

The University of Tokyo Studies on Asia

Ryo Sahashi · Yasuhiro Matsuda ·
Waka Aoyama *Editors*

Asia Rising

A Handbook of History and
International Relations in East,
South and Southeast Asia



The University of Tokyo
Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia
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We aim to solicit works from authors and editors whose studies focus on individual Asian countries as well as regional and trans-regional topics. We define the boundaries of Asian Studies quite broadly – from North to South and East to West. The Series Editors curate a theoretically rich series deeply engaged with postcolonial theory, gender studies, and cultural studies, led by the expertise presented by the scholars, and affiliated network, of the series' home: the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia. To date, postcolonial theory and gender studies have been prominent in scholarship by Anglo-phone scholars in the US, UK, and India. We aim this series to promote opportunities for new theoretical work by scholars from Korea, China, Southeast Asia, and Pacific-Asia.

The series editors invite submissions of original works across the broad spectrum of humanities and social sciences as well as translations of established works not previously published in English. Based at the University of Tokyo Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, the series seeks to engage scholarship 'on Asia in Asia', with the intent of bringing forth the intellectual works of those not otherwise likely to be known to scholars whose primary language is English.

We welcome contributions to cutting-edge issues and debates from younger researchers as well as from established scholars. We are particularly interested in submissions that cross disciplinary boundaries or seek to establish new disciplinary methods.

This book is supported by funds from the UTokyo Foundation, and we would like to express our sincere thanks to the donors.

Ryo Sahashi · Yasuhiro Matsuda · Waka Aoyama
Editors

Asia Rising

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Preface

This book, initiated by the Institute of Advanced Studies on Asia at the University of Tokyo in 2019, aims to broadcast the accomplishments of Asian studies within Asia through English. It is designed to facilitate the learning of undergraduate and master's students.

The University of Tokyo has seen an increase in English-medium introductory lectures on Asia for undergraduate and master's students. However, the textbooks typically assigned have been predominantly authored by Western scholars. Although these books are of high quality, they tend to offer a predominantly Western viewpoint and lack adequate emphasis on Asia's pre-imperial and pre-colonial developments. There was a noticeable trend to prioritize the global dynamics of the Cold War over the US and the Soviet Union, overshadowing the local contexts of post-World War II decolonization and the Cold War in Asia. More concerning was the predominance of English-language references and recommended readings in these textbooks, failing to reflect adequately on local Asian materials and research findings. To address these concerns, we compiled this new handbook.

This publication is just the beginning of a broader initiative to produce introductory texts on Asian studies by Asians. While the book is written by researchers based in Japan and does not specifically solicit contributions from other regions, it represents a collective effort without a unified structure but is nonetheless of great importance.

Firstly, it sheds light on the historical local relationships in East Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, from the end of what would be considered the premodern period from a Western perspective. The first three chapters extensively discuss the significance and enduring impact of Western expansion and colonization in Asia, offering insights from an Asian standpoint. Chapter 1 also addresses what Asia is, highlighting the ambiguous nature of its conceptual origins. It also points out that much of Asian studies has been conducted from an external perspective, often by those outside of Asia.

Secondly, the book extensively covers the implications of Japan's growth for Asia, including its modernization, expansion, and the effects of its behaviors on Asian politics, and Japan's re-engagement with the region, as detailed across several chapters.

Thirdly, the second half of the book comprehensively examines the late 20th century alongside the significant increase in America's influence in Asia, the achievements in democratization and economic growth in various Asian regions, and the rise of regionalism. It also explores how China's development is reshaping Asia.

While this book revisits many historical events previously covered in other textbooks, it reinterprets them from an Asian perspective. Readers are urged not to skip these sections merely because the facts are known but to consider the new interpretations offered.

As part of *The University of Tokyo Studies on Asia* series, this book is available in open access, reflecting the belief that academic knowledge should be freely and widely accessible. We hope this book serves as a valuable resource for those looking to deepen their understanding of Asia.

Compiling this book involved extensive dialogue with numerous authors and time-consuming revisions, culminating in a publication process that spanned five years. We extend our deepest gratitude to Associate Professor Christopher Gerteis of the Institute, Ms. Jennifer Anderson, the institute's staff, and many authors who patiently awaited its release.

Tokyo, Japan
Tokyo, Japan
Tokyo, Japan
2024 Spring

Ryo Sahashi
Yasuhiro Matsuda
Waka Aoyama

Contents

Introduction: What is Asia?	1
Masashi Haneda	
Prosperity in Asia	9
Satoshi Hirano, Hiroyuki Mashita, Yijiang Zhong, and Masashi Haneda	
Colonization and Imperialism	31
Toshie Awaya and Yuji Tsuboi	
East Asia and Imperialism	43
Takashi Okamoto, Shin Kawashima, and Kaoru Iokibe	
Japan's Expansion into Asia	67
Yuichi Sasaki	
Colonialism and War-Torn Asia	91
Masahiro Wakabayashi, Aiko Kurasawa, and Takashi Mitsui	
From the Concept of Postwar Order to the Cold War System	115
Yasuhiro Matsuda, Ayako Kusunoki, and Tadashi Kimiya	
Decolonization	141
Kazuya Nakamizo and Hiroyoshi Kano	
The Cold War in Asia After 1953	163
Toshihiko Aono	
Experiencing Development: The Resistance and Adaptation of Thailand Over Half a Century	187
Pattajit Tangsinmunkong and Jin Sato	
Economic Development in Korea and China	209
Tadashi Kimiya and Akio Takahara	
Democratization in Asia	221
Yuko Kasuya	

Japan’s Economic Growth and Engagement in Asia 237
Akihiko Tanaka

The Rise of China in Asia 253
Rumi Aoyama

Opposition and Cooperation: The Asia Pacific After the Cold War 269
Ryo Sahashi

Regional Concepts and Regionalism in Asia 289
Mie Oba

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Introduction: What is Asia?



Masashi Haneda

The term “Asian studies” does not necessarily carry the same meaning across the world. To begin with, the meaning of the word “Asia” differs slightly from language to language and from place to place. Inevitably, the conclusions that can be drawn from research on Asia—a word that has different meanings in itself—will not be universal. Therefore, this initial chapter begins by reviewing the origin of the word “Asia” and its multiple meanings. Next, it discusses the nature of Asian studies, a field of endeavor founded on the premise of the ambiguity of the word “Asia” as a type of area studies. It concludes by emphasizing the fact that, when dealing with Asian studies, it is critically important to be aware of who is conducting research on what and for whom. In this respect, the findings in the field of Asian studies described in this book are highly distinctive.


1 The Changing Meanings and Ambiguity of Asia

What was the original meaning of the word “Asia”? The word originates from the ancient Greek word “Asia.” However, we can trace it even further back to the Akkadian (a Semitic language used in Mesopotamia until around the first century) word “asu,” which means “land of the rising sun.” In ancient Greece, the word “Asia” referred to the east, namely, from the western part of the Anatolian Peninsula to the east across the Aegean Sea, and this word was passed on to Latin and then to other European languages (Everett-Heath 2020).

In the book *Etymologiae* by Isidorus, a seventh-century scholar from Seville in the Iberian Peninsula, the so-called T and O map illustrating the structure of the world appears for the first time. In this book, one of the three landmasses that make

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Fig. 1 T and O map (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Diagrammatic_T-O_world_map_-_12th_c.jpg)



up the world is named Asia and is located in the east. The other two landmasses are Europe and Africa. This T and O map, which appears in the literature of the Western European Christian world until the fifteenth century, is a conceptual representation of the world and is not based on actual knowledge. Asia is simply the land of the East. This is because the geographical knowledge of the people of the Western European Christian world at that time was limited to the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea at best (Fig. 1).¹

In the world before the fifteenth century, there were several such regional perceptions of the world. For example, ancient China classed its neighbors by compass direction as the “Four Barbarians,” with China in the center. Japan, meanwhile, referred to itself as *Honcho*, surrounded by the lands of *Shina* (China) and *Tenjiku* (India), while in West Asia, people divided the world into the “Seven Climatic Zones.” Other regions must have had their own particular, albeit lesser known, worldviews, too. In other words, until the sixteenth century, the word “Asia” was merely a vague spatial concept in the European Christian world and was unknown to the rest of the world.

Later, however, when Western Europeans actually moved into various parts of the world and created world maps based on accurate geographic information, the various perceptions in different parts of the world were gradually disregarded, and world maps and place names of Western European origin were accepted and used in other places.

In the early seventeenth century, while in Beijing, the missionary Matteo Ricci created *Kunyu Wanguo Quantu*, a map of all the countries of the world, which included much of the geographical knowledge and place names we use today. By

¹ Despite the existence of the T and O map, the geographical concept of “Europe” was not very well known in the Middle Ages. It is important to note that it was not until the eighteenth century that Europe was often used in opposition to the Christian world, which was the dominant spatial concept (Davies 1996, pp. 7–9).




Fig. 2 *Kunyu Wanguo Quantu*, Kano Collection, Tohoku University Library ([https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kunyu_Wanguo_Quantu_\(%E5%9D%A4%E8%Bhttps://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kunyu_Wanguo_Quantu_\(%E5%9D%A4%E8%BC%BF%E8%90%AC%E5%9C%8B%E5%85%A8%E5%9C%96\).jpg#filelinks](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kunyu_Wanguo_Quantu_(%E5%9D%A4%E8%Bhttps://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kunyu_Wanguo_Quantu_(%E5%9D%A4%E8%BC%BF%E8%90%AC%E5%9C%8B%E5%85%A8%E5%9C%96).jpg#filelinks))

this time, the word “Asia,” which had originally been a vague concept meaning “the eastern region,” had been transformed into a single geographical space (Fig. 2).

It should be noted, however, that even after the sixteenth century, several terms other than “Asia” were used to refer to the East as seen from Europe. “The Orient” (the land of the rising sun, the East) is one of them. The lands beyond the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa were collectively known as the “East Indies.” This category included the eastern coast of the African continent, the Indian subcontinent, the islands and continental areas of Southeast Asia, as well as mainland China and the Japanese archipelago. The coastal areas where ships arrived were certainly included in the East Indies, but it was not always clear how far inland the East Indies extended. Therefore, it can be said that among these terms, the only place name with a specific geographical range was “Asia.” Nevertheless, with the development of modern academic disciplines such as geography, place names originating from Europe became known to the people living in various parts of Asia, and they were gradually shared and used.

