It is precisely on their correlation that what is specific to temporal or real being hinges. What is present cannot in the next instant not be past, and it could not an instant ago not be future. And what is past must first have been present, and [must have been] future even before that. And, finally, what is future cannot be future without at some point becoming present and afterwards past. In other words: what exists in time (the real?) must pass through these three different variants of mode of being C. The necessary passage through these three variants of mode of being C first constitutes what is specific to the mode of being we call being-real. It would appear that we have come close at this juncture to a definitive grasp of being-real as a mode of being. Nevertheless, this outcome must first be confirmed by formal and material investigations. In other words: in order for everything to be consistent, both the form and the matter of what exists in the mode of reality must be of such a kind that mode of being C in the three variants we have just defined must prove to be necessary for it. To put it more precisely: objects determined by such [real] form and matter could not exist in any way other than in the mode of being defined under C, should they exist at all. Hence, it needs to be shown that there “are” or can be such forms and matters, that they of themselves require essentially mode of being C for the entities fashioned by them; only then would the problem of reality be solved in a satisfactory manner.

As was indicated, in every variant of mode of being C there are three different modalities, which, just as in mode of being B, correspond to the different variants of the formal makeup of the respective entities. And our formal analyses will confirm this. Modalities IIIaa, IIIba and IIIca correspond to the mode of being of persistent objects; modalities IIIab, IIIbb and IIIcb correspond to the mode of being of processes; and, finally, modalities IIIac, IIIbc and IIIcb correspond to the mode of being of events. These last modalities correspond not only to events, but to anything at all that is non-selfsufficient within the scope of the real (e.g., to properties). But all of these are just indications that will be later treated in detail.

Finally, one more mode of being can be defined which occurs in only two modifications. To the sphere of this mode of being belong, among others, the purely intentional objects:

D. *Purely intentional being (being-possible?):*

IVa	IVb
heteronomy	heteronomy
derivativeness	derivativeness
inactuality	inactuality
selfsufficiency	non-selfsufficiency
dependence	————

This is how a coherent system of possible variants of what exists begins to gain its contours, a system in which appear four different modes of being and four domains of being that correspond to them: 1) absolute being, 2) ideal being, 3) temporally determined (real) being, and 4) the realm of the heteronomous, which contains the purely intentional entities  $\tau$ . It is possible that both absolute and ideal being can still be on hand, or be possible, in two different variants. It is clear that two possible directions of research surface here which, however, we shall not be able to pursue further at this time, as enticing as it would be to reach a decision in this respect: the first is to ask whether some ultimate nexus exists between the differentiated modes and domains of being that could be intuitively grasped, and would make the entire system intelligible to us in its inner cohesion [*Verbundenheit*] and unity; and secondly, to ask whether these four domains and modes of being already exhaust all the possibilities, so that this system truly embraces the totality of existentially admissible being. But in order to glean certain insights in this direction, we would still have to get clear on the various possible existential relations between the differentiated domains of being, which at the moment far exceeds



our state of knowledge – as well as the scope of our main question. And it may well be doubted whether purely ontological commitments are possible here, whether one would not necessarily have to trespass the bounds of ontology in this instance and be forced to reach toward metaphysics. It is clear in any case that the problems outlined cannot be attacked within the framework of an ontology that is only existential, since they should probably first be articulated in material investigations.

But the problem context is becoming clearer for us in the sense that we are now in a position to pose the question: In which of the four sections of the partitioned system of existents ought we to seek for that “real” world given to us in coherent [*einheitlichen*] experience. And an analogous question pertains to pure consciousness of the type given to us in immanent perception. It is also clear at the same time, however, that we are unable to answer this question at the moment. With the insights achieved and the existential-ontological concepts forged, we can only get oriented as to whether we now still need to strike something from, or adjoin something to, the array of existentially admissible solutions already assembled, in order to acquire a complete overview of the now available possibilities.<sup>908</sup>

Let us first of all note that “real” being’s occurring in mode of being Ia, as designated above, is not ruled out. Formal and material analyses will first be able to lead us to results that are decisive in this regard. For the time being we must reckon with the eventuality of a “real” being that would satisfy the existential conditions spelled out under Ia. But in this case, what is real could not change in any respect.

In other words: if we managed to show that the real world, or everything contained in it, is in its essence absolutely immutable, even though it is temporally determined at the same time, and hence at least contains neither living nor conscious beings, then those solution options would be admitted in which the real world is treated as original, and pure consciousness could not occur in such a world. That is to say, it could not be non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis the real world

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908 ¶ , whereby absolute being could still occur in two different variants.\* For the time being, no choice can be made as to which from amongst them would ultimately be suited for the mode of being of a world given to us in coherent experience as “real,” or for the mode of being of pure consciousness. ¶

\* ¶ [Ftn.:] In the course of making corrections of this book, when 12 signatures had already been set in print, a book by Etienne Sourian, entitled *Les différents modes d'existence*, Paris [: Presses universitaires de France], 1943, came into my possession. I was unable to study and acknowledge it at that stage. I mention it as proof that the problems that motivated me to write my book were almost contemporaneously the focus of lively discussion in French philosophy. ¶

or its constituents, or be dependent on that world. It would have to be wholly extra-mundane.<sup>909</sup> And that is because incessant changes occur within pure consciousness, and a consciousness in which there were no changes and transformations [*Veränderungen und Wandlungen*] of any sort is altogether unthinkable (impossible).

Under these assumptions, not only all cases of creationism – 6 altogether – would have to be dropped from the 15 existentially admissible solutions to our Controversy listed earlier, but also those realisms which allow for the mutual non-selfsufficiency of the world and pure consciousness. In particular, modified absolute realism (V, 1) and dualist unity realism (V, 3) would have to be dropped. We would then still be left with 7 existentially admissible solutions.

Meanwhile, it is highly unlikely that the real world would consist exclusively of absolutely immutable objects, and this already on the basis of formal grounds with which we are yet to deal later.<sup>910</sup> If, on the contrary, we managed to show that the real world consists, in accordance with its essence, exclusively of changeable objects persisting in time, along with processes and events, then all those cases would have to be excluded – from among the 15 solution possibilities proffered – in which originality is demanded of the real world.<sup>911</sup> In place of the absolute realisms, we would have to allow various modalities of “weakened” realism in which the real world would indeed have to be considered as derived from some third factor, yet at the same time as not derived from pure consciousness. It would then be a world that is encountered [*vorgefundene*] by pure consciousness.

The different options discussed here in turn can coexist in various combinations, although they need not do so. We therefore have to examine which of the 15 admissible solutions named would have to fall by the wayside as a consequence of the individual possible commitments we have discussed, and which, on the other hand, would have to drop away if several or even all of these possible commitments were to obtain simultaneously. Let us emphasize in this connection that at the moment we know nothing positive of either the form or the material essence of the real world that would be significant for its mode of being. And the same applies to pure consciousness. The subsequent investigations can first instruct us as to which of the prospective solutions here designated as still admissible will remain tenable following all of our

909 † [Ftn.:] It is also probably no accident that radical materialism at the same time betrays a tendency to ascribe originality to matter, even though it is unaware of all the consequences of this [commitment]. †

910 Cf. † the expositions pertaining to the form of the world in † § 69.

911 † For this would be ruled out by the *fragility* of existence of objects that change, of living beings in particular. †

ontological analyses. From the point of view of a fully rational structure, the ideal would be if the final ontological reckoning were to lead to a *single* solution. At the moment, however, this does not appear to be necessary in principle, since neither of the remaining cases has yet been ruled out – in which either more than one ontologically admissible solution would survive, or none at all. In the former case, we would have to search through metaphysical analysis for that solution which would ultimately remain as the sole one. In the latter case, in contrast, we would have to concede that an error lurks somewhere in our analyses which makes every one of the solutions we have discussed impossible. At that point we would have to begin everything anew – from scratch, so to speak.

