

SpringerBriefs in Political Science

Arno Tausch

# Homonegativity and Religiously Motivated Political Extremism

A Study Based on World  
Values Survey Data  
from 88 Countries and  
Territories

OPEN ACCESS

 Springer

# **SpringerBriefs in Political Science**

SpringerBriefs present concise summaries of cutting-edge research and practical applications across a wide spectrum of fields. Featuring compact volumes of 50 to 125 pages, the series covers a range of content from professional to academic. Typical topics might include:

- A timely report of state-of-the art analytical techniques
- A bridge between new research results, as published in journal articles, and a contextual literature review
- A snapshot of a hot or emerging topic
- An in-depth case study or clinical example
- A presentation of core concepts that students must understand in order to make independent contributions

SpringerBriefs in Political Science showcase emerging theory, empirical research, and practical application in political science, policy studies, political economy, public administration, political philosophy, international relations, and related fields, from a global author community.


SpringerBriefs are characterized by fast, global electronic dissemination, standard publishing contracts, standardized manuscript preparation and formatting guidelines, and expedited production schedules.

Arno Tausch

# Homonegativity and Religiously Motivated Political Extremism

A Study Based on World Values Survey Data  
from 88 Countries and Territories

 Springer

Arno Tausch   
Department of Political Studies  
and Governance  
University of the Free State  
Bloemfontein, South Africa

Department of Political Science  
University of Innsbruck  
Innsbruck, Austria



ISSN 2191-5466 ISSN 2191-5474 (electronic)  
SpringerBriefs in Political Science  
ISBN 978-3-031-66201-0 ISBN 978-3-031-66202-7 (eBook)  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-66202-7>

This project is funded by the Austrian Fund for the Documentation of Religiously Motivated Political Extremism (Dokumentationsstelle Politischer Islam).

© The Author(s) 2025. This book is an open access publication.

**Open Access** This book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the book's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG  
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

If disposing of this product, please recycle the paper.


# Foreword

We live in a world characterized by growing polarization on a number of fault lines: political ideology, race, nationality, class, religion and increasingly sexuality. In a feat that has not been done before, Prof. Arno Tausch, examines the extent of homonegativity in 88 countries and territories of the world using the open data sets of the World Values Survey. Using the SPSS 29 statistical software package and multivariate methods, Tausch has produced a tour de force which has provided academics and policymakers with an incisive quantitative analysis merged with a deep qualitative interpretation which is solidly anchored in theoretical paradigms from Inglehart to Whitworth and Moretti.

The real strength of this book lays in how Prof. Tausch seamlessly connects homophobia, with xenophobia, restrictive gender and religious norms and pro-democracy attitudes and what this means for public safety and security. Consider here the fact that LGBTQ+ individuals are increasingly being targeted by those on the political right, Orthodox Christians as well as Islamist fundamentalists. One of the key questions about the extent of homophobia which was posed in the World Values Survey Wave 7 related to the acceptance or rejection of homosexual neighbours. This question is the key question if one seeks to understand levels of tolerance or acceptance in a society. In terms of rejection of homosexual neighbours, Jordan, Myanmar, Azerbaijan, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, the Maldives, Egypt and Armenia are at the top of the global list with more than 80% of the population rejecting homosexuality. The lowest rates of rejection are found in Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, Norway, Andorra, Switzerland, the UK, Brazil, France, Argentina, Germany, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, Italy and Austria.

Tausch notes that the persistence of homophobia is linked to a plethora of other variables like democratic and gender norms, the level of secularism, tolerance and religious exclusivity or religious particularism. And this, in turn, has security considerations. Learning how countries like Iceland, Denmark and others managed to create highly tolerant, pluralist and inclusive societies could provide a template from more

homophobic societies to change their current trajectories. This is an outstanding book which provide deep insights to academics and policymakers as they come to grips with the fractured world we reside in.

Prof. Hussein Solomon   
Centre for Gender and Africa Studies  
University of the Free State  
Bloemfontein, South Africa

# Preface

Homonegativity is not only a matter of growing scientific interest in the global social science community, but also of growing concern for public safety and political stability around the world. Extremist groups, from the far right to radical Islamists, are increasingly targeting LGBTQ+ people. It is therefore no surprise that a publication that compares the security threat posed by homophobic and religiously motivated political extremism—from whatever source—in the countries of the European Union and beyond is an absolute necessity.

This publication, after discussing the literature and methodology, arrives at a first global population-weighted estimate of homonegativity in the world today. Our research effort covered up to 88 countries and territories around the world, using open data from the World Values Survey (integrating data from the European Values Study) and examining the relationship between homonegativity and religiously motivated political extremism. Throughout this publication, we have used the IBM SPSS Standard Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, version 29.

Our estimates of global homonegativity, based on rates of disapproval of homosexual neighbours, cover more than 90% of the world's population and yield the population-weighted result of a global percentage of homonegativity of around 55%.

We present our research findings on the drivers of homonegativity with bivariate correlations, partial correlations and factor analyses examining the effects of individual global attitudes on secularism, democracy, tolerance, and religious particularism, as well as on gender equality, religion, political violence, and national resilience on homonegativity, as evidenced in the global attitudes data of the World Values Survey. We also analyse the relationship between homonegativity and cross-national social science data on the countries and territories of the world.



We then present a parametric, i.e., factor analytically derived, index of tolerant social gender norms and democracy, and show the results for the countries as a whole and for their Muslim and Orthodox populations.

We analyse homonegativity in the wider social context and discuss the very close relationship between homonegativity and phenomena such as religious particularism, restrictive gender norms, documented by the United Nations Development Programme's Index of Restrictive Gender Norms, and find evidence regarding the strong relationship between homonegativity and anti-Semitism. Our study also includes statistical appendices, including the country results of our new parametric index of tolerant social gender norms and democracy, and an original analysis of anti-LGBTI hate crimes in the countries of the European Union in 2021, based on OSCE statistics.

A key conclusion of our study is that with a share of 12.0% of anti-LBGTQ hate crimes in the total number of hate crimes registered by the OSCE in the countries of the European Union in 2021, it is necessary to analyse the drivers of homonegativity also for security policy considerations. To this end, we have analysed the potential of religiously motivated and violent homonegativity based on the latest version of the World Values Survey, 2017–2022, which covers almost 66% of the world's population. According to our admittedly limited data, 12.8% of the global population covered by our research not only oppose gay neighbours, but also strongly believe that it is an essential feature of democracy that religious authorities must interpret the laws. These are the global religious fundamentalist homophobes. 1.2% of the world's population covered by our research are not only such religiously fundamentalist homophobes, but also strongly believe that political violence is justified. This is the hard core of the 1.2% of the global population who can be expected to be at the forefront of future violent and religiously motivated political action against LGBTQ communities. The culturally and geographically diverse group of the ten countries with the highest potential for such homophobic political violence are the Philippines, Malaysia, Kenya, Ecuador, Zimbabwe, Canada, Spain, Nicaragua, Mexico and Iraq.

The bottom line of our research is that homonegativity poses a real future threat to the political and social stability of democratic societies, particularly in the West where LGBTQ communities enjoy greater freedoms. Our results for the new Gender Tolerance and Democracy Index, which we see as the most methodologically relevant innovation of our study, suggest that there is a very strong relationship between homonegativity and restrictive gender norms. And our analyses also suggest that threats to the well-being of LGBTQ communities come not only from Islamist radicalism, but also from increasingly militant Orthodox propaganda against LGBTQs in the context of the current war in Ukraine. Our empirical data on homophobic attitudes in many countries around the world support these conclusions.

Freedom and acceptance of LGBTQ+ people are part of the lifestyle of a free and democratic society. In the current world situation, this freedom is under increasing

global threat. We hope to have contributed to an analysis of the extent of the problem and the underlying factors. If we have succeeded in drawing attention to this phenomenon, our work will have achieved its goal.

Arno Tausch  
Department of Political Studies  
and Governance  
University of the Free State  
Bloemfontein, South Africa

Adjunct Professor  
Department of Political Science  
University of Innsbruck  
Innsbruck, Austria

# Acknowledgements

This study and its publication were funded by the “*Austrian Documentation Centre Political Islam*” (Dokumentationsstelle Politischer Islam; <https://www.dokumentationsstelle.at/en/>).

The author would like to thank the Documentation Centre and Springer Nature for the opportunity to publish this research.

June 2024

Arno Tausch

# Contents

<b>1 Introduction: Setting the Scene</b> .....	1
References .....	3
<b>2 The Global Clash of Civilizations on Homosexuality and the Threat of Hate Crimes Against LGBTQ+ Communities as Documented by International Organizations and NGOs</b> .....	5
2.1 FRA—The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights .....	7
2.2 Europol .....	8
2.3 OSCE ODIHR .....	8
2.4 EQUALDEX .....	10
2.5 KIRAS—Security Research .....	13
2.6 Roman Catholic Religious Leaders .....	14
2.7 Orthodox Homophobia? .....	15
2.8 Homophobia in the Muslim World? .....	16
References .....	18
<b>3 Using World Values Survey and European Social Survey Data on Homosexuality and Homonegativity: The Comparative Evidence from the Social Sciences</b> .....	21
3.1 Inglehart: Homosexuality and Existential Security .....	21
3.2 Adamczyk: Cross-National Variations in Public Opinion About Homosexuality .....	23
3.3 Anderson, and Fetner: The Impact of Economic Inequality Across and Within Nations on Attitudes Toward Homosexuality .....	26
3.4 Firdauzi, Hidayat, and Darmawan: The Role of Religion in Explaining Homophobic Attitudes .....	28
3.5 Hildebrandt, Jäckle and Wenzelburger: The Culture Wars on Homosexuality .....	29
3.6 Janssen and Scheepers: Religious Particularism, Religious Salience and Homonegativity .....	32

- 3.7 Roberts: Homonegativity, Postmaterialism, World Society,  
and Multiple Modernities ..... 35
- 3.8 Van Der Akker: Cohort Socialisation and Homonegativity ..... 37
- 3.9 Whitworth and Moretti: The Varying Effects of Religious  
Beliefs and Welfare Regimes on Homonegativity ..... 39
- References ..... 41
- 4 Methodology and Data for Our New Analysis ..... 45**
  - 4.1 The World Values Survey and European Values Survey Data ..... 45
  - 4.2 Methodology ..... 46
  - 4.3 Promax Factor Analysis ..... 49
  - 4.4 Testing Levels of Significance ..... 51
  - 4.5 Parametric Indicators ..... 52
  - 4.6 Error Margins ..... 52
  - 4.7 Dimensions and Variables from the World Values Survey  
and European Values Survey ..... 53
  - 4.8 Cross-National Data ..... 54
  - 4.9 The Empirical Research Design ..... 55
  - References ..... 56
- 5 Results from the Bivariate and Multivariate Analysis  
of Homonegativity ..... 59**
  - 5.1 Homonegativity According to the World Values Survey  
and European Values Survey Data ..... 59
  - 5.2 A Kuznets Curve of Homonegativity? ..... 60
  - 5.3 The Bivariate Correlations of Homonegativity at the Individual  
Level Among the Total Global Population and Among  
the Major Religious Denominations ..... 61
  - 5.4 The Bivariate Correlations of Homonegativity at the Individual  
Level ..... 64
  - 5.5 Partial Correlations of Homonegativity at the National Level ..... 66
  - 5.6 Partial Correlations of Homonegativity at the Individual  
Level of the Inhabitants of the World ..... 67
  - 5.7 Secularism, Democracy, Tolerance and Religious  
Particularism: Promax Factor Analytical Results  
for the Explanation of Homonegativity based on the World  
Values Survey, 2010–2014 ..... 72
  - 5.8 Gender Equality, Democracy, Religious Salience, Political  
Violence and National Resilience: Promax Factor Analytical  
Results for the Explanation of Homonegativity with the Data  
of the World Values Survey, 2017–2022 ..... 78
  - References ..... 90

- 6 The Potential for Violence Against Homosexuals and Strategies of Advancing Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy . . . . . 93**
  - 6.1 The Potential of Homophobic Violence, Driven by Religiously Motivated Extremism—Estimated from the Data from the World Values Survey, 2017–2022 . . . . . 94
  - 6.2 A Parametric Index of Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy (TGSNDI), Combining Acceptance of Gender Equality, Pro-democracy Attitudes, No Homophobia and Xenophobia, No Support for Political Violence, and the Willingness to Defend the Country . . . . . 99
  - 6.3 The Partial Correlations of Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy . . . . . 100
  - 6.4 The Catastrophic Global Situation of Restrictive Social Gender Norms in the World System . . . . . 103
  - 6.5 The UNDP Gender Social Norms Index and Our Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy Index . . . . . 105
  - References . . . . . 106
- 7 Perspectives and Conclusions from This Study . . . . . 109**
  - 7.1 Homonegativity and Tolerant Social Gender Norms in Multicultural Western Democracies . . . . . 110
  - 7.2 Political Measures to Strengthen the Rights of the LGBTQ+ Communities . . . . . 111
  - References . . . . . 113

# List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Equality index, designed by EQUALDEX, visualizing legal rights and public attitudes towards LGBTQ+ in the world and in the Euro-Mediterranean area ..... 13

Fig. 5.1 Homonegativity: Rejection of homosexual neighbours in the world and in the Euro-Mediterranean area. 0 = 0%; 1.0 = 100% ..... 60

Fig. 5.2 Rejection of homosexual neighbours in the world, predicted by the UNDP Human Development Index ..... 61

Fig. 5.3 Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, longitudinal 1981–2016: scree test ..... 73

Fig. 5.4 Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, 2017–2022: scree test ..... 78

Fig. 6.1 Religious fundamentalist homonegativity as a global problem (1—lowest, 86—highest) ..... 98

Fig. 6.2 Religious fundamentalist and potentially violent homonegativity as a global problem (1—lowest, 86—highest) ..... 98

Fig. 6.3 Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy Index (TGSNDI) ..... 103

Fig. 6.4 The UNDP GSNI Index (Gender Social Norms Index) in the world system ..... 105

Fig. 6.5 The UNDP GSNI Index (Gender Social Norms Index) as a determinant of the Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy Index (TGSNDI) ..... 106

Fig. 7.1 Homonegativity by religious denomination in Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland ..... 111

# List of Tables

Table 2.1	Global rejection of homosexual neighbours and of homosexuality by religious denomination .....	7
Table 2.2	Anti-LGBTI hate crimes 2021 in the OSCE countries, 2021 .....	9
Table 2.3	Hate crimes 2021 in the OSCE countries, 2021, percentages .....	11
Table 4.1	Our surveys from the World Values Survey and the European values study .....	47
Table 4.2	Maximum ranges of variation for survey results (the probability of error is 5%) .....	53
Table 5.1	The bivariate correlations of homonegativity at the individual level among the total global population .....	62
Table 5.2	The bivariate correlations of homonegativity at the individual level among the global Roman Catholics .....	63
Table 5.3	The bivariate correlations of homonegativity at the individual level among the global Muslims .....	63
Table 5.4	The bivariate correlations of homonegativity at the individual level among the global orthodox .....	64
Table 5.5	The bivariate correlations of homonegativity of the global population at the individual level with variables of xenophobia and racism .....	65
Table 5.6	The bivariate correlations of homonegativity of the global population at the individual level with key variables from the World Values Survey Project .....	66
Table 5.7	Partial correlations of homonegativity in the countries of world system with key socio-economic country-level indicators constant: HDI 2018 & HDI (2018)^2, latest edition of the World Values Survey .....	68



Table 5.8 Partial correlations of homonegativity among the global population with key indicators from World Values Survey (2010–2014), constant: Age and Sex and Highest educational level attained . . . . . 71

Table 5.9 Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, Longitudinal\_1981\_2016: Tests of Significance . . . . . 72

Table 5.10 Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, longitudinal 1981–2016: eigenvalues and explained variances . . . . . 73

Table 5.11 Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, longitudinal 1981–2016: loadings of the factor structure matrix . . . . . 74

Table 5.12 Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, longitudinal 1981–2016: component correlations . . . . . 75

Table 5.13 Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, longitudinal 1981–2016: factor scores . . . . . 76

Table 5.14 Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, 2017–2022: tests of significance . . . . . 79

Table 5.15 Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, 2017–2022: extraction (explained variance; 0.0 = 0%; 1.0 = 100%) . . . . . 80

Table 5.16 Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, 2017–2022: eigenvalues and explained variances . . . . . 80

Table 5.17 Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, 2017–2022: loadings of the factor structure matrix . . . . . 81

Table 5.18 Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, 2017–2022: component correlations . . . . . 82

Table 5.19 Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, 2017–2022: factor scores . . . . . 83

Table 6.1 Homophobia, extremist religiously motivated homophobia, and extremist religiously motivated and potentially violent homophobia: estimated share per total population . . . . . 95

Table 6.2 Parametric Index of tolerant gender social norms and democracy (TGSNDI); weights for the factor analytical scores . . . . . 99

Table 6.3	Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy Index (TGSNDI) and religious diversity—comparisons of the Orthodox population with the total country population . . . . .	101
Table 6.4	Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy Index (TGSNDI) and religious diversity—comparisons of the Muslim population with the total country population . . .	102
Table 6.5	Partial correlations of the Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy Index (TGSNDI) in the countries of world system with key socio-economic country-level indicators constant: HDI 2018 and HDI (2018) <sup>2</sup> , latest edition of the World Values Survey . . . . .	104
Table 7.1	Homonegativity in western democracies by comparison . . . . .	110

# List of Electronic Appendix

[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/376480185\\_Supplementary\\_Tables\\_Figures\\_and\\_Appendix\\_Homonegativity\\_and\\_religiously\\_motivated\\_political\\_extremism\\_A\\_study\\_based\\_on\\_World\\_Values\\_Survey\\_data\\_from\\_88\\_countries\\_and\\_territories](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/376480185_Supplementary_Tables_Figures_and_Appendix_Homonegativity_and_religiously_motivated_political_extremism_A_study_based_on_World_Values_Survey_data_from_88_countries_and_territories)

- Electronic Appendix 1 The parametric Index of tolerant gender social norms and democracy: countries and religious communities
- Electronic Appendix 2 Anti-LGBTI hate crimes—violent attacks against people in the European Union in 2021 according to OSCE ODIHR
- Electronic Appendix 3 Homonegativity (all available data from the World Values Survey)
- Electronic Appendix 4 Homonegativity—total population (World Values Survey, 2017–2022)
- Electronic Appendix 5 Homonegativity—Muslim population (World Values Survey, 2017–2022)
- Electronic Appendix 6 Homonegativity—Christian Orthodox population (World Values Survey, 2017–2022)

# Chapter 1

## Introduction: Setting the Scene



**Abstract** This chapter sets the scene for our research. It starts from the assumption that homonegativity is not only a matter of growing scientific interest in the global scientific community, but also of growing concern for public security and political stability worldwide. The death penalty for homosexuality exists in Afghanistan, Brunei, Iran, Mauretania, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. It outlines the basic research question of this publication: to estimate homonegativity in 88 countries and territories around the world, using open data from the World Values Survey, and to examine the relationship between homonegativity and religiously motivated political extremism. It outlines the structure of our study.

**Keywords** Homonegativity · World values survey · LGBTQ+ · Religion · Political Islam

Homonegativity is not only a matter of growing scientific interest in the global social science community, but also of growing concern for public safety and political stability worldwide. According to the Human Dignity Trust (<https://www.humandignitytrust.org/>), the death penalty for homosexuality exists in the following regimes Afghanistan; Brunei; Iran; Mauritania; Nigeria; Pakistan; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; Somalia; Uganda; United Arab Emirates; and Yemen.

In research on this topic, Kollman (2016) and Han and O’Mahoney (2011) have already impressively demonstrated the extent of global ‘othering’ of LGBTQ+ communities. Extremist groups, from the far right (Bjorgo, 2014) to radical Islamists (Vidino & Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2022), are increasingly targeting LGBTQ+ victims. It is no wonder, then, that a publication that compares the security threat posed by homophobic and religiously motivated political extremism—from whatever source—in the countries of the European Union and beyond is an absolute necessity.

The basic research question of this publication is to estimate the extent of homonegativity in 88 countries and territories of the world (including the Republic of Austria) using the open data of the World Values Survey (integrating the data of the European Values Study) 2017–2022 and to examine the relationship between

homonegativity and religiously motivated political extremism. For analytical reasons, the multivariate analysis also makes use of data collected in previous editions of the World Values Survey, in particular the World Values Survey 2010–2014.

Who are the homophobes in our society? The World Values Survey, the largest non-commercial and freely available survey of the world's population, provides a scientifically sound answer to this question and shows which social groups in the world are homophobic. Founded by the American political scientist Inglehart (1934–2021), the World Values Survey project now covers nearly 100 countries and 90% of the world's population, based on a representative sample of more than 400,000 respondents.

Our analyses were carried out using the latest and most advanced version of the SPSS statistical software package, SPSS 29. Due to the very large representative samples (e.g., >1000 in most countries), cautious conclusions can also be drawn for smaller subgroups. We have chosen to focus on members of the Orthodox and Muslim communities because several previous studies reviewed in this publication have already concluded that radicalised interpretations of Orthodox and Muslim religious doctrines lead to increased levels of homonegativity.

The items in the World Values Survey Wave 7 questionnaire that relate to homosexuality are acceptance or rejection of homosexual neighbours, whether homosexuality is justified or not on a 10-point scale, and opinions on whether homosexual couples are as good parents as other couples. Since the basic acceptance of homosexuality is assessed very differently by the religious communities in the world and is ultimately the responsibility of the religious communities themselves, the acceptance of homosexual neighbours is the decisive variable and indicator of homonegativity in our study, which ultimately needs to be interpreted in a scientific project to analyse homonegativity.

Now, it can be argued that these two questions do not adequately reflect the problematic nature of the issue, but obtaining comparative data from more than 80 countries on this phenomenon is equally important for the global debate.

The structure of this publication is now as follows. In Chap. 2, we look at the global clash of civilisations over homosexuality and the extent of hate crime and discrimination against LGBTQ communities around the world, drawing mainly on reports by the European Human Rights Agency, the OSCE, Europol and the EQUALDEX think-tank, and then analyse key statements by Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim religious leaders and discuss some key studies on religion and LGBTQ communities.

In Chap. 3, we review the main social science studies with high citation impact that have already used quantitative methods and existing opinion poll data to examine the relationship between homosexuality and religion.

After discussing these nine main approaches in quantitative social science, in Chap. 4 we turn to the methods of our own new study, discussing, among other things, the scope of the World Values Survey, the multivariate methods used, the significance tests, our parametric indicators, the error probabilities, and the transnational aggregate data at the national level that become important for quantitative analyses of the drivers and bottlenecks of tolerance of LGBTQ communities at the national level of countries and territories around the world.

In Chap. 5, we first analyse the extent of homonegativity in the world system, then address the question of whether there is a linear or non-linear relationship of homonegativity with the existential security of societies in the world, and finally present our research findings at the individual respondent level and at the national level with bivariate analyses. We then present our research findings based on partial correlations and factor analyses to examine the effects of secularism, attitudes towards democracy, tolerance and religious particularism, as well as attitudes towards gender equality, religion, political violence and national resilience, on homonegativity.

In Chap. 6, we then analyse the potential for anti-LGBTQ violence in the world system and present a parametric index of tolerant social gender norms and democracy, showing results for countries as a whole and for their Muslim and Orthodox populations. We also briefly refer to the very close relationship between homonegativity, phenomena such as anti-Semitism, and the United Nations Development Programme's index of restrictive gender norms.

Chapter 7 of our publication presents the conclusions.

Our study also refers to our electronically available statistical appendices, including country results for the parametric index of tolerant social gender norms and democracy, and anti-LGBTI hate crimes in European Union countries in 2021.

## References

- Bjorgo, T. (Ed.). (2014). *Terror from the extreme right*. Routledge.
- Han, E., & O'Mahoney, J. (2011). *From death penalty to legal marriage: LGBT politics in a global perspective*. APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1902163>
- Kollman, K. (2016). The same-sex unions revolution in Western democracies: International norms and domestic policy change. In *The same-sex unions revolution in western democracies*. Manchester University Press.
- Vidino, L., & Meleagrou-Hitchens, A. (2022). *Islamist homophobia in the West: From rhetoric to violence*. Program on Extremism, George Washington University; and National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center, Reports, Projects, and Research No. 14. <https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/ncitereportsresearch/14>

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.



## Chapter 2

# The Global Clash of Civilizations on Homosexuality and the Threat of Hate Crimes Against LGBTQ+ Communities as Documented by International Organizations and NGOs



**Abstract** This chapter documents some of the analyses of the perspectives of LGBTQ+ people around the world by national governments, bureaucracies, international organisations and NGOs we highlight among others the analysis of the European Union’s Fundamental Rights Agency, which has spoken out against discrimination against the LGBTQ plus community, and which states in its 2020 report analysed in detail in our chapter, that more lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex people are now open about who they are, but that they are afraid and face violence and discrimination. We also highlight Europol 2023 report that terrorist and violent extremist groups and individuals continue to use platforms for recruitment purposes and to disseminate propaganda against the community. Our chapter also analyses the data contained in the OSCE’s 2023 report on discrimination and hate crimes in the OSCE region. Our new statistical analysis of the data provided by the OSCE shows that 300 of the 600 hate crimes against the community were committed in Orthodox Christian majority OSCE member states, i.e. in descending order of the absolute number of crimes—in the Russian Federation, Armenia, Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia, Greece, Belarus, Cyprus, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania. We draw our readers’ attention to the data provided by EQUALDEX, an important think tank working in this field, and also provide an overview of the recent Austrian study published by the Austrian Security Research Programme KIRAS. In the second part of our chapter, we briefly analyse the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church, the Orthodox Churches and we highlight homophobia in the Muslim world.

**Keywords** Homonegativity · World Values Survey · European Union Fundamental Rights Agency · OSCE · Hate crimes · Roman Catholic Church · Orthodoxy · Muslim world

A first and rather casual look at the latest available data from the “global opinion barometer”, the World Values Survey, which we present in detail in Chap. 4 of this study, reveals not only that religious denominations and interpretations of religious norms and values have a lot to do with the way the global public views LGBTQ+



communities, but also that we should focus more on Islam, Orthodoxy and Catholicism in this theoretical background chapter, more or less leaving out other denominations, and also leaving out respondents with no denomination, who appear to be far less prejudiced against LGBTQ+ communities and homosexuality than other groups. Muslims and Orthodox respondents, in this our first look at the data we will be dealing with throughout this publication, hold the most negative opinions about homosexual neighbours (a phenomenon we will refer to in this essay as homonegativity) and about the justifiability of homosexuality. Roman Catholics, Muslims and Orthodox are also the most numerous denominations in the World Values Survey. These initial findings, which simply report how respondents to the World Values Survey view their gay neighbours and homosexuality, are reported here and in a sense structure our theoretical presentation, focusing on the voices to be heard in the worlds of Roman Catholicism, global Islam, and Christian Orthodoxy. The results, which, it should be emphasised, are not weighted by the population size of the countries in the WVS, nevertheless speak for themselves (Table 2.1).

The late American political scientist, Ronald F. Inglehart, arguably the most often quoted political scientist of the world today (29,751 citations in the Scopus Data Base to be found in 22,464 documents, and in addition, Inglehart was author of 55 publications which were cited 55 or more times) challenged the traditional understanding and the worldview of most global religions by saying in Inglehart et al. (2017):

But deep-rooted cultural norms change slowly. Virtually all religions that became major world faiths emphasize pro-fertility norms—and they do so vigorously, instilling the belief that violators of these norms will burn in hell for all eternity. It was necessary to make these cultural sanctions severe because pro fertility norms require repression of strong natural urges. “Thou shalt not commit adultery” goes against deep-rooted desires; requiring women to devote their lives to child-bearing and child-rearing entails major sacrifices; and defining homosexuality as sinful and unnatural imposes repression and self-hatred on gays and lesbians. These norms are no longer necessary for survival, but deep-rooted cultural norms resist change. Nevertheless, modernization brings high levels of existential security. People grow up taking survival for granted, making them more open to new norms. Inglehart et al. (2017)

The global clash of civilizations regarding homosexuality and issues of gender has reached the very centre of such institutions as the Roman Catholic Church, the dominant denomination in the Western democracies. Tausch and Obirek (2020) already warned that growing international sociological evidence based on rigorous analysis of World Values Survey data seems to suggest that more and more Roman Catholic faithful do not follow anymore the condemnation of the homosexual act as a “deadly sin,” voiced by the official, current Catechism of the Roman Catholic Church.