As a geographical name, Asia is the part of Eurasia east of the Ural Mountains, the Bosphorus, and the Isthmus of Suez.² Needless to say, Europe is to the west. This is the result of dividing the huge landmass of Eurasia into two parts, according to the tradition followed since the creation of the T and O map. The peoples of Western Europe referred to the vast landmass to the east of Europe, their home region, as Asia. There was no sense of belonging to the same human group, and no common

² The territory of Asia as a geographic space was defined in the late eighteenth century when the Russian government erected a marker in the Ural Mountains as the boundary between Europe and Asia. Consequently, this boundary was recognized by Western European countries (Davies 1996, p. 8). The boundary between Asia and Europe extends northward from the Sea of Azov on the north side of the Black Sea on the map of all the countries of the world mentioned above.

characteristics or customs existed among the people living in the region. Asia was only the “other” space remaining after removing Europe, the “self,” from this vast landmass.

As this shows, “Asia” is too large a space to be concretely explained as a single entity. Moreover, since the word was originally a concept, which later became a geographical term, there has always been ambiguity and arbitrariness attached to the word and its meaning. Therefore, for the purpose of academic analysis and explanations, such as explaining the characteristics of specific groups of people and cultures, or analyzing political and economic trends, the term “Asia” is often preceded by a direction, such as east, west, north, or south, which establishes a specific regional grouping.

However, even with the addition of an identifying term preceding the word “Asia,” ambiguity remains. For example, in English, “East Asia” is often used in reference to China, the Korean Peninsula, and Japan, but it can also refer to the combined space of Southeast and Northeast Asia, that is, the entire eastern part of Asia. In addition, there are many theories on how to divide Central Asia and North Asia.

Therefore, without an additional identifying term preceding it, the word “Asia” is ambiguous. In the United Kingdom, “Asian People” refers almost exclusively to the people of South Asia, while China and Japan are often referred to as being from the “Far East.”³ Today, countries in Europe and North America rarely use “Asia” in reference to the Eastern Mediterranean region, the area that this term was originally supposed to indicate. Instead, it is part of a space known as the Middle East or the Near East. The Association for Asian Studies in North America does not include West Asia in its research. In Japan as well, such a perception seems to be gaining strength. The term “Asia” is often used to refer to the region from East to South Asia.⁴ In fact, even this book, where the title refers to a “Rising Asia,” does not cover West Asia. However, the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia at the University of Tokyo, which played a major role in the publication of this book, has a research unit called the Department of West Asian Studies.

The people of Iran and Turkey, which are located in West Asia, often consider themselves to be from the Middle East, but traditionally, they have considered themselves to be from Asia, and as Asians, they feel a strong affinity with the people of Japan. Hence, the word “Asia,” which is supposed to be a geographical denomination, does not necessarily refer to the exact space indicated by that geographical name. This is the nature of research in the humanities, which deals with concepts including studies of “culture.” The term “Asia” has been used conveniently in various ways,

³ Oxford English Dictionary’s column of “Asian” explains as follows: “in modern use when referring to people of Asian descent typically denoting a person of East or South-east Asian descent in North America, but someone of South Asian descent in Britain”.

⁴ For example, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has an Asia and Pacific Affairs Bureau, which is in charge of diplomacy with Mongolia, the Korean Peninsula, China, Southeast Asia, and South Asia, the western border of which is Pakistan. In contrast, countries west of Afghanistan are handled by the Middle East and Africa Bureau, and the term “Asia” is not used.

especially when people living in Asia talk about something related to their own identity.⁵ This should be kept in mind when engaging in Asian studies, a field of study aiming to better understand and explain Asia.

2 New Asian Studies

Another point must not be forgotten when studying Asia or reading literature on Asia—in other words, when dealing with “Asian studies.” This is the need to be aware of whether the researcher or author is approaching the subject of Asia from outside or from within. In addition, the position of the recipients of the information sent by the researcher or author is also important. In other words, it is important to consider who is researching what and in what capacity, and to whom the information is being communicated.⁶

If we think of Asian studies as a type of area studies that flourished in the United States during the post-World War II period when the Cold War began, there is no way to approach Asia from within. This is because the original mission of area studies was to approach a certain region from the outside, specifically, from the United States, using social science methods to understand it in the context of the knowledge system and values of English in the United States, and to deliver the research results to readers in the United States. In essence, area studies at this time were policy studies, and they were the “study of others.”

These area studies influenced the Japanese academic world, and by the 1970s, the Japanese style of area studies, which uses multiple research fields and methods to understand an area comprehensively, was flourishing. In the case of Asian studies, this style is characterized by the fact that it attempts to reveal the characteristics of a country or region within Asia comprehensively by incorporating research methods from not only the humanities and social sciences but also the sciences, such as geology and agriculture. However, these area studies initially inherited the characteristics of American area studies as the “study of others.” This is because research results by Japanese researchers were published in Japanese, and research on Japan (itself), which is geographically located in Asia, was not included in the category of Asian studies. Asian studies in Japan during this period referred to the study of others by Japanese researchers for Japanese readers.⁷

Gradually, international exchanges between people flourished at the personal and academic levels, and the distinction between “self” and “other” in Asian studies became less clear. The reason for this is that researchers from the target country

⁵ The ideas of “Asianism” and the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere,” which held sway in Japan in the first half of the twentieth century, are examples of this (e.g. Saaler and Koschmann 2007; Matsuura 2019).

⁶ The author has elaborated on this major challenge for the discipline of area studies (Haneda 2018, 2021).

⁷ Observing Looking at Asia (others) to understand the region is the basic attitude of area studies (Takeuchi 1978).

or region entered area studies as “other studies” in the United States, while local researchers, such as Japanese and Chinese researchers, increasingly presented their research in English. Moreover, in the case of Japan’s area studies, the idea of returning research results to the communities that are the subject of study is often emphasized, and presentations in the local language—for example, Indonesian for Indonesian studies and Vietnamese for Vietnamese studies—are encouraged. It can be said that Asian studies with a character that differs from the original Asian studies are now being developed internationally.⁸

Nevertheless, this does not mean that the setting of research targets, methods, and results are completely shared among researchers across national and linguistic differences. The question of whether to approach the region under study from the outside or the inside is one of the issues that still requires careful consideration. Depending on the perspective from which one approaches the subject and tries to understand it, its perception and characteristics may differ. Moreover, the way in which the subject is understood may also vary depending on the kind of self-awareness, knowledge, or common sense the person receiving the explanation from the researcher or author has.

In this respect, this book has some interesting characteristics. All the authors of this book are researchers based in Japan. Many of them have published articles in Japanese for readers who have acquired the Japanese system of knowledge. However, not all of them are of Japanese nationality. These scholars discuss and write the history and international relations of Asia, including Japan, in English. One of the characteristics of this book is that it does not clearly distinguish between “inside” and “outside,” or “self” and “other,” and tries to overcome these distinctions. However, the Japanese language has a system of knowledge, values, and common sense that are characteristic of it. Considering the fact that the book is written by a number of researchers who usually think and write in Japanese, the explanations of certain events may be quite different from those presented in similar books from English-speaking countries. Nevertheless, the value of this book lies therein, as the respective authors present just one of the various ways of looking at “Asia” through English, a language with a large readership.

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⁸ Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology has been encouraging and supporting area studies as a means of revitalizing and internationalizing Japan’s humanities and social sciences, which generally seem inward looking, fragmented, and stagnant. See, for example, the summary of the discussions at the March 2002 meeting of the Special Committee on Humanities and Social Sciences of the Science and Technology Council’s Subcommittee on Academia (MEXT 2002).

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Prosperity in Asia



Satoshi Hirano, Hiroyuki Mashita, Yijiang Zhong, and Masashi Haneda

1 China

1.1 *The Order of Tianxia and the Rise of the Qing Dynasty*

Concerning East Asian international relations in the pre-modern era, the order of *tianxia*, centered around Chinese civilization, held great importance. The Chinese civilization born along the central area of the Huang He (Yellow River) over three thousand years ago spread via Chinese who claimed superiority over the surrounding *yi* peoples (barbarians) and even felt it was desirable to eventually assimilate them into Chinese civilization. Additionally, Confucianism was taught by Confucius around the sixth and fifth centuries BCE, and the Chinese believed spreading a moral order of *li*, focusing on adherence to hierarchical relationships, was also linked to the stabilization of *tianxia*.

Therein, in addition to adopting the idea that the emperor overseeing Chinese civilization and *tianxia* should be an individual of high moral character who adheres to the tenants of Confucianism and brings stability, a bureaucratic system developed based on imperial examinations in which hiring decisions were determined through the testing of individuals versed in Confucianism. And externally extending various benefits to foreign rulers in exchange for those rulers attaching themselves to and

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following the virtue of the emperor is thought to have engendered a hierarchical relationship between the emperor and foreign rulers, cementing a sense of unification and identification with the *tianxia*. This was a tributary relationship.

While it is true that trade (at *hu-shi* border trade markets) was also conducted with countries and regions without an official tributary relationship based on conditions established by the emperor's rule, this too was seen as an extension of the *tianxia*. Furthermore, tribute nations were given preferable treatment in trade, and under the idea that it was desirable to restrict trade by private citizens in order to weaken opposing forces, the "Hai-jin sea ban" policy of frequently eliminating private merchants was enforced.

The Ming order based on these sorts of principles was inherited by the Qing, which grew in power centering around the Jurchen people of Northeast Asia. The Jurchen people had originally traded with the Ming at Liaodong *hu-shi* border trade markets. However, the Ming began to wane due to a military dispatch to Korea by Japan's Toyotomi Hideyoshi, conflict within the imperial court, and clamped down trade conditions. As a result, the Jurchen leader Nurhaci, who unified the Jurchen tribes, grew increasingly dissatisfied with the Ming. In 1616, he established the Later Jin Khanate and began to oppose the Ming. Then, the Later Jin Khanate grew stronger, establishing the "Eight Banners" military organization filled with Jurchen people, as well as Mongolians and Ming soldiers who had surrendered to Jurchen forces. Eventually, the Jurchen people took the name Manchu, and in 1636 changed the name of their state to Qing.

In 1644, the Ming crumbled in Li Zicheng's rebellion. To quell the chaos, Ming military leader Wu Sangui opened the Shanhaiguan Gate of the Great Wall and let the Qing forces inside. The Qing, which had relocated its capital to Beijing, mostly inherited the general control framework of the Ming from the "Eighteen Provinces of China." In the process of subjugating the holdover remnants of the Ming Dynasty, the Qing initially strengthened the Haijin sea ban, but relaxed it after overthrowing The Kingdom of Tungning (the Zheng Dynasty ruled Taiwan) in 1683. This helped pave the way to economic prosperity in the eighteenth century.

