Routledge Studies in Media, Communication, and Politics

MEDIA TACTICS IN THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY

Edited by Marie Cronqvist,
Fredrik Mohammadi Norén and Emil Stjernholm

"The editors of *Media Tactics in the Long Twentieth Century* have shaken the concept of media tactics loose from the military, propaganda and strategic communication contexts they formerly belonged to. Instead they propose seeing media tactics and counter-tactics as a key to understanding media power. Their practice-based and historical approach is a genuinely innovative move. I believe that following the editors' lead through this collection's stimulating range of articles will be highly rewarding not only for media and other historians but for media and communications researchers more generally."

Espen Ytreberg, *Professor of Media Studies at the Department of Media and Communication, University of Oslo*

"This carefully curated collection provides a much-needed historical corrective to contemporary debates about strategic communication, reminding us of its long historical roots and many historical precedents, from propaganda and covert influence operations to public diplomacy. Inviting us to look beyond the neat designs of strategic communication, the contributors draw attention to the fascinating, messy world of media and communication 'tactics' and the many ways in which these tactics can expand, adapt, and sometimes subvert and resist strategic goals."

Sabina Mihelj, *Professor of Media and Cultural Analysis at the School of Social Sciences, Loughborough University*

"This imaginative collection lays bare the 'messy' tactics that have underpinned the fundamentally key relationship between media and power around the world and over time. Occasionally there are no 'rational' or easily theorised explanations for why and how individuals, institutions, and governments react the way they do. Failure is often intrinsic to the process and there are uncomfortable truths to be faced. The dialectical relationship between 'strategy' and 'tactic' explored in several essays also raises interesting avenues for future research."

Chandrika Kaul, *Professor of Modern History at the School of History, University of St Andrews*

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

Media Tactics in the Long Twentieth Century

Integrating media studies with history, *Media Tactics in the Long Twentieth Century* explores the dynamic relationship between tactics and strategies in recent history.

Drawing on examples from a range of different countries and world regions, and looking at the infrastructures, entanglements, and institutions involved, the volume makes a strong case for media tactics as a new field of scholarly inquiry and for the importance of a historically informed approach. In contrast to strategic communication approaches, this media historical intervention contributes to new knowledge about the practical implementation of strategies. First foregrounding tactics as an object of study, the volume then counters the presentism of contemporary studies by adding a necessary historical perspective. Moreover, the book theoretically disentangles the concept of strategy – from an abstract contemporary buzzword to concrete, hands-on actions – which in turn reveals the complexity of using media strategies and media tactics in reality.

This volume will interest scholars and students working in the field of media and communication in general, and in the subfields of strategic communication, public relations, media history, and propaganda studies.

Marie Cronqvist is a Professor of Modern History at the Department of Culture and Society, Linköping University, Sweden. Her main research focus is Cold War culture, history of civil defence, information and preparedness, and transnational broadcasting.

Fredrik Mohammadi Norén is an Assistant Professor in Media and Communication Studies at Malmö University, Sweden. His research is geared towards media history, strategic communication, digital humanities, and parliamentary history.

Emil Stjernholm is an Assistant Professor in Media and Communication Studies at Lund University, Sweden. His main areas of research include media and communication history, digital methods, and visual communication.

Routledge Studies in Media, Communication, and Politics

25 **Xenophobia in the Media**
Critical Global Perspectives
Edited by Senthan Selvarajah, Nesrin Kenar, Ibrahim Seaga Shaw and Pradeep Dhakal

26 **The Belt and Road Initiative and Australian Mainstream Media**
Jon Yuan Jiang

27 **From Legacy Media to Going Viral**
Generational Media Use and Citizen Engagement
Robert H. Wicks, Shauna A. Morimoto and Jan LeBlanc Wicks

28 **Refugee Settlement in Australia**
A Holistic Overview of Current Research and Practice
Aparna Hebbani

29 **Media, Dissidence and the War in Ukraine**
Edited by Tabe Bergman and Jesse Owen Hearns-Branaman

30 **European Media Systems for Deliberative Communication Risks and Opportunities**
Edited by Zrinjka Peruško with Epp Lauk and Halliki Harro-Loit

31 **Media Tactics in the Long Twentieth Century**
Edited by Marie Cronqvist, Fredrik Mohammadi Norén and Emil Stjernholm

https://www.routledge.com/Routledge-Studies-in-Media-Communication-and-Politics/book-series/RSMCP

Media Tactics in the Long Twentieth Century

Edited by Marie Cronqvist,
Fredrik Mohammadi Norén
and Emil Stjernholm

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
NEW YORK AND LONDON

First published 2025
by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158

and by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Cronqvist, Marie, 1973- editor. |
Norén, Fredrik Mohammadi, editor. | Stjernholm, Emil, editor.
Title: Media tactics in the long twentieth century / edited by Marie Cronqvist, Fredrik Mohammadi Norén & Emil Stjernholm.
Description: New York : Routledge, 2025. | Series: Routledge studies in media, communication, and politics |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2024018983 (print) | LCCN 2024018984 (ebook) | ISBN 9781032618272 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032618289 (paperback) | ISBN 9781032618326 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Mass media--Philosophy. | Mass media--History.
Classification: LCC P90 .M37231525 2025 (print) |
LCC P90 (ebook) | DDC 302.23--dc23/eng/20240624
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2024018983
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2024018984

ISBN: 978-1-032-61827-2 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-61828-9 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-61832-6 (ebk)

DOI: 10.4324/9781032618326

Typeset in Sabon
by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd.

Contents

Contributors

Burçe Çelik
Institute for Media and Creative Industries
Loughborough University
London, UK

Lucie Česálková
Faculty of Arts, Department of Film Studies
Charles University
Prague, Czech Republic

Edward Corse
Centre for the History of War, Media and Society
University of Kent
Canterbury, UK

Marie Cronqvist
Department of Culture and Society
Linköping University
Linköping, Sweden

Lars Diurlin
Department of Film and Literature
Linnaeus University
Växjö, Sweden

Lee Grieveson
Centre for Multidisciplinary and Intercultural Inquiry
University College London
London, UK

Ruth Hemstad
Department of Collections and Research
National Library of Norway/Department of Archaeology,
Conservation and History
University of Oslo
Oslo, Norway

John Jenks
Communication Arts and Sciences Department
Dominican University
River Forest, Illinois, USA

Pia Koivunen
School of History, Culture and Art Studies
University of Turku
Turku, Finland

Brendan Maartens
School of the Arts
The University of Liverpool
Liverpool, UK

Fredrik Mohammadi Norén
School of Arts and Communication
Malmö University
Malmö, Sweden

Erik Florin Persson
Department of Film and Literature
Linnaeus University
Växjö, Sweden

Nelson Ribeiro
Faculty of Human Sciences
Catholic University of Portugal
Lisbon, Portugal

Emil Stjernholm
Department of Communication and Media
Lund University
Lund, Sweden

Dominique Trudel
Department of Communication and Culture
Audencia Business School
Nantes, France

Betto van Waarden
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Maastricht University
Maastricht, The Netherlands

Preface

As the case in many book projects, the idea of *Media Tactics in the Long Twentieth Century* emerged from the experience of working with other books, in this particular case the edited volume *Nordic Media Histories of Propaganda and Persuasion* (edited by Fredrik Mohammadi Norén, Emil Stjernholm, and C. Claire Thomson for Palgrave, 2022) and *Expanding Media Histories: Cultural and Material Perspectives* (edited by Marie Cronqvist, Sune Bechmann Pedersen, and Ulrika Holgersson for Nordic Academic Press, 2022). Discussions of what actors do with media and why, including their intent, made us editors team up and seriously think about what tactics and strategies could mean in media historical contexts. To develop these thoughts further, the symposium "A History of Media Tactics" was arranged on 26–28 September 2022 at the Old Bishop's House in Lund, Sweden. At the symposium, an interdisciplinary group of 25 scholars gathered to present research and discuss what a history of media tactics could mean. Our two keynotes, Lee Grieveson (University College London) and Sabina Mihelj (Loughborough University), deserve a special mention in this context due to their different and engaging ways to open up the theme.

The discussions in Lund helped to further modify the theme of this book. We were also happy that many of the participants at the symposium were willing and able to contribute to the book project. In the spirit of collaboration, the authors met once more during a follow-up workshop in 2023 to present and discuss each other's drafts. At the workshop, Jamie Medhurst (Aberystwyth University), Sabina Mihelj, and Espen Ytreberg (University of Oslo) were invited as readers and we are truly grateful for the feedback they provided to the individual authors and to the book as a whole. We would also like to thank all the authors for their engagement throughout the book project.

Additionally, we would like to thank the foundations Crafoordska stiftelsen, Helge Ax:son Johnsons stiftelse, Holger och Thyra Lauritzens stiftelse, Magnus Bergvalls stiftelse, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Stiftelsen

Längmanska kulturfonden, Sven och Dagmar Saléns stiftelse, and Åke Wibergs stiftelse for their generous contributions, which made it possible to arrange the symposium in September 2022 and the follow-up workshop in 2023. We are also grateful to the Lund University Book Fund for covering the Open Access fee and thereby making the entire volume available to access and download via the Routledge website. Finally, we thank Suzanne Richardson and Stuti Goel at Routledge for their interest in the project and their support and professional assistance in all phases.

Lund and Malmö, July 2024

Marie Cronqvist, Fredrik Mohammadi Norén and Emil Stjernholm

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

1 Introduction

Towards a History of Media Tactics

Marie Cronqvist, Fredrik Mohammadi Norén and Emil Stjernholm

What is the relationship between media and power in society? How influential are the media and who controls them? How effective are key media agents' aims and operations? Are media promoters of participatory cultures, elite control, or market hegemony? These are questions that for many decades have belonged to the major debate within studies of media and communication in society. Research on media and power has also long held a strong fascination for either the strategies and plans for information, communication, and propaganda or the outcome or effects of said strategies. Strategy has been on the rise as a buzzword, a trend that runs parallel with increasing bureaucratisation in society, the growth of the social sciences, and the professionalisation of the communication field. However, alongside the sometimes grand and pompous strategies, we find the dim and messy tactics, the operational nuts and bolts of communication operations, and the pragmatic country cousin labouring in the shadows of elevated strategic thinking. As the down-to-earth implementation of strategies, tactics are open to constant negotiation and change. They are operational, preliminary, and always deeply embedded in existing social, political, cultural, economic, and discursive realities – and thus often less easy to discern and they do not always leave archived traces behind. While strategies are usually concerned with the destination and direction, tactics handle the bumps along the way. In short, without strategies, tactics have no direction, and without tactics, strategies have no method.

No wonder then that media and communication historians tend to be fascinated not only by the lofty display of desktop strategies but indeed by the deeply contextual and situation-specific tactical dimension of communication flows. However, unlike related scholarly works, *Media Tactics in the Long Twentieth Century* foregrounds the dialectic relationship between strategies and tactics and brings a much-needed empirical lens on the actions and vocabulary practised by the historical actors. The purpose of this edited volume is thus to explore the dynamic media/power relationship between tactics and strategies in what we call the long twentieth

DOI: 10.4324/9781032618326-1

century. Drawing on examples from a range of different countries and world regions, and highlighting the infrastructures, entanglements, and institutions involved, this book makes a case for a tactical turn and for media tactics as an important scholarly study object in itself, and the historically informed approach as a way of exploration. Our aim is to make a contribution to the field of media and communication studies in general, and also to propaganda history and cultural histories of the media in particular.

Strategies and Tactics – A Conceptual Discussion

Reflecting on the prioritisation of strategies over tactics within media scholarship, the first step for unpacking the history of media tactics can be to reflect on the conceptual careers of the two terms. In a broader public discourse, using Google Ngram Viewer as an aggregated empirical example, "strategies" seem to have exploded in popularity in the 1960s, while "tactics" have remained fairly stable to this day (see Figure 1.1).

There is, however, a much longer history to uncover here. The semantic difference between the interrelated concepts of strategy and tactic has its roots in military history. A famous quote attributed to the Chinese general and philosopher Sun Tzu (b. ca. 544 BC), avidly referenced in public relations and marketing literature, notes that "[s]trategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy are the noise before defeat".[1] In this context, strategy and tactics emerge as two sides of the same coin. Whereas strategy is about knowing where you want to go, tactics deal with the nitty-gritty details of how to get there. Historically, however, the conceptual usage of the two terms is much more multifaceted. In Ancient Greece, there was knowledge formation relating to *strategos* – referring to "generals' knowledge" or "generals' wisdom" – whereas the



Figure 1.1 Normalised word trends for "strategies" and "tactics" in Google Ngram Viewer, based on Google's catalogue of digitised English language books since 1800 ("strategy" and "tactic" show similar word trends).

concept of *taktike* primarily referred to the conduct of war.[2] This implies a binary division between strategies as the art of the commander-in-chief, that is top-down and long-term goals, and tactics as the "art of handling forces in battle or in the immediate presence of the enemy", that is bottom-up and short-term goals.[3]

As noted by historian Lawrence Freedman, the word strategy first came into general use during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and its origins reflected the Enlightenment's growing confidence in empirical science and reason.[4] That is, even the unruly and brutal activity of war could be studied and conducted in the spirit of reason. As a result, nineteenth-century military writers, such as officers Antoine-Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, made a great impact on theories of war.[5] In this sense, the notion of strategy was considered a matter of science: systematic, empirically based, and logically developed. By contrast, a tactic was thought to be what happened "within the enemy's cannon range".[6] Despite these established dichotomies, von Clausewitz contended that strategies and tactics "are two activities that permeate one another in time and space", and that "[t]heir inherent laws and mutual relationship cannot be understood without a total comprehension of both".[7]

The so-called classical notions of tactic and strategy, stemming from military history, have also been picked up in the field of media and communication studies. Drawing on classic military historical thinking, including key figures like von Clausewitz, scholars often translate the idea of a strategy into an overall objective in which communication is used purposefully – and tactically – as a means to reach a defined goal.[8] More concretely, such studies tend to be centred on the presentation of phenomena and best practices, such as tactics and strategies in using social media in different contexts and in so-called image repair activities within crisis communication, as well as grand national projects conceptualised as public diplomacy and strategic narratives.[9]

Meanwhile, today, the concepts of strategy and tactic are also integral to critical scholarship on ideology and power. In *Discipline and Punish*, Michel Foucault described a historical sequence of power systems, with accompanying modes of discipline and social control such as surveillance and incarceration.[10] For Foucault, a strategy was "the totality of the means put into operation to implement power effectively or to maintain it".[11] Following a similar logic, Michel de Certeau argues in his influential *The Practice of Everyday Life* that strategies and tactics are the two main practices in everyday life. Like Clausewitz, de Certeau saw the two as distinctly divided, but on the basis of power relations rather than military thinking, and partly as two conflicting approaches. On the one hand, according to de Certeau, powerful groups such as governments and corporate elites use strategies to establish a system of domination over ordinary people.

On the other hand, ordinary people can use tactics to interpret the system differently. In this way, de Certeau placed emphasis on an asymmetrical power relation: "a tactic is determined by the absence of power just as a strategy is organised by the postulation of power".[12] Based on this, tactics are defined as ways of operating against strategies, from below.

In the field of media and communication studies, researchers drawing inspiration from de Certeau have, for example, introduced the term tactical media, referring to media activism and media-related tools that challenge power and one-way flows of information. For example, as Alessandra Renzi argues, tactical media are "expressions of dissent that rely on artistic practices and 'do it yourself' (DIY) media created from readily available, relatively cheap technology and means of communication (for example, radio, video and Internet)".[13] The concept of tactical media has also been mobilised in social media research, placing particular emphasis on the "transient and temporary dimension" in media interventions questioning power relations.[14] This type of tactical opposition from below has further been highlighted by scholars working on the intersection of art and media activism. One such example is the Critical Art Ensemble, which "encourages the use of any media that will engage a particular sociopolitical context in order to create molecular interventions and semiotic shocks that contribute to the negation of the rising intensity of authoritarian culture".[15] These interpretations of the "tactical" highlight the mobility and ephemerality of certain media practices, something which can lend activists an advantage over major institutions such as governments or major corporations.

Three Guiding Parameters

This book does not privilege the classical military definition of strategy and tactic over the critical one, or vice versa. Rather, we are keen to ask how tactics and strategies have been practised throughout media history in the twentieth century. As such, the book builds on three guiding analytical parameters.

Firstly, emphasis is put on the dialectics of tactics and strategies. A strategy consists of planned tactics, but tactics may also be a response that deviates from the planned strategy – or as resistance against others' strategies. Consequently, chapters in this collection engage with both strategies and tactics, but not only with strategies.

Secondly, the book focuses on tactics as a practice and highlights the importance of studying both tactics and strategies from practice-oriented perspectives. Different chapters show that hands-on tactics could, for example, be part of a bigger strategy from above or resistance from below. Emphasising the use of media from a historical perspective productively

discerns how and when tactics and strategies have been carried out in the name of, for example, "propaganda", "public relations", and "information". Drawing on a broad media concept, furthermore, the book underlines that many different media technologies, and not only the traditional mass media, are important in the practice of employing tactics and strategies.

Thirdly, the contributions in this book tend to follow the actors. This means that the authors highlight the situated actions and vocabulary of the historical actors, which offers an empirical focus on the intentions, practices, and conceptualisations of tactics and strategies in specific contexts. This, in turn, reveals the messiness associated with the implementation of tactics and strategies in real life, and how seldom it appears linear, rational, and straightforward. Accordingly, the book acknowledges the scholarly value of studying failures and unplanned actions. As such, the tracing of historical agency also implies that meta perspectives and grand theories on tactics and strategies are positioned outside the book's main focus.

Combined, these analytical parameters could be understood as a contrast to contemporary social sciences in which the term strategy arguably has become a buzzword. For example, in recent years, a community of scholars has defined strategic communication as a field in its own right,[16] although embedded in various subfields such as crisis communication and organisation culture.[17] Researchers within this domain usually refer to strategy as "how organizations use communication purposefully to fulfil their overall missions".[18] This broad definition potentially opens up a range of different perspectives, approaches, and case studies. While there has been much research on what practitioners say that they do, much less emphasis has been placed on what they actually do in practice when strategic communication is materialised. Moreover, the field has been characterised by limited historical perspectives. In this book, we argue that organisation-centric perspectives that presuppose control over communication thus risk overlooking important historical and material dimensions of communication.

Indeed, an overemphasis on an organisation's strategic goals might give privilege to a one-way transmission view, thereby neglecting that communication is not always intentional and a vehicle for reciprocity and understanding.[19] On the contrary, more often than not, communication is a rather messy and complex affair, a dream more than a reality. As media theorist and historian John Durham Peters has put it, "communication as bridge always means an abyss is somewhere near".[20] A historical perspective on tactics and strategies, as argued by Freedman, is potentially subversive to "those forms of social science which must control for the random and the disorderly, the anomalous and the paradoxical, the exceptional

and the eccentric as awkward outliers".[21] Here, this book joins forces with wider influences in the humanities and social sciences, for example, what has been called "the practice turn" within philosophy, sociology, and the history of science.[22] For a historian, the messiness of empirical data is never a surprise but a point of departure. Thus, by employing such sensitive historical perspectives when investigating the vocabulary and practices that surround the notions of tactic and strategy, this edited volume contributes to historical and critical traditions of communication history which underline that persuasive communication can have both intended and unintended consequences in society. It can boost and backfire – not seldom concurrently.

Writing a History of Media Tactics

The dialectical tension between tactics and strategies speaks to a vast body of research fields in the humanities and social sciences. The ambition of this present volume is to discuss the topic of tactics and strategies employing media historical perspectives. In doing so, the book draws inspiration from and contributes to two primary fields of scholarly literature: *propaganda history* and *cultural histories of the media*. Drawing inspiration from these two fields, the book calls for an increased emphasis on communication practices and the messiness in communication processes.

In the wake of a growing public debate on "fake news", "misinformation" and "disinformation", and the rebirth of a Cold War mindset after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, media and communication scholars have discussed a "return of propaganda" and the renewed attention to its historical legacies as well as to its contemporary counterparts.[23] For example, recent research in the field of propaganda history discusses the adoption of new media technologies for strategic purposes, while also historicising this development in relation to influential theorists on propaganda (from Bernays to Ellul, and from Lippmann to Lazarsfeld).[24] Given its long and complicated history, the notion of propaganda and its related practices constitute a crucial topic in media historical scholarship.[25] Meanwhile, as Mark Connelly et al. point out in the introduction to their edited collection *Propaganda and Conflict: War, Media and Shaping the Twentieth Century*, existing paradigms and ways of thinking about propaganda have privileged scholarship on particular campaigns and their short-term effects. In this sense, *Propaganda and Conflict* shares the ambition with this present volume to "fundamentally reconceptualize how we think about propaganda as a historical problem".[26] While several of the aforementioned propaganda historical works deal with similar themes to those in this volume, *Media Tactics in the Long Twentieth Century* stands out by specifically highlighting the dialectic relationship between strategies

and tactics. By offering a rich array of historical case studies of media tactics, we also hope to facilitate a discussion towards a reconceptualisation of the practices associated with concepts such as propaganda, information, promotion, publicity, and public relations.

The book furthermore draws on the interdisciplinary field of cultural histories of the media. Scholars within this field challenge mono-medial disciplinary boundaries and a media history privileging teleological narratives of progress. Therefore, a key aim within the field has been to broaden existing definitions of the media concept. As Lisa Gitelman notes in her book *Always Already New: Media, History, and the Data of Culture*, the cultural-historical perspective warrants emphasis on the transforming social, cultural, and material conditions that have shaped communication over time. According to Gitelman, researchers should be sensitive to the dynamics of media as a combination of technology and social protocol, the latter signifying the values, norms, uses, and practices surrounding media technologies.[27] Inspired by this thinking, scholarly works on this kind of media history tend to emphasise the social, cultural, technological, economic, and infrastructural conditions shaping communication and their transformation over time.[28] From this perspective, it follows that specific media forms should never be studied in isolation but always in concert with other surrounding media. No medium is an island but deeply entangled in and dependent on the wider landscape of which it is a part. In fact, an emphasis on such entangled contexts has been prevalent in much recent media historical research influenced by social and cultural perspectives.[29] And, we argue, it is not least against the backdrop of discussions within the field of strategic communication that media historical research can be useful to unpack precisely the messy realities of media tactics. It bears repeating: in the eyes of a media historian, the messiness and fuzziness of (archived) reality – and the fact that media tactics do not follow any neat paths of communication theory – is not a surprise along the way, or a result of the analysis, but indeed a point of departure. The media historical approach is therefore the *raison d'être* of this book. It will be highly useful to explore media tactics and strategies as shifting, dynamic phenomena, while at the same time making a novel addition to the literature and challenging existing paradigms in the study of propaganda, public relations, and strategic communication.

Entanglements, Institutions, and Infrastructures

The different contributions in *Media Tactics in the Long Twentieth Century* have been divided into three broad thematic sections: the first focuses on *entanglements*, the second on *institutions*, and the third on *infrastructures*. The structure of each section is based on a rough chronological progression.

The first section of the book, *entanglements*, zooms in on how phenomena – actors, practices, technologies, images, ideas, material goods – move across borders and how different media forms are interlinked. What are the dimensions of media tactics and strategies – failed or successful – in the context of transnational entanglements such as imperial broadcasting or scientific and cultural diplomacy? Placing entanglements in the foreground accentuates the ways in which both tactics and strategies are far from controlled and pre-determined, but indeed constantly shifting and dynamic phenomena. The contributions within this section call specifically on literature within the so-called transnational turn in the historical sciences, which over the last two decades – using various concepts such as transnational history, global history, transfer history, or entangled history – has challenged the traditional preoccupation with the nation as the single and natural unit of study.[30] In this vein, Marie Cronqvist and Christoph Hilgert have advocated for the value of applying these perspectives to media history, a field still heavily dominated by national and mono-medial approaches.[31]

Albeit defined in slightly different ways, politics and diplomacy are key to this section's chapters. And far from doing away with the nation as a relevant unit of study, the chapters illustrate how transnational perspectives can unlock new aspects of national propaganda as well as the broad variety of diplomatic media strategies and tactics. In the first chapter of this section, Ruth Hemstad investigates three pan-national organisations promoting national culture abroad in the wake of the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian Union in 1905, one Swedish, one Norwegian, and one Danish. Tracing and comparing the media tactics of these organisations and their leading individual proponents, Hemstad demonstrates the vast variety of media used: journals and national and transatlantic newspapers, various kinds of information and propaganda material, and semi-public activities such as travelling lecturers, meetings, and events.

A different transnational entanglement is brought up by Nelson Ribeiro in his chapter on the Portuguese imperial media practices of the 1930s. Ribeiro explores the ways in which the grand ideas of shortwave broadcasting faced a much broader range of local trials and tribulations. These were predicaments that opened the way for a wide variety of private stations and radio clubs that were set up in the Portuguese African colonies by white expats who, instead of following a strategic plan designed by the overseas government, decided to take the development into their own hands. A spotlight on these media tactics thus makes it possible to address more complex dimensions of changing and historically situated media power relationships, locally and nationally as well as imperial and transnational.

The following two chapters in this section bring up Northern and Eastern European entanglements in the Second World War and the Cold War. In his contribution, Edward Corse highlights the media tactics of individual border-crossing agents. Using the specific case of the scientist Sir Lawrence Bragg's visit to Sweden in the middle of the Second World War under the auspices of the British Council, Corse explores the visit's lasting significance as a practical and tactical enterprise within a broader cultural propaganda strategy aimed at promoting British life and thought to Swedish scientific elites. In the final chapter, the entanglement of East and West in the shadow of the Cold War is placed in focus. Here, Lucie Česálková discusses transnational film distribution and the socialist media wars of the 1950s by analysing the ways in which Czechoslovak media – and film in particular – reported on the working class in the West and the East, taking into account the practices of distributing foreign nonfiction films as part of an information campaign. On a theoretical level, the chapter reopens the conceptual definition of communist propaganda and censorship through the perspective of the media tactics of communist internationalism, using a concrete example from the history of Czechoslovak film distribution.

The second thematic section centres on *institutions*. Here, the notion of institutions can be broadly understood to incorporate, in Peter Hall's words, "the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy".[32] Within historical institutionalism, analytical attention tends to focus on intermediate-level institutions, such as the parliamentary party system or the governing structure of state agencies, as a means to highlight the logic behind the historical actors' behaviour and the result of their actions. Focusing on institutions does not neglect the influence and role of actors but rather emphasises how institutions and actors relate to one another, thus making it possible to capture the complexity and messiness of a historical situation.[33] Institutions, then, play a part in shaping – and limiting – the actions of individuals, including their capability to establish, execute, or react to tactics and strategies. In this sense, the relationship between institutions and individuals also bears similarities with de Certeau's conflict-oriented relation between strategies (institutions) and tactics (individuals).[34] What the dominating authorities do and want is not always met with compliance, and established norms can meet resistance in various forms. Such struggles and negotiations are also represented in the contributions in this book section.

Both Pia Koivunen's and Betto van Waarden's chapters deal with how powerful institutions try to impose their strategy and will on underdog actors. Koivunen focuses on the Soviet-based organisation International Union of Students and how the Soviet Communist Party in the early Cold War era tried to integrate its broader strategy into this organisation's student

journal, and the tactics that the journal mobilised to balance between the pro-Soviet agenda and issues explicitly concerning the life of students. As a result, her chapter targets the role of an individual association within the broader "Soviet family of organisations". In turn, van Waarden's chapter focuses on the principal tension between, on the one hand, the individual UK parliamentarians' positionings and, on the other hand, the overall strategies of the parliament and the government, respectively. Emphasis is placed on the public debate surrounding the question of whether, and how, the British Parliament should be broadcast. In doing so, van Waarden focuses on the interplay between the media strategy of the parliament and the media tactics of its parliamentarians through the prism of their debates on broadcasting parliamentary proceedings during the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Another angle on media tactics is presented in Dominique Trudel's chapter, in which the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is used as a locus to study how journalists activated this law as a tactic to scrutinise authorities – in this case, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) – and how authorities, in turn, used FOIA requests strategically in terms of delays, censorship, and proactive disclosures. The chapter centres on the 1970s journalistic reporting on the relationship between the CIA and the American press in the early Cold War.

The conflicts and struggles that might arise between institutions and actors, often when strategies are confronted with tactics, underline that a strategy might not come to fruition. On the contrary – and this is something that our book emphasises – an intended strategy might result in unexpected outcomes, which in turn might activate unforeseen tactics from different stakeholders. The clash between the ideals and the reality, strategy and tactics, is illustrated in Erik Florin Persson's chapter on a specific 1973 film about and by the city of Gothenburg that was produced to promote and legitimise the politics of the city and by extension the Swedish welfare state. By using the film as an analytical lens, and focusing on the nitty-gritty of how the film was commissioned, distributed, and circulated, Florin Persson uncovers the unplanned media tactics of municipal information. In doing so, the author highlights the embedded ambiguities in everyday practices, and the ongoing negotiation of economic, material, and aesthetical factors, including ill-defined goals and messy unintentional outcomes. Another such example is Lars Diurlin and Fredrik Mohammadi Norén's chapter. Their study directs analytical attention towards how three Swedish state agencies, in the 1970s and 1980s, used cultural workers – filmmakers, visual artists, theatre actors, et cetera – to produce "creative" governmental information as a means to improve communication and nudge citizens' choices and behaviour in the desired direction of the authorities. Diurlin and Mohammadi Norén call this the information-by-proxy strategy, which intended both to create a buffer between the

agencies and the citizens and to make governmental information appear less bureaucratic. In their chapter, they discuss the implementation of this strategy as well as the various tactical practices and outcomes, including conflicts and tensions between the agencies and the cultural workers.

The last section, *infrastructures*, emphasises the media-related technologies, networks, and social protocols that govern the development and implementation of tactics and strategies. What is the role of material, statistical, visual, or technical assemblages in relation to the planned strategic goals and the operational communication or information tactics? Drawing on advances in science and technology studies, history of technology and media archaeology, recent years have seen a growing interest in media infrastructures. While infrastructures constitute a long-standing theme in media and communication scholarship, Lisa Parks and Nicole Starosielski argue, the expansion of electronic and digital media has prompted scholars to increasingly interrogate how content and form are shaped by "the physical systems of media distribution".[35] With the growing interest in network infrastructures, sparked by its centrality in the contemporary media system and our everyday lives, scholars have recently started to take a greater interest in the long-term maintenance of networks, cables, and satellites.[36] This perspective is central to Burçe Çelik's chapter, which focuses on NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and CENTO (the Central Treaty Organization) and their media and communication infrastructures in Turkey and the Middle East – from cables to microwave transmission, from radio to wireless broadcasting. Against this background, the strategy-tactic dynamic strongly comes to the fore, as Çelik examines both the US military-communicative strategies in the early years of the Cold War as well as how communication infrastructures were utilised by anti-American collectives and coalitions. Another chapter dealing explicitly with communication infrastructures is Emil Stjernholm's study on the window display as a medium for propaganda in neutral Stockholm during the Second World War. Placing particular emphasis on the upholding and sabotaging of these types of communication infrastructures, this chapter shines a light on the messy tactical implementation of strategies in an exceptionally entangled propaganda environment.

As Lisa Gitelman reminds us, media are both material technologies and social protocols, the latter referring to the social and cultural practices surrounding the technology.[37] John Jenks' contribution studies how the CIA-run Forum World Features attempted to follow the protocols of normal news agencies in order to spread propaganda, especially in the Global South. As Jenks shows, the strategic decision to use covertly funded and controlled news agencies as propaganda channels required tactics that led to broader, unsought consequences for the news media ecosystem. In Brendan Maartens' chapter, focusing on the Wartime

Social Survey's monitoring of the impact of communication campaigns on civilian audiences in Britain during the Second World War, emphasis is placed on the protocols and norms associated with the measuring of influence. In doing so, the author discovers a fixation with media tactics within the organisation, tactics which were subsequently used to inform the development of new and purportedly more effective media strategies.

In contemporary propaganda studies, meanwhile, the infrastructure perspective has become increasingly foregrounded in relation to digital media and current debates about fake news and disinformation.[38] The use of information and media as tactical propaganda weapons in recent times, from the US to Brazil, from the UK to Russia, raises questions about the deeper strategies that have shaped these practices. The aim of Lee Grieveson's essay is to write a history of the present that focuses on the fashioning of a new paradigm of prediction and control in the platform era, a development that he argues is closely aligned with the degradation of democracy and the resurgence of ethno-nationalism and fascism. Thus, the section on *infrastructures* highlights local, national, regional, and global phenomena, a multiplicity that is key in order to adequately map cultural and information flows.

To sum up, the notion of "strategy" has arguably been a rising concept in the public discourse of the twentieth century, signalled by the Ngram graph at the beginning of this introduction. However, as the different chapters in this volume demonstrate, it becomes clear that when strategies are fronted, tactics always lurk backstage – and sometimes vice versa. Hence, precisely where strategy ends and tactics start, as well as where tactics unfold into a strategy, is never a clear-cut case. While permeating each other with meaning, strategies and tactics are better understood as situated and entangled phenomena, each in their own media-specific way.

Notes

1 See, e.g., Diane M. Phillips, *Marketing Strategy and Management* (London: SAGE, 2023).
2 Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4.
3 Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 72–76.
4 Freedman, *Strategy*, 72.
5 E.g., Antoine-Henri Jomini, *The Art of War* (Rockville: Arc Manor, 2007 [1830]); Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989 [1832]).
6 Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories and His Times* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 91.
7 Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 80.

8 E.g., Howard Nothhaft and Hagen Schölzel, "(Re-)Reading Clausewitz: The Strategy Discourse and Its Implications for Strategic Communication", *The Routledge Handbook of Strategic Communication,* eds. Derina Holtzhausen and Ansgar Zerfass (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).
9 E.g., Jane Johnston and Katie Rowney, *Media Strategies: Managing Content, Platforms and Relationships* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018); Robert R. Ulmer, Timothy L. Sellnow, and Matthew W. Seeger, *Effective Crisis Communication: Moving from Crisis to Opportunity*, 5th ed. (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2023); Joseph S. Nye, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power", *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 616, no. 1 (2008); Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order* (London: Routledge, 2013).
10 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 2011).
11 Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power", *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 8, no. 4 ([1980] 1982), 793.
12 Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 38.
13 Alessandra Renzi, "The Space of Tactical Media", *Digital Media and Democracy: Tactics in Hard Times,* ed. Megan Boler (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008).
14 Graham Meikle, "Intercreativity: Mapping Online Activism", *International Handbook of Internet Research,* eds. Jeremy Hunsinger, Lisbeth Klastrup, and Matthew Allen (New York: Springer, 2010), 367.
15 C. Ondine Chavoya, "Critical Art Ensemble", *The Interventionists: Users' Manual for the Creative Disruption of Everyday Life*, ed. Nato Thompson and Gregory Sholette (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 117.
16 E.g., Jesper Falkheimer and Mats Heide, *Strategic Communication: An Introduction* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018).
17 E.g., Timothy Coombs and Sherry J. Holladay, eds., *Handbook of Crisis Communication* (Hoboken: Wiley 2022); Charles Conrad and Marshall Scott Poole, *Strategic Organizational Communication* (Hoboken: Wiley, 2011).
18 Falkheimer and Heide, *Strategic Communication*, 57.
19 Jim Macnamara, "Persuasion, Promotion, Spin, Propaganda?", *Research Handbook on Strategic Communication*, eds. Jesper Falkheimer and Mats Heide (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2022), 46–61.
20 John Durham Peters, *Speaking Into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 16. The messiness of communication is also self-critically recognised by scholars within the field called strategic communication, such as Jesper Falkheimer and Mats Heide who note that "in practice, organizational life is nothing but messy, ambiguous and full of paradoxes. Consequently, strategic communication is also a paradox. In theory, or in our minds, it is fairly easy to communicate strategically and reach certain wanted goals, but in reality, it is problematic to successfully communicate strategically". See Jesper Falkheimer and Mats Heide, "Introduction: The Emergent Field of Strategic Communication", *Research Handbook on Strategic Communication*, eds. Jesper Falkheimer and Mats Heide (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2022), 5.
21 Freedman, *Strategy: A History*, xiv–xv.
22 Léna Soler, Sjoerd Zwart, Michael Lynch, and Vincent Israel-Jost, eds., *Science After the Practice Turn in the Philosophy, History and Social Studies of Science* (London: Routledge, 2014); Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki, and

Eike von Savigny, eds., *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory* (London: Routledge, 2001).

23 See, e.g., the special issue "The Return of Propaganda", edited by Göran Bolin and Risto Kunelius for *Nordic Journal of Media Studies*, vol. 5, no. 1 (2023).

24 Paul Baines, Nicholas O'Shaughnessy, and Nancy Snow, eds., *The SAGE Handbook of Propaganda* (London: SAGE Publications, 2020).

25 Recent examples include Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Lee Grieveson, *Cinema and the Wealth of Nations: Media, Capital, and the Liberal World System* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2018); Fredrik Norén, Emil Stjernholm, and C. Claire Thomson, eds., *Nordic Media Histories of Propaganda and Persuasion* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).

26 Mark Connelly, Jo Fox, Ulf Schmidt, and Stefan Goebel, eds., *Propaganda and Conflict: War, Media and Shaping the Twentieth Century* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2020), 10.

27 Lisa Gitelman, *Always Already New: Media, History and the Data of Culture* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).

28 E.g., Sune Bechmann Pedersen, Marie Cronqvist, and Ulrika Holgersson, eds., *Expanding Media Histories: Cultural and Material Perspectives* (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2023); Johan Jarlbrink, Patrik Lundell, and Pelle Snickars, *From Big Bang to Big Data: A History of the Media* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2023).

29 Alec Badenoch and Andreas Fickers, eds., *Materializing Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2010), the special issue "Entangled Media Histories" in *Media History* (2017), edited by Marie Cronqvist and Christoph Hilgert; Alice Lovejoy and Mari Pajala, eds., *Remapping Cold War Media: Institutions, Infrastructures, Translations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2022).

30 Matthias Middell and Lluís Roura, eds., *Transnational Challenges to National History Writing* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Fiona Paisley and Pamela Scully, *Writing Transnational History* (London: Bloomsbury, 2019); Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier, eds., *The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, "Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity", *History & Theory*, vol. 45, no. 1 (2006), 30–50; Michel Espagne, "Comparison and Transfer: A Question of Method", *Transnational Challenges to National History Writing*, eds. Matthias Middell and Lluís Roura (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2013), 42.

31 Marie Cronqvist and Christoph Hilgert, "Entangled Media Histories: The Value of Transnational and Transmedial Approaches in Media Historiography", *Media History,* vol. 23, no. 1 (2017), 130–41.

32 Peter Hall, *Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 19.

33 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics", *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, eds. Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

34 De Certeau, *The Practice*.

35 Lisa Parks and Nicole Starosielski, *Signal Traffic: Critical Studies of Media Infrastructures* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2015), 5. Noteworthy examples of scholars interested in media networks and infrastructures include

James Carey, *Communication as Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1989); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996).

36 Gabriele Balbi and Roberto Leggero, "Communication is Maintenance: Turning the Agenda of Media and Communication Studies Upside Down", *H-ermes: Journal of Communication*, no. 17 (2020); Joseph Heathcott Jonathan Soffer, and Rae Zimmerman, eds., *Urban Infrastructure: Historical and Social Dimensions of an Interconnected World* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2022).

37 Gitelman, *Always Already New.*

38 E.g., James J.F. Forest, *Digital Influence: Mercenaries Profits and Power Through Information Warfare* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2022); Lance W. Bennett and Steven Livingston, eds., *The Disinformation Age*: *Politics, Technology, and Disruptive Communication in the United States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

Part I
Entanglements

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

2 Emigrant Colonialism and Transnational Communities

Scandinavian Cultural Diplomacy through Nationals Abroad

Ruth Hemstad

> Every single Danish pioneer, every single Danish home in the Far West, South or East is in fact a Danish colony […] This colonial empire is ours, it is vast and strong, and it *could be* preserved, if we only *wanted* to […] Because it is from here [the homeland] that the colonial empire of the future must be founded and preserved.[1]

The creation and preservation of a cultural and economic "colonial empire of the future" through nationals abroad, as formulated in the Danish journal *Vore Landsmænd i Udlandet* (Our countrymen abroad) in 1905, was the aim of several cultural diplomacy organisations and initiatives in the early twentieth century, both within and beyond the Scandinavian region. This chapter explores the relationship between the long-term strategy of strengthening the connections between the homeland and nationals abroad, as defined by these organisations in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and the tactical means employed in achieving these aims. The focal point will be how the overarching goals of the organisations and related publishing initiatives were implemented and discussed in published material directed at the two main audiences: the nationals abroad and a national readership at home, with a view to different Scandinavian experiences.

National organisations focusing on the emigrated population as vehicles for promoting national interests abroad appeared in the Scandinavian countries at the turn of the twentieth century. Nordmands-Forbundet (N.F.) (the Norse Federation) in Kristiania (Oslo) was founded in Norway in the summer of 1907 and Riksföreningen för svenskhetens bevarande i utlandet (the National Association for the Preservation of Swedishness Abroad) followed in Gothenburg in Sweden late 1908. In Denmark, Dansk Verdenssamfund (D.V.) (Danish World Association) was founded in Copenhagen in 1912 but was dissolved after only a few years of activity in 1916. In 1919, Dansk Samvirke (Danish Cooperation) was founded on the basis of a former, more narrowly defined association, De danske

DOI: 10.4324/9781032618326-3

Atlanterhavsøer (the Danish Atlantic Isles), created in 1902. In Finland, Suomi-Seura (the Finland Society) was founded in 1927.

The Nordic organisations echoed and were inspired by, similar initiatives in Germany, France and Italy reaching out to nationals abroad, such as Allgemeiner Deutscher Schulverein zur Erhaltung des Deutchtums im Auslande (the German school association for the preservation of German language abroad) from 1881, Alliance Française (the national association for the propagating French language in the colonies and abroad), founded in 1883 and Societá Dante Alghieri (the Dante Alighieri Society for Italian language and culture outside the Kingdom) established in 1889. All these organisations represent early examples of what has later been termed cultural, public, language, or commercial diplomacy.[2] Cultural diplomacy, broadly defined as "activities conducted by state as well as by non-state actors, designed to advance national or ideological agendas as well as to promote international understanding",[3] is commonly connected to state interests as part of their foreign policy, and it is frequently state-endorsed and subsidised, although rarely – for several reasons – directly organised by the state.[4] Early cultural diplomacy organisations, however, often started from below, from civil society organisations and in many cases precede state initiatives.[5]

A central aim of these early organisations was to promote closer connections between the homeland and nationals abroad, through creating and maintaining a national consciousness and identity both among their minorities in neighbouring countries and among the rising amount of their population emigrating, not least, to the Americas. An interconnected aspect was the teaching of the national language abroad. The organisations were based in the homeland as umbrella organisations, with both associations and individual persons as members and developed a more or less worldwide network of local chapters. The emergence of these initiatives was a response to European mass migration, globalisation, colonialism and international trade, as well as state and nation-building and the rise of pan-national movements.[6] The strong connection is underlined in what has been termed "emigrant colonialism": emigrants were in need of support from their native country, which in turn had much to "lose or gain by cultivating emigration" in promoting national interests through cultural and economic means.[7]

Deutscher Schulverein, Dante Alghieri and Alliance Française were dedicated to the spread and maintenance of their respective national culture and language outside the borders of the nation-state, not least through supporting schools and language teaching abroad, but also through the dissemination of journals and literature. These organisations, their strategies and tactics served as international models and inspirations for the Scandinavian organisations and journals established in the early twentieth

century. The strong connection between language, culture and nationalism – and economic growth – visible in several European cultural diplomacy organisations is also prevalent in the Nordic countries, although the means and tactics employed to reach out to nationals abroad could differ.

Emigration, Journals and Organisations in Scandinavia

Norway and Sweden had, like Germany and Italy, large diasporic groups abroad, and only Ireland had a higher rate of emigration in relation to the population. Almost 3 million emigrated from the Nordic region, most of them to North America, between 1825 and 1930: around 1.2 million Swedes, 850,000 Norwegians and more than 300,000 Danes.[8] Alongside emigrants leaving their native country to settle permanently abroad, many Scandinavians were expats residing temporarily in a foreign country or travelling on a short-term basis, as artists, artisans, travelling journeymen, journalists and scholars, people employed in business, trade and in the merchant fleet, as well as missionaries and diplomatic representatives.

The rising mass migration around 1900 represented a threat but also possibilities for the Nordic countries. Alongside organisational efforts to stop or reduce emigration, cultural diplomacy organisations were founded to *cultivate* emigration. These organisations argued, as part of their promotion strategy, that half of the Norwegian population lived outside Norway, one-third of the Swedish-speaking nation lived outside the homeland – this included the Swedish-speaking population in Finland and Estonia – and one-fifth of the Danish population lived across the globe. It was therefore an important national task to bring these divided parts of the national community together, thereby constituting, as it was said, and in line with European terminology at the time, a "Greater Norway", a "Greater Sweden" or a "Greater Denmark" that would also be of greater importance in the international community, both culturally and economically.

An additional, formative context in the Scandinavian region was the dissolution of the Norwegian-Swedish union in 1905 after 91 years of, albeit loose, unification. The Norwegians' one-sided way of leaving the union provoked anti-Scandinavian sentiments in Sweden. The background for this reaction was also the pan-Scandinavian movement of the nineteenth century, which had served as an inspiring impulse for the creation of a range of pan-Scandinavian associations, not least abroad. Thus, alongside national ethnic associations, many "Scandinavian associations", probably more than 125 in total, were founded by Scandinavian diaspora communities, mainly in European and North American cities, starting in the early 1840s and continuing throughout the century.[9] Some of the associations abroad stayed in contact with the often short-lived pan-Scandinavian associations at home, and some were also loosely

interconnected in an associational network abroad.[10] There was, however, never a central committee within the region that could have served as a joint organisation for associations across and beyond Scandinavia.

Most of the pan-Scandinavian associations abroad, especially in Europe and to a certain extent in the United States, were split along national lines after, and due to, the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian union in 1905. The politicisation of any dispute concerning the common Scandinavian associations led to an organisational reconfiguration, as new, national cultural diplomacy organisations were founded in Norway and Sweden directly after 1905. Some of the old and new national associations abroad became local chapters of the new umbrella organisations and new ethnic associations were founded abroad. The homeland organisations were, contrary to the loosely organised nineteenth-century Scandinavian association networks, actively involved in cultural diplomacy and the promotion of national culture and language through nationals abroad.

How did the new organisations in the Scandinavian region use the means of communication – *strategically* to fulfil their overall worldwide ambitions and missions and *in practice*, through the hands-on tactic of publication initiatives to reach out to nationals abroad? Although educational and cultural exchange was important for the organisations, in particular for Riksföreningen, at the core of their efforts in the founding years was, I will argue, the publication of transnational journals to circulate worldwide. These membership magazines served as tangible connections and tools to build communities and link peoples even across vast distances.

In Denmark, a journal for nationals abroad, *Vore Landsmænd i Udlandet*, mentioned above, preceded the founding of D.V., of which it soon became the main communication channel. In Norway, the organisation started its activities by publishing a journal – with the very same name, and from the start defined as the main task of N.F. In Sweden, Riksföreningen för svenskhetens bevarande i utlandet (Riksföreningen) used their annual *Årsbok* (Yearbook) as the main communication channel in the first few years but soon launched the membership journal *Allsvensk Samling*. The organisations and editors saw the journals as a central means in building a transnational imagined community across the continents. How did they discuss their role as mediators and what kind of editorial tactics were used to strengthen the ties between their two main audiences: the nationals abroad across the globe, and the national readership at home, from which the organisation needed support for the common cause? In the following parts of this chapter, the experiences in Denmark, Norway and Sweden will be examined more closely with regard to the discussions of the homeland's responsibility for nationals abroad and the role of the press, more specifically transnational journals, to serve as a connecting link between the population at home and abroad. In spite of the

differences between the countries, there are several interesting similarities, as well as significant entanglements and encounters.

A Greater Denmark

The Danish journal for nationals abroad predates, as we have seen, not only the founding of D.V. but also its Scandinavian equivalents. It was, it seems, the first important regular media channel for promoting closer connections between the homeland and nationals abroad in the Scandinavian region and will therefore be studied more closely, as it illustrates the discussion of and means employed in this kind of endeavour. It also shows the necessary role of dedicated actors believing in the common cause.

The journal for Danes abroad, published biweekly from October 1903, changed its title three times in an illuminating way. It started out as *Vore udvandrede Landsmænd* (Our emigrated countrymen), edited by the pastor M.C. Jensen after his re-migration from the United States. His co-editor from 1904, theologian and foreign policy publicist in the newspaper *Kristeligt Dagblad*, Bertel Fuglsang, who had also travelled widely, soon became the driving force and sole editor from the summer of 1905. From July 1904, the main heading of the journal was extended with a subheading, describing its main aim: "Our purpose is: to be a link between countrymen [landsmænd] all over the globe".[11] In 1905, it changed its title to *Vore Landsmænd i Udlandet* (Our countrymen abroad) in order to include not only emigrants but also expats. In 1911 the title was changed once again, this time to *Danmark hjemme og ude* (Denmark at home and abroad), while keeping the old name as a subtitle *(Vore Landsmænd i Udlandet)*. The journal was directed at, it was argued in favour of the new name, a "Greater Denmark" (Stor-Danmark), expanding beyond the domestic level.[12] These kinds of expressions were, however, seldom in the Danish context.

In the first issue, published on 1 October 1903, the overall aim and strategy were defined as connecting Danish homes far away to those in the mother country (moderlandet), acknowledging that half a million Danish-speaking people, more than one-fifth of Denmark's population, lived in foreign parts of the world.[13] In particular, the journal declared, it wanted to publish news and stories from and on the emigrated population and their life and work abroad.

The journal continuously discussed its own goals and tasks with its readers. "Our task", the journal stated in August 1904, is "to make spiritual and commercial connections which can reach across the seas and contribute to mutual benefit".[14] Later in August 1904, in an editorial on emigration, Fuglsang described the difference between great and small states regarding emigration: while the emigration of great states makes

them even greater, the emigration of the small ones just makes them smaller.[15] The aim of the journal – and later organisations – was hence to reach out to the emigrants and also make the smaller countries greater. In February 1905, Fuglsang underlined the role of the journal as being the "only *common organ*" monitoring all Danish activities beyond Denmark and having the potential to connect all Danish emigrants and Danish colonies.[16] The journal regularly published letters from Danes abroad, some of them underlining the uniqueness of the journal, functioning as a "wireless telegraph" connecting all Danes.[17] The journal presented, it was furthermore stated, the most important news from the homeland every fortnight and represented a powerful medium for Danes abroad to reach back home with their perspectives and experiences.[18] Although the published letters, sometimes followed by comments from the editor, mostly represented an elite segment of emigrants and expats, it opened a dialogue with the readers across the globe. The same kinds of exchanges were also important parts of the Norwegian and Swedish journals and publications.

Reaching the strategic goals of linking Danes together was, however, not always straightforward on a more tactical level. In February 1904, the editors noted that the journal received more interest from readers abroad than at home and called for more involvement: "We are just a small nation […] Let us keep the connection with the emigrated Danes […] we cannot afford to lose them".[19] In August 1904, the editor sent a sample issue and letters to all Danish embassies and consuls abroad to facilitate its dissemination and encourage new subscriptions. The journal even suggested the possibility of expanding to a common Scandinavian endeavour.[20] Although the journal could be ordered from "every post office across Scandinavia",[21] this idea came to nothing. Instead, Norwegian and Swedish organisations were founded and published their own national journals.

Recurrently, the Danish journal pointed to the German example regarding nationals abroad. The German state subsidised German schools abroad and officially recognised the national benefit of preserving Germanness among nationals abroad, the journal underlined. This has led to a change, strengthening the connections and identity, language and culture of Germans abroad, it was furthermore stated.[22] The Germans, from whom we can learn a lot, Fuglsang argues in another editorial, show that an international perspective in the long run serves the fatherland.[23] In general, the journal monitored how other countries such as Germany, Italy and Switzerland sought to support and maintain contact with their nationals abroad.

In implementing the strategic goal of strengthening connections, the journal invited prominent Danes to comment on the purpose of the journal as the "connecting link". In 12 successive issues published in 1905, this *enquête* or inquiry strongly supported the general strategy of securing

a common transnational Danish community using a journal as the main connection between Danes abroad and at home. The primary contribution to this series of inquiries was written by Admiral Andreas du Plessis de Richelieu, newly returned from Siam (Thailand) after many years as a prominent naval officer and businessman, and with central positions in DFDS (Det Forenede Dampskibs-Selskab), the pre-eminent shipping company in Denmark, which had been running the Scandinavian-American Line to New York since 1898. Richelieu accordingly had strong economic incentives and also experience in the interconnected ventures of promoting emigration and international trade. His article on "Our countrymen abroad" was printed and distributed separately – and was also discussed in the Norwegian press, as we will see.[24] Richelieu viewed the journal as a chain and necessary link, connecting Danes across the world by presenting relevant news and overview articles from home and being a channel for input and ideas from Danes abroad. This could lead to common interests – which would be the strongest linkage of all, he argued.[25] It was also as part of this inquiry that Julius Schiøtt, director of Copenhagen Zoo, argued that the Danish colonial empire of the future should and could be preserved. First, however, it had to be mapped, and then connected to the common Danish culture, and this was the task of the journal, Schiøtt maintained, suggesting that the energic editor should travel on a *Commis Voyageur du Danemark* to connect all threads.[26] Instead, one may say, Fuglesang sent Emil Opffer, who was already in Mexico, as a "world correspondent" in July 1905, to function as "agitator" for the greater cause of unification.[27] Opffer travelled to Danish "colonies" around the world, reported to the journal and gathered new subscribers. In similar ways, N.F. and Riksföreningen also sent out central actors on agitation tours, in Europe and across the globe.

From 1913, Fuglsang's journal became the journal of D.V.[28] The organisation, explicitly inspired by N.F., had been underway since 1909.[29] In a meeting of the planning committee in June 1911, the role of communication with co-nationals abroad through a journal was emphasised as the only way to secure success for its plans.[30] The first year after the formal founding, 26 March 1912, it published the monthly *Dansk Samvirke*, with the telling subheading "For Danish Culture. For Danish Export", as a parallel journal to *Danmark ude og hjemme*. The founders, headed by W. Hanssen, former consul-general in Colombia, soon realised, however, that they had to cooperate with Fuglsang, who had earlier withdrawn from the planning committee. Fuglsang was hired as secretary and leader of the organisation and continued as editor for what in May 1913 became a weekly journal for the members: *Danmark ude og hjemme (Vore Landsmænd i Udlandet): Medlemsblad for "Dansk Verdenssamfund"*. The First World War caused significant problems for the journal and its international

distribution. Early in 1916, Fuglsang emigrated to Argentina, and there are few traces of the journal or the organisation after he left.

The purpose of the D.V. was defined as "to maintain the connection and strengthen the solidarity between Danes within and outside of Denmark, and to gather Danish men and women in all parts of the world to work together for Danish culture and Danish interests. Party politics is outside the purpose of the Society".[31] In implementing this overarching strategy, the journal continued to play a central role, alongside other activities, from establishing an information bureau on emigration opportunities in Copenhagen in 1912 to forming an archive, supporting Danish book collections abroad and organising meetings and events for emigrants visiting Denmark.

Through much of its content, the journal sought, as Richelieu had suggested, to present relevant news from home and to be a channel for involvement and ideas from Danes abroad. Articles on Danish emigrant and expat communities served to make their experiences known not just to the homeland audience, but also to Danes in other parts of the world, thereby creating what may be termed a sub-global Danish public sphere and a transnational community.

From 1902, the association De danske Atlanterhavsøer (The Danish Atlantic Isles) had as its purpose to contribute to the development of, and strengthen the connections between, Denmark proper and the Danish territories and colonies: Iceland, the Faroe Islands, Greenland and the West Indian colonies. When the Danish West Indian colonies were sold in 1916, and Iceland became semi-independent in 1918, the association was transformed into a new organisation, more in line with D.V. and similar Scandinavian organisations. *Dansk Samvirke* (Danish Cooperation) defined its purpose as to facilitate cooperation and strengthen the connections between Danes in different parts of the realm and between Danes at home and abroad and to circulate information on Denmark and Danish conditions abroad. The new journal *Danmarksposten* was regarded as a main vehicle for stimulating an interaction of ideas and knowledge across borders.[32]

A Greater Norway

The first appeal to form a "Norwegian world association" was published in the Norwegian newspaper *Verdens Gang* in December 1905, and came from Halvard Bachke, a leading civil servant in the Foreign Office.[33] The newspaper discussed the topic in several editorials, also by referring to Richelieu's statement on the need to stay in contact with nationals abroad, printed in *Vore Landsmænd i Udlandet* and sent as a separate print to the Norwegian press in 1905.[34] The articles in *Verdens Gang* were soon reprinted and commented on in the Norwegian-American newspaper

Skandinaven, published in Chicago.[35] This transnational and transatlantic circulation of articles may also be seen as a result of tactical considerations from different publishing actors. *Skandinaven* and other Norwegian-American newspapers suggested, by referring to the Danish journal, that interest in nationals abroad was greater in Denmark than in Norway, and praised the initiative and appeal from the homeland to found a world association.[36] A letter from a Norwegian-American, printed as part of the article series on a world association, underlined the importance of a journal to link Norwegians at home and abroad; such a "connecting journal […] cannot fail to solve a very large task for the best of the Norwegian nationality", it was argued.[37]

An important background to the appeal and the new awareness in Norway of Norwegians abroad was the rising tensions within the Swedish-Norwegian union and its dissolution in 1905. This event led to a national mobilisation both at home and abroad and strong expressions of support by Norwegian emigrant communities. The visit of a deputation of Norwegian-Americans for the coronation of the new royal family in June 1906 – Prince Carl of Denmark was elected as King Haakon of Norway in late 1905 and his wife Princess Maud became Queen – was the direct occasion that brought the Norwegian world association into life or at least a committee to plan the new organisation. A new appeal, signed by a range of prominent Norwegians, was published and circulated widely in late 1906, and the organisation was formally founded on 21 June 1907. The internationally oriented microbiologist Fredrik Georg Gade was among the founders and a driving force from the beginning and for many years to come, as editor and later president. Central Norwegian politicians, such as Carl Berner, President of the Parliament and the first president of the new organisation, and the conservative politician and publicist C.J. Hambro, were important members of the elite leadership of the organisation during its formative years. The elite connection is also prevalent in the Danish and Swedish organisations.

The aim of N.F.,[38] defined as an association of Norwegian men and women around the world, was, like the Danish journal, to form "the link between Norwegians at home and abroad".[39] It further stated its purpose as being "to maintain the connection and strengthen the unity between Norwegians within and outside Norway and to gather Norwegians in all parts of the world in common endeavours for Norwegian culture and Norwegian interests".[40] In the strategic communication to fulfil this aim, a central narrative was promoted, namely that of a "Greater Norway", an expression introduced, it seems, by the author Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson. In his introduction in the first publication presenting the planned organisation, including the appeal, in late 1906, he recommended the association as an opportunity to "make Norway greater".[41]

Soon after its founding, and as a prioritised task, the monthly *Nordmands-Forbundet* was published, with the first issue in October 1907. The journal was perceived as a central means of implementing and interpreting the overarching strategy of connecting Norwegians across the globe and promoting national culture and interests, thereby creating a "Greater Norway". Lovoll maintains that much of "the success of Nordmanns-Forbundet may be attributed to its journal",[42] which from the start functioned as a "messenger and a connecting link between outside-Norwegians and home-Norwegians", as stated by Arne Kildal, secretary general for almost 30 years starting in 1925.[43]

In the journal, and in later published promotional material, the concept of a "Greater Norway" was regularly repeated[44]: a brochure published in 1927, when the organisation celebrated its 20 years anniversary, thus claimed:

> Almost half of the Norwegian national bloodline [*folkeætt*] lives outside their homeland, and when we all – both outside and at home – work together for Norwegian language, Norwegian culture and Norwegian interests, we create a GREATER NORWAY. Such work will bring with it greater material prosperity and greater cultural influence for our entire nation, and for the individual it will bring satisfaction through the awareness that one is participating in constructive work for the country and people of Norway.[45]

In a similar vein as the Danish and Swedish organisations and journals for nationals abroad, the greater national community was perceived as a vehicle for promoting national culture and interests in foreign countries. This cultural diplomacy dimension was strikingly expressed by C.J. Hambro, defining Norwegians abroad as ambassadors for Norway, seeing each of them as "a Norwegian flag in a foreign land".[46] The journal contributed to uniting the two homes of Norwegians – *Vesterheimen* (the Western home) in North America and the eastern, native homeland, by disseminating news and relevant articles on Norwegian society to the emigrated population, and on Norwegian communities abroad for the readership both at home and in other countries. As the parallel to the Danish journal, it also printed several letters from Norwegians abroad, and, like Fuglsang in Denmark, *N.F.* also sent an "agitator" on a world tour to meet Norwegians and write about Norwegian colonies abroad for the journal and increase the numbers of subscribers and members. The publicist Ludvig Saxe travelled as a combined correspondent for Norwegian newspapers and a "commissioner" for N.F. and its journal for two years, 1911–1913, and later served as editor of the journal. A lengthy article series written by him, printed from 1912 onwards, was later republished as a travel

account, *Nordmænd jorden rundt* (Norwegians Worldwide).[47] In 1917, as part of its first anniversary, the Norwegian journal published an *enquête*, asking friends of N.F. at home and abroad to reflect on the organisation and its tasks ahead.[48]

The journal was also a channel for critique and discussions among its members. Among other issues under debate was the question of the history of the Norwegian-American community, and the language reforms in Norway. The complex language issue, with several linguistic and orthographic reforms implemented from 1907 to make the originally Danish written language closer to Norwegian spoken dialects, caused strong reactions from Norwegian-Americans. This modernising and nationalising of the language weakened the important linguistic bonds between the diaspora and the homeland. The journal *Nordmands-Forbundet* was thus slow to implement the language reforms. The language situation in Norway is part of the explanation as to why N.F. did not engage in organising or supporting schools teaching Norwegian abroad, although they promoted student and academic exchange more generally. Norwegian-language studies in the United States, Lovoll comments, "emanated from a Norwegian-American cultural world rather than from any initiative in the homeland".[49] Here, N.F. differed markedly from the Swedish Riksföreningen, which centred on the preservation of the national language abroad as one of its main tasks, as part of promoting Sweden and Swedishness abroad.

The journal *Nordmands-Forbundet* was distributed to all members, in addition to a range of Norwegian diplomatic representatives and honorary consuls around the world, and all locations of the Norwegian Seamen's Mission. The Norwegian organisation started with 4,200 members in 1907 but soon reached an impressively high membership rate. The numbers included, however, and this was also commented on at the time, not only individual members but also affiliated associations and collectively all their members. Among them was Sons of Norway in Minneapolis, the greatest organisation in Norwegian America with 5,000 members of its own, representing one-third of the total membership in 1909. In 1911 the membership was 22,000, and by 1916, it stood at 50,000, mostly in Norway and North America, some in Europe and a few on other continents.

Alongside the journal and other printed promotional material, the organisation, as stated in its bylaws, employed an array of broadly understood media tactics to reach its overarching goals. In addition to staying in touch with members across the world by correspondence and the distribution of the journal, lectures at home and abroad were offered, books, journals and newspapers were sent to associations abroad and meetings, trips and receptions for emigrants visiting their homeland were organised. In 1914, a separate pavilion on "The emigrated Norway" (Det utflyttede Norge) was an important part of the Jubilee Exhibition in Kristiania. The

bylaws also endorsed the establishment of information bureaus to support and guide nationals in foreign countries as well as returning emigrants, to send representations to international meetings, to broadcast programmes overseas, to contribute to monuments abroad and to collect newspapers, journals and other publications produced by Norwegians abroad. An important national event exported successfully to Norwegian "colonies" worldwide, although not mentioned in the bylaws, was the annual celebration of Norway's Constitution Day, 17 May, functioning as a matching transatlantic and transnational celebration of Norway.[50] Before 1905, 17 May could even be celebrated as a common *Scandinavian* event in emigrant communities in North America.

A Greater Sweden

An important context for the founding of Riksföreningen för svenskhetens bevarande i utlandet is, as for N.F., the events of 1905.[51] While perceived as a triumph in Norway and among Norwegians abroad, it was felt as a national humiliation for Sweden, causing a national and conservative mobilisation at home and among the Swedish diaspora. This Swedish nationalism thus had a distinct anti-Scandinavian angle. After 1905, pan-Scandinavian cooperation and ideas, which had seen a revival around 1900, were considered a hindrance, constraining Swedishness. This perception became particularly dominant with regard to the many pan-Scandinavian associations abroad. In the Swedish conservative press, in 1905 and the following years,[52] this associational life abroad was condemned for institutionalising the failed idea of "Scandinavianism", it was argued.[53] It thus became important in the national mobilisation process to stimulate and strengthen Swedishness among the nationals abroad.

The initiative to form a national Swedish organisation for Swedes abroad came from Swedes in Germany who had recently left the pan-Scandinavian associations in Hamburg, Berlin and elsewhere and formed new Swedish associations. In 1906 there were around 30 Swedish associations and communities – new and old – in Germany.[54] On 6 November 1906, in conjunction with the annual ceremony since 1837 commemorating the death of King Gustavus Adolphus in Lützen in 1632, a committee was appointed to organise an association for the preservation of Swedishness among Swedes in Germany.[55] They initiated the first publication directed at Swedes abroad, *Svenska Utlandstidningen* (Swedish Foreign Newspaper) published weekly in Berlin from 1908, and from 1909 to 1913 by *Svenska Dagbladet* in Stockholm.[56]

The founder and heart and soul of Riksföreningen was Vilhelm Lundström, professor of classics at the University College in Gothenburg, newspaper editor and later conservative politician. Lundström was familiar

with the Italian discourse on nationals abroad and the Dante Alighieri society from his travels to Italy.[57] The German and Italian examples were referred to several times in speeches and publications from Riksföreningen. At the first meeting in Stockholm, in January 1907, resulting in the formation of a committee, Lundström drew attention to the German and Italian organisations that kept "their language communities together […] we have an even greater need for such an institution than they do, as we can afford even less to lose a single son of the Swedish language and Swedish nationality".[58] The line of argument is familiar from the parallel discourses in Denmark and Norway.

Riksföreningen för svenskhetens bevarande i utlandet, formally founded on 3 December 1908, aimed – like other cultural diplomacy organisations – to be a bond between Swedes across the world. While the Norwegian and later the Danish organisations were more directed at emigrants in North America, the Swedish organisation had another prime target group and mission: to reach out to the old Swedish-speaking minorities in Finland and Estonia, in addition to the newer Swedish communities in Europe, especially Germany, and also in North America and elsewhere. *Utlands-svenskar* (Swedes abroad) had been introduced as a concept around 1906 and contrasted to *hemmasvenskar* (homeland Swedes). It was argued that this group was an important part of the common Swedish cultural community, based on language, culture and identity. The first section of the bylaws accordingly defines the purpose of the association as to

> morally and financially support work for the preservation of the Swedish language and Swedish culture among the Swedes abroad, to promote solidarity between Swedes abroad and at home, and to otherwise promote knowledge of the Swedish language and Swedish culture abroad.[59]

This twofold purpose of maintaining the Swedish transnational community and promoting the Swedish language and culture abroad can also be recognised by similar Norwegian and Danish organisations. The Swedish efforts put into cultural diplomacy, and mostly directed at an academic setting, were, however, more in line with German, Italian and French organisations.[60] Riksföreningen supported and funded Swedish schools abroad, through scholarships, travel grants and educational material – especially in Estonia, and it funded and supported several Swedish lectureships at foreign universities, not least in Germany.

In pursuing the aim of promoting solidarity, the organisation sought both to reach out to Swedes abroad and to change public opinion at home towards Swedes abroad, through a range of different means. Central actors, such as Lundström, published a stream of articles on this issue in different

Swedish newspapers, in addition to contributing to the published material from Riksföreningen. From the beginning and into the interwar period, the organisation and its leader were more or less explicitly anti-Scandinavian. As well as looking to strengthen Swedish sentiments among Swedes, primarily in Europe, but also in North America and elsewhere, Riksföreningen also tried to improve the image of Sweden abroad in general, which had suffered due to the more nationally oriented Norwegians and Danes dominating the common associations, or at least so it was claimed.[61]

Starting in 1909, the annual yearbook *Årsbok* was published and distributed to Swedes around the world. From 1914, Riksföreningen started to publish its own journal *Allsvensk Samling* as a biweekly, later weekly, magazine to serve as the connecting link.[62] The journal published articles on the Swedish diaspora communities and news from home but differed from its Scandinavian parallels due to its focus on Swedish (war) memorials and monuments abroad – an aspect more important for historical reasons in a Swedish context and thereby for the Swedish organisation.

The concept of a "Greater Sweden" was used by the organisation, in its journal, speeches and newspaper articles, although not as frequent and integrated a part of the communication as in Norway.[63] Concepts such as race, tribe and blood are frequently used in published material, reflecting widespread attitudes and terminology at the time. In 1915, *Allsvensk Samling* underlined in an editorial the importance of "preserving the Swedishness of the three million people, who by blood and tribe and language are or at least ought to be Swedish, although they live outside Sweden's borders and for the most part are not citizens of the Kingdom of Sweden".[64] In addition to the journal, various kinds of promotional material were printed as part of the information tactics, and, as mentioned, Swedish newspapers and journals used this in promoting the organisation, through articles and also advertisements calling on support for the organisation: "Contribute to the work for Swedishness around the world […] one of the most, if not the most important question".[65] As part of the announcement in 1918, reference was made to N.F. and its 20,000 members (many of them collective members through other associations), while Riksföreningen only had 2,000 at the time.

As in Denmark and Norway, the Swedish organisation sent central actors to Swedish communities abroad. Lundström himself travelled around constantly, mainly in Europe, to form local chapters and promote the organisation and the journal, not least through an impressive number of public lectures. He also organised fundraising, administered conferences and was the main point of contact, corresponding with Swedes across the globe. Inspired by the Italian example, Lundström organised a conference in 1912 for Swedes abroad, and, similar to the Norwegian pavilion in

Kristiania in 1914, there was a pavilion on Swedes abroad at the exhibition in Gothenburg in 1921. The organisation also distributed Swedish books, journals and newspapers to associations and Swedish libraries abroad, and collected newspapers, journals and other material produced by Swedes abroad.

While Lundström was primarily focused on Swedes in Finland, Estonia and Europe, Reverend Per Pehrsson, also a central actor in the organisation, was the one travelling to North America, where a separate association was founded in 1910, *Foreningen for svenskhetens bevarande i Amerika* (the Association for the Preservation of Swedishness in America). In its communication with Swedish-America, Riksföreningen, with its strong emphasis on the Swedish language, had less success than its Danish and Norwegian counterparts, it seems.[66] In 1938, a separate, expatriate organisation was founded, *Utlandssvenskarnas förening* (Association for Swedes abroad),[67] and the old organisation became in general less important after the Second World War.

Conclusion

Today, the connections between the homeland and its diasporas are easily maintained through the internet, social media, television and radio – media technologies with a global reach. A century ago, the main media channel available was printed material – newspapers, journals, brochures and books. In the age of globalisation, colonialism and emigration, however, printed media also circulated worldwide, as tangible connections linking citizens and compatriots together across the globe. The cultural diplomacy organisations founded in the Nordic region in the early twentieth century perceived their journals, printed in Denmark, Norway and Sweden respectively, as central tactical means to achieve the overarching strategic goals of building transnational communities across borders and thereby promoting emigrant colonialism and national interests. The journals contributed, one may argue, to creating minor sub-global national public spheres as part of this endeavour, although their reach was somewhat confined to an elite part of the emigrant and expat communities.

The strategy and tactics employed differed between the Scandinavian diaspora-oriented organisations. While the Swedish Riksföreningen was more oriented towards the Swedish-speaking population in Finland, Estonia and Europe, and focused also on promoting and preserving the Swedish language abroad in general, the Norwegian N.F. and the Danish Dansk Verdensforbund, later Dansk Samvirke, had stronger connections with and focus on their emigrant communities in North America.

Today's organisations, Danes Worldwide, Riksföreningen Sverigekontakt, Swedes Worldwide and Suomi-Seura (Nordmanns-Forbundet/Norwegians

Worldwide was unified with the bilateral Norwegian-American Society, NORAM, in 2020), operate in a seemingly different world with a post-colonial discourse and characterised not by mass migration *from* the Nordic countries, but by new diaspora communities seeking – similar to the Scandinavian emigrants – to maintain *their* language and identity within the Nordic region by tactically using available media technologies linking them to varyingly supportive homelands across land and sea.

Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank Professor Jørn Brøndal, Professor Dag Blanck and Professor Daron W. Olson for their valuable comments.