In the following, we will first document some analyses by national and international government bureaucracies and organizations, and NGOs about LGBTI people around the world.

**Table 2.1** Global rejection of homosexual neighbours and of homosexuality by religious denomination

Religious denomination	Rejecting neighbours: homosexuals	N
Muslim	70%	26,171
Orthodox (Russian/Greek/etc.)	61%	18,521
Buddhist	50%	5603
Hindu	42%	661
Total WVS 7 sample	39%	145,216
Other denominations	29%	3035
Do not belong to a denomination	27%	40,532
Roman Catholic	27%	30,768
Jewish	25%	280
Other Christian (Evangelical/Pentecostal/Free church/etc.)	25%	3675
Protestant	21%	15,970
Religious denomination	Justifiable: homosexuality (1: never to 10: always)	N
Muslim	1.95	25,735
Orthodox (Russian/Greek/etc.)	2.41	18,176
Hindu	3.80	647
Buddhist	3.86	5551
Total WVS 7 sample	4.47	142,868
Other Christian (Evangelical/Pentecostal/Free church/etc.)	4.63	3525
Other	4.75	2987
Roman Catholic	4.96	30,177
Do not belong to a denomination	6.02	40,043
Protestant	6.24	15,747
Jewish	6.41	280

## 2.1 FRA—The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights

The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2020) has forcefully spoken out against the discrimination of LGBTI people. In its report, it specifies that more lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and intersex (LGBTI) people are now open about who they are but fear, violence and discrimination remain high. With 140,000 respondents, it is the largest ever survey on hate crime and discrimination against LGBTI people. *“Too many LGBTI people continue to live in the shadows, afraid of being ridiculed, discriminated, or even attacked. Even though some countries have advanced LGBTI equality, our survey findings show that overall, there has been too little real progress,*

*leaving many LGBTI people vulnerable. Their job and healthcare difficulties may worsen due to COVID-19. Policymakers should take note and do more to actively promote full respect for rights of LGBTI people,”* FRA Director Michael O’Flaherty said. European Commissioner for Equality, Helena Dalli added: *“Despite the important steps forward regarding the equality of LGBTI + people in the EU in the last years, LGBTI + people still report high levels of discrimination. More worryingly, we have recently witnessed within the EU anti-LGBTI incidents such as attacks on prides, the adoption of ‘LGBTI ideology-free zone’ declarations, fines for LGBTI-friendly advertisements and others. Everybody in the European Union should feel safe and free to be themselves.”*

The ‘A long way to go for LGBTI equality’ report looked at how around 140,000 LGBTI people in the European Union, the United Kingdom, Serbia, and North Macedonia experience their human rights. It also underlines changes since FRA’s first LGBT survey carried out in 2012. Comparing the two surveys reveals little overall progress over the seven years. The EU averages mask important differences between countries. In some, over 70% LGBTI respondent say society is more tolerant, while in others, up to 68% say it is less.

## 2.2 Europol

The EU’s police organisation, Europol (2023) reported that in 2022, terrorist and violent extremist groups and individuals continued to exploit gaming-adjacent platforms for recruitment purposes and propaganda dissemination. IS supporters in particular created groups on gaming communication apps, dedicated to the discussion of different topics, including media operations, translation of propaganda content and religious migration. Right-wing extremist actors exploited the gaming landscape by creating right-wing extremist utopias within popular video games, for example featuring neo-Nazi recreations, anti-Semitic and anti-lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer+ (LGBTQ+) themes. This was done mostly to appeal to a larger audience and to increase the base of young sympathisers, but also to foster a sense of community by engaging in a shared hobby.

## 2.3 OSCE ODIHR

The Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe, in its report, OSCE ODIHR (2023) documents the discrimination and hate crimes experienced by the LGBTI community. 300 of the 600 hate crimes, i.e., 50%, against the LGBTI community were committed in the Christian Orthodox majority OSCE member countries (in descending order of the absolute number of crimes) Russian Federation, Armenia, Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia, Greece, Belarus, Cyprus, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Romania (Tables 2.2 and 2.3).

**Table 2.2** Anti-LGBTI hate crimes 2021 in the OSCE countries, 2021

OSCE member country	Anti-LGBTI hate crimes 2021	Anti-LGBTI hate crime as % of total hate crimes, 2021
Albania	0	0000
Armenia	56	94,915
Austria	3	1935
Azerbaijan	1	100,000
Belarus	7	53,846
Belgium	0	0000
Bosnia and Herzegovina	15	11,719
Bulgaria	0	0000
Canada	0	0000
Croatia	18	40,909
Cyprus	2	50,000
Czech Republic	26	33,333
Denmark	0	0000
Estonia	3	75,000
Finland	0	0000
France	3	1987
Georgia	37	72,549
Germany	31	14,155
Greece	22	41,509
Hungary	8	27,586
Ireland	2	25,000
Italy	32	13,913
Kazakhstan	1	20,000
Kyrgyzstan	29	93,548
Latvia	1	100,000
Liechtenstein	1	100,000
Lithuania	2	100,000
Moldova	9	90,000
Montenegro	1	20,000
Netherlands	1	1087
North Macedonia	1	3571
Poland	14	6087
Portugal	1	100,000
Romania	0	0000
Russian Federation	85	54,839
Serbia	34	57,627

(continued)

**Table 2.2** (continued)

OSCE member country	Anti-LGBTI hate crimes 2021	Anti-LGBTI hate crime as % of total hate crimes, 2021
Slovakia	0	0000
Slovenia	2	20,000
Spain	1	1136
Sweden	0	0000
Switzerland	48	42,857
Tajikistan	14	93,333
Turkey	6	9,375
Ukraine	55	55,556
United Kingdom	0	0000
United States of America	16	1017
Uzbekistan	12	80,000
Total OSCE	600	15,083

The statistical analysis of OSCE data on anti-LGBT hate crimes in OSCE countries also has direct implications for debates on anti-hate crime strategies. It is somewhat surprising that at the level of the 25 EU countries for which the OSCE has provided data, i.e., all current EU countries except Malta and Luxembourg, in 2021 anti-Christian hate crimes already account for 39.5% of all hate crimes, racist and xenophobic attacks 16.8%, anti-LGBT I hate crimes 12.0%, anti-Semitic hate crimes 11.0%, anti-Muslim hate crimes 9.5%, anti-Roma hate crimes 2.1% and gender-related hate crimes 0.3%. We would like to mention however that in the wake of the Hamas October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, anti-Semitic hate crimes tremendously increased globally and also in the countries of the European Union.<sup>1</sup>

## 2.4 EQUALDEX

EQUALDEX, an important think tank working in the field, has developed and documented three indices, which capture the overall, the social situation and the legal situation of the LGBTQ+ communities around the world. In EQUALDEX's own wording, 2023, available from its website it says that the EQUALDEX's Equality Index is a rating from 0 to 100 (with 100 being the most equal) to help visualize the legal rights and public attitudes towards LGBTQ+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, questioning, intersex...) people in each region. The Equality Index is an average of two indexes: a legal index and the public opinion Index. The Index

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/world/open-hatred-jews-surges-globally-inflamed-by-gaza-war-2023-10-31/>.


Table 2.3 Hate crimes 2021 in the OSCE countries, 2021, percentages

	Anti-Christian hate crime	Anti-LGBTI hate crime	Anti-Muslim hate crime	Anti-Roma hate crime	Anti-Semitic hate crime	Gender-based hate crime	Racist and xenophobic hate crime	Other hate crimes	Total hate crimes
Austria	11.61	1.94	20.00	0.65	6.45	1.29	49.68	8.39	100.00
Belgium	52.38	0.00	28.57	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.76	14.29	100.00
Bulgaria	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
Croatia	0.00	40.91	0.00	2.27	2.27	0.00	43.18	11.36	100.00
Cyprus	25.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	25.00	0.00	100.00
Czech Republic	0.00	33.33	1.28	15.38	23.08	0.00	10.26	16.67	100.00
Denmark	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
Estonia	25.00	75.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
Finland	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
France	75.50	1.99	17.22	0.00	0.66	0.00	0.00	4.64	100.00
Germany	52.97	14.16	20.55	0.46	3.65	0.00	1.37	6.85	100.00
Greece	0.00	41.51	0.00	11.32	3.77	0.00	33.96	9.43	100.00
Hungary	3.45	27.59	0.00	10.34	24.14	0.00	24.14	10.34	100.00
Ireland	75.00	25.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
Italy	40.00	13.91	0.00	0.43	15.22	0.00	24.78	5.65	100.00
Latvia	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
Lithuania	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
Netherlands	0.00	1.09	17.39	0.00	59.78	0.00	0.00	21.74	100.00
Poland	62.17	6.09	0.43	0.43	7.39	1.30	14.35	7.83	100.00

(continued)

Table 2.3 (continued)

	Anti-Christian hate crime	Anti-LGBTI hate crime	Anti-Muslim hate crime	Anti-Roma hate crime	Anti-Semitic hate crime	Gender-based hate crime	Racist and xenophobic hate crime	Other hate crimes	Total hate crimes
Portugal	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
Romania	33.33	0.00	0.00	66.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
Slovakia	33.33	0.00	0.00	33.33	0.00	0.00	33.33	0.00	100.00
Slovenia	70.00	20.00	10.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
Spain	54.55	1.14	7.95	0.00	5.68	0.00	19.32	11.36	100.00
Sweden	75.00	0.00	12.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	12.50	100.00
Total EU-25	39.47	11.95	9.52	2.08	11.05	0.35	16.82	8.76	100.00



**Fig. 2.1** Equality index, designed by EQUALDEX, visualizing legal rights and public attitudes towards LGBTQ+ in the world and in the Euro-Mediterranean area

shows the dramatical extent of the discrimination of the LGBTQ+ communities in the Global East and Global South (Fig. 2.1).

## 2.5 KIRAS—Security Research

The study by Haberl et al. (2023), is part of the Austrian Security Research Programme KIRAS, which supports national research projects whose results contribute to the security of all members of society. The study by Haberl et al. (2023) is an opinion survey of Muslims in the Greater Vienna area, focusing on many indicators, from attitudes on religious tolerance to Antisemitism and how Muslims in the Greater Vienna area express views on homonegativity and homosexuality. Although 36,2% of all respondents in the study were very tolerant on a wide range of issues, and a further 17,7% to be tolerant (Haberl et al., 2023: 52), the study found also 7,5% of all surveyed Vienna Muslims strongly rejected pluralism, diversity, and favoured the death penalty for certain acts considered as crimes, and a further 5,4% rejected pluralism, diversity and favoured harsh body punishments. In all, 1,9% of the surveyed persons were in favour of the death penalty for homosexuals (Haberl et al., 2023: 123). The study also reveals that 12.3% of Vienna’s Muslims have a very positive opinion of the Muslim Brotherhood, and a further 14.1% a positive opinion of the Muslim Brotherhood (Haberl et al., 2023, page 90). 33.9% of Vienna’s Muslims have a very negative opinion of Israelis, and a further 18.1% a negative opinion (Haberl et al., 2023, page 101).



In the following, we can offer only some snapshots of current and often very passionately argued global debates on the problem among the world's religious communities, to alert our readers that the analyses of the sociology of religion presented in this publication as well as our new data analyses indeed touch the centre of the debate.

## 2.6 Roman Catholic Religious Leaders

The teaching on homosexuality by Roman Catholicism, the Western world's dominant religious affiliation, is clearly spelt out in the "Catechism" which is published on the Website of the Vatican and which is by the Catholic hierarchy considered to be the authentic summary of Roman Catholic doctrine:

2357 Homosexuality refers to relations between men or between women who experience an exclusive or predominant sexual attraction toward persons of the same sex. It has taken a great variety of forms through the centuries and in different cultures. Its psychological genesis remains largely unexplained. Basing itself on Sacred Scripture, which presents homosexual acts as acts of grave depravity, tradition has always declared that "homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered." They are contrary to the natural law. They close the sexual act to the gift of life. They do not proceed from a genuine affective and sexual complementarity. Under no circumstances can they be approved.

2358 The number of men and women who have deep-seated homosexual tendencies is not negligible. This inclination, which is objectively disordered, constitutes for most of them a trial. They must be accepted with respect, compassion, and sensitivity. Every sign of unjust discrimination in their regard should be avoided. These persons are called to fulfill God's will in their lives and, if they are Christians, to unite to the sacrifice of the Lord's Cross the difficulties they may encounter from their condition.

2359 Homosexual persons are called to chastity. By the virtues of self-mastery that teach them inner freedom, at times by the support of disinterested friendship, by prayer and sacramental grace, they can and should gradually and resolutely approach Christian perfection (Catechism, 2023, available at [https://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/\\_P85.HTM](https://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P85.HTM)).

As if to challenge the above-mentioned opinion of one of the world's leading social scientists, Ronald F. Inglehart, the current Head of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope Francis I, said that the "*ideology of gender*" is "*dangerous*" (America. The Jesuit Review, 2023). The Pope's views on gender and gender theory were given in an almost one-hour long interview with Elisabetta Piqué, Italian correspondent for *La Nación*, the Argentine daily newspaper. The interview was recorded at Santa Marta, the Vatican guest house where the Pope resides. In the interview Pope Francis said, among other things:

I have always distinguished between what is pastoral [ministry] to persons who have different sexual orientations and that which is the ideology of gender. These are two different things. [...] The ideology of gender is, at this time, one of the most dangerous ideological colonizations. It goes far beyond the sexual. [...] Because it dilutes the differences [...] The richness that is of men and women, and of all humanity, is the tension of the differences. It is to grow

by means of the tension of the differences. The matter of gender is diluting the differences and making the world the same, all dull, all equal. And that goes against the human vocation.

Several important Catholic dignitaries have come out in even harsher words in this debate. The Tablet (2019) reports on an interview by the influential African Cardinal Robert Sarah in which he explains what he believes is at the heart of a sickness that is blighting the whole world. Cardinal Sarah, Prefect of the Congregation for Divine Worship, says that the spiritual crisis that currently blights “*the whole world*” has its roots in Europe, because Europe has rejected God.

However, not all major decisionmakers in the Roman Catholic Church reflect this way of thinking. The National Catholic Reporter (2022) reported that German Cardinal Reinhard Marx of Munich and Freising spoke in front of a rainbow flag during a service marking the 20th anniversary of the LGBTQ community at St. Paul’s Church in Munich on March 13, 2022. In his sermon, Munich Cardinal Reinhard Marx has called for a change in Catholic teaching on homosexuality.

The catechism is not set in stone. One may also question what it says [...] Homosexuality is not a sin. It corresponds to a Christian attitude when two people, regardless of gender, stand up for each other, in joy and sorrow [...] The value of love was also shown in not making the other person an object, not using him or her or humiliating him or her.

Marx added: “*LGBTQ+ people are part of creation and loved by God, and we are called upon to stand against discrimination*”. He also said, “*Those who threaten homosexuals and anyone else with hell have understood nothing*”.

Similar attitudes were reflected in Reuters, 2022, where it is reported that Cardinal Jean-Claude Hollerich S.J., Archbishop of Luxembourg, who is the head of the Conference of European bishops has called for “*fundamental revision*” in Catholic teaching on homosexuality, and said it is wrong to fire Church workers for being gay.

## 2.7 Orthodox Homophobia?

With 50% of the hate crimes against LGBTQ+ individuals in the OSCE region (see above) one cannot escape debating homophobic attitudes, motivated or pretended to be justified by Christian Orthodoxy. Young (2023), documented how Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, offered a startling new explanation of the war in the Ukraine. It was to save Eastern Ukraine from the gays. The patriarch summed up the situation as follows:

For eight years, there have been efforts to destroy what exists in the Donbas. What exists in the Donbas is a rejection, a principled rejection of the so-called values that are now being offered by those who lay claim to global domination. Today, there is a certain test for loyalty to that power, a certain pass into that “happy” world, the world of excessive consumption, the world of illusory freedom. Do you know what that test is? It’s very simple but also horrific: it’s a gay parade. The demand to hold a gay parade is in fact a test for loyalty to that powerful world, and we know that if people or countries resist this demand, they are excluded from that world and treated as alien. (Patriarch Kirill, citation documented in Young, 2022)

His fifteen-minute sermon on the Eastern Orthodox holiday known as Forgiveness Sunday (the last day before Lent), the patriarch, according to Young, 2022, the Patriarch also asserted that resistance to such demands [i.e. a gay parade] is “*suppressed by force*,” which amounts to “*forcible imposition of a sin condemned by divine law*” and which means that the war for Ukraine is “*not a physical but a metaphysical struggle*.”

As Reuters Agency reported on December 5, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin on Monday signed a law expanding Russia’s restrictions on the promotion of what it calls “*LGBT propaganda*”, effectively outlawing any public expression of LGBT behaviour or lifestyle in Russia. Under the new law, which widens Russia’s interpretation of what qualifies as “*LGBT propaganda*”, any action or the spreading of any information that is considered an attempt to promote homosexuality in public, online, or in films, books, or advertising, could incur a heavy fine. The law expands Russia’s previous law against LGBT propaganda that had banned the “*demonstration*” of LGBT behaviour to children. Reuters commented that it comes as the Kremlin exerts increased pressure on minority groups and opponents of Putin at home, quashing independent media groups and further stifling free speech as Moscow ramps up a decade-long campaign to promote what it says are “*traditional*” values. (Reuters, December 5, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-signs-law-expanding-russias-rules-against-lgbt-propaganda-2022-12-05/>).

The shocking reality of the OSCE ODIHR reporting on hate crimes against homosexuals is that the Russian Federation, Armenia, Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia, and Greece alone, all countries with a solid Christian Orthodox denominational majority, in between them witnessed 289 of the 600 hate crimes against LGBTQ+ individuals.

## 2.8 Homophobia in the Muslim World?

Leading figures from the world of Islam have come out very strongly against liberalizing the teachings on homosexuality. Ahram Online, 2017, reported that the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, the leading theological authority of Sunni Islam, Sheikh Ahmed El-Tayeb slammed what he described as calls for allowing homosexuality as a human right.

*“The calls to allow homosexuality as a human right are blatant and are completely strange to eastern men... who are naturally disgusted with such deviance,”* El-Tayeb said. The head of Al-Azhar also slammed calls for gender equality in inheritance and allowing non-Muslim men to marry Muslim women. El-Tayeb also criticised the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which Egypt signed in 1980 without adhering to some of the articles that do not comply with Islamic law, including those on inheritance.

And the spiritual leader of the Iranian Revolution, Khomeini (2023) simply declared that homosexuality is forbidden in all the divine religions. As Jong et al. (2023) have convincingly shown, the Iranian regime now officially describes itself as adhering to “*Political Islam*”. The cruelty of the regime against LGBTQ+ and

women's rights in Iran is now legendary. Solomon et al. (2023), recently analysed the challenges facing LGBTQ + individuals in the MENA region, especially in Iran, Turkey, and Egypt. Solomon et al. (2023) speak about the harsh realities and general human rights violations endured by LGBTQ+ individuals in these countries. The protection and well-being of LGBTQ+ communities in Iran, Turkey, and Egypt remain under continuous threat, ranging from oppressive legal frameworks and discriminatory policies to systemic violence and social cohesion. The current situation of LGBTQ+ rights in these countries demand immediate attention and joint efforts to effect real change. The case of Iran, Solomon et al. (2023) say, has revealed the significance of how interlocking systems of power affect those who are most marginalized in Iran. One witnesses the repressive nature of the legal system, where homosexuality is criminalized, and individuals face persecution, arbitrary arrests, and even the death penalty. Moreover, the intersection of LGBTQ+ identities with religion, gender, and class has further compounded the discrimination experienced by these communities, making it imperative to adopt intersectional solutions.

In Turkey, according to Solomon et al. (2023), a paradoxical situation emerges, with certain legal protections for LGBTQ+ individuals existing alongside social and cultural challenges. Despite constitutional guarantees of equality and non-discrimination, LGBTQ+ people still face systemic discrimination, violence, and exclusion. Although, Solomon et al. (2023), argue, Turkey's culture is largely impacted by European values because of its geographical location, traditional Islamic values remain deeply ingrained in most of the social institutions of the country. The impact of these values on Turkish policymaking has resulted in further marginalization, stigmatization, and socially disadvantageous results for those who do not conform to the dominant hetero-normative gender norms and sexual identities. Although homosexuality is treated by Turkish law in a rather neutral way culturally, it remains a taboo subject in most areas of Turkish society, existing in a "don't ask, don't tell" setting.

Egypt, according to Solomon et al. (2023), presents its own set of challenges, where societal norms, religious conservatism, and an oppressive legal environment combine to marginalize and stigmatize LGBTQ+ individuals. Similarly, to Turkey, Egypt does not explicitly ban or criminalize homosexuality, but state security agencies target, criminalize and imprison LGBTQ+ individuals.

Vidino and Meleagrou-Hitchens (2022) highlight in their study that, over the last few decades, hateful rhetoric, and occasional acts of violence against the LGBTQIA + community in the United States and virtually all other Western countries have increasingly come from Islamist actors. Vidino and Meleagrou-Hitchens (2022) underline that both in the Muslim world and in the West, mainstream Islamists, such as those from Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist backgrounds, depict homosexuality as a perversion and a grave sin. Islamist anti-LGBTQIA + rhetoric takes different angles. At times, the study by Vidino and Meleagrou-Hitchens (2022) argues, focuses on warning the Muslim community about engaging in homosexual acts, evoking the divine punishments that await those who do so. The study by Vidino and Meleagrou-Hitchens (2022) highlights as well that Jihadist groups adopt even more extreme positions on homosexuality and justify killing those who engage in it. The Islamic State

has been particularly ruthless in its persecution of homosexuals, enacting theatrical executions of individuals it accused of being gay and broadcasting them when it controlled territory in Syria and Iraq. The study by Vidino and Meleagrou-Hitchens (2022) also maintains that lastly, certain prominent Islamists concur with the jihadist viewpoint that, in an ideal Islamic state, the death penalty should be enforced against homosexuals. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that in recent years the LGBTQIA+ community in the West has suffered a series of terrorist attacks perpetrated by individuals inspired by Islamist and/or jihadist ideology. Successful attacks against LGBTQIA+ targets were carried out in Orlando, Florida (2016, 49 killed), Dresden, Germany (2020, 1 killed), and Oslo, Norway (2022, 2 killed); other attacks were foiled in France, the Netherlands, the U.S. and the UK.

Surveying other high-impact studies on Islamism and homosexuality, one should first mention the qualitative field-work anthropological study by Mahdavi (2007). At great risk to the author who undertook her work as a single woman in Iran, her paper examines the sexual and social practices of young people in the country. Young people in urban areas live under the rubric of a fundamentalist, Islamist regime which restricts social freedoms such as premarital heterosexual contact, homosexual encounters, dancing, alcohol consumption and large group gatherings. Drawing on close focus research and individual and group interviews, Mahdavi (2007) seeks to analyse young people's responses to these constraints. Her findings suggest that many young adults use their 'rebellious' social behaviour to make political statements against a regime that dissatisfies them; saying, in their own words, that they are enacting and bringing about a 'sexual revolution'. Kaya (2015) by contrast uses hard-core openly available social science opinion surveys to arrive at a verdict about "the culture wars" in Turkey. Kaye, 2015 assesses whether social and political attitudes became polarized in Turkish society between 1990 and 2011. Interestingly, Kaya found some evidence for rising conservatism and rejection of homosexuality, especially in the 1990s.

## References

- America, The Jesuit Review. (2023). Pope Francis says 'ideology of gender' is 'dangerous' and that 'everyone' will vote in the Synod, in new interview with La Nacion. Gerard O'Connell, March 10, 2023. <https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2023/03/10/pope-francis-ideology-gender-theory-synod-244888>
- Catechism. (2023). *Catechism of the Catholic Church*. The Holy See. [https://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/\\_INDEX.HTM](https://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM)
- Europol. (2023). *European union terrorism situation and trend report*. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publication-events/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2023-te-sat>
- European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. (2020). *EU LGBTI survey II—press pack*. <http://fra.europa.eu/de/media/press-packs/eu-lgbti-survey>
- Haberl, F., Eberman, E., & Gomez-Diaz, L. (2023). Muslim\*innen im Großraum Wien zwischen Religion und Rechtsstaat. Fokus Religion und Rechtsstaat [KIRAS-Forschungsprojekt-Nr. 879675]. KIRAS, Vienna. <https://www.kiras.at/fileadmin/dateien/Endbericht%20Fokus%20Religion%20und%20Rechtsstaat%20%28FORREST%29.pdf>.

- Inglehart, R. F., Ponarin, E., & Inglehart, R. C. (2017). Cultural change, slow and fast: The distinctive trajectory of norms governing gender equality and sexual orientation. *Social Forces*, 95(4), 1313–1340.
- Jong, A., & Ali, R. (2023). Political Islam as an incomplete and contested category: A post-foundationalist revision. *Religions*, 14(8), 980. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14080980>
- OSCE ODIHR. (2023). *Hate crime reporting*. Anti LGBTI Hate Crime. <https://hatecrime.osce.org/anti-lgbti-hate-crime>
- Kaya, Y. (2015). The culture wars redux? The polarization of social and political attitudes in Turkey. *Social Currents*, 2(4), 393–412.
- Khameinei, I. (2023). *Homosexuality is forbidden in all the divine religions*. <https://english.khameinei.ir/news/9398/Homosexuality-is-forbidden-in-all-the-divine-religions>
- Mahdavi, P. (2007). Passionate uprisings: Young people, sexuality and politics in post-revolutionary Iran. *Culture, Health & Sexuality*, 9(5), 445–457.
- National Catholic Reporter. (2022). *German cardinal calls for change in church teaching on homosexuality*. <https://www.ncronline.org/news/theology/german-cardinal-calls-change-church-teaching-homosexuality>
- Solomon, H., & Bekker, S. (2023). *Intersectionality and LGBTQ+ Rights: A comparative analysis of Iran, Turkey, and Egypt*. Nova Science Publishers.
- Tausch, A., & Obirek, S. (2020). Catholics, the open society, and tolerance of homosexuals. In *Global catholicism, tolerance and the open society*. Springer. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23239-9\\_6](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23239-9_6)
- The Tablet. (2019). *Cardinal Sarah says world blighted by Europe's sickness*. by James Roberts. <https://www.thetablet.co.uk/news/11591/cardinal-sarah-says-world-blighted-by-europe-s-sickness>
- Vidino, L., & Meleagrou-Hitchens, A. (2022). *Islamist homophobia in the West: From rhetoric to violence*. Program on Extremism, George Washington University; and National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center, Reports, Projects, and Research No. 14. <https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/ncitereportsresearch/14>
- Young, C. (2023). Blaming the Ukraine invasion on ... the gays? How the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, a Putin enabler, spins the war. Commentary, March 9, 2022, Cato Institute, Washington D. C. <https://www.cato.org/commentary/blaming-ukraine-invasion-gays>

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.



# Chapter 3

## Using World Values Survey and European Social Survey Data on Homosexuality and Homonegativity: The Comparative Evidence from the Social Sciences



**Abstract** In this chapter we present some of the best known studies on the subject, based on data from the World Values Survey and the European Social Survey on Homosexuality and HomoNegativity. Because of their enormous importance in the literature of the social sciences, our presentation begins with the contribution of Ronald F. Inglehart, who stands out in the literature of world values research, and we highlight in this context his essay written in 2017 together with associates, which found that high levels of economic and physical security are conducive to a shift from material to post-material values, and this shift tends to make people more favourable to the importance of change, and the acceptance of gender equality, divorce, and homosexuality. The other studies reviewed, highlight cross national variations and public opinion about homosexuality, the impact of economic inequality across and within nations on attitudes towards homosexuality, the role of religion in explaining homophobic attitudes, the culture wars on homosexuality, religious particularism, religious salience and home negativity homonegativity; Post-materialism, the world society and multiple modernities, cohort socialisation and homonegativity, and finally the differential effects of religious beliefs and welfare regimes on homonegativity.

**Keywords** Homonegativity · World Values Survey · LGBTQ+ · Religion · Sociology · Opinion polls · Multivariate models

In the following chapter, we present some of the more well-known studies on the subject. We begin with the contributions of Ronald F. Inglehart and present the other approaches in alphabetical order of the authors' surnames.