Amidst these sorts of developments, most Asian countries came to pay tribute to the Qing. From the standpoint of respecting Confucianism, Korea yearned for the Ming Dynasty of the Han people that exemplified "Chinese" values. Therein, they took a cold stance towards the rise of the Later Jin Khanate and Qing, which to them represented northern *yi* barbarians. As a result, Korean King Injo of Joseon was besieged by Qing forces, and forced into paying tribute to the Qing in 1637. After the dissolving of the Ming, Korea deepened its resolve to inherit and sustain the Chinese civilization and practice the purest version of Confucian values. Thus, they attempted to achieve a high position within the Qing's *tianxia* by continuing to pay a reluctant tribute to the Qing.¹

¹ In the Qing era, the elites of Joseon considered Manchurian Qing as barbarian. The true meaning of *li* disappeared with the collapse of the Ming. However, the Joseon carried on the true Confucian value of *li* until the revival of the Ming. This concept is called the Small Middle Kingdom. The most representative source is: Bak Jiwon (1780) *The Jehol Diary* [熱河日記/열하일기].

The Ming positioned Ryukyu as being responsible for ensuring maritime region stability, and as such, Ryukyu prospered through tribute trade profits. In 1609, the Satsuma Domain of Japan invaded Ryukyu with an eye on those profits, and subsequently Ryukyu became subordinate to both Japan and the Ming and Qing Dynasties. Thus, from the viewpoint of Beijing, the feeling of loyalty expressed by Ryukyu's tributes did come into question, but the Ming and Qing chose to give quiet consent to avoid a clash with Japan.

Though the various dynasties in what is currently called Southeast Asia respected the rationales of doctrines such as Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam and had absolutely no reason to attach themselves to Chinese civilization, they paid tribute based on the motivation of economic profit. In part as an effort to oppose the southern advancement of the large dynasties of the Ming and Qing to the north, the dynasties that emerged in what is now Vietnam absorbed Confucianism and Chinese characters and proclaimed superiority over surrounding countries as a centralized state.

Regarding the relationship between the Ming and Japan, due to the Wokou pirate groups, which consisted mainly of Japanese people, and the invasions of Korea by Toyotomi Hideyoshi in the sixteenth century, relations were generally not smooth. In the fourteenth century, to actualize Wokou countermeasures and profit through trade, the Ming and Japan's Ashikaga clan established a tributary relationship. But this did not last long. The Japanese Tokugawa regime conquered the Toyotomi clan. And, to guard against the influx of Christianity from the mid-seventeenth century onward, right around the transition from the Ming to Qing Dynasty, the regime prohibited Japanese people from travelling abroad by ship and restricted docking for Qing ships to Nagasaki only. Therein, the relationship between the Qing and Japan did not exceed an extremely limited extent until entering into the Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty in 1871. However, Japan did strive to gather foreign information written in Chinese through Nagasaki, and this also helped pave the way to opening the Japanese borders in the mid-nineteenth century.

1.2 Power Games in Inner Asia

In the process of expansion, the Qing placed an extremely high value on strengthening relationships with Mongolian tribes who possessed powerful horseback military strength. Furthermore, influence of the Gelug school (a.k.a. the Yellow Hat school), a reformist branch of Tibetan Buddhism, spread rapidly throughout North-east Asian nomads on horseback, including the Mongolian tribes from the late sixteenth century onward. Therein, the history of Inner Asia centering around Tibetan Buddhism unfolded as another important aspect of Qing history.

Tibetan Buddhism belongs to the Mahayana Buddhism lineage. However, in the process of its development, various religious sects and powerful families formed ties, sparking power struggles. Founded by the fourteenth to fifteenth century monk Je Tsongkhapa, the Gelug school strengthened its missionary activity in Mongolia to bolster its own survival. Notably, the sixteenth century Mongolian grasslands ruler

Altan Khan converted to the Gelug school, and the school solidified unshakeable influence in Inner Asia. Furthermore, the Gelug school leader was designated with the title “Dalai Lama” by Altan Khan.

Subsequently, the belief spread among the nomads of Inner Asia that the Khan leader unifying the military groups was an ideal choice as the benefactor who could provide better protection for the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism. Therein, the Later Jin Khanate and Qing tried to position itself as the protector of the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism. However, the Mongolian tribe Dzungar, which rose to prominence centered around the northern area of today’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, also attempted to exert that same exact claim to be the protector of the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism and tried to strengthen its influence in Mongolia and Tibet. As a result, the national interests of the Qing and Dzungar directly clashed. And in addition to the Kangxi Emperor of the Qing leading forces into Mongolia in 1720 towards the end of the Kangxi period, the Qing placed Tibet completely under Qing influence. Then, in the 1750s, the Qianlong Emperor completely overthrew Dzungar, dubbed the area “Xinjiang,” and integrated it into Qing control.

Regarding Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang, in which Chinese and Confucianism did not circulate, and which conducted their own society and culture based on their own individual philosophies, the Qing installed Lifan Yuan, Office for Relations with Principalities, and ruled them indirectly. Specifically, the Qing bequeathed territory to the Mongolian Khans and nobles, sent imperial commissioner-residents to the Dalai Lama government in Tibet as representatives of the emperor,² and entrusted the rule of Xinjiang to local elites under the Generals of Ili.

On the whole, these arrangements established relationships based on the rationales between the emperor and each region, and there was no leeway for the Qing to introduce an “Eighteen Provinces of China” administration regimen involving imperial exam certified bureaucrats. As a result, Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang followed the Manchu emperor, but did not feel any special sense of belonging to China or Chinese civilization. The Qing Dynasty was basically a compound empire of multiple civilizations and multiple cultures, and it functioned based on the central Manchu emperor and nobles belonging to the Eight Banners applying different ruling rationales as appropriate for each situation. Entering the modern era in which Chinese nationalism arose, these relationships would falter and face ruin, and tension would continue to exist between the regime that inherited the Qing domain and focused on

² In consideration of the connection between the Qing and Tibet through the governance of Lifan Yuan and the Qing’s resident minister of Tibet, the Central Tibetan Administration considers Tibet as an independent nation from historical times, and the communication with the Qing is only for the patronage of Buddhism. On the other hand, Chinese nationalism considers the Qing as one of the Middle Kingdoms and Tibet as part of China. This chapter considers that we cannot understand the connection between the Qing and Tibet through the concept of sovereignty or the nation state. The Emperor and Dalai Lama are both very important to the stability of the Qing and Inner Asia, and they depend on each other. In the nineteenth century, the interpretation of this special communication is divided due to border conflict and modernization (Hirano 2004).

strengthening the sense of being “Chinese people” and the “minority peoples” that valued the rationales of their own cultures.³

1.3 *East and West Interaction in the Qing Dynasty*

Looking at the Qing from the viewpoint of inheriting Chinese civilization, it is true that in the early Qing Dynasty, as a symbol of obedience, customary Manchu qipao garments and the queue hairstyle were enforced, and even later on, acts repudiating rule by Manchu people and decrying the existence of *yi* (barbarians) were strictly punished. So, one must admit that there definitely were some major contradictions to that viewpoint. However, the Qing did not refute Confucianism or Chinese culture itself. In fact, the Qing even went as far as taking the stance that it saved Chinese civilization from chaos and was responsible for bringing it to prosperity once more.⁴ Furthermore, Confucianism suppressed free speech and strengthened its pragmatic leanings of professing the need for reform based on an acceptance of Qing rule.⁵ The Qing era also saw the interaction between Eastern and Western civilizations that had existed from the Ming Dynasty onwards through missionaries. The inheritance of this remains mainly in the calendar system and art.

However, until the eighteenth century interactions between Eastern and Western civilizations was, nevertheless, regulated by the Qing and was subjected to restrictions. Most notable is the case in which the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits) chose to allow both Christian faith and ancestor worship side-by-side to bolster missionary activity, and the Pope declared that this decision made by the Society of Jesus was heresy. In the “Eighteen Provinces of China” administration, the Yongzheng Emperor who valued Confucian *li* vehemently rejected this, and Christian missionary activity was finally banned. Subsequently, missionary activities were limited to the transmission of arts and technology, and only at the level of the Beijing court.

And regarding trade, though private Western ships were allowed only as far as Guangdong and trade was conducted through the mediation of local licensed merchants (Guangdong Thirteen merchants) from 1757 of the Qianlong period onward, Great Britain valued free trade and bristled against that kind of regulated trade.⁶ In 1793, the Macartney Embassy petitioned the Qianlong Emperor to allow

³ See Hirano (2007, Chap. 3).

⁴ See The Yongzheng Emperor (1730), *The Document of the Awareness from the Delusion by the Justice* [大義覺迷錄].

⁵ For example, the most famous scholar of the Jingshi School of Confucianism, Wei Yuan (魏源), considered that the Emperors of the Qing Dynasty got the vast territory of Inner Asia and then made the great gift to China. Then, from the middle of the nineteenth century, Qing elites considered Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang as also part of modern China under the concept of sovereignty and international law. Wei Yuan (1842), *The Document of the Holy Force* [聖武記].

⁶ The coast of Southeast China is so long that the Qing could not strictly control trade. Small Qing traders and the West pursued the benefit of trade without permission. The management of the Thirteen Merchants was not going well. (Murakami 2013).

free trade. However, citing the *tianxia* ideal and China as a “vast territory with abundant resources,” the Qianlong Emperor did not recognize the need for actively pursuing trade with the West. The dissatisfaction felt by Great Britain would become one factor for the subsequent First Opium War.

And with these stances in play, the Qing’s lack of motivation to pursue an open relationship with the West amidst an Asia permeated with a rapidly growing Western influence from the nineteenth century onward resulted in the Qing being left behind in terms of response. Moreover, defeats during the First Opium War and the Arrow War (Second Opium War) were factors leading to the Qing, and modern China, taking a subservient role within the international order headed by the West.

2 India and the Land and Sea Networks Surrounding It

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, India had entered a period of new changes. However, Vasco da Gama was not the one who opened the door to these changes. Rather, changes that had been occurring in Iran and Central Asia since the latter half of the fifteenth century were spreading to India through land and sea transportation networks.

In the latter half of the fifteenth century, the rise and fall of the Turkoman tribal confederations of the Qara Qoyunlu and Aq Qoyunlu in Iran, followed by the emergence of the Safavids along with the collapse of the Timurids and the emergence of the Uzbeks in Central Asia, pushed many Turkic peoples to the new land of India. In the late fifteenth century, the Turks who came from the Persian Gulf to South India via the Indian Ocean became an important force in the cavalry corps of the Muslim Bahmanids as well as the Hindu Vijayanagar Kingdom. After the collapse of the Bahmanids at the end of the fifteenth century, these Turkic soldiers established dynastic powers such as the Adil Shahis, the Qutb Shahis, and the Barid Shahis. In the meantime, the Mughal Empire was founded in northern India by Babur, a prince of the Timurids, who was one of the Turkic peoples who came to India after being forced to leave Central Asia.