Notes

1 Jul. Schiøtt, "Kolonier", *Vore Landsmænd i Udlandet*, no. 2 (17 October 1905), 269–70.
2 James Pamment and Andreas Åkerlund, "The Role of the State in Cultural Diplomacy", *Handbook of Cultural Security*, ed. Yasushi Watanabe (Cheltenham, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2018), 290–307.
3 Benjamin G. Martin and Elisabeth Marie Pillar, "Cultural Diplomacy and Europe's Twenty Year's Crisis, 1919–1939: Introduction", *Contemporary European History*, vol. 30 (2021), 155.
4 Pamment and Åkerlund, "The role of the state", 290, 304.
5 Pamment and Åkerlund, "The role of the state", 292.
6 Christopher A. Casey, *Nationals Abroad: Globalization, Individual Right, and the Making of Modern International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 2. On pan-nationalisms see Ruth Hemstad and Peter Stadius, eds., *Nordic Experiences in Pan-Nationalisms: A Reappraisal and Comparison, 1840–1940* (London and Boston: Routledge, 2023).
7 Mark I. Choate, *Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 2.
8 Mart Kuldkepp, "Emigration and Scandinavian Identity", *Introduction to Nordic Cultures*, eds. Annika Lindskog and Jakob Stougaard-Nielsen (London: UCL Press, 2020), 184.
9 On Scandinavian associations abroad see Ruth Hemstad, "Organised into Existence: Scandinavianism and Pan-Scandinavian Associations within and beyond the Region", *Nordic Experiences in Pan-nationalisms: A Reappraisal and Comparison, 1840–1940*, eds. Ruth Hemstad and Peter Stadius (London and Boston: Routledge, 2023), 158–79.
10 Hemstad, "Organised into existence", 160–69.
11 *Vore udvandrede Landsmænd*, no. 19 (1 July 1904).
12 "Bladets nye Navn", *Danmark hjemme og ude*, no. 1 (5 October 1911).
13 "Hvad vi vil", *Vore udvandrede Landsmænd*, no. 1 (1 October 1903).
14 "Vor Opgave", *Vore udvandrede Landsmænd*, no. 21 (1 August 1904).
15 "Vor Udvandring", *Vore udvandrede Landsmænd*, no. 22 (15 August 1904).
16 "Tiltrænges et Bindeled i Bladform?", *Vore udvandrede Landsmænd*, no. 10 (16 February 1905).
17 Signed by "H. H. Giersing", an engineer writing from St. Petersburg, "Aabent Brev til mine Herrer Landsmænd i Udlandet", *Vore Landsmænd i Udlandet*, no. 6 (15 December 1908).

18 Giersing, "Aabent Brev".
19 "Fra Redaktionen", *Vore udvandrede Landsmænd*, no. 10 (15 February 1904).
20 "Vor Opgave", *Vore udvandrede Landsmænd*, no. 21 (1 August 1904).
21 *Vore udvandrede Landsmænd*, 1 January 1905.
22 "For at bevare Tysdkheden", *Vore udvandrede Landsmænd*, no. 1 (1 October 1904).
23 "Hele Jordkloden vor Arbejdsmark", *Vore udvandrede Landsmænd*, 15 December 1904.
24 "Et norsk 'Verdensforbund'", *Vore Landsmænd i Udlandet*, no. 19 (1 July 1907).
25 Andreas du Plessis de Richelieu, "Vore Landsmænd i Udlandet", *Vore Landsmænd i Udlandet*, no. 15 (1 May 1905).
26 Jul. Schiøtt "Kolonier".
27 "'Vore Landsmænd i Udlandet' udsender en Verdenskorrespondent", no. 20 (15 July 1905).
28 "Til 'Dansk Verdenssamfund's Medlemmer!", no. 11 (May 1913), *Dansk Samvirke*. A. Kamp, *Dansk Samvirke: De første 25 aar, 1919–1930. April–1944* (København: Foreningen Dansk Samvirke, 1944), 9.
29 "Dansk Verdenssamfund", *Vore Landsmænd i Udlandet*, no. 38 (22 June 1911).
30 "Dansk Verdenssamfund".
31 "Dansk Verdenssamfund", *Dansk Samvirke*, July 1912.
32 Anders Vigen, "Hvad vil Dansk Samvirke?", Kamp, *Dansk Samvirke*, 17–21.
33 "Et norsk Verdensforbund", *Verdens Gang*, 18 December 1905.
34 "Nordmendenes Verdenssamfund", *Verdens Gang*, 6 February 1906.
35 *Skandinaven*, 17 January 1906.
36 Odd Sverre Lovoll, "Preserving a Cultural Heritage across Boundaries: A Comparative Perspective on Riksföreningen Sverigekontakt and Nordmanns-Forbundet", *Norwegians and Swedes in the United States: Friends and Neighbors*, eds. Philip J. Anderson and Dag Blanck (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2012), 40–42, referring to an editorial in *Pacific-Posten* in San Francisco 8 January 1906.
37 "Det norske Verdensforbund", *Verdens Gang*, 23 January 1906.
38 The name was modernised to Nordmanns-Forbundet in the early 1930s.
39 §2, "Nordmands-Forbundets Love" (Bylaws of Nordmands-Forbundet), Kristiania [1909], SA 325, National Library of Norway, henceforth SA:NL.
40 §2, "Nordmands-Forbundets Love", SA:NL.
41 *Nordmands-Forbundet*, published by and distributed with the trade journal of Norway, *Farmand* (Christiania: Centraltrykkeriet, 1906).
42 Lovoll, Odd Sverre, *Celebrating a Century: Nordmanns-Forbundet and Norwegians in the World Community 1907–2007* (Oslo: Kolofon, cop. 2009), 20.
43 Quoted from Lovoll, Celebrating a Century, 21.
44 See also Daron W. Olson, *Vikings across the Atlantic: Emigration and the Building of a Greater Norway, 1860–1945* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), for an elaborate discussion of the vision of a greater Norway in a Norwegian-American context.
45 "Nordmands-Forbundet. Enige og tro", Oslo 1927, SA:NL.
46 Lovoll, "Preserving a Cultural Heritage", 47.
47 Ludvig Saxe, *Nordmænd Jorden rundt* (Kristiania: Aschehoug & co., 1914). Saxe's articles were published, and later republished, in the journal in 1911 and the following years.
48 "Nordmands-Forbundet: En Enquete", *Nordmands-Forbundet*, vol. 10 (1917), 281–315.

49 Lovoll, "Preserving a Cultural Heritage", 48.
50 See Olson, *Vikings across the Atlantic*, 160, on celebrations as matching ceremonies in both Norway and America.
51 On the organisation, see Bengt Kummel, *Svenskar i all världen förenen eder! Vilhelm Lundström och den allsvenska rörelsen* (Turku: Åbo Akademis förlag, 1994).
52 See Ruth Hemstad, *Fra Indian summer til nordisk vinter. Skandinavisk samarbeid, skandinavisme og unionsoppløsningen* (Oslo: Akademisk Publisering, 2008).
53 On this development, see Hemstad, "Organise into existence".
54 Lennart Limberg, "Almost a Century's Work: Preserving Swedishness Outside of Sweden," *Scandinavians in Old and New Lands: Essays in Honor of H. Arnold Barton*, eds. Philip J. Anderson, Dag Blanck and Byron J. Nordstrom (Chicago: The Swedish-American Historical Society, 2004), 127–28; "Almost a Century's Work", 128.
55 "Svenskheten i Tyskland", *Svenska Dagbladet*, 20 December 1906. The organisation was formally founded on 6 November 1908 as Svenska Förbundet i Tyskland (Swedish Federation in Germany).
56 "En ny föreningslänk mellan utlandets svenskar", *Hvar 8 Dag*, 8 December 1907.
57 Andreas Åkerlund, "The Nationalisation of Swedish Enlightenment Activities Abroad: Civil Society Actors and Their Impact on State Politics", *Histories of Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding in the Nordic and the Baltic Countries: Representing the Periphery*, eds. Louis Clerc et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 25.
58 "'Riksföreningens' förhistoria", *Årsbok 1909*, Riksföreningen för svenskhetens bevarande i utlandet, Göteborg 1909, 2, here quoted from the English translation in Limberg, "Almost a Century's Work", 131.
59 "Stadgar för Riksföreningen för svenskhetens bevarande i utlandet", §1, *Årsbok* 1909, 10.
60 Åkerlund, "The Nationalisation", 28.
61 Hemstad, "Organise into existence".
62 *Allsvensk Samling: Tidning utgifven af Riksföreningen för svenskhetens bevarande i utlandet*.
63 "Ett større Sverige", *Aftonbladet,* 6 October 1922, reprinted in *Allsvensk Samling*, no. 20 (16 October 1922), 2.
64 Vilhelm Lundström, "Utlandssvenskarnes benämning", *Allsvensk Samling*, no. 13 (1 August 1915).
65 "Fria ord", *Göteborgs Aftonblad*, 5 January 1918.
66 See e.g. Arnold Barton, "Conrad Bergendoff and the Swedish-American Church Language Controversy of the 1920", *Swedish-American Historical Quarterly*, 46 (July 1995): 206–16.
67 Since 1988 renamed Svenskar i världen/Swedes Worldwide.

3 Scientific Exchange As a Media Tactic

Creating "Ever Smaller Worlds" through the Visit of Sir Lawrence Bragg to Sweden in 1943

Edward Corse

The British Council had been established in 1934 to counter growing cultural propaganda emanating from France, Germany, and Italy, which seemed to be threatening British interests not just in the cultural sphere but also commercially and politically. The term "cultural propaganda" was actively used by the Council to describe its work, although it recognised that the word "propaganda" might suggest being underhand or deceitful. It stressed, instead, that it had a strategy of creating a positive cultural exchange between peoples and to promote "British life and thought" – that is, Britain's cultural achievements, progress, and institutions. In the period since the Second World War, the term "cultural propaganda" has generally been avoided both by the Council and more broadly to describe such activity – with a preference to describe the activity as "cultural diplomacy" – to avoid any negative connotations.[1]

Although the Council had opened offices across Europe, practically the Council could only operate for the majority of the Second World War in neutral Europe, in places like Sweden. However, with Norway and Denmark occupied by Nazi Germany the logistical challenge of travelling there meant that Sweden did not have a full time British Council presence until the autumn of 1941, with the arrival of Ronald Bottrall.[2] Bottrall had the task of establishing an institute and beginning an active cultural exchange with the Swedish people. A range of tactical endeavours were used to implement the strategy of promoting British life and thought. These tactics included media-related activities such as establishing English language courses, working with indigenous teaching organisations and Anglophile societies and inviting cultural figures from Britain to tour the country. During the war these visiting cultural figures included Sir Malcolm Sargent (twice), Sir Kenneth Clark (twice), T. S. Eliot, William Holford, Harold Nicolson, the Bishop of Chichester and, of course, Sir Lawrence Bragg. Bragg's visit, which is the focus of this chapter, took place in April and May 1943.[3]

DOI: 10.4324/9781032618326-4

Employing a model of cultural propaganda, the aim of this chapter is to explore the media tactic of scientific exchange through the specific case of Bragg's visit.[4] This chapter draws largely upon the records held by the Royal Institution in London: Bragg's diary, report and correspondence relating to the visit.[5] Through applying this model, the chapter will explore how the tactical approaches of individual visits, such as that undertaken by Bragg, can build upon professional and transnational networks to implement wider cultural propaganda strategies devised by institutions such as the British Council.

The model was devised from the evidence analysed in a wider study of cultural diplomacy by the British Council in neutral countries during the Second World War and built upon several works across different disciplines. For example, the model was inspired by aspects of the works by Leonard Doob and Jacques Ellul in terms of considering different types and methods of propaganda, Nicholas J. Cull regarding public diplomacy, as well as studies written by Robin Wight, Amotz, and Avishag Zahavi in terms of reputation reflexes and other scientific analogies.[6]

The model has three "pillars" relating to "perception", "substance" and "organisation". Within each pillar there are a range of attributes associated with cultural propaganda that were considered necessary to make it successful. For example, the "perception" pillar contains elements such as the "handicap principle", a concept devised by Zahavi and Zahavi, to show that there is a benefit in "wasting" money and time on cultural activities to impress an audience without an immediately obvious benefit.[7] The pillar also considers that being benign and subtle are important elements: cultural propaganda is generally not aggressive or bombastic. In addition, a single cultural event is unlikely to make a significant impact, but many activities, over a period of time, will have an incremental benefit, with engaging personalities and personal contacts essential for longer term success. The "substance" pillar contains elements such as the need to be facts-based, generally conservative in outlook and expert in particular topics such as science, visual arts, and music. These elements ensure that cultural propaganda is robust and not particularly subject to changes in policy and fashions. In wartime, cultural propaganda rarely tries to interact proactively with the war itself in terms of its content, at least officially. Instead, it attempts to present an idealised, albeit credible, view of what life is like and the achievements being made. Importantly, two-way exchange is important in cultural propaganda – it is not a one-way broadcast of ideas but engages in a debate, with a great deal of respect for the audience, often seeking to fulfil their needs. Lastly the "organisation" pillar considers the logistical elements of making cultural propaganda work effectively. Institutions are important in being able to facilitate visits so that they can incrementally build upon past visits and lay the foundations for

later contacts. However, critical to the success of these institutions is the need to be sensitive to audience needs and to have representatives in situ able to shape the cultural activities in the most sensitive way. This pillar considers that being able to work through others, through local institutions in partnership, is often essential to break down barriers to access in a way that broadcasting messages might not be able to achieve.[8]

Applying the model of cultural propaganda to Bragg's visit helps illuminate the importance of studying scientific exchange as a media tactic. His visit was one of many that were organised by the Council and is, therefore, part of a package of activities during the Second World War. He was an expert in his field and, as this chapter will show, was able to engage effectively with other scientific experts, in a subtle two-way exchange, utilising his personal contacts and the contacts of the British Council to make an impact in scientific communities. His picture appeared, and news of his visit was reported widely, in the Swedish press, also enabling him to make a wider impact in the Swedish community.

There are other phrases and terms that could be applied to Bragg's visit. One is "science diplomacy" which has been used widely in recent years. There is even an online publication *Science & Diplomacy* by the AAAS (American Association for the Advancement of Science) Center for Science Diplomacy which has a range of articles exploring the interaction between science and diplomacy. In the United Kingdom, the concept has also been the subject of a research paper for the UK Parliament, considering how science can lead to cross-border collaborations. It has been considered "as a fundamental element in the UK Government's strategy to position post-Brexit Britain on the global stage".[9] Pierre-Bruno Ruffini has charted the use of the phrase and its meaning, describing science diplomats as "all those who are engaged in action at the interface of questions of science and diplomacy, whether or not they are officially invested with diplomatic functions".[10] He highlights that the literature often emphasises the collaboration aspects of "science diplomacy" rather than its use as a way of competing at the expense of others, but there is usually a competitive component to its deployment.[11] In *Science & Diplomacy*, Darryl Copeland has advocated for the idea to be prioritised, as it can be "potentially transformative … yet … it receives little notice and is being starved of resources".[12] In particular he emphasises that as science "produces the closest thing we have to proof and truth", there are no substitutes to its usage as a diplomatic tool.[13]

Clearly the idea of scientists engaging in international diplomacy in some form is a matter of interest to governments today. There is general recognition that the idea of "science diplomacy" predates the use of the term specifically. Undoubtedly scientists such as Bragg were pioneers in "science diplomacy", but there is some debate around its exact meaning.

However, the scientific visits organised by the British Council should not be isolated from the wider context. Science was not the only area of interest for the British Council: it was interested more generally in the promotion of what might be termed "knowledge actors".[14] The Council organised activities for a range of cultural diplomacy practitioners to places such as Sweden during the Second World War. Bragg's visit should, therefore, be considered as a tactic to promote British cultural prowess in the round, and not merely for the purposes of furthering scientific knowledge itself. The benefit of utilising the model of cultural propaganda is that Bragg's visit can therefore be seen in a wider strategic context – its scientific aspects were important, but there are wider considerations to be examined, as this chapter will demonstrate.

The British Council's Invitation to Bragg and His Preparation for Visiting Sweden

Bragg had shared the Nobel Prize for Physics with his father, William Henry Bragg, in November 1915, and he visited Sweden in 1922 to collect the prize. Although not as well-known as his father (who died in 1942), Bragg was a well-regarded scientist in his own right, not least owing to his book *Electricity* published in 1936. *Electricity* was an attempt to make science more accessible to a younger audience, following his appearance at the Royal Institution Christmas Lectures in 1934. He therefore established himself not only as a scientist but also as an able communicator to non-academic audiences.[15]

Sir Malcolm Robertson, Chairman of the British Council, approached Bragg in early 1943 about undertaking a lecture tour of Sweden. He stated "[w]e know that the Swedish scientific circles and audiences are most anxious to hear you".[16] Bragg responded quickly and positively to Robertson's letter, and arrangements were made for him to travel to Sweden in mid-April for a month.[17] Bragg stated he was keen to present a "story" that was "representative of the important work done here [in Britain] in recent years" and to give Swedish scientists the access they wanted to a wider scientific world.[18]

Shortly after Bragg had accepted the invitation, he contacted another scientist who had travelled to Sweden for a similar trip organised by the British Council, the biologist Dr Cyril D. Darlington of the John Innes Horticultural Institute. Darlington noted that news of developments in British and American science was slow to reach Sweden, but that Sweden was also an important neutral hub that enabled contact with occupied Europe. Darlington recommended to the Council that they should make Swedish scientists' access to publication in English language journals more straightforward in order to counter the "general impression in Sweden

that we [the British] do not want their work". He also recommended more scientists should be sent to Sweden.[19] Darlington's report, therefore, gave Bragg reassurance that visitors should receive a warm welcome and could overcome existing barriers. A second scientist also visited Sweden just prior to Bragg – Professor Francis Albert Eley Crew. Crew was an animal geneticist who had established the Institute of Animal Research at the University of Edinburgh and was working for the British War Office at the time. Bragg's visit, therefore, should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a series of tactical visits, each one building upon previous contact.[20]

Bragg requested that some lantern slides from Imperial Chemical Industries Limited (ICI) – which showed the structure of molecules – should be sent out in advance of his visit.[21] In addition, Bragg received correspondence directly from Swedish scientists such as Percy Quensel of Stockholms Högskola Mineralogiska Institutionen (Stockholm University's Mineralogy Department) who he had met in 1922 – Quensel wrote "I need not say how pleased we will be to see you here again".[22] It seems clear from this that the visit was desired as much by the Swedish scientists as it was by the British Council.

The context above already shows a very close alignment with the model of cultural propaganda described in the introduction. Bragg was one of several scientists travelling to Sweden, and so it was clearly part of an incremental build-up of a broader relationship across several scientific disciplines. The correspondence with Robertson and Quensel is evidence that Bragg's visit was welcomed, or even needed, by the scientific community in Sweden, and would help tackle the perception noted by Darlington that British scientists had not been engaging effectively with their Swedish counterparts in recent years. His own expertise made him a credible figure of course, but the ICI slides and the previous publication of *Electricity* would enable him to draw upon other material of substance in an effective way whilst he made his trip. Lastly, it seems fairly clear from the Robertson-Bragg correspondence that although Bragg was enthusiastic, he probably would not have organised such a trip without the assistance and invitation of the Council. This shows how important the Council was as a vehicle in instigating and realising the visit.

Bragg's Time in Sweden

Bragg's time was largely centred on the core places toured by all the visiting cultural figures – the main cities, plus the important university towns of Uppsala and Lund.[23] After arriving in Stockholm, Bragg began by undertaking administrative tasks and meeting members of the British Legation. There was time for a press conference on the Saturday, where Swedish journalists were interested in probing the purpose for which scientists

were being employed in Britain during wartime. This press conference, and another later in Malmö, enabled Bragg's presence to be more widely known in Sweden. News of his visit was detailed across the main Swedish newspapers – *Aftonbladet*, *Arbetet*, *Dagens Nyheter*, *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning* and *Svenska Dagbladet* – emphasising his expertise, Nobel Prize and previous connections to Sweden.[24] Whilst in Stockholm he also visited the Nobel Institute for Physics and gave the first recital of his popular lecture entitled "Seeing Ever Smaller Worlds" at the Grand Hotel in Stockholm, to an audience of around 250 people.[25] The Grand Hotel was known as a hotbed of espionage during the war, and it seems reasonable to assume that the delivery of Bragg's lecture there would have been widely known, not only in Sweden but across interested parties elsewhere in Europe.[26] His scientific exchange visit was immediately entangled within a wider landscape of espionage and press coverage, and implicitly just as much about promoting him as a British scientist as being there purely for reasons of knowledge exchange.

The records of the Allmänna Säkerhetstjänsten (STJ – the Swedish Civilian Security Service) show that they were also interested in Bragg's presence and intercepted phone calls to monitor his movements.[27] The content of the intercepts merely shows the administrative side of the visits, but they gave clues as to where the authorities should go to listen in to the conversations Bragg was having. John Gilmour has stated that "[t]he British in particular hated the STJ, referring to them as the 'Svestapo'".[28] Whilst the STJ files show that they were interested in any broader implications of Bragg's visit, there is no evidence that it was anything other than a purely scientific exchange, even if it was entangled within these currents.

On Tuesday 20 April, Bragg travelled to Uppsala to give another rendition of the "Seeing Ever Smaller Worlds" lecture, this time to the Anglo-Swedish Society. He also gave lectures on X-Ray optics to Ivan Waller's Mathematical Institute and another on proteins.[29] The following weekend he spent time in Sparreholm, southwest of Stockholm. Sparreholm was a 16,000-acre estate owned by Swedish scientist Harry von Eckermann, Docent in the Mineralogical Department of Stockholm University.[30]

From Tuesday 27 April to Sunday 2 May, Bragg spent a hectic week in Stockholm. It began with a visit to Quensel's laboratory (working to put Quensel's staff in touch with British scientists), followed by a lecture at the Tekniska Högskolan (the Technical College). The Wednesday involved preparing experiments for the evening lecture at the Teknologföreningen (the Technology Association) entitled "The Strength of Metals", followed by his election as a member of the Swedish Academy.[31] The Thursday involved interviews with British (and Commonwealth) scientists in Sweden who wished to return to Britain and take up posts at British universities,[32] a lecture on proteins at Ulf von Euler's Institute for Biochemistry, and a

conversation with Bragg's friend Arne Westgren of the Swedish Academy of Science about his research on crystal structures. Bragg also received a letter from Johan Hansson of Bokförlaget Natur och Kultur, a Swedish publishing house in Stockholm, who was keen to see whether an article about world morality could be published in an English language magazine.[33] It was clear that the Council and its audience in Sweden were getting as much out of Bragg as they could in the short time available and not restricting his activities to his area of expertise.

After a weekend of walking near Stockholm on the islands of Björkö and Adelsö, Bragg caught the overnight train to Malmö, arriving on Monday 3 May. The start of Bragg's tour of the western cities started in very much the same way as his time in Stockholm: with a press conference and a popular lecture. Despite the publicity and sense that his presence was welcomed generally, some lectures went better than others, showing that the specific circumstances were important for a smooth operation. Sometimes the planned tactics went awry. Bragg was not happy about how his lecture in Malmö went, compared to those he had given in Stockholm and Uppsala. He complained it had gone "rather stickily", largely because the lecture was not suited to a "purely social occasion".[34] He described his lecture in Lund as a "ghastly affair" owing to a mix up in rooms and equipment, and he arrived in Gothenburg only two hours ahead of a lecture he was due to give in the afternoon, rather than in the evening as he was expecting.[35] Other lectures seemed to go more smoothly, particularly where he had more preparation time – and he was particularly pleased with the "most appreciative audience" in Helsingborg[36] which made it a "very pleasant memory".[37] After visiting Helsingborg, the text of his main lecture, mentioned above, appeared in *Öresunds-Posten* under the Swedish title "Inblick i allt mindre världar", enabling the details to be fully understood by the audience.[38]

In the western cities, daytime activities were more positive and he was able to meet a range of scientists to discover more about their research. He also had the opportunity to meet several Danes who described the conditions in Copenhagen. In particular, he was pleased to learn that the Danish scientist, Niels Bohr, had been largely left alone by the occupying Nazis, although he was "strung up and nervous. Takes any defeat to Allies' cause very hardly".[39] Events for Bohr came to a head just over four months after Bragg's departure from Sweden, when he escaped from Denmark after hearing that he may be arrested, ultimately to work on the Manhattan Project. Bragg's interest in the Danish scientist, however, does not appear to have led directly to his escape, although Bohr was in covert contact with British scientists at the time of Bragg's visit.[40]

Lunches, supper parties and dinners, often organised by the Anglo-Swedish Society, enabled him to have casual, off-the-record conversations

with a range of both scientists and local dignitaries.[41] Sometimes these were accompanied by social events and dancing, or the screening of a Ministry of Information film, showing, again, that his visit was not purely about science but part of a wider endeavour to promote his adopted home country.[42] He recorded that he had "an excellent supper" in Gothenburg in the presence of J. A. Hedvall and the Rector of Chalmers, Gustav Hössjer, and was able to engage in detailed conversation on various topics.[43] He was begged by scientists there to obtain a regular supply of the *Proceedings of the Royal Society* and *Science Abstracts* – they already received the journal *Nature*, which although appreciated, only led to a wider desire for more journals.[44]

On Saturday 8 May, after giving a lecture and touring Hedvall's institute, he met with Östen Undén. Undén was at that time Chancellor of the Swedish Universities, but in the post-war period, he was Sweden's longest serving Foreign Minister (as well as very briefly Prime Minister). The diaries show he met with Undén twice (the first time was unplanned) and demonstrate how well connected such visits could be, building upon the excellent networks that Bottrall had established. He was able to influence Undén's thinking on how scientific research could be organised for the most effective results.[45]

After returning to Stockholm, he prepared for his return home. This was initially delayed and he feared having to stay in Sweden until late August because the light evenings made flying hazardous. However, on Wednesday 12 May, he was able to get a plane at short notice that could return over Norway owing to a "useful storm" that had developed.[46]

The diary reveals that apart from the scientific lectures he was there to present, there were a whole range of other entangled interactions – from the newspaper coverage to conversations over lunch and dinner, and the exchange of ideas on specific pieces of research. One particular theme that came up time and time again was the need to increase the flow of information about the state of science research, primarily through scientific journals. Bragg was urged to ensure this happened following his visit. His visit, although time-limited and in some ways narrow in focus, was a tactic of multiple dimensions.

Returning to the model of cultural propaganda, the evidence above demonstrates the importance (relating to the "perception" pillar) of Bragg being there in person – encapsulating the spirit of the handicap principle, by making an impression simply by being in Sweden at such a moment and being a flag bearer for Britain and not just a scientist. Bragg's visit was certainly not essential in contributing to winning the Second World War, and he did not have to take the considerable personal risk of flying over occupied Norway during wartime. However, the fact that he did so gave an audacious signal to Swedish scientists. The reporting in the wider press

of course enhanced the impact further. He was able to demonstrate the cultural intelligence of the British scientific community, and engaged in a very subtle way through making multiple contacts. The "substance" pillar is demonstrated through the two-way exchange, through his promotion of his expertise, and being able to hold detailed conversations around scientific facts and theories. The occasional mishaps in the lectures show how important the "organisation" pillar is – Bragg could be the most credible and brilliant lecturer, able to meet all of the details covered in the other two pillars, but if the organisational plans were faulty, then the whole visit could have fallen apart. Fortunately for Bragg, these were never significant enough to upset the overall experience.

Post-Visit Impressions and Connections

Upon arriving back in Britain on 13 May, Bragg corresponded with several of his contacts, such as Martin Blake of the British Council, Sir Edward Appleton of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), Bottrall and Robertson. To Blake he wrote that, "I think I can say … that the visit was a great success. Being the first physicist to be sent out by the Council I was warmly welcomed by all the Swedish physicists and chemists, and made very valuable contacts". More generally he stated "it is impossible to exaggerate their [the Swedish scientists'] eagerness to work with us".[47] To Appleton he outlined his conversations with Undén and stated "I think it would be [a] wise political move to be as helpful as we can in this matter … this is rather a critical time to impress them with our willingness to co-operate".[48] Of course, the war was already turning at this point – the Allies had pushed the Axis out of Africa whilst Bragg was in Sweden – and would soon invade Italy; meanwhile, the Soviets on the Eastern Front had stalled the Nazi advance at Stalingrad earlier in the year and were starting to move westwards.[49] Although not ostensibly about the war, Bragg's visit was pushing at an open door more generally for increasing Swedish co-operation. To Bottrall, Bragg wrote that he felt it was "a highly successful visit", useful for both sides, and had "a number of commissions to execute".[50]

In his report for Robertson, he noted "I was told how much the work of the British Council in Stockholm is appreciated … I was impressed by the attractiveness of the reading rooms for members". On the supply of journals, Bragg noted that despite the efforts of the Council to provide more to the Universities and Technical Colleges, "At every place, however, I was begged to arrange for more journals…. I am convinced that an increase in the supply of journals would be deeply appreciated, and would be one of our most valuable contributions…. If the British Council can help here, it will please Swedish scientists greatly". He also highlighted the importance

of the British Council in acting as a conduit for getting Swedish scientists' papers sent to Britain for publication in British journals.[51] Bragg suggested several names of scientists who could be sent to build upon his visit, although he was doubtful how realistic that was during the war itself. Concluding his report, he emphasised the warmth of his welcome. He believed the Swedes wanted closer contacts with Britain and "the atmosphere could not be more favourable".[52]

One of the key tasks that Bragg took away with him from his visit was to provide further information about British science, especially, as we have seen, through the provision of scientific journals to Sweden. In the weeks following his return from Sweden, he sought to send an X-Ray index and X-Ray powder photographs to Westgren at the Swedish Academy of Science.[53] However, he had difficulty finding an index and had to write a pleading letter to Frederick A. Bannister of the British Museum of Natural History (now the Natural History Museum), who he had known for many years, to ask him to part with his own personal copy.[54] Bragg noted "[i]t is asking a lot of you, but is very important politically to impress the Swedes with our desire to collaborate".[55]

Bragg also consulted the British Council, the Foreign Office and the Embassy of the United States in London (who, in turn, consulted the Rockefeller Foundation) with a view to increasing the supply of British and American scientific journals (as well as reprints of articles) to Sweden.[56] There were challenges in logistics, but arrangements were made to ensure a steady supply of material.[57] The British Council's report for the second quarter of 1944 noted that "[a]n increasing amount of scientific material is received for transmission, chiefly to and from Sweden".[58] This was largely down to Bragg's efforts. Around the same time, scholarships were also offered to graduates of Swedish universities to study in Britain, and a Swedish version of the British Council publication *Monthly Science News* was also inaugurated. Whether Bragg was directly involved is unclear but what is certain is that Bragg's efforts were part of a wider scientific cultural push by Britain to increase co-operation with Sweden and his visit should not be viewed in isolation.[59]

Following the suggestions made in his report to Robertson, Bragg was able to pass papers given to him by Swedish scientists on to British counterparts. For example, he was able to facilitate the publication of "Radio Fade-Out in Sweden" in the journal *Nature* by "one of the junior people" Olof E. H. Rydbeck, just one month after returning home.[60] Rydbeck had been at Harvard University before the war but had been struggling to engage effectively outside of Sweden during hostilities. Bragg recognised that Rydbeck's research was in a similar field to Appleton's and put the two in contact, which led to frequent post-war correspondence. Rydbeck subsequently recalled his "close contact" with Appleton, and Rydbeck was

later recognised as a "radio astronomy pioneer" – Bragg played a role in facilitating the development of Rydbeck's career.[61] *Nature* also published Bragg's lecture "Seeing Ever Smaller Worlds" on the day of his return, which, given the prominence of that journal in Sweden at the time, ensured that his lecture was widely available shortly after his visit.[62] Hansson's "The Spirit of Evil", which explored concepts of nationalism, socialism, totalitarianism and morality, also appeared in the *Hibbert Journal* at the turn of the year owing to Bragg's assistance.[63] Hansson was delighted to receive several responses from across the Anglophone world.[64]

Letters, gifts of books and reprints were exchanged across the North Sea, and the BBC invited Bragg to send a Christmas message over the radio in late 1943. The BBC radio message was gratefully received in Sweden, particularly as specific scientists were named by Bragg in his broadcast.[65] After the war, Bragg remained in touch with many of the same Swedish scientists – von Eckermann, Hedvall, Quensel, Waller and Westgren – that he had visited during his visit to Sweden in 1943. Waller, for example, attended a conference chaired by Bragg in London in July 1946 on crystallography; Bragg corresponded with a wide range of Swedish scientists in preparation for his next visit to Sweden in June 1947, and Westgren was elected as a member and vice-president of the Executive Committee of the International Union of Crystallography (where Bragg was president) in 1948.[66] Bragg also returned to Sweden in 1965 at the invitation of the Nobel Foundation to celebrate a rare golden jubilee for a Nobel Laureate.[67]

Returning to the model of cultural propaganda, it seems clear that Bragg's visit conformed to many of the elements of the pillars outlined earlier in the chapter. In terms of "perception", the message was clear: Britain was serious about genuine scientific exchanges, even when circumstances made that difficult. Bragg's visit was not officially about the war situation – it was an example of "science diplomacy" in action; it was about scientific progress that Bragg was willing to share with the Swedish scientific profession, benignly and subtly. Much of the content remained "off-the-record". Indeed, such was Bragg's subtlety, Peter Tennant, the British press attaché, and head of the Special Operations Executive in Sweden, appeared not to have remembered in his memoirs that Bragg had travelled widely across Sweden during his visit, perhaps oddly for someone in his position. He merely recalled that Bragg had been "kept under wraps … [he] stayed quietly at the Legation for a month".[68] Clearly that was not the case.

Contrary to Tennant's recollections, Bragg's visit made a lasting impact on the scientists that he met and also on a wider audience owing to press coverage. However, a single visit on its own would not have been warranted unless it had been part of a wider programme of sending out lecturers to Sweden at this time. It is clear Bragg learnt from Darlington's visit in 1942, and he was building on that success in an incremental way

as well as building the foundation for others. In large part, this was down to the work of Bottrall, who did a lot of the practical organisational work to make these visits successful. Bragg was most definitely the personality to send to Sweden. He was a trusted source of information about the situation in Britain, at the same time as being a prominent and eminent scientist. Bragg scored particularly well in demonstrating cultural intelligence – giving the latest information about advancements in British science.

Regarding the "substance" pillar, Bragg's tour was facts-based: it was about the genuine successes that British science was making that could be tested independently should Swedish scientists choose to do so. Indeed, in several of Bragg's lectures, he set up apparatus and experiments to demonstrate science in action in real time. He also brought along slides from ICI that helped show real scientific observations that were more difficult to demonstrate directly in the lecture itself. It was important for Bragg to talk with like-minded scientists from similar elitist backgrounds to himself, so that his direct contacts were manageable. Bragg had an indirect influence on wider audiences, as those like-minded scientists talked with a broader range of contacts. His meetings with Undén also showed he was able to reach the top elites of government. Bragg was clearly a credible expert in his field of research. A major facet in his success was being able to talk naturally in depth about British science. Successful cultural propaganda relies on experts who can stand up to scrutiny. Bragg's visit was not only about his lectures but also about talking to Swedish scientists who were looking to get their work published in British scientific journals and to be recognised by the wider Anglo-American scientific community. He was successful in getting several Swedish works published, and it was certainly not a one-way push by Britain to promote a certain message. Bragg's visit fulfilled a real need amongst his audience.

Lastly, in terms of the "organisation" pillar, the British Council and the other institutions involved in Bragg's visit (such as the Anglo-Swedish Society, the English Club, as well as the Universities of Uppsala and Lund) were essential in drawing people together, and the BBC was important in allowing him to maintain contact later in the year via his 1943 Christmas message. Without such focal points, it is difficult to see how Bragg's visit could have made such an impact. Bottrall was in control of Bragg's visit, rather than the central headquarters in London. Bottrall was able to rely on the local staff in the Anglo-Swedish Society as well as the Swedish institutions' own initiative to make Bragg's visit run smoothly. Bragg was able to accept, at short notice, invitations to social events that would not have been possible had there been over-centralisation of control. The British Council's organisation of Bragg's visit, and particularly the involvement of Bottrall, was essential in making sure that the lectures, lunches, dinners, press conferences, and travel arrangements all happened as smoothly as possible (despite a few mistakes).

Without the skill of logistical organisation, Bragg's visit could never have gone ahead as quickly or as smoothly as it did in reality.

Conclusion

Bragg's biographer, Graeme Hunter, briefly assessed Bragg's visit to Sweden and concluded that it was nothing more than one of "goodwill". He believed that because of Sweden's neutral status, the visit "could not have been a high priority for a nation at war", suggesting that it was "some kind of reward for his contributions to the war effort".[69] Hunter's conclusion is strange, given the effort put into it by both the Council and Bragg. Indeed, several authors have shown the importance of neutral countries in conflicts, especially in terms of propaganda, and these countries were far from being a low priority. Often, neutral countries have become alternative battlegrounds in wider conflicts and Sweden in the Second World War was no different.[70] Bragg's visit was hardly a holiday, and, in contrast to Hunter's view, it seems clear from the analysis in this chapter that his activities of scientific exchange (or "science diplomacy") were an important media tactic that had a significant impact amongst the scientific communities of both countries.

Bragg's visit had a real purpose in promoting Swedish sympathy for the British cause in the Second World War and encouraging Anglo-Swedish co-operation in science. The influence of Bragg's trip extended beyond the war and engendered lasting co-operation between British and Swedish scientists. Bragg was a credible and prominent scientist who made a major impression upon his hosts. The constraints of the war and the difficulties of getting to and from Sweden meant they were eager to respond positively to the effort he had made to engage with them. Although it was a tactic aimed at the scientific elites, there was inevitably a filter-down effect that meant a wider audience was aware of his visit, and his popular lectures provided a broader direct appeal.

Bragg's visit on its own did not, and could not, make a major difference to the outcome of the war. At the same time, however, Bragg built on the successes of other visitors to Sweden and continued to keep in contact with Swedish scientists after his visit. As part of a wider set of visits, Bragg's efforts were an effective media tactic that helped deliver Britain's wartime cultural propaganda strategy.

Notes

1 Edward Corse, *A Battle for Neutral Europe: British Cultural Propaganda during the Second World War* (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 5–15.
2 Corse, *A Battle for Neutral Europe*, 26–27, 32–36, 81. Peter Tennant had held a watching brief before Bottrall's arrival, but was also the head of the Special Operations Executive in Sweden and press attaché. See Peter Tennant,

Touchlines of War (Hull: Hull University Press, 1992) and Emil Stjernholm, "Censorship and Private Shows: Mapping British Film Propaganda in Sweden", in *Propaganda and Neutrality: Global Case Studies in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Edward Corse and Marta García Cabrera (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2024), 169–80.

3 Tennant, *Touchlines of War*, 8, 267.

4 See the model of cultural propaganda developed in Corse, *A Battle for Neutral Europe*, 183–94.

5 Details of the relevant records held by the Royal Institution relating to Bragg's visit are detailed on the website of the UK National Archives, henceforth TNA at https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/browse/r/h/f28c6cfd-d046-496e-8d49-892c28e0fbea (accessed 17 November 2023) primarily boxes 70A and 70B.

6 Leonard Doob, *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (New York: Henry Holt and Company Inc., 1950); Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*, trans. Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner (New York: Vintage Books, 1973); Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Robin Wight, *The Peacock's Tail and the Reputation Reflex* (London: Arts and Business, 2007); Amotz Zahavi and Avishag Zahavi, *The Handicap Principle: The Missing Piece of Darwin's Puzzle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

7 Zahavi and Zahavi, *The Handicap Principle*, 229.

8 Corse, *A Battle for Neutral Europe*, 183–94.

9 Emmeline Ledgerwood and Sarah Bunn, "Science Diplomacy", *UK Parliament website*, 10 November 2022, https://post.parliament.uk/science-diplomacy (accessed 17 November 2023).

10 Pierre-Bruno Ruffini, "Conceptualizing Science Diplomacy in the Practitioner-Driven Literature: A Critical Review", *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications*, vol. 7, no. 124 (2020), 1–9.

11 Ruffini, "Conceptualizing Science Diplomacy", 7.

12 See, e.g., Darryl Copeland, "Bridging the Chasm: Why Science and Technology for Diplomacy and International Policy", *Sciencediplomacy.org*, 29 July 2015, https://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2015/bridging-chasm (accessed 17 November 2023).

13 Copeland, "Bridging the Chasm".

14 This term is used in Johan Östling, David Larsson Heidenblad, and Anna Nilsson Hammar, eds., *Knowledge Actors: Revising the Agency in the History of Knowledge* (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2023).

15 Karl K. Darrow, "Book Review of *Electricity* By W. L. Bragg. The Macmillan Company. 1936", *Science*, vol. 86, no. 2220 (16 July 1937), 57–58; See also "Demonstration of Michael Faraday's Lines of Force", Royal Institution website https://www.rigb.org/explore-science/explore/collection/demonstration-michael-faradays-lines-force (accessed 15 January 2023) showing Bragg preparing for his Royal Institution Christmas Lectures in 1934.

16 Letter from Sir Malcolm Robertson to Sir Lawrence Bragg, 1 January 1943, Papers of Sir Lawrence Bragg, henceforth W.L.BRAGG, 70A/1, Archive of the Royal Institution of Great Britain, henceforth RI.

17 Letter from Bragg to Robertson, 4 January 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/2, RI; Letter from Bragg to Robertson, 15 January 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/4, RI; Bragg, diary of visit to Sweden, W.L.BRAGG 70B, RI.

18 Letter from Bragg to Robertson, 15 January 1943.
19 Cyril D. Darlington, Report entitled "Confidential: The British Council: Swedish Visit: December 1942", W.L.BRAGG 70A/11, RI.
20 "The British Council: Report for the First Quarter, 1943", April 1943, British Council files, henceforth BW, 82/9, TNA.
21 Letter from C. W. Bunn to Bragg, 1 April 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/34, RI; Letter from Bragg to Martin Blake, 8 April 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/39, RI.
22 Letter from Percy Quensel to Bragg, 19 March 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/21, RI.
23 See "British Council, Report for the Second Quarter, 1942", July 1942, BW 82/9, TNA for list of cities visited by Sir Kenneth Clark and T. S. Eliot; and a similar report in BW 82/9, TNA, for the fourth quarter for Sir Malcolm Sargent.
24 "Vetenskapsmän på kupong i Storbritannien", *Aftonbladet*, 17 April 1943, 9; "Nobelpristagare i Stockholm", *Svenska Dagbladet*, 18 April 1943, 4; "Celeber engelsk vetenskapsman gästar Chalmers", *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, 30 April 1943, 13; "Englands alla vetenskapsmän till föresvaret", *Arbetet*, 3 May 1943, 7; "Nobelpristagare talar i Lund", *Arbetet*, 3 May 1943, 13; "Yngste Nobelpristagaren krigsutbildar naturvetare", *Dagens Nyheter*, 18 April 1943, 5; "Det gäller att upptäcka en Faraday i tid", *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, 8 May 1943, 13. Copies available at Kungliga Biblioteket (National Library of Sweden), Stockholm, Sweden.
25 Bragg, diary entry for 19 April 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70B, RI.
26 John Baker White, *The Big Lie* (London: Evans Brothers Limited, 1955), 18, 78.
27 Intercepted phone calls dated 6 April 1943 (Ingeniör Malmström to Mrs Cameron); 16 April 1943 (British Council to Hotell Reisen, Portiern, Stockholm); 17 April 1943 (British Council to a restaurant); 19 April 1943 (British Council to Professor G. Borelius). Allmänna Säkerhetstjänsten, F8:EB5, Riksarkivet (National Archives of Sweden), Stockholm, Sweden.
28 John Gilmour, "Sweden's Ambiguous War: Contradiction and Controversy", *Nordic War Stories: World War II as History, Fiction, Media and Memory*, ed. Marianne Stecher-Hansen (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2021), 92.
29 Bragg, diary entry for 20 April 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70B, RI.
30 Bragg, diary entries for 23 to 26 April 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70B, RI.
31 Bragg, diary entries for 27 and 28 April 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70B, RI. Note Bragg uses the following spellings in his diary: "the Tekniska Hogskola" and "the Teknolog Vereningen", both of which have been corrected here. See also Letter from Bragg to Arne Westgren, 21 July 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/161, RI with regard to the election to the Swedish Academy; Bragg's diary entry on 28 April 1943 references his evening at the academy, although does not specifically reference his election.
32 Bragg later found a post for one of Quensel's staff – see Letter from Bragg to Quensel, 14 September 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/177, RI.
33 Letter from Johan Hansson to Bragg, 28 April 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/55, RI.
34 Bragg, diary entry for 3 May 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70B, RI.
35 Bragg, diary entries for 4, 5 and 6 May 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70B, RI.
36 Note that Bragg refers to the city as "Hälsingborg", the older version of the city's name.
37 Bragg, diary entries for 4, 5 and 6 May 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70B, RI.
38 Sir Lawrence Bragg, "Inblick i allt mindre världar. Föredrag i Halsingborg av nobelpristagaren sir Lawrence Bragg", *Öresunds-Posten*, 7 May 1943.

39 Bragg, diary entry for 4 May 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70B, RI.
40 Margaret Gowing, "Niels Bohr and Nuclear Weapons", *Niels Bohr: A Centenary Volume*, eds. Anthony Philip French and Patrick J. Kennedy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 269.
41 Bragg, diary entry for 5 May 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70B, RI.
42 Bragg, diary entry for 6 May 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70B, RI. I say "adopted home country" as Bragg was Australian by birth, although born to British parents.
43 See image available on the Bridgeman Images website "Sir Lawrence Bragg at dinner in Gothenburg with Swedish scientists, 1943 (b/w photo)", Image number TRI475781. https://www.bridgemanimages.com/en/english-photographer/sir-lawrence-bragg-at-dinner-in-gothenburg-with-swedish-scientists-1943-b-w-photo/black-and-white-photograph/asset/475781 (accessed 21 March 2024).
44 Bragg, diary entry for 7 May 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70B, RI.
45 Bragg, diary entry for 8 May 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70B, RI.
46 Bragg, diary entries for 10 to 13 May 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70B, RI.
47 Letter from Bragg to Blake, 14 May 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/63, RI.
48 Letter from Bragg to Sir Edward Appleton, 15 May 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/64, RI.
49 See John Keegan, *Atlas of the Second World War* (London: Times Books, 1989) for a good summary of specific dates of battles and events.
50 Letter from Bragg to Bottrall, 17 May 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/69, RI.
51 Bragg, report entitled "Preliminary Report on tour in Sweden", undated but attached to Letter from Bragg to Robertson, 22 May 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/83, RI.
52 Bragg, report entitled "Preliminary Report on tour in Sweden", W.L.BRAGG 70A/83, RI.
53 Letter from Bragg to F. A. Bannister, 18 May 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/74, RI; Letter from Bragg to J. G. Crowther, 21 May 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/81, RI.
54 See, e.g., Letter from Bannister to Bragg, 24 January 1929, W.L.BRAGG 77C/46, RI.
55 Letter from Bragg to Bannister, 18 May 1943.
56 Letter from Bennett Archambault to Bragg, 26 May 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/94, RI; Letter from D. P. O'Brien to Bragg, 28 May 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/98, RI.
57 Letter from T. Read to Bragg, 12 July 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/160, RI; Letter from Bragg to Crowther, 21 May 1943.
58 "The British Council: Report for the Second Quarter, 1944", July 1944, 18. BW 82/9, TNA.
59 "The British Council: Report for the Second Quarter, 1943", July 1943, 3. BW 82/9, TNA.
60 Olof E. H. Rydbeck, "Radio Fade-Out in Sweden", *Nature*, 151 (19 June 1943), 700; Letter from Bragg to O. E. H. Rydbeck, 29 May 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/108, RI. See Bragg, diary entry for 8 May 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70B, RI for his description of Rydbeck as "junior". Rydbeck had published in the *Journal of Applied Physics* in 1942 – see Olof E. H. Rydbeck, "The Reflection of Electromagnetic Waves from a Parabolic Friction-Free Ionized Layer", *Journal of Applied Physics*, vol. 13 (September 1942), 577–81 but from Bragg's diary description and correspondence, it appears that Bragg made the difference in facilitating greater contact.
61 "Interview with Olof E. H. Rydbeck" by Woodruff T. Sullivan III, 15 September 1978. National Radio Astronomy Observatory (NRAO) Archives,

Charlottesville, Virginia, USA. https://www.nrao.edu/archives/items/show/15155 (accessed 23 January 2023); V. Radhakrishnan, "Olof Rydbeck and Early Swedish Radio Astronomy: A Personal Perspective", *Journal of Astronomical History and Heritage*, vol. 9 no. 2 (2006), 139–44.

62 Sir Lawrence Bragg, "Seeing Ever-Smaller Worlds", *Nature*, vol. 151 (15 May 1943), 545–47.

63 Letter from Hansson to Bragg, 22 November 1943. W.L.BRAGG 70A/218, RI; Johan Hansson, "The Spirit of Evil", *The Hibbert Journal*, vol. 42–43 (1943–1944), 158–62.

64 Letter from Hansson to Bragg, 11 September 1944. W.L.BRAGG 70A/239, RI.

65 See, e.g., amongst others Letter from Bragg to Westgren, 21 July 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/161, RI; Letter from Bragg to Quensel, 14 September 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/177 RI; Letter from J. A. Hedvall to Bragg, 23 September 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/185, RI; Letter from Quensel to Bragg, 4 October 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/192, RI; Letter from Harry von Eckermann to Bragg, 20 October 1943, W.L.BRAGG 70A/203, RI; Letter from Hedvall to Bragg, 28 January 1944, W.L.BRAGG 70A/227, RI.

66 See Bragg, "Holiday in Sweden", June 1947, W.L.BRAGG 70C, RI. Also see Harmke Kamminga, "The International Union of Crystallography: Its Formation and Early Development", *Acta Crystallographica* vol. A45 (1989), 581–601. http://www.iucr.org/iucr/history/early-history (accessed 23 January 2023); and Graeme K. Hunter, *Light Is A Messenger: The Life and Science of William Lawrence Bragg* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 168.

67 "Lawrence Bragg – Biographical", The Nobel Prize Foundation, Stockholm, Sweden https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/physics/1915/wl-bragg/biographical/ (accessed 14 January 2023).

68 Tennant, *Touchlines of War*, 267.

69 Hunter, *Light is a Messenger*, 152.

70 See Edward Corse and Marta García Cabrera, "Alternative Battlegrounds: An Introduction to Propaganda and Neutrality", *Propaganda and Neutrality: Global Case Studies in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Edward Corse and Marta García Cabrera (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2024), 1–19.

4 Where Can You See Striking Workers?

Communist Media Networks, Documentary Film and Regimes of (In)Visibility in the Early Cold War

Lucie Česálková

In 1951, Robert Ménégoz's French film *Vivent les dockers* (*Long Live the Port Workers*, 1951) won the category of short documentaries at the Karlovy Vary Film Festival in Czechoslovakia; the Italian film *Nel mezzogiorno qualcosa è cambiato* (*Something Has Changed in the South*, 1949) by Carlo Lizzani won a year earlier. These two films, apart from being awarded at an Eastern European film festival in an era usually described as characterised by isolationism in the diplomatic relations between the East and the West, are linked by the fact that they depict the social problems and unrest of workers, in the first case French dockers, in the second Sicilian fishermen. Moreover, both were produced in conjunction with the local communist parties and were banned or censored in their countries of origin. At the festival, which was a platform for leftist filmmakers to meet, network and share knowledge, and in the case of the French film also in wider official distribution, these films were presented as evidence of the oppression of the working class in capitalist countries and as examples of "progressive" cinema. This chapter is based on primary sources in the contemporary press and archival documents, mainly correspondence and minutes of meetings of the Czechoslovak State Film (Československý státní film), the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry (Ministerstvo zahraničí Československa), the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (zahraniční oddělení Ústředního výboru Komunistické strany Československa) and representatives of the communist parties of Italy and France, stored in various collections of the National Archives of the Czech Republic. Exploring the circumstances of the movement of these films across the Iron Curtain and their role in the media tactics of the communist parties in the early Cold War era, it highlights the plurality of these tactics within the generally shared strategy of communist

DOI: 10.4324/9781032618326-5

cooperation and the specific regimes of visibility associated with the emblematic figure of the worker.

In Cold War studies, the Iron Curtain has become a metaphor referring to the impenetrability of the two camps. In the last two decades, however, a growing body of research has pointed to a different mode of exchange, at the personal, community or institutional level, in official and unofficial culture, that clearly undermines the idea of isolation – and called for other metaphors to describe the limited but existing cooperation and transfer between the two sides. "Holes" in the curtain,[1] "penetration",[2] "nylon"[3] curtain and so on – all these terms distort the original dichotomous concept emphasising the sharp contours of ideological antagonism. Acknowledging that the Cold War narratives were based on a cultural demarcation between one and the other, this kind of research has focused attention on cultural practices and has also brought about a number of shifts. Among others, this was a move away from the dominance of the American and Soviet perspective towards a European and more global space, the inclusion of a broader period beyond the 1950s or a change of interest from purely political (and diplomatic) history to social, cultural and media history.[4] These fundamental shifts have also fostered interest in the transfer, circulation and entanglements of cultural products but also of ideas, concepts or (visual) practices and styles.

However, if we want to study modes of entanglement at a more detailed level, we need to take into account the precise directions, circumstances and consequences of particular media tactics. In the research on the tactics of "punching the Iron Curtain" and the networks of actors and relations that negotiated them, the main focus so far has been either on the penetration of capitalist ideas, technologies or (pop)cultural models or influences into the socialist space or on the publication of works banned in the East in Western publishing houses. In terms of trajectories of movement between both spheres and of levels of officiality, this case study offers a different perspective by highlighting the instrumental use of communist films displaced from the official discourse of Italy and France in state-socialist Czechoslovakia. It draws attention to influence networks of transnational epistemic communities and specific narratives relevant in the respective political situation.

Walter Lippmann, in his work *Public Opinion* from 1922, already understood propaganda and censorship as complementary practices, since both create a "barrier between the public and the event".[5] For my understanding of the early Cold War media tactics of communist parties across the Iron Curtain, it is inspiring to see how social theorist Andrea Mubi Brighenti builds on these reflections of Lippmann in his work on "regimes of visibility".[6] Brighenti understands visibility as a relational and positional mechanism anchored in a normative social order that shapes thresholds of

relevance and selective attention. According to him, the dynamics of visibility and invisibility are anchored in power structures, whereby "The management of visibilities is a social enterprise whose output is a field of interactions created by the acts that draw cones (from few to many or from many to few) and vectors (from one to one or from many to many) of visibility, defining the reciprocal *constitutions* of subjects through their positioning within a field of visibility symmetries and asymmetries".[7] His approach allows us to overcome the concepts of censorship and propaganda, which are often burdened with negative values but also with metaphors such as barriers and curtains that emphasise differences, dichotomies and oppositions. Even if we understand this approach as merely changing the vocabulary describing the same thing, it is, I argue, the concept of power regimes of visibility that allows us to grasp more precisely the subtle tactics of making certain ideas invisible and visible in different geopolitical contexts.

In this text, then, I understand regimes of (in)visibility as sets of media tactics aimed at promoting or displacing certain ideas or narratives in/from public discourse within East and West entanglements. These tactics, in my understanding, are enabled by negotiations at the politico-cultural level and are part of a more general strategy of international cooperation between communist parties but are subject to a number of circumstances of mutual relations, and also to the contingencies of everyday practices and operations. Examining the exchange of documentary films between Eastern and Western communist parties in the early 1950s is essential in this sense. It was documentary film that, in addition to the promotion of post-war reconstruction, also highlighted social problems and unrest, and above all the growing tensions between empires and their colonies, leading to wars and decolonisation movements. Although looking very similar, documentaries from France and Italy reached Czechoslovakia for different reasons and through different routes. In other words, while the motivations for their release in Czechoslovakia may at first glance correspond to one overarching strategy of a communist cooperation, this happened under different political circumstances, with different cultural outcomes and made different aspects of the situation in the West visible in Czechoslovakia. It is therefore essential to address the specific tactics by revealing microhistories of the actors and platforms involved in both transfer processes, as well as visibility regimes, made possible (and complicated) by the specific geopolitical situation of the early 1950s.

Italy: (In)Visibility of Poverty and Social Injustice

After the Second World War, from the Czechoslovak perspective, Italy was a post-fascist country, which fought on the side of Germany and

was therefore considered a former enemy. Nevertheless, members of the Czechoslovak Communist Party maintained contacts with Italian communists who had been active in the resistance during the war.[8] Perhaps surprisingly, after 1948 Czechoslovakia became a place of exile for many of these people – in some cases partisans accused in Italy of post-war crimes.[9] Although an unlikely destination for migration, early 1950s Czechoslovakia became a place of exile for refugees from other countries, namely Yugoslavia, Spain, Greece, Iran etc.[10] These people came to Prague and other cities for different political reasons, with Italian refugees forming one of the largest groups at this time.[11] The Italian exile in Czechoslovakia certainly intensified Czech-Italian relations, but it cannot be claimed that it strengthened or deepened them in an unambiguously positive sense. The choice of Czechoslovakia in the case of these refugees was not a political one – it was a pragmatic solution to pick the easiest route to the nearest communist-oriented country.[12]

Official negotiations about cultural entanglements took place primarily at the level of the representatives of the Communist Party of Italy (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI), the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry and the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, namely between Giancarlo Pajetta, Head of the PCI's Press and Publicity Commission, and the Head of International Department, Bedřich Geminder.[13] As evidenced by their correspondence, both sides shared the basic ideological framework of strategic cooperation, yet often differed in their ideas of specific priorities, objectives and ways to achieve them. Simply put, on the level of particular media tactics, the PCI always wanted more than the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was willing to provide. This is very well illustrated by the written documentation of these negotiations, which was divided by the Central Committee official into two columns – in the left column he wrote down the demands of the Italian side, and in the right column the Czech side's statement and an alternative solution with justification. In some cases, the Czechoslovak position was favourable; in many cases it took into account both the domestic position and consultation with other state-socialist countries and the USSR.[14] It is notable, however, that economic aspects played a very important role in this positioning. According to the documentation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Czech side was generally willing to help materially (for example, in terms of the use of people, the provision of places and facilities) and at the level of mutual exchange, but not in the form of financial assistance.

As a result, however, within a few years a relatively broad base of cultural activities was established via media channels based in Prague and distributed towards Italy. Of these, perhaps the most famous and important was the radio broadcast *Oggi in Italia*, whose Prague studio was provided

both financially and materially.[15] This programme was created in response to the PCI's suppression within official Italian discourse, and remained in operation through the 1950s and 1960s, broadcasting counter-news to the official RAI in Italy – criticising the existing government and the new elites. Czechoslovakia also supported the publication of the trade union magazine *Democrazia Popolare*, where, among other things, Czech culture was introduced to the Italian public. In addition, regular "weeks" of Italian and Czech culture were organised, which also included film screenings.[16]

In the field of cinema, one of the most discussed issues in the early 1950s was the distribution of the feature films *La terra trema* (*The Earth Trembles*; Lucino Visconti, 1948) and *Ladri di biciclette* (*The Bicycle Thief*; Vittorio de Sica, 1948) in Czechoslovakia, at the direct request of the PCI, which was concerned that these artistically and socially valuable films were not being shown in Czechoslovakia. Further discussions took place with regard to the documentaries *Nel mezzogiorno qualcosa è cambiato* (Carlo Lizzani, 1949), *Il fatti di Modena* (Carlo Lizzani, 1950) and *14 luglio* (Glauco Pellegrini, 1948).[17] All of these films were associated with the PCI – the latter was based on the events surrounding the assassination of the party secretary, Palmiro Togliatti, in July 1948, while Lizzani's film from Modena depicted the funeral of six workers from the Modena Orsi factory who were killed by the police during a strike on 9 January 1950. As Gianluca Fantoni argues, the value of these films was not artistic, but instrumental – to capture the Communist Party's view of certain events or phenomena and to confirm its position in promoting communist ideals.[18]

The PCI, as well as representatives of Czechoslovak Film and the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tried to get all these films officially distributed in Czechoslovakia. The organisers of the Third World Festival of Youth and Students in Berlin (1951), who similarly wanted to show these Italian documentaries, were also involved in this correspondence exchange and the search for ways to get the films out of Italy. However, the Italian government banned foreign distribution of the films and, as it turned out, the routes to get the film to Czechoslovakia by diplomatic courier or via Hungary also failed.[19] Although the debate did succeed in mobilising a network of communist actors between Italy, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Hungary, only *Nel mezzogiorno qualcosa è cambiato* (Carlo Lizzani, 1949), as the film least tied to specific political events of recent years, was screened and awarded at the Karlovy Vary festival, where it was accompanied by a political and artistic delegation, including Giuseppe Alessandri, an important negotiator of the Italian side in the field of cultural relations.

Lizzani's film is first and foremost a documentary of the poverty and poor living conditions of Sicilian fishermen and as such demonstrates the interest of both sides in the visibility of the conflict between the working class and the Western European establishment, which could easily be

framed as an example of oppression and placed within a more general narrative of Eastern Europe defining itself against capitalism. As such, it both fit in well with the general discursive association of Italian film with left progressive tendencies in the Czechoslovak press[20] and promoted the impression of cultural reciprocity between both countries. Official relations between Czechoslovakia and Italy, especially after it was revealed where *Oggi in Italia* was being broadcast from, however, were not good; the link worked only on the basis of the political alliance of the communist parties and Czechoslovakia's willingness to help the Italian communists. At the same time, it should be added that even this cooperation was not harmonious but regularly influenced by the development of the political situation in both Italy and Czechoslovakia, as well as by personal relations and animosities.

France: (In)Visibility of Violent Colonial Domination

Relations with France and the exhibition of French films in Czechoslovakia after the Second World War had a different background. In the period between the world wars, France was perceived as a natural ally and partner in cultural relations in Czechoslovakia. These relations were developed both by the connection of Czech artists to Parisian avant-garde circles, and by the establishment of the Czech-French Society and the Ernest Denis Institute in Prague. This institution long functioned as a key mediator of French culture in Czechoslovakia. In 1938, however, at the Munich Conference, France, together with Britain, allowed Germany and Italy to annex part of the territory of Czechoslovakia in the belief that this would prevent war. This act was clearly perceived as a betrayal in Czechoslovakia, and it fundamentally influenced the future diplomatic and cultural relations between the two countries.

After the war, therefore, Czechoslovakia consistently applied the tactics of "reciprocity" when re-establishing cultural relations – it was sensitive to any efforts to promote French interests in Czechoslovakia in such a way that they would not have an adequate counterpart in the presentation of Czechoslovakia in France.[21] Yet the activities of the Ernest Denis Institute and the Czechoslovak-French Society were resumed, through which various cultural and social events were organised in Prague and Paris, including film screenings with lectures. At the level of cultural relations, an agreement was made between music publishers, and an exchange of films was developed. After 1948 and the Communist takeover, however, as in the case of Italy, most attention focused on cultural relations between Czechoslovakia and the French Communist Party (Parti communiste français, PCF). As Václav Šmidrkal states, it was the PCF and communist intellectuals and artists who represented "the real France" for Czechoslovakia

in this period and their work was used to present the international ties between Czechoslovakia and the West, to promote the idea of "progressive art" and to criticise capitalism.[22]

The PCF, like the PCI, were shunned from government after their short-lived success in the first post-war elections, remaining isolated and functioning as critics of conditions in their respective countries. The PCF's relations with Czechoslovakia were mainly promoted by Raymond Cogniat and Jean Jerome. Cogniat interestingly combined his experience as an art critic and historian in cultural-diplomatic relations. He held important positions in institutions presenting French art abroad and was also an important figure in international networking on the art scene in the 1950s. Jean Jerome was originally Polish and had been active in PCF since the 1920s. Before the Second World War, he developed contacts within the Comintern and after the war he was an influential figure in diplomatic and commercial relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia.

In addition to exhibitions, publishing and translating literature and agreements between music publishers, Czechoslovak-French cultural relations included, above all, the securing of a Prague editorial office for the radio broadcast *Ce soir en France*. Some historians believe that this was probably a reaction to the establishment of the *Voice of America* and that it was an order from Moscow,[23] but the archival correspondence shows the strong role of the PCF, which constantly increased its demands on Prague in terms of expanding the editorial staff, improving equipment, etc.[24] These demands, moreover, were often deliberately reduced or even completely ignored. Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, pursued its own interests with *Ce soir en France*, seeing this channel as an important tool for refuting other foreign media's information about Czechoslovakia. In the field of film, mutual distribution was provided through the "progressive" French company Procinex. A member of Procinex was the well-known French director Louis Daquin, who in the second half of the 1950s shot his films in Eastern European countries.[25] Agreements with Procinex included the exchange of feature films and documentaries, but also, for example, the possibility of providing laboratory processing for PCF films in Prague, provided that the French side procured necessary film stock.[26] The day-to-day negotiating practices of the communist parties show, behind the more general strategies of cooperation, a microhistory of both deliberate and accidental tactics that included an interest in making the narrative of Western colonial injustice visible in Czechoslovakia.

The success of Robert Ménégoz and *Vivent les dockers* in Czechoslovakia was linked to wider media visibility of colonial wars and the resistance of the dockworkers to supporting French armaments against the colonies through their work. The colonial question was one of the key points in reporting on France in Czechoslovakia in the early 1950s. On the one hand,

France was presented as a colony of America, and on the other hand, France itself exercised imperial domination over its African colonies. The film *Vivent les dockers* was both approved for official distribution and screened at the Karlovy Vary Film Festival in July 1951. Three months before these first screenings, Czech-French relations were framed by another important event – the return of Marcel Aymonin, former director of the Ernest Denis Institute in Prague, from Sofia and his request for political asylum in Czechoslovakia. Aymonin's speech justifying the request was heavily publicised – the statement was printed on 28 April 1951 in various newspapers, including the Communist Party's key press outlet, *Rudé právo*. A crucial part of Aymonin's justification was his opposition to French armaments in the colonial wars and the resulting distancing from contemporary French policy. In Czechoslovakia, the colonial agenda and the question of armaments (including fears of the remilitarisation of West Germany) were instrumental in defining itself against official French policy and also significantly disrupted official foreign relations. After 1951, this meant a gradual weakening of cooperation and closure of individual cultural institutions and consulates.

Actors, Platforms and the Wider Media Context

Despite many similarities, the position of French and Italian documentaries in Czechoslovakia was not the same. This was partly because of the different relations between the various communist parties, and partly because of the broader media context and the actors operating within it. While Italian ties to Czechoslovakia were significantly influenced by the strong Italian communist emigration, French ties benefited more from the personal and institutional continuities disrupted by the Second World War. For both parties, however, the Karlovy Vary Film Festival became a key platform for meeting, sharing and promoting their interests.

The festival has been held in the border spa town of Karlovy Vary regularly since 1950, but as a continuation of the event held in Mariánské Lázně between 1946 and 1949. It was therefore a relatively young event, but at the same time ambitious and at this time significant from a geopolitical point of view. As Jindřiška Bláhová argues, it was this political delineation that was typical of the festival in the early 1950s and is well illustrated by the list of awards given out at the festival. Instead of prizes for different categories of artistic mastery, the festival issued a Peace Award, Labour Award, Award of the Struggle for Freedom etc.[27] It is therefore no coincidence that films about social unrest in the West found themselves in such a defined environment. In the case of the films in this discussion, however, Karlovy Vary and its awards became a starting point for the wider circulation of the film or its theme in Czechoslovakia and the Eastern Bloc.

At the same time, the festival helped to develop media tactics on an accidental daily basis, as it enabled regular meetings of personalities from the artistic, intellectual and political scene and in some cases served as a platform for negotiating the future terms of cultural relations.

In 1950 and 1951, the festival paid increased attention to Chinese and Korean cinema, the latter specifically in connection with the Korean War. The visibility of particular films at the festival corresponded with an Eastern rhetoric of peace and an emphasis on the imperialism of Western, especially American, culture and society. Italian and French films were always reported in the "Western cinema" section, but the progressiveness of the authors and their films presented in Czechoslovakia was emphasised. This double framing was meant to confirm the idea of a bridge between East and West, but on the other hand, it showed that the bridge was built only on the axis of communist-minded artists and diplomats.

After the screening of Ménégoz's film in Karlovy Vary and its victory in the short film category, the film was widely distributed, most often in conjunction with the French feature film by Jean-Paul Le Chanois, *Addressee Unknown* (1951). Interviews with the filmmaker were published in the press[28] and the film was hailed as a work of "progressive French cinema". In parallel, other French works developing a striking narrative were also introduced into Czech culture. Ménégoz's film entered Czechoslovakia in the context of the regular publication of translations of books by André Stil, who depicted, on the one hand, the life and unrest of French miners (*The Word 'Coalminer', Comrade*, 1949, Czech translation 1950), and on the other hand, solidarity with the warring colonies, as for example in one of the short stories in *The Seine has Taken to the Sea* (1950, Czech translation 1951), but above all in the trilogy *The First Clash* (1951–1953, Czech translation 1952–1956). A book-length interpretation of André Stil's work was also published in 1954 by the aforementioned Marcel Aymonin.[29] Pierre Abraham's reportage novel *Tiens bon la Rampe* (*Hold on to the Ramp*), relating to the same events as Ménégoz's film, was translated as early as 1952, and Maurice Morelly's "The Song of the French Dockworkers" also penetrated Czech (and Eastern European) culture. In 1953, another award-winning filmmaker, Gustav von Wangenheim from East Germany, claimed in interviews that it was a Karlovy Vary festival screening of Ménégoz's film that inspired him to make his film *Gefährliche Fracht* (*Dangerous Cargo*) from 1954 – a fiction film about West German dockers who discovered napalm bombs while unloading a ship and went on strike.[30]

The author of the second of the successful films, Carlo Lizzani, had a similarly wide influence in Czech society and culture in the 1950s. Alongside his documentary filmmaking, all his feature films were released in Czechoslovak distribution, and Lizzani was a regular guest at the Karlovy

Vary festival, counting many Czech filmmakers and film industry officials as friends. The archives of Czechoslovak Film also preserve the original and French versions of his book called *Italian Film*, which was translated into Czech and used as teaching material at the Film and TV School of the Academy of Performing Arts in Prague (FAMU).[31] Lizzani's communist-oriented view of the history of Italian cinema thus became a formative view presented to new generations of Czech filmmakers. Both Lizzani and Ménégoz were revered as representatives of socially critical Western documentary cinema and their work was described as produced in spite of the official political system. Above all, however, their work was valued as an advocacy of workers' rights, in the case of France, protesting not only against working conditions but more importantly against the fact that their work was aiding the shipment of armaments in aid of the Franco-Vietnam War.

What is significant about the films that the Czech side was interested in and made visible through the festival awards is the primary strategic attentivness to the oppression of workers and their resistance to the existing establishment, whether because of unbearable social conditions and poverty (in the case of Italy) or colonial wars (in the case of France). However, it was the situation of 1949–1952 that was crucial for the entrenchment and visibility of the resisting West European worker – not later. While in these films, but also in film newsreels of the early 1950s, information about strikes in France, West Germany and Austria circulated regularly, after 1953 the situation was more sensitive. The partial purpose behind promoting the idea of the striking West was to obscure the problems the Czechoslovak Communist Party faced at home in its relations with workers. From the late 1940s onwards, the Party faced partial manifestations of labour indiscipline, especially absenteeism and turnover, but the turning point was 1953, when currency reform deprived people of their savings and resulted in massive demonstrations and strikes, across the whole country, and especially in Pilsen.[32] However, there are no official visual records of these events, neither photographs nor films, and no information about them has appeared in the press. Thus, the only surviving documents are amateur photographs, taken haphazardly and secretly.[33]

This rupture points to the asymmetries in the visibility of the key communist figure of the worker and to the party's changing relation to it. As the new Chairman of the Communist Party, Antonín Zápotocký, in 1953, after the Pilsen events, said the party relied on the workers, yet "we must not construct the question of the worker, the cult of the worker, in such a way that everything is permitted to him".[34] The image of the resisting worker, his or her hardship and resistance to oppression, weaponisation and colonialism, in the specific period of the early 1950s, thus proves to be a suitable example of the tactical visibility and invisibility of certain themes in space and time and allows for a new insight into the

transnational cultural and media relations between East and West through the perspective of the networking platforms of communist intellectuals.

At the beginning of the 1950s, the festival in Karlovy Vary was an overtly political event, financed and ideologically directed in cooperation with the Communist Party. As such, it became a platform for left-leaning or directly communist-minded filmmakers and intellectuals from all over the world to meet, make contacts and share their views or inspirations, as well as one point in an international network of events performing the ideas of communist internationalism. It is thus fruitful to look at this specific community of communist filmmakers and policymakers through the concept of epistemic community.[35] Epistemic communities are understood as professional networks with authoritative and policy-relevant expertise that have varying internal dynamics and varying potential for influence.

And for the study of visibility regimes and entangled media tactics between the East and West, transnational networking platforms and epistemic communities represent a key power vehicle. Film festivals enabled politically active filmmakers, intellectuals and policymakers to exchange ideas, build personal relationships and negotiate. These negotiations then paved the way for films to be distributed abroad and promoted the circulation of ideas among communist intellectuals and politicians across Europe – without necessarily leading to perfect or predictable results. In this perspective, propaganda opens up not as a one-way process of top-directed transmission of ideas from the party to those who produce and distribute films but rather as a network in which local, national and transnational political and artistic interests and influences intersect and are implemented with varying degrees of success.

Conclusion

Focusing on the image of the striking worker in the broader context of media production and distribution in the early Cold War era shows this key figure of communist ideology as both central and unstable. Above all, it highlights the linking of media and artworks in transmedia campaigns and targeted international distribution of films as two of the unmissable media tactics. Translations and language versions of books, films, songs and the like testify not to the geopolitical isolationism of the early 1950s Czechoslovakia, but to the tactical sharing of a select type of foreign knowledge and information enabled by a transnational community of communist artists, intellectuals and diplomats, which at this early stage operated across the Iron Curtain, drawing on personal and institutional contacts from the pre-war and wartime eras.

In this case study, the striking French workers could not be seen by the French public, just as the Czechoslovak public could not see the domestic

strikes happening only a few years later. For Czechoslovak audiences, however, the French, Italian, West German or Austrian riots were meant to demonstrate the unsatisfactory social situation of non-communist countries, where communist filmmakers represented the political opposition. In this transnational information game, the tactics of censorship and regimes of visibility were essential in directing public opinion. The story of the distribution of Italian and French documentaries depicting the labour unrest and hardship of the poor in Czechoslovakia and other Eastern Bloc countries can certainly be understood as part of the story of early Cold War media propaganda. However, as we have seen, it cannot be explained as a (strategic) collaboration with clearly planned results. At the same time, viewed from the perspective of the new censorship theory, we can argue that the specific post-war position of the French and Italian communist parties enabled new ways of communication, discourse or speech, emerging from suppression and displacement, and realised with Czechoslovak help[36]: the production of alternative press, (illegal) radio broadcasting and the effort to distribute films undesirable in one country – elsewhere.

