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Trust in International Relations

Rationalist, Constructivist, and Psychological Approaches

Edited by
Hiski Haukkala,
Carina van de Wetering,
and Johanna Vuorelma

This is an excellent book, tackling one of the fundamental concepts in International Relations and providing a timely and valuable exploration of the three different approaches to trust through fascinating and empirically rich case studies. It will be valuable for students and professionals alike.

Karolina Pomorska, *Assistant Professor in International Relations at Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, the Netherlands*

This book is a welcome addition to the growing literature on trust in international relations. Using the three main approaches to the study of trust, the collection is particularly valuable for the individual case studies. These range widely and cover an amazing variety of relationships between states and international organizations.

Jan Ruzicka, *Lecturer in Security Studies at the Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, UK*

This book provides a timely intervention into the research on trust and trust-building in international politics. It not only demonstrates the applicability of the concept, but brings together a novel series of case studies that help to enlighten previously unconsidered relationships and broaden our understanding about how scholars can operationalize trust in international politics.

Vincent Keating, *Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark*

Trust in International Relations

Trust is a core concept in International Relations (IR), representing a key ingredient in state relations. It was only relatively recently that IR scholars began to probe what trust really is, how it can be studied, and how it affects state relations. In the process three distinct ways of theorising trust in IR have emerged: trust as a rational choice calculation, as a social phenomenon or as a psychological dimension. *Trust in International Relations* explores trust through these different lenses using case studies to analyse the relative strengths and weaknesses of different approaches. The case studies cover relations between:

- United States and India
- ASEAN and Southeast Asian countries
- Finland and Sweden
- USA and Egypt
- The European Union and Russia
- Turkey's relations with the West

This book provides insights with real-world relevance in the fields of crisis and conflict management, and will be of great interest for students and scholars of IR, security studies and development studies who are looking to develop a more sophisticated understanding of how different theories of trust can be used in different situations.

Hiski Haukkala, Faculty of Management, University of Tampere, Finland.

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Contents

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Note

1 Statements of opinion and fact are my own and do not necessarily represent the official Finnish position.

Introduction

Approaching trust and mistrust in International Relations

Hiski Haukkala, Carina van de Wetering, and Johanna Vuorelma

The contemporary world exhibits signs of a multifaceted and growing erosion of trust. Studies show that citizens' trust in all four key institutions – government, business, NGOs, and media – is in crisis around the world (The 2017 Edelman Trust Barometer). Different manifestations of the lack of trust in the established institutions can be witnessed in elections and referendums that continue to produce unexpected results, such as the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, and the victories of Donald Trump in the United States and Emmanuel Macron in France.

At the same time, trust between states also seems to be receding. The institutional architecture that was built in the West after the Second World War is challenged to such an extent that many argue that we are facing a decline of the liberal West and its key institutions (see for example Walt 2016). From South Africa that is seeking to withdraw from the International Criminal Court to the United States that is foreseeing the end of 'human rights diplomacy' (Piccone 2017), multilateralism is no longer accepted as the only, let alone the most effective or necessarily even the most legitimate way to govern the international system.

But trust is a slippery concept that defies easy, or at least single, definition. To begin with, when it comes to trust in international politics, there are different levels simultaneously at play: trust between leaders, trust within domestic contexts, trust between institutions and state administrations as well as trust in the multilateral governance structure.[1] There are also different ways to conceptualise trust: it can be understood as a rational process, a psychological mechanism, or as a constructivist concept.

Different ways of conceptualising trust have a significant impact on how we understand trust affecting state relations. It is also important to distinguish between various representations of trust in international politics from first-order representations where trust is developed first-hand to second-order representations where images of the counterpart create trusting and distrusting relationships. Sometimes the concept of trust is employed interchangeably with the concepts of faith or belief, which makes it more difficult to develop a nuanced analytical framework for analysing

trust. For instance, Aaron Hoffman argues that the confidence to put your trust into others is a leap of 'essential faith' (Hoffman 2006, 7).

This book contends that trust should be one of the key notions in the study of International Relations (IR) and that it is a concept that creates greater understanding when it comes to analysing international politics. Yet for a long time, the concept did not receive sustained and systematic analytical attention in IR scholarship, partly because its ontological status was largely taken for granted. In the Realist paradigm, for example, trust – or rather the inevitable lack of it between states – has always explained the self-evident logic of the international system and its 'security dilemma'.

Therefore it was only in the 2000s that IR scholars began to probe what trust really is, how it can be studied, and how it functions in state relations. Andrew H. Kydd's *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (2005) and Aaron Hoffman's *Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict* (2006) were important works in developing a theory of trust in IR. Since Kydd's and Hoffman's books there have been important scholarly interventions that have focused on different aspects of trust in IR, bringing insights from other disciplines and developing a more nuanced understanding of trust in international politics (see for example Booth and Wheeler 2008; Keating and Ruzicka 2014; Rathbun 2007, 2012; Ruzicka and Wheeler 2010).

It seems that today we have arrived at the opposite end of the spectrum with numerous, perhaps even unnecessarily numerous and very sophisticated conceptualisations of trust in IR. Jan Ruzicka and Vincent Keating (2015) have proposed a well-defined distinction between different conceptualisations of trust in IR scholarship. In their review article 'Going global: Trust research and international relations' that was published in the *Journal of Trust Research* special issue 'Trust in International Relations: A Useful Tool?' (2015), they propose a typological division between three ways of theorising trust in IR: treating it as a type of rational choice calculation, as a social phenomenon or as a psychological dimension (Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 12).

The rational choice position conceptualises trust as risk-taking: it predicts whether a self-interested action is also in the other actor's interest and whether they therefore want to reciprocate (ibid., 14, 16). As Russell Hardin (1993, 507) argues: 'Trust involves giving discretion to another to affect one's interests. This move is inherently subject to the risk that the other will abuse the power of discretion.' The prediction and calculation of the other actor's preferences depends on the level of information available and applies to a certain situation only (Michel 2012, 872; Rathbun 2012, 13).

Key to the notion of trust as a social construct is the role of rules and identities (Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 15). The starting point is the expectation that others will 'do what is right' that Aaron Hoffman calls the *fiduciary approach* (Hoffman 2002, 375, 379; Hollis 1998, 10). One is willing to trust which provides an obligation that the other will honour it (Hollis

1998, 11). Approaching trust from a constructivist perspective means that the focus is not only on shared meanings and interpretations concerning trust but also the way in which they are represented in international politics.

The psychological approach emphasises emotions that shape decision-making, either individually or collectively (Mercer 2005, 95–96). Brian Rathbun talks about *generalised trust* that has more to do with psychological characteristics than interests. Some statesmen are generally more inclined to trust and therefore more eager to commit to internationally binding treaties (Rathbun 2012, 2–3). As Rathbun writes, 'Generalised trusters are more optimistic that others will live up to their agreements and that they do not wish them harm' (ibid., 3).

Taking the distinction between rational, constructivist, and psychological approaches as our starting point, we analyse how these three ways manifest themselves in actual case studies concerning state relations and institutional cooperation. In this book our aim is not to ask which approach is the most accurate. On the contrary, we want to move beyond these at times sterile debates and ask what the relative strengths and weaknesses of a given approach are in analysing a particular case study in comparison to alternative explanations.

In other words, the contributors will analyse in depth their case studies in light of their own framework while shortly assessing the merits of other approaches. What we will gain by this is recognition of the suitability of different approaches for particular types of case studies and hopefully growing appreciation of the fact that the diversity inherent in IR is a source of strength and not a weakness to be lamented. In this light, the book will discuss the scope conditions, for instance: in what types of cases should we place trust at the level of the individuals or the collectives? How should we approach agency and structure as the approaches are geared toward a particular understanding of the international system? As a common methodology, all chapters commit to a qualitative method in measuring trust, in particular a textual analysis, in applying a rationalist, psychological, or constructivist approach to the data.

Concretely, we are interested in probing, for example, what a rationalist approach can tell us about the role of trust in the creation of an international organisation such as ASEAN. What is the relative merit of this explanation over others? Concerning the relations between the United States and Egypt, what role does psychology plays in the way in which the Egyptian populace continues to mistrust the United States? Or in what way can the lack of trust within the EU-Russia relationship be defined as a social construction maintained through historical narratives and cultural resources? Could this approach be more suitable than another for this particular case study?

Our primary focus is on trust and mistrust between states and international organisations with case studies analysing relations between

United States and India, the European Union and Russia, the United States and Egypt, Turkey and the European Union, ASEAN and Southeast Asian countries, and Finland and Sweden. Our case selection is theory-driven, which means that the geographical scope is more limited. At the same time, the case selection is representative of contemporary world politics in the sense that we include cases between large and small states, between different inter-regional groupings, and the divide between the West and the rest.

The book is divided into two parts. The first section of the book approaches the question of trust from a constructivist perspective, showing how trust is connected to identity and best understood as a socially and narratively constructed concept. In the first chapter, Ville Sinkkonen analyses the relationship between the United States and Egypt, arguing that we need to examine trust on different levels. Privileging the level of foreign-policy elites and organisations at the expense of the societal setting may engender flawed prescriptions that privilege the maintenance of short-term stability over sustainable long-term peace. In terms of both IR theorising on trust and trust-building policies, a normative claim lies beneath the exposition: IR scholars and foreign-policy leaders should remain privy to the social trappings and the levels of interstate trust.

In the second chapter Johanna Vuorelma examines trust between Turkey and the West, the European Union in particular, arguing that we need to pay more attention to second-order representations that influence our perceptions and beliefs concerning the trustworthiness of different actors in the international system. Approaching the question of trust from a narrative perspective, Vuorelma shows that the current trust literature is inadequate when it comes to methods to tease out images of trust and distrust, which are pivotal in understanding the current deadlock in the relations between Turkey and the European Union.

Finally, Carina van de Wetering examines the relations between the United States and India, showing how, despite a shared democratic identity, distrustful relations endured during the Cold War even when there were no immediate crises in sight. In identifying identities, emotions, and practices, Wetering argues that a poststructuralist approach to trust captures different assumptions concerning the trustworthiness of the counterpart and the insecurity felt. These assumptions are part of a discursive process that is not fixed but always in the process of becoming.

The second part of the book focuses on rational and psychological approaches to trust in IR. In his chapter, Scott Edwards shows how the rational perspective to trust best captures the dynamics in the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. Positioning against the mainstream understanding in the trust literature that challenges the applicability of the rational approach, Edwards argues that while constructivist or psychological perspectives are useful approaches, rational

trust is the most significant tool for analysing the way in which relationships characterised by distrust were transformed into trusting relationships in the case of ASEAN's creation.

Similarly to Edwards, Hiski Haukkala and Sinikukka Saari argue that trust should be viewed as a multidimensional phenomenon that is best examined by combining different approaches. Analysing the relationship between the European Union and Russia, Haukkala and Saari show that despite initial mutual good intentions at the beginning of the 1990s, the mismatch between the level of trust and formally set basis and goals of the partnership led to too high expectations on both sides and the fundamental misreading of each other's intentions. They argue that the case should be explained by combining rationalist, constructivist, and psychological strands of trust theorising.

Finally, Matti Pesu and Tapio Juntunen analyse the relationship between two Nordic states, Finland and Sweden, probing why the progress in the defence and security policy cooperation has been so precautious between these two historically connected Nordic states that otherwise share mature and evolved partnership. Approaching the question through the lenses of social and psychological approaches to trust, Pesu and Juntunen argue that historically rooted suspicions over other's intentions, together with the general feel of uncertainty stemming out of the immediate geopolitical environment, can have decisive effects in generally trustful small state relations where interdependencies between states are high.

The book ends with Tuomas Forsberg's concluding chapter that addresses some general themes that cut across the chapters and help us reflect on what trust research has achieved and could achieve in International Relations. The chapter ends with suggestions on the potential research agenda ahead. It concludes that research on trust has become more prevalent in International Relations and we already have much sharper conceptual and theoretical tools and a broader scope of empirical knowledge than twenty years ago.

Note

1 Extensive research has already been conducted with regard to trust *within* society. For instance, Robert Putnam argues in *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (2000) that trust is generated by connections between people and through active face-to-face contact in voluntary associations, which he conceptualises as social capital. Signalling a corrosion of trust with the declining membership of these organisations, he writes: 'Trustworthiness lubricates social life. Frequent interaction among a diverse set of people tends to produce a norm of generalized reciprocity' (Putnam 2000, 21). Although heavily criticised for his unclear conception of social capital, Robert Putnam's work helped to generate new avenues for research into trust. For instance, Bo Rothstein contends that trust does not derive from below, but it is generated through honest and incorrupt policy-making at the government level (Rothstein 2013).

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Part I

Constructivist approaches to trust in International Relations

1 Understanding the trust–distrust nexus between the United States and Egypt

Ville Sinkkonen

Introduction

The relationship between the United States and Egypt has formed one prong of a trilateral axis of peace across Sinai since the signing of the Camp David Accords and the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty in 1978 and 1979, respectively. This original bargain included a considerable military aid component, channelled by Washington to the Egyptian armed forces on a yearly basis. By virtue of this arrangement, the gradual fostering of trusting relations took place not only between the top echelons of American and Egyptian foreign policy leaderships, but also between the countries' military establishments. These relationships have, in part, allowed the United States to maintain its hegemonic role as the self-anointed guarantor of peace and stability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

However, trust-building with Egypt's authoritarian leaders and the country's armed forces – the guarantor of Hosni Mubarak's dictatorship until the 25 January 2011 or Tahrir Revolution – led the United States to undermine and neglect a third societal level upon which trust functions in international politics. In fact, the upheaval brought Egyptian domestic political forces to the forefront of United States–Egypt relations, as the American foreign policy and military establishments tried to come to terms with the aftershocks of Mubarak's fall. The Egyptian people had regained agency for a brief moment. As Haukkala *et al.* (2015, 3) recently claimed, although trust and its antonym distrust are omnipresent in international politics, they are 'easier to identify and gauge […] during ruptures'. The United States–Egypt relationship in days of the revolution and its immediate aftermath, therefore, provides an ample fissure to chart the characteristics of the trust that prevails between these two international actors.

The present chapter departs from most previous studies of trust in International Relations (IR), which tend to focus on individual policymakers, 'anthropomorphise' the state or conflate these two levels of analysis. Here trust in international politics is approached as a multi-layered phenomenon, although the role of agency is relevant across all layers. In particular,

three *levels* are deemed pertinent when conceptualising how trust and distrust vary in the United States–Egypt relationship and international politics more generally. On a top *elite level*, trust takes the form of interpersonal relations between leaders. On an intermediate *organisational level*, trust is manifest in institutionalised relations between states. These relations are initiated and maintained by individual actors in ministries, departments or militaries. On a bottom *societal level*, trust is manifest as discursively reproduced collective beliefs that individuals as members of a society hold in relation to a referent, which may be the other state (an essentialised entity), its leadership, its people, its culture and values, or some combination thereof.

The exploration of these three levels of trust in the United States–Egypt relationship illustrates that neither a focus on trust as rational choice calculation (strategic trust) nor as representative of the psychological inclinations of leaders (interpersonal trust) captures the full complexity of interstate trust. This chapter, therefore, makes a theoretical and analytical case for bringing constructivist insights on the identity-based and emotional foundation of trust to the fore. Moreover, in terms of policy, privileging the level of foreign policy elites and organisations at the expense of the societal setting may engender flawed prescriptions that privilege the maintenance of short-term stability over sustainable long-term peace. In terms of both IR theorising on trust and trust-building policies, a normative claim undergirds the exposition: IR scholars and foreign policy leaders should remain privy to the social trappings and the levels of interstate trust.

Trust and the international

The non-hierarchical nature of the international system poses problems for IR trust scholars. Conventional realist wisdom grants little space for trust in an anarchic self-help system, where self-interested states seek to maximise relative power in the absence of a centralised enforcement mechanism (cf. Kydd 2005, 15–16; Mearsheimer 2013, 79–80). Though uncertainty vexes all human relations and the trustor can never be absolutely certain that the trustee will take its interests into account (Booth and Wheeler 2007, 4–5, 23, 230–231; Hoffman 2002, 378), the problem of misplaced trust is accentuated by the structural imperatives of the international arena (Hoffman 2006, 8). The key challenge for IR scholars therefore becomes on what basis trust can be built and the spiral of fear intrinsic to the international arena mitigated.

The rationalist paradigm of trust theorising is premised on 'the belief that one will not be harmed when one's interests are placed in the hands of others' (Rathbun 2011, 246). Essentially, for trust to occur between two rational actors, one must fathom it 'relatively likely' that cooperation will be reciprocated by another (Kydd 2005, 9). The extent

of trust that pertains between the said actors will therefore depend on a probability calculation of the other actor's trustworthiness (ibid.). Put another way, the decision to trust is *strategic* in nature and boils down to whether the actors perceive their interests as aligned or 'encapsulated' (Hardin 2002, 4). However, in an anarchical system, the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms hinders cooperation even in the presence of aligned interests. Rational actors remain wary of 'cheating, insufficient information and high transaction costs' (Reus-Smit 2004, 18).

Cooperation is thus the only way for actors to learn about each other's preferences (Kydd 2005, 19). Such cooperative behaviour can be made more stable by creating *institutions* – 'recognised patterns of practice around which expectations converge' (Young 1980, 332) – which alter the structural context that the trustor and trustee find themselves in and lengthen the 'shadow of the future' (Adler and Barnett 1998, 42–43; Axelrod 1981, 124; Rathbun 2011, 246). However, this liberal institutionalist solution to building trust is based on exogenous constraints on action, which weds it to the rational-actor model *and* renders it strategic in nature.

Criticisms of the rationalist approach to trust centre on the ontological assumption of autonomous, egoistic, and strategically thinking individuals. According to Rathbun (2011, 247–248), strategic trust is based on specific reciprocity as opposed to diffuse reciprocity, a continued and regular exchange, where the trustor will only maintain a relationship if the trustee's behaviour continually reinforces the belief that she prefers cooperation. Such a functional relationship can only be sustained when benefits from cooperation accrue regularly. The strategic approach, therefore, struggles to explain long-term cooperation based on temporally unspecified promises of reciprocation. Hoffman (2002, 379), in turn, suggests that trust is more than risk-taking in the face of uncertainty, as the rationalist approach appears to suggest. In trusting relationships, actors not only expect others to refrain from doing harm, but also to *do what is right*.

Of course, what is considered *right* is context-dependent and socially sanctioned. In this second social constructivist approach, trust therefore becomes a 'social phenomenon' grounded on 'normative expectations' (Adler and Barnett 1998, 46). By acknowledging the role of socially constructed identities in forging state interests (Wendt 1999), trust springs from a 'we-feeling', the recognition that the other is similar in some fundamental sense (Brugger 2015, 80–81; Lebow 2013, 19–21; Weinhardt 2015, 31–33). Identification of the other in a positive light, therefore, functions as 'the social basis of trust', which draws on 'experiences and encounters' (Adler and Barnett 1998, 46). Identity-based trust forms a 'positive perception bias', which allows actors to discount 'signals of uncooperative intentions' (Brugger *et al.* 2013, 443–444). This renders trust (and distrust) much more stable than the rational-actor model would expect (cf. Rathbun

2012, 13–14). In this vein, Katzenstein and Keohane (2007a, 22) argue that the intensity of trust (or distrust) towards another state depends on the extent to which it is grounded upon essentialist evaluations of characteristics. This also points to a less savoury side to trust-building on identitarian grounds: a positive bias towards an in-group means that its members are regarded as more trustworthy than outsiders (Booth and Wheeler 2007, 233; Mercer 2005, 96–97; Uslaner 2002, 29–31).

Relatedly, Booth and Wheeler (2007, 232) criticise the rationalists for eschewing the psychological basis of trust, the emotional and human factors that also underlie the phenomenon. They deem that the establishment of trusting relationships necessitate a proverbial 'leap in the dark', which necessitates the ability to 'empathise with [the other's] fear' (ibid., 237). In real-life situations, trust is therefore best understood as a mixture of cognitive rational calculation and *emotional* identity-based attachment in a relationship (ibid., 232; Weinhardt 2015, 33). Writing on the emotional foundations of trust, Mercer (2005, 95) goes further by suggesting that 'people […] who ignore their feelings and base cooperation on observable facts cannot trust'.

In this third psychological approach, the ability to grant others 'the benefit of the doubt' becomes paramount for the maintenance of trusting relations (Mercer 2005, 95). Effectively linking up the psychological and constructivist approaches, Mercer (ibid., 96) draws on Social Identity Theory to argue that emotional attachments underlie collective identity, and hence play a key role in producing identity-based trust. This means that the emotional foundations of trust need not be conceptualised as held only in the minds of individuals. Fattah and Fierke (2009, 70) argue that although emotions are felt individually, they are 'expressed in relation to others, and in a language understandable to them'. Collective emotions, just like collective identities, 'are socially meaningful expressions, which depend on shared customs, uses and institutions' (ibid.). In sum, as Lewis and Weigert (1985, 976) point out: 'trust is a highly complex and multidimensional phenomenon, having distinct cognitive, affective, behavioral, and situational manifestations which may not be co-present at any particular point in time'.

The levels of interstate trust: elite, organisational, and societal

The above definitional exercise posits that trust has strategic, social, and emotional components, but leaves open where specifically trust 'lies' in interstate relations. A crucial issue preoccupying IR scholars is whether the behaviour of units comprising a system should be attributed to system-level factors or the other way round, and this conundrum between 'system' and 'unit' level explanation animates the study of all levels of social organisation (Hollis and Smith 1990, 7–9). This points to the existence of a

levels-of-analysis problem in the study of interstate trust (Brugger 2015, 81–82; Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 18). Moreover, as Singer (1961, 90) famously argued, the choice of which levels to study turns on 'research needs' – the spatiotemporal intricacies of the phenomenon under scrutiny. Therefore, the distinction between levels-of-analysis is always a simplification, though an informed one, made to facilitate the understanding of complex real-world phenomena.

Trust at the elite level: interpersonal relations

Most apparently, trust appears as an attribute of a personal relationship that exists between two individuals. As the above discussion would suggest, on a personal level trust is far more than mere expectation of others' behaviour. Echoing the three approaches to the study of trust in IR, Larson (1997, 714) argues that personal trust can take on three meanings: predictability, credibility, and good intentions. In the first case, trust is solely functional, based on context-specific reciprocation *or* institutionalised into everyday practices (ibid.). In the second sense of credibility, actors can be expected to keep their word, as required in contractual obligations between parties or social norms (ibid.; Hoffman 2002, 282–383).

In the third sense of benevolence, actors can be regarded as trustworthy because their motives are regarded as generally good (Larson 1997, 714–715). This third form of personal trust appears the deepest and most resilient: if the trustor regards the trustee as having the good at heart, then it is easier to justify defections as anomalies. The trustee probably tried to do the right thing, but was constrained from doing so in this particular case (ibid., 715). The present chapter thus regards *elite level trust* as a manifestation of interpersonal trust, which can be understood as a mixture of cognition (a strategic component) and affect (an identity-based and emotion-based component) (Booth and Wheeler 2007, 230; Kydd 2005, 9; Larson 1997, 714–715; Mercer 2005, 95).

It is important to appreciate that interpersonal trust should be regarded as essential to all theorising on trust in international politics: 'the human factor remains to the fore, because relations between […] political units takes place through the actions of human actors playing political roles' (Booth and Wheeler 2007, 229; cf. Forsberg 1999, 606). This insight is in keeping with constructivist approaches to IR, which have long argued that agents and social structures are 'mutually constitutive yet ontologically distinct entities' (Wendt 1987, 360). In short, agents should be viewed as more than 'structural dupes' (Adler 1997, 333–334), whilst the social structures within which they are immersed are not simply reducible to these individual actors (cf. Keating 2015, 8–9; Wendt 2004, 304).

Trust and organisations: the role of institutions in sustaining interstate trust

Keating (2015, 5–6) has argued that a focus upon individual leaders as the repositories of interstate trust becomes problematic when the time horizon is extended beyond the tenures of these political agents. In this reading, interpersonal relations are an unstable basis for trust. This means attention needs to be directed to other levels which can contribute to the sustainability of trust in international politics. Much of the responsibility for conducting everyday diplomacy falls to foreign and security policy bureaucracies. These comprise an organisational level and function as the enduring structures of state policymaking as well as the repositories for the institutional memory of states (Hudson 2014, 84). The organisational cultures of state bureaucracies are permeated by 'rules of procedure, behavioural norms, tasks, rituals, jargon, perceptions [and] shared memories', which present themselves to individuals within these organisations as constraints and stymie normative challenges from within (Welch 2005, 32). These factors intrinsic to organisations can be expected to contribute to the sustainability of interstate trust.

When it comes to building institutions to facilitate interstate cooperation, the role of individual representatives of organisations again comes to the fore. These individuals assume the role of 'institutional agents' or 'boundary spanners' by representing their organisation within international fora where the day-to-day workings of interstate relations unfold (Adler and Barnett 1998, 43; Brugger 2015, 83–84; Schilke and Cook 2013). As posited above, institutions and their concomitant norms and rules function as the vehicles through which regularised relationships and the eventual institutionalisation of trust between states can take place. However, the embeddedness and sustainability of trust that these institutional fora give rise to can vary. To appreciate this, it is important to distinguish between the *regulative* and *constitutive* functions that institutional rules, norms, and procedures play. In fact, institutions have a dual role. They not only 'order and constrain behaviour', but also 'create […] actors, interests or categories of action' (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891). This division tracks the distinction between strategic and social definitions of trust laid out above. In the former case, trust is a function of exogenous constraints, which lengthen the shadow of the future and thus have bearing upon the cost-benefit calculations of actors. In the latter case, trust becomes a collective belief, a constitutive component of the identity of the organisation and its representatives (cf. Brugger 2015, 82; Vogler 2010, 2685; Weinhardt 2015, 34).

Trust and society: beyond individuals and institutions

Research on trust speaks liberally of the ability of individuals to not only trust each other, but also place their fate in the hands of 'abstract complexes'

(Keating 2015, 9), including business organisations, the domestic legal system, the government, or international organisations (Berzins 2004, 136–139; Brugger 2015, 82; Schilke and Cook 2013, 283–284). Therefore, it is sensible to argue that individuals or large portions of a social collective can trust another state, either as an abstract entity or as a particular type of social collective with certain generalisable characteristics (cf. Brugger *et al.* 2013, 444; Keating 2015, 9). To the extent that IR addresses the existence of trusting relationships between societies, it is through acknowledging that trust can only become truly entrenched between two political communities when the interpersonal bonds between leaders, established at the interpersonal and organisational levels, are transcended and trust diffuses into the domestic arena (Booth and Wheeler 2007, 230; Keating 2015, 11–12). There is also considerable agreement that mature and enduring trusting relationships necessitate processes of 'social learning', where trusting beliefs held by the leadership of one state towards another's come to be 'institutionalised', and eventually become 'embedded' or 'reified' (Adler and Barnett 1998, 42–45; Brugger *et al.* 2013, 444; Brugger 2015, 81–84; Schilke and Cook 2013, 292; Wendt 1999, 76).

When analysing the level of society, it therefore helps to conceptualise trust as a *collective belief*. In fact, despite their differences, all three approaches to trust in IR – the rationalist, constructivist, and psychological – hold that the achievement of a trusting relationship necessitates a *belief* regarding the trustworthiness of another actor. Depending on the definition of trust, this is a particular type of belief, one about the interests, preferences, identities, internal properties, or personal motivations of a trustee (Hoffman 2002, 377–378; Kydd 2005, 7–9; Larson 1997, 716; Mercer 2005, 95; Rathbun 2012, 13). In contrast to individual beliefs, collective beliefs 'are social and holistic', they 'have an intersubjective existence that stands above individual minds and is typically embodied in symbols, discourse and institutions' (Legro 2000, 420).

Collective beliefs can be altered under certain conditions, but often they are encountered by social actors as reified 'social facts' (Legro 2000, 420). Brugger (2015, 82), for instance, maintains that on the level of social collectives' trust 'systematically excludes doubts about the other's cooperative intentions and good character from the realm of acceptable speech'. Thus understood, trust is no longer an individual conception regarding the trustworthiness of another actor, or based on institutionalised relations between states on the organisational level, but a widely-held belief which is captured in '[political] discourse about the trustee' (ibid.). In this vein, collective beliefs can only be held by individuals if they are members of a community, and these beliefs are reproduced in that community through discursive processes.

Agency is invariably involved in both the reproduction and change of collective beliefs. Students of ideational change often point to the role that 'political entrepreneurs' – creative agents of change – play in circumventing

old ideas through exploiting 'policy windows' opened up by changes in the operational environment (Checkel 1993; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Drawing on this tradition, Brugger (2015) conceptualises state elites as 'trust entrepreneurs', responsible for disseminating information regarding other states to their domestic arena in the form of speech acts. These individuals play their institutional roles to create a trusting (or distrusting) discourse by disseminating their beliefs, usually forged in interpersonal encounters with representatives of another state, regarding its trustworthiness (ibid., 84). In state-to-state relations, the process of belief formation often occurs at the organisational level, within institutions through 'social learning' – 'an active process of reinterpretation of reality […] on the basis of new causal and normative knowledge' (Adler and Barnett 1998, 43).

Via this process of interaction, actors can convey information to significant others regarding 'self-understandings, perceptions of reality and […] normative expectations', opening up the possibility for the creation of trusting relationships (Adler and Barnett 1998, 44–45). Trust that pertains between these boundary spanners can thus become embedded in the fabric of their respective organisations (Schilke and Cook 2013, 290). In this vein, both 'the qualitative and quantitative growth of transactions reshapes collective experiences and alters social facts' (Adler and Barnett 1998, 41). Here it is important to appreciate that past policy actions play a constitutive role by conditioning appraisals of trustworthiness and these appraisals can, in turn, impact how future policy actions are perceived. Trust and distrust as collective beliefs, therefore, function as predispositions that lead actors to discount positive or negative signals about another actor, organisation, or state (Brugger *et al.* 2013, 443–444; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007a, 21; Larson 1997, 716).

It has now been established that social collectives – whether organisations or societies – can come to hold trusting or distrusting beliefs through a process of social learning about the interests, values, and character of others. However, when considering the level of society, this process of social learning is veritably complex. In Brugger's (2015, 83–84) formulation, trusting beliefs about other states are filtered into the domestic arena through statements made about the trustworthiness of others by states' trust-entrepreneurial elites. In essence, these statements are deemed authoritative by virtue of the actors' institutional role. This renders claims emanating from the echelons of power potentially more resonant than similar declarations originating from other actors confined to the domestic arena. Thus described, the mechanism through which trusting beliefs are disseminated in society appears inherently 'top-down'. Elites publicise their trusting beliefs, and the reception of the domestic audience determines whether such ideas resonate on the level of society.

However, the link between the elite, organisational, and societal levels of trust is far from unidirectional. There is no a priori reason why trusting relations between two states could not be built 'bottom-up' (Keating 2015,

11–12). Manifold actors and organisations – the media, business organisations, NGOs, or influential individuals – can also act as trust entrepreneurs by filtering and disseminating information regarding other states, their culture, values and peoples into the domestic arena (cf. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Through these 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' processes, the societal level – and individual actors embedded therein – is engaged in an on-going filtered encounter with the other state and its society. In essence, this can be conceptualised as a process of 'social learning by proxy'.

The challenges of analysing interstate trust

Drawing on earlier studies, to illustrate the incidence of trust and distrust on the two top levels, the best indicators are either *positive or negative statements* regarding the behaviour and character of a trustee or her representative organisation (Brugger 2015, 88–91). In short, declarations that stress benevolence, altruism, and cooperative nature can be taken to present trusting attitudes, whilst pronouncements regarding malevolence, selfishness, and obstinacy point towards distrust (Weinhardt 2015, 35–36). Another relevant indicator for trust is the *adoption of policies* that are 'discretion granting' (Hoffman 2002, 385–386), i.e. allow the trustee maximal room of manoeuvre. However, the manner in which actions and policies are interpreted by the parties concerned – for instance as justified as opposed to illegitimate – is also paramount when it comes to assessing trust (Weinhardt 2015, 36).

Before it is possible to proceed with the analysis, these proxies for analysing trust need to be placed in the context of the present case study. On the interpersonal level, the relationships between Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President Barack Obama with Hosni Mubarak will be compared to show how the former's trust in the Egyptian strongman functions as one potential explanation for their initially divergent views on how to deal with the 25 January Revolution. On the level of organisations, to explore the extent to which institutionalised trust was embedded in the sphere of military-to-military cooperation, the statements of American interlocutors – the boundary-spanning trust entrepreneurs – regarding Egypt's new military rulers and reactions towards policies pursued by the army will be mined.

On the level of society, in turn, the incidence of 'shared values, perceived similarity, sympathy or common vision' as well as positive assessment of policies can be regarded as general markers of trust (Weinhardt 2015, 36). Trusting beliefs can thus be gauged with opinion poll data, which provide an overall view of how Egyptians in the aggregate feel about the United States not only as a state, but also its leadership, people, culture, and values. These aggregated individual-level dispositions provide a cursory indication of the collective beliefs that hold sway in the country. For context, a synoptic overview of how the United States was portrayed

in Egyptian public discourse after the 25 January Revolution will also be provided. In terms of data, to assess trust on elite and organisational levels, spoken and written statements made by American and Egyptian foreign policy leaderships are complemented with media reports and first-hand accounts of policymakers. In the case of the societal level, opinion poll data will be supplemented with selected media reports from global and Egyptian outlets as well as relevant secondary sources.

The levels of trust and the United States–Egypt relationship

Now armed with the requisite theoretical and analytical framework on how trust is manifest in interstate relations on the three levels of elites, organisations, and society, a short historical background of the United States–Egypt relationship from the aftermath of the Egypt–Israel rapprochement of the late 1970s to the heady days of the Arab Spring will be provided. This introduction to the initiation and institutionalisation of a modicum of trust between Egyptian and American leaderships and military establishments will function as a necessary precursor to the analysis of a trust–distrust nexus, which emerges in the context of the 25 January 2011 Revolution.

Historical underpinnings

The Camp David Accords (signed 17 September 1978) and the subsequent peace treaty (signed 26 March 1979) were negotiated between Egyptian premier Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin with President Jimmy Carter as mediator. These landmark documents not only pacified Sinai, but also led to the birth of a de facto institutional bargain between the United States and Egypt. The American facilitators agreed to provide aid to Egypt, which took the form of Economic Support Funds (ESF) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) (Sharp 2011), in exchange for sustaining the peace. Over the years, this sum would remain dwarfed by the amount of money channelled to Israel, an arrangement designed to maintain the state's 'qualitative military edge' (Cook 2012, 212; Gardner 2011, 151; State Department 2011a). In this manner, the unshakeable bond between United States and Israel has foregrounded the United States–Egypt relationship, a dynamic which Cook (2012, 230–244) has termed 'the trilateral logic'. Nevertheless, the United States–Egypt–Israel triangle was forged in the auspices of one of the most daring trust-building 'leaps in the dark' in the twentieth century (Booth and Wheeler 2007, 234–238), for which Anwar Sadat paid the ultimate price. Assassins' bullets ended the President's life on 6 October 1981 (Gardner 2011, 148).

Over the next three decades of Hosni Mubarak's rule, the United States forged an ever-deepening tandem with the Egyptian leadership and especially the country's top brass. The United States–Egypt relationship formed a key prong in the American policy of 'authoritarian stability' in the

Middle East. Autocratic rulers were propped up by American aid to stem the tides of Communism and Arab nationalism. After the fall of the Soviet Union, this approach enabled the United States to exercise the role of ultimate guarantor of peace and stability in the region (Cook 2012, 249–252; Gerges 2012; Miller 2009). Halabi (2009) has termed this arrangement *semi-hegemonic*. It is 'hegemonic' in the sense that the United States as the superpower patron has used a mixture of co-optation and coercion to attain a position of preponderance vis-à-vis Egypt and other client states, and 'semi' because the United States has struck its bargain only with the ruling elites, which rendered the order illegitimate in the eyes of the region's populaces (ibid., 11–14).

In return for American military aid and the clout of being allied to the world's sole superpower, Egypt forwent its Cold War role as the prime motor of pan-Arabism. Instead, President Mubarak supported American (and Israeli) initiatives from the First Gulf War to the blockade of Gaza, at least tacitly (Cook 2012, 161–162, 241–243; Gerges 2012, 161–162). Meanwhile, joint exercises and officer exchange programmes between the countries' militaries provided a level of inter-organisational cooperation, which also seeped into close personal bonds at the top levels of the American and Egyptian officer corps (Department of Defense 2011a; Gardner 2011, 151, 169–170; Mackenzie and Packard 2011, 103; Tavana 2015, 6). In the aftermath of 9/11, George W. Bush's War on Terror (WoT) brought the CIA and the Egyptian intelligence services into ever-closer cooperation (Cook 2012, 282; Gardner 2011, 164–168). Although visible tensions between the Americans and Egyptians over human rights and democracy issues surfaced intermittently – especially after President Bush rolled out his ill-fated Freedom Agenda (Gerges 2012, 74) – the Egyptians managed to convince the US leadership to keep military aid to the country flowing, despite concerted obstructive efforts by Congress (Cook 2012, 221–230).

This relationship between the top echelons of the American and Egyptian leaderships, and the countries' military and intelligence establishments, became a double-edged sword for both sides as the Arab Spring revolutionary wave reached Cairo's Tahrir Square in late January 2011. After more than two weeks of protests, the Egyptian military did not clamp down on the protesters and deserted their President instead. On 11 February, Hosni Mubarak's reign of almost thirty years came to an end (Cook 2012, 288–295; Kirkpatrick 2011). The revolution ended in a takeover by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), but also brought to the political arena previously suppressed voices, which did not share in the benevolent assessment of the 'bond' that had been forged at the elite and organisational levels over the span of three decades. In fact, disillusionment with Egypt's emasculation at the hands of the United States and Israel was the one thing opposition groups, whether left, liberal, or Islamist, in pre-Revolutionary Egypt could agree on (Cook 2012, 243–244).

The elite level: the instability of interpersonal trust

To begin the analysis of the United States–Egypt relationship in terms of the levels of trust in the context of the 25 January Revolution, it is expedient to start with the most consequential interpersonal relationships, namely those between Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President Barack Obama, on the one hand, and President Hosni Mubarak and his inner circle, on the other. The rapport between Clinton and Mubarak – forged over decades – took the form of emotions-based attachment distilled with strategic trust, which drew from the acknowledgement that the former Egyptian strongman and his entourage could be counted on to uphold regional stability in keeping with America's security interests. President Obama, in contrast, showed little trust towards Mubarak, and was willing to back his dismissal despite lack of agreement among his closest advisors. The disgruntled Egyptian leadership, in turn, exhibited regret and moral outrage, reactions associated with the emotional and identitarian underpinning of trust, after the American decision to renege on its ally. Analysis of the level of elites in the United States–Egypt relationship, therefore, bears witness to the instability of interpersonal trust as a sustainable foundation for trusting relations between states.

