Democratization and Memories of Violence

Ethnic minority rights movements in Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador

Mneesha Gellman

Routledge

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Ethnic minority communities make claims for cultural rights from states in different ways depending on how governments include them in policies and practices of accommodation or assimilation. However, institutional explanations don't tell the whole story, as individuals and communities also protest, using emotionally compelling narratives about past wrongs to justify their claims for new rights protections.

Democratization and Memories of Violence: Ethnic minority rights movements in Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador examines how ethnic minority communities use memories of state and paramilitary violence to shame states into cooperating with minority cultural agendas such as the right to mother tongue education. Shaming and claiming is a social movement tactic that binds historic violence to contemporary citizenship. Combining theory with empirics, the book accounts for how democratization shapes citizen experiences of interest representation and how memorialization processes challenge state regimes of forgetting at local, state, and international levels. *Democratization and Memories of Violence* draws on six case studies in Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador to show how memory-based narratives serve as emotionally salient leverage for marginalized communities to facilitate state consideration of minority rights agendas.

This book will be of interest to postgraduates and researchers in comparative politics, development studies, sociology, international studies, peace and conflict studies, and area studies.

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For Matolah and Chayton, who are just beginning.
May they learn and share an appreciation of diversity and
the ways of peace.

"From its main question, to its principal lines of argumentation, to its selection of empirical cases, *Democratization and Memories of Violence* is an important contribution to comparative politics. It demonstrates with uncommon skill how communities across nations and time use the memories of violence to elicit responses from the state and the conditions under which this type of mobilization proves successful."

> – *Omar G. Encarnación, Professor of Political Studies, Bard College, USA*

"Mneesha Gellman's *Democratization and Memories of Violence* brilliantly moves among social movement theory, memory studies, and the strictures of political science to demonstrate how marginalized communities around the world do 'shaming and claiming' so states recognize and at times heeding their demands. In doing so, Gellman herself exercises the best of what students of memory and social movements bring to the table: she gives voice to some of the most voiceless of Mexico, El Salvador and Turkey, she makes visible and absolutely politically relevant those who are conventionally rendered less visible. Gellman's work is instructive for memory and comparative democratization debates across quite distinct global regions."

> – *Katherine Hite, Professor of Political Science, Frederick Ferris Thompson Chair, Vassar College, USA*

"This book is an excellent resource and contributes greatly to ongoing conversations in the humanities and social sciences on social memory, politics of memory, the relation of ethnic minorities to the state, indigeneity and identity formation, social movements, democracy and democratic transitions – and more."

> – *Ellen Moodie, Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA*

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Acknowledgements

I have been trying to hash out the reasoning for inequality for much of my life, since encountering poverty in Mexico as a child traveler and then opening my eyes to it at home in rural California. I don't understand the justification for injustice any better now than I did as a child, as the deep moral sense of wrongness is hard to explain away. But at least, after writing this book, I have a few more answers as to why certain kinds of injustices exist and how communities can challenge them.

Many people have shepherded me through the process of trying to understand the matrix of power that leads to such a contradictory world. At Northwestern, where I indulged in copious reading and travel as a graduate student, Edward Gibson, Will Reno, and Jim Mahoney saw this project through its early stages and introduced me to comparative historical social science methods and the broader scope of my chosen discipline. Graduate fieldwork was made possible by several grants through Northwestern University, especially the Keyman Modern Turkish Studies Program at the Roberta Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies, where Rita Koryan was an ally. The Dispute Resolution Research Center at Northwestern also financed two of my trips to El Salvador, and a Department of State Critical Language Studies award furthered my knowledge of Turkish with a sweltering summer language program in Istanbul. Parts of Chapter 5 originally appeared in a 2013 article in *Democratization*, 20:4, 771–94, which is available online through www.tandfonline.com.

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Abbreviations

AKP	Justice and Development Party/Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
APPO	Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca/Asamblea Popular de Pueblos Oaxaqueños
ARENA	Nationalist Republican Alliance/Alianza Republicana Nacionalista
BDP	Peace and Democracy Party/Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi
CACTUS	Center for Community Support Working Together/Centro de Apoyo Comunitario Trabajando Unidos
CCNIS	National Indigenous Coordinating Committee of El Salvador/Consejo Coordinador Nacional Indígena Del Salvador
CELALI	Center for Indigenous Languages, Art, and Literature/Centro Estatal de Lenguas, Arte y Literatura Indígenas
CGEIB	General Coordination of Intercultural, Bilingual Education/Coordinación General de Educación Intercultural Bilingüe
CHP	Republican People's Party/Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
CISPES	Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador
CMPIO	Coalition of Indigenous Teachers and Promoters of Oaxaca/Coalición de Maestros y Promotores Indígenas de Oaxaca
COCEI	The Coalition of Workers, Peasants, and Students of the Isthmus/Coalición de Obreros Campesinos y Estudiantes del Istmo
CONCULTURA	National Council for Culture and Art/Consejo Nacional de Cultura y Artes
Convergencia	Convergence for Democracy, Citizen Movement/Convergencia por la Democracia, Movimiento Ciudadano
COPULENCA	Council of Lenca and Kakawira Pueblos/Consejo de Pueblos Lencas y Kakawiras

CUP	Committee of Union and Progress/İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti
DA-RT	Data Access and Research Transparency
DBP	Democratic Regions Party/Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi
DEHAP/DTP	Democratic Society Party/Demokratik Toplum Partisi
DDR	disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DGEI	General Directorate for Indigenous Education/ Dirección General de Educación Indígena
ERP	Revolutionary Army of the People/Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo
ESP	The Oppressed People's Socialist Party
EZLN	Zapatista Army of National Liberation/Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional
EU	European Union
FAL	Armed Forces of Liberation/Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion
FARN	Armed Forces of National Resistance/Fuerzas Armadas de la Resistencia Nacional
FLP	Popular Forces of Liberation/Fuerzas Populares de Liberación Farabundo Martí
FMLN	Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front/Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional
GDP	gross domestic product
HAKPAR	Right and Liberties Party/Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi
HDP	People's Democratic Party/Halkların Demokratik Partisi
HEP	Peoples' Labor Party/Halkın Emek Partisi
IACHR	Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
IBE	intercultural bilingual education
IISUABJO	Institute for Sociological Investigation, Autonomous University of Oaxaca "Benito Juárez"/Instituto de Investigaciones Sociológicos, Universidad Autonoma Benito Juarez de Oaxaca
ILO	International Labor Organization
INI	National Indigenist Institute/Instituto Nacional Indigenista
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KADEP	Participatory Democracy Party/Katılımcı Demokrasi Partisi
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
LGBTQ	lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer
Limeddh	Mexican League for the Defense of Human Rights/La Liga Mexicana por la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos A.C.

MASJC	Autonomous Municipality of San Juan Copala/ Municipio Autónomo de San Juan Copala
MINED	Ministry of Education/Ministerio de Educación
MULT	Movement for Triqui Unification and Struggle/ El Movimiento de Unificación y Lucha Triqui
MULTI	Independent Movement for Triqui Unification and Struggle/ El Movimiento de Unificación y Lucha Triqui Independiente
MUPI	The Museum of the Word and the Image/El Museo de la Palabra y el Imágen
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NGO	non-governmental organization
OIT/ILO	International Labor Organization/Organización Internacional de Trabajo
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
OP-ICESCR	Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ORDEN	National Democratic Organization/Organización Democrática Nacionalista
PAN	National Action Party/Partido de Acción Nacional
PAPICA	Program of Support for the Indigenous Peoples of Central America
PCS	Communist Party of El Salvador/El Partido Comunista Salvadoreño
PDC	Christian Democratic Party/Partido Demócrata Cristiano
PNA/PANAL	New Alliance Party/Partido Nueva Alianza
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party/Parti Karkerani Kurdistan
PRD	Party of the Democratic Revolution/Partido Revolucionario Democrático
PRI	Institutional Revolutionary Party/Partido Revolucionario Institucional
PRTC	Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers/ Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos
PT	Labor Party/Partido de Trabajo
PUP	Popular Unity Party/Partido Unidad Popular
RAIS	Rescate Ancestral Indígena Salvadoreño/Salvadoran Indigenous Ancestral Rescue
SEP	Secretariat of Public Education/Secretaría de Educación Pública
SNTE	Mexican National Educational Workers Union/ Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación
SRI	International Red Aid/Socorro Rojo Internacional

UBISORT	Unity for the Social Well-being of the Triqui Region/La Unidad para el Bienestar Social de la Región Triqui
UN	United Nations
UNCERD	United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

1 Why communities shame and claim

Brightly colored posters lined the cobblestone streets of southern Mexico just a few months after the Acteal massacre of December 22, 1997. Glued to telephone poles and concrete walls, the cartoon-like graphics depicted faces of government officials leering over the silhouette of a bloody church. The poster text demanded rights for residents of Acteal, an indigenous Tzotzil village in the highlands of Chiapas, Mexico, and justice for the 45 members who were massacred by paramilitary forces while in a prayer meeting. "If we don't organize, they will wipe us out like they did in Acteal," Chiapan activists responded in 2012 when asked why they had organized a series of workshops on indigenous rights (Anonymous, 2012). The activists' explanations capture how one community includes memories of violence in grassroots mobilization as they try to gain state protection for their rights as minority citizens. Indigenous Chiapan activists, like their Kurdish and Nahua counterparts in Turkey and El Salvador, believe that community organizing is important for physical and cultural survival, implying that well-organized communities stand a better chance of self-preservation in the face of state or paramilitary violence.

In general terms, rights mobilizations are a means to collectively present demands to those authorities that are ostensibly able to make concessions. In the context of this book, I look at rights mobilizations as a unifying tactic employed by marginalized communities to increase the visibility of their claims on the state, thereby shaming states into cooperating with ethnic minority community agendas. "Community" is a notably problematic concept in that it is often invoked as a unified and homogenous actor, when in fact any community may be replete with difference (Wallace, 2010: 805). Some people are invariably included or excluded when employing such a general term (Keywords Project, 2015). Yet, at the same time, it is useful within the comparative political framework of this book to discuss communities as a tangible *something*; in this instance as conglomerates of actors with some degree of shared cultural attributes who have come together to advance their rights agenda. "State" is a similarly problematic term, referring here to the historically embedded institutions operating within a given territory, which is distinct from government, meaning the continually changing set of people

who staff the institutions. In this formulation, a state is also different from a regime, which is a type of political arrangement. State is also distinct from the nation, which assumes a set of shared cultural characteristics. In short, in this book, the state refers to the institutions responsible for managing power and is therefore a target of civil society demands.

My argument is that memories of violence fuel the narratives that drive communities to participate in shaming and claiming rights mobilizations. Shaming and claiming behavior occurs when citizens use grievances like memories of violence to pressure states to cooperate with their agendas for better rights protections. Though this book looks broadly at social movements for cultural rights, I use language rights as a specific component of cultural rights that can be tracked across a series of case studies. Language rights hold a special place in cultural rights because language is an aural indicator of minority status. As such, it is readily apparent to outsiders and is also used as a foundational benchmark of "culture" as a tangible attribute to be preserved or assimilated. A state's commitment to democratic quality can be partially observed through its cultural rights protections. Many ethnic minority communities assert the importance of mother tongues both as powerful organizing tools and as rights claims in and of themselves.

Communities claim the right to mother tongues in diverse ways within cultural rights mobilizations. For example, in Mexico, a portion of the Tzotzil community in Acteal created an alternative to the government-funded primary school because it was not upholding its bilingual education mandate. The alternative school, part of the Zapatista autonomous school system, operates bilingually in Tzotzil and Spanish and refuses government funding or interference. In Turkey, creating alternative schools has been less viable for Kurds because even use and publication of Kurdish languages remains controversial. While some Kurds choose to symbolically use Kurdish in parliamentary ceremonies even though it leads to political persecution, others make billboards, brochures, and pamphlets in Kurdish, determined to see the language remain alive in Turkey.

Through these and other case studies, this book examines ethnic minority mobilizations for cultural rights to garner insight about the constraints and opportunities facing citizens in democratization processes. In particular, I connect memories of violence to contemporary political behavior across six communities in Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador.

How, why, and under what conditions do violence-affected ethnic minority communities mobilize for increased cultural rights? How do marginalized citizens express demands for cultural continuity in democratizing regimes? These queries require an analysis of the post-conflict mobilization repertoires of communities invested in shaming their states as a tool to push for cooperation with new rights agendas. Understanding the contexts in which ethnic minorities mobilize for rights offers insight into what rights mean, when and why rights are seen as useful, and how marginalized citizens

envision themselves engaging with new kinds of rights not previously offered at local, state, or international levels.

To foreshadow my findings, violence-affected ethnic minority communities mobilize to differing degrees through institutional or extra-institutional means. The most mobilized cases employ narratives of violence while the least mobilized communities are prone to forgetting or silencing their own narratives of violence and often assimilate into the dominant culture. The extent of memory-based narrative production is intimately linked to patterns of political, economic, and cultural state accommodation for minorities. However, memory and narrative also deserve recognition as causal factors of political behavior in their own right. In sum, institutions matter in stopping or starting minority rights activism for cultural agendas, but people's feelings, identities, and memories matter too.

This proposed intervention is intimately connected to a larger puzzle for students and scholars of comparative politics: Why are some communities better able than others to resist the homogenizing tendencies of states? While many ethnic minority communities assimilate into cultural practices of the dominant ethnic majority, other communities assert their uniqueness while also claiming mainstream rights of citizenship. There is a spectrum of political behaviors available to citizens as they balance their dual identities as ethnic minorities and civil society members. For the sake of comparative analysis, I categorize the degree of mobilization simply as high, medium, or low across the six case studies. Though many possible paths to mobilization exist, I argue that the degree of mobilization for cultural rights claims is determined by combinations of incorporation policies – or ways that the state includes or excludes minorities from the full rights of citizenship – in relationship with the extent of narrative production about memories of violence that ethnic minorities choose to make public.

Understanding the dynamics of divergent paths to full citizenship for ethnic minorities informs our knowledge of democratizing states and corresponding agendas for multiculturalism. Though some minority communities considered in this book challenge the meaning of multicultural democratic states themselves, I take democratic statehood as the dominant norm and most likely evolutionary status for Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador at the national level. I contend that the outcome of memory-driven ethnic minority mobilization for cultural rights claims is, at its most basic level, significant for understanding democratization processes. While mobilization may not be correlated with an increase in actual rights achieved, ethnic minority communities that visibly mobilize are better positioned to demand more rights than communities that remain silent or only ask for limited rights. I consider the act of mobilizing for claims as a benchmark of robust democratization, independent of whether or not claims are successful. In this way, I frame shaming and claiming as unremarkable but important means for citizen participation in representative governance processes. Discourse about rights is integral to democracy because it is part of deliberation, a process contingent

on freedom of speech and expression. Referring back to the indigenous activist quoted at the beginning of the chapter, unorganized communities risk being eliminated, and communities that forget, or do not harness memories of violence through narrative, are more at risk of being victimized again. Silent communities do not generally get new rights protections and are easier to ignore or exploit. In contrast, communities that remember survive and hold their democratizing states accountable for their survival.

My depiction of the state as a basic unit of analysis has implications for the terminology I use throughout this book, especially the controversial label "ethnic minority," which I employ to delineate a collection of people who share a common cultural and geographic framework, even if there is much internal diversity within a given group. Some Kurds, for example, reject the term minority because in Southeast Turkey they constitute an ethnic majority, and many Kurds aspire to form an ethnic majority Kurdish state. However, from the current vantage point of state-level demography, Kurds can in fact be counted as ethnic minority citizens in Turkey, as well as in other states. Just because minority populations may be locally concentrated to constitute majorities in certain regions does not change their national-level minority status.

Another terminological problem in this book is that the four Latin American case study communities could be solely labeled "indigenous" or "*pueblos originarios*/original peoples," instead of "ethnic minorities." On the one hand, the term "indigenous" can also offend those to whom it refers as it lumps diverse populations and colonial legacies together into a generic term of otherness (Smith, 2012: 6). On the other hand, indigenous has sometimes been employed as a generic term that is capable of including many diverse actors (Smith, 2012: 6). Recognizing these potent critiques, I employ terms like ethnic minority and indigenous for the sake of comprehensibility when referring to different configurations of groups of people. While I use the terms indigenous and originario extensively in the empirical chapters on Mexico and El Salvador, these labels do not transfer to the case studies in Turkey, where Kurds and Armenians are rarely described with such language. As this is a book rooted in comparative political science traditions, I use the term ethnic minority when referring to the case studies in general to make the text more approachable for a comparativist audience, but I give due recognition to critics of its deployment.[1] Whether from the perspective of Brubaker's rewriting of ethnicity as "groupness" (2004: 8–12) or Bhabha's post-structuralist critique of meaning (1994: 50), the concept of ethnic minority as a meaningful identity remains contentious. As May points out, dominant constructivist discourses write off ethnicity and its indicators such as language as strategically manufactured within particular social and political contexts, rather than genuine markers of cultural expression (2008: 20).

Yet my own interests lie not in assessing the authenticity of ethnic identity, but rather in examining the ways in which certain marginalized groups narrate culturally specific memories in rights negotiations with states. I therefore

bypass arguments about ethnic minority labels and discourses as merely constructions of convenience (May, 2008: 20) because I seek to analyze the spectrum of memory-based rights mobilizations regardless of the categorical genuineness of the people doing the mobilizing. In fact, I explicitly put forth the notion that communities are drawing on the minority label strategically as a means to push states to cooperate with international measures for minority protection. As will be discussed in the empirical chapters, especially in the Mexico case studies, by defining themselves as ethnic minorities, communities gain access to rights provisions under international treaties and conventions that they might not otherwise be able to access.

The cases

This book is based on political ethnographic work done over five trips from 2009 to 2013, including more than 150 qualitative interviews and 20 participant observations of meetings and mobilizations across six communities in Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador. In addition, I use comparative historical analysis of secondary sources to supplement data on how ethnic minorities, their allies, analysts, and government officials have framed narratives of violence, and how these narratives are used during mobilizations for cultural rights during democratization processes. The following overview introduces some central concepts and provides local-level, place-based contexts for why a theory of ethnic minority mobilization for cultural claims in democratizing countries is important.

Political mobilization is much more than voting[2] and entails a range of behaviors that call on policymakers to consider new calls for interest representation. I divide mobilization for claim-making into institutional and extra-institutional categories (Garay, 2009: 269), with the former connoting channels of state-legitimized interest representation and the latter as contentious acts that place people in conflict with the state. The first type, institutional claim-making, includes contacting politicians and government agencies, calling on judicial infrastructure, or participating in venues for interest presentation that are state-created (Kapiszewski, 2009: 194). Extra-institutional claim-making often occurs when institutional claim-making fails or is not seen as a realistic means to achieve goals. It is part of contentious politics and does not require that claims be fulfilled in order to generate collective action. Extra-institutional claim-making may be further divided into violent versus non-violent tactics, for example (Almeida, 2008: 223–4). Most of the groups in this book employ a mix of mobilization tactics, with all groups employing institutional claim-making and the majority relying on non-violent means of extra-institutional claim-making to communicate their desire for increased cultural rights. In sum, communities use a variety of tactics to push states to cooperate with their rights agendas.

There are similarities across the cases that initially focused my interest in why communities perform shaming and claiming so differently. All six cases

have been affected by physical forms of state and paramilitary violence, including assassinations, massacres, or genocide. Though the scale of violence differs, case to case, the irreversible loss of life is a weight shared by all. Although the degree of political, economic, and cultural accommodation by the state varies, all six communities make choices about mobilization within the structural constraints of accommodation policies, or practices of inclusion or exclusion, instituted by their states. Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador also each contribute to an understanding about specific dynamics at play in transitional regimes, even though, during the course of my research, Turkey and Mexico have taken autocratic turns. Each of the six communities interact within state constraints and supports as they transform experiences of violence into a discourse of entitlements for cultural rights. At the same time, each community harnesses memories of violence differently. Even if the levels of mobilization have been low in some cases, all six cases have demonstrated *some* interest in retaining cultural rights by shaming and claiming. With varying degrees and techniques, these communities find remarkable means to perform memory publically in ways that inspire public conversations, if not ultimately state cooperation, with their agendas.

Tzotzil community members of the civil society organization Las Abejas in Acteal, Chiapas, Mexico exhibit a high degree of mobilization for cultural rights claims, and their use of narrative about memories of violence in mobilization is similarly high. The massacre of December 22, 1997, in which forty-five people were executed by paramilitaries inside Acteal's Catholic Church, has been commemorated on the twenty-second of nearly every month for the last eighteen years. Though Tzotzils have gained some prominence in local Chiapan politics through their implementation of autonomy provisions, they remain marginalized politically at the national level, living in poverty with few means for upward mobility. While Tzotzils receive token consideration in legal documents, they face ongoing practices of racism and structural violence.

The Triqui community in San Juan Copala, Oaxaca, Mexico has mobilized to a medium degree for cultural rights claims in the face of continued violence from paramilitary groups. More than thirty people have been killed since 2007, when a portion of San Juan Copala residents declared autonomy following Mexico's legal provisions for indigenous communities to choose local leaders in line with traditional customs. The numbers of people killed, wounded, and displaced remains controversial because each side in the conflict has a political motive to modify the numbers. Furthermore, due to rampant impunity, little formal documentation has taken place.

Violence against Triquis persists and the situation remains unresolved as of this writing. In fact, though many of the cases in this book are considered post-conflict, I generally avoid the term because some Triquis, as well as Kurds in Turkey's Southeast, remain in active conflict with state or paramilitary forces. Instead, I use the term "violence-affected," which does not carry a temporal connotation. Both Triqui and Tzotzil ethnic minority

communities in Mexico mobilize for cultural rights claim-making at local and national levels and use memories of violence to justify their sense of entitlements to increased rights. However, Tzotzils in Acteal are more highly mobilized than Triquis from San Juan Copala.

The state-led destruction of Dersim's Kurdish population in 1938 created potent memories of violence that are referred to in contemporary mobilization for cultural rights. In the Alevi Kurdish city of Dersim/Tunceli[3] in Southeast Turkey, between 6,500 and 11,000 Kurds were killed by military forces within the span of a few weeks, with perhaps as many as 50,000 killed in the few years surrounding the massacre of 1938. Incidents of violence against Kurds throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s keep concerns of violence at the forefront of Kurdish discourses about their place as citizens in a democratizing Turkey. In fact, more than 30,000 Kurds have been killed in Turkey since 1984 (Minority Rights Group International, 2011), with thousands more displaced by the civil war between Kurdish separatists and the Turkish military. Now one of the best organized Kurdish communities in the country with respect to mother tongue language initiatives, Dersim's Alevi Kurds strongly invoke memory-based narratives in their highly mobilized cultural rights claim-making.

Armenians in Istanbul, Turkey, by contrast, generally exhibit low narrative production and correspondingly low levels of mobilization for claims. The genocide of 1915 left an indelible mark on Armenian citizens in Turkey that is still being borne out today. Concerns that mobilization for cultural rights claims would bring swift state repression have been passed down to later generations and have had a paralyzing effect. There are worries among Armenians about increasing behaviors of assimilation, especially language loss. Though Turkey grants Armenians the right to enact mother tongue education through their own school systems, Armenians receive minimal support from the Ministry of Education, and Turkish is predominantly the language of young Armenians in Istanbul. Though the assassination of prominent Armenian journalist Hrant Dink briefly created a new forum from which to mobilize for cultural rights claims (Gellman, 2012), silence dominates the interaction between Armenian citizens and the state.

Returning to the Latin American context, in El Salvador, I consider how Nahua people in Izalco, Sonsonate and Lenca people in Guatajiagua, Morazán mobilize in different ways to claim cultural rights. Izalco was the center of a 1932 massacre that targeted indigenous people, killing tens of thousands, and preceded widespread assimilation visible through dress and language. Fear of continued persecution lingers, but today Nahua leaders have moderately mobilized in order to reintegrate the Nahuat language and indigenous cultural values into youth education. Though scholarly interpretation differs on terminology, in this book *Nahua* refers to the ethnicity, while *Nahuat* to the language.

Finally, the Lenca community in Guatajiagua exhibits a low level of mobilization for cultural rights claims. In addition to being targeted during

the 1932 massacre, Lenca people were also harshly affected by the civil war that ravaged Morazán Department, which was traditionally the Lenca region in El Salvador. Though communities such as Guatajiagua are trying to revitalize mother tongue usage, the majority of Lencas have assimilated into the dominant Spanish-speaking *mestizo*, meaning a mixture of Spanish and indigenous paradigms. Lencas tend to maintain private, rather than public, narratives of violence and indigenous ancestry. In both regions of the country, pueblos originarios have experienced the pressure of *mestizaje*, racial mixing, to join the ethnically mixed *mestizo* majority. Many mestizo people may acknowledge indigenous origins but primarily identify as national-level citizens. Regarding terminology in both Latin American cases, many Mexicans and Salvadorans are split between those who want to be called *indígenas* because the label comes with rights and those who want to move away from a legacy of racism by using pueblos originarios. With these debates in mind, I use originarios throughout this book, as well as "indigenous" when avoiding repetition, but follow the word choice of interviewees as often as possible.

Theorizing memory in mobilization

People remember when they have been wronged. Many people remember the grievances of previous generations of their families or communities, but only some people talk about it. Why is it that some memories of violence become salient in politics while other grievances do not? My central hypothesis is that the role of the state as previous anti-democratic perpe-trator of violence influences citizen reactions to the state as a potential cooperative partner in democratization processes. In other words, citizens are suspicious as to whether previous perpetrators have their best interests in mind and proceed with caution when considering mobilization. While the political opportunity of democratization does not fully explain why, when, and how social movements arise (McAdam, 1982: 40–4; Trejo, 2012: 5), such opportunities do offer a basic platform for assurance that citizens may voice their demands, even if such demands are not granted. Therefore, all cases are such that rights claims are occurring within at least minimal conditions of democratization, with relatively free and fair elections, broad suffrage, and some civil liberties protections. Rather, I consider a democratizing state as a special kind of actor being petitioned by mobilized minorities. This framework acknowledges the fragile but as yet undefined new space where institutional and extra-institutional mobilizations take place.

States are unlikely to create ethnic minority rights protections unless such rights are explicitly demanded. In this way, the potential for state cooperation with international rights regimes is contingent on domestic pressure to initiate such cooperation at the local and national level. My argument is that ethnic minority communities are more or less likely to mobilize in order to make

| Scope Condition | Background causes | Mechanism | Outcome |

| Violence against ethnic minority | + | Degree of political accommodation
Degree of economic accommodation
Degree of cultural accommodation | Extent of narrative production | Mobilization for cultural rights claims |

Figure 1.1 Theoretical model of memory mobilization

claims for cultural rights based on the different degrees of political, economic, and cultural accommodation that each community receives from the state, in combination with the communities' ability to articulate their grievances through public narrative. Figure 1.1 provides a reference point for this argument.

On the far left, the scope condition shows that all cases have experienced targeted violence, which may be state violence as well as what I refer to alternately as paramilitary or deep state-perpetrated violence. This condition provides content for the memories of violence that are then potentially harnessed into narratives. In this model, targeted violence creates the presence of grievance that influences the self-perception of the community as having been wronged. A massacre, assassination, or genocide can all be considered reasons for grievances within a given community, and the character of the grievance may inform the community's response to perceived perpetrators.

Moving to the right in Figure 1.1, background causes represent the structural environment in which ethnic minority communities operate when determining what to mobilize for and how to make claims. These include institutionalized policies and practices of inclusion or exclusion, such as accommodations that minorities may receive from the state through political participation, economic integration, or cultural rights protections. Background causes form structural barriers or incentives for communities to make claims on the state and, thus, exert an influence on the outcome through the mechanism of narrative.

Narrative, a technique of public communication that conveys meaningful messages between tellers and audiences, is a powerful tool in creating conditions for the mobilization of communities. Narrative is also the primary means by which memories of violence can be captured and instrumentally used in rights claims. I call this process *shaming and claiming*, and it happens when communities push states to increase rights protections by broadcasting narratives of violence that paint states as undemocratic or in an otherwise unflattering light. Groups that mobilize memory for shaming and claiming frequently encounter resistance from states that do not wish to remember or even acknowledge past state violence, and this resistance can have many repercussions.

Depending on how states accommodate ethnic minority citizens, shaming and claiming may occur to various degrees. Communities will achieve minimal mobilization if potential narratives are prevented from emerging and are only kept privately within communities. Conversely, a strong ability to produce public narrative, in combination with certain structural factors, results in higher degrees of mobilization. In this way, the extent of narrative production about violence-derived grievances extends from policies and practices of minority inclusion or exclusion and influences the high, medium, or low level of mobilization for rights claims that the case studies exhibit. In turn, mobilization can then influence the degree of state accommodation and also the degree of narrative being produced, as represented by the two feedback loops.

Memories of violence form the basis of politically salient public narratives. These narratives serve as the mechanism – the process through which a range of factors relate to an outcome – connecting political, economic, and cultural accommodation to mobilization. Mechanisms are not solely situation-specific; they can operate in similar ways in a variety of contexts (McAdam et al., 2001: 24–5). Narratives are the process through which memories of violence and structural practices of inclusion or exclusion fuse to exhibit a causal influence on mobilization patterns.

While there is no single path to high mobilization, a pattern of moderate exclusion, meaning generally lower levels of accommodation, combined with potent narratives of violence, allows Kurdish and Tzotzil communities to make forceful claims on their states. Similarly, Triqui and Nahua communities that exhibit medium mobilization have low to medium accommodation patterns and moderate degrees of narrative production. Neither purely excluded nor accommodated, these communities do make claims, but they galvanize less of their potential audiences. Armenians and Lencas have mobilized only minimally, with the former group keeping to themselves to avoid losing the privileges they have already gained, and the latter group so highly marginalized that they lack the tools to mobilize.

While the low mobilization cases share some levels of accommodation with communities that exhibit medium or high mobilization, a key difference is that these communities have not been able to translate their grievances into public narratives. In Armenian and Lenca communities, spokespeople maintain private narratives about grievances and sometimes try to make them public, but they do not emphasize these narratives as instrumental parts of their claim-making. Ultimately, accommodation patterns matter in determining the degree of mobilization for cultural rights claim-making, but the ability to transform memories of violence into palatable narratives matters too.

So where is this mobilization actually taking place? Drawing on Collier and Handlin's analysis of the interest arena as non-electoral space where citizens can express their preferences (2009: 8–12), I look to interest arenas as testing grounds where civil society can try to shame and claim. Standard benchmarks for consolidated democracy, and even benchmarks for democracy in general, focus too strongly on electoral outcomes, which many scholars

have critiqued in different ways (Bowman et al., 2005; Caraway, 2004; D. Collier and Levitsky, 1997; De Mesquita et al., 2005; Lijphart, 1968; Munck and Verkuilen, 2002; Paxton, 2000). Moreover, standard democratic transition timelines prioritize the experiences of dominant ethnic majorities who make up the bulk of voting polities, without adequate attention to ethnic inequalities that may still permeate countries at the time of electoral changes of power. Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador meet thinner definitions of democracy because all have had elections in which opposition parties have recently won the presidency, but none have sufficiently cooperated with ethnic minority rights agendas. The interest arena offers a different lens through which to evaluate community mobilization.

My intervention in part looks critically at factors relevant to evaluating the quality of democratizing regimes, especially cultural rights protections for marginalized citizens. During my ethnographic work, interviewees frequently expressed a lack of faith in their states, as well as in an international community that is willing to consider states democratic when minority citizens are still subject to daily indignities. For example, does citizenship in a consolidated democracy include being forced to use the majority language to obtain social services, or being denied the right to educate children in their mother tongue? Interviewees' questions along these lines prompted the inclusion of this angle of argument alongside my initial proposition about memory as a shaming and claiming resource.

Dahl called for the term polyarchy to refer to the imperfect practices of states in reality to avoid confusing them with true democracies (1971: 8). I in turn suggest maintaining the label 'democratizing' for states until they have met the full requirements of civil liberties, including cultural rights in addition to standard procedural democratic benchmarks. Such reasoning is in line with the work of King and Lieberman (2009: 2–4), who question whether the United States should be labeled democratizing rather than democratic prior to the 1960s.[4] Democracy should not be merely a "background condition" for political struggle, but rather can itself be the focus and goal of mobilization (King and Lieberman, 2009: 5). By applying the label "democratizing" to countries such as Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador, I invoke King and Lieberman's dynamic approach to democratization and extend their push for more than electoral benchmarks to be included in regime definitions.

The context of democratization creates unique opportunities for civic behavior patterns of both citizens and the state as they negotiate new social contracts. The definition of a given social contract may be contested or debated as citizens and states work out the institutional arrangements and social norms under which all actors will accept their respective roles. But how citizens go about forging the social contract and advocating for state cooperation with their agendas serves as a means to evaluate democratizing regimes. The rights that ethnic minorities claim also demand special attention as these rights pose problems for traditional liberal conceptions of citizen rights (Kymlicka, 1995: 10–33; Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 370–5), which

tend to see democracy as the rule of the majority that does not necessarily guarantee minority rights.

The following sections elaborate on each piece of the theoretical puzzle in turn. I define central concepts like mobilization as well as who is doing the mobilizing, and I unpack the political, economic, and cultural elements that serve as the structural backdrop for community political engagement. I present narrative formation as a mechanism capable of influencing the degree and type of shaming and claiming that communities undertake, and also consider previous explanations for indigenous and ethnic minority activism. I end with a discussion of political ethnography as a method able to capture the unique contours of each case while also engaging a comparative framework that extends the leverage of place-based observations.

Paths to mobilization

Mobilization for cultural rights claims happens through a variety of paths, either institutionally or extra-institutionally. These two claim-making types serve as defining dimensions of mobilization, and the prominence of these dimensions can be assessed through indicators, or signals, that let us know which kind of claim-making behavior is occurring. Institutional claim-making, for example, is often visible through indicators such as participation in electoral politics and formal negotiation with policymakers – in other words, it is mobilization through institutionally approved channels.

In contrast, extra-institutional claim-making implies just the opposite. A part of contentious political behavior, extra-institutional claim-making is not sanctioned by institutions and uses unconventional and unpermitted (though sometimes tolerated) tactics to make rights claims. Indicators of extra-institutional claim-making include protests conducted without permission from local authorities and other familiar activities from contentious social movements such as illegal strikes, boycotts, road blocks, or sit-ins. Essentially, communities utilize extra-institutional claim-making tactics when they feel that institutional claim-making will not produce results, such as when institutional channels have already been tried and have failed or when no institutional channels are accessible. Boundaries between what constitutes mobilization and what does not can be somewhat fuzzy because there are actions such as voting or non-payment of taxes that may occur for reasons other than mobilization, for example, due to coercion or poverty. But, generally, mobilization appears in different guises and accompanied by a narrative about why it is happening. Table 1.1 summarizes comparative data regarding the amount of narrative produced as well as the extent and type of mobilization across the six case studies.

High narrative production is defined as having vigorous visibility of memory in public, medium narrative production means that there is some invocation of memory in public but the specifics of the grievance may be lost, and low narrative production indicates that there is minimal presence

Table 1.1 Similarities and differences in narrative production and outcome

	Extent of narrative production	*Institutional mobilization*	*Extra-institutional mobilization*	*Outcome: aggregated mobilization*
Tzotzil (Acteal, Mexico)	High	Medium	High	High
Kurd (Dersim, Turkey)	High	High	High	High
Triqui (San Juan Copala, Mexico)	Medium	High	Medium	Medium
Nahua (Izalco, El Salvador)	Medium	Medium	Low	Medium
Armenian (Istanbul, Turkey)	Low	Medium	Low	Low
Lenca (Morazán, El Salvador)	Low	Low	Low	Low

of memory in shaping claims. Mobilization, with institutional and extra-institutional types taken together in aggregated form, can be described as high when the majority of a community uses a broad array of available interest representation tactics. Medium mobilization occurs when a portion of community members uses some tactics but rejects using others, and low mobilization is indicated by a small number of people using only a few tactics. Table 1.1 shows that a mix of institutional and extra-institutional mobilization strategies can lead to similar or different outcomes, while the extent of narrative production is best correlated with the aggregated level of mobilization, regardless of particular tactics.

Accommodations or assimilations

Structural factors strongly influence mobilization as well, and I account for these theoretically by assessing inclusionary or exclusionary policies by states that affect ethnic minorities: I label these factors political, economic, and cultural accommodation, and they are helpful for determining the landscapes of opportunity available to ethnic minority citizens to push states for greater cooperation with cultural rights agendas. Political accommodation refers to the political integration of ethnic minorities, evaluated by the availability of channels for minorities to express their interests to the state.

This refers not only to current institutional channels for claim-making such as parliamentary representation, but also to state policies regarding the political status of minorities.

Political channels for accommodation are a useful venue for comparative work across states because of different institutional designs. For example, Mexico's federal structure, compared to the highly centralized institutions of Turkey and the somewhat centralized institutions of El Salvador, creates very different channels of access to political accommodation across the states. I measure political accommodation by assessing institutional designs that facilitate or inhibit regional autonomy, constitutional provisions for minority rights, and the space for minorities in political decision-making, both inside and outside institutions.

Economic accommodation refers to the level of economic opportunity that each minority community has available and is qualitatively measured to show the perceived economic limitations or opportunities for minorities that may fuel or diminish their mobilization. For the sake of comparative simplicity, economic opportunities are understood as the ability to advance upwardly in class status through increased purchasing power. Though groups such as the Zapatista contingent of Acteal, Chiapas, Mexico may contest that such a capitalist model is in fact part of their pursuit, the ability to move away from the poverty line is integral to economic inclusion for minorities.

Cultural accommodation captures structural constraints on ethnic minority cultural practices, and additionally accounts for state philosophies of multiculturalism. This is measured by focusing on Ministry of Education and Ministry of Culture policies to determine how state-sponsored education and cultural projects facilitate or inhibit the formation of culturally aware and diverse citizens. I also focus on access to mother tongue education for minorities as a benchmark of multicultural tolerance. The table below shows the cases scored on each of the background factors, with low indicating poor state accommodation, medium showing that policies and practices of state accommodation have some progressive and some problematic aspects, and a high score indicating that states have policies and practices that accommodate ethnic minorities without requiring their assimilation. While the cases do not represent every possible typological component, they cover a simplified spectrum of important outcomes.

To summarize, political, economic, and cultural accommodation patterns form the structural constraints or supports that minorities encounter in their mobilizations for cultural rights. In the empirical chapters, I evaluate the background causes to determine if they represent accommodations to promote multiculturalism rather than attempts at state-driven assimilation. My political ethnographic work critically interrogates policies and practices that may appear to promote state accommodation of minorities, but in fact reveal the requirement for a degree of cultural assimilation in order to access a given benefit. This means that constitutional provisions for multiculturalism, for

Table 1.2 Background factor scores for cases

	Federal or centralized institutional design?	Constitutional recognition for ethnic minorities?	Adopted United Nations Declaration on Indigenous People?	Ratified International Labor Organization Convention 169?	State-sanctioned and supported intercultural bilingual education programs?	Local measures taken to protect ethnic minority rights?
Mexico	Federal	Yes, at both federal and state level	Yes, on paper and in limited practice	Yes, signed in 1990	Yes, but implemented with many problems	Yes, federally granted political autonomy, *usos y costumbres*
Turkey	Central	No	Yes, but applies only to some minority groups	No	No, forbidden by Constitution, education is Turkish-only, except for Lausanne minorities	No
El Salvador	Central	Yes, signed in 2012, ratified in 2014	Yes, in 2007, but has not implemented its measures	No	No, Ministry of Education sees population as too small and dispersed to warrant this	No, though Izalco Ordinance, signed April 2012, grants symbolic rights, but no enforcement. No protections in Morazán

example, are insufficient to warrant a case coding of high political accommodation because such provisions have the potential to be ignored in practice. Rather, I assess the degree to which political, economic, and cultural accommodation are both formally decreed and actually implemented and enforced to assure that accommodation is not merely assimilation in disguise.

The memory-narrative matrix

Memories contain the stories that people use to define their lives and play a role in how people make choices about their political and social behavior – in other words, how they choose to tell their stories. Marginalized citizens often hold marginalized memories, and in Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador, memorializations of past violent events within minority communities serve as rallying points for collective identity. In the social psychology literature, memories are described as potentially being "indictments or confessions" that serve as part of identity performance for victims and survivors (Antze and Lambek, 1996: vii).

   This book focuses on public, socially employed memories rather than private or individually held ones. As sociologist Barbara Misztal puts it, "Memory is social because every memory exists through its relation with what has been shared with others: language, symbols, events, and social and cultural contexts" (Misztal, 2003: 11). In the Greek tradition, memory is seen as "the precondition of human thought," operating as both a background subconscious and intentional recollection (Samuel, 2012 [1994]: xx). While memories of violence may form ephemeral qualities of sadness or self-righteousness that characterize specific ethnic minority communities, memories also play tangible roles in assimilation projects and therefore become sites of contention. For example, in textual sites such as history textbooks, certain memories are deemed official and thus play significant roles in childhood identity development and citizenship formation (Ceylan et al., 2004; Tarih Vakfı, 2007). Campaigns to correct these texts have generated forums for debate about the significance of historical memory in multicultural, democratizing states.

   The capacity to remember collectively is integral to identity formation and maintenance because collective memories contain stories that people tell about themselves to situate their lives in relation to the world (see debates in Burgos-Debray, 1983; Connerton, 1989: 22; Kubal, 2008: 167–72; Stoll, 1999). Collective memories can serve as founts of collaboration or conflict between different groups depending on how bound up these memories are with specific versions of truth (Misztal, 2003: 14). Memory scholars link emotionality to memory, as events that foster deep emotions are more likely to draw out evocative and enduring shared memories (Misztal, 2003: 81). Thus, events that bring about less emotive response may fall into obscurity while more potent emotional responses cause memories to "stick" within communities.

Just as citizens can use memories of violence to make cultural rights claims, state leaders may use memories for entirely different purposes, thus flagging the malleability of memory. If official state discourses remain impenetrable, oral histories can create and perpetuate collective memory for marginalized groups (Connerton, 1989: 18). Alternative or subaltern memories mobilized through narratives for shaming and claiming may or may not motivate states to comply with rights demands in an attempt to save their reputations as democratizing regimes. But memory, when translated into public narrative, has the potential to rescue marginalized memories from official policies of forgetting and from informal practices of silencing.

Narratives are the stories that people tell about themselves and others, and are communicated verbally, textually, or visually in ways that make others bear witness to the narrator's situation. Narration is thus a public act compelling social engagement and can emerge, for example, through testimony or collective storytelling. Though private narratives exist and may play powerful roles in the emotional lives of actors, narrative performed publically is necessary for shaming and claiming.

A common form of publically narrating memories of violence is through testimony. Testimonial performance and its related literature have a strong history in Latin America as tools to shame perpetrators and reassert the power of wronged individuals and communities (Jelin, 2003: 68–75). The testimonial genre uses personal narrative to describe political violence and resistance, and such writings give space to voices that often have few other avenues for expression (Lindo-Fuentes et al., 2007: 3). These verbal or textual assertions of lived experience, regardless of the authenticity of each exact detail, have been historically responsible for raising consciousness about human rights violations both domestically and internationally through shaming and claiming. Well known testimonials such as "I, Rigoberta Menchú" (Burgos-Debray, 1983) and "They Won't Take Me Alive" (Alegría, 1987) have brought the power of narrative to the attention of broad audiences, publicizing collective memories of violence while demanding accountability via international response. This form of moralized storytelling can be used to prompt states to cooperate with new "remembering" regimes that entail rights expansion. Misztal tells us, "[i]n testimony, memory is recalled in such a way that others can imagine being there – this imaginative narratization helps them to imagine a true experience" (2003: 119). Power comes not from the actual truth of the memory, but from the communal adherence in the performed version of the public transcript.

Public narratives require an audience beyond the immediate affected community. Individuals and communities must be able to craft narratives that are intriguing or shocking enough to draw in outside listeners. Though this book focuses on public narratives, private narratives may also affect political behavior choices. Private narratives – those that happen only within violence-affected communities themselves – often reinforce a sense of isolation that perpetuates low levels of shaming and claiming. In contrast, public

narratives connect memory to mobilization by creating wider forums in which violence can be remembered and addressed. Such narratives hold moral power that has the potential to prompt action.

My argument in this book is that memories of violence, translated into public narratives, join with political, economic, and cultural accommodation patterns to produce high, medium, or low levels of mobilization to shame states into granting minorities increased cultural rights. For example, when ethnic minorities are excluded from mainstream political, economic, and cultural life in their countries, they frequently feel dissatisfaction, resentment, and anger towards the state and its ethnic majority representatives. Ongoing marginalization exacerbates grievances about previous wrongs. In this scenario, memories of the violence become agentive when such memories are communicated to others. The ability to create narrative comes about regardless of the degree of political, economic, or cultural accommodation with one key exception. If an ethnic minority group experiences high accommodation in all three background factors, the ability to advocate for increased rights is compromised because groups become scared of losing already-gained privileges. Therefore, communities that are better accommodated by states perform lower levels of mobilization than communities that are more marginalized. However, lack of mobilization can also indicate an inability to translate grievance into narrative, as happens when communities are so dramatically silenced or assimilated that they lose the threads of their own collective memories.

People tell many stories about why they make certain choices in mobilizations. While memories of violence may deepen ethnic minority identities, it is the ability to communicate those memories powerfully to others that foments collective action for a specific purpose. If the potential to communicate memories through narratives is not harnessed, however, people may culturally assimilate to secure benefits that might otherwise be unavailable to them. Patterns of high accommodation may hinder the production of public narrative due to fear of losing privileges already gained, though it is possible that highly accommodated communities may also be able to make larger demands because they already have institutional access to the state. Conversely, communities with low degrees of accommodation have less to lose in taking their grievances public, but they also face larger hurdles in gaining recognition of their demands.

Memory protagonists

This book addresses two main types of memory protagonists, rememberers and forgetters. *Rememberers* are direct descendants of victims and survivors of violence, as well as solidarity community members, while *forgetters* constitute the majority of the public and successive government administrations. Forgetters may deliver both informal and official statements denying historic violence, or they may explain away violence as self-defense or intra-ethnic conflict rather than something perpetrated upon them. Both rememberers

and forgetters can be actors within minority communities, the state appara-tus, or both. Also, as will be examined in places such as Mexico, the line between remembering and forgetting can be very thin when considering the ways in which states have tried to include indigenous citizens by assimilating them. Sometimes states may pose as rememberers, a stance deemed more politically acceptable to the international community, through coopting projects that in fact push agendas of forgetting.

In Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador, local minority elites dedicated to advancing the rights of marginalized peoples have significantly contributed to democratization processes. Many of the actors documented in the empirical chapters are a subset of people whom Tarrow has labeled "rooted cosmo-politanists," people who are "rooted in specific national contexts, but who engage in contentious political activities that involve them in transnational networks of contacts and conflicts" (2005: 29). *Rooted cosmopolitanists* may be members of the ethnic majority. For example, rooted cosmopolitanists might include Turks who join with Armenians to form solidarity coalitions and are intellectual elites, academics, journalists, and NGO workers who have access to media, financial resources, and a capacity to frame the issues in ways that resonate with international audiences. Rooted cosmopolitanists may also be members of ethnic minorities who have greater access to resources and often emerge as spokespeople of their movements. These actors may be comparatively better able to frame the discourse of their communities but have only limited ability or interest in connecting their cause to the international community.

Though rooted cosmopolitanists may hold any political persuasion and might help ethnic minority causes for any number of reasons, this book traces the impact of those that reside on the political left, have more exposure to Western and international counterparts than monolingual and domestically educated elites, and are also politically involved in other domestic divisive issues. In Turkey, for example, other divisive issues could include Kurdish autonomy and the debate about religious freedom and headscarves, and in Mexico such topics might include Zapatista autonomy and free versus fair trade. Not only does this subsection of elites know how to capitalize on political opportunities and mobilize resources necessary to stage conferences or publish books, they are often also able to translate their message to a multilingual world. In sum, rooted cosmopolitanists are significant actors both within ethnic minority communities and in the solidarity coalitions that facilitate state cooperation with cultural rights initiatives. Such actors are central protagonists, shaping memory-based narratives and employing them to shame states and claim rights.

Inspirations and previous explanations

This book puts forth the notion that shaming and claiming through narrative can facilitate cooperation between states and ethnic minority citizens.

Memory becomes, therefore, more than a tool to seek justice for past violence, a resource to promote new kinds of rights. The guiding question of this book is: How, why, and under what conditions do violence-affected ethnic minority communities mobilize for increased cultural rights? This question draws on Charles Tilly's *Stories, Identities, and Political Change*, which looks at how stories and identities generate and constrain political change as a fruitful but messy explanation for why social movements develop in some cases but not in others (Tilly, 2002: 208–9). Rather than presenting a crisp causal model of how stories work in political behavior, Tilly asserts the importance of how non-structural, emotively rooted narratives contribute to citizen–state negotiations in democratizing states. Eric Selbin, in *Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance: The Power of Story* (2010) documents how stories are connected to processes of remembering and forgetting. Selbin looks to myths in revolutionary movements to explain how certain narratives become prominent and ultimately catalyze social change. Both Tilly and Selbin proffer convincing evidence for why memory is connected to identities that can be harnessed for political action. My own contribution of multi-level case study data extends Tilly and Selbin's connection between story-based identities and memory-based rights claims.

Doug McAdam's work on the politics of the civil rights movement in the United States looks at why people act collectively; ripe political opportunities, availability of mobilizing structures, and framing processes that draw on the strength of shared identity (1982: ix) are all factors. The first two are classic structural arguments about collective action in the social movements literature, while, through the third, framing processes, McAdam identifies "cognitive liberation" as the glue that binds political opportunities, socio-economic change, and organizational strength to the production of a social movement (McAdam, 1988: 51). What McAdam identifies as liberation is part of what I would characterize as remembering, where people are able to access memories of violence and then transform them into narrative production to overcome the collective action problem.

Mancur Olson's rational choice explanation of behavior is often invoked in political science (1965), but assuming that people are exclusively self-interested actors carries with it a strong orientation towards individualism and dismisses the rich legacy of collectivism found in many communities throughout the Global South. In fact, marginalized, isolated, or insular ethnic minority communities sometimes engage in collective action even when it entails great risk to their individual well-being. Elisabeth Wood's work on El Salvador (2001, 2003) and Jocelyn Viterna's studies of female insurgent mobilization there (2006, 2013) also contribute to discussions of collective action problems using identity-based means. They explain behavior during conflict, whereas I focus on the influence of democratization rather than the confines of an authoritarian regime.

Deborah Yashar addresses how indigeneity becomes salient in aggregated indigenous political participation within states and how states try to co-opt

indigenous actors (2005). My micro-analysis of memory-based narrative complements her national-level argument by looking at the dynamics behind why people mobilize. Similarly, my attention to the grassroots process of memory mobilization compliments Keck and Sikkink's spiral model of human rights, which focuses on changing norms of states and operates at the state and international levels. In other words, this book provides local context and case studies for dynamics that quickly make their way up the chain of political behavior.

Studies of memory in relation to truth commissions, tribunals, and grassroots reconciliation processes have done an excellent job linking remembering and justice, or, more broadly, memory and institutional rights claims (Chheang, 2006; De Greiff, 2006; Fawthrop and Jarvis, 2004; Lambourne, 2004; Marks, 2000; McGrew, 1999–2000; Popkin, 2000; Rae, 2005). These studies tend to argue for either institutionalized justice to ensure that the rule of law is embedded in the post-conflict state (Bull, 2008) or grassroots reconciliation to ensure credibility among local people who have irreparably lost confidence in the state (Breed, 2007; Ingelaere, 2007). To some extent, these literatures constrain citizens to the role of justice-seekers for past violence rather than explaining how people use memories to advocate for future rights.

Area studies literature about memory in political behavior also makes a significant contribution to understanding shaming and claiming processes. Scholarly work on Armenians in Turkey often revolves around the question of how to manifest genocide remembrance (Bilal, 2006) as well as the impact that such remembrance would have on current Armenian rights (Insel, 2009). Debates occupy Turkish media as well as academia about what types of narratives should be permissible in the public sphere. In Mexico, scholarship on Mayan indigeneity provides critical background for specific communities (Nash, 2001; Taylor, 2009; Thompson, 2001). Yet more leverage could be gained for political scientists by focusing comparatively across groups.

