ROOTED COSMOPOLITANISM, HERITAGE AND THE QUESTION OF BELONGING

ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

Edited by
Lennart Wouter Kruijer, Miguel John Versluys and Ian Lilley
This book explores the analytical and practical value of the notion of “rooted cosmopolitanism” for the field of cultural heritage.

Many concepts of present-day heritage discourses—such as World Heritage, local heritage practices, or indigenous heritage—tend to elide the complex interplay between the local and the global—entanglements that are investigated as “glocalisation” in Globalisation Studies. However, no human group ever creates more than a part of its heritage by itself. This book explores an exciting new alternative in scholarly (critical) heritage discourse, the notion of rooted cosmopolitanism, a way of making manifestations of globalised phenomena comprehensible and relevant at local levels. It develops a critical perspective on heritage and heritage practices, bringing together a highly varied yet conceptually focused set of stimulating contributions by senior and emerging scholars working on the heritage of localities across the globe. A contextualising introduction is followed by three strongly theoretical and methodological chapters which complement the second part of the book, six concrete, empirical chapters written in “response” to the more theoretical chapters. Two final reflective conclusions bring together these different levels of analysis.

This book will appeal primarily to archaeologists, anthropologists, heritage professionals, and museum curators who are ready to be confronted with innovative and exciting new approaches to the complexities of cultural heritage in a globalising world.

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“An important intervention in both archaeology and heritage studies, the contributors of this volume bring a global perspective to the classic theme of cosmopolitanism. Drawing from different disciplines and international case studies, this book makes a significant contribution beyond method and theory and offers new insights on globalisation, nationalism, religion, and the ethics of belonging.”

Lynn Meskell, Professor of Anthropology, University of Pennsylvania & AD White Professor-at-Large, Cornell University
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Preface

This volume is one of the results of the NWO (the Dutch Research Council) project Innovating Objects: The Impact of Global Connections and the Formation of the Roman Empire (VICI 277–61–001) that was undertaken at Leiden University in the period 2016–2022 and directed by Professor Miguel John Versluys. Issues of heritage and archaeological-anthropological questions on the continuous flows from past to future that characterise human history played a crucial role in the project from its very beginnings. This volume is among the main outcomes of our VICI work in this domain.

In collaboration with the Willem Willems Chair for Current Issues in Archaeological Heritage Management at the Leiden Faculty of Archaeology, the first impetus for this volume was a session at the European Association of Archaeologist’s annual meeting in Budapest in August 2020 (online). Instigated by its success, we organised a second in-person meeting at the National Museum of Antiquities (RMO) in Leiden in November 2021 with some additionally selected contributors.

We are grateful to the Dutch Research Council (NWO) for their support of the VICI project and the publication of this book. We would also like to thank the National Museum of Antiquities (RMO) for hosting us generously. We are grateful to our authors and the two discussants for their intellectual engagement. Last, but definitely not least, at Routledge, we would like to thank assistant editor Heeranshi Sharma for her wonderful work and Matt Gibbons for his support of this book.
Part 1

Introduction and theoretical perspectives
1 Rooted cosmopolitanism, heritage and the question of belonging

Miguel John Versluys and Ian Lilley

Introduction

Cosmopolitanism has a long and contested history and continues to be debated intensely. The discussion revolving around Martha Nussbaum’s *The Cosmopolitan Tradition: A Noble But Flawed Ideal* from 2019 illustrates both. First, there is the continuing importance of (the history of) the idea itself to try to understand the world we are living in. Second is the fact that cosmopolitanism is not considered a neutral term but rather something of an ideology that can only be either noble or dishonourable: flawed or perfect. One cannot be indifferent to cosmopolitanism so it seems, but nor, apparently, can the concept be used as a descriptive or analytical category in its own right.

The emergence of the idea of cosmopolitanism is usually ascribed to Stoicism and dated to the period around 300 BCE (for cosmopolitanism in Antiquity, see Pradeau 2015 as well as Versluys, forthcoming). The Stoa used and developed the concept to underline a (critical) opposition towards their place of birth, as a form of ‘rationalism’ or ‘enlightenment’, one might say. The roots of the idea, however, go deeper. The Cynic philosopher Diogenes of Sinope (who probably lived around 412–324 BCE) is reported to have answered, when asked where he came from, “I am a citizen of the world” (*kosmopolites*). The idea of cosmopolitanism as it developed in Antiquity most probably was a political reflection in the first place and already took shape around 500 BCE. It is thus attuned to a decisive breakthrough in connectivity during that period—that created, for the first time in human history as far as we can tell, a truly global understanding of the world (i.e., Afro-Eurasia) (Versluys forthcoming). These initial cosmopolitan ideas revolve around the legitimacy of the laws of the *polis* as being given by nature (or not). Through the idea of the cosmic, therefore, the civic is put in perspective and critically questioned. “Is the world not, in fact, one big city and should, therefore, the law not be common to all?” the philosopher Heraclitus asks (Pradeau 2015, chapter 2). As later cosmopolitanisms from the ancient world (cf. Tevdovski, this volume), these texts from around the turn of the middle of the first millennium BCE use the concept to think about the relation between the world and the city—and how humans relate to those categories. With the Cynics, this idea is used in a polemical way, to ask critical questions about one’s own locality. With the Stoics, the cosmopolitan serves more...
as a kind of ideal type of Other that assists in developing the Self. Acknowledging that next to a civic identity a person also has a cosmopolitan identity, Stoic philosophers even see the ‘enlightenment’ that emerges from this Self-Other dialectic evolving through time. Much of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, therefore, with its idea of a *homo duplex*, a person who can be local and global simultaneously, is indebted to Stoic thinking. It is in fact only relatively recently then that the notion of cosmopolitan is understood as being *fundamentally in opposition to* the local (see Papastephanou, this volume, for an overview of the debate)—and with that come the strong value judgements attached to the idea. When Stalin used the term ‘rootless cosmopolitan’ in his antisemitic campaign of 1948–1953, he was following Nazi propaganda that used 19th-century ideas of the cosmopolitan as denoting a lack of ‘national character’ in its turn (Gelbin 2016). More recent, negative views of cosmopolitanism that draw on the same absolute local-global dichotomy seem to be everywhere: from critiques that cosmopolitanism would be an elitist and uncommitted global lifestyle at the expense of the (local) subaltern (usually coming from the political Left) to attacks that cosmopolitans cannot be patriots and thus undermine the values of the nation-state (usually coming from the political Right). These two false stereotypes can be seen coming together and illustrated by a statement from Theresa May in a 2016 conference speech (in the wake of the Brexit vote) when she said: “If you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere”. While in fact, therefore, the idea of cosmopolitanism is about the entanglement of the local with the global, nowadays it is most often understood as being estranged from and opposed to the local. This is why it is valued in either (uncritically) positive or (uncritically) negative terms. As an analytical category, cosmopolitanism thus suffers from the same fate as the concept of globalisation at present. It is understood as having only one profile—that is the cosmo or global—while, in fact, it is Janus-faced. With cosmopolitanism that double stemma should, in fact, be clear from the term itself as it includes both the global cosmos and the local *polis*, as Ulrich Beck (2003) has reminded us. This is exactly how Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), the famous Bengali author who was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1913 and strived for Indian independence for whole his life, understood it (see Mukherjee 2020; Mehan, this volume). In his view, India should not have moved from a British nation-state to an Indian nation-state but should have become an open society. Cosmopolitan, for him, was one’s own local tradition as enriched by the traditions of the world. With globalisation, the inherent local-global interplay is less apparent from the terminology itself but very clear from its use as an analytical category and methodology: Globalisation is always and as a matter-of-fact *glocalisation* (see Hodos et al. 2017). The qualification *rooted* as attached to *cosmopolitan* is a useful reminder, then, of its true meaning. It is defending, one could say (Papastephanou, this volume), cosmopolitanism against the attacks from the last two centuries or so. It thus underlines that we are dealing with local-global interplay and are interested in analysing world history in such non-dichotomous terms (cf. Cannadine 2013). As such, we think that the concept is eminently suited to play a role in current debates on heritage and questions of
belonging, characterised as these often still are by the either/or logic of identity politics and culturalist approaches (see further below). That is not to deny that the local and the global can be (perceived as) oppositions but to maintain that these oppositions are non-exclusive.

As globalisation helps us to think about connectivity as intra-cultural instead of inter-cultural (Versluys 2017, 24–29), (rooted) cosmopolitanism shows that we have roots and routes simultaneously (see Walker and Kymlicka 2012 for an analysis of present-day Canada in these terms). Human culture is therefore not so much about inter-action but rather about intra-action, a dynamism of local and global forces working inseparably, to adapt Karen Barad’s (2007) term for our purposes (see also Papastephanou, this volume). Rooted cosmopolitanism is thus good to think with if we want to understand heritage (formation) and questions of belonging as multiple, non-linear, and non-hierarchical on the one hand while giving locality and identity its due—and taking seriously what people think about heritage and how they are treated because of it—on the other (see further Kruijer and Versluys, this volume, also Colomer 2017). All culture, we would argue, is ultimately global. Yet in a local context, it becomes identity at the very same time. Rooted cosmopolitanism, therefore, may help us to understand how people deal with the local-global paradox in terms of heritage.

As such it is part of the toolbox of what is called ‘critical transculturalism’ (Kraidy 2005; see Taberner 2017 for a literary example and Hoo 2022 for an archaeological case study in this vein). We would even argue that dealing with heritage can be understood as a performance to mediate the tension between the local and the global (as suggested by the case studies presented in this volume by Geurds and Berger, cf. Colomer 2017; Ma 2020). Acknowledging differences, rooted cosmopolitanism helps us to analyse heritage as cosmopolitan despite those differences (Appiah 2005, 2006).

Such a multi-scalar approach allows us to tell different stories in their own right and as related to each other (see Versluys, this volume)—and is, therefore, significant from an analytical as well as an ethical perspective (Appiah 2006; Gueye 2013 for the latter). The importance of the concept of (rooted) cosmopolitanism for archaeology was strongly argued for and illustrated by the landmark volume Cosmopolitan Archaeologies edited by Lynn Meskell (2009) (note Werbner 2008 for the discipline of anthropology). Although these ideas have certainly been applied since, including in discussions on heritage (Lawhon and Chion 2012 for a wonderful example of the application of specifically the idea of rooted cosmopolitanism in Peru), we feel that there is a lot of unused potential left, especially if we take the ongoing discussion to ‘renegotiate heritage beyond essentialism’ (see Archaeological Dialogues 23.1 from 2016; Holtorf 2017) into account. It is the ambition of this volume, therefore, to update, evaluate, and, where possible, strengthen the cosmopolitan agenda through a collection of essays that are all both a (critical) reflection on the idea of rooted cosmopolitanism and an application of it in the heritage domain. In the remainder of this chapter, we explore the local-global interplay and its role within the disciplines of archaeology and anthropology in more depth.

We will do so in two different ways—interpreting rooted cosmopolitanism from
Solving the local-global conundrum 1: participatory archaeology and indigenous heritage

From a practical, bottom-up perspective, rooted cosmopolitanism is about making manifestations of globalised phenomena (in this case, archaeology) comprehensible and relevant at local levels. Other terms used to describe the same condition include “discrepant” (Clifford 1992) and “vernacular” (Bhabha 1996) cosmopolitanism. We need to do this so that we can acquire and/or maintain our ‘social licence to operate’, or, to put it another way, ensure continuing community support for what we do, in terms of access to sites, cooperation with practitioners, funding for teaching, research and preservation and so on. We need this social licence because archaeology is not a self-evident public good that needs no justification. This fact is most obvious when working in places with indigenous communities, in Australasia, the Americas, and the Indo-Pacific, for example, where people often ask what archaeology is ‘for’—or, in other words, why it is considered something appropriate and useful to do (Sand et al. 2006). Yet, a sceptical mentality is also common in Western Europe, North America, and the Antipodes, where people, for instance, often do not understand or value archaeology, while governments and other institutions such as universities continue to reduce funding for archaeology among other supposedly non-essential pursuits. We are not always helped in this regard by other scholarly disciplines. Most scholars in the humanities and social sciences, and indeed across the academy more broadly, simply do not see archaeology as something they need to consider. As Meskell (2013, 92) declared, somewhat provocatively, “the omission of an archaeological contribution is more revealing about a broader scholarly reticence to engage with the messiness of things, their fundamental embeddedness, and their myriad historical residues and entanglements”.

So, what do we need to do? How do we make archaeology comprehensible and relevant at local levels? First, we need to recognise and continually remind ourselves that there is usually an enormous gulf between the socio-political and cultural power of archaeologists as representatives of universities and government and that of local people in the broader community. This situation is particularly acute when working with social and cultural minorities but is not restricted to such cases, as ‘ordinary people’ in mainstream communities often reflexively defer to the authority of archaeologists among other professionals. The only real means of bridging this gap is to go beyond inviting local people or descendant communities to participate in work in the field and the laboratory, attend seminars and conferences, or perform ceremonies on site to ensure spiritual safety and the like (cf. Geurds, this volume). As Meg Conkey (2005, esp. 15–18) made clear some time ago, it has long been understood that relinquishing power in a politically meaningful way means bringing local conceptualisations into archaeological practice in ways that guide the development and application of theory as well as inform technical work in the field and laboratory. This process is largely one of
two-way communication, top-down and bottom-up: from archaeology as a global phenomenon ‘down’ to the local level and from the local community level ‘up’ to archaeologists in universities, government, and international organisations such as UNESCO. If done effectively, such communication should allow both ‘sides’ to understand the other and determine the extent to which each can accommodate the needs and concerns of the other.

Even in cultural contexts where all parties share the same language, such dialogues require translation in both directions. This is to ensure that the conceptual and technical issues routinely considered by archaeologists and commonly discussed in arcane professional language are understood by non-specialists—including other scholars and professionals as well as ‘ordinary’ community members—while at the same time the needs and concerns of such interlocutors are unambiguously conveyed to archaeologists. Obviously, such translation is even more important in contexts where people in the conversation speak different languages.

There are two main kinds of translation (Lilley 2014; cf. Bachman-Medick 2016). The first entails the transfer of information based on literal word-for-word interpreting. The second is a literary transposition, which attempts to convey the sense of what is being translated rather than a direct word-to-word conversion. Literary transposition “moves the reader toward the writer”, while literal interpretation “moves the writer toward the reader” (as per Schleiermacher 1813, 41–42 cited in Munday 2001, 28). Literal translation is obviously crucial; one cannot simply ignore the literal meaning(s) of the original words. Nonetheless, many translators and scholars of translation understandably contend that it is even more important to capture and convey the overall conceptual message of those original words taken as a whole rather than individually word-by-word.

Translation for archaeologists working with local people entails something of both approaches, of ‘moving the (local) reader toward the (archaeological) writer’, as well as ‘moving the (archaeological) writer toward the (local) reader.’ On the one hand, archaeologists need to be as familiar as possible with the cultural context in which a translation is to be presented so that the translation can be comprehensible to the audience in question. On the other hand, an archaeological intervention where the translation is undetectable would be pointless, even though most ‘normal’ translations aim to be imperceptible so that the introduced material just slips unnoticed into the local cultural setting. Archaeological translations in such contexts need to be at least somewhat obvious because, as Umberto Eco (2004, 192) asserted, the recipients of a translation need to “feel das Fremde”, the foreignness, of a translation if it is to make a difference to them. As Eco (2004) recognises, translation is thus not a matter of choosing between literalness or literary creativity, or what Venuti in various publications discusses as “domestication and foreignisation” (cited in Munday 2001, 145–148). Rather, it is a matter of negotiation between all the parties concerned.

We know some archaeologists reject this approach (for instance, McGhee 2008), but there is nothing about such thinking that should threaten them. It is just good for both archaeology and anthropology. As Geertz (1983, 70) pointed out many years ago, “Accounts of other people’s subjectivities can be built up without
recourse to pretensions to more than normal capacities for ego effacement and fellow feeling.” As he went on to note, however, “Normal capacities in these respects are, of course, essential, as is their cultivation, if we expect people to tolerate our intrusions into their lives at all and accept us as persons worth talking to.”

Applied anthropologists have been doing this sort of thing for decades (e.g., Sillitoe 1998a, 1998b). What is more, as Strathern (2006) pointed out, the course of action we are supporting is ontologically no different from the “ideas trade” (cf. Bachman-Medick 2016) that underpins the interdisciplinary research that we are encouraged to pursue these days and, we would emphasise, with which archaeologists have long been familiar (cf. Warren 1998). To quote Strathern (2006, 192, quoting Galison 1996, 14), the idea in such contexts is to “work out an intermediate language, a pidgin, that serves a local, mediating capacity” (also see Osborne 2004).

One thing that should help everyone concerned with this process of negotiation and mediation is what scholars such as Tim Ingold have recognised as local people’s and archaeology’s shared interest in “the temporality of the landscape” (cf. Sheehan and Lilley 2008). Thus, Ingold (2000, 189) understands that For both the archaeologist and the . . . [local] dweller, the landscape tells—or rather is—a story, “a chronicle of life and dwelling” (Adam 1998, 54). It enfolds the lives and times of predecessors who, over the generations, have moved around in it and played their part in its formation. To perceive the landscape is therefore to carry out an act of remembrance, and remembering is not so much a matter of calling up an internal image, stored in the mind, as of engaging perceptually with an environment that is itself pregnant with the past.

Coming to ‘translation as negotiation’ from this shared ‘meta-interest’ is surely key to the success of effective two-way communication between archaeologists and non-archaeologists, especially local people, and thus to developing archaeology as an example of rooted cosmopolitanism.

Solving the local-global conundrum 2: towards an understanding of heritage as emergent

As we concluded in the previous section, rooted cosmopolitanism is about making manifestations of a globalised phenomenon such as archaeology comprehensible and relevant at local levels. Thus ‘translation as negotiation’ should be key. This resonates with what we wrote in the introduction to this chapter, namely that in more general terms, rooted cosmopolitanism is about making sense of the paradox that the local and the global are always, in one way or another, entangled in a non-dichotomous way. Local and global indeed constitute one another. Globalisation is always glocalisation and can be defined as the ability of individuals to operate across different (local, regional and global) scales simultaneously.
(Knappett 2011, 10 and also Berger, this volume). Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing summarises this point of departure as well as its consequence for our methodologies as follows (2005, 122):

Even the most out-of-the-way cultural niches are formed in world crossing dialogues. Cultures are always both wide-ranging and situated, whether participants imagine them as local or global, modern or traditional, futuristic or backward-looking. The challenge of cultural analysis is to address both the spreading of interconnections and the locatedness of culture.

In the previous section, we have taken, in tune with many present-day heritage discourses, the locatedness of culture as our point of departure and subsequently looked at the (bottom-up) integration of archaeology as a global phenomenon. In this section we will approach the local-global conundrum from the opposite perspective. We will depart from the fundamental cosmopolitan nature of (all) cultures and subsequently look at the status of a local phenomenon, such as the notion of indigenous heritage (top-down). This matters because many concepts of present-day heritage discourses—such as local heritage practices or indigenous heritage (but also the idea of world heritage)—show a tendency to ignore the complex interplay between the local and the global. However, no human group ever creates more than a part of its heritage by itself. The idea that the cultural heritage of one people is not that of another has become so ingrained in our (modern) understanding that it is difficult to realise how strange and artificial this conception actually is. This is, among many other reasons, certainly also owed to the intense intertwining of the appearance and the establishment of the nation-state in the 19th and 20th centuries with that of (historical) academic disciplines such as archaeology and anthropology. These projects were mutually dependent, and they therefore, scaffolded each other to the extent that they became interchangeable. That is to say, the past was to be studied and understood as a historical canvas to explain and legitimise the (nation-state) present. Museums play an important role in delivering this culturalist message to the wider public.

Postcolonialism got rid of the colonial idea of the superiority of some of these cultures over others but not, so it seems, of the culturalist idea that “individuals are determined by their unambiguously distinct cultures and can only realise themselves within their respective cultures” (definition after Holtorf 2017, 3). In an essay programmatically entitled ‘What’s wrong with cultural diversity in world archaeology’, Cornelius Holtorf (2017) has shown how, even today, the field we call world archaeology is determined by this culturalist thinking. From a focus on ‘some superior cultures’ (Europe selected the Greeks and Romans, cf. Funder et al. 2019 for the example of the Danish case), we have now moved to study all cultures worldwide, in their own right and without value judgements on their ‘importance’. The point, Holtorf (2017) argues, is that we still study these cultures in a culturalist way. Here lies the important distinction, we believe, between world archaeology on the one hand and global archaeology on the other. World archaeology understands
the world as a mosaic of hundreds of different tesserae that it considers to be distinct in terms of culture and identity. It does not deny the inter-action between them but understands that as a form of inter-cultural connectivity, thus making a distinction between self-other, inside-outside, us-them, etc. Global archaeology, on the other hand, is truly cosmopolitan in the sense that it has moved from the (culturalist) idea of inter-action to the framework of intra-action (for the difference between these notions see above). From this perspective, one cannot speak about ‘our culture’, ‘our identity’ or ‘our heritage’ any more. Holtorf (2017, 9) argues we should start with the notion of communities instead because “Communities provide attachments that are multiple and partial; they overlap and adjoin to each other; they have porous boundaries and allow hybrid exchanges” (cf. Kraidy 2005 for the same argument in different terms). This not only matters for our methodologies but is also of great importance ethically: individual human rights can be strengthened “where the lives of individuals are not determined by a distinct culture to which they are said to belong but by their own preferences” (Holtorf 2017, 10; cf. Ackerman 1994; Geurds this volume).

The feasibility of this perspective for heritage studies, both analytically and ethically, is underlined by an important recent book by the Belgian anthropologist David Berliner entitled Perdre sa culture (Berliner 2018). Berliner starts from the observation that, within society at present, there seems to be a rather particular way of understanding (foreign) cultures and identities and that is in terms of nostalgia. Central to our concept of heritage, he argues, is the idea of loss. As a result, the irreversibility of time is felt and understood as disappearance and has to be lamented (Berliner 2018, 12). There is an obsession, therefore, with what Berliner qualifies as ‘retromania’ and consequently we have difficulties when we see cultures change—despite the fact that this is what cultures do all the time. Although often unconsciously and with the best (ideological) intentions, this nostalgic conception of heritage departs from the idea of holistic and authentic cultures and is therefore deeply culturalist, in tune with the idea of world archaeology (as discussed above). It results in heritage practices that should be qualified as conservative as their main interest lies in preservation. These conservation, protection and maintenance practices can, of course, be described as part of the cultural dynamics of societies. However, they are often at odds with change at the very same time because they are primarily oriented towards the past, not the future. An important question, moreover, is whose past and future are then the main point of reference. Berliner explores this question for the inscription of the site of Luang Prabang (Laos) in the UNESCO World Heritage List (for information see https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/479/). Its preservation was mainly fuelled, he argues, by a European nostalgia for its colonial past in the ‘Orient’ on the one hand as well as by the wish to create a gentrified tourist destination for European pleasure, for the future, on the other. The local population seems to be much less enamoured with this aspect of its past and envisions a rather different future (Kruijer and Versluys, this volume for comparable conclusions on Nemrut Dağı). Berliner calls this process exonostalgia—a term meant to indicate that we long for their past—and he shows how related heritage practices have resulted in the “freezing” of culture at
Luang Prabang. His general conclusion on the basis of this and other examples is clear (Berliner 2018, 119):

Mon désaccord d’anthropologue avec ces défenseurs intransigeants de la culture précieuse porte principalement sur leur manière de sous-estimer, voire d’ignorer, le génie des humains à inventer et réinventer de nouvelles formes esthétiques, sociales, culturelles.

Culture is always in the making through local and global forces. Why preserve one specific manifestation and label that authentic and indigenous heritage in order to preserve it? This question is especially relevant now it is becoming more and more clear that preservation and ‘retromania’ might be rather particular manifestations—in place and time—of dealing with cultural change. From this perspective, we agree with Holtorf (2016) that heritage can “never be at risk” as it is constantly changing and evolving to varying extents and at different rates. Rooted cosmopolitanism emphasises the fact that, in localities all over the world, cultural heritage is always in the process of becoming and that these local processes are inherently shaped by global connections. Rooted cosmopolitanism emanates from local settings and practices—it is rooted—while at the same time, it moves beyond the essentialism (and culturalism) of cultural diversity—it is cosmopolitan. As such, the concept might well be able to critically reflect on the ideological dichotomy between globalisation and isolation that characterises our current political climate and strongly influences heritage practices in nation-states worldwide, as we described above. More and more, archaeological interpretations of the past show that globalisation is indeed a very deep historical process (Hodos et al. 2017). All the objects, assemblages, monuments and sites we excavate, document and preserve, therefore, are inherently cosmopolitan in nature. This characteristic, however, sits uncomfortably with the discourse and heritage practices of nation-states in which this work takes place. We know that the solution of nation-states to this problem is forgetting, or rather selective remembering, as illustrated by many of the chapters in this volume, particularly those of Kristensen et al. and Chu.

Rooted cosmopolitanism offers a different solution for reconciling the inherent tension between the local and the global, Self and Other, in a productive way. It does not choose one over the other nor contests the tension between them. Rather, it looks for ways to make this tension productive. Not denying the importance of identities, the idea of rooted cosmopolitanism refuses to bring people or cultures back to “the lies that bind” (Appiah 2018). Rooted cosmopolitanism asks for synthetic understandings of cultures, instead of the holistic and pluralistic ones we often still work with today (cf. Kraidy 2005, 150; Bachman-Medick 2016). Thinking through rooted cosmopolitanism, then, will enable us to understand the fundamental cosmopolitan nature of human society as a shared meta-interest as well. It urges us to explore this shared concern in terms of emergence and, for that, the instruments of curiosity, uncertainty, mutual exploration and conversation are key. We hope this volume contributes to that important project.
Note

1 Nussbaum 2019. For the debate on her use of the concept, which started with the famous 1994 essay entitled ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’ as published in the Boston Review (October–November issue, 3–6), see Ackerman 1994; Ayaz Naseem and Hyslop-Margison 2006; Nadiminti 2012, with references, as well as Papastephanou, this volume. This chapter was written as part of the NWO VICI project Innovating objects. The impact of global connections and the formation of the Roman Empire (277-61-001).

Bibliography


2 From the root of cosmopolitanism to rootless parasites
The politics and normative complexities of rooted cosmopolitanism

Marianna Papastephanou

Introduction

Emphases on cultural diversity and heritage have proven to be politically ambiguous. On the one hand, new perspectives on multiple identities, cultures in plural and recognition of the right to otherness urge people to acknowledge and respect a politics of difference. On the other hand, acknowledgement and respect of cultural diversity and heritage seem to usher along an “identity politics” of essentialist undertones and divisive effects. One risk is mistakenly to attach a specific culture exclusively to the historical collectivity that has supposedly created the related artefacts (monuments, sagas, etc.) from its own resources alone and from its own, unique and pure “essence”. Further risks are that people may assume an incommensurability of cultures, endorse monoculturalist and isolationist outlooks on identity and overlook the interdependence of the local and the global. All such risks have un-cosmopolitan consequences.

This ambiguity in how cultural diversity and difference may be politicised enables only partial visibility of various aspects of justice and cosmopolitanism that may be called “faces”. As I argue elsewhere (Papastephanou 2021a), strong normative notions such as justice and cosmopolitanism are composed of many aspects (e.g., legal, ecological, moral, existential, economic, etc.). These “faces” of normative notions operate on different surfaces, namely, spatial manifestations of the relevance of the related normativities (that is, topographies where such normativities emerge or are especially needed, such as the environment, the domestic space, the private realm, the political sphere, the domain of morality, etc.). The many faces of justice (or of cosmopolitanism) are interconnected in a complex relationship of occasional synergy and tension. For more on how they relate, on their possible taxonomy, etc., see Papastephanou (2021b). It should be noted that some intricacies of this theory that I term “a stereoscopic optic on normative notions” need further elaboration, but keeping in view the above preliminary clarifications will suffice to walk the reader through the main argument of this chapter. At any rate, to explain the complex point about the political ambiguity of cultural diversity and its effects, let me provide some examples. Affirmations of diversity and heritage encourage an acknowledgement of a face of justice that can be predicated as recognitive. Recognitive justice (Honneth 2004) is crucial in assigning people
normative tasks of cherishing, protecting and preserving particular identities and cultures. A reparative justice (Verdeja 2008) is thus also made visible, along with related normative tasks of compensating wherever possible for imperial cultural destruction; restoring, again whenever possible, the cultural landscapes that imperialism altered; and allowing people, on grounds of their cultural identity, to claim rights to self-determination along lines of cosmopolitan/international right/justice. However, when diversity and heritage are essentialised or over-emphasised, people miss other kinds of justice: the discursive justice that is operative when, in public dialogue and life, the cultural debt to others, to the stranger and to the foreign element and influence on diverse legacies is acknowledged; and the global justice that requires people to step out of their cultural entrenchment and comfort zones to consider issues of the whole world (of biota and non-biota). Global justice requires that people hark to claimants of justice beyond the narrow purview of the situated individual and take appropriate action.

As the above examples indicate, this political ambiguity of diversity and heritage is clearly a problem, one that is not exclusive to the nation-state. It plagues any particularist allegiance that may sustain partial sensibilities of justice. It thus affects normative cosmopolitanism, that is, a cosmopolitanism that makes ethical and political demands on the self, on particular collectivities and on global fora to advance an all-round, multi-faceted sense of justice. Therefore, much theoretical, problem-solving energy has been invested in finding a solution to the issue of ambiguous politics of diversity and heritage (see, for instance, Meskell [2009] and the editors’ Introduction to the present volume). Currently, the concept of “rooted cosmopolitanism” represents one such solution that has taken root in various disciplines and discourses throughout the world. Kwame Anthony Appiah, for instance, has famously implied this political ambiguity in his critique “of political projects that essentialize culture” and has promoted rooted cosmopolitanism as an antidote “centrally concerned with recognizing the value of different ways of life and fostering intercultural dialogue” (as phrased by Maciel 2014, 74). However, being tackled from many viewpoints, philosophical or other, rooted cosmopolitanism is no single or simple doctrine. It has become an umbrella term for very diverse approaches (Kymlicka and Walker 2012, 10).

Robert Maciel discerns, in rooted cosmopolitanism, three conceptions of roots “expressed as cultural rootedness, political rootedness, and moral rootedness” (Maciel 2014, 44). In this chapter, I explore the cultural(ist) conception of “rooted cosmopolitanism” and the operations of the horticultural metaphor of “roots”. This metaphor is widely used for the cosmopolitanism that is now considered suitable for cultural diversity and heritage issues and is eagerly being adopted by related fields. My aim is to indicate the complex politics of this new cosmopolitanism and what I later describe as “normativisation and doubled essentialisation of diversity and heritage”. To this end, I first introduce a grammatical, yet also political, account of how various predicates (e.g., the adjectives “legal”, “moral”, etc.) attached to cosmopolitanism specify and/or qualify it and reveal diverse faces of it. In our case in point, the noun “cosmopolitanism” is specified or qualified with the participle “rooted” and/or the adjective “cultural”. However, “roots” may be a
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bad choice of metaphor for human existence in cultures; hence, I begin (b) to
discuss the politics of “rooted cosmopolitanism” with my critical response to Judith
Shklar’s dismissive remark on the metaphor of roots. Her remark would under-
mine from the start the very value of rooted cosmopolitanism as an escape route
from tensions of the local and the global, a value that this collection of essays not
only acknowledges but also deeply relies upon. My response to Shklar’s remark
prepares the ground for my account of how “rooted” has been tasked with pro-
tecting cosmopolitanism from risks. To illustrate operations of “rooted” that pro-
tect cosmopolitanism from various charges, I refer inter alia to the metaphor of
the “cosmopolitan as a parasite” that Appiah’s version of rooted cosmopolitan-
ism intended to address. Much is gained through the notion of “cultural rooted
cosmopolitanism”, I will argue, beyond what has already been acknowledged as
its problem-solving capacity. However, (c) “rooted” cosmopolitanism is at risk of
developing its own ambiguous, “culturalist” politics when its normative scope is
not specified to diversity and heritage, and its dependence on other cosmopolitan
normativities is not acknowledged. Exaggerated and essentialised political expec-
tations from the cosmopolitanism of diversity and heritage should be avoided, and
its interconnectivity with other faces of cosmopolitanism and of justice should be
noticed if rooted cosmopolitanism is to have the normative value that we hope
for. Thus, fields researching diversity and heritage should keep an eye on what
lies beyond the perspective of “culturalist rooted cosmopolitanism” and is visible
through what I call “a stereoscopic optic on cosmopolitanism” (Papastephanou
2015). The cosmopolitanism that a stereoscopic optic makes more visible is that
which is composed of its many specifications and qualifications in their intercon-
nectivity, synergy and tensions.

(a) Specifications and qualifications of cosmopolitanism

Nouns often go hand in hand with predicates such as adjectives or participles.
The noun “cosmopolitanism”, for instance, can be predicated as “rooted”, “new”,
“critical”, “cultural”, “moral”, “legal”, etc. This is a seemingly trivial grammati-
cal point—“seemingly” because operations of predicates over nouns are not just
simply grammatical. They are also political operations because they demarcate the
discursive reception, treatment and power of the noun. They affect the power of
a notion in discourses, academia, public policy and local and global action. Such
operations even affect the noun’s influence on the spirit of the times (Zeitgeist).

I have discussed the politics of such grammatical operations elsewhere
(Papastephanou 2021b), so I will not cover the same ground here. For the pur-
poses of this chapter, then, I single out the specifying and qualifying operations
of predicates over the noun “cosmopolitanism”. That is, predicates may specify
cosmopolitanism’s scope, restrict its applicability in contexts, determine its mean-
ing, qualify or explain it, and indicate who its politically privileged or favoured
subject might be. Some predicates primarily narrow the noun’s meaning down
to a specific domain of life; that is, they specify the context in which the noun is
used. Cases in point are: “cultural cosmopolitanism”, “legal cosmopolitanism”,

“moral cosmopolitanism”, “economic cosmopolitanism”, etc. Specifications such as cultural, legal, economic, political, moral, ethical, environmental, etc., reveal different faces of cosmopolitanism and help us contextualise its relevance. Other predicates serve a protective and defensive politics by ensuring that the noun’s normativity will remain unassailable by critical opponents: such are the political functions inter alia of “new cosmopolitanism”, “critical cosmopolitanism”, and as we shall see below, “rooted cosmopolitanism”. The related predicates qualify cosmopolitanism as different from the “old” “modernist” cosmopolitanism. Or, they control cosmopolitanism’s conceptual scope to avoid the conceptual elasticity and generality of the noun that would permit its sliding into current, politically undesirable alternatives (e.g., “elitist”, “bourgeois” cosmopolitanism). Other predicates perform political concessions to opponents that, again, enable the protection, or revival, of the value of the noun: such is the case of adjectival constructions like “old cosmopolitanism” or “humanist cosmopolitanism” that grant to critics of cosmopolitanism that indeed a kind of cosmopolitanism is guilty as charged. But it is only a kind, a version, or conception of cosmopolitanism that is problematic rather than cosmopolitanism as such. The adjective “old” qualifies cosmopolitanism’s meaning in a way that allows for its dangerous or obsolete semantic version to be abandoned so that the new, politically acceptable meaning of cosmopolitanism will no longer be tarnished by critics. Therefore, these predicates perform qualifications of cosmopolitanism and secure its normative quality when threatened.

Specifications of cosmopolitanism (e.g., legal, cultural, environmental, moral, etc.) focus on one segment of reality, for example, on a “surface” such as a locality or a domain (such as the law courts that decide inter-state litigations), where issues of cosmopolitanism emerge as challenges (Papastephanou 2021b). They thus provide better insight into situations that need to be put in perspective, to be singled out and even magnified for better visibility and comprehensibility. It is not that specifications are devoid of normative content or qualifying intentions; on the contrary, the distinction between specifying and qualifying operations is not a neat modernist segregation of rigidly demarcated conceptual realms. Qualifications also have some specifying effects, just as specifications often reflect qualifying logics (e.g., ecological cosmopolitanism not only specifies a cosmopolitan concern directed at the environment but also normatively qualifies cosmopolitanism as non-anthropocentric). However, what justifies the distinction between specifications and qualifications is the fact that each performs primarily or more explicitly a certain task: a specification, for instance, the “legal”, primarily and clearly points up the domain (e.g., “law”) where cosmopolitanism is applied or made relevant. Moreover, through their division of labour, both specifications and qualifications work towards refining cosmopolitanism and clarifying its applicability and normative significance for diverse spheres of life and action.

Still, I argue for a more critical approach to such operations; we also need to distinguish between the optics through which we view nouns: the perspectival and the stereoscopic (Papastephanou et al. 2020; Papastephanou 2021a, 2021b). Each particular specification emerges from a perspectival optic that inevitably limits the visibility of other specifications if it is to make the specification in question stand
out. But, when isolated from one another and when, or if, they aspire to exhaust the scope of cosmopolitanism, specifications run the risk of consolidating a perspectival outlook on privileged facets of cosmopolitanism to the exclusion of other significant facets of it. Let me explain. An exaggerated emphasis, say, on cultural cosmopolitanism may block insight into legal, ecological/environmental, or moral cosmopolitanism. Qualifications run a similar risk but from another perspective, that which concerns single-focused attention on only one major normative challenge. For a better view of cosmopolitanism as a generic, umbrella concept whose normativity depends on the complex interconnectivity of its multiple facets and the tensions and challenges that accompany this interconnectivity, I suggest the metaphor of “stereoscopic optics” (e.g., Papastephanou 2021a, 2021b) that supplements the perspectival optics and addresses the latter’s risks. The multiple foci of a stereoscopic technique enable a better, simultaneous vision of the many faces and political challenges of cosmopolitanism. Occasionally, we need to “zoom in” when specific issues of cosmopolitanism become obscured by the abstraction of cosmopolitan generalities and a kind of God’s-eye-view universality. A perspectival optic is then required and offers better insight, also into “bottom-up” cosmopolitan practices. But, occasionally, awareness of the risks of becoming too absorbed in single-focused, perspectival vision necessitates that we “zoom out” to perceive what has escaped our visual scope and to notice the need for “top-down” action. Such a “zooming out” technique is the stereoscopic. Perspective and stereoscopy in synergy help cosmopolitanism reach maximised normative effects; that is, they enlarge its normative scope.

But, apart from the distinctions between specification and qualification and between perspective and stereoscopy, what is important for this paper as well is how “rooted cosmopolitanism” operates politically-discursively. The participle “rooted” predicates cosmopolitanism not quite to specify but rather to qualify it. “Rooted” demarcates what cosmopolitanism is and what it is not politically. This cosmopolitanism is at peace with localism; it is not inimical to local attachment. It is not a cosmopolitanism of abstract and even colonial aspirations to empty non-Western minds and places of their contents only to fill them up with universalist claims that are deep down Eurocentric. That is, it is an acceptable cosmopolitanism in its rhetoric and, possibly, also in its actual political implications. The next section elaborates on which risks the predicate “rooted” staves off by qualifying cosmopolitanism.

(b) Risks of cosmopolitanism and the political operations of “rooted”

In 1957, Judith Shklar formulated the tension between feeling rooted and aspiring to the freedom and self-image of the rootless as follows:

Today, after the original nexus of ideas about the cultural fecundity of the national soul has been all but forgotten, the ‘need for roots’ remains a major theme of romantic political thought. Man, like a vegetable, it seems, requires a root—though, why, no one really knows. It is the unhappy consciousness
itself longing for rest that wants roots, but refuses to abandon its aloofness, its supra-social freedom. It accepts roots as a general need, ‘for the others,’ but for itself it retains a position of dissatisfied, yet self-admiring freedom (Shklar 2020 [1957], 107).

In this passage, Shklar writes as if roots were optional, a product of choice, and a requirement that theory posits through a subtle levelling of humanity with one of its supposedly radical “others”, the ontological realm of flora: “Man, like a vegetable, requires a root—though, why, no one really knows”, she states. In my view, however, it is not a matter of requiring roots; it is a matter of inescapably\(^5\) having roots, and for reasons that we all know. In this section, I show how we know that we have roots and also what “to know” means in this case. I argue that when the noun determined by “rooted” is “existence” (human existence in this case), the predicate/metaphor “rooted” is appropriate. By implication, “rooted” also aptly describes the cosmopolitanism that is aware of inescapable human spatiotemporality and situatedness.\(^6\) But, as I argue in a later section, this does not entail that “rooted” indeed transfers to cosmopolitanism the ethico-political normativity that many thinkers expect from it today. On this, Shklar’s sharp criticism of rootedness being “for the others” is in some cases apposite and revealing of normative inconsistencies in the discourses of self-declared “cosmopolitans”.

We know that we have roots because an indisputable philosophical-anthropological given is that we are spatiotemporal beings. No matter whether we use the horticultural metaphor of ‘roots’ or another metaphor to describe our situatedness, by being embodied, we are embedded in a place at a given time. We are constructed by this embeddedness, regardless of the leeway for transcendence that any immanence gives to human beings for negotiating this construction and for reshuffling the multiple identities that we acquire through our being embodied and situated. Thus, here, to “know” why we have roots means that, at the descriptive level of what being alive entails, we understand and even define ourselves as immersed in specific cultures. These are marked by local collective historical memory, heritage, interpretive material and daily practices, some of which have taken centuries to be shaped. Arguably, one’s roots may be more rhizomatic (multiple, non-hierarchical) rather than arborescent (centralised, tree-like), to use the well-known Deleuzian-Guattarian distinction. This, along with the fact that human roots are (oxymoronically) portable since we carry them along wherever we go, or that we develop new roots, etc., may raise issues about whether the metaphor “root” is, in fact, a felicitous choice for describing our complex relationship to our own embeddedness in space and time. But such terminological and philosophical reservations do not undo our being embedded in life worlds, as roots more or less metaphorise us to be. That is, they do not undo that we are immersed in culture. Interestingly, culture is also a metaphor with botanical undertones since it originates from the Latin cultura, which means “cultivation” and in Middle English denoted a cultivated piece of land.\(^7\) Embeddedness in culture entails for the self that through culture and cultivation (acculturation), the roots go deeper and become stronger. Well over six decades after Shklar’s statement, we all know why humans
not just require but actually have roots\textsuperscript{8} of a kind. The question is rather: of what kind, and what are the implications of this knowledge for cosmopolitanism or, from the prism of the present collection of essays, the implications for diversity in relation to heritage?

Against the view, then, that we require roots as if roots were a purely normative issue of necessity, of something good and useful to add to our toolbox of life, I posit the purely descriptive account that we have roots, regardless of whether we acknowledge and thematise them or not and regardless of whether having roots is politically good or bad. The further issue then is to ask, not whether we require roots, but whether we require an exploration of what it means to have roots. The theory has so far mainly been interested in the problem-solving opportunities that the noun “roots” opens up when attached to cosmopolitanism (in the form of the past participle “rooted”). In this way, theory reproduces the logic that we “require roots” for problem-solving purposes, in this case, for instance, to make sure that the normativity of cosmopolitanism will not be threatened or blemished by the blind spots that tarnished the modern cosmopolitanism that claimed rootlessness and unattached, abstract universality. But, I argue, beyond any problem-solving merits, “rooted” is also very important in and of itself for theory and for those specific fields that aspire to describe how human beings live and have lived. We have roots rather than requiring them, and we require explorations of what it means to have roots because such probing may help us perceive what is taken for granted or passes for un-problematic in the normalcy and daily comfort zones that our deep roots create for us. That is, exploring “rootedness” is not only good for problem-solving but also for question-raising. One such question that (in its fervour to use “rooted” as a problem-solving qualifier of cosmopolitanism alone) theory does not raise is whether one being culturally a “rooted cosmopolitan” suffices to cover the full normative possibilities of cosmopolitanism. That is, does one’s acknowledgement of one’s roots in various cultures in a cosmopolitan manner entail that one is in a position to acknowledge also historical, ethical or moral debts to others, legal obligations, geopolitical challenges, environmental duties, etc.?

My answer to this question is that “having roots” describes us as cultural beings and, therefore, does not have full normative effects per se. It may have important normative implications but not enough to render cultural(ist) cosmopolitanism an all-encompassing notion that delivers normative goods all alone or unconditionally. For instance, having roots does not imply that one is always aware of them on occasions when one should. Shklar’s point about some “cosmopolitans” acknowledging the roots of others but reserving for themselves the “self-admiring freedom” (which is, in my view, the fantasy of freedom) from rootedness is most apposite, as I stated above. Even acknowledging one’s roots does not mean that one respects the roots of others or feels obliged to question the certainties of one’s existence for the sake of respecting others’ roots or of accomplishing something better for one’s locality, for other localities, or for the whole world. Neither roots as such nor their discourses should be normativised. The normative implications come from how our awareness of roots may be conducive or not to moral/ethical and political ideals. In my view, the recent discourses on the ethico-political requirement to explore
what having roots may mean, underpin and advance important investigations of the normative implications of the metaphor “rooted”. But these discourses have not self-reflectively investigated the politics of their using the predicate “rooted”. As I explain below, the “rooted” is something required by current theories of cosmopolitanism, and has been recruited, to qualify cosmopolitanism in a distinct way and to ward off the risks of some older cosmopolitan discourses. By being thus recruited, “rooted” has acquired a high normative status in many disciplines and now represents a renewal of the promises of cosmopolitanism. But this hasty normativisation of roots has its own risks. Much theoretical investigation today commits precisely the fallacy of jumping *tout court* from the descriptive to the normative and overlooks that a cultural rhetoric of roots does not accomplish by itself the possible, normative benefits of a rooted cosmopolitanism. After this caveat, let us explore how “rooted” has been used to qualify cosmopolitanism and effect specific politics.

The attribute “rooted” protects cosmopolitanism from the Eurocentric, homogenising undertones that modernity bequeathed it. The utopian aspirations toward a better world that some Enlightenment “cosmopolitans” entertained also involved dystopian elements of repressing or even obliterating cultural diversity. Some modern thinkers assumed that the recognition of “the equal moral worth of all human beings” would materialise “by creating a single world political order united around a single common language and global culture”. “Enlightenment images of cosmopolitanism” suppressed cultural and linguistic diversity and opened “the door to imperialism” (Kymlicka and Walker 2012, 3). Indeed, “European colonialism was often justified as a means of spreading a cosmopolitan order and ethos” (ibid). We notice in this version of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism what I have above indicated as a gap between one’s rhetoric and one’s actions or between theory and practice: “The core idea of cosmopolitanism may be to recognise the moral worth of people beyond our borders, particularly the poor and needy, but its historical practice has often been to extend the power and influence of privileged elites in the wealthy West while doing little if anything to benefit the truly disadvantaged” (ibid). Therefore, as Kymlicka and Walker argue, the avoidance of such connotations and the need for postcolonial cosmopolitanism prepared the ground for rooted cosmopolitanism. Again, however, I stress that avoiding negative connotations runs the risk of reducing cosmopolitanism to a verbal matter and of merely adapting the idiom of cosmopolitanism to new expectations. Acknowledging that everybody is rooted is a descriptive speech act that does not deliver by itself the normative goods that “new cosmopolitans” expect. Let us keep this consideration in mind because it will play an important role in my argument later on. Concerning the politics of “rooted”, it is important to stress that it gives locality its theoretical due and, at the same time, makes clear the normative expectations that thinkers now have from this renewed understanding of cosmopolitanism as “rooted”: “Rooted cosmopolitanism attempts to maintain the commitment to moral cosmopolitanism, while revising earlier commitments to a world state or a common global culture, and affirming instead the enduring quality and value of cultural diversity and local or national self-government” (Kymlicka and Walker 2012, 3). In other words, the
political operations of “rooted” on cosmopolitanism enable a dual loyalty and identity: as a rooted subject, the cosmopolitan is a citizen of a country and takes responsibility for it; as a cosmopolitan, the citizen undertakes a responsibility that extends to the whole world.

Ulrich Beck locates this dual loyalty and identity in the very term of cosmopolitanism. He finds the element of rootedness in the etymology of cosmopolitanism itself (Beck 2003, 16). This move keeps away any suspicion that the concept of rooted cosmopolitanism might be arbitrary or contradictory. “Etymologically, cosmopolitan is a combination of ‘cosmos’ and ‘polis’”. It thus evokes “a premodern ambivalence towards a dual identity and a dual loyalty”. That is, to justify the rooted cosmopolitanism of new cosmopolitanism, Beck explores cosmopolitanism at its own root, the notion’s roots in ancient Greek philosophy and also the semantics of the ancient Greek roots of the word, that is, “cosm-” and “poli-”.

“Every human being is rooted (beheimatet) by birth in two worlds, in two communities: in the cosmos (namely, nature) and in the polis (namely, the city/state). To be more precise, every individual is rooted in one cosmos, but simultaneously in different cities, territories, ethnicities, hierarchies, nations, religions, and so on” (Beck 2003, 16).

However, if that’s the case, if cosmopolitanism has within its very definition the component of rootedness, then, why the participle “rooted” and what are its discursive operations? Could “rooted” be a pleonastic and needless qualifier? Or, at most, could it merely remind us of the original Greek meaning of cosmopolitanism, which had been obscured when later, Roman Stoic and late-modern semantic layers privileging rootlessness were added to it? “Rooted” indeed works as such a reminder. But, as we saw above, more drastically, it staves off politically suspect modern layers of meaning; and it does much more. After all, the double identity and loyalty that is asserted by the very etymology of cosmopolitanism is, as James Ingram (2016, 68) remarks, figurative because “we cannot in any literal or legal sense be “citizens of the world”, let alone of the “cosmos”, since neither is a political unit”. In fact, cosmopolitan is as figurative as roots are when associated with the human being. Therefore, politically, the predicate “rooted” acting as a simple reminder of the etymology of cosmopolitanism hardly suffices to fulfil what contemporary academia expects from it. Hence, “rooted” is employed to do much more: it qualifies who the “true” cosmopolitan self is against misrecognitions and wrong identifications of the cosmopolitan with the global, supposedly rootless, traveller.

From the root of cosmopolitanism that generally precludes a free-floating rootless existence, we now move to the rootless cosmopolitan who stands accused of neglecting local duties or even of mocking local attachment the very moment that he indulges in various cultures and enriches his existence and lifestyle by drawing gratifying experiences from the cultural variety that the localism of others produces. In other words, “rooted” is attached to cosmopolitanism to hold it in check, to harness those of its universalist pretences that have proven toxic, but also to protect it from the charge of leading people to entertain the politically pernicious fantasy that they can or should live as deracinated beings. Thus, another political operation of the predicate “rooted” on cosmopolitanism is that of protecting the “cosmopolitan” self from charges of being a footloose creature of modernity, a
member of a global elite that is fed from the very cultural diversity and heritage that it downplays and to which this elite does not contribute. As Wim Vandekerckhove and Stan van Hooft (2010, xv) put it, “the nineteenth century also gave rise to criticism of the cosmopolitan ideal. In the context of the construction of national identities, cosmopolitanism was denounced as the love of no country and as antithetical to national pride”. Then, instead of being “a term of praise, the adjective ‘cosmopolitan’ came to be used to describe individuals who were seen to have an inadequate commitment or loyalty to the community or nation in which they resided”. The assumption of rootlessness worked as a rationalisation of the willingness and choice of footloose individuals “to move wherever opportunity beckoned them”. These individuals were thought to have “insufficient concern for their own compatriots or ethnicities” and, simultaneously, an “excessive interest in the lives and cultures of foreign peoples” (van Hooft and Vandekerckhove 2010, xv). Moreover, “this pejorative usage has occurred with reference to the class of international entrepreneurs, entertainers, tourists or fashionistas who are equally at home in the boardrooms, casinos or salons of New York, London, Berlin or Shanghai” (van Hooft and Vandekerckhove 2010, xv). They are regarded (and, to be fair to their own heterogeneity and diversity, they have often been stereotyped) as people of privilege who usually serve the interests of a neo-conservative right-wing ideology that some of the Left have aptly chastised as a bourgeois cosmopolitanism.

Thus, through “rooted”, cosmopolitanism becomes shielded from attacks by progressive theorists of post-colonial and de-colonial aspirations that defend localism. At the same time, it also becomes shielded from attacks by traditional nationalists who limit political obligation exclusively to the state and from attacks by conservative thinkers such as Roger Scruton, who reacted to the self-description of the modern “cosmopolitans” as rootless by accusing them of being parasitic upon local cultures. In other words, the horticultural metaphor of roots comes to deal with the problem of the cosmopolitan as parasite, another metaphor of horticultural, botanic connotations. Elsewhere (Papastephanou 2013a), I have critically discussed: Jeremy Waldron’s reaction to Scruton’s calling cosmopolitans “parasites”; Appiah’s different response to this charge; and the culturalist, subject-object framework of cosmopolitanism that these responses deep down share with Scruton’s account of cosmopolitanism. Scruton defined cosmopolitans as those who dabble in various local cultures and borrow styles of life and habits from cities around the world. Waldron shares this definition of the cosmopolitan and further unpacks it as describing a mixed-up self in a mixed-up world. But when Scruton’s definition takes an evaluative tone and pejoratively calls the cosmopolitan a “parasite”, Waldron strongly disagrees, defends the cosmopolitan against Scruton’s charge and maintains the liberal conception of the cosmopolitan as a creature of modernity opposed to belonging and to being immersed in a particular culture. Though Appiah also dismisses the charge of parasitism, he defends a rooted cosmopolitanism that combines liberal and communitarian sensibilities. All these thinkers, however, engage with cosmopolitanism as a self-description that eventually turns into a prescription, a model for others and reproduces a cosmopolitanism as a cultural, subject-object relationship rather than as a daunting,
complex relationality and interconnectivity of spheres/domains of life within the world. Since I have developed this elsewhere (Papastephanou 2013a), here I will show only how Appiah’s refutation of the “parasite” charge reveals the protective political operation of “rooted”.

Appiah (1997) considers the cosmopolitan as a collective subject13 accused of parasitism: “We cosmopolitans face a familiar litany of objections. Some, for example, have complained that our cosmopolitanism must be parasitic” (1997, 618, my emphasis). He goes on to defend this “we” by responding to this challenge: if the world were fully cosmopolitan, where would this “we” find its roots? “Where, in other words, would all the diversity we cosmopolitans celebrate come from in a world where there were only cosmopolitans?” For Appiah, the straightforward answer comes from entertaining “the possibility of a world in which everyone is a rooted cosmopolitan, attached to a home of one’s own, with its own cultural particularities, but taking pleasure from the presence of other, different places that are home to other, different people” (1997, 618, emphasis mine). “Behind the objection that cosmopolitanism is parasitic”, Appiah discerns an anxiety “caused by an exaggerated estimate of the rate of disappearance of cultural heterogeneity”. He avows that “the global system of cultural exchanges” is characterised by “somewhat asymmetrical processes of homogenization” that efface some cultural forms to a rather unusual range and speed. And then, having used the word “somewhat” for downplaying the homogenising new realities, he oversimplifies the issue of the kind of new, local diversity that is still produced. He overlooks the complex politics and multiple ways in which the homogenising processes that he has characterised as “somewhat asymmetrical” relate to heritage and uneven distribution of power: “as forms of culture disappear, new forms are created, and they are created locally, which means they have exactly the regional inflexions that the cosmopolitan celebrates” (619). They may indeed have the inflexions that the “new”, “rooted” “cosmopolitan” celebrates, but this does not make them truly regional or of a kind that would set at ease the aesthetic and ethico-political concerns of a more demanding and all-round cosmopolitanism. That they are local variations of a global trend speaks against, rather than for, a critical and bold, truly “other” originality that challenges, instead of reproducing or refining, what has already been a global trend. A more demanding and all-round cosmopolitanism does not just celebrate the adaptability and responsiveness of the local to the global. It does not just affirm regional imitations or refinements of global patterns. It expects a more drastic local pollination of the Western modalities of producing, say, music, literature or philosophy. It requires more confrontational words on the part of localities against tendencies regionally to create a newness of thought or culture that may only mystify that its origin lies in what Alatas (2007) described as a colonised, captive mentality. It is the mentality that reverently follows, transfers and adapts a colonial prototype to local cultural (re)production, even if that (re)production is somewhat variegated. Appiah thus overlooks the intensity and power of the political and financial operations that affect which cultural production passes the Western filters of global dispersal and consumption, what cultural heritage survives homogenising processes and the extent to which this survival is Eurocentrically
determined. Nevertheless, Appiah’s use of “rooted” is characteristic of how this metaphor is recruited to qualify cosmopolitanism and protect the “new cosmopolitan” from the charge of being a cultural parasite. Thus, the (self-)description of the “new cosmopolitan” as a “rooted” subject ends up easing the passage to (self-) prescription where the rooted cosmopolitan is sanitised enough to be presented not only as a multi-cultural, hybrid self but also as an avatar of locality- and world-oriented ethical and political virtues.

To sum up, “rooted” and its politics exculpate cosmopolitanism from charges that can be utilised by progressive and conservative opponents or critics of cosmopolitanism. The concept of “rooted cosmopolitanism”, which is the topic of this collection of essays, now fulfils important theoretical and practical purposes in discourses on cultural heritage too. Theoretically, “rooted cosmopolitanism” represents an effort to reconcile the local and the global, an effort that reflects what I have elsewhere (Papastephanou 2011) called “boundary discursivity”, that is, a discourse that explores limits and avoids extremes. It overcomes the tension that has haunted the split self-understanding of the Western world as, on the one hand, a modern creation of universality at odds with tradition and, on the other hand, a collection of nation-state particularities at odds with the abstraction of globality. Such “boundary discursivity” operations of rooted cosmopolitanism are evident in Beck’s position: “Rooted cosmopolitanism is defined against the two extremes of being at home everywhere and being at home nowhere”; it is to be “engaged in the local and the global at the same time” (Beck 2003, 27). From the perspective of rooted cosmopolitanism, cultural diversity is explained neither from the essentialist, modern framework of the soul of the nation nor from the equally modern framework of the soul of the footloose individual. But, as I have indicated above, this boundary discursivity of hitting the mean and striking the right balance should not be normatively over-ambitious. It does not fulfil by itself the surplus of normativity that the umbrella term of cosmopolitanism carries. This is so because the normativity of cosmopolitanism extends beyond the balancing of the local and the global. For instance, one may advance a worthwhile stance toward local and global cultures, but this does not mean that this stance is automatically ecologically sensitive or non-anthropocentric. Furthermore, cosmopolitanism is as multiply normative as its many faces suggest: when the domain of relevance is international law, one’s feeling as a mixed-up cultural self may prove of too little significance for the solution of a global problem that requires the respect of cosmopolitan right. Likewise, when an issue is more relevant to cosmopolitan affectivity, one’s commitment to legal cosmopolitanism hardly suffices to cover the normative ground that loving the world covers.

This surplus of normativity that escapes the confines of each specific aspect/face of cosmopolitanism and the mere acknowledgement of the cosmopolitan’s roots is implied in the very root of cosmopolitanism whose etymology involves the polis and the citizen. What is often missed “in the original term, ‘cosmopolitan’, is the concept of citizenship. A cosmopolitan is not just someone who feels at home in a globalised world, travels widely, and enjoys the cultural products of a global market. A cosmopolitan is a citizen of the world” (van Hooft and Vandekerckhove
2010, xvi). I would add that this is also somewhat missed in Beck’s discussion of cosmopolitanism’s etymology. Acknowledging one’s roots as hybrid and oneself as a culturally mixed-up self and even having “the global outlook of the many people who participate to a high degree in the possibilities opened up by contemporary globalisation” (van Hooft and Vandekerckhove 2010, xvi) does not entail that one acts as a citizen of the world ethico-politically as well. “This stress on the notion of citizenship implies a commitment and responsibility extended towards all of the peoples of the world, and a readiness to express such a commitment through political action in the context of institutions with a global reach” (ibid). In the next section, where I make my approach more relevant to diversity and heritage, I concretise my critical point that a more accurate description of cosmopolitanism (and its subjects, collectivities, or even disciplines which claim it) as “rooted” does not automatically secure an effortless passage to the normative benefits of cosmopolitanism as ideal and virtue.

(c) The normativisation of rooted cosmopolitanism and the doubled essentialisation of diversity and heritage

Practically transferred to disciplines that study more empirically people and cultures (e.g., synchronically, such as social anthropology or diachronically, such as archaeology), rooted cosmopolitanism makes it possible to perceive the foreign influence in any cultural production that may, at first sight, seem the singular outcome of a specific ethnic past. In this way, rooted cosmopolitanism helps us notice time-honoured practices of cultural interdependence and influence that attest to what could also be illustrated, in my opinion, with the post-humanist notion of *intra-actions*.14

As much as the problem-solving operations of the predicate “rooted”, as indicated in previous sections, may serve a well-meant salvaging politics that rescues cosmopolitanism from some charges and revives its normativity, they have their own problems. Maciel, for instance, sees “the core problem of rooted cosmopolitanism as a moral one: assessing the tension between our global and particular obligations” (2014, 45). He then informatively registers the many moral debates over what rooted cosmopolitanism and rootedness claims entail for partiality and diverse responsibilities. Some other objections (see, e.g., Kymlicka and Walker 2012, 11) to rooted cosmopolitanism relate to the usual ones about whether it negotiates well enough the local and the global and have so far concerned: its intellectual coherence (that is, whether it works well as a coherent theory or is plagued by inconsistencies, gaps, tenuous claims, poorly argued theses, etc., due to its effort to bring together heterogeneous and occasionally opposed, even contradictory, concerns and aims); the extent to which it truly takes into account local attachments or if it is just a disguised old cosmopolitanism paying lip-service to the local; the psychological or political stability of it; and even whether its effort to reconcile things that should remain irreconcilable is, after all, necessary or expendable.

I have, in the previous sections, registered another objection, one related to the *tout court* passage from description to prescription. I will now make this critique
more explicit and specific by reference to the disciplines of social anthropology and archaeology. These fields claim cosmopolitanism as an inherent part of their epistemic identity and province. Philosophically, the ground for this was prepared when the “new cosmopolitanism” trend advanced “rooted cosmopolitanism” as a counterweight to the “old cosmopolitan” preference for a rootless, abstract universality (Hollinger 2001). Let us take the “new cosmopolitan” reliance on the “rooted” as a starting point. “New cosmopolitanism” is a temporal qualification of cosmopolitanism that sets it against old, pre-1990s conceptions of cosmopolitanism. Some such conceptions distinguished between the rootless and the rooted self and normativised (that is, ethically and politically favoured) the former. Against them, new cosmopolitanism usually avoids the un-cosmopolitan effects of this distinction and asserts that all people are rooted. But it does not keep this assertion to a descriptive level. From the perspective of new cosmopolitanism, which valorises our negotiating local and global commitments as something of inherently high moral and political merits, we are not only “cosmopolitans” by being inherently mixed-up selves, that is, shaped by roots and routes and thus by having the opportunity to acknowledge the diachronic and synchronic presence of otherness in our cultures; we are “cosmopolitans” also normatively. Thus, cosmopolitanism becomes an accomplished ideal, an ethico-political badge for whoever or whatever bears the characterisation “cosmopolitan” by comprising roots and routes. Then the passage from the culturally hybrid self to willingness morally and politically to act as a cosmopolitan appears too smooth and unproblematic. This operation is evident, for instance, in many current accounts (e.g., Pnina Werbner’s) of social anthropology as “a comparative cosmopolitan discipline” (Werbner 2008, 13) and also in this specific statement: “Against the slur that cosmopolitans are rootless, with no commitments to place or nation, the new post-1990s cosmopolitanism attempts to theorise the complex ways in which cosmopolitans juggle particular and transcendent loyalties—morally, and inevitably also, politically” (Werbner 2008, 2). We notice that cosmopolitanism becomes an essential feature of the discipline of anthropology, probably by virtue of anthropology’s being comparative and inherently engaged with different cultures and their encounters. Then we notice that “cosmopolitan” juggling of local and non-local loyalties is said to have moral and political qualities—and even inevitably so. Thus, from the cultural cosmopolitanism the moral and political cosmopolitanisms seem automatically and inevitably to derive. The conceptual and epistemic essentialisation of cultural cosmopolitanism and its location squarely within this discipline are followed by a normativisation of it beyond a mere description of what it may mean to investigate cultures and cultural relationships. Let me remind the reader that, as I have argued in previous sections, there is a surplus of cosmopolitan normativity that is not derivative from or reducible to the cultural. This surplus normativity corresponds to faces of cosmopolitanism that are in synergy and tension with the cultural face. My claim will also be illustrated in this section with the example of how an anthropological and archaeological, rooted cosmopolitan account may have very un-cosmopolitan effects (from the prism of a legal and ethico-political cosmopolitanism) when it aspires to deal with a global problem of cosmopolitan justice and when it projects
its culturalist outlooks and methodologies onto domains that require cosmopolitan normativities other than those of cultural acceptance, recognition, rapprochement of cultural groups, etc.

