

Mirosław Karwat / Filip Pierzchalski /
Marcin Tobiasz (eds.)

Constituents of Political Theory

Selected Articles of the
Warsaw School of Political Theory



**Mirosław Karwat / Filip Pierzchalski /
Marcin Tobiasz (eds.)**

Constituents of Political Theory

The book gathers articles authored by several members of the Warsaw School of Political Theory. The publication reveals the School's *teoria polityki* (political theory), which is an attempt to establish an explanatory theory, a system of statements explaining the determinants, mechanisms, regularities of political life and political action. It is a search for the essential distinctive features of political phenomena, their specificity in comparison with the social phenomena that are formally non-political, an attempt to define the limits of the political sphere of social life.

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Constituents of Political Theory

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Translated by Jan Burzyński and Mikołaj Golubiewski



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Introduction

*“De omnibus dubitandum est
At the end I feel constrained to confess that there is
nothing in all
that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some
measure doubt,
and that not merely through want of thought or through
levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely
considered.”
Descartes¹*

*“... criticism is no passion of the head, it is the head of
passion. ...
It no longer assumes the quality of an end-in-itself, but only of
a means. Its essential pathos is indignation, its essential work
is denunciation.”*

*“Theory is capable of gripping the masses as soon as it
demonstrates ad hominem,
and it demonstrates ad hominem as soon as it becomes
radical.
To be radical is to grasp the root of the matter. But, for man,
the root is man himself.”
Karl Marx²*

One of the most important human motivations in conducting theoretical investigations on the subject of politics are various types of doubts, which are the root of intellectual nonconformism, conscious skepticism or scientific suspicion. To paraphrase the words of Karl Marx, doubts are equally related to the radical – free from an illusory sense of obviousness, based on a “search for a hole in the whole,” – view – both direct and indirect – on politics, as well as to the realization of the head of passion in the scientific creative process. We are talking about intellectual activities that, in their essence, question and undermine

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- 1 S. Tweyman, ed., *Rene Descartes' Meditations On First Philosophy* (London: Routledge 1993), p. 49.
 - 2 K. Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” in: *Critique of Hegel*, trans. J. O’Malley (Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 8, 15.

common beliefs, established superstitions, and binding habits or stereotypes. It is a scientific exposing, precise disenchantment of common, thoughtless, often banal or ordinary ways of thinking of, arguing or interpreting political reality. Simultaneously, theoretical political reflection is a mental activity, which does not occur in social isolation, therefore it is not based on the self-sufficiency of scientists, but is always (and only) realized – to use the argumentation of Ludwik Fleck – by functioning in a specific thought collective.

In other words, the contemporary theoretical reflection within the area of political science – more specifically, the emerging concepts, generalizations or theories – on the one hand, occurs in the space of scientific interpersonal communication, and, on the other hand, is the essence and, to some extent, an intentional consequence of the crystallization of certain currents and, consequently, communities of scientists. Members of such teams attempt to describe, explain or understand politics in a similar way with varying success. They are connected by a conceptual and even mental agreement in perceiving and exposing political phenomena. They recognize and accept common fundamental assumptions, conceptual apparatus, model schemes of description and explanation, systems of hypotheses or statements. Within this framework, they do not lose their individuality, but find an outlet for their specialization and rhetorical or polemical temperament. In this case, we are dealing with a school of science, or at least its beginning.

A theoretical school based on political theory, which constitutes a relatively coherent thought collective capable of formulating similar, coherent and intersubjective explanations or interpretations of certain phenomena, states of affairs or processes in politics, is to be understood as:

1. A community that has a directly or indirectly articulated level of theoretical and methodological self-knowledge and self-awareness related to the accepted paradigm or scope of axioms. Whereas, such auto-identification is the source and premise justifying the initiation or continuation of research projects – in particular intensive conceptual and theoretical, categorical or conceptual work – which constitutes a significant contribution to the development of a formalized discipline of knowledge.
2. A team of people who co-create, uphold or continue a certain tradition and/or an approach to conducting theoretical and cognitive reflection – from the meta-theoretical level, and from the lower-level analyses or theorization related to empirical research.
3. A community that has developed or is developing – including broadening and improving – a collective viewpoint (perception) of political reality.

This is the moment when, due to the mutual exchange of thoughts, views, arguments or interpretations, and internal discussions and disputes between the members of a given school about various subject of examination (cognition), as Ludwik Fleck puts it, an intra-team journey takes place. A scientific journey which for the individual theoretical activity of the team members becomes ipso sociologico facto, a strengthening to verbalize a coherent and collective perspective or argumentation.³

4. A team of scientists whose creations of intellectual work constitute somehow similar diagnosis, assessment or prediction of specific political phenomena, which results in a clearly profiled and targeted theoretical output. These includes also scientific publications that reflect the collective awareness of the team members regarding complexity of judgements, statements and proposed theoretical solutions, including the recognition and/or challenge of the principles and ontological, epistemological and methodological rules or directives existing in political science.
5. A community, of which the conceptual apparatus, system of assumptions and scheme of phenomena interpretation is an alternative to other communities, especially those circulating and established by a fixed tradition, sometimes by revising such tradition and challenging it.
6. A community, of which theoretical activity has an institutional dimension. This means that it is organized within a formal academic community, as well as within a specific framework and legal order.

The above six boundary conditions allow us to conclude that we are dealing with such a thought collective in the case of the researchers, whose sample of works we present in this collection. Minding a somewhat pathetic overtone of the term, it may be called the Warsaw school of political theory. It comprises a team of several researchers working under the lead of Professor Mirosław Karwat in the Department of Political Theory and Political Thought in the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies of the University of Warsaw. This team consists of co-participants and successors of the Zespół Badawczy Teorii Polityki Centralnego Ośrodka Metodycznego Studiów Nauk Politycznych (COM SNP, Political Theory Research Team of the Central Methodological Center for Political Studies) at the University of Warsaw, alongside their students and partners of the next generation. The Center was established in the 1970s on the initiative of its long-term president, Professor Artur Bodnar. Initially, the school

3 L. Fleck, "Patrzeć, widzieć, wiedzieć. Wiele błędnych mniemań rozprasza psychologia spostrzegania i socjologia myślenia," *Problemy*, No. 2/12 (1947), pp. 74–84.

of political theory was inspired by the so-called Poznań school in the methodology of humanities – an anti-positivist, anti-naturalist intellectual formation also known in scientific discourse beyond Poland.

The COM SNP was a particular institution of great importance in the process of separating, establishing and institutionalizing political science in the systemic and ideological realities of People's Poland. Its task was to coordinate work related to the program and methodology of educating students in the field of political and civic knowledge, and to assess and improve scientific and didactic qualification of the staff carrying out this completely new task. Initially, the staff was composed exclusively of graduates of faculties of other social sciences and humanities. It was only in the 1970s that the first generation of graduates with diplomas in political sciences appeared.

The COM SNP carried out its tasks under the pressure of the political state authorities, which expected a combination of didactic and indoctrinating effects. Therefore, it was “entangled in the system,” both in terms of its structure and desired by the authorities’ ideological orientation of most of its employees. On the other hand, the ambition of the staff (with Artur Bodnar as the head) was to give the research and didactics in political science an academic level and character. Above all, their aim was to introduce political science to the scope of academic disciplines, against all stereotypes and temptations to reduce its teaching to political agitation or press review. It should be remembered that among the countries in the socialist camp, political science was established as a scientific discipline and a subject of teaching only in Poland and Yugoslavia; other countries of this camp applied indoctrination programs of “scientific communism.” The Polish community of political scientists, although then still dominated by scientists belonging to the party, unanimously opposed such extreme propaganda ideologization in the transmission of political knowledge and consistently aspired to academic status.

The COM SNP research team formulated the conceptual categories and assumptions constituting an abstract-universal model (instead of one subordinated to the current state and political doctrine) of politics as such, remaining within the Marxist intellectual orientation and tradition. Although in the formula of open Marxism, not in the corset of orthodoxy. The scientific search of this team was surely not “subversive” or dissident, but “revisionist” from the point of view of dogmatic and ideological and propaganda interpretations of Marxism. They were an explicit polemic with a schematic presentation of the class character of state and politics, with an apologetic image of real socialism. And so, in terms of who was the subject (the driving force) of the politics, the emphasis was placed on the category of large social groups (variously divided,

not only by class). In the analysis of the style of thought and political action of contemporary political forces, reference was made to the theory of historical and cultural background formulated, in reference to Marx, in the works of Ludwik Krzywicki, Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz and Antonio Gramsci, but also to the consuming reflection from the circle of formal sociology of Georg Simmel and other researchers, emphasizing the inertia of institutional forms and mental patterns, cyclical recurrences of only seemingly overcome tradition.

This inquiry has not been honored in any form of a canonical lecture in a single program work, although it was expressed in the formally scattered collection of essays, monographs and articles, and in collections of textbooks. Probably this is why they were “covered with dust” after years. The atmosphere of ideological exorcisms in the process of political transformation (the anti-communist obsession excluded Marxism itself, any terminology and rhetoric of Marxist provenance) was conducive to this “annulment.” However, the continuation of this trend confirmed that the conceptual and model apparatus of political theory outline in the research project of the COM SNP group proves to be successful both in the “historical accounts” (in explaining the conditions and mechanism of the collapse of real socialism), as well as in the analysis (in the diagnosis and the explanation) of numerous antinomies and paradoxes of political life in the Third Polish Republic.

Teoria polityki (political theory), in the convention adopted in the Polish academia, was initially pursued by the first and second generation of the COM SNP research team; later the following generation developed and continued it in the work of the Department of Philosophy and Political Theory of the Institute of Political Sciences at the University of Warsaw. *Teoria polityki* differs significantly from *political theory* in the convention adopted in the Anglo-Saxon circle, which has numerous adherents also among Polish political scientists or philosophers.

Political theory (sometimes also called political philosophy) is a reflection and narration of an axiomaticnormative nature – both when it refers to the interpretation of key categories of political science and when it is an analysis (diagnosis, interpretation) of specific political phenomena – specific events or actions, trends, processes.

On the other hand, *teoria polityki* is an attempt to establish an explanatory theory, that is a system of statements explaining (in a logical mode of deductive reasoning) the determinants, mechanisms, regularities of political life and political action. It is a search for the essential distinctive features of political phenomena, their specificity in comparison with the social phenomena that are formally (based on their origin or form) non-political, an attempt to define the limits of the political sphere of social life (however, assuming that they are fluid,

historically changeable, that the feature of politicalness of the phenomena is only to some extent a constant, and to a greater extent a contextual, occasional and syndromic feature).

The adherents of the theory understood in such way are aware that, on an axiomatic basis, it cannot exist as a system of statements that exhaust “once and for all” the characteristics and explanation of politics as a complex and changing conglomerate, a syndrome of phenomena. Such unambiguity, completeness and unconditional adequacy of political theory (and politics in general), at which we are aiming in the case of the theory of specific phenomena (such as decision theory, theory of political change, conflict theory) is impossible.

The subject of political theory understood in such a way, on the one hand, is the specificity of politics as such, the immanent mechanism of political game, political fight, ruling and social resistance, and, on the other hand, the conditionings of politics by economic, technological, cultural factors and the (regulatory, disruptive, instrumental) influence of politics on the sphere of economy, culture, and religious or scientific life.

In this approach, political theory has a double-layer character. It involves the elements of meta-theory and meta-language (definition arrangements, subject delimitation, methodological assumptions), but also directional theses on the status of the laws of science, which are a necessary component of the act of explanation (of the relations of interests, the meaning of values, ideas, of the conditions of socio-political balance, on the premises of maintaining or discounting the legal and political order, etc.).

Undoubtedly, it is possible to distinguish at least a few key characteristics of the Warsaw school of political theoreticians. This applies both to the theoretical achievements from the early formation of the analytical and research foundations of this school, as well as to the current theoretical research among the continuators of the COM tradition. Such distinctive features of the Warsaw school of political theoreticians include:

1. The intention to maintain an active critical and skeptical approach to the analysis of political matter, as well as to the overall research process, namely the individual stages, activities and products of that process. It involves an intellectual focus on the search for antinomies and paradoxes both in reality and in one’s own thinking, the pursuit of objectivity, the awareness of the pitfalls associated with one’s own commitment.
2. The acceptance of directives and assumptions of methodological holism, especially the methodology developed within historical materialism, as well as the later reception of Marxist dialectics and directives of historicism in the

context of creating theoretical solutions, research strategies and the conceptual basis for contemporary political science; the adaptation of the theoretical constructs of different origins in a non-eclectic manner.

3. The acceptance and creative development of holistic explanations integral to science and politics, which emphasize the role and importance of holistic, subjective and objective dialectical, multifactorial, multidimensional explanatory schemes and interpretative approaches. This is accompanied by an emphasis on the syndromic nature of political phenomena and the very feature of politicalness.
4. The use of sociocentric spatial analyses in the theoretic and cognitive reflection, where political reality is a multi-level inter-subjective space, of which the nomological explanation hinges on the necessity to take into consideration the micro-, mezzo-, and macro-structural perspectives. In this approach, the political theoretical description, explanation or prediction is nothing more than an attempt to dialectically combine the intentional domain (human actions) with the causal (effects of actions related to the political process) and structural ones (specific historical circumstances).
5. A clear opposition to the single-sidedness in political science that dominates the “cratocentric” tradition (considering politics in terms of state power, struggle for power, mechanisms and techniques of governance), an emphasis on complementing it with the “sociocentric” optics – an analyses of bottom-up and spontaneous processes of social self-organization, social pressure on political parties, social resistance, an emphasis on taking into consideration forms of political influence other than formal or actual power.
6. Making theoretical judgements, while taking into consideration the fact that the political space consists of dynamic and emergent interweaving of processes, that is non-linear, non-directional (liquid) and morphogenetic. Its “driving force” are various contradictions, antagonisms, opposing tendencies, factors, rationale, values, norms, etc., occurring at different levels of complexity. In this sense, the creation of theories in the field of political science must take into consideration the fact that the essence of politics boils down to an in-depth reflection on both the contradictions and interdependencies within the inter-subjective political space. Thus, the guiding theme of this approach is the principle of emergence.
7. Completing factual terminology and poetics in describing and explaining phenomena using metaphors in model constructions allowing for the interpretation of politics in terms of a specific aspect or feature.

Presenting this anthology to a non-Polish reader has multiple purposes. First of all, it is intended to familiarize the reader with the achievements of the authors who did not take care to promote them internationally in time. Another intention is to verify its possible advantages or cognitive limitations when directly faced with international circulation. Secondly, it aims to present the way of understanding and practicing political theory that is different than the one that stems from the tradition and patterns of political philosophy and thought, or the one stemming from the legal, normative and institutional tradition. Thirdly, its goal is to show to what extent an interpretation of politics inspired by the intellectual (instead of ideological or propagandist) tradition of Marxism, and therefore different from the liberal, conservative or post-modern canon, can be fruitful. This also applies to the level of the examination of “politicalness” and the criteria of political character or political entanglement of social phenomena. Perhaps this anthology will “inspire” some and provoke others to useful polemics and discussions.

Warsaw, June 2021

Miroław Karwat
Filip Pierzchalski
Marcin Tobiasz

PART I: Subject and scope of political science

Tadeusz Klementewicz

Anthropological and sociological premises of political theory

The definition of political science is not self-explanatory, as the essential determinants of political life are outside the discussed realm, primarily in the economic structure of society and the technologies used by man in his interactions with the natural environment. The determinants, in connection with man's biological nature and his national culture, co-create his historical activity. The cognitive consequence of such a fact is the structure of theoretical knowledge necessary to understand political phenomena. Full understanding of the political phenomena requires reference to many more general theories that form the stock of humanistic knowledge. From the general point of view, the stock is multi-leveled, yet without foundation. Three levels form the humanistic knowledge stock. These are the level of general anthropology, the level of sociology (of the social whole), and the level of disciplines that make individual social structures, including the political realm of social life, the subject of research. In such a perspective, political theory is an aspectual or partial theory of the specific approach to society as a whole, e.g., T. Parsons' functionalism.

The Level of General Anthropology – Man as Bio-Psycho-Social-Culture Whole

The knowledge about the man from a biocultural perspective, i.e., evolutionary biology, general and physical anthropology, evolutionary psychology, is the highest level of the humanistic knowledge stock. From such a view, we can see the peculiarities of human nature as a product of the evolution and anthropogenesis processes. Only 7 % of genetic diversity includes differences between "races," i.e., the intra-population variability. It is only to this knowledge that we add the effects of individual development – socialization – in a particular national – local – culture and unique biography, the history of personal experiences, and often also the conscious, self-creative activity of man himself. An individual is a substantial component of all social structures or relationships and uses its human potential in them. Therefore, to understand how homo politicus behaves, we first need to learn homo sapiens sapiens' – an anatomically modern man's – peculiar nature. Modern man's qualities include an upright posture, an intense social life,

intelligence, and the ability to perform complex behaviors. The ecological crisis, i.e., the cooling of the climate in the intertropical zone of Africa, the associated desertification, the disappearance of primeval forests in favor of grasslands, and mosaic trees turned out to be a breakthrough in the process of anthropogenesis. The cooling happened during the Miocene crisis about 9–6 million years ago. Living in the savannah habitat required African hominids to adapt anatomically to the hot terrestrial climate, i.e., forced two-legged locomotion, and a vertical posture, as the distances to travel over savannah became wider. Such a way of moving saved 1/3 of energy, also when considering the body size. The selection pressure on body temperature regulation, i.e., thermal stress, forced adaptations in anatomy and physiology; hence homo sapiens' rare hair, sweat gland concentration, and sweating. As R. Foley writes, "that is why humans and hominids are very strongly dependent on water and its sources." Life in the group required social bonds, impossible to create without intelligence, an increase in brain capacity, which accounts for about 3 % of body weight, and consumes about 20 % of resting metabolism. This, in turn, required a high-protein diet and monogamy – a new reproductive strategy which meant long-term care for the offspring of the parent couple. A pelvis previously formed in the process of anthropoevolution, which was associated with a vertical posture, when the brain capacity was about 450–600 cubic cm. However, a sudden increase in brain capacity occurred much later. The change in reproductive strategy, i.e., long pregnancy, extended childhood, care of both parents, turned out to be an adaptation. Thanks to anatomical changes that enabled bipedality, the hand became a tool, and the behavioral strategy of hominids changed – a non-organic impact on the external environment became usual. The psycho-brain potential of humanity formed in the triangle of relations between ecology, the demands of social life, and intelligence. For example, living from savannah hunting required the cooperation of men, while such collaboration requires coordination of actions, difficult without communication, and empathy. In turn, we observe the development of intellectual dispositions, perception, imagination, etc.

Tomasz Kocowski's systemic concept of man is an attempt to synthesize empirically established knowledge about the man from a biocultural perspective. The idea presents man as a biosystem developing an individual psychoorganization in cultural conditions. The uniqueness of human species satisfies biogenic needs related to personal development, survival, and procreation, by organized collective activity with the division of roles. The conditions necessary for co-existence and group cooperation create human sociogenic needs. The behavioral control system is a rich psychosystem formed from mental dispositions developed in the process of anthropoevolution, i.e., perceptual and emotional sensitivity,

development of prospective abilities, and the ability of conceptual thinking. With such assistance, the acting entity controls its locomotion, communication, and intrapsychic activity through internal information modeling of controlled processes and experimental simulation of real operations on the models. The discussed psychical dispositions base on symbolic codes and abstract concepts, which are the highest stage of consciousness development. The generosity of the human mind and the ability to integrate different elements and domains of human existence also contribute to such a development.

Anthropology understands thinking related to the existence of reflexive-introspective consciousness as “a system of cognitive structures that order reactions to emotional stimuli.” And more broadly: as modeling of actions, as a way to play the effects of operations in the imagination, without spending energy or exposing oneself to the risk of actual combat, which K. Popper also stressed in the evolutionary theory of cognition. After such a general characteristic, let us indicate the essential features of human behavior, which base on the genetically conditioned psycho-brain potential of humanity. The man entered a new phase of evolution when, using his psycho-brain potential, he increased the range of his influence on the natural environment, thanks to tools and techniques, which constitute non-organic means of impact on nature. The phase of cultural evolution began with the mastering of fire, the invention of agriculture, and adapting new sources of energy. Man creates an “artificial” environment only by changing the form of dependence, e.g., thanks to air conditioning or artificial irrigation, man can live in the desert (like in Dubai or Texas). But man becomes dependent in a variety of ways to devices that use hydrocarbon energy, which is depleting and polluting the environment. The natural framework of human activity for millennia was the climate, temperature, rainfall rate, terrain form, or soil fertility. In the phylogenetic order, man moves from the realm of things to the symbolic area. In the ontogenetic order, however, it is the opposite, since man has to master the symbolic world of his community to better act in the world of things.

Also, the encountered forms of spiritual culture create a “thought reality,” which equips the individual with patterns of perceiving the surrounding reality, i.e., myths, common knowledge, political doctrines. At the same time, the species nature of man is a permanent condition, the basis of his historical activity. Parameters for the survival and development of an organism are biological constants, i.e., maintaining individual physiological metabolism per day requires about 2.5 thousand kilocalories, 4.5 liters of water, and 15 kg of air. Biological constants of activity in a given local ecosystem include, among other things:




Diagram 1. Human and the human world – a space of influence

Man is stretched between nature, i.e., genetic programming, and culture. The reason for this is that in his behavior human maximizes Darwin’s fitness, on the one hand, i.e., the transmission of gene copies to subsequent generations, which manifests itself, among other things, in strategies for choosing a permanent partner. These policies are different for both genders. However, at the same time, man is not a gene bank; he has a vast human potential, as he is altruistic, can selflessly cooperate, and collaborate with others. However, man lacks mechanisms to inhibit aggression.

Homo sapiens demens

The intra-species aggressiveness of men is also a specificity of human social biology. A tendency to be risky toward the representatives of one’s own species connects with possessing such traits and resources that potential partners value the most, i.e., courage, bravery, and high social position combined with material resources, or possessing the features and abilities that can foreshadow the

up-mentioned traits. Such traits represent the struggle not to be excluded from the reproduction process. At the same time, there was stiff territorial competition for food resources, especially protein, in the anthropoevolution process of primitive human beings. The competitors were mainly other human groups, and the evolutionary strategy was war. Active participation in the competition for scarce food sources required close cooperation within groups, inventions in the field of weaponry, and the development of numerous intellectual dispositions – at least this is what sociobiologists believe. Initially, the need for close cooperation between groups of hunters, not bound by blood ties, developed selfless altruism. Later, the altruism developed into a “patriotic” reflex of sacrifice for the threatened collective, i.e., killing its enemies without personal reasons. As S. Milgram’s famous experiment showed when the group’s authority indicates a goal – it may be the destruction of the community’s enemies – we change our moral orientation, i.e., we do not take personal responsibility for the action taken. D. Morris writes: “solidarity in hunting turned into solidarity in battle – and this is how the war was born.” Moreover, the lack of natural means of combat that predatory species have did not encourage the production of mechanisms inhibiting the aggression, which are characteristic for real predators, with universal adoption of a lower horizontal position. On the other hand, higher feelings, such as compassion or pity, had less and less chance of stopping aggressive behaviors in the face of increasing distance between the fighters – people started to use clubs, spears, bows, firearms, airplanes, or rockets. Initially, weapons appeared to defend oneself against other species. The other function of weapons was hunting.

Thought and emotion

Man has the ability to think abstractly and to precede action with the creation of a symbolic reality model. Still, at the same time, man depends on the older evolutionary limbic system, i.e., emotions and intuition, reacting equally strongly to the signals of the real threat as to the imaginary one. As paleontologist Ian Tattersall writes: “After many millions of years of chaotic and directionless evolution, there has been a huge expansion of the brain and the creation of various exaptation types, which made this last step on the road to “humanization” possible thanks to only minor changes in genetic material.” Until recently, such a gene of humanity was supposed to be a DNA fragment, defined as the FOXP2 gene. FOXP2 gene supports the articulation of words in the speech apparatus, enabling humans to speak. Recently, molecular geneticists discovered a better

candidate for the “humanity” gene – a part of the human genome, called HAR1 (Human Accelerated Region). It turned out that the transcription of HAR1 occurs in neurons that are crucial for the pattern of the cerebral cortex formation, i.e., its most undulating, external part. In any case, the extremely emergent cerebral property of introspective-reflexive consciousness was created without major anatomical or genetic innovation. Cognitive functions, i.e., thinking and reasoning, participate in the choice of a specific response to a stimulus situation, or the transition from reaction to action. Man, unlike pre-human species, does not act in the stimulus-response scheme. Amygdala, located in the limbic system, plays a significant role in the process of choosing a specific form of behavior. Among other things, the amygdala controls emotions and physiological reactions to external challenges. The limbic system cannot distinguish between the rational rage and the one caused by projecting a dangerous situation. Emotions are a biological compass, which, with the help of hormones, indicate the direction of behavior consistent with the biological interest, i.e., when one’s chances of survival or reproduction increase or decrease. As for humans, the amygdala still has more influence on the cortex than the cortex has on the amygdala. In such a system, the interaction between the cortex and the amygdala – thinking, and emotions – increases the accuracy of the reaction in a given situation. (Cf. diagram 2).




Diagram 2. The Emotional Brain – The Low and The High Road to The Amygdala
Source: J. LeDoux, *Mózg emocjonalny*, Poznań 2000, p. 192.

The Level of Sociology – Politics in The Social World of Man

We can only follow the chosen area of homo sapiens' life activity, knowing the essential characteristics of this species' nature. In the present case, we discuss man's activity in one of the social life spheres, i.e., political life. Since such an activity connects in various ways – in the sense of functional connections and determination – it is necessary first to adopt a concept of the whole, of which politics is a component. This is the level of sociology understood by the classics of the discipline – Durkheim, Marx, Weber – as a theory of society as a whole made up of many substructures. Different types of the social whole formed in the phase of cultural evolution, based on extra-genetic inheritance. At that time, the human world, i.e., various social units made of such elements as the economy, the state, different forms of spiritual culture like art, religion, or ideologies, etc., established. Politics, as a field of human activity, using language and semiotic means includes components of consciousness, or national identity: a sense of community, or collective destiny, common national culture and language, the similarity of national character. In a word, politics covers everything that may differ large and small human communities – ethnoses, nations, religious communities, primitive societies. Above all – apart from the race – politics addresses mentality, social personality, the basis of group identification, values, and patterns of behavior. All in all, the mentioned factors create the necessary conditions for an involved human community to last, and the symbolic and cultural world of man: language, cultural, artistic and religious activities, moral, legal and administrative regulations, cognitive activities, etc. Nevertheless, the permanence and development of the whole society require not only an economic structure based on the division of labor – by gender, age, and, further on, increasingly complex social criteria – and a capable state, but also various forms of spiritual culture.

Thus, society is a dynamic, hierarchical functional structure, creating the necessary and sufficient conditions for the duration and development of the groups and individuals belonging to it (Cf. diagram 3. The arrows represent the relationship of functional determination between the practical object activities, and the human consciousness that directs the activities' effectiveness). The visible criterion for distinguishing such a whole is the autonomy of existence. Hence, at various stages of human history, also a human horde, a tribal community, and now national communities, nation-states, and soon perhaps general human civilization, were a society. It was Aristotle who indicated the criterion of self-sufficiency. Aristotle called such social units "states," which is why he permanently distorted the terminology of political scientists, who call such entities "sovereign geopolitical units."

Therefore, social theory logically precedes political reflection. An ordinary view of man and the social world, perpetuated by conventional social knowledge from circulating ideologies such as today's mix of libertarianism and neoclassical economics, often replaces the level of general anthropology and sociology. Due to the multi-paradigmatic structure of contemporary humanities, the researcher has a choice of many possible conceptual arrangements and theses describing the relationships and conditions between different spheres of social life. What counts is: neo-evolutionism, Marxism, functionalism, institutionalism, interpretationalism, F. Braudel's concept of the triple rhythmicity of social processes, or the theory of society becoming. Because of the new phenomena and development trends in contemporary societies, the achievements of the sociological thought classics, i.e., their categories and theses, must be reworked, developed to pose and solve current research problems. Such an attitude toward classical schools and the theoretical and methodological directions of sociology S. Kozyr-Kowalski calls sociological neoclassicism. A recommendable synthesis of sociological knowledge about contemporary society, based on a globalized capitalist economy, is to be found in M. Hirszowicz's book. The economy occupies a prominent position in the structure of the social whole, as it affects all non-economic structures without exception, all spheres of humans' collective and individual lives, and also provides the material basis for the functioning of other areas of social life. Nowadays, such a level of reflection of a political scientist must combine with the level of world civilization, the level of the world-system in I. Wallerstein's understanding. National societies are the nodes in the networks of economic, political, and cultural relations that form the world society. The world society established over several thousand years. The next phases of the process are the formation of the international division of labor, the emergence of a global market, and, at the latest, the world economy as a system of trade, technological, investment, financial, and production links between national production systems. This happened only after the rapid increase in human labor productivity due to the industrial revolution that triumphed in the capitalist economy. National production systems develop now in global ecosystems. However, humanity, divided into cultural circles, nations, and ethnoses, must find a solution to the structural crisis, i.e., overpopulation, the development gap, the greenhouse effect, food shortages, the depletion of energy resources, or the distribution of global wealth. Such a level of analyzing the conditions of the political life of contemporary societies is the subject of world history, macro-historical sociology, the modern-world-system theory, or globalism. A new research problem for a political scientist is the problem of global leadership, often referred to as "global governance."




Diagram 3. Society as a Dynamic, Hierarchical Functional Structure

Natural and Technological Environment

The Third Level of Political Reflection – General Policy Theory

We can study the society only when we know how genetically and functionally the individual substructures of society as a whole link, and what role they play in the whole. Many methodological problems arise here – for example, the logical relations between the conceptual and terminological apparatus, the scopes of laws and the theories being built up, and primary terms on particular levels. It is about semantic coherence and consistency of ontological and epistemological assumptions, and research practice, built on a specific vision of man and society. The fundamental research problem for a political scientist at this level is the very perception of the politics phenomenon, which is a problem comprehensively illuminated in Polish literature. At such a degree, many specific disciplines are confusingly called sociology, e.g., sociology of village or city. However, if only disciplines' subject area has a relatively independent function in the whole of society, there is no reason to deny its own mark. This is how religious studies developed. Hence, it is easier to understand why a Ph.D. in political science is a doctorate in the humanities of political science scope. It is also easier to understand why scientific revolutions, such as problematic and

interpretative innovations at higher levels of the humanities pyramid, are more significant for the whole humanities community. A new thing that a psychologist will say about a human being is vital for other researchers interested in humans' actions and their creations. For example, it was the same with Freud's psychodynamic concept or Weber's views on the role of economy or religion in society. But at the same time, since the disciplines develop in an accepted sociological perspective in a general sense, all of them: theories of economy, state, family, or religion are partial theories of broadly understood sociology. Therefore, all the more so – political theory. As a result, it is right to consider political science as a sociological sub-discipline and political scientist – a sociologist with limited epistemological responsibility.

A practical conclusion from the considerations to date is the postulate of erudition, basic knowledge of the logical structure of social knowledge, and the ability to place political phenomena on a broad background of non-political conditions of human political activity.

The above-described place of politics, and consequently the political science, in the structure of the anthro-science, is also the basis for the problem strategy of studying politics. It depends on a particular phenomenon that we want to explain, what claims, theories we will have to run, and incorporate into the conceptualization of the phenomenon, the search for explanatory factors, factual knowledge, and language of description.

At the same time, an essential practical conclusion comes out of the considerations: neither a researcher nor an adept learning political science can limit himself to general and factual knowledge of his discipline to fully understand politics. The researcher must be three persons at once:

- A humanist, who knows the peculiarities of man as a bio-psycho-social-cultural entity; as a being active toward himself and other people – a socialized entity; as a being active toward nature, and as a historical entity – for man is shaped by the history of his nation, but also by the history of the entire human species;
- A theoretician of “own” subject matter and a theoretician of society as a whole, since the theory of state and politics is a partial theory, i.e., an element of the general theory of society as a whole;
- A researcher of individual political events or processes and structures of state power.

Mirosław Karwat

Research subject of political science in light of the aspectuality principle

Every political scientist should assimilate and rethink achievements of the sociology of knowledge, even if in a synthetic form if he or she wants to treat his or her work as a scientific activity, and not merely to be an expert or commentator on political tendencies and events. By paying attention to the social origin, and idea crystallization mechanism, – including scientific opinions, methodological schemes – social-economic and ideological entanglements of cognitive processes, sociology of knowledge allows political scientists to distance themselves from their own “politicization”, as well as from their own – colloquial or ideologically conditioned and marked – illusory sense of obviousness of concepts adopted at the starting point. The discipline also deprives those scholars who are likely to identify the duty of objectivity with some mythical “unprejudiced” research. This is because the sociology of knowledge forces us to understand that there are no unbiased studies, and even if they do exist, their colloquial and eclectic character invalidates their scientific value.

One of the essential teachings that political scientists owe to the sociology of knowledge – and assimilation – is the principle of the aspectuality of cognition. The principle arose as the consequence of the observation that cognition is intentional and socially determined, that it is not so much the “nature of the object” that imposes a cognitive perspective, but almost the opposite: it is the interests and intentions of the study that determine its subject. The more we become aware of the essence, meaning, and methodological consequences of the discussed principle, the more adequate our efforts will be to interpret politics theoretically. Superficially, such a statement is a truism. It is the political scientist who should understand well the social and political programming of ideas about phenomena, also in scientific knowledge. However, although the science of politics already established itself, and its environment is not a collective debutant in science, the naturalistic or pseudo-naturalistic and formalistic imaginations of the political research subject are still vivid. Formalism, in terms of research, mainly associates with the illusion that the basis of the constitution and *raison d'être* for political scientists may be the separation and specific “fencing” of their

own, unique, almost “reserved” subject.¹ Still, various fields of social sciences address the same thing, but from different perspectives, using different concepts and methods. This is where the aspectuality of cognition manifests itself.

The common understanding of the research subject

Every researcher trying to define the subject of his or her interests potentially exposes himself or herself to the trap of some sort of naturalism, connected with the illusion that one simply “examines what is,” and that science is like a camera that one has to use skillfully and accurately, but which does not distort the image of phenomena. In fact, this is where the common error is.

A standard, rational understanding of the subject of interest does not see this methodological detail that the task does not consist of some “perspicacity” and undisputed adequacy, and that language and the assumptions of social orientation, rather than purely cognitive orientation behind it, make it possible to “see things differently when looking at the same thing.” One does not see the difference between the real phenomenon itself, which is an integral whole, and a specific context and scope – “slice” and “angle” – of its analysis. When asking about the subject of a dissertation or study, the following answer would be typical for the common self-awareness of researchers: About Piłsudski, about the Constitution, the 2005 elections, etc. In reality, the purpose of such work relates to a specific question, e.g., respectively: about Piłsudski’s strategic concept and political tactics, about the style of his leadership and governance, or the balance of his merits and mistakes; about the ideological inspirations or situational conditions of a specific constitutional model, about the genesis and intentions of specific norms pushed through or agreed upon; about the pronunciation of electoral attendance and absenteeism, about the social representativeness of the election result, about the influence of the course and outcome of the election on the change in the structure of political forces, etc.

In a common approach, the subject appears to be evident and natural – either from the perspective of the shared viewing criteria, as well as according to formalistic rules – e.g., it is a legal issue, and this is a non-legal one; this is legal, and this is illegal, etc. As a result, the subject of research usually considers some real-life individual objects, i.e., physically materialized objects, sets of such objects, e.g., “electorate,” or visually observable relationships and properties, such as

1 Cf.: M. Karwat. “Cecha polityczności i dziedzina teorii polityki,” in: *Carl Schmitt i współczesna myśl polityczna*, ed. R. Skarżyński (Warszawa: 1996).

conflict, alliance, aggressiveness, or conciliatory attitudes. However, what seems evident and visible, in reality, is often the result of a biased diagnosis, e.g., that we deal with a crisis, decadence, or reforming actions rather than adaptation, maintenance, or restoration. Such a predetermined starting point, sometimes coinciding with the propaganda and indoctrination functions of research and teaching, is most often the result of submitting to non-cognitive, i.e., ideological, prejudices.

In a simplified approach, the difference between phenomena – which address differences between objects in the literal sense, i.e., things, or persons, properties, relation, functions, states, events, processes, etc. – and their cognition is blurred.

Taking the subject for the object

As a result, the subject of description and explanation seems to be the same as the selectively perceived real object. In contrast, the real object is sometimes identified with a physical object, a finite entity located in one place in space. A party, a state, a parliament are perceived and presented almost as a table, a chair, a bridge, a line of trenches, a low-pressure zone, or a sea current. Not always researchers, especially those suggested by the “concreteness” of their specialization field, see that they use metaphors to say that, e.g., an ideological or civilization trend has a slightly different status than a sea current. Such an approach, built on literalness and sense of “sight,” considers the difference between the real object and the subject of cognition, or even the difference between an entity and perception to a non-sufficient extent.

However, as E. Grodziński reminds us, not only a real entity, and even more so, not only a real object, can be a subject of cognition.

There are names that involve things, phenomena, and facts as well. Such a name is an entity. The name means everything that exists, regardless of the existence form ... But we can hardly call an entity something that does not exist. However, philosophers have at their disposal a term with an even broader scope, namely an object. In colloquial speech, an object is as much as a thing, although there are also other ordinary meanings of the word. On the other hand, in philosophical terminology, an object is everything that can be distinguished by a thought, that is, what can be thought of, so not only any being but also what does not exist. For philosophy, nirvana is also an object, although apart from orthodox Buddhists, nobody believes in its “existence.” The temperature below absolute zero, speed higher than the speed of light, or finally nothingness itself – since we can think about vacuum – are also objects for philosophy.²

2 E. Grodziński, *Myslenie hipotetyczne. Studium na pograniczu ontologii, filozofii języka i psychologii* (Wrocław, Warszawa, Kraków, Gdańsk, Łódź: 1986), p. 15. S. Nowak

Categorial adequacy

Such a trap of “naturalism” is not inevitable if the researcher, not being a professional methodologist, realizes that, although the real object itself is still the same, we examine it from different angles, in a cross-section of various properties and relations. Thus, a complex whole is not available to us “by nature,” as if we were simply painting a landscape, a portrait, or a nude, but capturing this whole requires first an abstract “parceling” and only then a secondary integration. It is an old way of going from analysis to synthesis. Only synthetic thinking makes it possible to learn about different aspects and ranges of the phenomenon to create an ordered sequence, e.g., parallel, equivalent and complementary characteristics, successive levels of generalization, levels of complexity, etc. Only then we avoid both the common error and the so-called *categorial shifts*.

The ranges of *definiens* and *definiendum* may be mutually exclusive. Such a situation will occur, in particular, if we make a *category shift error* when building a reporting definition. The error is that as a generic term, we give *definiens* a *genus* that is fundamentally different from the one that we should indicate for the proper definition of the current meaning of the *definiendum*, namely from a different so-called ontological category. ... For example, things are different than things' features. ... Events occur in things, but events are not things. Things can be in a certain relation to each other, the creation of a relation is a certain event, the existence of a relation between things is a certain state of things, but the relation itself is neither a thing nor an event or a state of things. The feature of one thing may be that it remains in a certain relationship to another, but the relationship itself is not a feature.³

There are many mistakes of such a type in political research, even in the research practice of veterans. For example, for some, as for exalted reporters and publicists, persistent manifestations with symbolic orange-colored props, and forcing a breakthrough for the time being only in determining the outcome of elections and the title to power is immediately an “orange revolution.” While a look from a distance would make one wonder whether it is the beginning, the culmination of long and more profound processes, or the solemn conclusion of a particular stage of the political struggle, not yet determining where the winners and society as a whole will reach. Another example of such an ordinary “naturalization” of the subject matter is the use of the “fourth power” metaphor, common among political scientists and media experts. The use of the term often

discusses the reistic and non-reistic approach to the subject of sociological theories in: *Metodologia badań społecznych* (Warszawa: 1985), pp. 38–39.

3 Z. Ziemiński, *Logika praktyczna* (Warszawa, 1974), p. 54.

lacks the awareness that it is a metaphor and that the word “power” has a relational – rather conventional and symbolic than formal and material – sense here rather than an attributive – power being a feature of the media? – or material one – media being a subject of power?

The confusion of ontological categories at different levels and in various scopes of the study is reinforced by a side effect of the division of labor in the humanities, or in the specialization. Separatist research “from here to here” helps to blur the difference between what is general, what is common, what is detailed, what is separate, and the characteristics of phenomena, e.g., political leadership phenomena created in legal, sociological, psychological, praxeological categories, are not compatible, do not create a complementary coherent picture, but a sum of unilaterality.

The object of cognition and subject matter in the light of the sociology of knowledge

Jan Woleński rightly stated at one time that “it is not an object that constitutes a theory, but a theory constitutes its own object”,⁴ Furthermore, in the broadly understood family of humanities and social sciences, no one owns a subject of any kind – e.g., the study of power, leadership, decision-making processes, political awareness, social conflicts, etc. On the contrary, representatives of different disciplines meet and complement each other when studying the same phenomenon, yet from different sides, in diverse cross-section, or different optics. This is also true for the political sciences themselves; they can successfully co-exist and complement the view of the overall normative, institutional, behavioral, systemic, historical, etc. approaches, for the same object is not so much studied in its entirety, but on a cross-sectional or contextual basis. The key to understanding what actual subjects of specific researches are – e.g., political studies researches – how they differ, but also what the non-identical subjects of different disciplines or methodological orientations have in common, is to recall the classic typology of ontological categories.

The typology of “cross-cutting” subjects

In the philosophical tradition – but in the tradition of historical methodology, sociological methodology, etc. as well – we can distinguish at least the following

4 J. Woleński, “Spór o status metodologiczny nauki o polityce,” in: K. Opalek, ed., *Metodologiczne i teoretyczne problemy nauk politycznych* (Warszawa: 1975).

categories of social phenomena. The phenomena are subject to empirical records, description, explanation, or prediction:

- *objects* in a literal, physical sense – things;
- *entities* – individuals, groups, communities or institutions forming an organized whole;
- *incidents* – as a result of a “tangle of circumstances,” unintentional by anyone, spontaneously created, often by chance, and without the participation of people, or in any case not influenced by their efforts;
- *events* – as a combination of incidents, human actions and the deliberate and unintended side effects of these actions;
- *states of things, social situations* and, accordingly, *states of human consciousness*;
- *properties* – features – of an object, subject, incident, action, event, relations, processes;
- *relations* – dependencies – between objects;
- *relationships* – dependencies – between characteristics of objects or entities, events, actions, etc.;
- *intercourse* – as a synthesis of objective dependence and intentional influence – between entities;
- *changes* in these states of things or properties;
- *processes* – as continuity and accumulation of changes, transformations.

The principle of aspectuality

It is not enough for a political scientist to say that the subject of his or her investigation is “politics.” The assumption which makes the illusion of colloquiality or formalism is that it is enough to adequately and exhaustively define the category of “politics”, and to establish the criteria for qualifying a phenomenon as political – when treating the attribute of “politics” on the same principle as colorfulness or colorlessness, softness or hardness, etc. – to “finally” and “reliably” determine the area of own research, to distinguish between politics and “the rest”, i.e., the sum of “non-political” phenomena. It would be a dubious and naive assumption if we treat it literally, especially without considering the dynamics of the phenomena, the changeability of their context,⁵ the unequal intensity of this crowning feature

5 Franciszek Ryszka paid attention to the etymological, contextual and historical relativization of the concepts of “politics” and “political.” Cf. F. Ryszka, “O tym co jest ‘polityczne.’ Przyczynek do roważeń z semantyki politycznej,” in: *Prawo i polityka* (Warszawa: 1988).

in different types of phenomena in different socio-historical circumstances.⁶ In fact, the definition and criteria “fulfill” only when the researcher can each time define the context of the application of his or her concepts, the aspect, scope, and level of research. Otherwise, he or she balances between the “usurpation” of exclusivity for certain types of phenomena, or fluidity, arbitrariness, and relativism in terms of an allegedly rigidly separated object of research – “political” is the area into which I delve into – or arbitrariness.

A political scientist gifted with methodological self-awareness realizes the fact of continuous modeling, gradation and concretization of an object in every stage of his or her abstract work: when defining concepts,⁷ the field of theory in terms of a multi-stage and multi-dimensional relational structure, and finally, when posing questions about properties or conditions of certain phenomena types. The scientist achieves his or her cognitive goal if he or she remembers the legitimacy of his or her answers – hypotheses, generalizations, laws – only in certain aspects.

Such a situation occurs due to the complexity of social reality itself and, consequently, *the aspectuality of its perception*:

The aspectuality of perception and the complexity of reality make it possible to see something different every time one looks at the same thing.⁸

Therefore, there is not only one question that we can ask about a given object but many questions with different content and scope. Moreover, there are many potentially equal partial or comprehensive and exhaustive answers to the same issues – cf. the competitiveness of the theory of the same phenomenon. There is not only one picture of the phenomenon, nor just one explanation or interpretation of it. There are many ways to reach not only different or divergent but also related interpretations and explanations. That is why, when talking about the subject of his or her research, the researcher must always add: **the subject of what?** – i.e., of what form, what stage, what level of the cognitive process.

6 Carl Shmitt especially pointed out the gradualness – different measure of intensity – of the political features of social phenomena; cf. C. Shmitt, *The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995).

7 Cf. O. Cetwiński, M. Karwat, “Dwa wybrane modele kierunku eksplikacji kategorii nauki o polityce,” *Studia Nauk Politycznych*, No. 4/1976; M. Karwat, “Zasady budowy siatki kategorii w nauce o polityce,” *Studia Nauk Politycznych*, No. 3/1981.

8 J. Niżnik, *Przedmiot poznania w naukach społecznych* (Warszawa: 1979), p. 21.

Józef Niżnik points this out by showing the process from the common perception to the scientific recognition of phenomena in terms of the difference between *the subject of research* and *the subject of cognition*.

The decision to examine a particular subject reflects the researcher's intentions articulated in terms of the everyday world. I want to call such described subject *the subject of research*. Of course, in many cases, such a subject is defined through conceptual categories shaped in science. However, I think that in most cases, we can reduce the subject's initial characteristics to the everyday world.⁹

The subject of research and the subject of cognition

Adopting as a starting point the difference between a standard view of phenomena and a theoretical, i.e., scientific, way of perceiving them, J. Niżnik distinguishes two "steps" in the process of the phenomenon cognition:

The first step, which we can call ... the selection of the research subject is ... the result of a specific demand or simply a conscious intention of the researcher. ... it is necessary to distinguish the second step, which is no longer "making a choice" or a decision, but rather a complicated act of the subject constitution. Whereas the result of the first step is the "selection" of *the subject for the research*, in one way or another, the result of the second step is *the subject's constitution*.¹⁰

If I understand the epistemological premises of such a scheme correctly, J. Niżnik seems inspired by the Ingarden's category of the subject's intentionality.¹¹

In any case, the discussed two-level schema of the creation of a theoretical subject – as in the meaning adapted by A. Żukrowska, i.e., a conceptual-assumption construction – seems convincing. First, the researcher consciously limits his or her field of vision, selects aspects that are relevant and interesting to him or her, and eliminates other aspects considered irrelevant to a given content and range of questions he or she poses by abstracting. The researcher aims to penetrate the phenomena more deeply by narrowing them. Then the researcher constructs his or her theoretical subject as an ordered whole.

Aspects of researchers – systematization

Adopted both in the methodology of science and in everyday scientific, bureaucratic, or journalistic jargon, the term 'aspect' is an adaptation of the Latin word

9 J. Niżnik, *Przedmiot poznania*, p. 29.

10 J. Niżnik, *Przedmiot poznania*, p. 30.

11 Cf. R. Ingarden, *Spór o istnienie świata* (Warszawa: 1987), Vol. 2, 3rd edn.

aspectus (= a gaze, look, view; from the verb *aspicere* = to look, watch). The term relates to other words, e.g., “spectacle.”

Generically, we use the term to describe specific dimensions or cross-sections, a certain side of a phenomenon, its highlighted property, or dependence on other phenomena. On the other hand, the aspect links with intentional selection and concentration of attention in the process of studying the phenomena. Then the aspect associates with such concepts as the point of view, angle of view – perspective, shot, optics.

Therefore, the concept of an aspect has a twofold meaning.

The *ontological* and *epistemological* sense of aspect draws attention. *Ontological*, in this regard, means aspect as a side, defining feature, one of the essence’s dimensions, or one of the phenomenon’s forms. *Epistemological* regard treats aspect as the expression or result of a particular orientation and concentration of interests, the highlighting of certain features compared to others, or abstracted from others, as a term of “cognitive perspective,” or as a way of approaching a given issue. There might or might not be a direct relationship between one “aspect of an aspect” and the other.

A brilliant dissertation by Stanisław Ossowski contains the systematics of meanings and functions of the “aspect.”¹² I shall briefly revise and supplement the order presented in the discussed work.

The meaning of the cognition aspectuality

The aspectuality of cognition, which anyway is conditioned by the multidimensionality of the reality itself, is a phenomenon independent of ontological and epistemological orientation, and the will of researchers. It is a fact which every scientist must consider:

We talk about empirically identifiable differences in the perception and characterization of reality, differences that are characteristic of individuals and social environments. To express this metaphorically, it is about differences in some kind of prisms through which we see the shapes and colors of the world, and not about the retina of the eye, which is a necessary condition for any vision of shapes and colors.¹³

12 St. Ossowski, “O osobliwościach nauk społecznych; p. 3 – Punkty widzenia, tezy, dyrektywy (Rozważania nad typami sporów w problematyce społecznej),” in: St. Ossowski, *Dziela*, Vol. 4 – *O nauce* (Warszawa: 1967).

13 St. Ossowski, “O osobliwościach,” p. 195.

As we can see, the phrase also contains a warning against absolutizing the aspectuality, which leads to cognitive relativism or a simplified perception of the world. Thus, aspectuality links with adopting – at the starting point, in a more or less conscious manner – a specific way of perceiving and defining phenomena, and with an attitude towards such or other methods and categories. The aspectuality of cognition clearly manifests itself in the existence of many types and kinds of explanations and angles of view:

Individual interpretations correspond to individual aspects of subjects.¹⁴

Aspectuality relates to the typological nature of theoretical cognition. Thus, not only does aspectuality refer to an intrinsic or comparative study of individual subjects, but also to unified patterns, in which personification expresses typification, and sets, classes, types and models of phenomena:

We can find differences in aspects both concerning subjects treated individually and when comparing classes of objects.¹⁵

Aspectual cognition of phenomena makes it possible, paradoxically, to increase the knowledge of a phenomenon, which, until now, was treated formally indivisibly, in reality, was limited to one particular meaning, dimension, or context, by referring to “narrower”, specialist knowledge. We do it on such a principle: we approach a phenomenon from the point of view of a specific type of knowledge intending to enrich the knowledge with the interpretation of a given phenomenon or a certain “cross-section” of it as a novelty, by referring to the reserves inherent in this very knowledge. Knowledge becomes a reference system for the analysis of a given phenomenon. The repeated, comparative application of different types of knowledge to learn about successive “cross-sections” or sides of a phenomenon reveals not only its new and hidden dimensions or its full scale but as a result raises the image of the essence, the quality of the phenomenon subjected to a secondary synthesis, to a higher level.

S. Ossowski illustrates well the discussed cycle of enriching knowledge by multiaspectuality with some examples:

We can talk about different aspects of Mickiewicz’s or Dante’s character. The author of *Divine Comedy* can interest us as a poet, as a Ghibelline, as a Tuscan, as a political exile, as a schizothymic individual. We can talk about different aspects of a human being: in one aspect, the zoological one, man will be a two-handed mammal, in another,

14 St. Ossowski, “O osobliwościach,” p. 195.

15 St. Ossowski, “O osobliwościach,” p. 195.

it will be a *homo faber*, a creature producing tools, in yet another – a social being (*zoon politikon*).¹⁶

The context of research

The theory of the phenomenon may be of one-aspect and one-level character, but also of multi-aspect and multi-level; then it has a systematizing and interpretive character, i.e., determining the relationship between different aspects, constitutive and regulatory factor, etc.¹⁷ One cannot forget about the principle of emergence: the impossibility to reduce one level of social organization – and thus the knowledge about it – to another.¹⁸

Concerning the analysis of the political context of the individuals' life or the existence of man as a species, we can observe similar nuances. It will be different to study the relationship between humanity and politics in general, and it will be different to study an individual in a specific role, e.g., a citizen of the state, a member of the nation, class, political party; a religion believer, a worker, a consumer, a voter.¹⁹

Here, we can see the phrase “reference system.” Therefore, let us note that the same subject changes its aspect and character depending on the context in which we place it, the determination direction we take, derivation, or conclusion. The experience of research on the relationship between the national-state community and the environment or international community, the globally understood human being – the very choice of the category “environment” or “international community” reveals a difference in cognitive perspective – illustrates this. Thus, the same institutions, bodies, activities, interests are exposed differently from the point of view of the country's “foreign policy” and differently from the point of

16 St. Ossowski, “O osobliwościach,” pp. 195–196.

17 Alexander Manterys points this out in his monograph: A. Manterys, *Wielość rzeczywistości w teoriach socjologicznych* (Warszawa: 1997). Concepts of Kazimierz Dąbrowski also emphasize the multilevel nature of social and psychological phenomena, and thus the need for a multilevel structure of the phenomena theory. Cf. K. Dąbrowski, *Moralność w polityce. Wielopoziomowość funkcji uczuciowych i popędowych w życiu społecznym i politycznym oraz instytucjach* (Warszawa: 1991).

18 Cf. J. Szmatka, *Jednostka i społeczeństwo. O zależności zjawisk indywidualnych od społecznych* (Warszawa: 1980).

19 Cf. M. Karwat, *Człowiek polityczny. Próba interpretacji marksistowskiej* (Warszawa: 1989); M. Karwat, “Role polityczne jednostki,” in: *Edukacja Polityczna*, Vol. 13 (Warszawa: 1989); M. Karwat, “Człowiek przez pryzmat polityki,” in: *Wokół istnienia człowieka*, M. Szyszkowska ed. (Warszawa: ISP PAN, 1992).

view of “world politics”, i.e., international relations. Such perceptions are usually complementary or need complementation, but the order in both perspectives is different. The dominants also vary, e.g., *raison d'état* and the requirements of collective security or global conditions of human existence, and even the links obtain a different meaning.

Let us also note that, according to the multi-level structure of social entity existence, also the aspectuality in its cognition is gradual. Apart from capturing one or other aspects of the subject directly, the researcher also perceives and highlights certain aspects of the relation between the subject and other phenomena, reflections of its features, and links in yet other relations and the social perception:

We can study different aspects of some layout of human relations *hic et nunc* and different conceptions of the social structure as aspects of the human relations layout in differentiated societies.²⁰

Similarly, in the sphere of political research we will see various aspects – e.g., economic, socio-technical, legal, military, moral, psychological – of an objective power ratio and multiple concepts of power or doctrine of power – e.g., legitimate, lawful, effective, strong, enlightened power – as an expression of certain aspects of political power arrangement, conflicting interests and claims, ideological options.

Abstracting

Either way, the aspectual cognition requires *abstraction* to focus on some kind of “cross-section” of the phenomenon, a particular “reference system” or the researcher’s chosen point of view.

We talk about aspects of a subject when one or other of its similarities or relationships become apparent. Differences in aspects of the same subject, event, or process are a matter of different conceptual categories into which we put it, or of different arrangements into which we incorporate it. In both cases, the different aspects are the result of abstraction. We abstract either from the features or the components of the examined or unique aspect of reality.²¹

At the same time, abstraction from specific features, emphasizing or even absolutizing others – e.g., in idealization procedures – may be dictated not only by

²⁰ St. Ossowski, “O osobliwościach,” p. 196.

²¹ St. Ossowski, “O osobliwościach,” p. 196.

considerations and rules that are autonomously and genuinely cognitive but also by non-cognitive functions of science:

A conscious abstraction from certain characteristics, relations or components of reality can be driven by the directives of struggle or propaganda when the image of reality aims to have an impact that corresponds to certain objectives.²²

In such a case, we face a deliberate deformation of the phenomenon image, i.e., with a bias – unlike in a scientific study, where detachment from something serves not to effectively suggest by hiding but to focus on something.

The researcher's attitude

Such an intentional exaggeration of the reality image may have a variety of cognitive motifs. The motifs range from realism and “truthfulness” – exaggeration as a rhetorical means associated with the awareness of the difference between a suggestive image and reality – through cognitive self-illusions and aberrations conditioned, for example, by wishful thinking, to the conscious falsification of reality.

In any case, another sense of the term “aspect” emerged; namely, we can understand it as an emphasis in this case. Such aspectuality occurs not only in the sphere of fiction or journalism, political information – in the form of, e.g., programmatic bias, prejudice, pamphlet poetics, poetics of programmatic documents, agitation, apologetic and panegyric creation, etc. – but also in the forms of scientific cognition, e.g., in the rules of genre polemics, discussion, scientific dispute, even in positive ways of scientific criticism, in recapitulations of the contribution of particular authors or schools to the continuation or verification of certain theories, etc.

The aspectuality as a synonym for *simplification* – especially cognitively inadequate one – is for us a secondary and marginal moment – although, in conditions of trivial and instrumental politicization and ideologization of science, it may come to the fore, at the expense of objective truth. What is more interesting for us is the cognitively motivated depletion of the phenomenon's scope, which goes together with the enrichment of the inner content of what it reduced to.

Then, not only the disciplinary specialization or the natural assignment of the interpretation of the phenomenon to categories specific to a given branch of science or a given field or school within it plays a role. There may be an organized

²² St. Ossowski, “O osobliwościach,” p. 198.

idea of the internal structure of the subject and the criteria of meaning – ontological or cognitive – of its elements or “sections.”

The selection of facts is sometimes also the result of hierarchization of elements from the point of view of some immanent importance criteria: the elements of reality are divided into those that are important and unimportant due to their significance in the course of the described events, and those that are treated as exceptions, i.e., “accidental,” “unrepresentative” or “depleted of more serious consequences” are not considered.²³

Thus, we return to the twofold meaning of the term “aspect”.

In some cases, the aspect determines the issues sphere. Different “aspects” are then equivalent to different “points of view.” Here, the difference of aspects is the difference of problematic issues.

A different way of using the notion of an aspect is relevant when, speaking about the difference of aspects, we mean not the scope of the problem but the difference in the characteristics of the subject. We do not usually say that such traits are studied from different points of view, but that they are the expression of different positions or that there are divergent prejudices in them.²⁴

The ontological and epistemological sense of aspectuality

Let us summarize. From the conducted reconstruction we can derive the following systematics of meanings and functions of the “aspect”:

- I. **The ontological sense** – an aspect as an objective characteristic of a phenomenon; a deliberate emphasis on phenomenon’s image in one way or another, but with a focus on what we consider not a conventional feature, but a self-contained “dimension,” originally independent of schemes and instrumental methodological solutions:
 1. *Type of substrate or carrier* of the essence, properties, functions of a phenomenon – e.g., qualification of a phenomenon as belonging to the sphere of social existence or social consciousness; as “energetic” or “informative”, as an element of material and technical culture or as an element of conventional-symbolic culture;
 2. A *specific feature* – characteristic, significant, representative of the whole, etc.;
 3. A specific *side* of the phenomenon – one of many interdependent but not identical;

23 St. Ossowski, “O osobliwościach,” p. 199.

24 St. Ossowski, “O osobliwościach,” pp. 200–201.

4. A particular **cross-section** of the phenomenon – one of the dimensions of a multi-dimensional whole; a specific way of linking non-uniform and non-homogeneous components.

II. The methodological sense – an aspect as a characteristic of the way and scope of studying a phenomenon:

1. **The angle of vision** – correlation of the “prism” and the scope of research;
2. **The point of view** – the type of adopted categories, or assumptions that determine the way the phenomenon is presented;
3. **A reference system** – location in a specific context, treatment of a certain structure as a starting point in the study, as a whole defining and conditioning genetically, structurally or functionally;
4. **Emphasis** – emphasizing the feature or side to which special meaning occurs in the interpretation of a phenomenon; subjective meaning due to cognitive or non-cognitive intention or objectivized meaning due to the belief of importance, significance.

The multifaced nature of political research

What we call politics – no matter what we consider to be the key to its essence and how we define its “boundaries” concerning the sphere of “non-political” phenomena – is a macro-phenomenon, a syndrome. If we assume that politics is a vast field of phenomena of various genesis and nature and that it is the result of a combination of complex and uneven phenomena in terms of meaning, then it is necessary to treat the “field” of politics as a complex system of relations.²⁵ We can reconstruct such a network of ties only under the condition of multi-faceted analysis – both at the level of individual phenomena and its types, e.g., political institutions, political ideas, norms motivating or justifying the direction of action, methods of political activity, and at the level of research of “politics as a whole”.

Applying the aspectuality rule in the research on types of political phenomena

We will now illustrate the presented earlier key of aspectuality by one example of a relatively specific, detailed subject of political theory. Let the illustration be the phenomenon of violence – as an influence based on destructive force. Already

25 Cf. J. Kmita, *Wykłady z logiki i metodologii nauk* (Warszawa: 1975), p. 78.

at the starting point, we have to treat the phenomenon as an aspect, because it requires distinguishing between state violence, legally regulated, sanctioned and legitimized, and “subversive”, usurper violence. Let us also assume that before the researcher interprets violence in its entirety and the spectrum of its possible forms – including both purely physical force and destruction in the form of economic, moral-psychological and symbolic influences – he or she will start with physical violence, occurring in the form of armed actions, actions of militant formations, acts of “death squads” or spontaneous collective actions such as riots, lynchings, pogroms.

In the ontological dimension, we can specify the following aspects of investigating violence in politics:

The context of the phenomenon: the non-contractual, non-compromising, and non-consensual nature of formulating and enforcing the will that is generally prevailing. The overwhelming advantage of one side of social conflict, i.e., antagonism, e.g., class, racial, ethnic, religious, allowing for effective action to the detriment of the other side, which is vulnerable or too weak. The advantage lies, among other things, in the fuller or even exclusive equipment with energy or informational means of destruction, and even in the guaranteed power of repression and destruction measures for the relevant authorities.

Substrate, carrier: a physical, economic, or psychological force applied with an intention or destructive effect, or the destructive meaning of certain symbols or the desecration of symbols.

Distinguished feature: aggressive in intentions, destructive in plans or permitted effects nature of the impact, i.e., limiting the possibility of action, suppressing aspirations, disintegrating and harming the other side, creating a threat to the existence, or at least to safety, identity and dignity of the attacked side, as a condition for achieving or maintaining the desired “constructive state.”

The side of the phenomenon: technical or organizational side of actions causing permanent damage and destruction, the way and mode – procedure – of activating the means of destruction, also forms of “managing” own attacks and losses of the victim; it is the economic side of damage: causing someone else’s loss or destruction as a means to one’s benefit, gain.

The cross-section of the phenomenon: The impact of a situation created by blows, persecution, suffering, etc. on the morale of the persecutors and the persecuted on the sense of identification of winners and losers, on the sense of self-righteousness, superiority, justice or harm.

In the methodological dimension, it is possible to imagine, for example, the following direction of the researcher’s interests:

The angle of vision: the interpretation of the formally programmed range of operation and the effectiveness degree of the means of destruction used in a given type of situation, with a given system of forces.

The point of view: the interpretation of means and forms of destructive action from the point of view of legality or illegality of this action, coherence, and completeness of legal regulations defining the conditions of using force threatening the existence of the attacked entities.

A reference system: violence as a tool to force or stop and reverse the social change.

Emphasis: irreversibility of material or destructive psychological effects.

The presented example seems to clearly illustrate and confirm the fact of gradation, a kind of moderation of the subject in different stages and scopes of research. We can treat such an example as an illustration of differentiation and relativization of the object of theory in the case of a specific disciplinary sphere – e.g., legal, ethical, praxeological, psychological – different orientation of interests in various separate theories, often formulated within different disciplines. The example can also illustrate the complexity of structure and multi-phase cognition within the multi-aspect approach, in which an attempt at integral interpretation precisely precedes partial, aspectual expositions. Therefore, in the integral interpretation, the integration of partial-aspect theories forms the cognitive whole through a particular holistic-systematic theory.

It was an example of the importance of the aspectuality principle in the theoretical-political knowledge of specific types or syndromes of phenomena, i.e., in the case of the object's concretization. However, aspectuality affects the way of putting the whole sphere of research, i.e., the subject of theoretical-political reflection in general.

The multi-aspectual interpretation of politics

Let us now consider – at the higher level of generality – in how many ways can we define “politics” as such.²⁶

26 I present the multidimensional approach to the phenomenon of “politics” – in reference to the systematics of Kazimierz Opalek – in the article: M. Karwat, “Polityka rzeczowa, stronnicza i metapolityka,” in: *Współczesne teorie polityki – od logiki do retoryki*, T. Klementewicz ed., *Studia Politologiczne*, Vol. 8 (Warszawa: 2004).

First of all, we can view politics dynamically, processually, diachronically, or statically, structurally, in a synchronous cross-section.²⁷ Thus, we can focus, respectively, on variability, continuity preserved in transformations or on permanent forms, types of phenomena, and interdependencies of different phenomena at the same time and place. By examining politics from the point of view of the intentions or effects of collective efforts, we can focus either on innovations and experiments in social relations or on attempts to maintain and regulate the functioning of what exists, i.e., on the reproduction of the *status quo*.

Within the processual-diachronic approach, the interest in the historical process as a whole, its primary trend, i.e., “direction” or “line” shown in the course, or in specific stages, of the caesuras and events themselves, e.g., climaxes or breakthroughs, may prevail.

Within the framework of the synchronous-structural approach, we can consider politics either as *a system of political relations* – i.e., dependencies of objective, conscious and intended influences – or as *a type of social practice*, i.e., as a system of intentional, programmed actions, subordinate to the task of transforming, maintaining, or reproducing these relations, as well as the task of reproducing one’s ability to act. Claims that are relevant to the first aspect, i.e., the analysis of the political relations system, cannot necessarily be automatically accepted or adapted without additional assumptions for the second aspect, i.e., the study of the political activity of individual entities – sides to these relations; and vice versa.

However, researchers of political phenomena very often confuse the mentioned two orders. For example, researchers confuse what belongs to the scope of the analysis of the conflict of interest and the structure of multilateral or bilateral conflict between large social groups and the so-called social power structure, with what is within the characteristics of the potential and efforts of individual entities. Sometimes, such a situation happens due to the researcher’s unconsciousness about identification with his or her favorite character’s perspective. Then, for example, researchers analyze the “path of leaving the communist system” in terms of “decommunization” – as if the difference between the socio-historical alternative and the subjectively made and imposed choice is of little importance, between the real possibilities and the goals of specific entities, their sense of duty and rightness. Such a tendency is visible in most of the works on

27 Tadeusz Klementewicz even distinguishes three essential research perspectives: structural, historical and humanistic political science one. Cf. T. Klementewicz, *Spór o model metodologiczny nauki o polityce* (Warszawa: 1991).

transformation, where one almost knows in advance what the author walks away from, or even “where the author is going to.” Of course, there is a connection between the circumstances of political action and strategy, tactics and methods of political action, between the social causes of certain group aspirations and the motives and intentions of those aspirations – but in such a case it requires at least two-stage reasoning, and not a “one line”, or even less a teleological approach.

Equally often, there is a leap between considerations concerning processes – e.g., historical trends, development trends, or potential challenges and threats to civilization – and considerations embedded in the context of practice. At the same time, the importance of moments of objectivity, subjectivity, necessity, choice, etc. is not identical in both cases. The “logic of globalization” and the calculations, aspirations, and resistance of its carriers and supporters, critics and opponents, are examined differently.

Let us now focus on understanding politics in categories of *activity*.

Aspects of politics as a type of human activity

Such an approach to politics also reveals several options, one of which we must choose, or the relationship of which we must determine by considering difference, avoiding the confusion of orders. Here are a few examples:

- A. Politics as *art* – understood either intuitively or rationally, i.e., in correlation with knowledge, based on recognizing specific rules of “craftsmanship and artistry”, but also social regularities; and politics as a *machine* – determined and programmed by objective necessity – even with a considerable margin of maneuver, invention, initiative; containing a certain amount of automatism, etc.²⁸
- B. Politics as *a way to meet necessity* and politics as *a way to achieve what is possible*. Let us not forget, after all, that what is necessary and what is possible does not have to be the same thing, and that realistic policy does not reduce itself to balancing between fate and willfulness.
- C. Politics as a struggle – or even a *war* – as a *tender-game* and as a technique for concluding, sanctioning, enforcing a “social contract” by compromise or consensus. The emphasis is on destruction – destroying, eliminating, or limiting and suppressing others – competition, cooperation – alliances,

28 Cf. T. Klementowicz, “Polityka jako sztuka rozwiązywania zadań ryzykownych,” in: *Metafory polityki*, B. Kaczmarek ed. (Warszawa: 2001); S. Kozłowski, “Polityka jako tworzenie historii i historyczna konieczność,” in: *Metafory polityki* (Warszawa: 2001).

agreements, concessions – manipulation or persuasion – in the form of an overt or covert indoctrination.²⁹

- D. Politics as a mechanism of *objectification* and human *empowerment* – in species, collective and individual dimensions.

There are many more of such diverse cross-sections and research perspectives. However, it is enough to limit oneself to the given examples to realize the practical importance of respecting the principle of aspectuality for political scientists with scientific, even more so theoretical ambitions.

Cross-sectionality and the integrity of the political phenomena picture

I think that the analysis of aspectuality clearly showed the duality of attempts to formulate a political theory. On the one hand, the coexistence of many aspectual policy approaches, i.e., narrow or one-sided ones, to some extent alternative, competitive, or complementary, is inevitable. For such reasons, many authors – e.g., the late F. Ryszka – doubted whether it is possible to say “theory of politics”; or just “theories of politics”. On the other hand, the ambition of “fulfillment” links with an attempt to achieve – through systematics – an integral knowledge.³⁰

In any case, we must see the difference and interdependence between:

- objectively non-identical “sides” of politics – such as: social, economic, legal, socialization, moral, aesthetic, customary, ideological-doctrinal, socio-technical, military – and respectively: the determination of politics by technological, economic, cultural phenomena;
- specific “branch” politics approaches – such as of sociological, economic, legal, pedagogical, ethical, praxeological, cybernetic, etc. kind.
- and an essentialist, integral, or organic approach that seeks to extract from the multitude of forms and entanglements – contexts – what is “pure” politics, or at least what is immanent to politics, and, secondly, to capture the mechanisms of influence of politics on technology, economy, culture, the legal system, morality, etc.

29 Cf. T. Klementewicz, “Pojęcie tego, co polityczne Carla Schmitta a współczesne koncepcje polityki,” in: *Carl Schmitt i współczesna myśl polityczna*, R. Skarżyński ed. (Warszawa: 1996).

30 Cf. T. Klementewicz, “Jak integralnie wyjaśniać politykę?,” in: *Spór o model metodologiczny nauki o polityce* (Warszawa: 1991).

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A political scientist – like any other humanist researcher – must become aware of the meaning and methodological consequences of the aspectuality principle in cognition, and define a specific aspect of his or her particular research if he or she wants to maintain the relevance of the field, the scope of his or her direct research and conceptual categories, control the conditions and limits of the legitimacy of his or her generalizations.

The methodological or content-related disputes – also in our discipline – all too often become idle as a result of not considering the aspectual nature of each interpretation or even the theory of the phenomenon. The dispute then takes place on a similar basis and is as fruitful as the discussion “on the superiority of Christmas over Easter,” or the arbitrary determination of what is in front and what is in back. It is also dangerous – as always when one does not see the forest behind trees – to lack humility and distance, expressed in the strict textbook specialist’s conviction that what he or she researches – e.g., norms, institutions or the genesis and evolution of something – is essential, while the interests of others are marginal issues, curiosities, and pseudo-problems. Fortunately, a specialist does not necessarily mean as much as *fachidiot*.

Mirosław Karwat

Syndromatic nature of the subject of political science

The subject of description – diagnosis – explanation – interpretation – and prognosis in the field of political science is a typical syndrome. In other words, it is a combination of heterogeneous phenomena with different origins, conditions, varied form, and different formal affiliation to various fields – technology, economy, symbolic culture – impossible to reduce to one dimension – e.g., economic, legal or religious one – which creates a unique quality.

The subject of the research understood as a framework – i.e., as a specific field, a sphere of social life – defined by criteria that are not one-dimensional and homogeneous in nature, but precisely syndromatic – has a syndromatic nature. The subject of the research as a concrete – such as political struggle or game, elections, social support, power – and an utterly tangible thing – such as particular intentions and plans of action, decisions, deeds, statements, events, causes of changes – has the same character as well. There are very few political phenomena that could seem independent, unambiguous, uniform in forms of occurrence, homogeneous in terms of pedigree, background or constitutive and identifying features in political scientists' analyses.

The syndromatic nature of the subject itself has two methodological consequences. First, there must be syndromatic concepts – as a grammatical subject or as a predicate – in the claims of political science. However, the syndromatic nature of phenomena not always coincides with the use of such terminology or definitions that reflect the syndromaticity. Second, multifactoral theories, which operate with a tangle of conditions or even systemic mechanisms, are the most appropriate in the description, explanation of phenomena, and not single-factor or “cross-sectional” theories. The very nature of the research subject forces political scientists to think synthetically, although many bravely defend themselves against it.

After all, the “politicality” of phenomena is not a cross-sectional, one-dimensional, or one-factoral feature but a result of the interdependence of economic, social, ideological, and legal factors.

1. The concept of syndrome

The Greek word *syndromé* means “concourse” – at a certain place or time – ‘joint’ – of something that was initially something separate. So, for example, when we talk about a coincidence of circumstances, an interweaving of human actions – it is a basic pattern in praxeology – a puzzling coincidence of the actions of entities previously not suspected of coordinating their efforts, we use the original, most general concept. From such a perspective, a syndrome would be a variant of the whole – the non-additive, integrative whole, i.e., the one that does not reduce to the sum of its elements. Also, we could call the real whole, a non-mystical one, because it exists not alongside or outside its components, but on the principle that a specific configuration of such elements creates a new, unique quality, which is different from the quality or identity of the individual components, a syndrome.

Nonetheless, we have long accepted that we do not refer the term “syndrome” to entity totality, but other ontological categories. A syndrome is not a team, group, team, authority, institution, community, community; these are organized wholes, which not only create a specific permanent structure but also produce a certain kind of self-knowledge, set specific goals, make decisions and take actions with the enforcement power. On the other hand, a syndrome can be what happens in relations between groups or institutions; what determines the nature and permanence of their internal bond; what is a permanent feature of the way of thinking and style of action characteristic of a given group entity. Therefore, the term “syndrome” describes not entities, but their properties, relationships between them, intentional and unintentional interactions, trends, and directions of transformation in their inner life or mutual relations.