But confining ourselves here to existential-ontological analysis, we obtain the following result:

- a) should the real world prove to be temporally determined, which demands of the world that it be existentially autonomous, two of the 15 solutions would drop out:
  - 1) idealist dependence creationism (I, 7)
  - 2) idealist unity creationism (I, 8)
- b) should pure consciousness prove to be temporally determined, which rules out its heteronomy, the next two would have to fall away:
  - 1. modified absolute realism<sup>912</sup> (VII, 1)
  - 2. modified absolute realism<sup>913</sup> (VIII, 1)

Should both the real world and pure consciousness be simultaneously determined by time, therefore, only 11 of the 15 solution possibilities on offer would remain.

If we were now in turn to admit existential fragility only for the real world or only for pure consciousness, then we would in either case always wind up with 13 remaining solution possibilities; if we were to admit fragility for both at the same time, we would wind up with only 11 remaining solutions, since fragility entails the temporality of temporal entities. But since fragility at the same time rules out the originality of what is fragile, the following of the 11 remaining solution possibilities would also have to be stricken:

- 1. absolute realism (I, 1)
- 2 – 6. modified absolute realisms of types II – VI (II, 1 – VI, 1)
- 7. modified dependence realism of type II (II, 4).

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912 [Reading ‘realism’ for ‘creationism.’]

913 [See preceding note.]

Of the 11 solutions still remaining, 7 more would have to drop away; hence, only 4 solutions would remain, which would need to be further investigated in the subsequent analyses. And they are:<sup>914</sup>

1. absolute creationism (I, 2)
2. realist dependence-creationism (I, 5)
3. realist unity creationism (I, 6)<sup>915</sup>
- 4<sup>916</sup>.modified realist unity creationism<sup>917</sup> (V, 6)

If, however, we decided to allow the weakened realism in the sense determined above, then, even assuming the fragility of both the world and pure consciousness, all 11 of the just mentioned solutions would be preserved, from amongst which we would have to choose consequent to further ontological analyses. We should not forget, however, that every weakened realism introduces – alongside the real world and pure consciousness – a wholly new existential factor from which the real world would have to be derived. This produces a totally new situation as point of departure for the entire problematic, which would force us to alter the style of our whole analysis. To uphold this transcendental mode of analysis, that new existential factor would somehow have to be derived from pure consciousness, whereby once again various possibilities for solving this new existential problem would be opened up. On the other hand, whoever regards such a derivation from pure consciousness as uncalled for, or even impossible, would indeed have to concede along with this that the purely transcendental mode of analyzing the entire question-complex has to be abandoned, and that the problematic would have to be set on a wholly new foundation and articulated in a new way. It is not ruled out that we may be compelled to grapple with this situation. For the time being, let this only be mentioned as a consequence of the prospectively to be admitted, weakened realism.

¶To conclude this phase of analysis, we only wish to point out the great significance that time and temporal determination of the world and of pure consciousness have in the whole question-complex of the idealism/realism Controversy. For this reason it behooves us in the future to seek means that will allow

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914 ¶ 7. dualist unity realism (I,3),

8. modified dualist unity realist of type II (V,3),

9. dependence realism (I,4),

10. modified dependence realism of type I (II,4).

Only *five* possible solutions would remain in that case, one of which would be dubious (V, 2): ¶

915 ¶ 4. Modified absolute creationism of type I (V, 2) ¶

916 ¶ 5. ¶

917 ¶ of type I ¶

us to grasp the temporality of an existent, and of the world in particular, in an indubitable manner. On this apprehension depends not only the possibility of reducing the initially overwhelming number of prospective solutions to four ontologically admissible ones, but – after shifting to metaphysical analysis – of also arriving at a final resolution.<sup>918</sup>

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918 「 For the time being we do not wish to commit to any of the indicated eventualities. Perhaps one point has already become clear on the basis of our last sequence of analyses, namely, the great significance for the entire problematic that accrues to the problem of time and the temporal determination of the real world and pure consciousness. It became apparent at the same time which points we shall have to address in subsequent analyses in order to arrive at a resolution. It became clear, finally, that the initially overwhelming number of possible solutions will gradually have to diminish. The course of formal and material analyses will fortify us in this conviction. We shall now turn to these. 』

## Appendix A [Ch. II, § 6, n. 33, 37]

⌈[§ 6, n. 33 (*Spór*, p. 46-7, n. 1):] What is said in the text concerning empirical possibility does not shed light on the *sense* of possibility or on the mode of existence of what is empirically possible; it simply sets out the *conditions* under which some state of affairs X is empirically possible.

It seems that X can be “possible” – in a *variety* of cases. Why does a particular state of affairs *not* obtain in the “current [*teraniejszej = jetzige*]” actuality? Either because it had *already* obtained and been consummated (prior to instant **t**), or because it has *not yet* obtained up to instant **t**, and does not obtain in it. We are not interested in the first case. In the second case, however, the reasons why state of affairs X fails to emerge and obtain at instant **t** may be the following:

- a) at instant **t**, states of affairs Y obtain in the real world which are an *indispensable*, yet *insufficient*, condition for the emergence of X;
- b) *apart from* [those in] (a), states of affairs Z obtain which *preclude* the emergence of X at instant **t**, and we know nothing about the durability of those Z;
- c) (a) is in effect, and in addition a state of affairs Z obtains which precludes X, but is such that it will *cease* to obtain at instant **t'** > **t** – so that following instant **t'** there will no longer be any obstacles to the emergence of X for *this* reason, and everything will depend on whether Y becomes completed and on whether or not it can ever be completed into a sufficient condition for the emergence of X. If Y were such that it could “never” be completed into a sufficient condition for the emergence of X, then X would always remain “merely possible” for all **t**<sup>n</sup> [> **t**]. In such a case, would it not be rather more appropriate to say that X is “impossible,” i.e., that it will *never* be capable of being “realized”? As we see, insufficiently conditioned states of affairs can be divided into two classes:  $\alpha$ ) those that are “possible” in the narrower sense of this word, i.e., Y can be completed into a sufficient condition, but there are *insufficient* data (i.e., there are no states of affairs either *pro* or *contra*) in the real world’s *actual* state at instant **t** as to whether it will in fact be completed;  $\beta$ ) those that are “merely possible,” but will never be capable of being realized since Y cannot be completed into a sufficient condition (one of the meanings of “impossibility”);
- d) only an ensemble of states of affairs obtains in the real world which precludes the emergence of X at the (current) instant **t**, and *not a single one* of those conditions obtains which are indispensable for the emergence of X – the second sense of “impossibility.” In this connection, there are two cases of (d):  $\alpha$ ) the states of affairs precluding X are *permanent* and will never yield, in which case X is always impossible;  $\beta$ ) the states of affairs preclud-

ing  $X$  are impermanent and can yield at some future time (more precisely: they will definitely yield – at some exactly or approximately specified instant, or at some unspecified instant): once they have yielded in the future there will no longer be any obstacles to the emergence of  $X$ , at which time  $X$  will become (negatively) “possible,” but nothing will “make it possible” since at the same time none of the conditions necessary for that will have been realized.

