

Nordic Studies in a Global Context

NORDIC PEACE IN QUESTION

A REGION *OF* AND *FOR* PEACE

Edited by
Christopher S. Browning, Marko Lehti
and Johan Strang

Nordic Peace in Question

This book explores historically and theoretically Nordic peace as a marker of identification, ontological (in)security and regional branding. It emphasizes how conceptions of Nordic peace have been translated into policy practices and how it has maintained its relevance over time.

The book distinguishes between the Nordic region as a region *of* peace, a prime example of a Deutschian security community, and as a region *for* peace, cultivating the role of a global humanitarian norm promoter and peacebuilder, but also interrogating how these two understandings of Nordic peace have been mutually constitutive and interdependent. The book discusses the politics of 'Nordic peace', analyzing what the concept does and enables, and why it continues to endure and exert affective appeal. Furthermore, it considers contemporary challenges, not least connected to the implications of the war in Ukraine, but also the potential future opportunities facing ideas of Nordic peace as Nordic peace is refashioned, once again, towards a new regional and global context.

This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of Peace Research, Nordic or Scandinavian Studies, History, Nationalism Studies, Critical Security Studies and International Relations.

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Preface and Acknowledgements

The End of History it turns out was short lived and the post-Cold War peace dividend not quite what it was proclaimed to be. Today, European security has rarely looked so precarious, with war raging in Ukraine, with the Ukrainian fight for survival itself a (pseudo) proxy war between the West and an apparently emboldened, revanchist and imperialist Russia. Beyond Europe the situation is no better. Across the Middle East tensions and conflicts have been ignited while the geostrategic standoff between the US/West and China in the Pacific has become increasingly tense. Arms racing has returned, military spending is escalating, while talk of the return of great power war is now openly contemplated, with the UK defence secretary proclaiming in January 2024 that we are moving 'from a post-war to a pre-war world'.

Peace appears to be a rare commodity, yet in the Nordic countries the idea of peace continues to animate discourses of national and regional identity and foreign policy – even at a time when the NATO military alliance has extended itself further into the region via the membership of Finland and Sweden, and when Swedish government and defence force representatives have called for their citizens to prepare for war. Of course, proclaiming and embracing peace in contexts of wider insecurity and destabilisation has a long heritage in the Nordic region. Yet what 'peace' means, how it has been understood, and what it does has never been fixed. A concern with peace is obviously not limited to the Nordic countries, yet there are few regions of the world in which across decades the regional moniker has become quite so widely understood as synonymous with 'peace', a source of considerable reputation but also of status, standing and (self-)identity. It is with understanding the emergence, heritage and evolution of revered ideas of 'Nordic peace' that this book is concerned but also with understanding how Nordic peace is being refashioned in the context of contemporary challenges, challenges that present both threats and opportunities for the renewal of 'Nordic peace'.

The book has been some years in gestation. It was initially conceived as part of the 'Nordic Branding' project led by Malcolm Langford and Eirinn Larsen, and funded by the University of Oslo as part of their UiO:Nordic initiative. We are extremely grateful to this project for enabling this manuscript to get off the ground, for providing various opportunities for the authors to meet, and in particular, for providing funding for an initial conference in March 2019 organised by The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). As with many academic ventures, the Covid

pandemic proved disruptive to the anticipated swift culmination of our initial ideas. Yet, the disruption also entailed further time for reflection and with the significant shift in European (and global) geopolitics that soon followed, it also clarified aspects of the emerging nature of the new context. If official proclamations of a Nordic peace brand in the mid-2010s arguably had a geopolitically complacent aspect, since the early 2020s ideas of Nordic peace have been thrust into a very different context, are more open to contestation and arguably much more interesting – and consequential – as an issue for academic analysis.

Alongside the 'Nordic Branding' project at UiO, we would like to thank the project 'Reimagining Norden in an Evolving World' (ReNEW, funded by NordForsk), the Academy of Finland, Lund University Library, VID Specialized University Oslo and the University of Oslo for making it possible for us to publish the book Open Access. Luiza Rakhmatullina and Samuel Brander at the University of Helsinki did a great job in assisting us to prepare the manuscript for submission.

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Last but certainly not least, we would like to express our gratitude to Pertti Joenniemi for his longstanding contribution to Nordic Peace research and for his great importance for the professional and intellectual development of all three editors of this book.

1 Nordic Peace Revisited

Christopher S. Browning, Marko Lehti and Johan Strang

The Puzzle

The idea that the Nordic countries together constitute an almost uniquely fraternal and stable region is historically well established. Indeed, within the region – but also to some extent beyond – the idea of 'Nordic peace' has become something of a 'rhetorical commonplace' (Jackson 2004), a shorthand for something that is presumed to be a relatively unproblematic description of an existing state of affairs. Additionally, the Nordic countries are also often lauded as archetypal international citizens keen to promote peace, security and cooperation beyond their borders, to help in areas of conflict resolution, humanitarian relief operations and development, and to offer their services with respect to a growing number of global problems. As one book recently framed it, they have a somewhat exceptional reputation as international 'do-gooders', a reputation they have historically been keen to foster, even if such positioning can sometimes appear a little sanctimonious (Puyvallée and Bjørkdahl 2021).

As a rhetorical commonplace, however, the idea and concept of *Nordic peace* is surprisingly little explored. Thus, while discussions exist around related concepts of 'Nordic internationalism' (Bergman 2006; Knudsen 2004; Lawler 1997, 2005), 'Nordic humanitarianism' (Puyvallée and Bjørkdahl 2021), 'Nordic exceptionalism' (Wiberg 2004), the Nordic model for peacekeeping and peace mediation (Jakobsen 2006, 2012; Lehti 2014; Wallensteen and Svensson 2016; Wivel 2017), the impact of Nordic peace research to practice (Bramsen and Hageman 2023), the Nordics as 'norm entrepreneurs' (Ingebritsen 2002), and perhaps most closely with respect to internal dynamics, the notion of the Nordic region as a 'security community' (Adler and Barnett 1998; Browning and Joenniemi 2013; Deutsch et al. 1957; Wiberg 2000), such literature either takes 'Nordic peace' as a given background condition or only engage with specific dimensions of it. For example, Archer and Joenniemi's (2003) seminal edited volume on Nordic peace only deals with certain internal aspects of the puzzle of Nordic peace, focusing as it does on explaining why a number of historical intra-Nordic disputes with the potential to turn violent were resolved peaceably (e.g., Norway's separation from Sweden, Iceland's separation from Denmark, the Åland Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden, and various language and minority rights issues).

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Indeed, if anything, insofar as the notion of Nordic peace has appeared in more recent scholarship, it has been in the form of obituarial lament. Concerns have therefore been aired about the countries' increased willingness to forsake historical Nordic non-alignment, soft alliance postures and anti-militarism in favour of choosing sides and engaging in military operations abroad with coalition partners, not least throughout the 'war on terror' (Rasmussen 2005; Wivel 2017). Or concerns have been raised that commitments to internationalist solidarism are declining, as evident in the adoption of increasingly restrictive (and sometimes antagonistic) policies towards asylum seekers and a more general decline in public discourse towards migrant communities and ethnic minorities within the region (Keskinen, Skaptadottir and Toivanen 2019).

Yet, this fear that 'Nordic peace' may be on its way out sits at odds with other developments, not least the fact that as part of its more general international marketing and promotional activities, the Nordic Council of Ministers is increasingly keen to make 'peace' a constitutive part of the 'Nordic brand' (see Chapters 2 and 10). However, in the context of Finland's and Sweden's applications for NATO membership,[1] the Nordic countries' vocal and military support for Ukraine in its defence against Russian aggression and increasing military and defence cooperation within the region, it is perhaps unsurprising that some commentators would see a tension with such proclamations.

In the face of such apparent tensions, it is tempting to declare the era of Nordic peace over and the contemporary marketing of Nordic peace mere propaganda. This book adopts a different approach. Rather than positing criteria against which the existence or otherwise of Nordic peace, internally and/or externally, can be assessed, Nordic peace is treated as a set of historical discourses and practices. In this respect, the book adopts a genealogical approach, concerned with understanding how Nordic peace has been understood over time, considering the emergence of the idea that such a thing as Nordic peace exists in the first place, and charting the historical development and refashioning of this idea and practices associated with it. In respect of today, it is therefore relevant to consider the relationship between contemporary and historical discourses and practices of Nordic peace, the extent to which there is convergence/divergence, and the extent to which the past continues to influence the present. What has been understood by 'Nordic peace' at various points in history? How are the historical layers of past meanings redescribed to serve the purpose of a new Nordic discourse in the twenty-first century? At the heart of the book are therefore concerns with the politics of 'Nordic peace', with what the concept does and enables and why it continues to endure and exert affective appeal. Specifically, the book seeks to situate and explore the concept *historically* and *theoretically*, but also in terms of its activating role as a marker of *identification, ontological (in)security and regional branding,* while exploring how conceptions of Nordic peace have been translated into *practice* over time.

Images of Nordic Peace

Within international politics, insofar as the Nordic countries are seen to stand out it is generally because they are understood as almost unique in having managed to escape the otherwise (apparently) ubiquitous security dilemma and its attendant logics of mistrust and mutual suspicion, which it is claimed necessitate that states adopt a cautious and limited approach towards multilateral cooperation (Herz 1950). In contrast, the region is often depicted as comprising a *prima facie* example of a Deutschian *security community* (Deutsch et al. 1957), a region where stable expectations of peaceful change prevail. In turn, such intra-regional peace has provided a stable context for economic development and, in turn, for these countries' projective engagement in global affairs. This is to the extent to which they are frequently treated as a singular community with shared perspectives and a mutually reinforcing collective reputation as exemplary – and to some extent exceptional – actors in world politics, in particular with respect to their socio-economic model, their environmentalism, gender advocacy, internationalist solidarism and not least their engagement with humanitarian issues and multilateral peace support operations, often through the UN (Browning 2007; Mouritzen 1995). In short, intra-Nordic peace has often been presented as exportable or at least as offering valuable lessons for the world beyond.

Critical questions can obviously be raised about this image. For instance, it is important not to forget that the gradual emergence of the so-called Nordic peace from the early nineteenth century was preceded by centuries of numerous intra-Nordic wars (Wiberg 2000). Moreover, although they were ultimately resolved without resort to war, the various disputes discussed in the Archer and Joenniemi (2003) volume were often notably fractious, in some cases including pre-emptive military mobilisation (e.g. the break-up of the Swedish-Norwegian Union in 1905 and the Finnish-Swedish conflict over the Åland islands, 1918–1921). At the very least, it is important to acknowledge that the histories of the individual Nordic countries continue to influence how they understand the tradition of internal Nordic peace, starting with the fact that Finland, Iceland and Norway all have a history as part of the Danish or Swedish realms. In this respect, it is important to recognise that the idea of 'Nordic peace' has never been just a descriptor but has also been deployed as part of an aspirational constitutive discourse of becoming. To the extent to which the image holds within the region, then, it also operates as a marker of collective regional self-identity, status and self-esteem. In other words, while the chapters which follow identify various drivers and explanations of Nordic peace, insofar as it has become constitutive of claims to self-identity it has itself become a reason to conduct both intra- and extra-regional relations in particular ways.

Today, the prevalence and success of such a discourse is evident in how this image has been internalised such that regional leaders regularly depict their region as being fundamentally 'world leaders in peace'. Indeed, to this extent, peace has often been depicted as a Nordic export and competitive advantage. It is this which

explains the decision of the Nordic Council of Ministers to reframe Nordic peace as a global brand to be cultivated and capitalised upon and to commission a 2019 report on the concept (Hagemann and Bramsen 2019), which concluded that the region possesses unique expertise in conflict resolution that can be mobilised for regional advantage and status enhancement. In this respect, though, it is also important to note that when it comes to the external policies of the Nordic countries, Nordic peace can be defined differently by different actors, which occasionally can result in friction and competition between the Nordic countries for the right to represent and define the 'true' Nordic peace.

Yet, the contemporary reframing of Nordic peace as a 'brand' is only possible because of the credence gained from the countries' combined historical engagements in the name of peace; an early but ongoing example of which has been the annual awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize by the Norwegian Nobel Committee since 1901. However, it is important to remember that the Nordic countries and Nordic diplomats and other regional actors have engaged actively in international peace promotion since the early days of the League of Nations. During the Cold War era, for instance, and particularly from the 1960s onwards, the Nordics were well-known for their prominent role in United Nations' peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, during this period Nordic 'peace mediators' played important roles in various international conflicts. This included Folke Bernadotte, the first UN mediator for Palestine in the late 1940s, and UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld. There were many others besides. In the post-Cold War era, the Nordics lost their leading role in (UN) peacekeeping, although this was replaced by a new and active emphasis in foreign policy on issues of peace mediation (e.g., in respect of Israel-Palestine, Kosovo, and more recently, Colombia amongst others), human rights issues and crisis management, with these becoming a central component of Nordic policies in the 2000s (Jakobsen 2006; Nissen 2021). In particular, the Nordics have consciously cultivated the role of humanitarian norm promoters, with a particular emphasis placed on advancing the UN's agenda around Women, Peace and Security (Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad 2021; also see Chapter 7) and with peace mediation simultaneously becoming an important part of the Nordic countries' individual and collective foreign policy orientations. The result is that today, being a 'peace nation' (Skånland 2010) or peacemaker is understood as an identity that has its foundation within the countries' respective national heritages, but which when framed as a brand is believed to give a new kind of visibility and influence in international forums. There is, however, very little discussion as to *what kind of peace* the Nordics are promoting and supporting beyond the Nordic region itself.

In this respect, Nordic peace raises many issues. Theoretically and historically, it is important to consider how the emergence and development of Nordic peace can be best explained and accounted for. Other important questions concern how Nordic peace has become internalised in the self-identity narratives of the different nations, how it has been integrated into their foreign policy approaches, and how understandings of Nordic peace have changed over time. As noted, given the prevalence of conceptions of Norden as a 'region of peace' and 'no-war community' (Kupchan 2010), it is therefore surprising that academic analyses of the

phenomenon have been relatively limited and were predominantly published in the 1990s or early 2000s. Those that do exist have generally sought to account for the emergence and endurance of Nordic peace, typically arguing either that it was a product of the Cold War balance of power and/or that it has been fundamentally reliant on (proclaimed) high levels of cultural commonality and convergence in the region (Adler and Barnett 1998; Archer 2003; Kupchan 2010; Wivel 2017). There are several limitations to such explanations. First, Cold War explanations are arguably overly reliant on acultural and apolitical structural forces applicable only during a particular historical period. They therefore have little to say about Nordic peace both prior to and after the Cold War. Second, cultural explanations suffer from the opposite problem of appearing overly ahistorical, ignoring intra-Nordic conflicts of the past, and therefore culturalist verging on determinist (for a critique see, Browning and Joenniemi 2013). Third, as a result, both explanations also have little to say about broader questions related to the historical development of Nordic peace, its mobilisation in foreign policy and its infusion into the identity politics of the region, while very little discussion exists with respect to contemporary challenges and potential opportunities facing ideas of Nordic peace in the future. With the 'post-Cold War era' now increasingly depicted as behind us, and in a context of new regional, European and global challenges, the time is ripe for revisiting theoretical and empirical debates about Nordic peace, and in particular, considering how 'Nordic peace' is being re-inscribed for a new age.

War and Peace

During the process of writing this book, the changing geopolitical situation in Europe and Russia's invasion of Ukraine specifically, have brought conventional war back to European political realities and future scenarios. Consequently, and like others, the Nordics' trust that within Europe disputes will be resolved peaceably has eroded, with the threat of war – be that hybrid or conventional – taken increasingly seriously. Nordic assumptions about their safety and security from external threats are no longer assumed. What this may mean for how Nordic peace develops, how it is conceptualised, and the role it may continue to play as a marker of foreign policy orientation, identity and ontological security will ultimately be questions for ongoing research. Yet, it is important we include some preliminary reflections as to what the increasingly revanchist actions of Russia and a return of traditional geopolitical strategising in Europe may mean for the Nordics. The *strategic* challenge concerns the question of whether Russian revanchism is understood to pose direct threats to otherwise extant realities of Nordic peace. The issue here is not just whether Russian geopolitical expansionist ambitions further south may also be extended into the north, raising questions of a possible return of war to the region, but (and perhaps more likely) whether Russia's increasing willingness to engage in various modes of interference has the potential to destabilise Nordic peace from within.

The *ontological* challenge is connected but different. Historically, though in different ways, ideas of Nordic peace have also operated as a grand and hegemonic

narrative marking ontological security and stability. For instance, during the Cold War Nordic peace located the region as 'the quiet corner of Europe', establishing a sense of geographical and psychological distance from the prevailing stand-off, not just for the Nordic states themselves, but also for the superpowers. If, during this period, security and threat were things to be kept at bay, in the post-Cold War period, the prevailing narrative of Nordic peace changed, with the question of regional security deemed essentially resolved. Norden now came to represent a region of asecurity as opposed to security (Joenniemi 2007; Wæver 1998). What marked out the Nordics then, and what contributed to a prevailing regional sense of ontological security, was their (neoliberal) market competitiveness and entrepreneurial spirit (Browning and Lehti 2007). Today, however, this narrative is being challenged with the return of geopolitical anxieties connected to security. What might Nordic peace mean in this context? Can it be reconfigured to provide a new sense of ontological security – for instance, even by resurrecting former narratives of standing apart – or will Nordic peace even become a source of ontological insecurity and anxiety to be traded for a greater emphasis on alliance politics and standing firm against a collectively constitutive Russian other, as potentially indicated by Finland's and Sweden's applications for NATO membership?

Arguably, we are seeing a return of traditional security concerns and a reprioritisation of alliances in security thinking in the leading powers of the West. But, there has also been an alternative European memory and experience of security much ignored in Western Europe. In particular, the Russian-Georgian War of 2008 revived hard security thinking and concerns with the threat of Russian aggression but also significantly decreased trust in the idea of the European peace project among the East European and post-Soviet states to some extent including Finland (Mälksoo 2023). NATO is increasingly shifting away from 1990s/2000s discourses of its transformation into a security community engaged in out-of-area operations (Williams and Neumann 2000) but is again primarily focused on European territorial defence and shifting Russia from the designation of a partner country to that of an enemy (MacIntosh 2023). Put a bit differently, throughout the 2000s NATO and EU strategic doctrines both began to emphasise out-of-area operations, with European security seen to be dependent upon what happens beyond Europe, often far away. European security meant going global. This obviously remains the case in respect of debates over climate change, migration, trade etc., but it was also arguably a framing that reflected the luxury of a generally stable continental security environment. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has changed this. The conflation of Europe with peace is breaking down. War is no longer in Europe's past but is increasingly viewed as possible.

The implications of this on Nordic self-understandings are potentially significant. As an example, it did not take long for the NATO debate in Sweden to become increasingly framed in terms of whether Sweden should hold fast to its self-conception as an idealistic country and maintain its refusal to cede to the demands of Turkey's President Recep Erdogan with respect to dealing with Sweden's 'Kurdish militants', or whether it should be a pragmatic country that compromises its ideals in favour of security concerns (Aggestam et al. 2023).[2] The latter position

suggests that the protection of Western liberal idealism is now dependent upon adopting an approach that would previously have been rejected. The Swedish example is clearly indicative of issues of idealism versus pragmatism that now challenge the region as a whole. But this also raises the question of whether previous more idealistic framings of Nordic peace have actually been dependent (and parasitical?) upon the emergence of a positive European security environment and more broadly western-led liberal order (see Chapter 7). In other words, was Nordic idealism a luxury (as realists would probably argue), is there still space for it, and if so, are the Nordics still likely to maintain such a positioning?

There is a significant perceptual change/challenge present in at least two respects. First, in respect of (now complacent) representations of Europe (EU) as an inherent region of peace and normative soft power projection, a region of peace facilitation and democratisation. In this respect, Russian actions have only exacerbated emerging tensions about the emergence of post-liberal forces in Europe that have accompanied the rise of populist forces and parties across the continent, including in the Nordic countries themselves. In this context, the Nordics can either tie themselves directly into these debates or constitute a sense of (superior) self-identity by once again framing the region as a space somewhat distinct (and better and immune) from Europe. Second, we are seeing a number of European (perhaps including Nordic) leaders having to get to grips with a more traditional and military-centric approach to thinking about security that they are not wholly comfortable with. One consequence, it appears, is that the combination of renewed militarism, active support for Ukraine – even extending to calls for the complete defeat of Russia, including regime change in Moscow – and not least Finland's and Sweden's NATO membership, signal a shift away from positions of intermediation and neutrality towards reconceptualising Nordic peace as aligned with defence of the (now) 'threatened' (Western) liberal international order (see Lawler 2005 for a related argument).

Rather than revert to Cold War narrative positionings, though, the Nordics have thrown themselves further into the fray. Any distinction between 'Nordic', 'Europe' and 'the West' is increasingly blurred. Peace is no longer primarily about avoiding the question of war but is even to be potentially achieved through war. Indeed, at times, the Nordics have been even more outspoken than many other countries of the traditional West with respect to Russian actions, this itself suggesting a determined and principled (moralistic) stand that maybe continue to mark them out. Of course, such a stand more closely parallels that of the Baltic States and Poland, though, the sense of existential threat is arguably currently less intense than experienced by these countries with their different histories of Soviet/Russian domination. Either way, peace is now seen to require realpolitik alliances and power balancing. Thus, within the region there is increased willingness to see regional Nordic peace as fundamentally part of broader calculations of European security contexts, no longer abstracted (or abstractable) from the continent. A fundamental change in geopolitical imaginaries is therefore evident, especially when compared to the Cold War or even when compared to the border-blurring idealism of the regionalisation projects of the 1990s/2000s. Nordic regional (and possibly internal) peace is now viewed as indivisible from broader European security dynamics.

One of the interesting aspects of the Ukraine conflict is therefore how it is shifting balances within EU-Europe, including with respect to the Nordic states. For instance, the Baltic States and Poland have been notably uncompromising and categorical that what is required is a Ukrainian victory and a Russian defeat, a position with which Finland's government has been aligned, with Prime Minister Sanna Marin unequivocally calling for a Ukrainian victory and the necessity that Russia lose – even to the point of regime change and the collapse of Russia.[3] For a state known for its traditional caution towards Russia/Soviet Union to the point that a geopolitical strategy of Finlandisation was named after it, such a rhetorical shift and its embrace of a military solution is remarkable. But Finland is not alone, and all the Nordic countries have emphasised that they stand firmly behind Ukraine and comprehend that this war is about possible European futures. In her 2024 New Year's speech, the Danish prime minister Mette Frederiksen claimed that Denmark had been one of the countries that had helped Ukraine the most and vowed to continue the defence of Europe.[4] Thus, despite some nuances in approach, collectively the Nordics have been some of the strongest supporters of Ukraine. Evidencing this are two high-level meetings between the Nordic premiers (and Finnish president) and the Ukrainian president Zelensky that took place in 2023, in Helsinki in May and in Oslo in December. In this regard, instead of bilateralism dominating, the Nordics continue to appear as a strong regional bloc, but one that arguably stands out from western and southern European partners, and one that has declared 'extensive military, economic and humanitarian support to Ukraine, individually and collectively as Nordics, as well as in the framework of international formats and platforms'. Furthermore, it has been precisely emphasised how 'Ukraine's resistance is also a fight for our common security' with it further stressed that 'the Nordic countries will stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes'.[5]

Of course, it could be argued that Finland's and Sweden's embrace of NATO membership and militarised approach to Russia simply constitutes them 'catching up' with developments in Denmark and Norway two decades ago. This was most notable with the 2001 Danish government's embrace of activist militarism and rejection of its (now deemed shameful) Cold War policies that, critics argue, gained security by free riding on the security guarantees of others (Browning et al. 2021, Chapters 5–7). Yet the question arises as to whether Finnish and Swedish militarisation and more aggressive positioning might actually constitute something a bit different. Indeed, there may be a paradox that as they are integrating further with Denmark and Norway on military issues via NATO arrangements, a divergence may be taking place in respect of geopolitical imaginaries and visions. While Denmark's (and to a lesser extent Norway's) moves in the early 2000s entailed an embrace of out-of-area military adventures, their concerns were less about defence of national sovereignty. In contrast, territorial defence is now what preoccupies the Finns and Swedes (and presumably Norwegians). Whether the Finns and Swedes develop globalist military ambitions like their Danish and Norwegian counterparts did previously is to be seen, as is whether Danish and Norwegian military adventurism itself continues to last or is curtailed in view of the new geopolitical challenges in Europe.

The Future of Nordic Peace Advocacy

Beyond Europe, such developments are likely to have a fundamental impact on any sense of recognition of Nordic distinction, yet while much has evidently changed in how the Nordics are approaching 'peace' within Europe (via alliances, militarisation and war) beyond Europe the same Nordic approaches as before have generally prevailed. These remain characterised by sentiments of humanitarian 'do gooding' and altruism. However, any previous 'benefit of the doubt' or lingering sense of Nordic exceptionalism/distinction from Western projects is likely to be fundamentally eroded. In Marko Lehti's and Christopher Browning's chapters, it is argued that the Nordics have yet to (fully) recognise what is at stake and how profoundly Nordic reputation and positionality is eroding. There are obvious challenges in respect of Nordic image and brand protection/promotion, though even more significant are likely to be looming ontological questions about Nordic identity(ies), roles, status and standing.

As outlined in Lehti's chapter, broader developments are likely to further crystallise and exacerbate this. While the Nordics continue to equate peace with Western liberal order (with this a key driving logic of their integration with Western security structures in Europe) and also – perhaps – conflate Western liberal order with system supporting actions, these positions are increasingly challenged and under stress beyond Europe (and arguably also within it). Two particular challenges might be noted. The first concerns the rise of increasingly authoritarian powers, including increasingly authoritarian democracies like India, promoting 'authoritarian peace projects' (Lewis et al. 2018). These are sometimes at the direct challenge to Western preferences for continued conflict, as in the case of China's brokering of a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In such contexts, while the West increasingly looks like the pro-war actor, China is attempting to cultivate a pro-peace image.[6] The second challenge is that as any sense of difference/distinction with the West breaks down the Nordics are liable to be increasingly vulnerable to postcolonial critiques long levelled at Western powers. In short, can Nordic peace any longer escape accusations of just being part of broader projects of Western neocolonialism? This may or may not be considered a problem moving forward. Whereas previously the Nordic liberal left often sought to emphasise Nordic distinction in this regard, contemporary sensibilities increasingly emphasise the need of all to search their historical consciences. To make a distinction to the 'real' colonial powers, is impossible. Indeed, having taken sides to become programmatic defenders of western values, the Nordic countries can no longer pretend to be immune from decolonial criticism.

This opens up new ethical and moral questions about how to promote and build peace in an evolving global order in the absence of a uniform normative peace paradigm. How will the Nordics adapt their peace policies in a new context in which their services and normative standing is no longer welcomed (or welcomed less enthusiastically)? Are there some normative principles like gender equality that the Nordics find so fundamental that they will feel impelled to stand and promote them in spite of normative resistance? In short, there is a clear difference between

continuing to promote liberal peace norms in the Global South as if nothing has changed, adopting a role of the last crusaders of liberal peace (as argued in Lehti's chapter), or alternatively attempting to reconfigure the fragmenting order, and adapting to an increasingly antagonistic normative environment via the adoption of a new active role as norm promoters and defenders.

What Does This Mean for Nordic Peace?

At one level, then, it seems obvious that the Nordic region, as with the whole of Europe and the West, is currently in the process of transitioning away from the post-Cold War era, a period of unquestioned liberal dominance, and entering a new era, but one the essence and normative contours of which remain unclear. Nordic peace, though, has evolved in the face of systemic change before. There is no reason to think it might not do so again. With this in mind, we might note how Nordic peace has gone through several stages over the years. It is therefore interesting to consider what has changed and what has remained the same.

In the first part of our book, we explore the historical underpinnings of Nordic peace, focusing especially on Scandinavist ideas of internal regional reconciliation in the nineteenth century and its impact on Nordic policies during the First World War and in the League of Nations during the inter-war era (Chapters 3 and 4). Although part of a more general small-state quest to foster an international order constraining the great powers, this was also the time when the idea of Nordic exceptionalism and of *Norden* as a special region of peace was evolving. It was during the inter-war period that the Nordic region first began to be seen as a model for others to follow (Musial 2002).

In many respects, however, the Cold War period and legacy constitutes the embedded heritage/tradition of Nordic peace. On the one hand, it was associated with notions of distinction with respect to the East-West conflict, and on the other, with distinction from the West with respect to engagements in the developing world. This was a period in which a 'brand' of humanitarian do gooding and altruism was established (see the chapter by Browning). Within Europe, the geopolitical dimension of Nordic peace was constituted by attempts to remain distant from the Cold War. While this was most evident in respect of Sweden's and Finland's neutrality, it was also evident in respect of Denmark's and Norway's delimited relationships with NATO, which included no NATO bases and a banning of visits by nuclear submarines.

During the post-Cold War period, the so-called era of the 'end of history' (Fukuyama 1992), the Nordics became increasingly similar to Europe. Specifically, notions of distinction from the European core began to break down, with Nordic peace efforts beyond the EU becoming increasingly managed through European mechanisms, especially following Finland's and Sweden's accession to the EU in 1995. Yet, despite the fact that at an 'objective' level a notable alignment with Europe was underway, with it becoming increasingly difficult to uphold distinct Nordic positions (Laatikainen 2003), perceptions within Norden, Europe, but also beyond did not as such recognise this. In branding terms, we might speak of an

enduring image, a stickiness of the Cold War brand that throughout this period retained ontological resonance and affective pull within the Nordic countries but also amongst others. Thus, despite increasingly falling into line with 'Europe' (EU) a sense of Nordic distinction prevailed, with perceptions still to catch up with realities on the ground. Norden retained a 'benefit of the doubt' as neutral arbiters, largely untainted by 'Western' actions and policies (of which they were now a part and to which they increasingly ascribed).

Within Europe, of course, geopolitical dynamics changed dramatically during this period. On the one hand, Nordic distinction appeared to have been eroded as peace was no longer seen to reside in the north of the continent in comparison to high tension mainland 'Europe'. Instead, peace seemed to have moved to Europe and out of the north. Indeed, 'Europe' and 'peace' became increasingly synonymous, especially in EU grand narratives according to which the European peace project was understood in terms of overcoming the troublesome legacy of the Second World War and the Holocaust. This revaluing of Europe and European institutions in the Nordic countries may itself, at least in part, have been reflected in the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the EU in 2012. In contrast, for a time the Nordic region became understood as temporally stuck in the modernist politics of borders and sovereignty that characterised the Cold War, a region being left behind by the postmodern project of fuzzy borders that came to characterise much EU discourse in the 1990s (Wæver 1992). Yet, it was not long before the Nordics sought to reinvent themselves as geopolitical pioneers of the new regionalism, promoting a host of projects of cross-border regional innovation and reconstitution. Crucially, though, these projects were not seen as drawing a categorical sense of distinction from 'Europe' as during the Cold War but were rather positioned as attempts to take a leading role in Europe. Nordic distinction was therefore reframed in terms of being better at the EU's own game.

As we have noted, the war in Ukraine and its provocation of Finland's and Sweden's applications for NATO membership suggest another stage is arguably upon us. In some respects, of course, the transformations of the post-Cold War period have simply been pushed further towards a 'logical' conclusion, whereby Nordic distinction from Europe/the West is ultimately eroded, where perceptions finally catch up with reality, at least in geopolitical terms. Yet, if the liberal position – the idea that liberal democracy, markets, and trade create peace, and that the world is moving towards post-sovereignty, international cooperation and an emphasis on multilateralism through international institutions – used to be a liberal universalist assumption, it is now increasingly becoming a partisan vision. This is evident externally in declining belief in the West, the United States or the EU as a model for the rest of the world. Indeed, the West is to an increasing extent a target of criticism rather than inspiration, and not only from Putin's Russia, but China, the Arab world, as well as many of the BRIC countries. Such criticisms, though, are also increasingly prevalent within the West, be it from both the (decolonial) left and the (populist) right, and where the liberal position is no longer seen as universal. Indeed, within the West, the embrace of 'liberal' values appears to be becoming increasingly selective.

In such a context, different options may exist for (re)imagining Nordic peace into the future. A first, 'idealist' option, would constitute a rejection of these trends and would represent a return to post-Cold War framings, though this time with the Nordic region positioned as the avowed caretakers of an idealistic understanding of western values that many in the West are themselves increasingly cautious about wholeheartedly embracing. A second, 'realist' option would push in the opposite direction and would entail a notable scaling back of Nordic peace. International engagements in terms of peace mediation and humanitarian assistance would likely be curtailed and maybe end entirely in favour of an emphasis on European geopolitics and security, with peace reconceptualised in terms of alliance politics and the willingness to engage in military deterrence and war in the European neighbourhood in defence of a more limited conception of Western/European civilisation, as opposed to liberal norms. A third, 'pragmatic' option, would entail some kind of mix of the two, a muddling on that both recognise geopolitical 'realities' but remain optimistic about the ability to engage positively in promoting peace in the world. If shorn of explicit ideological components, this could see a return to less normatively polarising conceptions of Nordic peace more in line with Cold War visions. A pragmatic option might, though, be a result of conscious and considered choice or – and perhaps more likely – emerge as a default option lacking a clear strategic direction.

Outline of the Book

To explore the concept and phenomenon of Nordic peace the book is divided into two parts. While these provide a temporal flow to the volume, the parts are primarily organised thematically in respect of (i) the internal/domestic constitution and dynamics of Nordic peace, with this enabling us to speak of Norden as a 'region *of* peace', and (ii) its external/international manifestations and projections, with this enabling us to speak of Norden as a 'region *for* peace' possessed of an idealistic impulse to spread peace to others, but where historically this projective dimension has been dependent on and facilitated by the former internal/domestic component.

The chapters in part one, *A Region of Peace: Constitutive Underpinnings*, focus on the underpinning practices that have been historically constitutive of Nordic peace and that have helped preserve it over time. In doing so, they provide a more historicised account of both the transformation of the region from a community of war to one of peace during the course of the nineteenth century, and also focus on the subsequent development and challenges that Nordic peace faced throughout the twentieth century. The chapters therefore address important themes related to the role of civil society actors and institutions, like the Church, relative to the state, in facilitating and fostering ideas of Nordic communality, and through which the idea of (initially) intra-Nordic peace became central to the forging of that very notion of Scandinavian community – indeed, where 'peace' became inscribed into notions of Scandinavianism itself.

In this respect, the chapters also point towards an important re-theorisation of Nordic peace that downplays the role of the balance of power and deterministic

arguments about assumed cultural cohesion, to instead focus on how Nordic peace became embedded in and emerges out of everyday routinised practices. Nordic peace therefore has a quotidian aspect to it that has often existed 'in spite' of the Nordic states themselves, rather than because of them. Central to this has been a particular and inclusive understanding of the role of difference in fostering a sense of Nordic community, one that traditionally resisted the collapsing of security into identity. However, while this has implied the downplaying of radicalised othering, it is also one that has typically relied upon the inscription of civilisational hierarchies, whereas today practices constituting Nordic peace exhibit increasingly statist and security-focused dimensions.

The chapters in part two, *A Region for Peace: Practices of Nordic Peace Export*, consider how over time, and in different ways, Nordic peace has been reconfigured and translated into various policies for export. In other words, it considers how ideas of Nordic peace became integrated into the foreign policy practices of the Nordic countries and Nordic humanitarian and peace work. The chapters focus on several different aspects of this: peacekeeping operations, humanitarian aid, peace mediation and peace and conflict resolution. Broadly speaking, this also reflects a temporal evolution in the emphasis of practices of Nordic peace export from the early Cold War through to the present. Thus it is that the Nordics initially developed a reputation as promoters of peace internationally during the early part of the Cold War through their contribution to UN peacekeeping operations. Solidarity with and aid directed to the developing world followed, with an emphasis on peace and conflict mediation becoming of principal concern in the post-Cold War period.

The chapters in this section not only chart this development but, in each case, explore the underpinning political drivers at play. Thus, we see that ethical and ideological considerations have also often been influenced by concerns about security, identity, status, image, and not least, intra-Nordic competition. Nordic peace exports have therefore performed domestic functions as much as they have international ones, with this impacting on their evaluation. In this respect, the chapters show how Nordic peace exports have attained a somewhat mythical and idealised status that feedback into constitutive narratives of Nordic peace, but one that is ripe for critical evaluation. In undertaking such analyses, the chapters question the efficacy of such exports, the self-congratulatory discourse that has often surrounded them, as well as the extent to which a distinctive Nordic perspective to peace exports can be identified (and whether it still exists).

Both sections of the book include a reflective and projective element. In particular, the chapters of Browning, Strang, and Lehti reflect on the longer history of Nordic peace and its centrality to both notions of Nordic communality and identity, as well as how it has functioned to position the region in the world. Furthermore, they draw out the extent to which ideas of Nordic peace have always been contested/contestable. However, this is no more so than in the current era. In this respect, the chapters highlight how contemporary challenges (including political and social upheavals within the region but also in Norden's broader geopolitical environment) have been understood as offering possibilities for rejuvenating ideas of both Nordic peace but also of Nordic distinction more generally. In doing so,

however, they also point to how such efforts appear to be transforming some of its underpinning constitutive dynamics, not least in respect of how Nordic peace is related to difference/otherness, militarism and broader trends within international politics.

Notes

1 Finland became a member on 4 April 2023. At the time of writing, Sweden's membership was still being held up by Turkey and Hungary.
2 See e.g. https://www.svd.se/a/ab0V6d/torbjorn-nilsson-om-natointradet-sverige-blir-lobbyister-at-erdogan.
3 Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin: Ukraine must win the war | 60 Minutes https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VCzq--Ac3u8.
4 https://www.stm.dk/statsministeren/taler/statsminister-mette-frederiksens-nytaarstale-den-1-januar-2024/.
5 https://www.government.se/statements/2023/05/joint-statement-of-the-nordic-ukrainian-summit-in-helsinki/ and https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/spilna-zayava-drugogo-samitu-ukrayina-pivnichna-yevropa-v-m-87745.

   Helsinki "The Nordic countries remain unwavering in their commitment to Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. The Nordic countries will continue their political, financial, humanitarian and military support to Ukraine for as long as it takes – individually, together as the Nordics, as well as through international cooperation in the European Union, in NATO, in the United Nations and in other formats."

   Oslo "Recognizing that Ukraine's resistance is also a fight for our common security and fundamental principles of international law, the Nordic countries have provided extensive military and civilian support and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. Since Russia's illegal full-scale invasion in February 2022, the combined value of Nordic support amounts to approximately 11 billion euros. The Nordics will continue to provide extensive military, economic and humanitarian support to Ukraine, individually and collectively as Nordics, as well as in the framework of international formats and platforms. The Nordic countries will stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes."
6 Another example would be Qatar, which despite its historical support for radical Islamic extremist groups has also been cultivating an image of peace mediator.

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PART I

A Region *of* Peace

2 Nordic Peace

Identity, Brand, Branding

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'Låt fred bli Nordens varumärke'
[Let peace become the Nordic brand/trademark]
(Nordic Council of Ministers, 3 March 2017)[1]

Introduction

As argued by the structuralist semiotician Saussure, 'signs' cannot be examined in isolation, but gain their meaning from how they are related to or contrasted with other signifiers. The idea, meaning and emotional valence of 'Nordic', for instance, derives from how it is connected to other words and concepts, signifiers like 'openness', 'consensus', 'solidarity', 'environmentalism', 'design', and, of course, 'peace'. Structuralist semioticians understood such relationships to be relatively stable. In contrast, post-structuralists argue these relationships are inherently unstable and inflected with power relations. Meanings can change and are context dependent. For instance, the meaning of 'Nordic' changes when it instead evokes signifiers like 'Vikings', 'war', 'race'.

In March 2017, and accepting as given the constitutive connection between 'Nordic' and 'peace', the Nordic Council of Ministers embraced yet another signifier, 'brand'. Aside from suggesting that the Nordic Council of Ministers are practising post-structuralists, the intervention raises interesting questions such as, why did they do this and what happens when Nordic peace is conceptualised as a brand? On the one hand, the declaration suggests a certain amount of strategic and instrumental intent, the idea that a 'Nordic peace brand' could be cultivated and capitalised upon for specific purposes. Brands, however, are not purely strategic and instrumental but are also increasingly central to how individual and collective actors make claims about their identity, claims that are often presented as authentic manifestations of the self (Banet-Weiser, 2012).

Two things are worth noting, however. First, the idea of a distinctive Nordic peace brand is not new in and of itself. For instance, while the concept itself may not have been utilised, if brand is defined in terms of an identifying characteristic (i.e. like the brand mark burnt onto cattle), then there is a longer history extending at least through the Cold War where the idea and image of Nordic peace had become rather well established and something for which the Nordics were 'known'.

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Second, historically there have also been instrumental attempts to cultivate such connections, with these typically underpinned by (geo)strategic calculations, but where notwithstanding, the idea of Nordic peace has also exerted considerable affective pull becoming a source of status claims, fostering collective and individual self-esteem, and emerging as a core ontological statement of 'who we are'.

The ultimate aim of this chapter is to consider whether the Nordic Council of Ministers' push to (re)package Nordic peace as a brand represents nothing more than terminological updating in line with contemporary lexical norms, or whether it suggests potentially significant constitutive changes, in particular with respect to the role ideas of Nordic peace play in conceptions of Nordic self-identity. The argument of the chapter is that while Nordic peace has had instrumentalist and geopolitical aspects to it, from the beginning it has also had an emotional and affective component. The chapter explores whether and how this has changed over time. In other words, the issue is not just whether ideas of Nordic peace are central to conceptions of Nordic self-identity, but to explore how this relationship has evolved and may be in the process of transforming also today.

The argument unfolds in three parts. The first section focuses on the nineteenth century through to the end of the Second World War and discusses how the idea of 'peace' came to resonate within the region becoming an increasingly important part of conceptions of both the different national identities but also of broader regional understandings. In particular, during this period previous associations of Norden with war became replaced by the idea of Norden as a 'region of peace'.

Section two homes in on the Cold War. During this period, a discernible Nordic peace 'brand' emerged, with brand here understood as a noun referencing an identifying characteristic. While this had various elements to it, characteristic was a transformation in which Norden was conceptualised, not only as a 'region of peace' but also as a 'region for peace' as – to varying degrees – the Nordic countries actively engaged in 'peace' supporting activities beyond the region, carving out a role and status within the context of the Cold War conflict.

Section three turns to the post-Cold War period, with a particular focus on more recent developments. If it can be argued that a 'brand' of Nordic peace emerged during the Cold War period, this section considers what the shift towards active strategies of 'branding' in the post-Cold War period may entail, and where branding figures as a verb and practice of brand cultivation. Of course, 'brand' cultivation did take place during the Cold War period insofar as attempts to foster benevolent images of the Nordics were apparent. What this chapter argues, by contrast, is that in the present context the self-conscious packaging of Nordic peace as a brand accords to logics somewhat different to image cultivation policies of the Cold War period, with this potentially transforming the relationship between the Nordic peace brand and Nordic identity.

Towards a 'Region of Peace': The Emergence of a Nordic Security Community[2]

The Nordic region is often held up as a *prima facie* example of a 'security community', defined by Deutsch et al. (1957: 5) as a community 'in which there is real

assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle disputes in some other way' (also Adler and Barnett, 1998a). Such 'no war' communities (Kupchan, 2010) are characterised by high levels of trust that self-restraint will prevail in internal community relations, with this guaranteeing dependable expectations of peaceful change.

The emergence of a Nordic security community was not, however, inevitable. Prior to 1814, for instance, intra-regional conflict and war between Nordic neighbours was common, with about 60 wars being fought in the preceding five centuries (Wiberg, 2000: 291). Indeed, traditional geopolitical security concerns dominated as the Nordic kingdoms of Denmark and Sweden battled recurrently for dominance over each other and competed for control over neighbouring lands (Østergård, 1997: 32). Such dynastic and imperial contests were in turn buttressed by the prevalence of myths recalling an ancient Gothic Scandinavian warrior society, myths that both supported internal regional conflicts, but also policies of military conquest in general (Henningsen, 1997: 98, 101–104; Kent, 2008: 83).

Indeed, while after 1814 military conflict largely disappeared from intra-Nordic relations mutual suspicions amongst military planners in the region could still be identified. For example, after Norwegian independence from Sweden in 1905 both countries developed defensive plans against each other that remained in place for years (Kupchan, 2010: 115), while during the inter-war period there was widespread suspicion in Norway about Finland's territorial ambitions in the north, with right-wing Finnish nationalists at the time propagating ideas of a forthcoming Greater Finland that would incorporate parts of Norway (Kaukiainen, 1997: 255–256, 258). Aside from these issues, disputes about sovereignty were also evident between Finland and Sweden over the Åland islands and between Denmark and Norway over Greenland, and as we know, where sovereignty is in question war quite often follows.

Pertinent from a security community perspective, of course, is that after 1814 such sovereignty centred issues did not result in open conflict. In each case, war was avoided through diplomacy and acceding to various processes of arbitration, such as by the League of Nations with respect to the Åland islands. It is therefore fair to say that over time expectations of peaceful change became increasingly reinforced. What started out as a somewhat negative peace became increasingly positive such that today the very idea of intra-Nordic conflict is inconceivable.

At the same time, such an historical record, particularly that of the age of warfare prior to 1814, should give pause for thought. For a start, it should dispel any notion that there is anything 'natural' or 'pre-ordained' about intra-Nordic peace. We should therefore be sceptical of explanations emphasising that the current situation derives from a certain amount of cultural and ethnic homogeneity, linguistic compatibility, or shared religion, since these were in place before evidence of Nordic peace emerged. Likewise, claims that it is a product of increasing trade, enhanced communications, and growing institutionalisation – all things predicted by security community theorising (Deutsch et al., 1957; Adler and Barnett, 1998b; Archer, 2003) – should also be questioned. As Wiberg (1993: 211; 2000: 294) notes, arguments about the extent of trading links and economic, social, and cultural interaction are often exaggerated (particularly when compared to their relations with

other neighbours), while the level of intra-regional institutionalisation has been relatively light, with more ambitious plans (Nordic economic zone, defence alliance, even pan-Scandinavian union) actively rejected.

Indeed, a good case can be made for suggesting that it was the initial demise of pan-Scandinavian nationalist idealism in 1864 following the failure of Sweden to come to the aid of Denmark in its war with Schleswig-Holstein, a refusal that clearly placed strict limits on future institutionalisation, that made the emergence of Norden as a region 'of peace' possible in the first place. The argument is that this evident lack of pan-Scandinavian solidarity removed issues of military defence and pan-nationalist statehood from the agenda and meant that future debates about Scandinavianism took place largely outside the language of sovereignty.[3] Attempts to foster solidarity, community, and common identity instead shifted towards the cultural plane (Hemstad, 2008: 22–25; Browning and Joenniemi, 2013: 494). Thus, while ideas of a pan-Scandinavian nation state had been supported by some in Denmark and Sweden (Stråth, 2005: 210), such ideas were always problematic for Norwegian and Finnish nationalists who were instead ambitious for their own nation-states. From being a point of contention, therefore, Henningsen (1997: 111; Stråth, 2005: 221) argues the end of pan-Scandinavianist dreams of political unification in 1864 ultimately saved Scandinavianism/Nordism. In other words, instead of Scandinavianism potentially being positioned in opposition to (future) Norwegian and Finnish aspirations for independence, it instead became a cultural support for it, with all the nations able to draw on their own sense of Scandinavian/Nordic heritage and where Scandinavianism was protected from in future having to 'withstand any political test' (Henningsen, 1997: 117).

What 1864 also indicates, however, is the extent to which the emergent Nordic peace was somewhat 'unintended' (Wæver, 1998: 73, 76, 104). In contrast to security community theorising which predicts security communities to be the product of rather intentional efforts on the part of authorities to 'abolish war' (Deutsch et al., 1957: 3; Adler and Barnett, 1998b: 3), Wæver argues Nordic peace appears somewhat inadvertent, lacking intentionality, with civil society actors at the fore. Put differently, to some degree at least, Nordic peace seems to have resulted from issues of traditional security being side-lined in favour of other concerns (Browning and Joenniemi, 2013: 490).

Key to understanding this is the outcome of the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, which in the Nordic region had several results. First, the wars had a sobering impact on the geopolitical position of Denmark and Sweden, both of whom found themselves greatly reduced on the European stage. For instance, Sweden lost Finland to Russia as well as regions in northern Germany, while Denmark lost Norway to Sweden. Dreams of European great power grandeur collapsed amongst political elites with the focus instead shifting to national consolidation (Sørensen and Stråth, 1997: 15) and coming to terms with playing a more minor role, often expressed in terms of neutrality towards European power politics (Kent, 2008: 156).

Second, after 1815 dynastic absolutism was also fundamentally challenged and overturned as ideologies of national awakening that located sovereignty with the

people, not the king, emerged. The nation was now to be found in the people, with peasants often identified as the locus of the national soul, which itself was now increasingly conceptualised in terms of freedom, equality, and education (Sørensen and Stråth, 1997: 14; Hilson, 2006: 195–199). Such a dramatic transformation away from dynastic states towards people's states (later encapsulated in the idea of the folkehjem – people's home), also had the effect of enabling a process of historical distancing from the conflicts of the past which could now be cast as the wars of kings/nobility, not of the peoples for whom such wars typically brought exploitation and suffering. In this respect, the end of the Napoleonic wars increasingly appeared as an historical rupture, where the concerns of the past no longer appeared quite so salient or affectively mobilising and where, as the period progressed, 'peace' increasingly became associated with the 'people', while intra-Nordic war was othered to the dynastic past.

It might be argued, therefore, that the structural and geopolitical transformations brought about by the end of the Napoleonic wars and reinforced in 1864 had created conditions conducive to both internal Nordic peace and avoiding engagement in conflicts elsewhere in Europe. However, by the turn of the twentieth century the idea of peace had also come to resonate internally as part of conceptions of self-identity, to this extent becoming ontologically significant. For instance, from its very early years of independence in 1905, the idea of Norway as a 'peace nation' became deeply embedded and understood as a defining trait of Norwegian national identity narratives and central to the national self-image, an image often drawn in contrast to European great power politics (Leira, 2013; Wohlforth et al., 2018: 537–539). Thus, the poet Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson argued that it was necessary to reject the traditional conflation of 'foreign policy' with *realpolitik* (Leira, 2010). In Sweden, of course, such sentiments became central to the country's adoption of an official policy of neutrality, a policy that has a heritage dating back to 1812. Meanwhile, although Denmark did not officially declare neutrality after 1864, it largely turned in on itself, embracing a self-designation as a small state and adopting a broadly anti-militarist approach to international affairs.

The situation with Finland was somewhat different, with independence from Russia in 1917 followed by a vicious civil war and the rise of a significant right-wing movement motivated by a mixture of Russophobia and aggressive ambitions for territorial expansion. By the mid-1930s, however, Finland was itself orienting more closely towards its Scandinavian neighbours and in 1935 proclaimed a policy of 'Scandinavian neutrality' (Browning, 2008: Ch. 5). While this did not prevent Finland ending up in a war for survival with the Soviet Union the declaration is significant precisely because it highlights the extent to which, in Helsinki at least, Scandinavia had become associated with a sense of sanctuary, neutrality, and peace – a way to escape the coming conflagration. By the 1940s then, the idea of Norden as a *region of peace* had gained considerable ground, with peace an increasingly important part of conceptions of both the different national identities but also of broader regional understandings.

The Cold War and the Nordic Peace Brand

During the Cold War the idea of Norden as a region of peace was further strengthened, arguably to the degree to which it is reasonable to talk of the emergence of Nordic peace as a regional 'brand'. Certainly, active attempts were undertaken by all the Nordic countries to cultivate such an image. There were, however, two different aspects to this. On the one hand, and of primary military strategic concern, there was a clear effort to maintain Norden as a 'region *of* peace'. On the other hand, and as the Cold War progressed, efforts were also made to carve out a role and identity of this as also a 'region *for* peace', a region actively seeking to promote peace more generally. These two dimensions to emerging ideas of Nordic peace were in turn closely connected. Not least, it was clearly hoped that efforts of peace promotion directed outside the region would foster goodwill and help keep Norden outside the main focus of the Cold War. Moreover, the very existence of the Cold War conflict itself helped to further foster self-conceptions of Nordic exceptionalism, the Cold War emerging as a constitutive other through which a Nordic role and identity could be constituted (Mouritzen, 1995; Browning, 2007). To the extent to which during the Cold War this idea of Nordic exceptionalism took hold in the region and beyond, an association for which the Nordics became 'known', then it becomes possible to speak of the emergence of a Nordic peace brand. This section, however, argues that underpinning the emergence of such a brand were several distinct drivers and elements.

First, as already indicated realpolitik geopolitical considerations were important. Put differently, cultivating an idea and image of Norden as inherently peaceful was seen to have a geopolitical pay-off by fostering a sense of distinction between 'high tension' areas in the rest of Europe and what was sometimes discursively constituted as the 'quiet corner of Europe' in the North. In other words, attempts were made to promote particular geopolitical imaginaries that would remove the region from the strategic calculations of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Most obviously, this was evident in the neutrality policies of Sweden and (somewhat more restricted due to its particular relationship with the Soviet Union) Finland,[4] and Denmark's and Norway's restricted alignments with NATO in which in peacetime both countries rejected the presence of nuclear weapons or permanent NATO bases on their territories.

In the 1960s the Norwegian political scientist Arne Olav Brundtland developed a theory suggesting an almost mechanistic interconnection between the defensive orientations of the countries, something he termed 'the Nordic Balance', a concept that had been floating around at least since 1962 (Brundtland, 1966). His suggestion was that enhanced pressure on one side of the balance, such as the Soviet Union seeking to activate its Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance treaty with Finland, or more generally pull Finland further into its orbit, would result in Denmark and Norway reconsidering the restricted nature of their relationships with NATO. And likewise, if Denmark and Norway strengthened their links with NATO then it could be expected that the Soviet Union would further enhance its grip on Finland. The theory was that any such shifts would be detrimental to all and that the

status quo was therefore the preferred option. Stability in the region was therefore seen to be the result of 'reduced great power involvement' and 'partial disengagement' (Brundtland, 1966: 30).

Not everyone supported the theory. In Finland, for example, it was criticised for implying a dangerous level of automatism (Andrén, 1982: 79; Majander, 1999: 85–86), although on the plus side it did designate Finland as a clear member of the Nordic club, a designation which itself was seen as having positive security dividends, not least because it differentiated Finland from other countries more closely under the sway of Moscow. What is significant about the 'Nordic Balance', however, is not whether it accorded to reality or not, but rather how it was utilised to try and construct for both East and West the strategic reality of the region and their interests within it. Moreover, while the Finns were hesitant about the concept they in turn engaged in similar constitutive practices, most notably in 1952 calling for a neutral alliance between the Nordic countries and in 1963 and 1978 proposing a Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) (Kekkonen, 1970: 143–145, 151–155; Hanhimäki, 1997: 114–115), proposals the other Nordics rejected, not least because they were seen as interfering in their own security policies and as undermining the idea of the Nordic Balance with its reliance on flexible response (Brundtland, 1986: 7; Hanhimäki, 1997: 115). The key point, however, is that be it the particular (and differentiated) security policy stances of the Nordic countries, the idea of the Nordic Balance, or proposals for an NWFZ, each were designed to enhance the sense that Norden constituted a region of peace distinct from the rest of Europe. Nordic peace was therefore operationalised for clear geostrategic purposes.

However, while this can make emerging notions of Nordic peace appear primarily instrumental, rational, and strategic, it is important to recognise that it also had other dimensions. The second point to highlight is therefore how Nordic peace was expanded beyond a purely defensive orientation and developed increasingly activist aspects. Rather than just seeking to keep the great powers and the Cold War at a distance, the Nordics also began to insert themselves into it. The point is that political leaders recognised that there was an opportunity to enhance the reputation of their states and of the region by providing services and being useful to the great powers, not least through establishing themselves varyingly as 'useful allies, impartial arbiters, or contributors to [the] system's maintenance' (Wohlforth et al., 2018: 530; Neumann and de Carvalho, 2015: 2, 9–10). For instance, as the Cold War progressed both Finland and Sweden utilised their neutrality to cultivate a role as mediators and bridge builders (Bjereld, 1995; Brommesson, 2018). From being purely geopolitical and strategic, neutrality was therefore transformed into something virtuous, with Finland's president Urho Kekkonen (1970: 94) emphasising at the UN in 1961 that the country should be viewed as a 'physician' trying to diagnose and cure, as opposed to passing judgement and condemning.