We also do not call tangles of random, unintentional and uncontrolled actions and events a syndrome. For example, a car accident, although it is a composition of many factors, is not defined as a syndrome. Still, a complex of accident injuries of a psycho-physical nature, characteristic for such a type of situation – e.g., a complex type of human reaction to an earthquake or flood, i.e., a cataclysm of which a given person was not an accomplice is different – is a syndrome.

With such a restriction – that we do not deal with individuals or groups of people, but with conditions and forms of their behaviors, emotions, aspirations, or the interdependence between their various features – the syndrome can be a combination of phenomena forming a conglomerate or a complex with a unique quality. The fact that elements that contribute to this configuration lose their individual properties, gaining features determined by the whole – but vice versa as well: apart from this configuration, they do not have such features also lets us

call something a syndrome. A classic example of a syndrome is the “psychology of a crowd”: the same people behave utterly different in conditions of spatial concentration and mutual induction of impressions, sensations, and when separately. We should also add that we talk about a combination of heterogeneous phenomena of unequal origin, conditions, occurring independently in different forms, yet creating some kind of organic connection. Let us take here as an example the phenomenon of love whose “secret” does not lie in any of the factors individually – physiological and psychological factors – but in the interdependence between them, which escapes universal and straightforward schemes.

The notion of a syndrome has the richest and most established tradition in medical and psychological sciences. However, over time it also became common in the thinking and language of sociologists both in sophisticated and theoretically codified versions – cf. e.g., the model called “group thinking syndrome” – and in terms of paraliterary metaphors, which are also cognitively prolific – cf. “besieged fortress syndrome.”

Medicine calls a complex of symptoms characteristic for the clinical picture of a given disease, which is, therefore, the basis for its diagnosis, the syndrome. Thus, a syndrome is primarily a diagnostic concept. In such a context, we often use the term “complex” as a synonym, usually defined from the name of the researcher who discovered or verified a certain interdependence. However, any case of correlation of various symptoms is not a syndrome – i.e., such a complex; it is the case that concerns different organs and systems of the body. For example, such symptoms as exophthalmos, goiter, frequent cramping are part of Graves-Basedow syndrome in cases of hyperthyroidism.

2. Typical examples of syndromes

Here are a few examples of the routine application of the syndrome concept in the professionals’ practice. As a rule, syndrome categories include not only the *symptoms* of diseases or manifestations of deviation or social pathologies but also their *conditions* and *prognosis*.

An interpretation of both symptoms and causes of allergy is typically syndromatic.

The therapists refer to the syndromaticity of the phenomena in their interpretation of the neuroses’ base, rejecting reductive, single-factor explanations of the organic, physiological and social type, without prejudging whether the causes are rather individual or rather typical in natural or social terms:

When talking to a sick person, we try to reach his or her neurosis-causing situation, i.e., to capture the essential disturbances of emotional relations with the environment, which

could induce the neurotic reaction. We should not forget that even in a neurosis-causing situation, neurotic symptoms may be a signal of a somatic disease or one of the endogenous or organic psychosis.

The principle of multifactorial etiology is even more valid in psychiatry than in other fields of medicine. Although deviating from such a rule and following only one etiological path gives a more significant appearance of scientificity, the image of the patient, created on the basis of such etiological research, is usually absurdly narrowed, and thus untrue and harmful to the patient.¹

A hasty reduction of the sources of neurosis – which, in its symptoms, is a syndrome and not one-dimensional maladjustment – to only one factor is also fraught with the risk of misdiagnosis and not only wrong but even harmful therapy. A doctor, whether he or she wants to, must even use combinatorial, mathematical scheme of permutation:

The probability of finding the right combination of etiological factors decreases as they grow. ... When there are two etiological factors A and B, only two systems are possible: AB and BA; when there are three factors, their number increases to six – ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB, CBA – i.e., to a product of $1 \times 2 \times 3$. The number of possible combinations is a factorial number of etiological factors. We should not ignore the low probability of finding the right etiological system when considering the origin of any mental disorders or neuroses. Etiological hypotheses in psychiatry are always fraught with uncertainty.²

The syndromatic nature of neurotic disorders raises the problem of whether neurosis is a disease or has a different medical status; it also forces to be careful, humble, and think alternative.

It is often even impossible to find the one that is the proper cause of neurosis among the many neurosis-causing situations, so it is better to consider several situations simultaneously as possible causes of neurosis.³

The interpretation of the background of various social pathologies is definitely syndromatic. For example, the analysis of the causes of prostitution – especially the kind of analysis that no longer refers to the general model of conditions and type of phenomena – i.e., prostitution as a social phenomenon – but the conditions of individual “moral decay”:

There were longstanding disputes about the reasons for practicing prostitution. Some claimed that the innate tendencies are decisive, while others claimed that it is due to

1 A. Kępiński, *Psychopatologia nerwic* (Warszawa: 1986), p. 178.

2 A. Kępiński, *Psychopatologia*, p. 178.

3 A. Kępiński, *Psychopatologia*, p. 179.

the influence of the surrounding environment in which the woman lives. The extent to which internal tendencies and the external environment affect a woman who is engaged in prostitution is currently a subject of analysis. Therefore, today, researchers explain the phenomenon with sociological, economic, and biological-psychological theories. Socio-economic theories see the causes of prostitution in poor living conditions, economic rights of supply and demand, and the class character of social culture. Socio-economic approaches also consider the impact of alcoholism and the entertainment industry on the prostitution phenomenon. Biological-psychological theories look at the influence of heredity and innate tendencies to practice prostitution; they also try to capture specific anthropological characteristics that would make a person predisposed to prostitution.⁴

Such one-factorial interpretations of the social background, and even more so of the individual conditionality, have a fundamental weakness: each of them may prove adequate and sufficient in isolation only for a certain number of cases, but not as a general rule without exception. And yet we can only understand many individual cases, as well as trends specific to particular eras, cultural circles or systems, in the correlation of several types of conditions.

Disputes about the individual causes that would determine the practice of prostitution are actually unnecessary. In each case, there are usually many causes that interact with each other, and every time, prostitution is the result of the whole combination of internal and external factors that have led a woman to such a way of living. Therefore, various reasons for prostitution are of relative value; none of them explains it thoroughly, but only in combination with the others we can explain the phenomenon. We must address the problem of prostitution in a multifaceted way because its causes are varied – i.e., anthropological, economic, psychological, and social. There are different varieties of prostitution and various types of prostitutes.⁵

Similar reasoning goes hand in hand with reflections on both the socially typical and individually unique background of alcoholism.

The given examples are also instructive for the political scientist. He or she would make a trivial, even unprofessional mistake if he or she tried to explain, e.g., the reasons for the collapse of the USSR – and even more so the specific moment and acceleration of such a phenomenon – with one type of factors. If the scientist absolutized only one factor when explaining or forecasting the election result, e.g., financial resources of the contenders, distribution of sympathy in the media, or high or low voter turnout/absence.

4 K. Imieliński, *Manowce seksu. Prostytycja* (Łódź: 1990), p. 111.

5 K. Imieliński, *Manowce seksu*, p. 112.

3. Types of syndromes

Given examples also suggest that the syndrome scheme is applicable in several non-identical contexts.

The syndrome can be:

- a combination of conditions, or a determinant of factors – then, it is an **etiological** syndrome, applicable both in explaining complex socio-political phenomena and in predicting them;
- a combination of signs of the creation and functioning of a whole; e.g., by analogy to the syndrome of symptoms of the disease, the syndrome of social crisis is a **symptomatic** syndrome, which is used in diagnostics; in the case of political scientists – in their role of analysts, commentators, interpreters.

On the other hand, considering the moment of social statics or dynamics, we should distinguish between *synchronic* syndromes – which are permanent structural adhesions, splices of phenomena or occasional coincidences of features of contemporary phenomena – and *diachronic* syndromes – when chronological and genetic relations between phenomena are involved.

However, sometimes the syndromatic concept reflects in detail the whole system of relations between individual elements of a syndrome, determining the temporal sequence of unique events, causal links between them, mapping the system of various couplings within the phenomenon, etc. Such syndromatic concepts are also sometimes called models of relevant phenomena.⁶

In such a sense, the syndrome is a crisis – both a broadly defined social or economic crisis and a “typically political” crisis, in which a routine political solstice, a “cabinet crisis” or an outbreak of riots turns out to be an indicator, a herald of a political crisis. Thus, the very concept of crisis is a syndromatic one – cf. below. The idea of political transformation or globalization would be equally syndromatic.⁷

6 S. Nowak, *Metodologia badań społecznych* (Warszawa: 1985), p. 151.

7 Barbara Krauz-Mozer rightly points out that the notion of globalization has multiple contexts. It combines structural dependencies, causal abilities – subjectivity – but many subjects are interdependent and entangled in structural dependencies, or uncontrolled social trends. Cf. B. Krauz-Mozer, “Globalizacja – metodologiczny problem politologii,” in: P. Borowiec, ed., *Globalizacja – nieznośne podobieństwo? Świat i jego instytucje w procesie uniformizacji*.

4. Statistical syndromes vs model syndromes

On another level, we have to see the difference between such a combination of phenomena, which is the result and expression of a certain regularity, and the one which is a strong correlation, but only a statistical one. In such a case we talk about a statistical syndrome and not a regularity syndrome, although the adhesion of certain features or tendencies may strongly and erroneously influence the researchers:

In social sciences, we often define syndromatic concepts when the relationships between *K* and *M* feature groups are not general – single or bilateral – relationships, but are statistical. Let us consider some examples. When the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* defined the concept of “an authoritarian personality” they not only listed a specific set of attributes the characters connoted but also stated that there are strong positive statistical relationships between such attributes. When Redfield defined the concept of the “urban-rural continuum,” he enumerated a long list of the traits that constitute the urbanization process, and at the same time assumed that these traits tend to occur together, or not. Finally, when an art historian thinks about the – individual or general historical – concept of “Baroque” or “Renaissance,” he puts many more elements in its content than would be necessary to clearly separate Baroque or Renaissance art.⁸

Features that do not express the essence of a given phenomenon by themselves, or are not its attribute, become its indicator, i.e., a symptom. Yet, we should not confuse an indicator with an attribute.

5. Syndromatic concepts

Syndromes of real phenomena are often defined by terms that do not express and expose their status as a tangle, adhesion of phenomena, or their network connection. However, there also is no shortage – in the tradition of medical, psychological, and sociological sciences – of terms – usually metaphorical – that emphasize the syndromatic nature of a phenomenon. Such examples include: “Madonna-whore complex”, “knight-rake complex”, “delusional syndrome”, “occupational burnout syndrome”, “crisis syndrome”, etc.

Stefan Nowak even distinguishes *syndromatic concepts* that:

Not only enumerate – or specify in another way – the constituent elements of their content, but also reflect the nature of empirical relationships between the phenomena, indicated by individual components of their definiens.⁹

8 S. Nowak, *Metodologia*, pp. 148–149.

9 S. Nowak, *Metodologia*, p. 147.

As S. Nowak emphasizes, from the perspective of the designations' logic, syndromatic concepts have "too rich" content because they include not only constitutive or identification features – which constitute the uniqueness of a given phenomenon – but also consecutive features, i.e., derivatives, not specific to a given phenomenon, although very characteristic and linked to the constitutive elements. Such an occurrence is a result of adopting assumptions that are more than just a definition, already expressing a certain concept or theory of the phenomenon.

Thus, in addition to the features necessary to clearly denote the scope of a defined concept, the definition also contains, explicitly or at least implicitly, theses about specific relationships, with different types of relations between the content elements of the concept.¹⁰

Sometimes we do not realize the syndromatic nature of concepts if it is not underlined directly in the name. We do so, especially when we use thoughtless mental abbreviations, to a direct sense of which we are used to, but we forget the initial assumptions. An example is the phrase "the effects of the E entity's actions", when we consider the relationship between the E entity's efforts and their results – e.g., in terms of cause and effect relationship – we even consider the entity's own costs and a certain degree of realization of intentions. Yet, we ignore other factors such as lack of resistance, counteraction from other entities, the ineffectiveness of their attempts to obstruct, or the "fitting" of the entity's intentions and efforts into some predetermined trend or someone else's game, circumstances and even the significance of a chance. The effect of the E entity's actions objectively remains a syndrome, but we reduce it to the effects and costs of E's actions.

Nevertheless, the danger is to identify the convergence, the entanglement of something with a mechanism that presupposes some tendency or regularity. It is not without reason that Stefan Nowak encouraged restraint in the use of such collective concepts. The concepts may blur the difference between statistical generalization and a strictly general claim – the law:

Many of the syndromatic concepts – almost all of them – that we encounter in social sciences are only statistical syndromes. We talk about "authoritarianism syndrome," "religiousness syndrome," "urban-rural continuum," etc. However, in such a situation, some problems do not exist when the dependencies within a syndrome are general; namely the choice of a constitutive feature, which is the "definitional minimum" of the relevant syndromatic concept. As before, we can consider one of syndrome's elements

10 S. Nowak, *Metodologia*, p. 148.

as definitionally fundamental – i.e., the element that defines the relevant S concept – and then consider that the remaining elements are the statistical – and not general, as before – characteristics of designators of the S concept, and also belong to its content, yet with different rights than the constitutive element, providing the basis for the probabilistic definitions of the S concept. However, we may treat all the elements of the syndrome equally, acknowledging that none of syndrome elements determines the constitutive content of the S concept, and all of them form the basis of its alternative and partial probabilistic definitions. Many examples of syndromatic concepts in social sciences belong rather to the latter category.¹¹

6. Types vs syndromes

The characteristics of social phenomena in terms of their typicality and division into qualitatively different categories overlap with syndromatic modeling.

It also happens that a syndromatic concept is treated as a “typological” concept. In such cases, we consider individual objects or phenomena from the perspective of how close or distant they are from a specific “type.” Then, the measure of the distance from the type is the number of attributes missing in a given object to correspond to the assumptions of the syndrome fully. Thus, for example, alongside entirely “cultured” individuals, we distinguish those who lack one, then two, of the “cultural” syndrome components. It is also a specific technique of measuring properties.¹²

However, the syndromatic model of phenomena proves to be something more than a useful tool for defining qualification criteria and systematizing phenomena:

Syndromatic concepts not only define the meaning of the terms of the language with which we want to study reality, but also summarize certain results of such studies. Many scientific studies end, among other things, with reformulating the definitions with which the researcher started, the conversion of constitutive contents into fuller meanings of a syndromatic nature. Such a fact makes it possible to reveal **the existence of descriptive or theoretical knowledge of reality where, at first glance, we see only typologies and classifications**. For example, the classification of biological species or the classification of organs, where each of the “classification” terms in their essential content means a complex syndrome of phenomena, a complex set of interrelated properties characterizing individual species or organs of an organism. An excellent example of a – internally additionally ordered – system of syndromatic terms is the Mendeleev table known from chemistry, where each field is a syndromatic description of a particular element, while individual columns – groups of similar elements – are more general syndromes.¹³

11 S. Nowak, *Metodologia*, p. 150.

12 S. Nowak, *Metodologia*, p. 150.

13 S. Nowak, *Metodologia*, p. 149.

Nevertheless, in the common methodological consciousness of political scientists, the notion of types is better established than that of syndromes; usually without thinking about the subtle difference between type as a *sui generis* common denominator of related, although not identical, phenomena and the ideal type as a different kind of abstraction, concerning the relationship between genetically and species-differentiated phenomena, which constitutes from them a unique new quality, which is additionally put in an empirically impossible form if understood literally.

Let us use here a literary example. The figure of Nikodem Dyzma¹⁴ has the status of an ideal type not so much because – as in novels in general – the protagonist is a fictional character, and not so much because we will not actually meet an individual so perfectly mediocre, unproductive, who would owe his career solely to a phenomenal coincidence, a total collective misunderstanding and unconscious or naive service from others. But most of all, because Nikodem Dyzma is a personification of a mechanism once figuratively called “dyzmism.” It is a mechanism that consists of many factors, including the functionality of Dyzma’s behavior towards the myth that favored him.

The popular understanding of typology – and its result, i.e., a type – at best boils down to the understanding that we call a type a set that has no exclusivity for the characteristics of its elements, or an abstract key of criteria for inclusion to such a set, where certain traits, taken separately, are not specific to the elements of the set but are important in relation to other features. Thus, the criteria of typology are actually syndromatic, but an object thus distinguished is no longer perceived as a syndrome, although there are reasons for this.

The misleading nature of at least some of the typological concepts – if we were to assume that they would contradict the syndromatic ideas – is perfectly illustrated by the example of the “charisma” concept, so crucial in Weber’s concept of legitimacy types. After all, the explanation of the “charisma” notion inevitably leads to the conclusion that the phenomenon is defined as a syndrome.

After all, it is not charisma in the case of an extraordinary collective fascination with the individual and listening to him or her basing on a legend or a divine halo. Charisma is rather a combination of many factors: the social

14 *Kariera Nikodema Dyzmy* (The Career of Nikodem Dyzma) is a satirical and critical novel showing the universal mechanism of a completely accidental career made by an individual, Nikodem Dyzma, who remains an ideal embodiment of dullness, mediocrity, and primitive adaptation based on the principle of mimicry – possible, paradoxically, as a result of the processes of decadence and decay of the political elite.

need for a providential man, a guide, a savior in a situation of crisis, decadence, breakthrough or significant changes causing widespread confusion; the personal character predisposition of a given man that make a social impression not only of his uniqueness, his extraordinariness, but also of his visionary and innovative abilities, his above-average inventiveness and his ability to solve critical social problems; the atmosphere of mystery, even mysticism, and the corresponding mythologization of the character and his actions – in terms of “miracles”; the breakthrough practical (and not only symbolic) meaning of his own achievements, or only of those attributed to him, in which he participated as initiator, executive, or coordinator.¹⁵

7. Typological vs syndromatic research subjects

Therefore, the researches realize their natural longing for transparency of the research subject in a specific way, i.e., by stopping halfway. Scientists realistically correct classification schemes of systematization and characteristics of socio-political phenomena, correctly understanding that the majority of these phenomena not only meet each other closely but, moreover, they intersect and permeate each other, which the contractual distinctions and qualifications do not fully reflect. Thus, the use of classes of phenomena must “crack” when we are forced to examine next to each other the power, authority, influence; when we wonder when do we talk about prestige and when about popularity. The problem solution is the typological status of such terms.

With such an amendment, we can formulate a list of phenomena that have the status of types and are perceived as homogeneous categories:

- social needs – collective, i.e., common, mass and group needs;
- social interests;
- aspirations of groups and communities;
- social claims – to specific goods, entitlements, but also particular roles and positions, e.g., representativeness, leadership;
- political ideas – consequently understood as ideas of goals, as principles, norms or evaluation criteria;
- social ideals including, e.g., political system visions;
- political patterns of thinking, argumentation, action;
- means and techniques of action;

15 Cf. M. Karwat, “Charyzma i pseudocharyzma,” in: *Przywództwo polityczne*, T. Bodio, ed., *Studia Politologiczne*, Vol. 5 (Warszawa: 2001).

- a historically shaped and culturally objectified **repertoire of possible or acceptable modes of action**;
- types of **political forces**, i.e., political entities;
- types of **political institutions**, or systemic solutions, regulations, movements, organizations and associations, state or party bodies, etc.

However, accepting that the phenomena we distinguish and compare as different qualities are rather types than classes is not enough to give an adequate picture of social and political reality. We are still in the circle of illusions that we managed to order the description of reality on the basis of such principles as the systematics of plant and animal species or the table of elements.

The uniformity of the phenomena assigned to the mentioned categories is relative and confusing. For example, when we talk about needs – individual, collective, or group needs – we should remember that they are incredibly diverse in terms of the basis, character, conditions, and ways of fulfilling them; only the pattern of any need is typical. The same is true of the other categories.

For the vivid formalists who are eager for clarity, the shallows of definitionally absolutized notions, whose real designations turn out to be phenomena ordered in a certain scale, rather than in one dimension are even more saddening. Gradual features such as: subjectivity – full only in definitions, never in real abilities and influences; relative and limited sovereignty; selective and limited rationality; only relatively unambiguous identity, are a real nightmare for conceptual formalists and lovers of simple schemes, which are a graceful tool of indoctrination and propaganda, but an unmerciful trap in scientific description and explanation.

However, one can easily indicate a catalog of evidently syndromatic subjects in political science. Whenever there is a combination of relations and properties that are not enclosed within a single separate object – system – or a homogeneous type of social whole, which can be conventionally “unified” like physical single-unit – even complex – objects, but which creates a multi-object – multi-system – and multi-subject, multi-different-subject, inter-subject, or over-subject whole; we will always have to deal with syndromes – macro- and micro-syndromes. For example, foreign policy – as an activity of a particular entity is a typological subject of political theory; whereas “world politics” is a syndromatic subject. The patterns of political action are a typological object, but already the political culture in general, of which they are a component and expression, is a syndromatic object. Similarly, syndromatic theoretical objects are, e.g., war, peace, peaceful coexistence, collective security, ecopolitics; power, rule, domination, antagonism, combat, rivalry.

To the list of definitely syndromatic phenomena and concepts let us add notions such as:

- Political situation;
- The arrangement of political forces;
- The state of a certain community or institution that is a political force, e.g., the level of integration, ability to act;
- Political events as a tangle of events – unintentional, independent of the will of the people – natural behavior and actions;
- Political provocation – as a combination of a moment of artificial creation and pretense with the regularity and spontaneity of specific social trends;
- Specific phenomena of political awareness considered in entanglement, i.e., complex context – e.g., ideological stereotypes, political, ethnic and racial prejudices, collective obsessions or frustrations;
- Political activity;
- Political apathy;
- Apoliticality as a macro-syndrome, a multi-level interweaving of conditions and patterns of passivity, political indifference, or internally contradictory political activity and engagement.

A reasonable doubt may arise here: after all, phenomena such as social needs, political interests, political values, political action, etc. treated as a typological object also have a relational character because of their relative homogeneity. The phenomena are dependencies and not features of one or another entity; dependencies on other entities, supra-objectivity, conditions of existence, or the social whole. Yes, but those are always the needs, values, interests, aspirations, actions of a particular entity, and it is the entity that is the reference for them. On the other hand, the latter phenomena have their own system of reference; apart from that of one entity, they go beyond its independent existence and connect with the dependence and non-autonomy of many entities.

What are the conclusions for the self-awareness and research practice of a political scientist?

First, the identity of political science is not defined either by the formal separateness of the subject – having one's own exclusive subject of research, supposedly identical to some mechanically separated field of reality – or by completely specific research methods. On the contrary, a political scientist draws from the repertoire of practices common to the humanities and social sciences, borrows techniques from “basic” sciences, i.e., philosophy, sociology, psychology. It is rather the categorical apparatus which allows us to grasp the political context of genealogically and formally diverse social phenomena, show the political

entanglement of originally and formally “non-political” phenomena or define what “political” in the interdependence of the economy, artistic culture, research, the media, etc. that defines the identity of political science is. But this is where we need syndromacity. As the discussions among political scientists since the time of Schmitt’s explication of “what is political” show, the political nature of social phenomena is just a combination of factors that are diverse in terms of genesis and formal affiliation – e.g., elements of the technological, economic, religious, or artistic type. The factors are historically variable but always entangled in conditions of social balance, distorted by the conflict between interests, views, and aspirations particular to any issue and the requirements of social integration, and consolidation, conditions of survival of a community, its historical continuity.

Second, although in plotting the research field and striving for conceptual clarity, the classificational unambiguity of the qualification of phenomena or at least the typological homogeneity of research objects must tempt the researcher, it turns out unreliable when we begin to interpret specific events, deeds, decisions, social processes. A “typological openness” – e.g., understanding that what is legal or economic at the same time can be political – is not enough; a researcher needs a more far-reaching approach. The approach consists in understanding that a researcher first must conduct a general sociological – or, e.g., socio-economic or cultural, as in the case of the religious background and style of political activity – analysis to grasp the political context of phenomena, which originally or formally were “non-political” at all, to determine the reason and extent of phenomena politicization, and, at the same time, not to get lost in the discrepancies between the non-political form and the political content of the phenomena or to fall into a super-political form without political content.

The progressing sub-disciplinary specialization of political scientists should not obscure the “organic” nature of the research subject, not only framed as a “politics area,” but also as the particular subject of description, analysis, explanation, or anticipation. From such a perspective, a “genre-pure” political scientist would be the epitome of the type once bluntly called *Fachidiot*. The future of political science belongs to those who are not afraid to operate on the borderline of sociology, social psychology, ethics, law, or cybernetics. Whereas the guardians of borders – i.e., boundaries between disciplines – catch flies in a holey sieve.

Filip Pierzchalski

Politics as a fuzzy subject of research

The subject of research or cognition of the political science is not by itself a quantifiable set of elements, which by the very fact of belonging creates once and for all a defined area of investigation among competent researchers of political phenomena. In the political science, subject of research is a fuzzy set,¹ where the feature of fuzziness is a sign of the lack of sharp boundaries in the scientific affiliation determination² of a given phenomenon, specific regularity or measurable process, properties, state of affairs, etc. to the scope of political research. In such understanding, determining – in a cognitive and theoretical-methodological sense – the subject of political science, or, more precisely, trying to determine what is “political” and/or “non-political” is always – and only – an intentional procedure. We understand the determination as an intentional procedure because it has sources in the cognitive entity, where the scientific reflection on the matter of politics as such depends to a large extent on the situational context, the research traditions, the existing and accepted paradigms, or financial or institutional capacity/restrictions.

The research subject in the field of political science treated as a fuzzy set of cognitive elements is a blurred area of theoretical political research with a margin of indeterminacy,³ in which there is an interdisciplinary merging of knowledge and experience from various formalized scientific disciplines. The subject is a

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- 1 The concept of fuzzy set relates to set theory. In 1965, Lofti. A. Zadeh initiated reflections on fuzzy sets; “Fuzzy sets,” *Information and Control*, Vol. 8 (1965), pp. 338–353. Nowadays, in science, considerations of fuzziness appear in many fields of knowledge. Cf. R. Wójcicki, *Wykład z logiki z elementami teorii wiedzy* (Warszawa: 2003), pp. 21–22; A. Piegat, *Modelowanie i sterowanie rozmyte* (Warszawa: 1999); E. Ozogala, W. Pedrycz, *Elementy i metody teorii zbiorów rozmytych* (Gliwice: 1983).
 - 2 A. Łachwa, *Rozmyty świat zbiorów, liczb, relacji, faktów, reguł i decyzji* (Warszawa: 2001), pp. 11–15.
 - 3 The creator of fuzzy logic, Lofti A. Zadeh, based the indefiniteness of a given system or set primarily on the principle of incoherence, which, when correctly formulated, states: “as the complexity of a system increases, our ability to make precise and yet significant statements about its behavior diminishes until a threshold is reached beyond which precision and significance (or relevance) become almost mutually exclusive characteristics.” More in: A. Piegat, *Modelowanie*, p. 18.

theoretical-research space that, in practice, breaks the positivist demarcation line in favor of contextual, inter-area, multi-level, syndromatic, etc. analyses.

The matter of politics understood as a space of scientific interests of various types of scientists, or a subject of political reflection is an epistemic-research fuzzy set. In such a fuzzy set, the affiliation and/or recognition of given parts, e.g., cognizable and definable phenomena, features, properties, facts, etc., as “political” to the whole-set of the “research subject” of politics is a mechanism based on individual decisions made by a particular researcher. However, such decisions relate to the semantic and linguistic aspects on the one hand. On the other hand, the decisions link with specific research practices. In the first case, we talk about the lack of sharpness of the “politics” concept/name. The blurred view of the concept consists in failing to precisely and unambiguously separate what should be within the scope of the name from what should not. At the denotation level, it is a situation where the “area of blurredness” means the lack of precise definition and separation of the designates from non-designates for the name “politics”.⁴ Alternatively, the second case is an intellectual and theoretic procedure consisting in relativizing the research subject of political science, where the recognition of what is “political” results from subjective justifications, decisions, acceptance of given statements, axioms or accepted hypotheses and methodological directives. The relativization endures according to the following principle: the subject of the study depends directly on the cognitive entity. Therefore, in the research process, the researcher’s attitude determines the ontological, epistemological, and methodological dimensions, which, in fact, means a situation in which perception, understanding, and explanation of the whole-set “research subject” of political science rely on an immanent imperative. At the same time, the relativization of the research or cognition subject is not synonymous with the research process that abolishes the reality of research objects by increasing individual phantasms, visions, delusions, or pious wishes of the entity about

4 In the literature on the subject, the fuzziness of names/notions takes the form of a connotational approximation, e.g., “the name N is a connotational approximation when there are items for which the connotation of the name N does not determine whether or not they belong to the name N connotation” or a denotational approximation, e.g., “the name N is a denotational approximation when there are items for which the name N connotation does not determine whether or not they belong to the name N designators.” J. J. Jadacki, *Spór o granice języka. Elementy semiotyki logiczne i metodologii* (Warszawa: 2005), p. 172. Cf. also: T. Pawłowski, *Tworzenie pojęć i definiowanie w naukach humanistycznych* (Warszawa: 1978), pp. 70–76; A. Łachwa, *Rozmyty świat*, pp. 161–177; J. Odrowąż-Sypniewska, *Zagadnienie nieostrości* (Warszawa: 2000).

reality as such. Above all, the relativization means making scientific research or cognition dependent on intentionality, where individual theoretical cognitive decisions inevitably condition all nomological analyses, the reached position or the argumentation presented. It is a thesis in which it is stressed that a real object of research exists, but one should not believe that it finds a full and unique representation in one or another object of cognition/explication. Therefore, research intentionality, which is most often ideological in nature and foundation, in a straight line means relativizing cognition, where in scientific practice, we deal with research aspectuality.

If the subject of political science research is a fuzzy set, whose shape, meaning, number of recognizable elements – both theoretical and empirical – depend on individual decisions of the cognitive subject and the contemporary tendency to the interdisciplinarity of research patterns, does it make sense to discuss the identity, or more precisely, the subject specificity of the political science?

The subject of research – a dispute among political scientists

The discussion on the identity of political science has recently revived among Polish political scientists. Among the numerous threads discussed in the debate, it is worth commenting on the problem of formal boundaries marking to “scientifically free oneself” from the burden of interdisciplinarity, vagueness, or “sloppy” merging of hard knowledge with the colloquial one. We understand hard knowledge as the scientific, reliable, empirically verifiable cognition, whereas colloquial knowledge as a soft cognition with a hermeneutic-humanistic tint. What sets the borders is individual disciplines of knowledge within social sciences, including political science. Among the critical voices about the “pseudo-scientific softening” of the formal boundaries of political science, there was, among other things, such an accusation (T¹):

Political scientists too easily disregard and even trample all boundaries because they do not know why they were set ... Hence, scientists encourage to avoid the discussion on the cognition subject of political science and distract attention from what constitutes political phenomena, i.e., defines what is political within what is social. They simply obliterate fundamental research problems and try to hide the dilemma that political scientists must solve. Syndromatic political science is only a nicely named variant of the colloquial political science practiced at the university, i.e., a pseudoscience.⁵

5 R. Skarzyński, *Podstawowy dylemat politologii: dyscyplina nauki czy potoczna wiedza o społeczeństwie? O tradycji uniwersytetu i demarkacji wiedzy* (Białystok: 2012), pp. 84–88.

The T¹ claim is a reverberated, positivist type of criticism, the blade of which aims at the blurred and/or fuzzy character of the political science's research or cognition subject, where the postulate's legitimacy of interdisciplinarity of research or the syndromatic nature of the political matter seems dangerous and harmful to the status and condition of the discussed science. However, the present work uses the T¹ statement as a starting point to strongly negate the pseudo-positivist vision of conducting political reflection, which includes defining and specifying the subject of politics cognition through the prism of a discretionary, categorical, or even authoritarian imposition of a specific pattern of thinking and defining the subject on Polish political scientists.⁶ In other words, to show the unreasonableness and confusion of the T¹ theses in the context of contemporary political research, including important theoretical and methodological considerations on the specificity of the political science's subject of study or cognition, we will lean on the following scheme:

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- 6 This is what R. Skarżyński does when he writes about the need to draw a demarcation line for political science. For such purpose, on the one hand, Skarżyński tries to talk about the specificity of the research or cognition subject of the discussed science. On the other hand, by means of a designing definition, Skarżyński tries to distinguish one, only the proper subject of interest of the science. The following paragraph proves Skarżyński's intention: "Political science is a discipline that investigates a specific way of uniting human communities in a large space and a long time in processes of political mobilization, which no other discipline does. In particular, sociology, state and law theory and history do not do so. Political science explores the way in which people live in great space and long time, the development of which changed the very existence of our species. Hence political science's separate momentous subject of cognition. Without examining political mobilization, it is impossible to understand how the human species functioned over the last six thousand years." R. Skarżyński, *Podstawowy dylemat* (Białystok: 2012), p. 307. Both procedures are theoretically and methodologically incorrect, even impossible to perform. If we authoritatively separate the subject of political science from an interdisciplinary scientific reflection and additionally narrow it down to the explication of political mobilization, we make at least two mistakes, which become a breeding ground for the political science isolation from other social sciences. The first mistake is the a priori negation of other science fields, including theoretical or explanatory momentum, which speaks of politics in a factual, adequate and constructive way – such as sociology or psychology does. The second mistake is the exclusion of those competent academics, including political scientists, who consider the subject of their research a phenomenon other than political mobilization. In the latter case isolation is double, apart from the "top-down" formal and disciplinary one, there is also the typically human one, where the community of political scientists is only a community that studies mobilization (sic!).

1. We will present and thoroughly discuss the arguments against positivist demarcation, where the separation of science from non-science, i.e., scientific and colloquial knowledge, is not at all an objective research procedure, independent of the entity undertaking the research, but has a strictly discretionary character, i.e., a conventional one. That is why separating the subject of political science research in a positivist spirit from an interdisciplinary cognitive background – even a mechanistic and authoritative separation from the multifactorial, contextual, syndromatic environment – is an incorrect theoretical-methodological procedure because it impoverishes the scientific explication of the matter of politics in its essence.
2. We will demonstrate that contemporary scientific practice, including political analysis of various forms and contents, generates a multitude of cognitive structures and, more importantly, different inference, explanatory, descriptive, predictive, etc. patterns. As a result, we observe a dispersed and/or distributive cognition, or, more precisely, an epistemological and theoretical-methodological pluralism, including a different, often exclusive way of defining or specifying the subject of cognition or research in political science.
3. We will show the scientific usefulness and adequacy of the theoretical-methodological concept of syndromaticity of the research or cognition subject of political science.

Arguments against demarcation

The idea – a project to distinguish science from non-science, which has its roots in logical empiricism⁷ – of some political scientists to use demarcation as a starting point for precise and scientific separation of the research or cognition subject of political science from the “interdisciplinary gibberish of pseudo-intellectualists” only seems to be a legible and useful mechanism. In fact, demarcation is a dwarfing operation, and in the context of contemporary scientific practice, it is almost impossible. We should remind that the concept of demarcation follows closely from the postulate of science unity, which, in fact, concerned the unity of language, and more specifically, the reduction of all terminology of science to observational terms. For instance, the axiom of empiricism, where non-scientific terms differ from scientific terms in that the latter are only conditioned by the degree of empirical verification. According to Rudolf Carnap:

7 W. Strawiński, *Jedność nauki, redukcja, emergencja. Z metodologicznych i ontologicznych problemów integracji wiedzy* (Warszawa: 1997), pp. 21–105; L. Kołakowski, *Filozofia polityki i wycieczka. Od Hume'a do Koła Wiedeńskiego* (Warszawa: 2004), pp. 178–212.

To speak correctly, I must speak not about objects but about terms, and my statement becomes: the terms of all branches of science are logically uniform. ... they are not in any way metaphysical theses concerning the essence of things, but only logical, which is to say syntactical theses.⁸

Therefore, finding a criterion for demarcation does not consist in setting a borderline between science and non-science, but, as Stefan Amsterdamski rightly pointed out, on:

[Finding] a criterion by which it would be possible to state what does and what does not belong to the realm of science.⁹

In other words, in logical empiricism, the use of demarcation was based on the division of sentences and/or judgments with which the scientist decided on the studied reality, including the subject of the research or cognition. Hence the division into analytical – metaphysical and/or meaningless – and synthetic – empirical and/or meaningful judgments, which, after all, arose as a specific result of applying an empirical verification procedure. At the same time, we should not forget that among the supporters of logical empiricism, there were also doubts concerning the scientific verification mechanism. The result of such objections was the replacement of strict verificationism for verifiability. Rudolf Carnap wrote:

But there is always the theoretical possibility of continuing the series of test-observations. Therefore, here also no complete verification is possible, but only a process of gradually increasing confirmation. We may, if we wish, call a sentence *disconfirmed* in a certain degree if its negation is confirmed in that degree.¹⁰

Moreover, Carnap expressed his observation of the practical and troublesome limitations arising from the demarcation between analytical and synthetic judgments in such a statement:

Thus the acceptance and the rejection of a (synthetic) sentence always contains a conventional component. That does not mean that the decision – or, in other words, the

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- 8 R. Carnap, *Philosophy and Logical Syntax* (London: 1935), *Canvas Harvard*, 1935a, 9.12/2009, p. 35 (11 Sep. 2020) https://canvas.harvard.edu/files/2222629/download?download_frd=1&verifier=UVv2nL47B6mWfh35GuV4Mrkm1Jy3SLeybPgOmtD2. Cf. K. Zamiara, *Metodologiczne znaczenie sporu o status poznawczy teorii* (Warszawa: 1974), pp. 41–46.
- 9 S. Amsterdamski, *Between Experience and Methaphysics: Philosophical Problems of the Evolution of Science* (Dordrecht, Boston: 1975), pp. 25.
- 10 Sahotra Sarkar ed., *Logical Empiricism at Its Peak: Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath* (London, New York: 1996), p. 203.

question of truth and verification – is conventional. For, in addition to the conventional component, there is always the non-conventional component – we may call it, the objective one – consisting in the observations which have been made.¹¹

Carnap's doubt about the conventional nature of putting a demarcation line between scientific and non-scientific judgments became a basis for substantive polemics. Among the many critical voices that questioned the sense and legitimacy of the demarcation, the concepts of the following authors deserve special attention:

1. Stefan Amsterdamski's conventionalism – in the present case, the author claims that the demarcation procedure, i.e., the separation of the scientific and non-scientific sphere in every sense, both semiotically and linguistically – judgments and opinions about the reality being studied – as well as materially and theoretically – recognizing a theory as scientific – is strictly conventional, i.e., dependent directly on the researcher. The following statement expresses the sense of such a way of argumentation in the best way:

Hence, it appears that whatever criterion of demarcation we would formulate, whatever features of statements we would choose as a symptom of their scientific status, our criterion cannot be formulated as a descriptive statement. ... the criterion of demarcation regardless of how we formulate it, must be of a normative character, and, by the same token, its acceptance or refutation is always a matter of convention. In such a situation, any rational discussion can pertain only to the usefulness of the norm, and this is

11 Sahotra Sarkar ed., *Logical Empiricism*, p. 204. Even Karl Raimund Popper, the continuator of the logical empiricism legacy, could not cope intellectually, in the theoretical-methodological sense, with conventionalism when separating scientific and non-scientific sentences/theories. The assumptions of falsificationism, understood as an improved version of verificationism, fell into a similar trap. In the present case, Imre Lakatos was right. Lakatos stated that the key to understanding falsification is the unempty empirical content of the theory that makes it possible to falsify it. "Only those theories are "scientific" which forbid certain observable states of affairs and therefore are factually disprovable. Or, a theory is "scientific" if it has an empirical basis. (The empirical basis of a theory is the set of its potential falsifiers: the set of those observational propositions which may disprove it.) But both assumptions are false. Psychology testifies against the first, logic against the second, and, finally, methodological judgment testifies against the demarcation criterion." Nevertheless, Lakatos stressed that in Karl R. Popper's case we deal with naïve falsificationism as the core of falsification are always and only subjective decisions about observational or non-observational sentences/theories, i.e., falsification bases on convention and/or choice made by researchers, and not on an objective and independent methodological procedure. More in: I. Lakatos, *Pisma z filozofii nauk empirycznych* (Warszawa: 1995), pp. 14 ff.

possible only under the condition that there is an agreement as to the ends which the accepted norm is to serve.¹²

2. Ludwik Fleck's thought collective – in the present view, scientific cognition directly relates to specific cultural and historical conditions, where the production or emergence of scientific facts/theories is not determined by “pure” empirical data but is only a product of a given scientific collective, i.e., a community of scientists who deliberate together on the research or cognition subject. In such an approach, scientific knowledge is not without assumption as positivists expect. It is rather the attitude of the researcher, socialization processes, scientific and research practice, etc. which determines scientific knowledge. Fleck put the state of affairs in the following way:

We would argue that there is probably no such thing as complete error or complete truth. ... Furthermore, whether we like it or not, we can never sever our links with the past, complete with all its errors. It survives in accepted concepts, in the presentation of problems, in the syllabus of formal education, in everyday life, as well as in language and institutions. Concepts are not spontaneously created but are determined by their ancestors.¹³

In other words, every procedure or theoretical-methodological operation in scientific practice is gradually determined by the socio-cultural conditions in which the researcher operates. The same applies to demarcation, which some scientists consider necessary, while others consider unjustified. Even if we agree that there is a need for demarcation, the very mechanism of separating science from non-science is, again, a matter of discretion, i.e., different thought collectives – specific groups of scientists¹⁴ – may either recognize or deny the accepted demarcation division. In such an arrangement, acceptance or negation of a particular demarcation division in a particular thought

12 S. Amsterdamski, *Between Experience*, p. 30.

13 L. Fleck, *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact*, Thaddeus J. Trenn, Robert K. Merton eds. (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1979) p. 20.

14 Writing about a thought collective, the author stresses that the overriding goal of any collective of researchers is to define the style of thought it will use. The style even becomes a kind of disciplinary mechanism and/or scientific discipline for the scientist, who defines it as what cannot be otherwise conceived. It is so because we should not define the style of thought as “directed perception, with corresponding mental and objective assimilation of what has been so perceived. It is characterized by common features in the problems of interest to a thought collective, by the judgment which the thought collective considers evident, and by the methods which it applies as a means of cognition.” L. Fleck, *Genesis and Development*, p. 99.

collective has mainly its sources in the research tradition, axioms, or theoretical-research directives, recognized by a given collective

3. Thomas S. Kuhn's historical relativism is a position, on the one hand, negating the unity of science – the positivist postulate of the physicalism of scientific practice – and, on the other hand, the cumulative nature of scientific knowledge – every scientific progress is the result of the accumulation of knowledge, i.e., empirically confirmed theories and laws that form the pyramid of verifiable, irrevocable and genuine knowledge. The Kuhn's approach consists in undermining the unity of science and the accumulation as a necessary and unavoidable mechanism of scientific knowledge creation. In such an approach, scientific progress means that researchers produce often contradictory representations of the world, i.e., by different theories and scientific laws that are disproportionate rather than correlate with each other. In such interpretation, any scientific revolution is not a straightforward consequence of accumulation but means a gestalt switch, i.e., grasping a new paradigm. The emergence of a new paradigm is synonymous with a different, often new way of explaining, describing, modeling, or theorizing about the studied reality. As Thomas S. Kuhn said:

Successive paradigms tell us different things about the population of the universe and about that population's behavior. ... But paradigms differ in more than substance, for they are directed not only to nature but also back upon the science that produced them. They are the source of the methods, problem-field, and standards of solution accepted by any mature scientific community at any given time. As a result, the reception of a new paradigm often necessitates a redefinition of the corresponding science.¹⁵

Converting the mentioned argument into the problem of demarcation, we can state that a firm, and very often irrevocable, drawing of the demarcation line in science, even falls into apparent conflict with the anti-cumulative nature of scientific knowledge development, especially in social sciences. It is due to a regularity that concerns, among other things, political science: something that is not considered scientific today may even be the quintessence of the science in the future or vice versa. In other words, the recognition/non-recognition of a given research method, interpretative perspective, theory, or explaining scheme has nothing to do with "objective" empirical verification or falsification but depends on the level of acceptability by a given community

15 T. S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1996) p. 103.

of scientists, situational-research context, intellectual fashion, financial resources, research culture, or canon of values held by particular research or cognitive entity. If demarcation would make sense, or, more precisely, if we would consistently implement its assumptions, contemporary science would not undermine itself, as it happens.

4. The diversity of epistemic cultures by Karin Knorr Cetina. Through a comprehensive analysis of current research practices, including laboratory and experimental work, the author challenged the concept of the unity of science, which in essence, aimed to develop a standard, universal research method – the idea of physicalism proclaimed by logical empiricists. Cetina concluded that in contemporary scientific practice, there are no grounds for formulating a demarcation criterion as there is no clear boundary between science and non-science. Such a situation results from the fact that today's scientific practice mainly bases on different epistemic cultures, which are often contradictory. Therefore, differences are noticeable between individual disciplines of knowledge, e.g., in the context of defining the subject of research/cognition in physics – laboratory production – and social sciences – environmental production – or between individual areas within a given discipline, e.g., theoretical or methodological – experimental methods and ethnomethodology.¹⁶ The concept of different research fields – an idea proclaimed, among others, by Randal Collins, Stephan Fuchs, Ian Hacking – expresses a similar intuition, noting that the research heterogeneity in modern science is much greater than it results from the formal division between traditional scientific disciplines. In such sense, cognitive, theoretical, or methodological differences and/or antagonisms operate “despite traditional distinctions,” which must result in a rejection of the postulate of the unity of science and, consequently, of positivist demarcation.¹⁷

At the present stage of analysis, it is clear that the objectivity of the demarcation procedure, and, more precisely, the scientific, supra-unit, purely empirical nature of the decisions related to the delimitation of boundaries between scientific and non-scientific judgments/theories, is a theoretical-methodological fiction. In fact, we can say that the fundamental postulate of logical empiricism cannot

16 K. Knorr Cetina, *Epistemic Cultures. How the Sciences Make Knowledge*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). Also in: Ł. Afeltowicz, *Modele, artefakty, kolektywy. Praktyka badawcza w perspektywie współczesnych studiów nad nauką* (Toruń: 2012), pp. 102–106.

17 K. Knorr Cetina, *Epistemic Cultures*.

overcome the “down-to-earth” conventionalism and the practical heterogeneity of scientific investigation. In such sense, any attempt to apply an objective research procedure consisting in a precise and strict separation of purely scientific claims from colloquial beliefs or convictions is only the wishful thinking of a given group of scientists. In other words, the demarcation is subject to a too hard assumption – the theorem of logical empiricism – which only apparently leads to the increase of scientificity of a given knowledge discipline.

It is no different with an attempt to use demarcation to separate the subject of research or cognition in political science. In such an arrangement, the analogy is doubly wrong. On the one hand, the demarcation line is transferred from the linguistic-theoretical level – judgments and theories about reality within a given discipline – to the subjective one – the object of research of a given domain – which is in contradiction with the essence of the demarcation procedure which, as Rudolf Carnap wrote, “concerns not objects but terms”. On the other hand, the determination of the demarcation in question, even if we assume that it is a necessary procedure that orders the science, is not able to free itself from the subjective decision of the researcher. It means a situation in which the boundary of recognition or non-recognition of a particular object of research as scientific, and consequently, creating a discipline of knowledge on the basis of its detailed analysis, is relativized to the subject, i.e., a single scientist, advocates of a given theoretical-methodological school, sympathizers of a particular theoretical-cognitive position, etc. The effects of such a mechanism are far-reaching because they always lead to indelible relativity of the subject of the study/cognition. Under such conditions, defining the discipline of knowledge, especially political science, through the prism of the subject characteristic, or more precisely, an attempt to objectively separate a finite collection of homogeneous research objects, which is a necessary condition for building a homogeneous identity of the discipline, becomes simply impossible. It results not so much from the fuzzy nature of research objects,¹⁸ which is undeniable but also from the specificity of scientific cognition in social sciences, where we deal with a multitude of cognitive structures.

18 The fuzzy nature of research/cognitive objects in political science relates primarily to the political nature of these objects. In such an approach, politicality is an aspectual feature. According to the rule M. Karwat wrote about, where the phenomena subject to political analysis are “both political – in some respects, e.g., in terms of effects – and non-political – in other respects, e.g., from the point of view of sources and place of

Specifics of the research subject in the field of political science

The multiplicity of cognitive structures in the broadly understood social sciences, including political science, is basically a consequence of epistemic boundaries set by the learning/researching entity – according to the thesis: “the conditions of cognition are its boundaries.” Basically, we can distinguish two epistemic boundaries. First – material; they determine what is and/or may appear within the phenomenal world. Second – formal; they determine how something may appear, i.e., they set the rules of data presentation, conceptualization, etc. Therefore, all scientific cognition depends gradually on the cognitive subject, where:

As we can see, we deal with a typical Protagoras-like statement, according to which the cognitive subject determines ontology depending on a certain individual or generic condition, and since there are many subjects, there will also be many ontologies, each of which will be entitled as a certain perspective or point of view.¹⁹

In such a perspective, scientific cognition is distracted among the participants involved in theoretical and cognitive reflection. It is a mechanism of epistemic dispersion that, as Jean Lave, a cognitive anthropologist, points out, has its origins in the diversity of society as such, and more precisely in the heterogeneity of the perceptual and cognitive characteristics of certain participants in collective life:

There is reason to suspect that what we call cognition is, in fact, a complex social phenomenon. The point is not so much that arrangements of knowledge in the head correspond in a complicated way to the social world outside the head, but that they are socially organized in such a fashion as to be indivisible. “Cognition” observed in everyday practice is distributed – stretched over, not divided among – mind, body, activity, and culturally organized settings.²⁰

In such understanding, a scientific method within a given discipline of knowledge is a pluralistic theoretical-research space in which representations of the world – i.e., its organization, conceptualization, operationalization, etc. – ontological, semiotic, epistemological or methodological sphere are conditioned

occurrence.” More in: M. Karwat, “Polityczność i upolitycznienie. Metodologiczne ramy analizy,” *Studia Politologiczne*, No. 17/2011, pp. 63–88.

19 D. Leszczyński, *Struktura poznawcza i obraz świata. Zagadnienie podmiotowych warunków poznania we współczesnej filozofii* (Wrocław: 2010), pp. 105–106.

20 J. Lave, *Cognition in Practice: Mind, Mathematics, and Culture in Everyday Life*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 1.

by the researcher's attitude and behavior, his or her self-awareness, intellectual sympathies, theoretical and cognitive habits or mannerisms and/or schemes of conducting the research process.

In the case of political science, the above means a moment when the determination of the subject of research or cognition directly depends on subjective factors – intentional nature of cognition – where the determination of criteria by which an object, phenomenon, process, etc. can be considered “political” or “non-political” is determined each time by the researcher's decision and not by the objectivity of the demarcation procedure. In consequence, we deal with the phenomenon of object disproportionality, which, nowadays, results in the expansion of new research areas within political science. We clearly observe such a tendency in Polish political science, where the subject-issue catalog of textbooks from the 1980s differs significantly, for example, in quantitative or qualitative terms, from current studies. Also, the works present the subject-issue differentiation as synonymous with scientific progress, new research methods, and techniques or, finally, different interpretations. An example of such quantitative subject differentiation can be research analyses relating to cyberpolitics, which did not exist at all in Polish political science in the 1980s. In turn, an example of qualitative differentiation within a previously designated subject of research in the field of political science may be the present analyses of decision-making processes in politics, where newer and newer theoretical-research instruments develop – e.g., the extension of research scope on decision-making processes to a cognitive component that developed under the direct influence of the new field of knowledge, i.e., cognitive science, especially the research on sensomotorical processes.²¹

In such conditions, it is natural that there is no subjective homogeneity in the political science, where individual researchers designate separate, often mutually exclusive, areas of research and theoretical and political studies. At the same time, the subjective diversity of the subjects favors the subjectivization of various types of methodological mechanisms, including postulating and putting forward an appropriate subjective criterion for the science of politics. Hence, it may or may not be a criterion of significance,²² as well as any other criterion that will de facto suit a given researcher of political phenomena. In a broader context,

21 P. W. Glimcher, “Neurobiologia wzrokowo-sakadowego podejmowania decyzji,” in: *Formy aktywności umysłu. Ujęcia kognitywistyczne. Ewolucja i złożone struktury poznawcze*, A. Klawiter ed., Vol. 2 (Warszawa: 2009), pp. 336–394.

22 According to R. Skarzyński: “The object of cognition appears when a fragment of reality is so significant for people that they focus their own interest on it, and the object attracts

the mechanism of subjective differentiation becomes the premise – basis – for abandoning unreasonable “demarcation rigorism” in favor of cognitive and theoretical-research fuzziness. In principle, the abandonment of anachronistic demarcation results in pluralistic recognition, i.e., equal treatment of often differing views or research perspectives. Additionally, attempts to combine separate, often antagonistic, points of cognition, understood as a contemporary trend of scientific investigations within the political science, results, among other things, in such research strategies as: the mechanism of research area hybridization; creation of entirely new interdisciplinary theoretical-methodological subspaces; the phenomenon of concept or research method aggregation.²³ It means a situation in which:

Factual and theoretical knowledge which has its subject references if it is true, accumulates. In such a way, the subject areas – the distinguished fragments of the objective world of politics, constituting its schematic representation – arise. Subject areas reproduce the objects studied, the relations between them, the distinguished states, giving an approximate picture of the world of politics. There are as many subject areas of the world of politics as many theories were built by political scientists within certain paradigms, programs or research traditions.²⁴

Simultaneously, the existing multitude of cognitive or research structures in political science is synonymous with the multiplicity of political knowledge, which, as a product of the scientific and research activities of political scientists and researchers dealing with politics, is de facto constructivist in nature. In such a perspective, the scientific study of the political matter is nothing

their attention, becoming an object of reflection for generations ... Cognition from an interdisciplinary perspective, that is, from the perspective of at least two disciplines of science, would hate the problem of cognition if it was possible. The problem's reflection may lead to the conclusion that we do not deal with interdisciplinary cognition or scientific cognition at all.” Cf. R. Skarzyński, *Podstawowy dylemat*, p. 247.

- 23 J. Nocoń, “Problem granic dyscyplinarnych politologii,” *Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne*, Vol. 26/2010 (Toruń: 2010), pp. 51–62. E. Ponczek, among others, noted such a regularity among political scientists, and thus evaluated contemporary researchers and political scientists: “It would mean that a political scientist should be, in a way, a polyhistoric person – and thus a person who knows a lot, i.e., a researcher with an open mind, a non-dogmatic scholar, not inclined to absolutize, ideologize, or fundamentalize such or other findings.” Cf. E. Ponczek, “Monodyscyplinarność czy interdyscyplinarność i multidyscyplinarność nauk o polityce – możliwości i granice,” *Transformacje. Pismo interdyscyplinarne*, 1–2 (68–69) (Warszawa: 2011), pp. 55–69.
- 24 T. Klementewicz, *Rozumienie polityki. Zarys metodologii nauki o polityce* (Warszawa: 2010), p. 59.

more than “constructing” political reality in an anti-realistic spirit, where theoretical-methodological considerations rely on generating separate images of the world, which frequently represent alternative cognitive structures to each other. Hence, it comes to a situation in which the diversity of images of the world is “each time a different kind of “attitude”, creating a specific field of reality and objectivity”.²⁵ On the linguistic level, which in fact precedes the ontological or methodological level, the multiplicity of world images directly relates to the treatment of scientific cognition as a Wittgenstein’s “language game” synonymous with semiotic heterogeneity, i.e., the phenomenon of multiplicity – “countless different kinds of use of what we call ‘symbols,’ ‘words,’ ‘sentences.’”²⁶ In such an arrangement, a linguistic turn in social sciences becomes crucial, whereby researchers’ attention is focused on the social context of meaning production in science. In other words, it is a moment of the dependence of the cognitive or research process on the language as such, including the communication and cultural practice in which individual scholars function.

Moreover, both constructivism and conventionalism deny the existence of an unbiased political reality, namely, “pure” facts, states of affairs, processes, phenomena, etc. in politics; on the contrary, the research process always – and only – relies on subjective conditions, i.e., subjective interpretation, perception, analysis or inference, which are, by definition, relative and/or disproportionate to other subjects like participants of scientific reflection within the political science. Hence, the specificity of the political science research subject is precisely the perception of these essential conditions, where there is not always full agreement and consensus among competent researchers of political phenomena regarding the objectivity of the research or cognition subject, or the necessity to consider a specific criterion for the recognition of the phenomena as “political” or “non-political.”

25 D. Leszczyński, *Struktura*, p. 429. On the one hand, we can understand the multiplicity of world images as *horizontal pluralism* – the multiplicity of coherent, equivalent conceptual schemes within a single discourse, e.g., many equal theories within a specific science; on the other hand, as *vertical pluralism* – it is a multiplicity of language games, discourses or narratives that are qualitatively distinct, e.g., science, art, religion, etc.

D. Leszczyński, *Struktura*, pp. 427–441.

26 L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Blackwell Publishers, 1986), p. 11.

Subject errors made in political science

A tendency toward a rigorous, even authoritative, separation of the research or cognition subject from the interdisciplinary study background to provide the political science not only with strict science but, above all, with an honorable status and a place in the pantheon of “real” science becomes apparent among Polish political scientists. Such a pseudo-positivist procedure not only does not encourage deeper scientific reflection. Moreover, the procedure does not build subjective self-awareness among political scientists, which leads to, among other things: numerous simplifications on the theoretical and methodological level; isolation of political science in the context of interdisciplinary exchange of knowledge and experience between scientists; research shortsightedness, which means rejecting the axiom of gradual integration of knowledge in favor of subject and analytical-research alienation. We can actually say that the mechanism, first, inhibits the development of political science understood as an interdisciplinary, aspectual, cross-border area of scientific research; second, it expresses hidden complexes and fears related to “progressive theoretical-methodological noise”. In other words, the mechanism is a quasi-criticism, mixed with anxiety and frustration caused by the ever-increasing complication of political practice – the distinguishing features here are the complexity and temporality of politics. More importantly, the quasi-critics mingles with the theoretical-explanatory differentiation occurring within political science, where it is increasingly difficult to unequivocally resolve the political nature of given phenomena, facts, processes, or states of affairs.

Of course, the attitude of object isolationism in the spirit of demarcation may have, and very often has its origins in numerous cognitive or theoretical-methodological errors. We can name such fundamental errors, which are at the root of the demarcation, and, in fact, discretionary, “subject separation” of the political science from other areas of knowledge within the broadly defined social sciences. Those are:

1. The scientific obsession of the so-called “epistemological dissolution” and forced objectivization. In the discussed case, the mania of the “epistemological dissolution,” as claimed by Jean Claude Kaufmann, consists in an intense “construction of the object” of cognition in individual disciplines of social sciences, including political science, which attempts to separate and clearly define the object of research to objectivize it. According to the thesis: “An object is what can be separated from the sphere of colloquial cognition and subjective perception of the subject through scientific objectification procedures.” In such an approach, the mechanism of “constructing an object”

becomes a scientific fetish of some scientists.²⁷ Forced objectivization implies the mechanism of putting the sign of equality between colloquial cognition and the subjective perception of the cognitive entity, i.e., the researcher. Such objectivization is an utterly unauthorized procedure because it denies the anti-positivist research trends in social sciences, including the crucial hermeneutical-interpretationist, structuralist, post-structuralist, or post-modern approach based on the axiom of cognitive subjectivity.

2. Lack of self-awareness of individual researchers concerning relativization of the cognition subject is an intentional or unintentional negation of the many equivalent subjects of cognition and/or research areas in political science. That is, the negation relates to many truths, conceptual patterns, research methods, and techniques, where reaching the truth and/or the essence of things is not possible, but is intended, i.e., probable and not certain – as in the relativism of scientific knowledge. No less crucial in achieving the proper theoretical-political self-awareness is the fallibilism, which very significantly emphasizes the mistakenness/error of human cognition. In the case of demarcation procedure, the fallibilistic warning means that any subjective delimitation of the subject or disciplinary boundaries can be simply an erroneous procedure, something revocable, questionable, unacceptable, transient, etc.
3. Strict formalism and reductionism – i.e., a focus on the formal distinctiveness of the research or cognition subject in political science, which always means putting subjective and conventional demarcation lines that pretend to be objective. As Mirosław Karwat rightly points out, such efforts result from a longing for simplicity and unambiguity, and, in fact, lead to dangerous formalism, where:

Formalistic definitions of politics – respectively: law, morality, aesthetic side of human life, religion, economy – tend to designate *completely different and separated*, not intersecting by scope, the composition of elements, and *closed* – i.e., influencing only externally, and not by mutual permeation – spheres of social relations and activities. Often such tendency goes together with *location* – i.e., a conviction of almost physical concentration – *of the given macrosyndrome* – politics, morality, law – *essence in specific subject carriers*; respectively: political, legal, aesthetic, or religious ones.²⁸

The discussed error also consists in the reduction of the research subject to one sphere, plane, factor, feature, or aspect, where in the name of simplicity

27 J. C. Kaufmann, *Wywiad rozumiejący* (Warszawa: 2010), p. 32.

28 M. Karwat, “Cecha polityczności i dziedzinia teorii polityki,” in: R. Skarzyński ed., *Carl Schmitt i współczesna myśl polityczna* (Warszawa: 1996), p. 109.

and unambiguity of scientific research the subject of political science is isolated from the interdisciplinary cognitive background; where through the mechanism of reduction the wishful thinking often narrows down the contextual, multifactorial, syndromatic character of the political science research subject.

4. Lack of acceptance and understanding for the temporality and complexity of the political matter, which results, among other things, in: monocausalism – a reflection based on a strict causal principle, according to which a specific cause always and only leads to a specific effect. In such a variant, no deviation from the rule is assumed, which means, among other things, a lack of acceptance for the coincidence, unpredictability, or any cause-effect reconfiguration, including overlapping or excluding both causes and effects; one-dimensional theorizing – using Margaret S. Archer’s terminology it is a conflationary thinking based on a “narrow,” often discretionary, view of socio-political practice;²⁹ rejection of integrative, multi-level or holistic methodologies – i.e., an impoverishment of knowledge for the well-being of individual researchers.

Syndromaticity of the political science research subject

The syndromatic nature of the research subject became apparent by showing the errors made when determining the subject of research or cognition in political science by setting a demarcation line. In such a sense, attempts to separate the “political” from the “non-political” cannot take the form of a formal-mechanical procedure that, under the guise of objectivity and, more importantly, the homogeneity of the research objects, tries to define the subject scope of political science. Still, the attempts must consider the syndromatic perspective that comes down to a statement:

We call a syndrome, in the strict sense, a combination of phenomena forming a conglomerate or a complex with a unique quality, such that the co-creating elements lose their individual properties in this configuration, gaining features determined by the whole, but also vice versa: apart from the configuration, they do not have such features ... Moreover, we deal with a combination of heterogeneous phenomena, of unequal origin, conditions, occurring separately in a differentiated form, and yet constituting some organic relationship ... The political nature of social phenomena is nothing more than a combination of factors that are diverse in terms of their origin and formal

29 M. S. Archer, *Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 82.

affiliation – e.g., technological, economic, religious, or artistic – historically variable but always entangled in the conditions of social equilibrium, distorted by the conflict between interests, views and particular aspirations on any issue and the requirements of social integration and consolidation.³⁰

Undoubtedly, the advantages behind such a strategy of defining the subject of research or cognition of political science include:

1. Going beyond traditional dichotomes and theoretical-methodological divisions in the broadly understood social sciences, including the science of politics – induction vs deduction; real vs formal; micro-scale vs macro-scale; determinism vs indeterminism – in favor of scientific synthesis strategies. In such understanding, we refer to the essential methodological self-awareness of individual researchers, which means, on the one hand, understanding the subject heterogeneity of the political science, and, on the other hand, the realization of gradual cognitive/research relativity, which involves the immanent limitations of individual researchers.
2. Using holistic theoretical-methodological tools, especially when analyzing various types of cognitive/research objects or subjects. The syndromatic view relies on: multi-level analysis, and complex and dynamic systems theory³¹ shaped in the spirit of interdisciplinarity.
3. Appreciation and consideration of such momentous phenomena – variables – that have a direct impact on the perception, understanding, or definition of the political science subject, such as: emergence, non-linearity, blurredness, or chaos.³²
4. Breaking the monocaustic thinking and abandoning all methodological reductionism in favor of precise multifactorial, contextual, multi-level

30 M. Karwat, “Syndromatyczny charakter przedmiotu nauki o polityce,” in: K. A. Wojtaszczyk, *Demokratyczna Polska w globalizującym się świecie*, A. Mirska ed. (Warszawa: 2009), pp. 175–188.

31 Among numerous publications on multi-level – complex – analyses of socio-political phenomena, the following deserve attention: J. H. Miller, S. E. Page, *Complex Adaptive Systems. An Introduction to Computational Models of Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); R. K. Sawyer, *Social Emergence. Societies as Complex Systems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); D. Elder-Vass, *The Causal Power of Social Structures. Emergence, Structure and Agency* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); D. Richards, *Political Complexity. Nonlinear Models of Politics* (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2000).

32 F. Pierzchalski, *Podmiotowość polityczna w perspektywie indywidualistycznej i holistycznej* (Pułtusk: 2009).

research, etc., where the subject specificity of the political science is not determined by a formal demarcation line but is conditioned by the insightful explanation of a pre-determined research object – in most cases it is a subjective decision of the researcher – understood as a configuration of heterogeneous elements/parts, which, apart from having their own qualitative specificity – they are fuzzy, undefined or inter-divided objects – additionally, under given conditions, create a unique and often an irreducible cognitive/research entity.

To sum up, we can say that some theorists too easily stigmatize other competent researchers of political phenomena by calling them unreliable pseudo-intellectualists because of the different ways of defining and/or perceiving the subject of research or cognition in political science. There is an apparent misconception of the criticism in such efforts, and also a lack of recognition that intellectual adversaries with syndromatic attitudes have the competence and theoretical-methodological self-awareness but also represent a real, scientific counterweight for supporters of demarcation boundaries. In such circumstances, the concept of syndromaticity of political matter, by the very fact of scientific perspicacity and objectivity, deserves special attention and reflection of political scientists.

Bohdan Kaczmarek

Management as the metaphor of politics

For a long time, I have been convinced of the profound, multidimensional, theoretical, and methodological rapport between the organization and management studies and the political studies, in terms of their origin, history of both study disciplines, and the increasing need for mutual interferences and inspirations. In this article, I would like to draw attention to certain aspects of the issue. The considerations will have an introductory character. The analysis will be conducted from a particular point of view and for a political theorist. At the same time, the understanding of the area of interest in the organization and management studies will be selective, related to a specified method of interpretation of the critical problems undertaken in the theory of organization.

At times, we may observe a certain mistrust of political scientists toward representatives of organization and management sciences, as well as resistance to a mutual rapprochement; the same applies to the attitude of the researchers in organization and management toward political scientists and political science. The existing barriers obviously have different origins. Indeed, especially relevant are the institutional traditions and interests of the corporations of scientists operating in these areas, the weighting, simplified ideas from the past about the criteria of the individual character of the areas of knowledge and scientific disciplines, the complexes rooting from the interdisciplinary and inter-problematic character of the political and organizational sciences, but also their relative youth. Also, relevant aspects are, to some extent, the instability of both disciplines, especially in comparison with the much more socially and intellectually rooted fields, such as law, history, economics, sociology, psychology, which the political and organizational sciences owe the most, regarding theory and methodology.

However, popular interpretations of specific critical issues approached by the political and organization and management sciences also influence the existing barriers. Traditionally, political science is under the predominant influence of a narrowly institutional approach, which places particular emphasis on the legal aspects of the analysis of political phenomena, which reduces the problem of the core of politics to the issues related to the struggle for power, its exercise and the functioning of the state. Also traditionally, political science focuses on the macrosocial dimension of social life, today sometimes enriching it with analyses of the mega-structural dimension, which refers to global processes; this area,

though, is still often interpreted in terms of interstate relations, instead of in the context of social systems of supra- and extra-state character. On the other hand, organization and management sciences traditionally interpret the problematic aspects of interest by narrowing the focus to the mezzo- and microstructural dimension, reducing the issue of the organizations to purposeful and formalized social groups, sometimes marginally treating organizational phenomena occurring in macro- and mega-structures, or not taking up issues related to the possible and dissipative character of organizational processes. Traditionally as well, the problems of power and politics are addressed peripherally, especially in management sciences. Pragmatically, teleological and cooperative perception of phenomena in this area dominates.

Political vs organization sciences – factors contributing to the assessment of the situation

Researcher of both political phenomena and the issues from the field of organization and management, LaPalombara correctly indicates many unfavorable, yet characteristic phenomena for the tradition and contemporary research situated on the crossing, as it may be said, of the paradigms of politics and organization.¹ Simultaneously, he notes that strengthening the interdisciplinary integration of political and organization studies requires greater openness of thinking on both sides. Intellectual exchange in this area should result in significant theoretical and conceptual reevaluations, reduce the intellectual isolation and backwardness, enrich both the theory of organization and theoretical reflection on politics. The interferences of political studies and sciences on organization and management are traditionally a matter of formalistic and legalistic tradition in political studies, including simplified notions of the institutional aspect of political phenomena. The elites of early American political science, similarly to many

1 See J. LaPalombara “The Organizational ‘Gap’ in Political Science,” in: G. King, K.L. Shlozman, N. Nie, eds., *The Future of Political Science 100 perspectives* (Routledge, 2009), “The Underestimated Contributions of Political Science to Organizational Learning, Power and Politics in Organizations: Public and Private Sector Comparisons,” in: *Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge*, ed. M. Dierkes, A.B. Antal, J. Child, I. Nonaka, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). Joseph LaPalombara is a retired professor of political and management studies at Yale University, where he was, among others, Dean of the Faculty of Political Science. He is the author of, among others, *Politics Within Nations* (1974); *Democracy, Italian Style* (1987); *Multinational Corporations and Developing Countries* (1981), *Stati uniti? Italia e USA a confronto* (2009), see also: <http://www.las.illinois.edu/alumni/magazine/articles/2003/lapalombara/>.

sociologists and representatives of other disciplines, believed that organizational processes were adapting to what was laid down in constitutions and laws, official regulations of political systems; they treated deviations in this respect as a political pathology, ignoring the internal dynamics and regularities of organizational functioning and learning of political institutions.²

The analyses of publications in *American Political Science Review* (ASPR) and *International Organizations* conducted by LaPalombara between 1989 and 1998 confirm critical evaluations of this area's situation. Among 448 texts published in the ASPR, half concerned broadly defined political organizations. However, very rarely such problems as learning of organizations, changes of their coding and aims, and if the issue of organizational changes was already addressed, then not in the perspective of self-reflection and organizational autodynamics, but only in the context of external interference. Formal and rational choice models prevailed. According to LaPalombara, many of the articles were empirically false. They were limited to a chronological description of organizations' activities, rarely tried to explain the complexity of organizations, the hierarchy's functioning,, the dynamics of internal and external conflicts, organizational change mechanisms, power redistribution or leadership transformation. This also confirms the thesis that political scientists tend to treat organizations in an un-theoretical and non-analytical way.³ On the other hand, the articles published in *International Organizations* only in twenty-three cases out of 152 referred to research on organizations. They focused, though, mainly on inter-organizational interactions, mainly the two-way ones, only briefly exploring the organizations' internal mechanisms. This was often accompanied by a characteristic lack of conceptual distinction between organizations and their leaders – their identification.⁴

Researchers examine similar problems by analyzing the interrelationships of other sciences and research on organizations. This is what J.R. Fear does in his text "Thinking Historically about Organizational Learning."⁵ History provides lessons for the future, although those lessons might be very different. The Americans have learned a lot from the defeat in Vietnam, while the Maginot Line may serve as an example of both organizational learning and misunderstanding history at

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- 2 See J. LaPalombara, "The Underestimated Contributions of Political Science..." pp. 138–139.
 - 3 LaPalombara, "The Underestimated Contributions of Political Science..." pp. 146–147.
 - 4 LaPalombara, "The Underestimated Contributions of Political Science..." p. 147.
 - 5 J.R. Fear "Thinking Historically about Organizational Learning," in: *Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge*, ed. M. Dierkes, A.B. Antal, J. Child, I. Nonaka (2003).

the same time. As H. Ford claims, history may also be “more or less nonsense.”⁶ Even when history enters into research on organizations, it often adopts the perspective called “history of command peaks”, treating a corporation’s inner life largely as *terra incognita*. The causes of profound organizational changes, the decision-making mechanisms, the criteria for making strategic decisions, the “micro-political” processes are not the focus of researchers. Limitations also influence access to sources. Public archives are more accessible than historical documentation of private corporations.

Management and organization theory and research on organizations often avoid or neglect the issues of power and interest. In this area, the perception of organizations as primarily cooperative systems is still strongly present. In this perspective, organizational conflict is nevertheless treated as a disruption, a barrier, an unnecessary cost, something pathological and undesirable, even when it is attributed, at least verbally, a natural character, as it occurs now. The aspirations of power are considered a result of mismanagement. The authors of works on management usually interpret the activities related to the struggle for power or scarce resources in organizations as politicking. “Power is treated like a dirty little family secret: Everyone knows it’s there, but no one dares come right out to discuss it.”⁷ LaPalombara recalls, among other things, the research showing that out of 3,000 works published in the *Harvard Business Review* between 1960 and the mid-1990s, only fifteen contained the word “power” in the title and only three the word “conflict.” If the problem of power appears more often in the texts themselves, then it is not as an axis of vision, a key concept. Managers, like researchers of management, do not want to admit the struggle for power within organizations; they emphasize the importance of integration, teamwork, unity around the mission, the decision-making choices are seen as exclusively technical, universally rational, detached from the structure of social interests, non-alternative in the political sense. Meanwhile, cooperation and conflict are closely related to each other, and the organizational rules of the game-defining the organizational logic are themselves the result of an earlier and contemporary struggle for power, scarce resources, and conflicts of interest.⁸ Theories of

6 Fear, “Thinking Historically about Organizational Learning,” p. 165.

7 J. LaPalombara, “Power and Politics in Organizations...,” p. 563.

8 Cf. LaPalombara, “Power and Politics in Organizations...,” p. 564.; On the subject of policy models in the organizations’ world, I write more widely in: B. Kaczmarek, “Politologia organizacji? ‘Organizatologia polityki?’ Polityka w świecie organizacji i organizacyjny sens polityki a ich badanie,” in: *Wyjaśnianie polityki*, ed. J. Błuszkowski, J. Zaleśny, *Studia Politologiczne*, Vol. 17, (2010).

organization and management do not deal with the issue of politics.⁹ However, the ability of organizations to accurately read signals about power and politics, both inside and outside the organizations, is a prerequisite for effective adaptation to changing conditions, also in the global dimension, where global competition forces corporations to deal professionally with politics, to enter the network of dependencies or to construct the broadest possible repertoire of relational strategies, to enter into coalitions and alliances also with competitors, especially with the state and public authorities.¹⁰

Theory of policy vs the theory of organization – the convergence in question

Suppose we refer to the traditional search for distinctiveness and identity of the sphere's scientific disciplines in question. In that case, it is worth indicating several aspects showing those exact *subject relations between the theory of policy and the theory of organization*, between political sciences and the sciences of organization and management. In this way, we are passing in a way “above and beside” the fundamental doubts that, due to the postmodern revolution in science, may be applied to such subject-objective.