Various types and degrees of possibility and impossibility may occur, depending on which of the options (a), (b), (c), (d) obtains.

*Nota bene:* the options submitted above have *not* been made relative to our current state of *knowledge* [*wiedzy = Wissens*] about the real world, but only [relative] to the state of the world at instant  $t$ .

The cases of “possibility” discussed above belong to a class of events (states of affairs) which at (the present) instant  $t$  “have not yet occurred,” but that does not mean that they belong to “future” states of affairs. The class of “future” states of affairs constitutes a *subclass* of states of affairs which “have not yet occurred” at instant  $t$ . In contrast, states of affairs that are “possible” at instant  $t$  make up a class that is broader than the class of future states, but narrower than the class of states that “have not yet occurred.” For this [last] class embraces both “possible” and “impossible” states of affairs, but [both] of the *type*: real states of affairs. It may well be that the class of states possible at instant  $t$  *intersects* with the class of states of affairs [at]  $t^n > t$ , since we should concede that to future states of affairs (whose  $t^n > t$ ) also belong those which are “possible” at instant  $t$  as well as those that are impossible at *that* instant.

Two classes need to be distinguished among the states of affairs “possible” at instant  $t$ : a) those states of affairs which are “possible” at instant  $t$ , and will *definitely* emerge – because they are *unequivocally* predicted by  $W(t)$  = the world at instant  $t$  (is that possible?); b) those states of affairs which are possible at instant  $t$ , but  $W(t)$  marks out *numerous* possibilities from amongst which  $X$  is only one. Should we not speak of empirical “possibility” only in case (b)? Possibilities (a) are “necessary” at instant  $t$ , whereas possibilities (b) are not.

Empirical possibilities that are “not necessary” presuppose something different about the structure of the world than those that are “necessary.” The former require the existence of relatively closed systems (that is to say, involving a *finite* range of the world’s individual constituents), and perhaps some other conditions as well, whereas it seems to me that the latter require the world to be *one* system of universal and one-to-one specification (so that there are no two facts within the confines of the world which are *independent* of each other at instant  $t$ ,

and moreover so that existing situations do not mark out “multiple paths” that are independent of each other, and yet “equally possible.”)

[§ 6, n. 37] ▮ Moreover, the *degree* of possibility of one and the same state of affairs X changes depending on the extent to which the ensemble of states of affairs currently realized, and which constitutes the necessary but insufficient condition of state X, differs from the total state of affairs comprising the sufficient condition for state X. The greater the number of states of affairs of that latter ensemble to achieve realization, or to put it another way, the *less* that which gets realized differs from the sufficient condition, the *greater* the degree of possibility of state of affairs X.<sup>919</sup> If, on the other hand, the difference between the already realized ensemble of states of affairs belonging to the necessary condition and the sufficient condition *grows*, the possibility of state of affairs X *diminishes* accordingly. Once this difference becomes zero, i.e., once the *sufficient* condition for state of affairs X has been realized, this very state achieves realization, and thereby ceases to be “merely possible.”<sup>920</sup> Of course any of this is only valid if the sufficient condition for state of affairs X is *composed of several* different states of affairs which *do not in virtue of their essence always have to appear together*, and if at the same time *none* of the states of affairs Z has been realized. However, if any of the states of affairs Z has been realized, then *ipso facto* X becomes *impossible*, wholly independently of which states of affairs of ensemble Y have already been realized. Therefore two cases have to be sharply

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919 This sort of conception of the issue is of course just an expedient simplification of the exact situation. For it is not here a matter of a simple “more” or “fewer” states of affairs Y, since some of them may be “more important,” i.e., “have a greater impact” (even though none of them is in itself decisive), whereas others may be “less important.” However, it is no easy matter to elucidate precisely the sense of that “greater or lesser importance.” This *could* only be accomplished within the framework of a full theory of empirical possibility. I expanded the theory of empirical possibility along certain lines in a paper entitled “*O możliwości i warunkach jej zachodzenia w świecie realnym* [On Possibility and the Conditions of Its Occurrence in the Real World],” read at a meeting of the PAU in 1951. [*Sprawozdania PAU*, v. 52:1951, no. 2, pp. 123 -27.]

920 There are *various* concepts of possibility. Here I am attempting to characterize *one* of them, without concerning myself with the others. N. Hartmann deals extensively with these various concepts of possibility in the book *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit*, Berlin, 1938. Let me note that what I am here calling “real possibility” is frequently termed “likelihood” [or “probability”]. But this latter term is rather more applicable to the degree of certainty or substantiation of a *judgment* in the logical sense, than to the state of affairs which it specifies. My focus here is precisely on the very “possible” or “impossible” states of affairs in some particular actuality, in the real world.



distinguished: state of affairs X is *impossible* because one of the states of affairs Z<sup>921</sup> has set in, and b) the state of affairs is *no longer possible because it is already realized*. The realm of empirical possibility lies between these two extremes. Something that is actual (real) *was* possible, but once it has already been actualized it is no longer “possible.” Obviously, this does not rule out that it can be possible in a wholly different sense, in the sense, e.g., that it is admissible by means of “pure possibility.” The *relativity* of possibility with respect to *instant t* and *the variability of the degree of possibility* constitute what is characteristic for empirical possibility. Of course, the concept of empirical possibility could be restricted solely to – if we may put it that way – the “highest” degree of possibility in the sense introduced above, to a degree therefore at which it promptly comes to a transition of what is “possible” into actuality, and hence to a degree at which the *last* contributor to the sufficient condition is just being annexed, but has not yet been appended to the already prevailing states of affairs necessary for X, and thereby, as it were, *eo ipso compels* the realization of state X. That “highest” degree of possibility<sup>922</sup>, as well as that transition from possibility into actuality, is surely the most interesting and most difficult thing to understand within the realm of problems pertaining to possibility. However, since even that highest degree of “possibility” is characterized by those two conditions of empirical “possibility” I have set forth, it seems to me that there is no reason for such a restriction of the concept of possibility. It would rather be more appropriate to consider this case as a *limiting* case of empirical possibility, though no doubt a decisive case. If it is lacking for a certain state of affairs X’, then X’ does not exceed “bare” possibility and is not realized.<sup>7</sup>

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921 It is ordinarily assumed that the real world is free of contradictions (incompatibilities), that is to say, that the case is ruled out in which on the one hand states of affairs Y would make up the *full* sufficient condition for state of affairs X, which in view of this would have to be consummated, and that on the other hand some one of the states of affairs Z would simultaneously be realized. There are formal motives that make this assumption reasonable. Cf. § 72.