Traditionally, relations across the Iron Curtain have been understood as ties of dependence and reciprocity, with Eastern European states as the "beneficiaries" – we usually follow the movement outwards, interested in cultural emigration to the West and the networks of samizdat and tamizdat connected to it. [37] The early 1950s, however, are a specific era when, as a result of generational and ideological continuities, we can also trace the opposite movement. In the particular case discussed in this text, it was Czechoslovakia's significant helping role towards the communist parties of France and Italy, across the whole range of cultural contacts. At the same time, these were not automatic services and harmonious relations, but always the result of negotiations dependent on specific people and the current political situation in individual countries and internationally.

The examples of cultural entanglements discussed in this text were clearly rooted in cultural-diplomatic relations and related media tactics – but they were not the product of negotiations at the state level, but at the party level, which was no less a complementary component in the era of state socialism. Thus, the history of Cold War media tactics could also be a microhistory of cultural practices (in the plural), which, in addition to large transnational events and platforms such as the Youth Festival, also take into account everyday contact, culminating in smaller events (lectures, exchange of cultural counter-services, requests for funding). This type of often invisible practice shows, first, that the communist parties of the East significantly helped the West European communist parties, and second, that the exchange in the field of culture could take many different forms and be influenced by various factors – first and foremost, of course,

the ideological aspects, but also the economic ones, as a result of which the West European communist parties found themselves in a certain dependence on the East European ones.

One of the questions we should therefore ask in further research of Cold War media entanglements is the question of the involvement of media networks in strategic alliances between the East and the leftist West. The period between the end of the Second World War and the early Cold War is significant in this sense, because, despite the apparent ideological distancing of East and West, there were many personal continuities, and many shared circumstances of the post-war reconstruction persisted and prevailed in both areas. The (de)colonial agenda also became an essential link, with Czechoslovakia and other Eastern countries acting openly as a supporter of independence and facilitating the production and post-production of several key films of the struggle.

Notes

1 See, e.g., Alexander Badenoch, Andreas Fickers and Christian Henrich-Franke, eds., *Airy Curtains in the European Ether: Broadcasting and the Cold War* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2013). Oskar Mulej, "'We Are Drowning in Red Beet, Patching Up the Holes in the Iron Curtain': The Punk Subculture in Ljubljana in the Late 1970s and Early 1980s", *East Central Europe*, vol. 38, no. 2–3 (2010), 373–89.
2 See, e.g., Linda Risso, "Radio Wars: Broadcasting in the Cold War", *Cold War History*, vol. 13, no. 2 (2013), 145–52. Alfred A. Reisch, *Hot Books in the Cold War: The CIA-Funded Secret Western Book Distribution Program Behind the Iron Curtain* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2013).
3 György Péteri, "Nylon Curtain: Transnational and Trans-Systemic Tendencies in the Cultural Life of State-Socialist Russia and East-Central Europe", *Slavonica*, vol. 10, no. 2 (2004), 113–23.
4 See, e.g., Rana Mitter and Patrick Major, eds., *Across the Blocs, Cold War Cultural and Social History* (London: Frank Cass, 2004); Patryk Babiracki and Austin Jersild, eds., *Socialist Internationalism in the Cold War: Exploring the Second World* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Peter Romijn, Giles Scott-Smith and Joes Segal, eds., *Divided Dreamworlds? The Cultural Cold War in East and West* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012); Annette Vowinckel, Marcus M. Payk and Thomas Lindenberger, eds., *Cold War Cultures: Perspectives on Eastern and Western European Societies* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012). Alice Lovejoy and Mari Pajala, eds., *Remapping Cold War Media: Institutions, Infrastructures, Translations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2022).
5 Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922), 43.
6 Andrea Mubi Brighenti, *Visibility in Social Theory and Social Research* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 45.
7 Brighenti, 45.
8 Marco di Maggio, *The Rise and Fall of Communist Parties in France and Italy: Entangled Historical Approaches* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021).

9 Philip Cooke, "From Partisan to Party Cadre: The Education of Italian Political Emigrants in Czechoslovakia", *Italian Studies*, vol. 61, no. 1 (2006), 64–84.
10 Doubravka Olšáková, "V krajině za zrcadlem: Političtí emigranti v poúnorovém Československu a případ Aymonin", *Soudobé dějiny*, vol. 14, no. 4 (2007), 719–43. Ondřej Vojtěchovský, *Z Prahy proti Titovi! Jugoslávská prosovětská emigrace v Československu* (Praha: UK, 2012). Konstantions Tsivos, *Řecká emigrace v Československu (1948–1968): Od jednoho rozštěpení ke druhému* (Praha: UK – Dokořán, 2012).
11 Philip Cooke, "Red Spring: Italian Political Emigration to Czechoslovakia", *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 84, no. 4 (2012), 861–96.
12 Philip Cooke, "From Partisan to Party Cadre".
13 Giancarlo Pajetta was a member of the PCI who significantly influenced its international relations. His importance increased in the later era, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. Bedřich Geminder was a key figure in the international relations of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the early 1950s, but in late 1952 he was sentenced to death and executed as part of the purges in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.
14 Relations with Italy, box 49A. National Archives of the Czech Republic (NACR), Archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (A UVKSC), International Department (ID), henceforth NACR, A UVKSC, ID.
15 Philip Cooke, "'Oggi in Italia': The Voice of Truth and Peace in Cold War Italy", *Modern Italy*, vol. 12, no. 2 (2007), 251–65.
16 Relations with Italy.
17 PCI letter to KSČ, 28 August 1950. Relations with Italy, box 49A. NACR, A UVKSC, ID.
18 Gianluca Fantoni, *Italy through the Red Lens: Italian Politics and Society in Communist Propaganda Films (1946–79)* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 46–47.
19 Czechoslovak State Film letter to KSČ, 12 December 1950. Relations with Italy, box 49A. NACR, A UVKSC, ID.
20 Francesco Pitassio, "Italian Neorealism Goes East: Authorship, Realism, Socialism", *Iluminace*, vol. 26, no. 3 (2014), 7–19.
21 Jiří Hnilica, *Francouzský institut v Praze 1920–1951: Mezi vzděláním a propagandou* (Praha: Karolinum, 2009).
22 Václav Šmidrkal, "The Image of 'Real France': Instrumentalization of French Culture in the Early Communist Czechoslovakia", *Beyond the Divide: Entangled Histories of Cold War Europe*, eds. Simo Mikkonen and Pia Koivunen (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 177–95.
23 Olšáková, "V krajině za zrcadlem".
24 Reports from meetings with PCF representatives, 1952. Relations with France, box 37. NACR, A UVKSC, ID.
25 Marc Silberman, "Learning from the Enemy: DEFA-French Co-Productions of the 1950s", *Film History*, vol. 18, no. 1 (2006), 21–45. Mariana Ivanova, *Cinema of Collaboration: DEFA Coproductions and International Exchange in Cold War Europe* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2020).
26 Czechoslovak State Film letter to KSČ, 5 June 1952. Relations with France, box 37. NACR, A UVKSC, ID.
27 Jindřiška Bláhová, "National, Socialist, Global: The Changing Roles of the Karlovy Vary Film Festival, 1946–1956", *Cinema in the Service of the State: Perspectives on Film Culture in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, 1945–1960*, eds. Lars Karl and Pavel Skopal (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 260.

28 Georges Sadoul, "S kamerou za zády nepřítele", *Kino*, 27 September 1951, 485.
29 Marcel Aymonin, *André Stil, laureát Stalinovy ceny za literaturu, a jeho První úděl* (Praha: Orbis, 1954).
30 "K prospěchu filmového umění a přátelství všech národů", *Kino*, 29 July 1954, 246.
31 Carlo Lizzani, *Dějiny italského filmu* (Praha: Státní pedagogické nakladatelství, 1959).
32 Jiří Pernes, *Krize komunistického režimu v Československu v 50. letech 20. Století* (Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 2008).
33 Pavel Marek, "Protikomunistické demonstrace v Československu", *Securitas Imperii*, vol. 24, no. 1 (2014), 10–34.
34 Pernes, *Krize komunistického režimu*, 92.
35 Mai'a K. Davis Cross, "Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 39, no. 1 (2013), 137–60.
36 Matthew Bunn, "Reimagining Repression: New Censorship Theory and After", *History and Theory*, vol. 54, no. 1 (2015), 25–44.
37 Tamizdat is a term usually used to describe the Soviet literature published abroad. See, e.g., Friederike Kind-Kovács, *Written Here, Published There: How Underground Literature Crossed the Iron Curtain* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2014).

References

Babiracki, Patryk, and Austin Jersild, eds., *Socialist Internationalism in the Cold War: Exploring the Second World*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
Badenoch, Alexander, Andreas Fickers, and Christian Henrich-Franke, eds., *Airy Curtains in the European Ether: Broadcasting and the Cold War*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2013.
Bláhová, Jindřiška. "National, Socialist, Global: The Changing Roles of the Karlovy Vary Film Festival, 1946–1956." In *Cinema in the Service of the State: Perspectives on Film Culture in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, 1945–1960*, edited by Lars Karl and Pavel Skopal, 245–272. New York – Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015.
Brighenti, Andrea Mubi. *Visibility in Social Theory and Social Research*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
Bunn, Matthew. "Reimagining Repression. New Censorship Theory and After." *History and Theory*, vol. 54, no. 1 (2015): 25–44.
Cooke, Philip. "'Oggi in Italia': The Voice of Truth and Peace in Cold War Italy." *Modern Italy*, vol. 12, no. 2 (2007): 251–265.
Cooke, Philip. "From Partisan to Party Cadre: The Education of Italian Political Emigrants in Czechoslovakia." *Italian Studies*, vol. 61, no. 1 (2006): 64–84.
Cooke, Philip. "Red Spring: Italian Political Emigration to Czechoslovakia." *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 84, no. 4: 861–896.
Davis Cross, Mai'a K. "Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later." *Review of International Studies*, vol. 39, no. 1 (2013): 137–160.
di Maggio, Marco. *The Rise and Fall of Communist Parties in France and Italy: Entangled Historical Approaches*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021.
Fantoni, Gianluca. *Italy Through the Red Lens: Italian Politics and Society in Communist Propaganda Films (1946–79)*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021.
Hnilica, Jiří. *Francouzský institut v Praze 1920–1951: Mezi vzděláním a propagandou*. Praha: Karolinum, 2009.

Ivanova, Mariana. *Cinema of Collaboration: DEFA Coproductions and International Exchange in Cold War Europe*. New York – Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2020.
Kind-Kovács, Friederike. *Written Here, Published There: How Underground Literature Crossed the Iron Curtain*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2014.
Lippmann, Walter. *Public Opinion*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922.
Lizzani, Carlo. *Dějiny italského filmu*. Praha: Státní pedagogické nakladatelství, 1959.
Lovejoy, Alice, and Mari Pajala, eds., *Remapping Cold War Media: Institutions, Infrastructures, Translations*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2022.
Marek, Pavel. "Protikomunistické demonstrace v Československu." *Securitas Imperii*, vol. 24, no. 1 (2014): 10–34.
Mitter, Rana, and Patrick Major, eds., *Across the Blocs, Cold War Cultural and Social History*. London – Portland: Frank Cass, 2004.
Mulej, Oskar. "'We Are Drowning in Red Beet, Patching Up the Holes in the Iron Curtain': The Punk Subculture in Ljubljana in the Late 1970s and Early 1980s." *East Central Europe*, vol. 38, no. 2–3 (2010): 373–389.
Olšáková, Doubravka. "V krajině za zrcadlem: Političtí emigranti v poúnorovém Československu a případ Aymonin." *Soudobé dějiny*, vol. 14, no. 4 (2007): 719–743.
Pernes, Jiří. *Krize komunistického režimu v Československu v 50. letech 20. století*. Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 2008.
Péteri, György. "Nylon Curtain: Transnational and Trans-Systemic Tendencies in the Cultural Life of State-Socialist Russia and East-Central Europe." *Slavonica*, vol. 10, no. 2 (2004): 113–123.
Pitassio, Francesco. "Italian Neorealism Goes East: Authorship, Realism, Socialism." *Iluminace*, vol. 26, no. 3 (2014): 7–19.
Reisch, Alfred A. *Hot Books in the Cold War: The CIA-Funded Secret Western Book Distribution Program Behind the Iron Curtain*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2013.
Richmond, Yale. *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain*. Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 2003.
Risso, Linda. "Radio Wars: Broadcasting in the Cold War." *Cold War History*, vol. 13, no. 2 (2013): 145–152.
Romijn, Peter, Giles Scott-Smith, and Joes Segal, eds., *Divided Dreamworlds? The Cultural Cold War in East and West*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012.
Silberman, Marc. "Learning from the Enemy: DEFA-French Co-Productions of the 1950s." *Film History*, vol. 18, no. 1 (2006): 21–45.
Šmidrkal, Václav. "The Image of 'Real France': Instrumentalization of French Culture in the Early Communist Czechoslovakia." In *Beyond the Divide: Entangled Histories of Cold War Europe*, edited by Simo Mikkonen and Pia Koivunen, 177–195. New York – Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015.
Tsivos, Konstantions. *Řecká emigrace v Československu (1948–1968): Od jednoho rozštěpení ke druhému*. Praha: UK – Dokořán, 2012.
Vojtěchovský, Ondřej. *Z Prahy proti Titovi! Jugoslávská prosovětská emigrace v Československu*. Praha: UK, 2012.
Vowinckel, Annette, Marcus M. Payk, and Thomas Lindenberger, eds., *Cold War Cultures: Perspectives on Eastern and Western European Societies*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2012.

5 Broadcasting Agency in the Portuguese Empire

Disrupting the Dominant Discourse through Media Tactics

Nelson Ribeiro

The interwar period saw the rise of radio as a central medium for the dissemination of news, entertainment, and propaganda. Due to its capacity to aggregate large audiences dispersed through different geographies, since its early days broadcasting was perceived as a powerful medium that could be used to influence the "hearts and minds" of those who listened. Unsurprisingly, it soon gained the attention of those holding political, economic, and even religious power. While dictatorships used it to keep hold of power and promote their ideological apparatuses within and beyond their immediate borders, in both authoritarian and democratic countries, radio was also employed to foster national identities. This allowed for the creation of a sense of nation among people who, despite living in the same country, under the same political rule, did not necessarily share the same lifestyle or the experience of having access to the same information.[1]

As has been widely discussed,[2] broadcasting's ability to reach even the most remote places via the airwaves led governments to initiate state or public broadcasting or, in cases such as the US, to incentivise private initiatives capable of reaching the populace. Broadcasting became part of the communication strategy of those in power, and in many countries it aimed to impact not only national citizens but also foreigners. The latter became the target of several broadcasters that resorted to shortwave transmitters to reach audiences located thousands of kilometres from the transmission point.

In the early 1930s, several stations were already broadcasting internationally, including the Dutch Philips Omroep Holland Indië (Philips Broadcasting Company Holland Indies, POHI), Radio Moscow, the BBC, and the German shortwave station at Zeesen. POHI and the BBC offered programming specifically targeted at their colonial territories, at a time during which broadcasting was foreseen as a particularly powerful tool to allow for a permanent connection between the European colonial powers and their overseas territories.[3] Even though no audience studies were available at the time for shortwave broadcasting, inside the stations there was a

DOI: 10.4324/9781032618326-6

clear perception that their mission was relevant and that many were listening overseas. Besides this perception based on their desire to be performing a very important job, most of the time those producing the programmes had no clue whatsoever about who and in which contexts people were actually picking up the transmissions.[4]

Despite all the limitations, in the interwar period broadcasting became a relevant technology for colonialism. The idea that radio allowed the centre of the Empire to speak continuously to the peripheries entered the imaginary of colonialism. Imperial broadcasters targeted the white expats living in Africa, Asia, or the West Indies, thus disregarding the native populations that did not speak European languages. Far from being perceived as a weakness that had to be addressed, the fact that broadcasts ignored the majority of the population needs to be understood as a continuation of the segregation that existed in the colonies between the white expats and the native populations.[5] The daily schedules were designed to keep the expats living overseas in contact with the motherland. Therefore, programming was mostly composed of popular music, domestic news, and major national events, including national festivities, speeches in parliament, and other celebratory rituals designed to foster the idea of nationhood. National ritual events gained a particular relevance in the imperial context, as they were believed to play a role in keeping nationalism alive overseas.

Just as maps are instrumental in creating the perception that a specific space is unified,[6] the same can be said about broadcasting, which can be used to serve the same purpose. Maps illustrating the coverage of imperial broadcasters were widely disseminated in the interwar period, intended to demonstrate how the metropolis and the colonial territories were kept in continuous contact via shortwave transmissions. As a space dominated by the state, imperial broadcasting was used to manipulate the power relationships within the Empire, thus functioning as a locus of power. Resorting to De Certeau's distinction between strategy and tactics, radio can be perceived as a strategy under the control of those who held the political power in the colonial context. It was used to ensure that no changes would be implemented in the uneven power relations that marked colonial societies.

While previous research on imperial broadcasting has mostly focused on shortwave transmissions as a strategy developed and used by those in power to prolong the *status quo*,[7] in this chapter I will instead focus on tactics. Our goal is to discuss how radio was used on the ground by those who, despite not being part of the official power structures, used their entrepreneurial and creative skills to establish and operate broadcasting stations that gave visibility to lifestyles and political ideas different from those that were promoted on the transmissions aired by the European imperial stations. In particular, the chapter presents the case of broadcasting in the

Portuguese Empire between the 1940s and the 1960s. Its main goal is to understand to what extent the peculiarities of the radio ecosystem set up in the territories under Portuguese rule in Africa allowed agents deprived of official political agency to tactically use radio in order to play an active role in shaping the soundscape in the African colonial territories. During this period pro-independence movements also started to make tactical use of radio for the dissemination of their political agendas which, as will be revealed, impacted the colonial broadcasting strategies, creating an entangled connection between strategies and tactics.

When analysing the tactical usage of broadcasting, I will adopt De Certeau's definition according to which tactics have no space of their own and thus are kept vigilant and "make use of the cracks that particular conjunctions open in the surveillance of the proprietary powers".[8] This seems to have been the case for several agents in the Portuguese Empire that used all the "cracks" opened by the colonial regime to promote their own agendas, as well as the possibilities given by foreign governments that shared the anti-colonial agenda.

The research is based on documentary research conducted in archives located in Lisbon and Maputo, namely the Oliveira Salazar Archive held at the Portuguese National Archives, the Archive of Radio Mozambique, and the Historical Archive of Mozambique. Oral interviews with former radio producer António Fonseca and former radio announcer Matânia Odete Dabula are also used as sources. Both worked for the major radio broadcaster set up in the Portuguese Empire and their testimonies contribute to problematising how those who played an active role in the production of radio perceived their role as cultural and political actors who acted to defend and/or disrupt the colonial power structures.

Broadcasting to the Portuguese Empire

After the Great War, Portugal remained as one of the European countries that controlled colonial territories but, contrary to other imperial nations, it was not an early adopter of shortwave broadcasting. While the Netherlands initiated overseas transmissions to its colonies in 1927, followed by France and Belgium in 1931[9] and Britain in 1932, with the creation of the BBC Empire Service,[10] in Portugal the first shortwave service entered into operation in December 1934. It was, however, a limited service operated by a private station – *Rádio Clube Português* – that aimed mostly to increase its domestic notoriety by showcasing its capacity to broadcast overseas. *Rádio Clube Português* was owned by the Botelho Moniz family, which had close ties to Salazar's nationalistic dictatorship known as the Estado Novo (New State), which had been officially instated with the approval of the country's new constitution in 1933. For Salazar,

Portugal's mission in the world was tied to its Empire and there could be no discussion whatsoever about the country losing its overseas possessions, even if this would mean Portugal's international isolation.

While the New State was a fascist-like regime, it was nevertheless marked by several peculiar characteristics that distanced itself from Italian fascism, one of the most important being the lack of investment in radio as a medium used to persuade the masses.[11] This can be explained by the dictator's reserved personality, which led him to avoid regular contact with the crowds.[12] Because Salazar did not use radio to speak regularly to the populace and was not interested in establishing a mass movement to support the regime,[13] investments in radio remained low throughout the 1930s and 1940s,[14] which also led to a late start for the state broadcaster's Imperial Service. Even so, the fact that a private station with few resources had initiated broadcasts to the Empire raised concerns among senior officials at the state broadcaster, *Emissora Nacional*, whose chairman argued that an Imperial Service was urgently required, to demonstrate "that the Metropolis gives the same affection and the same attention to all the Portuguese, no matter whether they live here [on the mainland] or far away".[15] *Emissora Nacional* then adopted the creation of a service targeted overseas as one of its main goals, believing that this would assume a strategic role in the context of Portuguese colonialism.[16]

To implement such a strategy, the state broadcaster assembled a small shortwave transmitter that broadcast for the first time in December 1936. The New State was then in possession of a broadcasting infrastructure that – at least on paper – allowed its voice to reach the expats living in the most remote geographies of the Empire. For those working for the official station in Lisbon, imperial broadcasts were of strategic value as they allowed for the creation of an emotional bond between the nation and those living overseas, thus enabling Portugal to secure its own symbolic power over the colonial territories.

While it was true that the Imperial Service was, from the outset, the voice of Salazar's regime and thus conveyed a world view in accordance with the dictatorship's ideology, one needs to also consider that transmissions to the colonial territories faced several difficulties, including the low power of the transmitters and the lack of knowledge of the types of programming that appealed to those living overseas. While some of these problems were shared with broadcasters operated by other European imperial nations,[17] in the Portuguese case the shortcomings of the official station opened the way for the emergence of a wide variety of private stations that were set up in the colonies by the white expats who, instead of following a strategic plan designed by the government, decided to take the development of broadcasting into their own hands. Radio was then used tactically by those who, despite having a privileged status in the colonial

society, were considered second-class citizens by the Lisbon authorities, depriving them of access to top positions in the colonial public administration, which were always occupied by Portuguese who were sent from Lisbon to rule over the colonies.[18] For the white elite living in Africa, including those who immigrated there and those who were born overseas, radio became a tactical weapon used to promote their own achievements and lifestyle, echoing local identities and values that, despite not challenging the regime in power, were different from those that were echoed on the broadcasts from Lisbon.

While the shortcomings of the Imperial Service operated by the state broadcaster *Emissora Nacional* led to its strategic value being limited, with the Portuguese expats reporting no frequent habits of tuning into the broadcasts from Lisbon[19] except to listen to football commentaries on Sundays,[20] the tactical usage of the radio clubs established overseas by the local white elites was quite visible (audible), namely in Angola and Mozambique, the two largest colonies under Portuguese rule. All evidence points to many tuning into these broadcasters for news and entertainment.

As will be detailed in the following section, as early as the 1930s, several stations established in Africa created a significant listenership and became important cultural centres for the expats living in the colonies. The success of such stations as opposed to the limited reach of the state broadcaster from Lisbon led the dictatorship to alter its policy on broadcasting to the Empire in the early 1950s, coinciding with a change in the overall colonial policy that was sketched to deal with the pressures for decolonisation that had been placed at the forefront of the international agenda in the aftermath of the Second World War. The major change in the colonial policy was the revocation of the Colonial Act which, since 1930, had regulated relations between the Portuguese administration, the white settlers, and the indigenous populations. With the revocation of such legislation, Portugal would no longer be presented as a country with an Empire. The word "colonies" was instead replaced by the expression "overseas provinces" and Portugal was then officially presented as a multiracial, multicultural, and pluricontinental nation.[21] While the state broadcaster echoed this new strategy set forward by Salazar, the regime was forced to acknowledge the limited reach of its shortwave transmissions. This led the state to make significant investments in the Imperial Service which, despite being claimed for more than a decade by the senior management of the *Emissora Nacional*, had until then been rejected by the dictator.[22]

The most significant investment made in accordance with the new broadcasting strategy was the establishment of the Overseas Broadcasting Centre, inaugurated in March 1954[23] at a time during which Portugal was facing increased pressure from the Indian Union to relinquish control of its

territories in the Indian subcontinent. The Overseas Broadcasting Centre was equipped with a series of powerful transmitters and antennas that were supposed to ensure more effective coverage of the Empire. Even though these did not prevent the state broadcaster from facing severe difficulties in competing with the stations set up in the colonies that gave voice to alternative voices, the Portuguese authorities were then in possession of a powerful broadcasting infrastructure that it recognised as a central tool to avoid the dismantlement of its imperial project overseas. In the meantime, the regime also made a strategic investment in the establishment of the *Emissora Oficial de Angola* (Official Broadcaster of Angola), which began its experimental broadcasts in 1951, with regular transmissions starting two years later.[24] Until then the New State had only established one state broadcaster in Guinea-Bissau, *Emissora da Guiné Portuguesa* (Broadcaster of Portuguese Guinea), which had been inaugurated back in 1946, and that aimed to allow the colony to have access to broadcasting as, unlike in the other colonies, no private station had emerged in this territory.[25]

Strategic and Tactical Broadcasting in the Portuguese Empire

Parallel to the Imperial Service that transmitted from Lisbon to the Empire, broadcasting flourished in the colonies, not by the hand of the state but instead as projects set up by the white settlers living in some of the main colonial cities. In other words, radio broadcasting in the Portuguese Empire was developed not strategically but mostly tactically, used by the local elites to affirm themselves as a locus of power. This tactical use of radio by the white elites does not fit De Certeau's definition of tactics as the "art of the weak".[26] On the contrary, the Portuguese expats and the white population born in Africa were far from being in a weak position within the colonial society. However, I will argue that this usage of radio should be considered tactical, as it represents a clear example of how those who did not control the political structures look for opportunities opened by those in power to improve their own status. In this case, the white settlers took advantage of the late start of the state broadcaster's Imperial Service and its shortcomings, as well as the fact that the Lisbon authorities had no strategic plan to set up broadcasting stations in the overseas territories.

The lack of initiative by the central government opened an opportunity for the economic elites to develop their own broadcasting projects, namely in Angola and Mozambique, the two major Portuguese possessions. The stations were set up as radio clubs and the dues paid by their members were a significant source of revenue, along with advertising, events – such as parties, dances, and fetes – and some occasional subsidies from the local authorities.[27] Those who engaged in setting up and managing the radio clubs took pride in demonstrating their capacity to create stations that, far

from being mere promoters of the New State, also echoed the lifestyle of those living overseas, capable of competing with the official broadcasters (*Emissora Nacional* but also the *Emissora Oficial de Angola*) on both the technological and programming fronts.

Radio clubs had a much better coverage of their regions of influence than the Lisbon state broadcaster, which throughout the years always struggled with the lack of powerful transmitters that would allow it to build a solid presence in the different colonial territories. In the late 1930s listeners in Africa would write to Lisbon complaining that it was much easier for them to tune in to stations such as the BBC, the German RRG, and Radio Moscow than to *Emissora Nacional*.[28] The complaints would continue in the following decade, by which time many radio clubs had already been established in the overseas territories.

While the official broadcasters functioned as the voice of the colonial power, the private stations did not challenge the regime – nor would they be allowed to do so due to the regime's control and repression apparatuses – but they did give visibility to a different imaginary about what it meant to live in Africa. For this, the radio clubs regularly aired cultural events with a hybrid nature, including musical programmes in which both Portuguese and African songs would be played.[29] This mixture was particularly audible in music request programmes, which were one of the highlights of the programming schedule in many of the stations set up in Africa.[30]

The first radio clubs to have emerged in the Portuguese Empire in Africa were *Rádio Clube do Sul* (Radio Clube of the South), installed in Benguela (south of Angola) in the early 1930s before later transferring to the nearby city of Lobito,[31] and *Rádio Clube de Moçambique* (Radio Clube of Mozambique, RCM), established in Lourenço Marques (the colony's capital, today Maputo).[32] Both initiated regular broadcasts several years before *Emissora Nacional* began both its domestic and imperial transmissions, which speaks to the entrepreneurial vision of the expats living overseas.

While the first radio clubs founded in Angola acquired significant local influence in the different cities in which they were located, RCM became the dominant station in the whole colony of Mozambique and soon evolved to become the most powerful station in the Portuguese Empire and on the African continent.[33] This was made possible due to the decision to launch an English-speaking commercial channel for South Africa that broadcast mostly Anglo-Saxon pop music targeted at the young demographics. The English programme, which also started offering news bulletins in Afrikaans in 1947, became known as LM Radio (LM was short for Lourenço Marques) and was particularly appreciated for the music mix it played on the air, disrupting the domestic monopoly of the South African Radio Corporation which, until the introduction of its first commercial service in 1950,[34] presented more highbrow programming when

compared to the programmes being aired from Mozambique. LM Radio's success in the South African market led it to sign profitable advertising contracts with several local businesses, as well as with multinationals operating in the country.[35] This allowed the station to expand its coverage of Mozambique and even to invest in powerful transmitters used to broadcast to Angola and to mainland Portugal. In 1939, when a new 10 kW transmitter entered into operation, the station management proudly announced that its signal now reached the metropolis.[36]

While LM Radio offered mostly music programming, RCM's channel A (broadcast in Portuguese) offered a wide variety of programmes. This included recorded and live music, the latter performed at the station's studios and in cultural clubs and theatres in Lourenço Marques. Talks on social and economic matters, children's programming and news bulletins were also part of the programming schedule.[37] While most segments were designed to cater to the taste of the listeners, which was considered indispensable to please and attract the advertisers, the news bulletins were mostly composed of the official agenda of the colonial authorities, the Head of State, and the Head of the government.[38] So, while most programmes had a hybrid nature, promoting Portuguese language and culture, but also echoing local identities and the lifestyle of the colonial elites, the news bulletins were perceived as performing a strategic function and thus spoke the voice of the political regime. It did not take long for the colonial authorities to recognise the important role performed by the RCM in promoting what was described as the economic, social, and cultural development of Mozambique. Thus, as soon as 1937 the Governor General made RCM the sole beneficiary of the radio licence that was introduced that year and was to be paid by all those owning radio receivers in the colony,[39] thus creating an entanglement between private and state interests.

The function performed by radio clubs in Angola did not differ substantially from that of the RCM in Mozambique. The major difference was that, instead of one major radio club, in Angola there were dozens of small/medium size broadcasters, the majority of which were established in the 1930s and 1940s. Later on, in the early 1950s two stations with a different ownership structure would also emerge – Radio Diamang, property of the Companhia dos Diamantes de Angola, and Radio Ecclesia, established by the Catholic Church.[40] These, however, did not change the radio ecosystem, which was mostly marked by the experimental environment that existed in most radio clubs.

The broadcasting landscape in Angola, featuring over 15 stations located in different cities, can be explained by the fact that, unlike in Mozambique, there was a significant presence of white settlers in many different provinces and districts, which led the local elites to take pride in establishing their own radio clubs. Furthermore, because these stations had no access

to foreign revenue, they had no ambition to cover the entire territory of Angola and thus operated with a different mindset to that of RCM. One of the major stations was *Rádio Clube de Angola* (Radio Club of Angola, RCA), founded in the capital – Luanda – in 1937.[41] The local authorities, faced with the fact that they had no access to broadcasting, soon entrusted RCA with transmitting the official news bulletins and programmes that were produced by the Governor's office,[42] who recognised the need to use the audio medium to promote its own agenda. This also signalled the political elite's dependence on the initiatives of civil society to reinforce its own power and how it resorted to tactical initiatives for strategic purposes.

This entangled relation between different players and layers of power was made possible due to the lack of a clear distinction between private initiatives and the state itself in the context of the Portuguese Empire. To start, setting up a radio club was dependent on authorisation from the political authorities. In most cases, the colonial regime did not create many obstacles to such projects, because the stations with the most powerful transmitters were established by the local elites, whose businesses and economic power depended on the continuation of the colonial system. In other words, even though the local elites did not have the same status as those who ruled the colonial administration, and to some extent had a different understanding of what it meant to live overseas, while they used radio to increase their symbolic status, they also remained conscious that their own position in the colonial setting was dependent on the continuation of the existing political system. For this reason, the establishment of private radio clubs did not constitute a threat to Salazar's regime which, on the contrary, saw the stations as an opportunity to showcase the technological development being achieved by the territories under Portuguese rule. This meant that, even though these stations were established with a tactical mission, they ended up also serving the strategies of the political structures. The constituency that these stations did not serve was the entire Black population, which made up the vast majority of those living in all the territories under Portuguese rule in Africa. It was only in the late 1950s that certain stations would start airing some programmes targeted at the native populations when some radio producers – who rented airtime on the radio clubs – understood they could make more money if they sold advertising to local businesses interested in targeting those who spoke African languages rather than Portuguese.

Broadcasts in African Languages: Serving and Undermining the Colonial Power

The first regular programme to be aired in an African language in the Portuguese Empire was *Hora Nativa* [Native Hour], which debuted on RCM

in March 1958.[43] Broadcast in Ronga (one of the most widely spoken languages in the south of Mozambique), it was presented by Samuel Dabula, a professor and one of the founders of the *Centro Associativo dos Negros* (Black Associative Centre) in Lourenço Marques.[44] Dabula was one of the first Black announcers to ever speak on the radio in Portuguese Africa and was put in charge of making both entertainment and news available to the native population in southern Mozambique. Because *Hora Nativa* was a commercial endeavour, the programme aired mostly music and light entertainment. However, Portuguese courses were also broadcast, along with drama and children's programming.[45] In order words, even though its main mission was to entertain the listeners, allowing RCM to expand its commercial success by reaching a new segment of listeners, it also served the Portuguese government's strategy for the Empire. Nevertheless, it did not prevent the programme from being given a tactical usage by the Black producers and announcers, who were given some freedom to select the music and other content that was played on the air. Dabula, for example, oversaw the selection of musical groups to perform on the programme.[46]

Despite promoting the benefits of colonialism, *Hora Nativa* was the "first radio manifestation of Mozambican identity, which was particularly noticeable in the musical broadcasts"[47] and those who worked on the programme understood they had been given the opportunity to access a tool that could be used to promote African cultures, thus disrupting the homogeneity that had marked the airwaves in Mozambique until the late 1950s. On some occasions, the announcers were even able to include messages that were not controlled by the station management, as their knowledge of Mozambican languages was very deficient.[48] The programme would come to an end after the outbreak of the war of independence in Mozambique in 1962. The Portuguese regime then decided to make strategic use of broadcasting in local languages. A new radio channel was created – *Voz de Moçambique* (Voice of Mozambique) – which became the successor to *Hora Nativa* but had a different goal. Although it was broadcast from RCM studios, *Voz de Moçambique* was no longer a commercial operation, instead coming under the control of the Psychological Action Service of the Portuguese Army.

Broadcasts in African languages then became part of the psychological war that was taking place parallel to the military operations on the ground. The tactical use that was given to *Hora Nativa* by some of the producers and announcers was much more difficult due to tighter control from the regime, which took over the transmissions that thus became part of their strategy to prolong colonialism.

In Angola, broadcasts in African languages assumed an even more obvious tactical dimension, as they were initiated by radio producers who aimed to promote the culture of the indigenous populations. The

first non-Portuguese programme was aired on *Rádio Clube do Huambo* (Radio Club of Huambo) and was produced by Sebastião Coelho, a second-generation white settler born in Angola. His aim was twofold: to increase his business as a radio producer and to give visibility to African culture, namely music, theatre, and other oral traditions. To achieve these goals, in 1960 Coelho launched a two-hour programme *Cruzeiro do Sul* (Southern Cruise) entirely broadcast in Umbundu, the most widely spoken language in the south and centre of Angola, and for which he was granted authorisation from the governor of the local district.[49] The programme was presented by two Black announcers who Coelho himself had trained: Judite Luvumba and José Castro. The programme gave voice to indigenous traditions and music, which led it to be considered the first expression of Angolanness on the radio.[50] It acquired special importance after the outbreak of the war of independence in 1961, when the Portuguese regime started to repress more severely all those who would dare to dissent from the official policies.

Known for his broadcasting activities and for recording Angolan popular music produced in the *musseques* (the suburban neighbourhoods on the outskirts of the capital), Coelho was also involved in facilitating some gatherings of members of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which led to his arrest by the political police in May 1963.[51] After his release later that year, he was forced to leave his hometown and live in the capital Luanda, where he established a radio production company – Estúdios do Norte (North Studios) – that became responsible for programmes aired on different stations. The most notorious was *Café da Noite* (Night Coffee), broadcast on Radio Ecclesia and sent by tape for rebroadcast to other stations located in different regions of Angola. Although it offered a mix of Portuguese and African music, it aired Angolan songs in its daily broadcasts, which made it quite an exclusive programme in the Angolan context of the time.[52] In 1964, Coelho also launched *Tondoya Mukina o Kizomba* (There is a Party in Our House), broadcast on *Rádio Clube de Angola*, and voiced in Kimbundu and Portuguese. Unlike *Café da Noite*, this new programme only aired music produced in Angola in a clear attempt to use radio to promote the culture and the sounds of a nation that was fighting for independence.

The Portuguese authorities soon realised that broadcasts in local languages were being tactically used by those who supported independence and thus sketched a plan to take over transmissions in Angolan languages. However, in contrast to Mozambique, there was no station with the technical infrastructure needed to broadcast to the entire colony. No radio club had a network of transmitters capable of reaching all the provinces, and nor did the *Emissora Oficial de Angola*. Inaugurated in 1953, its shortwave transmitters supposedly covered the entire territory of Angola,

but in actual practice the quality of the radio signal was not always acceptable, which led the state broadcaster in Lisbon to send a team to Angola to assess the quality of reception. The report found the existing radio system deficient, and unable to provide effective coverage of the territory.[53] This may help to explain why an official station dedicated to transmissions in Angolan languages only entered into operation in 1968, six years later than in Mozambique. The creation of *Voz de Angola* (Voice of Angola) was, nevertheless, perceived as a strategic move by the colonial power, aimed at limiting the influence of the independence movements. Although the technical support was guaranteed by the *Emissora Oficial de Angola*, in order to increase its credibility among the Black population, *Voz de Angola* presented itself as independent from the colonial administration. In fact, it was under the direct control of the General Staff of the Army in Angola and the political police. It broadcast mostly in Umbundu and Kimbundu, and along with music and other features designed to appeal to the native population, it publicised the initiatives of the colonial government, which was said to be working for the development of Angola while the independence movements were presented as acting in their own interest with the sole aim of controlling the territory's natural resources.

While the Portuguese authorities took over broadcasting in African languages in the two major colonies, the major independence movements also made a tactical move regarding radio. Deprived of access to radio infrastructure that remained under the control of the colonial regime or the white elites, independence movements took advantage of the transborder nature of radio signals and started producing programmes abroad that were transmitted via shortwave. The Republic of Congo offered airtime on Radio Brazzaville to the MPLA, which in 1964 initiated the regular transmission of *Angola Combatente* (Angolan Fighter, AC for short). AC was "the bailiwick of party intellectuals"[54] and soon became a central tactical tool used by the MPLA to undermine the colonial regime. Programming consisted mostly of talks and news on the anti-colonial movement and the war of independence, which was largely absent from all the media controlled by the Portuguese, except for the official notices issued by the military[55] that portrayed the war as a fight against the "terrorists" that were said to be undermining peace, order, and development.

Transmissions by liberation movements also took place from Congo-Léopoldville, after its independence from Belgium. Broadcasts from Léopoldville (today Kinshasa) were operated by the Union of the People of Angola (UPA)[56] – the predecessor of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) – urging the different ethnic groups to put aside their differences and join forces against the colonial regime. Transmissions took place in Portuguese, but also in Umbundu and Quicongo.[57]

In Mozambique, FRELIMO resorted to transmissions from Dar Es Salaam (Tanzania), where the liberation movement had been established in 1962.[58] It produced *Voz da FRELIMO* (Voice of FRELIMO), a programme designed to promote the idea that Mozambique as a free and independent nation was only a matter of time.[59] The programme would later also be broadcast from Lusaka (Republic of Zambia).

Overall, independence movements in both colonies made use of the opportunities given to them by new-born nations that had also fought colonialism, allowing them access to resources that domestically were under the strategic control of the colonial power. The quality of reception of the programmes produced by the independence movements was lower than the one offered by the stations operating in the two colonies, namely *Voz de Angola* and *Voz de Mozambique*, but represented an important tactical move to foster hope for regime change among the segments of the population that were politically active and that wished for national independence.

Conclusion

While De Certeau's theory makes a clear distinction between strategies and tactics and how these operate in different spheres that are separated by well-defined borders in the social realm, this chapter presents a less linear separation between the two. On the contrary, it demonstrates that in the context of broadcasting in the Portuguese colonies in Africa there was an entangled and complicated relationship between strategies and tactics, with different social and political agents resorting to radio to disseminate ideological messages.

Drawing a line between the strategic and tactical usage of radio broadcasting in the Portuguese Empire is especially difficult due to Salazar's broadcasting policy, which allowed the emergence of private stations managed by the white settlers. Despite their privileged status in the context of colonial societies, the white population living in Africa was deprived of access to the top colonial management positions, which led them to set up radio clubs that served both strategic and tactical goals. On one hand, these stations shared several strategic goals with the official broadcasters controlled by the Lisbon regime and were used as tools to promote the Portuguese language and culture, along with the regime's propaganda. However, the radio clubs set up in Angola and Mozambique also aimed to increase the social standing of the white settlers living in these territories, who did not feel represented on the imperial broadcasts by the Lisbon state broadcaster. This ultimately led the radio clubs to develop a hybrid nature: private but dependent on local colonial administrations, aligned with the strategies of the colonial political structures but, whenever possible, taking advantage of the "cracks" opened by the Lisbon regime in

broadcasting control to allow the lifestyle and the interests of the white population living in Africa to be heard on the radio.

The difficulties of clearly separating the strategic and tactical usage of broadcasting also extended to the transmissions operated by the liberation movements. Having to deal with the lack of access to broadcasting infrastructure within the colonies, they resorted to transmitters made available to them by neighbouring states. These allowed the MPLA, the UPA, and the FRELIMO to produce programmes that tactically countered Portuguese colonialism. Such programmes were broadcast via transmitters made available to the pro-independence movements by new-born states, which allowed their broadcasting infrastructure to be used by foreigners to counter colonialism and promote socialism. The programmes thus served the tactical needs of the liberation movements and the strategic interests of the foreign governments that sponsored them.

Besides illustrating the complexities of drawing a line between the usage of the same media for strategic and tactical purposes, the case of Portuguese radio during late colonialism clearly demonstrates the entangled connections between private and state media and between national and international broadcasting structures. This suggests that one needs to rethink and question how we use dichotomous categories to make sense of the role played by the media in different political and social contexts. Moreover, as the case of *Hora Nativa* and other African language programmes well illustrates, successful media projects started and operated by private initiatives can easily be taken over by those in power to ensure their alignment with the government's strategy. All the messiness and entanglements between private and public, national and international, discussed in this chapter seem far from unique. Instead, the interconnections between the different spheres are part of the everyday life of the media, in which strategies and tactics are frequently entangled.

Notes

1 Susan J. Douglas, *Listening In: Radio and the American Imagination* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004); Michele Hilmes, *Radio Voices: American Broadcasting 1922–1952* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
2 E.g., Simon J. Potter et al., *The Wireless World: Global Histories of International Radio Broadcasting* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022).
3 Vincent Kuitenbrouwer, "Radio as a Tool of Empire: Intercontinental Broadcasting from the Netherlands to the Dutch East Indies in the 1920s and 1930s", *Itinerario*, vol. 40, no. 1 (2016), 83–103; Simon J. Potter, *Broadcasting Empire: The BBC and the British World, 1922–1970* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
4 Simon J. Potter, *Wireless Internationalism and Distant Listening: Britain, Propaganda, and the Invention of Global Radio, 1920–1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

5 Nelson Ribeiro, "Segregation on the Airwaves: From a Monolingual to a Multilingual Broadcasting Model in Angola and Mozambique", *The Oxford Handbook of Radio and Podcasting*, eds. Michele Hilmes and Andrew J. Bottomley (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2024).
6 Michel De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1988).
7 E.g., Kuitenbrouwer, "Radio as a Tool of Empire"; Simon J. Potter, *Broadcasting Empire: The BBC and the British World, 1922–1970* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Nelson Ribeiro, "Broadcasting to the Portuguese Empire in Africa: Salazar's Singular Broadcasting Policy", *Critical Arts: South-North Cultural and Media Studies*, vol. 28, no. 6 (2014), 920–937.
8 De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, 37.
9 Rebecca P. Scales, *Radio and the Politics of Sound in Interwar France, 1921–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Philo. C. Wasburn, *Broadcasting Propaganda: International Radio Broadcasting and the Construction of Political Reality* (Westport: Praeger, 1992).
10 Potter, *Broadcasting Empire*.
11 Nelson Ribeiro, *A Emissora Nacional nos Primeiros Anos do Estado Novo (1933–1945)* (Lisboa: Quimera, 2005).
12 Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, *Salazar: Uma Biografia Política* (Lisboa: Dom Quixote, 2010).
13 Fernando Rosas, *Salazar e o Poder – A Arte de Saber Durar* (Lisboa: Tinta da China, 2015).
14 The lack of investment in the state broadcaster led to poor reception conditions even in some of the major cities in the metropolis. This was criticised by listeners and by shop owners who sold radio receivers (e.g., letter sent by business owners to the President of *Emissora Nacional* published in *Rádio-Semanal*, 27 July 1935).
15 Letter from Henrique Galvão to the Minister of Public Works and Communication, 3 February 1936, in Oliveira Salazar Archive (henceforth AOS), National Archives Torre do Tombo, Lisbon, CO/OP-7, folder 12.
16 Ribeiro, "Broadcasting to the Portuguese Empire in Africa".
17 Potter et al., *The Wireless World*.
18 Marissa J. Moorman, *Powerful Frequencies: Radio, State Power, and the Cold War in Angola, 1931–2002* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2019).
19 Interview with António Fonseca (former RCM producer) by Nelson Ribeiro and Catarina Valdigem, 6 February 2020.
20 Nuno Domingos, *Football and Colonialism: Body and Popular Culture in Urban Mozambique* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2017).
21 Cláudia Castelo, "*O Modo Português de Estar no Mundo": O Luso-Tropicalismo e a ideologia colonial Portuguesa (1933–1961)* (Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 1998).
22 Nelson Ribeiro, "A Polycentric Broadcasting Model: Radio and the Promotion of Portuguese Colonialism", *Journal Radio & Audio Media*, vol. 29, no. 1 (2022): 10–25.
23 Sílvio Santos, *A Rádio Estatal ao Modelo Integrado: Compreender o serviço público de radiodifusão em Portugal* (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra Editora, 2013).
24 Rogério Santos, *A Rádio Colonial em Angola: Festas e Rifas para Comprar o Emissor* (Lisboa: Universidade Católica Editora, 2020).
25 José Júlio Gonçalves, *A Informação na Guiné, em Cabo Verde e em São Tomé e Princípe* (Lisbon: ISCSPU, 1966).

26 De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, 37.
27 Ribeiro, "A Polycentric Broadcasting Model".
28 E.g. Letter from listener Francisco Gonçalves, resident in Lourenço Marques (Mozambique) who wrote on 28 July 1937 complaining that the Portuguese state broadcaster had poor reception conditions when compared with the transmissions from "London, Berlin, Radio Coloniale from Paris, Rome and others" (Letter published in *Radio Nacional*, 29 August 1937).
29 Recorded broadcasts from the 1940s and 1950s, Historical Archive of Mozambique, Maputo.
30 Santos, *A Rádio Colonial em Angola*.
31 Santos, *A Rádio Colonial em Angola*.
32 Ribeiro, "Broadcasting to the Portuguese Empire in Africa".
33 Ribeiro, "Broadcasting to the Portuguese Empire in Africa".
34 Mhlambi, Thokozani N., "Listening to Radio in South Africa, 1920s–1994", *The Routledge Companion to Radio and Podcast Studies*, eds. Mia Lindgren and Jason Loviglio (London: Routledge, 2022).
35 *Rádio Moçambique*, July 1936, p. 7.
36 *Rádio Moçambique*, December 1939, p. 1.
37 In accordance with several news items published during the late 1950s in the *Radio Clube de Moçambique* magazine.
38 Several editions of RCM's *Jornal da Noite* [evening news bulletin], Historical Archive of Mozambique and Archive of Radio Mozambique, Maputo.
39 António Estevão, *A Evangelização através da Notícia na Rádio Ecclesia* (Luanda: Mayamba, 2019); Ernesto C. Barbosa, *A Radiodifusão em Moçambique: O caso do rádio clube de Moçambique, 1932–1974*. (Maputo: Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, 1997).
40 Santos, *A Rádio Colonial em Angola*.
41 Resumo Histórico – Rádio Clube de Angola, AOS,CO/UL, Folder 30B.
42 José Júlio Gonçalves, *A Informação em Angola* (Lisbon, n.p., 1964).
43 "Novas Emissões", *Rádio Moçambique*, May 1958.
44 Luís Loforte, *Rádio Clube de Moçambique: Memórias de um doce calvário* (Maputo: CIEDIMA, 2007); António Sopa, *A Alegria é uma Coisa Rara: Subsídios para a história da música popular urbana em Lourenço Marques (1920–1975)* (Maputo: Marimbique, 2014).
45 *Rádio Moçambique*, May 1958, p. 6.
46 Interview with Matânia Odete Dabula (daughter of Samuel Dabula and announcer of *Hora Nativa*), by Nelson Ribeiro and Catarina Valdigem, 4 February 2020.
47 Ribeiro, "Segregation on the Airwaves".
48 Interview with Matânia Odete Dabula, 4 February 2020.
49 Santos, *A Rádio Colonial em Angola*.
50 Moorman, *Powerful Frequencies*.
51 Catarina Valdigem and Rogério Santos, "Sebastião Coelho e a Construção Sonora da Angolanidade", *Africana Studia*, vol. 34 (2021), 147–165.
52 Santos, *A Rádio Colonial em Angola*.
53 Celestino Anciães Felício, "Elementos Para a História da Radiodifusão de Angola (conclusão)", *Eletricidade*, vol. 87 (1973), 35–46.
54 Marissa J. Moorman "Guerrilla Broadcasters and the Unnerved Colonial State in Angola (1961–74)", *Journal of African History*, vol. 59, no. 2 (2018), 249.
55 Maria Helena Saltão, "Em Cabinda e no Rádio Clube de Cabinda não havia Guerra", *O Jornalismo Português e a Guerra Colonial*, ed. Sílvia Torres, (Lisboa: Guerra e Paz, 2016), 309–312.

56 Pamphlet containing the transcript of a broadcast from Léopoldville, 16 August 1960, Archive António Soares Carneiro, Lisbon, box 18, no. 4, folder 25.
57 Meneses, *Salazar.*
58 Fernando Dava *et al*., *Vida e Obra de Mateus Sansão Muthemba (1906–1968)* (Maputo: Arpac, 2015).
59 Alda Romão Saúte Saíde, "A Voz da FRELIMO and the Liberation of Mozambique", *Guerrilla Radios in Southern Africa. Broadcasters, Technology, Propaganda Wars, and the Armed Struggle*, eds. Sekibakiba Peter Lekgoathi et al. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020), 19–29.

Part II
Institutions

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

6 Supporting the Democratisation of Education and Anti-Colonialism in the Global South

The *World Student News* and Soviet Bloc Media Tactics in the 1970s

Pia Koivunen

> The world progressive and democratic student movement played an important role in the peoples' struggle in the 70s. It consistently supported all developments towards peace, detente and disarmament, and is now resisting any moves aimed at the renewal of the Cold War. The international solidarity rendered by students has always been an important contribution to the anti-imperialist struggle.[1]

In 1980, on the eve of the so-called Second Cold War, an editorial in the journal *World Student News* (*WSN*) looked back to the preceding decade and summarised the role that the Soviet bloc student movement had played in global societal and political changes. The editorial emphasised the significance of students taking part in world politics by supporting peace, international solidarity and disarmament. It also signalled that these students were not only being active members of the global society but were fulfilling the broader aims of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc.

The beacon of the student movement – progressive and democratic by its own definition – was the International Union of Students (IUS). The IUS was founded in Prague in 1946 and it was part of a cluster of Soviet-sponsored transnational organisations, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU, 1945), the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF, 1945), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY, 1945), the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW, 1946), the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ, 1946) and the World Peace Council (WPC, 1949). During the Cold War years, these organisations were viewed primarily as communist fronts and Soviet propaganda vehicles.[2] Recent scholarship has provided a more nuanced interpretation and argued that these organisations were more complex than mere mouthpieces of the socialist countries, especially among Global South countries.[3]

DOI: 10.4324/9781032618326-8

These works – most notably on the WIDF – have challenged the traditional Cold War binary categories and argued that these organisations formed a transnational, multicultural space, where political topics, ideologies, theories and concepts were discussed and negotiated by people working for the executive bodies and journals, for example *World Youth* (WFDY), *Women of the Whole World* (WIDF), *Peace Courier* (WPC) and *Democratic Journalist* (IOJ).[4]

Despite the growing interest in the topic, there is still a gap in our understanding about the broader impact of these organisations, especially in the Global South countries, and the legacies that might still have relevance in contemporary times, for example with regard to China and Russia's relations with Africa, Latin America and Asia. Moreover, while there is some sort of understanding of what these organisations and their agendas were like, there are neither works on their journals, nor a clear picture of what kind of media infrastructure they utilised in their work.

This chapter focuses on the journal of the IUS, *WSN*. *WSN* was an important paper as it was the largest and the longest operating international student organisation journal during the Cold War years. Recently, Mikuláš Pešta and Matthieu Gillabert have argued that although the IUS was a Soviet-backed organisation, *WSN* did not fully repeat the Soviet line but rather focused on issues specific to students.[5] By drawing on *WSN* from the 1970s, this chapter continues Pešta and Gillabert's work and examines how the contents of the journal reflected the interests of the IUS as a student body and the political goals of the Soviet Union and the socialist system that they were part of and dependent on. The 1970s was a time of détente in both world politics and the international student world. It was a few years after student rebellion in many Western countries, the war in Vietnam was still ongoing and a number of new countries had emerged on the world map as a result of the decolonisation process. The most significant shift in terms of the international student movement was that by the 1970s, the IUS had become the only international student organisation, its Western rival the International Student Conference (ISC) having ceased to exist. The ISC, which had promoted itself as a free and independent organisation in contrast to the IUS, had attempted to counterbalance communist dominance in the student world. Both the IUS and the ISC became more neutral and less political towards the end of the 1960s, but neither of them could win broad support from students, especially in the West.[6] The ISC operated until 1969. The reason behind its termination of the organisation was the revelations made by an American leftist magazine *Ramparts* about the CIA's financial assistance to the ISC and a few other international organisations to fight international communism.[7]

This chapter explores how the strategies of Soviet foreign policy were integrated into a student journal and what kind of tactics the editorial

board used in implementing these aims. By strategies I mean the broader objectives and plans set for the media in the socialist world and by tactics the everyday practices and choices taken by the editors of the journal. The analysis focuses on the choices of topics, the rhetoric and key concepts employed, significant gaps (what was not discussed) as well as the authors of published articles. Above all, to whom did *WSN* give voice?

As primary source material, I use the English edition of *WSN* between 6/1970 and 1/1980. It is an almost complete collection of the journal, with only a few issues missing here and there. Despite this incompleteness, the data is representative enough. For analysing the broader contents and themes, I have used both quantitative and qualitative methods. First, I browsed through the issues to get a sense of the content, structure and visual design of the journal. After that I used AntConc and Voyant Tools software programmes to trace the most frequent words and word collocations in order to see what the key topics and words in *WSN* were and whether there were any changes during the period under investigation.[8] For this, I used the editorial pages of *WSN*, which include the content of the issue, allowing one to get an overview of the discussed topics. Last, I chose a couple of articles on one of the most frequent topics in *WSN*, the democratisation of education, to illustrate the tactics used in the journal. The democratisation of education is a topic that is directly linked to student life, and thus, an analysis of this theme allows us to see the ways in which students as a social group were targeted. Analysing articles written by students from different parts of the world also allows us to make comparisons of how this topic was related to different types of countries and which other issues as well as broader Soviet goals were connected to it.

World Student News as a Journal

WSN, published from 1947 to 1991, was based in Prague, the hub of communist internationalism, where the IUS and many other Soviet-backed organisations had their headquarters.[9] It started as a small-scale bulletin, which initially served the needs of the student congress that preceded the IUS and after that became a "militant, responsible and graphically attractive" organ of the union.[10] *WSN* was published ten times a year and, in the 1970s and 1980s, it appeared in English, French, German and Spanish, with Arabic added from 1982. A Russian language edition was published for a shorter period (apparently between 1947–1951 and 1962), but it ceased to exist for an unknown reason.[11] The circulation was around 50,000 and it was printed in Dresden in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) by Grafischer Grossbetrieb Volkerfreundschaft. The subscription fee for the whole year varied between one and five dollars or equivalent in other currencies, and many of the student leaders received it free of charge.[12] In 1970, there

were subscription agents in 24 countries, mostly in Europe but also in Australia, Canada, India, Japan and Mexico. One could also order the paper directly from the *WSN* office.[13] According to a contemporary student activist, *WSN* was mainly distributed for free in student seminars, annual meetings, conferences and other events, such as demonstrations.[14]

The editorial board included between five and seven people at the time, representing different member organisations. In the 1970s, Palestinian Mazen Husseini and East Germans Hartmut König and Frieder Bubl worked as editors-in-chief.[15] Because of the lack of the archives of the journal, it is difficult to evaluate what the editing process was like, whether the editorial board received direct instructions from the IUS (or elsewhere) and how much room there was for individual choices in terms of topics, discourses and rhetoric. There are, however, a few memoirs and autobiographies that shed some light on the paper. Peter Waterman (1936–2017), a British communist who worked for the English edition of *WSN* between 1955 and 1958 (and later for the WFTU), briefly described the atmosphere in the journal in his memoirs. According to Waterman, it was almost impossible to change the way the journal was edited since they had to follow the same old formulations and "pathetic slogans of peace and friendship".[16] Swedish communist Jan Myrdal (1927–2020) pens similar experiences of his work for the French edition of *World Youth* (*Jeunesse de monde*) (the journal of the WFDY) in the early 1950s. Myrdal writes that the language used in the journal was troublesome as it did not appeal to Swedish youth, but because all the language versions had to be the same, there was nothing he could do to change it.[17]

East German Hartmut König (1947–) worked as editor-in-chief of *WSN* during the turbulent times of overthrowing Salvador Allende's government in Chile and the carnation revolution in Portugal (1973–1976). In an autobiography, he emphasises the importance of the anti-colonial struggle that *WSN* widely covered on its pages.[18] König's autobiography does not directly touch upon the editorial process of the journal, but he does describe his route to the journal, which followed the ordinary pattern of the socialist system, where everything was planned and controlled. In short: the central committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED) more or less ordered the post of editor-in-chief into being, without asking him first.[19]

Another East German, a Freie Deutsche Jugend worker and the editor-in-chief of *WSN* in 1976–1980, Friedrich Bubl, considered *WSN* more of a voice of the progressive student movement than an organ of the IUS. In an article published in a student magazine *Forum* in 1976, he explained that the journal gives room for divergent opinions from all willing associations, even those whose views on individual issues stood in contrast to those of the IUS. According to him, the idea of the magazine was to provide

in-depth articles on topical issues concerning students in different parts of the world.[20] The idea that *WSN* was not directly linked to the IUS was also underlined by the journal itself, and every issue had the standard phrase noting that "unless otherwise stated", the material published in the paper did not represent the views of the editorial board or of the IUS.[21]

In the 1970s, the editorial board published several articles on what the student press should be like and what kind of editorial work they were doing. For example, the editorial of the issue 11–12/1970 comments on readers' feedback and underlines the effort they have made to send their workers to do first-hand reporting on the spot in different parts of the world. "We have tried to introduce, as far as our possibilities allow us, an authentic picture of happenings throughout the student world and in the world in general".[22] Another editorial about the nature, methods and thinking of the editorial board and the journal was published in the issue 5–6/1974. The text reported and commented on an international student press seminar held in Ireland. Summarising the key points of the seminar, *WSN* also outlined its view on what the student press should be like. The editorial emphasised the social and transformative role of the student press in defending student rights, and as an important instrument for students in Global South countries in their fight against colonialism, neo-colonialism, national liberation and democracy. "The formation of progressive consciousness" was mentioned as an important task of the student press. Moreover, student journals should be non-profit, operating outside commercial media, and should act as the organiser, mobiliser and agitator of the student movement. Finally, the seminar stressed that the student press should strengthen international solidarity and help create "an atmosphere of mutual understanding, friendship, international cooperation and security".[23]

Compared to the *WSN* of the 1940s and 1950s, the magazine of the 1970s was less ideological and less propagandist, and more diverse in terms of topics and voices. While the papers of the late 1940s and 1950s were full of political sloganeering and aggressive campaigns,[24] the journal of the 1970s was more analytical, calm and journalistic, albeit including rather strong material on racism, torture of political dissidents and the fights of national liberation movements in Global South countries, showing photographs of brutally tortured people as well as young soldiers posing with machine guns.[25] *WSN* in the 1970s was also less polarised in terms of Cold War confrontation in comparison with the 1940s and 1950s. The reason for this might be that the contemporaries felt they had moved from the Cold War to détente and instead of military confrontation they were living in a period of cooperation at the time. This was explicitly mentioned in the journal a few times.[26] This view also fits very well with the institutional situation of the early 1970s when the IUS had

survived as the only large international student organisation, as the ISC had been closed due to its connections with the CIA. Another difference between these two periods was a clear shift from Eurocentrism to a much greater focus on Third World countries and topics from the 1970s onwards. The editor-in-chief Hartmut König writes in his autobiography that some Western workers within the IUS preferred to focus solely on student matters, but the brutal wars waged by the colonial powers in the Global South changed their minds.[27]

The main rival for *WSN* was the ISC's journal *The Student*, which was published between 1956 and 1968 with a circulation of around 25,000 copies. It appeared in three languages: English, French and Spanish (some issues also in Arabic).[28] Both *WSN* and *The Student* were distributed to university students and leaders of student organisations and political groups in numerous countries. In an article published in 1970, Philip Altbach suggested that the affiliated members (of the IUS and the ISC) were mostly interested in the activities and events, rather than their publications, which he thought were of relevance mainly to student leaders. He also pointed out that only a handful of university students at that time even knew about these organisations.[29] Due to the scarce sources and research discussing *WSN* and *The Student*, however, it is difficult to evaluate how much these papers were actually read and what their impact was.

Targets and Discursive Tactics

It was not explicitly mentioned on the pages of *WSN*, but one can read between the lines that the primary target audience for the paper was outside the socialist world. *WSN* was mainly written for and by students in the West and the Global South, or in Soviet rhetoric, the peace-loving and anti-imperialist forces in the capitalist countries and students participating in the national liberation movements in the Third World.[30] The publication languages also reflect this. In the 1970s, *WSN* came out in English (the primary working language), French, Spanish and German – all languages that enabled it to reach students and especially student leaders in Western countries but also in most of the Latin American, African and Asian countries. The fact that the lingua franca of the socialist bloc in Europe, Russian, is missing from the list of languages emphasises that *WSN* did not focus on students of the socialist countries and was not a major student paper there. Instead, its main goal was to win over supporters of pro-Soviet politics outside the socialist bloc.

Still, *WSN* largely operated within the Soviet bloc discursive landscape. It leaned on the Soviet view of the world, where the struggle between socialism and capitalism was the fundamental element in all spheres of life, and it followed the rhetoric familiar from Soviet foreign policy statements.

The corpus linguistic analysis of *WSN* shows that the typical vocabulary of Soviet foreign policy, including concepts like "democracy", "progress", "solidarity", "anti-Fascism", "anti-imperialism" and "anti-colonialism", was employed in the editorials of the journal. Anti-fascism was one of the key concepts in the first decades of the postwar period within the IUS and the whole Soviet-backed organisation cluster. The analysis of *WSN* editorials in the period 1970–1980 shows that anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism gradually replaced anti-fascism. This terminological change also reflects a geographical shift from Europe to Africa, Latin America and Asia. Anti-fascism still appeared in the paper, but it was most often mentioned in the context of World War II and the fight against Nazi Germany, like in this quote discussing the history of International Students' Day, "November 17 went down in the history of the international student movement as International Students' Day – commemorating the heroic resistance and anti-fascist struggle of the Czech students in those November days of 1939".[31]

The analysis also demonstrates how rarely concepts that were more closely linked to the Soviet system, such as "socialism"/"socialist", "communism"/"communist" and the names of political leaders of the European socialist countries, appear. For example, the terms "socialism" and "communism" do not appear at all on the list of the 500 most frequent words in the corpus. This was an old tactic. Avoiding too politically oriented discourse to obscure the links between the organisations and the Soviet Union had been typical for the Soviet-sponsored international organisations already within the popular front in the 1930s.[32] *WSN* employed this same tactic when trying to make the journal appeal to students who were not communist or socialist but could potentially become more pro-Soviet in their thinking.

The articles in *WSN* covered widely different parts of the world, which spoke to the global nature of the journal. The way the articles were framed, however, demonstrates that the Soviet categorisation of the globe into the First (capitalist), Second (socialist) and Third Worlds shaped the narration. The articles discussing the socialist countries followed an uncritical approach, avoiding any negative aspects. These articles hardly ever mentioned any difficulties or problems, but rather showcased the society, education and student life in a given socialist country as progressive and admirable, something that both the West and the Global South could learn from. This resembles the way the WIDF's journal *Women of the Whole World* was made. According to Yulia Gradskova, *Women of the Whole World* published overwhelmingly positive commentaries on the socialist countries, showing smiling women enjoying equal positions with men, as well as stories about socialist achievements written by visitors outside the Soviet bloc countries.[33]

Criticism towards the socialist system was not completely avoided; however, it was often belittled or answered in such a way that it looked beneficial for the system. A good example is an article written by *WSN* editor, Krzysztof Opalski. The article recounts a visit by an IUS delegation to Czechoslovakian universities and higher education institutions on the invitation of the Czechoslovakian Student Centre. Most of the article covers descriptions of the visit and the active role local students have played in university administration and in reforming their country. The last section of the article tackles political issues that the IUS delegation asked local students about. One of the issues was Czechoslovak students' passivity and apathy after the Soviet invasion of 1968 which, according to the article, had earlier been raised by some Western European experts. The local students admitted that "a certain group of students, after their experiences in 1968, realised that it was exploited and misused by various reactionary elements", but that "the normalisation of political life in the country, and above all the intensive ideological activity of student organisations has enabled the majority of the students to understand the political causes of the crisis" and thus find a place in their student community.[34] This represents a typical pattern of responding to critical questions on sensitive political issues or difficult social problems that existed in the socialist system. Instead of fully ignoring these questions, Soviet and pro-Soviet media offered their explanation, often belittling the problem by stating that it concerned only a small group of people and referring to the problem with minimal information, like in the case of Czechoslovakian students, where the Prague spring was referred to as "experiences of 1968".

The articles on students and education in capitalist countries, on the other hand, emphasise problems: power hierarchies, the un-democratic nature of higher education, difficulties in financing studies, unemployment and stress caused by the studies. For example, an article published in *WSN* November 1971 paints a picture of students in the US in the 1950s as passive, helpless and without any hope for the future. The article argues that because of the bourgeois state, monopolies and the McCarthy Terror, middle-class youth have no chance to plan for their future. Thanks to the peaceful co-existence policy, the author argues, American students had become more active in the ideological battle and the progressive student movement was mobilising in the country.[35] Another article discusses the use of "doping" (for example stimulants) among students in the US to survive the mental burden of studying. An expert from the research institute of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Health was interviewed for the article and he comments about the usefulness of drugs, offering alternative ways to cope with difficulties in student life.[36]

The coverage of the Global South students and countries was perhaps the most diverse in *WSN*. This is understandable, as the Global South

included a great variety of countries and regions, which were in different stages in terms of state formation. A common denominator was, however, the ongoing struggle either against fascist governments (for example Chile) or former/current colonial powers and colonial structures in given societies. Therefore, the articles on African, Latin American and Asian students often focused on national liberation movements, decolonisation, neo-colonialism, the fight against fascist regimes and students' roles in these struggles. Usually, these articles were written from the point of view of students, but sometimes the angle of Global South students fighting for the independence of their country or against military dictatorship was quite far removed from students living in different types of circumstances. Interestingly, Global South students are illustrated both as fighters against and victims of the former or still existing colonial powers, which have exported their malfunctioning and unequal educational system that needs to be reformed.[37]

The *WSN* of the 1970s revolved around three leading topics: the fight for national independence, the democratisation of education and organisational matters of the IUS. These topics were detected both by browsing the journal and through corpus linguistic analysis. The fight for national independence in Global South countries was linked to such words as "imperialist", "solidarity", "military", "liberation", "colonialist" and "fascism". Africa is the most frequently appearing continent, and Chile the country that appears most often. Education appears most often with the words "reform", "democratisation" and "financing", and the IUS and its activities are connected with the words "congress", "union", "festival" and "meeting".

The second prominent theme was education and student life, which meant in this journal studying, education and students as a social force in society. Under this category, there were articles for example on the democratisation of education in different types of societies, brain drain from the Third World countries to the West, values and worldviews, as well as the wellbeing of students. Relatively little space was devoted to leisure activities, culture and sports. Most of the issues had one or two pages of cartoons and half a page of personal ads for those seeking pen friends. In 1970–1973, every issue included at least one article focusing on culture, for example a report from film festivals, reviews on new films and books, or a reportage of theatre productions. Interestingly, the coverage of culture most often focused on socialist Eastern Europe.

The third major theme consisted of the organisational matters of the IUS. These included reports on congresses and seminars of the IUS, the events and activities it organised alone or together with other Soviet-backed organisations, as well as international events organised or hosted by socialist countries or associations. *WSN* reported on specific student

events, such as International Students' Day on 17 November,[38] the World University Theatre Festival, the International Student Forum on Cooperation in 1975, and congresses and seminars held by the IUS and national regional organisations, as well as devoting special issues to the World Festivals of Youth and Students that the IUS organised together with the WFDY. Moreover, *WSN* wrote a great deal about the activities of other Soviet-sponsored international organisations, such as World Peace Congresses arranged by the WPC. Cross-referencing each other's events and writing to each other's journals made the whole network known beyond one organisation. Publishing articles and special issues on international events hosted by socialist countries, but ignoring such events when they took place in capitalist countries, underlines the pro-Soviet ethos of the journal. While the Moscow 1980 Summer Olympics were discussed in a special issue, the other Olympic Games or any other significant international events were barely mentioned.

Controlled Diversity of Voices

WSN and its writers often underlined that the journal did not only focus on disseminating the IUS' views but also allowed divergent opinions on its pages. What did this mean in practice? What kind of difference in opinion was allowed and how diverse was *WSN* as a student journal? A close reading of *WSN* shows that diversity mainly applied to the articles that were written by guest authors, people who were not part of the editorial board or members of the IUS bodies. These authors included student leaders and activists, well-known figures from other Soviet-sponsored organisations and politicians. In the 1970s, *WSN* published articles, for example, by the likes of Soviet sociologist Igor Kon, Hungarian sociologist Károly Varga, Finnish student leader and chair of the Finnish Student Union Jorma Ollila (later the CEO of Nokia Corporation) and Argentinian communist politician and general secretary of the WIDF Fanny Edelman.

The topic of democratisation of education perhaps best shows the diversity of *WSN*, as the topic was discussed in the context of all three worlds: capitalist, socialist and the Third World. The editorials and articles written by the staff of the journal mainly followed the pattern where all these worlds had a different narrative on education, aligned with the stage of the development of statehood in the respective country. The articles discussing the democratisation of education in Western countries approached the topic from the perspective of crises, problems and an implicit need for a change in the educational system, resulting from the contradiction "between the interests of state-monopoly capitalism and those of the people". The texts addressing the topic in the context of Global South countries emphasised the legacies of the former colonial powers in creating educational

systems, which maintained and renewed the class-based hierarchies and power relations. Last, the educational system of the socialist countries was described as the most progressive and democratic in the field of education, "with free access for all, continuity at all levels of education, and the active participation of students and their organisations in the direction and management of university institutions".[39]

A closer look at a couple of articles allows us to see what kind of diversity was allowed and what the limits were within which the authors needed to operate. One of the articles discussing the democratisation of education in capitalist countries is a text written by a secretary of education and science of the Finnish Student Union, Mikko Pyhälä (1945–). His article, published in 1971, addresses the demands for democratisation of the university administration by Finnish students. Unlike most of the articles in *WSN*, Pyhälä's text does not lean on the idea of a battle between societal systems, and it lacks the standard concepts of Soviet international discourse. It focuses on the specific Finnish case and contextualises it by providing a detailed background and comparing the situation with other countries. In short, Finnish students wanted to have a real chance to influence the university administration and demanded universal and equal suffrage in the university elections. In comparison with many other articles in *WSN* discussing the democratisation of education, Pyhälä's article is analytical and thoughtful. It emphasises the role of student activism and does not blame the capitalist system for the problems in education. It is also interesting that the text mentions, in passing, that "the university should be a place of awareness, not of passive knowledge, as it is now". Moreover, Pyhälä points out the importance of critical thinking and objectivity, concepts that were rarely mentioned in other articles discussing education in *WSN*.[40]

In an interview, Pyhälä recalled that the editors of the paper had probably asked him to write for the paper. In the early 1970s, he was already an experienced writer with wide language skills and international network. Later to become a diplomat, serving as Finnish Ambassador to Peru and Venezuela, Pyhälä mentioned that he did not receive any strict guidelines or rules for writing to *WSN*.[41] A comparison of his text with other articles discussing the same topic demonstrates that it did not follow the conventional pattern of writing and that individual writers could get their texts published, thereby illustrating that *WSN* was not solely full of clear-cut praise for the socialist system and straightforward criticism towards capitalism.

The second example is an article by the Youth League of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO). It addressed the democratisation of education and anti-colonial struggle in Namibia. Namibia was a former British colony that South Africa had taken under her wing after World War I. Namibia finally gained independence in 1990. The article addresses

the question of education with regard to the colonial structures and different types of education offered to white colonialists and the local people, "African masses", as the article puts it. The discussion on education is closely linked to the colonial present, racism and the national liberation struggle. Therefore, the first step on the path to democratising the educational system in the country was to fight for national independence.[42] In a similar fashion to Pyhälä's article, this text departs from the local students' needs and perspectives. The article is framed in the anti-colonial fight, where students took part in the revolutionary activities and even guerrilla groups of SWAPO. The text does not mention the Soviet Union or the socialist bloc but refers to the Marxist-Leninist vision of a classless society as an inspiration for building education in the country.