Thus, the movement of people originating in Iran and Central Asia, and the accompanying changes in economic and social structure, reached India from both sea and land by the early sixteenth century. It was not only the Turks who came from Iran to India. Mahmud Gawan, the vizier of the Bahmanids, and Mir Jumla, who took control of the Qutb Shahis and later moved to the Mughal Empire, had migrated as merchants, and their backgrounds were multifaceted. The former was also a man of letters with a deep knowledge of Persian literature. In addition, people from East Africa played remarkable roles as soldiers. Malik Anbar, the vizier of the Nizam Shahis in the Deccan, was the most prominent figure. The East African soldiers also established an independent government in Bengal at the end of the fifteenth century. There is also a record showing that the founder of the Husayn Shahis, which overthrew this independent government, was the commander of the Arab legions that had migrated to this region.

The Portuguese, who arrived in the midst of these changes, found these Turks to be the soldiers of the local states in the coastal areas of India. The Portuguese quickly realized that warhorses, the weapons of war of the Turks, were being shipped from ports in the Persian Gulf to India, and that the warhorse trade was a much more lucrative business than the trade for pepper and other commodities. The warhorses were sold in exchange for gold, and the ships returning to the Persian Gulf were mainly loaded with rice from South India. However, this excess of imports over exports was quite exceptional in the context of the foreign trade of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Tomé Pires, a Portuguese man who traveled through the waters around Asia, called the region of Gujarat on the north-western coast of India by the name of its representative port city, Khambaya (Eng. Cambay), and wrote, “Cambay chiefly stretches out two arms, with her right arm she reaches out towards Aden and with the other towards Malacca” (Pires 1944, vol. 1, p. 42). These words cleverly capture the characteristics of the Indian subcontinent, which is located between the Arabian Peninsula and Southeast Asia in the trade network of the Indian Ocean. The port cities of India connected to this trade network included Khambaya, Surat, Daman, and Diu in Gujarat; Chaul, Dabhol, Goa, etc. in Konkan on the northern part of the Indian west coast; Honnavar, Bhatkal, Mangalor, etc. in Kanara on the central part; Kannur (Eng. Cannanore), Kozhikode (Eng. Calicut), Kochi (Eng. Cochin), Kollam (Eng. Quilon), etc. in Malabar on the southern part; Colombo, Galle, Trincomalee, etc. in Ceylon (Sri Lanka); Nagapatnam, Maylappur (Eng. Mylapore), Pazhaverkadu (Eng. Pulicat), Machilipatnam (Eng. Masulipatnam), etc. in the coastal region of Coromandel on the east coast of India; and Hugli, Chattogram (Eng. Chittagong), etc. in the Bengal of eastern India.

These Indian port cities not only maintained trade with each other, but also had overseas networks with other port cities in the Indian Ocean region. Their major trading partners were Hormuz and Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf coast; Aden on the Arabian Peninsula; Sofala, Mombasa, and Mogadishu on the east coast of Africa; and Malacca and Aceh in Southeast Asia.

On the other hand, Indian port cities were connected to the cities of Agra, Delhi, and Lahore in the interior of the Mughal Empire through land and river transportation routes. And the land transportation routes extended further into the adjacent regions of the Indian subcontinent. But the most important routes for foreign trade were those from Punjab in northwest India or Sind in west India to Central Asia or Iran via Kabul or Qandahar.

Among the agricultural products exported from India through these sea and land transportation routes were rice and pepper along with cinnamon from Ceylon, as well as processed products such as sugar and indigo. Teak from South India was exported as ship timber. The Portuguese were watchful over the shipping of teak, which could be used by their potential enemy, the Ottoman navy, for building warships. Among marine products, there were pearls from the Gulf of Mannar in northwestern Ceylon and cowries from the Maldives. The silk yarn produced in Bengal was not only exported overseas, but also transferred to Gujarat and other parts of India for processing into products. As for mineral resources, these include saltpeter (a material

for gunpowder) and gems such as diamonds, but gold and silver were not produced, and the country depended solely on imports, while copper production stagnated in the seventeenth century.

On the other hand, agricultural products imported into India included melons, apples, raisins, and various nuts from Central Asia; and camphor, musk, benzoin, sandalwood, clove, nutmeg, and other spices and fragrances from Southeast Asia; all of which were luxury goods. Coffee from the Arabian Peninsula was imported in the first half of the seventeenth century, and tea was brought in at the end of the same century, but it is not known how these products were consumed in India at that time. As for handicrafts, a limited number of silk fabrics, such as velvet and carpets, were imported from Central Asia and Iran, and silk yarn was also imported from the latter. More important than the above products were the aforementioned imported war horses from Central Asia and Iran, and a small number of Arab horses. The reason for this was that the Indian states continued to retain military power, mainly in the form of cavalry, despite the unsuitable climate for breeding and raising war horses.

Various merchant groups were responsible for trade. For example, there were the Hindu and Jain merchants of Gujarat, collectively known as the Baniyas; the merchants of the Khojas and Bohras, Ismaili Muslims in the same region; the Chetti (Chettiar), a Hindu merchant group of the Coromandel coast; the Chulia, native Muslim merchants of this same region; and the Marwari, a group of merchants from Rajasthan. These Indian merchants settled in various parts of Central and West Asia, where they engaged in commercial activities, while Muslim and Armenian merchants came to India from West Asia. The Portuguese, the Dutch East India Company, and the British East India Company were all newcomers in the trade network surrounding India.

In the foreign trade conducted via trade routes spanning land and sea, India was a major contributor with a surplus of exports, and its balance of payments was covered by extensive imports of gold and silver. This pattern seems to have been established before the arrival of silver in India from the New World in the late sixteenth century. From the second half of the fourteenth century onward, the volume of silver coinage issued in the interior of northern India declined under Delhi Sultanate rule, but there was no such shortage of silver in coastal areas such as Bengal and Gujarat. The silver rupee, which later became the key currency of the Mughal Empire, was originally introduced by the Surs, who ruled Bengal in the first half of the sixteenth century. There is a theory that the source of silver for this region is the area from northern Burma to Yunnan. Portuguese records from the beginning of the sixteenth century indicate that large quantities of silver larin (derived from the name of the Iranian city of Lar) were sent from the Persian Gulf region, and gold xerafin (a corruption of Ashrafi, named after the Mamluk Dynasty monarch Ashraf Barsbay of Egypt) from the Red Sea region to India.

In the latter half of the sixteenth century, the spread of the silver rupee and the systematization of cash payments of land taxes in the Mughal Empire greatly increased the demand for silver, but this was covered by the large amount of silver from the New World that flowed into India through various transportation routes by

sea and land. Bernier, a Frenchman who visited the court of the Mughal Empire in the middle of the seventeenth century, wrote, “Hindoustan (India) ... absorbing a large portion of the gold and silver of the world” (Bernier 1916, p. 204). As this suggests, India was one of the world’s biggest consumers of silver at the time, on a par with China.

The movement of people was not only accompanied by products, but also by the production of spiritual culture. For example, three of the Muslim dynasties in the Deccan embraced Shi‘ism due to the influence of people who came from Iran. In addition, the Nimatullahiya, a Sufi order which had been influential in Iran, established a large base in the Deccan because the head of the sect’s family moved to that region. In terms of the dispersion of religious sects across the Indian Ocean, the same is true of the Ismailis who came from Yemen and Iran, and who settled in India and survived as the Khojas and Bohras. On the other hand, the expansion of the Sufi order of Naqshbandiyya, which had been under the patronization of the Timurid Dynasty in Central Asia, was not unrelated to the establishment of its successor, the Mughal Empire. Thus, the movement of people by land and sea during this period had an impact on the development of Islamic culture in India. India, however, was not merely a unilateral recipient. The Mujaddidiya, which emerged under the Mughal Empire as a branch of the Naqshbandiyya, later returned to Central Asia and maintained their influence until modern times. As for Southeast Asia, Raniri, a Muslim scholar from Gujarat who was active in Aceh, is a remarkable example who gave significant influence on Islamic culture in the region. Islam was not the monopolizing religion over the Indian Ocean. The early modern Indian Ocean witnessed, along with European mercantile activities, newcomers in the form of Catholic missionaries such as the Jesuits, the Dominicans, and the Augustinians, which were followed by Protestant missionaries.

3 Early Modern Japan

3.1 *Political Consolidation*

At the battle of Sekigahara in 1600, Tokugawa Ieyasu won a decisive victory over his rivals, paving the way for his consolidation of national supremacy by ending decades-long warfare and bringing the entire country of Japan under the control of one single political authority. In 1603, he had the emperor in Kyoto confer on him the title of shogun and set up the bakufu government, or the Tokugawa shogunate, in Edo (present-day Tokyo). The political authority of the Tokugawa shogunate as the early modern state, however, was not absolute. Ideologically, the fact that Tokugawa Ieyasu needed the title Shogun from the emperor meant the ultimate source of legitimacy resided in the imperial house. Furthermore, the Tokugawa shogunate had to share power with over two hundred local daimyo lords who submitted to the shogunate but retained significant power as semi-independent domains (*han* in Japanese), including

power over taxation in their domains. Nevertheless, by the 1630 s, Tokugawa Ieyasu and his successors had consolidated a combinative regime of bakufu and domains (called the *bakuhan* system) that would last for more than two centuries (Totman 1993).

To neutralize potential threats from former rival domains, Ieyasu dispossessed, reduced, or transferred their land holdings, sometime erasing the entire domain. The confiscated lands previously owned by these domains were given to Tokugawa collateral domains or hereditary vassals to elevate them to daimyo status. In 1615, Ieyasu attacked the Osaka Castle, the power base of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, for whom Ieyasu earlier served as senior minister, and annihilated the Toyotomi family, clearing the final major obstacle for power consolidation. Ieyasu then issued a series of legal documents to regulate the daimyo, the imperial house, courtiers, and later, temples and shrines, laying down a legal basis for exercising the power of bakufu.