Finland, for example, became a partial host of the US-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation talks in 1969–1972 and was later an important sponsor of the process behind the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in the early 1970s. Meanwhile, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland were all active and visible

providers of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. Of course, providing such services obviously helped reinforce the broader regional security goal of keeping the focus of the competing sides of the Cold War off the region.

However, carving out such an international role as facilitators of peace also entailed important implications for status. In contrast to rational actor understandings of status, which depict its value as lying in the utility and transactional benefits it may afford (e.g. security dividends), psychologists emphasise that status is important in its own right, since subjects possess deep-seated socio-psychological needs to feel recognised and valued (Clunan, 2014). Status, in other words, is something subjects will pursue as an end in itself because it enhances the subject's sense of being and is emotionally significant. Focusing specifically on Norway, but seeking to make a broader point, Wohlforth et al. (2018: 544) therefore argue that the desire to cultivate the image of Norway as a nation embodying and promoting peace has often been driven precisely by this desire for status and standing and not always because of other considerations.

This last point, however, can be slightly overplayed. Turning to the third point it is also evident that at least from the 1960s onwards, ideas associated with Nordic peace gained an increasingly moral dimension and hold within the Nordic countries. In other words, promoting peace/being good was not just valued for the status it was felt to confer but because it was also felt to be the right thing to do. In consequence, the idea of Nordic peace also became increasingly central to conceptions of self-identity in the region. There were two aspects to this, both of which were evident most clearly in the Swedish context.

First, and personified by Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, there became a greater willingness to openly criticise the great powers in certain situations. Key examples included the Swedish government criticising the US intervention in Vietnam and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (Petersson, 2018: 80). More generally, the Nordic countries increasingly demonstrated solidarity with the Third World, embracing an anti-imperialist politics evident, for instance, in the fact that Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland were all engaged in the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, mainly through the provision of civilian and humanitarian support. Trägårdh (2002: 152) argues that in Sweden such idealism developed to the extent to which key elements began to view the country as the 'world's conscience', with neutrality actually providing the right and duty to speak out on international and moral issues.

Linked, but second, the increasing willingness to locate themselves as advocates of the Third World – and in the case of Finland and Sweden, with the non-aligned movement as well – also resulted in the Nordic countries developing generous foreign aid policies to help developing countries. Such policies, however, were also to some extent premised on an emerging belief in the progressive and (morally) superior nature of a 'Nordic model' of socio-economic development between American-style liberal capitalism and Soviet-style state socialism (Hanhimäki, 1997: xii). As Bergman (2007) notes, foreign aid and development policies were largely understood in terms of internationalising domestic welfare policy at home, and which through doing so, it was believed, would help reduce inequalities on a

global scale. In other words, development policies deemed key to building social solidarity and peace within the region were thus seen as the basis for international engagement and peace promotion abroad.

It is important to emphasise that domestic support for such a scripting of Nordic self-identity(ies) was generally strong, in part because efforts were also made to actively cultivate such views more widely. For instance, Swedish conscripts were actively educated that while NATO and the Warsaw Pact stood for conflict, Sweden stood for world peace, with neutrality policy attaining a quasi-religious standing in the country (Petersson, 2018: 80). Indeed, anyone challenging such commitments could expect to be criticised and stigmatised with peace gaining notable disciplining elements. Across the Nordic countries, however, strong civil society peace movements organised in support of the Nordic peace orientation, this suggesting a broader normative commitment to peace as a source of national and Nordic identity, status, and self-esteem at an everyday level (e.g., Vesa, 1987). To this extent, as the Cold War proceeded the signifiers of 'Nordic' and 'peace' became increasing melded and where a more activist position shifted the constitutive nature of the relationship from Norden as simply a 'region of peace' increasingly towards Norden becoming a 'region for peace'.

Branding Nordic Peace: Towards Conspicuous 'Do-Goodism'

The end of the Cold War generated a certain amount of critical self-reflection and loss of confidence in the Nordic countries. The belief in the region as a model of peace and progress was challenged in several ways such that while there was little doubt that Norden remained a region of peace, its ability to promote peace externally and stand as a beacon to others was much less certain. For instance, with the end of the Cold War the role of 'bridge builder' between East and West disappeared for the most part. Cooperation and confidence building measures now shifted to direct engagements between the US/NATO and Russia in forums like the NATO-Russia Council, without the need for intermediaries or neutral venues (Browning, 2007: 37). Meanwhile, the focus of innovation also no longer appeared to lie with Norden, but instead with processes of reconciliation and integration elsewhere in Europe, which were increasingly discussed using the metaphors of postmodern geopolitics emphasising fuzzy borders (Christiansen et al., 2000) and a more general side-lining of the nation state through processes of region building (Neumann, 1994). To be clear, while in many respects such ideas were embraced in the region, with the 'north' becoming conceptualised as something of a testing ground for this new postmodern geopolitics (as evident in the proliferation of regional projects like the Baltic Sea Region, Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation, Northern Dimension), Norden itself no longer appeared quite so motivational (e.g., Browning, 2001). As highlighted by Wæver (1992), Norden rather appeared as something of a nostalgic concept, the end of the Cold War highlighting the extent to which Nordic exceptionalism was actually reliant on the constitutive logics of the Cold War, the result being that Norden now appeared disconcertingly modernist and statist, preoccupied with issues of territorial sovereignty in contrast to the new

emphasis on networks. Similarly, Patomäki (2000) emphasised how the collapse of the Soviet Union also appeared to destroy for policy makers any notion of a middle way in terms of economic and social welfare policies. To many in Europe salvation now seemed to lie in some version of Anglo-American economic liberalism, a view that also began to take hold in the Nordic countries themselves.

It should be emphasised that this undermining of Norden did not put an end to Nordic efforts of peace promotion. Most notably, Norway was actively engaged in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process through the Oslo Accords and also played important roles in Sri Lanka and the Philippines. Similarly, former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari was a key negotiator during the Kosovo crisis. Such efforts, however, remained largely stand alone, lacking any particular sense of regional coordination, let alone presentation. Following 9/11, however, all the countries began to show greater willingness to become actively and visibly engaged on the international scene, but also with the beginnings of a desire for a more coordinated 'Nordic' branding/presentation of these activities. An early indicator of this was a 2005 conference on 'Nordic Peace Diplomacy' sponsored by the Norwegian Embassy in Denmark, which was tasked with discussing how 'Nordic peace can continue to make a difference in the post-9/11 world characterised by the threat of terror and an increased resort to military force' (Jakobsen et al., 2005: 1). The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Jan Petersen (2005), emphasised the 'moral obligation' of the Nordics 'to pursue peace and stability when – and where – we can'.

Branding Nordic Peace

More recently, these efforts have now been ramped up. As noted at the start of the chapter, in 2017 the Nordic Council of Ministers (2017) affirmed the idea for 'peace [to] become the Nordic brand', a desire that obviously hopes to capitalise and build on the longer heritage of Nordic peace mediation efforts noted above and which has in turn resulted in a follow up report on what this might look like (Hagemann and Bramsen, 2019). Moreover, the emphasis on 'branding' follows on from a more general embracing of the language and strategies of 'nation branding' in the region. Over the last decade or so all the Nordic countries have adopted explicit nation branding strategies; however, in 2015 the Nordic Council of Ministers (2015) also published a *Strategy for International Branding of the Nordic Region 2015–2018*, subsequently renewed in 2019 (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2019).

The question this raises is whether such a discursive re-packaging of Nordic peace as a brand is also impacting on its underpinning logics, dynamics, and rationales? Put differently, does branding have constitutive and transformative effects? Present indications suggest it might with Nordic peace developing characteristics of a 'knowledge brand' that needs to be both marketed and protected and which is increasingly seen as a source of status and distinction in global politics, with this in turn having the potential to transform how the idea of Nordic peace operates as a marker of Nordic self-identity and understanding.

As was noted in the previous section, certainly during the Cold War it is possible to point towards strategies actively seeking to 'brand' ideas of Nordic peace,

even if such a concept was not itself used. However, the logic underpinning such strategies was arguably different to that today. During the Cold War the promotion of a Nordic peace 'brand' was primarily driven by concerns of geopolitics and public diplomacy. Images of Nordic peace contributed to upholding regional security and gaining recognition and acceptance for these states' foreign policy orientations, but with this also contributing to a sense of status, self-esteem, and identity. By contrast, today the branding of Nordic peace appears more in line with logics of marketing, economics, and globalisation that have come to dominate social imaginaries in the post-Cold War world (Clerc and Glover, 2015: 14–17).

The concept of nation branding was coined in the late 1990s but can be seen as part of the emergence of a broader hegemonic discourse that has sought to reshape states and international politics in terms of logics of capitalist competition. In this imaginary the traditional geopolitical state is reconceived as a 'competition state' (Cerny, 1990; Moisio, 2008; Browning, 2023: Chapter 2). Viewed as akin to a corporation the state's primary role is increasingly understood in terms of attracting attention and investment, with statesmanship also increasingly morphing into salesmanship (Fougner, 2006: 180). In such an environment it is argued that states need to be 'known' and to generate corporate-style brands that make them stand out to potential investors, to capital, to tourists, to students and (skilled) migrants etc… but which can also have important dividends in terms of soft power. Strong brands, it is argued, will enhance trust, and activate a positive emotional orientation (Olins, 2002: 246; van Ham, 2008: 129–130), not only amongst potential investors and visitors but also amongst citizens. In this respect, nation branding is also increasingly understood as having the potential to enhance the sense of national self-esteem (Browning, 2015; 2023: 64–69).

To this extent, nation brands have also become signifiers of status, since nation brands (or their various constitutive aspects) are increasing indexed and ranked in league tables enabling swift comparison and pride/shame depending on the positioning of one's country (Broome, et al., 2018). This is particularly pertinent with respect to more recent developments in discourses of nation branding, with influential nation branding consultants arguing that to develop a strong nation brand states should stop focusing on what others can do for them (i.e., buying products, investing, visiting), but instead focusing on a more altruistic message by emphasising what 'they can do for the world' (Anholt, 2012). A good example of this is the development in 2014 by the nation branding consultant, Simon Anholt, of the Good Country Index, a benchmark that ranks countries in terms of their 'global contribution' in respect of seven different areas, one of which is 'International Peace and Security'.[5] One thing notable about this development is that it shifts nation branding away from an emphasis on 'place branding' towards greater emphasis on 'policy branding', encouraging countries to cultivate the idea that in particular areas of activity they possess special knowledge – what Sum and Jessop (2013: 268, 299–305) call 'knowledge brands'.

The influence of such a discourse should not be underestimated and many countries have taken this message to heart.[6] Not least, however, it is worth noting that the 2015 *Strategy for International Branding of the Nordic Region* explicitly

considers the question 'What the Nordic region can offer the outside world?' paying particular attention to the welfare model and the region as a 'knowledge society' with expertise in environmental, economic, and social stability (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2015: 16–17). Although that report did not explicitly mention peace the subsequent Nordic Council commissioned report that followed the Nordic Council of Ministers' call for 'peace [to] become the Nordic brand' directly packages this as part of the more 'general branding efforts of the Nordics, "Nordic solutions to global problems"' (Hagemann and Bramsen, 2019: 44).

Identity, Status, and the Changing Content of Nordic Peace

Branding Nordic peace in this way may have several effects. First, in terms of internally derived conceptions of self-identity such branding practices operate as a mechanism for reconstituting notions of common Nordicity which in the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War and with processes of regionalisation and European integration underway, had been undermined somewhat. Thus, branding Nordic peace becomes one way of re-binding the Nordics through reaffirming the connection between signifiers of Norden and peace at the everyday level. The commissioned report, for instance, is framed in terms of identifying whether or not a Nordic peace brand exists, finding that it does – as evidenced in the long history of intra-Nordic peace and the countries' various efforts at exporting peace – and defining this brand in terms of a sense of shared culture, mind-set, and values (Hagemann and Bramsen, 2019: 7, 9, 12, 15, 17, 36). The Nordics are therefore presented once more as an identifiable community with something distinct to offer based on their own specific shared history.

Second, the prospect of activating this brand externally is seen to have potentially positive reputational dividends. As one ambassador quoted in the report put it:

> we have a Nordic brand that we could possibly use more. It gives us a good profile when we go out together and perform together. In addition, visiting different countries together generates good press coverage and awareness of us.
> (quoted in Hagemann and Bramsen, 2019: 36)

The quote is telling because it highlights that, at least to some extent, when viewed as a brand Nordic peace is valued because of its potential for publicity and reputational impact, and perhaps only secondarily in terms of the actual good the Nordics may be doing in the world. It resonates with a sentiment expressed by the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Jan Petersen, back in 2002 that 'Peace processes make us interesting… We need a few products like that' (quoted in Wohlforth et al., 2018: 540). So while 'doing good' may be viewed as important in itself, the current desire to actively market Nordic peace as a brand means that 'being seen to be doing good' is perhaps more important. In terms of Wohlforth et al. (2018: 543), Nordic peace therefore increasingly takes on the form of 'conspicuous do-goodism'.

While it might be argued that there has always been an element of this about Nordic peace, explicitly framing Nordic peace as part of a broader strategy of

Nordic brand enhancement certainly suggests a ramping up of the logic. And, of course, for countries increasingly accepting the broader logics of nation branding discourses, for whom performing well on global benchmarks (like the Good Country Index) is viewed as an important proxy for reputation and brand standing, *but also a central part of brand strategy*, the importance of being seen to be doing good should not be underestimated. Indeed, the Nordic peace branding report is interesting because it also recognises the potential for intra-Nordic competition insofar as individual Nordic countries may understandably wish to take sole/primary credit for the efforts they have led on and not wish to share the 'limelight' with the other Nordic countries who might be viewed as free riders in particular cases (Hagemann and Bramsen, 2019: 37–38). What this highlights is how positive brands are becoming increasingly important for generating a sense of status and self-esteem that can reaffirm conceptions of self-identity at the domestic level. Put bluntly, it is affirming for nations (and their citizens) to feel that others feel positively about them, ascribing them with benevolent and pro-social identities. While this can generate political capital in international politics, it also responds to basic psycho-social needs.

We can unpick this a bit further, since logics of nation branding arguably have important effects on how national identities are constituted by ascribing greater significance to external audiences. Once marketing is prioritised the focus for self-identity is liable to shift away from what we think of ourselves to place greater emphasis on what others think of us. Self-identity narratives are therefore liable to become increasingly framed around what it is believed might 'sell' and appeal to external audiences through whom self-validation is increasingly sought (Browning, 2015: 203–205). This logic is arguably having direct effects on the actual content of Nordic peace, where the need for establishing conspicuous distinction for the Nordic peace brand is arguably central to the possibility of gaining satisfaction, enjoyment, and affirmation from it.[7] This is the third effect of branding Nordic peace.

This is to say that for the Nordic peace brand to sell, there needs to be a clear message as to what is distinctive about it. Establishing such distinction therefore becomes central to the very branding process (Browning, 2023: 100–104). It is therefore interesting to see certain shifts in the actual content of 'Nordic peace'. Today, three areas of focus can be identified that depart from the traditional emphasis on peacekeeping. First, has been a doubling down on peace mediation and dialogue. While this has a clear heritage in practices that first emerged during the Cold War, engagement in such actions is being foregrounded. In particular, Norway has actively touted its services in this area by leveraging its role in the Oslo peace process to foster a 'knowledge brand' in this field.

The second concerns a shift towards active military engagement in peace enforcement operations that contrasts starkly to the prior emphasis on peacekeeping operations with their focus on impartiality and neutrality to conflicts. This has been most notable in the cases of the established NATO allies, Denmark and Norway, but it is also evident in Sweden and Finland. Agrell, for instance, argues that the Swedish military forces have undergone a notable transformation and are increasingly organised in terms of engagement in stabilisation and counterinsurgency

operations (cited in Petersson, 2018: 85). For instance, Sweden and Finland both participated in the NATO Response Force operations in Afghanistan, while Sweden also participated in the UN-mandated but NATO-led operation in Libya in 2011 (Petersson, 2018: 86). Instead of positioning themselves as intermediaries, then, the Nordic countries are increasingly prepared to take sides. In doing so, peace promotion and being 'good' becomes equated with being a 'good ally' willing to accept sacrifices through engagement in system supporting actions that uphold a rules-based international order (Wohlforth et al., 2018).

Third, is an emerging focus on gender that connects with the UN's women, peace, and security agenda. The aim here is to exploit the Nordic countries' reputation for gender equality, something which the Nordic Council of Ministers has itself identified as a 'knowledge product' (Nordic Council of Ministers for Gender Equality, 2019). In a somewhat revisionist sense, advances in gender equality are increasingly being presented as a key explanation for the historic development and maintenance of internal Nordic peace. Repositioned as part of a renewed Nordic peace brand, a 'Nordic' approach to gender equality and gender mainstreaming has therefore emerged as part of a proclaimed peace-enhancing 'knowledge brand' that the Nordics can offer the world by 'leading by example' (Hagemann and Bramsen, 2019: 19). Whether incorporating gender into all areas of Nordic peace support activities is beneficial may be open to debate, what it does do, though, is help a rebranded conception of Nordic peace stand out, thereby 'providing a distinct Nordic voice internationally' (Wivel, 2017: 494).

Conclusion

The chapter has argued that while the idea of 'Nordic peace' has a long heritage recent attempts to repackage Nordic peace as a 'brand' may also be having constitutive effects. Ideas of Nordic peace, of course, have never been static. In particular, it has been argued that three key periods can be identified. The first, beginning sometime in the early nineteenth century through to the Second World War, was a period when the idea of an internal Nordic peace became gradually established and increasingly internalised in narratives of national and regional identity. Come the Second World War it therefore begins to make sense to speak of this as a 'region of peace', but where this was more a state of affairs as opposed to an idea or concept to be mobilised in international politics.

During the second period of the Cold War, things changed. Clear geostrategic reasons existed within the region to promote a geopolitical imaginary of Norden as a spatial exception to the Cold War conflict, as a region of peace, the maintenance of which would be beneficial to protagonists on both sides of the Cold War. As the Cold War progressed opportunities to develop this idea were also sensed. Attempts were therefore made to capitalise on the benign state of affairs in the region by suggesting that this provided the Nordic countries with the experience and resources to also step out into the world by promoting peace elsewhere. The 'region of peace' therefore also became a 'region for peace'. Importantly, while geostrategic considerations were important in all this, the very idea of Norden as a

region and promoter of peace also became further embedded in regional narratives of self-identity and became an important source of status and self-esteem, not least as a result of how this focus enabled the countries to carve out (somewhat distinct) roles in international politics.

The third period arrived with the end of the Cold War. Despite an initial loss of confidence, in more recent years the Nordic signifier has been significantly revalued. While this has been evident in various social, economic, political, and cultural dimensions, the idea of Nordic peace has also made a return. The chapter has argued that under the influence of hegemonic discourses of globalisation, marketing, and nation branding, the branding of Nordic peace is having important constitutive effects. In particular, geostrategic considerations appear much less important, with the Nordic peace brand instead increasingly valued for its ability to provide Norden and Nordic identity with a sense of benevolent distinction. While 'doing good' may still be an important consideration, increasingly 'being seen to be doing good' (conspicuous do-goodism) is at least just as important and is a central consideration of branding logics. Branding Nordic peace is therefore valued because of its ability to generate status benefits, standing, and in turn to enhance regional and national self-esteem. In this vein, Nordic peace is increasingly packaged as a 'knowledge brand' – or indeed a set of them – where the very focus and content of Nordic peace has also shifted as attempts have been made to identify in what aspects of peace promotion the Nordics can be seen to stand out.

As a final comment, it should be noted that while this turn to branding Nordic peace may appeal for its ability to provide a sense of virtuous difference and distinction, like all brands it is also inevitably vulnerable. One such vulnerability is whether a sufficient global audience remains supportive of the emerging 'knowledge brands' of Nordic peace. In this respect, the focus on mediation and dialogue is essentially uncontroversial as it lacks any particular ideological content. The shift towards peace enforcement/military activism and gender mainstreaming are potentially more controversial. For instance, the Nordic countries embrace of more forceful measures alongside Western allies carries a danger of appearing partisan and more in line with notions of liberal interventionism that they have historically avoided. While such engagements obviously enhance their 'peace brand' with allies, more globally, it may have the opposite effect. The same applies to the emphasis on gender mainstreaming and the prioritisation of the women, peace, and security agenda. While this is in accordance with the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goal 5, with its focus on advancing gender equality, Nordic notions of gender equality are not universally accepted and in regard to which the Nordics are often accused of moralising and proselytising (Moss, 2018).

Another vulnerability, however, concerns the actual state of Nordic peace within the region. As elsewhere, recent years have seen the rise of anti-immigrant (and often anti-Muslim) populist movements. The Danish government has in particular become much more restrictive towards refugees and asylum seekers, with established notions of Nordic humanitarianism and hospitality increasingly questioned. Of course, one function of the cultivation of a Nordic peace brand may be that it salves domestic consciences or diverts attention from internal issues, but if the

impression develops that in the Nordic 'region of peace', this peace is increasingly restricted to only some parts of the community, then the Nordic peace brand may find itself undermined more broadly.

Notes

1 Nordic Council of Ministers (2017) 'Låt fred bli Nordens varumärke', https://www.norden.org/en/node/4403.
2 The arguments in this section draw on Browning and Joenniemi (2013).
3 Although it should be noted that in the 2000s ideas reminiscent of nineteenth-century pan-Scandinavianism reappeared, not least in Gunner Wetterberg's (2009) proposals for a Nordic federation with joint foreign, economic, and security policies.
4 Finnish neutrality was both circumscribed and protected by the treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) it signed with the Soviet Union in 1948. Under the treaty Finland was obliged to resist attacks on the Soviet Union through its territory and, if necessary, ask for Soviet assistance in doing so. To this extent, the treaty placed Finland in the Soviet orbit and reinforced the Finns' need to be sensitive to Moscow's wishes. At the same time, the treaty also recognised Finland's desire to remain outside the conflicts of the great powers and to pursue a policy of neutrality.
5 https://goodcountry.org/. The others are 'Science and Technology', 'Culture', 'World Order', 'Planet and Climate', 'Prosperity and Equality', 'Health and Wellbeing'.
6 For instance, Finland subtitled its nation branding report of 2010, 'How Finland will solve the world's most intractable problems' (Country Brand Report, 2010).
7 On distinction and virtuous difference, see Bourdieu (1984).

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3 From Peace on the Scandinavian Peninsula to Nordic Peace

Geopolitical Rhetoric and Pan-Scandinavian Reconciliation

Ruth Hemstad

The modern idea and concept of Nordic peace ('*Fred i Norden*'), born out of the turmoil of the Napoleonic Wars, proved to have long-term impact. The Nordic track record of being a 'non-war community' since 1815 was, however, not a straightforward route to an 'unintended peace', as it sometimes appears in security community literature explaining the stable peace in the Nordic region (Joenniemi, 2003: 199, 205; Deutsch, 1957). The intention of Nordic peace was explicitly expressed in the Swedish geopolitical rhetoric towards an international and domestic public legitimising the Norwegian-Swedish Union in 1814. Furthermore, overcoming the war-ridden Nordic past and fostering Scandinavian sympathies across the region were recurrent arguments in the pan-Scandinavian rhetoric of reconciliation and cohesion which had been developing since the mid-nineteenth century (van Gerven, 2022).

In discussing the Nordic region as a security community, research literature has asked 'when and why the security question dropped out of the Nordic discourse', and it has been argued that peace in the region was not 'built around overcoming war and bringing about security' (Joenniemi, 2003: 206–209; Browning and Joenniemi, 2013). Going back to the formation of *Norden* around 1814 and the first half of the nineteenth century, however, the question of peace in the region was, at least among some of the central actors, exactly about overcoming inter-Nordic war experiences and securing Nordic peace.

'Peace on the Scandinavian Peninsula' was the powerful geopolitical slogan utilised by the Swedish Crown Prince and *de facto* head of state Charles John towards the Great Powers – as well as to a Norwegian audience – around 1814, a slogan that helped him to secure the necessary diplomatic support for Swedish imperialistic plans of a Scandinavian Union between Sweden and Norway. The union should serve both as a compensation for the loss of Finland to Russia in 1809 and as a reward for joining the coalition against Napoleon. The cession of Norway from the Danish to the Swedish King against the proclaimed will of the majority of the Norwegian people was, however, a controversial question, and the fate of the Norwegian people attracted international attention. The 'Norwegian question' was addressed in an emerging European public sphere as well as in diplomatic and political circles, and an aroused and aware European public opinion had to be taken into consideration when resolving the conflict in the North (Hemstad, 2014a;

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2023a). Swedish propaganda, emphasising Nordic peace, sought to pave the way for the Swedish policy by influencing the international community, while at the same time seeking to reduce Norwegian opposition against the plans (Hemstad, 2014b).

The resulting loose Swedish-Norwegian Union established in late 1814 contributed to turning the region from a community of war to a region of peace. Until the turning point in 1814−1815, the two composite states, Denmark-Norway and Sweden, including Finland, had fought against each other for centuries, in a struggle for hegemonic power in the North, although the Great Northern War (1700−1721) arguable represented a watershed moment, with fewer and shorter wars in the following than during the previous century (Slettebø et al., 2022).[1] The union of the peninsula at last, Barton claims, 'removed the apple of discord' (Barton, 2003: 167), although it did not fulfil Swedish pretensions of an integrated union. Nevertheless, the short war during the summer of 1814 was ultimately the last waged between Nordic countries. During the nineteenth century, Nordic peace was not only defined negatively, as an absence of inter-state wars in the region but also positively, connecting it to ideas of a unified Scandinavian community. The relationship between the countries in the region was thus gradually interpreted as one of reconciliation as former archenemies became brethren (van Gerven, 2022). In this process, the pan-Scandinavian idea and movement – nurturing a sense of Scandinavian identity and laying the foundation for closer cooperation at different levels of society across the region – played a prominent position.

This chapter will explore the emergence of Nordic peace as a concept and idea connected to the international political situation in 1814−1815, including the Congress of Vienna. It will further, more briefly, discuss Nordic peace in the context of the pan-Scandinavian movement, both in regard to perceived external threats and in overcoming national animosities and building a Scandinavian community (see also Chapter 4). Charles John's geopolitically defined but loose union – and the ideas and practices of reconciliation and cooperation during that century − proved sufficient to secure peace in the region. In 1905, the union on the Scandinavian Peninsula was dissolved, not through warfare – as some propagated on both sides – but in a peaceful, if not conflict-free manner, as the 'first Nordic *non-war*' (Wiberg, 1990: 15). The policy and diplomatic skills of the Swedish Crown Prince around 1814 – in spite of pan-Scandinavian political efforts of a common Scandinavian front against German and Russian aggression in the 1840s to 1860s (Glenthøj and Ottosen, 2021) − also laid the foundation for Swedish neutrality, lasting for 210 years, until 2024.

The Formation of Norden and the Wish for a General Peace

Recent research has underlined that international politics and diplomacy had to be conducted in a new and more revolutionary environment around 1800, in a context of an emerging press and print culture, a 'public opinion that was both aware and aroused' and governments concerned with 'public opinion as a factor in politics

and diplomacy' (Brophy, 2007: 3; Esdaile, 2007: 538; Vick, 2014: 13). In his study of the Congress of Vienna, Vick emphasises that

> statesmen considered public opinion in determining how to realise their goals and how to combat those of their opponents. […] Public opinion was important, or at least statesmen believed it was, given how much time they spent thinking about it and trying to manage it.
>
> (Vick, 2014: 329)

This new context also applies to the international conflict regarding the so-called 'Norwegian question' − an early and remarkable example of the use of 'public diplomacy', understood as 'propaganda in the service of a nation's foreign policy', to achieve geopolitical aims (Nye, 2004: 109; Osgood and Etheridge; 2010: 12−13). This was mainly done through a conscious propaganda campaign, involving Swedish, Danish and Norwegian authorities as well as profiled French, German and British participants (Hemstad, 2014a: 13−91).[2] One of these was the famous French-Swiss woman of letters Madame de Staël, to whom Charles John declared that her pen was worth 50,000 soldiers (Schinkel, 1855: 73).

The Napoleonic Wars constituted the formation of the Nordic region as we know it today. Two composite states, Denmark-Norway – united since 1380 − and Sweden including Finland (since the thirteenth century), gradually turned into five distinct nation-states during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 1814−1815 was a turning point for the political geography of Scandinavia, closely connected to the European reconstruction taking place at the same time (Schroeder, 1994: 580; Berg, 2014: 268−270). As Napoleon's ally, Denmark ended up as the greatest loser of the Napoleonic Wars in terms of both territories and inhabitants (Feldbæk, 1990: 259, 267; Berg, 2014: 269; Glenthøj and Ottosen, 2014: 254−255). The loss of Norway affected the balance within the Danish monarchy between the Danish- and the German-speaking population, gradually making the question of the German duchy of Holstein, part of the German Confederation since 1815, and especially the national divided duchy of Schleswig the most problematic ones until – and beyond – the loss of the duchies in 1864 (Glenthøj and Ottosen, 2014: 255−256).

In 1809, Sweden lost Finland after a war with Russia, and Finland became a grand duchy under the Russian emperor, representing an embryonic starting point of its national history (Björne, 2014). As a compensation for its loss, Sweden did realise its longstanding goal of a union with Norway in 1814. Norway, on the other hand, achieved in the end, after strong resistance and continuous struggle against Swedish schemes throughout most of 1814, a quite autonomous position as a distinct kingdom within the dual monarchy, the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway. The North Atlantic islands, Greenland, Iceland and the Faeroes, were separated from their old-Norse motherland, Norway, and continued as Danish dependencies. Excepting the Finnish situation, all these changes were stipulated in the Danish-Swedish Treaty of Kiel of 14 January 1814, making it 'one of the most important and remarkable documents in Nordic history' (Weibull, 1990: 301). This treaty, followed immediately by a Danish-British peace treaty, was guaranteed by

Britain, and later also by Russia and Prussia, in accordance with earlier Swedish treaties with these countries in 1812–1813.

The final restructuring of the Nordic region and the fulfilment of the treaty was, however, to be confirmed and concluded in Vienna. Paradoxically, the main actor bringing an end to the centuries of wars between the traditional archenemies was a product of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and himself a major contributor to these wars. Jean Bernadotte, former French Marshal, was elected Crown Prince Charles John in Sweden in 1810, becoming Charles XIV John, King of Sweden and Norway in 1818. He revived the older imperial Swedish vision of turning the Scandinavian peninsula into an extended and defensible Swedish Scandinavian empire,[3] a 'natural' geostrategic peninsula state (Berg, 2020: 5). This was presented as a means to secure, as formulated in the Swedish-British Treaty of Stockholm of 1813, 'the independence of the North, and in order to accelerate the so much wished for epoch of a general peace'. In 1807, Denmark-Norway became an ally of Napoleon after the British attack on Copenhagen, which sought to prevent the huge Danish-Norwegian fleet from being used by the French ruler. This alliance enabled Bernadotte to secure support for his imperialistic ambitions from his new allies after 1812 – Russia and Great Britain, later also Prussia and Austria.

The Norwegian question aroused interest in Europe, especially in Britain, after the conclusion of the British-Swedish alliance through the Treaty of Stockholm in 1813. This controversial treaty referred to the secret Russian-Swedish Treaty of St. Petersburg of 5 April 1812. These treaties – followed by a treaty with Prussia in April 1813 – ensured support for Sweden in its claims on Norway. Norway was promised to Sweden as a compensation for Finland and as a reward for Sweden's participation in what was to become the sixth coalition against Napoleon. In this respect, Sweden's loss of Finland played a major role in bringing Russia and Great Britain together (Schroeder, 1994: 431).

The Treaty of Kiel of 14 January 1814 dissolved the age-old Danish-Norwegian Union and prescribed the formation of a novel union between Norway and her archenemy Sweden, thereby seeming to seal the fate of Norway. The treaty was announced in the Norwegian press in late January in a strongly abridged version, declaring 'Peace, peace in *Norden*!', concealing the fact that the Norwegian people had been handed over 'as a Herd of cattle', as it was later framed, from the Danish to the Swedish King (*Tiden*, Extra edition, 25 January 1814). The Norwegians, having had no role during the negotiations in Kiel, soon rose against this decision taken on their behalf. Having a reputation of being brave and freedom-loving, the Norwegians did not want to become 'Swedish slaves'. The Danish Prince and Norwegian Governor, Christian Frederik, was soon to be at the head of what was called a 'rebellion' against Swedish ambitions. He proclaimed the independence of Norway in February, directed against the diplomatic arrangements between Sweden, Russia, Britain and Denmark, but he waited in vain for it to be acknowledged by the international community. Regarded as a struggle for national independence and armed with a new constitution adopted during the spring of 1814, the Norwegian resistance was nonetheless met with acclamation from liberals, not least in Britain. The battle against the Swedes was fought more through words than

swords. This challenge to Sweden bore important fruit. Although Norway was not acknowledged as a sovereign and independent state by the international community and accordingly faced union with Sweden after a short war during the summer of 1814, they entered the union with a special position that included far-reaching autonomy and recognition of its new constitution.

Several pamphlets, proclamations and articles circulated in Europe at this time, in what may be termed a propaganda and pamphlet war regarding the cession of Norway (Hemstad, 2014a: 13−91). Norway, until then a substantially unknown Northern periphery, was for a short time put on the international agenda (Hemstad, 2014a; 2023a). Pamphlets and official proclamations frequently appeared in newspapers and journals, along with articles discussing the situation in Norway, defending or attacking the Swedish policy and the promised (but disputed) support from the British government, during 1813 and 1814. The discussion surrounding the conflict over Norway in Britain soon devolved into something of a party question between the liberal Whig opposition and the conservative Tory government (Leiren, 1975: 364−370). The Treaty of Stockholm had been strongly criticised by the Whigs in Parliament in 1813, while the developments of 1814 made the Norwegian question even more awkward for the government. *The Morning Post* commented on the British blockade of the Norwegian ports in 1814 in this way: '[…] Norway alone was selected to be the foul spot in the map of Europe, where right and wrong seemed to be lost sight of, where the law of the strong must prevail' ('London', *The Morning Post*, 30 April 1814: 3). The sympathy of the opposition as well as public opinion increasingly grew in favour of the Norwegians, as was reflected in British pamphlets, journals and newspapers. This contributed to strengthening the Norwegian resistance, which again was highlighted by the British liberal press.

As a response to the Treaty of Kiel and as a part of the national resistance, a constitutional assembly gathered at Eidsvoll in April 1814. The Norwegian constitution was dated the same day as the National Assembly elected the Danish Prince as the new King of Norway on 17 May 1814. A national parliament, the *Storting*, was to be gathered the following year. The writing of a new liberal constitution made the Norwegian question even more difficult and awkward for the Tory government. During 1813, they could argue in support of their Swedish policy that Denmark was an absolutist state and an ally of Napoleon. The new Norwegian state was, however, a liberal, constitutional monarchy, based on popular sovereignty. The debate and strong opposition made the British government more cautious regarding the Norwegian question. This debate, along with the strong sympathy for the Norwegians demonstrated by public opinion, served as a cautionary reference, at least for the British, including during the Congress of Vienna. The opposition utilised this dimension in the accusations against the statesmen at the congress, who were, it was argued, bartering with peoples and territories and disregarding the will of the people – just like their common enemy Napoleon. The Norwegians had already been transferred. Next in line were the Saxons, the Poles and the Genoese.

All of Europe 'is now at play round a large green table', and this political play – now 'performing at the Theatre Royal Europe' – was regularly commented on in

contemporary accounts and political satire (La Garde, 1831: 213; George, 1949: 490−491; 1959).[4] In the English graphic propaganda against Napoleon, Bernadotte was quite frequently referred to, based on his position as an ally to Britain (George, 1949).[5] The satires, however, also reveal an ambivalent attitude towards the Swedish Crown Prince, which continued in 1815. In congress printings, in separately sold caricatures and broadsheets, Bernadotte figures with a cunning smile, satisfied with his possession of Norway, stating that: 'Now I have got Norway I can get a wind to blow which way I please', and eagerly securing his part of the European cake (George, 1959: 158). As late as June 1815, during the Hundred Days,[6] Napoleon's actions were, in a broadsheet, compared favourably with the allies' treatment of Poles, Saxons, Norwegians and Genoese (George, 1959: 163).

In the House of Commons in April 1815, the Whig politician Sir James Mackintosh emphasised in his strong defence of the Genoese the importance of public opinion (Hansard, 1815: 918−927; Webster, 1921: 404−409). Concerning the Congress at Vienna, he remarked:

> Disposing, as they did, of rights and interests more momentous than were ever before placed at the disposal of a human assembly, is it fit that no channel should be left open by which they might learn the opinion of the public respecting their counsels, and the feelings which their measures excited from Norway to Andalusia?
>
> (Hansard, 1815: 895)

This necessary public judgement, the opinions of independent men, was to be found only in one place, he argues: 'The House of Commons was the only body which represented, in some sort, the public opinion of Europe' (Hansard, 1815: 895). Chapman reminds us of the context for such speeches, within and outside Parliament: 'British foreign policy was conducted with a high moral tone, partly so as to justify it to a critical House of Commons. Splendid "soundbites" were the stuff of British foreign policy speeches and statements at this time […]' (Chapman, 1998: 4). The discussions in the Commons represented a wider stage of public declamations (Evans, 1996: 208). The outspoken consciousness on behalf of 'the public opinion of Europe', however, also mirrors the potential position of public opinion as a factor which the statesmen at this time had to take into account to be able to realise their goals. In the British Parliament at this time, many members had, as Brophy underlines, 'come to see themselves as beholden to [public opinion]' (Brophy, 2007: 38).

Bernadotte, after having, as it was perceived, extorted the consent of the Allies to the annexation of Norway by Sweden, continued to be a controversial and unsympathetic figure in the international community (Scott, 1935: 30; Stang Aas and Tønnesson, 2000: 18). Wellington, who replaced Castlereagh in Vienna in March 1815, was reported to be full of hate and disgust towards 'Pontus Corvus' (Bobé, 1924: 327). Wellington admitted, in one of his dispatches during the negotiations concerning Swedish Pomerania, that the whole world – referring to the European public opinion – was aware that the Norwegians would resist the

cession to Sweden, and that this fact was an embarrassment for England and Russia (Nørregård, 1954: 120). In September 1814, the British Prime Minister Liverpool even admitted in a letter to Lord Castlereagh that the Norwegian question was 'the most awkward and embarrassing of any in our European politics' (Wellesley, 1867: 213; Mestad, 2015: 58−61).

Norway remained a slightly embarrassing issue at the congress, even if the question was formally not on the 'large green table'. European public opinion was to a certain degree aware and aroused regarding the Norwegian question. This fact did put pressure on Bernadotte, including during the decisive fall of 1814, restraining his political options. Sweden and Denmark were represented at the congress, although on different levels. Denmark, as Napoleon's most loyal ally (as it was said at the time), was not officially invited to the congress. Still, the King was encouraged to participate by the Austrian diplomat Steigentesch, one of the four allied commissioners sent to Denmark and Norway in spring 1814 (Nørregård, 1954: 13). Sweden was one of the minor allied powers, and was represented by its plenipotentiary, the politician and diplomat, Count Charles Löwenhielm. The Crown Prince was, as Glenda Sluga points out, one of the few European sovereigns to avoid the congress (Sluga 2014: 4). Yet, Bernadotte was busy elsewhere. He was, as Palmer underlines, 'in a hurry. He wished the formal act of union to become legally binding before the Congress summoned to Vienna […] completed its task in the closing weeks of the year' (Palmer, 1990: 220−223).

European Tranquillity and a Scandinavian Compromise

In early August, the situation was still quite fluid in regard to Scandinavia. The much longed-for European peace, initially set out in the first Treaty of Paris in May and providing the template for the principles to be discussed at the forthcoming Congress, was still challenged in the Scandinavian area. Bernadotte had returned to Sweden in late May 1814. By that time, the Norwegians had managed to elect a constitutional assembly, which drew up a constitution and elected Christian Frederik King of Norway at Eidsvoll, in spite of the blockade and the powerful alliance against them.

At the same time, the famous French-Swiss author and woman of letters Madame de Staël, one of Bernadotte's old friends and one of his central agents in the war of opinion regarding the cession of Norway, was finally back in Paris (Hemstad, 2015: 114−115). Her flight away from Napoleon in 1812 led her to Vienna, Moscow, St. Petersburg and Stockholm on her way to London, and to campaign continuously against Napoleon through her mobile salon, her letters and publications. Her dream was to see Bernadotte ascending the throne of France. In this, she had support from the Russian tsar Alexander I as well. These French pretensions obviously had an impact on Bernadotte's actions but made him even more unpopular in the eyes of the other allies. From 1812 Madame de Staël was, as Sluga points out, 'literally in the middle of the intellectual and diplomatic machinations of a new European-wide coalition against Napoleon' (Sluga, 2014: 4).

In 1813, Madame de Staël contributed to a quite extensive pamphlet, ostensibly about Napoleon's continental system. The author, soon to be named and reviled in

many of the countering pamphlets, was the German literary critic August Wilhelm Schlegel, who had followed Madame de Staël on her long journey and was later hired as one of Bernadotte's publicists. In the pamphlet, he emphasised the Swedish policy of establishing an eternal union between kindred peoples and thereby securing peace, the aim being 'peace on the Scandinavian Peninsula' (Schlegel, 1813). This pamphlet was written under the direction of the Swedish Crown Prince and more than likely discussed with Madame de Staël during their stay in Stockholm from September 1812 (Brandt, 1919: 145−147; Hasselrot, 1950: 255−275). During the spring and summer of 1813, the pamphlet was published and distributed in an impressive number of different editions and translations, in French, German, Swedish and English, in Stockholm, London, Berlin, Leipzig, Vienna and Boston. The second English translation was published in the name of Madame de Staël – indicating her participation in writing the pamphlet as well as her position as such − and reprinted in Boston, with a more saleable title: *An Appeal to the Nations of Europe against the Continental System* (Holstein, 1813; Hemstad, 2014a: 307−309).

The main purpose behind this pamphlet was to clarify the Swedish policy – 'The acquisition of Norway to Sweden' – for the outside world (Holstein, 1813: 91). The pamphlet, however, also pointed in the direction of what was to become the Congress of Vienna. Napoleon, as was prescribed in the final part of the pamphlet, 'must be compelled to give up his system of universal sovereignty, and every pretension incompatible with the independence of nations and the tranquillity of the world at large' (Holstein, 1813: 97).

The pamphlet served as an advocacy for the role of Sweden and Bernadotte in the still unknown European future, by reminding of the role played by Sweden at the peace of Westphalia, 'one of her brightest claims to fame', which for the next 150 years was 'considered the foundation of the rights of all the nations of Europe' (Holstein, 1813: 97−98). Bernadotte himself, in a published letter to Napoleon in 1813, accused the Emperor of leaving a heritage of 'eternal war' and of depriving the nations their right of internal peace (Charles John, 1826: 21−29; Scott, 1935: 19−20).

By the summer of 1814, Madame de Staël's salon was again, as *The Times* reported, 'the central point of the literary, political and fashionable world' in Paris, a 'centre of opinion', as the police reported (*The Times*, 14 October 1814: 3; Sluga, 2014: 11). From Paris, Madame de Staël continued through her salon diplomacy to spin Bernadotte's cause, as well as giving him advice regarding the situation in Norway. Bernadotte had his liberal image and French pretensions to consider, as Madame de Staël kept reminding him, thereby influencing him to soften his stance on Norway and accept the constitution (Solovieff and Jameson-Temper, 2000: 341). In a letter of 12 July Madame de Staël urged Bernadotte to accept the Norwegian Constitution, in order to strengthen his liberal image in France. To settle this question was of vital importance, she underlined (van Schinkel, 1864: 73−74; Höjer, 1960: 170).

Almost at the same time, the allied commissionaires, who had travelled to Copenhagen and Christiania to settle the conflict in favour of Sweden, had to leave without being able to secure the peace. Nonetheless, they reported that the Danish King was not to blame for the Norwegian 'rebellion' – even if it was led by the heir

to the Danish throne. This was later to become an important point of discussion in Vienna. Despite advice from Paris and from the commissionaires in favour of a peaceful solution, Bernadotte found it necessary to confront and end the Norwegian resistance. Diplomacy and political negotiations and agreements were not sufficient means in the end. In late July, Sweden attacked Norway by military means, to get its promised reward and to force the newly elected King, Christian Frederik, to abdicate and leave the country.

The news of the Congress to be held in Vienna reached the Norwegian headquarters as a glimmer of hope in the middle of the short war and at a decisive moment, on 8 August, through a courier from London (Schiern, 1867/1869: 297). It was considered whether it would be possible for Norway to persevere until the start of the Congress, scheduled for 1 October, hoping for international support for Norwegian independence and sovereignty. The shortage of cereals and supplies was considered, however, too critical to allow for a continuance of the war. The King and his government decided instead, on the same day, to accept Bernadotte's offer to approve the Norwegian Constitution as a basis for an armistice and a union between Norway and Sweden (Lindbäck-Larsen, 1945: 378−383). The Convention of Moss of 14 August, concluded between the Swedish King and the Norwegian government, demonstrated a completely different approach to the people of Norway, who until then had only been the object of treaties (Mestad, 2015: 58). The Convention ended the last war in Europe in 1814, excepting the Hundred Days, for years to come and, as mentioned, ultimately became the last inter-state war in the Nordic region.

Bernadotte's sudden acceptance of the Eidsvoll Constitution has been regarded as something of a mystery in Norwegian historiography (Koht, 1914: 341−342). There were, however, plausible reasons for this offer, one of them being Bernadotte's repeatedly performed constitutional promises, while another was the upcoming congress. Bernadotte certainly did not want the Norwegian question to become a topic of international discussion and deliberation.

Aware that he needed international support at best and passivity at least in forming and framing the union, Bernadotte realised that completing the union in a timely manner was crucial. During the negotiations between the Swedish commissionaires and the reluctantly summoned extraordinary parliament, the Norwegian Storting, Bernadotte wrote to his Foreign Minister, Lars von Engeström, underlining the importance of avoiding protracted negotiations. 'In a moment where the chances of our policy depend on harmony existing between the great powers, it is essential that we prove that the assembly was made by the unanimous will of the nation' (Tegnèr, 1876: 229). Bernadotte needed the parliament to give its consent to the new controversial union, thereby legitimating his policy. The Crown Prince accepted the May Constitution with minor changes. Christian Frederik had abdicated as part of the Convention in Moss, and he left the country in October. On 4 November, the old Swedish King, Carl XIII, was elected by the Storting as King of Norway. The Treaty of Kiel of January – although never formally recognised by the Norwegians – resulted in November in a personal union between Sweden and Norway, a legal and political process 'later confirmed by its indirect presence

at the Congress of Vienna' (Michalsen, 2015: 72). A national assembly and a national constitution remained a *fait accompli* and the upcoming congress could have interceded in the Norwegian question if Bernadotte had not settled the question rather quickly – and according to his own internationally proclaimed constitutional promises (Michalsen, 2015: 72). It may be argued that Bernadotte could not simply ignore the weight of international and Norwegian public opinion in resolving the Norwegian question on a permanent basis.

Ultimately Sweden did, as Palmer puts it, 'well from the Congress' (Webster, 1963: 9; Palmer, 1990: 223), but it failed to live up to its pretensions of being a power of second or even first order. Quite the opposite – Bernadotte was condemned, not least by the British opposition, for constantly playing his 'Napoleon tricks of the North' (*The Examiner*, 26 June 1814: 410; Leiren, 1975: 373). The union he did secure was based on a contested compromise. In 1816, it was pointed out in the *Allmänna Journalen* by reference to foreign publicists, that this union and the way it was concluded, was something quite exceptional: 'A union between two separate nations, each of them with their own constitution and laws, united by a common King securing their eternal peace' (*Allmänna Journalen* 13 March 1816).

Pan-Scandinavian Reconciliation and Cultural Practices

Charles John did secure peace in the Scandinavian Peninsula. The loose state construction − a consequence of the international situation at the time of its establishment and maintained as such through Norwegian opposition against any efforts of amalgamation − contributed to the longevity and relatively peaceful character of the union. The weakness of the union made it more resilient than the Dutch Union of 1815−1830, for instance (Hemstad, 2019a: 93).

While the union remained weak, cultural bonds between Norway and Denmark persisted throughout the nineteenth century and beyond (Hemstad, 2023c). An interesting aspect of the loose Swedish-Norwegian Union, probably making it quite exceptional, was that it in many ways included a third part – the losing one in 1814−1815 − namely the southern, Danish part of Scandinavia. In understanding how the Nordic region became a 'pluralist security community' after 1905 (Deutsch, 1957), if not before, with stable peace and a sense of commonality, the pan-Scandinavian movement and its integrative efforts during most of the nineteenth century must be taken into account (Hemstad and Stadius, 2023). This Danish-initiated Nordic pan-nationalism, developing from the late 1830s, may be seen as a compensation on the part of Denmark and Sweden after the significant reduction of their power and influence in post-Napoleonic Europe. They maintained their dominant positions within the region, although considerably weakened internationally. Norway and Finland had, in comparison, relatively strengthened their position. The Norwegians had recently gained their autonomy and were in general more hesitant and cautious towards pan-national ideas, fearing Swedish ambitions of amalgamation and Danish supremacy.

Glenthøj and Ottosen have convincingly argued that the threshold principle was of main importance in the political considerations in Denmark and to a certain

extent in Sweden – the Scandinavian countries had become small and insignificant in a world of great powers and had to join forces in order to survive, according to pan-Scandinavian activists (Glenthøj and Ottosen, 2021). The political vision put forward by Danish national-liberal activists was that of a union of the three Scandinavian nations, enabling the region to stand against Prussian and Russian aggression and thus secure liberty and peace in the North. The political negotiations and schemes, aiming at a union or a federation, took place particularly around 1848, the mid-1850s and 1864, connected to the first and second Schleswig wars and the Crimean war (Glenthøj, 2014; Glenthøj and Ottosen, 2021). The second Schleswig war of 1864 − when Sweden and Norway declined to help their Danish brethren, resulting in the loss of Schleswig − and the German unification a few years afterwards, put an end to pan-Scandinavian political projects and state-ambitions.

The importance of these ideas and the possibility of their realisation has, however, been considerably reevaluated in recent historiography (Glenthøj 2014; Glenthøj and Ottosen, 2021). Even if the pan-Scandinavian political project aiming at state-formation has, since 1864, been perceived as a 'failure', it was nonetheless important at the time and reveals the role of security questions among the political and intellectual elite in Denmark and Sweden. While Danish and Swedish images of the Scandinavian Union arguably remained quite disparate, as Joenniemi maintains, in promoting a 'kind of Super-Sweden' and a 'projection of Denmark and Danishness', respectively (Joenniemi, 2003: 207), the external German and Russian threats were nevertheless defined as common threats against the region. The question of securing the national divided Danish southern borderland was reframed as defending the common Nordic border. Nineteenth-century discourses on Nordic peace thus clearly included security questions as mobilising arguments for Scandinavian unity.

Literature on the Nordic region as a security community has asked 'when and why the security question dropped out of the Nordic discourse' and has argued that the stable peace in the region is a case of 'unintended peace' and not 'built around overcoming war and bringing about security' (Joenniemi, 2003: 206−209; Browning and Joenniemi, 2013). The analysis that 'Norden' hence is a 'community of security by default' and 'from the very start' (Joenniemi, 2003: 204−205), does not quite fit the first half of the nineteenth century and needs some qualification.

Strategies of security were, as has been demonstrated, important, especially in a Danish context. Alongside the necessity to defend Nordic peace against aggression from outside the region, the importance of securing intra-Nordic peace and promoting transnational solidarity was clearly expressed as part of the pan-Scandinavian rhetoric of peace and reconciliation – especially in the mid-nineteenth century. The backdrop of centuries of intra-Scandinavian warfare until 1815 – with the 1814 experience as the last one – thus played an important role. A main endeavour for the movement was to overcome old animosity. The aim was not only to avoid war, but to establish a positive peace by building a Scandinavian 'spiritual' community that could serve as a foundation for a possible future political union. The image of the neighbouring archenemy thus underwent a significant shift. The former enemy was turned into the closest friend and a trusted Nordic brother. This shift did not happen

by itself, but required comprehensive conciliatory work, not least by cultivating the common Old-Norse history and by reinterpreting the 'age of discord' in Nordic history, as van Gerven has recently demonstrated (van Gerven, 2022).

The rhetoric of reconciliation was repeatedly performed at the early pan-Scandinavian meetings, with the Scandinavian student meetings and their extensive political toasting playing a significant role. The extent of this kind of rhetoric is illustrated in a satiric and slightly exaggerated comment in the Danish magazine *Corsaren*, ridiculing the number of speeches at the Scandinavian student meeting in Copenhagen in 1845, gathering 1,400 students from the university cities of Uppsala, Lund, Christiania (modern Oslo) and Copenhagen. The magazine claimed that all 247 (!) Scandinavian speeches were 'always about one and the same thing, "that Denmark, Norway, Sweden had disagreed, but were now good friends" that is simply too much […]' (*Corsaren* 4 July 1845, quoted in Clausen, 1900: 101). On the same occasion, in one of the numerous songs being distributed, it was underlined that the Nordic people should stand together and never fight against each other (Säve, 1846: 50). In 1856, at the fourth Scandinavian student meeting in Uppsala, after the first Schleswig war and at a point when Scandinavianism attracted dynastic interest, the Swedish-Norwegian king Oscar I received the students at the palace and solemnly declared that 'war is inconceivable between the Nordic brethren'. This may be seen as a decisive moment, underlining the unity and making 'the security question' less relevant in the Nordic discourse (cf. Joenniemi, 2003: 207).

In spite of, or partly due to, the disappointment after 1864 and the lack of Scandinavian support in the war, Scandinavianism as a cultural and civic project continued. It proved to be a strong inspirational impulse towards closer Nordic cooperation within an emergent transnational Nordic civil society (Hemstad and Stadius, 2023). Transnational ideas and practices are specifically prominent within associational and cultural life, with a range of associational initiatives starting in the late 1830s and flourishing after 1864. A renewed wave of cooperation is connected to the reemerging of pan-Scandinavian ideas around 1900, reinterpreted as 'Neo-Scandinavianism' (on this development, see Hemstad, 2008). During the last part of the nineteenth century, a close web of Nordic cooperation and contacts, of meetings, associations, organisations and networks, were formed across the region and even beyond, among Scandinavians abroad (Hemstad, 2023b). Many of these institutionalised Scandinavian contacts were inspired by pan-Scandinavian ideas of brotherhood and cohesion.

The pan-Scandinavian project of positive peace by building a community based on a shared identity and practices of Scandinavian cooperation was more successful in integrating the region than the Swedish-Norwegian Union. The civil society – and public sphere – initiatives were regularly on a common Scandinavian level, and not restricted to the Scandinavian Peninsula. The Scandinavian Union, as imagined by the pan-Scandinavian movement included – at least – three nations, not just the two already constituting a political, although weak entity.

When the loose Swedish-Norwegian Union broke up in 1905 through the peaceful means of negotiation, despite aggressive nationalistic rhetoric among both parties − even calling for war − the old catchphrase of 'peace on the

Scandinavian Peninsula', and more commonly, 'Nordic peace' (literally 'Peace in the North' – '*Fred i Norden*'), was revitalised. This is particularly evident in Norwegian and Swedish newspapers, where the phrase was frequently used during the year.[7] The dissolution of the union was prescribed − particularly pronounced from a Norwegian perspective − as a necessary means to overcome the conflicts within the union and to secure a more permanent peace and friendly relationship in the region. In a recent reevaluation of the union, Berg underlines that the union and the established practices of negotiations also served as a 'school for compromise seeking' and hence 'must take the main honour for the peaceful dissolution of 1905' (Berg, 2020: 15). The international political community, supportive of a peaceful solution of the conflict (as in 1814), was also of major importance for the events of 1905 in being, although not conflict-free, the 'first Nordic *non-war*' (Wiberg, 1990: 15).