In the 1970s, both the GDR and the Soviet Union assisted African liberation movements, including SWAPO, by training and educating Namibian youth. According to Chris Saunders, who has studied South African liberation movements, the help from the socialist countries did not ultimately have much influence on Namibia. Although SWAPO referred to scientific socialism in its political programme, it was more interested in the independence fight and used the ideological rhetoric only as a political tactic.[43] Mikko Pyhälä recalled that the IUS and the WFDY provided Global South students and young people with a channel to meet and interact with students from other parts of the world. Most of them adopted the pro-Soviet rhetoric, but, in his opinion, despite the few true believers, the majority were primarily interested not in communism but in international networking to help their countries.[44] The article by the Youth League of SWAPO can also be seen from this perspective. The main goal was to get Namibian voices heard and their struggle for independence known to the world. A brief mention of Marxist-Leninist inspiration at the end of the article might have been just a tactical move to ensure the publishing of the piece.

These two examples of articles demonstrate what kind of diversity existed in *WSN* in the 1970s. These texts did not radically differ from the Soviet bloc agenda and they were not anti-Soviet or anti-communist. The diversity can be found in the framing, language and contexts. Western and Global South students were in different positions, with regard to their regimes, than students in socialist countries, whose societies did not need such radical changes according to the official rhetoric. Therefore, students outside the socialist bloc were allowed more freedom in terms of writing. Students from the capitalist West could freely criticise their governments and were not obliged to frame their articles in terms of Soviet rhetoric. Students in African countries could use militant and revolutionary terms and rhetoric that would not be allowed for socialist students. As long as they did not criticise the USSR or praise the US or China, they were free to formulate their texts and use whatever discourse they liked.

Conclusion

WSN was a political student journal published by the Soviet-sponsored IUS. In the 1970s, the era of détente and less strained relations between the Soviet Union and the US, *WSN* adopted a new tactic. Especially during the late Stalinist years, it had been straightforwardly propagandist and unisonous. Now it attempted to look more diverse and limitedly tolerant. An openly propagandist style did not work in a world where both the US and the Soviet Union (and their allies) were fighting for the hearts and minds of students in the Global South and in the West.

WSN' tactic was to focus on students and student leaders outside the socialist bloc and support those issues that were important to them. Giving voice to student activists in newly independent countries in Africa or leftist students fighting against extreme right-wing governments in Latin America was a way to strengthen student agency but also their potential pro-Soviet sentiments. Western students, who often preferred to focus on "purely student matters", were encouraged to become more active in demanding social change in their societies. While supporting Global South and Western students in criticising, and even attacking their regimes, socialist students were required to keep silent about any problems and to project a picture of socialist countries as the forerunners of progress.

Soviet-sponsored transnational organisations and their journals have thus far received only marginal attention in scholarship. The obvious pro-Soviet nature might have given the impression that there would be nothing to actually study in their work. Using a media tactics approach, this chapter has demonstrated that the examination of the Soviet bloc organisations can bring new understanding of the mechanisms that the global leftist media used in reaching out to the leftist West and the Global South. In concert with other sources, such as archival materials of national student organisations as well as oral histories of student activists, *WSN* provides a rich base for future research on the long-term impact of the Soviet-sponsored international student movement among Global South students and young people. Do the legacies of *WSN*, the IUS and other Soviet-sponsored organisations still influence the way in which Global South countries think about Russia and its role in world politics?

Notes

1 R. Arzinger, A letter from the editor, *World Student News*, vol. 34, no. 9–10 (1980), 1.

2 Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Foreign Propaganda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Cultural Offensive* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); John C. Clews, *Communist Propaganda Techniques* (London: Methuen & Co, 1964); Richard Cornell, *Youth and Communism: An Historical Analysis of International Communist Youth Movements*

(New York: Walker and Company, 1965); Radomir Luza, *History of the International Socialist Youth Movement* (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1970).

3 Yulia Gradskova, *The Women's International Democratic Federation, the Global South, and the Cold War: Defending the Rights of Women of the 'Whole World'* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2021), 1–12.

4 Francisca de Haan, "Continuing Cold War Paradigms in Western Historiography of Transnational Women's Organisations: The Case of the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)", *Women's History Review*, vol. 19, no. 4 (2010), 547–73; Gradskova, *The Women's International Democratic Federation*; Melanie Ilic, "Soviet Women, Cultural Exchange and the Women's International Democratic Federation', *Reassessing Cold War Europe*, eds. Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy (London: Routledge, 2011); Joël Kotek, *Students and the Cold War* (London: Macmillan, 1996); Günter Wernicke, "The Communist-led World Peace Council and the Western Peace Movements: The Fetters of Bipolarity and Some Attempts to Break them in the Fifties and Early Sixties", *Peace & Change*, vol. 23, no. 3 (1998), 265–311.

5 Matthieu Gillabert and Mikuláš Pešta, "L'Union internationale des étudiants: Stratégies de légitimation en début de guerre froide mondiale", *Les Cahiers du Germe*, vol. 34 (2022), 81.

6 Philip G. Altbach, "The International Student Movement", *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 5, no. 1 (1970), 164–74.

7 Karen Paget, "From Stockholm to Leiden: The CIA's Role in the Formation of the International Student Conference", *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945–1960*, eds. Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 136–37; Hugh Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 134, 136; Altbach, "The International Student Movement", 174.

8 I first digitised the issues of *WSN* between 1970 and 1980, then transformed the editorial pages (one page on each issue) to text-files and formed a corpus of the editorials. For the use of corpus linguistics and AntConc and Voyant Tools in historical research, see, e.g., Eva Andersen, "From search to digital search: An exploration through the transnational history of psychiatry", *Digital History and Hermeneutics: Between Theory and Practice*, eds. Andreas Fickers and Juliane Tatarinov (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2022), 131–58.

9 For Prague as a hub of international communism and the transnational space of socialist networks, see Mikuláš Pešta, "A Hub of Anticolonialism. Prague's International Organizations in the Transnational Socialism Network and Global Cold War", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 0(0), 2024.

10 *World Student News*, vol. 25, no. 3 (1971), 1.

11 The assumption of the shorter life of the Russian language edition is based on the catalogue information of the Russian national library holdings of WSN's Russian language edition Vsemirnye Studencheskie Novosti and the World Student News from the 1970s onwards, where Russian is not mentioned.

12 *World Student News* 1970–1985; Philip G. Altbach and Norman T. Uphoff, *The Student Internationals* (Metuchen: The Scarecrow Press, 1973), 40.

13 *World Student News*, vol. 24, no. 6 (1970), 24.

14 Interview with Mikko Pyhälä, 14 August 2023.

15 Other members of the editorial boards in the 1970s: Juan Ernesto Gutiérrez, C. Kiss, Krzysztof Opalski, D. Toulaev, Vilmos Czerveny, Carlos Ordóñez, J. Sayamov; Lajos Demcsak, M. Ilyin, J. Gonzales, S. Nur, Bassie G. Bangura, A. Abu Ghosh, and L. Rivera, A. Al-Wahishi, A. Pardo, C. Valanidou.

16 Peter Waterman, Autobiography (unpublished manuscript in chapter author's possession), Chapter II, 13.
17 Jan Myrdal, *Maj: En kärlek* (Stockholm: En bok för alla, 1999), 107.
18 Hartmut König, *Warten wir die Zukunft ab: Autobiographie* (Berlin: Neues Leben, 2020), 206–7.
19 König, *Warten wir die Zukunft ab*, 199.
20 Peter Richter, *Reisen ins Fremde: Von Spitzbergen bis Kap Hoorn, vom Malecón zum Baikalsee* (Norderstedt: Books on demand, 2020), 148–49 (original references to Friedrich Bubl's views in *Forum*, Heft 21/19).
21 *World Student News*, vol. 24, no. 6 (1970), 1.
22 Mazen Husseini, "A Letter from the Editor", *World Student News*, vol. 24, no. 24 (1970), 1.
23 "A Letter from the Editor", *World Student News*, no. 5–6 (1974), 1.
24 See, e.g., Pia Koivunen, *Performing Peace and Friendship: The World Youth Festivals and Soviet Cultural Diplomacy* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2022).
25 "Torture in Uruguay", *World Student News*, vol., 30, no. 8 (1976), 22.
26 "A letter from the Editor", *World Student News*, no. 5–6 (1975), 1.
27 König, *Warten wir die Zukunft ab*, 202.
28 Altbach and Uphoff, *The Student Internationals*, 40–41.
29 Altbach, "The International Student Movement", 171.
30 See, e.g., Hartmut König, A letter from the editor, *World Student News*, no. 5–6 (1975), 1.
31 "A Letter from the Editor", *World Student News*, no. 11 (1976), 1.
32 Gerhard Wettig, *Stalin and the Cold War in Europe: The Emergence and Development of East-West Conflict, 1939–1953* (Landham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 30–32.
33 Gradskova, *The Women's International Democratic Federation*, 100.
34 "A journey through Czechoslovakia", *World Student News*, vol. 24, no. 9 (1970), 11–12.
35 G. Y., "Students of the USA: Seething, Turbulent, Inquiring", *World Student News*, vol. 25, no. 11 (1971), 11–13.
36 Michal Horáček, "Students and Doping", *World Student News*, vol. 24, no. 7/8 (1970), 29–31.
37 See, e.g., "The New Dynamic Role of Chile's University Students", *World Student News*, vol. 27, no. 9–10 (1973), 9–10.
38 International Students' Day was an integral part of the IUS mythology and a commemoration of Czech students' fight against Nazi occupation in November 1939. After World War II, 17 November was chosen as International Students' Day. See, e.g., "A Letter to the Editor", *World Student News*, vol. 30, no. 11 (1976), 1; Mikuláš Pešta, "Polozapomenutý Listopad. Mezinárodní den studentstva a jeho překrývaná paměť", *Paměť a dějiny*, no. 3 (2021), 90–100.
39 "A Letter from the Editor", *World Student News*, vol. 29, no. 11 (1975), 1.
40 Mikko Pyhälä, "Student Demands in Finland: A Democratic University Aware of Its Social Responsibility", *World Students News*, vol. 25, no. 3 (1971), 12–14.
41 Interview with Mikko Pyhälä, 14 August 2023.
42 "The Democratization of Education and Anti-Colonist Struggle by the Youth League SWAPO", *World Student News*, vol. 28, no. 8 (1974), 16–17.
43 Chris Saunders, "SWAPO's 'Eastern' Connections, 1966–1989", *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East'. Transnational Activism 1960–1990*, eds. Lena Dallywater, Chris Saunders, and Helder Adegar Fonseca (Berlin: De Guyter, 2019), 70–71.
44 Interview with Mikko Pyhälä, 14 August 2023.

7 The Paradox of Parliamentary Propaganda

Parliamentarians' Individual Media Tactics versus Parliament's Institutional Media Strategy

Betto van Waarden

Tactics generally support a singular strategy. Such a unified strategy fits businesses and governments, which execute commercial or political objectives. By contrast, parliaments *debate* rather than *execute* and are divided between parliamentarians and political parties with conflicting objectives. This internal division makes it difficult for parliaments to communicate to the outside world with a single voice. This multiplicity of voices *defines* parliament: as a forum of national debate, its main function is communicative. But the question of how to communicate this debate to the citizenry has illustrated its internal divisions. Institutions usually strategise about their tactics internally; parliament has been unique in that its media strategy has focused on mediating those tactical discussions publicly.

As media have been "written into history" in recent decades, research on parliamentary history has increasingly focused on communication. Scholars have studied parliamentary reporting by the press starting in the eighteenth century[1]; by audio-visual media in the twentieth century[2]; through the internet and digital media notably in the twenty-first century[3]; and by different media in the future.[4] Particular attention has been paid to the special and surprising roles of photography and caricature in communicating parliaments throughout these centuries.[5] While studies traditionally focused on national cases,[6] more recent research has drawn international comparisons,[7] shown the European Parliament's media engagement at the European level,[8] and emphasised the transnational nature of parliamentary reporting.[9] Most scholarship on media and parliaments fits into three categories: (1) *descriptive*, explaining the evolving mediation of parliaments; (2) *analytical*, studying the consequences of parliamentary mediation on parliamentarians' behaviour and the functioning of democracy; and (3) *advisory*, suggesting future policies for communicating parliament. In this literature, scholars have transitioned from studying individual media such as newspapers or television to understanding parliaments' engagement with an expanding media ensemble – how written, audio-visual,

DOI: 10.4324/9781032618326-9

and digital media interacted in their coverage of parliament. While this scholarship notes a shift from parliamentary opposition to publicity towards parliamentary demand for media visibility, it largely leaves open the question of parliaments' specific media objectives. Moreover, scholars have distinguished between the interests of *journalists and politicians* but have not differentiated as clearly between media approaches *among politicians*. Overall, scholarship has described how parliaments did – or deliberately did not – engage with media but leaves unresolved the puzzle of parliamentarians' underlying media strategies and tactics.

This chapter focuses on these parliamentary media strategies and tactics by analysing two layers of parliamentary practice: parliamentarians' media policies and their debates on these policies. Building on a *quantitative* analysis of broadcasting British parliamentary proceedings that *distinguished between subgroups* of members of parliament (MPs),[10] this *qualitative* study interprets the interplay between the overall media strategy of the British Parliament and the specific media tactics of *subgroups* of MPs by analysing parliamentary debates in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Westminster is relevant internationally, as it pioneered parliamentarism, and its debates on the question of broadcasting parliament spanned more than half a century. The chapter will argue that parliament and its parliamentarians dialectically reconciled an institutional media strategy with individual media tactics. This volume's media strategies-tactics interplay occurred on two layers, which will structure the chapter: (1) bottom-up media tactics of comparatively powerless parliamentarians combated the top-down media strategy of the powerful government; and (2) the higher level media strategy of the institution of parliament interacted with the lower level media tactics of individual parliamentarians, minority MPs similarly using tactics to subvert the majority strategy. The first layer will be explored by focusing on opposition and backbench MPs, and the second layer by concentrating on MPs representing the minority parties and smaller constituent countries of the United Kingdom (Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland). These parliamentary dialectics will finally show the elusiveness of specific media strategies and tactics themselves.

Opposition Media Tactics

The propaganda apparatuses that governments established during the World Wars were only nominally dismantled afterwards. In a semantic shift from "propaganda" to "public relations", modern governments increasingly professionalised their media strategy, supported by an expanding civil service public relations (PR) staff.[11] Parliaments, particularly their individual members, largely lacked such an institutionalised media apparatus. Parliamentarians had to resort to bottom-up media tactics to

face the government's top-down media strategy. This rear-guard resistance manifested itself in the British opposition's pleas for parliamentary proceedings to be broadcast. However, parliamentary debates on this question of parliamentary broadcasting also showed the messiness of media tactics, as MPs' arguments suggested parliamentary broadcasting would not clearly benefit the opposition or government in practice.

The opposition had not always been seen as the natural beneficiary of broadcasting. One opposition member noted at the first televised opening of parliament in 1958 that "anxieties were expressed earlier in some quarters that the Opposition might be prejudiced by what occurred", and that "commentators advised that we should not have agreed to the televising of the opening of Parliament". Yet he concluded "any anxieties I might have had were removed".[12] Subsequently, the opposition's tactical support *for* broadcasting proceedings became dual: publicity would enable the opposition to showcase its contributions *and* expose government MPs' shortcomings. In 1986, an opposition MP reasoned, if parliament were televised, "The whole country could then enjoy the Prime Minister's twice-weekly discomfort and listen to the Opposition's excellent speeches".[13] The opposition believed broadcasting would expose not only the prime minister but the entire governing party.[14] Despite this risk of exposure, it was still considered better to let the opposition question the government in broadcast debates than uninformed presenters in television shows: "The public will be able to see and hear what we do in this Chamber, rather than merely hear individuals being cross-questioned on a programme following our proceedings, possibly by people less well informed than Opposition Frontbenchers might be".[15]

These opposition media tactics faced the overarching media strategy of the government in parliament. The government enjoyed a natural publicity advantage and thus generally opposed broadcasting parliament. Emerging from the Second World War, an opposition MP complained that the government was continuing its costly publicity operations while curtailing press and parliament publicity. The government was "expending newsprint, and therefore dollars, on a vast scale", and "proceeding far more by the method of Press conferences, broadcasting, and now this Central Office of Information".[16] By the 1980s, an exasperated opposition member protested that there was "one Government handout officer for every two and a half journalists", making it "no wonder these sophisticated investigative journalists usually find themselves peddling the Government line".[17]

Given their advantage, government MPs stalled parliamentary broadcasting. Throughout these decades, MPs complained of both Labour and Conservative prime ministers opposing this broadcasting,[18] noting Thatcher "wants television kept out of the House because she fears that her public image will suffer".[19] MPs similarly complained all debates on

broadcasting proceedings had to be instigated by the opposition – "in the whole of this Parliament there has not been a debate on broadcasting at the initiative of the Government" – and therefore urged the government party to take more initiative here.[20] Even when the government finally arranged initial televising of parliament, an MP of the governing party itself objected that the government had still failed to take real responsibility by filming outdated parliamentary ritual rather than debate.[21]

Contradicting their overarching media strategy of resisting parliamentary broadcasting, government MPs sometimes supported such broadcasting for tactical reasons. Exposing the opposition was thought to benefit the government. Already in 1951, a government MP backed broadcasting because "I think it would do the people of the country good to see the joy on the faces of the Opposition at every difficulty which is imposed on the housewives"[22] – citizens should see the opposition hurting their interests. A corresponding logic re-emerged nearly four decades later when Thatcher tacked towards favouring broadcasts: "the image of the individual woman standing at the Dispatch Box, with the men howling and shouting at her while she tries to give the impression that she is faced with enormous difficulties in running the country because of all the hooligans on the Opposition Benches, will be worth half a million votes".[23] By the 1990s, a government MP even argued that "following the advent of the [televising] of the House, there is widespread concern and interest among our constituents in the Opposition's policies", and that parliament should thus perhaps institute a new question time – for scrutinising the opposition rather than the government.[24]

Finally, the messiness of media tactics was exemplified by continued controversy over whether the opposition or government would receive most parliamentary coverage.[25] A member summarised: "The official Opposition would argue their corner on the basis of their time-honoured position in the House. The governing party would argue its corner on the strength of its electoral victory and its parliamentary majority".[26] Overall, parliamentarians' tactical resistance to government media strategies thus manifested itself in opposition MPs advocating the broadcasting of parliamentary proceedings, which in turn was often resisted by MPs of that government. Yet on the level of parliamentary practice, opposition and government tactics overlapped, as MPs on both sides interpreted differently how they stood to gain or lose from parliamentary broadcasting.

Backbench Media Tactics

Tactical opposition also arose on the backbenches. Besides between opposition and government, bottom-up media tactics of relatively invisible parliamentarians confronted the top-down media strategy of a visible government in the struggle between back- and frontbenchers. The backbench

rather literally constituted the rear-guard – resorting to subversive tactics. Frontbenchers hold official positions like (shadow) ministerships in the government or opposition and thus naturally enjoy media attention, whereas their backbench colleagues are relegated to relative media obscurity. Backbenchers advocated broadcasting debates, particularly *in full* which would give them more visibility as well. However, some MPs warned of the negative effects of broadcasting on backbenchers and of procedural broadcasting coming at the expense of real reforms.

Backbenchers tactically sought media publicity, which in turn constituted a tactic for increasing their power in parliament. It was "very difficult as a backbencher to be seen or noticed on television",[27] but televising proceedings could "create opportunities for Backbenchers to be seen and heard".[28] Views on the desired extent of this coverage differed. "Many backbenchers are obsessed with the idea either of a parliamentary channel on which everything would go out from chaplain's prayers to 'Who goes home?', or with a half-hour programme 'In Parliament Today'", summarised a member.[29] Backbenchers wanted to be involved in regulating these televised proceedings[30] and to accommodate television staff in parliament.[31]

Backbenchers advanced ample arguments for their televising. Televising would restore the balance between the front- and backbenchers and represent more comprehensively to the public its own parliamentary representation. One MP suggested the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) exploit the "wealth of unused talent on the Backbenches" so "the predictable performers on the television screen would for a while or on occasion give way to others with fresh views".[32] Broadcast debates with "frontbenchers and backbenchers representing various points of view" would "have a far more representative impact on the public than allowing others to select who is merely to be interviewed".[33] One MP also suggested "the undoubted balance in favour of the Frontbench, which is inevitable in the Press, can be rectified if we have television".[34] MPs thus considered not only television itself, but its place within a broader media ensemble, and how this new medium could be leveraged tactically to compensate for the logic and political impact of an older medium. Another member even invoked Walter Bagehot, classical theoretician of the British Parliament, to emphasise that the function of parliament was not merely to legislate, but notably to inform the public about political affairs, and that frontbenchers could never fulfil this information duty alone.[35]

This distinction between front- and backbenchers itself was believed to attract attention. While television shows featured only "hierarchically equal" politicians, backbenchers questioning the prime minister in parliament showed the true dynamics of political power. "The David and Goliath act is far more fascinating to the audience than a contest between equals",

declared an MP in 1965.[36] A decade later, another member concluded that the "good balance between Front- and Backbenches" in broadcast experimenting constituted "a step in the direction of bringing Backbench influence to bear on the Executive"[37] – the David and Goliath act was not merely fascinating but increased David's tactical underdog power vis-à-vis Goliath's strategic topdog power.

However, broadcasting parliament also posed risks. Backbenchers would all feel forced to seek speaking time. In 1966, one MP warned "constituents will ask, 'Why are you not on television? Why are you not asking more Questions?'", leading to backbenchers vying for the television spotlight and thereby hurting the "prestige of Parliament".[38] Two decades later, this increased pressure on televised speaking time, exacerbated by backbenchers addressing *local* rather than *national* issues to cater to their local constituents, even provoked a renewed call for speeches to be shortened.[39] This problem was not unique to *plenary* sessions but also affected televised parliamentary *committees*. A member warned: "I believe we will soon come to a point where it will no longer be accepted as the role of Government Backbenchers to sit quiet, while Opposition Backbenchers spin out time, however familiar with that we may have become. Government Backbenchers have also been elected to speak".[40] The previously discussed opposition, and current backbencher, media tactics coalesced here, prompting a response from government backbenchers – signalling a vicious circle of competition for media attention in parliament. Moreover, seeking parliamentary publicity, backbenchers would enter another vicious circle of eccentricity. In the 1960s, an MP already predicted "The cameras would be on the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and on the occasional backbencher who steps out of line".[41] By the 1970s, it was noted more directly that "Backbenchers […] do not get in the news unless they say something outrageous or appalling".[42] Broadcasting parliament posed a potential race to the bottom in terms of backbencher behaviour.

The worst tactical backfire for backbenchers was the fear that broadcasting parliament would decrease rather than increase their visibility. From the early days, MPs warned frontbenchers' natural newsworthiness would simply transpose to parliament.[43] If parliament were televised, frontbench establishments would monopolise speaking time, and "no time will be allocated to Backbenchers".[44] An MP hypothesised: "Fifty-eight hon. Members put their names down to speak in the debate on the National Health Service, and I was fortunate enough to be called. However, I believe that if Parliament were televised, four times that number would put their names forward, and Backbenchers would therefore be precluded from speaking".[45] It was highlighted that in the Canadian Parliament, which had started broadcasting its debates eight years earlier, the whips had taken control of Question Time, undermining "the freedom and the

importance of Backbenchers on both sides of the House".[46] British backbencher fears partly came true. Once televising proceedings had begun in the Commons, an MP reflected that, rather than television having returned MPs to the Chamber, "people crowd in here only at peak TV times and it is difficult for Backbenchers to squeeze into the key positions that enable them to be seen by their constituents".[47] In the 1970s, an MP had still feared backbenchers would transform from "Lobby fodder", merely providing the necessary mass of votes for parliament's voting lobbies, to "camera fodder"[48] – but by the 1990s it thus became clear they did not even fit on camera.

Backbenchers thus embodied the bottom-up media tactics of the comparatively invisible parliament in its struggle for media attention with the frontbenchers' visible government. Backbenchers advocated broadcasting their proceedings, highlighting how their struggle with government would attract attention in itself. However, a tragedy of the commons loomed – or rather a "tragedy of common airtime". Backbenchers tactically vying for media attention and making long broadcast speeches would actually hurt parliament's overall strategy of increasing its media appeal vis-à-vis the government – assuming backbenchers would not be excluded from parliamentary media time to begin with. More generally, some MPs argued this focus on backbench publicity detracted from true parliamentary reform – "backbenchers on both sides" wanted "real democracy".[49] Another backbencher summarised: "If we install a television set in some humble cottage, this does not automatically turn it into a palace. To bring television cameras into this House will not change it overnight into a space-age automatised legislature".[50] These past two sections have thus shown that MPs of the opposition and backbench exemplified media tactics of a parliament on the defensive vis-à-vis the media strategies of an increasingly powerful and visible government in the twentieth century. Yet the backbench discussions already showed that there was also *internal* competition for media attention. How did media tactics play out *among* conflicting groups of MPs vying for the spotlight? These internal tactics will be the focus of the last two sections.

Party Media Tactics

In 1946, an MP praised the BBC's "Week in Westminster" programme for featuring members of parliament rather than journalists presenting parliament to the people, and for using a fair system of rotating these MPs based on the electoral size of their party.[51] Related to the struggle between the government and opposition, but with a different and constantly changing dynamic, was the interaction between political parties. In contrast to the general idea that partisanship has defined parliament, these parties

have not always been as divided. In fact, parties partly pursued a common media strategy on behalf of parliament as a whole. Initial discussions on broadcasting parliament were generally non-partisan, included arguments that it would benefit all parties, and resulted in non-partisan voting.[52] Yet as disagreement and competition increased, partisan media tactics gradually undermined a parliamentary media strategy.

The notion that broadcasting parliament constituted a common strategy emerged in the early post-war decades, when debates on this broadcasting occurred on a largely non-partisan basis. Throughout the 1960s, MPs stressed "this is a non-party subject of great interest to the House and the public".[53] Accordingly, both Labour and Conservative MPs requested and received a free vote on the question of parliamentary broadcasting – the whips would not enforce party loyalty but allow members to decide individually what they considered best for parliament.[54]

The belief behind this non-partisan approach was that parliamentary broadcasting would benefit all parties – and parliament as a whole.[55] A Labour MP argued that the Conservative and Labour leaders "both will come over brilliantly, because ability comes over well on television […] it is not a matter of which party wins or loses. The whole Chamber will gain".[56] Moreover, MPs noted that the Conservative and Labour party committees carried out important parliamentary work and should both be broadcast as well.[57]

However, by the 1980s, this Labour MP warned "the debate has moved on more recently to an argument about which party will have the advantage".[58] Broadcasting parliament became partisan. A Conservative MP warned "there would be disputes over the allocation of screen time between the parties", and that the fight over the allocation of political party broadcasting would be exacerbated by parliamentary broadcasting.[59] It was further feared that parliamentary debates could appear harshly partisan to television viewers at home,[60] and that this harsh partisanship might be aggravated as MPs would seek these viewers' attention.[61] Cracks began to form in parliament's common media strategy.

Partisan tactics increasingly dominated the debate on parliamentary broadcasting. The Labour Party thought it had brought politics to the common people historically, and broadcasting parliamentary debates would constitute a natural extension of that effort.[62] Broadcasting was also believed to benefit Labour. In 1978, a Labour MP regretted having voted against televising proceedings: "I should have liked to see the television cameras in here when the right hon. Member for Leeds, North-East made that incredible speech. I hope that it is well reported in the media, because it was worth a substantial number of votes to the Labour Party".[63] A decade later, another sceptical Labour MP similarly acknowledged "I can see some powerful arguments in favour of the Labour party", including that

"the press is almost wholly in hostile hands, whereas the electronic media are more impartial".[64] Some Labour MPs also believed broadcasting could expose their Tory nemeses: "the people of this country would see what an evil, rapacious and uncaring bunch the Tory Members have become".[65]

Conservatives displayed their own tactical interests in broadcasting parliament. In the early post-war period, they used Labour's self-image as the party of the public against it by expressing their surprise that Labour obstructed public discussion of parliamentary affairs in the media.[66] Conversely, as "support from the Tory side did not seem particularly evident" in parliamentary broadcasting, individual Tories expressed such support explicitly.[67] One Conservative MP pointed out that "all the worthwhile developments that have taken place in broadcasting since the war have been under Conservative Governments".[68] By the mid-1980s, the Conservative Party leadership became fully convinced the party stood to gain rather than lose from broadcasting parliament.[69]

Finally, broadcasting parliament mattered especially to minority parties. The Leader of the House acknowledged "minor parties have a specific view as regards the televising of our proceedings and that we must ensure that there is an opportunity for that properly to be taken into account".[70] These parties also wanted their piece of the media pie. "The minority parties would argue for more equal time on the strength of their share of the popular vote", reasoned one MP.[71] An MP of the minority Scottish National Party (SNP), however, warned of spiralling minority party competition for coverage if Question Time were broadcast.[72] Individual party media tactics also began to undermine a common minority parties media strategy. In discussions *preceding* permanent parliamentary broadcasting, an SNP member wanted: "to make it clear on behalf of Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National party that we would not be happy to be represented on the Select Committee by a member of the SDP or the Liberal party […] At one time we could have trusted members of those parties, because they wanted to further the interests of smaller parties. They now have ambitions beyond their stature. They are imperialist in the sense that they want to aggrandise themselves to get media coverage".[73] In discussions *following* permanent parliamentary broadcasting, this complaint resurfaced. A Conservative MP lamented "Liberal Democrats all bunched behind one other on Benches belonging to the Labour party so as to achieve the 'doughnut' effect for television […] They do that simply to get themselves on television and to give an impression that they are doing more work than they usually do".[74] Broadcast proceedings offered a tactical opportunity for minority parties to punch above their weight politically.

Political parties' shift from a common media strategy to partisan media tactics finally occurred in their voting on, and later usage of, parliamentary broadcasting. While early votes were non-partisan,[75] voting became

increasingly partisan over time. Following the voting and expansion of parliamentary broadcasting, MPs shifted from the idea that common parliamentary broadcasting could *replace* party broadcasting, to the idea that parliamentary broadcasting could be *exploited for* party broadcasting. In 1989, an MP argued "it would be far better if, every day, five minutes more could be broadcast from this House, and there were no more party political broadcasts".[76] In contrast, by 1995, several MPs wanted to remove "all restrictions on the use of [parliamentary] archive material in party political broadcasts and election broadcasts".[77]

These shifting notions on parliamentary broadcast voting and exploitation thus reflected a broader transformation. While in the early post-war period MPs had set aside their partisan differences to discuss a common media strategy to increase their collective visibility, MPs in later decades rather pursued partisan media tactics to enhance their party's individual visibility. Partisan tactics partly undermined a parliamentary strategy. However, this initial collective media strategy should not be overstated: many MPs appeared to support it instrumentally as a means of enhancing their personal media visibility, rather than idealistically to enhance their institution's media visibility. Moreover, it was not the parliamentary strategy of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s but the partisan tactics of the 1980s that finally provided the political support necessary to actually establish permanent parliamentary broadcasting.

Constituent Country Media Tactics

In 1988, the Scottish National Party was the only political party that voted unanimously for televising the House of Commons.[78] Why? This remarkable unity of purpose puts regionalism in the spotlight – and the media spotlight was exactly what was at stake. Parliament's media strategy was subjected internally not just to the media tactics of political parties but also to the tactics of MPs representing the different constituent countries of the United Kingdom. While "hegemonic" England and its MPs were represented rather naturally in the overall UK Parliament and the media attention it received, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland and their MPs still had to claim their media-political space. The media tactics of the latter MPs simultaneously supported and undermined a common parliamentary media strategy – albeit in ways distinctly different from those of the party tactics. Country tactics supported a parliamentary strategy by expanding the broadcasting audience with regional listeners and viewers, which would increase parliament's overall media visibility. However, increasing debating time spent on local issues to accommodate local audiences would come at the expense of debating national issues that would showcase the overarching national relevance of parliament; and attention for broadcast

country committees and assemblies would come at the cost of attention for parliament's plenary.

The problem was that the smaller countries of the union felt left out of its parliamentary process and coverage. "There is a great feeling in Scotland that, somehow, the whole processes of Government are remote from Scotland", noted an MP.[79] Another observed that, had parliament been broadcast, its "debate would undoubtedly have appeared on local screens in Wales, Scotland and Yorkshire".[80]

The solution was to promote such broadcasting. MPs pleaded to "involve the Scottish television networks in televising our proceedings and bringing the whole processes of our discussion much nearer home".[81] They insisted particularly on broadcasting debates on regional issues relevant to citizens in the constituent countries, such as education, housing, and local government.[82] Another MP argued broadcasting could help explain specific Northern Irish issues to the public, within both Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom.[83] Informing the public in this way could help it adopt a more critical attitude: an SNP member demanded "that our proceedings are relayed to the people of Scotland so that they can see that the minority viewpoint proposed by the Conservative party is completely alienated from the majority view in Scotland".[84] However, this public scrutiny argument was also used against the Scots. "I, too, wish that many more people from Scotland and Wales were listening to the debate, either directly or by means of television, so that they might witness the farce of this Scottish National Party motion and see how its Members will emerge from the debate with bloody noses and several black eyes", an MP remarked scathingly.[85] The sword of a parliamentary media strategy cut both ways – and thus MPs disagreed on how to handle it.

It was emphasised repeatedly that bringing parliament to the people *through media* would actually be more effective than bringing parliament to the people *physically* by moving meetings from Westminster to Scotland.[86] An MP exclaimed "the power of television is capable of bringing the Government closer in reality to people in their homes than by picking up part of the apparatus of Government and plonking it down in Edinburgh".[87] In practical terms, MPs advocating regional broadcasting of parliament tactically supported the broader parliamentary strategy of experimenting with broadcasting. They suggested regional broadcasters could focus on issues and MPs of regional importance[88]; that "viewers there may very well like to have quite long programmes about debates on Scottish or regional affairs"[89]; and that parliamentary broadcasting constituted cheap content for regional television.[90] Constituent countries' tactical interest in developing parliamentary broadcasting was acknowledged. The Leader of the House recognised the "particular considerations to be taken into account in the coverage of our proceedings in Wales, Scotland

and Northern Ireland"[91]; and an English MP asserted the regions should be represented on the Select Committee on Televising the Proceedings of the House to not "hand matters over – these are not my words – to the southern metropolitan interests, who would forget the needs of the other regions".[92] These comments suggest a solidary attempt to integrate regional tactics into the common media strategy.

However, fear arose that these regional tactics might actually pull apart the common media strategy. At first glance, additional coverage of regional issues in parliament and additional distribution of parliamentary recordings in the regions appeared simply to enlarge parliamentary visibility – enhancing a common media strategy. Yet within an attention economy in which broadcasting time and viewers' interest were limited, both coverage of regional issues and regional programmes competed with coverage and programmes focused on overarching national political concerns. Competition for content would increase. One MP warned: "regional coverage of activities on the Floor will turn out to be far more important than national coverage […] There will be a marked shift in the weighting of speeches from national to local concerns".[93] Another MP had also suggested that, for instance, Welsh broadcasters could use more of the recorded debates on Welsh issues than national broadcasters would.[94] From a regional political perspective, such local coverage would be great. Yet from the perspective of a common parliamentary media strategy, based on showing the public that its parliament addressed the most important national issues of common concern, this fragmentation into separate rather than collective interests was potentially detrimental.

This double-edged sword reappeared in another guise. MPs also suggested broadcasting, other parliamentary discussions and activities, besides the plenary debates. This widening of broadcasting content could increase parliamentary visibility but also create competition *among* different types of parliamentary broadcasts – in addition to the previously described competition for airtime *within* plenary debates. MPs notably advocated broadcasting the Welsh and Scottish Grand Committees and a possible Northern Ireland Committee. They argued that issues relevant to the constituent countries were often dealt with not in plenary sessions but in committees, and for their respective citizens it would thus be vital to broadcast those committees.[95] On a *practical* level, some of these MPs acknowledged that regional media tactics literally came at a cost for the common media strategy, as this committee broadcasting required additional financing. One specified "we must realise that what the broadcasting authorities can inject by way of resources for an experiment must have some limit, and therefore for the experiment we would have to be content with cameras in the Chamber alone".[96] On a *symbolic* level, however, another MP argued that this financial cost of regional media tactics was

outweighed by the benefit to the overall media strategy of showing parliament's importance: "broadcasting [the Scottish and Welsh Grand Committees] also would cost much more because it would mean fitting into the rooms upstairs equipment similar to that which would be used here in the Chamber itself, but it is, in my view, *vital to the whole position of Parliament in the public eye* that the discussions in some of our Committees should be broadcast".[97]

MPs promoted broadcasting select committees more generally, especially when these actually went *into the country* – which should be possible even if broadcasting them within parliament remained too controversial. One MP exclaimed that "if we cannot face breaking the traditions that go back to Elizabeth I, for goodness' sake let [televising committees] be done when we go out into the country – if, for example, a Select Committee goes to Merseyside, to Newcastle, to Scotland or to the West Country".[98] Finally, MPs tactically argued for broadcasting the Scottish and Welsh *assemblies*, the latter of which "would no doubt fill the people of Wales with great anticipation".[99] Corresponding to the argument about committees, it was contended such broadcasts constituted a synergy strategy, enhancing visibility of the Scottish and British Parliaments together. "In both that [Scottish] assembly and this House broadcasting could well lead to *the two* Chambers becoming once again a *focus of national debate*", stated an SNP member.[100] Broadcasting committees and regional assemblies thus had the potential not only to enlarge parliamentary visibility but also to detract from parliament's plenary work.

Following the establishment of permanent broadcasting, MPs concluded in the early 1990s that "regional coverage is one of the good things to come out of the televising of Parliament".[101] While interests of political parties and constituent countries overlapped in debates on broadcasting parliament, two fundamental differences existed. From a *partisan* perspective, broadcasting parliament formed a *zero-sum* game: arguments generally assumed a fixed amount of parliamentary debates that could be mediated, and a single national audience. From a *country* perspective, by contrast, broadcasting parliament formed a *non-zero-sum* game: arguments assumed a fluid number of parliamentary debates that could be mediated, and varying national and regional audiences. However, regional media tactics both reinforced and undercut a national parliamentary media strategy. Broadcasting more regional issues in parliament and broadcasting also to regional audiences increased parliament's overall visibility. Yet this regional focus might detract from parliament's national importance, and mediated regional committees and assemblies would compete for attention with the mediated plenary. Regional tactics potentially increased but fragmented parliamentary visibility.

Conclusion

> Television will turn the Chamber into a political soap box. Detailed, leisurely analysis by half a dozen right hon. and hon. Members on the Government and Opposition Benches of a weights and measures Bill, for example, or the White Fish Authority will vanish. During the time I have been here I have seen one hon. Member eating an apple during Prime Minister's Question Time, knowing that everybody would ask, "Why is he eating an apple?" He was eating an apple to draw attention to the plight of the Kent apple growers.
>
> (Joseph Ashton, MP, 1985)[102]

Parliamentarian Ashton's warning captures the dialectical dilemma of broadcasting parliament. Parliamentary media strategies and tactics interconnect in complex ways. MPs' *individual tactics* symbiotically generated media attention both for themselves and their institution, yet risked undermining parliament's *institutional strategy* of showcasing its political relevance to maintain its privileged position at the heart of democracy. Parliamentary practices of both establishing parliamentary media policies and debating these policies have shown this dialectic between the UK Parliament's media strategy and its parliamentarians' media tactics. Two levels characterised these media strategy-tactic dialectics. Firstly, the analysis of relatively powerless opposition and backbench MPs has shown how bottom-up parliamentary media tactics served to combat the powerful top-down government media strategy. Secondly, the study of MPs representing different political parties and constituent countries has demonstrated how the media tactics of individual MPs both reinforced and jeopardised the overarching media strategy of their collective parliamentary institution.

While existing scholarship *described* the evolution of parliamentary mediation, *analysed* its consequences, and *advised* on future policies, this chapter has thus for the first time *untangled its underlying strategies and tactics*. Based on a distinction *between journalists and politicians*, the scholarship showed parliaments shifting from opposing to seeking publicity. Yet based on a distinction *among different politicians*, this chapter has demonstrated that this shift was no straightforward evolution but subject to complex and conflicting internal tactics. Moreover, these parliamentary media strategies and tactics were neither clear nor static, but ambiguous and constantly changing. Parliament's media strategy of seeking democratic visibility constituted an equilibrium resulting from pulling and pushing tactics both within parliament and vis-à-vis the government. The paradox of parliamentary propaganda was that parliament's conflicting media tactics became its common media strategy: its debates and

disagreements on how to publicise itself to the public *were* publicised to this public. The chapter thus supports this edited volume's dual conceptual understanding that media tactics both supported and subverted overarching media strategies, and that these media tactics were messy in practice. Moreover, this parliamentary case study brings together the volume's three main themes: the media *infrastructure* of the *institution* of parliament was the result of its tactical *entanglements*.

While parliament has been unique in that its dialectic between media strategies and tactics played out publicly, it can help us understand media tactics within other complex institutions. With its constituent countries, the UK Parliament provides a model for also studying the media tactics of intergovernmental and supranational institutions – with a multiplicity of not only internal voices but external audiences.

Notes

1 Arthur Aspinall, "The Reporting and Publishing of the House of Commons' Debates, 1771–1834", *Essays Presented to Sir Lewis Namier*, eds. Richard Pares and A. J. P. Taylor (London: Macmillan, 1956); Andreas Biefang, *Die andere Seite der Macht: Reichstag und Öffentlichkeit im "System Bismarck" 1871–1890* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2012), 66–96; Charles J. Gratton, *The Gallery: A Sketch of the History of Parliamentary Reporting and Reporters* (1860); Ian Harris, "What Was Parliamentary Reporting? A Study of Aims and Results in the London Daily Newspapers, 1780–96", *Parliamentary History*, vol. 39, no. 2 (2020); Michael MacDonagh, *The Reporters' Gallery* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1913); Donald Ritchie, *Press Gallery: Congress and the Washington Correspondents* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1991); Colin Seymour-Ure, "The Parliamentary Press Gallery in Ottawa", *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 16 (1962–1963); Colin Seymour-Ure, "Parliament and Government", *Studies on the Press*, eds. Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Colin Seymour-Ure and Jeremy Tunstall (London: H.M.S.O, 1977).

2 Jay G. Blumler, "The Sound of Parliament", *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 37, no. 3 (1984); W. Mark Crain and Brian L. Goff, *Televised Legislatures: Political Information Technology and Public Choice* (Boston: Kluwer, 1988); Ronald Garay, *Congressional Television: A Legislative History* (Westport: Greenwood, 1984); Harry Grundy, "Televising Parliament: An Analysis of the First Fifteen Years of the Televised Proceedings of the House of Commons" (PhD, University of Cambridge, 2005); Ian Ward, "Parliament on 'the Wireless' in Australia", *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, vol. 60, no. 2 (2014).

3 Andrew Blick, *Electrified Democracy: The Internet and the United Kingdom Parliament in History* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2021); Stephen Coleman, *Electronic Media, Parliament and the People: Making Democracy Visible* (London, 1999).

4 Nicolas Bouchet and Nixon Kariithi, *Parliament and the Media: Building an Informed Society* (Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, 2003); *Members Only? Parliament in the Public Eye: The Report of the Hansard Society Commission on the Communication of Parliamentary Democracy* (London: Hansard Society, 2005).

5 Andreas Biefang, *Bismarcks Reichstag: Das Parlament in der Leipziger Strasse. Fotografiert von Julius Braatz* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2002); Andreas Biefang and Marij Leenders, eds., *Erich Salomon & het ideale parlement: Fotograaf in Berlijn en Den Haag, 1928–1940* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2014); Tineke Luijendijk and Louis Zweers, *Parlementaire fotografie: Van Colijn tot Lubbers* ('s-Gravenhage: Staatsuitgeverij, 1987); Sally Young, "Press Photography and Visual Censorship in the Australian Parliament", *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, vol. 64, no. 1 (2018).
6 Andrew Sparrow, *Obscure Scribblers: A History of Parliamentary Reporting* (London: Politico's, 2003); Huub Wijfjes, "Koningin der aarde in het parlement: Twee eeuwen journalistiek rond de Tweede Kamer", *In dit huis: Twee eeuwen Tweede Kamer*, eds. Remieg Aerts et al. (Amsterdam: Boom, 2015); Els Witte and Jan Ceuleers, "De parlementaire verslaggeving in en over de Kamer", *Geschiedenis van de Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, 1830–2002*, eds. Emmanuel Gerard et al. (Brussel: Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, 2003).
7 Frank Bösch, "Parlamente und Medien: Deutschland und Großbritannien seit dem späten 19. Jahrhundert", *Parlamentarische Kulturen in Europa: Das Parlament als Kommunikationsraum*, eds. Andreas Schulz and Andreas Wirsching (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2012); Marcel Broersma, "Mediating Parliament: Form Changes in British and Dutch Journalism, 1850–1940", *Mediatization of Politics in History*, eds. Huub Wijfjes and Gerrit Voerman (Leuven: Peeters, 2009); Bob Franklin, ed., *Televising Democracies* (London: Routledge, 2013 [1992]); Ralph Negrine, *Parliament and the Media: A Study of Britain, Germany and France* (London: Pinter, 1998); Uwe Thaysen et al., eds., *The US Congress and the German Bundestag* (Boulder: Westview, 1990), 495–536; Dietmar Schiller, *Brennpunkt Plenum: Die Präsentation von Parlamenten im Fernsehen. Britisches House of Commons und Deutscher Bundestag im Vergleich* (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002); Charles Wilson, *Parliaments, Peoples and Mass Media: A Report on the Geneva Symposium Organized by the Inter-Parliamentary Union in December 1968* (London: Cassell & Company, 1970).
8 Martyn Bond, ed., *Europe, Parliament and the Media* (London: Federal Trust, 2003).
9 Betto van Waarden, "Parliamentary Reporting", *Companion to Transnational Journalism History*, eds. Frank Harbers et al. (London: Routledge, forthcoming).
10 Betto van Waarden and Mathias Johansson, "Democracy (Not) on Display: A Structural Collocation Analysis of the Mother of All Parliaments' Reluctance to Broadcast Herself", *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 77, no. 2 (2024).
11 E.g., Brendan Maartens, "From Propaganda to 'Information': Reforming Government Communications in Britain", *Contemporary British History*, vol. 30, no. 4 (2016).
12 House of Commons (henceforth HC) 28 October 1958, vol. 594 cc. 15–23.
13 HC 4 December 1986, vol. 106 c. 1089; also HC 20 November 1985, vol. 87 cc. 317–18; HC 20 November 1985, vol. 87 cc. 337–38; HC 9 February 1988, vol. 127 c. 268.
14 HC 25 November 1987, vol. 123 cc. 273–74.
15 HC 19 March 1970, vol. 798 cc. 783–85.
16 HC 13 May 1948, vol. 450 cc. 2352–54; also HC 6 July 1954, vol. 529 cc. 2064–68.
17 HC 9 February 1988, vol. 127 cc. 211–12.

18 HC 21 November 1969, vol. 791 cc. 1701–04; HC 24 November 1987, vol. 123 c. 137.
19 HC 9 February 1988, vol. 127 c. 213; also HC 20 February 1990 vol. 167 cc. 798–99.
20 HC 27 November 1969, vol. 792 c. 621; also HC 27 November 1969, vol. 792 c. 623.
21 HC 25 April 1966, vol. 727 cc. 409–17.
22 HC 8 February 1951, vol. 483 cc. 1998–99.
23 HC 20 November 1985, vol. 87 cc. 305–06; see also HC 31 October 1991, vol. 198 cc. 107–8.
24 HC 27 June 1991, vol. 193 c. 1145.
25 E.g. HC 24 November 1966, vol. 736 cc. 1626–29.
26 HC 20 November 1985, vol. 87 cc. 345–47.
27 HC 28 May 1965, vol. 713 cc. 1048–50.
28 HC 9 February 1988, vol. 127 c. 275.
29 HC 19 October 1972, vol. 843 cc. 547–51.
30 HC 10 February 1972, vol. 830 c. 1580.
31 HC 2 November 1965, vol. 718 cc. 912–15.
32 HC 9 June 1976, vol. 912 cc. 1570–75.
33 HC 24 February 1975, vol. 887 cc. 116–19.
34 HC 24 November 1966, vol. 736 cc. 1726–29.
35 HC 19 October 1972, vol. 843 cc. 520–22.
36 HC 28 May 1965, vol. 713 cc. 1118–22.
37 HC 8 March 1976, vol. 907 cc. 144–47.
38 HC 24 November 1966, vol. 736 c. 1713.
39 HC 30 November 1988, vol. 142 cc. 782–84.
40 HC 8 November 1989, vol. 159 cc. 1014–15.
41 HC 21 November 1969, vol. 791 c. 1673.
42 HC 16 March 1976, vol. 907 cc. 1132–34.
43 HC 28 May 1965, vol. 713 cc. 1128–31.
44 HC 20 November 1985, vol. 87 cc. 306–7.
45 HC 9 February 1988, vol. 127 c. 250.
46 HC 9 February 1988, vol. 127 cc. 272–73.
47 HC 19 July 1990, vol. 176 cc. 1268–69.
48 HC 24 February 1975, vol. 887 cc. 104–5.
49 HC 25 April 1966, vol. 727 cc. 460–65.
50 HC 24 November 1966, vol. 736 cc. 1678–81.
51 HC 16 July 1946, vol. 425 cc. 1130–33.
52 Sparrow, *Obscure*, 172.
53 HC 28 May 1965, vol. 713 cc. 1122–27; also HC 28 May 1965, vol. 713 cc. 1122–27; HC 24 November 1966, vol. 736 cc. 1697–1700; HC 21 November 1969, vol. 791 cc. 1632–36.
54 HC 10 December 1953, vol. 521 cc. 2177–78; HC 07 November 1968, vol. 772 cc. 1086–87; HC 19 October 1972, vol. 843 cc. 501–03.
55 E.g. HC 28 May 1965, vol. 713 cc. 1094–1100.
56 HC 20 November 1985, vol. 87 cc. 328–30.
57 HC 20 November 1985, vol. 87 cc. 337–38.
58 HC 20 November 1985, vol. 87 cc. 328–30; also HC 9 February 1988, vol. 127 cc. 239–40.
59 HC 20 November 1985, vol. 87 cc. 345–47.
60 HC 20 January 1995, vol. 252 cc. 932–34.

61 HC 28 May 1965, vol. 713 cc. 1128–31.
62 HC 14 January 1964, vol. 687 cc. 139–41.
63 HC 4 July 1978, vol. 953 cc. 291–93.
64 HC 9 February 1988, vol. 127 c. 268.
65 HC 25 November 1987, vol. 123 cc. 273–74; also HC 27 January 1988, vol. 126 cc. 426–28.
66 HC 30 November 1955, vol. 546 cc. 2357–63.
67 HC 15 January 1974, vol. 867 cc. 443–45.
68 HC 20 November 1986, vol. 105 cc. 786–88.
69 HC 13 November 1985, vol. 86 cc. 640–41.
70 HC 29 March 1988, vol. 130 c. 1039.
71 HC 20 November 1985, vol. 87 cc. 345–47.
72 HC 20 November 1985, vol. 87 cc. 321–23.
73 HC 20 November 1985, vol. 87 cc. 323–24.
74 HC 20 June 1994, vol. 245 c. 31.
75 E.g. HC 26 November 1971, vol. 826 cc. 1803–06.
76 HC 18 December 1989, vol. 164 cc. 74–76.
77 HC 9 March 1995, vol. 256 cc. 517–18.
78 HC 29 March 1988, vol. 130 cc. 1046–47.
79 HC 29 April 1968, vol. 763 cc. 944–46; also HC 8 March 1976 vol. 907 cc. 154–56.
80 HC 24 February 1975, vol. 887 cc. 74–80.
81 HC 29 April 1968, vol. 763 cc. 944–46; also HC 16 June 1981, vol. 6 cc. 972–73.
82 HC 24 February 1975, vol. 887 cc. 128–29; HC 20 November 1985, vol. 87 cc. 323–24.
83 HC 26 November 1985, vol. 87 cc. 785–86.
84 HC 3 May 1988, vol. 132 cc. 845–46.
85 HC 4 July 1977, vol. 934 cc. 955–57.
86 HC 16 June 1981, vol. 6 cc. 972–73.
87 HC 22 February 1977, vol. 926 cc. 1330–34.
88 HC 20 November 1985, vol. 87 cc. 328–30.
89 HC 24 November 1966, vol. 736 cc. 1660–61.
90 HC 20 November 2000, vol. 357 cc. 52–53.
91 HC 29 March 1988, vol. 130 c. 1039.
92 HC 9 February 1988, vol. 127 cc. 279–80.
93 HC 30 November 1988, vol. 142 cc. 782–84.
94 HC 26 November 1971, vol. 826 cc. 1810–12.
95 HC 3 August 1976, vol. 916 cc. 1637–38; HC 24 November 1971, vol. 826 cc. 1446–48; HC 19 October 1972 vol. 843 cc. 494–96; HC 24 February 1975, vol. 887 cc. 61–64.
96 HC 19 October 1972, vol. 843 cc. 494–496.
97 HC 26 November 1971, vol. 826 cc. 1812–14 (emphasis added).
98 HC 16 January 1981 vol. 996 c. 1298; also HC 16 January 1981, vol. 996 cc. 1299–1300.
99 HC 26 January 1998, vol. 305 c. 113.
100 HC 24 February 1975, vol. 887 cc. 129–30 (emphasis added).
101 HC 1 May 1991, vol. 190 cc. 342–45; also HC 1 May 1991, vol. 190 c. 364.
102 HC 20 November 1985, vol. 87 cc. 305–06.

8 Local Media Tactics

Municipal Information, Audio-Visual Media and the Roots of City Branding in *Gothenburg* (1973)

Erik Florin Persson

Following the global economic restructurings of the 1970s and 1980s many cities around the world adopted a more entrepreneurial form of urban governance, with a pro-active focus on developing the local economy and marketing as a way of attracting tourists, investment and new inhabitants.[1] Since then, place marketing and city branding have come to be both an integral part of urban governance and policy-making and an expansively growing academic field. In this, the expansion of city branding, as research and practice, has many resemblances and overlaps with the parallel emergence of strategic communication as an interdisciplinary and practice-oriented research field in the first decades of the twenty-first century.[2] In a similar manner as strategic communication, research on city branding has to a large extent been focusing on the strategic or policy level and "best practice examples", as evident for instance in the title of one recent anthology within the field: *Place Branding and Marketing from a Policy Perspective: Building Effective Strategies for Places* (2024).[3] City branding encompasses a number of activities within urban governance, planning and development, including communicational and promotional practices, but what has been largely lacking in previous research is a more thorough engagement with the everyday practices and tactical uses of specific media technologies. A second lacuna within research on city branding and urban marketing activities is historical perspectives.[4] Although place marketing and city branding have evidently been growing in magnitude since the last decades of the twentieth century, the phenomenon is in no way new and has longer historical roots. A third lingering imbalance within the field is a tendency to focus on larger North American and European cities, with less research both on cities of the global south and on smaller and medium-sized cities.

In this chapter, I will shift the focus from contemporary city branding and zoom in on municipal communication practices in the local context of Sweden's second largest city Gothenburg, situated on the country's west

DOI: 10.4324/9781032618326-10

coast with some half a million inhabitants. The analysis will focus on a specific media object, the 25-minute-long film *Göteborg* (*Gothenburg*, 1973) commissioned by the then newly formed municipal Department of Information. The early 1970s and the year of the film's production are in many ways significant. The later part of 1973 saw the emergence of the oil crises, triggering the decade's economic turmoil and the subsequent restructurings of the global economy. This would hit old industrial and harbour cities, such as Gothenburg, especially hard. In the early 1970s, Gothenburg was at the peak of its post-war economic development. The city had a prosperous and internationally renowned shipyard industry that would be almost completely gone a decade later, heavily affecting the local economy. The 1970s was in many ways the beginning of a transitional period from the Swedish welfare state managerialism of the post-war decades to the entrepreneurial mode of urban governance of the late twentieth century, which makes the analysis of municipal communication practices from the early years of this decade an illuminating case study.

In the chapter, I make two central arguments. Firstly, I argue that the forms of city branding that would proliferate in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century should be understood in relation to earlier forms of municipal communication. Secondly, in contrast to the often top-down approach of research on city branding, with a focus on policies and strategies, I argue in favour of a more fine-grained and situated analysis of municipal communication and media practices. Following the general definitions within the field of strategic communication, media strategies can be seen as the purposeful use of communication to meet the general and long-term goals of an organisation.[5] Or, as historian Lawrence Freedman, puts it: "Having a strategy suggests an ability to look up from the short term and the trivial to view the long term and the essential, to address causes rather than symptoms, to see woods rather than trees".[6] In contrast, the concept of media tactics will in this chapter be used to analyse the everyday practical uses of a specific medium such as film, where trivial and momentary issues have to be dealt with, not seldom with unintended or unexpected outcomes. This includes the concrete decisions that must be made concerning media-specific, aesthetical and material factors of the filmic medium and how time-bound forms of production, distribution and screening affect the municipal use of this medium. By mapping how the film in focus was commissioned, financed, distributed and screened, I aim to highlight these ambiguities and everyday tactics of the municipal communication practices.

The archival material from the Department of Information that commissioned the film is vast, but not organised in a coherent and logical way, making it hard to obtain a comprehensive overview of the way the film was commissioned, distributed and screened. The preserved material

is messy and fragmented and organised thematically and not by organisational or chronological principles, making it hard to identify gaps and whether and where material has been saved. Material concerning the same theme, such as film production, is also spread out in different volumes. In the collection, two volumes explicitly concern film production, but material concerning the use of film and video is also to be found in a number of other volumes. Thus, there are clear limitations in the material. At the same time, in its extensiveness there seems to be material that would be hard to detect, if it was preserved at all, in a more structured archival collection. In this chapter, I argue that delving into archival material of this nature, with all its intricacies, enables the tracing of everyday tactical decisions within the municipal communication process and reveals how it is influenced by unexpected factors that would have been challenging to pinpoint in a more distant analysis.

Municipal City Films: From Propaganda to Information

This chapter is based on findings from a larger study, where I mapped and analysed the municipal use of film and audio-visual media in Gothenburg from the late 1930s to the mid-2010s.[7] More specifically, I analysed what I labelled as municipal city films: short films about a specific city, in this case Gothenburg, commissioned by the municipality.[8] In the study, I aimed to historicise the early twentieth-century city branding activities in a city such as Gothenburg, as well as to map and analyse the use of audio-visual media in these practices. From the late 1930s until the 1970s, one film about Gothenburg was produced on behalf of the municipality per decade, often with multiple aims such as attracting tourist and business companies, as well as targeting the city's own inhabitants. Up until the mid-1960s, the films were closely entangled with the developments of the Swedish welfare state and municipal propaganda activities, with the expanding welfare service and new housing projects as central themes of the films even when they were addressed to international tourists and business companies. As such, the municipal use of film during this period followed the international trends in using documentary film to promote the expanding welfare states, as has been showed in the last decade's growing research on useful and educational cinema.[9] A central argument within this field, which my study confirmed, is the fluid boundaries of commissioned and educational films. Many commissioned films had multiple aims and target groups and were shown in a number of different screening contexts. With the avoidance of blatant advertising, films sponsored by private companies and public bodies were often screened in cinemas, as well as in schools or, in the Swedish context, even on the country's early, supposedly advertising-free, public television.[10] Until the mid-1960s, the municipal city films in my study were

in most cases screened as pre-feature films in Swedish cinemas, as well as in non-theatrical screening contexts such as schools and associations and also made in different language-versions for international distribution.

While the early municipally commissioned films on Gothenburg were clearly connected to the development of the Swedish welfare state in the local context of its second largest city, the latter half of the 1960s was characterised by a growing critique of the planning ambitions of this welfare state, and the increasing distance between its planners and bureaucrats and the everyday life of its citizens. Trying to bridge this distance, the last years of the decade saw expanding interest and activities in public information. With more information, the plans of the bureaucrats would be easier to understand and to accept for the citizens, and in this way, the democratic contract would be strengthened. Hopes for the efficacy of public information were high, but questions were also raised about whether it was possible to fulfil such high ambitions. Academics such as left-wing sociologist Jan Ekecrantz argued in a polemic way that public information was a way of maintaining and legitimising the current structures of power, rather than opening up true debate and two-way flows of information.[11] The practices of and debates surrounding governmental information in Sweden around 1970 have been the focus of several studies in recent years, where they have been placed in relation to extensive international discussions on public information and information flows during the same time period.[12] However, public information was an issue not only at the national level but also in local municipal contexts.[13] For cities and municipalities around Sweden, information was seen as a way of involving citizens in the society's doings and development.[14] In Gothenburg, a new Department of Information was formed at the City Office in 1971 and it was this department that would commission the film which is the focus of this chapter.

The City Office's Department of Information

The Gothenburg City Office's Department of Information had a wide scope aimed at coordinating work with information throughout the municipality. In a written resume of its establishment, the first head of the department, Gunnar Bergsten, stressed the importance of information as a way of strengthening municipal democracy: "An objective and vivid social debate is one of the most important characteristics of a functioning democracy and presupposes well-informed citizens".[15] This can be seen as the general and strategic goal of the department and its informational activities. However, a few pages later Bergsten describes how: "it has become more and more common that PR is integrated into the management of a company and placed directly under its CEO. This should not come as a surprise, as

both the internal and external information creates the company's (The municipality, the public department, the governing office) face, which determines how the consumer/citizen perceives it and its activities".[16] Although set up as a way of creating more well-informed citizens and strengthening local democracy, this is also evidence of a more market-oriented view of the department, where the activities of the municipality are compared to those of a private company and the citizens equated with consumers.

Bergsten's overview of the department also states that its aim was to reach not only inhabitants of the city but also target groups outside of Gothenburg, in Sweden as well as abroad.[17] For all target groups, within and beyond the city, film was highlighted as one of many means of communication, together with ads, printed material, posters and articles in the printed press. During the 1970s and the early 1980s, a handful of film projects were discussed within the department, as well as a more general use of video technology within the municipality.[18]

Spreading Knowledge about the City: *Gothenburg* (1973)

Discussions concerning the film *Gothenburg*, which was the largest film project within the department throughout the 1970s and 1980s, began in 1972. The film's main aim was stated as being to "stimulate tourism as well as to give the short-term visitor an impression of Gothenburg's milieus for work and leisure".[19] In the following year, it was further stated that "the film should, for example, be involved in spreading knowledge about Gothenburg especially abroad as a city of industry, trade, shipping and congresses, with a central location in Scandinavia".[20] By now, some 20, mostly private, companies and organisations had decided to contribute to the film as sponsors and had approved a draft of the film's script. This included international industrial companies such as Volvo, SKF (Svenska Kullagerfabriken) and Götaverken, one of the major shipyards in the city, a number of companies within tourism and travel, including ferry companies and two international airlines, as well some of the city's larger department stores and shopping centres. Of the film's total budget of SEK 120,000 (roughly EUR 90,000 today), these sponsors contributed SEK 78,000 or roughly two-thirds.[21] The largest contributors were Volvo and the regional tourist association, with SEK 15,000 each, while the others contributed SEK 5,000 to SEK 10,000.

The language specifying the aims of the film is rather modest, stating that it should "stimulate tourism" and "spread knowledge about the city". However, by mainly addressing international businesses and tourists, and heavily relying on private sponsors in producing the film, it is clearly more commercially oriented than previous municipal city films in Gothenburg. The use of private sponsors in this type of film commissioned by a public

body, without explicitly stating their sponsorship, is not unique to this film, but a recurring phenomenon in educational films and public-sponsored documentary films throughout the post-war period. When it comes to earlier films about Gothenburg commissioned by the municipality, private companies did to some extent participate in their pre-production, but they only contributed a small share of the total budget for the films.[22] As such, *Gothenburg* was the first film produced by the municipality where private companies contributed to the larger part of the film's budget. This was not, as far as I have been able to tell, an issue discussed within the department, but it seems to have been a natural way of financing the film. Using private sponsors in financing the film could be understood as a tactical manoeuvre to seize an opportunity that presented itself. On the one hand, one could argue that this contradicts the more general strategic aims of the department of fostering well-informed citizens and an objective and vivid social debate. On the other, the use of private sponsors for the film seems to anticipate the more entrepreneurial form of urban governance that would flourish in the subsequent decades, with a closer collaboration between the private and public sector as a central characteristic.

Tactical Decisions: Material and Economic Constraints and the Visibility of the Film's Sponsors

A central feature of the finished film, in contrast to earlier municipal films about Gothenburg, is that it was produced without a voice-over. During pre-production, this was motivated by financial reasons.[23] It was argued that leaving out the conventional voice-over would lower the cost of international distribution, as expensive versions in different languages did not have to be produced. With the possibility of using prints of one single version of the film for all international markets, the distribution and storage of the film would be much cheaper and more efficient. Not having a voice-over in the film can be seen as a tactical decision to overcome specific logistical, material and economic obstacles in producing different versions and prints of the film. At the same time, this decision led to several other issues that needed to be dealt with. For example, the short and concise title of film, only including the city's name, can be seen as an attempt to avoid having to translate the film's title and make adjustments to the film prints when they were distributed to different language areas. In the introduction of the film, the name of the city is spelled out in several languages besides Swedish and English, including, for example Russian, German/Dutch and French. This was a way, one can assume, of both giving the city an international flair and specifying the title of the film and the name of the city for its different international target groups, without having to alter the physical film prints.

The decision not to have a voice-over also raised questions of how the sponsors of the film should be visible, since they could not be mentioned verbally. The visibility of the sponsors was recurrently discussed in memos and letters. One memo stressed that the sponsors had accepted that perfect fairness between financial contribution and visibility could not be guaranteed.[24] However, reading the preserved script of the film, the effort to make the sponsors visible in the film is obvious. In the script, several so-called "identifying shots" are used as a way of making the names of the sponsors visible in the film. For example, "Close up of Volvo name on car (Identifying shot)".[25] This can be seen as a tactical decision and practical way of making the sponsors visible, when they could not be mentioned in a voice-over. Although the visibility of sponsors in a film of this kind is a recurring theme in the history of publicly commissioned films, the approach taken in *Gothenburg* seems to be a new way of formalising this practice. In terms of product placement or tie-ins, which this can be considered a form of, Patrick Vonderau has demonstrated that this phenomenon has a long history within cinema. However, it was not until the 1980s that it entered the broader public's awareness and sparked critical debate.[26] In line with this, I have not been able to trace any discussion about the way private companies are visible in *Gothenburg*, not even when it was screened in schools and other non-commercial contexts.

The New Style of the City

Accompanied by a noisy and simple form of free jazz and with the use of handheld camera shots and fast editing, the film starts with a scene from the production of a ship at one of the city's shipyards.[27] The scene ends with the christening of the completed ship. Thereafter, Scandinavia and Gothenburg are located on a world map, accompanied by smooth easy-listening music. Zooming in on Gothenburg on the map, the city's name is spelled out in different languages, as a way of addressing the international target groups of the film and stressing the transnational connections of the city. The film continues with scenes, often filmed with a handheld camera, from the offerings of the city related to consumption, sports, tourism and night-time amusement, mixed up with scenes from some of the city's main industrial companies, such as the production of Volvo cars. On the soundtrack, easy-listening music and heavy synthesisers are mixed with scenes with noisy direct sound. The film lacks a proper narrative, but a recurring narrative thread in the film is a young blonde woman enjoying the city's offerings. Comparing *Gothenburg* to the previous film about the city commissioned by the municipality, *Göteborg: Hjärtpunkt i Norden* (*Gothenburg: Heart of Scandinavia*, 1964),[28] the differences are striking, both stylistically and thematically. One of the most prominent differences is the lack of voice-over in

Gothenburg. The 1964 film, as well as all the previous municipal city films about Gothenburg, relied on a rather classical voice-over driven documentary style, with a male voice-over describing Gothenburg, its industries and most prominent tourist attractions, as well as its welfare state development. With no voice-over and its use of hand-held camera shots and direct sound, *Gothenburg*, in contrast, bears similarities with the direct cinema style of documentary filmmaking of the 1960s. Rick Prelinger has argued that during the 1970s many directors of commissioned films started to experiment with handheld cameras and other techniques of contemporary documentary film with the purpose of making the films look modern.[29] Similarly, the observational style of filmmaking in *Gothenburg* can be seen as a way of appearing in step with its time. In this sense, the choice to not have a voice-over fits well as a stylistic choice, moving beyond the authoritative style of earlier films but was, as discussed during pre-production, considered an economic decision in the first instance. However, it is not only stylistically that *Gothenburg* differs from earlier municipal city films. In earlier films, there was a clear focus on the welfare development of the city, including housing, education and cultural institutions. In *Gothenburg* very little of this is shown; instead, the focus is on activities related to industrial production as well as tourism and consumption, giving the film, I would argue, a more commercial flair than earlier municipal films. This can be seen as an early sign of the coming changes to the urban economy of the following decades, with a stronger focus on tourism, consumption and industrial development than on the services of the welfare state.

Screening Contexts: Local, National and International

For at least a decade from 1973, *Gothenburg* was screened in a variety of contexts in Sweden and abroad. Mapping and gaining an overview of this distribution is a rather difficult task. In the messy archival collection from the Department of Information, a number of reports, invoices and requests are found that give an impression, however fragmented, of the distribution in Sweden and to some extent abroad. During the years 1974–1976, the film was distributed some 100 times directly from the department, mostly within Gothenburg and West Sweden.[30] The film was, for example, screened within the municipal organisation, including screenings for the Municipal Council and the City Planning Office. It was also distributed to schools, tourist associations and local NGOs, and in some cases to private companies including SKF and Volvo, who had sponsored the film. There was also some international distribution directly from the Department of Information and the film was, for example, lent to the International Housing Association in Chicago, as well as to the Department of Physical Education in Minsk. During the second

half of the decade, distribution within Sweden was mainly carried out by the film department of PA-rådet ("The Personnel Administration Council") and the distribution company Starfilm, which specialised in educational films and slide shows of various kinds. Through these organs, the film was distributed to Swedish schools, churches, hospitals, municipalities and NGOs during the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s. The municipal Department of Information also screened the film directly to local residents and to some extent visitors to the city. A recurring theme in the discussions preceding the formation of the department was the establishment of a physical place where citizens and visitors could obtain information about the municipality, its organisation and activities. In 1971, an Information Centre was established in the central part of the city, with a special "film corner" for the screening of 16-mm films and audio-equipped slide shows. The films and slide shows screened were of various kinds, some of which covered societal issues, such as traffic, immigration and the dangers of drugs and alcohol, and the municipality's political organisation, and some of which had a more touristic and commercial flair, including *Gothenburg*.

When it comes to the international distribution of the film, less is known. Besides being distributed directly from the Department of Information, the film is listed in a catalogue of Swedish short films for international distribution published by the Swedish Institute in 1976.[31] In the preserved material from the Department of Information, I also found a booklet in English, which seems to have functioned as a supplement to the film for international target groups. The booklet, entitled "A Colour Film about Gothenburg – One of the Centres of Scandinavia" has a rather modest tone and gives some brief information about the film as well as some basic facts about Gothenburg, including the number of inhabitants, dwellings, students and cars in the city, as well as statistics on employment in different sectors, the size of exports and imports and so on.

The most extensive preserved material concerning the film's international distribution comes from the Swedish Embassy in Helsinki. The embassy had a special library of films about Sweden and sent yearly reports on the activities of the film library to the owner of the films. The holdings of the library included general films about Sweden, focusing on geography, history, culture and business, as well as films on different cities or parts of the country.[32] Many films came from the Swedish Institute, but also directly from Swedish authorities, municipalities, companies and organisations, as in the case of *Gothenburg*. However, in the yearly reports, there are recurring complaints about access to suitable films.[33] The greater part of the distribution seems to have been to schools at different levels, as part of lessons in Swedish or geography, but also to associations and NGOs.

By 1984, *Gothenburg* had been lent some 250 times from the film library and been seen by some 10,000 viewers in Finland.[34]

An Informational Film?

The Department of Information was used as an umbrella to communicate with different target groups inside and outside of the city. However, the multiple uses, screening contexts and viewer groups for *Gothenburg* were not articulated in an explicit way by the department during preproduction. Although the inhabitants of Gothenburg were never mentioned as a target group for the film, it was screened in a wide range of local contexts, in schools and associations, as well as in the Information Centre alongside films and slide shows on societal issues. The initial aim of the film was to spread knowledge about Gothenburg as a tourist and industrial city, in particular abroad, but when the film was screened outside of Gothenburg, it was to a large extent shown in non-commercial contexts such as schools and associations in Sweden and, as far as I have been able to map, in Finland. When screened in such contexts, the film seems to have been viewed as an informational film and is for example labelled as such in the reports from the film library at the Swedish Embassy in Helsinki. Expectations of *Gothenburg* being an informational film are also visible in a number of report cards, which the distribution company Starfilm asked its consumers to fill in and then send to the owner of the film.[35] On these cards, the viewers were asked to make short comments about the film, including audience size, any technical problems and – most interestingly – opinions about the film. Despite a bit of carelessness in the way the cards are filled out and the shortness of the comments, they give a unique insight into the way a film of this kind was perceived when it was screened in schools and other non-commercial contexts. The positive comments are in the majority: "Pleasant film", "Very good", "Nice information before a trip to Gothenburg". But there is also a significant number of negative comments to be found on the cards, most of them commenting on the lack of voice-over: "Would have appreciated it more with speech", "The lack of speech is a downside", "Completely useless without a teacher who knows Gothenburg and could have commented", "It's a shame that such a nice film doesn't have a voice-over". Some of the comments suggest that a written text should accompany the film, which the teacher or leader of the group could read out loud during the screening of the film. What is obvious in both the positive and negative comments is a view of the functionality of this kind of film in offering information and hands-on facts about Gothenburg. The use of voice-over as a way of offering straightforward information seems to have been a clear expectation

when this type of film was screened in schools and associations. If a film of this kind lacks a voice-over or other ways of communicating facts, it appears incomprehensible or almost useless. Not having a voice-over in the film can be seen as a rational tactical choice to simplify and lower the cost of international distribution. However, this decision had unintended consequences, as it did not fulfil expectations for an informational film when screened in schools and other non-commercial contexts. This can be seen as a lack of knowledge about the functionality of informational films and the expectations of such films within the Department of Information. But it can also be seen as a consequence of the unclear aims of the film and the miss-match between its initial aims and target groups and how it was ultimately used.