Some cases suffer more than others from accurate documentation in the literature, from deliberate distortion of recorded information by Turkish and Oaxacan state officials, to long-term errors embedded in historical sources that have written *originarios* out of El Salvador. For example, only a handful of scholarly works exist (DeLugan, 2012; Gould and Lauria-Santiago, 2008; Héctor Lindo-Fuentes and Ching, 2012; Héctor Lindo-Fuentes et al., 2007; Tilley, 2005) on indigenous people in El Salvador that acknowledge this population in the twenty-first century. Each of these authors has contributed to the roadmap for understanding why communities mobilize, under what circumstances, and how memory is used in shaming and claiming.

The case for political ethnography

Maori academic Linda Tuhiwai Smith writes that "It is surely difficult to discuss *research methodology* and *indigenous peoples* together, in the same breath, without having an analysis of imperialism" (2012: 2 emphasis in original).

Indeed, layers of power were constantly operating in my research process based on my own profile as the *un*rooted cosmopolitan, able to indulgently continent-hop from one materially poor community to the next, conversing in multiple languages, with access to grants and media, but continually an outsider in each of the six communities. Each of my characteristics followed me into "the field," itself a power-laden name for the places in the Global South where Global North scholars go to extract information. As a white Jewish woman and mother, sometimes certain aspects of my profile were to my advantage in building relationships with those I wanted to engage. For example, I frequently breastfed my baby next to nursing Triqui and Tzotzil mothers at their sit-ins and assemblies. This basic human commonality seemed to help women feel more comfortable speaking with me because it highlighted our shared characteristics rather than our differences.

Other times, engaging prestigious politically connected male interviewees, particularly in the early years before motherhood, felt saturated with patriarchy as my legitimacy as a researcher was subtly questioned based on my age and gender. The increased respect I received in these interactions post-motherhood, when I would introduce myself to interviewees and include the fact that I was living in the area with my husband and child, was dramatic. Though beyond the scope of this book, this basic truth has implications for how personal profiles affect a range of qualitative methods in the social sciences. Such truth also relates to Smith's important critique of research in indigenous communities as power-laden. Smith reminds us that power and legacies of imperial relationships are still operating not just in the quality of interaction between researcher and the "researched," but also in methods and methodologies used to obtain data. Though this book does not showcase the deeply consultative framework that Smith considers as best practice, I do two things to address my role as an outside researcher. First, I include a critique of structural inclusion and exclusion within this book's central theory, in an attempt to avoid continuing oppression by theory, as Smith puts it (2012: 39). Second, I engage political ethnography as a method to interweave an analysis of power with narratives from people themselves, using interviewee voices to tell stories in their own words.

Schatz summarizes the contribution of ethnography as: 1) being able to provide information that may cast doubt on previous understandings of a case; 2) broadening our understanding of what constitutes the political; 3) providing the potential to redefine how knowledge about the subject or topic is constructed in the first place; and 4) offering "normative grounding" to political investigations (Schatz, 2009: 11). High degrees of missing or misconstrued information in the existing historical literatures make the community-level cases in Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador ripe for political ethnographic work. By showing up, observing narratives in mobilization, and talking with participants as well as local analysts, I collected an array of insights into why each mobilization was occurring in its particular circumstance. This use of

political ethnography allowed me to distinguish the voices of minority citizens themselves from dominant discourses and literatures and contributes to better documentation and reinsertion of minority experiences into studies of democratization.

It is worth noting that this data collection process may still be perceived as an act of "'taking' indigenous knowledge" (Smith, 2012: 2) even though my intent has been to contribute to awareness-raising about ethnic minority rights claims. The informed consent process served to articulate clear limits to my role, both in terms of what I expected and what I could offer. While elites and academics would sometimes sign the consent letter with barely a glance, especially in rural communities, my asking for a quick signature on a lengthy document – a tool historically used to swindle indigenous people out of their land – placed me within a system of "taking" where I was not at all comfortable, and this dynamic certainly influenced the subsequent conversations. This played out as having my own informed consent letters read back to me slowly, word for word, ruminated upon by interviewees, and discussed with their family and colleagues before people decided whether or not to speak. These power dynamics are too often given short shrift in social science research design yet constitute significant human variability that may determine the kind of data that researchers encounter.

Political ethnography as a method allows for the potential documentation of deep and contextualized first-hand narratives. In connection to the warning about power in fieldwork mentioned above, a problem with qualitative interviewing is the potential to simply be given "memory scripts" from interviewees, prompting a common question, "How do you know if they are telling you the truth?" This is a realistic concern because violence-affected community members may have a sense of what outsiders want to hear, and thus there is the potential for interviewers to be fed pre-packaged scripts about how the community feels rather than accessing any unique insight through the process of interviewing. However, for the purposes of analyzing narrative, the genuineness of the responses is actually less important than the way in which the community itself crafts the discourse. If community members have created memory scripts, it is likely connected to a perceived advantage in presenting themselves in a certain way, and deliberate construction of narrative is valuable data in and of itself.

Crafted narratives may represent the way that communities want to be perceived, rather than how they actually are, but narratives are no less powerful because of this. It may be impossible for outsiders to tell the difference between carefully performed narratives and genuine discourses that Scott calls "hidden transcripts," but documenting narratives contributes to understanding how power operates on discourse (Scott, 1990: 4–5). Public transcripts – or narratives – are crucial indicators of citizenship performance. Though not necessarily the authentic feelings of minorities, narratives show the way that communities publically address grievances. In this vein, gaining the "truth" is not the research objective. Rather, understanding the role of

crafted discourses in power-infused relationships can explain why communities behave in certain ways.

It is widely observed that different storytellers emphasize preferred aspects of a memory in order to make the resulting narratives more in line with their purposes. Renowned memory scholar Paul Connerton distinguishes social memory from historical reconstruction, with the former operating more like narrative with creative license and the latter more involved with an accurate retelling of the past (Connerton, 1989: 13). Connerton places social memory in the camp of the historically flexible, which is to say that social memory may shift in order to be instrumentally useful to those doing the remembering (Connerton, 1989: 3). Invoking this notion of social memory, Elisabeth Wood remarks how memories of political events, regardless of initial accuracy in documentation, are shaped over time through social and cultural lenses that can lead to strategic remembering and forgetting (Wood, 2009: 124). In fact, inaccurate public narratives may serve state or community agendas and therefore actors may manipulate memories of violence to use them for political purposes. Rather than memory for the sake of accurate documentation of an event, Wood corroborates my theory that instrumental memory use can be a tool that people sometimes use in fomenting mobilization (Wood, 2009: 125).

The creation of memory scripts can design a new social reality for groups based on how stories are retold to outsiders. The dominant narrative around memory in a community, regardless of who it is being constructed for, represents a strategy of memory that the community has espoused. I encountered these strategies in literal translation, as my fluent Spanish still required Tzotzil or Triqui speakers to either speak in their second language or have their words translated in Mexico. Though conversational in Turkish, I relied on multilingual interviewees to speak in English, or on graduate student translators in Turkey. These linguistic constraints surely must have shaped the content of information shared with me to some extent. Yet my outsider status and inability to access "real" insider perspectives does not undermine the validity of the narratives. Nearly a year spent across the six communities during 2009–13, including repeat visits, as well as extensive time spent in Mexico before 2009, offered me people's versions of the larger community narrative, scripted or not.

Participant-observation of activist meetings and demonstrations allowed me to witness symbolic performances of memory-based narrative used to facilitate mobilization. Visits to organizational headquarters repeatedly provided visual confirmation of the kinds of symbols that I saw in the streets and the types of stories that interviewees told. For example, at a Communist Party headquarters in Dersim, Turkey, I saw a wall of photographs titled "martyrs" from earlier conflicts between Kurds and the state. This visual representation of violence-based memory and its importance in contemporary activism is mimicked in how interviewees justify their mobilizations. Kurds killed during conflict with the Turkish military are framed as martyrs by

Kurdish political parties and Kurdish civil society members, but as terrorists by the Turkish state. Spending time with various actors in their professional, civic, and personal spaces helped me to better parse the symbols and narratives that people use to illustrate their politics. A diverse political ethnographic toolkit, including site visits, qualitative interviews, and participant observation, was all part of documenting memories of violence in narratives used for shaming and claiming. Even if the narratives used to shame and claim were scripted, they represent the public face of ethnic minority social movements.

Conclusion: shaming and claiming as democratic manifesto

Ethnic minority communities engage in shaming and claiming mobilizations for cultural rights in both institutional and extra-institutional ways and to different degrees. Rather than being driven purely by structural constraints, these mobilizations in Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador are partly facilitated by memories of violence and the way that memories are crafted into public narratives. Evaluating democratic quality through benchmarks such as cultural rights protections highlights how ethnic minorities, as some of the most marginalized citizens in their states, claim rights. Previous measurements of democracy and democratization, as well as classic explanations of collective action, are limited in their ability to capture the experiences of ethnic minorities grappling with past violence even as particular communities try to make their voices heard both domestically and internationally. A potential consequence of this is that, if we look to the experiences of ethnic majorities alone, we may inaccurately grant democratic status to countries that still face grave inequalities among domestic populations. To rectify this, the way that shaming and claiming mobilizations are received by states and either negated or addressed by increased state cooperation with rights agendas can serve as a benchmark of democratic quality.

This book offers a new model for memory-based political behavior. I show that institutional constraints and supports from political, economic, and cultural accommodation policies influence but do not fully explain why and how people decide to shame and claim. As the Chiapan activist at the opening of the chapter made clear, memories of violence fuel efforts to organize communities and mobilize them for self-preservation. There is a tangible understanding in many minority communities that organizing is the key to cultural survival. Narratives facilitate emotional buy-in from participants and can be wielded instrumentally to motivate people to engage in collective action even when risks to personal safety or comfort may be high.

The following chapters create a more complete picture of citizens as vibrant actors in democratizing states. Chapter 2 presents the memory-fueled activism of ethnically Tzotzil Las Abejas members in Acteal, Chiapas, Mexico. Chapter 3 assesses shaming and claiming mobilizations made by Triquis displaced from San Juan Copala, Oaxaca, Mexico. Chapter 4 analyzes the robust rights-claiming of Kurdish communities in Southeast Turkey,

particularly that of Alevi Kurds in Dersim. Chapter 5 considers how Armenian citizens of Turkey engage cultural rights frameworks in Istanbul, with particular attention to the role of mother tongue education as a benchmark of cultural rights. The final empirical cases address the forgotten indigenous populations in El Salvador. Chapters 6 and 7 respectively focus on how Nahua people in Izalco and Lenca people in Morazán are reasserting their rights to be both indigenous and Salvadoran. Lessons from within-country, cross-country, and cross-regional analysis are elucidated in Chapter 8, where I present central differences in shaming and claiming patterns and the structural environments for each case. Chapter 9 summarizes the findings of the book and presents the larger implications for studying cultural rights mobilizations in democratizing regimes.

Notes

1 Bhopal points out that the term "minority ethnic group" is sometimes preferred to "ethnic minority group" but that the two are virtually interchangeable (2004: 441).
2 See Burch (2013: 39) for an elections-focused approach.
3 Dersim is the name of the town in Zazaki, the language spoken by Zaza Alevi Kurds, but the Turkish government renamed the town and province Tunceli in 1935. As I try to follow local labeling vernaculars, I refer to the town as Dersim. See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the renaming.
4 Gilens and Page also document the problematic nature of the label "democracy" in reference to the United States, based on elite capture of policymaking (2014: 577).

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2 Memory, violence, and shaming and claiming in Acteal, Chiapas, Mexico

> There is no "Mexican" – we see distinct forms of being Mexican.
>
> (Miguel Vásquez de la Rosa, 2012, NGO worker)

> The only thing that can guarantee that their [indigenous peoples'] rights are heard, that they are respected, is permanent struggle. And I think that one manner to do it is public denouncement. Public denouncement is a symbolic act that confronts power.
>
> (Marina Jimenez, 2012, human rights worker, Chiapas).

The sun squints around the mountains as the march winds its way along the road towards Acteal. There are young mothers in plastic sandals, grandmothers barefoot, and one young woman with black Converse sneakers peeking out under her hand-woven skirt. It is International Women's Day, March 8, 2012, and women lead the march with chants and songs, hoisting banners, babies, and plastic grocery bags with water bottles and *tamales*, a traditional corn-based pap wrapped in banana leaf. A few hundred Tzotzils and a handful of international solidarity members and observers walk along the same road where fifteen years ago paramilitaries passed on their way to a massacre. Now, Acteal residents call out over bullhorns: "We do not forget, we fight for justice. We will not forget, we want our rights!" Their demands pierce the air as the group passes the garbage dump where dogs paw refuse and then marchers descend steep concrete steps to the open air meeting hall of Acteal. Crosses for each victim of the massacre ring the hall, white designs on green painted wood. In this setting, community leaders pick up the microphone, honor the memory of the people killed in the massacre, and read their communiqué, directed to "all social and political organizations," demanding to live without violence and free to make their own decisions (Las Abejas, 2012). This episode of shaming and claiming draws on potent memories of violence to form mobilizing narratives for a community and shows how the social contract with the state is being renegotiated by indigenous Mexican citizens.

In this and the following chapter, I present shaming and claiming mobilizations in two different *pueblos originarios*, or original peoples' communities

in Mexico. This chapter opens with an overview of ethnic minority–state relations in Mexico, including a discussion of how federalism, constitutional provisions, and *usos y costumbres* – customary uses of indigenous people – have helped or hindered indigenous rights claims processes. I situate the Tzotzil community of Acteal, Chiapas in the theoretical framework and describe political, economic, and cultural accommodation patterns by the state, as well as how mother tongue language use is part of the claiming and shaming process. Acteal is a case of high shaming and claiming, and the chapter shows how narratives based on memories of violence have been powerfully harnessed by cultural rights activists and instrumentally deployed in a range of institutional and contentious rights claims processes against the state.

Mexico's history of minority assimilation

Mexico is considered a democratic country based on electoral benchmarks (Freedom House, 2012; Tuckman, 2012: 16; Wuhs, 2008: 1), most notably the ability of an opposition party to win the presidency, as the National Action Party (PAN) did in 2000 and 2006. Though the Institutional Revolutionary Party's (PRI's) presidential victory in 2012 briefly caused concern that the interruption of PRI rule was a fluke, it is not party politics or procedural democracy measures that have resulted in downward-sliding democracy ratings. Mexico's human security situation[1] calls into question Mexico's status as a consolidated democracy, as the state monopoly on violence is in jeopardy and rule of law remains weak. Freedom House notes the downward trend in Mexico's "free" status, labeling it only "partly free" since 2010 (Freedom House, 2015). The types of criteria and the degree to which states must fulfill such criteria to achieve democratic status continues as an open debate (Boix and Stokes, 2003: 545; Bowman et al., 2005: 940–1; Dahl, 1971: 1–3; Munck and Verkuilen, 2002: 10; Tilly, 2007: 2–11). I put forth the argument that any state lacking a social contract guaranteeing cultural rights, including the right to mother tongue education as well as culturally appropriate self-governance mechanisms for its most marginalized citizens, should be considered *democratizing*, but not yet democratic. In this light, in addition to its omnipresent human security concerns, Mexico should be termed a *democratizing* country based on its treatment of indigenous peoples (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2010; La Liga Mexicana por la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos A.C., 2010; López Bárcenas, 2005; Muñoz, 2005).

Nation-building projects in Mexico have historically attempted to assimilate indigenous people under the guise of projects that accommodate their demands. States often perceive their own programs, such as schools and unions, as accommodating marginalized citizens, when in fact accessing opportunities through these institutions requires assimilationist actions such as using the dominant language or style of dress. In fact, much of Mexico's institutionalization of indigenous rights took place under programs that fused notions of co-optation, assimilation, and accommodation. Rights-claiming has a rich

tradition in Mexican history, but claiming cultural rights as indigenous people, rather than as *campesinos*, or peasants, was more limited until the late twentieth century.

In the late 1930s, Otomí people in Hidalgo were the first to petition the federal government for special schools and an Otomí-speaking teacher who could pass on indigenous customs (Dawson, 2004: 116). Following the First Inter-American Indigenist Conference in 1940, the National Indigenist Institute (INI) was created by President Lázaro Cárdenas and launched by President Miguel Alemán in 1948. Like many processes of state development in post-revolutionary Mexico, institutions were strategic vehicles utilized to integrate and assimilate indigenous people into the Mexican citizenry. INI was the epicenter of *indigenismo*, a collection of discriminatory practices that glorified Indian ancestors while denigrating contemporary indigenous people as backward (Brulotte, 2009: 6; Pye and Jolley, 2011: 7). Cárdenas intended INI to be a tool of "paternalistic advocacy" for indigenous people (Fallaw, 2001: 21), bringing them into the mainstream of Mexican nation identity through economic and social advancement. Though initially dedicated to land reform, traditional land use and governance, and bilingual education, by 1950 the goal became assimilation of indigenous people into Spanish language culture and the national economy (Taylor, 2009: 3–4).

Then-President Vicente Fox closed INI in 2003, but not before the Institute spent a half-century advocating so-called equality by incorporating indigenous people into a homogenous *mestizo* society, meaning a society of people with mixed European and indigenous ancestry. The pursuit of nation-building at the expense of cultural diversity has left a detrimental legacy of forced assimilation in Mexico. The Mexican state chose to make class – and not ethnicity – the salient organizing category through institutional tools such as workers' unions. While assimilationist practices such as unionization in exchange for prioritizing peasant over indigenous identity have sometimes facilitated socio-economic advancement, these practices have not historically included mobilization structures that allow for ethnically based rights claims.

Workers at INI were in line with twentieth-century regional norms of cultural homogenization. As seen in countries such as Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Peru, indigenous cultural rights were often subsumed by the quest for a Marxist triumph of the wage economy proletariat. Though guided by aspirations of improved living conditions for all, some leftist intellectuals and policymakers in fact made the quest for indigenous rights more arduous. Alexander Dawson notes how, through the 1970s, some leftists, out of fear that indigenous issues would take away from working class ones, subsumed ethnic struggles into class struggle and argued that ethnicity was constituted through false consciousness (Dawson, 2004: 137). This dismissive perception of pueblos originarios did not help foster solidarity ties between *indigenistas*, who were a leftist mélange of *ladinos* (social elites of mixed European and indigenous ancestry), *mestizos* (non-indigenous people of various mixed ancestries),[2] and their indigenous counterparts. Essentially, indigenistas

tried to convert indigenous Mexicans into "modern" citizens, by co-opting them into performing as a specific kind of de-ethnicized political actor (Dawson, 2004: xix).

The power dynamics and philosophy of citizenship construction were such that "backwards" indigenous people had to be transformed in order to become acceptable Mexican citizens. This tension is visible in the rise of corporatism in Mexico, when large-scale federations included indigenous people in state-run projects but altered their identity in the process. Yashar describes how resources were made available to rural, indigenous campesinos based on their willingness to identify as peasants and not as indigenous (Yashar, 2005: 61). Corporatist federations attempted to redefine the cleavages where people divided themselves, making occupation and resource access more salient than ethnicity. The agenda was partially successful, and the structure of corporatist peasant federations still exists in Mexico. The state's historic project to render indigeneity invisible reinforces a particular idea of "Mexicanness" that relied on ethnic homogenization and has lingering effects today. Punishment-enforced, Spanish-only classrooms in predominantly indigenous schools were the most common examples of a forced homogenization mechanism cited by interviewees, and this has led to language loss in contemporary indigenous communities. Ethnic minorities draw on these histories of coercive assimilation in their narratives of remembered violence used in shaming and claiming.

After the post-revolutionary 1930s–70s, during which indigenous people were pushed to conform with mestizo visions of citizenship, the tide shifted in the late 1980s and 1990s. In part due to neoliberal economic policies, money for the ruling party's social engineering projects began to dry up (Pye and Jolley, 2011: 7; Taylor, 2009: 7). Regional development centers – a cornerstone of INI's agenda that was meant to integrate isolated communities into non-indigenous economic networks – closed. For indigenous communities, this meant that new spaces emerged in which "cultural production," such as media and literature in indigenous languages, could take place (Taylor, 2009: 7).

However, as in previous eras, cultural production deemed legitimate by mestizo society remained concentrated in urban centers, particularly Mexico City, and self-representation for rural, indigenous people remained a challenge through the end of the twentieth century. Taylor comments that indigenous participation in cultural production continues to rely on intellectual, urban mestizos (2009: 110), a subcategory of the rooted cosmopolitanists described in Chapter 1. Arguably, the role of urban indigenous and non-indigenous intellectuals remains central to the success of social movements in Mexico because they publish stories in the national and international media, thus raising awareness about issues in potential solidarity communities. In a certain sense, these intellectuals are memory-keepers, able to transcribe narratives of violence into written form. Once documented, the narratives can then be dispersed as calls for mobilization throughout wider solidarity communities.

But such actors are also haunted by complaints of authenticity as they try to represent the particular experience of others. Social movements in Oaxaca and Chiapas in the 1990s and 2000s show that pueblos originarios are capable of enormous creative power, but an aura of state and elite paternalism still hangs over Mexican policies for indigenous citizens.

Struggles for representation are also apparent in the specific language choices I make in writing about them. I alternate the term indigenous with *pueblos originarios*, or original peoples, to refer to Mexico's indigenous ethnic minorities. "Originario" was the preferred term among most Oaxacans whom I spoke with, though in Chiapas most people continue to use the term "indígenas." Non-indigenous interviewees often used the term "pueblos originarios" in a two-fold deliberate manner. First, the term made clear their political correctness and interest in solidarity. Second, it distinguished their involvement in "helping" indigenous people from anything that indigenistas had tried to do previously. While "pueblos originarios" is broadly considered a politically correct term, there are other perspectives. For example, one interviewee told me:

> when we say "indigenous communities," it has connotations, it has rights. "Pueblos originarios" is suspicious – the government gives this title, but what are the rights that come with this title? If the "pueblo originario" label gives me subsoil rights, fine, I'll take it, but if it doesn't mean this, why take it? "Pueblos indígenas" have rights to the subsoil.
>
> (Aquino Centeno, 2012)

On the other hand, another interviewee said, "the word 'indigenous' is racist" (Salinas Pedraza, 2012). This perception of "indigenous" is connected to the word "*indio*," meaning indian, or "*indito*" meaning little indian, which nearly always had a derogatory and patronizing implication and was widely used to refer to originarios before the indigenous rights era. There are historically based power relationships bound up in each potential term, and I try to mimic the word choice that interviewees utilized themselves as well as avoid textual repetition.

Institutions, the Constitution, and local governance

For ethnic minorities, federal institutional systems offer the promise of decentralized regional authority. Though Mexico's Constitution lays out the federal structure of government, it is an aspirational document. There are problems in Mexico's federal design (Gibson, 2004; Trejo, 2004), as well as in its federal and state sanctions for political autonomy at the municipal level (Burguete Cal y Mayor, 2000; Maldonado Alvarado, 2002; Muñoz, 2005; Valdivia Dounce, 2010). Federalism can provide the institutional backbone for a national-level democracy, but in Mexico federalism has allowed subnational authoritarianism, meaning local authoritarian control, to flourish

(Gibson, 2005). In the post-revolutionary period, governance was characterized by elite subnational control, with local strongmen supporting federal officials when necessary in exchange for general non-interference with their domains (Dawson, 2004: 158), and this model has persisted to the present day.

In theory, federalism in Mexico provides a promising model of political accommodation for a multicultural citizenry. Yet federal design does not come with implementation and enforcement mechanisms to uphold constitutionally protected rights to regional diversity, usos y costumbres, and indigenous cultural survival. As a large and ethnically mixed country, each state in Mexico faces its own challenges of indigenous accommodation within the confines of regional governance strategies.

In 1992, Article 2 of the Mexican Federal Constitution was updated to include a passage stating that, "The Mexican Nation has a pluricultural composition sustained by indigenous pueblos, those that are descendants of populations living in the country at the beginning of colonization and that conserve their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions, or part of them" (Government of Mexico, 2011 [1917]: 2). However, though Congress approved this textual change, legislators did not create mechanisms to address the collective rights of pueblos originarios (Neil, 1999: 248–9). Furthermore, the supposed consultation with pueblos originarios that INI organized regarding the constitutional revision in fact only included those originarios who would vocally support the government agenda (Neil, 1999: 248–9). Though textually Mexico's Constitution is a solid document of state accommodation, applied examples of these reforms show the problems beneath the surface.[3] Constitutional recognition that Mexico is pluricultural does not automatically include a roadmap to protect diversity within state institutions such as the Secretariat of Public Education (SEP). In general, constitutions are known for aspirational language that is not necessarily borne out in practice. The 2011 version of the Mexican Constitution is based on the 1917 Constitution, which included many rights provisions aspired to in the post-revolutionary environment and which its authors hoped would be achieved in an ambiguous but soon-arriving future (Vargas, 2008).

Beyond the domestic aspirational commitment to rights for pueblos originarios, there is the fact that Mexico signed and ratified Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization (ILO) on Tribal and Indigenous Peoples, which calls for the implementation of safeguards to protect indigenous rights to cultural continuity and consultation on issues that affect their well-being. In fact, Article 4 of Convention 169 states that special measures should be put in place to protect indigenous communities and their customs, and Article 28 describes in detail the importance of indigenous language continuity through education (ILO, 1989). Though Convention 169 calls for consulting pueblos originarios, like constitutions that aspire to protect minorities, Convention 169 does not provide for implementation and enforcement mechanisms, as this would contradict state sovereignty. Rather, Convention 169 keeps its language broad, requiring that consultative processes be

adequate and in good faith (Cruz Rueda, 2008: 10). This is hardly binding language that will create accountability, but because of its broadness it has been palatable to an array of signatories.

Constitutional reform and ratification of documents like Convention 169 show that the Mexican state understands democratic norms expected by the international community. At best, they show that the Mexican state is invested in providing institutional channels to grant pueblos originarios their rights. In fact, Article 4 of the federal Constitution, which provides, among other things, the right to culture and the right to equality before the law for men and women, was reformed to show compliance with Convention 169 (Cruz Rueda, 2012). But these written rights achieve little in the absence of enforcement.

On paper, Mexico demonstrates high political accommodation of indigenous peoples. In practice, violence-enforced maintenance of the status quo continues as a major obstacle to originario political accommodation. Simply put, this is a case of the promise of rights without their actual attainment. For indigenous activists in Acteal, such a scenario lends itself well to a high degree of shaming and claiming. Since the state has shown that it cares enough to inscribe rights on paper, the state can therefore be shamed about the fact that it is out of compliance with its own policies. In this context, memories of past violence become potent resources for advocating for state cooperation with the full spectrum of rights claims. These claims include justice for perpetrators of past violence, as well as forward-looking claims to implement usos y costumbres and other aspects of indigenous autonomy, as well as the right to culturally rooted bilingual education.

Las Abejas of Acteal, Chiapas

Chiapas, with a population of approximately 3.5 million people, including 1 million originarios – mainly Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Tojolobal, Ch'ol, and Zoque groups – is one of the poorest states in Mexico (Eber and Kovic, 2003: 2). Tzotzil has seven known variations of its dialect and is part of the Maya language family, with an estimated 329,937 speakers of Tzotzil concentrated in Chiapas (INALI, 2005a).[4] According to the most recent data available, 28 percent of the total population of self-identified Tzotzils speak only Tzotzil, while the remaining 72 percent also speak Spanish (INALI, 2005b). Chenalhó is a remote highland department and Acteal lies along the twisting mountain road that runs from San Cristóbal de las Casas, the urban center, to Pantelhó.

Tzotzils in Chiapas have many political identities, and political activities vary substantially from one community to the next. Las Abejas are but one of many Tzotzil-comprised civil society organizations practicing innovative shaming and claiming practices. However, as the portion of Acteal residents most targeted in a 1997 massacre by paramilitaries, Las Abejas' mobilization of memory in their claims sets them apart from other indigenous advocacy groups. Las Abejas advocate non-violent resistance and autonomy and are

Figure 2.1 Map of Mexico (Copyright d-maps: www.d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=22291&lang=en. Names and arrows added by author)

Figure 2.2 Map showing locations of Acteal and San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas (Copyright d-maps: www.d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=24531&lang=en. Acteal name and arrows added by author)

closely allied with now-deceased former Bishop Samuel Ruiz's version of liberation theology, a variation of Catholicism that preaches liberation for the oppressed during this lifetime rather than in heaven. Las Abejas formed in 1992 in response to an intra-communal conflict over women's right to inherit property (Kovic, 2003: 63–4; Tavanti, 2003: 4) and are now organized in twenty-nine communities across three Chiapan municipalities of Chenalhó, Pantelhó, and Simojovel (Mesa Directiva de Las Abejas, 2012). Though Las Abejas are not part of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), they have similarly demanded a range of rights and continue to discuss gender hierarchies. Like the EZLN, Las Abejas challenge "traditional" aspects of indigenous culture that conflict with their rights agenda for autonomy and cultural survival. Zapatista women, for example, talk about how good customs that promote cultural preservation should be protected, but bad customs like gender discrimination through forced marriage and domestic violence should be abolished (Eber and Kovic 2003: 10), and this is echoed in Las Abejas discourses.

While many communities have internal divisions, Acteal is a dramatic example of divided allegiances within subnational authoritarian politics. Acteal itself is physically and ideologically segregated divided into three distinct political communities, all ethnically Tzotzil. The Zapatista-aligned portion of the village is based in Acteal Bajo; Las Abejas live in Acteal Central; and Acteal Alto consists of Presbyterian, PRI-voting residents (Tavanti, 2003: 14–16). Documenting the significance of these divisions, sociologist Marco Tavanti reports that the PRI-aligned residents of Chenalhó, the larger department in which Acteal is situated, support the presence of the Mexican Army in their communities, whereas the EZLN and Las Abejas view them as occupiers (2003: 85). The philosophic, religious, and political divisions in Acteal are such that members of one area generally do not enter the area of the other groups, though the main tension sets the PRI-aligned faction against the EZLN and Las Abejas factions.

Divisions exist within Las Abejas as well and, in 2008, they formally split into two groups. The splinter group took the name Las Abejas A.C., with A.C. indicating that it is a non-commercial but government-registered civil organization. Las Abejas A.C. receives government funds and follows a government-led agenda, and the group has used the deliberate confusion between the names of the two groups to speak on behalf of the non-governmental group, as they did, for example, in a 2012 radio broadcast (Mesa Directiva de Las Abejas, 2012). The non-governmental Las Abejas who are the focus of this chapter seek political and cultural autonomy as well as justice for past violence, while Las Abejas A.C. are characterized by the original Las Abejas as social climbers trying to gain government appointments.

A further tension exists in the gendered composition of Las Abejas. Though the organization is no longer exclusively made up of women as it was during its formation, it is generally perceived as an organization of women's empowerment and is linked with other feminist organizations regionally and internationally. However, the current Board of Directors is entirely male, as were all the spokespeople I formally interviewed. I heard informally from several women in the community, as well as from human rights activists in the region, that machismo is still a major problem in both Acteal and Las Abejas (Anonymous, 2012a). At the same time, the public face of Las Abejas is very much empowered and female.

The massacre

As a result of conflict between the EZLN and the Mexican military prior to the 1997 massacre, Acteal contained 325 internally displaced people in the Acteal refugee camp (Fray Bartolome Human Rights Center, 1999: 2), most of whom were Las Abejas members. On December 22, 1997, Public Security Police trucks transported PRI militants, some of whom were identified as belonging to the paramilitary group Mascara Roja, from surrounding communities into Acteal (Fray Bartolome Human Rights Center, 1999: 2–3, 11;

Tavanti, 2003: 10). While members of the Zapatista portion of Acteal quickly escaped, rightly guessing that any armed violence in the area would make them a primary target, some Las Abejas members and their families hid in surrounding ravines, while others were killed attempting to flee or assassinated in the Catholic church. The paramilitaries attacked the community for five hours, eventually killing forty-five people: nine men, fifteen children, and twenty-one women, five of whom were pregnant (Speed, 2003: 47; Tavanti, 2003: 13–14). The massacre was horrifically violent: paramilitaries hacked fetuses out of the wombs of pregnant women and cut off their breasts, and testimonies collected from survivors describe how paramilitaries threw fetuses from machete to machete (cited in Speed, 2003: 52).

The massacre represents a failure of human security and accommodation for indigenous people in several ways. First, the basic promise of the right to life and liberty was suspended by state financing of paramilitaries. Second, the larger indigenous community in Chiapas was (and still is) contained and controlled territorially through military and police checkpoints and paramilitary harassment, a condition that violates freedom of movement and freedom to associate and assemble. Third, the Catholic Church, generally a place of refuge in liberation theology communities, became a site of violent containment that targeted victims based on their religious and political affiliations. These and many other examples of rights violations in Acteal highlight why evaluating the rights of a state's most marginalized citizens is useful in assessing democratic status.

It is difficult to separate paramilitary activity from government decree in the Acteal massacre. Researchers have found evidence that, just a few days prior to the massacre, then President of Mexico Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon and the Justice Ministry approved a counterinsurgency project by the federal army (Marcos and Ponce de Leon, 2001: 143) that may have involved granting greater approval to paramilitaries. Tavanti, who authored an in-depth study of Las Abejas, describes the practice of territorial division of control to contain indigenous people as "low-intensity warfare" that had been promoted by Zedillo and put into action by Julio César Ruiz Ferro, then Governor of Chiapas (Tavanti, 2003: 74). Low-level warfare allows containment of indigenous groups to happen outside of the public eye. When orders are not linked to government policy, there is little accountability or monitoring by media and watchdog groups. Therefore, less traceable low-intensity warfare has become a strategy to repress indigenous people without undermining the state's democratic status.

The first non-PRI governor of Chiapas, Pablo Salazar Mendiguchía, was elected in 2000 through an unprecedented coalition of eight political parties, and initially people hoped he would hold Acteal massacre masterminds accountable and disband paramilitary forces there (Eber and Kovic, 2003: 15). Salazar created the Commission of Reconciliation for Communities in Conflict, which has provided some financial compensation to survivors of violence and tried to facilitate the return of internally displaced people (Eber and

Kovic, 2003: 15), but neither he nor the Commission has dramatically altered the landscape of Chiapas politics. The same is true of his successor, Juan José Sabines Guerrero, who began as a PRI member but was elected by a Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD)-led multi-party coalition. Guerrero has been accused by human rights activists of allowing politically motivated incarceration and forced disappearances to continue in Chiapas (Villamil, 2012).

In July 2012, the PRI reclaimed the governorship with the election of the youngest governor in the country, Manuel Velasco Coello, in partnership with the PRI-aligned Green and New Alliance Parties, and Velasco has not significantly increased state accommodation for Chiapan pueblos originarios. Meanwhile, in 2014, the United States Supreme Court declined to hear the Las Abejas lawsuit brought against Zedillo based on the stance of the US Justice Department that Zedillo's status as President during the massacre granted him immunity, an excuse that has been granted to former heads of state such as Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Mahinda Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka (Bellinger, 2013). In this way, Zedillo continues to elude charges brought against him by Las Abejas even as they have tried to use domestic and international institutional channels to press their claims against the massacre's intellectual authors.

Mexico's state and federal courts have thrown out Las Abejas' cases, but the case remains under review at the Organization of American States' Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Without institutional verdicts, Las Abejas continue to launch their own campaigns for justice, remembrance, and cultural rights. How exactly have Las Abejas transformed traumatic violence into shaming and claiming? The following section addresses the way in which memory becomes useful in pushing the Mexican state to increase its cooperation with the demands of Acteal residents.

Mobilization for shaming and claiming

Acteal is a case study in memory immersion and high shaming and claiming mobilization. The narratives of the December 22, 1997 massacre that Las Abejas reiterate showcase the urgency of protecting pueblo originario rights. The most consistent expressions of memory in Acteal are the monthly commemorative vigils that Las Abejas hold on the twenty-second of every month, as they have done for nearly two decades. In addition, there are numerous static visual testaments to memories of violence within the community: a memorial column to the victims, banners demanding accountability for the massacre, and the church itself where the massacre occurred, still showing an exterior riddled with bullet holes. These basic physical reminders of the massacre in Acteal prompt people to remember it and talk about it. Though there is concern that such heavy memories of violence immortalized in this way can contribute to a victimization of rememberers (Kovic, 2003: 15), Las Abejas have managed to use memories of violence as fuel for mobilization.

Scope Condition	Background causes	Mechanism	Outcome

Targeted violence in 1997 + **Medium** political accommodation / **Low** economic accommodation / **Medium** cultural accommodation → **High** narrative production → **High** mobilization for cultural rights: **Tzotzils in Acteal**

Figure 2.3 Theoretical model of mobilization in Acteal, Chiapas

The model in Figure 2.3 shows the relationship between structural supports and constraints for Tzotzils in Acteal, memories of the massacre, and Las Abejas' rights mobilizations. Rather than casting the process as unidirectional, through the feedback loops, the model captures the way in which dynamic mobilization can reinforce community narratives and also challenge state policies and practices of indigenous (non-)accommodation.

Mobilization occurs in many ways, both institutionally and contentiously. Since the massacre's aftermath, Las Abejas have made institutional rights claims through the courts, trying to charge the perpetrators. After unsuccessfully attempting to get the Chiapan and then the federal courts to hear their case, Las Abejas went international. With ongoing support and representation from the Fray Bartolomé de las Casas Center for Human Rights, based in San Cristóbal de las Casas, Las Abejas brought charges against intellectual and material authors of the massacre to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, where it remains under review.[5] Despite their blocked attempts to use Mexican courts, Las Abejas continue using a range of domestic institutional claim-making tactics. This includes monthly letter-writing campaigns and reports by human rights observers several times a year documenting ongoing harassment in Acteal, which Las Abejas then send to government officials.[6] All of these written documents reference the 1997 massacre and use descriptions of the murders and the effects on community members afterwards to make rights protections appear imperative. This is shaming and claiming in action.

The second form of mobilization includes conventional expressions of contentious politics, including marches and sit-ins, as well as a rejection of government services. Though the PRI-affiliated contingent of Acteal does not participate in these actions, often Acteal's EZLN contingent joins Las Abejas, thus mobilizing a majority of the community. Though Las Abejas distinguish their non-violent commitment from Zapatista-style resistance strategies,[7] this collaboration allows hundreds of community members to share projects and resources. For example, in March 2012, I attended the annual Women's Day march, described in this chapter's opening, from the nearby Zapatista-governed autonomous community of Polhó to Acteal that was colorfully led by Las Abejas flying flags, banners, and group chants and

songs proclaiming the need for increased originario rights. On the march, we passed telephone poles spray-painted with the message, "Don't pay the light," meaning that people should refuse to pay their electricity bills. This was a campaign started by autonomous communities to address state and electric company collaboration to dispossess originarios of lands wanted for Chiapas's hydropower projects. Similar campaigns to not pay water bills have taken root throughout Chiapas's autonomous communities. While the electricity and water bill boycotts can be seen as economic claims responding to low economic accommodation in Acteal, these extra-institutional claims are also in response to exploitation of originario land, something intimately bound to Tzotzil culture. The community refutes the government's right to demand payment because it is not upholding Tzotzil rights to continue their cosmology, which includes land use and stewardship. In this way, asserting indigenous autonomy contributes to the shaming and claiming process.

A unique aspect of Las Abejas' shaming and claiming is their use of locally based creative forums. Though not all of these artistic endeavors are explicitly contentious, many of them are performed outside of state channels while communicating explicit rights claims. For example, in Acteal there is a non-violence-focused youth group, a theater group, and weavers who make and market shawls and other goods with the distinct woven pattern of Las Abejas, which has become a general symbol of resistance in the region. A major artistic endeavor is the Acteal choir, which commemorates the victims of 1997 through song. Though the choir is now nationally recognized and tours throughout Mexico, it is still very much a grassroots endeavor, with lyrics that explicitly shame and claim by critiquing the state's approach to the massacre and subsequent impunity. One lyric states "I cannot be silent, I cannot go on indifferently,"[8] showing the choir song as a vehicle for mobilization where people, especially women, use their voices to demand rights and justice (Coro de Acteal, 2012).

Finally, the Las Abejas website also serves as a venue for shaming and claiming; acteal.blogspot.com has an automatically updating sidebar showing how many days have passed since the massacre. This constant reminder of the violence and impunity accompanies readers through all the tabs of the website, so that articles about grassroots radio, the latest Las Abejas choir performance, or the most recent call to action in solidarity with displaced indigenous people from nearby villages are infused with the weight of the massacre. All these venues show how memorialization of the 1997 massacre plays a highly visible part in shaming and claiming. As justice-demanding endeavors, the artistically channeled claims are contentious, yet not directly confrontational, and are also locally institutionalized. Through the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, petitions, song, weaving, theater, marches and refusal to pay for government services, Las Abejas perform both institutional and contentious mobilization. By relying on narratives infused with memories of violence, Las Abejas shame the state in an attempt to win cooperation with their rights agendas, including both justice for the massacre and future cultural rights protections.

Structural constraints and accommodations

Ethnic identity has only sometimes been the most salient factor in political behavior in Mexico. Similarly, ethnicity is but one of the epistemological layers that compose Las Abejas' identity and inform their political choices (Brewer, 2009; Gossen, 1999: 54; Tavanti, 2003: 209). Scholars such as Trejo have winnowed out different categories of rights demands, stating that "Peasant indigenous dissent is mainly driven by political demands. Almost 60 percent of all publically expressed demands between 1975 and 200 were political, while 30 percent were economic and 10 percent were ethnic" (Trejo, 2004: 361). However, scholarly parsimony cannot always capture the complexity of labeling things like reconfiguration of municipal authority structures, land reform, and indigenous autonomy. An "ethnic demand" for constitutional recognition, for example, is also a political demand, just as the demand for land reform and the demand to change municipal authority can be read as cultural demands. In reality, policies that would appear to be *politically* accommodating, such as the constitutional right to autonomy, also impact the degree of *cultural* autonomy that a community has, and therefore affect cultural rights claims processes. With this caveat in mind, I turn to the policies and practices that constrain and support Las Abejas' shaming and claiming mobilizations: the political, economic, and cultural accommodations offered by the Mexican state.

Though Mexico has achieved democratic status according to electoral benchmarks, ethnic minorities remain politically marginalized. Autonomy scholar Aracely Burguete characterizes the Mexican government as a "pacted democracy," with elites defining the rules of democratization (Burguete Cal y Mayor, 2012). Pacts in democratic transitions generally symbolize compromise between opposite party moderates in order to contain more radical elements on each side and thus can shut out voices that the mainstream deems unsavory (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 61). Regarding participation in Chiapas, Burguete says, "the citizenry does not find spaces to participate; there is no citizen participation in public decision-making, and participatory mechanisms are defined from above by the government" (Burguete Cal y Mayor, 2012). In other words, there is low political accommodation of originario citizens by the state, meaning that rights demands are more likely to be expressed contentiously rather than institutionally.

Trejo documents that, in the late 1980s, more than in any other state, Chiapan indigenous and campesino organizations changed demands from blanket civic and human rights to particular ethnic rights (2004: 374). In contrast, in Oaxaca, political and economic demands were superior to cultural ones in community agendas (Trejo 2004: 376). In 1998, Chiapan legislators passed a law recognizing communal autonomy and giving pueblos originarios the right to implement usos y costumbres, or traditional practices, including for leadership selection, as had occurred in Oaxaca in 1997. In an interview, Burguete related how "here it [usos y costumbres] doesn't mean anything, it

is like telling you you have the right to put on a red shirt [referring to *huipils*, or woven shirts, of *originario* women]" (Burguete Cal y Mayor, 2012). In other words, in practice, *usos y costumbres* grants superficial rights. Though there were supposed to be changes to the Chiapas state Constitution in early 2011 to support indigenous rights and culture, the Governor backed out, fearful of political repercussions (Burguete Cal y Mayor, 2012).

Oaxaca City-based anthropologist Benjamin Maldonado has written about how *originario* life is anchored by communal participation in local political and cultural institutions such as *cargos* (voluntary service work) and assemblies that demonstrate forms of power outside state institutions (Maldonado Alvarado, 2002: 4). Orantes, an anthropologist in San Cristóbal de Las Casas, referred to the culturally inappropriate nature of new political institutions, such as courts with defense attorneys put in place by federal and state governments and institutionalized in pueblos originarios (Orantes García, 2012). He remarked that "these spaces created by the Mexican government seem like Hollywood movies – for example, a space with a judge and witnesses that doesn't have anything to do with the community, with traditions" (Orantes García, 2012). Though some communities may demand the Hollywood court set-up that outside governments have created, many want states to assist their own autonomous management that they have been practicing long before the external legal recognition of *usos y costumbres*.

In Chiapas, the issue of autonomy is close to the surface of any discussion on cultural and political rights. Many pueblos originarios in Chiapas have a well-developed platform for the processes they want as "autonomous political subjects":

> a) the reaffirmation of our cultural identity, the recovery of our territories and the reestablishment of our customs; b) the struggle for the exercise of power, both in the communities, the municipalities and – with broader alliances – in the state government; and c) the desire to be seen as regional subjects, whilst also maintaining a clear sense of belonging to the Mexican nation.
> (Gonzáles Hernández and Quintanar Quintanar, 2000: 196)

Here again, political, economic, and cultural demands are intertwined. Political power within the municipality, through *usos y costumbres*, includes the right to use culturally based practices of leadership rather than political parties to decide authority structures. Finally, the quote above shows the explicit desire for applied federalism. In this instance originarios see Mexico's federalism as an opportunity for political accommodation where they can have regional identity and Mexican citizenship simultaneously.

In theory, federal states should have a larger toolkit than centralized states to address concerns of local citizens because federal arrangements grant greater administrative, financial, and political power to regional politicians. Decentralization allows federal governments to more swiftly disperse power

to the local level, whereas centralized states struggle to accommodate diverse needs through local responses. However, as Falletti shows (2005), it is not just decentralization itself that can empower local leaders, but rather the sequence in which responsibilities are decentralized. She demonstrates how regional governments that receive increased administrative duties from the national government, followed by fiscal and then political duties, will be less effective than regional governments given power in a fiscal, political, and *then* administrative sequence (Falleti, 2005: 332). In fact, Chiapas's decentralization through regional autonomy has happened first fiscally, then administratively, and finally politically, though the uptake of each stage has been riddled with subnational authoritarian control. In Falleti's model, she predicts that such a progression would yield only medium or low changes in the balance of power between levels of government (Falleti, 2005: 332).

One Chiapas scholar reported that fiscal decentralization in Chiapas has been the most successful of the three types, in that municipalities now receive more money than before decentralization, but they do not have the political power to actually use funds in ways that will benefit their communities (Rodríguez Castillo, 2012). Because funds are labeled for particular uses, Chiapan communities are unable to use them for other purposes, even when the original designation does not meet the needs of the community (Rodríguez Castillo, 2012). Such a scenario illustrates the fact that state accommodation requires more than decentralization alone. Federal institutional design does allow more flexibility in accommodating regional needs than centralized states like Turkey and El Salvador, but without political will to make decentralization meaningful, it offers only limited benefits to originarios. As with Convention 169 and constitutional reforms, decentralization in Chiapas suffers from non-enforcement. The lack of political power to enforce democratic changes made through fiscal and administrative decentralization undermines federalism's promise of regional autonomy for indigenous citizens.

While Chiapas is a poor state, there is significant income variation within the state, with rural indigenous people poorer than their urban ladino and mestizo counterparts (Eber and Kovic, 2003: 2; Tavanti, 2003: 48). Economically, Acteal's province of Chenalhó remains one of the most marginalized provinces in Chiapas (Fray Bartolome Human Rights Center, 1999: 10; Tavanti, 2003: 48), placing Las Abejas as some of the poorest of Mexico's poor. This poverty stands in stark contrast to the abundance of resources in the state, particularly in areas traditionally inhabited by indigenous people. For example, 2003 data showed that near Acteal, in the indigenous township of San Pedro Chenalhó, 56.5 percent of homes did not have running water and 78.12 percent of homes lacked electricity – yet Chiapas at the time generated 48 percent of total Mexican electricity from hydro-power, as well as 47 percent of its natural gas (Eber and Kovic, 2003: 36).[9] Long-term economic marginalization of pueblos originarios in Mexico has been a result of policy choice rather than resource availability. Land rights remain the central economic concern for indigenous communities like Acteal, and lack

of access to traditional lands is a major factor in indigenous impoverishment (Tavanti, 2003: 48–9). Even as many Mexicans move into middle class life-styles, indigenous communities like Acteal remain trapped as recipients rather than creators of policies that govern their daily lives. Las Abejas challenge this status quo, for example, through their public communiqués that combine cultural and economic rights demands with calls for justice for human rights violations. In sum, frameworks such as federalism, decentralization, and constitutional protections are inadequate to protect minority rights without tools for implementation and enforcement.

Accommodating cultural difference through bilingual education

Language is a central marker of cultural identity (Blot, 2003: 18; Pale Pech, 2012), and for originarios in Chiapas it is a key indicator of cultural accommodation by the state. Many scholars recognize that the homogenization of language through public education, media, and government offices serves nationalist projects that prioritize the ethnic majority (Anderson, 1991: ch. 5–6; Gellner and Breuilly, 2008: xxiv–xxx; Hobsbawm, 1990: 96). Trejo (2012: 76) uses indigenous language retention as a way to account for cultural survival and indigenous autonomy in his statistical model in recognition of an intricate link between language and identity.

   I look to Tzotzil language rights as a useful measurement of cultural accommodation for Las Abejas in Acteal because Tzotzil is used both in the process of shaming and claiming and as a claim itself. Tzotzil constitutes the basis of nearly all communication in Acteal, with translations into Spanish only when outsiders are present and in written communiqués intended for wide national and international audiences. Enrique Pérez López, the director of the State Center for Indigenous Languages, Art, and Literature (CELALI) in Chiapas, described how "for us, our languages play an important role in conflict resolution, in daily communication, in the forms of thinking about and understanding our world" (Pérez López, 2012).

   Language is also an intimate conveyor of intergenerational and intra-communal memory. Therefore, the persistence of Tzotzil usage in Acteal can be seen as positively contributing to the formation of narrative-based memory there. In fact, Las Abejas claims for justice in Acteal are part of self-preservation in the face of state homogenization efforts. As Blot observes in Mexico, the binding of the Spanish language to notions of "progress" for indigenous people continues today in the same trajectory as it did in colonial and nineteenth-century times (Blot, 2003: 15). Thus, despite recent structural accommodation policies for indigenous people, the legacy of Mexican nation-building is very much wrapped up in non-accommodation of cultural deviance from Mexicanness. Maldonado expounds that the rights of pueblos originarios were subsumed by the project "to become the Mexican nation under monocultural criteria that each State should correspond to a nation and each nation to a State" (Maldonado Alvarado, 2002: 8). Though not

unique to Mexico, this fusing of nationness to stateness poses serious problems for democratization as a process that fully includes pueblos originarios.

Though now indigenous languages are gaining recognition in Mexico and in international solidarity communities as being vital to cultural expression, these languages have been oppressed in Mexico for generations (Maldonado Alvarado, 2010: 13; Meyer and Soberanes Bojórquez, 2010; Vázquez Álvarez, 2012). The General Directorate for Indigenous Education (DGEI), created in 1978–9, grew out of a new indigenism taking place in Mexico at the time, where multiculturalism was beginning to be recognized as an asset (López, 2009: 14). The 1992 reform of the Mexican Constitution that acknowledges the multicultural make-up of the country grew out of this momentum. In 1997, the Mexican state solidified its approach to bilingual, intercultural education with the creation of the General Coordination of Intercultural, Bilingual Education (CGEIB) in 2001. DGEI has the mission of ensuring that minority languages are not abandoned as a result of Spanish language dominance in schools, while CGEIB seeks to make intercultural education available to *all* Mexican students, not only indigenous ones. However, these institutions are tempered by ongoing racism and underlying commitment to nation-building through homogenization, as seen through poorly designed bilingual education policies that result in monolingual school instruction.

Many factors impede implementation of federal and state laws that require bilingual, intercultural education. In practice, CGEIB and DGEI are under the authority of the SEP in Mexico, which is monitored by the Mexican National Educational Workers Union (SNTE), a powerful and controversial actor in Mexican politics.[10] At both federal and state levels, SNTE and SEP have failed in commitments to improve education for originarios and have been central players in the party politics that fostered subnational authoritarian control in many places. The union is not logistically prepared to deliver bilingual, intercultural education because of inadequate training, materials, and assessments of such programs, nor is its tenure system designed to match new indigenous educators with communities where their same indigenous language is spoken. For example, though in theory any teacher can train to teach bilingual, intercultural education, in practice, only indigenous students follow this path, leading to a ghettoization of bilingual, intercultural teacher-training programs. Chiapas and Oaxaca each do have special colleges for bilingual, intercultural teachers to complete their teaching degrees, but, because of SNTE's tenure system, which gives the newest teachers the least input into where they are placed, there is no guarantee or even real probability that graduates will be sent to communities that match their linguistic skills. Also, there is minimal development of an intercultural curriculum because of increasing pressures on teachers to prepare students for standardized assessment tests. Reflecting complaints in the United States after the implementation of No Child Left Behind legislation that teachers are just "teaching to the test," standardized tests in Mexico relegate intercultural education to the status of extracurricular luxury rather than cultural

imperative. In addition, Mexico's history of discrimination against indigenous people makes students and their families reluctant to push their claim to culturally sensitive education. Finally, continuing trends of migration and tourism make English proficiency more economically beneficial and prized than indigenous language use.