Conclusion

The new Nordic system of independent nation-states, unfolding during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, was initially established between 1809 and 1814, and internationally concluded and confirmed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The solution to the Norwegian question, a main part of the reconstruction of the Nordic countries, must be understood by taking into account the broader international context, including the role of public opinion in an emerging public sphere. The aim of attaining enduring or permanent peace, put forward by Charles John as a geopolitical argument around 1814, was, one may say, fulfilled in the North. The resulting stable peace in the region was thus not 'unintended', as it has been argued (Deutsch, 1957; Joenniemi, 2003: 199, 205). This state of Nordic peace had indeed not been the case until the turning point in 1815, ending centuries of wars of rivalry between Sweden (with Finland) and Denmark-Norway. Since 1815, Sweden has not been exposed to war and the Nordic countries have had a peaceful, non-violent – if not always conflict-free – inter-Nordic relationship. War between the Nordic states has been non-existent, and the region has developed into a 'zone of peace' and a 'non-war community' with 'stable expectations of peaceful change', as pointed out in security community literature (Deutsch, 1957; Archer, 2003: 3−5). In the process of reconciliation, the pan-Scandinavian ideas and movement played an important and often underestimated role in overcoming centuries of warfare and instead nurturing Scandinavian sympathies across the region to such an extent that war was perceived as inconceivable – and seemingly taken for granted.

The peaceful dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian Union in 1905 demonstrated the ability within the region to handle internal conflicts in a peaceful manner, despite several instances of nationalistic aggression in Sweden and Norway, which also for a while put the close Scandinavian interconnections to the test. Nordic cooperation gradually expanded, after several years of 'Nordic winter' following the dissolution (Hemstad, 2008), and after 1905/1917 was decidedly based on respect for national sovereignty and a more balanced Nordic relationship, but still informed by ideas of Nordic commonality and cohesion (Hemstad and Stadius, 2023).

Notes

1 An ongoing Nordforsk funded book project on 'Pax Nordica' examines the experiences and lessons of this early Nordic peace period in the eighteenth century.
2 For a closer examination of the development around 1814 and the Norwegian question, see Hemstad 2014a, 2014b and 2019b.
3 On the use of Scandinavian and Nordic as common although controversial denominations during the nineteenth century, see Hemstad 2022.
4 The satires, as 'Twelfth Night or, What you will!' Engraving by G. Cruikshank (no. 12453) are available at http://www.britishmuseum.org.
5 Sweden and Swedes are mentioned in these satires 13 times during 1813, and 11 times the next year. Bernadotte is explicitly mentioned or referred to 12 times during 1813 and 10 times during 1814, in addition to a satire from December 1812, where he, as a fox, is holding Norway, as a goose, in his mouth.
6 Also called the War of the Seventh Coalition, it describes the period between 20 March 1815, when Napoleon arrived in Paris after his exile on Elba, to the return of Louis XVIII to Paris 8 July 1815, after the Battle of Waterloo and Napoleon's second abdication.
7 Norwegian newspapers are digitally available at: www.nb.no, Swedish newspapers: tidningar.kb.se.

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4 The Scandinavist Origins of "Nordic Peace"

Fredrik Bajer and the Peaceful Afterlife of a Nineteenth-Century Pan-Ideology

Frederik Forrai Ørskov

Introduction

International Relations scholars such as Ole Wæver have argued that the emergence of a Nordic "security community" was "neither intentional, nor formulated as a project to secure peace among the Nordic countries" (Browning and Joenniemi, 2013: 409; cf. Wæver, 1998).[1] While this is likely true on a state level, I argue in this chapter that nineteenth-century Scandinavian peace intellectuals lacked neither intentions nor prolific formulations when it came to visions for a peaceful international order. What is more, many such visions grew from sentiments stressing Scandinavian cultural community and even Scandinavian political unity in one shape or another. In what follows, I trace a link between the mid-nineteenth-century Scandinavist movement and the conceptualizations of peace in the Nordic Countries prior to the First World War. Doing so, I align myself with recent historical re-interpretations of the movement that have challenged the rather entrenched historiographical notion that Scandinavism was a utopian vision with little sense for or bearing on political realities (Holmberg, 1984; Andrén, 1994; Hemstad, 2008; Glenthøj, 2018).[2]

In the following, I first provide a broad overview of the Scandinavist movement in the early- and mid-nineteenth century, the era most commonly related to Scandinavism in the research literature, while emphasizing the movement's role as a co-creator of a Nordic civil society and in generating, maintaining and mobilizing a sense of intra-Nordic communality. I then show how mid-century Scandinavism lived on and came to affect a particular vision, in which the Nordic countries were regarded as uniquely suited to lead the way toward international peace, exemplified in the intellectual and institutional work of Danish peace activist, politician, and Nobel Peace Prize winner (1908) Fredrik Bajer. I do this by first outlining Bajer's involvement with the Scandinavist movement from the late 1860s onwards and then turning to his thinking on peace as it developed from the 1870s and beyond. As important as his intellectual endeavors were his organizational ones. He was an organizational pioneer in the Danish peace movement and the initiator of a range of inter-Scandinavian collaborative efforts—the Nordic Interparlamentary Union perhaps most notable among them—as well as the arguably most prominent Scandinavian representative in the increasingly institutionalized international peace

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movement at the turn of the century. Concurrently, he strove to develop the intellectual and organizational underpinnings of the Nordic peace movement in tandem with a vision for Scandinavian republicanism, inspired, among other things, by his reading and translation of Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace*.

An unwavering Scandinavist outlook, shaped in the late 1860s, undergirded Bajer's activism and informed the liberal internationalist thinking propagated by Bajer in domestic, Scandinavian, and (Western) European contexts. This, I argue, manifested itself as Bajer came to regard the Scandinavian countries as exemplary not only in their overcoming of internal strife but also in what he saw as their potential for being active proponents of a peaceful international order. Thus, as I discuss in the concluding part of this chapter, a central part of his intellectual heritage at home and internationally was the forging of a link between an intra-regional sense of communality and an external conception of what has subsequently been termed Nordic peace.

The Scandinavist Movement: Constructing Intra-Nordic Communality

"Scandinavism began," writes Bo Stråth, "as an intellectual movement seeking mentally to come to terms with and consolidate the new status as small states at the European periphery" in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars (Stråth, 2005: 209). While a heterogenic phenomenon, Scandinavists generally held that the Scandinavian countries (sometimes, but not generally, including the Grand Duchy of Finland, which had been part of the Russian Empire since 1809) constituted a geographical, historical, societal, religious, and linguistic community; a community that, moreover, it was deemed worth, or even necessary, to preserve and promote (e.g., Thorkildsen, 1994: 191). Some sought to strengthen this community primarily through closer cultural and scientific collaboration, while others also strove for some kind of political integration—contemporaries and historians alike have distinguished between cultural and political Scandinavism, although the borders between them were always blurry.

Originally almost purely an academic movement—and an oppositional one of that—Scandinavism became, in Stråth's terms, "a dynastic movement" after the First Schleswig War (1848–1850) (Stråth, 2005: 14). While not devoid of internal frictions—and to a certain degree due to these frictions—the commonly declared neutrality of the Danish Kingdom and the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway during the Crimean War (1853–1856) paved the way for a stronger emphasis on political Scandinavism. On a dynastic level, this was especially the case in Sweden: Hence, King Oscar I argued that the eventual absorption of the Scandinavian kingdoms by their Russian and Prussian neighbors was inevitable unless countered by "the rebirth of the Scandinavian tribe" through "a closer intellectual, commercial, and political development" (Westberg, 2012: 60).

Beyond the poetic and literary sentiments often associated with the movement, much of the intellectual input to political Scandinavism came from popular linguistic theories making claims about a correlation of the languages and values of the

Scandinavian people as well as the essential oneness of its peoples (e.g., Jalava and Stråth, 2017: 41). In a reappraisal of the Scandinavist movement, Åke Holmberg has implied that the impulse behind much of this activity was a certain national cultural insecurity. For the famous Danish linguist Rasmus Rask, as well as his followers such as the committed Norwegian Scandinavist Ludvig Kristensen Daa, orthographical differences made Scandinavian readers much more likely to turn to French, English, and German literature than to the literature of their Scandinavian neighbors. Literal and linguistic disunity, in Holmberg's paraphrase, thereby constituted for the Scandinavian nations a "threat to the survival of their languages and thus to their very nationality" (Holmberg, 1984: 175).

Hence, cultivating cultural commonality became a means to the end of national survival and a companion piece to political efforts at institutionalizing Scandinavian unity, which Rasmus Glenthøj has described as being motivated by an "existential fear of being too small" to be able to resist foreign domination or even maintain independence. This anguish, Glenthøj argues, derived from the experiences of the Napoleonic wars and undergirded a primarily defensive "expand or perish"-logic fueling the mid-nineteenth-century macro-nationalisms of, for example, pan-Slavists or pan-Scandinavists (Glenthøj, 2020: 247). Danish Scandinavists, for example, feared that the diminished Danish state was too small to withstand the ongoing German unification process and saw a political union under one monarch as the only way to alleviate this ostensibly precarious condition (Glenthøj, 2020: 252).

Unsurprisingly, then, Danish national liberals were the main drivers of political Scandinavism in the 1840s and 1850s, as they sought to make the future of the contested region of Schleswig-Holstein a common Scandinavian concern (e.g., Hemstad, 2008: 51). As Glenthøj has pointed out, the movement's political ambitions have generally been portrayed as unrealistic dreams—but perhaps unfairly so, especially when compared to the ambitions and eventual successes of other contemporary pan-movements, the pan-Italian and pan-German being the most obvious cases. In the period from around 1855 to 1863, much of the elites of both Denmark and Sweden-Norway, including a significant minority of the three nations' politicians as well as all the monarchs involved, were in favor of a Scandinavian union, and the Danish and Swedish governments seriously negotiated the conditions for a union in the spring of 1864 (Glenthøj, 2018: 234ff). However, while both Oscar and his successor, Karl XV, entertained dreams of succeeding the childless Frederik VII on the Danish throne (e.g., Westberg, 1997: 40; Østergård, 1997: 40; Stråth, 2005: 215), Swedish aid to Denmark—what should have been a material manifestation of Scandinavian brotherly sentiments—ultimately failed to materialize in the Second Schleswig War of 1864. The resultant loss of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein undermined much of the logic underpinning political Scandinavism (see Leira, 2002: 70):[3] It was "declared dead and buried," according to Ruth Hemstad (Hemstad, 2008: 68).[4]

Despite its apparent failure, some historians and IR scholars have emphasized that the effects of political Scandinavism went beyond its failed visions. The meetings of student Scandinavists were "powerful media event[s]," Jonas

Harvard and Magdalena Hillström have argued, as the Scandinavist movement benefited both from emerging "infrastructures of opinion formation" and technologies that not only shrank distances for meeting participants but also facilitated faster dissemination of knowledge about the student meetings to wide audiences across the Scandinavian countries (Harvard and Hillström, 2013: 78ff.). "[A]n imagined community was under construction," Glenthøj argues, with intellectual intra-correspondence, the foundation of Scandinavian societies and journals, and attempts to create a common sphere for language and literature making up some of the building blocks (Glenthøj, 2018: 244). Indeed, Wiberg has implied that the long tradition for intra-regional links arising from Scandinavism form part of the backdrop for the political culture undergirding the "security community" existing between the Nordic states (Wiberg, 1990: 20–21). Correspondingly, according to Christopher Browning and Perrti Joenniemi "the routinised practice of crossing the Øresund Strait between Denmark and Sweden to meet the other as a brother in usually informal encounters" entailed a "rejection of borders as inevitable sites of othering, security and conflict," making it possible to see the "intra-Scandinavian and Nordic borders in connective rather than divisive terms" (Browning and Joenniemi, 2013: 502).

Furthermore, as Hemstad emphasizes in her authoritative work on turn-of-the-century neo-Scandinavism, 1864 did not represent a termination of Scandinavism as much as a reorientation from a political to a more practically oriented version of the movement (Hemstad, 2008: 68–69). Hopes for a dynastically unified Scandinavia, while not fully extinguished until German unification through the Franco-Prussian War in 1870–1871 made Scandinavian unification something of a geo-political impossibility (Stråth, 2005: 216),[5] gave way to a foundational period for Scandinavian collaboration (Hemstad, 2008: 70). From 1864 onwards, the dominating form of Scandinavism was a practical one whose proponents saw cultural commonality as well as collaboration in professional, scientific, and cultural fields not as stepping-stones on the road toward political union but rather as ends worth pursuing for their own sake. Many of those involved in Scandinavian collaboration were personally committed to the Scandinavian cultural community, seeing it as something natural and inherently valuable. While a meeting of Scandinavian natural scientists in 1839 constituted the first of the meetings of Nordic professionals and scientists, the frequency of such meetings as well as the prevalence of various Nordic associations increased after 1864. At the same time, the actors involved, many of whom were former student Scandinavist now in prominent administrative and professional positions, distanced themselves—and often explicitly so—from visions of political unification (Østergård, 1997: 42; Hemstad, 2008: 22, 30, 41–43, 68, 70–72).[6] Mid-century Scandinavism had been instrumental in generating, maintaining and mobilizing a Scandinavian public sphere and a sense of intra-Nordic communality in pursuit of political unification. The shift of emphasis toward the cultural and practical sides of Scandinavism ensured that such commonality was still cultivated through networks, meetings, and associations, making up the early foundations of a Nordic civil society, even after most Scandinavists had given up on the idea of a political union.

Fredrik Bajer: A Scandinavist Latecomer

Not everyone, however, were willing to leave the idea of a Scandinavian federation to the dustbin of history. Thus, as dynastic Scandinavism fell from grace and its "contentious national and political program was toned down markedly" around 1870–1871 and as the movement almost went into "a state of hibernation," as Hemstad describes it (Hemstad, 2008: 17), Fredrik Bajer's political Scandinavism remained wide-awake. To be sure, Bajer also abandoned dynastic Scandinavism; he replaced it, however, with a republican Scandinavism (Bajer, 1909: 376).[7] Thus, in June 1870 Bajer and a few others, among them the radical Swedish politician F. T. Borg, met in Bajer's home and inaugurated *Nordens Fristats-Samfund* [Norden's Free State Society, NFS] (Bajer, 1909: 377).

Prior to that, Bajer had served in the army, first as a cadet immediately prior to the Second Schleswig War, where he was stationed in a predominantly German-minded town in the Duchy of Holstein, and then as an officer during the war. While not directly engaged in combat, save for a few minor skirmishes (e.g., Bajer, 1909: 273), Bajer's wartime service significantly influenced his political and intellectual development (Bajer, 1909: 270).[8] This development did not initially align Bajer with Scandinavism, however, but it did mold his views on Denmark's position within international power structures. As he put it in one letter to his father, the Great Powers' willingness to guarantee the sovereignty of the Danish state hinged not upon the latter's German duchies but rather its geographical position at the entrance of the Baltic Sea. "For that reason," he concluded,

> am I neither a Schleswig-Holsteiner nor a Scandinav[ist], but put Denmark's independence above everything. I trust neither the Great Powers nor *bröderna hinsidan Sundet* [Swedish: the brothers from across the Sound], but say with La Fontaine: *Aide-toi, le ciel t'aidera* [Help yourself, and heaven will help you].
>
> (Bajer, 1909: 136)[9]

As the fortune of the war turned decidedly against the Danish army, Bajer would advocate a partition of Schleswig based on linguistic borders. He thus went against not just conservatives rallying around the integrity of the composite state but also the national-liberal consensus, which had long rallied around a border at the Eider River separating Schleswig and Holstein, the consequence of which would be the continued presence of a large German-speaking minority within the Danish state (Stråth, 2005: 212–213; see also Køedt, 1916: 14).[10]

Following his discharge from the army in the post-war demobilization, Bajer moved to Copenhagen and started teaching. Here he pursued language studies, an interest he had taken on with increasing seal running up to and especially during the war where he had read the works of linguist Rasmus Rask to the extent allowed by army life (Bajer, 1909: 224, 237, 258).[11] Concurrently, he got involved with the Scandinavist circles still gathering around the influential national liberals Carl Ploug and Carl Rosenberg, among others, while his attitude toward Scandinavism changed from skepticism to enthusiastic support (Bajer, 1909: 292).[12] In a letter

from March 1865, quoted at length here, it is evident that Scandinavian political unity had moved onto Bajer's horizon of expectations—if only just:

> All my life I will work towards that aim, which I know that I shall not myself see achieved. And I will consider Norwegians and Swedes as brothers (we Danes do after all stem from the same root, both when it comes to kinship and language), as brothers, who are only separated temporarily. I am Scandinav[ist] in everything non-political. I consider literature and art and in due time language as common for all three kingdoms. I shall work for the introduction of common or identical coinage, common citizenship, common universities,—only not for any immature political union; for that fruit, which is picked much too early, will never ripen,—no, it rots.
>
> (Bajer, 1909: 261)

The hesitancy gradually disappeared over the following years as Bajer involved himself in *Nordisk Samfund* [The Nordic Society] (Bajer, 1909: 297; Hemstad, 2008: 77–78)[13] and in a flurry of other organizational activities as would be characteristic for the rest of his active career (Larsen, 1984: 186; Bajer, 1909: 279, 294, 309).[14] Most notably, he wrote about language-related issues in the most prominent Scandinavist journal of the time while he also became a central figure in organizing the first Nordic school meeting, which would eventually take place in 1870 (Bajer, 1909: 428–431; Backholm, 1994: 21; Hemstad, 2008: 206).[15]

Through these and other less successful Scandinavian endeavors, Bajer got in touch with a range of actors in the networks that carried over from the days of student Scandinavism, although Bajer himself was a latecomer to the movement. Letters found in Bajer's private archives testify to a significant engagement with Scandinavists in Norway and Sweden, particularly with Swedish schoolteachers, professors, and other educationalists in the last years of the 1860s.[16] So do Bajer's travel activities during these years, as he often made the trip across the Sound in order to muster support first for an envisioned Nordic folk high school and later for the Nordic school meetings as well as to participate in meetings concerning various Nordic journals and societies. Here the notions of a Scandinavian civil society, a common public sphere of sorts, and the connective quality of the Scandinavist border-crossings, as discussed above, come to mind. To Bajer, this all served as foundations for his peace activism in the following decades. Indeed, it was from his sense of belonging to and participation in the "Scandinavian community," as Bajer would recall in his memoirs, that his "sentiment for brotherhood amongst the peoples" developed into "a sentiment for the universal human brotherhood" (Bajer, 1909: 416).

Scandinavist Republicanism and Scandinavian Peace Activism

In the late 1860s, then, Bajer was a practicing and organizing as well as ideological Scandinavist. This would hold true for his later peace work as well, something that helped facilitate the reconciliation of peace activism and Scandinavism. His active engagement as the main driving force in *Nordens Fristats-Samfund* marks an

important development in this regard. Retrospectively he saw the society—and in particular the manifesto, *Norden som Republik* [Norden as a Republic] from 1879—as "a sort of transition" from Scandinavism to peace activism (Bajer, 1879; Bajer, 1909: 379).[17] More than a mere transition, however, the booklet itself reads as a peace manifesto. That is, it links political unity via sentiments for brotherhood to the absence of war. The manifesto asserts this link already on its first page:

> The gradual association of the peoples [Folkenes gradvise sammenslutning] into larger and larger political units provides the best guarantee for the preservation of peace; and if Europe's states were united in a political federation for the sake of common external protection, then European wars would be as unlikely in the future, as wars between North America's 'United States' already are.
>
> (Bajer, 1879: 1)

That "North America's united states" had seen "its only large war" less than 20 years prior was of less consequence to Bajer, who asked rhetorically: "what is this one war against the almost incessant state of war that has shaken Europe's scattered states" in the last 25 years? The threat of war, then, "would only be reduced to the least possible when the idea of 'Europe's united states' was realized" in accordance with natural, historical developments. As for this development, European history—its many wars notwithstanding—revealed the principles of historical progress through gradual unifications into larger political units, as Bajer saw it exemplified by the conglomerations that now constituted Great Britain, France, Italy, Switzerland, and Germany among others. From this point of view, the creation of "The United States of Norden" was not only a natural development, it also constituted a stage on the arch of historical progress as "a step on the road towards 'the united states of Europe'" (Bajer, 1879: 1–3). Bajer explicitly framed this vision in peace-enhancing terms. Thus, in *Norden som Republik* he referenced the Swedish parliamentarian and Scandinavist Sven Adolf Hedin in stating that "a united Scandinavia is *one less* war cause, *one more* peace guarantee in Northern Europe, just as the unified Italy is in Southern [Europe]" (Hedin, 1868: 61; Bajer, 1879: 4).[18]

Bajer's republican vision was clearly inspired by Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*. Bajer read Kant already during his years as a cadet (Bajer, 1909: 86), and a decade after the publication of *Norden som Republik*, Bajer translated and introduced the second Danish language version of the book, which he also supplemented with additional information and his own extensive comments in endnotes (Kant, 1889). Kant's treatise contains a number of articles (six preliminary and three definite), the fulfillment of which would, so the argument runs, condition perpetual peace. As Rebecka Lettevall notes,

> The second definite article, where Kant suggests a federation, is totally in line with Bajer's own thoughts [….] Bajer meant that the centre of the whole work […] was the possibility that the idea of federalism might be proven to lead, step by step, to a society of enlightened people.
>
> (Kant, 1889: 141)

From Bajer's comments in the endnotes, it is evident that he—referencing Charles Lemonnier, a Belgian liberal politician and president of the League of Peace and Freedom—saw the ideal of a United States of Europe as a manifestation of such Kantian federalism (e.g., Kant, 1889: 89–90). Moreover, in the foreword Bajer encouraged the writing of a "natural law in *Kant's spirit*" from an international law perspective and—as a fitting preliminary study for this larger task—a work on "The Swiss Federation as a model for the United States of Europe." (Kant, 1889: 5–6).[19] Such federal dreams went well-beyond Kant's notion of a league of peace, yet Kant's framework was developed and applied rather loosely among nineteenth-century peace activists, as was the meaning of the notion "federation" (e.g., Lehti, 2014: 107–108). Indeed, Bajer conceived of this larger framework for European order as a coordinating rather than subordinating body; his ideal was a federation of sovereign and independent states tied together by a rights-based legal order (Gram-Skjoldager, 2012: 45). Thus, what Bajer primarily drew from his reading and translation of *Perpetual Peace*, Lettevall notes, was the encouragement to "propose an arbitration procedure as well as a Scandinavian federation in the name of the notion of rights" (Lettevall, 2009: 136). The goal, as Bajer wrote in 1886, was increasingly and "in all regards [i alle Forhold] to put *right in the place of might* …." (Gram-Skjoldager, 2012: 45).[20]

Scandinavian(ist) Neutrality

In a 1906 account of the history of the peace movement in Norway, Halvdan Koht—the interwar Norwegian foreign minister and proponent of a foreign policy based on active neutrality—portrayed Bajer's ambition for NFS as one of obtaining "peace and the freedom of the peoples [folkefridom]" through Nordic unity in a republican configuration and in relation to contemporary Norwegian republicans such as Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson (Koht, 1906: 86; Bjørnson, 1953: 98–100, 134–135, 138–144; 1970: 208–210; Hemstad, 2008: 274).[21] Halvard Leira has shown how Koht's political thought drew upon and developed a certain Scandinavian adaption of liberal internationalist peace discourse. Bajer and his Swedish friend and collaborator Klas Pontus Arnoldson inspired this adaption, in which *folket* [the people] in a Grundtvigian sense figured centrally as an inherent proponent of peace (Leira, 2002: 72–75). As such, it aligned well with the role the *folk*-concept played in contemporary Scandinavian political discourse. In the Danish political context (in which Bajer partook as a member of parliament for *Forenede Venstre* [The United Left] from 1872 to 1895 although as a rather marginal figure in the political power struggle) (Bajer, 1909: 396–412; Mortensøn, 2018: 178–188)[22] Grundvigians, National Liberals, and Cultural Radicals all portrayed *folket* as the carrier of sovereign power in the young democratic system (Leira, 2002: 73; Korsgaard, 2004: 465).[23]

In light of this, it is hardly surprising that Koht placed the rise of the republican movement in the context of the period's struggles for political legitimacy between monarchical and popular power [folkemagt og kongsmagt] (Leira, 2002: 72–75). Bajer made the same connection between *folket* and republicanism: This

is illustrated in his most ambitious literary endeavor—a satirical short story with an obvious republican message, entitled *Skuespilleren som konge* [The Actor as King]—in which the leader of the successful republican party is named "Folkesen." (Nordens Fristats-samfund, 1871; Bajer, 1881; Bajer, 1909: 377)[24]. According to Leira, this Grundtvigian merger of the *folk*-concept with peace led to a strong emphasis on the particularly peace-loving, "chosen" Danish people, which in Koht's later renditions—and via a reference to Bjørnson—unsurprisingly gave way to the notion of a particularly peace-loving Norwegian people (Leira, 2002: 73, 108). As noted by Browning and Joenniemi, this "connection between the 'people' and 'peace' [which] became established and was juxtaposed against a connection between monarchs and war" also made possible a distancing from the fratricide that had until rather recently been inter-Nordic history. In a 'people'-based History, the dynastic struggles of the past lost relevance as a "temporal othering" took place. That is, "the past was rejected as bankrupt and could be ignored as not being 'our past' or 'our' conflicts, and therefore unimportant when moving forward" (Browning and Joenniemi, 2013: 500–501).

As importantly, Bajer proposed a common Nordic declaration of neutrality in the postscript of *Norden som Republik*—an idea he had first put forth in an 1875-article (Bajer, 1879; 1900a: 8). As noted by Leira, Bajer and other peace activists "translated" the British internationalist notion of neutrality into a Nordic context. (Leira, 2002: 73). Beyond the strong focus on the *folk*, this translation would eventually include an insistence on permanent neutrality neutralization—of the Scandinavian countries. According to Karen Gram-Skjoldager, this represented a significant contribution to "the development of the international internationalist agenda" (Gram-Skjoldager, 2012: 48). Whereas non-intervention—that is, neutrality through passivity—was quite logically at the heart of the notion of neutrality in the imperial context out of which British internationalism emerged, active neutrality made more sense from a small-state point of view. The La Fontaine motto guiding his pre-Scandinavist days, then, must still have seemed relevant as Bajer exchanged a preference for a neutrality guaranteed by one or more of the great powers for a unilateral, self-declared one: Help yourself, and heaven will help you.

For the converted Scandinavist, however the "yourself" of La Fontaine's dictum was a Scandinavian one. Some scholars have put the breakdown of political Scandinavism around the Danish defeat of 1864 down to the adherence to neutrality on part of Swedish politicians. Having become a principle of Swedish foreign policy in the 1820s, Håkan Wiberg has noted how neutrality took on "an increasingly principled and programmatic character, thus becoming an 'ism'." While Wiberg notes that Scandinavism and neutralism "were for a long time intertwined" (Wiberg, 2000: 296), Clive Archer has noted how, as political Scandinavism and neutralism clashed in 1863, politicians in Stockholm "tugged back their monarch from embracing his Nordic brethren and clung instead to neutralism" (Archer, 2003: 12), rendering Scandinavism and neutralism mutually incompatible in the historical context of the Danish-Prussian struggle over Schleswig. Toward the end of the century, however, neo-Scandinavists such as Bajer strove vigorously to turn this opposition on its head and naturalize the mutual compatibility of the two isms.

Thus, in the following decades Bajer worked for common Scandinavian declarations of neutrality, both in national and international fora. Around the turn of the century, this led Bajer to propagate and theorize the term "peacefare [fredsførelse, *la pacigérance*]" as a contribution to international liberalist thinking through internationalist organizations and publications aimed at Danish, Scandinavian, and European audiences. These emphasized the sovereign states' collaboration for the maintenance or restoration of peace through associations of "peacefaring states" (e.g., Bajer, 1909: 512; see also Gram-Skjoldager, 2012: 53). In some important ways, this notion precedes approaches to peace pursued in the League of Nations Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (Laqua, 2011: 223–247), among others, and theorized by later peace scholars such as Johan Galtung as well as constructivist proponents of the term Nordic Peace within the field of International Relations. These have portrayed the Nordic region as a paradigmatic example of a security community where peace goes beyond a "negative" definition (that is, it goes beyond the mere non-existence of war) (Galtung, 1969: 167–191; Archer, 1996: 451–67; Adler and Barnett, 1998).[25] Correspondingly, Bajer continuously emphasized that peacefaring aimed at more than just the absence of warfare, for example in a 1913-article in which he instead associated the idea with active efforts on the part of states to "do as much *good* to each other as possible" (Bajer, 1913: 1).

As Gram-Skjoldager has noted, the promotion of a morally positively laden neutrality was both an abstract peace political principle for Bajer the activist as well as a tangible foreign political tool for Bajer the oppositional parliamentarian as his thinking developed from the 1880s onwards—and in this, a combined Scandinavian defensive alliance and neutrality association was a central element (Gram-Skjoldager, 2012: 48ff.). Here, the small-state status of the Scandinavian kingdoms was imperative. This, of course, was a rather obvious concern in the imperial world order of the nineteenth century. It was also one, which, in the years following the Danish defeat in 1864, had occupied the politically minded Scandinavists. For at least some of these, each of the "Scandinavian tribes" were "too few in numbers to [be able to] forcefully develop its inner life or securely guard its existence against external attacks," as stated in the 1864-program of the newly established Scandinavian Society in Christiania (Hemstad, 2008: 73).

It still concerned Bajer as he finished his memoirs in 1909. However, in this regard as well, Bajer advocated self-help:

> In international politics, it is the task of the small constitutional states [retsstater] to unite into a federation of neutral states for the protection of world peace. In this way, it will presumably finally be possible to defeat the great powers—that is: to transform them into constitutional states. But the small [states] will have to lead the way.
>
> (Bajer, 1909: 522)

As has been noted by Carsten Holbraad, Bajer adhered to neutrality in part out of a desire to reform international society (Holbraad, 1991). This was not solely for idealistic purposes but also out of national self-interest, as the sovereignty of

small states was presumably more likely to be respected in a world order based on international law. Rather than powerless pawns in the struggles of the Great Powers, however, Bajer now saw small states—if independent but willing to enter into federations—as active players with a particularly progressive mission. Peace propagation, then, was the best way for the small states on Europe's northern periphery to help themselves.

Peaceful Neo-Scandinavism

In his investigation of early Northern European involvement in transnational peace activism, the amount of which—although still scattered and unorganized—picked up as regular peace conventions were organized in the wake of the 1848 revolutions, Nobert Götz has noted the presence of Jacob Letterstedt—the later founder of an important foundation for cultural and practical Scandinavism—at the Third General Peace Congress taking place in Frankfurt in 1850. His participation, Götz suggests, implies that "unlike the militant proponents of pan-Scandinavianism at the time, Letterstedt was an early representative of a peaceful strand of Scandinavianism" (Götz, 2010: 199). Only later—with 1864 as the most obvious catalyst—would this shift materialize more widely, however, just as institutionalized Scandinavian connections to and resonance of the peace movement in the Scandinavian societies only came after what Götz describes as "a latency period" (Götz, 2010: 199). In *Norden som Republik*, the shift from militant to peaceful Scandinavism crystallizes rhetorically through the conscious invocation of common Scandinavian history:

> That we northerners were "of *one* blood and possessed the same language" and that we "as *one* people would become a terror to Europe" – those were the arguments that were used at the council of nobles in Uppsala in 1520 to support a dreadful cause, the dynastical Scandinavism of King Christian II […]

Yet, these words, attributed by Bajer to Gustaf Trolle, the archbishop who played a significant role in the Stockholm Bloodbath in 1520,

> […] contain much truth. The Nordic sense of unity originally emanate from popular sympathy, the sense of kinship [den folkelige samfølelse], and from the recognition of the fact that we, who can understand each other without assistance from any foreign language, also belong together spiritually.

However,

> […] the last part of Gustav [sic!] Trolle's statement must be changed to suit the spirit of the present and the future. […] Our forefathers have once been "a terror to Europe." Now it must be our task and one of the main purposes of the unification of the kingdoms to gain greater force to become "a blessing to Europe," and to be so in various ways.
>
> (Bajer, 1879: 4–5)

Bajer and NFS' turn from dynastic to republican Scandinavism was thus part of a double movement that also included a rhetorical re-description of Scandinavism from a militant to a peace-seeking ideology through a temporal othering of the violent past (Götz, 2010: 209).[26] As such, it played into the coming together of Scandinavism, Nordic collaboration, and peace activism, a convergence that Bajer would be a proponent for also after the NFS withered into oblivion in a rather undramatic fashion.

Decades later, in 1908, as the Nobel Institute announced Bajer and Klas Pontus Arnoldson as the recipients of the Peace Prize "for their long time work for the cause of peace as politicians, peace society leaders, orators and authors" (The Nobel Peace Prize 1908)[27] Johanne Meyer, a fellow peace and women's rights activist, wrote a glowing appraisal of Bajer's career in a Danish newspaper. A central passage reads:

> That same year [as Bajer founded the Danish Peace Association, 1882], he won the full understanding for his peace thought [Fredstanke] through parliamentarians in Sweden and Norway. It was Scandinavism in a practical way. Yet, often the word 'idealism' was thrown at him domestically. Abroad, a different perception of his work swiftly emerged. Mr. Bajer never neglected international congresses, and he could not only inform about wars, peace and arbitration in the Scandinavian countries but also historically and scientifically reason for the realization of arbitration between all of the world's nations.
>
> (Meyer, 1908)

A good part of this chapter so far has taken Fredrik Bajer as a personification of the links between political Scandinavism and the early Scandinavian peace movements and emergent liberal internationalist peace theorizing that gave a specific pride of place to the Nordic countries. The Nordic peace movement, as it developed toward and beyond the turn of the twentieth century, however, was probably at least as much a consequence of practical as ideological and political Scandinavism; "it was Scandinavism in a practical way," as Meyer would have it.

As Hemstad has authoritatively shown, the mid-nineteenth-century Scandinavist movement enjoyed a curious afterlife in which a practical Scandinavist impulse informed an increasingly vivid collaboration throughout the region. Indeed, the decade following 1895 saw the emergence of a neo-Scandinavian "Indian Summer," which saw a remarkable revival of Scandinavist rhetoric—if usually with less of a political tinge—until the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian Union in 1905 abruptly led to the coming of a "Nordic winter" (Hemstad, 2008: 124–125, 260).[28] During this relatively short-lived but far from insignificant blossoming of Scandinavist sentiments, Bajer published a number of treatises on common Nordic neutrality, often contextualized historically. He also communicated with Sven Adolf Hedin—the Scandinavist quoted by Bajer in *Norden som Republik*, by then a long-time Member of the Swedish Parliament—about the meaning of neutrality in international law and political initiatives promoting common Scandinavian declarations of neutrality (Bajer, 1900b; 1909: 508; Gram-Skjoldager, 2012: 52).[29] Jacob

Westberg suggests that Hedin's two failing yet agenda-setting proposals (1899 and 1902) for a permanent Scandinavian neutrality association were ultimately unsuccessful in the Swedish Parliament at least in part because of its strong Scandinavist dimension. This dimension seemed to imply the possibility of entering into a peace association with Denmark, which, it was feared, could eventually result in Sweden being dragged into a Danish-German war (see Westberg, 1997: 70–71). On these occasions, then Scandinavist visions both inspired and hindered common initiatives toward a Nordic region of neutrality.

In general, the flourishing of Scandinavian sentiments and collaboration was quite prominent within the peace movement. However, and perhaps because of its strong Scandinavist roots, this enthusiasm was somewhat extended temporally speaking. "The Scandinavian peace activists were looking for collaboration from the very outset," Per Jostein Ringsby (2012: 131) has noted; indeed, Nordic peace meetings had taken place since 1884 and the peace movement was among the branches of Nordic collaboration most set on braving the post-1905 Nordic winter (Bajer, 1909: 479; Hemstad, 2008: 389–391). The perhaps most lasting institutional consequence of this prolonged Indian Summer was the realization in 1907 of a long-time aspiration of Bajer's, namely the Nordic Interparliamentary Union, the foundations to which he had actively prepared during the years of flourishing neo-Scandinavism (Larsen, 1984: 185–189).

In his treatment of "The Nordic Peace," Archer has emphasized the importance of social movements and civil society. Their takes on "social security, consensus and compromise, respect for law and conflict resolution," he writes, "have been increasingly externalized into foreign and security policy and, with the help of more open political structures, have encouraged a propensity towards peace, and certainly against armed conflict, in the policies of these countries" (Archer, 2003: 16). While few scholarly accounts have taken up the links to Nordic collaboration and Scandinavist sentiments in this regard, an understanding of such links might lead toward an understanding of the construction of the Nordic region as a paradigmatic region of peace. Bajer's role as the founder of both the Danish peace movement and the Nordic Interparliamentary Union is particularly interesting here, exemplifying his facilitation of interactions between civil society and politicians domestically as well as between the Scandinavian states.

Nordic Peace Goes Abroad

As interestingly, Bajer's intermediary role extended to the international spheres of the peace movements. An internationalist outlook was intrinsic to the approach he and his like-minded activists took to peace propagation and organizing. The lesson Bajer drew from Kant is exemplary: In order to approach a Kantian rights-inducing United States of Europe capable of ensuring a perpetual peace, which still seemed as distant a reality to Bajer as to Kant, a *foedus pacificum* was perceived by Bajer, inspired—as noted above—by Charles Lemonnier, as a logical intermediary step. That is, they envisioned a sort of peace association between states, which Lemonnier, and Bajer with him, saw as an end goal for Lemonnier's League

of Peace and Freedom's agitation for permanent arbitration treaties (Kant, 1889: 90).[30] The same reasoning at least partially underpinned Bajer's founding—a few years later—of the still-existent International Peace Bureau, an organization that connected national peace associations and organized universal peace congresses, and whose later impact on international norms and the practices of international diplomacy should not be underestimated. Thus, writing in the Austrian peace activist Bertha von Suttner's organ *Die Waffen nieder!*, which circulated widely among European peace intellectuals, Bajer described the Bureau as a "practical step towards the realization of a European peace federation" based on the principles laid out by Kant in *Perpetual peace* (see Bajer, 1892: 6–9).

Becoming an exceedingly active participant in the liberal internationalist peace movement toward the end of the nineteenth century and through the first decade of the twentieth, via his publications, correspondence with international peace activists, and his participation in international peace congresses, conferences, and organizations, Bajer came to personify Nordic liberal internationalism abroad. As Meyer's homage in wake of the 1908 Nobel Peace Prize, as well as the very award that caused it, testify, his like-minded contemporaries recognized Bajer's standing abroad. Undoubtedly, his wide-ranging connections to activists in the "intellectual centers" of the peace movement—the first of which, established already in 1867, was likely with Frédéric Passy, another subsequent Nobel Peace Prize awardee and an early catalyst of Bajer's embrace of peace activism (Bajer, 1909: 327, 345, 420) —added to his authority among like-minded intellectuals, politicians and activists on Europe's northern periphery (Nygård and Strang, 2016: 75–97).[31]

Correspondingly, he was one of the few Nordic peace activists who were persistently active in the liberal internationalist peace movement of the late nineteenth century. As the President of the International Peace Bureau, he presided over its meetings in Bern for the first 16 years of its existence; from 1892 until well after he had ceased being a parliamentarian (in 1895), Bajer was a board member of the international Interparliamentary Union; and finally, he participated in nine of out the first eleven Universal Peace Congresses (from 1889 to 1902) (Bajer, 1909: 493, 496, 534). Through these activities, he was essential in overturning the rather marginal importance given to Scandinavian takes on or concerns regarding the international order by Western European and Anglo-American activists. As Bajer would later recollect of the 1884 Bern Peace Congress, he had to overcome the fact that "for most people this Nordic question [about the neutralization of the Nordic countries] was either new or unimportant" (Bajer, 1909: 452). Indeed, when bringing forth Bajer and Klas Pontus Arnoldson as potential Nobel-laureates already in 1903, a Norwegian newspaper framed the suggestion as a potential celebration of Nordic peace activism (Amtstidende, 1903).[32]

How activists in the European intellectual centers perceived of the contributions made by Bajer and other Scandinavian activists and politicians to peace thinking, and whether they saw them as particularly Nordic, is less clear and warrants further research. Yet, it is quite certain that the Scandinavian countries "already since the beginning of the twentieth century marked themselves as some of the most active and unconditional proponents of the new internationalist principles"

(Gram-Skjoldager, 2012: 18). To be sure, Gram-Skjoldager has noted a shift in the thinking dominating Danish peace activism as well as, eventually, Danish foreign politics from Bajer's internationalist liberalism toward a more radical internationalism eventually embodied by the social liberal giant P. Munch already in the 1890s (Gram-Skjoldager, 2012: 55ff; Ringsby, 2012: 132).[33] Yet, internationally Bajer was still the towering figure when it comes to the image of Nordic peace activism at the turn of the century. Toward the end of the century, his writings were increasingly translated and published abroad, just as he frequently appeared in the organs of various European peace associations and organizations, such as *Die Waffen nieder!,* especially with contributions relating to neutrality and the role of neutral states (Bajer, 1909: 507). Indeed, it was with the aim of having the international peace congress declare the desirability of a neutralization of the three Scandinavian states that Bajer made his first appearance at an international peace congress in Bern in 1884 (Bajer, 1909: 447).

As liberal internationalist peace activism reached its zenith with the Hague conferences in 1899 and 1907, the resulting arbitration treatises were well in line with Bajer's thinking. In fact, while there were some differences between Nordic countries, Bajer was a main driving force behind the Danish status as a frontrunner on arbitration, expressing a desire at the 1907 conference—with the Dominican Republic the only other state to do so—for mutual arbitration treatises with each and every country willing to take up the offer (Westberg, 1997: 74). And whereas the Nordic countries varied somewhat in their take on the desirability of a permanent court of arbitration, the Haag conferences generally offered the Nordic states an arena for contributions to the international order, especially in questions relating to neutrality.

Indeed, the outbreak of war in 1914 led to a collective Scandinavian response in the shape of a commonly declared neutrality (confirming a 1912 agreement on joint neutrality regulations) and a much publicized show of unity by the Scandinavian monarchs at the "Three Kings' Meeting" in Malmö in December 1914. The process leading up to the meeting was not without tensions and its significance in power political terms has been questioned (e.g., Salmon, 1997: 127–129; Stadius, 2014: 369–394).[34] Yet, historians have recently emphasized its rhetorical significance in overcoming the strained relations caused by the break-up of the Union between Sweden and Norway in 1905 and in moving toward the proliferation of Nordic collaboration and emphasis on a culturally and pragmatically focused "Nordism" in the interwar years (Hemstad, 2008: 369–394; Stadius, 2014: 393ff.).

The flourishing of Nordic collaboration was evident in the Scandinavian peace associations as well. Here, two significant intra-Scandinavian initiatives, both of which were first tabled at the Sixth Nordic Peace Congress in 1910 (Bajer, 1909: 479; Ringsby, 2011: 119–174; cf. Ringsby, 2012: 131),[35] came to fruition during the war: a monument on the Norwegian-Swedish border commemorating "a century of Nordic peace" in 1914 and the foundation of the Nordic Peace Association in 1918, just a few weeks before the war's end. Per Jostein Ringsby has argued that in formal terms, the war years constituted "the heyday of the peace activists in Scandinavian peace history" as the successful non-involvement in the war provided fertile ground for peace activism (Ringsby, 2012: 150).

It also nourished a sense that Scandinavians had a role to play as internationalist forerunners, as expressed in the prominent position Scandinavian internationalists played in ongoing discussions of the post-war order on the international stage. While not nearly as united ideologically during the war as has often been presumed, Scandinavian internationalists did come together in the aftermath of the war to significantly influence the shape of the League of Nations in its early years, seeking to strengthen the position of small states in the League structure as well as the League's institutional commitment to disarmament (Gram-Skjoldager and Tønnesson, 2008). Following these amendments, and despite some concerns about the prominent place of collective security in the League covenant as well as reservations about how League membership might affect future Scandinavian claims to neutrality, Scandinavist internationalist elites became wholehearted supporters of and active participants in the League (Westberg, 1997: 84; Gram-Skjoldager and Tønnesson, 2008; Götz and Heidi Haggrén, 2009: 42–63; Gram-Skjoldager et al., 2019).[36] Subsequently, this undoubtedly served to add to their reputation as active proponents of peaceful relations mediated through international law and via international organizations.

Conclusion

The idea of Nordic unity certainly saw a significant revival in the public sphere during The Great War. In the early days of the war, newspapers often framed this unity in terms related to the assertion of neutrality vis-à-vis the warring powers (Stadius, 2014: 392). Similar concerns meant that even political Scandinavism seemingly found some adherents during the First World War: for example, one Danish author—and former liberal politician—deemed a Scandinavian political union a necessary precondition for the institution of an effective armed neutrality capable of securing peace for the region in the post-war world (Køedt, 1916: 63ff). As the linkage between Scandinavism (whether in pragmatic and cultural or political terms) and "neutralism" had come to be seen as increasingly natural, Nordic unity could now rather smoothly be linked to a common Scandinavian quest for a peaceful present and future.

This was evident in one of Bajer's last published pieces as well. In *La Neutralité Scandinave*, appearing in the first 1915-number of a French journal on international politics, Bajer argued that the commonly declared neutrality of the Scandinavian states that had so far kept them out of the war should be turned into a permanent neutrality association for the post-war period (Bajer, 1915: 1–11). In order to make this argument, Bajer revisited "the main phases of historical solidarity [between the Scandinavian states] which still presides over their politics today" (Bajer, 1915: 1) Bajer considered the joint neutrality regulations of 1912 as "one of the best results" of "the common work of the Scandinavian states so far," and maintained that it hinged on a "fairly high" degree of collaboration between these states. The preparatory work for deepening this collaboration into a permanent neutrality alliance had, according to Bajer, already been carried out in the three parliaments (presumably, although not stated, through the Bajer-initiated Nordic Interparliamentary

Union) and by the peace associations. Moreover, Bajer concluded that the first step in this regard would be the final passage of Hedin's proposal for a permanent neutrality association that had been defeated in the neo-Scandinavist days around the turn of the century (Bajer, 1915: 10–11).

Neither this nor many of Bajer's earlier contributions to the public sphere of the international peace movement were far removed from his Scandinavist republican ideals, which again derived from his engagement with mid-century Scandinavism in the years following the Danish defeat in 1864. Even if political Scandinavism failed its goals, then, it was far from inconsequential. In a re-articulated and somewhat re-defined manner, it certainly played a role in the early stages of the Nordic peace movements as well as in the early conceptualizations of what has subsequently been termed "Nordic peace" as an image and model that could plausibly be promoted abroad.

Archival Sources

A. 1. Privatarkiv nr. 5066: Fredrik Bajer. Danish National Archive.

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Notes

1 As paraphrased in Christopher S Browning and Pertti Joenniemi, "From Fratricide to Security Community: Re-Theorising Difference in the Constitution of Nordic Peace," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 16, no. 4 (2013): 483–513 quote: 409. Cf. Ole Wæver, "Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community," *Cambridge Studies in International Relations* 62, no. 1 (1998): 69–118.

2 For an early re-assessment, see Åke Holmberg, "On the Practicability of Scandinavianism: Mid-Nineteenth-Century Debate and Aspirations," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 9 (1984): 171–182. In the mid-90s, Nils Andrén argued that "also historical visions that are never realized can have positive consequences." Nils Andrén, "Samling Och Splittring i Norden," *Nordisk Tidskrift NS* 70 (1994): 319–333; Ruth Hemstad, in her impressive work on the cultural Scandinavism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, positively asserted a link between Scandinavism and practical Nordic cooperation. Ruth Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter: skandinavisk samarbeid, skandinavisme og unionsøpplosningen* (Oslo: Akademisk Publisering, 2008); Most recently, Rasmus Glenthøj has argued that the original political Scandinavism entailed a good deal of pragmatism, and that the origin of its label as a utopian ideal with little sense of realpolitik can be traced back to the movement's contemporaneous opponents while its persistence in historiography reveals a certain teleological trend in the often very nation-based histories of the movement. E.g. Rasmus Glenthøj, "Skandinavismen - En Politisk Utopi Fra 1800-Tallet?: Et Komparativt Studie," in *Utopi Og Realiteter: Festskrift Til Erik Kulavig* (Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2018), 227–244.

3 For the purposes of this article, it is curious that arguments given in the Norwegian Parliament against support for Denmark on this occasion were framed in a discourse reminiscent of the contemporary internationalist peace discourse as propagated by the Manchester liberals. See Halvard Leira, "Internasjonal Idealisme Og Norge: Utenrikspolitisk Tenkning Fra Justus Lipsius Til Halvdan Koht" (Master's Thesis, Oslo, Universitetet i Oslo, 2002), 70.

4 This and subsequent translations are mine.

5 Stråth, "The Idea of a Scandinavian Nation," 216. As we shall see, this did not quite deter Bajer, although he, too, would no longer strive for a Scandinavian Kingdom.
6 Østergård, "The Geopolitics of Nordic Identity," 42; Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter*, 22, 30, 68 ff. On Scandinavism as networking and the importance of earlier networks carrying into practical Scandinavism, see also Hemstad, 41–43 and 70–72.
7 According to his own account, the primary occasion for this was the seeming royal indifference to the popular enthusiasm for dynastic Scandinavism shown in relation to the marriage of the later King Frederik VIII. of Denmark and princess Louise of Sweden in July 1869. Fredrik Bajer, *Fredrik Bajers Livserindringer, Udgivne af Hans Søn* (København: Jul. Gjellerups Forlag, 1909), 376.
8 In retrospect, Bajer noted that "the war service served a preparation for the peace service [fredstjænesten]." Bajer, 270.
9 Italics in the original.
10 "Scandinavia to the Eider," had long been a motto of the Danish National Liberals, see Stråth, "The Idea of a Scandinavian Nation," 212–213; See also A. Peschke Køedt, *Skandinavismen* (Kbh.: Gyldendal, 1916), 14.
11 Bajer wholeheartedly supported Rask's proposed orthographical reforms, see Bajer, *Livserindringer*, 224, 237, 258; To a certain extent, this interest was a logical precursor to Bajer's Scandinavist convictions. As recounted above, Rask directly influenced some of the most ardent and practically oriented mid-century Scandinavists.
12 Among other things, he wrote for *Fædrelandet*, the main national-liberal Scandinavist newspaper of the time, edited by Ploug, and later recalled that: "Rosenberg held a great influence on me in the following years until our paths separated after I had realized that his final aim was not the same as mine." See Bajer, 292.
13 See Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter*, 77–78; According to Bajer himself, he was the initiator of the association's name change from *Folkeforeningen* [The People's Association] to *Nordisk Samfund*. Bajer, *Livserindringer*, 297.
14 Among other initiatives, he worked intensively on founding the first Nordic folk high school and sought to set up both a Journal for Nordic literature and languages [Tidsskrift for nordisk bog- og sprogvæsen] and, later, a weekly for the Nordic associations in the three Scandinavian capitals, as can be seen from a draft in his personal archives. Fredrik Bajer, "Forslag. Handwritten Note," No date, E. Privatarkiv nr. 5066: Fredrik Bajer, Danish National Archive. Also Bajer, *Livserindringer*, 279, 294, 309; While none of these initiatives—all of which would have provided Bajer, who involuntarily postponed his wedding for pecuniary reasons after his army dismissal, a steady income—materialized in the way Bajer had imagined them, they all gave impetus to other, more immediately successful ones. One historian has aptly characterized Bajer as an "untiring organizer" in all the different movements to which he devoted himself. Knud Larsen, "Scandinavian Grass Roots: From Peace Movement to Nordic Council," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 9, no. 2–3 (1984): 186.
15 Bajer, *Livserindringer*, 428–431; on the origins and further development of the Nordic school meetings, including Bajer's role, see also Johan Backholm, "När Lärarna Blev Nordister: Om Skandinavism Och Nordism På de Första Nordiska Skolmötena," *Nordisk Tidskrift För Vetenskap, Konst Och Industri* 70, no. 1 (1994): 21; also Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter*, 206.
16 E.g. Fredrik Bajer, A. 1, Privatarkiv nr. 5066: Fredrik Bajer. Danish National Archive.
17 Fredrik Bajer, *Norden Som Republik. Några Ord Om Nordens Enhets Och Frihets-Mål.* (Stockholm: G. J. Leufstedt, 1879); According to Bajer, the manifesto was initiated by a publisher in Stockholm and was printed simultaneously in Danish and Swedish. Bajer, *Livserindringer*, 379.
18 Bajer, 4. Italics in the original; The quote is from S. Adolf Hedin, *Hvad folket väntar af den nya representationen. Femton bref från en demokrat till svenska riksdagens medlemmar* (Stockholm, 1868), 61.

19 Italics in the original.
20 Quoted in Gram-Skjoldager, *Fred og folkeret*, 45.
21 Halvdan Koht, *Freds-tanken i Noregs-sogo: Noreg i den samfolkelege rettsvoksteren* (Det norske samlage, 1906), 86; The only Nordic collaboration Koht regularly participated in, according to Ruth Hemstad, was the Nordic peace meetings. See Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter*, 274; Bajer corresponded relatively frequently with Bjørnson about NFS, with the latter showing varying degrees of enthusiasm for the project. See Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, *Bjørnstjerne Bjørnsons brevveksling med danske 1854–1874*, vol. 3 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1970), 208–210; Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, *Bjørnstjerne Bjørnsons brevveksling med danske 1875–1910*, vol. 1 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1953), 98–100, 134–135, 138–144.
22 On Bajer's time in Parliament, see Bajer, *Livserindringer*, 396–412; Ole Mortensøn, *Fredrik og Matilde: kvindebevægelsens og fredsbevægelsens pionerer* (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2018), 179–188.
23 Ove Korsgaard, *Kampen om folket. Et dannelsesperspektiv på dansk historie gennem 500 år* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2004), 465; Leira traces Bajer's own Grundvigian inspiration to his schooling at the Sorø Academy, a place heavily influenced by Grundtvigian thinking. Leira, "Internasjonal Idealisme," 73.
24 Fredrik Bajer, *Skuespilleren som Konge: Novelle* (Linköping: Isidor Kjellbergs Bogtryckeri, 1881); The story was re-published in the Norwegian daily *Dagbladet* in response to the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian Union in 1905. See Bajer, *Livserindringer*, 377; Moreover, in an early pamphlet, *Norden som Fristat* [Norden as a Freestate], the NFS (the actual authorship is somewhat unclear but both Bajer and Arnoldson have been cited as individual authors) explicitly claimed that "true popular self-government is impossible except in the form of a free state." N. F. S., *Norden som fristat: Nagra ord i frågan om de söndrade nordiska folkgrenarnes sammanslutning* (Göteborg: H. L. Bolinders Förlag, 1871), Foreword.
25 The positive-negative peace distinction has most influentially been developed in Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (1969): 167–191; For the classic work on security communities, see Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); For a paradigmatic volume treating the Nordic region as a security community built on positive peace, see Clive Archer and Pertti Joenniemi, *The Nordic Peace* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003); and Clive Archer, "The Nordic Area as a 'Zone of Peace'," *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 4 (November 1, 1996): 451–467.
26 Stating things slightly differently, Götz notes that "the Nordic Republican Society also represented a shift away from the dichotomy of Scandinavianism and military thinking on the one hand and anti-Scandinavianism and peace on the other." See Götz, "'Matts Mattson Paavola Knows Elihu Burritt': A Transnational Perspective on Nineteenth-Century Peace Activism in Northern Europe," 209.
27 "The Nobel Peace Prize 1908," NobelPrize.org, accessed September 23, 2021, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1908/summary/.
28 Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter*; This revival seemingly excited Bajer: Following one of its most significant moments, a student union speech by the Norwegian university professor and longtime Scandinavist Sophus Bugge in 1903 on "Unity in Norden," Bajer wrote to Bugge, suggesting the issuing of a general declaration in favor of the Nordic cause. Bugge was, however, skeptical as to whether the timing was right; Bajer, moreover, was one of the few Scandinavist veterans who mingled with the new generation of Scandinavists in the new Nordic associations. See Hemstad, 124–125 and 260.
29 Gram-Skjoldager, *Fred og folkeret*, 52, footnote 130; A text by Bajer on Scandinavian neutrality and the historical lessons of the Crimean war was translated into Swedish under the title "Skandinavisk Nevtralitet" and circulated among members of the Swedish parliament in an effort to support Hedin's proposals. See Bajer, *Livserindringer*, 508;

other contemporary texts include: Bajer, *Ideen til Nordens*; Fredrik Bajer, "Marinens Opgave under Krimkrigen Og Fællesnordisk Nevtralitet," *Tidsskrift for Søvæsen*, no. March (1900).