### 3.1 Inglehart: Homosexuality and Existential Security

Without question, the work of the late Inglehart stands out in the literature on global value research. Inglehart, in some of his major publications (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart, 2018a, b, 2020) developed an interpretation of global value change based

on a well-known two-dimensional scale of global values and global value change. It is based on the statistical technique of factor analysis of up to twenty key World Values Survey variables from the original 900 + WVS survey items. These 900 items cover virtually all major areas of human concern, from religion to politics and from economic to social life. The two Inglehart dimensions are: (1) the Traditional/Secular-Rational dimension and (2) the Survival/Self-expression dimension. In a factor analysis of ten indicators, these two dimensions explain more than 70 per cent of the cross-national variance. Each of these dimensions is strongly correlated with scores on other important variables. For Inglehart and Baker (2000), all pre-industrial societies have relatively low levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce and homosexuality; and tend to emphasise male dominance in economic and political life. There is respect for parental authority and the importance of family life, and these societies are relatively authoritarian. Most of them place a strong emphasis on religion. Advanced industrial societies tend to have the opposite characteristics.

Inglehart et al. (2017), found that that high levels of economic and physical security are conducive to a shift from materialist to postmaterialist values—and that this shift tends to make people more favourable to important social changes. Inglehart et al. (2017) maintain that (1) These value changes occur with exceptionally large time lags between the onset of the conditions conducive to them, and the societal changes they produce—as previous work implies but does not demonstrate. The evidence suggests that there was a time lag of forty to fifty years between when Western societies first attained high levels of economic and physical security after World War II, and related societal changes such as legalization of same-sex marriage. A distinctive set of “individual-choice norms,” dealing with acceptance of gender equality, divorce, abortion, and homosexuality, is moving on a different trajectory from other cultural changes. These norms are closely linked with human fertility rates and require severe self-repression. Although basic values normally change at the pace of intergenerational population replacement, the shift from pro-fertility norms to individual-choice norms is now moving much faster, having reached a tipping point where conformist pressures have reversed polarity and are now accelerating changes they once resisted. Inglehart et al. (2017) test these claims against data from eighty countries containing most of the world’s population, surveyed from 1981 to 2014.

Inglehart et al. (2017) also found that people who reject gender equality also tend to reject homosexuality, divorce and abortion, endorsing traditional pro-fertility norms; conversely, acceptance of gender equality, homosexuality, divorce and abortion go together in an individual-choice syndrome. Most societies, as Inglehart et al. (2017) argue, no longer require high fertility rates, and they have dropped dramatically—especially in high-income societies where life expectancy rates have almost doubled in the past century and infant mortality rates have fallen to one-thirtieth of their 1950 level. For many years, it has no longer been necessary for women to produce six to eight children in order to replace the population. But deep-rooted cultural norms change slowly. Virtually all religions that became major world faiths emphasize pro-fertility norms—and they do so vigorously, instilling the belief, Inglehart et al. (2017) maintain that violators of these norms will burn in hell for all eternity.



It was necessary, as Inglehart et al. (2017) argue, to make these cultural sanctions severe because pro-fertility norms require repression of strong natural urges and defining homosexuality as sinful and unnatural imposes repression and self-hatred on gays and lesbians. These norms are no longer necessary for survival, but as Inglehart et al. (2017) maintain, deep-rooted cultural norms resist change. Nevertheless, modernization brings high levels of existential security.

Because all major world religions traditionally supported pro-fertility norms, people with strong religious beliefs, and societies where religion is strongest, will be least likely to support individual choice norms.

### **3.2 Adamczyk: Cross-National Variations in Public Opinion About Homosexuality**

For the widely received study by Adamczyk and Pitt (2009), religion is often seen as an important predictor of attitudes about homosexuality. However, cross-national differences in cultural orientations suggest that the role religion has in explaining homosexual attitudes may depend on a nation's cultural context. The authors merge ideas from cultural sociology and religious contextual effects to explain cross-national variation in public opinion about homosexuality. Using data from the fourth wave of the World Values Survey and hierarchical modelling techniques, they find support for the micro and macro effects of religion and a survival versus self-expressive cultural orientation. Moreover, they find that personal religious beliefs have a greater effect on attitudes about homosexuality in countries like the United States, which have a strong self-expressive cultural orientation.

While, for example, same-sex marriage is permitted in Canada, Belgium, and the Netherlands, homosexuality is illegal and gay marriage is unthinkable in most African nations. Adamczyk et al. (2009) lament that very little research has been done to explain variation in attitudes about homosexuality in non-Western nations. Research done on the United States typically points to religion as one of the strongest predictors of attitudes about homosexuality. But, because research has primarily been conducted in Christian nations, it is not clear how non-Judeo-Christian faiths shape public opinion about homosexuality. Additionally, work in cultural sociology suggests that economic development and political stability may play a major role in shaping public opinion towards non-normative groups and behaviours, like homosexuality.

To examine the macro and micro level effects of religion and culture Adamczyk et al. (2009) used data from the fourth wave of the World Values Surveys. The sample included adults 18 and over from 40 societies. The key outcome variable is disapproval of homosexuality, which is measured using a single question that asks whether homosexuality can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between. Responses ranged from always wrong = 1 to always right = 10. The variable was reverse coded so that higher numbers indicate more disapproval.

Adamczyk et al. (2009) find that the largest correlation for attitudes about homosexuality is the country survival vs. self-expression index ( $r = 0.38$ ), which is followed by living in a Muslim-majority country ( $r = 0.35$ ), and then Muslim affiliation ( $r = 0.29$ ) and religious importance ( $r = 0.25$ ). Individual religious importance is moderately correlated with the country survival vs. self-expression index ( $r = 0.23$ ), Muslim affiliation ( $r = 0.26$ ), and living in a Muslim-majority country ( $r = 0.27$ ). Not surprisingly, Muslim affiliates are more likely to be living in a Muslim-majority nation ( $r = 0.63$ ).

People in older cohorts are more likely to disapprove of homosexuality than people in younger cohorts. Adamczyk et al. (2009) also find that females appear to have more liberal attitudes about homosexuality than men. Likewise, married individuals are more likely to disapprove of homosexuality than single or divorced people. Also, increases in educational attainment are associated with more approving attitudes about homosexuality. At the individual-level, a greater emphasis on survival, as opposed to self-expressive values, is associated with more disapproving attitudes about homosexuality.

Not surprisingly, Adamczyk et al. (2009) maintain, individuals who say that they find religion important are more likely to disapprove of homosexuality, which offers support for our first hypothesis. Compared to Muslims, people with no religion, Catholics, Jews, people who did not identify a religion, and individuals for whom the study did not have appropriate information to categorize them have more approving attitudes about homosexuality. Muslims do not differ significantly in their disapproval of homosexuality from Protestants, Hindus, Buddhists, Orthodox Christians and people who affiliate with a religion.

Compared to people living in Muslim-majority nations, people who live in Catholic and Protestant majority countries have, as Adamczyk et al. (2009) maintain, more approving attitudes towards homosexuality, regardless of the religion with which they personally affiliate. There is no significant difference in attitudes about homosexuality for people who live in a Christian Orthodox, Hindu, or Buddhist as opposed to a Muslim nation.

In nations characterized by a strong survival orientation, public opinion about homosexuality is highly disapproving, regardless of the individual's personal religious belief.

Consistent with Inglehart (see above), Adamczyk and Pitt (2009) also found that as societies shift their emphasis from survival to self-expression, attitudes about homosexuality become more accepting. In countries that have a stronger survivalist orientation, religiously inspired attitudes about homosexuality are likely to be consistent with secular norms and laws, giving attitudes about homosexuality wide-spread support. As a result, personal religiosity in countries characterized by a stronger survival orientation does not have much of an effect on attitudes about homosexuality. However, Adamczyk et al. (2009) say, when the cultural emphasis within countries shifts to self-expression, secular norms and laws regarding homosexuality become more liberal, providing a greater role for religion to influence attitudes about homosexuality. Hence, as Adamczyk et al. (2009) maintain, personal religious beliefs have a greater effect on attitudes about homosexuality in developed countries like

the United States, which are characterized by a high level of self-expression and a diversity of perspectives, than in countries like Zimbabwe, which have a stronger survival orientation.

These findings, Adamczyk et al. (2009), suggest that one may need to reorient our thinking about the relationship between religion, and tolerance for unfamiliar groups. Economic and political stability is likely to make all people within a nation more tolerant of non-normative groups and ideas. However, as economic, and political stability contributes to a self-expressive value orientation, religious attitudes may not become more liberal. Rather than religion having less of an influence on attitudes as nations develop, shifts from survival to self-expression are likely to provide a greater role for religion to influence attitudes. Adamczyk et al. (2009) offer an insight into what the study might expect as countries further industrialize and develop—namely increasing tolerance for homosexuality, but also a stronger relationship between religious beliefs and disapproval of homosexuality.

While Muslims appeared less likely to approve of homosexuality than Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists and people with no religion, they did not differ significantly from Protestants in their attitudes about homosexuality. One reason for Protestants and Muslims similar attitudes may be, as Adamczyk et al. (2009) suggest, the “brand” of Protestantism that is growing in the world today. While the Catholic Church and mainline Protestant denominations have been losing members, conservative Protestant religious groups, like Pentecostals, have been steadily increasing, not just within the United States and Europe, but across the globe. Adamczyk et al. (2009) also think that relative to mainline Protestants and Catholics, conservative Protestants tend to take a literal interpretation of the bible, and they have remained steadfast in their traditional beliefs about sexual morality. Hence, compared to Jews, Catholics and mainline Protestants, conservative Protestants tend to have more conservative sex-related attitudes.

Like Islam, the Catholic Church does not officially support homosexuality. But, unlike Islam, Adamczyk et al. (2009) maintain, the Catholic Church in Europe has experienced declining membership since Vatican II, which may have reduced the power of the church to influence laws, policies, media, norms, family structures and so forth. In Latin America, where the Catholic Church has remained relatively strong, issues associated with economic inequality have gained importance. If the growing number of conservative Protestants and Muslims across the world is any indication, religion’s influence is not declining, even as countries develop and stabilize. However, shifts in the issues of interest to religious leaders and adherents could have, Adamczyk et al. (2009) think, a powerful bearing on the development of national policies and laws, including the legality of homosexuality.

The key outcome variable in the study Adamczyk and Chen (2015), is again disapproval of homosexuality, which is measured using a single question that asks whether homosexuality can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between. The variable was reverse coded so that 1 = always justified and 10 = never justified. Adamczyk and Chen (2015) found that across the five Confucian societies in the World Values Survey, only individual feelings about prostitution and

divorce were consistently associated with attitudes about homosexuality. In Confucian nations, according to Adamczyk and Chen (2015), there were no significant relationships between attitudes about homosexuality and values related to behaving properly, conformity, gender roles, and filial piety. There was no consistency in the level of significance for the relationship between traditional gender roles and attitudes about homosexuality.

### **3.3 Anderson, and Fetner: The Impact of Economic Inequality Across and Within Nations on Attitudes Toward Homosexuality**

Using hierarchical linear models fitted to data from the World Values Survey and national statistics for 35 countries, Anderson and Fetner (2008) build on the post-materialist thesis by assessing the impact of economic inequality across and within nations on attitudes toward homosexuality. It provides evidence that tolerance tends to decline as national income inequality rises. Anderson and Fetner (2008) maintain that attitudes of the working class are generally less tolerant, and contrary to expectations of the postmaterialist thesis, are seemingly unaffected by economic development. Economic development influences attitudes only for those who benefit most. These findings have, as Anderson and Fetner (2008) maintain, political implications, suggesting that state policies that have the goal of economic growth but fail to consider economic inequality may contribute to intolerant social and political values, an attribute widely considered detrimental for the health of democracy.

Inglehart's postmaterialist thesis, as Anderson and Fetner (2008) argue, suggests that liberal values result from democracy, economic development and modernization. Anderson and Fetner (2008) discard this thesis and take the issue with the assumption that national economic prosperity affects all members within a nation in a similar manner. Given the vast differences in economic conditions and life chances according to the income group, social class and occupation, even within rich democracies, Anderson and Fetner (2008) argue that all members of society do not benefit equally from economic development. Following the logic of the postmaterialist thesis, Anderson and Fetner (2008) expect that if those with low economic standing are not completely free of material concerns they will exhibit less tolerance than those with high economic standing. Despite the large body of research supporting the main argument of the postmaterialist thesis, variation in social attitudes among rich nations—or for that matter, among poor nations—regardless of whether they experienced Communist rule in the past or not has not been adequately explained. Anderson and Fetner (2008) also say that the link between the distribution of resources within nations and postmaterialist values has not been sufficiently studied. Since the benefits of economic prosperity are not equally distributed throughout a nation's population, not all experience the freedom from material concerns that is so important to the postmaterialist thesis. Moreover, Anderson and Fetner (2008) argue, there is much

variation in the level of income inequality across countries, regardless of level of economic development and democratic tradition. Some highly developed nations, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, have relatively high levels of income inequality compared to other highly developed nations such as the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. A high level of inequality leads to a low level of social trust across all members of society, which in turn leads to low tolerance. Generalized trust pertains to the trust of others in general, or simply put, an attitude of faith in humankind. It is generalized trust that produces more tolerant attitudes toward others, including outgroups.

Anderson and Fetner (2008) now found that per-capita GDP had a very strong positive influence on tolerance to homosexuality when no other contextual variables were included in the statistical models. When other important context variables were controlled for, however, the effects of per-capita GDP were reduced dramatically. Further analysis that allowed per-capita GDP to interact with social class indicated that economic development matters significantly in the expected manner for professionals and managers but not for the working class. The findings, Anderson and Fetner (2008) argue, also reveal that income inequality within countries was negatively related to tolerance toward homosexuality, regardless of social class. Taken together these findings suggest that the postmaterialist thesis requires qualification.

The findings reported by Anderson and Fetner (2008) also suggest that economic inequality undermines social trust, which then produces social intolerance. While Anderson and Fetner (2008) did not measure trust directly, they showed a clear link between high levels of economic inequality and low levels of social tolerance. Similar to Inglehart et al. (2000), Anderson and Fetner (2008) found that former Communist rule has a strong negative effect on attitudes toward homosexuality. Contrary to their argument, however, this “*Communist effect*” is unrelated to economic development, which was controlled for in the statistical models. This finding, according to Anderson and Fetner (2008) suggests that cultural characteristics, which have less to do with economic development than with a lack of social trust related to Communist oppression, may be responsible for less tolerant attitudes. It is also possible, as Anderson and Fetner (2008) suggest, that the “*Communist effect*” reflects other related factors such as varying levels of nationalism, the role of churches, and the size of lesbian and gay social movements.

Tolerance for homosexuality is much more likely among professionals and managers than among the working class. This implies that cross-national studies of attitudes and values are, according to Anderson and Fetner (2008), misguided to automatically proceed as if national populations are homogenous in terms of how they react to national levels of economic prosperity. For Anderson and Fetner (2008), class and national prosperity interact in their effects on attitudes. On average, and controlling for other important predictors, the gap in attitudes toward homosexuality between the middle and working classes is greater in countries with high per-capita GDP than in others. Economic development is certainly important, then, but it cannot explain the divergence of attitudes according to social class. For Anderson and Fetner

(2008), the postmaterialist thesis does not apply equally to all groups within a particular country—economic development is important, but more so for those who gain most from it.

Although Anderson and Fetner (2008) focused exclusively on attitudes toward homosexuality, they think that there is good reason to believe that results would be similar for many other postmaterialist issues. Overall economic prosperity promotes tolerance among those in good economic positions, while high levels of inequality suppress tolerance regardless of economic group.

### **3.4 Firdauzi, Hidayat, and Darmawan: The Role of Religion in Explaining Homophobic Attitudes**

The study by Indrawan Firdauzi and associates (Firdauzi et al. 2022) assumes that currently, most communities in Southeast Asia are homophobic, and homosexuals suffer considerable rejection. Less than 20% of the community could justify the existence of homosexuals. Moreover, 64% of the people in Southeast Asia believe that homosexuals will not be able to become good parents. 40% of the respondents do not refuse to socialize and live side-by-side as neighbours in their environment despite their non-normative behaviour. Our results indicate that public receptivity toward homosexual Southeast Asia is also relatively low.

The study by Firdauzi et al. (2022) also shows that age influences individual perceptions toward homosexuals differently for each model. Firdauzi et al. (2022) suggest that the older a person is more likely to reject the existence of homosexuality. Also, when people get older, they believe that homosexuals will not be able to be good parents like heterosexual couples. This finding supports several studies that have been conducted in other regions.

The second finding in Firdauzi et al. (2022) shows that someone with a higher religious level has more probability of rejecting homosexuality. A high-level religious person prefers not to socialize with homosexuals, nor do they want to live in the same environment as homosexuals. In addition, a religious person believes homosexuals will never be a good parents when they have kids. Although it has a lower probability value, the results of the country group analysis show that homonegativity still occurs in countries that legalize homosexuality in their constitution. This finding, Firdauzi et al. (2022) argue, is consistent with previous work that found a higher religious people tend to reject the existence of homosexuals in their environment. Firdauzi et al. (2022) suggest that people who access the internet daily have a tendency to be more open to accepting the existence of homosexuals in daily life, encouraging them to believe that homosexuals can be good parents as well as heterosexual couple. In countries where homosexuality is legal, daily internet access shows a very significant increase compared to the probability that appears in the pooled analysis. Countries with vague regulations about homosexuality also show a reasonably high probability

of perceptions of homosexuals to be good parents and encourage them to want to socialize with other people homosexuals.

In general, more than half of the people in seven countries in Southeast Asia have a tendency to reject the existence of homosexuality. Most of them, as Firdauzi et al. (2022) maintain, are reluctant to socialize with or be neighbours with homosexuals. In addition, they are less likely to believe that homosexuals will become good parents when they choose to have or adopt children. According to Firdauzi et al., age has a different influence on each model; the older a person, the more likely they will reject the existence of homosexuality. An older person thinks that homosexuals cannot be good parents like heterosexual couples. However, they do not refuse to socialize and neighbour with homosexuals. The level of religiosity has a negative influence on homosexuality. It has the same direction in all models, meaning that a higher level of religiosity will encourage the person not to accept the presence of homosexuals. Also, they believe that homosexuals will not become good parents and tend not to want to socialize and be neighbours with homosexuals. However, in countries that legalized homosexuality, a higher level of religiosity has a lower influence compared to countries that prohibit homosexual behaviour.

### **3.5 Hildebrandt, Jäckle and Wenzelburger: The Culture Wars on Homosexuality**

Hildebrandt and Jäckle (2020, 2023), as well as Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) have achieved a great citation influence by their studies on the subject.

- Hildebrandt and Jäckle (2020): Focusing on the interaction for several moral attitudes which are part of the World Values Survey (WVS), namely, attitudes toward abortion, divorce, euthanasia, homosexuality and suicide most studies not only confirm the generally assumed idea that the more religious a respondent is, the higher their level of social conservatism tends to be, but find that this effect of religiosity is stronger in more developed countries. As development progresses, both groups (secular and religious) become less socially conservative and thus more tolerant, but secular people do so at a considerably faster rate, widening the gap between the two groups even further. This polarization fuels the “culture war” raging in many developed democracies over issues such as same-sex marriage or abortion law.
- Hildebrandt and Jäckle (2023): Using data from the seventh wave of the World Values Survey (2017–2021), this article provides evidence that the sex difference in attitudes on homosexuality is not universal, but limited almost exclusively to Europe and the Americas, indicating the need to replicate studies conducted in these societies in global cross-country comparisons. Contrary to predictions of the social role theory or biosocial construction theory, but in line with predictions from evolutionary psychology and a growing number of empirical studies in this

field, the sex difference in attitudes towards homosexuality widens with rising gender equality and development, especially when the two coincide.

- Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015): Although attitudes toward homosexuality have become more liberal, particularly in industrialized Western countries, there is still a great deal of variance in terms of worldwide levels of homonegativity. Using data from the World Values Survey (1999–2004, 2005–2009), Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) seek to explain this variance by means of a multilevel analysis of 79 countries. Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) include characteristics on the individual level, as age or gender, as well as aggregate variables linked to specificities of the nation-states. In particular, Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) focus on the religious denomination of a person and her religiosity to explain her attitude toward homosexuality. The study finds clear differences in levels of homonegativity among the followers of the individual religions.

Hildebrandt and Jäckle (2023) employ data from 56 countries that took part in the sixth wave of the WVS, collected between 2010 and 2014. They measure moral attitudes on the basis of respondents' ratings of various behaviours on a 10-point scale ranging from 1, "never justifiable," to 10, "always justified." For the morality domains of sexuality/partnership and the termination of life, they use the items abortion, divorce, homosexuality and suicide. For the civic morality domain, they rely on respondents' ratings of benefit fraud, fare dodging on public transport, tax cheating, accepting a bribe in the course of duties, and stealing property. Their measure of the violence dimension is based on responses to one question on unspecific violence (violence against other people) and two questions on domestic violence (a husband beating his wife, parents beating their children).

For religiosity, they use two different measures: "how important is religion in your life" (1 "very important," 4 "not at all important") and "how important is God in your life?" (1 "not at all important," 10 "very important"). The authors contend that their analyses confirm that people's attitudes toward sexuality/partnership and the termination of life become more polarized as development levels rise. At a lower level of development, religious individuals tend to disapprove of violence and violations of civic morality to a greater extent than secular individuals. At higher levels of development, this gap does not widen but narrows. In these two domains, religious and secular people's attitudes tend to converge rather than become more polarized. In highly developed countries, the positions do not just converge, but are in fact reversed: The secular show lower approval of violence and greater civic morality than the religious. This group adheres to norms not because they were instituted by God, but because of a morality of reason.

Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) point out that the trend of declining homonegativity in many Western countries is less clear if one looks at other regions of the world. In several countries, such as Turkey or China, the percentage of people who would be opposed to having homosexual neighbours has remained mostly constant. In those countries, the reactions to gay and lesbian people are the same as 20 years ago. Thus, according to the results of the World Values Survey, the average levels of homonegativity lie very far apart from one another in a worldwide comparison. This high



level of cross-country variance leads us to the fundamental question: How can the varying degrees of homonegativity be explained? In focusing primarily on religion and religiosity as determinants of homonegativity, Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) take a specific perspective, while well-known determinants of homonegativity such as age or education are controlled for. Consequently, the precise research question for Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) is as follows: How can adherence to a religion and the religiosity of an individual explain his or her homonegativity? For Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015), homonegativity should be understood as an aversion to homosexuality as a social practice or way of life. To measure this concept, Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) use a question of the WVS that asks whether homosexuality can be justified. This question can be answered on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means always justifiable and 10 stands for never justifiable. Some studies identify a further aspect of homonegativity that involves the question to what extent a person exhibits a negative, biased attitude toward gays and lesbians as individuals (going as far as aggressive prejudices and feelings of hate). Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) capture this second aspect of homonegativity using the WVS question whether one dislikes a homosexual person as a neighbour (scale: 1 to 3).

What are the results of the Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) study? The comparison of levels of homonegativity in different countries shows that there are substantial differences in the attitudes of people toward homosexuality.

Men are more homonegative than women, older people more so than young, married more so than unmarried, people with children more so than those without, people with low income more so than people with higher income, people with a lower education level more so than those with a higher education level. If the respondents are divided into groups based on their employment status, students and, contingent on the dependent variable, the self-employed present low homonegativity. In contrast, the attitudes of retirees, housewives, and the unemployed are more negative toward homosexuals. This insight, Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) argue, integrates well into Inglehart's theory of value change: the more post-material a person is, the lower their homonegativity. There are, as Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) also say, clear differences in levels of homonegativity among the followers of the individual religions: Muslims make up the homonegative end of the scale, whereas Buddhists and atheists are on the other extreme. Regarding religiosity, Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) find that religious people are, in general, more homonegative. This effect is, however, conditioned by religious affiliation. For Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015), the religiosity of a Muslim affects his or her attitudes toward homosexuals more negatively than would the religiosity of a Buddhist. Also relevant for the attitudes toward homosexuality is, according to Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) the nature of religious motivation: Extrinsically motivation strengthens the negative effect of religiosity on attitudes toward gay and lesbian people. The results of the multi-level regression analysis, Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) maintain, show that the aggregate variables help explain the variance with regard to homonegativity. Purely statistically speaking, the most influential aggregate-level variable is whether or not a country is a signatory to the UN Declaration on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.

Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) also conclude that the longer homosexual activities have been compliant with the law, the lower the homonegativity of the citizens. The current legal situation in terms of homosexuality also tends to influence homonegativity, even if the results cannot be claimed as valid for the entire sample of countries. In states where homosexual people have more legal rights, the population presents lower homonegativity. Also for Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015), the level of homonegativity in communist or post-communist countries is significantly higher than in non- or non-post-communist countries. In communist or post-communist countries, an increase in religiosity leads to a less strong rise in homonegativity than in non-communist countries.

### 3.6 Janssen and Scheepers: Religious Particularism, Religious Salience and Homonegativity

As our empirical work developed, it turned out that the categories used in the empirical study by Janssen and Scheepers (2018), using World Values Survey data to explain homonegativity, became extremely useful. Janssen and Scheepers (2018), when measuring the effect of religion on homonegativity, distinguish between.

- Religious attendance
- Religious particularism
- Religious salience.

These categories are well-known components of the sociology of religion, also in the context of empirical research, using World Values Survey data (Ekici et al. 2015; Filsinger, 1976; González, 2011; Jelen, 1993; Malhotra, 2010; Raiya et al., 2008; Ruiter et al., 2009; Scheepers et al., 2002), and have been largely overlooked in most existing studies on the subject of religion and homonegativity. Such an approach is also well compatible with the perspective of tolerance and ecumenical dialogue, championed for a long time by the German Muslim theologian Mouhanad Khorchide (El Omari et al., 2020; Kasper & Khorchide, 2017; Khorchide, 2015, 2016; Khorchide et al., 2013; Khorchide & Stosch, 2019).

In the influential article by Janssen and Scheepers (2018), the authors contend that religiosity appears to be one of the strongest socializing determinants to explain rejection of homosexuality. This relationship is based on the premise that individuals' moral attitudes are adopted via exposure to socializing agents—in this respect, religious institutions. Although most religions emphasize that people should respect others, most religions tend to categorize homosexuality as something “unnatural” or “impure”.

To test their hypotheses, Janssen and Scheepers (2018) used the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS). The data were collected in the period 2010 and 2014 in 60 countries around the world, and more than 90,000 respondents participated.

The dependent variable for Janssen and Scheepers (2018) was the rejection of homosexuality. Respondents were asked whether they think homosexuality can always or never be justified. Respondents could answer this question by using a 10-point scale ranging from 1 to 10. In the current study, this variable was recoded in a way that a higher score on this scale means that respondents reject homosexuality more strongly, ranging from 1 = homosexuality can always be justified to 10 = homosexuality can never be justified.

To measure religious denomination, Janssen and Scheepers (2018) used the World Values Survey item whether respondents considered themselves belonging to a religion or religious denomination. If yes, which one? A distinction was made between individuals who (0) do not belong to a denomination, (1) Roman Catholic, (2) Protestant, (3) Orthodox (Russian/Greek/etc.), (4) Muslim, (5) Hindu, (6) Buddhist, (7) Other Christian, and (8) Other.

Religious attendance was measured by Janssen and Scheepers (2018) with the following World Values Survey question: "Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these days?" Respondents could answer with (1) more than once a week, (2) once a week, (3) once a month, (4) only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days, (5) once a year, (6) less often, and (7) practically never. Religious attendance was recoded in a way that a higher score means that respondents have a higher frequency of religious attendance.

Religious particularism was measured by Janssen and Scheepers (2018) with the responses in the World Values Survey to the statement: "The only acceptable religion is my religion." Respondents had to indicate whether they (1) strongly agree to (4) strongly disagree with this statement. It was recoded in such a way that a higher score means that respondents have stronger religious particularistic beliefs.

To measure religious saliency, Janssen and Scheepers (2018) used the World Values Survey item in which respondents were asked to indicate how important religion is in their life. Respondents could answer with (1) very important, (2) rather important, (3) not very important, or (4) not at all important. Religious saliency was recoded such that a higher score means that respondents are more religiously salient.

To measure individuals' authoritarian personality, Janssen and Scheepers (2018) worked with the World Values Survey checklist of 11 qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Respondents had to indicate which, if any, they consider to be especially important (1) or not (0). They could choose up to five. A scale was made with three qualities: "obedience," "imagination," and "independence." First, scores on the qualities "imagination" and "independence" were reversed, because these two are the opposite of authoritarianism. Second, the scores on the three qualities were summed, and the mean score was calculated. Respondents had to have a least a valid score on two out of three qualities to have a valid score on this scale. A higher score on this scale means that respondents have more authoritarian child-rearing values and, therefore, a stronger authoritarian personality.