The role of SNTE in promoting language rights came up frequently in my interviews. Tuxtla Gutiérrez-based scholar Fernando Lara Piña stated that "language rights are also the right to education, the right to health, and to a dignified life" (Lara Piña, 2012). As in Oaxaca, real bilingual education is more promise than product in Chiapas. Leticia Pons Bonal, an expert on indigenous education in Chiapas, was critical of SEP programs in bilingual, intercultural education:

> as a model, they have tried to impose it ... there are study plans, the discourse does exist. But the teachers go to places where they don't speak the same language. When indigenous students come to us here in the university we ask them how their education was, if they went to a bilingual, intercultural school, and they say, "yes we went, but the teachers didn't speak the language." The teacher's union keeps thinking about indigenous communities as the same, as if they were all equal.
>
> (Pons Bonal, 2012)

Pons Bonal touches on a major obstacle to language rights for ethnic minorities in Mexico. Because the teacher's union controls teacher placements, they are ultimately responsible for ensuring that pueblos originarios get teachers who can instruct in their mother tongue. But the union acts as if sending *any* indigenous teacher to *any* indigenous community is enough to foster culturally sensitive education, without thinking about language differences (Pons Bonal, 2012). The tolerance of mediocre education for pueblos originarios by SEP and SNTE is sometimes mirrored by the pueblos themselves. Pons Bonal describes how:

> if you go to communities where it has been difficult for teachers to arrive, it is hard for those people to say, "we want a different one [teacher]," because it is that one or nothing. To have a teacher is better than to not have a teacher, and they don't want to reject the one who has arrived.
>
> (Pons Bonal, 2012)

In some instances, fear of losing a teacher prevents pueblos originarios from advocating for their right to bilingual education. Sometimes these communities dealt with "linguistic battles" between Spanish-speaking teachers and their mother tongue-speaking students, which strains the social fabric of communities and diminishes the utility of public education (Dawson, 2004: 57).

Despite Mexico's General Law on the Language Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, in place since March 13, 2003, indigenous language-learning remains problematic. In Acteal, I spoke with residents who have mobilized to address language rights in the schools. In the half darkness of Acteal's main administrative office, a concrete, tin-roofed shack at the bottom of the steep trail leading from the mountain road down to the village, the Las Abejas Board of Directors hold court once a month to deal with community issues. Tattered posters from past marches and assemblies lined the office walls, and the lone bare bulb overhead illuminated the many empty chairs next to me and the three Las Abejas representatives on the other side of a large table littered with file folders and coffee cups. They slowly read my informed consent letter out loud, verbatim, pausing to discuss certain phrases. The representatives didn't want to sign anything, having a well-honed suspicion of outsiders arriving and asking them to sign away rights, but they agreed to speak anonymously.

The Board of Directors representatives described how the Las Abejas and EZLN portion of Acteal residents had created their own bilingual school in response to the absence of meaningful bilingual, intercultural education at the state-run school (Mesa Directiva de Las Abejas, 2012). The state pays for a teacher at the primary school nearby, which professes to be bilingual but in reality is mostly conducted in Spanish (Mesa Directiva de Las Abejas, 2012). Proudly, the men described how the government does not recognize the school nor do students receive credits that are transferable to government schools, but the community funds teachers who work with students in both Spanish and Tzotzil and follow a community-approved curriculum (Mesa Directiva de Las Abejas, 2012). Because the EZLN has created a system of autonomous secondary schools and colleges, students who attend the autonomous primary school in Acteal are able to continue all the way through a university-level education outside the government system (Mesa Directiva de Las Abejas, 2012). Board members acknowledged that there are complications for students who may want to leave their communities to enter jobs that require official transcripts, for example, in the urban center of San Cristóbal de las Casas. But, for students who remain in their autonomous communities, the alternative school system allows bilingual education in line with originario values.

Yet, in other instances, the process of indigenous oppression has been internalized by originarios. Academic and development practitioner Cabrera Fuentes described how bilingual teachers have been forced out of schools in San Cristóbal de las Casas and Larraínzar, another municipality in Chiapas, because parents only want Spanish language school instruction:

> In some of the cases, parents have met with teachers to talk about this problem, saying, "we can teach mother tongue at home, we want you to teach Spanish," but the teacher says, "the school is supposed to be

bilingual.'' Parents want to know, why don't you give more classes in mathematics, in Spanish? Don't waste time on [mother tongue] language.

(Cabrera Fuentes, 2012)

Like Acteal, many communities have deep political and religious divides, as well as differences of opinion about the importance of bilingual, intercultural education. While some people have changed their stances over time, the reflections of interviewees in Chiapas show the diverse range of challenges facing cultural accommodation of originarios in Mexico. Some people perpetuate mother tongue use at home but accept Spanish language instruction at school, while others advocate for more inclusive formal education.

Language politics is happening beyond the schoolyard as well. Recently, a modest movement toward indigenous language appreciation has begun in San Cristóbal de las Casas as well as other indigenous villages. Pérez López comments:

To speak a[n indigenous] language in the past, people ridiculed, people treated [speakers] badly. Now it is less, but I think something that has helped us lessen the oppression is literature, because young people can read poems, listen to writers read books in their own language, and this process has lessened discrimination … there is still linguistic discrimination but now young people make movies or videos in their languages … also the knowledge that indigenous languages have the same [legal protected] status as Spanish is a help, that they are national languages gives confidence in them.

(Pérez López, 2012)

Informal recognition of indigenous languages through new cultural spaces is changing the internal accommodation of indigenous culture, and this is mirrored through institutional changes like the legal recognition of indigenous languages in the Constitution. Another interviewee talked about the increased use of indigenous languages in the globalization of communication and technological production:

On the northern side of San Cristobal, there are cybercafés every few blocks, and if you step inside, you'll see kids on Facebook in Tzotzil, teenage girls talking in Chol or Tolojabal to their boyfriends who are in the Lacandon or in the US. There are a few new commercial video studios on this side of town, and they are producing music videos in Tzotzil and Tzeltal, and sermons, and there are movies now being made only in Tzotzil, without Spanish subtitles.

(Anonymous, 2012b)

Despite a tremendous history of persecution based on ethnic identity, originarios in Chiapas use their mother tongues to communicate more

expansively in a globalized world and to preserve traditional practices in their communities. These informal spaces may over time change the dimensions of engagement with states as communities continue to advocate for more rights, including cultural rights.

Conclusion

Mexico faces numerous challenges in improving cultural accommodation of pueblos originarios on various levels. At the federal and state levels, new laws and policies created to grant indigenous people more rights will only be useful if they are implemented and enforced. Federal institutional design, constitutional recognition of pluriculturalism, and usos y costumbres all hold promise for political accommodation of indigenous people and communities. Yet entrenched racism and historical patterns of indigenous incorporation into class, as opposed to ethnic, agendas have diluted the potential for institutionally derived accommodations.

   At the local level, the right to bilingual, intercultural education stands as a strong indicator of how the state is cooperating or not with cultural rights agendas for pueblos originarios. The SNTE, the largest teachers' union in Mexico, along with the SEP, are complacent in the face of continuing major problems in bilingual, intercultural education. This includes problems with the training, curricula, assessments, and placements of bilingual, intercultural teachers, as well as non-consultation about the linguistic needs and preferences of pueblos originarios. I have examined these issues in the context of the Acteal massacre of 1997 and explored how the memory of this violence permeates community narratives and is used in shaming the Mexican state to cooperate with Las Abejas' rights agenda. Within the structural constraints of political, economic, and cultural accommodation, Acteal's Las Abejas have been a highly mobilized force for cultural rights protections, as well as justice for the violence that they have worked as a community to not forget.

Notes

 1 The discourse of human security in Mexico largely focuses on drug cartel-related violence and border violence (Kearney, 1991; Lusk, 2012; Torres Fernández et al., 2012).
 2 Countries in Latin America use ladino and mestizo in different ways but, in Mexico, ladino has an elite connotation, whereas mestizo can indicate any mixed race person, a broader category that can include ladinos.
 3 See Castillo, 2002 for a discussion of Mexican national law versus indigenous customary law in Mexico.
 4 Tzotzil is spelled *Tsotsil* in Spanish and sometimes appears this way in the literature.
 5 See www.cidh.org/annualrep/2010eng/MXAD212-05EN.doc for a summary of the case as it stands in the IACHR (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2010).

 6 See homepage of http://acteal.blogspot.com for regular letters issued by Las
   Abejas to various government authorities and civil society members, with
   archived letters linked on left-hand side.
 7 Though shots have not been fired by the EZLN since 1994, EZLN alignment
   connotes people's willingness to use armed resistance to gain rights and protect
   autonomy. Though the acceptance of instrumental arms use in mobilization may
   only be symbolic, it nevertheless communicates a divergence in mobilization
   philosophy between Tzotzil groups.
 8 In Spanish: "no puedo callar, no puedo pasar indiferente."
 9 This is derived in part from *Chiapas: Present and Future*. 1999, Publicaciones
   Garcia Lourdes.
10 See Cook (1996): SNTE's (Mexican National Educational Workers Union's)
   infamy as a corrupt political player was taken to new levels in February 2013,
   when then SNTE President Elba Esther Gordillo was arrested and charged with
   embezzling more than US$1.5 million from the union.

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3 The fight for Triqui autonomy in San Juan Copala, Oaxaca, Mexico

> If we were invisible, they would exterminate us.
>
> (Sergio Beltrán, 2012, community activist in Oaxaca)

> As a pueblo originario, we have never depended on the state.
>
> (Albino Ortiz, 2012, spokesperson for displaced Triqui community)

It is January 2012. My daughter is four months old and her eyes track red huipils[1] and the kids in tattered t-shirts clinging to them as I perch next to the flower boxes in the central plaza of Oaxaca City.[2] I had planned to spend these months outside the city, in the small town of San Juan Copala, talking to Triqui activists about why they chose autonomy in 2007 and why others have resisted the change away from political party control. Instead, during my time in Oaxaca, the conflict was so militarized that the roads into San Juan Copala were blockaded, with both military and paramilitary forces regulating entry and exit, and I was told that I would not be able to get through. So Oaxaca City became home-base, and from there I spent my days in the plaza as rotating dozens of Triquis camped out under the arches of the municipal palace and led marches, songs, chants, and vigils, while handing out leaflets in between brokering for meetings with government officials. It was not the fieldwork I had planned, but such is the risk when researching social movements. Sometimes they move, albeit against their will.

San Juan Copala lies approximately 239 kilometers from Oaxaca City, due west as the crow flies, but the road from the state capital first heads north-west towards the border with Guerrero and Puebla states before dropping south-west into Triqui land. Copala is located in the heart of the Triqui baja region, which is bordered by three mestizo[3] cities known by their abbreviated forms: Juxtlahuaca, Tlaxiaco, and Putla.[4] Juxtlahuaca is the administrative center for the Triqui baja, and Putla serves the same role for the Triqui alta – baja and alta indicate two separate groups of Triquis as described by their locations in the lowlands and highlands, respectively.

There are an estimated 23,097 speakers of Triqui in Mexico (INALI, 2005), though this includes both Triqui baja and Triqui alta speakers, who generally consider much of each other's languages to be mutually

Figure 3.1 Map showing locations of San Juan Copala and Oaxaca City, Oaxaca
(Copyright d-maps: www.d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=28413&lang=en.
Arrows added by author)

unintelligible.[5] In addition, cultural animosity exists between the two groups
(Javier Parra Mora and Hernández Díaz, 1994: 43). Triquis have historically
operated more as separate clans than co-ethnics (Huerta Ríos, 1980: 139–43),
despite being grouped together in census data. Like the Las Abejas portion
of Tzotzil Acteal residents, Triqui baja originarios have experienced relatively
recent paramilitary violence that has been tacitly condoned at the state and
federal level. In both cases, community narratives of violence have been
misrepresented in the media and by government officials as strictly intra-
community violence because co-ethnics have been recruited into the
government-funded paramilitary organizations that have carried out the violence.
Yet significant variation is visible across these two cases in Mexico. While
the Tzotzil case exhibits high mobilization, the Triqui case is one of medium
mobilization because some shaming and claiming tactics are used and others
not, and the tactics that are used are not used extensively.

Each case considered in this book shames and claims within different
patterns of accommodation by the state and uses memory-based narratives
of violence in distinct ways. These divergent paths account for differences in
the type and degree of shaming and claiming mobilization. This chapter
looks at the reality of why the violence happened in San Juan Copala and
how violence memorialization is part of a larger Triqui cultural rights struggle
exemplified by the fight for autonomy.

Contrasting visions of autonomy

On January 20, 2007, a portion of Copala's residents declared the town an autonomous municipality, in accordance with federal and state constitutional reforms of the 1990s. The federal Constitution makes it clear that the privileges of self-determination cannot infringe on the unity of the Mexican state as a whole (Government of Mexico, 2011 [1917]: 1, Article 2). Copala's declaration of autonomy did not challenge Mexico's territorial integrity and was not a call for separatism or autonomy even to the degree demanded by autonomous municipalities in Chiapas. Nonetheless, Copala's autonomy declaration was followed by intense violence perpetrated to quash the autonomy movement. Though Mexico had inscribed the right to indigenous autonomy in the national and state Constitutions, at the local level, political parties were not on board with this change.

Political repression in Copala contradicts the promise of federalism to expand subnational rights through autonomy provisions. As of 2008, the state of Oaxaca had 570 municipalities, 418 of which had opted to select leaders through *usos y costumbres*, or uses and customs, instead of through political party elections (Servicios Para Una Educación Alternativa A.C., 2008: 12). As discussed in Chapter 2, communities that invoke usos y costumbres have the right to non-political party municipal leadership selection that is in sync with traditional indigenous practices. San Juan Copala's declaration of autonomy was not a unique event in Mexican politics. Yet Copala's declaration was not exclusively for the right to select leaders through usos y costumbres, but rather a demand for remunicipalization, a reordering of Copala's local political power.

At the end of 1948, Copala lost its standing as a municipality as a result of political gerrymandering to bring Copala Triquis under the control of neighboring Juxtlahuaca (MASJC and Cilia Olmos, 2011: 18). Copala never regained municipal standing, despite this being an ongoing demand, and relations between mestizos in Juxtlahuaca and Copala Triquis have remained tense over the decades. In the early 1960s, Montes Vásquez documented Triquis in Copala complaining that Juxtlahuaca authority "treats us like children" (1988 [1963]: 15). Huerta Ríos, writing in 1980, noted that there were ongoing claims to autonomy in the Triqui region, where people did not want to be dependent on the surrounding mestizo districts (1980: 257). Therefore, it was unsurprising when a faction of the Copala Triqui community held assemblies in the mid-2000s to discuss transitioning to an autonomous municipality model in line with federal and state constitutional provisions for usos y costumbres. However, such an agenda flew in the face of historic political party and mestizo dominance of the region.

Pueblos originarios – original peoples – throughout Mexico had been increasingly voicing their claims for autonomy at both state and federal levels since gaining new rights through constitutional reforms in the late 1990s. The promise of new constitutional rights clashed with neoliberal

agendas such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which went into effect on January 1, 1994, and catalyzed a new generation of anti-NAFTA, pro-indigenous rights social movements, most notoriously by the EZLN in Chiapas. In Copala, as in Chiapas, ongoing repression by local vested interests was centered on land control, fueling anger and resentment towards mestizos, but also ethnic insiders who colluded with political parties and their paramilitary enforcers. In short, the state has used PRI-paramilitary alliances to exercise political, economic, and cultural control in Copala even as the community achieved, on paper, a significant increase in rights to self-governance and self-determination. Their attempt to claim that right in 2007, however, was met with swift repression.

Body counts and factions

Human insecurity in Copala is not new. More than 500 *Copaltecos* (people from Copala) were assassinated in 1977–83 (Pye and Jolley, 2011: 185), and there have been more than 1,000 violent deaths there in the second half of the twentieth century (De Marinis, 2011: 1).[6] Since Copala became an autonomous municipality in 2007, at least twenty-nine people have been assassinated, mostly in the siege of 2009. In addition, since October 2010 more than 300 Triqui people[7] from the region of Copala have been displaced as a result of intense paramilitary violence, though the exact numbers are disputed. Unable to return under fear of harm, displaced Copaltecos camped out under the arches of the government palace in Oaxaca City for more than seventeen months between 2010 and 2012, demanding a government response to their situation.

Though now infamous for its paramilitary networks, Triqui organizing in Copala did not begin as a paramilitary or even a right-wing enterprise. In the late 1970s, "El Club," composed of Copala's male power brokers Ramón and Luis Flores, Juan Domingo Pérez Castillo, Enrique Acevedo Ortiz, and Armando Guadalupe Flores, began collaborating and, in 1981, formed the Movement for Triqui Unification and Struggle (MULT) (De Marinis, 2009: 9; Javier Parra Mora and Hernández Díaz, 1994: 191; MASJC and Cilia Olmos, 2011: 12). Initially, MULT formed as a leftist organization to counter PRI control of the area and made alliances with socialist and worker-based organizations like the Coalition of Workers, Peasants, and Students of the Isthmus (COCEI) (De Marinis, 2009: 9, footnote 20; Pye and Jolley, 2011: 9) in Juchitan de Zargoza, which also proclaimed indigenous pride. However, members began to split into different factions as PRI resources co-opted some but not others (Pye and Jolley, 2011: 9–10).

The Independent Movement for Triqui Unification and Struggle (MULTI) formed as a response to internal conflict within MULT, with MULT ultimately leaning towards collusion with the PRI development agenda in the region and the MULTI faction declaring autonomy in 2007 (EDUCA A.C., 2010: 19; Pye and Jolley, 2011: 10). The division between MULT members sprung

from the formation of the Popular Unity Party (PUP), a PRI-aligned right-wing political party that MULT supports and MULTI does not. While both MULT and MULTI members reside in Copala, MULTI members support the Autonomous Municipality of San Juan Copala (MASJC), while MULT members adhere to the political party leadership system. The displaced Triquis who camped out in the Oaxaca City plaza, and with whom I spent the bulk of my data collection time in Oaxaca, are members of either MULTI, or MASJC, or both.

The right-wing paramilitary group, Unity for the Social Well-being of the Triqui Region (UBISORT), was formed in 1994 with PRI government support (De Marinis, 2011: 2) to serve as a counterpart to the perceived leftist approach of MULT. Whereas MULT has had several factions, some PRI-aligned and others COCEI-aligned, UBISORT has consistently served as a medium for PRI interests in Copala. Unlike MULT, which started as a more politically progressive organization, UBISORT has widely been perceived by human rights organizations to be a violent paramilitary organization from the start (La Liga Mexicana por la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos A.C., 2010). MULT–UBISORT relations have progressed through several phases. In 1994–2007 the two groups antagonized each other, though during 2007–10 they joined efforts to disband Copala's autonomy initiative and delimit different territories of influence in accordance with then Governor Ulises Ruiz's orders. From November 2009 to September 2010 MULT and UBISORT coordinated their actions to halt the first caravan of displaced people (MASJC and Cilia Olmos, 2011: 93). Both groups have used violence against MULTI and MASJC members to derail the autonomy process. While UBISORT is considered paramilitary, MULT has both a non-paramilitary and paramilitary component.

While the government refutes accusations that the PRI has funded paramilitary activities of MULT and UBISORT,[8] delegates of the state government have supported both MULT and UBISORT in the past (Ávila/IGABE, 2003: 10). A MASJC spokesperson described in detail the way in which the PRI government at the state level collaborates with the municipal level to finance paramilitaries:

> They have killed many of our people; they've blocked the highways so that those of us in the Autonomous Municipality will be left without food, so that we will die of hunger, then they started to surround the town, to shoot at the population every day, at children, at women, at those that they stop in front of; because this was financed by the government, because they [government] are connected with the next municipality, in the district of Juxtlahuaca. The President of Juxtlahuaxa has sent them [paramilitaries] radios, he sent them guns, he sent them everything they need to be able to attack us, the Autonomous Municipality.
>
> (Testimonio de Reina; MASJC and Cilia Olmos, 2011: 26)[9]

Another Triqui woman testified, "it seems that the state government does not find this type of autonomy project suitable and because of this they have armed paramilitary groups to attack us" (Testimonio de Fausta; MASJC and Cilia Olmos, 2011: 17). In addition to numerous testimonies collected by Cilia Olmos in the above-cited volume, my own field notes documented demands made by MULTI during their months of protests in front of the government palace in Oaxaca City in 2012. During this time, I watched MULTI members express both verbally and visually how they believe the PRI is funding both MULT's and UBISORT's attacks against them. MULTI's shaming and claiming was frequently expressed in banners with slogans like "Blood, Pain, and Death: Legacy of Ulises Ruiz and the PRI," and "Respect our traditional forms of governance! Paramilitaries, get out of the Triqui region! Enough aggression!"

In Item 2 of the Autonomy Declaration itself, MASJC residents call for an end to the subsidization and protection of paramilitary groups by the government (Indigenous People of San Juan Copala, 2011). To summarize, targeted violence by paramilitaries to carry out the political will of the PRI, in addition to impunity for paramilitary crimes, support MULTI's allegations that the PRI has supported MULT and UBISORT violence against autonomy-seekers in Copala. Though documenting the link between PRI and paramilitaries is difficult from an academic standpoint, slogans and petitions, in addition to everyday discourse on the ground in Oaxaca, reveal this connection to be common knowledge (Martínez Flores, 2012; MASJC and Cilia Olmos, 2011: 27). For its part, the PRI has always discounted any connection between itself and paramilitaries, even in cases such as Acteal, Chiapas, where proof is much more documented than in San Juan Copala.

Forms of mobilization in the fight for cultural rights

Like Acteal, Copala is bitterly internally divided. One portion of the Triqui community from Copala is moderately mobilized for cultural rights as expressed through the declaration of political autonomy, while another portion of the community attempts to suppress the mobilization. This means that, while some Triquis are making their demands known via sit-ins, marches, petitions, and meetings with government officials, not all of the community is mobilized, and those that are are not engaging the full range of institutional and contentious mobilization tactics to their fullest expressions.

Autonomy, as the sought-after cultural right that Triquis are mobilized for, is in this instance the right to fully implement and use usos y costumbres for all aspects of local governance. As with Las Abejas of Acteal in the previous chapter, here I focus on the portion of San Juan Copala Triquis who support the autonomy movement, referred to as MASJC or MULTI. The MASJC community has devised strategies to narrate their grievances publically through spokespeople, pamphlets, media interviews, and the highly visible sit-in in Oaxaca City's central plaza.[10] By broadcasting narratives of violence

to local, state, national, and international audiences, displaced Triquis hope to pressure the government into facilitating their return to Copala and disbanding the paramilitary forces there. Articulating the story of their displacement is the central means by which Triquis perform shaming, and their call for the right to return to Copala and implement their autonomy project is the claim. Memories of violence may not persuade elite power-brokers to grant originario demands, but they do produce narratives that foment community solidarity and make mobilization more likely. The process of mobilizing, and the constraints and supports that ethnic minorities encounter along the way, relay the experience of citizenship for marginalized populations in democratizing countries.

The kind of claim-making counted as legitimate by states – things like freely voting, advocating for referendums, or consultation between civil society and state representatives (Servicios Para Una Educación Alternativa A.C., 2008: 8) – is limited to certain strata of society: those educated, literate citizens who are not bound by patron–client relationships where votes are pre-determined. Pueblos originarios in Mexico have traditionally been spaces for vote-buying by political parties, or other forms of subnational authoritarian rule that kept local power concentrated and segregated from national democratic norms (Gibson, 2005: 103–9). In addition to subnational authoritarianism, legacies of racism and marginalization, as well as illiteracy and lack of funds to commute to urban centers of power, have historically curtailed indigenous institutional mobilization. Originarios that manage to disrupt these patterns of oppression have often engaged in more contentious, less institutionalized forms of claim-making, such as street blockades, sit-ins, and rallies.

Though MASJC spokespeople have petitioned for an audience with Governor Cué, Triquis have also mobilized through contentious political means like the sit-ins because they believe that state representatives are collaborating with the paramilitary forces that displaced them in the first place. MASJC averages medium institutional and medium extra-institutional mobilization, though as the conflict has not resolved, this depiction may be temporally limited. This autonomous portion of the Triqui community experiences low political and economic accommodation and medium cultural accommodation by the state, though, as in Acteal, accommodations exist more on paper than in practice. For example, the existence of Mexico's constitutional provisions for multiculturalism and the requirement for bilingual intercultural education show that there is some state policy of cultural accommodation because there are institutional provisions that support cultural rights. However, lack of implementation and enforcement of these accommodations in Mexico is widespread and leaves pueblos originarios perpetually marginalized. Figure 3.2 depicts each aspect of the theoretical framework in simplified form.

The generally low level of institutional accommodation by the Mexican state makes people more likely to use extra-institutional channels for mobilization because fewer sanctioned channels exist through which their claims

Scope Condition		Background causes		Mechanism	Outcome

Targeted violence in 2000s

\+

Low political accommodation

Low economic accommodation

Medium cultural accommodation

Medium narrative production

Medium mobilization for cultural rights: **Triquis from San Juan Copala**

Figure 3.2 Theoretical model of Triqui mobilization in Oaxaca

can be addressed. Therefore, it is unsurprising that Triquis used sit-ins and marches, as well as graffiti with messages like "Stop the genocide in the Triqui region" painted throughout Oaxaca City, as a central means of shaming and claiming. Displaced residents occupied the plaza, but they institutionally shamed and claimed as well through their declaration document and other printed requests that were handed to many government officials. MASJC members had learned what their rights were and who was capable of enforcing them. As one member of the displaced contingent told me, referring to the declaration, "you have to have written demands for the government to listen, so it was written" (Lorena, 2012). By soliciting meetings with government representatives where they present written demands that draw on Mexico's own constitutional guarantees for indigenous rights, MASJC Triquis showed their awareness of the cultural rights that they have on paper and continue to ask for their implementation.

In Article 2 of the MASJC autonomy declaration, which in 2012 was pasted on walls and telephone poles all over Oaxaca City's downtown, MASJC stated that they decided on autonomy "with the objective to break with subordination to organizations that, tied, subsidized, and protected by the government, have brought death, destruction, extortion, siege, and displacement to entire Triqui communities" (Indigenous People of San Juan Copala, 2011). The narrative of violence as a motivating factor for MASJC Triqui shaming and claiming is pervasive in the autonomy declaration. The statement goes on to give explicit examples of the violence that they have suffered as a community and that operate as core justification for their mobilization to shame the state, citing "the dispossession of goods, the rape of women, the assassinations of children, and the forced disappearances of people" (Indigenous People of San Juan Copala, 2011). Memories of violence are used as justification for the demand of Triqui autonomy, meaning to govern themselves without intervention by political parties and their affiliated paramilitaries. Displacement, in addition to other forms of bodily violence, has further politicized the MASJC portion of Copala, not only because people become more visible when camped out in front of government offices, but also because their narratives of wrongs committed against them serve as potent catalysts for mobilization.

In Item 6 of the MASJC declaration, the community engages the Mexican Constitution and the discourse of citizenship and human rights to bolster their rights claims. Their text quotes that Article 2 of the Mexican Federal Constitution "recognizes and protects the rights of pueblos and indigenous communities to free determination" (Indigenous People of San Juan Copala, 2011). MASJC's autonomy declaration is in essence a claim to free determination. The declaration language, both in printed form as a flyer posted for the general public and as a list of demands presented to the Governor and his representatives, shows how MASJC residents frame their claims within institutional channels. MASJC also draws on ILO Convention 169 for language about protection for indigenous people. Convention 169 prescribes that, for indigenous citizens, states "preserve and enrich their languages, knowledge, and all the elements that constitute their culture and identity" (Indigenous People of San Juan Copala, 2011). In their autonomy declaration, MASJC uses the Mexican government's signing of 169 as leverage to ask for its enforcement.

The legitimacy of MASJC claims faces frequent obstacles, in part because of the complexity of intra-Triqui relationships in Copala, but also because of the narratives being employed by all sides. While violence perpetrated by UBISORT fits more neatly into the box of paramilitary persecution and can be memorialized as a straightforward grievance, MULT violence is complicated by stories of PRI-granted privileges for those who agreed to toe the party line. The dynamics of ongoing mestizo control and intra-Triqui violence within the Copala community make memories of violence highly contested and thus less salient as a mobilizing tool. Though the state is the target audience for MASJC's shaming and claiming efforts, the presence of locally based, and sometimes ethnically Triqui, paramilitaries complicates the clarity of MASJC's campaign.

Violence in San Juan Copala

MASJC's 2007 declaration of autonomy and their intent to switch from political party leadership selection to usos y costumbres as their method of governance unleashed a vicious backlash. A PRI-armed faction began a campaign of terror and harassment against villagers who had voted for autonomy, and the full gambit of tactics has been used to terrorize them, including assassinations, rapes, kidnappings, and myriad forms of harassment. As in Acteal during the 1990s, the paramilitary forces controlled all entry and exit of people in Copala. Just as human rights observers and activists were barred from going in, community members had to sneak out at night in order to escape. As one displaced woman from Copala described it, "I was there in the village locked up like a little bird that wasn't able to leave" (Lorena, 2012). Many of those who were able to flee have ended up sleeping on scraps of cardboard under the arches of the governor's building in Oaxaca City while petitioning the government to disarm the paramilitaries and help the displaced return home.

The pairing of autonomy declaration with violent repression was not unique to Copala, as a similar pattern occurred in 2006 when MULT opposed the town of Aguas Frías's planned declaration of autonomy (MASJC and Cilia Olmos, 2011: 23). In that case, on August 10, 2006, two MULTI members and a twelve-year-old boy traveling with them were shot dead by unknown attackers near Putla on their way to a meeting of the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca (APPO) (Davies, 2007: 80). APPO is an umbrella organization that encompasses many regional and issue-specific organizations and was the central actor in the 2006 uprising against then Governor Ulises Ruiz. It was known that APPO also supported the autonomy of the Copala Triqui community, and the adult victims were leaders in their communities, so the political implication of the assassinations was to dampen APPO support for MULTI action. The ongoing escalation of violence and the resulting displacement of MASJC and MULTI members, however, has been most severe in Copala.

One of the most significant incidents of violence in the region occurred on April 7, 2008, when twenty-four-year-old Teresa Bautista Merino and twenty-year-old Felicitas Martínez Sánchez, both community radio broadcasters at "La Voz que rompe el Silencio," (The Voice that Breaks the Silence), a station committed to the project of autonomy, were assassinated in an ambush by MULT (EDUCA A.C., 2010: 47).

> The girls that died, our compañeras Teresa and Felicitas, were one hundred percent with the autonomy project; but the people of MULT … didn't like this, what they like is to be with political parties … so they kill these two compañeras and then the radio project fell, then the other compañeros that kept [it] going had death threats but even still they kept going.
> (Testimonio de Reina; MASJC and Cilia Olmos, 2011: 25)

Reina, a spokesperson for the displaced MULTI contingent of Copala, explains in the quote above several critical pieces of the conflict puzzle. First, she identifies that MULT's motivation for the assassinations was to re-embed political party governance and break up the autonomy project. Second, Reina testifies that MULT's violence was sufficient to break a key communicative tool in MULTI's struggle, that of the bilingual radio station, which stopped operating in the aftermath of the assassinations. Third, Reina describes this particular assassination as an effective deterrent to political participation by other community members, even among those who were committed to autonomy, because the cost of participating was evident in the assassinations. Thus, the death of the two young radio broadcasters provided both physical and symbolic obstacles to the autonomy mobilization.

On April 27, 2010, in an attempt to return displaced people to their communities, the first human rights caravan left Oaxaca City and, en route to Copala, was attacked by UBISORT paramilitaries. As with the assassinations

of the two radio broadcasters, the assassinations of Finnish human rights observer Jyri Jaakkola and Alberta "Bety" Cariño Trujillo, Director of the Center for Community Support Working Together (CACTUS), sent shock waves through Copala's displaced community and their domestic and international supporters.

Though these were some of the more pivotal moments in the Copala conflict, even trying to make a brief chronology of violence there is complicated because people testify that it started at different times. For example, Reina, the MULTI spokeswoman, says the main violence began in November of 2009 (MASJC and Cilia Olmos, 2011: 26), but she earlier described assassinations that occurred in April 2008. Thus, the way that people categorize the violence, and also the way in which different Copala factions were affected by the violence and therefore relate to it temporally, further complicates attempts to document it chronologically (Jelin, 2003: 3–4). Though some suspected paramilitaries have been detained and a few remain in prison as of this writing, there has been minimal government prosecution in relation to the scale of the crimes, and many MASJC and MULTI members have also been incarcerated. Violence and impunity since 2007 has created potent memories that are used in public narratives by MASJC and MULTI-affiliated Triquis as they shame the government for their role in repressing the autonomy movement and continue to voice their claim to indigenous governance. The following section addresses how state policies of inclusion and exclusion contribute to Triqui mobilization.

Including and excluding pueblos originarios

> Autonomy is translated into our languages as "what the pueblo decides."
> (Indigenous People of Oaxaca Forum, 2006: 271–2)

> We are aware that as citizens we have rights, but we also have obligations.
> (Citizens of Oaxaca, 2012: 1, printed in civil society organization leaflet)

Mexico is a federal system, meaning that significant power is delegated from the federal government to each of Mexico's thirty-one states. One of the promises of federalist systems like Mexico's is that they can grant decentralization measures to accommodate particular local needs, whereas centralized systems take a "one-size-fits-all approach." Some political and administrative decentralization has occurred in Mexico, most prominently in Oaxaca through the legalization of usos y costumbres. Yet, in San Juan Copala, PRI-supported paramilitary attacks on autonomy-seekers have sent the message that usos y costumbres and the decentralization that comes with it are not welcome in traditional PRI strongholds.

Though this is not a book about natural resource rights, it is worth noting that autonomous status for municipalities implies that originarios should be

able to administer their land and resources. But the Mexican state does not specifically include resource control in its own definition of autonomy (Taylor, 2009: 114), as it separates resource rights from cultural rights. These oppositional viewpoints create conflict and, in the case of Copala, fiscal, administrative, and political control were not devolved at all, let alone in a functional order (Falleti, 2005) that could have led to a democratic transition as an autonomous municipality. In Mexico overall, fiscal power especially remains concentrated at the national level. As activist and public intellectual Gustavo Esteva summarized, referencing taxation, "Constitutionally, there is federalism, but in practice, we are a very centralized country" (Esteva, 2012).

Constitutional provisions for indigenous communities to self-govern takes place through the transition from political party community governance to usos y costumbres, a form of leadership selection practices in pueblos originarios that implicitly challenges traditional political party politics and crosses the line between political and cultural rights. The right to traditional leadership selection is part and parcel of ethnic minority political accommodation by the state, but it is also a cultural right of originarios. A strength of usos y costumbres is flexibility, which entails giving space for pueblos originarios to craft meaningful solutions to community problems (Hernández Navarro, 1999: 161). In its ideal form, usos y costumbres operate in pueblos originarios that have several common attributes: communities form part of a unified territory, share a language, have community assemblies, have *cargo* and *tequio* (collective labor) systems, and organize ritual celebrations in the community (Vásquez de la Rosa, 2012).

However, in Oaxaca one interviewee referred to usos y costumbres as "abusos y costumbres" because of corruption among traditional leaders through preferential relationships with political parties, unequal representation for women, and other misuses of "traditional" power (Martínez Padilla, 2012). So as with federalism, usos y costumbres is not a panacea for Mexico. In fact, usos y costumbres has helped raise important debates about what constitutes tradition and therefore which rights and practice should be passed from one generation to the next (Eber and Kovic, 2003: 10). Usos y costumbres also illuminates the many layers of legal rights in Mexico and how they are protected or overridden at the local, state, and national level.

Indicators of political and economic accommodation

Constitutional provisions for rights of pueblos originarios are one indicator of political accommodation. The constitutional context for legally recognizing usos y costumbres in Mexico is a relatively recent phenomenon. First, in 1986, the state Constitution was amended to recognize Oaxaca's multiethnic composition, but Oaxaca's Law on the Rights of Pueblos and Indigenous Communities, affirming pueblos originarios' rights to self-administration[11] (Humberto Durand Alcántara and Campos Rayón, undated: 52–3), was not

put in place until August 30, 1995. This 1995 reform, referred to colloquially as the autonomy law, synced the state's electoral law with Articles 16 and 25 of the state Constitution (Hernández Navarro, 1999: 157). Article 16 gives recognition to the pluriethnic composition of Oaxacans and promises to "protect and preserve indigenous communities' forms of social organization," while Article 25 protects indigenous practices of local leadership selection (Hernández Navarro, 1999: 157). The 1995 law was operationalized in 1998 with a plan to limit political party intervention in usos y costumbres-governed communities (Fox, Stephen and Rivera, 1999). In fact, congressional bodies were "only ratifying what already existed in fact," because many communities continued internal leadership selection processes despite the dominance of political parties prior to the legalization of usos y costumbres (Hernández Navarro, 1999: 160).

Trying to access their legally defined rights to self-determination, Copala Triquis internally elect their municipal authorities in an assembly of adult community members, though the community divisions have not actually allowed full assemblies to take place. The main internal leaders are the council of elders and the *mayordomos*[12] who form the backbone of the municipal assembly, the communal political space in which all autonomous municipality decisions are made (MASJC and Cilia Olmos, 2011: 15). Autonomous municipalities have the right to non-interference by the state under Article 8 of the 1998 Law and have the freedom to choose their municipal authorities, according to section 9 of Article 7, as long as they are in compliance with Oaxaca's electoral code (Humberto Durand Alcántara and Campos Rayón, undated: 52–3). These constitutional changes have brought Oaxaca into line with international rights provisions like ILO Convention 169.

At the surface, the autonomy law and associated legislative reforms seem like progressive steps to indigenous cultural rights protections. Hernández Navarro identifies three factors that prepared states to accommodate the political practices of pueblos originarios: first; "the persistence of indigenous political and social institutions over time despite the encroachment of national-level institutions for political representation;" second, the potency of local indigenous social movements to gain national recognition of their rights; and third, the motivating example of the EZLN struggle, and the discord between the federal government and indigenous citizens in Oaxaca (Hernández Navarro, 1999: 157–8). These factors grant agency to indigenous actors as protagonists in their own story; pueblos originarios figured out how to enact strategic social movements to foster institutional change. Despite these positive examples of state accommodation of indigenous communities in Mexico, quotidian practice calls it into question. Often co-optation or assimilation is disguised as accommodation, giving rights to originarios in exchange for their participation as campesinos, not as indigenous citizens. Moreover, as Marcos Sandoval, a Triqui alta originario who works in the Office of Indigenous Affairs in Oaxaca City puts it, "there is the law, but the fact that the law exists does not mean that society already functions like that,

nor the institutions … . After the law, there is enormous work to do" (Sandoval, 2012). In this way, Mexico's constitutional provisions for indigenous autonomy remain very much aspirational.

The "enormous work" to which Sandoval refers may in part include eliciting elite buy-in for indigenous rights. Even as governing elites have incorporated multiculturalist language into their own agendas, they have also used military and paramilitary violence to control and terrorize indigenous communities that try to actualize their rights in ways that threaten entrenched power bases (Taylor, 2009: 114). In places like Acteal and Copala, where vested interests around political power, land use and control (Prashad, 1998: 1; Pye and Jolley, 2011: 9) were threatened by communities accessing these rights, paramilitaries stepped in. Though the PRI-dominated Oaxacan legislature decided it was more politically beneficial to grant legal status to usos y costumbres than to have pueblos originarios withhold their votes or transfer their votes to the opposition (Hernández Navarro, 1999: 159), PRI-backed paramilitary forces in Copala have not let the community put usos y costumbres into action through local leadership selection. While many communities that had been loyal PRI "clients" continued to act as such after implementing usos y costumbres, Copala did not.

The Copala conflict reflects similar dynamics unfolding on the state and federal stage, as long-time one-party rule has been successfully, if painfully, defeated. While Mexican voters broke out of the pattern of PRI hegemony by electing PAN President Vicente Fox in 2000 and his PAN successor Felipe Calderon in 2006, the PRI retook the presidency with the election of Enrique Peña Nieto in 2012. Meanwhile, PRI rule of Oaxaca did not experience a major electoral shift until 2010, with leftist coalition Gabino Cué Monteagudo's victory for the governorship (2010–16), although the PRI's grip on Oaxacan political power began to crumble long before Cué took office. The PRI had traditionally controlled the Triqui baja (and of course most of the country), though PRI intervention in the region solidified in the early 1980s as MULT was forming (Javier Parra Mora and Hernández Díaz, 1994: 225). Unsurprisingly, Oaxacan ex-governor Ulises Ruiz, a symbol of authoritarian PRI politics, was hostile to the announcement of autonomy in 2007.[13] The groundwork for Ruiz's need to increase control of rural Oaxaca was evident in 2006 as he dramatically lost control of the state's urban center. During months of intense street protests, Oaxaca City was locked down as protesters called for the then-Governor's ousting.[14] In the aftermath of the 2006 conflict, Ruiz's reaction to Copala's declaration of autonomy facilitated speculation as to the degree of PRI and Ruiz financing of the paramilitaries that cracked down on the autonomous municipality shortly after its declaration (Noticias, 2010).

For Triquis, the political assault they faced from Ruiz not only played out in terms of political non-accommodation, but also threatened cultural rights. Fundamentally, the attempt to destroy the autonomy project is an effort to perpetuate mestizo-dominated rule of pueblos originarios. The fact that

other Triquis receive funds to perpetuate the violence may serve as a smokescreen for the PRI, but Copala is more than an intra-ethnic conflict. One way of analyzing how Triquis experience political accommodation by the state is to look at the response of the Oaxacan government to the displacement of 2011–12. Though displaced Triquis had hoped that the transition away from PRI domination of Oaxaca would shift the dynamics in Copala, governor Cué is continuing some of the policies of his predecessors. Cué, elected as a coalition candidate of the National Action Party, Labor Party (PT), and Convergence Party, has directed his representatives to delay the return of displaced people to Copala indefinitely. Every time displaced Triquis negotiate with the government to seek protection for their return, they are told that, if they want government escorts they will have to wait for indefinite periods of time and drop many of their demands (Anonymous, 2012b; Matías, 2013). For example, in January and February 2012, newspapers carried regular articles about how, if the Triquis just waited until next week, next month, or the next government meeting, *then* they would receive assistance in their return (Noticias, 2012: 1A, 5A). These delays showed Cué stalling to maintain the authority of leaders chosen through political parties rather than usos y costumbres. Though he asserted his support for human rights organizations in general, Cué made it clear that outside voices were not welcome in the discussion about Copala, saying, "'we Oaxacans can solve our own problems'" (Martínez, 2012). In the above quote, Cué is telling activists from The Other Campaign, the Mexican League for the Defense of Human Rights, and unaffiliated solidarity groups that have traveled to Oaxaca from Chiapas, Mexico City, and Guadalajara that their input is not welcome.

At the same time, Reina, the MASJC spokesperson, asserted that the displaced Triqui contingent continually solicits help from federal and state governments, but the government does not actually want to act in a way that would support autonomy projects like MASJC's (MASJC and Cilia Olmos, 2011: 55). As Reina puts it, "What they want is for us to get tired, to get bored" (MASJC and Cilia Olmos, 2011: 55). Reina ascribes the lack of government aid to the fact that the Oaxacan government wants the autonomy project to collapse, something that Cué's statements reinforce. Through public statements and published missives, Reina asserts Triqui determination for cultural rights, stating that, even though the government may be fatigued, the displaced residents of the autonomous municipality will not get tired or bored and acquiesce to the demands of the political party-affiliated leaders. In other words, MASJC Triquis will continue pushing for greater political and cultural accommodation even if the government stalls. The government response to the displaced Triqui community shows that, PRI or not, the Oaxacan state government is not protecting the rights of Copaltecos. By not enforcing the right to usos y costumbres, delaying the return of displaced citizens, and ongoing impunity for MULT and UBISORT, Cué's government has not delivered the rights promised in the federal and state Constitutions.

Political and economic inclusion and exclusion in Mexico are often closely linked, as political parties exert economic influence through subnational control of communities. Triquis who have tried to maintain their indigenous identities and separate themselves from political party interests have found themselves harassed and isolated politically, economically, and culturally. MASJC members, already some of Oaxaca's most economically marginalized citizens, have been especially targeted for violence, making their daily attempts to gain livelihood through agriculture and day labor more challenging (Anonymous, 2012b).

As early as the 1830s, there were confrontations between Triquis and *ladinos* from Juxtlahuaca and Putla (García and Gómez Levy, 1998: 66–7). Women's huipils served to identify them as Triquis, and more generically as indigenous, thus making them targets of discrimination. The revolution of 1910 institutionalized violence as a political strategy of indigenous people and also facilitated increased access to arms (Javier Parra Mora, 1993: 86; Javier Parra Mora and Hernández Díaz, 1994: 50, 58).[15] During 1940–65, periods of guerilla war erupted among Triqui factions for political and also economic reasons. On the economic side, coffee, the major export crop of the Triqui baja, lent its production to exploitable hierarchies of labor both among Triquis as well as between them and mestizo business partners (García Alcaraz, 1997: 119), especially around the price of crops and labor (Javier Parra Mora, 1993: 88).

Exploitation manifested itself not just through quotidian labor, but also through physical attacks. The number of ambushes and assaults that occurred near or in Copala in the mid-twentieth century fueled theories typical of the day: that Triquis were naturally violent (García Alcaraz, 1997: 120), that their location in the hot valley made them more prone to violence, or that, as the origin story of the Triqui baja goes, as descendants of men instead of women[16] they were cursed with hot tempers (Sandoval, 2012).[17] Real causes of the violence were probably more ordinary. Mestizos would assault or assassinate Copaltecos to steal their coffee or the money they had just made from selling their coffee (García Alcaraz, 1997: 125), and different allegiances to various factions of co-ethnics or mestizos prompted ongoing patterns of retaliatory violence. Though I have only found passing references to control over natural resources being a cause for conflict in Copala, in 1950 one author stated that there were precious metals such as mica, lead, gold, and silver in the subsoil around Copala (Peña cited in Huerta Ríos, 1980: 44), and this could only have exacerbated tension over regional political and economic control.

The linking of demands for protection from economic exploitation to increased respect for cultural values has been brewing since the early 1990s (Indigenous Peoples of Oaxaca, 1992: 3–8), and this process of consciousness-raising has facilitated the current shaming and claiming mobilization. In the 1990s and 2000s, economic incentives were used to divide Copala Triquis. Prior to the declaration of autonomy in 2007, government influences had managed land control (Javier Parra Mora and Hernández Díaz, 1994: 234–40)

and a distribution of resources that maintained certain power hierarchies in the region. The transition to usos y costumbres threatened to change this arrangement. After 2007, the PRI-aligned portion of Copala, including Triqui-staffed paramilitary groups, received arms and payment to control the MASJC-aligned portion of the community. Low economic accommodation of autonomy-seeking Triquis directly contrasted with the economic benefits for Triquis willing to assimilate into and actively enforce the PRI agenda. As one woman from Copala put it, "Yes, we are all Triquis and have the same blood, but they [paramilitaries] don't think that way. My husband told me, all that matters to them is money" (Soledad's testimony, MASJC and Cilia Olmos, 2011: 50). Economic survival surely influenced the decision of some Triquis to collaborate with PRI-backed paramilitaries. As veteran Oaxaca activist Sergio Beltrán put it, "money and political power do lead to decreased demands, or to demands more in line with the giver's vision" (Beltrán, 2012). In Copala, higher economic accommodation of paramilitary collaborators ensured their perpetuity, while, for the MASJC contingent, economic marginalization made shaming and claiming all the more pressing. For MASJC, mobilization was not just a struggle for cultural survival, but physical, political, and economic survival as well.

Cultural accommodation

The right to mother tongue education serves as a benchmark of cultural accommodation because language is a primary marker of ethnic distinction in Oaxaca and throughout Mexico. Although language as a signifier of indigeneity is sometimes critiqued (Brulotte, 2009), it remains a meaningful path to examine how cultural rights are discussed between states and indigenous advocates. For Triquis in Copala, the Triqui language has been under threat from a decrepit bilingual education program and legacies of discrimination. As one Triqui woman told me in the midst of a rally against her displacement, "language is just part of who we are, we just want to be in our homes and have respect for who we are and how we want to live" (Anonymous, 2012b). For this respondent, mother tongue is part and parcel of an indigenous identity that she wants recognized by the state. Her displacement, a result of paramilitary violence, has led her to use her narrative of suffering as a means to shame the state, through her physical presence in a visible civic space, into prioritizing indigenous rights protections.

Language status occupies an important place for the identity of both states and pueblos originarios. Maldonado notes that, because indigenous languages serve to distinguish originarios from the majority population, the Mexican state has tried to implement nationalization through Castilianization, or the rendering of originarios into Spanish-speakers (Maldonado Alvarado, 2000: 28). Though Mexico has provisions for mother tongue education through the SEP program for bilingual, intercultural education in indigenous communities, the reality of how this plays out is often dismal.

There are many factors that inhibit the SEP's ability to deliver on the promise of bilingual education, and most of these are similar to challenges in Chiapas. First and foremost, the training of teachers came up in numerous interviews as a central problem in delivering bilingual education (Caballero, 2012; Maldonado Alvarado, 2012; Ruiz López, 2012). One interviewee, a teacher for thirty-six years and a member of a radical offshoot of the teacher's union that promotes pueblos originarios rights, said bluntly, "bilingual education does not exist in Mexico" (Soberanes Bojórquez, 2012). In addition to a lack of properly trained teachers, there are inadequate bilingual teaching materials and, worse, a practice in SNTE whereby bilingual teachers are sent to teach in communities that speak a different indigenous language than their own (Pale Pech, 2012), as discussed in Chapter 2. In this scenario, teachers resort to teaching in Spanish, just as they do when they have not received training to implement a bilingual agenda but are sent to communities that require or desire one (Ruiz López, 2012).

The production of Spanish-only texts for schools also makes mother tongue languages less compelling, as does exposure to Spanish-only media, and family or community memories and narratives about discrimination or persecution for using indigenous languages in public spaces. In interviews across all six communities in Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador, I heard numerous horror stories about students who spoke in their mother tongue in school and were publicly humiliated, beaten, or tormented. Punishments such as being hit by a teacher or administrator were the most common, while others were less common, such as one interviewee's recounting of having to hold clods of ant-filled dirt in his hands while kneeling in front of the class (Anonymous, 2012a).

These traumatic experiences form collective identities whereby originarios tried to distance themselves from anything that would mark them as targets of abuse. For example, Fernando Soberanes, head of the Coalition of Indigenous Teachers and Promoters of Oaxaca (CMPIO), a renegade subgroup of teachers devoted to improving education in originario communities, commented that "people want to be urban, they want to change themselves to not be discriminated against. Their mother tongue marks them as indigenous, so they want to drop it" (Soberanes Bojórquez, 2012). CMPIO is one of the only visible organizations in Oaxaca pushing SNTE to apply the bilingual, intercultural educational programming mandated by the SEP, and it is operating in a highly politicized, resource-crunched environment that may undermine its success. But the commitment of its members provides hope that mother tongue education will continue to grow as a part of cultural rights claims, especially as speakers see mother tongue education as rights worth demanding rather than something that will single them out for persecution.

The case of language as an indicator of cultural accommodation operates somewhat differently in Mexico than in Turkey and El Salvador. Copala Triquis continue to speak their mother tongue in homes and in public spaces within their communities despite the legacies of discrimination against

them. This is similar to Acteal, where Tzotzils have been able to retain their mother tongue as the dominant language of daily life. In both Mexico cases, the claim for cultural rights is not an *express* claim for language rights. Rather, Triqui claims to language are an integral part of the right to cultural practices writ large, including the right to political autonomy and to return to Copala from their displacement in Oaxaca City. This visually manifests itself, for example, through chalk slogans written in Triqui on the ground in front of the government palace in Oaxaca City. Only Triqui speakers can read it and respond to it, but any observer can see that language is a mobilization tool.