30 Kant, *Den evige fred*, 90; In her article, reading Bajer's references in *Perpetual Peace*, Lettevall confuses the League of Peace and Freedom with the International Peace Bureau, which Bajer was an initiator of a few years after the publication of his Kant-translation.

31 On centre-periphery relations in nineteenth-century intellectual spaces, especially with regards to the Nordic countries, see Stefan Nygård and Johan Strang, "Facing Asymmetry: Nordic Intellectuals and Center–Periphery Dynamics in European Cultural Space," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 77, no. 1 (2016): 75–97.

32 Among other things, the paper noted that "Bajer and Arnoldson incarnate the entire Nordic peace work." Cited from "Nobels Fredspræmie. Skal Fred. Bajer Have Halvdelen? Han Og Svenskeren K. P. Arnoldsen [Sic!] Bringes i Forslag," *Aalborg Amtstidende*, January 31, 1903.

33 Gram-Skjoldager, 55 ff.; The same turn towards a more radical approach, Ringsby notes, took place among all three Scandinavian peace societies around the turn of the century. Eventually, many of the peace activists would switch political allegiance and embrace the social democrats. It is thus hardly surprising, I would argue, that the liberal internationalist approach to foreign policy would eventually become central to the image of Nordic social democracy. See Ringsby, "Scandinavian Collaboration for Peace," 132.

34 E.g. Patrick Salmon, *Scandinavia and the great powers 1890–1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 127–129; On the "Three Kings' Meeting" as media event, see Peter Stadius, "Trekungamötet i Malmö 1914. Mot En Ny Nordisk Retorik i Skuggan Av Världskriget," *Historisk Tidskrift För Finland* 99, no. 4 (2014): 369–394.

35 The First Nordic Peace Congress commenced in 1885, and by 1918, nine such congresses had run their course, with Bajer participating in most, possibly all, of them. See Per Jostein Ringsby, "40 Års Kamp for Fred. Tre Fredsforeninger i Skandinavia 1882–1922." (PhD Thesis, Oslo, Universitetet i Oslo, 2011), 119–174; cf. Ringsby, "Scandinavian Collaboration for Peace," 131; Bajer, *Livserindringer*, 479.

36 Gram-Skjoldager and Tønnesson; on Swedish resistance towards membership on grounds of a potential loss of neutrality, see Westberg, "Den nordiska småstatsidealismens rötter," 84; On Scandinavians in the League of Nations, see e.g. Norbert Götz, "'Blue-Eyed Angels' at the League of Nations: The Genevese Construction of Norden," in *Regional Cooperation and International Organizations*, ed. Norbert Götz and Heidi Haggrén (Routledge, 2009), 42–63; and Karen Gram-Skjoldager, Haakon A Ikonomou, and Torsten Kahlert, "Scandinavians and the League of Nations Secretariat, 1919–1946," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 44, no. 4 (2019): 454–483.

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5 The Lutheran Heritage and Political Developments in the Nordic Community

Hans Morten Haugen

In debates about Nordic peace the role of religion is usually omitted. This chapter will address this absence and focus on two particular dimensions. First, the historical role of Christianity, particularly how the state was strengthened as a result of Lutheranism and how the religious impulse was central in the first broad-based movements in the nineteenth century onwards. Other impulses characterizing Western Europe are also acknowledged when analysing the extent to which the dynamic Lutheran heritage impacted on the emergence and maintenance of Nordic peace, and when Nordic internationalists have sought to change oppressive structures elsewhere.

Second, how the significance of religion in the context of Nordic peace has returned with contemporary influxes of immigrants. The increasing worldwide tendency to link nationalism and the dominant religion is also seen in the Nordic countries. As immigration is sometimes held as representing a challenge for social cohesion (Boucher and Samad, 2017) and affecting levels of (community) trust (Fladmoe and Steen-Johnsen, 2018; Wollebæk et al., 2012) the salience of religion in the Nordic region and for thinking about Nordic peace will be elaborated in the context of immigration. This tendency in the Nordic countries to foster cohesion by referring to "our values" finds a counter-discourse. This counter-discourse, emphasizing caring for human beings irrespective of their origin, can be explained by the strength of the civil society in the Nordic countries, influencing both general opinion and public policies.

The chapter starts from the premise that the Nordic community is characterized by strong states, rule of law and accountability (Fukuyama, 2014; 2011; on the crucial role of inclusive policies and political institutions see also Cederman et al. 2013; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2011). Moreover, the five Nordic states stand out in most global rankings – on justice, freedom, equality, innovativess and accountability. The role of the Lutheran heritage in fostering good societies will be explored, but there will be no emphasis on Iceland in the chapter.

The chapter is organized as follows: Section two analyses the impulses from the Reformation, seeking to explain the long time period before these resulted in societal change. An identification of the factors behind the emergence of broad-based movements in the nineteenth century follows in section three. Section four explains the parallel process of bringing societal change at home and in other parts of the

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world, through missionary activities and peace facilitation. Section five analyses the patterns of accommodation of immigrants, seen in light of survey data. Section six brings the findings together in a concluding discussion.

While space does not allow an investigation of the pre-Reformation impulses, it must be acknowledged that in general, Christianity brought with it an awareness of everyone's self-sanctioned responsibility (Stærk, 2018; Siedentop, 2014: 77). Moreover, legislation introduced by pious kings like the one adopted in Norway in 1274, introduced a radically new concept of care (Kvaal, 2019; Øyrehagen Sunde, 2014).

The terms "impulses" and "influence" are chosen rather than "impacts" in order to understand the role Lutheran heritage has played in shaping the Nordic societies and states, and beyond. This chapter seeks to explain – based on concrete examples from the Nordic states – how the dynamic Lutheran heritage has both helped and hindered the emergence and maintenance of Nordic peace, and whether an influence from the Lutheran heritage might still be present amidst secularization. Path dependency seeks to identify how a dominant impulse might continue to influence political culture and institutions – even after the weakening of the dominant impulse.

The research question that the chapter seeks to answer is: *What role has Lutheranism played for the overall socio-economic and political development in the Nordic countries, and how does the Lutheran heritage influence the external roles of Nordic states and actors and when receiving immigrants to their own countries?*

The Reformation and Influence of Lutheran Christianity

The influence of Lutheranism for political, social and economic development is analysed in several studies (Nelson, 2017; Aarebrot and Evjen, 2017; Agøy et al., 2017; Wegner, 2015a; Haugen, 2015a: 166; notes 6–8). While an important impact of the Reformation was that the state took control over church properties and tasks, hence growing in wealth, control and legitimacy, this strengthening of the states was not the only change that Reformation brought. I will now identify the essence of Lutheran understandings that evolved during and after the Reformation, and how these changed thinking and gradually societies overall.

First, the Lutheran doctrine of the priesthood of all believers (Nelson, 2017: 37; Haugen, 2015a: 166) – with no professions seen as more holy than others – is crucial. This view of the human person contrasts with for instance Catholicism, that despite the strong emphasis on equal human dignity for everyone, has developed a particular concept of priesthood for ordained priests that gives them an elevated status. The outcome of the notion of priesthood of all believers is a basic understanding of human beings embedded in anti-hierarchy, that promoted equality and the seeds for individual freedom. Moreover, if everyone's efforts for the community are valued equally, this enables alliances with other actors and movements that work for social reforms.

Second, a work ethics was the outcome of this positive view of all vocations, irrespective of whether these were oriented towards practical or more intellectual occupations. Life in monasteries was treated with suspicion. In Catholic-dominated countries, giving alms was a way to demonstrate one's devoteness, while begging

was sought abolished in countries dominated by Lutheranism (Nelson, 2017: 176; Wegner, 2015b: 16). The Reformation changed the administration of the "Poor fund", being transferred from the church to a city or citizen's council. A purpose of the management of these Poor funds was to hand out so little that the poor were forced to seek additional forms of income. The priest served in the management of the Poor fund and church bodies took some form of responsibility for the most destitute, like orphans. Due to the strong moral approach that characterized the management of the Poor funds, the concept of "unworthy needy" emerged. While Calvinst churches emphasized discipline, social responsibility was stronger in the Lutheran churches (Kaufmann, 2015: 69).

Third, the doctrine of the two regiments (the earthly/worldly and the divine/spiritual) implies a fundamental positive view of the state, as God is believed to rule over the earthly regiment through various political institutions. This contrasts with (most) reformed Christianity (and most forms of Islam) which seeks to enhance the power of religion by seeking to increase religions' influence over all institutions. Through the power sharing that the doctrine of the two regiments legitimizes, order and justice is promoted. A frequent misunderstanding is that the doctrine of the two regiments is about separating the two realms; a more precise understanding is that these are about discerning the two realms. The background for this doctrine is Luther's dissatisfaction with the power abuses of the Catholic Church. As the Nordic countries saw a real merger of political and religious power, with the "King of God's Grace" being the churches' highest authority, the doctrine of the two regiments has not been practiced widely, however. In the recent decade it has been used by certain politicians, particularly in Denmark, to argue that the Church must stay out of politics (Haugen, 2011).

Fourth, Lutheran Christianity has a positive view of the secularization of both the state and community institutions. This secularization is unlike what is found in Orthodox Christianity, where both the state, its institutions – and sometimes the state territory – is seen as sacred. Related to this emphasis on the sacred in the Orthodox tradition is the concept of symphonia, where state and church should work towards the same goal, and mutually reinforce each other. While one can find elements of a thinking that mirrors symphonia in the Lutheran conservative lay movement, emphasizing the state's responsibility for maintaining the Christian inheritance through the Constitution and legislation, a thinking embedded in concern for the common good became dominant in the church leadership in all Nordic countries. The Poor fund outlined above is one example of the local community's responsibility for tasks, and those managing the Poor fund were held accountable for their decisions.

While these four impulses are important in fostering freedom, social responsibility, justice and accountability, the realities around 1800 – after more than 250 years of Lutheranism – was that neither the push for freedom, nor justice and social responsibility and accountability stood in high esteem in the elite circles in the Nordic countries. These were weaker in economic terms than the rest of Western Europe (Maddison, 2007: 382). Moreover, they were highly stratified, with supreme kings and oppressive laws against deviant thinking and teaching.

The Reformation led to three crucial shifts, on three levels. On the state level, the state took control over the church and its properties, leading to a strengthening of the state in Northern Europe. On the level of social institutions, the weakening of the status of church-devoted occupations, such as monks, nuns and priests, seeing these as no more important than any other occupations – manual or otherwise – allowed for both secularization and new notions of the common good, and one's own contribution to this. On the individual level, the strengthening of individual accountability and emphasis on one's own relationship to God – including knowing God's will by being able to read the Bible – was decisive for individual empowerment. Moreover, priests and deacons were important mediators between state and people, emphasizing the autonomy and responsibility of the individual.

In order to identify what made the Nordic countries so successful in terms of freedom, justice and accountability, we need to include explanations relating to the new reform movements emerging in the nineteenth century.

Renewalist Movements in the Nineteenth Century

The renewalist religious movements in the Nordic countries in the nineteenth century were the first broad-based popular movements (Aarebrot and Evjen, 2017: 288–292). A leading scholar on democratic development finds that these movements "set the background for the precocious developments of social movements and democratic institutions…" (Tilly, 2007: 31). Hence, he acknowledged that religious reform movements initiated societal transformation.

These revivalist movements were embedded in a theologically conservative position. They did, however, see that the Bible was about caring for the oppressed and empowerment from oppressive structures. Moreover, women were allowed in leading position, some of the preachers being teenagers (Haugen, 2015a).

The first revival influence came from pietism, that emphasized the responsibility of the individual. This period, in the eighteenth century, has also been termed the second Reformation, and saw the early revival of diakonia, first in Germany (Aarebrot and Evjen, 2017: 171–173). Diakonia is a Greek word for serving, that in its various forms is used 100 times in the New Testament, also by Jesus about himself as a servant (Nordstokke, 2011: 55). Diaconal entrepreneurs established diaconal institutions in Scandinavia from the second half of the nineteenth century. Additional motivations were developed when the labour movement grew stronger, in Norway as early as in the 1850s (Haugen, 2015a: 171–172). The arguments were similar to Bismarck's arguments when the German "Sozialstaat" was shaped. State authorities and diaconal pioneers agreed on the need to stem the growth of revolutionary movements by improving workers' living conditions.

This brings us over to the second impulse that shaped the revivalist movement, namely rationalism, seeking to identify what was good for society overall. Morally embedded, hard-working and family-oriented persons was the key. Enlightenment was not perceived as a threat, but as progress, with a concrete example being the role of many priests in promoting the potato. On a societal level these revivalist movements influenced a broad range of organization, most notably the mission

associations and the temperance organizations, seeking to achieve a "pragmatic permeation of the whole of society" (Stråth, 2015: 91).

A final influence came from what can be termed romanticism in the second half of the nineteenth century, that at least in Denmark, Finland and Norway took the form of a popular, empowering nationalism within the free churches and certain parts of the state churches (Breistein, 2012; Stidsen, 2012; Stenius, 1987). In Sweden, there were also renewalist movements (Jarlert, 2012), but Sweden did not experience a similar popular, emancipatory nationalism. What characterized Sweden was an elitist nationalism, and this nationalism was also found in the Young Church Movement that was influential in the first half of the twentieth century. Their most preferred hymn, "The Church of the Fathers" (Harding, 2016), is currently sought revitalized by the Sweden Democrats, being one of several political party lists represented in the Synod of Church of Sweden. Moreover, in Sweden, the notion of the "folkhem" (people's home), that was first used in 1928, gave a central position to the state as the supreme provider of everyone's needs (Stråth, 2015: 94).

Finland's nationalism was about reviving Finnish in the public, seeking to narrow the social and educational gaps between Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking (Meinander, 2014), as the former had fared worse during the Swedish rule until 1809. These gaps continued until the early twentieth century, and while there was rural education and hence a relatively high literacy rate, the Compulsory Education Act was adopted as late as 1921. A public education system – for children from rich families – had developed in Finland since the mid-nineteenth century.

While compulsory education for all had been initiated in Denmark-Norway in 1739, initially for the purpose of learning the catechism, compulsory education was introduced in Sweden in 1842. This early emphasis on education for everyone, and outside of the church, is crucial in enabling persons to master their lives.

Revivalist Christianity that carried opposition to the power abuse by public authorities resulted in harsh treatment. One example is the story of reformer Hans Nielsen Hauge – being imprisoned 1804–1811; found guilty in 1813 of assembling without prior permission and for use of "indecent words" – acknowledged as the fifth most important Norwegian (VG, 2014).[1]

As seen above, while the Christian revivalist movement was the early and decisive movement (Tilly, 2007: 30–31), other movements followed. Societal changes were accelerated in the twentieth century, with a growing influence exercised by these other movements, most notably the labour movement and women's movement. The social changes did not happen without social tensions and struggles, but conflicts were solved and compromises found (Stråth, 2015: 87). The expansion of the welfare states happened with various drives and impeders in the various Nordic countries, but the main recipes was compromises between conservative, social-democratic and agrarian parties, with influences coming from the social movements.

In various ways, social movements were important for the Nordic welfare states, based on an understanding that the welfare state can be perceived as consisting of three elements: (i) universal benefits system, with the labour movement as the decisive player; (ii) targeted benefits system that have allowed women easier access to the labour force, with the women's movement as the decisive actor; and (iii)

care-providing institutions, including public incorporation of institutions – and care services, like home-nursing or orphans homes – owned by churches, congregations and church-based organizations.[2] Taken together, this enabled the rapid growth of Nordic welfare states. The size, strength and model of cooperation between the public authorities and the non-profit institutions owners differs between the Nordic states, but in general the institutions are contracted for a limited period of time to provide given care services, with standardized reimbursement and monitoring and reporting systems.

Hence, it is fair to state that the church hierarchies were not decisive in the legitimation and justification of the growth of the expanding welfare state, and some even argued against what they saw as a too powerful state (Tønnessen, 2000). Outside of the church hierarchies, however, there were church-based non-profit actors who were positive to the larger responsibility taken by the state, and a Norwegian Public Commission asserted: "The history about the Norwegian welfare state is largely the history about non-profit organizations" (NOU, 2016: 12, 40; author's translation; all subsequent translations from Norwegian are done by the author). Hence, the growing influence exercised by these movements, that were sometimes critical of the state churches and their abuse of power, paved the way for the subsequent welfare states and women emancipation – but not without opposition from those in the power hierarchies.

Summing up these impulses from the pre-Reformation, Reformation and renewalist era, we can illustrate this in a figure (Figure 5.1).

The impulses from the Reformation were also seen in the global "civilizing" role taken by the organizations that grew out from the renewalist movements, and we now turn to this complex history.

Does the Lutheran Heritage Influence the External Roles of Nordic States?

The term external role is primarily understood to refer to the efforts on other continents. While the early efforts by the organizations happened without public funding, when official development assistance efforts started in the late 1950s the main cooperation partners were mission organizations, as well as a few others. Four topics will be analysed: (i) how the mission organizations were perceived by the public authorities as tools for pursuing public policies; (ii) the policies of forced assimilation, knowing that the Nordic states had colonies on three (Sweden) and

Figure 5.1 Religious impulses shaping the Nordic states and political culture.

four (Denmark-Norway) continents;[3] (iii) the actual conduct of the missionaries sent from the Nordic states in the realm of social services, primarily health and education: and (iv) whether the presence of churches and organizations embedded in a Lutheran heritage promoted a Nordic peace concept in certain countries. It can be argued that concern for human rights and women's participation and influence does characterize the overall Nordic peace approach but there are also variations (Hagemann and Bramsen, 2019: 13). A full assessment in not possible, and the chapter will merely identify some examples and crucial drivers, leaving to others to supplement or nuance these explanations.

First, as concerns the proximity between missionary organizations and public authorities, the first missionary to another continent in the early eighteenth century – to the Inuit in Greenland – were sent by the King in coordination with a trading company.[4] As Greenland was formally Danish, with limited exercising of sovereignty, it is fair to say that religious, territorial and commercial interests went hand in hand. The understanding that missionaries were important for Nordic states' interests continued even after independent mission organizations started in the nineteenth century. As one example, priests employed in some (inner and foreign) mission organizations in Norway were in 1918 entitled to membership in the public pension scheme, as these were said to be "funded directly or indirectly by public money" (Norwegian Government, 1918: 2). Hence, the state-organization nexus was strong more than 100 years ago, and the Norwegian authorities viewed missionaries working in independent organizations as eligible members of the public pension scheme.

Second, the Nordic states do have a legacy of forced assimilation, sanctioned by law,[5] and displayed other forms of extreme intolerance,[6] based on a monolithic understanding of the "true religion". When the mission activities started on a wider basis in the second half of the nineteenth century, neither Denmark or the union between Sweden and Norway were involved in colonial expansion, rather selling the colonies to other states. Hence, it is reasonable to state that the missionaries from the Nordic states were not used as an active part in the colonization enterprise, unlike what has been seen for other European states.

The Nordic states, however, with their emphasis on what can termed a one-norm society, practices "a patronising position in relation to the other…" (Stenius, 2015: 111). Whether these attitudes were stronger or weaker among missionaries from the Nordic countries as compared to ordinary people or representatives of the political elites in the same countries, cannot be answered by available data. For many, but not necessarily all, the experience of diversity might enhance one's acceptance of diversity, and efforts to accommodate for such diversity and fight racism. It is also important, however, to acknowledge that all encounters change cultures and all encounters involve power asymmetries, and if one party in an encounter claims to possess the absolute truth, the encounters are not mutual. It has also been found that certain traditional gender roles were reinforced by the arrival of Western missionaries, making women more subservient (Fjelde Tjelle, 2013; Adeney, 2002). By arguing for limiting the political and social roles of women, patriarchy has been maintained and necessary transformations either been postponed or not taken place.

Third, missionaries did bring with them at least four crucial contributions (Woodberry, 2012): (i) the ideas of every person's equal worth and dignity, that changed person's self perceptions; (ii) the systematization of local languages, that enabled learning, being crucial for mastering life in complex societies; (iii) schools where there were no schools and books where there were no books and (iv) health services where these did not exist. While this is a finding applying to the wider category of *Protestant* missionaries, there is no reason to believe that health and education was less of a concern for missionaries from the Nordics, as compared to missionaries from other Protestant states. These efforts led to important societal changes, and faith-based schools and hospitals continue to be important in several countries, though not representing 50% of total services, as some claims (Haugen, 2019, identifying the source of this inaccurate figure).

Nevertheless, is important to recognize the many examples of states with a long and non-interrupted presence of missionaries from the Nordics who have not seen substantive changes in socio-economic or political terms. One example can be Madagascar. The explanations for such underperformance are many, and the colonial legacy and dominant traditions should not be ignored, but I will point to two explanations. First, the non-existence of social movements able to unify popular demands in an effective way. Second, church hierarchies being more concerned with maintaining a good relationship with the traditional and political elite, not able to promote a culture of women empowerment or political accountability. In some countries religious authorities argue against women's equal right to education or participation, leading to inadequate attention to women's health (Norad, 2018: 14).

Fourth, while literature on religion and peace is encompassing, I summarize three overall perspectives: (i) religion are in several parts of the world integral to communal identity conflicts (Svensson, 2013); (ii) political authorities, particularly in authoritarian regimes, wants to keep social and religious movements under control, restricting the abilities of religious leaders to reduce violent conflicts (Steen-Johnsen, 2019; 2017) and (iii) desacralization is the best way to solve an alleged religious conflict (Svensson, 2012). Such desacralization does not imply that religious insight is less crucial. Rather, such desacralization requires abilities to communicate convincingly what is good religion and what is misperceived religion, among ordinary people and political elites alike. While efforts by Nordic missionaries in facilitating peace processes in other continents are recognized by the former Norwegian minister for environment and development cooperation (Solheim, 2008), a more critical assessment asserts that such facilitation efforts belong to the 1990s and early 2000s (Sørbø, 2018). In one of these processes, Sudan, the churches and their Western partners played important roles in the first phases, but were then sidelined (Horjen, 2016).

What characterized those who have played constructive roles as facilitators for peace efforts is that they have a long presence, friendships with core actors, and adequate knowledge of societal structures and individual rewards mechanisms – and endurance and patience. As seen above, emphasis on human rights, including women's rights, and structural reforms for enhanced justice can be said to characterizes the

Nordic peace approach. In the absence of a general receptivity of human rights and structural reforms among the powerful actors of the conflict, it seems difficult to exercise a decisive influence on the outcome. Having developed a "Norwegian model", with close cooperation between public institutions and non-governmental organizations (Bandarage, 2011), Norway's peace efforts emphasize reconciliation (Hageman and Bramsen, 2019: 13). Nevertheless, the conflict with which Norway has been most strongly involved over the last years, in Colombia, was characterized by Christian leaders arguing against the *first* peace agreement, primarily because of formulations on LGBT rights. The *second* peace agreement, with strong provisions on women's rights and structural reform (Salvesen, 2018), was accepted by the Colombians.

The missionaries and other "civilizers" have operated within overall relationships of power asymmetries, and the awareness of one's own role in these was not always adequate. Hence, both within the Nordic region and beyond there are sometimes contradictory patterns of power abuse and exclusionary practices, but also empowerment and the ability to enable individuals to organize for the purpose of transforming unjust structures.

Unity v. Diversity

Multicultural policies for immigrants in the Nordic states are not seen as outstanding. Finland, Denmark, and Norway score "low" while Sweden scores "modest" (Banting et al., 2006: 56–58). To structure the complex analysis of what role the Lutheran religion plays in assessing the response to and potential societal impacts of immigration to the Nordic countries, I introduce Figure 5.2.

This is not a causal model, but seeking to highlight how the Lutheran religion "works" in the Nordic countries. Figure 5.2 does not seek to capture how committed Christians would describe the religious impulses. I will now explore these elements in greater detail.



Figure 5.2 Identifying three religious impulses shaping Nordic countries' accommodation of immigrants.

First, even if Christianity emphasizes human diversity and unity through faith, Lutheran Christianity has, in the Nordic region, been a tool for the building of national identity, ever since the Reformation. Attempts of nuancing this "us v. them" mentality has not always been successful. One example of a deep embedding of mono-religious thinking can be found in a quote from the former minister from the (right-wing populist) Norwegian Progress Party:

> ethnicity as a concept from the academic literature is about a group of person having community through language, culture, religion – and common values, first and foremost. It is not about skin colour, it is not about race.
>
> (NRK, 2019: 32:43-32:59)

In other words, to be an "ethnic Norwegian" one has to share in the majority religion. This understanding reflects a growing notion of understanding religion in identity terms, rather than in faith terms. This phenomenon also characterized the Nordic states.

Earlier surveys have found that those who keep a "belonging" relationship to Christianity have a higher scepticism of immigrants, particularly Muslims (Ribberink et al., 2017: 272; Doebler, 2014). For Western Europe as a whole, persons who are religiously unaffiliated have overall less nationalist, anti-immigrant and anti-religious minorities attitudes than both church-attending and non-practising Christians (Pew Research Center, 2018: 79). The term "non-practising Christian" needs clarification. It encompasses those who reports to be church members but who attends church less frequently than "once or twice a month" (Pew Research Center, 2018: 161). The broad label "Christian" for these does not adequately show that this is a highly diverse group of persons, that includes persons who do not term themselves as Christian, and might even express animosity towards Christianity, even if they are *members* of the majority churches.

This overall trend for 15 Western European countries has, however, some exceptions, most notably Finland, Norway and Sweden. Here, the share agreeing that immigration should be restricted is lowest among so-called church-attending Christians. The same trend – with less differences and overall more anti-immigration attitudes – is found in Belgium and the Netherlands (Pew Research Center, 2018: 23). Denmark, however, follows the Western European pattern, where the church-attending are overall more willing to restrict immigration than the non-practising, with the religiously unaffiliated being most positive to immigration.

The tendency of church-attending Christians being more pro-immigration might be surprising to many. The number of church-attending Christians in the survey is relatively low, ranging from 149 in Sweden to 241 in Norway (Pew Research Center, 2018: 165). Another survey in Norway revealed a similar pattern: "Believers" are the most pro-immigration among these (Opinion, 2021: 50–53; 2983 Church of Norway respondents), and believers are likely to be church-attending. How can this be explained, and what relevance does it have for the Nordic peace when faced with immigration? There are two related questions. First, why does

Denmark stand out from the other Nordic states? Second, why do Finland, Norway and Sweden deviate from the overall Western European pattern?

In Denmark, the majority of Lutheran churches do not have any bodies that can speak on behalf of the church, and the role that Lutheran Christianity still plays in constituting Danishness is remarkable (Haugen, 2022; see also Haugen, 2011). This is very different from particularly Norway and Sweden, and to a lesser extent Finland, where the majority of churches take an active positions for asylum seekers and immigrants in the public (Haugen, 2015b; 2010). It seems that these roles of the majority churches are actually influencing the frequent church attenders. The positions of the majority churches risk, however, to alienate the diverse – and large – group of so-called non-practising Christians, who are members in the majority churches. Compared with the West European average, the overall attitudes on immigration are more restrictive in Denmark and less restrictive in Finland and Norway.

The second element in Figure 5.2 is secularization and less influential churches, which does characterize the Nordic countries (Pew Research Center, 2018: 7). The theory of path dependency, introduced in the chapter's introduction, implies that even if the majority churches are not as dominant anymore, the values promoted by the majority churches and the religion they represent can still be influential. One of these values is caring for those who are vulnerable and marginalized. A high share of persons from the four largest Nordic countries agree with the statement "Churches and other religious organizations play an important role in helping the poor and needy" (Pew Research Center, 2018: 19). Immigrants constitute an important part of those categorized as "poor and needy".

The third element identified in Figure 5.2 is tensions between "own" values and "foreign" values, a discourse that can easily be challenged by pointing to the fact that most values are imported. While we see in Table 5.1 that church-attending Finns were the most pro-immigration among all categories of respondents (Pew Research Center, 2018: 23), they are the *most* sceptical of the possibilities of reconciling Islam with national values, as seen in Table 5.2 (Pew Research Center, 2018: 21; Finns score 9% points above Italy). Others have found that the differences in attitudes between Muslims and others are generally much less than commonly perceived (Sandbu, 2012; Esposito and Mogahed, 2007).

For the 15 countries overall, those classified as religiously unaffiliated see the least problems with Islam. Others have found that persons from countries with

Table 5.1 Shares in the four Nordic states that want reduced immigration to their own country (Pew Research Center, 2018: 23)

	Church-attending Christians	*Non-practising Christians*	*Religiously unaffiliated*	*All*
Denmark	51	49	35	45
Finland	19	37	33	33
Norway	20	39	26	30
Sweden	27	46	36	39
15 countries	40	37	28	38

Table 5.2 Shares in the four Nordic states agreeing that Islam is incompatible with national values (Pew Research Center, 2018: 21)

	Church-attending Christians	*Non-practising Christians*	*Religiously unaffiliated*	*All*
Denmark	55	50	30	43
Finland	67	63	52	62
Norway	44	47	35	40
Sweden	43	35	33	34
15 countries	49	45	32	42

strong secular values have less anti-Muslim sentiments than persons from countries with weaker secular values (Ribberink et al., 2017: 273).

The paradox of the church-attending Finns showing diametrically opposite views on immigration and Islam can most likely be explained by the emphasis on opposing values in Finland. The Finnish President Niinistö, at the Opening of the Parliament on 3 February 2016, said that to "safeguard our foundation of European values…" must come *above* providing "help to those who are … being persecuted" (Niinistö, 2016). As an example of the Finns' strong concern for maintaining Christian values, churches in Finland stood out from the other Nordic countries in pushing for including an explicit reference to Christianity when the EU in the early 2000s sought to identify "a soul for Europe" (Krause, 2007).

To sum up the elements of Figure 5.2, we see that the tradition of seeing the Nordic countries as characterized by unity – which was never true, as there were always minorities in these countries – is presently challenged by demographic, religious and value changes, which have produced more diversity. The various adaptations to this differ considerably, with Denmark and Sweden – as a result of totally opposite policies in the 2000s – constitute two extremes (Goodman, 2010: 757, 764; see also Goodman and Wright, 2015: 1893; data from the Citizenship Policy Index and the Civic Integration Index). Sweden's immigration and integration policies have, over the last five years, moved considerably closer to Denmark's, with stricter demands, parallel to a more immigrant-restrictive attitude (Martinsson and Weissenbilder, 2018: 22).

When asked about "Christian values", 40% of Norwegians and Swedes agree that these should be strengthened (Nilsen, 2017; Sveriges Radio, 2019; the latter being a marked increase). We do not have similar figures for Denmark and Finland, but the figures found in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, respectively, indicate that the shares are at least as high in these countries. These shares are higher than the persons who attend church regularly but lower than the membership rate in the majority churches: Norway: 62.6%; Sweden: 52.1%. The term "Christian values" are not defined in these surveys. It must be expected that most persons understand Christian values not as Christian dogmas, but rather as "carriers of national identity, something safe and secure in a changing world" (Mathisen, 2019: 277). This definition allows us to understand that *some* of those supporting Christian values are more concerned with what characterize their nations than the future of Christianity in their countries.

What does the on-going secularization taking place in the Nordic countries – and the recent increase in support of Christian values – imply for the living together and for Nordic peace overall? Secularism overall is positive for tolerance (Ribberink et al., 2017) and the Nordic secularized population do acknowledge the diaconal efforts of the churches (Pew Research Center, 2018: 19), hence acknowledging a "desacralized" social role of the churches, that can further the Lutheran peace.

Moreover, immigrants living in the Nordic countries have a life satisfaction that is among the highest in the whole of Europe (OECD and the EU Commission, 2018: 135–139). These figures apply to those having a legal residence, and those without legal residence are considerably more vulnerable. Taking Norway as an example, social assistance excludes those who have not legal residence or permanent domicile (Arbeidsdepartementet 2011/2014; NAV, 2018; affirming that these restrictions also apply to EEA citizens). Social assistance for these is provided by diaconal and humanitarian organizations, but some of the funds do actually come from municipal and state budgets. In all of the Nordic countries, the requirements for obtaining citizenship have increased, most recently, Sweden, has started a process for language and country knowledge tests as requirements for obtaining citizenship (SOU, 2021: 2). The balance between national solidarity, global solidarity and solidarity towards the newly arriving, is constantly under discussion.

Hence, it seems justified to conclude that the Nordic states have been at least partly successful in reconciling unity and diversity, rooted in inclusion and equal dignity, with differences between the Nordic countries. These differences result from the complex interactions between public authorities, majority churches, minority religious communities, non-governmental organizations and media in each of the countries (Haugen, 2022; 2017; 2015a; 2015b; 2011; 2010).

Influences from the Past in Maintaining Nordic Peace in the Present and Future

Potentials for societal transformation were latent following the Reformation, but became influential much later. The Reformation brought important seeds for societal transformations through emphasizing equality, work ethics, the strengthening of the state, and openness of secular values – even if several decisions to reduce the role of religion in public institutions continue to be opposed by committed Christians.

The strengthening of the state is probably the most important legacy of Lutheranism. In the Catholic-dominated Southern Europe, the Church fought against the state to maintain its position and, in many ways, opposed the "secular" nation-building (Knutsen, 2017: 82). In Southern Europe, the more monodenominational the society was, the more reactionary became the church (Manow, 2015).

The era with strong state control over the church in the Nordics (sixteenth to nineteenth century) saw new ways of seeing the world. These ranged from absolutism to enlightenment, empiricism, rationalism and romanticism, which influenced the churches, and pietism, which emphasized efforts by the individual Christians, all influencing the states. These mutual influences created strong – and sometimes

oppressive – states, but they also created the seeds for the emergence of independent and empowered individuals.

When popular renewalist movements began to rise in the early nineteenth century, inspired by liberal philosophers and in opposition to church and state authorities, this represented the early phase of an era where the three values of equal worth, free choice and self-sanctioned responsibility could gain a stronger position. This emancipation was met with suspicion – and sometimes outright resistance by state and church authorities (Haugen, 2015a; Jarlert, 2012).

In addition to the movements embedded in lay Christianity and temperance, the farmers' movement and later the labour movement and women's rights movements shaped the political and social landscape of the Nordic countries. These movements found allies among people active in the churches, but not necessarily among the churches's leaderships. The explanation for this is that those in power tend to prefer *status quo*, as they often benefit themselves and as they believe that the prevailing order should be protected. Those emphasizing cohesion and "our values" do reflect this emphasis on *status quo*.

As for the historical developments, three main findings can be summarized as: (i) the majority churches have not been agents for change, but were incorporated into the state, and have facilitated unity and social responsibilities, embedded in a vision of the common good, but with harsh and brutal practices against deviant ways of living, (ii) the state was considerably strengthened through the Reformation, in terms of wealth and authority and (iii) the real actors for change have been the counter-movements, some being initially suppressed by the authorities, but they sought to reform, not to undermine, the authorities. The authorities – oftentimes hesitantly – adapted to these demands. Nordic states fostered the universalism thinking that can be seen in both the subsequent Nordic welfare states and among those who went to other continents as missionaries.

As for the treatment of the "other", three impulses have been identified and discussed: (i) a "belonging" relationship to Christianity, (ii) overall secularization and (iii) a (perceived) value conflicts between "own" values and "foreign" values. I found that the populations in the Nordic countries are characterized by: (i) an overall welcoming attitude of immigrants; (ii) a high acknowledgement of the diaconal efforts of the churches; (iii) a pattern where most church-active persons have the most pro-immigrant attitudes, the latter with the exception of Denmark. Hence, values of caring for the weak and welcoming the stranger are still influencing the Nordic countries. I have argued that the term "Christian values" is so broad that it can also refer to support for nationalism, that can come in inclusionary as well as exclusionary forms.

Finally, can secularism of the Nordic countries be seen as a positive resource in the efforts of creating inclusive and accommodating societies, and hence promoting Nordic peace? I would say yes, if this allows for the facilitation of those actors, church-based and humanitarian, that promote inclusion, taking place when politicians *overall* are found to be more concerned about creating exclusionary national identities (Helbling et al., 2016). Politicians, churches and organizations have obviously different roles, but enabling everyone to experience belonging and inclusion is a good basis for fostering good societies and political stability.

Notes

1 As a curiosity, in a ranking of the most important persons in the world during the last 2000 years, only three Danes (Andersen, Bohr and Kierkegaard) are included among Nordics living during the last 200 years, and the list has Jesus Christ on the top (Ranker, 2019).
2 At some of these institutions, serious sexual and other misconduct took place. Unlike the Catholic Church, having a Pontifical Commission for the Protection of Minors, highlighting "local responsibility…" (2015, Art. 1, § 2), which is seen as inadequate (National Catholic Reporter, 2019), Norwegian lay organizations specify that reporting to the police shall always be the first option (Norsk Luthersk Misjonssamband et al., 2017: 37).
3 Denmark-Norway had an uninterrupted colonial era from 1620–1917, starting in Tranquebar in present India, being sold in 1845; having possession of 10 forts in present Ghana, selling the last ones in 1850; and colonized three islands in the Caribbean until they were sold in 1917, currently known as the Virgin Islands of the United States. The Swedish-Finnish colonial rule started in 1638, and lasted until 1878, with an interruption of 121 years (1663–1784). Sweden had its first colony termed New Sweden (1638–1655) in a triangle of Delaware, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and then built some fortresses in present Ghana. Sweden's longest rule was over Saint Barthélemy (1784–1878; currently part of Guadeloupe, a French Overseas Department). Both countries established trading companies that were mandated by their respective governments, and these companies were involved in slave trade.
4 In order to support the first missionary to Greenland, Hans Egede, arriving in 1721, becoming "superintendent" for Greenland in 1741, the "Bergenske Grønlandskompani" was established, see Lunde 1936; 9 and Nilsen 1958.
5 As in many other cases, Norway showed the strongest forced assimilation against the Samis, but there are several nuances to this story (Haugen, 2015a: 172–174); Denmark receives the best scores among the Nordics for its multicultural policies (MCP) for the Inuit (Banting et al., 2006: 62; see also 86). Treatment of three communities now recognized as national minorities are also worth mentioning. First, treatment of the Romani, arriving in the sixteenth century, can be illustrated by the 1689 Norwegian Law adopted by Christian V, characterizing them as "outlaws", and while all were to be expelled, the leaders were subject to death penalty (Christian V 1687, para. 3). The more recent forceful measures against the Romani, that were harsher in Norway than in the other Nordic states, have been well documented (NOU, 2015: 7). Second, on the Roma, arriving in the nineteenth century, legal protection differs considerably between the four countries, with Finland standing out. Finland has constitutional guarantees for the Roma's language and culture in Section 17; on Swedish policies, see SOU 2010: 55 and Sweden's Ministry of Culture 2014. Third, legal prohibitions of (unconverted) Jews lasted longest in Norway, being lifted in 1851; note that extreme intolerance of Jews was promoted by Martin Luther himself (Luther, 1543 [2016]). Compare Christian V (1687) and Kunglinga Myntkbinettet (2022) for the extreme fines.
6 The most tragic example is witch burning, that reached its peak in the first decades of the seventeenth century; leaving behind 40.000 executions, and explained by increased religious competition in Europe (Leeson and Russ, 2017).

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6 Nordic Peace Since the End of History

Exceptionality without Distinction

Johan Strang

Introduction

The end of the Cold War posed a massive challenge to the idea of the Nordic countries as a distinctive group of nations with a special political culture, societal model and international mission. The economic recession of the early 1990s called into question the vitality of the social democratic welfare state, and the Nordic model was challenged as a source of positive national identification. In 1991, the newly elected Swedish Conservative Prime Minister Carl Bildt noted that 'no-one wants to be a compromise between a successful societal model and a historical catastrophe' (af Malmborg 2001: 175). The idea of a special Nordic approach to foreign and security policy seemed outdated as the tensions between East and West evaporated and the Nordics became more thoroughly integrated within larger European and transatlantic frameworks. Voices were raised within the Nordic Council that the organization no longer had a clear role, as most of its member states were on the verge of joining the European Union (Strang 2021).

In scholarly discussions, an intense debate took place in the 1990s regarding regions and regionalism in Europe, but more often than not the old *Norden* was reduced to a matter of nostalgia, sidelined in favour of more exciting projects involving the wider Baltic Sea Region or Europe as a whole (Neumann 1992; Wæver 1992). Historians examined the historical and cultural foundations of the Nordic region but were rather sceptical of the durability of the construction (Sørensen & Stråth 1997), and the volumes dedicated to a re-evaluation of Nordic cooperation expressed a longing for the 'golden age' of the Cold War period (Værnø 1993; Sundelius & Wiklund 2000). Indeed, as late as 2007, one of the editors of this volume, Christopher Browning, argued that the very idea of 'Nordicity' was in need of 'rebranding' since its former attributes had either been abandoned by the Nordic elites or become conflated with more universal European ideals (Browning 2007). Two years later, Norbert Götz and Heidi Haggrén remarked on a seeming 'lack of vigour for reinventing *Norden* for the 21st century' (Götz & Haggrén 2009: 2).

In the past decade, or perhaps since around the time of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, we have clearly witnessed precisely such a rebranding and reinvention

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of 'the Nordic'. As the Nordic countries regularly appear at the top of different international rankings on, for example, competitiveness, transparency, education, happiness or peace, Nordic politicians have discovered a 'New Nordic' brand that they wanted to promote in global arenas (Strang 2021). Nordic crime fiction, TV series and even cuisine have gained in popularity around the world, and there appears to be an insatiable market for popular books penetrating the secrets of the Nordic way of life (Partanen 2016; Aurell, Jacobsen, & Panes 2017). More recently, Nordic cooperation has once again become part of the agenda, particularly in the fields of foreign and defence policy. Since the celebrated Stoltenberg Report and the establishment of the umbrella organization NORDEFCO (Nordic Defence Cooperation) in 2009, Nordic cooperation has gained an explicit security dimension (Stoltenberg 2009; Forsberg 2013; Archer & Joenniemi 2016). The increased unpredictability of Russia and ultimately its attack on Ukraine has strengthened this development, and currently the Nordic countries are united in the same military alliance, arguably for the first time since the sixteenth century. Adding to such changes, increasing academic interest in 'the Nordic' has resulted in a fresh wave of research projects and publications in the humanities and the social sciences.[1]

This chapter proceeds from the observation that a very different *Norden* is now on the rise compared to the one that faded away in the wake of the Cold War. Attracting the imagination in contemporary discussions is not a *Norden* associated with notions like 'middle way', 'social democracy' or 'democratic corporatism', but the idea of a 'New Nordic' brand that alludes to well-performing, competitive, top-ranking welfare societies as well as to the 'coolness', or 'cosines', of Nordic popular culture and way of life. In terms of foreign and security policy, Nordicness no longer invokes terms like 'low tension', 'international solidarity' or, indeed, 'peace'. Instead, 'the Nordic' points to the potential of a unified region that collectively could make a claim for a seat at G20 or boast one of Europe's largest air forces that protects NATO's northern flank.

This transformation or redescription of 'the Nordic' as a community and as a political concept is remarkable, but it can also be difficult to discern as old attributes linger and blend with new ones, creating both confusion and political debate. The chapter presents some theoretical perspectives that can help make sense of the relationship between the old *Norden* and the 'New Nordic' and uses the tools to discuss the fate of 'the Nordic Peace' after the end of the Cold War. The argument will be construed on the basis of public reports and scholarly literature.

Nostalgia is not on the agenda here: the intention is not to police and protect 'the Nordic' as a political concept from falsification and misuse. The old *Norden* served specific purposes in a very different context. Moreover, undoubtedly the old narratives of Nordic exceptionality rested on certain false assumptions or on values that most Nordic citizens no longer endorse. Instead, the chapter is written with the conviction that it is important to acknowledge *that* a redescription of the Nordic has taken place; it analyses *why* it happened and *how* the 'New Nordic' differs from the old *Norden*.

The End of History and 'New Nordic' Exceptionalism

In an inspirational article from 2007, Christopher Browning argued that the Nordic countries had succeeded in creating a distinctive 'Nordic brand' consisting of three elements: peace, international solidarity and egalitarian social democracy. The brand was based on narratives of 'Nordic "exceptionalism" – of the Nordics as being different from and better than the norm' (Browning 2007: 27). In the post-Cold War period, however, key aspects of this Nordic brand had been undermined by external, regional and global developments, on the one hand, and the deliberate choices of Nordic politicians and elites on the other. According to Browning, this had amounted to a decline in Nordic exceptionalism. The rising interest in the Nordic countries and the bourgeoning rhetoric of Nordicness during the past decades begs the question of whether, and in what sense, we are witnessing a return of Nordic exceptionalism. If we are, then how does the 'New Nordic' relate to the old Nordic brand?

The key argument in this chapter is that although we, since the end of the Cold War, have witnessed a continuous decline in Nordic exceptionality as *difference*, there has been a strong return of Nordic exceptionality as *superiority*. The argument builds on one of the most emblematic ways of portraying the political mood during the immediate post-Cold War period: Francis Fukuyama's notion of the End of History (Fukuyama 1989, 1992). As the great political divides and struggles of the twentieth century were being overcome, the world was uniting around the principles of liberal democracy, which appeared as the final product and endpoint of the ideological evolution of humanity. To be sure, Fukuyama's End of History thesis has been forcefully criticized as naïve and overly optimistic for its belief in the cascading progress of liberal democracy and its ignorance of more long-term global cultural and religious divisions (most notably by his teacher Samuel Huntington 1996a, 1996b). Moreover, it is certainly also the case that Fukuyama, in his more recent books, has tabled or even retracted the End of History thesis due to the rise of nationalist populism and identity politics (Fukuyama 2018). The Russian attack on Ukraine in 2022 points even more strongly in the same direction. For the purpose of this chapter, however, the End of History thesis serves not so much as a prediction, but rather as an ideational manifestation of the mindset of most European and Western countries during the political and cultural reorientation that took place in the decades after 1989. During the post-Cold War period, the range of imagined political alternatives narrowed to a particular version of liberal democracy built around the principles of the market economy and individual freedom.

The End of History thesis has sometimes been interpreted as an unabashed self-celebration of Western capitalism after prevailing in the Cold War. Arguably, however, the notion was marked by a more subtle form of imperialism by which the West, in its own eyes and in the eyes of many others, re-emerged as the most developed and modern societies of the world, *ahead* of the others not only in terms of technology and economy but also in terms of morality and politics. In an age of globalization, the world, and especially the formerly communist Eastern Europe, was expected to conform to, and eventually catch up with, the liberal democracies

of the West (Outhwaite 2016; Ther 2016). For Fukuyama, it was more the EU than the United States that, by virtue of its ambition to transcend national sovereignty and traditional power politics, embodied the new peaceful, globalized, post-sovereign and post-historical world (Fukuyama 1992: 346).

A related, but hardly less philosophical, way of understanding the transformations after 1989 and the idea that Western liberal democracy had reached its full fruition was put forward by the French historian and philosopher of time François Hartog in 2003. Building on the work of the German conceptual historian Reinhart Koselleck, Hartog developed the notion of 'shifting temporal regimes' (Hartog 2003). Whereas Koselleck's *Sattelzeit* thesis had identified a shift around the French revolution, when 'the future' became the dominant category in political language (Koselleck 1973), Hartog claimed that near the end of the twentieth century human (or arguably European/Western) society had entered a new 'presentist' regime of temporality. As mankind reached the End of History, the future lost its mobilizing force and thus political language became increasingly oriented towards 'the now'. The future no longer held the bright promise of a radically better world; instead, it began to pose a threat to the reigning liberal democratic order (Hartog 2003; Hoffmann 2016).

This chapter will use Fukuyama's End of History thesis and Hartog's notion of presentism as tools to understand the fall and rise of Nordic exceptionalism during the past three decades. Even if the Nordic countries undoubtedly counted among the Western democracies during the Cold War, the political rhetoric of Nordicness was to a considerable extent built around narratives of exceptionality as *difference* (Wæver 1992; Mouritzen 1995; Browning 2007). The Nordic welfare model famously represented a distinctive 'middle way' between Western capitalism and Eastern socialism, combining individual freedom and a market economy with a strong state that aimed at levelling economic differences through active redistribution (Nelson 1953; Kurunmäki & Strang 2010). The Nordic social model was also often defined against the rest of Europe, as a more progressive and socially democratic welfare state than the conservative, Christian democratic welfare models on the European continent (Esping-Andersen 1990; Stråth 1993; Trägårdh 2002). 'Nordic democracy', in turn, was portrayed as a more participatory and consensual form of governance, characterized by an emphasis on popular and parliamentary sovereignty, strong local government, a comparatively weak judiciary and a thriving civil society consisting of cooperative movements and associations (Rothstein 1992; Sørensen & Stråth 1997; Alapuro & Stenius 2010; Kurunmäki & Strang 2010; Strang 2019). Finally, and central to the topic of this volume, 'the Nordic peace' or 'the Nordic model of internationalism' was built upon the idea that the Nordic countries were distinctively peace loving, that they renounced the power politics of the superpowers, aimed at reducing tensions, expressed solidarity with the Third World and staunchly supported international law and international organizations.

The proposition of this chapter is that the old *Norden* became marginalized as the appeal of exceptionality as *difference* waned in light of the End of History. Gradually, however, a new rhetoric of Nordicness emerged, one which no longer rested

on difference, but rather on uniformity and sameness with the liberal democratic principles espoused by the End of History thesis. If *Norden* during the Cold War had been defined as different and to a certain extent even unique (and often also superior), the 'New Nordic' refers to those nations that have been *the best* at implementing the universal values of the liberal democratic West. The Nordic welfare state became a term used for the competitive model societies at the top of various global rankings. Nordic democracy came to signify how the Nordic countries are doing a better job at implementing the universal principles of liberal democracy, including its catalogue of civil liberties and individual constitutional or human rights. *Norden* went from signifying an alternative to representing supreme exemplars. Indeed, some two decades after presenting his End of History thesis, Fukuyama used the slogan 'getting to Denmark' to pinpoint a model society marked by stability, peace, prosperity, inclusiveness and low corruption (Fukuyama 2011: 14). The reminder of the chapter will focus on the shift from exceptionality as *difference* to exceptionality as *superiority* in relation to notions of Nordic peace.

Construing Nordic Peace Exceptionalism

There are good reasons to argue that the idea of *Norden* as a region of and for peace predates the Cold War. Many Scandinavians were active in the peace movements of the late nineteenth century (see the chapters by Hemstad and Ørskov in this volume), the Scandinavian countries made a common neutrality declaration during the First World War (af Malmborg 2001: 110–115; Jonas 2019: 35–54) and the Nordic countries formed a group of 'blue-eyed angels' in the League of Nations (Götz 2009). Arguably, however, the idea of a distinctive Nordic peace tradition became especially important during the Cold War, with the Nordic countries appearing not only as members of a larger group of small, neutral, peace-loving (European) nations but also as a *special* region of peace. Being Nordic and being peaceful were central parts of the narratives that underpinned the ontological security of all five nations.

This chapter will focus on three elements of the perceived Nordic Cold War peace-loving exceptionalism. First, an *internal* element must be considered based on the long legacy of peace between the Nordic countries and the unique sense of kinship and cooperation among the five countries. Second, Nordic exceptionalism includes a *security* element pertaining to the geopolitical position of *Norden* in a polarized Europe. Third, it is premised on an *internationalist* element that the Nordic countries share a special responsibility as promoters of peace, law and solidarity in global arenas.

During the Cold War, Nordic cooperation was often viewed as a competing project to (West) European integration. But if European integration has often been described as a peace project in the sense that cooperation and integration are essential for the continent to overcome its history of warfare, then peace, too, has been important for Nordic post-war cooperation in a more indirect manner. The Nordic Council (1952) was not established to prevent Denmark from going to war with Sweden, as internal Nordic peace was so self-evident that it would have been ridiculous to even introduce such a topic for discussion. Indeed, Scandinavia

represented a paradigmatic example for Karl Deutsch (1957) when he coined the term 'security community' in an effort to forge a blueprint for the emerging North Atlantic security arrangement. Whereas many security communities, according to Deutsch, emerged through amalgamation – by one power taking control of others – Scandinavia was a 'pluralistic security community' consisting of sovereign nations for whom the thought of war had become inconceivable. What made Nordic peace and cooperation remarkable for Deutsch and his followers was the fact that the region consisted of countries that had a long history of internal warfare and of controlling each other (Deutsch 1957; Adler & Barnett 1998). Indeed, for Deutsch the peaceful dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden in particular, but also the long-lasting Scandinavian peace in general, provided a potential model for how states could overcome conflict and create mutual trust through non-military cooperation and integration.

Deutsch saw Scandinavia as a model for others to learn from, even as Nordic politicians and theoreticians more often than not promoted *Norden* as a special case. Especially when Nordic cooperation failed to keep up with the pace of European integration, or when it experienced such grand failures as the defence union in 1948, the customs union in 1960 or the Nordic Economic Community (NORDEK) in 1970, politicians tended to emphasize the unique cultural bonds between the Nordic countries. There was no need for treaties or binding agreements, they argued, because Nordic unity was based upon commonalities in language, culture and social values (Strang 2021). Scholars and theoreticians likewise contributed to this idea of Nordic cooperation being based on different premises than international cooperation in general. According to Nils Andrén's 'cob-web' theory and Erik Solem's 'micro-integration' perspective, *Norden* was a uniquely integrated region, not by virtue of strong common political institutions or international agreements, but rather because of its special bottom-up character and the infinite number of links between actors across the region (Andrén 1967; Solem 1977).

It is important, however, to emphasize that this soft Nordic model of cooperation did not emerge intentionally. Nordic politicians tried hard to find ways to cooperate and integrate their countries through common economic and defence endeavours during the aftermath of the Second World War: advance plans were put into place for a common Scandinavian defence union before Denmark, Iceland and Norway joined NATO in 1949, while different types of trade agreements, customs unions and economic cooperation schemes were central talking points at the meetings of the Nordic Council throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Strang 2016, 2021). The narrative of the unique soft model of Nordic cooperation was often construed as an attempt to save and resurrect the Nordic idea after those failures (Strang 2021).

If internal Nordic peace was framed as an exceptional case, something similar could be said for the attempts to understand and theorize about the geopolitical position of the Nordic region during the Cold War. The Second World War had divided the Nordic countries from a security perspective. Whereas Denmark, Iceland and Norway abandoned neutrality in favour of NATO membership in 1949, Finland's foreign and security policy was restricted by the *Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance*, which it signed together with the Soviet

Union in 1948. Yet, the Nordic region never took centre stage during the Cold War conflict. The strong ties between both citizens and political leaders in the different Nordic countries constituted one significant reason, but another key explanatory model was the notion of a 'Nordic balance', coined by the Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange in 1961 and theorized by Arne Olav Brundtland later in the 1960s (Brundtland 1966; Noreen 1983). Premised on the antagonism between the West and East, the Nordic balance entailed that the Nordic NATO countries resist rearmament and, for example, permanent missile bases in their territory so as not to provoke the Soviet Union to tighten its grip on Finland. At the same time, the Soviet Union refrained from pressuring Finland out of fear of an increased NATO presence in Northern Europe.

The Nordic balance differed from traditional realist notions of a 'balance of terror' in that it did not entail the idea that it was the arms race itself that would create peace due to abject fear of mutual annihilation. Instead, the Nordic balance was premised on the shared security policy objective of lowering tensions in Northern Europe (Wæver 1992; Neumann 1994). As such, the Nordic balance became part of the Nordic peace brand, emphasizing that the region was a periphery in the Cold War conflict, the peaceful corner of Europe, consisting of five small countries that threatened no-one and that were bound together by unique cultural bonds. To be sure, there was never an official Nordic concordance, harmony or unanimity regarding security policy: the debates between particularly Finnish and Norwegian interpretations of, for example, initiatives like the Nordic nuclear-free zone were sometimes rather animated (Wendt 1979: 312–320). However, all Nordic countries found use for the ideas of 'Nordic peace' and 'low tension' as part their own Cold War strategies.

Finally, the notion of Nordic peace exceptionalism was also closely associated with the idea that the Nordic countries had a special global mission. Even if the ambition to keep Cold War tensions away from the region meant that the Nordic countries entered the post-war period with a low profile, the aspiration of promoting peace (and neutrality in the case of Sweden and Finland) soon developed into a moral argument and asset that could be used on the international scene. By the 1970s, the Scandinavian governments (particularly during the leadership of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme) became much more forthright in their criticism of not only violent dictatorships across the world but also of both the United States and the Soviet Union (Hellenes & Marklund 2018). Finland was less vocal, but its leaders undoubtedly still embraced the idea that small neutral countries had a special duty to work for peace. The most famous example was arguably that of Finnish President Urho Kekkonen, who invested much energy in arranging the *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe* (1973–1975).