In her memoirs, Clinton (2014, 333) recounts the logic of American engagement with Arab leaders as a 'balancing act', where 'personal relations and trust' were key in 'better understand[ing] the social and cultural views that influenced their actions'. Her relationship with Hosni Mubarak approximated this description. When she was pressed over a State Department report on Egypt's dismal human rights situation in 2009, Mrs. Clinton defended the Egyptian strongman by evoking the bond of friendship that pertained between Egypt and the United States as well as the trappings of her personal relationship with Egypt's former president and his wife Suzanne (State Department 2009). In her memoirs, the Secretary of State exhibits marked empathy for the Egyptian strongman, not only as a statesman who 'tried harder than any Arab leader to convince Yasser Arafat to accept the peace agreement negotiated […] in 2000 [at Camp David]', but also by recounting a tragic story of the death of Mubarak's grandson (Clinton 2014, 338–339).

In the early days of the protests in late January 2011, Secretary of State Clinton was initially adamant that the United States could not renege on its ally of thirty years (Clinton 2011b; Lizza 2011). This position appears curious when set against the background of a speech she had delivered a few weeks earlier in Doha, warning Middle Eastern leaders that in the absence of reform 'the region's foundations [… were] sinking into the sand' (Clinton 2011a, 2014, 337–338). Dennis Ross, then National Security Council Senior Director for the Middle East, thought that the Egyptian President remained 'blind to what is going on', and Clinton 'was putting too much stock in her old friends' (Traub 2015). Nevertheless, at

early stages of the revolution, Clinton's fears over shattering the status quo were shared by the 'old guard' in the Obama administration, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Vice-President Joe Biden in particular (Gates 2014, 504–505).

Their assessment was likely to have been made within a strategic frame, in the name of American interests in regional stability and the expectation that Mubarak, in spite of the inherent flaws of his regime, could keep providing it. Secretary of State Clinton's (2014, 340–347) memoirs paint a picture of agonising over the 'idealist' emotional response of throwing the administration's lot unabashedly behind the protesters and a more 'realist' approach of seeking an 'orderly' transition that would allow her old friend to save face and provide a modicum of predictability moving forward. Mubarak had remained a faithful ally for decades 'despite anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments among his own people', and deserting him would mean that this special bond would be lost regardless of who would assume the reins (Clinton 2014, 340).

To appreciate Clinton's trusting relationship with Mubarak and her inclination to grant the strongman the benefit of the doubt – regardless of his shortcomings – needs to be contrasted with the relationship between Barack Obama and Mubarak, which was neither long-established nor could it be described as trusting, although the Egyptian premier was apparently hopeful that relations with Obama would be better than with his predecessor Bush (Gardner 2011, 180–184). In fact, even if Obama's (2009) famous Cairo Speech briefly stirred the consciousness of people across the Middle East, he had not made any consequential attempts to press his Egyptian counterpart on either human rights or democratic reform before the Arab revolutionary wave engulfed Tahrir Square (Gerges 2012, 163–165).

The White House came out with a strong stance in favour of a transition already on 2 February (Obama 2011a), after considerable wrangling behind the scenes between the old guard of the administration and Obama's National Security Staff (NSS) (Clinton 2014, 343–344; Gates 2014, 506–507; Lizza 2011). As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (2014, 504–505) recounts, Obama was willing to contemplate Mubarak's dismissal early on, and was clearly swayed by the scenes of the protests and NSS figures such as Ben Rhodes and Samantha Power, who were pressing for Obama to opt for the 'right side of history'. The President was, of course, patently aware of the destabilising potential of the revolution. However, his decision to desert Mubarak – in clear contrast to Clinton's early wavering – echoed a pragmatic assessment of America's inability to influence the situation on the ground (Cook 2012, 287–288; David 2016, 52).

On the Egyptian side, aware of the fate that would befall them in the aftermath of the revolution, the ruling entourage was visibly infuriated with Obama's decision to desert a long-time ally (Lizza 2011; Traub

2015). These reactions also underline the identitarian and emotional underpinnings of trust, which lead actors to feel regret, even moral outrage, as opposed to mere disappointment in the face of betrayal (Larson 1997, 714). In an interview with ABC News, Mubarak retorted that the United States did not 'understand Egyptian culture', and insisted that his downfall would breed chaos and open the door for the ascendancy of the Muslim Brotherhood (Amanpour 2011; Lizza 2011). Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit expressed exasperation in private correspondence with Secretary of State Clinton that the Americans would contemplate deserting their long-time ally (Clinton 2014, 344), and later lambasted the United States for 'imposition' when asked if he regarded American calls for change as 'helpful advice from a friend' (McGreal 2011). As far as the Egyptian leadership was concerned, the United States had reneged on a moral obligation to stand by its faltering ally, which had catered to US regional interests and kept the spectre of an Islamist takeover of the country at bay for decades (Clinton 2014, 344; Lizza 2011).

The organisational level: the limits of institutionalised trust

From the standpoint of the United States, it therefore appeared fortuitous that the thirty-year-old relationship between the two countries runs deeper than those between individual leaders at any given point in time, testament to the role that the organisational level plays in fostering long-running trusting relations. In the case of Egypt, particularly when discussing the Tahrir Revolution and its aftermath, attention must be cast on military-to-military contacts between the two countries. As already argued, trust can become institutionalised and embedded in inter-organisational settings through a process of intensified transactions, and the development of the military connection between the United States and Egypt in the auspices of the trilateral relationship built on the Camp David Accords and the 1979 Peace Treaty is an archetypal example of such a process. Therefore, it was apparent that the United States could trust the army to cater to the very interests it had looked after for the last thirty years. However, it also became clear that the army was a less trustworthy interlocutor when cooperation stretched beyond military relations to the business of governing. This is testament to the limits of the situational and strategic nature of institutionalised trust between the countries' security establishments when assessed within a broader 'trust frame'.

Against this background, already when President Mubarak ordered the army onto the street three days into the protests (Cook 2012, 285–286), American military officials quickly addressed the military and called on it to act responsibly (Gates 2014, 505–508; Said 2012, 407). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen, for instance, stressed the army's role, as 'a stabilizing influence' in Egyptian society (Department of Defense 2011b). The top rank of the US military establishment was 'vouching' for

the trustworthiness of the Egyptian army, effectively drawing on the collective beliefs held within their organisation regarding the trustworthiness of their interlocutors. Assuming the role of trust entrepreneurs, the military leadership and functionaries in the intelligence community also conveyed behind-the-scenes messages to their Egyptian counterparts. Mullen recounts 'dozens' of conversations with his then counterpart Lieutenant General Sami Enan (Department of Defense 2011c). Robert Gates, similarly, kept the lines of communication open with Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi – Mubarak's last Minister of Defence, who then became Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) – throughout the revolution and early transition period (Gates 2014, 505–509).

As the first phase of the revolution ended in a takeover by the SCAF (Cook 2012, 288), the Egyptian army was lavishly lauded by the United States for acting 'patriotically and responsibly as a caretaker to the state' (Obama 2011b). In fact, the veritably peaceful takeover was likely aided by 'the political "interoperability" Pentagon hoped it had achieved with the Egyptian military over the three decades of Mubarak's rule' (Gardner 2011, 188). The military could not fire on the protesters with American-supplied arms and expect to continue enjoying the perks of its relationship with the United States (Said 2012, 410–411). Amidst fears of a swift Muslim Brotherhood ascent to the presidency in the event of Mubarak's abdication, from the standpoint of the United States – at least on the level of rhetoric – the army provided a welcome modicum of stability (Lizza 2011). Of course, on the Egyptian side, the country's military leaders expected the United States to uphold its end of the grand bargain: continue close ties with the defence establishment in order to maintain the military's preponderant position within Egyptian society (Said 2012, 398–399). To soothe the Egyptian military leadership's concerns, Secretary of Defense Gates also travelled to Cairo in March to reassure the Egyptian government and military establishment of the continuing relationship between the two countries. While there, he stressed the trustworthiness of the army during the revolutionary period:

> From our very first conversation, the field marshal [Tantawi] told me that the Egyptian army is of the people and that it would protect the people. And in everything that ensued, he and the Egyptian army kept their word.
>
> (Department of Defense 2011d)

In his memoirs, however, Gates (2014, 509) recounts his disillusionment with the *naiveté* the Field Marshal exhibited over the democratisation process, particularly by downplaying the Islamists' prospects in the forthcoming parliamentary elections, which the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party and the hard-line Salafists won convincingly (BBC News 2012). In addition, as the elusive transition to democracy stalled, the

United States consistently reprimanded the SCAF for vacillation and the continued use of violence against protesters (Clinton 2011d; State Department 2011b; White House 2011a). These inroads were met with a curious mix of cooperative statements and downright defiance by the Egyptian military authorities (Ahram Online 2011a; Clinton 2011e; Egypt Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). In the most brazen example of the limits and functional nature of institutionalised trust in this context, the SCAF-appointed interim government responded to public outcry over US funding of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) by setting up 'a fact-finding committee […] to investigate foreign funding for unlicensed local and international NGOs' (Ahram Online 2011b).

A crackdown on the organisations in late 2011 and a subsequent trial in the spring of 2012 followed (Ahram Online 2011d; Beaumont and Harris 2011; Kirkpatrick 2012). Although the trials were ultimately postponed, this occurred only after concerted US pressure and insinuation that Egypt's military aid would be withheld pending a satisfactory resolution (Clinton 2012; Nuland 2012). Such actions by the SCAF and concomitant threats by the United States are hardly testament to a sustainable trusting relationship. On Egypt's domestic scene, the NGO affair led to public outrage over the SCAF's lack of resolve and American meddling (Ahram Online 2012b), but for the Americans it signalled that the special relationship with the Egyptian military had become increasingly tenuous (Clinton 2012). The United States could trust the army to cater to its regional interests by maintaining security across the Sinai and assisting in the fight against terrorism, but could hardly trust the SCAF to govern the country, at least not in a manner consistent with American values and hopes for Egypt's future.

The societal level: intractable identity-based and emotional distrust

One way to understand the long-term development of America's relationship with the MENA region is as a fall from grace. In the early twentieth century, before it started pursuing activist policies in the region, the United States was actually regarded as morally superior to the European colonisers. American engagement in the Middle East which picked up pace during the Cold War, was followed by a pronounced military presence in the Arabian Peninsula during and after the First Gulf War, and ultimately culminated in the excesses of the WoT (Gerges 2012, 27–31). Recent studies on perceptions of Arab publics show broad-based distrust towards the United States, the roots of which cannot be reduced to either a wholesale rejection of what America stands for, or a simple assessment of how US policy conduct comes across (Chiozza 2010, 75; Lynch 2007, 197). The crux of the issue for Lynch (2007, 199–204) is that the distrust of United States, although it may have initially been based on strategic dismissal of America's increased activism in the MENA region over decades, has become

'embedded within Arab identity, constantly reinforced in the narratives that dominate the Arab media' (ibid., 204). In the Arab world, US policies are habitually viewed as hostile to local interests regardless of their content (ibid., Telhami 2013, 209–211), testament to ingrained identity-based and emotional distrust.

When compared against other Arab countries, Egyptians' views of the United States stand out as overwhelmingly negative, indicative of the link between America's involvement in Egyptian affairs and the country's lost position as leader of the Arab cause after Sadat's rapprochement with Israel (cf. Chiozza 2010, 18, 94–95; Telhami 2013, 118–119; Amin 2011). Opinion polls conducted in Egypt in the aftermath of the Tahrir Revolution broadly confirm the perpetuation of society-level distrust of the United States. Pew Research Center (2011, 2012) polls released in April 2011 and May 2012 reported that 79 per cent of Egyptians held an unfavourable view of the United States. Similarly, a Brookings Institution poll released in 2012 found that 68 per cent of respondents held a *very* unfavourable view of the United States (Telhami 2012). When asked to name concrete policies that could improve America's standing in the region, a Middle East peace deal garnered 66 per cent support, stopping aid to Israel 46 per cent, and withdrawing US troops from the Gulf 44 per cent (ibid.). In contrast, only 12 and 18 per cent of respondents, respectively, regarded democracy promotion and economic aid – the very policies the United States pursued in the aftermath of the revolution – as feasible pathways to boost America's image (ibid.). Moreover, the United States is consistently viewed as the second most threatening country by Egyptian respondents for both their personal security and the security of their country (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies 2012; Telhami 2013, 175).

This overall negative view of 'America' as an entity does not unambiguously track Egyptians' views on what can be regarded as America's 'core' values. For instance, 71 and 69 per cent of respondents to the Pew Poll in 2011 and 2012, respectively, thought democracy was 'preferable to any other kind of government', and fair judiciary, uncensored media, free speech, and honest elections each enjoyed over 50 per cent of support as 'priorities' in the country's transition (Pew Research Center 2011, 2012). Interestingly, Telhami (2013, 122) also finds evidence that Arab perceptions of the American people improved in the aftermath of the uprisings: in 2010, only 28 per cent of respondents held a favourable view, but the figure grew to 48 per cent in 2011. However, when it came to other US-backed values, such as freedom of religion or women's rights, support was much lower, at 36 and 27 per cent (Pew Research Center 2012). In addition, even of those people positively disposed towards America's democratic model of government, only 10 per cent actually approved of US support for Egyptian political organisations (Gallup 2011).

Distrust towards the United States was also prominent in Egyptian public discourse during the post-revolutionary period, an actuality which

led the US foreign policy establishment to express concern over the rising tide of anti-Americanism in the country (Ahram Online 2011c). Support for CSOs was reportedly targeted from both the left/liberal and Islamist camps as a manifestation of American meddling (Ahram Online 2011b). A related prong of critique was questioning of the 1979 Peace Treaty, the basis of the whole United States–Egypt–Israel trilateral relationship (Ahram Online 2012a; Egypt Independent 2011; Pew Research Center 2012). Anti-American views have also continued to circulate in the social media sphere in the post-Arab Spring period. Jamal *et al.* (2015, 59–61), for instance, analysed a large data set of Arab Twitter discourses from 2012 and 2013, and concluded that tweets on the United States were dominated by negative evaluations of American policy. Assessments of American society remained predominantly negative, but exhibited some incongruity, particularly admiration for culture (ibid., 60–61, 68).

In light of the above, as Katzenstein and Keohane (2007b) have pointed out, collective beliefs regarding America held by social collectives in other countries are 'polyvalent', i.e. there are many 'Americas' and whichever comes into play in the minds of people at a given point is an interactive process. Therefore, given the fluidity of identities that Egyptians hold e.g. Muslim, Arab, Egyptian, Copt (Hinnebusch 2014b, 77–78, 94; Telhami 2013, 30) – this identification process is not a simple affair in 'othering' against a monolithic United States (cf. Katzenstein and Keohane 2007b; Ross 2010, 124–125). The above discussion reflects this insight. In Egyptian society, distrust of the United States is not built upon the values America stands for per se – these are only part of the story. Instead, distrust is founded on the perceived *discrepancy* between America's professed values and the way it conducts itself towards Egypt and the region at large. In short, America is viewed as not 'practicing what it preaches', which then engenders a sense of 'frustrated expectations' and even betrayal (Lynch 2007, 203; Telhami 2013, 113). The United States appears a 'hypocritical actor' (Finnemore 2009), whose high-minded rhetoric is rarely matched by policy conduct. These dynamics can also be understood through the economic imagery of fear crowding out trust, an identity-based and emotional response activated by American policy conduct as the self-proclaimed regional hegemon (Jamal *et al.* 2015, 67).

Therefore, the origins of distrust felt towards the United States in the Egyptian public sphere lie in a strong disapproval of American policies. However, what might be counted as strategic policy-based distrust has, over time, become reified as identity-based and emotional distrust. This means that collective beliefs of America's duplicity are sufficiently deeply entrenched as to remain resistant to change even in the face of shifting American policies. Even acts that from an American standpoint seem perfectly in line with the aspirations of the Egyptian people – witness the funding for civil society in the aftermath of the Tahrir Revolution – appear as insidious encroachment, conspiracies to weaken the state, or a threat to the indigenous

transition to a post-revolutionary order (cf. Ahram Online 2011b; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007b, 314; Lynch 2007, 203–204). It should thus be remembered that the 25 January Revolution was a 'dignity revolution', in part a reflection of how states of the region have positioned themselves vis-à-vis the outside world, the United States and Israel in particular (Bâli and Rana 2012, 107; Behr 2012, 84–85; Telhami 2013, 17–19).

The limits of interstate trust in the United States–Egypt relationship

The picture painted above shows the elite and organisational levels of trust and the societal level pulling in disparate directions in the context of the Tahrir Revolution. A modicum of trust built on strategic exigencies and, to a lesser extent, on personal emotional bonds eventually broke apart as the Obama administration decided to back the ousting of Hosni Mubarak. However, this interpersonal trust had been complemented by institutionalised trust in military-to-military cooperation at the organisational level over decades, although the limits and functional nature of this relationship became increasingly clear as the transition period in Egypt began. Moreover, an aura of reified identitarian and emotional distrust plagues the United States–Egypt relationship on the societal level. This dynamic, where trust built on the elite and organisational levels is effectively offset by distrust on the societal level can be referred to as a trust–distrust nexus. Exploring the manifestation of this nexus between the three levels of trust allows for a more nuanced view of the dynamics of trust and distrust at play in the United States–Egypt relationship.

First and foremost, the Obama administration was never oblivious to the distrust of America that pervades Egyptian society. In fact, this acknowledgement very likely played a key role in altering the United States' position vis-à-vis Mubarak. The White House (2011b) was forthright in admitting that the American reaction needed to guard against 'straw man accusations' of meddling that could delegitimise the revolution, and tried to make explicit that it was an indigenous affair (Obama 2011c, 2011d). The flipside of this coin was a profound uneasiness with the proposition that Islamist groups would gain a disproportionate foothold (Clinton 2011c; Gates 2014, 509; Lizza 2011). In her meeting with Egyptian civil society groups in March 2011, Secretary of State Clinton was distraught – rightly it turns out – with the disorganised state of Egypt's liberal opposition (Clinton 2014, 346–347; Lizza 2011). The distrust and concomitant fear of US encroachment exhibited by a large majority of the Egyptian people was, in this manner, reciprocated by the Obama administration as fear of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists (Gardner 2011, 195).

Second, the Egyptian leadership has traditionally been extremely apt at playing what Putnam (1988) and Moravcsik (1993) term a 'two-level

game' spanning the domestic and international arenas when dealing with the United States. In fact, 'Mubarak's regime made an art form of using the state media to bash America, while pliantly going along with American policies' (Lynch 2013; cf. Cook 2012, 240; Hinnebusch 2014a, 32; Rubin 2002, 81), while consistently warning the United States of the spectre of radical Islamism to justify his crackdowns of the opposition (Gardner 2011, 171; Gerges 2012, 162). The Mubarak-appointed generals in the SCAF were thus no strangers to using the public mood to legitimise domestic rule. In the crackdown and trials of US CSOs, the army effectively played a Janus-faced role as distrust entrepreneurs at the societal level, whilst simultaneously trying to maintain trust with US interlocutors at the organisational and elite levels.

Third, the link between trust-building and cooperation, which pervades IR literature on trust, usually assumes that trust is a de facto positive phenomenon in the international arena, and that trusting relationships are normatively desirable (cf. Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 22–23). However, unpacking of the United States–Egypt relationship highlights an underexplored problem with trust in interstate relations: attempts to maintain and foster trusting relationships at the top levels may actually lead to the entrenchment of distrust at the bottom level. The interpersonal trust created over years of interaction between American and Egyptian leaders, along with the predominantly strategic and functional institutionalised trust between the countries' military establishments, actually accentuated distrust towards the United States at the societal level. In fact, as Amin (2011, 14–15) argues, this entrenched distrust towards America was a key driver behind the sustained legitimacy crisis of Mubarak's regime.

These insights point to the problematic nature of the semi-hegemonic order that the United States has created in the MENA region (Halabi 2009, 11–14). For Egyptians, the price of the special relationship with the United States has been a loss of status in the Arab world, an 'identity crisis' replete with a collective emotion of emasculation (Hinnebusch 2014a, 13; Telhami 2013, 18). This has been the case in particular vis-à-vis Israel. In this manner, the inherent illegitimacy of the original trilateral bargain reached at Camp David – along with the institutional arrangements and policy dispositions it has engendered on all three sides – continued to plague moves made by the United States to instil trust in the Egyptian populace at large in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (cf. Cook 2012, 230–244, 303–304).

Conclusion: threading the trust–distrust nexus

To conclude the study, it is necessary to tackle two outstanding issues that have remained in the background throughout the preceding discussion. The first pertains to the relationship between trust and policy, especially when it comes to the achievement of peaceful relations in the MENA region. The second deals with implications for IR trust theorising,

particularly in terms of the levels of trust and the threefold typology of trust. As argued, American attempts to sustain peace and stability in the Middle East – and between Egypt and Israel in particular – have traditionally been inherently 'top-down' in nature (cf. Bilgin 2004, 29–30). A tenuous *Pax Americana* has been maintained with the complicity of authoritarian allies, and this superficially stable order has been achieved at the expense of the region's populaces' calls for genuine reform (Bâli and Rana 2010, 224–226). What the United States has accomplished through trust-building with the Egyptian elites, coupled with a spending spree on the military establishment, is a tenuous form of 'cold peace' across Sinai (Miller 2000, 158). The spectre of confrontation erupting between the parties of the Camp David Accords lurks in the background, because there is significant domestic opposition in Egypt to the 'trilateral logic' that the original bargain implies in the first place (Cook 2012, 230–244).

The Arab Spring is testament to the dangers of shortcutting the grievances of the Egyptian and Arab populaces. The United States appears caught in an intractable nexus: fostering interpersonal trust with authoritarian elites and institutionalising trust through military-to-military cooperation was for decades touted as the best option for maintaining peace and stability in the pre-Arab Spring Middle East. After the revolutions, it is clear that a path for maintenance of *long-term* peace and stability necessitates forging links not only with the new authoritarian rulers of the Middle East, but also with the constellation of societal actors. A truly stable peace, however, would necessitate the achievement of a security community in the Middle East, wherein members 'entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change' and such expectations are reified into the collective fabrics of societies (Adler and Barnett 1998, 34).

The Egypt–Israel tandem, by virtue of its long-established and institutionalised nature, could function as the first prong in such an exercise, and the United States is the only actor with the necessary influence vis-à-vis both sides to bring such a process of mature pacification about. As a first step, though, the United States would need to (re)gain its trustworthiness as a neutral broker. This necessitates genuine engagement with broader sections of Egyptian society to mitigate the distrust felt towards both the United States foreign policy establishment and American society more broadly. In fact, such engagement might be one way to nudge semi-authoritarian regimes towards more accountable conduct, even in settings like Egypt, which are experiencing a *Thermidorian* reaction in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

The enormity of the task is further accentuated by the identitarian and emotional foundations of distrust vis-à-vis America in Egypt and the broader Arab world. The United States–Egypt relationship illustrates that identity-based trust is a 'double-edged sword' (Mercer 2005, 97). On the one hand, collective identity formation can lead to sustained zones of peace, as theorists of security communities argue (Adler and Barnett 1998).

On the other hand, trust grounded on closed moral communities can lead to a pronounced fear of outsiders (Jamal *et al.* 2015, 67; Mercer 2005, 97). Similarly, entrenched emotions such as humiliation and betrayal that underpin distrust may render future trust-building exercises difficult, especially in cases of longstanding conflict dynamics (Fattah and Fierke 2009, 80–81; Ross 2010, 125). Therefore, it is unlikely that simple changes in policies will be sufficient to alter the public mood in Egypt and erase decade-long experiences of humiliation and subjugation from the collective consciousness (Ross 2010, 125). This was made veritably clear in the way the US decision to desert Mubarak – a most daring 'leap of faith' – was insufficient to fashion improvement in Egyptians' perceptions of America. If anything, distrust towards the United States grew in the immediate aftermath of the Tahrir Revolution, though it was likely accentuated by the disgruntled SCAF, stoking the flames of anti-Americanism to legitimise its domestic rule.

Nevertheless, views on American society and culture show some ambivalence in Egypt. It might thus be possible to create a sustained long-term strategy of engagement where promises are followed up with substantive and discernible changes in American policy. The worst option for the United States is to make lofty declarations and achieve nothing, particularly when it comes to rejuvenating the Middle East Peace Process (Gerges 2012, 119–135; cf. Obama 2009). Of course, given that the United States–Israel relationship functions as a lens through which the Americans view Egypt and, reciprocally, the way Egyptians view the United States, a more even-handed approach towards the Israel–Palestine conflict is necessary for any long-term trust-building to occur on the societal level (Cook 2012, 233; Telhami 2013, 73, 92–93, 109–110). Perhaps the fact that the United States is currently viewed as a hypocritical actor incapable of marrying declaration with policy is indicative of not only bitter disappointment, but also of 'a reservoir of hope that the US could [in the future] live up to its rhetoric' (Lynch 2007, 223).

Finally, in terms of IR theorising on trust, this chapter has sought to illustrate that trust at the elite and organisational levels is not an avenue to sustainable and mature interstate cooperation, especially if it takes place in institutions that reflect the interests of the higher echelons of power and eschews an inclusive and egalitarian process at the societal level. Moreover, the study pays particular testament to the inadequacy of the trust as a rational choice approach. It adds fuel to the fire of critics, who maintain that a strategic understanding of trust is really no trust at all, indistinguishable as it is from surface-level cooperation based on exogenous structural constraints, risk-mitigation or reliance (Hoffman 2002; Lebow 2013; Michel 2012). In sum, if the building of trust is to be regarded as one potential path for breaking out of security dilemmas, creation of security communities and peaceful relations among states, theorists of trust in IR eschew the societal level and social underpinnings of trust at their own peril.

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2 Trust as narrative

Representing Turkey in Western foreign policy analysis

Johanna Vuorelma

Introduction

In this chapter, trust in International Relations (IR) is approached from the constructivist approach with a specific emphasis on demonstrating how trust is narratively constructed in second-order representations. The chapter focuses on the relationship between the West, particularly the European Union (EU), and Turkey, arguing that the way in which Turkey has been represented in Western foreign policy analysis has had an impact on trust between the actors. The chapter suggests that even though the discursive level of analysis is pivotal in understanding how trust is constructed in IR, it is largely absent in the literature. Considine's (2015) grammatical approach to trust represents a rare case in the literature on trust in IR. The constructivist paradigm in the literature that approaches trust as a social phenomenon focuses on ideas and identities, attempting to describe, explain, and predict how trust operates and how trusting relationships can be forged in the international system (see for example Weinhardt 2015).

The constructivist approach to trust often fails to take into account the question of how trust and trusting actors are *represented* in the international system. The issue of representing trust is of utmost importance in IR because representation and action are thoroughly intertwined. Whether we examine trust at the level of interpersonal relations, nation states, or the international system, we always encounter the question of representation, which constitutes a 'direct political encounter' that moves us towards 'the very location of politics' (Bleiker 2001, 512). Trust, as Lahno argues, 'is necessarily tied to a particular perception of the world or some part of the world. It may be characterized by certain patterns in the way the world is represented in thought and the way certain contents of thought are associated with each other. There is a causal relationship between trust and beliefs' (Lahno 2001, 177). In order to tap into the beliefs that are central to understanding trust, the chapter employs the interpretative framework of Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes (2003, 2006) that focuses on beliefs, tradition, and dilemma.

In his memoirs, Ronald Reagan noted in relation to the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War that 'there were myths and misconceptions that had contributed to misunderstandings and our potentially fatal mistrust of each other' (quoted in Fischer 1997, 140). In the literature on trust in international politics, there are frequent references to conceptions, beliefs, perceptions, and information regarding other actors in the international system, but there are almost no further elaborations as to where those perceptions arise from (see for example Hoffman 2002, 377–378). Rathbun (2011, 3) recognises that there are 'different framings of the same situation' but explain it through different social orientations of the left and the right. Rathbun argues that in the United States Democrats and Republicans approach multilateralism differently because the former has more generalised trust than the latter: 'This means that the left is more ideologically disposed toward multilateral solutions than the right because of its trusting nature' (Rathbun 2011, 3).

While the idea that generalised trust influences the formation of international organisations such as the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is a convincing argument, Rathbun fails to explain whether it is the inherent traits of individuals that lead them to a particular political party or the process of socialisation within the party that influences the level of generalised trust that exists in the political system. Michel acknowledges this problem in Rathbun's otherwise solid analytical framework and notes that Rathbun 'does not ask where (generalized) trust comes from and what its intrinsic qualities are' (Michel 2012, 873). This is a typical level-of-analysis problem that one often encounters in the literature on trust in international politics. As Nicholas Wheeler notes: 'Many trust researchers in International Relations obscure these important analytical boundaries by changing the referent for trust in their writings from individual leaders to collectivities without explaining what is at stake here' (Wheeler 2013, 480; see also Singer 1961).

Rathbun (2011, 3) does argue that generalised trust 'is a trait of individuals, not the product of a structural situation'. This points explicitly towards the inherent qualities of individuals who choose their political party based on their personality (see also Michel 2012, 875). However, Rathbun (2011, 13) also refers to, for example, the Democratic administration that framed the problem 'as a reassurance game in which American cooperation would be reciprocated'. The idea is that the Democratic administration was geared towards cooperation because of its generalised trust, but here we have already moved from an individual level to an organisational level. The level of analysis is important here because if we are to understand how conceptions, perceptions, and beliefs about the other actor's trustworthiness are constructed, we need to be able to distinguish between the situated agent and the social setting in which the agent operates.

Indeed, as Nicholas Wheeler (2013, 480) notes, it is human agents who exhibit trust but they 'are enabled and constrained by a set of intervening structural factors related to the roles and responsibilities of the offices they hold; the domestic political systems in which they operate; and wider societal narratives'. Although Wheeler recognises the importance of paying attention to the structural factors, he does not tease them out in his research. Neither do Vincent Keating and Jan Ruzicka (2014, 762) who argue that 'an unobservable social structure, a trusting relationship, has causal effects on policymaking'. Instead, they note that their method is to recognise a trusting relationship, not to 'answer the question of how a trusting relationship came about' (ibid.).

The current research on trust in international politics, then, does not examine the narrative traditions that influence our perceptions and beliefs concerning whether actors in the international system are trustworthy or not. This chapter argues that these narrative traditions should be studied carefully because it is through different webs of beliefs that we generate our understanding of whether an actor has 'malevolent motives and intentions' (Wheeler 2013, 480) or represents an 'upright' actor (Hoffman 2002, 381). Beliefs are at the centre of trust research, but they are not systematically studied or even defined. It is often unclear, for example, whether trust is discussed on an individual or collective level.

Beliefs are continuously referred to in trust research, starting from the very definition of trust. Hoffman, for example, places beliefs at the core when defining trust in interstate relations. He argues that 'trust implies a willingness to take risks on the behaviour of others based on the *belief* that potential trustees will "do what is right"' (Hoffman 2002, 375). Or as Andrew Kydd defines it: a '*belief* that the other side is trustworthy, that is, willing to reciprocate cooperation, and mistrust as a belief that the other side is untrustworthy, or prefers to exploit one's cooperation' (Kydd 2005, 3). It is clear that we need to tap into those beliefs in order to better understand how trust is constructed in international politics.

Trust traditions, dilemmas, and beliefs

Bevir and Rhodes argue that people 'act on habitual, unreflective beliefs about the nature of the world and about what is right in a given context'. In other words, a perception 'depends on the prior web of beliefs of the perceiver' (Bevir and Rhodes 2006, 23, 27). Beliefs are central to the interpretative approach of Bevir and Rhodes, and they are closely connected to the idea of a situated agent. Beliefs do not arise independently as manifestations of personal preferences but are strongly influenced by tradition, which is a 'first influence on people' and a 'social heritage' (Bevir and Rhodes 2006).

This means that traditions carry beliefs but they are contingent rather than fixed. The role of agency is central to traditions because it is

individuals as the carriers of tradition that make them meaningful. As Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 33) argue, they

> settle its content and variations by developing their beliefs and practices, adapting it to new circumstances, while passing it on to the next generations. We can only identify the beliefs that make up a tradition by looking at the shared understandings and historical connections that allow us to link its exponents with one another.

Dilemmas explain how change takes place in tradition, and allow for a fluid understanding of tradition. Bevir and Rhodes (2006, 9) explain that a dilemma

> arises for an individual or group when a new idea stands in opposition to existing beliefs or practices and so forces a reconsideration of the existing beliefs and associated traditions. Political scientists can explain change in traditions and practices, therefore, by referring to the relevant dilemmas.

This is where the idea of a situated agency becomes important; tradition as a structure can be shaped by creative individual acts. Dilemmas are 'frame-breaking moves' (Wheeler 2013, 481) that are central in transforming a rival relationship into a cooperative and trusting one. To truly understand the narrative traditions that influence the way in which some actors are represented as trustworthy and others as 'threatening and untrustworthy as a result of certain inherent characteristics' (Wheeler 2013, 486), the research focus needs to be on second-order representations.

If we consider foreign policy acts such as presidential speeches or official policy formulations as first-order representations as they engage directly with the events and actors that they represent, then speech acts analysing those representations are second-order representations. They can be also called 'interpretations of interpretations' (Bevir and Rhodes 2006, 1). Morton Deutsch begins his research on trust and suspicion by noting: 'Whenever philosophers, poets, statesmen, or theologians have written about man's relationship to his fellow man, to nature, or to animals, the phenomena of trust and betrayal, faith and suspicion, responsibility and irresponsibility, have been discussed' (Deutsch 1958). So even though Deutsch ends up talking about laboratory experiments on trust, he starts with second-order representations that reveal the importance and meaning of trust.

Second-order representations are an essential focus of study because, as Mills argues, the

> first rule for understanding the human condition is that men live in second-hand worlds. They are aware of much more than they personally

> experienced; and their own experience is always indirect.… Their images of the world, and of themselves, are given to them by crowds of witnesses they have never met and never shall meet.
>
> (Cited in Neumann and Nexon 2006, 7)

Or as Kuusisto (2009, 602) notes, with foreign policy matters, people 'have to rely on the labels and narratives of (prominent, trust-worthy, like-minded, well-informed) others and on interpretations they have previously accepted in similar situations'. In fact, as Neumann and Nexon (2006, 8) emphasise, 'for many people, second-order representations are often more significant sources of knowledge about politics and society'.

In international politics, second-order representations have a significant influence on perceptions and beliefs regarding the state's counterparts because foreign policy actors rely largely on reports, analyses, and second-hand information rather than first-hand encounters with the representatives of the counterpart. Scholars that study trust in international politics recognise the importance of examining discourse, but it is, first, used as a technique to determine a trusting relationship, and second, often limited to the discourse of political decision-makers, 'using their discourse to decide whether they trusted a particular person or institution' (Keating and Ruzicka 2014, 758).

This chapter proposes a different approach of focusing instead on second-order representations with the purpose of determining how trust is represented in international politics. Second-order representations are not subject to the same problems as statements of political actors that are usually strategic language or mere liturgy. As Keating and Ruzicka (2014, 759) note: 'Instead of providing clear access to their beliefs, actors are more likely to give answers or to write accounts, even in private papers, that suit their political purpose.' Or as Mearsheimer (2013) has bluntly emphasised, foreign political elites speak one language in public, but act according to a different logic. In that sense, second-order representations are often more reliable sources of information than first-order representations. Even if the intentions of the witness are not cunning like in Mearsheimer's example, people simply have different preconceptions that influence their interpretations. This is what Lahno means when he writes: 'Anything we perceive is already structured by concepts. Our beliefs color our picture of the world and, conversely, what we believe about the world is influenced to a large extent, by our perceptions' (Lahno 2001, 176).

Furthermore, in the world of foreign policy, the line between first-order and second-order representation is often blurred. Many foreign policy leaders also contribute to foreign policy analysis before, during, or after their political careers. For example, Henry Kissinger (United States National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State during the 1960s and 1970s), Joschka Fischer (Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor of Germany from 1998 to 2005), and Carl Bildt (Sweden's Prime Minister

from 1991 to 1994 and Minister for Foreign Affairs from 2006 to 2014) are also prominent foreign policy commentators who frequently contribute to policy or scholarly debates. As Neumann and Nexon (2006, 8) argue, the two orders of representation 'interact in a variety of ways. Moreover, sometimes one person's second-order representation is another person's first-order representation'. Or as Shimko (1994, 655) argues, 'international relations and foreign policy metaphors are used by scholars and policy-makers alike'.

Trust as a narrative prediction

Approaching the question of trust from an emotions-based perspective, Michel argues that by 'observing what agents are doing and what meanings they attach to and create through their interactions in various environments, we can gain new and further insights into the nature and characteristics of trust as an inarticulate disposition' (Michel 2002, 875). Michel perceives trust as a 'moralistic and emotive disposition' that 'carries with it a specific view of the world which forms a horizon of expectation that dispositionally informs social interaction' (Michel 2002, 882). This chapter shares Michel's understanding of trust and shows that the best way to tease out the moralistic nature of trust is to focus on narrative. The link between a moralistic disposition and a specific worldview is at the centre of trust narratives that this chapter discusses.

As White has convincingly shown in his oeuvre, when reality is represented in narratives, 'we can be sure that morality or a moralizing impulse is present too' (White 1987, 24). This is also the case in scientific works as Burke (1950, 26) and Emilhovich (1995, 44) argue. Burke (1945) talks about 'moralistic prophecies' and rhetoric that is 'charged with futurity', which well captures the narrative traditions that influence Western foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey. As such, focusing on narratives in foreign policy analysis opens up horizons to the moralistic and emotive disposition that Michel describes.

The way in which Turkey is narrated in Western foreign policy analysis well captures the nexus between identification and division that Burke (1950) describes. Burke argues that identification 'is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity' (Burke 1950, 22). Burke further argues that 'even in antagonistic terms, confronting each other as parry and thrust, can be said to "cooperate" in the building of an over-all form' (1950, 23). This is what Balci (2009) argues in relation to the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) that was proposed in 2005: the need for an alliance between civilisations in practice confirms not only the existence of different civilisations but also a clash between them, in this case especially between the Western world and the Islamic world.

The nexus between identification and division is particularly important in relation to trust in international politics, because the gap that opens up between them invites distrust. This is apparent especially in the relationship between Turkey and the European Union where official discourse in the context of the EU membership negotiations has emphasised identification and cooperation, but unofficial European utterances has pointed towards division and difference. I have earlier argued that the European Union's approach towards Turkey in the membership negotiations is lacking in dialogism and represents a Bakhtinian monologic relationship where the other, Turkey, is unable to answer back (Vuorelma 2011). In her response, Catherine Macmillan rightly emphasises that while it is true that the relationship between the European Union and Turkey is monologic, Turkey has in fact answered back but in a carnivalesque manner: 'Turkey's carnivalistic discourse on EU accession can be understood as an attempt to subvert the European Union's monologic dominance of the accession process and to make its voice heard in the absence of real dialogue' (Macmillan 2016, 127). This asymmetry, which I refer to as an ironic narrative tradition, is increasingly featuring in Western foreign policy analyses (see Vuorelma 2017).