It is not always the case that by juggling roots and routes we reach cosmopolitanism. Our acknowledging that our roots and routes raise for us moral and political issues may offer grounds for a valuable cultural cosmopolitanism. But even this cultural cosmopolitanism does not cover the ground of other cosmopolitanisms (e.g., legal, moral, political) that are necessary if we are to avoid un-cosmopolitan conclusions when we negotiate local and transcendent loyalties (Papastephanou 2021c). When cultural cosmopolitanism becomes normatively over-ambitious and sidesteps its need to synergise with other specifications of cosmopolitanism and ignores its tensions with them, it becomes culturalist. It jumps from the fact that domains/surfaces, such as the legal, ecological, etc., are culturally situated to reducing these domains (and the faces of cosmopolitanism that correspond to them) to the domain of culture (and the cultural face of cosmopolitanism). The “cultural” specifies cosmopolitanism; the “culturalist”¹⁶ that I am using here qualifies rooted cosmopolitanism to point out its risk of becoming normatively too self-confident, over-arching and hegemonic. When culturally rooted cosmopolitanism turns culturalist, it overlooks that cultures, communities, and their juggling of loyalties may be studied in normatively very un-cosmopolitan ways. Such is the case, for example, of the Cyprus issue, an international problem with which social anthropology has engaged extensively and often in a rather un-cosmopolitan fashion.¹⁷ The culturalist perspective on the Cyprus problem that anthropology typically adopts has reduced it to a negotiation between two cultures and has overlooked ethico-political cosmopolitan-right dimensions. These dimensions of international justice concern the illegal invasion of Cyprus by Türkiye in 1974 that led to the death of 5,000 Greek-Cypriots, to over 1,500 going missing, to 200,000 Greek-Cypriots becoming refugees and to the occupation of a third of Cyprus by Türkiye. This occupation continues despite the many UN decrees to Türkiye to withdraw its troops and advance dialogue for the reunification of the island.¹⁸ By drawing attention to these academically neglected dimensions, I do not exculpate the Cypriot people from their share of responsibilities. I am only retrieving the cosmopolitan justice issue and am pointing out that, by obscuring these dimensions of the Cyprus problem, the culturalist approach turns an international problem of invasion and illegal occupation of one-third of Cyprus by Türkiye to a bi-communal issue of ethnic, cultural and even religious identity that would be supposedly easily resolved by rapprochement between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. I have provided the historical and political background of the Cyprus problem that resists the problem’s reduction to a cultural or religious conflict and recuperates its cosmopolitan aspects of international right in previous work (Papastephanou 2005). There is no space here for more details on the facts of the Cyprus conflict that point for point falsify the impression (often enforced also by fields that construed themselves as relying on rooted cosmopolitanism) that the problem is local, ethnic-cultural and reducible to bicommmunal rapprochement. For more details concerning the dangers of culturalist discussions (social anthropological and educational) of the Cyprus issue
going un-cosmopolitan and becoming neo-colonial, see Kalli Drousioti (2022) and Papastephanou (2023).

Culturalist discussions of the Cyprus problem tend to overlook its root in the colonial politics of the conservative British governments in the fifties that denied the Greek-Cypriots, who were the overwhelming majority on the island (80% of the population), the right to self-determination. Instead, they treat the problem as one of local cultures having nationalist aspirations and purist conceptions of themselves. This reductive narrative makes the Cyprus problem a cultural matter of the corresponding communities’ overcoming their “archaic”, un-postmodern attachments to their ethnicities. The Greek-Cypriot struggle for union with Greece is thus judged by some not in political terms as to whether it relied on a claim compatible with cosmopolitan justice but in cultural terms as to what cultural imaginary guided it. To explain: The Greek-Cypriot demand for union with Greece was a fair political claim of applying the democratic and cosmopolitan principles of majority and self-determination. Subject, of course, to respecting fully the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot minority (18% of the population), a precondition that the Greek-Cypriot leadership publicly and repeatedly accepted and the implementation of which could be independently guaranteed and oversighted by the United Nations. On the claim of the application of self-determination in their case too, the Greek-Cypriots had the full support of the British Labour Party and of the progressive intellectuals of the times (e.g., Albert Camus 1955). The conservative British governments that opposed it did so because they wanted to maintain colonial control over Cyprus for their geopolitical and Cold War strategic interests, that is, for very un-cosmopolitan reasons.

Today, as the current culturalist sensibilities render any ethnic attachment suspect from the start, many academics ignore that the Greek-Cypriot claim for union with Greece was in perfect alignment with the cosmopolitan principles of democracy, freedom, self-determination and respect for the rights of all communities. Thus, many contemporary academics uniformly treat the 19th/20th century Hellenic claims in Greece and Cyprus as a problematic reflection of a Western, colonial discourse of Hellenism involving essentialist and exclusive notions of nationalism. Though this was evident in the rhetoric of many Greeks and Greek-Cypriots in the fifties and rendered their rhetoric un-cosmopolitan, and should certainly be problematised, it constitutes no compelling argument for incriminating the democratic and progressive ethnic affect that did not rest on any such nationalist and purist assumptions but relied on the right of the Greek-Cypriots to decide on their future on grounds of a democratic volonté generale in full respect, of course, of the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot community. As Spyros Kyprianou, the then representative of the Greek-Cypriot Ethnarchy in London repeatedly emphasised, the point was not “whether the Cypriots are Greeks, Italians or Chinese”. The point was that “Cypriots want to determine their own future in accordance with the established and internationally recognised principle of self-determination, contained in the United Nations and Atlantic Charters to which Britain is among the first signatories” (Kyprianou 1956). In the years’ hindsight, I would add that Greek-Cypriots should be granted (again, subject to the respect of minority rights of the other
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communities) what all the majority populations around the world were then eligible to or enjoying already, without expecting them to have been postmodern in their conceptions of themselves avant la lettre. True, although many Greek-Cypriots who fought the struggle against the British rule in 1955–1959 may have entertained modern metaphysical imaginaries of the “soul of the nation” kind, this should not tarnish the political claim of the struggle because that claim, just as all political claims, should not stand or fall on what ideology was popular at a given time. It should be judged on grounds of what arguments are there for and against it. Judging the claim by the imaginary that may have accompanied it has un-cosmopolitan effects. Because this may seem odd, let me justify it with this example. Black leaders (such as Nat Turner) of slave rebellions in the United States had promoted their claims to freedom, equality and justice through an apocalyptic imaginary of the Day of Judgment and other metaphysical, millennial conceptions of humanity in the eyes of God as well as prophesising visions of insurgency (Brodhead 2002). Does the fact that their imaginary was metaphysical, culturally problematic from a contemporary postmodern perspective and Western-centric render their claim to equality wrong? In this example, it is quite easy for a contemporary thinker to perceive the un-cosmopolitan, even racist effects of such a rationale and to accept that a claim must be judged politically (concerning what ethico-political argument justifies it), and not culturally (concerning what rhetoric or imaginary may explain a proponent’s attachment to it). In the case of Cyprus, too, problematising essentialist rhetoric or imaginaries (e.g., anthropologically and archaeologically) should not lead to conclusions that condone or reproduce and consolidate the colonial British, oppressive discourse and the un-cosmopolitan incrimination of any claim to political cosmopolitan principles of freedom, self-determination and democratic decision-making concerning a place’s future. Nor should it lead to reducing a political problem of international right (that began with the colonial suppressive denial of a people’s rights and ended up in illegal invasion and occupation) to a cultural problem of whether the two communities are well-versed or not in the current global “cosmopolitan” rhetoric.

Surely there is ample space vis-à-vis the Cyprus problem for the cultural cosmopolitanism that could be promoted by means of rapprochement. But this should not obscure aspects of the Cyprus problem that touch upon global justice and involve legal, moral and political cosmopolitanism and related measures for resolution. This is precisely what much social anthropology applied to this issue overlooks, single-focused as it is on culturalist negotiations of rootedness. It sometimes hopes to deliver normative cosmopolitan goods such as conflict resolution with facile, shallow solutions such as a mere change of school textbooks to make them talk in a more kind and politically correct manner about the historical entanglement of the two communities. Or, many anthropologists rely on very partial historical accounts of the Cyprus issue that promote half-truths, one-sided narratives and neo-colonial Eurocentric interpretations of the international power politics beneath the Cyprus problem and its roots in British colonialism. For instance, anthropologists such as Rebecca Bryant and Yannis Papadakis downplay the injustice of the invasion, the ongoing illegal occupation of one-third of Cyprus and the related effects. Their
suggestions for conflict resolution are silent about this injustice and the violation of Greek-Cypriot human rights (Papastephanou 2013b; Drousioti 2022). In fact, Drousioti investigates one such typical social anthropological venture, that of Papadakis, and convincingly shows how his approach to the Cyprus problem and to ethnic otherness has, deep down, not only un-cosmopolitan but even racist implications (Drousioti 2022). The overall point is that we can find many examples of social anthropology not being cosmopolitan per se (that is, cosmopolitan just by virtue of its comparative character and its focus on negotiating rootedness). Its cultural perspective, which may turn, in practice, into a culturalist one, does not suffice to deliver the normative goods that an all-round cosmopolitanism that takes into account ethical/moral, legal, and political sensibilities could deliver.

Let me now move to another discipline, archaeology. From the cultural perspective of this collection of essays and its focus on archaeology, rooted cosmopolitanism means that creative processes usually attributed to a singular, situated and isolated collectivity, in fact, owe much to recently acknowledged or unearthed supra-collective influences and connections. Thus, cultural diversity and heritage are not static but mobile and changing, and, more importantly, “inherently shaped by global connections” (as stated in the Introduction to this volume). From this it is extrapolated that “all the objects, assemblages, monuments and sites we excavate, document and preserve are inherently cosmopolitan in nature” (idem). What does this “being inherently cosmopolitan in nature” mean? As Versluys and Lilley assert, it means that cosmopolitan is what moves beyond the essentialism of cultural diversity. But here an unnoticed contradiction is that if all past cultural material is cosmopolitan “inherently” and “in nature”, then we have not moved beyond essentialism at all. We have merely added to cultural diversity and heritage one additional essential quality, that of being cosmopolitan. But if essentialism is problematic because, as postmodernism has taught us, meanings are constructions rather than essences, then assuming, even multiplying, inherent qualities (essences) in things may also be problematic and contradictory. It may even have political counter-effects because it takes for granted that the normative desirability and qualities that we associate with cosmopolitanism are inherently given in the field and its researchers. The corresponding identity is not only essentially rooted but also essentially cosmopolitan. That our spatio-temporality and relationality as beings make the metaphors of rootedness and hybridity appropriate aptly to describe our ontological status does not amount to essentialising the normative goods of these features of human existence (recall again my objection to Werbner’s position about being rooted amounting to being committed to one’s “place or nation” and about being cosmopolitan as entailing that one is juggling “particular and transcendent loyalties—morally, and inevitably also, politically”). Even if the essentialist cosmopolitanism, by being played off against the essentialised rootedness, could secure that the interplay of the local and the global as inherent in cultures is not only harmless but also politically convenient, the question about whether this enhanced essentialism is indeed true remains open. Cultures being always shaped by cross-cultural encounters and influences does not automatically mean that they are cosmopolitan, and inherently so. It does mean this only if “cosmopolitan” is
identical to “hybrid” or “multi-cultural” or, in more post-humanist parlance, “intra-
active”. However, the latter concepts are primarily descriptive and thus more fitting
to account for the cross-cultural shaping of creative processes.21 Unlike them, as
I have already shown in previous sections, cosmopolitanism typically carries along
normative, even ethico-political connotations, and this is in my view, precisely
what has made it so popular in so many discourses and fields. Therefore, the ques-
tion is whether the descriptive argument about cross-cultural influence and interde-
pendence carries the normative weight that is usually attached to cosmopolitanism.
Do foreign influences exerted upon a culture suffice to render it cosmopolitan, and
in what sense? What cosmopolitanism is this? Is it just cosmopolitanism or, rather,
a specific kind of cosmopolitanism? Is it generally a rooted cosmopolitanism, a
cultural cosmopolitanism, or a culturalist version of rooted cosmopolitanism?

My answer is that foreign influences are not by themselves, just because they are
foreign, necessarily cosmopolitan (e.g., one influence may be narrowing, unimagi-
native or even destructive of something valuable, or it may stem from a blatantly
un-cosmopolitan act such as a conquest). Nor does the hospitable assimilation of
foreign influence attest to cosmopolitan appreciation of the cultural loan as such
(e.g., it could be just an act of expedience on the part of the hosting culture). Ident-
ifying foreign influences and delivering them to the collective memory of the host
culture and outside of it (things for which archaeology should certainly take credit)
may have the cultural cosmopolitan effects of combating monoculturalist purism
or racialised essentialisation of cultural production. But this specific kind of rooted
cultural cosmopolitanism does not fulfil the political, legal, moral, etc., tasks of
cosmopolitanism that a normative umbrella term of cosmopolitanism involves; for
such a normativity depends on how the monuments, artefacts, etc., become inter-
preted and to what purposes they are submitted. I am not saying that archaeology
or anthropology are not capable of engaging with other faces of cosmopolitanism
(legal, ethico-political, etc.). I am saying that they should not take for granted that
they “inevitably” do so (or that they engage with other faces of cosmopolitan-
ism appropriately) just because they engage with the intricacies of cultures, cross-
cultural encounters and heritage and what they see as the related political and
moral significance. When these fields address, as they often do, issues of equality,
colonialism, freedom, etc. (the Cyprus issue is a case in point), they face the risk
of projecting their cultural sensibilities and explanatory tools onto challenges that,
to be met, require the active synergy of the other faces of cosmopolitanism and
justice (and their own criteria, tools, principles and interpretive material). Based
on archaeology’s epistemic identity and related province, its faring well on cultural
cosmopolitanism does not automatically guarantee that it truly or inevitably works
for an ethico-political cosmopolitanism. Hence, at best, archaeology promotes a
cultural cosmopolitanism that is valuable as such, yet not adequate to meet the sur-
plus of cosmopolitan normativity that I have theorised in a previous section. When
archaeology exaggerates the normative import of its identifying roots and routes, it
advances a culturalist cosmopolitanism that may have un-cosmopolitan effects or
may obscure its tensions with faces of cosmopolitanism other than the cultural. At
worst, archaeology may not promote cosmopolitanism at all. Whether it does so is
something that requires a complex examination of how its operations meet (if they
do) the truly high demands of a more stereoscopic cosmopolitanism comprising not
only cultural but also other cosmopolitan specifications (faces and surfaces) that
demarcate corresponding normative tasks. I illustrate this with another example
from Cyprus.

Early 20th-century archaeology in Cyprus developed while the island was a
British colony. Its unearthing of the Hellenic past of the place confirmed the claims
of Greek-Cypriots (80% of the population of the island) to their Greek ethnic iden-
tity and heritage, made them rejoice in it and use it argumentatively to demand
their freedom from colonial rule and their right to join Greece through their exer-
cise of the international-right and democratic principle of self-determination.
Greek-Cypriot intellectuals did not deny the foreign influences on Greek culture
throughout the ages but emphasised the continuity and very strong presence of
Greek culture on the island as it was manifested in language, practices, art, monu-
ments, etc. The British colonial rule reacted to this politicisation of archaeology by
moves and tactics that could now appear in line with the contemporary culturalist
rooted cosmopolitan assumption that, against national claims, cultures are diverse
and rich in foreign influences. Their moves and tactics also seem to chime with the
idea that cultural diversity and heritage are not static but mobile and changing, and,
more importantly, “inherently shaped by global connections” (see above). And,
yet, they were utterly un-cosmopolitan precisely because, as the British archaeolo-
gist Michael Given (1998) has shown, they led archaeology to false data and also
to serve purely ideological purposes of imperialism. In other words, the issue is
not that the idea of rooted cosmopolitanism might be abused; the issue is that, as
such, this idea, despite its merits, cannot fulfil the normative expectations that its
proponents have without a stereoscopic reconceptualisation of cosmopolitanism as
a multi-faceted normative concept that holds in critical check the operations and
purposes that rooted and cultural cosmopolitanism may serve.

This is how British colonialism recruited archaeology in diverse ways to
secure its imperial control over the island. Initially,22 British rulers attributed a
purist, static identity to the Greek-Cypriots and reserved the dynamic and mobile
sense of identity for themselves: “By parading ancient ‘survivals’ in modern
society—ox-ploughs, threshing sledges, oil jars—archaeology” proved “that the
colonised people have not changed since antiquity, thereby denying them all dyna-
mism and cultural vibrancy, and hence justifying imperial rule” (Given 1998, 6) for
“developing” and modernising them. By contrast, Western societies were presented
as “dynamic, constantly spreading their influence and developing new technolo-
gies”, as shown by the industrialised status of Britain. Unlike them, “‘oriental’ or
‘native’ societies” were presented as “static, primitive and lack[ing] initiative and
inventiveness” (idem.). Corroborating my claim that neither recognising the roots
of others nor recognising oneself as multi-cultural, mobile, and pliable is, as such,
a cosmopolitan thing, there is evidence that the British at first fully acknowledged
the rootedness of Greek-Cypriots in Greek culture, while the British “often found
it appropriate to describe themselves as hybrids, particularly to demonstrate their
flexibility in different situations (including their varying colonies)” (ibid, 7) and thus to “corroborate” their own supposed superiority.

At any rate, the identity of the Greek-Cypriots was still “not in doubt: classical poets and historians talked about the Greeks of Cyprus in the fifth century BC, and archaeology continued to uncover the remains of the island’s classical and Hellenic past” (Given 1998, 3). From the last decades of the 19th century, the Greek-Cypriots based much of their irredentism and anti-colonial demands on their Greek ethnic identity and, later, well into the 20th century, on the political right to self-determination that they possessed as a territorial ethnic majority, just as any other subaltern population in the world. However, the British were not ready to relinquish their imperial control over Cyprus. The old British Orientalist justification of rule over primitive Orientals for their own good was too weak by the 1920s and something more was needed. For British colonials, “the attempted solution to this crisis was the creation of a new Cypriot identity, something that was neither Greek nor Turkish nor Phoenician nor Anatolian, and yet more than a mixture of them all” (4). Archaeological resort to the constructed notion of ancient Eteocypriots, as we will see below, became the handy solution to the British colonial predicament of having to face Greek-Cypriot irredentism. The invention of the Eteocypriots supported the British agenda of questioning the Greekness of the Greek-Cypriots and denying them the application of the self-determination principle which would lead Cyprus to union with Greece and take Cyprus out of the British Commonwealth colonial status.

As Given succinctly puts it, “for a few years there was a determined, but clearly pointless, attempt on the part of imperialist ideologues to pass off the Cypriots as a mélange of different races, neither wholly Eastern nor wholly Western, but an amorphous blend of the two without any original or essential character” (13). The British imperial “need to manipulate the ethnic identity of the Cypriots” (13) then followed a tactic of a more “drastic dehellenization of history” (14) and archaeology, a kind of deracination of the Greek-Cypriots, a denial of their Greek roots and an ultra-hybridisation of them. In one letter in 1929, the British governor of the island, Storrs, “advised that British newspapers should be prevented from disclosing the Swedish Cyprus [archaeological] Expedition’s recent discovery of Hellenic antiquities in Larnaca” (15). Aware, however, that even this was not enough, he resorted to an effort to construct a different ethnic identity for the population of Cyprus, and thus, engaged archaeologists “sympathetic to the [British] cause” . . . who “invented a new ethnic group: the ‘Eteocypriots’”. Thus, ultimately, ancient Cyprus was not “denationalised by Storrs”; he did not make it “a cultural vacuum fit only for foreign occupation” but “combined the mélange theory with the new authenticity” (15) of the Eteocypriot archaeological construction. Given uses ample archaeological evidence to prove the idea of the Eteocypriots a 20th-century myth (24). Against Cyprus being Hellenic and assimilating a variety of other influences, as the Greek-Cypriots maintained, the British imperial control adopted a more convenient narrative of Cyprus being a true amalgam declared specifically Cypriot where anything Hellenic was purposely minimised. Colonialism aimed
to maintain its control over the island by using the archaeological construction of ‘Eteocypriot’ as a new cultural identity for the subaltern population, one suitable to colonial, un-cosmopolitan purposes. “The correct term for Storrs’s reinterpretation of the cultural and ethnic identity of the Cypriots is undoubtedly ‘manipulation’; it was explicit, deliberate, and directed toward the maintenance of British imperial rule in Cyprus” (16).23

What we realise from the example of how, in the 1930s, the British colonial rulers of Cyprus exploited the richness of the ancient history of the island and the foreign influences on its Greek culture for politically suppressing the Greek-Cypriot anti-colonial movement is that archaeological cultural rooted cosmopolitanism is not inherently moral or ethico-political and thus is not fully normative per se. At first sight, showing the foreign influence on a cultural heritage seems to be a perfectly cosmopolitan move. But to judge its cosmopolitan quality or not, one needs to examine what political purposes it serves. There is something amiss in thinking that emphasising a hybrid rootedness and making visible some foreign influences in heritage is, as such, a cosmopolitan move, regardless of how all this is interpreted and politicised and to what (un)ethical purposes it is submitted. The rushed prescriptivism that we notice in the current popularity of rooted cosmopolitanism raises, for archaeology, issues not only of epistemic instrumentalism but also of overlooking its complicities and hegemonising its own possibilities for advancing cosmopolitanism. To help people overcome fantasies of cultural purity and chauvinist utilisations of them may indeed have the cosmopolitan benefits that current culturalism celebrates. But this should lead neither to an instrumentalism that submits epistemic goals to ideological purposes (even if such purposes may otherwise be positive) nor to a culturalist cosmopolitanism that has, in becoming rooted in some fields, transferred to them the deeply rooted, modern fantasies of its own theorists, that is, their believing that they lead the backward, cumbersome and fanatic others to overcome their archaism and endorse a superior moral and political stance that is supposedly inherent in their field and in their own research. Disciplines such as anthropology and archaeology valuably focus on cultures and the interplay of the local and the transcendent. However, discovering that people should examine what their rootedness means for cosmopolitanism does not lead automatically to theories or disciplines overcoming firmly rooted ideologies. Nor does it secure that any such overcoming, if it were possible at all, would be sufficient proof of inherent, let alone normative, cosmopolitanism. The specialisation of anthropology and archaeology on culture brings them closer to a cultural cosmopolitanism, which, to deserve the name and to avoid becoming culturalist, requires critical tensions and synergies with other specifications of cosmopolitanism.

**Conclusion**

I hope to have shown that exploring adjectival/attributive operations helps us notice what gets bypassed when the theoretical focus is, directly, either on the concept of rooted cosmopolitanism or on its history. To this end, I have indicated how the “cultural” and the “rooted” are predicates that operate differently when attached to
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Cosmopolitanism—the former to specify and the latter to qualify it. Predicated as rooted, cultural cosmopolitanism becomes friendlier to local claims of cultural justice and better suited to dealing with concerns about diversity and heritage. On its part, cosmopolitan theory infuses descriptions of cultural rootedness with rich sensibilities concerning its involving intra-actions and cross-cultural influences. Thus, it is not only the case that elements of cultural heritage are cosmopolitan, but also the other way around: no cultural cosmopolitanism is rootless; it is always situated and created by people of multiple identities. Importantly, social anthropology and archaeology contribute to a cultural cosmopolitanism that affirms the need to avoid extremes, to operate within a boundary discourse such as Beck’s *Sowohl-als-auch* thinking, that is, “this and that as well”. From such a perspective, cosmopolitanism is seen as “an ancient ‘hybrid’ . . . concept . . . of non-exclusive oppositions” (Beck 2003, 16–17).

From its very roots, cosmopolitanism speaks against the modern caricature of the deracinated parasite. But, for the richer normativity that is sometimes claimed by various disciplines, and is more generally recognised as part and parcel of cosmopolitanism, much more is needed. Risks to be avoided are the enhanced essentialisation and normativisation as cosmopolitan of affirmations that cultural diversity and heritage reflect, simultaneously, roots and routes; and the unsubstantiated claims that follow from such a hasty passage from the descriptive to the prescriptive plane and turn cultural cosmopolitanism into a culturalist master discourse.

The hasty passage from the descriptive sense of roots to normativising and valorising the effects of our awareness of them on our politics may be proof of how firmly rooted current theory still is in the modernist tenets of cosmopolitanism. For, modern(ist) thought often favoured the One over the Many and tended to single out one perspective and invest it with all value while, at best, overlooking, at worst, tarnishing, all “rival” or kindred perspectives and their interconnection. As a difficult and complex heir of modernity, (post-)modern(ist) theory also slides into master discourses that privilege the One over the Many, hegemonise one face of a concept over its many other faces, and preserve tacit assumptions that only or mainly people and collectivities, rather than concepts, are interconnected. It misses, then, the possibility that some concepts may require an exploration, precisely, of how these concepts may obtain their strongest normative force when their many faces are interconnected in mutually corrective and directive tension. Against the time-honoured privilege of perspectival optics on such concepts, I have supplemented perspective with the stereoscopic optics that may increase the visibility not only of the interconnectivity of people across the globe but also of the various faces of cosmopolitanism. Simultaneous visibility of them in their complex relationship may assist rooted cosmopolitanism in fulfilling the qualifying role expected from it.

As I have maintained, culturalist rooted cosmopolitanism cannot deliver directly the normative goods that theory now expects from it or tout court attributes to it, and cannot cover the full scope of normative cosmopolitanism. “Cosmopolitanism is attractive as a normative orientation, but the historical record of actual cosmopolitanisms . . . is not encouraging” (Ingram 2016, 66). This reminds us again that speaking in a cosmopolitan idiom does not amount to acting in a truly cosmopolitan
manner. Instead of cosmopolitanism being declared an essential, inherent property of one’s negotiating the local and the global, and thus an accomplished ideal or a given property of a person, a collectivity or a discipline, cosmopolitanism is proven in action. It is not secured from the start. I have argued that negotiating the local and the global is not per se a cosmopolitan act prior to knowing the intentions and effects of this negotiation. To be cosmopolitan, or to approximate cosmopolitanism, in the full normative sense that is often given to the term by its adherents, this negotiation must ultimately promote a stereoscopic sense of justice (Papastephanou 2021a, 2021b) rather than either the local or the global. And this cannot occur within the exclusive purview of cultural(ist) rooted cosmopolitanism. I have argued that it requires the interconnectivity of cultural cosmopolitanism with other faces of cosmopolitanism, depending on the negotiated issue. If this cultural issue of negotiating the local and the global has implications for poverty or financial inequality, the face of cosmopolitanism that is relevant is the economic, and on grounds of global rather than social justice for that matter. If environmental justice is another parameter in a specific context, the considerations that must be juggled are also of a non-anthropocentric, ecological cosmopolitanism. Specifications of cosmopolitanism through predicates such as “legal”, “international”, “cultural”, etc., should be acknowledged as interconnected and in need of one another. For maximal normative effects, to avoid normative deficits of single-focused perspectives, to consider rootedness critically and to go beyond a drastic choice of “from below” or “from the top-down”, a more fully-fledged, stereoscopic optics is required, one that radicalises Beck’s “this and that as well” by making all specifications of cosmopolitanism more visible in their synergies and tensions.

Notes

1 Even the allegiance to one’s scientific field and community may reflect this problem and concomitant deficit of democratic and cosmopolitan sensibilities.

2 The cultural conception of cosmopolitanism is that which emphasises the cultural perspective, focuses on cultures and considers cosmopolitanism from the prism of how diverse cultures shape or enrich the life of subjects and collectivities. What can be seen as a “cultural(ist) conception of cosmopolitanism” is the kind of understanding of cultural cosmopolitanism that hegemonises it over other faces of cosmopolitanism (e.g., political, ethical, ecological, etc.) and tends to reduce (or subordinate) all such faces to the cultural.

3 D. A. Hollinger’s (2001) article on cosmopolitanism also refers to adjectives such as ‘critical’ and ‘new’ holding cosmopolitanism in check. However, I have developed (Papastephanou 2021b) the explorations of these operations differently from Hollinger.

4 For instance, a predicate may single out a specific subject, e.g., the “rooted cosmopolitan” as a better incarnation of embodied cosmopolitanism rather than, say, the “cosmopolitan celebrity”. Notice here how the term “cosmopolitan” acquires a different political significance in its different role as a noun or an adjective. On the “cosmopolitan celebrity”, see Tim Brennan (1989).

5 Does this “inescapably” efface any possibility of being rootless? Or is it possible, paradoxically, for one to be simultaneously rooted and rootless? Rooted cosmopolitanism relies precisely on this possibility. To engage with the issue of the interplay of rootedness and rootlessness another paper is needed, one that would focus on the operations of root-less. But this is beyond the confines of this Chapter.
Situatedness is inescapable in the sense that we cannot lift off all our paradigmatic certainties at once. The minimal essentialism that human spatiotemporality involves is that of a being which has an unavoidably limited lifespan and an unavoidably specific presence at a given space and time, even if it were possible for a human being to be on an aeroplane on a daily basis throughout her entire life.

We are situated as if we have roots, even if we do not choose to use this metaphor to describe our situatedness.

“In this sense, cosmopolitanism has been aptly described by Craig Calhoun as the ‘class consciousness of the frequent flier’” (Kymlicka and Walker 2012, 3). This could be paraphrased as rooted cosmopolitanism now being the updated class consciousness of the academics who know what endangers their public image and how to speak in a politically correct way, regardless of how or whether they practice cosmopolitanism or not.

For these roots, see www.oakton.edu/user/3/gherrera/Greek%20and%20Latin%20Roots%20in%20English/greek_and_latin_roots.pdf

An animal or plant that lives on or in another animal or plant of a different type and feeds from it. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/parasite

For Waldron’s reaction to charges of cosmopolitans with parasitism, see Waldron (2010).

Elsewhere (Papastephanou 2013a), I argue that phrases such as “we cosmopolitans”, which point to a collective subject meriting the “badge” of cosmopolitanism, are rather un-cosmopolitan because of their deep, exclusivist grounds and, more because they take cosmopolitanism to be a task accomplished by some people.

This possibility is opened up by Karen Barad’s (2007) use of intra-action as a better term than “interaction” to convey a sense of agency as the product of dynamic forces that are not reducible to already consolidated entities that supposedly come later, after their being already constituted, to interact with one another. But, the advantages and disadvantages of this for cosmopolitanism are a complex matter that requires at least article-length engagement to be argued out; hence, I leave it aside and only mention it as a loose end of the present chapter.

Here is Pnina Werbner: “Elite cosmopolitan literary intellectuals are not the only cos-
mopolitans in a globalising world. Along with the view that postcolonial elites are necessarily rootless and corrupt, a second false assumption the new anthropological cosmopolitanism rejects is the idea that cosmopolitanism is only and singularly elitist. Cosmopolitanism can equally be working class” (Werbner 2008, 12).

I find it appropriate to add to “cultural” the by now rather pejorative “–ist” ending because of the latter’s modernist connotations of something aspiring to be a system, an all-encompassing thing that tailors reality to its theoretical purview. I am not incriminating the “–ist” or “–ism” per se; after all, I am using it for cosmopolitanism and other umbrella notions. I am only differentiating its use and connotations according to appropriateness in context. A full justification of such distinctions and operations is well beyond the limits of this chapter.

I am not using this example out of self-indulgence but only because of my familiarity with it.

Hence, considerations of legal cosmopolitanism are utterly relevant when there is illegal invasion and occupation of a significant part of a state’s land, and this is totally obscured or sidestepped when culturalist cosmopolitanism becomes the hegemonic perspective from which to tackle the Cyprus issue.

As another example, consider one of Rebecca Bryant’s social-anthropological works on the Cyprus problem that I have critically discussed (Papastephanou 2013b) and detected in it very un-cosmopolitan conclusions and reductive analyses of the problem.
The assertion is: “Rooted Cosmopolitanism emanates from local settings and practices (it is rooted) while at the same time, it moves beyond the essentialism of cultural diversity (it is cosmopolitan”).

I say “primarily descriptive” because these concepts also get normativised occasionally, but their more explicit role in a discourse is usually the descriptive.

The Ottoman Empire leased Cyprus to Britain in 1878 in a contractual, expedient manner in which the local majority had no say at all. It is no exaggeration to say that the island and the people on it were purchased from the Ottoman Empire by Britain.

Interestingly, as Given (1998) notes, Storrs retracted all this after he retired and expressed his view that Greek-Cypriots were Greek in culture, language, history, etc.

To such ends an eccentric cosmopolitanism (2013a) might also be needed, one that is concerned with self-reflective operations regarding one’s relationship to one’s time or one’s discipline; and also with reflection on the positioning of self in metaphors of cosmopolitanism (e.g. concentric versus eccentric cosmopolitanism). But this is beyond the scope of this chapter.

I say “to approximate” because ideals and virtues always seem to be marked by a remainder, a dissatisfaction and a deficit that points to an inconclusiveness, a need to try again and a vigilance for how human finitude makes all efforts incomplete.

Bibliography


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3 Collaborative archaeology as rooted cosmopolitanism?

*Alexander Geurds*

**Introduction**

This book considers the question of whether the concept of rooted cosmopolitanism can map a way forward to the unhelpful opposition between the forces of globalisation and local identity formation and preservation. What might make this dichotomy unhelpful? Several authors answer this by highlighting the purifying tendencies that tend to mark definitions of national heritage (Lilley and Versluys; Kristensen; Tevdovski; Kruijer and Versluys; Berger, this volume). Specifically, national and multinational framing of (archaeological) heritage is known for its rigid specification of what is valued in the material past and who gets to decide about this question. At its core, this is a regulatory outlook on the valuation of heritage. As a possible alternative set out by the editors of this volume, the notion of rooted cosmopolitanism instead aspires to stress the continuous flux and flow of identity valorisation and the causal impossibility of detecting essential features in cultural form. This understanding, building on the conceptual work by the philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006), offers a vantage point of openness and opportunity, and alongside this conceptual framing, there is also room to connect with the moral argument of emancipatory commitment and assist others through archaeological work (Meskell 2009, 6–10). Exploring the theoretical postulate of the *inherrently* globalised character of material heritage invites the question of what this recognition of the global past in the local present leads to.

Rooted cosmopolitanism is also defined as an *active* force. This force becomes visible through the seemingly continuously developing mix between locality (understood as knowledge, tradition, and learning) and globality (understood as encounter, acceptance, and innovation). What is local and global is difficult to discern, Versluys and Lilley argue, given that both originate *somewhere* locally, and both tend to start playing a part in non-local dynamics as well. When one does manage to tease local and non-local/global apart, it is fundamentally only because of a problematic exercise in classification and labelling–practices that themselves are now thoroughly at the heart of the postcolonial critique. What rooted cosmopolitanism then appears to conclude is a recognition of the relative nature of both global and local views on heritage.
I am ambivalent about looking for a solution to the persistent global-local paradox by arguing that most everything has always been global. This assertion is as probable as it is difficult to demonstrate. Building from the opening proposed by the editors, I suggest here to instead accept this ‘essential globality’ as a moot point, and to see the notion of rooted cosmopolitanism as an invitation to explore the relations between Global and Local, as we continue to define them in the contemporary. A focus on this relational aspect forces critical considerations of the social stresses experienced by those who live in the Local where archaeology ventures for heritage concerns, mostly contracted through nation-state or commercial interests.

*Positionality* is a key variable in understanding essentialising identity strategies and such strategies are actively resorted to out of positions of various forms of stress on life conditions. Those stressors include economic variables such as poverty; political forces, such as the level at which one can affect change; and social stressors, such as the ability to determine one’s own identity. Those realities are all around us, including in the local settings of research. If research practice is minimally about the recognition of such realities and potentially also about contributing to changing such conditions, then we need to be cautious not to flatten the debate, by side-lining the human agency in efforts to strategically mobilise heritage in various ways.

As archaeology increasingly intersects with more disciplines and fields of interest, attesting to an epistemic openness and a commitment to the contemporary is timely and even more pressing. From this vantage point, I will discuss the parallels between the proposal of rooted cosmopolitanism and collaborative archaeology, presenting it as a form of critical engagement that is in line with experiencing rooted cosmopolitanism in practice (Delanty 2012). I then briefly explore and describe two contexts, one from the apparent innocence of the academic halls of the West and one from the apparent locality of the Central American nation-state of Nicaragua. Both show the relational friction and claims to authority about knowledge production. These sketches will show that seeing globalisation as merely the path to cultural mixture and ensuing hybridity underestimates the intentions of those who are looking to strategically mobilise identity in uneven power relations (Kraidy 2006), and that any discussion of the opposition between Global and Local is situationally and temporally bounded.

**Collaborative archaeology**

The rooted cosmopolitanism concept underlines that all understandings of heritage and identity are situated in space and time. Consequently, what counts as authentic becomes a function of time and place. If this is followed through, there is a call for archaeology to know about such anchors, to study the histories of the nation-state and the defined priorities therein, as well as to immerse oneself in the social and political networks of the local context that is under archaeological focus. It forces a consideration of sequence and an awareness of historicity to understand why heritage is valued locally in certain ways in the contemporary context of our
archaeological praxis. These historical trajectories can also help with mapping how particular understandings and valorisations of the past come about.

Such local-level mapping in archaeology is a multi-scalar process involving local actors, national organisations, and developments at the global level. To connect with and understand local views and identity dynamics, knowing the historical background to local heritage valorisation is a key methodological step. By engaging with those who live around and with archaeological landscapes, archaeology can begin to understand how collaborative dialogues come about, and through such insights increase the odds of developing a more fully co-constituted local archaeological practice (Geurds 2007).

This diagnostic mapping of local conditions is also central to the definition of an engaged, reflexive archaeological praxis, as set out in the currently burgeoning literature on collaboration in contemporary archaeology (Colwell-Chanthaphonh and Ferguson 2008; Supernant et al. 2020). Histories of archaeology in individual nation-state contexts such as Australia, the United States, and Canada or Ecuador (Benavides 2004; McNiven and Russell 2005) and, most recently, Greece and Israel (Greenberg and Hamilakis 2022) critically sketch the historical trajectories of progressivist nationalist narratives and therein the strategic othering of indigenous peoples, what Alison Wylie identifies as ‘epistemic disunity’ (Wylie 1995).

Such investigations into the roots of archaeology in individual nation-states is now indeed a common occurrence but the vantage point of regions or individual localities can also be chosen. Scoping in and out when engaging with an archaeological site, landscape, or collection can help disentangle the complexity of the contemporary context under study and, as earlier studies have forcefully argued, reveal the colonial structures that determine or even introduce the ways archaeological heritage is defined and interpreted at the national and local level across most parts of the world today (Díaz-Andreu 2007; Gosden 2004; Kohl 1998; Trigger 1984).

Mirroring rooted cosmopolitanism, the process of continuous becoming is also a central characteristic of collaborative archaeological endeavours. Since the turn of the millennium, archaeological studies from across the world have demonstrated how such collaborative work takes shape and varies radically from case to case, with some projects achieving deep and long-lasting co-creative dynamics, others almost no productive resonance, and a sizeable gradient of studies between the two extremes (e.g., Colwell-Chanthaphonh and Ferguson 2008; Hodder 2003; Kerber 2006; Lilley and Williams 2005; Marshall 2002; Wylie 2019). While most studies focus on methodologically illustrating cases of collaboration in archaeology, many of which are in local contexts of indigenous communities that are faced with the ruins of capitalism (Tsing 2005), there is a separate argument to explore the epistemic links to an understanding of rooted cosmopolitanism. I argue that this situates rooted cosmopolitanism as a conceptual and moral framework to collaborative archaeology by the view that the process of becoming is the central defining feature, rather than a predefined outcome or eventual appearance of the said process, and the aspirations—central to philosophies of cosmopolitanism—that academic practice should strive for positive change (see essays in Breckenridge et al. 2002; Meskell 2009).
The comparability extends further, as early forms of collaborative archaeology still sought to first identify and then couple certain fixed aims or bodies of knowledge, for example, ideas and goals harboured by the archaeologist or heritage official, as opposed to those of local members of communities (Dongoske et al. 2000). The contrast here is that current collaborative practice aims at first learning about a context that may present the opportunity or wish of working together, and only then have a process initiate that is anything but determined in its outcome, instead aiming to achieve result through the merging of different bodies of knowledge. Sonya Atalay, at the forefront of such current dialogues, refers to this form of research process as ‘braiding’ (Atalay 2019). It is such epistemic enmeshing that can be identified as a form of cosmopolitanism that develops outside of national or international geopolitical cores. What this shows is that in contemporary discussions on collaborative archaeology, the partitioning of what might be Local or Global is not the aim, rather, what matters in research practice is the productive merging of knowledge. Such merging is ultimately in service of moving forward with forms of societal stress and identifying emergent potentialities to improve lives (see also Appiah’s ideas on the potential of dialogue).

This emergence of the enfolding of knowledge around archaeological materials and concerns (e.g., objects, landscapes, heritage) through engagement with local communities is productive yet certainly not always smooth. It’s insufficient to describe this constant creative becoming as if it were a natural phenomenon, say as steam emanating from a geyser that is driven on by some unknown force. Rather, heritage discourses take shape in relation to surrounding social worlds and specifically the earlier mentioned life conditions and power structures, to preserve the interests of some over others. Historically, the culture concept is a central point of debate in globalisation discussions, being either a force of emancipation or not agentic at all (cf. Kuper 1999). Being the instantiation of observations in humanities and—later on—social sciences, Culture has a history of being invoked when discussing the relative difference between ‘cultures’. This perspective also infused early globalisation studies, leading to semantic discussions about cultural integrity and cultural threat. Here, we also find fertile ground for heritage-oriented archaeological views, prominently including those of the UNESCO World Heritage List, revolving around degrees of authenticity and representativeness (Geurds 2013). Instead, for a renewed interest in taking rooted cosmopolitanism as a referent in archaeological heritage, what is needed is to recognise the historicity of the modern colonial project and frame ways forward that are open, critical, and partial.

Ethics does not feature centrally in the framing for this volume, and the volume editors are right to consider it in this context, following Appiah’s The Ethics of Identity (2010). The proposal on ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ appears to move toward understanding how our work facilitates our ability to act and define goals and how we might foster diversity of thinking in that process. I would argue this connects well to how ethics is present in our thinking and, importantly, how ethics is social, that is, concluded upon and shared with a group of people, quite possibly in the context of collaborative archaeology.
Local routes to the global university?

Archaeologies that emphasise ethical aspects of research practice are now widespread but find their origin largely in what was once known as the ‘non-West’ and settler colonies like Australia, the United States and Canada. The second half of the 20th century increasingly saw scholarship from the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and the wider Asian world point out the problematic relations between the nation-state and archaeological knowledge production. Standing on the shoulders of this work, we find ourselves today, leaving disarticulated the persistent images of Henri Rousseau-like romanticism about the far-away Local.

For most of their time of existence, archaeology departments across Europe and North America were hardly bulwarks of ethical concern. Personal memories from the 1990s and early 2000s may serve as a guideline into this discussion. I vividly remember the obvious ideological, epistemic, and ethical tensions between research staff at my academic institution and the commitment to tie in reflections on contemporary life conditions in parts of Middle and South America. Such a commitment was central to the research goals co-developed between my former PhD supervisor and his research and life partner, whose life background is that they was born and raised in an indigenous community in Mexico. These contrasts are hard to capture in writing as they most often took the form of fleeting comments or indirect gestures of academic disapproval. It’s poignant to emphasise that these contrasts were a commonly found element in conversations in the periphery of academic seminar rooms, for example, around pantry coffee machines or invariably also expressly uttered during heated staff meetings or symposia over the years.

Reflecting on such frayed conversations now, many years later, I realise often also failing to be able to see the compatibility between the two forms of discourse; one built around disciplinary arguments and the other centred around life experience and taking issue with the disconnected nature of the ritual of academic dialogue. Through their family networks with the Local and experiences of living in the West, my supervisor and his partner were witnesses to what happens when archaeological research practice is developed with, at best, national heritage concerns in mind. The Local was merely the bounded region where archaeological projects would take place, in disregard of rooted bodies of knowledge and the social stressors commonly observed across its communities.

This same academic institution currently finds itself in a very different teaching trajectory, following the slipstream of wider discipline change. Indeed, rarely found now are colleagues that might habitually refer to the collective of undergraduate and graduate students working with my ‘radical’ supervisor as ‘those Indians’. Heritage and the contemporary more broadly, are now central defining features of teaching programmes, as they are across archaeology as it continues to develop globally. The challenges posed by the charged role of the past in the present result in a general acceptance of, and engagement with, the question of how (not if) archaeology needs to respond. Signposting such concerns under the heading of heritage archaeology, however, is a leaky procedure; identity politics,
Collaborative archaeology as rooted cosmopolitanism?

Tourism, environmental concerns, migration, and armed conflict are all sites of friction and crisis that invite archaeology to respond to challenges put forward as it continues to operate at a global scale. It is insufficient to put such challenges under the remit of heritage archaeology. It prompts an incentive to develop a reflexive, adaptable and, ultimately, effective archaeology.

Such an incentive for reflexive archaeology occurs not only owing to shifts in archaeological teaching programmes but also due to the significant changes in students’ priorities, many of which are motivated today, first, by questioning the production of knowledge about the past and, second, how one can mobilise such knowledge to make a difference in society. Across the world, and foremost in settler colonies or postcolonial nation-states, such methods of reflexive introspection of research design as well as field practice explore the significance and impact of archaeological work and upstream this into seminar rooms with students.

Understanding the political forces that drive where and how archaeology takes place is now a disciplinary focus of considerable mass, and across many arenas, the authority to determine how to see the past is increasingly being contested. In part, such reflexive work is summarised under the useful heading of archaeological ethnography (Castañeda and Matthews 2008; Hamilakis and Anagnostopoulos 2009) and it has also stimulated discussions in the subfield of Critical Heritage Studies (Winter and Waterton 2013; Gentry and Smith 2019), principally diffused through the *International Journal of Heritage Studies*. This then connects seamlessly with building a future generation of critical archaeologists who are driven by ethical collaborations and aimed at keeping their research connected to local communities that they recognise and collaborate with, whether near or far.

The evolution of archaeological undergraduate and graduate teaching programmes is a window into how the importance of life conditions in locations of research is increasingly recognised as central to archaeological work and that this recognition does not always come from the comfortably distant contemplation of the West but from local contexts that struggle with global designs, to invoke Walter Mignolo’s description (Mignolo 2008). The specifics of situatedness play a decisive role. Returning to the example of my supervisors: when someone from a complex internally colonised context would be ‘uprooted’, to then find oneself in the described academic hallways during the 1980s and 1990s, the discomfort was palpable. It’s relevant to explore this discomfort in the context of collaboration in archaeology and the proposal of a rooted cosmopolitanism as it may be mirrored by many Local communities when archaeologists arrive.

The presence of an indigenous voice in an archaeology department in the West is clearly uncommon, more so forty years ago than now, but across Europe this certainly remains rare. An indigenous scholar in a Dutch academic seminar room is a reversal of the traditional vector of global academic work that sees European scholars transfer somewhere to the non-West to extract research materials, be they archaeological or otherwise, and possibly build a career from such work. It was an unusual case where the collaborative engagement between local stakeholders and global scholarship flows in the other direction, establishing a dialogue from within.
a department of archaeology. In most cases, the protocol of an archaeologist travelling to ‘remote’ communities to engage with local stakeholders leaves the control and initiative with the researcher.

The presence of an indigenous voice in a north-western European university building echoes the canonical notion of ethnoscapes, defined by Arjun Appadurai in that same period of the late 20th century, as

the landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other moving groups and individuals constitute an essential feature of the world and appear to affect the politics of (and between) nations to a hitherto unprecedented degree.

(Appadurai 1990, 297)

This not only captures part of the spatial component of the rooted cosmopolitanism paradox, as it highlights the co-existence of stable local contexts that are connected via family networks and a range of additional social links, but it also stresses the increase in human mobility that is required, rather than voluntary, and tied up with macroeconomic shifts in the globalising supply chain and production locations, combined with increasingly hostile immigration policies put forward by nation-states.

As captured by some of the authors in this volume, the social phenomenon of rooted cosmopolitanism argues that the human journey across social landscapes and political as well as natural boundaries is defined by interaction. That constant process is often questioned for its point of origin, but more productive would be to argue the co-existence of the closeness of social communities and the globalising patterns of connectedness from the point of view of the contemporary. As people freely and involuntarily travel across routes, they assess where social ties are the strongest and often these are the communities at the origin or destination or indeed with the immediate family surroundings. Part of my supervisor’s partner’s life story attests to this, having crossed many boundaries to forge a voice in contexts where their presence could only have been assured due to global interconnectedness.

As a defining feature, rooted cosmopolitanism also allows for partiality. By acknowledging the weight of ethical considerations in the care for others, especially those where social ties are the strongest, archaeology has a significant history by now of facing pressing ethical concerns (González-Ruibal 2018; Scarre and Scarre 2006; Zimmerman et al. 2003) and taking an ethical position.

Ethical considerations for a more co-constituted research practice find a home in the philosophical underpinnings of cosmopolitanism. Despite a wide set of social science disciplines, a defining feature in understanding cosmopolitanism emphasises that the process of maintaining diversity of expression and conviction is central to the social science endeavour. This also sets it apart from processes of globalisation, in the sense that globalisation studies are most comfortable with describing connectivity dynamics as ‘diverse in spite of’ apparently dominant
global flows (Hodos et al. 2017). The cosmopolitanism analysis is one that is optimistic in seeing possibilities for positive transformation, and it attempts to achieve such change through a critical stance centred around local engagement and dialogue.

When this ecology of multivocality, however, is in fact more about selecting and shaping that very diversity, leading to forms of tolerance and idealised symbolism, rather than facing the uncomfortable realities of indigenous lives, then this may be an instance where a lesson about pragmatism can be found. It is this discomfort that was experienced when my supervisor’s partner intervened in discussions. The discomfort had less to do with mannerisms or normative practice in academic circles (although these are consequential) and was more linked to the sharpness of differences in experienced life conditions and the fact that this was unapologetically pointed out by them. Bringing out those differences tended to make conversations that were focused on an archaeological discussion sensu stricto, appear rather frivolous and possibly out of touch with the locations being discussed, leading to discomfort among discussion participants.

Many of those who experienced such moments would describe them as outside of their academic comfort zones, if not to go so far as to (dis)qualify these interventions as rude, ad hominem, or (ironically) out of place, possibly muttering beneath their breaths questions as to why this person was in the room at all. Partly, this discomfort was perhaps reasoned to reside in a perceived lack of conformity with the usual symbols of communicative practice inside academia. After all, language is consequential in efforts of collaboration, and this case is no exception to a much wider concern that an archaeology of rooted cosmopolitanism needs to be mindful of. Ian Lilley also makes this point from the field context in relation to speaking appropriate languages and perhaps also having the overall ability to speak appropriately (Lilley 2009). Language and topical focus in archaeology represent what is brought out through archaeological investigation and, equally, reproduce the discipline as its practitioners desire it to be; a point already made during early post-processual orientations (Hodder 1989), and later expanded on by Rosemary Joyce (2002).

Language and narrative structuring harbour strategic possibilities for collaboration and creating change, having the ability to reproduce but also to criticise existing terms of reference, for example, ‘pre-Hispanic’, and to introduce new referents that may be more capable of furthering the need to affect change and achieve progress. This is in line with the ideas of social movements in society. The aims of such conversational dynamics revolved around demonstrating individuality as well as furthering a much more broadly shared common understanding of critique and change. As Webb Keane also asserts, these aims serve to “facilitate individual self-awareness; the other was to create a public world in which an indefinite number of other individuals would be aware of the same things (Keane 2016, 245). A more detailed discussion of the semiotic relationships between the use of language and the all-importance of context (for example, the material interiors of university buildings) is beyond the remit of this chapter, but recent work by Preucel has forcefully brought this into focus once more (Preucel 2020)
But there is more to this. It is also about relinquishing control and a certain level of disciplinary anxiety that is still haunting archaeology today, questioning if the discipline may not be a sliding slope of eroding authority and credibility. To see this through the lens of cosmopolitan understanding is to recognise the central social process under study as being the formative value of experiencing dialogue as uncomfortable encounters. If collaborative archaeology is about transforming social realities, then in this process, we can recognise a cosmopolitan outlook. Rather than arguing from a position of conservatism and fear of disciplinary fragmentation and loss of authority, a collaborative archaeology becomes a site of deliberating and engaging with those that were, for the longest of times, constructed and viewed as outside Others by that discipline. That means that archaeology is not at risk of being overtaken somehow by other voices or other industries, more equipped to convince or productively engage in dialogue, but that archaeology is required to participate in the ongoing evaluation of (archaeological) heritage and the local identity flows that are tied-in around such heritage sites. Yes, his may indeed be a participation marked by friction and discomfort, but it is also one that enables new understandings of others and shared pasts.

Uncomfortable encounters are common when and where the Local and the Global meet. Anna Tsing metaphorically discusses this awkwardness through the evocative term ‘friction’, the consequence of objects and ideas of heritage and identity invading each other (Tsing 2005). While from a systems theory point of view, friction is seen as a suboptimal process, for Tsing, it is the key to creating metaphorical energy, heat and, ultimately, change. In other words, the Global interacting with the Local, and vice versa, is far from the straightforward critical understandings of globalisation as revolving around unidirectional oppressive flows. More accurately, the process analysed by Tsing—in this case multinational forestry in parts of Indonesia—is unpredictable, and defined by creativity through novel responses, curiosity, and opportunistic action. Some of those actions work out, and others backfire dramatically, underlining the fickle nature of Global-Local interactions.

The relevant contemporary

Ever since Kent Flannery’s ridiculing of the archaeological present (1967), practitioners of the discipline engaged with the contemporary of their field praxis. While, as mentioned, processual thinking was mostly preoccupied with removing individuality from the aspired-for law-like equations, later post-processual work returned to hermeneutics and the questioning of objectivity. While many of the well-known historical overviews on archaeological theory often foreground the halls of Cambridge as locales of critical voices, I would contend that the most impactful and productive critiques came from feminist archaeologists who put archaeological knowledge production at the centre of the research agenda (e.g., work by Meg Conkey, Joan Gero, Rosemary Joyce, and foundational work by Ruth Tringham). Why this work needs specific mention, is because it is through such studies that subjectivity in knowledge production is discussed, in combination with dialectic collaboration during archaeological fieldwork (see also Van Dyke and Bernbeck
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2015). This work stresses (implicitly) the process of continuous emergence wherein local and extra-local forces shape conversations about the material past and do so in highly situated conditions. Archaeological work, in other words, takes place in local socio-historical contexts and carries with it a deep legacy of exploitation of cultural resources and the concurrent exclusion of local communities.

If part of the aim of using rooted cosmopolitanism is to be helpful in heritage discussions, then I see reason for optimism. Archaeology’s future as a consequential discipline revolves around issues such as intellectual development, the opportunity for cultural and linguistic self-determination, and overall preservation and furthering of quality of life. This was recently summarised by Anne Stahl under the heading of effective archaeology (Stahl 2020). This idea centres around the growing sensation that archaeological studies have distinct use-value in the present and, accordingly, are of importance for considering human futures.

There are myriad worrying trends around us, with Cultural Resource Management, more widely known as contract archaeology, increasingly dominating the image of archaeology, being responsible for producing the bulk of archaeological data and for generating an ever-expanding marketplace firmly built on a capitalist model of maximising profit through increasing efficiency. This real-world machinery of producing archaeology and heritage is at times indeed a locale where work relations are alienated, and most practitioners of archaeology are simply earning a living by doing what they do best in terms of applying and developing disciplinary methods and techniques around the world. I formulate this from the incredible privilege of a tenured academic post, but our students weigh this future balance on a regular basis.

That said, this increasing podium also offers an opportunity for conversations about accountability in archaeology: to whom are we accountable, and why is this of relevance? Clearly, contract archaeology is as much driven by local stakeholders as the Shuar indigenous communities in Ecuador dictate what international mining corporations do or do not do on/to their ancestral lands; there is no need to be naïve in this (see Watkins 2018 for the US context). But, equally, the question of engagement looms larger than ever in archaeology, and this is owed to the current breadth of archaeological work taking place. We now routinely teach undergraduate students about how to deal with differences in the field; we sensitise them to be respectful and awaken their interest in things like epistemic justice and what the notion of decolonisation through new forms of archaeological knowledge production may entail (Fricker 2007).

If large corporations work with contract archaeologists, as they do around the world, then they hold the potential to work with more communities than ever before and in a much more upscaled sense than academic field projects ever would. A recent review of contract archaeology across South America, for example, refers to this as the ‘contractual turn’, wherein the practising archaeologist morphs into an enterprising capitalist, enlisting students as staff (Gnecco 2018). Contract archaeology across South America (with significant differences per nation-state) today forges categories of environmental variables that follow complex streams of federal or national regulatory bureaucracy, effectively neutralising natural surroundings...
and placing them outside social relations, on occasions designating heritage sites in the process.

Discussing the heritage *pro toto* is challenging given the intellectual incoherence of the concept itself, but one thing that does stand out is that it is often about regulation, about how to establish rules of engagement and forms of partnership. Invariably then, those rules tend to age, becoming rather static and non-discursive as time passes. Hence, why the field of heritage discussions so often splits between ‘policy’ and ‘practice’; a point made some years ago by Meskell and Pels (2005). There’s little room for optimism in such renderings of the corporate world of contract archaeology, and this needs to be acknowledged if we are to discuss the 10% of archaeological activity that remains outside of contract work (Gnecco 2018, 280), that is, the academic projects that attempt to establish longer-term ties at a local level.

The hard, material keystone that is the steep inequality in material wealth—if not to say the predicament of daily survival—amidst the friction caused by extractive capitalism across Middle and South America provides for a cold form of realism. Communities tend to respond to the opportunities offered by contract archaeology with an understandable degree of short-term *Realpolitik*, but such problem-solving seldom develops unanimously at the local level, often leading to community fractures when the green-tinted and promising prospectuses of corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs are rolled out, leading to internal division and sometimes long-lasting territorial and social conflict. Earlier mentioned collaborative archaeological endeavours are typically not found in such CSR contexts. Against such contexts, how does the idea of rooted cosmopolitanism stand its ground?

**Disarticulated Nicaraguan communities**

To call something ‘rooted’ is to imply a self-reflection (Papastephanou, this volume). A consideration that shows awareness of one’s place of descent and a willingness to be open to contrasting or opposing desires and intentions. As I have discussed earlier for contexts in the Americas (Geurds 2007, 2011), the initial idealising of collaboration that marked forms of early community archaeology led to an invariably positive reporting of local embedding of archaeological projects that originate elsewhere. It also rendered the community as an inherently positive and able entity, one that archaeologists need only open the door to, or so it seems.

Invariably, however, identifying community representatives then turns out to be a naïve endeavour (‘where is your leader?’), and communities themselves turn out to exist of networks of power and partially shared interests, where not everyone has a voice and divisions along gender lines may be troubling. All this may then raise concerns over the inclusive character of the collaborative process. I have argued that this apparent disappointment on the part of the well-willing and eager archaeologist is only to be expected if one recognises that an understanding of local communities as empowered and united stakeholders is a simplification, if not to say a misrepresentation, of society. This point was made many years ago by Anthony Cohen as no longer understanding communities along structuralist lines.
but as embedded and experiential fields of interaction (Cohen 1985). A rooted cosmopolitan archaeology is one that demands awareness of past and present political contexts, including national and local trauma, being capable of generating a multiscalar assessment of local identity and heritage matters (see also Chu, this volume).

As a brief example to illustrate such dynamics, we can turn to the Central American nation-state Nicaragua. I have worked in this historically and sociologically complex context since the early 2000s, and it may include situations of comparable complexity as other regional studies in this volume, like Green Island, Taiwan (Chu) or Kihnu Island, Estonia (Wu). Cultural diversity in Nicaragua is a complex notion, informed by a history of Marxist policies pushing for a uniform cultural outlook and preceded by more than a century of neocolonial US oppression. In this context, Nicaragua is involved, like other Latin American postcolonial nations, in a continuous process of crafting an image of Self through waves of cultural politics (for an excellent overview, see Whisnant 1995). Herein, in first instance, we see the selecting and forgetting, mentioned by Versluys and Lilley, that accompanies Nicaragua in facing wider global challenges.

As also discussed by Versluys and Lilley, archaeological materials have shown to hold the flexibility to be mobilised as symbols of the nation, and the course of history, being put forward, regulated, and monitored at the level of the state (Hararrison 2008; Joyce 2003; Oyuela-Caycedo 1994; Smith 2004), and Nicaragua is not exceptional in this sense. For nearly half a century, forms of archaeological heritage have been identified through national legislation, and this legal framework aims to protect archaeological, historical, and artistic object categories. Heritage dynamics at the level of individual communities are rarely studied, with a few exceptions from the Caribbean coastal regions and the central region of Chontales (Geurds 2011; Palomar Puebla and Gassiot Ballbé 1999).

In Nicaragua, there are relatively few archaeological sites designated as national patrimony, even if patrimony legislation covers the entirety of archaeological, ‘historical’ and contemporary material culture. In contrast to its northern neighbours of Honduras and El Salvador, there is no visually appealing precolonial architecture that easily compares to the iconic combination of pyramidal structures and large plazas that typify the Mesoamerican monumental architectural canon. UNESCO World Heritage in Nicaragua is limited to two sites: the 16th-century Spanish settlement León Viejo (abandoned in the early 17th-century owing to a volcanic eruption) and the 18th-century cathedral in the city of León.

Both UNESCO sites are linked to the expansion of the Spanish colonial system and were entered on the list in 2000 after various years of waiting and shortly following the devastating damages caused by Hurricane Mitch in 1998. Beyond that, there is a handful of natural sites that have resided on the Tentative List since 1995. The León cathedral and, in particular, the early Spanish colonial site of León Viejo are not merely covered by heritage legislation but also entangled in narratives on the nation-state identity. León Viejo, for example, is argued to be of central importance to national awareness of the population of Nicaragua, as one of the authors of the UNESCO document stresses: “León Viejo is undoubtedly a symbol of cultural identity for the population of Nicaragua” (UNESCO 2000).
Indigenous archaeological sites and material remains take on a more peripheral position in claims to a national past of Nicaragua. The remains of settlements and ceremonial centres are almost entirely absent from the national imaginary, much in contrast to, for example, Honduras, where the Maya site Copán is a central component of the nation-state’s cultural awareness, closely linked to the tourism industry and conservation concerns (see Joyce 2005). What is shown more prominently, both in museum exhibits as well as state-issued banknotes and postal stamps, is aesthetically pleasing polychromous pottery and seemingly enigmatic stone sculptures. This invisibility is largely in line with the marginalised position of indigenous communities across regions of Nicaragua, being relegated to handicraft industries on the Pacific coast or subsistence agriculture and fishery in the northern regions and the expansive coastal zones of the Caribbean littoral (Newson 1987; Van Broekhoven 2002).

In a broader frame, the creation and curation of archaeological heritage helps assemble a representation of the identity of the Nicaraguan nation-state, and this is a process commonly observed across parts of Middle and South America. Indeed, as in postcolonial national contexts across the world, archaeological and historical materials from a recent or deep past are activated by governing authorities to outline cultural boundaries and steward dynamics of exclusionary processes (Kohl and Fawcett 1995; Lowenthal 1998; Trigger 1995). Such emergence of nationalism is a form of ‘localising’ in relation to the global field, and here we recognise normative analyses of the character of the nation-state that came into view in the early 1980s (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). This constant interplay is what a rooted cosmopolitanism might wish to approach in all its complexity. My specific field praxis in Nicaragua is about navigating that complexity through finding and establishing a shared ethics with others. It is a project defined by multiscalar dialogue as well as partiality of myself as a researcher.

The multiscalar dialogues oscillate between transnational speaking partners including, for example, mining corporations, the national patrimony service, municipal authorities, museum custodians, landowners, and so-called subsistence farmers. Most of this takes place in the central region of the country, also known as Chontales but a fair amount is also situated in the national capital, online with Nicaraguan expats in the United States and with NGOs as well as diplomats. The national forces that are active in Nicaragua, such as legal frameworks of patrimony legislation; cultural policies that flow from this legislation; and curricula for secondary education across the country, all require engagement. Alongside these forces, there are localising strategies that aim to represent and build cultural images that are specifically regional (see Geurds 2011 for details). This entails a balancing on the part of the archaeologist between wider national obligations and a commitment to local empathies.