To be sure, according to traditional small-state logic, it makes sense to compensate for your existential vulnerability by investing in a rule-based international order. At the same time, it would be cynical to reduce all of such Nordic efforts to a matter of calculation. In the terminology of, for example, Peter Lawler, the Nordic countries were prime examples of 'Good States' that represented the ideals of classical internationalism (Lawler 2005). The Nordics also contributed actively

to UN peacekeeping missions, establishing themselves as experts in peace and mediation through diplomatic engagement in resolving various conflicts, and they also developed a scholarly expertise by establishing institutes dedicated to peace research (Gleditsch 2004; Wallensteen 2011). In the 1960s, when the processes of decolonization accelerated, Nordic civil society actors, experts, politicians and even governments began to nurse the idea that the Nordic countries were especially suited for acting as mediators, not merely between the East and West, but also between the Global North and the Global South. The Scandinavian states were among the first to reach the UN target of contributing 0.7% of GDP to foreign aid. Some interpreted this international solidarity as a continuation of Lutheran missionary traditions, as a special duty resulting from the presumed colonial innocence of the Nordic countries, others as a natural corollary to the domestic welfare state ideal, or even as an attempt to provide an alternative path to modernity beyond socialist or capitalist imperialism (Bergman 2007; Borring Olesen, Pharo, & Paaskesen 2013; Engh 2021; de Bengy Puyvallée & Bjørkdahl 2021). In this way, the notion of a special Nordic global mission was to a large extent based on a sense of distinctiveness.

The end of the Cold War presented a challenge to the established narratives of *Norden* as a special region of peace. The uniqueness of Nordic cooperation, security and internationalism were all intensely debated. In fact, this was perhaps also the time when the notion of an exceptional Nordic peace tradition gained the most theoretical traction, with scholars perceiving that something important was being lost. This was also the case with the Nordic welfare state model, which was given its classical definition by the Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen in 1990 (see also Strang, Marjanen, & Hilson 2021). The creative period of the early 1990s was succeeded by a period of neglect, when *Norden* was overshadowed by other projects, such as greater European or Baltic Sea region integration. In the new millennium, Nordic cooperation, security and internationalism were all reinvented, but in mutated form, relying less on a sense of distinctiveness from other regions and political models.

New Nordic Cooperation: From the Other Europe to the Best Europe

The general narrative of the 1990s is that *Norden* was overrun by Europe. This conclusion is easy to arrive at by revisiting, for example, the debates leading up to the EU referendums in Finland, Norway and Sweden in the autumn of 1994 as well as in the Danish Maastricht referendums of 1992 and 1993, where the no-side supporters often appealed to Nordic cooperation as an alternative to European integration. As the Nordic visions came across as defensive and somewhat nostalgic, they contributed to making *Norden* into a thing of the past (Wæver 1992). To be sure, Nordic cooperation was important also for the pro-EU side, which included the political elites. During the first half of the 1990s, a variety of plans were hatched for reforming the official institutions of Nordic cooperation and integrating them within a larger European framework (Jervell 1991; Iloniemi 1992). If there ever was any realism to such ideas, it faded away rather quickly after the accession of

Finland and Sweden to the EU, when, on the one hand, consideration had to be paid to the EU outsiders, Norway and Iceland, while on the other cooperation between the three Nordic EU members proved rather difficult (Brander 2004; Rûse 2015). The official organizations of Nordic cooperation, the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers, struggled to find a role for themselves in the shadow of the EU. Funding was reduced and politicians as well as the mass media turned their attention elsewhere (Borring Olesen & Strang 2016).

There was, however, something more fundamental to the idea that Europe overran *Norden*. The newly expanding Europe was deemed much more fit to respond to the challenges of the globalizing post-historical world. The early 1990s saw a burgeoning discussion on regions and regionalism among both politicians and scholars across Europe. These discussions were part of the project of European unification and, as such, they tended to focus on reviving historical connections across the old Cold War border (Wolff 1994; see also Götz & Haggrén 2009; Mishkova & Trencsényi 2017). The old *Norden* did not serve such purposes, and so instead Nordic scholars and politicians devoted much energy to broadening the Nordic geography by forging new more flexible regional constructions, which included the Baltic States and sometimes also Poland, Germany and Russia (Wæver 1992; Klinge 1995; Jukarinen 1999). The minister-president of Schleswig Holstein, Björn Engholm, wanted to revive the Hanseatic League, while Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs Uffe Ellemann-Jensen advocated creating the Council of the Baltic Sea States and Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen saw the EU's Northern Dimension as his main regional brainchild (Stråth 2000; Arter 2002; Smith 2003). Although the competing initiatives were designed to sustain and even increase the relevance of the Nordic countries in the new Europe, they also served to dilute the idea of a distinctive Nordic region. Even the official organizations for Nordic cooperation themselves, the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers, contributed to this belief by programmatically focusing on 'adjacent areas' in an effort to legitimize their continued relevance (Borring Olesen & Strang 2016).

A leading idea of the time was also to contribute to the making of an integrated post-sovereign Europe, one less bound by the nation-state ideal. After all, this was when the European Community was transforming itself into the European Union. According to Bo Stråth, the proposal for a 'New Hansa' and the attempts to promote the Baltic Sea as a 'Sea of Peace' in the 1990s must be understood as part of a post-historical quest for a dissolution of the modern state system (Stråth 2000). Leaders envisioned the new Europe as a return to an idealized medieval or imperial system where political power and responsibility were dispersed across different levels of administration. In relation to such discussions, most scholars deemed the idea of *Norden* hopelessly outdated. 'What appears as progressive', Ole Wæver wrote in 1992, 'is the integrating, market-based, cooperative, sovereignty-neglecting *Europe* – not the distancing, "Third Way", self-protecting *Norden* of sovereign states' (p. 87).

But some, drawing on the unique experiences of Nordic cooperation, saw the seeds for a fruitful model of post-sovereignty. In a series of articles written in the mid-1990s, Pertti Joenniemi argued that important lessons could be learned from

the de-securitized Nordic community. European integration had always been legitimized as a highly securitized peace project that had ended centuries of wars on the continent, but now, as security was fading away as a key concern in post-Cold War Europe, there was a demand for new models legitimating the European project. It was here, Joennemi argued that Nordic cooperation could serve as an example of a flexible, non-securitized form of international cooperation, one less obsessed with cumbersome federalist solutions intended to de-securitize the region (Joenniemi 1993, 1994). Joenniemi (1997) later expanded on this idea, suggesting that the Nordics should not merely adapt to Europe, but take the lead in forging a new non-securitized Europe based on their own experiences.

In hindsight, it is fair to conclude that neither the expanded Baltic Sea *Norden* nor the Nordic model for a post-sovereign Europe proved to be lasting successes. Instead, *Norden* and Nordic cooperation faded away. It did not take long, however, before Nordicity was reinvented in a different form. This happened in two stages: first, the Nordic countries discovered the 'New Nordic' as a brand to be utilized to promote the region in global markets, and second, Nordic cooperation made a somewhat unexpected return to the agenda as a matter of regional security.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, traditional military security concerns had been replaced by a focus on national economic competitiveness. The ontological security of a nation was based on its capability to successfully compete in global capitalist markets, measured not merely in terms of economic growth but also by an increasing number of international rankings and indexes (Kelley & Simmons 2015; Kirkebø, Langford, & Byrkjeflot 2021). Since the Nordic countries ranked quite highly in many of these indexes, the development spurred a rediscovery of the Nordic model. The extent to which this 'New Nordic' model corresponded to the old social democratic welfare state was a matter of heated political and scholarly debate at the time, though, and it continues to be so today (Andersson 2010; Kettunen & Petersen 2010; Byrkjeflot et al. 2021). More crucially in relation to the argument of this chapter, the Nordic model ceased to signify an alternative and became instead a certain shorthand for the best-performing societies. It was no longer based on an alternative ideology; instead, it was a society that was successful according to a set of universally accepted parameters.

In the neoliberal era, the Nordic idea was no longer based on policy distinctiveness or cooperation. Instead, the 'New Nordic' became a brand that the Nordic countries sought to exploit in global markets based on vaguely defined 'Nordic values'. Anna Kharkina (2013) has examined the transformation of the cultural policies of the Nordic Council of Ministers, noting that the neoliberal age has helped shift the focus away from the former ambition of promoting cooperation between cultural actors in the region and more towards using culture as part of an effort to promote the region (see also Strang 2021). Of particular importance in this process was the report 'The Nordic Region as a Global Winner Region: Tracing the Nordic Competitiveness Model' commissioned by the council in 2005, which urged the Nordic governments to redefine the aim of official Nordic cooperation, rebranding the region instead as a group of successful innovation economies based on the inherent values of the region.

The rediscovery of the Nordic model during the first decade of the new millennium did not spur a surge of Nordic cooperation in its traditional strongholds of welfare and culture (Kettunen, Lundberg, Petersen, & Österberg . 2016). But Nordic cooperation did spring to life in the form of common foreign and defence policies – areas where official cooperation had been impossible during the Cold War. Initially, the rise of Nordic defence cooperation was a result of the uncertainties surrounding multilateralism in general and the EU and NATO in particular. With the financial crisis of 2007–2008, the refugee crisis of 2016 and Brexit in 2021, on the one hand, and the American withdrawal from Europe and the unpredictability of US foreign policy under President Trump on the other, the Nordic countries found common security interests. Sometimes Nordic cooperation was presented as an emergency plan, but more often than not the idea was that the Nordic countries could better stand up for their interests within the EU and NATO by aligning with each other (Archer & Joenniemi 2016; Jakobsen, Ringmose, & Saxi 2018). With the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the attack on Ukraine, which pushed Finland and Sweden to seek NATO membership, security and outright military cooperation have almost more become the defining features of Nordicity.

Today, Nordic cooperation is no longer defined as an essentially different and 'softer' form of regional alignment but instead as being based on the forming of alliances in matters of foreign and security policy. At the same time, Nordic cooperation has ceased to represent an alternative to European or transatlantic frameworks; it is something pursued within the realms of the EU and NATO. In this way, the 'New Nordic' seems to be built on very different and sometimes even contrary elements to those that characterized the old *Norden*.

New Nordic Security: From Low Tension to Deterrence

In terms of regional security, the idea of a special 'Nordic balance' lost much of its relevance when there no longer were two antagonistic superpowers to weigh against each other. In this sense, it is easy to make the case that *Norden* became more clearly part of the Western mainstream. Finland and Sweden moved closer to NATO, joining the Partnership for Peace programme in 1994, and they gradually became more closely integrated with transatlantic security schemes (Archer & Joenniemi 2016). Similarly, Norway and Denmark both abandoned their previous caution and engaged more actively in US-led operations around the world. This reorientation has been explained both as a matter of adapting to the only remaining superpower and as a countermove against the threat of marginalization when US interests moved increasingly away from Europe (Jakobsen, Ringsmose, & Saxi 2018). If the objective during the Cold War had been to keep the superpowers out of the Nordic region, the fear now was that the region would be left on its own. By way of paradox, therefore, the decreasing tensions in Europe turned out to be a driving force behind the Nordic abandonment of the Cold War aims of reducing tensions in the Nordic region.

Nordic defence cooperation developed first in traditional Nordic areas, like peacekeeping (NORDCAPS), but it gradually spread to other fields of national

security as well (Forsberg 2013; Archer & Joenniemi 2016). The rationale was usually economic, as pooling resources was a good idea in a period characterized by, due to the lack of an immediate security threat, increased pressure to curtail defence budgets across the region. In 2008, the former Norwegian foreign minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, was asked by the Nordic foreign ministers to draw up proposals for closer foreign and security policy cooperation. Even if the resulting report included certain concrete military proposals (on air and maritime surveillance), and even a push towards a collective Nordic security identity, most notably, it focused, via its final recommendation of a mutual Nordic solidarity declaration, very much on more traditional Nordic themes, such as civil or societal security and peacebuilding (Stoltenberg 2009).

The focus changed, though, after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, when Nordic defence cooperation became more explicitly an issue of collective deterrence in the face of a re-emerging eastern threat (af Hällström 2016). The development created a new form of Nordic balance, where Finland and Sweden threatened to join NATO if Russia increased its military activity in the region and where NATO exercises and the presence of US troops in Norway were effectively used as instruments to counter Russian recidivism.[2] The aim of the new Nordic balance was no longer to frame the Nordic region as an exceptional low tension region in Europe; rather, according to Adrian Hyde-Price, it seemed increasingly clear that '[o]nce a strategically peripheral region in which the Nordic countries could attempt to "hide" from great power conflicts, the Nordic area is now part of the new frontline in Russia's confrontation with NATO' (2018: 440). Indeed, if the rhetoric of Nordicness during the Cold War was a speech act that served to distance Denmark and Norway from NATO, it now became instead a move to draw Finland and Sweden closer to the same alliance.

Norden appears no longer as a low-tension anomaly in Europe, with Nordic defence cooperation and ultimately Finnish and Swedish NATO membership instead now drawing the Nordic countries directly into the Western mainstream. This development has rightly been labelled 'a significant paradigmatic shift' in Nordic security policy, where '[i]nstead of their previous abstentionist policies, the Nordics now opt for a profile and form of togetherness where issues pertaining to security, defence and military matters stand central' (Archer & Joenniemi 2016: 174). If the element of exceptionality as *difference* in this sense was gradually lost, it did not take long before both politicians and scholars rushed to reinvent Nordic exceptionality as *superiority*, for example by singling out the region as an especially potent military force, jointly boasting one of Europe's largest air forces. As new forms of bi- and multilateral defence cooperation took shape across Europe, the Stoltenberg initiative and NORDEFCO were often, by virtue of their flexible nature and success in saving on costs, praised a forerunner and model for other regions (Forsberg 2013; Ojanen 2014).

A dramatic shift also occurred with regards to the narratives that underpinned the ontological security of the Nordic countries. This shift included revisionist accounts of previous policies, questioning narratives concerning both Nordic interactions with Nazi Germany during the Second World War and the idea of

Nordic Cold War exceptionalism. In Sweden, much attention was devoted in the 1990s to the country's secret collaboration with NATO, which, as pointed out by Mikael af Malmborg, scholars tended to interpret in two different, but equally moralistic, ways (af Malmborg 2001: 2–3, 148–153). Some regretted that Sweden had failed to live up to its own high moral standards, often connecting the nation's purported neutrality during the Cold War with its German-friendly neutrality during the Second World War. Others found it more troubling that Sweden had been free riding on the sacrifices of other Western countries, not least its Scandinavian neighbours, which had more resolutely committed themselves to the defence of liberal democracy against totalitarianism. This perspective also fed on analogies of Sweden's failure to break with Nazi Germany during the Second World War.

The Finnish alliance with Nazi Germany also came under increased moral scrutiny after 1989, but neo-patriotic narratives of the Second World War arguably became even more prevalent, emphasizing Finland's role as a victim of Soviet aggression (Tepora 2021). Much attention was also given to the Cold War policies of Finlandization, i.e. to the extent to which Finland adapted and subjugated itself to Soviet interests, which many scholars denounced as opportunistic, spineless and a source of political corruption (e.g. Vihavainen 1991). When Finland was on the verge of joining NATO in 2022 and 2023, it was widely suggested by politicians, commentators and scholars alike that the period of self-imposed silence was finally over (Arter 2023).[3]

In Denmark, such revisionism was equally politicized and pronouncedly a matter of denouncing the incapability of the Danish political elites to take a firm stand in the conflict between Western democracy and communist dictatorship (Villaume 2008; Pedersen 2009). According to critics like Bent Jensen, who served as director of the Danish Centre for Cold War Studies from 2007 to 2010, a continuous line of small-state cowardliness could be traced in Danish foreign policy back to 1864, with the (primarily social democratic) elites consciously choosing to accommodate themselves to the enemy, most notably during the Nazi occupation, but also during the Cold War (Jensen 1987). According to the Danish historian Nikolaj Petersen, this 'right-wing revisionism' became a key part of the culture wars (*Kulturkamp*) in Danish politics, as conservatives gradually revolted against what they perceived as a left-liberal (*kulturradikalisme*) hegemony in Danish political culture (Petersen 2009: 155–156). The collaboration with Nazi Germany and the circumspect engagement within NATO (e.g. the so-called 'footnote politics' of the 1980s) served as examples of such spineless foreign policy. Leading liberal and conservative politicians, Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen (2001–2009) included, claimed that Denmark had now finally learned from its own mistakes that one must never be neutral in the battle between democracy and dictatorship (Villaume 2008; Petersen 2009: 203). This historical lesson was used as part of the motivation for a turn towards a more active foreign policy, in which Denmark was prepared to stand up for the values of the West, with military means if necessary.

It seems obvious that in terms of security, the end of the Cold War also meant an end to the rhetoric of the Nordic region as an exceptional low-tension area. During

the time when the End of History thesis held sway, when the whole of Europe seemed to have become a low-tension area, the Nordic region lost its uniqueness. More recently, as tensions have risen once again, the Nordic countries have joined the Western alliance and become NATO's northern frontier.

New Nordic Internationalism: From Classical to Neoliberal Internationalism

Finally, what happened to the Nordic brand of humane internationalism after the End of History? Sceptical analyses are not hard to come by in this respect. In his article 'Branding Nordicity', Christopher Browning notes that the previous Nordic emphasis on internationalist solidarism and Third Worldism had been challenged by cuts in development aid and stricter immigration policies (2007: 39–40). More recently, the Danish political scientist Anders Wivel has argued that 'anyone trying to identify a Nordic model for international peace and security today would be hard pressed', referring, for example, to the fact that the Nordic countries took part in George W. Bush's coalition of the willing in Iraq 2003 and in the NATO operation in Libya 2011 (2017: 492). Hanna Ojanen and Tapio Raunio have even lamented about how 'the Nordic' has been used of late to legitimate policies – on, for example, immigration or foreign aid – that are almost opposite to traditional understandings of the term 'Nordic' (2018: 414–415).

Yet, the Nordic brand seems to persist. Annika Bergman (2007), for example, has suggested that the Nordic countries continue to generously meet both their domestic and international obligations, while Christine Ingebritsen has argued that 'the commitment to achieving social solidarity at home has contributed to a logical extension of this philosophy to global welfare' (2002: 20). Indeed, recent studies have indicated that there has not been a dramatic decline in Nordic international engagement since the end of the Cold War (Hagemann & Bramsen 2019). The Nordic countries continue to be engaged in peace mediation and humanitarian efforts; they are comparatively benevolent with foreign aid and remain strongly committed to the United Nations.

One way of interpreting what has happened is to call attention to an alignment of Nordic and European policies. As the EU has emerged as a chief representative of international law, peace and solidarity in global arenas, it has perhaps become difficult to distinguish a special Nordic brand of internationalism (Browning 2007). The extent to which this alignment has been a matter of a 'Europeanization of Norden', a 'Nordicization of the EU' or a 'like-mindization' of interests is a matter of debate, and studies indicate that the development varies from sector to sector (Elgström & Delputte 2016). Nordic politicians and scholars have been quick to argue that the Nordic countries found the EU a great vehicle for advancing their internationalist values and that the new soft European image has been a great Nordic success (Laatikainen 2003). Significantly, however, this alignment has made it difficult to find a distinctive Nordic element to the new internationalism, other than the fact that Nordic countries are usually quite supportive of such general European policies, sometimes even profiling themselves as the *best* Europeans. In this sense,

the alignment of Nordic and European international profiles might serve as an example of how elements of the old *Norden* have survived and become part of a more general Western or European universalism at the End of History.

Another interpretation is that a considerable shift occurred in the normative basis of Nordic internationalism during the post-Cold War period. A particularly useful tool for making this argument is Peter Lawler's analysis of the internationalist sentiments that peppered foreign policy pronouncements of most Western states following the end of the Cold War (2005: 427). According to Lawler, the new internationalism shared certain elements with the peace-promoting 'classical internationalism' that, for example, the Nordic countries had stood for during the Cold War period. It promoted increasing institutional multilateralism, the consolidation of a more self-aware Europe, the emergence of a global civil society as well as the spread of democracy across the world. But unlike classical internationalism, the new internationalism was much more blatantly imperialistic, especially after the rise of neoconservative foreign policy in the wake of 9/11. Lawler labels it a 'neoliberal internationalism' that not only reinforced and imposed the rules of liberal democracy, human rights and capitalism across the globe, but also led to increasingly aggressive behaviour against those states that did not conform to such principles.

Following Lawler's analysis, it can be argued that the Nordic countries conformed to and became prominent representatives of this new neoliberal internationalism that emerged following the End of History. To be sure, in the early 1990s, the classical 'Good State' internationalism was heavily criticized by neoliberal actors such as the Swedish think tank *Timbro* who scorned the Social Democratic conception of Sweden as a "moral superpower" (arguably contributing significantly to making the concept popular for a wider audience) and called for a shift in development policy from aid towards business promotion (Nilsson 1991; Murelius 1992). Soon however, Nordic internationalism mutated and blended into a broader neoliberal EU internationalism, which sometimes represented an alternative to, but at other times was also barely distinguishable from, the neoconservative internationalism of for example George W. Bush. The transformation was reflected in the values that underpinned Nordic internationalism. Provocatively put: if the ambition during the Cold War – whether naively or not – had been to export the particular values of the Nordic welfare state, the new Nordic internationalism was instead engaged in furthering and promoting the 'universal' principles of liberal democracy and human rights. The welfare state ideal had been intimately connected with the democratic aims of (popular and national) sovereignty, on the one hand, and the economic ideals of growth and equality on the other. The new liberal democratic ideal was in contrast based on the ideals of universal cosmopolitanism and individual rights, but more indifferent to economic inequality, focusing instead on establishing sufficient minimum standards for basic needs provision (Moyn 2018; Whyte 2019). Moreover, whereas the welfare state had been a matter of progress, development and the promise of a future society that was radically better, liberal democracy and human rights articulated more presentist ideals that had to be met in the here and now (Hoffmann 2016).

The claim here is not that the welfare state and human rights are incompatible, but rather that a tension exists between them, which usually has to be resolved by balancing one against the other (Strang 2018). During the post-war period, Nordic politicians and theoreticians had a distinct way of dealing with the conundrum that leaned heavily towards the welfare state, and this stance was also reflected in the ambitions reflected in their international humanitarianism. The aim was to assist the former colonies in consolidating their interests as nation-states and as welfare states, and to decrease the inequality between nations (Myrdal 1960: 149–167). Finnish development aid scholar Liisa Laakso has argued that the development projects of the Nordic countries in the 1960s and 1970s typically concentrated on socioeconomic concerns like economic growth, production, infrastructure, health care and education (Laakso 2002). In a more recent study, Johan Karlsson Schaffer notes that the Swedish foreign ministry in the 1970s explicitly took stock of the fact that the economic situation in recipient countries prohibited them from living up to Western democratic ideals and that economic growth and equality, as well as literacy and public education, were issues that had to be tended to before it was possible to expect there to emerge 'a democracy that is working in the Western sense' (Karlsson Schaffer 2021: 155).

From the 1980s onwards, and especially during the 1990s, human rights emerged as central foci of Nordic development policies. Now, the idea was that the recipient countries had to fulfil a set of democratic criteria, or that the funding should be used to enhance democracy and human rights. Indeed, in 1990 the Danish minister of foreign affairs, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, stated that a multiparty system was inherent to the concept of democracy, which clearly was a criticism of previous Nordic policies towards socialist regimes and the presumption that single-party systems could also offer popular participation in decision-making processes (quoted in Laakso 2002: 60).

The shift in priorities from welfare state to human rights in Nordic development policies was subtle and often framed as policy continuation in the name of 'democracy promotion' (Karlsson Schaffer 2021). But where democracy promotion had previously been about national sovereignty and economic equality, it was now about human rights, whereas material ambitions were reduced to matters of sufficiency and basic needs.[4] Moreover, even if the shift was in many ways driven by the centre-right, which wanted to dismantle a social democratic tradition, the human rights perspective was also internalized by the political left. Indeed, today the political parties are unanimous in their support of human rights as a leading principle in Nordic development policies.

Again, it must be emphasized that nostalgia is not on the agenda here. Whereas the Nordic welfare state ideal could easily be wedded with the postcolonial struggle for national sovereignty and with programmes for global economic development and justice (such as the New International Economic Order, NIEO), Nordic internationalism has also often included the naïve hope that economic support would generate a democratization of totalitarian regimes. In many respects, the reorientation of Nordic development policies mirrored changes in the Nordic welfare states domestically, where individual rights and sufficiency became much more central

to policymaking during the 1990s and where the past violations of present human rights norms (e.g. forced sterilizations) became moral narratives that legitimized the (neo-)liberal order (Hoffmann 2016: 305; Strang 2018: 216). At the same time, the mutation from classical to neoliberal internationalism goes some way towards explaining both the stickiness of the Nordic brand and the flexibility by which the term Nordic can be used in foreign policy debates.

In recent years, the Nordic countries have arguably moved even further away from classical internationalism. A vocal populist right wing opposing internationalism in all its facets has prompted both conservative and social democratic governments to introduce stricter immigration rules, to make cuts in foreign aid and, more generally, to prioritize national interests before international commitments. As observed by Hanna Ojanen and Tapio Raunio (2018), Nordic international policies have become almost opposite to what they were known for during the Cold War. Yet, the Nordic internationalist brand lingers on, which means that references to Nordicness or to the other Nordic countries can be useful tools to dress up one's policies as less harsh than they actually are or perhaps to push for a similar redemption of previous 'naïve' policies as has already taken place in the neighbouring countries.

Nordic Peace After the End of History

The purpose of this chapter has been to present some tools that can be used to understand a re-evaluation of 'the Nordic Peace' since the end of the Cold War. Much has happened in the subsequent decades. Nordic cooperation is no longer a unique bottom-up form of integration that focuses on soft areas like social policy and culture; instead, it is security and even military cooperation that is re-defining Nordic cooperation. The Nordic countries no longer have the ambition to present Norden as a unique low-tension area in Europe; rather, the Nordic countries are firmly integrated within NATO and make up its northern flank. Nordic internationalism is no longer defined by the ambition to assist Third World countries on the path to progress and welfare, but rather by joining the rest of the Western world in demanding that they become trustworthy members of the global economy.

They key argument of the chapter is that the Nordic countries conformed to the liberal democratic hegemony associated with the End of History thesis, arguably to such an extent that they became its prime representatives. As territorial security became a non-issue in Europe, the attributes of Nordic peace could easily be blended with a new European neoliberal internationalism and peace brand. Nordicity is today evoked less to signal exceptionality as *difference*, but notions of exceptionality as *superiority* still flourish in political rhetoric. The Nordic countries are known today not for representing an ideological alternative but for being the countries best able to represent the universal values of the liberal West.

The question is, what is happening to the Nordic peace now, as we are reaching the end of the End of History? As indicated above, there are clear signs that the Nordic countries are following the rest of the world and Europe in adopting a less idealistic stance in their foreign policies. To a certain extent, they are even more

hawkish than the larger European countries of the old West, thus almost reversing the Cold War roles. All Nordic countries also seem to agree that Nordic cooperation is needed to deal with the Russian threat. At the same time, competing notions of Nordicity are evident in political debates across the region. While some try to sustain at least elements of the Nordic peace exceptionalism of previous periods, sometimes by claiming that current policies are 'un-Nordic', others have urged the Nordic countries to act as transatlantic bridge-builders in preserving the (neo-)liberal world order (Penttilä 2018). Increasingly influential is also a third group, who call for the Nordic countries to more clearly break with the idealistic policies of the past, in both its classical and neoliberal iterations.

Curiously, while much disagreement seemingly exists regarding the political content and direction of the Nordic peace, everyone seems determined to ensure that the Nordic configuration has an important role to play in the future. Indeed, one of the most interesting features of the rhetoric of Nordicness is that it is both solid and flexible enough to be reinvented to serve new purposes in ever-changing circumstances.[5]

Notes

1 Indeed, this book must also be seen as the result of this reinvigorated scholarly interest: in *Norden*: that is, the UiO:Nordic initiative at the University of Oslo and the university hub *Reimagining Norden in an evolving world* (ReNEW), funded by NordForsk.
2 See, e.g. the Finnish neoliberal intellectual Risto E.J. Penttilä's blogpost from 18.6.2016: https://ristoejpenttila.fi/2016/06/18/nordic-balance-2-0/.
3 For example, Mika Aaltola, the leader of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, claimed that the NATO application broke the long tail of Finlandization (https://www.is.fi/politiikka/art-2000008818335.html). An example just before the Russian invasion of Ukraine was the TV documentary series *Kylmän sodan Suomi* (Cold War Finland), produced by the national broadcasting company in 2021 (https://areena.yle.fi/1–50828775).
4 The relationship between sufficiency and equality is a leading theme in Samuel Moyn's (2018) work.
5 The research for this chapter has been done as part of the Academy of Finland-project *Norden since the End of History* (2019–2024) and the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Fund-project *Neoliberalism in the Nordics* (2020–2025).

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PART II

A Region *for* Peace

7 Normative Interventionism

Nordic Policies and Practices on 'Women, Peace and Security Agenda'

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Introduction

Peace in the Nordic region has two dimensions: the Nordic is a region *of* peace, the chief characteristics of which are deep peace, 'non-wars' and a mutual security community; at the same time, it is also a region *for* peace, which implies adopting an active role beyond the Nordic region. The Nordics have identified themselves as a humanitarian great power and a global peacemaker and they have adopted the role of peace mediator, peacebuilder and peacekeeper around the globe.

The Nordics' global humanitarianism is described as an altruistic responsibility, a general (foreign) political agenda to commit to doing good beyond one's own nation-state and to work for global peace and justice. The Nordics have built a reputation for being 'global good Samaritans'—altruistic do-gooders—and collectively a humanitarian great power that seeks to promote 'decolonization, disarmament, human rights, and global equality' (De Bengy Puyvallée and Björkdahl, 2021: 1; Wivel, 2017: 490).

There is a certain particularity in the Nordics' eagerness to be seen as great humanitarian powers. Value-based activism is characteristic to a 'Nordic model for international peace and security' (Wivel, 2017: 490), as the Nordics have projected themselves as progressive actors who take ethical issues seriously. Their state-based peace activism and humanitarian policies are grounded in the normative confidence to be a progressive actor that has the capacity to be a global frontrunner in humanitarian and peace policies standing for modernization and social justice. Narratives of Nordic exceptionality date back centuries to the years of the Swedish Great Power in the seventeenth century. The idea of the progressive Nordics is not as old but has been embedded in the various national narratives of Swedes, Danes, Norwegians, Finns and Icelanders for over a century, and this progressiveness has been admired by the world, especially by the liberal-minded British and North Americans (Joenniemi and Lehti, 2003; Lehti, 2003; Musiał, 2002). The Cold War experiences of Nordic geopolitical exceptionality have also played an obvious role in the emergence of the active Nordic peace policies of today.

Nordic state-based peace activism is firmly based on the experience of Nordic exceptionalism which hints unselfconsciously at the moral superiority of the Nordic model. However, even though it is well-endowed and well-organized,

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'the Nordic model for international peace and security was always an ideal type that in practice appeared more pragmatic and less progressive than what was signalled by its brand' (Wivel, 2017: 494). Another question is how Nordic *of* peace and *for* peace are constitutive of each other, or how much Nordic for peace has been about promoting Nordic values, and how much it mimics the practices of intra-Nordic cooperation. Both Wivel (2017) and Ingerbritsen (2002) emphasize the specificity of the Nordic model. However, earlier research has omitted to examine how what is presented as Nordic norms are firmly grounded in broader liberal peacebuilding ideals and are not particularly Nordic, even if the Nordics may have given these norms a slightly different emphasis than other European powers.

Furthermore, the Nordic goal of promoting peace is embedded in a broader liberal ethos that considers doing good and promoting social justice to be a civic virtue, but also, more importantly, a hallmark of being civilized. Narratives of progressive Nordics and Nordic exceptionality have constituted the backbone for Nordic global humanitarianism, but the recent self-confident global agency that the Nordics have adopted has been possible only within the liberal multilateralism of the post-Cold War decades. I am arguing in this chapter that Nordic efforts for promoting peace are deeply embedded in the broader Western-led liberal international order (LIO), and its values and norms have given the Nordics a normative confidence to promote peace in the Global South. Seen from that perspective, being a global do-gooder is a contradictory position, as it necessarily evolves from a privileged or even superior position that makes doing good an obligation. The question then is how the Nordics have worked with this hidden colonial or paternalizing attitude of liberal ethos in their peace promotion efforts and how they legitimize their normative policies.

In this chapter, Nordic peace policies, peace engagements and policy declarations are examined within the frame of the practices of multilateralism and peacebuilding to analyse what kind of normative powers the Nordics use with regard to the promotion of peace, security and human rights. Switching focus from rhetoric and declarations to actual practices throws light on how Nordic policies contain paternalizing tendencies, but also how Nordic-promoted practices may support locally designed and owned approaches to peace. Instead of talking about one coherent Nordic approach as do-gooder and norm entrepreneur, it is argued that the Nordics adopt several positions and roles. For illustrating the case, the Nordic policies supporting and executing the UN's Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda based on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 are scrutinized more critically.

Nordics Within the Liberal Normative Order

For decades, the Nordics have been known as active protagonists of multilateralism and rule-based order, and they have taken an active role in developing and strengthening the capacity and capability of the UN to promote peace and security. According to Iver Neumann (2011: 571–572), the Nordic countries 'have consistently spent sizeable resources on system maintenance in such diverse areas as institution-building—the League of Nations and the UN, for instance; peacekeeping; development and disaster aid; and the mediatory role of third parties'

because it is in a small state's interest to support system maintenance and maintain a stable international order in which sovereign equality prevails rather than the power politics of great powers. In recent years, this has increasingly meant focusing on maintenance and strengthening of multilateral organizations and practices that have been under severe pressure from various directions. But it is not just about stability, it is also about prestige and ontological conformity of one's own international status.

According to Vincent Pouliot (2016: 11), global governance takes place in the international and multilateral spheres, which is essentially characterized by hierarchy. That is why multilateral diplomacy can be described as a 'politics of competence and practical mastery' resulting in 'international pecking orders' in which the 'struggle for competence is endogenous'. For the Nordics, who lack power political muscle, gaining and maintaining global agency is dependent on shining in the multilateral spheres of peacebuilding and humanitarian policies. Therefore, this privileged position has become a source for ontological security. From that perspective, it is understandable that the Nordics have been worried for some years about weakening multilateralism as it would generate ontological insecurity.

Nordic peace policies should not be seen only as a tool to gain prestige within the LIO because they are normative policies targeted at regulating peace and security not only beyond the Nordic region, but also beyond the liberal West, and thus they are an expression of the execution of normative power. From this perspective, it needs to examine how Nordic peace policies are embedded in the Western-led liberal normative order and how multilateral structures of peace build and necessitate privileged positions from which global peace advocacy becomes a necessity and how these positions enable the gaining of global agency.

Ingerbritsen (2002) describes the Nordics as norm entrepreneurs who have played an active role in initiating and shaping the normative principles of multilateralism, but she regards norm entrepreneurship as an unbiased position of doing good, which is not necessarily so in the context of liberal peace interventionism. Instead of understanding norms as constant and well-regulated, this chapter emphasizes contingency and fluidity of norms and how norms are constituted, strengthened and contested in practices of global governance. Multilateral practices of global governance are normative in their essence, and without a certain shared normative understanding, there cannot be any multilateral policies, including for peacebuilding and peacemaking.

The post-Cold War decades have been described as the age of liberal peacebuilding or the era of liberal peace interventionism because in these years, moral responsibilities and duties to promote peace, human rights and democracy were the normative basis of global governance and used to legitimate numerous peace and humanitarian interventions. Doing good on a global scale, however, had unintended consequences as well because the liberal ethos and moral obligations were accompanied by an asymmetry of power and knowledge, leading to it becoming a source of status and rights for do-gooders. The world is divided between the rich and the poor, the developed and the undeveloped, those who help and those who are helped, and those who have the capacity and knowledge to do good and those

who are regarded as passive objects of global charity work. For two centuries, the liberal mindset has combined duties and rights. Helen Rosenblatt's (2018: 4) description of liberal moralism in the nineteenth century explains well the liberal internationalism or humanitarianism of the twenty-first century. According to Rosenblatt, 'most liberals believed that people had rights because they had duties'. This is the core paradox of global liberal humanitarianism and has been widely discussed in critical peacebuilding literature during the past decades.

Critiques of neoliberal governmentality and liberal peacebuilding stress how 'contemporary peacebuilding operations have developed a range of uncomfortable similarities with earlier structures of Western imperialism' and how 'it is usually the interests, values and priorities of the interveners, not those of the victims, that shape contemporary peace operations' (Bellamy and Williams, 2004: 10, 12). Paradoxically, as Richmond (2020: 209) writes, a liberal '"interventionary order" offers emancipation from "war, violence, structural violence and cultural violence" but "yet it also undermines sovereignty and subaltern claims for expanded rights beyond the limited set of basic, liberal human rights the international community offers"'. Liberal practices of peacebuilding assume a distinction between omniscient external auxiliary and passive local targets of peacebuilding. To deconstruct this dichotomy, emphasis has been laid recently on locally owned processes, societal legitimacy, inclusivity and resilience-building, thereby trying to move away from Western-dominated liberal norms towards a more multiple global order. However, critical emancipatory approaches to peacebuilding can also not avoid making a distinction between local and outsider. Mathieu (2019: 47) points out how 'the local is indeed valued because of "its" difference, a difference that only becomes salient through the use of dominant peacebuilding frames' and, therefore, 'the stigma [of "local"] is unwillingly reproduced'.

Concerning the ability to initiate and promote norms the core questions are, who has the right to contest or whose voice is heard as well as what is the outcome of the contestation. International norms are not rigid and stable fundamental principles, but also transforming and contingent. Constancy is then not synonymous with normality, but more about the contested nature of norms. Norms can be viewed from the perspective of contestedness, which is a principle reflecting the agreement that 'the norms, rules and principles of governance…require regular contestation in order to work' (Wiener, 2014: 1). Following Adler (2019: 148), it is because of this contestedness that 'social orders cannot result solely from coercion based on material power' and also why 'standard of competence' determines the legitimacy of international social orders. From a systemic point of view, contestation is necessary for the maintenance and legitimacy of international social orders as only a 'contested norm can ever be a good norm'. Norms have the dual quality of being both structuring and constructed, and hence they must be contestable by all involved stakeholders 'so as to both indicate potential legitimacy gaps and to overcome them' (Wiener, 2014: 4).

Here lies the pitfall for multilateral pecking orders as it sets different access points to contest and there continues to be a hidden standard of civilization which gives a privileged position to the liberal core and depicts the Global South as a passive target of the philanthropy of the privileged. Indeed, the growing awareness of

this asymmetry and visibility of the steep rise of liberal intrusiveness have led to a wave of differentiated contestations, with significant variations in what is contested and where (Börzel and Zürn, 2021), the outcome of which is declining leverage and legitimacy of existing peacebuilding practices.

Closer examination of trends and policies of contestation would require differentiation between different levels of norms, modes of contestation and forms of validation. Wiener (2014: 33–39) makes a distinction between fundamental norms, organizing principles and standardizing procedures. By fundamental norms, she refers to widely shared norms like the principles of non-interference or respect of human rights, but it is in the level of organizing principles that the interpretation of accepted and justified behaviour is defined and accepted. If fundamental norms are norms that are written into the UN Charter, organizing principles are declarations that serve to mediate and transform what is meant by the fundamental norms as legitimizing principles. Thus, for example, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the WPS agenda for which it laid the foundation can be understood as what Wiener described as organizing principles (True and Wiener, 2019). Standardized procedures are then ground-level practices that help adapt these general norms into concrete policies.

The Nordics cannot be labelled simply as norm entrepreneurs (Ingerbritsen, 2002), countries that initiate and promote new norms of multilateralism; the normative power of the Nordics is more complex. Instead of focusing on policy declarations, focusing on practices of contestation helps to identify more invisible and subtle forms of engagement, organizing and practising peace as well moulding approaches of knowledge production. When looking at the role of the Nordics, it is important to explore what are the platforms, modes and practices of validating and legitimizing norms for the Nordic actors. From the perspective of the decolonial critic on liberal peacebuilding, it is necessary to look beyond self-declared humanitarian values and ask how the local, the one who is the recipient of Nordic altruistic help, is depicted in Nordic practices of peace and how the Nordics' own privileged position is assumed. Furthermore, how are the Nordics responding and adapting to external critiques and contestation, including decolonial critique and authoritarian contestation. Thus, the question is about recognizing and respecting the agency of Global South actors to shape and contest the norms of global governance.

Multilateralism is constituted by intersecting and co-constitutive global, regional, state and local levels and instead of a uniform order, it is better to talk about multiple diffused and decentred international regimes and regime complexes (Adler, 2019: 138). In the Nordic case, the processes within the UN bodies are the obvious ones to examine but it is as important to look at ground-level, local and often informal interactions between external third-party and local actors in which certain normative principles are negotiated. The focus should also be on the so-called non-profit actors, who are playing an increasingly important role in the global peace ecosystem. Non-profits—for example, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—are connected to the state level but have operational autonomy and, thus, their normativity does not necessarily have to mimic that of states, even if it often does so (Lehti, 2019; Palmiano Federer, 2023).

UNSC Resolution 1325

The WPS was constituted by the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on 31 October 2000, and it had seven follow-up resolutions. Resolution 1325 and WPS 'marked the end of gender-blindness in peace and security' and adopted gender mainstreaming perspectives in all UN peace operations (Scheuermann, 2020: 1). Following the formal introduction by the UN, Resolution 1325 'reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security'.[1] The WPS is often divided 'into three "Ps": prevention, protection that "encompasses two aspects, a positive one, which underlines the protection of women's rights as human rights, and a negative one referring to protection from SGBV [sexual and gender-based violence]" and participation' or then alternatively to 'participation of women, protection of women and the inclusion of a gender perspective in all policies of peace and security, mainly through gender mainstreaming processes' (Scheuermann, 2020: 3).

Acceptance of the WPS agenda 'represents a major normative change in international peace and security politics. In a historical perspective, the speed with which this normative framework has impacted the peace and security discourse within the UN system and among influential UN member states is quite remarkable' (Tryggestad, 2014b: 4–5). The suffering of civilians, human rights violations, and genocides in the wars of the 1990s, primarily in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia, were still fresh in memory and new normative principles were actively developed for protecting civilians that 'shifted the focus of the United Nations (UN) Security Council towards human security and the protection of women' (Scheuermann, 2020). The institutionalization of WPS was the most remarkable achievement of the golden age of multilateralism as well as the era of liberal peacebuilding that began in the mid-1990s and slowly faded away by the 2020s.

The process leading to the approval of Resolution 1325 was a rare example of how state-centric norm-setting can be a widely inclusive and bottom-up supported process. Through Resolution 1325, the UNSC was taking an active role as a norm entrepreneur that was possible for it only in the formative years following the end of the Cold War. From the perspective of the 2020s, this kind of multi-actor engagement in preparing a Security Council resolution appears as a distant historical moment, but at the time, it represented for many a game-changing moment in multilateralism.

The process of preparing Resolution 1325 was not carried out only by the permanent members of the UNSC, a major role was taken on by non-permanent members from the Global South such as Namibia and Bangladesh. Canada was the most active advocator of the Resolution, and it took the initiative to set up the Friends of WPS group, which was then joined by Namibia and Bangladesh, and soon followed by the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

The preparation process was next extended beyond state-centric frameworks as civil society actors began engaging actively in it. The preparation process for the WPS is a prime example of how non-profits and the state-centric world of diplomacy and policy advocacy can intersect and be co-constitutive (Adler, 2019). The WPC agenda was primed in a series of international women's conferences organized from 1975 to 1995 by the UN, but 'in 1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women at Beijing was the first to make "women and armed conflict" a priority issue area, and it also gathered the largest number of NGOs at any such UN conference at that time'. The most important precursor of Resolution 1325 was the Windhoek Declaration, which also included the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations, announced at a high-level seminar organized in Windhoek, Namibia, in May 2000. Between Beijing and Windhoek, 'many meetings, seminars and conferences on various aspects of women, peace, and security' were organized in New York by various NGOs and it seems that states willingly gave agenda-making power to civil society actors and UN civil servants. Obviously, the process can be criticized as having been dominated by elite NGOs based primarily in the Global North (Basu, 2016), but there was 'participation of individuals and organizations from the Global South, especially from African countries' (Basu, 2016)—the WPS agenda was understood as a much-needed instrument within countries that had suffered violent conflicts.

Since 2000, for two decades now, Resolution 1325 has symbolized strong normative guidelines, a new foundation of peacemaking, which states, international organizations and transnational and local NGOs can use to find support for their work on women and gender rights in peacebuilding and mediation. It would be difficult to imagine a peace process or peacebuilding effort without any reference to the WPS. Resolution 1325 did not mean the end of the discussion on and development of the WPS agenda. Adapting and implementing general principles to a normative frame of peacebuilding operations is one part of normative evolution in which the core norms have been contested and revisited. The original resolution has been complemented with new resolutions. The Office of the UN Secretary General has also announced its yearly reports on the WPS agenda. Therefore, a broad-scale discussion and contestation of the WPS has remained open for critique that termed it as not radical enough or as stigmatizing women solely as victims of violence and not supporting their full agency or understanding the complexity of the gender question (Scheuermann, 2020; Tryggestad, 2016). From another perspective, the incontestable legitimacy of Resolution 1325 enabled this academic and activist criticism that then influenced how its normative guides have been developed and applied, but that does not contest the validation and legitimacy of the Resolution as an organizing principle of multilateralism.

Simultaneously, calls for the decolonization of Resolution 1325 have increased. Basu (2016: 371) points out how WPS has been critiqued for not being able to bridge the gap between the international and the local, and says that this gap cannot be fully filled—'there will always be a hegemonic WPS narrative, articulated in dominant readings of UNSCR 1325', but it is possible to find an alternative

decolonializing approach that aims to contest the way 'UNSCR 1325 appears to be a tool that is used by powerful countries, located in the Global North'. Therefore, instead of depicting the countries in the Global South as passive recipients of 'politics formulated elsewhere', Global South actors should be able to 'claim ownership of WPS resolutions' as well, and, even more importantly, 'the global narrative of UNSCR 1325 must take account of divergences from the canon—understood as differing interpretations, resistances and subversions—particularly, as these manifest in the Global South, which tends to be marginalized at the international level' (Basu, 2016: 363).

Gender-Progressive Nordics

'"Gender equality" and "women's rights"' are, according to Tryggestad (2014a: 470), a 'distinct issue-area in which the Nordic countries have exercised normative power, not only in relation to the social, political and economic spheres, but also increasingly within the sphere of international peace and security'. The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of 2000 and WPS agenda constituted a culmination point in Nordic thinking and since then Nordic engagement with peacebuilding and promotion of gender-equal norms merged and became inseparable. Ever since, it can be argued that the Nordics' uncontestable self-image as well as widely shared national branding of being the world's most gender-equal countries have offered them a privileged position which not just enables but necessitates the use of normative power in the global sphere (Jezierska and Towns, 2021; Moss, 2021). This chapter asks how the Nordics have exercised this power in their policy practices.

Currently, the Nordic countries present themselves 'as historical frontrunners of gender equality'. They consider their societies to be the most progressive in the world with regard to gender rights and this is understood to be firmly grounded in the very essence of these societies (Larsen, 2021). However, the Nordics' image and brand of being the most gender-equal countries developed only during the late Cold War decades and rose to prominence *after* the Cold War. Though Nordic narratives often refer to how gender equality was first achieved in a Nordic country, historically, these countries were not seen from outside as a model for gender equality, as, for example, in the case of the suffragettes of the pre-World War I era (Larsen, 2021), and there was no gender perspective in the progressive image of the Nordics (or Scandinavia) during the interwar years (Musiał, 2002).

Gender rights have been given a central role in Nordic foreign policies, including peacebuilding and peace mediation policies, only in the twenty-first century. The most radical expression of the centrality of the gender question in Nordic foreign policies is the formal adoption of the feminist foreign policy (FFP) in Sweden in 2014. According to the official statement, Sweden's FFP 'entails applying a systematic gender equality perspective throughout foreign policy'. According to the official declaration, 'the focal points of the FFP are to promote equal rights and freedom from sexual violence, sexual and reproductive health and rights, women's participation in politics and peace processes, and equal allocation of resources between women and men' (Sundström, Zhukova and Elgström, 2021: 439–440).

Sweden thus 'habitually portrays itself as being at the very forefront of the fight for gender equality' (Moss, 2021: 69).

Even if the other Nordic countries have not formally labelled their foreign policies as feminist-oriented, the same patterns and agendas can be recognized there. Nevertheless, only Sweden has used the feminist label explicitly; the other Nordic countries prefer a more neutral gender equality approach. Inger Skjelsbæk and Torunn Tryggestad (2021) make a distinction between Sweden's ideological FFP and Norway's more pragmatic approach to emphasizing gender issues in its peace policies. In Sweden, the feminist approach defines the whole foreign policy and has no particular focus in the peace policies, whereas in Norway, the international promotion of gender rights is primarily channelled through its peace policies. Another interesting distinction among the Nordic approaches is how they view their own country as a model for the others. According to Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad (2021: 122), Sweden stands out from the other Nordic countries 'because it sees itself as a model country, not only morally committed to taking the lead…but also [as] a "look-to country" for others'. All the other Nordic countries also consider themselves to be frontrunners in gender equality, but they shy away from an unabashed presentation of themselves as a universal model for others to follow.

In their study of the representation of the FFP in Western and non-Western newspapers, Sundström, Zhukova and Elgström (2021: 446) reveal that Sweden's FFP is regarded widely in the Nordic region and elsewhere in Europe as a radical departure from conventional diplomacy, but beyond the Global North, it is interpreted also as a normative interventionism that is 'based on Western liberal feminism, which stands for women's rights, representation in public life and redistribution of resources'. It can be interpreted as illegitimate by the proponents of post-colonial feminism, who argue that Western liberal feminists disregard the structural inequalities caused by colonialism and globalization that exist between women in the West and the 'Rest' of the world (Achilleos-Sarll, 2018).

All interventionary praxes of peace need to be based on a certain methodology and epistemology of producing knowledge that 'facilitates ever more refined forms of practical intervention to maintain and extend the existing order', as Richmond (2020) explains. He points to three methodologies: methodological liberalism, nationalism and 'everydayism'. These three methodologies share a constrained relationship as methodological liberalism is aimed at curbing the power political logic of methodological nationalism and methodological everydayism contests the universalism and state-centrism of methodological liberalism. Methodological everydayism is often associated with a pluralist and culturally sensitive liberal peace approach that focusses on socio-cultural values and local understandings as barriers to overcome. However, Chandler (2014) contests the ontological basis of methodological everydayism by arguing that no matter how culturally sensitive peace interventions are, they are still inevitably producing hierarchical understandings, which 'problematized (even pathologized) local understandings and values and came across as patronizing and neocolonial'. According to him 'to overcome this problematic and hierarchical binary' calls for accepting epistemological plurality and uncertainty. Here, the question is how far Nordic peace practices are

embedded in methodological liberalism and how much methodological everydayism has influenced their policies. Furthermore, how is methodological everydayism configurated in everyday practices of peacemaking? The UN WPS agenda offers an excellent example to elaborate how normativity is constituted in practices of peacebuilding or how the Nordics engage in normative interventionism. The core question is how the Nordics depict a local actor as the target of their peace policies and how knowledge is produced about the kind of policies and norm diffusion that are needed.

The Nordics and WPS

The WPS agenda has generated a versatile multi-actor ecosystem extending from and linking local grass-roots actors to states and international organizations. There has prevailed for long an 'outstanding degree of normative consensus of [the] importance of the WPS agenda', but that does not mean that the agenda has not been contested. Multiple civil society actors have played a significant role in 'engag[ing] in both reactive and proactive contestation' (True and Wiener, 2019: 571). States that still hold a major stake in WPS are categorized by True and Wiener (2019: 562–563) into four groups according to their normative standing. The first group can be classified as reactionary, and consists of states like 'China, Egypt, India, Iran, Pakistan and Russia', who 'have in common an interest in delimiting the scope of the WPS normative agenda to issues pertaining to "international peace and security"', and their proactive contestation challenges the legitimacy of the UN as a norm definer. '[A] second group of states and regional organizations support the WPS agenda broadly', but 'these states seek to uphold their autonomy and continually refer to the political independence of states and the importance of UN cooperation with national jurisdictions and regional organizations'. These states can be found among the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the League of Arab States.

A third group of states consists of strong endorsers of WPS and 'these states are typically in a post-conflict phase or affected by conflict, so normatively committed but constrained in their capacity to implement the agenda without external assistance'. Finally, the fourth 'group of states are strong leaders and endorsers of WPS, and also tend to be wealthy donor states situated in the global "North"'. Furthermore, 'they note their achievements, often after successive NAPs [National Action Plans] institutionalizing WPS principles and procedures' and they address the WPS in 'their foreign policy and development assistance responses'. Among these rich states of the Global North, there prevails a kind of 'positive behavioural contestation designed to expand the moral and practical reach of the norm through implementation' (True and Wiener, 2019: 563).

The Nordics are a prime example of the last group. The Nordic countries are often presented as the leading 'countries in terms of promoting women's rights in relation to peace security' and 'as a norm entrepreneur in this particular issue area' (Tryggestad, 2014a: 465). However, if we were to examine closely how the Nordics are using their normative power as also how their normative power is

built on and used for building a privileged position within the LIO, the Nordic position appears more controversial.

During the past two decades, in their foreign policy planning and making, the Nordics have referred to Resolution 1325 hundreds of times. WPS has constituted an integral element of Nordic normative foreign policies for promoting peace and the Nordics have regarded themselves as promoters and protagonists of the WPS agenda and as a model for others. However, despite the importance of Resolution 1325 to the Nordics, their imprint was not particularly strong in the process leading to the original resolution. Before Resolutions 1325, there are a few examples of Nordic diplomats who, in the halls of the UN meetings, 'called for the acknowledgement of women's roles in relation to international peace and security and highlighted the need to recruit more women as peacekeepers' (Tryggestad, 2014a: 471). Even in the early preparatory phase, the Nordics had already adopted the role of donor. For example, Sweden and Norway 'initiated and funded the first major study under the auspices of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) on how to mainstream a gender perspective in UN peace operations' (Tryggestad, 2014a: 470). Another example of a Nordic contribution in the further development of Resolution 1325 was a report entitled 'Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts' Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peace-Building', written by former Finnish Minister of Equality Affairs and of Defence Elisabeth Rehn and former Liberian Minister of Finance Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. Rehn and Sirleaf were appointed by the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and in 2002, they published their report based on interviews 'focusing on the impact of armed conflict on women and women's role in peacebuilding' in 14 areas affected by conflict in different parts of the world (Laukka, 2018).

The role of the Nordic countries became more prominent when Resolution 1325 was applied and adapted into the practices of liberal peace interventions. Instead of actively contesting and shaping the organizing principles of multilateralism, the process leading to Resolution 1325, the Nordics took on an active role in setting the standardizing procedures to adapt WPS norms into liberal peacebuilding practices. Subsequently, the Nordics adopted the role of defender of the Resolution, but they also wanted to become a model actor in the implementation of the Resolution into policies. Here, I take a closer look at three different examples and perspectives to Nordic normative interventionism: the Norwegian role in executing WPS into a peacebuilding process in Burundi in the early 2000s, the writing of NAPs focusing on Finland as an example, and the role of private peacemakers in adapting WPS into peace mediation activities.

Nordic Normative Interventionism

Norway's Role in Burundi

Burundi was among the first target countries where the newly founded UN Peacebuilding Commission (UN PBC) took on an active role in designing post-conflict peacebuilding and where WPS norms were embedded in the peacebuilding

practices. The PBC was launched in 2005 to strengthen capacity and capability to develop and coordinate 'post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery' (Tryggestad, 2014a: 468). As Street, Mollett and Smith (2008: 33) remind us, the PBC was founded by the congruent decisions of the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly; it was the outcome of contestation about existing conflict resolution practices and 'a recognition that international support for post-conflict countries was not succeeding as well as it should'. Partly by accident, partly as a result of purposeful policy, Norway gained a pioneering role in the process as it was a co-chair of the PBC and then played a leading role in the Burundi peace process from summer 2006 to summer 2008.