The gap that opens up between identification and division becomes important when trust is viewed in Lahno's term as being 'ascribed only to those persons who perceive the person they rely on as connected to themselves by shared values or common goals' (Lahno 2001, 182). Lahno argues that 'trust presupposes that the trustor takes up a participant attitude toward the trustee' (Lahno 2001, 181). Lahno further notes that 'we must design our institutions such that we may experience that we have commons interests and such that some sense of "connectedness" in pursuing individual aims may be developed' (Lahno 2001, 187). Now, the institutional setting of EU membership negotiations is an obvious case where Lahno's imperative is not present as the process is not a dialogic process at all but simply about agreeing on a timetable within which the EU-imposed reforms will be carried out.

This means that trust between the actors – as well as the experience of sharing values and goals – must exist prior to the institutional process as the institutional setting is not conducive for building trust. The chapter argues that the close proximity between identification and division is not exposed only in the accession talks but in the wider discursive tradition in Western foreign policy analysis that focuses on Turkey. It can be teased out with the use of organising metaphors, particularly with the 'crossroads' metaphor and the 'losing' metaphor that are both frequently employed in Western foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey. Both the metaphors have been deduced from the data set of foreign policy analyses text using qualitative text analysis. The texts examined in this chapter are chosen as illustrative cases of how trust is narrated through the metaphors of 'crossroads' and 'losing'. In the metaphors we can witness Burke's notion that

> the essence of a thing can be defined narratively in terms of its *fulfillment* or *fruition*. Thus, you state a man's timeless essence in temporal terms if, instead of calling him 'by nature a criminal,' you say, 'he will end on the gallows'.
>
> (Burke 1950, 13)

It is precisely in this fashion that the metaphors of 'crossroads' and 'losing' are often used in Western foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey. Instead of saying that Turkey is a state that cannot be trusted, it is argued that 'Turkey will be lost' or 'Turkey is facing an important crossroads'. When the 'crossroads' metaphor is employed, the narrator usually provides two policy options to Turkey; one that can make the West to increase its trust on Turkey and another one that will further decrease trust. Edelman (1985, 16) was right in arguing that political language 'consists very largely of promises about the future benefits that will flow from whatever cause, policy, or candidate the writer or speaker favors'. As foreign policy discourse and foreign policy analysis discourse are closely intertwined with shared metaphors and narrative traditions, it is often difficult to tell where the first one starts and the second one is ending. Foreign policy analysis often includes policy advice and recommendations that are echoed in policy making and speeches.

Turkey and metaphors of trust

In order to demonstrate how manifestations of the identification/division play can be teased out in text analysis as well as how they form a narrative continuum with policy-making discourse, the chapter turns into four cases that illustrate the argument. It is crucial to understand that a metaphor itself does not relieve the dynamic as 'the same metaphor might have different implications for various people' (Shimko 1994, 658). Strauss (2013, 270) similarly argues that 'allies may be using conventional discourses with different policy implications and seeming opponents may espouse some of the same discourses'. This is why a narrative approach is necessary as it offers an interpretive tool kit to unlock the meanings that are carried in silence. Metaphors should be carefully analysed because 'natural-seeming metaphors help to structure and legitimize policies and programmes' (Chilton and Lakoff 1995, 43).

In foreign policy analysis discourses, Turkey is frequently narrated with the use of 'path' and 'journey' metaphors, which include the source domain 'crossroads' (more on foreign policy metaphors, see for example Chilton 1996; Lakoff and Johnson 1999). Being at a crossroads means that you are on the road and searching for the right direction. Situating a country at a crossroads is a particular powerful discursive act because it not only represents a country, in this case Turkey, as a state that is currently not 'stable' in terms of its location but possibly even 'lost' in case it cannot find

the right road. Both the metaphors generate causal linkages to trust as certainty. Even more importantly, the metaphor opens a number of framing opportunities to the narrator.

First, through the 'crossroads' metaphor Turkey can be given advice as to which road to choose, making the Western foreign policy analyst a policy advisor to Turkey that needs guidance. This is linked to the Western idea of a world community where some states are less developed than others and require 'both paternalistic help and a strong hand to keep them in line if they get naughty' (Chilton and Lakoff 1989, 7). Second, the metaphor enables Turkey to be represented as a state that is standing at a crossroads but not moving anywhere, which means that the West can only wait for Turkey to make the right decisions.

If the previous narrative framing shifts the main responsibility to the West to act as a policy guide to Turkey, this framing in contrast shifts the responsibility to Turkey that needs to choose the correct road. Most importantly, a state that is not stable in terms of its location cannot be fully trusted as 'trusting others involves making predictions about their future actions' (Hoffman 2002, 378). As Turkey is represented as a state that is in a process of 'becoming' rather than 'being' a solid actor in the international system, the question of whether Turkey will 'do what is right' (Hoffman 2002, 379) is constantly present.

Finn, an academic and a U.S. career diplomat, writes in her *National Interest* article in 2003 that

> Turkey is now at an important *crossroads*. There are *worrying* indications that Turkey will *miss* the opportunity to reclaim its *rightful* position on the world stage if the AK Party continues to make the same kinds of *mistakes* it has made already with the United States and Europe. Turkey must respond with a full-fledged and sincere attempt to *repair the damage*.
>
> (Finn 2003, emphases added)

Finn's analysis is written in dramatic and persuasive language, aiming to persuade the reader to perceive Turkey's parliamentary vote against participating in the Iraq War alongside the United States in 2003 as an immoral and irrational act. The analysis provides a 'moralistic prophecy' for Turkey, condemning Turkey's decision to act independently and democratically in subjecting the question of whether to join the 'coalition of the willing' to a parliamentary vote. There is an inbuilt moral paradox in Finn's analysis in that there was a widespread moral argument against the war in Iraq, which was widely advanced also in the West. The European Parliament and several European states, for example, opposed unilateral military action against Iraq. But that did not result in foreign policy analysts situating them at a crossroads. This means that the moral reasoning that Finn applies stems from considerations that are not connected to the moral justification of the war itself.

Turning the widely opposed military approach towards Iraq into a virtue and the more democratic non-military response into a vice is a practice whereby 'brutality is made "virtuous," through dramatic pretexts that justify it in terms of retaliation and righteous indignation' (Burke 1950, 18). The purpose of the 'crossroads' metaphor, then, is to educate Turkey on what is virtuous foreign policy behaviour. As Finn continues:

> Turkey is indeed at the crossroads. By making *right choices* now, it can proceed to fulfil the *dreams* and *aspirations* of the Turkish Republic. *We hope* that those choices will include a conscious decision to reestablish the *strategic partnership* with the United States, and to deepen and expand our *friendship* of the past fifty years so that it will *endure* over the coming decades of this new Millennium.
>
> (Finn 2003, emphases added)

The function of the 'crossroads' metaphor becomes more apparent here. It simultaneously moralises Turkey's action and offers a virtuous solution, but does this in a seemingly descriptive language – as if Turkey's position at a crossroads was simply a fact that was being described. Edelman rightly notes that 'performative function of language is all the more potent in politics when it is masked, presenting itself as a tool for objective description' (Edelman 1985, 16). This is particularly the case in foreign policy analysis because it is a field of study, not political language of persuasion. It can be argued that in Finn's analysis, 'the rhetorician and the moralist become one' (Burke 1950, 25).

The language employed to define the difference between the crossing roads is morally charged with two opposing ends. The morally and politically repugnant road is narrated through descriptions such as 'worrying indications', 'missed opportunity', 'mistakes', and 'damage repair'. The virtuous road, in contrast, is about 'right choices', 'fulfilling the dreams and aspirations', 'hopes', 'partnership', 'friendship', and 'endurance'. In light of the dramatic and almost threatening rhetoric employed in the analysis, the suggestion that Turkey would *deepen* and *expand* her *friendship* with the United States is not convincing. It well illustrates the frequent tendency in Western foreign policy analysis to bind identification and division together in narratives on Turkey, representing the country both as a potential partner and a potential adversary.

As a career diplomat and an academic, Finn well represents the continuum that forms between foreign policy discourse and foreign policy analysis; it is impossible to separate them in any meaningful way. Her narrative well captures the difference that Lahno describes between a 'participant attitude' and 'objective attitude' where the former is about being 'involved in interaction' and the latter implying 'a certain distance' (Lahno 2001, 181). This is a crucial distinction because the 'objective attitude' is 'obviously incompatible with trust' (Lahno 2001, 181). At the

heart of the 'participant attitude' is a perception of the other as an actor with 'personal goals, a personal standard of value and the capability of choosing her actions accordingly' (Lahno 2001, 181).

It is apparent that Finn's analysis represents the 'objective attitude', describing Turkey as an actor that does not understand her own interests, cannot choose them rationally, and is in desperate need of guidance from the United States. Representing Turkey as a state that is standing at a crossroads results in what Blanchard describes as 'ownership' and 'infantilisation' of certain countries and regions in the international system (Blanchard 2013, 189). This, in turn, results in perceptions and beliefs that Turkey cannot be trusted because her future actions cannot be predicted. There are also other ways to perceive Turkey's position 'at a crossroads'. In 1996 Rouleau, former French ambassador to Turkey and Tunisia, wrote in *Foreign Policy* that

> Turkey is *at a crossroads*. It is not enough for its leaders to update their domestic policy, tinker with the economy, and clarify their direction in foreign policy. The task that awaits them is far more *fundamental*, at least if they want to get at the root causes, and not merely the symptoms, of the *sickness* eating away at the republic.
>
> (Rouleau 1996, emphases added)

Rouleau, who as an ambassador and a foreign policy analyst also represents the discursive continuum between first-order and second-order representations in foreign policy, argues that Turkey is at a crossroads because of the Kurdish question, which refers to the Kurdish population in Turkey demanding more rights and includes the military campaign of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) that has been ongoing since 1984. Also Rouleau employs dramatic and persuasive language: Turkey is facing a *fundamental* task to cure its *sickness*.

Metaphors of disease and sickness are popular in foreign policy analysis because they are effective in framing policy issues and orientating moral and political thinking (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Schon and Rein, 1994; Vuorelma 2017, 7). They also provide cognitive cues as to which actor is the subject of moralising and needing cure. Davidson points out that 'disease' metaphors in political discourse highlight personal responsibility and culpability (Davidson 1984, 221). Burke's notion of 'localizing or dramatizing the principle of transformation' is clearly present in Rouleau's analysis (Burke 1950, 17).

The principle of transformation can be tied to any event with a causal linkage and a valued endpoint (Gergen 1999). If Finn linked it causally to Turkey's refusal to comply with the interests of the United States, Rouleau connects it to a more vaguely defined Kemalist tradition that can only be overcome with a new generation: 'a generation that is not beholden to the myths of the past and can set Turkey on a new course'

(Rouleau 1996, 87). What makes Rouleau's 'crossroads' different from Finn's 'crossroads' is not only that his moralising gaze is directed towards the Kemalist tradition in Turkey rather than towards the compliance with the United States' policies but also that Rouleau shifts the responsibility to Turkey.

The responsibility of the West is not to actively guide Turkey towards modernity but to wait until Turkey's new generation 'can set Turkey on a new course'. The function of the 'crossroads' metaphor, then, changes here in that Turkey is not standing at a crossroads because the country is in a process of being guided to the right destination by the West but instead stuck there until the new generation modernises the country. The narrative implications in terms of whether Turkey can be trusted are, however, similar. Also here Turkey is depicted as an actor that might not be able to 'do what is right' and choose the right future course.

Rouleau's 'crossroads' is not a call for Western action to guide Turkey but more a justification for possible inaction as regards Turkey's political development. The vague language of an ambiguous 'new course' serves the function; it does not offer any concrete options to Turkey to continue the path and to get rid of the 'myths of the past'. The most obvious explanation regarding the difference between Finn and Rouleau is that the former advocates a United States led Western alliance and calls for Turkey to continue pursuing membership in the European Union. Finn argues:

> After the U.K. and France, Turkey is certainly the most serious military power in Europe. Turkey has a great deal to offer Europe in terms of security. Turkey's dynamic young population, if appropriately educated for the modern technological world, can make a great contribution to a Europe with aging populations and low birth rates.
>
> (Finn 2003)

Finn's Turkey – dynamic, educated and with a great deal to contribute to Europe – is in stark contrast to Rouleau's sick and desperate Turkey. This is because Rouleau analyses the question from a different moral and political position, framing it around the European integration project, which becomes more apparent in his analysis four years later in 2000. In his article 'Turkey's Dream of Democracy' in *Foreign Affairs*, Rouleau once again places Turkey at a crucial crossroads: 'Turkey today stands at a crossroads. Few other moments in the 77-year history of the Turkish republic have been so decisive' (Rouleau 2000).

This time the formative event is the European Parliament soon beginning to consider the documentation concerning Turkey's accession. Turkey had been granted EU membership candidacy a year earlier in 1999, and would commence the actual negotiations five years later in 2005. This particular event was not considered formative in most other expert circles in the United States or Europe. But to Rouleau this is a crucial moment

because it might bring Turkey closer to the European Union. Now Turkey is situated even more firmly at a permanent crossroads that becomes more like a container than a passage.

Yanow and van der Haar argue that the integration discourse in the Netherlands is 'powerful for being carried out in disguise' and note that underlying the 'seemingly neutral policy and administrative terms' there is a suggestion that 'integration is not and never will be possible'. They further argue that the integration discourse 'brings ancient ideas of place and behaviour into play' (Yanow and van der Haar 2003, 229, 245). This particular dynamic can be identified in many foreign policy analysis narratives concerning Turkey, which is possible because the metaphor of 'crossroads' lacks specificity, is slippery, and can be constantly reasserted to claim that Turkey still has not made its definite choice.

The criteria laid out for Turkey to continue on the road change depending on the narrator's web of beliefs, which means that Turkey can be kept waiting at a crossroads permanently. Yanow and van der Haar (2003, 547) conclude that a policy discourse is 'all the more dangerous for carrying its meanings in silence, which is the power of metaphors and of the unspoken, yet tacitly known, organising logic embedded in category structures'. Burke refers to the statement of 'being at a crossroads' as a 'hot item' (Rueckert 2002, 186), and that is certainly the case in foreign policy analysis because the metaphor offers such a powerful discursive tool to create causal linkages between events in international politics. Because of the strong emphasis on the predictability of Turkey's actions and whether Turkish actors will do what is right, they continuously raise the question – often implicitly – of whether Turkey can be trusted in the West.

The 'losing' metaphor in foreign policy analysis is equally powerful in representing trust in international politics. The metaphor is particularly popular in foreign policy think tanks. Steyn (2010) even writes: 'As the think-tankers like to say: "Who lost Turkey?" ' There are different tropes within which the 'losing' metaphor is employed. It can provide narrative resources to convince the reader that Turkey is lost despite the West (see for example Cagaptay 2010: Matthews 2006) or to claim that Turkey is lost because of the West. The latter is more interesting because in these narratives there is a ironic approach towards the idea that the Western self represents a morally or politically triumphant actor; that it is the Western self that cannot be trusted. The critical gaze is directed towards the aesthetic gap between identification and division. Germany's Fischer represents this narrative tradition when he writes in his article 'Who "lost" Turkey?' (2010): 'I believe that these fears (of losing Turkey) are exaggerated, even misplaced. And should things work out that way, this would be due more to a self-fulfilling prophecy on the West's part than to Turkey's policies.'

Fischer argues that despite Turkey's strategic importance and its efforts to modernise the country, the West has treated Turkey as a 'client state'

with the European Union in particular causing damage with its demeaning attitude in Turkey's accession negotiations. In Fischer's narrative, both Russia and Iran are used as metaphors that signify a particular *direction* that Turkey is being pushed into by the morally weak West: 'European policy is driving Turkey into the arms of Russia and Iran.' Fischer's framing of the 'losing' question is ironic, which is a powerful narrative strategy in political language. At the heart of White's (1973) irony exists a self-critical and a bitter approach towards the world. It can be seen, as Brassett (2009, 221) argues, as a coping mechanism that in the British context is about dealing with

> their collective sense of loss: loss of empire, loss of the moral high ground, loss of economic and military credibility, loss of ignorance to Empire's excesses. In this way, irony can be more than merely playful recognition of our own certain fragilities then.

Irony is always, as White (1973, 37) notes, 'negational' in that it attempts to challenge the hegemonic representation of reality and turn it around. It has a 'potential to de-stabilise and de-naturalise hegemonic discourses of globalisation' as well as to address questions of global ethics (Brassett 2009, 220). There are often inbuilt hierarchies in ironic representations that attempt to either lift or lower the social and moral status of some actors in the international system. Alker (1996, 295) notes that when we 'describe political or social actors in terms of laughable inadequacies or ironically criticize them for redeemable failures, we place them beneath us'. These representations are often a reaction to perceived moral failings in the hegemonic order. Domanska (1998, 178) argues that the 'ironic apprehension of the world arose in an atmosphere of social breakdown or cultural demise'.

Bildt's analysis after the attempted coup in Turkey in 2016 offers an ironic framing with a strong self-critical emphasis. Bildt argued just weeks after the coup attempt in his article in *Project Syndicate* (2016a) that the West's 'lack of empathy for Turkey during this traumatic period has been astonishing'. Bildt's criticism concerns not only the lack of adequate support for Turkey's democracy in the European Union – 'Is Brussels asleep, or just ignorant?' (2016b) – but Europe's alienating attitude towards Turkey in general. He writes that

> Turkey's accession talks with the European Union have ground almost to a halt, owing partly to outright hostility against Turkey in some EU member states. The motives behind this animus vary, but the overall effect has been to alienate many Turks, who now feel rejected by a Europe that once inspired them. Not surprisingly, some Turks now look for inspiration and opportunities elsewhere.
>
> (Bildt 2016a)

Bildt employs the 'crossroads' metaphor and makes a clear moral and political distinction between the two roads. It is not Turkey but the West that is standing at the crossroads and facing a virtuous road that involves understanding for and engagement with Turkey, leading to reform, modernity, and a bright future for Turkey, the West, and the wider region. The repugnant road, on the other hand, means further alienating Turkey with a lack of understanding, leading to more conflict and authoritarianism:

> Turkey is at a historical crossroads … Western diplomats should escalate engagement with Turkey to ensure an outcome that reflects democratic values and is favorable to Western and Turkish interests alike. A *democratic* and *European* Turkey could be a bridge to deliver *reform* and *modernity* to the Muslim world; an *alienated* and *authoritarian* Turkey could bring *conflict* and *strife* back to Europe's eastern borderlands. What happens on the Bosphorus *affects us all*.
>
> (Bildt 2016a, emphases added)

Also Bildt employs dramatic language, using Burke's rhetoric strategy of 'scapegoat' (Burke 1950, 17) when analysing the West's approach towards Turkey. This is in line with what the United States Defence Secretary Robert Gates stated in 2010:

> I personally think that if there is anything to the notion that Turkey is, if you will, moving eastward, it is, in my view, in no small part because it was pushed, and pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the kind of organic link to the West that Turkey sought.
>
> (BBC News 2010)

The West is represented as the main scapegoat, making it impossible for Turkey to trust the West in general and the European Union in particular.

The question of how Turkey is represented in foreign policy analysis is important not only because the foreign policy analysis discourse forms a narrative continuum with language in foreign policy. It is also important because it provides narrative resources to Turkish foreign policy that is currently showing strong signs of distrust towards the European Union and the West. The aesthetic gap between Turkish self-image and its Western representation is used to demonstrate that the West is treating Turkey unfairly and cannot be trusted. Bleiker (2001, 532) has rightly argued:

> No representation, even the most systematic empirical analysis, can be identical with its object of inquiry. Any form of representation is inevitably a process of interpretation and abstraction. The power of aesthetics, and its political relevance, lies in this inevitability.
>
> (See also Ankersmit 1997)

While this is true, we cannot escape the fact that, as Bruner notes, 'narrative structures are not only structures of meaning but structures of power as well' (Bruner 1986, 144).

Turkey's carnivalesque strategy to turn the power structures upside down and treat the European Union as her inferior partner has become more prevalent following the coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016. The deteriorating trust between the European Union and Turkey has been similar to the political development with Russia that Haukkala and Saari describe in their article, which is in line with Zarakol's (2011) thesis about Russia and Turkey carrying a 'stigma' in international politics. The experience of injustice and not being afforded trust in international politics can be harnessed to provide a meaningful and powerful narrative in domestic politics about Turkey's role in the international system. In Turkey's administration, the European Union today is seen as what Kydd calls an 'untrustworthy hegemon' (Kydd 2005/2006, 621). Trust is about words, and words between Turkey and the European Union have ceased to aim towards solving

> problems by working with other states to identify policies that a majority can support, and then providing assurances that the hegemon and enough other states will cooperate in the common good to make it worthwhile for all the well-disposed states to cooperate.
>
> (Kydd 2005/2006, 621)

What is left is the ironic strategy that turns words increasingly meaningless, which demonstrates how irony indeed 'tends to turn into word play, to become a language about language, to conceive the world as trapped within a prison made of language, the world as a "forest of symbols"' (Domanska 1998, 178). The suggestion that Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan represents a modern-day Hitler that was put forward both in Western foreign policy analysis (see for example Karnitschnig 2016) and in European political statements (see for example Reuters 2016) has turned into a word play in Turkey, whose administration subsequently accused Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel of using 'Nazi measures' (Barigazzi 2017) and called the Dutch authorities 'Nazi remnants' (Gramer and Mellen 2017). Such utterances have become frequent in Turkish foreign policy discourse, which shows that the dilemma that the identification/division nexus brings to the relationship between the West and Turkey has been potent enough to break the discursive tradition during the Cold War that emphasised cooperation, understanding, and shared interests and turn it into a tradition that emphasises distrust, risks, and difference.

Conclusion

Burke emphasises that 'seeing of something in terms of something else involves the "carrying-over" of a term from one realm into another, a

process that necessarily involves varying degress of incongruity in that the two realms are never identical' (Burke 1945, 504). This discursive process takes place in foreign policy language, containing narrative traditions that are carried on by different generations of foreign policy scholars and practitioners who are situated agents in that what they perceive in the field is already structured by concepts but not fixed.

The chapter argues that when we study trust in international politics, we should pay attention to the representation of trust in discursive practices. The field of foreign policy analysis represents a discursive practice that employs strong metaphors through which images of trust and distrust are conveyed. The embedded beliefs are not just neutral descriptions about the nature of the international system but closely intertwined with foreign policy practices. Similarly to Considine's grammatical approach to trust, the narrative approach employed in this chapter is grounded on the idea that 'the terms we use to talk about the world will necessarily frame what we can and cannot ask' (Considine 2015, 126).

Trust is a social phenomenon, which is evident in the evolution of the relationship between Turkey and the West in general and the European Union in particular. The deterioration of trust between the actors could be predicted when studying the language of foreign policy analysis, which has constantly represented Turkey as a state that is potentially untrustworthy. The chapter presented two cases – the metaphors of 'crossroads' and 'losing' – to show how they convey different interpretations about Turkey, resulting not only in those representations being adopted in policy making discourses but also resulting in a wider aesthetic gap that invites distrust on both sides. Rational and psychological approaches to trust are useful when trust in international politics is measured and policies are designed to increase it, but a constructivist approach is needed when we need to explain how the language of trust is rendered meaningful and turned into practice.

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3 Mistrust amongst democracies

Constructing US–India insecurity during the Cold War

Carina van de Wetering

Introduction

Distrust is often identified within the US–India relationship. In the last two decades, US–India relations improved greatly through closer economic and military ties, such as a civilian nuclear agreement in 2008. However, the relationship was characterised by mistrust during the Cold War and it fluctuated over time (Kapur and Ganguly 2007, 642). During the second Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, the US administration displayed more interest in India, while in the 1970s relations were strained again (Wetering 2016a, 38–45). The relations improved somewhat afterwards. With President Reagan's presidency, Dennis Kux writes: 'Although the bilateral rhetoric became more positive, adding substance to the better atmospherics was not easy. Basic policy differences continued and a legacy of mutual distrust remained' (1992, 418). Other scholars also signal a degree of mistrust in the whole relationship or aspects of it (Cohen 2002, 307; Gould 2008, 128; Kapur and Ganguly 2007, 642, Mohan 2006, 28). As Raja C. Mohan argues, the relationship was lacking 'a history of mutual trust and cooperation', while others describe it as 'estranged', 'troubled', 'forged in crisis', or marked by 'tension rather than cooperation' (Brands 1990, ix; Chaudhuri 2014; Dutt 1984, 52; Kux 1992; Mohan 2007, 28).

Despite identifying the lack of trust, the literature on the relationship between the US and India has not explored the theme more closely. In general, a trusting bond is seen as difficult to establish in world politics, or as a slippery concept used in various settings without any attempt at theorising (Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 9). Until recent scholarship on trust within the International Relations (IR) discipline, trust or distrust was assumed when discussing other factors that can strengthen relations. However, Aaron Hoffman argues that '[t]rust is a necessary condition for cooperation' (2002, 376).

In order to capture the essence of trust, the recent scholarship on trust analyses the concept through rational choice, social psychology, and social constructivist lenses or a combination of the approaches (see Haukkala

et al. 2015). Especially, rational choice approaches have received criticism see Rathbun 2011; Booth and Wheeler 2008). In their aim of finding causal patterns and gaining measurable results, however, specific types of social constructivism (hereafter named conventional constructivism) and social psychology are also confined to a rationalist method, as discussed below (Michel 2012).[1] I argue that trust must continue to be regarded as 'elusive' in order to gain a better understanding (Michel 2012, 887). Here the case of US–India relations demonstrates this elusiveness by showing how the degree of mistrust is shaped by the construction of identities, emotions, and practices, drawing on poststructuralist insights.

Within the US–India literature, there is one author who displays more interest in the notion of trust. By drawing upon social constructivism in combination with democratic peace theory, Jarrod Hayes shortly refers to trust and mistrust in relationship to India's democratic identity.[2] According to Hayes, the US and India both share a democratic identity which deescalates any further conflict. He argues that some security issues were not successfully accepted as large emergencies due to India's democratic status (2009, 2012, 2013). Even if there were large crises, political leaders were careful to emphasise India's democratic identity, because the public saw India as a 'trustworthy member of the democratic community' that should not be approached with violent means (Hayes 2013, 32, 2009, 983).

Hayes refers, for instance, to the South Asia crisis in 1971, in which West Pakistan mobilised military forces to attack East Pakistan (currently Bangladesh). Whilst supporting its 'friend' West Pakistan, the Nixon administration deemed India a threat to global politics due to its support for East Pakistan. In a securitising move, the Nixon administration started to carefully present India as undemocratic and 'untrustworthy' in public, even though this was not deemed acceptable by the American public (2012, 79–80; 2013, 71).[3] In a recent example, Hayes also compares India's nuclear programme with Iran's, revealing that the US referred to India through 'their shared democratic governance and values as well as the trust that arises out of that shared governance', while the emphasis with Iran was on its 'nondemocratic nature' and a lack of trust emanating from this (2009, 985).

The question remains as to how a shared democratic identity helped to foster distrustful relations during the Cold War when no immediate crises between India and the US took place. Even though India was presented as a democracy with which the US shared the same values, this does not completely take into account the continuing sense of mistrust. Making use of social constructivism grounded in poststructuralism, Himadeep Muppidi is also puzzled by the sense of US–India insecurity. Drawing a comparison with the cordial Indo-Soviet relations, Muppidi reconstructs the self-understanding of India's relations with both countries (1999, 120–121). He finds that this insecurity is not rooted in a US alliance with Pakistan, but in India's nationalist efforts to gain independence from the British:

India wanted to be recognised as a great power (1999, 124, 126). The US misunderstood this call and denied the reality of India's independence. The US articulated the countries' shared democratic identity as part of its own anti-communist understanding, but these articulations helped to invoke an image of the US as a successor to British colonial pursuit (Muppidi 1999, 136–144).

Muppidi's analysis is an interesting account, but it focuses less on the volatility of US–India relations during the Cold War. Other authors refer to the oscillating relations (see, for instance, Nayar 1975 or Kux 1992). Unlike the social constructivist writings, these scholars discuss the role of negative perceptions and clashing security interests in order to explain why the relationship was so distant.[4] However, negative perceptions and clashing security interests are related: they are informed by underlying discourses through the construction of both. Discourses are systems of meanings in which these objects are produced as meaningful (Howarth 2000, 2). Making use of both conventional constructivist and poststructuralist insights, this chapter thus explores the relationship between India and the US during the Cold War, focusing on the construction of trust amongst both countries.

In order to analyse trust, this chapter first discusses conventional constructivist thinking on trust, by referring, for instance, to cognition, mutual identification and affective trust, as part of Clara Weinhardt's notion of relational trust (2015). Adding poststructuralist insights, I argue that trust and its sense of a secure relationship is made possible by the construction of identities, practices, and emotions. In order to demonstrate this, I perform a discourse analysis on the public documents produced during the visits of heads of states: President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1956 and 1959) and President Nixon and Indira Gandhi (1969 and 1971). They include (joint) statements, welcoming words, toasts at the state dinner, and addresses.[5] By going through these case studies, it is possible to find out what they can tell us about the construction of trust. The visits by heads of state are of particular interest, because these socially constructed events are 'conscious attempts to forge better understandings between states' by creating a 'shared reality' (Muppidi 1999, 132).

Trust as a relation

Trust as an intersubjective construction receives less attention amongst social constructivists despite their interest in locating identities, discourse, and norms within world politics (Weinhardt 2015, 28). This is surprising as the pioneering scholar and conventional constructivist Alexander Wendt writes about the construction of social identity through reiterated actions between the Id and the Ego in a state of anarchy. Without any prior knowledge, they start the 'process of signaling, interpreting, and responding [which] completes a "social act" and begins the process of creating

intersubjective meanings'. This creates expectations about the other and leads to more or less cooperation (Wendt 1992, 405). Karl Deutsch already noted decades earlier that a sense of community depends on a learning process through sustained contact between actors necessary for political integration into a Security Community (1957). The threshold for integration is based, for instance, on 'mutual sympathy and loyalties; of "we-feeling," trust, and mutual considerations; [and] of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests' (Deutsch 1957, 36).[6]

Within the trust literature, the conventional constructivist approach emphasises both risk and obligation. The actor is willing to put his trust into the other, which provides an obligation that the other will follow through (Hollis 1998, 11). As Martin Hollis illustrates with an example of a copy of Kant's manuscript, Hollis trusts the other person to return his copy after lending it to him, which means that he not merely predicts this to happen but also feels entitled that the book should return (1998, 11). It is both a prediction of others' behaviours and an expectation of 'fiduciary responsibility' which may lead the other to sacrifice some of their own benefits (Barber 1983, 14; Hoffman 2002, 379). There is the belief that the other actors will honor this obligation and do 'what is right' rather than causing any harm (Hoffman 2002, 375, 379, 394; Uslaner 2002, 2).

This approach differs from the rational choice argument which conceives trust solely as risk-taking behaviour by predicting whether a self-interested action is in the other actor's interest and whether this leads to reciprocity. In this risk calculation, one evaluates the costs and benefits to tackle the uncertainty of trusting the other (Hardin 1993, 507). Brian Rathbun calls this 'strategic trust', but he finds that the problem is that it does not properly explain why states commit to cooperation within, for instance, international organisations, when they are not informed about all the other actors' specifics (Rathbun 2011, 244). What is missing is a deeper understanding of trust. According to Eric Uslaner, strangers can also be regarded as trustworthy. Describing it as moral trust, he writes: 'Trust in other people is based upon a fundamental ethical assumption: that other people share your fundamental values' (Uslaner 2002, 2).

Trust is therefore not just about risk and obligation. The greater the perceived commonalities amongst the identities, the more likely the other is presented as trustworthy. This assumption is also advanced in other literatures which I already shortly referred to. For instance, democratic peace theory proposes that democracies are inherently peaceful. In his seminal article 'Liberalism and World Politics' (1986) Michael Doyle claims: 'Liberal states are different. They are indeed peaceful […] Liberal states have created a separate peace, as Kant argued they would' (Doyle 1986: 1151). Adapting Deutsch's security community, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett redefined it as a community with shared identities, values, and meanings which engages in direct relations and provide security to one

another with long-term interests in mind (1998, 30–31). According to Adler, 'security communities are socially constructed because shared meanings, constituted by interaction, engender collective identities. They are dependent on communication, discourse, and interpretation, as well as on material environments' (1997, 258).

Bringing together social psychological and conventional constructivist literatures on trust, Clare Weinhardt proposes a relational conceptualisation of trust. 'Relational trust' refers to the 'inter-subjective nature of trust, being dependent on assumptions about the relationship with other actors, which is constituted not only through cognitive, but also affective, identity-based interaction processes' (2015, 33). Similar to these conventional constructivists, social psychologists refute the mere cognitive calculations by individuals as proposed by the rational choice account of trust as too narrow. Within the social psychological literature, Weinhardt distinguishes between benevolence-based trust and identification-based trust. With regard to the former, the trusting relationship is analysed for its motives of benevolence or integrity to explain the willingness of the trustor to put his/her trust in the other (Weinhardt 2015, 32).

Identification-based trust or affective trust focuses on 'us' through '[s]hared values, perceived similarities, sympathy and a common vision' (Weinhardt 2015, 32). Trust is based on the high degree of sameness between the trustor and trustee which allows for closer cooperation. Also, it displays an emotional dimension, which is a different way of looking at the concept of trust (Mercer 2005, 93; Weinhardt 2015, 32). Emotions emerge in and through social interaction, also called 'circulations of affect' (Ross 2006, 206; 2014, 16). There are emotions through identification with the in-group which leads to cooperation and distrust of the out-group peers (Mercer 2005, 97).

Building upon these insights, Weinhardt first puts forth an argument that trust entails an identity relationship between two actors. Trust and identity are linked: interaction gives rise to an identity relationship of the Self and Other, reflecting trust or mistrust (Weinhardt 2015, 34). In other words, '[t]he concepts of identity and trust cannot be disentangled: they are mutually constitutive as one gives rise to the other' (Haukkala *et al.* 2015, 5). In general, within social constructivism, the agents' identity and social relations, either of trust or mistrust, are mutually constitutive. This also means that Weinhardt's account goes beyond social psychology as it takes less into account the psychological traits of an individual. Different from rational choice theories and social psychology, conventional constructivism relies on a social ontology through its focus on its relations with others rather than individual traits (Weinhardt 2015, 36).

However, similar to social psychology, conventional constructivist theory also harbors the emotional dimension. With the emotional turn in IR, there was a discussion whether enough emphasis is laid on emotions. One of the reasons why Deutsch's contribution did not seem to fit with

other IR contributions was due to his discussion of emotions, such as the 'we-feeling'. This was approached as a cognitive belief about the other's trustworthiness without reference to emotions (Mercer 2005, 97). In 2000 Neta Crawford warned her audience that there was not enough focus on 'the passions' within IR theories (2000). Both realism and social constructivism disregard emotions for their perceived irrationality (Mercer 2005, 97). If they are incorporated, there is the issue that emotions are often added on, according to Janice Bially Mattern. Emotions are marginalised either in reducing them to cognitive factors, by making them part of rationality and belief, or by regarding them as one of its 'constitutive components' as part of social representations (Mattern 2011, 67).

It is inevitable that one component is more addressed than the other, but emotions are starting to become more theorised and taken seriously as part of the analysis of social representations, as discussed here and in the next section (see also Hutchison 2016, 140). For instance, states are said to have emotional relationships and identities (Crawford 2000, 154). Emotions are often seen as an individual experience. However, Weinhardt notes: 'While human psychology seems intuitively to be the closest to the concept of trust, constructivism arguably offers a bridge between states as actors in international politics and the individuals that interact in international settings' (2015, 34).

With reference to Crawford, Weinhardt argues, '[c]onstructivism seems most suitable […] because it locates trust at the level of state identity' (2015, 34). In fact, within IR, there are three ways of studying emotions: trust can be analysed for states, groups or amongst foreign-policy makers (Sasley 2011, 453–454). First, the state is treated as a person as evidenced by statements such as: 'Washington decided to pursue closer relations with New Delhi' (Wendt 2004). It is unclear whether emotions actually play a role in this account (Sasley 2011, 453). Second, the state can also be seen as a group in which 'cognitive and emotional practices represent, comprise, and reflect that of the group (state) and so determine how the state will act' (Sasley 2011, 454).

Another approach is found within foreign policy analysis, or international history, which focuses on key decision makers whose personality is seen as representative for their state (Sasley 2011, 453). Nicolas Wheeler includes the emotional basis of mistrust amongst policy-makers in his own analysis of unsuccessful negotiations between India's Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart Nawiz Sharif (2010, 319). Outside of the trust discipline, well-known authors of US–India relations, such as Dennis Kux also tend to focus on inter-personal relations amongst leaders. He discusses how Vice President George Bush and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi developed friendly personal ties on a trip to the NASA space centre (1992, 404). Weinhardt opts for the second category: emotions felt by a group within the state. Within international politics, individuals often become part of a larger identity. Their personal feelings are submerged

under the state identity as it does not always reflect these emotions. Yet, these feelings of trustworthiness remain more at the disposition of the individual policy-maker than with other social identities (Weinhardt 2015, 34). Brugger agrees that trust is proposed by several individuals through a speech act which is continuously articulated and becomes common-sensible by attaching it to a state's identity (2015, 82).

In the next section, I discuss Weinhardt's contribution in light of poststructuralism. As mentioned above, Weinhardt's notes that trust is relational, dependent on assumptions one actor has of the other through cognitive, affective, and identity interaction (Weinhardt 2015, 33). This idea is linked to some poststructuralist insights, however, there is a larger issue at stake. As Torsten Michel argues, some trust authors are critical of the state of the trust discipline, but they do not move beyond rationalist accounts by omitting emotions (2012, 82). Here trust is an articulated sense of security enabled by discursive constructions of shared identity, practices, and emotions.

Trust as a discourse

With regard to trust, there is a 'rationalist bias' within the literature which neglects the impact of emotions (Michel 2012, 887). In fact, Jonathan Mercer asserts that the irony is that trust becomes unnecessary in rationalist accounts of trust: 'Rationalists drain the psychology from trust by turning it into a consequence of incentives. Emphasising incentives as the basis for trust eliminates both the need for trust and the opportunity to trust' (Mercer 2005, 95, 99). Emotion does not distract from a cold calculative process, Mercer argues (2010, 5). He adds: 'Trust based on feelings of warmth and affection allows one to go beyond the incentives or evidence and to risk being wrong. Cognition and emotion meet in "trust"' (Mercer 2010, 6). Torsten Michel even argues that strategic trust is not actual trust but reliance. Trust is grounded in emotions, which are beyond rational control (Michel 2012, 880). Any rational decision merely follows from an emotional base (Michel 2005, 78–79; 2012, 886). In other words, emotions can trigger trust, which is followed by rational behaviour and reliance (Michel 2012, 886).[7]

We should move way from cognition as the basis of trust. Kenneth Booth and Nicholas Wheeler want to include 'the human factor' (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 234; Michel 2012, 872). According to Michel, however, it is unclear what they mean by that: how does it impact trust? (Michel 2012, 872–873). With regard to Weinhardt, she discusses both cognition and emotions as Weinhardt's conception of trust is foremost grounded in conventional constructivism. Conventional constructivism has rationality at its core: causality is necessary to show how a norm or discourse matters, which can be detected through hypothesis testing (Wendt 1999, 87).[8] For instance, Wendt sees norm-building and identity

construction as a social learning process through a number of exchanges which allow the other to trust or to mistrust its counterpart. It becomes a rational choice to partake in the relationship through a series of iterative actions (Michel 2012, 873).