Conclusions: Local Media Tactics, Municipal Information and the Roots of City Branding

Through a case study of the municipal Department of Information in Gothenburg, formed in 1971, and, more specifically, of the 1973 film *Gothenburg*, I have in this chapter made two central arguments. Firstly, I have argued that the forms of city branding that would proliferate in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century should be understood in relation to earlier forms of municipal communication. Secondly, I have argued for the need to move beyond the strategic level in analysing these practices, in favour of a more fine-grained kind of media historical analysis. On a policy or strategic level, the work of the Department of Information can be seen as straightforward, with the stated aim of strengthening local democracy and creating well-informed citizens. However, using the department as an umbrella to communicate with a variety of target groups, within Gothenburg, Sweden as well as abroad, there seem to have been constraints and contradictions in its communicational practices. By means of detailed mapping and analysis of the pre-production process for *Gothenburg* and how the film was distributed and screened, I have been able to highlight such ambiguities. Within the framework of the Department of Information there seems to have been a tactical opportunity in commissioning a rather commercial film such as *Gothenburg*, which was largely financed by private companies and has a strong commercial focus on tourism, consumption and industrial production. However, since the established networks at hand for educational films were used for its distribution, the film ended up in schools and associations where it was expected to give hands-on information about the city. Thus, the film is characterised by a dual ambiguity between, on the one hand, the strategic aims of the Department of Information and the commercial orientation of the film, and on the other, between the initial aims and international

target groups of the film and the way it was ultimately used, screened and perceived by its actual viewers. In this, momentary tactical decisions such as leaving out the voice-over of the film for economic and practical reasons can be seen as trivial and practical but had unintended consequences, as the film did not fulfil its function as an informational film when screened in schools and similar contexts. Moving beyond the strategic level of the municipal communication practice makes it possible to pinpoint how this kind of material and economic factors of, for example, the expensive and inflexible filmstock affected the communicational process and had to be dealt with through tactical decisions.

The year 1973, when *Gothenburg* was produced and first met its audiences, was a significant one, just before the oil crises and the subsequent economic turbulence which would heavily affect an industrial city such as Gothenburg. Although the film was produced by the then newly formed Department of Information, it is possible to see early signs of a more commercial type of city branding that would proliferate in upcoming decades. In her study on municipal propaganda, PR and information in Stockholm, Kåring Wagman argues that the period of interest in municipal information of the early 1970s as a means of fostering a more participative municipal democracy was brief and soon overshadowed by a more market-oriented approach to urban governance. According to Kåring Wagman, the interest in municipal information can be seen as the first symptom of a more profound crisis of the Swedish welfare state and as the first phase of the market orientation that would follow, where citizens would increasingly be seen as costumers in relation to the municipality.[36] My analysis of municipal information in Gothenburg in the early 1970s and the ambiguities concerning the film *Gothenburg* points in a similar direction. A key characteristic of the entrepreneurial mode of urban governance and of the city branding activities that would emerge in cities worldwide in the following decades, emphasised in David Harvey's seminal article from the late 1980s, involves a closer collaboration between public and private stakeholders, often manifesting in new forms of public-private partnerships.[37] The involvement of private companies in financing the film *Gothenburg* appears to anticipate this development. This form of collaboration took on a more institutionalised shape during the 1980s. Parallel with ongoing efforts within the Department of Information, several new organs and public-private partnerships were established with the aim of marketing the city in the early years of the decade. In 1980, the public-private partnership Gothenburg Region Promotion Office was formed with a more explicitly stated goal of marketing and "selling the city".[38] Consequently, by the early 1980s, the municipality had started to diversify its communication strategies, featuring a clearer separation of information and a more commercially oriented branding approach.

Notes

1 See, e.g., David Harvey's seminal article: David Harvey, "From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism", *Geografiska Annaler B,* vol. 71, no. 1 (1989), 3–17.
2 In an overview on the expansion of research on city branding, Lucarelli and Berg highlight the foundation of the two field-specific journals *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* (2004) and *Journal of Place Management and Development* (2008); Andrea Lucarelli and Per Olof Berg, "City Branding: A State-of-the-Art Review of the Research Domain", *Journal of Place Management and Development,* vol. 4, no. 1 (2011), 9–27. For an overview on the institutionalisation of strategic communication as a research field, see: Jesper Falkheimer and Mats Heide, *Research Handbook on Strategic Communication* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 1–4.
3 Vincent Mabillard, Martial Pasquier, and Renaud Vuignier, *Place Branding and Marketing from a Policy Perspective: Building Effective Strategies for Places* (New York: Routledge, 2024).
4 For one of the few exceptions, see: Stephen V. Ward, *Selling Places: The Marketing and Promotion of Towns and Cities, 1850–2000* (London: E & FN Spon, 1998).
5 Falkheimer and Heide, *Research Handbook on Strategic Communication,* 1–2.
6 Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), ix.
7 Erik Florin Persson, *Film i stadens tjänst: Göteborg 1938–2015* (Lund: Mediehistoriskt arkiv, 2021).
8 The concept of city films is recurring within film historical research, referring to both the canonical so-called city symphonies of the interwar period, as well as shorter and often more instrumental portraits of cities of various sizes. With the term municipal city films, I want to stress the formal similarities between the two and to identify a specific type of city film commissioned by the municipality itself. See also: Erik Florin Persson, "Useful Cinema and the Dynamic Film History beyond the National Archive: Locating Municipally Sponsored Swedish City Films in Local Archives", *Journal of Scandinavian Cinema*, vol. 7, no. 2 (2017), 121–34. For an extensive overview of the city symphony genre, see: Steven Jacobs, Anthony Kinik, and Eva Hielscher, *The City Symphony Phenomenon: Cinema, Art and Urban Modernity Between the Wars* (New York: Routledge, 2019).
9 See, e.g., Yvonne Zimmermann, "Advertising and Avant-gardes: A History of Concepts, 1930–1940", *Advertising and the Transformation of Screen Cultures*, eds. Bo Florin, Patrick Vonderau, and Yvonne Zimmermann (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2019), 77–111.
10 See, e.g., Ole Johnny Fossås, "Extracting Versatility: Films Commissioned by the Swedish Mining Industry in Postwar Sweden" (PhD diss, Department of Media Studies, Stockholm University, 2023).
11 Jan Ekecrantz, *Makten och informatio*nen (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1975).
12 See, e.g., Fredrik Norén, "Deliberation or Manipulation? The Issue of Governmental Information in Sweden, 1969–1973", *Information & Culture*, vol. 55, no. 2 (2020), 149–68; Emil Stjernholm, "A Clash of Ideals: The Introduction of Televised Information in Sweden, 1969–1972", *Media History*, vol. 28, no. 3 (2022), 425–41.

13 For the only broader study on municipal information in Sweden focusing on Stockholm, see: Anna Kåring Wagman, *Stadens melodi: Information och reklam i Stockholms kommun 1930–1980* (Stockholm: Stockholmia förlag, 2006).
14 See, e.g. the governmental report "Report on Municipal Information etc.": SOU 1972:52 *Rapport angående kommunal information m.m.*
15 Memo from Gunnar Bergsten, 24 March 1971, F1 vol. 127:G, Stadskansliets informationsavdelning, Regionarkivet, Göteborg, henceforth SIA:RAG, 1.
16 Memo from Bergsten, 24 March 1971, 4.
17 Memo from Bergsten, 24 March 1971, 9
18 See, e.g., Memo from Göran Björkroth, Rolf Claesson, Pider Åvall, 12 October 1982, F1, Vol. 101:E, SIA:RAG.
19 Memo from the Department of Information, Gothenburg City Office, 15 August 1973, F1, Vol. 22, SIA:RAG, 3.
20 Memo from the Department of Information, Gothenburg City Office, 7 November 1973, F1, Vol. 22, SIA:RAG, 5.
21 Memo, "Film om Göteborg", undated, F1, Vol. 84:F, SIA:RAG.
22 See: Florin Persson, "Useful Cinema and the Dynamic Film History".
23 Memo from the Department of Information, 7 November 1973, 5.
24 Memo from the Department of Information, 7 November 1973, 5.
25 Film script by Mike Simon, undated, F1, Vol. 84: F, SIA:RAG.
26 Patrick Vonderau, "Kim Novak and Morgan Stairways: Thinking about the Theory and History of the Tie-in", *Films that Sell: Moving Pictures and Advertising*, eds. Bo Florin, Nico de Klerk, and Patrick Vonderau (London: Palgrave, 2016), 211–12.
27 The film has been digitised and can be seen for free at the website filmarkivet.se: https://www.filmarkivet.se/movies/goteborg/ (accessed 21 March 2024).
28 For a discussion about the film, see: Florin Persson, "Useful Cinema and the Dynamic Film History", 129–31; Florin Persson, *Film i stadens tjänst,* 147–72.
29 Rick Prelinger, *The Field Guide to Sponsored Films* (San Francisco: National Film Preservation Foundation, 2006), ix.
30 Memo, "Utlåning av Göteborgsfilmen", undated, F1, vol. 84:1, SIA:RAG.
31 Svenska institutet, *Swedish Short Films* (Stockholm: Svenska institutet, 1976), 5.
32 Memo, "Filmutlåning vid Sveriges ambassad i Helsingfors under budgetåret juli 1979–juni 1980", undated, F1, Vol. 84:1, SIA:RAG.
33 See, e.g.: Memo, "Filmutlåning vid Sveriges ambassad i Helsingfors under budgetåret juli 1979–juni 1980", undated; Letter from Agneta Grönvik to the Department of Information, Gothenburg City Office, 28 October 1980, F1, Vol. 84:1, SIA:RAG.
34 Letter from Agneta Grönvik to the Department of Information, Gothenburg City Office, 18 July 1984, F1, Vol. 84:CD, SIA:RAG.
35 Report cards from Starfilm, undated, F1, Vol. 84:H, SIA:RAG; Report cards from Starfilm, undated, F1, Vol. 130:CD, SIA:RAG.
36 Kåring Wagman, *Stadens melodi*, 52.
37 Harvey, "From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism".
38 See: Florin Persson, *Film i stadens tjänst*, 199–234.

9 Revisiting "The CIA and the Media"

FOIA, Paperwork, and the Dialectic of (Media) Tactics and Strategies

Dominique Trudel

Since its adoption in 1966, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) has played a pivotal role in American democracy. Enabling every citizen – and even foreigners – to access federal government information and documents, FOIA fits with the standard liberal political categories which oppose secrecy and the autocratic power of the state in favour of transparency and the power of democratic citizenship. The "FOIA" expression itself made its way into the vernacular language, referring to any request for information filed under the disposition of the 1966 law.

FOIA has been widely used by journalists and is now part of the professional practices taught in curricula. It has its best practices and experts, as well as its dedicated digital tools.[1] FOIA has played a key role in some of the most famous pieces of American investigative journalism of the last decades, including, among many examples, the highly mediatised torture scandals in the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo prisons, as well as the "PRISM" mass surveillance programme developed by the National Security Agency (NSA), first uncovered by Edward Snowden. In all these prominent cases, FOIA requests sparked complex legal processes, public discussions, and scholarly analyses which became as newsworthy as the subject matter.[2]

Star journalist Carl Bernstein's 1977 investigation into the relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and American news media, published in *Rolling Stone* magazine, is an intriguing case of investigative journalism making use of FOIA.[3] The subject matter and the revelations were not only relatively new to the public; they also concerned the whole apparatus of American journalism in its relation to state secrecy, that is, at the interface where FOIA takes place.[4] The article points to the long-standing entanglements of the CIA with American journalism. Bernstein claimed that over 400 American journalists, including well-known figures such as Joseph Alsop (*Washington Post*), Hal Hendrix (*Miami News*), and Jerry O'Leary (*Washington Star*), carried out missions for the CIA,

DOI: 10.4324/9781032618326-11

which also maintained a close working relationship with some of the top executives of American news media. Furthermore, Bernstein evoked connections with scholars and universities and alluded to a mysterious CIA training programme teaching secret agents how to act (that is, how to "make noise") like journalists.[5]

Bernstein's piece is one of the first journalistic investigations conducted following the 1974 and 1976 amendments to the original 1966 FOIA. In the aftermath of the 1972 Watergate scandal, a journalist-led movement for reforming the dispositions of the FOIA gained momentum. The many limitations associated with the original 1966 FOIA law included its cost (USD 1 per page and USD 7 per hour of research), and the so-called contamination tactics (mixing confidential exempt material with non-exempt material in the same folder to prevent its communication) used to limit access to information.[6] The new amendments of 1974 and 1976 made the process less costly, allowed for a judicial review of classification, and significantly narrowed the agency's power to withhold information and documents.[7] In the same spirit, the House Committee on Government Operations issued the first Citizen's Guide in 1977, detailing the process for requesting records from federal agencies.[8] Bernstein's FOIA request was timely since some of these new provisions were soon to be revised, at least with regard to the activities of the CIA. In 1981, shortly after his election, President Ronald Reagan made a systematic effort to control the flow of information coming from government agencies. While Reagan failed at getting completely rid of the FOIA, he was successful in exempting the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from many of its dispositions.[9]

Although Bernstein's 1977 FOIA seems to take place during the golden age of FOIA, it nevertheless highlights a major problem with the process, which is not at all adapted to the temporality and rhythm of journalism. Bernstein's FOIA request from 7 October was only answered on 4 November. What is more, the response did not contain the list of expected documents, but instead announced dilatory measures: "We are suspending your request until we receive notification from you of your willingness to accept responsibility for all charges incurred in processing your request, or if there is an upper limit to what you are willing to pay".[10] Given that Bernstein's article was published on 30 October 1977, the response was belated and insufficient. Due to the reliance on anonymous CIA sources in Bernstein's article, the extent to which its information is grounded in FOIA requests remains uncertain.

Another puzzling aspect is the timing of Bernstein's *Rolling Stone* article, which came out only a couple of months after Alan J. Pakula's Oscar-winning movie, *All the President's Men* (1976). Pakula's true-story account of the journalistic efforts to uncover the Watergate scandal in

1972, in which Carl Bernstein (played by Dustin Hoffman) has the leading role, tells the reassuring story of the press's victory over state secrecy. However, on the pages of *Rolling Stone*, at the very same time, Bernstein himself is telling a far more disturbing story, that of "how America's most powerful news media worked hand in glove with the Central Intelligence Agency".[11] Moreover, as an anonymous CIA official then confessed to Bernstein, further investigations into the matter "would inevitably reveal a series of embarrassing relationships in the 1950s and 1960s with some of the most powerful organizations and individuals in American journalism".[12] Among them, Philip and Katherine Graham, the owners of *The Washington Post*, the former employers of Carl Bernstein and the media outlet who led the Watergate investigation.[13]

This chapter proposes a reflexive historical exploration and a theoretical reconstruction of the complex relationship between US state agencies – focusing primarily on the CIA – and American journalism (as a set of institutions, actors, practices, et cetera). Largely shaped by the shifting dispositions of the FOIA, these relationships can be approached through the various media tactics used by journalists, and sometimes by academics, and the media strategies of state agencies. The case of Bernstein's "The CIA and the Media" is noteworthy as it demonstrates the multifaceted nature of media tactics and strategies, which operate on various interconnected levels: first, at the level of the discursive and material details of FOIA requests; second, at the level of media content and publications (for example, Bernstein's article, "The CIA and the Media"), and third, at the operational level, that is, at the level of intelligence gathering and reporting, or in the context of secret agents using journalistic cover or of journalists participating in CIA operations (meeting with sources and agents abroad, for example). Following up on Bernstein's work, this chapter aims to gain a better understanding of the different tactics and strategies operating at these different, yet interconnected, levels, with a narrower focus on (1) FOIA as a specific form of "paperwork" and media tactic, and (2) at the operational level, with regard to journalism education and journalistic practices within the CIA.

This chapter's primary material comes from two FOIA requests made in 2016 and 2017. Back then, a colleague and I were contemplating writing a follow-up piece to Bernstein's article for its 40th anniversary.[14] The documents we obtained had fragments of novel information but were nonetheless disappointing in relation to the topics we were aiming to investigate, especially regarding the CIA's "formal training program" to which Bernstein alluded and which was said to prepare CIA agents to be "placed in major news organizations with help from management".[15] The coveted smoking gun turned out to be a fantasy, and we did not go forward with the project of writing the 40th anniversary follow-up piece. Nevertheless,

the process was thought-provoking as it pointed to several other leads regarding the relationship between the CIA and different actors and institutions associated with journalism. Moreover, these FOIA requests broaden our understanding of the different media tactics and strategies at play, especially with regard to the contemporary functioning of FOIA requests, with all its little details and subtleties, at the level of local media tactics.

My approach in part draws on Michel de Certeau's canonical definition of tactic and strategy. That strategy is the privilege of the powerful, while tactic is an "art of the weak",[16] remains useful to understand how FOIA requests work. But my approach, in some respects, also differs from de Certeau's emphasis on asymmetrical power relations.[17] To be sure, the rationale behind FOIA – back in 1966 and still today – is the asymmetry of power and information between the ordinary citizen and the state. As a prominent FOIA scholar points out, FOIA has the function to "ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed".[18] At the same time, in the context of FOIA originating from journalists and powerful news media organisations, this asymmetry may very well be reversed.[19] Going against the grain, legal scholar David A. Pozen argues that the cost of FOIA is "pathologically asymmetric".[20] The resources needed to fulfil the dispositions of the law are enormous and constitute a major burden for the concerned agencies.[21] Such an argument is not exactly new. Jean-Marie Roland, who served as Minister of the Interior during the French Revolution, made a similar claim. Roland famously complained that his critics "assume that I have a lot of power because I have a lot to do", suggesting that the opposite was true.[22]

In other words, the assertion that tactics and strategies refer to distinct power positions may be tricky and may suggest, for example, that the CIA has no tactics but only a grand strategy. In order to embrace the full scope of the many tactics at play, my analysis focuses less on the asymmetry of power than on the complex entanglement of tactics and strategies through the three aforementioned levels. de Certeau's notion of tactic and strategy is inherited from previous works by Michel Foucault, on which I also draw. Foucault's conception of power, strategy, and tactic slightly differs from de Certeau's, as he highlights that power is not so much a characteristic (or a property) as it is a method, and that tactics occur on a small scale, at the level of a "micro-physics" of power dynamics, inside a broader predetermined strategic framework.[23]

Methodologically, I am also borrowing from Foucault's archeo-genealogical perspective, since I am approaching historical writing as a contingent and situated media practice. Using only material gathered through FOIA requests made at a given point in time shows how historical and journalistic knowledge is derived from specific power relations and is

situated in technological and media environment(s).[24] Furthermore, Foucault considered that such an approach to history – as practised by Henri de Boulainvilliers and Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès – is indeed "tactical": local and situated historical knowledge serves to subvert universal historical narratives and their claim to truth.[25] In a similar fashion, my work is not aiming at generalisation but rather at reflexively exploring the local power dynamics, forms of knowledge, and media tactics associated with two specific FOIA requests.

FOIA and the Tactics of Paperwork

In 2016–2017, a colleague and I prepared two FOIA requests, asking for material that would help us to further clarify – in the footsteps of Carl Bernstein – the complex entanglement of the CIA with American journalism from the 1950s to the 1970s. This was a new endeavour for both of us, and we tried our very best to make a "good FOIA" that respects all the rules and is as clear as possible, ensuring that it would likely lead us to documents containing new information. To put it differently, our approach was eminently tactical in the sense of de Certeau, who defined tactics as a "calculus" based on incomplete information in a situation where "the other" has no clear institutional or spatial boundaries.[26] Since there are no clear spatial grounds for tactics, de Certeau insists that a tactic "depends on time", that it is "always on the watch for opportunities that must be seized 'on the wing'".[27] These definitions seem to perfectly fit the context, as the whole problem at stake concerns the boundaries of the CIA, specifically with regard to institutionalised journalism.[28] In this respect, the ontological theatre of our FOIA requests is precisely the one of tactic.

Our letters were filled with certain legal and institutional lingo, which served to make it appear legitimate. Using the official letterhead of the university, we mentioned, for instance, the "Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. subsection 552", while also making sure our inquiry was framed in the acceptable terms of both contemporary social sciences and journalism. Our letters also try to prevent and preempt any reticence from the CIA by insinuating that we have the knowledge and resources to escalate things on the legal front if necessary ("If my request is denied in whole or part, please justify all deletions by reference to specific exemptions of the act and notify me of appeal procedures available under the law. I will also expect you to release all segregable portions of otherwise exempt material").

Our media tactics operate within the strategy of what Max Weber called the "rational-legal authority" which characterises most modern organisations and especially those associated with the sovereign functions of the state.[29] Such media tactics can be approached by the concept of "paperwork" defined as "all those documents produced in response to a

demand – real or imagined – by the state".[30] Building on previous work by Ben Kafka and Cornelia Vismann, I argue that paperwork constitutes both a set of media tactics and a broader media strategy.[31] At the micro-physical level of media tactics, it plays out discursively, through the very specific choice of words, and materially, through document treatment and processing, the latter inevitably implying time delays. As Ben Kafka puts it, "paperwork is a refractive medium in that power and knowledge inevitably change their speed and shape when they enter it".[32] At the level of strategy, paperwork is both concerned with the accumulation and organisation of knowledge and relies on well-known media practices such as "recording", "filing", "archiving", and so on.

The CIA responses to our FOIA requests were also tactical in several ways. The documents were often heavily redacted. Most names were crossed out and so was the content of several pages. As a result, documents bearing secrets were disclosed while simultaneously preserving the "secrets" they contained. Such a tactic of secrecy, taking place in the context of a general strategy of publicity and visibility, is a well-known practice of the state dating back to the early days of the mediaeval state. In the thirteenth century, Emperor Frederick II similarly made sure that "the exposed files guarded their mysteries well (…). A politics of visibility and effective tactics of secrecy were two sides of one and the same strategy of power".[33]

Such a paradoxical strategy of publicity and visibility is pivotal in a CIA initiative such as the CREST 25-Year Program Archive. Launched in 2006, the CREST (CIA Record Search Tool) makes every CIA declassified document available online – that is, searchable and discoverable – after 25 years. Every year, a great mass of 25-year-old documents is dumped online – a process that is regularly covered by news media outlets. In this respect, the CIA's regular document dumps are *also* public relations operations aimed at journalists. They are publicised media events prioritising topics that are most likely to generate clicks. For example, *Wired* summarised a massive 2017 dump of 12 million of pages in six short paragraphs on topics such as "German Disappearing Ink Recipe", "Project Stargate" (1990s programme exploring the military application of psychic power) and "UFO Photos and Analysis".[34]

While such attempts to achieve greater transparency undoubtedly contribute to democratic life – the CIA keeps bragging about it – they nevertheless involve media tactics whose main purpose is the preservation of secrecy by means of opacity-through-publicity. The mass of documents available on the database creates an important shift. At this magnitude and in such a technological and media context, (paper) documents are turned into something else, more akin to digital archives or even big data. A traditional approach to such digital material – the so-called close reading of documents – is beyond human capacities. One needs a team of people,

or even better, automated reading (*distant reading*) and data visualisation tools. These large volumes of textual documents are the privileged material of contemporary journalism, and digital tools and resources are its new fetish. Such a convergence is worrying. If distant reading is offering new entry points into textual data, it also gives a false impression of exhaustivity and may lead to a generic and totalising approach to media texts.[35] Distant reading results from a set of not so reliable remediations, including scanning or digitising, which imply both reproduction and erasure, and can make a document barely readable. Error-prone optical character recognition software is often much more about composing new texts than mere reproduction.[36] Distant reading is not only unreliable, it is also useless for taking into account several dimensions of the documents (ordering of the documents, handwritten annotations, boxes and files, colour and smell, et cetera). In other words, documents are not solely converted into digital format, and a virtual reading room does not provide the same capabilities as its analogue counterpart.

These dumps of documents on the CREST database also challenge the epistemological assumptions associated with FOIA requests. It reverses the temporality and the connection to knowledge implied by the mechanism of FOIA requests, which are necessarily guided by a specific interest and eventually lead to specific documents, identified by specialised staff. The CREST database is offering the documents first, as if they were related to a pre-existing and specific interest.[37] The twin hermeneutic assumptions that users know what they are looking for and that these research interests are coherent with the functioning of the database (based on in-text occurrence of words), and that so-called normal users are better at identifying key documents than specialised personnel are both very challenging hypotheses, to say the least.

As the new privileged entry point to CIA material, CREST also contributes to blurring the distinction between FOIA and CREST. While CREST only concerns previously unclassified documents, FOIA allows requests of classified material. If a FOIA request alludes to the CREST initiative or if it mentions "unclassified documents", it is likely that CREST documents – that is, documents already available on the CREST website – will be processed, charged (USD), and sent by snail mail. Previously classified documents may or may not be included, and the distinction between these two types of documents would remain unclear. For instance, our first FOIA request, which alluded to CREST and mentioned "declassified documents", resulted in the obtention of documents that had already been released through CREST. Since the distinction between the documents that were already available and the new declassified material was not explicit or systematic, this FOIA request is essentially equivalent to reproducing and sending out previously accessible digitised documents.

To go back to the tactical matter of time, the CIA answered our first request of 6 August 2016 on 25 August 2016. This latter date was the one used on the letterhead, but the letter was received a couple of weeks (or even months) later (I lost track). Trying to avoid the delay that faced Bernstein, we mentioned that we were willing to pay a maximum amount of USD 200 for the documents. Nevertheless, the CIA's letter makes clear that a payment of USD 10.60 – way below the aforementioned maximum – was needed before they would process the documents. While this may sound reasonable, it implies further delays and the possibility to not follow-up with the process. The nitty-gritty of the payment method is also dilatory. As they then specify in bold characters, "Checks must be *drawn* in US dollars on a United States bank or branch thereof. We *cannot* accept payment by checks drawn on a foreign bank". Being then based in Canada, these specifications were certainly not easy to follow and involved further administrative procedures. The fact that an organisation capable of monitoring the clandestine activities of thousands of persons and organisations in foreign countries cannot process a check in a foreign currency or drawn from a foreign bank (or use PayPal) may seem surreal, even comical. It also speaks to the strategic use (and paradoxical entanglement) of digital and analogue media in FOIA requests.

Our second FOIA faced another type of supplementary dilatory measure. Our request for "all the documents related in whole or in part to a course named 'Information Reporting, Reports, and Requirements'" was answered by a letter asking if we were willing to revise the scope of our request to "documents that describe the course, what was covered, and how the course was taught", a sentence we also used in our letter. According to the officer, "'all documents' is too broad as our systems are not configured to search for the information as requested". The fact that "all documents" related to a training course may be too broad is a given. What about the November 1984 pay slip of a CIA operative who took the class in 1961? Since we already unpacked what we meant by "all documents" and qualified their nature and relation to the course, such a response is difficult not to be considered a dilatory measure. It is also a reminder of who is running the show: systems and their specific configurations, which should be taken into account pre-emptively. Furthermore, it makes clear who is in control of the "language game" which consists of qualifying the relationship of words to reality in a specific context.[38] As Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari explained, "a rule of grammar is a power marker before it is a syntactical marker".[39] Let us add that specifying that "all documents" cannot be considered literally is a troubling suggestion that bears the deep metaphysical implication that language, in some contexts, can literally square with reality. This tenet is at the cornerstone of the CIA approach to reporting, which is the main topic our FOIA helps us explore.

A Mysterious Training Course

The documents obtained attest to the existence of a CIA course titled "Information Reporting, Reports, and Requirements" (IRRR) which was taught from 1956 until at least the mid-1960s and has not been the object of scholarly attention so far. While it remains unclear whether IRRR is the course referred to by Bernstein, the course raises many interesting questions regarding the parallels between the worlds of "intelligence" and secret services and that of professional journalism. In fact, the course constitutes a point of contact between the two universes, showing some of their commonalities.

The size of the record concerning IRRR seems to be rather small. In response to our second request, which was specifically about IRRR, we received 26 documents of various kinds (including memoranda, course catalogue, and course syllabi). While many of them are repetitive, reporting on the day-to-day running of a course repeated more or less identically several times a year, some nevertheless contain little surprises, nuggets of information. In this respect, these documents testify to the heterogeneous nature of administrative files and to the dialectic of paperwork, which is both repetitive and predictable but also full of surprises and mishaps.[40]

Under the responsibility of the CIA's Office of Training, IRRR is presented as a "Specialized Skills Training" course destined for the "Clandestine Service". In the course catalogue, IRRR sits next to much more exotic topics such as "Soviet Bloc Operations", "Counterintelligence Operations", and "Introduction to Covert Action". The course would usually be followed by around ten students and would last 120 hours, over a period of three weeks. A certain "Joe" seems to have been associated with the course, possibly serving as a lecturer. Internal reports often mention good student performance as well as occasional disciplinary problems.[41] The course would include lectures, presentations by guest speakers, screenings,[42] and "laboratory work", which consists of "reporting from direct observation".[43] This last dimension was central to the pedagogical approach of the class since it was deemed that "students working with live material is considered to be the heart of the course".[44]

Reporting is undoubtedly the core competency developed during the course. IRRR is presented as "a straight reporting course that would be useful for all intelligence officers assigned to the clandestine services".[45] Reporting includes "consideration of the qualifications of a reporter, the reporter's job, the application of tradecraft to reporting, collecting the information, and the content and the organization of the agent's report".[46] Speed, accuracy, and careful editing are often mentioned as key components of reporting and skills to be developed. In sum, "to develop agents as reporters"[47] seems to be the main objective of the course.

In this context, "reporting" refers primarily to the writing and editing of internal reports by agents based on direct observation. But the idea that a reporter is a type of professional journalist (defined by a set of specific journalistic norms and practices) is also implied in the context of the course, which includes many elements borrowed from journalism. As one CIA report makes clear, "First, we must get the idea that we are reporters. We seek information from our sources".[48] The same report suggests that CIA reporting should be made "in a more journalistic style".

In fact, the concept of "reporting" plays a similar role in the "boundary-work"[49] of both the universes of professional journalism and in the practices of intelligence agencies. In journalism, reporting is undoubtedly a strong marker "on which the break between opinion press and information press is founded".[50] At the CIA, reporting similarly serves to draw a line between the realms of opinions and facts and appears to be central to the professional identity of agents, which is partly modelled on established journalistic practices. For example, one principle taught in the class is the well-known formula of the "5Ws and How",[51] a writing rule whose institutionalisation is at the very core of the "discourse order" of modern journalism.[52] The laboratory work includes working with so-called morgue files,[53] an expression originating from newspaper slang. Such files – consisting of clippings, pictures, and notes – are commonly kept in newspaper editorial offices for quick reference, including to rapidly write obituaries of famous people.

These connections with standard journalistic practices were obvious to the CIA personnel involved in the course and were the object of internal debates. In April 1959, a CIA official criticised the new version of the course syllabus, which he deemed to be "completely unacceptable".[54] As he explained, "IRRR has been too heavy on the side of journalism as opposed to the collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence information obtained through clandestine mechanisms".[55] The CIA's internal debates about the course, which revolved around the places of theory and "historical perspectives",[56] as opposed to the time devoted to laboratory work, are standard and enduring dilemmas in most journalism schools.

In sum, IRRR was not about teaching agents how to "make noise" like a journalist (Bernstein), but to "improve the quality of field reporting".[57] In fact, not making noise and discretely gathering information was the preferred approach. The laboratory work includes practising the gathering of information from people and observation ("Collection of Information Through Talk"), which should involve persistence, concentration, and maturity, but exclude loudness or overt aggression. The instructor of the course once lamented about two students who were deemed too loud, and even aggressive. One of the students "was resourceful with perhaps a bit too much emphasis on being pleasantly aggressive", and the other was "too much of an extrovert to be an unnoticeable and therefore a secure one".[58]

The CIA focus on reporting can nevertheless be approached with the twin concepts of media tactics and strategies. Writing "good" reports, accumulating them, indexing them efficiently, and developing the associated competencies to do so are all soluble within the development of a large state intelligence and security apparatus and its core strategy. "Paperwork", as Karl Marx puts it, is the "bureaucratic medium" *par excellence*.[59] The grand strategy of the CIA is largely a specific media practice, paperwork, that needs to be tamed and perfected, and IRRR serves this purpose. "Good reporting", in this context, is a metaphysical fight against entropy. It is not only a means to counter the inevitable errors and semantic approximations but also to keep up with the pace of events. As reports keep multiplying, meaning is paradoxically both accumulated and dissolved, and only new reports can help to navigate the ever-growing paper Leviathan. As Reinhart Koselleck puts it, "because … a lot had to be written, even more had to be written".[60]

Conclusion: Towards a Broader Understanding of Media Tactics

Discussing two recent FOIA demands and internal CIA courses taught in the 1950s and 1960s, this essay sought to explore some of the media tactics at play at the interface of the worlds of journalism and the CIA. These tactics can be approached by looking at the complex implications of paperwork, the dialectical interplay of analogue and digital media, as well as the shifting boundaries and epistemologies of reporting. While the project of writing a follow-up piece to Bernstein's "The CIA and the Media" did not come to fruition, this essay stands as a tribute to the uncertainty and mishaps of paperwork and archival research.

Reflecting on specific attempts at FOIA and exploring internal CIA courses taught in the 1950s and 1960s, this research points to many questions that would deserve further scholarly investigations. Media tactics taking place at the level of media content and publications should be considered more closely. In the mid-1970s and early 1980s, several publications developed editorial projects in line with Bernstein's article and often focused on CIA actions. Magazines such as *CounterSpy* (1973–), *Covert-Action Information Bulletin* (1978–), and *Lobster* (1983–) often make use of FOIA and regularly focus on the interface of news media and the CIA. Several CIA agents left the agency to work with these magazines, which are also an interesting locus to explore the intersections of professional identities and practices of reporting. In the same vein, the place of journal articles in CIA files deserves greater attention and further reflection. Our FOIA requests turned out a lot of press clippings, which were carefully kept and sometimes commented on. This practice cuts across several tactics and strategies, including the surveillance of journalists, the gathering

and accumulation of information, and the writing of intelligence reports, which were often based on the format and content of press clippings.

This research also suggests promising leads with regard to the debated question of the origins of journalistic objectivity. Showing that the CIA's media practices are partly modelled on journalistic reporting seems insufficient and raises troubling questions regarding the genealogy of journalistic reporting and practices. Some well-established journalistic practices and key concepts may have been inherited from, or may have been modelled on, the media practices of the nascent state surveillance apparatus. The cross-examination of sources, the accumulation of files, and methodical verification were all common practices of state surveillance at the end of the eighteenth century. Such a hypothesis is yet to be substantiated and differs widely from the canonical historical narratives focusing on the role of the telegraph or the development of the news agencies.[61] Developed from a Foucauldian perspective, the concept of media tactic is perhaps particularly relevant in that it allows us to revisit such historiographical questions, while simultaneously pointing out that the practice of media history cannot be abstracted from the media tactics it reports.

Notes

1 Jonathan Peters, "'Always Appeal', and More Pro Tips from a Dozen FOIA Experts", *Columbia Journalism Review*, 17 March 2017, https://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/foia-expert-pro-tips-sunshine-week.php (accessed 12 November 2023); Paroma Soni, "A New Tool Allows Journalists to Quickly Sort through FOIA Data Dumps", *Columbia Journalism Review*, 2 March 2022, https://www.cjr.org/innovations/gumshoe-foia-data-dumps-ai.php (accessed 12 November 2023).

2 See Seth F. Kreimer, "Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow 'War': FOIA, the Abuses of Anti-Terrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency", *Lewis & Clark Law Review*, vol. 11, no. 4 (2007), 1141–1220; Devin S. Schindler, "Between Safety and Transparency: Prior Restraints, FOIA, and the Power of the Executive", *Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly*, vol. 38, no. 1 (2010), 1–48; Sioban Ghorman, "The Snowden Effect on the NSA and Reporting", *Journalism after Snowden*, eds. Emily Bell and Taylor Owen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 197–208.

3 Carl Bernstein, "The CIA and the Media", *Rolling Stone*, 20 October 1977.

4 The Congressional investigation of the Church Committee revealed some of the abuses of the CIA in 1975, including its troubled relationship with American journalists and media (Operation Mockingbird), but its conclusions on the topic were overshadowed by the disclosures of CIA programmes such as MKULTRA (mind control experimentations on civilians), COINTELPRO (infiltration of civil-rights and progressive organisations), and Family Jewels (covert assassination). Also in 1975, British journalists blew the cover of Forum World Features, a CIA propaganda operation which operated as a news service. See John Jenks' chapter in this edited volume.

5 In the 1950s, there were also discussions about setting up a "propaganda school", a project promoted by journalist Walter Lippmann which also includes media scholars. See Dominique Trudel, "Walter Lippmann and the Second World War's Propaganda and Psychological Warfare Network", *International Journal of Communication*, vol. 11 (2017), 3721–39.
6 United States Congress, Committee on Government Operations, *U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices: Administration and Operation of the Freedom of Information Act (Part 4)* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), 1254–55.
7 Sam Lebovic, "How Administrative Opposition Shaped the Freedom of Information Law", *Troubling Transparency*, eds. David E. Pozen and Michael Schudson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 13–33.
8 Committee on Government Operations, *A Citizen's Guide on How to Use the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act in Requesting Government Documents* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977).
9 Anthony R. Fellow, *American Media History*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Wadsworth, 2010), 354.
10 Gene F. Wilson to Carl Bernstein, 4 November 1977.
11 Bernstein, "The CIA and the Media".
12 Bernstein, "The CIA and the Media".
13 Bernstein writes that Phil Graham's "closest friend" was Frank Wisner, deputy director of the CIA and "the Agency's premier orchestrator of 'black' operations". The two men committed suicide in the mid 1960s.
14 I would like to thank my colleague, Dr. Juliette De Maeyer (Université de Montréal, Canada), for her contribution to this research.
15 Bernstein, "The CIA and the Media".
16 Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 38.
17 See de Certeau, *The Practice;* See also the introduction of this edited volume.
18 Cf. Seth F. Kreimer, "The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency", *University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law*, vol. 10, no. 5 (June 2008), 1013.
19 In the context of small and local newspapers, journalists' use of FOIA has been declining as their resources – including time, money, and expertise – are limited. FOIA is thus increasingly developing as a specialised niche for large media outlets. See James T. Hamilton, "FOIA and Investigative Reporting: Who's Asking What, Where, and When – and Why It Matters", *Troubling Transparency*, eds. David E. Pozen and Michael Schudson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 116–31.
20 David E. Pozen, "Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act", *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, vol. 165 (2007), 1097–1158.
21 Moreover, Pozen argues that FOIA is "neoliberal" and "reactionary" as it typically empowers opponents of regulation and powerful private and corporate interests. See David E. Pozen, "Freedom of Information". For a similar critique, see also Seth F. Kreimer, "The Ecology of Transparency Reloaded", *Troubling Transparency*, eds. David E. Pozen and Michael Schudson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 135–65.
22 Cited in Ben Kafka, *The Demon of Writing: Powers and Failures of Paperwork* (New York: Zone Books, 2013), 17.
23 See Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended* (New York: Picador, 2003).

24 For a clear overview of Foucault's approach, see Michael S. Roth, "Foucault's 'History of the Present'", *History and Theory*, vol. 20, no. 1 (1981), 32–46.
25 Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*.
26 "I call a 'tactic', on the other hand, a calculus which cannot count on a 'proper' (a spatial or institutional localization), nor thus on a border-line distinguishing the other as a visible totality", de Certeau, *The Practice*, xx.
27 de Certeau, *The Practice*.
28 The entanglement of the CIA with media and communication research is another dimension of the problem. See Christopher Simpson, *Science of Coercion: Communication Research & Psychological Warfare* 1945–1960 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Timothy Glander, *Origins of American Communication Research during the American Cold War: Educational Effects and Contemporary Implications* (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000).
29 Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations* (New York: Free Press, 1947).
30 Kafka, *The Demon of Writing*, 10.
31 Cornelia Vismann, *Files: Law and Media Technology* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
32 Kafka, *The Demon of Writing*, 117.
33 Vismann, *Files*, 84–85.
34 Lily Hay Newman, "UFOs, Psychics, and Spies: The CIA Just Put 12M Pages of Files Online. Start Here", *Wired*, 19 January 2017. https://www.wired.com/2017/01/ufos-psychics-spies-cia-just-put-12m-pages-files-online-start/ (accessed 8 December 2023).
35 See Franco Moretti, *Distant Reading* (London: Verso Books, 2013).
36 On the transformative aspect of digital remediation, see Juliette De Maeyer and Dominique Trudel, "@franklinfordbot: Remediating Franklin Ford", *Digital Journalism*, vol. 6, no. 9 (2018), 1270– 87.
37 See Ted Underwood, "Theorizing Research Practices We Forgot to Theorize Twenty Years Ago", *Representations*, vol. 127, no. 1 (2014), 64–72.
38 I use the concept of language game in the sense of Wittgenstein. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953).
39 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 49.
40 See Vismann, *Files*, and Kafka, *The Demon of Writing*.
41 A report highlights the childish behaviour of students who, among other things, drew a swastika on the blackboard. See Office Memorandum, Chief Instructor, Information Reporting, Reports, and Requirements to Chief, Operations School, 1 February 1960. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-04308A000100080001-8.pdf (accessed 8 December 2023).
42 In 1966, the course includes screenings titled "Language in Action" and "Eye of the Beholder", the latter probably referring to the 11th episode of *The Twilight Zone* (1960), a CBS series.
43 Memorandum for Senior Staff and Division Training Officers, 19 July 1956. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP62-00939A000100110010-8.pdf (accessed 8 December 2023).
44 Memorandum, Assistant of Headquarters Training to Chief, Operations School, 20 March 1957. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/cia-rdp78-05787a000200010044-5.pdf (accessed 8 December 2023).

45 Office Memorandum, Chief, Headquarters Training to Director of Training, 26 March 1959. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/cia-rdp61-00442a000100050017-7.pdf (accessed 8 December 2023).
46 Information Reporting, Reports, and Requirements, undated, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP62-00939A000100110011-7.pdf (accessed 8 December 2023).
47 Memorandum for Senior Staff, 19 July 1956.
48 Free-style Writing, undated, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP81-00706R000300030036-4.pdf (accessed 8 December 2023).
49 I use the concept of boundary-work in reference to the work of Gieryn, whose definition points to the "attribution of selected characteristics to [an] institution of science (i.e., to its practitioners, methods, stock of knowledge, values and work organization) for purposes of constructing a social boundary that distinguishes some intellectual activities as 'non-science'". See Thomas F. Gieryn, "Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 48, no. 6 (1983), 782.
50 Roselyne Ringoot and Denis Ruellan, "Journalism as Permanent and Collective Invention", *Brazilian Journalism Research*, vol. 3, no. 2 (2012), 71.
51 Reactions to a "Critique of the IRRR course with suggestion for change", undated. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-04308A000100020055-5.pdf (accessed 8 December 2023).
52 Jean Chalaby, *The Invention of Journalism* (London: Macmillan Press, 1998).
53 Reactions to a "Critique of the IRRR".
54 Office Memorandum, Chief, Headquarters Training to Director of Training, 2 April 1959. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP61-00442A000100050008-7.pdf (accessed 8 December 2023).
55 Office Memorandum, 2 April 1959.
56 Reactions to a "Critique of the IRRR".
57 Office Memorandum, 26 March 1959.
58 Office Memorandum, 1 February 1960.
59 Cited in Kafka, *The Demon of Writing*, 10.
60 Cited in Vismann, *Files*, 111.
61 See Michael Schudson, *Discovering the News. A Social History of American Newspapers* (New York: Basic Books, 1976); James W. Carey, "Technology and Ideology: The Case of the Telegraph", *Prospects*, vol. 8 (1983), 303–25.

10 The Information-by-Proxy Strategy

Cultural Policy as a Media Tactic in Swedish Governmental Information

Lars Diurlin and Fredrik Mohammadi Norén

Strategies and tactics regarding how government agencies should inform citizens about laws, rights, and recommendations have had many forms throughout history. In democracies, information about governmental policies is considered a civil right and thus a duty for state agencies to provide in order to make agencies accountable to the people – and to make the same policies effective.[1] However, governmental information has not only been used to provide facts and thereby keep citizens up to date on regulations. It has also been employed by democratic governments strategically as a steering tool to secure legitimisation among its citizenries for both short- and long-term political goals. This chapter centres on the production processes of information funded by Swedish government agencies in the 1970s and 1980s with the purpose of actively changing people's behavioural patterns, opinions, and attitudes – in Swedish known as "pleading information" (*pläderande information*).[2] More specifically, we will focus on a particular kind of strategy, the information-by-proxy strategy – derived from the Swedish terms *vidareinformation* and *vidareinformatör*, which we translate into "information-by-proxy" and "proxy-information creator". The Swedish terms were used by the historical actors at the time, mainly to denote a certain kind of "operations by transferred information" (*överflyttad informationsverksamhet*) and signified a strategy to reach desired target groups with pleading information utilising a selected proxy, which was sometimes explicitly referred to as a "medium" between agency and citizen.[3]

Pleading information was deemed problematic for state agencies to create in-house. Such information – directly communicated from agency to citizen – could be perceived as too unidirectional and thus too paternalistic. Hence, there was a need for a strategy that could decentralise and debureaucratise the information and create a buffer zone between the pleading intentions of the agency, and citizens on the receiving end. Citizens were deemed more susceptible to information that stemmed from a proxy, as the content could better dovetail with the recipient's ideological horizon.[4]

DOI: 10.4324/9781032618326-12

To achieve this goal, some agencies made use of an information-by-proxy strategy where information funds were channelled through the existing infrastructure of civil society (such as NGOs, unions, and ethnic organisations) but also to individual producers of information, often cultural workers – filmmakers, authors, visual artists, poets, theatre groups – who functioned as proxy-information creators. This chapter specifically analyses how Swedish state agencies not primarily associated with cultural practitioners still activated such actors to persuade and propagate.

Empirically, the analysis makes use of archival material from three state agencies: the National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen, 1913/1969–), the Swedish International Development Authority (Styrelsen för internationellt utvecklingssamarbete/SIDA, 1965–), and the Swedish Board of Immigration and Naturalisation (Statens invandrarverk/SIV, 1969–2000). These have been chosen because of their shared position as fiscally prioritised regarding the production of pleading information, especially during the 1970s and 1980s, in the areas of health, foreign aid, and immigration. An important objective of the chapter is to study the sometimes less predictable tactics that arose from implementing the information-by-proxy strategy and its generated results. Hence, we focus on the practices of the historical actors to reveal the complexities of such employed tactics – tactics that were not always aligned with the overall strategy. Using such an empirical perspective, borrowing from Lawrence Freedman, a strategy "evolves through a series of states, each one not quite what was anticipated or hoped for".[5] In the archival material, the traces of these actions are fragmented and uneven. Hence, the analysis is constructed through a net of remaining pieces found in, for example, correspondence, protocols, and reports.

The analysis is structured around two tactical stages. At the *contact stage* we focus on the rapprochement between the agencies and the cultural workers, examining why and how the actors were drawn to each other and what kind of tactics and objectives were involved. The enquiry driving this part of the analysis will be aimed in two directions: How could cultural practices and practitioners be utilised in the service of governmental information, and how could non-cultural state agencies be of use to cultural workers in need of funding? At the *results stage* we centre on how to trace and conceptualise material produced by cultural workers as governmental information. Here we ask: What kind of ambiguities were generated by the strategy, particularly concerning who is perceived to communicate the information?

This chapter relates to historical research that highlights how cultural workers have been contracted by the state to produce artistic material targeting the domestic population, partly through the lens of public relations.[6] Scholarly works on using cultural workers as a governmental buffer are

also visible in the field of cultural diplomacy.[7] Here, scholars have shown how artists have been used as part of foreign policy, to be sent abroad and produce and disseminate art, with the more or less transparent purpose of building a better national image abroad.[8] Our chapter contributes to these strands of research by adding discussions from the fields of cultural policy research and aesthetic theory, anchored with archival-driven approaches. For research more specifically related to this topic, scholars have focused on SIDA's use of filmmakers to stimulate positive public opinion on foreign aid, as well as SOC's use of visual artists to produce creative health information.[9]

The Instrumentalisation of Culture and Artification of Governmental Information

The *contact stage* of the analysis is driven by the assumption that the information-by-proxy strategy led to alterations regarding the traditional roles and functions of the involved actors. Cultural workers found themselves producers of governmental information, while agencies not primarily associated with cultural policies and practitioners found themselves patrons of the arts – thus transcending their sectoral policy boundaries into the cultural sphere. These alterations expose a novel perspective on the instrumentalisation of art and art's potential usefulness in society.

Instrumentalisation can be seen as a means to a non-cultural end, where the cultural sector is set to fulfil mainly economic or social goals associated with other policy areas. Overall, cultural policy research on instrumentalisation has been characterised by a unidirectional perspective on how cultural policy governance tends to reach outward, attaching itself to, and legitimising itself through, better resourced political sectors.[10] Clive Gray has used the term "policy attachment" to describe processes where cultural policy adopts such contributory and dependent positions.[11] The information-by-proxy strategy, as articulated and operationalised by the historical actors, differs from orthodox instrumentality since it concerns non-cultural actors striving to utilise the assumed qualities of art. This leads us to focus on a reverse policy attachment, in our case studying how the policy area of governmental information has become dependent on, as well as contributed to, the cultural sector and its practitioners. While this phenomenon has rarely been theoretically discussed in cultural or information policy research, it can be related to the concept of "implicit" – as opposed to "explicit" – cultural policy, which is pursued in non-cultural areas but affects the cultural sector. Hence, to paraphrase a statement by Jeremy Ahearne, the actual impact of policy upon culture, or upon governmental information, may not always be where we are accustomed to look for it.[12]

In the *results stage* of the analysis, we embrace a broad and entangled perspective of media, which is vital in conceptualising artistic creations as governmental information (and vice versa).[13] This section is driven by the assumption that such multifaceted media use, along with the employment of a buffer between agency and citizenry, gave the information-by-proxy strategy several layers of ambiguity. As Gray has pointed out, trans-sectoral instrumentalising of attachment strategies opens up the possibility that the focus of the cultural policy sector "can become skewed away from the core concerns of the sector itself".[14] We argue that this problem is mirrored in the three policy fields' information efforts studied in this chapter, as they become attached to, and dependent on, the cultural field to produce and disseminate governmental information, leading to ambiguities connected to the resulting material.

In this second analytical stage, we use the concept of artification to theorise processes where something that is ordinarily not regarded as art changes into something that takes influence from artistic ways of thinking and practising but still exists in a borderland between contextually perceived notions of art and non-art.[15] As aesthetic theorists Ossi Naukkarinen and Yuriko Saito suggest, the introduction of artistic ways of thinking and doing into non-art domains typically happens because the host domain recognises that art has something to offer of value that the host domain lacks, for example, creative experimentation and personal address. Anthropologist Roberta Shapiro has furthermore suggested that traits such as displacement, renaming, and individualisation are central to artification.[16] This, we suggest, can be related to the information-by-proxy strategy, where pleading information can enter spatial contexts and take medial forms rather associated with artistic and personal expressions and practices than with governmental information, such as in stage plays, cinemas, galleries, comics, illustrated children's books, and TV documentaries experienced in your own living room.

Establishing Contacts and the Instrumentalisation of Culture by Non-Cultural State Agencies

In the Swedish post-war era, the increase of various social reforms, and ambitions to support and steer citizens' everyday life, created demands for more and better information to make people aware of rights and obligations, and to make policies effective.[17] When society was perceived to grow more complex, information was believed to be a tool for making things clearer, as well as something that could enhance citizen emancipation. However, in the late 1960s, Swedish state agencies' communication practices were often criticised for being boring and old-fashioned, and demands were raised for more creative attempts to produce governmental

information.[18] At that time, moreover, Swedish health authorities discovered that people did not change their behaviour on account of exposure to scientific facts. This called for new thinking. Hence, in 1968, the newly appointed Director General of the National Board of Health and Welfare, Bror Rexed, gave a speech to the Delegation on Healthcare Education, the unit responsible for producing and disseminating health information to the Swedish people. According to the minutes, Rexed stated that

> The human being knows how to improve her health and protect herself, but she does not make use of the knowledge she possesses. The Delegation on Healthcare Education's task is to constantly convey the knowledge that exists and to convince of the necessity to utilise it, to make people understand the meaning of health information. […] Therefore, we are in need of constructive, imaginative proposals regarding how to push the propaganda.[19]

In hindsight, Rexed's call for more "imaginative" information (or "propaganda", using his phrasing) can be understood as a starting period when Swedish state agencies began to more actively team up with cultural workers as proxy-information creators to produce and disseminate more creative information-by-proxy material.

The foreign aid agency SIDA was an important actor in operationalising the information-by-proxy strategy, beginning in the early 1970s. To sway public opinion in favour of the newly increased aid level policy – 1 per cent of GDP – SIDA had one of the largest spending budgets for domestic information of any Swedish authority, which was partly channelled through NGOs and opinion-making individuals.[20] Legitimising the 1-per cent target was, however, not an easy task. Even though Swedes were relatively positive towards aid, the majority remained uninterested in global issues.[21] Similar to the health authorities' concern, mediating only facts about global poverty was therefore not considered enough. The 1-per cent target had to be contextualised by information that could "interpret the complex nature of development", emphasise "the possibilities for positive change through aid", and "activate" citizens in a meaningful way, as the board of SIDA phrased it in 1968.[22] This would depend on the behaviour-changing work done by the proxies which SIDA expected would have an "epidemic" effect, strengthening citizens' international consciousness.[23]

The influence of SIDA's strategy on Swedish governmental information policy should not be underestimated. For example, when the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brottsförebyggande rådet) in 1977 investigated the possibilities of producing attitude-changing information about the social stigmatisation of ex-convicts, it was natural for the investigator to highlight SIDA as an archetype. The investigation saw SIDA's

strategy of supporting artistically enhanced information by proxy-creators as especially effective for mediating empathy-strengthening experiences regarding the living conditions and cultures of "divergent others", be they ex-cons, people living in poor countries, or immigrants living in Sweden.[24] In fact, by the mid-1970s, Swedish research in the field of immigration policy had reached a similar conclusion to other neighbouring policy fields: prejudices against immigrants were driven by fear and ignorance which simply could not be effaced by information. Following strengthened education and heightened social security, the main solution brought forth was artistically enhanced information produced by cultural workers which could help Swedes to "discover how it feels to be the other".[25]

In its ambitious 1971 four-year information plan – produced to facilitate the post-legitimisation of the 1-per cent target – the board of SIDA emphasised the importance of the film medium as an information method and would continue to do so over the following decade in internal discussions and official requests directed at the government.[26] To encourage production, SIDA issued annual development, production, and travel grants to filmmakers, beginning in 1970.[27] Studying the extensive lists of applicants in the SIDA archive, it is apparent that the grants became essential for Swedish cultural workers interested in global issues. The impact of SIDA's information-by-proxy strategy on the cultural sphere can furthermore be illustrated by the recurring pleadings to SIDA from cultural workers in other fields, claiming that, in all fairness, their artistic domains should also be eligible for foreign aid information funding.[28]

Connected to such external solicitations, what began as a structured strategy to annually operationalise cultural opinion-makers soon snowballed into a flow of suggestions from cultural workers who saw in SIDA a potential patron of the arts, leading the agency to handle applications on a tactical day-to-day basis. This included everything from small ad hoc grants to large-scale transnational contributions aimed at bolstering the Nordic call for films on development which could be used domestically as pleading information.[29] As a result of their intimate collaboration with the UN, the Nordic aid agencies soon gained international renown as potential film financiers. Consequently, they also received international requests which were dealt with ad hoc. An example can be seen in two films by Brazilian-born filmmaker Helena Solberg-Ladd – the simultaneously shot *The Double Day* (1975) and *Simplemente Jenny* (1976) – produced under the auspices of the UN's 1975 International Women's Year, and granted a total of USD 27,000 split between the three Scandinavian aid agencies.[30] The fact that the agencies often customised grants and overall domestic information to focus on the UN's International Year themes may explain why the agencies granted such a large sum to a Women-themed project in 1975.[31]

While only SIDA had what we would call an explicitly formulated information-by-proxy strategy, all three agencies of interest in this chapter acted similarly when it came to employing cultural workers as creators and disseminators of governmental information. The archive material shows that the three agencies were the contact initiators. In the case of the National Board of Health and Welfare, Bror Rexed's previously mentioned call for "imaginative" health information ignited the idea within the Delegation on Healthcare Education to reach out and discuss potential projects with cultural workers. In 1970 contacts were established through meetings with the so-called cultural centres – independent interest organisations for, among others, visual artists, theatre groups, and filmmakers to promote the role of non-commercial culture in society and to mediate contracts with cultural workers.[32] The contacts generated various more or less formal collaborations throughout the 1970s – some fully funded by the agency, others co-funded.

The contact initiation was partly driven by enthusiastic Delegation officials, who believed in culture's role in building a better society, and thus had a notion of what we denote as a reverse policy attachment embedded in their thinking.[33] Kjell E. Johanson was such a figure, introducing several collaborative projects.[34] Johanson also wrote articles advocating the importance of working with cultural proxies in co-producing health information – about, for instance, alcohol and narcotics, with the purpose of "increasing the actual knowledge of different target groups"[35] – and defended information outputs that would later come in for criticism.[36] Instrumentalising culture was, according to Johanson, an essential part of producing and disseminating governmental information, but, importantly, it materialised outside the sphere of cultural policy. It thus exemplifies, as do the SIDA examples, the reverse policy attachment, in how a non-cultural policy area became dependent on the cultural sector in search of what the assumed qualities of art could bring to governmental information.

Once contact had been established between the Delegation and the cultural workers, and some of the projects had been carried out – such as two poster projects and an art exhibition about health, and film projects with incarcerated drug offenders – the driving force behind the collaborations changed.[37] From the mid-1970s, it was more often cultural workers who pitched projects and proposals. For example, there were (approved) requests to co-fund films, such as Stefan Jarl's *A Respectable Life* (Ett anständigt liv, 1979), and Annalena Öhrström, Maria Falksten, and Mary Eisikovits' *Eva and Maria* (1983).[38] Presumably, it was not only the Delegation's instrumental view of art that drove such submitted proposals. More likely, and similar to the development at SIDA, cultural workers saw it as an opportunity to fund their projects and artistic ambitions. Hence, the strategic will to collaborate with cultural workers also activated external tactics outside the agency.

Regarding the Board of Immigration, the agency granted general funds to selected organisations early on – including cultural-oriented associations – to broadly support the ideals and goals of the agency (promoting tolerance and understanding between different cultures, and counteracting prejudice against immigrants).[39] However, from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, the agency's budget also allowed for co-funding of external projects in collaboration with cultural workers to produce information that was judged to promote the current immigration policy. Mirroring the development at the other agencies, filmmakers, authors, and other cultural workers began soliciting SIV with ideas that they argued were in line with the agency's information policies. Among these projects were co-funded films about immigrants in Sweden directed by Gregor Nowinski, a play set in the Stockholm metro, a photo exhibition about Turkish immigrants, and a photo book about Greek immigrants by Georgios Theodossiadis.[40]

Taken together, such projects speak of a consciousness in strategically using cultural workers as part of the agency's information schemes. Still, what we can derive from the archive material is that the agency did not publicly announce funds to individual artists. Instead, cultural workers only gradually became aware of SIV as a potential patron of the arts. However – and this goes for all three agencies – only for cultural products that could be attached to, and function within, the information policy production context connected to each agency, supporting the agency's overall pleading information mission.

As will be discussed in the following analysis, the often tactical ad hoc nature of the agencies' information funding resulted in ambiguities connected to who might be perceived as the originator behind, and communicator of, the material. Furthermore, another layer of defamiliarising ambiguity sometimes emerged as non-cultural policy sectors relied on cultural proxies to infuse assumed qualities of art into the sphere of governmental information.

Ambiguities as a Result of the Information-by-Proxy Strategy

Through the information-by-proxy strategy, the Swedish public was thought to perceive pleading information as more personalised, decentralised, and less bureaucratic. As a telling example, at a SIDA information conference in 1977 the use of proxy-information was discussed as establishing a "buffer" between SIDA and the people, making it possible for SIDA "to back progressive and challenging projects without risking political critique".[41] Thus, combined with the sometimes ad hoc funding tactics outlined above, there is inherent in the strategy a certain amount of non-transparency.

Arguments on the non-transparency of the information-by-proxy strategy have been contested by film scholar Ingrid Ryberg, arguing that since traces of SIDA's film funding involvement can be found in the online Swedish Film Database, it is not "necessary to make visible anew the blurred link between the material and their production circumstances".[42] However, our primary sources illustrate the fallacy of such a simplistic approach. The TV series *About Angola* (Per Sandén, 1977–79) is a good example. Broadcast in the context of the Swedish Educational Broadcasting Company's TV slot aimed at preschool children, the series had, in typical tactical fashion, received SEK 50,000 from SIDA. Neither the children, nor the parents who watched the adult companion piece *The Future of the Revolution* (Sandén, 1978), nor the teachers who read the related educational material, were informed about SIDA's involvement.[43] Furthermore, SIDA's regular grants to cultural workers and organisations sometimes resulted in material which differed in name and content compared to the original application. Exemplifying this, the Swedish section of the Lutheran World Federation received a grant in 1971 for a film on illiteracy in Ethiopia. The grant resulted in an additional film, *Just a Shortwave Away* (1972). While co-financed by SIDA, the film contains no such information.[44] Further complexities can be illustrated by a travel grant received by Vilgot Sjöman in 1970 to develop a feature film in Tanzania. There, Sjöman decided instead to make the children's TV series *Jambo*, broadcast in 1973 on Swedish television – with no reference to SIDA.[45]

Despite several collaborations through the 1960s and 1970s, SIDA's strategy to employ filmmakers and TV producers, and use television as an outlet for their co-financed pleading information, was seen as problematic by Radio Sweden/TV – mainly since SIDA was a state agency. During the early 1970s, the public service company complained repeatedly about the issue to SIDA.[46] This complexity could explain why SIDA's financial and/or advisory involvement was excluded from the credits in several television productions on global poverty and development, such as the large-scale educational projects *Tanzania – Ett u-land i Afrika* (1967), *Vi kallar dom u-länder* (1970) and *Karibu – Fyra epoker i Tanzanias historia* (1974).

Foreshadowing the research on immigration policy, which underscored the need for artistically enhanced information produced by cultural workers, SIDA's Director-General Ernst Michanek stated in 1969 that the agency needed to fund information that could create a relatable emotional experience of life in poor countries, as mass-mediated images of poverty, could "propel the foreign aid effort, more than any one-percent-debate".[47] But there was a risk that such images instead created an alienating "psychological resistance" among citizens towards the possibility of helping.[48] SIDA's use of film for pleading information was therefore driven by a need for media that could address people in a more personal way (as opposed

to a state agency), could engage people emotionally, and, most importantly, could create both identification with, and empathy for, the aid receivers. As was stated in the 1971 information plan, a more "human" and personalised SIDA profile was not to be underestimated.[49] The search for information that could cater to the demand for emotion-driven empathy, identification, and personal address can be related to what Shapiro identifies as individualisation, in artifying processes, but also to what Emil Stjernholm has identified as an increasingly permissive informality and personalisation in how agencies addressed citizens through government public relations, beginning in the 1970s.[50]

A 1974 work programme for SIDA's Information Bureau stated that "the overarching goal is that Swedes should intellectually and emotionally understand development issues, and at least some should spend their time working actively on them".[51] The programme underscored that an archetype for artistic proxy-material that could achieve this was the SIDA-funded film *Keine Welt für Kinder* (1972) by Erwin Leiser, since "as a viewer, you experience both closeness and respect" towards the starving millions. Bridging both the geographical and emotional distance between Swedes and people of aid-receiving countries was arguably one of the most important goals for SIDA's Information Bureau, as the remoteness remained a threat to public opinion and made it difficult to communicate accomplishments.[52] Here cultural workers filled a fundamental artifying function, and it is apparent in applications and solicitations that the filmmakers stressed that their material could achieve exactly what SIDA needed. For example, Ingela Romare and Lennart Malmer received SEK 27,000 in 1972 for a film series on life in Vietnam, intending to reach "maximum possible openness for identification", and Rudi Spee claimed that viewers of his film *Free People in Guiné Bissau* (1969) – acquired by SIDA to use as information material – would obtain the "sense of presence" and "first-person identification" (with PAIGC liberation soldiers) which was traditionally achieved by dramatic feature films.[53]

In 1979 (up until 1987) the film grants became a specific category, constructed as a jury-based fund annually supporting around ten projects, with the purpose of "increasing the comprehension of the problems facing less developed countries" and "scrutinising Swedish foreign aid and the relations between developed and less developed countries".[54] Still, typical for these films, as well as for the 1970s proxy-productions, is that they rarely cover foreign aid projects or policy issues. Instead, they frequently feature personalised (albeit more or less dramatised) life stories of Global South individuals, such as in *Familjen Benedict* (Stig Holmqvist, 1970), *Uppbrott* (Kjell Nordenskiöld, 1976), *Jag tycker mycket om att leva* and *Nja på Kanjabak* (Leyla Assaf-Tengroth, 1981; 1985), *Vi ska mötas igen* (Ulf Hultberg and Mona Sjöström, 1983) and *Amandla! Maatla!*

(Magnus Bergmar and Kjell Söderlund, 1984) – films in which the strategic trait of individualisation in artified information can be found, strengthening the possibility of compassion and identification among Swedes vis-à-vis a distant aid receiver.

However, the creative leeway of individualisation intrinsic to the information-by-proxy strategy comes with risks of ambivalence and possible defamiliarisation of the purpose behind the agency's information mission. For example, it is safe to assume that the TV audience which in 1983 experienced Muammer Özer's experimental auto documentary *Utlänningen* (1981) and Peter Nestler's intermedial composition *Ruperto Mendoza* (1982) did not associate these SIDA co-funded films with issues of foreign aid and development – the former portraying the inner turmoil of an alienated Turkish immigrant in Finland, the latter depicting a tale of a poor Chilean man through expressionistic paintings, music, and poetry.[55]

The information-by-proxy projects created through collaborations between the Delegation on Healthcare Education and cultural workers often had a strategic focus on school children and youths.[56] The media practices surrounding these projects also had a tactical dimension in that the agency, in collaboration with cultural workers, experimented playfully with different media expressions to reach out to and impact these target groups. Among others, the attempts included co-funding of feature films and creative writing projects highlighting the damaging effect of alcohol and drugs, and co-funding of plays about gender roles and contraceptives. Often, these information-by-proxy creations were used as a basis for discussion and to increase engagement and reflection among the receivers of the information. The co-funded stage plays are good examples of this.

Kjell E. Johanson at the Delegation had enthusiastically and ambiguously described theatre as, on the one hand, "a method for disseminating facts" and, on the other hand, a "mobilisation instrument" that could be employed "to stimulate debate and provoke stances".[57] Theatre thus had the potential to both transfer knowledge and influence opinions. Consequently, in 1973, the agency arranged a conference to discuss this dual possibility with independent theatre groups.[58] The purpose was to discuss the potential for producing plays about contraceptives and gender roles, partly in light of the coming law on free abortion in 1975.[59] The conference resulted in collaborations with five theatre groups, which produced one play each on the topic. Overall, the plays were positively received by critics. Furthermore, when the collaborations were evaluated in 1975, the theatre groups gave positive reviews of the collaborations with the Delegation, which seems to have given the groups a fair amount of creative independence. An important aspect of the projects was the participatory component. To enhance the message, the plays were accompanied by audience discussions about the performed topics. Naturally, the agency

could not foresee the results of such discussions – and in the long run the outcome of the information-by-proxy strategy – especially since the discussions were led by the theatre groups.[60] Furthermore, the stage plays are a good example of how the intention of the governmental agency – to spread knowledge and stimulate discussions about contraceptives, abortion, and gender roles – was channelled through an artistic interpretation. The result, in turn, relates to Naukkarinen and Saito's idea of how, in this case, a state agency policy is turned into an artified product, renamed, and situated in a theatre context.[61]

Another example of how artified information outputs became an extension of a government agency – specifically to reach children as a target group – is how the Board of Immigration used the Swedish cartoon character Bamse to communicate its messages to schoolchildren. SIV had an explicit purpose to inform citizens about immigration and immigrants that aimed "to influence public opinion in a direction favourable to immigrants and to create a greater understanding of people with values, traditions, customs and behaviour patterns that differ from their own".[62] In the 1970s, the agency tried to change people's attitudes in various ways, for example, through film, radio, television, and the press. In the latter half of the 1980s, however, the agency seemed to have re-evaluated some of its media tactics. This was a period when the budget to co-finance external information projects decreased, as shown by the rejections of proposals from individual cultural workers in the archival material.[63] Hence, the agency had to rethink the tactics of the proxy strategy.

While children had always been an important target group, this became even more evident when in 1986 the agency contacted the famous cartoonist Rune Andréasson for permission to reprint an issue of the popular comic book *Bamse – The World's Strongest Bear* (*Bamse – Världens starkaste björn*).[64] The issue in question was "Bamse and Kalle Black Skull" (Bamse och Kalle Svartskalle), an anti-racist story about prejudice against divergent individuals (in this case the hedgehog Kalle with black spines). Originally released in 1980, the issue caught SIV's attention since its moral and ideology appealed to the agency's aims and goals. The agency ordered a reprint of 30,000 copies to be distributed to children in preschools and primary schools, to be discussed with their teachers.[65] In terms of distribution, the *Bamse* campaign was a success, which led SIV to order 250,000 additional copies.[66]

In the reprinted issue, Bamse, looking directly at the reader, states in a speech balloon: "I want you to read this together […]. Therefore, I have written questions that you can think about and answer together".[67] Clearly, SIV was employing not only the comic book as a medium but also the character Bamse as a proxy to communicate their messages to

the children. The case also exemplifies how the artification traits of displacement (schoolroom), renaming ("Bamse and Kalle Black Skull"), and individualisation (the character Bamse) could function in the information-by-proxy strategy.[68]

For the parents, however, it is apparent that some saw SIV as the primary sender. The negative responses, preserved in the archive, were mostly from parents largely reacting against the usage of the phrase *svartskalle*, which they regarded as part of a stereotyped and racist language that should not be used in schools.[69] In a letter to a concerned parent, the head of SIV's Information Bureau, Wiwi Samuelsson, revealed the tactics of the agency's information policy. While Samuelsson stated that SIV had a responsibility to "[…] influence people's opinions towards generosity and tolerance", she also acknowledged the difficulty in this task:

> You don't change your values as easily as you change your shirt, hairstyle or shampoo. We know for sure that it is next to impossible to achieve this through mass communicated messages of any kind and therefore we have deliberately invested in not sending information directly to people's homes. Instead, we have tried to find ways to provide already committed people with material that they can then use in their work with children and young people at schools or in association activities.[70]

A parallel to this dilemma was articulated 20 years earlier. When Sweden shifted from left-hand to right-hand traffic in 1967, schools were also treated as important receivers of governmental information. The reason was the assumption that children would talk with their parents about what they had learned in school and thus – indirectly, almost like a medium themselves – inform the adults (as in the case of SIDA's co-funded *About Angola*).[71] In a similar fashion, it is possible to regard SIV's usage of Bamse as a way to make school children proxy carriers of the agency's worldview.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have focused on how three Swedish non-cultural agencies implemented an information-by-proxy strategy, transcending their sectoral policy boundaries into the cultural sphere in search of artistic qualities which could be used in governmental information. The analysis has uncovered how the conviction that public attitude and behaviour needed to be actively influenced – not only by fact-based information but by artistically enhanced pleading information – was echoed in health, foreign aid, and immigration policy fields during the 1960s, 1970s, and

1980s. The tactics that were generated through this belief partly concerned how state agencies tried to attract cultural workers to produce creative information and how cultural workers, in response, tried to convince agencies to fund their artistic ambitions.

Gray has stated that when non-cultural policy sectors incorporate cultural elements into their own arenas, such strategies are merely examples of "instrumental reasoning, where culture is being used, effectively, for non-cultural ends".[72] The information-by-proxy strategy problematises this statement. Our findings point to the fact that it would be just as correct to state that non-cultural sectors were used by cultural practitioners, effectively, for cultural ends, in a way reversing the cross-sectoral attachment/dependency relation. Similar to how cultural policy actors try to utilise, in Gray's words, "the structural strengths that the cultural policy sectors normally lack",[73] SIDA, SIV, and the Health Delegation saw a need to utilise creative assets that their policy sectors lacked, thus attaching to the cultural sector for their policy objectives. Here, culture was not instrumentalised in traditional terms, merely to legitimise its own existence as a policy field, but rather it was employed to strengthen non-cultural policy fields through its power to artistically enhance or "artify" governmental information.

The cultural products deriving from the information-by-proxy strategy can be said to exist in a liminal space between policy areas which is a result of what we have called a "reversed policy attachment". The experimental usage of diverse media resulted in a variety of proxy faces and voices. Here, the notion of artification is useful to conceptualise the outcome of these messy tactical practices. That is, the debureaucratising, obfuscating, and defamiliarising elements that characterise governmental information when morphed into a form of personalised, artistically and emotionally enhanced material – presumably for greater impact at the receiving end but also with the ever-present risk that the original message might get lost in translation. The pervasive buffer-like non-transparency which we have shown characterises the information-by-proxy strategy is also reflected in the fragmented archive material, which sometimes makes it difficult to connect how information products were financed and possibly influenced by the funding agency. We therefore encourage further archival research into agencies that employed the information-by-proxy strategy and the media tactics it resulted in.