In 2006, Burundi entered a new post-conflict phase when general elections brought its long transition period to an end. The UN peacekeeping operation (ONUB, 2005–2007) was then replaced by the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB, 2007–2011), which was more a post-conflict peacebuilding operation. Civil war had broken out in 1993, and in 2000, the Arusha Accords—the transitional peace treaty mediated by former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere (*d.* 1999) and former South African President Nelson Mandela—were signed. When Norway gained a leading position in the PBC to organize a mission in Burundi, it had no previous experience of the Great Lakes Region and no pre-knowledge of the Burundi case; Burundi had held no primary importance in Norwegian foreign policy. Nevertheless, Norway lobbied actively to gain a leadership position in organizing peacebuilding in Burundi. The Norwegian diplomatic activity was an excellent example of small state policy in the emerging multilateral pecking order, in which reputation and influence within the multilateral system are achieved by gaining a leading position in this kind of peace operation. Norway was possibly not looking primarily at a role as a norm shaper—becoming a peacebuilder in Burundi was probably more about gaining international reputation as a peace nation, but because Burundi was a pioneering case for the PBC, Norway had an important role in adapting the WPS norms to the standardizing procedures of peacebuilding.

As 'a founding member of the PBC, Norway was well-placed to influence policy development and promote issues of particular concern to Norwegian foreign policymakers, including the WPS agenda', as noted by Tryggestad (2014a: 466). Norway was active, at least rhetorically, in promoting the engagement of civil society actors and the WPS agenda in the peace process that was conducted on an ad hoc basis in Burundi, but the example has broader significance for UN peacebuilding in general. In the PBC, strengthening local ownership 'was seen mainly as [a] capacity of the governments', but 'Norway's overarching goals during its membership period was to contribute to the establishment of guidelines and routines for consultations between the PBF [Peacebuilding Fund] and civil society—including women's group[s]—both in New York and in the countries that fell under the PBC's agenda' (Tryggestad, 2014a: 469). Giving a particular emphasis to civil society engagement reflects Nordic domestic norms and how the Nordic welfare society is based on close cooperation and interaction with state and civil society.

However, the way in which civil society engagement and WPS were incorporated into the formal process at Burundi under the Norwegian leadership was

not consistent and displayed paternalizing tendencies. Street, Mollett and Smith (2008: 37) emphasize the positive outcome of the Norway-led peacebuilding exercise in Burundi, and they argue that organized dialogue platforms 'provided a rare opportunity for all players (the newly elected government, the international community and local civil society) to sit together and discuss a vision for the country's recovery, something that had not typically happened before'. Their study, when it was published in 2008, held trust in the capability of the then newly established peacebuilding practices to spark 'a multiplier effect' for supporting sustainable peace if only organized dialogue were properly managed. Later studies display a more critical perspective towards third-party engagement, with more emphasis being laid on local agency. Väyrynen, Féron and Lehti (2021: 368) emphasize how 'Burundian civil society organizations have set up numerous small-scale initiatives to foster dialogue and prevent the reemergence of conflict' and how 'women's groups and organizations, in particular, built on their solid experience dating back to 1993 and the creation of the "Women for Peace" movement'. The Women for Peace movement has launched organizations such as Dushirehamwe ('Let's Reconcile' in Kirundi), which have played an active role 'in mediation and the peaceful resolution of conflicts with women throughout the country, even in its most remote areas'. International peacebuilding actors like Norway supported and empowered these movements but they existed there without external intervention and their agency was not primarily shaped by any international agency; nevertheless, the international peacebuilders stood as gatekeepers for their participation in the UN processes.

In the beginning, the Norwegian engagement in Burundi and execution of the WPS was a top-down logic to meet the formal criteria, and local women's voices were partly sidelined, but the Norwegians reacted to local contestations and at least partly changed their earlier top-down perspective. 'As part of the peacebuilding process a PBF [Peacebuilding Fund] National Steering Committee was set up', but in the beginning, 'membership was limited to representatives of the Burundian government and various UN entities already operating in the country. Gradually, participation at committee meetings was expanded to include donors, international NGOs, and national civil society representatives as observers' (Tryggestad, 2014a: 475). According to Tryggestad (2014a: 473), civil society got involved 'after pressure had been exerted on the government both from New York and from various international and national civil society actors—including women's organizations'. Interestingly, in early sittings of the National Steering Committee, 'women and women's organizations were still excluded' even though Burundi already had 'a vibrant women's movement' that was actively lobbying for women's involvement in the peacebuilding process. Later, when international NGOs took up protests, Norway adopted an active role by engaging in several meetings with local women's NGOs and supporting their capacity to engage by 'providing funding for a coordinator within the women's association, Dushirehamwe, to work on the PBC/PBF processes with a women's rights focus' (Tryggestad, 2014a: 475–476).

Another example of the patronizing approach is the primary meeting organized in New York in October 2006 to set the agenda for peacebuilding in Burundi.

Tryggestad (2014a: 475) says the manner in which Norwegian Ambassador Johan Ludvik Løvald compelled the Burundians to accept the 'women issue' in the agenda represents 'a clear-cut act of *normative interventionism* and norm-building by the chair, and very much along the traditional state feminist way of thinking on how to best promote women's rights'. In the beginning of the meeting, the Norwegian diplomats expressed their surprise 'that women's issues did not figure high on the agenda of the Burundian delegation' and even Burundian Minister Antoinette Batumubwira protested by explaining 'that Burundian women had already made it into decision making by ensuring a high level of women's representation in the country's parliament and among government ministers'. Norwegian Ambassador Løvald compelled the Burundians to accept the 'women issue' in the agenda. In the end, the Norwegians were satisfied when 'resolution 1325 [was] integrated into the formal peacebuilding documents'.

The Norwegian position gives an example of how liberal peace interventions tend to be justified as interventions in the cause of 'liberating women' but without caring to hear whether the local women want to be liberated and how they have promoted their rights. Basu (2016: 369) says that 'the canon of the global narrative of UNSCR 1325' belies the diversity of civil society actors with regard to the gender question and once again ended in stereotypic homogenization. That is why, according to her, 'gender advocates in conflict-affected regions do not necessarily see UNSCR 1325 as a particularly useful mechanism'; she concludes that 'while scholarly and policy literature is replete with examples of "success stories", there are very few examinations of instances where UNSCR 1325 has not made much of a mark'.

Nordic National Action Plan Writing

Following UN Resolution 1325, the so-called NAPs were introduced as the core instrument of diffusion of the gender-specific normative framework to enhance protection of women and girls against SGBV, to promote women's participation in all peace and security related processes, and to support women's role as peace builders (True, 2016). NAPs were introduced as a core tool to implement WPS in national-level practices by assisting 'countries in identifying priorities and resources, determining their responsibilities, and committing the government to action'.[2] By 2021, 98 nations had created NAPs and 12 regional organizations also had their own action plans for the WPS agenda (Stenius, 2022: 13). The Nordic countries were among the first 12 countries in the world to launch their NAPs: Denmark was the first, launching its NAP in 2005, followed by Norway and Sweden in 2006, and Finland and Iceland in 2008. Since launching their first NAPs, the Nordics have continued to develop subsequent NAPs and the NAP writing process has become a regular part of their foreign policy planning. For example, after accepting its first NAP in 2008, Finland accepted its second NAP in 2012, the third in 2018 and the fourth in March 2023 (Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad, 2021: 121).

A strong normative ethos of building a more peaceful and just world is stressed in all the Nordic NAPs. Norway sees the WPS agenda as integral to Norway's

commitment 'to promote a more just world' (Norway NAP 2006–2011), while Sweden boldly addresses the lack of women in peacebuilding efforts and declares that 'Sweden is, and will continue to be, at the forefront of work to reverse this development' (Sweden NAP 2006–2008). All in all, it is obvious that 'the WPS agenda has become a policy area in which the Nordic countries seek to shine on the international stage [and this] also becomes apparent with each new NAP' (Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad, 2021: 121–122). NAPs are then seen as important inputs within the international pecking order to strengthen the Nordic self-declared position as humanitarian great powers, and that the Nordics shine in excellence through their NAPs is manifested in their top ranks in the WPS index maintained by Georgetown University, USA.[3]

A close look at the Finnish experience explains the skewed reality of writing NAPs. NAPs have become a corner-stone of Finnish WPS policy, but, interestingly, necessity of being exemplary in its NAP policies is presented important for Finland's brand as a global frontrunner. NAP preparation included a wide consultation process in which several ministry agencies, NGOs and a few researchers participated (Stenius, 2022). The process itself can be seen to reflect Nordic norms as it is built on trust between formal and informal agencies and the ministry is broadly listening to opinions from civil society. However, everything was not as it looked at first glance because, first, the process was not as inclusive and multi-voiced as presented: the too critical voices were softly marginalized and the too critical researchers were excluded. Second, the process was streamlined by adopting the 'language of project management and use of "results language", diplomatic conventions and collective euphoria around producing "the world's best NAP"' (Lyytikäinen and Jauhola, 2020: 85, 89). Furthermore, for the third NAP, the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs contracted external consultancy—a US-based gender equality organization that has also facilitated several other NAP processes—to achieve a standardized format. The use of external consultancy was to confirm that Finland was gaining its national goal of 'ensur[ing] that Finland would meet established international best practice', but it also underlines how Finland was competing with other NAP-writing countries in the Global North to become a leading WPS country. Thus, from one perspective, NAPs represent a tool in the multilateral pecking order which Finland uses to gain respect and reputation. According to Lyytikäinen and Jauhola (2020: 85), the ostensibly inclusive process better 'exemplifies depoliticized neoliberal governmentalities at the heart of WPS policies'.

All Nordic NAPs are primarily written normative guidelines for humanitarian advocacy, peacebuilding and peacekeeping. Not all NAPs have a similar focus. A number of post-conflict countries in the Global South such as Burundi 'have adopted NAPs for the implementation of the WPS resolutions', but these NAPs focus 'primarily on the employment of the resolutions in their national contexts' (Basu, 2016: 366). Some of the NAPs in the Global North countries include also a focus on domestic challenges, even if simultaneously regulating peacebuilding and other processes targeted at the Global South (True, 2016: 309). Strikingly, the Finnish NAPs do not discuss domestic questions, and there is no reference to the Sami

question or the role of women in the Finnish army, but there is a short chapter on refugees and asylum-seekers, emphasizing the need to ensure 'the safety of women, consideration of their special needs and their participation at different stages of the refugee process' as well as paying special attention to the integration of women refugees in Finnish society. However, civil servants working on these problems did not participate in the preparation process (Finland's NAP 2023−2027: 66; Stenius, 2022). The image created by the Finnish NAPs is that everything is in order domestically in Finland and that this exemplary position gives it rights but also obligations to be a leading advocate of the WPS agenda in the Global South. This position is seen as incontestable, self-evident and beyond any criticism. Therefore, a significant point of critique regarding the Finnish NAPs is that they ignore interactions with the Global South during the preparation process. Finland has been investing in supporting NAP processes in selected Global South countries, and in this so-called twinning process, Finnish experts offer guidance on best practices to the target country (Stenius, 2022: 5). The process is very paternalizing and there is little room for dialogue and obviously no option for mutual learning. All NAPs are designed to be tools of norm diffusion but Finnish as well as all the other Nordic NAPs appear to be also strategic agendas for defining and justifying normative interventionism.

It is not possible here to focus in detail on what kind of impact and influence the various NAPs have had on Nordic policies. From a critical perspective, the Nordic NAPs appear to be normative guidelines to Nordic actors to design their peace or humanitarian interventions in the Global South, and thus they can be seen even as normative frames set by the Nordics on how societies in the Global South should develop. From a more pragmatic perspective, the NAPs are loose recommendations and not guides for strategic planning, and their importance in the operationalized activities of different actors is vague (Stenius, 2022). NAPs as such are not 'necessary or mandatory instrument[s] for compliance with the WPS agenda' (True and Wiener, 2019: 570), and thus they appear to be a branding tool that, though genuine in their desire to support WPS, end up depicting Nordic moral superiority. However, this is not the complete picture of the Nordics' normative approach, and the focus needs to switch to organizations executing the WPS agenda and their operational activities.

Nordic Mediators on the Ground

Peace mediation became a commonplace practice in peace diplomacy from the mid-1990s onwards, and during the last three decades, there has developed a professional field of peace mediation including various actors from big powers to small states, from international organizations to various non-profit organizations. There are several notable examples of Nordic mediators in the Cold War era, beginning with Count Folke Bernadotte, who was appointed the United Nations Mediator in Palestine in 1948 to mitigate the Israeli-Arab conflict. However, it was only in the post-Cold War decades that several Nordic countries added mediation to their foreign policy priorities (Lehti, 2019).

Norway had already earned a reputation as a great power in peace mediation in the late 1990s and has since become a high-profile peacemaker that has engaged in several peace processes since 1993: Afghanistan, Colombia, Guatemala, the Middle East, Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan/South Sudan and Venezuela (in alphabetical order, Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad, 2021: 116). Research literature describes the Norwegian model of organizing mediation as being based on a close relationship and prevailing trust between the foreign ministry, the NGO sector and research. In this setting, the ministry is responsible for the operational activities, while the NGOs primarily offer their expertise and knowledge for the supporting process (Lehti and Saarinen, 2014: 56–65).

Finland has tried to follow the Norwegian path since 2010 but not managed to become as successful in engaging in peace processes. Because its Ministry of Foreign Affairs lacked access to peace processes, it focussed more on supporting, networking, empowering and donating to nongovernmental mediation actors. A Finnish particularity in the peace sector is the existence of strong NGO actors that focus on mediation and peacemaking. Finland is home to three internationally well-known, independent mediation and peacebuilding organizations: the CMI–Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation (CMI), the Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission (FELM) and Finn Church Aid (FCA), which is closely associated with the New York-based Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers. These three NGOs have different organizational histories, and their profiles and achievements in peacemaking, mediation and conflict prevention are different, but together with the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, these constitute the heart of Finnish connected peace ecosystems that execute various field operations in different parts of the globe. The Finnish state's funding and support enable these NGOs to engage in peace processes, but they are not expected—nor do they consider themselves obliged—to work as an extension of Finnish foreign policy and the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have a specific interest in influencing the agenda of these organizations except to promote general principles like women's inclusion in peace processes (Lehti, 2019: 145–154).

In Finland, relationships with the formal and informal, state and civil society, actors take on a different format than in Norway. In the latter, private actors offer their knowledge and capacity to support Ministry of Foreign Affairs operations, but in Finland, it is NGO actors that execute mediation in conflict-affected societies. What is common in the Norwegian and Finnish models, and thus what grounds the Nordic norm of organizing mediation, is a prevailing trust between the state and the civil society actors that enables their interaction. A follow-up question is how this norm also influences the mediation practices of Nordic actors in conflict-affected areas and how they adapt the WPS agenda in their mediation policies.

The Nordics have branded themselves as impartial actors without political interests or colonial burden, that is not the whole picture. Engaging in mediation processes seems to be a tool for supporting system maintenance but above all for gaining international reputation, goodwill and influence at the global level (Skånland, 2010). In comparison to peacebuilding, mediation is less openly normative, but while mediation

has expanded from exclusive meetings of heads of state to support civil society, the inclusion difference between mediation, dialogue and peacebuilding has become fuzzier, and mediation has become more normative (Palmiano Federer, 2023). The adoption of WPS into mediation agendas is an example of a shift towards a normative ethos, but WPS is a rather late and reluctantly organized principle in Norwegian mediation policies. Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad (2021: 116–117) say that 'the majority of the profiled individuals involved in Norwegian peace mediation during the 1990s and early 2000s were men' and also that

> interestingly, gender-equality norms or WPS are not mentioned on this list as core values or principles of the Norwegian peace engagement model, even though the inclusion of women and the integration of gender perspectives within peace processes had already become an integral part of Norway's most recent peace engagements when it was made.

Finland has keenly promoted WPS in its peace mediation agenda and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been very active in launching and supporting the Nordic Women Mediators, a network of Nordic women peace professionals from the ministry, international organizations and NGOs (Finland's NAP 2023−2027). From the perspective of normative interventionism, the approaches and experiences of Finnish-based private peacemaking organizations are more relevant. The Finnish private peacemaking organizations are not uniform in their approaches to mediation and peacebuilding, but there are similarities in their practices and approaches to WPS. All the organizations work with a variety of women actors ranging from politicians and parliamentarians (e.g. CMI in South Sudan) to lawyers (e.g. the FCA in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Furthermore, as in FELM's approach, the partners can also be teachers, doctors or representatives from other professions. They acknowledge that sometimes it is easier to advance a dialogue through such professional groups as they include women from both sides of the conflict. (Lehti, 2019: 155–164; Väyrynen et al., 2018: 27–34).

In comparison to the rather straightforward approach to norm diffusion that is characteristic, for example, of WPS promotion in NAP writing, norm diffusion is comprehended in Finnish-based mediation organizations as complex and very sensitive. They share an understanding that inclusivity and women's participation in peace processes contribute to the sustainability of peace in a complex manner. When this is thought to be a question of participation and representation in the track one process, the relationship between the gender of the mediator and mediation success is not seen to be straightforward. In short, the belief in the causality between women's participation in official negotiations and more sustainable peace is seen to be based on a limited understanding of complex and often very long peacebuilding processes. It is recognized that international peacemakers cannot and should not aim at radical and fast change in terms of the existing gender roles, and within this kind of sensitive setting, it is challenging to push too openly and too single-mindedly for women's participation. Furthermore, the ability of the international third party to change the attitudes of political and military leaders is

often limited, but investing in civil society actors is seen to be useful as it prepares society for the de-escalation and peacebuilding phases in the conflict cycle. Private mediators also point out that women peacemakers and women's organizations are diverse and heterogeneous—and sometimes even internally fragmented, with different views, goals and interests (Väyrynen et al., 2018: 27–34).

All three organizations emphasize in their narrative context specificity, conflict sensitiveness, localized approaches and the fluidity and flexibility of their peace interventions. Working in gender-sensitive ways and supporting various women actors have been essential to their involvement in various dialogue and peace processes on the ground, as, for example, in Libya, South Sudan, Somalia, Syria and Myanmar. Working with women's NGOs is seen to guarantee the best access and entry points to the conflict cycle since they have legitimacy at the local level and local partners can offer their networks and platforms to work in all relevant sectors of society. However, women's involvement is not necessarily a question of capacity but rather of missing an entry point into the formal or informal peace processes or dialogues. For example, the Network's activities in Libya were targeted to support local women actors' access to dialogue among the tribal leaders (Lehti, 2019: 155–164; Väyrynen et al., 2018: 27–34).

From the WPS perspective, the fact that the Network works with religious and traditional peacemakers gives it stronger legitimacy among the local population than working with state actors and is indicative of the pragmatic approach of the Nordic NGO actors. According to the Network, local religious and traditional peacemakers are often patriarchal in nature but this normative position should not discourage one from engaging with them—rather, such engagement creates opportunities to advance gender-inclusive transformation from the inside and through local ownership (Rytkönen, 2014: 105; Väyrynen et al., 2018: 27–34). The Network's guidelines require that the (local) women should be consulted first to identify how they can be supported. International support is often welcomed, and is seen to support the perceived legitimacy of the work of the local actors but, at other times, international actors may end up 'hijacking' the agenda and activities of the local NGOs and thereby hinder the effectiveness of the local organizations' work and damage their reputation in the eyes of local stakeholders (Lehti, 2019: 222). Whether this is done knowingly or by accident, the damage may prove to be fatal to the local peace efforts and to the work carried out by local women actors. Therefore, engaging with local partners and setting the agenda for third-party interventions is a highly sensitive and context-specific exercise.

All in all, the Finnish private peacemakers are seemingly able at some level to escape the paternalizing perspectives characteristic of Nordic state-run peacebuilding or NAP writing, and in their activities, it is possible to recognize a pursuit for dialogic interaction but also situated practices that softly contest the universalizing ethos of liberal peacebuilding. Their approach is norm-based but they consciously aim to avoid normative interventionism and depart from methodological everydayism. WPS is understood to be open for divergent understandings, and local engagement in interpreting the agenda is actively supported in various situated interactions and dialogue with local, often civil society, actors.

Focusing on the engagement of Nordic NGOs in various mediation and dialogue processes paints a partially different picture from the two other examples discussed earlier in this chapter. There is a clear difference between formal actors and formal processes and informal actors and their interventions. The former includes large peacebuilding interventions as well as writing NAPs. These processes are dominated by methodological liberalism, and the approaches are predominantly paternalizing and there is only scant knowledge transfer between Nordic actors and the local actors who are depicted as passive targets waiting for Nordic policies to rescue them. However, when the Nordics have met with local contestation, like in Burundi, they have renewed their approach and engaged in more interactive normative practices in which methodological liberalism is contested by civil society actors. In private peacemaking practices, emphasis is placed on engaging with local actors and the local appears more as a partner than a target. Several mediation and dialogue interventions are generating communities of practices within which situated knowledge and adaptive practices to diffuse WPS norms are produced.

This kind of approach can be seen to better reflect Nordic societies' own trust in civil society and even the pragmatism of Nordic policymaking. The Nordics are not unique actors and a normative shift in favour of the grass roots has generated several practices and funding instruments initiating innovative bottom-up and grass-roots focussed process and dialogues to enable women's participation in various peacebuilding processes and to give local women full agency to shape their future. Nevertheless, the Finnish organizations discussed above are obvious pioneers in developing and executing new practices that respect divergent understandings of the WPS agenda.

Meeting Illiberal Contestation

In critical literature, contestation of liberal peacebuilding is largely seen as a means which ideally leads to inclusive dialogue with norm promoters enabling 'norm localisation' and 'norm subsidiarity' and leading towards a multipolar, non-hegemonic, pluralistic, democratic and globally equitable world order. In other words, contestation is understood to have constructive and transformative effects (Mathieu, 2019). In recent years, in addition to decolonial critiques, authoritarian and illiberal regimes have contested more openly and more severely the WPS agenda which is seen to symbolize the normative interventionism of the Western-led liberal order and to repress what they regard as authentic norms and values. Sites of multilateralism have changed to become not just sites of norm contestation but also norm clashes, but it should be kept in mind that even disruptive contestations do not aim to exterminate major sites of multilateralism like that of different UN bodies even if they contest their legitimacy from time to time (Bettiza and Lewis, 2020).

The incontestable normative consensus of importance that the WPS agenda enjoyed for almost two decades has been openly disrupted, and what was regarded earlier as non-acceptable behaviour has become commonplace in many international forums and organizations. In his yearly report in 2019, UN Secretary General António Guterres expressed his worry about how WPS has met a new type

of resistance, and how implementation and development of its agenda have been weakening or even stopped (Stenius, 2022: 11–12). Destructive anti-gender contestation may find a sympathetic audience in several conservative and illiberal states, but open contestation has been carried out primarily by two rising authoritarian powers, Russia and China (True and Wiener, 2019). The consensus in the UN Security Council regarding Resolution 1325 was broken for the first time in 2019 when there emerged disagreement about Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights and a proposal for UN Security Council Resolution 2467 (to strengthen justice and accountability and calling for a survivor-centred approach in the prevention and response to conflict-related sexual violence) had to be revisited because of Russian and Chinese opposition; the outcome was seen by many as having been watered down (Stenius, 2022: 12). It seems obvious now that the two decades long complementary development of Resolution 1325 came to its end in 2019 and continuous norm clashes at the UN are the new definers of an evolving age. The WPS agenda has become a site for evolving norm clashes.

There is not yet much empirical evidence to study how the Nordics have reacted to this increasing illiberal contestation, but according to the examples available, it seems that the Nordics have so far undervalued the significance of illiberal contestation and ignored the possibility of systemic change as they continue to operate as if the normative basis of the liberal order had no frictions. A good example of this is the Finnish policy at the UN Human Rights Committee (OHCHR). At OHCHR meetings, liberal emphasis of women's rights is continuously contested by the illiberal powers. The Finnish tactic so far has been to continue to push its progressive liberal agenda on WPS despite the everyday struggles and clashes it has met with. The increasing contestation has been recognized, but the only way to address it is to ignore it and continue pushing one's own agenda (Fröberg, 2022). Because of such tactics, even countries that do not necessarily share the same norms continue to quarrel on women's rights and thus the WPS agenda remains in the spotlight even though its impact on the ground is diminishing. It seems that the Nordics are confused and unable to adapt their policies to the new era of global uncertainties.

In recent times, there have been two major events that have fundamentally changed the Nordics' approach to peace promotion: the end of international peacebuilding and the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2021 and the aggressive Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. For the Nordics, Afghanistan was one of the most long-lasting and significant investments in peacebuilding, and the role of WPS was the central driving force and source of justification for engagement there. The dramatic end of international or Western presence in Afghanistan and the seeming failure of normative interventionism there opens up a need for Nordic countries to critically evaluate their peacebuilding methods and achievements (Mustasilta et al., 2022). The earlier omnipotent trust legitimacy and righteousness of peacebuilding has been severely contested.

The large-scale Russian military intervention in Ukraine was experienced as an existential question for the Nordic countries' national security: it was met with confusion and anxiety because the return of interstate war and great power aggression in Europe shattered trust in one's own secure position and in a peaceful future

as well as the illusion of the subordination of geopolitics to the markets that were characteristic of the heydays of the liberal order (Browning and Lehti, 2007). For decades, the Nordic *of* peace was extended to and embedded in the European Union, and all of Europe was understood as a zone of deep peace, a mutual security community just like the Nordic region itself, where trust in peaceful solutions to conflict prevailed. Any wars were understood more in terms of asymmetric civil wars that were seen as characteristic of the Global South but not of Europe, at least not after the Yugoslavian secession wars.

From the perspective of Western Europe, Eastern Europe was comprehended as a liminal space which was not fully European yet and not part of the European zone of deep peace. In regard to the wider Europe the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was regarded as a security-community building institution to diffuse liberal norms and liberal peace eastwards extending to Russia and the post-Soviet space (Adler, 2015: 199–204). The Russian aggression hit directly at trust in the capability of the OSCE and was seen to be targeted at the whole of Europe. As a result of the war, Ukraine is now regarded as a integral part of Europe and its destiny is experienced to be crucial for the Nordics' security. From this perspective, the Nordics have approached the Baltic states and receded from Western Europe's experiences. Currently, the Nordics (in particular Finland and Sweden) are configuring the future of Europe in terms of military guarantees (NATO membership) and military victory (of Ukraine), indicating how trust in the OSCE-centric multilateral structures has been lost.

Paradoxically, nothing has seemingly changed in the Nordic peace policies. There is no broader discussion or investigation on how to adapt Nordic peace policies to address the new realities. At the government level, the promotion and adoption of WPS in Nordic policies continue without any serious doubts about their own superiority and legitimate position and the belief that the Western-led liberal world will continue as before. If we look back to the golden decades of liberal peacebuilding, it is possible to recognize a fundamental division between how Nordics have figured out Nordic *for* peace and Nordic *of* peace. The first was and is still associated with normative policies concerning faraway places mainly in the Global South. Interestingly, since the refugee crisis of 2016 has begun to be contested in Nordic political discussions, their objective of crisis management and peacebuilding in the Global South is being seen more as a tool to prevent migratory flows to the Nordics, and thus as an issue of national security.[4] But, at the policymaking level, the two realms of peace remain separate to this day. Peacebuilding discourses targeted at the Global South continue as there is no war in the heart of Europe, but simultaneously, peace remains absent from the discourse on the future of Europe after the war in Ukraine.

Concluding Remarks

To conclude, the answer to the question of how the Nordics have used their normative power appears vaguer and more contradictory than presented by Ingerbritsen (2002). From the perspective of practices, the Nordics are not reformers or active contenders, rather, they act as guardians, protectors and mentors diffusing liberal norms. It is not particularly about Nordic norms, but liberal ones—the Nordics do

not appear as a progressive actor for changes in the norms of world ordering, but they are using their normative power to strengthen and secure the Western-led liberal normative order. But that is not the whole picture, and, as, for example, in the WPS context, Nordic actors are also working for situated normative practices that ignore the universalism of the liberal ethos and for local engagement and local solutions in knowledge production. It should be noted that even if the Nordics do not mimic the Nordic model of cooperation in their peace promotion, their own norms of understanding the relationship between civil society and the state is probably enabling Nordic actors to adopt methodological everydayism and escape a state-centric approach, but simultaneously, Nordic state-based approaches to peacebuilding are characterized by normative interventionism and methodological liberalism.

Within the prevailing multilateral pecking order, the Nordics have purposefully sought and obviously established a certain privileged position that they capitalize on within the frames of multilateral diplomacy. The reputation and position the Nordics have gained in the past three decades within the prevailing multilateral order of peace have become a source of ontological security as it guarantees them a global role but also justifies their own privileged position. From that perspective, it is understandable that the Nordics are not keen to contest or criticize the prevailing order and that they are extremely worried about it being contested and weakening. Furthermore, it explains why the Nordic countries are seemingly incapable of adapting to decolonial contestation, as such adaption would require accepting that the world order is changing.

As the polarization between—especially—the liberal and authoritarian powers increases, and the legitimacy of liberal peace interventions and liberal multilateralism decreases, the question is whether the hegemonic era of the LIO is approaching its end, being taken over by the 'deep conflict over values, underlying purposes, and ways of seeing the world' (Hurrell, 2007). In this evolving global order, do-gooding has become controversial and contested. As the Nordics' ontological, secure position within the LIO is so strongly embedded in their role as do-gooders, peacebuilders and normatively progressive actors that enjoy broad legitimacy, a disruptive contestation of the LIO generates anxiety as it puts in question also the Nordics' privileged position. How capable the Nordics are of adapting to the evolving world order remains to be seen. If the Nordics are not able to shift the emphasis away from normative interventionism and their role as a progressive normative actor remains unchallenged, they stand in danger of becoming the dinosaurs of a bygone era—the last crusaders of the liberal peace era. Adapting to the evolving world order would require repositioning, re-narrating and re-identifying what Nordic *for* peace would mean. It may be also that in the future, there is declining engagement with Nordic *for* peace and, instead, the Nordics will emphasize security more in all their global engagements, thus configuring normative policies as securitization of Western liberal norms. In addition to but also complementing the established normative approach and evolving tendency of securitizing peace, Nordic actors, in particular non-state actors, have shown the capability to use a pragmatic approach. In the post-liberal world order and the norm confrontations that have come to characterize it, a pragmatic approach may enable access to areas

and processes from which normative actors are excluded. However, pragmatic peacebuilding is often invisible, and not easy to be capitalized as country-branding or a source of prestige in multilateral pecking orders.

Whatever happens, the question is what implications it has for the Nordic *of* peace as even if the Nordics' peace promotion does not mimic Nordic cooperation and is not based on particularly Nordic norms, the two are essentially embedded in each other and mutually co-constituting.

Notes

1 https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/, accessed 1 October 2023.
2 https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/focus-areas/peace-and-security/national-action-plans, accessed 2 October 2023.
3 https://giwps.georgetown.edu/the-index/, accessed 2 October 2023. The current ranking of Nordic countries is: Norway (1), Finland (2), Iceland (3), Denmark (4) and Sweden (7).
4 See, for example, the Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy 2020.

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8 The 'Birth' of Nordic Peacekeeping

Can It Withstand Closer Scrutiny?

Martin Ottovay Jorgensen

Introduction

As noted in the introduction of this volume, the Nordic countries appear elevated to exemplary promoters of peace in the global diplomatic space in addition, or due, to being seen as constituting a uniquely peaceful region. Originating in the context of the rise of totalitarianism in the 1930s, the peace narrative found renewed popularity in the Cold War with additional dimensions being added, framing "(…) Scandinavia and the Nordic countries as an island of democratic order and peaceful compromise (…)" (Kurunmäki and Strang, 2016: 10). United Nations peacekeeping becoming one of these additional dimensions between the 1950s to the late 1980s, the Nordic states emerged as promotors of peace via their contributions of funds and of tens of thousands of troops for the United Nations interventions in the Gaza Strip, Congo and Cyprus. Throughout most of the period, Nordic peacekeeping research offered discrete support to this narrative (i.e. Andersson, 2007; Eide, 1976: 240–263; Galtung and Hveem, 1976: 264–281; Goldschmidt, 1971; Jakobsen, 2006, 2016: 741–761; Johansson, 1997; Persson, 1995: 337–354; Zetterberg, 2007: 50–60). As did official publications by the different Nordic armed forces with the added weight of being officially sanctioned.[1] Furthermore, official memory politics have mirrored these by way of museums, monuments and national commemorations, such as, for example, veteran days and veteran ID cards, across the Nordic region.[2] Additionally, both veteran organisations and the transnational UN Association has also rallied behind the official narrative(s) with events and the publication of memoirs, journals, home pages and online photo albums revolving around modes of reminiscence (i.e. Jensen, 2005; Gustafsson, 1988; Marki, 2007; Reiemark, 2006; Sköld, 1990; Thorsen and Reiemark, 2006). Finally, popular histories have also become another form of amplifier of the Nordic peacekeeping narrative(s) (i.e. Sørensen et al., 2006). Although the Nordic participation in the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq has generated a growing body of critical Nordic research regarding Nordic participation in military interventions (i.e. Bennike, 2020; Mäki-Rahkola and Myrttinen, 2014; Svedberg and Kronsell, 2012; Skjelsbaek, 2001), the UN interventions during the early Cold War—the 'birthplace' of the Nordic peacekeeping narrative(s) —have yet to be examined empirically.

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Against this backdrop, this chapter therefore takes a first step towards scrutinising the 'birth' of Nordic peacekeeping as part of this volume's broader examination of Nordic peace. Specifically, it focuses on the first United Nations intervention, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) which was deployed to initially Egypt, along with its twin operation the United Nations Suez Clearance Operation (UNSCO), for a few months and then the Gaza Strip from 1957 to 1967. Examining both the geopolitics of UNEF/UNSCO and everyday interactions between units from the Nordic contingents and the Palestinian and Bedouin communities in their areas of deployment, I seek to realise two aims. Firstly, I aim to start an empirically grounded discussion on Nordic peacekeeping that moves beyond official and commemorative narratives by linking to the international scholarship on peacekeeping and peacebuilding concerned with both (Nordic) geopolitics and 'local' experiences of insecurity in everyday life (i.e. Al-Qaq, 2009; Autesserre, 2016; Cunliffe, 2013; Higate, 2007; Razack, 2004). Secondly, I seek to connect this dialogue on Nordic peacekeeping to the broader discussion on Nordic peace of this volume from the position that one cannot be understood without the other.

Conceptually, I turn to the scholars Marsha Henry and Paul Higate who work across peacekeeping research, critical military studies and military sociology. Pertinent here, Henry and Higate offer an analytical framework that empirically links geopolitics to how its everyday manifestations often translate into experiences of insecurity for those living in areas that become 'mission areas'. This has to do with how, they suggest, the dominant powers of global geopolitics and their interests inform not only when different interventions are set up, how long they last and how they are paid for but also the logics and rationales behind their workings in the different 'mission areas', and, therefore, the different zones, enclaves and their ever-changing spaces within the 'mission areas'. While the geopolitical aspect may be self-evident, Higate and Henry (2009: 3) explain that interventions revolve around "(…) space, how it is seen, the ways it is reconfigured by peacekeepers going about their security work, and, crucially, the impacts these spatial-security practices have on those living and working in missions." Thus placing the soldiers of the various UN contingents and the members of the 'local' communities in the same analytical space, Higate and Henry link, and grant, their experiences equal importance. Accordingly, they see 'mission areas' as complex assemblages in which both encounters and the space(s) in which they take place are "(…) understood differently by different people and can be contested, fluid and uncertain" (Higate and Henry, 2009: 16). As such, the ways in which people interact with each other are shaped by their different circumstances and how these cut across, for example, intergenerational national, communal and familial as well as personal experiences and memories. UN soldiers, Higate and Henry suggest, will likely interact with members of local communities and their living spaces against the backdrop of their own military socialisation and thus how "(…) the conditions of possibility generated by military-cartographic ways of engaging these particular spaces are necessarily limited and may default towards the use of force (…)" (Higate and Henry, 2009: 66), thus often creating "(…) spaces of both symbolic and material insecurity (…)" (Higate and Henry, 2009: 21). UN soldiers, however, they

point out, are also a heterogenous group, formed by national traditions and norms, and recognised as such by the 'local' communities (Higate and Henry, 2009: 141). Altogether, Henry and Higate thus offer a flexible means to explore the linkage between the geopolitics of the intervention context, how it is paid for, which nations send troops, their understandings of the 'mission area' in which they serve and its communities, and, not least, how local communities see and interact with them the incoming troops.

To explore both geopolitics and everyday interactions within the Nordic sections of UNEF's 'mission area', the two sections of the chapter use different sources. Focused on the geopolitics of UNSCO and UNEF, the first section draws on unpublished records from the two UN Secretariat departments in New York (the UN Field Office and the Office for Special Political Affairs), the Suez Canal Company, the Suez Canal User's Association, Svitzer (a Danish salvage company involved in UNSCO), UNSCO and, not least, published records in the American 'Foreign Relations of the United States' series. Although governmental records from the Nordic national archives would need to be added for further research, these materials enable a good first look at the context of the intervention and its Nordic dimensions. Exploring the everyday interactions between Nordic soldiers and members of the Palestinian and Bedouin communities, the second section relies on unpublished records from UNEF and EIMAC (the Egyptian Israeli Military Armistice Commission, a UN corps of military observers active in the Gaza Strip) as well as published UN soldiers' memoirs, diaries and letters. Ideally, Norwegian, Danish, Finnish and Swedish contingent records would also have been used. Again, this chapter is not an ill-advised attempt to provide the 'definitive' history of Nordic peacekeeping in article form. More important here is how the UNEF and EIMAC records were created as products of military practices with built-in silences that require our attention (for more on silences in records and archives see Stoler, 2009; Trouillot, 1995). Indeed, Palestinians and Bedouin predominantly figure in the records as difficult employees, instigators of 'incidents', etc. Altogether, these materials thus offer a solid foundation for what hopefully becomes the opening of an empirically grounded exploration of Nordic peacekeeping.

As noted above, the chapter initially examines the formation of the twin operation of the UNSCO and the UNEF before it begins to explore everyday interactions between Nordic contingents and Palestinian and Bedouin communities in the Gaza Strip.

The Geopolitics of UNSCO and UNEF

In line with Henry and Higate's argument on the role of geopolitics, the first intervention of the UN—the records and the other sources suggest when brought together—was deeply connected to the geopolitics of oil, the cohesion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western dominance of the UN system before decolonisation. The unwillingness of the British and French to lose influence in the Middle East led to a military conflict with Egypt in late 1956, which led the Egyptians to block the Suez Canal and thereby cut the flow of

Middle Eastern oil to Western Europe. Among other initiatives, the United States, along with Canada and the (Swedish) UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, secured support for the twin operation to let oil flow to Western Europe again and to allow the British, French and Israeli forces to withdraw from Egypt. The Nordic states proved vital for the intervention in that they both deployed the necessary technical and military expertise and lent it their status as small states.

From its opening in 1869, the Suez Canal served European imperial needs of trade, communication and military infrastructure. After the Second World War, the canal also became energy infrastructure as most of Western Europe shifted from coal to oil. Oil from Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia came to provide 43% of the Western European oil needs in 1947 and no less than 85% in 1951 (Marsh, 2007; Painter, 2009; Romero, 2015). In 1951, however, the Iranian nationalisation of its oil production and the guerrilla war against the British in the Suez Canal Area by Egyptian military units seeking to overthrow the Egyptian king threatened Western Europe's oil supply. In response, the pro-western UN Secretariat planned to internationalise the Suez Canal with a UN force in "(…) the recognition of special interests of States whose vital lines of communication are dependent on free passage of shipping through the Suez Canal."[3] The plan was not realised, as a 1954-agreement between the British government and the new Egyptian military government (which had taken over power in 1952) offered a workaround, though it required the withdrawal of all British troops from the canal area by 1956. However, Western Europe's vulnerability remained as the oil coming via the canal still covered more than two-thirds of Western European oil needs in early 1956.[4] Moreover, the tension between the United Kingdom, the United States and Egypt increased well into 1956 after the former rejected the latter's request for World Bank loans to build a dam wall to electrify its economy and forced Cairo to turn to Moscow for weapons, trade deals and dam finance. Causing panic in the capitals of Western Europe, Egypt also nationalised the canal company. In turn, Washington obliged its allies to join two conferences to form a canal user association, which would have amounted to a non-military version of the 1951 UN idea and, in the view of the internationally renowned Danish expert of international law, Max Sørensen, a direct violation of Egypt's sovereignty and incompatible with the existing canal treaty from 1888, ignoring Egypt as the holder of sovereign rights in that the canal was Egyptian territory.[5] Nordic and British shipping companies also found the plan impractical.[6] The Danish and Norwegian governments were less critical, however.[7] Aside from being two small members of the still young NATO alliance, both governments also knew how dependent their economies were on the British economy and, not least, the Suez Canal. In 1956, Norway was the second largest canal user by tonnage as 80% of its canal tonnage was Kuwaiti oil shipped to the United Kingdom while Denmark was the tenth largest canal user.[8] Not content with diplomacy, however, the United Kingdom and France joined up with Israel to invade Egypt. In response to the invasion, Egypt blocked the canal by sinking 50 ships. Additionally, pro-Egyptian military units in Syria also reduced the flow of oil to Western Europe from Iraq by 50% by blowing up some of the pipelines. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq also cut their production by an average of 48%.[9] Moreover, Saudi Arabia

ended its oil sales to the United Kingdom and France, and forced its American partners to do so also (Bamberg and Ferrier, 2000: 83). In other words, the United Kingdom and France invaded a sovereign nation, caused a Western European oil supply crisis, created a conflict within NATO and risked nuclear war, all to avoid further loss of influence in the Middle East at a time the US elections were coming up and the Soviet Union was invading Hungary.

While the Nordic governments had to take a cautious stance, the US president, Dwight Eisenhower, angrily declared that "(…) those who began this operation should be left to work out their own oil problems to boil in their own oil so to speak."[10] Accordingly, the United States took different steps. Firstly, the United States not only kept the United Kingdom and France waiting for loans from the International Monetary Fund but also stalled the would-be oil relief coordination in the Middle East Emergency Committee (which was set up during the oil crisis in 1951). Secondly, the United States sent the Soviet Union a message that was impossible to misunderstand, deploying naval vessels between British and French vessels off the Egyptian coast in addition to having fighter jets do overflights and placing its aircraft carrier groups around the world on 12-hour combat readiness and its global network of air force bases on 5-minute combat readiness.[11] Lastly, and crucially, the Americans and Canadians secured support from a majority of the delegations at the UN General Assembly for a UN intervention proposal, with the Swedish UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, and his closest American staff (Jorgensen, 2016). Known as two separate undertakings, the *de facto* single intervention were designed to reopen the Suez Canal, to re-establish the Western European oil supply and get the British, French and Israeli forces out of Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Placing themselves firmly in the West, the Nordic states supported the proposal, joined the group of Western countries that paid about 99% of the UN's loan to finance UNSCO and UNEF and offered vital technical and military support.[12]

UNSCO's clearance efforts only saw Danish involvement, however. The salvage company, Svitzer, was chosen to join efforts with the Dutch salvage company, L. Smit en Co's Internationale Sleepdienst, as Smit Svitzer Suez Salvors. Well-received in Copenhagen (and Amsterdam), the decision was less so in Oslo since the UN Secretary-General had allowed the use of British and French salvage vessels from the invasion force as well as Swedish, Italian and West German sub-contractors but rejected a Norwegian company.[13] Ultimately, there was relief in the capitals across Western and Northern Europe as well as Northern America when UNSCO declared the canal open a month faster than planned, a fact shared widely in Western media to rebuild the confidence of Western markets and lower the oil price.[14]

The politics of manning UNEF were also delicate. As the host nation, Egypt had to approve the different contingents. Seeing Finland and Sweden as neutral, Egypt accepted both contingents (Burns, 1962: 203–204), unaware that Sweden was adopting NATO military standards and acquiring American nuclear technology (Makko, 2012; Nilsson, 2010; Nilsson and Wyss, 2015). However, Egypt rejected the forces of Norway and Denmark, seeing both states as too Western as well as supportive of the ill-advised Canal User Association. Predictably, and with US support, the UN Secretary-General rebutted Egypt, insisting all or

none of the Nordic contingents would be part of UNEF (Burns, 1962: 202–204). The Nordic contingents thereby joined UNEF with those of Brazil, Colombia and Canada on the one hand and India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia on the other, ensuring that two-thirds of UNEF consisted of contingents from Western and pro-Western states and around a third from non-aligned states. The Western influence also showed in how the US Air Force flew in most of the contingents to the Suez Canal Area via NATO air bases in Italy, Portugal and likely also Turkey.[15] Once in the canal area, UNEF gradually enabled the withdrawal of the British and French invasion forces, which ran in tandem with UNSCO's work to clear the canal. The Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip, however, remained and Egypt therefore put pressure on the UN and the United States to have UNEF enter the Gaza Strip, thereby creating the conditions for a partial realisation of the 1951 plan to protect Western European trade and oil supplies by internationalising the Suez Canal (Jorgensen, 2016).

When judged upon the basis of the accessed records, the UNSCO/UNEF twin intervention should not be seen as the first UN peacekeeping operation and in support of Egypt as an invaded state, but rather a Western salvage operation with vital Nordic involvement in both the literal and geopolitical sense. And as per Henry and Higate, the dominant powers' concerns informed not only the making of the intervention and its finances, logistics and rationales. These elements, and the Nordic involvement therein, would also inform the interactions between the UNEF contingents and the communities of the Gaza Strip.

Exploring the (In)security Practices of the Nordic UNEF Units, 1957–1967

While recognising that more work needs to explore the differences between Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish contingents' military cultures, norms and practices, the following exploratory undertaking will make clear that the Nordic units were at the centre stage of UNEF, from its arrival through its early stages to its consolidation and its eventual withdrawal, for better and worse.

Memoirs and various publications by different Scandinavian UN soldiers and the Canadian force commander show how the Nordic contingents, the Danish and Norwegian in particular, were deeply steeped in Western orientalist discourses. In a broader sense, both Denmark and Norway were strongly influenced by Great Britain in the 1940s and openly pro-Israeli (see for example Arnheim and Levitan, 2011; Mariager, 2006, 2009, 2012; Waage, 2000). Concretely, it is also telling that several of the outward-bound Danish units were lectured to by a British former colonial military officer prior to their deployment. One topic was on "(…) Egyptian characteristics and how to engage the local population" (Jensen, 2005: 3) by, for example, forcing them into the gutter. Rather than using, for example, the professional Indian units, the Canadian force commander, General Burns, also had the Danish and Norwegian joint contingent of volunteers collaborate with the British invasion forces (whose commanding officers he personally knew from the Second World War) in the Suez Canal Area on both the coordination of withdrawal in several towns and the purchase of vehicles, supplies, petrol and rations for UNEF

(Burns, 1962: 228–231; Engholm, 1996: 204–211; Jensen, 2005: 49–68; Kjeldsen, 1958: 7–40; Kristiansen, 1962: 22–23). Tellingly, the British officers thanked the Danish-Norwegian contingent for the "(…) harmonious ways (…)" (Burns, 1962: 238) of collaborating. Against that backdrop, many may well have perceived the British soldiers as partners versus the Egyptians and Palestinians, who in published diaries and letters often appear lumped together as 'Arabs', emotional and speakers of an unfathomable language (Jensen, 2005: 3–10; Kjeldsen, 1958: 12).

Once in the Gaza Strip in March 1957, the UNEF Commander continued in the same way. He not only ignored the resemblance of the UN force to the British imperial security forces in Palestine, which for most years between the First World War and the Palestinian Revolt in 1936 (Hoffman, 2013; Hughes, 2013; Johnson, 2015; Kroizer, 2004; Sinclair, 2009), had fielded an external and multi-national military force with light infantry, mobile reconnaissance units and light patrol aircraft for aerial surveillance. He also disregarded how both Palestinians and Bedouin had been subject to three months of Israeli aggressive occupation when he chose an unnecessarily antagonist route by appointing Western—and not Indian, Indonesian or Yugoslav—military governors in the larger towns, such as the Danish-Norwegian commander in Gaza City (the main town of the Gaza Strip), and set up headquarters in the most symbolic of all buildings in the Gaza Strip, the heavily fortified former Israeli and British garrison and prison in Gaza City. As if to drive this point home, UNEF also had loudspeaker vans in the larger towns proclaim that it was now in control (Burns, 1962: 231–261; Engholm, 1996: 231; Jensen, 2005: 89; Kjeldsen, 1958: 54; Sköld, 1990: 81). Predictably, not only the prisoners, most of whom were political prisoners left by the Israeli forces, protested (Burns, 1962: 231; Jensen, 2005: 89; Kjeldsen, 1958: 54; Sköld, 1990: 81). Several demonstrations also spread across Gaza City. In the following days, shots were fired at the compounds of one of the Danish platoons and of the UNEF commander at night. In the daytime, the rallies also grew tenser with stone throwing, UN units fixing bayonets on their rifles and firing warning shots and, crucially, causing the death of a demonstrator. On the third day, the Danish-Norwegian battalion needed the assistance of the Brazilian battalion as all its units were engaged, with some soldiers even rushing out in kitchen outfits or underwear. Making matters worse, UNEF's Swedish Chief of Staff subsequently banned both larger meetings and demonstrations in any form in the Gaza Strip, thus effectively expanding UNEF's control over an already diminished public space (Burns, 1962: 261–272; Jensen, 2005: 91–94). To prevent further escalation, Egypt sent back its Governor-general to retake control of the Gaza Strip a few days later, compelling UNEF to reorganise its posture (Burns, 1962: 261–272; Jensen, 2005: 91; Kjeldsen, 1958: 58–59). To be sure, the Danish-Norwegian troops had been at the centre of the growing tension with the Palestinians in Gaza City because they—rather than other Western units such as, for example, the Canadian and Swedish units that were deployed in the town of Rafah to the south—had been stationed there. However, the Yugoslavians were also in Gaza City, at least for a while, as the UNEF Commander sent them back to Egypt after Yugoslav soldiers had cheered the Egyptian and Yugoslavian leaders along with the demonstrators (Burns, 1962: 261–272; Jensen, 2005: 91–94).

Rather than seeing UNEF take control of the entire territory at strategic intersections and natural 'chokepoints' as the British had done in the Mandate era, the Palestinian pressure forced UNEF's commander to deploy his infantry and reconnaissance units to the de facto border between Israel and the Gaza Strip, the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) and set up a no-go zone 100 m wide in daytime and 500 m wide at night. While UNEF did not engage in counterinsurgency (as had the British from 1936 onwards) (Hughes, 2019; Swedenburg, 2003), the UN zone was a significant de facto land grab since the Gaza Strip was both overpopulated and only between 5 and 8 km wide (and 40 km long). Within a few months, UNEF had also grown to nearly 6,000 troops, compared to the approximately 2,000 troops the British Mandate government had in all of Palestine until the Palestinian Revolt in 1936. Furthermore, UNEF's ADL regime of mobile patrols day and night and a grid of 72 stationary unfortified observation towers with overlapping lines of sight and a field telephone network along the 59 km border confined the Palestinian and Bedouin communities in the Gaza Strip behind a much tighter-knit real-time surveillance regime than the British ever set up.[16]

In other words, UNEF's contingents represented a further militarisation of the Gaza Strip, which, as argued by Henry and Higate, would engender different experiences of insecurity both near the ADL and further into the Gaza Strip. On the ADL, Danish and Norwegian soldiers not only wounded and detained several Palestinians and Bedouin while on patrols in their 'area of responsibility' within the first three months of arriving in the Gaza Strip. More critically, they also killed two Palestinians and two Bedouin. Whatever the circumstances of these 'incidents' (as they are called in the UN records), they engendered pain, anger and insecurities in the affected Palestinian and Bedouin communities, adding further strain to the already tested relationship between UNEF, and the Palestinian and Bedouin communities both within and beyond their 'mission area' (Jorgensen, 2016: 237–241). Another way in which UNEF units, including those from the Nordic contingents, engendered insecurity was through the detention of Palestinian peasants, land workers and youth most of whom were doing little more than planting, inspecting, harvesting and picking fruits and vegetables, picking grass for animal feed or looking for missing livestock near the UN observation posts on the ADL.[17] For the most part, the Nordic UN units understood the importance of the work of the mostly poor Palestinian peasant families and agricultural workers and let them get on with their work, irrespective of whether they had moved into the UN zone or not. After all, it would have been quite apparent that the area was both suffering from an unemployment rate of more than 80% and unable to feed its original inhabitants and the more than 200.000 people displaced as refugees there in 1948 (Baster, 1955: 323–327). Relatively frequently, however, Nordic (and other) units would detain people in circumstances that created uncertainty, anger, frustration and fear in light of Palestinian experiences and memories. In some instances, Palestinians would launch formal written complaints on being detained on their own land as well as UNEF's use of their land. On occasion, however, Palestinians also responded violently to these encounters in ways that reflected the growing pressure on the gender norms of a society in which the figure of the Palestinian man had

struggled to defend nation, community and family in and since 1948. In one case, a young woman charged a UN soldier with her grass knife when detained. In another, several Palestinian men rallied together a group of villagers to chase a UN vehicle to free a detained female relative (for more on gender dynamics on Palestine see for example Fleischmann, 2000; Greenberg, 2010; Jacobson, 2004).[18] The UN records, which must be corroborated with the records kept in Nordic archives in subsequent research, appear to portray the Nordic units as rather vigilant in terms of detaining people. While it must be noted that the Nordic contingents were tasked with securing the more densely populated central and northern parts of the Gaza Strip—likely on account of the UNEF Commander's preference for these contingents—their countries' positive view of Israel as a 'modern' and democratic island in what was racialised as a 'traditional' and autocratic region also guided their practices on the ADL. For example, UNEF records show how Swedish soldiers racialised Egyptians and Palestinians by both lumping them together as 'Arabs' and labelling Palestinians 'Ali Babas' or 'fugitives' in incident reports, thus coproducing Western orientalist discourses. In the same vein, UNEF records also offer plenty of off-duty 'incidents' with Danish and Norwegian soldiers fraternising with Israelis on the ADL and in kibbutzes in Israel; Danish soldiers detaining Palestinians after conversations with Israeli border forces' without checking the validity of their accusations; or Finnish soldiers taking wounded Israeli soldiers back to their bases several kilometres into Israeli territory, flouting UNEF restrictions on entering Israel.[19] The Finnish contingent withdrew from UNEF in 1958 but also created problems. In one such case two Finnish soldiers in a patrol camp near an observation tower got drunk and went to look for young women for sex in a nearby Palestinian village. Linking to the gender dynamics of the Gaza Strip, the two soldiers kicked and punched a young male villager and a disabled male villager who condemned them for looking for young women before a dozen angry male villagers beat them with sticks and chased them away to protect the two above-mentioned male villagers and their female relatives.[20] Looking beyond day-time incidents, UNEF's night-time patrols also got into altercations with Palestinians using the cover of darkness to bring back vegetables from their former lands and/or steal irrigation pipes or vegetables from Israeli settlements or even phone cables from UNEF's field telephone network. Others shot at soldiers or attacked the Nordics with Israeli or Egyptian mines removed from active minefields (as was Bedouin practice) and were in some cases killed.[21]

From early 1958 onwards, however, both Israeli and (Nordic) UNEF units reported fewer incidents on both sides of the ADL.[22] This likely reflected how the UN force had had to reduce the intensity of its patrol regime after several reductions in troop numbers (the Finnish and Indonesian contingents left in 1958 and the Swedish contingent in 1960): For example, the Danish-Norwegian battalion's patrols in their sector were cut from multiple hourly patrols to just one in 1960 and 1961.[23] More importantly, however, several Egyptian socio-economic and political initiatives reduced the pressure on the ADL from the late 1950s by: exempting the Gaza Strip from tax; accepting the creation of Palestinian nationalist bodies such as *Fatah*; expanding the Egyptian-led Gaza Strip border guards from 2,000 to 3,600

with an increased ratio of Palestinians; and establishing a migrant worker scheme for Palestinian men in the Gulf states (Cossali and Robson, 1986; Sayigh, 1997). Although these policies enabled thousands of previously unemployed and refugees to find work in the Gaza Strip or migrant work in the Gulf states, they failed to change the underlying precarious conditions, leading more Palestinian men into militancy in the 1960s. To reduce the risk of this, the Egyptian administration set up a constitution and a political council in 1962, a Gaza Strip branch of the newly formed Palestinian Liberation Army in 1964 and a recruitment drive to enlist Palestinians to fight in its proxy-war with Saudi Arabia in Yemen (Cossali and Robson, 1986; Ferris, 2015; Sayigh, 1998). However, the militarisation of everyday life extended far beyond UNEF's presence and activities on the ADL.