This type of constructivism focuses on 'what agents think' (Pouliot 2008, 257, 263). However, trust should be seen as a 'subjective, personal, inarticulate, emotive, and moralistic disposition' (Michel 2012, 886). It remains theoretically 'elusive' to the observer (Michel 2012, 887). Also, it is not easily graspable for another reason, according to Michel. Phenomenological and hermeneutic literatures are interested in structures of experiences without describing them through theoretical constructions such as the notion of trust (De Jong 2016, 428). Applying this method to trust, trust is not an abstract cognitive process of decision-making (Michel 2012, 880; Pouliot 2008, 258). Trust manifests itself through acts of trusting which never find closure as our decision to trust is always deferred, or too late by projecting its possibilities ahead of itself, as discussed in hermeneutic literature (De Jong 2016, 880; Michel 2012, 880). Trusting practices are always in the process of becoming trust.

One way of analysing the world with a non-rational account is poststructuralism which also refers to identities and emotions. This approach argues that reality is not objective and given but is discursively constructed through various meanings. This seems closely related to conventional constructivism. However, according to poststructuralists, these meanings can 'never be reduced to conceptual essence' (Howarth 2013, 11–12). In other words, 'meanings, objects, imports, and affects of the things that subjects experience and engage with in the world are varied and often contested' (Howarth 2013, 12). In its contestation, some knowledges gain more dominance and become common sense. Poststructuralists are not merely interested in how these meanings are discursively constituted, but also in how the construction of subjects and objects are made possible by power relations which are operative within the discourse. Poststructuralism has an 'ethical concern' that peoples and perspectives are included and thus not excluded (Campbell 2010). In order to locate and recognise these power structures, poststructuralists aim for deconstructing or making strange our daily understandings.

In this approach, trust is discursive as it is constructed through various meanings. Trust refers to a *sense* of secure relations with the Other. A trusting bond assumes security, whereas there is the emergence of mistrust with the articulation of insecurity. In the trust literature, there is a discussion about uncertainty due to a lack of information, but this is a part of a cognitive calculation and therefore not the same as insecurity. In this chapter, trust is enabled by assumptions about security through identities, emotions, and practices. When these understandings are acceptable and common-sensible, they exclude insecurity. As Philipp Brugger argues, 'A trusting discourse systematically excludes doubts about the other's

intentions and good character from the realm of acceptable speech' (2015, 82). However, he does not tackle this in depth and remains within the rationalist framework.

Certain constructivist and poststructuralist scholars discuss more extensively the discursive understanding of security, such as the discourses of security (McDonald 2005) or insecurity (Weldes *et al.* 1999, 10). These authors argue that security has no fixed meaning. It may be defined in different ways. Similarly to trust, security or insecurity is a social production (McDonald 2005, 299; Weldes *et al.* 1999, 9). Also, the construction of security carries assumptions about other aspects, such as identity construction.[9] In fact, insecurities and the referent object which is under threat are closely related. In other words, 'insecurity is itself the product of processes of identity construction' (Weldes *et al.* 1999, 10). With regard to US–India relations, Himadeep Muppidi thus refers to his notion of a security imaginary (1999, 124). In order to have a systematic inquiry of India's self-understandings, he defines this security imaginary as an 'organized set of understandings and social identities that are productive of worlds' (1999, 120, 124).

The poststructuralist approach often refers to the construction of security and identity. Nevertheless, the approach tends not to make explicit the construction of both identities, practices, *and* emotions in order to pursue secure relations, even though security is an aspect which is important to all three objects. When differences amongst identities are produced and converted into otherness, such as a threatening other, this is a source of the insecurity felt and practices enacted (Weldes *et al.* 1999, 11). Meanings are thus attached to emotions, identities, and practices which make possible trust as a secure relationship. If the US, for instance, is viewed as a fearful colonial power by the Indian government, this affects a trusting relationship. The same goes for India: if India is constructed within US government texts as a dangerous authoritarian regime that is breaking its promises, this means that it is mistrusted by the US. This demonstrates that representations cannot be divorced from each other: they help to make sense of each other in order to convey a trusting or mistrustful relationship. In other words, if India is constructed as a democracy, it is less likely to be viewed as fearful and breaking international treaties. Or if India invokes fear, the focus is less likely on its democratic status and the international law it abides with.

There are a few similarities with Weinhardt's account. For instance, poststructuralists also argue that identities are relational: the Self's identity depends on its relationship with Others. As Weldes *et al.* argue, '[i]dentity, that is, can only be established in relation to what it is not – to difference' (1999, 11). With regard to the US during the Cold War, David Campbell writes how the state was produced through threats by drawing differences between 'us' and 'them', or other binaries, such as inside/outside, self/other, or domestic/foreign (1998, x). According to Jennifer Milliken, 'we' can

also constitute a larger grouping. In the Korean War at the start of the 1950s, the US not merely opposed the Soviet Union, but it was also creating a bond through interactions and processes of meaning-making with its allies, South Korea and the UN (2001, 223). Trusting relations thus display sameness through, for instance, a bond or common identity, while mistrusting relations are characterised by difference. However, poststructuralists argue that power relations demarcate the boundaries between 'us' and 'them' as the latter is constructed as degenerate. The operation of this power and identity takes place within discourses (Campbell 2010, 225–226). Also, the identities are not fixed and stable: they are in permanent need of reiteration (Campbell 1998, 12).

As mentioned earlier, poststructuralism also refers to emotions displaying trust: it introduces emotions in different ways. According to Howarth, some authors position emotions within the discourse (2013, 180). When discourse is defined as synonymous with language and meaning, emotions are non-discursive elements. However, according to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, the difference between 'the linguistic and the behavioural aspects of social practice' should be collapsed (2001, 107). These poststructuralists find that bodily reactions emerge in the discourse (Howarth 2013, 180). There is the argument that even though emotions are experienced through our bodies 'specific social and cultural surroundings influence how individuals gain an understanding of what it means to feel' (Bleiker and Hutchison 2014, 504). Often emotions are inexpressible as it is difficult to convey, for instance, a sense of trauma, as one is left speechless.

However, even though imperfect, the emotions will be expressed in some form (Hutchison 2010, 69–70). When they are expressed, feelings such as fear or trust are embedded within a social context which help to make emotions meaningful. Emotions are not merely internal states, but are shaped by mutual exchange through language and practices (Hutchison 2016, 91). 'Emotions help individuals to make sense of representations, while over time representations also help to shape and reshape individual emotions' (Hutchison 2016, 285). Emotions are cultural representations themselves: all emotions are expressed or communicated which are interpreted by others (Bleiker and Hutchison 2014, 506). Similar to other representations, such as identities and practices, power relations draw up boundaries what can be said and done with regard to emotions. People monitor daily their emotions for their acceptability (Hutchison 2016, 94).

Again the discussion is whether emotions such as trust can be tied to the level of state identity of India or the US. According to Ty Solomon, the focus on language negates the emotional dimension. Emotions are felt at the level of the body, yet poststructuralism is reverting back to discourse rather than the embodiment of feelings (Solomon 2015, 60–61).[10] However, with regard to the Cuban Missile crisis, individuals can experience these feelings through the repetition of meanings and images via the media, which helps to construct a shared sense of distrust of outsiders by identifying as American.

There is a fear that American values are under attack by the Soviet Union. This is the expression of emotions through various meanings (Bleiker and Hutchison 2014, 506; Crawford 2013, 122).

Also, nuclear tests conducted by India, as occurred in 1974 and 1998, could potentially give expression to powerful emotions. Meanings attached to India display the emotions felt by Americans, such as 'an aggressive act by India' or 'a bold action'. As emotions shape identities and other meanings, scholars analyse how they are formed. According to David Howarth,

> Affects and passions come to the fore in those moments of agency, when subjects identify with new discourses and objects, but they are also significant in accounting for the persistence of sedimented structures, as they foreground the enjoyments subjects procure form their identifications.
>
> (2013, 182)

Through the subjects' identification with, for instance, ethnic identities or nationalism, poststructuralists can discuss emotions such as trust or mistrust (Howarth 2013, 181). These are one of the 'processes that render individual emotions collective and thus political' (Bleiker and Hutchison 2014, 491).

Emotions do not merely shape identities but also practices. As a social construct, emotions help to make sense of the other representations, such as identities and practices, and also the other way around.[11] With regard to practices, trust or mistrust between India and the US, for instance, emerges through 'the actual practices agents engage in and the meanings they intersubjectively create' (Michel 2012, 875). In order to gain dominance, it is reiterated and eventually turned into conventional wisdom (Brugger 2015, 82; McDonald 2005, 302). This is not the same iteration as found within rational approaches. These practices are performed regularly and based on self-evident know-how (Pouliot 2008). In reference to Pouliot's logic of practicality, Torsten Michel calls this the 'capacity of active coping' (Michel 2012, 874; Pouliot 2008).

About diplomats Pouliot writes, for instance:

> Clearly, commonsense, intelligence, and tact cannot be learned in books through formal schemes; nor are they strictly the result of conscious deliberation or reflection. The diplomatic skills identified by practitioners and which constitute the social fabric of international politics are background dispositions acquired in and through practice.
>
> (Pouliot 2008, 258)

With regard to security communities, and relations amongst fewer countries, such as India and the US, trust is also seen as important, but it is 'an inarticulate feeling derived from practical sense' (Pouliot 2008, 278).

According to Pouliot, the reason for trust is not 'verbalizible' (2008, 278). Nevertheless, this feeling is dependent on a history of relations and social context, which is also stressed by authors who discuss emotions and post-structuralism, as mentioned above. A discourse determines what actions are acceptable and imaginable (Brugger 2015, 82).

Hence, poststructuralist insights show that trust is a secure relationship which is made possible by discursive identity-formation, practices, and emotions, which are expressed through meanings. The meanings attached can be reiterated which helps them to become common sense. Trust is not a rational choice. The next section analyses these meanings within statements during the visits of heads of state. I discuss the case studies as selected by Muppidi and Hayes. Muppidi chose the second Eisenhower administration, because he is interested in how the US tried to 'woo India' during the highly successful 1959 visit which gives a lot of interaction between different visions (Muppidi 1999, 133). Hayes selected the South Asia crisis in 1971 in order to show how democracies can disagree, but not fight each other. I will go through these case studies again to reveal the identity construction, emotions, and practices which help to create more or less trusting relations. The less trusting the relationship, the more objects and subjects are articulated as insecure.

Eisenhower and Nehru

The US–India relationship was distant and characterised by oscillations during the Cold War (Kux 1992; Wetering 2016a, 29). At the start of the 1950s, the US and India distrusted each other. For instance, the first Eisenhower administration transferred US arms to Pakistan rather than India and allowed it to become part of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in the fight against communism in 1955. Muppidi does not refer to trust or mistrust, but he argues that India's security imaginary was misunderstood by the US. By seeking to articulate India as part of the US anti-communist discourse, this generated insecurity for the Indians as it recalled the experience of colonisation (Muppidi 1999, 136–144). However, the relationship became somewhat more secure from 1956 onwards under Eisenhower and Kennedy. Since the US started to identify India's difficult economic conditions as attractive to communism, India received substantial economic assistance from the United States (Kapur and Ganguly 2007, 643; Kux 1992, 144–145, 186). This improvement is also demonstrated by the discursive identifications, emotions, and practices during the state visits in December 1956 and December 1959.

With regard to the state visits in 1956 and 1959, the US and India became slowly more trusting, as evidenced by the articulation of a shared identity. Initially, in the 1956 joint statement following discussions of the Prime Minister and the President, both countries were said to have 'strong ties of friendship deriving from their common objectives and

their adherence to the highest principles of free democracy' (Eisenhower and Nehru 1956). However, the meanings of freedom and democracy were ambivalent. For instance, freedom was a 'critical word and the key idea' for the US administration, as Eisenhower stated at a reception in India (Eisenhower 1959a). It came to represent the US and its allies against the Soviet Union. In fact, during the Truman administration, India and other countries were also presented as 'free' and 'free people' resisting subjugation (Truman 1949, 1947).

For India, however, freedom was related to its colonial past by coming out of its 'bondages' as a self-respecting nation and through celebrating its independence (Nehru 1947; 1955). The same was the case with the meaning of democracy. For India, it was a recognition of its newly found status, while it was tied to freedom as part of the US understanding. Not surprisingly, the 1956 joint statement also stated that both counties were 'convinced that the *greater understanding* of their respective policies reached at these talks' would help in achieving peaceful relations among nations [Italics added] (Eisenhower and Nehru 1956). Indeed, Prime Minister Nehru had discussed non-alignment as an antidote against divisions into two blocs at the first gathering of the leaders of all independent African and Asian nations at Bandung in Indonesia in 1955.[12] However, these particular differences were not emphasised in 1956 and 1959, which was also apparent when Eisenhower praised the Indians in 1959 as the US paid tribute to their culture, progress, and 'their strength among the independent nations' (Eisenhower 1959b).

Different from 1956, the 1959 joint statement stated that they shared 'common ideals and objectives and their quest for peace' rather than a free democracy (Eisenhower and Nehru 1959). A wish to achieve a trusting bond was articulated through sameness. In his speech at the reception, Eisenhower also moved beyond the usual meanings. As Eisenhower said:

> We of these two peaceful nations believe there are greater things in the world even than peace. They are the ideals, the hopes, and aspirations of humanity; our loyalty to conscience. They are the integrity of purpose; unswerving devotion to principle; love of truth and decency. People who believe and practice these things are certain to be friends.
>
> (Eisenhower 1959a)

He recognised India for sharing the same ideals and aiming for peace. The relationship was based on a deeper moral grounding. When Eisenhower referred to India's democracy and freedom, he stated:

> Between the first largest democracy on earth, India, and the second largest, America, lie ten thousand miles of land and ocean. But in our fundamental ideas and convictions about democracy we are close neighbors. We ought to be closer. We who are free – and we who prize

> our freedom above all other gifts of God and nature – must know each other better; we must trust each other more; we must support each other.
>
> (Eisenhower 1959a)

Even though there was mistrust and a lack of support for anti-communism, the Eisenhower administration recognised India by regularly referring to it as a democracy for the first time ever since India's independence in 1947. It was a 'sister democracy' (Eisenhower 1959a).

There were still differences in understandings of world politics. In an emotional sense, the US also experienced mistrust and insecurity about India due to its 'anxiety' regarding the Soviet Union (Eisenhower 1959b). According to Eisenhower, there was a 'special community of interest' sharing a democratic identity with a diverse population (Eisenhower 1959b). Eisenhower added:

> You and we never boast that ours is the only way […]. We both seek the improvement and betterment of all our citizens by assuring that the state will serve, not master its own people or any other people. Above all, our basic goals are the same.
>
> (Eisenhower 1959b)

In Eisenhower's articulation, the identities of the US and India were juxtaposed against an absent Other, which wanted to dominate and master others (Muppidi 1999, 134). By emphasising their shared democratic identity, it implied that there was a shared enemy: the Soviet Union which was naturalised as an authoritarian country.

President Eisenhower tried to explain the 'anxiety and suffering and tragedy' which the Americans felt by the hands of the Soviet Union (Eisenhower 1959b). In his 1959 speech to the joint sessions of Indian parliament, President Eisenhower referred to the Korean War at the start of the 1950s and how there were alarm bells because of 'aggressive intensions of an alien philosophy backed by great military strength' (Eisenhower 1959b). The Soviet Union was again Othered which is 'the ability to represent things as alien, subversive, dirty, or sick [that] has been pivotal to the articulation of danger in the American experience' (Campbell 1998, 3). At the time, India had indeed supported the Security Council's condemnation of North Korea's invasion by disagreeing with the US administration's anxiety about a connection with the larger communist threat (Chaudhuri 2014, 53–55). In 1950, Prime Minister Nehru sent Indian envoys to attempt to open up talks in the UK, the Soviet Union, and the US in order to resolve the Korean War (Kux 1992, 72–73). This clashed with the anxieties felt in the US. Eisenhower thus presented a dangerous world by portraying 'a world too often tragically divided by misgiving and mistrust and quarrel', even though the 'conference table shall replace the propaganda mill' (Eisenhower 1959b).

Emotionally, India's postcolonial understanding also generated insecurity about the US, as Muppidi mentions. Eisenhower acknowledged an earlier speech by Nehru on India's 'three evils', including 'political subjection, racial inequality [and] economic misery', but the President argued that the US was not one of the colonisers (Eisenhower 1959b; Muppidi 1999, 135). Eisenhower stressed that

> I come here representing a nation that wants not an acre of another people's land; that seeks no control of another people's government; that pursues no program of expansion in commerce or politics or power of any sort at another people's expense.
>
> (Eisenhower 1959; Muppidi 1999, 120)

Sameness was produced between the US and India through their shared colonial past. The similarity between the fight against the British and the Soviet domination was voiced.

However, India did not want to be hailed into the US understanding of shared experiences. It wanted to be acknowledged on its own terms rather than supporting US anti-communist security imaginary. In order to conduct trusting relations, India sought recognition as a country that could achieve progress, similar to the US. This was related to the modernization theory of 1957 as developed by Professor Walt Rostow and Max Millikan, which argued that countries should achieve progress by going through different development stages. Nehru referred to 'the great effort that India was making, through her Five Year Plans, to develop the country, both in regard to agriculture and industry, so as to raise the living standards of the people as rapidly as possible' (Eisenhower and Nehru 1959). India was presented as achieving progress through its own means and through a socialist-style planned economy.[13] Eisenhower acknowledged that:

> The near conclusion of her second 5-year program is proof that the difficulty of a problem is only the measure of its challenge to men and women of determined will. India is a triumph that offsets the world's failures of the past decade.
>
> (Eisenhower 1959b)

There was also mistrust in terms of practices, but the practices were less distrusting in 1959 compared to 1956. The 1956 joint statement was very short, even though they spent a day and a half together (Kux 1992, 140). As a diplomatic practice, joint statements usually refer to several shared ideas or policy statements. However, the statement left much unsaid and merely saw a shared bond through 'the principles of the UN' (Eisenhower and Nehru 1956). Instead, the joint statement of 1959 included two speeches by both leaders and one joint paragraph, although it did not convey any policy points. There were more trusting relations between the

Soviet Union and India, as Muppidi discusses. When Nehru visited the Soviet Union in 1955, they allowed India to draft a joint statement. According to Muppidi, the Soviet Union recognised India as a great and independent power similar to the Soviet Union rather than a colonial subject (1999, 142). Nevertheless, US–India relations revealed much more distrust under the Nixon administration than the second Eisenhower administration, as the next section discusses.

Nixon and Indira Gandhi

After the second Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, mistrust was on the rise within the relationship. Initially, President Nixon pursued a disengaged foreign policy toward India and Pakistan similar to the Johnson administration. However, the South Asia crisis broke out in 1971, during which the Nixon administration was either aloof or overbearing. As mentioned above, Hayes argues that India's democratic identity removed any possibility of larger involvement by Nixon and Kissinger, because the US population and other US politicians regarded India as trustworthy (2013). In public, it was difficult to securitise India due to its democratic status. According to Hayes, the articulations within the US public discourse were thus 'radically different' from the ones they used privately (2013, 61). They referred, for example, to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi as the 'old witch', while in public they discussed India's democratic government (Nixon 1971a).[14] However, I argue that the representations in the US public discourse were not completely different, because the articulations remained insecure through raising doubts about the Other. This became clear during the state visits which displayed a lack of trust, as evidenced by the discursive identities, emotions, and practices.

The crisis began with the people from East Pakistan electing the Awami League, an East Pakistan party in December 1970 in order to gain more autonomy. In March 1971, West Pakistan responded with a military clampdown on East Pakistan, which led to millions of East Pakistanis seeking refuge in India (Dallek 2007, 335; Sisson and Rose 1990). Soon Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi supported the Bangladeshi struggle for independence, because the East Pakistani refugees were overstretching India's resources. Nixon did not agree with India's position, because he secretly intended to improve relations with China through a West Pakistani channel: the channel needed protection. The crisis eventually changed into an Indo-Pakistani armed conflict in December 1971, in which Pakistan continued to receive Nixon's support, to the dismay of the Indian government. Expecting closer Indo-Soviet relations and greater interest of India in Pakistan's territory, President Nixon even ordered the USS Enterprise, a nuclear aircraft carrier, along with four escorts to proceed to the Bay of Bengal, about which President Nixon remained silent about what the exact mission was (Garthoff 1994, 271; Wetering 2016a, 85).

Nevertheless, the war ended quickly with India and Pakistan moving towards a ceasefire on 17 December 1971.

Emotionally, Indira Gandhi emphasised mistrust within the relationship during her meeting with Nixon and Kissinger in November 1971: 'Naturally, there have been differences of assessment and emphasis. And since our people and our legislatures live by speaking out, there have been moments of awkward candor' (Gandhi 1971b). Indeed, the meeting was not very productive. There are records which show that Nixon and Kissinger responded angrily to Indira Gandhi afterwards.[15] This was also reflected by the diplomatic practices enacted. It is customary that a country refers to the large problems presented in the other country, but President Nixon failed to mention the refugee crisis. He said: '[Your] heart is heavy because of various problems, but particularly more recently the floods that have devastated parts of your land' (Nixon 1971b). Other crises were constructed as more important. In response, Mrs Gandhi made an emotional appeal. She mentions how she was 'haunted by the tormented faces in our overcrowded refugee camps' in 'beleaguered' India (Gandhi 1971a). Yet, whilst she came 'looking for a deeper understanding of the situation' in order 'to save humanity from despair', she did not find this with her counterpart. As she argued:

> [M]ay I recall the sheer magnitude of the problem? Can you think of the entire population of Michigan State suddenly converging onto New York State? […] We are paying the price of our traditions of an open society, of all peoples, surely those of the United States should understand this. Has not your own society been built of people who have fled from social and economic injustices? Have not your doors always been open? None of our friends, and especially not those who share common ideals, would expect us to abandon our long-cherished democratic principles.
>
> (Gandhi 1971b)

The sameness in terms of democratic values had accounted to nothing. Prior to and during the crisis, the Nixon government had articulated a shared sense of freedom and a democracy. Similar to Eisenhower, Nixon spoke of the large elections in India and how Indira Gandhi 'represents the world's largest free nation, the world's largest democracy' and how they are 'bound together by a higher morality' (Nixon 1971b). However, Nixon did not move beyond anti-communist articulations. He argued that the US and India were devoted to freedom and representative government, while they were both 'independent of foreign domination' (Nixon 1971b). Nixon also called India the 'bastion of democracy in Asia' implying that other countries were under siege while India represented a stronghold amongst authoritarian nations (Nixon 1969a). Again it referred to Soviet domination. India was presented as 'free' from subjugation rather than in her own terms. Instead,

Mrs. Gandhi referred to their 'ideals' by declaring that '[w]e share a community of ideals, and there is no real conflict of interests between us' (Gandhi 1971a). She saw 'much difference' and commonalities: 'We are both large societies, composed of diverse ethnic elements, proud of our regional diversity, resentful of imposed uniformity' (1971b).

There was also another representation which displayed mistrust and insecurity amongst the US and India: India's representation as a 'large' democracy. Nixon said that India was the 'greatest democracy in terms of numbers in all the history of the world – 500 million people' (Nixon 1971c). However, according to Indira Gandhi, '[t]he size of my country and the complex situations which confront us have led to many prophecies of despair', while, in fact, it has shown great 'resilience' (Gandhi 1971b). India was thus constructed by the Nixon administration as a great country due to its size and numbers rather than any of its own achievements. Indeed, Indian crowds were often presented as frightening to westerners (Rotter 2000, 10). India's size was related to two themes: one of economic development and stability. For instance, President Nixon said that he 'followed with particular interest the steady progress' as it was 'proud of the role it has played, through economic assistance in India's economic progress' (Nixon 1969a).

Indeed, with the second Eisenhower administration and President Kennedy's, economic support to India increased. However, Nixon added: 'Only in peace can Asian nations devote their full energy and attention to the most important problem they face: the grave human problem of meeting the expectations of men, women, and children' (Nixon 1969a). The Asian countries needed to achieve progress in order to sustain their population. Amongst the binary of the advanced West and the dependent Asia, India was articulated as less developed, or, in other words, one of 'those lands that are newly developing' (Nixon 1971b). There was the gospel of the first, second, and third world development, which created a new pattern of domination. This hierarchy of worlds invoked colonialism and racism (Hunt 1987, 162).

India should not squander its resources, as was the case with earlier Indo-Pakistan conflicts in 1965. The Nixon administration added: 'We respect India's way […] We firmly believe that Asian problems must be resolved by the people of Asia'. However, Asia was regarded as unstable, while the US had an 'important stake in the stability of Asia' with the fight against communism (Nixon 1969a). Instead, Indira Gandhi stated that India was acting on its own and was a very strong country. As she said, aid had been 'generously given […] as a symbol of the involvement of advanced nations and, most especially, of the United States in the developing world'. However, any progress was also the effort of 'the labor and sacrifice or our own people' (1971b).

The US audience including the Congress members did not abandon India, as Hayes argues (2013, 78). Discursively, the viewpoints by President Nixon and Kissinger were rejected as they were not common sense. Visiting the

crisis zone during the summer, for instance, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass) said in a hearing on the topic that it was 'distressing' how the Nixon administration continued 'to gloss over a basic cause of the crisis: the continued violence in East Pakistan and the increasing flow of refugees into India' (1971, 355). Nevertheless, there were very distrusting relations on the basis of articulated identities, emotions, and practices.

Conclusion

This chapter shows that we can come to a more nuanced understanding of what trust is by focusing on underlying identity constructions, emotions, and practices. It demonstrates that trust refers to a secure relationship which is discursively constituted. Trust evolves as identities, emotions, and practices are constructed through the meanings attached. These constructions help to shape each other: one cannot go without the other. This account thus wants to move beyond the rationalist account, because 'strategic trust' is a *contradictio in terminis*. Trust is not an easily graspable phenomenon, but it is based, for instance, on moral, subjective, and emotional assumptions that the Other can be trusted. Trust should be analyzed as an elusive concept beyond our reach. Poststructuralism captures these assumptions through trust as a discursive construction, by which trust is not seen as fixed but always in the process of becoming. This is also the reason why we need to move beyond a conventional constructivist account, because it presumes causality and measurability.

With regard to US–India relations, the chapter analysed two social constructivist authors who showed that the relationship was insecure, but it did not lead to war. This chapter demonstrates that these insecure relations varied over time, even though it never fully transformed into a trusting relationship. The relationship experienced more mistrust during the South Asia crisis than in the latter part of the 1950s. The decrease in trust was reflected by the underlying identity constructions, emotions, and practices which made possible insecurity and mistrust. The less trusting a relationship, the more representations are constructed as insecure. It would be of interest to examine the underlying constructions that enabled the opposite: the emergence of trust after the Cold War. As mentioned in this chapter, the US–India relationship improved greatly from the late 1990s onwards.

Notes

1 Social constructivism is a broad term which includes all types. However, there is a positivist/post-positivist division between 'conventional' or 'mainstream' constructivism and 'critical' constructivism or constructivism grounded in poststructuralism.
2 Other authors also discuss the impact of India's identity as a 'democracy' on US policies, but they do not mention the notion of trust (Selden and Strome 2016; Widmaier 2005).

3 Despite his lack of reference to a distrusting relationship, Wesley Widmaier also explains the conflicting US–India relations during the South Asia crisis in 1971 by arguing that leaders in liberal democratic states view states with a social democratic identity as less democratic. Also, the Republican Party favoured Pakistan over India as opposed to the Democrats (2005, 431–432). However, the upsurge in relations during the second Eisenhower administration, for instance, fits less well with Widmaier's argument. Also, Eisenhower was a Republican.
4 A particular emphasis, for instance, is placed on misunderstandings of each other's cultures, and negative perceptions and images (e.g. Brands 1990; Glazer 1990; Heimsath 1998; Isaacs 1958; Palmer 1954; Rotter 2000). Other analyses stress the lack of national security concerns. The US pursued a policy which clashed with its concerns in South Asia (e.g. Kux 1992; McMahon 1994; Nayar and Paul 2003; Rudolph 2008).
5 According to Philipp Brugger, these statements have their flaws, but they circumvent the problem of analysing individual beliefs in order to track trust (2015, 87).
6 It also depends on 'mutually successful predictions of behaviour, and of cooperative action [through] […] mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision-making' (Deutsch 1957, 36).
7 In this manner, decision-making can harbor 'emotive *and* rational, dispositional and strategic components' (Michel 2012, 886).
8 Conventional constructivists include Peter Katzenstein, John Ruggie, and Alexander Wendt (see also Wetering 2016b, 2).
9 The definition of security also makes assumptions about, for instance, the nature of the referent object, the threat and the state of world politics, but also what responsibilities, norms, and values circulate and what the end goals are (McDonald 2005, 299).
10 This refers indeed to a larger debate about whether emotions should be necessarily attached to the body and whether it can be linked to the state (Bleiker and Hutchison 2014, 419).
11 Instead of a representation, Janice Bially Mattern sees emotions as a practice, yet they are also socially meaningful and can be analysed with specific discursive methods (2011, 80, 83).
12 India was one of the leading non-aligned countries, which stood for non-involvement in disputes between the two blocs that were of little interest to the non-aligned.
13 This is the development theme which was articulated in the US discourse. There are also the non-alignment, stability, and democracy themes (Wetering 2016a).
14 During the state visit in 1971, Kissinger said to Nixon on the White House tapes: 'We really slobbered over the old witch'. 'You slobbered over her in things that did not matter', Kissinger admitted, 'but in things that did matter, you didn't give her an inch' (Nixon 1971a).
15 Kissinger's overall assessment was that 'the Indians are bastards anyway. They are starting a war there.… To them East Pakistan is no longer the issue' (Nixon 1971a).

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Part II

Rational and psychological approaches to trust in International Relations

4 The role of rational trust in ASEAN's creation

Scott Edwards

Introduction

Whilst the role of trust between the states constituting the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been recognised (see Roberts 2010; Keating and Wheeler 2014), there have been few studies that actually focus on the concept and the dynamics of this trust. ASEAN, the Southeast Asian intergovernmental organisation, was formed in 1967 by Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The initial goal of bringing closer association between these countries has since expanded to also encompass Vietnam, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. Whilst now being involved in many sectors, ASEAN is crucially recognised as being a significant factor in transforming Southeast Asia from a region with widespread conflict to one which is now experiencing a 'long peace' (Kivimäki 2001).

The lack of focus on trust is particularly problematic, as scholarship surrounding ASEAN is engaged in a debate on whether, and the extent to which, the regional organisation constitutes a Security Community. Within this concept trust is recognised as playing an important role, even if trust is again under-conceptualised. This chapter aims to partly address this omission through a case study of ASEAN's creation in 1967, suggesting that trust is of importance when attempting to explain the absence of war in the region. The chapter argues that it was rational trust[1] in particular that was a necessary condition for ASEAN's creation and through this aims to make three primary contributions. By arguing that trust was necessary at the initial stage of ASEAN, the chapter further aims to argue that this makes trust a significant mechanism in the ASEAN context. Owing to this, there should be an in-depth and independent focus on trust when considering whether ASEAN constitutes a Security Community today.

While constructivist or psychological based trust are useful concepts, instead rational trust is the most significant for analysing the way in which relationships characterised by distrust were transformed into trusting relationships in the case of ASEAN's creation. It further argues that by recognising that trust has multiple inputs, as trust is a multi-dimensional and

temporal phenomenon, International Relations literature can move beyond polarising debates that claim, both explicitly and implicitly, that trust is best understood as having one specific basis only. By arguing that rational trust was of most significance, and a necessary element in the formation of ASEAN, the chapter positions itself against literature arguing against the role of rational trust in organisational creation.

This chapter will first offer an overview of the current debates concerning the role of trust in ASEAN, in particular arguing that these have significant limitations due to the way in which trust is (not) conceptualised. This creates problems when it comes to attempting trust's measurements and its effects. It will then offer a multi-dimensional conceptualisation of trust, whereby trust is seen as characterised by different bases or antecedents at different times depending upon the context, as well as indicators for measuring trust. Following this, the chapter will move on to the case study of ASEAN's creation. In order to demonstrate the importance of rational trust, the chapter focuses on the most conflictual relationships preceding the creation, those of Indonesian and Malaysian elites.[2]

By focusing on the most problematic relationship and the one which is said to be providing the cornerstone of ASEAN (Liow 2005), the process of transformation from distrusting to trusting relationships can be identified. Through this, it will argue that a willingness to make oneself vulnerable to the other that was present in ASEAN's creation came about due to trust that was grounded in decision-making based on rational calculations. Despite this, these initial calculations do not preclude a possibility for trust to deepen to other bases in future. The analysis in this chapter is based mainly on primary documents and memoirs, but also includes a limited number of interviews which assist in interrogating elite perceptions concerning trust.

The role of trust in ASEAN

Trust (or mistrust) is widely recognised as a potential factor when analysing the role of ASEAN in regional relations (Roberts 2010; Keating and Wheeler 2014; Emmers 2016), but there is a lack of detailed exploration both empirically and theoretically on whether trust is important. This is of significance when considering that there is an ongoing debate concerning ASEAN as a Security Community (Jones and Smith 2002; Acharya 2014; Emmers 2016). Security Communities are groupings of states where there is no expectation or planning for inter-state conflict, and instead dependable expectation of peaceful change (see Adler and Barnett 2008). The concept itself has trust at its core, even though the issue remains under-conceptualised. Deutsch and his colleagues, in their original discussion of Security Communities, argued that states could generate 'mutual trust' as long as they habitually evaded conflict (Deutsch *et al.* 1957, 6–7).

Mutual trust was one of the key pillars alongside mutual sympathy, common interests, and a sense of community that generated 'we-feeling' (Deutsch *et al.* 1957, 6–7, 36). However, whilst there is recognition of the role trust may play, there is no conceptualisation of what trust is. Keating and Wheeler highlight that it is not clear to the extent to which trust is important as a causal mechanism in Security Community construction (2014, 64–65). Trust takes on greater importance in Adler and Barnett's (1998) work that reformulates the Security Community concept by providing it with a constructivist theoretical basis. Within this framework, Security Communities emerge through interplay between mutual trust and collective identity formation, and the degree of trust is one of the indicators for the depth of the Security Community (Adler and Barnett 1998, 17, 30).

In this formulation, trust is at the core as it allows actors to reconceptualise themselves and 'reimagine their social bonds' through the trust building process (Adler and Barnett 1998, 42–45). However, whilst Adler and Barnett define trust as 'believing despite uncertainty', problems emerge since they are inconsistent with the causal process. They argue at some points that trust is a pre-requisite for the emergence of collective identities, and at others that identity produces trust. This is particularly problematic since the Security Community literature has gone on to side-line the role of trust, and instead focuses primarily on identity (for example Bellamy 2004; Adler 2008; Adler and Greve 2009; Keating and Wheeler 2014; for exceptions see Pouliot 2008).

This omission is particularly demonstrated in the studies on ASEAN as a Security Community. Acharya's (2014) seminal study, for example, recognises the importance of trust and incorporates it into his framework, through explicitly stating that 'the development of a pluralistic security community means investigating the development of trust, especially through norms of conduct' (2014, 20). In this social constructivist understanding of ASEAN, drawing upon Adler and Barnett, he lays out a framework for the way in which trust would occur through norms that help constitute, and are constituted by, a sense of common identity similar to Deutch's idea of 'we-feeling' through a process of socialisation (2014, 15–22). Beyond this, however, he provides no conceptualisation of what he considers the concept of trust to actually be, seeing it only as an outcome and, despite the recognition of its importance, does not feature the term 'trust' in his research questions (Acharya 2014, 36).

This is a recurring theme in his works; in the chapter Acharya contributed to Adler and Barnett's 1998 volume, he mentions trust only once in passing and argues that collective identity emerges from multilateralism, norms, and the creation and manipulation of symbols (1998, 208–212). This socialisation process has transformed state interests and resulted in overcoming tensions; implicitly suggesting they have developed a degree of trust (Acharya 2014, 255–260). Such an argument is problematic as there

is no exploration of what his indicators would be regarding the measurement of trust, and he comes to no explicit conclusion on whether trust is present. This is despite the fact that the three recognised stages of security community – nascent, ascendant, and mature – are all delineated by different depths or degrees of trust, which would suggest that an exploration of trust would be beneficial in ascertaining where ASEAN lies (Acharya 2014, 30). In line with Acharya's arguments, much of the literature continues to focus on debates concerning the role of identity when suggesting that ASEAN is a 'nascent' (Acharya 2014), or a 'loosely coupled' (Bellamy 2004) Security Community. Little time is invested in defining the concept of trust and exploring whether trust is present between the states (for further examples see Kivimäki 2001; Emmerson 2005; Dosch 2007; Ba 2009).

Studies that do provide a greater focus on trust in ASEAN demonstrate that progress is being made in considering causal mechanisms beyond identity (Roberts 2010; Keating and Wheeler 2014), but as of yet trust remains under-conceptualised and under-explored in regards to its conceptualisation, its measurement, and also its effect. Roberts provides perhaps the most empirical depth in his argument that states the importance of focusing less on structure (the normative aspects), and giving greater attention to agents and actors within ASEAN (Roberts 2010). In this, whilst recognising the importance of social learning, he explores how feelings of mutual trust are preconditions for the existence of dependable change, and draws upon the Social Identity Theory to justify the importance of actors in the formation of a collective identity (Roberts 2010, 11–12). Whilst norms are seen as the means to an end, he sees trust as being relevant in assessing how likely peace is to be, and argues states will 'not agree to be bonded by agreements in the absence of trust' (Roberts 2010, 17, 30).

The deficiency, however, in this work lies in the fact that it does not address the literature on trust within International Relations. Roberts also does not define his concept of what trust is. Instead, he offers it as being a central dimension to the constituent elements of community where trust is required for predictability, removal of ideational obstacles to decision-making and ultimately creating a sense of 'we-ness' (Roberts 2010, 30–34). It is difficult to ascertain the level of trust he sees as being within ASEAN, as he does not offer indicators of trust beyond surveys among 'elites' from ASEAN countries. These are problematic as there is no definition of these elites or even implication that they have any role in foreign policy or particularly in ASEAN. Within his empirical analysis he does not make many references to the trust dimension or the relationship between this and the lack of cohesion (Roberts 2010, 79, 87–97, 111–118).