As collaborations grew more entangled, conflicting ambitions and ideas for directions of the archaeological activities were often quick to emerge, requiring considerations on my part of ethical obligations felt in the local context. Conversations about identity and the past in central Nicaragua are manifold, which led me early on to conclude the apparently rather dissatisfying point that there is not
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a singular or ideal approach to participating in local or national heritage discussions. The impacting period of European colonialism in the Chontales region first led to the cutting of ancestral ties to the landscape and subsequently to a 19th- and 20th-century period of various regime changes and economic forces that engulfed the region, complicating any straightforward understanding of identity as a form of care or investment in the landscape. Therefore, if this idealised outcome is not feasible, what does collaboration set out to do?

Collaborative archaeology is not about merging points of view but rather about the shared exploration of ways forward when discussing matters of the past. The process of collaboration is the continuous establishment of a dialogic relation, and therein lies its experiential goal. Based on my experience working with stakeholders in Nicaragua, conversations were not about truth-finding or aligning with universal convictions but aimed at establishing conversations that productively contributed to social problems linked to heritage and seeking the past in the present. Such an aim is methodologically cemented in ethical considerations with social problems that include inclusivity, equity, and forms of fairness, including epistemic and wider social aspects of justice.

Collaborative archaeology depends on people’s willingness to work together on a project. It also depends on who is working with you and how you assess their role. Working with people in Nicaragua on archaeological matters is, of course, context specific. But that is perhaps not saying much. More specifically, I’ve found that dialectical collaboration is defined by a level of situatedness that co-determines how people respond and participate; that is, rather than concluding that people’s individual histories, dispositions, and character (their roots?) define how they might decide to be involved with collaboration, it is the specifics of location and context that can swing judgements from the favourable to the unfavourable.

An example of this would be the diversity in conversations when enquiring about residents’ views of the abundant amounts of precolonial built mounds that dot the landscapes of central Nicaragua. Answers tended to differ depending on the time of day, the number of people present, or indeed the location itself. Where does this leave people’s intentionality to work together if we seem to observe that much of their actions and language are, in part, at least, steered by situational circumstances they may not even be mindful of? As I’ve seen over my years of working together, the form of dialectical work in collaborative archaeology is not primarily one marked by a priori decision-making but rather one that is driven by relational contexts.

Conclusion

As an archaeologist myself, I do not stand outside of the discipline and its internal debates but have the need to position myself in it. This is perhaps also a meaning of the idea of being ‘rooted’. In archaeology, displacement and travel is as much a facet as being aware of contemplation and self-reflection. Indeed, one might recall the etymology of ‘theorising’ as that activity which archaeologists engage in while in the field, which always involves both reflection and
comparison. The fleetingness of self-reflection, however, makes it hard to qualify the adjective in ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’. Papastephanou recognises a locally anchored globalisation, one that is not opposed to the local but in a certain harmony with it (Papastephanou this volume). Overall, the adjective ‘rooted’ appears to smuggle in a suite of unstated points: Is rooted something original, something other-than-connected? Is rooted indeed ‘Local’; if so, where is that locality bounded? Does rooted imply thinking, perceiving, or speaking about something from ‘scratch’? Is that which is rooted not subject to having been assembled? Is it somehow linked to the relational context mentioned earlier? Where do rootedness and cosmopolitanism meet? And what are the results? Less rootedness? Much depends on the specific definition of this suspiciously frank and sympathetic-sounding adjective.

I have argued that collaborative archaeology is a process of exploring a cosmopolitan relationship. This relationship revolves around seeking dialogic encounters with locally situated and historically specific actors in relation to an archaeological context. The principal driver toward such a dialogue is the ethical commitment to engage with local actors. This engagement is not merely to acknowledge local actors but to include them integrally in emergent archaeological work.

It is one thing to reflect on cosmopolitanism and the form of the feedback loops between what is local and global and then to position this social phenomenon in contrast to the Utopian imaginary of a Globalised economically and culturally connected world. It is, however, quite another to live with what the former portrays. The awareness of these dire life conditions endured by people living in communities where archaeology ventures gave rise to ethical awareness in the archaeological discipline, and eventually, collaborative forms of archaeological practice.

Concerns about inclusivity are hardly new in archaeology nor in the social sciences more widely. References to multivocality, repatriation, and forms of publicly engaged archaeology date to at least half a century ago. I would contend that we can trace such an emphasis to the contemporary in which archaeological practices unfold to as far back as the early renditions of the New Archaeology, with archaeologists voicing deep concern for the relevance of their discipline and the need to forge epistemic connections beyond the discipline’s boundaries, if only to other social and natural sciences in order to thereby be of consequence to society more widely. Herein, we can recognise the long-considered path toward a more inclusive practice and recentre research goals to include local processes and empowerment, self-determination, and emancipation.

The struggles apparent in heritage discussions, to distance theoretical thinking and policymaking away from the problematic definition of universal heritage have, in part, resulted in a certain disciplinary self-consciousness. As described here, collaborative archaeology, centred around those who need the material past to address existential concerns in the contemporary, is a form of critical cosmopolitanism. The adjective rooted is one implied herein and therefore a moot point.

If rooted cosmopolitanism is about encounters and overcoming degrees of difference, then I think we can harbour mild optimism. Observations on the complexities of the production of conscious or subconscious difference against analyses that
aim for all-or-nothing reductionism are not new. I have already noted archaeology’s concern with knowledge production, and anthropology also habitually discusses significantly different worlds of practice and material surroundings. The work by James Clifford is one such focus on the variety of, for example, indigenous experience, dislocation, and cultural articulation culminating in his seminal *Returns* (2013), even if his emphasis on rootedness is limiting in the end, due to the lack of diversity described within indigenous experiences. Anthropological fieldwork, in its methodological sense, is about the ability to learn how to be with others and, following from that knowledge, recognise the ethical implications of such learning—collaborative archaeology is no different.

**Afterthought**

Today, we cannot discuss rooted cosmopolitanism without the forces of reactionary culture wars that pervade various nation-state contexts in Europe and the United States in particular. From the current context of my home in southern England, writing this from what is arguably the historical heart of British imperialism, one witnesses the daily accusations in which critical voices are seen to ‘politicise’ how history is discussed. Rather than acknowledge and redress the violent urban landscapes of today’s English city centres, the historical discomfort of monuments for Imperial Era men is balanced by proposals to ‘retain and explain’ through plaques that offer ‘nuance’. Also here, we see the ‘radicals’ being identified, eerily evoking the spaces of the faculty coffee pantries mentioned above. The acts of intentionally damaging ‘public’ heritage are branded by the racially loaded term of ‘thuggery’, and a retreat to xenophobic nationalism is noticeable. Writing this from such a contemporary context, one might ask, what does rooted cosmopolitanism mean now to those with whom archaeology wishes to converse beyond the local context? This is pointing the arrow in the opposite direction toward those that situate themselves in the West. It is an argument to not (only) discuss heritage discourses between us, for example, in the confines of this book, but also to more directly engage with the understanding that archaeology writes from social science and therefore about ourselves.

**Notes**

1 Unless they, of course, manifest themselves as more knowledgeable on these subjects than the lecturer, which is increasingly the case.
2 I do recognise, of course, that such 1960s archaeology was not particularly concerned with the rampant forms of cultural repression and growing inequity around the world and near the field sites of interest.

**Bibliography**


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Introduction

In November 2014, just a few months after he was elected as president of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hosted a representative summit of the Latin American Muslim leaders on the Bosphorus. It was in that particular context that the first popularly elected president of Türkiye decided to spectacularly declare that “Muslim sailors reached the American continent 314 years before Columbus” (Guardian, November 2014). The utterance was widely hailed and gave a sense of pride to many Muslims worldwide (see: Kar 2019; Yayla 2022), but it seems it did not resonate well with the wider Western public.

For the specialists and political analysts in the West, the pompous speeches, historical revisionism, and even the specific wording might have seemed unsurprising. They interpreted this statement of the early re-Islamising and populist “reformer” in the Near East mostly in the narrow context of his domestic political aspirations, the need to present himself as leader of the “Muslim world”, or as just another mantra or catchy phrase tailored for the needs of his new foreign policy, frequently labelled as “neo-Ottomanism”.

Yet, the wider public in the West seemed to be less prepared for such historical revelations. The response came through the leading Western media outlets that were not yet so decisively critical of Erdoğan’s policies. Instead, the very content of this political statement coming from the East and its explicit character turned into mind-boggling global news. While the numerous public reactions carried overtones that varied between humour and ridicule (The Guardian, 18 November 2014), serious news agencies, including The Guardian and BBC (14 and 16 November 2014), acted much more “responsibly”. In accordance with Western intellectual traditions, they objectivised the context of this “irrational” claim by consulting relevant scholars who anonymously confirmed that “there is no archaeological evidence of Islamic structures or settlements in the Americas pre-dating (Columbus)” (Scham 2009, 172; O’Connor 2014; The Guardian, 18 November 2014).

Today, when Erdoğan is increasingly alienating politically and geo-strategically from the major Western powers, his original motives behind the 2014 statement of “the Muslims’ possible discovery of the Americas” are largely forgotten in the West. Yet, what remains interesting from this episode is our prompt response and
the attitude in this short, uneven debate. Even then, many were fast to portray the president as another megalomaniac oriental despot, ignoring the substance of his arguments that “an objective writing of history will show the contribution of the East, the Middle East and Islam to the science and arts” (Tharoor 2014; Rubiés 2005). It made no difference that Erdoğan’s argumentations were not an isolated appearance but part of a wider perspective that included the viewpoints and extensive analyses by academics and institutions from the “Orient”, as their academic credentials and “(un)scientific methods” are traditionally questioned and considered less reliable in the West (Scham 2009, 166–183).

As prime minister of Türkiye, Erdoğan was proclaimed “the European of the Year” in 2004; he was co-founder of United Nations’ Alliance of Civilizations and a “model US partner” for presidents such as Bush and Obama. Yet, no one dared or cared to locate in his historical revelations an element of a new bond or shared history between the East and the West. Thus, the segment of the same 2014 speech in which Erdoğan underlines that “converting people by force, by the sword, has never been a part of Islam” (O’Connor 2014) was less interesting to Western audiences. At the same time, there were no signs of serious considerations to analyse this new “American discovery theory” as a unique attempt to bring America and the West, as well as their values and achievements, closer to the Muslim identity. Though deeply rooted in their “uniquely Muslim” narratives and ontologies, with a bit of effort to reconceptualise through the perspective of the “other”, one might find in Erdoğan’s statements interesting aspects of contemporary cosmopolitanism. After all, his dislocation of Muslim culture, ideas, and accomplishments beyond, and even far away from, the traditional boundaries of the Ummah in the Old World of Afro-Eurasia, closely resembles the ancient challenge to the political and mental boundaries of Greek poleis of the first “Western” cosmopolitan, Diogenes (Eikeland 2016, 26–30; Lavan et al. 2016). At the same time, his exposed visions for the history and nature of Islam and Islamic proselytism might be targeting mainly Western stereotypes. Yet, in his polis in the East, such bold statements might be interpreted by many influential political and religious authorities as “religious impiety and corruption of the minds of the youth”.¹ These are, incidentally, the same charges brought once against Socrates and his cosmopolitan ideas that were extremely intimidating to the political, ideological, and religious particularities of ancient Athens (Brown 2000, 74–87).

These interesting parallels might have been much more useful in some parallel universe where the Islamic or re-Islamising leaders are the main proponents of globalisation and cosmopolitanism or are perceived as such in the West. In our world, instead, the most important questions arising from this short-lived debate are not particularly connected to the Orient. They rather reflect certain dilemmas of the contemporary identity of the West.

One wonders whether the (non-)existence of Muslim material culture in the early Americas represents the key question of such a debate or just the best excuse. Should we not rather ask ourselves why we are so dismissive of the whole idea of Muslim sailors predating Columbus in the Americas? Or why we are able to imagine a prehistoric migration to these continents or a Viking landing but not
consider a Muslim one? Even more importantly, are we subconsciously ignoring or undermining the great and well-documented contributions of Muslims in the development of medieval and early modern cartography and science? Should we be reminded of their contributions in the transmission of the “classical knowledge” that led towards the overall growth of early modern European societies and the transatlantic and wider discoveries (Jolivet 1988, 113–148)?

These and other such questions reveal a more substantial one, that convincingly reminds us how much of our objective analyses are still undermined by the importance of the past and its symbols for our present identity. Is our dismissive attitude towards Muslim presence or contribution to the early development of the new Western world only a reflection or even a direct reflex of our Huntingtonian worldview (Huntington 1996)? Do we still share this strong ideological conviction that the primacy of the West and its values is dependent on its “uniqueness” and clear ideological distinctiveness and moral superiority to the “other civilizations” and especially those most stereotypically connected to the idea of the “Orient”? Even more, are such propositions of the contemporary political, scientific, or cultural leaders from the East considered as dangerously undermining even the most liberal and cosmopolitan global visions of the West? Are the liberal (or cosmopolitan) followers of the idealistic traditions in International Relations’ theories of Fukuyama, Huntington’s main ideological opponent, able to imagine or accept an intensively globalising world where the “non-Western values” are equally promoted and influential as the unilaterally and strongly proposed Western liberal democracy?

This chapter explores the roots of cosmopolitanism far beyond its traditional Western ontologies, which are limiting its appearance to the Western-imagined “Greek, Roman, and Enlightenment” historical contexts (Meskell 2009, 2). Instead, it reconstructs a thick layer of protocosmopolitanism related to the wider historical, political, and cultural transformations in ancient Afro-Eurasia. It locates the roots of this development in the intensifying globalisation processes of the first millennium BC, strongly empowered by the widely extending, consistent, and ever-transforming imperial system.

I hypothesise that the climactic point of this ancient globalisation, occurring in the last three centuries of the first millennium BC, and closely connected to the decentralisation of the universal imperial model, created a shared “cultural (and political) horizon” (Versluys 2022, 67), that can be categorised as “cosmopolitan oikumene”.

The chapter focuses on the Hellenistic-period decentralisation of the global system of rule as a key element for the empowerment of local and regional elites, as well as an important driver of their economic, political, and symbolic exchanges. Most importantly, I am reconstructing through these processes the creation of a universal system of mutual legitimisation of local, regional, and global elites. A system that was constantly reimagining the shared oikumene through syncretisation, glocalisation, and globalisation of numerous local religious, social, and political traditions, narratives, and symbols.

In that context, I argue that this shared ideology of ancient Afro-Eurasia represents an ancient form, or at least a precursor, of the “rooted cosmopolitanism,
which accepts a multiplicity of roots and branches and that rests on the legitimacy
of plural loyalties, of standing in many circles, but with common ground” (Cohen

In addition, using globalisation theory, I propose a new model that explores the
elements of the heritage of the holy grail of the Western “uniqueness”, the Classi-
cal “Greco-Roman” world. Utilising the comparative framework of the extending
*oikumene* of ancient Afro-Eurasia and the Waters’ triparted theorem of globalisa-
tion as a primary matrix, the chapter synthesises a sharper picture of the elements
of localism, glocalisation, and cosmopolitanism of Rome and its heritage.

Finally, arguing that Rome, as other Western historical *topoi*, presents only
one of the many diverse successors or transmitters of the resilient elements of the
ancient cosmopolitan ideology, I suggest that the glocalised heritage of this pro-
tocosmopolitanism, embedded in different local cultures around the world, should
be utilised in the constant reconceptualisations of the dialectically imagined rooted
cosmopolitanism.

**The cosmopolitan *oikumene* and its heritage**

“The deeply embedded ancestral status” that the West ascribes to Rome, and the
aspects of Roman heritage that were used for modern self-identification, the cre-
ation of the shared identity of Western elites and the legitimisation of their global
dominance in the colonial phase and later, are postulated on the understandings of
the unique and uniquely Western history, culture, and identity of the Romans and
the Greco-Roman world (Witcher 2015, 202; Hingley 2001).

However, this status of Rome as a key milestone in the creation of the “imagina-
tive geography” and the new local heritage of the modern Western imagined com-
nunities and the imagined community of the West, had repeatedly stumbled upon
the multitude of undeniable and indelible historical sources and material, exposing
the major impact of *Ex oriente lux* on the creation and identity of the Roman world
(Athanassiadi and Macris 2013, 61; Clark 2013).

The classicists, historians, archaeologists, and other researchers have spent dec-
dades debating and finetuning the different aspects of this East-West dichotomy.
Finally, due to the new paradigms and achievements in these and numerous related
disciplines developed in the last few decades, we can no longer see Rome or the
Roman world as uniquely Western.

Important arguments in favour of such a conclusion emerge as well from the
increased application of the globalisation theory, suggesting that Rome could not
be analysed adequately through this modern categorisation or as any other form
of consistent “cultural container” (Pitts and Versluys 2015, 12). Furthermore, this
“beyond container thinking” framework also involves the deconstruction of the
stereotypical nomenclature of Eastern or Near-eastern influence (Versluys 2015,
143–147). Instead, the complex transformative processes that created the Roman
world(s) and Roman heritage can be reanalysed, in this context, only in the wider
frame of the spatio-temporal continuities and change of the Afro-Eurasian globali-
Thus, while the roots of these processes might be traced to early Bronze Age globalisation (Vandkilde 2017, 509–518), born in the Near East, Rome was integrated into a much wider, complex, and interrelated globalisation network. This shared world, or oikumene to which Rome was introduced, was neither exclusively Near-eastern nor Eastern. Instead, it extended and related communities, ideas, and materials from the Indian to the Atlantic Ocean and from the Caspian Sea and Hindukush to Eritrea.

As much as it owed to its Bronze Age roots, this oikumene was truly developed only in the first millennium bc. At that stage, the globalisation process received a new great impetus through the emergence of the imperial systems of the Neo-Assyrians, Persians, and Macedonians (Versluys 2022, 34–71; Tevdovski 2020, 7–28).

These ancient empires, or evolving system(s) of global governance, expanded dramatically the geographic scope of the globalisation process and served as additional cohesive elements that supported the constantly increasing wide-scale flow of materials, ideas, knowledge, and technological know-how (Lavan et al. 2016, 1–28). In addition, the imperial policies, in conjunction with the wider transformative effects of the globalisation process, helped the creation of a widely shared framework of institutions, society, belief systems, customs, and practices among numerous interrelated communities (Versluys 2022, 34–71).

This ever-evolving imperial system was developed under the central, millennia-old premise that the world should be ruled by a universal ruler, like the Assyrian “king of the four quarters”, the Persian Great king, as a restorer of the “primordial unity of the world”, or the Macedonian “cosmocrator” (Stoneman 2008, 96–97; Lavan et al. 2016, 1–28; Chin 2016, 134). Such a ruler, as “Archimedes fulcrum”, was perceived as a unique legitimate force with a mandate to move or model the universe by the will of god/s, in accordance/synergy with the gods, or as living god or son of god (Iossif et al. 2011).

While this paradigm of the rule suggested strong centralisation, the effective system that implemented it was very decentralised. It represented a wider multi-layered network, consisting of the ruler’s extended family or ethne, the priests, and the free/autonomous merchants. The extended family or ethne, effectively ruling different areas of the empires, drew their legitimacy from the central authority, its narratives, propaganda, and policies, and as such, they represented the main element of homogenisation and standardisation of the imperial space. Yet, this first layer of integration was only one element in the creation of the ancient oikumene. An equally important element of the imperial system was the priestly (and bureaucratic) class, which drew its legitimacy from both global and local factors. Depending usually simultaneously on the will of the global ruler (or his extended court) and the local/regional traditions and dynamics, priests were constantly in a position to translate global ideologies and policies into local religious and political idioms. Finally, the free/autonomous merchants represented an additional adhesive element interrelating the diverse communities through the imperial space and providing new links even with those living beyond the geographical, sociological, or ideological boundaries of such worlds (Payne 2016, 212).
Thus, the priest/bureaucratic class (and merchants) was crucial for the deep penetration of the imperial propaganda, as well as the ideas of universality and unity that it conveyed. Serving the political needs of the universal rulers, perceived as universal protectors of all temples, saviours of all peoples or giving freedom (autonomy) to mercantile cities, priests and bureaucrats were constantly injecting global conceptions, messages, and symbols into the local religious and political narratives. At the same time, the status, interests, and aspirations of these elites were directly connected with their capabilities to innovate and promote their own local cults and traditions over others in the wider imperial context and among central administration and dynastic courts.

Thus, they transformed into key protagonists of the two-way dialogue between the local and global elements of the imperial system. Through reimagining or globalising the local religious and political traditions, the priest class impregnated the ideas of universality into numerous and diverse local narratives. At the same time, together with the dynastic courts and the decentralised ruling class, they promoted them globally, creating increased global awareness of the cultural diversity of the ideologically united world. The deep penetration of this global multidirectional flow of ideas, materials, and symbols in diverse local realities initiated the creation of an oikumene, united not in homogeneity but in diversity and cosmopolitanism.

The climactic point of interconnectedness and sharing throughout this cosmopolitan oikumene of ancient Afro-Eurasia occurred in the last three centuries of the first millennium BC, a period that we still refer to, Eurocentrically and derogatively, as Hellenistic.²

The Hellenistic globalisation involved global elements of homogenisation, like the massive urban planning and elements of life in the cities, global monetisation, new communication and trade lines, development of the universal (linear) time, universalising languages and alphabets and the culture of reading, global educational and scientific centres, as well as hybridisation, globalisation and glocalisation of numerous local and regional cultural, religious and political traditions and practices (Irby-Massie and Keyser 2002; Russo 2004; Bugh 2006, 265–94; McKenzie 2007; Kosmin 2018; Berrey 2017). Yet, most of all, the Hellenistic period brought an unprecedented increase in the consciousness of the world as one place.

One of the key developments of this period that the globalisation process would benefit greatly from was the modification of the structure of the traditional imperial system (Tevdovski 2020, 7–28). Macedonian imperialism was built upon the traditions and parameters of the Near-eastern imperial systems and especially those of its immediate predecessors (Briant 1996; Ma 2005, 187–191). Yet, the unique developments in the few decades following the death of Alexander led towards a process of transformation that replaced the embedded centralisation of the system with a form of competitive multidimensional network. This amended imperial model has proved to be very compatible and adaptable to overall globalisation trends (Martinez-Sève 2003, 234).

Thus, the new Macedonian dynasts, emerging at the end of the 4th century BC, in the tradition/pattern of their Persian and other Near-eastern predecessors, ruled as universal rulers of the world in synergy with gods and frequently as living gods
or sons of gods (Chaniotis 2003, 431–443; Ma 2013, 323–352). Each Macedonian dynast was presented as a new Alexander, a descendent of the Macedonian royal house and related to its gods and godly predecessors Heracles, Dionysus, and Helios (Apollo) (Mørkholm 1991, 27; Stewart 1993; Strootman 2014a). As such, each Antigonid, Ptolemaic or Seleucid, by his real and imagined birthright and accomplishments, was an inheritor and ruler over the entirety of Alexander’s oikumene (Stewart 1993; Strootman 2014c, 38–61). Yet, at any point in time during the Hellenistic period, there were at least a few of these universal Alexanders, effectively ruling only limited parts of this imagined world (Strootman 2014c, 38–61; Kosmin 2017, 85–94).

The fierce mutual competition of these localised global rulers, embedded in the amended imperial model, involved a constant re-legitimisation through a battle of the spear, but even more through the competing and ever-evolving dynastic narratives (Strootman 2014d, 325–341). Yet, such parallelism did not lead towards estranged imperial spaces or worlds. Instead, it initiated a great mobilisation of local and regional resources, populations, technologies, ideas, and traditions in the lasting global competition for envisioning and achieving the shared conception of a universally ruled oikumene.

Thus, both coalitions and confrontations of different Macedonian dynastic centres ultimately resulted in intermarriages. Over time, every Macedonian dynast in Europe, Asia, or Africa was not just legitimised as the “new Alexander” through his lineage from the old Macedonian royal house (the Argeads) but also through his descent from dynasts from some other dynastic centre, which added to his narrative and ambitions (Tevdovski 2020, 7–28). At the same time, it was not just the rulers of the core territories who were related and were basing their legitimacy on this combined heritage. The consistency of such a model can be seen throughout the Hellenistic world. Thus, even the rulers of different edges of this wide globalising world, like India or Sicily were distantly related between themselves and, through marriages with Macedonian princesses of different lateral dynastic branches, integrated into the wider dynastic system.

In addition, all these multiplying universal rulers, in the pattern of their Persian and other Near-eastern predecessors, acted as protectors of all temples, saviours of all peoples or giving freedom (autonomy) to mercantile cities/elites (Beaulieu 2014, 13–30). Yet, in the new competitive global realities, Macedonian dynasts were particularly close and relied upon the resources, cooperation, and loyalty of concrete local or regional communities, elites, and centres of power. Thus, if the policies of localisation of power and “co-opted local elites” were already used by Assyrians and Persians in their system of governing different regions (Lavan et al. 2016, 18), in the case of the Macedonian dynasts, the policies towards concrete local traditions, institutions, and elites became central for their global imperial pretensions (Martinez-Sève 2003, 234). As much as they depended on the support of the global Macedonian ruling/military elites, their localised effective rule promoted the status of the local elites as well.

This close relationship of different local elites, especially those from the core territories of different dynasts, like Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, or Bactria, and
those from contested territories like Jews, Hellenes, and Anatolian elites (even India), with the local dynastic centres, as primary nodes of Hellenistic globalisation, created diverse forms of cultural and political metamorphoses, with dramatic local, regional, and global effects.

The policies and initiatives of these universalistic hubs preserved and promoted glocalised or globalised different local traditions, like the Aegean heritage of Homer’s myths, theatre, and the paideia of the Hellenes, Phrygian Tales, “Indian wisdom”, or the Babylonian, Egyptian, and Jewish history, culture, and tradition. They also promoted, transformed, glocalised or globalised early Buddhism, Hellenic, Babylonian, Anatolian, and Egyptian gods and paved the way for the global expansion of Mithraism, Judaism, and Christianity.

All these traditions, “memorised” by the Hellenistic oikumene, were rooted in the heritage, values, and aspirations of different local and regional elites (Versluys 2022, 34–71). However, their reproduction in the Hellenistic period was part of the enhanced local-global dialogue of the Macedonian imperial model. They served the needs for legitimising different dynasts as universal and ideal rulers, descendants and related to all Kings and Gods and benefactors of all communities and temples (Beaulieu 2014, 13–30). At the same time, they promoted the status and aspirations of different priestly and bureaucratic elites trying to establish ownership or authority over this reimagined heritage as a unique tool in the global battle of narratives in the shared oikumene (Stevens 2016, 82).

One of the many appropriate illustrations of this multi-directional dialogue of the local and the global is the heritage of Hellenistic Babylonia. There, in the light of the Antiochus cylinder, we are able to witness the glocalisation of the globalised symbols and narratives or rule and order into the traditional idiom of the Babylonian religious and bureaucratic elites (Beaulieu 2014, 13–30). Thus, the dynast is presented with his usual universalised characteristics: as “Macedonian”, “king of the world”, and “king of (all) countries” (Stevens 2016, 82–84; Strootman 2013, 67–97). Yet, at the same time, he is “king of Babylon”, caretaker of the temple of “Esagila and Ezida”, who complies with its traditional/regional religious rituals, compared to the traditional deities, and, as the previous Neo-Assyrian and Persian universal rulers, enters the eternal Babylonian archives (Stevens 2016, 82–84). Berossos’ Babyloniaca, on the other hand, although emerging from the same local (and religious) tradition, takes a totally opposite approach. It tells a local/regional history of Babylonia, from its traditional myths of the creation of the world to its Assyrian and Babylonian dynastic history. Yet, Berossos chooses not to use the local elitist traditions of the Akkadian cuneiform script. He also avoids the older universalised written tradition of Imperial Aramaic, although it was widely used in the Seleucid realm. Instead, he introduces his “local history” through the widest possible medium, the Koine language used by courts and elites throughout the Hellenistic oikumene (Haubold 2016, 95–96). In addition, Berossus “establishes his credentials” through a globally prominent stereotype (and exonym) as a “Chaldean sage” and carefully selects his “Babylonian” mythical material, choosing the narratives that could be easily understood and appreciated by elites with different cultural and educational backgrounds (Haubold 2016, 92). Finally, he illuminates
episodes and aspects of Assyrian and Babylonian kingship that directly identify with and legitimise the policies and global status of the Seleucid dynastic house (Haubold 2016, 94–97). Thus, Babyloniaca visualises a local/regional heritage that was, at the same time, globalised and glocalised (Stevens 2016, 70). Even more, in its striving towards universality, this Hellenistic heritage transforms into a monument of the ancient cosmopolitanism rooted in the Babylonian local traditions.

Yet, this is not a unique characteristic of Berossus’ Babyloniaca, but rather an omnipresent pattern that illustrates the level of cultural and societal transformation driven by the impact of Hellenistic globalisation.3

The same process might be traced in Hellenic heritage as well, despite the fact that its localism is most prominently appropriated in modern Western identity and traditionally exaggerated through scientific misconceptions related to Eurocentrism. Thus, the paideia of the Hellenistic world is notoriously related to the philosophers living and working in its numerous urban centres. However, despite the Hellenic-rooted nomenclature or possible appearances, the function of many of these professionals as educators of aristocrats and princes, advisors of kings, courtiers, court scientists and encyclopaedists/archivists, and even religious authorities, owes equally, if not more, to the imperial traditions of Egypt, Mesopotamia and the wider oikumene.4 The cosmopolitan ideas of Hellenistic philosophy, rooted in different local and global traditions, are an even more illustrative aspect of the globalisation of this local (or previously localised) heritage (Brown 2006, 549–558).

At the same time, through the local status and characteristics of this cosmopolitan elite group, we might analyse the impact of globalisation on the Hellenic polis’ society. In the new Eastern Mediterranean, integrated into the Macedonian imperial model, the particularistic identity and vision of the micro-world of the Hellenic poleis lost its political, cultural, and military significance, which led towards the overall decay of different urban centres of the classical period. Yet, Athens endured this transformation and strengthened its reimagined identity and prominence as the city of the philosophers. However, while classical Athens, with its localism and particularism, condemned the elements of cosmopolitanism in the philosophy of its citizen Socrates and was hostile to and repeatedly banished the pro-Macedonian foreigner, Aristotle, during the Hellenistic period, the city of philosophers transformed into a small but important centre of cosmopolitanism. The numerous new philosophical schools attracted foreigners who frequently led these schools, promoted cosmopolitan ideas, collaborated closely, and profited from different competing dynastic centres. A particularly illustrative episode for the character of the new cosmopolitan Athens was the delegation sent to represent the polis in Rome in 155 bc. Consisting of the “heads of the Academy, the Peripatus and the Stoa, Carneades of Cyrene, Critolaus of Phaselis in Lycia, and Diogenes of Babylon”, the delegation represented Athens as a cosmopolitan hub of the wisdom of the “four quarters of the world” (Haake 2015, 79; Lavan et al. 2016, 16). At the same time, it illuminates the results of a process through which a smaller centre of the Hellenistic oikumene reimagines its localist preimperial traditions into a globalising image of a meeting place for dialogue and competition of the intellectual traditions and heritage produced in the universalistic centres of the different dynastic branches.
Finally, even the most distinctive symbols of Macedonian imperialism, although rooted in the local or regional Macedonian heritage and initially transformed into deterritorialised social traditions of the ruling Macedonian elites, were later universalised into shared symbols of order, hierarchy, and power. Furthermore, this global heritage, through the close interrelations of different universal rulers with the local and regional political, bureaucratic, and religious elites, was multiplicated into different glocalised and interrelated variants and interpretations. The iconography and mythology of these global symbols of power were re-rooted in diverse local or glocalised traditions, acquiring a multitude of forms, like the Buddhist, Egyptian-born, and Carthaginian Heracles, or different syncretisation and reinterpretation of Dionysus and Helios (Puskás 1990, 42–45; Arora 1992, 319; Karttunen 1997, 89; Bosworth 1996, 121–123). In the same context, we are able to follow, as well, the early integration and reinterpretation of the mythology and iconography of Alexander in Hellenic, Egyptian, and Syrian, and later in Jewish or Mithraic, temples and religious traditions, or his reimagining as universal ruler born to Egyptian, Persian, and, later, Ethiopian dynastic parents.

While certain cultural transfers can be traced in the needs and policies of the dynastic centres, this unprecedented level of transformation and interconnectedness of the local, regional, and global represents a direct result of the accelerated globalisation process during the Hellenistic period. Its level of affecting local communities and creating interrelated interests, ideas, and identities across the lines of the traditional social and cultural cleavages and throughout wider geographic distances displays many similar characteristics with the present stage of the globalisation process (Mairs 2017, 885–895).

**Globalising Rome—between polis and cosmopolis**

As much as the decentralised model of Macedonian imperialism promoted globalisation, the overall growth and empowerment of the local communities through this globalisation process ultimately challenged the central authority of the Macedonian dynasts.

In addition, the “decisive stage in the integration” and “interconnection” that, by the year 200 BC, spread towards the Western Mediterranean, continental areas of Europe and Africa, deeper north into Central Asia, and east towards Eastern India, and China, empowered communities, and elites beyond the traditional “imagined geographies” of the Hellenistic dynastic system (Beaujard 2010, 34). While the “material” and “political exchanges” were increasingly interconnecting these new entities with the *oikumene*, many of them were only recently introduced into its symbolic unity (Waters 2001, 20). This symbolic deficiency of the new-comers represented a particular challenge for the “global moral behaviour” that was uniting the complex “network of dependent and overlapping factors” of the *oikumene* and ultimately undermining its global rulers (Scham 2009, 169, also on global moral behaviour, see: Appiah 2006; Ng 2006, 293–308).

This complex relationship with the globalisation process encouraged further decentralisation and flexibility of the dynastic system, creating the new “cultural
Globalisation, ancient cosmopolitanism, the Western Bollywood

(and political) horizon” of the post-Hellenistic oikumene (Versluys 2022, 67). Thus, in the process of dissolution of the most powerful dynastic systems/branches of the Hellenistic oikumene, those of the Antigonids, Seleucids, and Ptolemaids, numerous lateral dynastic branches and local elites grew into independent dynastic cores. This enhanced multiplication of the model of rule created a new strong bond between the local and global in the oikumene. Finally, between the first century BC and the first century AD, numerous territories of the Old World from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, were ruled by “universal” dynasts with shared origins, narratives, and worldviews. The traditional Macedonian dynastic names, like Ptolemy, Amyntas, Demetrius, Antiochus, or Archelaus, in these new globalised dynasties were frequently combined with local and regional ones, like Agathocles, Mithridates, or Ariobarzanes. Many of them were still wearing proudly their diadems, the Macedonian kausia, glorified royal chlamys or boots, issuing coins in koine, or promoting their patron gods and progenitors like Heracles, Dionysus, and Helios (van Oppen de Ruiter 2019, 160–191). Yet, in this new post-Hellenistic context, there was also an additional place and focus on numerous reinvented local and glocal symbols and traditions that were strengthening the legitimacy of the newly emerging dynasts. At the same time, through the well-developed model of Macedonian imperialism, these new dynastic cores reached legitimation through mutual marriages. Thus, they based their legitimacy on the co-dependence on a combined heritage, that recreated an even more vibrant, colourful, and, yet, ideologically unified dynastic “network of alliances and descent” throughout the post-Hellenistic globalised world (Ng 2006, 301).

This interplay between the local and the global created various glocalised identities and entities throughout the oikumene. The combinations varied, from those with strongly embedded universal symbols, narratives, identities, and principles of rule in their local realms, such as the pioneers of the post-Hellenistic dynastic model in Anatolia, to those aiming to reimagine and “bring forward” their local identities and culture, while pushing for wider extension of their realm and global pretensions (Versluys 2022, 67).

Numerous contemporary scholars have already suggested that the empires born in or on the spatio-temporal boundaries of the Macedonian imperial system should be analysed as successors of its model and socio-cultural traditions (Versluys 2015, 165; Strootman 2014a, 2; Nederveen Pieterse 2015, 225–237; Tevdovski 2020, 7–28). Thus, the Maurya Empire, the Parthian Empire, as well as the Roman and the Kushan Empires, Aksumite and Meroitic kingdoms, and even Han Empire were differently, yet substantially influenced by the global cultural horizon of the Hellenistic oikumene (Bang 2012, 60–75; Pitts and Versluys 2015; Beaujard 2010, 34).

Furthermore, the Parthian, Roman, and Kushan Empires that were building their identities against and upon the global cultural and socio-political horizon of the Hellenistic oikumene and in close interrelations with post-Hellenistic dynastic cores, such as Cappadocia, Commagene, Osrhoene, Judea, or post-Hellenistic dynasts in India, might be also analysed as integral elements of the wider post-Hellenistic dynastic system. These successful latecomers, in the competition for legitimacy and global rule, lacked some of the credentials of the traditional
post-Hellenistic cores and had to rely more heavily on their reimagined local identities. In that process, they created multiple “innovative” glocalised versions of the ideology and heritage of the Hellenistic *oikumene* (Versluys 2022, 70–71; Witcher 2017, 634–651).

It is only in this wider context that we would be able to reconceptualise Rome beyond the rooted misconceptions (for 200 BC “threshold” see: Versluys 2022, 69–71) related to its status as a supreme shrine of the unique heritage of the Western world. Understanding Rome “as a successor culture” of Macedonian imperialism and the Hellenistic cosmopolitan *oikumene* (Versluys 2015, 165; Strootman 2014a, 2) and an integral element of the post-Hellenistic system takes away its status of a “sui generis” case and the historical “precedent for the current world” (Witcher 2017, 645). However, “contextualising” the development and transformations of Rome within the wider globalisation processes of ancient Afro-Eurasia, and even “provincialising it (them) spatially”, alongside the related transformations in Parthia, “Indian Ocean and China”, provides us with a useful comparative framework (Witcher 2017, 645; Nederveen Pieterse 2015, 231–232).

Using globalisation theory and the comparative approach, we might be able to introduce a more complex picture of the interrelated local, regional, and global identities and heritage of Rome. For the needs of this chapter, I have structured and simplified this complexity, following the main principles of Waters’ globalisation theorem, summarised as: “material exchanges localize; political exchanges internationalize; and symbolic exchanges globalize” (Waters 2001, 20).

### Localism as Roman heritage

Although living beyond the borders of the dynastic system and on the margins of its cosmopolitan *oikumene*, Rome, like other less integrated parts of the Western Mediterranean, was deeply affected by the enhanced globalisation processes of the Hellenistic period. The analyses of the material culture and early Latin literature reconstruct a picture of Rome and Italy from the third century BC that is not just integrated into the global trade networks but also “perfectly comfortable with its cosmopolitan (cosmopolitanising), or globalised, state” (Isayev 2015, 132).

However, the particular “intensification” of the globalisation process in Italy (Versluys 2015, 162; Isayev 2015, 125–133), related as in other cases with the global developments around 200 BC, might be brought in direct relation with the appearance of the first element of Waters’ tripartite globalisation model—localisation (2001, 20).

Thus, the cosmopolitan world was already *ante portas* with all its glory, even by the end of the third century, when Hannibal brought in front of the walls of Rome the “strange (Indian) monsters of the Macedonians” (Justin, 18.1). Yet, half a century later, the books, artefacts, craftsmen, scholars and especially the cosmopolitan lifestyle that Roman generals themselves brought from the forums, royal libraries, and palaces of the Macedonian kings, were not just inside the city walls but also “corrupting” the minds of young Roman aristocrats (Polyb. 31.25.1–7, see also: Goldberg 2005, 24; van Oppen de Ruiter 2019, 160–191; Spawforth 2018, 262).
This “intensified”, multi-layered connectivity triggered a reaction from the overwhelmed local elites who were trying to navigate and reconceptualise their role and identities in the changing realities (Versluys 2015, 162; Isayev 2015, 125–133). The anti-globalist and xenophobic rhetoric and the religious prosecutions of this period, emerging from the historical sources, like the writings, speeches, and advocacy of Cato the Elder and the Bacchanalian Affair of 186 BC (Petrochilos 1974, 186), reveal the new element of the globalisation of Rome. This newly imagined localism dominated the discourse of Roman conservatives during the Republic and remained an important aspect of the identity of certain Roman elites even in the imperial period.

The ideas, as formulated in Cato’s era, that the newly approaching cosmopolitan, eloquent, and knowledgeable elites, like doctors, philosophers, diplomats, scientists, astrologists, priests, or seers, were dangerous for the city, its values, and system of rule, transformed into a consistent narrative, present in the city and among its elites for centuries. This embedded parochialism cultivated a specific *intra muros* aspect of the identity of the city and its elites. Thus, rustic ‘common men’, uncorrupted by extravagant global influences, like Marius, were praised in the city as “good Romans”, while the protagonists of wider cosmopolitan influence, projects, or global leadership, like Tiberius Gracchus or Marcus Antonius, were perceived as the biggest threat to Rome, its elites, and their social status quo (Petrochilos 1974, 166; Sall. Jug. 63.3; 85.12, 32; Rawson 1975, 148–59; Astin 1978).

These elements of Roman identity, entrenched in the ideological battle between the “unique local values” of Rome and the cosmopolitan *oikumene* are at the same time very recognisable, reminding us strongly of the xenophobia in classical Athens and the reactions against its own “medized” elites, “seduced by (the) luxury and power” of the great kings (Zacharia 2008, 29–31; Hall 1989, 204). In that context, we should remind ourselves of the words of Appadurai, that many of the products of globalisation “manifest themselves in intensely local forms but have contexts that are anything but local” (2001, 6).

Thus, if the Roman localism of the early second century was built upon the principles of the *intra muros* identity developed in classical Hellenic poleis, in the later period, it also recycled, integrated, and utilised concrete narratives from the “cultural memory” of the Hellenistic *oikumene* (Versluys 2022, 66). Prominent examples involve Cicero’s reminiscence of Demosthenes’ Philippics, in the process of defending the republic and its ideology from the Roman leaders “seduced by (the) luxury and power” of the dynasts, or Tacitus’ later defence of the city’s local elites and “freedom”, during the Flavian twilight of the Republican traditions (Andrade 2012, 441–475; Tevdovski 2020, 7–28).

Finally, one might ask if Roman localism makes its heritage local. Regarding material culture, we might consider the introduction of Latin in epigraphy and particular objects that provide increased visibility to Italians in the Mediterranean of the second and first century BC as elements related to localism (Woolf 1992, 289; Isayev 2015, 125–133; Witcher 2000, 218–219). However, even as such, their close interconnectedness with materials, styles, techniques, and processes of
the wider oikumene translated them into part of the increased flow of ideas and materials and widened the repertoire of the global heritage of the post-Hellenistic oikumene (Versluys 2015, 141–167).

On the other hand, the reimagined “local” or “sui generis” Rome, appearing locally during the Renaissance, transformed into one of the most influential globalising discourses “over the course of the ‘long’ nineteenth century from the French Revolution to the First World War” (Funder et al. 2019, 2–3). It became an important reference point and “locus of meaning, memory and identity” (Malpas 2014, 4; also Malpas 2012; Berry 2009) for the newly invented localisms, such as races, cultures, nations, or civilisations. Thus, Roman localism, or at least its principles, through the agencies of colonialism and anticolonialism (Versluys 2014, 1–20), was embedded in countless localised social traditions and transformed into the glocalised heritage of the contemporary world.

**Internationalisation and the Western Bollywood**

During the second half of the second century bc a new trend of accommodation of Roman identities towards the globalisation process is clearly visible. While for some Romans, their identity remained inside the city walls, for others, their domination, education, or ventures within the ‘Roman protected’ cosmopolitan centres of the globalised world and wider became a new identity and Romanness. This development is closely related to the second element of Waters’ tripartite globalisation model—internationalisation (2001, 20).

In the words of Waters, Romans entered into numerous “political exchanges”, including challenging major actors and coalitions with minor actors of the international dynastic system (Eckstein 2008), and had to introduce new “social arrangements” in order to “control . . . the population that occupies (the extended) territory and harness . . . its resources” (Waters 2001, 19). However, this complex international dialogue required an internationalisation of their local ideological idiom in order to be recognised as collocutors in the “international relations” of the cosmopolitan oikumene.7

A new glocalised worldview that served the internationalising visions and aspirations of the Romans and articulated the changing realities appears in historical records through the works of Polybius (Isayev 2015, 123–140; Strootman 2019, 179–182; Quinn 2013, 337–345). Its narratives manage to reinvent the outdated elements of localism that were built through challenging central authorities from the fringes of the oikumene. Internationalising these localisms, the author presents them as unique capacities and elements of the ideology of the new “improved” world of the Romans (Erskine 2013, 243–245).

Polybius’ “Roman world” is ideologically structured upon the principles of the globally dominant universalistic narratives developed in the courts of the Macedonian dynasts and their predecessors. At the same time, it also follows some of the major patterns of other glocalising efforts, already seen in the Hellenistic and augmenting in diverse post-Hellenistic contexts (Polybius, 1.1.5; Strootman 2019, 179–182, 2022). From that perspective, Polybius represents a post-Hellenistic
reincarnation of Manetho or Berossos, reimagining “classical Greece” as a mythological predecessor that legitimises the new global and glocalised rulers—the Romans (In Thornton’s words, “mediator”, like the Hellenistic bureaucratic elites, see: 2013, 225–226, also: Henrichs 1995, 243–261; Spawforth 2012).

In the post-Hellenistic context, Polybius’ vision strongly resembles the efforts of different local rulers in Asia to rearticulate their local identity into a new glocalised Persianism (Strootman and Versluys 2017). Although many of these local rulers were already integrated into lateral branches of the Macedonian dynasties, their court propaganda made diverse efforts to transform the stereotypes of outsiders or second-class elites into an additional argument for global rule—the descent from both the Macedonian dynasts and their predecessors in global rule—the Persian Great kings (Tevdovski 2020, 7–28).

An even closer glocalisation model might be recognised in the efforts of different, less integrated, or newly emerging dynastic cores to invest strongly in glocalising and globalising their cultural and religious traditions. Thus, compensating for their deficiencies in international legitimisation through dynastic lineage, dynasts from India, Indochina, or Judea were “reshaping” their religious traditions in an “innovative and cosmopolitan way” and presenting themselves as “universal monarchs” upon the argument of “rule in accordance with” and through the promotion of universal values and principles (Bang 2012, 60–75; Murphy and Lefferts 2017, 770–771; Leonhard 2012, 190; Amitay 2010; Vermes 1973, 212–213).

The structure of Polybius’ metathesis is not much different. It transforms the Hellenistic prejudice of Rome as a distant (aspiring) Greek polis (Strabo, 5.232) into a unique quality of the new global rulers (Tevdovski 2020, 7–28). While they could not claim lineage from the great descendants of Alexander, Romans defied the model and instead presented themselves as proud global contesters of the will of the Great kings, on the model of the classical Greeks (or rather Athenians).8

This “innovative” glocalised vision was useful in introducing Romans into the cosmopolitan oikumene (Quinn 2013, 337–345). It internationalised (glocalised) their identities, reached towards the reimagined traditions and loyalties of certain communities they effectively governed, and formulated elements of structure, regulation, and shared values of their newly imagined world of “free poleis” (Thornton 2013, 225–226; Spawforth 2012). However, some of the early “innovations” of this ideological system transformed into limitation factors in the ever-increasing global dialogue and interrelation in the wider post-Hellenistic oikumene.

Thus, Roman leaders from the second half of the first century BC and the early emperors, together with other post-Hellenistic rulers, were increasingly perceived as integral parts of the system of global rule by the elites of the cosmopolitan oikumene. Therefore, their global imagery was developed upon the patterns of the court culture, ideology, and rituals of the Macedonian dynasts. However, the new glocalised identities of the Roman elites, different from the identities of the Macedonian and local priestly elites from the Hellenistic and other post-Hellenistic contexts, were not supporting the global credentials of their rulers. Instead, reimagined as global “free” elites, “well organised”, and united in taming the “irresponsible nature of kingly power” (Thornton 2013, 216–218), the identity and aspirations
of these elites were undermining both the global and the local credentials of the Roman emperors. Thus, ideological fractures were increasingly estranging Roman emperors and their growing courts from the traditional or conservative Roman elites and privileging the cosmopolitan elites with shared narratives, values, credentials, and worldviews. In addition, the majority of post-Hellenistic dynasts legitimised their positions as global rulers through descent from the Macedonian dynasts and constantly strengthened their credentials by entering into dynastic marriages, coalitions with different local and regional elites, and embracing different local traditions. Roman emperors, on the other hand, were in a challenging position of “homo duplex” (Versluys 2022, 70–71). Lacking dynastic credentials, they had to zealously, and sometimes preposterously, imitate and constantly reintegrate the growing repertoire of symbols and rituals of the global rule. At the same time, in order to reaffirm their Romanness, emperors had to tame the “irresponsible nature of (their own) kingly power” (Thornton 2013, 216–218; Harries 2013, 50–51), which was preventing them from developing a consistent dynastic ideology and system of rule.

Finally, the internationalisation of Roman localism extended the ideological “city walls” throughout the imagined geographies of the new Roman world. Yet, at the same time, and in accordance with Waters’ definition, it strengthened and multiplied them. The conceptualisation of the “Roman world” upon the “Greeks-barbarians” dichotomy, as early as the second century bc, remained an important element and transformed into an agent of new glocalisations throughout the Roman empire.

Part of the Roman bureaucratic and intellectual elites, although increasingly embracing the global koine of material culture and ideas, kept the backbone of the narrative of “leadership over free cities that defy the kings and their loyal subjects” as their own version of Romanness in the next few centuries (On the concept, see: Polybius, 1.1.5; Spawforth 2012; Quinn 2013, 337–352; Tevdovski 2020, 7–28). Thus, picking and choosing through the traditions of Hellenistic philosophy, the mundanus Cicero was vigorously defending the republic, mocking the “phony credentials, rituals, attire, and symbols” of different post-Hellenistic dynasts and the “medising” of the Roman administrative and military leaders (Cic., Q.fr. 2.12.2–3.; Facella 2006). After two centuries, Aristides was still able to reconstruct the ideological narrative of a world based on the traditions and glory of the Greek poleis, freed and united by the “ultimate polis”, Rome (Asirvatham 2008, 207–227). In the pattern of Cicero, Aristides evokes once again the picture of the “archenemy” of the freedom of Greeks, Philip of Macedon, reminding Thebes, Athens, and Rome of the “dangers” of the penetration of the shared values of a cosmopolitan oikumene ruled by the “barbarian” “kings of all nations” (Asirvatham 2008, 207–227).

By the second century, aspects of the Macedonian imperial ideology, including “unity under a single, divinely protected monarch became acceptable for the Romans” like Aristides (Strootman 2022, 391). Yet, their reinterpreted “notion of universal peace and prosperity” stood in stark contrast to its Hellenistic pattern (Strootman 2022, 391). Thus, the imperial ideology of the Macedonian dynasts,
styled as saviours of all nations, protectors of all peoples, theoi synnoai or sons of their dynasts and gods, and promoters of their local traditions, aimed at homonoia (harmony) and “unity of all the peoples of the world under the king’s aegis” (Legras 2014, 104; Strootman 2014b, 2022, 391). The global credentials of Aristides’ Romans were, instead, related to “surveying” and “control of territories”, their transformation through Roman “bridges”, “roads”, filling deserted places (colonisation), and Roman citizenship (assimilation), with a final aim to “civilize(ing) everything with your (Roman) way of life and good order” (trans. Behr 1981, 78; Strootman 2022, 385; Ando 2016, 169–185).

This glocalised version of the cosmopolitan oikumene, as a pseudo-cosmopolitan element of the Roman heritage, was impregnated in the value systems of the modern colonial elites of the West and still influences our efforts to reimagine a new cosmopolitan world (Hingley 2015, 35–38).

The cosmopolitan Rome and its heritage

In a close resemblance with the developments in other post-Hellenistic cores, the globalisation process that triggered Roman localism and later reimagined these traditions in a wider international context, also exposed Romans to an assortment of universalised and widely shared “meanings, beliefs, commitments, preferences, tastes, and values” of the cosmopolitan oikumene (Waters 2001, 17).

Thus, even while living beyond the boundaries of the Hellenistic dynastic system, different Roman elites entered early into diverse “symbolic exchanges” with the world of the dynasts (Waters 2001, 18). Among them, the most important engines of change were the Roman military leaders. Their military successes, which escalated at the end of the second and during the first century bc, pushed these individuals deep into the global context and the constant dynastic contest for global rule.

This development, as in the case of previous successful or strategically important local military leaders, opened the path for the integration of the Roman military elites into the system of the global rulers of the Hellenistic world.9 While the process of “progressive basilisation” of Roman military elites, as an element of the wider “symbolic exchange”, might be traced as early as the second century bc, the unique opportunity for the Romans occurred only a decade after their triumph over one of the most ambitious post-Hellenistic pretenders for global rule, Mithridates VI of Pontus (Hekster and Fowler 2005, 9–38).

Rome was a latecomer in such a system, lagging behind the elites of Cappadocia, India, and even Sicily by over a century. Yet, the historical momentum that elevated its leaders, like Caesar and Marcus Antonius, beyond the possibilities of other post-Hellenistic pretenders for global rule was a logical development in the context of Roman tempestuous military penetration into the cores of the Hellenistic system and oikumene (Strootman 2010; 140–57; Tevdovski 2020, 7–28). Thus, the descendants of the suddenly deified yet consistently militarily effective leaders of Rome and the last prominent Macedonian dynast Cleopatra VII, Ptolemy Caesarian, Alexander Helios, Cleopatra Selene II, or Ptolemy Philadelphus, were for a
moment in history in a position to stabilise the Hellenistic world and legitimise the new Roman positions in such a global reality.10

Yet, this fast-track integration process created a “friction” of the “local, the regional, and the global” that, after the “brutal encounter” in Actium, resulted in new creative “arrangements of culture and power” in the Roman world (Versluys 2021, 33–43).

Thus, the Roman-governed areas of the globalised *oikumene*, living under the newly deified global rulers from Rome, remained in ideological unity with the rest of the world. However, the Julio-Claudians temporarily postponed the ambitious plans for reuniting Alexander’s *oikumene* of their relative, Antonius. Instead, they focused on introducing Hellenistic ideology in Rome and developing their new dynastic traditions through “symbolic exchanges” and close association with their dynastic cousins from different post-Hellenistic cores (Waters 2001, 18).11

On the other hand, the conservative elites in the city were provided with the Actium “ideological bubble” that was artificially preserving some rudimentary forms of the anti-globalist or glocalised traditions (see: Spawforth 2012). This “illusion of *libertas*” was not inconsistent with the previous imperial policies of the Macedonian and Persian dynasts that allowed many poleis (and ethnae) to retain certain traditions and local institutions (Andrade 2012, 444–452).

However, the enthronement in Rome of the outsider Vespasian, elected as global ruler in Alexandria (Sullivan 1978, 933; Murison 2016, 80), in close relation with the Hellenistic elites and post-Hellenistic dynasts, and under the ideological, cultural, and religious norms shared by the cosmopolitan world, changed the city to its core (Andrade 2012, 444–452; Hekster and Fowler 2005, 29). The local traditions and elites had to give way to the ambitious visions of Rome as the important dynastic centre of the cosmopolitan *oikumene* (Tevdovski 2020, 7–28).

The “Vespasian momentum” of dramatic cultural, ideological, religious, and political change in the city was perceived by some locals as “Eastern enslavement” that erased even the Augustan “illusions of *libertas*” (Andrade 2012, 444–452). Yet, the close interrelation of Flavian emperors with the global network of cosmopolitan elites and post-Hellenistic dynasts and the development and promotion, under their auspices, of different globalised and glocalised narratives, religious cults, or institutions, paved the way for the creation of a new cosmopolitan Rome (Tevdovski 2020, 7–28).

The enlargement of the Roman world towards the East, which started with Vespasian, was augmented through the policies of another military leader and an outsider from Rome (and Italy). The new Rome of Trajan involved numerous Hellenistic core territories and post-Hellenistic dynastic centres and promoted on a global level their elites and narratives (Syme 1988, 315, also: Hammond 1938, 1957; Tevdovski forthcoming). This reinvigoration of the networks of the cosmopolitan *oikumene* “proliferated rapidly” the universal symbols in “any locality” and undermined many cultural barriers (Waters 2001, 19–20). Thus, Syrian and Anatolian dynasts could become Roman senators, consuls and officials in different provinces, while Roman senators could become Armenian kings (Tevdovski forthcoming, also: Sullivan 1978, 937; Syme 1988, 23, 195, 326–340; Rémy 1989,
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202–204; Bowie 2014, 76). The Roman Senate was transforming into a club of dynastic elites and cosmopolitan intellectuals, serving, in a Hellenistic pattern, as emperors’ companions. Finally, the Roman emperors were increasingly perceived as global rulers and “guiding spirit” of this enlarged oikumene and presented in the pattern of the Macedonian dynasts as Heracles, Dionysus, Helios, or the new Alexander (Voegelin 1974, 132).

During the first two centuries of Roman imperialism, the extensive “symbolic exchanges” of the Roman emperors, with numerous dynastic, bureaucratic, and religious elites from different post-Hellenistic centres of the oikumene, have gradually integrated Rome into the post-Hellenistic dynastic system and standardised its system of rule with the millennial imperial traditions, and especially those of its immediate predecessors, the Macedonians. As anticipated in Waters’ tripartite definition, this cultural globalisation of Rome and the multidirectional “exchange of symbols” that is very hard (or impossible) to “monopolise”, ultimately “release(d) social arrangements from spatial referents”, creating a truly global and cosmopolitan Rome (2001, 19–20).

The most symbolic element that illustrates this new phase of development occurred during the enthronement in Rome of another military leader and outsider from Africa. Differently from the unsuccessful attempts with Cleopatra and Titus’ Berenice, Septimius Severus brought and enthroned in Rome his dynastic princess and based the legitimacy of the new Roman dynasty on the glorious descent of the new “despoina of the oikumene” and “augusta” (Levick 2007, 150–153). His, or rather, her descendants became true rulers of the cosmopolitan oikumene.

The new Roman emperors of the third century resurrected the ideal of the united world in its full Hellenistic glory. They were universal dynasts who could trace their descent through post-Hellenistic dynasties to Alexander and Darius. Many of them were born and raised in the centres of the Hellenistic world, some with Macedonian dynastic names as Alexander and Philip, others as priests and princes in Mesopotamian and post-Hellenistic manner. They reintroduced the global symbols of rule, like Alexander, the royal diadem, and the Macedonian phalanxes, and globalised the local and glocal traditions, providing a Senate for the Alexandrians or “Syrian” and “Egyptian” gods for Rome.

Maybe the most symbolic triumph of the values of the cosmopolitan oikumene might be recognised in the policies of Caracalla. This “new Alexander”, in accordance with the ideals of the cosmopolitan universe, as exposed by Zeno, erased the “walls” inside his empire, providing equal law for all people, and by proposing marriage to another descendent of Alexander and Darius, the Parthian princess, he made the final stretch for uniting the oikumene (Burgersdijk and van Waarden 2010, 78–80).12

These cosmopolitan policies and universalistic ideologies represent an important element of the wider process in the Roman empire and the wider post-Hellenistic oikumene that introduced new localisms, glocalisations and globalisations of identities, symbols, and the related material culture. The later Roman empire, or rather Basileia ton Rhomaion, that emerged from this process was a protean hub of the interrelated globalised and glocalised heritage of the Hellenistic and

It was this global Rome and its cosmopolitan traditions that were reimagined and multiplicated in the medieval and early modern courts and policies of its “heirs”, like the Holy Roman Emperors, Emperors of Ethiopia, Russian Tzars and Ottoman Sultans, and thus transformed into a shared heritage of the modern globalised world (Bang and Kołodziejczyk 2012, 1–40; Ng 2019, 49–73).

We the Bollywood: from proto to metacosmopolitanism

“Roma! Roma!” was the war cry of the soldiers of the Ottoman sultans that was terrifying the 16th-century diplomatic corps to the Pope in Rome. But the Ottomans were not in Italy yet, and their slogan was not related to the city of the Popes. At least not directly. Instead, they were marching in the name of their own “Rome” and the new universal rulers of the world in Constantinople. Each one of the Ottoman Sultans, these new rulers of the millennial centre of the globalisation process on the Bosporus, was lavishly celebrated as the new Alexander and Caesar. (Ng 2019; Gibb 1882, 166).

Yet, they had to compete for the shared image and related narratives and heritage with the Hapsburgs, the Bourbons, the English or Portuguese kings and even the sultans of Sumatra, like Iskandar Muda, “the Young Alexander” (Ng 2019, for Mughal emperors as “lords of the universe”, see: Pagden 2003, 42).

Such insightful historical episodes, not differently from the contemporary historical revelations, increasingly present in the contemporary political and international debates, pose an important question for both researchers of the past and heritage managers. What kind of heritage are we really looking for? Does it need to be uniquely ours or just understood in our own terms? And is the cosmopolitanism still an applicable or desirable concept for such aspirations?

The same question was occupying the prominent American lawyer and philosopher, Ackerman, more than three decades ago. In the midst of the fierce debate of the intellectual elites about the question of whether the new Pax Americana should be conceptualised upon the protection of the “unique” Western values or upon their promotion as a universal norm, Ackerman promoted a new or reimagined concept (Huntington 1996, 21–22; Fukuyama 1989). His “rooted cosmopolitanism” exhibited awareness of the Western system as “lots smaller than the world” and with a “history (and history of ideas) that is a hiccup in world time”. Yet, at the same time, Ackerman was idealistically opposed to giving up on the premise of one world for “all earthlings”.

This chapter builds upon such early ideas of rooted cosmopolitanism and its dialectical nature (Cohen 1992, 480–483), daring to make new propositions and avenues for reconciliation, or at least added flow, between the local and global, or particular and universal, as pivotal categories of this philosophical conception.

Thus, by developing a wider frame for understanding the cosmopolitan oikumene of ancient Afro-Eurasia, it enlightens us with elements of shared heritage and traditions, overlooked, abandoned, and sometimes even proscribed by the
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growing particularistic tendencies of the 19th and 20th centuries. The thick layer of protocosmopolitanism that I tried to reveal on this occasion, in the globalising world of antiquity, and the numerous localised and glocalised elements of continuity of such ideology around the world provides us with a new perspective on the rootedness and capacities of this conception.

In addition, analysing the globalisation of Rome in the wider context of this oikumene, I reacknowledge Ackerman’s ideas of our “shrinking” world in the context of its “shrinking” mythical predecessor (Ackerman 1994, 516). Through such a methodological approach, the “unique” values of Rome, and implicitly those of its symbolical heir, the Western world, are recognised as manifestations of the recurring localisations that are interconnected, mutually promoted, and empowered by the globalisation process (Miksic and Yian 2017, 810). Therefore, they can no longer be perceived as cultural “containers” that need protection but as elements of the growing cultural repertoire and agents of the wider globalisation process (Pitts and Versluys 2015, 12).

The process of internationalisation of Roman localism, as analysed in the chapter, reminds us that the internationalisation of our own values and visions for the world is an inevitable and useful aspect of the intensified global trade and political exchanges, but it also has limited capacities. In that context, the “belief in the universality of Western culture”, understood as a continuation of the “Greco-Roman” ancient Bollywood, will always be perceived as “false . . . immoral and . . . dangerous” (Huntington 1996, 310), by all representatives of the otherness that this model implies. Even the efforts to reinvigorate and reconceptualise the philosophical concept of cosmopolitanism, “aged” through the “Greek, Roman, and Enlightenment” traditions (Meskell 2009, 2), would fall short of meeting their goals every time they overlook the particularistic heritage embedded in our Western cosmopolitanism, and the cosmopolitan heritage embedded in different local traditions.

Finally, the process of creation of a cosmopolitan Rome in antiquity, its longevity, multiplications, and wide cultural impact, suggests that the only way to preserve any values, symbols, and heritage that we hold dear in the global “disjunctive flow” is to expose them and constantly reimagine them through the multiplicity of different aspirations, loyalties, and perspectives (Cohen 1992, 480–483; Appadurai 2001, 6).

In that context, I propose that the intensifying contemporary globalisation process and the numerous original contributions and perspectives of the non-Western researchers that have helped us dramatically alter our Eurocentric and classicised views of human history and society represent just the first step towards truly cosmopolitan research. The opening towards different non-Western perspectives, while trying to analyse them through the Western-born methodologies in the postmodern stage of development, might be styled as a glocalised model, or in our particular context, as “Polybius momentum in modern research”. Yet, the real question is if this research, its methodology, analyses, and conclusions are appropriate for the interconnected multipolar world of the “Vespasian stage of globalisation and integration”.