Across the Gaza Strip, Palestinians would see UNEF units travelling between camps, training areas, bases and observation posts in vehicle types ranging from smaller 2-person jeeps to trucks weighing several tonnes. In most instances, the drivers from the different UNEF contingents were trained and skilled, sober, as well as observing rules and traffic conditions on the major and minor roads. In others, however, they were not, driving while drunk or without training, experience or sufficient awareness, hitting and killing either children and youth who were playing in public spaces including roads (due to overcrowding) or adults who through their work or refugee rations provided for their families. The rate of accidents remained a problem for years.[24] Operating in the central areas of the Gaza Strip, soldiers from the Nordic contingents were also part of engendering this form of insecurity.[25] Even more significant than the traffic accidents, however, was UNEF's inability to prevent Israeli forces from creating not only fleeting experiences of insecurity but a permanent borderscape of insecurity and immobility. From UNEF records, it seems that some of the Israeli patrols lost their bearings momentarily while others intentionally crossed the ADL to either test response times or send 'messages' to UNEF, the Egyptian forces and the Palestinian militants about Israel's border vigilance. In other cases, Israeli settlers also managed to cross into the Gaza Strip, in some cases attacking villages and homes close to the ADL with hand grenades, kidnapping people or stealing animals.[26] Additionally, the Israeli strategy on confining people in the Gaza Strip also involved maritime vessels that cut off Palestinian fishing boats and fighter jets that would overfly the Gaza Strip at 50–200 m in altitude often daily, and occasionally in groups of up to 21 planes.[27]

Bringing Higate and Henry together with the realities inside everyday life in the Gaza Strip, it seems fair to suggest that the Gaza Strip residents may well have seen UNEF, including its remaining Nordic contingents, as both unable to prevent the Israeli suppression of the Gaza Strip and engendering fleeting sensations and longer experiences of insecurity.

Conclusion

Within the context of the broader edited volume, this chapter set out to provide an empirical exploration of the 'birth' of Nordic peacekeeping, which has been shrouded by myth, commemoration and memory. The aim was to start an

empirically grounded discussion on Nordic peacekeeping linked to the international scholarship concerned with both geopolitics and 'local' experiences of insecurity in everyday life. The second aim was to link Nordic peacekeeping to the broader discussion. To this end, the chapter used the analytical framework of Marsha Henry and Paul Higate and a broad range of published and unpublished records. A few initial observations seem in order.

As should be clear, UNSCO and UNEF was very much about restoring the oil supplies of Western Europe and restoring trust amongst the members of NATO following the invasion of Egypt but has since became known as the first peacekeeping operation of the UN. The Egyptian request to have UNEF deployed to the Gaza Strip unintentionally partly realised the 1951 plan to put in place an international force to safeguard the Suez Canal. Once in the Gaza Strip, a space already deeply militarised by Egyptian and Israeli military forces following its creation in 1948, UNEF further militarised the territory. Moreover, both the Nordic governments and contingents, it must be noted, appear to have been central actors in this process throughout. To be sure, this different history of the 'birth' of Nordic Peacekeeping requires further exploration, discussion, and reflection within Nordic academia on the one hand and the (different) Nordic political and military sphere(s) on the other.

As noted by philosopher of history Frank Ankersmit (2007: 186), "(…) big problems have long histories; and as long as we remain in the dark about these histories we shall be unable to deal with them." Let us begin to make sense of the 'birth' of Nordic peacekeeping, what it means today and where this will lead.

Notes

1 I.e. *Swedish International Forces in the Service of Peace: International Missions Undertaken by the Swedish Armed Forces* (Malmö, Sweden: Bokförlaget Arena, 2006).
2 The Nordic countries have museum exhibitions and monuments that in various ways touch upon UN peacekeeping in, for example, the Norwegian Defence Museum and the Danish UN Museum.
3 'Memorandum of Peace and Security – Suez Canal Area' 14 December 1951, Suez Canal Area 10 Dec 1951 – 15 April 1957, S-1066-0001-0007, Office of Special Political Affairs, UNA.
4 Suez Canal User's Association Report, 19 February 1957, Indgået korrespondance vedr. Suezkanalen til Dir. J. Aschengreen, Danmarks Rederiforening - ØK, 1956–1958, pakke 51, Danish National Archive (DNA).
5 Memo of telephone conversation between A. P. Møller and the Danish Foreign Ministry 13 September 1956, J. Ch. Aschgreen 1956 m. fl, 1956–1958, Korrespondance fra Rederiforeningen vedr. Suez, DNA.
6 Memo of telephone conversation between A. P. Møller and the Danish Foreign Ministry 13 September 1956, J. Ch. Aschgreen 1956 m. fl, 1956–1958, Korrespondance fra Rederiforeningen vedr. Suez, DNA.
7 "Memo to the Danish Foreign Ministry's Department for Political and Juridical Affairs" 13 September 1956, J. Ch. Aschgreen 1956 m. fl, 1956–1958, Korrespondance fra Rederiforeningen vedr. Suezkanalen, DNA.
8 Letter from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry to the Norwegian Shipping Association 9 August 1956, Indgået korrespondance vedr. Suezkanalen til Dir. J. Aschengreen, Danmarks Rederiforening - ØK, 1956–1958, pakke 51, Danish National Archive (DNA).

9 Suez Canal User's Association Report, 19 February 1957, Indgået korrespondance vedr. Suezkanalen til Dir. J. Aschengreen, Danmarks Rederiforening - ØK, 1956–1958, pakke 51, Danish National Archive (DNA).
10 Foreign Relations of the United States, Historical Documents, 1955 1957, Suez Crisis, July 26 December 31, 1956, Volume XVI, Memorandum of a Conference with the President, 30 October 1956, (dok. 435).
11 Foreign Relations of the United States, Historical Documents, 1955 1957, Suez Crisis, July 26 December 31, 1956,
Volume XVI, Telegram from Joint Chiefs of Staff to Certain Commanders, 6. November 1956 (dok. 533).
12 UN A/3719.
13 RA, Svitzers Bjergnings- Enterprise A/S (05089), Materiale vedr. Suez-rydningen, Avisudklip, Kasse 569, Børsen: Svitzers Bjergnings- Enterprise A/S (05089), Materiale vedr. Suez-rydningen, Avisudklip, Kasse 569, Politiken 22.12.1956, RA, Svitzers Bjergnings- Enterprise A/S (05089), Materiale vedr. Suez-rydningen, Korrespondance A-K, Kasse 559, Memorandum af telefonsamtale mellem Goth-Bendtzen i New York og Svitzers Hovedkvarter i København 4. december 1956, RA, Svitzers Bjergnings-Enterprise A/S (05089), Materiale vedr. Suez-rydningen, Korrespondance KO, Kasse 560, Brev fra Goth-Bendtzen til Hector Kiær 21. december 1956, RA, Svitzers Bjergnings-Enterprise A/S (05089), Materiale vedr. Suez-rydningen, Korrespondance K-O, Kasse 560, Brev (nr. 5) fra Hector Kiær til GothBendtzen 28. december 1956 og RA, Svitzers Bjergnings-Enterprise A/S (05089), Materiale vedr. Suez-rydningen, Korrespondance K-O, Kasse 560, Brev fra Goth-Bendtzen til Hector Kiær 7. januar 1957.
14 RA, Svitzers Bjergnings- Enterprise A/S (05089), Materiale vedr. Suez-rydningen, Korrespondance A-K, Kasse 559, Brev til Svitzer fra FN 8.12.1956, RA, Svitzers Bjergnings-Enterprise A/S (05089), Materiale vedr. Suez-rydningen, Korrespondance A-K, Kasse 559, Brev til Svitzer fra FN 11.12.1956 og RA, Svitzers Bjergnings-Enterprise A/S (05089), Materiale vedr. Suez-rydningen, Korrespondance K-O, Kasse 560, UN Department of Public Information, UN Press feature 175-G.
15 "United States Airlift for the United Nations Emergency Force" undated, Brazil Folder, Field Operations Division, S-0530-0271, UNA.
16 "EIMAC Incident Report" 4 April 1957, Complaints and Investigations April 1957–June 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Political Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0073-0003, UNA, "EIMAC Incident Report" 14 May 1957, Complaints and Investigations April 1957–June 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Political Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0073-0003, UNA.
17 "Incident Report" 16 December 1957, Complaints and Investigations July 1957–December 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Pol. Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0067-0001 and "Incident Report" 19 December 1957, Complaints and Investigations July 1957–December 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Pol. Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0067-0001.
18 "Incident Report" 1 July 1957, Complaints and Investigations April 1957–June 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Pol. Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0073-0003, UNA, "Incident Report" 1 October 1957, Complaints and Investigations July 1957–December 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Pol. Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0067-0001, UNA, "Incident Report" 3 January 1958, Complaints and Investigations January 1958–June 1958, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Pol. Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0067-0002, UNA and "Cable from UNEF Commander to Undersecretary of the UN", 4 April 1959, Middle East, UNEF/UN-EFCA, Code Cables, Incoming, S0370-0032-0002, UNA, "Incident Report" 5 June 1957, Complaints and Investigations April 1957–June 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Pol. Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0073-0003, UNA, "Incident Report" 8 June 1957, Complaints and Investigations April 1957–June 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Pol. Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0073-0003, UNA, "Incident Report" 14 June 1957, Complaints and Investigations April 1957–June 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Pol. Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0073-0003, UNA, and "Complaint" from Civilian Claimant to UNEF, 24 May

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20 Incident Report" 27 July 1957, Complaints and Investigations July 1957–December 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Pol. Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0067-0001, UNA.

21 "Incident Report" 6 April 1957, Complaints and Investigations April 1957–June 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Pol. Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0073-0003, "Incident Report" 14 June 1957, Complaints and Investigations April 1957–June 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Pol. Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0073-0003, "Incident Report" 27 August 1957, Complaints and Investigations July 1957–December 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Pol. Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0067-0001, UNA. "Incident Report" 22 October 1957, Complaints and Investigations July 1957–December 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Pol. Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0067-0001, "Incident Report" 9 February 1959, Complaints and Investigations July 1958–April 1959, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Pol. Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0067-0003, UNA and "Incident Report" 19 March 1959, Complaints and Investigations July 1958–April 1959, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Pol. Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0067-0003, UNA.

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23 DANOR BN IX, "DANOR BN IX - October 1960-April 1961."

24 "Message on Motor Accident Rate in UNEF" from Force Commander to all contingents, 8 April 1960, Accidents 1959–1962, UNEF, UN Field Operations Service, S-0534-0245, UNA.

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9 Humanitarian Action

Does the Nordic Model Make a Difference?

Cecelia Lynch

Introduction

Other chapters in this volume have detailed the historical and ethical underpinnings of Nordic models for peace and justice (see part one). In this chapter, I highlight aspects of the 'humanitarian international',[1] that are problematic for critics, including myself and ask whether or to what degree Nordic practices of aid avoid them. On the one hand, Nordic practices of advancing equitable relations around the world – as well as at home – have acted as a powerful model for other states, that (unfortunately) have not been copied enough. This model includes not only allocating a greater percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for aid than most other countries and regions but also a philosophy for how that aid is conceived and distributed, based on a political history of support for independence and self-determination movements across the Global South. On the other hand, elements of the Nordic model are rooted in the same paternalistic ethos as other parts of the humanitarian international. Nordic humanitarianism is far from immune to either the neoliberal disciplinary logics of aid or the racialised logics of North-South representation. Moreover, Nordic politics today (and European politics in general) are increasingly influenced by anti-immigrant racism. Neoliberal disciplinary logics promote mechanisms of control, beliefs in epistemic superiority and metrics of efficiency that perpetuate inequitable relationships. In combination with advances by reactionary political movements, they are in tension with historical legacies of Nordic support for decolonisation and equitable relations. These factors each work to fray the Nordic model and pose serious challenges for equitable aid on the part of Nordic countries in the future.

Criticisms of International Humanitarianism Vis-à-Vis the Nordic Model

Criticisms of humanitarianism include its roots in colonial and missionary activity, which breeds paternalism and neocolonialism and denigrates knowledge systems and practices in postcolonial societies; its tendency to promote ever more complex metrics for measuring alleged success, which respond to donor concerns for quick results instead of recipient well-being; its ongoing representation of aid recipients

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as victims whose only recourse to a better life is to be helped by generous people in the global north; and its politicisation and securitisation stemming from inter-state security policies such as the war on terror, and/or linking aid to state security and economic interests. These are not discrete concerns: legacies of paternalism in missionary and colonial periods continue in both the representation of aid recipients and the metrics of measurement of successful aid policies; colonial ties produced ongoing security and economic interests that donor states try to protect.

What is the Nordic model and why is it attractive? In partial contrast to the above criticisms, the Nordic countries have a reputation for providing a generous amount of aid, when measured as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI). For 2021, according to OECD statistics, only Iceland (at .28% of GNI) provided aid lower than the OECD average of .33% of GNI. Finland, at .47% of GNI, exceeded the average but remained below the UN's target donation of .7% of GNI, whereas Denmark (.7% of GNI) met the target and both Sweden (.92% of GNI) and Norway (.93% of GNI) exceeded the UN target (OECD 2021). Nordic countries also cultivate an internal sense of self that marks a difference with non-Nordic European aid. Nordic countries are known for providing aid in a spirit of egalitarianism, based both on traditions of neutrality in foreign policy (especially Sweden and Finland) and on extending the benefits of their domestic social welfare model abroad. Moreover, the Nordic countries were early supporters of decolonisation and Third World liberation movements, crafting stances against apartheid in South Africa and against the Vietnam war, and in support of revolutionary movements in Latin America. In contrast to former colonisers like Britain and France, they see their relationships with countries of the Global South as free of the economic ties and settler political interests resulting from colonial occupation. As a result, they are also generally viewed as avoiding policies that promote a strongly 'western' security stance.

Nevertheless, an increasing number of scholars view such a cultivation of Nordic historical difference as misplaced (see, e.g., Andersson-Burnett, 2019; Lofftsdöttir and Jensen, 2012; and Merivirta, Koivunen, and Särkkä, 2021a, b, among others). At least two historical periods are noteworthy for assessing the Nordic reputation for generosity, equality and freedom from colonial legacies. First, several Nordic countries were colonisers, even though this history is often forgotten or minimised. Both Sweden and Denmark participated in the slave trade, building or controlling forts on the Gold Coast of Africa; both also seized territory in the Americas. Scholars at the University of Helsinki in Finland established a multi-year research programme (from 2020 to 2022) to examine individual Nordic states' participation in colonialism, including vis-à-vis indigenous peoples in North America.[2] The four workshops of this research programme brought together historians of colonialism from across the Nordic region, exploring and comparing the contents of colonial archives, letters and memoirs, as well as the appropriation of multiple forms of art and artefacts, tying colonial pasts to the impact of Nordic colonial legacies on the present and future. In addition, Nordic scholars are increasingly studying colonisation among and within Nordic states themselves. Most obvious is the colonisation of Sàpmi by Russia, Sweden, Norway and eventually Finland (after its

independence in 1917; although Finns participated in colonisation earlier), and of Greenland by Denmark (on the twentieth- and twenty-first-century manifestations of the latter, see Jensen 2012). Indeed, the Arctic University of Norway's 'New Sámi Renaissance' project, funded by the Research Council of Norway, is based on the underlying thesis that 'Nordic colonialism is not a thing of the past – it is reproduced actively in the present'.[3] Both the history of Nordic colonialism and participation in slavery are largely absent from transnational humanitarian memory, even though they are well-documented in places such as the slave fortresses along the coast in Ghana and in areas above the Arctic Circle.[4] As the organisers of a travelling art exhibition on Nordic colonialism put it, 'Although it continues to make itself felt in the region's former colonies, this history is alarmingly absent in the collective memory of the once-colonising Nordic countries'.[5]

Moreover, Nordic colonial encounters did not stop at direct colonisation. This is because colonisation generally occurred with a humanitarian gloss – a civilising mission for 'backward' peoples, and/or a religious mission to evangelise and proselytise among those practising 'primitive' religions. This history of missionising, in addition to other forms of knowledge circulation and material appropriation, is why Merivirta, Koivunen, and Särkkä (2021b) assert that even Finland has been complicit in colonisation, despite its lack of overseas colonies and the fact that it was itself colonised for hundreds of years by Sweden and then Russia. They argue that Finns

> contributed to common European knowledge about colonized areas, cultures, and peoples; sent out missionaries to spread ideas of Western/White/Christian superiority; and participated in the construction of racial hierarchies. Arguably the construction of Finnish identities was in many ways connected to colonial endeavors.
>
> (Merivirta, Koivunen, and Särkkä, 2021b: 8)

Colonisation, in their view, is much more than the appropriation of land elsewhere; it is also the constitutive crafting of an identity of a superior self vis-à-vis an inferior other, and of modes of interaction that reflect and reproduce the resulting unequal relationships. Finnish missionaries travelled to parts of Africa and Asia, and their work in the Owambo region of south-west Africa, according to Merivirta, Koivunen and Särkkä, resulted in 'creating long-lasting representations and imagery of Africa and Africans that were passed on to several generations of Finns' (2021b: 10). The role of missionising both within the Nordic region and overseas is crucial to examine because it further deconstructs aspects of the Nordic mythology of exceptional egalitarianism vis-à-vis the rest of the world, and also because it refocuses any examination of the role of Nordic countries on the paternalistic foundations of western humanitarianism *writ large*. These paternalistic foundations have intersected with other strands of the Nordic model over time, but (as we shall see) they have never been eradicated.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, several strands of Nordic humanitarian identity were solidifying. First, racialised notions of paternalism were becoming

well-established in Nordic perspectives on peoples abroad as well as indigenous Arctic peoples at home. Second, socialist movements were also taking hold in domestic politics. The Finnish Civil Wars of 1917 provided a militant example of conflict between workers and owners of capital, while Sweden's socialists 'gradually shook off their Marxism', putting 'their own stamp' on what became social democracy.[6] Third, Nordic diplomats and Red Cross societies took on an outsized influence in developing norms of global international organisation during and after World War I. These three components of Nordic humanitarianism – racialised paternalism, social democratic provisions for social welfare, and internationalist norms of assistance – would each continue to play important roles in practices of aid through the twentieth and into the twenty-first centuries, although the specific normative configurations have varied over time. More specifically, the latter two components – expanding social welfare across national boundaries and promoting relatively egalitarian internationalist norms of assistance – could provide the basis for a more equitable humanitarianism. But, as we shall see, ongoing racialised paternalism in addition to neoliberal pressures to break down Nordic egalitarianism in the post-Cold War era have resulted in a mixed record for the vaunted Nordic model.

Interwar Nordic Domestic and International Social Welfare

The interwar period (between World Wars I and II) was foundational for the development of the Nordic model in establishing the latter two components of Nordic humanitarianism discussed above. Nordic diplomats and Red Cross societies were active in famine and refugee relief at the League of Nations, and domestic social welfare systems developed during this period. During and after World War I, Nordic countries, aided by national Red Cross societies, accepted refugees from Armenia, Russia, and Poland as well as Austria and Germany, and also provided famine relief. In 1921, Norwegian diplomat Fridtjof Nansen became the first High Commissioner for Refugees under the League of Nations; Nansen was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work a year later. These forms of Nordic activism were foundational in establishing patterns of providing aid for humanitarian relief abroad.

As the interwar period progressed, Nordic social welfare systems also began to take hold. For example, Finland (independent since 1917), instituted a modest pension system along with aid to pregnant women in 1937. (The contents of the annual box of free baby clothes and other necessities are displayed each year around the country in the office windows of Kela, the Finnish social service agency.) In Norway, plans for full unemployment insurance provided by the state were drawn up in 1948 and became institutionalised soon thereafter (Lange, 2020). While Nordic social welfare was primarily a domestic affair, assuring people's economic and social viability within the boundaries of the state, the belief that others also merited care was a motivating factor for generous Nordic aid policies overseas. By the time of the founding of the United Nations, the welfare provisions that Nordic countries provided for their domestic populations combined with Nordic states' experience and legitimacy in international relief efforts to establish a model of action for the new, post-World War II international organisation. The egalitarian social norms

that emerged from this period have overtaken those of colonial and missionary violence in Nordic international action and humanitarian memory, but colonial/missionary encounters continued while norms of social welfare solidified. Both, therefore, should be recognised in debates about Nordic normative commitments to equity and well-being for all.

Nordic UN and Cold War Humanitarianism

As Carl Marklund (2016) points out, the Nordic model, especially in its outward manifestations, was also constituted by traditions of neutrality, particularly during the Cold War.[7] Two successive Nordic Secretary-Generals, Trygve Lie of Norway followed by Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden, led the newly formed United Nations from 1946 to 1961, bolstering Nordic internationalist norms in the consolidation of global international organisation. In addition to their internationalist orientations, both Lie and Hammarskjöld also represented key features of Nordic socialism and social democracy: Lie had been a Socialist Minister of Justice before World War II, and Hammarskjöld was known for drafting the legislation that led to the Swedish welfare state.[8] Such internationalism also characterised Nordic foreign policies, which were compelled to navigate between attempts to influence them by both the Western and Eastern blocs. Marklund asserts that even though only Finland and Sweden remained officially neutral, Denmark, Iceland and Norway (all members of NATO) each 'adopted a cautious stance during the Cold War, cooperating closely with neutral Finland and Sweden in promoting a non-confrontational geopolitical regime, regionally known as the "Nordic balance"' (Marklund, 2016: 2).

As a result, from refugee assistance in the early twentieth century to the embrace of human rights in the 1940s to the shaping of Cold War peacekeeping missions under Secretaries-General Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjöld, Nordic countries have shaped the moral practices of humanitarianism in global international organisation. Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, in particular, were the first (with the Netherlands) to meet the UN General Assembly's target, set in 1970, for countries to give at least 0.7% of GDP annually to Overseas Development Aid.[9] In addition, official Nordic aid agencies were gradually established throughout the region, beginning with Denmark (DANIDA) in 1963, Sweden (SIDA) in 1965, Norway (NORAD) in 1968, Finland (FINNIDA) in 1972 and Iceland (ICEIDA) in 1981 (Marklund, 2016: 10–12). Notably, nongovernmental and missionary organisations, labour unions and student movements were active in their establishment and influenced their development goals. Thus, the Nordic model also included a high degree of civil society participation in decisions about aid. During the same period, Nordic countries distanced themselves from United States and colonial power wars in Vietnam, and in the 1970s and 1980s from U.S. actions in favour of Central American dictatorships.[10] Marklund describes the result:

> In view of this commitment, a particular 'Nordic aid model' has emerged within this group, reflecting the welfare state corporatism of the Nordic countries, characterised by a relatively high degree of representation of

> NGOs in domestic policymaking and implementation, and a lower degree of coordination between business interests and development aid than in most other donor countries.
>
> (Marklund, 2016: 1–2)

By the end of the Cold War, Nordic moral leadership in human rights and financial leadership in foreign aid, along with Nordic leadership in designing workable social welfare systems at home, were established phenomena, leading to a number of scholarly works on Nordic exceptionalism as norm entrepreneurs (see, e.g., Ingebritsen, 2002). But tensions in the Nordic model, especially those situated in perceptions of Nordic identity as both white and anti-colonial, had not yet been fully vetted or tested. Nordic publics that were assumed to be supportive then encountered waves of immigration from the Middle East and Africa. In addition, the regional economic fissures brought about by neoliberal pressures to privatise parts or all of social welfare systems did not leave the Nordic countries unscathed.

Contemporary Nordic Humanitarianism: A Less-Than-Perfect Model?

Nordic social welfare policies have been challenged at home in recent years, both economically and socially. Economically, Nordic countries have maintained varying degrees of their vaunted social welfare model at home, despite challenges by conservative governing coalitions. There has also been fairly consistent public support for the relatively high amount of foreign aid as a percentage of GDP (and then GNI) originally established in the 1970s. During the past several decades, however, both paternalistic representations of aid recipients and the neoliberalisation of aid programmes have increased, meaning that market models are increasing applied to the provision of aid. Neoliberalisation increases the role of private vs. public actors in aid debates, which in turn become more centred on aid 'effectiveness' and the measurement of quick results. Such hallmarks of the neoliberal provision of aid have increased across the Nordic countries (Marklund, 2016: 18). Nordic humanitarian organisations have become more integrated, albeit unevenly, into the practices of the 'humanitarian international', while at the same time, intra-Nordic collaboration has frayed.

Neoliberalism in aid provision has at least two primary economic aspects: increasing 'privatisation' of aid (in the form of increasing business and/or NGO as opposed to government control), and reliance on efficiency metrics and the promotion of quick results on the donor dollar. Ole Jacob Sending and Iver Neumann (2006) show how these features are constitutive of the disciplining mechanisms of the humanitarian international, in that they form the basis of what Michel Foucault called 'governmentality', which highlights how contemporary governance mechanisms interpellated by states and international organisations facilitate and even require the expansion of NGOs into 'issues hitherto held to be the responsibility of authorised governmental agencies'. According to the governmentality paradigm, however, this does not translate into independence for civil-society actors, who must constantly demonstrate their worthiness … by carrying out their tasks

'in accordance with the appropriate (or approved) model of action' (Sending and Neumann, 2006). Still, in the Nordic region as elsewhere, the picture painted by this paradigm does not fully account for the resistances to neoliberalism that also occur in the non-profit world, especially on the part of many NGOs and FBOs (see, e.g., Lehti, 2019). In my own research, I find that resistances and accommodations can occur within the same organisations, because they sometimes critique and even influence donors to be more flexible in their giving, even while they can also fall into alignment with donor demands, as discussed below.

For example, even as Nordic actors (state aid organisations and NGOs alike) frequently work together to set aid priorities, a number of aspects of their work accord with their increasing involvement in the broader humanitarian international. Approved models of action include results-oriented market discourses that value and prioritise accountability, efficiency, results, and 'sustainability' (referring not to ecological sensitivity but to the ability to wean local programmes from transnational sources of funding). Led by Denmark, after its accession to the European Union (then the European Community, in 1973), Nordic countries have increasingly adopted the humanitarian industry's use of metrics, allegedly to measure aid 'effectiveness' for donors (Marklund, 2016: 17). Neoliberal pressures on domestic social welfare programmes in the Nordic countries, in other words, have translated into demands for greater 'efficiency' and quicker results in the provision of aid abroad. States, international organisations, and NGOs, including FBOs, respond to these demands through their programming, marketing techniques, and annual reports (Lynch, 2011: 213–214; Sending and Neumann, 2006).

The trend towards the ever more expansive use of metrics to show donors (including state agencies) and the public that their money is producing results, however, has been widely criticised (see, e.g., Bernal and Grewal, 2017; Lynch, 2011; Merry, 2016; Murphy, 2018; and Roy, 2010; among others). These critics analyse the quantification of aid as a key feature of the neoliberal governance of humanitarianism. Specifically, they charge that such quantification is generally unable to measure the well-being of aid recipients, relying instead on ill-designed proxies such as numbers of people 'trained' in conflict resolution techniques (rather than whether specific techniques are effective), or percentages of micro-loans repaid (rather than whether the recipients of these loans became better off after repayment or whether they were increasingly debt-burdened). Nordic aid organisations reproduce these trends, albeit with potential caveats. Norad, the official Nordic aid agency, for example, states that its 'main purpose is to ensure that Norwegian development funds are spent in the best possible way, and to report on what works and what does not work'.[11] And while Norad's evaluations department recognises that its 'knowledge base must be improved', it continues to locate such improvement in enhancing 'its ability to collect data, [and] analyse and evaluate on an ongoing basis'.[12] Reporting on 'what works' and collection of qualitative as well as quantitative data are not, *a priori*, indicators of neoliberalism gone amok, Nordic countries should do more to contest, explicitly, the power of donors to decide and enforce acceptable metrics. One example is the push towards 'impact evaluation'. As Marklund puts it, 'an extensive focus on impact evaluation may over time shift the focus of humanitarian

action to favour more easily assessable measures, which are often palliative rather than the preventive, and hence more complex and long-term, measures traditionally prioritised by Nordic donors' (2016: 18). The example of Norad may be indicative of both the pressure to go along with such measures and potential resistance to them: Norad's website states that 'Due to the nature of Norwegian aid and the multi-purpose nature of evaluations (well beyond merely testing whether interventions work or not), impact evaluations are often not feasible'.[13]

The problem of metrics and the economic power relations between donor and recipient, however, are only part of the problem of the neoliberalisation of humanitarianism. Neoliberal trends also encourage broader marketing strategies that try to demonstrate need on the part of recipients as well as the propensity of specific organisations to obtain results. Indeed, part of the lifeblood of the humanitarian international lies in its ability to pull at the heartstrings of donors by representing aid recipients as either victims in the midst of dire suffering (e.g. from famine, earthquakes, tsunamis, refugees from bloody conflicts or increasingly and climate-related issues), or as grateful beneficiaries of generous benefactors. In either case, the paternalistic relationship becomes solidified by organisations' representations of recipients of aid.

Contemporary representations of aid recipients by Nordic donors and humanitarian organisations have frequently fallen into the same paternalistic traps as those of non-Nordic organisations. For example, Liisa Malkki (2015) has dissected how such paternalism becomes merged with 'the need to help' in her ethnography of the Finnish Red Cross. She sensitively examines the creation of affective imaginaries by Red Cross volunteers, many of them elderly women who make 'aid bunnies' intended to provide comfort to children in conflict zones abroad. She also analyses the motivations and disappointments of Finnish humanitarian workers who go abroad to assist others. Scholar and former aid worker Marjaana Jauhola, along with her co-author, Ermina Martini (2014), provide critical self-reflections of these motivations and disappointments, as well as their own discomfort in the contradictions of the larger 'aidworld' of which they formed a part (as white, western European women) in responding to catastrophes in Aceh, Indonesia and Haiti, respectively. They name a central dilemma for actual and would-be humanitarians: the point at which they realised that the aidworld they had joined in order to reduce inequities was actually built on reinforcing many of them (Martini and Jauhola, 2014: 89):

> I was extremely angry and disappointed by the aid system I observed and of which I was part; I felt that we aid workers reproduced the 'inequitable power relations that international aid is meant to challenge'.

More provocatively, perhaps, their dawning realisations demonstrate the pervasiveness and power of the humanitarian international:

> Am I really an outsider to all this? Is there such a thing as an 'outside' to the humanitarianism/aid machinery? … Retrospectively, I would argue that no

> matter into which position I move my body or what I work on, I am part of a wider nexus of knowledge production on aid, a tension which had worn me out.
>
> (Martini and Jauhola, 2014: 88–89)

Naming this tension is what Pernilla Johansson, a Swedish academic and aid worker, terms 'the invisibility cloak' – the hidden emotions experienced by the 'internationals' who go abroad to help. International aid workers are trained not to exhibit such emotions, especially not to 'locals', yet their range determines (and inhibits) the very partnerships that are supposed to establish the framework for equitable forms of aid (Johansson, 2022).

These and other scholar/aid workers note the paternalism that remains strong in Nordic humanitarianism. Paternalism exists not only in relationships on the ground but also in marketing materials created by nongovernmental organisations seeking funding for aid, which frequently depict aid recipients as either suffering victims or as happy recipients of (northern) aid. Such paternalistic representations of have created controversy in the Nordic countries. For example, the Finnish chapter of the transnational NGO Plan International incited considerable criticism after a campaign featuring a pregnant girl in Zambia emphasised the 'shocking' number of children who become mothers in 'developing countries'. The ad, showing the girl wearing a Finnish designer maternity dress, was displayed on public transportation and also won a design award. Backlash came from academia, and also from the director of SahWira, 'an organization fighting for women and girls' rights, for equality, against racism and negative representation of black and brown people' and to 'eradicate poverty in Africa'.[14]

The public backlash to this campaign is noteworthy. In addition, it is significant that one of the most successful campaigns against stereotypical representations of aid recipients comes from a Norwegian-South African collaboration called 'Radi-Aid'. Radi-Aid's series of videos humorously mock the humanitarian industry's egotism and unreflective paternalism by turning the tables on who gives to whom and showing would-be aid recipients as thriving, agentic members of African society. For example, the first Radi-Aid video took on concerts such as Live-Aid and Band-Aid by turning the tables to show South African celebrity musicians arriving in limousines to record a song to raise money to send radiators to freezing Norwegians because 'frostbite kills, too'. Another shows a South African grandmother in her living room, receiving a goat she does not know what to do with from a European aid programme.[15]

Contemporary Trends

Nordic aid in the post-Cold War period is also shaped by the racialised perception of threats to security and social identity, primarily as a result of successions of refugee movements from the Middle East and Africa into the Nordic region from the early 2000s to the present. Recall the early twentieth-century Nordic activism in support of refugees, both among Nordic countries and in Europe. The United

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) website assumes the continuation of such support throughout the Cold War to the present, as the following statement demonstrates:

> For decades, the Nordic countries have been strong resettlement partners to UNHCR and have welcomed refugees via resettlement. Denmark since 1979, Finland since 1985, Iceland since 1995, Norway since the 1980s and Sweden since 1950. In recent years, several Nordic countries have increased their quotas, responding to the global needs and demonstrating strong solidarity with host countries. Several countries in the region are also supporting UNHCR's Global Resettlement Program, which helps to build capacity and develop the program.[16]

Nevertheless, scholars of migration note that the years 2015–2016 became known as years of refugee 'crisis' in the Nordic region (Garvik and Valenta, 2021). At this time, policies became considerably more restrictive, reflecting the rising xenophobia occurring throughout Europe and including the Nordic countries with the increase in asylum-seekers from Syria and Afghanistan, in particular. Denmark developed the most restrictive policies, Norway began to enforce and build on restrictive policies it had developed earlier in 2010, and even Sweden, long considered to have the most welcoming stance towards refugees of all the Nordic countries, tightened eligibility. Measures adopted by these countries included greater temporal restrictions on length of stay (especially in Denmark), increasing numbers of rejections of asylum applicants at the border (Norway), and increasing deportations as well as the introduction of new, tiered (and hence, second-class) status for refugees in their ability to access Nordic social welfare provisions (Garvik and Valenta, 2021).

Such responses to asylum-seekers, especially non-white and/or Muslim refugees, is not surprising to scholars of Nordic colonialism. As Keskinen, Tuori, Irni and Mulinari pointed out in 2009, Nordic countries have long been 'complicit' in the racialised and racist forms of discrimination that are characteristic of colonial practices. Moreover, they argue that contemporary emphases in Nordic human rights and humanitarian activism, particularly around gender issues, reflects the construction of an allegedly 'superior' Nordic identity that prioritises gender equality vis-à-vis an 'inferior' stance towards gender on the part of decolonised societies (Keskinen et al. 2016; Mulinari et al. 2009). Thus, Nordic countries, while differing in their specific legal codes and degree of restrictions on refugees, still claim to be leaders on issues of women's rights and gender-based violence, even as immigrants into the region are increasingly securitised as economic and political threats.

What Can and Should Be Salvaged From the Nordic Model of Aid?

As this chapter has demonstrated, the Nordic countries have developed a track record of giving to other parts of the world that is (in relative terms) generous and that supports autonomy and independence. They have helped each other – especially in

the aftermath of the World Wars, and expanded their assistance to significant parts of the Global South as they fought for decolonisation from co-Europeanists. They resisted falling into U.S. Cold War policies that demonised Vietnamese, African, and Central American movements as communist, instead supporting movements for independence and economic and social liberation.

At the same time, Nordic humanitarianism also has a legacy of racism and racialised representations of 'otherness' that originated in the Nordic countries' active or passive complicity in imperialist expansion, the slave trade and missionising. Neither the Nordic countries nor the broader 'humanitarian international' have been able to transcend the problems of representation today, which in this analysis are symptomatic of a much deeper reliance on forms of neocolonial control of aid mechanisms and programmes in the hands of (largely) western donors. In other work, I have argued that what is necessary is an onto-epistemological as well as geographic recentering of aid in the Global South (given my own work, I argue in favour of recentering in Africa, Lynch, 2022). In other words, what is needed is unconditional equity – the full acceptance of recipient ways of knowing and doing, without the mandate to 'develop' in particular ways that follow western trajectories; not only the willingness to learn from recipient societies but the full acknowledgement that such learning is imperative; and the acknowledgement that our current roles of giver and receiver in the aid world are predicated upon past forms of violence and extraction that should make us question who, ultimately, is the 'giver', and who is the 'receiver,' and allow a geographic as well as onto-epistemological recentering of aid decision-making in the Global South (Lynch, 2022). The Nordic countries have in the past demonstrated a path towards equity that has not been followed by other members of the Global North aid community; they (the Nordic countries) need to retake and continue that path. The way to take it forward is (perhaps paradoxically) to take a back seat to the decision-making of those they purport to assist, as the Nordic countries did while supporting Global South political decolonisation and independence. A renewed and reinvigorated Nordic model also entails allowing the free movement of peoples into the Nordic countries themselves, while explicitly countering both anti-immigrant racism at home and paternalistic and racialised forms of representation of those who are aided abroad.

I wish to thank the editors of this volume for their perceptive comments. I also thank especially Tiinna Vaittinen for numerous helpful suggestions when I presented a very early draft in the spring of 2019.

Notes

1 The concept of the 'humanitarian international' was first articulated by Alex de Waal in 1997, to describe 'the cosmopolitan elite of relief workers, officials of donor agencies, consultant academics and the like, and the institutions for which they work.' De Waal (1997), *Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*, Oxford:

James Currey, pp. 3–4. I frequently use the term to describe the complex of aid agencies, nongovernmental organisations and faith-based organisations, donors, UN agencies, foundations and states that tends to structure the provision of both emergency and development assistance around the world. Others have used the terms 'disaster relief industry' (e.g., de Waal in the subtitle to the same book); 'humanitarian industry/ development industry'; 'aidland' (see David Mosse, ed., *Adventures in Aidland: The Anthropology of Professionals in International Development,* New York: Berghahn Books, 2013); and 'peaceland' (to describe the loose transnational infrastructure that promotes the concept of peacebuilding; see Séverine Autesserre, *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); some use the term 'internationals' (to connote relief workers and development experts who travel from one country to another, see Pernilla Johansson, *Emotional Practices and Listening in Peacebuilding Partnerships: The Invisibility Cloak,* London: Routledge, 2022).

2 ABOUT – Nordic Colonialism and the Global, University of Helsinki, available at blogs.helsinki.fi/nordic-colonialism/about-2/ [accessed May 06, 2024].

3 The New Sámi Renaissance: Nordic Colonialism, Social Change and Indigenous Cultural Policy (NESAR), The artic University of Norway, available at https://en.uit.no/project/nesar [accessed February 19, 2024].

4 See, for example, UNESCO Heritage Site Cape Coast Castle, built of timber by the Portuguese, expanded by Swedes, and controlled by Danes before finally being taken by the British. See also the Sámi Museum and Nature Center Siida in Inari, Finland for photographic and other memories of intra-Nordic colonisation: https://siida.fi/.

5 Rethinking Nordic Colonialism: A Postcolonial Exhibition Project in Five Acts (2023), available at https://www.e-flux.com/announcements/41460/rethinking-nordic-colonialism-a-postcolonial-exhibition-project-in-five-acts/ [accessed February 19, 2024].

6 By 1910, immigrants from Sweden, Norway and Denmark had created the 'Scandinavian Socialist Federation' in the U.S., with strong chapters especially in immigrant cities such as Chicago and Minneapolis. 'Scandinavian Socialist Federation – Socialist Party of America, 1910–1919', Mapping American Social Movements Project, University of Washington, 2015. Scandinavian Language Federation - Mapping American Social Movements, available at https://depts.washington.edu/moves/SP_map-scandinavian.shtml [accessed November, 2022]. On Sweden and Norway's social democracy, see Francis Sejersted (2011), 'Introduction', *The Age of Social Democracy: Norway and Sweden in the Twentieth Century*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

7 Carl Marklund (2016) has provided an excellent analysis of the origins and development of Nordic humanitarianism, which I draw on in this section. Marklund, 'Neutrality and solidarity in Nordic humanitarian action.' *Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper*, London: Overseas Development Institute.

8 Brian Urquhart notes that as Justice Minister, Lie had given Leon Trostky asylum in Norway (later rescinding it); Hammarskjöld's Nobel Peace Prize biography credits him with coining the term, 'planned economy'. See Urquhart B. (2019), Character Sketches: Trygve Lie by Brian Urquhart, UN News, available at https://news.un.org/en/spotlight/character-sketches-trygve-lie-brian-urquhart [accessed November, 2022], and 'Dag Hammarskjöld – Biographical', NobelPrize.org, Nobel Prize Outreach AB 2022, available at https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1961/hammarskjold/biographical/ [accessed November 26, 2022].

9 'History of the 0.7% ODA Target', *The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. III-9 to III-11, 2002; revised March 2016.

10 As Marklund points out, the Nordic countries often shared this kind of solidarity politics vis-à-vis what was then known as the "Third World" with other middle powers such as Canada, Ireland and the Netherlands (Marklund p. 1; he also cites Pratt and Södersten, 1989; Olesen, Pharo and Paaskesen, 2013a; 2013b; and O'Sullivan, 2015).

11 Norad, available at: https://www.norad.no/en/front/about-norad/ [accessed February 19, 2024].
12 Evaluation in a time of crisis (2021), Norad, available at https://www.norad.no/en/front/evaluation/news/2021/evaluation-in-a-time-of-crisis/ [accessed February 19, 2024].
13 Evaluation methods, Norad, available at https://www.norad.no/en/front/evaluation/what-is-evaluation/evaluation-methods/ [accessed February 19, 2024].
14 SahWira Africa International, Facebook, available at: https://www.facebook.com/sahwiraafrica [accessed February 19, 2024]; See also Wall D. (2018), '"Eroticising and Sexualising": Research Slams Plan Finland over ad campaign featuring pregnant 12 year-old girl', *Yle,* updated 3.5.2018, available at https://yle.fi/a/3–10180236 [accessed February 19, 2024]; Mustonen, L. (2017). Is it time for Finnish celebrities to save the black girls of a 'developing country'?, allegralaboratory.net, available at https://allegralaboratory.net/finnish-celebrities-save-the-black-girls-of-a-developing-country [accessed February 19, 2024]; Yrjölä, R. (2014), The global politics of celebrity humanitarianism (dissertation, Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä].
15 See 'Africa for Norway', and 'The Radi-Aid App: Change a Life With …', both at Radi-Aid (2017), available at https://www.radiaid.com [accessed February 19, 2024].
16 UNHCR - The UN Refugee Agency, available at https://www.unhcr.org/ [accessed November 11, 2022].

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10 "In Practice, It Just Happens"[1]

How the Nordics Work Together Within Peace and Conflict Resolution

Isabel Bramsen and Anine Hagemann

Introduction

Built on a long history of peaceful coexistence, the Nordic countries share strong affinities and cooperate in many areas. The most notable policy exception to this has always been foreign and security policy, where there is a strong Nordic institutional framework for information sharing and coordination but where further policy integration has always met resistance. Recently, however, attention has begun to shift toward increasing cooperation in a number of areas. Even so, in this area, studies of Nordic cooperation have often focused attention on the institutional structures as an indicator of the depth and nature of policy integration. This chapter takes a slightly different approach. It examines an area of foreign policy, which has received little attention, namely the area of peace and conflict resolution, and it does so from below, examining practices of collaboration rather than institutional structures. Mapping different degrees and characteristics of integration from the bottom-up, this study of Nordic collaboration around peace and conflict resolution sheds light on the mechanisms, processes and nature of peace and conflict resolution but sheds light more generally on the practices of Nordic policy cooperation within foreign and security policy more broadly.

In the past decade, there has been increased attention to the geostrategic and political reasons for enhancing Nordic cooperation, both among policymakers and academics (Brommesson, 2018c; Græger, 2011; Ojanen, 2005; Olesen and Wivel, 2015). With liberal values and multilateralism in general under pressure and growing tensions in the Arctic region, the strategic environment for Nordic collaboration has been growing gradually more conducive (Itu-Maki, 2008). Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 sparked a surge in Nordic defense cooperation, which will likely continue. Common Nordic agreements to use each other's airspace and military infrastructure were reached. In addition, Swedish and Finnish membership of NATO will allow for increased sharing of intelligence and cooperation on security issues within both the EU and NATO, however without necessarily building separate Nordic structures for this. These trends together signal an *intensification* of what Hyde-Price has referred to this as a general "Nordic turn" within security policy with new commitment to strengthened defense cooperation and to projection of a more unified group in the Baltic Sea region. (Hyde-Price, 2018: 1)

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In the area of peace, the verdict has been less optimistic when it comes to cooperation. Several scholars have declared the so-called Nordic peace brand to be outdated and challenged by growing differences in the political priorities of the Nordic countries. One scholar went so far in his characterization as to say that "anyone trying to identify a Nordic model for international peace and security today would be hard pressed" (Wivel, 2017). In this chapter, we show that when it comes to Nordic cooperation on peace and security on the ground, common ways of working and common projects are in fact not that hard to identify. Hence, rather than focusing on the Nordic Peace brand as an innate quality of the five Nordic countries, we focus on it as a community that has been produced through day-to-day cooperation, examining what those practices then look like and what consequences they have for policy integration.

The analysis is based on a bottom-up examination of the practical work within conflict resolution and peacebuilding by the respective Nordic ministries of foreign affairs, development agencies and their close implementing partners. We show that despite lacking formalization in the foreign policy realm, the Nordics do in fact work very closely together in the areas of peace and conflict resolution, and this integration is increasing. Especially in third countries, at the country level, informal and formal Nordic structures facilitate collaboration, not least in conflict settings. This work is generally driven by pragmatic like-mindedness and practical solutions. From the data, we distill a typology of three different types of working together, which represent degrees of integration: *coordination*, as the least integrated approach, primarily involving information sharing and trust building; *cooperation*, as a more ritualized, yet still politically non-committal form of working together; and *collaboration,* as a more regular, integrated and in some examples more binding approach, where joint analysis leads to joint solutions. We find that, while there is often limited appetite for formalizing cooperation, there is a growing appetite among the Nordics for working together and deepening integration, both due to the practical benefits hereof but also due to geopolitical shifts in the Nordic neighborhood the increasing pushback against multilateralism and international norms globally. Further, we find that whereas certain policy areas may pose greater challenges for joint efforts, the benefits of working together count the potential to increase impact and gain information and that working together is made easier by shared working cultures, values and high levels of trust among the Nordics.

Our approach is a substantive reorientation in two ways. First, most literature on Nordicness and the ambiguities that lie in increased collaboration yet hesitance toward formalization focuses on foreign and security policy with an emphasis on security policy (see, e.g., Hyde-Price, 2018). By zooming in on a particular part of foreign policy, namely peace and conflict resolution, which is perhaps not as "high politics", we open up the examination of Nordicness in foreign policy. As argued by Mouritzen regarding Nordic collaboration within foreign and security policy: "New openings are more likely in areas detached from national core interests" (Mouritzen, 2018). Second, our examination is a methodological reorientation. By taking a bottom-up approach, we hope to add to the knowledge about how Nordic cooperation unfolds in its more mundane, practical forms and through this to say

something novel about modes and styles of Nordic cooperation as well as their strengths and weaknesses. In this way, we contribute both to the literature on Nordic transnational cooperation in practice (Strang, 2016) as well as more indirectly to the literature on the Nordic peace brand (Browning, 2007; Wivel, 2017). In addition, the chapter speaks to practice theoretical approaches in International Relations that focus on what practitioners and diplomats do rather than analyzing states and their policies from the top down (e.g. Adler-Nissen, 2014, Pouliot, 2016). It also builds on recent contributions focusing on the power of lower-level bureaucrats and their practices in shaping institutions in international relations (Hagemann, 2020, 2021).

The chapter proceeds as follows: first, we set the stage by introducing briefly the Nordic countries and their cooperation within foreign and security policy, and show how shifts in the tectonics of competing institutions may open up space for new Nordic maneuvering. Second, we briefly discuss methods and data. Third, we distill from the data a typology of the ways the Nordics work together, as seen from the bottom-up and discuss the conditions cultivating integration as well as exemplify with the case of Nordic cooperation in Afghanistan. Finally, we discuss various challenges of Nordic cooperation, including the global pushback against liberal values.

"New Superstructures Are Not What We Need": Nordic Foreign and Security Policies

The Nordic region has been categorized as a "zone of peace" due to the lack of intrastate and interstate war, military interventions by outside forces, military intervention by forces from the region in areas outside, and the overall long-term expectations of peace within the region. This is often explained by the strong historical link between democracy and peace, as well as gender equality, which all enable the prevention of violent conflict and by a tradition of peaceful conflict resolution seen as the sole legitimate means of solving conflicts within the Nordic area (Archer, 1996). In the first theorizations of "security communities", as regional entities with internal stability and cohesion in the 1950s, the Nordic countries were used as the token example (Deutsch et al., 1957). And the Nordics in their foreign policies have also had a track-record of being peace promoting; the Nordic zone not just a region of peace, but a region for peace; or what one observer has called a "Scandinavian International Society" (Schouenborg, 2013). Moreover, the Nordics have a strong tradition in Peace Research hosting some of the most renowned peace research institutions in the world (Bramsen and Hagemann 2023). Yet, references to peace, mediation or conflict resolution is remarkably absent from joint Nordic branding documents like the 2018 initiative of the Nordic prime ministers "Nordic Solutions to Global Challenges", even though this initiative promises "50 steps for global change". The decline in a Nordic peace brand is also evident in recent scholarly work. For example, Browning (2007) argues that the Nordic peace brand has been undermined over the years, "first in that the region no longer appears more peaceful than the rest of Europe; and, second because some of the Nordic

countries have de-emphasised and rejected the utility of the brand when it comes to military issues" (Browning, 2007). Likewise, Wivel (2017) argues that while the Nordic peace brand remains, "the 'product' is no longer a distinct and progressive voice in international relations". For a country like Denmark, this aligns well with increased investments in the military starting from the end of the Cold War, and a declining emphasis on peace as a key part of Danish foreign policy (Hagemann, 2022) .But for other Nordic countries, this makes less sense. Many of the chapters in this volume (Browning; Joenniemi; Strang, this volume) argue that the peace brand has been redefined in the new millennium. However, in line with the shifts in the geopolitical landscape, the ambition of the Nordic Council in making Peace the brand of the Nordics ("Låt fred bli Nordens varumärke", Nordic Council of Ministers, 2017) warrants more scrutiny.

When thinking about foreign and security policy cooperation among the Nordics, the geopolitical context is of key importance. Historically, the idea of a Nordic defense union was put on hold with the formation of NATO in the 1950s (Olesen, 2018), but where Sweden and Finland stayed neutral. In the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the EEC then EU grew in importance and became to its members the primary point of reference in terms of coordinating foreign policy. In light of the growing importance of the EU and end of the Cold War, analysis of the geopolitical context of the Nordic countries has tended to emphasize that mutual dependence among the Nordics was dwindling (Wæver, 1992). Some have argued that an exception to this was Norway, which not being a member of the EU, had the strongest interest in pursuing common mechanisms for Nordic foreign and security policy (Mouritzen, 1995). However, for a number of reasons, the strategic assessment of both the Nordic community generally and the Swedish particularly, seems to be shifting.[2] The analysis of the global context centers around four significant shifts, which include: (1) growing assertiveness of Russia, (2) wavering commitment of the United States to NATO and multilateralism in general, (3) fragmentation within the EU and (4) global challenges to a rules-based international order. Regardless of what relative weight one puts on these, they can individually and together be used to argue for the need for stronger Nordic integration, both internally and externally. As regards Sweden particularly, recent analysis has pointed out how Sweden in the current context and with its limited defense capability, among the Nordics should have the strongest interest in Nordic realignment, especially security and defense policy (Hyde-Price, 2018).

There are differences among the Nordics in terms of their "Nordicness". Brommeson uses Nordicness as referring to "the perception and recognition of a Nordic role in the foreign and security policy of the various Nordic states" (Brommeson, 2018a: 2). The authors in a special issue on Nordicness in security and foreign policy use a two-dimensional model and look at cultures within the Nordic community and the degree to which ideas of the Nordic influenced the construction of foreign and security policy in each Nordic country. Græger finds that Norway and Iceland, while sharing a high affinity with Nordic culture, have – to a lesser degree – been inclined to let the Nordic to shape its foreign and security policy (Brommesson, 2018c; Græger, 2018). Denmark is the "least Nordic" in the sense

that there is a low degree of orientation toward the Nordic environment and a low inclination to allow it to shape foreign and security policy (Brommesson, 2018a; Wivel, 2018). Finland and Sweden were found to be the "most Nordic", being pro-Nordically oriented as well as the Nordic playing an important role in key dimensions of foreign and security policy (Brommesson, 2018a, 2018b; Ojanen, 2005; Ojanen and Raunio, 2018).

While there are differences among the Nordic countries' foreign and development policies' emphasis on Nordic collaboration (see Hagemann and Bramsen, 2019), all five Nordic countries place emphasis on conflict-affected, fragile states. All of the Nordics are top performers when it comes to per capita contributions to fragile states despite the cuts to foreign policy and development funding in several countries. Counted together, the collective Nordic contribution is a little over 8% of the total amount of funds from all Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors to fragile states, making them the fifth largest bilateral donor. Looking at the priority countries for each of the Nordic countries, the focus on fragility and conflict is also clear.

Nordic cooperation in the area of peace and security has seen an increase starting around 2009–2011, especially on the military side, including the implementation of the Stoltenberg Report on Nordic Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy in 2009, the establishment of a joint Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) in 2009 and subsequent initiatives, including a joint declaration of Nordic solidarity in 2011. Despite this, the appetite for formalizing foreign and security policy remains limited among decision makers. Even with recent realignments, there are no indications of any radical shifts in terms of the baseline, which is not formalizing foreign and security policy: "New superstructures are not what we need to join forces and strengthen the Region's role in the world", said Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Villy Søvndal in 2012 (quoted in Arvidsson and Schou-Knudsen, 2012: 24). This remained the Nordic policy. An indicator of this was the follow-up to the Stoltenberg Report in 2019, "Ten Years On: Reassessing the Stoltenberg Report on Nordic cooperation", which was specifically given a very limited mandate in terms of the scope of its recommendations (URU, 2019), signaling the limited appetite for deepening the formal Nordic security cooperation structures.

Methods, Data and Defining Nordic Peace and Conflict Resolution

Our analysis is based on 32 semi-structured interviews with 49 individuals during January, February and March 2019, which were conducted as part of a Nordic Council funded project of mapping Nordic cooperation on peace and reconciliation, producing and end-report titled New Nordic Peace: Nordic peace and conflict resolution efforts (Hagemann and Bramsen, 2019). We interviewed civil servants from the Nordic foreign ministries; government development agencies; key implementing agencies of Nordic peace and reconciliation efforts (Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF), Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) and The Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)); foreign policy analysts; politicians and advisors working in the context of the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers.

One notable distinction among the practitioners is useful. We spoke to two groups: One was made up of practitioners working on Nordic cooperation specifically; the other was made up of people working on peace and conflict resolution. The focus of the interviews was the practical realities of Nordic cooperation as well as potential, challenges, overlaps or competition between activities.[3] By conducting interviews rather than for example merely analyzing policy documents, we got an insight into the everyday practices of practitioners working with peace, conflict and Nordic cooperation. In addition to the interviews, the article builds on existing policy documents from the Nordic Council and the respective Nordic governments, as well as a wide array of written material available publicly about the activities of the Nordic countries at home and abroad.

Through our analysis of foreign, security and development policy documents as well as through our interview process, the Nordics often characterized their work with diverging terminologies depending on the country, although often referring to similar efforts on the ground. An in-depth discussion of the respective definitions of the Nordic countries' peace and conflict resolution efforts and programs can be found in Hagemann and Bramsen (2019). Here, we map different understandings of central concepts such as peace, reconciliation, security and mediation in the different Nordic countries both rooted in linguistic and cultural differences (Hagemann and Bramsen, 2019). To avoid confusion with these slightly diverging terminologies, we apply the broader concept, "peace and conflict resolution", to encompass all types of Nordic efforts related to building, supporting and making peace, from more structural programs of supporting rule of law, human rights or state building, to more direct efforts of dialogue and mediation. This terminology also corresponds with mainstream peace and conflict research (Ramsbotham et al., 2011).