Whilst Roberts offers a great deal of empirical exploration, even if this is not necessarily matched with his arguments on trust's centrality in ASEAN, Keating and Wheeler's argument suffers the opposite under-exploration (2014, 58). They argue that ASEAN is a robust Security

Regime based on a constructivist underpinning due to trust. It remains one of the most convincing theoretical considerations of trust in the Security Community context that has been applied to ASEAN, as trust is recognised, conceptualised, and linked to their argument throughout. In it they argue that ASEAN has the potential to become an emerging Security Community, but that it remains a robust Security Regime as trusting relationships between elites are not yet embedded into societies, and military planning against each other continues (2014, 58). This leads to a circumstance where limited trust is not sufficient to overcome mistrust concerning each other's intentions, and trust building has not led to the emergence of a collective identity (2014, 72). Instead, new practices of trust building are required (2014, 73). However, the work is not particularly in depth empirically – limited to only a few pages – which limit the theoretical explanation (Keating and Wheeler 2014, 71–74).

Such limitations are important as the identity aspect of ASEAN has been heavily critiqued on the basis that the norms said to constitute the collective identity are inconsistently adhered to, or that the norms themselves, centred on non-interference, are incompatible with collective identity construction (see for example Jones and Smith 2002; Khoo 2004). Despite this, other potential causal mechanisms related to identity in the literature have not been explored. Of further importance is that those that argue that ASEAN is a Security Community need to address arguments which emphasise mistrust within the region – especially as these studies are more rigorous in their conceptualisation. Emmers, for example, adopts Kydd's conception of trust to argue that ASEAN is not a Security Community as residual mistrust prevents ASEAN from addressing inter-state disputes (2016). Whilst it has deficiencies, such as a lack of measurement of trust and mistrust, the focus on mistrust is of greater depth than any studies on trust. In order to effectively counter critiques more rigour is required in terms of conceptualisation, indicators, measurement, and outcomes of trust through systematic applications of the concept.

Conceptualising trust

Owing to the requirement for more rigour in regard to conceptualisation and measurement of trust, this chapter will now turn to laying out an inclusive definition of trust, as well as indicators and methods for its measurement. Specifically, it draws upon a trust-as-process framework. It suggests that trust can have rational, social, or psychological bases, that these concepts are not incompatible with each other, and that the bases of trust can differ depending on the context of the relationship being analysed. Trust as a process constitutes multiple potential 'inputs', which lead to a 'decision' to trust and finally results in an 'output' of trusting behaviour. Within this process the decision to trust is derived from the inputs, which incorporates (1) disposition; (2) assessment of trustworthiness based on behaviours, character, and

motives (more often referred to as ability, benevolence, and integrity, ABI); (3) quality and nature of the trustee-trustor relationship; (4) situational factors; and (5) domain-specific concerns (Dietz and Hartog 2006, 564). These inputs lead to an intention to accept vulnerability under conditions of risk with positive expectations that the trustor will not be harmed. In turn, this decision leads to behaviour that is a manifestation of this intention and the positive expectations.

Trust has proven difficult to define, especially within International Relations (see Hoffman 2002; Kydd 2005; Booth and Wheeler 2008; Ruzicka and Wheeler 2010; Rathbun 2011, 2012; Wheeler 2013). However, most definitions used, both in International Relations and other fields of literature such as Business, incorporate elements of positive expectations (Wheeler 2013) and belief (Hoffman 2002; Kydd 2005; Rathbun 2011). These beliefs and expectations, however, do not fully encapsulate trust on their own. For it to be trust, such expectations are given meaning by the fact that they operate despite conditions of risk and potential vulnerability, due to uncertainty, that the trustee may not reciprocate and may harm the trustor (Ruzicka and Wheeler 2010, 72; Rathbun 2011; 2012, 10–11). Whilst Keating and Ruzicka argue that a trustor, if trusting, is not aware of such vulnerability, their definition also encapsulates the idea that the trustor is operating under conditions of risk despite not feeling vulnerable due to the belief they have in the other (2014).

This focus on trust involving some form of belief or positive expectation, as well as vulnerability and harm, is further reinforced within literature outside of International Relations. Within Business – the field in which the framework the chapter draws upon originates – a growing consensus has emerged around Rousseau's definition of trust as a 'psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of the other' (Rousseau *et al.* 1998, 395; see also Mollering *et al.* 2004, 560; Mollering 2006, 7–9; Colquitt *et al.* 2007, 909; Lewicki and Brinsfield 2012; Lyon *et al.* 2012, 2; 31; Pytlikzillig and Kimbrough 2016, 18). The emerging consensus shows that these elements constitute the general agreement concerning any definition of trust (Fulmer and Geldfund 2012, 1171; Lyon *et al.* 2015, 169). As within the International Relations literature, these expectations or beliefs gain meaning through the interplay between risk, uncertainty, and vulnerability, as without this vulnerability and risk trust would not be required (Zand 1972; Gambetta 1988; Meyerson *et al.* 1996, 424; Mollering 2006, 7; Lyon *et al.* 2015, 169).

Whilst consensus is emerging in both the literatures on these constitutive elements of trust, they have significant debates on the bases of trust which undermine any emerging consensus in how to operationalise it, as demonstrated by the divergences between rational, constructivist, and psychological approaches to trust (Ruzicka and Keating 2015). As demonstrated in Ruzicka and Keating's review of trust research in International

Relations (2015), there remain strong divisions between those that have focused on trust as a rational phenomenon (for example see Kydd 2005), those that argue this ignores the social dynamics of trust and the importance of obligation (see, for example Hoffman 2002; Keating and Ruzicka 2014), and those that questions whether rationalist accounts of trust actually add value in analysing trust at all.

Rathbun, with his focus on generalised trust, further enhances the divisions when he argues that the psychological dimensions of trust should be focused upon (2012). Instead he points to the disposition of actors as explaining variation in the origins of institutionalised cooperation (Rathbun 2012). These are embedded in the social, in that this form of 'moralistic trust' reflects the behaviour of the other's character, but such judgements arise from a psychological disposition (Rathbun 2012, 25). This has led to a situation whereby within International Relations, definitions of trust remain divided due to the tendency to suggest that trust has one particular basis, and that if another basis is utilised then it is not trust that is being discussed.

This chapter argues that such definitional issues should not prevent trusts operationalisation if it is operationalised as an inclusive process incorporating different dimensions; multiple bases (or inputs), a decision to trust, and an outcome of trusting behaviour. Within Business there has been movement to reconcile the differences by suggesting that the inputs that inform trust can be assessed differently, or have different bases, depending on the context, but that it remains trust if it is constituted by the wider elements discussed above. Whilst psychological based trust, based on predisposition to trust, is considered, it is often part of an extensive process. Instead, disposition to trust (psychological), assessment of trustworthiness drawn from assessments of ability, benevolence and integrity (ABI), cognitive and affective elements, and structural and situational context, including institutions, all form the inputs to trust. Such an argument demonstrates potential overlap between psychological, rational and social bases. These inputs will be weighted differently in different contexts, situations, and stages in a trusting relationship.

Rather than there being different types of trust, or different phenomena therefore, they form part of the inputs that are drawn upon in the decision to trust – making it the same phenomenon, but one that is based on different sources (Dietz 2011, 216). For example, the assessment of ABI of the other could be calculative in the primary stage of the relationship as experience of the other is limited, so knowledge is less prevalent. However, once the relationship evolves and the sequence has been played out a number of times, it is expected that the trustor would gain knowledge of the trustee, and base future decisions on that, or begin to be less reflexive in their decisions to trust (see Lewicki and Bunker 1995). Within Business, frameworks have been created which encompass multiple trust concepts, thus allowing a thorough operationalisation of trust (Dietz and Hartog

2006; Lyon *et al.* 2015, 169; Pytlikzillig and Kimbrough 2016, 19, 37–40). One such process model, which this chapter adopts, is that created by Dietz and Hartog (2006), the 'universal dynamic sequence' of trust (see also Dietz 2011, 215).

Inputs to the decision can incorporate elements such as predisposition to trust, the assessment of trustworthiness (through assessment of ABI), the nature of the relationship, and structure or situation in which it takes place. This leads to a decision, which leads to behaviour, though such trusting behaviour may take different forms depending on the context, which the process allows for. This integrative yet coherent framework recognises the relational and longitudinal nature of trust, the importance of each element, and offers the ability to look at how trusting relationships may evolve over time and the variations that affect each stage of the relationship. This cyclical feedback model, furthermore, emphasising two actors within an interdependent process, creates a structural 'trusting relationship', an 'intersubjective, ideational structure that allows two or more actors to partially or wholly set aside existing risk and uncertainty' (Keating and Ruzicka 2014, 755). Most meaningfully, however, Dietz's model overcomes the multiplicity of trust problem, which has divided the International Relations literature. It allows us to question what basis of trust – rational, psychological, or constructivist – was important in a given case, rather than a continuing debate on why some 'types' of trust are trust whilst others are not.

Rational trust and the origins of multilateral organisations

This chapter situates itself against the dominant position in the literature to suggest that trust based on rational calculation was primarily important in the ASEAN case. Rathbun argues that multilateralism is the expression of trust, and that trust is required to begin the process of coming together to build institutions, rather than distrust characterised in the rationalist literature (2012, 2, 5). He further argues for a basis in generalised trust as rational (or strategic) trust is too limited to create multilateral institutions with qualitative and quantitative multilateralism (2012, 2, 4). In this, generalised trust is a moralistic form of trust, and it is dispositional making it a quality of the trustor, grounded in particular cooperative social orientations (2012, 30–33). What is problematic, however, is that Rathbun seems to suggest that trust is static, when arguing that rational trust cannot evolve and account for diffuse reciprocity over time, and that it is derived from experience and incentives to sustain trust (2012, 17, 18).

Instead, this chapter argues that rational trust was the necessary condition for ASEAN's creation. As this will be demonstrated, the chapter will briefly offer an overview of rational trust being adopted, before moving onto demonstrating how this will be measured. Rational trust incorporates what is known as strategic, rational, reasoned, or encapsulated trust

(Hollis 1998; Hardin 2002; Mollering 2006; Rathbun 2011, 349). Within this conception, relationships depend on interest-based calculations concerning pay-offs and deterrence, akin to the rational choice theory (Lewicki and Bunker 1995, 145; Mollering 2006, 32; Ruzicka and Wheeler 2010, 73). A rational assessment of the other would be the primary input to the assessment of trust. The benefits derived from either staying in the relationship or cheating, as well as the costs of both, are considered similar to a 'market oriented economic calculation' (Lewicki and Bunker 1995, 145). Kydd represents this conception of trust within International Relations. Kydd focuses on prediction and estimates in assessing whether states have 'assurance game' preferences, and are therefore trustworthy (Kydd 2005; Haukkala *et al.* 2015; Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 7).

This is also observed outside of International Relations with for example Hardin arguing that there are two elements crucial to the rationalist account; incentives of the trustee to honour the trust, and knowledge to justify the trustor's trust (Hardin 2002; Rathbun 2011, 350; Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 5). Crucially, for Hardin trust emerges when individuals have what he terms encapsulated interest – self-interest in reciprocating cooperation and a perception that the trustee has similar interests (2006). However, where the chapter's model departs from these accounts is that it does not agree with the implication that agents are rationalist, as often argued by scholars who focus on this conceptualisation of trust (Rathbun 2011, 351).

Instead, dispositions and emotions of individuals are important, but at this stage rationality and calculation dominate as experiences of the other are limited. It would be expected that rational trust is extremely relative and limited, as any sense of obligation is limited, but this does not mean it is not meaningful in overcoming distrust and facilitating the beginnings of a trusting relationship. This is in line with Keating and Wheeler, who identify a number of potential approaches for overcoming mistrust to form organisations – one of which is based on Osgood's Gradual Reduction in Tensions (GRIT) that highlights a rational cost-benefit calculation and small steps to reducing uncertainty (Wheeler and Keating 2014, 66).

Measurement of trust

Drawing upon arguments from Business that suggest antecedents to trust and trusting behaviour are distinct and need to be distinguished (Glaser *et al.* 2000; Dietz *et al.* 2010; Gillespie 2012, 176; Lewicki and Brinsfield 2012, 30; Uslaner 2012, 75), and that few studies actually operationalise trust by analysing the observable manifestation, this chapter will measure trust in a two-step process. First, manifestations of trust and its consequences can be observed (Mollering 2006, 129), making them ideal starting points. These behaviours can then be linked back to trust by looking at the justification for them. Furthermore, inputs that led to the decision to

engage in the potential trusting behaviour can also be observed. By linking the behaviour to trust and inputs, a degree of validity can be attained, and two different stages of the process can be measured.

Zand (1972) argues that 'behavioural trust' can be demonstrated by the amount that a trustor 'depends on another's skills, knowledge, judgements or actions, including delegating and giving autonomy, and disclosure, sharing sensitive information', based upon the prior inputs such as assessment of trustworthiness (see also Lewicki and Brinsfield 2012, 33). Whilst this is a useful basis, trusting behaviour needs to be adapted to the realm of International Relations. In order to do this, the chapter will adopt three primary behavioural indicators embedded in the International Relations literature. The first is the voluntary acceptance of vulnerability (Hoffman 2002, 376–77; Booth and Wheeler 2008, 241). The second, diffuse reciprocity, highlights reciprocation that results from trusting in relation to one issue potentially resulting in the perception that the trustor can trust in relation to further issues (Rathbun 2012). The final measure is the reduction, or absence, of hedging behaviour against a potential decision to trust (Keating and Ruzicka 2014).

In these measures all can be seen as having different degrees, which would contribute to the analysis of the basis that characterises the relationship. If acceptance of vulnerability is not particularly high, and there is significant hedging against this limited acceptance, then it can be inferred that trust is limited, and therefore characterised by one of the more limited bases. There would more likely be greater degrees of diffuse reciprocity if trust had developed to a stage whereby it was characterised by a deeper basis, such as identity – especially if there was a lack of hedging. Behaviours, therefore, will be the initial demonstrative measure.

The second measure is also of crucial importance, that of antecedents to trust. This importance is based on two issues; substantially demonstrating a basis of trust, and substantially demonstrating it is actually trust that led to the decision. Without looking at the antecedents to trust, it is difficult to argue that any decision to trust was based on any particular basis. Instead, the chapter will look at sources such as memoirs, speeches, statements, and other primary documents to attempt to substantially demonstrate the basis of the trusting decision (and behaviour). Second, analyses of antecedents are important to demonstrate that trust itself, no matter the basis, was of some importance to engaging in the behaviour, and that such behaviour was not only a result of another factor. The analysis of the sources mentioned above, therefore, will also aim to substantiate the claim that trust played a role. This can be substantiated even if such trust was limited in nature, by analysing whether there were, implicit or explicit, behavioural representations of trust, as well as statements concerning trust, and what led to them. However, whilst the chapter advocates for this measure, it also argues that when trust has a rational basis, discursive representations would be low compared to behavioural manifestations.

ASEAN's creation

This chapter argues that the creation of ASEAN was constituted by a number of trusting behaviours, particularly the willingness to accept vulnerability with elements of diffuse reciprocity. ASEAN was created through the Bangkok declaration in 1967 by the five founding members: Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. The institutional design was such that the declaration focused on uncontroversial topics and had no tangible enforcement mechanisms in place. However, it reflected a number of symbolic compromises that demonstrated elites were willing to endure a perceived vulnerability for the purposes of establishing ASEAN. In light of this, they had positive expectations, even if these were also limited, that these vulnerabilities would not be exploited, based on a limited form of trust.

The first such voluntary acceptance of vulnerability based upon a calculative assessment of Suharto's trustworthiness was Malaysian leader Tunku Abdul Rahman's[3] acquiescence to include a statement within the declaration concerning the temporary nature of external powers' military bases. Indonesian elites were focused upon removing foreign involvement from Southeast Asia, especially along their immediate borders, due to the heightened Cold War and the memory of a violent decolonisation. The Tunku was, prior to this, extremely concerned about allowing such a thing to come to pass. Malaysia depended on security guarantees provided to it under the 1957 treaty with the British. This impacted on Malaysia's ability to both defeat the internal communist insurgency going on within its borders and prevent Indonesia from enforcing its regional leadership on Southeast Asia as the largest state in the region (Mackie 1974, 32).

Upon independence, the strengthening of the military was seen as incompatible with a focus on attainment of development (Rahman 1984, 63–67). Instead, it was decided a small army would be sufficient as long as the treaty with the British underpinned security. Rahman himself argued that 'the stationing of Commonwealth forces in the country is of greatest importance' (Rahman 1984, 144). By undermining one of the pillars of Malaysian security, the acquiescence to include foreign bases in the declaration is demonstrative of an acceptance of vulnerability and, therefore, a trusting behaviour (Kupchan 2010, 224).

While it can be argued that the terms were vague, and there was no tangible upper limit set on the date at which British troops were obligated to withdraw, the Tunku seemingly continued to see this as vulnerability, but accepted it despite this. The fact that tangible preparations were made for the withdrawal of British troops are demonstrative of this fact. Militarily hedging against the decision for Britain to withdraw was occurring, and it is clear that Indonesia was considered a reason for requiring significant military development. However, such militarisation was not possible in a substantial manner, as Malaysia could not reach the required military

capability alone without sacrificing massive amounts of investment in its development (Mackie 1974, 221).

Indeed, the British had been reducing their commitments in Asia, and there was a concern within Malaysia that by declaring that foreign bases were temporary, it would provide the perfect 'excuse' for the British to 'abandon' their commitments (interview with a Former Malaysian Member of Parliament). Whilst the aforementioned hedging demonstrates this was only a limited acceptance of vulnerability, this chapter argues that without even a slight degree of trust, the Tunku would not have accepted such conditions. In his past dealings with Indonesia where distrust had dominated, as will be demonstrated later, he was always unwilling to offer any degree of flexibility. However, in this he was willing to compromise in order to signal to Indonesia's leader Suharto[4] that Malaysia was willing to undermine its security pillar that Indonesia saw as problematic to facilitate the creation of ASEAN. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated later, he held positive expectations that such vulnerability would not be exploited by Indonesia.

Alongside this perceived vulnerability, the Tunku also compromised on who would have the leadership role in ASEAN (Kupchan 2010, 223). The Tunku had hoped that Indonesia would join the ASA (Association of Southeast Asia), which had been his creation and which would ensure his leadership role. Whilst such a role would clearly have been symbolic, in that Indonesia had a much larger capability, the Tunku had been hopeful that Indonesia joining ASA would reduce Indonesia's ability to subvert the power of other regional powers and it would demonstrate Indonesian sincerity (Liow 2005, 110). Despite this, Suharto was unwilling to join ASA, as it had been perceived as an anti-Communist block that had sought to exclude Indonesia.

At the same time, Indonesia traditionally viewed such organisations as being a source of prestige given their foreign policy in the Third World (Haacke 2005, 43; Liow 2005, 84). Malaysia finally capitulated, and Indonesia's new Foreign Minister Malik chose to name the new organisation ASEAN to demonstrate a similarity to ASA (Severino 2006, 27). Again, this was an extremely limited form of trusting behaviour due to the narrow nature of the vulnerabilities, but such a symbolic power held importance to two elites who were attempting to consolidate their domestic positions. The Tunku particularly was concerned that this would be viewed as capitulation to Indonesia, which would weaken his domestic power.

Indonesia, too, perceived a limited vulnerability in forming this new institution. Suharto had weakened his domestic position by going against the nationalist furore that had gripped Indonesia, and effectively 'placed Indonesia in a hostage position, albeit in a golden cage' by voluntarily constraining his country's future foreign policy options (interview with contemporary Indonesian political observer; Acharya 2014, 49). The acceptance of constraint seems to have had no tangible hedging against it; military power structures were strengthened but with an inward focus and Indonesia turned its focus to *ketahanan nasional*, or national resilience,

through economic development. One interviewee present at the discussions surrounding ASEAN argued that Indonesia 'wanted to show to the Malaysians that they were willing to engage […] and show they could become a trustworthy part of Southeast Asia and repair the damaged reputation' (interview with a contemporary Indonesian political observer).

This desire led to a significant compromise on issues where compromise was not possible before. For example, Indonesia had long demanded elections in North Borneo and Sarawak as a condition for acceptance into the Malaysian federation, but Suharto was willing to progress from this issue in the face of criticism from Indonesian members of parliament (Liow 2005). On this issue Liow states that 'Jakarta's acceptance of the Malaysian interpretation of the Bangkok Accords inspired confidence in the latter that relations could finally be based on firmer ground' and 'humility'. But with the reciprocation that was expected and emerged, in Malaysia's compromises, it seems more meaningful to see this in the frame of limited trust emergence due to the presence of trusting behaviours such as a willingness to accept vulnerability and a reduction in hedging (Liow 2005, 111–113).

An element of diffuse reciprocity was also witnessed, and the importance of trust is reinforced by significant actions that ran alongside ASEAN's creation. Malaysia and Indonesia undertook more tangible vulnerability when they agreed to engage in joint-anti-communist operations in North Borneo, which were seen as significant in encouraging greater mutual trust and a way to 'bind' ASEAN (Sudarsono 1973, 7). Despite Indonesia engaging in limited conflict prior to this, Malaysia allowed joint-training, Indonesian forces within North Borneo, and information exchange concerning the area. Furthermore, there was no tangible verification in place that Indonesia would not take advantage of this opportunity and attempt to subvert Malaysian sovereignty over North Borneo.

Indonesia reciprocated on this by not exploiting Malaysia, and also by recognising the local elections which confirmed Malaysian sovereignty over North Borneo (Kuhonta 2008, 296). This joint-commission for defence and security, as well as Indonesia's lack of conflict over the local elections, assured Tunku Abdul Rahman of the 'genuine nature of Suharto's political commitments' (Leifer 1989, 22). This episode, named as a de-facto alliance (Liow 2005, 108–109), suggests that once rational trust had allowed limited positive expectations in the face of vulnerability, relations in the following period developed to allow more significant trusting behaviours to emerge, and trust had the potential to develop due to predictability concerning the other not defecting. This demonstrates that rational based trust may be an important first step in the development towards a psychological or constructivist basis of trust.

So why could the Tunku trust enough to engage in limited trusting behaviours? Why was Suharto able to trust Malaysia? As ASEAN was facilitated by Suharto taking power, this element was of particular importance, but the positive expectations still seem characterised by rational

calculations as to Suharto's relative trustworthiness compared to Sukarno (Poulgrain 1998, 6; Haacke 2005, 40). With Suharto, who was less sympathetic to communism, coming to power, alongside the withdrawal of Western forces from the region, there was a degree of convergence of interest, particularly in their security perspectives, which allowed a degree of rational trust to emerge.

There were rational benefits to be gained from cooperation that outweighed potential negatives, and it would be more likely Suharto would be benevolent (Acharya 1992, 151; Severino 2006, 93). This convergence is in line with Hardin's encapsulated interest – both the Tunku and Suharto perceived each other to hold similar interests (anti-communism) through which they could begin cooperation. Related to this, the Tunku and Suharto were able to come to view each other as having 'assurance game preferences', in Kydd's terminology, due to the priorities of the new leadership boosting the assessment of integrity in particular (Kydd 2005). It was Tunku Abdul Rahman's calculated assessment of Suharto and his regime's trustworthiness, based upon this, that led to positive expectations emerging (Rahman 1977, 93). Indonesia's decision to end *konfrontasi*, in line with the deposing of the President who had embodied the policy, created the perception that Indonesia would no longer be a predatory state, but that it had more of a benign intent and desire for reconciliation. This suggests, similar to Kydd's arguments concerning rational trust, that they were now of the same type (Kupchan 2010, 219). Both faced issues concerning communism at home, and both desired to avoid foreign entanglement in order to focus on the number one priority of national development following their relatively young status as post-colonial states.

This is not to suggest that such vulnerability was expansive as it was clearly limited. However, the relationships had transformed from those whereby no vulnerability was acceptable, as they could not be sure of the other's intentions, to one where they were at least willing to consider actions that they thought would make them vulnerable to a small degree. Furthermore, this was on the basis of a positive expectation that the other would not exploit such vulnerability. Indeed, prior distrustful interactions had demonstrated that cooperation was not possible because neither side was willing to accept vulnerability, meaning trust was a necessary condition required to transform the relationship into one where any vulnerability was acceptable. Prior to the formation of ASEAN, the Indonesia and Malaysia relationship was defined by significant tensions, which culminated in *konfrontasi*. *Konfrontasi*, or confrontation, was the Indonesian diplomatic and military campaign that was conducted between 1963 and 1966 in reaction to Malaysia's formation. Indonesia not only sought to isolate Malaysia on the world stage, especially in the Afro-Asian sphere, but also engaged in a guerrilla war around the border region in Borneo, before escalating to small scale penetrations in to the Malaysian peninsula itself.

Contemporary accounts of the period just following ASEAN's formation point to the significant 'suspicion, even hatred' that had been instigated, and are worth exploring to demonstrate how there was distrust between Sukarno and Subandrio[5] on the one hand, and Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Razak[6] on the other, and to demonstrate why trust was needed to transform the relationships to make the above possible, even if the above was limited in scope (Sudarsono 1973, 7). In particular, it was a difference in the rational assessment of ABI, that the chapter argues was of most significance. Sukarno, it will be demonstrated, had no integrity or benevolence in the eyes of the Tunku, and little ability to wind down *konfrontasi*, yet Suharto's early behaviour demonstrated a more positive perception of his ABI.

Prior to *konfrontasi*, it can be seen that the Tunku's government was viewed with suspicion from Indonesian elites, who distrusted their intentions in a number of foreign policy issues (Mackie 1974, 28, 31). Not only did Malaya[7] seem complicit in the smuggling that occurred between Indonesia and Singapore, where goods flowed out of Indonesia and enriched Singapore, they also withheld support from Indonesia's bid to claim control over West Irian (Mackie 1974, 28, 31). This was exacerbated by the Tunku's attempted mediation on this issue. The Tunku was inistent that the Dutch were willing to compromise, and he expected that the terms negotiated would be acceptable to Sukarno. Instead, however, he was attacked by Subandrio, who argued, in a 'vehement manner', that the Tunku was exceeding his mandate (Mackie 1974, 31; Liow 2005, 91–93). These early tensions and representations of distrust soured the personal relationships between the leadership of Malaya and those of Indonesia, providing an obstacle to the emergence of trust that would come to characterise their relations.

Such tensions escalated following the Brunei revolution of 1962, when Azahari's declaration on a Unitary State of North Kalimantan led to Sukarno reversing the Indonesian policy of 'no objection' to a united Malaysia incorporating North Borneo and Sabah. Instead, he supported the right of Brunei and the Northern Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak to be independent, despite the Tunku's prior assuredness that the Indonesians would not embark on such a policy (Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung 1973, 457). This reversal of policy can be seen as leading the Tunku to assume the worst of Sukarno, as he accused the Indonesian of complicity when arguing that 'the Borneo national army leading the revolt was created … in Indonesian Borneo' to which Subandrio replied 'If the Tunku is determined to use any occasion to be hostile, there is no alternative but to accept the challenge' (Mezerik 1965, 68). *Konfrontasi* was announced by Subandrio, who, according to the Tunku:

> For no reason that one could conceivably imagine, suddenly he turned a complete 'about-face' making a violent speech attacking Malaya.
>
> (Rahman 1977, 93)

Following these events, Sukarno, Subandrio, and forces within Indonesia[8] followed a process to undermine Malaysian control over areas in North Borneo, Sabah, and Sarawak, which announced their intention to join the Malay federation alongside Singapore. Sukarno aimed to undermine the federation through limited conflict and economic pressure (Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung 1973; Mackie 1974, 3). *Konfrontasi* had a basis in Sukarno's wider policy of confrontation against imperialism and the 'old established forces' and the 'new emerging forces', and a movement from non-alignment which he had supported in the past (Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung 1973, 313–314). This was marked by his speech of 'the era of confrontation', which laid out a militant policy against neo-colonialism (Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung 1973, 348, 356).

This represented a complete separation in threat assessment, whereby Sukarno saw colonialism as the greatest threat and the Tunku saw communism as the greatest threat (Mackie 1974, 32; Rahman 1984, 92). Sukarno, with his linkages to the PKI and what was seen as his sympathy for communism, was extremely suspicious of Malaysia's anti-communist rhetoric, which had prevented Indonesian involvement in both SEATO and ASA, ASEAN's predecessor organisations (Haacke 2005, 35–36). Malaya, under the Tunku, also sought to keep some of the vestiges of colonialism, particularly Western involvement, due to the communist insurgency now threatening the stability of the Malaysian federation (Miller 1959, 215; Haacke 2005, 37). The Tunku himself stated that there was trust between Malaya's political parties and the British, which underlay a desire for continued goodwill and cooperation (Rahman 1984, 36).

This ran prior to Sukarno's desire to remove all Western, and indeed external, influence in Southeast Asia – demonstrated by both his departure from non-alignment and *bebas dan aktif* (independent and active) foreign policy (Liow 2005, 61–65). It was also compounded by the defence pact the British had with Malaya, which would extend to these other territories, and create the potential for the UK to maintain bases close to the Indonesian border. This British presence undermined the potential for Southeast Asia to become a region free of great power struggle (Mackie 1974, 38). These differences in threat perception and interests led to a great degree or suspicion from the Tunku, even before it was confirmed that Sukarno was going to enact such a policy. The Tunku voiced his suspicions of Sukarno's actual intentions prior to Sukarno openly choosing to oppose Malaysian formation, and Sukarno doubted Malaya as pursuing 'counterfeit independence' (Lee 1998; Liow 2005, 80, 90). Such distrust, as will be demonstrated, led to a situation whereby no acceptance of vulnerability, diffuse reciprocity or reduction of hedging would be considered as possible by both the Tunku and Sukarno.

As the course of *konfrontasi* continued, distrust between the elites in particular grew, due to their differences of interest and the ways in which they were pursuing their interests. Attempts to prevent it faltered, grounded

in events which not only confirmed in the eyes of the Tunku and Sukarno that they could not trust one another, but deepened distrust. Negotiations were perceived to be an unnecessary risk, mostly on the side of the Malayan elite, as they had no way of knowing what Sukarno's desired outcome was in regards to *konfrontasi*, which influenced their viewpoint of each other from the start (Mackie 1974, 130).[9] Developments in the relationship, especially disagreements over interpretation of the Manila and London Agreements destroyed any sense of remaining cordiality. It was these developments that prevented trust from emerging, and ensured the continuation of *konfrontasi* – dooming the relationships.

Whilst goodwill was garnered at the Manilla Agreements, the terms of the Accord were absent of trusting behaviours. Indonesia agreed to recognise a united Malaysia, but hedged against the recognition by creating the condition of a referendum of the wishes of the North Borneo peoples prior to such recognition. Sukarno recognised that he would be vulnerable if he was seen to be losing face, and was unwilling to accept such vulnerability. This goodwill was also squandered in the London Agreements, whereby Malaysia and the United Kingdom agreed to transfer sovereignty of North Borneo to Malaysia. The Manila Accord had been particularly vague, leading the Tunku to assume that there was no strong expectation that a referendum would be an in-depth undertaking, but would instead be a device for Sukarno to save face. Such a suggestion demonstrates that the Tunku doubted Sukarno's ability to change course, due to the structural conditions he faced domestically of using the nationalistic furore to unite the opposing military and communist domestic power bases. The reaction of Indonesian representatives, however, came out against the London Agreements, arguing that the investigations to be made into North Borneo's desires needed to be a lot stricter.

The Indonesian press argued that Malaya had betrayed Indonesia, even though the Tunku had not committed Malaya to a formal or well laid out idea of how these investigations should take place. Sukarno in particular led the charge against the Tunku, stating publicly that 'I declare to the world that Tunku Abdul Rahman is a man who does not keep his word', demonstrating the way in which he perceived the Tunku's integrity (Mezerik 1965, 74). Later, he stated privately to the US ambassador to Indonesia, that he felt 'insulted and humiliated' due to the 'real tearing up of Manila agreement' (Jones 1964a, 83). This resulted in a negative assessment of trustworthiness, and prevented Sukarno from perceiving in the future that the Tunku could demonstrate integrity and benevolence.

Such perception that one leader had gone against his word was not one sided, however. The Tunku believed that at Manilla, Sukarno had been 'bluffing' the Tunku into believing he only wanted a symbolic acquiescence from the Malayan leadership, whereas the reaction to Malaya signing the London Agreements demonstrated this was not the case. Such perceptions showcase his negative assessment of Sukarno's integrity following Manilla,

and his doubts concerning this integrity at the preceding talks (Mackie 1974, 149; Rahman, 1977). The Tunku later called the Manila meeting a

> shadow-play … [where] Indonesia and the Philippines were aiming at delaying Malaysia in every possible way, but these same velvet voices were those that were threatening us … the chronology of these events showed clearly that the President Sukarno had made up his mind never to accept the idea or the fact of a nation on Malaysia.
>
> (Rahman 1977, 96, 97)

By the time following the London Agreements, therefore, distrust had grown between each of the actors on either side, and marked a point of no return. Any future negotiations continuously stalled – with the distrust on both sides preventing any meaningful outcome – demonstrating the necessity for trust. Both the leaders had significant conditions as actions on both sides had heightened negative assessments of trustworthiness, and when one stated that they would meet the conditions of another, they would go back on their word – undermining both their vocal guarantees and their integrity and benevolence, in particular, in the eyes of the other.

Even when ceasefires occurred, border raids continued, resulting in communiqués arguing that 'since the cease-fire has been repeatedly violated by the Indonesians, it would be futile to regard the cease-fire as operative' and further destroying any positive perception of Sukarno's integrity (Ball 1964, 206; Forrestal 1964, 69; Komer 1964, 52). The continuation of raids despite assurances was a particularly strong obstacle in the mind of the Tunku. Not only were raids continuing, but requests for Indonesia to first drop supplies to the 'volunteers' and the 'farcical' nature of any withdrawals that took place, strengthened the idea that Indonesia could not be trusted (Rahman 1977, 108–109).

The situation worsened to the point that the Tunku refused to travel to meet Suharto before he could be sure of Indonesia's 'honesty and sincerity', such as at proposed talks in Tokyo in June (Rahman 1977, 109). For Sukarno, any trust and meaningful action was seen as impossible because the Tunku and Tun Razak continued to make anti-Sukarno statements; he viewed them as displaying a lack of benevolence by attempting to exploit his situation, and he thought the Tunku and Tun Razak were ultimately unfairly rigid at conferences when they had suggested a degree of flexibility beforehand, undermining their integrity (Jones 1964a, 100; Rusk 1964a, 113).

According to Secretary of State Rusk, such actions produced an 'atmosphere [which] also failed to produce hoped-for diminution of mutual distrust and antipathy between Indo[nesian] and Malaysian leadership. Instead, it sharpened them' (Rusk 1964a, 113). Indeed, it was at this stage where the Tunku remarked: 'So ended any attempt to bring about a personal settlement between President Sukarno and myself.' Both sides were inhibited by their perceptions of the other as lacking trustworthiness. This

was as a result of displays of lack of integrity, benevolence, and ability, and they were therefore disposed not to trust each other (Rahman 1977, 110).

This resulted in a period between the formation of Malaysia and the toppling of Sukarno whereby a stalemate was reached, for which a degree of trust was required in order to overcome. Both the Tunku and Sukarno had conditions for negotiation, as they could not trust the other to not exploit negotiations for their own benefit, so they were unwilling to engage in them without prior assurances. The Tunku established conditions whereby any negotiations would only take place once Indonesian guerrillas had been withdrawn, raids stopped, and Malaysia recognised, as he did not want to negotiate with such an exploitable situation overhanging him. He was particularly concerned that Sukarno would use guerrillas as a way to elicit further gains or later renege on his agreements (Ball 1964, 206; Jones 1964b, 100; Rusk 1964b, 170).

Sukarno, on the other hand, had a degree of dependence on *konfrontasi* publicly continuing, due to its role in distracting away from increasing domestic problems, and needed some sort of 'sweetening of the pill'. However, he did not trust the Tunku to keep any moves made secret and not exploit Sukarno's domestic situation. This led to a significant impasse, which required trust to emerge, as only one side accepting vulnerability would lead to significant potential for negotiation. When Suharto came into power these concerns were not necessarily immediately halted, so there were still perceived risks in the interactions moving forward. Assessments of Suharto's success and potential emphasised that the policies of *konfrontasi* had the potential to emerge again as late as 1968, due to Suharto needing to distract from continuing domestic issues or in his inability to keep control of power (National Intelligence Estimate 1968, 566).

Despite this, both sides engaged in limited willingness to be vulnerable, completely transforming the situation whereby neither side were willing to engage in even the most limited acceptance of vulnerability and trusting behaviour. This makes limited trusting behaviours indicators of the transformation that had taken place in the relationship. As demonstrated in the era prior to Suharto, the most significant impasse arose from a negative assessment of trustworthiness on both sides, due to perceptions that the elites lacked integrity, benevolence, and ability. Once the interests converged, however, following Suharto taking power, the elites were able to perceive each other as being trustworthy, as they both seemingly believed that the other had integrity and benevolence, and would not exploit trusting behaviour, allowing the creation of ASEAN, as well as further diffuse reciprocity, which would have been impossible in the later stages of Sukarno's leadership.

Malik's appointment as Indonesian foreign minister further assured Tunku Abdul Rahman that Indonesia had dropped its more radical approach, due to Malik's anti-PKI posture during the years of *konfrontasi*,

reinforcing the perception of integrity concerning Suharto's newly stated interests (Smith 2000, 13). Public statements from Malik and Suharto in the years surrounding ASEAN's formation demonstrated that they were distancing themselves from Sukarno's regime, as Malik stressed the 'deviations from these basic principles [of non-alignment] which the previous regime has led the nation [were] among the gravest sins it has committed' (Malik 1972, 27–28). It was common knowledge that Sukarno had been furious at Malik when Malik had gone to Bangkok and come to an agreement with Tun Razak over the undoing of *konfrontasi* without conditions such as the withdrawal of British troops or a referendum in Borneo (Mackie 1974, 320).

Suharto, too, had undertaken a secret operation during the twilight year of *konfrontasi*, Operation Khusus, which aimed to contact Malaysia and end the war (Smith 2000, 12). Through such contact, as well as through observing Suharto's public criticism of Sukarno, Tunku Abdul Rahman was also able to make a preliminary calculative assessment of Suharto's trustworthiness, believing that he had benevolence and integrity in regard to his commitment to pursuing a low-key foreign policy. A limited convergence of interests heightened this assessment, as the two combined ensured that there were strong potential gains to be made, and it was unlikely Suharto would exploit any cooperation. When Suharto came to power and did slowly wind down *konfrontasi*, such benevolence and integrity was reinforced. Tunku Abdul Rahman was also able to see that now Suharto had the ability to lead Indonesia through any foreign policy direction he decided on, even if it countered a foreign policy that had been pursued previously for nationalistic unity.