To measure individuals' traditional gender beliefs, Janssen and Scheepers (2018) used the following statements by respondents in the World Values Survey: "When a mother works for pay, the children suffer"; "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do"; "A university education is more important for a boy than for

a girl”; and “On the whole, men make better business executives than women do.” Respondents had to indicate whether they (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) disagree, or (4) strongly disagree with these statements. All statements were recoded in such a way that a higher score means that respondents have a more traditional opinion about gender roles.

Education, gender, age, individual’s income and marital status were included as control variables. Initially, 90,350 respondents were included in the data from 60 different countries. However, five countries were excluded from the data, since they had a missing value on the dependent or independent variables. Then the data consisted of 55 countries with a total 84,064 respondents. After listwise exclusion of the respondents with missing values on the dependent and independent variables, the data consisted of 67,648 respondents. Those respondents with a missing value on any variable were excluded, because the number of missing values per variable were relatively small. Most percentages of missing values on a variable were between 0 and 2%.

The country averages regarding rejection of homosexuality illustrate, so Janssen and Scheepers (2018) argue, that countries such as Armenia, Tunisia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia reject homosexuality the most, whereas countries such as Sweden, The Netherlands, Australia, and Spain reject homosexuality less strongly.

For Janssen and Scheepers (2018), religiosity appears to be one of the most important characteristics explaining rejection of homosexuality. Exposure to socializing agents, such as religious institutions, is essential in explaining individuals’ attitudes. The influence of religion on individuals’ daily lives is argued to have become less prominent due to secularization processes, but the general attitude toward homosexuality remains negative in many countries.

It was found that individuals who adhere to any denomination reject homosexuality more strongly than those who do not adhere to a denomination. Hindus reject homosexuality the most, but “other Christians” do not differ from the Hindus. One reason for this finding may be, Janssen and Scheepers (2018) argue, that some of the main Christian denominations have been losing members, while the more conservative denominations are still growing. Janssen and Scheepers (2018) underline that the finding that Hindus reject homosexuality the most is not in line with previous studies.

A higher frequency of individuals’ religious attendance is also related to stronger rejection of homosexuality. For Janssen and Scheepers (2018), individuals who are more integrated into a religious community and therefore are more frequently exposed to traditional norms and values, by attending religious services, more strongly reject homosexuality.

According to the Janssen and Scheepers (2018) study, individuals who have stronger religious particularistic beliefs also more strongly reject homosexuality. Strong religious ingroup favouritism is associated with more unfavourable attitudes toward other religious outgroups and, more generally, with more unfavourable attitudes toward ethnic outgroups. Individuals who have stronger religious particularistic beliefs might feel threatened by the deviating lifestyles homosexuals have that violate their religious norms and values.

Janssen and Scheepers (2018) also found that authoritarianism and traditional gender beliefs are related to rejection of homosexuality. It appears that individuals who adhere to a denomination, who more frequently attend religious services, or who have stronger religious particularistic beliefs have a stronger authoritarian personality and stronger traditional gender beliefs and, consequently, reject homosexuality more strongly.

The influence of religion is argued to have become less prominent in individuals' lives, since trends of secularization seem to be present in many societies, but the general attitude toward homosexuality remains rather negative. For Janssen and Scheepers (2018), different religions pass on their negative views on homosexuality no longer by actual exposure, but in other, more latent ways as well.

### **3.7 Roberts: Homonegativity, Postmaterialism, World Society, and Multiple Modernities**

The starting point for the widely received study by Roberts (2019) is that public attitudes toward homosexuality have become substantially more favourable in many Western countries, including the United States, over recent decades. Roberts (2019), compares the predictive power of three prominent social scientific theories—Inglehart's postmaterialist thesis, world society theory, and multiple modernities theory (see below) can each be used to generate different predictions about what drives worldwide attitudes.

Roberts (2019) interprets Inglehart's postmaterialist thesis as a contemporary variant on classical modernization theory which maintains that existential security (i.e., the feeling of personal security that results from having one's basic needs met) is the key driver of attitudes on a wide range of social and political issues, including attitudes toward homosexuality.

World society theory, according to Roberts (2019), would offer a global cultural explanation for attitudinal change. World society theory, points to the influence of an expansive and more-or-less unitary "global culture," embodied, for example, in the elite-level discourses that circulate within international professional and activist communities. In this context, Roberts (2019) maintains that pro-gay discourses have achieved a certain international ascendancy in recent decades: in international fora, in professional and activist communities, and at the level of national policymaking. Roberts (2019) also highlights that if global cultural messages have increasingly penetrated to the level of the average person living around the world, then exposure to these messages should be driving a worldwide upswing in the societal acceptance of homosexuality.

Finally, multiple modernities theory is in Roberts' reading (Roberts, 2019) a general approach that points not to the influence of a single global culture, but to the importance of regional discourses and institutions. The multiple modernities approach would suggest that elite cultural and institutional influences in the Muslim

World, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc should promote negative societal attitudes toward homosexuality in these regions, in spite of the more positive discourse to be found at the global level.

Roberts (2019), in her data analysis, concentrates on the World Values Survey/ European Values Survey (WVS/EVS), from 1981 through 2012. The Roberts (2019) results show a broad global upswing in societal acceptance of homosexuality over the period 1981 to 2012, both within and outside Western countries. World society theory is supported, in that this widespread increase appears to have been driven in large part by the diffusion of a new global cultural discourse favourable toward homosexuality. The results provide strong evidence, Roberts (2019) argues, that global culture has shaped average national attitudes worldwide. But Roberts (2019) finds that the effect of exposure to global culture was much diminished in more religious societies, presumably because these societies were less receptive to pro-gay messages. And, even as there has been a broad upward trend in the acceptance of homosexuality, the results also show that the attitudinal gap between countries has widened over time. Roberts (2019), finds no evidence for the influence of existential security on attitudes toward homosexuality.

The sample of the study is composed of data from 87 countries. The former Soviet and Eastern Bloc and the West are the best-represented world regions, with 21 countries each. Slightly more than half of the sampled countries, are from other world regions, with: 13 countries from the Muslim World, 12 from Latin America and the Caribbean, 10 from sub-Saharan Africa, six from South and Southeast Asia, and three from East Asia. While not all world regions are equally well-represented, the countries in the study by Roberts (2019), together make up 85 percent of the world's population.

Data on mean national levels of acceptance of homosexuality were sourced from the integrated WVS/EVS.

Roberts (2019) found evidence of a broad global upswing in the acceptance of homosexuality between 1981 and 2012. Change has not only occurred in Western countries. Societal attitudes toward homosexuality became more favourable across most world regions during this period. At the same time, however, attitudes varied considerably between countries. And societies that began the 1981-to-2012 period with the least favourable attitudes actually changed the most slowly, so that the attitudinal gap between countries widened over time.

Roberts (2019) supports the explanatory power of both world society theory and multiple modernities theory. In line with world society theory, both the longitudinal, within-country effects of global cultural exposure and its between-country effects were positively correlated, Roberts (2019) argues, with the societal acceptance of homosexuality. Moreover, the influence of global culture appears for Roberts (2019), to explain much of the overall upswing in acceptance of homosexuality in the sample. For Roberts (2019), the global culture described by world society theory is not just global, in the sense that it flourishes among an elite global stratum or influences national governments, but also in that it penetrates down to national populations around the world.

Although it appears, as Roberts (2019) says, that the attitudes of people the world over are indeed being affected by a common global cultural message, Roberts (2019) found that global culture's influence has not, or has at least not yet, resulted in cross-national convergence around a single attitude toward homosexuality. Thus far, average national attitudes toward homosexuality have in fact become more heterogeneous. More religious societies were in general less accepting of homosexuality. And societal receptivity toward favourable global cultural messages about homosexuality appears to have varied, depending on how religious the society was as compared to other societies. The influence of exposure to global culture (both its between- and within-country effects) was substantially moderated by between-country differences in religiosity: exposure to global culture was more influential in comparatively less religious societies and less influential in comparatively more religious societies. For Roberts (2019), the results indicate that membership in the Muslim World, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc slowed over-time increases in the societal acceptance of homosexuality, as compared to membership in the West. Both global and region-specific cultural and institutional factors thus appear to have acted upon worldwide attitudes toward homosexuality. These cross-regional differences promoted, as Roberts (2019) argues, a trend toward increased divergence in societal attitudes, and thus help explain why the attitudinal gap between countries has widened over time. Roberts (2019) squarely maintains that her study's analyses did not support the explanatory power of Inglehart's influential postmaterialist thesis, which predicts that existential security should promote the societal acceptance of homosexuality. The between-country effect of logged GDP per capita was positive but not statistically significant when included in her full statistical model.

### **3.8 Van Der Akker: Cohort Socialisation and Homonegativity**

Van der Akker et al. (2013), in their influential study, start from the assumption that the changing European political structure towards increasingly close cooperation led to the demand for more universal policies. Van der Akker et al. (2013), are principally interested in disapproval of homosexuality. Since the variation in attitudes concerning homosexuality between countries seems quite large, it is likely that country differences in disapproval of homosexuality not only occur because of differences in composition of the population, but also because of specific national circumstances. The focus of the study Van der Akker et al. (2013), is on the fact that besides religious communities and schools as socializing agents, there is the component of socializing circumstances, i.e., cohort socialization.

Most religions have a rather negative norm towards homosexuality. Since religious people are more exposed to these norms and attach more value to them than non-religious people, Van der Akker et al. (2013), expect that people who participate in religious life, will comply more with the anti-homosexuality norms of the church

than people who are not. In addition to the moral norms of the various religious denominations, Van der Akker et al. (2013) maintain, the hierarchical structure of denominations is also considered important for the transmission of norms. When it comes to the Christian tradition, Orthodox Christian churches as well as the Roman Catholic Church can be regarded as more hierarchical than Protestant churches, since the latter only in some countries have influential national boards. Based on these considerations, Van der Akker et al. (2013), venture the hypothesis that Muslims to disapprove of homosexuality the most, followed by Orthodox Christians, Roman Catholics, and Jews. Protestants are expected to disapprove of homosexuality the least.

Moreover, religious involvement indicates the degree to which norms and values are internalized. The more people are involved in a religious organization, the more they will comply with religious norms and values. With respect to homosexuality, Van der Akker et al. (2013), expect that frequent church attendees disapprove of homosexuality more than those who attend church less or never, since the former are more frequently exposed to the negative norms, presumably present in sermons about homosexuality.

Besides religiosity, educational systems are supposed to be socializing agents, also regarding attitudes towards homosexuality. Education is considered to increase people's general knowledge, to stimulate critical thinking and to expand people's frame of reference, which might induce tolerance for those who differ from traditional norms. Educational systems are additionally supposed to inherently teach or strengthen liberal attitudes such as equal rights for homosexuals. As higher educated have been longer and/or more exposed to the educational system, Van der Akker et al. (2013), expect them to be less negative towards homosexuality as compared to lower educated.

Van der Akker et al. (2013), also propose that differences in disapproval of homosexuality can be (partly) a result of cohort socialization. Older cohorts have been socialized in times in which homosexuality was considered a disease or even a sin. In these times, the denial of equal rights for homosexuals was dominant in society as well as in law. The general view towards homosexuality became more tolerant in the 1960s, because of the sexual revolution: homosexuality was no longer seen as immoral.

The disapproval of homosexuality is often associated with right-wing-authoritarianism in psychological research. For Van der Akker et al. (2013), an anti-gay orientation is due to a personality that is strongly against out-groups more in general, and that it has not so much to do with homosexuals per se.

Although an authoritarian personality is mostly associated with intolerance against ethnic minorities, it can be applied to explain negative feelings towards very different out-groups. It appeared to be useful concerning opinions about homosexuals, since they are also considered an out-group that deviates and violates traditional values. Homosexuals are perceived as blocking the establishment of the traditional family. In order to answer the research questions, Van der Akker et al. (2013), used the data from four modules (2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008) of the European Social Survey.



The attitude toward homosexuality was measured with the item “Using this card, please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish.” Respondents could answer on a five-point scale, ranging from “strongly agree” (score 0) to “strongly disagree” (score 4). Due to missing values four percent of the respondents (5,755) were excluded from the analyses.

With respect to the individual level, Van der Akker et al. (2013), claimed on the one hand, that individuals are affected by socializing agents on their disapproval of homosexuality. On the other hand, human values were supposed to determine people’s attitude toward homosexuality.

The hypotheses on socialization were mostly supported by the results reported in Van der Akker et al. (2013). The study found that religiosity plays an important role in explaining differences in the disapproval of homosexuality. People with strong religious beliefs and people who attend church often, disapprove of homosexuality more than respectively people with less strong religious beliefs and people who attend church less or non-attendees. Besides, it was ascertained that Muslims disapprove of homosexuality the most. A noteworthy and somewhat unexpected finding regarding denomination for Van der Akker et al. (2013), was that the disapproval of homosexuality is lower among Roman Catholics and Jews as compared to nonreligious people. Lower educated and older cohorts disapprove of homosexuality more than the higher educated and younger cohorts do.

Support for conventionalism and the attaching value to traditions increases the disapproval of homosexuality. For Van der Akker et al. (2013), this is an indication that the theory of an authoritarian personality and the related negative out-group feelings is also relevant in the disapproval of homosexuality.

Van der Akker et al. (2013), also found that people living in (highly) religious countries disapprove of homosexuality more strongly than people living in secular countries, over and beyond their own religious beliefs and norms. The countries’ religious tradition has, however, no significant effect on people’s opinion about homosexuality. The national level of religiosity is more important for the explanation of differences in anti-homosexual attitudes as compared to the religious tradition.

According to Van der Akker et al. (2013), the countries’ law on homosexuality affects the attitudes towards homosexuality.

### **3.9 Whitworth and Moretti: The Varying Effects of Religious Beliefs and Welfare Regimes on Homonegativity**

Whitworth and Moretti (2023) start their analysis from the assumption that although homo-positivity, the attitudinal acceptance of homosexuality, has generally increased across Western societies there remains considerable homonegativity across certain regions of the world including Africa, Eastern Europe, and parts of Asia. In addition,

there is evidence to suggest that legal and policy protections for homosexuality are far from inevitable, with several eastern European nations showing reversals in previous progress towards homo-positivity between 2018 and 2019. Within nations too, there remains widespread variation in homo-positive attitudes across individuals. Several cross-national quantitative studies have examined the reasons for variation in homonegative attitudes across Europe and globally.

Whitworth and Moretti (2023) claim that current literature neglects possible mediation pathways between those explanatory factors. Religiosity is consistently found to be a major determinant of homonegativity, with the strength of religious belief, the degree of regular participation in religious practices, and religious denomination each playing a role.

Whitworth and Moretti (2023) make use of the Round 9 of the European Social Survey (ESS) released in late 2019 and relating to data collected during 2018. The ESS has been collected bi-annually since 2001 and has well-established survey sampling, data collection, and weighting procedures as well as detailed documentation. The Round 9 survey wave contains data for 36,015 individuals based on strict random probability methods from 19 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia, Switzerland, UK). National samples are representative of the population aged fifteen and over resident within private households, regardless of their nationality, citizenship, or language. Whitworth and Moretti (2023) argue for a mediation pathway between religious beliefs and religious practices. Whitworth and Moretti (2023) include detailed interaction terms between religious beliefs and religious denomination in order to explore the potential for varying effects of beliefs across denominations, in contrast to existing scholarship which assumes uniform effects. Whitworth and Moretti (2023) show that although religious beliefs are important to homo-positive attitudes in all faith groups their effect size differs across denominations. Specifically, other things equal Eastern Orthodox and especially Islamic faith show notably less positive attitudes towards homosexuality at low levels of religious belief while individuals of Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, and other denominations show larger expected increases homonegative attitudes as strength of belief increases compared to other faith groups.

In terms of the socioeconomic drivers of homo-positive attitudes Whitworth and Moretti (2023) claim to have made three contributions to the literature. Firstly, they newly illustrate that education has marked indirect effects on homo-positive attitudes mediated through household income in addition to the direct effects of both education and household income on homo-positivity, evidenced in previous research. Secondly, Whitworth and Moretti (2023) claim to bring new insights into the role of welfare regimes in affecting homo-positive attitudes directly as well as in moderating the effects of low income. The Nordic regime shows the largest positive association with homo-positive attitudes and the Eastern European regime the least positive association, other things equal, with Liberal, Corporatist, and Southern European regimes falling in between those extremes. Thirdly, Whitworth and Moretti (2023) highlight that household income shows a positive association with homo-positive outcomes and that this effect does not vary across welfare regimes despite their

markedly differing propensities to mitigate financial risks and losses, particularly at lower income levels. Taken together these findings Whitworth and Moretti (2023) suggest that societal social policy welfare regimes do matter to the shaping of homo-positive attitudes and hence should be included into future research in the field. Finally, Whitworth and Moretti (2023) confirm the relevance of key basic human values to homo-positive attitudes, with Universalism showing a particularly strong positive association with homo-positive attitudes. Whitworth and Moretti (2023) cast doubt on the substantive importance of a country's legal and policy framework regards homosexuality in either affecting homo-positive attitude directly or in moderating the effects of basic human values on homo-positivity. Despite general strides towards greater acceptance of homosexuality, homonegativity continues to be a challenge in many regions of the world and within certain demographic groups of all nations.

## References

- Adamczyk, A., & Cheng, Y. H. (2015). Explaining attitudes about homosexuality in confucian and non-confucian nations: Is there a 'cultural' influence? *Social Science Research, 51*, 276–89. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2014.10.002>. Epub 2014 Oct 29. PMID: 25769867.
- Adamczyk, A., & Pitt, C. (2009). Shaping attitudes about homosexuality: The role of religion and cultural context. *Social Science Research, 38*(2), 338–351.
- Andersen, R., & Fetner, T. (2008). Economic inequality and intolerance: Attitudes toward homosexuality in 35 democracies. *American Journal of Political Science, 52*(4), 942–958.
- Ekici, T., & Yucel, D. (2015). What determines religious and racial prejudice in Europe? The effects of religiosity and trust. *Social Indicators Research, 122*, 105–133.
- El Omari, D., Hammer, J., & Khorchide, M. (Eds.). (2020). *Muslim women and gender justice: Concepts, sources, and histories*. Routledge Islamic Studies Series. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351025348>
- Filsinger, E. (1976). Tolerance of non-believers: A cross-tabular and log linear analysis of some religious correlates. *Review of Religious Research, 232*–240.
- Firdauzi, I., Hidayat, P., & Darmawan, A. R. (2022). The influence of social demographics toward homosexuality from seven countries in Southeast Asia. *Journal of Homosexuality, 1*–18. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00918369.2022.2114869>. Epub ahead of print. PMID: 36043909.
- González, A. L. (2011). Measuring religiosity in a majority Muslim context: Gender, religious salience, and religious experience among Kuwaiti college students—A research note. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 50*(2), 339–350.
- Hildebrandt, A., & Jäckle, S. (2020). Pervasive polarization or partial convergence? Moral attitudes of religious and secular people at various levels of development.
- Hildebrandt, A., & Jäckle, S. (2023). Particularly in highly developed and more gender egalitarian societies: Sex differences in attitudes towards homosexuality. *The Journal of Sex Research, 1*–14. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00224499.2023.2198500>. Epub ahead of print. PMID: 37126123.
- Inglehart, R. F. (2018a). *Cultural evolution: People's motivations are changing and reshaping the world*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, R. F. (2018b). *Culture shift in advanced industrial society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. F. (2020). *Religion's sudden decline: What's causing it, and what comes next?* New York: Oxford University Press.
- Inglehart, R. F., & Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values. *American Sociological Review, 65*(1), 19–51.

- Inglehart, R. F., Ponarin, E., & Inglehart, R. C. (2017). Cultural change, slow and fast: The distinctive trajectory of norms governing gender equality and sexual orientation. *Social Forces*, 95(4), 1313–1340.
- Jäckle, S., & Wenzelburger, G. (2015). Religion, religiosity, and the attitudes toward homosexuality—a multilevel analysis of 79 countries. *Journal of Homosexuality*, 62(2), 207–241. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00918369.2014.969071>. Epub 2014 Oct 30. PMID: 25256802.
- Janssen, D. J., & Scheepers, P. (2018). How religiosity shapes rejection of homosexuality across the globe. *Journal of Homosexuality*, 66(14), 1974–2001. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00918369.2018.1522809>. Epub 2018 Oct 29. PMID: 30372378.
- Jelen, T. G. (1993). The political consequences of religious group attitudes. *The Journal of Politics*, 55(1), 178–190.
- Kasper, W., & Khorchide, M. (2017). *Gottes erster Name: ein islamisch-christliches Gespräch über Barmherzigkeit*. Patmos Verlag.
- Khorchide, M., & von Stosch, K. (2019). *The other Prophet: Jesus in the Qur'an* (1st English edn.) (Transl. S. Pare). Gingko (Interfaith series).
- Khorchide, M., & Topkara, U. (2013). A contribution to comparative theology: Probing the depth of Islamic thought. *Religions*, 4(1), 67–76. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel4010067>
- Khorchide, M. (2015). Das Herz ist die oberste religiöse Instanz: Papst Franziskus aus einer islamischen Sicht. *Herder-Korrespondenz/Spezial*, (1), 57–59.
- Khorchide, M. (2016). Staat und Religion im Islam: Der Beitrag des Islam zur politischen Kultur der Demokratie. *Staat und Islam: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven*, 71–87.
- Malhotra, D. (2010). (When) are religious people nicer? Religious salience and the “Sunday effect” on pro-social behavior. *Judgment and Decision Making*, 5(2), 138–143.
- Raiya, H. A., Pargament, K. I., Mahoney, A., & Trevino, K. (2008). When Muslims are perceived as a religious threat: Examining the connection between desecration, religious coping, and anti-Muslim attitudes. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 30(4), 311–325.
- Roberts, L. L. (2019). Changing worldwide attitudes toward homosexuality: The influence of global and region-specific cultures, 1981–2012. *Social Science Research*, 80, 114–131. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2018.12.003>. Epub 2018 Dec 10. PMID: 30955550.
- Ruiter, S., & Van Tubergen, F. (2009). Religious attendance in cross-national perspective: A multilevel analysis of 60 countries. *American Journal of Sociology*, 115(3), 863–895.
- Scheepers, P., Gijssberts, M., & Hello, E. (2002). Religiosity and prejudice against ethnic minorities in Europe: Cross-national tests on a controversial relationship. *Review of Religious Research*, 242–265.
- Van den Akker, H., Van der Ploeg, R., & Scheepers, P. (2013). Disapproval of homosexuality: Comparative research on individual and national determinants of disapproval of homosexuality in 20 European countries. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 25(1), 64–86.
- Whitworth, A., & Moretti, A. (2023). Homo-positivity across Europe: Predictors, pathways, and moderators. *Archives of Sexual Behavior*, 52(3), 945–955. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-023-02531-8>. Epub 2023 Jan 20. PMID: 36662324; PMCID: PMC10102151.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.



# Chapter 4

## Methodology and Data for Our New Analysis



**Abstract** In this chapter, we lay the groundwork for our own empirical study, based on data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey. We briefly summarise the key facts about these two global barometers, explain the empirical statistical methodology, in particular Promax factor analysis and our approach to testing significance levels in factor analysis, discuss the nature of parametric indicators, provide our readers with an insight into margins of error, and highlight the dimensions and variables from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey that are used in our analysis. We then briefly discuss the cross-national data that we used to draw conclusions from the relationships between opinion structures and cross-national aggregate data. Finally we highlight the empirical research design.

**Keywords** World Values Survey · European Values Survey · Factor analysis · Parametric indicators · Error margins · Cross-national data · Empirical research design

### 4.1 The World Values Survey and European Values Survey Data

Launched in 1981, the World Values Survey (WVS) is a series of nationally representative surveys conducted in nearly 100 countries, covering almost 90 per cent of the world's population, using a common questionnaire on the attitudes of the world's population towards religion, politics, economics, society, education, prejudice, gender and sexuality and the family. The WVS is the largest non-commercial, cross-national, time-series survey of human beliefs and values ever conducted, and currently includes interviews with nearly 400,000 respondents (Inglehart, 2020). The Website of the World Values Survey currently states:

The World Values Survey ([www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org)) is a global network of social scientists studying changing values and their impact on social and political life, led by an international team of scholars, with the WVS association and secretariat headquartered in Stockholm, Sweden. The survey, which started in 1981, seeks to use the most rigorous, high-quality research designs in each country. The WVS consists of nationally representative surveys

conducted in almost 100 countries which contain almost 90 percent of the world's population, using a common questionnaire. The WVS is the largest non-commercial, cross-national, time series investigation of human beliefs and values ever executed, currently including interviews with almost 400,000 respondents. Moreover the WVS is the only academic study covering the full range of global variations, from very poor to very rich countries, in all of the world's major cultural zones. (<https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>)

The current study uses the well-established methodology of analysing data from international surveys, again in the World Values Survey, as already presented in detail in the study by Tausch et al., (2014). We would like to emphasise that, in addition to comparing percentages and means in cross-tabulations, the present study makes particular use of the method of partial correlations and promax factor analysis. As can be seen in Tausch et al. (2014), promax factor analysis is particularly suitable for extracting dimensions of variables that may be correlated with each other from a dataset with many variables. Table 4.1 of our paper shows the date of the WVS samples as well as the sample size N.

The latest version of the WVS had the following name: WVS Cross-National Wave 7 spss v4 0.zip; and the identical version of the joint EVS/WVS is accessible through two data service points: EVS/GESIS: via the GESIS Data Collection at GESIS—Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences (data download page); and WVSA: via the WVS website.

## 4.2 Methodology

Our research attempt is of course guided by the vast traditions of mathematical-statistical analysis in opinion survey research (see Tausch et al., 2014, see furthermore Abdi, 2003; Basilevsky, 2009; Brenner, 2016; Browne, 2001; Fabrigar et al., 1999; Hedges et al., 2014; Kline, 2014; Knippenberg, 2015; McDonald, 2014; Mulaik, 2009; Suhr, 2012; Yeşilada et al., 2010).

Our main statistical calculations relied on simple cross tables, comparisons of means, bi-variate and partial correlation analyses, factor analysis (oblique factor rotations based on promax factor analysis) (Abdi, 2003; Babones, 2014; Basilevsky, 2009; Blalock, 1972; Browne, 2001; Cattell, 2012; Ciftci, 2010, 2012, 2013; Clauß & Ebner, 1970; Fabrigar, et al., 1999; Finch, 2006; Gorsuch, 1983; Harman, 1976; Hedges et al., 2014; Kline, 2014; Rummel, 1970; Suhr, 2012; Tabachnick et al., 2001; for a condensed survey, see also Tausch et al., 2014). For the algorithm of partial correlation analysis and promax factor analysis, we refer our readers to IBM-SPSS (2014); Hendrickson et al., (1964) and Morrison (1976).