The organizational dimension of policy

The observation that political phenomena and policy have an organizational dimension, that they occur in the world of organizations and that they realize in organizational forms is probably banal. In general, the social realm is a world of organizations, and in a particular perspective, it can be argued that human ability to create social institutions, including organizations understood in one way or another, is the core of our culture, the core of human social life. If organizations function in all spheres of social life, at all levels of its hierarchy – at the micro, meso-, macro- and mega structural levels, it is evident that the political sphere of social life is embedded, entangled, and determined by organizational correctness, just like any other. While with economics and economic life, such a statement is evident and confirmed by the directions of various scientific disciplines' activity. Unfortunately, with political science, one can sometimes have the impression that this aspect of politics seems vastly underestimated

9 J. LaPalombara, “Power and Politics in Organizations...,” p. 566.

10 On the topic of relational strategies, from a fascinating political point of view, see Strategor, *Zarządzanie firmą. Strategie Struktury Decyzje Tożsamość*, (Warszawa: 1999), p. 11.

or formalistically trivialized. Meanwhile, without understanding how politics is determined by how organizations work, it is difficult to speak of any meaningful practical examination or explanation of politics.¹¹ Political parties, institutions of legislative power, agencies and offices, state services are not impersonal aggregations of norms and statutory bonds, but living organizations that build organizational identity, produce organizational culture, create and distribute power and leadership, structure themselves and their environments, enter into autopoietic relations with themselves and their environment. They implement specific strategies of survival and development, growth and competition, entangled with the mechanisms of non-formal order auto-dynamically produced in every organization, face decisions of also moral consequences, sometimes subjected to the functionalized pathological erosions, bear particular social responsibility, serve as tools of domination or mental prisons toward their participants, clients, electorate or competitors, establish, change and implement goals. Companies legitimately force to question the effectiveness of political organizations, no less than economic organizations, their multidimensional efficiency, limited rationality, and sometimes their actual irrationality, the relationship between their results and the costs they bear and the social system they are a part of. The organizational structures of policy, similarly to organizations in general, may have the character of not only conscious human undertakings, but they also emerge in the complex historical process of becoming, producing order out of social chaos, they can be dissident structures.¹² Finally, the functions of the organization in the sphere of politics are transformations and flows, rather than a stable state of affairs. They may be interpreted as networks of activities, as

11 An example of a researcher, who seems to shudder at the idea of the Polish political science and policy being inspired by the field of organization theory, is Ryszard Skarzyński. At the same time, he uses the notion of organization in its plain sense, sometimes identifying it with the category of order. However, he does so apodictically ignoring the rich debate and relevant literature on the essence of these phenomena and trying to explain them by constructions and models developed on the basis of theoretical reflection on organization and management. Such is the impression after reading, for instance, the work rather one-sidedly inspired by social Darwinism and sociology: R. Skarzyński, *Mobilizacja polityczna* (Warszawa: 2011), and especially in the work that is more journalistic rather than scientific, the pamphlet: *Podstawowy dylemat politologii Dyscyplina nauki czy potoczna wiedza o społeczeństwie* (Warszawa: 2012).

12 See: I. Prigogine, I. Stengers, *Z chaosu ku porządkowi* (Warszawa: 1984). The concept of Prigogine inspired, among others, G. Morgan, whose work *Images of Organization* (Warszawa: 1997) is claimed to initiate the postmodern revolution in the sciences on organization and management.

social spaces that produce performatively interpreted power,¹³ they may be taken for processes, dynamically rather than statically, especially when viewed through the prism of theoretical models of organizational change and dialectical, conflicting perspectives. The organizations operating in the sphere of politics will be subject to the iron law of oligarchization, which, after all, was formulated based on the research on the German social democracy and, according to the thesis of the author R. Michels, works with regard to all organizations; wherever there will be a need for professional power and in a way commensurate with the lack of professional competence in terms of the power of the subjects.¹⁴

Learning about these aspects of policy does not only lead to simplified perceptions, inadequate descriptions, and explanations. It also has a particular ideological dimension. It is a mechanism for legitimizing certain relations of domination, economic rule, and ideological hegemony. Suppose political science is to have the ability to analyze political reality critically. In that case, it cannot do without the tools provided by the sciences on organization, especially sociology and anthropology of organization, the theory of organization and management. The history of political reflection proves that it is not an easy matter. Policy, state power, has always tended toward a kind of sacralization, a legitimizing mythologization, the sense of which was to make sure that the subjects of a given power did not come to question its right to give orders and to look for alternatives to it and the social system it guaranteed. Reflections on politics have always been attached to the legitimizing chariots; to some extent, this is inevitable and understandable, but a reflection reduced to such functions always loses its expansive abilities and cognitive potential, which require the necessary ability to question reality and critical thinking.

Emphasizing the importance of the organizational dimension of politics should not lead to certain sometimes observable simplifications. Sometimes there occur simple attempts at transferring to public organizations heuristic schemes and practical hints derived directly from the business management's achievements, as is the case, for example, in some incarnations of the so-called *New Public Management*. On the one hand, it is conducive when modern management methods are introduced to the often stiffened, routinized structures

13 The concepts of organization as network of activities are presented in: B. Czarniawska, *Trochę inna teoria organizacji. Organizowanie jako konstrukcja sieci działań* (Warszawa: 2010). It also includes the analysis of the performative nature of power in organizations, see pp. 48–58 among others.

14 R. Michels, "Oligarchiczne tendencje organizacji," in: *Władza i społeczeństwo*, chosen and edited by J. Szczupaczyński (Warszawa: 1995).

of public administration, government agencies, etc. Besides, in contrast to the American tradition, the European tradition of organizing and management studies has emphasized the universal character of the theory of organization from the beginning. On the other hand, however, it sometimes happens that the preference for business models of management in the public sphere is connected with underestimating its qualitative separateness even in the conditions of the market economy or directly with an attempt to privatize this sphere, its commercial appropriation, subjecting it to the logic of commodity fetish under good-looking banners of seeking efficiency. It may be characteristic in this respect to treat public organizations as service providers and citizens as customers. The aim of this is to foster an orientation towards efficiency and satisfaction of needs. However, on the other hand, it reduced the relationship between the power and citizen to a simple market transaction. Meanwhile, a citizen is not only a customer but a political subject, a sovereign, a creator of the power and not only a consumer of its services. It is a separate subject in itself, but it is worth mentioning it at this point.¹⁵

As mentioned earlier, LaPalombara, highlights the distinctions between a public and private organization in slightly different aspects.¹⁶ He emphasizes, among other things, the more remarkable, in his opinion immanently, the effectiveness of the private sector. He indicates some of the characteristics of public organizations, which in turn are their constitutive characteristics. Public organizations have a normative character, to a much greater extent than private ones, while efficiency and usefulness are commercial organizations' philosophy. Public organizations are inevitably entangled in Easton's authoritative distribution of values, which will always result in conflicts of interest and rationale, disputes not only about goals but also about the ways of achieving them. Simple rational logic

15 On this subject, see works presenting various points of view inspired by the achievements of the legal sciences, including the history of political and legal doctrines, the sciences of administration, economics, management sciences or political science, among others: H. Izdebski, "Nowe kierunki zarządzania publicznego a współczesne kierunki myśli polityczno – prawnej," in: A. Bosiacki, H. Izdebski, A. Nelicki, I. Zachariasz, *Nowe zarządzanie publiczne i public governance w Polsce i Europie*, (Warszawa: 2010), J. Hausner, *Zarządzanie publiczne* (Warszawa: 2008), especially chapter I, B. Kożuch, *Zarządzanie publiczne* (Warszawa: 2004), *Zarządzanie publiczne – elementy teorii i praktyki*, ed. A. Frączkiewicz-Wronka (Katowice: 2009), M. Zawicki, *Nowe zarządzanie publiczne*, (Warszawa: 2011), G. Rydlewski, *Rządzenie w świecie megazmian*, (Warszawa: 2009).

16 LaPalombara, "Power and Politics in Organizations..."

will not work in this situation. Public organizations must respect the political context. If something is even rational, yet there is no proper political approval, it will probably not be undertaken, for fear of the institution's political bankruptcy or its management. The division into those who formulate goals and their executors is not as clear in public institutions as in the relationship between shareholders "owners" and management. The division into those who formulate goals and their executors is not as clear in public institutions as in the relationship between shareholders "owners" and management. Furthermore, also this relationship is not as straightforward as it sometimes seems to some people, but it can be interpreted very differently from the perspective of corporate theory and corporate governance models.¹⁷ In various ways, the possibilities for policy-making by seemingly executive regulated staff are certainly no less in the public than in the private sector. Moreover, in each of these spheres, the advantage of knowledge and information will be on the direct managers' side.

Other characteristics of public sector organizations that determine their uniqueness include, among other things: more comprehensive, multidimensional activity, a multitude of goals that are sometimes clearly divergent, on the one hand, limited responsibility, its unclear criteria, and on the other hand – sensitivity to pressure from many sources, party entanglement and, at the same time, "over-regulation," normative shackle and, in this sense, much greater responsibility and lack of autonomy in comparison to the business organization sector. The limitation of autonomy is also expressed in the external definition of objectives (at least for bureaucratic organizations, offices, agencies, etc.), a generally strong dependence on resource holders external to the organization, especially regarding organizations financed by the budget. As a result of these circumstances, autonomy and the initiative of managers of public organizations are significantly reduced, while opportunistic, businesslike, clientelist and loyalty attitudes are strengthened at the expense of creativity. By nature, public organizations would be more susceptible to conservatism, attachment to tradition, cultural caching and selecting innovations, and finally, to dominate the organization's goals by the interests of its leaders and the current coalitions of

17 See, e.g.: T. Gruszecki, *Współczesne teorie przedsiębiorstwa* (Warszawa: 2002), J. Miroński, *Zarys teorii przedsiębiorstwa opartej na władzy* (Warszawa: 2004), W. Piotrowski, *Gry i interesy w teorii organizacji i zarządzania* (Warszawa: 1990), M. Jarzemowska, *Nadzór korporacyjny* (Warszawa: 2002), S. Rudolf, T. Janusz, D. Stos, P. Urbanek, *Efektywny nadzór korporacyjny*, (Warszawa: 2002), B. Wawrzyniak, "Nadzór korporacyjny – perspektywy badawcze," in: *Krytyczna teoria organizacji Wybór zagadnień*, ed. W. Kieżun, (Warszawa: 2004).

power and interest. Also, susceptibility to political games, politicking, various power tenders and scarce resources will generally be more significant in these organizations.¹⁸

These are only some exemplary organizational preconditions differentiating the functioning of public organizations from the private ones, especially those of a business nature. However, these examples clearly show how vital and productive the “organizatological” perspective can and should be in the research on them, how crucial the organizational dimension of politics is.

The political dimension of organizations

The relationship described earlier may be reversed in a way. Just as politics has an organizational character, so organizations have a political dimension. The interpretation of this dimension of organizations would depend on the understanding of politics and politicalness. Should we adopt a broader understanding of politics, if we do not reduce it to the problem of state power, as it is still sometimes done traditionally, then in a broad sense the political nature of organizations will manifest, for instance: in the struggle for power in the organization and in its exercise and transfer, in the mechanisms of organizational power alteration, in the contradictions and conflicts of interest of different segments of organizational systems and their articulation, in the relations between different organizational stakeholders, in games fought for scarce resources and accompanying the creation of organizational strategies, in the organization's relations with other organizations and its environment, in its interferences with the social supersystem to which it belongs, in the processes of homeostasis of the organization, in the relations between power and ownership in the socioeconomic sense, including the mechanisms of corporate governance, in the understanding of the organization as a political system or a tool of domination. In the literature on the sociology of organization and management, we may find an exciting line of reflection on political phenomena in the world of organizations, sometimes resulting from

18 Cf. LaPalombara, “Power and Politics in Organizations...” and, for instance, B. Guy Peters, *Administracja w systemie politycznym* (Warszawa: 1999) for a broader analysis of the problem. In the Polish literature on the subject, the critical analysis of public administration from the perspective of the sciences of management organization has for years been dealt with by W. Kieżun – see: “Transformacja administracji publicznej /1990 – 1999/ w świetle teorii organizacji i zarządzania,” in: *Krytyczna teoria organizacji...*, Kieżun published a lot of interesting material on this subject on his website www.witoldkiezun.com.

the research work of the political scientists who shifted their interests from the areas traditionally explored by political science to the science of organization and management. This is despite the previously indicated tendencies of pragmatically oriented sciences of organization and management to avoid issues of power and politics in organizations, emphasizing the apolitical, technical nature of organization and management processes.

A vital contribution to research on power and politics in organizations was made by, among others, Mary Parker Follet. Her views are appreciated in management theory and psychology for her humanistic, holistic approach, although forgotten in political science, even though this was the area in which she conducted her first research, and her reflection on the issue of organization and management focused, among others, on the problem of organizational power.¹⁹ The political “breath” may be found in the works of Chester Barnard. His work managerial functions, including the analysis of leadership as a moral creation, are certainly of significance beyond the narrowly conceived field of interest of research on management.²⁰ Ch. Barnard’s output was referred to by a political scientist, a Nobel Prize winner in economics, creator of the interpretation of decision-making processes in social systems in terms of limited rationality Herbert Simon.²¹ Similarly, a political scientist is also James March. He researched organizations together with Simon. Their work entitled “Organizations” from 1958, as writes LaPalombara, “had immensely more influence in several of the social sciences other than the one (political science) in which both of these innovative scholars were trained”.²² J. LaPalombara characterizes as a political scientist also the founder of the theory of social exchange, Peter Blau, who made a significant contribution to the theory of organization and power.²³ LaPalombara emphasizes that Harold D. Laswell – the “fountainhead” in policy studies – had a significant influence on the work of Simon and March, as well as Karl Deutch, and his studies on

19 See: <http://www.follettfoundation.org/mpf.htm>, DOA: 22.05.2011.

20 As Stefan Bratkowski writes in the foreword to *Funkcje kierownicze*: “This book is as much for managers of industrial and commercial enterprises as it is for bishops and parish priests or activists of political parties and heads of state or local government administration,” Ch. I. Barnard, *Funkcje kierownicze* (Kraków: 1997), p. 7.

21 See: H.A. Simon *Podejmowanie decyzji i zarządzanie ludźmi w biznesie i administracji* (Gliwice: 2007).

22 LaPalombara, “The Underestimated Contributions...,” p. 140. In political science, the work of J. March and J. Olsen is known and appreciated: *Instytucje Organizacyjne podstawy polityki* (Warszawa: 2005).

23 LaPalombara, “The Underestimated Contributions...,” pp. 140–141.

communication and internal processes, including learning, in government organizations. Lasswell studied with Simon at the University of Chicago, his student at Yale was J. March, and Lasswell's work was inspired by Deutch. Lasswell stressed that in all organizations, people are driven by the desire for power.²⁴ Other prominent political scientists, whose ideas contributed to the development of research on organizations, were also interested in organizations' problems. In this context, J. LaPalombara includes the works of J. Pressman and A. Wildawsky, A. Panebianco, R. Mayntz, F. Schapf, among others.²⁵

The problems of power and policy in organizations were also addressed in works on sociology, psychology and organization and management theory. Many theoretical models were developed, attempting to interpret organizational policy.²⁶ It is worth mentioning here: models treating policy in organizations as an expression of management pathology, models of political games in organizations, J. Pfeffer's resourceful concept of organizational power, a concept linking the need for policy and power with the reduction of uncertainty of M. Crozier and E. Friedberg, theories comprehensively presenting organizations as complex social aggregates which are communities of different interests formed on the basis of the values of A. Etzioni, the models proposed by H. Mintzberg, including power coalition and organizational games models, the models interpreting the strategic process in organizations as a political process – theories of K. Katz and R.L. Kahn, among others, as well as the theory of strategic conditions which distinguishes M. Jo Hatch, the iterative models, including those of M. Ghertmann, the incremental concepts C. Lindblom, J. Quinn, G. Johnson, the J. Bower's resource allocation model, models of the organization's electorate not only in relation to its relationship with the environment or social responsibility, but also as an interpretation of the political essence of the organization, the comprehensive model of Strategor, the approach of organization of G. Morgan as a political system and a tool of domination. The political nature of the theory of organization and management is also attributed to the specificity of relations between organizations. J.D. Thompson pointed it out a long time ago, writing: "managing the inter-organizational relations is as political as managing a political party or

24 LaPalombara, "The Underestimated Contributions...", p. 149.

25 LaPalombara, "The Underestimated Contributions...", pp. 150–151.

26 I write more about the organizational policy models in: B. Kaczmarek, "Politologia organizacji? 'Organizatologia polityki?...' it involves references to more extensive literature.

international relations”.²⁷ The author of the book *Management and Machiavelli* A. Jay, goes much further in his findings, noticing before political science and political theory an exciting challenge to address issues that are unambiguously unresolved in the economic sciences. He writes as follows:

“Whether a tenable economic theory of business enterprise will ever be found, I do not know. And perhaps it does not matter; because I believe there is a tenable political theory of business enterprise. The new science of management is in fact only a continuation of the old art of government, and when you study management theory side by side with political theory, and management case histories side by side with political history, you realize that you are only studying two very similar branches of the same subject. Each illuminates the other.”²⁸

Various aspects of the political dimension of the organizations’ functioning were also indicated by many Polish authors, including A. K. Koźmiński, A. K. Zawisławski, K. Bolesta-Kukułka, M. Bielski, W. Piotrowski, J. Miroński.²⁹

These are only examples of threads that address policy issues in organizations inspired by a political perspective but located in theoretical reflection on organization and management. Regardless of the consequences of adopting one or another understanding of politics and politicalness, perceiving the political dimension of organizations’ functioning has several advantages. First, it shows the often-discussed realm of the organizations’ functioning and enables its better understanding. Second, it facilitates recognizing the structures of conflicting and

27 J. D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action*, (New York: 1967), p. 138, quoted in: M. Bielski, *Organizacje Istota struktury procesy*, (Łódź: 1992), p. 72

28 A. Jay, *Management and Machiavelli* (Toronto-New York-London: Bantam Books, 1968), pp. 3–4.

29 See, among others: A.K. Koźmiński, A.M. Zawisławski, *Pewność i gra. Wstęp do teorii zachowań organizacyjnych*, (Warszawa: 1982), K. Bolesta, Kukułka *Gra o władzę a gospodarka. Polska 1944 – 1991* (Warszawa: 1992), W. Piotrowski, *Gry i interesy w teorii organizacji i zarządzania*, (Warszawa: 1990), J. Miroński, *Władza i polityka w przedsiębiorstwie*, (Warszawa: 2000), J. Miroński, *Zarys teorii przedsiębiorstwa opartej na władzy*, (Warszawa: 2004), Bielski *Organizacje...*, which introduced an interesting distinction between “politicalness” and politicalness in its concept of multi-criteria evaluation of organizational effectiveness. The former referred to the bargaining position of the organization in its environment in the game for important resources, while the latter was related to the consequences of the organization’s actions on the sustainability of the social, economic and political system of which it is a part. The effectiveness understood in this way concerned not so much the interests of the organization itself as the social and economic order and the interests of the ruling class. See: Bielski *Organizacje...*, pp. 124–125.

contradictory interests hidden under the mask of apolitically and undisputed rationality, as well as the relations of domination present in organizations. Third, from a broader point of view, it contributes to a better understanding of the mechanisms of social control and ideological rule, an essential component of which are also processes taking place at an apparently non-political, organizational level, including cultural aspects, and consisting, sometimes imperceptibly, of general disciplinary practices in the macro- or mega-structural dimension, ensuring the ability of concrete, historical and contemporary systems of constraint, to reproduce.³⁰ It seems that the potentially more significant interest of political studies in the issues of power and politics in organizations could significantly influence the demystification of various ideological concepts that justify the apolitical nature of management and organizational processes.

Policy as a process of organizing social life, organization and organizing as a political problem

The considerations on the aspectual relations between the policy paradigm and the paradigm of organization may be strengthened by showing the significant character of this relevance. It is possible to try to interpret the policy as a process of organizing social life, and characterize the organization's phenomenon as constitutively, indigenously political.³¹ We will notice such a sense of these dependencies when we consider the result of the political process. It is a specified organization of social life, whether in the factual, attributed or functional-processual sense. Regardless of the motives of the political subjects, their preferences or ideas about their interests, the forms and ways they resort to in the game of realizing their needs and interests, the consequence of the political process is some kind of organization of social life, effective or not, efficient or not, ensuring the realization of one or another of social interests, to one degree or another, ensuring the ability of social wholes to survive and develop or not. Therefore, the fabrication of the organization of social life, strengthening or undermining, the change of the existing order are an objective result of the policy.

30 Cf., e.g. Morgan, *Obrazy organizacji*, M. Jo Hatch *Teoria organizacji* (Warszawa: 2002), among others, chapter 11, as well as J. Szczupaczyński, "Kultura korporacyjna jako narzędzie zarządzania i przemocy symbolicznej," in: *Metafory polityki* 3, ed. B. Kaczmarek, (Warszawa: 2005).

31 See: B. Kaczmarek, "Polityka jako proces organizacji życia społecznego," in: *Metafory polityki* 2, ed. B. Kaczmarek, (Warszawa: 2003).

At the same time, however, if we refer to T. Kotarybiński's understanding of organizations as such entities, the components of which contribute to their success and treat them as an archetype of organization and organizationally, then each organization will be a function of the part's ability to gravitate and integrate the whole. The organizational processes, the activities of organizing will be based on the ability to glue together, unite, organize link, arrange the parts in order to enable the existence of the entirety, the creation of bonds, community, unification, social system so that a new holistically understood quality may crystallize – an organization, not limited to the sum or the resultant of given parts. Such a process of integration – disintegration, deconstruction, reconstruction and construction, and “attributing sense” must involve both convergence and divergence, contradictions and conflicts of interest between parts of the whole and between the components and the whole. In turn, if we treat the policy as a process of articulation of the conflicting and contradictory interests necessary for the survival and development of society as a whole, we may see the immanent political nature of the process of organization in this sense. The same will be true if we refer to other ways of understanding policy, linking it to the need for power, to homeostasis, to the distribution and redistribution of scarce resources, to the distinction between “own and foreign,” and to understanding it as an action to unite people who are subject to political mobilization, which consists in uniting people and controlling their behavior, transforming a community of selfish organisms into a union capable of establishing a universal order using every means in the struggle against rivals.³² The sense of each of these exemplary narratives will be similar, in fact, if we refer it to the category of an organization. However, the “organizational” narrative seems to allow for finding a theoretical common denominator for those sometimes perceived as separate or alternative concepts of policy.

32 Such a concept of policy in the perspective of man as a species is being developed by Skarzyński, *Mobilizacja polityczna*. The weakness of this concept is the connection of politics and politicalness to the common order in the sense of large spaces and long time. Meanwhile, the “great space” and “long time” seem to be relative, contextual, historical, and the mechanisms of social life at the “lower” levels of its organization are in many ways similar to those in the mega- and macro-structural dimension. This does not mean, of course, not to see the importance, as it were, of the final perspective relating to the “great space” and the “long time” and the “universal order” and its vision of the “place in the space,” etc.

Management as a metaphor of policy

So, in what sense is it possible to claim that management is a metaphor of policy? Answering this question, it is worth noting the following aspects of the problem:

A metaphor understood conceptually, not rhetorically, is a tool for learning the unknown by finding similarities between what is known and what is learned or explained. Thus, if we describe policy by analogy with management, we emphasize the consequences of policy processes in organizing social reality and managing social phenomena. We show that policy does not happen on its own and its consequences are expressed in the effectiveness of management and controllability of the social system in which policy occurs. This may facilitate the use of the heuristic schemes present in the reflection on governance for policy analysis. Only then it is reasonable to ask about the effectiveness of the policy, its consequences for management in the area of strategies for the survival and development of the social system, the rationality of the use of resources and development opportunities, the efficiency of the system, the effectiveness of governance, among other things; we may similarly interpret policy culture as organizational culture, etc.. This way of presenting the issue seems to be quite obvious and can be found in many contemporary studies, e.g., on public management.

However, it seems more attractive to draw attention to another aspect of the problem. Metaphor is always an aspectual, incomplete and reducing knowledge. In the metaphorical filter, one thing is always brought to the foreground and another thing goes to the background. The former secondary feature is raised to the level of the phenomenon's essence, while what was considered to be the essence of the problem is shown as only its aspect. In this sense, every metaphor leads to incomplete, somehow falsified knowledge. Only the superimposition of many metaphors can give a more panoramic, multifaceted and complete picture of the examined phenomenon. The policy has specific characteristics, which are explained and brought out by the perspective of perceiving it as management. However, the policy is not reduced to management, especially when viewed technically, as an expression of an impassioned search for the rationality of human action. If this is the case, then management as a metaphor for policy clarifies it on the one hand and confounds it on the other.

Limiting complex political phenomena to the problem of governance alone characterizes various concepts of post-politics announcing the end of traditional forms of policy following the non-alternative triumph of market economy and liberal, procedural democracy. History is over. We are in an era of politics without ideology; the so-called mainstream of public discourse, also in science and political science, often seems to give the impression that it is subject to such

a way of thinking. Reflection on the structural contradictions of social systems, including those related to the control of tangible and intangible conditions for the reproduction of social life, including the contradictions and conflicts of class and para-class interests, is replaced by an analysis of electoral social engineering, image creation and political marketing. The system ceases to be the subject of critical analysis. It seems to be something obvious and impassive. Such an approach is, of course, a self-proclaimed ideological choice with an unequivocal legitimacy message. It turns political science and other social sciences into an instrument of affirmation and legitimacy of the existing order, depriving these sciences of the possibility of performing the function of criticism and changing the social and political reality. It responds to the needs of beneficiaries of the current social, economic and political system.

It is worth noting that this does not apply only to the macro and mega sphere traditionally studied by, among others, political science. It concerns the research of the world of organizations also in the micro- and meso-structural dimensions. The learning of the political aspect of organization management serves similarly to affirming the existing order as the learning of this aspect in the analysis of social phenomena at the national and global levels. The boundary is also quite fluid in the situation of the power of contemporary transnational corporations, often not only economically stronger than many states. The political consequences of corporate actions can often be more significant than those of formally political institutions in the traditional sense. This applies especially to the financial sector and many critical economic complexes, such as the armaments and security complex, the energy complex, or the corporations that operate the cyberspace. Therefore, it may be said that the management metaphor is also used to mask the political nature of the organization to hide this aspect of organizational processes and phenomena. Management as a metaphor of policy contains not only a cognitive but also an ideological message. It is an essential component of the modern mechanism of ideological rule and hegemony.

Therefore, in management studies, it is especially worth noticing the efforts of some researchers aiming to see and reveal the ideological dimension of modern management sciences and the political nature of organization management. This line of management interpretation develops within a critical paradigm. Within it, visible are political, philosophical and sociological inspirations; on the other hand, it may inspire political science and other social sciences to carry out the type of research that breaks out of affirmative patterns.

A thorough reconstruction of the key research directions developed within the critical paradigm's framework in management sciences is included in Łukasz Sułkowski's work *Epistemologia i metodologia zarządzania* (Epistemology and

Methodology of Management).³³ The author notes that there is a need for self-reflective criticism of epistemological assumptions so far treated as unshakable in the sciences of management. The critical paradigm is inspired by the achievements of the postmodern revolution in science, which took place in the management sciences back in the 1980s; the fundamental role in it was played by G. Morgan's work *Images of Organization*, in which the author uses the method of metaphors as tools for studying the world of organizations and considers the metaphor of organization as a tool of domination the key metaphor of the organization. Apart from postmodernism, the formation of the critical paradigm was also influenced by, among other things, the performative and interpretative approaches, textism, Neo-Marxism, the Frankfurt School, feminism, and a strong sociology of knowledge program.³⁴ The book by M. Alvesson and H. Willmott *Critical Management Studies* published in 1992, marks the beginning of the critical current in management studies.³⁵ According to Ł. Sułkowski, the Polish perception of the new paradigm is, so far, limited, especially in the field of economy and management studies. It may be added that such a situation is probably influenced by various historical and ideological circumstances accompanying the Polish transformation, sometimes reactive dogmatic fascination with neoliberal and neoconservative approaches among many media representatives of economic sciences, as well as the attachment of significant circles to the paradigm, which is sometimes described as "neo-positivist – functionalist – systemic". The critical current has a much stronger position in the United States, Great Britain, France and the Scandinavian countries. The last twenty years have brought a clear distinction between this approach, which has been reflected in many publications and studies, as well as in the emergence of institutional solutions that integrate and promote the critical paradigm.³⁶

The characteristic principles of the critical current are, among others:

- Including the sciences of organization and management as a tool for the ideological legitimization of the relations of domination and exploitation of

33 Ł. Sułkowski, *Epistemologia i metodologia zarządzania* (Warszawa: 2012).

34 Sułkowski, *Epistemologia i metodologia zarządzania*, pp. 161–162.

35 M. Alvesson, H. Willmott, *Critical Management Studies* (Sage, London: 1992).

36 Alvesson, H. Willmott, *Critical Management Studies*, p. 163. In the American Academy of Management, there was created a special section dealing with Critical Management Studies (CMS). In Europe, for example, a lot of material inspired by the critical paradigm is published by Ephemera Theory and Politics in Organization – <http://www.ephemerajournal.org/>.

modern capitalism, questioning the seemingly objective status of managerial practices and ways of organization, exposing the structures of interests contained in the organizational order, mechanisms of power and the apparent rationality of management;

- Expecting that critical reflection on management systems will emancipate and articulate the interests of people subjected to various forms of exploitation, domination and symbolic violence, will allow the development of people's self-awareness. This should be done by discovering the mechanisms of ideological enslavement and symbolic violence, deconstructing managerial discourse, critical analysis of language, strengthening the possibilities of self-control and autonomy of "disadvantaged" groups³⁷;
- Revealing the institutional dimension and social context of the sciences of management, the entanglements of modern science, the mechanisms of hierarchy and authority that determine the content of research and formulated conclusions and didactic programs, which are an element of symbolic violence functioning in science under the slogans of objective, impartial science; working for the hierarchization of relations within the institutional science, its formalization and elimination of actual censorship and scientific monopolies. It is emphasized that today science is not a selfless pursuit of truth but has become "a tool in the hands of political and economic decision-makers;"³⁸
- Emphasizing that management sciences and the theoretical concepts, as well as normative practical recommendations developed on their basis, serve social manipulation, perform specific ideological functions, rationalize "instrumental and alienating treatment of employees of industrial organizations". This is the face of many modern management methods such as *reengineering*, *lean management*, *Total Quality Management*. Methods promoted by the management sciences serve to reproduce ideologies and consolidate the structures of the false consciousness of employees and participants of organizations, effectively masking the real relations of domination and exploitation and preventing adequate articulation of interests of many social groups;
- Noting that globalization processes are not reduced to objective and inevitable regularities, but are also policies that realize the interests of the beneficiaries of these processes, emphasizing the role of transnational corporations in this process and the aggregations of interests they represent, exposing the "colonization of everyday life by corporations" and consumerism;

37 Sułkowski, *Epistemologia i metodologia zarządzania*, p. 164.

38 Sułkowski, *Epistemologia i metodologia zarządzania*, p. 165.

- Emphasizing the links between the social sciences, including management sciences, and power and business structures, exposing the influence, sometimes directly corrupt, of various interest groups and research funding systems on the practice of these sciences, as well as the significant role of commercial ventures, market mechanisms in this area, consulting and think-tank companies, sometimes rewarded by influential political and financial lobbyists. Showing the ongoing game of interests in the area of science, which are at stake: material resources, prestige and social authority, influence and power;
- Identifying the importance of management in contemporary capitalism, in public and private institutions; the emancipation of the interests of the management layer and the accompanying ideological articulation that fixes its power and social position. It is reflected in the management science in the form of idealizing the role of managers and managerial rationality. It is noted, “that the creators, continuators and promoters of management have built a huge system of social legitimacy of power, which includes business schools, the business publishing market, academia and lobbies centered around management”.³⁹ With this system of symbolic violence, “seemingly unquestionable assumptions and contents supporting reproduction and legitimizing power are printed into social discourse,” such as promoting the thesis that without management, the world would fall into chaos, that management is a science capable of finding objective truth, or the art of exercising power over other people.⁴⁰
- Deepening the study of individual areas undertaken by management sciences and their sub-disciplines from a critical perspective: among others, manipulative and exploitative aspects of human resources management, organizational communication, marketing, organizational culture, its totality and oppressiveness, the neo-colonial character of intercultural management in the conditions of globalization, domination contained in organizational structures, mechanisms of power and leadership or mythology of strategic management.⁴¹

While reporting on the important threads of the critical current, Ł. Sułkowski draws attention to its not entirely justified radicalism. He emphasizes the

39 Sułkowski, *Epistemologia i metodologia zarządzania*, p. 167. Sułkowski refers here to the work by N. Harding, “The Social Construction of Management,” (London: Routledge, 2003).

40 Sułkowski, *Epistemologia i metodologia zarządzania*, p. 167.

41 Sułkowski, *Epistemologia i metodologia zarządzania*, pp. 172–292.

multi-paradigmatic character of contemporary management sciences and the different interpretations of scientific criteria in contemporary epistemology. Rejection of the neo-positivist tradition, its enrichment with cultural relativism and critical paradigm does not, in his opinion, mean denial of the scientific sense of management. Instead, it opens up the possibility of analyzing the ideological functions of management and its essential social role, allows for the reflection on management to interfere with other social sciences, enables the identification of the links between science and political, economic and cultural power.⁴²

To summarize these only slightly signalized considerations, we may state that the interpretation of management as a metaphor for policy has gained strong support in the critical current. The critical deconstruction of management practiced according to the dominant and traditional paradigms enable demystifying these approaches and perceiving the profoundly political nature of contemporary management systems. It also opens up new research perspectives for political science, it may facilitate a more multidimensional interpretation of politics, the search for its real mechanisms where they are actually located, a detachment from the limitations of an approach focused mainly on formally political institutions, in fact often deprived of political significance today. It can also make it easier for the political sciences to explore the already familiar areas of social phenomena and bring together the very close and artificially “de-branded” political and management sciences. Provided, of course, that political science also develops its critical paradigm...

42 Sułkowski, *Epistemologia i metodologia zarządzania*, pp. 169–171.

PART II: Research process in political science

Tadeusz Klementewicz

Ideological dilemmas of a contemporary political scientist

1. Between ideology and science

The once announced end of history has not happened. Capitalism is rubbing against the ecological limits of its prosperity. Representative democracy is being challenged from various sides. The evolution of the world order toward multipolarity is happening. Doubts and questions arise about the future proceedings. This is why the ideological debate between liberals (and their more extreme variant – neoliberals, libertarians), social liberals, social democrats and socialists continues. Two themes prevail: The former concerns the effectiveness and developmental barriers of particular variants of capitalism, the latter – the new role of the state and its further democratization. As Geoffrey Ingham writes, “these divergent views reflect the constant political struggle over the scale and scope of the state’s role in capitalist society.”¹ The voice of the conservative national right wing is becoming increasingly loud. It dreams of reviving a power system resembling proto-fascism. This raises the question of the role of the social sciences in the situation when such disciplines are marginalized that are responsible for the formation of critical attitudes and the development of political awareness of citizens, the disclosure of the mechanisms of naturalization of the system, and at the same time the depreciation of diplomas, non-instrumental knowledge, not directly subordinated to the needs of business and a career in corporation.

The debate inspired by these questions also takes place in a subtler discourse of academic reflection. Social sciences together with philosophy are a spiritual echo of social practice. This fact explains the specificity of the social-humanistic sciences in comparison with the mathematized natural sciences and applied sciences. Serious arguments allow us to believe that mainstream social sciences are only an ideological form of social consciousness, although their representatives pretend to be the consistory virgins. The main public function of the social sciences is to neutralize the social order (which is not as gracious for everyone), of course, assuming that the constructivist thesis of social creation is true.

1 G. Ingham, *Capitalism: With a New Postscript on the Financial Crisis and Its Aftermath* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).

For if the reality of culture is in its fundamental features a social product, and the basic mechanism of its construction is the dissemination of beliefs, then the decisive issue for the shape of social facts is to effectively influence the opinions of others, that is to effectively impose a definition on a situation.²

The now greatly valued plurality of research approaches fosters this trend. It provides the internal dynamics of scientific debate in a complex community of researchers. Therefore, it would seem that thanks to the plurality of paradigms, cognitive chances will increase. But these are most often incoherent, disproportionate and even contradictory paradigms (e.g. the psychodynamic and humanistic paradigm in psychology, neoclassical economics and institutional economics). A political scientist fights on two fronts: On the one hand, he or she is expected to be open to confrontation with paradigms other than their own, but at the same time he or she should confront their own paradigm with the reality beyond their mind.³ Thus, the problem of the cognitive realism remains valid despite the postmodernization (radical subjectivization) of the humanities, ontological inflationism and conceptual relativism proclaimed by contemporary philosophers of cognition (L. Wittgenstein, J. Derrida, R. Rorty). Otherwise, science would be no different from loose speculation and “casual nonsense,” it would only create the “postmodern culture of falsehood,” as described by Maciej Soin. Leszek Kołakowski adds that:

The ability to justify oneself well only when combined with good intention (which also includes the willingness to constantly subject one’s own assumptions to testing procedures) is regarded as an important distinguishing feature of scientific morality.⁴

According to postmodernists, the contextual and situational aspects of cognitive acts entail the contextuality of both the subjects of cognition and its objects. Here, a researcher is a participant of a cognitive practice. As a concrete subject, he or she speaks the language of the discipline, the researcher uses a specific type of rationality of beliefs, learn the reality within the framework of some objectifying project, often financed from public funds. Therefore, the subject of

2 M. Soin, *Kryzys filozofii i zadanie krytycznego myślenia* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii PAN, 2017), p. 32.

3 B. Krauz-Mozer, P. Ścigaj, “Sklep z podróbkami? Podejścia badawcze i metodologie w nauce o polityce,” in: *Podejścia badawcze i metodologie w nauce o polityce*, ed. B. Krauz-Mozer, P. Ścigaj, (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2013), pp. 17–19, Z. Blok, “Drogi poszukiwania tożsamości nauki o polityce,” *Przegląd Polityczny* 2013/4.

4 L. Kołakowski, “Prawda i prawdomówność jako wartość kultury,” in: L. Kołakowski, *Kultura i fetysze. Zbiór rozpraw*, (Warszawa: PWN, 1967), p. 203.

cognition is only a correlate of the cognitive activity of a political scientist, aimed to be understood within a specialized cognitive practice. This, in turn, always constitutes only a link between human struggle with the matter of nature and the dependence of one's own existence on a concrete historical unity of life and work. A cognitive situation, therefore, has many aspects: Not only epistemic and linguistic, but also social psychological, ideological and historical.⁵ However:

Without the concept of truth, neither language, nor thought is possible. Although, on the one hand, conformity to facts is a prerequisite for the truthfulness of a sentence, on the other hand, it is in true statements that the (descriptive) meaning of words is established.⁶

Here, we adopt Althusser's characteristic of ideology as a system of "imaginary" representations of the real living conditions in which individuals find themselves as subjects of social life. In the ideological image of the individual's place in society, the practical function prevails over the cognitive (theoretical) function.⁷ These representations are widespread, internalized beliefs (conceptual categories, values, ideals, myths, practical solutions) fixed in morals, religions, philosophies, laws, political doctrines, pop culture, common thinking. As conventional wisdom, they control the actions of people in the economy, in public life, in cultural activity, in the perception of the social world. An analogous role is played by cultural modelling of behaviors, creating social bonds and a sense of identity in the concept of social system described by Talcott Parsons.

We understand the role of ideology only when we try to describe how a social whole consisting of the economy, the state, various forms of spiritual culture functions, embedded in some local ecosystem. In order for an individual to be able to take on the roles envisaged in the **conditions** of a certain division of labor and division of social wealth, these conditions in his spontaneous mental image of the social world must be registered, experienced, "recognized." Recognized in a specific logic of colloquial thinking, precisely. This is because the assumptions about the construction of the social world in colloquial thinking are unarticulated, *unconscious*. These assumptions create a mental structure that is imposed on individuals beyond their knowledge, in order for them to accept their social status and fulfill their "autonomous" role, to willingly "march" along the paths of reproduction of basic social relations, especially the processes of management.

5 B. Tuchańska, *Dlaczego prawda? Prawda jako wartość w sztuce, nauce i codzienności* (Warszawa: Poltext, 2012), pp. 220-223.

6 Soin, *Kryzys filozofii...*, p. 91.

7 L. Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. A. Lane, (The Penguin Press, 1969), p. 231.

For the common consciousness, the social world is **seemingly** cognitive and transparent, which encourages a sense of obviousness. By contrast, opaque to common consciousness is the world of politics. This comprises the phenomena of power, the mechanism of parliamentary democracy, the sources of social wealth, the geopolitical game of the powers, the division of labor between politicians, experts and the bureaucracy. As David Ost states:

The opacity of power is probably capitalism's leading political asset since it creates a fragmented opposition, with every one proposing a different enemy said to be responsible for whatever mess people may find themselves in.⁸

Thanks to ideology, people perceive their place in the world and in history in a specific way. However, what prevails in this image is not so much people's attitude to the conditions of their existence as the way they experience that attitude, which implies both the real and the experienced, imaginary relationship. Therefore, we deal here with the unity of the real and imagined attitude of people toward the real conditions of their social and historical existence. This consists in the fact that "the real relation is inevitably invested in the imaginary relation, a relation that *expresses a will* (conservative, conformist, reformist or revolutionary), a hope or a nostalgia, rather than describing a reality."⁹ While the diversification of the ideological images specific to various social classes is the result of the contradictions present in every social practice (especially the economic one). Ideology embraces these contradictions because it establishes a specific order of domination and subordination that is beneficial to the economically ruling class. It embraces them in such a way that it adapts the notions of the legitimacy of the prevailing social order, so that its attitude to the world may seem "real," right and justified.

In the currently ruling liberal ideology, which draws the ontology of the present day, the discussed *salto mortale* looks as follows. It proclaims the narrative of modernity, in which individuals can simultaneously experience freedom, equality, and be rational at the same time. This is done through market exchange and the market logic of production, in which each of the individuals may take up their chosen field of entrepreneurship or employment (economic freedom), they may enter into purchase and sale transactions (also as the owner of *ergodynamis*) without discrimination (equality of contracts, contracts). On this basis, in accordance with the logic of production, each entity acts rationally as a

8 D. Ost, *The Defeat of "Solidarity." Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe* (Ithaca-London: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 22.

9 L. Althusser, *For Marx*, p. 234.

producer, a consumer, as it maximizes the benefits from its resources (the homo oeconomicus rationality principle). The praxeological principle applies here: to obtain the greatest effect from the owned resources in conditions of competition with others. They are also equal and free in their efforts to satisfy their needs. Then the pool of utility values increases. The market exchange of resources held by individuals increases the prosperity of all: Both the princes and merchants, or generally – citizens; it guarantees them legal and political equality in the public sphere, that is, in the market. This field has been ideologically managed by the social engineering of equal opportunities, which effectively operates the “superstition of equality”: from rags to riches. But this is only a reference plane for the actual relations between the participants in the economic practice of society. For where did the exploitation of native villagers, the exploitation of colonial peoples, protectionism in trade come from?

However, every citizen is nowadays either a manager, a worker, or maybe a pensioner, a preacher or a homeless person. But also a Pole or a Syrian, an African or an Asian. Therefore people in the actual management processes are not equal. Some can control the working conditions of others, because they own machines, buildings or resources of monetary capital. They can purchase the necessary raw materials and work of others, treated as goods purchased on the market. The market then is only a mechanism of work coordination, where products, as well as nature and workers’ labor force, become goods. They are also free, but from other “production factors.” Living from the work of their own hands and minds, they have the liberty of choosing their employer, as they have their workforce as a commodity. This guarantees legal order. After all, every good and every service can become a commodity – health, education, consumer preferences, wet forest, cultural heritage of nations. Then, the market economy turns into a capitalist economy based on the exploitation of labor reduced to the role of a commodity. In such a situation prevails the logic of capital accumulation, net profit accumulation, “abstract wealth,” multiplied endlessly regardless of external costs. These may violate social cohesion, destroy the global ecosystem, or inhibit cultural development. An employee may change their employer, but not the class to which they belong. Ultimately, they only reproduce their own workforce. On the other hand, the owner of the monetary, productive, commercial capital, may further increase his social power resources. It ultimately leads to the single-sided power of capital, the power of corporations over the labor classes forced to sell their ergodynamis, over their working and pay conditions, as well as over the direct disposers of state instruments. In this way, freedom is transformed into domination, equality into exploitation, and economic rationality into the destruction of the social fabric and balance of the biosphere. The permanence of

the social order is therefore sustained by the functional necessity of the means of consumption, which are forced by those with only ergodynamis and by the logic of capital accumulation (“the capitalists earn as much as they spend”). The economic, political and legal aspects of the functioning of the social whole cannot be separated here. Only an integral analysis is possible, combining the categorical economy, state and democracy, ideology and culture into a coherent system. Such analysis is possible on the basis of political economy or macrosociology. What are, can and should be the public functions of political scientists in this situation?

Theoretical cognition in social sciences is embedded in the ideological perspective of various social classes. It is formed as a tool to explain the structure and dynamics of the social world and the collective fate and individual biographies running in specific *Homo sapiens* communities. Visible is, for instance, the fundamental difference in terms of labor relations. It is a question of whether we view it from the point of view of power and labor control or, on the contrary, as in the economy of transaction costs. In its view, the aim is not only to ensure profitability in a market full of competitors, but also to increase the total value of the contract, which is beneficial for all parties: Managers, equity holders and all employees.

Thus, for classical and neoclassical economists, the basis for the approach to management is the $C \rightarrow M \rightarrow C$ scheme (commodity – money – commodity), i.e., generating utility values under conditions of free competition and free trade. Thanks to the price mechanism, efficient markets lead to an optimal allocation of resources, which may create an overall balance and increase social welfare. All that provided that the state does not distort the “natural” process of market regulation. The value of goods is determined by the usefulness subjectively assessed by the consumer. In this case, economy is a practical science, useful for those who have capital-value in various forms. It tells them how to achieve the highest possible return on capital, and now how to maximize “shareholder value” through stock market capitalization. The power of the corporation, which is a direct result of the oligopolization of the economy, is disappearing somewhere. Despite the various “ownership rights,” economic ownership relations are absent, and with them the basic relationship between capital and labor. As a consequence, it does not matter that some enter the “free competition” with great assets and income, and others are revenged by “the weapon of mathematical extermination” in the form of tests that involve the use of artificial intelligence for work.¹⁰ Work is

10 See more in: Cathy O’Neil, *Broń matematycznej zagłady. Jak algorytmy zwiększają nierówności i zagrażają demokracji*, trans. M. Zieliński, (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2017).

just a “supply factor,” the resource-fictitious commodity in the language of Karl Polanyi. All in all, the market here is not constructed historically and socially, it does not depend on social institutions or organizations. It is a gift from heaven to an entrepreneurial individual.

The partiality of the social sciences is plainly visible here. When researchers accept the perspective of capital owners, then they actually maintain a social world picture that is beneficial to legitimacy needs. They naturalize the System, but paradoxically, this fact is considered axiologically neutral. It is only theoretical logic that dictates opinions, judgments about the “natural” principles of the social system. Whereas, a researcher becomes ideologically invested when he or she adopts the perspective of ergodynamis owners. He or she is allowed to do less, because of being biased, obstinate, he or she has lost his or her researcher’s objectivity. Therefore, the condition for the scientific nature of his or her research efforts is ideological neutrality, but, as implies in the above argument, being in fact a *tout court* commitment, although on the opposite side. The liberal canon is now regarded as ideologically neutral. The liberal canon dominates today in the deep layer of assumptions guiding research in the mainstream social sciences. This is the axiology of non-alternative free market capitalism in the corset of *global governance*. In this perspective, the only threat to democratic capitalism could be populism, the national right and global terrorism at most. In this narrative, the market is in charge, as it is the market that decides what is worth. The main protagonists of the drama – corporations, their boards and owners – disappear from the visible range. In this narrative, liberal capitalism is the natural order of the world, it suits the human species, and it even sets the “impassable horizon of humanity.” Rafał Woś called the Polish version of this childhood disease of liberalism “polonoliberalioza.”¹¹ According to Andrzej Walicki, it is created by a set of the following beliefs, which is widespread in scientific discourse, media and common thinking: 1) private property and the free market are sacred; 2) rhetoric of depleted human rights (civil and political, not socio-economic); 3) belief in the universal salvation of political democracy (opposition to autocracisms).¹²

11 R. Woś, *Dziecięca choroba liberalizmu* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Studio EMKA, 2014), p. 14.

12 A. Walicki, *Od projektu komunistycznego do neoliberalnej utopii* (Kraków: TAIWPN Universitas, 2013), pp. 338-339; A. Szahaj, *Neoliberalizm, turbokapitalizm, kryzys*, (Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Książka i Prasa, 2017), pp. 12-23, and also P. Dybel, *Dylematy demokracji. Kontekst polski* (Kraków: TAIWPN Universitas, 2015), pp. 187-195.

The political sciences, similarly to the rest of social sciences, remain therefore under the influence of the awareness factors embedded in the particular European culture of modernity. In terms of content, social sciences are less autonomous and sovereign.¹³ They are shaped by various “images of the world”: ideological, scientific-philosophical systems and images of the world, which are produced by common consciousness of particular classes and social states. The main reason for this is the lack of connection between the “discoveries” of the human and social sciences (including the influence of ideological, religious or secular discourses) and production techniques and technologies, new products, new therapies. These are, after all, provided by the natural and applied sciences, which embody scientific reason as “an autonomous guarantor of the legitimacy and practical usefulness of rational knowledge of the available physical reality.”¹⁴ As a consequence, social sciences do not influence people’s reasonable rationality in the basic and thus economic sphere of social life. Because only the owner of financial, commercial or productive capital knows best what kind of investment will result in the greatest return, and the employee – where to find the most beneficial employment. This leads to the separation of the rationality that governs the management processes from the practical knowledge that can be provided by social sciences, including economics.¹⁵

The sciences on politics as a type of social practice, as a form of social consciousness and as a genre of knowledge are also to provide directives for predicting the consequences of actions taken, that is, for determining the effectiveness of people’s actions in their social environment – whether they are the governors or governed. Therefore, they seek to provide more universal knowledge. To achieve this goal, political researchers must go beyond the horizon of particular cognitive perspectives, ideological images of social life. They must embrace society as a whole in order to reconstruct those contradictions and conditions to which they “respond” (or not) and which are hidden within ideology. At a deeper level of analysis, they establish the theoretical premises, i.e. the issues in which the basic meaning of a given ideology is concentrated, its problems and suggested solutions. The rationality of the cognition of humanities and the resulting narratives are therefore of a dialectic nature. On the one hand, they represent, in

13 L. Nowak, *O ukrytej jedności nauk społecznych i nauk przyrodniczych*; epistemo@main.amu.edu.pl

14 A. Motycka, *Człowiek wewnętrzny a epistème. Zbiór rozpraw i szkiców filozoficznych o nauce* (Warszawa: Eneteia, 2010), p. 138.

15 R. Karpiński, *Świadomość potoczna jako kategoria świadomości społecznej* (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Humanistyka, 1991), pp. 264–269.

a hidden (ideological-political) form, the particular interests of the classes and social states, while on the other hand, they strive for legitimacy borrowed from the sciences. This creates a vast space for public discourse, in which individual scientific and philosophical paradigms serve as a “shield and sword” for people’s reasonable rationality. They become functional for the interests of classes and large social groups, often even against the ideas of researchers. No wonder, then, that political science during the era of the Polish People’s Republic revolved around the problems of the functioning of “democracy” led by a leading force. Current political scientists rationalize the functioning of representative democracy and civil society. It is easier for them, because democracy and human rights legitimize capitalism, and therefore all of them have a significant share in the naturalization of the System. This transformation of the research field shows the ability of ideological mimicry.

2. Post-political political science?

Polish political scientists, having regained the privilege of freedom of research, removed from the field of view through a “new glass” the dynamics and consequences of the class character of the market society, i.e. the society in which work and nature are only variables in the profitability formulas of entrepreneurs. It turned out that the plurality of research paradigms was creative as long as it was immunized for inspiration by the output of “the most insightful critic of market society,” who according to A. Walicki was undoubtedly Karl Marx. When books on the energy revolution, the global tax, the consequences of the financialization of the economy, and life after neoliberal capitalism are published in the world, Polish political science still tracks “politicality” in the nooks and crannies of social life. It was done in the hope that finding the essence of the mythical “politicality” would finally solve the crisis of its identity, academic prestige and declining social significance. In the popular opinion of political scientists, the institution of the state is neutral in the sense that it is an instrumentarium for the management of social life, and access to this instrumentarium is determined by elections and citizens. In turn, the accumulated knowledge is to have practical value for civil society. Above all, it is to serve to consolidate democracy, enriched by human rights, as a model of world governance. According to Bronisław Łagowski, Polish political science once again became an ideological apparatus, only under different patronage.¹⁶ The daily duty of a political scientist

16 B. Łagowski, “Strefa partyjna,” *Przegląd*, (December 1-7, 2014).

has become handling the so-called “tellyblebledemocracy.” It is a type of political science applied immediately, in a television studio or in front of a radio microphone. The topics are suggested by journalists, who do not care about the disenchantment of the mystified political reality.

A political scientist of the “second modernity” therefore came to terms with the decline of redistribution and emancipation policies. He or she now draws inspiration from the work of social philosophers, who broaden his or her field of politics to include several areas – politics of recognition, identity, media, hegemony, lifestyle, politics of fear, etc. They tend to be particularly inspired by Carl Schmitt, the light version of Chantal Mouffe, and thus agonism. The field of research expanded to include the politics of individual emancipation understood as “the politics of self-fulfillment in a reflexive environment” and the politics as a form of representation, of “self-authorization” (U. Beck, S. Lash, A. Giddens). Previously, the highlighted issues were the role of discipline and supervision (M. Foucault), the role of violence and bi-power (Foucault, G. Agamben) or the role of symbolic violence (A. Gramsci, P. Bourdieu). For instance, political scientists recognized the fact that the “politics in the new modernity” is also a confrontation of various hegemonic projects between experts, politicians, entrepreneurs and citizens (now more citizens) without the possibility of final consent (Ch. Mouffe). It is also necessary to indicate here the concept of politics as organizing social order through deliberation or nowadays more often in the form of the tellyblebledemocracy, and a rich repertoire of ways of manipulating popular consciousness (S. Czapnik, M. Karwat, J. Kurowicki). These research perspectives have significantly broadened our view of politics.¹⁷ Currently, it is easier to accept the position that “one must see in a sovereign state not only a legal and political apparatus or disciplinary system, but also a machine of mass destruction subject to political imperatives to the highest degree,” writes Enzo Traverso.¹⁸

However, the industrial conflict disappeared from the research spectrum. Instead, a kind of socioeconomic escapism emerged. The problem of eliminating social and economic inequalities, exploitation, oppression due to family biography, gender or skin color from human relations disappeared from the agenda. Worker classes disappeared, the middle class emerged. Only David Ost reminded

17 Broader on the subject in: P. Dybel, Sz. Wróbel, *Granice polityczności. Od polityki emancypacji do polityki życia*, (Warszawa: Aletheia, 2012), and in K. Morawski, *Dyskurs, hegemonia, demokracja. Analiza krytyczna projektu demokracji radykalnej E. Laclau i Ch. Mouffe*, (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2016).

18 E. Traverso, *Historia jako pole bitwy*, trans. Ś.F. Nowicki, (Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Książka i Prasa, 2014), pp. 239–240.

sociologists that there exist classes, class wrath, furor populi.¹⁹ Ost and Lawrence Goodwyn did not have to authorize themselves with the new elites. Without hesitation, they demythologized the role of the intelligentsia's "national tribunes," which, like Pilate, condemned the working class to shock therapy. The therapy soon turned out to be a neoliberal transformation. The most deceiving of the opposition intellectuals was the paternalistic attitude of the Polish intelligentsia towards the working classes and the conviction of the mission of leadership in defining national strategy; the conviction that the intelligentsia is the "custodian of community identity."²⁰

The mainstream research strategy ignores the fact that the political scene continues to rise on the pillars of capitalist society. The functional imperative to which this society is subjected is the compulsion to self-multiply values, an "abstract surplus." In various ways, in various institutional forms and with various influences, including symbolic coercion, the state performs its part of the task in the social system. The functions of the state, the final result of politics, may only be learnt indirectly by analyzing the structure of income distribution, the range of social power (economic power, political influence, disseminated ideology) of the holders of different capital. This point of view also does not appear in the otherwise lively debate on the evolution of the governance process, on the transition from governance to co-government, on the transition to new public governance and to global governance. In this debate, the voice of political scientists themselves (B. Jessop, J. Rosenau, G. Peters, in Poland A. Antoszewski, J. Osiński, G. Rydlewski, J. Itrich-Drabarek) sounds relatively quiet, although gradually gaining strength. Jerzy Hausner sees a huge arena for developing the creativity of the state. In his opinion, the repertoire of the state's tasks includes the following functions: regulatory, control, strategic, adaptive, orderly and operational.²¹ Joachim Osiński also sees the need for states to work together to deal with "the seeming omnipotence of markets and corporations."²² A new political economy is emerging as a subset of institutional economics, limited to the study of "interactions between political institutions, economic institutions and the behavior of individual social groups, from the political class to entrepreneurs and

19 D. Ost, *The Defeat of "Solidarity"*, p. 22.

20 For more on this subject, see: M. Siermiński, *Dekada przelomu. Polska lewica opozycyjna 1968-1980*, (Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Książka i Prasa, 2016), p. 57.

21 J. Hausner, *Zarządzanie publiczne*, (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, 2008).

22 J. Osiński, *Państwo w warunkach globalnego kryzysu ekonomicznego. Przyczynek do teorii państwa*, (Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, 2017), p. 321.

ordinary consumers.”²³ Economists, in their reflection on the state, are guided by the maxim: *more steering – less rowing*. The state should be limited to *steering*, while rowing should be left to other entities.²⁴ On the basis of the search for the higher “quality of governance,” new research orientations were developed, even with claims to independence, such as, for instance, the idea of neo-liberals – the science of public policies. In practice, they continue the research program of the theory of public choice, with its individualism, the assumption of the domination of egoistic advantages and the conviction of the genetic defect of the state, called “incapacity.”

The socio-economic escapism leads to breaking with the best traditions of the integral analysis of politics. Instead, the research field of contemporary political science is fragmented into separate fields, well isolated from neighboring specialties (political systems, political thought, international relations, political philosophy, etc.). This weakens the connections with the achievements of political economics, macrosociology or macro history. Polish political scientists let themselves be beaten by the economists (T. Kowalik, G. Kołodko, J. Hausner, J. Wilkin, G. Konat) and sociologists (J. Tittenbrun, J. Sowa, K. Jasiński, J. Urbański, K. Pobłocki) and lawyer David Sześciło. Fortunately, there appeared works restoring to the bloodstream of Polish political science the perspective of analyses of the state as a committed steersman or constructor of social order, especially the regulatory (now rather deregulatory) order of economy.²⁵ The criterion

- 23 J. Falkowski, “Siła i słabość państwa w nowej ekonomii politycznej,” in: *Jakość rządzenia w Polsce. Jak ją badać, monitorować i poprawiać?*, ed. J. Wilkin, (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, 2013), p. 39, and A. Kargol-Wasiluk, “Ewolucja sfery publicznej – prolegomena do rozważań teoretycznych,” in: *Jakość rządzenia w Polsce. Jak ją badać, monitorować i poprawiać?*, ed. J. Wilkin, (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, 2013), pp. 98-119.
- 24 See, e.g.: R.A.W. Rhodes, “Nowe współzarządzanie publiczne: rządzenie bez rządu,” *Zarządzanie Publiczne*, 2010/4, pp. 101-118, and V. Tanzi, *Government versus Markets: The Changing Economic Role of the State*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 32.
- 25 Let us indicate, for instance: S. Czapnik, *Władza, media i pieniądze. Amerykańska ekonomia polityczna komunikowania*, (Opole: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, 2014); F. Ilkowski, *Imperializm kapitalistyczny we współczesnych ujęciach teoretycznych*, (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2015); B. Kaczmarek, “Polityka jako proces organizacji życia społecznego,” in: *Metafory polityki*, II, ed. B. Kaczmarek, (Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, 2003); M. Karwat, *O karykaturze polityki*, (Warszawa: Warszawskie Wydawnictwo Literackie MUZA, 2012); T. Klementewicz, *Stawka większa niż rynek. U źródeł stagnacji kapitalizmu bez granic*, (Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Książka i Prasa, 2015); *Marksowskie inspiracje*

for choosing a paradigm The criterion for choosing a paradigm should also be its usefulness in diagnosing and shaping a far-reaching strategy for the development of the researcher's national community and even the general public.

3. Engagement and research objectivism

The axiological engagement of a social researcher has become the subject of a debate between Michael Burawoy and Piotr Sztompka on public sociology. The division of tasks (and orders) of the representative of social sciences extends here between the naturalization of the prevailing order and social criticism. The ideological stamp is imprinted on research schools as well as on the work of individual researchers. Civil society, the free market, representative democracy, the middle class – are these theoretical categories or ideological clichés that silence colloquial thinking? The crisis of the hegemony of neoliberalism and the disgraceful role of economists in its triumph raised the question of the axiology of this profession anew. The practice of value-free research does not usually prevent the political “vocation.” After all, Max Weber, as a German nationalist, was unscrupulously inclined towards Realpolitik. The ideology of the profession itself is not enough in the face of the challenges that the system with an increasing number of farmers without land, businesses without workers and companies without factories or laborers.

The functions of social disciplines nowadays, as in the past, come down to answering the question of how to serve the gods of this world. And those may constitute classes, nations, mankind. The problem is that, unlike an ideologist, a researcher – when standing on the side of solidarity (i.e. on the side of a certain axiology) – must also maintain a research objectivity. Otherwise, the researcher's help would be useless, decorative. Here we are dealing with the thin line between reliable thought as a “light” in the way of action and thought as a “weapon” in hegemonic class struggles. As Alexandre Koyré writes:

For them thought is not a light but a weapon: its function, they say, is not to discover reality as it is, but to change and transform it with the purpose of

w badaniach polityki, ed. A. Laska, (Warszawa: 2013); F. Pierzchalski, *Morfogeneza przywództwa politycznego. Pomiędzy strukturą a podmiotowością sprawczą*, (Bydgoszcz: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego, 2013); D. Sześciło, *Samoobsługowe państwo dobrobytu. Czy obywatelska koprodukcja uratuje usługi publiczne*, (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, 2015). See also: *Politologii model krytyczny*, ed. M. Mikołajczyk i M. Karwat, (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego, 2017).

leading us towards what is not. Such being the case, myth is better than science and rhetoric that works on the passions preferable to proof that appeals to the intellect.²⁶

The reform projects recommended to people living in a given society must be socially effective. Thus, they should not only mobilize the will to act, but above all indicate the means of action. These should be the means that allow an actor to overcome the resistance of an institutional system, whether economic, political or cultural, which indicates the necessary, favorable or unfavorable conditions for maintaining, and often changing, the institutional framework of the socio-historical existence of a given community of life and work. In fact, the practical role of a researcher comes down to indicating the importance which certain phenomena and processes of the social and natural world have for the biological and social existence of people, for their material and spiritual needs, for their common activity. In brief, a scholar must consider both values, goods for their livelihood and cultural needs, and antipathetic values, negative values that make it difficult, or even impossible, to meet individual and collective needs. Knowledge, which is the rational basis of practical directives, can have the cognitive status that all theses about reality have. It may be unreliable, adequate and justified theoretically or empirically. It is distinguished only by its content, because it concerns the relations and mutual dependencies between the properties of the natural world and the human world and the causative features of subjects living and operating in both these worlds.²⁷ An additional obstacle is the mediated nature of the main determinants of the collective fate of people. Deep causes and conditions of the directly observed phenomena influence through other phenomena and processes. The most important are especially those that are beyond the reach of individual's will and influence, which go beyond their life experiences. This creates opportunities to mystify the social world of man and his place in it. To exemplify, the causes of disparities in development between various regions of the world are invisible to the naked eye. In order to capture them, the knowledge of the dependent development or the capitalist economy-world are necessary, as well as historical knowledge about the evolution of this economy to date. The objects of the mystified images in the common consciousness are the

26 A. Koyré, "Reflexions sur le mensonge," *Renaissance* 1, (1943). Quoted in J. Derrida, "History of the Lie: Prolegomena," *Without Alibi*, ed. and trans. P. Kamuf, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002) p. 60.

27 Broader on the subject in: S. Kozyr-Kowalski, *Struktura gospodarcza i formacja społeczeństwa*, (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1988), pp. 673-679, and S. Opara, *Tyrania złudzeń. Studia z filozofii polityki*, (Warszawa: MUZA, 2009), pp. 54-63.

classes (especially the blessed who “create jobs”), the state as the creator of the “common good,” the nation as a great family, the historical role of individuals and events in the collective fate of the nation (J. Piłsudski as the founder of state independence).

The first dilemma concern whose needs, interests and values a political scientist should identify with. The conditions of realization of specific practical goals are then inscribed in the catalog of research questions, and these then guide the researcher’s practice. After choosing the research problem, further stages of research must follow the rules of artistry, though. This is a condition for obtaining practical qualities. Every science, at least potentially, provides practical knowledge, i.e. information facilitating the resolution of decision-making dilemmas. A political scientist acts here as a quasi-researcher and quasi-expert.²⁸ Various identifications may be involved. Are the research tasks to determine the needs for the duration and development of a nation as an ethno-cultural community? Or should the focus be on the needs of the great collectives into which each community of life and work is divided, i.e. a society with a specific economy, spiritual culture, and a particular local ecosystem? The community of people working together to sustain and improve the satisfaction of their material and cultural needs (and all others) constitutes, in fact, a “community of communities”: class communities emerging in the division of labor, property, religious, cultural, moral, ideological, and social communities. In turn, each of these communities has its own particular interests. In the economy, these will be the holders of various types of capital, both the owner of ergodynamis and the manager who employs or manages them. In this case, the political scientist must consider whether to support the bank economist and how to legitimize free market capitalism, or rather to take into consideration the needs for emancipation and social advancement of the working classes, their solidarity-based empowerment. However, these are always perspectives of partial and particular rationality. It maximizes, at most, the needs of a particular class, a minority or majority ethno-cultural community.

As far as the needs of different minorities are concerned, the practical goal may be, for instance, creating a public space in which citizens of various cultural identities meet. Currently, it is mainly about the needs of Europeans of Muslim origins. Their needs are the possibility to preserve their own customs (dress, prayer, halal food) in the workplace and in the streets. Conflict, discord and fear

28 On the subject see: Ł. Młyńczyk, “Politolog w ‘sporze’ z metodą. Quasi-badacz a quasi-ekspert,” *Atheneum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne*, 2013/39.

are inscribed in the democratic public space. Their solution requires consensus and empathy, understanding and respect for the otherness of the Other.²⁹ To take such a particular point of view into account requires the political scientist to overcome Eurocentrism, and to be very resistant to the widespread stereotypes that are mainly spread by the media and politicians.

But a researcher can identify with the interests and values of the entire community of life and work, that is to operate at the level of the social whole. He or she then adopts the point of view of overall social rationality. At that point, prevailing social order is the chosen criterion. The dilemma arises as to whether to rationalize this order using a discursive *instrumentarium*, or rather to seek alternative forms of social organization, if it gives rise to dysfunctional states. In the former case, we will be dealing with European universalism, with its democracy, with human rights, freedom, with sacred ownership rights. It is the academia, not international journals, that has so far been the site of a pluralistic debate on national strategy, interpretation of tradition, diagnosis of opportunities and threats in the face of the existing development trends in the economy and man's relations with the environment, the consequences of exuberant consumerism, evolution towards a multipolar world-system, ways of arranging relations with neighbors. It is very doubtful whether the "Dubaiization" of Polish science and the Anglicization of the humanities is the right answer to these needs.

An additional argument in favor of the representation of overall social rationality by a scholar is the system of rewards attributed for learning. Those scientists who work at public universities are financed by Polish taxpayers. These taxes are paid by Poles with the lowest incomes. This is evidenced in the fact that majority of people pay the flat-rate tax of 19 %. The second and highest tax threshold in Poland exceeds 2.14 % of taxpayers, while 60 % of employees earn income below the national average, sometimes twice less than that. The income from PIT does not exceed 2 % of GDP. It is therefore "capitalism without social anesthesia," as Przemysław Wielgosz puts it. Another indicator is the ratio of the wage fund to companies' income. In Poland this ratio is two times lower than the EU average (and three times lower than in Scandinavia). The Polish tax system is therefore regressive. Low income is relatively more heavily taxed than high earnings.

29 Broader on the subject in: N. Göle, *Muzułmanie w Europie. Dzisiejsze kontrowersje wokół islamu*, trans. M. Ochab, (Kraków: Karakter, 2016), pp. 278-279, and A. Meddeb, *Choroba islamu*, trans. K. Marczevska, (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie SEDNO, 2017), pp. 213-215; M. Bobako, *Islamofobia jako technologia władzy. Studium z antropologii politycznej* (Kraków: TAIWPN Universitas, 2017), pp. 373-378.

But another axiology is yet still possible. It is a program of human personality development, referring to *paideia* understood as a set of “cultural patterns” formulated in the educational process, in the system of social communication. It is shaped by the whole legacy carried through speech, writing, printing.³⁰ This heritage is supposed to form such principles of social coexistence, so that they may find a properly exposed place also for people’s developmental needs. For this, it is necessary to free the existence of the Earthlings from hunger, disease, wars. To this end leads not only a fairer distribution of wealth in the countries of the center, but also the reduction of the development gap in the capitalist system-world.

An important task here is to find a common ground, the normative basis for cooperation and collaboration between people of different races, national identities, citizens of large and small countries, inhabitants of metropolises and deep provinces. It would be a process of shaping global awareness, alongside national and regional ones. At its core are the global collective goods. The axiological universe is formed by values and directives common to all the most important religious systems and ethical doctrines.³¹ In the perspective considered, the most important is the golden rule of ethics, the principle of reciprocity: *do, ut des* (I give you so that you may give me too). It lies at the basis of the social exchange, it occurs in the cases of various species, so in the case of humans it has genetic roots as well. Another natural virtue is moderation, *aurea mediocritas*. Hesyod, Laozi, Confucius, Buddha, Sophocles and Aristotle, among others, encourage us to respect it in our own lives. In the face of the depletion of natural resources, this virtue may inspire the lifestyle focused on quality. The aforementioned matters are associated with other virtues, such as adherence, prudence, conscientiousness, compliance. All of them lead to the coexistence of people free from constant conflicts, tensions, introduce predictability of reactions, increase trust. A difficult dilemma arises in relation with harmonizing equality and justice. The latter demands that inequalities in the distribution of wealth be justified by work

30 Broader on the subject in: A. Mencwel, *Wyobrażenia antropologiczne. Próby i studia*, (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2006), p. 394.

31 On the subject see: E. Lewandowski, “Konfrontacje cywilizacyjne,” *Dziś*, 2007/1, p. 95; P. Singer, *Jeden świat. Etyka globalizacji*, trans. C. Cieślakowski, (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 2006), pp. 164–165; J.M. Hobson, “Deconstructing the Eurocentric Clash of Civilizations: De-Westernising the West by Acknowledging the Dialog of Civilizations,” in: *Civilizational Identity. The Production and Reproduction of ‘Civilizations’ in International Relations*, ed. M. Hall, P.T. Jackson, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 149.

and abilities. Another virtue is tolerance, that is, consent to attitudes other than ours. Tolerance is prompted by the realization of profound assumptions and a certain arbitrariness or particularity of one's own culture. Intellectual openness is also required. The opposite of tolerance is fanaticism, that is, a categorical conviction of the absolute rightness of one's own conduct and a desire to make others do the same. In this perspective, a researcher's task is to show the role of various fields of spiritual culture that influence the consciousness of contemporary man, especially colloquial, regional, national and cosmopolitan consciousness. This consciousness develops under the influence of ideological discourse. It is dominated by motives and slogans of neoliberalism, ideology of democracy and human rights, ecology or religious fundamentalism. The first step to liberate man from the power of this discourse is the rejection and discrediting of Hayekism, market fundamentalism, and thus the rejection of the absolutization of freedom, hyperindividualism and social Darwinism.

Further steps must aim at overcoming statophobia, especially aversion to tax progression. The needs of capital accumulation are best served by economizing the existence of the owner of the labor force, covering most spheres of their life, including family life and leisure time. Here, the ideal is a man-enterprise, whose dynamics are ensured by egocentrism, greed and consumerism. He or she must manage his or her own career, lifestyle, feelings and emotions in such a way as to appear on the market as an attractive commodity for corporations. For this, he or she must be effective, available and conformist. Since this trend is at the root of the stagnation syndrome of the current form of capitalism, it must be corrected. This is why academia cannot be subjected to business infiltration. Additionally, the growing pool of free time will create an opportunity for the development of cultural needs. The ideal was the autotelic (Kant's) ideal of humanity. The education system cannot only be subordinated to the needs of the current labor market. If a citizen is to be a subject and not an addition to a machine or computer, neither culture nor education should be in the form of an exchangeable value (commodity). Moreover, participation in culture, including high culture, can be an alternative to the consumer lifestyle.