One major strategy of the Tokugawa shogunate in containing the power of the domains was the policy of *sankin kōtai*, or “alternative attendance,” instituted in the 1630 s. All the daimyo were required to reside in Edo every other year as a service to the bakufu while their wives and children had to reside there permanently, essentially as hostages. As a result, the daimyo were forced to establish two administrative offices, one in Edo and one in their home domain, between which they had to travel back and forth. This arrangement was costly and weakened the financial basis of the domains, especially those potentially dangerous domains which were located furthest away from Edo. Moreover, the daimyo were forced to support public works including castle and road construction. All these strategies contributed to the consolidation of the power of bakufu (Totman 1993).

With the daimyo under check, the Tokugawa bakufu built on Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s policy of warrior-farmer separation to implement a social hierarchy. It should be noted that the bakufu never divided society into the four groups of samurai, farmers, artisans, and merchants (*shi-nō-kō-shō*). Major distinctions were rather between samurai, *hyakushō* (“commoners” including farmers and people working in fishing and forestry), *chōnin* (urban dwellers), monks, priests and doctors, and *eta* and *hinin* (outcasts). Specific duties and professional skills were associated with each category of status. The distinctions were not all hierarchical, although the difference between samurai and other statuses was emphasized and *eta* and *hinin* were considered subhuman. Social mobility was very limited, although by the second half of the early modern period change of status was no longer impossible or rare.

Another feature of Tokugawa society was surveillance. The purpose of monitoring the population was to prevent people from following Christian teachings. Ieyasu was initially tolerant of Christian missionaries for the profit from trade. After the establishment of the bakufu, however, the ideological threat posed by Christianity to the new regime came to be perceived as outweighing the economic benefit of missionaries. Ieyasu adopted a policy of prohibition, issuing bans in 1612, and again in 1614. After suppressing a tenacious Christian-led peasant uprising in Kyushu in 1637, the bakufu became determined to root out Christianity entirely. It implemented a method of detection called *fumi-e*, requiring those suspected of being Christians to trample on an image of Christ or the Virgin Mary. A system of registration at Buddhist

temples was also instituted. All Japanese were required to register as parishioners at a local temple that bore the responsibility of securing nobody in the area was following the outlawed Christian teaching (Hur 2008; Vaporis 1995).

3.2 *Managing Borders*

The need to root out Christianity in Japan, according to traditional historiography, led to the Tokugawa bakufu's shutdown of exchange and communication with the outside world in the 1630s, a policy known as "national seclusion" or *sakoku*. The bakufu banned Portuguese and Spanish ships from visiting Japan, due to their zeal in the Catholic mission, and restricted foreign trade to Dutch traders, who promised to not proselytize in Japan but were still confined to a small man-made island, *Dejima*, outside Nagasaki. Foreign books were not allowed into Japan. With *Dejima* acting as the only access to outside nations, Japanese seclusion enabled the bakufu to maintain peace for over two hundred years and helped foster a distinctive Japanese culture. However, it also resulted in an insular mentality that missed out on discovering the spirit of science and reason as the West was doing at the time. In the postwar period, this insular mentality, believed to have evolved into a xenophobic nationalism in the modern period, was used by major scholars such as Watsuji Tetsurō to explain Japan's slide into war in the 1930s (Watsuji 1950).

The *Sakoku* theory is now discredited for only looking at interactions with Europeans. Rather than seclusion, historians today view the Tokugawa bakufu as strategically regulating cross-border flows of people, goods, and information (Toby 1984; Arano 2019). It did so by controlling, directly or indirectly, "four portals," which functioned as regulated gateways for trade and information flow. The bakufu delegated the management of cross-border movement to the three "gateway daimyo" of Satsuma, Tsushima, and Matsumae, while directly administering Nagasaki through an appointed governor. While Nagasaki managed trade with Dutch and Qing China ships, the Satsuma Daimyo was in charge of trading and relations with the Ryukyu Kingdom, Tsushima with Korea, and Matsumae with the Ainu people. Nagasaki and the three daimyo performed the duties of overseeing relations with foreign entities as service owed to the shogun as its subordinates. As compensation, they were granted exclusive prerogatives in conducting foreign trade (Arano 2019).

The "four portals" played a critical role in collecting information from outside Japan. The bakufu required the Dutch traders to provide regular reports on the latest activities of the world. At Nagasaki, Japanese interpreters of Dutch learned astronomy, physics, and other sciences while mediating communication between Dutch and Japanese. They functioned as key carriers of western knowledge into Japan before the eighth shogun, Tokugawa Yoshimune, (r. 1716–1745) loosened the ban on foreign books and allowed import of books in Chinese. He also sponsored the translation of western books. As a result, Japanese access to western knowledge through Chinese and translated texts broadened, and by the early nineteenth century some Japanese had a well-rounded grasp of western astronomy, medical

science, physics, languages, and culture, evidenced by the emergence of a new form of knowledge known as “Dutch learning,” so-called because the knowledge was obtained via Dutch traders.

3.3 *Political Ideology and Cultural Fermentation*

One curious feature of the bakuhan system in early modern Japan is that the bakufu never consciously developed a political ideology to legitimize its rule. Theoretically, the right to rule came from the emperor, even though the Tokugawa shogun was the de facto ruler and the emperor was no more than a figurehead. In other words, there was a mismatch between actual power and symbolic authority. There was no evidence that the bakufu made explicit attempts to close that gap even though it was aware of it. Similarly, the bakufu was never proactive in constructing a theory to justify the status-based social formation of the bakuhan system. Rather, it was the neo-Confucian scholars who supplied the ideology to justify the status-based social order.

The most well-known neo-Confucian scholar in the early Tokugawa period was Hayashi Razan (1583–1657). Hayashi studied the Zhu-xi school of neo-Confucianism of the Song Dynasty with the Buddhist monk-turned Confucian Fujiwara Seika and offered his learning to the bakufu as an intellectual rationalization for the status-oriented bakuhan system. Yet while the Tokugawa shogunate hired Hayashi for lecturing on neo-Confucian teaching and drafting official documents, the Zhu-xi school of neo-Confucianism was not officially adopted as the ideology of the bakufu until the late eighteenth century when Matsudaira Sadanobu (1759–1829), the senior councilor of the bakufu, singled out the Zhu-xi school as its official teaching and banned all other learnings from its academy.

Neo-Confucianism never went unchallenged in Tokugawa Japan. Ito Jinsai and Ogyu Sorai called into question Zhu-xi’s neo-Confucianism as deviating from the original teaching of Confucius. They went back to early texts to recover what they believed to be the original meaning. The mid-Tokugawa period neo-Confucian Yamazaki Ansai, on the other hand, sought to integrate the teaching of Zhu-xi with Shinto. This attempt at synthesis, however, came to be fiercely denounced by those who upheld the superiority of the mythological narratives of eighth-century Shinto texts where local deities, the kami, play a central role. By emphasizing the indigenous teaching of the kami, contrasted with the “foreign” neo-Confucianism and Buddhism, these scholars advocated the indigenous learning of *kokugaku* or “Learning of Our Land,” which in the early nineteenth century evolved into an emperor-revering nationalism (Zhong 2016; Burns 2003).

3.4 *Commercialization and the Problem of Governance*

The bakuhan system ushered in a period of unprecedented domestic peace that stimulated production, exchange, and commercialization. Farmers reclaimed new lands and were able to produce a variety of cash crops including cotton, silk, and rapeseed oil. The standard of living improved over time and the population increased. Communication and transportation developed, partly the result of increased mobility enabled by the *sankin kōtai* system. As production and exchange increased, wholesalers and financiers emerged leading to further commercialization.

Urban centers grew across the country, partly because the bakufu allowed only one castle for each domain, giving rise to the formation of castle towns where merchants and craftsmen clustered to provide services to the growing urban population. Purely commercial towns and post towns that lined major highways also burgeoned. Edo in the eighteenth century had a population of more than one million and was one of the largest cities in the world (Totman 1993, pp. 146–159).

Commercialization, however, engendered a chronic political crisis. The finances of the bakufu and the domains were based on a rice economy. Taxes and samurai salaries were paid in rice, and their values were set as a predetermined quantity of rice. As society commercialized, the value measured in rice decreased. Commercialization, on the other hand, improved overall living standards. However, because the bakufu and domains collected taxes from agriculture but not from commercial activities, they ignored an increasingly lucrative source of revenue. Into the eighteenth century, the bakufu and many domains found themselves in chronic financial difficulties. Political and economic reform measures, mostly tax increases and consumption reduction hardly helped the situation. Heavier rice taxes only led to more frequent peasant rebellions (Vlastos 1990). Into the early nineteenth century, the deepening political and social crisis spurred the rise of emperor-centered political theories that called into question the legitimacy of the bakufu.

3.5 *Crisis Within and Without*

Compounding domestic political crises were demands from western powers to open the country for trade. Russians made the earliest appearance in the north around the turn of the nineteenth century, and their demands for trade were met with outright rejection by the bakufu, which resulted in several military conflicts. English and French ships arrived at Japan's seashores from the south. The bakufu's initial policy to forcefully dispel foreign ships softened after it learned, with surprise, about the defeat of Qing China in the Opium War of 1840–42. While the bakufu started building a modern military and strengthening coastal defenses in the 1840s, the U.S. warships commanded by Commodore Matthew C. Perry that arrived in Tokyo Bay in 1853 and 1854 showcased the strength of modern forms of military power. Unable to sustain its anti-foreign stance, the bakufu opened up the country and signed treaties with Western

powers. The bakufu's accommodating approach gave rise to anti-bakufu criticisms from imperial loyalists who intensified their advocacy for returning political power to the emperor. As the bakufu progressively lost its legitimacy and authority and the imperial institution was pushed to the symbolic center of politics, a group of young anti-bakufu warriors took the initiative in enacting a coup in the name of the emperor in January 1868 and went on to establish a new, modern, emperor-centered political state that by 1869 had successfully overthrown the Tokugawa bakufu.

4 East Meets West

"East meets West" is a distinctive way of looking at the past that is often seen in people whose viewpoint is of someone from Japan or China. But it was not the case that Europe,⁷ the so-called "West," only encountered Japan and China, the so-called "East." In the same way, the West attempted to expand into North and South America, Africa, Oceania, and other regions, and created new knowledge about human beings and the world by integrating various information obtained from different parts of the globe. For example, in the Boston Tea Party incident of 1773, which triggered the American War of Independence, the people of the American colonies threw away their tea from a British East India Company ship. As this symbolizes, for good or bad, Europeans were active on the world stage and created a global exchange of goods with themselves at the center. A view of the past that focuses only on the encounter between "East" and "West" does not accurately reflect the reality of the world at that time.