The arguments that I presented in favour of the idea of a protocosmopolitanism, whose elements might be impregnated in the most diverse societal, ideological, religious, or cultural systems around the globe, create an opportunity to answer
such dilemmas by envisioning a novel model of cosmopolitanism. Purified from the limitations of our own Western ontology, ideological and value-based particularities, and ownership, such metacosmopolitanism, rooted in and cogently expressed through the diverse yet shared traditions and aspirations of countless cultural entities of the intensively interrelated world, might result in a new understanding of both human history and our heritage. When reconceptualised in this manner, as dynamical and perspective-relative, this rooted cosmopolitanism will not struggle but instead benefit and dwell upon the growing interrelations or confrontations of the inconsistent perceptions, impressions, influences, ideas, and traditions facilitated by the globalisation process.

Notes

1 One must bear in mind the traditional political and religious tensions among different Near-Eastern leaders and countries with dominantly Muslim populations. In addition, some of the main ideological and political opponents of Erdogan and his policies are his former Islamising allies (see: Guardian, December 2013; Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 2021).

2 The intensity of the Eurocentric bias and Saidian Orientalism embedded in this term is well illustrated by Barry Strauss, who underlines its “doubly problematic” character. Thus, while “one half of the term—‘istic’—suggests a mere derivative of the pure and original Hellenic”, or oriental hybridisation of the Western brilliance, the other half—“Hellen”—ignores the great majority of non-Greek and even non-European inputs in the global developments of this historical period. See: Strauss 1997, 165–166.

3 For the heritage of Hellenistic Egypt, see Versluys 2002, and for the “Persian” or “Phrygian heritage”, Strootman and Versluys 2017; Rives 2005, 223–244.

4 On the institutions and policies of Assyrians and Persians that were reaching towards the global knowledge and culture of the “four quarters of the world”, see Lavan et al. 2016.

5 Cato’s insistence to remove the philosophers from Rome in order that the youth might “return their ears to the laws and magistrates”, is a true reminiscence of Athenians’ accusations against Socrates’ cosmopolitanism. See: Plut. Cato. Mai. 22.5. On official decisions to expel philosophers and rhetoricians in the second and first century BC, see Athen. 12.547; Suet. 1. On prejudices against the doctors and the medical knowledge arriving to Rome from the cosmopolitan centres, see Astin 1978, 169–179.

6 At this point, Romans might have still been “outside of the wall” of the Greek-barbarian dichotomy and acquired the concept through the emancipatory efforts to cross such an ideological wall. See Pliny, NH 29.7.14.

7 As a newly emerging power, Romans were increasingly perceived and intentionally portrayed by competitors as “cruel barbarians”, greedy pirates and “motley rabble of refugees” that challenged the order of the world and its legitimate rulers, because of the “very low rank” of their ancestors (Erskine 2013, 243–245; Lerouge-Cohen 2017, 227; Naco del Hoyo and López Sánchez 2018, 1–14).

8 For the omnipresent conception that contesters of the power of the universal rulers, are “wrongdoers . . . against the divine world order he claims to protect”, see Strootman 2022, 386. Romans’ innovative model was trying to challenge/reform this centuries-old aspect of the “Near-eastern” imperial propaganda.

9 On the policies of “vassalisation” of successful military elites as imperial policy of the Persians and Macedonians, see Strootman 2022, 381–393, 2010, 140–157.

10 In the words of Strootman: “What Kleopatra had to offer Rome in return for a revived Macedonian empire . . . was exactly what Rome needed most to become the new master in the east: royalty.” See Strootman 2010, 140–157.
11 For the relation of the Julio-Claudians with their dynastic companions and “tyrannodi-
12 On the Roman ideological and literary tendencies to translate these universalistic impe-
rial ideologies into personal pothos and “dream” of military leaders and emperors, also
see Strootman 2022, 393.
13 According to the report of Ladislas Veteisus, ambassador of King Matthias Corvinus to
Pope Sixtus IV (Babinger 1978, 494).

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Part 2

Case studies
5 Local pasts, global presents?
Rooted cosmopolitanism and (the future of) pelota mixteca

Martin E. Berger

Introduction

In the early years of this century, Jonathan Xavier Inda and Renato Rosaldo (2002, 11) noted that, under the influence of globalisation, anthropological analysis needed to rethink culture beyond the confines of ‘the local’. In their own words,

the inclination in anthropology has been to assume an isomorphism between place and culture. Culture has been seen as something rooted in ‘soil’. . . . Nowadays, though, it is impossible, or at least rather unreasonable, to think of culture strictly in such localized terms. . . . Globalisation has radically pulled culture apart from place.

While Inda and Rosaldo (2002, 17) stress that this should not be taken to mean that globalisation can be automatically equated with cultural imperialism, their focus on glocalisation implies a study of the “interpretation, translation, and customisation [of western cultural forms] on the part of the receiving subject”. Lynn Meskell (2009, 25) has suggested that, rather than starting from this top-down globalisation/glocalisation perspective, a (rooted) cosmopolitan approach to heritage and culture is more productive because “while the processes of globalisation lay claim to an overarching homogeneity of the planet in economic, political, and cultural spheres, the term cosmopolitanism might be employed as a counter to globalisation from below”.

In this chapter, I first describe and analyse what could be called a bottom-up, rooted cosmopolitan practice of players of the Mexican handball game of pelota mixteca. Faced with the choice between the ‘museumisation’ of the game on the one hand and its ‘detraditionalisation’ on the other, and taking into account the significant decline in the number of players over the past decades, the playing community has tried to popularise pelota mixteca using transnational networks and ‘global forms’. In the second part of this paper, I briefly consider the broader ethical question of how a rooted cosmopolitan mindset can help us not only better understand the processes and cultures we are studying but also move past the artificial boundaries of ‘the field site’ and its implicit connotations of ‘out there’/‘exotic’/‘Other’.

Following Meskell (2009), I argue that a rooted cosmopolitan approach to the study
of immaterial heritage can offer a fruitful way out of the perceived exclusionary binaries of local/global and traditional/modern.

Much of the research presented in this chapter is based on informal interviews and conversations with players of pelota mixteca that took place in the period 2008–2014. Naturally, since almost a decade has passed between the research that this article is based on and the writing of this work, some things have changed. For example, more communities of players have established themselves in the United States, creating a livelier pelota mixteca community in the country. In addition, several initiatives aimed at promoting pelota mixteca as a sport for children—and including pelota mixteca in the curriculum of primary and secondary schools—have taken shape. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, travel to Mexico at the time of writing is difficult, if not impossible. As a result, the earlier research was updated based on text, photos and videos posted to Facebook, a medium used extensively by players and teams to communicate about where tournaments will take place, discuss the rules of the game, and promote not only their quintas (teams) but also the sport more generally. Parts of the findings of the 2008–2014 research were published in an earlier article (Berger 2016), in which I explored the tension between the classification by the state of pelota mixteca as intangible heritage versus its value to the players of the game as lived (and living) practice. I framed that discussion within discussions about globalisation and its impact on traditional (sports) cultures, concluding that globalisation both endangered the continued existence of pelota mixteca and created new opportunities for the sport to grow and the playing community to expand. In this article, I revisit the earlier work through the lens of rooted cosmopolitanism, not only updating the research with information from social media but also exploring whether ‘rooted cosmopolitan-thinking’ affords a more productive theoretical approach through which to reconcile the tensions between differing views on intangible heritage and its futures.

Pelota mixteca—between local and global origins

Pelota mixteca is a handball game played in three different modalities (hule, forro, and esponja), which are differentiated based on the equipment and ball used for playing. Originally played in Mexico’s southern state of Oaxaca, the game has spread to different parts of Mexico and the United States because of the extensive labour migration that has taken (indigenous) migrants from Oaxaca to areas far removed from their hometowns. While most teams are still based in Oaxaca, there are also sizeable active playing communities in Mexico City, as well as in California and Texas in the United States.

While there is no need here to give a full account of the rules of the game and how it is played (see Berger 2010; Pacheco Arias 2016 for a more in-depth description), in short, the game is played on a playing field of about 100 by 11 meters, called pasajuego. Teams consist of five players, and scores are counted in the same way as in tennis (15–30–40-juego). The game is played in three different modalities, pelota mixteca de hule, pelota mixteca de forro, and pelota mixteca de esponja. These modalities are differentiated by the implements used to hit the ball.
In all varieties of the game, players can only hit the ball with their hands, but the equipment that protects the hand differs between modalities. In *hule*, players hit a rubber ball with a large leather glove. *Forro* uses a ball made of leather and textile, and players’ hands are protected by cotton bands that are wrapped around the hands. The last modality, *esponja* or *del valle*, is played with a soft foam (sponge) ball that is hit with a wooden board. Depending on arrangements made before the start of a match, the first team to win a certain number of games wins and takes home the money that was bet on the game, a standard feature of virtually any game of pelota mixteca.

Pelota mixteca originated in the southern Mexican state of Oaxaca. Since at least the beginning of the 20th century, it has been regarded as an ‘indigenous’ or ‘autochthonous’ game (*Juegos autóctonos* in Spanish). While its name, which translates to ‘Mixtec ball’, suggests an origin among the Mixtec—one of Oaxaca’s indigenous peoples—the way the game is played is of European origin. In fact, the name *pelota mixteca* was only coined in the early 20th century. Before this, the game was simply called *pelota a mano fría* (‘bare-handed ball’). After the Spanish invasion of what is now Mexico, the colonial administration prohibited many forms of indigenous culture, religion, and ritual. One of the things it forbade was the hip-ballgame, known to the Aztecs as *ollama* or *ollamaliztli* and to contemporary academics as the Mesoamerican Ballgame. This game was prohibited because it was intimately related to Mesoamerican cosmology, religion, and ritual. However, in addition to its ritual value, the ballgame was also a pastime or sport that was played simply for its ludic value. As a result, when the Mesoamerican Ballgame was forbidden, local (indigenous) communities assimilated the handball games that the Spanish introduced as a replacement. Pelota mixteca developed as this kind of local assimilation of European games that were introduced by Spanish missionaries and/or immigrants (Berger 2010, 2011).

Despite this complex origin of the game, most players see pelota mixteca as a game with pre-colonial origins, a sport inherited from Mixtec noblemen, who played it in the ballcourts of pre-Hispanic archaeological sites like Monte Albán. Academic research has shown that the rules of the game and the way it is played are of European origin. While these two views might seem mutually exclusive, a rooted cosmopolitan approach to the game acknowledges that both views can be true at the same time. Pelota mixteca might be ‘of Spanish origin’, but this does not deny the fact that it is also ‘una práctica ancestral’, part of contemporary indigenous/traditional culture. Binary oppositions between the two present a view that is too simplistic to adequately express past, present, and future realities.

In line with this binary opposition of pre-Columbian vs. European, in his discussion of Marijke Stoll’s (2015) work on pelota mixteca, David Anderson (2015, 121) suggests that because players tend to think of pelota mixteca as a game that was played at Monte Albán, it is conceivable that “if an archaeologist or historian presented data demonstrating that the pelota Mixteca is, in fact, a Spanish game, their research would not be favorably received”. In my experience, this is not the case. Players of pelota mixteca themselves understand that their game has changed over the years, and many have no problem accepting that the game might be of Spanish
origin in terms of form. It remains a game that they learned from their forefathers and which was played and formed by their ancestors. When discussing my ideas about the Spanish origin of the game with a group of players in Los Angeles, one of them said, “well, I guess that makes sense. Since we count just as in tennis, which is a European game, the games probably had the same origin.” Similarly, a retired pelota mixteca player from Mexico City told me, “Yeah, I think long ago it was played with the hips”, indicating a direct continuity (in socio-cultural practice, rather than in form) between the precolumbian and the contemporary ballgame. The outward appearance of the game may have changed, but a significant continuity still exists between pelota mixteca and the precoloniol Mesoamerican ballgame. This continuity can only be discerned, understood and explained when taking into account all of the socio-historical processes that have affected Mexico over the course of the past 500 years.

Still, it seems that to some archaeologists, this concept of historical (experiential) continuity in spite of apparent change, is still unacceptable or, at the least, hard to grasp. Years ago, as a first-year graduate student, I was asked to do a presentation about this project to a peer group. One of the supervisors of this peer-group discussion, a (senior) full professor of archaeology, was of the opinion that it would be scientifically unethical to suggest that pelota mixteca is a continuation of the pre-Columbian ball game despite its formal European origins. While I do not recall exactly how he phrased his objections, they could be summarised as “the way the game is played is European, so it is clearly not indigenous. Saying that it is, is a misconstruing of the facts and a political choice to call something indigenous when it is not.” However, while indeed, “there is only one reality” (Appiah 2006, 43), there are different stories about how this reality has come to be. Cosmopolitanism forces us to “take seriously the value not just of human life but of particular human lives, which means taking an interest in the practices and beliefs that lend them significance. People are different, the cosmopolitan knows, and there is much to learn from our differences” (Appiah 2006, XV). This means that methodologically speaking, we cannot outright dismiss other’s views of history as ‘non-scientific’ since a cosmopolitan methodology/stance towards research forces us to listen and not only to speak.

It appears that rooted cosmopolitan ethics on the part of the researcher not only brings us closer to the view of the players but can also help us better understand the historical trajectory of the game. An essentialist approach that claims that the game cannot be at the same time European and indigenous/ancestral closes its eyes to cross-cultural compatibility and similarity. When discussing the ‘hybridisation’ of cultures, Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2009, 86) asks, “are cultural elements different merely because they originate from different cultures?” In the case of pelota mixteca and European traditional handball games, the answer to this question has to be “no”. To be sure, the outward appearance of the Mesoamerican ballgame changed significantly, and I do not think that we can say that pelota mixteca is a game that was played at Monte Albán, but I do think that pelota mixteca is, in a significant way, the continuation of the Mesoamerican ballgame. Not just because the game fulfils many of the social roles that ullamalitztli fulfilled, but also because
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it fulfils the same social roles as 16th-century Spanish pelota. The secular version of the Mesoamerican ballgame and *pelota a mano* were virtually the same cultural element; they simply originated from different cultures and continents.

**Pelota mixteca—sport and/or heritage?**

Because it is generally perceived as an indigenous or autochthonous game, pelota mixteca is played under the umbrella of what is called the ‘Juegos y Deportes Autoctonos y Tradicionales’ (Autochthonous and Traditional Games and Sports), a collective term for a variety of games and sports that are seen as sharing a pre-colonial, indigenous origin. Since 1988, the ‘Federación Mexicana de Juegos y Deportes Autoctonos’ (FMJDAT—Mexican Federation of Autochthonous and Traditional Sports) has promoted traditional sports in Mexico, of which pelota mixteca is one of the most popular. The FMJDAT is part of the National Sport System and recognised by both CONADE (National Sport and Physical Culture Commission) and CODEME (Mexican Sports Confederation) and received the National Sports Award in 2002.\(^1\) Over the past decades, the FMJDAT has done tremendous work supporting local communities across the country in various ways. The FMJDAT carries out a wide range of activities, but its primary aims are “to promote and safeguard traditional games and sports”\(^2\). It is in this formulation of ‘promoting and safeguarding’ that the essentially dual (and possibly ambiguous) nature of the federation’s aims come to light, since—unlike other sports and games which are simply played and practised—the only reason that these autochthonous and traditional sports and games are ‘safeguarded’ is because of their value as heritage.

This heritage value of traditional sports and games, in general, is underlined by the FMJDAT on their own website. They mention that “FMJDAT’s permanent work has managed to increase the experience and value of this national and international legacy, its importance has been recognised by the global village and acknowledged by international entities such as UNESCO”\(^3\). In their vision for the organisation, the value of these games and sports as *heritage* is highlighted, as the organisation wants to “successfully safeguard, promote and spread the historic, cultural and social importance of traditional games and sports practice, *as a heritage and as a background of national identity*”\(^4\). The FMJDAT’s largest annual event is the National Traditional Games and Sports Encounter, which it has organised since the mid-1990s. During this event, players of different traditional games and sports gather for exhibitions, demonstrations, workshops and cultural exchange. In addition, the FMJDAT coordinated Mexico’s participation in the World Indigenous Games, which included ten pelota mixteca players who demonstrated the game to the public, which consisted largely of indigenous athletes from around the world.

The FMJDAT was also involved when, in 2008, Marcelo Ebrard, then president of Mexico’s federal district, declared pelota mixteca intangible heritage of the city of Mexico. The proposal to declare the game an official intangible heritage came from the ‘Council for the Cultural Promotion and Development of the City of Mexico’ and was preceded by an extensive consultation with the National Institute of Anthropology and History (INAH). As part of the declaration, the Secretary of
Culture was tasked with preserving and promoting ballgames of pre-Hispanic origin by creating a cultural program meant to stimulate and spread these games. In addition, the declaration requested the Secretary of Culture to promote these games as a cultural tourist attraction.

I have argued elsewhere (Berger 2016) that this framing of pelota mixteca as ‘heritage’ (i.e. as a traditional cultural practice or tourist spectacle, rather than a sport) has strongly impacted not only the context within which it is played but also the way in which the government has (or has not) supported the players of the game and the game’s chances of survival into the future. Rather than seeing the game as physical exercise or sport, the Mexican authorities have treated pelota mixteca as a form of intangible heritage. The result of this ‘museumisation’ or ‘heritage canonisation’ is that the support the game has received from the Mexican authorities has been limited to the realm of cultural festivals, heritage declarations, and activities aimed at tourists rather than including pelota mixteca in the curricula of schools, supporting the creation of leagues, or other measures that would be appropriate for the popularisation of a sport.

In spite of the authorities’ insistence on the cultural (rather than the ludic) value of pelota mixteca, the players have initiated several initiatives that could result in a ‘detraditionalisation’ of the game, aiming to promote it as a sport to all sectors of society, rather than a cultural tradition that is particular to a well-circumscribed and delineated (indigenous) community. In this paper, I will explore how the players of pelota mixteca have developed what one could say is a rooted cosmopolitan attitude towards the game, aiming to ensure its survival not by ‘trapping themselves in difference’ (Appiah 2006, 105; Meskell 2009, 4), but by opening up their traditions to other participants, ensuring that way a thriving community that can carry the game into the future. By promoting the game as a sport (with its connotations of modernity, globalisation, and competition) rather than as a cultural practice (associated with traditions, the local, and folklore), the players seek to use ‘global’ forms to safeguard the future of ‘local’ tradition/practice. While, to some extent, these two forms of understanding the game might seem contradictory or even mutually exclusive (as exemplified by the decision to make the Secretary of Culture and Tourism, rather than the Secretary of Sport and Education, responsible for the development of plans to safeguard the future of pelota mixteca [Berger 2016]), I argue that the players of the game themselves have opted for an approach that can successfully navigate this tension between the local importance of traditions and the cross-boundary (global?) popularisation of the cultural tradition as a sport. In the view of the players, the game can be both an ancestral tradition and a modern sport that is popularised. In the following, I will explore this ‘rooted cosmopolitan mindset’ of the pelota mixteca community through quotes from informal interviews with players of the game, as well as posters and logos that were created for pelota mixteca tournaments and teams. In the second part of the paper, I will argue that the only way to truly understand and appreciate this process as researchers is by adopting a rooted cosmopolitan research ethics that acknowledges that, while (intangible) heritage might have cross-cultural origins, over time, these multicultural traditions tend to become rooted in the cultural identity of communities, without this leading to essentialist notions of traditions only belonging to one particular group of people.
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Picturing pelota mixteca

A brief look at some of the posters that have been created for pelota mixteca events clearly shows how pelota mixteca is promoted both as a sport and as an ancestral tradition. These posters were posted to Facebook in order to publicise tournaments and games taking place in different places in Mexico and the United States. In general, they are made by the teams themselves or by individuals related to the playing community, with the possible exception of the ‘Lunes del Cerro tournament’ (Figure 5.1), which was probably commissioned by the organisers of the state-wide tournament, who themselves are not players of the game. The first set of posters and logos shows the ‘heritage image’ of the game, focusing on precolonial iconography and links between pelota mixteca and precolonial ballgames. Figure 5.1, for example, was created for the ‘Torneo Lunes del Cerro 2021’, a tournament that takes place annually in the city of Oaxaca during Guelaguetza, a festival that celebrates and showcases the different indigenous cultures of the state of Oaxaca. For years, this tournament has been one of the largest and most important, bringing together quintas (pelota mixteca teams) from around the state, as well as Mexico City and, occasionally, the United States. The main image on the poster shows two men playing a game with a rubber ball. They are dressed in what could be called ‘generic precolonial outfits’, sporting a loin cloth, feathered headdresses and gold jewellery around their necks. The men are engaged in a game that resembles ulama de antebrazo, one of the modalities of the precolonial ballgame called ollama by the Aztecs/Mexica. The most famous (and widespread) version of this game is what is nowadays called ulama de cadera, the (in)famous hip-ball game that was played all over Mesoamerica in the precolonial era, and that is well-known to any tourist who has visited archaeological sites in large parts of Mexico and Guatemala. Ballcourts for this hip-ballgame have been found in all corners of the region, and scholars have extensively studied both the ancient version of this game, as well as its modern iterations (e.g., Taladoire 1981; Scarborough and Wilcox 1991; Whittington 2001; Leyenaar 1978; Aguilar 2015).

Its status as a deporte autóctono or deporte indígena, has lead players, aficionados, and politicians alike to see pelota mixteca as a direct descendant of precolonial ulama. This historical relationship to ‘pre-colonial glory’ is also visible in other posters for tournaments, such as Figure 5.2, made for a tournament of pelota de esponja, which shows a man in a loincloth and with a feathered headdress propelling a ball with his hip. Similarly, Figure 5.3 shows a poster for a tournament in Magdalena Jaltepec, at the bottom of which there are two depictions of Lord 8 Deer (1063–1115), a Mixtec ruler and famous cultural hero from the pre-colonial Mixtec codices (Anders et al. 1992). While this poster does not directly show the precolonial ballgame, the inclusion of an image from the pre-colonial Codex Tonind-eye (Zouche-Nuttall) clearly emphasises the deep historical roots of the game.

In contrast, the representation of pelota mixteca in a second group of posters employs a visual language aimed more at showing pelota mixteca as a modern sport rather than an ancestral game. Figure 5.4, for example, shows a poster for a tournament organised in Mexico City by the Arellanes team, a group of players from the same family who have been active in promoting pelota mixteca. Members
Figure 5.1 A (digital) flyer for the 2021 ‘Lunes del Cerro’ tournament.

Source: Pelota Mixteca De Hule “oaxaca” Facebook.
of the team have designed logos, t-shirts and other promotional material for their own team, as well as the sport more generally. The main logo shows the outline of a pelota mixteca de hule player wearing a baseball cap and hitting the ball with a glove. This image is included in neon colours on the poster, together with a neon outline of important buildings from the centre of Mexico City. A similar poster made for an international pelota mixteca tournament in Dallas, Texas, in the United
Figure 5.3 A (digital) flyer for a tournament in honour of Alfredo Emilio Bolaños “el Flaco” in 2021.

Source: Pelota Mixteca Magdalena Jaltepec Facebook.
Figure 5.4 A (digital) flyer for the ‘Torneo Álvaro Arellanes 2021’, showing the skyline of Mexico City.

Source: Pelota Mixteca Arellanes Facebook.
States follows a similar format (Figure 5.5). This image cleverly combines several elements that highlight the international nature of both the tournament and the game. At the bottom of the poster is an outline of the Dallas skyline, combined with an orange image of a bat, included because the tournament took place on October 30–31 and coincided with Halloween. Above the skyline is the name of the game, which is slightly hidden behind an image of papel picado, a traditional Mexican folk art.
garland used in celebrations of Día de Muertos, Mexico’s famous holiday celebrated on the days directly following Halloween—1 and 2 November. By combining these elements, the poster bridges the local and the transnational (if not global, considering the global spread of both Halloween and Día de Muertos) in the context of a traditional, autochthonous Mexican sport, focusing on the present rather than the past. A final example of the ‘sport approach’ to posters for pelota mixteca tournaments comes from San Miguel Jaltepec, Oaxaca. In this poster, pelota mixteca is included alongside other, more globalised, sports such as basketball, boxing, and soccer, among others. Notably, the comité de festejos, which organises these sports tournaments as part of the community’s patron saints day festival, is also transnational as its members are based in Mexico City and the United States.

Performing pelota mixteca

Most of the posters shown above were made by players of pelota mixteca themselves or by people related to the playing community. In these posters, it is the players themselves (or at least individuals affiliated with the playing community) who choose how the game is represented. In contrast, when players take part in demonstrations of the game organised by state authorities and organisations (other than the FMJDAT), they have little control over how their game is represented. As a result, the game is sometimes presented in ways that ‘historicise’ both the practice and its players. For example, during a demonstration of traditional games that was organised by Mexico City authorities in 2008, only a few days after pelota mixteca was declared an Intangible Cultural Heritage of the City of Mexico, pelota mixteca was presented inside a replica of a precolonial ball court. This replica included the rings that are traditionally found in Aztec and Post-Classic Maya ball courts, as well as Aztec calendar signs and plastic skulls on the walls. At the beginning of the match, the players lined up, their captains wearing a shield that was decorated with precolonial Mixtec iconography. Naturally, this ball court replica did not resemble in any way a normal pasajuego or even the playing field on which modern-day ulama is played. According to one participant, the players of pelota mixteca were even asked to wear loincloths instead of regular clothing, so that the demonstration would have a more ‘authentic’ feel. The peloteros responded by saying that their families had not worn loin clothes in at least 500 years and refused to dress up, especially for the event. These kinds of theatrical exhibitions in which players dress up in ‘pre-columbian garb’ have been taking place for a long time, as demonstrated by a pelota mixteca exhibition game organised at the archaeological site of Monte Albán in Oaxaca in the late 1960s. During this demonstration, players of the game did indeed wear loin cloths decorated with precolonial symbols, as well as traditional sandals, kneebands and arm protectors, all of which were part of a sort of ‘pre-colonial costume’ (Taladoire 2003).

Clearly, these kinds of performances present pelota mixteca as an ancestral tradition or living heritage, rather than as a sport. While, in 2008, the players did choose to participate in the demonstration in hopes of promoting their sport to outsiders and recruiting new players, the way in which the sport was presented was
not conducive to bringing in new participants. Eduardo Arellanes, one of the players of the *quinta* Arellanes, explains it best when he says:

I think mythicising the game has not helped in promoting it. I think it is a mistake to play under the label of the ancestral game that the ancestors played. This leads us to take part in exhibition games in loincloths at archaeological sites. . . . People who saw these exhibitions did not ask us ‘what’s your team called?’ or ‘where do you train?’, ‘how can I sign up to play?’ . No, the questions they asked were ‘is it true that the winner was sacrificed?’, or ‘why are you not wearing a loincloth?’

Similarly, about a decade ago, when the Arellanes players showed some of the t-shirts they had designed and printed to the cultural and sports committees of Mexico City, members of the committee “said that it looked very ‘basebally’”, leaving Eduardo Arellanes to comment “I don’t know what they expect, that we should play in loincloths instead!!”

Pelota mixteca is not the only sport that has been presented as ‘a remnant of the past’ on the Zócalo, in the heart of Mexico City. An arguably more extreme example took place recently, in August of 2021. As part of the 500-year anniversary of the fall of the Aztec-Mexica capital of Tenochtitlan, a reconstruction of the Mexica *huei teocalli* (Templo Mayor) was erected on the plaza in the heart of Mexico City. Part of this festival was an ulama exhibition, which featured body-painted players performing a type of *ulama de antebrazo* (Figure 5.6). According to the organisers:

The prehispanic games, which were declared Intangible Heritage of the City of Mexico on the 27th of October, 2008 [which includes pelota mixteca] will be recreated with the sound of the conch shell trumpet, . . . , a purification of the players and the court with incense, as well as a staging of the [human] sacrifice of the winners. With this presentation in the heart of the capital, the public will get acquainted with the values that have carried on this cultural inheritance, such as community social cohesion, rituals, rules and score count, as well as the diverse dynamics of this spectacular game.

Since a picture is worth a thousand words, I hope that Figure 5.6 makes abundantly clear that this exhibition does little to popularise ulama as a sport and, consequently, can never achieve the aim of acquainting the public with community values—let alone motivate spectators to start playing the game themselves. Contemporary players of the ulama do not paint their bodies, they do not perform purification rituals, nor do they sacrifice the winners of the game. It is exactly this kind of folklorisation of the game (and its players) that many players of pelota mixteca have tried to avoid. Of course, the reason traditional games are turned into heritage spectacles is their value as ‘ancestral traditions’. However, to players of the game, this ancestral origin of the game has little value, if it means that pelota mixteca only survives as an ‘intangible heritage’ and not as a popular sport. As Eduardo Arellanes puts it:
I think that, if we indeed carry this inheritance, the best option is to share it, so that it does not end with us. If some changes have to be made, in order for the sport to be widely practiced, that’s preferable. 8

Mexico has a long history of putting its indigenous traditions on display, while at the same time requiring its indigenous citizens to ‘modernise’ and relinquish those traditions, in favor of ‘modernity’. While there is no space here to sketch this history, the presentation of pelota mixteca within a replica of a prehispanic ball court is a perfect example of the strategy that the Mexican state pursued for a long time of representing indigenous culture devoid of any modern elements. This way a demonstration functioned solely as a presentation of a tradition of a certain indigenous group, which the Mexican state was proud of as historical patrimony but which had no place as a lived tradition in ‘modern’ Mexican culture. This strategy is similar to what Nestor García Canclini (1993, 164–177) describes for the 20th-century ethnographic display of the Museo Nacional de Antropología in Mexico City, where the highly traditional representations of the life of certain indigenous groups were always ‘sanitised’, stripped of any indications of the inclusion of these individuals and communities in a modern globalised world. According to Charles Hale (2004), this persistence of the ‘Indian Other’ was essential in order to create a counterpoint to the mestizo cultural ideal. The indigenous population still formed a large part of the backbone of Mexican national cultural identity, but

Figure 5.6 An ulama exhibition in August 2021 at the 500-year anniversary of the fall of the Aztec-Mexica capital of Tenochtitlan in Mexico City.

Source: Eyepix Group / Alamy Stock Photo.
a temporal distance had to be created. In the case of pelota mixteca this was achieved by giving demonstrations of the game within a replica of a pre-Hispanic ball court. Ultimately, what this points to is the lack of acceptance of precolonial traditions as living heritage in the modern-day Mexican nation-state. As José del Val has argued when discussing the work of José Vasconcelos, whose writings functioned as a blueprint for the creation of post-Revolutionary Mexican racial-ethnic-cultural identity, “[Vasconcelos’] revindication of pre-Hispanic Mexico resulted in righteous murals and in a cult for the ‘indians of stone’, to the detriment of the ‘living indians’ who were condemned to disappear in his protean project” (1999, 355).

**Trapped in diversity or rooted practice?**

Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006, 105) has argued that, in cosmopolitan ethics, “there is no place for the enforcement of diversity by trapping people within a kind of difference they long to escape”. Similarly, Lynn Meskell (2009, 4) states that “[cosmopolitanism] does not entail enforcing diversity by trapping people within differences they long to escape . . . nor would it attempt to congeal people within some preserved ancient authenticity”. What the designation of pelota mixteca as cultural heritage effectuates, or at least facilitates, is this ‘trapping in difference’ (not only culturally, but also temporally) of the players of an ‘age-old game’, who become bearers of a pre-colonial tradition, more so than athletes. Hence, the ‘fencing off’ of pelota mixteca as intangible heritage—a move borne out of a preservationist ethos that presupposes that particular traditions or forms of heritage are best ‘protected’ by museumisation or ‘heritagisation’—can do little to popularise pelota mixteca as a modern sport. This results in the kinds of situations described by Eduardo Arellanes when he speaks about his experience in presenting pelota mixteca jerseys to the CONADE, as well as the sports demonstrations of pelota mixteca that take place within replicas of precolonial ballcourts, adorned with skulls and Aztec iconography. Of course, this ‘congealing of people’ is not unique to the players of pelota mixteca, but rather a shared experience among indigenous and native peoples and cultures worldwide. In the words of Tyson Yunkaporta, “our knowledge is only valued if it is fossilised, while our evolving thought patterns are viewed with distaste and skepticism” (2020, 12).

While the declaration of pelota mixteca as an intangible cultural heritage ostensibly aimed to preserve the sport for future generations, its canonisation as heritage also resulted in congealing a particular form of the game as worthy of protection and preservation. In their introduction to this volume, Lilley and Versluys refer to the work of David Berliner (2018), who argues that heritage practices can result in the ‘freezing’ of culture. This is what happens in pelota mixteca’s declaration as heritage and presentation in heritage spectacles, which cast the game as a tradition and present its players inside replicas of pre-Hispanic structures. It is for exactly this reason that Appiah (2006, 105–107) takes issue with what he terms “the preservers of cultures”, who try to ensure that people around the world keep their ‘authentic’ ways. According to Appiah, “cultural preservationists often make their case by invoking the evil of ‘cultural imperialism’” (Appiah 2006, 107).
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An example of this can be seen in the reaction of the sports committee to the creation of pelota mixteca jerseys, in which ‘baseball-like’ is invoked as a modern imposition on pre-Hispanic traditions. The aesthetic of baseball, which was introduced into Mexico from the United States in programs of ‘cultural modernisation’ (which have historically been based on culturally imperialist visions and ideas), was seen to be incommensurable with pelota mixteca as an ancestral tradition, as something not ‘authentic’ enough in a preservationist mindset.

As such, a rooted cosmopolitan approach to pelota mixteca would seem to favour a position that acknowledges the historic rootedness of the game, while at the same time allowing for modification to meet the needs of modern-day players. In this view, pelota mixteca can at the same time be an ancestral tradition and a popular sport with all its connotations of globalisation, modernisation, codification of rules etc. This seems to be the same mindset that many of the players have adopted in promoting the game. We have seen this to a certain extent in some of the posters, which combine ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ elements (insofar as these can be separated), but can also see this in the statements of some of the players. When asked about why they play the game, many peloteros speak about the game as an inheritance or something that runs through their veins. Consider, for example, this discussion between Jaime and Pedro, two young players of the game in the United States:

Jaime: This whole sport consists of a chain. If your grandfather, your nephew, your son plays, of course you are going to come [and play] as well. . . . When I was 15 years old and going to high school and all that, this sport did not appeal to me. . . . But then later it started to attract me and I said, ‘well, yes, this is my thing’.

Pedro: I think you are carrying something from before, from your family

Jaime: My blood!

Pedro: Your blood. His [Jaime’s] family played a lot

Jaime: That’s what I’m saying. I was in high school and was like, no this is not my thing. . . . But then later, it becomes more than a hobby, you know. How should I put it? It’s like something pulls you in, and you say, I need to be there every week. . . . It’s like your blood is calling you.

Similarly, Agustín Hernández, who organises the longest-running pelota mixteca tournament in the United States in Fresno, California says:

When I was a kid, my dad played, my grandpa played. So, this was passed down through the generations, right? I think it is something that we carry in our blood. Because when I arrived in the state of California, well, there were many sports I could play. But none of them spoke to me, I just wanted to continue to play pelota mixteca.

Evidently, the practice of pelota mixteca is rooted not just in place but also in the body or the family. For some players, these roots extend beyond their immediate
ancestors (fathers, grandfathers) all the way back to the pre-colonial past. For example, one member of the playing community commented on Facebook,

we practice a game that is an inheritance from our forefathers. . . . When I began playing, I did not know about the history, that this is a game of the [precolonial] Mixtec kings. If more people would know the great history that’s behind this game, they would feel proud to be bearers of this tradition and culture.

It is important to stress here that this rootedness of the game in ‘the blood’ of the players is not conceived of as exclusionary by the players themselves. That is to say, this rootedness of the game in family, ancestry, and kinship does not prevent the players from wanting to spread their sport beyond its traditional boundaries, be these boundaries of family, place, culture, class, or nation. Rather, many players stress their ambition to share this inheritance with others, making sure the sport survives in a transnational context, in which people who would not traditionally play pelota mixteca can also participate in games and tournaments, and excel as competitors. Ricardo, a player from Fresno who calls pelota mixteca his family inheritance says, “I support all emerging players, they should continue. I would like our game to be played all around the world.”

In order for this global spread of pelota mixteca to materialise, pelota mixteca schools have recently been created. While cultural transmission would traditionally take place within the family or the community—players would learn how to play from their fathers or uncles—these schools have created formal training programs for (primarily) children. While, traditionally, pelota mixteca was only played by men, these schools are open to girls and women, a significant (cosmopolitan?) development that not only broadens the playing community to include a more diverse group of people but also helps in safeguarding the sport for future generations. Through schools, training programs, popularisation, ‘branding’ of teams, and many other measures, the pelota mixteca community has charted a way out of this ‘trapping in diversity’ that a strong focus on heritage and the precolonial past might effectuate. However, this is not to say that this cross-boundary popularisation makes the roots of the game disappear. Eduardo Arellanes phrases it like this,

A sport cannot lose its roots, it will always have them. But there needs to be development, a vision on how to grow. . . . The game does not have to lose its value, its roots, but we do have to think about what we want to do with it in the future. Because, the way things are going now, this sport will definitely disappear in the future. . . . Of course, something is going to be lost. I’m not sure exactly what this will be. But something will be gained as well.

This strongly rooted vision of the game, then, does not exclude a more cosmopolitan outlook of growth and development. Now that more children are starting to play the game, it is being taught as part of the curriculum of several high schools, and leagues are created. This essentially rooted cosmopolitan mindset, which fuses
the local and the global, as well as the past and the present, seems indeed to be the approach that will help pelota mixteca survive well into the 21st century.

**Hybrid or cosmopolitan?**

Following Anna Tsing’s (2005, 122) assertion that “the challenge of cultural analysis is to address both the spreading of interconnections and the locatedness of culture”, the editors of this volume argue that the concept of rooted cosmopolitanism can help move heritage studies in the direction of a more holistic view of cultural heritage. In the introductory chapter of this book, Versluys and Lilley argued that all heritage is cross-cultural. Cosmopolitanism seems to offer a way out of the eternal binary of local versus global, as well as, more importantly, in the case of pelota mixteca, a transcending of the exclusionary binary of traditional versus modern. From the standpoint of rooted cosmopolitanism, pelota mixteca does not have to be only ‘the game that our pre-colonial ancestors played’ or a modern sport without historical significance. According to Lilley and Versluys (this volume, 8), “rooted cosmopolitanism is about making sense of the paradox that the local and the global are always, in one way or another, entangled in a non-dichotomous way [sic]”. In the case of pelota mixteca, local and global can also be read as ‘ancestral and modern’, for lack of better terms, in which the place-based elements of globality and locality coincide with conceptions of time, time-depth, and temporality.

However, claiming that ‘all heritage is cross-cultural’ is not the same as saying that ‘all heritage is cosmopolitan’. Marianna Papastephanou argues elsewhere in this volume that acknowledging the multi-sited origin of heritage (i.e., traditions, monuments, objects, archaeological sites) does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that we should see these forms of heritage as essentially cosmopolitan. As she (this volume, 31) stresses, some forms of ‘cross-cultural origin’ “may stem from a blatantly un-cosmopolitan act such as conquest”. As Papastephanou (this volume, 32) puts it, “cultures being always shaped by cross-cultural encounters and influences does not automatically mean that they are cosmopolitan, and inherently so. It does mean this only if ‘cosmopolitan’ is identical with ‘hybrid’”. I would tend to agree but would add that claiming that “all the objects, assemblages, monuments and sites we excavate, document and preserve ... are inherently cosmopolitan in nature” (Versluys and Lilley this volume, 11) can unwillingly hinder the (cultural-) political ambitions of marginalised groups who try to create spaces for themselves.

This issue is also apparent in some of the writings of Kwame Antoniah Appiah (2005, 2006), arguably rooted cosmopolitanism’s most prominent proponent. Appiah’s discussion of indigenous identity, framing certain claims to tribal recognition as primarily economic affairs of which he says that “cynics might call casino-culturalism” (Appiah 2005, 135) appears particularly troubling, as it seems to bypass the historical context in which indigenous communities and people were forced to assimilate into national culture. This forced assimilation led to both cultural and actual genocide, destroying not only the tribal affiliation of individuals (for example through the boarding school system) but also actually destroying the individuals in the indigenous nations themselves. Appiah’s main objection to
‘cultural preservationism’ seems to be that he considers ‘culture’ as a possible constraint on individual freedom of choice. As he argues, “it is far from clear that we can always honor such preservationist claims while respecting the autonomy of future individuals” (Appiah 2005, 135). However, it seems that this focus on ‘individual freedom of choice’ ignores the fact that assimilationist politics (drawn up by the nation-state)—not only in Mexico but in all settler- and post-colonial states—have actively tried to make cultures disappear. In the case of Mexico and pelota mixteca, the state’s campaigns against traditional/indigenous sports, both in the colonial period and after Mexico’s independence, make clear that individual freedom of choice was hampered more by anti-preservationist policies (i.e., cultural imperialism) than by the fact that individuals felt ‘trapped in diversity’.

Just because ‘modernisation’ or globalisation present a larger ‘choosing context’, does not mean that the freedom of choice of individuals is secured or expanded, if the traditional choices are no longer available because they are actively vilified by the nation state. Maybe my issue with Appiah’s point is best summarised by himself when he says, “when a metropolitan francité is imposed upon adjoining regions—regions where a little earlier a salient identity might have been Savoyard, Gascon, Burgundian, Provençal—we celebrate the birth of a nation” (2005, 152). But who is this ‘we’? And why exactly the celebration? It is clear that the forced acculturation and assimilation of indigenous peoples and cultures into the Mexican mestizo ideal, similar to, but more violent than, Appiah’s French example, was no cause for celebration for any of Mexico’s indigenous peoples. According to Appiah (2005, 138), the state is not “properly concerned with the survival of specific ethnic subgroups (as opposed to their members) as an end in itself”. One can wonder if that statement can also be upheld in societies in which, historically, the state has actively tried to endanger or impede the survival of specific ethnic subgroups (i.e., indigenous peoples and their cultures).

Appiah (2005, 124) responds to concerns about homogenisation and assimilation by saying that ‘as John Tomasi suggests, a greater degree of personal autonomy may be afforded by a less rigid ‘choosing context,’ where there are fewer constraints on what counts as an acceptable life plan than there would be in a more stable cultural community”. I wonder if this statement holds true also for indigenous communities in settler-colonial societies. Is individual autonomy really increased when new options are (forcibly) introduced to the detriment of traditional culture? My impression is that this is not necessarily the case. As such, it seems to me that what is missing in Appiah’s objections against cultural preservationism is a consideration of the power imbalance that exists in cultures and communities that live (and have suffered) under settler-colonial rule. Calling forms of indigenous (intangible) heritage ‘cosmopolitan in nature’, then, is not politically neutral. In the concrete case of pelota mixteca, insisting on the essentially cosmopolitan nature of the game risks ignoring the socio-political historical circumstances (16th-century colonisation and its attendant forced Christianisation and acculturation) that led to its creation, while at the same potentially diffusing/defusing political claims of the players in the present day. Perhaps the heart of the issue is the inherently positive connotations that the term cosmopolitan seems to carry with it, conjuring
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up images of openness, tolerance, and diversity. Calling heritage cosmopolitan in nature (rather than cross-cultural, hybrid, or global) aligns the multi-sited origin of these practices and things with a particular kind of (contemporary) politics or worldview, which might not actually represent lived realities in the past or the present. To return to Marianna Papastephanou’s (this volume, 36), “showing the foreign influence on a cultural heritage seems to be a perfectly cosmopolitan move. But to judge its cosmopolitan quality or not, one needs to examine what political purposes it serves”. This is not to say that academics writing on these issues should necessarily all become activists on behalf of the people that they work with (/study). However, in a cosmopolitan ethics that stresses the entangled nature of (cultural production of) actors across the world, I do think this should mean that academics consider the real-life, on-the-ground consequences of their writings and the ways in which their work can be mobilised politically, possibly to the detriment of the people that they work with.

Of course, none of this is to suggest that indigenous communities and individuals should not be free to choose which cultural elements they want to perpetuate and which they want to abandon. On the contrary, as Meskell (2009, 23) suggests, “cosmopolitans would consider that though indigenous individuals and connected communities have certain rights and claims to culture, they are not trapped by ancient identities and necessarily expected to perform them in the present”. However, Appiah’s (2005, 127) rather hyperbolic statement that “you may indeed ensure that the dispossessed enjoy a stable and distinctive cultural community . . . by a variety of means; perhaps the most efficient goes by the name segregation” seems to do little justice to the work of (indigenous) activists who try to keep traditions, languages, and cultures alive. Rather, it seems more productive to focus on how indigenous communities are creating and re-creating rooted traditions in a rapidly globalising world. The fundamental potential of a rooted cosmopolitan research ethics lies in the fact that it can recognise the multi-sited origins of (intangible) heritage, while at the same time acknowledging that, over time, these practices become rooted in places, individuals, communities, and cultures in ways that are not essentialist.

Conclusions

By organising games that transcend the boundaries of the nation-state, groups of players of pelota mixteca community have set out a practice that is inherently cosmopolitan, but that also problematises analyses that focus on intangible cultural heritage as belonging to the nation-state and bound to particular groups. Cosmopolitan methodologies—which collapse the boundaries between local and global—can help us better understand these transnational heritage practices that are no longer confined to local communities, places, and individuals. In this chapter, I have tried to show how players of pelota mixteca have adopted what could be called a rooted cosmopolitan approach that bridges the gap between two ways of understanding pelota mixteca. By promoting pelota mixteca as a modern sport—using, among other things, branding, the formation of leagues and schools, and the
codification of rules—players of the game will take the game out of its traditional sphere and rethink it as a sport that can be played across traditional boundaries. However, this does not mean that the game will no longer be an ancestral practice, or that it will lose its roots. By refusing to wear loin clothes or paint their bodies in exhibition games, and by stimulating the practice of the game beyond its traditional communities, players of pelota mixteca make the same choice as Maya workers at the archaeological site of Chichén Itzá described by Lisa Breglia (2009, 206), who
don’t confine themselves within the parameters of indigenous identity politics—a discourse that requires these contemporary Maya to align themselves with the ancient Maya, as construed by archaeology. Instead, they position their attitudes, perspectives, and claims within a cosmopolitan discourse on global culture.

By adopting a rooted cosmopolitan discourse, the players reconcile two fundamental assumptions that at first sight seem contradictory: (1) that pelota mixteca is an ancestral practice, and (2) that pelota mixteca needs to be popularised and detraditionalised in order to survive.

This discourse also highlights the fact that, in some cases, the heritage canonisation of certain traditions can be counterproductive when trying to safeguard their continuation into the future. As Roland Robertson (1992, 152) has argued that “the museumization of the premodern is a major feature of (post)modernity”. In the case of pelota mixteca, this museumisation (or ‘heritagisation’) has been accompanied by a strong decrease in players and, as sketched above, a situation in which the state has generally treated the game as an element of Mexico’s pre-colonial legacy, rather than as a living sport. As a result, rather than helping the sport survive and thrive, pelota mixteca’s declaration as intangible cultural heritage potentially endangers its survival as an active and widespread practice. By problematising the usefulness of heritage declarations, this is a practical example of Meskell’s (2009, 5) suggestion that cosmopolitan approaches to questions of heritage and the archaeological past “posit a new challenge to the impositions of Euro-American heritage discourse by destabilising the presumed cultural ‘goods’ of world heritage, global patrimony, and other universalisms”.

In this article, I have not only attempted to sketch the rooted cosmopolitan discourse created by players of pelota mixteca but also stressed the necessity for a heritage/archaeological practice that recognises that we are all enmeshed in the same global networks and flows and that this is as true today as it was a hundred or more years ago. While this should not be taken to mean that all communities and individuals enmeshed in these networks have equal starting positions in terms of power, capital, and mobility, it does force us to recognise that studies of other cultures (or of other people’s pasts, for that matter) should be self-reflexively understood through the positionality of the researcher. This focus on what is shared, rather than on what is different, can help archaeologists move beyond the vision of the field site as a cordoned-off, distant space in which different rules can apply than back home.
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Notes

5 “Pienso que mitificar el juego no ha ayudado mucho para promoverlo. Pienso que es un error el tomar la bandera del juego ancestral que jugaban los antepasados. Esto llevó a que por mucho tiempo deberíamos dar exhibiciones en taparrabos y en zonas arqueológicas. [...] La gente que veía estas exhibiciones no nos preguntaba ¿cómo se llama el equipo? o ¿dónde y cómo entrenan? ¿dónde me inscribo para practicarlo? No, las preguntas son ¿es cierto que al que ganaba lo sacrificaban? o ¿por qué no vienen vestidos con taparrabos?” Eduardo Arellanes 2014 [this and further translations from Spanish by MB]. All quotes by Pelota Mixteca players are taken from interviews conducted by myself between 2008 and 2014. These interviews took place in Oaxaca, Mexico-City, Fresno, and Verona, in the context of my doctoral dissertation research. Quotes are reproduced with permission from the interviewees.
6 “llevamos [a la comisión] unas de la playeras con los logos, dijeron que lo veían muy beisbolero . . . entonces, yo no sé qué es lo que esperan, que juguemos en taparrabo?!” Eduardo Arellanes 2014.
7 “Una representación escénica del Juego de Pelota Prehispánico Mexica “Tlachtli” se podrá disfrutar [...], como parte de la oferta que la Secretaría de Cultura de la Ciudad de México presenta [...]”. “Los juegos prehispánicos, declarados Patrimonio Cultural Intangible de la Ciudad de México el 27 de octubre de 2008, se recrearán con el sonido del caracol [...], así como la purificación mediante la sahumación de la cancha y los jugadores y la escenificación del sacrificio de los vencedores. Con esta visibilización en el corazón de la capital, el público podrá conocer los valores que perpetúan esta herencia cultural como la cohesión social comunitaria, sus rituales, reglas y puntuación, así como las diversas dinámicas de este espectacular juego.” (https://cultura.cdmx.gob.mx/comunicacion/nota/222-21, accessed 2 March 2022).
8 “Pienso que si tenemos esta herencia la mejor opción es compartirla y no que se acabe con nosotros [y que], si para la práctica masiva ha de tener algunos cambios, es preferible así.” Eduardo Arellanes 2014.
9 “Su reivindicación del México prehispánico se plasmó en murales justicieros y en el culto por los indios de piedra, en demérito de los indios vivos que en su proteico proyecto estaban condenados a desaparecer.”
10 The names of Jaime, Pedro, and Ricardo are pseudonyms. They have been anonymised to protect their identity, since they live in the United States without legal documentation.
11 Jaime: Todo este deporte consiste en una cadena, pues. Si al nieto, al sobrino, al hijo, si le gusta, lógico que va venir, me entiendes. . . . Yo tenía 15 años y yo iba a la highschool y todo ese rollo.
   Pero nunca me atraía este deporte . . . Pues como que me empezó a atraer y dije, no pues esto es lo mío
Pedro: Yo pienso que trae algo de antes, de tu familia.
Jaime: La sangre!
Pedro: La sangre. La familia de él [Jaime] jugó mucho.
Jaime: Eso es lo que te digo, yo iba a la high school y que esto no era mi rollo . . . Pero después como que, te hace como, no un hobby, pero ni un pasatiempo. Un pasatiempo no se te hace, me entiendes. Pero es como, como te diré. Como que algo que te trae, que tú te dices “tengo que estar cada ocho días ahí” me entiendes . . . Es como que la sangre llama.
12 “Nosotros desde niños, mi papá jugaba, mi abuelito jugaba. Entonces esto ya viene como . . . Ya viene por generaciones, no? Y yo creo que es algo que lo traemos en
la sangre, porque cuando yo llegué aquí al estado de California, pues, había muchos deportes que practicar. Pero no me llamaban la atención, sino yo quería seguir practicando la pelota mixteca.”

13 Facebook commentors have been anonymised, because permission to reproduce their words—posted in an openly accessible online forum—could not be obtained directly.

14 “practicamos este juego que es herencia de nuestros antepasados […] ni yo mismo conocía la historia y que este era un juego de los gobernantes mixtecos en verdad si supieran la gran historia hay [sic] detrás de esto se sentirían muy orgullosos de ser portadores de está [sic] tradición y cultura.”

15 “Para mí, el apoyo para todos que van subiendo para arriba y que sigan. Yo quisiera que se desarrolla a nivel mundial nuestro juego.”

16 “Un deporte no puede perder sus raíces, los va tener. Pero que tenga un desarrollo, una visión de crecimiento. La puede jugar alguien de Michoacán, alguien de Chihuahua, pero el origen sigue siendo lo mismo. […] Es que no tiene que perder el valor que tiene, las raíces que tiene, pero sí debemos pensar qué es lo que queremos para el futuro con esto. Porque en el futuro la práctica definitivamente, así como vamos, va a perderse. […] Que va perder algo, por supuesto. Exactamente que, no lo sé. Pero va a ganar algo también.”

Bibliography


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6 Rooted cosmopolitanism in Southeast Türkiye? Contemporary responses to Nemrut Dağı and ancient Commagene

Lennart Wouter Kruijer and Miguel John Versluys

Introduction: Greek and Roman heritage in the Turkish Republic

Kwame Anthony Appiah’s observations concerning the persistent heritage question ‘whose culture is it, anyway?’ underline once more that archaeological heritage is complex by nature (Appiah 2005, 2007). This certainly is the case for the archaeological heritage of the Greek and Roman periods in contemporary Türkiye. Ever since the early years of the Republic, ‘Graeco-Roman’ culture relates to Turkish memory politics in complex and often conflicting ways. The influential 1930 Turkish History Thesis (Türk Tarih Tezi) posited that all ‘Anatolian civilisations’ descended from a primordial Turkish high culture that brought civilisation from central Asia and settled in Anatolia through a sequence of migration waves. The Türk Tarih Tezi started out as a historical narrative to explain the racial origins of modern Türkiye (Atakuman 2008, 219), but, around the 1950s, this ideal of ‘Anatolianism’ transformed into a less racially oriented but more cultural conceptualisation of Turkish-Anatolian unity and continuity. With that came a more acculturative notion of its influence and the claim that all civilisations developed from a Turkish-Anatolian source. Through this narrative, all civilisations from Anatolian history were subsumed into the idea of Anatolianism, although some periods and cultures clearly were prioritised, with the Hittites, Phrygians and Sumerians taking pride of place (Erimtan 2008; Atakuman 2008, 221). ‘Graeco-Roman’ culture was assigned a less prominent place in this matrix as, for instance, demonstrated by the collection of Ankara’s Museum of Anatolian Civilisations, where the Greek, Hellenistic and Roman periods are given minimal attention (Davis 2003; Gür 2007; Redford and Ergin 2010). Similarly, archaeological sites from this era were largely ignored in the early years of the Republic, a situation that only changed in the 1950s.

The persistent idea of Anatolianism is related in a paradoxical way to ‘Greek culture’, however. On the one hand, the Turks were staged as the historical antagonists of the Greeks, particularly through an identification with the Trojans. In this line of reasoning, the reclaiming of territory from the Greeks, be it in the form of Mehmet II’s conquest of Istanbul or Atatürk’s defeat of the Greek army during the War of Independence (1919–1923), was framed as a revenge for the fall of Troy (Bilsel 2007, 11). On the other hand, by claiming that Anatolia was the source of ‘Mediterranean civilisation’, Turkish scholars took pride in Türkiye being
the source of ‘classical culture’, as opposed to Greece. While this narrative was meant to undermine European philhellenism, it nonetheless maintained a certain Eurocentric hierarchy of cultures in which the ‘Greek miracle’ held an esteemed position. Although this discourse soon dwindled in state-sponsored discourses of Turkish history, it forms the core tenet of the humanist Blue Anatolianism Movement (Mavi Anadolu), which, since the 1950s, emphasises the Anatolian origins of ‘Greek’ culture (Bilsel 2007, esp. 10–13; Sharpe 2018; Kristensen et al. 2021). By proclaiming a ‘Hellenism without Greeks’ (Sharpe 2018), this movement is entangled with the political context of Turkish claims on the Aegean Sea. Among the intelligentsia of western Anatolia, this cultural-historical Blue Anatolianism discourse is alive and well, as demonstrated by the reception of the Mausoleum of Halikarnassos in Bodrum (Kristensen et al. 2021, esp. 104–106). Recently, however, the current AKP government appears to have redirected its national memory politics towards the Selçuk and Ottoman periods, (further) diminishing the role of Graeco-Roman heritage in state-sponsored affairs (Kristensen et al. this volume). As such, the paradoxical nature of ‘Graeco-Roman’ Turkish heritage—considered as cultural Self and Other simultaneously—continues to exist. This is specifically the case with regard to western Anatolia, where archaeology from the Greek and Roman periods abounds and has been thoroughly studied, also in terms of reception as outlined above. This chapter draws attention to the status of ‘Graeco-Roman’ heritage in an area that has remained outside the historical claims of the Blue Anatolianism movement and has been little investigated in terms of heritage politics, namely southeast Anatolia. It thereby focuses on the site of Nemrut Dağı (dating to around 50 BCE) and the Late-Hellenistic kingdom of Commagene (Figure 6.1). Do people in the region feel a connection to this archaeological site and whose culture they consider it to be?

Appropriating Nemrut Dağı on local, regional, national, and global scales

The famous UNESCO World Heritage site of Nemrut Dağı, located in the province of Adıyaman in southeast Türkiye, is the most important monument that remains from the Hellenistic-Roman kingdom of Commagene. Placed on a high mountain-top of the Anti-Tauros, this tomb sanctuary (hierothesion), commissioned by King Antiochos I of Commagene, is culturally eclectic and cosmopolitan in many ways and (therefore) often characterised as “Graeco-Persian”. The site consists of a large tumulus grave and two monumental terraces containing colossal statues of the king himself enthroned amidst four deities, as well as a variety of (figurative) reliefs (Figures 6.2 and 6.3).

The tomb sanctuary combines figurative styles, iconographies and religious concepts that derive from the Greek and Hellenistic Mediterranean, Armenia, the Persian world and Rome. Modern scholars have struggled with this culturally eclectic character, characterising Nemrut Dağı as, for instance, ‘a last outpost of Hellenism’, corrupted by ‘Oriental influences’ or an ‘Eastern’ attempt at ‘doing Greek’—what we might recognise as ‘the arborescent reflex’ (see below). As the
site did not fit the cultural taxonomies used by 20th-century scholarship, it was generally understood, moreover, as an idiosyncratic and megalomaniac caprice of an isolated monarch ‘in the hinterland’ (Cf. Versluys 2014). Recently, these scholarly interpretations have been critically re-examined in an attempt to deconstruct their colonial undertones and Orientalism as well as their reliance on cultural essentialism, something especially problematic in their equation of visual style and (ethnic or cultural) identity (Versluys 2017; Blömer et al. 2021; Kruijer 2022). This goes hand in hand with a scholarly re-evaluation of Nemrut Dağı as a prime example of Late-Hellenistic dynastic strategies of cultural *bricolage* and innovation in western Afro-Eurasia.

Lacking from this renewed attention for Nemrut Dağı and the novel phase in the study of ancient Commagene (for which see Blömer et al. 2021) is a critical examination of contemporary and particularly non-scholarly responses to Nemrut Dağı, especially in relation to (recent) Turkish memory politics.\(^8\) The first aim of
this chapter is to take an initial and modest step to fill that lacuna. What can we say about the contemporary reception of this famous Turkish UNESCO heritage site by its many local, regional, national, and global stakeholders? Who claims to ‘own’ the site in cultural terms, and on what basis? How is its cosmopolitan character understood, nationally and internationally? We explored these questions by gathering and analysing a variety of modern-day responses to Nemrut, consisting of 1. Turkish and international newspaper articles regarding the site, 2. social media posts, as well as 3. interviews with local and regional stakeholders. Our central research question addresses the contemporary socio-cultural and political roles of
Nemrut Dağı, asking how the site relates to modern forms of identity formation on a local, regional, national and global scale. The second aim of this essay is to investigate if rooted cosmopolitanism is a useful concept to (better) understand the interaction of these analytical scales—as we will explain further below. Let us first, however, in the remainder of this section, provide a brief overview of what role heritage plays in debates on politics and identity in Southeast Türkiye from the last decades and what the archaeology of Commagene is about in terms of cultural ownership. After that, we will discuss two outspoken scholarly interpretations of those debates before introducing the concept of rooted cosmopolitanism as a more critical lens to understand the shifting, versatile and conflicting claims on Nemrut Dağı.

Nemrut Dağı is located in the vilayet of Adıyaman, which has ca. 600,000 inhabitants. The city of Adıyaman functions as its provincial capital, and the city of Kâhta, to the north and much closer to Nemrut, is its second major urban centre (see Figure 6.1). The region’s population is made up of a Kurdish majority belonging to the Reşwan tribe, while other cultural and ethnic communities include, most prominently, Turks, as well as Lazi, Cherkessians, and Turkmen. President Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been elected in the province continuously since 2004 (Alptekin 2018). Traditionally, the region’s economy was based on agriculture and livestock breeding, with a strong cotton and tobacco production, and was considered as relatively poor and conservative. Since the 1980s, much has changed in Adıyaman through the implementation of the Southeastern

Figure 6.3 The archaeological remains on the eastern Terrace of Nemrut Dağı.
Source: Picture by L.W. Kruijer.
Anatolia Project (SAP), especially with the construction of the Atatürk Dam in the Euphrates, and the creation of the large Atatürk Reservoir (Bilgen 2020). This project had the aim of raising living standards in south-eastern Anatolia by increasing the productivity of the rural sector through irrigation projects. However, Adıyaman has been mostly negatively affected by SAP, losing a substantial part of its arable, fertile land and suffering the complete destruction of its cultural landscape at the banks of the Euphrates. Up to the present, it cannot make beneficial use of SAP’s irrigation opportunities, and Adıyaman remains one of Türkiye’s poorest regions.9 The need for national and international tourism to its most important archaeological destination, Nemrut Daği, is therefore high. Touristic interest in the site developed in the 1970s and 1980s and boomed in the 1990s, something stimulated by the site’s 1987 inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage List, based on its ‘outstanding universal value’ as a ‘unique artistic achievement’.10 Tens of thousands of foreign tourists visit the site and its National Park each year, almost exclusively during the spectacular sunset and sunrise. In general, the site is considered an important part of Türkiye’s archaeological and touristic canon (see Figure 6.4).11

In the last decades, the Turkish government seems to have increasingly realised the site’s touristic potential. Currently, it advertises Nemrut as a crucial destination for international tourists visiting Türkiye; the official ‘tourism guide’ called ‘Go Türkiye’, a governmental branch of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism focused on international tourism, advertises extensively with pictures and references to Nemrut, proudly exclaiming the site’s UNESCO heritage status.12 It is not clear, however, if the historical content of the site plays any role in the recent memory politics of the AKP government. By 2010, the governmental funds for a grand-scale Turkish restoration project (see below) seem to have dried up, with no large-scale continuation of the much-needed restoration activities. Similarly, for quite some time the regional branch of the AKP was involved in the funding of the Kâhta Kommagene Festivali, which has been held since the late 1970s and was co-organised by the Adıyaman University and the Municipality of Kâhta (Mitchell 2014, 258). This four-day festival was meant to celebrate Nemrut Dağ, ancient Commagene, and actively promoted archaeological tourism in the region through on-site performances and activities, ranging from classical concerts and Tango recitals to folk dancing and illusionist shows (Figure 6.5). The festival was terminated in 2012, and, although several local politicians are keen on revitalising it (see below), it has not been organised since.

Meanwhile, scholarship on Nemrut Dağ and ancient Commagene has been largely determined by foreign scholars and missions so far, although there have been attempts to counter this from the Ottoman side from the very beginnings.13 Ever since Karl Sester ‘discovered’ the site in 1881 and reported his findings to the Königlich-Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin, mainly foreigners have appropriated the hierothesion. Already in 1883, however, a short-lived Ottoman presence can be observed in the person of Osman Hamdi Bey, the famous scholar, artist and intellectual. His Le Tumulus de Nemrut-Dağ was published in French though, showcasing the cosmopolitan reach of Hamdi Bey himself, as well as the limited accessibility of his scholarship for a broader Turkish audience.14 It seems that Hamdi Bey’s interest in Nemrut was directly related to Prussian interest
in the site, represented by Karl Humann and Otto Puchstein (Humann and Puchstein 1890); the two groups met when Hamdi Bey was on his way down while Humann and Puchstein were on their way up.\footnote{During the early- and mid-20th century, archaeological expeditions were undertaken by the Münsterer ancient historian Friedrich Karl Dörner (Dörner and Naumann 1939) and the American Theresa Goell (Dörner and Goell 1963; Sanders 1996). In the early 2000s, the University of Amsterdam organised three consecutive campaigns, together with international partners and Turkish scholars, under the banner of the International...
Contemporary responses to Nemrut Dağı

It should be noted that between 1978 and 1989 some important geophysical and topographical studies were undertaken by Sencer Şahin (1991a, 1991b, 1998). Only in the early 2000s, however, a large-scale Turkish project was conducted at the site in the form of the Commagene Nemrut Conservation and Development Program (CNCDP), which mostly focused on the conservation of the site (Şahin Güçhan 2011).