922 If I understand him correctly, N. Hartmann wishes to restrict the concept of possibility to this case. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 40 ff. I presented the concept of empirical possibility in the sense here advocated in a paper entitled “*Czy filozofia jest syntezą nauk szczegółowych?* [Is Philosophy a Synthesis of the Special Sciences?],” read in 1936 at the 3<sup>rd</sup> National Philosophical Congress in Cracow. [This paper was published under the title “*Czy zadaniem filozofii jest synteza wyników nauk szczegółowych?*” [Is It the Task of Philosophy to Synthesize the Findings of the Special Sciences?], *Kwart. Filoz.*, Vol. 13: 1936, no. 2, 1937, pp. 195 – 214.]

## Appendix B [Ch. III, § 17, n. 280]

¶However, the attempt to resolve the question in accordance with this interpretation poses the danger of committing all kinds of errors in the entire constellation of problems pertaining to idealism and realism, errors that would at once lead the investigations astray. In particular, the existential-ontological problem of actuality in this interpretation is in danger of being transformed into a *terminological* issue, which is simultaneously intertwined in a peculiar fashion with a particular *metaphysical* commitment. Hence, e.g., various “idealists,” commencing with Berkeley, assure us that by adopting an idealist position they accomplish nothing beyond eliminating a certain false *usage of the word* ‘actuality.’ Presumably this word is employed in everyday, prephilosophical discourse in a sense that idealist theory rejects as unfounded. In its proper, correct interpretation “actuality” *means* – so it is said – nothing other than the mode of being of the world factually given us in experience, and in particular – the mode of being of the things we perceive through the senses. At the same time, this mode of being is to be nothing other than what the given idealist theory proclaims it to be, and thus – in the sense of Berkeley’s position – *esse = percipi*<sup>923</sup>. In this way, one forestalls in advance the objection that theory clashes starkly with everyday experience – by simply *calling* “actuality” something entirely different than is ordinarily done, and denying the charge of any sort of conflict between theory and the prescientific, everyday view. On the other hand, the *metaphysical* problem of the existence of the world given to us factually in experience is thereby tacitly resolved in a *positive* manner, so that the entire task is simply reduced to providing a more detailed *definition* of the mode of being of a world whose factual existence has already been decided. But the result which is at issue in the entire controversy is not achieved by means of all this. Even disregarding the fact that all of the epistemological problems which lead to the metaphysical problem of the existence of the actual world are thereby set aside, we continue to remain in the dark as to what the actuality of something is, and consequently we do not know whether the world we are given in experience – provided it exists at all in some manner – is actual, or whether it differs in an essential way in its existence from actual being. But we really need to answer *both* questions: [1.] *Does the world given to us in experience exist?*; [2.] *In what manner* does it exist *insofar* as it exists at all; is it actual? Yet, in order to answer this second question, we *already* need to be *familiar with the ideas* of the various *modi existentiae*, with the *idea of actual being* in particular. The problems that lead to defining the *sense* of these questions, and then contribute to their resolution – and they are precisely those existential-ontological problems with which we are presently

923 Cf. my [“Berkeley” essay of] 1931.

dealing – need to be carefully enough formulated so that their content does not prejudice any positive resolution of the controversy’s substantive problems. *No* possibility should be ruled out without appropriate consideration. Among other things, despite everything – i.e., despite all the weight of everyday experience and the overall accomplishment of our scientific knowledge of the world – we need to reckon with the possibility that the idea of actuality does indeed single out precisely *that* mode of being in which the world given to us factually appears to exist, and yet that *despite this no “actual” world of this sort truly exists*; that all our sensory experience therefore presents itself as one *huge delusion*. On the other hand, we must also reckon with the possibility that – after unveiling the content of the idea of actuality – the world given us factually in experience will turn out to exist, but at the same time is not “actual” in the mode of its existence, whereby factual experience would not at all have to be illusory.

All of these possibilities would be ruled out in advance by the content of the question, were we to understand it in the sense of formulation (b). If instead we pose the question pertaining to the content of the idea of the actuality of something in accordance with interpretation (a), we shall not prejudice anything concerning the suggested possibilities.

### **Appendix C [Ch. IV, § 19, n. 40]**

Now, something that is existentially original cannot be non-selfsufficient with respect to something that is itself derivative. For an original object could not find itself in a situation in which it could not exist. If, however, it were non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis something derivative, then it would exist only under the condition that what it is non-selfsufficient with respect to, exists. Yet the latter, as derivative, might not exist, or it might cease to exist, and thereby annihilate the entity that cannot be annihilated in virtue of being original. Thus, its non-selfsufficiency vis-à-vis something *derivative* would lead to a contradiction with its originality.

We shall now apply this to the solution of our controversy currently under discussion. If we assume that pure consciousness is not derived from the real world, then we admit one of two cases: either that it is itself existentially original or that it is derived from something other than the real world. But if this second possibility is not ruled out by the assumption of our solution, then its contradictory is not ruled out, although at the same time that contradictory is not necessary. The entire case is therefore irresolvable as long as we do not resolve along some other path whether pure consciousness is original or whether it is derived from some third factor. As I have already previously indicated, it seems

rather likely that the consciousness lived through by us philosophizing subjects is factually derivative. It is thus a quite natural symptom that in the historically sought solutions that are akin to the case currently examined, this solution is transformed into one in which the originality of consciousness seems obvious, though it is not expressly explicated, whereby one obviously passes from the individual consciousness of particular philosophizing subjects over to divine consciousness (so-called “substance”). I shall presently return to this.

Having assumed, however, that the non-contradictoriness of the proposed solution can be demonstrated in some way, it could be named – perhaps a bit paradoxically – “dualist unity realism”: “dualist,” because there would appear to exist arguments in favor of accepting *two* realms of fundamentally distinct “material”<sup>924</sup> attributes and states of affairs – the real world and pure consciousness; yet “unity” realism, because the objects of *both* these realms would ultimately constitute a *single whole*.

It would, however, be possible – and I shall yet return to this case – to change in such a way the assumption made above pertaining to pure consciousness, that its selfsufficiency with respect to the real world would be dropped. Then a *reciprocal* relative non-selfsufficiency would obtain between the two relata of being. But since an essential difference prevails vis-à-vis the *material* endowment of the two existential regions, we would then be dealing with a different variant of dualist unity realism<sup>925</sup>, which we shall still take up.

## Appendix D [Ch. IV, § 19, n. 41]

⌈If we seek an example in the annals of philosophy that would be at least a suitable *approximation* to dualist unity realism, we have as candidates the so-called “philosophy of immanence,” views of some of the representatives of the so-called English analytic school, perhaps Mach (in the conception presented in the so-called “antimetaphysical remarks” of his *Analyse der Empfindungen*) – or, speaking more generally, the view according to which the world of material things is reduced to a manifold of “contents” (sense data, elements, and the like) experienced by a subject. In each of the cited examples there are certain deviations from the “dualist unity realism” explicitly spelled out here.

It seems, however, that Spinoza’s pantheistic monism also approximates dualist unity realism, and this precisely as the variant just indicated [in App. C].

924 In the sense of material ontology. That is precisely how Schuppe’s immanent philosophy poses the issue.

925 Whether this and the previous variants of dualist unity realism are admissible from a *formal-ontological* perspective is something we shall still have to take up.