However, from the sixteenth century onward, Europeans expanded into South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia, both economically and later militarily. As a result, there is no doubt that the politics, economies, societies, cultures, and perceptions of the world in these regions have changed dramatically. The subsequent historical development of the Asian regions cannot be understood without considering the movements of European countries in the "West." Therefore, from the perspective of people in these Asian regions, it is perhaps natural for them to perceive this as an "encounter between East and West." In this sense, the title of this section is a good example of how the past can be seen differently in retrospect, depending on one's position.

With this in mind, this section focuses on the period prior to the full-scale military expansion and colonization by European nations, i.e., until around 1750 in South and Southeast Asia, and until the beginning of the nineteenth century in East Asia. It will explain in detail the impact of European expansion on these regions and on the European countries themselves. For the sake of convenience, it will discuss the situation in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia separately. However, for Europeans at that time, these regions were collectively recognized as the "East

⁷ The "Europe" referred to here is only that of a concept and does not correspond to "Europe" as a geographical space with boundaries. See also Chap. 1 of this book.

Indies.” This is something that we must always bear in mind: that they engaged in their activities in a unified manner across these two spaces. It is also important to remember that the “encounter” and the accompanying changes in both societies occurred in parallel with the period of “prosperity” depicted in this chapter.

4.1 South and Southeast Asia

4.1.1 Portuguese Expansion

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the route from the coast of Africa southward to the Indian Ocean via the Cape of Good Hope became known, many Portuguese ships entered the Indian Ocean through this route, and established trading posts in the port towns along the coast, taking them by force of arms. From Malacca on the Malay Peninsula in the east to Hormuz in the Persian Gulf in the west, and Sofala and Kilwa on the east coast of Africa, trading posts scattered over a vast area of ocean were connected by this route, and the Portuguese Viceroy stationed in Goa in the western part of the Indian subcontinent controlled the entire area. The Portuguese royal family had a monopoly on trade between Portugal and the seas around Asia, which produced a wealth of products such as spices, textiles, dyes, ceramics, gold, silver, and precious stones.

For this reason, the entire network of bases and shipping routes is often called the Portuguese Maritime Empire (or Seaborne Empire), but in reality, the bases were only connected by lines, and the sea and its coasts were not all under the control of the Portuguese. The term “maritime empire” is a bit of an exaggeration. The land behind the bases was under the control of local rulers. Many Portuguese who came to the coasts of Asia broke away from the framework of the Portuguese royal monopoly and settled around these waters to start their own trade with the local people in the region. Such was the nature of the Portuguese, who first introduced guns to the Japanese archipelago aboard a Chinese ship in 1543.

During this period, local merchants along the coasts of the Indian Ocean, South China Sea and East China Sea were still actively engaged in intra-Asian trade as before. For those who lived along the coasts of Asia, bustling places where a variety of people came and went, there must have been no resistance to the Portuguese joining the trade. Nevertheless, the Portuguese maintained military bases, albeit limited to a small part of the coastline, and their trading style, using force to monopolize the trade of spices to Europe, was something that had not existed in these sea areas before. In particular, the islands of Southeast Asia, which were production regions for high-grade spices such as clove and nutmeg, were greatly affected. The Portuguese tried to manage commodity production and trade in an integrated manner, intervening in the production of spices and collecting goods in Malacca, which was under their jurisdiction. This new form of trade by the Portuguese was taken over and strengthened by the various East India Companies of Western Europe after the seventeenth century (Boxer 1969; Boyajian 2008; Newitt 2005; Oka 2010; Subrahmanyam 2012).

4.1.2 The Age of the East India Company

The East India Company, first founded in England in 1601⁸ and then in the Netherlands the following year, entered the open sea space around the Indian Ocean by intervening in the business of the Portuguese, who had a monopoly on the maritime transport of spices and other goods between various parts of Asia and Western Europe. These companies issued stock certificates and collected funds from a large number of people, which they used to conduct trade within distant Asian waters in an organized and functional manner. In each country, the monopoly of the East India Company's trade within Asian waters was granted by the monarchy or government of the country in question (Haneda 2007).

In seventeenth century Europe, spices were traded at high prices as valuable products, and their importation generated large profits. The English and Dutch East India Companies, having swept aside the Portuguese to become the predominant traders in the region, fought fiercely for control over trade in the islands of Southeast Asia, which were particularly rich in spices. The Dutch East India Company, which had established a base in Batavia on the island of Java, ended up winning the battle, and the defeated English East India Company began to concentrate on purchasing goods such as cotton textiles in South Asia. As well as spices and cotton textiles, products from Asian waters that were not produced in Europe, such as Chinese tea and ceramics, were very popular. These products greatly changed the daily lives of Europeans and triggered the Industrial Revolution. In addition, orders and requests from the East India Company led to an increase in the production of textiles and ceramics throughout Asia, and the development of new designs.

In order to purchase goods from Asian waters, the East India Company brought in silver from the Americas. The East India Company also brought in Japanese silver and copper in exchange for Chinese silk, South Asian cotton textiles, and sugar and dyes from Southeast Asia, which were in demand in Japan, and used them to pay for products from other coastal areas around Asia. In this way, the East India Company's trade was not only between the coastal regions of Asia and Europe, but also incorporated trade conducted within Asian waters along with the trade of commodities with North and South America into its structure.

The East India Company is often regarded as the vanguard of European colonial rule. However, this is only how things appear to someone looking back at the past through the eyes of the present. Until the mid-eighteenth century, the company was nothing more than a trading company that transported products from various areas along the coasts of Asia to Europe for sale for a profit. Local bases were sometimes occupied by force, as in the case of Batavia, but most were built peacefully with the permission of the local rulers. It was a characteristic of royal authorities in South and Southeast Asia at that time that they did not reject outsiders but welcomed them and

⁸ The East India Company was authorized a monopoly on trade with the East Indies by Queen Elizabeth I on December 31, 1600. This date refers to the Julian calendar, then still used in England, which corresponds to January 10, 1601 on the Gregorian calendar.

accommodated them if they wished to trade. In some cases, as in the case of Madras, the local ruler even offered land to attract the East India Company.

Added to this is the fact that the Mughal Empire was a powerful political power in South Asia at the time when the East India Company started its activities, and the company's limited military power was not enough to compete with it. In fact, when the English East India Company's troops fought against the Mughal army in Bengal in 1686, they suffered a crushing defeat. The local head of operations was reprimanded by the company's head office, which questioned, "Why did you fight so recklessly even though we told you to avoid fighting like that? You should have focused on trading." Even in Southeast Asia, where there was no power as strong as the Mughal Empire, the Dutch East India Company did not actively move to acquire colonies. Conflicts with the local authorities and the use of military force would require a large amount of money. Conquest by military force was not an attractive venture for a trading company that aimed to earn profits through trade.

The movement toward colonization began in the 1740s, when the British and French East India Companies became involved in conflicts between local rulers in South Asia and began to provide reinforcements. In the 1770s, the British government attempted to take direct control of the financially troubled East India Company, which was in a deteriorating financial situation and had lost its identity as a trading company. With this, the colonization of South Asia gained pace.

On the other hand, the colonization of the islands of Southeast Asia did not begin in earnest until the nineteenth century, when the Dutch East India Company was dissolved and the Dutch government began to directly engage in trade in East India. It was also in the nineteenth century that continental areas of Vietnam and Cambodia became colonies of France, and the Malay Peninsula became a colony of Great Britain.

4.2 *East Asia*⁹

It was in the first half of the sixteenth century that Portuguese sailors and merchants appeared in the East China Sea in the eastern part of Asian waters. Catholic missionaries came with them to this area. Unlike South and Southeast Asia, the political powers of mainland China, the Korean Peninsula, and the Japanese archipelago around the East China Sea strictly controlled trans-oceanic trade, and the same was true for the Portuguese. Unlike South and Southeast Asia, where it was easy to establish trading posts, the Portuguese struggled to find a base of operations that would allow them to operate freely in these waters. In 1557, the Ming Dynasty government allowed the Portuguese to settle in Macau, but the city itself was under the control of the Ming Dynasty, and the Portuguese were only given leave to live there and nothing more. The powers on land, who possessed great military might, were making an attempt to restrict sea trade with foreign countries and bring it under their control,

⁹ See Haneda and Oka (2019) for further details on maritime history in East Asia.

a move that was also significant in the sense of dealing with the Japanese pirates who were rampant in these waters at the time. The Portuguese military might, which had been so powerful along the coast of the Indian Ocean, was almost powerless in these waters.

Even under the Qing Dynasty, which succeeded the Ming Dynasty, trade with foreign countries, including Europeans, was strictly controlled by the government. In the 1680 s, when the anti-Qing forces on the seas were suppressed, people from coastal areas were allowed to sail abroad, and many people migrated to various parts of Southeast Asia. However, trade by the East India Company and private merchants from Europe was still controlled by the government, and in 1757, it was decided that European ships would only be allowed to visit Guangzhou. The British government sent the Macartney Embassy to the court of the Qianlong Emperor in 1793 in search of open trade, but they were unable to achieve their goal and returned home emptyhanded.

The situation was no different in Japan, which had been politically unified by the Tokugawa clan in the early seventeenth century. The Christian teachings propagated by Catholic missionaries, who often worked alongside the Portuguese, were unacceptable to the unified government. These missionaries taught that the faithful should obey the authority of God and the Pope, not the local political authorities. Initially, the Portuguese visited the ports of Kyushu relatively freely, but due to the presence of Catholic missionaries accompanying them, they were unable to gain the trust of the unified government and were banned from coming to Japan in the 1630 s. Instead, the Dutch East India Company was allowed to trade in Nagasaki, which was a shogunal demesne, on the condition that they did not bring Christianity with them. However, East India Company officials were allowed to reside only on Dejima, a small man-made island off the coast, and were strictly forbidden to bring in weapons. The Dutch East India Company's trade in Nagasaki consisted of exchanging Asian goods, such as dyes and sugar from Southeast Asia and silk from China, for Japanese silver and copper. However, the annual reports from the Dutch on the state of affairs in various parts of the world, as well as the Dutch-language books that were offered as gifts, became an important source of information for the Japanese government and intellectuals on world affairs and modern science.¹⁰

In order to protect its monopoly on the lucrative trade with Japan, the Dutch East India Company accepted all the demands of the Tokugawa government as a matter of principle. These included restrictions on trading ports, the number of ships that could come to Japan and the amount of silver and copper they could take out, the offering of curiosities to the shogun, and annual visits to Edo by the head of the Nagasaki trading post. Trade in Nagasaki was controlled by the Tokugawa government and not by the Dutch East India Company.