As one scholar in Oaxaca told me, "though linguistic heritage is so rich, linguistic rights have not been a specific demand. Linguistic rights are seen as part of cultural or territorial rights" (Sorrozo Polo, 2012). In Turkey and El Salvador, by contrast, mother tongues have been lost to ethnic majority languages, and therefore linguistic rights are a much more explicit demand. For Triquis, the right to culture includes the right to speak their language, but it also includes the right to wear huipils, to self-governance through usos y costumbres, and to be free from paramilitary violence. They are mobilized for cultural rights, but meaningful granting of these rights includes political and economic rights as well. In short, MASJC has mobilized to shame the government at both state and federal levels into not just cooperating with Triqui rights claims, but to cooperate with the government's own legally inscribed rights provisions.

Conclusion: multicultural Mexico?

Though both Tzotzil and Triqui communities in Acteal, Chiapas and San Juan Copala, Oaxaca, have been subject to paramilitary violence and poor state accommodation, they have practiced shaming and claiming to different degrees and through different tactics. The Las Abejas contingent in Chiapas created powerful public narratives that have highly mobilized their population through discourses of memorialization in songs, communiqués, slogans, and court cases. Though Las Abejas use extra-institutional means, much of their mobilization practices are at least locally institutionalized and use a broad array of claiming and shaming tactics. In contrast, MASJC-aligned Triquis in Oaxaca have produced less narrative and are less mobilized. For example, though visible during the protracted Oaxaca City sit-in, MASJC Triquis have not managed to package their narratives for wide external consumption and rely instead on their physically displaced presence rather than their stories to gain an audience. The MASJC autonomy declaration document is one of few printed examples of their claims, whereas Las Abejas have hundreds of documents, many of which are available on their website, using narrative about the 1997 massacre to push for state cooperation with their claims for rights and justice. Triqui shaming and claiming tactics have been less effective in mobilizing people than those in Acteal's Tzotzil community because their memories of violence have not been well packaged into relatable

narratives. However, it is possible that this may change over time, as Triqui displacement and sit-ins have continued into 2016. Both communities are only asking for state cooperation with, and enforcement of, legal provisions for indigenous self-determination that already exist on paper. In this way, both groups are thus asking states to make good on their own previously negotiated commitments rather than asking for accommodation of new rights claims.

State accommodation patterns also inform ways that marginalized communities in Mexico channel memories of violence into narratives that are subsequently used to shame and claim. National-level factors such as institutional design, constitutional provisions, and usos y costumbres all affect political accommodation of originarios in both Chiapas and Oaxaca. Political, economic, and cultural policies and practices can and do specifically inhibit cultural rights in Mexico, including how the teacher's union and SEP together have generated education programs that prioritize administrative hierarchies over the needs of indigenous learners. Yet these structural processes of inclusion and exclusion do not tell the full story as to why and how indigenous communities shame and claim differently. Communities tell the rest themselves when they narrate memories of violence for public consumption.

At a broader level, this and the preceding chapter have looked at what community narratives and accommodation policies tell us about Mexico's commitment to multiculturalism and democratization. Constitutional reforms, the legalization of usos y costumbres, and a decentralization of power under federal arrangements all have the potential to provide a structural environment to accommodate pueblos originarios. Yet pressure to assimilate and cooperate with political party agendas has manifested itself in violence and terror despite the package of institutional accommodations for indigenous citizens. Ongoing economic marginalization, in addition to inadequate bilingual schooling held in place by a fierce teacher's union, has further compounded the marginalization of indigenous Mexicans. Through strategies of political, economic, and cultural co-optation, the Mexican state continues to favor assimilation of, rather than cooperation with, a diverse citizenry. Nonetheless, many groups like Las Abejas and MASJC push back through memorialization ceremonies, communiqués, marches, sit-ins, petitions, and negotiations with local government officials, using memories of violence to shame their state and claim rights they have already been promised.

Notes

1 Huipils worn by Triqui women are large squares of red, woven and beribboned fabric that hang like ponchos, but reaching to the ground. Today, they are often worn over jeans and t-shirts, or other modern clothing, and thus are not perceived as "necessary," clothing. Instead, the Triqui huipil serves a symbolic purpose as what one interviewee called "the flag of the Triqui" (Swanton, 2012).
2 The city is formally called Oaxaca de Juarez. Locals refer to the state capital simply as "Oaxaca," but I use the common English name, Oaxaca City, to distinguish it from Oaxaca state.

3 These cities are often described as mestizo in the literature, though in fact much of their populations could be better described as urban indigenous. Many inhabitants are Mixtecos who have assimilated via clothing and language but retain other aspects of their cultural identities.

4 Full names of the cities are Santiago Juxtlahuaca, Asunción Tlaxiaco, and Putla de Guerrero. Though I refer to Copala as a region throughout the book, it is in fact made up of several small villages, including Agua Fría Copala, Yosoyuxi Copala, Santa Cruz Tilapa, Pajare Pérez, and La Sabana, a site of major road closures and violence during attempted returns by displaced Triquis.

5 According to researcher Francisco López Bárcenas, there are actually 35,000 Triquis, but as a result of the violence and instability many have migrated to the north-east of Mexico. See EDUCA A.C. (2010: 47), footnote 10.

6 The numbers of people killed, wounded, and displaced are all controversial because each side in the conflict has a political motive to modify them. Also, because of rampant impunity, little formal documentation has taken place. Moreover, accurate numbers of people killed are hard to obtain, in part because it is mostly community members keeping track, and they do not always publish the deaths. In an edited book of testimonies, Reina says that more than twenty people have been killed (MASJC and Cilia Olmos, 2011: 40). De Marinis, citing journalistic sources, says that between August 2005 and November 2009, there were thirty registered deaths in the region (2011: 5, footnote 8). A flyer handed out by displaced Triqui children in the Oaxacan Zócalo on February 15, 2012, stated that more than twenty-two people had been killed (Consejo Autónomo Comunitario de San Juan Copala, 2012), and another flyer handed out three weeks prior says that there have been more than thirty people assassinated, raped, and tortured (Copala, 2012). When Triquis petitioned the Finnish embassy to help return them to their communities (selected because of the murder of a Finnish human rights observer in the caravan returning to Copala in 2010), the newspaper reporting the incident cited more than thirty people shot down (*Tiempo de Oaxaca*, 2012).

7 The numbers of displaced people are also highly contested and vary dramatically depending on whether one is citing a government, MULT (Movement for Triqui Unification and Struggle), UBISORT, or MASJC (Autonomous Municipality of San Juan Copala) source. The number 300 attempts to take neither the highest nor lowest estimates of displaced from each group and this figure was often used in Oaxacan discourse and sometimes by the media.

8 Paramilitaries are described as "armed men pertaining to groups economically assisted by their government and supporting the police state" (Municipio Autónoma de San Juan Copala and Cilia Olmos, 2011: 70).

9 Reina, a MASJC spokesperson, is confusingly identified several times by Cilia Olmos in his 2011 book as both "Reina" and "Reyna." I use the spelling she dictated to me in our interview.

10 The displaced population of Triquis in Oaxaca City was my main point of contact with the Triqui community, a distinction from other cases in this book where I was in both urban centers and also home communities. Biased treatment by the media, minimal academic documentation, and constant contention over the facts of the mobilization for cultural rights claim-making made the Triqui case ripe for further ethnographic work.

11 Especially Articles 7–13.

12 For a historical account of the role of mayordomos in the mid-twentieth century, see Javier Parra Mora and Hernández Díaz (1994: 114–15).

13 This is a widely known fact in Oaxaca, and is presented in the grassroots publication of MASJC and Cilia Olmos (2011: 15–16).

14 For a discussion of the 2006 Oaxaca protests, see Denham and Collective (2008: 74–83).

15 For a timeline of mestizo actions that influenced Triquis in Copala, see page 85 in Javier Parra Mora (1993).
16 This juxtaposes the nature of people in the Triqui baja to the Triqui alta community of Chicahuaxtla, whose population is said to descend from a woman, which explains the non-violent nature of the population there (Sandoval, 2012).
17 Sandoval related this as an origin story, and he also conveyed an astute analysis of politico-economic reasons for the conflict.

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4 Turkey

Memory, "mountain Turks," and the politics of Turkification

The democratization project in Turkey is about forgetting.

(Leyla Nezi, 2009, anthropologist and oral historian)

After climbing many flights of concrete stairs to a bustling office overlooking Dersim's central square, I met Hüseyin Aygün, a leading human rights attorney in Dersim who has published several books on the history of 1938. A dedicated, mustachioed man whose eyes sparkle despite the gravity of his work, Aygün leaned forward across his file-laden desk to describe the effect of 1938 on different generations of Alevi Kurds in Dersim:

> Lots of old people say "we are guilty, we deserved that punishment, so why bring it up again?" This is psychological trauma – instead of accusing the murderers, they accuse themselves. They are afraid to take on the state and have the same thing happen again. It is interesting, and there is a contradiction. *People are afraid, but they still speak* … "A new '38" is the phrase said by people when they are protesting the state – "*are you going to make a new 1938 for us?*"
>
> (Aygün, 2011, emphasis mine)

Aygün served as Dersim's Member of Parliament for the Republican People's Party (CHP) from 2011 to 2015, before a falling out with the party. He has raised the issue of the 1938 massacre in political, civil, and judicial contexts, using narratives about remembered violence on behalf of his constituents and clients.

This chapter explores memories of violence and the narratives used to publicize them as a new generation of Kurdish activists challenge state policies of ethnic minority marginalization. I show how interactions between memories and narratives of violence, as well as minority accommodations by the Turkish state, shape the degree and type of shaming and claiming performed by Kurds in Turkey. This and the following chapter incorporate data from more than 60 open-ended interviews and multiple mobilization observations over four periods in Turkey from 2009 to 2013. Language rights campaigns serve as an indicator of cultural rights claims, as language remains a primary

cultural battleground in Turkey. I present empirical vignettes regarding how Kurds in Turkey's Southeast navigate their civic identities in relation to their ethnic minority status and how they use memories of violence, encapsulated in narratives, to shame the state into acknowledging their rights petitions. Though the Turkish state itself has been only minimally responsive to these claims, Turkey's quest for increased access to the international community via its European Union (EU) bid, as well as the Justice and Development Party's (AKP's) electoral strategy targeting conservative Kurdish voters, has caused the state to think more strategically about how it handles calls for increased accommodations from minority citizens.

Minorities in Turkey

> Kurdistan is a multiethnic, multireligious, multilinguistic [*sic*] society.
> (Mustafa Gündoğdu, Kurdish Human Rights Project Officer)

Turkey, despite the intentions of its founders to create a homogenous nation-state, is ethnically and religiously diverse. Yet this diversity remains so politically sensitive and controversial that there is only limited data about its scope. Of the approximately 77 million citizens of Turkey, Alevis, referring to a smaller Islamic sect whose members can be ethnically Turkish or Kurdish, constitute 10–33 percent (Kaya, 2009: 8), while roughly 70–75 percent of the population is ethnically Turkish and 18 percent is ethnically Kurdish (CIA, 2011).[1] The 7–12 percent of the total non-Turkish, non-Muslim "other" population includes 60,000 Armenians, 23,000 Jews, 16,000 Rum Orthodox Christians, and some 15,000 Syrian Orthodox Christians (Kaya, 2009: 8) and smaller numbers of Greeks, Caucasians, Caferis, Rum, and Laz people (CIA, 2011). Religiously, most Turks are Sunni, a major Islamic sect, but many are not. Broad characterization of Turkey's religious composition misses the details of identification that form the basis of social and political conflict. The US Government's *CIA World Factbook*, for example, does not distinguish Alevis from what it classifies as a 99.8 percent Sunni Muslim population (CIA, 2011).

In addition to tremendous variation of religious practices within Sunnism, Kurds are also divided between Sunni and Alevi groups. The majority of Kurds in Dersim are Alevi, which creates a double stigmatization for them, as for Armenian citizens of Turkey, who are both ethnic *and* religious minorities. Religious ritual observances differ dramatically between Sunnis and Alevis, with Alevis frequently culturally identifying more with Turkish Alevis than Sunni Kurds (van Bruinessen, 1994: 6, 17).[2] Alevism is closer to Shi'ism than to Sunni Islam, as Alevis follow the teachings of the Twelve Imams of Shi'ism.

There is also a major language divide among Kurds. Though often lumped together under the term "Kurdish," there are in fact three main Kurdish languages that are mutually unintelligible: Kurmanji, which boasts the largest

Figure 4.1 Map of Turkey showing locations of Dersim/Tunceli and Istanbul (Copyright d-maps: www.d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car= 4145&lang=en. Names and arrows added by author)

population of speakers identified ethnically by the same label; Sorani, which is mostly spoken by Iraqi and Iranian Kurds; and Zazaki, spoken by ethnic Zaza people, including Zaza Alevi Kurds in Dersim (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 63; van Bruinessen, 1994: 19). There is much debate among scholars about the relationship between these three languages but I do not weigh in. The majority of Kurds in Turkey speak Kurmanji and they dominate the linguistic rights movement, though Zazaki-speaking Alevi Kurds in Dersim are forging their own regional movement.

Many Alevis maintain an uneasy connection to Sunni Kurds, and the Turkish government has exploited religious differences to prevent the formation of a larger Kurdish autonomy movement (van Bruinessen, 1994: 7). Religious, linguistic, and cultural factionalism of the larger Kurdish community came up repeatedly in interviews, with many people insisting that the state has fostered intra-Kurdish discord to prevent large-scale collaborative organizing. While Kurdish nationalist leaders have also essentialized Kurdishness for their own political purposes, the Turkish state has been a central actor in creating tropes of essentialist identity that have prevented larger-scale Kurdish collaboration.

As in El Salvador during the civil war, the state alienated factions of Kurds from each other through the creation of village guard systems that required some Kurds to report on guerilla activities of their neighbors. These external barriers to unity exacerbated tribal tensions that long characterized social relations in south-east Anatolia. Mesut Yeğen, professor of sociology at Istanbul Şehir University, points out that "Turkey recognizes the potential power of an Alevi–Sunni Kurdish coalition and did nasty things to prevent it. In Tunceli [Dersim], the town is almost divided in two – half supports the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] or the BDP [Peace and Democracy Party], and the other half supports the CHP" (2011). In part, this is due to strategic recruitment by CHP of party candidates from Dersim, who elicit hometown pride in voters who would otherwise vote BDP.[3] For example, a national leader of CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, is originally from a village near Dersim, and his parents were exiles from Dersim in the aftermath of 1938.

Alevi participation in CHP is then not simply assimilation into a mainstream political party but indicative of a complex relationship between politicians' Aleviness and their role as Turkish citizens. Dersim electoral allegiance to CHP also has to do with CHP being starkly secularist, which historically appealed to socialist-oriented Dersim Alevis. While the intricate political party identity matrix is beyond my scope here, it is worth noting that identity politics in the region continue to be reinvented for the purposes of representation. The dissolution of the Kurdish BDP was followed by its reinvention as the People's Democratic Party (HDP), a coalition party that brought together Kurdish, socialist, and other progressive civil society organization bases for electoral victory in 2015. While HDP perhaps represents a victorious unification of previously divided constituencies, state "divide and conquer" tactics have fragmented Kurdish identity and mobilization capacity.

Turkey's purportedly homogenous demographic facade is crumbling in the face of electoral political victories of ethnic minority candidates, the EU application process, and the conflict involving Kurds and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), increasingly referred to as Daesh.[4] The new visibility of diversity has only deepened identity politics, as ethnic and religious minority status become new layers at play in political behavior. Yeğen told me, "if a Kurd is an Alevi, being Alevi is more important than being Kurdish" (2011). In other words, religion takes precedence over ethnicity or nationality as a vector of identification. Many other interviewees echoed this sentiment, insisting that Alevis and Sunnis first identify with other co-religionists and only secondarily with Kurdish or Turkish co-ethnics. These layers of identity are at play in a competitive discursive arena, where different kinds of actors want sometimes oppositional elements of personal identity to be most salient at the community level. In Dersim, political parties as well as civil society organizations have prioritized different identity layers as they seek out the strongest constituent bases. The temptation to oversimplify the potent diversity that exists among Turkish citizens obscures the real challenges that exist for Turkey – to meet the needs of all citizens, not just the ethnic and religious majority.

A terminological disclaimer is necessary here, to reiterate what I outlined in the opening pages of Chapter 1. Though I write about Kurds as an "ethnic minority" in Turkey, many Kurds reject this label because, as some point out, they are the ethnic *majority* in Southeast Turkey and envision the region as part of greater Kurdistan, a homeland for Kurdish people. This subset of Kurds do not want to categorize themselves as a minority because they see themselves as a separate nation comparable to Basque or Catalan in Spain, rather than a minority inside a Turkish-dominated state. Nonetheless, from a statist perspective the minority label applies to Kurds, and I use it for the sake of maintaining terminological consistency.

It is also important to point out that Alevi Kurds in Dersim are not necessarily more mobilized than Kurds as a whole in Turkey, but that the case is interesting because of the manner in which they are highly mobilized. Instead of guerilla warfare, an option employed by some Kurds in Turkey and neighboring countries, residents of Dersim are strategically using narratives laced with memories of violence to express grievances and challenge state policies of cultural domination. Dersim thus serves as a case study of how memories of a specific violent incident can be turned into powerful narratives that are useful in attempts to shame states into cooperating with certain demands.

This and the following chapter lay out the divergent ways that narratives of violence have been used by Kurds and Armenians for shaming and claiming against the Turkish state in hopes of gaining new cultural rights such as the right to mother tongue education. I argue that different avenues available to translate memories of violence into public narratives – with these avenues defined as forums and tactics for speaking out about

grievances – as well as mixed levels of state accommodation explain why Kurds are highly mobilized for cultural rights, while Armenians have tended towards assimilation. The different physical and emotional legacies available to Kurdish and Armenian cultural rights activists come from their historical relationships with the Turkish state and the way that memories of violence have been processed within communities. These memories operate as central tools in trying to broker increased state cooperation for minority rights implementation and protection.

Dersim, the 1938 massacre, and the Kurdish "problem"

> To be Kurdish is a dangerous thing in Turkey.
> (Sami Tan, President, Istanbul Kurdish Institute, 2011)

Dersim residents have a long history of experiencing forced assimilation as part of Turkey's "Turkification" policies – measures to incorporate ethnic and religious minorities residing in Turkey's territorial boundaries into a Turkish identity. In 1925, just a few years after the nation's founding, then Prime Minister Ismet İnönü made a speech declaring, "We shall, at any price, turkicize those who live in our country, and destroy those who rise up against the Turks and Turkdom" (in van Bruinessen, 1994: 9). Though the specific content has changed over time, Turkification policies have included laws and practices such as Turkish-only schooling (Aras, 2014: 64), forced secularization by closing religious schools, forced resettlement (van Bruinessen, 1994: 8–9), conversion to Sunnism, and encouragement of interethnic marriages to dilute non-Turkish customs. Strong tribal affiliations among Alevi Kurds made these policies particularly contested, and tribal leaders led a series of rebellions against Turkish state representatives (van Bruinessen, 1994: 2–9).

Early on, Dersim earned a reputation as being a problem area. In part, this was because its residents refused to participate in the Russo-Turkish wars, the First World War, or the Turkish War of Independence (Chaliand, 1993: 58). In 1920, Dersim Alevis resisted nationalizing policies (Olson, 1989: 27), thus challenging the Turkification of the region during its transition from Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic. To try to co-opt traditional leaders into serving state agendas, the state brought Dersim Alevi tribal leaders into their own local government structures (N. Yıldız, 2011). The resulting community parliaments may have to some extent served as a means of early political accommodation for Alevi Kurds, but also as spaces of political and cultural co-optation.

In 1937 and 1938, Alevi Kurdish residents of Dersim fought a guerilla war against state military troops occupying their territory, one of the last autonomous regions of the country. In their planning, military officials underestimated the willingness of *Dersimis*, residents of Dersim, to give up their lives rather than sacrifice cultural and political autonomy. With roughly 65,000–70,000 inhabitants in the 1930s (van Bruinessen, 1994: 2), official

reports document that nearly 10 percent of Dersim's population was killed during a seventeen-day offensive in the spring of 1938, though Kurds say the numbers were considerably higher (van Bruinessen, 1994: 6). In one interview I was told 11,000 were killed in 1938, with more than 50,000 Alevis killed during the 1937–8 period (Çifçi, 2011). Kurds hidden in caves and barns were burned alive, women and girls committed suicide by jumping into the Munzur River, the military dispensed poison gas, and towns and countrysides were bombed from the air and subject to artillery fire on the ground (Chaliand, 1993: 58). Van Bruinessen writes that the term "ethnocide," an attempt to destroy an ethnic identity, is the most appropriate label for the violence against Alevi Kurds in Dersim (van Bruinessen, 1994: 6). The military finally isolated the community to such a degree that, by the summer of 1938, guerilla attacks ended and violence diminished. A larger-than-life stone statue of a Dersimi martyr from 1938 now sits along a main road in Dersim, his back to the jagged mountain range and his gaze fixedly pointed towards the town's current inhabitants. This and other visual reminders of 1938 serve as material for memory retention and narrative production in contemporary Dersim.

Though government documents, historical works, and contemporary Turkish politicians refer to the events of 1938 as the Dersim Rebellion, this is considered by some to be an inaccurate label (Aygün, 2011). "Rebellion" implies violence towards the state rather than a systematic slaughter by the military. A Dersimi civil society leader who has contributed to the Dersim-based organization, The Dersim History Project, told me "there was no rebellion against the state at that time" (Aygün, 2011). Others, such as Kurdish scholar Ramazan Aras, do sometimes use the term "rebellion" (Aras, 2014: 51, 58). Though the exact nature of Kurdish responses to state assimilation projects in 1938 may not be known, the end result was a large-scale massacre of Alevi Kurds in Dersim by the Turkish military.

Dersim's cultural rights claims are in part a result of its status as a community educated and assimilated enough to know how to engage the state to its benefit, while simultaneously remaining independent enough to retain a distinct cultural identity. Aspects of Dersim's political life have remained unassimilated for generations, even from that of other Kurdish communities in the Southeast. For example, in the 1970s Marxists and the New Left in Dersim generated activism distinct from that happening in larger national Kurds movements (N. Yıldız, 2011). Even though assimilation projects were successful at changing certain benchmarks such as language and to some extent government, Dersimis have maintained their independence throughout time and have not wanted to conform to national norms or submit to Turkification policies (van Bruinessen, 1994: 2).

Dersim's self-identity as a persecuted region in 1938 has been reinforced in more recent times. During the 1980s and 1990s, Dersim, like much of Southeast Turkey, was besieged by the civil war between the Turkish military and the PKK. Turks and the international community predominantly associated Kurds with the PKK and its call for the creation of a separate,

socialist Kurdish state encompassing part of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Even as the PKK is listed as a terrorist group by Turkey and the United States, it is also part of the fight against ISIS in Syria and remains a leading actor in the Kurdish rights movement.

The civil war between the PKK and the Turkish military showed just how far both sides were willing to go to reach their goals. More than 30,000 people, including PKK guerilla members, soldiers, and civilians, have been killed since fighting began in 1984 (Marcus, 2007: 1; Minority Rights Group International, 2011). More than 1 million people have been displaced. Justifying its militarism with an appeal to the territorial integrity norm, the Turkish state maintained a state of emergency in the south-east until 2002[5] to prevent the formation of an independent Kurdistan. However, the number of people supporting separatism has waned since the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, and the PKK has become one of many actors rather than the dominating platform for Kurdish demands, particularly in Dersim.[6] Violence during the civil war reinforced the memories of violence held by Alevi Kurds in Dersim stemming from the 1938 massacre. Actors that Jelin calls "memory entrepreneurs" (2003: 33) created powerful narratives to convey their stories to broad audiences. These narratives, in the context of the cultural and structural environment in which they are maintained, lent themselves to a range of venues for shaming the Turkish state as part of a rights-claiming agenda. I turn to these rights mobilization venues in the following section.

Shaming and claiming movements in Turkey's Southeast

> The state wants us to think they are bringing democracy but they are not.
> (Hasan Ölgün, 2011, Teachers Union of Dersim)

> I'm not hopeful about Turkey's ability to democratize, but I am hopeful about the Kurdish movement's power.
> (Anonymous, 2011b, Member of The Oppressed People's Socialist Party, ESP)

As Benedict Anderson illustrated, imagination is a key component of nation-building (1991), and many countries fictionalize their unity through a variety of national symbols. The idea that a modern state could only evolve out of a homogenous populace has been reinforced through the Turkish government's public education program and national myth-making. Schools are ideal settings for states looking to create collective identities since the curriculum, classroom materials, and language of instruction are all subject to state approval.

Coşkun and colleagues at the Diyarbakır Institute for Political and Social Research created a report that addresses the role of imagination in Turkish nation-building in relation to consequences of banning mother tongue education for Kurdish students:

> [T]he first thing that needs to be done for the creation of a national identity is the creating of an imagined common memory. The teaching of history is designed in accordance with the historical memory needed by the nation-state; *events believed to negatively affect the people are either passed over quickly, or ignored, or distorted.* On the other hand, events believed to be of critical importance for the memories are parsed in detail and, if necessary, exaggerated.
>
> (Coşkun et al., 2011: 17, emphasis mine)

Just as remembering is critical to forming the imagined community, so is forgetting. As one memory scholar puts it, "[i]n order to ensure national cohesion there is a need to forget events that represent a threat to unity and remember heroes and glory days" (Misztal, 2003: 17). In Turkey, selective remembering forms the basis for the imagined unity of the state, but Kurds are challenging this narrative with their own counter-narratives.

Institutional mobilization

Memory-driven mobilization happens both institutionally and contentiously. While contentious claims tend to get more media attention as they often result in military or police action, institutional channels for claim-making are also dynamic. This section briefly explores the development of a new Kurdish studies program, the work of a human rights non-governmental organization (NGO), and Kurdish political party participation as examples of institutional mobilization. It is followed by a discussion of contentious Kurdish mobilization and illustrated with examples of Kurdish language rights claims.

Ramazan Aras grew up in Southeast Turkey, did his PhD in Canada, and now teaches anthropology at Mardin's Artuklu University, near the Syrian border. Seated across a narrow desk, Aras squints through the golden sunshine pouring through his office window and assembles his words. He tells me about his own legacy of remembered violence and how his childhood, spent as a Kurd in the peak of the civil war, shaped his current involvement in the new Kurdish studies taking shape at Artuklu. Aras is the quintessential rooted cosmopolitan, vibrantly aware of the international community, able to publish analyses in multiple languages, but dedicated to the issues of his home community not far from Mardin. He is a memory entrepreneur, but also a scholar of memory politics. Aras asserts, "every single member of the Kurdish community has been influenced by violence. Everybody has a story, everybody has a memory, everybody has a family member who is part of the movement. Everybody has a memory of state violence" (2011).

The degree to which memories of violence permeate people's lives may depend in part on how they navigate their public Kurdish identities. But Aras argues that violence was so pervasive in the south-east that people would be subjected to it simply by bearing markers of Kurdishness – a

name, a skin color, or the birth location of one's father, which is printed on mandatory state identification cards. Also, because experiences of violence were so widespread throughout Kurdish communities, the ability to remember those experiences collectively is strong, even if it is not always openly discussed. As the sun dipped low and our meeting waned, Aras recounted:

> There is this memory, underground. In collective punishment, the whole family is punished, *every single person is affected*. In the 1990s, there were checkpoints. Generally, if you are Kurdish you are stopped, every passenger is taken out of the vehicle, if you are a woman, a man will search you, and there are insults. So you have this daily practice of violation and humiliation. *There is an "otherization" of Kurds* as dirty, brown-skinned.
>
> (2011, emphasis mine)

Aras's reflection on these violations, years after they occurred, demonstrates the complexity of the human psyche in integrating powerful emotions and sensory experiences into one's identity. The "otherization" he describes becomes a shaming and claiming tool when held up to the light of democratic criteria for states.

Aras and colleagues at Artuklu are using these powerful discourses of remembered violence in connection with the founding of a Kurdish language and cultural studies program at Artuklu. Approved by the Turkish Council of Higher Education in 2009, Artuklu is one of only a few universities in Turkey to now offer undergraduate and post-graduate studies in Kurdish language and culture. Domestic institutional approval for this program resulted in part from pressure as part of the EU membership application process, which Turkey first initiated in 1987 after decades as an associate member with various trade agreements in place with Europe. Though the membership talks stalled significantly in 2006, institutional channels for Kurdish cultural rights such as the Artuklu program have been opened as token elements of the state's good faith project to address critiques of its treatment of minority citizens.

In the bustling Diyarbakır Human Rights Association office, Reyhan Yalçındağ echoes Aras's recounting of pervasive violence in the south-east. She also connects remembered violence to a collective emotion, courage, which can be channeled into "fighting" for future rights:

> Most families lost a father, brother, or sister, or they lost their village, or their sister was raped. It is impossible to forget all this. *Not to forget … it helps us to be more courageous*. We fight for the next generation. We believe we can find a solution in a peaceful and democratic way under a new constitution.
>
> (2011, emphasis mine)

Yalçındağ sees memories of violence as something that can fuel mass action to achieve rights and, as a lawyer, she looks for ways to institutionally protect rights for Kurds. If Kurds were granted greater political accommodation through decentralization, for example, extra-institutional (contentious) rights claims could be reduced or exchanged for institutional claims.

The kind of new Constitution that Yalçındağ envisions may be more likely now that a Kurdish political party has entered Parliament with broad constituency backing. Though numerous Kurdish parties have been shut down by the central government and accused of being PKK-affiliated, Kurdish parties have continually reinvented themselves and maintained a presence in the electoral arena over the last several decades, beginning with the formation of the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Labor Party (HEP), in the early 1990s (Watts, 2010). By 2011, the Kurdish BDP had achieved significant electoral victories throughout the south-east, including governance of municipal offices in Dersim and Diyarbakır.

In 2014, BDP was absorbed by the HDP, which built a rainbow coalition model that involved a range of interest groups including Alevis, leftists, workers, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) voters, and conservative Kurds who had previously voted for AKP. This rainbow coalition approach allowed HDP to break through the 10-percent electoral threshold to enter Parliament, something never before achieved by a Kurdish party. Reaching the 10-percent threshold to gain Parliamentary access is the result of institutional mobilization sustained by narratives of rights claims made by many actors within the HDP coalition. The effects of this new form of representation for Kurdish rights at the national level have yet to be seen as of this writing.

The 1938 massacre had already entered party political discourse prior to HDP's victory with a botched opportunity for state apology by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on November 24, 2011. In remarks to AKP members that were later made public, Erdoğan acknowledged that "Dersim is one of the most tragic events of our near history. It is a disaster waiting to be enlightened and boldly questioned," and apologized for the role of the state in the violence (Al Jazeera, 2011). However, Erdoğan's apology appeared more strategic than apologetic. It riled members of AKP's rival political party, CHP, which incorporated cadres of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the party in power at the time of the massacre, and therefore responsible for ordering it. CHP maintains significant support in Dersim as the party has recruited prominent Dersimi politicians into its ranks. In this instance, AKP could have safely administered a real apology for 1938 without claiming responsibility. Erdoğan's side-stepping of this opportunity reminds us how deeply entrenched Turkey's forgetting of self-perpetuated national myths continues to be.

Contentious mobilization

Extra-institutional or contentious mobilization in Turkey takes place in many forms. Since the 1990s there has been a resurgence of ethnically motivated cultural activity and associated social movements in Dersim as

well as throughout the south-east. During my fieldwork in 2011, numerous residents talked about the massacres of 1938 as a major turning point in their consciousness regarding their status as citizens in Turkey. Regardless of the type of specific mobilization that they were engaged in, many people I spoke with talked about drawing on the collective memory of 1938 to fuel their activism. Sometimes the connection to 1938 was explicit, such as in 2011 at protests in Dersim and throughout the south-east, when demonstrators chanted to police and military personnel, "Are you going to make a new '38 for us?" Yet memories of state-perpetrated violence also manifest themselves in more discreet kinds of contentious mobilization for cultural rights. This includes mobilizations that may seem insignificant from the outside but in fact are considered major transgressions by the Turkish state.

Many contentious acts among Kurds in Turkey take place around language and the use of Kurdish language in public venues. In the 1930s, the Turkish government, in an effort to make Turkish language dominant in the Southeast, enacted a widespread program of renaming provinces and towns throughout the Republic. On December 25, 1935, the Turkish government changed the town name from Dersim, roughly translated meaning "silver gate," to Tunceli, meaning "land of bronze." Tunceli is a resoundingly Turkish name that redefines a previously Kurdish-named space. The renaming of Dersim happened just three years before the 1938 massacre, and the events are linked in community discourses of historical memory. Many locals continue to call the town Dersim, both out of tradition and as a means of refuting the Turkification policies that changed it in the first place. The divide between those who refer to the town as Dersim and those who call it Tunceli signifies broader political alliances and also highlights how the act of naming is itself an act of identity mobilization. While the state wields institutional power to make language choices for its citizens, citizens may contest those choices through their everyday vernaculars. In this book, I follow the labeling practices of interviewees in the south-east and refer to the town as Dersim.

In another example of contentious mobilization of language, in 2010, Dersim city workers installed bilingual Zazaki–Turkish signs in the municipal building to indicate the various offices and services performed by the municipality. Though using the Kurdish language in government functions was illegal at the time, municipal officials refused to comply with central government policy, and one of them proudly gave me a tour of the building, pointing out the modest black and gold signs. Each one features the Zaza word for the particular office title, for example, Secretary and Treasurer, underneath the Turkish word and is placed at front of each functionary doorway.

Multiple interviewees contextualized the importance of the signs as part of Dersim's historic legacy as a stronghold of Kurdish culture that couldn't be broken by the Turkish state even with the 1938 massacre. As Dersimis chose to die rather than be Turkified in 1938, they were also willing to incur state anger over the signs rather than subvert their own cultural agendas. Though this may sound like a dramatic comparison, Dersimis used these analogies to

reflect their self-perception as sustainers of Kurdish culture from 1938 through to the present.

Q, W, and X are letters in both Zazaki and Kurmanji alphabets, but do not exist in Latinized Turkish script. For decades, following the 1980 coup in Turkey, use of these letters in written or spoken language could result in steep prison terms, in line with the banning of Kurdish languages from any government institution. Despite this risk, Kurds have regularly marched holding signs demanding the legalization of these letters to enable them to freely use their mother tongues. While in 2011, no action had been taken against the municipality to remove the signs, many Dersim residents and municipal workers mentioned the potential for state reprisal.

Employing Kurdish languages for anything remotely political can be considered anti-state and therefore a crime in Turkey under Article 220, part of AKP's updated 2004 penal code. Article 220 is primarily designed to regulate organized crime, but has sometimes been employed to essentially equate the use of Kurdish languages for political purposes with membership in an illegal organization. This legal mismatch between Kurdish language use and terrorist activity is a state tactic to deter Kurdish activists from cultural rights activities by criminally charging them as if they were PKK members.

Though bilingual signs in government offices and other public venues have become the norm in many countries around the world, Article 220 and other language restrictions have prevented this in Turkey. The illegality of Kurdish language use until very recently, in combination with Turkey's highly centralized government structure, meant that the government in Ankara would actually intervene to censor Kurdish language use in Kurdish-majority municipalities. For example, in Diyarbakır during early 2011, members of the Kurdish BDP were charged with violating Turkish language laws for distributing pamphlets about a women's empowerment program in Kurdish. Making municipal services available in Kurdish through installing signs or handing out pamphlets about local government programs might seem non-contentious, but, considering Turkey's historical context of forcing minorities to assimilate, they constitute significant acts of non-compliance.

To put the Dersim sign installation in context, while I was in Diyarbakır in 2011, the municipal government there was coming under fire from Ankara-based government officials for hanging Kurdish-language flyers around the city. These flyers announced the upcoming celebration of *Newroz*, the Kurdish new year celebration that has been adopted as a day of demonstration for Kurdish cultural rights. While the holiday itself only became legal in Turkey in 2000, at that time the Turkish government Turkicized its name, spelling it *Nevruz* and claiming it as a Turkish rite of spring. Using the Kurdish spelling "Newroz" rather than "Nevruz" was officially forbidden into the 2010s and may have explained the flustered stand-off between Ankara officials and Kurdish municipal officials over the posters, who took turns taking them down and then rehanging them.

However, this example also points to the vagary of lines between contentious and non-contentious mobilization. By 2011, the holiday itself as well as Kurdish language use for non-political purposes had both become legal, yet the municipality was still ordered to take down the "Newroz" (Kurdish spelling) posters. Perhaps this was because of the Kurdish spelling, as written Kurdish was historically illegal, but also because the posters were considered political speech, given the event's history as a day for protest. Either way, the Newroz poster conflict is an example of a contentious act that challenged Turkish authority to dictate political and cultural norms and was rooted in Kurdish resistance to state Turkification programs.

As Kurdish languages are gradually decriminalized, these "crimes" of bilingual municipal signs and Kurdish-language place names and holiday posters may slowly become obsolete. The Turkish state has also taken measures to try to quell contentious mobilization for Kurdish cultural rights by cooperating with elements of Kurdish agendas that it deems sufficiently safe. The call for allowing Kurdish language media culminated in AKP opening TRT6, the first Kurdish-language public television station, in response to feedback given to Turkey in the EU membership application about the need for more minority media access. TRT6 began with 30-minute broadcasts in 2004 and started 24-hour programming in 2009.

Critics counter that TRT6's content is bland and folkloric, dominated by provincial music and dance shows, as well as full of Turkish cultural propaganda. There were some problematic restrictions as the station launched, clearly designed to limit the cultural impact of Kurdish media access. This included prohibiting programming such as cartoons for children in Kurdish or featuring any written Kurdish that could be used to promote language learning. Also, AKP has not taken the step of embedding the right to Kurdish-language media in the Constitution, but rather operates TRT6 at its own whim. This means that TRT6 could be closed down at any point. The potential for TRT6 as a Kurdish media station may be undercut by its role as a Turkish-governed public television station, but its very existence also signifies a shift in the visibility and permissibility of Kurdish language use in the public sphere.

Democratization and assimilation

What do all these mobilization examples and state responses mean for Turkey's democratization process? Turkey is increasingly being called a "police state" by some Kurdish activists (Yalçındağ, 2011), especially since the Gezi protests of 2013. Because of this, Turkey has been losing its hold on the notion that it is democratizing. The demonstrations in the summer of 2013 began as public protest against the demolition of Gezi Park in Istanbul's Taksim Square. But they quickly spread to Ankara and many other cities as a referendum against President Erdoğan's repressive policies and the AKP government agenda. In the aftermath of police repression during the Gezi Park protests,

organizations like Freedom House downgraded Turkey's regime rating to show that it was less "free," and now has a "downward trajectory" (Freedom House, 2015).

The increasing authoritarian tendencies of the Turkish state are visible in a range of circumstances. For example, I observed the presence of secret service officers photographing Kurdish dancing on university campuses in 2011, as some Kurdish folk dances associated with the PKK were considered illegal. Ongoing restrictions on internet access also show the extent of state control over communications, as when AKP had YouTube's website blocked in the late 2000s for hosting a video thought to denigrate Turkey's founding father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and in the 2010s for streaming a clip reported to show Erdoğan involved in a corruption scandal.

The impact of this authoritarian behavior for Kurdish activists is severe and shows how poor political accommodation can gear people towards assimilation.

> Just to be a Kurd and trying to express yourself in legal democratic process means you are at risk of going to prison. You have to choose to be yourself with your identity or to just live amorphously. Kurdish society is very divided between politicized Kurds and those who are assimilated, with a small middle ground where more assimilated people cautiously participate in small ways.
>
> (Anonymous, 2011a)

This fear plays out in the daily life of Kurdish people through constant identity negotiation, and the use of Kurdish languages in public is the most widespread example of this. To illustrate, Şükrü Aslan, an Istanbul-based Dersimi sociologist told me the following story:

> The Diyarbakır municipal government decided to set up a call center to assist residents in navigating city services. When they started doing interviews to hire people for the call center they asked applicants if they could speak Kurdish, and they all shook their heads, "oh no, we do not speak Kurdish." The interviewer said, "but many of the people who call in will only speak Kurdish, so we need to hire Kurdish speakers." "Well, of course we speak Kurdish" admitted the applicants.
>
> (2011)

As amusing as it is tragic, Aslan's vignette captures the maze of identity that Kurdish people navigate. So accustomed to seeing their ethnic identity as a liability, Kurdish applicants would rather lie to be safe than claim their cultural heritage. However, when such identity appears as an asset, Kurds are willing to claim it. In this way, language use serves as a test of freedom of expression in Turkey.

In another example, a teacher of English and Kurdish at the local university in Dersim told me: "In any province in the south-east it is less common, but

in the west and middle of Turkey, people will still be punished in the street for speaking in Kurdish. If you are talking on the phone in Kurdish, people may get angry and say 'You have to speak in Turkish, this is Turkey!'" (Yıldırm, 2011). This story was echoed by a Kurdish doctoral student who told me that he only uses Kurmanji to speak with his mother, but his mother is fearful of him being accosted, so when his mother calls she always asks him where he is. If he is at home, she will talk, but if he is out somewhere she tells him to call her once he gets home because she doesn't want him to speak Kurmanji in the street. As the vignette relates, memories of violence are always present as Kurds make choices about identity presentation.

Divergent generational responses to memories of violence have been seldom recorded in Dersim. This is partly because the town is far from intellectual centers of research and the topic is fraught with conflict. Even as the next generation of Turkish and Kurdish scholars are beginning to work on this topic, there is also a new grassroots movement in Dersim, where reviving Zazaki as a spoken language is intimately bound up with the older generation's memories of violence.

Over steaming cups of tea in a half-empty cafeteria, two young women discussed how family memories of violence led their parents to assimilate by only speaking Turkish at home. As adults, the women joined the mobilization for language rights by teaching at the newly established Dersim branch of Kurdî-De, which offers free Kurdish-language (Zazaki) classes to the community. One woman said: "At the beginning of our participation, my father and mother were afraid for me to work at Kurdî-De, but I explained the importance" (Anonymous, 2011c). Justifying their interest in Zazaki, the women said:

> We are a bridge between generations, between our mothers and our generation. When my mother went to school she spoke Turkish but only spoke mother tongue at home. But for us, we also speak Turkish at home so our relationship to our mother tongue is more deliberate. *When we speak Zazaki, we feel ourselves differently*. When we listen to our songs, listen to our grandmothers, we feel ourselves differently. *Everything begins and ends with language. Language is our existence, our culture, our traditions*. We cannot represent ourselves fully in Turkish.
>
> (Anonymous, 2011c, emphasis mine)

The women show how language is a powerful manifestation of Kurdish identity, yet they also acknowledge the way that memories of persecution affect language learning:

> There is no special way to encourage people, just say – "be brave and speak your language." When you learn a new language, it is difficult to speak, people prefer to give up and not talk. In our classes, people can understand Zazaki but are afraid of speaking. Past experiences have a big

impact, but nowadays there is great uncertainty, anything can happen. Just for using the letters QWX you can be sent to jail.

(Anonymous, 2011c)

For many, memories of persecution for something as small as using a letter of the alphabet reinforce the culture of fear that the 1938 massacres created. As Turkey's regime status as democratizing or authoritarian is not always clear, potential cultural rights activists may either mobilize their memories or choose to remain quiet out of fear of further persecution. Even in mobilized communities, many people go through periods of questioning their own choices. To decide to be proud of one's Kurdishness in Turkey today comes at a high risk, as one interviewee explained:

> Sometimes I say, "I don't want to be a Kurd." To say I am a Kurd is not advantageous. It means being against the entire system and includes torture, prison, discrimination, economic problems. People are really psychologically, emotionally, socially very tired from struggling with all these barriers. They lose their dreams. *Sometimes Kurdish people choose to be "dead" people who are living. They don't want to be seen. They assimilate.* These are people who have greater access to power.
>
> (Anonymous, 2011a: emphasis mine)

Assimilation is seen as more than just a survival mechanism, and as a tool for upward mobility (Neyzi and Kharatyan-Araqelyan, 2010: 33). Though many Alevi Kurds in Dersim are highly mobilized, other Dersimis reject the idea of mobilizing around their Kurdishness and instead assimilate into Turkish culture.

As in many minority communities, fear of state persecution can disincentivize people from mobilizing. This barrier to participation – fear – exists even in communities that have managed to gather enough momentum to act anyway. Suvari, the Kurdish youth activist in Diyarbakır, summarizes the challenges to mobilizing Kurds in the Southeast for political particpation:

> There is a fear of volunteering because it means being visible. In Kurdish areas, people are afraid because they think they will be arrested for participating in something. For example, when the Roma were organizing for their rights, the news presented it as "Roma ORGANIZING," as if it was a bad thing. To be organized in the modern meaning is quite new for people. This is not like the old way of participating by giving money to religious organizations.
>
> (2011)

As Suvari attests, fear of visibility, stemming from the remembered persecution of others who have spoken out before, can impede civil society creation.

Rights activists in Dersim have been watching what happens to people organizing in Diyarbakır, and the arrests and imprisonment of top BDP politicians and other high-level civil society leaders throughout the 2000s and 2010s has not been reassuring. The Turkish government is widely targeting Kurdish figures such as Muharrem Erbey, the Vice-President of the Human Rights Association of Diyarbakır and a symbol of state repression. Erbey, like many others, was accused of "aiding the insurgency" and imprisoned for years (Human Rights Watch, 2010). The government was quite calculated in selecting public figures such as Erbey, as well as journalists and BDP politicians, for arrest to dissuade others from speaking out (Cheterian, 2013; Hawramy, 2012; Kurdnet, 2011). Suvari commented that "Kurdish politicians were educated, and working hard, so the message is, if you work hard to accomplish something, you'll be arrested. This is a big deterrent to participation" (2011).

The structural context of Kurdish rights mobilizations

Memories prompt different behavioral responses by individuals and groups across a range of geographies and political circumstances.[7] Violence-affected ethnic minority groups that are not well accommodated by their states use public narrative to convey memories of violence to wider audiences. As discussed above, memories of past state violence, especially the 1938 massacre and the civil war, are visible in both institutional and contentious Kurdish mobilization strategies. I presented in Chapter 1 a model for how memories of violence galvanize community members to mobilize in relation to structural background factors, and I summarize these dynamics for Dersim in Figure 4.2 below.

The antecedent condition of violence, in combination with mediocre political, economic, and cultural accommodation by the state, facilitates high narrative production, which in turn has the potential to feed back into creating more narrative and influence cultural accommodation by the state. In this manner, memories of violence are instrumentally developed as tools to shame the state into considering Kurdish cultural rights claims. Though

Figure 4.2 Theoretical model of Dersimi Kurdish mobilization

many subpopulations of Kurds in Turkey are engaged in rights-claiming mobilizations, the massacre of 1938 created a specific and temporally bound incident of remembered violence that Dersimis use in pushing the state to cooperate with their claims. The following subsections elucidate the structural environment at play in the theoretical model.

Political accommodations

Since Turkey's foundation as a republic it has been a highly centralized state, controlling all political, fiscal, and administrative business through a central apparatus across highly diverse parts of the country. Kurdish group rights are not protected through any decentralized or autonomous arrangement, and the state has been long resistant to any notion of federalism. In general, Kurds put their regional or city identity above the state – they may feel little connection to Ankara, the capital, but are civically engaged at the local level. In this environment, it is no surprise that Kurds have actively vocalized their demands for state institutional redesign.

Because PKK militancy for the creation of Kurdistan dominated popular imagination for so long, the stigma of Kurdish rights equaling separatism has not been shed even today, despite the shift in Kurdish strategy since the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 (Içduygu et al., 1999: 993–4). In fact, many Kurds, including Öcalan and other PKK leaders, have been moving towards endorsement for "democratic autonomy" rather than separatism (Anonymous, 2011a). What this autonomy would look like and how it should actually take place is still a point of debate, but, in general, the discourse about what Kurds are demanding has substantially broadened in Dersim and in other urban hubs. However, the new regional conflict between Kurds and ISIS/ISIL/Daesh has given Turkey a complicated geopolitical disaster to focus on, diverting attention away from the idea of a Kurdistan in Turkey.

Many members of the Kurdish intellectual elite with whom I spoke in Istanbul, Diyarbakır, Mardin, and Dersim advocated for some type of democratic autonomy within Turkey, which has at least some precedent with the autonomous arrangement of the Kurdish region in Iraq. While there were some calls for true federalism, it seems that federalist demands serve more as a radical flank, which is useful to push towards compromise on some degree of decentralization as a halfway point. Regarding federalism, one Kurdish activist whom I spoke with conceded:

> It [federalism] is only talked about by small groups within the Kurdish community. Democratic autonomy, on the other hand, is more widely discussed, not just for the Kurdish region but for the rest of Turkey, which would mean a decentralization of the state with more power for local authorities.
>
> (Gündoğdu, 2011)

On a practical note, democratic autonomy would divide Turkey into approximately twenty-eight sections and could allow use of regional languages alongside Turkish. While journalists and other members of civil society discuss this option openly, state leaders are more reticent (Gündoğdu, 2011), reluctant to give up any degree of power.

Coşkun, an expert in constitutional law, remarked, "the state is afraid of decentralization. In 2004, AKP put forth a public administration reform draft on decentralization but the president refused to sign it. According to the draft, some powers would be shared by the regional government, but it didn't go through" (Coşkun, 2011). A Kurdish academic in Istanbul elaborated:

> Federalism is an acceptable alternative to separatism, but the state won't consider it. The Turkish public will also not accept federalism, but it is possible to do, because the state could see it as a way to stop calls for separatism. *Unofficially, it is a federal system because the regions are so disconnected from the national center*, but people want to insert this formally into the constitution and have the benefits that go with formalizing it.
>
> (Çifçi, 2011, emphasis mine)

De facto independence for municipal governments like Dersim and Diyarbakır is unlikely, but ongoing grievances about centralist policies mean that it remains in discussion. For example, a municipal worker commented: "we have just the money that the central government sends us, and they always cut it. We are so dependent on the central government" (Anonymous, 2011a). But Kurdish intellectuals disagree about what exact institutional arrangement could fix these types of problems. Yeğen explained:

> Federalism in its full sense is too much, and also not that popular among Kurds or among PKK. There are two parties, the Participatory Democracy Party (KADEP) and the Right and Liberties Party (HAKPAR) that both support federalism, and they are both influenced by the KDP [Kurdistan Democratic Party] in Iraq and think that Kurds in Turkey should have the same arrangement that Kurds in Iraq do. But a radical federalist stance is taken to make bargaining about moderate reforms more likely. Decentralization is needed, but Kurds need to present a viable arrangement to Turkey to get their [government] support.
>
> (2011)

Again, Yeğen's statement reinforces the impression that federalism is discussed only as a radical flank, whereas the realistic goal is a lighter version of decentralization. Many Kurds and their allies are hopeful that a new institutional arrangement could be democratic autonomy, a watered-down version of federalism that would allow for regional cultural practices. At the same time, a necessary skepticism pervades conversations about democratic

autonomy because the Turkish government has shown no signs of being genuinely willing to consider it:

> The government is very nervous because democratic autonomy would bring a whole new administrative system, and not just for Kurds but for all of Turkey. The government doesn't want to give up any power. The proposed autonomy includes fiscal, administrative, and political decentralization. We are looking at Latin American models and get references from the EU and the Copenhagen documents.
>
> (Anonymous, 2011a)

Turkish institutional design as a highly centralized state was compatible with its self-image as an ethnically homogenous one. However, the state's recent begrudging acknowledgement of its own population diversity offers a small crack in its armor through which discussions of decentralization might be able to penetrate to some degree. For now, state political accommodation of Kurds would be considered quite low but for its acceptance of Kurdish political party participation, which has become quite robust since the HDP achieved the 10-percent voter threshold in 2015 that is necessary to allow parties parliamentary participation. With this new development in mind, medium political accommodation better captures the complex playing field of Kurdish participation in Turkish politics.

Indicators of economic marginalization

Economically, Kurds in Turkey, particularly in the Southeast, find themselves perpetually on the economic margins, despite Turkey's overall transition to middle-income country status. Studies show that historical state neglect of the south-east, combined with the destruction of villages during the civil war and consequential migration to urban centers, has led to much higher unemployment, illiteracy, birthrates, and student:teacher ratios than in the rest of Turkey (Ozturk, 2002: 6; TESEV/UNDP, undated: 2). As in Mexico, Turkey's economic growth has not benefited the majority of Kurds. In a United Nations Development Programme report on Turkey, the Southeast scores lower than all other regions besides the east in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, public and private investment, and human development indicators (UNDP, 2004: 16). In fact, detailed comparisons of social and economic indicators between Turkey's western and Southeast regions show consistent disparities in sanitation, household crowding, and the existence of durable household goods, leading to a situation of "environmental insecurity" in the predominantly Kurdish region (Içduygu et al., 1999: 1002–5).