Nonetheless, the decision as to whether to present this standpoint here is problematic, since Spinoza lacks the existential distinctions that we introduced, whereas the definitions he puts forth are opaque with regard to a number of issues. As we know, he assumes *two* different attributes of *the very same* “substance” (speaking at the same time of infinitely many others, which, however, we do not come to know at all). His psycho-physical parallelism would then be the external manifestation of the coexistence – in virtue of the essence of substance – within a *single* whole of *two* different entities: consciousness and extension. About both of these attributes we are supposed to assume that they are just as existentially original<sup>926</sup> as the substance itself whose essence they constitute [*budujq = bauen*]. However, we do not know what existential relation obtains a) between attribute and substance, or b) between the attributes themselves. This can be partially surmised on the basis of Spinoza’s assertions, partially on the basis of philosophical tradition. We may conjecture that Spinoza adopted the concept of “attribute” primarily from Descartes, but possibly even from an earlier philosophical tradition. According to Descartes’ *Principles of Philosophy*, an “attribute” is a permanent, immutable characteristic [*stałq niezmiennq cechq = beständige unveränderliche Merkmal*] of something (whereby both of Spinoza’s attributes – consciousness and extension – are cited [by Descartes] as the properties of substances: of an “extended” and of a “thinking entity”). In Spinoza they become the attributes of *one* infinite substance, but they probably do not lose their character of immutability by being what constitutes the “essence” of substance. As such, they must coexist with each other within the confines of the same substance, but at the same time – it would seem – they cannot exist *without* the substance (as something that accrues to it). From this we may infer – although it is nowhere written in Spinoza – that they are non-selfsufficient in relation to substance, and this in view of their form. Can their necessary coexistence within the confines of one substance be regarded as their reciprocal non-selfsufficiency – that does not appear to be necessary. Necessary coexistence within the confines of one whole does not yet after all suffice for their reciprocal (or unilateral) non-selfsufficiency. On the basis of Descartes’ expositions in the *Principles* we know that “consciousness” (“thinking”) and “extension” differ from each other, so that with their aid clear and distinct concepts can be constructed of two substances: corporeal and conscious. But we do not know whether these specific “qualities” – of consciousness and extension – are such as to (reciprocally or unilaterally) postulate each other’s coexistence. Only then would they be non-selfsufficient. But concerning this we learn

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926 There is no concept of existential originality in Spinoza in the sense I have adduced, but – as may be surmised – the concept of “substance” corresponds to it, which is *causa sui* and exists necessarily.

nothing from Spinoza. We know about their “parallelism,” which can be understood as implying that the attributes are unable to affect each other causally. But changes occurring in the one (*modi*?) correspond (in a one-to-one manner) to changes in the other. This, despite everything, would indicate a certain dependence between them, but of a nature that remains rather unexplicated. Hence, this point must remain unclarified, and is eventually different from the resolution of the [problem pertaining to the] existential relation of the real world and pure consciousness currently under consideration. Also, it is not possible to say anything more specific on the basis of Spinoza’s philosophy concerning their unilateral or event bilateral (reciprocal) non-selfsufficiency. It seems that in Spinoza the attributes are equiordinate [*równorzędne = gleichgeordnet*] (indeed, materialists claim that the attribute of matter is more fundamental, with an advantage over the attribute of consciousness, but that appears to be unsubstantiated!). There is therefore no advantage to consciousness – as there is for the transcendentalists – nor is there any getting started from the attribute of consciousness as an indubitable factor – as there is commencing with Descartes. And there are still additional differences between Spinoza’s position and dualist unity realism. First of all, Spinoza’s resolution is not existential-ontological, but metaphysical. However, because every true metaphysical thesis must have its support in some ontological commitment, this difference – just as in other cases – is indeed significant from a methodological and epistemological point of view, but relatively slight taken strictly in terms of content.<sup>927</sup> More importantly questionable is whether, when speaking of the attribute of consciousness, Spinoza has in mind a pure *individual* consciousness in the sense relevant to the above assumptions. That is not so easily resolved, since Spinoza’s conceptual determinations are not sufficiently well-defined in this case.<sup>928</sup> Thirdly, in order to come closer to Spinoza’s views, one would have to

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927 In conjunction with this, it is highly characteristic of Spinoza’s metaphysics that it has a peculiar, though not clearly singled out, theoretical underpinning which is the source of various proofs of metaphysical assertions carried out “*more geometrico*” (though not rigorously).

928 It may be conjectured with a certain degree of likelihood that Spinoza distinguishes consciousness as an attribute of substance from the consciousness of individual human beings. From one perspective we read: “Thought is an attribute of God.” (*Ethics*, Prop. I, pt. II, [*op. cit.*, p. 64]) Whereas, concerning man we read: “The being of substance does not belong to the essence of man, which is to say, substance does not constitute the form of man.” [*Ethics*, Pt. II, Prop. 10, *op. cit.*, p. 69] Now, in the proof of [Pt. II,] Prop. I Spinoza writes: “Individual thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes expressing the nature of God in a definite and determinate way. Therefore there belongs to God an attribute the conception of which is involved in all individual thoughts, and through which they are conceived.” [*op. cit.*, p. 64] However, we do not know whether these “individual thoughts” comprising the *modi* of the attributes of thinking are Divine or

get clear about what in Spinoza is to be understood by the real world. This is bound up with the very murky concept of *modus* and the equally opaque relation of *modus* to substance – and, indirectly, with the relation of the real world to God. This shift of the problem, having to do with taking the *material* world exclusively as the antithesis of pure consciousness – instead of the *full* real world, which, apart from material things, also embraces psycho-physical individuals and perhaps even other entities, such as cultural products – has its source in the fact that for the most part the distinction is not made between pure consciousness and what is spiritual or “mental” (psychical). This very shift of the problem shows up frequently in the annals of philosophy and is almost [wholly] dominant among currents that do not adopt a transcendental standpoint. Finally, it is noteworthy that the existential assumptions made by dualist unity realism (of Group I), which create a certain existential difference between the two regions, do not appear in Spinoza, for whom *both* attributes are existentially *equiordinate*. At the same time, they are in Spinoza – insofar as we may surreptitiously impose our existential concept on him – non-selfsufficient with respect to something third: to substance; this follows precisely from the fact that they are attributes. Now whether they are also derived from substance as its *attributes*, or whether they are just as original as substance itself, as precisely *its* attributes – that is difficult to sort out within the framework of Spinoza’s system. This is not clearly stated by him, since the requisite conceptual apparatus is lacking. To be sure, it can only be divined that the existential status of the attributes is different from that of the substance itself. It can also be divined on the basis of the so-called “psycho-physical parallelism” in Spinoza that some sort of singular co-dependence or reciprocal non-selfsufficiency obtains *between* the attributes. Thus, on a closer inspection of their mode of being one would surely come to discover the existential moments which I here put forth, but none of this is worked out by Spinoza.

All of these deviations from the ontological solution under discussion here simply attest to the fact that Spinoza’s metaphysics needs to be seriously modified and further elaborated if we wished to arrive at a position that is at least non-contradictory from an existential point of view, leaving aside for the time being whether it can be substantiated from the standpoints of formal and material ontology, and whether, in transitioning to metaphysical reflections, it would merit some sort of priority in this respect over other solutions.