Conclusion

The focus on rational trust is not to discount other elements such as social and psychological aspects but these were not significant enough to characterise the trusting relationship between the elites of these two countries. Concerning the social bases of trust, with the focus being on the structural conditions the relationship is in, the norms of behaviour within that structure, and sense of obligation, the very fact that the relationships were transformative and newly emerging reduces the impact it had at this stage. Whilst the Tunku had some degree of knowledge of Suharto prior to these decisions, it seems that such knowledge was not enough to characterise the relationship as Suharto and his policies still lacked predictability, and that calculative assessments of Suharto's trustworthiness, relative to that of Sukarno, maintained the position of importance.

Operation Khusus, for example, had not yet made Suharto more predictable due to its limited scope, and nor had the gradual winding down of *konfrontasi*. This was essentially the beginning of their relationships – no sense of obligation, expected in social bases of trust, had been garnered

between the two individuals, and there were few social norms in place for them to follow. Instead, their relationships took place in what was essentially a newly created structural condition of ASEAN. ASEAN's creation marked the first real cooperative move between the two groups of elites, and ran alongside the ending of *konfrontasi*.

The psychological aspect also seems of less significance. Neither leaders demonstrated any evidence of being predisposed to trust generally and even elements such as social identity as strengthening a predisposition to trust a particular other are problematic. In reference to identity, Severino, for example, argued that their coming together was also based on shared experiences of trying to govern failing states, and a common colonial history, which allowed for a degree of identification to emerge between Suharto and Tunku Abdul Rahman (2006, 93, 115; Acharya 1992, 152). By accounts there was also an affective element; Tunku Abdul Rahman seemed to have positive feelings towards Malik and Suharto, especially as Suharto embraced a leadership style of quiet dignity over Sukarno's flamboyancy (Haacke 2005, 45).

Psychological dispositions would seem to fit in with Liow's ideas about kinship between Malaysian and Indonesian elites, furthermore. However, as he states, despite a discourse concerning the leadership as 'blood brothers', due to regularly focused upon common socio-cultural identities, this discourse did not seem to resonate between the Tunku and Suharto (2005, 17, 41, 68). Whilst the idea of kinship incorporates elements of expectation and obligation that tie into trust, Liow argues that at this time Malaysian elites traditionally had more affinity with Sumatrans, not the Javanese. Instead, caution was emphasised, rather than public discourse surrounding brotherly ties (Liow 2005, 104–112). The different socio-political perspectives had prevented moral frames of reference, disallowing a common identity from emerging to the point that it would be a significant input to trust (Mackie 1974, 9). Suharto replacing Sukarno did not necessarily transform differing perspectives, only subduing them to the extent to which limited trust and cooperation was possible as calculations of the cost-benefits of doing so were favourable.

Whilst these elements are also of importance, the chapter argues that it was rational trust and the cost-benefit calculation and calculative assessment of ABI that resulted in the limited positive expectations in regards to vulnerability. The decision to trust Suharto was seemingly embedded in the cost-benefit calculation that the potential vulnerability was worthwhile as there was a chance that ASEAN could constrain Indonesia and enable both states to focus on their converging security beliefs. Suharto, too, was willing to accept the vulnerability of a constrained foreign policy as long as it could lead to the benefits of peace, which would enable a focus on economic development. Indeed, Malik himself argued that Indonesia's new foreign policy should serve its developmental needs (Kupchan 2010, 222).

The proposed focused on *ketahanan nasional* (national resilience), Suharto's anti-communism, and domestic development, for which cooperation was required, meant a perceived convergence of interests in this realm as well as the now common anti-communist outlook, in what Jones has described as an inter-elite pact (Malik 1972, 26–29; Jones 2012, 410). That this was based on rational trust is also partly in line with Rathbun's thesis that generalised trust would lead to hierarchical structures within any organisation created as well as greater commitments and a larger organisational structure (qualitative and quantitative multilateralism) (2012). In the ASEAN case, however, flexibility and sovereignty were highlighted, with only limited commitments, which Rathbun equates to a lack of generalised trust (2012, 31, 37, 42). This does not mean that trust was entirely lacking or insignificant, however. Limited forms of trust were required to reverse the relationships that had been mired in distrust, and to begin cooperative moves and compromises within an institutional structure.

As such, strategic trust, based primarily on a convergence of interests changing perceptions enough to enable positive expectation whilst undertaking trusting behaviours in a context of risk, was an important element to understanding ASEAN's origins. Whilst trust may not be sufficient on its own, due to other internal and external factors, in the face of the dominating distrust that preceded ASEAN's creation, it was necessary to transform the relationships. This has a number of impacts when it comes to considering the role of trust. First, rational trust is an important tool for analysing institutional creation. Rejecting both the rational institutionalist notion that trust comes after organisations are created, and Rathbun's argument that generalised trust is of most importance, this chapter instead demonstrates that rational trust was a necessary if not sufficient condition for ASEAN's creation.

Indeed, the psychological and social variants of trust are also compatible with the trust-as-process framework, but within this case and context it was rational trust that was present. The calculative antecedents to trust that characterised the trusting behaviours undertaken, such as the renunciation of foreign bases and the expectation that Suharto would commit to ASEAN over seeking an expansionist foreign policy, demonstrated that rational trust is significant in the transformation from distrust to limited trust in this relationship. Positive expectations of a lack of harm when accepting vulnerability can be seen in the relationships in the decision to form ASEAN and in episodes that directly followed its formation.

These positive expectations, while extremely limited due to the nature of the suspicions and tensions that had emerged before 1967, marked a massive departure from the expectations that the leaderships had towards one another during the previous years. Whilst this is limited, the chapter argues that such rational trust need not stay static, but can

develop into deeper bases as the relationship develops. For example, trust was reinforced by significant actions that ran alongside ASEAN's creation in the beginning of diffuse reciprocity. Instead, ASEAN's creation, and the events that followed, suggests that trust is of significance, and there is a space to consider trust's role more explicitly in regards to ASEAN, which should be operationalised when considering whether ASEAN is a Security Community.

Notes

1 There is considerable debate over whether rational trust can be truly considered as trust (for example see Lewis and Weigert 1985, 976). This chapter takes the position that rational trust can be considered as trust in the context of the trust-as-process framework incorporating behaviour resulting from the acceptance of vulnerability under risk due to positive expectations held by the trustor. However, it recognises it is an extremely limited form of trust.
2 It is important to note that the chapter takes the position that states cannot trust and trust is an individual expectation. Whilst others, such as Keating and Ruzicka (2014), argue that states are complex institutions and more than just their elites, the chapter will contend that in this case it is the elites that are the individuals who are most meaningful to analyse, as they acted in the name of the state with little constraints (for discussions on elites in Malaysia and Indonesia see Ott 1972; Ahmad 1985; Liow 2005; Chandran 2008; Sarayanamuttu 2010; Thompson 2015).
3 Tunku Abdul Rahman was the Prime Minister of Malaya, and then Malaysia, from 1957–1970, as well as Foreign Minister from 1957–1970.
4 Sukarno was the President of Indonesia following Indonesia's independence in 1945, until he was replaced by Suharto in 1967, who had effectively overthrown Sukarno in 1965, but slowly dismantled his power.
5 Subandrio was the Indonesian Foreign Minister from 1957–1966.
6 Tun Abdul Razak Hussein was deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister 1957–1970, after which he became Prime Minister of Malaysia.
7 Any references made to 'Malaysia' signify this was post-16 September 1963, the day Malaysia was formed as a unified entity. References to 'Malaya', 'North Borneo-, 'Sabah', 'Sarawak' and 'Singapore' are made pre-16 September 1963.
8 Some of the forces generally pointed to are elements of the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI – Communist Party of Indonesia) as well as *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI – Indonesia National Armed Forces).
9 Interestingly this lack of clarity of Sukarno's intentions was not limited to the Tunku or Malaysian side. Despite ongoing contact between the US and Sukarno, they claimed to find it difficult to assess his intentions, and were not sure on Sukarno's desired end point (Read 1964, 29).

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5 The cycle of mistrust in EU–Russia relations

Hiski Haukkala and Sinikukka Saari

Introduction

The Ukraine conflict in 2014 resulted in a crisis between Russia and 'the West' that also plunged EU–Russia relations into a dramatic rift. There seems to be a consensus among the policymakers and analysts alike that in the mid-2010s, the relations between the two are at their lowest ebb for over 20 years, deeply ridden with mutual mistrust and suspicion (see Kazantsev and Sakwa 2012). This is a disappointing state of affairs in light of the fact that for the past quarter of a century the EU and Russia have been busily engaged in repeated attempts at developing a mutually satisfactory 'strategic partnership' (for overviews of the relations, see Forsberg and Haukkala 2016; Maass 2016). The very foundation of the relations is in tatters. High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini (2014) commented on the relationship in September 2014 and her comment is full of bewilderment on how this all happened:

> I don't think it [Russia] is a strategic partner anymore. I wish it could go back in the future, I wish Russia would choose to go back to be a strategic partner in the future, but I don't think this is what is happening now.

From where this mistrust stems, is a disputed issue. While many Russian commentators refer to a Western bias against Russia as an actor from the 1990s and the ultimate Western desire to keep Russia down (Karaganov 2014), Western observers tend to highlight Russian 'autocratic turn' and the desire to establish its sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space (Sherr 2013; Dawisha 2014). Some claim that the main issue at stake is really an inability to communicate and to convince the other party of its true intentions and the fault lies with mutual misunderstandings (Legvold 2014, 84). However, the former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov (2015) dismisses this last argument:

> Those who support Russia–Europe cooperation often try to reduce this distrust down to mutual misunderstanding – to misconceptions and

> stereotypes that exist in the East and the West. Unfortunately, the roots of distrust go much deeper than this.

We, too, believe that several issues and processes have contributed to the cycle of mistrust: mismatch between the level of mutual trust and the level of ambition, too high expectations on both sides and fundamental misreading of each other's intentions. The fact that trust between the EU and Russia was always relatively shallow and personality-dependent made it easier for the cycle to start spinning and, once spinning, spinning faster and faster.

Conceptually the relationship between the EU and Russia offers an exciting case study for trust research as it involves multiple actors and levels that interact either directly or indirectly. The mistrust between Russia and the EU stems from the fact that the budding trust established between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of the Cold War was essentially emotional and personality-dependent. It is important to note that trust never became fully embedded in wider institutionalised relations as well as the societal level between 'the West' and Russia (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 228).

The idealistic statements of the early 1990s never described an existing state of affairs but the ideal state of relations looming somewhere on the horizon. The future based on partnership, interdependence, and shared values never materialised nor did it became institutionalised in security structures, political practices or, indeed, reflected in the minds of ordinary people. As will be explained later in greater detail, trust between the parties was not constructivist nor rationalist, nor was it present on multiple levels.

Therefore, and in addition to shedding light on different theoretical schools of thought in trust research through the analytical narrative of EU–Russia relations, this chapter seeks to rectify a certain positive bias in the extant literature that has devoted much more attention to the notion of trust at the expense of mistrust. Although many IR theories take mistrust, or at least lack of trust, as a default option, an analytical exposition of the issue has only rarely been undertaken (for exceptions, see Hardin 2004 and Welch Larson 1997 that deal with the issue of mistrust explicitly). This chapter will use the unravelling of relations between the EU and Russia over and during the Ukraine conflict to examine this topic at length.

Analytical framework: from trust to mistrust

Trust is an elusive concept that is usually linked with the issue of cooperation in one way or another. While mistrust is often seen to make cooperation (even if both parties would benefit from it) difficult, trust is seen as a 'lubricant' for cooperation: it makes it easier and more likely

(Misztal 2001, 371). Often trust is seen as having a clear either-or quality: either you trust someone or you do not. Although we see merit in this analytical clarity, we want to put forward a claim that trusting relationships can – and in fact do – vary in degree and in kind and that these differences have implications for what kind of cooperation is likely to be successful in terms of results. Furthermore, we note that cooperation can be successful even in the absence of trust – given that the expectations, goals, and verification mechanisms properly reflect this basis of relations.

In this chapter, we study the categories of Rationalist Realist, Institutionalist Realist, and Social Psychological and Psychological trust – following (with some modifications) the categorisation put forth in the introduction to this volume. Let us start with the Realist Rationalist trust. Realist scholars assert that the main dynamics in international relations stem from the anarchic nature of the international system that effectively hinders the emergence of trusting relationships. In the words of Mearsheimer (1994–1995, 11), 'states in the international system fear each other. They regard each other with suspicion, and worry that war might be in the offing. They anticipate danger. There is little room for trust among states'.

Although this does not necessarily entail endless confrontation, the instances where states attend to the interests of others are – according to Realists – predicated on the wish to continue interaction that is in their own self-interest. It is shared interests, not any inherent trust, that are the motivation behind cooperation (Lewicki and Tomlinson 2003). Trust in the form of cooperation exists only as long as it is directly beneficial to all the parties involved and it will cease immediately when that is no longer the case. The weakness of this approach is clearly that there is very little independent value of trust; interests essentially reign (Kydd 2005).

Jonathan Mercer (2005, 95) argues that if 'trust depends on external evidence, transparency, iteration, or incentives, then trust adds nothing to the explanation'. Torsten Michel (2012, 878) insists that the Realist/Rationalist trust is in fact, the very *absence* of trust (see also Mercer 2005, 99). He further takes issue with classic examples of 'trust-building' in international politics such as increasing transparency and establishing verification and assurance mechanisms (see also Wheeler 2009). While we agree with Michel's argument and Mercer's notion that if trust depends on constant monitoring schemes it is not really about trust, we also see some independent merit in confidence-building schemes.

While confidence-building is irrelevant in the context of trust, it is highly relevant in the context of mistrust. Active mistrust means that even the basic confidence between actors has eroded and cooperation is almost impossible. Confidence-building tools (see e.g. Mason and Siegfried 2013) – such as increasing transparency and assurance mechanism – are, in reality, instruments to *manage mistrust* and *to prevent conflict*. For instance, in order to manage the current state of mistrust between the EU and Russia, serious confidence-building schemes are in dire need. More

ambitious cooperative schemes in the conditions of mistrust (without confidence-building first) are unlikely to be successful.

Mercer (2005), drawing from the Social Identity Theory, has suggested that a common identity between different groups can foster trusting relationships that can cut both ways. According to him, an identity-based approach on trust can override observable evidence by the parties in a sense that '[P]eople give the benefit of the doubt to those they trust, and doubt anything beneficial done by those they distrust'. In essence, trust rooted in a shared identity can withstand even defection by the other party while a relationship mired in deep mistrust is in danger of becoming a vicious circle unable to escape the mutual negative dynamics. While this is undoubtedly true, and there is, indeed, plenty of evidence of this pattern in international relations, it is likely that in most cases there is a certain limit to this too. If the other party constantly and over a long period of time fails to meet commitments, erosion of trust will eventually follow.

We argue that mistrust is something more than mere absence of trust. It includes a much more active and intentional component (Cook *et al.* 2004, 60). Mistrust can be defined as a belief that others do not care about our interests and if we are in a vulnerable position, they will take advantage of that.[1] This prevents us from cooperating even if it would be in our best interests (Ullmann-Margalit 2004, 72). The same logic applies to mistrust than to trust: it can be personality-driven, institutional, or rooted in culture and collective psyche of publics. This question of different levels of analysis in trust research has also been taken up by Booth and Wheeler (2008).

When talking about genuine trust (that is something more than mere confidence and predictability of action), we follow Luhmann (1979) in claiming that 'trust begins where knowledge ends' and that uncertainty – a leap of faith – is the essence of trusting relationships (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 230). Trusting partners do not need to verify every move because they believe that the other side understands and respects their interests and will not act against them. The partners value the relationship and its continuation, and not just merely the material gains that it brings.

Although pay-off is unlikely to become completely irrelevant, it becomes less relevant: pay-offs can be postponed. Following the Institutionalist tradition, some scholars speak of 'diffuse reciprocity' (Rathbun 2012) instead of immediate and equivalent reciprocity stressed by Realists. Relationships like these often result in institutionalised arrangements where the 'shadow of the future' grows longer, constraining the parties. This is in essence what we define as Institutional Realist trust.

Even deeper forms of trust can be envisaged. Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler (2008) claim – drawing from social psychology and constructivism – that trust between political collectives requires uncertainty (acceptance of risk), empathy and bonding, vulnerability, integrity and reliability. All these attributes are integral for this deeper form of trust. Even after the

initial leap in the dark that is often the initial step in trust-building, uncertainty will always be present in a truly trusting relationship. Empathy refers to the ability to see the situation from the other side's perspective (see e.g. Booth and Wheeler 2008) and bonding takes place when this empathy translates into a political relationship characterised by positive feelings and a shared collective identity (Wendt 1994). Vulnerability to betrayal refers to the lack of safety net in a trusting relationship. Finally, integrity and reliability indicate that the trusting partners will do 'what is right' (Hollis 1998). This is the normative dimension of trust: we feel morally obliged to act in an agreed way albeit nothing in practice would thwart betrayal.

To clarify the theoretical point, that has also methodological relevance as institutions and ideational structures do not trust or mistrust others, only people do. Nevertheless, people are not *tabula rasa* but fully immersed in their cultural setting, including a shared sense of identity. In this respect, Marx's remark on how people do make history but not in circumstances of their own choosing, is apt.[2] The point that we would like to stress here is that we should not view the different levels of analysis in exclusionary terms. One of our core arguments is that trust can exist on several levels and that interpersonal trust is always immersed in – while at times also feeding back into – the wider organisational, institutional and societal levels (Pursiainen and Matveeva 2016, 106).

If trust is only personality-dependent, the pendulum can very quickly swing to another direction, and we claim that this is exactly what happened between Russia and the EU at the turn of the 1990s, and again in 2014. However, if it is embedded in shared institutions, mutual norms, contacts and dialogue on multiple levels, it is more likely to endure also an occasional untrustworthy leader or other hardships. In the empirical part that will follow, we will try to showcase the co-existence of these two levels by drawing attention to the importance of both in explaining the rupture in the EU–Russia relations during and over the Ukraine conflict.

EU–Russia relations: the failure to trust

We have evidence of how mutual fear and mistrust played a key role in the advent of the Cold War (Gaddis 2005) and how the slowly emerging interpersonal trust between Gorbachev and Reagan was instrumental in ending it (Forsberg 1999, 603–621). In this respect, it is important to ask how – and to what extent – the quarter of century following the end of the Cold War has affected trust-formation between Russia and the West, the EU in particular, and how the different levels of analysis spelled out above have affected the process.

Although the image of the early 1990s as a 'romantic period' between Russia and the West is not fully correct, the beginning of the decade did witness considerable hope, even enthusiasm, concerning the future of the

relations. This was reflected in the rapid development of a host of institutional mechanisms that were intended to bind Russia tightly into Europe and give it a meaningful stake and a role in the relations. A good example of this is the negotiation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia during 1992–1994 that saw Moscow pressing hard for repeated concessions on the part of the EU with a view of arriving at a significantly more ambitious agreement and a notion of partnership that was originally envisaged by the EU (for discussion, Haukkala 2010).

The adoption of the PCA was seen as auguring a new era of gradually deepening partnership between the EU and Russia. Interestingly, explicit references to trust accompanied the EU–Russia summits and meetings from the very beginning. For example, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, speaking after the signing of the PCA in June 1994, declared how although the hardest part still lay ahead for the partners in implementing the agreement, Russia's EU partners had his word that 'Russia will be an honest, loyal and trustworthy partner' (cited in Haukkala 2010, 91).

It appears that trust was not, however, that firmly embedded in the relationship. An indication of this can be found seven years later when his successor Vladimir Putin (2001), in a speech where he otherwise professed Russia's European choice, lamented the essential lack of trust between the EU and Russia:

> We are talking about partnership, but in reality we have not yet learned to trust each other … without a modern, sound and sustainable security architecture we will never be able to create an atmosphere of trust on the continent, and without that atmosphere of trust there can be no united Greater Europe!

A few years later, president of the European Commission Romano Prodi (2004) referred to the limits of trust in the relationship:

> While overall our relations have progressed over the last five years, there are of course issues on which our perspectives and approaches diverge. We should not over-dramatise these differences; divergences of views are an inevitable feature of any partnership, however close. A genuine partnership must be based however on a mutual readiness to discuss such issues frankly and openly. Only then can we overcome misunderstandings, take steps to bridge our differences and reinforce mutual trust.

It is perhaps telling that while Putin made reference to security architecture, Prodi listed human rights issues as the source of differences and limited trust. In order to understand the change from initial optimism to a growing mutual disillusionment we must take into account several key

factors that the Constructivist trust scholars emphasise in their identity-based analytical framework.

First of all, a low level of trust is characteristic to Russian foreign policy culture. Here it is essential to take into consideration the Soviet tradition. Already Nathan Leites' classic study of Bolshevik leaders' operational code revealed a propensity to view the world through mistrust and antagonism towards the opponents (Leites 1951). This requirement of immediate pay-off and strict reciprocity – a typical characteristic of a lack of trust or mistrust – is a key feature in Russian foreign policy and rhetoric.

In an interesting interview published in 2013, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov makes this very plain: 'You always reciprocate. Positively, negatively, but this is something which you cannot change. It was not invented by us. It is the law of international relations. Reciprocity is the key' (cited in Glasser 2013). Even blunter is President Putin's (2015) remarks in June 2015 when commenting on the relations between Russia and the West in the wake of the Ukraine conflict: 'What has trust got to do with it? This is not about trust – it is about having our interests taken into consideration.'

We must also factor in the role of individuals, in particular the long-serving President Putin who has effectively consolidated power in the Kremlin. Already an early study concerning Putin's operational code drew attention to his general propensity to mistrust people and not to forgive or forget slights, real or imagined, easily (Dyson 2001, see also Rathbun 2012). In their magisterial study on 'Mr. Putin' Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy have built a nuanced psychological portrait of the Russian leader that basically verifies these observations: Putin is a person that is low in generalised trust, prefers control, even intimidation to secure outcomes and is not a person to let bygones simply be bygones (Hill and Gaddy 2015).

Putin has enjoyed a particularly close connection with German leaders, given the close interconnectedness of the economies, Putin's personal history of serving in East Germany, and the *Ostpolitik* foreign policy tradition of Germany. Indeed, from the start of his presidency Putin cultivated a special relationship with Germany's Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. It has been reported that the men came from similar social backgrounds, understood and trusted one another, and still remain close friends.

The Russian economy grew rapidly in the early 2000s and the economic relations between the states were blooming. The political relationship was particularly intense during the run-up to the Iraq war, an operation that both Germany and Russia opposed. However, a German observer has noted how even during Schröder's time in office 'too little agreement on basic political values existed for a real partnership' between the countries' (Mannteufel 2005). The same is likely to apply to the European Commission's former president and the former prime minister of Italy, Romano Prodi, who is close to Putin and has, for instance, visited Putin in a personal capacity after leaving office.

The structural and value-based hindrances, however, were such that personal trust did not translate into further cooperation between the states. Compared with Reagan and Gorbachev who were able to pursue their line quite independently despite conservative forces in both governments, the German leader's political independence was more restricted due to failing popularity figures and structural issues such as German-style coalition government. When talking about EU institutions and their leaders, the position is even weaker: the independent actorness of EU leaders in influencing the EU line as a whole is very restricted.

We would even go further and argue that the fact that the interpersonal trust between Gorbachev and Reagan translated so directly into changing policy and superpower history was truly exceptional and depended on several factors: first the independent status of the leaders in forming and agreeing on the policy, the generally shared understanding between the 'east' and the 'west' that the threat of arms race and nuclear war was so horrifying and acute that extraordinary measures were needed. This feeling was shared in particular by European leaders who actively supported the 'new thinking' concerning superpower relations. This in turn led to a feeling of euphoria that further fed the flames of the change. This dramatic shift in thinking and world politics incited by emotional trust between two leaders is an exception rather than a rule.

Journalist and author Mikhail Zygar describes in his book *All the Kremlin's Men* (2016) how first Putin admired Tony Blair and George Bush and got along with them well, but how later during his second presidential term he came to see them as weak and himself strong in comparison. Both Blair and Bush grew increasingly unpopular in their respective countries and their political leadership grew much more restricted and tied while Putin's leadership became more independent. Trust and admiration turned into contempt. The Iraq war and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine fed into his disillusionment and growing cynicism towards the West and Western leaders.

Putin has stated that he 'trusts' Schröder's successor Angela Merkel but given his reserved, suspicious nature, this is unlikely to mean true emotional, active trust (Bild 2016). As a former East German, Merkel probably understands Putin and the cultural setting he comes from but she is unlikely to have ever trusted him. She has been reported as commenting on Putin's speech (referred to earlier) in the German Bundestag in 2001: 'This is typical KGB talk. Never trust this guy' (cited in Packer 2014). So the events in Ukraine have not exactly shattered a previously trusting relationship between these leaders because even at the personal level trust probably never existed. But the lack of trust is likely to have given way to more active forms of mistrust, a significant and negative development in its own right.

Another key consideration is that the examination of the vagaries of the EU–Russia relations in isolation from the longer temporal arc of the Soviet era and the wider relations between Russia and the West, including both

the US and NATO, is not helpful. On the contrary, we must keep in mind the background of chronic mistrust between the Soviet Union and the West as well as the relative paucity of trust before the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Russian Federation in its stead (for discussion, see Bernstein 1991).

In addition, we should take note of the fact that to a large extent the Russian reading of the EU has evolved in the direction that Brussels lacks credible indigenous agency with Washington pulling the strings. One issue that was popular in the Soviet thinking that re-emerged quickly in the Russian discourse is the propensity to view the EU as being merely an instrument – or a 'plot' – of the US that was backed up by NATO. For example, Sonja Schiffers has noted how in the Russian discourse the EU has since 2013 been increasingly immersed into the notion of a wider and hostile West (Schiffers 2015).

The 'non-actorness' of the EU in the eyes of Russians may also be related to the institutions-bound, legalistic nature of the EU's action – one that is so alien to the traditional Russian operational code. This argument is also strongly present in European left-leaning debates. For example, Richard Sakwa has argued that it is precisely the EU's growing immersion into what he calls 'New Atlanticism' where it is 'in danger of becoming little more than the civilian wing of the Atlantic security alliance' that has resulted in the growing mistrust and alienation on the part of Russia (Sakwa 2015). Certain instances have been the key in increasing mistrust particularly on the Russian side. It is remarkable how different the interpretation of the events were in the 'West' and the 'East' and this is likely to point towards significant identity and value differences between the 'strategic partners' that fed into the cycle of mistrust.

The Kosovo war in 1999 – although not a crisis between the EU and Russia per se as it was a NATO operation with the US bearing the main responsibility of the military campaign against Serbia – was also important in the EU–Russia context. For Russia, the Kosovo case drove home at least two lessons that made a lasting impact on its subsequent relations with the West, the EU included (Averre 2009). First, that the US, together with some EU member states, uses military intervention to affect regime change in cases where it sees fit, and, second, that unilateral military intervention can take place without an explicit mandate from the UN Security Council.

Taken together, the Kosovo affair had the wider implication of distancing Russia from the West, the EU included, paving the way for the galvanisation of a much more hard-nosed Realist foreign policy consensus during the Putin era (Trenin 2007). This is essentially what Igor Ivanov had in mind when he claimed that the roots of distrust in the relationship can be found in the fundamental differences regarding the conceptions of the modern world and the dominating trends in global politics. The Russian view of the world shifted from the PCA world of interdependence to a more Realist and geopolitically driven understanding of world politics. The

foundation of the relationship assumed a different logic of action – one that emphasised positive interdependence and cooperation – hence the growing mismatch between the foundation of the relations and reality – and mutual disappointment and growing mistrust between the EU and Russia.

Another grand setback – perhaps the most crucial one – from the Kremlin's perspective was the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in the winter of 2004–2005. Although again the US received the most blame for 'staging' the revolution, also the EU's role was perceived negatively since it demanded new elections on the basis of election fraud and thus challenged the Russian blueprint for the future of Ukraine. The Russian reading of the events confirmed the geopolitical comeback: it was claimed to be an aggressive and orchestrated regime change by the West in the Russian sphere of interest.

Indeed, the regime security aspect of Putin's Russia should not be underestimated in fuelling the growing suspicion and even hostility towards the West in recent years. The popular protests over the fraudulent Duma elections in December 2011 that overshadowed Putin's return to presidency seemed to confirm Putin's suspicions and accelerated his policies of increasing internal control and selective forms of repression and of rooting out Western assistance and financial aid to the Russian civil society (Finkel and Brudny 2012, 1–14).

Finally, an important backdrop to the conflict was also the growing feeling on both sides that the practical cooperation under the auspices of 'strategic partnership' had failed to live up to expectations or fully meet their interests. It is notable that even trade in energy – the essential economic backbone of their relations – was turned into a source of growing mistrust between the parties (Ziegler 2012). Given the low level (in the case of the EU) or the non-existent trust (Russia that expected strict and immediate pay-back for any concession it made), this should not have been surprising. There was clearly a mismatch between the ambitious agenda and the actual levels of trust. In order to materialise in practice, the ambitious agenda of partnership would have required identity-based trust, institutionalised practices, and vast resources of benevolence and empathy from the actors – all of which were increasingly absent in the EU–Russia relations.

Over time, this basic dynamic resulted in the EU–Russia relations becoming increasingly dysfunctional despite the adoption of new common schemes, such as Four Common Spaces and Partnership(s) for Modernization. Interpretations of this failure are diametrically opposed, with both parties seeing the fault mainly with the other. The asymmetrical interpretations derive from state identities that were clearly different and world view that emphasised different operational logics in world affairs.

In the view of the EU, the guilty party in the deterioration of relations was Russia, the usual refrain being Moscow's essential unreliability as a

partner. In the EU's view, mutual agreements were not honoured by Russia and deliverables were largely undelivered. In the EU's view, the problem was not confined to isolated instances but it had become systemic. A powerful symbol of a growing displeasure with its relations with Russia was the Commission's continuously updated 'Key Outstanding Issues' document, an internal and confidential laundry list of problematic issues in EU–Russia relations. It is illustrative that the 2008 rendition of the document was already 87 pages long, with issues ranging from the quality of overall political dialogue to cooperation in education and science as well as in international security (Council of the European Union 2008).

For Russia, by contrast, the main culprit was the EU and its inflexibility. Indeed, the EU *is* inflexible and slow in its action due to its multi-faceted and legalistic institutionalised nature (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014). This has been a difficult thing for Russia to accept. In the words of Russia's Permanent Representative to the EU Vladimir Chizhov (2015):

> The internal transformation of the EU following the 'big bang' expansion of 2004 and the subsequent Lisbon Treaty reform, resulted in narrowing the flexibility of EU's positions in the international arena. In other words, the price for 'speaking with one voice' has been the lowest common denominator of the resulting message. On many topics of mutual importance, like crisis management, Russia was often confronted with a 'take it or leave it' approach that often seemed to negate our concerns and interests.

In retrospect, the mismatch between the level of trust and the expectations of cooperation is evident. Approaching the Ukraine conflict in 2013–2014, the growing irritation and even suspicion between the EU and Russia was palpable with both sides increasingly confident that the other was consistently acting in bad faith.

The question of shared neighbourhood and the Ukraine conflict

The question of a shared – or in the original EU parlance 'common' – neighbourhood between the EU and Russia entered the agenda on the advent of the EU's Eastern enlargement that took place in 2004. A year earlier, the EU adopted its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) with a view 'to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a "ring of friends" – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and cooperative relations' (Commission of the European Union 2003). Since then the ENP has undergone two revisions (2008, 2011) with the third currently underway.

It was also complemented with a multilateral Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009 which, although officially initiated before the war in Georgia in

2008, was nevertheless in the Russian debates interpreted as a geopolitical upping the ante vis-à-vis Russia over the future direction of the neighbourhood (Gretskiy *et al.* 2014, 382). In the European reading, the EaP was a response to calls from the neighbours themselves – a strategy to offer something more to the neighbours whilst pushing back the increasing demands for a full membership of the EU.

Indeed, the adoption of the EaP that indicated moving towards Association Agreements that would also include Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) between the EU and its Eastern neighbours was instrumental in changing Russia's direction concerning the EU's role in the region. The adoption of the EaP was greeted with immediate Russian suspicion. Already in April 2009 the Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (2009) cautioned:

> We're hearing assurances from Brussels that this is not an attempt to create a new sphere of influence, nor a process directed against Russia … we want to believe what we're hearing from Brussels regarding the Eastern Partnership, although I won't conceal that some comments on this initiative that have come from the EU have made us cautious.

Outside the diplomatic quarters, the criticism was even harsher. For instance, Director of Council on Foreign and Defence Policy Sergei Karaganov (2014) – an active defender of Russian power and pride internationally – wrote on the heels of the eruption of the Ukraine conflict that:

> [After the war in Georgia] The tactic of a rapid offensive gave way to a prolonged siege. That was precisely the meaning of the Eastern Partnership and of the latest senseless and economically harmful attempt to forge an Association Agreement with Ukraine.… Some Europeans and the forces behind them [referring to the U.S.] … wished to annoy Moscow, to retaliate for defeats suffered in the past, to bind it hand and foot, and to push Russia into a crisis.

In addition, and particularly during the crisis in Ukraine, Russia has started to take issue with the EU's motivations and objectives in the neighbourhood. To quote Chizhov (2015) again:

> The inward-looking peace project has acquired a new somewhat messianic dimension – the EU now 'seeks to advance in the wider world … principles which have inspired its own creation' (Art. 21 TEU).… These worrying trends have converged in Ukraine. May I remind you that back in May 2013 EU high officials were making it clear that the Vilnius summit of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) later that year would be about 'winning Ukraine' in a 'geopolitical battle of Europe'. This was clearly a wrong approach.

The EU did not see its own actions in this light, but instead sought to highlight its inclusive positive-sum and non-antagonistic objectives. It systematically insisted that the logic was not a geopolitical one and certainly not directed against Russia.[3] Barroso (2014) summarised the triangle in the EU–Russia summit in January 2014:

> Our relationship and our common interests are too important to not address our differences. We need each other to ensure stability and prosperity throughout our shared continent and to produce solutions to the many challenges we face together. To do this, we need mutual understanding and strategic trust.
>
> The Partnership is not against someone, it is for something – it is about making the countries in our neighbourhood more prosperous and giving their citizens better living conditions. This is something that can only benefit our other partners, and certainly will not harm Russia.

Barroso (2014) further criticised 'the perception that one region's gain is another region's pain' and said that the European Union was 'against the mentality of block against block. We believe the European Union and Russia have all to gain from a cooperative attitude'.

However, the fact remains that the circles of membership in the EU and NATO are to a large extent congruent, and the Eastern partners that have pushed for a closer relationship with the EU have also actively attempted to balance against Russia with a membership application to NATO. Instead of openly admitting the geopolitical implications of its actions – however unintentional – the EU hid behind the technocratic jargon of the Association Agreements. This further fuelled the flames of mistrust towards the EU in Russia (Haukkala 2016). Perceived opportunism on the part of the EU was probably one of the deciding factors aggravating the Russian response. Aaron Hoffman has suggested that the basic confidence that others will do what is right in changed circumstances is the key in fostering mutual trust (Hoffman 2002, 394). From the Russian perspective, the opposite happened.

The fact that after the fall of Ukraine's President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 the EU quickly rushed to embrace the new government in Kiev was interpreted by Russia as a sign of bad faith on the part of the EU, showing its willingness to take advantage of the new situation, reneging on the negotiated agreement between Ukraine, Russia, and the EU only a few days before. Also the fact that the EU representatives had previously been seen as clearly taking sides in the domestic conflict in Ukraine – for example many EU foreign ministers and the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton had taken part in the anti-government rallies on the Maidan – seemed to verify the Russian suspicion of the EU's foul play in the conflict.

Yet, and although the EU can be seen as having acted in a clumsy way over the years and particularly in the run-up to the rupture of ties in 2014 that was in the very least conducive to both undermining Russia's trust as

well as generating the conflict over and in Ukraine, it cannot be denied that the subsequent Russian actions have been particularly damaging in eradicating any trust that might have lingered between the two. To a degree, the EU's shock in the face of Russia's actions is explained with the notion of shattering positive illusions.

Harbouring positive illusions is a quite prevalent tendency when people predict the future on the grounds of what they would like to see happen, rather than what is likely to occur (Renshon 2012, 3). Indeed, one way of reading the EU's policy for the past 15 years is that it has been premised on positive illusions. They stem partly from the prevailing outlook and mind-set of the early 1990s and the EU's Eastern enlargement that followed. The general expectation at the time was that the Western norms would somehow peacefully and half-automatically spread to other corners of Europe and further.

Albeit Russia was not as eager as Central and Eastern European states to adopt European norms, the expectation was that through interdependence and cooperation this would slowly and gradually take place. This has been perhaps particularly true in the case of Germany whose 'rapprochement through interweavement' approach, predicated on the assumption that increasing interaction and interdependence would consequently turn Russia into a reliable member of the wider European security community, has been highly influential in shaping the EU's Russia policy as well (Meister 2012). Although the actual results of this policy were meagre at best, the consequent cognitive dissonance was simply papered over with the continued talk of 'strategic partnership' and the insistence on the notion of 'common values' as the nominal foundation of relations with Russia (Schmidt-Felzmann 2016, 21–22).

Conclusions

In this chapter we have attempted to demonstrate how the false premises of EU–Russia relations – insisting on a highly-institutionalised trust-based relationship ('strategic partnership') in the conditions of a lack of trust – led to consequent disappointments and a sense of betrayal between the two. This, combined with communication issues and inconsistencies, resulted eventually in more dangerous forms of mistrust culminating in the current rupture in relations and deep disagreements on the very root causes of the problem.

We can now summarise the above analytical narrative and contrast that with some of the key factors often contributing to the breakdown of trust identified by Kramer and Lewicki (2010, 251). The Cold War era ended with high hopes but trust between the West and Russia was mainly personalised. Despite mutual efforts and an ambitious, value-based agreement (PCA), trust was never firmly institutionalised on different levels of interaction between the EU and Russia. Even during the very first years of

cooperation, the idealistic documents never described an existing reality and hence led to constant *unmet expectations* on both sides where the Russian side highlighted broken promises and/or violated unspoken premises of relations with the EU drawing attention to Russia's breach of rules and non-compliance with formal norms and obligations.

When commitments were broken, there was *unwillingness to acknowledge and to take responsibility for mistakes or issues*. Both sides put their own concerns first and ignored the complaints by the other side, avoiding taking responsibility for their own mistakes. All this was combined with mutual *communication issues* (failure to listen and to work to understand the other side) and perceived *disrespectful behaviour* (discounting the other side and its contributions, disregarding feelings and input, and blaming the other side for problems).