The directory for a researcher is cognitive rationality "with a past," in the period of cognitive realism crisis. The censored turned out to be the Enlightenment mythologization of reason as a self-reliant instance, founded on a priori cognitive structures (e.g., K. Popper's critical rationalism). Truth as a regulatory idea of science must be embedded in the social, historical and cultural context. Only then can we explain why, in social life, there exist truth claims and why we demand them to be respected, especially in science. This is what gives truth an adventitious character, instead of a supra-historical or universal one, because

truth has “as many forms as the varieties and historical forms of the community practices in which it occurs.”³² Also, the relativity of scientific knowledge (as its intrinsic feature) should not be confused with cognitive relativism as the position of the philosophy of science.³³ Truth understood in this way can protect society from the ideological fire of the media, from the traps of common thinking, may provide pre-evidence for action programs.

4. Public functions of a political scientist

For the evaluation of the social functions of humanities, the question of who and for what purpose uses the knowledge accumulated by academia is important. Is it supposed to legitimize the existing social order or rather to look for reasons of its unreliability? The latter task is more difficult, but it holds seeds of greater social benefit. William A. Williams, an American reflexive historian and political scientist, points out four criteria of social utility of a social researcher. Firstly, the researcher must get to the bottom of the issues. He or she is led to this by the disclosure of the deeper hidden determinants of social life – the economy, the game and political struggle, the systemic contradictions that are masked by ideology, popular awareness and mainstream, conventional knowledge. Only the surface of social life is available to the common and ideological view. It gives an illusory sense of understanding reality without any theoretical explanation. Secondly, the researcher has to indicate new tendencies, changing the functioning of different structures of social life. Thirdly, he or she must present a hierarchy of values that is alternative to the socially shared hierarchy because it is responsible for the current causes of stagnation and developmental barriers. Finally, he or she must show the way to a structural change of the existing order, both strategic objectives and tactical alternatives to action.³⁴ He or she is supposed to be more of an exponent than a “preacher of truths,” as Tony Judt puts it.

The social function of a political scientist ultimately comes down to an attempt to actively shape public opinion through publication and participation in discursive practices. This task has become more important in a mass-mediated society, where facts are replaced by opinions and free interpretations. “The general principle of the post-modern self-awareness orders not only to depreciate alleged facts in favor of their arbitrary interpretations, but also to authenticate

32 Tuchańska, *Dlaczego prawda?...*, p. 33.

33 On the subject see: Motycka, *Człowiek wewnętrzny a epistème...*, p. 50.

34 Quoted in: R. Tilman, “Apology and Ambiguity: Adolf Berle on Corporate Power,” *Journal of Economic Issues*, Vol. 8, No. 1, (1974), pp. 111-126.

the desired interpretation as a reality by means of measures masking its arbitrariness.”³⁵ Social criticism does not have to violate research objectivity. It leads to the revelation of the axiological basis of the seemingly autonomous actions of an individual, as well as the social practices that organize and naturalize this subjectivity. These will be, above all, power discourse, relations of domination and exploitation, symbolic violence, exclusion. That is why the perspective of solitary subjectification of people in history is so important in social criticism. According to Theodor Adorno, “no cognition that is oriented toward the directly unavailable essence of society may be true, unless it wants to change it, and therefore, unless it is *evaluative*.”³⁶

We may look at the dynamics of history either through a telescope or a microscope. From the perspective of millennia, from the perspective of the relation of human and nature, the source of historical development is technology. It increases the productivity of work, enables the use of new sources of energy (currently hydrocarbons), materials, better organization of production. Under the microscope, however, history pulsates with constant attempts to improve the fate of those whose work oils the machinery of society. The catalyst of the historical dynamics are still worker’s and socio-political movements, the furor populi. They tend to intensify in the periods of structural crises. Therefore, in the political scientist’s view, an important place is still occupied by the process of creating a “community of communities” as a gradual increase of subjectivity of the subordinate classes, increase of their causality, autonomy, obtaining influence on working conditions and standard of living.

The list of problems, the analysis of which involves an axiologically modern political scientist, is long. They give rise to constant developmental tendencies in the functioning of societies subjected to the logic of capital accumulation. These problems include:

- The process of concentration of production and economic power of corporations (oligopolies, large global corporations). The research on the network of ownership links and financial flows between financial and industrial capital groups shows that 737 such entities control 80 % of other corporations. Moreover, the core composed of 147 financial groups (75 %) controls 40 % of

35 Soin, *Kryzys filozofii...*, p. 321.

36 Quoted in E. Mokrzycki, *Kryzys i schizma. Antyscjentystyczne tendencje w socjologii współczesnej*, Vol. 2 (Warszawa: PIW, 1984), p. 42.

the corporate system.³⁷ At the same time, an increasingly narrower group of shareholders owns the assets of the corporations. For example, in the United States only five people own about $\frac{1}{4}$ of the assets, which formally belong to the 500 largest American corporations.³⁸ The process of oligopolization of the economy is coupled with the financing of accumulation and offshoring. In turn, the process of financialization of the economy is responsible for the gargantuan growth of the financial sector, the devaluation of the industrial sector, the decline in investment rates and real wages and, consequently, the disproportionate distribution of social wealth. The increasingly higher demand barrier is explained by the additionally distorted circular income movement (M. Kalecki, J.M. Keynes, J. Steindl, P. Sweezy, J.B. Foster, J. Toporowski, among others, expressed their opinions on this subject). It is disturbed by the stagnant real salaries, reduced state budgets, ineffective expansive monetary policy of central banks (quantitative loosening of money) described figuratively as “pushing the string,” lack of breakthrough investments. The above-mentioned tendencies, which are the result of greedy pursuit of profit by corporations, do not create effective demand, which could move the profit machinery.

- The deepening of the “economy of innocent fraud,” as the myth of “market sovereignty” is described by John K. Galbraith.³⁹ The market does not exist in a social vacuum, it is run by major corporations. The power of corporations (international regimes, the role of seemingly multilateral agencies, which act as door-to-door corporations such as the IMF, the WTO or the WB), as well as the servitude of politicians, especially the current European Commission, are carefully concealed. This is evidenced by the mode of negotiations and the content of CETA and TTIP agreements.
- The weakening national state (a hungry tax system, the adhering to ordopolicy neoliberal Leviathan, incapacitated by “investors” and the financial markets through the public debt mechanism).
- The faulty system of power with an inefficient mechanism of representative democracy. It serves mainly, together with human rights, to legitimize

37 See: L. Dowbor, *Co to za gra? Nowe podejścia do ekonomii*, (Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Książka i Prasa, 2017), pp. 145-150, and J.B. Glattfelder, *The Network of Global Corporate Control - Revised*, www.bit.ly/pWsiEs [DOA: 21.11.2017].

38 W. Lazonick, “The Financialization of the U.S. Corporation: What Has Been Lost, and How It Can Be Regained,” *Seattle University School of Law*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (2013), p. 883, fig. 5.

39 J.K. Galbraith, *The Economics of Innocent Fraud: Truth for Our Time* (New York, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), p. 7.

the economic system. As a result, capitalism is increasingly less democratic. According to Wolfgang Streeck, instead of the categories attributed to liberal democracy, new, more precise categories should be used for the state on the drip of corporations. Thus, instead of the will of citizens there are the wishes of investors, instead of voters – creditors, instead of civil rights – contracts, and instead of public opinion – interest rates.⁴⁰ The former people, *Staatsvolk*, were replaced by *Marktvolk* – “institutional investors,” i.e., financiers, presidents known by name, board members, great managers of global banks, insurance funds, trusts, shareholders and owners of huge stakes, financial capital. As Ladislau Dowbor writes, “building the democratic processes of control and resource allocation today is a key challenge.”⁴¹ Before this happens, there will be a post-capitalist *interregnum*, according to Streeck’s term.⁴² Capitalism in the center will lose its macro-systemic steering, and at the micro level the individual strategy of “run for your lives” will prevail.

- The inscription of social sciences into legitimacy functions. A “class of servants” is recruited from the scientific community, whose mission is to neutralize the System. Currently these are mainly bank economists and their academic teachers. As Jan Kurowicki writes, “truth and other axiological gems related to the ethos of the intellectual and scholar, if he or she turns out to be useful in this service, will be used only according to the principle: *Why lie if truth is more profitable*. If, after all, this truth could harm it or deviate from the norms of political correctness, it will create more or less intellectually enticing ways to downgrade it or to disavow it completely.”⁴³ This was done by post-modernism which effectively undermined the objectivity of research and the true weight of a researcher. However, critical analysis does not deceive the audience that ultramodern research techniques ensure ideological neutrality. It maintains the enlightenment’s critical and skeptical attitude. Therefore, according to Wolfgang Streeck, there is a need for a new project of social science. Political scientists, together with sociologists and heterotoxic economists,

40 W. Streeck, *Buying Time. Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism* (Brooklyn-New York: Verso, 2014), pp. 99-105.

41 L. Dowbor, “The Corporate Capture of Democracy,” (2016): <https://dowbor.org/2016/07/ladislau-dowbor-the-corporate-capture-of-democracy-july-2016-11p.html/>.

42 W. Streeck, *How Will Capitalism End? Essays on a Failing System*, (London: Verso, 2016), p. 13.

43 J. Kurowicki, *Figury i maski w praktykach ideologicznych*, (Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Książka i Prasa, 2013), p. 150.

- should create a new socio-political economy, subordinated not to maximizing the usefulness of neoclassical economics, but to harmonizing social goals.⁴⁴
- The ideological traps set for the common people's awareness by the national right wing on the one hand and the liberals on the other. The conservative right wing refers to the concept of the nation as a great family. As a result, the workers' perspective on the social world disappears. Another trap is the civil society understood in a liberal spirit. These conglomerates of ideas create an effective wound lotion for the unemployed, self-employed, those working in special zones or those waving stormtroopers during patriotic ascensions. This way of legitimizing the social order is different from the social contract, a pick so willingly used by liberal reason.

Nowadays, a political scientist has to answer the question: which model of capitalism would help solve the global problems of technical and scientific civilization in the present form of neoliberal capitalism? Regarding the long-term structural crisis (interregnum) encountered by the capitalism without borders, there remains the debate on its further reconfiguration. It concerns such orientation of a community of life and work that will allow to maintain the parameters of sustainable development, welfare without growth, and at the same time remove the developmental disparities between the world's regions. In the new civilization of sustainable development, the corrected mechanisms of globalized capitalism must combine the efficiency of natural resources management with food and social security of all inhabitants of the Earth. The production capacities and rich scientific and research base of the civilization allow for this. The impassable parameters of the durability of biosphere corresponds to the energy revolution (transformation), suggested in many publications.⁴⁵

The main condition for this evolution will be regaining control over the state. Only the states subordinated to demos may together shape the new rules of corporate functioning in the global economic space. Reclaiming the state will require supplementing representative democracy. It will be complemented by various forms of participatory democracy, co-determination (co-production),

44 Streeck, *How Will Capitalism End?...*, p. 251.

45 On the subject see: M. Popkiewicz, *Rewolucja energetyczna. Ale po co?* (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Sonia Draga, 2015); T. Jackson, *Dobrobyt bez wzrostu. Ekonomia dla planety o ograniczonych możliwościach*, trans. M. Polakowski (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2015); R. Fücks, *Zielona rewolucja*, trans. Ś.F. Nowicki (Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Książka i Prasa, 2016).

including employee democracy. Street pressure, furor populi, in the form of social movements, including the “populist” and radical and national right-wing movements, is a necessary impulse for change.

The System’s structural crisis is a magical time when utopias become reform programs, and further they lead to a gradual socialization of the economy operating under a regime of profit logic instead of an ethic of sustainable development.

Tadeusz Klementewicz

Nothing alive is a unity. Political science as a multi-paradigmatic structure of knowledge

*“Nothing alive is a unity
The unity of the world lasts in the plurality.”*

Goethe

1. Unity of social sciences or disciplinary autarchy

The weakness of political science lies, among other things, in too strict “discipline” of its representatives, and the failure to notice its relatively low position in the logical structure of knowledge about man as a social being. The political scientist from the East wall, who fought in all ways for the position of the wisest discipline chief, reminded us of such a problem. However, the *common* understanding of the political science’s specificity issue results from a misunderstanding of the two logics of each science: practical logic, subordinate to the organization of research and didactic process, and explanatory logic, which requires referring to the general, theoretical knowledge. As Jan Woleński, the philosopher of science, writes, “the problem is not what the subject or method of discipline is but whether the acquired knowledge is represented by a set of sentences constituting a theory or not.”¹ Woleński sneeringly adds that “attempts to assign a specific object to each known discipline leads to rather grotesque results,” for then, “we could distinguish over four thousand specific aspects of the subject, and, besides, we should leave something for the future development of science.”² In such perspective, the

1 J. Woleński, “Dyscyplina naukowa a teoria naukowa,” *Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa*, No. 1–2/1981, p. 10.

2 J. Woleński, “Dyscyplina naukowa,” p. 5. W. Morawski also formulates the practical conclusion that “I consider separating the disciplines from each other, even in the slightest form, a serious mistake, which is not justified by having the so-called own research method because its definition may be broad.” W. Morawski, *Konfiguracje globalne. Struktury, agencje, instytucje* (Warszawa: 2010), p. 25. In fact, the sign of the times at universities is the combination of traditional faculties into integrated research and teaching units such as the School of Human Evolution and Social Change or the Global Institute of Sustainability, as at Arizona State University. Cf. M. M. Crow, “Nowy uniwersytet,” *Świat Nauki*, No. 11/2012, pp. 32–33.

essential and the most challenging task is to merge the knowledge dispersed in many research paradigms, additionally developed in institutional fringes of various social sciences, coherently – i.e., logically and in terms of content. Here, we deal with Wallerstein’s problem – as understood in Węsierski’s works – i.e., the problem of transdisciplinary research strategy.³ The main task of the strategy is to overcome the nineteenth-century division of social sciences into three “sovereign knowledge kingdoms,” i.e., economics, political science, and sociology. Immanuel Wallerstein in his social history program, Fernand Braudel in his global history program, and Marshall Hodgson in his studies of civilization, not to mention the classics of social research, especially Marx and Weber, struggled with the problem in question.⁴ Moreover, the problem of transdisciplinary strategy results in “a conviction in the unity of the social sciences, the value of which lay not so much in a generalized theory and a set of abstract, high-level concepts but in providing an incentive to tackle intellectual problems of the human situation, past and present, without being constrained to one field and one method.” Jack Goody, the author of such a statement, formulates a practical conclusion:

substantive problems are best dealt with not by utilizing one method or confining the discourse to one field, but by trying to pierce the heavy curtains of instituted and institutionalized boundaries and by drawing upon as wide a range of resources as are available.⁵

The evidence of the need to use a variety of information necessary to understand the political life of a given society lies in the subject scope of the politics phenomenon.

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- 3 Cf. I. Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis. An Introduction* (Durham: North Carolina University Press, 2004); M. Węsierski, *Problemy integracji wiedzy a badanie zjawisk politycznych. W stronę jedności nauki* (Warszawa: 2011). The author accurately remarks that “theoretical knowledge serves to show similarities and relations between phenomena, not to create subject barriers.” M. Węsierski, *Problemy integracji*, p. 114.
- 4 Cf. F. Braudel, *Kultura materialna, gospodarka i kapitalizm XV-XVIII wiek*, Vol. 3, especially pp. 584–587; M. G. Hodgson, *Rethinking World History. Essays on Europe, Islam and World History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 2–9, 72–95, 245–246. On the virtues and weaknesses of Marx’s socioeconomic analysis, cf. J. Schumpeter, *Kapitalizm, socjalizm, demokracja* (Warszawa: 2009), pp. 10–54. About the Weber’s research toolkit cf. S. Kozyr-Kowalski, “Weberowska socjologia religii a teoria społeczeństwa jako całości,” in: Max Weber, *Szkice z socjologii religii* (Warszawa: 1984), pp. 7–68.
- 5 J. Goody, *The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. vii.

The core of society's political life is the state. The state manages a wide range of governance instruments: it constitutes and enforces the law, collects the society's financial resources in the form of taxes or levies, it has a bureaucratic apparatus to govern with, entities that model science, education, culture – state patronage – or even bodies that regulate the functioning of the media. There are rivalry and competition between parties, social movements, interest groups representing different classes and strata, social categories, national, ethnic, religious minorities, etc., for the use of the state power instruments for general social and group purposes. Political scientists of all epochs tried to describe and understand the game and struggle between rulers and ruled happening in front of them. To do so, the scientists had to gather factual knowledge and formulate laws of science about the following aspects of the political world.

First, about the activities of various entities – individuals and collectives. We talk about activities of: a) those who currently run the state apparatus; b) those who only just apply for control of the apparatus – the opposition; c) those who effectively influence the content of governing decisions – lobbying, clientelism, corruption, political rent-seeking. The c) category includes primarily economic interest groups, third sector organizations, and media. The most recent political history deals with such an aspect of politics. The works of this sub-discipline of political science use historical sources or official documents and apply a broad procedure of causal understanding and explanation. The works in question seek to show the circumstances and causes of events on the political scene, trying to assess their historical importance and to link them with the role of the people involved, especially leaders and statisticians, patriots and pikers, cosmopolitans, and those interested only in the hut in the country.

Second, about the organizational structure of the state apparatus, the party system, and the legal and cultural norms that determine the functioning of the political system. It is a study subject of an indigenous political sub-discipline – system studies. Today, system studies grew into a dense network of even narrower specialties, limiting their interests to particular elements of the political system, including political parties, interest groups, local authority units, and local government, government administration, army and police, constitution, etc.

Third, about the forms of culture – awareness – of people participating in politics, i.e., ideologies, declared party's program options, public opinion, national, historical, class consciousness, stereotypes, myths spread in a given society. The above, in turn, is a matter of interest for researchers of political culture and public opinion, electoral sociology, the psychology of politics, and in the historical aspect – of the political thought history.

Fourth, about the values and norms of political life, which the philosophy of politics addresses. At such a level, there are disputes between supporters of classical liberalism or libertarianism and advocates of social/democratic liberalism, or the solidarity and collectivism movement. The aim is, among other things, to establish – on the basis of ethical and axiological arguments – a catalog of primary goods, to analyze the relationship between social justice and economic efficiency, or to indicate the permissible activities of the state in the field of redistribution of goods and provision of public services, especially social security. Over decades, it was a lively dispute about the minimum state versus the social, welfare or wealth state – F. von Hayek, M. Friedman, J. M. Buchanan, R. Nozick, and J. Rawls, A. Sen, and A. Walicki. The normative basis of ownership democracy, the understanding of freedom, equality – personal and political rights – justice – fundamental economic and social rights, the permissible extent of income and property inequality, the acceptable extent of relative poverty and social exclusion – the scope of social intervention of the state, and the creation of human capital – education, research and health care – the extent of the burden of taxes and social benefits, the importance of the quality of public institutions for social welfare were also the subject of non-conclusive debates. An essential axiological premise for such specific evaluation analyses is the ideas of the individual's dignity and dignified society, especially as a basis for the limitations of market regulation of social life. At such level, we consider the ethical challenges of global poverty and development disparities, the fair distribution of the costs and benefits of globalization, the range of solidarity of a wealthy society member with those “who have trouble getting enough to eat, clean water to drink, shelter from the elements, and basic health care.”⁶ The above is the domain of globalization ethics – P. Singer, A. Sen, J. Stiglitz, J. Ziegler.

Fifth, about the means and methods of political action. Several sub-disciplines more or less systematically study the social techniques of governance and influence: political marketing, mass communication, sociology of law, political language, public discourse, manipulative techniques, the role of non-violent techniques such as civil disobedience, etc.

Sixth, about the economic and non-economic efficiency of political actions. Politicians are interested in the role of the state in the economy. Therefore, several specific policies attract politicians' attention, e.g., monetary, tax, income, economic and social politics in particular. A new topic is the issue of global

6 P. Singer, *One World: The Ethics of Globalization* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 194.

control of the world economy. Moreover, the research on the effectiveness of socialization and civic and historical education. The scope of the issue includes, among other things, the theory of public choice.

Seventh, finally, about the international conditions of political life and the formation processes of supranational communities, human civilization, chaos, and international order. It is mainly the domain of the science of international relations, which nowadays increasingly becomes the core of political science.

Researchers of political phenomena manage the vast field of research in various ways. The management depends directly on two factors. The first one is the studied aspect of politics, views on its connections and role among other aspects of political life, and, perhaps most importantly, how politics as a sphere of social life links with other areas, i.e., economy, spiritual culture, ecosystem, religion or media world. The second factor is of epistemological nature. It relates to the ways of solving research problems – first of all, what vision of man and society does the researcher adopt. Further, the researcher also has a certain freedom of choice in research methodology, including, above all, the ideal of science, criteria of truthfulness, preferred research methods, procedures, and techniques. We can roughly narrow down the problems of research methodology to the following ones:

- 1) The problem of combining knowledge accumulated by representatives of various political sub-disciplines and other social sciences to explain politics comprehensively – Wallerstein-Węsierski problem.
- 2) The problem of a coherent connection of external operating conditions with human subjectivity in the research process. The point is to show how the choice of a specific alternative for an individual's operation depends on the entity's knowledge of these conditions and the systems of values entity declares. It is now believed that structures – natural, economic, traditions established in the institutional order – do not determine human activity but limit or facilitate it. The social sciences study the subjects capable of reflection, who themselves interpret and change the existing material and ideational structures – cf. M. Archer, P. Sztompka, M. Karwat in the political science, B. Krauz-Mozer, F. Pierzchalski. The primary motor of change is the entity power of human individuals and communities.
- 3) The problem of the whole-system, of which the phenomenon is a part. It is a choice of relatively isolated systems, containing all necessary and sufficient conditions to understand the phenomena of interest to the researcher. Sometimes it is enough to limit the interest to a chosen substructure of social life, e.g., social awareness or economy. Yet, we usually have to distinguish

local communities, empires, ecosystems or regions, and even continental systems or the whole ecumenes – Braudel problem – for some processes.

- 4) The problem of Eurocentrism, i.e., conventional knowledge, often beyond empirical control, stemming from the belief in European exceptionalism, i.e., from the role of European rationality, science, individualism in the emergence of the current urban-industrial civilization. Such conviction does not appreciate the technological and cultural achievements of other local civilizations, mostly Chinese, Indian, and Islamic-Arabic – Blaut problem.
- 5) Continuity/shift problem. In the history of human societies, new – in terms of quality – forms of social life emerge. The forms change the existing determinants of social processes. Such a fact makes the laws of social sciences, together with the concepts applied in them, must respect the developmental aspect of historical reality. The generality of the laws consists in recognizing the structural differences between *all* the types of social phenomena they describe so far – we talk about generality in the historical sense and not in the theoriological one. For example, anatomically modern people lived in small hunter-gatherer communities for ninety percent of this homo sapiens variety's existence. There was neither state nor writing, there was a spirit of cooperation and mutual assurance, and the birth rate was only a half percent per year. The life of a member of modern urban-industrial civilization is quite different – Hegel's problem.
- 6) The problem with the hierarchy of factors determining the course of a studied phenomenon. Social phenomena are a combination of diverse factors and conditions, from ecological, demographic, and economical to political or cultural. The conditions' and factors' different determination power is also crucial. To properly emphasize the different significance of these factors and the different mechanisms of interaction in the research process, we must operate with appropriate concepts or theories. Then, the ontological and epistemological assumptions made by the researcher lead to such fragments of social reality and the postulated relationships between them, which may or may not be consistent with the accepted social image of the world. Hence, on the one hand, the necessary versatility of the approach in the study and, on the other hand, the empirical, although sometimes significantly mediated, contact with historical matter – the Parsons problem.
- 7) The problem of eclecticism. A researcher who strives for a multi-faceted illumination of the studied phenomenon juxtaposes himself between a desire for a complete description and explanation and a conceptual or theoretical inconsistency. He or she cannot use all paradigms or theoretical achievements available on the research scene. To maintain an orderly and

consistent image of a given phenomenon, the researcher should consistently refer to the chosen research concept. Then he or she will avoid conceptual confusion. Limitations make the master – Petrzycki problem.

The paradigms that occur in research practice adopt different visions of the social world and man, solve research problems in numerous ways, and use varied research strategies and, less frequently, methods and procedures. Paradigms are rarely specified; most often, they are silent assumptions that we can reconstruct by learning the research practice of individual schools or research orientations. In short, research paradigms are different in terms of philosophical perspective, scientific ideals, and ideological perspectives.

In terms of the accepted ideals of science, they lead to different languages for describing reality, postulate different research methodologies, and consequently create different sets of questions and research problems. At the core of each paradigm are presumably accurate theses about the isolated fragment or aspect of political reality. Thus, the paradigms give a potentially accurate and approximate picture of the studied reality, together with a set of directives on how to investigate it. In the language of a given paradigm, it is possible to formulate reasonable research questions and methods of solving them. However, it is only when we confront the hypotheses with the results of observations and broadly understood historical material that we can increasingly treat this picture as less and less model-like, and thus more and more adequate. For example, in the psychodynamic concept of man – Freudianism – the main mechanisms guiding human behavior – life and death instinct – lie in the subconscious. Such a paradigm uses appropriate concepts of id, ego, or super-ego. We can discover the action of compulsive forces through appropriate research techniques, e.g., learning dreams, language lapsus, the game of associations. It makes sense to ask questions about relations with a parent of the opposite sex and to direct attention to the period of childhood and adolescence. Culture plays a unique role in suppressing the forces of the subconscious.

Contemporary reflection on the empirical sciences values the role of adopted philosophical perspective – i.e., for example, the epistemic reference system or external science base.⁷ Such a perspective is the so-called hard core of research programs, which eventually falls through when facts that are inconsistent

7 Cf. K. Jodkowski, "Filozofia przyrody a nauki przyrodnicze," *Colloquia Communia*, No. 1–2/2007, pp. 15–22, and I. Lakatos, "Falsyfikacja a metodologia naukowych programów badawczych," in: *Pisma z filozofii nauk empirycznych* (Warszawa: 1995), pp. 3–169.

with it accumulate. I argue that the epistemic system of modern political science, common to the research paradigms that specialize in the study of specific aspects of politics, has four main premises: anthropological, sociological, methodological, and axiological ones. The premises are the foundations of individual “aspect-related” communities of researchers, who occupy separate rooms, yet in a shared home.

Anthropological premises. These are beliefs about the species nature of man as a social being. The premises come from physical anthropology and evolutionary psychology as embedded in Darwin’s theory of evolution – thus having the most reliable theoretical basis.

In such an approach, *Homo sapiens* expands both externally and internally, developing the psycho-brain potential of its humanity. In turn, the expansion relates to conquering local ecosystems. Of the many peculiarities of human behavior, we must refer to three directly.

First, to the human cognitive apparatus, which determines the subjectivity of an individual. The apparatus consists of psychological dispositions developed in the process of anthropoevolution, such as perceptual and emotional sensitivity, the development of prospective abilities, and above all, the ability to think conceptually. Man uses the dispositions for informational modeling of controlled processes and experimental simulation of real actions on models. The man does not act like other species in the stimulus-reactio scheme. A symbolic picture of an external situation mediates between man’s behavior and stimulus. Thanks to the mediation, the man avoids spending energy or exposing to risk when planning actions in new circumstances. The extensive cognitive structures also allow the human being to organize the reactions on strong emotional stimuli and to integrate different domains of life activity. Altogether, introspective and reflective consciousness, combined with symbolic thinking and volitional activity – i.e., motivation – are the basis of creative subjectivity. In human consciousness, subjectivity allows us to create images and ideas of various future goals and action programs that can realize them. Thanks to this, *the field of consciousness expands* – A. Wierciński⁸ – which is a condition of adaptability in changing ecosystems for an increasingly long time. The creative rationalized or heuristic

8 Cf. A. Wierciński, *Magia i religia* (Warszawa: 1997), pp. 23–36; T. Kocowski, “Antroposystem, czyli systemowa koncepcja człowieka, jego funkcji i potrzeb,” in: *Człowiek w perspektywie ujęć biokulturowych*, eds. J. Piótek, A. Wiercińska (Poznań: 1993), pp. 11–31; R. Foley, *Zanim człowiek stał się człowiekiem* (Warszawa: 2001).

invention, i.e., imaginative and thoughtful creation of goal models, leads to such an expansion.

Second, to the socialization of the individual, i.e., the necessity of the community to meet the individual's biogenic needs. *Homo sapiens'* species specificity is to satisfy biogenic and other needs through organized collective actions with a division of roles according to gender, age, ability, and birth. The communities additionally bond by blood and territorial ties, and cultural tradition. The individual then benefits from the experience of the entire community. He or she adapts to the social environment in the course of socialization and then competes with others for a position that ensures that the biological and sociogenic needs of coexistence and group cooperation are satisfied as fully as possible. Starting from the Neolithic Revolution, privileged people in the social hierarchy could exploit the work of such a human.

Third, to the role of tools – i.e., techniques and energy – as non-organic ways of influencing the natural environment, which enables the creation of a new space of collective existence, i.e., the natural-technical environment. Such an environment is a habitat, a settlement network of people. From now on, man is subject to cultural evolution, with much shorter rhythms of change than biological evolution. Man's adaptation to the changed environment does not depend on the change of the morpho-physiological structure of the organism. Instead, the adaptation closely connects with a large brain, which, in turn, is an adaptation to the growth of information and regulatory needs.

Thanks to the species nature, human beings can perform internal expansion – through increasing knowledge of nature and practical skills – on an individual level. The cultural creation of new needs, especially of the need for general knowledge of the world and the need for a sense of life purposefulness, is the way to expand internally. Nevertheless, the man can also carry out a far-reaching expansion, adapting better and better to the ecosystem or expanding into areas occupied by other groups. Humans can do so either peacefully using persuasive pressure or by military force – i.e., by conquest. Thanks to the external expansion of individual human populations, the habitat of the entire species also expands.

The human species nature is a historical constant; it determines the human or biocultural way of historical existence and runs in different types of social systems. Until now, humanity lived in the Malthusian world, except for the last two centuries after the industrial revolution.

Sociological premises, i.e., those concerning the general concept of society and mechanisms of its change. The researcher can choose either an organic-systemic model of society or a processual vision, i.e., a morphogenetic approach in which the axis of analysis is a dynamic social field. In such a perspective, the

history of human societies is the gradual exploitation of the global ecosystem using diverse sources of energy and materials – e.g., wood, steel, or bioengineering products. In terms of human knowledge, human communities' history is the evolution of social phenomena self-awareness, regularities, mechanisms of society functioning. As a result, some myths, illusions, utopias, conventional pearls of wisdom are lost, and new ones arise, although knowing does not equal doing so.

Political science broadly accepts the systemic concept of society being a loose adaptation of Talcott Parsons' structural functionalism concept. The structuralism, in turn, stems from the ecology of systems and cybernetics. The social system stays in a state of dynamic balance thanks to the functions performed by four types of institutions. First, the economy – it provides goods that satisfy the biogenic and derivative needs of society. Second, political institutions. The institutions serve for the mobilization and coordination of joint activities. Another type of institution is established patterns of behavior. Identity and integration come from the spiritual culture, historically most often from religion, national and ethnic ties, or traditions of the shared state. Small and large social groups like family, school, religious, or neighborhood communities, implement such patterns in the process of socialization and social control.

Methodological premises – they consist of a realized pattern of scientific and cognitive rationality. In the methodological shape of social-humanistic sciences, we imprint the matter of research, i.e., the human being as the subject of action and cognition, the human world, the world full of social facts of subjective, normative, and semiotic character. Other interesting topics might be: a multi-element world with a character of a whole, a world composed of mutually irreducible structures of social life such as economy, law, science or religion, and, above all, an exceptionally dynamic world, with rhythms of change unknown to nature.

In contemporary political science, the pattern of cognitive rationality is, in fact, the behavioralism after transitions. We should not associate this pattern with either the representative, or statistical method, survey technique, or the discrimination of qualitative methods. However, the pattern's core is the concept of goals and criteria of scientific cognition, which applies to every political scientist – D. Sanders claims that “in many respects, we are all – or should be – behavioralists now.”⁹ In such a concept, scientific research aims to explain

9 D. Sanders, “Behavioural Analysis,” in: *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, eds. D. Marsh, G. Stoker (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 41.

individual and collective behaviors like national uprisings, national or emancipatory movements. We can explain the behaviors through the laws of science. The laws describe the regularities between the behaviors and social situations in which people find themselves – e.g., according to the Dollard's law of frustration-aggression, a frustrated person will behave aggressively; according to another law, the existence of an economic surplus is a necessary condition for the creation of a state. In this concept of explanation, the idea of causality and functional dependencies between different states of the social system is present – e.g., the economic potential of a society determines its military potential. The laws of science allow us to formulate predictions regarding the states of affairs if the conditions for their realization appear. Thanks to such a situation, it is possible to empirically falsify the claims made, testing them according to the broadly understood observation, possibly experiments, but most often based on the historical material. The researcher then uses the comparative method, which in political science replaces the experiment. In the process of social reality cognition, there is an interdependence of the source base and its interpretation. As a result, “the historian is engaged on a continuous process of moulding his facts to his interpretation and his interpretation to his facts.”¹⁰

All basic theoretical and methodological orientations of contemporary scientific humanities built their foundations in political science. A broad pluralistic panorama of contemporary political science consists of, among other things, orientations referring to logical empiricism – behavioral approach – institutional approach, which uses the new institutional and neoclassical economy – the theory of public choice – and historical approaches – which refer to Weber, Marx, and the critical school – approaches referring directly to hermeneutics, phenomenology, psychoanalysis – interpretationism – and also a naturalistic direction – the biopolitics. The ideal of cognitive rationality, common to all types of empirical sciences, expresses the postulate of intersubjective controllability of all claims aspiring to be called scientific. In turn, the ideal requires accuracy in the formulation of theses and logical correctness of reasoning. All paradigms have a common distinctive feature of political phenomena. It is the role of legitimized – state – compulsion in the organization of social life. The attributes, sources, main functions, in a word, the theoretical concepts, research problems, and research strategies based on them, are different.

Axiological – ideological – premises. The liberal concept of freedom and equality dominates among political scientists. Contemporary political scientists

10 E. H. Carr, *What is History?* (London: Penguin, 1962), p. 24.

broadly accept the ideology of a democratic-liberal state and the values it implies – in particular, normativism. In the research, especially in the political system studies, the scientists assume that the axis of politics is *the rule of law*, i.e., the primacy of general principles of law over all power. Therefore, researchers assume a universal model of the public sphere functioning. In such a concept, the state, constituting the legal norms of human coexistence in a given community, must respect individual freedom and general principles of law. Even social rights were introduced for the realization of freedom, so that individuals, having satisfied their existential needs, could make better use of freedom. The state becomes an impersonal public authority because “it governs by law understood as an expression of the mutual good of legal entities which, by concluding more or less formal agreements, take part in the creation of civil order.”¹¹ In a word, members of civil society become equal under the law as subjects of the agreements. The sources of such historical aspirations would derive from the ideals of social order.

Eurocentrism is also widely shared among political scientists in the West. This view favors the view on the history of nations and local civilizations from the perspective of the last two hundred years when Europe dominated the world-system thanks to the scientific and industrial revolution. However, until then, China was the homeland of inventions, e.g., paper, printing, powder, the compass. Mathematics – decimal system, the concept of zero – originated in India, and the Arab-Muslim civilization mediated the journey of different innovations to Europe. The Greeks utilized the achievements of the previously developed civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt. A polycentric vision of the coexistence of different nations and civilizations is closer to the historical truth. The result of the coexistence was the convergence of nations’ material and cultural heritage – primarily commodities – through far-reaching trade, inventions, religious currents, but also pathogens like the hemorrhagic plague, smallpox, and flu epidemics. I present such a reconstruction of the local civilization’s history in another work.¹²

The multifacetedness of political phenomena discussed above leads to specialized strategies of their description and explanation. The strategies have an empirically sensitive language – a specific microscope – responding sensitively to the distinguished features of the world of politics, and also a heuristic base,

11 A. Bihr, *Nowomowa liberalna* (Warszawa: 2009), p. 61.

12 Cf. T. Klementewicz, *Geopolityka trwałego rozwoju. Ewolucja cywilizacji i państwa w trakcie dziejotwórczych kryzysów* (Warszawa: 2013).

facilitating their ordering – like a specific research telescope. Nevertheless, since the research tools address specific areas of the political world, they cannot cover the whole research field. Therefore, the research tools have certain cognitive and heuristic qualities, but, at the same time, they must follow other research perspectives. Hence the postulated research pluralism and its methodological necessity. In such a situation, an autarky would be a conscious choice of Robinson Crusoe's fate, condemned to self-help in a vast ocean of knowledge. Now we will point out the most influential paradigms of political research, showing their cognitive indispensability for understanding the diverse aspects of the political phenomenon and, at the same time, the cognitive limitations and, sometimes, simply weaknesses.

2. Outside the chalk circle of politics and geopolitics

I. The systemic aspect – the political system

A) Institutionalism: law and cultural norms

In the discussed concept of politics, a politician is the organizer and guarantor of social order. Thereby the politician uses means of physical coercion or public regulation, rarely sharing such an exclusive right. We can express such a thought equivalently with the category of political – state –power. Thus, the practice of politics here mainly consists of using power, i.e., making laws by virtue of legislative competence, issuing administrative acts that update obligations through already established norms, and imposing sanctions.

The well-known quotation from John Locke's *Second Treatise of Government* expresses the concept of politics in question most clearly. For the philosopher, political power is:

a right of making laws, with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this only for the public good.¹³

In the discussed current, political thought intertwines with legal and sociological reflection, since all of them are necessary for recreating the normative foundations of political life. It is assumed that people's action happens within the possibilities and limitations created by institutions, which we understand

13 J. Locke, *The Second Treatise of Government* (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2004), p. 2.

broadly as a set of rules in which the public sphere functions. First of all, we deal with formal institutions – e.g., law and state organization. In such a case, we face organizational institutionalism. Second, we may deal with informal institutions like tradition, social culture, mentality, or religion. The research of the informal institutions is the domain of normative – in other words, sociological – institutionalism. In political science, institutionalism focuses mainly on the real aspect of legal phenomena. R. Rhodes, the representative of this research approach, calls institutionalism the “historic heart” of political science, and the instruments of this analysis are “part of the toolkit of every political scientist.”¹⁴ Institutionalism has the longest tradition and eminent representatives in Polish political science, who combine the knowledge and research competence of related disciplines – primarily political, legal, historical, and sociological sciences. Such representatives are, for example, Czesław Znamierowski, Konstanty Grzybowski, Marek Sobolewski, Stanisław Ehrlich, Kazmierz Opalek, Franciszek Ryszka, or Jan Baszkiewicz.

B) System analysis: state functions

It would also be challenging to understand the politics phenomenon without reflecting on its function in the social system, in society as a whole. The premise for such a concept is the observation that, unlike in non-human wildlife, in social life, we deal with people acting consciously, intentionally, people trying to control their collective fate. This statement contains the fundamental difference between biological and cultural evolution. There are two basic mechanisms of social change: the mechanism of the global effect – the invisible hand – and the mechanism of planned social change, i.e., the interference of people to change the existing social structures. After the Neolithic revolution, the collective subject of such changes was the state organization. The organization has instruments for the purpose: potential and effective physical force – the law – the economic surpluses of the community collected through fiscal coercion, or the propaganda apparatus – rituals, religious rites, holidays, school, or public media. The state is the only institution that can influence the entire society directly and indirectly by strong and soft means. In such a role, the state can use a variety of governance

14 R. Rhodes, *Understanding Governance* (Buckingham: 1997), pp. 5 and 64, qt. after V. Lowndes, “The Institutional Approach,” in: *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, eds. D. Marsh, G. Stoker (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 62. Cf. J. G. March, J. P. Olsen, *Instytucje. Organizacyjne podstawy polityki* (Warszawa: 2005), pp. 27–30.

techniques to achieve social goals that go far beyond ensuring internal order and external security. Among other things, the state is able:

- to coordinate the functioning of different spheres of social life – from the coordination of irrigation works in the first agricultural communities to the organization of public transport when the state directs public capital to those branches of the economy that are important for the functioning of the others – and, the systemic and operational functions of the state;
- to initiate institutional reforms to overcome the dysfunctionality of the existing structures of economy, state, and social awareness. Usually, the structures fail in changed conditions due to the development of technology, the growth of subjectivity of new social forces, the unreliability of the existing institutional solutions, or simply the civilization regress – e.g., the Meiji revolution, New Deal, democratic reform in England in 1867, Bismarck social legislation);
- to correct the market division of goods;
- in the era of globalization, a new function of states becomes the postulated global leadership, for which, so far, there are no institutional forms; hence the strategy of state cosmopolitanization, the idea and practice of global governance – involving international organizations and states.

All in all, thanks to the coordinating and regulatory role, national society functions more efficiently. It can change its economic, political, and – slowly – awareness-raising structures, adapting them to the new challenges of the natural environment, technological progress, or emancipation of human subjectivity. There is also an increase of the non-zero summativity, in other words, of the possibility to benefit from the cooperation of people, guided even by personal or group interests – cf. E. Ostrom.¹⁵ We refer to the solution of the common pasture problem, i.e., subordinating to the egoistic strategy of individuals – rational at such a level – or collective strategy of the group. The strategy's implementation – e.g., regulating the use of the Nile's water resources by the states through which the river flows – requires concerted cooperation organized by a higher instance – rationality on a social, supra-individual level.

The realm of politics understood in such a way became the subject of research and reflection for several directions, approaches, or schools; first of all, of those which refer to the theory of systems and functionalism, neo-evolutionism, and classical economics – particularly the systemic approach of D. Easton, K. Deutsch,

15 The main work of the Nobel prize laureate is *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

and N. Luhmann. Systemic analysis has only heuristic qualities in political science. Unlike biology and technical sciences, the systemic analysis does not use the mathematical apparatus, nor does it quantify the relationships between the elements of the systems studied.

II. The analysis of the social content of politics

A) Marx's conflict paradigm: a politician as a biased referee in conflicts over the distribution of goods and the realization of the group and common values

In the political scientist's research questions catalog, we find a particularly important one. The question concerns the social content of politics, especially its primary sources, conditions, and macrosocial effects. The starting point of the analysis is to distinguish the contradictions and conflicts in the economic structure of a given society, which is "a community of life and work."¹⁶ Next, we examine how our starting point reflects in the aspirations and consciousness of classes and statuses, growing subjectivity, organization, quality of leaders, inter-group alliances. Speaking more broadly – how the intricate competition for the use of the instruments and authority of the state to achieve group goals runs. Noteworthy, the competition is full of compromises and temporary alliances. We must consider the separate ideological and parliamentary logic of such a fight. There is an admixture of social, universal, emancipatory – national and other minorities, women's rights, moral minorities, racism, etc. – objectives at the discussed level. There is also a frequent shift in the levels of conflict, primarily from class level to identity level – i.e., backlash – or to populist level, both in the form of extreme right-wing movements and religious fundamentalism. The categories of the analysis in question must be appropriately developed and modified when referring to a contemporary society based on modern science, which functions in a globalized market-capitalist economy.

Conflicts over income redistribution are directly crucial to a political scientist. Modern states accumulate from about forty to fifty percent of GDP in the form of taxes. The states use the taxes and loans to finance public goods with the consent of economic entities within civil society. Therefore, the dispute over the scope of state intervention is now the main content of politics. The seemingly

16 J. Hartman, "Powstanie i kres własności," in: *Polityka filozofii. Eseje* (Kraków: 2010), p. 68.

self-regulating market mechanism is only a natural extension of such a construction – cf. G. Ingham.¹⁷

Therefore, the study of the social content of politics requires a kind of research plurality. The plurality consists in a skillful use of a specific theory of society as a whole – as a heuristic base for analysis – and then requires a historical-empirical analysis of the ownership situation and the relations of the surplus division between different classes and social states. In the next phase of the research process, factual knowledge about current intergroup relations – rarely antagonisms, more often cooperation, alliances, common values – appears. The discussed stage is the phase of the struggle for mastering and using the power competences and resources of the state to achieve group goals and public and common goods. Therefore, we deal with a theoretical-empirical analysis of a trans-disciplinary character. The analysis requires an integral combination through a common general theory – sociological competence – of all the aspects of the political phenomenon, i.e., the sources – economic competence – the aspect of subjectivity, action, and the structures and instruments of governance and influence – the competence of the political scientist. We find such socio-economic and political analyses in the works of many researchers like B. Barber, D. Harvey, M. Hirszowicz, B. Jessop, T. Kowalik, S. Kozyr-Kowalski, P. Krugman, D. Ost, I. Wallerstein, or L. Wacquant.

B) The theory of public choice – institutions of the public sphere

We can treat the theory of public choice as a variant of institutionalism because the subject of analysis here is the assessment of the economic effectiveness within the institutional foundation – mainly of the law – of contemporary societies. The optimization of institutional governance would reduce transaction costs, i.e., generally speaking, the expenditure on contract and law enforcement, in the form of, e.g., additional insurance or security costs. Transaction costs also include expenditures on the functioning of administrative bodies, e.g., administration collecting duties. Then, society as a whole of taxpayers bears the costs. Good institutions improve not only the efficiency of the economy but also social stability, e.g., in Scandinavia. Elinor Ostrom's theory of common goods and their protection mentioned before is an excellent achievement of such a research trend.

In the 1980s, during the period of the ideological triumph of neoliberalism, the theory of public choice was the dominant paradigm, especially in American

17 G. Ingham, *Kapitalizm* (Warszawa: 2011), especially pp. 231–240; cf. W. Rutkowski, *Współczesne państwo dobrobytu. Ekspansja, kryzys, spory* (Warszawa: 2009), pp. 62–83.




Diagram 1. Directions for determination of individual behavior and explanation of its effects in the public choice theory

Source: J. Wilkin ed., *Teoria wybory publicznego* (Warszawa: 2005), p. 14.

political science. The dysfunctionality of the government or state was then the main focus in political science, similar to market failure in economic science. There was an attempt to apply standard tools of economic analysis to political decisions, that is, to decisions made not according to strictly economic criteria, i.e., maximizing the expected usefulness, but including social needs in the distribution of common funds. The social premise of these interests is the fact that current states are still distributional, protective, productive, and developmental states; in a word, they are states which are active toward the economy and mechanisms of public sphere functioning. Despite the progressing deregulation, the regulatory impact of the state on the economy remains, whether to address market failures, especially in the area of income distribution or control of the natural capital usage or to support innovation processes in the economy and the functioning of the public sphere – productive spending accounts for about thirty-five percent of total public spending. The sphere of politics is treated here as a specific market with a supply and demand side, price category, or maximization of benefits. Such a situation is most evident in the approach to political marketing. We show the scheme of individual behavior analysis within the institutional framework of the public sphere and the state in diagram 1.

The field of research interest for the representatives of the theory of public choice is to optimize the boundaries between the public and private sphere with the use of tools and assumptions of classical economics – e.g., methodological individualism, the principle of usefulness maximization, concepts of social optimum, the mechanism of system balance, etc. The theory of public choice explored many traditional threads of political reflection on the failure of governance. In particular, the theory tried to analyze the following issues:

- the scope and principles of providing public goods, especially how to enforce property rights and prevent excessive monopolization of the economy – cf. J. M. Buchanan, G. Becker, W. Landes, J. Coleman;

- the functioning of distribution coalitions – i.e., monopolies, trade unions – which reduce the efficiency of the economy, and also the pursuit of pensions through political mechanisms – like costs of lobbying, especially in corporations seeking to reduce the tax burden – cf. M. Olson, A. Krueger, G. Tullock;
- the relationship between bureaucracy and legislative bodies – cf. W. Niskanen's economic theory of bureaucracy;
- the effectiveness and competition in the system of separation of powers, especially issues of voting and constitutional order, and the analysis of electoral behavior – A. Downs' economic theory of democracy.

The strong side of the paradigm in question is the analysis of business-state relations. The existing regulations create a grey area of discretion and malpractice, informal connections, biased decisions in granting public aid, public investment and commissioned tasks tenders, subventions, tax operations, business licensing, funding of various economic sectors, creating special economic zones, maintaining state monopoly, or protectionism.

In the view of researchers inspired by the new institutional economics, political order emerges from rational decisions of individual entities based on their needs, preferences, and expectations. At the same time, the entities take different positions in the administrative apparatus or have different particular interests, mainly economic. Thus, politicians, bureaucrats, and advocates of interest groups are not capable of altruistic behavior consistent with the public interest. In such a situation, *Homo politicus* becomes *Homo economicus* as an abstracted entity, which, striving for the most preferred effect, pursues rational knowledge and pragmatism. Hence the methodological individualism – there are and there operate only individuals, guided by their own benefits, mainly of material profits character. The theory of public choice creates opportunities for integrating knowledge and research toolkit in economics, sociology, and political science. The cross-disciplinary category of institution is the basis for such integration.

III. The aspect of political consciousness and the socio-technical aspect of its formation – the interpretationist approach

The domain of the discussed research paradigm is the analysis of the basic conscious, imaginative, and linguistic construction of political reality – cf. M. Bevir, R. Koselleck, M. Foucault, A. Wendt. The proponents of the approach assume that there is no such thing as a substance reality that exists independently of the meanings that people attribute to their actions – e.g., to take off a hat at the sight of a familiar person is not an airing of the head, nor a physical activity but a

conventional one. The world is constructed socially and conceptually, hence the conviction that concepts – i.e., theories mediate any observation of phenomena beyond human consciousness. It is impossible to observe phenomena without their simultaneous interpretation – cf. W. Quine. Thus, an individual interprets the social world according to the given tradition, language, discourses, and narration; this is the first level of the reality interpretation. Then, the researcher interprets the interpretation of the political life participant, which is the second hermeneutical level, the so-called “dense description” – cf. C. Geertz. The researcher’s interpretation may only be more systematic but not privileged, i.e., closer to an adequate description. Consequently, the interpretationism has a predisposition to qualitative methods, mainly participatory observation, in-depth interviews, text transcriptions, keeping observation logs, etc. Here, the researcher’s task is to analyze traditions, discourses, to grasp how individuals perceive social problems and development dilemmas, how to react to them – e.g., the discourse about the greenhouse effect. Nevertheless, is there one unquestionable truth about the greenhouse effect? However, some of the narrations about the greenhouse effect are more accurate than others because of the irrefutable data; they make greater use of possible general knowledge about mechanisms that shape the climate – e.g., volcanism, continental drift, orbital parameters, etc. Thanks to the reliable analysis, the mechanisms’ interpretation seems more credible. The discussed approach is the position of moderate cognitive realism.

Interpretationism finds wide application in the analysis of contemporary political debates. Many analysts of the contemporary public debate think that nowadays, the discourse is the ontological foundation of politics, and politics itself is a form of common debate. There are often claims that exaggerate the role of the medial dimension of politics. For example, some claim that “there is no politics without a spectacle” or call the media “contemporary reality demiurges.” In public discourse, it is easy to find symbolic violence. Such violence occurs when media agents of various political movements quite arbitrarily impose their language of reality description, problems to debate, and value systems basing on which the problems are to be solved on the whole society. In such a situation, already in the phase of using specific newspeak, cognitive perspective, and axiology, *choices* are settled. The rest is a very *meaningful silence*. The discourses shape the view of the political scene, which shrank to the dimensions of a TV window.

Interpretationism raises the question of whether the analytical framework for the contemporary debate should be a liberal vision of the republic as a self-governing citizen community. In the vision, the debate is a tool for agreeing views on a given issue and elaborating alternatives to its solution. In turn, the

alternatives are subject to a vote or negotiation aimed at reaching a common position. A better interpretive schema for a public debate is the concept of Michel Foucault's ruling techniques, especially the *governmentality* concept and the concept of *the neoliberal Leviathan* by Loic Wacquant. In the concepts, social order continues thanks to dispersed techniques of governmentality that teach an individual self-management, which allows them to achieve the ergodynamics desired by the market and employers. The governmentality techniques also teach the style of consumption, strategy of striving for success, leisure time spending, ability to fulfill the duties of a responsible citizen, taxpayer, participant in quizzes and academies, etc. Apart from the state, the media, non-governmental organizations, the school, public authorities, bank economists, which replace the old astrologers and the intelligentsia today, also play an essential role in the process. The contemporary neoliberal Leviathan implemented mechanisms of market functioning as an optimal method of resource and remuneration allocation in various spheres of social life. In Wacquant's concept, relatively new instruments of state policy include the commercialization of the existing public service sector, disciplining social policy – the transition from welfare to workfare – expansive penal policy – prison fare – and the cult of individual responsibility as a *motivating discourse* and *cultural glue* allowing the acceptance of such a role evolution of the state and the way the role is performed. In a word, power remains scattered beyond the media spectacle or discourse, and many institutions of the public and private sphere model the awareness and, consequently, behavior. The critical school offers excellent potential here – cf. P. Bourdieu, S. Lukes, A. Ong, L. Wacquant.

IV. International relations aspect: security, competition and cooperation studies

A) Realism. Realism is still the dominant paradigm in the analysis of international relations – cf. E. H. Carr, R. Aron, K. Waltz, J. Mearsheimer; in Poland: S. Bieleń, A. Bromke, R. Kuźniar. Realism's field is the polyarchic international system, whose participants are states – institutions – acting as representatives of national communities. The axis of influence in such a system is rivalry, competition, fight, and cooperation between its participants. The system's participants must ensure their own security – self-help system – in various ways, appropriate for particular epochs. In a realistic paradigm, what comes to the fore is the individual actions of the states/institutions, their leaders, soldiers, and diplomats delegated by them, as well as international organizations established. The idea that the foundation for the security of states in the historical perspective is ultimately

the military potential conditioned by material resources and technologies, and, finally, by the level of economic development, is a thesis of realism. The interdependence between wealth and security is visible over time. In the short term, military power determines the level of security. On the other hand, in the long term, it is economic development. Due to the factors and size of the power, we distinguish between universal, sectoral, and regional powers. The specific strategic matrix, including natural resources, the shape of the national territory, the level of economic development, population resources, the armed forces, the level of development of science and education, the quality and type of national culture and religion, and also the system of governance and style of foreign policy, is a synthesis of the factors of power. Thus, the matrix features hard and soft means of influence on other participants of international life.

Rivalry and competition have different geopolitical vectors in the age of globalization. The nations whose citizens establish corporations using in the world space the remaining production factors, mainly cheap labor, local markets, and energy resources, are competitive. Such nations have an advantage in intellectual capital. The future of the world order under realism is not bright. If the modern market economy continues the pursuit of a pension, regardless of the social and ecological consequences, there will be *old-new conflicts* – cf. H. Welzer¹⁸ – such as: local, regional, cross-border armed conflicts over resources like water, arable land, or raw materials. Moreover, transnational refugees will exacerbate the conflicts. Therefore, the fundamental political characteristics of our contemporary times do not lose its importance, and what is worse, it will not lose its significance. Violence has not only a not very glorious past but, unfortunately, also a shameful future.

However, contemporary realists also acknowledge the growing role of global governance, a gradual shift from state to polycentric ways of regulation. The necessity to overcome global challenges resulted in the need for developing and implementing international regimes and new supranational structures. We can no longer put the whole of modern national societies, together with the multitude of ties that link them, into the political system of the world. We rather deal with the new Middle Ages. Alongside nation-states, appeared regional and global organizations, major corporations, regions, and local government units, megaregions and megapolis, religious organizations, militias and private armies,

18 Cf. H. Welzer, *Wojny klimatyczne. Za co będziemy zabijać w XXI wieku?* (Warszawa: 2010), pp. 197–201; W. Bello, *Wojny żywnościowe* (Warszawa: 2011), pp. 62–64; R. Uessler, *Wojna jako usługa* (Warszawa: 2008), pp. 137–143.

drug cartels, and many others. In such a situation, today's governance undergoes a new phase of institutionalization reflected in multilateral institutions and informal mechanisms based on flexible cooperation principles. We can observe such an order mainly in the quartet of the UN, the EU, the US, and BRICS, or the G-20 summit for the global economy – cf. S. Bieleń.¹⁹ Strategic and military security research and a geopolitical thought balancing between ideologies, national interests, *the competition of nations* in geographical space and strategic planning – or rather programming – *scenarios of the possible future* – based on geographical premises and assuming the existence of competitors and potential conflicts – developed on the grounds of broadly understood realism.²⁰

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- 19 S. Bieleń, *Polityka w stosunkach międzynarodowych* (Warszawa: 2010); P. D. Williams ed., *Studia bezpieczeństwa* (Kraków: 2012), especially pp. 1–10.
- 20 Cf. R. Kuźniar, *Polityka i siła. Studia strategiczne – zarys problematyki* (Warszawa: 2005); C. Jean, *Geopolityka* (Wrocław: 2003). The author refuses the geopolitics in scientificity (pp. 40–41, 43–46), writing that geopolitics is a metaphysics of the struggle for control over space, which we use to interpret the history and predict the future. A. Piskozub makes similar claims but develops geosophy instead of geopolitics. Cf. A. Piskozub, *Między historiozofią a geozofią. Szkice z filozofii czasoprzestrzeni ludzkiej* (Toruń: 2001), pp. 74–75. On the other hand, political geography limited its thought to the layer of physical economic activity of people – e.g., agriculture, settlement network, concentration of industry, population density, exploitation of natural resources, etc. A book by D. Olusoga and C. W. Erichsen, *Zbrodnia Kajzera* (Warszawa: 2012), especially pp. 390–425, answers why geopolitics developed in Germany at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For Friedrich Ratzel, the co-founder of the pseudo-science – i.e., geopolitics – “war is still a great school of overcoming space.” Needless to say, Ratzel talks about a *great space*. Cf. F. Ratzel, “Geografia polityczna,” in: *Przestrzeń i polityka. Z dziejów niemieckiej myśli politycznej*, A. Wolff-Powęska, E. Schulz eds. (Poznań: 2000). However, it is true that *Homo sapiens* settled many ecosystems, often creating peculiar civilizations. A British historian, Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, portrayed the following ecosystems in his excellent work: desert, tundra and ice, uncultivated steppes – „the oceans of grass” – tropical and post-glacial forests, alluvial soils in dry climates, mountain plateaus – „the mirrors of the heavens” – and, finally, the oceans, whose domestication became the historical work of the nations living on the Atlantic coast of Europe. Cf. F. Fernandez-Armesto, *Cywilizacje. Kultura, ambicje i przekształcanie natury* (Warszawa: 2008). Also Napoleon Wolański distinguishes analogous geoclimatic environments of human existence: arctic areas, high mountains, dry areas, grassland ecosystems and wet equatorial forests. Cf. N. Wolański, *Ekologia człowieka. Wrażliwość na czynniki środowiska i biologiczne zmiany przystosowawcze* (Warszawa: T.I., 2006), pp. 410–423.

B) The world-system theory – cf. I. Wallerstein, S. Amin, G. Arrighi. Unlike realism as a research trend in the science of international relations, the concept of a world economy breaks with the image of society – nation state – as isolated, to some extent independent, developing its civilizational potential, dependent on the local ecosystem and the developed crafts, later industry. The discussed approach treats a separate national society as a node in the network of a more comprehensive social whole. The focus of such a paradigm is on a vast megamacrostructure with elements such as national production systems, capital flows between stock exchanges, the world food supermarket, migration movements, and global pop culture. Moreover, the reconstruction of mechanisms of economic surplus flow between regions of the world economy is essential in the current of research in question. The research trend originated from the interest toward the emergence of a world market, the debate on the causes of the “great division” between East and West, and the role of modernized, industrialized, capitalist Europe in joining separate local civilizations into a world-system. The unit of analysis is the world economy integrated by market exchange – in earlier times, the state played such a role by creating empires, and even earlier, there were the so-called mini-systems based on social exchange. Wallerstein, similarly to Karl Polanyi, juxtaposes the current structure of the world-system and the earlier epochs when economic activity followed the needs of the whole community, and the division of labor determined its organization according to gender, age, or various totemic principles. The next stage was the phase of agricultural empires. The empires could exploit the wealth of the conquered nations, eventually using physical violence to take tribute, join their cultivated lands, and use slave labor. However, the empires of earlier times had no means of transport, no logistics, no army to conquer more space for longer because of small surpluses, and a smaller population. Empires instead used to assimilate the annexed territories – like in the case of Chinese, Roman, Persian, and several Islamic empires, such as the Ottoman empire. The military power helped to maintain relations between the center and the periphery. The political power concentrated in the apparatus of the nation states, which divided the geographical space into the matrix and colonies, separating them with borders. However, the capitalist economy operates in an area larger than any nation state can control.

An important theoretical and methodological conclusion of this analysis of social reality on the global scale is the adoption of a unified analytical framework, with the central category of world-system. The analysis of this social totality requires crossing the fences hitherto reserved for ‘sovereign’ social sciences: economics, political science, and sociology.

C) Institutional liberalism. A school or a research paradigm called liberalism – institutional liberalism – cf. R. Keohane, J. Nye jr, J. Rosenau – developed in the neoclassical economics grounds. According to the paradigm, relations between national societies evolve toward greater prosperity, greater freedom, and greater harmonization of interests. States act as rational actors in an anarchic international environment following their selfish national interest while pursuing a common interest. The common interest is the growth of the benefits resulting from absolute cooperation. The primary way to achieve such a goal is to intensify trade. Free trade leads to interdependence, which is the leading cause of peace. If trade ties all parties together, the costs of wars increase. We measure the interdependence by the costs of terminating the cooperation and using coercion or military force – e.g., the costs are greater for an oil importer than for an importer of luxury goods. Complex interdependence is an essential category of the discussed approach. Distortion of an order based on exchange becomes uneconomic for all participants. Hence the reinforcement of the desire to solve conflicts peacefully, with priority for negotiation and the search for shared benefits. For contemporary traders under WTO rules, returning to economic nationalism and protectionism would have a high economic cost, and hence the shape of international politics of individual countries.

The biggest weakness of institutional liberalism is the disconnection from the facts. The real competition on an international scale favors companies from those countries which produce goods at the lowest real cost. In turn, the costs depend on real wages, the level of technological development, and the availability of natural resources. International competition leads to a comparison of different configurations of the factors in question. The relative difference in the pace of technical progress is the decisive parameter. Hence the explanation of why underdeveloped countries, competing with low real wages, always widen the development gap. Such a tragic paradox implies that “if the rich countries are advancing at a faster pace, then the poor countries have to widen the real-wage gap even to maintain what cost advantages they have. This would be the very antithesis of development.”²¹ Moreover, we should recognize the metatheoretical foundations of liberalism as a research paradigm, as fragile. The metatheoretical

21 A. Shaikh, “The Economic Mythology of Neoliberalism,” in: *Neo-Liberalism: A Critical Reader*, A. Saad-Filho, D. Johnston eds. (London: Pluto Press, 2005), p. 48. Cf. a book by Ha-Joon Chang, polemical toward widespread stereotypes about free trade and the role of the state. H. Chang, *Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism* (New York: 2008), especially pp. 19–39, and G. Ardinat, “Moda na mit o konkurencyjności,” *Le Monde diplomatique*, No. 12/2012, pp. 32–35.

basis of liberalism is the theory of free international trade; in other words, the theory of comparative cost advantage. The theory directly relates to the relative abundance of production factors. In the doctrine in question, the elimination of trade deficits and surpluses plays a major role. However, as Anwar Shaikh points out, “in a capitalist world, it is *businesses* that engage in foreign trade,” and international trade theory is, in fact, a subset of competition theory. The difference between domestic and international competition would consist in the fact that “whereas competition within a country is said to punish the weak and reward the strong, competition between countries is said to fortify the weak and debilitate the strong.”²²

The total destruction of myths about supposedly free trade between nations is the work of Paul Bairoch. Besides the trade policy of Great Britain after 1846 and the European policy after 1960, various forms of protectionism dominated. The author analyses the problem according to a vast database.²³ Modifying the metaphor of the Swiss historian-economist, we could say that trade ships sailed in *the ocean of protectionism, which included several islands of liberalism*. Economic liberalism was a quick and straightforward way to backwardness, especially for the Third World.

Pensioners from all over the world also struck a blow to the concept of *an economy without borders*. The pensioners created a global financial market that resembles a casino. As a result, the implementation of the liberal concept of international relations led to a *super-, hyper-, or turbo-capitalism*. In such a system, financial institutions, both national and international, interact with the state when necessary. The financial turnover currently exceeds the GDP more than 50 times. A significant part of financial operations is the so-called short-selling transactions. As a result, the stock market began to determine the strategies of corporations, while the fluctuation of the stock market became the primary determinant of economic cycles. As Jerzy Żyżyński noted, “financial services became a key branch of economy in developed countries. They have a significant, continuously growing share in GDP and become a major source of employment.”²⁴ Needless to say, since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, this market is “regulated” only by financial crises.

22 A. Shaikh, “The Economic Mythology,” pp. 43, 46. J. Świerkowski presents his classic and contemporary concepts of international trade in the study *Zarys ekonomii międzynarodowej* (Warszawa: 2011), ch. 1 and 2.

23 P. Bairoch, *Economics and World History, Myth and Paradoxes* (Chicago: 1993), pp. 15–50. See page 47 for a table with complete data on international trade tariffs.

24 J. Żyżyński, “Neoliberalizm – ślepa uliczka globalizacji,” in: *Globalizacja, kryzys i co dalej?*, G. Kołodko ed., (Warszawa: 2010), p. 33. Cf. J. Toporowski, *Dlaczego*

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By combining all the discussed aspects of society's political life into an analytical whole, the political life stops being a chaos of confrontational statements, surprising administrative and personal decisions, turbulent demonstrations, and "peaceful" manipulations. Only all the scattered information tells us about the main instrument of power, which is the law, and also about the essential function of the state, i.e., the regulation of the social system and, if necessary, the control of its transformation. Finally, the whole information tells us about the social basis of politics, that is, politics as a reaction to contradictions and conflicts, especially in the sphere of distribution of social wealth. Additionally, the researcher must reconstruct both the external conditions of people's actions in politics but also understand the social construction of reality, namely the political subjectivity. Therefore, the political scientist examines the complicated facts of the syndrome – cf. M. Karwat.²⁵ In such a situation, we could expect a cacophony of statements about the world of politics, like before a symphony orchestra concert. However, *there is one political science*. First, there is an epistemic system shared by the community of political researchers – the anthropological and sociological premises discussed above, which are a generalization of the scientific achievements of the humanities. Moreover, only those paradigms that lie on the ground of cognitive realism, even if in a weakened version, provide reliable, cognitively valuable knowledge about politics. Therefore, although our knowledge is unreliable and theoretically burdened, we can use multiple research perspectives and available data collection tools to explain and understand people's actions in the public sphere; yet, this raises the problem of eclecticism. To minimize the problem, we need to think thoroughly about using the achievements of our scientific competitors. However, in the end, cognitive progress occurs in the process of constructive, inter-paradigmatic debate and mutual criticism of the presented theses and their justifications – the rhetorical concept of truth. As a result, the whole of paradigms shows a mosaic of different dimensions and areas of the political world. Together they form a unity in diversity and multiplicity. Unity creates a complex network of subject areas and a rich complex of theses about them. Such complexes are called structures.

gospodarka światowa potrzebuje krachu finansowego, (Warszawa: 2012), pp. 79–82; R. Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century* (Princeton: 2000), pp. 299–324; H. Chang, *Globalization, Economic Development and the Role of State*, (London: 2003), pp. 17–24.

25 M. Karwat, "Cecha polityczności i dziedzina teorii polityki," in: *Carl Schmitt i współczesna myśl polityczna*, R. Skarżyński ed. (Warszawa: 1996), pp. 133–135.

Therefore, political science, like all existing structures in the natural and human world, could not exist, function, and develop without the different, and even opposing paradigms of research. For example, the motivation of human behavior creates such a structure and nature struggles with the culture there. As a result of such coincidences, each specific behavior manifests the genetically programmed Darwinian fitness, upbringing in a specific national culture, and a unique individual biography in different proportions – just like in a cocktail. The global ecosystem, in which abiotic factors combined with the biosphere create the conditions for the “great game of life,” also constitute such a structure. Also our knowledge of the world is the structure in question. The knowledge intertwines physical and semantic information, which results in a new quality – the amalgamate of theoreticized observation. The structure of knowledge about politics does not deviate from the trend. The political scientist is also in the labyrinth of paradigms, and only the light of theory powered by empiricism, allows him or her to see the glows and shadows of the multicolored world of politics.

Filip Pierzchalski

Faultless disagreement: on analytical and research discrepancies in political science

The competent researchers' self-reflection on political science's research object leads to numerous chronic intellectual tensions,¹ which can vary in nature. The tensions include such issues as linguistic misunderstandings, ontological and epistemological doubts, and strictly methodological dilemmas. In the context of current political science research, the intricacies and mutual, often ambiguous interpenetration of these spheres appear obvious. However, most researchers that study political phenomena do not wonder about the complexity of epistemological relationships between the researcher and research object. In other words, the former concerns the entity that analyzes the matter of politics, whereas the latter concerns the object of cognition or explanation in given political science analysis. But more importantly, most researchers disregard the need to establish or revise previously established and accepted cognitive axioms, methodological directives, and theoretical political schemes each time as they conduct their own research.

Consequently, the above leads to a research situation, in which researchers deprive different analyses of references to the existing belief system and their predecessors' rationale, i.e., an intersubjective political knowledge system, founded on some ontological foundations, explanatory schemes, research methods, etc. However, such a system may result from the fact that different research communities perceive, conclude, and conceptualize differently. Instead, the researchers mainly concentrate on epistemic internalism. In other words, I mean the twofold internalism in detailed political science studies. First, the

1 The Cartesian maxim "de omnibus dubitandum est," which translates to "everything must be doubted," is still actual in scholarly practice, where methodological uncertainties, cognitive dissonances, and conceptual discrepancies constitute the intellectual development's basis. Indeed, these issues become a prerequisite for honest scientific reflection. Professor Barbara Krauz-Mozer's academic performance is no exception. The scientific value of Krauz-Mozer's scientific achievement involve, among other things, constant, intellectual strife with theoretical and methodological fundamental questions in the spirit of skepticism and criticism. Undoubtedly, such a scientific stance inspires the younger generations of political scientists, including the author of this article.

twofold internalism deals with beliefs. The beliefs in studied reality mean nothing more than the internal mental states of individual researchers. Therefore, in political science, the knowledge revision originates solely from the researching entity. Second, the twofold internalism deals with rationale. In scholarly practice, specialists reduce the rationale of all researching entities to their internal circumstances, mental states, and individual perception.² In other words, the twofold internalism involves research conditions, in which a given research society consciously or inadvertently depart from the relatively recognized scientific rigor.³ Instead, the research society becomes involved in autonomic scientific reflection, which is free from external circumstances. In such an approach, the political knowledge's context of justification does not involve the externalist plane. The lack of externalist plane results in the conviction that specified cognitive subjects' scientific and research products are not dependent – in a way that one can gradate them – on metatheoretical assumptions that scientists created and accepted earlier. We can characterize the metatheoretical assumptions as embedded in a defined ontology or epistemic perspective. Instead, the

2 J. Woleński, *Epistemologia. Poznanie – prawda – wiedza – realizm* (Warszawa: 2005), p. 377.

3 Today, logologists argue over the issue whether to classify such actions and their results as “science” For example, we can observe such polemic's consequences in the methodology of science, which deals with formulation of different, often opposite, cognition types. See more in: K. Ajdukiewicz, *Logika pragmatyczna* (Warszawa: 1965), p. 173; S. Nowak, *Metodologia badań społecznych* (Warszawa: 2007), p. 276 and subsequent pages. In modern philosophy of science, we can observe a tendency to depart from the assumption that a theory, i.e., a product of science, means a basic structural unit of scientific knowledge. Instead, the analysis of scientific procedures become the above unit. In this respect, the “problem-solving activity” methodological orientation became a significant trend. The orientation focuses on solving specific research problems by scientists, i.e., “the use of non-propositional knowledge, whereas in work concerning the logic of scientific discovery, scientists mainly focused on formalized and explicit knowledge.” In other words, we can observe a departure from knowledge based on scientists' propositional knowledge. Interrogative knowledge, i.e. a knowledge which scientists acquire because of ad hoc scientific research, replaces the propositional knowledge. See more in: P. Zeidler, “Nowy eksperymentalizm a teoretycyzm. Spór o przedmiot i sposób uprawiania filozofii nauki,” in: *Nowy eksperymentalizm – teoretycyzm – reprezentacja*, eds. D. Sobczyńska and P. Zeidler (Poznań: 1994), pp. 87–108; Ł. Afeltowicz, *Modele, artefakty, kolektywy. Praktyka badawcza w perspektywie współczesnych studiów nad nauką* (Toruń: 2012), p. 70; N. Reschner, *Epistemic Logic: A Survey of The Logic of Knowledge* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), pp. 35–41.

metatheoretical assumptions mainly mean a consequence of the researcher's perspective capabilities, inner intuition, and immanent expression. Therefore, we can observe a departure from cultural and social determinants of scientific research. The determinants stress that any conceptual, semiotic, and linguistic means of expression, decoding of meaning processes, explanatory mechanisms, and individual memory-perception schemes directly depend on external surroundings. The external surroundings include social context and established scholarly conventions.

The article aims to present the complexity and multifacetedness, which occurs in the researcher/political scientist and research/cognitive object relationship. I put particular emphasis on the extrospective and introspective dimension of political analyses. In this case, the starting point deals with the objective analytical and research disagreement, which exists in political science. On this basis, I described the issue of faultless disagreement in detail. I interpreted the issue as an actual starting point in the intersubjective community of political scientists. The issue is synonymous with ambiguity and fuzziness of definition in a given knowledge domain, such as research pluralism, including epistemic relativism, pluralism in theoretical conceptualization, and conceptual differentiation. Besides, I described some of the theoretical rationales for the phenomenon of analytical and research divergence, which become a necessary condition to make the thesis of faultless disagreement reliable. Moreover, I presented the theoretical and methodological effects of such a correct disagreement in the context of advanced political research.

Reasons for analytical and research disagreement

Modern considerations concerning the process of political knowledge production in the methodological sense⁴ allow us to notice numerous deficiencies and discrepancies in the formation of homogeneous and coherent systems of beliefs. The systems of beliefs deal with events, states of affairs, and political processes.

4 For the purposes of this article, let us adopt Ryszard Wójcicki's basic classification of knowledge, which assumes the existence of two categories of knowledge: epistemological and methodological. The former includes a set of true beliefs that scientists properly justified. The latter includes a set of critically developed beliefs, such as scientific theories. The statements and judgements of the theories remain in certain mutual connections in terms of content and formality. The statements and judgements create a set of beliefs, which scientists often describe as a "field of knowledge." See more in: R. Wójcicki, *Wykład z logiki z elementami teorii wiedzy* (Warszawa: 2003), p. 235.