This being said, a few more specifications are necessary for the readers interested in getting to know more details of the methodologies used in this work. So, our methodological approach is within a more general framework to study global values with the methodology of comparative and opinion-survey based political science

**Table 4.1** Our surveys from the World Values Survey and the European values study

Country	Year of survey	N =
Albania	2018	1435
Andorra	2018	1004
Argentina	2017	1003
Armenia	2018, 2021	2723
Australia	2018	1813
Austria	2018	1644
Azerbaijan	2018	1800
Bangladesh	2018	1200
Belarus	2018	1548
Bolivia	2017	2067
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2019	1724
Brazil	2018	1762
Bulgaria	2017	1558
Canada	2020	4018
Chile	2018	1000
China	2018	3036
Colombia	2018	1520
Croatia	2017	1487
Cyprus	2019	1000
Czechia	2017	1811
Denmark	2017	3362
Ecuador	2018	1200
Egypt	2018	1200
Estonia	2018	1304
Ethiopia	2020	1230
Finland	2017	1199
France	2018	1870
Georgia	2018	2194
Germany	2017, 2018	3698
Great Britain	2018	1788
Greece	2017	1200
Guatemala	2020	1229
Hong Kong SAR	2018	2075
Hungary	2018	1514
Iceland	2017	1624
Indonesia	2018	3200
Iran	2020	1499
Iraq	2018	1200

(continued)



**Table 4.1** (continued)

Country	Year of survey	N =
Italy	2018	2277
Japan	2019	1353
Jordan	2018	1203
Kazakhstan	2018	1276
Kenya	2021	1266
Kyrgyzstan	2020	1200
Latvia	2021	1335
Lebanon	2018	1200
Libya	2022	1196
Lithuania	2018	1448
Macau SAR	2019	1023
Malaysia	2018	1313
Maldives	2021	1039
Mexico	2018	1741
Mongolia	2020	1638
Montenegro	2019	1003
Morocco	2021	1200
Myanmar	2020	1200
Netherlands	2017, 2022	4549
New Zealand	2020	1057
Nicaragua	2020	1200
Nigeria	2018	1237
North Macedonia	2019	1117
Norway	2018	1122
Pakistan	2018	1995
Peru	2018	1400
Philippines	2019	1200
Poland	2017	1352
Portugal	2020	1215
Puerto Rico	2018	1127
Romania	2018	2870
Russia	2017	3635
Serbia	2017, 2018	2545
Singapore	2020	2012
Slovakia	2017	1432
Slovenia	2017	1075
South Korea	2018	1245
Spain	2017	1209

(continued)

**Table 4.1** (continued)

Country	Year of survey	N =
Sweden	2017	1194
Switzerland	2017	3174
Taiwan ROC	2019	1223
Tajikistan	2020	1200
Thailand	2018	1500
Tunisia	2019	1208
Türkiye	2018	2415
Ukraine	2020	2901
United States	2017	2596
Venezuela	2021	1190
Vietnam	2020	1200
Zimbabwe	2020	1215
Total N =	2017–2022	147,260

(Brenner, 2016; Knippenberg, 2015; Inglehart, 2018a, 2018b, 2020). Our methodology of evaluating the opinions of global publics from global surveys is in addition based on recent advances in mathematical statistical factor analysis (Basilevsky, 2009; Hedges et al., 2014; Kline, 2014; McDonald, 2014; Mulaik, 2009). Such studies allow to project the underlying structures of the relationships between the variables.

Current methodology of the social sciences makes it clear that besides factor analysis, there are also other powerful tools of multivariate analysis available to test complex relationships between an independent variable and independent variables (Tabachnik, & Fidell, 2001; Abdi, 2003; Babones, 2014; Basilevsky, 2009; Browne, 2001; Clauß & Ebner, 1970; Fabrigar, et al., 1999; Hedges et al., 2014; Kline, 2014; Suhr, 2012; Tabachnick et al., 2001; for a condensed survey, see also Tausch et al., 2014). In our case, we also used partial correlation analysis. Omitted variable bias indeed is a serious problem in the discipline (see Tausch et al., 2014).

### 4.3 Promax Factor Analysis

In the vast literature, surveyed in Tausch et al., (2014), there are two ways to add together the results from the different components, making up either an UNDP-type of performance Index indicator: simply adding the results together, or first grouping them together to various subcomponents, and only from there to arrive at the final results. Our multivariate analysis greatly relies on factor analysis (see Tausch et al., 2014; and IBM Documentation SPSS Statistics, 2023; and Universität Zürich Methodenberatung, 2023). Factor analysis combines groups of interval-scaled variables into meaningful factors that are as independent of each other as possible.

It can also be used to discover structures in the data (see IBM Documentation SPSS Statistics, 2023; and Universität Zürich Methodenberatung, 2023).

Concerning factor analysis and the so-called oblique rotation of the factors, which are underlying the correlation matrix, we also refer our readers to important literature on the subject (Abdi, 2003; Browne, 2001). The IBM-SPSS routine chosen in this context was the so-called *promax* rotation of factors (Browne, 2001; Fabrigar et al. 1999; Suhr, 2012; Yeşilada et al., 2010), which in many ways must be considered to be the best suited rotation of factors in the context of our research today.<sup>1</sup> Formulated in plain everyday language, the mathematical procedures of the rotation of factors which best represent the dimensions underlying a correlation matrix are necessary to make the structure simpler and more reliable.

The problem which factor-analysis is solving can be described as follows: can the variables under consideration here be represented in mathematically reduced dimensions, and what percentages of the total reality are thus reproduced, and how are these dimensions related to each other? And what is the relationship of the underlying variables with these dimensions? Is there indeed such a “factor” or “dimension” as religiosity, and how does it affect phenomena like “trust in the police” or “Antisemitism”? Is there, apart from it, also something like “Accepting Gender Equality”, and also something like “class” or “status”, which influences “trust in the police” or “Antisemitism”, independent from the other “factors”? Promax factor analysis is a well-established multivariate and mathematical variety among the general techniques of factor analysis, which extracts the underlying dimensions from the matrix of correlations between the variables and precisely answers the questions just raised above.<sup>2</sup> It was amply described in recent literature (Finch, 2006; Tausch et al., 2014, see, furthermore Gorsuch, 1983; Harman, 1976; Rummel, 1970). As already stated, Promax factor analysis is the most appropriate technique of factor analysis in public opinion survey studies today (Finch, 2006; Ciftci, 2010, 2012, 2013; Ciftci & Bernick, 2015). Factor analysis—in our case promax factor analysis—also allows the researcher to use the mathematical model for the development of a new measurement scale for the new dimensions, derived in the research process (Tausch et al., 2014). In modern social indicators research, such new scales are called “*parametric indices*”.

Factor analysis is therefore primarily used for data structuring and data reduction. On the one hand, grouping variables into factors facilitates interpretation, and on the other hand, a single factor or a few factors can be used instead of a large number of

---

<sup>1</sup> Older approaches often assumed that there is no correlation between the factors, best representing the underlying dimensions of the variables. But for example, in attempting to understand the pro-Brexit vote in the United Kingdom it would be ridiculous to assume that, say, there is no correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and the feeling to be among the losers of globalization.

<sup>2</sup> The mathematical algorithm is described in [https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/en/SSLVMB\\_22.0.0/com.ibm.spss.statistics.algorithms/alg\\_factor\\_promax.htm](https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/en/SSLVMB_22.0.0/com.ibm.spss.statistics.algorithms/alg_factor_promax.htm). Interested readers are also referred to materials used at the University of Texas in Dallas, available at <https://www.utdallas.edu/~herve/Abdi-rotations-pretty.pdf>.

variables in further analyses. Factor analysis includes a number of different procedures, some of which have different aims (see IBM Documentation SPSS Statistics, 2023; and Universität Zürich Methodenberatung, 2023).

## 4.4 Testing Levels of Significance

The Universität Zürich Methodenberatung (2023) underlines, among others the following advices for the practice of factor analysis:

1. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy is a statistic that indicates the proportion of variance in the variables that might be caused by underlying factors. High values (close to 1.0) generally indicate that a factor analysis may be useful with the data. If the value is less than 0.50, the results of the factor analysis probably won't be very useful. The rule of thumb is that the KMO value should be at least 0.60 in order to proceed with factor analysis. The literature generally suggests 0.50 as a lower acceptable limit.
2. Bartlett's test of sphericity tests the hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an identity matrix, which would indicate that the variables are unrelated and therefore unsuitable for structure detection. Small values (less than 0.05) of the significance level indicate that a factor analysis may be useful with the data.
3. In addition, Bartlett's test can be used to test the null hypothesis that the variables are completely uncorrelated. However, this test assumes that the data are normally distributed. The Eigenvalue of a factor indicates how much of the total variance of all variables is explained by that factor. SPSS normalises the total variance to be explained to the number of variables.
4. The so-called "Kaiser criterion" (also known as the "eigenvalue rule") states that only factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 should be extracted. SPSS selects the number of factors strictly according to this criterion, unless the user specifies a fixed number of factors. The screeplot shows the number of factors on the x-axis and their Eigenvalues on the y-axis. If the factors are random, the slope is flat.
5. The factor loading of a variable is the correlation between the variable and the factor. Theoretically, values between  $-1$  and  $+1$  are possible. The amount of factor loading indicates how closely a variable is related to a factor: Values close to 0 indicate that there is little relationship. The higher the value, the stronger the correlation.
6. In order to assess the factor loadings and the assignment of the variables to the factors, the rotated component matrix is considered. Factor loadings below  $\pm 0.20$  should not be considered. If an item does not load higher on any factor, it is recommended to remove the item and run the analysis again. Factor loadings of  $\pm 0.30$  to  $\pm 0.40$  are minimally acceptable, but higher values are desirable (especially with small samples and a small number of variables).

## 4.5 Parametric Indicators

Our indicators are so-called “parametric indicators,” which—in every day plain language—combine the data with the methods of multivariate statistical analysis (see Tausch et al., 2014). Such a parametric indicator relies on advanced statistical methods, such as principal components analysis (see, again, Tausch et al., 2014). Such an analysis extracts an overriding indicator, mathematically best representing the component variables and their correlation matrix. Our parametric indices thus rely on the original survey respondents of the survey, and calculate the country results, based on principal components factor scores.

Our statistical calculations were performed by the routine and standard IBM-SPSS statistical program (IBM-SPSS XXVIII).<sup>3,4</sup> Since both our data and the statistical methods used are available around the globe, any researcher can repeat our research exercise with the available open data and should be able to reproduce the same results as we did.

## 4.6 Error Margins

For the calculation of error margins of the representative opinion survey, readers are referred to the easily readable introduction to opinion survey error margins, prepared by Cornell University Roper Center (2017). Readers more interested in the details are also being referred to Langer Research Associates (n.d.)<sup>5</sup> On the basis of the methodological literature on opinion surveys this website makes available a direct opinion survey error margin calculator. It is important to recall that, for example at a fictitious 5% distrust rate in the Government, error margins for our chosen samples of around 1.000 representative interview partners for each country are  $+ -1.4%$ . A 10% distrust rate, the error margin is  $+ -1.9%$ : and at a distrust rate of 15% the error margin is  $+ -2.2%$ ; see Langer Research Associates (n.d.) That error margins differ according to reported rates of, say, distrust in the police, is an important fact of opinion survey research theory, often forgotten to be mentioned in the public debate. Keeping in line with standard traditions of empirical opinion survey research (Tausch et al., 2014), for all analysed groups and sub-groups, a minimum sample size of at least 30 respondents per country had to be available to be able to attempt reasonable predictions (Clauß & Ebner, 1970) (Table 4.2).

---

<sup>3</sup> <https://www-01.ibm.com/software/at/analytics/spss/>.

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.ibm.com/analytics/spss-statistics-software>.

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.langerresearch.com/moe/>.

**Table 4.2** Maximum ranges of variation for survey results (the probability of error is 5%)

Sample size	Maximum fluctuation ranges (+-)	Maximum fluctuation ranges (+-)	Maximum fluctuation ranges (+-)	Maximum fluctuation ranges (+-)	Maximum fluctuation ranges (+-)
N	10 or 90% (%)	20 or 80% (%)	30 or 70% (%)	40 or 60% (%)	50% (%)
20	13.1	17.5	20.1	21.5	21.9
30	10.7	14.3	16.4	17.5	17.9
40	9.3	12.4	14.2	15.2	15.5
50	8.3	11.1	12.7	13.6	13.9
75	6.8	9.1	10.4	11.1	11.3
100	5.9	7.8	9.0	9.6	9.8
250	3.7	5.0	5.7	6.1	6.2
500	2.6	3.5	4.0	4.3	4.4
1.000	1.9	2.5	2.8	3.0	3.1
2.000	1.3	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.2

### 4.7 Dimensions and Variables from the World Values Survey and European Values Survey

In a brave new world of fully available social science data, it would certainly have been easier to find an appropriate design for our multivariate analyses. Admittedly, the impartial observer and analyst will very quickly notice that the complete data set of the World Values Survey varies considerably from wave to wave, and that for the analysis of global respondents’ attitudes towards religion, there is far more data available in the World Values Survey wave 2010–2014 than in the latest wave from 2017 onwards.

Another important limitation for the design of the present analysis is that for some EU countries that are of particular interest for the present study, such as the Republic of Austria, unfortunately no data are available for the period 2010–2014. The following list shows the variables used in the multivariate factor analysis. For the World Values Survey wave 2017–2022, we used two indicators of homonegativity, namely rejection of homosexual neighbours and rejection of parenthood by homosexual couples.

In general, our chosen variables well reflect the variables which were used in other studies, surveyed in our Chap. 3. Of particular relevance, the research by Janssen and Scheepers (2018) provided very valuable insights for the present study, especially its treatment of religious particularism and religious salience.

World Values Survey, 2010–2014:

- Democracy: Civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression
- Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections
- Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws

- Democracy: Women have the same rights as men
- Disagree: all religions should be taught in public schools
- Disagree: people who belong to different religions are probably just as moral as those who belong to mine
- Disagree: the only acceptable religion is my religion
- Distrust: People of another religion (B)
- Favouring income inequality
- For state ownership of business
- Important child qualities: religious faith
- Never attend religious services
- Not important in life: Religion
- **Reject neighbours: Homosexuals**
- University is not more important for a boy than for a girl.

World Values Survey, 2017–2022:

- Not important in life: Religion
- Important child qualities: religious faith
- Reject neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers
- **Reject neighbours: Homosexuals**
- **Homosexual couples are not as good parents as other couples**
- Men don't make better political leaders than women do
- University is equally important for a boy and for a girl
- Men don't make better business executives than women do
- Willingness to fight for country
- Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws.
- Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections.
- Democracy: Civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression.
- Democracy: Women have the same rights as men.
- Importance of democracy
- Justifiable: Political violence
- Gender—female
- Year of birth.

## 4.8 Cross-National Data

In the explanation of the partial correlations of homonegativity, due emphasis was also given to dependency and world system approaches to development, which received a large-scale empirical confirmation in an earlier study (see also Tausch et al. (2013)). Earlier, well-known datasets for these investigations were obtained from Ballmer-Cao et al. (1979); Müller et al. (1988), Tausch (2012, 2019) and Tausch et al. (2013).

The present data set, which we used in our analysis, is available in EXCEL format data in Tables 5 and 7 at [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/374631532\\_Homonegativity\\_28\\_09\\_2023\\_EXCEL\\_PUBLIC\\_ACCESS\\_Data\\_for\\_the\\_publication\\_Homonegativity\\_and\\_religiously\\_motivated\\_political\\_extremism\\_A\\_study\\_based\\_on\\_World\\_Values\\_Survey\\_data\\_from\\_88\\_countries\\_and\\_terr](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/374631532_Homonegativity_28_09_2023_EXCEL_PUBLIC_ACCESS_Data_for_the_publication_Homonegativity_and_religiously_motivated_political_extremism_A_study_based_on_World_Values_Survey_data_from_88_countries_and_terr).

## 4.9 The Empirical Research Design

Our empirical research design is heavily influenced by the availability of open access international data on the phenomenon of homonegativity. In a first round of analysis, we wanted to know from the available OSCE hate crime data, which to our knowledge have not yet been analysed in the literature, what exact patterns of homonegative hate crimes exist in the countries of the European Union and what exact percentages of total societal hate crimes these homonegative hate crimes already account for. This huge database was analysed using our IBM SPSS, 29 statistical software.

Using the World Values Survey database and its 2017–2022 version and the 1981–2016 longitudinal edition, we first looked at the bivariate correlations of homonegativity at the individual level among the entire global population, and whether or not there are differences in these correlation patterns among global Roman Catholics, global Muslims and global Orthodox. Are there differences in the drivers of homonegativity for the total population, global Roman Catholics, global Muslims and global Orthodox? For example, does worship attendance among global Roman Catholics trigger a higher level of homonegativity than, say, worship attendance among global Orthodox?

We then decided to look at the bivariate correlations of global population homonegativity at the individual level with variables of xenophobia and racism.

We then proceeded to analyse the pattern of partial correlations of homonegativity in the countries of the world system with key socio-economic indicators at the country level. The UNDP Human Development Index (and its square to control for possible non-linear effects) was held constant as the key indicator of existential security. We also calculated the partial correlations of the homonegativity of the world population with key indicators from the World Values Survey (2010–2014), holding constant age & sex & highest level of education attained.

For the remainder of Chap. 5, which is devoted to the bivariate and multivariate empirical results, we conducted a Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from the World Values Survey, Longitudinal\_1981\_2016 and the World Values Survey, 2017–2022. In each case, we present tests of significance, percentages of explained variance for each variable (Extraction (explained variance; 0.0 = 0%; 1.0 = 100%)), Eigenvalues and explained variances, and scree tests for each factor analytic model, and then present factor structure matrix loadings, component correlations and country factor scores.



In Chap. 6 we analyse the levels and relationships between homophobia, extremist religiously motivated homophobia and extremist religiously motivated and potentially violent homophobia in the countries of the world. We then compute a parametric index of tolerant gender social norms and democracy (TGSNDI) based on the factor analysis of Chap. 5, and we present the weights for the factor analysis scores.

We also analyse the partial correlations of the Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy Index (TGSNDI) in the countries of the world system with key country-level socio-economic indicators, again holding existential security (the UNDP Human Development Index) and its square constant.

## References

- Abdi, H. (2003). Factor rotations in factor analyses. In *Encyclopedia for research methods for the social sciences* (pp. 792–795). Sage.
- Babones, S. (2014). *Methods for quantitative macro-comparative research*. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.
- Ballmer-Cao, T. H., & Scheidegger, J. (1979). Compendium of data for world-system analysis. In *A sourcebook of data based on the study of multinational corporations, economic policy and national development*. Sociological Institute, University of Zurich.
- Basilevsky, A. T. (2009). *Statistical factor analysis and related methods: Theory and applications* (Vol. 418). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
- Blalock, H. M. (1972). *Social statistics*. McGraw-Hill.
- Brenner, P. S. (2016). Cross-national trends in religious service attendance. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, nfw016.
- Browne, M. W. (2001). An overview of analytic rotation in exploratory factor analysis. *Multivariate Behavioural Research*, 36(1), 111–150.
- Cattell, R. (Ed.). (2012). *The scientific use of factor analysis in behavioural and life sciences*. Springer.
- Ciftci, S. (2010). Modernization, Islam, or social capital: What explains attitudes towards democracy in the Muslim world? *Comparative Political Studies*, 43(11), 1442–1470.
- Ciftci, S. (2012). Islamophobia and threat perceptions: Explaining anti-Muslim sentiment in the West. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 32(3), 293–309.
- Ciftci, S. (2013). Secular-Islamist cleavage, values, and support for democracy and Shari'a in the Arab world (December 26, 2012). *Political Research Quarterly*, 66(4), 781–793. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2920382>
- Ciftci, S., & Bernick, E. M. (2015). Utilitarian and modern: Clientelism, citizen empowerment, and civic engagement in the Arab World. *Democratization*, 22(7), 1161–1182.
- Clauß, G., & Ebner, H. (1970). *Grundlagen der Statistik für Psychologen*. Volk und Wissen Volkseigener Verlag.
- Cornell University Roper Center. (2017). *Polling fundamentals—total survey error*. Retrieved May 22, 2021, from <https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/support/polling-fundamentals-total-survey-error/>
- Fabrigar, L. R., Wegener, D. T., MacCallum, R. C., & Strahan, E. J. (1999). Evaluating the use of exploratory factor analysis in psychological research. *Psychological Methods*, 4(3), 272).
- Finch, H. (2006). Comparison of the performance of varimax and promax rotations: Factor structure recovery for dichotomous items. *Journal of Educational Measurement*, 43(1), 39–52.
- Gorsuch, R. L. (1983). *Factor analysis*. Hillsdale, N. J.: Erlbaum.
- Harman, H. H. (1976). *Modern factor analysis* (3rd ed.). University of Chicago Press.
- Hedges, L. V., & Olkin, I. (2014). *Statistical methods for meta-analysis*. New York, NY: Academic press.

- Hendrickson, A. E., & White, P. O. (1964). Promax: A quick method for rotation to oblique simple structure. *British Journal of Statistical Psychology*, 17, 65–70.
- IBM Documentation SPSS Statistics. (2023). *Factor analysis*. <https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/spss-statistics/29.0.0?topic=edition-factor-analysis>
- IBM-SPSS. (2014). *IBM Statistics 22 Algorithms*. [https://www.sussex.ac.uk/its/pdfs/SPSS\\_Statistics\\_Algorithms\\_22.pdf](https://www.sussex.ac.uk/its/pdfs/SPSS_Statistics_Algorithms_22.pdf)
- Inglehart, R. F. (2018a). *Cultural evolution: People's motivations are changing and reshaping the world*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, R. F. (2018b). *Culture shift in advanced industrial society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. F. (2020). *Religion's sudden decline: What's causing it, and what comes next?* New York: Oxford University Press.
- Langer Research Associates. (n.d.). Moe. Retrieved May 23, 2021, from <http://www.langerresearch.com/moe/>
- Janssen, D. J., & Scheepers, P. (2018). How religiosity shapes rejection of homosexuality across the globe. *Journal of Homosexuality*, 66(14), 1974–2001. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00918369.2018.1522809>. Epub 2018 Oct 29. PMID: 30372378.
- Kline, P. (2014). *An easy guide to factor analysis*. London: Routledge.
- Knippenberg, H. (2015). Secularization and transformation of religion in post-war Europe. In *The changing world religion appendix map* (pp. 2101–2127). Springer Netherlands.
- McDonald, R. P. (2014). *Factor analysis and related methods*. Psychology Press.
- Morrison, D. F. (1976). *Multivariate statistical methods*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Mulaik, S. A. (2009). *Foundations of factor analysis*. CRC Press.
- Müller, G. P., & Bornschieer, V. (1988). *Comparative world data: A statistical handbook for social science*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Rummel, R. J. (1970). *Applied factor analysis*. Northwestern University Press.
- Suhr, D. (2012). Exploratory factor analysis with the World Values Survey. In *Proceedings of the SAS global forum 2012 conference*, Orlando, FL.
- Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2001). *Using multivariate statistics*. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
- Tausch, A., Heshmati, A., & Karoui, H. (2014). *The political algebra of global value change. General models and implications for the Muslim world*. Hauppauge, N. Y: Nova Science Publishers.
- Tausch, A., Heshmati, A., & Brand, U. (2013). *Globalization, the human condition, and sustainable development in the twenty-first century: Cross-national perspectives and European implications*. Anthem Press (with data definitions and sources). [https://www.academia.edu/35044095/Globalization\\_the\\_human\\_condition\\_and\\_sustainable\\_development\\_in\\_the\\_21st\\_Century\\_Cross-national\\_perspectives\\_and\\_European\\_implications\\_Codebook\\_and\\_EXCEL\\_data\\_file](https://www.academia.edu/35044095/Globalization_the_human_condition_and_sustainable_development_in_the_21st_Century_Cross-national_perspectives_and_European_implications_Codebook_and_EXCEL_data_file)
- Tausch, A. (2012). *International macroquantitative data*. Faculty of Economics, Corvinus University of Budapest. [http://www.uni-corvinus.hu/index.php?id=47854&tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=0&tx\\_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=31638&tx\\_ttnews%5BcalendarYear%5D=2012&tx\\_ttnews%5BcalendarMonth%5D=6&cHash=af8ef6888f7c9922b83b113f71c1ca32](http://www.uni-corvinus.hu/index.php?id=47854&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=0&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=31638&tx_ttnews%5BcalendarYear%5D=2012&tx_ttnews%5BcalendarMonth%5D=6&cHash=af8ef6888f7c9922b83b113f71c1ca32)
- Tausch, A. (2019). Migration from the Muslim world to the West: Its most recent trends and effects. *Jewish Political Studies Review*, 30(1–2), 65–225. <http://jcpa.org/article/migration-from-the-muslim-world-to-the-west-its-most-recent-trends-and-effects/> (with data definitions and sources. Free data download available from [https://www.academia.edu/37568941/Migration\\_from\\_the\\_Muslim\\_World\\_to\\_the\\_West\\_Its\\_Most\\_Recent\\_Trends\\_and\\_Effects](https://www.academia.edu/37568941/Migration_from_the_Muslim_World_to_the_West_Its_Most_Recent_Trends_and_Effects)
- Universität Zürich Methodenberatung. (2023). *Faktorenanalyse*. [https://www.methodenberatung.uzh.ch/de/datenanalyse\\_spss/interdependenz/reduktion/faktor.html](https://www.methodenberatung.uzh.ch/de/datenanalyse_spss/interdependenz/reduktion/faktor.html)
- Yeşilada, B. A., & Noordijk, P. (2010). Changing values in Turkey: Religiosity and tolerance in comparative perspective. *Turkish Studies*, 11(1), 9–27.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.



# Chapter 5

## Results from the Bivariate and Multivariate Analysis of Homonegativity




**Abstract** Our estimates of global homonegativity based on rates of disapproval of homosexual neighbours cover more than 90% of the world’s population and are based on research results from 88 countries covered in the World Values Survey and the European Values Study. These data give the population-weighted result of a global percentage of homonegative people of around 55%. We present our research findings on the drivers of homonegativity using correlations, partial correlations and factor analysis, examining the effects of individual global attitudes on secularism, democracy, tolerance and religious particularism, as well as on gender equality, religion, political violence and national resilience on homonegativity, as evidenced in the global attitude data from the World Values Survey. We also analyse the relationship between homophobia and cross-social science data in the countries of the world.

**Keywords** Homonegativity · World Values Survey · Religion · Political Islam

In the following, we will present the results of our quantitative investigations.

### 5.1 Homonegativity According to the World Values Survey and European Values Survey Data

Our data on homonegativity, i.e., the rejection of homosexual neighbours, are based on the representative data of around 90 percent of the global population. The data are listed in Appendix 3, Appendix 4, and Appendix 5 of this work. Our results suggest that the percentage share of homonegative respondents is 54,9% of the global population. A choropleth map of data from the World Values Survey, 2017–2022, and 2010–2014 again shows the extent of the problem. Rejection rates of gay neighbours are relatively low in the “Global North” and relatively high in the “Global South” and in the (former) Communist countries. Figure 5.1 summarizes the results from Appendix 3.



**Fig. 5.1** Homonegativity: Rejection of homosexual neighbours in the world and in the Euro-Mediterranean area. 0 = 0%; 1.0 = 100%


In terms of rejection of homosexual neighbours, the twenty most tolerant countries in the world are Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, Andorra, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Argentina, France, Germany, Brazil, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Finland, Austria, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. At the bottom of the list, the most homonegativity countries are Jordan, Burma (Myanmar), Azerbaijan, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Armenia, Maldives, Egypt, Qatar, Burkina Faso, Morocco, South Korea, Bangladesh, Ghana, Türkiye (Turkey), El Salvador, Rwanda, Uganda, Vietnam and Moldova.

A stark North–South and North-East divide in today’s global society is evident.

## 5.2 A Kuznets Curve of Homonegativity?

Economics Nobel Laureate Simon Kuznets, in 1955, proposed in one of the most influential articles ever written in the social sciences,<sup>1</sup> that economic inequality first increases and later decreases with socio-economic development (Anand et al., 1993; Kuznets, 1955). A very large number of societal problems nowadays are being explained by such a trade-off between development level and a societal process to be explained (Acemoglu et al., 2002; Dinda, 2004), and it is no wonder that also the rejection of homosexual neighbours in the world can be neatly predicted by the UNDP Human Development Index and its square. In the comparative social science

<sup>1</sup> According to Google scholar (<https://scholar.google.de/>), the article was quoted 20,400 times in the literature (Access: October 21, 2023).



**Fig. 5.2** Rejection of homosexual neighbours in the world, predicted by the UNDP Human Development Index

literature, there even has been already a suggestion to talk about a “Gender Kuznets Curve” (Eastin et al., 2013). All these attempts start from the common denominator that social crises culminate at the middle-income level. But Ronald F. Inglehart thought all along in his numerous works, also discussed in Chap. 3 of this study, that with growing existential security the acceptancy of homosexuality will increase in a rather linear fashion. But on closer inspection, homonegativity, like economic inequality and social conflict, indeed increase at higher levels of Human Development, only to decrease at higher levels of the UNDP Human Development Index. The Kuznets curve of homonegativity explains none the less than 51.8% of the total variance of the rejection of homosexual neighbours in the world (Fig. 5.2).

### 5.3 The Bivariate Correlations of Homonegativity at the Individual Level Among the Total Global Population and Among the Major Religious Denominations

After having established this important methodological principle of the Kuznets Curve of Homonegativity, we now begin the round of the presentation of our quantitative bivariate and multivariate results with Table 5.1, which presents the bivariate correlations of homonegativity at the individual level for the world population.