Nordic Peace in Practice: Coordination, Cooperation and Collaboration Within Peace and Conflict Resolution

The title of this chapter highlights the bottom-up aspect of what drives the Nordic integration of peace work. In this section, we look at the *how* of what happens in practice, and we categorize different degrees of integration when it comes to working together. Working together among the Nordics is persistent and widespread in the areas of peace and conflict resolution and generally characterized by a high degree of informality at all levels. The shared values, culture and ways of working make working together easy. This intra-Nordic "cobweb" integration is characterized by a combination of bottom-up and top-down initiatives from both public, private and third sector actors under the auspices of the Nordic Council (Wivel, 2017). It maps different degrees of cooperation within peace and conflict resolution. Based on descriptions by practitioners of the ways in which their Nordic work is structured, we have distilled three categories of working together within policy: *Coordination, Cooperation* and *Collaboration*. As illustrated in Figure 10.1, the three are on a spectrum ranging from less integrated (light gray) to more integrated (dark gray) approaches.[4]



Figure 10.1 Nordic integration.

Source: from Hagemann & Bramsen 2019, published with the kind permission of the Nordic Council of Ministers.

Coordination and information sharing happens completely naturally among the Nordics at all levels, be it between politicians, bureaucrats, or civil society actors working on peace in the Nordic countries; in other capitals with a large concentration of actors working with peace, such as Brussels, Geneva, New York and Washington DC; and at country level, wherever there is more than one embassy. Perhaps the best example of a successful coordination mechanism on peace and conflict is the high-level structure of the Nordic Council of Ministers within foreign and security policy. These areas are not part of the mandate of the Council of Ministers; thus, the mechanisms of coordination under the auspices of the Nordic Council of

Ministers are characterized by being informal. The meetings have a focus on information sharing and discussion of current foreign policy topics. Many mechanisms stay at the coordination level and have done so for decades. Coordination can also include joint statements and joint meetings. For example, at the global level, the Nordics often give joint statements in the UN. Holding joint meetings is also common practice, both for ambassadors posted abroad, typically as a means to enhance leverage (Interview 15) or for Nordic leaders. Recent examples are meetings between Nordic heads of state and US President Barack Obama in 2016 as well as with Prime Minister Narendra Modi from India in 2018.[5]

Where coordination is mainly limited to information sharing, **cooperation** is accomplished by a division of labor among actors, each responsible for solving a certain part of a joint challenge. A lot of the Nordic joint work, which happens in multilateral fora such as the EU or UN can be characterized as cooperation. Many underlined the UN as a vehicle for promoting shared values in the global arena; one informant even stated that the UN is "the best example of how Nordic collaboration – and Nordic cooperation alone – can move mountains. It is just amazing what has been done. The collaboration there is so close" (Interview 25). All the Nordic countries have been dedicated to international cooperation and global rules and norms in distinct ways. Being small, open democracies, their interest in furthering the values of rules-based democratic coexistence has been consistent. Examples of collaboration in multilateral fora are joint lobbying for a Nordic country's candidacy for a seat on the Security Council, joint policy initiatives and a degree of representation of one another in coordination groups or committees. Here, priorities overlap in some areas, and those areas are subject to cooperation. Others are not.

Collaboration is a coordinated, synchronous activity that is the result of a continued attempt to construct and maintain a shared conception of a problem. It involves joint analysis and letting that analysis influence decision making and action. Collaboration thus involves a different degree of knowledge exchange altogether, which essentially entails shaping understanding and analysis of a situation together. The joint analysis also allows for defining the nature of challenges together, rather than separately. Deeper levels of trust and openness, as well as routinized mechanisms of coordination in place already, are required for this level of integration to exist. At this level of integration, joint analyses inform joint action to solve a commonly defined challenge. This is mainly seen at country level. What our analysis shows is that with growing integration, that is, moving from left to right on the spectrum, actors move from mere information sharing and division of labor to sharing joint analysis and letting that analysis influence decision making and action.

In parallel with the policy realm, a wide range of practical cooperation happens at all levels. This type of cooperation includes embassy colocation, joint visa application processing and practical support. There are regular, institutionalized meetings between heads of IT, heads of property management, legal departments, etc., among the Nordic countries' foreign ministries and other relevant actors in order to facilitate coordination in these areas. This is further elaborated when we discuss colocation below.

Why Nordics Work Together

We have now established that Nordic policies of peace and conflict resolution are implemented in a much more integrated way on the ground than what is visible from policy documents and academic papers on the subject. Rather than strategic, deliberative efforts to join forces or streamline policies, what first and foremost foster this practice of working together is shared (working) culture, values, language and many benefits of working together such as increased impact and outreach. Several interviewees mentioned how the first thing an ambassador taking up a new post would do is to meet one or several of her Nordic counterparts for coffee to get an understanding of the situation and create links. One of the reasons for this is that Nordics have a straightforward manner of communicating. Several informants talked about Nordic cooperation as "natural" or "organic" emerging out of similar working cultures and mindsets rather than larger strategic considerations or formal structures. Nordic ways of working are driven by pragmatic like-mindedness and practical solutions. One interviewee stressed how "there's something about the way we (the Nordics) approach things, we're quite open and direct, we don't spend a long time on introductions and preliminary talk. It's straight to the heart of the matter" (Interview 22). Apart from a more direct and pragmatic approach, a central aspect of the Nordic working culture that also relates to the basic trust described below is a culture of resolving conflicts. One interviewee tellingly described a situation in which Nordic cooperation had been attempted but failed due to major disagreements: "but then again, the advantage is that even in such a situation, where it's fair to say that we really disagreed – both regarding substance and the process – even then we could still talk about it" (Interview 24).

Likewise, increased cooperation and coordination is cultivated by a general high degree of trust between Nordic practitioners in conflict-affected areas. Of course, this also depends on personality and personal relationships but generally the interviewees reported a high degree of trust and a general sense of "being part of the Nordic family" with shared history, language and culture. This trust enables information sharing and close cooperation. As one interviewee highlighted,

> You can always ask your Nordic colleague about something and know that it won't be leaked to the press (…) there's a basic trust. And with the Nordic colleagues you can be much more open than you can with other colleagues.
> (Interview 27)

Besides the intersubjective and cultural aspects that make collaboration and cooperation smooth and often a "natural" choice, there are several strategic advantages of working together that also fosters cooperation. Several practitioners stressed how Nordic cooperation often increases the impact of different efforts and multiply the power of the particular countries. Externally in relation to actors outside the Nordics, with collaboration and a consistent, common voice, the level of access to policy fora is potentially greatly increased; the Nordics speaking with one voice or attending meetings together gives a completely different leverage and "brings us

into the major league" (interview 25). The advantage in terms of access and leverage was a very general lesson, mentioned by interviewees speaking respectively about the Nordic engagement across four different continents. For example, the Nordic Ambassadors posted in a given country or region often meet together regularly, visit relevant venues together or push for certain agendas together, amplifying their collective voice. An ambassador tellingly states that

> we have a Nordic brand that we perhaps could make more use of. It gives us a good profile when we go out together and perform together, and when we have visited different counties together, it generates a good press coverage and an awareness of "*these are special countries*".
>
> (Interview 22)

Similarly, the level of analytical understanding is potentially heightened when Nordic resources are pooled. Numerous interviewees stress how the Nordic countries often act as each other's eyes and ears in different fora where the other Nordic countries are not represented. In particular, it is emphasized how Norway is not part of the EU, while Sweden and Finland are not part of NATO and therefore, they benefit from information sharing from these organizations. Likewise, in many contexts, some Nordic countries may have a larger representation than others, for example in Russia where Finland's largest embassy is placed and the remaining countries highly benefit from close cooperation and information sharing, due to Finland's comprehensive understanding of the situation in Russia.

Sometimes the circle of Nordics is increased to a circle of "Nordic Plus" countries, a common forum, which exists in many regions and consists of the Nordic countries with the addition of other likeminded countries. The Nordic Plus concept is evidence of at least two things. First, a Nordic brand – at least when the Nordics are far away from home – still has clout. Otherwise, there would be no reason to invoke it when other countries were involved and there would be no reason why countries like the Netherlands, the UK and others would accept being subsumed under this heading unless the assessment of it was that it carries positive connotations or even a certain soft power (Nye, 2017). Second, Nordic integration, related to its often ad hoc and organically driven bottom-up nature, can have a centrifugal quality, where daily coordination leads to cooperation which slowly leads to policy integration over time, and where likeminded players are brought in – the substance and ways of working together driving the collaboration rather than politics in the capitals.

A Case of Close Collaboration: Diplomatic Colocation in Kabul, Afghanistan

While Nordic cooperation in foreign policy – and thus also in the area of peace and conflict – is not formalized, one policy strategy that does seem to cultivate closer integration is colocation. Not intended for this purpose, but rather as a cost-efficiency measure, colocation of diplomatic missions implies that more than one

country's embassy is located next to or together with other embassies and has been a measure practiced by the Nordics for decades. In countries where staff live next to or in the embassy, this means Nordic staff live side by side.[6] Several informants touched upon the question of whether practical colocation leads to more cooperation on the policy side. We do not have any way to point to direct causality, but informants with experience from colocation projects mentioned several indirect links, that is: Working and living side by side with a group of people, over time, provides a basis for more information sharing and, where possible, deeper cooperation. A contributing reinforcing condition, which was noted in addition to the colocation, was the fact that the security situation in many conflict-affected areas restrains mobility and thus colocation has an even stronger impact than it probably would in a non-conflict environment. As one informant called it, "the camp atmosphere", which emerges in conflict settings among staff, was an integration multiplier.

Despite longstanding and continuing challenges to donor coordination and alignment (Oxfam, 2018), interviewees across the Nordic countries mentioned Afghanistan as an excellent example of a conflict setting where Nordic work was integrated to an extent well beyond mere ad hoc information sharing and cooperation. Several of the Nordic countries, particularly Denmark, Norway and Sweden, all had large engagements since the war in Afghanistan started in 2001 and until the drawback in 2021. The Nordics are still invested in terms of humanitarian portfolios post-2022. Until 2021, the scope and scale of the Nordic cooperation in Afghanistan was far-reaching and was by many presented as a best practice of what close-knit Nordic collaboration looks like. Below, we go through the characteristics of the Nordics in Afghanistan.

In terms of advantages of working together, first, collaboration has the advantages of increased access and leverage. The collaboration is an example of the multiplication factor of acting and speaking with one voice. The argument that "separately we are relatively small, but together we are a super power" (Haugevik and Sending, 2019) was highlighted by several informants with regard to the example of Afghanistan (Interviews 6, 25, 27). The Nordics together were the third largest bilateral donor in Afghanistan and counting the multilaterals, they are the fifth largest (OECD, 2018). The sheer volume of aid alone gave the joint Nordic voice considerable leverage politically (Interview 25, 27). Vis-à-vis the Nordic Plus-Group consisting of the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, this provided the Nordics with a seat at the table at the highest levels. Besides giving access, it also allowed the Nordics to push common policy agendas. Specifically, at the time interviews were being conducted, attempts to reach a new political settlement among the warring parties and the political players in Afghanistan were the focus of the international efforts. Here, the ability of the Nordics to use their seat at the table allowed them to pursue joint strategic priorities. At a more general level, the common Nordic voice also allowed for "walking the talk" in terms of development cooperation and the Nordic support generally for coordination in accord with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, producing more tangible results as a consequence of streamlined development efforts (Bauck and Strand, 2009: 16).

Second, efficiency and burden-sharing were also mentioned by many of the interviewees (Interviews 21, 25, 26, 27), both practically and substantively. Specifically, the level of joint analysis was emphasized. In terms of benefits to the Afghans, other studies have shown that a common Nordic approach can provide more effective development assistance (Bauck and Strand, 2009). Whereas countless analyses have highlighted the tendency of donor duplication and competition in Afghanistan (Riis Andersen, 2016; Ball et al., 2016; Swenson, 2017), one assessment specifically of the development engagements in Afghanistan saw the joint Nordic approach both as an efficiency measure, that is, an opportunity for dealing with fewer and better-coordinated counterparts, as well as substantive streamlining of the support given generally (Bauk and Strand, 2009: 18).

Third, in terms of the characteristics of collaboration, a number of tendencies stood out from our interviews. First, the Nordic way in Afghanistan was an organic form of collaboration, which grew out of the specific context. Second, and related to this, it worked well because it encompassed different degrees of collaboration bilaterally within the Nordic umbrella; for example, the Norwegians and Danes shared an Embassy complex, the different countries in different bilateral sometimes jointly funded an initiative; and Iceland, who did not at the time have an official representative deployed to Afghanistan, had allocated responsibility to a seconded staff member, who could participate in the Nordic Plus development cooperation and thus be part of the concerted Nordic work nonetheless. There was a sufficient level of trust in the cooperation mechanism that Nordic joint lines were followed as a fallback if a country did not have a clear position. At the same time, each Nordic country had certain areas of engagement, which were more sensitive and which the others were only involved in where relevant, and thus the flexibility and sensitivity to leave room for division of labor where needed was highlighted as a strength. This was, for example, the case when it came to the confidential peace process engagements, which some Nordics were more engaged in than others.

Fourth, in terms of the degree of integration, the collaboration in Afghanistan was an example of a very integrated approach. Referring back to the conditions for collaboration, the Nordic Plus community shares analyses and the Nordics (again, some more than others) not only shared analyses but worked together on analyses and let each other's analyses shape their own views. The Nordic Plus had divided central tasks among them, designating one with the responsibility for elections, another with responsibility for anti-corruption efforts, etc. However, the trust among partners was so deep that many of the key responsibilities rotate, so the lead on various issues regarding both political and development engagement shifts from one to the next with biannual or annual chairmanship (Interview 27). This bore witness to a deep level of like-mindedness and integration in that it has become an efficient solution, rather than dividing tasks, to allow the responsibility for them to rotate – demonstrating coherence and trust in both a joint understanding of challenges and goals as well as a confidence in each other's equal ability to address these. Colocation is commonly a policy priority as part of a cost-reduction exercises. However, ironically, in our data collection, the finding from several of the Nordics was generally that colocation was oftentimes practically cumbersome

and logistically challenging, thus not in the beginning particularly cost-reducing. However, under the right circumstances, such as in Afghanistan, colocation, while not economically cost-reducing in the short run, could prove extremely useful for greater *policy* effectiveness. The case of Kabul, Afghanistan provided an interesting example of successful collaboration, but other Nordic colocation efforts have proven more challenging, and there is no natural law, which makes colocation necessarily leading to policy integration.

The exact conditions for fruitful diplomatic colocation and policy integration should be studied more, something which is bound to happen in the coming years as the Nordics continue to collocate in a growing number of places. Research investigating results across other cases, such as the case of the Nordic colocation in Myanmar and a planned colocation in Islamabad, would shed more light on the variables relationship between colocation and increases or decreases in policy integration.

Challenges of Working Together

The Nordics are like siblings; they are similar and know each other well, but they also know how to get on each other's nerves. Though there are many advantages and benefits of working together among the Nordics, there are also drawbacks and challenges that render cooperation difficult or even unwanted in certain areas. These challenges include issues of competition, confidentiality in mediation, diverging systems and setups, as well as varying budgets, which are addressed in the following.

One of the challenges of working together is the potential competition that may occur in areas where two or more countries have an interest in being responsible for a particular process or policy agenda or want to gain visibility or take political credit in relation to a peace process. The competition issue was a recurring subject in the interviews, many interviewees emphasizing the importance of *not* competing.

Certain policy areas lend themselves more to competition, such as that of peace mediation, narrowly defined. In many interviews, the countries involved in mediation voiced concerns and reservations in terms of the other Nordic countries' efforts in the area as well as concerns with regards to working together. It is obvious and legitimate why a country that has invested years of funding on mediation wants credit: there is considerable political capital to be gained from being the primary broker of a peace deal, externally and to the taxpayers at home. Ironically, representatives from several different countries noted how Nordic neighbors sought the "limelight and green lawns" more than their own country. Several interviewees the across the Nordic countries mentioned Colombia as an example where there had been good cooperation on civil society and gender equality projects, but where several parties had also expressed concerns about other countries taking credit for the successful peace agreement rather than sharing recognition. One interviewee expressed how this illustrates "the potential problems when you have Nordic cooperation: Who takes the credit for things? Are we able to all take the credit together? Or would the temptation to take the credit yourself be too great?"

However, several interviewees also stressed that it was not necessarily competition as such that generated challenges regarding cooperation on peace processes, but rather the fact that the field of peace and reconciliation is not always geared to close collaboration of any kind due to the often confidential and discrete nature of the endeavor. One interviewee refers to how

> It can sometimes look more like a competition than it really is. Sometimes it's related more to local sensitivity, local ownership; you can't always disclose what you're doing. You might want to do that yourself, but if the parties to the conflict say that this cannot be disclosed, what can you do?
>
> (Interview 5)

Certain areas are simply "off limits".

Another limitation to working together which came up in many of the interviews, especially the ones concentrating on practical, administrative, logistical and legal forms of working together, was that the respective Nordic countries have relatively different systems, setups and rules that often contradict each other. In one context, for example, there were plans to co-locate the Danish and Icelandic representations, but diverging rules on the size requirements for office space prevented the colocation.

In addition to diverging systems as a challenge to working together, major differences in budgets for peace and conflict resolution work sometimes also hamper what is possible. Whereas the prioritization of resource effectiveness can sometimes facilitate greater collaboration, the substantial spending cuts in some of the Nordic countries' foreign policy and development portfolios has challenged opportunities for joint projects. Notably, unprompted by us, representatives from all of the other Nordic countries, noted in one way or another how the substantial cuts made to the budget of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and on Danish development aid over the previous decade, including cuts to personnel, had had severe consequences for the opportunities for working together, since they created significant limitations on Nordic cooperation. The Danish withdrawal from policy fora and coordination mechanisms was mentioned by Nordic counterparts in various policy areas.

One of the challenges to Nordic cooperation was not related to cooperation itself but rather to the changing dynamics of global politics. Several informants pointed toward a general global push back against the liberal international order, democracy and the rule of law as a threat to the common values of the Nordic countries. The UN is for example an arena, which many informants formulated as being under increased pressure. Several informants referenced Nordics previously pushing progressive agendas and now the challenge being simply to defend agreed upon language (Interview 29, 31). For a long time this strategy seemed to work well, but several informants spoke of the need for revising this approach. Interviewees emphasized the increasing importance of building broad coalitions in campaigns like the ones for UN Security Council and the Human Rights Council or when lounging initiatives like the "Friends of mediation" community. Rather

than having all Nordic countries pushing for a particular agenda, the Nordics increasingly build broad coalitions with other countries but work together behind the scenes. One example mentioned by interviewees included an R2P focal point initiative, which was led jointly by Denmark, Ghana and Costa Rica, but with silent support from the other Nordics, as one interviewee commented. In this way, Nordic cooperation should not be considered an exclusive arena of cooperation but rather a basis of support that can be mobilized in different settings and constellations. We call this new approach "non-exclusive Nordic cooperation" referring to the many ways Nordics have started working together not as an exclusive group of countries but together with other partners, notably also in the global south. This type of collaboration adds legitimacy and influence Nordic initiatives while signaling respect for Global South leadership and avoiding neo-colonial optics.

As one interviewee stated,

> less and less we believe that the Nordic circle is the demonstrable unit that does things together. Our strength is that we are so well coordinated, we speak so well together, we know what the others are doing, we support each other's initiatives, but strategically it is more important to have a cross-regional alliance than to have a Nordic alliance in public.
>
> (Interview 9)

The broad coalitions also make Nordic cooperation less visible for analysts looking for cooperation in policy documents, but it does not necessarily mean that Nordics do not work together behind the scenes. Many interviewees mentioned the global push against liberal values not only as an invitation to build broader coalitions but also as a condition requiring further Nordic cooperation in the future. In a way, this brings full circle the story of the peace and conflict work from a bottom-up perspective; from a range of practitioners' perspectives, the way to get things done is with those we are most aligned with. While the Nordics have learned the hard way that acting as a monolithic moralizing bloc is a sure recipe for push back, the strategic alliance remains.

At the same time, as more countries get involved in the area, the sharing of information or division of labor could become of common interest. While stressing the importance of confidentiality and how it challenges the Nordic cooperation on peace mediation, the actors working on peace negotiations with whom we spoke also identified areas where Nordic efforts in mediation more broadly defined could be more coordinated in the future. For example, one interviewee mentioned how Norway, in a particular example, had experienced challenges related to being a lead facilitator and monitoring a ceasefire agreement at the same time. A ceasefire agreement, which entails a pause or stop to using armed force among conflicting parties, has guarantors or monitors, who track possible violations to the agreement. Being the observer and "judge" of a ceasefire and simultaneously having to engage in the mediation of peace – typically a more neutral role – is a difficult balancing act for anyone. In such examples, other Nordic countries could assume the responsibility for monitoring the ceasefire. In the specific example, a joint monitoring

mechanism among the Nordics had indeed been set up and had been successful, according to several interviews. This sort of division of labor between the Nordics has worked well in conflict and post conflict settings, for example in Sri Lanka. Another example of the potential usefulness of sharing experiences and developing joint Nordic ideas of is the Nordic Women Mediators network (NWM). This initiative brings together women working in peacebuilding and mediation across the Nordic countries, focusing on promoting women's role in diplomacy, integrating tracks 1, 2 and 3 diplomatic efforts and combining the different comparative advantages of the Nordic countries in peace and conflict resolution. The NWM network represents a new kind of networked cooperation; a formalized structure introduced to cultivate more informal and bottom-up connections among peace professionals, which may inspire other initiatives.

Conclusion

The strategic assessments in the 1990s and beyond of waning Nordic appetite for collaboration was based on the surge in new and stronger alternative alliances. Now, academics and policy analysts are beginning to reevaluate the strategic interests of the Nordics. Although analysts have pointed to the decline of the Nordic alignment around peace and conflict, both in academia and in policy, this chapter has shown that within the area of peace and conflict resolution, Nordic cooperation is alive and well; in fact there is potential for growth. As war is once again a reality on the European continent with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the need for peace and conflict expertise close to home is sadly more relevant than ever. Undoubtedly there will be an increasing need for conflict resolution, long-term peacebuilding and postwar reconstruction efforts spanning decades to come in Eastern Europe. Here, the Nordics have a role to play – each with their comparative advantages, but – judging from our analysis – likely much more efficiently if they coordinate their efforts more closely.

Our approach to studying Nordic integration in this chapter was to take a bottom-up approach and look not to policy directives but to the implementation, the *how* of Nordic peace efforts work. The analysis was based on the experience of civil servants and practitioners within the fields of peace and conflict resolution in the Nordic countries. From this perspective, there is an increasing relevance to working together among the Nordics, not least in light of the global context at the time of writing.

We developed a typology of how the Nordics work together, based on the descriptions of practitioners: Sometimes working together implies merely coordination and information sharing, often Nordics burden share and divide labor and sometimes, the integration is so deep that all major issues are subject to joint analysis, problem formulation, decision making and planning. We gave the example of a deeply integrated case of Nordic collaboration in Afghanistan, where integration was cultivated by a common working culture and shared values, exacerbated by colocation of Embassy staff. The practical and cultural affinities made increased Nordic integration "organic" and "natural". Despite growing integration,

we also discussed some of the challenges to working together, including practical, economic and contextual challenges.

This chapter sought to bring new perspectives to Nordic collaboration within peace and conflict resolution by regarding the field from the ground and up. Civil servants and policy implementers across the board reflected upon the increasing pressure on global liberal norms and institutions and saw Nordic policy affinity as a red thread and hence momentum for further cooperation. If Nordics are to promote a common peace brand and move closer when it comes to foreign policy, this chapter has shown that there is much to build on. While a common Nordic security policy and foreign policy may not be adopted soon, judging from recent regional developments in foreign and security politics in the Nordic region and its surroundings as well as from our snapshot of the legwork in the field of peace and conflict, Nordic cooperation at the practical level is alive and well. It will likely be developing and perhaps expanding gradually as the world becomes increasingly geopolitically polarized; as always, in its own Nordic way – organically and from the ground up.

Notes

1 Interview 9.
2 An area of relevance, which we do not look into, is the area of Nordic-Baltic cooperation. Although Nordic-Baltic cooperation has grown in quantity and quality and the example for its increased importance in the current context is definitely not hard to make, in this piece we focus on Nordic cooperation.
3 The interviews were primarily conducted in English, with a few exceptions where the informants preferred speaking in their mother tongue. One of the authors is on leave from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and therefore had a particular advantage in terms of getting access to relevant informants and evoking trust during the interviews even on potentially problematic issues.
4 Loosely following Roschelle and Teasly (1995).
5 One interviewee mentioned that joint meetings are sometimes a matter of pure necessity; in Modi's case, a joint meeting was not a Nordic idea, and "certainly not the idea of Sweden," the host. Rather it was a condition from Modi for holding the meeting at all. (Interview 4) However, although this anecdote does indicate that it is not always the preference of the Nordics to be lumped in together, it does not run counter to the insight that jointly the Nordics are a stronger force; the fact that the most powerful states want to meet with them together underlines the strength of the Nordic bloc as perceived from the outside.
6 There are a variety of models of colocation among the more than 20 locations where two or more Nordic countries' embassies or representations are colocated (The Danish Ministry of Defense, 2014). Starting from the Stoltenberg Report in 2009, the Gade-Birker Report in 2012 and the joint declaration from the Nordic Ministers, colocation as a goal in itself became a specific priority theme within the Nordic Council of Ministers (Nordic Ministers for Foreign Affairs, 2012). Apart from specific projects in Yangon, Dhaka, Islamabad and Hanoi, other joint solutions in Europe and North America are being pursued (The Danish Ministry of Defense, 2014).

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Appendix: List of Interviews

Interviews with Nordic peace and conflict practitioners

Number	*Date*	*Type of institution*	*No of people*	*Country*
1	2019 01 03	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Portfolio: Peace, conflict and humanitarian affairs	2	Denmark
2	2019 01 04	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Portfolio: Conflict and fragility	1	Denmark
3	2019 01 08	Nordic Council of Ministers Portfolio: Nordic coordination	1	Sweden
4	2019 01 09	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Portfolio: Nordic affairs	3	Finland
5	2019 01 09	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Portfolio: Peace, security and conflict	3	Finland
6	2019 01 09	FINNIDA Portfolio: Conflict and development	1	Finland
7	2019 01 09	CMI, NGO Portfolio: Peacebuilding and conflict	2	Finland
8	2019 01 21	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Portfolio: Peace and mediation	2	Norway
9	2019 01 21	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Portfolio: Peacebuilding	1	Norway
10	2019 01 21	NOREF, NGO Portfolio: Mediation and conflict resolution	2	Norway
11	2019 01 21	NOREF, NGO Portfolio: Mediation and conflict resolution	2	Norway
12	2019 01 25	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Portfolio: Nordic affairs and coordination	2	Denmark
13	2019 01 25	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Portfolio: Peace and security	2	Denmark
14	2019 01 28	SIDA Portfolio: Peace and development	2	Sweden
15	2019 01 28	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Portfolio: Nordic cooperation	1	Sweden
16	2019 01 28	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Portfolio: Peace and conflict resolution	1	Sweden
17	2019 01 28	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Portfolio: Peace and mediation	1	Sweden
18	2019 01 28	FBA Portfolio: Peacebuilding and conflict	3	Sweden
19	2019 01 31	TAPRI Marko Lehti Specialist in mediation and peace research	1	Finland
20	2019 01 31	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Portfolio: Nordic cooperation and security	2	Denmark
21	2019 02 01	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Portfolio: Multilateral affairs	1	Denmark

(*Continued*)

Number	*Date*	*Type of institution*	*No of people*	*Country*
22	2019 02 04	Parliamentarian Portfolio: Nordic cooperation and peace	1	Denmark
23	2019 02 06	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Portfolio: Judicial affairs and conflict	1	Denmark
24	2019 02 07	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Portfolio: Peace and security	2	Denmark
25	2019 02 08	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Portfolio: Nordic cooperation	1	Iceland
26	2019 02 08	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Portfolio: Peace and conflict	1	Denmark
27	2019 02 11	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Portfolio: Conflict and development	1	Norway
28	2019 02 12	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ambassador with experience within peace and conflict	1	Denmark
29	2019 02 13	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ambassador with experience within peace and conflict	1	Iceland
30	2019 02 14	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Portfolio: peace and mediation	1	Iceland
Total no of people			**46**	

11 Branding Peace

Norway's Campaign for a UN Security Council Seat

Sigrun Marie Moss and Malcolm Langford

Introduction

The notion of Norway as a peace nation and peace activist has been central since the 1890s (Leira, 2013; see also Skånland, 2010; Stokke, 2010, 2012). This self-understanding and external image was further entrenched throughout the twentieth century, especially through Norway's leading role in multiple peace processes and the annual awarding of the peace prize, as well as its embedment in Norden, known as a region of and for peace (see Chapters 1 and 2). By the early 2000s, the notion was regularly affirmed by its politicians. In 2004, Prime Minister Bondevik stated that 'Norway is a peace nation', and, in 2006, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Gahr Støre declared that 'Norway is a nation that wants peace.'

It is thus perhaps no surprise that the Norwegian government made the idea of 'a peace nation' central in its campaign to have Norway elected to the UN Security Council for the period 2021–2022.[1] Its campaign brochure loudly proclaimed that it had 'a long history of solidarity and partnerships for sustainable development, peace and security, and human rights'. Such an identity could prove especially popular with the relevant voting constituency: the UN General Assembly. The majority of states in the UN are generally sceptical to Western military adventurism.

However, the presentation of this master narrative in Norway's campaign was complicated. Firstly, Norway's membership in NATO and military participation in several non-UN operations, including Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, are difficult to square with the image of a peace nation. Secondly, Norway's two competitors for the two available Security Council seats, allocated to the group 'Western Europeans and others', possessed their own advantages. Ireland is not a NATO member, and both Canada and Ireland had a strong record on peacebuilding and gender equality in the armed forces (Langford, 2018). If Norway was to wield peace as a brand, it had to be viewed in a competitive context in which it was forced to differentiate itself.

In this chapter, we return to the Security Council campaign and ask: How did Norway present itself as a peace nation, and how did it manage this narrative in light of its military activism and its competitors' credentials and campaigns?[2] We do this by analysing speeches and texts from Norwegian government ministers and diplomats regarding the campaign, together with campaign material from the three

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countries. To be sure, peace activism and military activism need not be clear and binary contradictions. Yet, contrasting them permits arguably a better understanding of the construction of Norway's campaign and its strategic reflexivity in light of the competitive threat posed by Ireland and Canada.

Theoretically, this analysis of the Security Council campaigns is done in context of narrative and critical branding theories. We seek to understand how the Norwegian peace narrative or brand is constructed and sustained, and then subsequently used as a resource or capital for political purposes. In particular, it permits us to understand how a Nordic country seeks to manage its NATO membership and controversial military activism in the communication of its peace credentials. As Browning (Chapter 2) notes, in the wake of the Cold War, all Nordic countries began engaging more actively with NATO, regardless of the status of their actual membership. With the accession of Finland and Sweden into NATO, Norway's campaign provides a case study in the potential future moves of the Nordic region to maintain the peace brand in a troubled time where the relevance of NATO and military activism is gaining traction.

We begin by presenting nation branding with a broader analytical framework of narratology, and then examine how Norway built and sustained this peace narrative and managed the competing narrative of its militarism. As a secondary focus, we move on to investigate how Ireland and Canada presented themselves on these two axes of peace and military activism, and how Norway reflexively anticipated and engaged with their campaigns.

Master Narratives and Nation Branding

In their campaign for a Security Council seat, candidates sought both to persuade and induce other states to vote for them. Persuasion was often done through the promotion of the candidate's suitability and plans for its tenure on the council; and inducement by quieter though less subtle techniques, such as enhanced development aid to a particular state. In persuasion, there is often a focus on a country's particular uniqueness, which is interwoven in its discourse on suitability (its past) and plans (its future). To analyse this persuasion, we draw on research on master narratives and nation branding. Together, these relate to the narratives of society about who the 'we' is, and how such characteristics are used to promote the nation's brand.

Societies have master narratives about who one is as a people (Hammack, 2008), which frequently serve political and collective interests. Constituted by a mixture of ideas, images and imagination, such central narratives constitute a collective history that the group sees as essential and fundamental (Hammack, 2011). At the same time, there will be oppositional narratives and resistance to strong master narratives (Hammack, 2011). The result is that master narratives are contextual and vary with time. As Castoriadis (1975: 465) writes, 'the imaginary of the society […] creates for each historical period its singular way of living, seeing, and making its own existence'.

Master narratives are often aimed at the construction of a self-image for the society in question. Most important for us is the master narrative that links the

Norwegian self-image to peacebuilding (Skånland, 2009, 2010; see also Schouenborg, 2013). According to Leira (2013: 339), the notion of Norway as a peace nation is associated deeply with national identity:

> Norway and Norwegians have engaged in peace promotion first and foremost because it has been deemed to be part of what makes "us" Norwegian'; with 'teachings' such as the famous line from Norwegian author Nordal Grieg in the poem *To the youth*: 'War is contempt for life, peace is creation.'
>
> (Grieg, 1946)

The role of master narratives in an international competition can also be understood using nation branding as an analytical category (Langford and Larsen, 2018). Branding is often associated with organisations and products, but since the early 2000s, it has also become increasingly common to talk about and work actively with branding of nations (see e.g., Angell and Mordhorst, 2015). Dinnie (2008: 15) describes a nation's brand as 'the unique, multi-dimensional blend of elements that provides the nation with culturally grounded differentiation and relevance for all of its target audiences.' According to Aaker (2003: 83), 'differentiation is the engine of the brand train'. If countries can develop a simple, solid, and stable image that differentiates them from others, they can possess a powerful form of capital for nation branding (Browning, 2007). This may be then deployed to bolster investment, tourism, political influence, nation building, or reinforcement of national identity and existential meaning. To be sure, a nation's brand can exist without a deliberate strategy (Fan, 2006) – a reputation earned by habit or happenstance – but successful nation branding is often viewed as requiring attention to nurturing and reinforcement of a nation brand.

A nation's brand may vary for an external and internal audience – different audience 'markets'. In nation building, Norway may seek to develop a different image or narrative for an external audience than the one it possesses, or promotes, internally. Likewise, it may differentiate its brand between different external audiences. Branding Norway as a tourist destination will look, partly, different from the branding of Norway as peace nation and natural Security Council candidate. This differentiation may extend to subsets of these audiences if the communication sphere can be successfully differentiated. In projecting the image of a peace nation, Norway the state may wish to emphasise or tone down its own contributions in particular peace processes, in order to calibrate its message according to the interests and views of a relevant state or groups of states.

The handling of such national brands and active nation branding is often seen as the work of public diplomacy (Van Ham, 2001, 2008). This often makes the Ministries of Foreign Affairs central, and Norway is no exception (Angell and Mordhorst, 2015). Successful branding strategies though also attract other supporters, such as journalists, NGOs, academics and other countries. It creates the perception of a natural and broadly entrenched – rather than a constructed and subsidised – image. This has been central for example in the promotion of the Nordic brand of criminalising sex purchase (Langford and Skilbrei, 2022).

At the same time, nation branding is complicated. Fan (2006: 12) emphasises that there are many factors included in a country's brand: 'Nation-branding relates to a country's overall image, covering political, economic, historical and cultural dimensions' (see also Angell and Mordhorst, 2015). This overall image will also need to relate to the master narratives discussed above. On one hand, opportunities are provided for this in specific branding campaigns, where, for example, gender equality features in almost all Norwegian branding strategies (Danielsen et al., 2013; Larsen et al., 2021; Langford and Skilbrei, 2022). On the other hand, general or specific features in a nation's brand can create messaging challenges. The discrepancy between the 'image' and the 'reality' must not be too great – and such a discrepancy must be handled well, in terms of brand and reputation (Browning, 2007; Mordhorst, 2015).

A particular challenge for Norway's branding is the discrepancy between the Norwegian peace nation and military activism, with conflicts between these two versions of what being Norwegian means. To be sure, Norway can draw on its specific multilateral and UN-centric military contributions, arguing that any conflict between the master narrative of Norway as a peace nation and its military engagements is not particular significant. Leira (2013: 348) says:

> Norway was also a very strong supporter of the UN from the beginning and had a strong presence in peacekeeping operations from the start of such operations. Such participation was understood in relation to peace and internationalism, rather than defence, as demonstrated by the attitude within the Norwegian military, where UN operations were at best a career-dead end and at worst a waste of resources.
>
> (Græger and Leira, 2005, our translation)

However, the nature of Norwegian military engagement has been changing and the state has become more prominent in non-UN missions. The state sought to manage this disjuncture by emphasising the humanitarian dimensions of its missions. For example, Haaland (2007: 505) explains: 'With a few notable exceptions, many Norwegian politicians still prefer to emphasize the non-military aspects of Norway's participation in international conflict situations and the humanitarian aspects of their military contributions.' She refers to the example of Norway sending in 2003 an armoured engineer company to Iraq, and the emphasis by the government that this was a humanitarian contribution to help Iraqis rebuild their country. This incited negative reactions at home – from the political opposition, aid organisations, and internally in the military itself, where this contribution was perceived as a cover-up of its effective military presence (Dagbladet, 2003; Thomassen, 2003; see also Harpviken, 2011). As to Norway's military participation in NATO's post-Taliban peacekeeping in Afghanistan, Matlary (2009) writes that its description of its security policy and military activism was adorned with values such as peace and nation building. Its somewhat controversial military engagement was portrayed through the lens of soft values.

This motivation to brand Norway as a humanitarian nation first and foremost also emerged in analyses of its participation in the NATO-led military missions in Libya. As described by Dicke et al. (2013: 41):

> Norway has put considerable effort into crafting a humanitarian persona on the international stage and was very clear that the human rights violations perpetrated by the Qaddafi regime were one of the main reasons for its participation in the Libyan mission.

Others have also highlighted the tension between the idea of Norway as a peace nation and the practices and ethos of its military. In 2009, Edström, Lunde and Matlary published the book *Krigerkultur i en fredsnasjon – Warrior culture in a peace nation*, which sheds light on an emerging warrior culture in the armed forces, and its increasing professionalisation (see also Rones, 2015).

In this chapter, we are especially interested in how this discrepancy between peace nation Norway and its military activism was articulated or navigated in the campaign for the seat in the Security Council.

Method

Our approach is based on the analysis of two types of data. One is the campaign brochures for Norway, Ireland, and Canada. These were available on each country's web pages. In the campaign material, the core points that each country wants to promote are crystallised. The form and partly substance for each country differed: Norway's brochure consists of four short pages; Canada's is five times the length at 20 pages; while Ireland's came in at 10 pages. Norway's brochure is rather informal. It contains both trivial information (such as the number of pairs of skis in Norway; Norwegian football's FIFA ranking) alongside highly relevant information (such as Norway's engagement in the UN, amount of development aid, etc.). The other two campaign brochures focus largely on information relevant to participation in the Security Council and broader international engagement. Nonetheless, as we shall see, there are many similarities between the campaigns, both in content covered (especially military-related and peace-related) and how those points are presented.

Furthermore, we have analysed speeches and texts of direct relevance to Norway's Security Council campaign. Here, we searched 'Security Council' via the government's web pages. For 2018, we identified 72 items, of which 10 were assessed as being particularly relevant to our discussion. For 2019, there were 64 items (with five relevant), and in the period January to April 2020 there were 23 items (with three relevant). In assessing relevance, we were concerned with documents in which Norway's candidacy was the focus, and where the core of the campaign or military/peacekeeping operations or peace were mentioned. These documents were then analysed more deeply in relation to these focus areas, especially the narratives concerning peace and military action. In the next section, we reproduce excerpts of selected texts. These selected texts address different audiences, from the national audience to the relevant UN audience, which affects clearly both the message and emphasis.

Norway's Campaign

Starting with the Norwegian campaign, it began long before the official elections. The Nordic countries rotate informally their candidacies so that they do not compete against each other. With Sweden gaining a place in the last round, the plan for Norway's candidacy for 2021–2022 was clear early on. However, it was initiated in a partly modest fashion, as Norway tried to avoid criticism for the excessive use of resources, which it had received domestically for its campaign two decades earlier.[3]

The campaign brochure, *Norway for the UN Security Council 2021–2022*,[4] is arguably the most 'official' source concerning Norway's campaign. This is where the core points are crystallised most comprehensively. The slogan was 'Consistent partner. Common future', and the brochure consists of 32 different points, ranging from the percentage of GNP spent on development aid, to the number of islands in Norway and, as mentioned, its FIFA ranking. Of the 32 points, four are specifically military-related:

	Related to	*Military-related text in Norway's campaign brochure for SC*
1	The Armed Forces and gender	'Gender equality in the armed forces – 2015 – introducing universal conscription'
2	UN peacekeeping operations and gender	'Major General Kristin Lund is the first female Force Commander in a United Nations peacekeeping operation.'
3	UN peacekeeping operations I	'More than 40,000 Norwegians have served in UN-led peace operations since 1949, including currently in South Sudan, the Middle East and Mali.'
4	UN peacekeeping operations II	'More than 40,000 Norwegian women and men have served in UN peace operations as military and police personnel since 1949'

As is notable, gender is a key focus. Two of the points (1 and 2) concern gender equality. In point 4, there is a further emphasis that the forces sent on UN peacekeeping missions include both women and men. It is only the third point that does not link Norwegian gender equality to the military; although, it overlaps also with point four in terms of the general focus.

In the brochure, there are also ten illustrations. In addition to photos of former UN Secretary General and Norwegian politician Trygve Lie and a female military leader, Major General Kristin Lund, there is a photo of a skier and a map of Norway. Again, we see an emphasis on the contribution to gender equality. While this is clearly an attempt to draw on its strong gender brand (see Larsen et al., 2021), many have also noted that it is an attempt to deflect attention from a lack of gender equality in the Norwegian armed forces which have a low proportion of women (Rones and Fasting, 2017), with most other NATO forces including a higher share of women (Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad, 2011). This discrepancy has been of long concern to policymakers, but success in promoting equal participation in the armed forces has been muted (Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2007).

The campaign brochure thus makes sure to link peacekeeping operations as closely to Norwegian women as to Norwegian men, but does not mention the actual shares of participation.

If we look at peace-related text (excluding the points related to peacekeeping operations above and in addition to various points relating to humanitarianism), this is constituted by three specific points:

	Related to	*Peace-related text in Norway's campaign brochure for SC*
1	Peace processes	'Norway seeks to establish trust, listen to all sides and engage in peace and reconciliation processes, whether in Colombia, Israel–Palestine, South Sudan, or the Philippines'.
2	Peace and security	'Norway has a long history of solidarity and partnerships for sustainable development, peace and security, and human rights'.
3	Women, peace and security	'Norway promotes women's rights and participation at all levels of society, including through persistent efforts for women, peace and security'.

These peace extracts emphasise something different, namely neutrality and reliability, long experience, and practice. Although, there is again a focus on gender equality and women. As we shall see, this focus on both partnership and gender is arguably partly a response to concerns about military activism and NATO membership.

Put together, we can see that the campaign brochure foregrounds and emphasises both military- and peace-related themes. Yet, we do not find the former in the speeches or texts related to the campaign. In launching Norway's candidacy in New York on 22 June 2018, Norwegian Foreign Minister Søreide focused on Norway as a peace nation:

> Our support is consistent. Across the Norwegian political spectrum, there is broad support for the UN and our engagement for sustainable development and peace. […] We will bring to the Council our experience from peace and reconciliation processes – in Africa, the Middle East, the Philippines and Colombia. As women's rights and participation are a prerequisite for lasting peace and stability, we will keep it high on our agenda.
>
> (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018a)

Notably, Norway's military role is omitted. In this prime and central speech for an international audience, only multilateral engagement, experience-based knowledge and practice, and elements of gender equality are highlighted.

The same is repeated in many other government contributions to the campaign in Norwegian. This includes the text published on the government's website on the same date, entitled 'Why does Norway want to be voted into the Security Council?' (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020), and the similar online text 'Norway seeks a seat in the UN Security Council 2021–2022' from the day before (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018b). Likewise, we can note the opinion

editorial in VG newspaper by Deputy Foreign Minister Audun Halvorsen in July 2019 (Halvorsen, 2019), and the speech that another Deputy Foreign Minister Jens Frælich Holte gave at a Civita breakfast in March 2019 (Holte, 2019). There is no focus on the military, but a major focus on Norway as a peace nation.

In Holte's speech, it is also interesting to see how the idea of security is constructed:

> It is certainly the case that most conflicts on the Security Council's agenda take place pretty far from Norway. The agenda of the Council is dominated by conflicts in Africa and the Middle East. This, however, by no means imply that the Security Council is less relevant to Norway […]
>
> Even if conflicts are far away geographically, they will affect our security and economy. In 2013, when our government took office, we didn't know that we would experience conflict in our immediate neighbourhood. The example of Ukraine shows that security issues also arise close to home.
>
> Countries like Norway should be present around the table when binding decisions on war and peace are being made […] Critical issues are at stake, also for us, and we cannot simply leave these decisions to others.

Here, security issues are related to the value of the seat and relevance for Norway, but again, without the military being given focus.

Viewing these documents together, an image of Norway as being 'on the sidelines' emerges. Norway is presented as a neutral state but also a proactive one with an interest in solving international problems. And while these texts have different audiences, both international and national, they all have in common that there is no specific focus on military activism. That is only found in the four points in the Norwegian campaign brochure for SC, and in a somewhat limited manner.

The failure to address *any* military engagement explicitly in Norway's campaign-related speeches in our data, can potentially be explained by the fact that military activism related to UN operations is seen as incorporated into peace and internationalism. The focus is on the ends rather than the means. This can be supported by Karlsrud and Oslands (2016: 784–785) differentiation between Norwegian UN contributions and NATO contributions:

> Norway's contributions to UN peacekeeping operations are generally perceived as value-driven, motivated by solidarity. In contrast, participation in NATO operations has always been understood as more self-interested, maintaining transatlantic relations to ensure the security guarantee of the Alliance.

At the same time, one can question this equivalence of peace and security policies. Many scholars argue that the tensions between them should be directly recognised (see Harpviken and Skjelsbæk, 2010, in relation to participation by the Norwegian military in Afghanistan).

Moreover, this equivalence has political effects, occluding in practice participation in controversial non-UN operations. In this respect, an alternative explanation for the silence of military engagement is that Norway had less to gain from it in its campaign. A good part of the Security Council campaign concerns gathering votes

from the 70-plus states in Africa and the Pacific that are often sceptical of, and less interested, in military activism. Even peacekeeping operations can be considered a form of colonialism. A hallmark of many campaign statements from Norway is the representation of its role as a stable partner – reliable, neutral, and generous with international development aid. Moreover, as we will see, Ireland and Canada could match Norway on both peacekeeping operations and gender equality in the armed forces. There was little brand differentiation on these points.

Ireland's and Canada's Campaign Brochures

Turning to Ireland and Canada, we examined how they portrayed themselves in their campaign brochures with a focus on the military-related and peace-related aspects.

Ireland has a 10-page brochure on its candidacy,[5] with the slogan: 'Empathy, partnership, independence'. Three points in the brochure are military-related:

	Related to	*Military-related text in Ireland's campaign brochure for SC*
1	UN peacekeeping operations	'Since 1958 we have been a UN peacekeeping nation. In that period, not one month has passed without Irish troops participating in UN peacekeeping operations. Today, Ireland is one of the highest per capita troop contributors to UN peacekeeping globally.'
2	UN peacekeeping operations as a focus of foreign policy	'Our foreign policy has a strong tradition of principled engagement on development, humanitarian assistance, disarmament, human rights and peacekeeping.'
3	UN peacekeeping operations	'Ireland's participation in UN peacekeeping has been unbroken since 1958. Today, Ireland is one of the highest per capita troop contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations.' (From photo text)

These points underline Ireland's continued and strong efforts in UN peacekeeping operations. The text itself is not gendered. However, in the Irish brochure, there are five photos. The fifth is of two female Irish UN soldiers. Facing the camera, one smiles broadly at a cheerful mother with a laughing baby. Here we can see parallels both to the focus on the military and gender equality, but also to a humanitarian presentation of participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Both have similarities to the presentation in the Norwegian brochure.

Much of the text of the Irish campaign is directly or indirectly peace-related, with the following excerpts being the most specific:

	Related to	*Peace-related text in Ireland's campaign brochure for SC*
1	Peacekeeping	'Yet while we celebrate the end of violence, the lives saved and the futures transformed, we are reminded daily of the challenges of sustaining peace.' Michael D. Higgins, President of Ireland

(*Continued*)

	Related to	*Peace-related text in Ireland's campaign brochure for SC*
2	Inclusive peace processes	'We have learned through our own history that tackling the root causes of conflict is required if peace is to be built and sustained. We understand the importance of listening to the voices of all community members. We know that peacebuilding takes time. It must be carefully nourished, involve all in society: peace cannot simply be imposed from the top. We believe that women and girls have a special role to play in building peace, with all of the complexities that job brings.'
3	Peace processes and EU membership	'As Ireland's national peace process and membership of the European Union has shown us, we are far stronger acting collectively than we are acting alone. […] Partnership and cooperation have brought peace and prosperity to our island and our region.'

This narrative is partly similar to Norway's, as seen in the emphasis of the gender dimensions of its peacebuilding efforts. However, a unique tripartite-based identity is also highlighted: Ireland's recent experiences of conflict, Ireland's role as an independent country, and Ireland as a powerful peacemaker. Not only is legitimacy sought by presenting its own experience of conflict (and colonialism) in recent times, it can pivot to presenting itself as an independent peacemaker. This is done in two contrasting ways. First, Ireland highlights indirectly its non-membership in NATO: the word 'independence' is mentioned nine times in the brochure. In Norway's brochure, independence is not mentioned once. Indeed, while Ireland did not explicitly indicate its lack of membership in NATO, this fact was informally and widely used in lobbying (Langford, 2018; Lynch, 2019). Second, Ireland mentions EU membership, which Norway and Canada cannot leverage. This allows it to lean on EU as a major soft power on peace issues, with its deep economic strength a useful resource in confrontations with the world's military superpowers, the United States, China and Russia. As Norway and Canada have experienced, diplomatic conflicts with China over values come with a high economic cost; while Ireland is protected effectively by the EU from any economic retaliation.

Canada's 20-page campaign brochure is available in seven languages,[6] and features the slogan 'Together'. The text is actively linked to various sustainability goals. The military-related aspect occurs several times, of which these are the most explicit:

	Related to	*Military-related text in Canada's campaign brochure for SC*
1	UN peacekeeping operations	'Lester B. Pearson, former Prime Minister of Canada, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and is considered a father of modern UN peacekeeping'
2	Police contributions to UN peacekeeping operations	'4,000 police officers participated in over 66 peace operations since 1989'
3	Funding	'Currently 9th largest contributor to UN peacekeeping budget.'
4	Contributions to UN operations, and leadership	'Sustain peace, together. More than 125,000 Canadians have served abroad in support of UN peacekeeping operations. Our contribution and commitment to peacekeeping and peacebuilding also manifests itself through the leadership roles we have taken at the UN'

Here, the contributions highlighted by Canada are diverse. Canada is presented as the founder of UN peace(keeping) operations and one of its central contributors, in terms of budget and personnel – with broad-based participation by the police and the military. Unlike the other two campaigns, the photos related to the military in the campaign are not focused on women but on Prime Minister Trudeau.

The peace-related text is extensive. We have extracted some of the most important and relevant statements:

	Related to	*Peace-related text in Canada's campaign brochure for SC*
1	Funding	'6th largest donor to UN peacebuilding fund'
2	Peacebuilding	'As a member of the UN Security Council, Canada will: [...] continue to strengthen the focus on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Together, we can build and sustain peace for the communities we serve.'
3	Economic growth and peace	'As a member of the UN Security Council, Canada will: call attention to the vital links between sustainable and inclusive economic growth, job creation, conflict prevention, and peace and security; […] Together, we can realize the potential of investment to make a more inclusive, sustainable and peaceful world.'
4	Women, peace and security	'As a member of the UN Security Council, Canada will: work towards increasing the meaningful participation of women in peace negotiations, mediation and prevention processes, peacekeeping operations and special political missions'

As in the other two campaigns, there is a great deal of focus in Canada's brochure on the peace-related aspects, including its gender dimensions. It is unique, though, with its foregrounding of economic development and growth, which can be contrasted with Norway's focus on international development. Nonetheless, for both countries, these rhetorical moves can be interpreted as an attempt to communicate a less-than-subtle message about historical and future economic contributions, especially to poorer countries. Since both countries have problems explaining their NATO membership and active participation in non-UN conflicts – and must win the support of African and other countries in the South – a focus on material support is politically relevant, even if it does not apply directly to security.

Discussion and Conclusion

As underlined previously, *differentiation* is a key aspect of branding activities. To succeed in branding, one must be perceived as positively different from the competitors (Aaker, 2003). In the context of a Security Council campaign, it is notable how similar Norway, Ireland, and Canada are as largely liberal small-to-middle Western powers, with different claims to being peace nations – a major source of capital in a campaign for a Security Council seat. From a branding theory perspective, this creates a tension in seeking to both occupy that shared space while simultaneously

highlighting differences (Deephouse, 1999; Wæraas, 2015). At the same time, branding is mainly about positive differentiation, which can be difficult when nations are portraying themselves as relatively similar on many of the points in the campaigns. Therefore, it is interesting to observe how the three states emphasise dissimilarities, which concern partly peace and security (Ireland as a non-NATO member; Norway as a distant and non-threatening country) or that are politically attractive (Norway as a major UN donor; Canada as a major investor and supporter of the SDGs).

Nation branding is further complicated by slippage and the internal contradictions between its constituent elements. As analysed above, Norway was forced to navigate its military activism and peace activism. In some settings, it might be possible to blend these distinct concepts. For example, Browning (Chapter 2) notes correctly that the growing Nordic engagement with NATO has generated an attempt to marry the idea of a 'good ally' with the notion of 'peace nation'. In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Norway sought to execute a version of this strategy: it aimed to be first to offer economic support to Ukraine and last to offer military support. While this temporal difference could be measured in hours, and the overall nature of Norway's support is no different from other NATO members, it is a pertinent example of trying to create a coherent narrative. Military support and engagement is a last resort.

However, this strategy was not particularly feasible in a competition for Security Council votes from a sceptical Global South. It is here that the *silences* in Norway's master narrative in the campaign are interesting – especially in light of Ireland's weighting of its lack of military activism. Military engagement was mentioned once by Norway, and rather than being explained away, it was simply not discussed in the leading speeches or other texts we examined. Given the importance of the master narratives in society, about who Norwegians are as a people and what is important to them, the nation's branding benefits from cohering with such narratives. The brand as a peace nation is flexible and vague enough to incorporate desired elements and occlude unwanted elements.

Ultimately, Norway was given a seat on the Security Council. Perhaps one could say that the master narrative and branding was successful and proved to be an effective strategy. At the same time, there are probably several other factors that contribute to explaining the result. In particular, Canada's many years as a markedly neoliberal state, in which it instigated major development budget cuts, complicated its development-friendly messaging. It also entered the race late. However, the fact that Norway received a few more votes than Ireland, which boasts less controversial military activism than Norway, is perhaps a sign that Norway succeeded in retaining and creating a desired notion of Norway as an approved peace nation. In this respect, it confirms scholarship that points to the remarkable resilience of the Nordic brand in the face of contradictions. As Antoine de Bengy Puyvallée and Kristan Bjørkdahl (2021: 7) state in relation to the Nordic humanitarian brand, 'in the face of all these challenges, this brand seems remarkably resilient and ready to adapt to any new circumstances, even though all nation branding logic makes it sound plainly impossible'.

Notes

1 Norway has held a seat on the Security Council four times (1949–1950; 1963–1964; 1979–1980; 2001–2002).
2 Activism is understood here as the nation's willingness to take the initiative despite the costs (Branner, 2013).
3 Norway boasted that they were spending less money than their competitors, but the amounts were still considerable. Norway had a dedicated campaign team and communication budget, increased funding for Norway's UN delegation and travel activities, as well as the purchase of a new residence for Norway's Ambassador to the UN, which is partly justified by Norway's SECURITY COUNCILcampaign (Skjæraasen, 2018).
4 Brochure, *Norway for the UNSC 2012–2022*: https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departemen- tene/ud/vedlegg/fn/flyer_un.pdf.
5 Ireland's campaign brochure: https://merrionstreet.ie/MerrionStreet/en/ImageLibrary/20180702.pdf.
6 Brochure, *Canada, UN security council candidate, 2021–2022* https://www.international.gc.ca/ campaign-campagne/assets/pdfs/unsc-csnu/unsc-csnu-en.pdf.

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