In fact, this intellectual breakup with the cumulative nature of knowledge in the spirit of unification became a fact in social sciences. Among other things, the cumulative nature of knowledge includes the positivist “unity of science” idea. Despite bold but daring attempts to restore the postulate of a reductionist vision of science in political science with the use of concepts developed by formal and exact sciences,⁵ we can clearly observe the presence of “inalienable” theoretical and methodological pluralism in political analyses. The methodological pluralism deals with reality, properties, and definability of specific objects, types, as well as individuals. In other words, reductionist ideas remain highly questionable in the whole of scholarly practice, particularly in political science. For example, the reductionist ideas include the concept of “bridging laws” formulation, the correspondence principle in social sciences, the theoretical microreduction idea, the language unity postulate, and scientific method unity postulate. Moreover, the reductionist ideas include the call for the elimination of differences between the research fields of social and natural sciences.⁶ In principle, we can state that modern research on different political phenomena, more exactly specified conceptualizations, research paradigms, and theoretical and methodological perspectives on the matter of politics, remains in a state

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- 5 M. R. Węsierski undertakes such attempts. His solution to the “inconvenient” ambiguity of concepts or linguistic fuzziness in political science involves a reductionist mechanism of redefinition, based on a strict criterion of the given concepts’ applicability. Elsewhere, he proposes a micro correspondence of semantic fields of given concepts, which should result in meta-scientific and metatheoretical homogeneity. See more in: M. R. Węsierski, *Problemy integracji wiedzy a badanie zjawisk politycznych. W stronę idei jedności nauki* (Warszawa: 2011), p. 187 and subsequent pages. We should note that the applicability, understood as a metacriterion for scientific and theoretic homogeneity, is to a small extent arbitrary and much more often conventional, determined e.g., by practical or ideological considerations. Paradoxically, the above fact leads to semiotic, theoretical, and explanatory disagreement (sic!). Let us recall that Jan Such described such a mechanism already in the 1980s, when he referred to the chain of mutually corresponding laws in exact sciences: “Anyway, the practical, i.e., observational, convergence of the results of the applications, i.e., descriptions and predictions, of the laws that correspond to each other in a certain field does not allow to “eliminate” their theoretical inconsistency in the whole range of their applicability, because they provide competitive explanations of the studied phenomena.” See more in: J. Such, “Relacja korespondencji a wynikanie,” in: *Zasada korespondencji w fizyce a rozwój nauki*, eds. Wł. Krajewski, W. Mejbbaum, and J. Such (Warszawa: 1974), p. 89.
- 6 W. Strawiński, *Jedność nauki, redukcja, emergencja. Z metodologicznych i ontologicznych problemów integracji wiedzy* (Warszawa: 1997), pp. 107–170.

of relative mutual disparity and discrepancy. At the same time, the above phenomena maintain a gradable complementarity of certain theses, assumptions, and directives. Barbara Krauz-Mozer, in her assessment of the current state of political science, stresses:

Various theoretical orientations coexist and clash within modern, pluralistic political science. Sometimes, theoretical orientations use fundamentally different criteria of science. ... Today, the increasing diversity at the level of assumptions, including concepts and statements, results in a pluralism of theoretical trends. Each of these trends is unilateral in its own way and has its own limitations. There is an ongoing discussion of whether these different theoretical approaches lead to contradictory statements concerning sociopolitical reality, or to statements about other aspects of sociopolitical reality, or to statements that complement each other.⁷

As we search for an analogy to the described situation, we can state that the modern theoretical cognitive discourse in political science started to follow the path of broadly understood pluralism. Moreover, the discourse departed from unification and reductionist tendencies in the conduct of scientific theoretical and research reflection. First, in this case, we can interpret the analytical and research multitude as polymorphism. The polymorphism involves different perceptions, many ways in which one possesses knowledge concerning given phenomenon, process, situation, etc. In this variant, specialists most often assume a kind of ontological realism and epistemic polymorphism. Therefore, the studied reality is permanent and unique, but we deal with a variety of perceptual experiences. Second, we can interpret the analytical and research multitude as a contingency. Contingency involves a situation in which the objective experience of multiformity results in the thesis that scientific cognitive constructs within a given knowledge domain are ad hoc and conventional in nature. Precisely speaking, the scientific cognitive constructs are cancellable and relative, because most often they depend on different needs, goals, ways of interpretation, proposed hypotheses, etc. Finally, we can interpret the analytical and research multitude as relativity. Relativity involves scientific knowledge mainly determined by cultural and social factors. In this case, we can speak of different behavioral patterns, models of conclusions and interpretations, cognitive patterns, existing values, etc. Therefore, specialists describe contextual determinism as crucial. Contextual determinism involves such factors as socioeconomic relations,

7 B. Krauz-Mozer, "Teoretyzowanie w politologii u progu XXI wieku," in: *Czym jest teoria w politologii?*, ed. Z. Blok (Warszawa: 2011), pp. 39–46.

religious practices, current aesthetic patterns, culture codes.⁸ According to John Dupré's argumentation, we deal with a shift from a reductionist unity of science to a combination of pluralism and realism that is synonymous with promiscuous realism, where we can observe a departure from a unified model of scientific knowledge. The above situation results in the existence of numerous equal ways of scientific cognition, recordkeeping, description, and explication of political reality. Moreover, we can characterize the equivalent ways as internally coherent.⁹

Faultless disagreement

On the linguistic level, especially considering the evaluation of fuzzy expressions in scholarly practice, i.e., expressions that possess borderline cases or fuzzy semantic scope,¹⁰ we deal with a state defined as faultless disagreement. In other words, faultless disagreement means a semiotic and research situation, in which two or more researchers settle the case of a given term or research object in a different but correct and logically authentic way. According to Max Kölbel's definition of faultless disagreement:

- (a) Party A states that P is true, Party B states that non-P is true
- (b) Party A and Party B are not at fault¹¹

Moreover, the recognition of faultless disagreement unintentionally matches the issue of broadly understood contextualism and relativization of individual scientific and research practices within a given field of knowledge and epistemic culture. Contextualism deals with content, expression, use, and evaluation. In this

8 D. Leszczyński, *Struktura poznawcza i obraz świata. Zagadnienie podmiotowych warunków poznania we współczesnej filozofii* (Wrocław: 2010), pp. 451–458.

9 J. Dupré, "Metaphysical Disorder and Scientific Disunity," in: *The Disunity of Science. Boundaries, Contexts and Power*, eds. P. Galison and D. J. Stump (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 101–117.

10 Fuzziness "means a feature of expression's extension: an expression is fuzzy, when we deal with a presence of things, that we cannot decide on concerning their affiliation to the expression's extension. But importantly, such an inability does not result from the lack of knowledge concerning things, on the subject of which scientists formulate a predicate." See more in: J. Odrowąż-Ostrowska, *Kontekstualizm i wyrażenia nieostre* (Warszawa: 2013), p. 18.

11 M. Kölbel, "Faultless disagreement," in: *The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy*, eds. M. Ezcurdia and R. J. Stainton (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2013), pp. 537–553.

sense, we refer to a common subject of scientific investigation, which becomes the cause of real intellectual and analytical discrepancies. The interested parties, or researching entities, represent distinct attitudes and present distinct workshop and research behavior. In other words, a state of disagreement means that the researching entities utilize distinct cognitive patterns, thinking patterns, research methods, and mental presuppositions. Moreover, the researching entities demonstrate formal correctness as they theorize or make conclusions in the domain of discussed subject matters, which we can characterize as faultlessness. Therefore, we can characterize faultless disagreement as, among other things, an existing research state, which means a given moment of nomological analysis. In the existing state of research, we can observe the lack of conceptual clarity or ambiguity, subjective epistemic disjunctions, antagonistic equivalence in scientific perception, explication, and prediction.

The above invariants mainly relate to the intellectual antinomies between the researchers, or cognitive subjects, in a given knowledge domain, including political science. To be more specific, the invariants mainly relate to the intellectual antinomies during studies of a specific research object, such as the “politicalness” phenomenon. We cannot forget that the faultless disagreement state can originate on the linguistic and semiotic decisions level, especially when we take into consideration the fuzzy multifaceted predicates, such as the “political” term. Moreover, the faultless disagreement state can originate on the ontological and epistemic plane, i.e., the distinctiveness of cognitive structures and accepted ontologies in science, as well as on the theoretical and methodological plane, i.e., research paradigms differentiation. As a result, the faultless disagreement concept becomes the necessary condition for the gradual dependence of scholarly practice from contextual analyses. Among other things, the contextual analyses involve:

1. The analyses of linguistic context, which deal with the possibility and restrictions which occur in a given language, the language’s syntax, and grammar. These include the language’s properties and internal characteristics, which impact the formulation of a statement, defining of statements, and passing judgments on studied reality. Therefore, we can characterize language as an important factor that constitutes reality.
2. The analyses of extralinguistic context, which deal with the established patterns, styles, and communication standards in a given society. These issues impact the level of acceptance of given statements, definitions, and notions. Still, cultural practice, which includes the established axiology, normative

plane, and aesthetic codes, conditions the creation and functioning of such a canon.¹²

From the theoretical political scientific reflection process point of view, the context of use, and especially Dawid Lewis' conversational scorekeeping concept, seems crucial. The latter deals with differentiated form and content of the discussion between competent researchers in a separate knowledge domain. In reality, the abstract and specific score, known as scientific knowledge, occurs thanks to a verbalized exchange of thoughts, notions, hypotheses, assumptions, and observations between researchers. Still:

The score defines which move in conversation is correct. Among other things, logical values of sentences and extensions of predicates depend on what is present in the score. Such a conversational score is "a local version of common knowledge" and includes, among other things, presuppositions, scopes of quantifiers, proper names' references, appropriate comparative classes, patterns, etc. The scope tends to evolve in such a way that we could assume every move in a conversation as correct. The characteristic feature of the score involves the operation of rules of accommodation in it. The operation of such rules results in the fact that "whatever will one say, the others will interpret it in a way that they could treat it as correct" given the statement meets some necessary conditions necessary conditions (among others, *the conditions of truthfulness and trust* – emphasis F.P.).¹³

In such an understanding, any scientific knowledge, interpreted as a formalized, conventional, and structuralized conceptual and theoretical system, is a systematized score of scientific procedures of a given group of researchers. The group ceases to be the real world's direct emanation due to "multilateral immersion" in reality. In other words, the group immerses itself in culture, its products, and its practices. As a result, the group becomes a social construct, according to the sociology of knowledge methodology solid program. In the sociology of knowledge methodology, scientific facts mean artifacts. In other words, the artifacts include not only empirical and direct observation results but also

12 In studies on contextual theories of fuzziness, researchers also utilize the distinction between the external context and internal context. The former deals with the logical value of sentences and notions dependent on comparative class or generally accepted pattern, whereas the latter deals with the recognition of given notions dependent on accepted verdicts and accepted for the purpose of given conversation precision standards. See more in: J. Odrowąż-Ostrowska, *Kontekstualizm...*, pp. 158–159 and subsequent pages.

13 J. Odrowąż-Ostrowska, *Kontekstualizm...*, p. 203.

artificial products of researchers' subculture. The above relates to the fact that the researchers conduct scientific recordkeeping in the spirit of logical empiricism.¹⁴ Therefore, faultless disagreement relates to the researchers' perception, their conceptual and categorial articulation, and individual conceptualization and operationalization processes. We should understand faultless disagreement as a state or perspective of studies created during the process of specific scientific knowledge building. In such a frame of reference, the score of conversation between researchers becomes a "field of contradictory articulations," where the researchers constantly exchange thoughts, arguments, and rationale concerning the research object they defined earlier. From the point of view of existing meta-principles concerning scientific reflection cultivation, such an aporetic analytic and research sphere is synonymous with the existence of systems of beliefs, conclusions, and rationale in the research community. We can characterize the above systems as often contradictory but correct.

The previous analysis presents the scientific process' manifoldness, especially in the context of the relationship between a researcher, i.e., a subject who starts the analysis, and the research object, i.e., defined studied reality. In the relationship, we can observe the mutual intersection of linguistic and semiotic issues, epistemic considerations, and considerations strictly related to nomological knowledge building in a given scientific domain. However, in the context of the above issues, the faultless disagreement implies that we must keep two relationships in mind, whenever we consider the research process:

1. Cognitive relation between the research subject and object, i.e., different dependencies which arise between the researcher/research subject, in the whole of his or her characteristics, and the research object in the whole of its capabilities and limitations. In the context of scientific cognition relativity, we can include several key issues in the set. First, we can include cognitive entity's perceptive directness/indirectness, i.e., unassuming sensory perception against research based on realized or unrealized presuppositions, observation's primariness, and secondariness in relation to theory. Second,

14 A. Grobler, *Metodologia nauk* (Kraków: 2009), pp. 274–278. We should stress the fact that social constructivism becomes popular among researchers who study the researcher–research object relationship, especially in new knowledge domains. We can exemplify the above with cognitive neuroscience. The researchers in this domain created a culture embodied-embedded mind paradigm. See more in: M. Hohol, *Wyjaśnić umysł. Struktura teorii neurokognitywnych* (Kraków: 2013), pp. 125–152.

we can include environmental and group recognition of given scientific investigation forms. The recognition deals with the problem of scientists that designate criteria to recognize judgments, sentences, statements, and theories as scientific. Third, we can include subjective demarcation, i.e., the issue of accuracy and lack of precision in the process of defining the analyzed object in a given science.

2. Cognitive relation between a unitary and social research aspect, i.e., the dilemma concerning primariness and secondariness of individual knowledge in comparison to social, accumulated knowledge. The above means the decisions concerning the subject of importance, adequateness, rightness, and veracity of individual and social justifications that appear during the research process. The latter concerns the researchers' collective opinion. The above involves the question of scientific knowledge growth's essence. Does the growth result from individual and autonomous research work, which assumes the relative cognitive, and theoretical and methodological independence of individual subjects? Or maybe we deal with the opposite situation in which the environment determines the growth in scientific knowledge. In other words, the knowledge depends on socially accepted models of thinking, research, and epistemic culture, which are in force in a given research society.

Theoretical justifications for research discrepancy

Now we should consider the origins of such objective analytical and research difficulties and discrepancies among the competent political scientists concerning the research object. Therefore, we should consider the role and importance of the subject in the research process. Obviously, we could answer these questions in many different ways, from different points of view, as well as utilize different justifications that separate the knowledge domain created. Cognitivists, linguists, cognitive psychologists, and naturalistic epistemologists would differ in their explanations of the issue. Despite the conceptual differences, we can speak of a group of beliefs and stances, which lead to similar conclusions in a systematic approach. I mean the individual theorists' research intuitions and concepts created by formalized knowledge domains, which explain the current faultless disagreement state in research practice reasonably and factually. However, before I present the faultless disagreement's cognitive consequences and methodological effects in the domain of political science, I will discuss the selected theories, which do not perceive research discrepancy–accuracy as something peculiar or dangerous. Instead, the research discrepancy–accuracy becomes an opportunity

and starting point for heuristic scientific searches. If we want to create a set of such coherent concepts, we can include such theories as:¹⁵

1. On the linguistic and epistemic level: John R Searle's hidden "default positions" concept, Sapir-Whorf's linguistic relativity hypothesis, Hilary Putnam's conceptual relativity theory, and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's radical conventionalism's assumptions.
2. On the cognitive and perceptive level: the automatic-reflexive perception theory, phenomenological concept of consciousness (qualia), perceptive readiness concept and cognitive representations in cognitive psychology, and research aspectuality expressed with Wittgenstein's "rabbit-duck" dilemma.

In the case of linguistic and epistemic level, we speak of a group of antirealist stances, which in their assumptions underline the fact that every kind of knowledge concerning studied reality is always dependent on a subjective point of view. In other words, knowledge depends on the researcher, his or her conceptualization, and the way of theorizing. Therefore, specialists always study the real world with the help of only a set of intellectual analytical tools available in a given situation. However, we must stress that antirealists doubt that the real world exists independently of us. The intellectual analytical tools function as coherent yet alternative research, conceptual, and theoretical constructs: most often, they include relatively systematized, concretized, and defined concepts, ideas, and scientists' intuitions. In such an understanding, every kind of knowledge, in a gradable way, depends on existing linguistic conventions, established and often temporally accepted cognitive schemes, and, to put it more broadly, scientific practices that occurred in a given culture.

In such an interpretation, there are no unambiguous decisions concerning factual usefulness, adequateness, and relevance of given research practice as multiple opposite ways to conduct research professionally and relevantly exist. Moreover, as John Searle said, the above alternative ways originate from different default positions. He defines the default positions in the following words:

15 The presented theories concerning the subject of simultaneous discrepancy and research accuracy in scientific practice include only some of the stances related to the issue of research relativity and methodological relativism. In the case of this article, I included theoretical concepts which I subjectively choose. My sole goal was to present the intellectual process that deals with researchers and knowledge domain that "embrace" the state of faultless disagreement.

Default positions are the views we hold prereflectively so that any departure from them requires a conscious effort and a convincing argument. ... Among the default positions that form our cognitive Background, perhaps the most fundamental is a certain set of presuppositions about reality and truth. Typically when we act, think, or talk, we take for granted a certain way that our actions, thoughts, and talk relate to things outside us ... , but when the Background is functioning—when it is, so to speak, doing its job – we do not need a theory. Such presuppositions are prior to theories.¹⁶

The default positions concept understood as presuppositions in relation to a given theoretical discourse mean a factual connection between research practice and a given cultural practice. In such an approach, a social sphere, together with a language, standards of conduct, patterns of action, style of thinking, epistemic axioms, and research principles, have a direct impact on the quality and content of conducted research. Researchers are often unaware of the impact's presence. Therefore, the cultural pluralism is equivalent to the linguistic, cognitive, and theoretical and methodological pluralism.

Sapir-Whorf's linguistic relativity hypothesis supplements the above stance because its authors characterize the language's role and importance as primary. In their opinion, the language's role and importance are primary as they organize human experience in an unassuming way because a language means a "habit and cultural non est disputandum." The language allows us to interpret, assess, and analyze: these actions can contradict each other. In other words, various linguistic systems, which often arose in distinctive cultures, directly and primarily form the scientific standards of conduct, types of stances, as well as ways in which one perceives, defines, understands, and explains. Still, there is no single way to conduct science as there is no single, universal language. The above means the situation in which a researcher wants to conduct given research work. Still, he or she cannot go "beyond" the language he or she uses to work because the language constitutes both the researcher, i.e., the researching entity, and the analyzed object. For example, in Western civilization, the understanding of the concept of time, space, and matter would not be the result of Newton's genius intuitions. Instead, the above concepts would be the assumptions of the culture and language in which Newton worked. According to the hypothesis:

Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and

16 J. R. Searle, *Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), pp. 9–12

that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the “real world” is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. . . . We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation.¹⁷

Hilary Putnam, the representative of internal realism, and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, the representative of radical conventionalism, spoke of the issue in a similar vein. Putnam believed that any scientific reflection on reality means a direct reflection of reality, i.e., research entity’s intentionality. The research entity’s intentionality means that the number of analyzed objects in science directly depends on the choice of a conceptual system. Therefore, in scholarly practice, research objects do not exist independently of the linguistic plane: in reality, there are no “extralinguistic” analyses, nor analyses in which researchers omit the formalized language issue. Ajdukiewicz, on the other hand, believed that any scientific and intellectual work directly links with the choice of a given conceptual system, i.e., conventional research decision concerning the use of a given terminology. Thanks to the terminology, a researcher can make claims on the research subject. Therefore, the above constitutes the conceptual, definitive, and categorial equipment of a researcher in the research process. De facto, the above leads to the choice of the world’s linguistic image. At the same time, research communities often create different world’s linguistic images, which are mutually untranslatable and distinctive. The above means the situation in which the linguistic and semiotic sphere becomes a pre-plane: a starting point to start an intellectual effort. Moreover, the choice of the conceptual system, understood as a core of all scientific considerations, leads both to changes in meaning, as well as to empirical and logical reevaluations in science.¹⁸

On the cognitive level, we deal with theories concerning the subject of dual-process models, which assume that the research entity’s perception results from automatic processes, i.e., an area in the brain, which is responsible for direct perception. “The main function [of the above area] is to produce the stream of consciousness that we experience as the real world—not just the objects of the real world, but also the semantic and affective associations of those objects.” The dual-process models also assume that the research entity’s perception result from reflective awareness, i.e., the cultural perception area, in which the consciousness’

17 B. L. Whorf, *Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1956), p. 134.

18 K. Ajdukiewicz, *Język i poznanie* (Warszawa: 1985), Vol. I, pp. 175–195.

creation results from patterns of conduct, interpretation, and meaning, which are rooted in culture.¹⁹ Still, studies on phenomenological consciousness reflect the above division, especially in the “qualia” theory. In theory, qualia mean qualitatively defined sensations, available firsthand. In its core, the theory refers to cognitive diversity and distinctive perceptive, somatic, emotive, and volitional modalities. Therefore, we can speak of two functions of qualia. First, I mean the internal function, i.e., the subjectively oriented perception, organism’s, or entity’s internal reaction to the surroundings. Second, I mean the external function, i.e., the socialized and corrected perceptive information, which is supposed to cognitively stabilize the researched objects.²⁰

In turn, cognitive psychologists speak of perceptual readiness, related to the constructivist theory of perception, which underlines the indirectness of all cognition. The indirectness involves a situation in which, between the external world and cognitive entity, numerous representations are present and take the form of schemes that function in human minds. In such an approach, specialists treat the relationship between the researcher and the research object as a multifaceted observation process, which bases on the sensory data confrontation mechanism and mental data. The former deals with dynamic and variable information from the surroundings, whereas the latter deals with rooted schemes used to interpret information that comes from the surroundings. The adaptation mechanism becomes the essence of the process, in which we deal with a standardization of data that comes from the sensory perception. In other words, we deal with sensory categorization. Apart from the sensory categorization, we deal with the memory schemes’ search for traits or sets of traits that suit the existing cognitive constructs best. In other words, we deal with memory categorization. At the same time, constructivists bring our attention to the entity’s perceptual readiness, which shows how easy it is to use given representations to receive, analyze, and perceive given perceptual material. Therefore, constructivists speak of two basic groups of factors that influence the entity’s perceptual readiness:

1. External factors, which include two basic issues. First, external factors include the frequency of previous experiences, i.e., experience in sensory

19 M. D. Liberman, R. Gaunt, D. T. Gilbert, Y. Trope, “Reflection and Reflexion: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Approach to Attributional Inference,” in: *Advances in experimental social psychology*, ed. M. P. Zanna (Academic Press, 2002) Vol. XXXIV, pp. 199–249. (24 Sep. 2020) [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601\(02\)80006-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(02)80006-5).

20 W. Dziarnowska, “Subiektywna natura świadomości. O funkcji jakościów,” in: *Funkcje umysłu*, eds. M. Urbański and P. Przybysz (Poznań: 2009), pp. 29–59.

data receiving has an impact on better perceptual readiness. In other words, if a cognitive entity once again experiences the same phenomena, processes, states of affairs, he or she can match, cognize, and understand them better. Second, external factors include social consequences, i.e., perception highly depends on social factors, in which we can observe clear stereotyping and conformism. Categories used by other cognitive entities show higher perceptual readiness.

2. Internal factors, which include three basic issues. First, internal factors include the number of perceptual categories used by the cognitive subject. The lesser the number of these categories, the higher the perceptual readiness. Therefore, the higher the schematization and dogmatism in the perception of reality. Second, internal factors include cognitive integration. The stronger the connections between the cognitive schemes, the higher the entities' perceptual readiness. Finally, internal factors include motivational consequences. Perception is not fully impartial and objective: it is quite the opposite, as perception depends on goals, motivations, preferences, and emotions of the cognitive entity.²¹

If we consider the psychology of perception, we can exemplify the above approach concerning the research subject and research object relationship with the "rabbit-duck" dilemma. The "rabbit-duck" dilemma involves a situation in which the object of perception or analysis, on the one hand, appears as a duck, whereas, on the other hand, it appears as a rabbit, depending on the used interpretative perspective. The dilemma means the aspectual perception of the research object, where the formula "I see as" becomes the standard and integral starting point to conduct different scientific analyses. In the above situation, the objective, or even necessary, aspectual state refers both to the given research object's aspects, i.e., "rabbit-duck," as well as to individual aspects treated as separate, completely new, subjects of scientific investigation.²² In such an approach, aspectuality relates to culture, in which we can observe distinct rules, patterns, ways to perceive, as well as values, which dictate how one conducts science. In other words, aspectuality means divergent cognitive structures, descriptive and explanatory schemes, and interpretations used by individual researchers in the given research subject's area. The above situation leads to paradigmatic differentiation in the exact sciences'

21 T. Maruszewski, *Psychologia poznania. Umysł i świat* (Gdańsk: 2011), pp. 60–83.

22 L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), p. 204e and subsequent pages.

area. De facto, the paradigmatic differentiation originates from culture. Thomas S. Kuhn writes on the issue in the following way:

Nevertheless, paradigm changes do cause scientists to see the world of their research-engagement differently. In so far as their only recourse to that world is through what they see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different world. It is as elementary prototypes for these transformations of the scientist's world that the familiar demonstrations of a switch in visual gestalt prove so suggestive. What were ducks in the scientist's world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards.²³

To sum up the previous considerations, we can clearly observe that, despite the formal and relevant differentiation, the above theoretical concepts present the subject of cognitive and research complexity. Moreover, the above theoretical concepts present the issue of determinants, which influence the final shape and course of the research process in a gradable way. In a simplified way, we can distinguish two basic components of analytic scientific actions, which remain in a close mutual relationship:

1. Subjective component, which, as a whole, depends on the researcher's stance itself. In such an understanding, we can mainly distinguish such elements as the individual sensory perception, the internalized pattern of behaviors, values, theories, norms, and directives, the language used, the applied schemes of cognition, definition, explanation, and categorization. Moreover, we can distinguish such elements as the scope of epistemological sympathies and antipathies, as well as workshop efficiency and research curiosity.
2. Component of surroundings, which results from the research community. In other words, the component results from habits, standards, procedures, actions, and interpretations rooted in the community's culture, and inter-subjective context of discovery and explanation. Moreover, the component results from established and accepted semantic scopes, predicates in the given knowledge domain's language, accepted research conventions, relativity, and temporality of theoretical approaches and conceptual systems in scholarly practice. Finally, the component also includes characteristics and properties of external surroundings as we can observe that given phenomena, processes, and states of affairs take place there, and require scientific reflection.

Such a differentiation shows that research duality is inalienable, as any analytical and research activity in a given knowledge domain always results from

23 T. S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), p. 116

introspective and extrospective experiences. Barbara Krauz-Mozer proposed two patterns of “scientific” in political science and assessed them. The above patterns include the analytical and empirical model and hermeneutic and humanistic model. She writes on the duality experience with the following words:

The supporters of both science’s patterns that function in the social science’s domain argue about the goal of scholarly practice, the cognitive value of theory, the concept of research object in social sciences. Consequently, they argue over the right method, which would let them scientifically cognize the research object. The method can base on either objective external experience, such as extrospective experience, or subjective internal experience, such as introspective experience. ... On the one hand, some scientists claim that theses which one cannot qualify as true or false cannot belong to science. On the other hand, other scientists believe that sciences that study the world of social phenomena should attempt to understand human activities and gather knowledge concerning subjective human activities. The above sciences should do so because the “society” is a result of units’ mental actions, which give society a constantly modified meaning. Therefore, assessment of scientific findings in terms of truth and falsehood is unnecessary in this context.²⁴

Still, the discussion of priority and importance of introspection over extrospection and the other way around becomes a dilemma, which one cannot simply solve. In the face of complexity and multifacetedness of the research process, as well as pluralism concerning the functioning interference and methodological mechanisms in political science, I find it hard to make categorical, unilateral decisions. We can rather speak of a dual fusion between the introspective and extrospective sphere, where a political analysis always results from these two components. The above means a synthesis between subjective experiences and social and environmental experiences. The former means subjective perception, individual assessments of the research object, subjective consciousness of one’s cognitive and research capabilities and limitations, and internalization of research, cognitive, and concluding patterns. The latter means the entity’s objective experience. On the one hand, the entity’s objective experience results from scientific realism, i.e., the existence of processes, facts, states of affairs in the world, independent of the cognitive subject. On the other hand, the entity’s objective experience results from established and culturally accepted research practices’ canon.

24 B. Krauz-Mozer, *Teorie polityki. Założenia metodologiczne* (Warszawa: 2005), p. 49.

The effects of faultless disagreement in political science

If political science analyses become a result of introspective and extrospective experience's duality, we reach a point in which every scientific research, conducted in the political science's domain, its conceptualization, operationalization, course, and evaluation, remain in dual dependency. On the one hand, the isolated research entity determines the research. The research entity gives the analyses a distinct character through his or her own choice concerning the application of theoretical political axioms, epistemic directives, research methods, descriptive and analytical tools, and evaluation systems. On the other hand, the research, in a gradable way, depends on existing, conventionally accepted standards of conducting research activity in a given research society, where intersubjective communication between researchers bases on established and active base assumptions. These assumptions concern the subject of acquiring scientific rationality, adequateness, cognoscibility, veracity, effectiveness, etc. Basically, such a double determination does not prevent us from scientific speculation and searches for heuristic methods of problem solving. Indeed, the double determination allows us to experiment with innovative theoretical political perspectives and methods which go beyond the existing canon or paradigm. Obviously, the impulse to go beyond the boundaries of scientific explication can originate from intellectual anxiety and theorist's objection, who is not satisfied with a functioning set of analytical and research tools in the political science domain. Moreover, the impulse can originate from an actual political practice, where completely new facts, events, processes, and states of affairs appear. The above phenomena require to be scientifically defined, described and explained.

In such circumstances, the research entity's autonomy, ingenuity, and intellectual objection, together with variability, dynamics, indeterminacy, and scope of political science's interdisciplinary character, results in the state of faultless disagreement. In other words, the duality of research experience in political science fully presents the existence of an analytical and research discrepancy state. In the above discrepancy state, individual researchers of political phenomena decide differently on the political reality's issue. Still, such differentiation can occur both on the subjective and theoretical plane, as well as on the methodological plane. In a simplified way, we can speak of two types of faultless disagreement's functioning consequences in the scholarly practice of political science:

1. Epistemological consequences, which relate to subjective decisions in the political science's domain. The subjective decisions include the contextual and aspectual perception of the research object, cognitive relativization, and relativity, especially deflationary understanding of truth. Moreover, the

subjective decisions include theoretical pluralism, in which the formal correctness of theorizing and theoretical antagonism mean the same.

2. Research consequences, which relate to research multiparadigmality in the political science's domain, including the individual researchers' preference for distinctive research strategies in the context of production of reliable and cohesive political knowledge.

In the first case, I mean the scientific cognition's aspectuality, in which the creation of any nomological knowledge in political science relates both to the experience of researched reality's unity and the epistemological differentiation of that reality. The above means a situation in which the entity's or entities' perceptions differ when they study or analyze the same thing. Still, in such a situation, the notion of aspectuality is somewhat ambiguous. Józef Niżnik describes the above issue with the following words:

As we speak of "different aspects," we can relate them either to the differences in perception itself or to distinctive "sides" of reality. Let us characterize the first case as an aspect in the subjective sense. In turn, we can characterize the second case as an aspect in the objective sense.²⁵

In other words, I mean the dual analytical and research aspectuality, in which, on the one hand, the cognitive subject's behavior and stance itself determines the variety of perceptions. The cognitive subject's behavior and stance involve the researcher's theoretical and methodological self-awareness, proposed research goals, accepted research paradigm, recognized worldview, available funds, existing intellectual fashion, etc. On the other hand, the dual analytical and research aspectuality depends on the researched matter's overview itself, in a gradable way. In such a situation, the analysis's results base on the investigation's object's immanent aspectuality. For example, the phenomenon of political leadership understood as a highly specified political research's object, creates opportunities for scientific overview itself. Therefore, we can study the dependencies between a political leader and supporters from the microanalytical level. The former involves scientific studies on leadership qualities, personality and leader's skills, leadership styles, etc. The latter involves scientific considerations on the social, organizational, and environmental context in which political leadership

25 J. Niżnik, *Przedmiot poznania w naukach społecznych* (Warszawa: 1979), pp. 21–22. See more in: M. Karwat, "Przedmiot badań politologicznych w świetle zasady aspektowości," in: *Teoretyczne podstawy socjologii wiedzy*, eds. P. Bytniewski and M. Chałubiński (Lublin: 2006), pp. 38–57.

occurs.²⁶ Moreover, from the linguistic point of view, we can speak of direct links between the research process and different contexts, which undoubtedly encourages cognitive and research objective relativization. In such a situation, any scientific considerations, or to be more specific, the relationship between the cognitive subject and the research object, fit into several contexts. First, the contexts include representation, i.e., conventional languages and their linguistic representations' diversity, and representation's relativity, which means the relationship between the meaning and reality. Second, the contexts include conditions, i.e., the notion of meaning conditions' determination, including the determination of veracity or falseness of given notions or statements. Finally, the contexts include usage, i.e., the issue of notions' meaning in science. The above issue deals with the question of whether the issue itself depends on some intangible, mental, abstract creations, such as the content of thoughts, or is it the other way round. In the opposite situation, the context of usage determines the issue.²⁷

The redefinition of the classical, substantial idea of truth by deflationism is one of the cognitive consequences of political knowledge's gradable dependency on the aspectuality principle and social and cultural contextualization mechanism, known as relativistic epistemology.²⁸ An example of another consequence involves the relativization of background knowledge based on basic statements. In other words, background knowledge bases on empirical observation, which scientists theorized in advance in the light of clear or enthymematic acceptance of assumptions or theses. In the empirical observation, scientists underline the temporary, cancelable, and conventional nature of these sentences. The above means a situation in which scientific knowledge inevitably becomes revised. Utilizing Popper's terminology, we deal with empirical basis's temporariness²⁹

26 F. Pierzchalski, *Morfogeneza przywództwa politycznego. Pomiędzy strukturą a podmiotowością sprawczą* (Bydgoszcz: 2013), pp. 235–238.

27 D. Leszczyński, *Struktura poznawcza...*, pp. 608–624.

28 For a deflationist, the notion of truth is a somewhat trivial term, a so-called “empty compliment.” More importantly, the notion of truth depends on different determinants, which include linguistic, epistemic, cultural, and logic determinants. Therefore, one of the deflationism's main theses assumes that one can eliminate the predicate of truth in any context. Among others, we can include Frank P. Ramsey, Alfred J. Ayer, Willard V. Quine, and Paul Horwich into the group of precursors of deflational, antirealist way of thinking on truth. See more in: C. Cieśliński, *Deflacyjna koncepcja prawdy. Wybrane zagadnienia logiczne* (Warszawa: 2009), pp. 7–70; A. Grobler, *Prawda a względność* (Kraków: 2002), pp. 19–45.

29 Karl R. Popper presented the issue of basic statements' recognition in a given knowledge domain in a form of Fries' trilemma, which involves the choice between dogmatism,

in political science, in which we neither can define once confirmed research hypotheses as permanent nor can we define certain statements and political categories as unchangeable. It is quite the opposite, as political knowledge is disputable, and what is more, the political knowledge's core, i.e., basic statements, become falsified in the spirit of fallibilism. The falsification is a consequence of individual research communities' critical analyses of a research object defined in advance.

On the theoretical political level, the above means that political science's analytical and research complexity results in objective and necessary theoretical differentiation within the framework of different political reflections conduct. We can exemplify the complexity with the duality of research experience. In this respect, a real pluralism of theorizing among competent researchers occurs, where we can observe a constant development and polishing of theoretical and research tools. Theoretical pluralism often involves the perception concerning not only the research object and entity but also concerning the definition of science in the political science's context. The perception concerning the research object means the directness and indirectness of an overview of given objects, facts, and processes, the partial or full glance at politics, causality or randomness of political reality, and predictableness or emergence of politics. The perception concerning the research entity means the researcher's potentials and deficits, his or her goals, function, role, which he or she establishes, or ones that other interested parties expect the researcher to establish. Still, we cannot forget that such an objective, competitive tension between theories in a given knowledge:

domain "lets us reveal the theories" fortes and weaknesses, recognize their pragmatic pedigrees, basic assumptions, and unavoidable limitations. As a result, the tension lets us define the formulated empirical justifications' cognitive value by defining the levels in which they agree with prior, visual reports. However, first of all, the tension defends the researcher from disorientation and drift in the direction of self-destruction. Moreover, the tension prevents the researcher from confusing the actual state of things with theories concerning how we speak and think of these things.³⁰

psychologism, and infinite regress. The empirical basis's temporariness idea was supposed resolve the dilemma. See more in: K. R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2002), pp. 76–89; A. Chmielewski, *Filozofia Poppera. Analiza krytyczna* (Wrocław: 2003), pp. 57–62.

- 30 B. Krauz-Mozer, P. Borowiec, and P. Ścigaj, eds., *Kim jesteś, politologu? Historia i stan dyscypliny w Polsce* (Kraków: 2012), Vol. II, p. 260. When we consider scientific typologies that reflect the factual theoretical pluralism in the political science domain, we should pay special attention to the classification proposed by Mirosław Karwat. Karwat distinguished the following theories of politics, according to the intersection of

In turn, in the second case, I mean the usage of distinct, but coherent analytical and research strategies in the scientific work, which means the methodological pluralism, the research multiparadigmality, and the variety of existing interpretative and explanatory approaches in the political science.³¹ The situation in Polish political science does not differ as a tendency to use different explanatory tools within broadly understood political research clearly manifests itself.³² Therefore, on the one hand, we can speak of Polish scientists' individual preferences concerning the use of strictly defined research methods. On the other hand, we can speak of the creation of distinct research strategies to explicate politics by competent methodologists themselves.³³ In other words, faultless disagreement on the explanatory and research level of one knowledge domain or research object results in pluralism, which means the functioning of autonomous, alternative, often contradictory methods and ways of scientific explanation.

To sum up, we may claim that the faultless disagreement state in modern political science is both natural and inalienable. We cannot possibly imagine an opposite intellectual and research situation in which unanimity and full consensus would prevail between the researchers or theoretical and methodological schools. But neither single scientific perception nor inferential meta-scheme, nor generally applied explanatory scheme, nor a single research method in political science exist, which would meet the individual scientists' expectations and

detailedness and integrity criteria: internal general theories of politics, aspectual general theories of politics, integral detailed theories, and aspectual detailed theories. See more in: M. Karwat, "Rodzaje teorii w nauce o polityce," in: *Czym jest...*, ed. Z. Blok, pp. 75–93.

- 31 T. Klementewicz, *Rozumienie polityki. Zarys metodologii nauki o polityce* (Warszawa: 2010), pp. 58–59.
- 32 The empirical research conducted by a science team from Krakow, supervised by Professor B. Krauz-Mozer, shows that Polish political scientists most often use comparative method (thirty-four percent), systems analysis (twenty-eight percent), survey method (eighteen percent), and historical method (sixteen percent). See more in: B. Krauz-Mozer, P. Borowiec, and P. Ścigaj, "eds.," *Kim jesteś...*, pp. 212–216.
- 33 Leszek Sobkowiak draws our attention to the issue. He indicated that factual analytical and methodological distinctiveness exists among the Polish political scientists. Sobkowiak distinguished, among other things, B. Krauz-Mozer's complementary approach, T. Klementewicz's problem strategy, and M. Karwat's syndromic depiction, which show that research pluralism exists in Polish political science. See more in: L. Sobkowiak, "Metodologiczne problemy zmiany politycznej," in: *Polityka i polityczność. Problemy teoretyczne i metodologiczne*, eds. A. Czajkowski and L. Sobkowiak (Wrocław: 2012), pp. 43–68.

strict criteria. Let us imagine a situation in which modern scientific and research practices in the social sciences domain could base on the knowledge's unification and homogenization on linguistic, ontological, epistemic, and methodological levels. Such a situation seems highly abstract and unlikely to happen. The discrepancies are too visible. Each time, the discrepancies fit into, for example, the research duality and conversational score among the researchers, when the political scientific deliberation becomes a "field of contradictory articulations." The above constitutes an aporetic analytical and research space, in which scientists exchange systems of beliefs, explanations, and justifications that are often contradictory but correct. The state of such faultless disagreement in the political science's domain does not indicate that such issues as backwardness, rubbishness, pseudoscience, lack of identity, and subjective and research self-consciousness' atrophy are present among political scientists. Instead, faultless disagreement involves an intellectual challenge, as multifaceted, dynamic, and emergent political reality challenged the fallible scientists who seek the matter's essence there, as they utilize imperfect analytical and research.

PART III: Key concepts and assumptions of political theory

Bohdan Kaczmarek

Politics as articulation of interests

Understanding politics as a sphere of social life, in which the process of articulation of social interests takes place – above all, interests of large social groups – is one of the popular models of politics interpretation applied in theory and political sociology. Sources of this interpretation may be looked for in various theoretical and methodological concepts. The intellectual tradition that stems from the achievements of Marxism, attempts at applying to the politics analysis the systematic approach inspired by the cybernetic approach, by the general systems theory or by the concept of socio-cultural systems of T. Parsons,¹ and the direct reference to the communicative characterization of politics represented in D. Easton's² concept were particularly significant, at least, in the Polish research on the essence of politics. Nowadays, connecting politics with broadly understood communication gains, as it may seem, new relevance. It is thanks to a number of reasons, ontological, but also epistemic. The modern world, not only politics, becomes more and more a communicative space, its character is decided more and more by processes connected to the flow of information, its analysis and synthesis, collection and interpretation. Knowledge becomes a more and more important factor, not only of social, economic, technological, cultural and political dynamics, but also the source and basis of social diversity, the cause

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- 1 T. Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies* (New York: 1965); T. Parsons, *Politics and Social Structure* (New York: 1969); T. Parsons, *Struktura społeczna a osobowość* (Warszawa: 1969); T. Parsons, *Szkice z teorii socjologicznej* (Warszawa: 1972); see also J. Jakubowski, "Władza: czy gra o sumie zerowej" in: T. Buksiński, ed., *Idee filozoficzne w polityce* (Poznań: 1968); A. Manterys, *Klasyczna idea definicji sytuacji* (Warszawa: 2000).
 - 2 D. Easton, *The Political System. An Inquiry into the State of Political Science* (Knopf: New York, 1953); D. Easton, *A System Analysis of Political Life*, Wiley, New York 1975; "Analiza systemów politycznych" in: J. Szacki, W. Derczyński, A. Jasińska-Kania, eds., *Elementy teorii socjologicznych* (Warszawa: 1975). In Poland, Easton's concepts were popularized by, among others, K. Ostrowski, *Rola związków zawodowych w polskim systemie politycznym* (Warszawa: 1970). Numerous publications that refer to this approach resulted from intense studies and discussions held by a team of researchers centered around the Center of Political Science Studies, under the supervision of Professor Artur Bodnar.

of contradictions and social conflicts. Symbolism, giving meanings becomes an area, in which the sense of collective actions is defined, which defines the way of life and modern societies' perception of their own aspirations. Social life may be more and more interpreted as a mechanism of collective learning. Reassessment of courses and scientific schools accompany these processes. In a sense it is the sign of our times that postmodernism, symbolism and constructivism are so popular in social sciences. They are characterized by a search for explanations of social reality in the sphere of creating meanings and symbols, in mechanisms of collective learning or even expressed in the perception of social practice, including science itself, as a narrative of sorts and a form of language defining the limits of human space of exchanging meanings. Numerous modern theoreticians treat communication processes as the basis of social existence of man and the basic mechanism of social rationalization, as they see in discourse the essence of modern man's social life.³

Thus, treating politics as articulation of interest may be connected to several, one would think, independent and sometimes even competing theoretical perspectives: dialectic and materialistic, systematic, symbolic and communicative, and of social rationality. In light of previous abundant number of works depicting politics as articulation of interests – independently from sometimes important differences among detailed approaches – one may treat this interpretation not only as a significant metaphor, but in fact as a mature analytical model. Thus, key theoretical issues, that is the category of interest, contradiction and conflict of interest, articulation of interests, understanding politics as articulation of interests and its social position, meaning and applicability of politics

3 See, for instance T. Buksiński, ed., *Idee filozoficzne w polityce*; T. Buksiński, ed., *Rozumność i racjonalność* (Poznań: 1997); in these collections of articles, there are certain interpretations of rationality and communication presented and analyzed, for instance the concept of J. Habermas. On the other hand, the perception of organized forms of social life as symbolic, cultural and also political spaces is strongly represented in sociology of organization and similar sciences. I will return to important interferences of research paradigms of organization and politics when I discuss the applicability of the perception of politics as articulation of interests. The cultural and political aspect of social systems is strongly emphasized by, for instance, T. Parsons in his concept of systems' functions: adaptation, integration, goals and latency. See also – works that analyze social life from the organizational perspective – for instance, G. Morgan, *Obrazy organizacji* (Warszawa: 1997); Ch. Hampden-Turner, A. Trompenaars, *Siedem kultur kapitalizmu* (Warszawa: 1998); Strategor, *Zarządzanie firmą. Strategie Struktury Decyzje Tożsamość* (Warszawa: 1999); M. Kostera, *Postmodernizm w zarządzaniu* (Warszawa: 1996).

interpretation as a process of articulation of social interests, require certain explanation and clarification.

1. Interest

The category of interest belongs to these notions that have key importance in social sciences. At the same time, it is very differently interpreted and entangled in basic theoretical and methodological conflicts of modern science. Its ambiguity may sometimes lead to fundamental misunderstandings; thus, there is a need of establishing in this matter several initial arrangements in order to advance the reasoning.⁴

Among many terms of the essence of interest, it is worth paying attention to the following:

- interest as an objective necessity
- interest as a pursuit
- interest as a need

4 Explaining human activity sources, especially collective social subjects through referring to the category of interests is characteristic for the Marxist tradition. Numerous other approaches to this matter were also under its influence. More on the subject of the understanding of interest and the significance of this category, among others, see J. Hochfeld, "Marksizm a socjologia stosunków politycznych" in: *Marksizm, Socjologia, Socjalizm. Wybór pism* (Warszawa: 1982); W. Wesołowski, *Klasy, warstwy i władza* (Warszawa: 1982); R. Dahrendorf "Teoria konfliktu w społeczeństwie przemysłowym" in: *Elementy teorii socjologicznych* (Warszawa: 1975); J. Drażkiewicz *Interesy a struktura społeczna* (Warszawa: 1982); J. Mucha, "Konfliktowe modele społeczeństwa we współczesnej socjologii niemarksistowskiej – próba typologii," *Studia Socjologiczne*, No. 1/1975; J.P. Georgica, "Kategoria interesu w naukach społecznych" in: *Prace Zespołu Marksistowskiej Teorii Polityki COM SNP* (Warszawa: 1976); M. Ziółkowski, "Propozycja zintegrowanej koncepcji socjologicznej interesów i wartości" in: E. Hałas, ed., *Teoria socjologiczna Floriana Znanieckiego a wyzwania XXI wieku* (Lublin: 1999); W. Wesołowski, "Niszczenie i tworzenie interesów w procesie systemowej transformacji. Próba teoretycznego ujęcia," *Kultura i Społeczeństwo*, No. 1/1995; M. Ziółkowski, "Interesy i wartości jako elementy świadomości społecznej," in: A. Jasińska-Kania, K.M. Słomczyński, eds., *Władza i struktura społeczna. Księga dedykowana Włodzimierzowi Wesołowskiemu* (Warszawa: 1999); J.P. Georgica, "Potrzeby i interesy jako czynniki determinujące działania polityczne" in: K. Opalek, ed., *Elementy teorii polityki* (Warszawa: 1989); R. Herbut, "Interes jako kategoria politologiczna" in: A.W. Jabłoński, L. Sobkowiak, eds., *Studia z teorii polityki* (Wrocław: 1996); M. Chmaj, M. Żmigrodzki, *Wprowadzenie do teorii polityki* (Lublin: 1996).

- interest as a conscious need
- interest as a value
- interest as a conviction
- interest as a desire
- interest as a favorable state, as a state or a process that allows to satisfy needs
- interest as economic and social relations
- interest as a relation between social relations and satisfaction of needs
- interest as a relation between needs and goods.

Exemplary formulations of the definition of interests may be the following:

Economic interests constitute ... a form of objective necessity for a particular man, group of people, layers, classes, society as an entirety, of the satisfaction of their emerging and developing needs.⁵

Or, according to another author:

The most primitive and at the same time, the most general expression of class interests is the pursuit of classes to increase their part in the division of the general mass of products.⁶

J.J. Wiatr interprets interests as a pursuit in a similar manner, as he considers that interests are constituted of such pursuits, the realization of which, in specific historical conditions, favors the maximal satisfaction of human needs.⁷ On the other hand, A. Bodnar treats interests as a specific category of needs, as he writes that:

All needs of individuals and social groups, which express the necessity of collective cooperation (cooperation with the collective) in order to achieve objective conditions of existence and development within the scope of a given need, may be recognized as the interest of individuals or social groups, as individual or collective, social interest.⁸

J. Szczepański deems interest to be a conscious need. He determines interest as:

... certain needs and their complexes, states of affairs, the achievement of which individuals and social groups recognize as desirable, valuable and sometimes necessary and for the achievement of which they mobilize their activity and means that they have at their disposal.⁹

5 J. Kronrod, *Zakony polityczeskoj ekonomii socjalizma* (Moscow: 1966), p. 54.

6 N. Bucharin, *Teoria materializmu historycznego* (Warszawa: 1936), p. 425.

7 J.J. Wiatr, *Socjologia stosunków politycznych* (Warszawa: 1977), p. 213.

8 A. Bodnar, *Ekonomika i polityka* (Warszawa: 1976), p. 50; a similar view is present in the work of S. Ehrlich, *Oblicza pluralizmów* (Warszawa: 1980), p. 16.

9 J. Szczepański, *Elementarne pojęcia socjologii* (Warszawa: 1972), p. 343.

J. Hochfeld deems value to be the basis of interest.¹⁰ The close connection of interests and values is also emphasized by M. Ziółkowski. He draws attention to the fact that previous sociological theories of interests and values are centered around similar theoretical problems. Thus, he proposes an integrated concept of interests and values understood as convictions that are an element of social awareness.¹¹ R. Herbut defines interests as conscious pursuits of man to realize a specific and common goal, at the same time, he specifies this definition in reference to political interests claiming that they are conscious desires of directing public politics as an entirety or specific decisions concerning the separation of political values in a specific direction, perceived by the interested as necessary to achieve the previously realized and articulated goals.¹² For P. Jaszczenko, economic interests constitute a category expressing economic relations in connection to satisfying material needs.¹³ According to W. Wesołowski, the category of interest refers to the relations between a certain objective/current state and the evaluation of this state from the point of view of the benefit that it provides to a certain individual or group. The criterion of profitableness is composed of the participation in goods and values that occur in a limited amount and are unequally distributed among people.¹⁴ In a subsequent work, this author specifies that interests are objective states or processes perceived as enabling the satisfaction of physiological, economic and cultural needs of individuals and groups.¹⁵ J. Drążkiewicz points out that the interest of a specified social subject is to participate in the social relation that allows the satisfaction of its needs.¹⁶ O. Cetwiński is the author of the last of the above mentioned definitions of interest. He thinks that:

... by defining all things, relations or states of affairs, material and immaterial ones, which are used to realize needs, as goods, interest may be characterized as a certain relation that links needs with the goods that satisfy them.¹⁷

10 J. Hochfeld, *Studia o marksowskiej teorii społeczeństwa*, pp. 587–588.

11 M. Ziółkowski, *Interesy i wartości jako elementy świadomości społecznej*, pp. 121–122.

12 R. Herbut, *Interes polityczny jako kategoria politologiczna*, p. 41.

13 P. Jaszczenko, "O prirodzie ekonomicznych interesów," *Ekonomiczeskije nauki*, No. 3/1973.

14 W. Wesołowski, *Klasy, warstwy, władza*, p. 107.

15 W. Wesołowski, *Niszczanie i tworzenie interesów*, p. 3.

16 J. Drążkiewicz, *Interesy a struktura*, p. 81.

17 O. Cetwiński, "Zjawisko i proces polityczny" in: K. Opałek, ed., *Metodologiczne i teoretyczne problemy nauk politycznych* (Warszawa: 1975), p. 66.

The above cited exemplary definitions of interest may be divided into two groups: terms emphasizing the objective character of interests and those that assume that interests have, above all, a subjective, psychological character. Some approaches may be attributed with a conviction that an interest of a given subject constitutes something that objectively exists; others, on the other hand, with the view that interests are a form of social awareness. In the first case, one assumes that something may be an interest of a subject independently from its awareness, knowledge or will; in the second, the subject's interest may be only what this subject thinks its interest is. The ontological status of the category of interest constitutes the criterion of this division. Terms, such as pursuit, conscious need, value, conviction, desire may be, in principle, counted among the subjective and psychological orientation. In principle, because values may be interpreted in various ways. Perceiving values as a psycho-social phenomenon, as for instance the result of the relation between an experiencing and active subject and objects of the external world, dominates.¹⁸ Values may be also attributed with being objective or even absolute. Such an understating of values may be found in numerous varieties of philosophical idealism that understands values as innate and a priori beings, beings that are eternal and only partly accessible to the human experience and cognition. The objective understanding of values may also be found in such interpretations, which bring together their sense and the meaning of the category of interest, for instance when one claims that elements of nature and society, which are favorable to the subject independently from the degree of it being conscious about this fact, are values.

The objective perception of interest is visible in determining interest as the objective necessity, need, economic and social relations, relation between social relations and satisfaction of needs or relations between needs and goods that are used for their satisfaction. In this case, much depends on the manner of interpreting needs. Here, one may also see a possibility of their subjective or objective perception, an objective shortage of resources necessary for existence and development of a certain subject or feeling their shortage may also be a need. The original concept of Wesołowski about the favorable state of a given subject rather suggests psychological analogies, as there appears a problem of the status

18 On the subject of values, see for instance A. Kłoskowska, *Socjologia kultury* (Warszawa: 1981), p. 175. Political values may be linked to the system of socially determined preferences, to ideals functioning in the social awareness. M. Karwat and W. Milanowski do so in: "Wartości polityczne" in: K. Opalek, ed., *Elementy teorii polityki* (Warszawa: 1989).

of criteria of this profitableness, drawing attention to the objective but perceived states and processes seems to much more emphasize the objective status of interests than referring to the objectified criteria of profitableness. Deciding the ontological status of interests leads, in fact, to choices of philosophical and ideological character, it is a declaration of assumptions adopted by a researcher. Some define such problems as essentially questionable, even though the thesis on essential questionability itself does not have to, firstly, lead to a conclusion on the permanent undecidability and secondly, this thesis is also questionable and problematic.¹⁹ Broad argumentation of the position concerning the ontological status of interests would require a separate treatise. Nevertheless, a declaration in this matter, even a preliminary one, seems to be necessary. Interests in their nature have an objective character. It is not decided by their relation with ideas understood as absolute and a priori beings that construct social and natural life. The objective character of interests is the consequence of the objectivity of the world's existence. It does not mean the fatalistic interpretation of the role of interests, which could be read in the terms that identify them with the objective necessity or economic and social relations. In these definitions, there is a conviction about the deterministic and mechanistic dependence of the subject of interest from its position in the historical, social and economic context; meanwhile, history does not happen by itself and requires an active participation of people who pursue the realization of their interests. However, it means an assumption that something may be in someone's interest even when this person is not aware of it or imagines something completely different when engaging in activities that are failed in advance. If one used such an extreme and simplified example, one could imagine a subject thinking that its interest is to be on time for a meeting, or for a class at the university. By having this conviction, this subject runs into the street, despite the red light and causes a collision with different participants of the traffic. In an extreme situation, the collision may lead to the destruction of the subject of interest, as the second participant of the collision turned out to be more armored than the described subject. Thus, it is difficult to acknowledge that what, in a given moment, the subject considered to be its interest, was actually so. The subjective interpretation of interest in this situation would be false, as we did not assume, after all,

19 See T. Ball, "Władza" in: R.E. Goodin, P. Pettit, eds., *Przewodnik po współczesnej filozofii politycznej* (Warszawa: 1998), pp. 706–709; A. Waśkiewicz, *Interpretacja teorii politycznej. Spór "o metodę we współczesnej literaturze anglosaskiej"* (Warszawa: 1998), pp. 59–68.


the subject having suicidal tendencies. We reach here the problem of the limits of interest. If interest always belongs to someone, if it is a relation between the subject and its environment in some way, then the existence of the subject of interest is the condition of the existence of this relation. The subject's interest may be to change the form of its existence, for instance a metamorphosis or a transformation, there are numerous examples of such phenomena, not only in social life, but also in nature.

The acknowledgement of an objective in essence character of interests raised and raises doubts and protests.²⁰ One of the premises of this resistance to the acceptance of the objective, ontological status of interests is the repeatedly confirmed in history phenomenon of the abuse of this construction to impose to others one's own ideas concerning their real interests. These situations may be found in the history of religious wars, in the experiences of totalitarianism, in various attempts at using Plato's cave metaphor to manipulate social life and other people. These experiences cannot be trivialized. It is a simplification once again, however, one has to notice that the abuse or use of a certain tool for bad intentions and in violation to its purpose does not mean its falsehood or uselessness in general. A hammer may be used to many things different than hammering a nail. Making a conclusion that a hammer as a tool needs to be removed from the human instrumentarium, broadly understood as the appropriation of nature and the reproduction of material and immaterial conditions of social life, would be, as one could think, unjust and unreal.

If one rejects fatalistic interpretations, then among definitions of interest that recognize its objective character there are those that are about interest as a need and of defining it as a relation between a subject and its needs and social relations and as a relation between needs and goods. Identifying interest with a need leads to blurring the differences between these categories, with the objective understanding of needs it also suggests an interpretation that is extremely deterministic or even fatalistic. Thus, the relative definitions remain. Referring to the proposal of O. Cetwiński, one may acknowledge that interest is composed of a relation between needs and goods that are used to their satisfaction entangled in social relations of the subject of interest. The way of getting goods and satisfying the need is the content of this relation. The relation has a reflexive character. The sole getting of goods does not mean the satisfaction of the need.

20 See, for instance: A. Cawson, "Wprowadzenie. Wielość korporatywizmów: O konieczności mediatyzacji interesów na szczeblu pośrednim" in: J. Szczupaczyński, ed., *Władza i społeczeństwo* (Warszawa: 1995).

Its satisfaction is only possible after the appropriate exploitation of goods, after using them skillfully. In political life, we usually deal with an illusion that the acquisition of goods automatically satisfies the need. Every other election campaign demonstrates this. Many think that gaining power, by them or their party, will lead directly to the solution of social problems and satisfaction of needs. Subsequent practice efficiently makes the illusions disappear. If a certain social need is satisfied in the first place, it is the need to have power itself. The relation of interest may be illustrated with the following scheme:



O. Cetwiński aptly notices that the relation of interest has many arguments. It stems from the fact that interest is not a simple assignment of one goods to one need. Many arguments of the relation are defined by the fact that:

- for the satisfaction of a certain need it is sometimes necessary to provide many goods of different kinds;
- specified goods may satisfy many needs;
- a value of a certain social entity for its member influences in a modifying way the need, individual interests and particular interests of a part of the entirety introducing their hierarchy and order of their satisfaction;
- the satisfaction of specified needs requires in general the satisfaction of subsequent or/and resignation from the satisfaction of others.

2. Objective interest

The consequence of being in favor of the objective status of interests is the need to specify the understanding of objectivity and the reference to the forms of social awareness reflecting interests. The construction that serves to explain the dependence between interests and their realization is the differentiation of objective and subjective interest. The meaning and complexity of this distinction goes deeper than the sometimes-applied division of interest on overt and covert. In R. Dahrendorf's interpretation, covert interests are the interests connected to the social role fulfilled by a subject in a social structure that are independent from its conscious orientation, they are imposed in advance.

Overt interests constitute, on the other hand, the psychological reality, their content is composed of feelings, will and desire of the subject directed to a defined goal.²¹

The problem of the objective and subjective interest was intensely developed in Marxist concepts. Perhaps, it is what sometimes evokes moderation and excessive caution of certain researchers when undertaking this problem. Meanwhile, Marxism in this field developed numerous interesting interpretations, still inspiring and worth reflective continuation. The category of objective interest was very important in the analysis of transforming a class in itself in a class for itself. The class in itself was not aware of its historical and social position and the class for itself had such an awareness, it understood its social role and historical mission. The transformation of a class for itself required, among others, a revolutionary ideology granting an appropriate sense of vividly forming consciousness of interim, mostly socio-economic interests of the working class. On such assumption was based, for instance, Lenin's concept of contributing to the working class from the outside and a rising from it concept of a party of new, organized in a way that provides the realization of such task.²² This thought was developed and reinterpreted, among others, in the works of G. Lukacs, A. Gramsci,²³ who wrote about a historical bloc connecting intellectualists with folk as a condition of an effective historical creation. A similar train of thought may be found in R. Dahrendorf's differentiation of quasi-groups and groups of interest, or a concept of the class awareness and the class awareness of A. Giddens.²⁴ Many Polish authors were also engaged in this problem, among them were J. Szacki,²⁵ who interpreted ideology as a false awareness, W. Wesolowski, who analyzed the

21 R. Dahrendorf, *Teoria konfliktu*, pp. 441–444.

22 See, for instance: W.I. Lenin, *Co robić? Palące zagadnienia naszego ruchu*, *Dzieła* Vol. 5; R. Luksemburg, *Zagadnienia organizacyjne socjaldemokracji rosyjskiej*, *Wybór pism*, Vol. 1 (Warszawa: 1959); H. Zand, *Leninowska koncepcja partii* (Warszawa: 1977).

23 See, for instance: G. Lukacs, "Lenin. Studium struktury myśli," *Studia Filozoficzne*, No. 10/1978; G. Lukacs, *Historia i świadomość klasowa* (Warszawa: 1988); A. Gramsci, *Pisma wybrane* (Warszawa: 1961).

24 See R. Dahrendorf, *Teoria konfliktu*, pp.444–450; A. Giddens, *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies*, (London: 1973). These authors are referred to by J. Drażkiewicz, *Interesy*, pp. 96 and 80–82.

25 J. Szacki, "Uwagi o marksistowskim pojęciu świadomości fałszywej," *Studia Socjologiczne*, No. 2/1966; J. Szacki, ed., *Idea społeczeństwa komunistycznego w pracach klasyków marksizmu* (Warszawa: 1977).

so-called political class interests, P. Sztompka²⁶ or J.J. Wiatr.²⁷ The importance of this issue was also confirmed by contemporary history, as what else “Solidarity” from the years 1980–1981 was if not the illustration of interferences of the objective social conditions and their ideological and political expression, which was the testimony of bringing interests awareness also from the outside thanks to the alliance of at least an essential part of intellectualists with at least an essential part of folk?

It does not seem that not only the explanative value of the Marxist construction of objective interests and their subjective reflections expired along with the fall of the real socialism, and even so on the contrary, it gained new relevance.

The most classical proposal of defining the objective interest was given in the Polish socio-political literature by J. Hochfeld. He defined the objective class interest as a model of a specific system of symbols, “the function of which consists of the fact that they serve the vital for a given class or the maintenance or changing a certain social structure or a complete replacement of this structure by another.”²⁸ He explains the essence of the objective interest in the following manner: “the process of shaping awareness by antagonizing social positions has a tendency of focusing on the values that are the rationalization of pursuits heading to the maximization of privileges or the minimization of sufferings connected to the occupied positions. I would be willing to call the objective class interest a model of rationalization of these pursuits, which each time fulfils the condition of the optimal connection of maximized goals with chances and means of their realization.”²⁹ P. Sztompka represented a similar point of view. He recognized the objective interest as such a system of convictions, pursuits or desires that is maximally ambitious and, at the same time, historically adequate; the objective interest is such a system of values, which represents the maximal aspirations of the subject that are possible to realize in given historical conditions. The objectivity of interests was emphasized even more by the creators of Marxism. They wrote the following on the working class:

The question is not what this or that proletariat, or even the whole of the proletariat at the moment considers as its aim. The question is what the proletariat is, and what,

26 P. Sztompka, “O marksistowskim zaangażowaniu nauk społecznych,” *Studia Filozoficzne*, No. 8/1975; P. Sztompka, “Partia w lenińskim modelu społeczeństwa socjalistycznego,” *Studia Socjologiczne*, No. 4/1970.

27 J.J. Wiatr, *Marksistowska teoria rozwoju społecznego* (Warszawa: 1973); J.J. Wiatr, *Socjologia polityki*, (Warszawa: 1999); J.J. Wiatr, *Zmierzch systemu* (Warszawa: 1991).

28 J. Hochfeld, *Studia*, p. 589.

29 J. Hochfeld, *Studia*, pp. 588–589.

consequent on that being, it will be compelled to do. Its aim and historical action is irrevocably and obviously demonstrated in its own life situation as well as in the whole organization of bourgeois society today.³⁰

If this quotation was out of context, it would lead to a fatalistic attitude and sometimes it was so in history. Moreover, it is characteristic that the voluntary social practice is often and effectively accompanied by a legitimizing it fatalistic interpretation of one and only correct path in line with the natural order of things or the universal laws of history and development scenarios. It also does not seem that this dependence lost its meaning with the fall of real socialism, when one looks closer at, for instance, discussions on the systematic transformation, economic model of modern societies or model of democracy.

The objectivity of interest may – referring to, for instance, the above-mentioned examples – be understood in various ways:

1. As an independence from the awareness of the subject of interest

However, drawing a strict demarcation line between the objective reality and the awareness of man and his subjectively defined activity provides many problems. It cannot be done mechanically. This border is not some line, but rather it is a process of mutual influence, compatibilities and contradictions. The results of human activity undergo objectification in social practice, they become a component of the objective reality. The relation of the objective interest contains a necessity to undertake by the subject specified activities resulting from the situational context, in which the subject finds itself. Their refusal by the subject, for instance as a result of having by it a falsified image of reality actually changes the content of the interest relation. The content of the objective interest is changed. The necessary for the interest realization level of awareness and activity is the real relation of the incorporated subject. *However, what decides on the objective status of interest is its real existence.* The objective interest is incorporated into the objective conditions in the relation between needs and goods. It may be said that social reality is objective and subjective at the same time, as the way in which people perceive reality is in itself a part of reality.³¹ By going further with this activist conviction, one may come to a conclusion that the independence of the objective interest from the awareness is relative and is not its most important

30 K. Marx, F. Engels, *The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Critique* (Foreign Languages Publishing House: Moscow, 1956), p. 53.

31 On this subject see, for instance J.J. Wiatr, *Marksistowska teoria rozwoju społecznego*, pp. 185,186.

property. The objective interest is dependent from its imagination between needs and goods. A social subject tries to discover in its consciousness this relation, in accordance with the state of its knowledge and under the influence of a number of different – including social and psychological – conditionings, in accordance with previous experience, it tries to formulate the relation of interest in the social awareness. The content of this formulation and resulting from it practice influence reality, change it and also, the objective interest is transformed.

2. Another way of understanding the objectivity of interest is treating it as a reflection of historical necessity

Historical necessity may influence the relation of interest in the following way:

- via defining the subject of interest, its emerging from among other subjects entangled in social relations;
- via defining the needs of the subject;
- via defining the properties of goods necessary to satisfy needs, opportunities of gaining and using them.

However, historical necessity is not independent from man. It may be realized only via conscious social activity; thus, human activity modifies the objective situation components. It may recognize them and via their conscious use, take away from necessities their elemental character. It may be said that in the most general sense, historical necessity is the relation of objective, real conditions of action and action itself; thus, it is not something external when it comes to human actions. The division between the social subjects and the environment, between their activity and the environmental conditions and necessities, which are linked to it, including historical necessity, has a character of a dialectic relation, or as some call it, autopoiesis. What is external and objective is also created. The subject reacts with its objective environment, actually being a part of the same system. A flower is a part of a bee's system and not something completely external to the bee.³² Thus, historical necessity conditions the objective interest, it is not, however, identical to it. It is itself dependent from interest.

32 See H. Maturana, F. Varela, *Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realisation of the Living* (London: 1980), this concept is repeatedly referred to by G. Morgan, *Obrazy organizacji*, pp. 275–283.

3. *Objective interest may be interpreted as a necessity of satisfying needs*

The reasoning justifying this thesis may be the following: as objective interest as a relation between needs and goods really exists, then there exists in reality a way of obtaining and using goods that guarantees the satisfaction of an objectively existing need. Thus, the relation contained in objective interest may be perceived as a necessity of satisfying needs indicated by a subject's objective position, its historically specified existence, by production and reproduction of its vital functions. However, there exists a factor of subjective and active human behavior, independently from the fact whether these behaviors are adequate to the objective situation or not. Thus, the fact that it is difficult to talk about unconditional necessity of satisfying needs is the consequence of the existence of this subjective factor. *The objective interest determines not so much the necessity of satisfying needs, but more the historically and objectively conditioned possibility of their satisfaction.* What is necessary becomes so only after filling possibilities with human activity.

4. *Objectivity of interest may also be perceived in the epistemic sense, as a consequence of limits of human cognition and as a consequence of an intersubjective character of human cognition and broader intersubjectivity of social practice*³³

Cognition is never absolute. It may be in accordance with the existing state of knowledge, adequate in light of applied methods and procedures and established assumptions, confirmed with socio-historical practice. Thus, man is not capable of functioning fully rationally, he is condemned to the risk of making mistakes, not to mention that he not always consciously and subconsciously wants to be rational. His imagination on reality and himself, his own needs and ways of their satisfaction is actually always different from the real situation. His cognitive process is interfered by values, from which one cannot be entirely free, although obviously there are numerous ways of taming at least the elemental and uncontrolled evaluation interference in the cognitive process.³⁴ Interests are

33 M. Ziółkowski is in favor of the recognition of the objective character of interests in the epistemic sense, M. Ziółkowski, *Interesy i wartości*, p. 127.

34 See, for instance: P. Sztompka, "O problemie wartościowania w naukach społecznych," *Studia Socjologiczne*, No. 3/1975; M. Ziółkowski, *Wiedza jednostka społeczeństwo* (Warszawa: 1989); K. Mannheim, *Ideologia i utopia* (Lublin: 1992).

always historical, variable, partial in some sense, as they are the function of the subject's state of knowledge about its position. This position constantly changes as a result of the activity of the subject itself and the entirety of the independent from it circumstances. Consequently, recognizing the objective interest is a constant process that is never finished, it occurs in an incremental, sequential and iterative way.³⁵ Cognition is realized in social discourse, in socially and culturally determined interactions. The intersubjective dimension of cognition is their result. What was intersubjectively verified and confirmed seems to be objective. Intersubjectivity, however, is not the final criterion of the adequateness of cognition.

Similarly absolutely impartial and neutral ideological research, firstly, is never fully possible³⁶ and secondly, is also subject to verification. It may be only a long-term social practice. Thus, the development of knowledge has a relative character, it can be confirmed by, above all, looking back, and the recognition of new true knowledge is not easy.³⁷ The recognition of interests is made in a specified social context, in conditions of interests competition and paradigms of their cognition and interpretation, where the conditions of social being make the selection of ideas, where there is an ideological fight and the social awareness is the subject of manipulation, and the communication processes are subject to numerous limitations and corruptions. Due to epistemic reasons, the hypothesis on the existence of objective interests conditions the ability of their potential and always incomplete recognition.

Thus, it may be said that objective interest is a very complex category that signifies the real existence of such a relation between needs and goods of a subject, entangled in social relations, which specifies the historical and contextual and situational possibility of gaining goods and their use for the satisfaction of needs via the subject's active action conditioned by its limited cognitive abilities and an intersubjective character of social practice.

The category of objective interest may be very useful in the analyses of social life and politics. It enriches immensely the possibilities of constructing theoretical and empirical research models. It allows for a qualitative analysis of phenomena, it frees from limitations that stem from overestimating the significance of the quantitative approach and the narrow-minded empiricism that it is

35 On the subject of sequentiality, incrementality and iteration of strategic choices, see Strategor.

36 Such a possibility was seen by J. Hochfeld, *Studia*, p. 590.

37 T.S. Kuhn, *Struktura rewolucji naukowych* (Warszawa: 1968).

accompanied by. It enables the infiltration in the structure of social and political phenomena.

It may be attributed with several important functions: descriptive, explanatory and prognostic. In political practice, this category had and still has also ideological and legitimizing functions.

3. Contradiction and conflict of interests

If one looks dialectally on social and political reality, contradictions and conflicts have a fundamental role in it. They are the source of social dynamics, the mechanism, thanks to the activity of which social systems are capable of adaptation, survival and development. Contradictions between specific subsystems and social processes, between them and larger social entities, of which they are part, or even between systems and processes in the global character, decide on regularities of movement, change and development of societies. General position of society and culture regarding the world of nature may be analyzed by identification of fundamental contradictions of development. They may be understood to the fullest by means of the search and identification of contradictions that constitute the essence of given phenomena. Thus, we may talk about contradictions of development or structural contradictions that decide on the identity of phenomena.

Conflicts of interests are the consequence of the existence of these structural contraries that constitute phenomena and social processes. They have – similarly to interests – an objective character. They result from a different position of socio-economic subjects of interests, from different roles played by them in the organization of social systems. In case of classes and large social groups, their position in the sphere of social and economic relations, in the field of social division of labor, relation to property – including the property of means of production and participation in the division of social revenue – is particularly significant. Contradictions also have their sources in cultural and ideological differences, in social systems of beliefs, in the meaning assigned to important symbols, in the life style of large social groups. Contradictions have also their sources in the relations of governance, power and dominance and other deficit, and consequently, always unequally divided social resources.

Given the definition of interest accepted so far, one may distinguish three model situations of conflicts of interests:

- objective conflict of needs that interests concern;
- conflict of means and ways of satisfying needs;

- deficiency of goods, through which one may satisfy the needs of various competing over them subjects of interests.

In practice, all these model situations generally occur together. Thus, social systems are forced to decide in some procedure on the distribution of deficit resources in such a way that will ensure their ability to exist and develop. Without the ability of such decision making, their further existence is endangered. By referring to the simplified comparison, one may say that every flock exists as an entirety as far as it can solve the problem of the order of pecking. The issue of according to which rule or procedure it occurs – randomly, in accordance with the order of arrival, according to merits, belonging to a particular class, ethnic group or group in general – is secondary at this level of reflection. The ability to distribute resources made or gained from the environment is the condition of maintaining the dynamic balance of every social system. Solving the problem of the access to resources is the condition – using the systemic definitions – of acquiring by social entiresities the negative entropy or at least maintaining its state.