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human. But when Spinoza later deals with “affects,”\* there is no question that he has in mind human affects (indeed, the discussion concerns *human* servitude to the powers emanating from affects!).

\* [*afektami*: probably the *Affektion* that showed up in conjunction with Kant, which I have elsewhere rendered by ‘affectation.’]



## Appendix E [Ch. IV, § 19, n. 43]

┌ But – in concert with the current assumptions – not conversely. Whether this would be consistent with the originality of the real world is an issue whose positive resolution is certainly not ruled out from an existential point of view, but which would nonetheless still have to be considered in close connection with material investigations. Now only these latter can elucidate the material conditions for one of two selfsufficient, materially diverse and original objects to be dependent on the other. For it appears certain that in this case pure consciousness, too, would have to be original. An original object cannot, it would seem, be dependent on another object, which for its part would be derived – and this from the former. Were we to allow this sort of case, we would therefore have to allow the possibility of a necessary and “eternal” object being at the same time dependent on an object that would only come into being at some instant and not be at all necessary in its being. But the one is contradictory to the other. Whereas, if a certain original (autonomous, etc.) object were dependent on some truly eternal object X, but [one which is] derived from some third object, then in the final analysis it would be dependent not on object X, but on that third object. The derived object would thereby only play the role of a mediator that would not hold the reason for the ultimate dependence of the first of these objects. We therefore have to settle on the following: if the real world were to be autonomous, original and selfsufficient, but at the same time *dependent* on pure consciousness<sup>929</sup>, then either pure consciousness itself would have to be original, or the real world would have to be dependent on

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929 We may entertain doubts as to whether an original object, owing precisely to its originality, does not rule out its dependence on any other object. It may well be this doubt that compelled Spinoza to reject not only the capacity of one substance to act on another, but even the existence of a second substance. But it seems at the same time that, having endorsed the originality of substance, Spinoza ascribed to it something more than this originality. For it does not follow from the fact that a particular object cannot be *created* by any other object – that is to say, that, if it exists at all, it does so because its own nature compels it to exist – that, in necessarily existing owing to its nature, it could not at the same time be dependent in its existence on some other object. It only follows that this other object, too, would have to be original. Existential originality does not of itself rule out a plurality of original objects, and allows at the same time for a reciprocal or unilateral dependence. A materialistic atomist, e.g., proclaims the originality of “atoms,” but acknowledges at the same time their material dependence. Contemporary physical theory does *not*, incidentally, acknowledge the originality of atoms, nor even of the elementary particles, allowing for either their shattering or annihilation. Whether it does not, despite all of this, assume something existentially original – that is a separate matter, but one which already exceeds the current problematic.



some third, original factor from which pure consciousness would at the same time be derived. Like the real world, this consciousness would thereby also have to be eternal. This would of course have to follow from the material essence of all the objects involved, and for this reason material solutions would be needed here.

In view of the fact that in this Group we are only presupposing about pure consciousness that it is not derivative in relation to the real world, which does not preclude its derivativeness in general, dependence realism is undecidable in this group of solutions strictly on the basis of existential considerations, yet it is not at the same time ruled out as a possibility. It therefore ought to remain in the tabulation of solutions left for further consideration.

## Appendix F [Ch IV, § 20, n. 100]

☐The absolute creationism which is possible in the solutions of Group I is *untenable* for the current set of assumptions concerning pure consciousness. For it seems ruled out on the basis of the very idea, that a pure consciousness – vis-à-vis which the real world is supposed to be derivative – could itself be *dependent* on precisely that which was derived from it, and which is independent of it. That which is derived would in this case be – despite its derivativeness – existentially stronger (if we may use this expression) than pure consciousness. The latter would in this case have to *create* the real world, but at the same time – as dependent on it – could not at all exist without it. Yet in order to be able to create it, it would after all have to *already* somehow exist before it came to the creating. This, however, would be impossible in view of its dependence on the world. The real world on the other hand, once created, would be – given absolute creationism – independent of pure consciousness, which could somehow disappear after creating the real world without implementing thereby any change in its being; from the opposite side, the world would comprise a necessary fulcrum for the existence of consciousness. This seems impossible.

At this point, someone may well say: “This precisely is the basis for the *tragic character* of pure consciousness. Itself the creator of the world, consciousness is dependent on the latter, on its own artifact. And why should it be ruled out that something would create a world from the very *first* instant of its existence in order to become its prisoner, as it were? Could this not inhere in the essence of consciousness, belong to the content of its idea – that necessity of creating a world on which it is to be dependent? Could it not be that its dependence resides precisely in this necessity of creating a world?”

Now it may well be that no one would wish to ascribe to pure consciousness, which in its general type would be of the same kind as our human experiences [*przeżycia* = *Erlebnisse*], the sort of creative power whose impact would be to produce a world. This attempt to resolve the controversy on the *current* assumptions of the problematic would thereby collapse. Nonetheless, this would not yet decide the purely *existential* sensibleness of this solution. For its further substantiation we would only need to assume an appropriate view of the essence of consciousness. Aside from this, that thought could be clad in a metaphysico-theological garb. Someone could then ask: “Is it really absurd to entertain the notion of a personal, conscious God, Who would have the sort of creative consciousness that would *in virtue of its essence have to* create (or produce) out of itself an autonomous, selfsufficient and independent world without which it could not itself exist?” Of course there could be no talk in this case of a creating that would have a beginning at some point in time, and with respect to which the existence of God would be at an earlier time. That is clearly precluded by the assumption made here. “But” – we would be told – “this does not yet rule out that God always existed ‘from eternity’ along with the world which simply follows from His essence, and on which precisely for this reason God would be existentially dependent. Is that impossible from a purely existential-ontological point of view?”<sup>930</sup>

All problems in which the concept of eternity plays a role are riddled with dangers and very difficult to solve. However, we can reject the whole notion from an existential perspective even without getting involved in a discussion of this topic. The derivativeness of a particular object is characterized not only by the source of its existence residing in some other object, but also by a certain “brittleness” (fragility) of existence, which inheres in the *fundamental* possibility of ceasing to exist. According to the notion entertained here concerning the existential relation of God to the world created by Him, that world – as existentially derivative – could always be annihilated by Him. But at the same time, God – in virtue of His essence – could not do this, because He is supposed to be dependent on it. In order to annihilate the world, He would have to be capable of annihilating Himself, which, once He already existed, would be ruled out by His existential originality. Hence, either the derivativeness of the real world or the originality of God would be completely illusory.<sup>931</sup> We would arrive at an exis-

930 It would seem that various theologico-cosmogonic conceptions of a Neoplatonic prove-nance are close to posing the issue in this manner. This would, however, call for a more detailed investigation. Provided these conceptions are altogether amenable to being interpreted in a rigorous and intelligible fashion.