‘Je suis Antiochos’: questioning the rootedness of a cosmopolitan claim

Despite the great scholarly interest in Nemrut Dağı, only a few scholars have engaged with the theme of Nemrut’s contemporary reception and its place in Turkish memory politics. Two essays written by foreign (Dutch and British) scholars, however, stand out in this respect. The first is a 2017 piece written by Dutch philosopher Jos de Mul, who reflects on his short-term stay in Adıyaman in 2002, which he visited as a participant in a conference on art and social engagement (De Mul 2017). De Mul argues that ancient Commagene provides an important cosmopolitan model for modern-day Adıyaman and Türkiye in terms of its ethnocultural and religious pluriformity. His positive judgement of ancient Commagene’s cosmopolitanism is obvious, calling the kingdom ‘an interreligious paradise’ (De Mul 2017, 151) and portraying Antiochos I as a modern, enlightened king:

While crossing the Euphrates . . . my mind wandered off, thinking about the many parallels between the multicultural and multi-religious Commagene and modern-day Netherlands. Was the huge success story of Commagene...

Figure 6.5 The Kâhta Kommagene Festivalı, last organised in 2012, consisted of a variety of performances and events in Kâhta and on Mount Nemrut, including local folk-dance groups and tango recitals.


Nemrut Dağı Project (Brijder 2014). It should be noted that between 1978 and 1989 some important geophysical and topographical studies were undertaken by Sencer Şahin (1991a, 1991b, 1998). Only in the early 2000s, however, a large-scale Turkish project was conducted at the site in the form of the Commagene Nemrut Conservation and Development Program (CNCDP), which mostly focused on the conservation of the site (Şahin Güçhan 2011).
not due mainly to the intentional polytheistic policies of Antiochus I? This ‘polytics’, and even more so his Hellenistic quatorze juillet, allowed not just for many different cultures to feel at home in and identify themselves with Commagene, but will also without any doubt have contributed to its success as a trading nation. Commagene was a place with an open, cosmopolitan character, and one that welcomed newcomers.

(De Mul 2017, 150)

Reflecting on his 2002 trip more than a decade later, De Mul (2017) suggests that Türkiye had changed considerably over that period. He argues that the ‘enlightened’ and modern (Western) values ascribed to Antiochos I would be most desirable in the region now:

It is clear that freedom and other basic human rights in Türkiye are under enormous pressure and the future is not looking bright. Let us hope that the spirit of Commagene will descend once more onto this plagued land.

(De Mul 2017, 151)

In another essay by the renowned British archaeologist Stephen Mitchell, the evocative potential of Nemrut Dağı for the formation of a cosmopolitan Adıyaman is considered to be a rooted phenomenon. Mitchell (2014) discusses modern receptions of Nemrut Dağı in the context of an argument about the increased prevalence of regional identity formations in Türkiye, dealing specifically with the role of archaeological material as ‘tools’ for creating identity. He bases his conclusions primarily on his experiences during a conference held in Adıyaman in 2010 (the I. Uluslararası Kommagene Kültür, Sanat ve Turizm Sempozyumu), which was organised within the context of the Kâhta Kommagene Festivali and ‘had as its main aim the finding of continuities between antiquity and the present day, thus identifying the roots of modern Adıyaman in ancient Commagene’ (Mitchell 2014, 262). Mitchell does not seem to critically question this aim, stating that ‘in broad terms the project to annex ancient Commagene as a forerunner of modern Adiyaman was not unsuccessful’ (Mitchell 2014, 262). Like De Mul, Mitchell considers ancient Commagene as offering the region of Adıyaman a ‘template for the creation of a modern social and political identity’ (Mitchell 2014, 265), one that should be seen as a hopeful narrative of ‘reconciliation and co-existence’ (Mitchell 2014, 266) and that should serve as an antidote to ‘national totalitarianism’ (Mitchell 2014, 246) in Türkiye more broadly.

For the purposes of this article, it is particularly interesting that Mitchell considers this cosmopolitan memory of Commagene to be a widely shared sentiment, not restricted to the region’s intelligentsia: ‘The civic authorities of Kâhta and, more recently, the University of Adıyaman, have taken advantage of the spectacular ancient site to generate their own celebration of local identity’ (Mitchell 2014, 256; see Figure. 6.6 for the University of Adıyaman), and ‘private entrepreneurs have done the same. Businesses locally and all over Türkiye have taken the
name Nemrut to annex the glamour of the statues on the mountain’ (Mitchell 2014, 268 n. 16). Mitchell is convinced that these evocations of ancient Commagene happen not merely for ‘superficial’ economic motivations, but are truly ‘authentic’ (Mitchell 2014, 258) and genuine. This ultimately leads him to suggest that the deep-felt connection to ancient Commagene is religious in nature, claiming that the ‘Antiochian cult’ is alive and well.

Like de Mul, Mitchell reasons from a rather idealised understanding of the modern-day regional reception of Nemrut Dağı and ancient Commagene. Both do not critically examine the historical legitimacy of Antiochian Commagene as a peaceful, harmonic, and multicultural society in the first place. In fact, however, most recent research comes to a rather opposite conclusion: first century BCE Commagene notably suffered from multiple military intrusions by foreign (Armenian, Parthian, and Roman) forces and its increasing dependency on Rome caused this buffer state’s rule to be continually feeble (Facella 2006; Brijder 2014; Versluys 2017). What’s more, neither De Mul nor Mitchell attempt to dissect the multiple and conflicting claims on Nemrut Dağı. The contested nature of the site is not mentioned, at all. Only in passing, Mitchell briefly notes that, between 1997 and 2004, statues and reliefs were being pushed over and damaged at the site, something which he attributes to religious controversy. The Islamic and Islamist voices of

Figure 6.6 At the monumental entranceway to the campus of Adiyaman University, copies of the heads of Nemrut’s colossal statues are placed on socles.

Source: Authors.
the region seem to be ignored \textit{a priori} or discarded right away as ‘controversial’ (Mitchell 2014, 264) and ‘conservative’ (267). The value of Islamic heritage in the region is furthermore characterised as ‘inconspicuous and unremarkable’ (263, on Islamic tombs) and ‘not very numerous or notable’ (Mitchell 2014, 263 on the Ottoman mosques of the region); and thus placed in stark opposition to Nemrut Dağı and other Late-Hellenistic sites which are judged ‘rightly famous’ (264).

We conclude that, although both authors seem to be particularly keen on the idea of pluralism, their historical narratives of and anticipated political future for the region are, in fact, only semi-pluralistic. By embracing the (utopian) idea of a ‘multicultural’ world consisting of ‘rainbow coalitions’, in the past and future, controversy and confrontation are swept under the carpet. This critical conclusion formed the starting point of our own research as presented in this essay. We wanted to know how representative the sentiment described by de Mul and Mitchell, both non-Turkish and academics, really was; as an initial survey already soon suggested that heritage claims were much more complex and ambiguous. What about those other voices? Which individual groups can we distinguish, and how do their claims intersect and collide? Moreover, we felt we needed a concept that could do justice to \textit{all} these (conflicting) contemporary responses to Nemrut Dağı and ancient Commagene. How can we make room, in our analysis, for perspectives and claims on Nemrut Dağı that appear intuitively unethical or even damaging? Does, for instance, the radical alterity of Islamist fundamentalism also have a role to play as a legitimate heritage claim? The concept of rooted cosmopolitanism promises to be most useful in approaching these questions as it invites us to think about Nemrut Dağı as a place that is open to contestation. What it represents in terms of heritage, therefore, should be the outcome of a dialogue that does not exclude inconvenient alternatives. This is possible because, according to Appiah (2005, 255), ‘Disagreement presupposes the cognitive option of agreement’. From this perspective, Mitchell and De Mul’s notions of cosmopolitanism in Adıyaman can be qualified as being distinctly \textit{un}rooted and hence one-sided. Below we will, before presenting our as-inclusive-as-possible overview of contemporary responses to Nemrut Dağı and our interpretation of them through the lens of rooted cosmopolitanism, first elaborate on the concept more in depth.

\textbf{Why rooted cosmopolitanism is good to think with}

Humans are spatio-temporal beings, embedded in a specific time and place. We are therefore used to define ourselves as immersed in specific (local) contexts and ‘cultures’, such as Greek, Roman or Turkish (Shklar 2020; Papasthephanou, this volume). Heritage plays an important role as part of that process. At the very same time, however, world history can be understood as characterised by dispersal, migration and Globalisation from the very first day onwards. Besides being embedded in a specific time and place, therefore, as humans, we are also a very mobile and global species (Morin 2015, 65: “La première mondialisation est préhistorique”; see also Gamble et al. 2014). Brandt and Eagleman (2017) talk about the human race as a ‘runaway species’ to underline this. They maintain, moreover, that
it is only because of this intense mobility that humans can innovate because they always do so based on things coming from outside their local context. Understanding Heritage in such (culturally) cosmopolitan terms, characterised by mobility, turns out to be most difficult, however. The difference between arborescent (that is: tree-like with roots, a trunk and branches and thus hierarchical) and rhizomatic (that is: multiple, non-linear, and non-hierarchical), also evoked elsewhere in this volume, serves well to illustrate this contrast (see Papasthephanou, this volume, with references). We usually imagine cultures and their heritage to be arborescent because this is how people most often understand and portray it themselves; as unique and distinct entities that developed over time, independently and all by themselves, in a specific locality or region. We have much more difficulty in understanding culture and heritage as multiple, non-linear and non-hierarchical. This is problematical as, from a philosophical, theoretical, and historical perspective everything human indeed relates to the global in one way or another (contra Geurds, this volume; cf. Morin 2015) with ‘cultures’ being temporary constructions alone. However, this is not how people perceive cultures and cultural differences; what in fact are relative distinctions play out in a very absolute manner in human socio-cultural behaviour. The idea of rooted cosmopolitanism is good to think with because it pays attention to and provides room for both aspects. We use the notion of Cosmopolitanism to pay attention to the rhizomatic side of things. For debates on Heritage, this is important as it deconstructs notions of authenticity and indigeneity, and shows that Heritage is always in the making (see Versluys & Lilley, this volume). From such a perspective, Heritage can indeed, as Cornelius Holtorf (2016) has convincingly argued, “never be at risk” as it is constantly changing and evolving anyway. We use the notion of Rooted to give locality the attention it deserves and to take seriously what people think about Heritage and how they are treated because of it (as Geurds, this volume). Rooted thus also serves as a reminding qualifier to make clear how we understand cosmopolitanism; it indeed protects, as Marianna Papastephanou (this volume, p. 22) phrases it, ‘cosmopolitanism from the Eurocentric, homogenising undertones that modernity bequeathed it’, explicitly rejecting what Appiah has identified and condemned as ‘toxic cosmopolitanism’ (Appiah 2005, 220). In fact, as Ulrich Beck (2003) has argued, the global-local interplay is already present in the idea of cosmopolitanism itself as the notion includes both cosmos and polis and is about their entanglement (cf. Versluys 2022). This, however, is not how, most often, it has been instrumentalised, with the idea of cosmopolitanism being abused as a vehicle for imperialism and colonialism. Rooted cosmopolitanism, therefore, is a postcolonial cosmopolitanism (Papastephanou, this volume) that elucidates how people are always engaged with the local and the global simultaneously and how they deal with this paradox, also in terms of Heritage. Acknowledging differences, it urges us to think about heritage as cosmopolitan despite differences (Appiah 2007) and to pay attention to these competing narratives in relation to one another. This is important in both analytical and ethical terms, as this volume illustrates at length (for the latter see Appiah 2005; Meskell 2009 and the contributions by Berger and Geurds in this volume).
Contemporary responses to Nemrut Dağı and ancient Commagene: set-up and methodology of the research

To acquire a wide and multifarious understanding of contemporary claims and responses to Nemrut Dağı, a broad dataset was investigated consisting of 1. Turkish and international newspaper articles pertaining to the period 2004–2021; 2. social media posts from approximately the last decade; and 3. interviews with local stakeholders conducted in the vilayet of Adıyaman in September 2021. These interviews were conducted with 46 respondents, consisting of 28 males (60.9% of the total) and 18 females (39.1%), aged between 14 and 70. Respondents partially derived from the authors’ personal social networks resulting from previous years of archaeological work in the region of Adıyaman, but on purpose, many other types of respondents were also included (Figure 6.7). This resulted in five different ‘respondent categories’: (1) archaeologists and academics (5: 10.9%); (2) politicians and governmental employees (5: 10.9%); (3) people working in the tourism sector, including ‘heritage entrepreneurs’ such as tourist shop owners, restaurant owners, and hotel owners (11: 23.9%); ‘local inhabitants’, including inhabitants of the cities of Adıyaman and Kâhta as well as local farmers and villagers (13: 28.2%); and (mostly Turkish) visitors and tourists (12: 26.1%).

Figure 6.7 Conducting interviews with the local inhabitants of Kâhta.
Source: Picture by M.J. Versluys.
The interviews revolved around the respondents’ personal relations to the site, as well as their opinions concerning issues of cultural ownership, potential controversies, regional benefits, heritage policy, and tourism. Our questions included the following: How do you know about Nemrut Dağı?; What is your personal relation to the site? Have you visited Nemrut and do you remember the first time you were there?; How do you feel about Nemrut?; How many times have you visited the site?; To whom do you think Nemrut Dağı belongs and why?; Do you think that the site is important for the region and why?; What is your opinion about the current heritage policy regarding Nemrut Dağı?; According to you, is there any controversy concerning Nemrut Dağı? The interviews were most often recorded and conducted through a qualitative, semi-structured method that focuses on the individual respondent.23 An interpreter was present to translate from English to Turkish and vice versa when this was necessary.

Results

What follows is a discussion of seven different contemporary claims and responses to the archaeological site of Nemrut Dağı that we have distinguished and which result from the dataset presented above (i.e., newspapers, social media, interviews). We will first consider responses to Nemrut that somewhat echo De Mul’s and Mitchell’s claim of a pluralistic and cosmopolitan appropriation of ancient Commagene in modern-day Adıyaman. The six subsequent paragraphs, however, show that this is only part of the picture and explore alternative and often contradicting positions that have not been (seriously) considered in previous scholarship yet.

1. ‘200 years of peace’: historical idealisation and a regional cosmopolitan identity

Almost none of the 46 respondents actively brought up the notion that ancient Commagene plays a central role in the identity (formation) of the contemporary population of Adıyaman, and none suggested that the Antiochan cult can be said to ‘live on’ among modern locals. Several respondents, however, did prove willing to explore potential parallels between the past and the present when they were explicitly asked to reflect on the issue. Not surprisingly, such reflections primarily derived from respondents working in (archaeological) academia, the heritage sector or politicians and government employees. Some of these, in fact, suggested an ancestral connection: ‘Modern Adıyaman is very mixed, with Kurdish, Turkish, Syrian, Armenian people. Although many people have gone and come in the meantime, I believe there are still people left from ancient Commagene. Perhaps my roots derive from ancient Commagene as well’ (R1 Male 45, archaeologist/academic, Adıyaman). A local inhabitant of Kâhta is even more convinced: ‘It is our past, they are our ancestors. The kingdom has a very long history. I am very proud of this history’ (R27 Male, 58, local inhabitant, Kâhta). In a slightly different vein, a local archaeologist speaks of Nemrut as ‘a child you have to take care for’
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(R1 Male 45, archaeologist/academic, Adıyaman), thus similarly emphasising the existence of familial bonds that are felt between ancient Commagene and modern Adıyaman. Other respondents are less inclined to claim a Commagenian ancestry but, again, when pressed, do appropriate the site as their local history. A student in Adıyaman says, ‘Of course I am proud of Nemrut Dağı; it is part of our history’ (R15 Male, 21), and a local young man in Kâhta states ‘I do see Nemrut Dağı as part of my own history’ (R28 Male, 24). The actual character of this local ownership and pride concerning Nemrut in many cases remains rather elusive and ahistorical, however. It appears to emerge rather from the idea of Nemrut as part of a modern regional identity, itself caused by a national and even global acknowledgement of the site as being of exceptional value (see the next section).

In those cases, however, where the identification and pride are truly based on a historical claim, it centres around the notion of a peaceful pluralism that existed in ancient Commagene as well as in modern Adıyaman: ‘Ancient Commagene was mixed in terms of population and modern Commagene also’ (R1 Male 45, archaeologist/academic, Adıyaman). One of the recurrent associations with Commagene is that of a 200-year period of peace, something credited to the intelligent and wise rule of Antiochos I: “Commagene had 200 years of peace... Antiochos wanted peace and was very smart in creating inter-marriage. He was at peace with the Romans” (R4 Male, 52, tourism sector, Adıyaman). In some rare instances, the notion of peaceful pluralism is expanded with other modern and progressive values; a male governmental employee from Adıyaman, for instance, suggests that ‘Women had an important role to play in this kingdom, as witnessed on the ancestral gallery’ (R2 Male, 50) and a younger man similarly asserts that ‘Antiochos actually brought democracy to the people’ (R20 Male, 39, politician/government employee).

This idea was particularly prominent in a recent art festival, the ‘Kommagene Bienal’, which was organised in the vilayet of Adiyaman and held from the 20th of August until the 20th of October 2022. The organisers invited 53 modern artists from 23 different countries (including Türkiye, Syria, Greece, the Netherlands, and Korea) to make artworks related to six landmarks of the region, including Nemrut Dağı. The theme of the biennale was ‘hayali bir uygarlık’: “an imaginary civilisation”. The curator, Nihat Özdal, explained that it should be seen as a tribute to Commagene’s peaceful, cross-cultural identity:

The Commagene kingdom lasted only for 200 years but lived in peace. We think that is its most important legacy for us after two millennia. The event aims at creating a fictional civilisation to help people imagine what a contemporary Commagene kingdom would look like.24

The Turkish artist Yasin Uysallar produced a four-meter high polychrome portrait of an imagined king Antiochos VI, which was placed on the East Terrace of Nemrut, in front of the ancient sculptures (Figure 6.8). Together with his team, he carried the 190 kg statue—made of polyurethane foam, paper, metal and wood—up the hill, in order to reenact the heavy labour of ancient workmen.
The archaeological site, in this discourse, in some cases seems to function as a type of time-machine in which present and past collide: ‘I visited Nemrut at least 10 times. Nemrut is definitely a part of my identity. Commagene had 200 years of peace. When I go there I have the feeling that the people of 2000 years ago are very close to me’ (R4 Male, 52, tourism sector, Adıyaman). Crucially, this vicinity is not so much expressed in terms of a monolithic nation-state or a well-defined

Figure 6.8 The imaginary king Antiochos VI, by Yasin Uysallar, part of the Kommagene Bienal.

Source: Authors.
ethnicity but rather in the notion that continuity might be traced from one pluralistic society to another: ‘In general, ethnicity should not be important. I am proud of Adıyaman’s history and its multicultural element. This region is characterised as a peaceful environment. When an important leader of the Alevites was recently sick, everybody prayed and supported for his health’ (R6 Male 48, politician/governmental employee, Adıyaman). As Mitchell observed already, this notion of ‘unity in diversity’ is particularly popular with local politicians; however, it is striking that most of them trace this multicultural element more to the last few centuries and do not explicitly include Nemrut in this narrative: ‘Since the 18th/19th c. CE, the region of Adıyaman is populated by Jezidis, Kurds, Armenians. In a way the region is very heterogeneous, but in fact it functions in a very homogeneous way’ (R2 Male, 50, politician/governmental employee, Adıyaman).

2. ‘The eighth wonder of the world’: local pride through global fame

Explicit evocations of ancient Commagene as a blueprint for modern Adıyaman are much less apparent than Mitchell’s account suggested. Despite a generally positive appreciation of the Hellenistic kingdom, direct links to the present are seldom actively made. Much more widespread seems to be the more ahistorical notion that Nemrut Dağı is something to be proud of locally because it is so highly valued across the world. Particularly the site’s UNESCO World Heritage status seems to play an important role in the local reception of the site, often combined with the notion that the site is the ‘eighth world wonder’: ‘It is important because it is a wonder of the world and UNESCO world heritage. I am very proud of Nemrut—it is a place that many people from all over the world come to visit. It is a place of civilisation’ (R14 Male, 21, local inhabitant (student), Adıyaman). This particular status is, moreover, argued for also in explicit relation to other world heritage; a local politician in Adıyaman suggests, ‘What the pyramids mean to Egypt is what Nemrut means to Adıyaman’ (R3 Male, 43, politician/governmental employee, Adıyaman) while the guard of the site assures us ‘It is the eighth wonder of the world. It is also the highest museum of the world’ (R40 Male, 45, tourist sector (guard), Nemrut). For some respondents, this exceptional global status is understood as imposing on the local inhabitants a special responsibility to visit the site: ‘I feel ashamed about the fact that people come to visit Nemrut from all over the world and that I have not been there yet’ (R16 Female, 20, local inhabitant (student), Adıyaman). Likewise, several respondents suggested that, in case a new Kâhta Kommagene Festivali should be organised, it should have a more cosmopolitan character: ‘The Kâhta Kommagene Festivali was very nice for the local people. There were many local singers. Now the population has increased and we want not only traditional music but a more international festival’ (R20 Male, 39, politician/governmental employee).

At the same time, this notion of the ‘global stage’ at which Nemrut operates still seems to allow for very different opinions about who owns the site. For a governmental employee from Adıyaman, ‘Heritage is world property, it is a very cosmopolitan thing’ (R3 Male, 43). Another governmental employee, also from
Adıyaman, agrees but seems to suggest a more shared ownership that explicitly acknowledges the local sphere as well: ‘Everybody owns the heritage of Nemrut Dağı, not only people from this region. . . . Commagene is not only our history but it is also owned by the world’ (R2 Male, 50). For a female Turkish tourist at the site—not from the region—the site is owned by Türkiye however: ‘It is the eighth wonder of the world. It is from so long ago, it is our country’s property’ (R41 Female, 34, visitor/tourist, Nemrut Dağı). It is striking that the idea of Nemrut as ‘a synthesis of east and west’ (R3 Male, 43, politician/government employee, Adıyaman) was only mentioned once. In many ways, it can be concluded that the existing local narratives of Nemrut Dağı’s place in modern Adıyaman are often formulated through a global lens.

3. ‘I have gained from this place my whole life’: Nemrut as a source of income

Whereas Mitchell (2014) stated that Nemrut Dağı was deeply embedded in cultural and even religious notions of Self in modern-day Adıyaman, the outcomes of the respondent group suggest that, at present, the site first and foremost is considered in terms of its (touristic) revenue instead: ‘There seems to be very little interest in Nemrut Dağı by local people besides it being a possible source of income’ (R10 male, tourist sector, 42). In Kâhta, too, the notion that the site is essential for the local economy seems widespread: ‘We all make money from Nemrut Dağı; restaurant owners, tourist bus drivers, hotel owners etc. 50% of the city benefits from Nemrut Dağı’ (R22 Male, 65, tourism sector, Kâhta). It is noticeable that most respondents who feel a connection to Nemrut formulate this connection primarily in financial terms, considering the site as a source of (potential) income.

Standing near the waterside, on the terrace of his fish restaurant (Figure 6.9), a local restaurant owner (R22 Male, 65, tourism sector) becomes passionate when speaking of his connection to Nemrut Dağı: ‘I feel extremely connected to the place. People should feel connected to it as well. I make money from this place so I respect it very much. I have gained from this place my whole life.’ While talking, he picks up a piece of warm bread from a basket on our table and walks closer to the guard rail, throwing large chunks of it into the water, where immediately a spectacle of hungry fish can be seen. ‘Like these fish, I was fed by Nemrut Dağı throughout the years’, he clarifies.

Several of the respondents working in the tourism and heritage sectors as well as local politicians are, however, frustrated with the lack of local interest in Nemrut Dağı:

It is an important place in the region because it brings a lot of income. . . . I like to tell people about the history of the site; it is important that people in the region know more about the site. If we want to increase tourism, people need to know the history.

(R23 Male, 52, tourism sector, Kâhta)
They emphasise the great financial potential of the site, which, according to them, has not been taken full advantage of yet. What lacks, according to these respondents, is a local understanding of, connection to, and identification with the site. Only when this local engagement is achieved, they argued, people can start to benefit from the site: ‘to be able to sell it, you have to know it yourself first’ (R1, Male 45, archaeologist/academic). It is interesting to note that this connection between self-identification and financial gain is also made in the exact opposite manner, suggesting that only when local communities start to financially benefit from the site a sense of deeper connection with Nemrut will develop. Reflecting on the Kâhta Kommagene Festivali, a local politician remarks (R20 Male, Figure 6.9).
39, politician/governmental employee): ‘The festival attracts people which will make the population financially benefit from the site. Only afterwards, people will develop a connection to the site.’

Most respondents agree that there are problems with tourism to Nemrut, especially regarding the degree to which the region of Adıyaman actually benefits from this tourism. These concerns are formulated against the backdrop of a significant decrease in the numbers of foreign tourists to Nemrut and Adıyaman during the last few years (see above, n. 11). This drop is considered to be especially related to the 2016 terrorist attack in Gaziantep, the 2016 coup attempt, and the ongoing civil war in nearby Syria. Not only hotels and restaurants but also the site of Nemrut itself have witnessed a serious decrease in visitor numbers, especially when compared to the booming visitor numbers in the 1980s and 1990s. The restaurant owner explains: ‘Before this restaurant had about 600–700 visitors per day. Now tourists (especially foreign ones) are not coming anymore’ (R22 Male, 65, tourism sector).

Local politicians and journalists repeatedly complain that the local and regional economy does not benefit much from these international tourists: international travel agencies usually only plan one night in a hotel near the site, after which the tour continues to other places in eastern Anatolian: ‘Foreign tourists only visit Nemrut but do not stay for instance in the towns of Adıyaman and Kâhta nor in other important sites’ (R1 Male 45, archaeologist/academic, Adıyaman). What is lacking, according to several respondents, is a tourist infrastructure that draws tourists to cities and sites other than Nemrut Dağı alone and, importantly, keeps them in the region there for more than a single day. Several, sometimes related, initiatives have currently started, however. The dynamism of the various projects as developed over the last couple of years are impressive and clear attestations of the touristic and political interest expressed in the archaeological heritage of the region, for whatever reason.

Important in this context is a large-scale regional project funded by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the local municipality of Adıyaman, as well as the European Union (see Figure 6.10). It involves the building of new visitor centres at nine important heritage sites in the area, with new documentaries on those places made in English and in Turkish. A central visitor centre next to the archaeological museum of Adıyaman, now under construction, is meant to function as a starting point for this ‘Heritage trail’. These initiatives are focused on the attraction of (foreign) tourists and the creation of a regional touristic infrastructure. As such, they should principally be seen as accommodating an economic injection in the region by means of its archaeological heritage. It fits the widespread economised notion of archaeological sites as a potential source of (regional) income. Be that as it may, its tools are those of education and also, or so it seems, the updating of historical narratives about ancient Commagene.

4. ‘A different spirit’: the ahistorical Nemrut experience

The largely economic definition of Nemrut Dağı’s value described in the previous section goes hand in hand with the successful emergence and development of a
‘spiritual narrative’. This appropriation of the site is strikingly ahistorical. Central to this discourse of what we could call the ‘Nemrut experience’ is the impressive panoramic view offered from the tomb sanctuary’s terraces, particularly the overwhelming encounter with the sunset and sunrise (see Figure 6.11). Many people from all different respondent groups mentioned this aspect; it even appears to be the very first thing that comes to mind when people are asked about Nemrut: ‘Experiencing the sunset and sunrise is a very important element. There is a different spirit on top of the mountain, the experience of the whole ambience is an important aspect of the site’ (R2 Male, 50, politician/government employee, Adıyaman). A student in Adıyaman states, ‘Most people go to see the sunrise’ (R7 Female, 23, local inhabitant (student), Adıyaman). It is interesting to note that even local archaeologists mention it: ‘For a historian, Nemrut Dağı is a very important place. It is also a spiritual place’ (R8 Male, 43, archaeologist/academic, Adıyaman). In this context it is worth referring to Jos De Mul’s narration of his visit to the site: ‘Anyone who has managed to reach the summit after a tiring climb in the night and, standing there in the freezing cold, watch the sun rise and the glorious landscape of Mesopotamia slowly unfold before his eyes, will experience an awe-inspiring moment, something which cannot be described, even by a staunch atheist, in any

Figure 6.10 A recent large-scale project, funded by the municipality of Adıyaman, the Turkish government and the European Union, is intended to promote (international) tourism to Nemrut as well as the wider region and consists of a network of visitor centres across the vilayet of Adıyaman.

Source: Authors.
other than religious terms. For the first time during our trip, we all fell silent for a long time’ (De Mul 2017, 148). Only some visitors seem to explicitly distance themselves from this spiritual notion and use it to emphasise their own more historically informed interest:

I was 12/13 years old when I went to Nemrut for the first time. It was a very nice experience; I went there with my friends. We did not go to see the sunrise or sunset but to see the sculptures. We wanted to take pictures of the sculptures, because they are of such gigantic size.

(R28 Male, 24, local inhabitant, Kâahta)

That being said, it is clear that the sunrise and sunset experience is the go-to framing by which the site is to be sold. When speaking of attracting more tourists, a local governmental employee remarks: ‘An important element of the site is also to feel the environment, including the sunrise and the sunset’ (R20 Male, 39, politician/governmental employee, Kâhta). This is particularly expressed in the official governmental ‘Go Türkiye’ advertisement of Nemrut Daği, which does not cease to conjure a sense of enigma and mystique, speaking of ‘the secrets of the Commagene Kingdom’ with its ‘mysterious sculptures’ that have a ‘jarring effect’.27 This imagery, moreover, was recently disseminated to an audience of millions by means of the highly successful ‘Atiye’ (‘The Gift’), a three-season Netflix series.
sponsored by the Turkish government since 2019 (see Figure 6.12). The series represents an effective commercial for Southeast Turkish tourism, with Göbekli Tepe and Nemrut Dağı as particularly evocative protagonists. Nemrut appears as a mystical backdrop to a new-age shamanist cult, with imagery of a witch-like grandmother hitting pebbles above her head while worshipping the rising sun. The series’ ahistorical treatment of the archaeological sites—no mention is made of Antiochus I or Hellenistic-Roman Commagene—is criticised by Turkish archaeologists and their students: ‘Many of the tourists know about Nemrut because of the new series Atiyeh. The latter also creates a lot of misinformation about the site. This series is clearly a form of governmental advertisement’ (R7 Female, 23, local inhabitant (student), Adıyaman). Despite these criticisms, the easily malleable spiritualist connotation of Nemrut proves to be a profitable one, and companies and brands seek to capitalise on this potential. According to a guard at the site, ‘Often people are making commercials or other types of professional videos here, it happens almost one time per week’ (R40 Male, 45, tourist sector (guard), Nemrut Dağı). While we conducted our interviews on the site, a large film crew started installing their equipment. When we informed them about their work, it turned out they were about to shoot a commercial: ‘We are making an advertisement here for female clothing that will be shown on the Iraqi market. It is a good place to do this because it is a place with a high energy’ (R42 Male, 26, tourist sector, Nemrut Dağı).

Instead of an Antiochan cult revival (as Mitchell 2014 suggested), what we seem to witness instead is the instrumental role of Nemrut in what can perhaps best be understood as a form of neoliberal spiritualism (Jain 2020). Crucially, in this regard, is the fact that it is not just companies that capitalise on Nemrut’s potential.
Rather, it seems that the main entrepreneurs appropriating the site in this particular way are the tourists themselves, the individuals climbing the mountain hunting for that ‘unique’ Nemrut sunrise (or sunset) selfie. The iron grip of social media draws people to Nemrut in a desire to brand themselves online as adventurous, fit, undertaking, and persistent. Nemrut’s alleged mysticism provides abundant possibilities to fulfill these desires, making it a heritage site that exists in a virtual space that has a hyper-real dimension, almost a *simulacrum* that can prove a powerful tool for strategies of self-representation for each and every individual visitor. Fuelled by social media as well as the ‘Go Türkiye’ advertisement of Nemrut Dağı on YouTube (‘A reign of thousands of years, a view worthy of kings is waiting for you, at Nemrut. Don’t miss it!’) and the likes, we could say that the cult of the Self rules supreme on the mountain at present.\(^{28}\)

5. **‘Just stones’: indifference and lack of knowledge**

In the mountain village of Kayadibi, located in a narrow valley on a 20-minute car drive from Nemrut Dağı, the UNESCO World Heritage site appears very far away and stirs enthusiasm nor disapproval. A Kurdish family, busy preparing the basis for sweets called *cevizli sucuk*—a complex process that involves drying grape must on square pieces of shiny white cloth—are not eager to discuss their relation with Nemrut when we arrive. A 40-year-old farmer recalls: ‘The first time I visited Nemrut I was 5 years old. I didn’t feel anything, it is just stones. I have been several times since then, but it still does not mean much. Nemrut plays no role in the local traditions’ (R43 Male, 40, local inhabitant, Kayadibi). For people in these mountains, Nemrut has functioned as a material resource rather than a symbolic one, if a resource at all: ‘The first time I went to Nemrut Dağı, I was 17. We went there to take the snow’ (R26 Male, 61, politician/governmental employee, Kâhta). Here, on the fringes of the vast Anti-Taurus mountain range, there seems to exist no claim on Nemrut Dağı as local heritage, nor any illusion that the villagers may benefit from the site as a tourist location.

Several respondents working in the heritage sector or local politics explicitly emphasise that, indeed, there would be no strong local narrative concerning the site: ‘There is not a clear cultural or religious connection between Nemrut Dağı and the region’ (R20 Male, 39, politician/governmental employee, Kâhta). Many respondents working in archaeology, politics, heritage or tourism are aware of what they understand as disinterest: ‘I see that many people do not know anything about the site, they just see “stones”’ (R20 Male, 39, politician/governmental employee, Kâhta). Another man, working in the tourism sector, remarks, in a more general vein: ‘It is sad that people go to the site, make photos and then run back without knowing anything about the site itself’ (R4 Male, 52, tourism sector, Adıyaman). This is not just restricted to local villagers or visitors to the site. Also, we are told that people working in the tourism sector are often only minimally informed: ‘Even most hotel owners do not know anything about Nemrut and the past of Comagene’ (R4 Male, 52, tourism sector, Adıyaman). Many respondents indeed turned out to have no idea about the history of the site or the approximate dating of its
construction: ‘Nemrut Daği is important because it is a very old place. Perhaps Nemrut Daği is even older than Göbekli Tepe or from the same period’ a local student assured us. (R13 Female, 18, local inhabitant (student), Adıyaman).

Different explanations for this lack of knowledge and interest in its history are provided: ‘The lack of interest probably mostly has to do with the socio-economic standing of people here’ (R12 Male, 44, archaeologist/academic, Adıyaman), a trope always to be handled with care because of the wish for social distinction it might portray on the part of the respondent (cf. Kristensen et al., this volume).

Another man, working in the tourist sector in Adıyaman instead suggests that there is an ethnic reason: ‘Local people are not from Commagene but rather from Iran, so they feel no connection to the site’ (R4 Male, 52, tourism sector, Adıyaman).

Most respondents also emphasised that the curriculum in Turkish schools, be it in Istanbul, Adıyaman or Kâhta, gives no attention to ancient Commagene whatsoever: ‘Local people don’t know anything about Nemrut. During my three years of school in Adıyaman [between 15–18 years old], I never learnt anything about Nemrut Daği’ (R7 Female, 23, local inhabitant (student), Adıyaman). Similarly, a 22-year-old girl from Istanbul, visiting Nemrut for a holiday, said: ‘In the bus I was just discussing with my friends why we don’t know anything about this site, while it is as important as Göbekli Tepe. During primary school, middle school and high school there was no information about it’ (R34 Female, 22, visitor/tourist, Nemrut Daği). Although, as we discussed in the introduction, pre-Islamic periods of Turkish history are important in its national memory politics, these generally seem to ignore the Hellenistic kingdoms of the eastern Türkiye (like Commagene) and instead prioritise the Hittites, Phrygians and western-Anatolian ‘Greeks’. The municipality of Adıyaman attempts to correct the lack of knowledge about Nemrut by organising a range of events: ‘Currently, a project is ongoing that organises trips to Nemrut for especially older people from the different districts of Adıyaman that have not yet been there’ (R1 Male 45, archaeologist/academic, Adıyaman).29

6. ‘We love it like our homeland’: conflicting regional claims

Despite the indifference and lack of knowledge as it comes forward in the various reactions discussed above, Nemrut is, in fact, not at all an uncontested archaeological site. Claims of Nemrut’s ownership profoundly conflicting with the commercial objectives of the central government can indeed be discerned when actively looked for. Almost none of the respondents, however, seemed prepared to discuss these matters.

The first claim concerns the engagement of Kurdish groups with Nemrut. Reimagining the origins of Kurdish identity, some Kurdish communities have started to consider ancient Commagene a ‘Kurdish Kingdom’, suggesting, for instance, continuities between the attire of the Commagenean sculptures and modern Kurdish dress. Interestingly, this search for similarities between ancient remains and contemporary rural culture shows many similarities with the ahistorical method of anthropological survivalism that underpinned much of the Anatolianist discourse (mentioned in the introduction). On the website of SARA Distributions,
a publishing house and distribution agency for Kurdish literature, it is stated that
‘Commagene was founded by Kurds around the city of Adıyaman in Anatolia. Mount Nemrut was the most important capital of the Kurdish kingdom. King Nemrud is Kurdish and his name is Kurdish. . . . Peace and tranquility prevailed during the Commagenes, the ancestors of the Kurds.’30 On social media, furthermore, it is not hard to find evocations of Nemrut Dağı as solely Kurdish heritage, often combined with militaristic imagery and explicitly anti-Turkish sentiments.

A similar (political) controversy is witnessed by contemporary Armenian claims concerning Nemrut. In 2015, Armenian members of the ‘Tigran Mets Charity Fund’ performed Armenian folk dances and unfolded a 100-meter-long flag with which they enveloped the site’s tumulus as a symbol to commemorate “the centenary of the Armenian Genocide” (Figure 6.13).31 Ermeni Haber Ajansı, the Armenian news site covering the event, talks about ‘Mount Nemrut, where the statues of the Armenian Gods are located’ and ‘the place of the old Armenian pilgrimage’. In 2014, a group of Armenians came to conduct ‘polytheistic rituals’ at the site, something published extensively in the local newspapers. One news item described the event as follows: ‘After watching the sunrise at the top of the mountain, the ritual was started. The ritual started by heating the knives brought by the convoy over a fire in a special bowl. The ritual led by the person called the Kurm witnessed interesting

Figure 6.13 A 100-meter-long flag as a symbol ‘to commemorate the centenary of the Armenian Genocide’ envelops the site’s tumulus, from the Armenian news site Ermeni Haber.

Source: www.ermenihaber.am/tr/news/2015/08/14/Ermenistan-bayra%C4%9F%C4%B1-Nemrut/63939
movements. After the program, which lasted about an hour, the participants were served. Gagik Hayrabetyan, who attended the ritual, told reporters that Nemrut and Van are sacred to them. Stating that Nemrut represents peace, Hayrabetyan said, “We want to come here every year. We have musicians, businessmen, writers, doctors and soldiers of military origin. We wish peace for all humanity.” Online responses to the Armenian ‘pagans’ (as they were called by Turkish Islamic readers of the newspaper) were almost exclusively hostile, with statements like: ‘Liars. Take those peace wishes and use them in your own country. Those who are not on their knees are not praying in the right way. We recognise the friend of God as a friend and his enemy as an enemy EVVELALLAH’.32

In our request to comment on these Kurdish and Armenian claims on Nemrut, almost all respondents claimed to be ignorant of these matters. Only one local archaeologist was willing to confirm:

Some of the local people make an ancestral connection. The Armenians for instance see a link with the Orontids, and the Kurds see Commagene also as a Kurdish kingdom. Armenians find it Armenian because of the Armenian tiara and they see a link between the statue of ‘Commagene’ at Nemrut Dağı and the scarf that women still wear.

(R8 Male, 43, archaeologist/academic, Adıyaman)

7. ‘A place of idolatry’: Islamic reception in Kâhta

The last response we would like to discuss here was brought up almost without exception by local archaeologists, heritage experts and politicians but has received only very limited attention so far. This concerns the response to the site by conservative religious communities of the region who consider Nemrut Dağı an idolatrous place connected to King Nimrod, known from the Jewish Bible as well as from the second and 21st suras of the Qur’an:

There is a big misunderstanding between Nemrut and Nimrod. Many people do not have a very sympathetic feeling towards the site. It can be described as a cold relationship. . . . The society here in general is Muslim, which explains the cold relation with the site.

(R4 Male, 52, tourism sector, Adıyaman)

This confusion has not been without its repercussions. Particularly salient is a 2017 scandal surrounding a primary school textbook published by the Ministry of National Education (MEB) dealing with ‘the question of Idolatry’ and used during Qur’an lessons.33 In this book, Nemrut Dağı is explicitly connected to King Nimrod, describing the site as ‘the centre of unbelief, immorality, ugliness and idolatry’ and providing pictures of the site with accompanying texts propagating the ‘breaking down of idols’.

Although this false identification is based only on the modern nomenclature of the site, it is not entirely coincidental that the Qur’anic tradition has such a big role
Contemporary responses to Nemrut Dağı

To play. In fact, it could be argued that, through this association, Nemrut makes part of what we might call an imagined İbrahimic geography that centres on Şanlıurfa (ancient Edessa) and its wider region. This city is also known as ‘the Prophet’s City’ as it is believed that the prophet Ibrahim (the Jewish and Christian Abraham) was born here in a cave. Apart from this cave and a hill known as Nimrud Kürsesi (Nimrod’s Pulpit, the location where Ibrahim’s funerary pyre would be built by King Nimrod), Urfa is famous for the Balıklıgöl or ‘Pool of İbrahim’, holding the sacred carp, and marking the location where it is believed, İbrahim experienced his confrontation with king Nimrod. The importance of the Ibrahimic geography for Şanlıurfa cannot be overstated; every Turkish tourist visiting the city will go to the Balıklıgöl, probably on the day of arrival. There is a thriving economy of shops and restaurants in and near the park with the sacred pools. Their historical authenticity, their material contestation and verification of the Qur’anic tradition, are not questioned.

It proved difficult to establish how widespread the Qur’anic discourse on Nemrut Dağı actually is. While several professionals commented upon the existence of a Qur’anic claim on Nemrut, none of our respondents brought up this connection in the first place. Some local experts suggested that it is only a minority of mostly elderly people that believe in a connection of the site to King Nimrod. Others suggested that this number was actually growing ever since more conservative villagers started to settle in towns like Kāhta and Adıyaman as a consequence of the submerging of their villages by the Euphrates River. Especially in Kāhta, the conviction that Nemrut Dağı is connected to the idolatrous king Nimrod appears to be more than a marginal phenomenon. A local politician explains that these negative local associations with Nemrut have caused the site to be absent from the city’s official logo that, instead, features Cendere Bridge (a 3rd c. CE Roman bridge in the region, see Figure 6.14) as well as references to petrol-production.

Recently, the integration of small plaster copies of the Nemrut statues on a central roundabout of the city stirred strong dissatisfaction with the inhabitants, who apparently found this ‘inappropriate’ and asked for their removal (Figure 6.15). ‘Despite having one of the most famous sites of the world, there is no pride about Nemrut Dağı in Kāhta’ (R20 Male, 39, politician/governmental employee, Kāhta). When asked about the identification of Nemrut with King Nimrod, a local inhabitant replies: ‘There is a lack of awareness in Kāhta, people are generally ignorant. This is quite a big group. People don’t read. They think it is a place of idolatry’ (R27 Male, 58, local inhabitant). A local from Kāhta working in the tourism sector estimates that ‘Around 60% of the older generation believes that Nemrut is connected to Nimrod. Especially the religious ones’ (R21 Male, 65, tourism sector, Kāhta).

The Menzil community is mentioned particularly often by respondents when they refer to an increasing Islamic and what they perceive as a conservative mindset in Adıyaman. This widespread movement, in fact originates in the region of Adıyaman, in a village that bears the name of the community. The Menzil movement belongs to the Naqshbandi cult, one of the major Sunni orders of Sufism and, while promoting itself as apolitical, should be considered a considerable political and economic power in Türkiye, owning radio stations, TV channels, and journals (Balancar 2019, 28–29).
An article by journalist Saygı Öztürk in the Sözcü newspaper, an opposition outlet, reflects the most recent manifestation of the apparent anti-Nemrut sentiment of the Menzil movement. Öztürk noticed that overhead road signs mentioning Nemrut Dağı in the region of Adıyaman were increasingly covered with white paint, rendering the sign of Nemrut Dağı illegible while leaving the other destinations untouched (see Figure 6.16). Notably, the targeted signs without exception included the destination of ‘Safvan Bin Muattal’, which indicates the location of the tomb of Safvan Bin Muattal a ‘sahabi’ (companion) of the Islamic prophet Mohammed and an important Arab commander in the Muslim conquest (Juynboll 1995, 819–820). The tomb, located in the environs of modern-day Samsat, was built with large financial support given by the Istanbul Metropolitan
Municipality and, according to Öztürkhas’ strong ties to the regional branch of the AKP. Öztürk argues that this erasure was executed by the official Karayolları Bölge Müdürlüğü (the ‘Regional Directorate of Highways’) but pushed for by the Safvan Eğitim, Çevre, Gençlik ve Spor Kulübü Derneği (‘Safvan Education, Environment, Youth and Sports Club Association’), a religious organisation in charge of the Safvan Bin Muttual tomb and connected to the Menzil movement. A spokesperson of the Safvan Association reportedly stated ‘Nemrut’la aynı tabelada olmak istemiyoruz’ (‘we don’t want to be on the same sign with Nemrut’), as such rejecting the coexistence of two sacred tombs in the same mnemonic landscape. Öztürk argues that this negative association concerning Nemrut is extremely powerful and responsible for an increasingly negative attitude and policy towards Nemrut.\textsuperscript{36} The reason for this hostility, according to Öztürk, has to do with the religious nature of the site: ‘Religious circles do not favour Mount Nemrut because it has statues of gods’.\textsuperscript{37}

Although Öztürk’s claims concerning the political context of these actions cannot be verified and definitely have a political agenda themselves as well, his article exemplifies how local religious and political tensions are played out with Nemrut at their centre. The actions were criticised in a variety of local media, leading even to protests at the University of Adıyaman. Öztürk mentions that some individuals

\textbf{Figure 6.15} The central roundabout of the city of Kâhta, where small plaster copies of the Nemrut statues stirred controversy among the inhabitants of the city.

\textit{Source: Authors.}
have been threatened with legal action, something that, so far, seems to have been without result. To some degree, the ‘competition’ between Nemrut and ‘Safvan Bin Muattal’ is also expressed by those invested in Nemrut Dağı. Öztürk suggests that the 40 million Turkish Lira that the government invested in the ‘Safvan Bin Muattal’ tomb would have been better spent on Nemrut and Commagene’s history that ‘lies in ruins’. A local politician too, mentions the tomb of Mohammed’s companion as Nemrut’s chief competitor: ‘When we wanted to organise trips for local people and asked where they wanted to go the people rather wanted to go to Cendere for picnic or to Samsat to see the grave of Hz. Safvan bin Muattal (a friend of the prophet Mohammed)’ (R20 Male, 39, politician/government employee, Kâhta). More generally, religious sentiments are brought up time and again as forming a threat to Nemrut: ‘Türkiye is a Muslim country with a non-Muslim heritage. The fact that Nemrut is non-Muslim is more deciding for the way it is treated nowadays than the fact that it is non-Turkish’ (R11 Male, 54, archaeologist/academic, Adıyaman). This is also, by some, considered the main reason why the Kâhta Kommagene Festivali was terminated: ‘Organising the festivals was very difficult; there was a lot of resistance. In the mosques, it was openly advised not to go to the Kâhta Kommagene Festivali. In 2012, there was the last festival. (R21 Male, 65, tourism sector, Kâhta).

These religious-political issues are not recognised or acknowledged by everyone though; a local archaeologist decisively states: ‘In general, there is not a very political stance towards Nemrut’ (R1 Male, 45, archaeologist/academic, Adıyaman). Politicians reassured us that ‘The Nimrod/Nemrut misunderstanding is only followed by a very small minority of the local population’ (R5 Male, 59, politician/
government employee, Adıyaman) or that ‘The Nemrut/Nimrod confusion is only a very marginal phenomenon’ (R2 Male, 50, politician/government employee, Adıyaman). Yet, at the same time, it was added: ‘Because of the confusion between Nemrut and Nimrod, I rather talk about Commagene than about Nemrut.’

Despite the existent antipathy to Nemrut Dağı and the uncomfortable feeling that many locals seem to have when confronted with the site, what appears to shine through is a form of acceptance as well. Even the Menzil community restricts its protest to a relatively low-key and restrained interference in the overhead road signs—and only those signs that also mention Safvan Bin Muattal. A guard at Nemrut Dağı furthermore assures us that

very rarely people try to damage the statues. There are cameras and guards. In general I think visitors have become more sensible, more cautious, sometimes even asking whether they can leave the path, which is in fact allowed. People know more, probably through the internet. Visitors for instance often ask where the lion horoscope is. They also compare the site with photos that they have from the internet.

(R40 Male, 45)

A young female and Muslim visitor at the site tells us with great enthusiasm: ‘Many people think that Nimrod and Nemrut are the same. I also thought this before, but I did research on the internet when I was home and then I found out it does not have to do with each other. I think travelling opens up your mind and therefore it is important for people to visit a place like this’ (R38 Female, 20, visitor/tourist, Nemrut Dağı). For some, the religious difference can even be considered an appealing aspect of the site: ‘It is a place with very different beliefs. I want to see the sculptures; they seem very beautiful’ (R18 Female, 22, local inhabitant (student), Adıyaman). For others, such enthusiasm is perhaps simply impossible to conjure up: a tall, elderly man, sitting in a tea house of Kâhta, seems disinterested in talking about Nemrut, but, after a silence and a long sigh, concludes: ‘We have to accept that it is part of our culture’ (R26 Male, 61, government employee, Kâhta).

**Conclusion and outlook**

This sketch of shifting, versatile and conflicting claims on Nemrut Dağı deliberately did not prioritise the nation-state scale of analysis but rather looked at the mutual co-constitution of often conflicting claims and interests on local, regional, national, and global scales alike. Clearly, Nemrut operates in a variety of networks that both transcend and undermine the national level. Despite its funding by the AKP, for instance, the local Kâhta Kommagene Festivali could equally be described as a gathering of cosmopolitan worldviews and local heritage actors that together redefine, if not create, a regional cultural identity. Equally complex are the Kurdish claims on Nemrut, as these are highly controversial on a national scale but also seem to conflict with local cosmopolitan attempts at promoting regional solidarity. The national governmental policy directed at cosmopolitan international tourism,
meanwhile, appears to stand in contrast with an increasingly Islamist politics that struggles to find a place for non-Islamic heritage in its cultural politics. On a global level, non-Turkish tourists and scholars are often ignorant about the modern local and regional context (social, cultural, economic) of the archaeological site and region they visit or study. Although perhaps unknowingly and unintendedly, this often results in pushing a form of ‘toxic cosmopolitanism’ by emphasising the site’s uprooted, global significance alone.

The provisional, and therefore, undoubtedly still incomplete overview provided by our study shows that the idea of rooted cosmopolitanism much better describes the complex reality of the variety of Heritage claims. Nemrut is a contested place in both political and religious terms. The historicising, cosmopolitan discourse exemplified by Mitchell and De Mul, in fact, goes hand in hand with a great deal of indifference but also antipathy, fear, dogmatism, neo-liberal nationalism, ethnic tribalism, and ahistorical opportunism. A truly rooted cosmopolitanism takes all these alternate voices seriously, mapping out controversies and cultural conflicts while postponing value judgements that rely on notions of universalist ethics or indigenous heritage alone. Insisting that points of congruence between wildly different world views are always possible, thinking with rooted cosmopolitanism allows us to take all heritage claims seriously in their own right without violating the fundamental premise that cultures and their heritage, in fact, belong to no one (or everyone) and are always in the making.

Notes

1 See particularly his apt remarks on cultural heritage in chapter eight of his 2007 Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers: ‘The connection people feel to cultural objects that are symbolically theirs, because they were produced from within a world of meaning created by their ancestors—the connection to art through identity—is powerful. It should be acknowledged. The cosmopolitan, though, wants to remind us of other connections. One connection—the one neglected in talk of cultural patrimony—is the connection not through identity but despite difference.’ (Appiah 2007, 134–135).

2 For the role of classical archaeology in the preceding Ottoman period, not further dealt with in this chapter, see Shaw 2003; Bahrani et al. 2011; Çelik 2016.

3 In search of a new national identity for the young republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk initiated the Society for the Study of Turkish History (Türk Tarihini Tetkik Cemiyeti), whose task was to formulate a historical rationale behind his political agenda of national cohesion, modernisation, secularisation and ethnic homogenisation. In 1930, the Society published ‘The Main Tenets of Turkish History’ (Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları), which would have a lasting influence on Turkish cultural memory. In general, see Bilsel 2007; Atakuman 2008; Coşkun Özugün 2010; Bozoğlu 2020, 42–65. Archaeology was of particular importance for Atatürk’s rewriting of Turkish history, providing the material and geographical evidence for its thesis, cf. Tanyeri-Erdemir 2006; Hođos 2015, 89; Savino 2017.

4 Gür 2007 calls this later, less racial version of the Turkish History Thesis the ‘Anatolian Civilisations Discourse’, which ‘constructs the national identity around ‘the peoples of Anatolia’, which is an imagined community across ages and which shares a common identity of ‘Anatolian-ness’ (Gür 2007, 49).
As an intellectual project, some of its proponents have been keen on investigating forms of ‘anthropological survivalism’ to prove Anatolia’s primacy, seeing vernacular village cultures in Anatolia as remnants of an enduring ancient tradition (Eyüboğlu 2002 [1956], 12, 67–68; Eyüboğlu 1987). The claims of the Blue Anatolianism Movement also had a more cultural-historical dimension and focus on art and elite culture, for instance, in the writings of Ekrem Akurgal, whose The Birth of Greek Art: The Mediterranean and the Near East (Akurgal 1966) investigated the acculturative influence of Late-Hittite culture on archaic Greece, specifically in terms of artistic styles. See also the work of Cevat Şakir Kabaağaçlı, also known as ‘the Fisherman of Halikarnassos’ (Halikarnas Bahçecisi), who argued that ‘Greek heritage’ was actually Anatolian, and that its most important cities and protagonists (e.g. Homer, Herodotus) were from Asia Minor, cf. Balkıçısı & Kabaağaçlı 1980, 159–160; Oppermann 2013; Kristensen et al. 2021, 105–106.

The most recent and exhaustive archaeological overview is Brijder 2014.

For an overview of scholarly approaches and illustrating this struggle, see Versluys 2017, 185–201.

With the important exception of the case study on Nemrut and Turkish politics of national identity in Mitchell 2014, 256–269, to which we come back extensively below. The overview volume Gottkönige am Euphrat has a chapter on the contemporary context of Commagenian heritage (Wagner 2000, 123–129) but is not analytical. The useful article by Şahin Güçhan (2011) provides information on visitor numbers and briefly describes Nemrut as an ‘important cultural asset of the Adıyaman province’. It is remarkable that the various (foreign) missions working on the site in the 20th and 21st centuries have paid little to no attention to this aspect of their archaeological work at all; it is absent, for instance, from the work of the International Nemrud Project (as presented in Brijder 2014).

To benefit from the dam in terms of irrigation, Adıyaman depends on the construction of high-cost pumping stations in the province, but these, so far, have not been built sufficiently. Cf. Şahin Güçhan 2013, 145.

See the entry for Nemrut Dağı on the official website of the UNESCO World Heritage List: https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/448/

For exact visitor numbers and percentages of foreign tourists between 1991–2008, see Şahin Güçhan 2011, 316 tab. 1. The number of tourists shows an increase from the early 1990s (ca. 15.000) to the year 2000 (38.045) and then a slight decline again in the late 2000s (25.432 in 2008). A general drop can be witnessed in the percentage of foreign tourists (from 84% in 1991 to 28% in 2008). In the period 2010–2018, the average number of visitors (domestic and foreign combined), according to Özkan et al. 2019, was ca. 65.000 per year, with a slight increase in the last years (the average amount of tourists in 2018 was 78.523). See Özkan et al. 2019, 22 Figure 1. There are no statistical data available for the ratio of domestic/foreign tourists for this period, but the number of foreign visitors visiting Adıyaman has dropped from ca. 50.000 in 2010 to ca. 10.000 in 2018 (Özkan et al. 2019, 23 fig. 2). For the period before, see Şahin Güçhan 2011. The great difference in visitor numbers between Şahin Güçhan 2011 and Özkan et al. 2019 warrants some caution about the reliability of these datasets, but a general drop in foreign tourism since 2016 seems to be generally confirmed by our respondents (see below).

See www.goturkey.com

Brijder 2014 part II (“A survey of previous explorations and archaeological activities on Nemrut Dağı and in other Commagenean sanctuaries and sites. The sites revisited and reviewed”) provides a useful overview up to the beginning of the 21st century.

Hamdi Bey and Efendi 1883. Only recently, this book was translated into Turkish, an initiative by the new Turkish Institute of Archaeology and Cultural Heritage in Gaziantep, cf. Hamdi Bey and Efendi 2022 (transl. Murat Erşen). Hamdi Bey holds
an interesting position in Ottoman relations with the ‘West’. His 1884 *Law of Antiquities* introduced much stricter regulations concerning archaeological excavations and the trade in antiquities, for the first time claiming state ownership of such antiquities (Akın 1993). In 1991, he became the director of the Müze-i-Hümayun, the museum of the Ottoman Empire with its rapidly growing archaeological collection that derived from across the empire. His paintings have furthermore stirred much debate in recent decades, as they adopt a Western Orientalist view of the ‘East’ while simultaneously undermining European stereotypes. Hamdi Bey did not comment on his views of Western Orientalism, and was neither the subject of such criticism. See Çelik 2020, 28 for further literature.

For a thorough analysis of the Ottoman expedition, and its sometimes competitive relation to the German endeavours, see Radt 2003; Eldem 2010. Eldem 2010, 20: ‘Il va sans dire que, du point de vue des archéologues allemands, Osman Hamdi Bey tombait comme un cheveu dans la soupe’.

See also Mitchell 2014, 266: ‘Ancient Commagene has supplied Adıyaman with an important example that has resonated in contemporary local (and national) politics’.

He expresses admiration for several local journalists, entrepreneurs, and politicians who join in celebrating Adıyaman as ‘a rainbow coalition of Kurds, Suryanis, Turks, Cherkessians, Laz and Turkmen’ (Mitchell 2014, 262), where peace and ‘consensual harmony’ (Mitchell 2014, 267) can be achieved by joining forces and emphasising a shared ancient Commagenean past. Mitchell mentions how the *Kaymakam* of Kâhta makes explicit ‘the link between the achievements of Antiochus I, who managed to profit from being friends with both the Romans and the Parthians, and that of Adıyaman, which was able to achieve a fruitful compromise between Turkish nationalism and Kurdish aspirations’ (Mitchell 2014, 265). Mitchell’s assessment is laced with cosmopolitan value judgements, hailing the conference’s message as ‘nuanced and pluralistic’ (247), a ‘relief from dangerous polarisation’ (267), ‘very democratic and moderate’ (266), and even ‘less politicised’ (253).

Mitchell 2014, 265: ‘The material evidence of the monumental sculptures on Nemrut Dağı and along the processional way at Arsameia on the Nymphaeus provide inspiration for designers of costumes, touristic replicas, posters and other paraphernalia. The significance of these goes far beyond attracting tourists to the region.’

Mitchell 2014, 264: ‘It must be said that the cult itself lives on’; ‘The sense that the cult itself had been revived (. . .)’; ‘The writings of Antiochus I (. . .) make possible a cultic revival that has some genuine connection to the ancient ideology.’

This is not the place to argue in detail against the historical and archaeological inaccuracies that underlie De Mul’s and Mitchell’s understandings of Antiochan Commagene, but it should be noted that the average Commagenean will probably not have experienced the 1st c. BCE as a particularly peaceful time.

Note that these damages have also been attributed to mass tourism in the 1980s and 1990s, cf. Wagner 2000, 131: ‘Das führte in kurzer Zeit dazu dass das Heiligtum (. . .) auch im Sommer zunehmend einem touristischen Vandalismus anheimfiel (. . .). So wurde mancher monumentale Götterkopf mutwillig beschädigt, manches Fragment der bereits sehr brüchigen Kultreliefs abgeschlagen und als Souvenir mitgenommen, manches umgestürtzte Ahnenrelief als Picknicktisch oder als Sitzbank zweckentfremdet und weiter geschädigt.’

Most respondents belonged to the age groups 21–30 and 41–50 (in both cases 11 individuals made up 23.9% of the total), while other age groups were slightly less represented: 11–20 (9: 19.6%); 31–40 (4: 8.7%); 51–60 (7: 15.2%); and 61–70 (3: 8.7%). In general, we are aware that the low number of respondents from certain demographic groups—probably most importantly local, elderly women—renders our dataset uneven and thus not fully representative of the entire population of Adıyaman.
The semi-structured method implies the use of a fairly specific list (a research script or guide) of questions and topics which recur in each interview using more or less similar wording, while at the same time, it allows for a lot of freedom and flexibility in terms of how the questions can be answered as well as in what order the questions are asked. The method offers room for extra questions and topics emerging from the conversation and is generally targeted at acquiring a high degree of detail, cf. Bryman 2012, 471. All standard ethical considerations and procedures were met when conducting and processing the interviews. All interviews were undertaken with informed consent.

See the article in the Daily Sabah, by Deutsche Presse-Agentur from 18 September 2022: www.dailysabah.com/arts/events/commagene-biennial-greets-peaceful-coexistence-of-ancient-kingdom

Something, for instance, also observed in Özkan et al. 2019; Şahin Güçhan 2013, 128–159.

A telling example of dynamic creativity is the planning of a new bus station in Kâhta, for which, despite a current lack of financial resources, the layout has already been designed; it is shaped like the head of Antiochus I, complete with an Armenian tiara (the location of the bus lanes) and comprising of a festival area near the Late-Hellenistic king’s nose.


From this perspective, Antiochus I is joined by thousands of fellow god-kings every day, alive and well, seated on the virtual throne of their Insta page. For the video, see www.youtube.com/watch?v=KZto7Vd8iAY

See also www.haberler.com/adiyaman-da-kentimizi-geziyoruz-projesi-start-aldi14326305-haberi/

www.saradistribution.com/kommagene.htm

Described in an article of 14 August 2015 on the Armenian news site Ermeni Haber Ajansi: www.ermenihaber.am/tr/news/2015/08/14/Ermenistan-bayra%C4%9F%C4%B1-Nemrut/63939

In 2019, a different Armenian group visited Nemrut, led by Aragats Akhoyan, the former deputy of Armenia. He expressed his feelings as follows: “In this beautiful place, we want to give a message of brotherhood by holding a national cultural show here, to meet and mingle with the people here. ( . . . ) I was very excited when the young people danced the halay with drums and horns. I thought for a moment that the statues here would come to life. ( . . . ) I came to Mount Nemrut for the first time, but these places were no strangers to me, we love it like our homeland. Our ancestors lived here together in the past, and we should live together as brothers, just like them.” (See an article on the Adıyamanlilar news site of 7 July 2019: www.adiyamanlilar.net/kahta/ermeni-gruptan-nemrut-daginda-baris-cagrisi-h43241.html)

See an article in the secularist online newspaper Diken of 18 October 2017: www.diken.com.tr/yeni-mufredatin-nemrut-tanimi-ahlaksizligin-ve-putperestligin-merkezi/. The textbook was part of a wider controversy concerning changes in the school curriculum in 2017, for which see an article in the Haaretz from 18 July 2017: www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/turkey/turkey-removes-darwin-from-high-school-curriculum-1.5430713

The Islamic tradition tells that, after resisting the king’s ‘idolatrous cult’ by destroying the cult statues, Ibrāhīm was thrown into a fire, only to be saved by God who turned the flames into water and the logs into the sacred carp. See Rojas 2019, 106–110, commenting on the modern memory horizons of the carp in Urfa. On the legends of Nimrod: Van der Toorn and Van der Horst 1990.