Acknowledgement

Lars Diurlin wishes to thank the Åke Wiberg Foundation and the Wahlgrenska Foundation for funding his research on Swedish governmental foreign aid information.

Notes

1 E.g. Mordecai Lee, "An Overview of Public Reporting", *Government Public Relations: A Reader*, ed. Mordecai Lee (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2008), 144–48; Fredrik Norén, "Deliberation or Manipulation? The Issue of Governmental Information in Sweden, 1969–1973", *Information & Culture*, vol. 55, no. 2 (2020), 149–68.
2 NSI, *Samhällsinformationens principiella problem: En diskussionspromemoria* (Stockholm: NSI, 1977), 75–84.
3 NSI, *Samhällsinformationens principiella problem*, 43–44, 94, 96. SOU 1984:68 *Samordnad samhällsinformation*, 35–38. The terms have not been fixed in Swedish information policy discourse. In SOU 1984:68, e.g., the term refers to agency employees disseminating information within an organisation. Regarding foreign aid information policy, the term remained more stable, signifying anyone who played an active part in SIDA's information-by-proxy strategy: information creators (cultural workers, journalists), or disseminators (school teachers, students and organisation officials). Cf. SOU 1977:73 *U-landsinformation och internationell solidaritet*, 30, 118; SOU 1988:19 *U-lands och biståndsinformation*, 11, 178.
4 NSI, *Samhällsinformationens principiella problem*, 82.
5 Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), xi.
6 Cf. Stuart Ewen, *PR! A Social History of Spin* (New York: Basic Books, 1996); C. Claire Thomson, *Short Films from a Small Nation: Danish Informational Cinema 1935–1965* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018); David Welch, *Protecting the People: The Central Office of Information and the Reshaping of Post-War Britain, 1946–2011* (London: The British Library, 2019).
7 Patricia M. Goff, "Cultural Diplomacy", *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, eds. Nancy Snow and Nicholas J. Cull (New York: Routledge, 2020).
8 E.g. Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Kirsten Bönker and Jane Curry, eds., *Entangled East and West: Cultural Diplomacy and Artistic Interaction during the Cold War* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2019); Simo Mikkonen, "Interference or Friendly Gestures? Soviet Cultural Diplomacy and Finnish Elections, 1945–56", *Cold War History*, vol. 30, no. 3 (2020), 349–65.
9 Lars Diurlin, "Att vidmakthålla och stärka allmänhetens intresse och stöd": SIDA:s attitydförändrande informationsstrategier", *Efterkrigstidens samhällskontakter*, eds. Fredrik Norén and Emil Stjernholm (Lund: Mediehistoria, Lunds universitet, 2019), 317–60; Lars Diurlin, "The Nordic Mobilization of Public Opinion on Foreign Aid in the UN's Second Development Decade", *Nordic Media Histories of Propaganda and Persuasion*, eds. Fredrik Norén, Emil Stjernholm and C. Claire Thomson (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), 261–82; Lars Diurlin and Fredrik Norén, "Cultural Policy as a Governmental Proxy Tool for Improved Health: The Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare's Collaborations with Cultural Workers 1970–1975", *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, vol. 27, no. 1 (2021), 667–82; Ingrid Ryberg, "Abortion Prevention: Lesbian Citizenship and Filmmaking in Sweden in the 1970s", *The Power of Vulnerability: Mobilising Affect in Feminist, Queer and Anti-Racist Media Cultures*, eds. Anu Koivunen, Katariina Kyrölä and Ingrid Ryberg (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018), 195–215.

10 Steven Hadley and Clive Gray, "Hyperinstrumentalism and Cultural Policy: Means to an End or an End to Meaning?", *Cultural Trends*, vol. 26, no. 2 (2017), 95–106; Clive Gray, "Commodification and Instrumentality in Cultural Policy", *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, vol. 13, no. 2 (2007), 203–15. For Nordic examples see: Per Mangset, "The End of Cultural Policy?", *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, vol. 26, no. 3 (2020), 398–411; Sigrid Røyseng, "Myk og hard instrumentalisme i kulturpolitikken", *Nordic Journal of Cultural Policy*, vol. 19, no. 2 (2016), 159–62; Geir Vestheim, "All kulturpolitikk er instrumentell", *Kultursverige 2009*, eds. Svante Beckman and Sten Månsson (Linköping: Linköpings universitet, 2009), 56–63.
11 Clive Gray, "Local Government and the Arts", *Local Government Studies,* vol. 28, no. 1 (2002), 77–90.
12 Jeremy Ahearne, "Cultural Policy Explicit and Implicit", *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, vol. 15, no. 2 (2009), 151.
13 Marie Cronqvist and Christoph Hilgert, "Entangled Media Histories: The value of Transnational and Transmedial Approaches in Media Historiography", *Media History*, vol. 23, no. 1 (2017), 130–41.
14 Clive Gray, "Instrumental Policies: Causes, Consequences, Museums and Galleries", *Cultural Trends*, vol. 17, no. 4 (2008), 218.
15 Ossi Naukkarinen and Yuriko Saito, "Introduction", *Contemporary Aesthetics*, no. 4 (2012), 1–8. The artification process in the information-by-proxy-strategy should be differentiated from the concept of "information visualisation" where artists are employed to simplify and aestheticise national traumas or social problems. Cf. Melissa Ragona, "Beauty and Danger: The Aestheticization of Information in Contemporary Art", *Outrage: Art, Controversy, and Society*, eds. Richard Howells, et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 278–90.
16 Roberta Shapiro, "Artification as Process", *Cultural Sociology*, vol. 13, no. 3 (2019), 265–75.
17 Hanna Kjellgren, *Staten som informatör eller propagandist? Om statssyners betydelse i svensk informationspolitik* (Göteborg: Gothenburg University, 2002).
18 Fredrik Norén, "*Framtiden tillhör informatörerna*": *Samhällsinformationens formering i Sverige 1965–1975*, PhD diss. (Umeå: Umeå universitet, 2019); Norén, "Deliberation or Manipulation?".
19 Protocol, 23 February 1968, A IV, Hälsovårdsbyrån (HVUD), Socialstyrelsen (SoS), Riksarkivet (RA).
20 *U-information: Fyraårsplan för SIDAs informationsverksamhet: 1971/72–74/75* (Stockholm: SIDA, 1971), 5, 38. Cf. SOU 1988:19 *U-lands och biståndsinformation*, 47.
21 Stig Lindholm, *U-landsbilden: En undersökning av allmänna opinionen* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wicksell, 1970), 218.
22 SIDA's fiscal plan for 1969–1970, quoted in SOU 1977:73 *U-landsinformation och internationell solidaritet*, 12.
23 *U-information*, 34.
24 Göran Hedebro, *Att informera om avvikande grupper: En genomgång av några olika samhällsområden* (Stockholm: BRÅ, 1977), 66–70.
25 Arne Trankell, "Svenskars fördomar mot invandrare", *Invandrarproblem: Fem uppsatser om invandrar- och minoritetsproblem från IMFO-gruppen* (Stockholm: PAN/Norstedts, 1975), 182.
26 *U-information*, 79; Informationsbyråns arbetsprogram 1974/75–75/76, A8A:5/9.81, SIDA (SA), RA; Protocol, "Extra byråmöte", 4 April 1978,

A8A:7/9.81, SA, RA; Petitaförslag från Informationsbyrån, 16 May 1978, A8A:11/9.81, SA, RA.

27 Journalists and authors were also eligible. The grants ranged from around SEK 10,000 to 27,000. Around 200 applications were received per year. In the mid-1970s the total amount was SEK 300,000. Protocol, Byråberedningen, 10 March 1977, A8A:11/9.81 SA, RA.

28 Letter, The Swedish Photographers Association to SIDA's Information Bureau, 19 December 1969, F1ACA/499, Sa, Ra; Letter, The Artists' Association of Sweden to SIDA's Information Bureau, 31 March 1976, F1ACA/500, SA, RA.

29 E.g. Protocol, Byråberedning, 18 October 1979, A8A:12/9.81, SA, RA.

30 Letter, Anna-Maria Sant'Anna to SIDA's Information Bureau, 30 September 1976, F1ACA/500 SA, RA; Letter, Helvi L Sipilä to Helena Solberg-Ladd, 28 June 1974, 104Q/5/8, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Danish National Archives (DNA); Proposal for part two of a documentary film package, December 1975, 104Q/5/8, MFA, DNA.

31 E.g. Petitaförslag från informationsbyrån, 16 May 1978, A8A:11/9.81, SA, RA; Cf. *U-information*, 43.

32 "Liten sammanfattning från mötet mellan Soc. styrelsens HVUD och representanter från Konstnärscentrum, Teatercentrum och Filmcentrum, 8/10 1970", F IV a vol. 1, Nämnden för hälsoupplysning (NFH), SoS, RA.

33 Cf. Gray, "Local Government and the Arts".

34 "Liten sammanfattning från mötet".

35 Kjell E. Johanson, "Kulturarbetare som sociala debattörer", *Socialnytt*, special issue "Konsten: En bruksvara – i socialt arbete", no. 2 (1971), 5.

36 Kjell E. Johanson, "Socialstyrelsen och Konstnärscentrum: 'Lyckan är en vit ko…'", *Socialnytt*, no. 3 (1971), 58–59.

37 For a study of these projects, see Diurlin and Norén, "Cultural Policy".

38 "Föredragslista", 20 December 1976. E I, NFH, SoS, RA; "Föredragslista", 15 April 1977. E I, NFH, SoS, RA.

39 E.g. Protocol, 9 February 1977. A 6 A, Informationsbyrån (IB), Statens invandrarverk (SIV).

40 "Synpunkter på en fortsättning på projektet Fyra invandrarfilmer", 13 February 1981. F1 51–55, SIV; "Ansökan – projektbidrag", 28 March 1983. F1 51–55, SIV; "Anteckningar från byråledninsmöte 78-06-19", 22 June 1978, A6 b1, SIV; PM, 28 July 1981, A6 a, SIV.

41 *Hur marknadsför vi u-landsengagemanget i Sverige?* (SIDA: Stockholm, 1978), 8.

42 Ingrid Ryberg, "Film Pioneers? Swedish Women's Documentaries about the 'Third World' in the 1970s and 80s", *NORA – Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research*, vol. 30, no. 1 (2022), 67. It is therefore no surprise that as she discusses the previously mentioned films by Solberg-Ladd, Ryberg misses out the fact that these were part of the UN's global mobilisation for public opinion as well as being tactically co-financed by SIDA.

43 Protocol, Byråberedningen, 10 March 1977, A8A:11/9.81, SA, RA; *Om "Om"*, Stockholm: Utbildningsradion, 1979. SIDA's involvement is not listed in the Swedish Film Database, as is the case regarding several SIDA-funded 1970s audiovisual productions. Moreover, many productions (especially TV collaborations, international co-productions and still films) from 1965 to 1990 are not found in the database, which emphasises the need for archival research.

44 Anders Stymne and Stig Lindholm, *Bidrag till u-information: Erfarenheter från några enskilda organisationers projekt* (Stockholm: SIDA, 1974), 101.

45 Letter, Vilgot Sjöman to Bo Kärre, 14 December, F1ACA/499, SA, RA.
46 Letter, Sven Wahlström to Mats Gullers, 9 May 1972, F1ACA/499, SA, RA.
47 Ernst Michanek, "Bistånd och påverkan", *Tiden*, no. 3 (1969), 154.
48 Lindholm, *U-landsbilden*, 226.
49 *U-information*, 39.
50 Emil Stjernholm, "Government Public Relations, Audiovisual Communication and the Informalisation of Sweden", *Critical Studies in Television*, vol. 18, no. 4 (2023), 441–59. Cf. Shapiro, "Artification as Process".
51 "Arbetsprogram 1974/75 för arbetsgruppen för upplysningstjänst", 13 June 1974, A8A:8/9.81, SA, RA; *U-information*, 160. The film was broadcast on Swedish television in 1973 as *Alla världens barn*.
52 Annika Berg, Urban Lundberg and Mattias Tydén, *En svindlande uppgift: Sverige och biståndet 1945–1975* (Stockholm: Ordfront, 2021), 377.
53 "Stipendier till författare, journalister och filmskapare 1972", F1ACA/499, SA, RA; Grant application by Rudi Spee, 7 May 1971, F1ACA/499, SA, RA.
54 Anders Holt and Carl Henrik Svenstedt, *Film från tredje världen: Sidas produktionsstöd för film 1979–83: En utvärdering* (Stockholm: SIDA, 1984), 124.
55 For the complex production history of *Utlänningen* see John Sundholm, "Ulkomaalainen/Utlänningen/Yabanci (1979–1981–1983) – a most typical migrant archival object". *L'Atalante. Revista de estudios cinematográficos*, vol. 34 (2022), 103–14. Although Sundholm misses that the film received a SIDA-grant.
56 See e.g., discussion in Kjell E. Johanson, "Konsten – en bruksvara i socialt arbete", *H-rapport*, no. 7 (1978), 23–30.
57 Johanson, "Konsten", 24.
58 See the special issue "Teater som pedagogik", *H-rapport*, no. 2 (1978), 3.
59 E.g. Draft, "Insändare till Västerbottenkuriren och Västerbottens Folkblad", 26 March 1975. F V, NFH, SoS, RA.
60 Cf. *H-rapport*, no. 2 (1978), 44–60.
61 Naukkarinen and Saito, "Introduction".
62 SOU 1974:69 *Invandrarutredningen 3*, 385.
63 E.g. Letter, 24 January 1985. F 1 51–55, 1985, Siv; Letter, 11 January 1988. F 1 51–55 1987, SIV.
64 "Projektplan", 20 November 1986. A 6 A, IB, SIV.
65 "Projektplan", 20 November 1986. A 6 A, IB, SIV. The sum is equivalent to some €30,000 in today's money.
66 Letter, 6 April 1988. F 1 51–55, 1988, SIV.
67 Rune Andréasson, *Bamse och Kalle Svartskalle* (Norrköping: Statens invandrarverk, 1987), 2.
68 Cf. Shapiro, "Artification as Process".
69 E.g. Letters, 2 December 1987, 22 January 1988. F 1 51–55, 1987, SIV. According to the Parliamentary Ombudsman records, no such report was filed in the end.
70 Letter, 3 December 1987. F 1 51–55, 1987, SIV.
71 Fredrik Norén, "H-Day 1967: An Alternative Perspective on 'Propaganda' in the Historiography of Public Relation", *Public Relations Review*, vol. 45, no. 2 (2019), 236–245.
72 Gray, "Instrumental Policies", 217.
73 Gray, "Commodification and Instrumentality", 211.

Part III
Infrastructures

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

11 Measuring Media Tactics to Improve Propaganda Strategies

The British Wartime Social Survey and "Publicity in Reverse", 1941–1945

Brendan Maartens

"Influence", John Corner has written, represents the "contested core" of media research.[1] Scholars have been writing about it for over a century and have proposed a range of theories to explain it.[2] These theories have become a staple of undergraduate communications curricula, which usually trace the study of influence to early effects theories arising out of certain American universities.[3] What is less well known, both in studies of media and in studies of history, are the many attempts by governmental and corporate actors to measure influence.

This chapter focuses on one such attempt spearheaded by a British organisation established in 1940. Part of the Home Intelligence Division of the Ministry of Information (MOI), Britain's largest domestic propaganda[4] agency, the Wartime Social Survey (hereafter the Survey) produced "statistical studies of public opinion, market research studies, and other inquiries of this type on behalf of Government Departments".[5] Working through much of the Second World War, it produced 16 surveys on the impact of government propaganda on public opinion in 1941–1945. Using a method of polling pioneered in the United States in the 1930s,[6] its work was described after the war as a form of "publicity in reverse": a "source of information about what people are thinking and doing" that could be used to enhance official communications.[7]

Such "publicity", and the methodology for examining influence on which it was predicated, represent the primary focus of this chapter, which begins by charting the origins of the Survey and its methods of monitoring opinion. The remainder of the piece concerns the organisation's research on propaganda and advances two main arguments regarding it: that the Survey's method of "sampling" the public rationalised and codified persuasion in ways that gave an illusion of a "science" of influence and that this "science" was driven by a fixation with media tactics the apparent effects of which could be used to inform media strategies. The Survey, as we shall see, did not actually explore strategy, defined here as the overarching

DOI: 10.4324/9781032618326-14

approach that an individual or institution takes to persuading people, but did isolate specific means and methods of persuasion in an attempt to map their effects. How it managed this and what broader lessons can be learned from its work represent key concerns of this chapter.

Publicity, Morale, and the Origins of the Wartime Social Survey

The Survey was launched at the tail-end of the so-called Phony War, a period of relative calm that ended with the German advance on Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in May 1940.[8] While it was the first official polling agency to operate in Britain, it was not the first organisation to map the relationship between media consumption and public opinion. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) had maintained a Listener Research Section since 1935, one of the many initiatives of Stephen Tallents, its Controller of Public Relations at the time. As Scott Anthony has shown, Tallents was a pioneer of government propaganda, having worked for the Empire Marketing Board and General Post Office. He also played a key role in the pre-war planning of the MOI as its Director General Designate from 1936 until 1939.[9]

Other organisations that probed opinion included Mass Observation, which commenced a programme of qualitative ethnography in 1937,[10] and the British Institute of Public Opinion, an affiliate of the American Gallup Poll created in the same year by a statistician who described polls some years later as a "psychological X-ray, probing beneath the surface of behaviour and habit, laying bare the foundation and structure of our views and preferences".[11]

In their own way, each of these bodies would influence the Survey, with the Institute providing a methodological blueprint for its "science" of opinion and the BBC and Mass Observation providing staff.[12] Such staff included Mary Adams, who had worked as the world's first female television producer[13] before being snapped up by the MOI to lead the Home Intelligence Division at the close of 1939. The eyes and ears of the MOI, Home Intelligence pursued a variety of investigations into public opinion, including a series of qualitative studies of home morale that have been heavily cited by historians.[14] Its functions were spelled out in a memorandum drafted by Adams in January 1940:

1 To provide a directive for Home Publicity. A continuous flow of reliable information is required on what the public is thinking and doing in order that publicity measures may be formulated and their effectiveness tested.
2 To provide an assessment of home morale. For this purpose, it is necessary to study immediate reactions to specific events [and] to create a barometer for the measurement of opinion, on questions likely to be continuously important, for example, pacifism.[15]

Investigations of morale proved controversial and engulfed the Division in a "snooping" scandal that threatened its very existence in the summer of 1940.[16] They were also costly and led to an enquiry the following year spearheaded by a Select Committee on Expenditure. Reporting in 1942, this committee recommended an end to formal investigations of morale and a prioritisation of "factual enquiries which are necessary … to guide a Ministry in some particular policy".[17] A purveyor of supposedly neutral statistics, the Survey was well placed to provide such "factual" research and operated for the rest of the war without further setbacks.

Most of the Survey's work during this period concerned subjects that did not have a direct bearing on propaganda, such as problems in food production or the quality of lighting in modern buildings.[18] This might explain why the Survey has attracted limited historiographical attention and certainly a great deal less than the British Institute of Public Opinion and Mass Observation.[19] Although several historians have referred to the organisation in passing,[20] and though its surveys on morale and publicity have been used as sources of evidence of what people were thinking and doing,[21] the body itself has not been subjected to detailed scrutiny.

The lack of understanding of what the Survey did represents one rationale for this chapter; another is the organisation's analysis of propaganda. Ian McLaine has argued that "examining the domestic work of the Ministry of Information" can give historians an "unprecedented insight into the mind of both government and people during the war".[22] This chapter extends his argument by exploring the Survey's attempts to monitor the effects of propaganda in 1941–1945, a topic that McLaine overlooks, and it does so by examining a wide range of promotional materials produced by the MOI and three departments that hired the Survey to work for them: the Ministries of Food, Agriculture, and Health. These departments used propaganda for different reasons and the surveys examined here can shine new light on their work.[23]

Samples, Universes, and Codes: How Polls Were Designed and Developed

When planning for the Survey began in early 1940, it was envisioned as an official version of the British Institute of Public Opinion: an organisation that would poll the public on a regular basis using the same bank of questions and polling methodology. Interviewing about 5,000 people a month, "so chosen to constitute a representative sample of the total population of Great Britain", it would "obtain answers to about ten simple questions designed to test [their] attitudes to various aspects of the war situation".[24] This arrangement would allow policymakers to map shifts in opinion in real time, offering the "barometer" Adams had called for.

A team of researchers, investigators, and clerical staff was assembled, with Professor Arnold Plant of the London School of Economics appointed as the body's first Director. An economist who had made a name for himself studying the impact of state controls on labour in pre-Apartheid South Africa,[25] Plant directed the Survey from the School until the snooping scandal broke in 1940. The offices of the Survey were subsequently moved to a building adjacent to Senate House, the MOI's headquarters, and the commitment to a Gallup-style poll was abandoned, with the Survey's remit restricted thereafter to "work explicitly commissioned by [other] departments".[26] The reorganisation prompted a spate of resignations, including from Plant, who, after some delay, was replaced by Louis Moss, a statistician who had worked for the British Institute of Public Opinion and the BBC before the war.[27]

Alongside Durant, Moss was a pioneer of opinion polling in Britain and the work he presided over at the Survey bore all the hallmarks of the practice. Opinions were solicited through interviews (or "polls") conducted by investigators who asked questions of a specified number of respondents. The number (or "sample") was determined in advance and was supposed to be statistically representative of a larger population (or "universe").[28] Occasionally, the Survey took an interest in the opinions of the entirety of the UK population, but it was more commonly interested in specific demographic groups – industrial workers, for instance, or housewives – whose attitudes towards government policies were gauged. Departments hired it to explore these attitudes, respondents' behaviour, and their living environments, the goal being to develop a better understanding of the "relationship between saying, doing, and thinking".[29]

Questions, which were also determined in advance and drafted in such a way to ensure that answers could be quantified, represented the sole means of generating such understanding. The Survey deployed a range in its investigations, from simple binary choices like "Do you prefer dramatised or undramatised films?", which appeared in the first propaganda survey in 1941,[30] to more complex multiple-choice questions that gave respondents several options, such as "How would you like information about health to be given out by the Ministry of Health?", asked in a 1944 study that gave newspapers, radio, film, posters, or public lectures as options.[31]

The majority of questions were "closed" in this way, which meant answers were restricted to certain categories determined in advance by pollsters. Some questions, however, gave respondents the opportunity to respond in their own words, with "interviewer[s] … required to write down what the informant says, either in summary form, or more or less in the exact words used".[32] The remarks were not repeated in their entirety in the reports the Survey prepared for its departmental clients, but some were quoted to give a sense of the variety of opinions expressed. The rest were organised into categories by "tabulators" who sifted through reams

of qualitative commentary to "classify … answers in order that they may be blocked together". This work, one official claimed, required a "certain amount of initiative" since a "large proportion of the answers are not straightforward and some individual judgement has to be called upon".[33]

Interviewers recorded answers on sheets of paper known as "recording schedules", with results analysed by a small team of researchers comprised of Moss, two senior research officers, and three junior research officers.[34] This team collated results and prepared reports summarising the findings for the departments that commissioned the Survey to poll the public on their behalf. The reports varied in size, with some presenting cursory overviews of specific investigations and others offering lengthier treatments that included descriptions of past propaganda work and the rationale for the enquiry. All of them, irrespective of size, contained charts that communicated findings in numerical form, which varied from report to report and sample to sample. The largest surveys dealt with 5,000 or more respondents, each asked upwards of 20 questions. The smallest, a study on a national recruitment campaign for nurses conducted in 1943, involved 14 questions asked of 490 unmarried women and girls aged 16–34.[35]

Respondents typically possessed common characteristics – being residents of a specific town, for instance, or sharing the same occupation – though additional efforts were made to map variation within groups to determine whether such things as age, sex, or educational attainment, for example, impacted opinions. This allowed the Survey to map differences within samples by correlating characteristics with answers. In the aforementioned study on film propaganda, for instance, respondents were asked: "Do you enjoy MOI Films or would you prefer to see the usual type of show picture?".[36] Respondents were drawn from three different areas, Glasgow, Leamington, and Bristol, which were selected to represent a "northern and Scottish industrial concentration", a "reception area town with many evacuees from adjacent bombed industrial districts", and a "town much expanded by war production", respectively. Responses were subsequently communicated in a table that appeared in the report (see Table 11.1).

Table 11.1 Excerpt from the survey *Ministry of Information Films and the Public*, 1941.

	Enjoy Films %	*Do not mind* %	*Would prefer usual type* %
Glasgow	79.3	17	3.7
Leamington	73.4	22.7	3.9
Bristol	80.7	11.8	7.6[37]

Campaigns, Channels, and Messages: How Propaganda Tactics Were Conceptualised

This system of monitoring opinion was not new, although it had never been applied to the topic of government propaganda, at least in Britain.[38] Its goal was simple: to promote a "skilled intake of information from the public to the Government" that led to a "skilled output of information from the Government to the public".[39] The "information" sought was tactical (how many people read a specific newspaper, for instance, or saw a given poster) and was accumulated to inform future propaganda strategies. This allowed the Survey, one report claimed, to "assess the results of past [propaganda] campaigns to provide data on which future campaigns could be based".[40]

Much has been written about the role of strategies and tactics in contemporary persuasive communications, with most authors regarding tactics as the means of reaching an objective or goal and strategy as that objective or goal.[41] For Anne Gregory, tactics and strategies are two sides of the same coin, with strategy representing a "cohering approach … taken to a programme or campaign" and tactics the "methods or activities … used to implement the strategy".[42]

The Survey serves as a useful case study in this regard because it reveals how studies of propaganda tactics helped to facilitate improvements in propaganda strategies. It did so by reducing propaganda to three core domains: campaigns, channels, and messages. Campaigns were waged by many government departments on a regular basis and represented coordinated attempts to change opinion that utilised multiple media and methods of persuasion. Channels represented those media and methods and included newspapers, films, posters, leaflets, books, radio broadcasts, and public lectures and demonstrations. Messages were the content conveyed on channels and were divided into three categories: "appeals", which "may be for volunteers, or for alteration of habits and behaviour"; "exhortations", which "aim at producing alterations in states of mind, for example: making the public more confident in final victory"; and "explanations", which involved "explanation of new or existing legislation" that "make as clear as is possible to as many people as possible … the reasons why such legislation is necessary".[43]

In contemporary media theory, the planning and development of campaigns is often regarded as an inherently "strategic" act with the choice of channels and messages growing out of such strategising as a "tactical" decision.[44] There is evidence that some officials in Britain in 1939–1945 embraced similar thinking, albeit with diverging terminology.[45] Writing shortly after his appointment as Controller of Press Censorship and News at the MOI, Francis Williams, for instance, called for a "great campaign"

that would "reinforce confidence and build a moral defence against future military shocks". Based on the overarching "theme" of the "appeal to reason", this campaign would require "a more adult treatment of day-to-day news" and provision of "news statements … more facts and more explanation" in news.[46] It would call, in other words, for a more selective and effective use of the channels of newspapers and radio.

In its research, however, the Survey did not assess strategic decision-making so much as the strengths and weaknesses of the various channels and messages used to exhort the public. Though it investigated campaigns, its studies focused on the media used and appeals developed, not the broader strategic direction of the propaganda in question, a point to which I will return. This method of measuring influence was rooted in the Survey's methodology. Polling people on what they could *remember* about a given campaign, medium, or message, it did not ask them, in the vast majority of cases, what they *believed* would be a viable propaganda strategy. The departments that commissioned the Survey determined their own propaganda strategies, but they were more interested in which channels and messages represented the most cost-effective means of reaching a given demographic, not the broader "themes" of their work.

Print, Film, and Broadcast Media: Surveys of Government Propaganda

Six of the Survey's investigations considered campaigns waged by the Ministries of Health, Food, and Agriculture, two of which – "Dig for Victory", a long-running initiative to encourage gardeners to grow their own food to complement wartime rationing, and "Coughs and Sneezes Spread Diseases", an annual anti-influenza drive – are well-known today. The remainder of the surveys examined channels (specifically, leaflets, films, books, and newspapers) and messages, and in particular the BBC cooking show *Kitchen Front* (1940–1944), described by Siân Nicholas as a "new kind of informational broadcasting of the most straightforward and practical kind"[47]; the film *Desert Victory* (1943), one of the most popular factual films of the war[48]; and six MOI books that formed part of a suite of "propaganda bestsellers" sold in Britain and elsewhere: *Bomber Command* (1941), *Front Line* (1942), *Coastal Command* (1943), *Battle of Egypt* (1943), *East of Malta, West of Suez* (1943), and *Combined Operations* (1943).[49]

This ensured that the Survey covered a wide range of promotional content from the cheap and ephemeral (leaflets cost departments little to produce, were drafted by public relations officers rather than specialists in advertising, and were printed using the government's own printer, His

Majesty's Stationery Office)[50] to the ambitious and costly (the Ministry of Food alone had spent 565,000 British pounds on its newspaper and poster advertising in half a year alone).[51] The reports generated from these investigations generally corresponded to the scale of the promotional endeavours analysed, with one 1945 investigation on leaflets, for instance, amounting to a single page[52] and the three major reports on newspaper reading, MOI books, and cinema attendance each polling more than 5,000 respondents and offering commentary to match.[53]

Some intriguing findings on reading and contrasting ways of accessing printed content were presented. In one 1943 investigation into national and provincial newspapers, men and the middle-aged were considerably more likely than women and other age groups to report "seeing" (not buying) a newspaper. Educational attainment and occupation also reputedly shaped use, with professionals with higher degrees significantly more likely to read than school-educated agricultural workers or miners. Some minor regional differences were reported, with the south of the country possessing slightly higher proportions of readers than the north and Wales, and local weekly and bi-weekly titles read more in small towns and rural areas than cities. There was also a clear correlation between social class and the type of newspaper read, with the *Daily Express* having the broadest socio-economic reach, the *Daily Herald* being popular with a working-class heavy industry audience, and the *Daily Telegraph* and *Times* attracting social and economic elites.[54] The study on books, completed in the same year, also found a positive association between gender, social class, and reading, with more men reporting seeing a title than women and reading tapering off among lower socio-economic groups.[55]

Films told a different story, with women considerably more likely to be "cinema enthusiasts" – avid watchers of films – than men. That, at least, was the conclusion of a 1943 survey of 5,639 individuals aged 14 and over. This study found an inversion of the socio-economic logic underpinning print media, with lower socio-economic groups more likely to see films than the middle classes, who were themselves more likely to go to the cinema than the upper class. However, the most important factor determining cinema attendance was reportedly age, with the youngest much more likely to visit, and to visit often, than the old, and single people more likely to visit than married people. These results were skewed, the Survey acknowledged, by access to the medium, with the vast majority of film enthusiasts living in medium and large towns or cities, and the northwest and London boasting the greatest numbers of them.[56]

In another survey completed in 1941, some attention was given to content, and in particular fictional and factual films, with no clear preference stated either way by men or women in the three areas assessed. What this survey did suggest is that upwards of 70% of 1,700 respondents expressed

a liking for official films, suggesting official films might, as one respondent quoted in the report suggested, allow ordinary citizens to "realise things more clearly".[57]

Radio, the one remaining mass medium, was central to wartime propaganda and to constructions and representations of national identity more generally.[58] The BBC had a de facto monopoly on it and was subject to direct control by the state via the MOI, whose censors offered guidance on programming decisions and minor script-level censorship.[59] The BBC's listener research apparatus allowed it to monitor the impact of its broadcasting, which might explain why no large-scale study of its work was conducted by the Survey. What were sanctioned were a large study of *Kitchen Front*, another shorter enquiry that also examined the show as part of a trio of investigations sanctioned by the Ministry of Food and a third investigation into public attitudes towards "news presentation".[60] Radio was also examined alongside other media in a series of studies of campaigns discussed shortly.

The findings of the first three studies broadly cohered, with the 1941 report on *Kitchen Front* suggesting that a paltry 15.3% of 3,004 respondents listened to the radio at the time of day when the show was broadcast[61] (a conclusion reiterated in the second Ministry of Food study of 2,218 respondents completed the following year).[62] In the first of these investigations, 697 "spontaneous comments" were recorded, indicating that most respondents would have preferred the show to be broadcast at a later time of day, specifically after the daily 1 pm news bulletin. Most of those who did listen to the show did so "fortuitously", with roughly equal numbers of them regarding the recipes presented on the show as impractical or useful.[63] All respondents of this survey, it is worth noting, were housewives, though other groups did cook.

The 1 pm bulletin was one of three daily news broadcasts and in 1942, 867 people were asked whether they were satisfied with the bulletins. Overall, 64.3% expressed broad approval, with roughly a quarter being dissatisfied, a larger proportion of whom were male. According to the report, men were more likely to express an opinion on the advantages and disadvantages of news than women, which could reflect their apparent fondness for news, and both they and women gave many reasons for critiquing the bulletins, including the belief that the BBC was withholding information from the public, that it was "padding" its broadcasts and not giving listeners "real news", and that there was too much repetition in its bulletins.[64]

The remainder of the Survey's work was devoted to campaigns, the most famous of which was popularised by a poster bearing the slogan, "dig for victory". The strengths and weaknesses of this campaign were examined in a 1943 study of 2,982 gardeners in England and Wales. The

study found a clear correlation between social class and gardening, with the upper classes considerably more likely to garden than the working classes, high recall rates for the poster that became synonymous with the campaign (53.7%), and an impressive 30% of the sampled population claiming they had modified their behaviour in response to the campaign. The report also suggested, however, that the campaign had got progressively more difficult as time had passed, as those who were easily reached and persuaded made way for the hard to reach and persuade, indicating something of a diminishing return.[65] Whether the same principle applied to other campaigns is unclear, since the same question was not asked in other surveys.

In the same year, a different type of campaign was run by the Ministry of Health, which wanted to know the attitudes of student nurses to one of its recruitment campaigns. The report the Survey produced as a result of this request detailed the trials and tribulations of nurses as much as it did the strengths and weaknesses of the publicity intended to attract them to the profession. Respondents complained bitterly about the hours, the pay, the lack of freedom, and the dorms, with some claiming they were treated "like children".[66] Borne out of real experience of nursing work, these opinions inspired many comments that were reported verbatim:

> All glamour and no practical facts. Just a beautiful nurse.
>
> [Advertisements] always paint the nursing profession much brighter than it is.
>
> [One advertisement] gives the impression that nursing is a holiday, and all we have to do is hold the patient's hand.[67]

Calling for a greater degree of realism, these nurses advocated a "considerable reversal of present publicity policy", although there is no evidence that their recommendations were heeded by the Ministry of Health, possibly because, as the Survey itself noted, "It is perhaps an unusual point of view that in order to persuade people to do anything, you should stress the more difficult side of what is to be done rather than the easy and pleasant aspects".[68] The strategy of sugar-coating the job, in other words, trumped one of underscoring its hard realities and in that regard nurse recruitment was no different to military recruiting of the period.[69]

Two studies on venereal diseases were conducted in 1943 and 1944, with the first polling 14–50-year-olds across the entire country. Its roots can be traced to a statement broadcast by the Chief Medical Officer in October 1942 and to a series of subsequent press statements released by

the Ministry with an "object of breaking the 'taboo' on public discussion of this problem".[70] In February 1943, these statements were complemented with display advertising in major national and provincial newspapers, with the Survey commissioned two months later to "find the extent to which the statements had attracted attention … the state of public knowledge about venereal diseases … [and] to discover what public opinion was with regard to the V.D. campaign". Results were encouraging, with 91% of 2,459 interviewees wanting the government to issue statements of the kind released in 1942, 92% agreeing with the Chief Medical Officer's statement, and a majority regarding the press as the most appropriate propaganda channel.[71]

The second study narrowed the geographical scope but broadened the media and age ranges, surveying 16–60-year-olds in England and Wales. Following the apparent success of the first propaganda drive, the Ministry of Health invested in posters, films, public lectures and plays, and in early 1944 the Survey was asked to "find out how effective the increased publicity about V.D. had been", "what people's attitudes were on the suitability of using various types of publicity media", and "what aspects of V.D. people wanted fuller information [on]".[72]

As in the earlier inquiry, the questions were "received very well by the majority of people interviewed, since altogether 87% of the informants were co-operative in discussing the subject, and three-quarters expressed an interest, quite often a very keen interest, in the problem [of sexually transmitted infections]". Recall rates of government publicity were also high, though there were some differences between different demographic groups, with men being more likely to remember encountering posters in lavatories than women and residents of northern England being more likely than those in the south or east to recall seeing a film. The report also compared the VD campaigns with two other public health campaigns and found recall rates for VD higher than others, perhaps because of the sensitive nature of the topic.[73]

The Survey, as already noted, explored propaganda through what respondents could remember of it, but in this study, participants were shown three posters that had been distributed as part of the campaign. Asked "what they thought about each … to estimate what effect the posters might have on the general public", this experimental approach to examining the efficacy of tactics boasted the "advantage", according to the report the Survey prepared for the Ministry of Health, of exploring "attention [in a] more or less stabilised [way]". It generated some intriguing qualitative findings, with one respondent describing the posters as "Terrible, but I suppose … necessary" and others suggesting they were "Disgusting … whoever thought of putting things like that up?" and a "Good warning to those thinking of getting married".[74]

Conclusion: Opinion Polls, Propaganda, and the Legacy of the Wartime Social Survey

Qualitative commentary of this kind ran against the grain of the Survey's work, which sought to "reduc[e] words to numbers", as Justin Lewis put it in an insightful critique of polling, and "views of the world … into hard figures and percentages".[75] The sociologist J. G. Ferraby penned his own critique of pollsters during the war, claiming that while polls were useful for "clear-cut issues, such as the way in which people … vote", they were not appropriate for more complex problems, telling "nothing of the intensity with which the verbally expressed opinion was held, the reasons for holding it, [and] the extent to which it was related to other attitudes".[76]

Propaganda was one such "problem" and Survey staff understood the difficulties of examining it. In the preamble to the last report examined in this chapter, the authors claimed that testing a Ministry of Food campaign to increase public consumption of potatoes was problematic, partly because some of the influence generated by campaigns is "unconscious", and partly because "factors other than publicity" influence behaviour.[77] Each admission was prescient in its own right. The notion of unconscious influence lay at the heart of several Cold War critiques of "subliminal" communication,[78] and the emphasis on broader social and economic factors reflected a wealth of post-war communications research that suggested that what people did with media was just as important, if not more so, than what media did to people.[79]

These theories are worth bearing in mind when assessing the legacy of the Survey, which was the first official body in the United Kingdom to "statistically [examine] the public mind" with an eye to improving wartime propaganda.[80] It may even have been the first official organisation in the world to carry out such research. The Office of War Information, the United State's answer to Britain's MOI, possessed its own Survey Division and its own team of statisticians, coders, fieldworkers, and psychologists to probe the impact of propaganda.[81] Canada's Wartime Information Board also conducted polls, which generated findings that were comparable to those presented in this chapter.[82] Both organisations, however, were set up some time after the Survey came into being and neither operated for more than three years. The Survey, for its part, continued to poll Britons long after the war ended, being wound up only in 1970, when it was merged with the General Register Office for England and Wales.[83]

If it stands out for its longevity, the Survey is also notable for the ways in which it conceptualised media tactics. As the introduction to this volume demonstrated, scholars working within the disciplines of advertising, public relations, strategic communications, and marketing have placed a much greater emphasis on strategy than tactics, which has diverted attention

from the more practical, hands-on work of tactics, and from the complex relationships between tactics and strategies. Though staff at the Survey did not use the same terminology as we have in this collection, they did map the impact of media tactics on audiences to improve propaganda strategies. Dividing tactics into three broad domains – campaigns, channels, and messages – they developed a system for quantifying their influence that has not attracted the attention it deserves. It would be useful to know whether this system was mirrored elsewhere, and what lessons, if any, can be learned from a comparative study of its application to the study of wartime propaganda in the long twentieth century.

Notes

1 John Corner, "'Influence': The Contested Core of Media Research", *Mass Media and Society*, 3rd ed., eds. James Curran and Michael Gurevitch (London: Hodder Arnold, 2000), 376–97.
2 In 1859, to pick an early example, the historian Alexander Andrews described the British press in bombastic terms as the "Giant which now awes potentates and … rules the destinies of the world". In 1930, in one of his lesser known political pieces, Harold Lasswell claimed that some propagandists had an innate grasp of "nearly universal forms of appeal … which [can] mobilize deep unconscious impulses". Alexander Andrews, *The History of British Journalism: From the Foundation of the Newspaper Press in England to the Repeal of the Stamp Act in 1855: Vol. 1* (London: Richard Bentley, 1859), 1; Harold Lasswell, "The Politics of Prevention", *The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1951), 190.
3 For general overviews of these theories, see Shearon Lowery and Melvin de Fleur, *Milestones in Communications Research: Effects* (New York: Longman, 1983); Brian O'Neill, "Media Effects in Context", *Handbook of Media Audiences*, ed. Virginia Nightingale (Chichester: Wiley, 2011), 320–39.
4 Following Philip Taylor, I define propaganda as the "deliberate attempt to persuade people to think and behave in a desired way [using] … techniques of persuasion designed to achieve specific goals that are intended to benefit those organising the process". Philip Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day* (Manchester: MUP, 2003), 6.
5 The Social Survey: Field Surveys Made from July 1941 to December 1945, 27 March 1946, CAB 124/637, The National Archives, henceforth TNA.
6 On the history of opinion polls, see Nick Moon, *Opinion Polls: History, Theory and Practice* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).
7 Thomas Critchley, *The Civil Service Today* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1951), 97.
8 On the Phony War, see Nick Smart, *British Strategy and Politics during the Phony War: Before the Balloon Went Up* (London: Praeger, 2003).
9 Scott Anthony, *Public Relations and the Making of Modern Britain: Stephen Tallents and the Birth of a Progressive Media Profession* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012). On the planning of the MOI, see Temple Willcox, "Projection or Publicity? Rival Concepts in the Pre-War Planning of the British Ministry of Information", *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 18, no. 1 (1983), 97–116.

10 On Mass Observation, see James Hinton, *The Mass Observers: A History, 1937–1949* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
11 Henry Durant cited in Mark Roodhouse, "'Fish-and-Chip Intelligence': Henry Durant and the British Institute of Public Opinion, 1936–63", *Twentieth Century British History*, vol. 24, no. 2 (2013), 225.
12 The MOI also commissioned the British Institute of Public Opinion and Mass Observation to conduct their own investigations into home morale and mass media. See Employment of Mass Observation and the British Institute of Public Opinion, 1939–40, INF 1/261, TNA.
13 On Adams's broadcasting career, see Allan Jones, "Mary Adams and the Producer's Role in Early BBC Science Broadcasts", *Public Understanding of Science*, vol. 21, no. 8 (2011), 968–83.
14 See, e.g., Paul Addison and Jeremy Crang, *Listening to Britain: Home Intelligence Reports on Britain's Finest Hour – May to September 1940* (London: Vintage, 2011).
15 Memorandum on the Functions of Home Intelligence, 22 January 1940, INF 1/47, TNA.
16 For an account of the relationship between propaganda, opinion monitoring, and public criticism of the MOI, see Jo Fox, "Careless Talk: Tensions within British Domestic Propaganda during the Second World War", *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 51, no. 4 (2012), 936–66.
17 Cited in *The Social Use of Sample Surveys: A Broadsheet Issued by Political and Economic Planning*, no. 250 (24 May 1946), 4.
18 "Food Problems: A Survey of Consumers" Habits and Attitudes, February 1942, RG 23/7, TNA; *Lighting of Dwellings: An Inquiry Carried Out for the Committee on the Lighting of Buildings* (October 1942) RG 23/28, TNA.
19 On these bodies, see Penny Summerfield, "Mass-Observation: Social Research or Social Movement?", *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 20, no. 3 (1985), 439–52; Robert Wybrow, *Britain Speaks Out: 1937–87. A Social History of Britain as Seen Through the Gallup Data* (London: Macmillan 1989); Moon, *Opinion Polls*; Hinton, *The Mass Observers*; Roodhouse, "Fish-and-Chip Intelligence".
20 See, e.g., Angus Calder, *The People's War* (London: Pimlico, 2008), 471–72; Paul Addison, *The Road to 1945* (London: Pimlico, 1994), 15–17.
21 Daisy Payling, "'The People Who Write to Us Are the People Who Don't Like Us': Class, Gender, and Citizenship in the Survey of Sickness, 1943–1952", *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 59, no. 2 (2020), 315–42; Bex Lewis and Gary Warnaby, "The Contribution of Posters to the Venereal Disease Campaign in Second World War Britain", *Contemporary British History*, vol. 36, no. 4 (2022), 487–515.
22 Ian McLaine, *Ministry of Morale* (London: Routledge, 1979), 2.
23 For accounts of the propaganda produced by these departments and others, see Garry Campion, *The Good Fight: Battle of Britain Propaganda and the Few* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2009); Michael Balfour, *Propaganda in War 1939–1945: Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany* (London: Routledge, 1979); McLaine, *Ministry of Morale*.
24 So said the official Fredrick Brown, cited in McLaine, *Ministry of Morale*, 53.
25 Keith Tribe, "Plant, Sir Arnold (1898–1978)", *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
26 Frank Whitehead, "The Government Social Survey", *Essays on the History of British Sociological Research*, ed. Martin Bulmer (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1985), 84. An imposing stone monolith located in the heart of central London, Senate House also served as the inspiration for the Ministry of Truth in George Orwell's *1984*. It is now owned by the London School of Economics.

27 Jon Agar, *The Government Machine: A Revolutionary History of the Computer* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 228.
28 *The Social Use*, 17–18.
29 Note on the Functions of Home Intelligence, 9 February 1940, INF 1/47, TNA. For contemporary accounts of the Survey's methodology, see Kathleen Box and Geoffrey Thomas, "The Wartime Social Survey", *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, vol. 107, nos. 3–4 (1944), 151–89; Wilfred Prest, "The Wartime Social Survey", *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 7, no. 1 (1948), 27–38.
30 Ministry of Information Films and the Public, 1941, RG 23/2, TNA.
31 The Campaign against Venereal Disease, 1944, RG 23/38, TNA.
32 Box and Thomas, "The Wartime Social", 158.
33 Aikman to Nash, 6 February 1942, INF 1/277, TNA; Wartime Social Survey, undated, INF: 1/263, TNA.
34 A complete list of researchers and interviewers can be found in Food during the War: A Summary of Studies on the Subject of Food Made by the Wartime Social Survey, 1943, RG 23/9A, TNA.
35 Recruitment to Nursing: An inquiry into the Attitudes of Student Nurses to their Profession, 1943, RG 23/52, TNA.
36 Ministry of Information, RG 23/2, TNA.
37 Ministry of Information, RG 23/2, TNA.
38 Though it considered party-political rather than government propaganda, Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues produced a major study of the relationship between media consumption and voting habits in the United States in 1940. Using panel surveys – continuous polls of the same people over time – this study found that "Despite the flood of propaganda and counterpropaganda available to the prospective voter, he [sic] is reached by very little of it". It also suggested that people are influenced indirectly via intermediaries who act as "opinion leaders" in communities. Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960 [1944]), xx.
39 The (Wartime) Social Survey: Memorandum, by the Ministry of Information, 1945, INF 1/273, TNA.
40 "Dig for Victory": An Inquiry into the Effects of the "Dig for Victory" Campaign, 1943, RG 23/26, TNA.
41 E.g., Sandra Oliver, *Public Relations Strategy: Third Edition* (London: Kogan Page, 2010); Edward Vieira, *Public Relations Planning: A Strategic Approach* (Oxon: Routledge, 2019); Jane Johnston and Leanne Glenny, *Strategic Communication: Public Relations at Work* (Oxon: Routledge, 2020).
42 Anne Gregory, *Planning and Managing Public Relations Campaigns: A Strategic Approach: Fourth Edition* (London: Kogan Page, 2015), 131, 133.
43 Report on Home Front Propaganda, 1941, INF 1/292, TNA.
44 As the authors of one recent textbook suggest, a key function of public relations strategy is "deciding which tactics … [are] appropriate for the audience, the message, the goal, and the overall image of the organisation [sponsoring the campaign]". Jim Eggensperger and Jeanne Salvatore, *Strategic Public Relations Writing: Proven Tactics and Techniques* (New York: Routledge, 2020), 98.

45 Where it was used in official documents, the term "strategy" almost always referred to military engagements on the field of battle, not propaganda planning. "Tactics" was used in ways that contemporary theorists would recognise. In one memorandum on a burgeoning food crisis in German-controlled Europe, for instance, "tactics in the handling of news" included "avoid[ing] the impression that we are conducting propaganda". Secret Policy Committee, 14 August 1940, INF 1/848, TNA.
46 Theme for Propaganda, undated, INF 1/73, TNA.
47 Sian Nicholas, "Under Siege: The Kitchen Front", *History of the BBC*: https://www.bbc.com/historyofthebbc/research/kitchen-front (accessed 8 June 2023).
48 S. Paul Mackenzie, *British War Films, 1939–45: The Cinema and the Services* (London: Hambledon, 2001), 109–11.
49 Henry Irving, ""Propaganda Bestsellers": British Official War Books, 1941–46", *The Concept of the Book: The Production, Progression and Dissemination of Information*, ed. Cynthia Johnston (London: Institute of English Studies, 2019), 125–46.
50 On the HMSO, see Mariel Grant, "The Stationery Office and Government Information", *Propaganda and the Role of the State in Interwar Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 54–81.
51 Home Front Propaganda: Home Intelligence, 1941, TNA, INF 1/292.
52 Food Facts: An Assessment of the Effects of the Ministry of Food's Advertising, 1945, RG 23/78, TNA.
53 Newspapers and the Public: An Inquiry into Newspaper Reading, 1943, RG 23/43, TNA; The Cinema Audience: An Inquiry Carried Out for the MOI, 1943, RG 23/44, TNA; Ministry of Information Publications: A Study of Public Attitudes towards Six Ministry of Information Books, 1943, RG 23/42, TNA.
54 Newspapers and the Public, 1943, RG 23/43, TNA.
55 Ministry of Information, RG 23/42, TNA.
56 The Cinema Audience, RG 23/44, TNA.
57 Ministry of Information, RG 23/2, TNA.
58 For a wide ranging and engaging discussion of the BBC in wartime, see Siân Nicholas, "The People's Radio: The BBC and its Audience, 1939–1945", *Millions Like Us?: British Culture in the Second World War*, eds. Nick Hayes and Jeff Hill (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 62–92.
59 Ian Whittington, *Writing the Radio War: Literature, Politics, and the BBC, 1939–45* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018), 19.
60 Publicity Media: Three short inquiries carried out in 1942 and 1943 for the Ministry of Information, 1943, RG 23/19, TNA.
61 The Kitchen Front Broadcast Programme: A Survey amongst Housewives Conducted for the Ministry of Food, November 1941, RG 23/3, TNA.
62 Food: A Collection of Short Reports Made into the Attitudes of the Public towards the Various Wartime Measures and Types of Publicity Adopted by the Ministry of Food, 1943, RG 23/18, TNA.
63 The Kitchen Front, RG 23/3, TNA.
64 Publicity Media, RG 23/19, TNA.
65 "Dig for Victory", RG 23/26, TNA.
66 Recruitment to Nursing, RG 23/52, TNA.
67 Recruitment to Nursing, RG 23/52, TNA.
68 Recruitment to Nursing, RG 23/52, TNA.
69 I have written widely on this topic. See, e.g., Brendan Maartens, "'It's Like a Good School, Only Better': Recruiting Boys to the British Armed Forces

under the First Attlee Government, 1946–50", *Propaganda and Public Relations in Military Recruitment: Promoting Military Service in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries*, eds. Brendan Maartens and Thomas Bivins (Oxon: Routledge, 2021), 117–30.

70 A Summary of These Efforts Can Be Found in the Second Survey: The Campaign against Venereal Diseases, January 1944, RG 23/56, TNA.
71 The Campaign Against, RG 23/38, TNA.
72 The Campaign Against, RG 23/56, TNA.
73 The Campaign Against, RG 23/56, TNA.
74 The Campaign Against, RG 23/56, TNA.
75 Justin Lewis, *Constructing Public Opinion: How Political Elites Do What They Like and How We Seem to Go Along with It* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 4.
76 J. G. Ferraby, "The Validity of Public Opinion Survey Results", *The Sociological Revie*w 36, nos. 1–4 (1944), 43. Ferraby had earlier published a book, *The Limitations of Statistics in the Field of Public Opinion Research* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1943).
77 "Eat more potatoes": An Inquiry into the Effect of a Publicity Campaign, July 1943, RG 23/46, TNA.
78 The best known of which is Vance Packard's *The Hidden Persuaders* (New York: IG, 2007 [1957]).
79 See Lowery and Fleur, *Milestones in Communications*; O'Neill, "Media Effects in Context".
80 Public Attitudes to Health and the Autumn Health Campaign, 1942, RG 23/24, TNA.
81 Herbert Hyman, *Taking Society's Measure: A Personal History of Survey Research* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1991), 23–24.
82 One poll, e.g., found that "people with lower incomes and education, younger people, and women were relatively poorly informed [of official directives]" and was "cited as a reason for increasing propaganda to promote the war effort". Christopher Page, *The Roles of Public Opinion Research in Canadian Government* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 30.
83 The Survey was one of several MOI departments transferred to the peacetime Central Office of Information in 1946. It continued to offer polling services to any ministry that required them and worked with the armed forces, among other entities, on a variety of post-war propaganda campaigns. I have written about one such campaign and the role that the Survey played in informing it in Brendan Maartens, "Your Country Needs You? Advertising, Public Relations and the Promotion of Military Service in Peacetime Britain", *Media, War & Conflict,* vol. 13, no. 2 (2020), 223.

12 Window Tactics

Entangled Visual Propaganda in Neutral Sweden, 1939–1945

Emil Stjernholm

On Tuesday 8 May 1945, the German Tourist Information Office's window display on Kungsgatan, the high street of Stockholm and the scene of massive celebrations during the day widely known as Victory in Europe (VE) Day, was attacked. "Police ordered not to subdue the celebratory atmosphere" was the headline in the evening newspaper *Expressen*, which reported that "thousands of people celebrated" when the windows of the Tourist Board were smashed to pieces. Directed by the German Legation, the Tourist Board organised large, lavish and eye-catching window displays for propaganda purposes on Kungsgatan throughout the war, gathering large crowds outside of their offices. However, the final exhibits, entitled *Germany's Power Remains Intact* and *German Art*, did not survive long. Having struggled throughout spring 1945, the Tourist Board abandoned all attempts to repair the window during the last weeks of the war and instead attempted to shield the shop window with wooden boards.

During the Second World War, neutral Sweden became an arena for a propaganda war between the belligerent nations. Window displays were a prominent means of persuasion with a strong visual presence in everyday life. Besides the German Legation, the US, the UK and the Soviet Union developed tactics and strategies for the utilisation of window displays in the city centre of Stockholm, as well as in other smaller Swedish cities. Much previous research on propaganda in Sweden during the Second World War has focused on traditional mass media such as film, radio and the press, mapping both who produced and circulated propaganda and what this propaganda could look and sound like. However, little attention has been devoted to window displays, which constitute an ephemeral media form and a neglected visual culture within the field of propaganda studies.

Theoretically, the chapter engages with the concept of entangled media histories as well as media scholarship on infrastructure and maintenance, placing particular emphasis on the upholding of and sabotage to these types of communication infrastructures. Methodologically, the tracing of an ephemeral media like window displays presents challenges.

DOI: 10.4324/9781032618326-15

For example, little has previously been written about the actors who produced and set up these windows, how they were used tactically and what type of engagement they sparked. Thus, this chapter primarily focuses on two key research questions: How did the belligerent countries use window displays as a means of persuasion in neutral Sweden during the Second World War? What type of engagement did the window displays evoke? To answer these questions, one needs to address both *strategies* and *tactics*: on the one hand, how belligerent nations discussed the strategic use of window displays as a medium of propaganda; on the other hand, how personnel on the ground in Stockholm dealt with the messy realities of everyday life, including sabotage, repair and maintenance.

Methodologically, the chapter primarily builds on archival material from Sweden's Civilian Security Service (Allmänna Säkerhetstjänsten), the intelligence service that surveilled and monitored the activities of foreign propaganda institutions in Sweden during the war. Additional archival material pertaining to propaganda for Sweden has been collected in The National Archives in the US, The National Archives in the UK and Bundesarchiv in Germany. Notably, the material on window displays – a highly ephemeral medium – is by no means exhaustive but rather provides a glimpse of the strategic and tactical considerations behind the scenes. To complement the archival sources, the chapter relies on newspaper material from the National Library of Sweden's digital search tool for digitised newspapers, through which I have searched for selected keywords such as window display propaganda ("skyltfönsterpropaganda"), and key institutions such as the German Tourist Information Office ("tyska turistbyrån"), the Soviet Intourist ("intourist") and the British Legation Press Department ("brittiska legationens pressavdelning"). These keyword searches were also refined and modified in various ways using single or combined search terms, as well as more open or ambiguous keywords such as broken windows ("krossat fönster").[1] All in all, some 150 articles, editorials and short fillers were collected on the topic.

Entanglements, Infrastructures and Maintenance

Previous research on propaganda in Sweden during the Second World War is extensive yet dominated by an emphasis on traditional mass media. Noteworthy examples include Åke Thulstrup's research on external pressures targeting the Swedish press, Arne Svensson's work on Swedish film censorship in the face of external pressure, and Niclas Sennerteg's study on the German Swedish-language radio station Radio Königsberg.[2] Such histories have had a tendency to be monomedial, thus contributing towards what Lee Grieveson has described as "the balkanization of media into separate subfields".[3] However, media history is permeated by cross-border

and cross-media entanglements, and this chapter will adopt an entangled approach, placing such perspectives in the foreground.[4] Meanwhile, as a medium of propaganda, the window display is eclectic and hard to pin down. The look of window display designs can vary greatly, but usually they rely on a combination of merchandise displays, lights, posters, images, maps or drawings. Notably, in the context of Second World War propaganda, the window displays were part of a broader media ensemble, including brochures, magazines and illustrated newspapers. As such, an intermedial perspective is crucial. Moreover, given that Stockholm constituted a transnational propaganda hub where belligerents developed and re-shaped their tactics in response to other countries' propaganda, the entangled point of view is particularly relevant in this case.

In previous research, window displays have predominantly been studied from the vantage point of consumer culture, advertising and commercial messaging.[5] In a Swedish context, economic historians Klara Arnberg and Orsi Husz note, there was a professionalisation of the window display in the interwar period, with window dressers combining "American marketing theory with functionalist aesthetics".[6] While cultural historians have introduced new perspectives on the window display in recent years, for example, by focusing on the professional careers of neglected practitioners or the connection between window displays and art, little research exists on the window display as a medium for propaganda and persuasion.[7]

Besides this, the chapter draws on scholarship focusing on the material dimension of communication. As Charlotte Nilsson points out, the window display brings media theoretical debates about mediation, that is how something is transmitted, to the fore.[8] Drawing on the media theoretical tradition of McLuhan, Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin have distinguished between the concepts *immediacy* and *hypermediacy*. Whereas immediacy refers to processes where the mediation becomes invisible and "the user is no longer aware of confronting a medium", hypermediacy means making the viewer or user aware of the medium, thus highlighting the process of mediation rather than the message.[9] As my analysis underlines, the mediation (the window display as a communication tool) became highly visible and in that sense it sometimes overshadowed what was mediated (the messages in the window displays).

Moreover, this chapter draws on the growing interest in media infrastructures in contemporary media and communication studies.[10] Of particular interest to this chapter is the recent trend within critical infrastructure studies of focusing on processes of maintenance. That is, the social and political conditions that shaped the window display as a propaganda infrastructure at this historical conjuncture and the work involved to produce and sustain these as a means of communication. As Gabriele Balbi and Roberto Leggero have argued in a theoretical intervention on

the role of maintenance in media and communication scholarship, "roads, infrastructures, and communication networks tell a story, which is that of the power that holds them. This story is intertwined with the issue related to the responsibility for ensuring the operation of infrastructure networks and therefore with maintenance".[11] Foregrounding maintenance, we can approach phenomena such as sabotage to infrastructures – and the question of what makes communications function – from a new perspective. From this point of view, Balbi and Leggero underline, "the maintenance of communication infrastructures is a communicative act".[12] These perspectives will inform my analysis of the window display in the sense that this chapter will not offer an in-depth content analysis of the messages on display, but rather it focuses on the window display itself as a communicative act.

Neutrality and Sweden as a Propaganda Hub

At the outset of the Second World War, Sweden, like its Nordic neighbours, declared itself neutral. At this time, Germany was seen as an imminent threat towards Sweden and therefore there was much concern amongst politicians and the security services about Hitler's impression of Swedish neutrality.[13] As soon as the war broke out, German demands for Sweden to observe "strict neutrality" increased, particularly in relation to the Swedish press but also the film industry.[14] As historian Niclas Sennerteg notes, this was an attempt to influence Swedish public opinion by "silencing media outlets that were critical against Germany and thereby giv[ing] the German propaganda greater leeway".[15] In January 1940, Sweden launched the State Information Board (Statens Informationsstyrelse) as a branch of the Foreign Ministry (Utrikesdepartementet). During the war, the State Information Board monitored foreign propaganda in Sweden and provided guidelines to the Swedish press with regard to what they were – and were not – allowed to write about.[16] Much like with other forms of propaganda such as pamphlets, magazines and films, the belligerent nations' Legations made formal complaints to the Swedish Foreign Ministry about the content in window displays. Indeed, archival traces indicate that this could result in window displays facing reprimands from the Swedish authorities.[17]

The most controversial window displays in Stockholm were housed by tourism bureaus turned propaganda outlets, most prominently, the German Tourist Promotion Bureau (Reichszentrale für Deutsche Verkehrswerbung, RDV) and the Soviet Intourist's respective branches in the Swedish capital. Tourism has a long history in relation to propaganda, public diplomacy and what today is described as place branding.[18] As Elisabeth Piller notes, Nazi Germany used tourism strategically and had a "well-documented

ambition to use tourism as an unobtrusive political instrument to showcase its peaceful intentions and improve its damaged image abroad".[19] A German Tourist Information Office was first established in Sweden in 1935 as part of the larger global organisation RDV, which had more than 50 offices around the world.[20] From the outset of the war, the RDV shifted attention from the strategic aim of increasing knowledge about Germany's various attractions as a tourism destination to propaganda, and Swedish intelligence sources indicate that the Swedish branch received regular funding from the German propaganda ministry.[21] Indeed, the Civilian Security Service monitored the activities of the German Tourist Information Office, most notably through its director Bernd von Gossler's frequent private correspondence with Germany, as well as the lengthy monthly and yearly reports sent to Berlin.[22] The German Tourist Information Office had a prime location at Kungsgatan 18, a main thoroughfare in central Stockholm, and the office constituted a key propaganda outlet during the war.

Due to an influx of refugees, journalists and diplomats, the Swedish capital has been described as a spy hub, a Casablanca of the North.[23] As intelligence scholar Wilhelm Agrell puts it, "the Swedish capital was invaded by the belligerent nations' intelligence agencies. They could no longer fit in the Legation offices. Their operations expanded to leased addresses with more or less credible fronts".[24] One such example was the Soviet Union tourist organisation Intourist's office at Vasagatan 8, a stone's throw from Stockholm Central Station, which also featured a massive window display. Whereas VOKS (Vsesoiuznoe Obshchestvo Kul'turnoi Sviazi s zagranitsei), the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, focused on the coordination of cultural contact between Soviet cultural workers and their peers abroad, Intourist was an organisation responsible for foreign tourism in the Soviet Union as well as all the organisational details regarding such visits.[25] Further, as Rósa Magnúsdottir asserts, "Intourist played an important role in projecting Soviet ideology to foreigners".[26] Besides Intourist, Agrell notes, the Soviet Union News Agency TASS and airline Aeroflot had "obviously oversized" locations in Stockholm.[27]

Another belligerent with an eye-catching window display was the UK, who by contrast did not use a tourism organisation for such purposes but rather made use of the window at the British Legation Press Department, which just like Intourist's window was located on Vasagatan in the city centre. The Ministry of Information supplied the Press Department with visual material and posters for display.[28] An example cited in the memoirs of Peter Tennant, a Special Operations Executive who officially served as press attaché at the British Legation in Stockholm, shows a massive display with two large posters showing two iconic Royal Air Force aircraft: the Supermarine Spitfire and the Hawker Hurricane. In between the two

aircraft, there is a large portrait of Winston Churchill under a banner with the text ENGLAND.[29] Accompanying these larger posters are numerous smaller displays, which most often circulated news from the frontlines of the war to passers-by. Besides this main window display, the Press Department controlled two smaller windows at Götgatan and St Eriksplan, where the latter "masquerades as an ordinary news window and confines itself to British, American and Swedish photographs".[30] In addition, the British Pass Control Office on the centrally located Birger Jarlsgatan served as a clandestine SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) station of importance to the propaganda effort.[31]

Window Displays in the Service of Propaganda

The window displays used in the service of propaganda gained attention already in the autumn of 1939. For example, in November 1939, *Dagens Nyheter* reported on the establishment of the German Tourist Information Office's window in their "hyper elegant new offices on Kungsgatan" and described the display as an "innovative addition" to the foreign propaganda in Sweden.[32] While commending that propaganda of this type had a clear mark of origin – what Jowett and O'Donnell label as white propaganda, where the producer of the material is explicitly indicated – the commentator cautioned, "if the other part of the conflict were to set up its own window display on the other side of the street and use this platform to say one or two things about the German side, would Kungsgatan then become an agitational battlefield with walking, driving and biking Stockholm in a front row seat?"[33] The issue of foreign propaganda was indeed discussed intensely during the first years of the war. For example, Major Arvid Eriksson, in charge of propaganda matters within the Swedish Military, described the strategic aims and hands-on tactics involved in foreign propaganda in a speech on wireless radio during the winter of 1941.[34] In the speech, Eriksson placed great emphasis on the threat that print propaganda directed at the youth posed. However, attention was also afforded to visual propaganda in Swedish cities – what Eriksson labelled *picture propaganda*.[35]

> To begin with, I would like to take the listener with me on a trip through Sweden. Let us travel from Hälsingborg via Malmö and Lund to Gothenburg. From there to Karlstad, Upsala, Gävle, Sundsvall, Östersund, Boden, Luleå and Kiruna. Let us walk through these towns… along the high street. And keep your eyes open. Somewhere in most of these towns we shall find display windows with foreign propaganda pictures, in numbers ranging from a dozen or so to half a window full.[36]

Indeed, the large and lavish window displays in the city centre of Stockholm were complemented with numerous smaller windows around the capital, as well as in other cities around the country. In this context, the window display primarily served a function to promote other propaganda media, such as posters, pamphlets and newspapers. As Peter Tennant notes in a memorandum on Nazi activities in Sweden, the German windows would typically display Swedish translations of German literature, new pamphlets, the magazine *Tyska Röster* produced by the German Information Centre (Tyska Informationscentralen), as well as German photographs from the war fronts and cultural photographs in general.[37]

As such, the centrally located window displays were used alongside a wide variety of media with different functions. An illustrative example of this phenomenon is a German campaign launched in December 1943 which centred on a comparison between 1918 and 1943 – and the fact that the Second World War had now lasted as long as the first. In a surveillance report on German propaganda actions in Sweden in the Civilian Security Service's archive, it is noted that "the lead act is a photographic montage in the window display on Kungsgatan", featuring three separate displays under the joint motto of "The Secret of Strength" (*Geheimnis der Kraft*).[38] Besides the window display, an "anti-Bolshevik exhibition" was organised in the premises of the German Information Centre, 10,000 pamphlets with the heading 1918–1943 were distributed, and 15,000 copies of the pro-Nazi illustrated newspaper *Folkets dagblad* were circulated.[39] Notably, the campaign drew on a strategic narrative pushed continuously in the German propaganda for Sweden from Operation Barbarossa onwards, namely that the Bolsheviks and communism constituted a major threat to the country. Similar stories, the report notes, would be pushed out through Radio Königsberg. While internal reports on the impact of propaganda should be read with caution, it can be noted that Hans Thomsen, the head of the German Legation, reported on "lively interest from the public" in relation to this particular window display and that it "exceeded all prior achievements".[40] As such, the 1918–1943 campaign underlines how the window display was used in concert with other means of propaganda.

However, this campaign was far from the only one that took place during the years that the window was in operation. As noted in a much discussed government report from 1946 on German propaganda, which devotes a whole section to the medium of window displays, Kungsgatan housed numerous prominent displays focusing on themes such as the celebration of Adolf Hitler's birthday, the history of the Hanseatic League, reports from the Eastern front, accounts of the number of Allied prisoners of war and their treatment, a special Christmas display showing Hitler celebrating Christmas with German soldiers, a celebration of the Swedish

King Gustav V's 85th birthday and displays on the ongoing war in Africa.[41] Von Gossler wrote many enthusiastic (or perhaps more aptly described as hyperbolic) reports back home. In September 1941, for example, the head of the Tourist Information Office applauded a display made by a Swedish decoration firm by highlighting "the astounding impact the display have [sic] on passers-by … even though the rain has poured down today long lines of people have besieged our window display".[42]

The winter of 1943–1944 has been described as a decisive turning point for German propaganda in Sweden as the Nazi aggressions against teachers and students at Oslo University evoked strong reactions in Sweden, sparking amongst other things a boycott.[43] According to the aforementioned government report, the boycott led to "a definite renunciation of the German propaganda even in its more moderate forms".[44] Throughout the war, the belligerents monitored one another's propaganda in Sweden and adapted to the circumstances on the battlefields. During the spring of 1944, shortly before the Allied invasion of Normandy, this became particularly evident in the window displays around Stockholm. For example, in May 1944, the German Tourist Information Office featured a display with the slogan "Let them come – Europe is ready behind its Steel Wall". As Tennant noted in a letter to London, "This type of propaganda endeavours to convince the Swedes that the forthcoming Allied invasion is foredoomed to failure".[45] Meanwhile, the communist newspaper *Arbetartidningen* ridiculed the grandiose tone in the display:

> Goebbels' largest Swedish window display, at the German Tourist Information Office on Kungsgatan, now focuses adamantly on the invasion. Anyone who wants to know the results of it will get an answer here. With typical thoroughness the Germans have already made a plan of the invasion and how it will run its course from beginning to end … The German window on Kungsgatan shows Goebbels' wishful dreams about how the invasion will play out, but as usual reality will be totally different.[46]

Following D-Day on 6 June 1944, the press noticed that the German invitation to battle was hastily replaced with charming images of Germany along with the slogan "German exports on the rise after all".[47] Meanwhile, it was observed that the British Legation's Press Department had not received advance notice of the pending invasion, and that the Normandy landings were only advertised through a simple placard.[48] As such, the window display can be described as a particularly ephemeral propaganda medium, where the people responsible on the ground in Stockholm had to make quick tactical decisions in response to the entangled media environment in which the windows were situated.

Sabotage, Repair and Tactics of Resistance

"Communication is a risky adventure without guarantees. Any kind of effort to make linkage via signs is a gamble, on whatever scale it occurs", John Durham Peters concludes in his influential book *Speaking into the Air*.[49] Indeed, the messages on display in neutral Sweden reached not only a domestic audience but also a heterogeneous international one. In this sense, the nature of the reception was far from certain. While much historical scholarship has focused on the policies governing Swedish migration during the Second World War and the view on immigrants in, for example, politics and in the press, little is known about the local media cultures of the diasporic communities that were established in Sweden during the war.[50] As well as engaging in the hosting of "refugee evenings" (*flyktingaftnar*), clandestine film screenings, reading clubs and the production of pamphlets,[51] refugees also engaged with the propaganda that was circulating widely in Sweden at the time. In this context, the window displays emerged as a prime target for acts of sabotage and resistance, a phenomenon much discussed in the press.

A sabotage action that gained particular attention in the press took place against the German Tourist Information Office's window display in response to Nazi propaganda on the Warsaw Uprising in the summer and autumn of 1944. The controversial window display featured a large letter display in the window, "Warsaw", coupled with photographs and posters.[52] As Sir Victor Mallet from the British Legation in Stockholm described it in a letter to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, the display was arranged to evoke reactions:

> The German Tourist Bureau in the centre of Stockholm, which has throughout the war been a source of irritation to Allied nationals in this city, exploited the tragedy of the Warsaw Uprising in a particularly repulsive window display designed to show that the Nazis were the only true friends of the Poles. It is not surprising that Polish escapees in Stockholm, who can scarcely avoid the window owing to its prominent position on the city's principal thoroughfare, should have taken offence to this typical example of German hypocrisy and they have three attempts during the past week to smash the £150 pane – in the belief perhaps that violence is the only argument the Nazis understand.[53]

The press reported on the stone-throwing against the window which took place three times during the first weeks of November, leading to the arrest of several Polish nationals.[54]

In the wake of the attacks against both the German window and the Soviet Intourist window, the Stockholm police decided to guard the windows, which however did not succeed in protecting them.[55] *Svenska Dagbladet*, for example, concluded that the window display was "a frail medium of propaganda".[56] Famous Swedish columnists also discussed the phenomenon. For instance, the humorist who went by the pen name Kar de Mumma conjured up a comedic dialogue between two Swedish men on the state of post-war Sweden:

> How do you think Sweden will manage when the Allies have won the war? Do you think we will have any say in a new and better world?
>
> "It depends on how we've behaved." Long pause, whereupon Svensson says: "Hey, Johansson, do you want to go down to Kungsgatan and throw a rock through the window of the German tourist office?"[57]

In a letter to the editor of *Aftonbladet*, the Swedish journalist Jules Berman, who had Jewish-Polish heritage, wrote an animated column on "perpetrators" of the attacks: "Polish refugees, who – besides the martyrdom of alienism and homelessness – here in our neutral capital are forced to accept seeing their home country ridiculed in a window on one of Stockholm's main streets".[58] Berman added, "Is it so strange that their emotions lead to actions that are less well-balanced than what we neutral and cold Swedes are used to?"[59]

The sympathetic tone towards the plight of the Polish refugees in the Swedish press was also noted by Mallet in his letter to Eden: "It is a tribute to the sympathy with which the Poles are regarded in this country that Swedish opinion, otherwise so docile and law-abiding, appears throughout the campaign to have sided with the stone-throwers rather than with the dutiful policemen who solemnly but ineffectively guard the window day and night".[60] By contrast, to the Germans, the attacks were taken as a compliment on the efficacy of the window display as a medium of propaganda. As a Civilian Security Service report on German propaganda noted with regard to the November attacks, Hans Thomsen saw them as "evidence of the great interest that this superior and well-documented art of display evokes. The Allies want to eliminate its propaganda effect by using violence".[61] Notably, press reports at the time estimated the cost of replacing a window of this size at SEK 3,000, approximately SEK 70,000 today (EUR 6,500).[62] In other words, the constant repair and maintenance of the windows not only presented tactical challenges for personnel on the ground who were the ones tasked with the re-building and re-organisation of displays, but it also entailed significant economic investment, something which attests to its perceived strategic importance in the ongoing propaganda battle.