The way in which social entiresities solve the problem of the access to resources is not made in the process of harmony and cooperation, at least not only in such conditions. Man's social life is constantly accompanied by deficiency of resources in relation to constantly rising needs. This is the reason of the rivalry of various subjects concerning resources, such a shape of social structures, rules of production and reproduction of social life conditions, definitions of collective identity, which will ensure to the fullest the satisfaction of their needs. In the long perspective, the competition concerning the shape of social, economic and connected to exercising power structures is particularly important, as the possibility of realizing the final, political interests of subjects is dependent from them. Therefore, large social groups – of which the socio-economic position has the most direct influence on the character of the bond that connects social entiresities – have the most political influence. In class societies, it concerns, above all, social classes; in the modern world, it concerns also many other subjects, not only nations, social layers, economy branches or socio-professional categories, but also large organizations, including economic corporations with the global scope of activity, which hide in themselves conglomerates of important social interests and the potential of which, not only the economic one, surpasses the abilities of many countries. In the present, complex world, political subjectivity seems to be owed by a broader spectrum of social entiresities than it is usually thought.

The analysis of various social conflicts demonstrates that not always conflicts of interests are easy to explain with the objective contradiction of needs or other

parameters of objectively existing contraries in the structural positioning of subjects in the system of socio-economic relations. Conflicts have their own dynamics, they may be – from the point of view of their objective premises – apparent, secondary, they may be the expression of false awareness and mystified image of reality.³⁸ Conflicts stem from a different perception of reality, from different meanings, from different social symbolism and hierarchy of values of subjects of interest, from different cognitive and cultural paradigms that decide on the identity of specified social groups.³⁹ Thus, it is clearly seen that conflicts have a subjective character, they are an element of social awareness. Therefore, it seems sensible to make the following distinctions:

- a contradiction, understood as an objective situation, in which at least two sides of social reality, distinguished in some way, are at the same time, contradictory to each other and coexist in scope of a certain social entirety. Hence, under a given system, they have three functions: they are a permanent property of this system, a disruption of its internal life and, at the same time, a condition of its existence and development;⁴⁰
- a conflict of interests understood as their objective contradiction;
- an antagonistic contradiction of interests referring to such an objective situation, in which solving contradictions requires to change the entire system of relations, contradictions surpass the horizon marked by the qualitative identity of the social system and cannot be decided under the previous system. Exhausting the development possibilities of social systems is connected with

38 See, for instance: J. Reykowski, “Logika walki” in: *Sprzeczności i konflikty polityczne*.

39 A mutual relation of values and interests would require a separate analysis. J. Habermas’s concept gives the key difference of the way of explaining interests and values in the process of social communication. The explanation and agreement on interests take place by referring to truth; on the other hand, values – by referring to equity, that is social norms. According to M. Ziółkowski, interests and values appear in social awareness as elements of convictions and as elements of objectivized transfers. However, it seems possible to look at values as a reflection of social interests on a possibly high level of generalization of human social experiences, on the level of, for instance, interests of human kind, western civilization, national or class interest. In this sense, criteria of equity are not independent from criteria of reality. Cf. M. Ziółkowski, *Interesy i wartości*; J. Habermas, “Pojęcie racjonalności komunikacyjnej w świetle teorii aktów mowy” in: T. Buksiński, ed., *Rozumność i racjonalność*.

40 See, for instance: R. Bryła, “Sprzeczność jako kategoria nauki o polityce” in: B. Pasierb, ed., *Sprzeczności i konflikty polityczne* (Warszawa: 1989) and other works in this collection.

the appearance of antagonistic conflicts of interests. Then, the so-called transgressive interests connected to the articulation of the vision of new shapes of structure and identity of social entities manifest themselves;⁴¹

- a conflict of interests referring to a situation, in which conflicts of interests manifested themselves in social awareness, they became present in social game of interests, they are made conscious by at least one party of the conflict and the actions of parties are rationalized in order to solve the conflict for their benefit, in accordance with their definitions of their interests;
- an antagonistic conflict of interests, which is characterized by acuity surpassing the abilities of its solving under the existing system of relations, even though the objective contradiction may not have an antagonistic character.

One may look at contradictions and conflicts of interests as a gradable phenomenon. The continuum of contradictions is then established by non-identity of interests, their discrepancy, contradiction till the opposition of interests.⁴² It is also possible to analyze them by means of game theories, where conflicts may have a character of a game of a zero or non-zero sum, and some characters in the game, for instance, the so-called the prisoner's dilemma, the tragedy of the commons or the so-called beer game demonstrate co-dependence of playing subjects in the framework of a broader game system and an only apparent rationality of behaviors dictated only by directly understood, particular interest. Game concepts, except for various other qualities, confirm exceptionally well the holistic character of social and political processes, force to the analysis of deep and dynamic structures of social and political life, through them, somehow, in certain segments of sciences, there is a characteristic return to the canons of dialectic analysis in social sciences.⁴³

The question of the opposition holism–reductionism has fundamental meaning in the analysis of social interests. The politically significant interests

41 See W. Wesołowski, "Nowe spojrzenie na interesy," *Przegląd Społeczny*, No. 11–12/1993, this category is referred to by T. Kowalik, "Polityka kluczem do polskiej transformacji ekonomicznej" in: A. Jasińska-Kania, K.M. Słomczyński, eds., *Władza i struktura społeczna* (Warszawa: 1999).

42 Cf. M. Gulczyński, *Siedem głównych kwestii spornych* (Warszawa: 1982), pp. 27–29.

43 See, for instance, P.M. Senge, *Piąta dyscyplina. Teoria i praktyka organizacji uczących się* (Warszawa: 1998); G. Brennan, "Ekonomia" in: *Przewodnik po współczesnej filozofii politycznej*. Models of political decisive games are broadly discussed by Z. Pietraś, *Decydowanie polityczne* (Warszawa – Kraków: 1998), this aspect of political processes is also noticed by F. Ryszka, *Nauka o polityce Rozważania metodologiczne* (Warszawa: 1984).

are in general the interests of social subjects, even though, of course, criteria of this significance and distinguishing subjects may be and is different in different theoretical systems. From Marxist inspirations, there stems the focusing of the analysis on relations of classes and large social groups as the source of shaping interests that are socially significant and politically important, other research perspectives will localize differently the subjects of political interests. However, independently from the issue of classiness of politics, the problem of a relation between interests of an individual and a group, between interests of social entireties and interests of their component parts, is always required to be solved. In the background and as a consequence of such decisions, there returns an eternal problem of common good, sometimes described in the categories of social interest. The choice of holistic or reductionist research perspective basically is connected to the position in the matter of the ontological and epistemic status of interests. Psychological interpretations of interests prompt their perception by the prism of a human individual, as it is him that has consciousness and psyche, group psyche is secondary to it. Although, if the essence of interests is seen in their objective character, then the change of the subject of interest means a different interest. The interest of the entirety is not reduced to the sum or a resultant of partial interests, the group interest is not reduced to individual interests, it is a qualitatively different level of organizing social life. It also happens that research on social phenomena in the macroscale prompts rather accepting the holistic view; on the other hand, the microstructural view on reality increases the appeal of the reductive position. The proportions of popularity of these methodological positions in particular fields of science may be an illustration of dependence if one compares psychological, sociological, economic and philosophical approaches. However, it is not a rule. Also, researchers of micro and mesostructures of social life sometimes clearly stand by the holistic position. J. Szmátka aptly states that: "to say that a social group consists of human individuals, it is as to say of which substance it is made." The fact that the substance, of which social entireties are made, are humans, has – of course – an entire spectrum of extremely significant consequences for the functioning of such entireties. However, it does not cross out the thesis that social entireties really exist and cannot be diminished to individuals, names or presentations. Social entireties are not only abstract and model categories, although abstract reasoning could lead to their identification in social reality. Entirety is a different being than parts, it has a separate identity. People and groups of people have physical reality. However, interests, social roles, social structures, social groups and classes, values and statuses really exist in social sense and they are the right object of the structurally and functionally oriented social analysis.

Particular levels of social reality differ in their qualitative character, they are to a great extent autonomic and mutually irreducible. It does not mean that they do not influence one another, that the logics of social processes on different levels of reality does not indicate analogy. However, it does mean a qualitative separateness of different levels of reality. Such, even though presented more firmly and perhaps too mechanistically, position is called by J. Szmátka to be an emergent sociological structuralism.⁴⁴

Specific solutions explaining relations between an interest of entirety and parts may of course be different. For instance, Z. Cackowski defines group interest as such repeated interests of numerous individuals, the fulfilment of which depends necessarily from their mutual cooperation, then their cooperation is their common interest.⁴⁵ A similar thought was developed by A. Bodnar and O. Cetwiński, who used in their works the notion of needs of bonds as the needs resulting from the existence of a group as an entirety. Group subject has other needs that the individuals that create it, above all those that are connected with its existence as a collective subject. This existence is defined by its internal bond – the satisfaction of the need of bonds decides on maintaining the identity of the subject. For the group bond to exist, it has to be accompanied by a certain community of needs that are part of the group of individuals. Thus, it may be said that the group interest is decided on by the following co-dependent criteria:

- a criterion of minimal community of needs of group members;
- a criterion of necessity of mutual cooperation of group members in the realization of interest, group acting as an entirety. For collective interest to occur, it has to satisfy the group's needs of bonds;
- a criterion of structural conditions of separateness and identity of a group, in reference to political phenomena in the macrosocial dimension expressing themselves in the objective positioning of groups in the structure of social and economic relations and connected to them cultural and symbolic relations.

The logics of reasoning developed for the purposes of the politics analyses in the matter of the relations of individual and group interests may be applied to the relation between interests of the social entireties and their parts. Social entireties as a term are rather imprecise. However, its use has some sense to it. Not only the interests of social groups, large social groups in particular, have political significance. I have already mentioned the hypothesis of the political

44 Cf. J. Szmátka, *Małe struktury społeczne* (Warszawa 1989), part I.

45 Z. Cackowski, *Główne pojęcia materializmu historycznego* (Warszawa: 1974), p. 566.

subjectivity of large corporations. This issue may also be interpreted in a different way. If we can talk about the interest of every subject in regard of, above all, existence and survival of the subject, the survival is the limit of the interest, the most important meaning for the subject have its relations with other social subjects, with a suprasystem, to which the subject itself belongs and those of its internal contradictions, which are connected with the existence of the subject as a separate entirety. The search of politically significant social interests must be specified and historical. It depends from the structure of the socio-economic and cultural relations of a given society which interests are in it the most significant and politically important. Whether they are social classes, large social groups or, finally, the subject of interests that are the most important for the survival and development of a given society or a broader social system are organizations and which ones, should stem from the analysis of the entirety of social relations of this system. The dialectic and systemic analysis that allows for going into the deep structure of phenomena should give an answer to this question. The social structure itself, which is the source of shaping interests, may be, in its aspect of the class division, differently interpreted even when one makes it from the position established in the Marxist tradition.⁴⁶ The theory of social classes cannot have an a priori character, it also results from the application of a specific analysis. In this sense, the notion of a large social group allows to grasp more important phenomena that are the premise of interests than the dogmatically interpreted class division.

In macroscale, social interests in the modern, globalizing world may, however, have more complex forms, which join classes, groups, institutions, elites, or, simply, reflect different forms of capital, civilizations and cultures in complex aggregates determining the route of social processes; the real subjects of these interests are, then, difficult to identify social systems that do not fit in the categories of class, large social group or organization. Similarly useful categories of groups of interest and groups of pressure also seem to be insufficient. Their empirical character is too narrow to encompass the complex structure of modern aggregates and, at the same time, they suggest their cliental and applicant-like approach to power, whereas this relation seems sometimes to be, at present, a complete opposite. Such social systems require each time to be recognized and defined; their components, partial interests may have individual but also, at the same time, group, organizational, functional or process character.

46 See for instance, analyses of social structure and property of S. Kozyr-Kowalski, *Socjologia, społeczeństwo obywatelskie i państwo* (Poznań: 1999).

Such social systems have dynamic character, they are rather forms of movement than states of affairs, they often constitute a connection of phenomena that are apparently distanced. Previously, a term complex was sometimes used to mark social aggregates, such as military-industrial complex. Today, there are more such complexes, systems or conglomerates of interests, for instance a complex or a social computerization, drugs, privatization, energetic, international financial institutions, nomenclature – as a mechanism rather than of a certain specified social group and political orientation – globalization, oil and car, bureaucratic and symbolic structures system vitally connected with the system of representative democracy etc.

Drawing attention to this aspect of the analysis of interests does not mean the resignation from paradigms of classes and large social groups. It only means a hypothesis on the political significance of a completely new kind of interests and their aggregates and a postulate of including this perspective to the research on political phenomena. Sometimes one may have an impression that studies on politics are focused on these places in which there is a sufficiently visible, historically and conventionally fixed sign of politics. Meanwhile, the real politics happens in a completely different place, often as far as possible from the political signs in a form of apparent political institutions and organizations. It resembles casting a net and fishing in these places where – in accordance with old maps – fish should be. In the meantime, fish is long gone in these places and it is time to change the fishery. Traditional focus of research interests on public authority, institutions, mechanisms of formal representative democracy resembles such a petrified way of fishing. If one illustrated this with examples, he could notice that, for instance, today political phenomena are much more frequently decided on by stock market than parliaments; meetings in Davos have more influence on the fate of the world than the United Nations General Assemblies and rules of very different political color and different electorate are forced either way to realize politics that little differs, despite strong emotions and large social mobilization of election campaigns and – easy to read from professionally conducted public surveys – social expectations.

4. Articulation of interests

Explaining political phenomena by means of articulation as an adhesive of theoretical constructions and also empirical research gained a permanent place in political sciences. D. Easton is considered, above all, to be the initiator of such a method of interpreting politics, the approach of whom is called cybernetic and communicative. G. Almond, G. Powell and K. Deutsch are also representatives

of the systematic analysis of politics and the concept of socio-cultural systems of T. Parsons had an undoubted influence on the development of the systematic analysis, not only in political sciences. G. Almond and G.B. Powell are concerned with the issue of the articulation of interests from a more functional and structural, but also cultural, point of view, the communication theory is for them a tool of analysis. For D. Easton and K. Deutsch, creating and using also the empirical systematic model of politics is the main area of interest. G. Almond and G.B. Powell think that they begin with defining politics and proceed to the analysis of social processes; D. Easton and K. Deutsch reach politics in their analyses.⁴⁷ For Easton, the fundamental element of systematically interpreted politics are the behaviors connected to the allocation of scarce goods and burdens, politics is a system of interactions created in a process of conversion of demands and supports into decisions. Almond and Powell as the fundamental element of political system consider the roles connected to interactions influencing the legitimized use of physical coercion. The political role is interpreted by them as a system of actors orientation defining their participation in the system of interactions, the politicalness of which is decided by fulfilling the function of integration and adaptation in a given social system.⁴⁸


In Polish literature referring to the approaches of the mentioned authors, detailed interpretations of articulation differed and evolved. K. Ostrowski treats articulation as a process, through which avant-garde is informed about postulates and needs of masses. This process begins with spontaneous forming in different social circles of various postulates requiring decisions or actions of a political system. Subsequently, postulates via accepted channels and in specified mode are given to the political system, as a result of which they are arranged in order, qualified and become the basis for actions and political decisions. The process of articulation has a phase character. It consists of phases of forming, giving and processing postulates.⁴⁹ This scheme referred to a socialist society, in regard to which avant-garde was understood as these parts of working class, peasantry and intelligentsia that were connected with the functioning of a political system and “masses” as the rest of the society constituting the system’s environment.

47 See G.A. Almond, G.B. Powell, *Comparative Politics. A Developmental Approach*, Boston-Toronto 1966, p. 12; K.W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (New York-London: 1966). Deutsch’s concepts are discussed by F. Ryszka, *Nauka o polityce*, pp. 366–372.

48 See A. Antoszewski, “System polityczny jako kategoria analizy politologicznej” in: A.W. Jabłoński, L. Sobkowiak, *Studia z teorii polityki* (Wrocław: 1996), p. 61.

49 K. Ostrowski, *Rola związków zawodowych*, p. 17.

J.P. Georgica draws attention to the fact that articulation understood in this way is, in fact, a function of interests.⁵⁰ J.J. Wiatr sees the matter in a similar manner.⁵¹ In J.P. Georgica's interpretation, articulation is a process in which occurs the manifestation of needs, argumentation of interests and representation of postulates and it is the first stage of a complex process of political actions. Articulation occurs according to the following scheme:



K. Jasiewicz advocates for understanding articulation as articulation of interests.⁵² He does not use the term of *avant-garde* but the category of the center of political decisions. The process of articulation of interests is characterized as a process of informing centers of political decisions about needs and interests of masses, specified aspects of which are manifestation of needs, aggregation of interests into postulates, selection of postulates and representation of interests.

The presented interpretations of articulation had, besides fundamental qualities, several limitations. They were formulated in a specific historical context and were the expression of searching by the Polish political science for more efficient than before theoretical tools allowing for the understanding of the dynamics of the Polish political system, including its costly critical transformations under the influence of social tensions, not recognized in time and not transformed into appropriate decisions. In conditions of systematically limited possibility of full manifestation of social interests by means of political fight and pluralistic public debate, it was natural to focus the attention on only the informational aspect of articulation, understood as communication of political leaders and society, of which the degree of social integration was repeatedly overestimated due to ideological and political reasons. Meanwhile, D. Easton – the creator of the communicative approach – noticed in his cybernetic models a duality of the articulation process as an informational and energetic process, in which demands have an informational character and supports stemming from the political system have

50 J.P. Georgica, "Interesy społeczne a działalność polityczna," *Studia Nauk Politycznych*, No. 3/1974, pp.182 ff.

51 J.J. Wiatr, *Spółeczeństwo. Polityka. Nauka* (Warszawa: 1973), pp. 104, 106.

52 K. Jasiewicz, "Artykulacja interesów w polskim systemie politycznym," *Studia Nauk Politycznych*, No. 4/1977.

an energetic one.⁵³ Politics is not only a transfer of information, it is a process that defines also meanings, symbols determining frameworks of political communication. Thus, politics is often a linguistic conflict. Moreover, the content of politics is composed of contradictions and conflicts of interests, fight, rivalry of subjects of interests concerning scarce resources. The result of articulation is not so much decided on by the right informing, but by the clash of social forces that are carriers of information, forces directed by specified interests in the communication process. Political game decides on which interests will be realized and not the correctness of their formulation. Just as society has diversified interests and it is necessary to notice in its frameworks contradictions and conflicts of interests of various large social groups, other conglomerates and systems having their own interests, also such categories as avant-garde or center of political decisions require a closer analysis. Even in totalitarian systems, not to mention the political systems of real socialism, centers of political decisions were not uniform, there was also an internal fight, usually a secret one and led with specified means, it was a political game and fight, entangled in general class contradictions and other interests. Another issue is the unjust, not only in the Polish analyses of articulation, the sometimes-occurring artificial separation of articulation of interests from deciding and, above all, realizing political decisions, undertaking actions and consequently, realizing interests.

In light of the critical view of certain interpretations of articulation stems a concept of A. Bodnar. He writes about a process of securing needs and interests of large social groups, about a process of their coordination, treating the problem of articulation of interests and their realization as strictly connected to one another and jointly forming once social process.⁵⁴

However, weaknesses of the communicative approach are, to a large extent, to eliminate. Qualities of this manner of analyzing political phenomena are important. It allows to notice the procedural and dynamic aspect of the political reality, enables surpassing the limits created by static studies of political institutions or legal dimensions of political life, enables creating models of a significant degree of universality.

Thus, the following conclusions may be proposed:

1. Phenomena of articulation, mobilization and representation should be treated as component parts of a uniform process connected to formulating,

53 See D. Easton, "Analiza systemów politycznych" in: *Elementy teorii socjologicznych*, p. 565 ff.

54 See A. Bodnar, *Ekonomika i polityka* (Warszawa: 1978), pp. 56, 73.

confronting, verifying and realizing social interests, especially those that are essential for the existence and development of social systems, their abilities to adapt and maintain dynamic balance of large social groups, classes and other social entities.

2. The content of such understood articulation of interests is composed not only of mutual communication of social subjects, but a fight of political forces representing interests of those subjects. These forces act as carriers of transferred information. The competition of political forces has a decisive influence on the final result of the articulation process in the framework of possibilities marked with socio-economic position of subjects in specified historical conditions.

The process of articulation of interests is composed of several subprocesses that are, at the same time, its phases:

- manifestation of needs and formulation of interests; this stage of the process may be defined as articulation in the strictest sense;
- representation of interests;
- institutionalization of interests; in this phase, there are processes of forming groups of interests, political parties and other organizations and institutions that are supposed to ensure social subjects the possibility to articulate their interests;
- legitimization of interests consisting of actions by interests and their final and direct subjects to achieve legitimacy, social acceptance, not only in the eyes of social groups connected to given interests, but also in a possibly broad social scale, legalizing interests in the legal system and their legalization as accordant with the interests of the entire social system;
- mobilization and distribution of material and immaterial resources, including social activity, for an efficient articulation of interests;
- making decisions, choices, above all on the strategic level of social systems reflecting the preferences resulting from interests;
- undertaking implementation actions in various spheres of social life, economy, culture and exercising power. As a result of these actions, there occurs a satisfaction of the subject's needs which evokes a change in its socio-economic position, its needs and other components of the relation of interest are changed, new needs and new possibilities of gaining and using goods appear.

The complex social process, thus characterized, may be defined as articulation in a broad sense.⁵⁵ The result of such understood process of articulation of interests is the achieved level of satisfying needs that are the basis of articulated interests.

Articulation of interests may be analyzed on two planes:

- as a process of articulation of the entirety of social interests, its content will be composed of clashing, fight and sometimes even cooperation of interests of subjects neuralgic for the manner of existence and development of society, seeking the satisfaction of their needs and realization of interests;
- as a process of articulation of objective interest of a given social subject, for instance a class and a large social group, specifically separated in a given system of social relations.

The process of articulation of interests in global society is the result of clashing and mixing articulation of objective interests of component parts of this society. However, it is not a sum or a resultant of these interests. It constitutes a new quality, specified by the character of the bond that joins society. At the same time, this bond objectively reflects the political interests of those social groups that to the largest extent, in specified historical conditions, were able to define the character of the social bond. In class societies, such a role is played by interests of the economically ruling class, connected to the dominant way of social production and reproduction. The possibility of defining the character of the bond is not only the consequence of subjective actions of a certain social class, large social group, another social subject or conglomerate of interests. Its frameworks result from the character of social, economic and cultural relations, connected to regularities of social development and the development phase of society. The level of development of those elements of social life that are connected to the work process and determine economic basics of social life is particularly important. Therefore, the political fight for the construction of social order, for genetic code, programming of this order is the most important sphere of politics, which defines other rules of social game and possibilities of realizing interests, especially the political ones of large social groups. This mechanism, discovered and analyzed in detail by Marxist concepts of social development, does not seem to be questioned, despite the historical failure of real socialism and even when specific statements concerning the character and role of class divisions in societies, above all modern and the so-called developed ones, lost their relevance. This

55 A similar distinction between articulation *sensu stricto* and *sensu largo* was applied by K. Jasiewicz, *Artykulacja interesów*, p. 116.


mechanism may also be applied independently from basic philosophical and ideological choices of a researcher, also in reference to the ontological status of interests. It is a certain kind of universal dialectics of entirety and part, a mutual accordance and contradiction of different levels of social life organization.

The process of articulation of objective interest of a specified social subject may be analyzed according to a similar schema, as a process of articulation in global society. The dynamics of this process also goes through internal and external contradictions, game of partial interests competing for defining the character of the subject's bond, social genetic code and programming the identity of the subject in the most compliant manner with the particular interest of competing and at the same time cooperating component subjects. Here, it is also about gaining access to scarce in their nature social resources and using them to satisfy needs. This game is played in the framework of objective, historical and situational conditions defining "in the last instance" its rules, chances and possibilities of particular social actors participating in the game.

In such an approach, the process of articulation of interests may be treated as joining the objective and subjective factor in social development. Referring to previous reflections on the subject of mutual relations of what is objective and subjective, between objective and subjective interest, the process of articulation may be described in two ways:

- it is a process of subjectification of objective interest, as a result of this process, the objective interest is, at first, more or less adequately subjectively reflected in the form of ideas, values, goals, pursuits, aspirations, convictions, and social desires and then, it is fulfilled in socio-economic and symbolic and cultural social practice,
- it is, at the same time, a process of objectification of subjective interest. Human imagination on interests is realized in reality, it is verified and confronted in social practice, creating as a consequence an objective reality.

The process of the articulation of interests may be illustrated in a simplified manner by means of the following scheme:



As we have already observed, it is only based on practice, or post factum, that people are able to finally say what was their objective interest. Particular attempts at defining this interest in the form of subjective interests are verified and objectivized in the process of the articulation of interests. It is worth noting that a specified objective interest is usually accompanied by many proposals of its identification, many subjective interests. It results from the complexity of subjects positioning in the structure of social relations, from the existence of the division of the entirety on parts and dialectics of the relation between their interests, from the variation of situational and historical circumstances, from the development of knowledge and cognition, from influencing other subjects participating in the game of interests. Its inherent component is the game on the awareness of interests, falsification of this awareness, seeking diminution of its historical and situational adequacy, lowering, in consequence, the ability of a competitive subject to act rationally, all this what was once called an ideological fight. The realization of the objective interest does not only depend from its accurate formulation. The subject's will, determination, conviction about the validity of an undertaken direction and a manner or activity is significant. Without these elements even an adequately reflected interest itself cannot ensure satisfaction of the subject's needs. On the other hand, it is often that ideological imagination about objective interests is at the same time connected with specific practice experiences, which are assigned with universal meaning and which are accompanied by interests of social groups benefiting from this specific form of social practice. As a result, subjective interests and practice that accompany them have tendencies of petrification, fossilization, schematization, living their own life.⁵⁶ The ability to question what is checked and generally accepted as obvious is a necessary condition of creative action in general, including in the sphere of politics. Of course, the ability to question and imagination do not always have to mean an actual negation. Nevertheless, they are a condition for the error correction and elimination of inevitable risk of strategic deviation, as it is defined by researchers of organizational strategies. Interests cannot be accurately formulated once and for all. Articulation of interests is some kind of perpetuum mobile, something that never ends as long as a subject exists, it is a subject's collective process of learning how to recognize its own identity and needs, the position taken in the society and possibilities of realizing interests in an environment today characterized by a high level of uncertainty, complexity, turbulence and

56 Petrification was discussed by W. Bieńkowski, *Problemy teorii rozwoju społecznego* (Warszawa: 1966), p. 58.

risk. It is a process that may be analyzed by means of the model of cognitive and conflict incrementalism, applied in modern theories of organizational strategy.⁵⁷

Anatomy of the process of articulation of interests may be demonstrated by means of articulation mechanisms, methods of interests coordination, articulation channels and its styles. In G.A. Almond and G.B. Powell, articulation and aggregation of interests – together with political communication, rule creation, and their application – are treated as equal functions of a political system. At the same time, they claim that articulation, aggregation, and governance were in primitive political systems realized in the framework of one role (structure). Dispersion and separation of these functions is, in their opinion, one of the criteria of political development.⁵⁸

By assuming broad understanding of articulation of interests, aggregation of interests is one of the mechanisms coordinating articulation. Besides it, one may enumerate disaggregation, selection, segregation of interests and ignoring, postponing, depreciating, hiding, reorienting, separating, escalating and creating interests.

Almond and Powell define aggregation of interests as a conversion of postulates into politics alternatives. It means a phenomenon of connecting interests in larger entities representing broader environments, groups and social conglomerates. Interests of many subjects may be partially close to each other or for their realization similar means are needed. Aggregation of interests means finding a common denominator for a number of interests, creating their common beam. Those subjects of which interests are not able to be independently represented are especially interested in aggregation. Phenomena of interests aggregation are corresponded by, on a representation and institutionalization plane, alliances of various political and organization forces: political parties, groups of interest and groups of pressure, states and their communities etc. Aggregated postulates have higher chances of successful articulation, they connect a larger social background, a broader social basis interested in their realization.

Disaggregation of interests consists of breaking larger complexes of interests and their generalizations on smaller elements. Political forces with competitive interests in reference to aggregated interest seek disaggregation. Therefore, they may not allow for a decision about the unfavorable for them allocation of social resources. In the sphere of representation and institutionalization, phenomena

57 See G. Johnson, "Rethinking Incrementalism," *Strategic Management Journal*, Vol. 9; Strategor, *Zarządzanie firmą. Strategie Struktury Decyzje Tożsamość*, pp. 479–483.

58 G.A. Almond, G.B. Powell, *Comparative Politics*, pp. 14, 99.

of disaggregation of interests are accompanied by processes of the collapse of political alliances, so far uniform parties and political movements.

Selection of interests also takes place on all stages of the articulation process. Selection of interests is connected to the power of their representation. Successfully represented interests are able to go through the entire process of articulation and influence its results. Poorly represented interests are rejected on lower stages of this process. Selection is also applied to interests recognized as unreal, those that are identified as false or concerning subjects of little importance for the entirety of the system and interests of low degree of aggregation. The process of interests selection is particularly accompanied by severe political fight and rivalry of political forces.

Segregation of interests means their ordering not according to social meaning and power of representation, but according to the sphere of reality they concern or the function performed in the social system of the subject of interest. A successful articulation is generally much more likely to be achieved by interests segregated adequately to their content. Inaccurate segregation of interests, manipulation of segregation is an element of the political game played in the process of articulation. Classification of an interest concerning, for instance access to power, as a problem of mental health desiring power of a subject may, of course, prolong this path to power. Phenomena of interests segregation correspond to the specialization of channels of interests articulation, creation of institutions and organizations and their internal structures and procedures.

Ignoring, postponing, depreciating, hiding, reorienting, separating, escalating and also creating interests are other mechanisms of their articulation, components of a political game of needs satisfaction and interests realization. These mechanisms, besides interests creation, may be looked at as some kind of pseudosolution of conflicts, including conflicts of interest.⁵⁹ To a large extent, however, the process of articulation of interests in society is precisely such a mechanism of pseudosolutions of resources objectively conditioned by a deficit.

Coordination of interests in the process of articulation is conducted by means of various methods. The fundamental ones are:

1. Compromise. It consists of mutual concessions, it is an agreement, the basis of which is sides' being content with only partial satisfaction of their interests. Compromise is often a result of a conviction about insolubility of contradictions of a conflict of interests or it reflects the possibility of coordinating interests according to the rules of the game of nonzero sum.

59 Cf. S. Chępa, T. Witkowski, *Psychologia konfliktów* (Unus: 1999).

2. Reference to the superior interest. In the process of articulation of interests, it may turn out that particular social subjects are all interested in the existence of a certain social entirety, of which they are elements and, at the same time, the possibility of a compromising solution by means of an accepted by subjects proportional resignation from their interests is not possible. Then, conflicted political forces may reach to the superior interest and in relation to it rationalize and relativize their postulates. In this case, a particular importance has defining the content of this superior interest; each of the subjects will pursue such its identification that aggregates to the fullest its own interests with the superior interest.
3. Subjugation of interests. It is a result of such a clash of interests that gives victory to only one of the entangled subjects or their coalition and as a consequence, only chosen interests of victorious subjects are realized. Subjugation of interests is the result of applying various means, among which typical ones are the following:⁶⁰
 - a. Physical coercion, violence or threat of their use. Violence and coercion as means of politics are by some thought to be some kind of the quintessence, essence of politicalness of social phenomena. As V.I. Lenin used to say: "Not one issue of class fight was solved in history in another way than with violence."⁶¹ N. Bucharin treated violence as "a method of building communist future from human material inherited after capitalism."⁶² So far, great politics and history really cannot exist without violence and physical coercion, independently from general opinion and justified expectation that the criterion of political development is the ability of societies to limit and regulate the role of these means in the process of articulation of social interests. F. Ryszka writes: "who agrees to the subjugation to the political power silently accepts that the power may demand a life sacrifice. The subject of power equipped in such an ability exercises political power

60 Cf. P. Winczorek, "Władza polityczna" in: J. Kowalski, W. Lamentowicz, P. Winczorek, *Teoria państwa* (Warszawa: 1978), pp. 62–65 ff., W. Lamentowicz, "Dialektyka i klasowe podejście badawczo-metodologiczne – problemy teorii polityki," *Studia Nauk Politycznych*, No. 5/1978; W. Lamentowicz, "Funkcje systemu politycznego a żywiłowa dynamika makrostruktur życia społecznego" in: K. Opałek, ed., *Z zagadnień teorii polityki* (Warszawa: 1978).

61 W.I. Lenin, "Sprawozdanie z działalności Rady Komisarzy Ludowych 11/24 stycznia 1918," *Dzieła*, Vol. 26, pp. 466–467.

62 See W.I. Lenin, "Zamieczanija na knigu N.I.Bucharina "Ekonomika pierechodnogo perioda,"" in: *Leninskij sbornik* (Moscow-Leningrad: 1929).

and only this power may be recognized as political. These are the limits of politics, as it results from history.”⁶³ Physical coercion as a means of subjugation of interests is applied especially by those subjects that notice a chasm between their aspirations and existing in a given system of social relations chances of their realization. The role of coercion is the lesser the more open are other possibilities of articulation.⁶⁴

- b. Economic means. Their essence is production and reproduction and administration of resources that have the role of goods satisfying needs. The entanglement of articulation of interests in economic relations is not reduced, of course, to only the issue of means of interests subjugation, it is above all a basic context and ground that interests themselves and their game stem from. As an instrument of articulation, they define the possibilities of subjects participation in the interests game. Their role may also consist of various forms of corrupting social life via, for instance, satisfaction of the most spectacular needs of competitive subjects, at the expense of their political or other more important interests, of dependence and neutralization of chosen segments constituting a structure of these subjects and especially, their leading elites and political representation. Known phenomena of working aristocracy, oligarchization of political structures or, simply, political corruption may be its exemplary illustration.⁶⁵
- c. Ideological and informational means. They consist of qualitative and quantitative regulation of the flow of information, of shaping and popularizing aspirations of life styles and values and of creating symbols, defining

63 F. Ryszka, *Nauka o polityce*, p. 23; see also T. Klementewicz, “Głosowanie życiem. Polityka pomiędzy genetycznym a kulturowym zaprogramowaniem człowieka” in: *Historia-Idee-Polityka. Księga dedykowana Profesorowi Janowi Baszkiewiczowi* (Warszawa: 1995). The understanding of coercion and violence and their roles is analyzed by M. Karwat, *Sztuka manipulacji politycznej* (Toruń: 1998). On the subject of various understandings of politics I write in B. Kaczmarek, “Kilka uwag w sprawie interpretacji polityki” in: *Pokolenia. Kultura. Polityka. Księga jubileuszowa na sześćdziesięciopięćciolecie Profesora Bronisława Gołębiowskiego* (Warszawa: 1999).

64 See G.A. Almond, G.B. Powell, *Comparative Politics*, p. 82.

65 On this last, relevant subject, see A.Z. Kamiński, “Instytucjonalne i kulturowe uwarunkowania korupcji politycznej w Polsce” in: J. Kubin, J. Kwasniewski, *Socjotechnika. Kontrowersje, Rozwój, Perspektywy*, (Warszawa: 2000); the problem of mechanisms of economic interests influencing administration structures, including clientelism and others, is broadly analyzed by B. Guy Peters, *Administracja publiczna w systemie politycznym* (Warszawa: 1999).

meanings, generating myths and stereotypes, building mystified forms of awareness, including falsifying the awareness of objective interests of subjects participating in the process of articulation.

- d. Institutionalization of conflict of interests. Institutionalization of conflict of interests means inserting it into a given political mechanism already programed in accordance with the interests of dominating subjects in a given structure of social and economic relations. Institutionalization prevents the disintegration of the superior subject, it creates a certain mechanism of taming a conflict of interests, channeling it into acceptable framework. The consequence of it may be the creation of a safety valve that prevents the explosion of social structures by means of conflicts, the civilization of the political game, but also directing articulation efforts of specified social subjects in “a whistle” and not “pistons,” as to use such a metaphor. As a consequence, institutionalization prevents such social changes, which could turn out to be unfavorable for a subject, which adequately constructed a given institutional mechanism. The most fundamental form of institutionalization of conflicts of interests is from this point of view a state, which prevents “devouring each other” by subjects of antagonistically opposite and conflicting interests.
4. Neutralization of interests. Neutralization of interests may occur by means of solving contradictions that are the ground of conflicts of interests, by satisfaction of needs that are the basis of the interest relation or by moderating conflict of interests by ideological, informational and institutional means. Conflicts of interests stem from objective structural contradictions of a given social system and their continuation via objective conflicts of interests. Thus, a permanent solution of a conflict of interests may occur by means of solving the contradiction and satisfying needs. It is not always possible, in general it is impossible due to the limitation of resources and the character of bonds constituting a given social system. Thus, sometimes solving a conflict of interests requires revolutionary or transformative changes in such a social system. At the same time, solving contradictions that are the premise of specified interests and their conflict is not yet a guarantee of solving the conflict itself. It has a subjective character and may be kept despite the lack of objective basics. The awareness of a conflict is ruled by autodynamic regularities and is more lasting than its objective sources. Nevertheless, solving contradictions and satisfaction of needs create only necessary conditions for a permanent neutralization of interests. At the same time, it is worth noticing that from the fact of greater permanence of a conscious expression of interests than objective basics of their existence results a repeatedly and historically confirmed

possibility of the restauration of subjects of interests as a result of the creation of social subjects' bonds by means of social awareness, active social action, the intention of which is regeneration, restoration to life the nonexistent social subject. Collective memory is then the source of crystallization of subjects, interest somehow precedes the subject itself. Especially in favorable circumstances of social crises, defrosting of the existing social system, possibilities of absorption of patterns from other social systems, such restauration of social structures and interests is possible. Objective circumstances select and verify such tendencies and in this sense, they are still the final source of crystallization of interests and their subjects. It also concerns situations of the creation of new interests and only in their aftermath of a conscious creation of subjects of interests. History is full of such efforts, a great part of them remains only a volatile episode without important social consequences, unless objective conditions create a demand for such an action.

Processes of articulation of interests take place on specified ways, which are usually called channels of articulation of interests. The importance of particular channels of articulation, their quantity and structure, result from the system of social interests, balance of power representing these interests, rules of political game, historical background and political culture of society. Channels of articulation of interests may be spontaneous and organized protests and manifestations, not formalized personal contacts as well as official political institutions and bodies, artistic and scientific events, educational projects, forms of participation in religious life, public opinion and mass media etc. Thus, channels of articulation of interests are not only more and more a system of institutions of representative democracy, state and local administration, political parties, unions and social organizations, but also all these forms of social life that constantly or incidentally in a specific situation participate in the process of articulation of interests.

Articulation of interests of particular subjects is characterized with specific for it patterns. Permanent systems, complexes of patterns of articulation of interests may be defined as styles of articulation of interests. These styles may be differently classified:

- Articulation of interests may take place in an overt and covert manner, out of range of the official social and political control.
- Articulation may take place elementally, for instance when the existing channels of articulation of interests in society are obstructed, there are too little of them or their specialization does not correspond with the real structure of interests. With elements of the elemental articulation we were in

contact in Poland in critical moments of 1956, 1970, 1978, 1980 and partially in 1989. In a smaller scale, elements of the elemental articulation are still present, especially in situations of social tensions and protests. Articulation may also have an organized and institutionalized character.

- Depending from properties of political culture of subjects of interests and also political culture of a broader social system, the level of political and economic development, the political situation and the state of conflicts between classes, large social groups and other subjects, we may talk about a pragmatic and affective style of articulation. The pragmatic style is characterized by the advantage of compromise, negotiation, rationalization of actions. The affective style is established by emotions, symbols, elemental reactions.
- The degree of integration of a social system and discrepancies of interests has a decisive influence on whether the dominant style of articulation has a general or particular character. The general style of articulation is characterized by seeking aggregation of interests, common values and referring to the superior interest. The particular style dominates when interests are on a low level of aggregation. The final result of articulation depends then from the game of a great number of particular interests.

Almond and Powell propose also a complex division that includes criteria applied to the previously discussed proposals of the classification of articulation styles. They distinguish the following:⁶⁶

- A pragmatic and negotiation style which is characterized by a great number of postulates aggregated into few variants; a way of compromises, negotiations and auctions;
- A style oriented on the absolute value, in which there are no compromises, the scheme of behavior consists of hierarchization of postulates in accordance with the accepted superior values, on the logical connection of postulates in relation to values of an ideology in force. In the name of ideology, interests are unified. This pattern was realized in totalitarian states, in political systems of real socialism, its elements may also be found in political systems of western democracies.
- A traditional style which lacks specialized roles in the process of articulation. Tradition has a decisive meaning, the patterns of which determine the entirety of social behaviors and groups with behaviors inconsistent with tradition norms are not assimilated.

66 See G.A. Almond, G.B. Powell, *Comparative Politics*, pp. 86–91, 108–109.

5. Politics as a social space of articulation of interests

If interests and their articulation are understood in a way discussed above, then there appears a conclusion concerning the essence of politics. It may be understood as articulation of interests.

In the Polish political science literature, there are several proposals of politics definition, which treat it as articulation of interests, although specified approaches and formulations are different in accordance with the approaches represented by particular authors and applied by them terminology. For instance, A. Bodnar claims that “everything that concerns the choice of social goals connected to needs and interests of large social groups, creating realizing structures of these goals and also their functioning is called politics.”⁶⁷ O. Cetwiński formulates the issue in the following way: 1. A political phenomenon is a phenomenon directly connected to the formation and realization of needs, bonds, interests and awareness of interests of large social groups. 2. Political processes are the processes of integration or disintegration that occur in large social groups due to the needs of these groups, interests and awareness of interests.⁶⁸ Another interesting interpretation was formulated by W. Lamentowicz who the specificity of what is political notices in 1. the conflict character of needs, interests, forces and forms of awareness; 2. the stimulation of the activity of large social groups (classes, layers) as relatively separated entities; 3. the activity or ability to act of these groups in the direction of maximization of their power potentials (social force); the satisfaction of needs or interests by achieving management positions in society, especially the influence on centers of state power.⁶⁹

The mentioned definitions of politics seem to have common denominators. These are, above all, the following:

- emphasizing social entanglement of politics, politics is in them understood as a function of social life, not as a phenomenon separated and independent from social, economic and other relations that are the source of crystallization of needs and social interests; politics is not an innate value but an expression and consequence of social processes;
- emphasizing that the essence of political sphere of social life are needs and interests, their differently understood manifestation, formulation and

67 A. Bodnar, *Ekonomika i polityka*, p. 15.

68 O. Cetwiński, “Zjawisko i proces polityczny” in: K. Opalek, ed., *Metodologiczne i teoretyczne problemy nauk politycznych* (Warszawa: 1975), p. 59.

69 W. Lamentowicz, *Dialektyka i klasowe podejście*, p. 32; *Funkcje systemu politycznego*, p. 81.

realization – using the above proposed terminology – their broadly understood articulation;

- assuming that among many social interests, the political significance have those, which concern large social groups and society as an entirety, above all in connection with integration and disintegration processes of those groups or in a broader sense, of society as entirety;
- accepting that politics has a conflict character and is connected with political subjects being aware of their own separateness and identity, needs and interests and with undertaken actions, the intention of which is satisfaction of needs and realization of interests.


Thus, referring to previous reflections, one may propose understanding politics as a process of articulation of conflicting social interests of the subjects, the social functioning of which is significant for survival and development of society as an entirety, its adaptation and integration, production and distribution of resources conditioning the obtaining and use of goods satisfying social needs. In this understanding, politics is a multidimensional phenomenon, not only a social life plane or a field of influence of various factors, but rather a kind of separate, multidimensional social space, of which characteristic is articulation of interests that are significant for the existence and development of societies. Important dimensions of such illustrated social space are:

1. Social contradictions in structural understanding, determining objective positioning of subjects in the sphere of social, economic and cultural relations;
2. Relations between social needs and goods used to satisfy needs, defined by generally understood scarce of resources that constantly accompanies social practice;
3. Similarities and discrepancies of interests of subjects, reflected in social awareness in the form of subjective interests and conflicts of interests of subjects and as a consequence, dynamics and autodynamics of relations between social subjects;
4. Dialectics of relation of entireties and parts of social life macrostructures, their ability to survive and develop, integrate and disintegrate, adapt to changing environmental conditions, create changes in the environment and define the environment itself;
5. Ability of subjects to adequately recognize objective conditions of their existence and action, mutual influence of what is objective and what is subjective in social practice, social process of collective learning, defining and

interpreting meanings and symbols, collecting and interpreting historical experience.

In a processual interpretation, political space qua articulation of interests may be treated as a subsystem of a social system, as a political system. Its basic element would be then these social activities, of which content consists of articulation of conflicting interests of various kinds of subjects, macrostructures of social life, significant for existence and survival of social system, its integration and disintegration, ability to produce and allocate resources necessary to satisfy social needs. Thus, in this approach various different phenomena would be political. Each social phenomenon, if it was entangled in a conflict of such socially understood significant interests, would get properties, an attribute of politicalness. It is the context defining the function of a phenomenon that would decide on its political character, not its sign, pretensions or formal status. Politicalness would be then assigned to social phenomena in a variable, dynamic, specific and historical manner. They use a simplified comparison, as one could say, that a canary may become a political phenomenon if it is inserted into the game of important social interests. In normal conditions, canaries evoke interest of mainly hobbyists, vets, biologists and artists maybe. If, on the other hand, a social movement undertaking a fight for important social interests makes a canary its symbol, then supporters of this movement will wear pin buttons with a figure of a canary, canary flights will accompany mass manifestations, and the canary color will become the color of official uniforms of the movement's activists, there will be created a canary myth as an enslaved bird, which needs to be freed, just as freedom and a possibility of satisfying interests and values carried on banners of this social movement need to be ensured, then a canary in all its glory will be present at the political scene. The state of canary population, geography and structure of its breeding, proportions of canary breeds etc. will become balls in the political game, they will acquire a political character.

Positioning politics against other subsystems of social system may be illustrated by means of a scheme that is some kind of vertical projection of social space:



It is worth noting that between particular infiltrating each other subsystems and their aggregates there are dialectic relations of necessary agreement-necessary contradiction that decide in the last instance about the dynamics of macrostructural social changes.

Understanding politics as articulation of interests results also in a way of understanding other, derivative political and socio-political categories. It especially concerns the interpretation of political power. It ceases to be a distinctive problem of politics, which obviously does not mean that it is not one of the key problems. However, it is not the connection with public power that gives social phenomena a political character, but specified properties of these phenomena make from specified figures of power political power in general. Power is an instrument of politics, one of means of articulation of interests, not the essence of what is political. Identifying the sense of politics with power, its exercise and fight over it, evokes important doubts of not only theoretical and methodological nature, but also of socio-ideological and ethical ones. Power is not the only means of satisfying interests and their articulation, it is also not – especially today – the only or even basic mechanism of adaptation, integration and homeostasis of social systems. Modern systems often have an innovative and holographic character and it is not the hierarchy of power that is their basic mechanism of self-regulation, but rather components of their cultural identity: knowledge, symbols, values, language etc. Defining politics by means of an emphasis put on its connections with power often leads to tautologies that can be found in different definitions of politics, the consequence of which is defining political power as, in fact, such a form of power in general that is connected with exercising power and fighting over it. Tautology, even masked with reservations that it is about the society in macro dimension and not about all social processes, still remains a tautology. Reducing politics to the problem of power leads to looking at political phenomena through the prism of these social groups, of

which life existence is connected with broadly understood power service; meanwhile, from the point of view of other social groups and society as an entirety, power is exercised not for power itself, but in order to solve social problems and satisfy social needs. Power is socially justified and necessary as long as it is socially useful. Power put in the center, as the essence of politics lacks independent from it criteria of efficiency. As a result, effective and rational are only those political actions that allow to gain and maintain power, regardless of which social interests – and if any – were satisfied. Such an understanding of politics leads as a consequence to fetishization of power, to petty political degeneration of politics, to legitimization of such a degeneration, of which even a casual observation of reality provides enough examples, and not to the perception of politics and the roles of politicians as, above all, social service and responsibility.⁷⁰

The model of interpreting politics in categories of articulation of interests has also one important quality. It allows for an analysis of political phenomena not only in macroscale, but also on other levels of social reality, on the meso and microstructural level. By using this schema of analysis, one may research and explain politics, especially in different social systems and especially in organizations. Besides, this is what happens. Organizations, their strategic process, are analyzed as systems and political processes, the essence of which are contradictions and conflicts of interests creating dominant coalitions and reflecting the social positioning and needs of the organization's electorate. The political interpretation of organizations is strictly connected with understanding them as intentional systems that are capable of not only a choice of possibly the most efficient methods of realization of prearranged goals, but of an independent definition of goals. Survival and existence of an organization is not a function of its goals, but goals are the method of formulating by organizations their strategy of survival that ensures existence and development. The process of formulating and realizing strategies is an organizational auction, in which articulation of interests takes place.⁷¹

70 I discuss my position to a larger extent in B. Kaczmarek, *Kilka uwag w sprawie interpretacji polityki*.

71 I use this way of thinking in the work entitled *Analiza organizacji* (in print); there, I also refer to broader literature and discussion on the subject of the politics of organization and socio-political approach in the research on organizational life.

Bohdan Kaczmarek

Politics: the issue of power as the issue of property? Property as the condition of power

Many views on politics emphasize its constitutive relation to power. In common perception, politics is often determined as a sphere of social life connected with power struggle and its exercise, especially with state power. Moreover, a great amount of the subject's literature closely connects the phenomenon of politics with state power and violence. This view is present not only in literature referring to the Marxist intellectual tradition, but also in the one, which is on different ideological and theoretical positions. In this respect, a reference to Max Weber's approach, who states that "hence, what "politics" means for us is to strive for a share of power or to influence the distribution of power, whether between states or between the groups of people contained within a state,"¹ is classical.

Many researchers connecting politics with state and power encounter problems with defining the specificity of political power and distinguishing it from power in

1 Max Weber, *The Vocation Lectures: "Science as a Vocation," "Politics as a Vocation,"* edited and with an introduction by David Owen and Tracy B. Strong, trans. R. Livingstone (Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis/Cambridge, 2004), p. 33.

See also, among others: Franciszek Ryszka, *Nauka o polityce. Rozważania metodologiczne* (Warszawa: 1984), p. 18, who emphasizes – referring to, among others, Carl Schmitt's views – that "... who agrees to the subjugation to the political power silently accepts that the power may demand a life sacrifice. The subject of power equipped in such an ability exercises political power and only this power may be recognized as political. These are the limits of politics, as it results from history," F. Ryszka, *Nauka o polityce. Rozważania metodologiczne* (Warszawa: 1984), p. 23.

"The main goods with which politics is connected is the human life, the main need – the need of security. The essence of politics is the human life protection and prevention of its endangerment," Tadeusz Klementewicz, "Głosowanie życiem. Polityka między genetycznym a kulturowym zaprogramowaniem człowieka," in: *Historia Idee Polityka. Księga dedykowana Profesorowi Janowi Baszkiewiczowi* (Warszawa: 1995), p. 345.

"The system of social relations, which may be regulated only via a state (it concerns, above all, interclass relations) and as much as the interference in them by the state is necessary, will be called the political sphere of social life," Zdzisław Cackowski, *Główne pojęcia materializmu historycznego* (Warszawa: 1974), p. 352.

the general sense, or from power in the social sense. If we assume that not every power is a political power, then what is political power? If, at the same time, we define politics via connecting it with power, we inevitably fall in tautology. If politics is a sphere of social life, in which there is power struggle and its exercise, then does it mean that political power is the power, in which there occurs power struggle?

The shadow of this tautology makes its way through reflections of many serious theoreticians of politics. Obviously, it is a certain solution to state that political power is such a power that is exercised by means of violence or that there is a real threat of its use. But then, other difficulties appear. What is the difference between political power and state power if we recognize that the monopoly for the use of violence in the society is one of the state's constitutive features? The second difficulty is the following: with such an interpretation, politics begins to come down to the problem of violence, to be reduced to the violence distribution. Certainly, history is full with violence and key historical issues were not solved in any other way than with violence, but was it with violence only? Is this how it always has to happen? History, obviously, gives us great amount of evidence confirming the role of violence as its demiurge, but people enter into interdependence relations not only under the influence of violence. With such an approach, we begin to lose from our sight other means of power exercise, the authority phenomenon is lost, there reappears the question about different kinds of power, about the differences between social and political power.²

However, the problem seems to have even deeper roots. It concerns the understanding of power, its conditions and sources and as a consequence, the relation

2 Many theoreticians clearly distinguish power from violence. Such a position have especially those authors, who emphasize the communicative aspect of power, the fact that communication is the basis of power. "I could for instance exercise power by threatening to use force in case of disobedience. If however, the threat is not effective and I resort to the use of force, then what we are dealing with is not power but defeat. This is a key differentiation made by such diverse authors as Arendt, Habermas, Foucault, and Giddens." Terence Ball, "Władza" in: R.E. Goodin, P. Pettit, eds. *Polish Round Table Yearbook* (The Polish Academy of Science's Press: Warsaw, 2002), p. 53. Cf. also the distinction of pure politics, power politics, also called realistic and ideal politics, in which there are values present. Giovanni Sartori writes: "The point is, then, that pure politics is as unreal as its opposite, a wholly ideal politics. Every policy is a mixture of idealism and realism; and if either element becomes overwhelming, if too much idealism eliminates realism, or vice versa, then a policy is likely to fail. ... What today goes under the name of sheer "power politics" can function only insofar as it is nourished by an ethos," G. Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Part One: The Contemporary Debate* (Chatham House Publishers: 1987), p. 41.

between power and property, the understanding of property itself and also its social functions.³

1. What is power?

In general sense, power is defined as an influence, as a kind of social control, as a choice and decision, as a domination and regulation of freedom, as an integration and homeostat, as a transaction, as trust, as an authority, as violence, as psychical addiction, as will, as a mechanism of synergy and cooperation, as a conflict and its institutionalization, as a function and instrument of goals realization, as human or supernatural will, as a deviation and pathology of an individual person or group, as a myth and ritual, a theater,⁴ as a mechanism of social resources distribution etc. The enumerated terms do not fill all the possible definitions and metaphors of power.

Sometimes, as a consequence of a terminological confusion concerning power, it is stated that the intuitive understanding of power is not worse than the scientific attempts at making it more precise.⁵ The meanings of power in different languages had a significant influence on the various ways of defining it. The Greek etymology of the word *power* is connected with the verb *archein*, which means *to rule* as well as *to begin*. The noun *arche* refers to *sovereignty* and also to *the beginning*. The Latin etymology of power, the word *potere* means *to be able to*. There appeared much confusion due to the English translation of Weber's terms *Macht* and *Herrschaft*. The first is usually translated into English as *power* – in Polish *władza* – and the second provides much more difficulty, as it is translated as *authority* (*autorytet*), *rule* (*rządy*), *rulership* (*władztwo*), *power* (*władza*) or finally, as *panowanie* in Polish.⁶

I write more on the subject of power and politics relation in the article "Kilka uwag w sprawie interpretacji polityki" in: *Pokolenia Kultura Polityka. Księga Jubileuszowa na 65-lecie Profesora Bronisława Gołębiowskiego*, (Warszawa: 1999).

3 I write more on this subject in B. Kaczmarek, *Organizacje. Polityka, władza, struktury* (Warszawa: 2001), from this book, I used certain fragments in this text.

4 On the subject of the myth in politics and its dramatization, see S. Filipowicz, *Mit i spektakl władzy* (Warszawa: 1988).

5 See T. Biernat, *Legitymizacja władzy politycznej. Elementy teorii* (Toruń: 1999), p. 40, where also one may find references to the literature on this subject.

6 G. Sartori pays attention to the confusion and its consequences, G. Sartori, *Teoria demokracji* (Warszawa: 1998), pp. 232–234; see also L. Porębski, *Behawioralny model władzy* (Kraków: 1996), pp. 45–47.

Among different concepts of power, the following theories are often enumerated in the most general sense:⁷

- behavioral, assuming that power is a special kind of behaviors consisting of modifying other people's behaviors;⁸
- teleological, treating power as producing intended results, realizing goals;⁹
- instrumental, for which power is connected with the use of specific means in relations between people, that is above all violence;
- structural, understood as interpreting power as a social relation between the ruling and the ruled;
- normative, assuming that power's normative regulation decides on the essence of its social relation;¹⁰
- conflictive, specifying the sense of power as the institutionalization of conflict;
- identifying power with influence;¹¹
- of social exchange, defining power as a kind of exchange, transaction and social contract;¹²

7 On the subject of the typology of the concept of power, cf., among others, J.J. Wiatr, *Socjologia polityki* (Warszawa: 1999), p. 110.

8 The work of L. Porębski contains a review of behavioral concepts, L. Porębski, *Behawioralny model władzy*; see also S. Turner, *American Sociology. From Pre-Disciplinary to Post-Normal* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014).

9 For instance, the evolving definitions of T. Parsons, for instance in *Structure and Process in Modern Societies*, (New York: 1965), p. 182. These definitions are referred to and analyzed by J. Jakubowski, "Władza: czy gra o sumie zerowej?" in: T. Buksiński, ed., *Idee filozoficzne w polityce* (Poznań: 1998), pp. 177 and 188. Parsons's concepts are also interpreted as systemic and functional more than teleological and in such an approach, they will be further discussed.

10 K. Pałecki proposes such an understanding of power. See K. Pałecki, "Wprowadzenie do normatywnej teorii władzy politycznej," in: B. Szmulik, M. Żmigrodzki, *Wprowadzenie do nauki o państwie i prawie* (Lublin: 2002).

11 Many theoreticians of management identify power with influence, defining it, for instance, as "the ability of having an effect," J.A.F. Stoner, Ch. Wankel, *Kierowanie* (Warszawa: 1992), p. 257, "the ability of influencing the behaviors of others," R.W. Griffin, *Podstawy zarządzania organizacjami* (Warszawa: 1998), p. 494. It is worth noting that reducing power to generally understood in a neutral and axiological manner influence, intelligently moves away the issues of dominance, exploitation, freedom and contradictions to the borders of such idealized organizational power, which allows for a further interpretation of management as technical and, in fact, apolitical.

12 P. Blau or M. Crozier's proposals – who treat power as the result of the interactive process of negotiation between partners of social relation – and also R.M. Emerson's – who

- psychological, treating power as a psychical addiction of ones from others, domination of ones over others and a possibility of realizing one's own will of ones against others, even against their resistance;¹³
- of common good, characteristic for instance, for the social thought of the Catholic Church,¹⁴ in which power is interpreted as a force responsible for the unification of common action via rules that are binding for all;
- treating power as a kind of social control;¹⁵
- realistic, assuming that power is an attribute, property of individuals, which is a function of their positions and roles in social system;¹⁶
- communicative, sometimes defined as linguistic, symbolic or constructivist, emphasizing the communicative and subjective character of power as a possibility of undertaking equal social action by people participating in it.¹⁷

sees the essence of power in unequal dependence happening between partners of the exchange – are counted among such approaches. See M. Kempny, J. Szmatka, *Współczesne teorie wymiany społecznej. Zbiór tekstów* (Warszawa: 1992), including “Wprowadzenie,” pp. 54–55, and also E. Masłyk-Musiał, *Spółczeństwo i organizacja. Socjologia organizacji i zarządzania* (Lublin: 1996), pp. 100–102; M. Crozier, E. Friedberg, *Człowiek i system. Ograniczenia działania zespołowego* (Warszawa: 1982), p. 69.

- 13 M. Weber's definition is sometimes deemed to be psychological, it states that “power is any possibility of exercising one's own will within the framework of given social relations, regardless of objection and of which this possibility is supported with,” *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tubingen: 1922), p. 28, this definition was translated into Polish by A. Czajowski, “Władza polityczna. Analiza pojęcia” in: A.W. Jabłoński, L. Sobkowiak, eds., *Studia z teorii polityki*, Vol. I (Wrocław: 1996), p. 27.
- 14 See Y.S. Simon, *Ogólna teoria władzy* (Kraków: 1998), p. 33.
- 15 Among concepts reducing power to control, sometimes definitions of, among others, H. Lasswell, A. Kaplan, R. Aron are enumerated. See D.H. Wrong, “Problemy definiowania pojęcia władzy społecznej” in: W. Derczyński, A. Jasińska-Kania, J. Szacki, eds., *Elementy teorii socjologicznych* (Warszawa: 1995).
- 16 The following works are representative for this approach: J.C. Isaac, “Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique,” *Polity*, Vol. 20/1987, *Power and Marxist Theory: A Realistic View* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), see T. Biernat, *Legitimacja władzy...*, pp. 54–56, L. Porębski, *Behawioralny model władzy*, p. 148.
- 17 For instance, concepts of power of the following authors are deemed to be communicative, R. Fay, *Critical Social Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), J. Habermas and H. Arendt, J. Habermas, “Hannah Arendt: On Concept of Power” in: J. Habermas, *Philosophical – Political Profiles* (MIT Press: Cambridge, 1983), M. Foucault, “The Subject and Power” in: H. Dreyfus, P. Rabinow, eds., *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1983). These works are referred to by L. Porębski, *Behawioralny model władzy*, pp. 148–150.

The enumerated theoretical concepts overlap, it is not a separate division, qualifying specified proposals as representative for a given theory group may also raise doubts and discussions, it has an inherently simplified character. Particular definitions of power should be examined in the context of the entirety of theoretical reflections of their authors, and even comparative analyses are always, at least partially, burdened with selective treatment of this comprehensive context. It is well visible on the example of M. Weber's concept of power or the Marxist theory. Weber's interpretation of power encompasses – according to some researchers – numerous complementary aspects: behavioral, teleological, instrumental, conflictive, relational (structural) and personal. Similarly, the Marxist concept encompasses many layers and dimensions of power analysis that do not come down to, as it is sometimes interpreted, class struggle and violence.¹⁸

Addressing in this place numerous theoretical controversies will not be – due to obvious, I think, reasons – possible.¹⁹ Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that it is possible to separate several basic directions of power interpretation that could be significant also for the attempts at identifying the essence of politics:

1. Power may be understood as an **attribute** of interpersonal relations and as a **property or function** of social systems or as a **social relation**.²⁰ It concerns

18 See M. Orzechowski, *Polityka, władza, panowanie w teorii Maxa Webera* (Warszawa: 1984); A. Pawłowska, *Władza Elity Biurokracja. Studium z socjologii polityki* (Lublin: 1998), pp. 28–32. With Weber's concept of power L. Nowak interestingly argues in the work "Przyczynek do krytyki liberalistycznej teorii władzy" in: *U podstaw teorii socjalizmu*, Vol. 2, Poznań 1991. He treats Weber's concept as a sophisticated ideology of power. "It is an ideology of state power, as it presents reasons for the division on administrators of coercion and others, reasons for legitimacy of the former. It is a sophisticated ideology ... not only due to the reasons of its qualities of purely cognitive nature, but also because it expresses a citizen's point of view. It is a tamed citizen's point of view, overwhelmed with foreign force, which he tries to mentally tame ... this concept expresses the citizen's helplessness who, for the price of obedience, tries to tie the power's hands, even just a little, he declares obedience, but to the power that respects the requirements of legitimacy, tradition or charisma." L. Nowak, "Przyczynek do krytyki liberalistycznej teorii władzy" in: *U podstaw teorii socjalizmu*, Vol. 2 (Poznań: 1991), p. 291.

19 In social sciences, it is sometimes deemed that power and leadership are the examples of notions that are by nature conflicting and permanently insolvable. See A. Waśkiewicz, *Interpretacja teorii politycznej. Spór o metodę we współczesnej literaturze anglosaskiej* (Warszawa: 1998), pp. 59–68; T. Ball, "Władza" in: R.E. Goodin, P.Pettit, eds., *Przewodnik po współczesnej filozofii politycznej* (Warszawa: 1998), pp. 706–709.

20 Cf. for instance, L. Porębski, *Behawioralny model władzy*, pp. 50–56.

the answer to the question – what is the essence of power? In literature, especially in the psychological one, but also in the sociological and political ones, there dominates the understanding of power as a social relation, perceiving it as a relation. Such understood power is a relation between subjects, which may be differently characterized, for instance as a possibility of realizing one's own will, giving an order, which other subjects need to follow on the basis of norms in force, a possibility of using sanctions, as a control or dependence of these subjects from the dominating subject, regulating their freedom, triggering behaviors in accordance with assumed goals etc.²¹

However, the fact that power manifests itself as a relation does not mean that it comes down to a relation, that it is a relation. One may look at power as an attribute of social relations and systems of these relations. The essence of power is then its social function. Such a systemic and functional character have definitions of power connecting it with distribution and redistribution of resources necessary for satisfying human needs and by nature occurring in limited quantity, then power seems to be a socially necessary mechanism ensuring social systems the possibility of existence and development despite the deficit of resources.²² A similar view on power is present in such its definitions, which treat it as a homeostat of social systems, a mechanism ensuring adaptation, integration and possibility of maintaining a dynamic balance in changing conditions of the environment, institutionalization of conflicts, as the conflictive character of power does not come down to the conflict of the dominating subject and the subjugated subject, asymmetry and counterasymmetry of power relations, it is the expression of a broader conflict inflicted by the deficit of social resources or general contradictions of social development. Moreover, teleological interpretations of power do not have to come down to the question of relation, but can be

21 The view on the relational character of power is presented, for instance, by P. Bachrach, M.S. Baratz, "Władza, władza prawomocna, siła" in: M. Ankiewicz, ed., *Władza i polityka. Wybór tekstów ze współczesnej politologii zachodniej* (Warszawa: 1988).

22 The fact that power is not a property of an individual, it belongs to the group and exists as long as this group sticks together is emphasized by H. Arendt. "When we say of somebody that he is "in power" we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name. The moment the group, from which the power originated to begin with (*potestas in populo*, without a people or group there is no power), disappears, "his power" also vanishes," H. Arendt, *On Violence* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: 1970), p. 44.

referred to the goals of social systems, as it was done by T. Parsons²³ in his concept of socio-cultural systems and their functions.

2. The second important controversy concerns whether it is necessary for the occurrence of the phenomenon of power for the entangled in power subjects to **be conscious** or whether power is an **objective** phenomenon, about the existence of which participating in it people or other subjects can be oblivious. In general, in the subject's literature the conscious character of power is established. The relational approaches to power prompt such a statement. It is then assumed that participants of the power relation do it consciously and this awareness should be at least possessed by the subject that gives orders or manifests, that is communicates, its will. In this approach, power has an intentional character. The situation of the objective modification of the subjects' behaviors is then described by means of the category of influence and control. The systemic and functional interpretation of power does not have to lead to such conclusions. Power may be perceived in a broader manner, it may take place independently from the degree of its being made conscious, as it is the objectively existing need of systems, organizations and social relations. Power may have a different form, people may influence it, but they cannot do without it until the moment when we think about relations between people and not individual people. For individual people to exist, they need to have minimum power over themselves, even in the simplest organic sense, that is control over their organism.
3. The third important issue concerns **the relation between power, violence and coercion**. In this matter, there exist also other views, their sources are sometimes different linguistic conventions and not only theoretical differences. As it was mentioned before, in English, the Polish word *władza* is translated as *authority* or *power*, sometimes the word *control* is used as a synonym. *Power*

23 Power, in T. Parsons's understanding, is a generalized ability to mobilize social resources for gaining collective goals of a system, the subsystem of formulating and realizing these goals is the political subsystem of the social system. Power has a similar role to the currency in the economic subsystem, it is a means of social exchange. See T. Parsons, N. Smelser, "Funkcjonalne zróżnicowanie społeczeństwa," in: W. Derczyński, A. Jasińska-Kania, J. Szacki, eds., *Elementy teorii socjologicznych* (Warszawa: 1975), p. 221, cf. also M. Ziółkowski, B. Pawłowska, R. Drozdowski, *Jednostka wobec władzy* (Poznań: 1994), pp.12–15. T. Parsons's theory is synthetically characterized by H. Białyszewski in the foreword to the Polish edition of T. Parsons's *Szkice z teorii socjologicznej* (Warszawa: 1972), pp. VII–LXII. See also J. Jakubowski, *Władza: czy gra o sumie zerowej*.

may also be *sila* and *authority* – *autorytet*, so in many interpretations, power is based on other than violence means of subjugation. In the European, continental tradition, power was often connected with violence and coercion, it is often deemed to be an immanent characteristic of the power relation as a social phenomenon.²⁴ In the Anglo-Saxon reflection, power is dominated by the conviction that applying the direct coercion constitutes violence or force, not power. Power requires the possibility of a choice that guarantees the minimum of subjectivity of the relation's partners, which is the condition of the relationality of the power situation if it is interpreted in a relational way and as a conscious dependence.²⁵

Relations between violence and power are plastically illustrated by E. Canetti who writes the following:

The cat uses force to catch the mouse, to seize it, hold it in its claws and ultimately kill it. But while it is playing with it another factor is present. It lets it go, allows it to run about a little and even turn its back; and, during this time, the mouse is no longer subjected to force. But it is still within the power of the cat and can be caught again. If it gets right away it escapes from the cat's sphere of power; but, up to the point at which it can no longer be reached, it is still within it. The space which the cat dominates, the moments of hope it allows the mouse, while continuing however to watch it closely all the time and never relaxing its interest and intention to destroy it – all this together, space, hope, watchfulness and destructive intent, can be called the actual body of power, or, more simply, power itself.²⁶

4. Another difference of positions concerns **the conflictive character** of power. The relationality of power will prompt a conclusion about the conflictive character at least as a consequence of the asymmetry of power²⁷ – and as it was previously mentioned – the conflictive character of power has, however,

24 Cf. For instance, W. Pietras, "Władza polityczna i jej przedmiot," *Studia Nauk Politycznych*, No. 3–4/1985, p. 82.

25 See L. Porębski, *Behawioralny model władzy*, pp. 61–63. H. Arendt thought that, for instance, "it is insufficient to say that power and violence are not the same. Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power's disappearance," H. Arendt, *On Violence* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: 1970), p. 56.

26 E. Canetti, *Crowds and Power* (New York: 1984), p. 281.

27 The asymmetry of power is analyzed, among others, by K. Pałeczki, *Prawo Polityka Władza* (Warszawa: 1988), pp. 39–41. See also K. Pałeczki, "Wprowadzenie do normatywnej teorii władzy politycznej" in: B. Szmulik, M. Żmigrodzki, eds., *Wprowadzenie do nauki o państwie i prawie* (Lublin: 2002).

a much deeper sense. The functional and systemic interpretations of power may lead to the constructions that recognize the conflictive character of power, if one connects it with the deficit of resources and their distribution, and to the integrational view on power, if one emphasizes its synergetic and cooperative functions, or an adjunct character toward the common good.²⁸ Perceiving power as a phenomenon closely connected with contradictions and conflicts does not have to mean not perceiving the importance of integration and cooperation. One can accept the dialectic interpretation of the mutual connection of contradictions and compatibility even as it is done in the methodological Marxist tradition. Referring to the previous analogy of power and the cat and mouse, one may notice that the relation of the mouse and the cat has a conflictive character, but in reality results from their structural and functional positioning in the biologic system, in the food chain of which they are part. In different conditions, perhaps, the cat and the mouse could be friends, although creating such a situation would require significant talents of a breeder.

5. The phenomenon of power may be perceived in an **idiogenic** or **allogenic** manner. In the first case, power, especially political power, is interpreted as a being above all autonomic and autodynamic, which has its own basis. In the second case, power is treated as a derivative of other spheres of social life. Such “powergenic” spheres may be economic or cultural factors. Every one of these approaches may attribute the key meaning to the material, institutional and conscious aspects. Theories of power may also be divided into antagonistic and solidaristic. L. Nowak, who uses these criteria of distinction, tries to apply them to the analysis of main concepts of power. For instance, the Marxist concept has an allogenic character, as it searches for the explanations of power in economic factors; materialistic, because as a basic property of power it deems the disposition of coercion means; and also solidaristic, because power itself does not create the social antagonism, but its main mission is to integrate the society, to prevent its tearing on class interests while maintaining the interests of the ruling class, resulting from the political properties. The anarchistic interpretation of power is also allocentric and materialistic, but at the same time, antagonistic, as power is here an autonomous source of social antagonism. The Christian theory of power is also allocentric, but at the same time, idealistic and culturalistic, the nature of power is in it explained with transcendent values; it is also solidaristic, as the common

28 See for instance, Y.R. Simon, *Ogólna teoria władzy* (Kraków: 1998).

good is in it the main message of power. Liberal concepts are – according to L. Nowak – idiogenic and institutional. They assume the independence of the power sphere and the decisive role of institutionally fixed patterns of social interactions. Weber's concept of power is also idiogenic, at the same time, the basic meaning has in it power legitimation and so, the basics and faith of the ruling in the legitimacy of power. Thus, it is an idealistic and solidaristic concept.²⁹ Whether the typology proposed by L. Nowak is fully adequate, it may be, of course, discussed. The Marxist concept is not, for instance, clearly solidaristic; in turn, it is difficult to accuse Weber of underestimating the institutional factor. However, the proposed axes of discussion are worth noticing, as they order certain controversies and positions important for defining power.

Recognizing that the essence of power are its functions fulfilled in social systems requires a further comment. Specified manifestations of power may have and have a relational character. It is worth noting that reducing this relation to interactions of two subjects with a clearly asymmetric character is a far-reaching simplification. Power not only subjects one subject to another, but also connects these subjects and makes them dependent from one another. Without a subject, which is subjected, one cannot talk about the existence of a dominating subject. Without obedience, an order is only a declaration of will and intention, only obedience makes power. In social reality, pure two-subject dependencies do not occur in practice. In power relation, even maximally prepared, there are present interferences of social context in the form of norms, values and situational entanglement of subjects; in fact, relationally perceived power is always a convolution of social relations and not one relation. In norms, values, possibilities of using sanctions, we have also social relations with many other subjects, often made conscious in practice only to a certain extent. Besides, even an isolated interaction and social relation may be looked at as a certain microsystem of many influences and dependencies, having their own individual identity resulting from a social bond, objectively made between subjects. Then, power is a certain functional attribute of such a relation. T. Parsons interpreted in a similar manner social systems as groups of individual and collective actors, connected by a net of dependencies and interactions. In this sense, the social relation is also a social system. The multitude of interactions and dependencies, the number of participating actors defines only the degree of the system complexity. The interaction

29 See L. Nowak, *U podstaw teorii socjalizmu. Dynamika władzy* (Poznań: 1991), Vol. 3, pp. 9–14.

and dependency of two actors is also a system.³⁰ If under the notion “actor” one understands every intentional or deliberate system, then actors are not only civilizations, nations, social classes, groups and organizations, but also various social aggregates and conglomerates or structures of actions and structures of interests, their complexes and multiplexes. Thus, the functional interpretation of the essence of power prompts to allocentric explanations.