Though Dersim remains highly marginalized, there is a small prosperous middle class. The creation of a university in the city in 2008 has boosted the intellectual class and economic growth simultaneously. Several of the people I interviewed saw the university as a meaningful place of employment that

brought with it the promise of a middle class lifestyle. Though poverty, unemployment, and underemployment are persistent problems among Kurds in general (Kirisci and Winrow, 1997: 122–6), there are an increasing number of Dersimis who have found opportunities to develop businesses and change their economic circumstances.

While Dersim as a town scores higher on human development indices, the south-eastern region as a whole scores lower than Turkey at the national level (TESEV/UNDP, undated: 9). Dersim's geographic isolation has only aided government neglect of the area, and arriving there from economically bustling Istanbul feels like entering another country. Because of years of assimilatory schooling, residents in Dersim are fluent Turkish speakers who are able to access state services and educational opportunities. However, doing so often requires ongoing suppression of ethnic difference, showing that moderate economic accommodation comes at a cost to cultural rights.

There is still much information that we don't know about Kurds in Turkey's Southeast. In some states, such as Mexico, state institutions collect group-level statistics on basic indicators of education and development across indigenous communities. In others, such as Turkey and El Salvador, the state has not done this, leaving the job to international organizations. Statistical data about levels of education in specific ethnic groups have been collected in some countries by the United Nations Children's Fund and the United National Development Programme, but there are no such statistics available at the community level for Kurds or Armenians in Turkey.

The absence of this data suggests the disregard for minority communities by the national government (van Bruinessen, 1994: 2). For example, a question about mother tongue identification was removed from the Turkish national census after 1965 (Kirisci and Winrow, 1997: 199–20), leaving no means of counting minority language speakers. Numerical practices of population categorization are infused with power relationships (Anderson, 1991: 164–70) and the absence of data implies the withholding of recognition of minority groups by the Turkish state, as was historically the case in El Salvador. Though organizations such as Minority Rights Group International and Minorities at Risk offer general information about minority groups, these organizations have limited resources and ideally should supplement state data rather than provide the baseline.

Language rights as cultural rights

Unequivocally, cultural accommodation of Dersim's Alevi Kurds is low. Lacking constitutional protection, recognition, or valorization, Kurds are culturally marginalized and actively persecuted. Dersim's particular history of non-assimilation has made it a target of state resentment, and the marginalization of Zazaki-speaking Alevis as outsiders even among Kurds especially highlights their status. Cultural marginalization of Kurds is most egregiously evident in the historic criminalization of Kurdish languages.

Language matters for identity (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000; García et al., 2006; Kymlicka, 1995; Skutnabb-Kangas and Dunbar, 2010; Watson, 2007). In Turkey, language rights serve as an indicator of the larger package of cultural rights that minority communities demand. Clearly language is not the only way by which ethnic identity is preserved and passed on, but it has long been accepted as a key marker of culture. Kurds in Istanbul, Dersim, Diyarbakır, Mardin, and other parts of Southeast Turkey articulated remarkably similar explanations of why language matters so much, namely that it equates with identity. Both Kurdish and Armenian youth describe feeling left out of their culture until they began to speak more in their mother tongues.

Turkish state actors know that language matters for cultural continuity and have targeted language assimilation as a cornerstone of ethnic minority cultural integration. Kurdish languages remained completely illegal in Turkey until 1991, at which point they were still illegal to use in any public space connected to the state—for example at utility offices, in city halls, or in schools—and those who violated this ban were frequently jailed. Such an agenda has met resistance domestically but also in the international community as a stumbling block in Turkey's EU membership application. The quest to be viewed as a democracy, which Turkey desired enough to initially engage the EU application criteria, has opened the institutional discourse in Turkey about recognizing previously repressed rights. Though the Turkish government decriminalized the non-political use of Kurdish in public to some degree in 2006, its use in any political forum, including on the floor of Parliament, was banned until the 2010s.

In 2012, offering Kurdish as an elective in public schools was legalized, though it is still prohibited to use Kurdish as the language of instruction. Kurdish-language public education would require a constitutional amendment: Article 42 of the Turkish Constitution declares that public education must be provided in Turkish. This Article has recently been debated by Turkish and Kurdish public intellectuals as being in need of revision if or when the Constitution is amended, but the last constitutional reforms took place in 2010 and Erdoğan's aspirations to expand presidential powers deadlocked Turkey's Constitutional Reconciliation Commission in charge of the review process. As it currently stands, Article 42 also makes it impossible to open private schools with general education curricula in Kurdish languages, though, as mentioned above, privately funded Kurdish language classes for adults are now allowed. Thus many Kurdish families find themselves wanting to pass down their language to their children but lack institutional reinforcement through schools.

Multiple interviewees expressed the impact of Article 42 in their family lives. For example, Vahap Coşkun, a law professor at Diyarbakır's Dicle University and language rights activist admitted that, "in my family, my children and parents can't understand each other well because my kids speak Turkish, from going to school, but my parents didn't go to school so

they only speak Kurdish" (2011). Despite Coşkun's professional commitment to Kurdish languages, he described how, when his kids became school-aged, they became immersed in Turkish at school and with their friends, and gradually lost their ability to communicate in Kurmanji at home (2011). Another interviewee related a similar story. "My son, I speak to him in Kurdish at home. This worked until he was three and started daycare – now he understands me but answers in Turkish" (Yalçındağ, 2011).

One line of argument put forth by Kurdish language rights activists is that denial of mother tongue education undermines another constitutional provision – free and equal access to education for all citizens. However, activists have so far not developed a uniform argument about why mother tongue education is so important. While democratic liberalization, in conjunction with the bid for European Union membership, opens the dialogue about multiculturalism in Turkey, important restrictions remain in place. It is still illegal, for instance, to use Kurdish in any political context, and decisions about what constitutes a political versus a public act are often made with calculations to target and arrest Kurdish activists and politicians.

As Kurds migrate from Kurdish language-dominant rural areas to urban spaces in search of work or as internally displaced peoples from the civil war between the PKK and the Turkish military, Turkish language skills become a necessary survival tool (Kaya, 2011). Thus, the Kurdish language is at an increased risk of disappearing. In addition, public schools in places like Dersim have been very successful at linguistic assimilation by requiring Turkish-only immersion. Yet Kurds who have not learned their Kurdish language, or who have deliberately stopped using it, report feeling disconnected from their culture. This separation can be a source of psychological stress, particularly when it leads to a loss of connection with one's elders. For example, Sami Tan, who has been part of the Kurmanji language revitalization movement in Istanbul remarked:

> It is impossible without language to live the Kurdish identity and to preserve Kurdish identity. When you ask people why they want to learn Kurdish, they say, "I want to continue with my identity, I want to understand the stories of my grandparents." It is a traumatic situation to not have intergenerational understanding.
>
> (2011)

Language loss matters for Kurds today because, as one young woman put it, "we can't even speak to our grandmothers" (Bozgan, 2011). Intergenerational knowledge-sharing forms a vibrant part of cultural production and, without it, cultural continuity becomes threatened. In expressing why language loss is particularly tragic for Kurds, Coşkun connects language rescue to cultural rescue:

> Kurdish culture is a verbal culture. Language is the main carrier of this culture from one generation to the next, therefore language preservation

is very important for cultural survival. Since the beginning of the Republic, language has been oppressed. Saving language is saving culture, language is identical to our being.

(2011)

Though Coşkun is correct that Kurdish languages have mostly been passed down orally, and oral languages are more vulnerable to state linguicide, or language death policies, this is true of many minority languages. It is not the oral transmission of Kurdish that has led to its loss; it is the targeted Turkish state policies to restrict its use. The lack of a written culture for Kurdish communities can be seen more as an outcome of Turkish-only language policy than an endogenous cultural attribute.

Intergenerational breakdown among Kurds and the loss of language is also deeply connected to memories of violence and the fear that those memories create. Umut Suvari, a young Kurdish activist and President of the Youth and Change Asssociation of Diyarbakır, described the intersection of language, memory, and trauma when we met in his barren office in the municipal government building complex on the outskirts of town. Suvari told me, "parents who are afraid of past violence don't speak Kurdish to their kids, so young people are losing the language" (2011). This may help explain why Coşkun's children are not learning the language, even though they spend time with their grandparents at home where they hear multiple generations of elders employing Kurmanji to communicate. The fear of persecution for Kurdish language use has inhibited survivors of violence from passing on a cultural inheritance. While some activists are mobilizing and demanding linguistic rights from the government, Suvari told me that his solution also includes, "to use Kurdish among ourselves now, to bring language into daily life" (2011).

These vignettes from Diyarbakır, the principal city of what many consider to be northern Kurdistan, and where many Dersimi intellectuals now live, show that language is a crucial identity marker for Kurds within and across generations. Language rights are also a unifying Kurdish rights platform, something that many different factions can agree on even in the face of historic divisions. Language is a key that can unlock the "Kurdish Question," a way of referring to the messy situation in Southeast Turkey or, more broadly, to the future of Kurds in Turkey. As Yeğen put it, "being a Kurd doesn't mean necessarily that one is part of the Kurdish Question. Being a Kurd and objecting to a monolingual state makes one part of the Kurdish Question" (2011). In other words, Kurdish shaming of the monolingual Turkish agenda defines the Kurdish Question, not simply ethnic difference.

Finally, despite nasty political infighting about issues such as political party loyalty, separatism versus democratic autonomy, and the use of violence as a claim-making tactic, the demand for language rights unifies otherwise segmented populations. As Coşkun told me, "diverse Kurds and Kurdish groups are all able to agree on language rights" (2011). Tactics to claim these rights, however, vary from place to place and across generations.

Conclusion

Many of today's cultural rights activists in Dersim are descendants of survivors of the 1938 massacre. While these activists interpret the reason behind 1938 – Alevi Kurdish cultural and linguistic exclusion from Turkey – as a reason to mobilize, their elders are generally more fearful to make claims. As in many other post-violence communities, those who directly experienced violence in Dersim are less inclined to translate their memories into mobilization because they fear further violence. However, their children and especially grandchildren have used memories to form mobilizing narratives with which they advocate for increased cultural rights.

The bulk of my interviews in Dersim were with the younger generation (forty years old and under), themselves the new social movement leaders who had grown up on stories of the massacre and of the conflict between the PKK and the military during the 1980s and 1990s. I did not interview 1938 survivors, but rather young and middle-aged Dersimis who held a remarkable array of opinions about the uses of memory in the region's identity – some wanted to remember (Aygün, 2011) and others to forget (H. Yıldız, 2011). Kurdish academics and others have documented the stories of those survivors who were willing to speak (Aslan, 2011; Aygün, 2011; N. Yıldız, 2011) and, though few publications in English have appeared on this topic, multilingual Turkish and Kurdish graduate students working on Dersim issues will surely soon make new offerings to this literature. Dersim's role as a vibrant memory-keeper for Kurdish identity and activism is experiencing a renaissance in Turkey. How open the state will be to cooperating with Dersimi demands is another story entirely.

Though memories of 1938 can create potent public narratives to shame Turkey both nationally and internationally, Dersimis have received very moderate concessions in return. Throughout Turkey, Kurds are marginalized politically, economically, and socially, and Turkey's recent backtracking in its democratization process does not provide an optimistic climate for change. Prior to new negotiations resulting from the Syrian refugee crisis of 2015–16, Turkey's EU membership application had stalled and it remains unclear whether Turkey will turn to the EU or the Middle East to fulfill its leadership ambitions.

The comparative lens may be useful for Kurdish rights activists and their sympathizers looking for models of increased state accommodation through regional decentralization measures. To some extent, Mexico's experience with implementing *usos y costumbres* could be one such model, albeit an imperfect one, for how state power could be dispersed to meet the cultural needs of diverse communities. However, the Turkish government has continued to reject any sort of federal arrangements that Mexico relies on to keep usos y costumbres, as a local governance tool, in check.

Yet, at the end of the day, if the Turkish state is serious about ending civil conflict with Kurds, it will need to consider methods other than military

crackdown and judicial persecution. President Erdoğan's 2015 bombings of PKK camps in Turkey's border region with Iraq and Iran, though done under the guise of anti-ISIS/ISIL/Daesh campaigns, show that an AKP-governed Turkey is not yet ready to take that step. In fact, the creation of new "special security zones" in the Kurdish region in 2015, as well as condemnation in 2016 of Turkish academics who signed a petition critical of military protocols in the south-east, indicates that, under Erdoğan, Turkish state policy towards Kurds may continue to be repressive rather than cooperative.

Nevertheless, Kurds continue to mobilize resources that are rooted deeply in their communities. Memories of state perpetrated violence cast shame on the state in the bright light of the international community's gaze. By translating these memories into powerful public narratives that call on the collective conscious of both Kurds and state actors, Kurdish memory entrepreneurs shame the state as a means to push for new rights. Activists in Dersim are at the forefront of this movement as they engage in memory-fueled mobilizations that assert a host of cultural rights: to name their children with previously forbidden letters Q, X, and W, to install bilingual government signs, and to speak freely with their grandparents, their teachers, and their elected officials in Kurdish.

Notes

1 Some scholars, such as Michele Penner Angrist have called Kurds Turkey's "sole significant ethnic minority" (2004: 388), but members of the ethnic and religious minority groups listed here would likely disagree.
2 For details on Alevi religious cultural practices in Turkey, see Shankland (2003).
3 BDP was a major Kurdish political party that has since given way to the HDP (People's Democratic Party).
4 Daesh is an abbreviation for Dawlat al-Islamiyah f'al-Iraq wa al-Sham, which can mean "to trample down and crush" or "a bigot who imposes his view on others" and is being used by French and British leaders to symbolically reject the group's claim to legitimacy and stateness (Khan, 2014).
5 Newly designated "special security zones" with some of the security characteristics of a state of emergency were created in 2015, and ongoing violence in the region spilling over from ISIS and the Syrian civil war make new states of emergency likely.
6 Van Bruinessen (1994: 18) discusses how Dersim residents rejected the PKK, and also how the state encouraged this intra-Kurdish discord.
7 For example, Slobodan Milosevic gave a speech in 1987 that referenced an Ottoman military victory over Serbs in 1389 to fan the flames of nationalist sentiment that eventually led to genocide against non-Serbs (Lindo-Fuentes et al., 2007: 19).

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5 Armenians and the "G" word in Turkey

> Being an Armenian in Turkey is very dangerous.
>
> (Rober Koptaş, 2010, Armenian journalist, Istanbul)

> Only if you accept assimilation are you allowed to be a citizen, but minorities want to be accepted as citizens with their own identities. We need to create a new "we."
>
> (Rezan Sarişen, 2010, NGO worker, Istanbul)

In the final years of the Ottoman Empire and amid the chaos of World War I, the Ottoman state intentionally killed Armenians through forced migration and assassination. Though the death toll is highly contested, scholars commonly estimate that roughly 600,000–1,500,000 Armenians were killed in the deportations and massacres from 1915 to 1922.[1] The Turkish government, in contrast, contends that there were between 300,000–600,000 casualties.[2] While exact figures are still up for interpretation, the events of 1915 have left an indelible mark on the Turkish and Armenian psyche, though they have never been recognized by the Turkish state.

Today, there are roughly 60,000 Armenian citizens of Turkey living in Istanbul, but they keep a low profile and highly culturally assimilation in contrast to the Kurdish communities profiled in the last chapter. This chapter explores why Armenians have maintained a strong private narrative about 1915 but have not successfully translated this narrative into activism for cultural rights. More specifically, why has the Armenian community not been able to use narratives about 1915 as a tool for shaming the state and claiming greater rights as moral leverage to push for state cooperation with cultural rights agendas?

Genocide, the most accurate description of what happened in 1915, is a highly contested term in Turkey. More commonly, non-Armenians in Turkey use words such as massacre, deportation, or catastrophe to describe the events of that time (Adak, 2009; Neyzi and Kharatyan-Araqelyan, 2010: 19, 120). As a Turkish academic said to me, "'Catastrophe' also captures the ongoing catastrophe of denial" (Adak, 2009), thus adding a poetic, if tragic, double entendre. In contrast, the Association of Genocide Scholars is

unequivocal that the events of 1915 merit the label of genocide[3] and is critical of watering down the term with less direct language. I generally refer to the events of 1915 as a genocide but also use "catastrophe" when referencing interviewees who did so.

In the face of widespread agreement in the international community that the events of 1915 meet the definitional criteria of genocide, the memory of this event as any sort of state crime has been repeatedly denied and suppressed in Turkey. State officials and the media will sometimes call the events of 1915 the "Armenian rebellion," emphasizing that some Armenians sided with Russia during World War I, when the Ottoman Empire clashed with its near neighbor. So naming an act of violence is to set the terms of relationship between parties. The term "rebellion" connotes justification for perpetrators using violence to deal with "rebels", whereas "genocide" recognizes an unwarranted attack. The rigid divergence in the naming of what took place in 1915 highlights some of the potential roadblocks to Armenians constructing an effective mobilizing narrative. Also, a century of Ottoman and Turkish state denial about the genocide has constricted the ability of Armenians to publically employ memory as a rallying concept because the validity of their memories is portrayed by the state as false. In this memory vortex, Armenian assimilation into dominant Turkish culture has been widespread.

In what follows, I examine how Armenian citizens of Turkey relate to memories of the 1915 genocide and how state genocide denial has affected Armenian identity in Istanbul. To address structural constraints, I assess political, economic, and cultural policies and practices of state accommodation that provide the backdrop for Armenian rights activism, and I place these factors in conversation with the mechanism of narrative production. Drawing on interview data collected over three periods of fieldwork in 2009–11, I present the tension between public and private narratives of 1915 and how narrative relates to calls for cultural rights. Foreshadowing my findings, I argue that, since private narrative is largely censored from the public arena, more Armenians opt to assimilate into Turkish culture than push the state to cooperate with Armenian cultural rights protections through shaming and claiming.

Why powerful narratives don't always help shame and claim

In the face of ongoing Turkish state denial that the events of 1915 constituted a genocide, Armenians in Turkey have limited their public narratives about 1915 and have only cautiously challenged the state. While private narratives of the genocide are still held in family and community spaces among Armenians, there is not the strident call for national and international attention to past violence in the way that there has been in Chiapas, Mexico, for example, or among Kurds in Turkey's Southeast. In combination with significant levels of political, economic, and cultural accommodation of Armenians by the

Scope Condition	Background causes	Mechanism	Outcome

Figure 5.1 Theoretical model of Armenian mobilization in Istanbul

Turkish state, the quieting of memory-based narratives about the genocide of 1915 has undercut the potential for Armenian rights mobilizations. The figure above outlines the central theoretical premise of this chapter.

Figure 5.1 shows that, as Armenians are somewhat included in the Turkish political and economic apparatus, they are also more reluctant to assert their right to remember 1915 in public, or to use such memories instrumentally as a way to push for increased state cooperation on cultural rights agendas. Low mobilization in turn feeds back into maintaining the status quo of low narrative production as well as the varied state accommodations.

The Treaty of Lausanne and cultural accommodation

Though the Republic of Armenia, which borders Turkey to the east, was created in 1918, most Armenians in Turkey today are not exiles or immigrants from Armenia but rather indigenous descendants of the Armenian population that lived in Anatolia, the broad eastern plateau of Turkey, since at least the Ottoman Empire. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, signed by Turkey after its defeat by World War I allies, established Turkey's sovereignty within newly diminished borders and explicitly required the state to protect its Armenian, Greek, and Jewish populations. No other minority groups were named in the Treaty, and this has been a means for Turkey to justify only providing cultural rights protections to these three groups and not to Kurds, Roma, or other minorities. In line with the preceding empirical chapters, I focus on the movement for mother tongue education rights as a signifier of broader cultural rights that serve as a benchmark of democratic quality.

Armenian status as a Lausanne Treaty minority means that there are specific institutional means of rights claiming that are available to them. In this vein, Armenians in Istanbul have generally focused organization efforts on defending treaty-granted rights from the Turkish state. As treaty rights are explicitly delimited, their implementation and enforcement has usually come about through quiet institutional negotiations with a small number of Armenian leaders, rather than contentiously. In theory, the availability of institutional channels to protect Armenian rights makes the use of extra-institutional

mobilization less likely. Yet Lausanne protections are consistently stymied by state controls on Armenian institutions such as schools and the resources needed to run them.

As discussed in earlier chapters, minority language rights serve as a powerful signifier of state commitment to democratic multiculturalism. On paper, Turkey's signature on the Treaty of Lausanne acknowledged special cultural rights for Armenians in Turkey, including the right to Armenian-language education in their own private, self-funded schools. However, in practice, the Treaty provides only modest cultural rights protection, as constitutional provisions for Turkification policies function through the Ministry of Education and minimize the limited power of the Treaty. Yet this rights package for Armenians is still significant. Non-Lausanne minorities such as Kurds have no right to mother tongue education, as the Constitution establishes the legality of general education only in Turkish.

In practice, the Treaty provision to educate Armenian children in their own language means that Armenians are allowed to create Armenian-language schools separate from the Ministry of Education. In Istanbul, this happens through Armenian community organizations called foundations that collect money from the community to fund all school expenses. The Turkish state, in return for its generosity to allow the schools to exist, is not required to fiscally support them. The Ministry of Education has the right to monitor the schools, however, and does so by requiring that the vice principal of all "foundation schools" as they are known, must be an ethnic Turk. In practice, Turkish teachers working at Armenian schools submit work reports to the Turkish vice principal while Armenian teachers give their reports to the Armenian principal. This "big brother" arrangement of monitoring Armenians within their own self-funded schools is so preposterous that it is even recognized as an imposition by some in the Turkish government (Paylan, 2011). In an attempt to soften this control mechanism, "nowadays the government sends liberal Turks as vice principals to our schools so they don't make so many problems" (Paylan, 2011).

The operation of Armenian foundation schools is complicated because their exact relationship to the Turkish Ministry of Education and, hence, their degree of autonomy have never been fully specified. In an interview, Minority Rights International expert Nurcan Kaya explained that major challenges to Armenian-language education come from lack of learning materials, lack of qualified teachers, and lack of money (2011). Because there is the practice that all Armenian schools must get Ministry of Education approval for Armenian-language textbooks that they develop, this drastically extends the timeline and cost to make new school materials, as texts must be translated into Turkish to be reviewed (Paylan, 2011). In addition, there are not enough new teachers capable of teaching subjects in Armenian because Turkish universities have never provided subject-specific training in the language (Paylan, 2011). While bringing teachers from Armenia to Turkey has been suggested as a solution to this teacher shortage, eastern and western Armenian languages

are quite distinct. Armenian school board member and language rights advocate Garo Paylan names the dialect difference as posing a formidable obstacle to attracting teachers who are actually fluent in Western Armenian *and* the subject matter (2011).

The lack of high quality Armenian-language textbooks and teachers is an increasing concern for educated families in Istanbul. Many middle and upper class Armenian parents have begun to send their children to French- or English-language-based private schools instead of Armenian foundation schools. This creates a whole new challenge for the survival of the Armenian language in Turkey. Not only does this mean that donor support migrates, but the next generation of potential Armenian language speakers has exited the system too. "We have to find a way to teach Armenian to better compete with private schools. Armenian textbooks have to be better than English materials. I am explaining to parents that kids can learn more than two languages, [but parents aren't sure]" (Paylan, 2011). After all, Paylan relates, "Europeans learn multiple languages; why can't we?"

In Istanbul today, Armenian children end up attending English-speaking schools, speaking Turkish on the street, and Armenian becomes relegated to the language of their grandparents:

> Of course there are problems with the textbooks, but *the biggest problem is that we can't make kids speak Armenian in social life*. Ninety percent of kids come to school not speaking any Armenian, 30 percent of these might know a little, and 10 percent come to school only speaking Armenian, but then they see other kids speaking in Turkish, socializing in Turkish.
>
> (Paylan, 2011, emphasis mine)

While theoretically, students' immersion in Armenian schools should make them fluent in the language by the time they graduate, this is generally not the case. Aris Nalcı, a journalist at the Istanbul-based bilingual Armenian- and Turkish-language newspaper *Agos*, commented that, despite going to Armenian schools his whole life, it wasn't until he began working at *Agos* and had to write articles in Armenian that he actually became fluent in the language. Paylan opines, "we pretend we are teaching Armenian, but if you talk to kids they can't even make a full sentence. This is why we have to accept that Armenian is not a living language" (2011). Nor is the language necessarily reinforced at home – parents may not have the language skills to interact with their children beyond basic greetings (Paylan, 2011).

The degree to which Armenians in Turkey feel connected to their identity as Armenians has historically, to some extent, been based on their capacity to speak the language. Paylan reflected on this connection, saying, "You call yourself an Armenian because you feel it, but if you don't speak Armenian, if you don't speak your language, you lose your identity" (2011). As the

Armenian language struggles to stay alive in Turkey, it may become less and less a marker of Armenian identity but, for the meantime, speaking ability still holds weight and stigma. For example, in one of Leyla Neyzi's oral history projects, she and her colleague document the reflections of a young Armenian woman in Istanbul who told them, "'I always avoided the [Armenian] community because I don't speak Armenian'" (Selin in Neyzi and Kharatyan-Araqelyan, 2010: 54: 55). Language in this instance, as in so many communities around the world, essentially serves as a ticket into group membership.

   Culture can be maintained in other ways beyond language, but the loss of Armenian as a living language strikes at the core of Armenian identity. The up-and-coming intellectual class of Armenians like Paylan and members of *Agos* newspaper staff are searching for ways to encourage spoken and written Armenian. Paylan told me, "we have to see Armenian as a foreign language to teach. This is something teachers don't want to accept. In my childhood it wasn't like this; we spoke Armenian everywhere" (2011). There is the possibility that the promise of an identity achieved through one's mother tongue will appeal to young Armenians in Turkey who, like Nalcı, come into the language as young adults. Paylan's reflections on the Armenian foundation schools highlight the struggle to keep Armenian culture and identity alive in the face of ongoing Turkification policies.

Political and economic inclusion and exclusion for Armenians

The democratization process in Turkey, stalled though it may be, has changed the way that Armenians in Istanbul engage with identity politics and the "the right to have rights" (Arendt, 1968 [1951]: 177). As discussed in the previous chapter, Kurds as well as Armenians have used the EU membership process to create greater space for minority rights claim-making in Turkey (Gellman, 2013: 776, 788). Yet, legal and institutional provisions for minority rights that may be strengthened by democratization processes can still be inhibited by state rhetoric and Turkification policies. Another complexity of democratization is around questions of legitimacy, both in terms of who is entitled to leadership roles within minority communities and how rights negotiations take place. As with Kurds in the Southeast, Armenians in Istanbul face dilemmas of internal accountability and legitimacy as fellow in-group members may hold widely divergent opinions about who should speak on their behalf and for what purpose.

   The question of who may speak for a community has long been of interest in social movements research (McAdam, 1982: 47–8). Depending on the qualities of the actor, in-group leaders or rooted cosmopolitanists can foster or inhibit political mobilization. For Armenians in Istanbul, there are rigid controls on who has been traditionally allowed to speak on behalf of the community. The most influential actor is the Patriarchate, or office of the Patriarch of the Orthodox Christian Armenian Church, which is the voice of

the religious community, as well as donors from the upper class who give money to the Church. The Patriarchate is an ostensibly autonomous actor, but in reality it is a conservative force with values not in line with younger Armenian activist agendas. Referring to this problem, Rober Koptaş, Executive Editor at *Agos*, told me, "there are hierarchical, traditional, feudal relationships that inhibit political participation or new action on behalf of the community" (2010). In this light, it is not just Turkey's democratization as a country that has the potential to change minority rights advocacy, but internal democratization among Armenians as well. Nalcı, the *Agos* journalist, told me bluntly:

> Religion is a big political actor [organizer] in the Armenian community. If people have something to say to the Turkish government, they go through the Patriarchate. The Patriarchate has been the channel for the older generation to petition government, but the younger generation is using different organizations.
>
> (2010)

Neither the Patriachate nor wealthy elites are particularly consultative with the wider Armenian community in Istanbul, especially the young and less wealthy. Newer actors like the staff at *Agos* capture younger readers, while *Jamanak* and the *Marmara Daily*, which only publish in Armenian, are restricted to an older generation of readers.[4]

  Low political accommodation of certain kinds of Armenians is evident in their lack of political representation in institutions such as Parliament, the army, and the state apparatus. A Turkish academic involved in the solidarity movement with Armenians put it this way:

> When faced with people who deny unfair treatment of minorities in Turkey, ask: How many non-Muslim officers are in the army? Zero. How many non-Muslim deputies are there in Parliament? Maybe one. How many non-Muslim state officers are there? A few. Non-Muslims don't have representation!
>
> (Keskin, 2009)

Keskin is right that the numbers point to a widespread problem of lack of representation for non-Muslims in a variety of state institutions. In June 2015, this improved slightly with three newly elected Armenian members of Turkish Parliament, including Garo Paylan, the former Armenian school board member and rights activist.

  Economically, Armenians are also better accommodated than other comparative cases. During the Ottoman Empire and earlier years of the Turkish state, capital taxes were used to financially dominate Armenians and other minority business owners. Yet today, Armenians in Istanbul are members of the middle and business classes and also have higher levels of material

security than many other minority groups in Turkey. This is important to note because economic integration diminishes material grievances, which commonly serve as a social movement platform when conjoined with cultural rights claims. Despite the history of discriminatory additional state taxes for minorities, in modern times, Armenians in Istanbul have a robust economic niche that they do not want to lose by overtly challenging the state on its seemingly entrenched stance of genocide denial. In other words, cultural rights have not seemed worth the risk of upsetting already gained economic arrangements.

Though economic inclusion does not determine the degree of mobilization, it is worth noting its significance, especially since in all the other case studies in the book there is little risk of non-mobilization due to economic well-being. The case study communities in Mexico and El Salvador, as well as Kurds in Turkey, are all generally considerably poorer than the ethnic majorities in their respective countries. Yet, even though high economic accommodation may impede the translation of internal narratives about 1915 into public claims on the state, Armenians in Istanbul still hold potent memories of violence, as the following section discusses.

Narrative and contentious memory in Turkey

The policies and practices of state accommodations for Armenians are important structural factors that create constraints or opportunities for shaming and claiming to take place. My argument is that higher levels of political, economic, and cultural accommodations, combined with low levels of narrative production about remembered violence, mean that Armenians engage only minimally in shaming and claiming mobilizations for cultural rights. This section explores the agentive role of memory politics and state genocide denial to explain why Armenians in Turkey have struggled to capitalize on genocide narratives as a source of inspiration for rights claims.

The international community generally remains sympathetic to the Armenian version of historical events, and the Armenian diaspora has lobbied hard for an apology and achieved a degree of recognition from governments of countries such as the United States and France. Domestically, however, Armenians face the problem that their memories are erased by "official" history. Like other minorities, Armenians do not see positive mention of themselves in school textbooks, for example, which serve a major function in forming young citizens (Rezan Sarişen, 2009, 2010). Consequentially, scholar and public intellectual Murat Belge explained, "as time passed, fewer and fewer people even knew enough to challenge the state version of history" (2009). As another interviewee in Istanbul put it, "the fact that history is not discussed has made the official ideology very hegemonic" (Anonymous, 2009). The withering of accurate historical knowledge in the public sphere undermines the sense of self that is necessary to drive narratives forward and channel these stories into politicized behavior.

Loss of historical knowledge also furthers the divide between Armenian citizens of Turkey and ethnic Turks. For Armenians, "identity is constituted around remembering, while Turkish identity is constituted around forgetting, so there is a big disconnect between the two identities" (Anonymous, 2009). The alienation of Armenians in this process further inhibits their incorporation into the citizenry *as* ethnic Armenians. I met with Rober Haddeciyan, the Editor of the *Marmara Daily*, one of the two Armenian-language-only newspapers, in his office filled with dark furniture and piles of old newspaper copies. Haddeciyan decried this memory-identity stalemate, saying, "there should be no contradiction between being a good Armenian and a good Turkish citizen" and implied that both identities can profit from economic prosperity and mutual acceptance (2010). His calls for promotion of dual identity as a way to combat forgetting without losing one's place in Turkish society is noble. However, it risks running up against the line between fostering assimilation rather than accommodating ethnic difference.

Turkey's negation of the genocide has diminished Armenian use of public narrative about 1915 as a mobilization tool. Yet it has not repressed these memories completely. One interviewee, who had invited me to meet in an activist-geared café near Istanbul's Armenian neighborhood, pointed out that: "even if individuals forget, the collective memory will keep these issues going. Forgetting has far greater implications than individual memories" (Anonymous, 2009). While on one hand individuals make up the remembering community and play a role in memory-keeping, this statement points toward the truth that memories can also form their own narrative momentum. Though individual testimonials may lie dormant in the face of state denial, community production of anniversaries, slogans, photographs, and documents sometimes do the remembering for us. In this way, the "community" writ large can become an alternative bearer of history.

The role of documents especially holds importance for institutional memory sites like state archives. Archives are repositories of official state histories, as well as sources to guide the next generation of social scientists as they produce new kinds of historical knowledge. Turkey's censorship around memories of 1915 in archived documents is just one physical means of asserting genocide denial. The dominant approach to history used to be, according to Sabanci University Professor of Literature Hülya Adak, "'if it's not in the archives, it didn't happen.' We have to redefine where we look for history and what sources we should use" (2009). In fact, new spaces of historical knowledge are being created in Turkey all the time. For example, in the "I'm sorry" apology campaign of 2009, prominent Turkish and Kurdish intellectuals signed an online statement apologizing to Armenians for the 1915 catastrophe and associated suffering, acknowledging publically that individuals have a role to play in rectifying state denial (Gellman, 2013: 784). In addition, in 2005, an academic conference on the 1915 events took place that brought together an array of social scientists and historians to discuss the effect of 1915 and ethnic pluralism on Turkey's democratization (Gellman, 2013:

786–7). These and other burgeoning alternative sites of historical memory show that, though Armenian memories of violence have not yet produced robust narratives, they may yet be able to find new routes of expression.

Arguably, it is critical for Turkey to accept these new spaces for historical knowledge as the state tries to describe itself as a democracy and apply to enter the EU, but also because genocide denial has major repercussions for the process of citizen development. "Memory shouldn't inhibit modern development of the national state, but sometimes it does," scholar Ahmet Evin told me in his office in the Istanbul Policy Center of Sabanci University (2009). Invalidating culturally formative memories can inhibit the full incorporation of minorities as citizens with legitimate rights to their distinct ethnic identities.

Remaining silent about 1915 is part of the cost that Armenians pay to integrate into Turkish society. The silence-and-integrate paradigm accounts for different degrees of mobilization between Armenians with Turkish citizenship and those in the diaspora. The Armenian diaspora outside of Turkey is able to be vocal about their demands for recognition of the genocide because they don't have to pay the social cost of living in Turkey. As an interviewee in Leyla Neyzi's oral history project shared, "[t]hose who have to live with it [costs of speaking out] become conservative, fearful" (Neyzi and Kharatyan-Araqelyan, 2010: 29). Though this is not unique to the Armenian diaspora, it is worth pointing out because Armenians in Turkey are frequently critiqued for not trying hard enough to push for genocide recognition. In fact, their narratives about remembered violence are much more restricted than those same memories in the diaspora in the United States or France, for example. Yet one man did decide to consistently speak out on a range of issues affecting Armenian–Turkish relations, and his assassination in 2007 spawned the most notable Armenian mobilization of memory to date. The impact of Hrant Dink's life and death, and its catalyzing of other Armenian narratives and associated claims, is the subject of the following section.

Hrant Dink and venues for Armenian shaming and claiming

Hrant Dink, an Armenian citizen of Turkey, spent his life as a writer and public intellectual addressing pertinent issues within the Armenian community. These issues spanned from the Armenian community's social cohesion and civil society strength to the memory politics of 1915. In 1996, Dink founded *Agos*, the first newspaper in Turkey to be published in both Armenian and Turkish, as part of a strategy to engage Armenians who had linguistically assimilated, as well as form a platform to share Armenian issues with a state-level audience (Hrant Dink Foundation, 2011). When I saw printed copies of *Agos* in 2010, the Armenian language insert was considerably smaller than the Turkish section, reflecting, as Paylan pointed out earlier, that Armenian language is struggling to stay alive. Nevertheless—or perhaps because of this compromise—Dink's creation was able to reach across generations of Armenians in Turkey and include them in *Agos*'s left-wing political critique

of both the Armenian community and the structures that conditioned their civil society efforts (Hrant Dink Foundation, 2011).

Dink was subject to numerous court charges for his articles about the Turkish state, including one charge under the infamous Penal Code 301, which broadly defines a violation as anything that denigrates Turkishness. In 2006, Dink had spoken to Reuters and named the 1915 events as a genocide, and, when the story was republished by *Agos*, its editors, including Dink, were charged with this bizarre "crime" (Hrant Dink Foundation, 2011). Throughout this and many other court encounters, Dink was targeted by nationalist groups who harassed him repeatedly and threatened his life. Although he asked for protection, his requests were repeatedly ignored.

Dink was shot dead by a young ultra-nationalist Turk in front of the *Agos* office building in the Şişli neighborhood of Istanbul on January 19, 2007. Tens of thousands of people – some estimate 100,000 – filled the streets of Istanbul for Dink's funeral holding signs that said "we are all Armenians" and "we are all Hrant Dink" in Turkish, Armenian, and Kurdish. While much of the limited Armenian claim-making for cultural rights has taken place institutionally, through the Ministry of Education, for example, or through private discussions between the Patriarchate and state representatives, Dink's funeral march was an isolated contentious act. Though the funeral itself, held at an Armenian church, was a staid affair with dignitaries in attendance, the march that preceded it, which began at *Agos*'s office and passed through high-density Istanbul neighborhoods, was a direct challenge to state policies of Armenian memory suppression. Dink's funeral is cited as a transformative moment in Armenian–Turkish relations in the country and as a moment that encouraged Armenians to speak more boldly about 1915 (Neyzi and Kharatyan-Araqelyan, 2010: 19). In fact, many of those marching to commemorate him were not Armenians but ethnic Turks who were appalled by his murder and who wanted to voice their dissent from the state's persecution of minorities.

The presence of so many ethnic Turks offering solidarity with a major Armenian grievance allowed Armenians to more safely raise their voices in protest of state behavior. The momentum of the funeral march began an uncorking of long-held private anguish in the Armenian community that has led to a modest increase in the public narratives of violence used to voice Armenian claims. For example, the funeral mobilization inspired personal commitments to action by some Armenian intellectuals, several of whom told me they were unsure of how Turkish society would respond if they had spoken out before the assassination. Aris Nalcı, then a journalist at *Agos*, [5] described how this turning point affected him personally: "I lost my fear in 2007. If I speak I can be killed, if I don't speak, I can be killed, so why not speak?" (2010). The kind of speaking that Nalcı refers to, through writing newspaper articles and using other media venues, exemplifies civic expression as a mobilization tactic. Such speech is not inherently contentious, though sometimes the state perceives it to be, as seen through Dink's charges under Penal Code 301.

It is important to bear in mind that Nalcı's readiness to speak out does not represent the majority Armenian attitude, which is geared towards representing the interests of mainstream Armenian businessmen and the conservative Patriarchate. Such actors access only institutional channels of claim-making, and even these are done with care to not ask too much from the state. While Nalcı carries his claims forward through his writing and activism in spite of the threat of violence, other Armenians perpetuate silence in hopes of avoiding drawing attention to themselves.

There is a significant generational gap in narrative use among Armenians in Turkey, comparable to that of Kurds in Dersim discussed in the previous chapter, where older generations who remember, either personally or from parents' ethnically targeted violence, are far less inclined than younger generations to shame and claim, or indeed to expect much of anything from a historically unjust state. Yet younger generations are not only further from the visceral fear of violence, they are also more assimilated into Turkish culture, or at least more comfortable in many cultural settings – they are the rooted cosmopolitanists whom I described in Chapter 1. This description is true for many Armenian youths and thirty-somethings, including Nalcı, who, while identifying clearly as Armenian, have been incorporated into Turkish society through Turkish-language media and culture and feel able to make rights claims as citizens in Turkey. Koptaş of *Agos* remarked, "It is normal to be Turkish, Armenian, or Kurdish all at the same time. These labels are just one of our identities" (2010). However, for elderly Armenians who still remember parents or grandparents dying in 1915, the benefit of pushing a public narrative about 1915 is less compelling. There is still a pervasive sense that only by being invisible and essentially assimilating can one be safe in Turkey. This is captured by one young person describing their ethnic self-labeling; "I would repeat what my mother told me to say: 'I'm a Turk of Armenian origin'" (Selin in Neyzi and Kharatyan-Araqelyan, 2010: 54). For Armenians living with this mindset, Dink's assassination only proved the danger in trying to stir the conscience of the state or asking for any rights beyond those established through Lausanne.

Nalcı offers a thumbnail sketch of how different generations of Armenians navigate their identity in relation to the catastrophe and their connection to Turkey:

> Since the genocide, the first generation is afraid to talk, the second generation didn't want to talk because they hate Turkey, the third generation forgets Turkey and becomes the diaspora, and the fourth generation is starting to think about memory, culture – it is this fourth generation that has started to communicate with Turkish people.
>
> (2010)

Nalcı and his *Agos* colleagues use a media platform to capitalize on the energy of this "fourth generation" and channel it into non-contentious advocacy for dialogue with the state. They serve as the community's internal

democratizers, pushing new voices into the public sphere. Koptaş reflected on the role of the newspaper:

> *Agos* is challenging the passive stance that most people in the community prefer. Regarding Hrant Dink, his assassination proved for the older generation that their way of thinking was right, [namely that] the state is incapable of giving rights to non-Muslims, and it is dangerous to advocate for them.
>
> (2010)

In the face of a skeptical older generation of Armenians, some younger Armenians are claiming their Armenian identity even as they start conversations about increasing cultural rights in Turkey. Over the din of clacking printers and computers in the press room next door, Koptaş waxed optimistic, saying, "we can change our society and then the state. We are Turkish citizens and we have rights as such" (2010). Though the readership of *Agos* is small, it nonetheless serves as a platform from which to advocate simultaneously for Armenian identity and participation in the Turkish polity.

Next door to *Agos*, the Hrant Dink Foundation, founded after Dink's death to continue his legacy, shares office space and members with *Nor Zartonk* (New Awakening), a youth-driven political movement-cum-NGO staffed by young Armenian social change activists who put on conferences covering a range of topics such as the EU application process, the environment, and issues of concern to Armenians as ranked by periodic surveys of the Istanbul community (Tekir, 2010). Sayat Tekir, a vocal member, commented on his identity as an Armenian and as a democracy activist. Echoing many of the Kurdish youth mobilizing for cultural rights in Dersim, Tekir reflected on how fear around memories of 1915 has paralyzed the older generation of Armenians while catalyzing the younger one. "My mother and father say, 'don't go out, don't speak.' Their parents told them the same thing because their grandparents died in 1915 so they are afraid. They want us to also be quiet but at the same time they are proud" (2010).

For Kurds and Armenians alike, there is a significant generational divide in how narratives of historic violence are used. The effective citizenship route claimed by Tekir, Nalcı, and others through their outspoken writing and conferences contrasts with the external silence of previous generations of Armenians who chose to seek safety by insulating themselves within the Armenian community. Though this older generation may believe in the legitimacy of their private narratives, the fear of repercussions, whether through violence[6] or loss of political and economic privileges, diminishes their willingness to be visible and use public narratives about the genocide to claim cultural rights beyond their Treaty rights.

For many years, it seemed that Dink's funeral, as a momentous and contentious mobilization for Armenians and their solidarity networks, was an isolated event. In its aftermath, discourse about 1915 and the role of Armenian

citizens in Turkey has expanded, but not dramatically. Yet, in 2015, another incident of contentious mobilization transpired when plans to bulldoze Camp Armen, the grounds of a former Armenian summer camp led to a sit-in by more than a hundred Nor Zartonk activists. Following weeks of protest to get the owner to sign the land deed for the camp grounds over to the Armenian church, Armenian youth occupied the space and at one point were attacked by unknown assailants, prompting Armenians in Turkey to connect memories of 1915 to the attacks with statements like "Turks just can't stop genociding" on social media (*The Armenian Weekly*, 2015).

   The continued persecution of members of the Armenian community has reinforced the notion that it remains better to blend into Turkish society than it is to stand out as Armenian. Paylan summarized this sentiment, saying,

> We've lost so many things as an Armenian community. We saw that if you participate you will be in trouble, like Hrant Dink, but if we don't participate we will lose the things we have – the schools and foundations – we would only have the Patriarchate left.
>
> (2011)

The potential to only have conservative, institutional channels to work towards state cooperation with Armenian cultural rights agendas is bringing young Armenian activists together to expand their mobilization repertoires. Though this mobilization is modest, venues such as *Agos* and Nor Zartonk are well placed to facilitate new dialogue among Armenian citizens in Turkey, since they are respected and invested in civil society processes.

Conclusion: mother tongue politics at a crossroads

This chapter has shown how memories of violence, their associated narratives, and political, economic, and cultural accommodation by the state are useful in explaining Armenian strategies of shaming and claiming in Istanbul. The state project of denying the genocide of 1915 has been a central obstacle to Armenian cultural rights activism and has halted the development of robust narratives of violence that could instrumentally shame the state in the eyes of the domestic and international community. Limited but dynamic leadership by a new generation of cultural rights activists to reshape these narratives is changing the discourse to some degree. *Agos* and Nor Zartonk represent meaningful platforms for dialogue and activism on issues of concern to Armenian citizens of Turkey, and recent controversy over Camp Armen shows their resolve to take a stand. Yet, at the same time, the Turkish state has accommodated Armenians economically to an extent that there is fear of agitating the state to a point at which certain material comforts may be jeopardized. The Armenian business class that has developed in Istanbul focuses its energy on institutionally channeled requests to Turkish state representatives and represents a very different path than that of the more radical youth contingent.

Though a more thorough cross-case analysis will be offered in Chapter 8, it is useful to briefly consider the two Turkey cases side by side. Though both Kurds and Armenians constitute visible minorities within twenty-first century Turkey, they vary greatly in how they perform their citizenship. Kurds in the Southeast have mobilized intensively to claim cultural rights, while Armenians have mobilized tentatively. While Alevi Kurds in Dersim have found ways to invoke the massacres of 1938 in shaping the narrative and claim-making process, Armenians in Istanbul are still trying to find a way to use memories of 1915 to move forward their own claims.

Both groups face the major obstacle of trying to shame a state that does not acknowledge that there is something to be ashamed of. This makes shaming and claiming in Turkey a more challenging process than that found in Mexico and El Salvador, where state actors and institutions have acknowledged at least on paper that ethnic minority citizens deserve rights protections. Yet, within Turkey there is great variation in the potential for state cooperation. Even as Kurds herald the victims of 1938 as martyrs and create powerful narratives about them, Armenians are reluctant to publically champion their own right to the memory of 1915 because of vehement state denial. In this context, it has proven exceedingly difficult for Armenians to create a publically acceptable narrative of these events within Turkey.

Turkey may have not yet accepted its own status as a multicultural state, but the international community considers respect for cultural diversity part of good democratic practice, thus leaving Turkey in a bind. To claim democratic status means releasing the myth of ethnic homogeneity that the state has clung to since its founding. Such a rhetorical shift may prompt an increase in cooperation with cultural rights claims, especially the claim to mother tongue education, requiring meaningful changes in Ministry of Education policies and constitutional reform. Though Kurdish languages have larger speaking populations and a more consistent history of language rights mobilizations than Armenians, state barriers to speaking Kurdish have been much higher because of Treaty of Lausanne protections granted to Armenians. The Armenian language, though still spoken, is not experiencing anything akin to the renaissance occurring among both Kurmanji and Zazaki-speaking communities, though all languages have withered in the face of Turkification policies. Yet each language also has its champions willing to pressure the state to do right by its supposed commitment to democratization and, by proxy, to multiculturalism. The utility of shaming and claiming as a tool to facilitate this commitment is strong because memory is a potent organizing tool, but the roots of state denial run deep.

Notes

1 In everyday discussion, this time period becomes compressed into just "1915," the year of the largest single genocide, though the whole time period was in fact part of the catastrophe.
2 Akçam (2006: 4); Suny (1993: 217).

3 See www.genocidescholars.org/about-us for the way that international scholars apply the term.
4 When asked about the effect on his circulation of the dwindling number of Armenian-fluent readers in Istanbul, the founder of the *Marmara Daily* quipped that "every time an Armenian person dies, we lose a reader" (Haddeciyan, 2010).
5 Nalcı has left *Agos* since our interview in 2010. Since this writing, among other things, he works at *Radikal*, a leftist daily newspaper, does political analysis for International Media TV, and produces GAMURÇ, a show on minorities in Turkey.
6 Recent targeted attacks on older Armenians in Istanbul have exploited this fear among the older generation. See Nalcı (2013).

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6 Nahuas in El Salvador

Negating "pupusas"[1] but eating them too

> I have heard, including from people who work for human rights in this country, that here there are no indigenous people.
> (Pineda, 2012a, Coordinator of Pueblos Indígenas, Secretariat of Culture, Government of El Salvador)

> Before, indigenous people were seen as folkloric, but we are not.
> We are people, and we need our own space.
> (Juliana Ama de Chile, 2010, former bilingual school director and Nahuat language activist, Izalco)

Many people both inside and outside of El Salvador do not believe that indigenous people still exist in the country. El Salvador, with roughly 7 million citizens in a sliver of land the size of Massachusetts, is a much-studied case of civil war, post-conflict reconstruction, and democratization. Yet only recently have scholars begun to acknowledge and address the existence of contemporary *originarios*, [2] or original, indigenous Salvadorans (DeLugan, 2012; Peterson, 2006; Tilley, 2005). The dynamics involved in originario participation in the Salvadoran democratization processes remains largely undocumented. Even as originarios in El Salvador gain recognition, the reasons why some communities choose to mobilize for cultural rights claim-making while others remain invisible is under-theorized; it is here that I offer my contribution.

Memories of violence are a potent force that impact collective behavior and in turn affect democratization processes. This chapter and the next look to public narratives resulting from violence-based memory to explain why some originarios mobilize in El Salvador while others do not. An increased understanding of why some communities assert their originario identity even as others continue to blend into the mestizo, or mixed Spanish-descendent and indigenous majority, contributes to knowledge about the politics of multiculturalism in a democratizing, post-conflict context.[3] The two El Salvador cases considered in this and the following chapter, the Nahua in Izalco, Sonsonate and the Lenca in Guatajiagua, Morazán, respectively, show that, despite low levels of accommodation by the state, originario communities mobilize for cultural rights to different degrees and in different ways, based

Figure 6.1 Map of El Salvador showing locations of Sonsonate and Morazán departments (Copyright d-maps: www.d-maps.com/carte.php?
num_car=1635&lang=en. Names and arrows added by author)

in part on how they employ narratives of violence to shame the state into considering their rights claims.

This chapter traces the connection between memories of violence, narrative production, and cultural rights mobilizations in El Salvador, and it proceeds as follows. First, I outline the main challenges to ethnic minority rights in El Salvador, touching on problems in Salvadoran originario identification and the state's fragile democratization process. Second, I examine the case of the Nahua-Pipil[4] people in Izalco, referred to generally as Nahua, as the first of two case studies in Salvadoran shaming and claiming mobilizations for cultural rights. I particularly focus on the effect of the 1932 massacre in community narratives about originario rights. Third, I situate the Nahua community in theoretical context with special attention to the role of memory in addition to political, economic, and cultural accommodation by the state, and then discuss the right to Nahuat language as emblematic of Salvadoran originarios' struggles for cultural rights in the twenty-first century.