Thus, in East Asia before the nineteenth century, powerful governments in China, Korea, and Japan stably ruled, and the economic and military influence of European

¹⁰ Matsukata Fuyuko's (2018) research on the letter to the Tokugawa government by the Dutch East India Company, both in English and Japanese, are to be consulted in this regard. Also, see Fūsetsugaki (2010).

countries was extremely limited. On the other hand, products and crafts from China and Japan were brought to Europe and became popular. The political and cultural aspects of the Qing Dynasty, as reported by Jesuit missionaries, caused a kind of boom in Chinese culture among Europeans. Different from the situation in South Asia, European countries were not yet a serious threat in East Asia before the nineteenth century. However, this situation drastically changed.

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Colonization and Imperialism



Toshie Awaya and Yuji Tsuboi

1 India

1.1 *The “Eighteenth Century Problem” and British Rule in India*

British rule in India began in the second half of the eighteenth century in the Bengal region, and there has been much debate in recent years about how to place the eighteenth century in the history of India. Traditionally, the eighteenth century after Aurangzeb’s death (1707) has been regarded as a period of turmoil following the decline and dismantling of the Mughal Empire. However, a revisionist history has been proposed that criticizes such an understanding as being Mughal-centric and emphasizes the fact that trade and commerce flourished, and urbanization progressed under the regional governments (successor states). According to this view, British rule was positioned as an extension of the preceding period, and the traditional understanding of the break in Indian history at the beginning of British rule had to be reconsidered.

It should be noted that British rule in India began before colonial rule in other places and lasted for almost 200 years. Since the period under British rule differed from region to region, the form and character of its rule changed according to the time and region.

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1.2 From the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century to the Revolt of 1857

After defeating the French-backed local regime in Bengal at the Battle of Plassey (1757), the East India Company embarked on its journey from trading company to colonial power. In 1765, the East India Company was granted the diwani (the right to collect land revenue) in Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar by the Mughal Emperor after its victory over local forces, including Mughal troops, in the Battle of Buxar (1764), and consolidated its position in the Bengal region.

During the tenure of Warren Hastings, the first Governor-General of Bengal (period of service as Governor-General of Bengal: 1772–74; as Governor-General of India: 1774–85), the Judicial Plan of 1772 established the principle of applying Hindu law (Dharmashastra) to Hindus and Islamic law to Muslims in the field of family law. Based on this policy, Dharmashastra texts written in Sanskrit were translated into English. As a result, a beginning was initiated to divide the community into Hindu and Muslim by religion, and Brahmanical values were spread through the judicial system for Hindus.

Land revenue formed the pillar that supported colonial finances. In order to stabilize this revenue, various systems were introduced in each region. The Zamindari system (Permanent Settlement) was introduced in Bengal in 1793 by Lord Cornwallis, Governor-General of India (period of service as Governor-General: 1786–93), who granted land ownership to zamindars, who had been tax collectors since the Mughal era, and imposed a fixed land revenue on them. In the early nineteenth century, the Madras and Bombay Presidencies adopted the Ryotwari system, in which the ryot (upper strata of the peasantry) were made to bear the burden of land revenue and the amount of land revenue was periodically reassessed. There were other variations on the land revenue system, but they all had one thing in common: they defined the landowners who were to pay the land revenue and overlooked the rights of the various kinds of tenants who existed under them. In general, the burden of land revenue in the early years was heavy.

At a time when friction with France was growing in Europe, Lord Wellesley, Governor-General of India (period of service as Governor-General: 1798–1805) pushed for territorial expansion. In 1799, he defeated Tipu Sultan of Mysore in South India, who had attempted to unite with the French revolutionary government to oppose the British, and also brought various powers under his control through the Subsidiary Alliance Treaties. In 1789, the Indian army numbered just over 100,000, but during the Napoleonic Wars, it swelled to 155,000, one of the largest European-style standing armies in the world (Metcalf and Metcalf 2002, p. 60). In the early nineteenth century, while winning the Napoleonic Wars, the British overthrew the Marathas in India (1818) and gained economic advantage from the Industrial Revolution. The British rule in India seemed to have stabilized. The tenure of William Bentinck (period of service as Governor-General: 1828–35) was also seen as an “Age of Reform” influenced by the liberalism and utilitarianism of his own country. The “Civilizing Mission” was foregrounded as the ideology of legitimacy for rule, such

as the banning of sati, the Hindu practice of burning a widow alive with the body of her deceased husband (1829).

1.3 From the Aftermath of the Revolt of 1857 to the First World War

The Indian Revolt, an uprising which challenged British rule, was suppressed by overwhelming military force. The cost of quelling this uprising is variously said to have amounted to either 50 million or 36 million pounds (Bates 2007, p. 80; Bose and Jalal 1998, p. 95; Brown 1994, p. 96). In 1857, Queen Victoria issued a proclamation that intended to pacify her Indian subjects, and the Government of India Act 1858 transferred power from the East India Company to the British Crown. The Governor-General of India was to concurrently hold the position of Viceroy, and a Minister for India was appointed to the Cabinet back in Britain. The Indian Civil Service, selected through an examination introduced just before the Indian Revolt, became the core of the bureaucracy as the “steel frame of Raj (British rule).” The period from then until the First World War was the “High Noon of Empire” (Brown 1994, p. 96).

The annexation policy of the local states, promoted strongly by Lord Dalhousie (period of service as Governor-General: 1846–56), came to an end because it was considered a contributing factor to the Indian Rebellion. From then on, the rulers of a number of large and small princely states that were granted relative autonomy in terms of internal affairs and local landowners were positioned as the main collaborators in British rule. (At the time of independence, there were more than 500 princely states, which is about one-third of India’s total population and 40% of its total land area (Metcalf and Metcalf 2002, p. 103; Bates 2007, p. 82). Furthermore, starting with the Indian Councils Act of 1861, a policy of incorporating influential Indians into the legislative structure, first through non-official appointments and later through limited elections, was initiated. In the 1880s, under Viceroy Ripon, elections were also introduced to local self-government. However, there was a reluctance to intervene in the internal affairs of Indian society, and the ideology of legitimizing rule shifted focus to “good governance.”

The army was reorganized after the Indian Rebellion. British soldiers were given more weight; in place of the upper caste Hindus from the Ganges plains who had been employed as soldiers before the Revolt, Indian soldiers were recruited from those communities stereotyped as “martial races,” such as Sikhs, Muslims, and Nepalese Gurkhas who came from areas not involved in the Revolt, such as the Punjab. Indian troops were deployed around the world to maintain and extend British rule, at no cost to the taxpayers back home. Examples include the suppression of the Mahdi Rebellion in Sudan, the Boxer Rebellion (1900) in China, and deployment to the South African War (1899–1902) (Bose and Jalal 1998, p. 98). Military expenditure was a large proportion of India’s fiscal budget. The racist attitudes of the British, who

saw themselves as the “ruling race,” were aroused by the Revolt and increasingly came to the fore in the late nineteenth century.

1.4 Restructuring of Indian Society, Culture, and Economy Under Colonial Rule

Like the aforementioned principles of the judicial system, the census, which came to be conducted every ten years from 1871, had the effect of fixing the linguistically and socially diverse Hindu and Muslim communities into a monolithic community. The census and ethnographic research on various castes and tribes also acted to embody them as homogenous groups. Herbert Hope Risley, a high-ranking colonial administrator in India who presided over the 1901 census, was notorious for bringing racial theory into the understanding of caste, and also for his attempt at establishing a hierarchy of castes. The embodiment of caste and religious communities was to have a major impact on the political culture of post-independence India.

The Charter Act of 1813 not only abolished the East India company’s monopoly (with the exception of tea), but also stipulated that one lakh (100,000) rupees per year be allocated for the promotion of local education. The conflict between the Orientalists, who stressed the importance of classical languages such as Sanskrit and Arabic, and the Anglicists, who wanted to give priority to English, ended in the victory of the latter with Macaulay’s Minute on Education of 1835. Through education in English, the Minute aimed to create a class of people who were “Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect” who would act as intermediaries between the British, the ruler, and the Indians, the ruled (Zastoupil and Moir 1999, p. 171). Throughout the colonial period, primary education was neglected, even though Charles Wood’s Educational Despatch of 1854 went some way to correcting this. On the other hand, a knowledge of English became essential for access to public office and white-collar careers, like in the legal profession, which entailed social status and high income. This in turn fostered friction between castes and religious communities.

With the decline of the traditional cotton textiles industry due to colonial rule, India’s economic structure was transformed into a typical colonial structure, exporting its raw materials to the world and at the same time importing manufactured goods and capital from the metropolis. India was a lifeline for the British economy in the sense that the excess of exports that India had outside the United Kingdom compensated for the deficit in British balance of payments. In addition, home charges, consisting of military expenditures, bureaucrats’ pensions, and interest payments on investments in railroad construction, were a burden on Indian finances. The “drain of wealth” and “deindustrialization” theories, which were the theoretical weapons used by nationalists to challenge British rule in India, have been criticized in recent years, however. Such criticism points out that the Indian cotton industry survived

through differentiation from British industrial cotton products, and that industries in other fields emerged.

Modern industries with Indian capital emerged in the late nineteenth century, such as the cotton industry in Bombay. In addition, traditional commercial communities, such as Marwaris in North India and Nattukottai Chettiars in South India, expanded into Southeast Asia and other regions under British rule. With the indentured labor system, Indian workers also moved to Mauritius, the Caribbean, and other parts of the world as plantation workers and the like.

1.5 Embryonic Social and Religious Reforms

The first Indians to receive an English education were overwhelmingly upper caste Hindu males. In the first half of the nineteenth century, various religious and social reform activities were initiated primarily by these men. Rammohan Roy, who founded the Brahma Samaj, a Hindu reform organization in Calcutta in 1828, played a major role in the banning of sati. The rise of evangelicalism in Britain, the 1813 Charter Act that lifted the ban on missionary activities in company territories, and the full-scale activities of missionaries in India who criticized Hinduism and society combined to provide the background for these activities. It is worth noting that the main themes of social reform movements were issues concerning women, such as sati, widow remarriage, infant marriage, and girls' education. It can be said that the local elite shared with the British the perception that the status of women was an indicator of the "level of civilization" of the society in question. In the 1850s, Governor-General Dalhousie's initiatives, such as the establishment of the postal service, the telegraph system, and the railroads, stimulated not only economic activities but also the activities of the elite. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, anti-Brahmin movements, such as Jyotirao Phule's Satyashodhak Samaj (Truth-Seekers Society) founded in 1873, which criticized the hegemony of the upper castes, emerged.