Thus, depending on how we interpret power, the sense of treating it as a key problem of politics may be completely different. Relational perception of power narrows down its meaning and causes that deeming it the essence of politics seems to be very debatable. Treating power as an attribute of social systems, as functions or a convolution of functions increases the social space of power and with such an approach, the degree of the overlapping of power and politics space is clearly larger. Depending on how we define the functional essence of power, the essence of politics will be differently shaped.

2. Conditions of power

If one recognizes in simplification that reality has its overt, covert and deeply covert order, then he can construct a three-tier model of the analysis of power basics. What is the most visible and overt would be then the legitimacy and legitimization of power, sources of power will have partially covert character and a deeply covert order will be analyzed by the use of the category of conditions.³¹

Conditions of power are connected with above all the objective situational context, in which there occurs a power phenomenon. Thus, general contradictions connected with the manner of the existence of a social system in the environment will be the conditions of a given power system. Among the key conditions of power we may enumerate, for instance:

- the character of socio-economic macrosystem, the subsystem of which is a given social system, its socio-economic and political regime;

30 See J. Jakubowski, “Przeciw utylityzmowi” in: T. Buksiński, ed., *Rozumność i racjonalność* (Poznań: 1997); T. Parsons, *Szkice z teorii socjologicznej*, including the foreword of H. Białyszewski; S. Kozyr-Kowalski, *Struktura gospodarcza i formacja społeczeństwa* (Warszawa: 1988), pp. 9–15; A. Manterys, *Klasyczna idea definicji sytuacji* (Warszawa: 2000).

31 I justify and use this model of analysis in the work *Organizacje. Polityka, władza, struktury*, referring to, among others, D. Bohm, *Ukryty porządek* (Warszawa: 1988).

- the level of development of the socio-economic, civilizational and political society, defining on the one hand, the character of resources and on the other hand, the possibilities of gaining and using the resources;
- the functions of the system toward the social macrosystem, the degree of its eufunctionality or dysfunctionality toward a specified social order constituting a macrosystem bond;
- the character of the society's culture in the supranational, national and local dimension, which determines the dominating types of culture, including patterns of leadership and power, submission toward power, parameters of the power distance, main systems of social values, dominating ideologies, symbols, beliefs and social rituals, often subconsciously reflected in culture and those its segments and levels, which may influence the imagination of power and its objectification in social institutions;
- contradictions between the system and macrosystem, other systems and basic internal contradictions of the social system determining the limits of its social space, its ability to exist and develop, including the structural and functional contradictions, on the basis of which there occur conflicts in the environment and internal conflicts in the system;
- the objective entanglement of the system in the articulation of social interests processes, their contradictions and conflicts;
- phenomena and processes connected with the regularities of population and social ecosystems development connected with, for instance, historically, economically and socially specified organizational technologies or specified social needs, which created a given type of a system, their populations and ecosystems.

Conditions of power may be compared to somehow “natural” conditions defining the initial abilities of survival and development of social systems. Just as earth, climate, water accessibility etc. determine in “the last instance” the possibilities of organisms’ development, conditions of power define limits of possibilities space, necessity and necessary functions of power and leadership, determining the shape of the power and leadership system and their basic, structural parameters. Explaining and understanding mechanisms of power requires seeking a deeper and usually difficult to recognize structure of phenomena and social processes, from which a need for power stems. Thus, penetration of power conditions is some kind of “third reason” behind power and leadership. Often, real conditions of a given power can be visible only with a significant time perspective, when basic consequences, results of functioning of a given system of power and leadership are visible. Many analyses of social life do not reach

that far. It may be noticed that the analysis of power conditions, just how we understand them here, is, above all, characteristic for cultural, psychoanalytical, structural and functional concepts and conflictive system approaches, dialectic theories, including Marxist and post-Marxist concepts. Every one of them will define differently the factors that should play the role of power conditions.

If one recognizes the determining in “the last instance” social life role of economic phenomena, working process, the key power condition, gathering in itself the basic for the system contradictions of structural and functional character, are the property relations. The meaning of property as the basis of social relations is emphasized in many concepts, not only in Marxism. The thesis that property makes power is also rather universally accepted in the everyday language. The researchers of property enumerate James Harrington, contemporary to Hobbes, and his work “The Commonwealth of Oceana” from 1656, as the first theoretician who noticed that the political development is not only the problem of power division, but rather the question of property division. His basic thesis consisted of the statement that who has control over the wealth (the land) also controls politics, as political power is based on military power and it requires financing. Political power is a by-product of economy, and more precisely, of property division between the state and people. Hypotheses on the role of property in social life have been present in human thought since at least Antiquity and views in this matter were directly or indirectly uttered by the greatest thinkers, such as Plato and also Aristotle, who emphasized the role of property for the stability of social and political order and opted for the recognition of property as an attribute of hearth and not the community or state. The problem of property played a significant role in stoics’ concepts and formulated by them rule of natural law, it was analyzed and codified in ancient Rome, it repeatedly recurred in the Christian thought, Jewish tradition, it was present in theological medieval disputes, in the thought of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, gaining a particular meaning along with the industrial revolution and the development of capitalism.³²

32 A review of the concepts of understanding property as an idea and institution appears, for instance, in R. Pipes, *Property and Freedom* (New York: Random House Books 1999), who refers to Harrington’s theses, among others, on pp. 59–62, see also S. Kozyr-Kowalski, *Socjologia, społeczeństwo obywatelskie i państwo* (Poznań: 1999). To J. Harrington’s concepts repeatedly refers also T. Żyro, *Boża plantacja. Historia utopii amerykańskiej* (Warszawa: 1994).

3. Property in the legal and socio-economic sense

Property is differently understood in particular scientific schools and fields of expertise. Relatively universally, property in legal sense is distinguished from property in economic or socio-economic sense or – in other words – between legal and economic property laws.³³ The distinction stems from the conviction that real property relations are only partially reflected in legal norms, that the actual owner and the object of property may be mystified in a given legal system, the legal form of property is at most a certain form of the reflection of real property relations.

For a long time, S. Kozyr-Kowalski³⁴ pays attention in the Polish literature to the key differences between property in the legal and socio-economic sense. Referring to the Marxist criticism of the formal and legal concepts of property, he notices that:

- the economic relation of property is a phenomenon historically prior to state and law;
- for the existence of property in socio-economic sense, the existence of an appropriate law is not necessary. “Gold and silver are acceptable by law only because they are acceptable in practice; and they are acceptable in practice because the present organization of production needs a universal medium of exchange. Right is only the official recognition of fact;”³⁵
- in reality, the same legal relation of property may contain in itself many significantly different economic relations. The share ownership law of a marginal and dominating shareholder may be formally identical, in reality, it may be substantially different;
- actually, the identical property relation in the socio-economic sense may be formally regulated by many legal relations, for instance the capitalistic

33 See for instance, A. Reeve, “Własność” in: *Przewodnik po współczesnej filozofii politycznej*, p. 714; A. Herman, M. Strzyżewska-Kamińska, “Własność jako podstawa współczesnych systemów gospodarczych,” *Ekonomista*, No. 3/1981; W. Gumuła, *Własność. Meandry prywatyzacji i uspołecznienia w teorii społecznej Karola Marksa*, Tyczyn 2000; J. Wasilkowski, *Pojęcie własności we współczesnym prawie polskim* (Warszawa: 1972); J. Strzelecki, “Teoria praw własności a ekonomia neoklasycyzna,” *Colloquia Communia*, No. 4–5/1988.

34 See S. Kozyr-Kowalski, *Struktura gospodarcza i formacja społeczeństwa* (Warszawa: 1988), pp. 201–218.

35 K. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, available at: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/poverty-philosophy/ch01c.htm>.

property of means of production may take the legal form of property, lease or lending for use;

- the legal identification of the property subject often does not allow for the identification of the owner in the socio-economic sense. If the legal owner of specified means of production is, for instance, a transnational corporation, the actual property may have a very different character. It may be that in a specified situation, the management of the corporation is the owner, it may also be the dominating shareholder, the key creditor or the state toward which there occurred, for instance, significant tax obligations; it may turn out that an another corporation – which is part of the same economic system, which actually has, for instance, the same owner, not to mention that in the case of a constant rotation of property rights on the capital market, determining the owner in the legal sense in a given moment may be incredibly difficult – is the actual owner;
- the legal interpretation of property may be present also in the attempts of property identification in the socio-economic sense, when the legal logic is applied in the socio-economic analysis. It may consist of, for instance, localizing empirical property subjects hidden in its legal form. Then, we will come to, for instance, a conclusion that if a battle ship has legal identity, its captain or officer staff is its actual owner, the management will be the owner of a library and the senate and the rector – of a university etc.;
- the legal understanding of property focuses its attention on the relation of property subject to its object, on man's attitude to things. Meanwhile, the essence of property consists of relations among people, things are only an intermediary and catalyst of these relations. The owner's attitude to things consists of, above all, the attitude toward other people in the matter of this thing.³⁶

However, the distinction of property in the legal and socio-economic sense does not exhaust the issue of understanding property, but actually, it only just begins it. Conflicts surrounding the interpretation of property are one of the most basic in science, not only due to the complex content of the phenomenon itself, but also due to its role in social life, which causes an ardent discussion and its strong ideological mood.

36 This aspect of property is noticed by, for instance, S. Morawski in the work *Socjologia ekonomiczna* (Warszawa: 2001), pp. 236–238. Such a perspective traditionally organized the Marxist analysis of economic relations, which are defined as social relations occurring via things.

4. Property in the socio-economic sense as actually having something at one's disposal

In the searching of the essence of property on the sociological and economic plane, one can observe two distinct analysis currents. In one of them, property is associated with real control, disposal, governance, possession, usage, having benefits, an opportunity of abuse, disposing, these notions are in fact the expansion and specification of disposal and control, they connect property relations with the act of will and as a consequence, their heuristic scheme indicates fundamental relationship with the legal property construction stemming from Roman times and recognizing that property means full governance over a thing. As a consequence, such an understanding of property situates it as an actually particular form of power. It is worth noting that identifying property with the economic power is sometimes stemmed from the thought of Marx himself.³⁷ Identifying property with an actual disposal and control leads also to the conclusion that property is a specified economic relation, which is a basis – according to some theoreticians who refer to Marxism – of the rest of economic and social relations.

S. Ossowski in his time indicated a close connection and overlap of phenomena of power and property. He treated **the economic power** as a kind of social relations expressing itself in the economic advantage of some people over others. In his interpretation, the economic power is possessed by the one who disposes the type of goods that are more suitable for exchange in a given environment, the one who disposes a larger amount of goods for exchange, of whom situation is closer to the situation of a monopolist.³⁸ The economic power is more visible, the more there are transactions made by a given subject and this, in turn, is connected with wealth. S. Ossowski distinguished economic power understood as having capital and economic power, which is the privilege of the higher share in social income. The economic power has a voluntary character in a sense that the underlying agreement is not forced with physical strength, it

37 N. Kejzerow does so in the work *Władza i autorytet* (Warszawa: 1976), p. 160. He refers to, for instance, the following K. Marx's statement: "Property, at all events, is also a kind of power. Economists call capital, for instance, "power over the labour of others". We are therefore faced with two kinds of power, on the one hand the power of property, in other words, of the property-owners, on the other hand political power, the power of the state," K. Marx, *Moralising Criticism and Critical Morality*, <https://marxists.catbull.com/archive/marx/works/1847/10/31.htm>.

38 See S. Ossowski, "Władza polityczna i władza ekonomiczna" in: S. Ossowski, *O strukturze społecznej* (Warszawa: 1982) and J. Błuszkowski, *Struktura społeczna* (Warszawa: 1996).

is concluded in the framework of social game rules in force, it consists of goods and services exchange or payment. However, one of the exchange parties is in a privileged situation, as it has an economic advantage ensuring the application of economic coercion that may be not so less severe than the physical one. In turn, the physical coercion, which is in the hand of political power, guards observing the game rules. The coercion steps in in the situation of an agreement breach, in the form of sanctions. Other guarantees of the game rules of economic power is the public opinion, decency and also trust, which have a measurable commercial value in economic relations. The economic power allows for influencing people also when they are not directly entangled in it. Funds that are in its disposal may serve addicting in various forms, for instance, opinion-forming environments, ruling groups as well as other classes and social groups.

Of particular significance are the relations identified by Ossowski between the ruling group and the administrators of economic power, which may be treated also as a heuristic scheme of analysis of power conditions resulting from economic power (property), not only in the macrostructural dimension. These relations may have different forms:³⁹

- owners' political power, which is exercised directly by the owners or their representatives, political power is then an executive committee of property, its participants are the functionaries of owners or they are owners themselves. Then, we deal with an advantage of economic power over political power;
- mutual dependence of political and economic power of owners, the sense of which would be a specific agreement, a mutual respect of one's own autonomy and interests between, for instance, professional administrators and owners;
- playing the role of an arbiter by political power in the class conflict between owners and employees, which corresponds to the Marxist analysis of situation of the so-called class balance;
- political power's direct disposal of economic power also in the sense of property, in the situation of nonexistence or neutralization of independently separated owner subject.

All these idealized situations find confirmation in the historical development of forms of organizational power, especially in capitalistic enterprises. The initial development of capitalism was characterized with owners' direct exercise of organizational and management power. Then, management became the domain of payable, contract and hired functionaries – managers. With time, the

39 See S. Ossowski, *O strukturze społecznej* (Warszawa: 1982), pp. 60–66.

management layer more and more autonomized its interests and gained subjectivity, sometimes aspiring to the role of an arbiter in social conflicts, opposing the political auction to the ethos of power that is technically effective and professional. Nowadays, the power of such management ideology is also significant and articulated in its real problems of social managing are important. Finally, the last form of relations seems more and more to adequately describe the world of modern corporations with scattered, fluid and anonymous share capital, often remaining under the control of economic organisms dependent from the corporation management thanks to various forms of taking owner control over oneself by corporations themselves and their managing structures. The last form of relations may, as a consequence, be read as a change of property type and taking it over by the management layer; as an illustration of the process of transformation of power into property and not only conditioning power by property. As a consequence, the last distinguished type of relations in the process of evolution begins to approach the first type.

5. Property in the socio-economic sense as the entirety of economic relations

S. Kozyr-Kowalski – and some other researchers of the problem inspired by his proposals – develops a different interpretation of property, which refers to the thought of K. Marx and also of M. Weber.⁴⁰ Their position is that property is, in the most general sense, the gaining by means of one's own or someone else's labor of what is not the product of one's own labor and they notice that property is an initial condition of production and labor and not only their consequence or moment. As a result, it turns out that property is not some basic economic relation, but a historically specified for a given manner of production entirety of

40 See among others, S. Kozyr-Kowalski, "Przemiany stosunków własnościowych a marksistowska teoria rozwoju społeczeństwa" in: W. Wesolowski, ed., *Marksizm i procesy rozwoju społecznego* (Warszawa: 1979); J. Tittenbrun, "Własność w świetle prac Karola Marksa," *Ekonomista*, No. 3/4/1982; P. Marciniak, R. Pluta, *Własność środków produkcji a klasy społeczne*, duplicated typescript; J. Drażkiewicz, *Interesy a struktura społeczna* (Warszawa: 1982); T. Piwowarun, "Co to jest własność – Spory we współczesnej myśli ekonomicznej" in: S. Kozyr-Kowalski, ed., *Własność: gospodarka a prawo* (Warszawa: 1977); W. Mejbaum, "Własność jako przedmiot teoretyczny," *Colloquia Communia*, No. 4–5/1988; S. Kozyr-Kowalski, *Struktura gospodarcza a formacja społeczeństwa* (Warszawa: 1988); S. Kozyr-Kowalski, *Socjologia, społeczeństwo obywatelskie i państwo*, Poznań 1999.

these relations, for which disposal is some kind of mask, a sign hiding in itself a more various social mechanism.

If one carries out destruction of the understanding of private property of production means in a broad sense, encompassing not only the direct manufacturing activity connected with manufacturing material goods, but also the indirect manufacturing activity connected with the goods-money exchange of material goods, workforce, means of production and consumption as disposal, then it will turn out that it is the convolution of various economic relations, among which the following may be enumerated:⁴¹

- a possibility of transforming production means into money allowing for gaining means for the existence without labor for a longer or shorter period of time;
- a regular transformation of gained material goods or activities into an object of the goods-money exchange in order to gain fundamental life means;
- a more or less lasting and repetitive possibility of the non-occurrence on the goods-money market in the character of a vendor of workforce;
- the occurrence on the goods-money market in the character of a workforce buyer in order to execute it thanks to one's own production or exchange means;
- operating one's own production means with someone else's workforce, the production and obtaining its products thanks to someone else's labor;
- obtaining an additional product in the production process, the appropriation thanks to the production or exchange means of the unpaid labor of another man;
- a possibility of gaining thanks to production means the fundamental means of support without one's own labor of a direct or indirect manufacturing character;
- a possibility of replacing one's own labor by activities of "natural agents of labor," that is functioning in an unpaid way in the process of producing forces of nature (wind, water, solar energy, thermal energy, air);
- a possibility of using the acting in the image of forces of nature in the process of producing material forms of past human labor, products of spiritual labor of past generations;

41 On the basis of S. Kozyr-Kowalski, *Struktura gospodarcza i formacja społeczeństwa*, pp. 239–252; J. Tittenbrun, *Własność w świetle prac Karola Marksa*. Cf. also W. Gumuła, *Własność*, pp. 13–61, who reflects on the Marxist understanding of property in the dimensions of production, division, exchange and consumption relations.

- a possibility of the appropriation of scientific discoveries and also of knowledge and qualifications of workforce;
- using unpaid benefits resulting from cooperated labor;
- a possibility of inheriting property.

Such constructed interpretation of private property in the capitalistic system unambiguously leads to a conclusion on conditioning power by property, including political and organizational power, even though specified relations in this matter require a detailed analysis, as particular relations of power may occur to a limited degree and property will always be specified and historically determined.

As a consequence, property is a multidirectional relation, subjects and objects of property may be various and certain relations of property may, in general, not be registered as property in the collective awareness. Just as Latin American peasants are not aware of the fact that they are co-owners of Amazon forests, we also are not aware of the participation in the socio-economic universal property. The legal perception of property stands out thanks to its tendency to reification of the world, identifying law with phenomena, which may only be described by legal categories; it leads to treating many phenomena of fundamental property meaning as beyond-property phenomena. According to Kozyr-Kowalski, the examples of such phenomena are, among others, man, his body, qualifications and education, air, sunlight and other free goods, safety and hygiene at work, taxes, unemployment benefits, university diplomas or concessions for conducting business activity and practicing a profession.⁴² The objects of property are free goods, means of production, including intellectual and virtual ones, means of distribution, including spiritual goods, workforce and its working ability, defined by Kozyr-Kowalski as *ergodynamis*, money and industrial and commercial, financial and share capital and in some concepts also social, political and cultural capital, for instance in the concept of P. Bourdieu.⁴³ M. Weber among objects of property enumerated economic and non-economic chances, real means of equipping (production and transport, alternatively also commerce and finances), real means of hiring as means of administration, struggle, religious cult and also disposal powers, political, spiritual, representation power, respect, man, his qualifications, education, upbringing, workforce or the so-called human pension connected with having slaves and enslaved peasants.⁴⁴

42 See S. Kozyr-Kowalski, *Socjologia, społeczeństwo obywatelskie, państwo*, pp. 107–111.

43 See P. Bourdieu and L.J.D. Vacquant, *Zaproszenie do socjologii refleksyjnej* (Warszawa: 2001); P. Bourdieu, *Reguły sztuki* (Kraków: 2001), especially chap. I.3.

44 S. Kozyr-Kowalski, *Socjologia, społeczeństwo obywatelskie, państwo*, pp. 112–145.

In economic and sociological concepts of property, the problem of property subjects is also broadly treated, property is also not at all identified with private property. Property subjects may be collective and individual, they may be nations, classes and social groups, social categories separated on the basis of social labor division, organizations and social institutions and also systems and other social macrostructures, even though some researchers of empirical orientation emphasize that the only property subject are “real, specified human individuals, who engage in a given place and time in specified dependencies with other people and have similar or different place in social space and time. Property reduction attributed by formal and legal doctrines to persons-institutions to property owed to real people is a characteristic feature of the economic and sociological analysis. A sociologist cannot reshape the notions of nation, society, class, city or village, church into nonhuman and superhuman beings and make property subjects of such fictional people.”⁴⁵ This thesis may raise doubts adequately to the applied theoretical and methodological orientation. With holistic position, even moderately emergent one, one needs to recognize that social systems, including large social groups, institutions and organizations, are not the only cognitive models, but they really exist in this empirical sense and thus, they may also be property subjects in the sociological and economic sense, which has nothing to do with questioning the thesis claiming that a legal person as a property subject is a legal fiction, only an attempt at describing the real property and not its real subject and that the essence of socio-economic approach must be studying reality in the final check and not stopping at such or another its expression. However, the degree of compatibility of the description and reality may be different, the sense of description cannot be rejected in advance only because it is made in a different language of depiction and in different categories.

6. Power and property in the interpretation of transaction costs approach

The questions of the relation of power and property are the subject of some economists' analyses, including the ones representing the institutional current, the so-called **transaction costs approach**. O.E. Williamson, one of the representatives of this current, notices numerous significant, also in a practical manner, aspects of these relations.⁴⁶ In his approach, power and property have common

45 S. Kozyr-Kowalski, *Socjologia, społeczeństwo obywatelskie, państwo*, p. 164.

46 O.E. Williamson, *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism* (New York: 1998). Cf. also W. Morawski, *Socjologia ekonomiczna*, pp. 239–243.

effectiveness basis, of which the essence are transaction costs treated marginally in the classical and neoclassical interpretation of economic and organizational processes. Transaction costs have a similar role in economic and social life, as the phenomenon of friction is physical processes.

Based on the transaction costs analysis, O. Williamson proves that known tendencies of the modern capitalism manifesting themselves in the separation of management from property cannot be explained in the categories of power itself. Explaining the hierarchical character of work organization by means of preventing the power gaining of employees is not enough, as it does not answer the question why organizational innovations were possible despite the fact that they encountered opposite interests and their coalitions. Power played a secondary role, as these innovations, which were connected with significant effectiveness benefits, were able to deal with opposite interests or to adapt to them.⁴⁷

The fact that property and management were separated does not mean depriving property of control over power. This control reminds about itself, for instance, when the results of administration are close to border norms. The bureaucratic power is also characterized with internal limitations connected with a tendency to control complexity, including through using organizational resources for the realization of secondary goals and also for forgiving mistakes and cronyism.

O. Williamson argues with the theses on the lack of control of shareholders and views questioning their particular, ownership role. For instance, he cites a view that the cost of rarefied property reflects the degree of the corporation management's freedom, it is the cost of dispersing compensated by profits, even though he thinks at the same time that if the freedom of the management has a real character and changes along with the form of an organization, the question on managing a corporation by its management in their own interest remains relevant. He thinks that shareholders have a unique approach to the enterprise, they invest for the enterprise's lifespan and their claims are the last to be satisfied if there occurs the enterprise's liquidation. In contrast to trade unions, people with debts, suppliers and consumers, they do not also have the possibility of renegotiating terms and periodic renewing of the relation with the corporation, their investments are not connected with specified assets and their dispersed character puts them in an incredibly unfavorable situation. Selling shares is possible for certain shareholders, but it is not possible for shareholders as a collective. Thus, the fundamental solution is such a structure of corporation management, which would secure against the risk of expropriation.

However, a manager's freedom does not, of course, go to zero and, which is not added by Williamson, not directly at least, it may lead to expropriation of shareholders by the management, to transforming power into property, which is very visible, for instance in the Polish transforming economy. On the other hand, the question is to what extent it is the capital that employs labor, and to what extent it is actually the other way round: that labor employs the capital. The analysis of this phenomenon leads to a conclusion that labor sooner or later, in the conditions of capitalistic economy, will be forced to look for capital and if the investment is to be competitive, the gained capital has to be in an appropriate price, which as a consequence leads to offering capital's owners such security, of which the real socio-economic sense will be to give property away or to share it with capital suppliers.⁴⁸ As a consequence, power will be subjugated to property.

7. R. Pipes's interpretation

R. Pipes is in the position of unambiguous addiction of power from property, validity of such a solution and dangerous risks connected with questioning property also in modern capitalistic societies. **He thinks that property is a natural law of man and a guarantee of freedom.** The modern growing, under the pretext of social obligations and responsibilities, role of the state is a threat to property. According to him, social welfare programs transformed democratic authorities in a gigantic mechanism of redistribution of private resources. States begin to treat property not as a fundamental right, the protection of which is their most important task, but as a social institution and an obstacle in realizing justice, the reason of which states recognize that property needs to be regulated. "In such arguments, by a sleight of hand, the fact that the state protects private property is construed to mean that the state holds ultimate title to it."⁴⁹ In democratic conditions, property does not successfully limit political power, as politicians are dependent from their electorate and it is composed of mainly poor voters, not rich ones. As a result, the increasing part of citizens is materially dependent from power, which may create a danger of destroying the democratic system. However, Pipes thinks that inevitability of such a scenario is threatened by budget limitations, a greater political activity of the rich and the fact that private interest in principle outsmarts the guards of "common good."⁵⁰ The modern

48 Cf. O.E. Williamson, *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism* (New York: the Free Press), p. 304.

49 R. Pipes, *Property and Freedom*, p. 323.

50 R. Pipes, *Property and Freedom*, p. 324.

world is characterized by a paradox situation, in which there occurs a limitation for the social goods of private property, which is the strongest bastion of freedom, which leads to such a state strengthening that it threatens and limits freedom. Despotism may appear in various costumes. The traditional absolute power of a monarch or a dictator may be replaced by the despotism of a democratic state, in which one part of the society tyrannizes the other part only because it won the elections. Meanwhile, it may be disputed whether the right to property is not more important than the right to vote.⁵¹

To back his theses, R. Pipes cites a number of facts and arguments. He analyzes the scale of tax burdens, the state's participation in the property of fixed assets and in the gross domestic product. He states, for instance, that as in 1900, the government of the United States had 7 % of the national fixed assets and employed 4 % of the national workforce, in 1950, it had 20 % of the national resources and employed 12,5 % of the people. Its participation in the GDP increased from 3,9 % in 1870 to 27 % in 1970 and finally, in the 1990s, the participation of governmental expenses in the GDP reached the amount of about 30 %; in Germany, it is more than half and in the United Kingdom, it is 42 %. In turn, the number of governmental employees in the years 1900–1992 in the United States increased 18,7 times and increased six times faster than the number of population. Pipes pays attention to limiting private property under the pretext of environment protection, taking over private property by the state as the result of court procedures, acquiring rights by citizens via the state expropriating for this purpose other citizens. He formulates a thesis that citizens' economic dependence from state power increases, which happens via, among others, social welfare, employment in state sector, professional licenses, concessions, government agreements, subsidies, using state resources as assets in economy, services, etc. Thus, certain researchers come to a conclusion that property in the developed capitalistic world changed its character and became some kind of a modern feudalism.⁵² A similar character have state's interferences in the freedom of agreements, which is limited by, for instance, minimum wages, rent control, laws and bank privileges, condescension in employment, including the one connected with regulations that aim for the fight with ethnic discrimination, protectionism in higher education or education, protectionism of which may be

51 See R. Pipes, *Property and Freedom*, p. 411.

52 R. Pipes refers to, in this regard, the analyses of Ch. Reich included in the work *The New Property*. See R. Pipes, *Property and Freedom*, pp. 380–385. He pays attention to the recently occurring privatization processes that made a huge difference in this field.

seen in, for instance, driving children to school in buses, which was supposed to equalize educational chances, but caused a petrification of differences, including a boost of racial segregation in the United States.

At the same time, Pipes decidedly emphasizes that property was never connected with the necessity of its personal managing by owners. "The notion that property entails personal management is as erroneous as would be the notion that democracy requires everyone's personal participation in the legislative process."⁵³ Significant changes of modern property consist of the increase of the role of a state and of moving production to poorer countries due to lower costs of, for instance, workforce.

8. S. Kozyr-Kowalski's position

For Pipes, the key meaning has private property, while in S. Kozyr-Kowalski's approach, there is no equal sign between private property and property in general. He also thinks that the market may coexist with public property. The occurring in the modern world changes in property relations are understood by him as processes leading to the increase of the role of collective property and the expression of the real socialization of property, which is the consequence of the socio-economic development and socialization of processes of production and reproduction of man's conditions of social existence. The threat is not so much socialization processes, but private appropriation of social labor and its results. Thus, sometimes phenomena similarly registered as in Pipes's approach, gain a fundamentally different interpretation.

S. Kozyr-Kowalski calls attention to the following phenomena:

1. In the modern world, property of modern capital figures is connected with the property of well-trained *ergodynamis*. Higher education is an important condition of maintaining, achieving and multiplying wealth. It is an expression of the process of enfranchisement and overcoming the status of an employed person by certain social categories, for instance managers, specialists, academics and doctors. In turn, a part of states of higher education gains capital in order to protect from the bureaucratization of spiritual labor or from the subjugation to the tendency to organize human life in the categories of only the goods-money exchange and market. Kozyr-Kowalski reminds in this context that "having one's own capital and independent from the employment at the university funds for livelihood co-conditioned objectivism, boldness

53 R. Pipes, *Property and Freedom*, p. 349.

and theoretical originality of ideas of three giants of the modern sociological thought: Herbert Spencer, Max Weber and Georg Simmel.⁵⁴ At the same time, gaining higher education, especially by representatives of the so-called middle class, is accompanied by having expenses by tax payers, diminishing public expenses falling on one student and a degradation of the higher education level. As a result, there occurs a division of property subjects on owners of real higher education, better diplomas and owners of only formally higher education.

2. There increases the significance of property in the relations of creditors and debtors. In 1995, 38,3 % of the global internal product of developing countries fell on external debts, Poland dealt with the debt of 40 billion dollars and had the 11th place on the list of the most indebted states of the world. The rate of the debt service understood as a relation between payments of the interest and installments and the income from export reached, for instance 39,1 % for Hungary, 37,9 % for Brazil and 12,2 % for Poland. According to Kozyr-Kowalski, this indicator illustrates the participation of foreign states and banks in the state and national property of other countries.

Banks often are the owners of enterprises, including co-owners in the formal and legal sense of their debtors. In fact, however, bad debts are a form of subvention leading – in consequence – to enfranchisement of corporations, their managements and employees at the expense of lenders and often of a state giving subventions or guaranteeing loans. Kozyr-Kowalski also notices that in the modern American and western European law, debtors are deprived of the owner status, in the Roman law, the borrower is considered to be the owner.

3. The economic co-owner of all types of private property is the modern state and national community. In such a way may be interpreted even the role of the tax system. In the OECD, taxes covered in 1996 37,4 % of the global internal product, in the countries of the European Union it was 45,6 % and about 8 % in Russia, where – as it was estimated – the black market takes over about the half of the global internal product. Taxes mean expropriation of part of the population by the state and enfranchisement of others as a result of the state redistribution. Until recently, in developed countries there was a larger contribution into the public property put by richer citizens, now, there is an opposite tendency. Taxing capital and labor in one's own account in the European Community decreased from 50 % in 1981 to 34 % in 1994; at the

54 S. Kozyr-Kowalski, *Socjologia, społeczeństwo obywatelskie i państwo*, p. 172.

same time, taxing labor increased from 35 % to 41 %. At the same time, as Kozyr-Kowalski writes, “it is without a doubt that a part of non-corporeal objects of public property are taken over by members of management, professional politicians, members of central and local administration, “state bureaucracy.” State property is transformed in the property of particular classes and states and also, in the form of transfers and subsidies for the poor, handicapped, pensioners; nevertheless, the people most in need are not the beneficiaries of the large portion of the help, but middle and higher classes are.”⁵⁵

4. State subsidies for the private economy increase. The scale of these expenses varied from 5,4 % of government expenses in Germany to 2,5 % in France. Transforming national property in the property of specified classes and states takes place by means of numerous methods, sometimes with difficult to estimate economic consequences. Among them we should enumerate subsidizing researches, investments, tax reliefs, loans below value and loan guarantees, proving infrastructure, various kinds of package deals, privatization and its conditions, financing enterprises of public usefulness. According to Kozyr-Kowalski, subsidies also express the dominance of common property over the entire private and personal property.

Manifestations of common property dominance are, among others, such phenomena as equipping an army in necessary, material and intellectual means of work and such an *ergodynamis*, which can ensure national safety, or these objects of public property, of which the sense is to protect all property subjects from expropriation by natural forces, for instance flood protection and anti-seismic equipment or one enabling the prediction of atmospheric phenomena. This dominance is also expressed in legal institutions, the goal of which is to not expropriate other people from eternal objects of common property, such as clean environment, air and water, or also imposing on real estates' owners the observance of specified building regulations ensuring protection against fires. A rule is expressed in it that an owner is not the only owner and has to respect social needs of also future generations. Finally, there are known legal solutions enabling expropriation by the government of the private property for public goals, for instance in situations of the threat of internal and external safety. Even though in many legal systems it is done by means of compensation, it does not cover all of the losses incurred by an owner.⁵⁶

55 S. Kozyr-Kowalski, *Socjologia, społeczeństwo obywatelskie i państwo*, pp. 185–186.

56 See S. Kozyr-Kowalski, *Socjologia, społeczeństwo obywatelskie i państwo*, pp. 197–200.

5. In reference to corporation property, managers become real co-owners of production means, as long as they become real owners of the share capital and they transform their income, formally being their wage, into financial capital. It is not decided solely by the position in the power system, even though it may be a means to gaining property. Kozyr-Kowalski states in this context that empirical research shows that five biggest share owners are the owners of about one quarter of the wealth, which formally and legally is owned by 500 biggest American corporations.⁵⁷ By referring to H. Demsetz's research, he claims that in typical share companies, the increase of wealth of professional top rung managers of \$3,25 required the increase of wealth of the shares' owners of \$1,000. As a consequence of his research, Demsetz had a position that a shareholder status who does not have shares that give control over corporation is the borrowing of means for the controlling the corporation shareholders in exchange of the dividend of capital.⁵⁸

Research conducted in reference to the question of power and property in mature market economies and democratic societies may lead – as it seems – to conclusions that significantly differ from observations made of phenomena occurring in this scope in societies that are less advanced when it comes to civilization and economic growth. **It is worth noticing that real income and economic privilege of the management may significantly differ from official standards.** It is easily noticeable in the societies in which the restoration of capitalistic and market relations is made in an accelerated rate, characteristic for societies of the former real socialism. The real privilege of the management in these conditions is not only expressed in the relatively higher income in relation to other groups of employees, not only of economic organizations, relatively in the sense of income proportions, and not only and above all of their amount, which is still often lower than the income of the comparable management groups in developed countries. In the transformation conditions, lacking tax laws, with low level of economic and legal awareness, imbalance of value and the lack of business ethics, the real privilege consists of the possibility of appropriating private and social wealth by hiding the real private, personal expenses in the costs of business activity, charging commission from goods and services providers, and

57 S. Kozyr-Kowalski, *Socjologia, społeczeństwo obywatelskie i państwo*, p. 201.

58 S. Kozyr-Kowalski, *Socjologia, społeczeństwo obywatelskie i państwo*, p. 202. S. Kozyr – Kowalski refers to the work of H. Demsetz, “The Emerging Theory of the Firm.” *Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Studia Oeconomiae Negotiorum*, 33, Uppsala: Lars Engwel & Jan Johanson.

sometimes from customers, in exchange of having contracts with them, being directed not by the interest of the organization, but one's own, in such managing of entrusted property, not so to multiply it, but rather to create chances of its private appropriation by the managing, by means of, for instance, acting in favor of decreasing the value of enterprises intended for privatization, entangling in financial obligations impossible to fulfill without a particular engagement of the managing and forcing in this way a particular gratification on the state or private owner, by such conducting of the management, which does not allow for owner's control, till different forms of corruption and ordinary theft.

In this context, one may formulate a more general hypothesis – in the situation of the deficit of the capital capable of elastically power entrepreneurship and immaturity of the rules of the economic game – power becomes its substitute to the much stronger degree than in other conditions. Exercising power and connected with it access to resources, not only in private organizations, but also in public ones, is one of the main means of enfranchisement or – speaking a bit differently – a specific path of not only initial or original, but rather secondary capitalistic accumulation, undoubtedly morally ambiguous, creating numerous pathologies and social injustice, waste of social resources, inefficiency or apparent efficiency.⁵⁹ Defenders of this path of accumulation perhaps accurately may state that geographic discoveries, extermination of Native Americans, exploitation of colonies, peasants removal, exploitation of children, slavery, were not more moral instruments of the capitalistic initial accumulation and from it ultimately stems the force of the modern capitalism.

6. In the modern capitalistic economy, there is visible the occurring with a variable intensity tendency of real enfranchisement of employees. Employees of large corporations may sometimes be deemed to be the aristocracy of work, their socio-economic position is often drastically different from the one of the employees of other organizations. The phenomenon of real enfranchisement may be reflected in higher salaries, in using non-salary material and immaterial bonuses, such as bonuses, additions, special medical care, pensions, annuities, severance pays, catering, recreational events, sports equipment, educational opportunities and participation in culture, a possibility of using solutions ensuring humanization of labor. As Kozyr-Kowalski notices, one of the consequences of real enfranchisement is the occurrence of the opposition between classes of employees-co-owners of modern means

59 About characteristic processes occurring in the sphere of property of former states of real socialism, see J.Staniszkis, *Postkomunizm* (Gdańsk: 2001).

of production and classes of typical contract work.⁶⁰ He also pays attention to the occurrence in the United States of more than 9,500 corporations that are formally the property of employees. They developed 8–11 % faster than private enterprises, among them there is a known enterprise, United Parcel Service (UPS), of which half of the wealth belongs to its employees. However, the formal and legal property does not mean property in the socio-economic sense, as 29 % of enterprise's shares belongs to the management. Similar tendencies occur, as research demonstrates, in enterprises that are formally the property of the employees in Poland.⁶¹

9. Property as a condition of power

The above reported interpretations of property in modern capitalistic societies significantly differ in their theoretical assumptions. For institutional economy, the key meaning for explaining power and organizational property have transaction costs, for liberal and neoconservative approach, a significant role is played by the market, freedom and natural law, for the concepts inspired by Marxism, it is enfranchisement of the results of human labor and regularities of the socio-economic development. However, one thing is undoubted. They all interpret property in a broad manner, more or less socio-economically, even when they do not declare it straightforwardly. Also, all of them emphasize that property creates power, power cannot be explained without the analysis of property, even when power begins to create property. Thus, property is the key condition of power.

Accepting as the basis of the analysis the socio-economic understanding of property as a convolution of economic relations, one may formulate several hypotheses concerning social mechanisms deciding on imputing property relations the role of power conditions:

1. Property, property relations system in the society is the key factor deciding the way of the existence of social systems in the environment, it indicates the border rules of social game, the organization of the way of appropriation by man of nature and culture.
2. Thus, property has the role of a component of the genetic code of social systems, source programming of social life, it indicates the fundamental mechanism of self-regulation of systems and as a consequence, the fundamental

60 S. Kozyr-Kowalski, *Socjologia, społeczeństwo obywatelskie i państwo*, pp. 213–216.

61 See, for instance, W. Kozek, J. Kulpińska, eds., *Zbirowe stosunki pracy w Polsce* (Warszawa: 1998).

parameters of the power system. Especially property of broadly understood means of production is the basis of social life. If we deem contradiction and compatibility between man and nature to be the fundamental contradiction of social development in the dialectic sense and we consider the process of using nature by man in order to satisfy social needs as a driving force of this development, then property of production means defines the way in which this appropriation and using nature takes place, using unfashionable terminology: the way of production and reproduction of social life conditions. Property is the condition of production and reproduction of social life, it has always accompanied human culture. Another issue is that the content of property relations, also their cultural, social, political or religious and not only economic conditions, kinds of property and its forms, which has a historical and specified character, or also the approach to the interpretations assuming the natural, biological, instinctive character of property, as an inseparable attribute of not only human nature.⁶²

3. Property not only determines genetic rules of social game and social order and as a consequence, chances in the game. Property determines fundamental indicators of social structure and as a consequence, key contents of social interests. Thus, property relations not only create rules of the game, but also create gamers participating in the social, economic or political game and their motives for the game. Property relations determine also the sole shaping of these gamers, social actors, independently from the fact that these actors, depending on a situation and to varying degree, play later, above all, the game for their own development and survival even against the previously assumed goals and functions, including owners' expectations. Finally, property relations determine human behaviors in social life, as their objective positioning and subjective approach to property determines their needs and possibilities of their satisfaction; as a consequence, social game is played to a large degree around property and for property, which is perceived as not only the source and conditioning, but as a fundamental instrument of realizing interests and satisfying individual and social needs, becoming sometimes an innate goal of individual and social actions.⁶³

62 The biological and natural genesis of property is emphasized, for instance, by R. Pipes, who, in sometimes obstinate polemics with Marxism, proves a thesis close to Marxism about the key meaning of property and its being determined by other realms of social life, including politics, but above all freedom. See R. Pipes, *Property and Freedom*.

63 On the subject of the articulation of interests as the essence of politics see B. Kaczmarek, "Polityka jako artykulacja interesów," in: B. Kaczmarek, ed., *Metafory polityki* (Warszawa: 2001).

4. Finally, property gives control over resources necessary to play the game. Property defines the possibilities of the access to resources, including power as a resource and, among others, via power to other key resources enabling and conditioning its exercise or striving for power.
5. In modern societies, property has a legal expression. It does not fully render the real property relations system, but in itself, it is perhaps not the structural and functional condition, but an empirical source of power. Every social system acts in a certain legal system, it has also internal law and one of the most important issues regulated by the law is the problem of power, its formation, functioning, change, competences, responsibility, means etc. Property uses its legally attributed prerogatives in the issue of power and in the subject of property and control over applying power for the law, provided with a possibility of using sanctions till the physical coercion, remaining to the disposal of the upholding the law state power included. Property in the legal sense is a common source of formal power in social systems on the micro and mesostructural level and nowadays, in the globalization conditions, also on the macro level in respect to transnational corporations, of which economic potential repeatedly exceeds the economic potential of the majority of modern countries.

10. Power, property and the process of oligarchization. Politics as the process of oligarchization of social life

As it is visible in the above, inevitably rather cursory deductions, power always remains entangled in the problem of property, it remains dependent from property relations that constitute a deeply hidden order, which is a condition of power. This dependence may be also analyzed in the perspective including the maneuverability of relations between property and power. In a general sense, property defines the frameworks of power, but power may be an instrument of creating property relations. This issue deals with fundamental questions of the possibility of creating economic order by the sphere of politics, in itself it has broad literature and the experience of real socialism and systemic transformation may be, in this regard, particularly inspiring.⁶⁴

64 On the subject of the role of the managing layer in the systemic transformation I wrote in B. Kaczmarek, "Rozpad realnego socjalizmu a interesy warstwy zarządzającej," *Dziś* 2/1991.

The phenomenon of creating property by power may be interpreted via referring to the processes of oligarchization of power. The traditional view of the problem – as it was presented by Robert Michels, in the analyses of the German social democracy – explains the phenomenon of oligarchization, above all, via referring to its organizational reasons. However, they are not neutral when it comes to property, as the final result of the processes of oligarchization is forming an economically privileged group as a consequence of political privilege. The goal of oligarchy and the result of the process of oligarchization is a permanent possibility of appropriating social wealth, as only it gives a chance for consolidating the privilege and inheriting a social position.

In this place it is worth reminding certain key theses of R. Michels, because they strike with their relevance and stimulate to think also on the relation of power and property.⁶⁵ The initial questions, which were posed by R. Michels, concerned whether oligarchic disease of democratic parties is incurable and whether it is possible to have democratic politics exercised by an oligarchic party or – in a broader sense – whether the oligarchic essence of organization determines also the oligarchic politics?

Discussing the example of the German social democracy, Michels notices the processes of oligarchization that consisted of professional political leaders leaving the social basis of the party and interests of masses. Along with organizational strengthening of the party and its mass character, real theoretical differences, ideal conflicts and intellectual and program searches were pushed to the background. The authentic discussion is replaced by “the politics of suppression.” The most important issue for the party becomes gaining new members and voters, ideological struggle and debate in their own ranks is treated as an unnecessary impediment in this scope. The party is inevitably centralized. If one wants to successfully fight in elections for power, he focuses on discipline and authority. Along with the centralization, there appears “fearfulness” of the party’s politics. It loses its revolutionary character and momentum. The party becomes more and more dependent from the state. It avoids everything, which could “irritate the state,” it avoids conflicts and clear taking a position in the name of saving energy for future needs. The organizational bond becomes the main or the only adhesive of the party. Ideology, theory and science is, if necessary, weakened and falsified. Strategy becomes dilatory. The party begins to be guided by the complex of financial and prestige interests, it becomes subjected to the interests of its

65 See, for instance R. Michels, “Oligarchiczne tendencje organizacji,” in: *Władza i społeczeństwo*, choice and ed. J. Szczupaczyński (Warszawa: 1995).

own bureaucracy. The organization from the means to the goal becomes the goal itself. "The party loses its teeth." The increasing position of its apparatus leads to the subjugation of the party to its existential interests. It ceases to be about building and realizing a program, it is more about to be once more elected, to be still able to have funds for existence from the fact of exercising power, to maintain the privileged social position.

Michels noticed that managing social wealth by clerks gives them the same amount of power as having their own capital. As a consequence, it may be noticed that power becomes for clerks a substitute of capital, a means of gaining it. Thus, the question of socialism is not solely an economic issue, it is also an issue of democracy and management. When a minority begins to rule in a party, a class struggle is taken to its inside. It manifests itself, for instance in contradictions between ordinary members of the party and its apparatus and the party's leadership. The party becomes the goal in itself and separates itself from its own class and social basis.

This phenomenon has a broader character and concerns all organized structures, which – when consolidated – create their own interest, "own interest in itself and for oneself ... More: via exercising social functions, numerous social layers are connected to each other and create bodies that represent their interests; with time, they are shaped as classes."⁶⁶

The main reasons of oligarchization result from the technical necessity of leadership and also from the natural immobility of masses. Immaturity of masses is not an interim phenomenon, it is their permanent property as an amorphous collectivity, immanently incompetent, conditioned by social division of labor, specialization and need of managing. Thus, every organization is as a consequence "a mother of control of the chosen over voters, authorized over authorizing, delegated over delegating," every organization creates oligarchy. In reference to labor movement and its organization, Michels noticed certain specific problems. On the one hand, parties of the poor are always more exposed to oligarchization, as their management is existentially dependent from politics and its own organizational position, also the vision of the society, present in the socialist tradition, only apparently resolves the problem of the capitalistic exploitation by giving the working class under the rule of the state and bureaucracy. On the other hand, the theoretical potential of labor movement, its ability to revise authorities and also its "democratic spirit" may be a force counteracting oligarchization. The final

66 R. Michels, "Oligarchiczne tendencje organizacji," in: J. Szczupaczyński, ed., *Władza i społeczeństwo* (Warszawa: 1995), p. 148.

conclusion is pessimistic: the existence of oligarchy and oligarchization is inevitable, the problem of democracy is in fact the question of a particular ethical measure, according to which one can establish the scale of oligarchization that is immanently present in every social system. Thus, democracy is only the lesser evil, for instance because it will always create a parasite oligarchy, the ideal of governments is aristocracy of people who are morally good and that is substantively useful; however, where one can look for it?

Elaborating Michels's thought, we may treat the process of oligarchization as stemming from mechanisms of social division of labor the key process of creating elites and classes, as its result is transforming property relations. Particularly clearly these phenomena may be noticed in social transformations of systemic transformation of previous real socialism countries. Then, new phenomena overlap the traditionally identified technical and organizational factors of oligarchization. Among them – above all – the key meaning have politically managed processes of privatization, economic measurability of possibilities of decisions and informational competences of politicians and clerks, the scale of phenomena connected with corruption and abuse of power, absolving and deregulating the ethos of public service, the crisis of ethical and ideal values or finally, political struggle in a democratic system requiring the engagement of important material means, which with the lack of effective legal regulations in the sphere of politics financing or in a situation of politically conditioned threat, it favors breaking the law in this sphere and legitimizes hidden mechanisms of financing, additionally strengthening parties' oligarchies. Also history shows how important for the distribution of power in political parties is the control of the sources of financing their activity, for instance we may remind the lives of Piłsudski and Stalin, who had in common a role – that they had at the beginning of their careers – in an illegal, which included bank robberies, obtaining of money for parties' activity.

As a consequence, politics reveals its important faces of being an instrument of processes of oligarchization and transforming power into property. It is not solely a guarantee of existing relations and their function. At the same time, it is a mechanism of property redistribution, social and economic emancipation of various social groups, including those for whom the broadly understood politics is the fundamental manner of their social existence. Politics will protect interests of oligarchy and at the same time, it will always produce new oligarchies. The political process may be interpreted as the process of oligarchization of social life. At the same time, this dimension of politics demonstrates the real meaning of the problem of property for the understanding of the essence of politics and – despite all of it – the secondary meaning of the issue of power.

Democracy, the one that we know it, turns out to be a hidden oligarchy. However, it does not have to mean an overt exercise of aristocratic or plutocratic rules, even though it often means “a conspiracy of the rich in wealth.” As Cz. Znamierowski notices, “cryptocracy is always more comfortable: invisible dictation of decisions for apparently independent state bodies. To rule from the shadows, it can be done not only by optimates, but also by other social groups: it may be done in different political systems...”⁶⁷

67 Cz. Znamierowski, *Szkoła prawa. Rozważania o państwie* (Warszawa: 1999), p. 375.

Mirosław Karwat

Subjects of politics: typology and gradation

Explaining trends and advanced or already accomplished political processes, political changes – changing conditions in the balance of power, permanent political transformations – and current political events, political decisions, and actions is possible – and the same it is true of the explanation of historical phenomena – in two forms. On the one hand, it is possible in terms of impersonal causal forces, determinants, intertwined circumstances; in a special approach – in terms of historical fate or, on the contrary, coincidence, chance, including looking through the prism of unpredictable events,¹ turning points, breakthrough factors.² On the other hand, it is possible from the perspective of agency, and thus subjectivity. Such different perspectives differ not only externally between the various strands of the philosophy of history or philosophy of politics, but also occur within certain philosophical-theoretical orientations. We may find an example of this in the antipodes of the Marxist tradition – the opposition between the fatalistic, teleological and activist interpretation of historical materialism.³

Whoever focuses on perceiving and explaining what happens in politics through the prism of human aspirations, goals, calculations, deliberate and planned actions – that is, in terms of subjectivity,⁴ must inevitably encounter a trap and a dilemma.

The trap for the political scientist is the temptation to succumb to colloquial optics, multiplied by the patterns of media commentary and the traditions of classical chronicling or even contemporary biography writing. It is a view of politics in terms of a literal personification and psychologization of politics,⁵ often

1 Cf. N. N. Taleb, *Czarny łabędź. O skutkach nieprzewidywalnych zdarzeń* (Warsaw:2015).

2 Cf. M. Malia, *Lokomotywy historii. Zwroty w dziejach i kształtowanie nowoczesnego świata*, Warsaw 2008; L. Stomma, *Historie przecenione* (Warszawa: 2011); L. Stomma, *Historie niedocenione* (Warszawa: 2011).

3 Cf. J. Topolski, *Aktywistyczna koncepcja procesu dziejowego*, in: J. Kmita, ed., *Elementy marksistowskiej metodologii humanistyki* (Poznań: 1973).

4 The reader will find extended commentary on the premises and components of this concept in the works of: K. Obuchowski, *Człowiek intencjonalny*, Warsaw 1993; K. Obuchowski, *Od przedmiotu do podmiotu* (Bydgoszcz: 2001).

5 Cf.: M. Karwat, “O statusie metodologicznym personifikacji,” in: *Historia, idee, polityka*, Warsaw 1995; M. Karwat, “Stereotypowa personifikacja polityki,” *Studia Polityczne*

along the lines of the Caesarist-heroist vision of history,⁶ and along the lines of the “valet’s version of history” derided by Hegel.⁷ Too often political scientists are meticulously fascinated with contemporary politics as if they were reporters of events on television, in court life, in the salons, behind the scenes, losing sight of the social representativeness of the political protagonists, of their entanglement in conflicts and rivalries of various social groups, of the underlying (or barely camouflaged) game of interests,⁸ of social pressures – not just lobbying – and self-organization, of the establishment of a new political representation in response to the disintegration or alienation of the previous one.

The dilemma felt by a thinking political scientist – and, contrary to appearances, political scientists can be unreflective – is related to the fundamental question: Who is actually the subject of politics? Is it leaders and managers in the role of decision-makers, guides? Is it elites and interest groups – lobbies – in the role of principals, sponsors, patrons, behind-the-scenes regulators of the political game? Is it institutions considered as a whole – political parties, quasi-party groups? Is it only those formally political, or also those officially, formally “non-political,” “apolitical,” e.g. churches, trade unions as a substitute emanation of political aspirations?⁹ Is it unofficial conspiracy groups, e.g., subversive, terrorist groups? Is it “prominent individuals?”¹⁰ Moreover, such a dilemma contains a trap in the form of the temptation to settle this alternative on an “either-or” basis, “if this, then not that.”

No. 5, 1996; M. Karwat, “Personifikacja a personalizacja polityki,” *Zeszyty Naukowe ALMAMER* No. 2(6), 2011.

- 6 A canonical explanation of such an approach: T. Carlyle, *Bohaterowie. Cześć dla bohaterów i pierwiastek bohaterstwa w historii* (Kraków: 2006).
- 7 G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibbe (New York: 1956), p. 32.
- 8 Hence, it is justified that the alphabet of political thinking reminds that the essential content of politics is interdependence, the contradiction of interests and the game for the conditions of their realization. See B. Kaczmarek, *Polityka jako artykulacja interesów*, in: B. Kaczmarek, ed., *Metafory polityki* (Warszawa: 2001).
- 9 At this point, we may recall the example of the Solidarity movement in Poland in 1980–81 – formally a trade union, but actually a mass political movement, the nucleus of the future party system in the new political system.
- 10 In interpreting the meaning of leaders, ideological guides who anticipate historical changes, inspire collective aspirations, and initiate the actions of organized communities, the difference between the Marxist tradition and Carlyle’s heroism is clear. See G. W. Plechanow, *O roli jednostki w historii*, Warsaw 1951; K. Kautsky, *Materialistyczne pojmowanie dziejów*, Vol. II pt. 2 (Warszawa: 1963); fragment entitled “Pierwiastek indywidualny w dziejach.”

A political scientist must first realize what universally understood *political subjectivity* is and then realize that this property is embodied on the principle of multi-level¹¹ and *emergence* – properties and mechanisms of macro-, meso- and micro-social structures and individuals have their own specificity, are irreducible to those of “higher” or “lower” levels.¹²

A proponent of ontological realism¹³ and holism¹⁴ A proponent of ontological realism and holism – including the author of this paper – or essentialism – i.e. searching for a deeper essence of phenomena, often obscured or deceptively deformed by external manifestations, considers political subjectivity as a property not only of individuals or political institutions but also of large social groups – groups, not socio-statistical categories, collections¹⁵ – or ethnic, religious, world-view communities. This second kind of totality has especially gained importance in the last century and at the present time, when politics has been dominated by the confrontation of different, especially opposing types of group identity and group mentality. And in doing so, it considers the subjectivity of individuals, groups, and institutions *not side by side* or on the basis

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- 11 Kazimierz Dąbrowski emphasized the multilevel principle in the study of social and even psychological phenomena. See K. Dąbrowski, *Elementy filozofii rozwoju*, Warsaw 1989. Cf. also: F. Pierzchalski, *Morfogeneza przywództwa politycznego. Pomiedzy strukturą a podmiotowością sprawczą* (Bydgoszcz: 2013), chap. 5. “Wieloaspektowość i wielopoziomowość przywództwa politycznego.”
 - 12 See J. Szmataka, *Jednostka i społeczeństwo. O zależności zjawisk indywidualnych od społecznych* (Warsaw 1:980); F. Pierzchalski, *Podmiotowość polityczna w perspektywie indywidualistycznej i holistycznej* (Pułusk: 2009), Chapter 4. *Koncepcja emergencji*; A. Rothert, *Emergencja rządzenia sieciowego* (Warszawa: 2008).
 - 13 Ontological realism – as opposed to nominalism – is a position, which assumes that the concepts called “universals” and terms of social totality refer to real being and are not just a mental shortcut, a conceptual fiction. Cf.: J. Lipiec, *Podstawy ontologii społeczeństwa* (Warszawa: 1972), chap. I. See also P. Rybicki, “Problemy ontologiczne w socjologii,” *Studia Socjologiczne* 1965, No. 2 (17).
 - 14 Holism – as we know – is a common name for the ontological view that the whole genetically precedes and functionally determines the creation and functioning of its parts, components, or the methodological view that the knowledge of the nature and mechanisms of functioning of the whole must be the premise for the study of the specificity or even autonomy of the components.
 - 15 I justify this position in: M. Karwat, *Podmiotowość polityczna. Humanistyczna interpretacja polityki w marksizmie*, Warsaw 1980, in reference to Marx’s distinction of a *class in itself* and a *class for itself*.

of alternative or substitution, but in a chain of interdependence. We may best grasp this chain of interdependence through the procedure of idealization and concretization.¹⁶

Next, I will outline this approach growing out of a humanist and activist interpretation of historical materialism, Marxism.

1. The Concept of Subjectivity as Such and Political Subjectivity

People often use the term *subject* – in official language and in the language of legal acts – without a broader or deeper context and without analytical intent, as merely a qualification of the status of some individual or institution that calls it to being and authorizes it to engage in a certain type of activity in a given sphere – in the realm of policy and “public policy,” for example: a subject of employment policy, a subject of defense policy, a subject of decisions, etc., which is reflected in the normative regulation of the scope of powers, tasks, obligations, authorization to do something, responsibility for the effects of action in a given sphere. It is true that in the background, the concept of subjectivity does appear – but it is only implicit – as a premise for such a status or its result; usually, however, the term *subjectivity* itself does not appear.

We may see here an evident analogy between indicating certain institutions, bodies or persons in official roles as disposers of certain goods and means of action, addressees of certain demands, initiators of certain actions, authors of certain ideas – e.g., legislative proposals, order regulations – and syntactic grammatical schemes – subject and verb in a sentence, where the subject means: who, and the verb – what he does, says or what his features are.

In Slavic, Germanic and Romance languages, the term subject – unlike in English, where this difference is not emphasized – acquires even in colloquial speech, and not only in academic terminology a more pronounced sense due to the juxtaposition of subject and *object*. The object – of someone’s interest or influence – is something or someone who is subject to influence, changes caused by someone else’s action, regulations, which can be – who can be – even shaped or deformed by external influence. On the other hand, the word subject is taken for granted to describe a human being who is conscious, who is endowed with free will, who has the ability and the need to make choices, who is the author of

16 For an in-depth characterization of this procedure, see the collection: J. Kmita, ed., *Elementy*.

what happens. In stereotypical representations, people sometimes exaggeratedly and erroneously absolutize this opposition. In such a situation, they ignore the fact that the subject understood in this way can also be the object of someone else's influence, for example, in bilateral and multilateral interactions, in mutual influences.¹⁷

However, from this juxtaposition, we also derive the moralistic-pedagogical understanding of the word *subject*, which is fixed in popular consciousness. And here, in a persuasive and at the same time performative context, the concept of *subjectivity* – being a subject – appears as a desirable feature of individuals or communities – under the slogan: one should be aware of one's own identity, interests and rights, independent, able to act in one's own matters and interests – and at the same time as a postulated status expressed in the postulate “nothing about us without us.”

In Polish, this notion corresponds to the quite unambiguous and specific term “podmiotowość” [subjectivity] – as an abstract name, denoting a specific property, permanent state of being a subject. Hence, we have a pair of terms “subject – subjectivity.” Other languages – even Slavic – lack the separate native term; it is replaced by a word of Latin origin (subiektywność; subjectivity; subiektywność). It is only from the context that one can deduce when the term subjectivity means such qualities of ideas, views of judgments, aspirations that result from what is close or comfortable to the subject, what appears to him – as opposed to objective qualities, independent of the subject's consciousness and will – and when does it mean being a subject – “subject” as opposed to an object.

Historiosophical reflection has given the word *subject* – and its derivative, the lofty word *demiurge* – an even more serious meaning. When we speak about the *subject of history*, we mean one or another causal force embodied in an individual or a community endowed with self-knowledge, a will that binds others, a kind of mission, etc. The reflection on the criteria and premises of such a role leads precisely to the abstract, universal notion of subjectivity.¹⁸

The tradition of philosophical anthropology – the philosophy of man – has significantly contributed to the creation and consolidation of the notion of subjectivity. In this aspect, when people sought man's distinctive features as a being

17 Moreover, being an agent – someone driven by their own needs, ambitions, and calculations – does not preclude such a status and functioning when we are someone else's tool, a screen for someone else's influence. See: M. Karwat, *Figurantwo jako paradoks uczestnictwa* (Warszawa: 2004).

18 An example in philosophical tradition: G. Fichte, *Powołanie człowieka* (Warszawa: 1956).

endowed with consciousness, the ability to think abstractly, guided by free will – and not simply by instinct, intuition, or an adaptive reflex – who satisfies his needs through work that transforms the environment, and who is possible and effective thanks to the ability to know and understand reality.¹⁹ At this level of philosophical thought, we find a common denominator for different forms and spheres of subjectivity – e.g., economic, moral, legal – and an *iunctim* between cognitive and practical subjectivity.

Let us add that modern doctrines and concepts of natural rights – in particular human and civil rights – have contributed significantly to the development and popularization of the concept of subjectivity. Here, the concept of subjectivity refers to each human being – to his or her social maturity, self-awareness, aspirations and capacity for self-realization,²⁰ sense of identity and personal dignity, and to the catalog of rights to which a person or citizen is entitled.²¹

All of these traditions have been the inspiration for adapting the concept of subjectivity for use in political philosophy and political theory.

Let us add two more to them. Namely: the praxeological concept of agency²² and the legal scheme of understanding legal subjectivity as the ability to perform legal actions, more precisely – to perform actions causing legal effects, which is derived from the former concept.²³

It is not without reason that this very legal scheme turned out – per analogiam – to be a good foundation for the theorist of politics. After all, the key issue in social life, and even more so in politics, is *agency* – this concept is almost, but only almost, synonymous with subjectivity.²⁴ Thus, when we speak of subjectivity in the political sphere, we necessarily mean above all: the ability to act, and to act in such a way as to be able to exert influence – in spite of numerous objective

19 See Z. Cackowski, *Człowiek jako podmiot działania praktycznego i poznawczego* (Warszawa: 1979); J. Lipiec, *Wolność i podmiotowość człowieka* (Kraków: 1997).

20 Cf. na ten temat: W. Łukaszewski, *Szanse rozwoju osobowości* (Warszawa: 1984), pp. 390–391, 422–440.

21 See J. Błuszkowski, D. Mider, *Demokracja późnej nowoczesności* (Warszawa: 2012); J. Raciborski, *Obywatelstwo w perspektywie socjologicznej* (Warszawa: 2011).

22 See Cz. Znamierowski, *Wina i odpowiedzialność*, Warsaw 1957; T. Kotarbiński, *Prakseologia*, pt. I (Wrocław: 1999); T. Pszczołowski, *Zasady sprawnego działania* (Warszawa: 1967).

23 See H. Kelsen, *Czysta teoria prawa*, Warsaw 2014, chap. 29–33.

24 For a socio-psychological perspective see: M. Archer, *Człowieczeństwo: problem sprawstwa* (Kraków: 2013). B. Wojciszke, *Sprawczość i wspólnotowość. Podstawowe wymiary spostrzegania społecznego* (Sopot: 2009).

obstacles and subjective resistance on the part of co-participants in the political game – that is significant not only for the perpetrator himself but for the entire community of which he is a part and permanent. The distinguishing feature of political subjectivity is not the formally political character of the subject – e.g. a party, parliament, government, state body, diplomatic service, armed forces, intelligence services – and not necessarily the legal regulation of the political status of that subject but the fact that the state, shape or transformation of political relations is significantly and permanently influenced by a given – arbitrary – social force, organization – also informal, illegal – a social movement even not yet crystallized, *in statu nascendi*, or an individual in a certain role, effectively using certain equipment and social support, especially an individual with particular personal potential – for example authority,²⁵ charisma²⁶ or even routine assertiveness.

2. Distinctive Features and Attributes of Political Subjectivity

We refer the concept of politics – in a certain continuum, on the principle of the “pyramid” – first to the relations between large social groups and communities, i.e. to interactions entangled in the contradictions of particular group or community interests requiring a certain regulation – selection, coordination, subordination – due to the conditions of social balance, integration, survival and continuity of the existence of a superior, common whole: society, state, empire, international community. This is the foundation of “politicity” and politics. Second, we refer the institutionalized or informalized activity, which makes possible, on the one hand, the articulation, representation and realization of such particular interests, and, on the other hand, their harmonization within a given common and superior whole. Third, we refer to such a particular form of activity, enabled by a certain status, possessing sufficient means of imposing and enforcing the will, which is called dominion or rule, and thus exercising power within the borders of the state or domination, supremacy, hegemony in the resultant influence on an international scale – regional or global.²⁷

25 See J. Ziółkowski, *Autorytet polityczny. Geneza, ewolucja, symptomy kryzysu* (Warszawa: 2012); L. Witkowski, *Wyzwania autorytetu w praktyce społecznej i kulturze symbolicznej* (Kraków: 2009).

26 See M. Karwat, “Charyzma i pseudocharyzma,” *Studia Politologiczne*, Vol. 5, 2001.

27 I adopt such a multi-layered view of politics after A. Bodnar, *Ekonomika i polityka. Podstawowe zależności* (Warszawa: 1980) and K. Opałek, *Przedmiot nauk politycznych – chap. I* in: *Podstawy nauk politycznych*, second edition (Warszawa: 1977).

The subject of politics is the one who by his own actions and sometimes even by his very existence and presence in a certain system of relations between large social groups or communities, exerts influence – significant and permanent – on the system of social forces, on the character of these relations – e.g. as harmonious co-existence or as threat and conflict²⁸ as equal rights, as partners, or as relations of domination, dependence, subordination, oppression, exploitation – and in the direct effects of these relations or even his mere presence – on a certain orientation, forcing, enabling or preventing certain decisions concerning these particular interests, and at the same time the overriding interests of the common whole, the principles of this whole and the conditions of its cohesiveness, among others – the reason of state. Let us be clear from the outset: the subject of politics is not only the one who exercises power – the formal or informal subject of power within the state, or the hegemon in relations between states – but anyone who exerts influence – in the form of effective pressure or social resistance that must be reckoned with. The “title” to such a status is agency in political relations and/or in the processes of making and enforcing decisions of general scope and importance.

At this stage of reasoning we are still abstracting from the fact that such properties may be possessed by: a large social group or community, an institution/organization representing or instrumentally using group or community interests and aspirations, a small social group in the role of a management team, leadership team, collegial decision-making body – but also, for example, a conspiracy group – and an individual – especially – but not only – in the role of a leader, ideologist, initiator and inspirer of team and group actions or collective behavior. It is a different matter – as we will discuss later – that in the case of each of these entities these common properties manifest themselves in a different way.

Following such a universal, interlevel view of political subjectivity and referring to the legal scheme of “legal capacity,” we shall assume here as a starting point an understanding of political subjectivity as a permanent capacity for sovereign actions causing permanent and significant effects in the functioning of a state community, an international community, an ideological community of a general social or even human scope.

We are dealing here with actions understood as intentional and rational – rational in the praxeological, pragmatic sense, i.e. based on the recognition of

28 As we known, Carl Schmitt pointed out such a factor in his interpretation of the premises and multiple contexts of the politicization of social relations and ideas. See C. Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. J. H. Lomax (Chicago: 1996).

the relationship between goals, the conditions for their realization and the means and resources at one's disposal, based on foreseeing the consequences and making specific calculations; which does not mean, however, that they are always flawless. This is how actions differ from even purposeful but spontaneous, reactive, and reflexive behavior caused by behavioral stimuli, emotions, spontaneous inclinations and drives, irrational ideas and prejudices. Subjectivity does not exclude the factor of emotions, spontaneity, but these factors are not enough for an individual, group or institution to be permanently capable of achieving its own goals, satisfying its own needs, shaping and changing the conditions of coexistence with other participants in political relations in a manner planned by itself, and not only reactive and occasional.

By sovereignty of action we mean three properties: (1) independence – at least relative, as the ability to make choices even when acting under pressure or in a state of dependence on others – in the formation of intentions, basing the action on one's own will – one's own initiative or consent to someone else's offers, calls, orders – and one's own calculations; (2) independence – also at least relative – in the very manner and course of action; (3) the framework conformity of the relatively independently decided and implemented action with the interests of the given subject. It is a conformity both in its point of departure – in intentions – and in its effects. For it is possible to act independently, guided by one's own will, but at the same time to one's own detriment – especially as an instrument of someone else's manipulation – and then it is difficult to speak of fully sovereign action.

Subjectivity as the ability to act implies the choice of both the goals and the actions themselves. We cannot ascribe subjectivity to a person who is deprived of such a possibility or capacity. The possibility and ability to choose is one of the constitutive features of both rationality and sovereignty. If the actions of a given individual or group were unequivocally determined or even predetermined – whether by virtue of “ironclad regularities” in the fatalistic sense of the term, or directives of organizations from the outside of the group or even by the fact that an individual or group sees ahead of themselves only one goal that is irreducible to any alternative meaning it is always unambiguous and predetermined, or by the fact that they know only one mode of action – then its actions would be automatic, which contradicts both rationality and sovereignty, since sovereignty presupposes self-control.

The phrase “capacity to act” also has multiple meanings. To be more precise, it is not the capacity for action alone – as for rational and sovereign acts – which may determine in an abstract way that determines a group's subjectivity, but the use of that capacity, its manifestation and confirmation in effective action.

However, this does not mean that subjectivity is manifested only by efficient actions, because it is also expressed by mistakes or failures. Moreover, among actions there is a special type of them, which is of great importance and no less important in its consequences: the refraining from a particular action. The refraining of an individual, group, or institution from acting also creates political facts. Moreover – as we may easily see from historical examples – it is not always the action itself, but often only the possibility of it that exerts a certain influence on the behavior of the partners, co-creating the political situation. In praxeology this is called the potentiality principle and in practice it is used in tactics such as demonstrating force, cheating or bluffing. Examples include, but are not limited to, the ability to use violence or coercion. Of course, it is not only the possibility of using force – or the threat of it – but all actions anticipated by the partners of a given actor that modify their behavior.

Therefore, the ultimate criterion of a group's political subjectivity is not so much the lasting capacity for sovereign and rational action understood in an abstract way and expressed, for example, in the formal powers of the institution representing that group, nor even the performance of action itself – in the three distinguished forms: effective action, abandoned action, potential action, as well as in other forms not considered here – but the lasting significance of the effects of that action. A real political subject is only such an individual, group or organization whose actions leave a permanent mark on the political life of society, shape and determine the content of political relations, impose certain frameworks and limitations or necessities on rivals, opponents or successors. In other words, the test of political subjectivity is the objectivization of the effects and products of action. Even if an individual or a group does not act at a given moment, the status of political subject ensures that its past actions – as well as possible, future actions, expected by its co-participants – influence their scope of freedom of action, the horizon of their imagination, their determination to strive and struggle, or their resignation, demobilization.

The precise and non-occasional application of the concept of subjectivity – in general, but especially political – presupposes something else, something more than the criterion of the permanence of the influence exerted, of the lasting significance of the results of a given subject's activity. We may assume that one "becomes a subject" when a collective or a narrower group exerts influence and makes a strong impression with, for example, a rebellion, a protest action, a social campaign, etc., but "does not continue to roll with the punches," the mobilization fades away, the movement is not institutionalized, the long-range program does not crystallize. The moment of being a subject – *sui generis* ephemeral subjectivity – does not yet confer a strictly understood subjectivity. Moreover,

subjectivity does not come from bestowal. There is no sense in talking about subjectivity if the acquisition of rights and the potential ability to act is an act of grace – example: the tsarist enfranchisement of peasants – a top-down reform and granting of rights, and not the result of the process of self-consciousness, self-determination, self-organization, as it were, “self-subjectivization” within the collective concerned. Only with this proviso, after all, can we reasonably speak of emancipation.

“Here is the rub!” An attribute of subjectivity is a kind of metaability – namely, the ability to achieve and “reproduce” the said ability to act, to influence others as a result of one’s own efforts at self-awareness, self-determination, self-organization, gaining support, allies. Example: What we call self-determination, e.g. of nations,²⁹ is supposed to be a permanent, reproducible feature, not just a one-off situation, e.g. in an independence referendum.

However, such a general, universal definition of political subjectivity will not allow us to avoid ontological dilemmas and disputes, which are reflected in the dispute between the atomistic and nominalistic orientation – according to which only individuals are real entities, and therefore real subjects – or the Caesarist-heroist tradition – Great History, and therefore Great Politics as the creation of “great people” – and the position of ontological realism – social wholes are real entities, associations of people aware of their community and consciously cooperating in common actions are real subjects, not legal or ideological fiction – and ontological holism – features of social institutions and individuals are determined by the properties of large groups and communities.

We adopt the latter position. From this point of view, the question of whether the ability to act is a property of the whole group, or whether it is an ability which characterizes only and directly political organizations and individuals – a question which is often formulated in the form of deciding who actually is the sovereign, who is the subject of politics – is misplaced. The adequate question is rather: what is the specificity of the ability to act on each of these levels of social being, what is the interdependence between the political subjectivity of a large social group and the subjectivity of a political organization, a team or a body of a given institution and a political individual? This is the question we will seek to answer.

29 In this context, see J. Chlebowczyk, *O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów* (Warszawa-Kraków: 1983).

3. Ontological Basis for the Taxonomy of Subjects – Politics and Policy Participants

In ontological and methodological systematics of phenomena in the social sciences, two fundamental levels – analyses – of social being are distinguished and – more or less sharply – contrasted: 1) individuals; 2) social wholes.³⁰ Moreover, the distinction between these two levels of analysis gives us a basic typology of social subjects. From now on we will speak of individual social subjects – individuals – and integrative social subjects among which we distinguish organized wholes: large social groups and “higher organized” organic³¹ – societies.