Originario rights in El Salvador

There is disagreement on how many originarios are in El Salvador. Rough estimates place the total Nahua, Lenca, Kakawira, and Maya populations of El Salvador at 500,000–600,000, or nearly 10 percent of the total population (DeLugan, 2012: 70; Peterson, 2006: 172; Tilley, 2005: 34, 171). The Pan American Health Organization reported the indigenous population as being between 3 and 10 percent (2012: 304). The 2007 Salvadoran census documented 13,319 indigenous people in the country, or less than 1 percent of the total population, though this is a problematic source as both the quality and quantity of questions pertaining to originarios result in low figures (Anaya, 2013: 4–5). Of the census's documented indigenous citizens, 27 percent identified as "pipil" (Nahua), 15 percent as Lenca, 31 percent as Kakawira, and 27 percent as "other" (Anaya, 2013: 4–5). These figures are at odds with demographic information in the international literature, which generally cites the Nahua group as the largest and Kakawira one of the smallest. In 2007, the figures were that of El Salvador's 687,492 indigenous people, 94.4 percent were Nahua, 4.1 percent were Lenca, and 1.5 percent were Kakawira (Pan American Health Organization, 2007: 326). Overall, originarios in El Salvador remain poorly documented by their own government and under-documented in the international community.

If signifiers of indigeneity such as language and dress alone were used to calculate the indigenous population, the numbers of Salvadoran originarios would be even more miniscule, making a strong distinction between El Salvador's performance of indigeneity with that of neighboring communities in Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Honduras. To reach the figure of originarios constituting 10 percent of the total population in El Salvador, broader indications of connection to indigenous culture are utilized by activists, for example, the presence of "cosmovision, orientation to community,

connection to place and environment, and traditional medicine" (DeLugan, 2012: 70). While some originario activists rely on self-identification in order to be counted, the legacy of racism has created many incentives for people to not auto-identify. It is possible that false consciousness among originarios who claim mestizo identity drastically reduces the numbers of communities that should in fact be considered indigenous (Peterson, 2006: 172). The widespread disappearance of indigenous dress and language in everyday life challenges us to see beyond conventional signifiers both in identifying originario citizens and also in designating which aspects of culture should be protected by the state.

El Salvador is the only country of the three in this book that is considered a post-conflict country in the classic sense of the term, meaning a country that has transitioned from a civil war to post-peace accords. Much of the scholarly work in El Salvador focuses on the conflict and its aftermath from a human rights perspective, in part because of its inclusion in the post-conflict literature. For example, Cath Collins discusses transitional justice and the role of the judiciary in El Salvador (Collins, 2008), Martinez Barahona and Linares Lejarraga discuss the role of the Supreme Court in facilitating what they term "punitive populism" (2011), and a host of scholars have documented specific challenges for women in the post-conflict era (Gellman, 2014; Hume, 2008; Shayne, 2004; Theidon, 2007; Viterna, 2006). El Salvador has also been a testing ground for conceptions of civil society (McIlwaine, 1998), theorization on the role of NGOs (Thompson, 1997), and analysis of the role of media in perpetuating cultures of violence (Moodie, 2006, 2009). I and others have explored how to foster cultures of peace through schools (Gellman, 2015) and United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) programs (DeLugan, 2012: 25–8).

Drawing on this former scholarship, I approach El Salvador as a case of "successful" *mestizaje* discourse that shows the perils of multiculturalism in democratization. The predominance of mestizaje as a mythical force of political and cultural power in El Salvador is impacting the quotidian rights for people who identify outside the mestizo box. DeLugan describes mestizaje as the state's background narrative in the postwar transition phase (2012: 61). Hale, discussing Gould's study of indigeneity in Nicaragua, says the "'myth of mestizaje' holds that indigenous culture is inevitably, almost naturally, destined to disappear, replaced by a hardy and unique hybrid national culture" (2002: 500). In this way, mestizaje is "successful" in El Salvador because many people think that originarios have already disappeared. National policies in education and cultural sectors reinforce and perpetuate these myths to the detriment of the contemporary indigenous community.

Memory, 1932, and Nahua cultural revival

The town of Izalco has approximately 20,000 inhabitants and, along with the nearby towns of Nahuizalco, Pachimalco, and Santo Domingo de Guzmán,

Izalco is part of the movement to preserve originario culture. At first glance to the outsider, Izalco may appear like any other Salvadoran town. Men and women wear Western clothes, speak Spanish, and attend any of the myriad crumbling, hodgepodge churches that line the roads. Geographic segregation in the town has been the same for generations. Fair-skinned mestizos and *ladinos* (also mixed race but connoting colonial heritage)[5] live in gridded cement blocks and colonial-era houses in the area above the central plaza. Meanwhile, the majority of the originario community lives far below, across the highway in a tangle of rural compounds with chickens and turkeys scurrying next to outdoor kitchens.

   While grouping the diverse population of Izalco residents who identify as Nahua into one "community" is problematic, it is a vocabulary-necessitated shorthand to facilitate cross-case and cross-country comparisons. Therefore, a range of thoughts, opinions, and actions by Nahua people in Izalco is consolidated in something happening in the "Nahua community," even though micro-level ethnographic work might deeply complicate the homogenous presentation of such a term. I employ the term "community" with cross-case analysis in mind, and try to minimize, by presenting diverse voices within the community, how terminology infringes on an already beleaguered population.

   The western region in El Salvador has a long history of originario mobilizations for rights claims, most prominently in the struggle for land rights. In the nineteenth century, land distribution policies embedded intense socioeconomic discrepancies between colonial *criollos*, or Spanish-born people, ladinos, and originarios.[6] Despite a short period of openness in the 1920s, citizens experienced steadily diminishing political space to voice their concerns and petition the government (De Zeeuw, 2008: 34). The 1930s brought a sharpening of oligarchic behavior amongst political elites as they stepped up the use of military repression to achieve self-serving ends. This included democratically elected President Arturo Araujo, who had advocated for land and labor reform, being ousted by a military coup in December 1931 (De Zeeuw, 2008: 34; Gould and Lauria-Santiago, 2008: 90). The military then brought to power Vice President General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, who would go on to lead a repressive campaign in the countryside to quash dissent among peasants. These events occurred in the context of the global economic recession that began in 1929, eviscerated the coffee industry, and drove peasants further into poverty (Gómez, 2003: 124).

   After fraudulent elections in January 1932, peasants in western El Salvador followed several leaders, including Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS) collaborator Augustín Farabundo Martí, who acted as the local representative of International Red Aid (SRI),[7] as well as José Feliciano Ama, a local Nahua leader, into a rebellion against the state that was violently suppressed by president Martínez. The suppression of revolt turned into large-scale assassinations of anyone who appeared to be either indigenous or aligned politically with the left and with the communists. *La matanza*, or the massacre, left

between 10,000 and 30,000 people killed by the state and fewer than 100 people killed by the "rebels" (Ching, 1998: 206; Lindo-Fuentes et al., 2007: 2; Tilley, 2005: 31),[8] leaving a legacy of fear, shame, and misinformation for future generations.

Mayra Gómez characterizes the 1932 massacre as genocide because of its explicit targeting of indigenous people based on physical appearance, as well as if they were carrying machetes (a typical indigenous and campesino farming tool), or if they were wearing campesino clothing (2003: 101, citing a 1982 Human Rights Watch report, p. 52). In general, local Salvadoran activists tend to favor the term genocide to describe 1932 (Alegría, 1987: 20; Herrera, 1983: 107), whether for dramatic resonance in the international community or because, for those who lived through it and their descendants, it felt like an attempted extermination.

While the massacre itself was genocidal in targeting indigenously identified people, arguments about why the indigenous Salvador population today is so small and not mobilized have relied too heavily on the legacy of 1932. One testimonial writer comments that 1932 was the tipping point for indigenous survival in El Salvador:

> hounded for any vestige of clothing, custom or physical feature that might mark them out as 'savages', they had to shed their distinguishing characteristics in order to survive at all. Names, clothes and habits were changed, native languages and traditions suppressed.
>
> (Alegría, 1987: 18)

Though originarios may have dropped overt signs of indigeneity at a faster rate after 1932, to characterize 1932 as the direct cause of the loss of indigenous identity in the country is oversimplified. More likely, survival-necessitated assimilation of indigenous people into the myth of mestizaje after 1932 made the racial and ethnic divides in El Salvador more opaque to outsiders. This is apparent in the dearth of scholarship on Salvadoran originarios over the years, though the trend has been broken with recent works (Ching, 2013; DeLugan, 2012; Gould and Lauria-Santiago, 2008; Lindo-Fuentes et al., 2007; Peterson, 2006; Tilley, 2005).

An intervention from historians working in archived government documents shows that in fact there was some government protection for indigenous citizens after 1932, though this was rife with ulterior motives. Lindo-Fuentes et al. persuasively argue that Martínez defended the rights of indigenous people and campesinos as part of a broad "fascist-style populism" that included them as part of the state-controlled masses (Lindo-Fuentes et al., 2007: 62). There are also examples of government encouragement for indigenous culture, including language revival (Gould and Lauria-Santiago, 2008: 253). Tilley examined birth registries in Sonsonate and finds that the number of babies registered as indigenous actually goes up after 1932, suggesting that parents continued to assert (or at least not explicitly subvert) their ethnic identities in

public spaces (Ching, 2013: 321; Tilley, 2005, chapter 8). In short, the 1932 massacre itself was sufficiently traumatic to form a narrative among Salvadoran originarios about the dangers of indigeneity, even though the state did not maintain a consistent campaign of ethnicity-based violence. Rather, everyday practices of domination and co-optation extended the legacy of 1932 in the collective memory of indigenous communities.

Gould and Lauria-Santiago argue that the loss of identity had begun decades before and was partly endogenous, and that in fact it was much later, during the 1970s, that originario communities lost what remained of key indigenous cultural markers (2008: 241). In the 1960s and 1970s, new generations saw indigenous dress and language as markers of discrimination that they wanted to avoid (Gould and Lauria-Santiago, 2008: 258–9). For this reason, Western clothes were more frequently adopted and, as in so much of the world, originario mother tongue usage declined as parents insisted their children use the dominant language instead. Intense discrimination against originarios in the 1960s and 1970s partly fueled their participation in the guerilla insurgency that challenged the ladino-dominated state control in the 1980s.[9]

The remembering of historical events is often riddled with bias that emphasizes desired perspectives over less desired ones, rendering the entire process of memory subjective (Lindo-Fuentes et al., 2007: 14–15, 18). The generation of leftist activists who came of age in the 1960s and 1970s commonly cite 1932 as the central event in the downward spiral of culture loss (Anonymous, 2012b; Dominguez, 2012; Galindo, 2012). This is an instance where the perceived truth of the narrative for the speaker is more relevant to their mobilization than the truth itself. My argument operates on the premise that such collectively believed memories of violence can have long-term social implications whether or not they are factually true. The assertion by contemporary indigenous activists in El Salvador that 1932 was in part responsible for their loss of cultural practices is part of a shaming and claiming movement to push for state cooperation for new rights protections.

Respondents across dozens of interviews referred to 1932 as a memory of violence that generated fear, which in turn catalyzed assimilation for survival. In light of Gould and Lauria-Santiago's (2008) and Ching's (2013) arguments that 1932 was not actually the turning point for cultural loss among El Salvador's originarios, one must also interrogate the power that the narrative itself holds in silencing marginalized citizens. Even if the narrative may not be true, it still can influence people's behavior. After all, "what people *think* happened in the past can be just as important as what *actually* happened" (Lindo-Fuentes et al., 2007: 252, emphasis in original). For example, multiple interviewees perceived Salvadorans in the west of the country as non-participatory in the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) because they were scared about another 1932 (Anonymous, 2012b; Galindo, 2012; Pineda, 2012a).[10] One originario activist described how, both physically and metaphorically, in 1932 the military cut the tongues of people so they couldn't

speak, and how even now there is fear about speaking out. She recounts, "I remember a ninety-two-year old woman interviewed by a journalist during the anniversary of 1932 who said, 'yes, I will explain what happened [in 1932], but be quiet' [the interviewee held her finger to her lips demonstrating what the woman did]. The fear still exists" (Dominguez, 2012). The concern that people could still be persecuted for things that made them a target in 1932 belies the underlying structural challenges in El Salvador's democratization process, where the memory of state repression lingers. DeLugan has also documented the way that the legacy of state violence against originarios has different effects across generations. Here, the combination of the older generation's fear of continued violence and the younger generation's shame of their own indigenous identities facilitated the loss of indigenous culture in the post-1932 period (Ching, 2013, chapter 8; DeLugan, 2012: 68).

Shaming and claiming in Izalco

Mobilization manifests in different ways. In Izalco, mobilization has been both institutional, through petitions, letters, ordinances, and in-person meetings between originario leaders and government officials, as well as contentious, through protests. This section first presents examples of institutional mobilization followed by contentious examples.

The primary school, Mario Calvo Marroquín, sits on a corner of the central plaza in Izalco. Colorfully decorated with murals and bilingual Spanish–Nahuat posters, the school serves as a model of language rescue in the country. The Nahuat language program began in 2001 under the initiative of then-School Director Juliana Ama de Chile, who is a leading figure in the Nahuat language resuscitation efforts in Izalco. She is also a descendent of 1932 originario martyr José Feliciano Ama, for whom the central plaza holds a modest memorial plaque.

The Marroquín school hired local Nahua teachers, who themselves had learned the language as adults, to teach Nahuat language classes (Ama de Chile, 2010). Children not only hear Nahuat through daily classes, but also attend school where Nahuat words line the walls and where "dignity day" celebrations give them the chance to dress in traditional clothing, practice speaking Nahuat, and engage in ceremonial activities that encourage originario cultural participation (Ama de Chile, 2010). In this way, Ama's approach to Nahuat language-learning attempts to normalize it as part of Izalqueño[11] culture, thus counteracting the stigma of speaking what is no longer truly a "mother tongue" for children, but perhaps "grandmother or great-grandmother tongue."

However, convincing families that learning Nahuat is a worthwhile endeavor remains a challenge. Discussions with families about the importance of Nahuat brought up memories of violence that have shaped the community's response to the new curriculum.

> Some parents say, "Why do my children learn Nahuat? It is not going to serve to earn a living." But one child brought her new language book

home, and when her grandma saw it she pulled out her Nahuat language book that she had had hidden away, and for the first time the family began to talk about their culture. *The impact of language is that it starts to break the shame around indigenous identity*. Mainstream culture did this, to make us feel like outsiders – because I am very brown, I don't fit – but this has started to change, people are starting to feel more pride. There are some parents that are starting to accept it [Nahuat language learning at Marroquín School], but in the beginning there was much resistance. *Speaking Nahuat after 1932 was seen as dangerous, stupid, ridiculous.*

<div align="right">(Parras, 2010, emphasis mine)</div>

In this way, Irma Parras, a teacher at the Marroquín School, describes the many interrelated layers of contention that faced the community with the introduction of the Nahuat language program. There is concern that learning Nahuat as a second language will not lead to a lucrative career, especially when high out-migration places a premium on English as a means to an economic end.

Alongside this concern, family histories remain connected to the 1932 massacres, where fear of persecution caused originarios to repress their own identities. Parras illustrates the positive way in which the school program facilitated family dialogue about their identity, but she also notes the ongoing stigmatization of being "brown." Though now the school program enjoys community support, Parras's insight reminds us that learning Nahuat has been perceived as dangerous, at worst, and unproductive, at best. Shaming the state to make rights claims first requires overcoming one's own shame about being indigenous. These concerns have taken persistent dialogue with families and community members to address and enact institutional change in the Marroquín school.

Previous chapters have shown that use of one's mother tongue can have a profound effect on identity. In El Salvador, the erosion over time of originario languages has undermined the maintenance of minority identities and signifies cultural non-accommodation by the state. National policies of homogenization chipped away at originario culture through many mediums, including Spanish-only education. Though it may be easier to absorb information in one's mother tongue (Bénéï, 2008: 73), as Kurds currently argue, Salvadoran educational policy never subscribed to this philosophy. To date, the Salvadoran Ministry of Education (MINED) has offered only tokenistic financing to cultural initiatives at the Izalco school, despite a consistent campaign by Ama and other school administrators through letters, petitions, and meetings to press the importance of their project. For example, the originario activist group, the National Indigenous Coordinating Committee of El Salvador (CCNIS) pressed the topic of intercultural and bilingual education on FMLN candidate Funes during the presidential elections, declaring it as a component of originario claims (Anonymous, 2012a).

When I first visited the school in 2010, I walked by a poster in the hallway declaring "The absence of culture is civic death" on my way to sit in on a Nahuat language class. In the class, thirty primary school students repeated words pointed at on the blackboard identified by their teacher, a man whose salary MINED refused to pay, but who instead was funded by other portions of the school's budget as well as by local family contributions (Ama de Chile, 2010). The children sang the Salvadoran national anthem and several other songs in Nahuat and used out-of-date Nahuat textbooks for grammar and vocabulary lessons.

Classrooms are cauldrons for state philosophy. States have students as impressionable captive audiences who will be shaped by the content to which they are exposed. In the words of anthropologist Veronique Bénéï "school is not just a space for learning and official education but one of the most omnipotent manifestations of the state in people's lives" (2008: 21). This principle is well understood by the Salvadoran state as well. Former Vice-Minister of Education Hectór Samour emphasized this point, saying, "Education is the principle instrument of socialization. Through it we have culture, values, knowledge, attitudes; therefore education plays a fundamental role in the development of competent and engaged citizens" (2012).

Ama had retired from the school by my next visit in 2012, after a long career there, but continued teaching Nahuat to groups of students through Izalco's House of Culture. Ama's presence in the House of Culture marked another kind of institutional mobilization, the repurposing of a local institution that for so long had not served the interest of the originario community. As a Nahua cultural activist and memory entrepreneur, Ama used shaming and claiming discourses in making her case for garnering support from MINED, international solidarity members, and local community members to protect Nahua cultural rights. Rather than criticising, Ama exemplifies how under-resourced communities can use collective memories as a tool to facilitate mobilization. Another avenue for memory mobilization has been through commemorative events for 1932:

> The general population still feels a little afraid to talk about who we were before 1932, and who we are now. People in Izalco now don't know their own history. In January 2010, the commemoration of 1932 was attended by more than 400 people, but only 100 or 150 from here. People deny their own history. There are some people who do not want to know their own identity. We need to work in the pueblo so that they accept their history.
>
> (Ama de Chile, 2010)

Ama shows how, as the past is revisited through scholarly and community investigation and commemoration, mobilizations begin to emerge. As communities like Izalco have struggled to maintain memories of 1932 and their own originario identities, it is not the accuracy of the memories, but the way they are harnessed, that connects memory and political behavior.

Mobilizing the Mayors

A brief but significant mobilization transpired at the local level between the municipal Mayor of Izalco and the *Alcalde del Común*, the People's Mayor,[12] who is the spiritual and political leader of a subsection of Nahua originarios. On May 1, 2012, as one of his last acts in office, outgoing municipal FMLN Mayor Roberto Acevedo signed the Municipal Ordinance on the Rights of the Indigenous Community of Izalco in cooperation with the People's Mayor. This Municipal Ordinance represents an unprecedented document in El Salvador that establishes a commitment on the part of the municipal government to recognize, respect, and protect the rights of originario residents (Izalco City Hall, 2012: 6).

Based on the structure of the Catholic Church's *cofradía* system of saint worship, the People's Mayor of the originario community was created as an institutional structure by colonizers to bind the indigenous community together and make it easier to control (Izalco City Hall, 2012: 14; Pañada and Rafael Latin, 2012). It has since been appropriated by some originario communities in El Salvador, but only in Izalco has the People's Mayor gained such a degree of recognition by the municipal Mayor. The Izalco ordinance details at length ways in which the municipal government should support cultural rights of Izalco's originarios. This includes subsections describing specific rights and protections for originario women, children, disabled people, midwives, and the elderly (Izalco City Hall, 2012: 7–11). As with many treaties and conventions that protect originarios but lack enforcement mechanisms, it is unclear how much fruit the Ordinance will bear for Izalco residents. Though the Común is not legally allowed to be politically partisan by the nature of its charter (Pañada and Rafael Latin, 2012), there is clearly more affinity between the FMLN and indigenous Salvadorans, and the incoming Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) Mayor is unlikely to uphold the Ordinance. Nevertheless, the very nature of its existence offers an alternative model of political accommodation for ethnic minorities in El Salvador.

Despite the potential positive effect of the Ordinance, an ongoing challenge remains to unify originario mobilization in Izalco. The originario community contains deep divisions that manifest themselves in disagreements about tactics as well as political alliances. While a portion of the community is on board with the Ordinance, other originarios in Izalco feel that the document was created too exclusively, without soliciting real public input, and that it would not have any effect (Anonymous, 2012c). Each of the originario leaders I spoke with across the divide felt that the other side was claiming a leadership role without real legitimacy (Anonymous, 2012c; Pañada and Rafael Latin, 2012). There are also political party alliances that divide leaders within the originarios' cultural rights mobilization in Izalco, and this discord has posed—and will most likely continue to pose—a real hindrance to better coordinated and effective mobilization for claim-making. These community divisions are extremely sensitive and I mention them in order to

acknowledge the range of challenges that Izalco's originarios face in mobilizing to shame and claim.

Contentious mobilization

The global push for institutional support for indigenous cultural rights projects comes amidst multiple projects to integrate indigenous rights with human rights. Organizations and individual activists have been mainstreaming human rights terms as such language becomes an increasingly salient tool in facilitating state consideration of citizen demands.[13] El Salvador is by no means unique in the recent wave of rights-based language utilization. Similar terms can be found in the discourses of Palestinians, Egyptians, American Indians, and Occupy members in the United States, to name a few. In fact, around the world these days, many different kinds of people make demands on governments, whether at local, state, national, or international levels, by invoking the discourse of rights to support their petitions.

Rights discourses are useful to marginalized communities because they invoke the social contract and remind states of their obligations to the rights petitioners. Mayra Gómez comments that the increasing power of instrumental rights discourses by social movements comes from linking concrete struggles to abstract notions of dignity that have moral power (2003: 4). Not only are citizens supposed to have their dignity as people as long as they fulfill their duties to the state, but a democratic or democratizing state is also supposed to guarantee minimum rights. The substance of rights granted to indigenous peoples has expanded in recent years as new mandates such as ILO Convention 169 and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples have been introduced. In fact, Gómez sees this expansion of rights as a primary function of the human rights movements, which fortifies otherwise often insufficient citizens' rights (2003: 18). Though human rights discourses continue to grow at the international level and many communities adopt these discourses locally, El Salvador has only recently seen the transformation of identity politics into concrete cultural rights.

The Salvadoran Constitution did not recognize or protect indigenous rights until 2014, after substantial contentious and institutional mobilization. ARENA governments had shot down previous efforts to achieve constitutional revisions, but activists persisted in demanding constitutional reform, which was seen as an important juridical backbone for originarios' rights protections (Anonymous, 2012a). CCNIS serves as an umbrella organization, mobilizing originarios for rights claim-making throughout the country. During a demonstration coordinated by CCNIS in front of the National Assembly building in San Salvador on 17 April, 2012, originario representatives from all over El Salvador petitioned the National Assembly to revise the Constitution to recognize pueblos originarios. I interviewed participants and observed the demonstration, which I describe below.

The legislative building in San Salvador is sealed behind barbed wire, but a large cement expanse in front was accessible to the public. After a Nahua

musical group from Nahuizalco played an opening march, several long-haired, middle-aged men gathered near the central convocation zone, lighting incense, setting up a campfire-style fire, and chanting prayers in Spanish, Nahuat, Potón, and other tongues. Nearby, a man and woman in "native" dress – fake leopard print cloth covering their groins – danced to the rhythm of a drum. Organizers gathered attendees to form a large circle around the fire and the dancers. As various men took turns blowing conch shell horns, the group paid respects to the four directions, and this and other traditionally "indigenous" symbols were displayed throughout the day.

Bordering the gathering, CCNIS banners proclaimed the need for indigenous rights, for indigenous solidarity with mother earth, and for indigenous rights to be inscribed in the Constitution. One banner read "Indigenous rights have been negated – today we reclaim them!" Many people held patchwork rainbow flags used to symbolize pan-indigenous solidarity in Latin America, and others held solid flags of white or dark blue, the colors of the Salvadoran flag. This was a demonstration meant to shame the state into cooperating with the basic claim to indigenous existence in El Salvador.

Gustavo Pineda, Coordinator of Indigenous Peoples under the Secretariat of Culture and trained as a Mayan priest, took the microphone to state that, since the President has affirmed that El Salvador is a multicultural, pluriethnic country, the next steps would be constitutional recognition, the signing and ratification of Convention 169, and the implementation of the United Nations Declaration on Indigenous People (2012b), which was signed by El Salvador in 2007. Numerous Salvadoran originarios demanded these three institutional steps throughout the rally. These steps, if undertaken, could signify and increase, albeit modestly, the political accommodation of ethnic minorities by the Salvadoran state. At the same time, it is problematic to perform indigeneity to comply with particular agendas (Tilley, 2005). For example, DeLugan has described the government co-optation of indigenous culture in El Salvador by misrepresenting it as Maya in order to promote it as part of a government tourism campaign (2012: 78). The ceremony and demonstration for constitutional reform showed this symbolic stretching, perhaps as a way to make Salvadoran originarios more recognizable to national and international audiences.

Despite these persistent concerns about authenticity, the demonstrations yielded an impact. Barely two weeks later, the National Assembly approved Article 63, recognizing indigenous persons in the Salvadoran Constitution. However, Article 63 was not ratified until 2014, and even then it was not in line with the demands of some originario activists. CCNIS had advocated for the Constitution to guarantee rights to "pueblos originarios," original *people*, not "*poblaciones originarios*," original *populations*, as the 2012 draft did, because the conflict in terms can pose problems when trying to match rights across government documents (Dominguez, 2012; Pineda, 2012a).

Background factors affecting memory-based mobilization

Originarios in Izalco are not well accommodated by their state. Ongoing denial of their very existence makes access to political, economic, or cultural concessions particularly difficult. The interrelatedness of these three types of accommodation means that an increase in any one type could threaten the entrenched system of privileged hierarchy in the country. Overall, state accommodation of originarios has been continually low in Izalco over time. The memories of state violence against originarios there fuse with these accommodations to create narratives that encourage ongoing submission to the status quo of mestizaje identity. Yet the tide is shifting as El Salvador's authoritarian legacy unravels in the post-war democratization process.

Political accommodation

This and the following subsections describe the state's levels of accommodation toward Nahua originarios in the political, economic, and cultural realms and assess the way these accommodation levels affect Nahua shaming and claiming mobilizations for cultural rights. The Figure 6.2 outlines the basic theoretical components of my argument. Nahua originarios experience low political and economic accommodation by the state, measured by concrete legal and economic protections and initiatives in place for them as well as subjective measurements of originario perceptions of state accommodations. Low Nahua mobilization feeds back into the model by sustaining, and not changing, low narrative production as well as the state accommodations.

   Though mobilization can happen in any political context, the potential for governmental fulfillment of rights claims is more likely at the beginning of a transition (Hite and Ungar, 2013: 22) or with a democratic social contract in place, rather than under authoritarianism.[14] El Salvador's change of presidential power from ARENA to the FMLN with the election of Mauricio Funes in 2009 is a benchmark on the road towards democratic consolidation and increased indigenous visibility. While past governments have refused to sign treaties and conventions to protect originario rights, Funes changed that legacy. For example, originarios achieved a major milestone on October

Figure 6.2 Theoretical model of Nahua mobilization in Izalco

12, 2010 when he declared that El Salvador is a multicultural and pluriethnic country and asked the pardon of the citizenry for what had happened to indigenous people under past governments. Though it carried no immediate promise of reparations or other material benefit, Funes's acknowledgment of indigenous citizens and his state apology created an opening in the discourse about their rights in the country. This moment was not only a new kind of political accommodation for originarios, but is also a testament to the symbolic power of apology in post-violence situations.[15]

Funes's FMLN government was also more open to demands for constitutional revisions and invited Special Rapporteur for Indigenous Rights, James Anaya, to visit the country in 2012 to document their status. Anaya's report to the UN General Assembly on June 25, 2013 documents the concerns of Salvadoran originarios that government efforts to protect their rights have not been sensitive to community needs or had much of an impact (Anaya, 2013: 10). Anaya recommended that the Salvadoran government comply with many indigenous demands including, among others: constitutional recognition, preparation of bilingual, intercultural teachers and educational materials, and economic support for community-based mother tongue language learning programs (2013: 18–22). None of the recommendations are binding, though Funes' successor, former FMLN commander, school teacher, and justice advocate Salvador Sánchez Cerén, is continuing to innovate new progressive FMLN policies. Cerén, who served as Funes' Vice-President from 2009 to 2014, took office in 2014 amidst significant regional wins for FMLN candidates in municipalities and in the National Assembly.

Under pre-2009 ARENA leadership, the Salvadoran government consistently adopted a contradictory approach to recognition of its indigenous population in relation to universal protections for the rights of indigenous people. By 1940, the Salvadoran government had removed the category of "indigenous" from the census, and a 1952 statement to the ILO regarding protection of indigenous people through Convention 107 made it clear that the government no longer thought indigenous people existed in El Salvador (Peterson, 2007: 68). In 1958, the government tried to have it both ways, negating the existence of originarios in El Salvador even as they affirmed ILO Convention 107 on indigenous protection (Amaya Amaya, 2012; Peterson, 2006: 164) in order to stay in line with international norms. More recently, in 2005, the state submitted a report to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UNCERD), stating that the country had no significant indigenous population, but simultaneously stated that new attention was being given to protect indigenous communities (DeLugan, 2012: 72).[16] The second half of the statement is simply telling international agencies what they want to hear, while the first part of the statement makes it clear that the government continued ignoring indigenous people. The lack of a democratic commitment to a social contract for all citizens obstructed the ability of originarios to achieve recognition.

DeLugan has analyzed this kind of report-writing, including the statement that, since the indigenous population in El Salvador lacks geographic concentration, there is consequentially no racism (2012: 72). Not only does such a government stance dangerously conflate correlation with causation, it also blatantly disregards the long history of racism embedded in Salvadoran history. The refusal of the state to sign the ILO's Convention 169 on the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples represents another signifier of state denial of originario rights through non-accommodation. As discussed in Chapter 2 on Mexico, Convention 169 recognizes a range of rights for tribal and indigenous peoples, and some states, including Mexico, have revised their national and state constitutions in order to be in compliance with Convention 169. Past ARENA governments, on the other hand, argued that granting special protection to indigenous people would violate constitutional provisions of equal protection (DeLugan, 2012: 72), a concern that has not stopped other states such as Mexico from constitutionally adopting Convention 169 protections. Like Mexico, El Salvador has the option to sign Convention 169 and other measures to protect originario rights without real implementation or enforcement, though the signature itself does hold symbolic weight. Under Funes, in 2009 El Salvador became a signatory to the UN Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (OP-ICESCR), which creates mechanisms for originarios to present grievances regarding violations of these rights. Ratified by El Salvador in 2011, the OP-ICESCR, though not enforceable, represents a progressive approach to indigenous rights that the Salvadoran government is endorsing. Neither Mexico nor Turkey have signed the OP-ICESCR.

Finally, originarios in El Salvador rarely discuss the role that the state's highly centralized institutional arrangement plays in preventing local or regional strategies of accommodation for originarios. Unlike Mexico, where federalism at least gives states the option of limited autonomy for communities that wish to govern by their own principles, in El Salvador, policy emanates from the capital. This is akin to Turkey, where entrenched centralized bureaucracies make any regional provisions for cultural rights nearly impossible, as the state is conceptualized and actualized as a unitary and homogenous actor. Within this framework, Nahua cultural rights activists face low political accommodation even as the national political framework trends more in their favor.

Economic accommodation

Low economic accommodation of Nahua people in Izalco reflects the intense poverty that has followed loss of traditional lands to colonizers, ladinos, and large-scale haciendas over time. A report by the Pan American Health Organization shows significant discrepancies between urban and rural communities' progress towards Millennium Development Goals (2007: 320). These divisions remain deeply rooted, as in much of Latin America. Since

the majority of El Salvador's indigenous population is rurally based (World Bank et al., 2003: xiv), their economic accommodation is best reflected by the rural indicators, which show rates of poverty and malnutrition higher than in urban areas (Pan American Health Organization, 2007: 320). Though some originarios in the community may have access to the same chances for economic success and upward mobility as their mestizo counterparts, this results more from international aid funding than from the state.

This points to the striking differences in treatment for originarios in El Salvador by their own state and by the international community. While economic accommodation by the state is low, outside actors like UNESCO and the EU have offered significant economic assistance for indigenous cultural projects. However, as Tilley points out through section headings in her book such as "Being Indian for UNESCO," it is complicated for Salvadoran originarios to match the type of indigeneity that outside funders seek in order to gain access to their resources (2005: 230). For example, in the mid-1990s UNESCO offered funding for a range of cultural programs including bilingual education, artisan craft production, and cultural media, but would not consider funding agricultural endeavors that would allow Nahua farmers access to credit or fertilizer (Tilley, 2005: 230–1). Though corn is a central element in Nahua cosmology and a core component of subsistence livelihood, these requests were dismissed as not being cultural enough to warrant UNESCO funding by a UNESCO worker who disparaged the use of UNESCO funds for "mere farmers" (Tilley, 2005: 230).

Economic non-accommodation is a potentially potent tool for mobilization, as seen in the Kurdish and Triqui cases, but it has not been used as forcefully by Nahua people. Instead, many campesinos and originarios alike have "settled" for their lot in exchange for minor concessions. For example, despite the fact that nearly 62 percent of rural Salvadorans lived in poverty in 1999, people tended to accept this economic reality in exchange for a sense of post-war physical security, thus underutilizing a grievance that could potentially mobilize many politically (Gould and Lauria-Santiago, 2008: 278). In 2011, the United Nations Development Programme ranked El Salvador 105 out of 187 countries based on its Human Development Index and, by 2015, it had slid to 115 (United Nations Development Programme, 2015). The Human Development Report showed that, while El Salvador is close to medium development indicators, it is lower than most other Latin American and Caribbean countries in this measure (United Nations Development Programme, 2011). World Bank data shows that 42.5 percent of El Salvador's population lived in poverty in 2010 (2013).

Neither of these indices separate out indicators for originario populations, but observational data from Izalco and other more heavily indigenous towns such as Nahuizalco and Guatajiagua show that much of the originario population still lives in poverty, as does a significant portion of the mestizo population. I accounted for this through material measures such as access to indoor plumbing and building materials for homes, as well as through

subjective measures that came out of conversations about how people view their own job opportunities and how they describe their dependence on subsistence agriculture.

Originario poverty is directly related to the issue of land rights, which are a major constraint on political and economic accommodation in El Salvador. Those with deeply vested interests in the agricultural sector want to avoid any possibility of land reclamation. There is concern that, if the government signed Convention 169, which states that tribal and indigenous people have the right to ancestral territories, originarios could reclaim lands stolen from them (Pineda, 2012a). As in many other Latin American countries, El Salvador experienced loss of originario cultural identity through seizing of land and manipulation of originario cultural and political organizations in the process of national myth-making (Gould, 1998: 70). Though it is analytically useful to separate categories of political, economic, and cultural accommodation, in fact their lived experiences are intertwined. As Gould points out, loss of land – an economic non-accommodation – impacts loss of culture, as does the loss of political organizations. Land is the basis for subsistence farming, a long-practiced originario tradition, but it is also connected to cosmovision and to political clout in a country ruled by the landed class. The right to land highlights how state non-accommodation in one area affects the whole structural environment and, in turn, influences mobilization for cultural rights.

Cultural accommodation

Though cultural accommodation for Nahua originarios at the national level has been low, with new modest improvements, there have been small victories at the local level. This subsection looks at cultural accommodation through state policies towards bilingual, intercultural education and the influence of the National Council for Culture and Art (CONCULTURA). As mentioned earlier, the FMLN presidential victory with the election of Funes in 2009 boosted El Salvador's democratic commitment to originario citizens. This happened not just in political arenas, but also in cultural ones, as when Funes transformed the old ARENA stomping ground of CONCULTURA into a more autonomous Secretariat of Culture, replete with its own Indigenous Affairs office.

CONCULTURA was a problematic institution for originarios as it tended to promote culture by romanticizing ancient indigenous histories at the expense of contemporary indigenous communities (DeLugan, 2012: 41–3). Many interviewees reinforced this point by describing frustration at being treated as "folklore" by the national government through CONCULTURA and their associated staff at local-level Houses of Culture (Ama de Chile, 2010; Guzman, 2012; Hernández, 2012). One interviewee points out, "In the Salvadoran Constitution it says that the government should preserve culture, but it is open to interpretation as to what culture consists of" (Parras, 2010). Culture is produced and evaluated in many venues, but schools are

particularly important sites of cultural performance because they embed cultural values in the next generation of Salvadorans.

Unfortunately, even with government agencies more sympathetic to originario claims than under previous administrations, it appears unlikely that intercultural or bilingual education will be incorporated by MINED anytime soon. When pressed on this topic, Vice-Minister of Education Héctor Samour told me:

> Yes, there are indigenous associations, but there are no geographically concentrated [indigenous] zones, they are diluted – in some zones, yes, like the Nahua, but in reality there are few speakers. Therefore it would not serve to have a bilingual or intercultural curriculum. There are other spaces to make sure culture does not disappear, but not in the schools.
>
> (2012)

Originarios, however, through the leadership of CCNIS have made clear that a small population size does not diminish their demand for the cultural right to learn their language (Anonymous, 2012a). Intercultural education should theoretically allow people from different cultures to better understand each other, with the hope that by socializing young people in schools, peaceful co-existence rather than ethnic antagonism or misunderstandings will transpire. Also, if schools are not the place for indigenous culture, where *is* its place in Salvadoran society?

CONCULTURA and the Houses of Culture left a dismal legacy of homogenized nation-building in their wake, making these institutions unlikely—or at least more challenging—spaces for cultural revival. Though the Secretariat of Culture may be able to create new venues and methods for cultural preservation with the input of Gustavo Pineda as the Coordinator for Indigenous Peoples, the absence of intercultural or bilingual education in schools demonstrates non-accommodation of originarios by the Salvadoran state. Excluding bilingual education from MINED's agenda has had both short- and long-term effects on the cultural maintenance and identity of Salvadoran originarios. It also has created long-term effects on the perception of El Salvador's attempted democratization, a process which in theory is dedicated to the equality of all citizens. Language imposition constitutes repression, whether in schools or society more broadly (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000: 11). This repression is evident in the way that Nahuat struggles to continue as a living language. Though some originarios in Izalco talk with optimism about how their project is to strengthen, not rescue, Nahua culture in the region (Dominguez, 2012), others told me that there are only four remaining semi-fluent speakers of Nahuat in Izalco (Pañada and Rafael Latin, 2012). The presence or absence of indigenous culture in the formal and informal education sectors serves in this way as an important measure of cultural (non-)accommodation in El Salvador.

Conclusion

Roque Dalton, the celebrated revolutionary Salvadoran poet, invokes the impact of 1932 on the Salvadorans who came afterwards in his poem, "Todos":

> We were all born half dead in 1932/we survived but half alive/each with a count of thirty thousand full deaths/that they used to fatten up their interests/their revenues/and reaches today to stain the death of those that continue/being born/half dead/half alive.
>
> (Dalton, 1974)

As Dalton evokes, today's generation is still affected by the "stain" of 1932, as it touches the ways that they live their lives, half dead and half alive. Long after the immediate repercussions of the massacre occurred, originario communities keep memories of violence circulating in community narratives. These stories translated to fear-driven silence and assimilation for the majority of the population, with only a handful of outspoken dissidents.

Originarios in El Salvador face grave challenges to cultural continuity. Despite low-to-medium levels of political, economic, and cultural accommodation by the state, Nahua cultural rights activists in Izalco have undertaken cultural resuscitation projects, government lobbying efforts, and public education projects, all rooted in memories of the 1932 massacre. They may not be able to mainstream bilingual education or indigenous cultural appreciation in schools throughout the country, but, in Izalco, the more that people access the collective memory of 1932, the more they mobilize. Slowly, the state is beginning to see cooperation as a more helpful response than repression. There may yet be a path out of the bifurcated existence that Dalton describes for descendants of the 1932 massacre.

Notes

1 In an apt summary of the mainstream national discourse, and commenting on the Nahuat origin of the word *pupusa*, the stuffed corn tortilla that is El Salvador's staple meal, a Nahua activist said to me, "we negate the people who invented pupusas, but we eat them" (Tepas Lapa, 2012), thus inspiring the chapter title. See also Tilley (2005: 30–1).

2 Throughout this chapter, I use the term "pueblos originarios," original peoples, or often simply "originarios" to refer to El Salvador's indigenous ethnic minority citizens. This was the preferred term among many rights activists with whom I spoke (Pañada and Rafael Latin, 2012), though some people also continue to use the term "indigenous" or "indigenous peoples," along with "native" (Tepas Lapa, 2012). There are historically based power relationships bound up in all potential group labels of people, and I generally mimic the word choice that interviewees employed themselves.

3 Charles Hale's work (2002) on multiculturalism in Guatemala is useful for exploring this topic, as is his exploration of how identity politics emerged in Latin America (1997).

4 There remains much internal discussion with Salvadoran scholars and scholars of El Salvador about the correct terminology for the originario group in Izalco. I follow the labeling of three Salvadorans prominently involved in cultural rights in the region. Nahua-Pipil, often shortened to Nahua in the vernacular, is the most accurate term for the ethnic group, though Nahuatl-Pipil is also sometimes used (Gould and Lauria-Santiago, 2008: 241). Nahuat refers to the language spoken by Nahua people (Lemus, 2013; Pineda, 2013; Tepas Lapa, 2013). Though some academic works use the term Pipil to refer to the ethnic group, this term is linked to colonial legacies of discrimination. See, for example, Tilley's discussion of her choice to use the term "Nahua" instead of Pipil (2005: xvii–xviii). Other naming options include DeLugan (2012), who uses Nahuat, with a final "t" to refer to both the ethnic group and the language, as this is also heard in the local vernacular. Debate over terms is ongoing.

5 See Erquicia Cruz (2011) for a discussion of the term "mestizo" and "ladino" in the Salvadoran context.

6 See Mahoney (2001) for a detailed discussion of how colonial economic and political relations led El Salvador on a path-dependent march towards twentieth-century authoritarianism.

7 See Ching (2013: 295–6) for more about Martí's role in organizing Sonsonate.

8 See DeLugan (2012: 67); Stanley (1996: 42) or De Zeeuw (2008: 34) for different numbers of victims. One scholar stated that "Government terrorism in the countryside combined with a 'scorched earth' policy of retaliation claimed the lives of up to 30,000 peasants, a number which represented nearly 3% of El Salvador's total population at the time (HRW 1982)" (cited in Gómez, 2003: 101).

9 For discussion of *ressentiment* and the way resentment of discriminatory practices fueled indigenous mobilization in El Salvador, see Gould and Lauria-Santiago (2008: 147).

10 This parallels a trend I heard in my interviews in Dersim, Turkey, where Kurds were cautioned to not be overly critical or demanding of the state because they didn't want "another 1938," or large-scale massacre of Kurds by the military.

11 Residents of Izalco.

12 See Tilley for mention of three historic pillars of a visible Indian community: community, *cofradía*, and the People's Mayor (Tilley, 2005: 111).

13 Omar Encarnación offers an excellent analysis of how citizens engage human rights discourse for domestic mobilization in an article on the gay rights movement in Argentina (2013).

14 See Encarnación (2014) for an example of how regime type matters for gay right mobilizations.

15 See Gellman (2012); Nobles (2008) for more on the role of apologies in comparative context.

16 This schizophrenia affected originarios' organizing in that they went very slowly, not knowing what could be expected from the government and frustrated by these mixed messages (Amaya Amaya, 2012).

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7 Cultural erosion

Fragile Lenca persistence in Morazán, El Salvador

> A people that does not know its history is condemned to repeat the past.
> (Sign posted at a former FMLN encampment in El Salvador)

Indigenous Lenca people in eastern El Salvador are the marginalized of a generally marginalized population. As the previous chapter shows, there has been recent momentum around Nahuat language and other cultural practices throughout Izalco and other towns in western El Salvador. However, this momentum has not carried over into the eastern department of Morazán, where the legacy of El Salvador's civil war dominates the discursive landscape. In the face of civil war narratives, there has been little space for Lenca Salvadorans to mobilize narratives of violence related to their indigeneity, as opposed to narratives of their class-based identity as campesinos, to advocate for their rights. Yet despite low levels of rights mobilization, several communities in Morazán still identify as originario and hold vibrant, if fading, private narratives about violence perpetuated against them.

This chapter, in line with the previous empirical chapters, proceeds as follows. I first present the historical context for memories of violence as a mobilization resource in Morazán, looking in this case to El Salvador's civil war. Next, I revisit the conceptual relevance of memory for this particular case and then describe the way that cultural rights demands are being expressed by Lenca activists. I situate the high level of Lenca assimilation into the mestizo population in the structural context of low political, economic, and cultural accommodation for Lencas historically, compounded by class-based narratives of the civil war that downplayed the relevance of indigenous identity in the conflict. I conclude with an assessment of what the loss of Lenca culture means for El Salvador.

In addition to close readings of related literatures, my data comes from the interviews I conducted during 2008–12 in Guatajiagua, San Fransisco Gotera, Cacaopera, Segundo Montes, El Mozote, Perquín, and Arambala, which are all towns in Morazán Department. Of these, only Guatajiagua and Cacaopera are recognized by Salvadorans as being vaguely "indigenous," but each has played an important role in memory-based narrative formation in eastern El Salvador. As the Lenca community is the least mobilized of all the

cases described in the book, this chapter documents as much the absence of memory-based narratives as it does Lenca cultural rights mobilizations.

Lenca identity and the Salvadoran civil war

El Salvador's civil war was a devastating conflict that affected many layers of Salvadoran identity. The war's formal start date is usually ascribed to the January 1981 FMLN[1] offensive, but the origins of the conflict began long before. Land inequality, liberation theology, the role of grassroots organizers, reforms in the 1960s, and people's moral outrage over historic oppression were all contributing factors to the civil war (Lindo-Fuentes and Ching, 2012: 20–4). After right-wing fraudsters stole the presidency from Christian Democratic Party (PDC) candidate José Napoleón Duarte in the 1972 election, guerilla organizations recognized that elections were not a viable means for representation and sought out alliances with peasant and labor organizations to foment armed rebellion instead (De Zeeuw, 2008: 35).

State repression increased throughout the 1970s, with basic rights such as freedom of assembly and movement suspended, and military courts commandeering jurisdiction over civilian crimes (Gómez, 2003: 135). A coup in 1979 brought a series of brief military governments to power and an expansion of death squad operations. The March 24, 1980 assassination of human rights advocate Oscar Romero, Archbishop of San Salvador, the day after he asked soldiers to defy orders from their superiors by refusing to kill fellow citizens, was a turning point in Salvadoran history. Fifty thousand people attended Romero's funeral, which was attacked by government troops, leaving several dozen dead. No research has yet documented the role of indigenous people in these funeral protests, but, since Romero was a friend of poor and indigenous parishioners, it is plausible that indigenous Salvadorans were among those in the streets. State repression curbed further protest in the early 1980s, with 12,000 people killed in 1980 alone.

El Salvador's civil war took place in the context of staunch authoritarianism. The right-wing ARENA party, founded by the notorious death squad director Roberto D'Aubuisson, controlled the Legislative Assembly from 1976 to 1984. D'Aubuisson was then defeated in a presidential bid by the PDC's Duarte, who was cast out of office in 1988. In 1989, Duarte, in turn, was replaced by ARENA's Alfredo Cristiani, a major landowner and neoliberal businessman. Estimates of the death toll from the decade-long civil war vary from 50,000 to 75,000 people (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 3; Wood, 2008: 541), and few people have ever been held accountable for any of the killings.

The Lenca population in El Salvador began to dwindle long before the civil war in the 1980s. As in western El Salvador, multiple interviewees cited the massacres of 1932 as forcing originario culture further underground or making it disappear altogether (Anonymous, 2012a; Galindo, 2012; Guzman, 2012). Some claimed that memories of targeted violence against originarios in 1932 also acted as a deterrent to originario claim-making during the civil

war itself, as well as in contemporary politics (Anonymous, 2012a; Galindo, 2012). The previous chapter discussed the intervention of historians of El Salvador to explain how memories of 1932 alone are not responsible for the loss of indigenous identity to the extent proclaimed by many Salvadorans. Nevertheless, the fact that this misunderstanding persists in discourses about the effects of remembered state violence in both Izalco and Morazán makes the potency of the constructed narrative compelling. Even if the story about 1932 as a turning point for indigenous cultural loss is not exactly true empirically, it has taken on the ability to explain an aspect of reality for the speakers. In this way, the narrative of the memory – what is sometimes referred to as historical memory – exerts causal power in its own right.

What is certain is that, by the civil war era, originario identity in Morazán had dwindled but not vanished completely. The memoir of FMLN Radio Venceremos leader Carlos Henríquez Consalvi, or "Santiago," describes numerous everyday interactions with indigenous people in Morazán, for example. His anecdotal evidence of how people maintained and remembered indigenous customs in the region during the war shows that, contrary to official discourse, indigenous people did continue to exist in Morazán (Henríquez Consalvi, 2011: 54–6, 60–1).[2] Some people participated in the insurgent FMLN as originarios, others as campesinos, and still others as mestizo, ladino, or foreign allies. Memories of 1932 and other incidents of state persecution in the lead-up to the war served to both motivate and deter indigenous Salvadorans from participating with the FMLN. Many on the Salvadoran left who were executed during the war had indigenous ancestry even if they did not claim customary practices. But the war, like the 1932 massacre, has been narrated as a class conflict by government, FMLN, and scholarly sources alike, thus obscuring the role of ethnicity.

Even though the literature does not explicitly show the operationalization of ethnicity in the civil war, Salvadoran social divisions set the framework for ethnically targeted acts of violence.[3] Most officials and landholders protected by the Salvadoran government were Spanish colonial-descendent elites or ladinos (neither indigenous nor direct colonial descendants). Meanwhile, most indigenous Salvadorans were part of the campesino class, and campesinos supported the FMLN (Wood, 2003: 127). Though the FMLN's agenda was class-based, many originarios participated in the civil war for other reasons and were targeted for persecution based on ethnicity.[4] In large part, this was because indigenous people were automatically assumed to be FMLN-affiliated, which was sometimes true and sometimes not.

The affiliation binary is complicated by the incorporation of poor campesino and indigenous boys and men into the government forces and its rural intelligence-gathering and paramilitary unit, the National Democratic Organization (ORDEN). Studies of campesino households in the mid- to late-1970s show that location, more than economic status, helped predict political affiliation, whether with ORDEN or an oppositional group (Wood, 2003: 195–8). Though it is possible that some originario-descendent ORDEN

members may have believed in ORDEN's mission, boys and men were coerced into aiding the government through ORDEN out of survival necessity because such membership promised jobs, education, and farming materials, among other things (Alegría, 1987: 14; Wood, 2003: 95). Poor, often indigenous campesinos were promised ownership over the meager land plots that they already farmed, as well as land tax exemption and, most significantly, identity cards, which would allow the newly minted informers to move freely in the country without being suspected of being FMLN members or sympathizers (Alegría, 1987: 62). Often those who joined ORDEN were in fact originarios who lacked "the capacity to recognize themselves" (Galindo, 2012). Whether through false consciousness or a calculated strategy for survival, originarios-*cum*-campesinos found themselves on both sides of the war. This bifurcated role during the war may be one reason why strong narratives about war violence have not been utilized by indigenous communities in rights advocacy in the post-war period.

Memory and mobilization

Elisabeth Wood defines political mobilization as taking place when certain sectors of society try to convince the state to meet their demands (2008: 543). This means that mobilization may not always be an obvious process taking place in the public eye, but may also be a covert process (Wood, 2008: 543). Though Wood was referring to covert preparations made by insurgents in the lead-up to the civil war, mobilization also can refer to efforts that do not culminate as visibly as those of the FMLN. Instead, such mobilization may attempt to capitalize on state shame over past deeds, if such shame is acknowledged by states, in order to push forward cultural rights claims.

The use of the civil war in El Salvador's historical memory by actors on both the political left and right has complicated how indigenous people are able to use narratives of the war as instrumental tools in shaming and claiming. For example, the few references to indigenous Salvadorans in middle school social studies textbooks are in the context of the folkloric past. There is no mention of them as active protagonists in the civil war (Ministry of Education of El Salvador, 2009). Lenca communities in Morazán have a low level of narrative production about their experiences of violence during the civil war. Yet, for indigenous and campesino Salvadorans who did join the FMLN, narratives about the 1932 massacre were often invoked during the 1980s to illustrate the long-term violations of human rights that they experienced and to justify the taking up of arms. However, the memories of violence that existed in Morazán tend to be absorbed into class-based discourse about violence towards campesinos or communists rather than against originarios, whose ethnic identity was subsumed by other categories. In this way, Salvadoran war narratives render originarios invisible by inserting their experiences into class frameworks.