In the second phase, Russia's dissatisfaction with its place in the European and international security architecture grew, encouraging mistrust towards European organisations. The Eastern enlargement of NATO was considered as a sign of mistrust towards Russia, which affected negatively upon EU–Russia relations as well. Again we can detect *unmet expectations*. Russian leaders were disappointed to see that the West was not willing to accommodate Russia's concerns regarding the security arrangements in Europe. Furthermore, although Russia signed several European documents and agreements and pledged its commitment to European values, it did not fulfil its commitments and gradually showed, first, no serious interest in complying with many of them and, then, finally started acting in active opposition to them – all this denotes a high degree of *incongruence* that encourages mistrust.

Albeit certainly not the only problem, also c*ommunication issues* played a part here too. Many European leaders were taken by surprise every time Russia interfered in conflicts in the post-Soviet space. This reflects a tendency of the European side of explaining Russia's aggressive statements away by taking them merely as 'rhetoric' aimed at the domestic audience. Similarly, the Russian side misinterpreted the EU's benign words as a weakness and/or considered them as a smoke screen for other (or other actors') 'real' interests. Both parties disregarded the feelings and input of the other side and blamed the other side for all the problems in the relationship, which can be taken as *disrespectful behaviour*:

On the one hand, Putin may have felt marginalised among the European leaders and disappointed for not having received the special treatment that he believes Russia deserves. On the other hand, many European leaders certainly did not have antagonistic relationships with Putin as a person with, for example, Schröder, Berlusconi, Prodi, and Sarkozy having been on amicable terms with Putin during their terms in office. Also Solana and Barroso systematically refrained from antagonistic language towards Putin. It thus appears that it has been value- and identity-based issues and the political events that have unfolded and been interpreted very differently

that have in the end mattered more than attempts at cultivating benign personal relationships between the parties.

In the final analysis, an aggravating factor concerning the mismatch between the levels of trust and the levels of cooperation was that there was never open and frank talk concerning the root causes of disagreements. The false premise of the EU was to believe that Russia would eventually change its operating code. The false premise of Russia was that the EU shared and accepted Russia's geopolitical logic at some basic level behind the icing of normative language. In the end, it seems that the former Foreign Minister Ivanov (quoted at the beginning of this chapter) had it right when making a reference to different worldviews as the ultimate source of mistrust, but better communication and willingness to take the other side's arguments seriously would nevertheless have helped along the way.

There seems to be an emerging understanding of this: in 2014, Germany's Foreign Minister Steinmeier (cited in Baczynska and Hudson 2014) stressed that Moscow and Brussels should discuss long-term aims with a mutual pledge of transparency and continued: 'We can't avoid the fact that due to history, and the long enduring division of different systems, we have different perceptions in East and West. But if we are aware of this, then we can create trust.' Acknowledging this by both sides is the primary prerequisite for mending fences between the European Union and Russia. But the road ahead to establishing trust between the two is probably long and winding.

Notes

1 This definition is an amalgamation of Cook *et al., Cooperation without Trust?*, 193, and Larson, 'Distrust: Prudent, If Not Always Wise', 35.

2 The original quotation goes: 'Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.' The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Karl Marx 1852, www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm.

3 See Gunnar Wiegand and Evelina Schulz, 'The EU and Its Eastern Partnership: Political Association and Economic Integration in a Rough Neighbourhood', in Christoph Hermann, Bruno Simma, and Rudolf Streinz (eds), *Trade Policy between Law, Diplomacy and Scholarship*, Liber Amicorum in Memoriam Horst G. Krenzler, EYIEL Special Issue (Berlin: Springer, 2015), 321–358.

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6 Mistrust within trust

Finnish–Swedish defence cooperation and the ghosts of the 1990 EC application incident

Tapio Juntunen and Matti Pesu

Introduction[1]

Finland and Sweden are countries sharing a border, history, interests, and identities, and hence over the course of history their fates have been tightly intertwined. Interaction between the states is close-knit, and cooperation takes place across multiple domains. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union opened up new avenues for Fenno-Swedish cooperation. Considering the status quo-oriented foreign policy posture of the two states during the Cold War, some of the most prominent opportunities for completely new forms of cooperation were found in the area of security policy. But unlike in many other policy domains and spheres of interaction between the states, bilateral cooperation in defence and security policy has only started to gain momentum in the last ten years or so.

Nordic defence cooperation, encompassing all five Nordic countries, has, to a great extent, figured prominently on the agenda after the end of the Cold War, especially since the establishment of the Nordic Defence Cooperation structure (NORDEFCO) in 2009. In Finland, bilateral cooperation with Sweden has recently begun to be seen as the most important approach to and substance of defence cooperation.[2] Bilateral cooperation appears to provide opportunities for ambitious collaboration and, at least nominally, a way to abide by the policy of military non-alignment – a doctrine seen as upholding the balance of power in the Baltic Sea area and enhancing the region's strategic stability in an era of notable turbulence.

Establishing a more extensive security policy partnership, or even a military alliance, is however more easily said than done. Rather surprisingly, in Finland there seems to be an underlying lack of trust, which would have to be overcome in order to take cooperation beyond its current, rather nascent and incrementally evolving state to a more mature level. Indeed, as the stakes and ambitions of defence cooperation between Sweden and Finland have increased, so have historically rooted suspicions. In particular, the impression that Sweden betrayed Finland when it announced its intention to apply for membership in the European

Community (EC) on 26 October 1990 without consulting Finland beforehand remains vivid in the Finnish foreign policy discourse. In fact, some Finnish decision-makers, experts, and public commentators have begun to frame the current situation in light of the 'lesson' of October 1990. This time the fear is a sudden Swedish transatlantic reorientation, namely Stockholm applying for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) without properly consulting Finnish interests on the decision.

The underlying puzzle in this chapter, approached from the perspective of trust research in International Relations (IR), is why progress in the defence and security policy cooperation between these two historically connected Nordic states, which otherwise enjoy a mature and evolved partnership, has been so circumspect. At first glance, the Swedish–Finnish inter-state relationship seems to be a rather superfluous object of study, especially from the perspective of trust research in IR; after all, the relationship between the two Nordic countries has been described as that of a model security community (see Waever 1998, 72).[3]

Moreover, if Finland and Sweden in fact belong to a model security community – that is, a 'group of states among whom trust is so high and trusting relationship so robust that war between them has become unthinkable' (Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 9; see also Wiberg 2000) – their relationship can also be presented as a paradigmatic case of what interstate trust is and how it is maintained (on security communities see Adler and Barnett 1998; Deutsch 1957).[4] As Ruzicka and Keating (2015, 9) suggest in their explorative article on the latest developments in the IR trust research, 'trusting relationships rarely feature as something to be explained' in international politics. Instead preoccupying itself with questions of how to build trust between adversaries and (former) enemies, we suggest that the study of Finnish–Swedish bilateral relations should endeavour to offer valuable insights into the question proposed by Ruzicka and Keating.

In the spirit of analytical eclecticism, we approach the Finnish–Swedish case through the lenses of social and psychological approaches in IR trust research (see Haukkala *et al.* 2015, 4).[5] This means that we highlight the centrality of shared norms and political values when understanding the general identification-based conditions of trustful relations between collective units (e.g. Weinhardt 2015, 32). That said, conceptions more familiar from the psychological approach to international trust also need to be considered – the role of cognitive biases, beliefs, emotions, and, especially in our case (collectively shared) historical experiences and narratives – if we want to explain the role and effect of mistrust and suspicions even within generally trustful interstate relationships (see especially Michel 2012). In other words, whereas the constructivist orientation's focus on shared norms seems to highlight mutual trust in Swedish–Finnish bilateral relations, the role of suspicions (or even the historical experience of 'betrayal') in the context of this essentially non-conflictual small-state

relationship seems to provide clues how factors more familiar to psychological approaches can at the same time have negative effects, especially when stratified into collective narratives of mistrust.

Moreover, our study aims to broaden the existing discussion on international trust by avoiding the prevalent inclination towards studying trust in the contexts of profound tensions, disagreements, disputes, and processes of post-conflict reconstruction, with the usual addition of a great power being at least one part of the dyad (see for example Brugger 2015; Brugger *et al.* 2013; Hoffmann 2002; Larson 1997; Rathbun 2011a; Wheeler 2009).[6] Our study shows how historically rooted suspicions regarding another's intentions, together with the general feel of uncertainty stemming from the immediate geopolitical environment, can have decisive effects in generally trustful small-state relations where interdependencies between states are high. Indeed, there are myriad levels of trust and variations of trusting relationships in world politics: the potential benefits of building trust are not only significant in inherently conflictual dyads but can also play a major role for the security policy interests of states that have profoundly non-conflictual relationships.[7]

Finally, Finnish–Swedish defence cooperation offers an interesting case illustrating what Keating and Ruzicka (2014, 22) describe as 'complex relationships where trust varies across different issue areas'. Questions of national security policy seem to form a domain that can be separated historically from the wider bilateral issue areas such as questions of cultural, social, and economic integration in Finnish–Swedish relations. Indeed, the case of building cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy and coordinating grand strategy at large between Finland and Sweden shows that there can be deeply rooted and historically sensitive sources of latent mistrust and other asymmetries within bilateral relations that are otherwise understood to be based on a high level of an institutionalised, functional, and even mundane sense of reciprocal trust.

The study applies qualitative content analysis to research material consisting predominantly of statements and comments given by relevant foreign policy figures in Finland and Sweden. The outline of our chapter is the following. We first introduce the theoretical contributions, followed by the presentation of the social-psychological standpoints of the study and further elaboration of the theoretical framework. Then, we briefly review the October 1990 incident, before proceeding to an examination of contemporary defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden. Prior to exposing the latent misplaced trust in Sweden found in Finland, we concisely evaluate trajectories within Sweden and in the Baltic Sea region that have resulted in the (re)appearance of mistrust among Finnish decision-makers and the Finnish political elite. Lastly, we sum up our arguments and findings, and suggest avenues for further research.

Trust research in IR and its application to the relations between Finland and Sweden

We introduce three key conceptual distinctions that help to understand the dynamics of trust in the post-Cold War bilateral defence and security cooperation between Finland and Sweden. First, it is important to separate the general condition of *distrust* between states from the historically sensitive experiences of *mistrust* (or misplaced trust). Indeed, we suggest that a more profound understanding of the mistrust-distrust nexus is needed in IR trust research. Essentially, it is important to increase our understanding of how and where historical experiences of misplaced trust have evolved into full-blown distrust and where they have not.

Second, we suggest that the distinction between experiences of betrayal and disappointment seems to be especially salient in the Finnish–Swedish case. Here we follow the lead of the trust researchers who have drawn a distinction between, on the one hand, conceptions of strategic trust inspired by the rational choice theory, in which a breach of trust leads to a more nonchalant and 'calculated' sense of disappointment, and, on the other, emotionally and morally loaded conceptions of general trustfulness and moral trust, in which a breach of trust leads to a sense of betrayal and a more comprehensive re-evaluation of the relationship itself (see Rathbun 2011a, 2011b; Michel 2012).

Finally, we claim that interstate trust should be understood as a complex phenomenon that can have competing manifestations even within a single interstate relationship. There can exist a high level of institutionalised trust within certain policy sectors between states A and B, but for some reason this mundane trust that characterises certain everyday practices does not translate into trust that would pervade the relationship at large – a situation we can clearly sense in the Finnish–Swedish case. In more general theoretical terms, this leads us to consider the idea of scaling trust along an axis that moves from minimal trust towards the ideal type of maximal trust among states (see Booth and Wheeler 2008, 230). But before we introduce these conceptual innovations, a few preparatory words are in order on the theoretical standpoints informing the different approaches to trust research in IR and the theoretical and analytical commitments our approach builds on.

Merging psychological and social approaches to international trust

There is no conclusive way to define trust in interstate relations. Ruzicka and Keating (2015), for example, trace three interrelated approaches to studying trust in IR – rationalist, social, and psychological paradigms. In an eclectic spirit (see Sil and Katzenstein 2010), we combine elements from both the social and psychological approaches in our analysis, rejecting the

consequentialist and deterministic formulations of trust derived from the rational-actor framework, developed in international settings by neoliberal institutionalists (see for example Keohane 1984; Kydd 2001). As Rathbun (2011b, 2) observes, in the rational institutionalist conceptualisation 'trust emerges when [actors] have information that leads them to believe that specific others have a self-interest in reciprocating cooperation rather than violating their commitments'. We agree with Rathbun's criticism of the rather counterintuitive idea proposed by the neoliberal institutionalists that cooperation starts from a state of distrust. Trust must precede cooperation and institution building.

Instead of tracing the calculation of costs and benefits in 'mutually advantageous arrangements', we opt to focus on the role of non-rationalistic and relational 'variables' relating to trust such as the burden of historical experiences and their stratification into collective lessons (see for example Jervis 1976, 220–222; Rasmussen 2003; Snyder 1991, 13–14; Weinhardt 2015). In social approaches to trust the fiduciary nature of trusting relationships supersedes the rational weighing of self-interests as the ultimate source of trust: a trusting relationship emerges from the 'confidence in expectations that others will "do what is right", not (necessarily) from cool calculation of mutual benefits' (Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 16).

Here the verb 'to trust' relates to being able to make a series of (generally successful) *judgements* about the other parties involved even where direct information on their intentions is scanty. Social trust is thus not understood as a situationally isolated moment of calculation of pros and cons but as 'a belief that one will not be harmed when his or her fate is placed in the hands of the other' (Rathbun 2011b, 10). Any sense of being exposed to opportunism should be transcended or suspended in a trusting relationship *beyond the moments of isolated decisions*. Indeed, to paraphrase Rathbun (2011b, 11): 'Trust is critical for cooperation when there is no simultaneous exchange for benefits' (see also Larson 1997, 19; Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 19).

Scaling trust – from minimal trust-as-reliance to a maximal sense of habitual trust

Although difficult to establish in absolute terms, the scale of trustfulness can be imagined as going all the way from complete distrust (an example being the Soviet Union and the United States bilateral relationship during the early 1980s) to a habitual sense of trust-as-bond between states, reflecting the Deutschian notion of 'amalgamated security communities' (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 184, 229; Deutsch 1957). For example, confidence-building as a strategic instrument of enhancing predictability in order to avoid conflict between states implies a profound lack of trust. Michel (2012, 879), for example, labels this as mere *reliance*, juxtaposing it with a

praxeological sense of trust that 'does not derive from a calculated deliberative process but describes an inarticulate disposition which manifests itself in a social orientation with a strong moralistic element that carries an inarticulate belief about how others should behave'.

The distinction between moral trust and mere reliance echoes Rathbun's (2011a, 2011b, 3–6) distinction between generalised and strategic trust. According to Rathbun's reading, inspired by social-psychological trust research and the work of Ulsaner, generalised trust, that is, 'the belief that others are largely trustworthy', differs from the institutionalists' rationalistic assumptions of international cooperation as a calculative mode of behaviour activated to cope with distrust. The idea of generalised trust, which Rathbun (2011a, 245) applies to the settings of multilateral cooperation, reverses the order of trust and cooperation: by definition, social trust must precede cooperation. Unlike strategic trust, general/social trust 'allows actors to make more binding commitments and to reap the gains of cooperation without the protections that rationalism expects'.

The crude dichotomy between generalised/moralistic trust and strategic trust/reliance shares features with Booth and Wheeler's distinction between minimal (trust-as-predictability) and maximalist trust (trust-as-bond). For Booth and Wheeler (2008, 230), a minimal level of trust

> exists when two or more actors, based on the mutual interpretation of each other's attitudes and behavior, believe that the other(s) now and in the future, can be relied upon to desist from acting in ways that will be injurious to their interests and values.

In the maximalist conception of trust the goal of avoiding inflicting harm on the other is not enough. Instead, it requires more than functional cooperation, a sense of habitual care where the 'actors mutually attempt to promote each other's interests and values, including in circumstances that cannot be observed' (ibid.). Minimal and maximal trust are, of course, ideal types, not empirical but analytical categories. We deploy the scale from minimal to maximal trust as a heuristic device to illustrate how experiences of misplaced trust can linger on even where bilateral relations between the states are highly functional as a whole.

To return to the Finnish–Swedish case, the discussion on the possibility that Sweden could once again leave Finland high and dry revolves around the question whether Sweden might apply for NATO membership alone without consulting Finland properly before making such a move. Interestingly, as we point out later in this chapter, the foreign policy elite in both states have recently made reassuring comments, highlighting the interdependence between the states in the area of security policy. From the perspective of moralistic/maximalistic trust, however, this signals that there are at least doubts as to whether Sweden will take Finnish interests into consideration in making its key national security decisions. In this respect,

where security policy is concerned, the relationship between Finland and Sweden does not fulfil Booth and Wheeler's definition of maximal (habitual) trust or Michel's notion of phronetic trust.

Indeed, there are constant suspicious voices in the Finnish public debate on whether Sweden will commit itself fully to the promotion of both countries' interests and values.[8] More specifically, we go on to claim that the case of Finnish–Swedish defence cooperation and Finland's experience of misplaced trust in 1990 indicate how important a role historical precedents and learned lessons can play in trust building. At the same time, it should be acknowledged that the maximalist reading of trust as an all-encompassing moralistic disposition has difficulties when it comes to explaining why the wider framework of bilateral relations between Finland and Sweden is clearly based on a high level of confidence and everyday cooperation. In this respect, the significance of the aforementioned historical experience of misplaced trust should also be interpreted against what we term, following Deborah Welch Larson (1997, 714), the *overall expectation of benevolent intentions* in the bilateral relations as a whole. As Larson (ibid., 714–715) argues:

> This form of trust need not correspond with credibility; the other person may not keep all her promises and undertakings toward us, because of competing demands, or circumstances beyond her control, but we nevertheless trust her because her actions and words are well-intended. Similarly, we may trust another state because we believe that it has *fairly benign* intentions and will not take advantage of use (emphasis added).

The problem here, however, is that this kind of relationship should be based on the idea that any conflicts of interests between the two states 'should concern only minor issues' (ibid.). From the perspective of small states, the future orientation of one's foreign and security policy is not a 'minor issue',[9] but a core matter of national interests. And if, in the present case, we agree that the fates of the national security policies of Finland and Sweden – two small states – are intertwined, the level of trust specifically perceived within the realm of security becomes a defining element in relation to the expectations of benevolent intentions in the states' bilateral relations as a whole. As Larson suggests (ibid., 709):

> More trust is needed for large decisions, where the potential losses from betrayal would be devastating […] the extent to which states must trust each other to enter into an international agreement depends on how catastrophic would be the consequences of betrayal […]. Agreements affecting the relative balance of military power between two states require more trust than cultural exchanges.

Historical experience of misplaced trust and centrality of promises – disappointment or betrayal?

Honouring promises and obligations indeed proves to be an important element in the Swedish–Finnish case. It was, as the popular sentiment in Finland suggests, the informal agreement not to surprise its neighbour to the east in terms of foreign policy that Sweden 'broke' when announcing it intended to apply for EC membership in autumn 1990 without informing the Finnish foreign policy elite of its intentions beforehand. According to Ruzicka and Wheeler (2010, 73; see also Nicolaïdis 2007), who follow Martin Hollis, '[t]he binding approach to trust rests on the notion that actors will honour their promises'. Moreover, as Ruzicka and Keating (2015, 17) suggest, 'a trusting relationship […] leads states not to hedge against the potentially negative consequences of other's actions because such actions are cognitively considered to be zero'. In the following observation, one particularly salient to the case at hand, Hoffmann (2002, 394) expresses how important honouring obligations seems to be in maintaining a trusting relationship:

> Trusting relationships are behavioral manifestations of trust. They emerge when actors leave the fate of their interests to the discretion of others with the expectation that those actors will honor their obligation to avoid using their discretion in a manner harmful to the first.

Moreover, the scope of actions and decisions that can lead to injurious consequences in small-state relations is not exhausted on issues of war and peace. Small states play a different game from that played by great powers, especially when it comes to defining what is and what is not a matter of core national interest (see for example Elman 1995; Hey 2003). The point here is to problematise what 'injurious effect' means and how it can have different manifestations in different contexts, whether they are measured against great power politics, asymmetric power relations, or symmetrical relations between small states. Even within the context of peaceful and trustful relations between *small* states A and B, a unilateral decision made by state A – a decision that need not even be directed against state B – can have injurious consequences for the latter and weaken the trust between the states.

We suggest, as the case at hand shows, that it is important to make a distinction between a sense of disappointment and of betrayal. According to Michel (2012, 881), *a sense of disappointment* 'can be caused by both animate and inanimate entities in response to a specific let-down following a rational and conscious process of decision-making after […] which we decide to rely on someone or something'. Understood in this way, a feeling of disappointment follows when calculated strategic reliance is somehow misplaced or broken. It *might* not affect the fundamental feeling of

trustfulness felt by actor B towards actor A. The *feeling of being betrayed*, on the other hand, indicates that a deeper, more profound trusting relationship has been undermined: '[T]he experience of betrayal is attached to a moral judgment about the respective other as compared to a strategic judgment in cases of reliance' (ibid.). Moreover,

> the experience in cases where our normative belief in the trustworthiness of the other is violated, that is, in cases of betrayal, the form of harm we suffer exceeds disappointment qualitatively as it involves a deeper emotional as well as existential challenge.
>
> (Ibid., 882)

The question remains whether the Finnish experience of misplaced trust in autumn 1990 would fulfil the description of either disappointment or betrayal. And against the present puzzle, we might ask whether the incremental deepening of the Swedish–Finnish security policy cooperation amidst the Ukraine crisis is used as a mere hedging strategy, or whether we should see it as an indicator of a genuinely (morally) trusting relationship at work. Our analysis suggests that the level of trustfulness between Finland and Sweden in matters of defence and security policy has only reached a rather minimal level. If the experience in October 1990 (and the reiteration of this experience as a common narrative) falls into the category of being betrayed, this indicates that the Finnish foreign policy elite did not have any prior 'strategically held reservations' before Sweden 'broke' its promise in autumn 1990, in which case the experience can be seen as signalling a more serious rupture in the states' bilateral relations.

Here we can discern that the ability of at least some members of the Finnish foreign policy elite to brush aside a latent and historical source of mistrust might be crucial even for the fate of bilateral relations between Finland and Sweden as a whole. Moreover, the stakes of reaching an agreement on these terms are even higher amidst the post-Ukraine crisis geopolitical environment in the Baltic Sea area. The inability to mitigate this predicament would echo what Larson (1997, 702) describes in her social-psychological reading of interstate trust as 'a missed opportunity for agreement'[10] (see also Rathbun 2011a, 246, 2011b, 5).

'The seed of mistrust' was sown: October 1990 and Sweden's EC announcement

> The good relations between the neighbours almost broke down because Sweden played a two-faced game: first by concealing its intentions, then by betraying the promises given to Finland and finally by trying to sneak into the EC. This was the sentiment held by the Finnish state leaders, president and cabinet. Sweden's chicanery has left its

> mark on our national memory; it is an event that is always brought up when friction emerges between the neighbours.[11]
>
> (Hämäläinen 2015)

The quotation above is taken from Unto Hämäläinen, an eminent Finnish journalist and popular historian who analysed the October 1990 debacle in which Sweden announced its intentions to apply for membership in the EC. In his article, Hämäläinen traced the Finnish foreign policy elite's sentiments regarding Sweden's surprise decision in late October 1990 using material in the archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. His somewhat unnecessary mystification of the classified archival material aside, Hämäläinen corroborated the popular understanding that Sweden indeed seemed to have taken Finnish foreign policy elite by surprise, although the surprise was not as total as the popular memory in Finland seems to suggest.

Helsinki in fact knew that something was going on in Sweden. Finnish diplomats informed Finnish state leaders of Sweden's internal discussions throughout the summer and early autumn in 1990. The general expectation was that the Social Democratic government of Sweden was preparing to announce its plan to apply for EC membership soon.[12] Pressure from industry and commerce on the Social Democrats was especially high and widely known in Finland (Blomberg 2011, 213).

In addition, Finnish foreign policy commentators, such as Max Jakobson, a renowned former diplomat, took note of the evolving opinion and process in the neighbouring country in his much-read op-eds (see e.g. Wahlbäck 2011). If Sweden's tendency towards unilateralism as such did not come as a major surprise, the fact that it did not even keep its promise to inform Finland before making the announcement got under the skin of the Finnish foreign policy elite, especially the then-President Mauno Koivisto. The Finnish foreign policy elite felt that Sweden had jumped the gun (Jakobson 2003, 367–372).

Sweden had promised Finland that it would continue the negotiations on establishing the European Economic Area (EEA) between the EC and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) – an initiative by the then-president of the European Commission Jacques Delors. The Finnish foreign policy elite, in particular President Koivisto, prioritised EEA negotiations over the EC membership process. According to his memoirs, Koivisto felt strongly that the process would involve too many uncertainties, although Koivisto's discussions with François Mitterrand earlier the same year indicated that the prospects of the EEA negotiations were also perceived somewhat pessimistically by the Finnish president (Koivisto 1995, 517–529).

Moreover, even though Austria had already applied for EC membership in 1989, Finnish bilateral relations and commitments vis-à-vis the Soviet Union remained an obstacle, notwithstanding the constant decline of the eastern superpower. The proximity of the Soviet Union, even if badly

crippled, as well as the official Finnish policy of peacetime neutrality, reinforced these tendencies towards self-restraint when it came to choosing the appropriate strategy for western integration in 1990.

Things looked very different from Sweden, where the tide started to turn in favour of the EC track. The Swedish government, led by the Social Democrats, came under increasing pressure by the Liberals and the Conservatives, especially after their respective leaders Bengt Westerberg and Carl Bildt announced already in May 1990 that they would make EC membership a theme in their forthcoming election campaign in autumn 1991. Together with the deteriorating economic situation, the domestic political pressure towards the Social Democratic government pushed Ingvar Carlsson's government to hasten the prospects of EC membership, eventually leading to the 'shock' announcement on 26 October 1990 (Blomberg 2011, 213).

Koivisto was left shell-shocked when the information on Sweden's breakaway reached him. It was a 'complete surprise', as Koivisto (1995, 522) describes his sentiments in his memoirs. Koivisto made his disappointment known in his emblematic and discreet style. In an interview given immediately after hearing about Sweden's actions, he contemplated Sweden's break with tradition in the Nordic cooperation whereby states give one another an opportunity to express their views when it comes to making statements on matters of shared interests so 'that we would not be forced to face a *fait accompli* time after time'. Koivisto continued by noting that it would be desirable, considering that it had just been agreed in the EEA negotiations, that promises made on how to proceed would be kept.

In other words, Koivisto's initial reactions implied that Sweden had not only broken a promise but also fundamental tacit rules, or codes of conduct, among the Nordic countries on how to proceed in such matters. The sense of betrayal and its later social stratification to the Finnish foreign policy discourse thus had personal and individual origins, something the psychological approach to trust would emphasise. On the other hand, to understand the later depth and significance of the experience of misplaced trust on the collective level, one should take into account the wider cultural context – shared social norms and expectations between the two Nordic countries – in a way that also incorporates a constructivist understanding of the conditions of trust into the analysis.

The Finnish experience of misplaced trust seems imminent. Eventually, Finland and Sweden joined the European Union (EU) hand in hand in 1995. But this clearly did not do enough to dispel the underlying and latent sense of mistrust in Finland. As Jaakko Blomberg (2011, 214), head of the Foreign Ministry's political department in 1990, recalls in his memoirs regarding the overall mood in Finland, the true lesson of Sweden's behaviour was to think about international politics increasingly from the perspective of pure self-interest. This was especially true inasmuch as it had become apparent that 'one could not trust that others would care about us'.

Thus, the experience of October 1990 was more than a blow to what could be defined as strategic trust and a sense of reliance on functional cooperation with Sweden. The blow evidently penetrated deep, implying that Finland had invested a high amount of generalised/moralistic trust into the countries' bilateral relations with Sweden in 1990. Indeed, reliance came to be seen more as a challenge than as a solution. It is in this context that any parallels with the events of October 1990 and the experience of misplaced trust during the Ukraine crisis should be understood.

Bilateral defence cooperation in a security community

As we have described in our introduction, the Nordic countries, including Finland and Sweden, often serve as a standard example of a security community where the predictability of peace and degree of integration are high and where mutual contacts on different levels of society are abundant (see e.g. Waever 1998, 72; Wiberg 2000, 133–135). The common labour market and language community, cultural affinities, cooperation in taxation, and the agreement on social security, *inter alia*, facilitate close norm- and rule-based interaction on the official level and, also, between civil societies and individuals. In short: the elements of identification-based trust between Finland and Sweden are strong.

Despite the extremely close relations, practical cooperation in security and defence policy is a rather new field for Finland and Sweden. During the Cold War both took active part in the United Nations' (UN) peacekeeping efforts and, along with other Nordic countries, endeavoured to find ways to coordinate their policies and find benefits on the ground (see e.g. Forsberg 2013). Yet, this cooperation did not incorporate territorial defence or any other integral area of national security. For Finland, abiding by absolute sovereignty and autonomy in national security was considered sacred (see Möttölä 1982). Sweden again cherished its *alliansfrihet*, while nevertheless cooperating closely with the United States (Holmström 2009).

For Finland, geographical location, namely proximity to the Soviet Union, mattered greatly. Although both countries pursued policies of neutrality, albeit with different variants (see Karsh 1988), there was not enough common ground for substantial cooperation on security, since their standpoints were so different (Forsberg and Vaahtoranta 2001). As Max Jakobson (1983; see also 1980, 97–98) has aptly described the differences between Swedish high-profile and Finnish low-profile neutrality, Sweden could afford to feed its people the caviar of moralising foreign policy, whereas Finland forced its citizens to swallow the oatmeal of realpolitik.

The end of the Cold War opened up new possibilities in Nordic defence cooperation. The nature of neutrality changed and was eventually replaced by a much less restrictive policy of military non-alignment in both Sweden and Finland. Until the end of the 2000s this cooperation encompassed rather low-key issue areas such as peace education and training. Financial

difficulties at the end of the decade changed the name of the game; nations in Europe, allied and non-allied alike, had to reconsider how to make the most of the available resources in an era of shrinking defence budgets. The time was ripe for initiatives such as *Smart Defence* within NATO or *Pooling and Sharing* within the EU. Cost-efficiency became a guiding principle of the Nordic collaboration as well.

In 2009, the NORDEFCO was established, bringing the existing forms of cooperation under one umbrella. The initiative encompasses all five Nordic countries, and it has five cooperation areas: capabilities, human resources and education, operations, armaments and training and exercises (NORDEFCO 2017). Cooperation has yielded new results. One well-known achievement is the cross-border training (CBT) between the Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian air forces, in which fighter jets convene in joint exercises in the High North on a weekly basis, utilising the air spaces of all the three countries.

However, due to different defence choices, robust and deeper cooperation between all five states has not made headway. The allied Nordic countries, Norway and Denmark at the forefront, have little reason and interest to extend Nordic cooperation. Since 2013, at least in the Finnish debate, Nordic defence cooperation has predominantly referred to bilateral cooperation with Sweden, and it is 'the Stockholm way' where the most promising opportunities lie (Valtioneuvosto 2017). Indeed, throughout the last decade it has become clear that Sweden and Finland are increasingly in the same boat in terms of their national security concerns. Back in 2008, Foreign Minister Ilkka Kanerva stated that Finland and Sweden should make focal foreign policy decisions hand in hand, while Swedish Defence Minister Sven Tolgfors endorsed Kanerva's statement by underscoring that Sweden would not join NATO without Finland joining as well (Giles and Eskola 2009, 23).

One of the most striking features of Finnish–Swedish defence cooperation – distinct from the outset – has been its practicality. For quite some time, the main and exclusive driver was cost-efficiency. Hence, Nordic cooperation has not been threat-driven, and the Russian menace did not play a significant role in pushing the states to cooperate until the overall security situation in Europe became aggravated in 2014. The fact that two states are cooperating does not yet indicate that a trusting relationship exists, at least in the phronetic sense of the term presented earlier (Keating and Ruzicka 2014, 758; Michel 2012). As we will soon point out, there are clear signs in the Finnish public debate of latent mistrust as regards to collaborating with the western neighbour on defence policy. This mistrust and its significance has already been identified by Finnish security policy commentators. Salonius-Pasternak (2014, 6) has pointed out that trust in defence cooperation between Sweden and Finland is in short supply.

In addition, a well-known Finnish journalist Olli Ainola (2015) has stressed the significance of trust, or rather the lack of it, in Finnish–Swedish

defence cooperation. Ainola suggests that both the Finnish and Swedish foreign policy elites should trust each other if the states are to cooperate not only in time of peace but also in time of crisis. The tentative and incremental style of the defence cooperation implies a shortfall of trust (cf. Michel 2012, 873; Wheeler 2009). Indeed, the small steps taken regarding defence cooperation may indicate that proceeding in an incremental manner is itself a (strategic) trust-building exercise. Recent reassuring comments made by the Finnish and Swedish politicians in this context, analysed in the next section, further corroborates this conclusion.

Then again, the negotiations on the evolving defence cooperation between the two states have thus far proceeded without major disagreements, implicating an underlying sense of trustworthiness. A good track-record, even incremental in nature, might not only erase the experiences of mistrust but also ignite a positive spiral of deepening partnership, echoing Rathbun's (2011b, 12) idea of the *reciprocity circle* of social trust. On the other hand, for Finland, deepening cooperation on security policy is not taken for granted given the historical policies of autonomy, and for Sweden new commitments in the East would indeed indicate a profound reorientation from 'The Policy of 1812', that is, nearly 200 years of *alliansfrihet*.

Minimal trust in defence cooperation

Swedish defence policy and the Russian aggression: implications for bilateral cooperation

In order to understand what created circumstances for mistrust to surface in Finland, one must pay attention not only to the aggravated state of affairs in the Baltic Sea area but also to the impact of domestic trajectories in Sweden that played a significant role also in Sweden's decision in autumn 1990. At the end of the year 2012, the then commander-in-chief of Swedish Defence Forces Sverker Göranson dropped a bombshell. According to Göranson, Sweden would have been able to stand its ground and defend itself for only a week should it encounter military aggression (Holmström 2012).

The statement was given against the backdrop of defence reforms where Sweden considerably scaled down its conventional military capabilities and discontinued conscription in favour of recruiting professional defence forces. These decisions were a logical continuation of Sweden's post-Cold War defence policy, which has put an emphasis on expeditionary operations instead of old-school territorial defence, the latter being one of the cornerstones of the Finnish defence policy.

More fuel was added to the fire in the spring of 2013, when Russia allegedly carried out a simulated nuclear attack on Stockholm in the early hours of Good Friday. Swedish planes were not prepared, and eventually Danish fighter jets from Lithuania were sent out to intercept the Russian

planes conducting the manoeuvre (Holmström 2016). Various incidents kept occurring in the Baltic Sea region (see Frear *et al.* 2014), and in August 2014 Sweden hunted an assumed Russian submarine in the Stockholm archipelago. No intruder was found, but commander Göranson was 'convinced' that a foreign submarine had indeed violated Swedish territory (The Local 2015).

The cases cited are the result of increased Russian assertiveness in European and global politics. Russia's annexation of Crimea and the Ukraine crisis at large have been a game changer in the post-Cold War European security architecture. In his annual New Year's speech in 2016, Finnish President Sauli Niinistö (2016) stated that 'Russia's reprehensible actions in Crimea and Ukraine disrupted our oasis of peace', referring to the Baltic Sea area. The disruption has not gone unnoticed in security policy debates in Finland and Sweden or elsewhere in security policy communities. Rather intense speculation has begun among security policy experts as to whether Helsinki and Stockholm will discard the policy of military non-alignment and apply for NATO membership, and arguments have been put forward for and against Finland's and Sweden's membership (see e.g. Bertelman 2015; Braw 2015; Dempsey 2014; Gay 2015; Giraudo 2014; Lucas 2015; Moreland 2015; Seip 2015).

In Finland, public opinion has remained critical of NATO membership irrespective of Russia's actions (see e.g. Forsberg and Pesu 2017). Support for membership has not surged. The foreign policy leadership has also underscored that, for the time being, Finland will remain outside NATO, maintaining the possibility of military alignment in the future (Valtioneuvosto 2016, 19). Sweden's official policy, on the other hand, is even more explicit in that it intends to postpone NATO membership during the current government's term. However, the centre-right opposition now unanimously advocates Sweden joining (Dahl 2017, 84; Reuters 2015b). Hence, the ruling Social Democratic Party is the gatekeeper as regards Swedish NATO membership application.

To top it all off, Swedish public opinion is more positive toward military alignment, and some recent polls have indicated that there are more Swedes supporting than opposing the country's NATO membership (Milne 2014). In liberal democracies, public opinion tends to matter in foreign policy if certain conditions are met (see e.g. Davis 2012; Foyle 1997; Risse-Kappen 1991). Therefore, the trajectory of public opinion understandably sparks speculation concerning Sweden's future actions.

The turbulent environment has given an extra boost to defence cooperation – between Finland and Sweden and in *Norden* at large. In May 2014, Finland and Sweden took considerable steps forward in their partnership when Defence Ministers Carl Haglund and Karin Enström signed an action plan outlining how the two countries should deepen cooperation. Several possible areas for bilateral cooperation were identified, including enhancing the interaction between the defence ministries

and exploring the possibilities to deepen cooperation between the countries' navies, armies, and air forces. The final reports, made in accordance with the action plan, were published in February 2015. According to the report by the Defence Forces of Finland and Sweden,

> [T]he long term commitment to deepened defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden aims for better security in a regional context and strives for the better use of resources and cost-efficiency in defence-related areas. Furthermore, the cooperation increases interoperability and the capability to act jointly both domestically and internationally.
> (Swedish Defence Forces and Finnish Defence Forces 2015, 2)

Again, many opportunities for cooperation were recognised – most notably the combined units of the navies and air forces that had been mentioned in the 2014 action plan. The report also stated that cooperation is a 'significant signal for the surrounding region'. It also suggested the countries should study the possibility of extending cooperation to cover not only peacetime but times of crisis as well (ibid.). This argument was reiterated in a joint op-ed written by the Prime Minister of Finland Juha Sipilä and his Swedish colleague Stefan Löfven in winter 2016 (Sipilä and Löfven 2016). Along with the report, there are other indications of increased ambition as regards the partnership between Helsinki and Stockholm.

A possible defence alliance looms on the horizon. For example, Finland's Defence Minister Jussi Niinistö has argued that the possibility of an alliance between Finland and Sweden should not be excluded (Iltalehti 2016). The former and the longest-serving foreign minister in the history of Finland Erkki Tuomioja also expressed the same opinion, although he did not see the alliance as a realistic possibility at the time (Uusi Suomi 2015). In Sweden, the chair of the Defence Committee, Allan Widman, has advocated the idea of a defence alliance, but in Finland enthusiasm seems generally higher.

When it comes to the changed reality in the region, the Nordic countries have also reacted on the multilateral level encompassing all five states. In an opinion piece and joint declaration published in various Nordic newspapers and signed by the defence ministers of the Nordic countries in April 2015, the ministers made known their respective countries' readiness to deepen cooperation in the face of Russia's aggressive policies. For the first time, Nordic defence cooperation publicly echoed deterrence against Russia and cooperation was no longer merely a pragmatic way to achieve cost-effectiveness (Reuters 2015a).