Moreover, it should be noted that retaliation was common. When studying reports in the press on broken windows, it is striking how often reports of broken windows at the German Tourist Information Office are followed by reports of sabotage against the Soviet Intourist window. For example, shortly after an attack on the German window carried out by two French and Belgian refugees, the Soviet Intourist window was pelted with large rocks two weeks in a row.[63] Similarly, in February 1945, the windows of the German office were broken first, whereupon there was a similar attack against Intourist the next night.[64] In these cases, the motive of the assailants was likely not related to specific propaganda messages on display, but rather they served to attack the enemies' propaganda infrastructure. This cat-and-mouse game, meanwhile, was not met with favour in the Swedish press.

When examining newspaper articles about window displays and sabotage towards them, there is a clear narrative of refugees' resilience and resistance in the Swedish press. For example, in October 1944, two previously captured soldiers from France and Belgium, who had managed to flee to Sweden, attacked the German window in response to images of Germans, Belgians and French people enjoying one another's company.[65] In this case, the refugees' plight – both their individual back story and the reasoning behind why they were provoked by the messages on display – was brought up in the article as a mitigating circumstance. At the same time, refugees' emotional reactions were often placed in sharp contrast with a well-established narrative about Swedish neutrality, where calmness and a stiff upper lip were seen as part and parcel, even in the face of an onslaught of foreign propaganda. For example, pro-German *Aftonbladet* called attacks like these carried out by refugees "understandable but not justifiable",[66] and a sarcastic editorial in the same newspaper noted that "out neutrality is still unbroken" since retaliatory attacks were so commonplace.[67]

The window display was kept operational until the final days of the war, despite mockery and continuous sabotage. In the late stages of the war, the German window stopped displaying war propaganda altogether. Instead, window displays were produced highlighting Germany as a country of culture and science, a thematic shift that was underlined in the general press,[68] and ridiculed in left-wing newspapers.[69] The tactical decision to continue with the production of window displays can thus be interpreted as a communicative act of resilience. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that large crowds of people celebrated VE Day on Kungsgatan in Stockholm by smashing the German Tourist Information Office's window display. As *Expressen* reported,

> Outside the German Tourist Information Office, which had the foresight to cover the window with a blanket, the police had blocked

> off an area which was soon being pressured from all sides. Around eleven o'clock, as thousands of people pushed against the police lines, one of the spectators got through and threw a large rock straight at the window. The sound of the smashed window was drowned out by the deafening cheers of the crowd, which broke out on all of Kungsgatan. People were screaming and cheering like lunatics. That was the signal that started a real bombardment. Now stones were raining through the window, smashing it completely to pieces.[70]

Besides the window pane, *Dagens Nyheter* noted, some youngsters had put up a sign saying *realiseras*, meaning on sale for a reduced price.[71] The violent jubilation thus highlights the window display's symbolic importance in the city of Stockholm and in neutral Sweden in general.

Conclusion

Recent media historical scholarship has foregrounded a materialist approach to media infrastructures in the urban environment. For example, Shannon Mattern, drawing on the concept of urban media archaeology, has argued that "media technologies – particularly media infrastructures – have been embedded in and informing the morphological evolution of our cities since their coming into being".[72] Previous research on propaganda in Sweden during the Second World War has usually privileged traditional mass media like film, radio and newspapers, while little emphasis has been placed on how visual propaganda such as images, posters and window displays shaped Stockholm as an urban setting. The materialist perspective, and its particular attention to infrastructures, maintenance and design, allows us to shift attention from the transmission of propaganda messages, prominent political themes and the aesthetics of propagandistic content to the complex and messy tactics involved in the day-to-day upkeep of propaganda infrastructures.

This study shows how the window display became a contested and resisted form of propaganda in an exceptionally entangled environment – both from an intermedial and a transnational point of view – that is, the capital of neutral Sweden during the Second World War. Starting at the outset of the war, window displays on some of Stockholm's main thoroughfares became propaganda mouthpieces, making them a hotly debated part of the lived environment not only for Swedes but also for the refugees, journalists and diplomats who resided in the neutral capital during the war. This chapter underlines the strategic and tactical dimensions of visual propaganda in neutral Sweden. On the one hand, the chapter shows that the window display was considered a pivotal medium of propaganda, most notably by the Germans, but also by the British and the Soviets.

For example, both Peter Tennant, the press attaché of the British Legation, and Hans Thomsen, head of the German Legation, reported home about the symbolic importance of the window displays and monitored the enemies' propaganda practices. On the other hand, the chapter shows some of the tactical considerations that had to be taken into account on the ground in Stockholm. While the window display is an ephemeral media form, and scarce evidence exists on the planning and execution of particular displays, this chapter shows that swiftly changing conditions and recurring acts of sabotage promoted actions and reactions from the different actors involved in the battle for hearts and minds.

Notes

1 Sarah Oberbichler and Eva Pfanzelter, "Tracing Discourses in Digital Newspaper Collections: A Contribution to Digital Hermeneutics while Investigating 'Return Migration' in Historical Press Coverage", *Digitised Newspapers: A New Eldorado for Historians?* eds. Andreas Fickers et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2023), 135–38.

2 Åke Thulstrup, *Med lock och pock: Tyska försök att påverka svensk opinion 1933–45* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1962); Arne Svensson, *Den politiska saxen: En studie i Statens biografbyrås tillämpning av den utrikespolitiska censurnormen sedan 1914* (Stockholm: Stockholms universitet, 1976); Niclas Sennerteg, *Tyskland talar: Hitlers svenska radiostation* (Lund: Historiska media, 2006). See also Klaus-Richard Böhme, *Signal: Nazitysklands propaganda i Sverige 1941–1945* (Stockholm: Bokförlaget DN, 2005); Mats Jönsson, *Visuell fostran: Film- och bildverksamheten under andra världskriget* (Lund: Sekel, 2011); Emil Stjernholm, *Gösta Werner och filmen som konst och propaganda* (Lund: Mediehistoria, Lunds universitet, 2018); Andreas Åkerlund, *Anti-Versaillesfreden: förtäckt tysk presspropaganda i Sverige 1920–1945* (Stockholm: Södertörns högskola, 2023).

3 Lee Grieveson, *Cinema and the Wealth of Nations: Media, Capital, and the Liberal World System* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018), 20.

4 Marie Cronqvist and Christoph Hilgert, "Entangled Media Histories", *Media History*, vol. 23, no. 1 (2017), 130–41.

5 Cf. Simon J. Bronner, *Consuming Visions: Accumulation and Display of Goods in America 1880–1920* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989); Bill Lancaster, *The Department Store: A Social History* (London: Leicester University Press, 1995); Bosse Bergman, *Handelsplats, shopping, stadsliv: En historik om butiksformer, säljritualer och det moderna stadslivets trivialisering* (Stockholm: Symposion, 2003). Besides this, there is a long tradition of research on the window display as an integral part of everyday city life since the late 1800s, including Walter Benjamin's theorising of modernity in relation to the *flâneur*, see, e.g., Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999).

6 Klara Arnberg and Orsi Husz, "From the Great Department Store with Love: Window Display and the Transfer of Commercial Knowledge in Early Twentieth-Century Sweden", *History of Retailing and Consumption*, vol. 4, no 2 (2018), 134.

7 Arnberg and Husz, "From the Great Department Store with Love"; Anna Dahlgren, "The Art of Display", *Journal of Art History*, vol. 79, no. 3 (2010),

160–73; Orsi Husz and Klara Arnberg, "Far i fönstret: Kommersiell konstruktion av kön och den nya mannen i 1930-talets skyltfönster", *Bakom stadens kulisser: Genus och gränser i Stockholm 1800-2000*, eds. Karin Carlsson and Rebecka Lennartsson (Stockholm: Stockholmia förlag, 2021), 291–337.

8 Charlotte Nilsson, *En förbindelse med en större värld: Postorder i Sverige under tidigt 1900-tal* (Lund: Mediehistoriskt arkiv), 32–33.

9 Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, *Remediation: Understanding New Media* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 24.

10 Lisa Parks and Nicole Starosielski, *Signal Traffic: Critical Studies of Media Infrastructures* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2015); Marion Näser-Lather and Christoph Neubert, eds., *Traffic: Media as Infrastructures and Cultural Practices* (Leiden: Brill, 2015); Christine Evans and Lars Lundgren, "Dividing the Cosmos? INTELSAT, Intersputnik, and the Development of Transnational Satellite Communications Infrastructures in the Cold War", *Remapping Cold War Media: Infrastructures, Institutions, Exchanges*, eds. Alice Lovejoy and Mari Pajala (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2022).

11 Gabriele Balbi and Roberto Leggero, "Communication Is Maintenance: Turning the Agenda of Media and Communication Studies Upside Down", *H-ermes: Journal of Communication*, no 17 (2020), 17.

12 Balbi and Leggero, "Communication Is Maintenance", 19.

13 Sennerteg, *Tyskland talar*, 52.

14 Thulstrup, *Med lock och pock*; Svensson, *Den politiska saxen*.

15 Sennerteg, *Tyskland talar*, 53.

16 Jönsson, *Visuell fostran*, 12.

17 E.g., in December 1944, the French Legation made a formal complaint against the German Tourist Information Office's display of the cathedral in Strasbourg, which remained in the German window despite the liberation of Strasbourg a month earlier. See complaint from the French Legation, 21 December 1944, 622:1: Tyskland 1935–1948, Krigsarkivet, Riksarkivet (National Archives of Sweden).

18 Shelley Baranowski, *Strength Through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Kristin Semmens, *Seeing Hitler's Germany: Tourism in the Third Reich* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Bertram M. Gordon, *War Tourism: Second World War France from Defeat and Occupation to the Creation of Heritage* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018); Elisabeth Piller, *Selling Weimar: German Public Diplomacy and the United States, 1918–1933* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2021).

19 Elisabeth Piller, "Managing Imponderables: The Rise of U.S. Tourism and the Transformation of German Diplomacy, 1890–1933", *Diplomatic History*, vol. 44, no. 1 (2020), 74.

20 SOU 1946: 86, *Den tyska propagandan i Sverige under krigsåren 1939–1945*, 105.

21 SOU 1946: 86, 105.

22 SOU 1946: 86, 105.

23 Tobias Hochscherf, "A Casablanca of the North? Stockholm as Imagined Transnational Setting in the British Spy Thriller *Dark Journey*", *Journal of Scandinavian Cinema*, vol. 9, no. 3 (2019), 329–47.

24 Wilhelm Agrell, *Stockholm som spioncentral* (Lund: Historiska Media, 2006), 59.

25 Rósa Magnúsdottir, *Enemy Number One: The United States of America in Soviet Ideology and Propaganda, 1945–1959* (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2019), 61. For more on VOKS, see Olov Wenell, *Sovjetunionen och svenska vänsällskap 1945–1958: Sällskapen Sverige-Sovjetunionen som medel i sovjetisk strategi* (Umeå: Umeå University, 2015), 37–45.
26 Magnúsdottir, *Enemy Number One*, 61.
27 Agrell, *Stockholm som spioncentral*, 82.
28 "Overseas Planning Committee Discusses Propaganda for Sweden", 3 January 1945, FO 371/48027, The National Archives, Kew.
29 Peter Tennant, *Touchlines of War* (Hull: Hull University Press, 1992), 116.
30 "Memorandum on the Press Department, British Legation, Stockholm", 20 September 1940, GBR 0014/KNNY, The Papers of Rowland Kenney and Kit Kenney, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
31 Geoff R. Berridge, *Embassies in Armed Conflict* (New York: Continuum, 2012), 115.
32 "Den utländska propagandan i vårt land", *Dagens Nyheter*, 4 November 1939.
33 "Den utländska propagandan"; Gareth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda & Persuasion* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2019).
34 Eriksson was a frequent radio speaker on such matters, see Marie Cronqvist, *Mannen i mitten: Ett spiondrama i svensk kallakrigskultur* (Stockholm: Carlsson, 2004), 110.
35 "Krigspropagandan siktar på ungdomen", *Dagens Nyheter*, 13 February 1941; see also Arvid Eriksson, *Propagandans smygvägar* (Stockholm: Kooperativa förbundet, 1941).
36 The speech was transcribed by the British Legation and sent to the Ministry of Information. See "Report from Peter Tennant", 13 February 1941, Propaganda: General, FO 188/372, The National Archives, Kew.
37 Memorandum from Peter Tennant to the Ministry of Information, "Nazi Activities in Sweden", 27 March 1942, FO 188/372, The National Archives, Kew.
38 "Propagandaaktioner", 7 December–19 December 1943, F8EB:16, Allmänna säkerhetstjänstens arkiv, Riksarkivet (National Archives of Sweden), henceforth ASA:RA.
39 "Propagandaaktioner", 1943.
40 "Propagandaaktioner", 1943.
41 SOU 1946: 86, 115–20.
42 SOU 1946: 86, 116.
43 Birgitta Almgren, *Drömmen om Norden: Nazistisk infiltration i Sverige 1933–1945* (Stockholm: Carlsson, 2005), 56–59.
44 SOU 1946: 86, 11.
45 British Legation, "Memorandum on Nazi Activities in Sweden", 29 May 1944, FO 371/43490, The National Archives, Kew.
46 "Invasionen i skyltfönstret", *Arbetartidningen*, 22 May 1944.
47 "Legationerna i Stockholm sitta vid radion", *Göteborgs handels- och sjöfartstidning*, 6 June 1944.
48 "Legationerna i Stockholm sitta vid radion", 1944.
49 John Durham Peters, *Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 267.
50 See, e.g., Mikael Byström, *En broder, gäst och parasit. Uppfattningar och föreställningar om utlänningar, flyktingar och flyktingpolitik i svensk offentlig debatt 1942–1947* (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 2006); Karin Kvist Geverts, *Ett främmande element i nationen svensk flyktingpolitik och de judiska flyktingarna 1938–1944* (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2008).

51 "A Rain of Propaganda: The Media Production of the Office of War Information in Stockholm, 1942–1945", *Nordic Media Histories of Propaganda and Persuasion*, eds. Fredrik Norén, Emil Stjernholm, and C. Claire Thomson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), 119–40; Emil Stjernholm, "Censorship and Private Shows: Mapping British Film Propaganda in Sweden", *Propaganda and Neutrality: Global Case Studies in the 20th Century*, eds. Edward Corse and Marta Garcïa Cabrera (London: Bloomsbury, 2023), 169–80.
52 "Tyskt fönster krossat, polack greps på buss", *Dagens Nyheter*, 7 November 1944.
53 Letter from Sir Victor Mallet (British Legation Stockholm) to Anthony Eden (Foreign Secretary), 17 November 1944, Propaganda: General, FO 188/372, The National Archives, Kew.
54 "Åter ett tyskt fönster i Stockholm förstört", *Göteborgs handels- och sjöfartstidning*, 4 November 1944; "Mer stenkastning mot tyska fönstret", Dagens Nyheter, 9 November 1944.
55 "Polisbevakning vid turistbyråer", *Dagens Nyheter*, 2 November 1944.
56 "En omtålig propagandaform", *Svenska Dagbladet*, 11 November 1944.
57 "Dagens Kar de Mumma", *Svenska Dagbladet*, 11 November 1944.
58 Jules Berman, "Ett ögonblick redaktörn!", Aftonbladet, 14 November 1944.
59 Berman, "Ett ögonblick redaktörn!".
60 Letter from Mallet to Eden, 17 November 1944.
61 "Memorandum on propaganda actions, 5/11 – 19/11 1944", Sammanställningar av information om propagandaaktioner, F8EB–16, ASA:RA.
62 "'Såg rött' i tyska fönstret", *Aftonbladet*, 11 October 1944; "3000-kronorsruta krossad för Intourist", *Dagens Nyheter*, 15 October 1944.
63 "3000-kronorsruta krossad för Intourist", *Dagens Nyheter*, 15 October 1944.
64 "Busliv och olyckor under mörkläggning av Stockholm", *Hudiksvallstidningen*, 12 February 1945; "Ligister krossade fönsterrutor", *Dagens Nyheter*, 13 February 1945.
65 "'Såg rött' i tyska fönstret", *Aftonbladet*, 11 October 1944.
66 "Lag och orätt", *Aftonbladet*, 30 December 1943.
67 "Krönikan av Flins", *Aftonbladet*, 22 August 1943.
68 "Tyskarnas nya propaganda genom engelska Sthlms-ögon", *Expressen*, 8 April 1945.
69 "Om toffeldjuren och fönsterskyltning", *Arbetartidningen* 6 April 1944; "Nazipropagandans nya linje", *Arbetaren*, 12 April 1945.
70 "Polisen hade order att ej dämpa fredsglädjen", *Expressen*, 8 May 1945.
71 "Europa fritt", *Dagens Nyheter*, 8 May 1945.
72 Shannon Mattern, "Deep Time of Media Infrastructure", *Signal Traffic: Critical Studies of Media Infrastructures*, eds. Lisa Parks and Nicole Starosielski (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2015), 97.

13 Communications Infrastructures and Cold War Politics

The Middle Eastern Theatre of the US/American Empire and Anti-American Coalitions

Burçe Çelik

This chapter aims to reveal the role of communications in the history of the American empire, particularly in its interactions with the Middle East and Turkey during the early Cold War period from 1945 to 1960. In contrast to techno/media-centric and medium-specific studies, I adopt a holistic approach, considering communications as a geopolitical, social, and economic force shaped by discursive and material pillars. These pillars include infrastructure, states, interstate organisations, the military, market, media, labour, meaning, practices, and users. By doing so, I seek to contribute to the main discussions of this book by understanding the relationship between strategy and tactic as dialectical and dwell on the interplay between communications strategies and tactics.

My work is informed by a decolonial perspective aimed at unmasking the colonial and imperialist features of communications, along with the associated struggles throughout the evolution of modern capitalist global communications. The typical history of modern communications is West-centric and imperial. It tells a story of communicative developments within a mono-temporality of Anglo-European modernity, by erasing the totality of the non-West[1] or relegating it to the status of an exploited periphery. This narrative predominantly focuses on the US and British experiences, portraying them as the quintessential examples of modern progress, while conveniently divorcing their domestic histories from their imperial ventures, thus obscuring the oppressive realities within their empires. This deliberate erasure serves to construct a teleological narrative of history, depicting Anglo-modernity as a model for others to emulate.[2]

While I consider the militarisation of communications as a central strategy in US-led Cold War politics aimed at containing socialism and independent Third World movements in the Middle East, I approach the counter-use of communications to produce anti-imperialist, Third Worldist, and socialist organisations of public communication as a form of tactical use of communications in the hands of anti-American coalition.

DOI: 10.4324/9781032618326-16

The militarisation and commodification of communications in the Middle East involved various actors, including US institutions such as the United States Information Service (USIS) influential scholars backed by corporate and state interests promoting paradigms like "media for development" or "media for freedom", as well as international alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Baghdad Pact (later called the Central Treaty Organisation, CENTO). Conversely, resistance to American imperialism in the region was multifaceted, involving actors such as the Soviet empire and its counter-militarisation efforts in the Middle East, but my focus primarily lies on communist and/or socialist exiles from Turkey and their initiatives within the context of anti-imperialist liberation movements in the Arabic-speaking Middle East. I draw upon a wide range of primary and secondary sources, including digitised documents from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and US Foreign Office, archives from the Turkish Republic National Archives, published memoirs, and testimonies of key communicative figures to inform my analysis.

The Rise of the United States in the Middle East

While the United States' involvement in Middle Eastern geopolitics has a longer historicity, its hegemonic dominance in the region became significantly pronounced following the end of the Second World War. This was in parallel with the rise of the United States as a world hegemon, as Ellen Meiksins Wood noted, by "setting the conditions for economic development throughout the world" and establishing "itself as the supreme military power after it dropped the atom bombs in Nagasaki and Hiroshima".[3] The Middle East had long been a focal point of imperialist interests, but the transition from European to American hegemony brought about a shift in the nature of imperialism – from direct territorial occupation to the exertion of military and economic control over territories, resources, and populations. For the United States, the Middle East held strategic importance for two primary reasons: its vast oil reserves and its proximity to the Soviet Union. Preventing Soviet influence in the region and securing access to valuable oil reserves were paramount objectives for American policy-makers.

The US administration developed a two-pronged strategy to extend its influence over the Third World and counter socialist and communist movements therein. This strategy relied on a combination of developmentalism and militarisation. Unlike the laissez-faire policies of European colonial powers, US hegemony was consolidated through the promotion of state-managed national development programmes, unified under the sovereignty of the US dollar.[4] Promoting indicative planning for national industrialisation, these programmes were somewhat similar to the import-substitution

industrialisation model that was adopted by many Third World countries in their political-economic project of self-reliance and self-determination. US-sponsored developmentalism, however, never sought, as Yeonmi Ahn wrote, to cultivate self-reliant economies in the periphery.[5]

Concurrently, the United States also prioritised the development and deployment of military programmes in the Third World, aiming to expand its global military reach and dominance. This "extra-economic force" of military power, as described by Wood, historically served to reinforce economic coercion and perpetuate the image of global supremacy.[6]

Communications, as we will see in the rest of the chapter, were at the centre of this two-pronged strategy. As such, they were re-invented as assemblages of geopolitical, economic, and social forces to produce exchange, use, and militaristic value. If communications were vital and at the centre of this strategy, Turkey emerged as a crucial testing ground for this strategy within the Middle East and the broader Third World context.

The Turkish Republic was founded following the liberation war fought against European imperialism and related partition plans of the Ottoman empire in the aftermath of the First World War. When Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the Turkish Republic and the leader of the liberation war, was in power (1919 and 1938), he sought to pursue a policy based on independence and sovereignty in foreign relations and national economics.[7] Following the end of the Second World War, this stance changed dramatically with the Turkish administration's decision to engage in a strategic alliance with the Unites States. This was in a context where Turkey faced Soviet aggression towards the country over its straits and the slowing pace of industrialisation during the war. Ankara considered US military and economic aid to be crucial for the aversion of military risks coming from the Soviets and for acceleration of national industrialisation processes.[8] Reciprocally, the US administration considered Turkey as a valuable ally because it was "one of the strongest anti-communist countries on the periphery of the USSR and the only one in the Near East capable of offering substantial resistance to Soviet aggression".[9] Also importantly, Turkey was close enough to the oil-rich areas of the region and was one of the modernising Muslim countries that could be a model for the rest of the Middle East in adopting US-led Western lifestyles, military, and economic programmes.

In this context in the mid-1940s, the rapprochement between the United States and Turkey began to transform Turkey into what historian Eric Zürcher calls an "Atlantic Republic" until the late 1950s.[10] Throughout this period, Turkey remained a recipient of substantial military and economic assistance, accompanied by substantial alterations in its governance – from political economy to foreign policy, political systems, and institutional structures – to meet the conditions tied to such aid packages.

However, the process of Americanisation faced persistent challenges, as various social and political actors within Turkey and beyond its borders contested the rapprochement and its associated strategic agendas.

The Militarisation of Communications

In 1947, US President Harry Truman delivered his famous speech before Congress, advocating for economic and military aid to Turkey and Greece to bolster their security forces and stabilise their economies. This proposal, later termed the Truman Doctrine, laid the groundwork for the developmentalist agenda that the United States would pursue across the Third World, spanning from Argentina to the Philippines.[11] A year before, Turkey received its first economic assistance from the United States (USD 25 million) in return for the promise of opening up its economy to foreign trade. A quarter of this sum was used to import the surplus of American transportation and communication stocks – mainly the stocks of companies such as the International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) Corporation and the Radio Corporation of America (RCA).[12] These companies would actively advocate for the implementation of the programmes outlined in the Truman Doctrine.

Following Turkey's integration into the US-led financial system, including the Bretton Woods system, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, Turkey was also incorporated into the Marshall Plan in 1948. In due course, the country's political system was changed, wherein the single-party system was replaced by a multi-party parliamentary democracy. This system change was not a direct consequence of the rapprochement with the United States but was certainly used to garner support for US assistance within American political debates.

Turkey's role in the Marshall Plan was designed to leverage its agricultural resources to supply essential commodities to Western Europe. Through this agricultural trade, the country would be able to invest in the modernisation of its military power. In the eyes of the US administration, the Turkish military was strong but lacked efficiency, as it relied heavily on manpower rather than well-functioning infrastructure systems and modernised weaponry. The US funds would thus be deployed for the development of infrastructure that would facilitate both agricultural trade as well as military advancement. In the same year that the Marshall Plan was launched, the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey (JAMMAT) was established. The latter programme enabled the transfer of US trucks, aircraft, weapons, and defensive equipment to Turkey, whilst RCA laid wireless communications infrastructure between Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. In the meantime, ITT would establish automated telephone systems in the country, with special training programmes launched to train

Turkish engineers and technical personnel on the latest telecommunication systems in their country, locally under the supervision of American experts and in the United States.[13]

During this period of infrastructural development, Turkey, along with other Middle Eastern countries, became a focal point for audience development research funded by both US corporations and state institutions. This research aimed to inform the creation of culturally appropriate media products, spanning from radio programmes to films to print materials, tailored to native audiences. Additionally, it served as a foundation for the emergence of a new paradigm in media and communication research and social theory, often referred to as "media for development", "media for freedom", or modernisation theory.

A seminal work in this paradigm is Daniel Lerner's renowned book, "The Passing of Traditional Society". In this work, Lerner posited that media could be leveraged to induce behavioural changes among native populations, encouraging them to adopt Western (specifically American) values, lifestyles, and governance. Lerner's argument suggested that exposure to certain media messages could lead peasants to aspire to become "freeholding farmers", prompt wives to reduce childbirth, and encourage daughters to adopt Westernised attire and grooming habits. Thus, communications were envisioned not only as a means to win the hearts and minds of native populations but also as a catalyst for social change, aligning the governance, economy, and military of the Third World with Western interests.[14]

Communications for Americanisation

In the early 1950s, Turkey experienced its first free and fair national elections under a multi-party parliamentary system, resulting in the victory of the Democrats and their centre-right political stance. Initially, the Democrats championed the Americanisation of Turkish society, pledging to "create a little America".[15] However, as their tenure progressed, tensions arose between the Democrats and the US administration, particularly concerning the management of Turkey's economy. By 1960, discontent culminated in the Democrats being ousted from power through the country's first military intervention.

The Democrats in government brought about a major transformation to the country's communicative landscape. Before they came to power, their main promise was to expand communicative rights and freedoms in the country, whilst also refashioning the communicative systems to support the agricultural trade and economic development in the country. When in power, the Democrats used their institutional power to favour their supporter groups by enlarging communicative possibilities for them

and curbing dissenting voices. As economic challenges and opposition to their rule mounted, the Democrats increasingly restricted communicative liberties, stifling criticism and dissent.

In the mid-1940s, before the Democrats took over the government, the Turkish state power adopted a repressive approach towards journalistic publications and journalists who were critical of the administration's decision to align with US politics. In due course, prominent left-leaning periodicals such as *Tan* and *Görüşler* were subjected to the first governmentally orchestrated lynching campaign against journalistic outlets in the country's history. Following this, the owners and leading journalists of these two outlets, Sabiha Sertel and her husband Zekeriya Sertel, fled the country following their short imprisonment. Another public figure, the communist poet Nazım Hikmet who contributed to Sertels' outlets throughout the 1920s and 1930s, had to leave the country during an anti-communist campaign. This pattern of exile persisted throughout the 1950s, resulting in the establishment of transnational dissident media enterprises aimed at Turkish audiences. These individuals were pivotal in employing a "tactical" approach to media during this era, utilising communications to resist the process of Americanisation within Turkey and Middle Eastern societies. We will delve deeper into their stories when we discuss the "tactical use" of media in the hands of an anti-American coalition.

While dissenting voices against the US-Turkey rapprochement were suppressed, the government enacted legislation to close down pivotal institutions of the Kemalist Republic, including People's Houses and Village Institutes. These enterprises were essentially communicative-educative hubs founded in the rural segments of the country to educate the peasantry about scientific farming methods, philosophy, literature, science, and communicative arts. Many of the left-wing writers, artists, and intellectuals of the 1950s and 1960s had some experience with these establishments in their youth when they lived in areas where these establishments were active. By the early 1950s, the Democrats had closed these enterprises with claims that they did nothing but cultivate socialist, communist, and un-Turkish culture in the republic.

At the new conjuncture, state-sponsored communicative-educational institutions ceased to exist in rural Turkey. However, there were undoubtedly networks and organisations that received either tacit approval or direct support from the government. Its activities included producing films, radio programmes, and training material focusing on various themes such as capitalist farming, Soviet oppression, American progress and freedom, and the significance of regional alliances such as NATO and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO). Additionally, the USIS collaborated with the Turkish government to censor public libraries, excluding all literature authored by blacklisted communist writers.[16]

Another network that emerged and was infused into public life in urban and rural Turkey in this period was anti-communist associations which essentially functioned as communicative-educative hubs. By re-charging a Turkist (Sunni) Islamic racist-fascist ideology, whose historicity goes back to the late Ottoman period, these associations aimed to mobilise the conservative population against communist ideas by tainting socialist ideals with infidelity, perversion, immorality, and treason. These anti-communist associations organised conferences, seminars, and talks aimed at local populations, where they propagated their views and ideologies. Additionally, they published a variety of materials including leaflets, brochures, and magazines distributed across both rural and urban Turkey, further disseminating their anti-communist rhetoric and agenda.

During this period, the print media landscape in Turkey experienced significant expansion with the emergence of new businesses entering the market, motivated by both commercial and political interests. These new outlets played a role in popularising anti-communist Turkist and Islamist discourses within public communication channels. Between 1950 and 1960, the circulation of daily newspapers saw a remarkable increase of 400 per cent, far outpacing the population growth rate of 17 per cent.[17] However, despite this exponential growth in print media consumption, a large portion of Turkey's population still lacked access to print media. By 1960, the overall circulation numbers had reached approximately 1.5 million, whereas the population stood at around 28 million.

For those who did not have access to print media or could not afford it, radio emerged as the primary medium for news and entertainment. The infrastructural and technological advancements in radio transmission and broadcasting in Turkey and parts of the Middle East were largely facilitated by investments from the United States, Britain, NATO, and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO). These investments served both military and civilian communication purposes. Between 1950 and 1960, the official number of radio receivers in Turkey surged by 188 per cent. By 1960, there were approximately 1.34 million officially registered radio receivers in the country.[18] It is worth noting that radio consumption was not limited to individual households but also extended to communal settings such as coffeehouses, shops, marketplaces, villages, rural districts, and urban areas. Moreover, many radio receivers were not officially registered during this period, indicating that radio was indeed the most widely accessible and mass medium of the era.

In the early years of the Republic, when the country was ruled by a single-party system, the modernising state power used the radio as a pedagogic medium to educate, enlighten, modernise, and secularise the public. During those years, radios were strategically placed in state-sponsored educational and communication centres such as People's Houses or Rooms and

Village Institutes, aimed at reaching rural populations. However, following Turkey's transition to a multi-party system and its rapprochement with the United States, radio broadcasting underwent a significant transformation. First, the radio-sphere became *international* and notably Americanised.

Despite Turkish legislation prohibiting the establishment of radio broadcasts outside the state monopoly, the US military bases established their own radio stations in various parts of Turkey, including Adana, Diyarbakır, and Karamürsel. Additionally, when the US administration sought permission to launch Radio Free Europe in Istanbul, Turkish authorities initially considered facilitating the legal framework for its establishment. However, concerns arose within the government, particularly among the Democrats, regarding the potential proliferation of oppositional radio stations if legislative measures were altered. Consequently, rather than permitting an independent radio station, the government opted to Americanise state-run radio broadcasting. This shift reflects a strategic decision by Turkish authorities to control the narrative of radio broadcasting, preferring Americanisation under state auspices over the potential challenges posed by independent oppositional radio stations.

With the assistance of USIS, Turkish state radio underwent a transformation characterised by an "American accent", as described in an article published in *The New York Times*. In addition to incorporating music programmes featuring jazz and American pop music, the radio introduced shows modelled after popular American broadcasts such as Arthur Godfrey's Talent Scouts and Information Please. A Turkish administrator, trained by Voice of America, was recruited to oversee the reshaping of the radio into an "Americanised organ of popular entertainment and edification". Concurrently, US corporations such as RCA installed three 100-kilowatt stations in major Turkish cities – Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir – to expand radio coverage across the country. Furthermore, additional transmitters were deployed in eastern Turkey to counter the influence of powerful Soviet radio stations, which monopolised broadcasting in Turkish, Armenian, and Kurdish.[19]

Secondly, the state-run radio increasingly functioned as a partisan propaganda tool for the ruling Democrat party, particularly as they faced mounting societal grievances against their policies. In addition to utilising radio broadcasts to justify and celebrate their governance, the Democrats weaponised state radio to discredit and attack oppositional parties, groups, and individuals. The excessive use of radio for propaganda purposes by the Democrats provoked various forms of protest, including public boycotts of radio broadcasts during propaganda-heavy news programmes in coffeehouses and communal spaces. Additionally, citizens organised associations such as the "Societies Who Refuse Partisan Radio" across Turkey to express dissent against the partisan manipulation of radio content.

NATO and CENTO as Communications Enterprises

NATO and CENTO significantly influenced the communicative landscape of Turkey and the Middle East during the Cold War era. In the early 1950s, Turkey's political parties viewed NATO membership as essential for national security and integration into the Western Bloc. However, this policy faced opposition from socialist-leaning groups within Turkey, such as the Peace Association, and from the United Kingdom, which advocated for Turkey's inclusion in a Middle Eastern defence framework instead. Despite domestic opposition, the Turkish government employed various tactics to secure NATO membership, including dispatching troops to the Korean War in support of Northern/Western interests and permitting the establishment of US military bases in exchange for NATO membership. In 1952, Turkey became a NATO member, serving as a critical component of NATO's eastern border and a primary entry point for US influence in the Middle East.

Upon joining NATO, Turkey actively participated in establishing Middle East defence systems, aiming to include pro-Western governments in the region, such as Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan. In collaboration with the United Kingdom, these nations, along with Turkey, formed the Baghdad Pact in 1956. Although the United States initially participated in the Pact as an observer, it played a more active role in alliance operations beyond its observer status.[20] This strategic engagement with NATO and CENTO not only bolstered Turkey's geopolitical position but also facilitated closer ties with Western powers, shaping the region's communicative dynamics and security discourse during the Cold War.

These developments unfolded against the backdrop of burgeoning anti-imperialist nationalist movements in the Middle East, North Africa, and the broader Third World. During this era, notable events included the convening of the Bandung Conference in 1955, characterised as "the first intercontinental Conference of coloured peoples in the history of mankind"[21] by Indonesia's President Sukarno. Additionally, pan-Arab nationalist movements, spearheaded by figures like Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, gained momentum, culminating in events such as the Suez Crisis of 1956. The formation of the Baghdad Pact aimed to counteract the influence of these anti-colonial and nationalist movements in the region. Its objective was to preserve and expand Western influence across Muslim-majority countries through collaborative efforts. However, the trajectory of the Baghdad Pact shifted following the 1958 coup in Iraq, which prompted Iraq's withdrawal from the Pact. Consequently, the organisation underwent a transformation, re-emerging as the CENTO. With its headquarters relocated from Baghdad to Ankara, CENTO assumed the mandate of planning, organising, and implementing various projects aiming to

"defend their territories against aggression or subversion and to promote the welfare and prosperity of the peoples in the region".[22]

NATO and CENTO transcended their roles as mere military and political alliances, emerging as influential communications and cultural enterprises that significantly shaped member states' infrastructure, telecommunications, and media development. By 1955, a substantial portion – approximately a quarter – of NATO's project budget was allocated to the development of communications and information transmission systems. Notably, the investment in Turkey's military and telecommunications systems represented the largest share within the US European Command by the late 1950s. The presence of over 100 US military bases on Turkish soil further underscored the extent of infrastructure development, encompassing intelligence, weaponry, and communication systems, many of which were installed without the knowledge or approval of the Turkish authorities.[23]

Before the development of satellite systems in the late 1960s, territorial and extra-territorial communications networks were organised to enable electronic transmission over long distances using microwave radio signals. These microwave radio links connected modern weapons systems such as jet fighters, naval forces, guided missiles, tank formations as well as intelligence facilities across member states. The network also enabled a safe connection between military bases and the multiplication of communication types, by using multiplexing devices into many teletype channels. These links were not only used for military connection but also for civilian communication, including telephone and telegraph traffic, albeit with priority always given to the military connection. As such, the NATO-led projects constituted the nucleus of civilian communications in Turkey. For instance, while the country's own investment in telecommunications infrastructure reached some USD 20 million throughout the 1950s, NATO's contribution was over USD 37 million.[24]

The development of telecommunications and microwave systems was also prioritised in the CENTO projects from 1956 onwards. The CENTO Microwave System, which was largely funded by the US and British grants, constituted the longest in the world when it was constructed and enabled connections from Ankara through Tehran to Karachi, a distance of 3,060 miles. In the meantime, various medium and shortwave transmitters were installed in these countries to air Western content via radio in the battle with the powerful transmitters of Egyptian and Soviet radio. These communication links were founded in parallel to the roads, railways, agricultural and cultural programmes to serve the Western-sponsored economic, military, communicative, and cultural alliance during the Cold War.[25] In various Turkish sources, including the journalistic books on the foreign and local spy networks in the country, it was also claimed that CENTO

had developed a Writers Panel to recruit and finance influential journalists and journalistic outlets to articulate and disseminate anti-Soviet, anti-communist propaganda across the member countries via their journalistic work.[26]

The Rise of the Anti-American Coalition and Its Mediation via Radio Broadcasting

If communications were key to the US-led strategy to draw Turkey and the Middle East into the orbit of the American empire, networks also played a crucial role in the counter-geopolitics of the anti-American coalition. In this chapter, I conceptualise the latter as the tactical use of communications against strategic forms of communication, wherein the means and infrastructure of communications were militarised and commodified to facilitate the Americanisation (or Westernisation) of the region.

The roots of anti-Americanism as a key political stance and movement in the Middle Eastern region to this day can be traced back to the 1950s. While there have been various manifestations of anti-Americanist movements in the region, spanning socialist to Islamist politics, the early forms of anti-Americanism were articulated through the prisms of anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, and pro-independence, liberatory-nationalist movements. One influential manifestation of this political stance emerged in Egypt during the 1952 Revolution, which propelled Gamal Abdel Nasser to prominence as a leader advocating liberatory politics against "imperialism" and "capitalist colonialism".[27]

The Nasser-led liberatory political project extended beyond Egypt, aiming to foster pan-Arab nationalism and promote decolonisation throughout the Arabic-speaking world and beyond. Upon assuming power in Egypt following the revolution, Nasser strategically utilised radio as a pivotal mass medium for political communication, propaganda dissemination, and entertainment to advance his political agenda.

In addition to investing in the transmission power of Radio Cairo, Nasser's administration crafted a distinct populist rhetoric, employing accessible, everyday Arabic language to directly engage both literate and illiterate populations. Addressing the audience with inclusive pronounce like "you, brother", Nasser sought to mobilise marginalised and oppressed peoples in solidarity with Arab unity against colonialist and imperialist forces.

Nasser's radio broadcasts strategically targeted regional alliances forged by the United States and the United Kingdom, such as the Baghdad Pact, and repeatedly criticised Zionist expansionist policies as threats to Arab unity, peace, and freedom. The Voice of Arabs programme played a significant role in mobilising Arabs for anti-imperialist revolutionary

movements, contributing to revolts in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. While some in the United States dismissed Nasser's radio broadcasts as manipulative and hypnotic, labelling the Arab population as "ignorant and emotional", others in the region viewed it as a rallying cry for unprecedented solidarity and new leadership. Many historians attribute the coup d'état in Iraq, leading to its withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, to the influence of Nasser's mediated politics in the region. [28]

The impact of Nasserism transcended the Arabic-speaking populations of the Middle East, resonating strongly within the left-wing circles of Turkey and Turkish-speaking communities across Europe. This influence is exemplified in a letter addressed to Prime Minister Menderes by a Yugoslav national, expressing dismay over Turkey's adversarial stance towards Nasser and citing Turkish state radio's negative portrayal of Nasserism, which the sender was able to access from Sarajevo.[29]

Within Turkey, Nasserism found ideological resonance with Kemalism, the foundational ideology of a non-Western modernising project, particularly among left-wing factions. While Kemalism had historically been embraced by both left and right factions in Turkey, the left in this period associated Kemalism with unwavering independence and sovereignty against the backdrop of Turkey's growing Americanisation in the 1950s. Consequently, Nasserism was perceived by some as a natural extension of the pro-independence Kemalist liberation movement, garnering support for its influence on Middle Eastern and global politics, including the Iraqi coup. This sentiment found traction among low-ranking military officers, predominantly left-leaning Kemalists, who orchestrated the 1960 military coup in Turkey. Like their counterparts in Iraq, they believed they could govern the country more effectively than the ruling Democrats. However, unlike the aftermath of the Iraqi coup, Turkey maintained its ties with Western establishments, including NATO and CENTO, albeit developing a relatively distant relationship with the United States and the West, at least temporarily, following the coup.[30]

The events unfolding in the Middle East also captured the attention of Turkish communist-socialist exiles. Following the mid-1940s rapprochement between the United States and Turkey, numerous journalists, intellectuals, and members of Turkey's left-wing community fled the country, fearing persecution, imprisonment, or even death under the increasingly repressive policies of the Democratic government.

Among these exiles were prominent figures such as Nazım Hikmet, as well as Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel, who sought sanctuary in the Eastern Bloc. Hikmet and the Sertels shared a close relationship; the Sertels, known for their influential left-leaning journalistic and cultural endeavours in Turkey from the 1920s to the mid-1940s, provided platforms for Hikmet's contributions as a poet, playwright, essayist, columnist, and

revolutionary communist. Hikmet gained renown across Turkey, the Middle East, and the Soviet Union for his literary prowess and political activism, often hailed as "Turkey's greatest modern poet".[31]

Despite his burgeoning international reputation, Hikmet faced disdain from Turkey's political elite during his lifetime and endured prolonged periods of incarceration within Turkey. In 1951, with assistance from the clandestine Turkish Communist Party (TCP) headquartered in Moscow, he fled to the Soviet Union. From his base in the Eastern Bloc, Hikmet and his TCP associates embarked on efforts to establish "Radio Independent Turkey" and enlist "Turkish-speaking exiles for its programming".[32]

Hikmet himself harboured a deep passion for radio, a sentiment he articulated in a poem during his imprisonment in Turkey. In his verse, he portrayed radio as a conduit for the world's words and melodies to reach him. Now in exile, Hikmet envisioned radio as a means to reconnect with his homeland, alongside comrades who would collaborate on the radio, using its extraterrestrial signals to bring back home. As Edward Said reflected on exiles, whether forced or voluntary, they traverse borders, forge new lives, and cultivate new allegiances and loyalties in their adopted environments. Yet, exiles never fully sever ties with their homeland or extinguish the yearning for what they have lost. Indeed, the sensation of loss and displacement is, as Said suggests, intrinsic to the essence of exile – shaping its life, perspective, and communication.[33]

When Soviet authorities granted approval for the establishment of a Turkish-speaking radio station in 1958, a cadre of Turkish-speaking exiles within the Eastern Bloc was ready to launch the first transnational exile radio station for Turkish-speaking communists or socialists. Founded in Leipzig as Bizim Radyo (Our Radio), the station utilised high-power shortwave transmitters funded by Soviet technology to broadcast to Turkey and European regions with Turkish-speaking populations. While TCP officials viewed the radio station as an official organ of the party, advocating for peace and independence against imperialism and fascism, others involved in its inception, like the Sertels, envisioned it as an autonomous platform to raise awareness about American influence on Turkey and governmental decisions affecting its populace. The name Our Radio, suggested by Zekeriya Sertel, signified its role as a voice of exile, distinct from party affiliation.[34]

This tension persisted until the early 1960s, when Bizim Radyo increasingly aligned with the TCP's partisan agenda. Nevertheless, during its formative years, Bizim Radyo stood as a formidable and influential advocate for anti-American and anti-capitalist-imperialist politics in the region and in Turkey. In its inaugural broadcast, the radio host directed a message to the Turkish government, condemning its interference in Iraqi politics in line with Western interests. With this declaration, the radio station became part of the anti-American coalition in the realm of the airwaves.

Prior to the establishment of Bizim Radyo, young Turkish-speaking exiles, including Turkish, Armenian, and Kurdish individuals with backgrounds in journalism, writing, or translation, contributed to the Turkish-language services at Radio Budapest. However, these services were limited to a few hours of programming and supplemented by other Soviet-run radio stations like Moscow, Tiflis, and Baku, which broadcast in Turkish, Armenian, and Kurdish languages for a few hours each week. Despite their availability in Turkey, much of the programming in local languages lacked resonance due to heavy accents and propagandistic content, failing to galvanise the local populace towards revolutionary politics.

With the recruitment of the young Turkish-speaking exiles to the Budapest radio station – as campaigned for once again by Nazım Hikmet in his persistent communication with the Soviet authorities – Radio Budapest's Turkish-speaking services began to change and find a new diction, mode of communication, and discourse for radio programming in the Turkish language. Gün Benderli, who began working at the Radio Budapest in 1953, along with her husband, Can Togay, recounts that they paid sustained attention to distancing themselves from propagandistic language and articulating a relatable tone, mode, and use of Turkish language to address many across Europe and Turkey, literate and illiterate, women and men, young and old.[35] Whilst the journalistic coverage was highly dependent on the Soviet sources and thereby limited, their radio services aimed to diversify the content by adding cultural and literary programming as well as participatory – two-way – broadcasting whereby letters from the audience were read, commented on, and discussed by the guests on radio programmes. Many of the cultural and literary programmes at Radio Budapest featured Nazım Hikmet – he would sit down with Benderli for an interview, often introduce the literary figures of Turkish literature that are associated with the social realism tradition and recite some of their poetry or his for the audience. He would occasionally read the workers', peasants' poems that were posted to him via letters and comment on their literary genius on these shows. With astonishment for the social-realist literary tradition and its transformative power, he would celebrate their listeners' poetry as true works of social realism.

Hikmet contributed numerous literary journalistic pieces during his tenure with Sertel's media outlets in Turkey. Their journalistic approach included featuring audience letters and addressing the everyday struggles, aspirations, and grievances of peasants, workers, and women – an approach championed by Sabiha Sertel and other female journalists during the early years of the Turkish Republic. Notably, Sabiha Sertel held a managerial position at Radio Budapest's Turkish-language service when such programming was adopted. Sertel, along with her contemporaries, embraced a form of journalism which we define elsewhere as "parrhesiastic

activity", characterised by a commitment to truth and justice, and conducted with courage and persistence against the interests of both the market and the government.[36] This approach diverges significantly from the conventional liberal model of professional journalism, where independence from the state and political parties is emphasised, often in favour of of market interests. Despite their activities in the Eastern Bloc facilitated by Soviet Cold War technology and funding, their radio programming remained aligned with their ethical communicative practices, which centred on critiquing domestic government regimes and advocating for the rights of oppressed populations.

Exiles in the Eastern Bloc, often accused of treason for fleeing their native countries and continuing to critique their governments from abroad, faced allegations primarily from governmental bodies and right-wing media and political groups. In response to such accusations, Hikmet denounced those who he deemed responsible for betraying Kemalism, Turkey's national interests, and its people, during a radio interview with Benderli. In a radio broadcast, he remarked, "whoever made Turkey's peasantry and workers servants to a colonising force", "whoever sold Turkey to America", "whoever sold Turkey's national industry. They are the ones who betrayed Kemalism", "they are the traitors".[37]

The closure of Radio Budapest's Turkish-language service following the Hungarian Revolution and Soviet occupation prompted Hikmet and his TCP associates to advocate for the establishment of Bizim Radyo in East Germany. However, the events surrounding the closure of Radio Budapest and the establishment of Bizim Radyo highlight the contradictory aspects of the exiles' politics. For example, in private communication with Roni Margulies, one of Radio Budapest's Armenian contributors, recounted that they saw the Hungarian revolt as a CIA provocation.[38] Similarly, while working for Radio Budapest/Bizim Radyo, many exiles refrained from discussing topics such as the Armenian genocide or colonial dynamics between Turks and Kurds, despite some radio staff belonging to these marginalised groups. Although Bizim Radyo initially broadcast in Kurdish for a few hours per week, this programming was discontinued due to staffing limitations.

Anjel Açıkgöz, who migrated from Lebanon to the Eastern Bloc and worked for Bizim Radyo with her husband and relatives, recalls the radio quickly gaining popularity in Turkey due to its non-propagandistic, relatable language, culturally rich programming, and participatory format. As the radio addressed everyday problems and grievances faced by workers, peasants, and the marginalised, its programming resonated with a Turkish audience increasingly disillusioned with the economic policies, oppressive politics, propaganda, and Americanised foreign policy of the Democrats. Letters from the audience were read on air, activists were given airtime to publicise their campaigns, and alternative journalistic content targeting

the United States, CENTO, NATO, and CIA was disseminated and discussed on factual programming.[39]

According to CIA documents, Bizim Radyo played a significant role in mobilising anti-American sentiment and fuelling student and youth protests against the Democratic government, contributing to the circumstances that led to the 1960 military coup. Subsequently, the Prime Minister acknowledged the radio's role in exacerbating societal tensions. Due to its its increasing influence, the radio became a target for right-wing media, which frequently highlighted its Soviet origins. A right-wing journalistic representation of the period would state, for instance, in relation to Bizim Radio, "we will be a little America, not a little Russia".[40]

Following the coup, the military regime implemented a series of changes, including political, economic, and constitutional reforms. While these reforms expanded political and communicative rights through new constitutional measures and institutions, they also institutionalised autonomous public service radio and television broadcasting. However, the 1960s marked a decline in public service broadcasting, as the state radio increasingly adopted partisan programming. Although Bizim Radyo continued until 1989, its influence waned after many left the station in the mid-1960s, including the Sertels. The language, diction, and discourse articulated by Bizim Radyo (and Radio Budapest) continued to inform Turkey's anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, socialist, and communist communicative traditions, just as Nasser's radio rhetoric influenced populist liberation movements in the Middle East in subsequent years.

Conclusion

My chapter explored how, while the United States and its allies strategically utilised communications networks to exert influence and control, the anti-American coalition employed a tactical approach to counter these efforts. These alternative networks served as platforms for disseminating counter-narratives, fostering solidarity among resistance movements, and mobilising against Western imperialist agendas. By framing this dynamic as a dialectical relationship between strategic and tactical communication, we illuminate the multifaceted nature of the geopolitical struggle in the region. Strategic communications, characterised by the militarisation and commodification of communications infrastructure, served the interests of dominant powers seeking to impose their agenda. Tactical communications here represent a form of counter-communicative politics that utilises material and discursive pillars of communications to subvert and contest dominant narratives.

It is essential to acknowledge the complexity of the relationship between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic communicative struggles, without

oversimplifying it into a binary of oppression and resistance. While the communicative strategies employed by the American empire undoubtedly carry elements of oppression, it is important to recognise that the tactical use of communications by the anti-American coalition was not always entirely independent or consistently progressive. Members of the anti-American coalition aligned with regimes such as the Soviet empire who themselves practised imperialist, colonial, and suppressive politics. Additionally, these actors faced contradictions that could lead them to overlook their own involvement in colonial and oppressive politics, while engaging in anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggles through communicative means.

Notes

1 I will be using the concept of non-West and Third World interchangeably in this chapter. Third World was a term commonly used during the Cold War era to define geographies and a collection of states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that included ex-colonial, newly independent, non-aligned countries. It was also used to define "poorer" nations of the Cold War as well as the geopolitics and political economy of non-aligned countries that pursued anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, and nationalist-modernist politics. See B. R. Tomlinson, "What was the Third World?", *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 38, no. 2 (2003), 307–21.
2 See Catherine Hall, "Doing Reparatory History? Bringing 'Race' and Slavery Home", *Race & Class*, vol. 60 (2018), 3–21; Gurminder K. Bhambra, "Decolonising Critical Theory? Epistemological Justice, Progress, Reparations", *Critical Times*, vol. 4 (2021), 73–89.
3 Ellen Meiksins Wood, "Empire in the age of capital", *Verso*, January 21, 2016, https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/blogs/news/2441-ellen-meiksins-wood-empire-in-the-age-of-capital (accessed 31 March 2024).
4 Sylvia Maxfield and James H. Nolt, "Protectionism and the Internationalization of Capital: US Sponsorship of Import Substitution Industrialization in the Philippines, Turkey and Argentina", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 34 (1990), 49–81.
5 Yeonmi Ahn, "The Political Economy of Foreign Aid: The Nature of American Aid and its Impact on the State-Business Relationship in South Korea, 1945–1971", PhD Diss. (Yale University, 1992).
6 Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Empire of Capital* (London: Verso, 2003), 4–7.
7 Nur Bilge Criss, "A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case", *Journal of American History*, vol. 89, no. 2 (2002), 472.
8 Burçe Çelik, *Communications in Turkey and the Ottoman Empire: A Critical History* (Urbana: Illinois University Press, 2023).
9 "The Near East and Africa", vol. 7, doc. 1234, US National Archives: Foreign Relations of the United States (henceforth NA: FRUS) 1945; "The Near East and Africa" vol. 7. Doc. 622–701, NA: FRUS, 1946.
10 Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 234.
11 Harry S. Truman, "Inaugural Address", *Truman Library*, 20 January 1949, https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/19/inaugural-address (accessed 31 March 2024).

12 "The Near East and Africa" vol. 7, doc. 1234, NA: FRUS, 1945; "The Near East and Africa" vol. 7, doc. 702–29, NA: FRUS, 1946.
13 Foreign Aid Appropriations for 1951, Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Eighty-First Congress, Second Session (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1950); *New York Times*, 24 October 1946; *New York Times*, 3 August 1951.
14 Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*: *Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: Free Press, 1958), 348.
15 Criss, "A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism", 143.
16 *New York Times*, 31 December 1952; Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006); Julide Aysehan Etem, "Mediating US-Turkey Relations: Nonfiction Film and the Networks of Transnational Communication", PhD Diss. (Bloomington: Indiana University, 2020).
17 Aytül Tamer, "Basın Üzerine Niceliksel bir Çözümleme: Fiyatlar ve Tirajlar", *Cumhuriyet Döneminde Iletişim*, ed. Nazife Güngör (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2010); see Çelik, *Communications*, and Ertuğrul Meşe, *Komünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri: Türk Sağında Antikomünizm Inşası* (Istanbul: Iletişim, 2023).
18 Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Şirket Telsizinden Devlet Radyosuna: TRT Öncesi Dönemde Rayonun Tarihsel Gelişimi ve Turkiye Siyasal Hayatı Icöndeki Yeri* (Istanbul: Iletişim, 2010).
19 *New York Times*, 22 May 1955.
20 Çelik, *Communications*; and Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, "CENTO: The Forgotten Alliance in the Middle East (1959–1979)", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 56, no. 6 (2020), 854–77.
21 Opening address given by Sukarno (Bandung, 18 April 1955), Cvce, https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/9/5/88d3f71c-c9f9-415a-b397-b27b8581a4f5/publishable_en.pdf.
22 Yeşilbursa, "CENTO", 857.
23 *New York Times*, 15 January 1952.
24 Çelik, *Communications*, 91.
25 *Department of State Bulletin*, no. 1403 (May 1966), 761.
26 Tuncay Özkan, *Bir Gizli Servisin Tarihi* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1997); Murat Yetkin, *Meraklısı İçin Casuslar Kitabı* (Istanbul: Doğan, 2018).
27 Gamal Abdel Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1955).
28 See Douglas A. Boyd, "Development of Egypt's Radio: 'Voice of the Arabs' under Nasser", *Journalism Quarterly*, vol. 52, no. 4 (1975) for a general overview; Hisham Sharabi, *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1966) for Arab's response to Nasser's radio; and *New York Times*, 5 July 1958; *New York Times*, 7 April 1958 for the US response to Nasser's radio.
29 Turkish National Archives (Başbakanlık Özel Kalem Müdürlüğü) 30-1-0-0/6-31-32 (5 December 1956).
30 Kemal Karpat, "The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960–1964: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of a Revolution", *American Historical Review*, vol. 75, no. 6 (1970), 1654–83.
31 *New York Times*, 20 April 2002.
32 James H. Meyer, *Red Star over the Black Sea: Nazım Hikmet and His Generation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023).

33 Edward Said, *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).
34 See oral history interviews with Yıldız Sertel in S. Gezgin, V. Polat, and E. Arcan, eds., *Türkiye Sözlü Basın Tarihi Cilt 1* (Istanbul: Iş Bankası Yayınları, 2015), and Yıldız Sertel, *Ardımdaki Yıllar* (Istanbul: Iletişim, 2017).
35 Gün Benderli, *Su Başında Durmuşuz* (Istanbul: Belge, 2003).
36 Burçe Çelik and Nazan Haydari, "Parrhesia as journalism: Learning from the truth- and justice-seeking women journalists of twentieth century Turkey", *Journalism Studies*, vol. 23, no.13 (2022), 1607–24.
37 Nazım Hikmet, Budapest Radio, 1954, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-5bhYcViHrA.
38 Roni Margulies, "Jak ve Vartan, Anjel ve Hayk", *Altüst*, 9 September 2017.
39 See Anjel Açıkgöz, *Bizim Radyoda Nazım Hikmet* (Istanbul: TÜSTAV, 2000); Hayk Açıkgöz, *Anadolulu Bir Ermeni Komünistin Anıları* (Istanbul: Belge, 2015); Sinan Kiyanç, "Soğuk Savaş Yıllarında Bir Aktör: Bizim Radyo", *Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, vol. 68 (2021), 463–94.
40 CIA, RDP74-00297R000900080012-5 (30 September 1958); CIA-RDP78-00915R001200080005-5 (1957-9 Propaganda Forgeries – Worldwide Target); CIA-RDP78-00915R001400380002-3 (Working Paper: The Third Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference); Foreign Press Bulletin, 8 July 1960; CIA-RDP81M00980R00320001000 (Communist Forgeries).

14 Working Their Cover

The CIA's Forum World Features, Covert Propaganda Strategy, and News Tactics, 1966–1975

John Jenks

When British muckrakers blew the cover of the covertly funded and controlled news-feature agency Forum World Features in June 1975, their reporting and follow-up stories emphasised the secret manipulation of unwitting global opinions towards the goals of its sponsor – the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).[1] There was some truth to this, but it was only part of the story. Forum and its propaganda contemporaries clearly had covert propaganda missions, but to keep effective cover stories they had to make plausible shows of being real feature agencies. The CIA's goals, and those of its Cold War propaganda counterparts, were to provide regular flows of articles to support their policies, denigrate their opponents, and attack their enemies. But for that strategy to work the faux agencies had to employ the tactics of real, full-service feature agencies and push science, medicine, sports, and human interest stories as aggressively as they did political and economic analyses that supported their policies. This shows the interdependence of propaganda strategies, in this case the strategy of a disguised feature agency, and the tactics of plausibly and simultaneously spreading propaganda and newsworthy feature articles. Agencies that perfected the balance had a cover that could endure for years and subtly alter both the political complexion and the political economy of the global news ecosystem.

To put Forum into the context of Cold War American covert operations, the CIA owned or subsidised more than 50 news organisations at one point or another. In the mid-1960s the agency had an estimated 800 organisations and people pumping out news and information – "from Radio Free Europe (a CIA-controlled broadcast system) to a third-string guy in Quito who could get something in the local paper", as one CIA official told the *New York Times*.[2] Some CIA media operations were primarily fronts for espionage – giving press passes to spies – but thus far there is no evidence that the CIA used Forum that way.[3]

DOI: 10.4324/9781032618326-17

Research on these media operations has gone through several distinct phases. The erosion of Cold War consensus and deference to the CIA led in 1966–1967 to exposés in both mainstream and alternative publications of agency covert operations; however, most of the exposed operations were in the world of education and culture. Muckraking journalists went deeper in the mid-1970s, anticipating and following up on US congressional investigations of CIA media activities to lay out institutional and personal connections they believed undermined the independence and integrity of the press.[4] Both these exposés and the initial British reports on Forum emphasised the threats to American and British journalism, respectively, but did not deeply explore the impact on non-Western media systems.[5] Since the late 1970s, a few memoirs and mea culpas from Forum journalists have dripped out, detailing operations, feigning ignorance, claiming righteousness, and settling scores.[6] More recent scholarship on CIA covert actions has given a cursory look at media operations as part of the larger historical accounts of CIA subversion, sponsorship, and partnerships with a vast range of people and organisations in arts, literature, academia, religion, labour, and advocacy of every type.[7]

This chapter situates the empirical story of Forum operations in the theoretical context of media imperialism, an important strand of media studies scholarship that developed in the 1970s. This approach emphasised the Western, particularly Anglo-American, media's structural role in maintaining and extending the influence of both old and new imperial powers in the non-Western world through journalistic practices, economic predominance, and raw political power.[8] That structural media advantage made the propaganda strategy of a London feature agency an easy choice, but successful execution of that strategy over the long term complicated the tactics. In this chapter, I use strategy and tactics in a classical sense. This seemingly legitimate news agency was the plan and platform to achieve propaganda goals. The tactics that necessarily flowed from that strategic fiction were sometimes straightforward, sometimes diversionary, and sometimes messy steps to simultaneously spread propaganda and maintain the agency's cover of legitimacy. Forum could use its London base and Anglophone output to blend in unobtrusively with a massive flow of other post-imperial media and use its subsidised tactics of a faux full-service news agency to contribute to that continued Western dominance.

In this study, I build on these empirical and theoretical foundations to argue that Forum contributed to continued Anglo-American dominance in several ways. At its most basic, a substantial amount of its output was propaganda, that is, political-economic commentary and analyses that broadly promoted Western interests among readers whom the CIA wanted to reach. On a business level, the CIA subsidy meant that Forum could undercut competitors and sell its articles much more cheaply to

cash-strapped editors around the world, thus giving its propaganda an edge. Finally, because the CIA's covert propaganda strategy with Forum necessitated adopting the tactics of a real news-feature agency, complete with hundreds of non-political articles, it helped foster a cut-rate environment in which virtually no one could survive without a subsidy.

Because the CIA records on Forum are still withheld, this chapter also relies on a lateral archival strategy, drawing on the records of Forum's predecessors, partners, and competitors to flesh out the details of the agency's operations. Taken together with contemporary journalism and scattered memoirs, these documents start telling another angle of the story of Forum World Features, the story of what happens when a covert propaganda agency tries to work its cover.

The Global News Media Ecosystem and Propaganda

In the post-war global media ecosystem, news-feature agencies like Forum operated in important niches that the big players neglected in the wholesale media business. The major international news agencies such as Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, and Agence France Presse covered the world with non-stop, time-sensitive breaking news and aggressively sold their services globally. Other news agencies confined their work to an individual country or region, often in partnership with one of the big four international agencies. News-feature agencies and the big agencies' feature divisions filled in the gaps, specialising in providing newspapers with news, commentary, analyses, profiles, and background information that were more in-depth and less time-sensitive than most of the big agencies' copy. Some were covertly subsidised, like Forum. Others were independent, such as Gemini News Agency, which specialised in the British Commonwealth and Inter Press Service, which tended to concentrate on Latin America.[9] They all shared that market niche with Anglo-American newspaper syndicates like the *New York Times* and London *Observer*, which sold previously published articles to wealthier newspapers around the world.[10]

The CIA and its Cold War counterparts recognised the importance of third parties in giving cover and credence to their propaganda. Editors and readers would be more likely to accept information from disinterested and preferably reputable sources than they would from openly labelled state propaganda agencies.[11] This is why many propagandists funnelled their information through independent, or at least plausibly independent, third parties in a form of information laundering to remove any stains of official inspiration. At the most basic level, propagandists could slip information to friendly contacts, who could then use it under their own names. On a more sustained basis, propagandists could set up their own newspapers or broadcast stations under false cover, as was the case with the CIA-run

Rome *Daily American* newspaper or Radio Free Europe. But these high-visibility retail news operations were vulnerable to exposure.[12] An attractive alternative could be to set up low-profile media wholesalers who could reach millions of readers through hundreds of independent outlets from a position of comparative anonymity.

Of course, the CIA wasn't the only propagandist with this idea. The British had covertly operated a cluster of news-feature agencies since the Second World War. By the mid-1960s they were funding and running Near and Far East News (NAFEN) in India, Star in Pakistan, Nairobi-based Africa Features and London-based International News Rights and Royalties.[13] The French government openly subsidised Agence France Presse and also operated, de facto, the officially independent Nouvelle Agence de Presse (NPA) in post-independence Africa.[14] The Soviets set up Novosti feature agency in 1961, but it had little credibility outside the communist world.[15] Smaller countries' covert operations added their own spin. These types of agencies had official subsidies and propaganda strategies – and all embraced the tactics of legitimate feature agencies. The result was a market flooded by covert propaganda, cheap news, and subsidised fluff. The situation was acute in post-independence Africa. By 1967 more than a dozen disguised agencies were competing for the attention of a Zambian newspaper, as the editor complained: "We are swamped in apparently innocent material for nothing".[16]

Origins

Forum began in the late 1950s as a giveaway service of another CIA venture, the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). The congress had formed in 1950 as a partnership between anti-communist intellectuals who needed money, and the CIA, which had it.[17] By 1957 the CCF decided to add a London-based feature service to its extensive and expensive high-brow mix of journals, exhibitions, conferences, and concerts.[18] Its Forum Information Service mailed out twice-weekly articles written by CCF associates and freelance journalists as well as reprints from friendly newspapers. And they were often published – in one month in 1960 nearly 200 Forum articles in 12 languages appeared around the world.[19] Forum quickly set up an Indian office and expanded into the regional publishing market to supply nearly 100 newspapers with free articles.[20]

By 1964 things were starting to change. American journalists were becoming less deferential to the CIA and beginning to publish unflattering details about the agency and its operations.[21] The CIA had to expect that its sponsorship of the CCF and by extension of Forum would eventually be exposed. But Forum was a powerful tool. CIA officer Gene Gately had been working with CCF publications and was impressed with

Forum and its potential. He argued that a rebranded Forum could target the undeveloped world and smaller papers in North America and Europe where poor and understaffed newspapers wanted cheap, professional features for the editorial pages.

> This programme should contribute much toward putting Forum Service in a favourable financial position. And, if handled in a proper manner, this aspect of the Service could become self-supporting. The editor, ever pressed to provide that element of quality on his editorial page which will set his publication above the competition, hopefully will learn to depend on our material, and our 'packet' will become an opiate which he cannot refuse. We, on the other hand, must keep in mind that for the programme to succeed we must sell professionalism; therefore, we must be professional, in action and product.[22]

Over the next 12 months Forum was given a new name and a thorough makeover. New York publisher John Hay Whitney became the "notional" benefactor funnelling CIA money through the Delaware shell company that ran Forum World Features, now housed in a high-rent building fronting London's Lincoln's Inn Fields.[23] Forum publicly broke with the CCF and claimed its new mission as a commercial feature service – "independent, without political or national affiliations". Clients could choose from by-lined exclusive "A" service articles or unsigned "B" service pieces; custom jobs were also available.[24] Veteran British journalist Brian Crozier was hired to run it all, on a part-time basis.[25]

The Australian-born Crozier had 20 years of journalism experience and deep connections with the British secret state, especially the propagandists in the covert Information Research Department (IRD).[26] For most of the previous decade, he had worked at the *Economist*, eventually as the editor of its *Foreign Report* confidential newsletter, and as a commentator on the BBC's external services.[27] He began at Forum trying to cut all remaining links with the CCF in a drawn-out struggle. By June 1966 he had won and was answering directly to the CIA.[28]

But Crozier was far from a company man. He had his own ideas about journalism, politics, and propaganda, ideas that became increasingly right-wing during his decade at Forum. His primary loyalty was to his hard-line version of anti-communism, not necessarily the CIA. But he drew on the CIA for money, and on MI6, MI5 and the intelligence agencies of a half dozen other countries for information and inspiration. A key connection was with the IRD, which was cooperative and fully aware of the CIA's role.[29]Throughout this chapter the IRD figures as a major influence on Forum, and as a key archival source of documentary evidence on its operations.

At the IRD itself, teams of polyglot researchers combed the newspapers, journals, books, and broadcasts of Britain's opponents; swapped information with their American counterparts; and picked up tips from private groups, the military, diplomats, and spy agencies. Specialists and "hack journalists" wrote it up in myriad forms.[30] The extra-secretive Special Editorial Unit, sometimes known as the Special Operations Section (SOS), wrote directly for IRD-controlled news-feature agencies and dabbled in forgeries and disinformation aimed at disrupting Britain's enemies.[31] At this time there is no available evidence that the British-controlled agencies or Forum were directly used in any of these disinformation operations.[32] But stories in IRD-controlled agencies such as NAFEN could provide cover for thinly sourced, sanitised intelligence the department wanted to plant in the media. As an IRD official noted, "They do get published however, their weakness not being noticed because they get lost among the mass of other journalistically faultless material. The SOS material, so to speak, is carried on the back of a professional general news service".[33] The specific tactics could be quite convoluted. In one operation to highlight Sino-Soviet tension, the IRD planted intelligence information from Mongolia in a NAFEN dispatch with a Vienna datelined story attributed to a Yugoslav source, which was then picked up by NAFEN's Indian newspaper customers. Next, the IRD repackaged the news, attributed it to the Indian papers, and pitched it to the *New York Times* News Service; that dispatch was published on the front page of *The Times* of London with a Moscow dateline attributing the information to "authoritative sources".[34] Tactics became messy in another case when anti-Soviet IRD information processed through a controlled news agency and legitimate newspaper customers was picked up and amplified by the unwitting Communist Chinese Xinhua news agency; it surely was not the IRD's intention, but they were encouraged by the lucky break.[35] Considering Forum's tight connections with the IRD, it is not unlikely that some of that sort of information made it into Forum stories as well.

Connections with the IRD were vital for Forum's work and its journalists needed to be on good terms with the department, according to Crozier.[36] Crozier also continued working for the IRD, both as a writer and a "cut-out" intermediary to get IRD material into circulation, in addition to his other ventures.[37] The IRD returned the favour and cooperated with the agency, noting that "much of the sort of material we would like is carried in their service".[38] Of course, there was sometimes material the IRD did not like, such as a 1971 analysis of Irish politics that the IRD claimed was riddled with errors and distortions at a delicate time in Northern Ireland. An official called it a "most unhelpful article".[39] A blunt interview in *The Guardian* with an African Maoist guerrilla "would be damaging to our interests" if circulated widely; however, it could be used

to scare the established African leaders about China's intentions if shared privately.[40] The intentions of Forum's messy tactics are not easy to discern. Were they diversionary cover for more conventional critiques in the output? Were they signs of specific disagreement between Crozier and his IRD friends? Or were they just sloppy journalism?

While Crozier himself was out of the office on his own projects, a new, professional staff ran the show. BBC producer John Tusa came in as the new editor but would last less than two years until ideological impurity led Crozier to replace him with South African Cecil Eprile, whom Crozier's CIA contact had recommended. Crozier valued the fact that Eprile was "absolutely loyal" to him.[41] A bigger name was exiled Ceylonese journalist Tarzie Vittachi, who had previously been the Asian representative for the International Press Institute and was plugged in with editors throughout the continent.

Operations and Competition

In its first year, politics and Cold War priorities dominated Forum's output in the exclusive "A" service, but the staff worked their cover with regular pieces on science and medicine, a few sports stories and one feature on the Loch Ness Monster – with a photo, allegedly of the beast. The topics of political stories ranged from the American Civil Rights movement to fears of a right-wing resurgence in Germany, but most focused on Cold War concerns in the Third World. An analysis of the 208 of the "A" service articles available for 1966 showed the following emphases:

- 17 per cent on sub-Saharan Africa,
- 10 per cent on China,
- 7 per cent on India or Ceylon,
- 6 per cent on Vietnam,
- 6 per cent on Indonesia, and
- 6 per cent on the Middle East.[42]

Forum paid its contributors well and attracted top talent. Many of the by-lines were from prominent academics, commentators, and journalists, such as Africa correspondent Russell Warren Howe, Vietnam academic specialist P. J. Honey, and legendary Indian editor N.J. Nanporia. Others were less well-known or seemingly unknown. As the service's changing tactics emphasised more general news, it drew on London-based freelancers such as Elizabeth "Liz" Taylor, who wrote three or four light articles a month, such as "Family Planning Can be Fun" at GBP 25 each. She later wrote, "I was just churning out these features and I could never understand who was buying them!"[43]

The "B" service, also known as Forum Briefings, was designed primarily for background information, but many of the stories had style and length similar to the "A" service stories. None carried a by-line or a dateline, but many were published. An analysis of the 1966 output showed a much higher percentage devoted to politics than the "A" service – nearly 90 per cent of the 111 briefings available had a Cold War or political theme; most of the rest were economic stories plus a handful of scientific briefings.[44] In addition, to the "A" and "B" services, Forum put out regular Facts to File papers and handled custom jobs. For example, the service produced a special supplement for *The Times* on the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, "for which many of the authors were proposed, and material provided, by IRD".[45]

The new Forum had plenty of cash. Crozier mentioned a planned subsidy of USD 100,000 a year, but there always seemed to be more around.[46] Actual income from selling news was derisory but later increased – from GBP 7565 in 1967–1968 to GBP 13,218 in 1969–1970.[47] Expenses were high. Forum paid contributors the competitive London rate of GBP 25 an article, while competitor Gemini paid only GBP 15.[48] The agency spared little expense on promotion and sales. In April 1966 the agency sent Africa correspondent Russell Warren Howe on an 18-country, 63-day, USD 6000 trip around Africa to report stories and recruit clients.[49] The books could never balance. A later investigation cited annual losses of USD 325,000, some of which was covered by CIA front foundations.[50]

In its first year of operation Forum's Cold War goals were clear – political, military, and diplomatic news for the Third World market through the strategic cover of a plausibly independent news-feature agency. But for that strategic cover to work, Forum needed to embrace tactics that were often diversions from its unstated mission of Cold War propaganda. The big-name by-lines, the generous pay, the promotional tours, and the human-interest stories were all necessary tactics that did not necessarily advance Cold War goals but did advance the strategic cover. Other moves were more ambivalent. Tactically allowing client newspapers to publish items meant for background information and calmly accepting their practice of slapping their own by-lines on Forum articles would be a little odd for a truly independent commercial agency, but it served the larger strategic goal of getting important news into circulation.