During many interviews about the effects of the civil war in Morazán, interviewees would insist that it was a class story and not related to ethnicity. For example, there is much evidence that the FMLN was kept alive by local support bases who brought them tortillas and beans. These communities and individuals are usually referred to as campesinos, even though these same people might be remembered for performing originario-associated rituals such as sacrificing local birds at nearby springs to ensure the continued flow of water (Martínez, 2012). Several interviewees used descriptive stories about a sacrifice or other indigenously connected rituals to describe various community members during the war and afterwards, but would not label them as indigenous. In this way, at the local level, memories of violence and the actors within that violence seem to be caught up in the same myth of mestizaje that has enveloped El Salvador's national-level memory. Because of this, narratives of violence within the Lenca community are weak, as the community itself lacks cohesion and has suffered from ongoing assimilation. The ways in which memories about the civil war have been operationalized also lack a significant ethnic component.

Immediately following the signing of the Peace Accords in 1992, the United Nations (UN) implemented a Truth Commission as a condition of the accords. This was one of the few ways in which the Salvadoran state institutionalized memories of the civil war, and it only did so under pressure from the international community. The Truth Commission was designed as a justice and reconciliation mechanism, but it also served as a claim-making tool towards the government for those brave enough to use memories of violence in this way. ARENA continued in power for seventeen years after the Peace Accords were signed and, therefore, though the armed conflict had stopped, the political, economic, and cultural conflicts were still ongoing.

The UN released the report of the Commission on the Truth on March 15, 1993. The report published the results of its investigations into only thirty-two cases, though it had collected more than 2,000 testimonies about more than 7,000 alleged crimes (Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, 1995: 88). These crimes included extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, and torture, the vast majority of which was attributed to the military (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 38). The Commission on the Truth report deemed El Salvador's judicial system incapable of impartial judgment and punishment for the crimes it documented and recommended deep judicial reform as well as reform of many other state institutions (United Nations Commission on the Truth for El Salvador et al., 1993: 163, 167).

Those accused in the report of violating human rights vehemently decried its release, and such high level condemnation of the report caused fear that the fragile peace process could be undone, especially since perpetrators had not completely been purged from the armed forces[5] (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 37). In his 1993 address to the nation, ARENA President Cristiani, called for "erasing, eliminating, and forgetting everything in the past" and the UN Secretary General noted that the government largely ignored the

commission's recommendations (Popkin, 2000: 136, 159, 160). El Salvador's legislature passed a blanket amnesty law in the week following the report's release. Salvadoran judges repeatedly created legal barriers to prevent the prosecution of high-ranking military officers for human rights abuses (Popkin, 2000: 45), in part because the judges felt connected to the military through patrimonial, familial, or class relationships. This scenario is indicative of the fragility of claim-making in a post-conflict context, where the democratization process is just beginning and has not yet included a change in government.

El Salvador's Truth Commission, like truth commissions everywhere, represents the narrating of memories of violence. Officials made transcriptions of memories to serve as proof of human rights violations, and these acts of memory mobilization gained national and international audiences through institutional processes. Though the Commission served as a channel for memory-based institutional claim-making as grounds to invoke retributive justice measures (United Nations Commission on the Truth for El Salvador et al., 1993: 188–92), it was ultimately unable to obtain redress for claims that were made. Initiated less than six months after the signing of the Peace Accords, the Commission was underutilized as an information-gathering tool due to trauma, routine suppression of grief, and disbelief by potential testifiers that the war was actually over (Popkin, 2000: 134). This was in addition to the challenges posed by its six month mandate, limited resources, the context of an entrenched ARENA government, and elite backlash against the Commission's work.

Given these challenges, it is unsurprising that, subsumed by the myth of mestizaje, the pervasive class war narrative of the conflict, and the aforementioned political obstacles, originarios had no special role in the Commission. Though there was one documented case of the military raiding an indigenous cooperative (United Nations Commission on the Truth for El Salvador et al., 1993: 69), the Commission did not discuss this case any differently than other cases it documented. Despite the significance of the Commission for El Salvador as a whole, any claims made by originarios were absorbed into the larger class and political discourse of the civil war, and not expressed as being related to originario status. Since the Commission report served as the prime source of narrative about memories of violence from the war, the absence of indigenous voices there is indicative of their larger absence in the historical memory of the war in Morazán.

Memories of war violence continue to be politically powerful tools in El Salvador's democratization process. Though former President Funes apologized on behalf of the state to the citizenry for the civil war violence in 2010, the impact of the amnesty provision that followed the release of the Truth Commission report remains ongoing. In 2013, when Salvadoran courts agreed to hear cases that potentially could overturn the amnesty provision, José Luis Escobar Alas, the Archbishop of San Salvador, hastily closed the office of Tutela Legal, a human rights and legal aid organization that holds

much of El Salvador's war archives. As a platform for shaming the state and claiming rights in El Salvador, Tutela Legal's office was well positioned to bring untold stories from the war to light, as it was the repository for archived cases of human rights violations. Its forced shut-down, which happened so covertly that its Director arrived to work one day only to find the doors locked, is cause for concern. Tutela Legal's closure at that time was an act of forced forgetting. The clergy, acting on orders from the judiciary behind closed doors, aided the state's complicity in denying war memories to populations still seeking redress for human rights violations.[6]

Local cultural rights mobilization in Guatajiagua

The town of Guatajiagua sits perched on a mountainside in El Salvador's eastern-most department and is considered one of the few remaining Lenca villages in the country. Despite this status, it would be easy to pass through and think of it as another mestizo hamlet, as many of the easily recognizable signs of indigenousness – language, clothing, and religion, for example – are interchangeable with neighboring mestizo towns. Yet Guatajiagua has sustained itself as a bearer of indigenous culture and continues to look for ways to better protect its cultural resources. Though the Lenca community of Guatajiagua exhibits the lowest level of mobilization compared to other cases in this book, it is important to note that community members are still mobilizing by using claims to cultural rights protections based on a legacy of past grievances, most notably the 1932 massacre and the civil war.

Local Lenca elder Salvador Hernández is one of the Guatajiaguan memory-keepers and the CCNIS representative for the originario community. The San Salvador-based umbrella group for indigenous rights in the country, CCNIS, has provided training and support for indigenous community organizers including Hernández. He greets me barefoot in his tidily swept yard and pauses to consult his daily indigenous almanac before we begin speaking. We perch on chairs in the shade as my baby daughter crawls after his neighbor's chickens and towards a pottery kiln near the side of the house. Like Izalco, Guatajiagua is a town divided, with the non-indigenous population living at the top half of the town near the plaza while the indigenous community is based on the lower down slopes of the mountain. I was told the town's one hotel, where I was staying, formed the dividing line.

Hernández carries much of the responsibility for cultural continuity in Guatajiagua as a language teacher, potter, bearer of the cosmovision, and activist. I asked what his goals were for the Lenca community in Guatajiagua. He described how "We always maintained ourselves as pueblos originarios … our vision is to one day reclaim our rights as people, as indigenous people" (2012). When I bring up the fact that government officials in San Salvador talk of Lenca disappearance, rather than cultural survival in Morazán, Hernández asserts that the Lenca community still very much exists as an active indigenous population. At the same time, he recognizes that, in order to prevent

the ongoing erosion of Lenca culture, certain institutions will have to be created to preserve it (Hernández, 2012).

In Guatajiagua, Lenca originarios organized by Hernández have made requests for state resources to aid small-scale Potón Lenca language classes, artisan cooperatives, and the House of Culture, which, like many other Houses of Culture in El Salvador, have tended to serve more as centers of assimilation rather than indigenous cultural promotion. Though these requests have not been met by the state, the Lenca community in Guatajiagua has turned inward to meet their own needs, supported by a few outside funders as well as by CCNIS. The Potón Lenca language, called Potón by Lenca people, is part of the Mayan language family and has only a handful of remaining speakers left in El Salvador, including Hernández.

Language no longer constitutes originario identity in El Salvador in the way it does in countries like Guatemala, but it is still a standard component of ethnic identity and is often used by outsiders as a basic criterion of indigeneity (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000: 11; Eisenstadt, 2011: 55). In Guatajiagua, holding on to the Potón language has been a struggle, and it brings our attention back to the role of memory in forming cultural rights claims. Hernández relates the loss of language to memories of violence and fear of persecution for outward displays of indigeneity:

> The bad thing is that many old people here have already lost the language. They have some words, but they use them with fear because of what happened in 1932. Since then there has always been the question of being fearful to speak … the truth is that we haven't achieved another way, to leave the fear.
>
> (2012)

Hernández showed me several Potón vocabulary workbooks[7] that he uses to teach ten children age five and up every Sunday in the space created by a Spanish-funded NGO. The language classes are his own initiative, with financial support from the NGO, and have no connection to MINED. When I ask him why he has been unable to gain MINED support for his language classes, he responds:

> The truth is that the Ministry of Education does not think we are important – what is important is the culture of the system. There needs to be recognition that the culture of pueblos originarios is different than the culture of the system. We are not folklore, we are a pueblo, truly, which maintains its identity, which maintains its spirituality.
>
> (2012)

MINED has traditionally been a keeper of the mestizaje myth, which presents Salvadoran culture as homogenously mestizo based on past indigeneity that is romanticized. In this way, indigenous communities are perceived by

some administrators as "vestigial holdouts of a culture whose disappearance was inevitable" (Peterson, 2006: 170), and therefore MINED was not going to invest its limited resources in indigenous community preservation. Yet the myth of mestizaje has not completely pervaded Guatajiagua, nor have memories of indigenous experiences of 1932 and the civil war been completely lost. A small circle of elders retains these stories and a portion of the pueblo still maintains its identity and is trying to expand its identity by sending children to Hernández's Potón language classes and to serve as apprentices to him in Lenca pottery techniques.

As the state remembers and narrates its official discourse of the civil war, communities like Guatajiagua navigate the line between claiming their rooted identities as indigenous protagonists in Salvadoran history and making themselves vulnerable to ongoing persecution as people who defy mestizaje's dominant story. This section has put memories of violence in conversation with the low-level mobilization for cultural rights taking place in Guatajiagua. The following section illustrates the structural environment in which mobilization for claim-making takes place. The absence of robust memory-based narratives in Guatajiagua and throughout indigenous communities in Morazán is in part shaped by the kinds of political, economic, and state accommodation that originarios experience from the Salvadoran state.

Background factors affecting low mobilization in Morazán

Political, economic, and cultural accommodation – defined as the policies and practices through which the state facilitates or constrains indigenous participation in daily citizen activities – forms the structural background in which memory can be mobilized. Figure 7.1 outlines the causal dynamics at work in Morazán.

El Salvador's history as an authoritarian state up until the last decade of the twentieth century sets the context for low political accommodation of originarios. Though many Salvadoran originarios and mestizos alike live in economic distress, originarios continue to be particularly un-accommodated economically based on the refusal of the state to address land reform, a long-standing indigenous demand. Cultural accommodation also remains low,

Figure 7.1 Theoretical model of Lenca mobilization in Morazán

though there has been recent improvement under FMLN-led governments since 2009. Such unrelenting policies and practices of indigenous oppression by the state exert a causal impact on narrative formation. With few avenues for potential success through ethnicity-based advocacy, Lenca people have instead folded their grievances into mestizo ones. This low production of specific memory-based narrative results in low mobilization for shaming and claiming. The following sections consider the theoretical elements in turn.

Narratives of war violence in Morazán

Lenca communities in Morazán have produced weak public narratives about civil war violence as part of small-scale shaming and claiming mobilizations for cultural rights. Why is this so? Narrative production can be low in communities for many reasons, but two stand out in Morazán. First, generations of non-accommodation led to the erosion of originario cultural cohesion in Morazán, which caused stories of originario-specific narratives to dwindle. Like Nahua and Kakawira indigenous groups in El Salvador, Lenca communities in Morazán have been treated like mestizo campesinos by the state for much of the last century.

Second, the civil war replaced uniquely originario narratives with guerilla-infused narratives, as the political and class framework became especially salient during the 1980s. Because originarios had been marginalized to the point that ethnic identity was not a potent organizing tool, it may have been easier to absorb originario claims into those of campesinos that formed the base of the FMLN. Though memories of 1932 and the civil war are both sometimes described as targeted violence against indigenous people, these narratives are mostly privately held and hard to document.

Low narrative production about memories of violence from the war undermines a potential rallying point around past injustice. Carlos Henriquez Consalvi, "Santiago," the Director of the Museum of the Word and the Image in San Salvador, argues that "memory opens doors to participation because people become conscious of their identity" (2010). This book takes up his charge by documenting ways in which the "truth" is passed down and narrated from one generation to the next and how this influences the willingness of citizens to utilize historical memory as a resource in mobilization. War memories could be used to shame the state and push for greater cooperation with a Lenca cultural rights agenda, but memory has not been mobilized enough to facilitate this potential participation.

Political accommodation

There have been very few policies or practices designed by the state to support Lenca communities in Morazán, even in comparison with accommodations

for Nahuas in the west of the country. As explained by a government official in the department, this universally low accommodation stems from resentment by previous ARENA governments because the north-east was a rebel stronghold during the civil war (Anonymous, 2012a). In addition, El Salvador has maintained a lack of recognition of originario existence until the constitutional reform of 2012 and also has a long history of discrimination against indigenous Salvadorans. The Vice-Governor of Morazán explained that "there is the perception that indigenous people are concentrated in the western zone, in Izalco, Nahuaizalco, and there is the perception that they do not exist in the east and this is purely misinformation" (Guzman, 2012). Lencas are invisible in part because they live in a region that was deliberately neglected after the war as punishment for their support (or perceived support) of the FMLN during the war. In addition, they are overshadowed in the limited conversations about indigenous rights in the country because Nahua originarios in Sonsonate department are more visibly mobilized around ethnic identity. Expecting Lenca cultural rights mobilization in the face of such exclusion is unreasonable – all other cases presented in the preceding chapters had at least medium or high accommodation on one or more background factors.

By 1992, with the Peace Accords signed and considered successful (Popkin, 2000: ix), attention turned to the FMLN transformation into a political party as elections loomed. With little support to familiarize themselves with how to generate political party structure and platforms, the FMLN had a rocky transition from guerilla army to electoral competitor, but it was ultimately successful. Yet, as in all of the cases in this book, procedural democratization through elections did not translate into the representation of marginalized interests in daily life. As one human rights activist put it, "The only democracy we have is the word itself, spoken in the air" (Tula and Stephen, 1994: 176). Originario cultural rights were not spoken of as long as ARENA controlled the government, which it did until 2009.

Before recent waves of gang violence in the 2010s that has threatened the integrity of the state, El Salvador's democratization process was frequently held up as exemplary. A previously authoritarian government had shifted through popular action towards a regime of competition, inclusion, and, to some degree, civil liberties protection for many previously non-accommodated citizens, though not for indigenous people. Yet the democratization process did not include addressing institutional design, which has continued El Salvador's legacy as a highly centralized state that does not allow for significant regional variation in policymaking.

Institutional design is one element of political (non-)accommodation that can explain the structural environment that constrains or supports mobilization for cultural rights. Though hardly a tonic for countries with conflicts over multiculturalism as seen in Mexico, Nigeria, India, and the United States, federal institutional design is a useful indicator for state commitment to political accommodation. This is because federalism at least allows for the

creation of potential strategies to further cultural rights of regionally grouped minority citizens within a unified state. Whether or not such strategies are implemented or enforced is a step beyond the mere availability of their existence.

El Salvador's institutional structures are based in San Salvador, and the entrenched central design of the state means that there is little room to accommodate regional diversity through decentralization. Local-level political policies were formally codified in the mid-1980s with the national creation of a municipal code. But, due to a lack of resources for implementation and enforcement, municipal codes have been for the most part insignificant in governing (Manning, 2008: 121). This situation has significance for the cultural rights of indigenous Salvadorans in many ways, but my focus here is on the impact on education. For example, while MINED has made clear that originario populations in El Salvador are too small to warrant a wholesale shift in school curricula to be intercultural and bilingual, this is in part the case because El Salvador's centralized MINED does not allow for regionally tailored programming.

In federal countries like Mexico, decentralization at the regional level has at least provided the potential for the adoption of unique curricula within local communities. Though the need for bilingual, intercultural education might be moot in much of El Salvador, in places like Izalco or Guatajiagua, it has traction. Similarly, decentralizing financing for certain projects like the Houses of Culture could make them more accountable to the local populations whose culture they are ostensibly preserving. For example, in communities like Guatajiagua, decentralization of economic resources might allow these funds to be used for activities such as artisan work of potters and other economic initiatives rooted in originario practices.

However, decentralizing the institutional arrangement of the state to make limited autonomy provisions is unlikely, especially because of the small numbers of originarios who are not widely organized to demand them. Institutional change is slow because it requires political and socio-cultural change. While sometimes change is desirable, in other instances, maintaining existing systems is important for legal stability (Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo, 2007: 63), and such an approach may slow the potential for decentralization. Yet presenting decentralization and autonomy as options at least opens the dialogue about the range of state accommodations possible for originarios.

Economic accommodation

Economically, Salvadoran originarios face grave challenges to meet their daily needs, with almost the entire population at or below the poverty line (World Bank et al., 2003: x).[8] Nearly 61.1 percent of Salvadoran originario families are at the poverty line, with another 38.3 percent living in extreme poverty, and less than 1 percent are estimated to be able to cover their daily needs (World Bank et al., 2003: x). Salvadoran economic woes have not

changed substantially in the 2010s, when 20 percent of the population reportedly earns 52 percent of the country's wealth, and unemployment and underemployment has remained stuck at around 50 percent for the last fifty years (Pan American Health Organization, 2012: 303–4).

In both Guatajiagua and San Fransisco Gotera, Lenca representatives commented on historic legacies of racism and economic injustice, often centered around land use, that made upward economic mobility very difficult (Anonymous, 2012b; Hernández, 2012). This is reinforced by studies that show the highest rates of extreme poverty concentrated in rural indigenous communities like those in Morazán and Sonsonate (cited in Lemus, 2011: 11). Breakdowns of human development indicators by department show that Morazán is one of the country's most marginalized, with significantly lower rates of literacy and clean water access than other parts of the country (Minority Rights Group International, 2015; Pan American Health Organization, 2012: 304). This marginalization of indigenous citizens is unsurprising, as these patterns hold true in many other Latin American countries and beyond.

In fact, Salvadoran anthropologist and sociologist Alejandro Marroquín defines originarios in El Salvador in socio-economic terms, as the original inhabitants of the region who were the most marginalized and oppressed, and whose descendants continue in those circumstances today (in Lemus, 2011: 11). Yet like within any population, among Nahua and Lenca civil society leaders, some could be considered to be living in poverty while others enjoy more middle class circumstances. Advocates for increased language rights have emerged at various levels on the economic spectrum. While low economic accommodation of Lenca originarios in Morazán may facilitate assimilation into the mestizo majority in hope of gaining increased economic opportunities, it also may serve to reinforce a sense of entitlement, that, as the country's most marginalized citizens, originarios deserve additional protections from the state.

Cultural accommodation

Diversity has been perceived as a threat to Salvadoran nation-making over time, and mestizaje has so dominated the discussion of Salvadoran ethnicity that there is little space to even invoke the specific needs of indigenous citizens for cultural accommodation. As in previous chapters, I look to education as an indicator of cultural accommodation. El Salvador's MINED has not been a champion of cultural accommodation, and though this has improved under FMLN leadership, it has yet to substantially shift the dialogue about what is taught to Salvadoran school children about their country's cultural heritage. MINED was historically used as an instrument of diversity suppression, as well as political whitewashing, where significant political assassinations and massacres were excluded from national history curricula (Gellman, 2015; Menjívar, 2010). Salvadoran schools continue to teach in

Spanish, with English the most popular language elective, and no mention of indigenous languages outside of specific localized community efforts to integrate them, as in the Izalco example in Chapter 6. There is no intercultural curriculum supported by the state. While the Salvadoran state does not overtly persecute cultural rights activists as the Turkish state and others do, its lack of accommodation for indigenous rights cannot be seen as benign because of the effect that this non-accommodation has. Lenca culture is in real danger of disappearing entirely.

Conclusion: replacing the myth of mestizaje with pluricultural recognition

This chapter has described Lenca mobilization for cultural rights in El Salvador and the way that memory interacts with structural constraints to produce narratives of violence there. Looking to Morazán, particularly Guatajiagua as a case study, I addressed Morazán's unique background and the main incidents of state-perpetrated violence that formed collectively held memories there. I looked at central institutional challenges to originarios gaining greater rights, including a lack of constitutional recognition, as well as historical marginalization and invisibility through the national discourse of mestizaje. This conversation provided context for the ways in which narrative production has been constrained by the Salvadoran state politically, economically, and culturally. Lack of interest or belief in originarios' existence or importance by the state, rampant impunity for past violence, and divisions and weak identities within the communities themselves are all factors that impinge on the shaming and claiming process.

   As El Salvador continues trying to enact democratic consolidation, originarios may continue to look for new spaces in which to mobilize their claims to a culture long since mythologized by their state. El Salvador's "cultural resurgence" hangs on the question of recognition not just of indigenous people, but also of the effects of the civil war on cultural identity (Peterson, 2006: 174). Lenca people have not vanished, but these communities hover on the brink of continuity. However, it is important to keep in mind that *low* mobilization is not the same as *no* mobilization. There is still a Lenca population with an identity as such that is asking, through CCNIS, MINED, and the Houses of Culture, for its presence to be reinserted into Salvadoran consciousness. Though mobilization has been mild and predominantly institutional, Lenca demands for Potón language-learning support, culturally sensitive House of Culture programming, and support for indigenous crafts such as Lenca black pottery are all significant demands for cultural survival. In addition, Lencas from Morazán have also participated in larger pan-indigenous processes in El Salvador such as the mobilization for constitutional recognition in 2012. Narrative production about memories of violence from the civil war, 1932, and historic indigenous oppression is present in Lenca mobilization. But Lenca narrative production is also highly constrained by low state

political, economic, and cultural accommodation. As long as the myth of mestizaje pervades Salvadoran culture and history, groups like Guatajiaguas Lencas will continue to face serious constraints to utilizing memory as a tool in their pursuit of cultural rights.

Notes

1 Five main guerilla groups joined together in October 1980 to form the FMLN: the Popular Forces of Liberation (FLP); the Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP); the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN); the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL); and the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC). See Gellman (2014: 46–9) for more on the factions.
2 Also see Henríquez Consalvi (2011: 161–163) for Santiago's example of Kakawira traditions during the war.
3 Wood's study of collective action in El Salvador generalizes about campesino participation in the FMLN and ORDEN but does not disaggregate to indigenous or non-indigenous campesinos (see 2003: 195–8).
4 See an example of a military raid on an indigenous cooperative documented in the Truth Commission report (United Nations Commission on the Truth for El Salvador et al., 1993: 69).
5 See Popkin (2000: 108) for more on the need to purge human rights abusers from the military.
6 See the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) website for archived stories about the Tutela Legal closure: http://cispes.org/blog/archbishop-announces-tutela-legal-replacement-plan-government-moves-protect-archives.
7 The Potón language books were published by the Universidad de El Salvador (USAL) and authored by Consuelo Roque, a former FMLN guerilla, and Manuel Ramirez Suarez, a professor at USAL.
8 For comprehensive studies see FLACSO, MINEC, PNUD, 2010 on urban poverty, FLACSO, MINEC, PNUD, 2010 on human development, and Lemus (2011: 11) for a brief overview relating to originarios. The FLACSO, MINEC, PNUD 2010 report, for example, documents urban poverty using complex indices and convenient for better understanding challenges to urban populations, but the report does not address rural poverty, nor does it separate out originario economic status as a specific category.

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8   Dynamics of shaming and claiming in comparative perspective

> Each group, each pueblo, has its own way of demanding its rights in distinct forms.
>
> (Marcos Shilón Gómez, 2012, indigenous government official in Chiapas)

Cross-cultural, cross-country, and cross-regional analyses of mobilizations provide insights about how indigenous and ethnic minority people use narratives about memories of violence in social movements. These narratives operate in relation to political, economic, and cultural accommodation patterns and manifest themselves as expressions of institutional or extra-institutional shaming and claiming for cultural rights. Like memory, culture wields significant influence in political mobilization and can help shape the form that social movements take. Yet there is also the temptation to overly rely on specific cultural attributes when explaining many political behaviors. Generalizations circulate in the vernacular, whether for complimentary or discriminatory purposes, such as "so-and-so does X (action) because she is Y (ethnic group)." Yet ascribing political behaviors to certain groups based on cultural background in this format over-simplifies the rich complexity of factors that contribute to collective action choices. I have tried to avoid the cultural-specificity pitfall by including multiple layers of comparison in this book in order to study cultural rights movements without reducing them *to* culture.

Having considered each case study in the six previous empirical chapters, this chapter engages cross-case analysis to highlight distinctions and points of convergence across cases. The chapter opens by considering alternative explanations to differences in collective action repertoires and then turns to multi-level analysis across the six cases in Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador. Cross-case comparison is first presented by level of mobilization, which enables cross-regional comparisons of instrumental memory use in shaming and claiming. The second half of the chapter turns towards intra-country comparisons, with attention to structural factors of political, economic, and cultural accommodation across all six cases. The conclusion reiterates the argument that memories of violence and their instrumental

utilization through narrative production remains a vital part of explaining differences in shaming and claiming patterns within and across states and regions.

Considering alternative explanations

Why did Tzotzils employ such a different configuration of mobilization techniques than Triquis, or than Kurds and Nahua people? There are many potential explanations for differences in collective action that challenge the primacy of memory in explaining ethnic minority mobilization, including changing economic and political landscapes and the rise of human rights discourses internationally (Trejo, 2012: 4–6). This section considers four common explanations in relation to the six case studies.

First, historic violence is frequently discounted in contemporary rights mobilizations because it is perceived as temporally irrelevant. The previous empirical chapters show, however, that the amount of time since violence has taken place is not a consistent predictor of memory and narrative strength. For example, Kurds in Dersim use memories of 1938 robustly in their rights claims, yet Armenians in Istanbul do not similarly leverage stories of the 1915 genocide (see Neyzi and Kharatyan-Araqelyan, 2010 for many examples). Tzotzils in Acteal use the 1997 massacre as a rallying point, while Lencas in El Salvador do not use the civil war of the 1980s to collectively mobilize. In these juxtapositions, time since violence is a weak predictor of memory mobilization potential.

Second, the severity of violence is sometimes invoked as a determinant of mobilization scale. The 1915 Armenian genocide again disproves this, as there has been low Armenian mobilization in Turkey. Public narratives can be created out of any scale of grievance – more dead bodies do not necessarily mean more memory mobilization power. This is visible in the 2007 assassination of Hrant Dink and the largest Armenian mobilization to date that followed it.

A third common explanation of collective action is that it is easier when larger groups of people are affected. Larger groups with a common language do tend to have medium or high mobilization in some, but not all, cases. This is a self-reinforcing attribute of cultural resilience through language because the larger the population, the more opportunity there is to use the shared language in a variety of circumstances. The Kurdish and Tzotzil populations are large enough that surely some fraction of them will be interested in cultural rights-claiming, and they constitute ethnic majorities in their specific regions where minority language use is high. Moreover, like Anderson's imagined communities (1991: 6), just knowing that other co-ethnics and co-speakers exist may help people maintain their stories and practices.

In contrast to these larger minority groups, one could hypothesize that smaller Armenian and Triqui communities in Turkey and Mexico,

respectively, who do not have the same robust avenues to maintain cultural practices, may acquiesce more readily to pressures for assimilation. Within-country analysis disproves this. San Juan Copala Triquis are more mobilized for cultural rights in Oaxaca than some other indigenous groups there, despite being a statistically smaller community. Similarly, the tiny Nahua population in El Salvador is making vocal rights claims despite its numbers. Size does matter, of course – communities need speakers in order to keep a language going – but size alone is an inadequate reason for weak collective action.

Fourth and finally, territorial concentration and geographic isolation of ethnic minorities is sometimes used to explain mobilization variability. This argument assumes that integrated urban lifestyles, where speaker pools are diluted, decrease language maintenance, while remote communities of concentrated groups are better able to be culturally resilient. Yet this argument also does not hold up in cross-case scrutiny. Tzotzils in Acteal are more mobilized than their Triqui counterparts, but both groups are based in remote mountainous villages and have strong traditions of cultural rights maintenance. In Turkey, Zazaki-speaking Kurds in Dersim are not necessarily more mobilized than Kurmanji-speaking Kurds in urban Diyarbakır. In El Salvador, Nahuas in Izalco are more highly mobilized despite the town's proximity to San Salvador and its location along a major highway, while Lencas in Morazán are more isolated and less mobilized. Table 8.1 puts these characteristics side by side.

Each of these explanations may explain a correlation across two or more of the cases, and some of them may in fact bear explanatory fruit in quantitative work covering a large number of cases. However, none of these explanations alone can sufficiently account for variation in mobilization across the six cases in Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador. Instead, I assess that when the violence happened, on what scale, to what size population, and in what locale are far less important than how the state responded to minority interests in the aftermath of violence; in other words, how the narratives were received by their audiences. My contention is that memories of violence, harnessed through degrees of narrative production, serve as a non-material resource that explains the levels of variation in the outcome of community mobilization.

State regimes of forgetting and citizen memory mobilization

> To tell our story, first, one must construct very effective stories from inside, and then make them external. I don't think this is anything magical; the first thing is to tell stories inside like a tool for oneself, and then we use those stories to tell them who we are.
>
> (Sergio Beltrán, 2012, community activist, Oaxaca, Mexico)

This book furthers the notion that identity is created and maintained through memory (Coy and Woehrle, 2000: 3), and that narratives reinforce

Table 8.1 Comparative case data with alternative explanation ingredients

Ethnic minority group	Ethnic population size and number of minority language speakers	Number of people killed in main incident of remembered violence	Year of main incident of remembered violence	Geography	Aggregated level of mobilization
Tzotzil, Chiapas, Mexico	Pop. 329,937 in Chiapas,[1] a few hundred in Acteal, nearly all Tzotzil speakers	45	1997	Rural and isolated	High
Triqui, Oaxaca, Mexico	Pop. 23,097[2], but this number compiles Triqui alta and Triqui baja. Several hundred speakers in San Juan Copala	30	2006–2012	Rural and isolated	Medium
Kurdish, Dersim/Tunceli, Turkey	Pop. nearly 14 million[3] Kurds, millions of Kurmanji- and Zazaki-speakers, many thousand speakers in Dersim	13,000–40,000 in 1938, 30,000 in civil war	1938, 1980s–1990s	Rural and isolated	High
Armenian, Anatolia and Istanbul, Turkey	Pop. 60,000[4], number of speakers unknown, but thousands	1.5 million	1915	Urban	Low
Nahua, Izalco, Sonsonate, El Salvador	Pop. thousands, with dozens of speakers and many dozens learning Nahuat as second language	Tens of thousands[5]	1932	Semi-urban	Medium
Lenca, Guatajiagua, Morazán, El Salvador	Pop. hundreds, but less than a dozen speakers, with another dozen learning Lenca as a second language	Unknown number of Lenca deaths out of 75,000 killed in civil war	Late 1970s–1980s	Rural and isolated	Low

individual and social perception of self, history, and the "other." Collective identity can be strengthened in the aftermath of identity-targeted violence by relying on in-group identities (Coy and Woehrle, 2000: 7). Mobilization of memories of violence through narrative can be a community defense mechanism against state regimes of forgetting, but such mobilization may come at great cost. Speaking out may bring domestic and international attention in ways that may help individuals and groups better spread their message, but it also can put their own physical security at risk if states or deep states feel threatened.

State regimes of forgetting exert two central influences on precarious identities. First, repression of ethnic minority identities by states may encourage assimilation into the ethnic majority because the cost of maintaining a minority identity becomes too high. This is true for Armenian citizens of Turkey and Lenca people in El Salvador, where official state negation of memories perceived as fundamental to these group identities has resulted in self-silencing. In Turkey, the deliberate rejection of inclusiveness through contemporary violence against Armenians in Istanbul has reinforced this sense of minority vulnerability. Notable recent violence includes the assassination of Hrant Dink in 2007 (Gellman, 2013), attacks on elderly Armenian women in Istanbul in 2013, and nationalist marches through Istanbul's Armenian and Kurdish neighborhoods in 2015, which included the chanting of slogans like "We will turn these districts into Armenian and Kurdish graveyards" (Asbarez, 2015). These reminders of Armenian and Kurdish outsider status in Turkey are an extension of nationalist agendas to cast Turkish identity and history in a homogenous and glorified light, which requires minority self-silencing or forced silencing.

Second, official state forgetting may make minorities identify less strongly as citizens at the national level and more strongly at the community level, where people are better able to self-affirm and perform culturally relevant practices. Variations of this are visible for autonomy-seeking Triquis in Oaxaca, Nahua activists in Izalco, El Salvador, Tzotzils in Acteal, Chiapas, and Alevi Kurds in Dersim. In the first two cases, moderate memory-based narratives produce shaming and claiming that are mostly focused on furthering local-level initiatives. In the third and fourth cases, state denial of minority identity fosters community backlash, where strong narratives and mobilizations are more robust at both local and national levels.

In all four cases, communities have found ways to skirt state projects of forgetting by establishing their own internal mechanisms for cultural resilience. Memories of violence remain salient mobilizing tools even in groups that have low degrees of state accommodation because of the accessible story format of narrative that draws in audiences. The degree to which communities lobby for state recognition of these initiatives, however, varies in relation to the political, economic, and cultural environment in which their narratives are being employed. Where communities have been highly accommodated or not accommodated at all, there is the tendency for assimilation, but

where communities have been accommodated in some ways but not in others, narratives can be potent tools for shaming and claiming to expand the spectrum of their rights that are protected by the state.

Shaming, claiming, and degrees of mobilizations

Memory-fueled narratives can come off sounding like reasons for entitlements. In other words, "We deserve rights because something bad happened to us."[6] But why do communities wield this moral leverage so differently across cases? Rather than one clear causal pathway, memories of violence, translated through narrative production, serve as resources for performing shaming and claiming in a variety of ways. Comparative analysis of how memories are harnessed as non-material resources in Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador offers insight into how instrumental narrative use works across a range of variables. This and the following sections address how memory can account for different *degrees* and *types* of mobilization. The major similarities and differences across the cases help reveal which patterns are results of "culture," and which fit into a more generalizable theory of memory mobilization.

High mobilization in Acteal and Dersim

Communities engage institutional or extra-institutional mobilization in ways that best suit their purposes or fit their resources and motivations. Las Abejas Tzotzils in Acteal, Chiapas and Alevi Kurds in Dersim both exhibit high narrative production by vocally incorporating narratives of past violence into their robust mobilizations to shame and claim. Yet, while both groups have high aggregated mobilization for cultural rights, their mobilizations do not look the same.

 Las Abejas uses a mixed package of medium extra-institutional and high institutional claim-making, drawing heavily on memorialization of the 1997 massacre through monthly commemorative assemblies, the choir, and their regular communiqués to government and civil society members. The group's members also enact marches, sit-ins, and land occupations. Highly organized and tight-knight, Las Abejas relies on strong networks of solidarity contacts and its own cosmovision to make up for the lack of material resources in their mobilizations. The overall driving momentum behind Las Abejas' mobilization for cultural rights is bound up in words, and using words legally or illegally, in Spanish and Tzotzil, whether in songs sung in public concert halls or as slogans shouted in unpermitted marches, as tools to shame in order to claim cultural and political autonomy.

 Dersim's Alevi Kurds are highly mobilized both institutionally and extra-institutionally, making them the highest mobilized case in this book. There are strong parallels between this case and that of Las Abejas, and both communities use previous traditions of organizing through socialist groups

as a means of cementing the centrality of community rights as an important outcome for mobilization. Institutionally Dersimis have made claims through Kurdish and non-Kurdish identified political parties and gained real electoral victories. This type of mobilization is in contrast to the other five cases, where groups are either too small to constitute separate, ethnically based political parties or have not successfully integrated into coalition parties. At the same time, because so many legal challenges have blocked Kurdish political party mobilization, Dersimis are also highly mobilized extra-institutionally through their affiliations with the PKK and other locally based Marxist groups. Protesting and even petitioning has mostly been contentious and led to the arrest of cultural rights activists, which has happened in Chiapas and Oaxaca as well.

Identity discourses remain central to Dersim's cultural rights movement, as in Acteal, where words and language, both highly politicized, are intimately bound up with the political behavior of the community. For example, in Dersim Kurds have quietly used words, especially words in Zazaki, to reclaim previously assimilating space such as the town's municipal building. By posting the building's basic office signs bilingually, Dersimi officials are violating the ban on using Kurdish in political contexts. Though language does not have the same legal constraints in Mexico, the creation of an autonomous Tzotzil–Spanish school in Acteal poses a similar challenge to state-imposed cultural hegemony in the town. Similarly, the maintenance of Tzotzil language in Acteal parallels the aspirations of Zazaki-language teachers in Dersim, who see the reintegration of Zazaki into everyday life as a political and cultural act. In both Mexico and Turkey, language rights are connected to complex matrices of identity-driven political behavior that include memory-based narratives as catalysts for shaming and claiming.

Medium mobilization in San Juan Copala and Izalco

Triquis from San Juan Copala have harnessed memories of violence into narratives to a medium extent, but community leaders have not yet managed to streamline grievances into a cohesive and compelling story for audiences in the way that Las Abejas and Dersimis have. Instead, Triqui stories of violence remain mired in accusations of intra-ethnic conflict, obscuring the subnational authoritarian control via PRI-supported paramilitaries, which continues the displacement and assassinations.

Nonetheless, Triquis have the strongest legal claim under existing national laws to political and cultural autonomy of any of the cases, based on Oaxaca's constitutional adoption of usos y costumbres. MASJC residents have well-utilized institutional means of mobilization, including numerous meetings with Oaxaca's state-level government representatives, to claim their right under law to live autonomously. Entrenched political interests have prohibited follow-through on Triqui requests for autonomy enforcement, however, and the community has thus engaged high levels of extra-institutional mobilization

as exemplified by their extended sit-in in Oaxaca City's central plaza and numerous marches and demonstrations.

Many Nahua people in El Salvador have also mobilized to a medium degree, but, with medium institutional and low extra-institutional tactics, their mobilization contrasts that of MASJC's Triquis. After meetings with Ministry of Education officials failed to convince the government of the importance of Nahua language programs, administrators and families at the local primary school collaborated to create Nahua classes themselves. The classes, like the Las Abejas choir, are not illegal or visibly controversial like the Triqui sit-in, nor do they defy laws about only using the ethnic majority language, as is the case in Turkey. Nahua language classes are institutionalized locally in that they have become a standard part of the Izalco's culture and the school curriculum, even as they lack national support.

Though Nahua activists occasionally take part in CCNIS-led protests in San Salvador, extra-institutional claim-making generally remains low. This is in part because the community has been so highly assimilated in Sonsonate, but also because the path of least resistance has been to protect cultural rights locally while assimilating nationally as Spanish-speaking Salvadorans. Nahua stories of 1932, though controversial in terms of how accurately they explain the diminishment of indigenous culture in El Salvador, are still more accepted than Armenian stories about the genocide of 1915, which suffer from denial and mischaracterization in Turkey, and Lenca stories about targeting indigenous people in El Salvador's civil war.

Low mobilization in Istanbul and Morazán

Like the Nahua community in Izalco, Armenians have found ways to locally institutionalize cultural rights through privately funding their own schools where the Armenian language is taught. Treaty of Lausanne provisions grant them the right to maintain these schools, and Armenians have mobilized to medium degree in demanding that Lausanne provisions be enforced, even as anachronistic government provisions to control the schools remain in place. Yet fear of repercussions for speaking out have rendered Armenians in Istanbul mostly unwilling to engage in extra-institutional mobilization, with rare moments like the funeral of Hrant Dink as occasions when Armenians could protest with the protection of their solidarity community.

For Armenians, the right to language has not featured prominently in identity-based mobilization because the community is relatively politically, economically, and culturally accommodated in Turkey, despite important problems in the quality of that accommodation. Language rights have made it onto Armenian activist agendas even as Armenian schools deteriorate and an increasing number of young Armenians leave foundation schools with low levels of language fluency but high assimilation into Turkish culture.

There is no doubt that Guatajiagua's Lenca population was persecuted throughout the war, but the myth of mestizaje, joined with both the right's

and left's misconception of the conflict as strictly a class war, impeded accurate documentation of ethnically specific dynamics. The packaging of violence towards Lenca people as anti-communist violence has muted the narrative production that Guatajiagua's cultural rights activists could otherwise harness in their campaigns for state financing of language rescue projects. Today, modest participation in CCNIS petitions and activities in the capital, in addition to a local project teaching children the mother tongue of their grandparents on Sunday afternoons, for which the teacher has requested MINED support, is the extent of the community's mobilization.

In the following sections, I compare cases geographically, which allows for cross-case comparisons within countries to examine how state supports and constraints differ dramatically within states based on specific histories for minority groups. Also, cross-regional comparisons illustrate how different degrees and types of mobilization can happen regardless of cultural or regional specificity. Different types of memory mobilization take place within varied structural environments and hold a range of potentials for shaming and claiming.

Comparing cases across policies and practices of state accommodation

In Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador, minority groups share a range of common concerns, among them legacies of ethnically targeted violence, linguistic domination, and the absence or misrepresentation of minorities in school textbooks. Yet, despite commonalities, communities make quite different choices about the different *types* of mobilization, that is to say, *institutional* versus *extra-institutional* mobilization across the cases. These differences are in part derived from the opportunities and constraints on interest representation – in other words, the structural environment in which communities operate. State accommodations of minorities, meaning institutionalized norms and decrees about inclusion and exclusion, vary in influence across each case study. Political accommodation as a causal factor helps to explain differences between communities in federal states like Mexico, but is less useful accounting for differences in mobilization across centralized countries like Turkey and El Salvador. Economic accommodation is low in most cases except for Armenians in Istanbul. Dissatisfaction about poverty and low living standards generally serves as an additional catalyst of mobilization, showing how state responses to mobilizations for cultural rights cannot be addressed through cultural inclusion alone. Cultural accommodation or non-accommodation takes place through government ministries, unions, and other assimilationist institutions that play a significant role in crafting provisions for ethnic minority language use or non-use in the education sector.

In the face of these policies and practices to include or exclude minorities, the ability to articulate grievances has been fundamental for communities to find audiences for their agendas. In this and the following section, I consider

Figure 8.1 Bar graph of degrees of state accommodations, narrative production, and community mobilization in each case

interactions between narrative production and mobilization as well as the background factors of political, economic, and cultural accommodation across the cases. Figure 8.1 presents the whole range of elements in the theoretical argument across the cases.

Shaming, claiming, and political accommodation through institutional design

Institutional design, adherence to international protocols, and local provisions for minorities are structural factors that contribute to determining both the degree of mobilization and whether such mobilization happens through institutional or contentious means. Presence, absence, and type of political accommodation serve to support or constrain shaming and claiming mobilizations, in combination with memory-based narratives. Though causal political science theory tends to be presented as unidirectional, in reality, state accommodation and rights claims have a certain degree of feedback looping in each of the case studies. This is to say that low accommodation of minorities can be a cause of mobilization, with higher accommodation one of the goals for claim-makers.

There is tremendous variation in the structural environment at the regional, state, and national levels that influences shaming and claiming processes in Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador. Political accommodation of minorities by the state is significant because it determines the kinds of opportunities that minority communities have to make claims institutionally. Specifically,

institutional state design, or the ways in which power is divided between different regional units within a state, can affect how minorities mobilize in shaming and claiming processes. The practicalities of lobbying for such rights frame the choices that mobilizing communities make. Should communities make claims at local, regional, federal, or international levels? Which institutions are responsible for restricting or expanding the kinds of rights that claim-makers seek? At which institutional level is there the greatest potential for government cooperation with minority agendas? These questions point to the importance of institutional design in mobilization processes. I argue that federalism or its softer alternative of democratic autonomy through decentralization within a centralized state holds more promise for minority accommodations than a traditional highly centralized state design.

Regionally-based self-governance through federal arrangements is one way for ethnic minorities to protect their rights in the face of majorities. However, the extent of minority power in federalism is determined in part by how boundaries of the subnational unit are drawn. Kymlicka demonstrates this distinction in his comparison of Canada and the United States; Canada's territorial divisions were created explicitly to protect minority self-government, while US boundaries in places like Florida and the Southwest were expanded to dilute the potentially high concentration of minority voting power (Kymlicka, 1995: 27–30). Recognizing the importance of boundary delimiting for regional governance in Mexico, in 1967 then-Bishop of San Cristóbal de las Casas Samuel Ruiz created ethnically-based pastoral regions in Chiapas to facilitate the administrative power of the Church (Trejo, 2012: 93).

In addition to boundaries, the balance of power between central and regional units also determines the degree to which federalism can help protect minority rights. Increased scholarship on decentralization has boosted the visibility of devolving power from the center to the subnational level as a way to make citizens feel more involved and invested in their state (Beramendi and Maiz, 2004; Hooghe, 2004), but this devolution of power comes with a loss of centralized power. Moreover, the sequential pattern of decentralization, that is to say, the order in which decentralization of political, fiscal, and administrative responsibilities takes place, has been shown to hold important implications for the effectiveness of decentralization (Falleti, 2005), and thus cautions against over-simplifying power transfers.

To obtain cultural rights, communities sometimes propose restructuring the institutions that govern them, as with Kurds in Turkey, where Kurdish petitions for the right to mother tongue education are part of larger demands that have included variations of separatism, federalism, or, most recently, democratic autonomy. A centralized country like Turkey may be less likely to adopt even limited decentralization, let alone full-blown federalism, despite Kurdish demands for both of these institutional changes, because the risk of losing central power is perceived as too great. Even if Turkey or El Salvador did decentralize somewhat, there is no guarantee that the pattern of decentralization or federation undertaken by states would be effective or appropriate for

minority populations. By considering institutional design as part of political accommodation – a background factor of mobilization – I focus on the role of such accommodation in the mobilization *process*, rather than the *result* of the mobilization. This contributes to an assessment of strengths and weaknesses for communities and states in fostering greater cooperation in cultural rights protections.

The notions of federalism and decentralization have a robust literature in Latin American politics that is only recently beginning to affect debates about institutional design in places like Turkey. Gibson (2004, 2005) describes how federal governments in Latin America leave ample space for political manipulation at the subnational level, which cautions against overestimating the promises of federalism for increasing minority accommodation. In fact, the federalism literature is rife with promises and pitfalls when devolving power down to subnational units (Amoretti and Bermeo, 2004). Yet, at the same time, decentralization and federalism do appear to allow states greater accommodation of minority demands. Table 8.2 presents comparative data for Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador pertaining to institutional design, domestic and international recognition of ethnic minorities, and opportunities for minority accommodation at the local level.

An assessment of Table 8.2 indicates that Mexico's indigenous peoples, at least on paper, have a much higher degree of recognition and accommodation than minorities in Turkey and El Salvador. Following this logic, communities with higher political accommodation should show higher institutionalized mobilization but lower contentious mobilization because such communities have more state-sanctioned dialogue channels. Yet practices of recognition and accommodation are embedded in legacies of racism, discrimination, and state formation. Though, in theory, the federal structure in Mexico should contribute to greater political accommodation because subnational units have more freedom to respond to the unique needs of minorities in particular communities, in fact this is only partially true. Tzotzil and Triqui communities do display high institutional rights claims, but they also make high extra-institutional claims because in practice institutionally directed claim-making does not sufficiently spur state cooperation. Though community activists use the international signatures and federal structure to pressure local authorities, Tzotzil and Triqui civil society leaders also come up against entrenched subnational authoritarian actors who block meaningful implementation of federal and state laws that should allow for the institutionalization of indigenous practices.

While Mexican communities mobilizing for cultural rights at least have more options for institutional claim-making, even if it is not effective, by contrast, the centralized design of the Salvadoran and Turkish states severely limit these states' ability to institutionally respond to minority claims. In fact, minority communities in centralized countries engage in less institutionalized claim-making and more extra-institutionalized claim-making. This argument plays out for Kurds in Turkey, who routinely make

Table 8.2 Comparative case chart for institutional design and international and local minority protection measures

	Federal or centralized institutional design?	Constitutional recognition for ethnic minorities?	Adopted United Nations Declaration on Indigenous People?	Ratified International Labor Organization Convention 169?	State-sanctioned and supported intercultural bilingual education programs?	Local measures taken to protect ethnic minority rights?
Mexico	Federal	Yes, at both federal and state level	Yes, on paper and in limited practice	Yes, signed in 1990	Yes, but implemented with many problems	Yes, federally granted political autonomy, usos y costumbres
Turkey	Central	No	Yes, but applies only to some minority groups	No	No, forbidden by Constitution, education is Turkish-only, except for Lausanne minorities	No
El Salvador	Central	Yes, signed in 2012, ratified in 2014	Yes, in 2007, but has not implemented its measures	No	No, Ministry of Education sees population as too small and dispersed to warrant this	No, though Izalco Ordinance, signed April 2012, grants symbolic rights, but no enforcement. No protections in Morazán

extra-institutional claims because they are mostly barred from formal access to state power. With few state or international provisions to facilitate their cultural rights protections, Kurds are highly mobilized and draw on support from solidarity communities both domestically and abroad. Armenians, who also have a greater degree of protection in Turkey thanks to a post-World War I treaty protecting religious minorities there, make few extra-institutional claims on the state, though Armenian institutional claims are also low.

In centralized El Salvador, despite minimal political accommodation, Nahua residents of Izalco mostly make their claims institutionally, a truth that contrasts with the lines of argument laid out above. In fact, fieldwork in El Salvador was crucial to see the complexities that exist for Nahua and Lenca mobilization. The regime of forgetting has so dominated Salvadoran society, leading to weak internal organization and low outside solidarity, that extra-institutional mobilization has not been a compelling option. Rather, these communities mobilize for the most part institutionally, for example by petitioning Ministries of Culture and Education to grant them funds for indigenous-led cultural rejuvenation projects.

It is also worth pointing out one surprising finding regarding accommodation patterns and mobilization in Oaxaca and Chiapas. Despite greater autonomy provisions in Oaxaca, there is high contentious mobilization, while lower accommodation in Chiapas results in a lower percentage of Chiapan communities mobilized for rights. Therefore, it is not always clear that higher accommodation leads to higher assimilation out of fear of losing rights, as is the case for Armenians in Turkey who have reached a level of economic accommodation that many do not want to jeopardize. Oaxaca has a significant contingent of originarios making extra-institutional claims despite their theoretically guaranteed legal accommodations. In this case, a taste of rights may in fact whet the appetite for more.

Legal boundaries of autonomy in Oaxaca and Chiapas help shape the political environment in which each community mobilizes, but it is worth remembering that there are also ethnic minorities in both states that have organized more or less than their Tzotzil and Triqui counterparts. Political accommodation thus serves as an important background factor in explaining why differences in degree and type of mobilization exist. However, though differences within political accommodation of minorities are useful for parsing mobilization levels and strategies within states, this background factor holds less explanatory power in cross-case analysis of Kurdish, Armenian, Nahua, and Lenca communities, which all operate under central state systems.

Though mobilization results will have real impacts on the quality of life that minorities experience, the "right to have rights" (Arendt, 1968 [1951]: 177) can be a goal in and of itself. States in the process of redeveloping social contracts with their citizens as they democratize are poised to consider citizen

demands. At the same time, communities remain on guard against the Tocquevillian tyranny of the majority (Lijphart, 1968; Tocqueville et al., 2003 [1835]) in asking *who* has the right to have rights. States may cooperate with minority claims based on new international norms in hopes of proving their democratic credentials to the international community. Yet minorities remain particularly vulnerable to undemocratic practices at the subnational level, and therefore attempts to foster state cooperation with minority rights protections through federated or decentralized solutions should be approached with caution.

Including and excluding difference across cultures

This book argues that state accommodations, in addition to narrative production, influence the six cases in community efforts to shame and claim. Here I revisit the most compelling of the three kinds of state policies considered, that of cultural accommodation, where states have set frameworks of inclusion or exclusion for different categories of citizens. Language rights, as part of the challenge to state discourses of homogeneity, continue to serve as a bellwether for the state's inclusion or exclusion of minority citizens through cultural accommodation.