931 This is connected to the thesis already put forth that an original being cannot be dependent on a derivative one.

tential-ontological contradiction in one of these two directions – either vis-à-vis God or vis-à-vis the real world. Existential analysis therefore enjoins us to reject this attempt at a solution – and this, whether we relate it to an individual consciousness of our type, or whether we draw God into play.<sup>7</sup>

## Appendix G [Ch. IV, § 23, n. 146]

¶*Ad 2.* The same reservations arise here that arose against accepting absolute creationism in Group I of possible solutions. Insofar as it was there possible to defer them to the occasion of carrying out material investigations into pure consciousness, here, in addition, a certain doubt of an *existential* nature gets attached to them. For how is a non-selfsufficient consciousness supposed to be able to create (in the strict sense of this word) an autonomous, *selfsufficient*, and *independent* real world? Does not its non-selfsufficiency vis-à-vis the real world presuppose the existence of the real world? If this world were also non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis consciousness, or at least dependent on it, then the way out we might still attempt is that pure consciousness – if we may put it this way – creates this sort of world out of itself from the first instant of its existence. But given the world's selfsufficiency, this seems highly unlikely. Perhaps we might meet with weaker objections, if we simultaneously assumed that pure consciousness is derived from some *third* entity (from God, say) and is so shaped by it that despite all of its non-selfsufficiency it would have to create out of itself a world in the sense of absolute creationism. Pure consciousness would in this case play the role of a mediator between the third entity and the real world. In order to diminish the degree of improbability of such a solution, we would have to provide a reason for such mediation, which does not at all seem necessary. However, the world would in this case not be ultimately derived from a non-selfsufficient, individual pure consciousness, but from that third entity, which would then have to be admitted and its existence substantiated. All of these states of affairs make such a resolution of our controversy appear highly improbable, but in view of the lack of certainty as to whether it is existentially contradictory, it needs to be entered into the register of possibilities that will have to be submitted to a final deliberation. Besides, there are *formal* arguments that also emerge against it.

*Ad 3. Dualist unity realism* – proclaiming that the real world is indeed supposed to be autonomous and original, but at the same time non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis pure consciousness, which for its part is supposed to be non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis the world – appears to be admissible from a strictly existential point of view, but only under the condition that we somehow rule out the possibility of

pure consciousness being derived from something else, and that we relinquish the “stronger” transcendence of the world vis-à-vis pure consciousness, defined in § 3, and only admit a “weaker” one. If we could not manage to take care of the first of these issues, then the solution proposed here would be undecidable within the framework of existential ontology. Just as in Group I of possible solutions of the controversy, so too would the world now form with pure consciousness a *single* whole, within the framework of which both regions of being would have to exist. In the case at hand, the bond between them would have to be formed considerably more tightly than in the case discussed in Group I. It would have to have its source in the material essence of *both* regions. Thus also in this case a final resolution must be deferred to material and metaphysical reflections. Formal analysis would also have to play an essential role in this connection, because *it* would have to elucidate the issue of whether an existentially non-selfsufficient *region* is possible.

*Ad 4. Dualist dependence realism* is impossible under the current assumptions pertaining to pure consciousness since an *original* real world would at the same time have to be *dependent* on pure consciousness, which is supposed to be non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis that world. But this is ruled out, for dependence presupposes both the selfsufficiency of that which is dependent as well as the selfsufficiency of that on which that something [the world] is supposed to be dependent.<sup>7</sup>

## Appendix H [Ch. IV, § 23, n. 147]

⌈*ad 6. Realist unity creationism* raises the same doubts as we encountered in this Group in the case of absolute creationism. The question arises, namely, of how it is to be possible for a factor that creates the world to be itself non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis that world. However, this problem needs to be left for resolution to material investigations. An existential resolution is, despite everything, not impossible. The existential bond between the world and pure consciousness must, however, in this case be considerably tighter than in absolute creationism, for a *reciprocal* non-selfsufficiency of the two domains of objects is to obtain in the present case. It is precisely this reciprocal non-selfsufficiency that imposes special demands on the material essence of these domains. It must be of such a kind that they would not only mutually *demand* completion, but so that, above and beyond that, they would themselves be capable of *satisfying* this need for completion by the other existential domain, i.e., so that their own coexistence would *suffice* to make the whole arising from them *selfsufficient*. Otherwise, they would have to demand for their existence yet some sort of *third* do-

main or object which would itself already be selfsufficient, or would at least in conjunction with both of the domains at issue form a selfsufficient whole. Such a resolution of this issue must be left to material investigation. As in *sub 3*, formal inquiries must also be taken into account here, in which the possibility of the non-selfsufficiency of an entire existential domain must be examined, as well as that of individual, purely intentional objects, which, according to the assumptions of this solution, is what the constituents of the world would be.

On the other hand, it should not be presumed that realist unity creationism in Group V is impossible because the assumptions of this group ascribe to consciousness, among other things, non-derivativeness vis-à-vis the real world, and its non-selfsufficiency at the same time. I certainly did embrace the claim earlier that originality and non-selfsufficiency of existence are mutually exclusive, yet the assumptions of the present group of solutions do not postulate *originality* of existence for consciousness, but only its *relative non-derivativeness* vis-à-vis the real *world*. This non-derivativeness need not at all be interpreted in the sense of originality, so that it is not at all necessary to apply the law concerning the mutual exclusion of originality and non-selfsufficiency to the case currently under consideration.<sup>7</sup>

## Appendix I [Ch. IV, § 23, n. 148]

<sup>7</sup>*Ad 8. Idealist unity creationism* does not on the other hand appear to be impossible in this group from an existential perspective – at least at first glance; it does, however, arouse serious doubts. According to it, the real world and pure consciousness would have to form *one* whole in which both existential domains would be reciprocally non-selfsufficient. At the same time, however, a deep existential disparity would obtain between them, and this would be so in virtue of their essence. One of the components of this whole, indeed precisely the world-creating one, would be autonomous, whereas the other component coexisting with it within the same whole would be heteronomous. This existential difference between them would perhaps express the dominant status of consciousness vis-à-vis the world; yet the doubt arises as to whether this difference is possible within the unity of one whole. The formal and material counterarguments that emerge in the case of realist unity creationism would also be adjoined to this. Finally, it is also highly doubtful that a non-selfsufficient consciousness would attain a fully satisfactory completion in a component which is supposed to be heteronomous. There would therefore be a demand for some third entity which would satisfy the need for completion of both of the domains under consideration. It would of course itself have to be autonomous, hence would find itself in

the same existential opposition to the real world as consciousness itself. Therefore, a double existential tension would prevail in the whole that would have to arise out of all of these components. It would then appear that, under such circumstances, this solution ought to be abandoned.<sup>7</sup>

## Appendix J [Ch. V, § 30, n. 147]

⌈out of which the human being is somehow supposed to be generated [*narodzić*], and which constantly fills him with dread, but which he can never fill in with anything. Sartre's conception (similar, incidentally, to what can be found in Heidegger) follows from a certain correct, but mistakenly interpreted assertion that could be clad in the Heideggerian dictum: "*Das Sein des Daseins is seine Möglichkeit* [The being of Dasein is its possibility]," and which may perhaps be better expressed by saying that man – as a human person – is that being which fashions, and in some sense creates, its own self. That is basically true: man is not a being that is absolutely passive and subject to fate, but an active being that influences its own formation. Adopting one life-style or another, deciding on some particular conduct in situations imposed on him by life, assuming this or that attitude toward matters of importance to him, he solves in his own manner problems posed for him by life, and he not only interacts in this or that fashion with the world surrounding him, but at the same time transforms and shapes his own self. And he often does so with full awareness that he wants to bestow upon himself this status rather than some other, and with a full sense of responsibility for what he does and for what he makes of himself. But none of this attests to his doing all of that out of a total *void*, deprived – in virtue of his essence as a human being – of some ultimate core of his personality. Of course, the issue should not be presented too extremely and generally: there are people who bear the anathema of their lives – an inner void – from early on. There are also people for whom this core is imperceptible and without significance. However, there are also people in whom this core is very strong and distinct, and that leads to an outstanding personality being crystallized out even under quite adverse conditions. So there are all kinds of situations in this context. But what is vital at the moment is that this type of personality of a human being – who possesses a certain stable but evolving center, and who in this way differs from a straightforward stream of complicated processes – is possible.