The focus here is on the variables of religious salience and religious attendance as explanatory variables, absolutely in line with the research results reported by Janssen and Scheepers (2018) (see Chap. 3, above). Although there are quite significant correlations, none of the correlations shown for the citizens of the world system

**Table 5.1** The bivariate correlations of homonegativity at the individual level among the total global population

	Correlations—total sample	Error p	N
Not important in life: religion	−0.262	<0.001	146,367
Important child qualities: religious faith	0.210	<0.001	145,885
Member: belong to religious organization	−0.033	<0.001	146,227
No trust: people of another religion (B)	0.217	<0.001	139,892
Democracy: religious authorities interpret the laws	0.178	<0.001	136,305
Never attend religious services	−0.192	<0.001	146,396
Never pray (WVS7)	−0.205	<0.001	89,091
Never pray outside of religious services (EVS5)	−0.223	<0.001	56,097
Not a religious person	−0.165	<0.001	143,470
Believe in: god	0.171	<0.001	140,068
Believe in: life after death	0.090	<0.001	133,107
Believe in: hell	0.216	<0.001	134,226
Believe in: heaven	0.173	<0.001	134,392
How important is god in your life	0.256	<0.001	144,430

explains more than 10% of the variance of homonegativity. The conclusion is therefore that at the global level, although there is a statistically significant but quantitatively rather weak correlation between various aspects of religiosity and homonegativity, and nowhere is homonegativity influenced by religiosity by more than 10%. In the following Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 we now pursue the same question as in Table 5.1 at the separate level of global Roman Catholics, Muslims and Orthodox Christians. Our research results run counter to most assumptions which we discussed above in our Chap. 3 on the hitherto existing studies, and for the Muslim sample, for example, the correlations are even lower than for the global citizens of the world system. Religiosity is not a reliable predictor to explain Muslim homonegativity. This means nothing other than that the homonegativity of Muslims is even less dependent on basic religious convictions than for the other citizens of the world system. A similar statement can also be confirmed for global Orthodoxy. Thus, it is not religious salience, or religious attendance, but socio-cultural traditions that statistically determine homonegativity in those important subsamples of world society (Tables 5.3 and 5.4).

**Table 5.2** The bivariate correlations of homonegativity at the individual level among the global Roman Catholics

	Correlations—Roman Catholics	Error p	N
Not important in life: religion	-0.148	<0.001	30,569
Important child qualities: religious faith	0.139	<0.001	30,419
Member: belong to religious organization	0.053	<0.001	30,553
No trust: people of another religion (B)	0.144	<0.001	29,127
Democracy: religious authorities interpret the laws	0.113	<0.001	28,955
Never attend religious services	-0.175	<0.001	30,641
Never pray (WVS7)	-0.153	<0.001	17,240
Never pray outside of religious services (EVS5)	-0.082	<0.001	13,117
Not a religious person	-0.093	<0.001	30,164
Believe in: god	0.073	<0.001	29,913
Believe in: life after death	0.041	<0.001	27,955
Believe in: hell	0.108	<0.001	28,018
Believe in: heaven	0.108	<0.001	28,177
How important is god in your life	0.142	<0.001	30,479

**Table 5.3** The bivariate correlations of homonegativity at the individual level among the global Muslims

	Correlations—Muslims	Error p	N
Not important in life: religion	-0.042	<0.001	26,045
Important child qualities: religious faith	0.070	<0.001	25,521
Member: belong to religious organization	-0.033	<0.001	25,721
No trust: people of another religion (B)	0.078	<0.001	25,380
Democracy: religious authorities interpret the laws	-0.014	0.027	24,630
Never attend religious services	-0.038	<0.001	25,757
Never pray (WVS7)	-0.051	<0.001	20,747
Never pray outside of religious services (EVS5)	-0.100	<0.001	4997
Not a religious person	-0.053	<0.001	25,374
Believe in: god	0.029	<0.001	23,624
Believe in: life after death	0.007	0.266	22,861
Believe in: hell	0.026	<0.001	23,005
Believe in: heaven	0.024	<0.001	23,023
How important is god in your life	0.089	<0.001	24,795



**Table 5.4** The bivariate correlations of homonegativity at the individual level among the global orthodox

	Correlations—Orthodox	Error p	N
Not important in life: religion	−0.108	<0.001	18,302
Important child qualities: religious faith	0.046	<0.001	18,349
Member: belong to religious organization	0.012	0.102	18,240
No trust: people of another religion (B)	0.107	<0.001	17,282
Democracy: religious authorities interpret the laws	0.055	<0.001	16,812
Never attend religious services	−0.032	<0.001	18,360
Never pray (WVS7)	−0.079	<0.001	7439
Never pray outside of religious services (EVS5)	−0.051	<0.001	10,546
Not a religious person	−0.067	<0.001	18,029
Believe in: god	0.034	<0.001	17,959
Believe in: life after death	−0.020	0.013	15,536
Believe in: hell	0.022	0.006	15,421
Believe in: heaven	0.029	<0.001	15,518
How important is god in your life	0.089	<0.001	18,231

## 5.4 The Bivariate Correlations of Homonegativity at the Individual Level

In Table 5.5 we now look at the correlations of homonegativity with other phobias for the citizens of the world system. Homonegativity has the strongest statistical correlation with the rejection of neighbours who have AIDS, as well as with the rejection of neighbours who are drug addicts or who have been convicted of crimes. Interestingly, the next highest correlations are observed with the rejection of unmarried couples living together, with the rejection of emotionally unstable people, and with the rejection of alcoholics.

On the scale of the strength of the determinants of the rejection of homosexuals as neighbours, the rejection of right-wing radical neighbours, the rejection of Jewish neighbours, the rejection of political extremists as neighbours, the rejection of Muslims as neighbours, the rejection of guest workers, the rejection of Christian neighbours and the rejection of immigrants follow. Next in the list is the rejection of Christian neighbours, the rejection of neighbours of a different religion, the rejection of neighbours of a different race, the rejection of Roma neighbours, the rejection of neighbours speaking a different language, the rejection of members of a militant minority and the rejection of Hindu neighbours. This investigation was carried out with the WVS\_Longitudinal\_1981\_2016\_Spss\_v20180912.sav data set, and our readers will immediately notice that the sample sizes in the chosen WVS data set vary considerably.

**Table 5.5** The bivariate correlations of homonegativity of the global population at the individual level with variables of xenophobia and racism

	Neighbours: homosexuals	Error p	N
Neighbours: people who have AIDS	0.498	<0.001	303,879
Neighbours: drug addicts	0.379	<0.001	302,813
Neighbours: people with a criminal record	0.353	<0.001	147,461
Neighbours: unmarried couples living together	0.341	<0.001	156,126
Neighbours: emotionally unstable people	0.326	<0.001	145,989
Neighbours: heavy drinkers	0.324	<0.001	303,913
Neighbours: right wing extremists	0.288	<0.001	16,439
Neighbours: jews	0.285	<0.001	49,812
Neighbours: political extremists	0.215	<0.001	76,411
Neighbours: muslims	0.190	<0.001	65,974
Neighbours: immigrants/foreign workers	0.171	<0.001	296,590
Neighbours: christians	0.152	<0.001	14,135
Neighbours: people of a different religion	0.142	<0.001	195,657
Neighbours: people of a different race	0.132	<0.001	301,542
Neighbours: gypsies	0.125	<0.001	12,739
Neighbours: people who speak a different language	0.114	<0.001	150,399
Neighbours: militant minority	0.073	<0.001	19,706
Neighbours: hindus	0.022	0.011	13,406

Table 5.6 now gives an overview of the significant bivariate correlations of homonegativity at the global level of respondents to the World Values Survey with other key variables of the World Values Survey. As with all correlations based on analyses of the results at the individual level, the correlation coefficients hardly reach more than plus or minus 0.25 and many of the significant correlations are even below or far below in strength; that they are nevertheless significant is due to the large number of observations, some of which exceed 300,000 respondents.

The only two correlations with the rejection of homosexual neighbours that are greater than plus or minus 0.20 are the rejection of the thesis that the only acceptable religion is one's own (working in the direction of homo-positivity) and the rejection of the thesis that politicians who do not believe in God are not suitable for public office (also working in the direction of homo-positivity). Both correlations show that homophobia and an exclusivist interpretation of one's own religion (= religious particularism) are more strongly connected. I leave the further correlations with

**Table 5.6** The bivariate correlations of homonegativity of the global population at the individual level with key variables from the World Values Survey Project

	Reject neighbours: homosexuals	Error p	N
Important child qualities: hard work	0.149	<0.001	303,914
Democracy: religious authorities interpret the laws	0.141	<0.001	141,283
Democracy: the economy is prospering	0.133	<0.001	65,766
How important is God in your life	0.133	<0.001	291,148
Democracy: criminals are severely punished	0.123	<0.001	65,209
Democracy: The army takes over when government is incompetent	0.119	<0.001	140,021
Democracy: people obey their rulers	0.118	<0.001	80,483
Important child qualities: religious faith	0.112	<0.001	301,749
Believe in: re-incarnation	0.111	<0.001	11,917
Democracy: women have the same rights as men	-0.100	<0.001	147,758
Do not believe in: resurrection of the dead	-0.106	<0.001	12,132
No confidence: the Arab league	-0.108	<0.001	14,668
No confidence: churches	-0.109	<0.001	288,568
Never pray	-0.126	<0.001	81,387
No confidence: education system	-0.128	<0.001	19,376
Reject: politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office	-0.226	<0.001	103,492
Reject: the only acceptable religion is my religion	-0.227	<0.001	77,239

religiosity and understanding of democracy to the readers of this publication. They speak for themselves. For reasons of the clarity of the presentation, we mention only correlations greater or equal plus minus 0.10. In any case, the correlations are far lower than is often suggested in public discussion.

## 5.5 Partial Correlations of Homonegativity at the National Level

In the following, we now use the technique of partial correlation analysis, presented in all detail in Tausch et al., (2014). As we have shown in Chap. 3, a considerable part of the research on global values assumes with the great American sociologist Ronald F. Inglehart that values in a society change with the achievement of existential security. To test these effects, in Table 5.7 we have now appropriately held constant the

United Nations Human Development Index, which maps existential social security very well, and we used the non-linear formulation presented in Sect. 5.2 of this work, i.e., the Kuznets Curve of Homonegativity. So, we look at the partial correlations of the rejection of a homosexual neighbour in the societies of the world, regardless of whether a society is rich or poor. Restrictive social gender norms, as evidenced by the UNDP's Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI), which measures how social beliefs obstruct gender equality in areas like politics, work and education. The UNDP GSNI presents stunningly high partial correlations with homonegativity. It is now interesting to note as well that also restrictions against the Jewish population surveyed in the very encompassing study by Fox and Topor, as well as anti-Semitism as expressed in the ADL's anti-Semitism index (ADL 100), correlate very strongly with the rejection of homosexual neighbours, and that the violation of civil and political rights, the proportion of Muslims in the total population, the membership of a country in the Islamic Cooperation and the proportion of Orthodox Christians in the total population correlate strongly with negativity towards homosexuals, holding the society's level of affluence correspondingly constant.

Continuing with the series of remarkable significant partial correlations, we can clearly conclude that educational indicators, indicators of social globalisation, indicators of population satisfaction as surveyed by Gallup, world-class universities, proportion of women in government, proportion of women in parliament, freedom from corruption, proportion of Protestants in the total population, a high employment rate, and the constitutionality of the social order are the best guarantees that a society is not characterised by homophobia. In our list of significant partial correlations, we should also draw special attention to the correlation of  $-0.45$  with the proportion of Roman Catholics in the total population, as well as, of course, the weight of the variables measuring the realisation of democracy. Table 5.7 is thus presenting strong evidence in the direction of the hypothesis that LGBTQ + rights and the wellbeing of LGBTQ + communities are best guaranteed by the free, democratic and open societies of the Western World.

## **5.6 Partial Correlations of Homonegativity at the Individual Level of the Inhabitants of the World**

Table 5.7 was based on national aggregate data and its results were collected by using evidence about countries at the national, aggregate level. The logic of all this can be summarized as follows: X levels of globalisation of a given country, are associated with Y levels of homonegativity in each country. In Table 5.8 we now look at the partial correlations at the individual level according to the data from the 2010–2014 wave of the World Values Survey. Does the opinion of the respondents of the World Values Survey that for example it is an important characteristic of a democracy that criminals are severely punished, or that in a democracy the army takes over when government is incompetent, lead to higher or lower rates of homonegativity?

**Table 5.7** Partial correlations of homonegativity in the countries of world system with key socio-economic country-level indicators constant: HDI 2018 & HDI (2018)<sup>2</sup>, latest edition of the World Values Survey

Constant: HDI 2018 and HDI (2018) <sup>2</sup>	Rejecting homosexual neighbours	Error p	df
UNDP gender social norms index political	0.605	<0.001	69
UNDP gender social norms index economic	0.580	<0.001	69
Fox topor GRD—government restrictions against jews	0.578	<0.001	45
Civil and political liberties violations	0.573	<0.001	94
UNDP gender social norms index “I2” (UNDP terminology)	0.570	<0.001	69
UNDP gender social norms index	0.523	<0.001	69
Antisemitism ADL 100	0.493	<0.001	80
Share of Muslims per total population	0.469	<0.001	97
Carbon emissions per million US dollars GDP	0.435	<0.001	93
Membership in the islamic conference	0.427	<0.001	93
Military personnel rate ln (MPR + 1)	0.422	<0.001	91
MENA country	0.409	<0.001	98
Military expenditures per GDP	0.376	<0.001	76
Share of orthodox Christians per total population	0.368	<0.001	97
Carbon emissions per capita	0.364	<0.001	93
Immigration—share of population 2005 (%)	0.342	<0.001	94
Gulf cooperation council country	0.338	<0.001	98
Combined failed states index	0.329	0.001	94
Arab league membership	0.309	0.002	98
Prison population per 100,000	0.292	0.003	98
FPZ (free production zones) employment as % of total population	0.269	0.008	94
Willingness to fight for the country, mean	0.257	0.019	81
Worker remittance inflows as % of GDP	0.231	0.033	83
Share of total immigration from OIC Countries, 2013 in %	0.222	0.026	98
Economic globalisation, overall index	0.215	0.031	98
Foreign savings rate	0.215	0.039	90
MNC PEN: DYN MNC PEN 1995–2005	0.211	0.041	93
Net international migration rate, 2005–2010	0.208	0.042	94

(continued)

**Table 5.7** (continued)

Constant: HDI 2018 and HDI (2018) <sup>2</sup>	Rejecting homosexual neighbours	Error p	df
Migrants 2017 percentage of total population	0.201	0.045	98
Expected years of schooling	-0.222	0.027	98
Social protection (ILO)	-0.231	0.025	92
Closing the economic gender gap	-0.233	0.027	88
Life EXPECTANCY (years) (by 2010)	-0.243	0.019	91
Tertiary school enrolment	-0.256	0.017	84
Social globalisation, de jure index	-0.265	0.008	98
Environmental performance index (EPI)	-0.273	0.009	90
MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP	-0.287	0.012	74
Share of jews per total population	-0.291	0.003	97
Gallup poll about satisfaction: Local labour market	-0.299	0.003	95
Per capita world class universities	-0.314	0.002	94
Gallup poll about satisfaction: Standard of living	-0.324	0.001	95
Expenditure on education	-0.330	0.002	87
% women in government, all levels	-0.364	<0.001	91
Gallup poll about satisfaction: overall life satisfaction index	-0.380	<0.001	95
Corruption avoidance measure	-0.390	<0.001	94
Female share of seats in parliament	-0.392	<0.001	98
ESI-index environment sustainability index (Yale Columbia)	-0.396	<0.001	90
Share of Protestants per total population	-0.403	<0.001	97
LFPR (Labour Force Participation Rate) 55-59 year olds Labour Force Participation Rate age group 55-59	-0.409	<0.001	94
Closing of global gender gap overall score 2009	-0.415	<0.001	88
Gallup poll about satisfaction: Freedom of choice	-0.427	<0.001	95
Rule of law	-0.431	<0.001	94
Gallup poll about satisfaction: Job	-0.436	<0.001	95
Labour force participation rate of migrants (both sexes)	-0.444	<0.001	94

(continued)

**Table 5.7** (continued)

Constant: HDI 2018 and HDI (2018) <sup>2</sup>	Rejecting homosexual neighbours	Error p	df
Current health expenditure (% of GDP), 2017	-0.445	<0.001	94
Share of Roman Catholics per total population	-0.453	<0.001	97
gender empowerment index value	-0.456	<0.001	57
Health expenditure as % of GDP	-0.456	<0.001	97
Life Satisfaction (0–10)	-0.464	<0.001	91
Closing health and survival gender gap	-0.471	<0.001	88
ESI index component social and institutional capacity	-0.474	<0.001	90
Happy life years	-0.492	<0.001	91
Closing the political gender gap	-0.505	<0.001	88
UNDP gender social norms index—share of people with no bias	-0.523	<0.001	69
Effective democracy index	-0.548	<0.001	93
Democracy measure	-0.572	<0.001	90
Overall 35 variable development index	-0.674	<0.001	94

We have chosen this dataset because it tends to provide significantly more religion-specific explanatory variables than the latest available wave of the World Values Survey. As mentioned above, it would be again a miracle if the correlations were greater than plus or minus 0.25. This time we have held constant a respondent's age, gender and the education level in the partial correlations at the individual level. In the result list, reported here, we exclude correlations smaller than plus minus 0.10.

It again can be shown that the highest positive correlations of homophobia occur with variables that involve a very specific and restrictive interpretation of religious traditions, as correctly predicted by Janssen and Scheepers (2018). The highest positive partial correlation of disapproval of a homosexual neighbour is achieved with over 14,000 respondents with the agreement by the respondents to the obligation to veil women. In second place is agreement with the proposition that religious authorities should interpret the laws in a democracy. The round of influencing factors blocking homophobia opens with rejection of polygamy at -0.24 (for more than 17,000 respondents). In second place is the rejection of the opinion that it is better for people with strong religious beliefs to hold public office exclusively, followed by the rejection of sexism against women's activities in the business world and in the world of politics, followed by the rejection of the opinion that one's religion is the only acceptable religion. Rejection of the opinion that politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office and rejection of the opinion that a woman must obey are also related to homophobia by more than -0.20.

**Table 5.8** Partial correlations of homonegativity among the global population with key indicators from World Values Survey (2010–2014), constant: Age and Sex and Highest educational level attained

Age and sex and highest educational level attained	Reject neighbours: Homosexuals	Error p	df
Traits in a woman: woman wearing veil	0.168	<0.001	14,431
Democracy: religious authorities interpret the laws	0.134	<0.001	141,278
Democracy: The economy is prospering	0.133	<0.001	65,761
Democracy: Criminals are severely punished	0.121	<0.001	65,204
Democracy: The army takes over when government is incompetent	0.112	<0.001	140,016
Democracy: People obey their rulers	0.112	<0.001	79,387
Important child qualities: religious faith	0.108	<0.001	273,586
Believe in: hell	0.103	<0.001	184,954
No confidence: Churches	-0.106	<0.001	273,586
No confidence: The Arab League	-0.108	<0.001	14,663
Reject: University is more important for a boy than for a girl	-0.109	<0.001	272,850
No confidence: Education System	-0.122	<0.001	10,677
Reject opinion: Only laws of the Shari'a	-0.138	<0.001	10,036
Not important in life: Religion	-0.149	<0.001	273,586
Reject opinion: wife must obey	-0.219	<0.001	17,807
Reject opinion: politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office	-0.221	<0.001	102,289
Reject opinion: the only acceptable religion is my religion	-0.221	<0.001	74,626
Reject: men make better political leaders than women do	-0.223	<0.001	267,229
Reject: men make better business executives than women do	-0.238	<0.001	148,489
Reject opinion: better if more people with strong religious beliefs in public office	-0.239	<0.001	100,146
Reject opinion: more than one wife	-0.242	<0.001	17,674



## 5.7 Secularism, Democracy, Tolerance and Religious Particularism: Promax Factor Analytical Results for the Explanation of Homonegativity based on the World Values Survey, 2010–2014

We now move to the higher stages of the multivariate analysis of homonegativity. We first investigate how

- Secularism
- Pro-Democracy support
- Religious tolerance, no restrictive gender norms
- Religious particularism.


Affect homonegativity. The database used was WVS\_Longitudinal\_1981\_2016\_Spss\_v20180912.sav. The data cover around 68% of the global population.

So, this chapter examines the multivariate effects of secularism, pro-democracy attitudes, religious tolerance and non-restrictive gender norms and religious particularism on homonegativity. Table 5.9 first reports the significance criteria of our promax factor analysis. To report insignificant results it is essential to run counter to any standard of quantitative social science. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling propensity is well above 0.6, and Bartlett’s test is also easily passed. Figure 5.3 shows the Eigenvalues of the factor analysis  $> 1.0$ , and four of these factors are suitable for further interpretation according to the so-called scree test, while the last resulting factor with an Eigenvalue  $> 1.0$ , which expresses the affirmation of state ownership, is no longer interpretable, since a clear kink in the line of Eigenvalues can only be observed with Factor 4, the factor “religious exclusivity or religious particularism”. Table 5.10 now shows the Eigenvalues and variance shares as well as the cumulative variance shares of the factors used in the final analysis: secularism, pro-democracy, religious tolerance, and religious particularism. Together, these four factors already achieve a total (and high) explained variance of no less than 46%.

As in any factor analysis, the factor loadings of the structural matrix are now used for the substantive interpretation of the results and the reader is referred in this context to Table 5.11. It is emphasised that in any factor analytic study there is a degree of subjectivity in the naming of the factors.

**Table 5.9** Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, Longitudinal\_1981\_2016: Tests of Significance

Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin test		
Measure of the inclination of the sample according to Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin		0.728
Bartlett test of sphericity	Approximate Chi Square	101,465,340
	df	105,000
	Significance according to Bartlett	<0.001



**Fig. 5.3** Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, longitudinal 1981–2016: screetest

**Table 5.10** Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, longitudinal 1981–2016: eigenvalues and explained variances

	Eigenvalues	% of variance	Cumulated percentage %
Secularism	2607	17,382	17,382
Pro-democracy	1795	11,965	29,346
Religious tolerance, no restrictive gender norms	1425	9499	38,845
Religious particularism	1082	7215	46,061
For state ownership	1071	7141	53,201

Rejection of homosexual neighbours is determined by secularism with  $-0.22$ , by attitudes towards democracy with  $-0.06$ , by religious tolerance and the absence of restrictive gender norms with  $-0.49$ , and by the presence of religious particularism with  $+0.16$ . We have marked all factor loadings above plus minus  $0.5$  accordingly in our table.

Table 5.12 now shows the correlations of the factor analytic components. The main determinants of homonegativity appear to be the lack of religious tolerance and restrictive gender norms.

Table 5.13 and Fig. 5.4 now present the country results of our analyses.

So, as we already mentioned above, we first report (in Table 5.9) the reliable and satisfactory statistical properties of our model, and all tests of significance wielded good and acceptable results.

Figure 5.3 shows the results of the screetest, suggesting that our choice to interpret only four factors is correct.

**Table 5.11** Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, longitudinal 1981–2016: loadings of the factor structure matrix

	Secularism	Pro-democracy	Religious tolerance, no restrictive gender norms	Religious particularism
Democracy: religious authorities interpret the laws	-0.269	-0.031	<b>-0.567</b>	-0.025
Reject neighbours: homosexuals	-0.223	-0.006	-0.493	0.167
Distrust: people of another religion (B)	0.005	-0.008	-0.353	<b>0.513</b>
Important child qualities: religious faith	<b>-0.751</b>	-0.025	-0.192	0.049
For state ownership of business	0.036	0.044	-0.184	-0.030
Disagree: people who belong to different religions are probably just as moral as those who belong to mine	-0.010	-0.164	-0.105	<b>0.712</b>
Favouring income inequality	-0.211	-0.055	0.039	0.114
Democracy: civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression	0.071	<b>0.788</b>	0.056	-0.032
Democracy: people choose their leaders in free elections	0.021	<b>0.804</b>	0.127	-0.014
Disagree: all religions should be taught in public schools	0.096	0.068	0.164	<b>0.735</b>
Never attend religious services	<b>0.726</b>	0.125	0.199	0.124
Democracy: women have the same rights as men	0.130	<b>0.745</b>	0.233	-0.083
Not important in life: religion	<b>0.812</b>	0.073	0.350	0.028
University is not more important for a boy than for a girl	-0.005	0.256	<b>0.643</b>	0.113
Disagree: the only acceptable religion is my religion	0.425	0.097	<b>0.645</b>	-0.133

As already mentioned, Table 5.10 lists the Eigenvalues and the explained variances of our model. With four interpreted factors, explained total variance is at 46%:

The main result of our investigation with the very inclusive data from the World Values Survey, Longitudinal 1981–2016, listed in Table 5.11 is that the following

**Table 5.12** Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, longitudinal 1981–2016: component correlations

Component correlations	Secularism	Pro-democracy	Religious tolerance, no restrictive gender norms	Religious particularism
Secularism	1.000	0.075	<b>0.276</b>	-0.004
Pro-democracy	0.075	1.000	<b>0.162</b>	-0.022
Religious tolerance, no restrictive gender norms	<b>0.276</b>	<b>0.162</b>	1.000	-0.059
Religious particularism	-0.004	-0.022	-0.059	1.000

factors determine homonegativity. We list here, for reasons of the brevity of the presentation, the factors, and the size of their influence:

Religious particularism	0.167
Secularism	-0.223
Religious tolerance, no restrictive gender norms	-0.493

As already hinted at above, in Table 5.12, we show the factor component correlations for the following factors, which we think are important for a future, more thorough understanding of the empirics of global religiously motivated extremism. In Table 5.12, our readers see the correlations between the global citizens’ attitudes on

- Secularism
- Pro-Democracy
- Religious tolerance, no restrictive gender norms
- Religious particularism.

Table 5.13 now lists our country results, based on the promax factor scores, in the alphabetical order of their standard country or territory names.

Both the United States and, of course, Latin American countries such as Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, and Brazil, and then, in Europe, Poland, Romania and Türkiye (Turkey), as well as virtually all of Africa and the Middle East, and also the Muslim-majority countries of Southeast Asia and Buddhist Thailand, show higher levels of religiosity, while Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and, of course, the former Soviet Union and especially China are bastions of secularism, as is Australia.

The countries where the population does not sufficiently identify with the support of democracy are to be found in Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador and further to the East on our globe, in South Africa and Nigeria, Jordan, Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as in Pakistan and Central Asia. And in East Asia and Southeast Asia, the Philippines, South Korea and Malaysia have a very low support rate for democracy.