To sum up the recent developments in defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden, one could argue that both the stakes and the level of ambition are higher than ever, and collaboration has become an integral part of Finland's and Sweden's national security policies. There is a will to proceed in tandem, and cooperation is not only a matter of cost-effectiveness

in a time of austerity but also one of reacting to the worrisome and worsened state of affairs in the Baltic Sea region. The increased stakes and ambitions also mean that if they are to go forward on the road of defence partnership, Sweden and Finland need to build trust, as has already been suggested.

The 'lesson' of October 1990 as an indicator of misplaced trust

Instability in the security environment and uncertainty stemming from the domestic debate as regards Swedish foreign and security policy moves have brought back the bitter memories of October 1990 in Finland. The recollection is evident when one examines various statements in Finnish foreign policy discourse suggesting that the present situation is analogous to that which prevailed in 1990. Several foreign affairs notables have voiced their concern that Sweden might desert what thus far has been fruitful bilateral cooperation and seek security guarantees from NATO without consulting Finland. A peculiar feature of the analogy is that it is invoked rather latently; the memories of the lesson from October 1990 seem to loom in the background.

The case of trust between Finland and Sweden differs greatly from the stakes at hand in superpower relations, where actions fuelled by distrust might lead to consequences threatening the existence of humankind. In the case of Finland and Sweden, the stakes of possible disappointment or betrayal are not weighed in a context of mutual hostility and conflict. Instead, being betrayed means facing the possible negative repercussions for security policy of being abandoned by the other state should it make a unilateral move to reorient its foreign policy. However, the relevant Finnish stakeholders are aware that the future of Fenno-Swedish cooperation is integral to Finnish national interests and that Sweden's feared jumping the gun or unexpected foreign policy reappraisal might have even more direct security policy implications than the rather optimistic race towards European integration in the early 1990s.[13]

Mistrust towards Sweden, usually hidden in the analogy of the 1990 EC incident, is easily observable in the Finnish foreign policy discourse. According to former defence minister and leader of the Swedish People's Party of Finland Carl Haglund, for example, Sweden might apply for NATO membership soon and if it did, Finland would find itself in a position similar to that in 1990, when Stockholm 'rather surprisingly' decided to announce its EU bid (Iltalehti 2015). The former chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee and a Member of Parliament Pertti Salolainen, who personally experienced the October 1990 as a member of the Finnish foreign policy decision-making elite, has again implied that Sweden's position towards NATO could turn unexpectedly if the country's Social Democrats change their foreign policy orientation (Suomenmaa 2015). Alpo Rusi (2015), a former ambassador and professor, has also joined the chorus by warning that the pro-NATO stance of the Swedish centre-right opposition

may soon spill over into the left–green government, bringing about the anticipated change in Sweden's position on NATO membership.

Moreover, the various reassuring statements being made signal that the issue troubles not only heavyweights and pundits but also incumbents. When Finland's Prime Minister Juha Sipilä paid his first official visit to Stockholm in June 2015, he reassured all concerned that Sweden and Finland have agreed not to surprise each other regarding NATO and that Helsinki and Stockholm will keep one another informed on matters of foreign policy. In the same breath, he asserted that Finland would refrain from any unexpected actions in terms of foreign policy (Yle Uutiset 2015b). Sipilä's assertion can be seen as an effort to reinforce certain social norms between Finland and Sweden. An understanding of the social prerequisites for a trusting relationship are clearly present in Sipilä's concerns; enhancing predictability is seen as a virtue in the present uncertain security environment.

In June 2015 during his visit to Sweden, the new Defence Minister Jussi Niinistö underscored that if Finland and Sweden ever joined NATO, it would be 'natural' to do so hand in hand (Helsingin Sanomat 2015a). However, Niinistö has since stated that Finland should 'unceasingly' monitor what Stockholm is up to in its relations with the United States and NATO and that it is not self-evident that Finland and Sweden would submit their applications to Brussels simultaneously. To avoid any surprises concerning NATO, Finland and Sweden have decided to keep each other up to date and, according to Niinistö, the parties have better chances of doing so today than in 1990 (Helsingin Sanomat 2015b).

The Finnish media's role in invoking the lesson of October 1990 and hence reproducing the 'mistrust narrative' cannot be underestimated. For instance, former Prime Minister Alexander Stubb was once asked in a live interview to predict what his reaction and subsequent policies would be should Sweden catch Finland off guard by announcing its NATO bid (Yle Uutiset 2015a). The article by Unto Hämäläinen, mentioned earlier, is an example of the reproduction of the mistrust narrative through overt speculation that Sweden might take Finland by surprise yet again (Hämäläinen 2015). The most widely circulated daily newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat* (2016) has also speculated, in direct reference to October 1990, whether 'a surprise from the other side of the Gulf' is due in the near future.

The Finnish discourse of mistrust has not gone unnoticed across the Gulf of Bothnia. In the annual *Folk och Försvar* defence conference in Sälen in January 2016, Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström recognised Finland's anxiety. However, she pleaded for military non-alignment as the best way to uphold the balance in the Baltic Sea area and reassured Finland that Sweden's existing foreign policy line will hold fast – irrespective of the worsened state of affairs in its security environment. In addition, Wallström referred to the joint op-ed of the Finnish and Swedish prime ministers, published just before the conference, as an act of alleviating suspicions.

In the piece, Prime Ministers Sipilä and Löfven emphasised the feasibility of non-alignment and ever-deepening cooperation and information sharing between the militarily non-aligned Nordic countries (Hufvudstadsbladet 2016; Sipilä and Löfven 2016). Moreover, in autumn 2016, Prime Minister Löfven himself, echoing Wallström, underlined that Sweden rules out such a surprise move, and further highlighted that a change in the Swedish foreign policy line would be irresponsible and would bring about a change in the status quo (Ilta-Sanomat 2016). The message from Sweden to Finland was once more amplified later on in autumn 2016 when Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist strongly emphasised that his nation's NATO membership is not in the cards (Helsingin Sanomat 2016).

What is important to note here is that Wallström's, Löfven's, and Hultqvist's comments can be interpreted as reassuring signals towards Finland, implicitly reminding it of the unresolved historically rooted suspicions. The level of trust between Helsinki and Stockholm, at least in the moralistic/maximalist sense proposed by Michel, Booth, and Wheeler, is not as high as it could be. This does not imply that the relationship as a whole would be distrustful, but the puzzle remains of how to explain the latent experience of misplaced trust within a generally trustful partnership.

The fact that the experience of misplaced trust in 1990 pops up recurrently in the Finnish debate is not that surprising if one considers how heuristically strong historical analogies, lessons, and myths generally are in world politics (see especially Rasmussen 2003 and Juntunen 2017). There are superficial similarities between the present and the latter days of the Cold War – namely an unsettled security environment inciting deliberations regarding the feasibility of existing foreign policies. Moreover, in the 2010s, Sweden is once again being governed by the Social Democrats, and it has an opposition challenging the present foreign policy line.

At the beginning of the 1990s, Sweden went through economic difficulties. This time, Stockholm has encountered a national security challenge in terms of capabilities. In addition to exhibiting a number of parallels with the present, the incident of October 1990 is a recent episode, and therefore it is rather available to the generation of Finnish politicians in power now. But there are also differences: whereas in 1990 the dilemma was essentially 'positive' in nature – a European-wide race towards western integration – the present case, marked by the Ukraine crisis and Russia's provocative behaviour, is even more about leaving a friend out in the cold.

What do all these statements tell us about the trusting relationship between Finland and Sweden? It gives the impression that Finnish foreign policy elites cannot exclude the possibility of Sweden potentially acting against Finnish interests. Thus, following Michel's reading of trust as a moralistic commitment, we should contest the idea that there is a habitual sense of trust at work in Swedish–Finnish bilateral national security cooperation. Rather, the pragmatic and incremental step-by-step progress made in the defence cooperation in recent years points towards strategic

trust-building efforts to mitigate the lack of trust in the sphere of national security using the 'social trust capital' inherited from the wider identification-based framework and expectations of benevolent intentions between the states. Indeed, the Finnish–Swedish case shows that trust can be understood both as *a result or objective of* cooperation (to overcome historically stratified mistrust within a certain policy area) and as *a condition for* cooperation (in the form of a general affective identity relationship between the collective units) at the same time (Weinhardt 2015, 32–35; see also Möllering 2006, 79).

Conclusion

> [B]ecause the amount of trust required for an agreement varies, states can overcome the barrier of mutual suspicions by starting with small agreements where less is at stake so that each state can test the other's intentions without putting too much at risk. In this way, states can acquire more information about the other's values and reliability, before they move on to riskier agreements.
>
> (Larson 1997, 716)

As regards to questions of national security, the overall framework in Finland seems to start from the appreciation of the social prerequisites and the overall value of identification-based trust with Sweden. This sense of trust and its social value is overshadowed by the shared and mediated experience of misplaced trust dating back to October 1990, thus implying that there is also a psychological dimension at work in the Finnish perception of cooperation with Sweden. Indeed, the gradually evolving style of the countries' defence cooperation – visible in the way it has concentrated on building peacetime defence interoperability and coordination – indicates that there are background suspicions and issues that affect the depth and pace of the cooperation.

Moreover, the way in which the scope of this cooperation has been incrementally but constantly widened might be interpreted as a trust-building exercise in itself, at least on Finland's part. Therefore, the question is not about pre-existing trust but (strategic) trust built in piecemeal fashion. It is interesting to note that in the above quotation Larson, together with the majority of trust researchers in IR it seems, mainly focuses on the nature of trust building in dyads that can be easily described as hostile or otherwise conflictual.

From the perspective of small states, where countries' security policy orientations and decisions are usually highly interdependent, we need to weigh the significance of trustful relations and cooperative endeavours against the wider (sub-)regional security environment. In other words, the stakes of mutually reinforcing trust between small states should be measured against the question of how the level of trust and cooperation might

affect the wider international position and posture of these states. To measure the stakes of small-state trust building from a purely conflictual perspective is to succumb to what could be called the 'great power fallacy' (see also Juntunen 2017).

Put in more analytical terms and looked at from the perspective of trust-theorising in IR, the Finnish–Swedish case poses an outright paradox: as the illustrations in the analysis show, there is historically rooted mistrust within the Finnish foreign and security policy elite towards Sweden's future foreign policy decisions. Both high-level policy-makers, such as the Finnish prime minister and defence minister, and experts seem to fear that Sweden might suddenly make a security policy reorientation – something similar to what happened in October 1990, causing disappointment that, having left unresolved, has since evolved into a narrative of betrayal.

This time Stockholm would however join NATO – a move that, from the Finnish point of view, would render Finland strategically vulnerable and hence violate the spirit of the close-knit relationship between the two Nordic neighbours. It, therefore, seems that the Finns cannot be totally doubtless about the benevolence of Sweden's intentions and its recognition and consideration of Finnish interests. As a result, the Swedish foreign policy leadership has tried to reassure Helsinki of Stockholm's adherence to the shared sense of interdependence and common fate.

How should we then explain this seemingly deeply ingrained Finnish suspicion towards Sweden in the realm of security and defence policy within the framework of bilateral relations that could be described as being as trustful as one can imagine in world politics, framed as they are in a general expectation of benevolent intentions and even held up as a model example of a security community? To unlock this paradox or tension, we have made three analytical and conceptual moves.

First, we distinguished historically engrained and socially stratified experiences of *misplaced trust* (mistrust) from *distrust* as a more comprehensive depiction of the overall condition of the relationship between states and political units. This distinction gives us clues on how the Finnish experience of mistrust in autumn 1990 can linger on even in mature relationships where social norms and mutual expectations maintain a profound sense of trustfulness. Second, and closely related to the first distinction, our analysis on the latent suspicions on Finland's part towards Sweden in the realm of security policy shows that it is important to distinguish the experiences of betrayal and mere disappointment. Whereas disappointment fits better into a situation where the motives of the actors are more strategic and calculated (reliance), the sense of betrayal implies that something more profound and deeper in the relationship itself has been violated (moral trust).

Moreover, because the sense of disappointment was not dealt with properly in the early 1990s, it gradually stratified into a narrative of betrayal in the Finnish foreign policy discourse and now overshadows the

prospects of defence cooperation with Sweden. Additionally, the role of historically significant experiences of misplaced trust, especially in relation to sentiments of disappointment and betrayal, demonstrates that the puzzle cannot be approached from a purely rationalistic standpoint without reducing the role of history to the strategic and situational calculation of states that are acting with full information on the intentions of other parties.

Third, our analysis supports Booth and Wheeler's (2008, 230) idea on placing trust on an ideal scale from minimal to maximal trust. This is to say that the conditions and nature of interstate trust are highly context-dependent and relational (see also Weinhardt 2015). This is accompanied by the notion of sectoral trust, or what Ruzicka and Keating (2014, 22) describe as 'complex relationships where trust varies across different issue areas'. This seems especially relevant in small-state contexts as the Finnish–Swedish case quite well illustrates. Defence and security policy seem to form a sector of cooperation between Finland and Sweden where all the elements in the otherwise mature and fully evolved trusting relationship do not yet fully apply.

Moreover, coming back to the question of how to dispel the latent mistrust and its potentially harmful consequences between Finland and Sweden depends on how we define (and value) trust in international relations in the first place. If we define it as a form of strategic calculation, the way forward might well be the already established incremental process in defence and security political cooperation. This would indicate that a rather modest level of trust would be enough to steer the states towards a framework that enhances a reciprocal sense of credibility as regards this relationship. Theoretically this would point, in the words of Larson (1997, 714), to a mere reliance 'on a state to fulfil its commitments and promises' without further expectations of enhancing mutual trust and interests beyond explicit agreements.

We therefore go on to suggest that the sense of strategic trust – or trust-as-reliance – describes the nature of Finnish–Swedish bilateral defence cooperation, therefore making the case that the level of trust is closer to minimal than maximal trust. And if this is the level of trust that can be reached between two states within a model security community, this conclusion tells a great deal about the levels of achievable trust in international politics in general, that is, not very high above the minimalistic level. Moreover, coming back to the Finnish–Swedish case, during an era defined by turbulence in the external security environment, the level of trust experienced in the realm of national security is in danger of 'spilling over' to define the overall expectations of benevolent intentions between the states. One should remember that the incremental process can also take on a negative spin. This implies that the latent experience of mistrust, once left unresolved, might have even deeper ramifications than first acknowledged.

But the demands of this relationship could also be read from the perspective of maximal/phronetic trust. Here, a mere signing of agreements

and pragmatic-functional forms of everyday cooperation are not seen as significant enough developments, especially if read against the changing geopolitical environment in the Baltic Sea region. Maximal trust and its emotive basis echoes the idea of perceiving one's partner in the general framework of benevolent intentions *in all possible sectors of cooperation*. Here it becomes crucial that any experience of misplaced trust should be dealt with accordingly (Michel 2012, 881). The Finnish–Swedish case shows that the ability to deal successfully with past experiences of misplaced trust (and thus the explicit acknowledgement of latent mistrust in the present) can have a crucial role in pushing the interaction between states from a mere pragmatic hedging strategy towards a genuine process of trust building – a process that never starts from a historical and social void.

A moralistic leap into uncertainty, as Booth and Wheeler (2008, 234–243) describe the effort that is needed if one wants to pursue maximalist trust, should be made so that the bilateral security political cooperation could thrive beyond the pragmatic understanding of trust as mere reliance. Even in its maximalist reading it should be acknowledged that the existential sense of future uncertainty in international politics can only be transcended, or suspended – the *possibility* of being let down, even betrayed, cannot be fully escaped (see also Brugger *et al.* 2013, 443; Möllering 2006, 111).

Notes

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2 In the recent white paper on defence policy, published by the government of Finland (Valtioneuvosto 2017, 17) in February 2017, bilateral cooperation with Sweden is described as having a 'special status' (*erityisasema*) in the totality of Finland's international cooperation on defence policy. Moreover, the white paper explicitly says that no limitations have been set in advance on the depth of this cooperation in the future.

3 According to Wiberg (2000, 133–135) the forces behind the Nordic security community are predominantly internal. Mutual contacts with migration, a language community – Swedish is second official language in Finland – and the long tradition of neutralism are the core features underpinning the community. There are no indications of military contingency plans made against the other members of the community and the idea of a military conflict between the nations sounds utterly unthinkable. Moreover, over 600,000 people of Finnish ancestry live in Sweden. In addition to a common history, Finland and Sweden both adhere to the same social system, the Nordic welfare model. According to

the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (Ulkoasiainministeriö 2015), 'Sweden is the closest partner of Finland in the world', and the relationship and connections between the states are described as 'unique'.

4 Booth and Wheeler (2008, 183) highlight that the defining features of a security community are, *inter alia*, the predictability of peace, a high degree of integration, the delegitimized use of force, transparency, and trust.

5 According to Sil and Katzenstein (2010, 412) analytical eclectism attempts to generate '[…] complex causal stories that forgo parsimony in order to capture the interactions among different types of causal mechanisms normally analyzed in isolation from each other within separate research traditions'.

6 For example, on the face of it, it seems to be quite hard to apply Hoffmann's rules for measuring trusting relationships to the context of peaceful small-state relations, as the rules are heavily influenced by empirical examples taken from settings of multilateral institutions or power relations involving great powers (see also Rathbun 2011b).

7 Although it provides a compelling critique of the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the rationalistic mainstream in the IR trust literature, Torsten Michel's (2012) *phronetic* and emotion-driven conceptualisation of trust also relies on empirical examples based on conflictual dyads (such as that of Brazilian–Argentine relations in the 1970s) (ibid., 877–878; see also Wheeler 2009).

8 Whether this suspicion is well-grounded or not is an empirical issue and beyond the scope of this chapter. From the perspective of trust research, the mere existence of this suspicion amongst the foreign policy elite in Finland, whether latent or explicit, is already an indicator of a certain level of historical pathologies clouding the bilateral relationship.

9 Joining (or forming) a military alliance and thus abandoning the long history of military non-alignment policy could be interpreted as an *international orientation change*, although membership in the EU already imposes security policy requirements on Finland and Sweden that would make NATO membership a less sweeping change, one that would operate on the level of reorienting one's foreign policy programme or its driving goals. See Hermann (1990, 5) for a typology on major foreign policy changes.

10 Larson uses US–Soviet/Russian post-Cold War arms control discussions as a prime example of this kind of missed opportunity that might eventually increase mistrust.

11 Naapurimaiden hyvät välit menivät melkein poikki, koska Ruotsi pelasi kaksinaamaista peliä: ensin se salasi aikeensa, sitten petti Suomelle antamansa lupaukset ja lopulta yritti yksin livahtaa Euroopan yhteisön jäseneksi. Tätä mieltä oli Suomen valtiojohto, presidentti ja hallitus. Ruotsin välistäveto jätti kansalliseen muistiimme jäljen, johon aina palataan, kun naapurimaiden väleissä ilmenee kitkaa.

(Translation by authors)

12 For example, on 19 October 1990, seven days before Sweden made its announcement, Finnish ambassador to Stockholm, Björn-Olof Alholm, informed Pertti Salolainen, then Minister for Foreign Trade of Finland, that 'the social democratic government [in Sweden] is probably intending to take the initiative into its own hands before the opposition parties move forward [on the EC question].' Alholm further highlighted that the reasons for this lay in Sweden's domestic politics and economy, thus implying that Finnish interests did not matter that much in the equation. On the other hand, on 24 October, only two days before Sweden's announcement, Undersecretary of State Veli Suncbäck wrote a confidential background paper to President Koivisto, Foreign

Minister Pertti Paasio, and Secretary of State Åke Wihtol in which he stated that Sweden's minister for foreign trade, Anita Gradin, had just promised her Finnish counterpart, Salolainen, that Sweden would inform Finland before making any declarations concerning Sweden's position vis-à-vis the EC and ETA processes. See archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (UMA) 35–00 EY, Ruotsi 1990, telegram from Stockholm 'Ruotsin mahdollinen lähentyminen EY:n', 19.10.1990 (two pages) and UMA 35–00 EY, Ruotsi 1990, memorandum no. 936 'Ruotsi/EY-jäsenkysymys', 24.10.1990 (three pages).

13 In April 2016, an expert group commissioned by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs published a study on the effects of possible Finnish NATO membership which argued that Sweden and Finland constitute a common strategic space. Therefore, the countries should make their decisions concerning NATO hand in hand. According to the report, different choices, especially Swedish accession to NATO, would render Finland vulnerable, (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2016).

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7 Taking stock of the trust study in International Relations

Tuomas Forsberg

Trust or at least the quest for it is present everywhere in human and social life – and also in world politics. Although practitioners have almost always understood its importance, it has taken a long time for researchers to discover – or to some extent to rediscover – the concept of trust in the field of International Relations. There is now an expanding and forward-looking body of research on trust in IR that seeks to make analytical and theoretical sense of the concept, apply it to new empirical contexts as well as to solve explanatory puzzles with the help of the concept.

This book is an excellent example of this growing trust research, representing a variety of perspectives and examining its significance via empirical case studies in International Relations. We can no longer depart from the assumption that trusting relations are marginal in world politics and that distrust is the natural point of departure for conducting international affairs. Instead, trust should be seen as a central and instrumental concept in tackling pressing problems from security to trade and environment that we are encountering in today's world shaped by suspicion and uncertainty. In short, where trust does not exist, we should think of how to create trust in order to make human and social life better.

Yet, having said this, there is still some work to do in order to place trust among the central concepts of the discipline. Trust is not, for example, listed as a key concept in International Relations in neither of the two edited volumes that discuss more than 40 key concepts in the discipline (Diez *et al.* 2011; Roach *et al.* 2014). The key articles on trust in the field of the IR have gathered less than 100 citations (some even less than ten) in refereed journals. Neither is trust indexed as a key word in any of the several IR textbooks I surveyed.

There is a variety of avenues to enhance our understanding of trust in International Relations. Although research on trust has been extensively conducted in many neighbouring disciplines, it is not always easy to create interdisciplinary knowledge and transfer existing research findings to a new field (Neal *et al.* 2016). For example, there is a dynamic research field focusing on political trust but much of the research relies on narrowing down the concept of trust to political trust and accepting empirical

operationalisations of the concept (Zmerli and van der Meer 2017). Indeed, the concept is often analysed in idiosyncratic ways, which has not resulted in much cumulative knowledge (Hupcey *et al.* 2001).

A telling example is that the outgoing editor of the *Journal of Trust Research* that was established to advance knowledge on trust, characterises the areas where progress has been made during the first six years of the journal in terms of more sophisticated ways of addressing various dualisms and complexities (Li 2017). In other words, progress is more evident in the increased number of perspectives and the more refined way of understanding the dividing issues rather than in the form of shared knowledge. Even within IR, as the editors of this volume note, there are perhaps too numerous and sometimes unnecessarily complex conceptualisations of trust. The flipside of conceptual richness is conceptual confusion.

In this concluding chapter, I will not deal with the articles of this volume in detail but rather address some general themes that cut across them. The purpose of the chapter is to help us to reflect what research on trust has achieved and could achieve in IR. I will first discuss the concept and then the theories, although these are partly overlapping issues. Finally, I will look at the empirical findings of this volume before concluding with some words on the potential research agenda ahead.

The concept of trust

In the introduction to this volume, the concept of trust is defined as slippery. Trust certainly is not an easy concept since it is not directly observable. It takes many forms and contains a number of functions in the vernacular – partly depending on the language in question. Diverging definitions of trust can be seen as competing constitutive theories. Still, the very basic understanding of trust as a belief that the other does what it should do and at least does not intend to cheat or cause harm in the conditions of uncertainty seems to be shared (Hoffman 2002; Michel 2012; see also PytlikZillig and Kimbrough 2016).

Indeed, trust is not normally seen as an 'essentially contested concept' (see e.g. Collier *et al.* 2006), although approaches and perspectives to studying trust vary according to subjects and objects of trust. Trust has normative components – for example, the question of whether trust creates obligations – that can be contested, but discussing and disagreeing over those components has not so far been at the core of trust research. 'Unpacking' the concept of trust is still important since understanding its temporal, cultural, linguistic, political and theoretical layers enables us to think more comprehensively and consciously about the limits of fixing the meaning of a concept (Berenskoetter 2016).

It seems that the most theory-relevant conceptual discussion is related to the degree to which trust is a rational belief or an emotion – or an emotional belief (Mercer 2010). For many, the concept of trust entails some

emotional dimension and therefore conceptualising trust as a cognitive concept distorts its meaning. This debate is related to the distinction between the notions of trust and confidence where confidence is more cognitively constructed and based more on past experiences than trust.

The other salient conceptual issue in analysing trust is whether it is useful to distinguish between distrust and mistrust. Sometimes this is made on the basis that mistrust reflects a general absence of trust, hesitation and distrust is the opposite of trust being more emotionally loaded and based on experience compared to mistrust. However, neither ordinary language nor etymology of these words offers clear guidance for terminological practice. Overall, the authors of this volume tend to think that trust is not an absolute either–or concept but one that varies in degrees. But it is not clear if trust and distrust are just opposite ends of the same scale (see Saunders, Dietz, and Thornhill 2014). There are some research findings that support the view that trust and distrust are better to be analysed not as a continuum but as two distinct dimensions: The sources of trust and distrust can be different. For example, Martin Reimann, Oliver Schilke and Karen Cook (2017) have argued that the disposition to trust is explained to some extent by heritability but not by shared socialisation, whereas the disposition to distrust is explained by shared socialisation but not by heritability.

Theoretical approaches to trust

This volume is based on the idea that there are three key approaches to the study of trust in International Relations: rational, psychological, and constructivist. This tripartite typology for theorising trust in IR is elegantly put forward by Jan Ruzicka and Vincent Keating (2015). Similar typologies have been presented by other scholars, too. For example, Christer Pursiainen and Angelica Matveeva (2016) employ a parallel theoretical framework to study trust at the end of the Cold War (see also e.g. Weinhardt 2015).

Rational approaches perceive trust as being based on calculation as to whether it is wise to trust the other party in conditions of uncertainty. The key questions deal with the information available concerning the interests and structural constraints of the trustee as well as the degree of control that the trustor can impose. In the rational approach, trust depends on a cost-benefit analysis since it is rational to trust if the expected gains are high. And vice versa, if the potential losses are higher than the gains, distrust prevails. In the framework of the principal-agent theory, it can be asked what the optimal amount of trust is compared to control.

Psychological approaches stress that trust is based more on intuition than calculation, and trust formation is dependent on many situational factors that trigger the propensity to trust the other. Positive emotions, such as happiness, are likely to increase trust while negative emotions, such

as anger, are a conducive trigger for distrust (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005). Another type of key claim here is that certain personality traits are more conducive to the creation of trusting relations. Some people tend to be more trusting than others, and this distinction often distinguishes political left from right (Rathbun 2012). Individuals whose ancestors were heavily traumatised during the slave trade are less trusting today (Nunn and Wantchekon 2012).

Finally, constructivist approaches to trust in IR tend to emphasise the role of identities in trust-building: the more similar and closer in identity terms the parties are, the easier it is for them to trust each other. Constructivist theorising of trust can also specify what kind of norms and rules are likely to invoke trust. Some constructivists pay more attention to the role of language and discourses in the construction of trusting relationships.

These three approaches to study trust are not exhaustive. There are, for example, biological, hormonal, neuropsychological, and psychoanalytical approaches to trust that can be applied also in the field of IR (on neuropsychology and trust in IR, see Kugler and Zak 2018). It is partly unclear whether postmodernist theories can offer an alternative account of trust. To the extent that postmodern or poststructuralist approaches can be set apart from constructivism, they can be seen as second-order theories that deal with the linguistic construction and underlying assumptions concerning trust. From the outset, however, postmodernism can be seen as antithetical to the concept of trust because of its critical attitude towards existing representations (Hassan 2003). Typical representations of trust often connect the importance of trust to the weaker side of the relationship, while the stronger party can exhibit self-confidence. Indeed, the dichotomy of trust and distrust where trust is always positive and distrust negative can be deconstructed. Such a deconstruction can be supported by psychological studies showing that distrust can free the mind and lead to less stereotypical thinking than trust (Posten and Mussweiler 2013).

Theoretically, trust research can also be divided depending on the level of analysis. This is one of the recurrent themes of this volume and should not be confused with the three approaches above since all the theories can deal with several levels. The paradigmatic case for studying trust is often on the interpersonal level. Yet, both the subject as well as the object of trust can be an institution or a group. The idea of isomorphism between these levels may not hold. Therefore IR scholars can and should contribute to the overall theorising of trust. While trust research in IR often focuses on state leaders, it also aims to theorise trust between states or nations.

It is not always clear how collectives such as 'states' or 'nations' can trust each other, other than as aggregates of individuals. However, individuals often think and act in terms of the extended self of the nation or state, and those who represent the state are also obliged to do so.

Moreover, besides the individual and states and nations as collective entities, there are also elites or bureaucratic agencies that can have their own dispositions and develop their own cultures of trust.

The level of analysis problem in trust research has no simple solution when it comes to the question of relative explanatory power. Whereas Brian Rathbun (2012) has put emphasis on individual dispositions, most chapters in this volume tend to pay more attention to collective cultures and representations. As the constructivist literature suggests, there are collective traditions and representations that create and sustain cultures of trust.

As trust is relational and contextual, it is also interesting to theorise contexts such as how trust varies depending on the issue area and other contextual frames (Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 22). The standard view is that in security policy issues, trust is more difficult to build than in other areas, but this can be a fallible starting point if generalised too readily. The European members of the NATO alliance may have trusted the US in security policy, for example, but not necessarily when it comes to environmental policy. This variation of trust across contexts has no single explanation but can also be probed through rational, psychological, and constructivist perspectives.

Moreover, trust is an expectation that is relative to the object of trust, but expectations also have a psychological baseline relative to time and past experiences. This is a theme that is discussed in many chapters of this volume. To start with, trust often grows procedurally since beliefs about others' trustworthiness tend to be self-reinforcing. However, there are limits to this growth of trust. The more trust there is, the easier it is to feel betrayed as the expectations of what trust entails also become higher.

From a psychological perspective, even minor experiences of distrust lead to lower levels of trust. Experiences of distrust can have more negative consequences for cooperation than no experiences of distrust on a lower level of trust, since misplaced trust is emotionally more charging than no trust at all. This leads to an idea that there could be a pendulum cycle in the development of trust. Trust develops up to a point where disappointments follow, but it can also degenerate to a point where it is again more likely that surprises are positive.

The three perspectives to trust – rational, psychological, and constructivist – do not directly match the grand theories of IR – realist, liberal, and constructivist paradigms. The standard view is that realism is a theory that does not pay much attention to trust, but there is actually a theory of distrust embedded in the realist paradigm drawing – often implicitly – on rational, psychological as well constructivist insights. A rationalist perspective to trust, in turn, can be mainly associated with the liberal theory, while the constructivist theory can subsume both psychological and larger cultural and discursive perspectives. However, these definitions and boundaries of the grand theories are often contested, and therefore alternative conceptualisations can also be justified.

The point here is that the key in the trichotomy within trust research in IR is not so much the general assumption of the nature of the international system as defined by grand theories but the underlying theory of microfoundations (Rathbun 2009). These microfoundations can be typologised in different ways but a classic way of distinguishing them is Max Weber's (1978 [1922]) taxonomy of instrumental (strategic), value-ethical (normative), affective (emotional), and traditional (habitual) rationality coupled with Jürgen Habermas' communicative rationality.

Yet, this taxonomy does not match directly the three approaches to trust above. The rational approach corresponds with instrumental rationality, while the psychological perspective can be most easily associated with emotional rationality. Constructivist approaches can cover both value-ethical and affective rationalities as well as communicative rationalities. This suggests that a more explicit theory of microfoundations might lead to even more nuanced frameworks for studying trust than the conventional tripartite scheme. Also, normative and habitual conceptualisations of trust may lead to separate perspectives as the growing popularity of the practice theory indicates (Hopf 2010).

The editors and authors of this volume do not propose that one perspective to trust would be superior to others. Such a claim is unnecessary to the extent that they are not mutually exclusive. Many people think that a rational approach to trust could be omitted because trust that is based on calculation is actually not trust at all, which means that calling it trust is superfluous. Yet, the rational approach to trust is valuable at least in setting a baseline to psychological and constructivist approaches to trust.

Moreover, if trust tends to grow procedurally, different sources of trust can play a more significant role on various stages in the course of this development. The key question as to where the rational and psychological perspectives differ is whether control increases or diminishes the likelihood of trust. Apart from that, they rather complement each other than compete directly. The rational, psychological, and constructivist approaches to trust are hence not mutually exclusive, but a research strategy based on theoretical pluralism and analytical eclecticism can be adopted. In empirical contexts, the relative interpretative fit, the explanatory power or other gains of these diverse approaches can, however, be put into test.

The methods and empirical knowledge of trust

There is no simple way to study trust empirically. We can have theoretical circumstantial knowledge of relationships and situations where trust or distrust is likely to prevail. Those propositions can be backed by studies, for example experimental ones, on the basis of which we may conclude via analogical reasoning whether it is plausible that trust or distrust exists. But empirical research in IR must rely on a combination of verbal and behavioural indices (Hoffmann 2002).

Trust researchers often study texts and statements, but the language itself is fallible. Paradoxically, the language of trust is perhaps most needed in situations where there might be an intention to build trust but where there is also simultaneously plenty of uncertainty concerning whether trust actually exists. If trust exists and is taken for granted, there is no similar need to directly stress it.

Behavioural indicators offer no panacea either. Cooperation is no direct indicator of trust since parties can cooperate without actually trusting each other. This is the case when they are, for example, forced to do so. There are also situations where parties trust each other but do not necessarily cooperate if there is no need for cooperation. To overcome this problem, Aaron Hoffmann (2002) regards the absence of oversight mechanisms as a good indicator of trust. Keating and Ruzicka (2014), for their part, point towards the absence of hedging strategies in analysing trusting relations. Arguably, these are better indicators than cooperation as such, but the mere absence of control mechanisms or hedging strategies does not necessarily prove that trust exists any more than their presence automatically confirming distrust.

A lot of trust research is based on key examples, both negative and positive, of trust-building between enemies in situations where interpersonal relations between leaders are paramount (Wheeler 2018). Process-tracing and cross-case comparisons help to build knowledge concerning trust. In this volume, there are case studies that represent a variety of cases and examine not only the leaders but also foreign policy elites and societies. Asking the classic question of 'what is this a case of' (see e.g. George and Bennett 2005 and Levy 2008) can (even though one should not commit to the empiricist research programme often underlying such questions) help systematise findings and create interesting research puzzles.

The case studies in this volume cover new terrains, illustrate theoretical innovations, and address anomalies. So far relatively scant research has been conducted on the role of trust in the European Union foreign policy. The EU is a special case among international actors because of its hybrid nature. In their chapter, Hiski Haukkala and Sinikukka Saari examine the relationship between the EU and Russia, defining it as a case where personal and emotional trust has not been enough to create a truly trusting relationship between them. Expectations that were set too high led to the erosion of trust, although there could have been rational reasons for enhancing trust.

This is not very different from Johanna Vuorelma's case of trust between Turkey and the European Union – or by extension the West. Vuorelma highlights what role trust plays in an asymmetric relationship, describing how opinion makers in the EU are using the language of trust in framing and imposing the right policy choices for Turkey. This again enhances the sense of distrust on Turkey's side. Both EU–Russia and EU–Turkey relations can be seen as cases of how democratic and non-democratic states, at least in terms of the self-understanding of the other party, have difficulty in building trust.

Carina van de Wetering focuses on the United States and India, showing how, despite a shared democratic identity, distrustful relations endured during the Cold War. Since democracy is a discursive construction, it did not in itself result in a trusting relationship between the two, but underlying identity constructions, emotions, and practices contributed to insecurity and mistrust. Ville Sinkkonen, in turn, analyses the relationship between the United States and Egypt. Sinkkonen's analysis is an example of how a relative high level of interpersonal or inter-elite trust is not enough for sustaining trusting relationships between states if there is a high level of distrust within the societal level.

Scott Edwards discusses how the rational perspective to trust best captures the dynamics in the creation of ASEAN, a group of mostly non-democratic states. The case shows both the significance but also the thinness of rational trust: while it has helped to kick off cooperation and preserve peace in the region, it has not led to a deeper security community shaped by a high level of trust. Finally, there are cases where we would expect to encounter relatively high levels of trust. Tapio Juntunen and Matti Pesu analyse trust in Finnish–Swedish relations which is an interesting case of two historically close, democratic neighbours with highly trusting societies that still harbor suspicions against each other in the field of security cooperation. The mistrust in this case originates from past experiences of misplaced trust combined with the realist worldview that trusting a small state does not pay off since in times of crisis they do not have much freedom of choice despite benevolent intentions.

On the basis of these empirical chapters, we can draw both pessimistic and optimistic conclusions. To some degree, the chapters confirm the realist wisdom that building trust among states or societies or even between state leaders in the international arena is not an easy task. Even those societies or leaders that have high levels of trust are not immune to rapid spiraling down when it comes to the level of trust. On the other hand, there are also some positive lessons. Trust building is possible between states, and efforts to cultivate trust in the international system often pay off since even a relatively small amount of trust can make a difference in policy outcomes.

The research agenda ahead

Trust is an important concept in human and social life that has not yet been studied exhaustively in IR. Although research on trust should form a multidisciplinary endeavour, it must be better embedded in the study of IR. If trust is relational and contextual, IR scholars need to drive their own research agenda while at the same time not losing sight of trust research in other disciplines. In this concluding chapter, various suggestions for future research have already been proposed.

Many trust researchers, such as Keating and Ruzicka (2014), have put forward their own, partly overlapping ideas concerning future research. If more systematic research of the various contexts and relationships was carried out, we could create some more cumulative knowledge of the causes and effects of trust. Moreover, second order research on the concept and representations of trust is also certainly needed. Yet, the gap between first order research and second order research should not be too wide. They should not be seen as two distinct research programmes that both suffer from certain thinness of reflection.

Trust research in International Relations is not exactly a research programme, since it has no clearly defined theoretical core from where empirical hypothesis testing expands (see e.g. Elman and Elman 2002). The proliferation of research has therefore not led to much theoretically cumulative knowledge but to a greater awareness of the basic themes and issues at stake and a growing number of empirical applications. Fred Chernoff (2014) has argued that progress depends on the degree of agreement about the criteria for good explanation and the ability to address more clearly defined research puzzles. This does not preclude multiple perspectives and approaches to trust but suggests that we need more rigorously defined questions and a more explicitly pronounced objectives and criteria of assessment.

In sum, research on trust has become more prevalent in International Relations as the political significance of the theme has been increasingly recognised. We already have a much sharper conceptual and theoretical tools and a multifaceted set of empirical knowledge than 20 years ago. Yet, many questions related to trust and distrust are only preliminarily explored in IR. We can trust that research on trust will flourish also in the future.

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Index