The conception I am here sketching – and which I shall still supplement with the analysis of a persistent object and of the various types of an object's essence – is also fundamentally different from the one outlined by Wilhelm Schapp in his beautifully written book *In Geschichten verstrickt\** [*Entangled in*

*Narratives*]. To be sure, every human being – and every real object in the world – is entangled in various “narratives” imposed by life. Nor is this entanglement without significance for his personality and for the essence he bears within himself, and which ultimately develops and crystallizes in him and in his life. But again, none of this attests to the human being’s being altogether deprived of this essence and that man is merely a stream of changes embroiled in various ensembles of processes. Of course, things are not so simple as to be disposed of with this brief note. My only concern at the moment is to make the reader aware that the view I am sketching here differs essentially from both Sartre’s position and Schapp’s conception. A justification of my view will be presented later on [in Vol. II (?)] (1959).<sup>7</sup>

\*[Hamburg: Meiner, 1953]

## Appendix K [Ch. VI, § 32, n. 27]

Also in Husserl, for whom working out the existential relativity of the real world lay very close to his heart, we find the claim that everything real exists in time.<sup>932</sup> All the same – as I have previously noted – there is no clear formulation in Husserl of the concept of existential heteronomy.<sup>933</sup> But it is very likely at the same time that Husserl does have existential heteronomy in mind, among other things, when he tries to assert the relativity of the real world’s existence by alluding to the (putative) intentionality of real objects. In view of this, there would not appear to be any discord between temporality (existence in time) and the object’s intentionality, and consequently [between temporality and] its heteronomy. Yet such discord would have to obtain on the basis of the results of analyses carried out in the previous chapter.

The fact that idealists, and Husserl in particular, sense no difficulty in attributing to the real world both a temporal character and existential heteronomy can first of all be explained by their inability to properly analyze the modes of being and to become aware of the laws governing relations among the several existential moments. However, it is also possible to surmise their reckoning on the possibility that acts of direct experience – of sensory and inner perception in partic-

932 Cf. especially *Ideas I*, § 81 and *Formal and Transcendental Logic*.

933 Years ago (1929) I came up with this concept (as well as the concepts of the remaining existential moments) in order on the one hand to make distinctly and rigorously precise on what the various idealist positions depended, Husserl’s standpoint in particular, and on the other to prepare the ground for refuting Husserl’s transcendental idealism, against which no polemic could be conducted as long as this standpoint was not formulated in terms of fully precise existential concepts.

ular, which according to Husserl and other idealists comprise the source of the *existence* of “actuality” and lead to the constitution of intentional objects of a quite specific type that in everyday life we call “real” – confer on these objects activeness in the present on the one hand, and autonomy on the other: the one and the other in a purely intentional fashion, incapable of producing any other but heteronomous being. Hence, in their *contents* these objects would be active and autonomous, but *truthfully*, as intentional products, they could be merely heteronomous and would not possess that activeness<sup>934</sup> that can occur only where we are dealing with a *genuine* autonomy, and not with a merely *conferred* one. And so also the temporality of these objects – as far as their content is concerned – would be only intentionally bestowed on them, not “autonomous.” In this case, the idealist standpoint would not conflict with the claim concerning the link between activeness and autonomy.<sup>935</sup> When reckoning with this possibility in the course of analyzing certain objects with the aim of resolving whether they are autonomous, or heteronomous and produced by some subjective operation, it is not enough to assert that according to experience they are temporally determined and active in their [temporal] presence, but rather some *method* needs to be found *that would enable us to decide whether that activeness is genuine*, or whether it is merely some *intuitive phenomenon* evoked by intentional bestowal. And only if we were successful in this, would we have the means for deciding between idealist and realist solutions to the Controversy. For the time being, we have not the slightest notion of how such a method could be constructed. Nonetheless, we shall have to search for it in the course of our formal and material reflections.

However, I have not yet warded off the reproach that at least some heteronomous objects exist – so it would appear – in time and undergo various sorts of changes in it. This already pertains not to the temporal character appearing in their *contents*, but to *them themselves* as intentional objects.<sup>936</sup> *Now it seems that the abiding in “actual” time of this sort of objects is merely illusory*, and the illusoriness of this stems from their being the correlates of intentional acts of consciousness (the creative acts of the author and the reproducing acts of the reader), which are themselves *effectively* temporally determined. By means of this correlation to acts having an unequivocally determinate imprint of some particular present, the purely intentional objects themselves, e.g., some specific

934 This is probably the situation with objects represented as real in a literary work.

935 In the sense that intentional objects would not be effectively either autonomous or active.

936 Cf. the expositions pertaining to the bilateral structure of purely intentional objects: pertaining to their “contents” and to their structure *qua* intentional objects. [Vol. II.] Ch. IX, § 43.



poem, begin to take on a temporal character, and in particular the temporal imprint of the corresponding present. But just as no property of purely intentional objects accrues to them “effectively,” (i.e., the quality determining it is not contained in them immanently), so too it is impossible for that temporal character to determine these objects effectively. The indubitable fact of the “aging” of works of art also does not bear testimony to their existence in the concrete time of the real world. For this is simply the fact of a change in the relation of the perceiver to the work of art as a result of his altered mental structure, of altered preferences in the realm of experiences, etc. When we juxtapose this fact to the *effective* “aging” of a living organism, we are struck by the fundamental difference in these two facts of aging, of which only the latter is a process that “truly” occurs in the given object, whereas the former is merely a phenomenon of “strangeness,” “inadaptability,” and consequently of the unintelligibility of the work of art for the recipient – the reader, in particular – who is temporally distant from the instant of the work’s origin and removed from it by an entire cultural atmosphere. Only by *correlating* the products of culture to certain periods of “actual” time, and to the mental structures and processes occurring in the authors (creators) and in the recipients of cultural products, does culture take on a temporal character and belong to certain epochs of historical evolution. This, however, attests most convincingly to the fact that not the entire world surrounding us human beings, a world which seems to us real and homogenous in its reality – is “truly” such. Entire strata and entire domains of objects can be differentiated in it which are heteronomous in their being.<sup>937</sup> We are only concerned with whether in this world surrounding us a “real world” in the strict sense of the word can and ought to be differentiated, which would be fundamentally different in its being from the mode of being of cultural products, or whether the *entire world surrounding us* is in its being like the world of our poems, musical works, etc. This is one of the central existential problems of the controversy over idealism. My effort in the book *The Literary Work of Art* was aimed to show that there is indeed such a disparity.<sup>7</sup>

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937 I shall still return in the formal reflections to the issue of whether different regions of being can intertwine into a single world surrounding us.

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