**Table 5.13** Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, longitudinal 1981–2016: factor scores


Country/ region	Secularism	Pro-Democracy	Religious tolerance, no restrictive gender norms	Religious particularism	For state ownership	N
Algeria	-0.581	0.006	-0.658	1.067	0.531	679
Argentina	0.569	0.134	0.707	-0.081	0.001	647
Armenia	-0.112	0.268	-0.461	1.040	0.263	637
Australia	1.024	0.363	1.212	-0.160	-0.416	1290
Azerbaijan	0.443	-0.207	-0.418	0.556	-0.037	840
Belarus	0.529	0.032	0.143	-0.017	-0.358	1033
Brazil	-0.214	0.205	0.648	-0.445	-0.106	1152
Chile	0.622	0.123	0.306	-0.407	0.010	560
China	1.600	0.104	0.262	0.971	-0.203	473
Colombia	-0.281	-0.211	0.151	-0.011	0.113	1185
Cyprus	0.054	0.329	0.459	0.238	-0.560	629
Ecuador	-0.276	-0.219	0.168	-0.082	0.136	1165
Estonia	0.972	0.453	0.438	-0.107	-0.292	914
Georgia	-0.690	0.147	-0.143	0.427	0.022	815
Germany	0.853	0.466	0.796	0.163	-0.433	1550
Ghana	-0.887	-0.067	-0.120	-0.270	0.259	1518
Haiti	0.520	-0.580	-0.383	-0.267	-0.811	1896
Hong Kong	0.972	-0.113	0.309	0.191	0.124	955
India	-0.553	0.026	-0.272	-0.475	-0.617	2711
Iraq	-0.690	-0.096	-0.746	0.346	0.186	947
Jordan	-0.920	-0.370	-0.602	0.457	0.770	1034
Kazakhstan	0.650	0.214	-0.020	0.099	0.175	1168
Korea, South	0.322	-0.021	0.346	0.482	-0.042	700
Kyrgyzstan	0.148	-0.379	-0.540	0.318	0.208	1201
Lebanon	-0.144	-0.596	0.046	-0.177	-0.020	932
Libya	-0.885	-0.048	-0.886	0.986	0.581	1417
Malaysia	-0.621	0.008	-0.580	-0.227	0.485	1251
Mexico	-0.024	-0.159	0.171	0.229	0.234	1829
Netherlands	1.062	0.330	1.150	-0.046	-0.062	959
Nigeria	-0.958	-0.392	-0.615	-0.420	0.186	1574
Pakistan	-0.667	0.019	-1.141	0.177	0.560	1021

(continued)

**Table 5.13** (continued)

Country/ region	Secularism	Pro-Democracy	Religious tolerance, no restrictive gender norms	Religious particularism	For state ownership	N
Palestine (Gaza and the West Bank)	-0.762	-0.386	-0.629	0.879	0.385	788
Peru	-0.085	-0.015	0.035	0.336	0.276	799
Philippines	-0.640	-0.278	-0.353	-0.314	0.511	1164
Poland	-0.082	0.438	0.339	-0.594	0.299	561
Romania	-0.129	0.419	0.105	-0.008	0.286	992
Russia	0.831	0.209	-0.062	-0.070	-0.276	1182
Rwanda	-0.181	-0.341	-0.174	0.058	-0.857	1143
Singapore	0.153	-0.470	0.419	-0.126	-0.078	1645
Slovenia	0.807	0.308	0.561	-0.088	-0.606	713
South Africa	-0.319	-0.448	-0.387	-0.718	0.433	2703
Spain	1.093	0.315	0.723	-0.002	-0.026	659
Sweden	1.188	0.645	1.278	-0.950	-0.236	927
Taiwan	0.740	0.409	0.568	-0.164	-0.128	1001
Thailand	-0.056	0.036	-0.150	-0.128	0.328	1050
Trinidad and Tobago	-0.615	0.168	0.639	-0.705	0.249	676
Tunisia	-0.694	0.209	-0.604	0.704	0.437	827
Türkiye (Turkey)	-0.180	0.196	-0.667	-0.060	-0.136	1207
Ukraine	0.375	0.377	0.053	-0.097	-0.255	981
United States	0.096	0.149	0.983	-0.089	-0.475	1996
Uruguay	0.944	0.131	0.649	0.228	0.038	484
Uzbekistan	0.574	0.353	-0.877	0.145	-0.142	1000
Yemen	-0.821	0.341	-0.952	1.160	0.734	472
Zimbabwe	-0.782	0.068	0.066	0.248	0.008	1186

The areas of lack in religious tolerance and restrictive gender norms are found mainly in Peru; in the African countries for which data are available, in Türkiye (Turkey) and in the Middle East, in Uzbekistan and Pakistan, in India, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, and in some other countries of the former Soviet Union.



**Fig. 5.4** Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, 2017–2022: screetest

Religious particularism is more pronounced in Latin America, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay, also in the Federal Republic of Germany, and in many countries in the Middle East, in Uzbekistan and in Pakistan, South Korea and in the People’s Republic of China.

### **5.8 Gender Equality, Democracy, Religious Salience, Political Violence and National Resilience: Promax Factor Analytical Results for the Explanation of Homonegativity with the Data of the World Values Survey, 2017–2022**

In the following multivariate analysis, based on data from the latest wave of the World Values Survey, we analyse the multi-variate relationships between respondents’ attitudes on gender justice, democracy, religion, xenophobia and homophobia, political violence and national resilience. The inclusion of national resilience corresponds well with the World Values Survey item “*willingness to defend the country*” and “*confidence in the Armed Forces*” at a time of heightened international tensions, wars and crises. Readers interested in the issues of national resilience are being referred to the recent study Tausch and Neriah (2023), which among others provides readers an in-depth analysis of the problems of the Middle East, the lack of resilience

in key countries of the Western alliance, and the multivariate analysis of resilience with World Values Survey data.

Table 5.14 shows the results of the significance tests of our factor analytic procedure, and again the significance tests are fully in line with the research design. Table 5.15 lists the proportions of variance explained by the variables in the model, where, of course, a proportion of variance of 0% is written mathematically as 0.0 and a proportion of variance of 100% is written as 1.0. The two homophobia variables—rejection of homosexual neighbours and rejection of parenthood by homosexual parents—each are explained by more than 50% by our factor analytical model. Our Table 5.16 shows the Eigenvalues of the factor analytical model, and the percentage shares of the explained variance and the cumulative percentage shares of the explained variables of our six factors. The core of the factor analytical results is presented in Table 5.17, which, as before, shows the loadings of the factor structure matrix. In this Table, factor loadings greater than plus or minus 0.5 are again marked accordingly. Table 5.18 shows the results of the correlations between the components of our Promax factor analytic model. Our factors were labelled:

- acceptance of gender justice,
- pro-democracy trend,
- religious salience,
- homophobia and xenophobia,
- advocacy of political violence, especially among the younger generation and
- willingness to defend the home country.

The homophobia and xenophobia factor correlates +0.28 with the religious salience factor and +0.13 with the willingness to defend the country (national resilience factor). Ronald Inglehart’s assumption (see also Tausch & Neriah, 2023 for a detailed survey of the literature) was that patriotism stems from a social model that is more likely to be found in the poorer societies of the world where traditional gender norms still prevail; homophobia and xenophobia correlate with the acceptance of gender justice at -0.35 and with pro-democracy currents at -0.12.

Table 5.19 shows our sample sizes for our factor analysis.

The ten countries most strongly combining homophobic and xenophobic attitudes in the world are Myanmar, Azerbaijan, Montenegro, Bangladesh, Armenia, Maldives, Belarus, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Russia, Serbia and Georgia, while the ten societies in the world with the lowest occurrence of homophobic and xenophobic attitudes

**Table 5.14** Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, 2017–2022: tests of significance

Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin test		
Measure of the inclination of the sample according to Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin		0.787
Bartlett test of sphericity	Approximate Chi Square	315,533,967
	df	136,000
	Significance according to Bartlett	<0.001



**Table 5.15** Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, 2017–2022: extraction (explained variance; 0.0 = 0%; 1.0 = 100%)

	Extraction (explained variance; 0.0 = 0%; 1.0 = 100%)
Not important in life: religion	0.689
Important child qualities: religious faith	0.609
Neighbours: immigrants/foreign workers	0.612
<b>Reject neighbours: homosexuals</b>	<b>0.658</b>
<b>Homosexual couples are as good parents as other couples</b>	<b>0.567</b>
Reject: men make better political leaders than women do	0.704
Reject: university is more important for a boy than for a girl	0.676
Reject: men make better business executives than women do	0.760
Willingness to fight for country	0.594
Democracy: religious authorities interpret the laws	0.469
Democracy: people choose their leaders in free elections	0.634
Democracy: civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression	0.623
Democracy: women have the same rights as men	0.609
Importance of democracy	0.385
Justifiable: political violence	0.433
Sex	0.563
Year of birth	0.626

**Table 5.16** Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, 2017–2022: eigenvalues and explained variances

	Eigenvalue	Percent of variance	Cumulated %
Accepting gender equality	3.509	20.644	20.644
Pro-democracy	1.982	11.661	32.305
Religious salience	1.436	8.449	40.754
Homophobia/Xenophobia	1.177	6.926	47.679
Support for political violence among the younger generations	1.080	6.352	54.031
Willingness to fight for the country	1.026	6.034	60.065

**Table 5.17** Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, 2017–2022: loadings of the factor structure matrix

	Accepting gender equality	Pro-democracy	Religious salience	Homophobia/ Xenophobia	Support for political violence among the younger generations	Willingness to fight for the country
Not important in life: religion	0.235	0.131	<b>-0.825</b>	-0.246	0.035	-0.101
Important child qualities: religious faith	-0.163	-0.092	<b>0.778</b>	0.176	0.023	0.099
Reject neighbours: immigrants/ foreign workers	-0.190	-0.113	-0.048	<b>0.706</b>	0.097	-0.128
Reject neighbours: homosexuals	-0.308	-0.088	0.335	<b>0.799</b>	-0.001	0.198
Homosexual couples are not as good parents as other couples	-0.292	-0.061	0.424	<b>0.656</b>	-0.223	0.309
Men don't make better political leaders than women do	<b>0.831</b>	0.161	-0.266	-0.368	-0.065	-0.189
University is equally important for a boy and for a girl	<b>0.815</b>	0.238	-0.217	-0.212	-0.110	-0.075
Men don't make better business executives than women do	<b>0.868</b>	0.160	-0.232	-0.339	-0.060	-0.182
Willingness to fight for country	-0.058	0.018	0.230	0.108	0.025	<b>0.748</b>
Democracy: religious authorities interpret the laws	-0.365	-0.160	<b>0.533</b>	0.176	0.378	-0.043
Democracy: people choose their leaders in free elections	0.174	<b>0.796</b>	-0.102	-0.093	-0.171	0.045

(continued)

**Table 5.17** (continued)

	Accepting gender equality	Pro-democracy	Religious salience	Homophobia/ Xenophobia	Support for political violence among the younger generations	Willingness to fight for the country
Democracy: civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression	0.102	<b>0.777</b>	-0.095	-0.043	-0.061	0.009
Democracy: women have the same rights as men	0.242	<b>0.774</b>	-0.157	-0.118	-0.146	-0.018
Importance of democracy	0.205	<b>0.567</b>	-0.018	-0.158	-0.309	0.132
Justifiable: political violence	-0.181	-0.229	-0.111	0.010	<b>0.621</b>	-0.133
Gender—female	0.219	-0.003	0.154	-0.033	0.045	<b>-0.671</b>
Year of birth	0.023	-0.061	0.135	-0.010	<b>0.741</b>	0.096

**Table 5.18** Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, 2017–2022: component correlations

Component correlation	Accepting gender equality	Pro-democracy	Religious salience	Homophobia/ Xenophobia	Support for political violence among the younger generations	Willingness to fight for the country
Accepting gender equality	1.000	<b>0.238</b>	<b>-0.249</b>	<b>-0.354</b>	<b>-0.124</b>	<b>-0.145</b>
Pro-Democracy	<b>0.238</b>	1.000	<b>-0.111</b>	<b>-0.123</b>	<b>-0.202</b>	0.059
Religious salience	<b>-0.249</b>	<b>-0.111</b>	1.000	<b>0.284</b>	0.026	<b>0.168</b>
Homophobia/ Xenophobia	<b>-0.354</b>	<b>-0.123</b>	<b>0.284</b>	1.000	-0.019	<b>0.137</b>
Support for political violence among the younger generations	<b>-0.124</b>	<b>-0.202</b>	0.026	-0.019	1.000	<b>-0.126</b>
Willingness to fight for the country	<b>-0.145</b>	0.059	<b>0.168</b>	<b>0.137</b>	<b>-0.126</b>	1.000

**Table 5.19** Promax factor analysis of the drivers of homonegativity with data from World Values Survey, 2017–2022: factor scores

Country	Accepting gender equality	Pro-democracy	Religious salience	Homophobia/Xenophobia	Support for political violence among the younger generations	Willingness to fight for the country	N
Albania	0.559	0.624	0.201	0.503	-0.594	0.461	991
Andorra	0.576	0.444	-0.669	-0.768	-0.256	-0.299	955
Argentina	0.160	0.141	-0.095	-0.650	0.160	-0.194	560
Armenia	-0.431	-0.073	0.542	0.915	-0.318	0.459	1930
Australia	0.686	0.272	-0.655	-0.684	-0.439	-0.319	1562
Austria	0.579	0.425	-0.633	-0.458	-0.357	-0.406	1146
Azerbaijan	-0.475	0.162	-0.034	1.086	-0.317	0.622	1019
Bangladesh	-0.807	0.364	1.545	0.923	0.564	0.423	942
Belarus	-0.446	-0.008	-0.182	0.817	-0.079	0.303	931
Bolivia	-0.062	-0.186	0.555	-0.290	0.385	0.252	1267
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.174	0.073	0.283	0.468	-0.272	-0.144	1298
Brazil	0.130	-0.027	0.176	-0.678	0.015	-0.235	1081
Bulgaria	-0.048	0.281	-0.221	0.766	-0.547	0.088	711
Burma (Myanmar)	-0.938	0.084	0.742	1.225	0.165	0.222	1199
Canada	0.449	0.223	-0.728	-0.768	0.267	-0.490	4018
Chile	-0.097	-0.492	-0.318	-0.401	0.214	-0.370	607
China	-0.248	0.197	-0.610	0.539	-0.153	0.395	2758
Colombia	-0.061	-0.670	0.524	-0.203	0.150	0.187	1520
Croatia	0.423	0.168	-0.042	0.004	-0.446	0.011	1012

(continued)

Table 5.19 (continued)

Country	Accepting gender equality	Pro-democracy	Religious salience	Homophobia/Xenophobia	Support for political violence among the younger generations	Willingness to fight for the country	N
Cyprus	0.110	0.256	0.480	0.157	-0.493	0.102	268
Czechia	-0.282	-0.187	-0.847	0.085	0.138	-0.566	1741
Denmark	0.721	0.547	-0.703	-0.862	-0.450	0.138	1591
Ecuador	-0.063	-0.544	0.546	-0.242	0.366	0.217	986
Estonia	0.090	0.266	-0.605	0.187	-0.429	0.014	637
Ethiopia	0.083	0.507	1.274	0.765	0.346	0.730	819
Finland	0.586	0.425	-0.592	-0.569	-0.427	0.112	967
France	0.767	-0.134	-0.710	-0.766	-0.062	-0.143	1384
Georgia	-0.277	-0.029	0.806	0.654	-0.528	0.348	1469
Germany	0.627	0.599	-0.709	-0.773	-0.468	-0.216	2624
Greece	0.216	0.505	0.317	0.238	-0.568	0.324	862
Guatemala	0.181	-0.673	0.702	0.126	0.513	-0.058	856
Hong Kong SAR	-0.087	-0.125	-0.569	-0.448	-0.176	-0.256	872
Hungary	0.013	0.178	-0.329	0.358	-0.290	-0.244	1097
Iceland	0.841	0.598	-0.739	-0.971	-0.337	-0.290	1302
Indonesia	-0.836	-0.055	1.442	0.490	0.233	0.414	3016
Italy	0.348	0.309	-0.256	-0.378	-0.439	-0.284	1075
Japan	0.072	0.184	-1.066	-0.222	-0.437	-0.715	346
Kazakhstan	-0.580	-0.451	0.203	0.573	0.296	0.140	760
Kenya	-0.074	-0.635	0.992	0.397	0.751	0.416	1026

(continued)

Table 5.19 (continued)

Country	Accepting gender equality	Pro-democracy	Religious salience	Homophobia/Xenophobia	Support for political violence among the younger generations	Willingness to fight for the country	N
Korea, South	-0.537	-0.313	-0.326	0.454	0.172	-0.014	1245
Kyrgyzstan	-0.917	-0.185	0.539	0.562	0.001	0.458	883
Latvia	-0.108	-0.100	-0.368	0.383	-0.309	-0.139	690
Libya	-0.760	-0.257	1.351	0.479	0.094	0.508	954
Lithuania	-0.303	0.103	-0.272	0.643	-0.214	-0.320	674
Macao SAR	-0.253	-0.161	-0.731	0.210	0.507	-0.588	752
Macedonia (North Macedonia)	0.019	0.277	0.210	0.467	-0.345	-0.076	632
Malaysia	-0.551	-1.406	0.835	0.649	0.654	0.096	1302
Maldives	-0.195	-0.372	1.466	0.825	0.143	0.564	926
Mexico	0.079	-0.718	0.182	-0.358	0.238	0.012	1507
Mongolia	-0.374	-0.724	-0.284	0.197	0.859	-0.028	1633
Montenegro	-0.039	-0.519	0.474	1.004	-0.174	-0.130	726
Netherlands	0.601	0.337	-0.861	-0.729	-0.170	-0.238	1369
New Zealand	0.613	0.390	-0.814	-0.782	-0.468	-0.364	482
Nicaragua	-0.175	-0.442	0.660	-0.104	0.511	0.079	930
Nigeria	-0.899	-0.245	1.278	0.730	0.252	0.416	1119
Norway	1.076	0.506	-0.612	-0.908	-0.262	0.234	1024
Pakistan	-1.376	-0.015	1.087	-0.030	0.663	0.268	1525
Peru	0.156	-0.178	0.347	-0.040	0.092	0.234	1018

(continued)

Table 5.19 (continued)

Country	Accepting gender equality	Pro-democracy	Religious salience	Homophobia/ Xenophobia	Support for political violence among the younger generations	Willingness to fight for the country	N
Philippines	-0.756	-0.676	0.734	-0.318	0.806	-0.102	1190
Poland	0.039	0.461	0.267	0.043	-0.402	0.276	796
Portugal	0.312	0.054	-0.318	-0.570	-0.388	-0.474	740
Puerto Rico	0.696	0.224	0.480	-0.711	-0.214	-0.198	1018
Romania	-0.066	0.099	0.497	0.492	-0.254	-0.087	1555
Russia	-0.583	-0.164	-0.238	0.724	0.244	0.043	2297
Serbia	0.134	-0.187	-0.043	0.709	-0.146	-0.150	1714
Singapore	0.034	-0.146	0.023	-0.250	-0.155	0.159	1718
Slovakia	-0.485	-0.245	-0.198	0.426	-0.029	-0.558	1938
Slovenia	0.330	0.164	-0.593	-0.049	-0.344	0.086	768
Spain	0.620	0.117	-0.590	-0.638	0.142	-0.652	818
Sweden	0.997	0.538	-0.740	-0.940	-0.256	0.081	1022
Switzerland	0.600	0.451	-0.700	-0.714	-0.277	-0.098	2704
Taiwan ROC	0.133	0.194	-0.313	-0.036	-0.195	0.097	1163
Thailand	-0.411	-0.886	-0.023	0.075	0.098	-0.144	1189
Ukraine	-0.319	0.084	-0.087	0.433	0.185	-0.057	1301
United Kingdom	0.438	0.159	-0.536	-0.732	-0.220	-0.172	1529
United States	0.337	0.062	-0.208	-0.625	0.142	-0.147	2263
Uruguay	0.395	0.178	-0.624	-0.964	0.061	-0.423	589
Venezuela	0.040	-0.331	0.275	-0.228	0.478	-0.119	1190

(continued)

**Table 5.19** (continued)

Country	Accepting gender equality	Pro-democracy	Religious salience	Homophobia/ Xenophobia	Support for political violence among the younger generations	Willingness to fight for the country	N
Vietnam	-0.522	0.018	-0.326	0.576	1.088	0.093	1125
Zimbabwe	-0.088	0.125	1.117	0.603	0.039	0.430	1115



are Iceland, Uruguay, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, New Zealand, Germany, Canada, Andorra, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Figure 5.4 now shows the results for acceptance of gender justice based on our factor analysis, and it is clear to see how low is the acceptance of gender justice in the countries of the former Soviet Union, as well as in the other countries of the world with a prolonged rule of a communist party, and unfortunately also in the countries influenced by a widespread “*Islamic popular culture*”, based on the restrictive reading of the Islamic traditions, quite against the original message of tolerance in Islam (see also, Solomon, 2016; Solomon et al., 2023; Solomon & Tausch, 2020a, b, c, 2021).

Indeed, our factor analysis shows that the pro-democracy factor combines the following variables:

- a democracy is characterised by people choosing their leaders in free elections;
- civil rights defend people’s freedoms against oppression;
- democracy is characterised by women having the same rights as men; and
- the importance of democracy per se is emphasised.

The results in some Latin American countries, such as Mexico, Colombia, but also Ecuador and Chile, as well as in Kenya, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, are particularly disappointing. According to our research, the most secular societies here are Sweden, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Japan.

So, our factors, explaining more than 60% of the total variance are:

- Accepting gender equality
- Pro-Democracy
- Religious salience
- Homophobia/Xenophobia
- Support for political violence among the younger generations
- Willingness to fight for the country.

The statistical properties of our model are listed in Table 5.14.

Table 5.14 lists the explained variances of each variable (0.0 = 0%; 1.0 = 100%).

Table 5.16 lists the Eigenvalues and the explained variances.

Figure 5.4 performs the scree test, suggesting that five factors should be interpreted.

Tables 5.17 and 5.18 list the main factor analytical results. The most important drivers of the Homophobia and Xenophobia factor and the size of their influence on the factor (factor loadings) are

Important child qualities: religious faith	0.176
Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws	0.176
Willingness to fight for country	0.108

The most important blocks against the Homophobia and Xenophobia factor and the size of their influence on the factor (factor loadings) are

Men don't make better political leaders than women do	-0.368
Men don't make better business executives than women do	-0.339
Not important in life: Religion	-0.246
University is equally important for a boy and for a girl	-0.212
Importance of democracy	-0.158
Democracy: Women have the same rights as men	-0.118

Our factor component correlations suggest the following very important theoretical connections. The rejection of neighbours: Homosexuals (=homonegativity) is determined by the following factors:

Religious salience	0.335
Willingness to fight for the country	0.198
Support for political violence among the younger generations	-0.001
Pro-democracy	-0.088
Accepting gender equality	-0.308

Homonegativity as the rejection of homosexual parenthood (homosexual couples are not as good parents as other couples) is being determined in the following fashion by the factors:

Religiou salience	0.424
Willingness to fight for the country	0.309
Pro-democracy	-0.061
Support for political violence among the younger generations	-0.223
Accepting gender equality	-0.292

Table 5.19 shows the factor scores for those countries in the world system for which data are available and the number of countries included in the study. At the top of the global homophobia and xenophobia list are Myanmar, Azerbaijan, Montenegro, Bangladesh, Armenia, Maldives, Belarus, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Russia, Serbia, Georgia, Malaysia and Lithuania.

At this stage of our analysis, we also should emphasize that the 10 countries with the lowest acceptance of gender equality are Pakistan, Burma (Myanmar), Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Libya, Philippines, Russia and Kazakhstan.

The ten countries with the highest acceptancy of gender justice were Norway, Sweden, Iceland, France, Denmark, Puerto Rico, Australia, Germany, Spain and New Zealand.

The ten countries with the lowest support for democracy are Malaysia, Thailand, Mongolia, Mexico, Philippines, Guatemala, Colombia, Kenya, Ecuador and Montenegro.

Support for democracy was strongest in Albania, Germany, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Ethiopia, Norway, Greece, Poland and Switzerland.

In times of rising international tensions, we also include—in Table 5.19—our evidence about national resilience, which was recently analysed in extenso by Tausch and Neriah (2023). The drama of the lack of national resilience in key Western countries might in future also affect the willingness of Western societies to stand up for Western tolerance towards the LGBTQ+ communities as an integral part of the Western lifestyle.

## References

- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2002). The political economy of the Kuznets curve. *Review of Development Economics*, 6(2), 183–203.
- Anand, S., & Kanbur, S. R. (1993). The Kuznets process and the inequality—development relationship. *Journal of Development Economics*, 40(1), 25–52.
- Dinda, S. (2004). Environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis: A survey. *Ecological Economics*, 49(4), 431–455.
- Eastin, J., & Prakash, A. (2013). Economic development and gender equality: Is there a gender Kuznets curve? *World Politics*, 65(1), 156–186.
- Janssen, D. J., & Scheepers, P. (2018). How religiosity shapes rejection of homosexuality across the globe. *Journal of Homosexuality*, 66(14), 1974–2001. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00918369.2018.1522809>. Epub 2018 Oct 29. PMID: 30372378.
- Kuznets, S. (1955). Economic growth and income inequality. *The American Economic Review*, 45(1), 1–28.
- Solomon, H. (2016). *Islamic State and the coming global confrontation*. Springer.
- Solomon, H., & Bekker, S. (2023). *Intersectionality and LGBTQ+ Rights: A comparative analysis of Iran, Turkey, and Egypt*. Nova Science Publishers.
- Solomon, H., & Tausch, A. (2020a). “The age of ignorance” and the civic culture of democracy: A multivariate analysis based on world values survey data. In: *Islamism, crisis and democratization*. Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region. Springer. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22849-1\\_3](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22849-1_3)
- Solomon, H., & Tausch, A. (2020b). *Islamism, crisis and democratization: Implications of the World Values Survey for the Muslim world* (Perspectives on development in the Middle East and North Africa Mena region). Springer.
- Solomon, H., & Tausch, A. (2020c). The demise of the Muslim brotherhood in the Arab world? *Jewish Political Studies Review*, 31(1/2), 171–209.
- Solomon, H., & Tausch, A. (2021). *Arab MENA countries: Vulnerabilities and constraints against democracy on the eve of the global Covid-19 crisis*. Perspectives on development in the Middle East and North Africa Mena region. Springer.
- Tausch, A., & Neriyah, J. (2023). *Destabilizing forces and resilience in the current world crisis: Comparisons of global opinion data and a Middle East analysis*. Nova Science.
- Tausch, A., Heshmati, A., & Karoui, H. (2014). *The political algebra of global value change: General models and implications for the Muslim world*. Nova Science Publishers.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.



## Chapter 6

# The Potential for Violence Against Homosexuals and Strategies of Advancing Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy



**Abstract** In this chapter, we first present an estimate of the potential for homophobic violence driven by religiously motivated extremism, estimated from data from the World Values Survey 2017 to 2022. on a population-weighted basis, 52.5% of the world's population can be classified as homophobic, that is, they disapprove of having a homosexual neighbour, and 12.8% of the population not only disapprove of having a homosexual neighbour, but also strongly believe that it is an essential part of democracy for religious institutions to interpret the laws. 1.2% of the world's population now not only are homophobic and believe that it is an essential part of democracy for religious institutions to interpret the laws, but also strongly believe that political violence is justified. We then present country estimates of this extremist religiously motivated homophobic population with the Philippines, Malaysia, Kenya, Ecuador, Zimbabwe, Canada, Spain, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Iraq leading the way. We then present a parametric factor analytical derived index of tolerance, social gender norms, and democracy, and show the results for the countries as a whole, and for their Muslim and Orthodox populations. we also analyze in this chapter homonegativity in the wider social context and discuss the very close relationship between homonegativity and phenomena, such as religious particularism, and restrictive gender, norms, documented by the United Nations Development Program and find evidence of the strong relationship between homonegativity and anti-Semitism.

**Keywords** Homonegativity · Restrictive social gender norms · United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) · Anti-Semitism · Political extremism · Political violence

So far, our findings have attempted to provide the necessary clarity at the theoretical level. We have shown that restrictive interpretations of religions and religious particularism lead to a lack of tolerance. But what are the implications of our study for policymakers in the free world, and what are the consequences for state security agencies and actors charged with protecting freedoms from totalitarian—and in our case, homonegativity—political violence? And how great is this threat?

So, the present Chapter advances the horizons reached in the studies, debated in Chap. 3, as well as those of our empirical results, by calculating first the global real threat potential of homonegative political violence around the world. We then will investigate the drivers of homonegativity by using multiple regression results with the data from the World Values Survey 1981–2016. We will then present a parametric index of tolerant gender social norms and democracy (TGSNDI), which is combining the acceptance of gender equality, pro-democracy attitudes, no homophobia and xenophobia, no support for political violence and the willingness to defend the country. Political decisionmakers of democratic societies, and think tanks, associated with them, would do well to study the empirical details of these analyses, including to find indicators of tolerance and “integration” among the huge Orthodox and Muslim religious minorities, now living in the leading Western democracies.

### **6.1 The Potential of Homophobic Violence, Driven by Religiously Motivated Extremism—Estimated from the Data from the World Values Survey, 2017–2022**

So, the aim of this section is to find analytical indicators that estimate the potential not only of homophobia, but also of religiously motivated homophobia and, as an extension of all this, the political propensity to violence of religiously motivated homophobia in the world population. On a population-weighted basis, 52.5% of the world’s population covered in this sample based on the World Values Survey, 2017–2022 (which differs from the sample, based on the maximum number of countries considered in Chap. 5) can be classified as homophobic. That is, they disapprove of having a homosexual neighbour. 12.8% of the world’s population not only disapprove of having a homosexual neighbour, but also strongly believe that it is an essential part of democracy for religious institutions to interpret the laws. 1.2% of the world’s population now not only believe that it is an essential part of democracy for religious institutions to interpret the laws, but also strongly believe that political violence is justified.

Table 6.1 now lists our findings country by country.

- Reject neighbours: Homosexuals
- Essential characteristic of democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws (7–10 on a ten-point scale)
- Justifiable: Political violence (7–10 on a ten-point scale).