Integrativity – i.e. non-additive, and in the case of wholes formed from non-homogeneous elements of different origin: syndromaticity – is a feature consisting in the fact that the bond between the components creates a new quality, that there appear features of this bond that are not reducible to the features of the components – members, participants – and that cause the dependence of these components – such as functional requirements of the whole, which is no longer a summary set or the conditions for maintaining unity.³² In this context Bronisław Malinowski used the term “integrative needs.”³³

Sometimes, we wrongly identify this division – individuals vs social wholes – with the distinction between the personal (individual) level of analysis and the “collective” level, where it is a question of aggregate, mechanical wholes rather than wholes based on a permanent bond that becomes the overriding factor for participants, that makes individuals dependent and generates subordination.

In such an additive, summary or statistical sense, we speak for example of collective consciousness, public opinion – which, after all, is not a subject but

30 Cf. J. Karpiński, “Ludzie i zbiorowości (zagadnienia “poziomu analizy” w socjologii),” *Studia Socjologiczne* 1975, No. 3; J. Szmátka, “O holizmie i indywidualizmie w naukach społecznych,” *Studia Filozoficzne* 1976, No. 7.

31 Organicism is the relative self-sufficiency of a given community, associated with the complementary interaction of various constituent groups within the social division of labor and the resulting ability to self-reproduction. Such a feature is possessed by society, the nation, but not the large social groups with particular interests that form such a community, which from the ontological point of view are “non-self-contained and non-self-dependent in being.” Cf. the distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity in the classical treatise: E. Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, trans. W.B. Halls, New York 1997. See also: J. Lipiec, *Podstawy*.

32 See I. W. Błauberg, B. G. Judin, *Poniatije celostnosti i jego rol’ w naucznom poznanii* (Moscow: 1972).

33 B. Malinowski, *Kultura i jej przemiany* (Warszawa: 2000).

a statistically measurable state of moods, the degree of diffusion and intensity of certain opinions at a given moment. Furthermore, in a similar vein, we speak about the difference between individual subjects and “collective” subjects, while the collection – e.g. territorial community, gathering, audience of a performance – is not a subject but only a similarity, kinship and co-occurrence of individuals or at most their uncoordinated cooperation, mainly on the basis of imitation or simultaneity of emotions and reactions to stimuli.³⁴ The social set is a “meeting” or coexistence, even an interdependence of individuals with common characteristics, but not a self-regulation beyond the individual. Let us note by analogy: the simple relationship –of typicality and genetic determination – between species and individual in nature does not, after all, constitute subjectivity – either of the species or of the individual of that species.

Thus, conceptual precision demands that we distinguish collective consciousness from group consciousness, collective – mass – behavior from group action; that we associate the concept of subjectivity with a group or community in the sociological sense and not with a social group still lacking the attributes of integration, self-definition in terms of community, self-organization.³⁵

Let us repeat: from the point of view of realism and ontological holism in the social sciences, a society is not the sum of its inhabitants, a nation is not the sum of its citizens, conservatism or liberalism as ideological and political orientations are not simply the sum of its adherents, but a systemic whole.

Among the properties of individuals, we distinguish inimitable, unique properties, which we can call individual – personal, individual – and properties shared by many people, common, typical for members of a particular community, thus characterizing social sets – of these properties we can say that they are collective or aggregate. We speak, for example, about the aggregation of interests. Individual – personal – properties and universal, collective properties are the two sides of the phenomenon of existence, identity and possible subjectivity on the level of individuals in the analysis of social existence. On the other hand, universal, collective properties, belonging to the characteristics of individuals, at the same time characterize also social wholes, although they do not exhaust this characteristic, because its important elements are the already mentioned

34 Thus, a theory of group action as the actions of a group subject is one thing and a theory or model of the behavior of a “mass,” crowd, congregation, etc. is something else. Cf. E. Canetti, *Crowds and Power [Masse und Macht]* (New York: 1981). See also: L. Krzywicki, “Istota zdarzenia społecznego,” in: T. Kowalik, *Krzywicki* (Warszawa: 1965).

35 I justify this position in the aforementioned monograph: Karwat, *Podmiotowość polityczna*.

integrative features of the whole – such as the needs of the group as a whole, its traditions, guiding principles, criteria of group identity not resulting simply from the sum of experiences or identifications of individuals.

The holistic theory of politics is primarily interested in the integrative characteristics of social groups, followed by collective characteristics – typical for each or almost each member of the group and distributed on a mass scale – and only in third place in the individual characteristics of parts and members, but considered from the perspective of the determining influence of integrative characteristics. After all, the properties of a social group and the processes occurring in it condition the properties and behaviors (actions) of its members – whether on the principle of “replication” or by setting a framework for the unique characteristics of individuals.

Accordingly, if one variation of the methodological thesis of sociological holism can state as follows: “Claims characterizing the integrative properties of a large social group as a whole are cognitively primary³⁶ in relation to the assertions concerning the properties of its parts and members,” then the methodological thesis of theoretical-political holism will take on the following wording in concretization: “Claims characterizing the political subjectivity of a large social group as an integrative whole are cognitively primary to claims adjudicating the subjectivity of its parts and members.”

And indeed, when it comes to average members of the social group, the mass processes of acquisition of subjectivity by individuals depend on the development of the subjectivity of the group as a whole. Moreover, this dependence applies to non-typical, “leader” individuals, although with a lesser categorical character – with due regard for individuality, creativity, personal transgression capital³⁷ – and with a stronger feedback influence. There are known cases in history when the rise of the subjectivity of “leaders” is correlated with a decline in the subjectivity of social groups – for example, the career of Louis Bonaparte analyzed by Marx.³⁸ Behind these cases there are certain regularities governing the political subjectivity of social groups and ideological communities, including

36 In other words: they must precede, be the starting point.

37 On the mechanism and significance of transgression in the functioning of individuals see: K. Dąbrowski, *Dezintegracja pozytywna*, Warsaw 1979; J. Koziński, *Psychotransgresjonizm. Nowy kierunek psychologii* (Warszawa: 2001).

38 See K. Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, trans. S.K. Padover, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015; K. Marks, *The Class Struggles in France, 1848–1850* (New York: 1972).

the processes of disintegration, reintegration – in conjunction with ideological and doctrinal revaluations, decadence, alienation of leadership elites.

4. Political Subjectivity as a Multilevel Property. The Principle of Emergence

Let us now apply the principle of multilevel and emergence to the interpretation of the phenomenon of political subjectivity.

What is the emergence of the property that we simplified to the ability to act?

A large group or macro-social community is “capable of action” in the sense that as a result of a process of self-awareness, self-determination – defining its own identity³⁹ – and self-organization, it is capable of emerging its representation, to one degree or another gradually institutionalized, through which it can express its interests and aspirations; and whose activity it is capable of programming – as expressed in doctrines, strategies, political programs – controlling, stimulating by its pressure, limiting or disciplining by its resistance or withdrawal of support.

The political organization/institution of such a large group or community is “capable of action” in the sense that it brings together and disciplines individuals and entire social circles in a specific division of labor, mobilized to carry out complex actions that have the hallmarks of macro-cooperation, such as propaganda and agitation campaigns, mass demonstrations, protest actions, acts of sabotage or diversion, and ceremonies for the cultivation of specific traditions of the community. What is the purpose of the mechanism of formal membership, assignment of tasks (“party tasks”), recruitment and enlistment of new adherents, but also public consultation, referendum actions to establish the “collective will,” etc.? At this stage, we encounter strictly group actions⁴⁰ – inspired, stimulated by “social demand” – i.e. both collective expectations and objective needs of the community – and by social pressure.

An internal body or informal team of this organization – e.g. a leadership team, a narrow fraction or coterie, an initiative group – expresses its ability to act in such a way that it becomes – collegially – the author and – in the case of possessing certain prerogatives or the ability to control, motivate, condition the executors of the will – the enforcer of decisions that determine the objectives,

39 Cf. e.g. P. Ścigaj, *Tożsamość narodowa: zarys problematyki* (Kraków: 2012).

40 The mechanism of formation of such actions is presented in the monograph: M. Olson, *Logika działania zbiorowego. Dobra publiczne i teoria grup* (Warszawa: 2012).

methods, tools of a particular action at a particular time and on a particular matter.

Finally, the individual expresses and confirms the ability to act in two ways: on the one hand, with readiness and ability to carry out the will and plans of the team, party, community, to which the individual belongs and in which he or she has been entrusted a specific social role, a specific task, responsibilities and powers, on the other hand – with the expression of his or her own aspirations, ambitions, desire for self-fulfillment – to test and confirm their own value, even uniqueness, striving for a personal career, etc. – liking for a particular style and specific methods of action, which may be characterized by inventiveness, innovation, uniqueness, relative irreplaceability in a given role.

As we can see, we are dealing here with successive levels or layers of what forms the structure called political action.

To some extent, these nuances correspond to the criminal law typology and gradation of the types of perpetration in criminal acts, when one distinguishes, for example, between directing perpetration – inspiring, instigating, directing or coordinating – and executive and auxiliary perpetration.⁴¹

5. Typology and Gradation of Politics and Policy Actors

Starting from the above-mentioned premises – ontological realism and holism, the principle of multilevel structure of social being, emergence – let us try to tackle the systematics and qualification of those carriers of influence to whom we could attribute politic subjectivity. First, we will point to the bipartite and bipolar categorizations already present in the Polish philosophical and political science literature. Next, we will consider whether this does not create a certain gradation – in a continuum of levels and forms of subjectivity specific for each level.

Zdzisław Cackowski distinguished between the “ultimate subject of power” and the “direct subject of power,” i.e. political power.⁴² By analogy – with a broader understanding of policy actors than just sub-actors of power, of course, when those who exert influence without exercising power are also taken into account – the literature distinguishes between the “ultimate policy actor” and the

41 Cf. Cz. Znamierowski, *Wina i odpowiedzialność* (Warszawa: 1957), pt. I; T. Przesławski, *Psychika, czyn, wina. Wpływ czynnika psychicznego na zachowanie człowieka i jego winę jako podstawę odpowiedzialności karnej* (Warszawa: 2008).

42 Z. Cackowski, *Główne pojęcia materializmu historycznego* (Warszawa: 1974), p. 333.

“direct policy actor.”⁴³ Treating this distinction as equivalent, we may also speak of primary and secondary policy actors,⁴⁴ and even about abstract and concrete actors.⁴⁵

The three divisions mentioned above are not infrequently treated as parallel, one dimensional. Indeed, they refer to the same two levels of political subjectivity – social wholes as opposed to individuals – but at the same time each of these pairs of concepts expresses a different aspect, a different criterion of distinction. The first two divisions are justified primarily by ontological criteria.

The first division – ultimate subjects versus direct subjects – refers to the difference between the principal or controlling power, which defines the framework of freedom of action for the will’s executors, and the direct perpetrator of certain situations, events, and changes. And in reference to familiar colloquial connotations, it refers to the question of “who has the last word” in resolving conflicts of interest, conflicts, decision-making dilemmas.

The second division – primary and secondary subjects – refers to the genetic relationship. We then treat subjectivity of individuals, leadership teams, intellectual elites in the role of ideologists, subjectivity of larger associations – such as parties, associations, civic movements – as the result and manifestation of the process of crystallization of identity and group will of social classes, their factions, layers, states, ethos groups, ideological, religious or ethnic communities, as a correlate of the process of self-organization and emergence of representation, which autonomizes secondarily and refers not only to the original, founding social base.⁴⁶

On the other hand, the third division – abstract and concrete subjects – seems to be a methodological way to avoid the position of ontological realism, a tribute to sociological nominalism. It is from the point of view of nominalism correlated

43 Cf. e.g.: A. Bodnar, *Decyzje polityczne. Elementy teorii* (Warszawa: 1985), chap. IV. *Podmioty działań politycznych*. See also: E. Pałyga, “Strony stosunków międzynarodowych,” *Studia Nauk Politycznych*, 1977, No. 4.

44 Cackowski, *Główne pojęcia materializmu historycznego*, p. 333.

45 Cackowski, *Główne pojęcia materializmu historycznego*, p. 333.

46 Just as the difference between a “class in itself” – Marx’s sarcasm in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*: “a sack of potatoes is just a sack of potatoes” – and a “class for itself” is important, so too is the difference between the electorate – as a statistical set – and the social base of a party as a conglomerate or alliance of social groups and communities aware of their interests and demands and able to give or refuse support under certain conditions. For more on it see: M. Karwat, “Baza społeczna ruchów i partii politycznych,” *Rocznik Nauk Politycznych* No. 11 (Pułtusk: 2008).

with ontological and methodological individualism that the class as a whole, the nation as a whole seems to be an ontological fiction or at most a mental shortcut, a conventional metonymy or synecdoche, a peculiar counterpart of allegory. And in this sense, the subjectivity attributed to such a whole is “abstract;” and the name itself is as abstract as the terms ‘justice,’ ‘freedom,’ ‘equality,’ which have a criterial content and are used in qualifying phenomena, but lack designators. Accordingly – concrete subjects are those which we can empirically grasp and show – the board of directors of a party in a certain composition, the prime minister as the author of a decision confirmed by his signature and speech, a terrorist – assassin, etc.

Be that as it may, this triple typology is crucial. Treating the group or community as the ultimate, primary subject, while its parts and constituents as direct, secondary subjects, expresses precisely the essence of the issue; the primary political subjectivity of the group versus the subjectivity of its parts and members. This primordiality understood ontologically – as the direction of determination of phenomena – is the quintessence of the view we will call here theoretical-political holism.

At the methodological level, the aforementioned distinction between the “abstract” and “concrete” political subject is of similar importance. At the same time, according to the methodological thesis of theoretical holism, the direction of explanation will proceed from the abstract characterization of the ultimate subject through successive stages of concretization to the characterization of the direct subject.


However, the two-stage typology, turns out to be insufficient and even misleading.

If the ultimate subject of politics is the social group – class – and the direct subject is the individual or small group,³⁰ then a legitimate question arises: and where is the place for organizing a political group that does not identify with the group as a whole, even when it is ideologically identified with it?

We will then note that the terms “secondary subject” and “direct subject” are not the same. The first concept is broader and includes both political organizations – and their bodies, instances or informal leadership teams, internal narrow interest groups, coteries, camarillae, cliques – and individuals. In line with the relativization of the concepts of “whole-part-component,” we must distinguish here not two but three levels of analysis of political subjectivity: 1) the large social group; 2) the political organization of the group; 3) individuals in political roles and small groups – e.g., leadership bodies – assigning to them respectively three concepts characterizing the different scope of political subjectivity: 1) subject of political interests and relations; 2) subject of political actions; 3) subject of

political initiatives and decisions. We present this typology in the diagram below. Moreover, the level of small groups within a political organization/institution and the level of individuals are not identical either: it is one thing for the characteristics of an individual's aspirations and actions to be caused by membership of such a group, or by inspiration or loyalty to a narrow group, and quite another for his or her attitudes and conduct to be conditioned by characteristics that are most literally individual.

Palyga did the same with regard to political subjectivity in international relations. Palyga distinguished four types of parties to international relations, according to the holistic view of subjectivity as a gradable feature: 1) the primary, ultimate subject – the great social group; 2) the secondary, direct subject – the group's political organization; 3) the indirect participant – the organ of organization of the great social group); 4) the direct participant – the representative of the organ of group's organization.³¹



Scheme 1. The “Ladder” of Political Subjectivity

The continuous vectors in the diagram denote the basic, decisive, primary direction of determination – genetic, structural and functional. Respectively, the dashed vectors show the direction of reflexive, secondary determinants. In this second direction of dependence, we take into account both the inspiring influence of derivative, direct subjects, the importance of their activity and initiative for

the confirmation, growth or weakening of the subjectivity of the institution and, above all, of the large group, community, and the processes of autonomization and even alienation of representatives, executors of the group will.

The dashed vectors in the diagram denote the direction of the secondary, but active, modifying influence of the subjectivity of individuals and political organizations on the subjectivity of the group.

6. Idealization Versus Concretization in the Holistic “Ladder” of Subjectivity

We present these conditions in a simplified way, abstracting from external relations with the environment – in the form of “side” influences, shared representation of interests or decision-making capacities with other entities – from situational entanglements or, for example, restraining dependencies and obligations limiting the freedom of action and the effectiveness of exerted influence on all four levels and assuming unambiguous determination.

Thus, this schema can depict a model of political subjectivity – in the idealized sense of “model” – as a multilevel, emergent property.

At the same time, we may use it to concretise the model. Then, it is enough to assume that continuous vectors mean the direction of increasing sovereignty – autonomy, independence – of subsequent subjects in relation to previous ones – subjects of “lower order” in relation to subjects of “higher order” – e.g. representatives in relation to the represented, contractors in relation to employers. At the same time, this is the direction of weakening of identity and “dependence” between the organization and the group, the individual and the group, the individual and the organization.

This concretization is justified because although the properties of the parts and components are determined by the properties of the whole, they are not exclusively determined by them or reduced to them. Many properties of the components and parts are relatively independent of the properties of the whole. For example, the lives of human individuals, their personalities, are incomparably richer than just their social roles in various societies and social institutions. The fullest manifestations of political subjectivity are at the level of the individual, especially considered in the totality of his personality and not in one or more political roles. Here the importance of individuality, character, temperament, unique or incomparable to anyone else personal talents and inclinations becomes apparent.

From this point of view, we make the scheme more precise: in the subjectivity of the individual, we are more interested not in what can be enclosed within

the subjectivity of the organization – as his or her role, function, position – but in what he or she contributes and creates of his or her own, which – due to originality, creativity, inventiveness, initiative, special personal talents and achievements – determines the personal subjectivity of this individual. At the same time, we note that the political subjectivity of the individual – the fullest, richest in manifestations – is simultaneously the most deceptive phenomenon, because the suggestive individual features may obscure the social representativeness of this individual, the programming of his consciousness in the processes of indoctrination, fulfilling the role of someone else's tool – contrary to the illusion of personal self-sufficiency and freedom of his own actions. It is easy to succumb here to the temptation of purely colloquial personification – in the Caesarist-heroist convention or, for example, conspiracy – trivial psychologization of explanations.

The dashed vectors in the diagram indicate the direction of the secondary, but active, modifying influence of the subjectivity of individuals, leadership teams or initiative groups and political organizations – parties, associations, civic movements – on the subjectivity of the group.

Thus, in the idealizing interpretation, we were interested, as it can be stated in a somewhat simplified way, only in the sphere of determination, necessity, regularity – in abstraction from the sphere of freedom of subjects of different levels. On the contrary, in the concrete interpretation, we are interested in the sphere of freedom, autonomy of individual and institutional subjects – political organizations – in relation to the social group. In this concretization, we take into account in particular the contemporary tendency to decompose the features of class position, the blurring of boundaries and identity features of classical large groups, communities, social atomization – which makes us inclined to see in politicians self-contained and self-sufficient personalities, in politics – simply a vanity fair correlated with the auctioning of personal and clique influences, with the voluntaristic bidding of lobbyists; in isolation from the social representativeness or unrepresentativeness of such phenomena, the criteria of servility and functionality in relation to larger communities.

It is precisely the idealizing character of the thesis of theoretical-political holism that makes it possible – though it may seem paradoxical – to understand both the relationship between different levels of political subjectivity and the differences, the barriers between them. Provided, of course, that we make conscious and reliable use of the procedure of idealization and concretization. The idealizing character of theoretical-political holism can be most appropriately expressed by constantly pointing out that large social groups or cultural-ideological communities are the subjects of politics “in the last instance.”

7. A Moderate Versus Radical Version of Theoretical-political Holism

The moderate methodological thesis of theoretical-political holism follows from the adoption of counterfactual assumptions:

1. about the separateness of large social groups – structural separateness, not just in terms of their personal composition;⁴⁷
2. on the unambiguous assignment of a given organization, political institution to a specific and only one large group or community – for the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is only one organization of a given group, representing and serving only that group and no others;
3. on complete identity between the interests of that group or community and the interests of the political organization established by that group or identifying with it, meaning that that organization has no interests – including its own concerning the whole as well as internal particular interests – apart from those of the group as a whole;
4. on the full identification of the organization with the group, which is at the same time the assumption that the exclusive motive and the only intention of the actions of this organization is to pursue the interests and ideals, principles and mental patterns of this group/community as a whole – in other words, it is the assumption of absolute and unconditional servitude of the organization;
5. on the identity of the role – and thus tasks and obligations – of a member of a given organization – party, political movement, association – as a representative of that group/community with the role of a member of that group/community treated as a principal of that organization;
6. on the exclusivity of one social role – the role of a member or leader of the group – in such a case, we abstract from the multiplicity, complexity and conflict of social roles of the individual in the group and, moreover, we identify the individual with his social role, abstracting from the integrity and relative autonomy of individual, personal life;

47 In reality – especially nowadays – “multiparticipation” dominates. It stands for simultaneous participation in different communities and structures, often resulting in incompatible roles in these different frames of reference. See W. Makarczyk, *Wspólnota uczuć i działań* (Warszawa: 1993), chap. V. “Zjawisko wieloucześnieściwa.”

7. about the identity of interests of an individual – group member – and the interests of the group as a whole – while abstracting from the diversity and contradiction of interests in the group and from the phenomenon of “multi-participation,” i.e. simultaneous membership in different social groups, we assume that the individual does not have any interests apart from the interests of the group as a whole;
8. about the full identification of an individual with the organization and the whole group, about the exclusivity of group goals in the motivation of individual actions – which means the abstraction from motivations, aims, intentions and calculations purely individual, personal, related to their own ambitions, benefits, career, or at least the assumption that the individual realizes such aims only within the community and its representation, and not in different reference systems, at the junction of different social associations, even across political divisions.

If all the aforementioned conditions were fulfilled, and therefore if there was a full identity of the group and its political organization, and an exceptional and boundless identification of the individual with his political role in the group and with the group as a whole, and if at the same time the large social group or community were a homogeneous – and not internally differentiated, complex – social subject, then the political subjectivity of the organization and the individual would be – in its orientation and programming – unambiguously and somehow automatically determined by the subjectivity of the group, they would only be its manifestations, components.

Moreover, the radical version of theoretical-political holism assumes – although we must remember that this is done on the basis of metonymy or synecdoche and in the mode of idealization – the anthropomorphization of the group, i.e. considering the group as if it were endowed with consciousness and will in the likeness of a human being – an individual of the human species. Then we attribute the action itself, the choice of action, and the choice of goals to the group treated as in the popular formula that it thinks and acts “like a man.” In such an operation of thought we even melt a large group or community and its substructures into a unity, considering it as a monolith. Thus we treat the complex integrative subject as if it were an individual subject. However, this is not the same as attributing group causality and supra-individual aspirations simply to a certain individual – person.

As we can easily see, the moderate thesis is a concretization of the radical thesis. Including further concretizations – abrogation, modification of the above-mentioned counterfactual assumptions – they form a whole continuum of

statements characterizing the subjectivity – degree and scope of sub-subjectivity – of large social groups, political organizations and individuals. According to this continuum of successive concretizations of the position of theoretical holism in explaining political action, we apply in fact a sequence of explanations based on successive, gradual approximation to reality. From a model that outlines the framework and successive phases of excluding specific obscurities or factors that have only an indirect and limited influence, we move gradually to establishing concrete facts. It is important to note here that the reverse order, from the individual to the broader and deeper context, is only effective if it is equally scrupulous in revealing determinants that the common view rarely notices.

8. The Methodological Significance of the Idealization Thesis of Theoretical-political Holism

The methodological significance of the idealization thesis of the theoretical-political holism lies in the fact that with a reliable application of the procedure of abstraction and concretization it allows to explain both the motives of human actions in politics, the goals guiding the acting individuals or narrow human groups, and the deeper political meaning of those actions, independent of people's consciousness and not always realized or understood adequately by them. Meaning connected with whose interests, aspirations, expectations, calculations – of what social forces – does the perpetrator of concrete actions realize – whether in the role of a representative or in the role of a tool; whether on his own initiative or under pressure and in the face of arising necessities.

The gradation of characteristics of the ability to act in the above presented continuum of concretization allows us to avoid the naive idea of the causal power of individuals – that “Hitler created Hitlerism, Stalin created Stalinism” as if those Creators were not at the same time products of a certain process and links of a system arising in this process. An image reminiscent of Baron Münchhausen, who pulled himself and his horse out of the swamp by their hair. In reality even the most influential individual subject is under the influence of the environment, and equipped with ineffective resources and tools, and stimulated by certain pressure, perceived demands, and limited by the lack of support or resistance to some of his own intentions.

The meaning ascribed to the decisions made and actions carried out by direct perpetrators – i.e. the goal ascribed to them resulting from individual or micro-group motives and intentions, the character subjectively ascribed to them – does not necessarily coincide with the meaning ascribed to them by the addressees or witnesses of these actions, the beneficiaries or victims of what has been done.

The meaning attributed by the individual to his actions may turn out to be only an individualization – and a deceptive based on illusions – of the meaning ascribed to actions by the legislator in the form of a particular political institution or a large social group or an ethnic or religious community. Moreover, this subjectively perceived and declared sense of action may mask – whether as an illusion of the direct subject, or as a deliberate rationalization, elevating the action, as hypocrisy and manipulation – the real functions of that action. The real functions consist in fulfilling a certain demand, a “political order” or in entangling the actor in someone else’s plan, in a political game in which he is only a pawn.

However, the significance of theoretical-political holism goes beyond the purely methodological plane, beyond the sphere of researchers’ interests and cognitive competence. This view and the idealization-concretization scheme outlined above make it possible to realistically and multifacetedly explain concrete decisions and individual actions –especially those of leaders or, in any case, socially representative ones – in the process of training political scientists and in related fields, also in media analyses and commentaries on political events and decisions, if journalists and even more so the scholars appearing in the media will manage to popularize political knowledge and to promote political thinking in such a way that it will go beyond the courtly or “valet-oriented” schemes – in terms of the role of prominent people and the goals of politics or the convention typical for reporting on sports competitions.

Mirosław Karwat

Needs of large social groups and goals of political organizations – explanatory model

In this paper, we shall present a variant of explaining the political goals formulated by political organizations in such official documents as programs, manifestos, declarations, etc. which, due to their structure and functions, we can collectively define by the term *political agenda*.¹

This will be a variant of secondary analysis of political action – in this case secondary to the humanistic interpretation procedure based on the indication of the subject's goals and calculations resulting from his recognition of the situation, resources and knowledge of the relation between goals and means. However, the humanistic interpretation raises the question of the – subjective, among other things – existence of certain goals in the value order of the acting subject and the reason for such a hierarchical ordering of these goals. Therefore, we will seek some type of answer to two related questions: 1) what were the subjective reasons for a political organization to have adopted such, and no other, political goals in its agenda; 2) for what reasons did a political organization adopt such, and no other, hierarchy of political goals.

In order to answer this question, we shall refer to the assumption about the relationship between (political) aims and (social) needs, about the conditioning of political aims by social needs – the needs of large social groups as a whole and/or society as a whole – and about the secondary autonomy of political aims in relation to social needs. On the basis of this assumption, taken here as a starting point, we formulate and concretize two general theorems of an idealizing nature with the help of which it is possible to provide answers to the two questions above.

We derive the assumption about the relationship between social needs and political goals from a more general assumption – quite widely accepted in the literature – that (all) goals are related to specific needs.² At this point, we may

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- 1 The concept of a political agenda – in correlation with the concepts of political doctrine and ideology – is the topic of analysis for e.g.: F. Ryszka, *Wstęp do nauki o polityce (Uwagi metodologiczne)* (Warszawa: 1976); J. Skrzypek, “Z zagadnień nauki o doktrynach politycznych” in: K. Opałka, ed., *Metodologiczne i teoretyczne problemy nauk, politycznych* (Warszawa: 1975).
 - 2 W. I. Kucenko, a soviet author, makes this assumption explicit in the very definition of the goal: “A goal is an idea reflecting the needs of an entity: the conditions of

denote this assumption as premise $Z(1)$. The assumption about the connection between political goals and social needs – with the needs of large social groups – is a consequence of premise $Z(1)$ and the second fundamental premise $Z(2)$, i.e. the assumption about the functional connection of the activities of political organizations with the needs of large social groups. In the case in question, we consider this functional connection in subjective categories, in terms of the identification of a political organization with a large social group.

We may formulate the assumption Z , which states that political goals are conditioned by the needs of large social groups, in the most general form as follows: “If the agenda of a political organization that identifies with a large social group reflects the need p of that group, then in the agenda, there will be a political objective c expressing that need.” According to this assumption, we may at the same time formulate a methodological directive prescribing the adoption of this assumption and a certain way of proceeding in explaining political goals – and, indirectly, political actions. When we determine a particular political objective in a given program, we should strive to determine what – and whose, which social group – needs are hidden behind it, in other words – whom and what is a particular action intended to serve. Of course, in formulating this directive, we are talking about the need to find the essential subjective evidence of political goals, to reach the essential, necessary, correct factors that condition the subjectively specified choice of goals in the organization’s agenda. This requires that we abstract from the influence of numerous – subjectively – less important and irrelevant determinants that are secondary, incidental, and accidental. Therefore, assumption Z signifies what *ultimately* determines the act of formulating certain political goals by an organization, refers to the most important determinant, which is, however, overshadowed by the influence of secondary factors, interfering, complicating, making its way “in the last instance.” Thus, premise Z is essentially idealizing, since it captures the subjective conditioning of political goals in an essential, pure – “ideally pure,” cleansed of the aforementioned side factors – form. In order to formulate this assumption more fully, it would be necessary to add in the quoted wording: “If other factors were not at work, then” etc., as before. This is because we assume counterfactually – contrary to reality – or approximationally – when the influence of these secondary factors is minimal and can be reduced to zero – that no additional factors interact here.

their satisfaction, its attitude to achieve the expected desired result of its activity and being a regulator of this activity.” W. I. Kucenko, “Socjalnaja zadacza kak kategoria istoriczeskogo materializma,” *Naukowa Dumka* (Kyev: 1972), p. 134.

Based on assumption Z, we will introduce two general theorems, also of idealization nature, to answer the two questions posed in the introduction. They are as follows:

- I. The catalog of political objectives adopted in the agenda of a political organization is conditioned in the last instance by the catalog of needs of that the represented social group is aware of. The latter catalog is of course included in the agenda.
- II. The hierarchy of political goals in the program of a political organization is conditioned in the last instance by the hierarchy of the needs that the represented group is aware of as defined in that program.

In connection with the condition of “the last instance” the above formulations are equivalent to the developed formulations of assertions in the form of a counterfactual Conditionals. For at the same time, along with the identification of the essential, relevant determinant, we place – in accordance with the content of the notion of “last instance” – other determinants of lesser degree of relevance in the background.

Below, we shall reconstruct the outline the mode of construction of the two theorems, indicating in order of importance those factors omitted in the theorems. Thus, it will be a reconstruction of the procedure of idealization, reaching the “last instance” in the determination of political goals. Symmetrically to this procedure, we will also define the mode, the order of concretization of these statements, characterizing the explanation of the political goals of the organization.

We may define the assumption Z and its derivative theorems I and II as the internal laws of functioning of the system of political values in political agendas,³ respectively to the understanding of the idea of political needs and goals as distinct and functionally related types of political values. These laws are of momentous importance in view of the fact that the connection with the needs of large social groups constitutes the essential criterion of political valence, the criterion

3 Cf. M. Karwat, “Definicja i typologia wartości politycznych (na użytek wyjaśniania działań politycznych),” in: *Problemy teorii decyzji politycznych*, Prace Zespołu Marksistowskiej Teorii Polityki COM SNP, 1976. In this paper, I present the concept of political values and the system of political values as a complex arrangement of political ideas expressed in political doctrines and programs. The concept of political values as culturally objectified, abstract ideas of the needs of large social groups is presented in the work: “Wartości polityczne jako idee potrzeb społecznych,” *Studia Nauk Politycznych* 1979, No. 5.

of the recognition of an idea as a political value;⁴ and in view of this, the variant of secondary explanation presented here is of vital importance for explaining the determinants of the political sense of institutional action.

We will begin further discussion by adopting a certain terminological and conceptual framework.

1. Terminological and conceptual framework

The needs of large social groups mean here the needs of these groups as organized wholes, not reducible to the needs of individuals (members) or to the sum of these needs. To define the needs of a large social group means as much as to answer the question, what the functioning and development of this group as a whole depends on – in this case, a qualitatively defined whole. The need of a large social group as a whole is the dependence of the existence and development of this group as a whole on certain interactions between this group as a whole and its internal and external environment, that is, between the group as a whole and society, the social environment, certain other groups, between the group as a whole and its substructures and members.

It is not a coincidence that we have adopted the relational term “needs” here, for the factor that constitutes the group as an organized whole and perpetuates its integration is certain social interactions. The mentioned dependence is the fact that if certain activities – influences – on the part of the group do not take place or are not directed at it, it is threatened with disintegration, permanent disintegration or change of identity.

In order to bring this complicated definition a little closer to concrete phenomena, we will use the example of a nation as an ethnic, cultural group. The essential needs of a nation as a whole include the need for identity, the need for cultural continuity, the need for cultural distinctiveness, the need for sovereignty, the need for security, etc. If a nation ceased to cultivate community and linguistic distinctiveness, historical traditions, certain values and symbols uniting its members into a unified community, if attempts at assimilation were not counteracted, etc. the nation would lose its identity, and thus would cease to be a nation. Therefore, when speaking of the specific needs of a nation as a whole, we mention certain groups of factors on which its existence depends. This dependence is precisely the need.

4 M. Karwat, “Definicja,” p. 80.

Let us now adopt the idea that the needs of large social groups and their interests – the notion of interest is treated as derivative of the notion of needs – and certain relations between the needs of different social groups – e.g. convergence, contradiction, competitiveness, complementarity – are the source of politics⁵ as an activity that resolves social contradictions through the coordination of social needs and interests in the name of the overriding needs and interests of society as a whole.⁶

By *political goals* we mean ideas of states of affairs, envisaged as possible and desirable results of actions of political organizations; desirable from the point of view of needs – interests – of certain large social groups or society as a whole.

The catalog of needs means the set of group needs that the group is aware of and which the organization's agenda expresses, the totality of ideas of needs reflected in the program. It is a non-hierarchical collection. In characterizing the catalog of group needs in the organization program, we simply list all those group needs reflected in the program. From a catalog of needs we will distinguish the *system of needs* characterized by complex relations occurring between needs. By introducing a network of interdependencies between different needs – due to the scope of these needs, their mutual dependence in the realization; compatibility, competitiveness, complementarity, contradiction – we transform the catalog of needs into a *system of needs*.

As we may see, both of these concepts have an analytical value. We use them to briefly express in which aspect we will examine the functioning of the idea of needs in a political agenda.

We will also distinguish the *hierarchy of needs* from the catalog and system of needs. It consists of ranking them according to the degree of importance for the functioning of the group as recognized by the organization.

The concept of system of needs is broader than the concept of hierarchy of needs. The hierarchy is an important but not exhaustive element of the system. The assertions expounded in this work concern the catalog of needs and the

5 Cf. O. Cetwiński, “Zjawisko polityczne i proces polityczny,” in: *Metodologiczne*. This work presents an account of political processes as processes of integration and disintegration of large social groups due to the needs, interests and awareness of the interests of these groups. See also: A. Bodnar, *Ekonomika i polityka. Podstawowe zależności* (Warszawa: 1977), which presents the concept of politics as a platform for revealing and resolving social contradictions – arising from conflicting social needs and interests – and as an activity aimed at selecting and coordinating social needs with a view to the overriding interest of society as a whole.

6 Bodnar, *Co to jest polityka?* (Warszawa: 1980).

hierarchy of needs, only indirectly and partially characterizing the system of needs as a motivational system – subsystem – of the system of political values in the political agenda.⁷

By analogy, we shall define the *catalog of political goals* as the set of goals adopted in the political agenda, and the *hierarchy of political goals* as the order of political goals determined by the relation of preferences. As in the case of needs, we will distinguish from the catalog of goals and the hierarchy of goals the system of goals as a system of directive values – a subsystem of the system of political values.

We introduce the term “catalog” in Theorem I to emphasize that it is not the relationship between individual needs and goals but the relationship between *sets* of needs and goals that falls into the framework of a certain regularity.

2. Needs vs goals – the nature of relationship

In considering the dependence of goals on needs, we naturally assume their non-identity. Their mutual relationship is a bond of different qualities. Needs are the dependence of the existence and development of the subject on the occurrence or, more precisely, the causing of certain states of affairs. The ideas of these states of affairs are the desired results of actions, goals. Thus, needs imply certain goals and this is the premise for seeing in goals the expression of certain needs.

By accepting the assumption that goals are conditioned by needs, we do not ignore the fact that the relationship between a given need and the goal corresponding to it – expressing it – is not unambiguous. It is a complex relationship which manifests itself in a different and unique way in the case of different needs and goals. It is not a simple “need – goal” mapping. There is no automatism in the conditioning of goals by specific needs. Specific social needs – realized in the organization’s program and motivating its action – necessarily give rise to certain goals of political action. However, this does not happen mechanically and directly but through many mediating factors of which we will speak below.

It is therefore more correct to say that, in the final analysis, every political objective expresses certain social needs – it is then necessary to examine whose and what these needs are – and is subordinated to these needs – for it is subordinated to the overriding objective of satisfying certain needs. However, attempts at a simple mechanical reduction will obviously be unreliable.

7 I use the term in the same sense as in the paper: M. Karwat, “Definicja,” p. 95. To be sure, in this case, we are talking about ideas of group needs as “primary” political values that have a motivational function in the actions of political actors.




Figure 1. Relations between needs and goals

In this paper, we shall be interested precisely in those intermediate – disturbing – factors which make the way from the disclosure and expression of certain social needs in a political agenda to their translation into the language of specific goals extremely complex and complicated. This includes cases when political goals do not serve any social needs – needs of large groups, of society as a whole – while the latter serve only as a curtain, as a pretext for the organization's actions.

Generally speaking, the ambiguity of the relationship between needs and goals manifests itself in the fact that: 1) one political goal may express several social needs at the same time – not necessarily in their totality, but often only to a certain extent, in certain aspects – and 2) one need may be reflected in several goals (cf. Fig. 1).

It stems from the fact that the needs of large social groups as a whole and of society as a whole are in fact syndromes, complexes of conditions that only together determine the requirements of the functioning of the group as a whole. This is because certain requirements of the existence and development of large social groups as a whole are inseparably connected with each other, we cannot fulfil them separately but only as a whole, in correlation, in unity. Thus, for example, the preservation of national security depends on non-aggression from the outside, securing the defense potential of the country, maintaining internal order and order, combating diversionary activities, and many other conditions. Moreover, this applies also to the realization of specific goals, which usually presupposes and requires the simultaneous or prior realization of other goals – instrumental relations of goals and correlation of goals. In turn, this involves the prior or simultaneous satisfaction of many other needs not directly related to a given goal. This is what we meant when we stated that the determination of political goals by social needs concerns *bundles, sets* of needs and goals, and not necessarily directly individual needs and goals. For this reason, we shall speak hereafter of the conditioning of the catalog of political goals by the *catalog* of needs of large social groups, and not of the conditioning of specific goals by specific concrete needs. We may schematically illustrate the complex characteristics of this conditioning as follows (cf. Fig 2).




Figure 2. Interdependencies between sets of needs and sets of goals

Finally, it is worth emphasizing that a given political objective may express several competing or even contradictory⁸ needs of the same social group – not to mention the divergent needs of different social groups – and not only complementary or indifferent ones. Conversely: the same need sometimes finds expression in several competing or contradictory goals. This contradiction or competitory character of needs, implying the conflictuality of the system of goals, and the peculiar internal contradiction of individual needs, reflected in the bundle of conflicting goals, is an important regularity of the functioning of the system of political values and a regularity of the functioning of political organizations. It is worth referring to it when we try to explain the reasons for the change in the hierarchy of political goals. However, this issue goes beyond our interest.

Continuing the topic of the conditioning the catalog of political objectives by the catalog of needs of large social groups, we shall have in mind the determination of a set of objectives by a set, a complex, a syndrome of needs, which is the first reason why this determination is described as indirect, in the last instance.

8 The contradiction – or mutual exclusion – of needs consists in the fact that we can satisfy only one of them, excluding the others. On the other hand, needs are competitive when it is possible to satisfy them simultaneously, but only partial and at the same time the maximum satisfaction of one need is connected with the minimum satisfaction of the others – satisfaction of needs at the expense of others.

3. Catalog of social group needs versus a catalog of political objectives in the organization's agenda (theorem i)

In attributing to the needs of the large social group the role of the main factor subjectively determining a selection of the organization's political goals, we rely on an assumption concerning the relationship between organization and group, a certain degree of identification of the political organization with the large social group. This relationship is precisely the "last instance" in the explanation of political goals, since the relationship between needs and goals occurs primarily within the boundaries of one subject. By defining a large social group as an organized whole and stating that a political organization is an organization of this very group – due to its ideological identification – we grant a political subjectivity to a large social group as a whole – an organized whole – considering it further as an ultimate subject, a subject of needs and interests motivating political activity, and organization – as a secondary subject, a direct subject of political activity, which satisfies the group's needs. It is only when we concretize this assumption – following the consideration of the autonomous subjectivity of the political organization not to the limits of alienation from the group – that we simultaneously take into account the weakening influence of the needs of the group as a whole on the selection and gradation of the organization's goals. However, such cases are only a negative manifestation of the same regularity.

Thus we assume at the outset a strictly idealizing assumption that the political organization identifies itself completely and indivisibly with the great social group *G*. This means that the organization identifies itself completely with the group, defines itself as only a part of the group serving the needs of the whole, recognizing in consequence the exclusivity or at least the supremacy of the needs of the group as a whole.

We will denote this assumption by the number (1). If condition (1) holds and there are no other conditions, then the political organization *O* would formulate only such political goals as express the needs of a large social group *G*.

We may formulate assumption (1) in a radical or moderate version.

In the first case, we assume the *exclusivity* of the needs of the group as a whole, we counterfactually assume that the organization has and expresses no other needs, no autonomous requirements of its own to function apart from the needs of the group as a whole. In this case, we assume that organization *O* can constitute political goals solely because of the needs of the group.

However, this assumption may be more concrete when we allow – in accordance with reality – for the fact that the organization also possesses and expresses in its agenda its own autonomous regularities and requirements of functioning,

not always reducible to the corresponding needs as a whole. Therefore, a political organization generally perceives and expresses in its program also its own needs and interests, not fully identical with those of the group as a whole. However, we assume – up to a certain point – that these needs – of the group as a whole and of the organization as a separate entity within the group – are incompatible and interdependent. While not identical, they are inseparable in their realization. In the case of contradiction – within the limits of the organization's identification with the group – these needs are harmonized in such a way that the organization unconditionally recognizes the superiority, the domination of the needs of the group as a whole over its own, particular needs, insofar as they are contrary to the needs of the group

In this case, we may formulate assumption (1) more cautiously, in its concretized version (1.1) as an assumption about the *superiority*, the absolute priority of the needs and interests of the group as a whole in motivating the organization's activities, in defining its goals.

Adopting assumption (1) and at the same time abstracting from the influence of all other factors – not yet specified here – we formulate the first version of Theorem I, which states that if a political organization maximally identifies with the group and if identification with the group is the only motive for its actions, then the organization's agenda would include only those goals that express the needs of the group.

This is an idealizing version of explanation, showing the relationship between needs and goals in its purest, “essential” form, in abstraction from disturbing factors. This version is tantamount to assuming that the satisfaction of group needs depends on the “goodwill” of the organization – identification with the group and ability to act.

This law of subjective determination of political goals answers the question of what the subject of political action would pursue if it did not take into consideration any secondary factors. We may generally define these factors as the *autonomous requirements of the political game*, imposed on an organization, limiting its ability to pursue goals related to the needs of the group despite the pursuit of those goals. Then we can explain the discrepancy between the catalog of political goals and the catalog of group needs by pointing out that – given the possibilities – the lack of “good will” was the main reason for ignoring the group's needs. Using colloquial language, we can justify this order of explanation in such a way that we should first specify what the subject of the action would aim at “if he wanted and could (satisfy the needs of the group),” “if he wanted but could not,” and finally. “if he could but would not,” leaving aside the case that is unlikely to require explanation – “if he could not and would not want to.”

As we may see, in its most general form, Theorem I appeals not only to assumption (1) about the full identification of the organization with the social group, but also to the conjunction of assumption (1) and another assumption according to which we assume that the establishment of political goals depends solely on the organization itself – with the simultaneous counterfactual assumption about the exclusive influence of both conditions.

We may describe this second assumption – let us call it premise (2) – as the assumption of the full, indivisible sovereignty of the political organization, that is, the fact that it determines its political goals independently, according to its own will. This is an assumption about the independence of a political organization from other organizations, but not about the independence – in any case – not full independence – of the organization from the group. This is because we have simultaneously assumed the subordination and servitude of the activities – and goals – of the organization to the needs of the group as a whole.

With only relative independence, freedom of action – and in this sense – relative sovereignty of the organization towards the group, we consider the group as a whole as sovereign. From this point of view the sovereignty of an organization is a manifestation, a reflection of the sovereignty of the group in relation to other groups – represented by other organizations. Assumption (1) about the full identification of the political organization with the group can thus be reformulated as an assumption about the – recognized in the organization's agenda – sovereignty of the group as a whole towards the political organization.

In the conjunction of these two assumptions – about the sovereignty of the group in relation to other groups and in relation to its organization, and about the sovereignty of the group in relation to the organizations of other groups – we can assume that the catalog of political goals in the program of the organization is shaped solely under the influence of the catalog of needs of the group it represents.

We can now concretize this theorem by taking into consideration successively more and more important influences of factors that we previously deliberately omitted.

First of all, the realization of the needs of a large social group, and thus the realization of the goals expressing those needs, most often depends not only – and even not so much – on the organization identifying itself with the group, but on the complex system of objective conditions – the stock of means of action and the system of political forces as well as other factors, spread out in a specific time perspective. Thus, we repeal the assumption of unlimited capabilities of the organization, stating the opposite – limited capabilities to meet needs at any given time. Thus, we repeal the assumption that the catalog of political goals is shaped

by the organization solely because of the recognized needs of the group. In accordance with the degree of discrepancy between the possibilities of action of the organization and the range of needs of the group motivating its activity, there is a discrepancy between the catalog of group needs formulated in the agenda of the organization and the catalog of political goals contained therein. This is the first of the important regularities determining the fact that the catalog of group needs conditions the catalog of goals only to a limited extent.

Due to the knowledge of the limited possibilities of satisfying needs at a given time, the pursuit of the group's needs is reflected in the organization's agenda in the chain of goals spread out over time. Therefore, a teleological-instrumental relativization of goals occurs. The ultimate goal – superior to the intermediate partial goals – expresses the needs of the group as a whole. On the other hand, the sub-goals only indirectly express these needs because of their relationship to the overall goal. Some of the sub-goals reflect certain needs of the group, but they are different than the needs which determine the final goal or which together constitute the set of needs reflected in the final goal.

A further manifestation – and effect – of the limited possibilities of the organization to act in order to satisfy the needs of the represented group is a certain restriction of the sovereignty and freedom of action of the organization, resulting from the functioning of a series of obligations not connected with the articulation of the group's interests, but connected with political compromises, political alliances, the rules of action adopted in the political system, etc. We may refer to these factors as autonomous – in relation to the needs of the group, but also in relation to the organization itself – requirements of the political game. The influence of these factors causes that even when the organization identifies itself with the group to the maximum degree and does not set for itself any other ultimate goals apart from satisfying the needs of the group, it is forced in its goals to deviate from the catalog of the needs of the group, taking into account the needs of other groups as well, including those conflicting with the needs of the represented group. It is a specific price for participation in the political game, burdening the cost of concessions primarily to the group itself and under certain circumstances also fostering the weakening of the organization's ties to the group.

Deviations in the program of the catalog of political goals from the catalog of group needs may be temporary – involving and passing away along with tactical maneuvers, instrumental and sham actions – but they may also be permanent, becoming objectified, marking the process of autonomization, and even alienation of the organization from the social group, within the framework of which or on the order of which it was created.

In this connection, it is worth clarifying Theorem I as a statement relating primarily to strategic goals: ultimate, long-term, overarching political goals are determined relatively unambiguously by the needs of the social group, while tactical and indirect goals, also reflected in programs, are shaped directly under the influence of the aforementioned factors, being only indirectly related to specific group needs.

One of the factors influencing the deviation of the catalog of political goals from the catalog of group needs is the mechanisms of cultural diffusion that co-shape the catalog of political goals. An organization's political goals may in fact result from its recognition of certain values accepted in the culture of a given society, including certain patterns of political culture. Sometimes, under the influence of these factors, i.e. moral, political and other values – external to the needs of the group as a whole – organization may abandon certain political goals incompatible with the values but resulting from the needs of the group. Often, politicians develop their goals solely on the basis of the values accepted in the group's environment – in society, in other groups – without analyzing their relationship to the needs of the group. When the needs of the group so far represented cease to be the fundamental criterion for the selection and re-evaluation of goals, we may consider this to be a sign of a far-reaching autonomization of the organization – just as, for example, the social reformist parties abandoned the class goals of their politics in the name of the abstractly understood interests of society detaching themselves off from a class character.

Such concretization is tantamount to abrogating the assumption of indivisible identification of a political organization with a particular social group and only with it. In fact, many political organizations declare themselves to represent the interests of many social groups – classes and social strata, ethnic minorities, religious communities – and not just one of them. Many of them proclaim in their documents to be programmatically “above-class,” nationwide, etc.

Therefore, the most far-reaching concretization of Theorem I about the conditioning – in the last instance – of the catalog of political goals by the catalog of needs and of the large group is a situation in which not the needs of the group expressed –declared – in the agenda determine the political goals of the organization, but vice versa: it is the political goals of this organization that cause a particular interpretation of the catalog of needs of the given group. In its purest form, such a situation occurs when the organization's relationship with a social group is based not on actual identification with it but on manipulation, the use of a particular social base for the realization of particularistic

goals; often – if only against the consciousness of those who act – in the objective interests of another group – especially a social class, another faction of it, an oligarchy, etc.

As we can see, in the construction of the general theorem, which is the nomothetic component of the explanans, to determine the essential necessary, correct conditioning of the catalog of political goals in the program of the organization, we go by the way of successive abstraction from the influence of various accidental, “circumstantial,” variable factors. Of course, the order of abstracting from these factors is determined by the degree of their significance. These factors co-determine the choice of political goals in the organization’s agenda but only in close connection with the general regularity thus not independently. They are not sufficient conditions or even necessary components of a sufficient condition for such and not other political goals to appear in a program. For these reasons, we may initially omit them in the analysis, even assuming that they do not occur at all, thus formulating the law of idealization expressing regularity in its “pure” form, which materializes only in the tendency, in the long run, through short-term, momentary deviations under the influence of marked side and disturbing factors.

We adopt the reverse order of procedure in the explanation of political goals, in attempts to formulate an answer to the question of the subjective reasons for the appearance of certain political goals in the program. We then take the general theorem formulated above as the starting point, as a fundamental, given relation. We then obtain the answer to the question of why an organization’s agenda contains such a given political objective rather than another in a series of subsequent, concrete explanations. In this case, the explanatory procedure consists in making incremental, successive approximations to reality, through the overruling of previously introduced counterfactual assumptions, i.e., through the concretization of the general claim. If we may explain the goal by pointing directly to a general regularity, disregarding these interfering factors as irrelevant in the given context, then we stop at the first, most general, most abstract variant of explanation. If, on the other hand, the political goal appeared in the program of the organization not directly because of the needs of a large social group but precisely under the influence of these factors, we should determine them by successive concretizations, one of which will prove to be fairly adequate to the actual concrete conditions. Reproducing the procedure of the construction of theorem I in order, we have presented the order of explanation starting from the theorem in its final form, and then revealing the counterfactual assumptions.

4. The hierarchy of needs of a large social group and the organization's hierarchy of political goals (theorem ii)

It seems that the relationship expressed in Theorem I is one that is relatively easy to observe in political reality. Therefore, when explaining political action through its subjective determinants, including the secondary explanation of the background of the factors subjectively determining the action, we may take Theorem I for granted as a starting point without much objection. Moreover, it seems to be accepted in the practice of explaining political action. However, in this case, we only explicitly articulate it.

A much more interesting issue to researchers is to determine why the relationship of preferences of the acting subject – in the given case, political organization – took a particular course, particular hierarchy of political goals to which we refer in the direct explanation of actions – in humanistic interpretation.

The relationship between the hierarchy of needs of a social group and the hierarchy of political goals of an organization is much more complex than the relationship between the respective catalogs of needs and goals. It is conditioned by the latter not explicitly but indirectly, for the hierarchy of political goals is shaped by the catalog of political goals determined in the last instance by the catalog of needs of a large social group. However, in specific cases, it is also not an accurate reflection of the hierarchy of needs. This is because, although the catalog of political goals reflects the catalog of needs, the relationship – as we stated earlier – is primarily one of composition, a set of needs and goals. On the other hand, the relations between needs and goals are shaped differently and only to some extent are they appropriate to each other – e.g. because the two catalogs are not fully identical. Second, as we stated earlier, usually the set – catalog – of political goals subject to hierarchization also includes such political goals that are not directly related to the specific needs of the group, but are instead justified by other reasons. Hence, if the catalog of needs of a large social group expressed in the program of a political organization only indirectly only as a factor of “the last instance” determines the catalog of political goals formulated in that program, then the hierarchy of needs of a large social group determines the hierarchy of political goals even more indirectly and with less explicitness. This is so because of the non-identity of the catalogs, the non-identity of the relations in the sets of ideas of needs and political goals and – what follows – the non-identity of the criteria of hierarchization.

Thus, on the one hand, in determining the determinants of the hierarchy of political goals, we will take as our basis Theorem I concerning the relationship between the “catalogs” of group needs and the political goals of an organization,

but on the other hand, we must necessarily take into consideration the many additional and complex factors that make the reflection of the hierarchy of group needs in the hierarchy of political goals extremely complicated.

In the first stages of the construction of Theorem II on the relationship between the hierarchy of group needs and the hierarchy of organizational goals in a political agenda, the reasoning will proceed as in the case of Theorem I. For here we make analogous counterfactual assumptions, with the additional assumption that they exhaust the determinants of the hierarchy of political goals. This is tantamount to assuming that the hierarchy of political goals in an organization's agenda is determined solely by the character and hierarchy of needs of the large social group with which the organization identifies. In the following phases, we shall repeal the assumption of exclusivity, stating only that the hierarchy of political goals is determined primarily by the hierarchy of the needs of a large social group and secondarily and incidentally by other factors. In extreme cases – the alienation of an organization from the social group on the basis of which it was founded – the hierarchy of the needs of this originally represented group will be, on the contrary, a secondary, incidental factor; while other considerations will be dominant in the hierarchy of the organization's goals.

Beginning with phase one of the theorem construction, we should first identify what the hierarchical ordering of the idea of the needs of a large social group is and what are the criteria that define this hierarchy.

The hierarchy of realized needs of a large social group is defined in the political agenda according to the organization's knowledge of the degree of importance of those needs. The needs and interests of the group are assessed as more or less important, more or less general – compared to others – substitutable or non-substitutable. The criterion of the importance of needs, which is the basis for their hierarchy, is expressed in the form of a “negative” definition, in the form of overlooking the possible destructive consequences of this fact – among others, the threat to the unity and existence of the group as a whole.

This criterion – which is subjective in nature, because it is connected to a more or less adequate knowledge of the conditions of the group's functioning and development – is at the same time an objectivized criterion, because it is based on the experience of the life of the group as a whole and on the knowledge of the general laws governing the group's development and consolidation together with the recognition of the specific conditions in which these laws may come into play.

Thus, those needs whose consequences of dissatisfaction in a given period – which the agenda concerns – are predicted in the agenda to be more severe, more far-reaching in comparison with the consequences of dissatisfaction of

other needs, are treated in the agenda – in the hierarchy of needs – as dominant, important, shaping the criteria of importance of political objectives. As a rule, these are the needs which have the most general character, encompassing a complex and relatively broad set of conditions necessary for the successful functioning of a given group in society. Therefore, in the long run, the criterion of the degree of generality of needs would coincide with the criterion of the degree of their importance, determining in tendency the criteria of political goals' gradation.

In view of this, we may formulate the general theorem that is part of the expansive explanation of political goals as follows: "If, in the agenda of a political organization O identifying with a large social group G , the need p_1 of the group G is judged to be more important than the need p_2 of this group, then in this program the political goal c_1 expressing the need p_1 is preferred to the political goal c_2 expressing the need p_2 ." Of course, in such a formulation we make a simplification, tacitly assuming the counterfactual conditions mentioned earlier, i.e. consciously omitting the limited possibilities of action of the organization, the autonomous requirements of the political game, a certain degree of sovereignty – independence – of the organization in relation to the group with the degree being somehow "inversely proportional" to the degree of identification with the group, as well as the modifying influence of the phenomenon of psychological domination of needs, which we will discuss below. Thus, in its full form, as empowered by an explicit statement of the premises, Theorem II may state the following: "If the conditions mentioned above did not apply and if in the agenda of a political organization O identifying with a large social group G , the need p_1 dominated over the need p_2 in the hierarchy of needs, then in this program the goal c_1 expressing the need p_1 would be preferred in the hierarchy of political goals over the goal c_2 expressing the need p_2 ." This theorem is equivalent to the following thesis: "The hierarchy of political goals in the political agenda of a political organization O representing a large social group G is determined in the last instance by the hierarchy of needs of the group G as a whole, as determined by this program."

Thus, similarly to Theorem I defining the conditioning of the catalog of political goals of an organization by the catalog of the needs of the group as a whole, Theorem II on the conditioning of the hierarchy of political goals of an organization by the hierarchy of the needs of the large group has an idealizing character and opens – as a nomothetic component of the explanans – a sequence of explanations adequate, at a certain stage of concretization, to the actual direct and indirect conditions determining the place of certain political goals in the hierarchy of goals.

In the concretization, we take into consideration the factors gradually abrogated earlier – found in the assumptions of Theorem I – and then we also arrive at complicating factors specific to the relationship between the hierarchy of needs and the hierarchy of goals.

Thus, making the assumption about the knowledge of the limited possibilities of the organization's activity more concrete, we can point to the following consequence of the subject's discernment for the preferences, hierarchy of goals, using the regularity repeatedly stated in the social sciences. According to the knowledge about the degree of reality of certain goals, about the possibilities of their realization, a political organization can choose and place higher goals that are more realistic, more likely to be realized, as well as goals that require less "resources," exposing to a lower risk of material and social costs. In this case we are dealing with two orders of values:⁹ a hierarchy of goals determined by the hierarchy of the group's needs and a hierarchy of goals determined by their degree of reality or by their degree of "economy." At the same time, the final hierarchy of the organization's political goals oscillates between one scale and the other, tending – in cases where the "gradients" are transient rather than permanent – to combine the two criteria. This is one of the important reasons why the hierarchy of political objectives may diverge significantly from the hierarchy of group needs found in the program. Of course, this relationship applies more to lower-order, tactical and operational, immediate goals. For the hierarchy of higher-order, long-term, final goals – also expressed in the agenda – there is a greater stability of preference criteria and a more permanent correspondence of the hierarchy to the hierarchy of group needs – of course, only as long as there is a maximum degree of identification of the organization with the group.

As a consequence of these modifications in the hierarchy of political goals – in relation to the group's hierarchy of needs – the organization may also take steps to reshape the group's hierarchy of needs – or at least to reflect, interpret it differently – either by reordering the ideas of needs in their unchanged catalog or by attempting to *substitute needs*. In such a case, we are dealing with

9 Cf. O. Cetwiński, "Metodologiczne przesłanki integracji nauk politycznych," *Studia Nauk Politycznych* 1975, No. 4. Cetwiński points out that in a risky situation the decision-maker actually takes into account two orders of values – two hierarchies of goals: 1) the one resulting from the preference relation – defined in a given case by ideological criteria, 2) and the one resulting from the estimated probabilities of realistically bringing about the intended results of actions. The final order of goals motivating action in such a situation is the result of influence of both value orders, according to the highest expected utility of possible actions.

a reversal of dependence: it is the hierarchy of political goals of the organization that determines the hierarchy of group needs expressed in the program, rather than the other way around. Phenomena of this kind are the rule under conditions in which the servile character of the organization towards the needs of the group is only a screen for manipulating the group in the name of goals that have little to do with its real needs. In such a case, the ideas of the group's needs contained in the political agenda serve only to "produce justifications" for specific political goals.

Turning now from the extreme situation to the conditions in which the organization identifies with the group, we may take into account one more factor that modifies the hierarchy of political goals as compared to the hierarchy of group needs. The very criterion of hierarchy of needs may deform or distort. Under the influence of certain social moods in the group as a whole, in society and/or in the political organization, the psychological dominance of certain needs in a given period may obscure the criterion of their importance and replace them. If the dominance of certain needs in social consciousness is consciously included in the arrangement of needs and goals in the organization's program, then we may consider this modification as one of the requirements of the political game considered earlier. The hierarchy of political goals is often a reflection of the dominance of certain needs of social groups at a particular stage of the political struggle – a reflection that is both conscious – in the knowledge of the changed, concrete conditions for the realization of ultimate goals expressing the most vital needs of the group as a whole – and spontaneous – when the dominance in the agenda of certain needs and goals is determined solely or mainly by the state of social moods, and not by other, more important reasons. In the first place, psychological domination concerns the swollen, "starved," unsatisfied needs which require ad hoc regulation.

Among the mechanisms that weaken the link between the hierarchy of political goals and the hierarchy of needs of a large social group, we should emphasize the influence of cultural diffusion processes, which is even stronger and more far-reaching than in the case of the catalog of political goals.

The application of Theorem II in its most general, "initial" form and in its subsequent concretizations allows us to understand both the ultimate, necessary determinants of the choice of political goals in an organization's political agenda and the direct causes – concrete, specific, unique – by locating the regularity governing the order of goals in the intertwining of the various, variable, specific circumstances of an organization's operation.

We have justified the reasoning presented in the paper – expressed in the assumption about the relationship of goals to needs and in the formulation of Theorems I and II – only in outline. The presentation of the procedure of secondary explanation of political action – explanation of subjective reasons for the appearance and specific ordering of political goals in the documents of the organization – obviously requires more elaborate explanation and exemplification. Nevertheless, it seems that this kind of analysis of political goals can be useful in examining political practice on the basis of the documents of official organizations. This procedure does not exhaust the explanation of political goals and actions: it is not enough to apply it – and stop there – to get a full answer to the question of why political organizations orient their activities in a given way. However, it seems that such an explanation is a necessary condition for obtaining such an answer. While being aware of these limitations resulting from the scope of application of Theorems I and II, we may treat them as a supplement to other theorems that adjudicate other regularities governing political action and are used in other – i.e., structural, functional – types of explanation.

Credits

Part I. Subject and scope of political science

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Part II. Research process in political science

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Part III. Key concepts and assumptions of political theory

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11. M. Karwat, "Podmioty polityki. Typologia i gradacja" / updated and revised edition: "Podmiotowość polityczna wielkich grup społecznych, organizacji politycznych i jednostek. Model eksplanacyjny," in K. Opałek (ed.), *Elementy teorii polityki*, Wydawnictwo PWN, Warszawa 1989, pp. 64–82.
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Abstracts

Anthropological and sociological premises of political theory

Abstract: Basic determinants that shape political life are found in various spheres of man's activity: the economic structure of a given society or technologies used by society to interact with the natural environment. Man's biological nature and his national culture co-create his historical activity. The cognitive consequence of such a fact is the structure of theoretical knowledge necessary to understand political phenomena. To fully understand them, one requires to refer to many more general theories that form the stock of humanities' knowledge. It is made out of three levels of reflections: the level of general anthropology, the level of sociology (of the social whole), and the level of disciplines studying areas of social life, including its political sphere.

Keywords: man and the world of man, politics in the social world of man, humanistic knowledge's structure, general policy theory

Research subject of political science in light of the aspectuality principle

Abstract: The problem with the standard understanding of research is that it does not distinguish an object as a thing or a complex technical or social system from an object in the epistemological sense, i.e., as a conceptual construct based on abstraction, grasping phenomena in a certain cross-section and certain terms, from the point of view of certain properties, whose exposure and model or typological separation results from specific intentions, practical needs, specialization of knowledge, etc. The object of cognition, in particular the object of a particular study (trying to describe, explain, and predict) is determined by the type of questions we ask, the type of knowledge we refer to in the search for answers, and the nature of the assumptions we make. The aspectuality principle in scientific cognition, well demonstrated in the sociology of knowledge, is related to this, and political scientists should be aware of it to avoid the error of colloquialism. The aspectuality principle in the cognition of political phenomena means that the same phenomenon (or type of phenomena) may be studied from different points of view, in diverse contexts. On the one hand, it means that no single-aspect characteristics is sufficient to fully understand a phenomenon; therefore, specialization also means a kind of perspective limitation. On the other hand, it means that different-aspect approaches do not have to be mutually exclusive, may be complementary, and express a kind of labor division within the megadiscipline

which is political science. Thus, the subject of political research is so fascinating because it may and must be analyzed from multiple points of view, using diverse interpretation keys.

Keywords: research subject, aspect, research context, aspectuality principle

Syndromatic nature of the subject of political science

Abstract: A significant part of phenomena, which are a subject for political science, is ontologically peculiar. Namely, it is weaves of heterogenous phenomena, which create new quality in this combination, i.e., syndromes, and not homogenous types of phenomena. Both the concept of politicality and the criterion of politicality of phenomena, as well as the concept of politics (understood as a kind of social relations, type of action, and decision-making mechanism that also directs certain spheres of social life) are precisely syndromatic concepts. A political scientist must be aware of the difference between the typological approach to phenomena (possible when phenomena are homogenous in their origin, matter, and nature) and the syndromatic approach (where they deal with a combination of factors which differ in terms of origin and have their own logic, e.g., economic, legal and ideological, ethical and pragmatic, institutional and natural factors). The syndromatic nature of numerous political phenomena imposes the need of a multi-aspect, multifactorial, and systemic, and, therefore, often interdisciplinary, analysis.

Keywords: subject of political science, syndrome, syndromatic concepts, type, syndromatic research subjects

Politics as a fuzzy subject of research

Abstract: The goal of this article was to present the research subject of political science as a fuzzy set of cognitive elements, which is a blurred area of theoretical political research with a margin of indeterminacy. It is an area, where interdisciplinary merging of knowledge and experience from various formalized scientific disciplines occurs. Moreover, it is also a theoretical-research space that, in fact, breaks the positivist demarcation line in favor of contextual, inter-area, multi-level, syndromatic, etc. analyses. In this sense, the author analyzes in detail such issues as: scientific arguments against demarcation, specifics of the research subject of political science, subject errors made in political science, and syndromaticity of the political science research subject.

Keywords: fuzzy sets theory, demarcation, conventionalism in science, syndromaticity, the research subject of political science

Management as the metaphor of politics

Abstract: There are significant mutual relationships between the phenomenon of politics and the phenomenon of organization. Politics involves an organizational dimension and organizations involve a political dimension; we may analyze politics as a process of social life organization, while organization and organizing as a political process. Political science contributed greatly to the development of organizational sciences; organization and management sciences may inspire political research. The use of political and critical perspective may expose a seemingly apolitical nature of organization and management. In this context, the interpretation of management as a metaphor of politics may be useful.

Keywords: politics, interest, power, management, organization, cognitive metaphor

Ideological dilemmas of a contemporary political scientist

Abstract: Theoretical cognition in social sciences is embedded in the ideological perspective (of social classes). It takes a form of a tool needed to explain the structure and dynamics of the social world. The liberal canon is now regarded as ideologically neutral. It dominates in the deep layer of assumptions guiding research in mainstream social sciences. Political sciences also represent, in a hidden (ideological-political) form, the particular interests of the classes and social states; on the other hand, they strive for legitimacy borrowed from the natural sciences. Various scientific and philosophical paradigms emerge on this foundation and create a vast space for public discourse. The public functions of a political scientist include indicating the importance of certain phenomena and processes of the social and natural world for the existence of people, their material and spiritual needs, and their common activity. Knowledge, which is a rational basis of practical directives, must be adequate and justified theoretically or empirically. It also must adopt the point of view of overall social, and nowadays even global, rationality. A political scientist must answer the question: which model of capitalism would help in solving the global problems of technical and scientific civilization in the age of planetary crisis?

Keywords: ideology, legitimacy of cognition in the humanities, public functions of a political scientist, particular rationality, overall social rationality, planetary rationality, practical directives

Nothing alive is a unity. Political science as a multi-paradigmatic structure of knowledge

Abstract: This article sums up the author's reflections about the current state of research conducted by political scientists. The research is conducted within a few major research paradigms. The author claims that contemporary political science can develop as a structure (that is, a whole made up of heterogeneous elements) of knowledge gathered by the individual sub-disciplines of political studies, as well as the remaining disciplines of social sciences. Continued debate about the validity of these formulated within certain paradigms (and evaluated from the perspective of the remaining ones) enables painting a richer picture of political life. An autarkic strategy would cut political science's reflection off from theoretical and heuristic inspirations coming from sociology, as the general theory of the society, as well as from economy, social anthropology and psychology. The article presents a strategy of integrating the dispersed knowledge about man and society. It helps to get a fuller understanding of political phenomena and to reconstruct the process of emergence of the global civilization.

Keywords: scientific discipline, subject domain theory, heuristic and factual base of a political scientist, paradigms of research, unity of social sciences, multi-paradigmatic structure of political knowledge

Faultless disagreement: on analytical and research discrepancies in political science

Abstract: The goal of this article was to present the complexity and multifacetedness that occurs in the relationship between a researcher/political scientist and a research/cognitive object; the author particularly emphasizes the extrospective and introspective dimensions of political analyses. In this case, addressing the objective analytical and research disagreement which exists in political science became the starting point. On this basis, the author describes the issue of faultless disagreement in detail. He interprets the issue as an actual starting point in the intersubjective community of political scientists. Faultless disagreement is synonymous with, among other things, ambiguity and definition fuzziness in a given knowledge domain, such as research pluralism, including epistemic relativism; multitude of theoretical approaches, or in conceptual differentiation. Besides, the author describes some theoretical justifications of the phenomenon of analytical and research divergence that became a necessary condition to make the thesis about faultless

disagreement reliable. Moreover, he presents the theoretical and methodological effects of such correct disagreement in the context of advanced political research.

Keywords: faultless disagreement, theoretical-research pluralism, epistemic relativism, explanatory models, the researcher's multiparadigmality in the political science's domain

Politics as articulation of interests

Abstract: The article contains a review of literature on the notion of politics as a realm of articulation of interests, and formulates a way of addressing this issue inspired by a systemic approach and Marxist tradition. The author differentiates and analyzes mutual relationships of objective and subjective interests and personal and group interests, and the issue of interest in general; he also analyzes the categories of contradiction and conflict of interests, characterizes the process of articulating interests, its components and mechanisms, and proposes a model of a political system as a system of interests articulation in the context of a comprehensive model of social system. Understanding politics as an articulation of interests that are crucial for the survival and development of social wholes allows for a broad interpretation of politics, demonstration of social character of many seemingly nonpolitical social phenomena, and development of a sociocentric approach toward it.

Keywords: interest, objective and subjective interest, articulation of interests, politics, political system, contradiction and conflict of interests

Politics: the issue of power and the issue of property? Property as a condition of power

Abstract: The main thesis of this paper is that politics is not so much a problem of power but a problem of property, which is a key condition of power. The author presents the tautological consequences of defining political power by referring to politics understood as a power problem. He analyzes different approaches to power and crucial axes of disagreement in the source literature, such as: the problem of understanding power as a relationship versus understanding it as an attribute and function of social systems; the relationship between power and consciousness, power and violence; and the conflictual nature of power. He argues for viewing power as a function of social systems. Next, the author deals with the issue of power conditions, including property in the socio-economic sense. He characterizes relationships between property in the legal and socio-economic senses referring to the concepts of S. Kozyra-Kowalski and other authors; the author also characterizes the differences between property understood as the entirety of economic

relations and disposition. Finally, the author characterizes property as a condition of power; the conclusion also contains a characteristics of mutual relationship of power and property in relation to the concept of oligarchization and the metaphor of politics as the process of social life oligarchization.

Keywords: power, property in the legal sense versus property in the socio-economic sense, economic power, conditions of power, oligarchization, politics as the process of oligarchization of social life, function, relationship

Subjects of politics: typology and gradation

Abstract: Both the interpretation of political actions (in terms of motivation, intentions, human calculations, meaning attributed to actions in the perception of the surrounding) and the explanation of these actions (in terms of realized demand, fulfilled functions, conditions and limits of efficiency and effectiveness) require an answer to the question what is the very ability of a group or individual to act and what does it depend on? And the evaluation of the significance of given subject's actions and their status is related to the issue of whether the ability to act, be agile, and cause something to happen (i.e., results which are significant for society, state, or their development and change) is a permanent feature. This is what the concept of subjectivity relates to. Subjectivity requires self-awareness (being aware of one's own identity and interests), will, self-organization, pragmatic rationality of intentions, plans, and deeds, the ability to make decisions, and finally, sovereignty, i.e., acting relatively independently at one's own initiative, or at least for one's own interest in a situation of dependence or subordination. Subjectivity understood this way is a feature of individuals in political roles, small formal or informal teams, political institutions (parties, associations, or movements), and large social groups. At the same time, the subjectivity of individuals and small teams (e.g., leadership groups), who act as direct initiators and performers of the action, is secondary to the subjectivity of large social groups (classes, strata, social categories, ethnic groups, religious communities), who act as principals, patrons, or even clients. In politics, one should distinguish ultimate subjects from direct and indirect subjects, subjects of collective interests from institutional subjects of (parties to) political relations, and the latter from subjects of initiatives, decisions, and particular deeds. The model of political subjectivity assumes gradation and concretization of political impact on subsequent levels of social existence.

Keywords: subject, subjectivity, emergence, subject of politics

Needs of large social groups and goals of political organizations – explanatory model

Abstract: The goals of political organizations (even those alienated from the communities that enabled their creation and functioning) do not simply express expression of self-created ideological and doctrinal dogmas, nor the personal ambitions of leaders, nor opportunistic tactical calculations, although these factors directly influence their interpretation and hierarchization. However, they reflect (be it a distorted reflection) the needs of large social groups, which a given political party or movement represents or represented in the starting point. The catalog of organizations' goals, the hierarchy of these goals, and acting priorities are eventually determined by the nature and intensity of particular needs of large social groups (classes, strata, interest groups, ideological communities), and secondarily modified (even distorted) by the mechanisms of the autonomization of representatives, alienation of politics, factors related to the power balance and compromises in alliances made. The use of idealization and concretization is useful in explaining such a complex dependency.

Keywords: social needs, large social group, political goals, political organization

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