Forum's quantitative publishing success was clear; however, in 1968, it sent out 521 articles that were published 1104 times. In 1969, the tally rose to 846 articles published 2329 times and in 1970 to 872 articles republished 4242 times. Managing director Iain Hamilton estimated that this was only about half the record, pointing out that some papers never sent cuttings and "our articles are frequently published without acknowledgement to FWF, their headings changed, sometimes by-lined by the paper's

'own correspondent' and sometimes transformed into editorials".[51] From another angle, the service's customer base was broad but thin – Forum served 173 newspapers in 65 countries but usually had only one or two customers in each one of them. India with 22 and Great Britain itself with 25 were the outliers. Worldwide, only 75 of the customers had firm contracts. An additional 59 bought individual stories, and 39 were on a free trial basis and may not have continued.[52]

The new Forum's first big client, at USD 2800 (GBP 1000) a year, was the Australian *Sydney Morning Herald* group, which planned to use Forum to beef up the features section of its *Canberra Times* in competition with Rupert Murdoch's *Australian*.[53] And it did. Forum articles appeared exclusively and regularly, with the count hitting 284 articles in 1969 alone.[54] It is not clear why Forum targeted the paper, but it was a quality broadsheet that reached the professional, administrative, and managerial readers in the capital city at a time when Australian troops were fighting alongside the Americans in Vietnam.[55] Also, it paid well and provided good cover.

Africa was an early but less lucrative priority. By 1967 Forum material was frequently showing up in newspapers in Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone.[56] In Kenya, the *East Africa Standard* had been relying on Forum but by 1968 was shifting increasingly towards Gemini, with an editor calling it "the most useful feature agency". Across town the competing *Nation* group used Forum but thought it was too American and was suspicious of its financing. Ironically, much of the competition in east and central Africa also came from covert services – the IRD's Lion Features and Africa Features, the IRD-supplied Swiss Press Review, and the French NPA.[57] But Forum was the agency that most seemed to bother Gemini editor Derek Ingram, who considered exposing the CIA connection in 1967 in a countertactic to compromise his competitor's strategic cover.[58] That message may have gone out gradually, however, with a British diplomat writing in 1968: "I have pretty well authenticated reports that Gemini salesmen have been going round in Africa warning newspapers of Forum because 'It is an organ of the C.I.A.'".[59] But dislike of Forum went beyond CIA sponsorship, as Gemini's general manager S.A. Wateridge noted:

> Forum has one advantage over Gemini – lots of money which they can afford to chuck away on massive publicity and promotion campaigns. Their material, however, belies their promotional activities and we have found that people usually drop them after a few months; although they seem to be making some headway in the Far East. Unfortunately, however, because of their low standards they do not particularly enhance the name of independent news agencies with the world press.[60]

By 1971, however, Forum was judged to be "out on a limb" with clients in only four countries – Kenya, Malawi, Rhodesia, and South Africa – and by 1973 both Gemini and Forum had "fallen away", leaving the field to the covert British agencies.[61] By 1974 Forum had largely abandoned Black Africa and instead concentrated on South Africa, including selling to the apartheid Nationalist Party's newspaper, *Die Burger*.[62] That probably reflected Crozier's rightward ideological evolution as much as market conditions.

India was another problematic priority where the quantifiable strategic results were impressive, but the tactics were inconsistent. To keep politically valuable clients, Forum used the un-commercial tactic of letting unpaid bills pile up for years. To maintain its commercial cover, the agency bowed to Indian rules on foreign control and sold articles to politically hostile clients who could pay. Forum was able to place hundreds of stories with more than a score of regular customers but found it difficult to get them to pay and, if they did, to access the money. Early on the *Hindustan Standard* was Forum's most reliable Indian customer, printing 192 Forum stories in 1969 alone. The conservative *Indian Express* group published plenty of Forum stories but didn't like paying for them. By 1971 they owed GBP 1250; by 1973 they were GBP 2000 in arrears.[63] But sometimes Forum stories could defy political expectations, as when the service sold a Tarzie Vittachi story on the Indian elections to the legendary pro-communist tabloid *Blitz*.[64] Much of their work in the early 1970s was going through a controlled Indian quasi-subsidiary, Forum World (India). But the passivity of the local manager and a nationwide newsprint shortage led to a falling demand for Forum and left the operation "in a poor state financially" by 1973.[65]

Other Western agencies also had trouble in India. Financial retrenchment had led the IRD to close the Pakistan-based Star agency and transform the widely distributed NAFEN into a more limited venture dubbed Asia Features.[66] Independent operations such as Gemini had troubles in India and Ceylon, where currency exchange controls made it very difficult for the commercial agency to function.[67]

Forum had been popular elsewhere in South Asia. English-language newspapers in Ceylon were blocked from paying Forum but still received and ran articles. The *Ceylon Observer* was "publishing virtually every article that we send them", including a critical Crozier piece on revolutionary gadfly Regis Debray and Latin American Marxism that brought a published counter-blast from a Ceylonese politician.[68] Other newspapers there also had a good opinion of Forum, according to a British diplomat.

> Local editors, moreover, place a much higher value on 'feature' material which they can reprint from reputable international sources than

> on 'militant' material 'written-up' for them. It is perhaps no accident that among the agencies most popular among editors here are the Observer Foreign News Service and World Forum Features [sic].[69]

English-language newspapers elsewhere in Asia were major outlets, especially the *Korea Herald*, which published 84 Forum stories in 1969, and the Tokyo-based *Mainichi Daily News,* which ran 72. Both papers ran a mix of Forum's political, science, economic and general news, as did the *Bangkok Post*, *Vietnam Guardian*, and the *Saigon Post*. Forum articles in these papers jostled with dispatches from the big agencies, as well as stories from Gemini and the major Western newspaper syndicates. In Bangkok, Forum muscled out Gemini when the editor dropped the independent to take the "infinitely superior" Forum service and save USD 80 in the process.[70]

Forum landed a politically important client in the Caribbean when the Jamaican *Gleaner* signed up. *The Gleaner* had been the major newspaper in Jamaica for more than a century and in the 1970s was fiercely opposed to the left-wing policies of Prime Minister Michael Manley.[71] Forum's political articles in *The Gleaner* competed with AP, Reuters, and American newspaper syndicates and tended to bring a centre-right perspective. For example, "Tension over Japanese Air pact with China" analysed problems generated by Japan taking landing rights from Taiwan and giving them to Communist China.[72] Of course, *The Gleaner* also ran plenty of Forum's innocuous stuff, including an off-beat feature about a teenage Kenyan village girl turned faith healer.[73]

Other consistent customers in 1971 included a wide array of papers, such as the Catholic, nationalist *Irish Independent*, the Tanzanian ruling party's *The Nationalist*, the revitalised *Indonesia Raya* edited by legendary journalist Mochtar Lubis, the authoritative Malaysian *Straits Times*; the Kenyan *Sunday Post*, the Philippine *Manila Bulletin*, and the German Nordpress agency.[74] American newspapers were conspicuous by their absence; perhaps because of the rules against CIA operations at home. But, nevertheless, the *Washington Post* and perhaps up to 30 American newspapers carried some of the service's stories.[75] One of the oddest clients for a CIA-sponsored service primarily targeting the Third World was the provincial Yorkshire *Huddersfield Examiner*, which reported publishing 27 Forum articles from February to July 1974.[76] It is unclear what motivated this tactic – did it reflect Crozier's greater interest in domestic British politics, was it a financially useful cover, or was it a channel for onward distribution?

Forum waded into the flooded Latin American market in January 1969 with a Spanish service but found that the competition included two other "probably subsidised" Miami-based agencies staffed by Cuban exiles that

"almost give away their features, mainly on Cuban problems".[77] The output in the Spanish service was prolific by 1972, with more than 350 re-publications in six months; the rate was up to 500 in a six-month period in 1973. But in each year nearly half of those re-publications came in just two Latin American newspapers – the Dominican Republic's *El Caribe* and Mexico's *El Informador* in Guadalajara.[78] Forum also launched a small-scale Chinese service that had just five clients in 1971.[79]

By 1974 the heavy political output of 1966 was gone. About 70 per cent of Forum's output (measured by headlines of stories published by at least three different newspapers over a three-month period) was non-political. Economic, science, and medical stories were still popular and avoided the propaganda tinge.[80] But human-interest stories had grown to be a much bigger part of the mix and some of the consistently most popular stories in Forum's offering. A profile of Kenyan track star Sabina Chebichi, known as the Petticoat Princess, was a big hit with publications in seven countries.[81] A sampling of other big-selling human-interest pieces includes a profile of a British author writing about dirty jokes, an examination of the role of the condom in population control efforts, and a breezy account of the psychology of keepsakes and hoarding.[82]

However, Cold War politics was still there. A sampling of political and social stories from the Tokyo-based, English-language *Mainichi Daily News* covered much of the Third World and generally played it straight, from a Western perspective.[83] But others managed a spin, such as one article linking resistance to caste oppression in India to gains by the radical left.[84] Others had angles that made the Cold War point clear, such as an account of a crackdown on cultural dissent in Poland.[85] And one screed used comparisons with animal experiments to show the brutal impossibility of any utopian society.[86]

The angle of the political stories reflected a rightward tendency that had been growing since at least 1970.[87] In 1971 the *Canberra Times* editor John Allan complained that Forum was pushing a "strongly right-wing political line" at the expense of a disinterested approach to world politics and questioned what Forum was deliberately leaving out.[88] The Australian paper cut sharply back on Forum.[89] Forum and Crozier made Chilean President Salvador Allende a special target and Crozier revelled in his overthrow.[90] And Crozier's fear of subversion extended to his own backyard, as he linked striking British workers to Soviet revolutionary subversion in his Forum article "Reds Now in the Bed".[91] Crozier stepped up his political activities after having launched the militant Institute for the Study of Conflict (ISC) to host seminars and publish books and journals. By the mid-1970s he seemed to endorse royal or army intervention to prevent a Labour government from moving too far to the left.[92]

Closure and Exposure

Forum had passed its first test of plausible cover in 1967 when a flurry of articles in the American press exposed the CIA-CCF connection. There were some private rumblings, a few journalistic probes, but no public mention of the new Forum.[93] Tarzie Vittachi had quit and wrote to his Asian contacts that he had no knowledge of the past CIA connections and left it up to them if they wanted to continue subscribing. Almost all did.[94]

But by the mid-1970s CIA operations were coming under increasingly intense media and political attack in America, culminating in a series of congressional investigations and a barrage of critical press articles and tell-all books, including *The CIA and The Cult of Intelligence*.[95] Their original American edition was expurgated by court order, but the CIA knew that expurgated sections mentioning Forum and Crozier would probably surface in the UK and moved to pre-emptively close the agency, citing financial pressures.[96]

The exposure came in June 1975 in the London entertainment and listings magazine *Time Out*, which at that time had left-wing muckraking journalism as part of its remit.[97] Other press revelations soon came out not only on Forum but also on ISC and some of Crozier's other murky activities, followed by counter-accusations and threats of legal action.[98] At least some of the coverage was "fuelled" by a June 30 burglary at the ISC office in which someone took two dozen files. The IRD backed away from the by-then-radioactive Crozier, gradually cutting off him, his associates and the ISC in 1976.[99]

Despite his bluster about lawsuits and the behind-the-scenes IRD blackball, Crozier came out of the rumpus in good shape and with an even more powerful media, political and intelligence network in several countries. He soon gained the ear of rising Conservative politician Margaret Thatcher and managed an invitation to the White House to meet with President Ronald Reagan in 1985.[100] Ironically, when he wrote his politically indiscreet memoir in 1993, the British government tried, and failed, to stop him.[101]

Conclusion

Agencies such as Forum obviously pumped a great deal of propaganda in the form of features supporting American goals into the global media ecosystem over the years. Some gained strength by recirculation, such as a Crozier IRD paper on the New Left that he condensed into a critical Forum article carried by the *Washington Post* and then picked up by *The Times* of London.[102] Forum flooded some newspaper markets with extensive coverage – the *Canberra Times*, the Jamaican *Gleaner*, the *Hindustan Standard*, the Dominican Republic's *El Caribe*, and the cluster of English-language East Asian newspapers. Other newspapers took Forum in smaller doses.

In both instances, future case studies on not only specific themes but also on these newspapers and their influences could help determine the political impact of Forum propaganda.

Where Forum and its subsidised competitors did make a clear difference was in the market for features and commentary, as this chapter demonstrates. Their diversified selections and comparatively low prices made life difficult for legitimate agency competitors. If they had just peddled propaganda, they would have left open and available a large market for straight news and non-political features. But the strategic need to maintain their disguised functions as legitimate news agencies meant they inevitably and inescapably had to embrace a range of tactics that frequently did not advance their propaganda goals. Agencies such as Forum tactically had to compete in every type of feature – unbiased analyses, insightful profiles and weird fluff, as well as propaganda. These tactics safeguarded the strategic disguise but increasingly blew back on strategy, as agency staff worked their cover and offered more and more non-political articles as the years rolled on. This put agencies like Gemini in a bind.

Newspapers wanted a competitive price on feature services, especially in the Third World, where poverty and foreign exchange controls left little to spend. For political reasons Forum and the others offered a cheap price to sell a strategically diversified package in which was nestled the desired propaganda. This kept the market artificially depressed and difficult for those without the deep pockets of the British and American governments. Forum contributed to the problem, as did an innovative IRD programme that followed the downsizing of its controlled feature agencies. In this programme the IRD gave *The Economist* and *The Observer* reporters material on desired topics, then subsidised free global distribution of the ensuing politically palatable stories to newspapers that otherwise could not pay for them.[103] In this "truncated service" the IRD gave *The Economist* GBP 3625 in 1970 for rights in 30 countries, and *The Observer* GBP 2250 in 1974 for 17 countries.[104] Gemini editor Derek Ingram had competed against CIA subventions in the 1960s and in 1973 complained bitterly against the IRD doing the same.

> …more than once we have been asked by papers, 'Why should we pay for your service when we get the *Observer* service for nothing? …. Naturally, I have found this disappointing since the *Observer* is a business rival. I do not seek special advantage for Gemini, only that it should not find itself at unfair advantage anywhere.[105]

As we have seen in this chapter, the strategy of operating a news service to fulfil official propaganda goals would always lead to tactics that put the unconnected, unsubsidised outsiders at an unfair advantage.

Notes

1 "CIA Makes the News", *Time Out*, 20–26 June 1975; Bernard Nossiter, "CIA Reportedly Set up, Ran UK-Based Features Service", *International Herald Tribune*, 4 July 1975.
2 John M. Crewdson, "The CIA's 3-Decade Effort to Mold the World's Views", *New York Times*, 25 December 1977; John M. Crewdson, "Worldwide Propaganda Network Built by the CIA", *New York Times*, 26 December 1977.
3 John M. Crewdson, "CIA Established Many Links to Journalists in US and Abroad", *New York Times*, 27 December 1977. Of course, any official documentation of any espionage would be the last to be released if it were even written or retained. In 1978, one regular Forum contributor speculated that some of his stories that were never published were intended for CIA consumption alone, such as an account of his accompanying guerrillas into Rhodesia. See Russell Warren Howe, "Asset Unwitting: Covering the World for the CIA", *MORE*, May 1978, 27. Another CIA-run agency, the Continental Press Service, was used not only for propaganda but also for foreign and domestic espionage cover. Steven T. Usdin, *Bureau of Spies: The Secret Connections between Espionage and Journalism in Washington* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2018), 239–60.
4 David P. Hadley, *The Rising Clamor: The American Press, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Cold War* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2019), 97–109,134–57.
5 See, e.g., Carl Bernstein, "The CIA and the Media", *Rolling Stone*, 20 October 1977, https://www.carlbernstein.com/the-cia-and-the-media-rolling-stone-10-20-1977, accessed 20 June 2023.
6 Brian Crozier, *Free Agent: The Unseen War, 1941–1991* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993); John Tusa, *Making a Noise: Getting it Right, Getting it Wrong in Life, Arts and Broadcasting* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2018), 155–58; Howe, "Asset Unwitting".
7 Hugh Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 225–48; Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: The New Press, 1999), 311–12, 406.
8 Oliver Boyd-Barrett, "Media Imperialism: Towards an International Framework for the Analysis of Media Systems", *Mass Communication and Society*, eds. James Curran, Michael Gurevitch and Janet Woollacott (London: Sage Publications, 1977), 116–35; Oliver Boyd-Barrett, "Media and Cultural Imperialism: Genealogy of an Idea", *Media Imperialism: Continuity and Change*, eds. Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Tanner Mirrlees (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020), 11–28.
9 Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Daya Kishan Thussu, *Contra-Flow in Global News: International and Regional News Exchange Mechanisms* (London: John Libbey, 1992), 34–36; Richard Bourne, *News on a Knife-Edge: Gemini Journalism and a Global Agenda* (Luton: University of Luton Press, 1996), 9–36. A philanthropist initially subsidised Gemini; later the *Guardian* newspaper group took it over and accepted the losses as a tax strategy.
10 Oliver Boyd-Barrett, *International News Agencies* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980), 15; Bourne, *News on a Knife-Edge,* 10.
11 This "deflective source model" is fully described in Victoria O'Donnell and Garth S. Jowett, "Propaganda as a Form of Communication", *Propaganda: A Pluralistic Perspective*, ed. Ted J. Smith III (New York: Praeger, 1989), 49–63.

12 Crewdson, "Worldwide Propaganda Network Built by the CIA".
13 Paul Lashmar and James Oliver, *Britain's Secret Propaganda War* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Ltd., 1998), 77–82. The British also subsidised the Beirut-based Regional News Service (Mid-East) to the tune of GBP 200,000 a year but did not use it for covert propaganda. Statement by the Head of IRD to Interdepartmental Review Committee, 19 June 1968, FCO 168/3384, The National Archives of the UK, Public Record Office, hereafter TNA.
14 William Hachten, *Muffled Drums: The News Media in Africa* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1971), 62–63, 97. British diplomats seemed to confirm this in 1977, though they referred to it as INPA. Biggin minute, 11 January 1977, FCO 95/1941. TNA.
15 Theodore Kruglak, *The Two Faces of TASS*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), 219–20.
16 Hall to Ingram, 1 March 1967, GEM/5/1/1/1/21+22, Gemini Collection [hereafter Gemini], Guardian News and Media Archive, London, henceforward GNM.
17 Peter Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe* (New York: Free Press, 1989); Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War.*
18 Lasky to Editors, 23 October 1957, Folder 14, Box 7, Series Va, International Association for Cultural Freedom Archives, University of Chicago Regenstein Library, Chicago, henceforward IACF.
19 Mindlin to Hunt, 6 October 1960, Folder 9, Box 233, Series II, IACF
20 Mindlin to Hunt, 16 August 1963, Folder 5, Box 235, Series II, IACF.
21 Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 95–97.
22 Thoughts on Forum Service (Gately to Hunt and Josselson), 7 December 1964, Folder 3, Box 244, IACF.
23 Crozier, *Free Agent*, 62–76. IACF records corroborate Crozier's memoirs.
24 Forum World Features to Editors, 31 Dec. 1965, Folder 8, Box 10, Series Va, IACF.
25 Crozier, *Free Agent,* 62–76.
26 Brian Crozier, 30 August 1983, FCO 168/6249, TNA.
27 Crozier, *Free Agent,* 20.
28 Crozier, *Free Agent*, 62–76.
29 Denis Greenhill minute, 17 April 1968, FCO 168/3528, TNA.
30 Report on the Inspection of the Information Research Department, 5 October 1967, FCO 77/134, TNA.
31 Samples of the unit's work can be seen in the Special Editorial Unit's Output: April to September 1972, FCO 168/5000, TNA. Also, see, Forgeries: Policy (T.C. Barker memo), 5 October 1972, FCO 168/4813, TNA.
32 The IRD sometimes forged Novosti dispatches, however. Rory Cormac, "British 'Black' Productions: Forgeries, Front Groups, and Propaganda, 1951–1977", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, vol. 24, no. 3 (2022), 21–22.
33 Welser to Crook and Clive, 22 January 1968, FCO 168/3399, TNA.
34 H.P. Kos minute, 10 January 1968; "Soviet Military Build-up in Mongolia" (MPR-29), 8 December 1967; and 'Soviet Troops in Mongolia,' *Times*, 6 January 1968, FCO168/3401. TNA
35 WFS: Non-Aligned Article Usage, 5 July 1978; WFS Usage, 25 September 1978, FCO168/5863, TNA.
36 Crozier to Hunt, 1 October 1965, Folder 8, Box 140, IACF.

37 Brian Crozier, 30 August 1983, FCO 168/6249, TNA.
38 Subsidised Feature Agencies, 14 November 1968, FCO168/3382, TNA.
39 Forum World Features: 2/FWF/1708, FCO 168/4737, TNA.
40 The article, "From China with Love" came with the by-line of Musoa Kazembe, a Forum "interviewer", but Forum did not appear on the by-line. Peck to Greenhill, 10 April 1968, FCO 168/3528, TNA.
41 Crozier, *Free Agent*, 73.
42 The full articles, illustrations and photos are available in Box 526 in the IACF records. The remaining 17 articles from 1966 could not be located.
43 Liz Taylor, *Voices of Scottish Journalists: Recollections by 22 Veteran Scottish Journalists of their Life and Work*, ed. Ian MacDougall, (Edinburgh: John Donald, 2013), 482.
44 Folders 1 and 2, Box 527, IACF.
45 Peck to Greenhill, 10 April 1968, FCO 168/3528, TNA.
46 Crozier, *Free Agent*, 64.
47 Notes on Effectiveness of FWF, 15 June 1971, FCO 168/4662, TNA.
48 Crozier to Hunt, 15 November 1965, Folder 9, Box 140, IACF; Bourne, *News on a Knife Edge*, 14.
49 Howe, "Asset Unwitting".
50 Howe, "Asset Unwitting".
51 Notes on the Effectiveness of FWF, 15 June 1971.
52 Notes on the Effectiveness of FWF, 15 June 1971.
53 Mindlin to Hunt, 21 October 1965, Mindlin File, Box 224, IACF.
54 Notes on the Effectiveness of FWF, 15 June 1971.
55 Jack Waterford, "Canberra Times", *A Companion to Australian Media*, ed. Bridget Griffen-Foley (Sydney: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2015), 81–83.
56 Biggin to Hunt, 23 November 1967, FCO 95/230, TNA.
57 Reiss minute, 19 April 1968, FCO 168/3453, TNA; Round-up of Special Editorial Unit's Output, October 1972 to September 1973 (inclusive), FCO 168/5351, TNA.
58 Ingram to Hall, 8 March 1967, GEM/5/1/1/1/21+22, GMN
59 Reiss minute, 10 October 1968, FCO 168/3382, TNA.
60 Wateridge to Hall, 19 June 1967, GEM/5/1/1/1/21+22, GMN.
61 Biggin to Tucker, 20 September 1971, FCO 95/1224; Africa Features: Annual Report for 1973, 18 January 1974, FCO 168/5480, TNA.
62 Notice of cuttings during March 1974, FCO 168/7044, TNA.
63 Roger Barnett's Far East Sales Trip, May 1971, FCO 168/4662, TNA; For the Record, 28 November 1973, FCO95/1500, TNA.
64 Roger Barnett's Trip, May 1971.
65 For the Record, 28 November 1973, FCO95/1500, TNA.
66 Clive to Peck, 21 June 1968, FCO 168/3384, TNA; Rayner to Wong, 3 May 1971, FCO 168/4615, TNA.
67 Carruthers to Fabian, 3 August 1971, FCO 95/1224, TNA.
68 Roger Barnett's Trip, May 1971; Brian Crozier, "Has Debray Changes his Views on Revolution?" *Ceylon Observer*, 4 January 1971; Vasydeva Nanayakkara, 19 January 1971, "Debray, Che and Revolution", *Ceylon Observer*, FCO 168/4662, TNA.
69 Dutton to Garner, 30 May 1967, FCO 95/4, TNA.
70 Roger Barnett's Trip, May 1971.

71 Jean C. Woolcock, "Framing the Demise of Manley's Government: The Case of 'The Jamaica Daily Gleaner'", MSc, San Jose State, 1997.
72 Frederick Lumley, "Tension over Japanese Air Pact with China", *The Daily Gleaner*, 13 May 1974.
73 Peter Thomas, "Kenya's Remarkable Faith-Healer", *The Sunday Gleaner*, 2 June 1974.
74 Notes on the Effectiveness of FWF, 15 June 1971.
75 Crewdson, "Worldwide Propaganda Network".
76 Notices of cuttings received March, April, May 1974, FCO 168/7044, TNA.
77 Lugris to Eprile, 17 December 1968, FCO 168/3929, TNA.
78 Report on Spanish Service, 17 January 1973, FCO168/5148; Report on Spanish Service, 21 February 1974, FCO 168/7044, TNA.
79 Notes on the Effectiveness of FWF" 15 June 1971.
80 "Dangers of the Plague", *Mainichi Daily News,* 26 April 1974; "Can Metals Cure Cancer?", *Mainichi Daily News,* 5 May 1974; "European Jumbo", *Mainichi Daily News,* 19 May 1974.
81 Notices of cuttings received, FCO 168/7044, TNA.
82 Christine Brown, "The Wit and Humor of Sex", *Mainichi Daily News,* 5 May 1974; Elizabeth Taylor, "Family Planning Can be Fun", *Mainichi Daily News*, 1 June 1974; "Why We Hoard Those Odd Objects", *The Sunday Gleaner*, 17 March 1974.
83 Examples include Bob Neiland, "Refugees from Repression: The 'Exodus' from Haiti", *Mainichi Daily News,* 24 March 1974; Ivan P. Hall, "Seoul Maintains Tight Control on Students", *Mainichi Daily News*, 3 May 1974.
84 Harji Marik, "India's Untouchables: Revolt Could Benefit Radical Left", *Mainichi Daily News*, 18 March 1974.
85 George Schöpflin, "Hard Line in Polish Culture", *Mainichi Daily News,* 20 May 1974.
86 Nicholas Conway, "The Nightmare of Utopia", *Mainichi Daily News*, 10 June 1974.
87 Howe, "Asset Unwitting"; Crozier, *Free Agent*, 92–93.
88 Allan to Crozier, 21 April 1971, FCO 168/4662, TNA.
89 Notices of cuttings received, May, 1974, FCO 168/7044, TNA.
90 Crozier, *Free Agent,* 109–11.
91 "Reds now in the Bed", 1/FWF/2614/ch, Speeches, Writings 1974 (file), Box 5, Crozier Papers, Hoover Institution Library & Archives, Stanford, California.
92 Crozier, *Free Agent,* 121–22.
93 Crozier, *Free Agent,* 75.
94 Howe, "Asset Unwitting".
95 Hadley, *The Rising Clamor,* 134–72.
96 Crozier, *Free Agent,* 113–14.
97 "CIA Makes the News", *Time Out*.
98 Peter Chippindale and Martin Walker, "Only the Views We Want you to Read", *Guardian,* 20 December 1976; "Brian Crozier Replies to Guardian Reports", *Guardian*, 31 December 1976; Crozier, *Free Agent,* 114–19.
99 Brian Crozier, 30 August 1983.
100 Crozier, *Free Agent,* 127–69.
101 Chris Bellamy, "Brian Crozier: Intelligence and Security Expert who Fought Communism and Founded his Own Spy Network, *The Independent*, 12 August 2012.

102 Crozier, *Free Agent*, 85: Brian Crozier, "The New Brotherhood of Violence", *Washington Post*, 9 June 1968.
103 Tucker to Crook, 15 May 1968, FCO 95/422, National Archives UK.
104 Fugelsang (*The Economist*) to Monro, 13 July 1970, FCO95/928, TNA; Observer Foreign News Service Affairs, 17 Jan. 1974, OBS /4/1/1/132, GNM.
105 Ingram to Reddaway, 10 December 1973, FCO 95/1595, TNA. Gemini's benefactor, Oliver Carruthers, had met with IRD in 1971 to consider an arrangement; nothing came of it. See, Possible Assistance to Gemini, 2 August 1971, FCO 95/1224, TNA.

15 Propaganda → Counterinsurgency → Digital

A Brief History of Prediction and the Present

Lee Grieveson

My essay has two parts. The first focuses on the recent history of the tactical use of information and media to shape political and economic realities. It is a history of the present and of the fashioning of a new paradigm of prediction and control in the platform era, allied to the degradation of democracy and the resurgence of ethno-nationalism and fascism. I shall start with examples and descriptive details.[1] In the second part of the essay, I shall sketch some of the genealogical threads that entwine to shape the present and draw some conclusions about the tactical role and use of information and media to control populations. Both parts come from a sustained exploration of the ways media and information are used to facilitate and sustain political and economic strategies and realities. My previous scholarship has focused on the histories of mass media and its uses in the strategies of liberal globalisation and empire.[2] In this essay, though, my focus is on digital media and information principally in the period after 2007, amid the complex breakdown of liberal order and the recrudescence of fascism.[3] Put concisely, I shall argue that a set of novel tactics using information to generate predictive influence and control emerge in this period, using the affordances of the generalisation of the digital in the years after the birth of the Internet. Quite clearly these tactics entwine together with broader shifts in political and economic order after the global financial crash of 2008, and the first part of my essay sketches out the history and political and economic intent of these media tactics. The second part of the essay draws some conclusions about the deep roots of the strategies that have used information control and media to facilitate and sustain the interests of political and economic elites. I shall be interested in discerning the logic of these strategies and the contingent formulation of tactics to facilitate them. In other words, the strategies innovated to use mass media and the control of information to shape reality and broadly to sustain and secure racial and imperial capitalism continue but are joined together now with a set of new tactics that cluster around the predictive possibilities of digital information. My essay sketches out these histories

DOI: 10.4324/9781032618326-18

and genealogical threads, stretching from the growth of propaganda and public relations-oriented activities through to the counterinsurgent control of information and media up to the present. Of interest to what follows then is both the deep continuum of strategies across history, in the epoch of capitalism, and the contingency of media tactics in the present to facilitate and sustain those political and economic strategies of domination and control. I shall start at the pivot point of our present and burrow forwards and backwards.

Prediction Machines

Parts of the present conjuncture pivot around the years 2007–2008. Research efforts to explore the way information spreads online, and what this information reveals about people, began in 2007 as a series of collaborative projects between scholars working in computational social sciences (and the emergent field of "psychometrics"), alongside researchers from the US and UK military and from digital information technology industries. One of the early experiments created an "application" on the newly created Facebook platform that gave users a standardised personality test designed to "measure" five significant components of "personality".[4] Users taking the test could opt in to share scores and their Facebook profiles, enabling researchers to correlate "personality" and profile. Over time this meant that "personality type" could be predicted from the information given by people freely to Facebook. "Private traits and attributes are predictable from digital records of human behavior", the title of a widely cited 2013 paper written collaboratively by researchers in academia and industry, illustrates concisely the results of the experiment.[5] Corresponding research suggested that tabulating what people "like" on Facebook (after the company introduced the feature in 2009 to gather more lucrative data about people) can accurately predict "traits and attributes".[6] In the midst of this research, beginning in 2008, the Minerva Initiative of the US Department of Defense distributed millions of dollars to support social science research exploring the ways data and influence can be used to facilitate "US strategic interests globally".[7] One of the projects aimed to "develop new dynamic statistical network techniques […] that can be leveraged […] to alter the distribution of power […] or stabilize or destabilize communities".[8] In 2011, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began a four-year programme exploring "Social Media in Strategic Communication" as part of an expansive re-tooling of counterinsurgency and psychological operations tactics for the digital era in the endless War on Terror.[9]

In 2012, similarly, the Psychological Operations Group, part of the British military, imported a "Targeted Audience Analysis" methodology

developed by a commercial psychological operations organisation called Strategic Communication Laboratories (SCL) into its practices of "counter-terrorism" and "counter-radicalisation".[10] In 2013, the patented form of "audience analysis" gathering data to produce predictions about "insurgents" was deployed by the UK Defence Science and Technology Laboratory to shape communication and media directed towards young Islamic populations.[11] Collectively, this research and practice shared out across academic, corporate, and military institutions and interests gathered pace after 2007 and the birth of social media platforms and demonstrated that the information people give and leave online could be extracted to reveal "personality" and be used to generate predictions to pre-emptively affect attitudes and conduct. Put concisely, imperial counterinsurgency innovated to control dissident and racialised populations fused with the practices of data extraction and psychometric modelling integral to surveillance and platform capitalism to become routine everyday tactics and practices.[12]

Bear with the details a little longer: in 2007, the commercial psychological operations company SCL was paid by a private US military contractor to develop a "motivation and segmentation profile" of populations in two "lawless" provinces of Yemen.[13] Counterinsurgent control (of a state on the borders of oil-rich Saudi Arabia and the critical Suez Canal shipping route) proceeded through analysis of the country's communication and media system. In turn, SCL deployed its patented Targeted Audience Analysis "unique behavioural methodology" to "identify" which aspects of the "non-desired behaviour" of the population "can best be challenged".[14] In 2011, the company deployed this methodology and these tactics to monitor "unrest" across the Middle East during the "Arab Spring", and in UK missions in Libya and Afghanistan.[15] In 2013, the same company, growing wealthy from lucrative military contracts in the War on Terror, was contracted by the Trinidad Ministry of National Security to find ways of predicting crime and disorder.[16] Mobilising its "Targeted Audience Analysis" methodology, SCL operatives tapped directly into the live feeds of the Internet Service Providers in the country and began correlating this data with social media profiles and offline information such as censuses and credit data to discern "personality". It was a tactic of data rendition where the ghost traces of experience were secretly extracted, to be rendered into algorithms determining personality and producing predictions about people and security. Raw material in the form of private information was stolen, extracted, and mined to be processed into the valuable commodity of prediction. Subsequently these predictions about personality and conduct were built into self-learning algorithms to trigger the automated sharing of messages and media designed specifically to influence people.[17]

I will give one other related example of these new informational and mediated tactics to generate control. In 2016, a spin-off from SCL (financed by a radical libertarian investment banker and built from Facebook data gathered during the experimental psychometric research emerging from 2007) worked directly alongside Facebook and the Republican Party in the US election of that year to gather data to enable prediction and the automated sharing of media designed to *dissuade* Black citizens from voting.[18] In that same year, 2016, similar practices in the British referendum about membership of the European Union mobilised information to build predictive models to "flood the zone" with around 1.5 billion "dark ads" spreading disinformation directed personally at people on Facebook in the last week of the campaign, urging citizens to *Take Back Control* from refugees, migrants, and "globalists".[19] In all these examples, and countless others from around 2007 onwards, information extracted principally from digital media produces predictions about the future interest or conduct of populations that triggers media to marshal influence. Crucially, these populations (stretching from "Yemeni terrorists" and "Trinidadian criminals" to "Young British Muslims" and "Black American citizens") are assumed to lack sovereignty, or the capacity for self-government, and to present problems of security that must be foreclosed by the deployment of information, prediction, and media.

The Prism of Control

Built out of this praxis was a new paradigm of control.[20] It did not begin here, and the longer project from which this essay is drawn, called *The Digital Imperium*, explores the complex deep ties between imperial counterinsurgency securing the capital order and the history of the digital as the orchestration of information control. But certainly this paradigm of control accelerated and intensified, and novel tactics grew to sustain deep strategies of political and economic control. The years 2007 and 2008 constitute a key turning point, after the growth of social media platforms and the research and practice demonstrating their utility for prediction, influence, and control. In the "data rush" that ensued across those two years, Facebook became a "platform";[21] Google spent USD 3.1 billion on purchasing a targeted-advertising company that tracked people's movements across the Internet;[22] and the extraordinarily expansive PRISM project of the US National Security Agency began collecting and analysing "Internet communication" as a component of the global counterinsurgency project (to foster "security" and "control") that expanded after 2001 and the declaration of War on Terror.[23] Also in 2008, Barack Obama's "app" was one of the first integrated into the new Facebook platform, making use of the pools of data in the company's "social graph", and the success of this

sparked the systematic use of the informational, predictive, and influential possibilities of social media by political organisations.[24] It is certainly a long eight years from Obama's success in "the first Facebook election" to "Project Alamo" in 2016 using information and media to disenfranchise Black citizens – or to purposeful efforts to deny reality and degrade democracy, culminating in the insurrection at the US Capitol in January 2021.[25] By that point billions of media texts had been circulated on the Facebook platform alone, using behavioural data and predictive algorithms and designed specifically to mobilise affect broadly about "security" and "control" to re-order political and economic reality.

Obama's election in 2008 coincided with the collapse of the financialised economy in the US, triggering a global economic crisis and the most recent episode of the strategy of "primitive accumulation" of looting, enclosure, and predation ontological to capitalism.[26] Quite clearly, the state bailing out banks and insurance corporations while enforcing austerity on populations was one simple example of the dictates of liberalism overriding that of democracy and a clear-cut illustration of the reality of capital's control of government.[27] In the years since then, in what Wendy Brown has called "the ruins of neo-liberalism", a bloc of radical libertarians began using the new affordances of information and mediation to fashion predictive control. One simple concrete example is the aforementioned spin-off company from the British psychological operations outfit SCL, called Cambridge Analytica, central to "Project Alamo" and the "Brexit" referendum, and financed by a libertarian billionaire hedge-fund CEO waging war against taxation and government. (Robert Mercer had made extraordinary sums of money extracting patterns from data about markets and began using some of that capital to create media and practices of information control.)[28] In the US and UK, the principal agendas for a transatlantic libertarian bloc have been the degradation and "deconstruction" of government broadly to foster "freedom" from regulations on capital. It is this that is the underlying strategy out of which these informational and media tactics emerge.

Often these radical liberals oppose taxation to contribute to the public good, as well as regulations designed to protect shared environments, and espouse positions opposed to the liberal-democratic paradigm that precariously balanced "liberty" with the "equality" essential to democracy and the operations of popular sovereignty. In the US, a radical libertarian praxis grew from the early 1970s in direct opposition to Civil Rights and school desegregation and governmental efforts to facilitate racial equality.[29] Put simply, the libertarians oppose the ideal of equality and its political form of democracy and work to disable government projects to foster egalitarianism (like public schooling or health care) and to "protect capitalism from government".[30] In the aftermath of 2008, and the fracturing

of the economic and political order, a transatlantic bloc of libertarian ethno-nationalists opposed to government, equality, and (often incoherently) globalisation seized some of the means of informational and mediated control to degrade democracy and shape new political and economic realities. In 2016, after "Project Alamo" and "Brexit", the parameters of these tactics of informational and mediated control became clearer, and in the years since then journalists, government commissioners, scholars, and filmmakers have explored the myriad ways "bot networks", "astroturfing", microtargeting, *dis*information, and more, were wielded by blocs of elites to fracture and re-order reality. My essay contributes to the exploration of these tactics as they accelerated from 2007. Scratch the surface of these developments though and there is revealed a deeper history and strategy of the battering of the idea and practice of government and the use of capital translated into control of media and information to foster the deregulation of capital in the name of liberty and freedom. Part two of my essay explores some of that deeper history.

Back closer to the present now though. It became clear after the caesura of 2016 that the Russian state had also marshalled information and media to shape political reality.[31] Once again these developments pivot around 2007–2008, in the wake of the expropriation of the global financial crisis, when Russia trialled cyberwar in Estonia and the Russian President Vladimir Putin rewrote the democratic constitution created after the collapse of the Soviet Union to inaugurate what was called a "sovereign democracy".[32] The term was invented by an influential "political technologist" to orchestrate the breakdown of democracy and the fashioning of a new autocratic state system.[33] In the wake of fraudulent elections in Russia in 2011 and 2012, political technologists fashioned media tactics to overwrite reality and degrade democracy to sustain oligarchic and kleptocratic control of government. In 2014, this praxis was unleashed in Ukraine, when Russia invaded a state on the verge of joining the European Union and practised "cyberwar" to degrade reality and confuse and disorient dissident opposition.[34] From 2014, and ongoing, the Russian state began hacking and leaking information and infiltrating social media in Europe and the US with the aim of identifying and augmenting division. Using fake accounts (about 60 million of them on Facebook) and automated bot networks (about 50,000 on Twitter), Russian digital operatives mobilised behavioural data to circulate media orchestrated to amplify enmity, fracture reality, and degrade the possibility of democracy.[35] Often the media circulated using this information sought to intensify racist affect and purposefully destroy social links other than that of enmity. Oddly the Russian state's strategy (to liquidate government and degrade democracy and create and amplify division) collided with those of libertarians, and both groups mobilised similar tactics of information and media control to realise these goals.

Reality is now often "astroturfed", jumbled together with fictions and "alternative facts" masquerading as real, and marshalled by wealthy elites, oligarchs, rogue states, and/or commercial oligopolies profiting from the circulation and "virality" of information. In the process, counterinsurgency and the psychological operations innovated mostly to sustain empire and control racialised populations have become markets and everyday practices. Overall, the new digital media sphere that emerged, after the US military-created Internet was privatised in the mid-1990s, presented new opportunities and created new markets for the orchestration of information and influence beyond the control of established editorial gatekeepers, which accelerated from 2007 in some of the ways sketched thus far. It marked a rupture that generated new tactics for the core strategy of the manufacturing of reality and consent to facilitate and sustain the political and economic interests of elites. One information/media order (broadly that of corporate liberal mass media) began to unravel, while another emerged (let us call it here for the moment digital libertarianism), and this transition catalysed with the rupture of the globalised financialised economy and the crumbling of the liberal world system. Russia's mediatised war in Ukraine, Europe, and the US is one concrete example of this fracturing of global liberal order. In the wake of these events of political, economic, and media transition, to reiterate, blocs of elites broadly (if often incoherently) opposed to "liberal democracy" and "liberal globalisation" have tactically marshalled capital, information, and media to mobilise populations and to control political and economic reality.

Info-Wars and Fascism

It is now well-known that a virulent racial nationalism grew out of this perfect storm of economic, political, and information/media breakdown. It did not begin here, of course, given the centrality of racialisation (of slavery, imperialism, of violent accumulation by dispossession) to the deep history of capitalism and the Atlantic world;[36] but it intensified and grew newly visible. Online at first, on message boards and radical right-wing websites, growing from algorithmic aggregation, this violent racial nationalism metastasised after 2008 and spilled over into reality and policy.[37] Groups of elites from two of the countries made wealthy by the long histories of slavery and imperialism, tied together by the deep histories of commerce across the Black Atlantic integral to the birth and expansion of capitalism, called for the building of new border walls and the creation of "hostile environments" to oppose and degrade refugees and migrants fleeing war and economic and climate disaster. The "borderisation" of the Global North accelerated after 2014, in response to migrant and refugee movement from spaces of war and climate breakdown, prompting

European states to extend their borders into Africa and mobilise novel digital technologies of surveillant control.[38]

During the early months of 2016, amid the "crisis" of population movement, the PR slogan "Take Back Control" was extensively tested on British populations by psychological/information operatives, using the psychometric profiling innovated in 2007.[39] It was chosen because it made people angry that "control" had been taken away from them. Or, put another way, because it generated enmity. It bore little relation to historical reality (as Britain had in the early 1970s voluntarily joined the trading union of European states formed in 1955 to try to forestall the reemergence of European fascism in order to replace the loss of empire markets); but the deliberate creation of political fictions like this replaced reality with spectacle and feeling.[40] By the summer of 2016, the circulation of billions of media texts in the UK, targeted using behavioural information, was purposefully designed by libertarians with close ties to hedge funds and transatlantic libertarian networks to generate enmity, anger, and division. It was a psychological operation seeking to divide a population, drawing on the longer history of imperial counterinsurgency to control racialised populations which was reanimated, retooled, and turned into a market in the digital revolution amid the War on Terror and the turn to sovereign democracy.[41]

Our present pivots around 2007 and 2008, then, and in the years since the Hobbesian "war of all against all" fostering enmity has accelerated because it is now built into the architecture and commercial practices of the globe-spanning media and communication corporations that profit from converting social life into information as prediction to generate capital. Our social worlds are converted into the commodity of information and prediction as the data-commons are enclosed, generating extraordinary profits for information and media corporations. Once again, as it did most recently after the last collapse of the capitalist system earlier in the twentieth century, the unstable balance of liberalism and democracy collapses, and in the face of the intertwined breakdown of political, economic, environmental, and media orders, *fascism* metastases. Again, it grows out of "capitalism" and out of "liberal democracies", because (as Marx, Hannah Arendt, Franz Fanon, C.B. Macpherson among others have taught us) capitalism and its political formations as liberalism exceed democracy and produce the imperialism of accumulation by dispossession that necessitates violence, racialisation, and immiseration.[42] Plus, too, the degradation of reality, what Arendt called "the *strategic* destruction of reason", that is now being accelerated by libertarian fascists, making use of the affordances of the digital embodied in platforms controlling information and affect to disable the "distinction between facts and fiction" and generate enmity.[43] Our present "exit from democracy" comes to resemble the past,

then, of the generalisation of terror and control essential and integral to the long histories of racialised capitalism that spawned a new praxis and novel tactics of informational and affective control, of counterinsurgency and psychological operations, of datafication and psychometrics, which gets built into the operating systems of the digital world.

The Strategic Continuum

Up to now, in the first part of my essay, the focus has been on the period since 2007. I shall now sketch out four concluding points that seek to sketch out the histories that shape the prediction and media machines of our present and draw some broad conclusions about the continuity of strategies and the contingent tactical uses of information and media to shape political and economic realities.

A first concluding point: the affordances of the predictive praxis gathering pace from 2007 rely on deep histories of informational control. The history can be unravelled backwards. Obviously, this praxis required the building of the Internet, carried out by the US military in the 1960s principally to counterinsurgent opposition to the US empire.[44] It required also the building of the digital computer itself, also principally by the US military, in the 1940s in the midst of war and the fashioning of a military-industrial complex creating technologies of informational control.[45] However, the history can be spun further backwards. One key development was the census technology innovated in 1890 that digitised information about populations in the form of machine-readable punch-cards, as a component of the biopolitical management of populations.[46] Yet the orchestration of calculation, probability, and prediction stretches even further back to the birth of the capitalist world system in early modern Europe, and the innovation of new mechanisms to calculate risk and probability that shaped the creation of new forms of financial capital, and deep and constitutive ties between state and capital.[47] One simple example is the fact that insuring ships and the people stolen from Africa to work on plantations in the Americas required new mechanisms of information control and prediction.[48] These predictive rationalities intertwined with the emergence of a global capitalist system predicated on racialisation and inequality. Put simply, there is a deep continuum of strategies and tactics to realise them that stretches across the histories of racialised capitalism and is enacted in contingent ways at moments across that history. I have focused on the period from 2007 to 2021, but the deep logics shaping our present stretch back to the capitalist praxis emerging in Italian city states in the fourteenth century and the voyages of "discovery" and accumulation by dispossession beginning around 1492.[49]

Now on to the second concluding point. The digital and its long prehistory in the calculative rationalities of capitalism centre on informational

control. Key to this is a praxis of prediction. One core root of this praxis is found in the histories of counterinsurgency sketched in part above. Strategic Communication Laboratories and its "influence operations" and "behaviour change programmes" is one example of that history. SCL operated across the globe (it held lucrative contracts in Afghanistan, Ukraine, and Yemen, for example) and it grew out of traditions of British counterinsurgency that were innovated principally in the post-Second World War period to maintain empire. Both the British and the Americans developed forms of counterinsurgency that required informational control to generate predictions and influence. The efforts to counterinsurgent resistance to empire needed information and media and developed tactics to police and control populations, which were in turn reborn as markets that grew in the years after the US military-created Internet was privatised in 1994. One simple example of this praxis is instructive. In 1964, fearful of the possibility that Chilean democratically elected politicians would nationalise resources, the US Army developed what was called Project Camelot, to build a computer that would be loaded with information about the Chilean population to predict when disorder might emerge.[50] Project Camelot preceded the coup orchestrated by the US in 1973 that overthrew a democratically elected socialist and installed a brutal military general who orchestrated the mass killing of leftist opponents. Often this event is taken as the birthplace of neoliberalism, and it begins with the predictive rationalities of the digital and the fascist degradation of democracy.

The third concluding point returns though firstly to thinking about media. Broadly, the tactics explored here combine information-generating prediction with media-generating influence. I take these dynamics to be key to the understanding of media tactics essential to the chapters gathered together in this book. One is about informational control and prediction. The other is about mediatisation and influence. Take the example of SCL and Cambridge Analytica's work in Trinidad: it proceeded in gathering information, generating predictions that triggered the deployment of media to foster influence and consent. I have been interested in the history of media influence before, and in the examples I know best from the imperial hegemons of the US and UK, this gathers pace from the First World War amid the twinned birth of propaganda and public relations, triggering efforts to understand and enact the "manufacturing of consent".[51] The famous line comes from probably the most significant liberal theorist of the function of mass media, Walter Lippmann, and his 1922 book *Public Opinion*. In it, Lippmann argues for the construction of a mediated reality to bypass the messy complexities of democracy. In 2005, Strategic Communication Laboratories took this injunction seriously when they trialled and displayed a media praxis that could literally overwrite reality for populations.[52] It took place at the Defence and Security Equipment International arms fair in

London, and it worked like this: the company controlled an "Operations Centre" that could monitor media in particular territories and override them to present a different reality. On the company's now-shuttered website, its "Ops Centres" were advertised to clients needing "media capture and analysis […] Target audience issue analysis […] Radio production […] TV production […] and message development". Reality is something to be mediated to secure the interests of those paying for the mediation. Russians would recognise this practice well. It seems to me that this shaping and re-shaping of reality to generate influence is fundamental to the control and use of information and media. It is in this context that censorship and propaganda emerge and out of which the affordances of the digital enable the remediation of reality.

On to my final point, which zooms out to think about the deep structures and strategies that underpin and shape the tactical deployments of information and media. I think here we need to broaden our horizons to try to understand the structures that shape the intertwined histories of capital and the state. It is necessary to recognise that capitalism produces racialisation and division and requires the degradation of the gains and possibilities of democracy. I cannot fully explicate that argument here and instead I return to a couple of simple historical examples. One is the example of the US that grew from the genocide of indigenous populations into what Achille Mbembe provocatively describes as a "slave holding democracy".[53] It is from these contexts that "America's long war" to uphold the fictional hierarchy of race unfolds and continually pollutes the present.[54] (Indeed one could say that one function of media from the eighteenth century onwards has been to uphold these fictional realities. It is one of the reasons for the ferocious libertarian/radical right attack on media and the teaching of history.) Or take the example of Britain as both a "liberal democracy" *and* a violent imperial state "taking control" from indigenous populations to generate capital. Both are reminders that liberalism as the political armature of capital consorts readily with fascist violence to secure capital. Chile is another example of that reality. It is a deep continuum because slavery and imperialism are fascism and because fascism is "structurally embedded in the functional mechanisms of capitalist accumulation" that reproduce accumulation by dispossession over and over again.[55] I have taken this to be a core strategy from which differing tactics across the control of information and media have evolved. It generates a deep continuum across the history of racial capitalism. Recently, the tactics of informational and mediated control have shifted and penetrated further into social life. The year 2008 is a key pivot point in that history. In the wake of this twinned breakdown of economic and media orders, in 2016, radical libertarian ethno-nationalists financed Donald Trump to become President of the US. In 2021, after losing a democratic election, the former

reality television star denied reality and took to social media to amass supporters to overthrow democracy. Donald's Tweet set off a chain reaction in the digital echo-chambers of radical liberals, white supremacists, and militias, who stormed the Capital Building to disrupt the transfer of power. One image widely circulated on social media showed a man carrying a Confederate flag through the building in a remarkable condensation of the deep history of racial violence integral to the histories of capitalism and the foundation of the US that again irrupts into and stains our present.

Notes

1 The first part of this essay is drawn from Lee Grieveson, "Prediction Machines", *Critical Quarterly*, vol. 64, no. 2 (2022).
2 Lee Grieveson, *Cinema and the Wealth of Nations: Media, Capital, and the Liberal World System* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2018); Lee Grieveson and Colin MacCabe, eds., *Empire and Film* (London: British Institute, 2011); Grieveson and MacCabe, eds., *Film and the End of Empire* (London: British Film Institute, 2011); and Haidee Wasson and Lee Grieveson, eds., *Cinema's Military Industrial Complex* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2018).
3 On this recrudescence, see Enzo Traverso, *The New Faces of Fascism: Populism and the Far Right*, trans. David Broder (London: Verso, 2019); Wendy Brown, *In the Ruins of Neoliberalism: The Rise of Antidemocratic Politics in the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019); Maurizio Lazzarato, *Capital Hates Everyone: Fascism or Revolution*, trans. Robert Hurley (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2021).
4 See https://www.psychometrics.cam.ac.uk/productsservices/mypersonality (accessed 28 November 2019).
5 Michael Kosinski, David Stillwell, and Thore Graepel, "Private Traits and Attributes are Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior", *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, vol. 110, no. 15 (2013).
6 Wu Youyou, Michael Kosinski, and David Stillwell, "Computer-Based Personality Judgements are more Accurate than those Made by Humans", *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, vol. 112, no. 4 (2015).
7 US Army Combat Capabilities Development Command, Army Research Laboratory, Broad Agency Announcement, No. W911NF-08-R-0007, 2008, available here http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/newsfiles/MinervaRFP.pdf (accessed 13 December 2020).
8 Minerva Initiative, "Program History & Overview", US Department of Defense, 2015, http://miNerva.dtic.mil, cited in John Cheney-Lippold, *We Are Data: Algorithms and the Making of Our Digital Selves* (New York: New York University, 2017), 263.
9 Rand Waltzman, "The Story Behind the DARPA Social Media in Strategic Communication (SMISC) Program", Information Professionals Association blog post, 28 June 2017, currently available here https://information-professionals.org/the-darpa-social-media-in-strategic-communication-smisc-program/ (accessed 22 November 2019).

10 See email, redacted, dated 11 January 2012 from the UK Ministry of Defence, included in the documents released by Christopher Wylie to the Department of Media, Culture, and Sport "disinformation" committee, available here https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/culture-media-and-sport/Chris%20Wylie%20Background%20papers.pdf (accessed 6 November 2019); and Lee Richards, "The Rainbow in the Dark: Assessing a Century of British Military Information Operations", *Defence Strategic Communications: The Official Journal of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence*, vol. 1, no. 1 (Winter 2015), in particular 42–43.

11 See the redacted version of the Defence Science and Technology Lab's evaluation of Project Duco here: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/389795/response/975478/attach/3/FOI%202017%2003434%2020170508%20Rpt.pdf (accessed 4 December 2023). See also Open source investigations, "Cambridge Analytica and the Government next to you" (accessed 4 November 2019), https://www.opensourceinvestigations.com/conspiracy/cambridge-analytica-government-next/

12 On histories of counterinsurgency, see Joseph MacKay, *The Counterinsurgent Imagination: A New Intellectual History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023); and Stuart Schrader, *Badges Without Borders: How Global Counterinsurgency Transformed American Policing* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2019). On surveillance and platform capitalism, see John Bellamy Foster and Robert W. McChesney, "Surveillance Capitalism: Monopoly-Finance Capital, the Military Industrial Complex, and the Digital Age", *Monthly Review*, vol. 66, no 3 (July–August 2014); Shoshana Zuboff, *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power* (London: Profile Books, 2019); and Nick Srnicek, *Platform Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity, 2017).

13 SCL, "Project Titania", Phase I: Motivation and Segmentation Profile, no date (probably 2007), and "Project Titania", Phase II: Research Plan, no date (probably 2007). Both these reports have been leaked online and are available here: https://www.scribd.com/document/380435224/SCL-Cambridge-Analytica-Project-Titania-Plan-for-Yemen-Part-Two, and here https://www.scribd.com/document/380434279/SCL-Cambridge-Analytica-Project-Titania-Yemen-Plan#from_embed (accessed 1 November 2019). See also Max Blumenthal, "Exclusive: Leaked Docs Expose Yemen-Based Counter-Insurgency Program by Cambridge Analytica Parent Company SCL", *The Grayzone*, 23 May 2018.

14 SCL, "Project Titania", Phase I: Motivation and Segmentation Profile, 6, 2.

15 Blumenthal, "Internal Cambridge Analytica Documents". See also Barret Brown, "Romas/COIN and HBGary", Project PM, June 2011, available here: https://freebarrettbrown.org/project-pm/#romas-coin-and-hbgary (accessed 1 November 2019). On SCL's work in Libya and Afghanistan, see: Email, redacted, dated 11 January 2012, from the UK Ministry of Defence, available here https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/culture-media-and-sport/Chris%20Wylie%20Background%20papers.pdf (accessed 6 November 2019).

16 Christopher Wylie, *Mindf*ck: Inside Cambridge Analytica's Plot to Break the World* (London: Profile, 2019), 52–55.

17 House of Commons, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, "Disinformation and 'Fake News': Final Report", Eight Report of Session 2017–2019, HC1791, 18 February 2019 (accessed 29 March 2019), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/179102.htm, 45–56.

18 Joshua Green and Sasha Issenberg, "Inside the Trump Bunker, With Days to Go", *Bloomberg*, 27 October 2016. See also *The Great Hack* (dirs. Kari Amer and Jehane Noujaim, USA, 2019). Of course, these efforts were tied together with a whole host of practices – from redistricting to ID cards to purging electoral rolls – designed to strip Black citizens in particular of their democratic rights. The building of these predictive models speeded up over the summer of 2014. In that year a psychological/data researcher affiliated with the University of Cambridge created a company called Global Science Research Limited (GSR) to develop an app that allowed people to take an online psychological test and GSR to correlate that data with their Facebook profiles. It was a commercial spin-off from the psychometric experiments in 2007. Only around 320,000 took the test but the app and Facebook were designed to enable GSR to access the Facebook data of the "friends" of those people, meaning that somewhere in the range of 50–87 million Facebook accounts had their data scraped in the summer of 2014 to be built into predictive models to shape political realities. Official accounts of how this process worked, drawn on here, include: Information Commissioner's Office, *Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns*, London, November 2018, in particular 28–35; Federal Trade Commission, *In the Matter of Cambridge Analytica, LLC, a Corporation: Opinion of the Commission*, n.d. (2019), in particular 4–8, available here https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/d09389_comm_final_opinionpublic.pdf (accessed 17 December 2019); and House of Commons, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, "Disinformation and 'Fake News': Interim Report", July 2018, 26–31, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/363/363.pdf (accessed 17 December 2019).

19 Dominic Cummings, the campaign director of the Vote Leave campaign in Britain, stated that the campaign circulated around 1.5 billion ads in the final weeks of the campaign. See Cummings, "Why Leave Won the Referendum", available here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CDbRxH9Kiy4 (accessed 2 February 2021). And his blog on the referendum here: https://dominiccummings.com/on-the-eu-referendum/ (accessed 29 October 2019).

20 Giles Deleuze has generatively proposed that the computer exemplified a new "control society" that marked the shift from one governmental paradigm (of sovereignty and discipline) to another (of control) tied together with "the progressive and dispersed installation of a new system of domination". Giles Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control", *October*, vol. 59 (Winter, 1992), 7. See also Seb Franklin, *Control: Digitality as Cultural Logic* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2015).

21 "f8 Event and Facebook Platform FAQ", 2007, included in the legal documents *Six4Three v. Facebook*, Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Mateo, Case No CIV 533328, 10 April 2015, that were made available by the British parliament. Available here https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/culture-media-and-sport/Note-by-Chair-and-selected-documents-ordered-from-Six4Three.pdf (accessed 19 December 2019). Platforms such as Facebook are digital infrastructures that afford programmability by offering third-party developers access to platform data and functionalities to build new platform integration and extensions such as apps.

22 Louise Story and Miguel Helft, "Google Buys DoubleClick for $3.1 Billion", *The New York Times*, 14 April 2007.

23 PRISM was the code name for a programme under which the US National Security Agency collected digital communications routed through companies,

including Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Apple. See Glen Greenwald, *No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the Surveillance State* (New York: Macmillan, 2015). In the wake of the 2001 Patriot Act and 2002 Homeland Security Act, the NSA had authority to examine each packet of data that passed through the US Internet. Also, after 2001 global surveillance networks run in particular by the CIA (as well as the Department of Homeland Security) began to connect to domestic surveillance networks controlled by the FBI. See Tung-Hui Hu, *A Prehistory of the Cloud* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), 113.

24 *Six4Three v. Facebook*, 29.

25 Final Report, "Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol", 22 December 2022, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-J6-REPORT/html-submitted/index.html (accessed 25 July 2023).

26 Put concisely, Karl Marx argued that "primitive accumulation" in the form of wars of conquest, predation, and enclosure beginning from the late fifteenth century onwards were the crucial motors in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy* (London: Penguin, 1990), 873–942. Marx tended to regard this as the preconditions of capital, destined to be reconfigured over time, but subsequent scholars influenced by Marx have understood it as a cyclical and permanent feature of expropriation. It is not "primitive", i.e., but always also contemporary. See Rosa Luxembourg, *The Accumulation of Capital* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951); David Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Éric Alliez and Maurizio Lazzarato, *Wars and Capital*, trans. Ames Hodges (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2016), 45–82. The financial crash of 2007–2009 facilitated the transfer of public wealth into the coffers of financial and insurance entities, governed by liberal states protecting capital. It became an extraordinary act of "accumulation by dispossession", to borrow Harvey's reformulation of Marx.

27 In 2008, the US Treasury Secretary making the decision to bail out investment banks like Goldman Sachs was formerly CEO of Goldman Sachs. One hardly needed the Marxist theory of state capture to explicate this reality.

28 Robert Mercer and his daughter Rebekah also funded libertarian conspiracy films; the Breitbart far-right news site; and recently too the "Parler Free Speech Social Network" which offers a space for libertarian and far-right conspiracy theorising. On Mercer, see Carole Cadwalladr, "Robert Mercer: The Big Data Billionaire Waging War on Mainstream Media", *The Observer*, 26 February 2017; Joshua Green, *Devil's Bargain: Steve Bannon, Donald Trump, and The Storming of the Presidency* (New York: Penguin, 2017), 119–36; and Lee Grieveson, "Dark Money Documentaries", *The Oxford Handbook of American Film History*, ed. Jon Lewis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2025).

29 See Nancy MacLean, *Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right's Stealth Plan for America* (New York: Viking, 2017); Quinn Slobodian, "Anti-'68ers and the Racist-Libertarian Alliance: How a Schism among Austrian School Neoliberals Helped Spawn the Alt Right", *Cultural Politics*, vol. 15, no. 3 (November 2019), 372–386; and Brian Doherty, *Radicals for Capitalism: A Freewheeling History of the Modern American Libertarian Movement* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 339–387.

30 Dwight R. Lee, "*The Calculus of Consent* and the Constitution of Capitalism", *Cato Journal,* vol. 7 (Fall 1987), cited in MacLean, *Democracy in Chains*, 81.

31 "Russian targeting of election infrastructure during the 2016 election: summary of initial findings and recommendations", US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 8 May 2018, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/russia-inquiry (accessed 9 August 2018); *Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, On Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election*, 5 volumes, 2020, available here https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/report-select-committee-intelligence-united-states-senate-russian-active-measures (accessed 19 October 2020); "Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament: Russia" (London: House of Commons, July 2020), available here, http://isc.independent.gov.uk/news-archive (accessed 2 February 2021).
32 Timothy Snyder, *The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America* (London: Vintage, 2018), 81–109. On the Russian cyber offensive in Estonia in 2007, see Peter Pomerantsev, *This Is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War Against Reality* (London: Faber and Faber, 2019), 86–88.
33 On Vladislav Surkov and this history, see Peter Pomerantsev, "Putin's Rasputin", *London Review of Books*, vol. 33, no. 20 (20 October 2011).
34 Snyder, *The Road to Unfreedom*, 51–57 and 73–78. Ukraine was negotiating an association agreement with the EU in 2013. Pomerantsev notes that the Russian state began infiltrating pro-democracy movements in Europe from around 2012. Pomerantsev, *This Is Not Propaganda*, 89–90.
35 See the five-volume *Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, On Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election*. I take these figures from Snyder's account, *The Road to Unfreedom*, 228–35. In March 2016, elements of the Russian security services and military hacked into the servers of the Democratic party in the US and seeded the information into the public sphere. See *Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, On Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, 170–221.
36 On the deep histories of racialised capitalism, see Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944); Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London: Verso, 2018); Cedric Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
37 This history is well told by Angela Nagle in her book *Kill All Normies: Online Culture Wars from 4Chan and Tumblr to Trump and the Alt-Right* (Winchester: Zero Books, 2017). Nagle emphasises also the toxic misogyny of this culture, growing in particular around the "gamergate" scandal from 2014.
38 Mbembe, *Necropolitics*, 96–104.
39 Wylie, *Mindf*ck*, 157–61, 166–70.
40 On the function of the EU in this respect, see Quinn Slobodian, *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018). On the growth of "feeling" in contradistinction to expertise and reason, see William Davies, *Nervous States: How Feeling Took Over the World* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2018).
41 It bears emphasising that many of the people in Britain who voted to leave the European Union had good reasons to do so, broadly as a rejection of the reigning political classes, and of the general order of things under neoliberalism and its global re-ordering of the political economy which produced poverty and immiseration for many people in the former industrial centres of Britain.

See here Perry Anderson, "Ukania Perpetua?", *New Left Review*, 125 (Sept–Oct. 2020). Once again, the impact of 2008 and the austerity that followed is a significant factor in explaining "Brexit". Anderson quotes a study of the data of the referendum that concludes: "Remain would probably have won in the absence of austerity". Nicholas Crafts, "The Fall in UK Potential Advantage in the Global Economy", Working Paper no. 399, January 2019, cited in Anderson, 93.

42 Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (London: Penguin, 2017); Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967); C.B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).

43 Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. My emphasis.

44 Yasha Levine, *Surveillance Valley: The Secret Military History of the Internet* (New York: Public Affairs, 2018), 139–84.

45 See Paul Edwards, *The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997).

46 Beniger, *The Control Revolution*, 399–401, 411–22; Lars Heide, *Punched-Card Systems and the Early Information Explosion, 1880–1945* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2009), 15–37.

47 Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times* (London: Verso, 1994); Ian Hacking, *The Emergence of Probability* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Alliez and Lazzarato, *Wars and Capital*; Steve Marks, *The Information Nexus: Global Capitalism from the Renaissance to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Liam Campling and Alejandro Colas, *Capitalism and the Sea: The Maritime Factor in the Making of the Modern World* (London: Verso, 2021).

48 Francois Ewald, "Insurance and Risk", *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, eds. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (London: Harvest Wheatsheaf, 1991); Jonathan Levy, *Franks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capital and Risk in America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 29–37.

49 Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century*, in particular 86–130.

50 Irving Louis Horowitz ed., *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967).

51 Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Free Press, 1997).

52 Sharon Weinberger, "You Can't Handle the Truth: Psy-ops propaganda goes mainstream", *Slate*, 19 September 2005.

53 Mbembe, *Necropolitics*, 17.

54 Nikhil Pal Singh, *Race and America's Long War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017).

55 Lazzarato, *Capital Hates Everyone*, 62; Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.

Afterword

Towards a Tactical Turn?

Marie Cronqvist, Fredrik Mohammadi Norén and Emil Stjernholm

In this book, we argue for what can be called a tactical turn in media and communication studies, one which is informed by historical perspectives. The chapters of the volume constitute a broad variety of empirical cases. Together, they point to the value of looking back on the long twentieth century when reflecting on media strategies and tactics as well as the transnational entanglements, media institutions, and communication infrastructures of today. Working with the theme of the book, it has become clear to us that in contemporary media research, strategies are undeniably prioritised over tactics. In contrast, our media historical intervention contributes with new knowledge about the often quite messy, practical implementation of strategies.

We aim to contribute to existing knowledge in three ways. First, we foreground tactics as a study object in itself, not just the effects or outcomes of strategic thinking. Second, we counter the presentism of contemporary studies by adding what we argue is a necessary historical perspective. And third, by theoretically disentangling the concept of strategy from an abstract, contemporary buzzword to concrete, hands-on actions, some of the many complexities of operational media strategies and media tactics can be revealed. As media and communication scholar James Curran put it in his much-cited *Media and Power*: "A historical perspective provides a critical distance which can make apparent and clarify things that seem blurred when only viewed in a contemporary context."[1] It is our hope that *Media Tactics in the Long Twentieth Century* does exactly this and can be used as a point of departure when contemplating and critically dissecting pressing issues of today.

The three thematic sections – entanglements, institutions, and infrastructures – have helped structure this book, but in this afterword, we also want to highlight some of the transversal or cross-cutting themes that have appeared in our joint discussions. One such theme is that the study of media tactics raises methodological questions. While historical documents that shine light on strategies have a tendency to linger in the archives and be made visible

DOI: 10.4324/9781032618326-19

in the form of steering documents, official memorandums, overviews, and plans, media tactics have an obvious ephemeral dimension. Associated with the implementation of said strategies, tactics are often part of day-to-day and off-the-cuff everyday decisions. As such, some tactical considerations, such as improvisations on the ground, will inevitably remain invisible, as they are neither documented nor preserved for posterity. Other tactical considerations, however, are indeed possible to trace, as this book evidences. For instance, tactics can be foregrounded by studying traces of when strategies go awry, by comparing strategic documents with actual outcomes in terms of media content, and by mapping how strategies are resisted from below, to take but a few examples. In this sense, the historical method allows the authors to nuance seemingly stable theoretical concepts like propaganda, public diplomacy, and public information by studying contrasting definitions and associated practices over time and in various contexts.

Another cross-cutting theme that can be noted throughout this book is the diversity in how chapters operationalise the concept of tactics, combining it with different scholarly traditions. While some contributions draw on the classic military historical distinction between strategies and tactics, others take inspiration from the critical tradition in which the question of power takes centre stage. At the same time, all chapters share a focus on the actions, practices, and vocabulary of the historical actors, as well as an emphasis on power, conflicts, and contingencies. As such, the study of media tactics, informed by historical methods, illustrates that communication more often than not is a messy and complex undertaking.

Employing the three parameters outlined in the introduction – centring on the dialectics of tactics and strategies, practical-oriented perspectives, and the principle of following the actors – this volume points to the analytical significance of foregrounding media tactics as a study object. While some strands have already been highlighted at the beginning of this book, a few others deserve mention as an attempt to draw out a roadmap with future directions to scholars who are keen on tackling tactics as an object of study.

When shifting emphasis from strategies to tactics the analytical gaze alters. This also prompts an epistemological tilt: from plans to practices, and from theoretical models to archival sources. Even so, as this book has shown, strategies and tactics are often deeply entangled. In this sense, the study of tactics is also a way of studying strategies – and vice versa. More importantly, scholars who choose an empirical point of departure take neither strategies nor tactics for granted. Strategies and tactics are always embedded in the historical situation, and in order for us to study them, we need to identify the contexts in which they are moulded.

An analytical emphasis on tactics, using the parameters employed in this book, can further offer concrete studies of power relations. Power is not only privileged to desk work but something that is carried out as well as contested in the field. Hence, following the actors and paying attention

to their actions and utterances makes it possible to discern manifestations of who is actually doing what, when, and to which effect. Moreover, such an approach enables studies of the tactical actions of those in power as well as of those opposing established regimes. This way of conducting research could both strengthen the empirical connections between the concepts of strategies and tactics and also expand the theoretical understanding of these two phenomena and their relations.

Reflecting critically on the relationship between strategies and tactics, one could also question what really constitutes a strategy. In problematising the distinction between the local and the global, Bruno Latour once stated: "There is no pathway between the local and the global because there *is* no global."[2] Writing the afterword to *Media Tactics in the Long Twentieth Century*, a provocative question, paraphrasing this quote, came to our mind: what if there are no strategies, only tactics? This thought exercise relates back to the introduction in this volume, in which we stressed that the point where tactics unfold into a strategy is, at the very least, blurred. What is observable, however, are actors, media, and actions – connected and combined in various ways, prompting practices and outcomes.

Finally, one risk of interpreting everything as tactics is of course that one might not be able to see the forest for all the trees. Hence, only zooming in on local practices and media tactics could also cloud normative structures and power hierarchies. A flat ontology of tactics clearly has its dangers. Therefore, it is important, we argue, that a move towards a tactical turn acknowledges the existence of concrete and shifting power relations and pursuits to study them empirically.

This book only scratches the surface of how a history of media tactics could be written. In this sense, more research is needed. For example, while the chapters in this book deal with a wide variety of national contexts, the volume still reflects a dominant Western emphasis in contemporary media and communication history. Future scholarship on media tactics should broaden this horizon by placing greater emphasis on other regions of the world. Moreover, the recent years' development in machine learning and artificial intelligence have forced us to rethink what, for instance, propaganda and psychological operations mean in today's global society. However, we argue that it is also important not only to highlight how strategies and tactics should be understood in this context but also their longer historical continuities – and how media strategies and tactics can cut through and impact both the micro and the macro levels.

Notes

1 James Curran, *Media and Power* (London: Routledge, 2002), 3.
2 Bruno Latour, *The Pasteurization of France* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 220.

Index

Note: Page references in italics denote figures and with "n" endnotes.