**65,8%** of the global population were covered by our investigation.

To summarize the stunning results, of these:

- **52,5%** of the global population covered in this sample based on the World Values Survey, 2017–2022 (which, we repeat, differs from the sample, based

**Table 6.1** Homophobia, extremist religiously motivated homophobia, and extremist religiously motivated and potentially violent homophobia: estimated share per total population

	% Homophobes	% Religious fundamentalist homophobes	% Religious fundamentalist and violent homophobes
Philippines	16.900	6.833	9.917
Malaysia	60.400	23.686	5.255
Kenya	75.100	16.978	4.630
Ecuador	31.500	7.750	3.917
Zimbabwe	90.100	30.033	3.744
Canada	9.800	2.962	3.534
Spain	13.000	3.443	3.275
Nicaragua	33.300	10.250	3.167
Mexico	23.000	4.781	2.938
Iraq	55.100	19.333	2.917
Guatemala	40.600	9.845	2.441
Bolivia	29.000	8.389	2.333
Vietnam	76.100	29.750	2.250
Indonesia	75.500	40.813	2.219
Russia	65.800	11.224	2.201
Mongolia	45.300	8.852	2.198
Ukraine	51.700	8.399	2.016
Venezuela	31.600	8.487	1.933
Colombia	28.100	7.105	1.711
Morocco	79.900	27.917	1.667
Hong Kong SAR	21.700	2.410	1.590
Serbia	52.700	5.302	1.562
Romania	54.600	14.507	1.552
United States	12.900	2.218	1.314
Ethiopia	69.700	26.148	1.312
Peru	35.600	8.472	1.231
Chile	23.800	2.900	1.200
Tunisia	57.900	11.867	1.134
Libya	62.600	32.776	1.087
Pakistan	41.200	26.165	1.053
Korea, South	79.600	12.289	1.044
Kazakhstan	73.400	17.398	1.019
Nigeria	89.000	27.971	0.970
Kyrgyzstan	72.500	19.250	0.917
Argentina	7.200	2.094	0.897

(continued)

**Table 6.1** (continued)

	% Homophobes	% Religious fundamentalist homophobes	% Religious fundamentalist and violent homophobes
Slovakia	39.500	6.973	0.863
Brazil	6.800	1.362	0.851
Sweden	2.600	0.509	0.849
Puerto Rico	12.500	2.396	0.799
Lebanon	47.700	11.333	0.750
Macau SAR	43.600	4.724	0.603
Czechia	23.300	2.885	0.577
Bosnia and Herzegovina	53.600	9.958	0.537
Belarus	67.500	8.087	0.526
Armenia	82.800	16.271	0.519
France	6.900	0.861	0.484
Australia	10.400	1.214	0.441
Austria	11.800	1.511	0.441
Bangladesh	79.900	57.057	0.430
Jordan	93.800	40.898	0.416
Lithuania	61.400	6.833	0.367
Great Britain	5.600	0.730	0.337
Greece	33.500	6.940	0.334
Italy	11.500	2.394	0.329
Poland	30.000	5.730	0.323
Latvia	38.700	5.736	0.310
Montenegro	70.900	12.193	0.307
Maldives	85.500	25.120	0.289
Macedonia (North M)	62.400	13.077	0.289
Croatia	32.100	4.581	0.282
Thailand	35.100	5.333	0.267
Singapore	26.100	2.883	0.249
Georgia	59.400	10.652	0.230
Switzerland	5.500	0.350	0.223
China	71.800	5.045	0.201
Hungary	36.200	6.809	0.200
Andorra	5.200	0.199	0.199
Germany	7.300	0.333	0.194
Slovenia	30.000	2.662	0.190
Azerbaijan	90.100	8.509	0.171

(continued)



**Table 6.1** (continued)

	% Homophobes	% Religious fundamentalist homophobes	% Religious fundamentalist and violent homophobes
Portugal	13.200	1.602	0.169
Cyprus	45.100	11.734	0.104
New Zealand	7.600	0.852	0.095
Türkiye (Turkey)	78.500	19.228	0.086
Finland	11.900	1.251	0.083
Taiwan ROC	44.400	3.025	0.082
Estonia	39.500	2.744	0.081
Japan	27.100	0.989	0.076
Albania	74.300	9.662	0.071
Bulgaria	63.400	5.696	0.070
Netherlands	2.800	0.203	0.068
Iceland	2.200	0.129	0.065
Egypt	84.000	27.833	0.000
Burma (Myanmar)	91.300	27.333	0.000
Denmark	2.300	0.210	0.000
Norway	3.000	0.090	0.000


on the maximum number of countries considered in Chap. 5) reject homosexual neighbours: **(52,5% homophobes)**

- **12,8%** of the global population covered in our research reject neighbours: homosexuals **and** think it is an essential characteristic of democracy that religious authorities interpret the laws **(12,8% religious fundamentalist homophobes)**
- **1,2%** of the global population covered in our research reject neighbours: homosexuals **and** think it is an an essential characteristic of democracy that religious authorities interpret the laws **and in addition** think that political violence is justified **(1,2% % religious fundamentalist & violent homophobes).**


Table 6.1 summarizes these depressing results, ranked by the incidence of religious fundamentalist and potentially violent homonegativity.

Our following figures (Figs. 6.1 and 6.2) now summarize these results in choropleth maps. For reasons of visibility, 1 is each time the lowest value and 86 the highest value.

The following section deals with a new index of tolerant gender social norms.



**Fig. 6.1** Religious fundamentalist homonegativity as a global problem (1—lowest, 86—highest)



**Fig. 6.2** Religious fundamentalist and potentially violent homonegativity as a global problem (1—lowest, 86—highest)

## 6.2 A Parametric Index of Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy (TGSNDI), Combining Acceptance of Gender Equality, Pro-democracy Attitudes, No Homophobia and Xenophobia, No Support for Political Violence, and the Willingness to Defend the Country

Is it possible to construct an index in the social sciences that summarises, at the click of a mouse and briefly, attitudes towards gender equality, pro-democracy attitudes, no homophobia and xenophobia, no support for political violence, and the willingness to defend the country in times of the necessary defence of democracy? And one that is well enough constructed to produce results not only for the state, but also for members of the Orthodox and Muslim religious communities, who, unfortunately, according to the results so far, often tend towards homonegativity?

So, in the following section we construct a parametric index of tolerant social gender norms and democracy, abbreviated TGSNDI, which uses the weights from our factor analysis listed in Table 6.2 to rank the countries of the world system according to their tolerance and support for democracy. The full results of our comparisons are documented in our Electronic Appendix.

The results of this procedure are that the most tolerant democratic societies in the world are Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Australia, as well as Andorra and Puerto Rico.

The best scores in the Orthodox world are observed in Albania, Germany, Australia, Switzerland, Greece, Ethiopia, Cyprus, Bosnia, Macedonia, Austria, Bulgaria, and Kyrgyzstan, while the worst scores are observed in Kazakhstan, Russia, Montenegro, Lithuania, Belarus, Latvia, Armenia, Ukraine and Nigeria.

The results for Muslim communities around the world are the following. The tolerance and democracy indicator is highest in France, Albania, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, the United Kingdom, Bosnia, Georgia, Ethiopia, Canada, Singapore and China, while it is lowest for the Muslim communities in Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Nigeria, Pakistan, Myanmar, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Northern Macedonia and Russia.

**Table 6.2** Parametric Index of tolerant gender social norms and democracy (TGSNDI); weights for the factor analytical scores

Index component	Index weight for the factor analytical scores
Accepting gender equality	3.509
Pro-Democracy	1.982
No homophobia/Xenophobia	-1.177
No support for political violence among the younger generations	-1.080
Willingness to fight for the country	1.026

Table 6.2 explains the methodology of our index construction from the promax factor analysis of Sect. 5.8.

An Orthodox population with a higher Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy Index than the total population of the country is to be found in Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Albania, Ethiopia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia (North Macedonia), Kazakhstan, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Russia, Romania, Belarus, Armenia and Georgia.

An Orthodox population with a lower Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy Index than the total population of the country is to be found in Canada, Austria, Switzerland, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Australia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Serbia, Greece and Cyprus (Table 6.3).

A Muslim population with a higher Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy Index than the total population of the country is to be found in: Georgia, Montenegro, France, Russia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Pakistan.

A Muslim population with a lower Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy Index than the total population of the country is to be found in Macedonia (North Macedonia), Thailand, Bulgaria, Kenya, Canada, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Philippines, Nigeria, Singapore, Austria, Germany, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, China, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Burma (Myanmar), Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Maldives and Albania (Table 6.4).

There is a straightforward and linear relationship explains more than 88% of Muslim homonegativity. This means nothing more and nothing less that in general terms Muslim homonegativity does follow the patterns of homonegativity of the society around Muslims.

Figure 6.3 now projects these results onto a choropleth map.

### 6.3 The Partial Correlations of Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy

Table 6.5 presents the partial correlation results of the Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy Index (TGSNDI) in the countries of world system with key socioeconomic country-level indicators constant: HDI 2018 & HDI (2018)<sup>2</sup>, latest edition of the World Values Survey.

Our results safely suggest that on the positive side, policy interventions on the following fronts will lead towards more tolerant gender norms and support for democracy:

- gender empowerment
- Labour force participation rate of migrants (both sexes)
- closing the political gender gap
- LFPR (Labour Force Participation Rate) 55–59 of the year olds
- Environment Sustainability
- closing of global gender gap
- Rule of law

**Table 6.3** Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy Index (TGSNDI) and religious diversity—comparisons of the Orthodox population with the total country population

Country (ISO 3166–1 numeric code)	Total country: TGSNDI	Orthodox population: TGSNDI	Difference
Kyrgyzstan	−3.776	−0.120	3.656
Nigeria	−4.346	−1.471	2.875
Albania	3.720	5.121	1.401
Ethiopia	0.772	1.728	0.956
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.348	1.301	0.953
Macedonia (North Macedonia)	0.360	1.179	0.819
Kazakhstan	−3.779	−3.231	0.548
Bulgaria	0.167	0.710	0.543
Ukraine	−1.722	−1.474	0.248
Russia	−3.442	−3.200	0.242
Romania	−0.431	−0.247	0.184
Belarus	−2.147	−1.995	0.152
Armenia	−1.920	−1.828	0.092
Georgia	−0.871	−0.829	0.042
Cyprus	1.348	1.341	−0.007
Greece	2.424	2.399	−0.025
Serbia	−0.732	−0.774	−0.042
Montenegro	−2.293	−2.464	−0.171
Lithuania	−1.714	−2.118	−0.404
Australia	3.901	2.996	−0.905
Latvia	−0.837	−1.856	−1.019
Germany	4.583	3.508	−1.075
Estonia	1.098	−0.143	−1.241
Switzerland	4.038	2.673	−1.365
Austria	3.380	0.991	−2.389
Canada	2.128	−0.430	−2.558

- Corruption avoidance
- world class universities
- social security expenditure
- public education expenditure
- % women in government, all levels.

On the negative side, structures of civil and political liberties violations, the carbon dependent economy, and support for Putinism all are not conducive to a climate of tolerant gender norms and support for democracy.

**Table 6.4** Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy Index (TGSNDI) and religious diversity—comparisons of the Muslim population with the total country population

Country (ISO 3166–1 Numeric code)	Total country: TGSNDI	Muslim population: TGSNDI	Difference
Georgia	−0.871	0.104	0.975
Montenegro	−2.293	−1.595	0.698
France	3.248	3.720	0.472
Russia	−3.442	−3.004	0.438
Azerbaijan	−1.643	−1.517	0.126
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.348	0.405	0.057
Pakistan	−5.265	−5.263	0.002
Albania	3.720	3.702	−0.018
Maldives	−1.967	−1.987	−0.020
Bangladesh	−3.373	−3.410	−0.037
Indonesia	−3.448	−3.664	−0.216
Kazakhstan	−3.779	−4.037	−0.258
Burma (Myanmar)	−4.519	−5.070	−0.551
Malaysia	−6.091	−6.658	−0.567
Kyrgyzstan	−3.776	−4.427	−0.651
China	−0.543	−1.214	−0.671
Zimbabwe	−0.372	−1.338	−0.966
Ethiopia	0.772	−0.223	−0.95
Germany	4.583	3.511	−1.072
Austria	3.380	2.135	−1.245
Singapore	0.453	−1.199	−1.652
Nigeria	−4.346	−6.021	−1.675
Philippines	−4.594	−6.290	−1.696
Switzerland	4.038	2.318	−1.720
United Kingdom	2.774	0.840	−1.934
Canada	2.128	−0.277	−2.405
Kenya	−2.372	−4.886	−2.514
Bulgaria	0.167	−2.427	−2.594
Thailand	−3.541	−6.835	−3.294
Macedonia (North Macedonia)	0.360	−3.054	−3.414




Fig. 6.3 Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy Index (TGSNDI)

## 6.4 The Catastrophic Global Situation of Restrictive Social Gender Norms in the World System

This Section briefly discusses our research findings in the context of the United Nations Development Programme’s work on restrictive social gender norms, which unfortunately has received far too little attention in the public and social scientific debate, especially in Europe. A very welcome counter-tendency is to be noted in the literature, published in the world’s leading medical and human development journals, which debates restrictive social gender norms as a problem of public health (see Connors et al., 2023; Divan et al., 2016; Jain, 2020; Mukhopadhyay et al., 2019; Nabhan et al., 2023; Zarocostas, 2023). The UNDP has presented its indexing of the GSN Index for 91 countries, representing more than 85% of the world’s population. The GSN I Index is based on the variables of the World Values Survey on the following statements.

- It is essential for democracy that women have the same rights as men,
- Men make better political leaders than women,
- University education is more important for men than for women,
- Men should have more rights to work than women,
- Men make better business leaders than women,
- justifying domestic violence against women.

Figure 6.4 now shows the catastrophic global situation of restrictive social gender norms in the world system; hardly any other indicator separates the worlds of the

**Table 6.5** Partial correlations of the Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy Index (TGSNDI) in the countries of world system with key socio-economic country-level indicators constant: HDI 2018 and HDI (2018)<sup>2</sup>, latest edition of the World Values Survey


Constant: HDI 2018 and HDI (2018) <sup>2</sup>	TGSNDI	Error p	df
Gender empowerment index value	0.675	<0.001	49
Share of protestants per total population	0.655	<0.001	71
Labour force participation rate of migrants (both sexes)	0.547	<0.001	69
Closing political gender gap	0.530	<0.001	66
Comparative price levels (US = 1.00)	0.505	<0.001	67
LFPR (Labour Force Participation Rate) 55–59 year olds	0.503	<0.001	69
ESI-index environment sustainability index (Yale Columbia)	0.468	<0.001	66
Closing of global gender gap overall score 2009	0.438	<0.001	66
Rule of law	0.420	<0.001	69
Corruption avoidance measure	0.419	<0.001	69
Per capita world class universities	0.419	<0.001	69
Social security expenditure per GDP average 1990s (ILO)	0.418	0.001	55
Public education expenditure per GNP	0.409	<0.001	67
Overall 35 variable development index	0.407	<0.001	69
Gallup poll about satisfaction: trust in other people	0.395	0.001	63
% women in government, all levels	0.391	<0.001	66
Ecological footprint (g ha /cap)	0.300	0.012	67
Unemployment rate	0.272	0.025	66
Gallup poll about satisfaction: Freedom of choice	0.267	0.024	69
Net international migration rate, 2005–2010	0.266	0.025	69
Multinational corporations outward investments (stock) per GDP	0.260	0.049	56
Democracy measure	0.257	0.034	66
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)	0.256	0.035	66
Population density	–0.256	0.033	68
Share of Hindus per total population	–0.273	0.020	71
Worker remittance inflows as % of GDP	–0.277	0.029	60
Share of adherents of Eastern religions per total population	–0.286	0.014	71
ADL 100 (Anti-Defamation League) Antisemitism	–0.292	0.021	60
Membership in the Islamic Conference	–0.296	0.013	68
FPZ (free production zones) employment as % of total population	–0.308	0.009	69
Combined failed states index	–0.313	0.008	69
Share of Muslims per total population	–0.323	0.005	71
Share of Buddhists per total population	–0.329	0.005	71
Military personnel rate ln (MPR + 1)	–0.360	0.002	67
Share of people without religion per total population	–0.376	0.001	71

(continued)



**Table 6.5** (continued)

Constant: HDI 2018 and HDI (2018)^2	TGSNDI	Error p	df
Happy planet index, HPI	-0.454	<0.001	67
Civil and political liberties violations	-0.458	<0.001	69
Confidence in Putin	-0.492	0.023	19
Carbon emissions per million US dollars GDP	-0.545	<0.001	69




**Fig. 6.4** The UNDP GSNI Index (Gender Social Norms Index) in the world system

Global North from those of the Global South as much as this United Nations Development Programme indicator. The shocking reality is that in many countries of the global South and East, restrictive social gender norms abound.

## 6.5 The UNDP Gender Social Norms Index and Our Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy Index

Figure 6.5 now shows the relationship between the UNDP Gender Social Norms Index and our index, i.e., our new index of tolerant gender social norms and support for democracy, and the non-linear relationship explains no less than 78.15% of the total variance.



**Fig. 6.5** The UNDP GSNI Index (Gender Social Norms Index) as a determinant of the Tolerant Gender Social Norms and Democracy Index (TGSNDI)

## References

- Connors, K., Jaacks, L. M., Awasthi, A., Becker, K., Kerr, R. B., Fivian, E., Bliznashka, L., et al. (2023). Women's empowerment, production choices, and crop diversity in Burkina Faso, India, Malawi, and Tanzania: A secondary analysis of cross-sectional data. *The Lancet Planetary Health*, 7(7), e558–e569.
- Divan, V., Cortez, C., Smelyanskaya, M., & Keatley, J. (2016). Transgender social inclusion and equality: A pivotal path to development. *Journal of the International AIDS Society*, 19, 20803.
- Jain, S. (2020). Human development, gender and capability approach. *Indian Journal of Human Development*, 14(2), 320–332.
- Mukhopadhyay, T., Rivera, C., & Tapia, H. (2019). *Gender inequality and multidimensional social norms*. Working Paper. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report Office, New York.
- Nabhan, A., Kabra, R., Allam, N., Ibrahim, E., Abd-Elmonem, N., Wagih, N., Kiarie, J., et al. (2023). Implementation strategies, facilitators, and barriers to scaling up and sustaining post pregnancy family planning, a mixed-methods systematic review. *BMC Women's Health*, 23(1), 379.
- Zarocostas, J. (2023). UNDP reports that 90% of people hold gender-based biases. *The Lancet*, 401(10393), 2026.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.



## Chapter 7

# Perspectives and Conclusions from This Study



**Abstract** This chapter further evaluates our findings and presents materials on homonegativity and tolerance, and social gender norms in multicultural Western democracies. The chapter then considers policy measures to strengthen the rights of the LGBTQ+ communities, and suggests that on the positive side policy interventions on the following will lead to more tolerant gender norms, and support for democracy: gender empowerment and closing the gender gap, labour force participation of migrants, rule of law, corruption avoidance, world class universities, social security spending, public education expenditure on the negative side, we found that structures of civil and political liberty violations, the carbon dependent economy and support for Putinism all are not conducive to a climate of tolerant gender norms and support for democracy.

**Keywords** Homonegativity · World Values Survey · Political Islam · Open society

In summary, the conclusion of our study is that with a share of 12.0 per cent of the total number of hate crimes registered by the OSCE in the countries of the European Union, it is necessary to analyse the drivers of homonegativity also for security policy considerations. The findings presented in the second chapter of our analysis, those of international organisations and NGOs, as well as the already available, frequently cited and proven quantitative studies discussed in the theoretical part of our work, all come to this conclusion. Our own empirical research has now confirmed this finding, in some cases dramatically, and we have also been able to show that it is not so much religion as restrictive interpretations of religion and religious particularism that have contributed to an increase in homonegativity. The proven effects may be smaller than the public debate suggests, but religiously motivated political extremism will challenge the acceptance of LGBTQ+ communities even more than before in the coming years and, as Vidino and Meleagrou-Hitchens (2022) have already shown, will also lead to terrorist actions against these communities. The proportion of the world's population that is not only homophobic but also characterised by restrictive interpretations of religion is well over 10%, and in this respect poses a real future

threat to the political and social stability of democratic societies, particularly in the West, where LGBTQ communities enjoy greater freedoms.


However, the religious communities of the major Christian denominations in Europe and in the democratic societies of the West resolve issues such as the admission of homosexuals and LGBTQ people to sacred ministries or to a church wedding, it is imperative that the other major denominations, and this is especially true of Christian Orthodoxy, and also Islam in the countries of the West, distance themselves from any discrimination against LGBTQ people and reject any form of anti-LGBTQ violence.

## 7.1 Homonegativity and Tolerant Social Gender Norms in Multicultural Western Democracies

In the following table, which is based on the statistical studies in the previous chapters, we first want to draw a picture of homonegativity based on the rejection of homosexual neighbours in some Western democracies. We compare the overall situation with homonegativity among the Muslims and the Orthodox, noting that the table can of course only be interpreted in the context of Table 4.2 on the probability of error. Only in Cyprus, Greece and Slovenia do the data deviate somewhat from the general hypothesis that respondents with a Muslim or Orthodox socio-cultural background are more homonegative than overall society (Table 7.1).

**Table 7.1** Homonegativity in western democracies by comparison

	Homonegatives: total country (%)	N	Homonegatives: Muslim respondents (%)	N	Homonegatives: Orthodox respondents	N
Austria	12	1588	22	58	19%	26
Bulgaria	63	1422	75	190	65%	823
Canada	10	4018	32	85	27%	75
Cyprus	45	963	55	474	36%	473
Denmark	2	3340	22	23	xx	<20
France	7	1859	9	87	xx	<20
Germany	7	3608	14	138	14%	50
Great Britain	5	4368	12	124	xx	<20
Greece	34	1196	22	27	34%	1094
Netherlands	3	4430	15	117	xx	<20
Slovenia	30	1052	14	29	26%	27
Spain	13	1191	18	22	xx	<20
Switzerland	6	3141	17	81	17%	35



**Fig. 7.1** Homonegativity by religious denomination in Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland

Figure 7.1 shows the rate of homonegativity by denomination in the Western European countries of Austria, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland, where the data situation allows a relatively meaningful comparison between total homonegativity, Muslim homonegativity and Orthodox homonegativity.

## 7.2 Political Measures to Strengthen the Rights of the LGBTQ+ Communities

At a time of multiple threats to liberal democracy and rising anti-Semitism, we believe it is highly appropriate to develop a perspective to strengthen the rights of LGBTQ+ communities in multicultural societies. With LGBTQ+ communities now the target of 12 per cent of all hate crimes in the European Union, it is time to stop ignoring the threat that violent and especially religiously motivated violent homonegativity poses to the long-term stability of free and democratic societies. Our research has shown that in all the global samples we have used, more than half of the world’s population can be classified as homophobic, and that 12.8% of the world’s population not only disapprove of having a homosexual neighbour, but also strongly believe that it is an essential part of democracy for religious institutions to interpret the law. 1.2% of the world’s population now not only believe that it is an essential part of democracy for religious institutions to interpret the laws, but also strongly believe that political violence is justified.

In our research, our results safely suggest that on the positive side, policy interventions on the following fronts will lead towards more tolerant gender norms and support for democracy:

- gender empowerment and closing the gender gaps
- Labour force participation rate of migrants (both sexes) and older workers

- Rule of law
- Corruption avoidance
- world class universities
- social security expenditure
- public education expenditure.

On the negative side, we found that structures of civil and political liberties violations, the carbon dependent economy, and support for Putinism all are not conducive to a climate of tolerant gender norms and support for democracy.

We showed that the following factors determine homonegativity:

Religious particularism	0.167
Secularism	-0.223
Religious tolerance, no restrictive gender norms	-0.493

We also found that one of the most important drivers of the homophobia and xenophobia factor was the belief that in a democracy religious authorities should interpret the laws. The most important blocks against the homophobia and xenophobia factor were the rejection of male privilege in politics, economics and higher education and the belief that in a democracy women have the same rights as men.

Finally, it should be noted that the conclusions of a recent study (Solomon et al., 2023) on ‘political Islam’ and homonegativity also apply to our study. We agree with Solomon et al., (2023), that the challenges to inclusive policies for LGBTQ+ communities range from discriminatory legal frameworks and societal stigma to limited access to healthcare and lack of adequate legal protection. Our own empirical evidence—throughout this publication—underlines the importance of what Solomon et al., (2023) call the ‘intersectional lens’, which allows us to capture the overlapping dimensions of marginalisation experienced by LGBTQ+ people, taking into account their sexual orientation, gender identity, race, religion, class and other intersecting factors.

We also agree with Solomon et al., (2023) that legal reforms, policy changes, social awareness initiatives, educational efforts and community empowerment will become very necessary. Challenging discriminatory laws will be essential, accompanied by advocacy for inclusive policies that protect the rights and well-being of LGBTQ+ people. We also agree with Solomon et al., (2023) that challenging stereotypes and creating safe and inclusive spaces for marginalised communities to freely express their identities and access support services is paramount. These authors are also correct in insisting that external stakeholders, including international businesses, multinational corporations and the global community, have the potential to influence and contribute to transformative change.

In summary, the main and most robust conclusion of our study is that, with a share of 12.0 per cent of the total number of hate crimes registered by the OSCE in the countries of the European Union, it is necessary to analyse the drivers of homonegativity also from a policy perspective on religiously motivated political extremism. The findings presented in the second chapter of our analysis, those of

international organisations and NGOs, as well as the already available, frequently cited and proven quantitative studies discussed in the theoretical part of our work, all come to the conclusion that the relationship between homonegativity and a restrictive interpretation of religions needs to be investigated. Our own empirical research has now confirmed this finding, in some cases dramatically, and we have also been able to show that it is not so much religion as such but restrictive interpretations of religion and religious particularism that have contributed to an increase in homonegativity. The proven effects may be smaller than the public debate suggests, but religiously motivated political extremism will challenge the acceptance of LGBTQ+ communities even more than before in the coming years and, as Vidino and Meleagrou-Hitchens (2022) have already shown, will certainly lead to terrorist actions against these communities.

However much the religious communities of the major Christian denominations in Europe and in the democratic societies of the West resolve issues such as the inclusion of gay and LGBTQ people in sacred ministries or in a church wedding, it is imperative that the other major denominations, and this is especially true of Christian Orthodoxy and Muslim communities in the countries of the West, distance themselves from any discrimination against LGBTQ people and reject any form of anti-LGBTQ violence.

Although the proven percentage of violent religiously motivated homophobes in the world system is only 1.2% of the world's population, this is a global army, just like the violent ones against other victims, capable of threatening the foundations of political stability in the countries of the West and preparing to restrict the rights of LGBTQ communities.

Ultimately, the world today is faced with the stark alternatives of a world modelled on Sir Karl Popper's social philosophy of a free and democratic society (Popper, 1991, 2012; Popper et al., 2000) or totalitarianism, which, especially in the West, is increasingly influenced by Islamist radicalism in the tradition of Sayyid Qutb (Qutb, 1990, 2000; Qutb et al., 1979, 2006, 2008).

If we have succeeded in drawing attention to this phenomenon at a time when the resilience of the free world is under great strain (Tausch et al., 2023), our work will have achieved its goal.

## References

- Popper, K. (1991). The best world we have yet had. George Urban Interviews Sir Karl Popper. RFE/RL Report on the USSR, 3, 22, May 31, 20–22.
- Popper, K. (2012). *The open society and its enemies*. Routledge.
- Popper, K. R., & Bosetti, G. (2000). *The lesson of this century: With two talks on freedom and the democratic state*. Routledge.
- Qutb, S. (1990). *Milestones*. American Trust.
- Qutb, S. (2000). *Social justice in Islam*. Islamic Publications International.
- Qutb, S., & Bergesen, A. (2008). *The Sayyid Qutb reader: Selected writings on politics, religion, and society*. Routledge.



- Qutb, S., & David, R. (2006). *Basic principles of the Islamic worldview*. Islamic Publications International.
- Qutb, S., Salahi, M. A., & Shamis, A. A. (1979). *In the shade of the Qur'ān*. MWH.
- Solomon, H., & Bekker, S. (2023). *Intersectionality and LGBTQ+ rights: A comparative analysis of Iran, Turkey, and Egypt*. Nova Science Publishers.
- Tausch, A., & Neriya, J. (2023). *Destabilizing forces and resilience in the current world crisis: Comparisons of global opinion data and a middle east analysis*. Nova Science.
- Vidino, L., & Meleagrou-Hitchens, A. (2022). *Islamist homophobia in the west: From rhetoric to violence*. Program on Extremism, George Washington University; and National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center, Reports, Projects, and Research No. 14. <https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/ncitereportsresearch/14>

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