   A central way in which state (non-)cooperation with minority rights agendas is visible in daily life is through the discourse and practices of mestizaje in Latin America and Turkification in Turkey. Ethnic meta-narratives about who belongs to the state and to the nation deliver persuasive messages about who is an acceptable citizen and which kind of citizen states are more likely to accommodate. Mexico's history of corporatism and Turkey's ongoing Turkification agendas make clear the limits of cultural accommodation for minorities – that they are deemed worthy of state support only when they drop minority cultural markers such as language and participate in the ethnic majority. Yet El Salvador offers a more subtle case of cultural (non-)accommodation through the lens of mestizaje. Each of these cases is discussed in turn below.

Comparing Chiapas and Oaxaca, Mexico

On paper, Mexico is a signatory to many international protections for indigenous rights, including the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, but in practice intense discrimination still exists against indigenous people throughout the country. The divergent experiences in Oaxaca and Chiapas provide an opportunity to explore how state policies and practices of cultural inclusion or exclusion operate comparatively. Politically, both Tzotzils and Triquis benefit from federal institutional design that grants them regional indigenous autonomy, though Oaxaca's state law on usos y costumbres makes more space to localize autonomy than does Chiapas' state law. Cruz Rueda described how, because Oaxacan autonomy is limited

to leadership selection, movements for autonomy are more unified because the parameters of claim-making are clearer (Cruz Rueda, 2012). By contrast, communities in Chiapas appear to be more willing to challenge state control with a broader range of tactics because the boundaries of autonomy are not yet defined. While Chiapas follows federal provisions recognizing the rights of indigenous communities to self-determination, Oaxaca is the only state in Mexico that provides a legal framework for local leadership selection through usos y costumbres (Rodríguez Castillo, 2012). Economically, indigenous Mexicans are the poorest Mexican citizens across all states.

A key difference between Triqui and Tzotzil mobilization can be found in how the communities respond to the education situation. Culturally, both Acteal and San Juan Copala should be served by bilingual, intercultural education programs to allow cultural transmission within the schools, but national SEP and SNTE practices, in addition to local self-inflicted mestizo discourses that prioritize Spanish over mother tongue languages, have made classrooms assimilationist spaces. In San Juan Copala, the violence against the MASJC portion of the community drove Triqui cultural rights activists out of the community, while in Acteal Las Abejas allied with EZLN factions to create an autonomous bilingual school that has served as a vibrant site of mobilization and memorialization for the community's radical history. These different scenarios have resulted in remarkably distinct social networks and available social capital for each community, which in turn relates to how narrative is produced and disseminated. Even as displaced Triquis return to Copala, they have not generated a cohesive narrative upon which a receptive audience could build solidarity, whereas such a narrative is quite strong in Acteal and has garnered extensive international interest. Though both Tzotzils and Triquis draw on similar state institutions and indigenous cosmovisions to frame their rights mobilizations, their narratives of violence, and ultimate mobilization patterns, differ.

Comparing Kurdish and Armenian mobilization in Turkey

Kurdish and Armenian citizens of Turkey address the question of cultural rights after legacies of violence in markedly different ways. With historically low accommodations from the state, the attitude of "nothing to lose" has characterized the bold mobilizations of Kurds in the Southeast. Alevi Kurds in Dersim and throughout the country have articulated well-reasoned demands for democratic autonomy through decentralization and the full legalization of Kurdish language use as an immediate necessary step for cultural rights to compensate for the generations of cultural loss resulting from Turkification policies. These demands have been channeled through a wide variety of institutional and contentious means, essentially employing every available tactic to gain visibility for their claims.

Armenians are still considered foreigners in Turkey despite the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne protections (Kaya, 2009) and the fact that they lived in

Anatolia before the modern Turkish state was created. Memories of the 1915 genocide permeate private narratives of Armenians in Istanbul, but state denial of this memory has prevented a meaningful public forum to use 1915 as a shaming and claiming tool. In this context, Armenians in Istanbul have high rates of assimilation and comparatively low mobilization for cultural rights. They have clung to the institutional rights guarantees from the Treaty of Lausanne and relied on elite bargaining through the Patriarchate to secure these claims. However, in the wake of ongoing targeted violence against Armenians in Istanbul in the 2000s and 2010s, Armenians and their solidarity community have been more vocal in protesting this repression. At the same time, because Armenians have become economically integrated in Istanbul, any notion of forceful mobilization is tempered by fear of losing economic accommodations that keep Armenians ensconced within the middle class. Whether called "Mountain Turks" or "foreigners," both Kurds and Armenians have been simultaneously "Othered," that is, presented as people who do not belong. Though the reality of marginalization is pervasive for both groups, each employs strategic memory mobilization differently.

In Turkey, cultural accommodation for Kurds has been so low that the right to language has become a safe, tangible alternative issue to advocating for separatism. Also, as generations of Kurds complete Turkish-only schooling and can no longer talk with their elders, the importance of language as a cultural right has achieved new recognition. For Armenian citizens of Turkey residing in Istanbul, medium levels of political accommodation via the institutional claim-making of the Patriarchate and high levels of economic accommodation have disincentivized many Armenians from upsetting the fragile but comfortable status they have achieved in Turkish society. The Treaty of Lausanne provides a high degree of cultural accommodation compared to accommodation for Kurds and other non-Lausanne minorities, and Armenians use institutional channels to claim these cultural rights as they try to negotiate with the Ministry of National Education to support Armenian language education.

Comparing Nahua and Lenca mobilization in El Salvador

El Salvador's Nahua and Lenca people, like originarios in Mexico, draw on cosmovision to fuel their discourses about the cultural rights they are mobilized to reclaim and share comparable state institutional constraints. Politically, both communities have been mostly invisible, and both have been highly economically marginalized. While Izalco and Guataijiagua are subject to the same highly centralized state structure that includes a monocultural, monolingual public education curriculum, Nahua people in Izalco have taken the narratives of 1932 and woven them into stories compelling enough to create a community-funded Nahuat-language program in the local primary school.

In Morazán, communities like Guatajiagua also have powerful narratives of violence from the war, but these have been framed for so long as class-based grievances that originarios struggle to reclaim them as ethnic stories. One reason why shaming and claiming is so minimal in Morazán, even as war narratives are so potent, is in part because originario identity was subsumed by campesino identity in the aftermath of the civil war. The Vice-Governor of Morazán described to me how he saw the covering up of ethnic identity with campesino identity as an explanation for low Lenca mobilization. In his perception, "The armed conflict at the end of the twentieth century was not directly against pueblos originarios, but rather pueblos originarios suffered in an indirect manner linked to their identity as campesinos" (Guzmán, 2012). Mimicking the recasting of the 1932 uprising as communist instead of indigenous, Guzman commented that the civil war was "not a determining factor in the loss of identity in pueblos originarios because it was already lost when the armed conflict started … pueblos originarios were persecuted because all people who lived in Morazán, including originarios, were called guerillas, communists" (Guzmán, 2012). His casting of mestizaje discourse as responsible for how people remember not just the events of the war but also the reason why the war happened to them in certain ways shows how cultural (non-)accommodation is particularly salient in explaining low mobilization. Originario identity has not been retained as the most salient identity in eastern El Salvador, but rather it has been replaced by class or political affiliations. Given the historical denial of the existence of originarios by several Salvadoran governments, it is not surprising that political affiliations are seen as more salient in defining who would be targeted for violence and who would mobilize about it afterwards.

Finally, Lenca originarios in Morazán have low narrative production and low levels of institutional and extra-institutional mobilization. Like the Nahua community, Lencas have seen their stories subsumed into class discourses, particularly around violence that they experienced during the civil war. Though originarios faced extra levels of discrimination based on their visible indigeneity, the assumption that all indigenous people were communists or at least FMLN sympathizers has made ethnically targeted violence less easy to identify during the war, and particularly in the FMLN stronghold of north-east El Salvador. In sum, memories of violence are filtered through minority experiences of state accommodation policies and practices to produce (or not produce) public narratives that become salient as mobilizing tools for shaming and claiming.

Despite differences in the extent of narrative production and the degree of mobilization, it is significant that Nahua and Lenca communities are both mobilized around the right to transmit indigenous languages to the next generation. Both communities dialogue with the Ministry of Education to encourage funding of their local initiatives and use language learning as the primary cultural activity to raise ethnic identity awareness

in their communities. The visibility of language rescue projects in El Salvador is notable for its contrast with the Mexican cases and its comparability with the cases in Turkey. The way language is politically charged in relation to shaming and claiming is bound up with the historic identity and cultural practices that communities have maintained or lost to varying degrees.

Conclusion: the many factors at play in cultural resilience

There are remarkable similarities and differences in how the six ethnic minority case studies use memory and narrative to negotiate with their states. Whether or not memories of violence play a potent role in mobilization derives in part from constraints and supports that minority communities experience from the state. If communities are so oppressed that their narratives cannot find a public avenue for expression, minority stories tend to remain private and frequently disappear. However, the same absorption can happen if communities are accommodated through co-optation or coerced assimilation.

Accommodation patterns by the state partially determine how memories of violence appear in different types of mobilization in the following ways. Higher patterns of accommodation reduce extra-institutional mobilization and promote using institutional channels to dialogue with the government about grievances in non-confrontational ways. In contrast, lower accommodation, if it is not so low as to render assimilation the only option, spurs contention. The stories that communities tell about state- and paramilitary-perpetrated violence permeate these mobilizations and emerge in both institutional and extra-institutional mobilizations. By including multiple levels of comparison, both within and across states and regions, I have addressed ethnic minority mobilizations for cultural rights beyond any one locality, state, or culture, and posit that the theory of memory mattering in shaming and claiming can be generalized to other post-violence ethnic minority groups in ethnic majority-dominated democratizing states.

There are many compelling reasons why ethnic minority communities mobilize to the extent that they do, and use the tactics that they do, in the process of claiming culture rights. The chapter opened with a summary of some of the common alternative explanations for collective action. While the structural factors considered, such as time since the violence and the size of the population, do create certain frameworks within which citizens operate, these factors do not fully account for the degree and type of mobilization of post-violence ethnic minority communities.

By considering emotion- and identity-based collective memory in tandem with structural constraints, people can best be understood holistically as social and political actors. In short, to study political behavior, we must

account for humans, with all the messy emotional and identity-laden baggage we each carry with us. By including factors that touch on both conceptual and structural limitations and resources for ethnic minorities, I have accounted for people as place-based, socially constructed beings who also respond to material and practical incentives from their states and abroad. With this in mind, I have argued that memories of violence, and the extent of public narrative production about those memories, combine with political, economic, and cultural accommodation of minorities to determine shaming and claiming mobilization patterns that push states to cooperate with minority rights agendas.

Notes

1 From INALI (2005a).
2 From INALI (2005b).
3 From CIA (2011).
4 From Kaya (2009: 8).
5 From Tilley (2005: 9); DeLugan (2012: 70).
6 This sentiment touches on "ressentiment," the French term to describe frustration and hostility toward those responsible for grievances without a channel to express such feelings, a concept widely discussed in political theory and philosophy literatures. See Nietzsche and Kaufmann, 1967 and Kierkegaard et al., 1978 for an overview. Also, Wendy Brown's work looks at how groups organizing for grievance-based rights can breed ressentiment by overly attaching to their victim status (Brown, 1995).

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9 Conclusion

Memory matters

> Violence shapes consciousness.
>
> (Ramazan Aras, 2011, Kurdish anthropologist, Artuklu
> University, Turkey)

Philosopher George Santayana once famously quipped that "History is a pack of lies about events that never happened told by people who weren't there" (in Bush and Saltarelli, 2000: 12). Memory is subject to the same fallibility – neither history nor memory is an objective transcript of the past but rather both are power-laden zones of contestation where rival interpretations of the past may compete for legitimacy (Jelin, 2003: xvii). Collective memory is a social act constructed within the vehicle of narrative, which allows for memory dispersion and perpetuation. It is not so much the dissemination of "the truth," but rather a truth or some of many truths. The "pack of lies" plays out in Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador as states and marginalized citizens posit different versions of the violent past and each group tries to inscribe their "remembered" version of "history" into the national consciousness.

   This book has explained how memory matters in social movements. The previous pages have provided extensive proof across a range of cases that memory, and more specifically the narratives that spring forth from violent memories, are crucial in determining the way in which marginalized communities perform shaming and claiming for cultural rights. The preceding chapters have illustrated how ethnic minority groups in Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador form narratives about memories of violence and use those narratives to claim cultural rights – particularly the right to mother tongue education – in the face of political, economic, and cultural policies of inclusion or exclusion. These cases suggest that, when minority communities have some opportunity to participate institutionally in interest representation, for example through usos y costumbres in Mexico or through Kurdish political parties in Turkey, they are the most likely to go on to shame and claim more broadly. This may be because the promise of greater rights has been made but not yet fulfilled by states, and also because communities see that mobilization on their part does have real impact.

Chapter 1 presented the theoretical framework of the book and operationalized many of the concepts for the study including shaming and claiming, memory, narrative, and cultural rights. Chapter 2 examined the dynamic shaming and claiming processes of the Tzotzil group Las Abejas in Acteal, Chiapas, Mexico, where members continue to seek justice for the massacre of 1997 as they also push for cultural and political autonomy. Chapter 3 considered the displaced, autonomy-seeking Triquis from San Juan Copala, Oaxaca, Mexico, as they petition the Oaxacan government for assistance returning to their village and upholding their right to implement usos y costumbres instead of political party governance. Chapter 4 assessed the multifaceted shaming and claiming agenda being acted out in Turkey's Kurdish Southeast, particularly in the Alevi Kurdish region of Dersim. Chapter 5 analyzed the language rights movement of Armenian citizens of Turkey in Istanbul and problematized why mobilization there has been low. Chapter 6 returned to Latin America through a case study of indigenous cultural revitalization among Nahua activists in Izalco, El Salvador, and Chapter 7 examined the low level of shaming and claiming produced by Lenca memory-keepers in Morazán, El Salvador.

Chapter 8 brought all the case dynamics together in a comparative analysis that crossed states and regions, to parse cultural context from structural dynamics to elucidate how and why memory matters for cultural rights across the six cases. Though the circumstance in each country and case study is unique, post-violence democratizing countries share common attributes, as do ethnic minority communities struggling to retain their sense of self amidst ethnic majority domination. This chapter presents my concluding analysis of how shaming and claiming performs a vital role in the mobilization of memory within democratization processes. It opens by addressing the deeper methodological problems that haunt many social science studies that rely on qualitative, but not necessarily consultative, methods when working with indigenous and ethnic minority communities. By failing to intentionally "decolonize methodology," scholars risk perpetuating structural injustices that have characterized encounters between the West and the Other (Smith, 2012: 8). The chapter and book argue that shaming and claiming is a vital performance of previously marginalized representation by ethnic minorities and indigenous people in Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador. This memory performance is essential for community resilience and the furthering of multicultural democracy, as it gives states the opportunity to cooperate with cultural rights agendas that have previously been overlooked or oppressed. In this way, narratives are an immaterial resource that pushes forward the potential to live together well.

Storytelling as methodology

This has been a story about stories, and how narrating past violence in public allows marginalized citizens to use previously silenced parts of their

identities to catalyze mobilization for cultural rights. Stories are messy and do not always have clear beginnings and endings, but they can convey powerful messages nonetheless. This book has served as a space for marginalized stories to be heard, as in the spirit of testimony, where stories passed through a narrator as a medium to reach a wider audience. It has not been a participatory action project that engaged communities as equal stakeholders in the steps of research puzzle design. Such a methodology is sadly not part of standard political science training in the US academe and not something that I was able to undertake in this book. In the vein of "decolonizing methodology," Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2012: 179–80) states clearly that best practices for doing research in indigenous communities dictate that the "subjects" themselves be more involved in research design than they were here.

In stark contrast to Smith's approach of making social science research less imperialistic, other "best practices" are evolving, with questionable long-term impacts on political science as a field. Recent efforts to bring qualitative social science research in line with quantitative research in the social and natural sciences has resulted in the creation of guidelines for Data Access and Research Transparency (DA-RT), which have been adopted by the American Political Science Association and affirmed by 25 leading disciplinary journals (Büthe and Jacobs, 2015: 2; Parkinson and Wood, 2015: 26).[1] DA-RT operates on the assumption that data, such as interviews and field notes for qualitative researchers, can be extracted from communities and then deposited into databases where other scholars, from the comfort of their offices, can test the viability of the claims made by the original researcher. Ostensibly, DA-RT comes with a noble purpose, to aid in research transparency and decrease fraudulent claims. For certain methodologies and forms of data, DA-RT may indeed fulfill it goals.

However, for political ethnographic work, DA-RT protocol carries with it the tinge of methodological imperialism (Smith, 2012: 22) because it rests on the premise of data as something extractable from the context in which it is produced. In line with Timothy Pachirat, I argue that my interview transcripts do not constitute raw data that has been "extracted," but rather should be understood as co-created conversations that may be interpreted differently by scholars operating with other lenses and positionalities (Pachirat, 2015: 28–9). This approach to interpretation as a central part of ethnography problematizes the use of transcripts by other scholars trying to replicate studies because researchers' own positionality is central to the dialogues in which they engage. To quote Katherine Cramer on the debate about transcript access as a means to promote transparency, "I do not think it is possible to remove me from the analysis" (Cramer, 2015: 19). By removing the interaction between the researcher and her interlocutor that is not captured in transcripts or field notes but is nevertheless integral to processes of critical analysis, DA-RT and its like risk furthering the "oppress [ion] by theory" (Smith, 2012: 39) that ethnic minority "subjects" have experienced in research processes.

In addition to the epistemological and political concerns about new efforts at data transparency measures that are based on guidelines for quantitative methodologies, there are also ethical concerns about researchers' responsibility for interviewees' safety, particularly in the context of violence research. As I argue in Appendix A.2, even redacting some information or creating pseudonyms does not sufficiently protect interviewees who may face persecution for their work or statements if others were to gain access to them (Parkinson and Wood, 2015: 24). Since many interviewees for this book addressed issues of state and paramilitary violence in indigenous and ethnic minority communities, this security consideration applies to them.

My approach to political ethnography as a culturally sensitive endeavor does not entail sacrificing causality for pure interpretation, but I do not "extract" information simply to test my theoretical argument. Although I designed the research puzzle, the semi-structured nature of my interviews meant that in fact much of my data came from the agendas of speakers themselves. In the course of data collection, I spoke with many people who wanted to make sure their stories were told. As a researcher, I represented another vehicle for people to convey their narratives in public, and these narratives took many forms. Some interviewees prioritized conveying their discontent to the world, while others chose to lament the lack of mobilization, the injustice of state control, or the bias in the media's reporting about a particular situation. Though I conducted *interviews* throughout the project, in fact, I was often the facilitator of *monologues*, the repository for bottled angst that embittered activists had been waiting for the right moment to spill. Fellow academics, public intellectuals, and elected officials also delivered monologues, seizing opportunities to inscribe their narratives on my tape recorder without taking the time for dialogue or even to catch their breath.

Though it was sometimes frustrating to not get my own agenda in the interviews fulfilled, I was also cognizant of the special dynamic happening where I bore witness to the turmoil of the interviewees. Usually, the most poignant moments of revealing happened when I scrapped my carefully outlined questions and just listened to people talk. The experience of qualitative interviewing was one more representation of the power that narratives hold, as person after person used my position as an audience to express things that they wanted to say to their mayors or governors but usually couldn't, or reinforce arguments that they previously made in articles and books.

Performing political ethnographic work aligns with the fundamental premise of my argument in this book, that stories are meaningful vehicles for people to integrate personal identity with political objectives. In fact, the line between monologue and testimony was sometimes blurred during interviews, particularly those that focused more on experiences of violence. For example, the two young women teaching Zazaki in Dersim were immersed in the dynamics of layered identity and language as they spoke to me, while Reina Martínez Flores, the MASJC spokesperson for displaced Triquis, used our interviews

to give testimony about collective memories of violence in hopes of disseminating the claims of her community to a broader audience.

Interviewees testified, narrated, proclaimed, critiqued, and explained, and I scribed and prompted. In the moment of our encounters, I was their means to talk out ideas or reiterate arguments and, in this process, the ethnographic work was not only political because of the topics but also because of the dynamics playing out between us. The way in which power operated in the data-gathering process depended on many factors such as how the contact had been brokered, which language we were speaking in, the demographic profile of the interviewee in relation to my own profile, and whether or not our perceptions of each other's agendas matched up (Mosley, 2013: 12–13).

Though it is not always articulated in political science research, these kinds of perception-based factors are often at play in both qualitative and quantitative data collection, with the reflectivity of the researcher being the true wild card. My awareness of these dynamics has not minimized them but rather been part of the analytic process as I considered the stories-as-data that have come from the more than 150 interviews that I conducted. The very act of interviewing is an exercise in memory performance as I called on participants to articulate their own relationships to memories of violence and cultural rights claims. In this way, my methodology, in addition to my theory of memory-based narrative production that I constructed and tested in the field, has served as a platform to assess the role of memory in shaming and claiming mobilization.

In the midst of new calls for data transparency and accessibility in qualitative methods, I add my own agenda to rethink how we characterize "fieldwork" in sensitive environments on controversial topics. Political ethnography has the potential to address some of the problems that plague conventional social science research methods by explicitly theorizing power within the encounters between researchers and the researched. At the same time, as long as social science methods try to lay claim to "Truth" rather than "truths," we may continue to find our data collection toolkits unsatisfactory. In this way, memory politics scholarship reminds us about the deep subjectivities that we can only purport to subdue with qualitative methods that are still steeped in the language of "othering."

Shaming and claiming within the limits of democratization

Ethnic minority citizens face real threats to cultural continuity in the twenty-first century. Myths of mestizaje and policies like Turkification have been at work for generations, eroding the social base for minorities to maintain unique identities across Latin America and Turkey. However, state democratization processes represent an opportunity for minorities to renegotiate their place in the social contract. As Trejo points out in the example of Mexico, the act of negotiation between indigenous citizens and the state may constitute a valuable practice of democratization in and of itself (2012: 15). In

these transitional periods, when rules and norms of citizen-state interaction are not yet institutionalized, the rights and duties of each party may more easily be redrafted. Ethnic minority communities may capitalize on this opening by insisting that state cooperation with community agendas be inserted into the new social contract. They may use institutional or extra-institutional tactics to put forth public narratives about past violence as part of shaming and claiming strategies. In other words, communities sometimes use memory instrumentally to connect past state or paramilitary violence to current demands for rights protections.

Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador have each labored at the democratization process in their own ways, overcoming many challenges in pursuit of a democratic regime. Each state has made limited advances in consolidating democracy through electoral benchmarks, namely changes in executive branch political party control over the last decade. However, these states fail to meet broader definitions of democracy that include civil liberties, particularly for ethnic minority citizens. In fact, historical analysis shows that the success of democratization in each of these three countries is in part based on projects of forgetting historical discrimination of minorities and minority assimilation into the ethnic majority culture (Akçam, 2006; Lindo-Fuentes et al., 2007; Tavanti, 2003). In short, democratization presents an opportunity for new interest representation, but actually gaining rights for culturally specific identities and histories in moments of transition is by no means guaranteed. In Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador, addressing cultural rights like mother tongue education in state-sanctioned spaces such as schools is just one part of the challenge to increase state cooperation with minority citizens. But the question lingers, for what purpose do communities embark on the difficult path of mobilization in the first place?

Shaming and claiming, as I have called these mobilizations, works to grant communities the moral high ground in negotiating with sometimes-belligerent states. This moral legitimacy helps explain how tactics like narrative framing can be useful in building momentum for mobilization (McEntire et al., 2015: 423). However, shaming and claiming is also a risky tactic that not all communities are able or willing to take. If, for example, there is insufficient momentum or motivation to shame and claim collectively, individuals who speak out may be more vulnerable to targeted attacks than if the whole community mobilized together. In this sense, shaming and claiming works best when communities can harmonize their version of past grievances in the collective memory and find audiences willing to at least tolerate the expression of their public narratives. The requirement that narratives have the potential to be heard makes the extension of the theory of shaming and claiming to minority communities in authoritarian regimes untenable, as communities under authoritarian rule may expect public narratives to meet with swift repression. On the other side of the spectrum, ethnic minorities in consolidated democracies may be able to present their narratives more freely but with little expectation that institutional rights parameters are open to reform.

In Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador, minority citizens have used shaming and claiming as part of democratic praxis to join theoretical ideas about equality and rights with a political agenda to catalyze state momentum to initiate needed institutional change. Shaming and claiming social movements are exemplary of democratic praxis because they engage in practices of translation between different cultures and languages as they find ways to negotiate and live with difference within institutions and communities, as well as in individual daily life. In a globalizing world, where cultural homogeneity lurks in the background of migration effects, social media use, and desires for upward social mobility, shaming and claiming is a means of confronting and working with difference. When communities clash with states, they risk a repressive backlash, but they may also gain state cooperation and initiate new democratic momentum.

Communities that shame and claim embody the praxis of democratization in that their demands represent a path for states to do right by marginalized citizens. In short, such mobilizations offer real options for how we can all live together better, allowing multilingual, multicultural state-nations to become the norm rather than clinging to antiquated notions of homogenous nation-states. Yet let us not succumb to overwrought predictions about globalization doing away with the state as the fundamental structure of the international order. Effort would be better placed figuring out how to nurture state-nations as polyglot democracies where states respond thoughtfully to the claims of not just the many, but the marginalized as well.

This book has presented democratization as a moment of state vulnerability when new claims can be represented in public discourse. Democratizing states across Latin America, Africa and the Middle East have opportunities for constitutional reforms through public and delegated votes as well as institutional policy modifications from popular petitioning and international pressure. At the same time, democratization is also a period in which regimes may be more fearful about losing power and therefore may be reluctant to decentralize power to minority citizens. This is evident in Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador, where all three states appear uncertain about giving new power to ethnic minorities, whether through federal provisions, democratic autonomy, or constitutional recognition. Rather than see power-sharing strategies as ways to make ethnic minority citizens feel included in the polity and therefore more invested in the state, state reluctance to share power locally derives from concern that such devolution would weaken rather than strengthen states by increasing citizen involvement with politics at every level. Yet resentment and anger breed in communities subject to cultural hegemony by the majority. Cultural dominance can create bitter and distanced citizens. The quality of democracy, if not its procedures, suffers as a result.

In contrast, states that make space for minority citizens to claim their cultural rights facilitate multi-level cooperation, where citizens are able to live with multiple identities and commitments to communities and states. Cultural practices and citizenship duties can be complementary and lead to

robust and rich participation in local, regional, and state polities, but states must be willing to acknowledge the inherent diversity of their citizens to allow multicultural democracies to flourish. Instead of trying to conjure up mono-cultural nation-states out of diverse populations, states would do better to embrace their status as entities containing many nations.

Contemporary ethnically diverse states contain polities that make up numerous cultural worlds that can come together to appreciate a shared commitment to living together well within democratic practices and ideals. Such a cooperative approach stands in marked contrast to past incorporation policies like those in Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador, where indigenous and minority people have historically had to drop their culturally unique attributes in order to access state benefits. In each of these countries, and others with similar profiles, including ethnic minority epistemologies in historiography and analyses of collective action offers the potential to correct deep-seated political and cultural misunderstandings as well as power imbalances, and to teach new lessons of tolerance and mutual appreciation to future generations.

Conclusion: learning to live together well

Throughout the process of researching this book, I have been continuously challenged by the dominant logic that, in the face of political, economic, and cultural globalization, isn't it more useful for people in diverse states to speak the ethnic majority language? Why should we bother trying to increase cultural rights such as the right to languages for minorities when it is more economically useful for everyone to learn English? Is optimism about the importance of multiculturalism in democratic politics just another way of romanticizing culture? Why should culture be something sacred when we know it can be riddled with unjust hierarchies and has been used as a trope that the Global North uses to exotify the Global South?

These "so what?" questions represent a challenge to the notion that culture has the right to exist for its own sake and therefore keep in check the potential romanticism that could dominate a study of local mobilization. Instead of casting misplaced idealism on the power of the local, the indigenous, or the underdog, this book instead rests on the premise that, for deep and sustainable democratization to take place, all citizens, including ethnic minority citizens, must have a place at the table where they can participate in crafting the institutions that govern them. Furthermore, the impetus to participate is increased when identity is validated. Therefore, the act of including bilingual education in official curricula sends a message about the perceived legitimacy of someone as a part of the local and national polity. When faced with the "so what?" question, my response is, "because we want to live together well." And living together well means allowing each of us to bring our cultural identities with us when we participate as citizens in the politics of representation and institutional change that contribute to democratization.

As the world continues to globalize politically, economically, and culturally, learning to live peacefully with diversity may be seen more as an asset than a deterrent for multicultural states. To be multilingual in the twenty-first century is to have more opportunities for economic and social advancement, allowing young people to learn the stories of their grandparents and read multilingual newspapers online in the same afternoon. Mother tongues and other tongues are both relevant for identity construction and political participation. Neither Castilianization nor Turkicization, nor even Englishization is the only means to modernity or to democratization.

Ultimately, communities themselves benefit from having the power to decide what languages to use for their children's education, what form of leadership selection to use in their villages, and what traditions to pass on or set aside. This decision-making power is a means of cultural resiliency in an increasingly globalizing and homogenizing world. Shaming and claiming is part of the toolkit for resilient communities because it provides a means for violence-affected communities to prod states into cooperating with whatever agendas communities create for themselves. Communities that lack this resiliency, that tend towards silence rather than speaking out, also tend towards cultural assimilation. While assimilation may be a perfectly respectable option for individuals and communities, the dissolution of cultural resiliency may hold implications for citizen participation that, as researchers and fellow humans, we are only just beginning to recognize, let alone understand. Because of this, processes like memory-based narrative production that support cultural resiliency should be further documented and theorized, as well as the methodology that goes with it.

Shaming and claiming is a social movement tactic to facilitate state cooperation with rights agendas. The performance of memory enacted through shaming and claiming narratives is the glue that binds historic violence to contemporary citizenship. By reminding states of the wrongs they have done, communities can claim more power than they previously had in the decision-making process over the nature and quality of their daily lives. This form of cultural resilience can affect local, national, or international political participation, and it holds the promise that minority citizens need not continue to be marginalized ones.

Note

1 See https://qdr.syr.edu/about and www.dartstatement.org for more on the new movement in social science data transparency.

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Appendices

Appendix A.1

Political parties and leaders in each state

Table A.1 Political parties and leaders in each state, 2009 to 2013

	State leaders and political parties	Sub-national level	Governor or mayor
Mexico	President: Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI 2012–2018); Felipe Calderón (PAN 2006–2012)	Chiapas	Governors: Manuel Velasco Coello (PNA 2012–2018); Juan Sabines Guerrero (Former PRI-turned-Coalition 2006–2012)
		Oaxaca	Governors: Gabino Cué Monteagudo (Convergencia 2010–2016); Ulises Ruiz Ortiz (PRI 2004–2010)
Turkey	President: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (AKP 2014–present); Abdullah Gül (AKP 2007–2014) Prime Minister: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (AKP 2003–2014); Ahmet Davutoğlu (AKP 2014–present)	Dersim/Tunceli	Governor: Osman Kaymak (AKP 2014–present); Hakan Yusuf Güner (AKP 2012–2014); Mustafa Taşkesen (AKP 2009–2012) Mayor: Mehmet Ali Bul and Nurhayat Altun (Democratic Regions Party – DBP – Co-Mayors) (2014–present); Edibe Şahin (BDP 2009–2014); Songül Erol Abdil (DEHAP/DTP 2004–2009)
		Istanbul	Governor of Istanbul Province: Vasip Şahin (AKP 2014–present); Hüseyin Avni Mutlu (AKP 2010–2014); Muammer Güler (AKP 2003–2010); Mayor of Istanbul: Kadir Topbaş (AKP 2004–present)
El Salvador	President: Salvador Sánchez Cerén (FMLN 2014–present); Mauricio Funes (FMLN 2009–2013); Antonio Saca (ARENA 2004–2009)	Izalco, Sonsonate	Mayors of Izalco: José Alfonso Guevara (ARENA 2012–present); Roberto Alvarado (FMLN 2009–2012)
		Morazán	Governor of Morazán: Luis Enrique Salamanca Martínez (FMLN 2014–present); Miguel Angel Ventura (FMLN 2009–2014)

Appendix A.2
Interview and ethnographic protocols

Much of the data used to determine key theoretical and empirical arguments across the cases came from qualitative interviews and ethnographic observations. Most interviews were semi-structured and sometimes went "off-script," deviating from the generalized template below. This happened organically, based on my own demographic profile (e.g. white/young/female/mother/academic/visitor/foreigner/perceived as supportive or not of interviewee's agenda) in relation to that of the interviewees, who spanned wide ranges of ages (eighteen-seventy), occupations (e.g. farmers/organizers/academics/public intellectuals/lawyers/politicians/teachers), and political ideologies. The choice to sometimes go "off script" is in line with the approach of political ethnography generally and speaks to the importance of reflexivity for qualitative researchers operating in power-laden matrices of relationships while collecting data.

   Below I include sample questions for each conceptual category, though within each case and interview the questions were asked in different orders and phrased in ways that I judged to be most appropriate for the given interviewee and circumstance. Most interviews also included documenting detailed information about actors, events, and factors specific to the interviewee. Though I recognize the importance of recent discussions in political science to increase transparency through data access (Büthe and Jacobs, 2015), my full transcripts and field notes are not publically available for three reasons.

   First, data collection for this project operated under Northwestern University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) protocol with an informed consent letter for interviewees that did not disclose the intention to make full transcripts available, but rather described the interview process as something that would take place between myself as the interviewer and the interviewee. Though the informed consent letter was clear that information from interviews would be used in academic work, posting complete transcripts was not explicitly specified and would not fulfill the perception of confidentiality and trust on which the interviews relied. Second, social movement leaders, ethnic minority activists, and their solidarity communities are notorious targets of state and paramilitary violence – indeed, all of the

communities discussed in this book have already been affected by such violence. Even with names and locations redacted, it would not be an acceptable risk for interviewees to make our full conversations available, not just under their state regimes, but because of uncertain political futures in all three countries.

Third, political ethnography is an interpretive process that requires physical presence in a place to make integrated analyses. Barring the absurd scenario of researchers being required to upload 24-hour footage from audio and video recording devices that they wear in the field (Pachirat, 2015: 30), outside readers cannot have access to the full range of information that comes with fieldwork. In other words, my field notes and transcripts are not publically available because they are not raw data that can be extracted from the context of the political ethnography itself. Such an attempt at imitating the replicability of the natural sciences through new data access initiatives in the social sciences risks conflating transparency of theory with reproducible fragments of decontextualized data. To be transparent in a manner more suited to a philosophy of knowledge that rests on the co-creation of information, then, in the pages below, this appendix provides the conceptual scaffolding for qualitative interviews to show the threads of inquiry that, gathered together, constituted knowledge production – data – for the book.

Political accommodation

What administrative provisions have been made at the national and state levels to protect originario rights?

How have provisions (like usos y costumbres/bilingual and intercultural education) played out in practice?

What does federalism offer originarios? What does this mean in practice?

What does decentralization offer X community? What problems may it face in implementation?

How does the state include or exclude X people politically? Who is a citizen officially? In practice?

Tell me about the quality of democracy here. How does this affect X group? How is governance different for people at the national or local level?

What does the process of democratization mean to you?

How do you interact with the state when you (as teacher/municipal official/civic leader) work with X group?

Give examples of times when you have been helped or obstructed by state officials or regulations in your work for political/economic/cultural rights for X group.

Where are the spaces that government enters daily life in X community?

What does the constitutional reform/EU membership application/new autonomy provisions mean to you?

Where does political will come from in this country?

Economic accommodation

How have economic opportunities changed for people here over the last X years?

How does the state include or exclude X people economically?

How has the community been economically supported by the state since the war/massacre/assassination?

Why is X community's economic circumstances different from Y community?

Where do funds for X (schools/language programs/heritage celebrations) come from?

Has the government ever contributed to your organization? In what capacity? Who made this happen/prevented this from happening?

What economic assistance have you asked for in the past? How was your request received?

How does the state support originarios here?

What rights are people asking for from the state? How do people talk about land rights/right to work/special taxes/poverty here?

Cultural accommodation

What does X community want from the state? How do they/you communicate their /your demands? Who participates? What portion of the community supports those tactics? How does the state respond to these demands?

What is the vision of the community for itself? What are they asking for? How do they define the right to X?

How does the state include or exclude X people culturally?

How important is language in the identity of X group?

What kinds of programs have been useful or would you like to create to support language learning and use?

Why does language matter? Why does it matter to X community?

Who speaks the language? In what circumstances? How do you choose to use or not use your mother tongue in a given situation?

What role does education play in citizen formation?

How does bilingual, intercultural education work here in theory? In practice?

How are human rights taught or conveyed to people in this country?

What are the biggest influences on teachers here? What are the biggest obstacles for them implementing X agenda?

Who uses the term "indigenous?" The term "originario?" Why do people choose one term over others?

Why do people make the choice to assimilate? How do you know when someone has assimilated?

Extent of narrative production

How has violence affected this community?

How were political/economic/cultural support and constraints different during the war/before the massacre compared to now? What accounts for these changes?

What reasons do people give for their participation or non-participation in X event? Why did you participate/not participate?

How do people talk about X massacre? Do young people know about this event? Who tells them? How is the event talked about?

How do people talk about their history? Their identity? How, where, and why do people tell stories here? What stories or legacies are being told?

Are there examples of people talking about the massacre at X rally/meeting/ march?

Who decides what goes on the banner/press release/T-shirt/poster?

Who keeps the memory of the community? Who avoids these memories?

How is national memory influenced? How do you address geographical variations in memory?

How did the apology affect the community's plans to petition for X rights?

How and why has indigenous culture been lost here? How has it been revitalized?

What role do women play in the community here?

What is it like for you to tell the story of the massacre over and over again?

What role do spaces like this museum/memorial play in identity-formation?

What is the role of academics in this mobilization?

Do you think there is more or less space for dialogue about the massacre now than before? Why?

Extent of mobilization for cultural rights claims

What are the demands of X group?

Have you participated in X mobilization? Why and how?

Tell me about the formation of movement leaders. Where are they from? Educated locally? Bilingual? What is their profession? What percent of the community supports them?

How many people are in your organization? Who are they (workers/teachers/ farmers, etc.)? When did the organization form? Why? How did you get involved?

How do you present your demands to the government?

How does X organization relate to Y organization (for example, RAIS (Salvadoran Indigenous Ancestral Rescue)/CCNIS, or MASJC/MULTI)?

How do internal divisions among indigenous people here affect the capacity for mobilization?

How does your identity as X affect your participation in Y mobilization?

What are the biggest obstacles to mobilization in the community?

In this region, which communities are the most and least organized? How do you measure their mobilization? Why is there this difference in claim-making across regions?

How is this community supported in its agenda by local leaders/state leaders/ national leaders/ political parties/internationals/women?

Has the government responded to your report/campaign/recommendations/ articles? If so, how?

How has the change in government affected your community's project for cultural rights?

What are the community's plans for the future?

Who in this community identifies as indigenous/originario/mestizo? Why? What is the role of indigenous culture in politics here?

Where does political consciousness in the community come from?

How did the community develop the program to use their language? What has been the easiest part of creating this project? Hardest part? How has the community gained support for this?

What does multiculturalism mean for your country? Your community?

How does Penal Code 301 change the way your organization chooses to present its demands in Turkey?

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Appendix A.3
Case timelines

Tzotzils in Acteal, Chiapas, Mexico: case timeline

1940s: Assimilationist boarding schools opened for indigenous children.

1948: National Indigenist Institute, (INI) opens.

1950s–1980s: Successive Mexican governments practice policies of assimilation, partly through overt racism that fostered internalized oppression, but also through populist tactics such as representing campesino interests in state-controlled unions. Ongoing erosion of indigenous land rights push people into conflicts with land-owners and developers to maintain livelihoods.

1992: Formation of Las Abejas in Acteal, as a response to a community conflict over women's right to inherit property. Group begins with 200 members in eight Chenalhó communities.

10,000 indigenous Chiapans, including Tzotzils from Chenalhó, march in San Cristobal de las Casas, protesting generations of ethnically-based exploitation.

Mexican political constitution reformed to define the country as multicultural

January 1, 1994: Zapatista uprising. After twelve days of armed clashes with state security forces during EZLN occupation of many municipal government offices, EZLN agrees to a ceasefire. No armed strike by the EZLN has taken place since.

The North American Free Trade Agreement goes into effect.

January 8, 1994: EZLN Revolutionary Laws made public, including Women's Revolutionary Law, which listed principles of equality for women. Las Abejas draw on this law in their own advocacy, though Las Abejas are not part of the EZLN.

February 16, 1996: San Andrés Accords signed between EZLN and President Ernesto Zedillo in San Andrés Larráinzar, Chiapas, granting autonomy, recognition, and rights to indigenous Mexicans.

November 1997: More than 4,500 indigenous people, mainly Las Abejas and EZLN sympathizers and members, fled paramilitary and state violence in Chenalhó, with several hundred coming to the refugee camp in Acteal.

December 22, 1997: Massacre of forty-five people in Acteal, many of whom were members of Las Abejas.

1998–2000: Low intensity warfare by state and paramilitary groups against Acteal residents through harassment at checkpoints, raids, assault, and rape.

2001: Though national regulations for intercultural bilingual education (IBE) begins in 1997, it is only in 2001 that IBE is institutionalized though the national government IBE coordination office, which designs national strategies on interculturalism.

EZLN march to Mexico City to present ongoing demands to government.

Congress adopts weak indigenous rights law that does not meet San Andrés Accord requirements and violates International Labor Organization Convention 169 provisions.

2003: INI closed by President Fox.

New law for linguistic rights of indigenous peoples passed, National Institute of Indigenous Languages created.

February 2012: Mexican Supreme Court releases remaining suspects in Acteal massacre and drops charges against those not in custody. The Human Rights Center "Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas" (Frayba) in Chiapas issues a condemnation of the impunity.

Acteal case remains under ongoing investigation at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

2015–2016: Internal divisions among Tzotzils in Chiapas has perpetuated smear campaigns against Las Abejas and their supporters such as Frayba.

Triquis in San Juan Copala, Oaxaca, Mexico: case timeline

1948: Copala loses its standing as a municipality during political gerrymandering to bring Copala Triquis under the control of mestizo town Juxtlahuaca.

1940–1965: Periods of guerilla war erupt among Triqui factions for political and economic reasons.

Late 1970s: "El Club" forms the Movement for Triqui Unification and Struggle (MULT), initially as a leftist organization to counter PRI control of the area.

1977–1983: More than 500 Copaltecos assassinated.

1986: Oaxaca's Constitution amended to reflect Oaxaca's multiethnic composition.

1990s: The Unifying Movement of the Independent Triqui Struggle (MULTI), formed as a response to internal conflict within MULT, with MULT ultimately aligning with the PRI and MULTI faction seeking political autonomy.

1994: Unity for the Social Wellbeing of the Triqui Struggle (UBISORT), PRI-aligned paramilitary group formed.

1995: Oaxacan reforms bring state electoral law into accord with Articles 16 and 25 of the State Constitution. Article 16 recognizes the pluriethnic nature of the state's population; Article 25 protects indigenous traditions and practices regarding the selection of local government

1998: Oaxaca passes Law on the Rights of Pueblos and Indigenous Communities, creating institutional way for communities to gain political autonomy through usos y costumbres.

2006: Massive protests in Oaxaca City against PRI Governor Ruiz and his regime. Communities like San Juan Copala become more empowered to organize for indigenous rights.

1994–2007: MULT and UBISORT antagonize each other.

August 10, 2006: two MULTI members and child traveling with them were killed by paramilitaries on their way to a community organizing meeting.

January 20, 2007: MULTI portion of Copala residents declare the town the Autonomous Municipality of San Juan Copala (MASJC).

2007–2010: MULT and UBISORT join efforts to disband MASJC.

April 7, 2008: Teresa Bautista Merino and Felicitas Martínez Sánchez, both pro-autonomy community radio broadcasters, are assassinated in a MULT ambush.

Nov 1, 2008: Valerio Celestino Pérez is paid by UBISORT to kill Héctor Antonio Ramírez Paz, a community leader, during an autonomous municipality meeting.

April 27, 2010: Human rights caravan from Oaxaca City attacked by UBISORT paramilitaries en route to Copala. Finnish human rights observer Jyri Jaakkola and Alberta Cariño Trujillo, Director of the Center for Community Support Working Together (CACTUS) are assassinated.

October 2010: More than 300 Triqui are displaced from Copala as a result of intense paramilitary violence and camp out in front of government offices in Oaxaca City.

2012: Some displaced Triquis move out of the plaza, returning to Copala and others settle into permanent displacement regionally. Many remain in the plaza.

2015–2016: Many Triquis are still displaced and encamped in front of the government palace.

Kurds in Dersim/Tunceli, Turkey: case timeline

October 29, 1923: Founding of Turkish Republic.

November 1, 1928: Turkish alphabet switched from Ottoman (Arabic) script to Latin script.

December 5, 1934: Women granted rights to vote and be elected.

Spring 1938: Dersim massacre, with 7,000–11,000 Dersim residents killed by military during 17 days, with up to 50,000 killed in 1937–1938.

1940s-1970s: Linguistic integration policies of Turkish state, mainly through schools, make many Kurds in Dersim monolingual in Turkish.

1970s: Strong Marxist movement in Dersim challenges the state politically and provides mobilization alternatives to the PKK.

1980: Military *coup d'état*; long period of emergency rule follows.

1980s: Intense violence between PKK and military. Fighting, harassment, and murder in and around Dersim and throughout the south-east, with more than 30,000 Kurdish people killed.

1985: Government creates local paramilitary groups to repress Kurdish mobilization.

July 1987-November 2002: "Emergency" legislation gives increased state power in south-east.

1991: First limited removal of ban on speaking Kurdish, though it remains illegal to use in any public space connected to the state such as utility offices, city halls, or schools.

1992: Turkey becomes associate member of the Western European Union.

1999: Capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.

Turkey recognized as candidate for full EU membership

2002: Non-Turkish radio and television broadcasting allowed for first time.

Private organizations allowed to teach Kurdish languages

2005: Negotiations over Turkey's EU membership application begin.

2009: Government-run TRT6, Kurdish television station, starts, but programming is folkloric and prohibited from showing any political content.

2010: Kurdî-De begins offering Zazaki classes to community members in Dersim.

2011: All signs in Dersim's municipal buildings changed to be bilingual in Zazaki and Turkish, despite ongoing government prohibition of Kurdish languages in political communication.

Several Turkish universities open Kurdish language and literature studies programs.

November 24, 2011: Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gives a limited apology for the role of the state in 1938 Dersim violence.

2011–2013: Article 220 of the Turkish penal code, which states that a person can be punished as if he or she is a member of an illegal organization if their actions threaten state security, is widely used to jail and silence hundreds of Kurdish government officials, journalists, human rights workers, and activists in the south-east. Protests by thousands of Kurds and solidarity members take place despite continued arrests and repression.

2013: Kurdish language further legalized, but remains illegal for any political communication.

January 2015: Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu addresses crowd in Diyarbakır, speaking a few words of Kurdish, and expresses his own interest in learning more Kurdish.

Summer and Fall 2015: Turkey bombs Kurdish strongholds in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, claiming it as part of an anti-Islamic State agenda.

October 10, 2015: Nearly 100 people killed at a peaceful rally in Ankara led by the Kurdish political party, HDP.

2016: Ongoing clashes between Turkish military and Kurds as tensions from Syrian civil war serve as a cover for state violence.

Armenians in Istanbul, Turkey: case timeline

1915–1922: Armenian genocide during Ottoman Empire, 600,000–1,500,000 Armenians killed.

1923: Treaty of Lausanne grants protected status to Armenian, Greek, and Jewish minorities in Turkey, including the right to teach their mother tongues in privately funded schools.

2004: During EU membership discussions, French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier states that Turkey must recognize the systematic massacres of Armenians in 1915 as genocide. Turkey rejects this as a part of the EU membership criteria.

2005: Academic conference in Istanbul on the events of 1915.

2006: European Parliament votes against a proposal to formally add genocide recognition as EU membership criteron for Turkey.

January 19, 2007: Assassination of Armenian journalist and public intellectual Hrant Dink.

January 23, 2007: More than 100,000 people filled the streets of Istanbul for Dink's funeral holding signs that said "We are all Armenians."

2009: "I'm sorry" apology campaign of mainly Turkish intellectuals to Armenians for 1915 "catastrophe."

January 2013: Several elderly Armenian women are attacked in Istanbul's Armenian quarter.

September 2015: Turkish nationalist groups march through several Istanbul neighborhoods shouting anti-Armenian and anti-Kurdish slogans.

April 24, 2016: Armenian Genocide publically commemorated at Istanbul's Haydarpasha train station.

Nahuas in Izalco, Sonsonate, El Salvador: case timeline

1929: Global economic recession.

December 1931: Coup ousts democratically elected Arturo Araujo, led by Vice President Maximiliano Hernández Martínez.

January 1932: After fraudulent elections, leaders of different civil society factions, including José Feliciano Ama and Faribundo Martí, organize protests.

On 22 January, the military massacres between 10,000 and 30,000 people, especially targeting indigenous peasants and leftists in Izalco.

January 28, 1932: José Feliciano Ama is hanged in the town square of Izalco.

1932–1979: Authoritarian governments are led mostly by military officers serving as presidents.

1940: Government removes category of "indigenous" from census.

1952: Government makes statement to International Labor Organization (ILO) regarding Convention 107 saying that the government no longer thinks indigenous people exist in El Salvador.

1958: Government negates existence of originarios but also affirms International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 107 on indigenous protection.

1960s-1970s: Period of originario cultural loss in El Salvador due to pressures of assimilation.

1979–1992: Civil war between FMLN and the state.

2001: School Director Juliana Ama de Chile hires teachers to give community-funded Nahaut language classes at Izalco primary school, Mario Calvo Marroquín.

2005: The government submits a report to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UNCERD) stating that El Salvador has no significant indigenous population but also that new attention was being given to protect indigenous communities.

October 12, 2010: President Funes declares El Salvador a multicultural, pluriethnic country and apologizes to originario citizens for what had happened to them in the past.

April 17, 2012: Mobilization coordinated by the National Indigenous Salvadoran Coordinating Council (CCNIS) in front of the National Assembly building in San Salvador petitioning for Constitutional recognition of pueblos originarios.

April 2012: Municipal Ordinance on the Rights of the Indigenous Community of Izalco signed by municipal mayor and indigenous people's mayor.

June 25, 2013: Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous people, James Anaya, presents his report on indigenous people in El Salvador to the United Nations General Assembly.

June 12, 2014: Legislative Assembly of El Salvador ratifies amendment to Constitutional Article 63 that recognizes indigenous peoples.

May 2016: Indigenous peoples of El Salvador represent their interests at the 15th meeting of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.

Lencas in Morazán, El Salvador: case timeline

October 15, 1979: Civil-military coup deposes President/General Carlos Humberto Romero.

March 24, 1980: Archbishop Oscar Romero assassinated while giving mass in San Salvador.

Throughout 1980s, the Salvadoran Army, National Guard, National Police, Treasury Police, and paramilitary groups kill nearly 12,000 people.

December 2, 1980: Salvadoran National Guard members rape and murder four American nuns and a laywoman, causing a short pause in US aid to state forces.

December 11, 1981: Atlacatl Battalion massacres up to 1,000 unarmed civilians in El Mozote, Morazán.

1982 and 1983: Government forces killed approximately 8,000 civilians a year and target Morazán because it is an FMLN stronghold.

1987: Central American Peace Accords signed but quickly fail. FMLN demands that all death squads be disbanded and members held accountable. Instead, Salvadoran Assembly approves a war crimes amnesty.

November 16, 1989: Atlacatl Battalion executes six Jesuit priests and their housekeepers at the University of Central America.

1991–1997: United Nations mission aids El Salvador's post-war transition.

January 16, 1992: Chapultepec Peace Accords signed, regulating Armed Forces, establishing a civilian police force, and transforming FMLN into a political party.

March 15, 1993: Commission on the Truth for El Salvador publishes its report containing more than 22,000 complaints of political violence for the period between January 1980 and July 1991.

March 20, 1993: Post-peace accord amnesty law legislated.

1994: First post-war elections, ARENA wins.

2000: FMLN wins significant amount of Congressional seats and local government seats.

2009: FMLN candidate Mauricio Funes wins Presidency.

2012: Government extends pension program to include elderly former FMLN guerillas.

2014: FMLN candidate and former Vice President Salvador Sánchez Cerén wins Presidency.

September 2015: CCNIS workshop with indigenous communities in Morazán to make a National Action Plan for the World Conference of Indigenous Communities.

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