Öztürk 2021: ‘Nemrut’a ilgisiz kalanlar, Safvan Eğitim, Çevre, Gençlik ve Spor Kulübü Derneğine yoneticiлерinin ellerindeki güç bir bilseniz.’

A theme that has been explored specifically in relation to Erdogan’s conversion of the Hagia Sophia from a museum into a mosque, cf. Harmanşah 2020.

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Uykusuz 2015 = cover of Uykusuz Dergisi Cilt (magazine), 1 October 2019.


7 Karian cosmopolitanism

Archaeology, heritage, and identity in Southwestern Türkiye

Troels Myrup Kristensen, Vinnie Nørskov and Gönül Bozoğlu

Introduction

This chapter uses Kwame Anthony Appiah’s concept of rooted cosmopolitanism to examine contemporary constructions of the past in southwestern Türkiye and to explore how archaeological cultures can be manipulated by these constructions to manifest regionally specific identities in a complex national and global geopolitical setting (Appiah 2005, 213–272). While cosmopolitanism on its own refers to the ethics of being a citizen of the world with obligations to our global ‘others’, an idea first voiced in Stoic philosophy, rooted cosmopolitanism is a more recent development responding to the challenges faced by discrete, individual communities that do not find easy solutions in universalism (see also Papastephanou, this volume). Rooted cosmopolitanism may be described as ‘a way to express global concerns for heritage while at the same time orienting resolutions towards local actors’ (Colwell-Chanthaphonh 2009, 143). As such, it is a process that both happens within a particular community and ‘overturns any notion that the local, situated contexts in which we work as archaeologists or ethnographers are isolated, traditional, disengaged, or disconnected from larger processes, institutions, organisations, consumer networks, and knowledges’ (Meskell 2009b, 25). The concept provides a useful lens onto the difficult interactions between different geographical scales in the configuration of identities, allowing the inherently cosmopolitan formation of local histories to come into sharper focus.1

The empirical focus here is local engagement with archaeology and heritage practices in the towns of Bodrum (ancient Halikarnassos) and Milas (ancient Mylasa), where we did ethnographic fieldwork in 2017 and 2018 (Figure 7.1). These towns are part of a cultural landscape in southwestern Türkiye that in antiquity, even in some contexts today is referred to by the Greek name Karia (occasionally Latinised as Caria). In Turkish, the region is sometimes informally known as Karya. More formally, the region corresponds roughly to the modern provinces (il) of Muğla, Aydın, and Denizli, although we will here focus on the first of these, not least in light of the differing political and social dimensions of heritage across the provinces. This region and especially the settlements on the Aegean coast have experienced radical transformation over the past 50 years through urbanisation and the growth of tourism. This not only has fuelled strong economic growth in the

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region but also frequently leads to a sense of cultural estrangement and downright nostalgia among the local population for the ‘good old days’ before mass tourism and other dramatic changes in society and politics. A characteristic feature of the region is the configuration of a regional identity that is based on a distinctive archaeological culture defined as Karian and that can be placed within local, national, and global discourses in the present-day political landscape of the Republic of Türkiye (Kristensen et al. 2021).

The first section defines the concept of Karianism, some of its current manifestations, and its relationship to rooted cosmopolitanism. We focus here on manifestations of Karianism both locally in the seaside town of Bodrum, site of the Maussolleion, the mid-fourth century BCE tomb monument of Maussollos and Artemisia II that in antiquity was considered one of the Seven Wonders of the World (Rodríguez-Moya and Mínguez 2017, 103–132), and nationally in a major exhibition on Karia and its archaeology shown in 2020 in Istanbul. The second section then turns to the case of the inland town of Milas, which has attracted considerable attention since the discovery in 2010 of a monumental, late Classical-period funerary complex (possibly) belonging to Hekatomnos, the founder of the Hekatomnid dynasty, but which (for now) remains outside most tourist itineraries through the region. While massive investment has gone into making the town part of a modern heritage experience (as defined by the Turkish state and global organisations such as UNESCO), we focus on more locally rooted initiatives that aim to raise awareness of the town’s (and the region’s) Karian identity by setting
or ‘translating’ academic knowledge to vernacular uses by means of cosmopolitan networks. These cases from Bodrum and Milas show how rooted cosmopolitanism can help us to understand the connections between archaeology and identity in a regional context, as well as how individuals use cosmopolitan networks to claim and make sense of local heritage. In the concluding discussion, we explore some implications of our case studies for engagement with local communities in archaeological practice, pointing out the gains and tensions of rooted cosmopolitanism as a frame for rethinking this.

Regional archaeology and Turkish identities

To understand the attraction of Karianism, it is first necessary to reflect on the dominant paradigms and national narratives within Turkish archaeology. Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, archaeology has played an important role in defining national identity and in laying a transhistorical claim to all of Anatolia (Özdoğan 1998; Atakuman 2008; Matthews 2016). In the words of historian Afet İnan, one of the central figures in promoting Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s vision of Anatolianism as the defining principle of Turkish culture: ‘No cultural period is alien. . . . Ownership of this land by the Turkish race reaches back to time immemorial’ (cited in Aydın 2010, 36). While this overarching nationalistic narrative of Anatolianism is still very strong throughout the country (including Karia), regionalism has increasingly developed as a major theme in Turkish archaeology, particularly since World War II, with more and more studies now being devoted to the cultural and social distinctiveness of specific regions of the country, such as Phrygia, Lydia, and Ionia (see, most recently, Hallmansecker 2022).

Among the most important individual figures in the development of regional approaches to Anatolian archaeology is the Turkish archaeologist Ekrem Akurgal (1911–2002), whose works have helped to define what gets to count as an (ancient) region within the national archaeological landscape. Born near Haifa in modern Israel, Akurgal was deeply embedded in the social networks of late Ottoman cosmopolitanism (Eldem 2013; Freitag 2013). Going abroad for his university studies, he studied archaeology in Berlin in the 1930s and completed his PhD in 1941 on fourth-century BCE reliefs from Lycia under the mentorship of Gerhard Rodenwaldt (1886–1945) (Greenewalt 2005; Özgünel 2010). In the same year, he secured a chair at Ankara University, where he remained until his retirement in 1981. While staying faithful throughout his career to Atatürk’s promotion of Anatolianism, Akurgal published a range of studies that defined Anatolian archaeology in regional terms, including a book on Phrygian art (Akurgal 1955). His popular work Die Kunst Anatóliens von Homer bis Alexander (1961) consists of chapters devoted to regional styles in Anatolian art, including a chapter on Karian art (1961, 160–166) that is, in fact, rather sketchy, reflecting the state of scholarship at a time when relatively little regional fieldwork had been done. According to Akurgal, the cultures of Anatolia were united by the Ionian world of thought (‘der ionischen Geisteswelt’) (1961, ix) that developed from coexistence between the Greeks, the indigenous populations of Anatolia, and eastern influences. This perspective acknowledges the positive
outcome of a culturally complex, cosmopolitan setting—perhaps comparable to some of his own childhood experiences.

Akurgal’s influence is apparent from his role in shaping the next generation of Turkish archaeologists: no less than 23 of his students went on to have positions in Turkish universities (Özgünel 2010, 144). These include Fahri Işık, who remains a highly influential figure in Karian archaeology, as we shall see (Kristensen et al. 2021, 105). Other factors that have contributed to the development of regional approaches include international scholarly trends in Mediterranean archaeology, whereby the introduction of new methods such as landscape archaeology and archaeological survey has opened up interpretive frameworks that tend to focus on individual regions as their fundamental mode of analysis (Reger and Elton 2007; Roosevelt 2012, 4–6). More recently, the growth of archaeology as a scientific discipline in Türkiye has pushed the field in a similar direction, with the number of local universities throughout the country increasing drastically over the past 20 years. Many of these universities are active in fieldwork and research, typically within their own communities, adding new data and documenting archaeological sites that enable the identification of cultural distinctiveness.

Not only scholarly trends but also personal and political motivations have contributed to the development of regional perspectives in Turkish archaeology. Regional archaeologies are often seized upon by individuals to provide a platform for contemporary politics and self-representation at the subnational level. Indeed, the ancient historian Stephen Mitchell has recently noted that ‘[r]egional identities are important in modern Türkiye, although [they are] often overlooked by commentators who focus on the national or metropolitan picture’ (2014, 265). However, this tension between ‘national’ and ‘regional’, as it is visible, for example, in museum spaces and exhibitions, is generally left unexamined. As Mitchell also notes, several groups and individuals across Türkiye have seen regionally defined archaeological cultures as useful and dynamic prisms for new identity constructions that can apply the past to address the present needs and future aspirations of particular regions and to situate their communities within the multi-layered political, religious, and economic tapestry of the country (see also Kruijer and Versluys on Nemrut Dağı, this volume). Rooted cosmopolitanism, in many cases, becomes a key vehicle for expressing and developing these identities, for example, by actively seeking out and engaging in cosmopolitan academic networks and practices. As such, these regional identity constructions constitute examples of cosmopolitanism as a particular kind of ‘globalisation from below’ (Meskell 2009b, 25).

In our own previous work on local perceptions of heritage in Bodrum, we observed how the Karian heritage ‘label’ informed cultural politics and the agency of individual stakeholders in a whole range of contexts in southwestern Türkiye (Kristensen et al. 2021). The wave of what we call ‘Karianism’ is a response to political, religious, and demographic changes in the region. While the Bodrum region is a traditional stronghold of the Kemalist and secularist Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), it has since the 1960s undergone radical changes through tourism and the arrival of new residents drawn by its economic opportunities, lifestyle, and climate (Mansur 1999). These developments have been
even more dramatic since the tenure of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in 2003. The changes in the region are evident in the construction of high-end resorts, gated communities, large infrastructure projects, private schools, and hospitals, as well as the organisation of new heritage initiatives that cater to the global experience economy. The increasing urbanisation in the Bodrum region that is the result of migration from other parts of Türkiye (both from Istanbul and central Anatolia) has caused some resentment and antagonism, expressed perhaps most strongly in controversies surrounding the construction and funding of new mosques in the expanding suburbs of Bodrum (Anter 2021).

Heritage politics are intrinsically enmeshed in the political and discursive landscape of the region, often through the distinctive prism of Karianism. Karianism evokes the ancient Karian culture that inhabited a corner of southwestern Türkiye bordered by Ionia to the north, Lydia to the northeast, and Lycia to the southeast (Reger 2020). The earliest beginnings of Karian culture have been traced back to the Late Bronze Age (Herda 2020). The main identifier of the culture is the ancient Karian language, which belongs to the Indo-European family (Adiego 2020). Even if Karian is no longer spoken, a sense of linguistic continuity is still perceived by some locals, for example, when a school teacher in Bodrum told us that the local dialect is coarse and difficult to understand, just as Herodotos described it in his day (Kristensen et al. 2021, 109). A Karian identity is furthermore often enforced through the authority of the ancient authors Herodotos and Homer, who are firmly part of the Classical canon but can, with some credibility, be claimed as ‘natives’ of the region. While Homer is considered by some (especially Turkish) scholars to have come from Smyrna (modern Izmir), just north of Karia, Herodotos was certainly a native of Halikarnassos, even if the question of his native tongue remains controversial (Abe 2015). Herodotos also tells us that Halikarnassos was first founded as a colony by Troizen, a Greek city in the Peloponnese, adding to the cultural complexity of the region (Hdt. 7.99.3; Flensted-Jensen 2004, 1115).

While there can be no doubt that the Karian language is a distinctive feature of the region’s culture, other aspects of the Karian identity are much harder to pin down, not least in archaeological terms. For example, the relationship with other local cultures attested in the region, such as those of the Lelegians and the Pelagians, remains difficult to define, even if they are sometimes described as ‘proto-Karians’ (Flensted-Jensen and Carstens 2004; Rumscheid 2009; Unwin 2017). Even in antiquity, a strong tradition connected the Karians with Crete, suggesting they were originally part of a Dorian migration to Asia Minor (Unwin 2017, 32–60). From the mid-sixth century, the region also had strong links to the Persian Empire, under which the Hekatomnids served as satraps (Carstens 2009). The imposing fourth-century BCE monuments built by the Hekatomnid dynasty combined Greek, Persian, and local traditions, itself attesting to a cosmopolitan and transregionally engaged culture (Henry 2013). As argued by ancient historian Naomi Unwin, ‘[the] history of Karia is entangled with that of the Greek-speaking world; the cultural and religious character of the region was shaped by sustained interaction with both east and west’ (2016, n.p.). It is clear that the cultural specifics of a Karian identity
in antiquity were complex and may well have changed considerably over time. Yet the Karian region—especially during the time of the Hekatomnids—shares much of the ‘cosmopolitan’ outlook of the kingdom of Commagene during the late Hellenistic period (Versluys 2017). This trait may also explain why the cultural complexity of Karianism can be a potential asset, since it provides the current inhabitants of the region with an ancestral link not only to a deep past, one that was inherently ‘international’ or even ‘cosmopolitan’. In the emic sense, then, the label of ‘Karian’ may itself connote cosmopolitan values.

In spite of the cultural ambiguities and difficult issues of interpretation, Karian identity today holds considerable appeal for both archaeologists and non-professionals in the region, with significant implications for current political and economic developments. Bodrum is arguably the key locus of the definition and expression of Karian identity in the region, both because of the Maussolleion, first identified by Charles Newton in the mid-19th century, and in light of the town’s history since the 1950s, since when it has become a globally known tourist destination. Bodrum certainly has the longest history of foreign archaeological exploration in Karia, with scholars since the Renaissance attracted by the allure of discovering and reconstructing the Maussolleion (Funder et al. 2019, 76–99). Between 1966 and 1977, a Danish team excavated both the substructures and the larger area around the Maussolleion, thus shouldering responsibility for the state in which the site is presented today. The vast majority of archaeological fieldwork in Bodrum has produced scholarship with a ‘global’ academic audience in mind. In the worst case, this fuels what Appiah would call ‘toxic cosmopolitanism’ (2005, 220–223), with significantly detrimental implications for how local heritage is perceived today, specifically as ‘foreign’, ‘irrelevant’ or as a hindrance to economic developments (Kristensen et al. 2021).

Karianism is not least an important counterreaction to the totalising discourse of Hellenism, with all that implies in terms of past and present geopolitics, including the troublesome relationship between modern Greece and the Turkish Republic, as well as the country’s complex role as a mediator between ‘east’ and ‘west’ (Tezcür 2022). This tension is particularly vexing and relevant in the Aegean region, which, until the 20th century, was home to a large Greek population and which has close geographical and cultural ties to the nearby Dodecanese islands, today part of the Hellenic Republic (see, for example, contributions in Pedersen et al. 2021 on cultural interactions in the region; and Leontis 1995 on the contested geographies of Hellenism). Material remains from the Greek and Roman periods found in the region have, unsurprisingly, been subject to public controversy and scholarly dispute on numerous occasions (Ergin 2010). For example, in his observations on the mid-fourth century BCE Maussolleion of Halikarnassos, Akurgal identified the sculptor Bryaxis as Karian on the basis of onomastics: ‘As the name Bryaxis is a Karian word, he must have originated from Karia’ (2000 [1997], 297). Contrast this assessment with the less confident analysis of the American art historian Bruni-lde Ridgway, who in her authoritative book on fourth-century Greek sculpture noted that Bryaxis ‘seems to have been an Athenian about whom little is known, although the possibility exists that he was a Karian, given his unusual name’ (1997,
Such scholarly arguments are in turn mirrored in local popular or vernacular culture, as in the works of the Bodrum-based author Cevat Şakir Kabaağaçlı (1886–1973), published under the penname Halikarnas Balıkçısı (the Fisherman of Halikarnassos), which make similar claims to Bryaxis as a local artist (Kristensen et al. 2021, 105). From the perspective of Karianism, historical figures and groups from outside the region, such as the Persians and Alexander the Great who besieged Halikarnassos in 334 BCE, are seen as destructive tyrants.

Local interest in Karian identity digs into contemporary concerns, such as the global issues of neoliberalism, mass consumption, urbanisation, and environmentalism, responding, for example, to the wholesale destruction of archaeological landscapes in the region in the construction of megahotels, resorts, and private villas for both global and Turkish elites. In response, and to promote local tourism, a Karian trail has been established that allows walkers to experience the natural and archaeological landscape of the region (Özdemir et al. 2013). The significance of regional archaeology for local identity is also expressed in the cityscape of Bodrum, including an unfinished mural in a shopping centre by the Myndos Gate that depicts the recently discovered sarcophagus in Milas, believed to have contained the body of Maussollos’ father, Hekatomnos, the founder of the Hekatomnid dynasty who ruled from c. 395 to 377 BCE (Figure 7.2; also see below). While this may be simply a symbol of local pride, it is also part of a larger discourse of Karianism. This discourse places itself in the struggle between the religious, economic, and social policies of the current AKP government and the strongly Kemalist loyalties of many communities on Türkiye’s Aegean coast, including Bodrum. This is seen, for example, in a new book by Oğuz Alpözen, former director of Bodrum’s Museum of Underwater Archaeology, that strongly condemns recent changes by the Ministry of Tourism and Culture to the structure and design of that museum (Alpözen 2019). The museum has been housed in Bodrum’s crusader castle since 1962; it was established there to house the finds from shipwrecks excavated along the Turkish coast. Already in the late 1950s, Bodrum had become a centre for underwater archaeology, and when Alpözen became director in 1978, the museum experienced a transformation, leading to international recognition when it was nominated for the European Museum of the Year award in 1995 (Hudson 1996). In his new book, Alpözen objects to the destruction of the castle garden that Kabaağaçlı created, and to the removal of Atatürk’s words and image within the exhibition space, thus fusing national and local horizons of heritage.

A range of local stakeholders in the Bodrum region have employed cosmopolitan networks to claim archaeology as part of local heritage through the prism of Karianism. In our research, we have followed the work of the Bodrum-based Akdeniz Ülkeleri Akademisi Vakfı (officially translated as Mediterranean Countries Academy Foundation, MCAF), which organises public lectures and other events focused on Karian archaeology and various aspects of local heritage (http://academia.org.tr/). The MCAF operates on the basis that cultural heritage should produce claims to local identity, notably a Karian one, as expressed in the desire of one of its most outspoken members to construct a Museum of Karian Civilisation, modelled, both in its name and its institutional framing, clearly on the Museum
of Anatolian Civilisations in Ankara that gave a public face to Atatürk’s vision of Turkish archaeology (Kristensen et al. 2021, 109). Such a museum would transform Karianism from a grassroots movement into a state-sponsored, authorised heritage discourse with expanded political clout (Smith 2006). The work of the MCAF ties into global networks of knowledge production to achieve its goals, for example, by working with foreign archaeologists and other specialists in the

Figure 7.2 Unfinished mural at the Myndos Gate mall, Bodrum, showing the Hekatomneion sarcophagus and reconstruction of Alexander the Great’s siege of Halikarnassos, April 2018.

Source: Authors.
organisation of lectures and conferences (Funder et al. 2019, 95; Kristensen et al. 2021, 101–102, 109–110). The group works to translate from the academic into the vernacular and to raise awareness of archaeology among local students and residents. As expressed by a key member of the MCAF—identifying himself as Karian—whom we interviewed in April 2018, ‘We need to bring your academic knowledge to the people.’ He emphasised repeatedly throughout the interview that the foundation was responding to what they perceived as an increasingly lost sense of place and history in Bodrum.

Other recent examples of Karianism pose difficult questions about local and national agencies in the configuration of identity and heritage. Since our fieldwork was concluded, a major exhibition specially dedicated to Karian culture was organised in 2020 at the Yapı Kredi Gallery in Istanbul, entitled Karialılar—Denizcilerden Kent Kuruculara (‘The Karians—From Seafarers to City-Builders’). The exhibition was accompanied by a large bilingual (Turkish/English) catalogue with contributions by many prominent Turkish and international historians and archaeologists working on individual Karian sites, with a full scholarly apparatus (Henry and Belgin-Henry 2020). The exhibition was the ninth in a series of 12 planned by Yapı Kredi to be dedicated to Anatolian civilisations, thus staying loyal to the nationalist framework of Afet İnan while still following the regionalist approach employed in more recent work. As Ian Hodder notes in his discussion of an earlier Yapı Kredi exhibition on Çatalhöyük, these occasions represent microcosms of the many tensions in Turkish society today, between different classes and between centre and periphery, as well as between secularist and Islamist visions of heritage and culture (Hodder 2009). The preface to the Karian catalogue was written by İbrahim Yelmenoğlu, general manager of the Tüpraş and Koç holding companies that own Yapı Kredi. It reveals what the organisation sees as the political potential of Anatolian and Karian archaeology under the headline ‘dreams know no boundaries’—making a conceptual leap from the exhibition’s assemblage of archaeological heritage to the potentialities of nationhood and economic prosperity. In contrast, the contemporary and local implications of Karian heritage for people living in the modern-day region were left largely underexplored. The exhibition catalogue has only a single chapter dedicated to the postclassical history of the region, covering the entire second millennium CE (Pektaş 2020). While to some extent cosmopolitan in character and execution, the exhibition was profoundly ‘un-rooted’, not only by virtue of its display in a metropolitan setting at a considerable distance from Karia itself, but also by expressing virtually no interest in its contemporary heritage, or what Lynn Meskell has called the archaeological present (2009b). It consequently presents us with a conception of Karian culture that is characterised by temporal rupture and a sense of dislocation. Both catalogue and exhibition may have striven for a cosmopolitan outlook, but ultimately both embody a very selective view of the past of the region and one which places historical agency firmly elsewhere, specifically in the hands of scholarly specialists and the funding bodies responsible for the exhibition and its catalogue.
Karianism and the translation of archaeological heritage in Milas

The town of Milas occupies a very different position in the Turkish landscape than Bodrum and Istanbul, geographically, politically, and economically. Although it has a strong claim to a Karian identity, its inland location means that it is mostly absent from tourist itineraries (and investment), which tend to focus on destinations on the Aegean coast, in spite of the fact that Milas-Bodrum Airport is situated only 16 km to the south. The town’s history can be traced back to the early Iron Age (Flensted-Jensen 2004, 1128–1129; Edgü 2010; Aubriet 2013; Diler 2021, 87; Williamson 2021, 93–178). Herodotos and Strabon tell us that, as home to the sanctuary of Zeus Karios, it was both the religious and the political centre of Karia (Hdt. 1.171.6). The town was connected by a ‘sacred road’ to the important regional sanctuary at Labraunda, located roughly 15 km to the north. In the fourth century, Hekatomnos made Milas his capital and initiated a monumental building programme in the town, at Labraunda and other Karian sites (Hornblower 1982, 68–78). With Maussollos (ruled 377–353 BCE), the capital was moved to Halikarnassos, but Milas continued to have some importance, not least as a religious centre. Milas flourished again during the Roman period. In the Ottoman period, the city developed into a multicultural town, where ethnic Greeks, Jews, Armenians, and Turks lived (Usta 2018, 53–54).

The ancient remains in the city belong primarily to two periods, the fourth century BCE under the Hekatomnids and the Roman period. Most prominent in the cityscape is a Corinthian column known as Uzunyuva (‘high nest’), with an inscription on the column naming a certain Menandros dating to the late first century BC. The column is now in use as a stork nest and is claimed to have been a landmark of the city since antiquity. Located in Hisarbaşı, one of the town’s oldest neighbourhoods, with many houses going back to the Ottoman period, it was already mentioned in travel reports from the 1670s. In 2005, the German archaeologist Frank Rumscheid suggested at a conference that the column represented a secondary phase of use and that the large foundations in the area constituted a ‘proto-Mausolleion’, a large funerary complex located inside the city walls that was similar to, but earlier than the more famous Mausolleion in Bodrum and that contained an underground tomb belonging to Hekatomnos. The same year the paper was published, it was discovered that illegal excavations had been carried out in one of the houses in the neighbourhood (Brunwasser 2011; Savran and Özbey 2020, 31–34). The looters had reached a tomb chamber with a large sarcophagus already in 2008 and tried to sell it on the international antiquities market. When the Turkish authorities in 2010 discovered the looting, ten individuals were arrested. Artefacts associated with the tomb have surfaced on several occasions, becoming the focus of intense repatriation efforts by the Turkish state. The tomb and the sarcophagus quickly became iconic emblems of Milas and its Karian identity, decorating, for example, many local commercial products (Figure 7.3) and as we already saw, a mural in nearby Bodrum.

The ‘discovery’ of the tomb not only changed the understanding of fourth-century Karia, but it also completely changed the heritage landscape of Milas and
became the basis of a new archaeological strategy for the town. The excavations began in August 2010 after 40 lots had been expropriated and the site defined as a first-degree archaeological site. Buildings on 35 lots were demolished, radically changing the character of the local community. Indeed, the entire site was fenced off, not unlike the walling in of the Maussolleion as an official heritage site after the extensive excavations of the 1970s (Kristensen et al. 2021, 106–107). Eight examples of the traditional Milas houses were restored rather than bulldozed and are now used for administration and exhibitions, both archaeological and relating to local ethnography and heritage, such as displays of the town’s rich tradition in carpet production (Savran and Özbey 2020, 39–59). After the completion of the excavations, the site opened as the Uzunyuva Hekatomneion Arkeoparkı, applying neoliberal heritage branding (Figure 7.4) (Usta 2018, 77–80). The site is managed by the state on the basis of a comprehensive development plan.

In 2012, the Hekatomneion site was included in UNESCO’s tentative World Heritage List, marking an important step in the authorities’ efforts to place Milas and its monuments on the map. The ambition of the state to raise the status of the archaeological site by means of the UNESCO label reflects a particular kind of cosmopolitanism that caters to universalist and globalist agendas. In fact, UNESCO World Heritage sites have a long history of excluding local populations rather than creating economic or social opportunities for them (Meskell 2018). Although grand in scale and ambition, the Hekatomneion archaeological park was only one
Figure 7.4 Entrance to the Hekatomneion archaeological park, Milas, April 2018.

Source: Authors.
part of a larger project to turn Milas into a ‘city of museums’. While the city was previously home only to a small archaeological museum, a Roman-period mausoleum known as Gümüşkesen (which architecturally references the Maussolleion of Halikarnassos) was to become the centrepiece of a new, much larger museum. After construction had already begun, this project was stopped by environmental protesters. The museum’s empty concrete shell now stands as a stark reminder of the failed ambition to make Milas a museum city. The full effects of the overall strategy and the institutionalisation of the Hekatomneion as an archaeological park remain to be seen, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic has, at least temporarily, decreased the number of foreign visitors to the Bodrum region.

Alongside these official, public, and well-funded efforts to raise the inflow of tourists in Milas through national investment, professional management, and international heritage labels, various groups and individuals have sought to use and valorise Karianism in other ways. We focus here on the grassroots scientific conference on Karian archaeology, the *Karia, Kariahlar ve Mylasa Sempozyumu* (‘Karia, the Karians and Milas symposium’), organised in Milas by Olcay Akdeniz, an employee of the Milas chamber of commerce who is not a professional archaeologist or historian. The conference brings together representatives of the international and national scholarly community alongside locals interested in Karian archaeology. During a visit to Milas in April 2018, we interviewed Akdeniz about his work. He had started the symposium about eleven years earlier, after having met the archaeology professor Fahri İşik. Akdeniz had heard İşik talking to his students in Labraunda, and these words were inspirational for him:

He said that culture has its roots in Anatolia—that culture was born here.
He had this very message. I felt that other people should hear what he was saying.

Akdeniz’s aim was to bring international and national scholars working on Karian archaeology to the provincial town of Milas and to build international networks. He stated that he ‘only wanted the best people’ in order to keep the symposium of the ‘highest quality’. Speakers included those directing the various excavations in the Karia region, as well as other Turkish, Swedish, Italian, French, British, Danish, and German archaeologists. Locally, there was significant interest in Bodrum, although archaeologists from Istanbul and Izmir also participated. The conference languages were English, Turkish, and Italian, with simultaneous translation. Each year the symposium was dedicated to ‘one Turkish and one foreign archaeologist’, usually ‘veterans’. For Akdeniz, the scientific character and appearance of the symposia were important. One way to achieve this was to secure the presence of renowned international scholars and/or those with prominent roles within heritage organisations, such as the Turkish National Committee for UNESCO.

Getting the Karian symposium off the ground did not come without a struggle. The local municipality supported the first symposium, but when a new mayor was appointed, this support disappeared. However, Akdeniz ‘did not give up’ and secured support, mostly from the local chamber of commerce and from the
chamber of architects, as well as contributing private funds of his own. The job was ‘collectively done, like in a village’, reflecting a transfer of rural ways of life into the academic sphere. With a small budget, the organisers managed to accommodate speakers at a modest local hotel. The speakers—in his view—shared this sense of a ‘villagelike collectivism’: ‘people don’t seem to mind our humble venue and they keep their expectations at a minimum level. Nobody asks for an airplane ticket from us.’ His struggles also included confronting one powerful individual who had ideas about who should be invited to speak. However, Akdeniz rejected these suggestions if they were ‘not academic enough’, even risking local-level political support. He was proud of his intransigence, which came from the very culture that the conferences are aiming to explore and celebrate: ‘I fought. I am from Karia, and the Karians are warriors.’ In light of the complex geopolitics of the region and within Türkiye itself, this self-identification as a warrior may be warranted, but cannot, of course, be innocent.

In this case, it is again apparent that the interest in building networks and connections transcends the traditional sense of ‘local’ and ‘global’. Instead, we may see Akdeniz’s Karian conferences as manifestations of a rooted cosmopolitanism that provides a very specific avenue of ‘translation’ from the academic to the vernacular. On the surface, this appears to be a good example of how we can develop or invest in what Appiah calls ‘habits of coexistence’ (Appiah 2006, xix). In Bourdieusian terms (1986), Akdeniz’s initiative to develop and organise the conference furthermore appears to be a strategy to secure the symbolic capital of professional scholarship in order to make Karia matter—the very fact of assembling international (in reality, largely mainly European) experts to share perspectives necessarily has a constitutive effect on Karia as a historical concept. The scientific character and prestige of an academic conference signal the worthiness of topics for study and increase the credibility of those who promote it. The conference has a scientific advisory board to bolster its claims to academic legitimacy, and on the poster advertising the symposium, the names of individual professors (and their titles) appear prominently (Figure 7.5). However, for Akdeniz, this goes hand in hand with a personal commitment that is not just an academic interest but a process of identification with the historical culture and civilisation of Karia. In this sense, the conference both means and does more because it buttresses the identity construction processes of an individual who wishes to link himself to the deep past and who seeks long continuities over historical time that provide moorings for his self-understanding in the present. In this sense, Akdeniz’s conferences provide us with a powerfully vernacular, rooted counter to the archaeological park of the Hekatomneion with its nationalist, globalist ambitions.

Conclusion: rooted cosmopolitanism and archaeological practice

The construction of ethnic and cultural labels is commonplace in archaeology. It has a long and tragic history, typically tied to nationalist or imperialist ambitions (Given 1998; Quinn 2018). In contrast, the attraction of regionally based labels has been considerably less discussed in scholarship. Here we have argued that while
Karianism is by definition an exclusive term that sets a particular corner of the world apart from everywhere else, at the same time, it allows for a cosmopolitan dialogue to emerge that, in some instances, can be characterised as rooted and empowering. Specific individuals have clearly used the Karian past to translate academic knowledge and to construct a place for themselves and their communities in the present (and future) Turkish Republic. We have argued that rooted...
cosmopolitanism is an apt framework to describe the configuration of a Karian identity and the act of translation that takes place in relation to the archaeology of Karia—from its ‘production’ in the hands and minds of both foreign and Turkish archaeologists, to its ‘consumption’ by local non-professionals who care deeply about the region’s past and use it to express both their aspirations for the present and their hopes for the future. These spheres are not as separate as the confines of the traditional parameters of the disciplines of ‘archaeology’ and ‘heritage’ suggest. In fact, each moment of translation includes the active participation of both locals and outsiders, professionals and non-professionals (Anderson 2015). It is indeed clear that local investment in heritage does not negate the global but is deeply enmeshed in both national and cosmopolitan agendas. Such tensions between diverse interests are, of course, not unique to Karia or Türkiye. Indeed, Jonathan Hall has recently examined similar collisions between global and epichoric heritages in the Peloponnesian town of Argos (Hall 2021).

Behind the cases of rooted cosmopolitanism that we have discussed, there runs an uneasy question about representation. Do all stakeholders really aim to include everyone in their engagement with local heritage? Frequent references in our interviews to other locals as ‘ignorant’ or ‘indifferent’ suggest this is not the case. Other interests, relating not only to class but also to political and economic opportunities, are clearly in play. The Istanbul exhibition was the most illustrative and explicit example of limiting local agency. But we may also ask, more broadly, what are the boundaries of the cosmopolitan world we have identified in Karia? These may be constituted by peoples and cultures from around the world whose value is implicitly downplayed by the insistence on locality and lack of attention to otherness. A second issue is who within the locality is excluded: for example, peasants, shopkeepers, and all other non-elite locals without access to international networks and resources. This poses difficult questions about who we should give our loyalty to as ethical and reflexive individuals engaged with archaeological heritage and identity. Even more fundamentally, we may ask if some cases of cosmopolitanism are not really ways to secure distinctiveness for local identities by positioning local history as globally significant. Linking to a wonderful local past is certainly one way to do this. One (harsh) argument might be that those who place themselves within a cultural continuum with an ancient civilisation and its people might be seen as individuals whose relatively weak sense of identity induces them to reach for something historical to cling to (indeed, a point made by the MCAF member in Bodrum) to give life meaning and to feel distinctive, with all of the claims to cultural superiority that it entails. In other words, rooted cosmopolitan perspectives on the past may also be self-serving in some ways, to help affirm identities that are actually about building a sense of pride, even competitiveness, with other places, other pasts, and other people—as we also see in claims that ‘culture’ itself was born in one particular place.

Does rooted cosmopolitanism, then, open up new pathways for engaging local communities in archaeological practice? It is certainly a way to shine a critical light on fundamental ethical issues in the discipline. Archaeology has a long history of toxic cosmopolitanism, one that is only recently beginning to be critically
examined (e.g., Meskell 2018). This history encompasses numerous episodes of European fieldwork in foreign lands, which, while firmly based in global networks of science and knowledge exchange, was far from rooted in a moral obligation to improve the lives of local communities (Díaz-Andreu 2007). The history of archaeological fieldwork in the Karian region follows this pattern, being tied to the colonial trajectory of European archaeological practice. In Bodrum, it is discernible from Newton’s discovery of the Maussolleion and the subsequent removal of its sculptures to the British Museum to the more recent work by Danish archaeologists (Funder et al. 2019, 82–89, 95–98) and also at many other sites in the region excavated by Swedes (Labraunda), Italians (Iasos), Germans (Knidos and Kaunos), and Americans (Knidos again). Many foreign archaeologists from these projects have engaged in collaborations and partnerships with local groups and individuals, for example, by participating in events organised by the MCAF or in Akdeniz’ Karian conferences. Engagements like these may be taken as good examples of what Meskell calls ‘multiscalar engagement’ in her account of cosmopolitan archaeology (2009b, 2). Or are they, more cynically, just another way of legitimising further foreign involvement in archaeological excavations in the region? We may also ask: what does participation in the Karian symposia actually entail? On the one hand, international scholars are invited to ‘globalise’ the subject; on the other, they are co-opted to give legitimacy to Karia as an academic focus. This in turn promotes the specialness of its locale and, indirectly, those who claim to belong to it through constructing historicised identities for themselves. Such historicised identities may not be fundamentally cosmopolitan; they may instead help to build an exclusive imagined community. Ultimately, these questions highlight the complexity of the issues that cosmopolitan archaeology sets out to confront.

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Notes

1 Other scholars have referred to similar perspectives as qualified, marginal, or vernacular cosmopolitanism to describe the delicate balancing acts between local particularities and macro-level dependencies and concerns. See, for example, Werbner 2008, 14–16; Colwell-Chanthaphonh 2009, 156–9; and González-Ruibal 2009, 118–121.

2 A notable example is the Halikarnassos Heritage Festival, whose first edition was scheduled for October 2021 and organised by TG Expo Group, an Istanbul-based exhibitions company, in association with the municipality of Bodrum and other public agencies. It brings together shopping, food, music, art and heritage, claiming that ‘[t]he journey
from past to the future begins here!’ (http://www.heritagefestivalhalikarnassos.com, last accessed 16 May 2022).

3 Smyrna’s claim to Homer was most recently marked on 8–9 July 2021 when the Centre for Mediterranean Studies at Yaşar University in association with Izmir Metropolitan Municipality and other institutions hosted an international symposium entitled ‘Homer from Izmir and His Period’ (https://cms.yasar.edu.tr/uluslararasi-sempozyum-izmirli-homeros-ve-donemi/, last accessed 17 May 2022). On (some of) the problems relating to identifying Homer as a historical figure (or even as the author of both the Iliad and the Odyssey), see West 1999.

4 On the cultural complexities and tragedies of the region in the Late Ottoman and early Republican periods, see Mansel 2011 and the recent Greek film Σμύρνη μου αγαπημένη (2021).


7 An exhibition catalogue on the heritage of Milas describes the women of the nearby village of Çomakdağ as ancient Karians: ‘They lived according to customs in an isolated world, lived free on mountain tops, shared life with men, and were treated with the respect that they earned’ (Edgü 2010, 245).

8 In 2020, a lengthy publication on the monument in Turkish and English was published (Diler 2020). The volume includes articles on the excavation and restoration of the monument as well as interpretations of the architecture and finds. In his discussion of the sarcophagus, Fahri Işik notes “[e]ven when it was known that the place was organised for a ‘burial’, the Anatolian character of the Karian people remained unchanged, and moreover emphasised, since a temple-tomb was the product of an Eastern/Anatolian thought” (Işık 2020, 201).


Bibliography


8 The locality of a cosmopolitan claim revisited

Heritage of state violence and its local embeddedness on Green Island (Taiwan)

Fang-I Chu

Introduction

Many heritage-related practitioners face difficult choices about incorporating national and local authorities’ interests when promoting heritage conservation. These decisions are influential because they involve enormous budgets and considerable agreements among different organisations’ stakeholders. Since 1972, the World Heritage Convention has raised awareness about the importance of conserving the cultural heritage of all countries around the globe. In response, many sovereign states have been assessing and conserving cultural places based on the Operational Guidelines that help put the Convention into practice. As a universal standard, the Convention serves as a starting point for national and local authorities to consider which cultural sites deserve to be conserved, and how they should be conserved. However, despite these so-called universal standards having incorporated more diverse cultural viewpoints from outside Europe, and foregrounding the engagements of more local communities since the 1990s, the transition to a less Eurocentric framework still has its limitations. In practice, national and local bureaucratic schemes still inevitably privilege and exclude specific contexts of the past. Therefore, many researchers, NGOs, and government employees involved in heritage conservation have noticed endless tensions: they attempt to respond to the grand visions promoted by the World Heritage Committee, but at the same time, they cannot ignore the specific interests of local stakeholders.

Apart from the tension resulting from keeping the balance between international conventions’ suggestions and local stakeholders’ interests, addressing the importance of cultural heritage has become more complicated in the global arena. As Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson have indicated, how assumed ruptures between spaces and how such spaces were endowed with different cultural dimensions have become problematic:

People have undoubtedly always been more mobile and identities less fixed than the static and typologizing approaches of classical anthropology would suggest. But today, the rapidly expanding and quickening mobility of people...
combines with the refusal of cultural products and practices to “stay put” to give a profound sense of a loss of territorial roots, of an erosion of the cultural distinctiveness of places, and of ferment in anthropological theory.  

(Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 9)

In other words, the flows of population, capital, technologies, and media have been crumbling the geographical boundaries people use to define “local”. In addition, such seemingly de-territorialised phenomena do not lead to a borderless imagination of an undifferentiated world; instead, certain identities are gradually attached to specific imaginary of localities. In other words, political connections between places, peoples, and cultures are further intertwined or intensified:

The irony of these times, however, is that as actual places and localities become ever more blurred and indeterminate, ideas of culturally and ethnically distinct places become perhaps even more salient. It is here that it becomes most visible how imagined communities (Anderson 1983) come to be attached to imagined places, as displaced peoples cluster around remembered or imagined homelands, places, or communities in a world that seems increasingly firm territorialized anchors in their actuality.  

(Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 10)

Under such circumstances, heritage researchers face a dilemma: on the one hand, they cannot deny that the concept of locality itself is more often challenged and reformed than has conventionally been the case, but on the other hand, they recognise that many authorities still regard cultural heritage as an important dimension of the ‘local’. In this situation, heritage researchers need new frameworks to foreground the impact of global flows. From an analytical aspect, researchers need a concept to describe how cultures (or traditions) are more often de-territorialised and re-territorialised under global flows (Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 20). For instance, David Harvey (2002) indicates that economic globalisation has created monopolistic trades of localities and cultural forms. Mads Daugbjerg and Thomas Fibiger (2011) reveal the underlying tensions behind local stakeholders’ interests in incorporating heritage—a globalised perception and practice. Rodney Harrison (2015) argues that heritage (especially World Heritage) should be regarded as a globalising process. These researchers might not share much common ground on defining global flows, but they all critically indicate how culture, locality, heritage, and globalisation have become intertwined.

Apart from the researchers mentioned above, heritage scholars also need another normative perspective that can highlight their ethical position for certain communities and raise such concerns to the broader scope of global movements. As advocated by the editors of this volume, one approach addresses such multi-level (local and global) concerns by highlighting that heritage practitioners should consider adopting “rooted cosmopolitanism”. Lynn Meskell (2009, 8) adopts this approach in her term “cosmopolitan archaeologies”; she indicates that researchers should actively engage with the communities they work with by addressing these
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communities’ views and rights of heritage, and by extending such engagement into the realm of global politics, where the voices of local communities are often overlooked. Such a notion can be seen as a significant step for heritage researchers to embrace their ethical position locally and globally. However, I will argue later in this chapter that it is not without limitations.

In general, rooted cosmopolitanism seems feasible to cope with the tensions, dynamics, and balance of loyalty between international consensus and local stakeholders’ views. However, what remains underdeveloped is the extent to which rooted cosmopolitanism can foreground the complexity of “local communities” in a world that seemed rapidly de-territorialised. Therefore, in this article, I examine whether rooted cosmopolitanism can encompass debates of identities, historical context, and cultural practices surrounding heritage conservation, specifically conserving the heritage of state violence, also known as “historical sites of injustice” in Taiwan.

I highlight identity because I notice that some related phenomena on Green Island echo the basic concern of rooted cosmopolitanism, as summarised by Kwame Anthony Appiah (1998, 622): people can have loyalty to their homeland as well as to the whole of humankind. During my fieldwork in 2019–2020, I noticed that conserving the heritage of state violence had become a common discourse among the two major parties in Taiwan’s legislature, the Legislative Yuan: The Chinese nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwanese nativist Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Their discourse recognised the authoritarian past of Taiwan between 1945 and 1987. KMT, despite a reluctant attitude, admitted that it was responsible for once being the dictatorial regime in Taiwan. As for the incumbent DPP government, it has paid great attention to the KMT’s autocratic past in Taiwan (Lin 2019, 203–204). Both these parties acknowledged the importance of conserving the Green Island political prison complex as a heritage related to the authoritarian past. Furthermore, they both situated such need under another broader scheme: human rights. Therefore, the heritage I conduct my research on could serve as a valid starting point for the explanatory scope of rooted cosmopolitanism. I am interested in whether rooted cosmopolitanism can foreground the complex concerns and interests at the local level, such as Green Island, which used to confine people regarded as political dissidents.

Following this research concern, I used a qualitative approach, specifically ethnographic fieldwork, to depict the fieldwork I conducted between 2019 and 2020 on Green Island, where a political prison complex is conserved as a heritage site. I combined archive research, interviews, and participant observation to capture how local residents perceived, narrated, and challenged heritage conservation. In the remainder of this chapter, I will concentrate on three topics: (1) the content of identities in Taiwan, in terms of highly-contested identity politics resulting from party politics after democratisation; (2) local residents’ reactions to the heritage of state violence and their current tourism business; and (3) local residents’ religious beliefs about the deceased during the autocratic past, including related landscapes and ritual practices. By highlighting these ethnographic contexts, I wish to reveal how the heritage of state violence is embedded in the local community’s everyday
life and how it is entangled with national identities, local economies, and religious practices. I understand the implications of rooted cosmopolitanism in much as I realise how some interlocutors attempt to combine their love toward Green Island and their broader concern for a greater world. However, some other political and economic premises need to be addressed before fully applying rooted cosmopolitanism in the Green Island case. Furthermore, these two aspects both impact religion, a cultural aspect that best foregrounds the locality of Green Island, yet probably overlooked by Appiah while emphasising rooted cosmopolitanism (Jeffers 2013, 505–506).

Identity politics behind Taiwanese heritage

Heritage, apart from glorifying a nation-state’s past from present perspectives, can also foreground controversial aspects of national history (González-Ruibal 2007; Macdonald 2009). Similarly, the conserved political prison complex on Green Island also reveals how post-authoritarian Taiwanese governments recognised the island’s authoritarian past between 1945 and 1987. The process of transforming the island to become a heritage site of state violence and a memorial site for human rights foregrounds Taiwan’s intricate politics of nationhood: How should people in Taiwan define their national identity (their ‘root’) in the aftermath of the KMT’s autocratic regime? Should the KMT regime be regarded as a foreign colonial government occupying Taiwan? Or was its enacting martial law necessary to save ‘free China’ and its citizens from communist invasion? These questions are at the core of historical narratives about contemporary Taiwan, which is mobilised by different political parties and their supporters and manifests in turning state-violence sites into heritage.

As Kirk Denton (2021, 2–3) indicates, many museums and exhibitions in Taiwan have become sites reflecting these debates about political identities. The museum division in which I conducted my research also foregrounds such debates on identities. The Green Island site functioned as a political prison complex between 1951 and 1987, connoting the dictatorial past of the KMT regime. The prison complex mainly confined people deemed politically subversive under the autocratic government during the Chinese Civil War (Cao et al. 2016; Lin 2017; Roy 2003, 88–94; Schubert 2016, 36–50). After 1987, the political prison complex was shut down due to the lifting of martial law in most places in Taiwan. However, there were debates about whether the political prison complex should be conserved or transformed into other prisons. In 2002, the DPP government (2000–2008) conserved some parts of the prison complex and made it open to the public at the end of that year. In 2011, the KMT government (2008–2016) set up a preparatory office for a museum of human rights to encompass the prison complex on Green Island. However, the precarious status of such an office was not relieved until 2018, the time when the DPP government (2016–) further institutionalised the National Human Rights Museum. Nowadays, the museum contains two divisions: Jing-Mei White Terror Memorial Park in Taipei and Green Island White Terror Memorial Park. According to the museum’s official statement, the museum’s mission is to promote
research into archives, exhibitions, and education related to the authoritarian past. Under this scheme, most of the current research about the museum concentrates on surveys of the prison architecture, oral histories of the political prisoners, and the potential for developing ‘dark tourism’ (Light 2017, 277; Lin 2013) and human rights education (Carter 2019; Tsao 2012; see also Fig. 8.1). These researchers mainly share the same goal: Promoting historical education about the authoritarian past in Taiwan.

For me, the basic goal of the museum is quite neutral because it did not criticise specific parties or political identities in current democratised Taiwan. However, political debates often happen on-site. In research on another division of the National Human Rights Museum, Ching-pin Tseng (2022) indicates such a situation at the end of his paper:

At the end, with regards to the guided tours in person, the paper suggests that differences of political ideology might be unavoidable in relation to the narration of these political incidents, because varied narrators could propose their biases and interpretation of the ‘White Terror’ events.

According to my participant observation and interviews, most museum guides and some museum guards on Green Island also faced opposition from some visitors with specific political identities. Museum guides were often more targeted by these
visitors’ hostility because the guides were responsible for conveying official narratives of the past in the former political prison complex. One museum guide stated that she used to be afraid of tourists because some of them could bring up political conflicts; according to her words, visitors would say: “The White Terror is a necessary evil. If the KMT did not help you, you would also be a member of the communists in China.” Another museum guide told me that a visitor mocked her, saying that the DPP government ‘built’ the museum, on which she commented: “Technically, when the political prisons were constructed, DPP did not even exist!” Another incident of this kind happened when another museum guide and I presented to some visitors the story of a famous political prisoner of Green Island, Kē Qí-Huāg (柯旗化). Kē Qí-Huāg was famous for his efforts in editing English grammar textbooks between 1958 and 1982. Remarkably, when Kē Qí-Huāg was confined on Green Island between 1961 and 1976, he still devoted himself to editing (National Museum of Taiwan History 2021). After hearing our presentation, a visitor whispered to us: “Kē Qí-Huāg edited the English textbooks because he wanted to brainwash you.” I quickly exchanged glances with the museum guides and realised I had better keep my mouth shut. Another museum guide told me that some visitors scoffed at her as a “xiǎo-féi-māo” (小肥貓, literally meaning little fat cat) under the policy led by the DPP government. In Taiwan, “féi-māo” refers to government employees who receive salaries without making a practical effort. The museum guide explained that when she heard these words, she was staying in an exhibition room with air-conditioning. Therefore, these visitors might have taken her as staff member with an easy job on a hot summer day, enjoying air-conditioned exhibition rooms built by the DPP. Although some visitors expressed their consideration and support for the museum guides, most visitors consciously distanced themselves from political debates, making conflicts between the museum guides and other visitors more salient. Such diverse attitudes echo what Denton (2021, 1–6) mentioned: Taiwan’s identity resonates with political debates between the two polarised major parties, and museums reflect how debates are awarded in public circumstances.

Intriguingly, despite these debates about the museum division, both the KMT government (2008–2016) and the DPP government (2000–2008, 2016 –) have addressed the importance of human rights (Covenants Watch 2016; Roth 2019). Under such circumstances, the construction of the museum has also been incorporated into the promotion of human rights (Denton 2021, 93). By remembering the authoritarian past in Taiwan, both parties raise the heritage of state violence to the realm of global concerns, implying that such commemoration could help Taiwan engage with the world outside—specifically, a world in which the United Nations supports the nine core Human Rights Instruments. Even though Taiwan is unlikely to join the United Nations in the foreseeable future, such promotion still highlights the de facto Taiwan government’s progressive side and further differentiates it from the PRC Beijing government (Denton 2021, 90–93). In other words, while being isolated from the realm of international human rights, commemorations of the loss during the authoritarian past hint at a way that simultaneously shows respect for local history and concern for international claims.
Although the KMT government and the DPP government seem to share a rooted cosmopolitanism attitude about the heritage of state violence, some researchers still notice a difference between them regarding the extent of their willingness to implement their commitments to human rights. Denton (2021, 90) vividly describes how the KMT government unwillingly acknowledged such commitments: “it did so slowly, hesitantly, and reluctantly, and only after the DPP prodded it to do so”. In general, the KMT government tended to foreground the victims and downplayed the omnipresent impacts of its autocratic regime. In addition, the KMT remained powerful after Taiwan’s democratisation in the 1990s. Such a situation causes one common scene: in Taiwan: we often see “political victims” but seldom see “political perpetrators” (Wu 2005, 7). In other words, concrete details, such as people and institutions that support the surveillance system, remained unrevealed, let alone comprehensively discussed the KMT’s political responsibility (Huang 2021, 210; Roth 2019, 55–56). However, such a situation has been comprehensively challenged since 2016, when the DPP party won the presidential election and became the majority party in the legislature for the very first time (Denton 2021, 91; Roth 2019, 56). After the DPP party’s victory, multiple bureaucratic systems were set up to address the impacts of KMT’s dictatorial regime systematically. Moreover, issues of commemorating the loss of human rights by conserving the heritage of state violence are once again brought to light. The Organizational Act of the National Human Rights Museum (國家人權博物館組織法) has been proclaimed in 2018.² When President Tsai Ing-Wen (2016–) gave a speech in Mandarin at the opening ceremony of the museum in the same year, she focused on how such a museum connects Taiwan’s dark past and universal values of human rights (as mine translation in the following words):

We establish the National Human Right Museum, because, through [recognizing] the history of an illiberal past, we can invite each generation of Taiwanese people to understand the value of freedom; through [understanding] the history of violating freedom, we shall retain our faith in human rights.

(Teng 2018)

As a researcher, I am still sceptical about to what extent the incumbent government can implement such a political claim, as I will argue in other sections. However, there can be no doubt that the KMT and the DPP governments were starkly different in addressing the KMT’s nationalist-era repression, even though they both seemed to embrace human rights, a cosmopolitan moral value.

One fundamental reason for such differences between the two major parties’ attitudes is the regime’s legitimacy. For the DPP party, being a Taiwan nativist party that has been addressing the injustice of the KMT regime even before the lifting of martial law in 1987, it is comparatively easy to connect its legitimacy with local political victims’ trauma and loss under the KMT regime’s repression (Lin 2019, 135–146). Although such political discourse excludes left-wing political victims who bear communist-Chinese identity and therefore singularise the multiple aspects of political victims (Yeh 2015), the DPP’s criticism against a Chinese party
does not counter with its Taiwanese nationalist subjectivity (its ‘root’). In contrast, when the KMT recognises its autocratic past, such a legacy weakens its legitimacy under party politics. To compensate for such weakness, the KMT often rationalises the necessity of the Martial Law Period during the Chinese Civil War. From such a perspective, since Taiwan is an inseparable part of mainland China, the KMT regime’s priority is to fight against the communists. This could be seen in a Facebook post from Chu Li-Luan (朱立倫), the Chairman of the KMT, on August 17th, 2021. He posted the following words in Mandarin (as translated below):

Without KMT in 1949, there would be no Taiwan today. Without KMT and the military’s defense against the Chinese Communist Party, Taiwan would have been taken over by the communists, and there would not be democracy and prosperity today [in Taiwan].

Such words exactly echo what the museum guide heard during her work: the KMT party constructed its legitimacy on being orthodox China (its ‘root’), and therefore, its authoritarian regime is rationalised. Furthermore, such comments should be left behind because people need to look forward, embracing progressive values, such as human rights.

By navigating through the two parties’ contrary attitudes toward the loss during the authoritarian past, I argue that current debates of identities in Taiwan, including Chinese nationalism and Taiwan nativism, hint at different interpretations of the necessities of the autocratic system. Such interpretations further connote different imaginary of ‘roots’, the legitimacy of each party’s regime. Such debates can be noticed on the site of the museum division. Even though both parties seem to convey their vision of implementing human rights as a universal value, the underlying contrast of identities affects how cosmopolitan claims (human rights) can be incorporated differently with their identities in practice. Considering Taiwan’s highly contested national identities and its need for coping strategies with ambiguous international status, perhaps the concept of rooted cosmopolitanism should be read in a reversed way: to make each party’s roots internationally and domestically recognised, such roots need to be cosmopolitan, or at least appear like it.

**When cosmopolitanism is embedded on the island: tourism economy**

In the previous section, I presented an overview of how human rights, as a shared cosmopolitan value, are contrastingly incorporated into different parties’ national identities, and how such differences affect each party’s implementation of conserving the heritage of state violence. In this section, I will shift focus to everyday lives on Green Island: how is the promotion of the heritage of state violence, a rooted cosmopolitanism claim shared among the two parties, acknowledged or confronted at the local level? In contrast with the top-down viewpoint in the previous section, I attempt to provide other bottom-up viewpoints in this section. These perspectives hint at other politicised discourses apart from national identities, showing how rooted cosmopolitanism is diversely valued in the local community. In other
words, I attempt to examine the extent to which the current heritage policy can encompass multiple aspects of locality. Therefore, I will focus on how local residents accept, challenge, or even sidestep the articulations about promoting the heritage of state violence on Green Island.

Besides being a significant site commemorating the authoritarian past’s loss, Green Island has been a tourism hot spot in Taiwan since the early 1990s (Li 2001): lush verdure on hills, shell-white beaches, glassy-clear water, and colourful creatures among coral reefs. These images have been advertised on various web pages, booklets, and social media, attracting people worldwide to visit this remote offshore island. Being situated on a touristic island, the museum division has also been intertwined with local economic life. According to the statistics provided by the Taitung County Government, 244,480 people visited Green Island between June and September 2020; in the same period, 175,568 visitors visited the museum division. A senior manager in the museum division once told me how much faith he had in the division. Before staying on Green Island, he had worked in another similar museum in Taipei, and the annual number of visitors there was a mere 20,000. In other words, the visitor numbers of the museum division that summer was almost eight times more than where he used to work. With a smile, he said, “How can I not be optimistic about the museum division’s future?”

Despite the senior manager’s confidence in promoting the heritage of state violence in a touristic place, I also noticed that local residents (mostly Green Islanders who had local relatives or had lived on Green Island for more than ten years) held divergent attitudes about the heritage of state violence. For example, some of my interlocutors tended to concur with current exhibitions in the museum division, while others emphasised that the ongoing policies of heritage conservation had paid too much attention to political victims and overlooked the island itself. Apart from such divergences, I also noticed that some islanders were not interested in developing their engagement with the museum division and tended to keep their distance from the museum division’s events. These different attitudes imply that a rooted cosmopolitan claim could generate multiple reactions when being implemented at the local level, including (1) recognition, (2) confrontation, and (3) indifference.

(1) Recognition
Some of my interlocutors regarded the museum division as a remarkable step in historical education, in which Green Island connoted an irreplaceable part of memorialising some political victims’ past. From such a perspective, conserving the heritage of state violence also meant recognising the political victims’ existence and the state’s persecution. Since not every person in Taiwan is familiar with this history, transmitting stories of political victims could become a significant job on Green Island.

Yi-xin, museum staff member, told me how she learned about the history of Green Island. Although she was a Green Islander’s daughter, she was born and raised in another city in Taiwan. When she visited Green Island during her winter vacation in high school, she saw a film about Taiwan’s authoritarian past.
She was shocked because the elders she met on Green Island only described political victims as thák-tséh-lâng ("book readers", which means intellectuals), and they were confined because they oo-pêh kóng-ûē ("careless talk", which means saying things without a second thought or saying things one should not mention). In other words, she could not get much meaningful information from her elder relatives on Green Island. However, she thought that more people should know about such history, “Green Island should be recorded as a milestone in archives.”

Yi-xin was not the only person who underlined the political victims’ life stories on Green Island. En-lin, another local resident, also emphasised the importance of historical education by telling stories about political victims, and she further highlighted how she engaged local history with the existence of political victims. En-lin was also born in another city but has lived on Green Island for a decade. She worked in a local workshop and sometimes collaborated with the museum division. When studying the local history of agriculture, she realised that political victims brought cultivation techniques into Green Island. She told me that moment was how she “touched the history in the islanders’ way”. From her perspective, some political victims also brought other benefits, such as educational resources and medical knowledge, to Green Island. She addressed: “Maybe we can not understand these victims’ sorrow, but we can learn to appreciate them.” She also told me that such appreciation was a good way to promote historical education: “Some people would refuse to learn serious issues.” Therefore, she would bring tourists to the museum division, and talk about positive stories during the dark past on Green Island.

Yi-xin and En-lin both shared their concern about transmitting the memory of political victims. Moreover, their experiences resonated with current policies of conserving the heritage of state violence, an approach of incorporating cosmopolitan claims into Taiwan’s identity politics. In the next section, I will present another perspective that challenges current heritage conservation on Green Island.

(2) Confrontation

Apart from positive attitudes toward the museum division, I also noticed that some interlocutors were not satisfied with the heritage conservation on Green Island. These people might not deny the importance of transmitting political victims’ memories during the authoritarian past but would argue that local residents were absent in museum exhibitions or historical education. For instance, You-jie, an islander and elementary school teacher on Green Island, once told me about his dissatisfaction with the government. He thought the government was “unfair” because the government “only commemorates political victims”. According to You-jie’s remark, Green Islanders also faced many restrictions during the authoritarian past. For instance, You-jie recalled how his sister had a dispute with the garrison on the island. His sister used to capture fish fry with other villagers, but where they went to was a beach they could not visit without the garrison’s approval. Although the garrison allowed villagers to enter the beach at a specific time, fish fry appeared at different moments with changing tides. Therefore, villagers needed to sneak onto the beach when the sky was dark. When villagers turned on their flashlights, the
soldiers would notice these villagers with warnings. One time, a soldier fired a warning shot, and a stray bullet hit You-jie’s sister’s bucket. You-jie argued that such repressions at the local level were never mentioned in current state-led heritage conservation.

Besides being absent in official narratives of the autocratic past, museum staff on Green Island could also feel that they did not have enough support, especially when they were comparing themselves to the other museum divisions in Taipei. He-yang, another islander and museum staff member, commented that many scholars were invited to various events in Taipei. In addition, more exhibitions were held in Taipei. In comparison, the exhibitions on Green Island are seldom renewed. Another museum staff member, De-liang, born in Taiwan, told me about the difficulties he experienced on Green Island. His job included securing sufficient funding to maintain often malfunctioning equipment and buildings in a very harsh maritime climate, finding the right human resources (such as hiring qualified construction workers—those who know how to reconstruct historic buildings and are willing to work on the remote island), and designing suitable museum exhibitions. De-liang further underlined that the museum division on Green Island was embedded in tourism. He added: “Many tourists might know nothing about the White Terror Period on Green Island and just want to have some ‘fun’, such as augmented reality (A.R.), between their diving activities.” However, De-liang remarked that these ‘local-level’ problems were not always given enough attention. These complaints were not directly related to the authoritarian past but to the position of Green Island as an offshore island marginal to Taiwan’s state apparatus.

You-jie, He-yang, and De-liang all complained about how the islanders’ memories and the division’s requirements were neglected in current heritage conservation. Such criticism connotes a similar version of what Lisa Breglia (2009, 218–221) calls ‘quotidian’ cosmopolitanism. According to Breglia’s explanation, quotidian cosmopolitanism does not necessarily link to universal values (such as human rights in cosmopolitanism). Instead, it addresses how cosmopolitan claims are methodologically formulated in local people’s everyday lives. However, what differs You-jie, He-yang, and De-liang’s complaints from quotidian cosmopolitanism is that they do not directly counter the state’s interest in incorporating local heritage into national identity. On the contrary, they also wish to be recognised and further incorporated into the current rooted cosmopolitanism claim promoted by the state. Such an attitude could be best seen in You-jie’s positive attitude toward an event held by the museum division. You-jie was invited to host a talk about agriculture during the autocratic period. He said: “In the past, when we saw Green Island, we saw political victims. Now we can see Green Islanders [in such events].”

(3) Indifference

Except for resonance and confrontation, most local residents on Green Island do not develop their engagements with the museum. Even though local guides would bring tourists to the museum division during their tour, they often would not stay long. One local guide admitted to me that the museum division was often used as
a spot with toilets and air-conditioners, allowing tourists to rest. For me, such an instrumental attitude was not hard to understand: even though visiting an old prison complex seemed interesting for tourists, talking about party politics under Taiwan’s highly contested identities could still be provocative. Besides, most local residents did not know how to deal with tourists’ emotional gap between facing the heritage of state violence and relaxing on a tropical island. For instance, Rong-Fang, another museum guide also an islander, describes her dilemma between promoting historical education and attracting tourists’ interest. Despite knowing the museum was also a significant landmark on Green Island, she could not help but notice that the museum division has difficulties to fit in the local tourism scene. She asked me: “Shall we let those people who come to Green Island for fun also experience the political victims’ emotions?”

Rong-Fang’s questions revealed the difficulties of promoting the museum division in such a tourist hotspot. Although other local residents, such as En-lin, attempt to combine the positive side of political victims and local history, most local residents lack incentives to actively involve themselves in events initiated by the museum division, let alone communicate with the museum. De-liang, the museum staff mentioned above, told me his frustrations with promoting historical education on the island:

One of our problems is that Green Islanders do not know how to communicate with us. Currently, there is no deeper collaborations between these islanders and us. They do their tourism business, and we do our historical education. The only temporary intersection is our training lectures for local guides, but we seldom see new faces in these training lectures. The real solution is that we should counsel these local residents, tell them our planning, so that these local residents could suggest their customers to visit the museum. . . . Currently, there are no public hearings from us. So, generally speaking, we do not communicate.

Since there are not many communications between the museum and the local residents, many local residents give tourists information based on their interpretations or impressions of the autocratic regime. A good example is that some local residents on Green Island would mention specific female Taiwanese politicians, such as Lǚ Xiù-Lián (呂秀蓮) and Chén Jú (陳菊), who were famous political victims. To impress the tourists, some local residents on Green Island would erroneously suggest that these former female politicians were once confined to the island. Likewise, local residents are eager to talk about the execution ground on Green Island, while such a place never really existed during the Martial Law Period.

Being a place where the heritage of state violence is situated, the local residents still have diverse attitudes toward a rooted cosmopolitanism claim. Intriguingly, both resonance and confrontation are reactions from local elites (museum staff, teachers, and workshop participants). These residents know how to articulate their knowledge of local history and respond to current heritage conservation policies. In contrast, most local residents still need knowledge and incentives to engage their
tourism business with the museum’s intentions. As Daugbjerg and Fibiger (2011, 140) comment, cosmopolitanism often unavoidably conveys an elitist perspective. As De-liang remarks, local residents do not know how to communicate with a division of the national museum on the island. However, implementing cosmopolitanism does not necessarily exclude lay people’s memories and experiences. What if researchers could expand the implantation of rooted cosmopolitanism by incorporating an alternative discourse of state violence? What if researchers can indicate how the autocratic regime not only brought political victims to Green Island but also changed how islanders perceive the local landscape? What if researchers could depict islanders’ projections of haunting victims in their religious beliefs? These cultural aspects constantly evolve under the swiftly changing environment on Green Island and therefore are hard to incorporate into current discourse and policies of heritagisation. However, these cultural aspects hint at another approach to develop a more rooted perspective on the heritage of state violence, not just about national identities and intellectuals, but a vernacular, localised, and quotidian narrative at the periphery of the state. In the next two sections, I will examine how popular religion can provide an alternative way of interpreting local islanders’ narratives about the authoritarian past.

Religion as an alternative way of comprehending heritage:
(1) A paradox in the perception of landscape

In my previous sections, I considered how conserving the heritage of state violence, as an implementation of a rooted cosmopolitan claim, triggered different reactions on a tourist island. I also underlined that some local residents’ support and criticisms about current heritage conservation imply a hierarchy of knowledge, in which lay people’s daily experiences are often absent. To challenge such limitations, I explore other narratives of state violence based on local residents’ conceptions during the authoritarian past. In this section, I will present how landscapes related to the deceased can provide another approach to understanding the impact of the autocratic regime.

According to my participant observation and interviews, local residents regarded death as a contagious status that could harm the deities’ powers and the health of people and livestock. For instance, if people died, local residents would wish to bury the dead body as soon as possible. According to an islander’s memory, even if a family were too sad to bury the body right away, the unbearable smell of a dead body would force them to fulfil their duty. Also, villagers would shut their doors and windows when a coffin was transported from a family house to a local cemetery. Furthermore, people who had relatives who died in recent months were not allowed to join religious events, especially those ceremonies welcoming deities’ power into villagers’ houses. Sometimes, if livestock suddenly died without obvious reasons, islanders would also suspect whether someone passed the contagious status of a deceased person to their family farm, and children were often blamed for such matters. One of my interlocutors told me about a similar dispute: an islander with a recently deceased family member was accused of causing his neighbour’s
loss of a deer simply because he passed by his neighbour’s farm. What intrigued me was the accused islander’s explanation: He knew he was “zāng” (髒, “filthy”) because of his deceased family member, so he did not stay long, and therefore he should not be blamed for such a loss. In other words, the contagious status of the deceased was related to a need for isolation and purification, and such status was widely recognised among islanders. Therefore, isolating the deceased and their family members was necessary to ensure other villagers’ health and fortune.

The importance of such isolation can also be seen in a local legend, which is widely known on Green Island. According to some islanders’ narratives, a dead body was buried in an inappropriate place due to limited choice during typhoon season, and such an error later caused the death of eight other villagers. Islanders sought a ritual expert’s help, and a stone tablet placed on a hill carved the name Amitābha (阿彌陀佛), a deity often regarded as a messenger from the after-world in East Asian Buddhism. According to my survey, the body was most likely buried at the entrance of a mountain path. The path was an important passage linking different villages on the island. In other words, the wrongly buried body implied a disturbing status: The boundary between the living and the deceased was blurred, and such a boundary needed to be reassured by a deity representing purified status.

Although islanders could cope with local residents’ death, political victims’ deaths were most likely beyond their daily coping strategies. A good example is a sea cave called “Swallow Cave”, affiliated with the museum division on Green Island.

This sea cave is situated on the island’s north-east coast, and such a position makes the cave the furthest site from the entrance of the political prison complex (see Figure 8.2). Therefore, this location was almost inaccessible for islanders during the Martial Law Period. However, many islanders still refused to go to Swallow Cave after the lifting of the martial law. Even some children on Green Island were surprised that I had visited Swallow Cave alone. These children said: “We have never been to Swallow Cave. It is haunted.” What makes Swallow Cave particularly uncanny is a cemetery adjacent to the cave, called “the Thirteenth Squadron”. The number “thirteenth” came from the management system during the New Life Correction Camp (1951–1965) on Green Island during the Martial Law Period. Because the inmates in the Camp were divided into 12 squadrons, those who died and were buried on Green Island were called “the Thirteenth Squadron” (National Human Rights Museum 2018). The Thirteenth Squadron was the place for burying political prisoners and some soldiers from mainland China. In other words, the cemetery was for outsiders. Since no capital punishment was undertaken on Green Island, the prisoners buried there mainly died of diseases, suicides, or accidents. This place was also regarded as a sacred place by people who valued the loss of the authoritarian regime. However, it was also a haunted place for local residents because the state had created such an isolated place only for deceased outsiders, and such a place was out of reach in islanders’ everyday lives during the era of repression.

The state had created a trouble area in the islanders’ conception of the landscape related to the deceased and triggered multiple reactions in different generations of islanders. For the younger generation born after lifting the Martial Law, the
Swallow Cave and the Thirteenth Squadron were erased from their understanding of Green Island. Two islanders younger than 40 told me that adults never talked about Swallow Cave when they were children, so they had never heard of the cave before learning about Green Island's history. For those islanders older than 40, it seems like they are unwilling to talk about the Swallow Cave, let alone visit the place. Nevertheless, the booming tourism and the heritagisation of state violence once again remind islanders of the existence of the Swallow Cave. According to two local elders (older than 60), Swallow Cave became popular only after tourism started booming on the island.

The cave has become famous for its rumours transmitted among tourists. For example, rumour has it that the Swallow Cave had been the execution ground on the island for a long time. Even though such rumours have different versions, they share a similar structure: the perpetrators of the executions were colonisers, such as the first Han Chinese migrants who arrived at the Green Island 160 years ago, the Japanese Colonial Government, or the KMT government; the victims were those whom they suppressed, such as the indigenous Austronesian people, Han inmates eliminated in the Japanese Colonial Period, or the political victims or the gangsters who were targeted by the KMT regime. Even though several museum guides keep stressing that Swallow Cave is not an execution ground for political prisoners, such rumours are still very popular. The related ghost stories also made this place an ideal site to test tourists’ courage. Furthermore, while the political prison complex is being promoted, more and more local residents realise that some political victims died and were buried on Green Island. In general, the Swallow Cave and the Thirteenth Squadron have become a paradoxical part of local residents’ perception of the landscape: it is forgotten and recognised simultaneously and for the same reason: inappropriately buried deceased from the authoritarian past.
Religion as an alternative way of comprehending the heritage:  
(2) Ritual practices

In my previous section, I argued that state violence, island tourism, and heritage conservation have co-created local residents’ contradictory perceptions about the landscape related to the deceased under the autocratic regime. Such a cultural aspect provides an alternative approach to understanding islanders’ impression of state violence, underlying the possibility of developing a more rooted narrative than current cosmopolitanist claims. Apart from landscape, ritual practice can also reflect local residents’ anxieties toward the deceased in the authoritarian past. Such anxieties may not necessarily be about actual burial; instead, they penetrate other parts of the museum division.

On 2 September 2020, which is also the 15th day of the seventh month in the Lunar Calendar, I arrived at the museum on Green Island around 2 p.m. When I arrived at the museum that day, the museum guides and the guards were busy with two different tasks simultaneously: besides guiding tourists to the former political prisons, some staff moved tables and religious offerings to the courtyard. These offerings were for the “good brothers”, a veiled term to address the deceased, who have no descendants to appease them. There were about 30 museum staff and subcontractors present at the ritual. Everyone was facing the courtyard—in other words, they were worshipping spirits inside the museum, unlike other local residents who appeased ghosts on the same date, facing outside of their house. After everyone was given an incense stick in their hand, the director of the museum started to read out her prayers printed on an A4 paper in Mandarin (as translated words below):

The Green Island White Terror Memorial Park director represents the National Human Rights Museum, leading all colleagues and subcontractors, including our cleaners and guards, to prepare clear alcohol, fruits, animal sacrifice, sweets, and treasures. Humbly, we invite all our good brothers to receive these offerings and return to your place.

After reading out the prayers, the director led everyone to bow three times, and then she collected all the incense sticks and inserted them into a small can filled with uncooked white rice. She then repeated this procedure twice, and after the final incense sticks burned to their half-length, all the attendees tossed paper-made spiritual money into a 1.5-meter-high metal container and burned this spiritual money. Owing to sudden winds, some packs of crackers fell to the ground twice. Some attendees laughed while picking up these packs: “[the good brother] finished their eating!” During the whole ritual, tourists still wandered around the museum, looking at us from afar.

The vignette above is an annual event in the museum. Compared to the museum’s political purposes, the religious aspect of the museum division is seldom mentioned in public circumstances. My other interviews also show their unwillingness to address the division’s religious characteristics. For instance, when I visited
two former political prisoners who devoted themselves to the historical education of the dictatorial regime in Taiwan, they both strongly denied the existence of ghosts in the political prison complex. A museum staff even told me: “When you hear ghost stories from the museum guards, do not get fooled! They are just trying to scare you!” Even when the museum’s senior manager first heard about my project, he grinned: “Don’t you dare make our museum spooky! If everyone is scared of our museum, we are in trouble!” Apparently, the religious aspect is not an openly recognised topic regarding the museum of state violence.

To my surprise, the more I became familiar with my interlocutors, the more ghost stories or haunted experiences concerning the museum I heard. Besides the solace for the ghosts in the vignette mentioned above, a museum guide also told me that, one time, she was giving an introduction in an exhibition room, a tourist suddenly said, “Child, do not run [inside the museum]!”, although only five adults were listening to her introduction in the exhibition room. Her colleagues had also seen child-like ghosts inside the nearby area. A museum guard told me that sometimes the intercoms in the office would ring during the night, but no one made the call. Besides the staff in the museum, other local residents also shared their haunted experiences about the museum with me. For instance, some local adults would prevent their children from visiting the museum. These paranormal experiences still impact how the staff and other local residents feel about their well-being when visiting the museum. Intriguingly, despite the ghost stories inside the museum seeming quite noticeable, the figures, contexts, and behaviours of ghosts in these stories were unclear compared to other ghost stories I collected on Green Island. Many origins of other ghost stories are traceable—they were usually linked to traumatic incidents. For instance, a catastrophic flood resulted in a piece of abandoned land; a woman who died in childbirth became a lingering ghost; a police car disappearing in typhoon season became an uncanny figure patrolling at night. An islander committed suicide without removing the fishnet on his roof, so his spirits still haunt the house—all of these ghost stories are attached with specific memories of people, sites, and reasons. In other words, the figures in these ghost stories are more human-like and, therefore, understandable. In comparison, the ghost stories in the museum are often obscure. Such unexplainable ghost stories, along with the ghost appeasing ceremony inside the museum, imply islanders’ imaginary of the arbitrarily lingering deceased in the museum, an embodiment of their interpretation about the possible death in the political prison complex. Even though the state attempts to endow the prison complex with a more positive social meaning (such as human rights), local residents are still haunted by the buildings’ past.

Under such circumstances, the solace for ghosts in the vignette mentioned at the beginning of this section became significant for the staff and other local residents: they tried to rebuild their relationship with the ambiguous haunting past, specifically in the museum division. Such worship provides a more localised way to confront the authoritarian past despite the fact that this past has already been addressed by the state in a rooted cosmopolitan claim. Intriguingly, outsiders may also have similar rituals of confronting the “deceased prisoners” besides the local residents’ ritual practice, even though local residents and the museum
division may not appreciate these outsiders efforts. I have witnessed two religious
groups visit Green Island. These new religious groups were there to provide salva-
tion for the ghosts, especially the ghosts of prisoners. In one of the rituals, the ritual
experts were residents of Taipei City or Taitung County. They invited me to chant
some Buddhist texts for the lingering spirits on Green Island. This chant was meant
to provide salvation for the ghosts to be purified and released from Green Island.
During this ritual, a spirit medium prepared cooked food as the offerings to tame
the ‘spirits of bad death’, including the ‘the souls of the prisoners’ that lingered
on Green Island. In another new religious activity recorded by the anthropologist
Fabian Graham, who conducted a long-term study of mediums and new deity cults
in Taiwan (Graham 2022), the mediums were gathering together on Green Island
to “invite the souls of the dead on Green Island to partake of offerings and to learn
religious teachings”. During this new religious activity, the mediums specifically
visited several famously uncanny places in the museum on Green Island, includ-
ing the Thirteenth Squadron and Swallow Cave. However, these mediums and
their religious practices were not allowed to be implemented inside the museum’s
courtyard—the place conserved for the museum to hold their solace for ghosts.
A museum guide remarked that some new religious groups also wanted to worship
ghosts inside the museum’s old prisons, but these requests were all denied. Instead,
these new religious groups moved to the outdoor area of the museum division,
launching their worship. In other words, another hierarchy incorporating the power
of the museum division and local religious rituals was formulated.

Regarding these new religious groups, a local resident told me that these groups
often held their ceremonies in front of a small shrine next to the museum division,
and she thought these religious activities held by outsiders made the shrine more
‘creepy’ than other shrines on the island because those outsiders kept summon-
ing ghosts and fulfilled their needs in front of the shrine. Ironically, her feelings
toward these new religious activities stood in stark contrast to the intention of these
activities: to purify Green Island from being haunted by the deceased prisoners.
These outsiders’ religious practices reminded local residents of a stigmatised past:
an island of the unwanted outsiders. However, I noticed that a few residents were
willing to talk with these new religious groups. They told me they thought these
new religious groups did purify Green Island. One of them even talked with the
ritual experts during the purification ritual I attended, and he said it was good to
provide salvation for these lingering ghosts, and he wondered if the ritual expert
could help him hold similar purifying rituals on Green Island. In general, I noticed
new ways of conceptualising the haunted past were being formulated. These new
depictions were still not very stable, yet they encouraged local residents and outsid-
ers to co-present their imaginary of the authoritarian past on Green Island.

Researchers who adopt rooted cosmopolitanism often downplay correlations
between culture and politics to prevent essentialising certain groups’ cultural
practices (Gueye 2013, 505; Jeffers 2013). However, through these religious prac-
tices, as I have presented and analysed them here, we can understand how the
tangible heritage of state violence intertwined with intangible beliefs in the local
community. Although such entanglement is often absent in the official discourses
of conserving the heritage of state violence, these cultural practices can provide an alternative way to reflect how state violence is perceived and embodied in locals’ daily lives.

Conclusion

This article examines (1) how rooted cosmopolitanism is incorporated into the central state government’s vision of conserving the heritage of state violence, (2) how such incorporation triggers different reactions from local residents who live with the heritage, and (3) how to encompass more localised narratives which are often absent in current government’s rooted cosmopolitan claim. Although scholars have adopted rooted cosmopolitanism to address the compatibility between universal values and local stakeholders’ interests, implementing such a normative framework would need to clarify some political and economic contexts in the first place.

Contested identity in Taiwan provides an example challenging the stable sense of belonging to a specific locality behind rooted cosmopolitanism. While both parties (pro-Chinese nationalist and pro-Taiwanese nativist) attempt to convey their recognition of human rights, their implementations can still greatly differ due to considerations regarding their legitimacy. Meanwhile, the actual implementations of each party’s rooted cosmopolitan claim can trigger various reactions from local residents. However, both recognition and criticism of such implementation connote elitist discourse, while most lay people might still lack the knowledge to communicate with the museum. To challenge such limitations, I describe local residents’ conceptions of landscape related to the deceased and anxieties about their haunted past. These two cultural aspects can be seen as an alternative approach to understanding how the heritage of state violence is entangled with the local community. By highlighting the significance of Green Island’s locality, I rethink the rooted cosmopolitan claim behind heritage conservation. Indeed, rooted cosmopolitanism is an approach worth heritage researchers’ consideration, but the extent to which this approach can encompass the complexity of locality could also be worth exploring.

Notes

1 The DPP was founded in 1986, at the very end of the Martial Law Period.
2 There are debates about why the incumbent government has selectively fulfilled its political promise to face the disturbance from the authoritarian past, despite the fact that President Tsai has obviously transcended other predecessors’ limitations on addressing the heritage of state violence (Huang 2021). During my fieldwork, some interlocutors also criticised the incumbent government for not actively supporting the Transitional Justice Commission (2018–2022), the independent institution responsible for dealing legacies of the authoritarian regime.
4 thāk-tsēh-lâng and oo-pēh kóng-uē are both Taiwanese Hokkien.
5 During the autocratic period, the cave served multiple uses. According to the memories of the political victims, it was used to rehearse plays, dance, and paint backdrops. Although some political victims did cremate the dead bodies of other inmates inside Swallow Cave, that was not a normal occurrence.
6 The motivation of these new religious groups still needs further research.

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9 What have the Romans ever done for us? Towards a relational mnemohistory

Miguel John Versluys

Introduction: remembering Rome

Heritage is an expression of the way in which individuals or groups situate themselves in time.¹ It is, in the words of François Hartog, the form(s) taken by the ‘historical condition’ of a society.² Heritage, therefore, is the alter ego of memory and a symptom of our relation with time or, to be more precise, a form or construct that results from translating, refracting, obeying, or obstructing the order of time.³ These entanglements with time matter greatly to understand what society in a certain period is about: in deciding how to inhabit the present, one needs to be clear about one’s relation to the past and the future. In that respect, it is true that we become what we (decide to) remember.⁴

Over the last two millennia, ‘Rome’ has been perceived as heritage by many societies around the globe, and used to construct their memory—and play a part in their present and future. The notion of ‘construction’ is crucial here.⁵ As Rémi Brague argued in regard to the question to what extent ‘Classical Antiquity’ can be understood as ‘European heritage’:

L’héritage européen est l’objet d’une vaste captation. Les Européens ne sont en rien les héritiers de l’Antiquité. À tout le moins, ils ne le sont pas s’il faut entendre par ‘héritier’, comme dans la plupart des cas, quelqu’un qui s’est donné ‘la peine de naître’ et qui a reçu dans son berceau les biens, matériels ou culturels, que ses parents lui ont laissés. Ils le sont, en revanche, si l’on conçoit le fait d’hériter comme n’étant rien d’autre qu’une activité d’appropriation.⁶

Looking back upon the very long period and the many (different) historical contexts in which it has been appropriated, with due recognition of the continuing impact of earlier appropriations on later ones, we now find that ‘Rome’ has developed into something of a contested concept. Sigmund Freud, for instance, did not like to visit Rome as, to his mind, it was an oppressive, almighty force representing a terrible father; already as a schoolchild, he had instinctively taken the side of Hannibal.⁷ Freud’s attitude represents one important and persistent memory construction: Rome as imperium, the insatiable war machine, conquering and destroying.
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without morality and therefore reprehensible. This is also *mutatis mutandis*, the negative perspective held by a prominent group of scholars, heavily influenced by postcolonial theory, working in the field of provincial Roman archaeology at present. Another important and persistent memory of Rome is diametrically opposed to this construction and very positive. In general terms, it could be said to follow Petrarch, who imagined all history to be “nothing but the praise of Rome”. This appropriation of Rome was dominant in ‘Europe and the Western world’ for a long time, gaining force from the mid-19th century onwards through school curricula and university education. From this perspective, the Roman Empire represents a Golden Age in cultural and political terms since it involves much of what later would be defined as the foundations of European civilisation: Greek culture, the Latin language, Cicero, a law system, Christianity, et cetera. This now is *mutatis mutandis*, the perspective held by a substantial group of scholars presently working in other parts of the field, Classics, for instance, although this seems to be rapidly changing (see below).

The main point of suggesting a connection between memory constructions of ‘Rome’ on the one hand and scholarly opinions on the other, as I did above, is that these are much more intertwined than we often imagine them to be. When scholars, or museum and heritage experts, engage with the archaeology and history of the Roman world, they automatically partake in its mnemohistory. Mnemohistory asks how the past, in this case, the historical phenomenon we call ‘Rome’, is remembered through time. A mnemohistorical approach primarily regards historical sources (and scholarly reconstructions) as codifications of memory and investigates *who* remembers the past, *when*, *why*, *for whom*, and *by what means*. In the case of the mnemohistory of Rome, one important, perhaps even crucial, question that always seems to hover in the background is whether we should remember the Romans as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. In a memoir on his fascination for the Roman Limes in the Netherlands (for which see below), Dutch writer and journalist Christiaan Weijts confesses:

> Already as a child I didn’t know whether to side with the Romans or the barbarians. If you read the stories of Asterix and Obelix, it was obvious. Then our land was taken and we had to reconquer it. But still, the Romans were different from the Germans, who had to answer for the dead for whom there always was a two-minute silence on my birthday, May 4... But those barbarians were our ancestors, the Romans were strangers. And yet, it felt as if I had to choose [my emphasis].

That this question plays such a defining role might have to do with the fact that, for Europe in particular, ‘Rome’ is something of an ‘ancestor cult’ and has been so for a long time. Rome is the ancestor against whom Europeans measure themselves, as Montesquieu did in his 1734 *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence*, and as many commentators do today with regard to the (supposed) decline of their ‘Empire’. Within the European (intellectual) tradition, the story of the Roman Empire, both its rise and its fall, occupies a unique
place. It is different from comparable narratives—it is not just a story; it is our (European eq. Western) story. Nicola Terrenato has argued, moreover, that it is such an utterly compelling one in terms of identification and heritage because it is the ultimate rags-to-riches story as well. Be that as it may, memory constructions of Rome as they developed over time, indeed, seem to reflect certain historical conditions of the societies that shaped them. Moreover, there are few ‘European and Western’ (social) groups or cultures that have refrained from using ‘Rome’ to situate themselves in time and construct their identities.

Roman heritage and the Netherlands

The continuous (intellectual) reception, remediation and appropriation of Rome from the Renaissance onwards has received a lot of attention. So has the use that the emerging 19th-century nation-states made of it in terms of their legitimisation. However, Rome also turns up in present-day issues, as the historical analogies used in the Brexit debate, recent discussions on nationalism in Romania or disputes on the borders of Europe illustrate (to give but three examples). In addition, let me, again, underline how important such entanglements with time, in this case ‘remembering Rome’, are for our future as well. Remembering allows us to temporarily leave the here and now and explore and ‘play with’ the past in order to reflect on the future. The past helps us to imagine and develop all kinds of possible scenarios for the future. Given our current socio-political climate in particular, we must be aware, therefore, that ‘playing with Rome’ is not at all an innocent game.

This essay revolves around the basic point that ‘doing Roman archaeology and history’ is a form of remembering—mnemohistory—and that scholars would do well to be more aware of that. Within the study of ‘the Roman Netherlands’ attention to the subject has remained surprisingly limited so far, in particular in comparison with debates in, for instance, Britain and France. It is to be hoped and expected that the large and interdisciplinary (research) project Constructing the Limes, financed by the Dutch National Science Agenda, will alter this state of affairs. To try and stimulate that development, two different cases pertaining to the mnemohistory of ‘Rome’ in the Netherlands, as it is developing at present, will be analysed below. The first example concerns the way in which ‘the Roman Netherlands’ is presented in the highly successful 2022 documentary series about the Dutch past and Dutch identity, Het verhaal van Nederland (The story of the Netherlands) and, in relation to that, on 20th-century wall charts as they were popular in Dutch schools. The second case study deals with the ideas schoolchildren visiting the National Museum of Antiquities in Leiden (RMO) have about Romans and the Roman Empire. A brief conclusion will state that we should move beyond the Roman-Native dichotomy by leaving both the colonial and the postcolonial frames of reference behind us and try to become truly ‘decolonial’. In the outlook, I will argue for the notion of relationality as being central to a mnemohistory that can achieve this, also in relation to heritage.

Before we move towards our two case studies, however, let us first look at some aspects of the Roman heritage in the Netherlands. The geographical area
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of the modern-day Low Countries was never fully part of the Roman Empire—only its southern part was, up to the river Rhine, which functioned as the frontier zone or Limes of the Roman Empire. Nevertheless, the idea of classical antiquity as the foundation of Western civilisation formed part of the Netherlands’ identity.\textsuperscript{28} Until the second half of the 20th century, the coming of the Romans was presented as the end of Prehistory and the dawn of civilisation and modernity. At the same time, however, there was the motif of the Batavians, who were seen as the ancestors of the Dutch, an identification that already started during early Dutch humanism.\textsuperscript{29} Caesar mentions a ‘Batavian island’ in his \textit{De Bello Gallico}, and we now know that the term \textit{Batavi} is a Roman (-etic) definition to indicate tribes that populated the area south of the Rhine, probably after the Roman slaughter of other Germanic tribes that lived there originally.\textsuperscript{30} The identification with the \textit{Batavi} took on special significance during the rebellion of factions within the Low Countries against the Spanish in the 16th and 17th centuries. As the ‘old Batavians’ had stood up against the Roman oppressor, so it was thought, the ‘new Batavians’ were now bravely rising against the Spaniards.\textsuperscript{31} The ‘Batavian myth’ was widely reflected in Dutch politics, literature and art of the time, as illustrated, for instance, by Rembrandt’s famous painting \textit{The conspiracy of the Batavians under Claudius Civilis}.\textsuperscript{32} Commissioned for the new town hall in Amsterdam in 1661–1662, it was part of a cycle of eight historical paintings on Batavian history. The town hall was a symbol of the newly gained independence of the Dutch Republic and the idea of the Batavians as ancestors fitted the context beautifully.\textsuperscript{33} Equally telling is the fact that in 1619, the newly founded capital of the Dutch East Indies was called Batavia (Jakarta since 1949). In the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, Dutch appropriations of Rome largely followed the general European discourse with Classical Antiquity as the cradle of Western civilisation.\textsuperscript{34} In the latter part of the 20th century, partly inspired by Hollywood films as well, a popular image of Rome took shape, which was populated with emperors (preferably mad), gladiators (usually exotic) and legionaries.\textsuperscript{35} Most recently, the Roman Empire has been used by nationalistic, right-wing parties in the Netherlands who imagine it as a glorious era of ‘pure’ Western culture.\textsuperscript{36} The political presence of Forum voor Democratie and its leader, Thierry Baudet, who, in 2017, began his maiden speech in parliament in Latin, modelling his first sentence after Cicero, is probably the most prominent example of this development.\textsuperscript{37} But already in 2015, Prime Minister Mark Rutte argued that the EU should better protect its borders against migrants in order not to share the fate of the Roman Empire.

As we all know from the Roman empire, big empires go down if the borders are not well-protected. So we really have an imperative that it is handled.\textsuperscript{38}

At the same time, we see the slow start of a debate, so far mainly in academia, on the need for a decolonisation of the classical heritage (including our appropriation of the Roman Empire).\textsuperscript{39} All of this makes it clear that the Roman Empire still matters as a mirror for Dutch identity.
Archaeological evidence testifying to the presence of the Romans in the Netherlands can be seen in several museums throughout the country. There, however, no monumental remains with the potential to serve as lieu de mémoire. At the original track of the ancient Limes, there are some replicas of tombstones or milestones as well as various reconstructions of castella or watchtowers to provide an impression. Over the past few decades, however, the Limes has assumed an increasingly important role in Dutch heritage. It has been framed as the biggest archaeological monument in the Netherlands and was awarded the status of UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2021 as part of the ‘Frontiers of the Roman Empire’ project. Very recently, a 4.2 million euro research project entitled Constructing the Limes was initiated to come to a better understanding of the Limes as a borderzone, including its impact on the surrounding region. It is important to underline again, however, that there are no remaining walls above ground level, as is the case with Hadrian’s wall in England, for example (see below under case study 2).

**From native freedom to roman occupation: ‘Rome’ in the documentary series the story of the Netherlands**

The story of the Netherlands is a historical documentary series, which was broadcast in 2022 (on channel 2 of Dutch National Television NPO) to great critical acclaim and remarkable public success. The series tells the story of “who we are and how we came to be” in ten chronologically presented defining episodes of Dutch history. Dramatic events from these periods are shown as life enactments, with a modern-day narrator, the well-known Dutch actor Daan Schuurmans, who is witnessing it all and provides background information and interpretation. These dramatised scenes alternate with commentaries by academics and museum and heritage specialists. The second episode, which interests us here, deals with the period from the late Iron Age to the beginning of the Early Middle Ages.

All ten programs have titles consisting of a dichotomist pairing of terms, for instance, hunters and farmers (Jagers en boeren) or patriots and Orangists (Patriotten en prinsgezinden). The title for our episode is Romans and Batavians (Romeinen en Bataven). Instead of alluding to socio-political or religious divisions within Dutch society at a certain point in time, as most of the other titles do—knights and counts (Ridders en graven), for instance, or pioneers and paupers (Pioniers en paupers)—this title evokes something of an ethno-cultural or nation-against-nation dichotomy. The title probably most strongly resonates with that of the final episode on Dutch history from the 1930s onwards: Bevrijders en bezetters (Liberators and occupiers). The program on Romans and Batavians was screened on February 9, 2022, and watched by a staggering 2,021,000 people (about 12% of the total population of the Netherlands). It was the best-viewed episode of the whole series.

The first images are gripping. We see a calm river in the early morning (captioned ‘Kessel 58 bc’), then, suddenly rising from the water, a group of young men, hiding under animal skins, slowly making their way to the riverside. We follow the main character, who has striking blue eyes, a beard and long blond hair, walking along the shore. To his dismay, he finds the bodies of several people who have
been brutally murdered. He kneels beside a young woman, takes her in his arms and starts to cry (Fig. 9.1). The presenter comments: “We know that this happened, because it has been described.” “In the 1st century BC”, he continues, “a powerful nation arrives in our country and ends Prehistory.” The camera now swings back to the protagonist, who looks up towards the sky and screams in anger. After this brief clip of one and a half minutes, the opening clip of the series (“This is our story; who we are and how we came to be”) starts. Then, the episode really begins with a sketch of late prehistory in which families “passed their lives in small communities of two or three farms, and were buried in the vicinity”. We see enacted scenes of happily laughing women in an intimate interior scene and their menfolk, also grinning, walking through the surrounding woods. The narrator underlines their freedom (“there was no authority whom they had to obey”) and self-sufficiency.

We see a party with lavish food and merriment. A group of young men arrives and the camera focuses on an excited young woman; it is the arrival of her marriage partner. In the groom, we recognise the blue-eyed protagonist of the introductory clip. The scene is one of blissful (native) happiness: most of the merrymakers are constantly smiling and roaring. “Little is known about them until 58 BC”, the narrator says, “when we have the first historical sources, which call them Germanen”. And these sources, he immediately adds, do not at all tell the truth but mainly consist of negative stereotypes denoting barbarity. A shot of a happily playing fair-haired child brings us back to the wedding party in 58 BC, where the young woman and the blue-eyed man kiss. Then, abruptly, the music turns gloomy, and the idyll is broken: at the edge of the forest, two figures on horseback appear against the dark background of trees. They are armed and wear visors covering their faces. Their facelessness makes them inhuman, indeed, in every respect they are visually presented as the very opposite of the Germanen. The story is interrupted by two clips in which specialists comment on De Bello Gallico, not only Caesar’s account of his war but also the first description of the Netherlands. The narrator briefly explains the historical situation by saying that Caesar thought that the Gauls would be willing to submit to Roman rule whereas the German tribes would not, before the enacted story continues. Roman troops attack the village; fighting and killing the men. The women, elderly and children run to take refuge in the woods; some of them are shown hurriedly burying their valuables. “Local tribes are no match for the Roman army”, the narrator comments, “because the Romans have more discipline and better tactics”. In the clip that follows, Professor Nico Roymans, the best-known and most prominent Dutch provincial Roman archaeologist, explains that Caesar is still mostly described as a brilliant general, but that there is another side to him which has received considerably less attention: Caesar created “landscapes of terror”. This is subsequently shown in an enacted scene lasting more than a minute in which Roman soldiers slaughter the fleeing group of unprotected women, elderly folk and children. The last victim is the bride. When one of the Roman soldiers is about to thrust his sword into her back, the music stops, and the screen turns black. We now understand the background to the dramatic start of the episode.

Contrast this image as it is presented in The story of the Netherlands in 2022 with how the coming of Rome was remembered in the large educational charts
which decorated the walls of Dutch primary and secondary schools during large parts of the 20th century. An example from 1911 entitled ‘The Romans in our country’ (‘De Romeinen in ons land’), designed by the artist Gerard van Hove (1877–1936), shows a settlement developing in the vicinity of a vast Roman army camp visible in the background (fig. 9.2). The new village is characterised by a structured, linear layout, and it is clear that all kinds of (technological) novelties have been introduced. Not only would the indigenous population have felt protected by the Romans, but the description tells us that they were also keen to follow their example. A few thatched huts in the background refer to the Germanic past, an additional feature signalling that what we have here is progress in every respect. The description’s first sentence encapsulates this idea as follows: “This developing settlement near a Roman fort gives us some idea of the influence of Roman culture on the primitive civilisation of the Germanic peoples.” It is the idea of Romanisation as mission civilisatrice which was pervasive during most of the 20th century.

A similar notion of (technologically and culturally) civilised Romans versus uncivilised natives is also apparent in another example, dating to the early 1950s and designed by Johan Herman Isings (fig. 9.3). It shows the castellum Praetorium Agrippinae, which was situated on the Limes on the site of the present village of Valkenburg. We see Romans and members of the local Cananefates tribe engaged in (friendly) interaction: a Roman officer on horseback is talking to an indigenous chieftain; several Cananefates women, obviously doing well, are interested in buying a bronze mirror from a veteran while two young men, one Roman and one indigenous but both serving in the castellum, walk along. The description not only

Figure 9.1 A still from the episode discussed showing the main character finding his murdered bride.
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provides us with this information but also says: “When the Romans penetrated these regions, the light of history dawned here, too. For nearly four centuries these low countries were under the influence of the Roman Empire to a greater or lesser extent.”

Forty years after the first example, there still is a strong idea of mission civilisatrice, with the Romans taking the Cananefates by the hand and leading them, in a friendly manner and without friction, towards civilisation and modernity.

The “landscapes of terror”, evoked by Roymans are indeed invisible in these two memory constructions of Rome. This may have to do with the practical fact that the historical periods portrayed are later (and post-conquest), but in fact that choice is significant in itself. The wall charts can be seen as representative of an attitude predominant during much of the 20th century: ‘Rome’ was something good. The contrast between 2022 and Het verhaal van Nederland is remarkable—here ‘Rome’ is something bad.

This shift is, of course, strongly intertwined with the changing ‘historical condition’ (see above) of Dutch society between, roughly, 1950 and 2020. Postcolonialism played an important role in that development and has brought much to the field of Roman history and archaeology as well as to Classics in general.

We must be aware, however, that postcolonial theory as most often used within Roman archaeology and history has some of the colonial...
theory’s disadvantages. This has to do with the fact that it often focuses on the issue of what we might call ‘turning the tables’, taking the ‘native’ perspective. This is undoubtedly of crucial importance from an ideological and political point of view. As a result, however, the categories of colonial thought themselves are often (unconsciously) maintained, which may result in a tunnel vision similar to the one provided by the colonial frame of reference. The shift in the perception of ‘Rome’ described above might be an illustration of this. I do not mean to say that the narrative provided by the documentary series is false—although the portrayal of the late Iron Age Germanic people as noble, courageous, autarkic ‘savages’, untouched by the wider world, is remarkably stereotypical and should be criticised from a truly postcolonial perspective in particular. What I would like to contend is that our scholarly perspectives on ‘Rome’ are much more deeply entangled with mnemohistory than we often realise—and that this is an issue we should discuss.

**What have the Romans ever done for you? The perspective of Dutch schoolchildren—with Rebecca Henzel**

Our second case study was designed to put the memory construction of *Het verhaal van Nederland* into perspective and deals with the ideas of schoolchildren visiting the National Museum of Antiquities in Leiden (RMO) regarding the Romans and the Roman Empire. Our small and limited investigation was inspired by an
experiment executed by Nicola Terrenato more than two decades ago. In a 2001 article, Terrenato analyses perceptions of Rome in modern Italy from the 18th century onwards. In order to include contemporary views on Rome, he created a survey for children. In this way, Terrenato aimed to show that popular views of the Roman Empire in Italy had not significantly changed since the 19th century. He decided to engage children because of their assumed naiveté. His sample consisted of 125 school children of 9 and 10 years old. His article presents the answers to four questions, along with an analysis and interpretation of the results. First, the children were asked to name three words to define the Romans. Second came the question of whether the Romans were good or bad (or both). The third question concerned a choice between three options: “The Romans succeeded in creating their empire because a. they were more advanced, b. they got everybody to agree with them, c. their army was stronger.” Finally, the children were asked to mention three important things the Romans did. The survey showed that most children associated the Romans with military conquest and defined them in such terms as ‘strong’, ‘warlike’, ‘brave’, ‘conquering’, and ‘bad’. A total of 42% of the children indicated that they considered the Romans as bad. As for the third question: 68% answered that the Romans succeeded because their army was stronger. According to the children, the most important thing the Romans did was ‘building’, which Terrenato explains by the ruins of Veii visible from their classroom window. The children put forward ‘conquest’ as the second most important achievement of the Romans. On the basis of these answers, Terrenato concluded that schoolchildren in Rome were rather negative about ‘Rome’, which he attributed to the influence of their teachers. These were educated, he says, in a period when a negative view of ‘Rome’ predominated because of the postcolonialism debate of the 1970s.

For our limited experiment, we decided to work with primary school groups that had signed up for a guided tour at the National Museum of Antiquities (RMO) in Leiden, involving children between the ages of 7 and 12. The survey consisted of seven questions, of which the first two concerned the participant’s age and gender. The children had to fill in the form by hand during a class in preparation for their visit to the museum. They were not supposed to talk to each other during the survey and were told that their answers would not be assessed as being right or wrong. They could take as much time as they needed to complete the questions; it usually took them about 10 minutes. Among the five content questions were two open questions concerning their associations with ‘Rome’ (“When you think about the Romans, what comes to your mind?” and “Mention three important things the Romans did.”). The third question was about how the Romans managed to build their Empire (“The Roman Empire stretched from the Netherlands and Spain to present-day Iran. How did that happen?”) and offered four answers to choose from, as well as the possibility to (additionally) add an own opinion. The possible answers were, 1. they had better ideas and techniques than other people; 2. their army was stronger; 3. they were better at negotiating; and 4. they were just better than other people. The fourth question was supposed to reveal how and whence the children had obtained knowledge about the Romans. Nine options were given; they could choose several and were also allowed to add categories of
their own. The options were: school, museum, books, comic books, friends/family, TV/films, computer games, board games, and YouTube. The fifth and final question was about whether the Romans were good or bad. The children were given five different options: very bad, bad, both good and bad, good, very good.

The survey was conducted between September 2021 and March 2022, and our sample consisted of 142 children. Overall, the outcome points to a nuanced view of ‘Rome’ and the Romans. Whereas Terrenato’s article suggests that the majority of his sample mostly associated ‘Rome’ with concepts such as bad, negative, and brutal, the Dutch children did, on the whole, not opt for the extremes of ‘very good’ or ‘very bad’: 60.6% thought that Romans were both “good and bad”; only 1.4% chose “very bad” and 4.2% “bad”, with 21.1% choosing “good”, and 9.9% “very good” (fig. 9.4).

The older the children, the more nuanced their view of the Romans, and the more they associated ‘Rome’ with inventions, such as heating systems, baths and latrines, instead of objects connected to warfare, such as swords. It is noteworthy that when asked about things they would associate with the Romans, many children pointed to everyday life and items such as clothing. The association most frequently mentioned, however, concerns the military (soldiers, fighting, swords etc.). Many children also mentioned “conquering land” as one of the important things the Romans achieved. Nevertheless, this strong association with military categories apparently does not automatically result in a negative image of ‘Rome’ (fig. 9.5). When mentioning important things achieved by the Romans, most children thought about ‘innovations’ such as aqueducts, writing, heating, etc (fig. 9.6). The fact that the children belonged to different schools hardly played a role. While it is only in the case of one particular age group (from the same school) that we found a significant mention of “slaves”, this association was almost never mentioned by
children from other schools. We can surmise that Roman slavery had been a topic of these children’s history lessons.

Interestingly, some of the children who saw the Romans in a largely positive light mentioned achievements such as “protecting”, “saving lives”, and “making
life better”, while at the same time naming fighting and other aspects of warfare. On second thought, a connection between fighting and protecting is not so strange. This corresponds to the answers to the question how the Romans managed to expand their empire. Most of the children were of the opinion that military power and innovative ideas were behind the Roman successes (fig. 9.7).

Question 4 was supposed to reveal how the children acquired their knowledge about the Romans. Digital media and movies played a less prominent role than we expected (fig. 9.8).

Over the last few decades, the question of what schoolchildren in the Netherlands should know about Dutch history has been the subject of heated discussion. This debate resulted in the creation, by a committee of experts, of a canon containing ‘the most important events’ in Dutch history. The Canon of the Netherlands consists of 50 ‘windows onto the past’. These ‘windows’ may be individuals, objects, movements, or important events. Together, they are meant to reflect the essence of the identity of the Netherlands and the Dutch. Significantly, this canon is regularly updated, most recently in 2020. The Romans always played a part in this canon and will probably always continue to do so. This is logical in view of the fact that, for the Low Countries, the arrival of ‘Rome’ marked the transition from Prehistory to history. The updated canon presents the timeframe from 47 BC to the period around 350 AD as ‘The Roman Limes. On the frontiers of the Roman world.’ Although the education in Dutch primary schools indeed seems to focus on the Limes and Romans as conquering soldiers, attention is also given to trade, technological innovations, and urbanisation, in short, to a ‘positive’ impact. In this context, the Limes is not described as a hard border in constant need of defence but as a fluid frontier region. This is also the idea communicated by the

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*Figure 9.7 Question 3: The Roman Empire stretched from the Netherlands and Spain to present-day Iran. How did that happen? Outcome.*

*Source:* Rebecca Henzel.
Constructing the Limes project, which has now developed an educational board game for children called Grensland (Border country) (fig. 9.9).75

Although, admittedly, our survey is not extensive, the results differ from those achieved by Terrenato two decades ago. It suggests that the association of ‘Rome’ with warfare remains very strong, but for Dutch children this, apparently, is not a reason to see the Romans as ‘bad’, as was the case with many of the Italian children. The Dutch children’s attitude is not surprising given the fact that most of the educative material in Dutch museums and schools revolves around the Limes. This material also pays attention to the ‘positive’ impact of the Roman presence, which would account for the more nuanced view of the Dutch schoolchildren.76 Popular media, such as TV, movies and YouTube feature among the sources of information mentioned by the schoolchildren, but apparently, these did not (yet) significantly alter the image presented in school. It is interesting to note that the Batavian myth is lacking from our sample altogether; it was only mentioned once. We conclude that the schoolchildren from our sample have no trouble combining various notions of ‘Rome’ without emphasising only one particular memory construction (good and civilising versus bad and imperialistic) and that school education seems to be their main source of information and judgment.

Conclusion: beyond ‘good Romans versus bad Romans’

On the basis of two brief and still somewhat impressionistic case studies, this essay explored some of the ways in which ‘Rome’ is remembered in present-day Dutch society. The first and obvious conclusion is that remembering Rome matters—and that this issue needs much more scholarly attention. From the statement of Prime Minister The Prime
Minister Mark Rutte regarding the 2015 refugee crisis to the image of Rome as a foreign oppressor in *Het verhaal van Nederland*; and from Thierry Baudet’s ideas about European civilisation to the *Limes* as Dutch World Heritage: Rome continues to be an important point of reference.\(^77\)

The second conclusion is that the scholarly discourse goes hand in hand with changes in the intellectual climate and the public discourse. This should be equally obvious.\(^78\) However, we do not seem to be sufficiently aware of the fact that ‘doing
Roman archaeology and history’ is also a form of remembering or mnemohistory. I have not heard, for instance, of an in-depth analysis of the Romans and Batavians episode discussed above in these terms, nor of any form of (self)reflection by the participating archaeologists and museum or heritage experts. Many would argue that Roman archaeology and history have moved from a colonial to a postcolonial paradigm by now. As a result, a prominent group of scholars currently working in the field of provincial Roman Archaeology, under the influence of a particular strand of postcolonial theory, mainly seems to associate Rome with something ‘bad’. The image of Rome as presented in Het verhaal van Nederland reflects this paradigm shift and may be seen as an indication of its public success. Of course, the paradigm shift taking place within the field is following a much wider intellectual trend within society, and there is nothing wrong with that. Scholarly conclusions are always marked by the historical context in which they emerge—all the more reason to critically investigate (one’s own) points of departure. This is, I propose, what we should try to do in taking the next step towards truly decolonial perspectives.

A third conclusion, therefore, is that we should stop evaluating Romans in terms of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ and move beyond the Roman-Native dichotomy to come to a better understanding of the complexities at stake. We should no longer ‘fetishise the Romans’. One way to achieve this is to show what else was going on in what we call the Roman era, in other parts of the Mediterranean and the wider oikumene—and examine those developments in their own right. In other words: write a global history of Antiquity. Additionally, we should make it clear that Rome, in fact, was heavily dependent on, and even partly made up of, the non-Roman elements in the (global) network to which it belonged. In other words: write an entangled, relational history of Antiquity, which involves connectivity, the role of networks, and the issue of globalisation. Moreover, we should not only look at aspects of ‘space’ but also explore aspects of time and write a truly longue-durée history of Antiquity. Finally, a ‘post-humanist’ approach, in the sense that investigating the influence of climate, landscape, objectscape, et cetera on the constitution of what we call ‘Rome’, will effectively put an end to our ‘fetishising the Romans’. Combining these overlapping approaches will provide us with a much fuller sense of what we mean when we say ‘Rome’ than the Roman-Native dichotomy is able to give.

In any case, we should no longer construct Rome as a positive or a negative anchor for our society while at the same time continuously and self-critically investigating our scholarly (re)constructions as a form of mnemohistory.

**Outlook: towards a relational mnemohistory**

Let me, to enlarge on what has been concluded above, return to the relation between mnemohistory and heritage as was described in the Introduction to this chapter. If it is true that we become what we (decide to) remember, what should we do to remember Rome without fetishising the Romans? A key term in this respect is relationality. A recent essay by Astrid Erll illustrates this by analysing the case of Homer in terms of what she calls relational mnemohistory. Could such an
approach enable us to move beyond the ‘good Roman’-’bad Roman’ dichotomy? Homer has often been appropriated as ‘European heritage’ and, to some extent, plays a role similar to that of ‘Rome’ in functioning as one of the ‘foundations of the West’. By shifting the perspective from history to mnemohistory and appropriation (as I proposed here as well), Erll shows the fallaciousness of this view. She focuses on what she calls the genea-logic of Homer, which allows her to conclude that understanding the Iliad and Odyssey as European heritage is only one highly selective actualisation of a complex and entangled phenomenon. (Remembering) ‘Homer’ has been a co-constructive and transformative process from its very beginnings. The Homeric epics, as they emerged in what we habitually call ‘archaic Greece’, were the product of a cosmopolitan world and show many influences from Western Asia, in particular. They are the outcome of the continuous interaction of diverse elements, creating a meaningful structure (the Homeric epics) and, at the same time, transforming all elements involved. This relationality is equally fundamental in the case of all (further) developments in the mnemohistory of Homer. Erll discusses the Middle Ages, during which the travel of manuscripts from the Eastern to the Western Roman world was crucial for the ‘rediscovery’ of the Homeric epics. In this context, she mentions networks of wealthy Italian artists who were negative about Byzantine culture but eager to appropriate their Greek cultural history, including Homer, and welcomed emigrant translators who could unlock this memory for them. Erll convincingly summarises modernist and postcolonial remediations of Homer, ultimately concluding that “(s)ome of the aesthetically most convincing claims to Homeric memory have been made in 20th century Caribbean literature”. ‘Homer’, we find, is about relationality, connectedness and co-construction. One may speak about Homer as a heritage in Europe, but it would be wrong to use exclusive memory logics and see him as the heritage of Europe.

I would argue that this is an important insight to approach the question, ‘What have the Romans ever done for us?’

Let me finally give a concrete and recent example of what an exercise in relational mnemohistory could look like in practice and how this can lead to a more differentiated understanding of the ancient world without ‘fetishising’ particular civilisations. The exhibition Alexandria. Past Futures, on show in Brussels and Marseille in 2022 and 2023, was developed as part of the project Alexandria: (Re)Activating Common Urban Imaginaries. In order to explore the distinct character and history of Alexandria, one of Antiquity’s most important cities, this exhibition took a relational perspective, emphasising developments through space and time. Alexandria is presented as an intersection, not as a civilisation. Mnemohistory, moreover, is given a central place by recurring emphasis on the fact that there are different, sometimes conflicting, views on the historical and archaeological reconstructions pertaining to Alexandria. This is done by consistently evoking a dialogue between scholarly and popular reconstructions of aspects of the city and the ancient artefacts themselves. The first two rooms of the exhibition, as shown in Brussels (BOZAR), are even left rather empty so as to underline that any image of Alexandria (including those created by scholarship) is indeed just that an image or mirage. A second layer of mnemohistory is provided by 20 contemporary artworks created by artists...
from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine, which engage in a dialogue with the exhibition and its artefacts. These installations, paintings, photographs, sculptures, texts, archival documents, and videos not only mirror the subjects presented in the exhibition, but also ‘unmask’ the exhibition as a distinctly European initiative—a view of Alexandria from the perspective of European cultural and academic institutions. Through their works, the artists propose a reflection on who is actually doing the mnemohistory here—and for whom (fig. 9.10). The artworks thus throw the verity of history into question and even further complicate our understanding of the history of Alexandria and its archaeology. To have such an exhibition, departing from the myriad ways of seeing and remembering ‘Rome’, on Roman (archaeological) heritage and the Netherlands remains an urgent desideratum.

Notes
1 This article was written as part of the NWO VICI project Innovating objects. The impact of global connections and the formation of the Roman Empire (277-61-001). Rebecca Henzel was responsible for the survey (case study 2) as part of her work for this project in the domain of Heritage, and that section of the essay has been written together
with her. We would like to thank the National Museum of Antiquities (Rijksmuseum van Oudheden/RMO) in Leiden for their kind cooperation in bringing us in contact with the following primary schools: Koningin Julianaschool De Lier (groups 7 and 8); school Vest Dordrecht (group 7), Silvester-Bernadette basis school Helmond (group 8) en Openbare Bloemcampschool Wassenaar (group 5). Lennart Kruijer, Frits Naerebout, Martin Pitts, and Saskia Stevens critically commented on a draft of the manuscript; Anna Beerens kindly edited the English text. The first part of the title refers to the famous sketch from Monty Python’s *Life of Brian*. All links mentioned in the footnotes have been consulted on 15 November 2022.

2 See Hartog 2015a (who calls this historicity).
3 Hartog 2015a, 11.
4 Cf. Naerebout 2022, 20: “Because society needs a memory to survive.”
5 Erll 2018 uses the term ‘remediation’ to characterise the same process.
6 Brague 1992, 168.
7 For this example, see Terrenato 2019, 1 (with bibliography).
8 Jankoviç and Mihajloviç 2018; Fernández-Götz et al. 2020 constitute recent examples.
9 Cf. Mazzotta 1993, 111 with references.
10 The story is much more complex, of course, and characterised by great differences between the various societies involved. I will not deal with those nor with the difference in appropriation between Greece and Rome, for which see the remarks in Hartog 2015b, chapter 1.
11 See Mac Sweeney et al. 2019 and Naerebout 2022 for an overview of this development with an emphasis on current debates and the future; note also Postclassicisms Collective 2020.
12 Dealing with the mnemohistory of Egypt and including all relevant previous bibliographies, Assmann and Ebeling 2020 provide a recent and succinct summary of the theory. See also the interpretative overview by Schneider 2020 and note the refreshingly critical approach to the memory-studies boom (and its relevance for Roman Antiquity) in Naerebout 2018.
13 Weijts 2022, 27, 28: “Als kind wist ik al niet of ik nou aan de kant van de Romeinen moest staan of aan die van de barbaren. Als je de verhalen van Asterix en Obelix las, was het duidelijk. Dan was ons land ingenomen en moesten we het terugveroveren. Maar de Romeinen waren toch anders dan de Duitsers, die de doden op hun geweten hadden voor wie we altijd twee minuten stil waren op mijn verjaardag, op 4 mei. (...) Maar die barbaren waren onze voorouders, de Romeinen waren vreemdelingen. *Toch voelde het alsof ik moest kiezen.*” Note that Weijts has in the meantime developed a different understanding of the Roman Empire, seeing it as quintessentially multicultural and in that respect even more successful than our present-day society: “Het Romeinse rijk kon zo succesvol zijn omdat het de grens met de barbaren nooit werkelijk zag als een grens. (...) De grootsheid van het Imperium Romanum was, in de bloeiperiode, gericht op eenheid, op samenwerking. Deze streek was geen voortdurend frontlinie. Het was een multicul- turele samenleving die vier eeuwen standhield, en in veel opzichten geslaagder was dan die van ons” (36).
14 Terrenato 2001, also for the expression. See also Lawrence 2021.
15 See Engels 2012 on Europe, to just give one example. There is a plethora of books comparing the rise and fall of Rome to the United States of America and their ‘Empire’. Note also the quotation by Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte quoted later in this essay.
16 Terrenato 2019.
17 It is important to stress, however, that the mnemohistory of Rome does not exist, not even within a particular (social) group, society, or time period. There are always different, often competing or contradictory, imaginations functioning at the same time, as the remainder of this essay will illustrate.
18 Edwards 1999 and Hingley 2001 provide overviews.
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19 Gardner 2017 for Brexit; Hanscam 2017 for Romania; Lawrence 2021 for the European borders.

20 Abraham 2020.

21 In this sense, it is imagination that engenders the future; cf. Glăveanu 2020; Zittoun and Glăveanu 2018. Here, the past can be used in a positive form of anchoring or a negative one. For anchoring, see Sluiter 2017; Sluiter and Versluys 2021 who define it as the process or activity through which social groups connect phenomena they perceive as ‘new’ to those they see as familiar. Anchoring thus enables people to perceive or construct continuity within change and helps them to accommodate and absorb new inventions, practices, objects, or ideas. Anchoring could even be regarded as a precondition for imagining the future, in that it provides the imagination with a starting point: the familiar past.

22 As forcefully underlined by the important essay Padilla Peralta 2020.

23 For Britain, see Bonacchi et al. 2016; Gardner 2017; Hingley et al. 2018; Kamash 2021 and most recently Hingley 2021; for the situation in France, the analysis by Dietler 1994 remains illuminating. This chapter will not deal with the situation in Germany. It is interesting, though, to note the recent, heated debate on the Netflix series Barbarians and the portrayal of Arminius and the battle of the Teutoburg Forest, an ideologically contested event frequently claimed by far-right extremists. See www.nytimes.com/2020/10/28/arts/television/barbarians-netflix.html. I thank S. Stevens for bringing this issue to my attention.

24 See https://c-limes.nl/. The project is coordinated by S. Stevens at Utrecht University. Lawrence 2021 for the concept (and its mnemohistory) itself.

25 Inspired by a similar kind of experiment undertaken by Nicola Terrenato two decades ago and published in Terrenato 2001. We acknowledge the limitations of the survey and its results; note however that detailed research into the attitudes of the public in the Netherlands to the Roman past is lacking altogether (cf. Hingley 2021 for Britain). Our modest attempt is primarily meant to draw attention to that gap.

26 It is here, in stressing relationality, that the analyses in this chapter meet the concept of ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ that is central to this volume. For a summary of what the idea of rooted cosmopolitanism entails and why it matters, see Versluys and Lilley, this volume; note however that detailed research into the attitudes of the public in the Netherlands to the Roman past is lacking altogether (cf. Hingley 2021 for Britain). Our modest attempt is primarily meant to draw attention to that gap.

27 No real overviews of the reception of the Romans in the Netherlands exist. Swinkels 2004 probably still provides the most information. For the period 1400–1700 cf. Schöffer 1975; Enenkel and Ottenheym 2017 as well as the Limes case study recently provided by Ottenheym 2022.

28 Note that countries such as Denmark, although they were never part of the Roman Empire, likewise consider Classical Antiquity as part of their European identity, see Norskov and Kristensen 2018.

29 See Enenkel and Ottenheym 2017 part II.

30 De Bello Gallico 4, 10. For the Batavians, see Roymans 2004, 2009.

31 Schöffer 1975 and Swinkels 2004 for an overview of the ‘Batavian myth’, now with Enenkel and Ottenheym 2017 part II.


33 For the Amsterdam town hall (and its many historicities), see Bussels et al. 2021.

34 Veenman 2009 for an overview of ‘the classical tradition in the Low Countries’.

35 See Naerebout 2007; Naerebout and Versluys 2014 for further details.

36 See Mac Sweeney et al. 2019; Naerebout 2022 for the wider context of this development (and many more examples).

37 Naerebout 2022, 22 n. 35 (with references).

38 Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte in an interview on the 2015 refugee crisis with a group of international newspapers, Financial Times, 26 November 2015, see
www.ft.com/content/659694fe-9440-11e5-b190-291e94b77c8f; quickly discussed in the Netherlands www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/politiek/artikel/842146/rutte-waarschuwt-eu-voor-val-zaols-romeins-rijk; with several critical comments like www.volkskrant.nl/columns-opinie/vluchtelingen-een-bedereiging-leer-van-het-romeinse-rijk–b388e33d/?referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F. The Roman Empire apparently plays a significant part in the mnemohistory of Prime Minister Rutte, who holds a degree in History from Leiden University. When, in 2015, he was invited to formulate a question for the Dutch Science Agenda, he asked about the reasons for the successes of the Roman World Empire (www.wetenschapsagenda.nl/video/mark-rutte/).

39 See the important contributions Huig et al. 2022; Beerden and Epping 2022. The need for this is well summarised by Naerebout 2022, 21: “In the present context, the most troublesome part of our ancient heritage is a sense of superiority. We are the inheritors of what we consider as a/the apex of culture, and as such, we ourselves are superior to those who belong to other lines of inheritance.”

40 Especially: Leiden, Rijksmuseum voor Oudheden; Nijmegen, Valkhof; Hoge Woerd; Alphen aan de Rijn, Archeon; Utrecht, DOMunder; Heerlen, Thermenmuseum; Sint Michielsgestel, Museum Romeins Halder; Venlo, Limburg Museum.

41 See Enenkel and Ottenheyym 2017, 167-177 for the role this circumstance already played with memory-constructions of Rome in the 16th and 17th centuries (despite the ‘Brittenburg’). Naerebout 2018 for a discussion of the concept of lieu de mémoire.

42 www.romeinen.nl/over-ons/romeinse-limes-nederland. Evocations of castella can be found in Leiden, Matilo (the park occupies the site of the castellum); Bunnik, Castellum Fectio (walls outline the castellum, with information and replica of pottery and inscriptions); Utrecht, Trajectum (lighted outline of the castellum and underground museum) and the Castellum-square in Valkenburg.

43 For all information, see https://c-limes.nl/. The project, in which citizen science plays an important role, is coordinated by S. Stevens at Utrecht University and has many partners from inside and outside academia. Wejts 2022 can be seen as an example of the recent importance of the Limes for imagining Rome. In 2020, an exhibition on the Limes in the Low Countries was held at the National Museum of Antiquities (RMO) in Leiden, entitled Romeinen langs de Rijn.

44 After the phrasing of the website and the trailer: “This is the story of the land in which we live”; “This is our story; who we are and how we came to be.” The series was followed up by an equally successful podcast.

45 All data from the website of the series as well as https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Het_verhaal_van_Nederland.

46 Kessel is the place where, according to N. Roymans (see below), the massacre of two Germanic tribes by Iulius Caesar took place. His interpretation has instigated much debate, also because Roymans suggests qualifying it as genocide (see Roymans 2018). It made the newspapers with headlines like “Caesar roeide voor een groot deel onze voorouders uit” (“Caesar exterminated a large part of our ancestry”) (Volkskrant 26 May 2017) and Roymans presented his ‘discovery’ on national television.

47 The opening clip, repeated in every episode, features flashes of illustrative events from all periods to give the viewer something of an overview; episode 2 is represented by a reference to “the Batavian revolt”, suggesting that is the key historical moment of this era.

48 The remainder of the episode first deals with the Batavians and the developments in and around Nijmegen (Noviomagus) before zooming in on Iulius Civilis and the so-called Batavian revolt. A notable scene shows a young Batavian boy in hiding, who is discovered and dragged from his hiding place by Roman soldiers. In Dutch viewers, this probably evokes images of WWII and the German occupiers’ search for people in hiding (Jews, political adversaries, members of the Resistance).

49 The wall chart illustrations as well as their descriptions have been taken from the website historywallcharts.eu.
50 “Het zich ontwikkelend legerdorp bij een Romeinse vesting, geeft enig denkbeeld van de invloed van de Romeinse cultuur op de primitieve beschavingstoestand van de Germanen.”

51 “Met het doordringen van de Romeinen naar deze streken daagde ook hier het licht der historie. Bijna vier eeuwen lang stonden deze lage landen in meerdere of mindere mate onder de beïnvloeding van het Romeinse wereldrijk.”

52 To do justice to the episode, which deserves a much more in-depth analysis than provided here, it should be underlined that the narrative in the second part, about Noviomagus and the Batavian revolt, is less dichotomous and rightly stresses that the revolt was a distinctly Roman affair instead of a ‘native uprising’.

53 For this development within the field of Roman archaeology and history in particular, see Sommer 2012; Gardner 2013; Versluys 2014, 2021; Hingley 2015; Van Oyen 2015.

54 For this critique see, more extensively, Versluys 2014, 2021; already Sommer 2012.

55 As argued by Bromberg 2021 in his forceful manifesto entitled Global Classics as and becomes very clear from the examples given in Mac Sweeney et al. 2019.

56 It is interesting to note that where postcolonialism has done a fine and important job in providing a different perspective on the Romans in the Netherlands, it has apparently played no role whatsoever in imaginations of the late Iron Age. This strengthens the idea that the Roman-Native dichotomy set up by the series is at least partly ideological. See Hingley, Bonacchi, and Sharpe 2018 for this problem in the Britain. The portrayal of the main character as having striking blue eyes, a beard and long blond hair (suggestive of the Ur-Dutchman) is striking (and disturbing) in this respect. Note that for the Netflix series Barbarians, the makers opted to have Arminius played by an actor with a darker complexion and hair, see www.nytimes.com/2020/10/28/arts/television/barbarians-netflix.html

57 Terrenato 2001, 74.

58 They would have “infantile images of Rome,” cf. Terrenato 2001, 74.

59 Terrenato 2001, 83.

60 The article does not tell us, however, how the study was actually performed (orally or in writing), how the questions were formulated, and how the results were analysed. One would also like to know more about the other answers given by the children, subsumed under the category “Other” (questions one and four).

61 For the results see Terrenato 2001, 84–85.

62 Compared to 23% ‘good’ and 35% ‘both good and bad’.

63 Terrenato 2001, 85–86.

64 Originally, we included a question concerning four images, asking the respondents to tick a box when they believed the picture depicted a Roman. The images showed 1. the upper part of a coloured cast of the Primaporta Augustus, 2. a military (face) mask from Nijmegen, 3. a marble portrait of Caesar (the so-called Chiaromonti) from the Vatican Museums, and 4. Septimius Severus as depicted on a wooden panel in Berlin. Due to practical reasons, however, not all the children were able to properly see these images (and/or the colours of the objects) in their copy of the survey. The answers, therefore, were not representative and we decided not to include this question in our survey and conclusions.

65 “Waar denk je aan bij ‘de Romeinen’? Noem drie belangrijke dingen die de Romeinen hebben gedaan.”

66 “Het Romeinse rijk strekte zich uit van Nederland en Spanje tot aan het huidige Iran. Hoe kwam dat?”

67 “Ze hadden betere ideeën en technieken dan andere volkeren; Hun leger was sterker; Ze konden beter onderhandelen; Ze waren gewoon beter dan andere volkeren.” It was possible to select several options.

68 “Waar heb je iets over de Romeinen geleerd, gehoord of gelezen?”

69 “Wat denk je? Waren de Romeinen goed of slecht?”
Answers to question 1: 87 children mention fighting, against 24 thinking about innovations; answers to question 2: 42 answers mention fighting and 29 conquering, while 55 mention innovations, 51 buildings and 32 streets.

Van Boxtel 2009; www.canonvannederland.nl/

Current opinion, therefore, seems to favour the idea that the ideal canon is one that is in constant motion. It is important to realise, however, that this contradicts what has often been considered the defining characteristics of canons: their stability and coherence. See the Preface to Agut-Labordère and Versluys 2022.

www.canonvannederland.nl/nl/romeinselimes

This subject would also benefit from further, in-depth investigation.

The map was made by mappa mundi; and the game was designed by IdeeHB.

Cf. Hingley 2021, who also underlines the impact of school curricula on the attitudes of the public in Britain.

Although these are important elements for the discussion, in this essay I did not deal with the popularity of re-enactment or with archaeological theme parks like Archeon where visitors are taken back to the Roman era.

Cf. Naerebout 2022, 19: “That is to say: writing history is inherently subjective and the narrative is constantly changing—as those who write history, and those who ask for it to be written, instigate and undergo change, historical narratives change. Society, all its subgroups, all individuals evolve, relevance evolves with it/them, new questions are asked, and the past gets rewritten.”

Note that I have not looked for these on social media, however. This lack of attention becomes clear in more general terms from the absence of debates and projects concerning the role of Rome in present-day society comparable to those that take place in Britain (as reflected in important essays like Gardner 2017; Hingley et al. 2018; Hingley 2021). And even in this context it has been remarked that: “There is a lack of detailed research into the attitudes of the public in Britain to the Roman past” (Hingley 2021, 241).

See Kamash 2021, but also note her critical comments.

Although one also notes more nuanced, less dichotomous perspectives, for instance, in exhibitions such as Romeinen langs de Rijn (National Museum of Antiquities (RMO), Leiden 2020) or, in particular, Moving Stories. De rijkdom van de Limes (Museum Het Valkhof, Nijmegen 2022).

As already extensively argued in Versluys 2014. The critique by Fernández-Götz et al. 2020, although important, mainly underlines, in my view, the difficulty postcolonial Roman archaeology has with critically reflecting on its own ideological premises and moving forward from postcolonial to decolonial.

Van Dommelen 2014 for the terminology.

Naerebout 2022, 31 phrases it radically: “We should be brave and do the unthinkable: banish the Greeks and Romans from the centre of our attention.”

Versluys 2014 is moving in that direction by proposing a focus on intense connectivity and its impact (Globalisation) as well as relationships between humans and things in our study of the Hellenistic-Roman world. A recent application of that agenda can be found in a volume on spolia and the process of appropriation, see de Jong and Versluys 2023. For how such ‘penser global’ can effectively rewrite world history, see Morin 2015.

Horden and Purcell 2000 remain a wonderful illustration of the gains of this approach.

For this non-anthropocentric approach and focusing on things and objectscapes, see Pitts and Versluys 2021.

Erll 2018. She defines relationality as the notion that historical phenomena are always the result of ongoing interaction between individuals and groups, among partners, neighbours, strangers, and even enemies. Note also Schneider 2020.

Erll 2018, 279–280. Exactly the same argument can be made for the Hellenistic period; see Manolea 2022.

Erll 2018, 281–283, 278 for the quote.
Erl distinguishes between three different ‘categories’ in this respect: 1. the relationality of the remembered (the Homeric epics as the co-creation of the wider Mediterranean and Near East); 2. relational remembering (the forms of interaction within the memory process) and what she calls 3. mnemonic relationality, which is a conscious and reflective form of relational remembering in which you are aware of the earlier phases of the genealogy and actively engaging with those. This model well fits the mnemohistory of Rome.

91 www.alexandria-urban-imaginaries.eu/; funded by the EU programme Creative Europe.
92 For all information, see the exhibition catalogue Alexandria: Past Futures, in particular the Introduction by A. Quertinmont and N. Amoroso (12–23) as well as the essay by E. Nasr and S. Rifky, the curators responsible for the contemporary artworks (200–217). The 2022 exhibition Moving Stories. De rijkdom van de Limes at Museum Het Valkhof, Nijmegen had a similar strategy.

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What have the Romans ever done for us?


Introduction: rooted cosmopolitanism and international mindedness

Worldwide, many different conceptions of the idea of cosmopolitanism exist. Interpreted as a Western concept, cosmopolitanism is often associated with liberal individualistic values. Unlike Greek “kosmopolitēs” (or citizen of the world) and the Kantian notion of abstract moral universalism and federation of the world to counter nationalist forces, Rabindranath Tagore’s non-Western approach to “rooted cosmopolitanism” was not disembodied (Mukherjee 2020, 49). While most Indian freedom fighters sought freedom from British colonial rule, Rabindranath Tagore sought freedom through cooperation between the East and West for the education and empowerment of the most marginalised people in rural India. By focusing on the problem of nationalism in India and around the world, Tagore urged fellow citizens to fight against blind nationalism and religious fanaticism (Mukherjee 2020, 55).

Through highlighting the problems of dominant Eurocentric ideas, Tagore emphasised:

The civilization of ancient Greece was nurtured within city walls. In fact, all the modern civilizations have their cradles of brick and mortar. These walls leave their mark deep in the minds of men. They set up a principle of “divide and rule “in our mental outlook, which begets in us a habit of securing all our conquests by fortifying them and separating them from one another. We divide nation and nation, knowledge and knowledge, man and nature. It breeds in us a strong suspicion of whatever is beyond the barriers we have built, and everything has to fight hard for its entrance into our recognition.

(Tagore 1915, 6)

Kwame Anthony Appiah, in his book, ‘Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a world of strangers’ argues that a ‘rooted cosmopolitan’ is someone who is rooted in his own cultural context while having an open mind to feel literally at home in the world (Appiah 2006). This has been articulated very well by Saranindranath Tagore (2008), when he writes: “For Rabindranath Tagore, to achieve cosmopolitan identity is to achieve one’s humanity through an existential engagement with one’s
tradition and the constellation of traditions that constitute the world” (Tagore 2008, 1801). Zwarts (2015, 18) added:

The India Tagore imagined, however, was more than just a freedom from British rule; Tagore imagined a society ordered according to an ideology that was radically different from British imperialism. His vehement criticism of nationalism, orientalism, and imperialism means that his writing is still of value in our contemporary time. This is because Tagore’s vision for India did not merely imagine a future without British rule; it proposed an India organised not as a nation state, but as a developed, open society that relies on humanity rather than patriotism. As such, it appears Tagore’s thought can make a valuable contribution to the imagination of cosmopolitanism.

To describe the glocal qualities of Tagore’s cosmopolitanism, Bagchi (2016, 66) articulated:

Tagore’s capacity to bridge the local and the global, remaining loyal to both, his commitment to decolonization while being a critic of the ideology of nationalism, and his tremendous contribution to bringing different materially grounded civilizations, cultures and crafts to Visva-Bharati and Shantiniketan, all contribute to his cosmopolitanism. . . . Tagore’s cosmopolitanism coexisted with his commitment to rural Bengal and its strengths and beauties.

According to Appiah’s (1997, 618) definition, the term ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ links the specific geographically rooted space with the notion of cosmopolitanism. This space-based definition suggests “the possibility of a world in which everyone is . . . attached to a home of one’s own, with its cultural particularities, but taking pleasure from the presence of other, different places that are home to other, different people”. For Beck (2003, 27), cosmopolitanism can be transcended by recognising the ‘Other.’ He added, “Rooted cosmopolitanism is simultaneously engaging in the local and global. It is opposed to ethnocentrism and universalism”. Moving beyond the binary dichotomy of local roots and global flows, Casey (2001) suggests that this co-occurrence will happen through the re-conceptualising of place and identity as additive attachments to local and global phenomena. In this definition, identities are increasingly being additive (Massey 2005).

In this article, I will follow the non-Western ‘rooted cosmopolitan’ ideals, especially Rabindranath Tagore’s way of thinking and international mindedness. Focusing on internationalisation, Tagore’s rooted cosmopolitan ideas invite us to move beyond the binary of the local and the global. Inspired by Massey (2005), especially the concept of multiplicity and the interconnectedness of space, this research is focused on the importance of connection to place. This place does “not require the constitution of a single hegemonic ‘we’” (Massey 2005, 154). In this definition, the place need not be local or global; people need not be the same or other. Instead, the local tradition and cultural concepts are dynamic domains of multiplicities unrelated to a single place or people (Clifford 2003).
Comparing two types of cosmopolitan architecture (socialist and capitalist) during the Cold War period in third-world contexts aims to highlight the core conceptualisation and theoretical definition of rooted cosmopolitanism. In recognising such politics of critically analysing the multiplicity of space, contemporary architectural and urban historians borrow theories and ideas from the broader social sciences—such as urban anthropology, urban sociology, and politics—to understand how particular built forms were reconceived, borrowed, and transplanted into new geographies. Through the case of exported modernism, this article defines the spaces created by global and local influences to help us learn from the interconnected, multifaceted, and multilayered transnational histories. As well, it would help us to understand the non-aligned networks, actors, organisations, and institutions in the process of the production of space in the Middle Eastern context. To highlight the core conceptualisation and theoretical definition of rooted cosmopolitanism, the next section aims to compare two types of cosmopolitan architecture (socialist and capitalist) during the Cold War period in the Third World context.

The role of architecture in ‘third world’ ideology

Third Worldism emerged out of the activities and ideas of anti-colonial nationalists and their efforts to mesh highly romanticized interpretations of pre-colonial traditions and cultures with the utopianism embodied by Marxism and socialism specifically, and ‘western’ visions of modernization and development more generally (Berger 2008, 9)

French economist Alfred Sauvy coined the term Third Worldism, suggesting a parallel between the emergence of the nations of the Global South and the awakening of the ‘Third Estates’ (Tiers État) that had led to the 1789 French Revolution. Sauvy highlighted the co-existence of the two worlds and their possible confrontation, which are both ignorant about the presence of the Third World, like the Third Estates (Malley 1999, 359).

In this definition, the Third World describes countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America that are not part of the First World (the United States and Western Europe) and the Second World (the Soviet Union and other socialist countries). Although this conceptualisation was not the first thought system to posit the globe’s division into North and South, ideological constructs have been premised on this sharp distinction between the two worlds (Nawratek and Mehan 2020; Kozlowski et al. 2020). Third Worldism sought to substitute the picture of a globe polarised between, on the one hand, a revolutionary Third World symbolising the future and, on the other, an imperialistic West. Understood as a system of representation and theoretical discourse, the politics of Third Worldism resonated both globally and locally. Third World countries, first and foremost Vietnam, Algeria, and Cuba, challenged Western colonialism by demanding national liberation (Wu 2018, 712).

In the scholarship about Third Worldism, this research engages with the works that intertwine the local and the global and expand the chronology of anti-imperial internationalism. In her edited book *Third World Modernism: Architecture,*
Development, and Identity, Duanfang Lu (2010) argued that the concepts of the ‘First/Second/Third’ Worlds are rooted in the semiotics of power and domination by the first world—either physical or imaginative. She further suggested that to overcome such domination, architects and planners, known as built environment agents for architectural actions, sought to transform their society using their built work as political manifestos and trans-cultural representation through the spread of foreign forms on local soils (Lu 2010). Brian Smith, in his book Understanding Third World Politics, noted that examining the variety of political institutions and processes in the Third World gives a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the major theoretical frameworks and concepts that have been used to understand political change in developing countries (Smith 2003). However, the rise of Third Worldism, the fall in oil prices, and the onset of a new global economic crisis in the 1970s tolled the death knell of political liberalism for many historians and commentators on U.S. politics (Wu 2018, 715). In this sense, the debt crisis and the collapsing economies spelt the end of the Third World’s definitions. Another reason for the collapse of the utopian demand of Third Worldism as a revolutionary future was the complex nature of international solidarity, which was demonstrated so well in the sequence of gatherings and summits that gave Third Worldism a sharper focus (Malley 1999, 363–364).

The Third Worldist countries received funds and financial aid from various international institutions for future development. Institutions such as the International Court of Justice, the UN General Assembly, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the UN Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) were the organisations favoured by the more militant Third World. Malley (1999) argued that these institutions were premised on top-down instead of market-based resource allocation (Malley 1999, 361).

Focusing on planning transfers and international urban projects, this chapter aims to deconstruct the dominant European narratives by tracing the other geographies and contexts. Through an analysis of various case studies in the Middle Eastern context, this research analyses the circulation and local applications of urban development and modernisation paradigms in Third World countries. To assess the main parties involved in the project, it is necessary to provide a list of projects completed in the Middle East by architects and organisations from First and Second World countries. Subsequently, this study introduces a more nuanced assessment of socialist- and capitalist-inspired modernisation processes in the second half of the 20th century that still influence the paradigms of contemporary urbanisation processes from a global perspective.

In the 1980s, the former ideological conceptualisation of the First/Second/Third Worlds was being increasingly replaced by differences and non-similarities. While the labels First, Second, and Third Worlds have fallen by the wayside, the idea of third-world modernism continues to be employed. This idea raises questions of identity for third-world architects but rarely for Western architects building in the Third World (Cicchelli et al. 2020, 98). Lu (2010) focuses directly on how the various forms of modernism impacted architecture and design in the Third World between 1945 and the late 1970s to question the legitimacies of different knowledge.
In this sense, Lu attempts to overcome the hegemonic assumption that the West provides the yardstick for all aesthetic and technical issues. Contrary to the orthodoxies of recent architectural history, the key to this unorthodox argument is seeing all modernisms as already local, pointing towards cosmopolitan modernism (Lu 2010, 266). Re-conceptualising and re-narrating architecture and urban planning as assemblages of transnational companies and experts helps us to highlight the existing connections between Third Worldism and trans-cultural architecture in line with the space-based definition of rooted cosmopolitanism (Avermaete 2012, 475). To show the connections, the next part of the research analyses the Middle East Architecture and Urbanism between Socialist and Capitalist values.

**Middle east architecture and urbanism between socialism and capitalism**

Comparing two types of cosmopolitan architecture (socialist and capitalist) during the Cold War period (1950–1991) in third-world contexts would help us to analyse and compare their relative rootedness: the degree to which these urban projects transformed into re-localised phenomena in the process, after their construction. Analysing the socialist model versus the capitalist model of modernisation provides an opportunity to study the current urbanisation processes in the Middle East. Concerning the notion of rooted cosmopolitanism, it is essential to mention that Middle Eastern governments initiated the influx of foreign architecture and planning ideas. So, we are not dealing with a simple top-down and uni-directional planning ‘transfer’ and ‘exportation,’ but also, to some extent, a more complex form of appropriation. The resources offered by the socialist and capitalist countries to Middle Eastern governments did come with social, political, and economic leverage. In the meantime, these resources helped(?) these governments advance their local developments (Stanek 2017). Through different case studies in the Middle East, such as Kabul, Baghdad, and Tehran, this section traces a specific genealogy of cosmopolitanism in urban planning.

In Afghanistan, with the experience of several forms of government, such as monarchy, pro-communist, theocracy, and republic, in the past century, the extent of local participation in the development process still needs to be discovered (Mushkani and Ono 2022, 3). Geopolitics began to play a decisive role in the planning of Kabul after the mid-1950s. During the Sixth Five-Year Plan of 1956–1960, Khrushchev shifted focus from massive industrialisation to massive urbanisation. The Khrushchev Administration deployed its integrated urban planning and development system in the Seventh Five-Year Plan of 1961–1965, both in the USSR and allied countries (Calogero 2011, 73).

From the 1960s to the 1980s, some Middle Eastern governments in Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen sought development aid in the socialist countries of central and Eastern Europe (Guan-Fu 1983). One example of the Socialist transfer of architecture and planning ideas is exporting Soviet Urbanism for the drafting of the development of the 1964 master comprehensive urban development plan of Kabul, which took two years to develop, building upon extensive demographic and spatial
According to Calegero: “The plans for Kabul responded to local conditions, reserving large areas adjacent to the Kabul and Logar rivers as aquifer-recharge zones to maintain a potable urban water supply. However, they were indeed top-down plans for modernist urbanisation. The plans were built on the Soviet ideal that all people deserved the same aggressive programme of modernisation and progress. Furthermore, creating the City of Socialist Man would require integrated, and therefore centralised, coordination” (Calogero 2011, 73).

For Beyer, “the key to Soviet modernisation was the same as French, Danish and West German building companies were proposing such as the prefabricated concrete housing, sanitation, and electrification, only according to Soviet standards and typical projects” (Beyer 2012, 310). Thousands of Afghan staff were trained by and worked with Soviet engineers and foremen. Work on an educational facility was started in 1963 by the Soviet State Design Institute for Higher Learning Institutions.

This facility for construction engineering following the Soviet model was opened in Kabul in 1967, with the Soviet-sponsored and designed campus of the Polytechnic University (Beyer 2012, 310, 329). Through interaction with the Afghan staff and local counterparts, Soviet planners integrated the expertise of both, running their own and observing international competitors’ projects in Kabul—or Cairo, Accra and Jakarta (Beyer 2012, 311). The involvement of Soviet urban planners in Kabul resulted in the introduction of modern housing typologies, public spaces, and facilities on the city scale.

Figure 10.1 Schematic map of Soviet aid to Afghanistan indicating industrial and educational facilities (symbols), gas pipelines, roads, and geological surveys of natural resources (hatching).

Source: Arunova 1964, 197.
In 1964, the municipal elections for selecting the mayor in major cities like Kabul were held for the first time. Apart from a few cases of indirect local Afghan participation in urban development projects, the planning for Kabul has been a state-led phenomenon. The significant difference is the role of various foreign powers, who not only guided urban planning and urbanisation but also led the institution-building process in architecture, urbanism, and education and even influenced methods of governance (Mushkani and Ono 2022, 8).

In the 1960s and 1970s, Iraq was a site for socialist architectural transfers. European socialist countries such as Poland and Romania exported mass housing, urban
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infrastructure, industrial facilities, and large-scale urban developments to the Third World. Stanek (2017) criticised the lack of scholarly attention to the works of Polish architects in Iraq. This record has been concentrated widely on the work of Western architects as the pioneers of European modernism, such as the works of Alvar Aalto, Le Corbusier, Constantinos Doxiadis, Giovanni Ponti, Walter Gropius, and Frank Lloyd Wright in the 1950s (Stanek 2017, 787).

The post-war reconstruction and redevelopment of Eastern European cities such as Warsaw and new towns like Nowa Huta, inspired the urban designs by Miastoprojekt—Polish Urban Planner—manifested throughout its two master plans for Baghdad, in 1967 and 1973, following socialist values (Figure 10.3). In the meantime, the active post-war contributions and engagements of Polish designers like Miastoprojekt to international competitions in Iraq and Syria are other examples of socialist worldmaking (Stanek 2017, 361–362).

The basic methodological principles of socialist architectural exportations are the same for socialist countries, albeit with required adaptations to the local specificities. The Soviet-led concepts often originated according to climatic, geological, and seismic conditions and regional differences as well as historical development. According to Stanek (2021): “Never free of racialised phantasies, paternalistic attitudes and formulaic uses, the concepts of ways of life and national traditions—and the planning practices that referred to them—conveyed a tension between

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**Figure 10.3** Miastoprojekt-Krakow, ‘Master-Plan of Baghdad’, 1967.

*Source:* Miastoprojekt Archive, Krakow, Poland.
the ultimate aim of merging various ethnic groups in the USSR and the carefully controlled promotion of local languages, customs, traditions and Islamic religion” (Stanek 2021, 1583). Eastern European scholars were delegated to newly established planning and research institutions in Iraq and Syria. At these institutions, they worked with local scholars, gathered empirical material, and accessed international literature, which included heterodox Marxists critical of the Soviet Union (Stanek 2021, 1583).

At the same time, as the USA realised that it was being faced with the rapid spread of what was seen as the new threat of Communism, it decided to tackle it by supporting non-communist governments and armed groups fighting against the spread of Communism to their nations. U.S. President Harry S. Truman introduced this new attitude of ‘containing’ Communism within its borders as the ‘Point Four Program’ (Madanipour 1998). During this critical period, major governmental and political plans helped rapidly speed up the recovery of post-world war European countries. The discourses of national identity, memory, and cultural history were familiar topics for architects and planners from Central Europe, who could refer to the state-led post-war reconstruction and the rapid modernisation processes after World War II but also to the preceding experience of architecture participating in nation-building processes after the World War I. In his book Exporting American Architecture, Jeffrey Cody explains how American architects, planners, building contractors, and other actors have marketed American architecture overseas (Cody 2005). In 1947, the U.S. Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, announced that the USA would provide development aid to help the economies of Europe recover and reconstruct their countries, which is widely known as the ‘Marshall Plan’ (formally European Recovery Program). Although this offer was open to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and other Eastern European nations, Stalin rejected it, saying that the aid was politically motivated (Roberts 1994). Consequently, the Marshall Plan reduced the influence and power of Communist parties in Western Europe (Roberts 1994).

Regarding the fact that the network of architecture and planning transfers was based on the geopolitical alliances in non-aligned countries, it is important to note that international institutions like the United Nations and UN-Habitat Program and private philanthropic bodies such as the Ford Foundation played a leading role across the Cold War division. Exporting new planning paradigms and modern architecture to the Third World was a powerful instrument in Cold War politics. For example, the powerful coalition of two parties, the Greek architect and development consultant Constantinos Apostolou Doxiadis and the American Ford Foundation created a global network of architectural exportations. The American Ford Foundation was a private one under the leadership of Paul Hoffman, the former coordinator of the Marshall Plan in Europe (Provoost 2007). His Athens-based firm, Doxiadis Associates (DA), operated in more than 60 countries with significant projects in Iraq, Pakistan, Ghana, Ethiopia, and the United States (Daechsel 2013, 88).

By introducing an engineering system called Ekistics—the science of human settlements—Doxiadis developed the idea of his ‘gridiron cities’ as the leading
exponent of applying modernist planning and design models as an apparatus for democracy according to other contemporary urban designs (Figure 10.4).

In the mid-fifties, the Ford Foundation’s grant to Doxiadis’ planning for Karachi in Pakistan affirmed this close cooperation. Doxiadis proposed a completely new

![Figure 10.4](image-url)

**Figure 10.4** One of the covers of the *Ekistics Magazine* (December 1974), which demonstrates the five elements that constitute *Ekistics*’ definition of human settlements.

*Source: Doxiadis Foundation.*
system based on the idea of a world shaped like a network with an emphasis on technical instrumentation, statistical surveys, and the construction of grids. This kind of planning could ease the way for a Western lifestyle and help third-world countries grow towards Americanised autonomy. The master plan of the University of Aleppo and programmes for Hama, Homs, and Selemiyah are parts of Doxiadis’ significant projects in the Middle East.

The revolutionary modernism in Tehran

Although Iran was never a colony, it was always of significant interest to colonial and imperial forces, which, in turn, manipulated Iran’s political affairs through the ‘indirect rule’ (Mamdani 1996). The project of modernising Tehran was, in fact, a less important issue for spatial planning—which was not even a topic in Iran until the mid-1950s—than it was a concern of national development and preservation goals of a centralising state and hence highly political (Mehan 2022, 35; Mehan and Behzadfar 2018). Starting from 1945, a new stage of modernisation began in Iran, which shows a dramatic transition from a feudal social formation to a capitalist one (Mehan 2016, 2017a). At the end of World War II, and with the rise of the oil venues, a new stage of urbanisation began in Iran, which continued to grow and foster the culture of neoliberal economy and mass consumption (Mehan 2017d, 2019b, 2020).

As a result of the global economy, the modernisation project in Tehran, similar to how it developed in some other Middle Eastern cities such as Cairo or Istanbul, was associated with several changes to the socio-spatial structure of the city (Mehan 2017b, 2017c). During this period, the immediate need for massive construction in Tehran resulted in the development of new planning and design processes. It paved the way for the rapid implementation of urban political projects. As a result, Tehran became the living urban lab for showcasing the modernisation projects within its urban projects, which were associated with several changes to the city’s social, political, and spatial structure. These megaprojects depicted a different future for the city, at odds with the introverted urban form that had characterised it until the beginning of the 20th century. Most urban policies were based on the need to create a significant change in public and private lives and revolutionise Iranian society’s socio-political aspects (Mehan and Mehan 2020). This radical struggle has been reflected in two revolutions and numerous protest movements, which often occur in Tehran and other major cities of Iran (Mehan 2017b, 2017c).

The core concept of ‘Tabula Rasa’ planning as a desire for total renewal and creating a potential site for the construction of utopian dreams is the presupposition of modern architecture (Mehan 2017b). This dominant tendency to create a modern society based on nationalism and modernist values led to the creation of a new image of Tehran, at odds with its pre-existing, introverted urban form. In this sense, Tehran’s ‘Tabula Rasa’ planning strategies emerge from an inherently uprooted ideology of modern cosmopolitan architecture.

John Gurney (1992) interestingly described the city’s introverted urban form as follows: “The city’s traditional social fabric was defined by the Mahalleh
(traditional quarter system), which organised urban space not along class lines but according to ethno-religious divisions, clustering citizens of the same ethnic or religious affiliation, whether rich or poor, within particular quarters” (Gurney 1992, 51–71). The quarter system is defined based on clustering the citizens of the same ethnic background or religious affiliation and tradition rather than social class segregation (which emerged shortly after the urban developments).

The city’s traditional morphological pattern remained unchanged until the first half of the 19th century when the vision of a “modern city” transformed Tehran into an urbanised city. The straight lines inherited from 19th-century urbanism were a great canvas to provide an open city with a centralised political system and administrative bureaucracy for building a modern city. The daily process of the street-widening act enforced by military agents is described as follows: “Every day the red flags are installed, and the mayor agents who are military officers arrive to demolish the houses” (Takmilhomayoun 2000, translation from Farsi by the author). In some cases, the mayor agents arrived to demolish houses even before the house owners had enough time to move their furniture. As a result of these rapid demolitions ordered by the mayor of Tehran, people complained and asked the official parliament representatives and the local authorities to mediate and solve the problem. According to Bayat (2013), “the transformations were also partly inspired by a version of a ‘modern city’ derived from Baron Haussmann, whose ideas spread as the time from Paris to the Middle East and were adopted by Khedive Isma’il (or Isma’il Pasha) in Cairo and Ottoman rulers in Istanbul. However, the social inequality within the various Mahallehs (quarters) persisted and was reinforced by a speculative land market in the early twentieth century” (Bayat 2013, 154–158). The next section will focus specifically on the case of Tehran’s modernisation processes starting from the 1960s.

White bread, white revolution

In the post-war period, the confrontation between the East and the West polarised the dissemination of architecture and planning concepts. The concept of ‘Modernism’ and its adaptations to the conditions of the Third World from capitalist countries introduced the new paradigms of reconstruction and resettlement policies that created new urban identities in these countries. This section will focus on the case of exported and capitalist-inspired modernism in Tehran starting from the second half of the 20th century.

During the early 1960s, the Kennedy Administration urged its allies in the Third World to carry out necessary social reforms (by using aid as leverage) to prevent popular discontent and enhance the dominant ideology of ‘modernism’ (Root 2008, 125). Consequently, beginning in 1961, the king of Iran initiated a series of land reforms and national modernisation projects entitled “White Revolution” or the “Revolution of Shah and People”, which included social, political, and economic reforms. This series of reforms was termed “white” for their implementation without bloodshed. Similarly, the Ford Foundation described its urban planning projects in Third World countries as ‘white bread,’ the innocent, soft bread that everybody likes with
no particular taste (Provoost 2007). In 1968, a significant piece of legislation, the Urban Development and Renewal Act, enabled the municipality to implement Tehran’s Comprehensive Plan (TCP) (Figure 10.5). The planning of the master plan, which was supposed to take Tehran forward by 25 years, was entrusted to Victor Gruen, an American planner and mall-maker. Embracing Frank Lloyd Wright’s garden city idea, Victor Gruen’s Metropolis of Tomorrow centred on the idea of cluster planning, influenced by a linear version of Ebenezer Howard’s Social City with satellite garden cities around the metropolis core (Figure 10.6). Gruen’s desire to restore a sense of community was influenced by Ebenezer Howard, Lewis Mumford, and Jane Jacobs (Wakeman 2016, 254–297). Tehran Comprehensive Plan integrated all the elements of a 1960s American city, such as the separation of functions, highways, suburbs, shopping centres, and housing areas (Madanipour 1998).

Figure 10.5 Master Plan of Tehran, 1968.
Back in 1974, in response to the opportunities posed by increasing oil revenues, the second International Congress of Art and Architecture with the theme of *Enhancing the Quality of Life* was held at Persepolis. The conference brought together internationally known architects and urbanists to review Iran’s

*Figure 10.6* Gruen’s 1964 design of the “cellular city”.

advancement (Mehan 2017a). Some of the well-known and international architects and planners of that time, like Oswald Mathias Ungers, Constantinos A. Doxiadis, Georges Candilis, Balkrishna V. Doshi, Moshe Safdie, Richard Buckminster Fuller, Kenzo Tange, Fumihiko Maki, I. M. Pei, James Stirling, Hans Hollein and many more were invited to Persepolis, the old capital of the Persians, to showcase their new conceptions of Tehran (Theodosis 2015; Madanipour 2010).

Tehran’s master plan envisaged a spatially segregated society that denoted some ideals of bourgeoisie freedom (Figure 10.7). Wakeman (2016) argues that small new town projects in the late 1950s and early 1960s were based on strict social segregation. She added: “Kuy-e Narmak northeast of the capital for middle-income residents, Nazi-Abad for working-class families and the northern garden city of Tehran Pars for the upper classes” (Wakeman 2016, 282). Wakeman clarifies: “critics argued that the plan looked shockingly like Los Angeles, strewn with highways and dominated by development interests. It was put into practice by a combination of American companies and western-minded and European-educated Iranian elites, many of whom (such as Abdol-Aziz Farman-Farmaian) had studied in England or at the Ecole des Beaux-Arts in Paris and also worked in the United States (like Fereydoon Ghaffari)” (Wakeman 2016, 282). The high-rise residential buildings, towers, and mass housing projects became one of the main typologies of the new Master Plan. In 1968, Rahman Golzar and Jordan Gruzen collaborated with Victor Gruen to design the biggest residential complex in the Middle East at the time: Ekbatan Residential Complex on the western edge of Tehran along with the new international Airport of the time—Mehrabad Airport—and the grand-scale

![Figure 10.7 Urban districts proposed by the Tehran Comprehensive Plan (TCP) in 1968. Source: Llewelyn-Davies International 1976, 30.](image-url)
project of Shahyad (now Azadi/freedom) Square as the new gateway of the city. This project manifested the utopian nature of modern architecture, reflecting capitalist values. On 12 December 1978, Shahyad Square, a brand-new showcase square at the western entrance to the city, provided an open space for revolutionaries during the 1978–1979 Islamic revolution (Mehan 2018, 2015).

Through various case studies in the Middle East during the Cold War, this section studied and compared socialist and capitalist architectural and urban exports to create cosmopolitan spaces. The model offered by Socialist countries was state-centred, justice-centred, practical, fast growth, and less technological. The focus of socialist projects was on demonstrating the virtues of Soviet society, such as modesty and equality achieved through practical standardisation methods like prefabrication of housing units (Daechsel 2013, 88). However, the Capitalist model as the project of building new urban formations from scratch was a response to a global discourse of urbanisation that viewed the rapid growth of cities in the emerging Third World both as an inevitable corollary of ‘modernity’ and as a potential threat to the welfare and political stability.

Further discussions and concluding notes

Comparing the global circulation and local applications of exported modernism in third-world countries has allowed us to recognise the production of a rooted cosmopolitanism that brings multiple voices, such as foreign architects, international institutions, governments, and citizens, into the urban development process. The concept of rooted cosmopolitanism can help us acknowledge the diversity of actors and socio-political processes that might be lost in discussions that focus on extreme dichotomies of the local or global. To study the trans-cultural and cosmopolitan spaces, we also need to avoid the traditional extreme boundaries such as global/local, modern/traditional, and east/west. This research suggests thinking about rooted cosmopolitanism conceptual pathways across conventional terrain of north and south, local and global, or west and east. In contrast to eschewing local or global categorisation, the focus here is from a relational, rather than the binary, notion of rooted cosmopolitanism, revealing in many instances the flows of ideas and practices and highlighting how local experiences are also global.

This chapter draws on diverse disciplines and geographies, such as architectural and urban history, to bring together various contextual narrations and the multiplicity of actors. As Steve Basson suggests, architecture is perceived as a continuous and accessible subject of historical knowledge trapped in a linear, chronological order and corresponding organisation of forms. Basson questions the linearity of conventional temporality and invites us to let the multiplicity of time spans and disparate discourses come into play. According to Basson, the totalising vision of convention can be avoided by allowing the multiple encounters, flows of time, and disparate discourses to play in the historical narratives (Basson 2012, 173–175). Moving beyond the socialist and capitalist urban development models, comparing the different cases in Third World modernism shows how cosmopolitanism becomes an empty signifier in both receiving and sending societies. The exported
modernism here is defined as a hybrid culture of local and global, modern and traditional, unique to each country. In this definition, the rootedness and up-rootedness of cosmopolitan spaces become an empty signifier. Followingly, this chapter highlights the complex interplay of various local and global actors and urban agencies. Through analysing the various transnational case studies, this study shows the complex interplay of local and global, theoretical, archival and empirical to ‘de-assemble’ and ‘re-assemble’ the mainstream urban theories and practices. Through the case of exported modernism in Third World countries during the Cold War, this chapter offers a more nuanced understanding of the production of cosmopolitan spaces and flows of thoughts from the global urban north, east, and south by exploring the intersections and multiplicity of cultures, practices, and identities.

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Part 3

Conclusions
Let me approach the main theme of this volume through one of the many case studies presented in its chapters. At the entrance of Adıyaman University (south-central Turkey), an extensive modern complex dedicated to scientific research and teaching, are two massive stone copies of enormous elaborately sculptured stone heads, the originals of which can be found at the nearby ruins of Nemrut Dağı (Lennart Wouter Kruijer and Miguel John Versluys, this volume). Nemrut Dağı is a ‘tomb-sanctuary’. It was probably built around 50 BCE, as a place of worship within the late Hellenistic kingdom of Commagene. Displaying “styles, iconographies and religious concepts” deriving from the “Greek and Hellenistic Mediterranean, Armenia, the Persian world and Rome”, Nemrut Dağı bears witness to a pre-Islamic history of the region. On the basis of its ‘Greek’ characteristics, scholars have often understood Nemrut Dağı as part of a wave of ‘Hellenisation’ that would have changed the Near East from ‘Oriental’ into ‘Greek’. Similarly, and in contradiction, the ruins also figure in competing academic narratives that argue for the indigenous, Anatolian character of the site. The ancient origins of the impressive and elaborate statues attract global tourism, providing the site with a further role in defining the ancient and mixed cultural roots of the region. Although the ruins nowadays lack a formal religious function, they continue to inspire contemporary mysticism, as is evident from their recent emergence in a well-received Netflix series (notably in Turkey) foregrounding the sanctuary’s ancient past. Last, given its pre-Islamic origins, to some, Nemrut Dağı represents nothing less than idolatry. Between the copies of the statues at the driveway of the university, their ancient roots, the appeal of the site to global tourism, and its associations with contemporary mysticism, what does Nemrut Dağı stand for today? How are its distinct significances and interpretations premised on the particular locality, while at the same time embedded in notions that operate at a much higher level of abstraction?

UNESCO has recognised Nemrut Dağı as a World Heritage site. If landscapes, ruins, buildings, and practices become formally designated as heritage, that serves to indicate that as manifestations of a past, they should be sustained in the present, to be kept for the future (Harrison 2010, 5). Sites, objects and events designated as UNESCO World Heritage of outstanding universal value have to explicitly meet

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a large number of criteria. But even with rigorous procedures in place, the appreciation which people have for what is acknowledged as heritage is likely to vary. What may be of great value to some, in a variety of different and differing ways, may, for others, not hold much importance at all. What is heritage that should be safeguarded for the future is necessarily and unavoidably a subjective assessment, which varies across societal categories if not from person to person.

The authors of this volume proceed from the premise that what is heritage, what is identified as valuable, and to be kept, is never a given. They explore how places, objects, and events are valued, as heritage or in myriad other ways. Analysing how people with different backgrounds engage in meaning-making processes can shed light on how they position themselves in a cultural and historical sense. Consequently, the explorations undertaken in this volume towards heritage ‘in situ’ produce valuable insights in terms of identity and historicity. People’s engagement with what to some is heritage (but not necessarily to others) helps to reveal how they locate themselves in terms of loyalties and connectedness, what they draw inspiration from, and hence how they include themselves in certain societal categories and exclude themselves from others.

### Rooting cosmopolitanism

If places, objects and events do not carry intrinsic significances, whether these are considered as heritage or not, by what processes do they obtain these? How do phenomena that are at least in their physical manifestation local, derive significance from being associated with global concepts? Nemrut Daği’s location in European ideas about classical antiquity and the superiority of Ancient Greek civilisation, Anatolian nationalist rhetoric, as well as religious mysticism, depends on the locality fitting in with notions that are undeniably global, such as nationalism or New Age-ism. As global concepts, these attribute significance to phenomena that manifest themselves in the local. At the same time, what is local contributes to the shaping of notions that are at a higher level of abstraction. If Nemrut Daği as a locality can be experienced as Hellenic, the place is conceptually shaped by its being bundled with the idea of the superiority of the ancient Greeks. At the same time, what Nemrut Daği means to people who experience the place in the context of a glorious Hellenistic past, also shapes their understanding of nationalism more generally.

In globalisation theory, the strong interdependency between the local and global resulted in the adoption of the term glocal: concepts and ideas that are globalised, always necessarily manifest themselves in one or another local context, while what is local cannot exist without being given meaning with reference to global processes (Swyngedouw 2004). These processes were captured by Anna Tsing (2000, 2005) in what she called ‘scale-making’. Tsing (2000, 348) identifies “not just the global but also local and regional scales of all sorts”. ‘Scale-making’ for Tsing raises a question such as: “Through what social and material processes and cultural commitments do localities or globalities come, tentatively, into being? How are varied regional geographies made real?” (Tsing 2000, 348). Rather than focusing
on what constitutes a specific level of scale, Tsing thus directs attention to the processes by which ideas, concepts, and practices are being reformulated across a variety of contexts. Such a processual approach allows to “reconcile” the local and the global (Marianna Papastephanou, this volume), but what remains, as pointed out by Anthony Kwame Appiah (2006), is that the global, by its very nature of being at a higher level of abstraction, overarches the local. Given the history of colonialism, and how that continues to shape the inequalities that create today’s world, perceiving the world in terms of the global and the local unavoidably shifts the balance towards the former (the global) as against the latter (the local). Considering that the global can only manifest itself through the local and is overarching, thinking with these two levels perpetuates the conceptual hierarchies which the globalisation debate intended to challenge. Appiah, the authors of this volume argue, proposed to overcome this imbalance by foregrounding the notion of cosmopolitanism instead (Appiah 2006). As Lynn Meskell puts it:

What is appealing about cosmopolitanism is that while the processes of globalisation lay claim to an overarching homogeneity of the planet in economic, political, and cultural spheres, the term cosmopolitanism might be employed as a counter to globalisation from below.

(Meskell 2009, 25)

Cosmopolitanism is radically decentred, and in this respect, it really differs from globalisation.

For Appiah, cosmopolitanism is “centrally concerned with recognising the value of different ways of life and fostering intercultural dialogue” (as phrased by Maciel (Maciel 2014, 74), cited in Miguel John Versluys and Ian Lilley, this volume). Cosmopolitanism serves for the authors of this volume as an inspiration to better understand heritage and identity formation since these are necessarily ‘rooted’. In terms of Mitchell Cohen, who worked with the concept prior to Appiah, “the fashioning of a dialectical concept of rooted cosmopolitanism, which accepts a multiplicity of roots and branches and that rests on the legitimacy of plural loyalties, of standing in many circles, but with common ground” (Cohen 1992, 480) cited in (Meskell 2009, 3). This rootedness is intended to overcome what Sandra Scham (2009, 175) calls the ‘conundrum’ of how to operate across different levels of scale and create room for the exploration of how people’s actions shape and constitute processes of meaning-making in practice.

In this volume rooted cosmopolitanism creates an agenda aimed at identifying trajectories by which heritage is identified, acknowledged, authorised, or challenged. It forms a focus that allows us to proceed from actual experiences, readings, and perceptions, and to analyse how these are being constituted in broader ideational realms. What actors does this involve? How are these actors part of what interest groups? And how do these actors, and the groups they belong to, locate themselves in terms of ideas and affinities? And, most significantly, what role do places, objects and events identified as heritage play in these respects? It is an approach that is actor-centric even if it aims to locate people and the heritage they
create and attribute meaning to within the broader cultural and political spheres that shape them. While rooted cosmopolitanism deals with phenomena that are located, meaning-making processes are inevitably suspended in theories that exceed a given place, event, or locality. These meaning-making processes can not only entail reference to religious ideas and histories and reflect local perceptions of landscape and the entities embedded in it but also encompass geographies that are political, deal with biodiversity and geology, tourism, and so on.

**Empirical and conceptual elaborations**

For each of the authors of the chapters of this volume, the focus on rooted cosmopolitanism results in an engagement with distinct levels of scale. Asma Mehan (this volume) shows how urban design, inspired by either capitalist or socialist modernism, had severe implications for the citizens of the cities in the Near East which were confronted with it, as historical neighbourhoods were often demolished overnight to make way for rigidly modernist housing estates and large squares. While this urban renewal was, in most cases, imposed with little compassion for the residents, Mehan shows that these urban designs have eventually been adopted by the people who came to live with them.

Alternatively, in a process that foregrounds the agency of the local, *pelota mixteca*—a ball game very popular in Mexico—derives its various significances from how it is integrated into broader ideational frameworks (Martin Berger, this volume). Berger explores the multiple and to some degree, contradictory ways in which people attribute meaning to the game. This includes the idea that the game is “of Spanish origin” as well as a pre-Hispanic “ancestral practice” (*una práctica ancestral*), which can, in the given context, seamlessly go together. For the players, the game can also be a modern sport. All these different meanings apart, notably among Mexican immigrants in the United States, it is purely the skill required to play the ball game that acts as an identity marker and therefore has the capacity to effectively create community.

Interpretations of heritage, and the histories associated with these, almost invariably have political connotations. This not only holds for the ball game *pelota mixteca* discussed above but also holds for contemporary interpretations of the past formulated by archaeologists in southwestern Turkey, as explored by Troels Myrup Kristensen, Vinnie Nørskov and Gönül Bozoğlu (this volume). This formulation of pasts involves the creation and dissemination of archaeological knowledge by both foreign and Turkish archaeologists, as well as its reception and utilisation by local non-professionals who have a solid commitment to the region’s history. Their powerful narratives are also being adopted by government representatives of Turkey’s southwestern region, for whom it creates the possibility to claim a cultural space that can compete with the Anatolian heritage, which, so far, has been the main inspiration for Turkish nationalism.

Nationalist narratives are not necessarily able or willing to accommodate the experiences of common people at heritage sites. For Green Island, a former detention centre for political prisoners off the coast of Taiwan, Fang-I-Chu (this volume)
scrutinises the multiple narratives associated with the island and its former detainees. While the state-run memorial centre provides a formal narrative of the terror which the inmates faced, the former detention centre is for numerous visitors also marked by the presence of many ghosts. These ghosts derive from victims of the violence meted out at Green Island. While the ghosts are not acknowledged in the official narrative of the memorial centre, their presence is an essential dimension of the heritage which the island constitutes for many of its visitors.

Expectations that take existing hegemonies into account are also discussed by Ljuben Tevdovski (this volume), who explores how mental templates shaped by what are dominant perspectives of globalisation influence our readings of the past. He asks: “why we are so dismissive of the whole idea of Muslim sailors predating Columbus in the Americas? Or why we are able to imagine a prehistoric migration to these continents, or a Viking landing, but not consider a Muslim one? . . . are we subconsciously ignoring or undermining the great and well documented contributions of Muslims in the development of Medieval and Early Modern cartography and science?” Oversights such as these are, in part, the result of hegemonic cultural perspectives among researchers. For such Eurocentric interpretations of human history and society to lose their dominance, the perspectives of non-Western researchers will need to gain more prominence, Tevdovski rightly concludes.

The epistemological importance which rooted cosmopolitanism can have to adjust the ways in which academic knowledge is typically framed, is also the main issue discussed by Alexander Geurds (this volume). He explores the ways in which it can serve as an inspiration to revise the relationship between interlocutors and researchers. Referring to his own fieldwork experiences in Nicaragua, Geurds argues for a collaborative archaeology, in which knowledge is co-created, to allow truly cosmopolitan relationships to emerge in the context of the research. Such an archaeology of shared exploration necessarily reveals multivocality and can therefore make a significant contribution to the foregrounding of the kind of voices that easily remain unheard.

The theme dealt with by Geurds resonates in the chapter of Miguel John Versluys (this volume), who analyses the importance attributed in popular perception to the contribution of the Romans to the early history of the Netherlands. He considers representations of the Roman era in popular media in the Netherlands and research conducted among Dutch primary school students. In popular perception, he concludes, the imagination of this Roman past is “innocent” and characterised by selective omissions and problematic assumptions. The Roman Empire, uncritically considered as such, can act as a model, an inspiration, and perhaps even serve to legitimise European imperialism.

Resolving the conundrum

The contribution which Rooted Cosmopolitanism, Heritage and the Question of Belonging: Archaeological and Anthropological Perspectives makes is at least twofold. First, at a conceptual level, the volume explores the constitution of abstract inspirations that have a reach that is far beyond the regional. Rather than locating
such inspirations in a global sphere, the contributions to this volume show how, in
given contexts, these can only manifest in relation to specific societal phenomena.
Second, the contributions show how local and regional objects of heritage depend,
for the meanings attributed to them, on their framing in relation to abstract concep-
tual notions.

Foregrounding rooted cosmopolitanism thus creates a focus which necessarily
highlights how heritage manifests in a specific location and how the people who
admire, reject, are indifferent to, or otherwise live with this heritage value and
appreciate it. This connectedness between place and people makes methodological
demands and explains why this volume is located at the intersection of Archaeology
and Anthropology, even though most of the contributors locate themselves either
in Archaeology or Anthropology. While the affinity between these two disciplines
is in a thematic sense more or less self-evident, methodological repertoires tend to
differ (Gosden 1999; Garrow and Yarrow 2010). Where an archaeological perspec-
tive necessarily considers a diachronic perspective, anthropologists can often live
with a much shallower appreciation of time. Anthropologists, on the other hand, are
place-wise in a comparative endeavour. Even if for many anthropologists conduct-
ing research in one’s own cultural context has become the norm, research outcomes
still need to be formulated for a delocalised global readership (although, in prac-
tice, this is typically Western and Anglophone). Adopting rooted cosmopolitanism
as a conceptual framework demands both depth of time and change of place to be
taken into consideration.

Rooted cosmopolitanism also demands the utilisation of methodologies that
are oriented towards the people for whom the various contexts studied are of rel-
evance. As is evident from the contributions to this volume, these always encom-
pass a variety of stakeholders, with a broad range of interests. These interests are
manifest in terms of meanings attributed, interpretations, and the kind of usages
shaping stakeholders’ engagement with a specific heritage location. While surveys
can be used to obtain insights into the opinions of larger groups of people, ideas
about religious or cosmological matters more generally may not be shared so easily
in such a way. Even more so, people may not be able to vocalise, say, what is for
them experiential knowledge. Instead, such knowledge is best researched through
ethnography, which creates room for learning through informal interaction. Such
an approach also allows for the creation of a clear distinction between what people
perceive themselves and the analysis arrived at by the researcher. To do justice
to this multivocality among stakeholders, it is essential to be able to identify and
contextualise grounds for contestation, notably with respect to potentially sensitive
domains such as religion or nationalism. Similar issues are at stake in contexts
where heritage is even more explicitly politicised, as evident from my research on
urban-rural cultural disparities in the uplands of North East India. Also, in this con-
text, ethnography has produced knowledge problematising time and place, produc-
ing crucial insights into the processes of heritage-making figuring in these uplands
(De Maaker 2022).

So, how does a conceptual framework which centres on rooted cosmopolitan-
ism help to arrive at perspectives on heritage as well as belonging that do justice to
the subaltern voices that are so easily denied agency, or altogether overlooked? The rootedness, as an important qualifier of the kind of cosmopolitanism considered, ensures that the approach chosen is place, event, but even more so people-oriented. In operationalising how people relate to places and events it not only reveals the kind of differences in terms of experience and value existing among them but also shows how invariably, and in different ways, they locate themselves vis-à-vis larger conceptual realms, shaped by globalised notions such as nationalism and religion. Given the grounding of the various chapters of this volume in case studies, the contributing authors are able, each in their own way, to reveal how people position themselves in relation to heritage. The authors clarify how people in an everyday engagement with heritage actively engage with the conundrum of how their lives are shaped across different levels of scale. As both a concept and a methodology, rooted cosmopolitanism is excellently suited to bring the processes that thus play out into sharper focus.

Bibliography

The road to anywhere

Rooted cosmopolitanism in the universe

Cornelius Holtorf

The present volume and the concept of “rooted cosmopolitanism” are raising important and timely issues about heritage and belonging at the interface of local human life worlds and global more-than-human responsibilities. In this contribution, I will take the concept of rooted cosmopolitanism one step further and explore human roots from a cosmic perspective.

Initially, it is easy to agree that rooted cosmopolitanism is a concept that is, in various ways, ‘good to think with.’ As Miguel John Versluys and Ian Lilley elaborate in chapter 1 and Lennart Wouter Kruijer and Miguel John Versluys extend in chapter 6, rooted cosmopolitanism combines recognising the significance of local rootedness somewhere with that of global citizenship and a more rhizomatic identity that is part of being human anywhere on Earth. In terms of David Goodhart’s account of The Road to Somewhere (2017), this volume effectively combines the notions of all people belonging somewhere as members of specific socio-cultural groups with that of an increasing number of human beings realising that they effectively can feel at home anywhere on Earth. Whereas the latter, according to Goodhart, are autonomous individuals living fulfilling lives on Earth irrespective of cultural roots and territorial belongings, the former is said to value being locally anchored in time and space and have a strong sense that change means loss. However, according to the concept of rooted cosmopolitanism, all human culture, linked with a particular framework for understanding the past, is “ultimately global” (p. 5) and can, as such, contribute to a framework for understanding the future. Translated into heritage, this means, as Kruijer and Versluys conclude chapter 6 (p. 150), “to take all heritage claims seriously in their own right without violating the fundamental premise that cultures and their heritage, in fact, belong to no one (or everyone) and are always in the making”. That sounds interesting!

Having established these qualities, the issues raised by the book are, however, also ‘good to critique’ for everybody. For one, the notion of rooted cosmopolitanism represents, in effect, yet another form of human cultural essentialism, because it is said to apply globally and subsume all expressions of human heritage. As Marianna Papastephanou (chapter 2, 32) points out, what it means is that we have “merely added to cultural diversity and heritage one additional essential quality, that of being cosmopolitan”. The problem is that, in this view, cosmopolitanism
is always present and not a cultural achievement or a historical choice, and it thus loses some of its value and significance. Secondly, is there really something in all human contexts that transcends the local heritage? As I see it, the presence of some foreign influences alone does not suffice to render a given cultural context cosmopolitan. What we are stuck with, according to Alexander Geurds (chapter 3, p. 43), is “to explore the relations between Global and Local”, but that is probably less innovative than the editors would like to have it. Finally, Troels Myrup Kristensen, Vinnie Nørskov and Gönül Bozoğlu argue in chapter 7 (p. 173) that, locally, heritage is, in fact, not always aiming to include everyone but often only those who share a degree of sameness, thus deliberately excluding others. Consequently, the claim to represent cosmopolitan identities can easily result from a desire to position the local as global and thus of raising a specific cultural profile and heritage in competition with others:

In other words, rooted cosmopolitan perspectives on the past may also be self-serving in some ways, to help affirm identities that are actually about building a sense of pride, even competitiveness, with other places, other pasts and other people—as we also see in claims that ‘culture’ itself was born in one particular place.

This is a thorny issue associated with ‘toxic cosmopolitanism’ but somewhat worrying also for ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ and its larger intellectual viability.

The heritage climate paradox

A lot of these discussions have been raised in relation to cultural heritage for some time. How does local heritage relate to global heritage? Who benefits from particular claims to heritage? And who is excluded by the same claims? However, given climate change, there is a new dimension to these issues now that is truly planetary, even when we are not all agreeing that all culture is “ultimately global”.

Arguably, a Heritage Climate Paradox can be identified that translates our book’s concern with roots and cosmopolitanism to the climate emergency of the day. The Heritage Climate Paradox has two dimensions:

1. It is paradoxical that in contemporary society, archaeological and other cultural heritage often emphasise continuities when humanity, maybe at a larger scale than ever before, faces the need for change and transformation.

Archaeology and heritage are deeply immersed in frameworks of sameness, exemplified by the conservation of objects and by narratives dominated by a sense of human collective identity and specific cultural groups belonging to particular spaces. Cultural heritage often inspires people to appreciate continuities rather than transformations and to think backwards rather than forward—just as humanity is facing (climate) change and the need for transformation of ways of life and livelihoods ahead. Figure 12.1 illustrates the geographical shift of the human temperature niche
on Earth 2020–2070 and hints at some of the changes human beings will be facing to make a living in the same places as previous generations. In light of the first paradox, it may be appropriate to promote a change of thinking for understanding cultural heritage generally. This is not the time to be afraid to experiment but instead, the time to explore how the very notion of heritage could be conserved by placing it in new frameworks that address the need for change and transformation. Rooted cosmopolitanism is certainly a new concept and, in that sense, reflects a change in archaeological and anthropological understanding, but does it really reflect the scale and scope of the kind of transformative change of understanding and working with cultural heritage and the past that may be required today? We may have to take archaeology and heritage far beyond existing frameworks and their limitations.

2. It is paradoxical that archaeological and other heritage is usually managed and interpreted within legal frameworks of governance provided by individual nations when humanity faces global challenges more than ever.
Cultural heritage is often the result of an existing national interest and is not seldom linked to a specific ethnic group. In this way, as this volume illustrates, cultural heritage reifies and promotes distinct cultural identities rather than panhuman solidarity and mutual trust—just as humanity is facing one or arguably several challenges that are inherently global. In light of this second paradox, it seems appropriate to remind ourselves that the most significant and distinct identity of every human being is that as an inhabitant of Planet Earth, in other words, something of a cosmopolitan identity. Arguably, as the world maps of Figure 12.1 illustrate, we all are indigenous Earthlings, belong to the local community of humankind, and feel at home not anywhere but somewhere on our planet within the universe. This does not necessarily mean that we should adopt anthropocentric policies specifying how to be hostile to extraterrestrial immigrants. But it does mean, on the one hand, that “human futures are inextricably bound with larger planetary futures” (Simon 2022, 120) and, on the other hand, that it may be time to focus on placing Earth as a whole into a larger cosmic context, as a specific locality in space, somewhere in the universe. Wherever we live, we are native humans on the planet we inhabit in the universe. And we are increasingly reaching out into the entire Solar System and indeed beyond (Gorman 2014, 2019).

Towards the cosmos

In the second part of this paper, I will take the claim that all culture is “ultimately global” into an even larger context and discuss how humanity’s roots have been portrayed in the cosmos. In this way, I will conduct an extension of perspective from human cosmopolitanism to (much-) more-than-human cosmologies. This seems appropriate for several reasons.

In our Anthropocentric age, various forms of post-human perspectives are increasingly enjoying intellectual currency. It makes sense when Miguel John Versluis points out in Chapter 9 that it is high time to consider the Romans, like any other culture, in the context of “climate, landscape, objectscape, et cetera” (p. 215). In this passage, I am particularly curious what is meant by “et cetera”: insects? bacteria? weeds? fungi? Besides a focus on non-human living beings, we may wish to dwell on mythical and imaginary creatures relating to heritage. As Fang-I-Chu discusses in Chapter 8 (p. 194–196), museums can feature ghost stories and be attentive to the needs of transcendent beings from a haunting past, worshiping ghosts in a religious fashion. Intriguingly, it seems not essential for cultural heritage to refer to human heritage, for it to fulfil functions of heritage in society (Lazar et al. 2006; Hanks 2015).

Often unduly neglected in these contexts is the universal view addressing our planet Earth and its inhabitants from a cosmic and extraterrestrial perspective (Gorman 2019). Today, as several space rockets to Mars are being prepared, the particular future of life on Earth is sometimes questioned and the prospects of humans and many other species are deemed to be bleak. Arguably, this concern is the outcome of extending human attention beyond the ozone layer and towards the effects of the carbon dioxide layer surrounding the narrow zone we inhabit on the surface of Earth. Whereas the former has been restored to protect our planet, the latter is now
expanding to its detriment. Taking the human attention even further, what does the human species do on, and indeed with, its precious planet Earth? How are we to make sense of humanity in relation to space, the universe, and extraterrestrial beings? Asking questions such as these is to engage with the past, present and future of planet Earth as human “self-knowledge”, as Simon put it (2022, 126–127), implying a cosmopolitan perspective from the start.

Mnemofutures

We are well advised to ask about mnemofutures, in other words how Earth, and the human and other species on it, are to be remembered through time and space ahead of the present. The term mnemofutures takes up the idea of mnemohistories introduced by Jan Assmann and later taken up by Miguel John Versluys (see Chapter 9). Mnemofutures offer humanity a framework for understanding the future rather than the past. They ask about prospective memories and legacies, framing the community of living humans as ancestors for future generations. Mnemofutures are not only composed of memories and other foundations of our lives we have inherited from the past and decide to transmit to the future but also of foresight, anticipation and what we end up leaving behind for the human and post-human future. In this sense, mnemofutures are also about heritage futures: the role of heritage in managing the relations between present and future human and indeed non-human societies (Holtorf and Högb erg 2021).

Poorly developed mnemofutures are behind the unimaginative ways in which science-fiction presents future pasts that match what we are used to from the presentation of present pasts. This can be illustrated by a revealing scene portraying future heritage in the mid-22nd century in Christopher Nolan’s science-fiction movie Interstellar (2014). In that scene, the film’s hero and time traveller Joseph Cooper returns decades later to his reconstructed childhood home where the family’s history is now celebrated. Although a familiar place, Cooper encounters interpretive video screens and bollards with red velvet rope cordoning off the original furniture and precious artefacts that must not be touched by ordinary visitors so that they can be preserved intact for a yet more distant future. The cultural heritage on this space station effectively denies Cooper and his contemporaries an original perspective that is meaningful in their present. He asks: “I want to know where we are, where we’re going”, and the heritage remains mute, looks dull, and is expendable as it has not been sufficiently adapted and lacks upgrades when times have changed.

Another—and arguably more sophisticated—way of constructing mnemofutures is by sending messages from Earth and into deep space, possibly initiating, with a self-presentation of humanity, a future conversation with other beings somewhere in the universe. This is an occupation that many people find fascinating and inspiring, resulting in the extensive attention that has been given over the years to the physical messages sent into deep space on the spacecrafts Pioneer 10 and 11 in 1972 (Figure 12.2) and 1973, in the form of a “Golden Record” on Voyager 1 and 2 in 1977, and on New Horizons in 2006 (Quast and Duner forthcoming).
The road to anywhere

Figure 12.2 A modified version of the graphic sent on board of the spacecrafts Pioneer 10 and 11 into deep space in 1972. This version was first published illustrating a paper written in Czech by Pavel Doubrava in the magazine “L + K” (10/87, p. 25). Pioneer 10 and 11 cruise today through outer space at a distance of more than 16 resp. 20 billion km from Earth.

Source: Redrawn by Routledge.

Deep-space messages about human roots

The content of deep-space messages tends to draw in various ways on the human heritage both conceptually and in terms of their content (concerning the Golden Record designed by Jon Lomberg and sent on the Voyager spacecraft (see Sagan et al. 1978; Lomberg 2007). The addition of heritage effectively transforms space and the universe into a cultural field, and it has been doing so since the very beginning of space exploration (May 2020). From the American flag which Neil Armstrong proudly planted on the moon to the astronauts’ incidental footprints, the space junk they left in various orbits, and indeed the carefully crafted messages that were sent to various places in the solar system and into deep space through spacecraft or radio waves, all these objects are left for an anticipated future when other astronauts, human or not, may discover and somehow make sense of them. Perhaps primarily, human heritage in space represents a testimony of our own time on planet Earth (Darrin and O’Leary 2009; Gorman 2019). Arguably, this body of material, if anything, ought to be appreciated for its outstanding universal value.
One of the particular qualities of deep-space messages is the emotions they bring about, not all necessarily positive, and their potential to touch people of very different backgrounds living in diverse present-day contexts. Deep-space messages evoke thoughts about the remote corners and distant futures of the universe, the uniqueness of humanity as such, primary human values and norms, and also the variety of human legacies on Earth. Given the mind-boggling distances in time and space of the universe, deep-space messages transcend what we can know and perhaps even imagine from our specific vantage point on Earth. But at least in part, these messages, which are outwardly directed at other intelligent beings, are also about communication between human beings. When about a decade ago, a new, digital message was planned to be uploaded onto the New Horizons spacecraft, Mark Washburn (2015), who was associated with the project, suggested that “the symbolism inherent in the Message runs in both directions, and it is also very much a Message to Earth . . . [It] will remind us that, for all our differences, we share the same heritage and future on this small and fragile world.” That is why the project chose to call itself the ‘One Earth Message’.

A deep-space message can thus transcend some of the boundaries that are presently dividing humanity. For all their shortcomings, the messages sent by the Pioneer and Voyager spacecraft intended, and to some extent succeeded, in representing a unified portrayal of human (and indeed non-human) life on Earth. The universe can perhaps make us focus in a unique way on the existence of universal human values and indeed human rights. In this way, deep-space messages are messages directed from humanity “to whom it may concern” in the universe but they are also prompting us and our descendants on Earth to reflect on what it means to be human in the universe. Such messages also give answers to the questions of who is speaking for Earth, what they choose to speak about, and how they speak (Figures 12.2 and 12.3). Naturally, there are many possible ways of designing deep-space messages communicating very different messages about us (Holtorf forthcoming).

Figure 12.3 The all-embracing social roots of human beings are addressed in this Pearls Before Swine cartoon by Stephan Pastis with reference to a message to be sent to planet Mars (first published in 2014).

Source: PEARLS BEFORE SWINE © 2014 Stephan Pastis. Reprinted by permission of ANDREWS MCMEEL SYNDICATION. All rights reserved.
The graphic depicted in Figure 12.2 added some small children compared with the original design on board Pioneer 10 and 11. In this way, it adds a commentary on genealogy to the representation of humanity sent into the cosmos—the biological roots of every living generation of human beings. Curiously, this was not considered originally. The question of how humanity is represented and what should be added or better left out, is also taken up in the cartoon in Figure 12.3. In this cartoon, the characters discuss a possible message to planet Mars and what the character Steph comes up with is “I like beer”. Here, the social roots of specific interpretations of the cosmos are being discussed. Historical geniuses such as Shakespeare, Einstein, Plato and Da Vinci represent a high culture version of the human legacy, contrasting with the statement “I like beer”, which matches many people’s actual preferences in life but possibly also reveals their specific social and cultural roots (with their own toxicities).

**Conclusion: taking a one earth perspective**

Rooted cosmopolitanism is an interesting and perhaps timely concept that, among others, raises questions about the various roots of being human and how they have been portrayed for the cosmos (and for ourselves on Earth). Spacefaring tells us a lot about humans on Earth, maybe more than some of what never leaves our shared planet (Gorman 2019). Considering human roots in the cosmos, seemingly never-ending both in time and in space makes us aware of the inevitability of change over time and of the fact that we are all together, native humans on the planet we inhabit in the universe. In that sense, the perspective of cosmic roots of humanity can help resolve the Climate Heritage Paradox and thus help us future-proof the practices and concepts that currently surround cultural heritage. As Jon Lomberg, the designer of the Golden Record on the Voyager spacecraft and leader of the One Earth Message project for New Horizons, stated in the latter context (cited from Washburn 2015),

the most important part of the Project has always been the message to Earth aspect. Literally nothing is more important than raising a planetary consciousness, a planetary perspective, given the global problems we will face in this century.

In the end, I am reminded of the wisdom of past British Prime Minister Theresa May back in 2016 (cited earlier, see p. 4). But her thoughts were muddled up, as she was too preoccupied with Brexit rather than contemplating the destiny of all humanity on Earth. It should be: If you do not believe you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere.

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