On the other hand, in the early nineteenth century, there were several movements among Muslims to "purify" Islam by adhering to the Qur'an and Hadith, and in the 1870s, the Aligarh movement started by Syed Ahmad Khan was born to promote the "modernization" of Islam. These religious-based reform movements had the contradiction of causing friction among religious communities.

Apart from the above elite trends, armed uprisings by peasants and tribes were also seen throughout the nineteenth century. Criticizing the elite-centered understanding of Indian nationalism, a group of historians who came together in the early 1980s to form the Subaltern Studies collective emphasized the consciousness and behavioral norms of "subalterns," subordinate groups who are relatively autonomous from the elite (Guha 1982).

2 Southeast Asia

2.1 *Southeast Asia: Regional Overview*

Southeast Asia consists of the southeastern part of the Asian continent (Indochinese Peninsula and Malay Peninsula) and the countless islands that surround it. The former is called Mainland Southeast Asia, and the latter Maritime Southeast Asia. Historically, Southeast Asia has played a role in connecting the East and the West, as it is located at a strategic point in the maritime traffic routes of Asia (Tarling 1992, Reid 2015).

Forests covered the land, and agricultural development was limited. In a space with low population density and mobility, a networked society connecting the sea and rivers was formed. Many of the states established there were port city states, based on trade. The port polity is one of the representative types of kingdoms in Southeast Asia. The ruler, located in the port, reigned by distributing the specialties of the hinterland to foreign merchants and mediating between the internal and external worlds, connecting people, goods, and culture (Kathirithamby-Wells and Villiers 1990). These port polities wielded power from the exterior to govern over the internal affairs of their countries, and the spread of religions such as Buddhism and Islam also stemmed from them.

Southeast Asia has been strongly influenced by the global economy, and the times have changed in accordance with these transitions. For example, Lieberman (2003, 2009), who specializes in Burmese history, has attempted to contrast the history of Mainland Southeast Asia with that of Europe during the same period, and to depict it within the context of the interlocking regions of Eurasia as a whole.

In the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, the prosperity of Southeast Asian port cities coincided with the rise of East–West trade, and this period became known as the “Age of Commerce.” Reid (1988, 1993) coined the term “Age of Commerce,” referring to the period when merchants from all over the world flocked to Southeast Asia, the maritime world connecting East and West, and port polities prospered as a result of the global economic revitalization of the “long sixteenth century.” In the Indian Ocean, a network was established of Muslim merchants engaged in the transit trade of spices such as cloves and nutmeg, which were specialty products of the Maluku Islands in East Indonesia, and Islam spread to port cities in Maritime Southeast Asia. European powers such as Portugal and the Netherlands also arrived in search of spices. In the South China Sea, the demand for silver from Ming Dynasty China increased, and the transit trade of silver brought in by the Japanese and Spanish flourished.

The Age of Commerce came to an end in the late seventeenth century with the decline in the price of spices in Europe and the withdrawal of Japan and China from oceanic trade. In the eighteenth century, land development on the mainland increased and the population grew, shifting the economic focus to the hinterland. Reid (1997, pp. 11–14), who espoused the idea of the “Age of Commerce,” saw the subsequent period from the late eighteenth to the nineteenth century as the final phase of Asian

autonomy before colonization. Reid regarded the growing influence of the Chinese people due to the expansion of the Chinese market and the increase in immigration as characteristic of this period and regarded it as the “Chinese century.” On the islands, the cultivation of commodity crops such as coffee expanded, and European powers such as the Dutch and Spanish began to penetrate the interior. On the continent, the Konbaung Dynasty of Burma, the Rattanakosin Kingdom of Siam (Thailand), and the Nguyễn Dynasty of Vietnam were established one after another, and the prototype of the current framework of nation states emerged. With the increase in the number of immigrant workers from China, the development of the deltas of major rivers such as the Mekong, Chao Phraya, and Ayeyarwady began. This development was accelerated by colonization.

2.2 The Changing Order in the Seas of Asia

With the development of the Industrial Revolution in the latter half of the eighteenth century onward, the European powers underwent a change in character. The Dutch East India Company, which established its dominance in the seas of Southeast Asia in the latter half of the seventeenth century, sought to monopolize the trade of tropical products and adopted a mercantile policy. Meanwhile, the British East India Company, which entered the region in response, adopted a free trade policy, lowering tariffs to guarantee the free entry of merchants and selling its own country’s products to markets in Asia.

In the course of its expansion from India, where it was based, to China, the British East India Company acquired three ports in the Malacca Straits as transit points: Penang (1786), Singapore (1819), and Malacca (1824), turning them into the Straits Settlements. It was Raffles who acquired Singapore from the Malay sultanate in Johor, declaring it a free port and making it Britain’s trading base in Southeast Asia. In Singapore, he drew up a modern city plan and instituted progressive policies, such as the establishment of educational institutions for local people and the abolition of slavery.

Raffles’ construction of Singapore is considered to be the beginning of “modernity” in Southeast Asia. Raffles brought with him the most advanced European liberal thought, science, and technology of the time. He had a deep interest in and attachment to the local Malay people and, therefore, actively tried to reform their society in order to civilize them. This was in contrast to the traditional European powers, who sought commercial interests and were less concerned about the local society. It was this attitude of intervention that led to the subsequent period of colonial rule.

The liberalism brought in by the British did not mean freedom for local powers, as unrestricted free trade meant the dominance of industrialized Western powers. In the middle of the nineteenth century, in the process of transition to imperialism, the process by which Britain expanded its power through economic domination through free trade rather than political domination can be regarded as free trade imperialism. Through such events as the Treaty of Nanking (1842) following the Opium Wars

of the Qing Dynasty, the Bowring Treaty between Siam and Britain (1855), the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Japan and the United States (1858), and the Treaty of Saigon of the Nguyễn Dynasty (1862) following the French occupation of Cochinchina, the countries of East and Southeast Asia were forced to “open up” under the military dominance of the West. The inclusion of these countries in the free trade order was the first step in the establishment of the colonial regime. This incorporation into the free trade order was a major shift from the world order of port cities. Many studies have been conducted in Japan on the changes that took place in maritime Asia during the middle of the nineteenth century and the continuity with the preceding and following periods (e.g. Kagotani and Wakimura 2009).

2.3 Division of Southeast Asia

The end of the nineteenth century ushered in the age of imperialism. In addition to Britain, other countries such as France and the U.S. achieved industrialization, and capital from various countries vied with each other for investment opportunities. The evolution of means of transportation and communication, such as steamships, railroads, and telegraphs, increased Western pressure on Asia. The West shifted from controlling the trading networks in the seas to controlling the land. By the beginning of the twentieth century, with the exception of Siam, Southeast Asia had been divided into colonies (Tarling 2001).

The Dutch East India Company dominated the maritime network of the spice trade in the seventeenth century, and in the eighteenth century, it used Batavia as a base to gain control of Java. The Dutch East India Company was dissolved by Napoleon, but the Dutch then took direct control of the region. In addition to Java, the Dutch expanded their rule to other islands (outer islands), eliminating small local kingdoms. As a result, although it encountered resistance in the Java War, the Padri War, and the Aceh War, it established control over the area that is now Indonesia in the early twentieth century.

The British fought three Anglo-Burmese wars with Konbaung Dynasty in the nineteenth century and colonized Burma in 1885 after the Konbaung Dynasty was overthrown. Burma was adjacent to the Bengal region, which was Britain’s stronghold in India, and was of strategic importance to Britain. For this reason, Burma was incorporated into British India.

From the 1870s, the British moved into the Malay Peninsula, where tin mining operations were being developed, from the Straits Settlements, and made nine small kingdoms into protectorates one after another (British Malaya). In the 1880s, Brunei, the Malay sultanate of Borneo, the Kingdom of Sarawak, which was ruled by the British Brooke family, and North Borneo, which was ruled by the British North Borneo Chartered Company, became protectorates (British Borneo). In addition to Burma, Malaya, and Borneo, the British established control over the coastal areas between India and China.

The French intervened in Nguyễn Dynasty Vietnam, with which they had originally had close relations, and after occupying the eastern part of the Mekong Delta in 1862, they moved up the Mekong River with the aim of advancing into China and made Cambodia a protectorate the following year. In 1867, France also took control of the western part of the Mekong Delta, forming French Cochinchina. In the 1880s, French intervention in northern Vietnam increased, and after the Sino-French War, the Nguyễn Dynasty became a protectorate in 1886. From there, France took possession of northern Vietnam (Tonkin) and central Vietnam (Annam). These areas were combined to form French Indochina in 1887, incorporating Laos, which had been made into a protectorate, in 1899.

The north central part of the Philippine Islands was ruled by Spain, which arrived from the Pacific in the sixteenth century. However, after Spain lost the Spanish-American War in 1899, it handed over the Philippines to the United States. After Spain's defeat, native inhabitants temporarily took power in the Philippines (the Philippine Revolution), but the U.S. defeated the revolutionary government with military force, and the U.S. territory of the Philippines was established. The U.S. conquered the Muslim areas in the southern part of the archipelago that Spain was unable to conquer, and the territory that is now the Philippines took shape.

While Burma was colonized by the British in the west and Cambodia and Laos by the French in the east, Siam was regarded as a "buffer state" and maintained its independence. Domestically, the two kings of the Rattanakosin Kingdom, Mongkut (Rama IV) and Chulalongkorn (Rama V), were successful in their modernization policies. Rama IV, who "opened up" the country through the Bowring Treaty, welcomed many foreign advisors and began to modernize the country. Rama V implemented a series of modernization policies known as the Chakri Reforms, including the development of a cabinet system and military organization, and the establishment of a local administrative system. He also made treaties with Britain and France to demarcate their borders and ensure their independence.

In his book *Siam Mapped*, the Thai historian Thongchai (1994, pp. 16–19) describes the drawing of borders and the "geo-body" of the pre-modern polity, which had little territoriality due to colonization, as a milestone in the formation of the modern nation state. Thongchai emphasized the linkage between the formation process of the concept of Thainess, or Nation, in Thailand and the establishment of geographical totality, pointing out the importance of geography and cartography. His discussion focuses on the case of Thailand, influenced by Anderson's (1991) theory of "imagined communities." The borders of Siam were established through the division of the region into colonies and by the cutting of the periphery by Britain and France. The borders drawn during the colonial period have been inherited by the current Southeast Asian countries, and Southeast Asia as a region took shape in the early twentieth century.

2.4 *Southeast Asian Society Under the Colonial Regime*

The establishment of the colonial system brought about many changes in Southeast Asia. The “modernity” introduced with this colonization has been essentially inherited by the present Southeast Asian states and societies.

One change in politics and administration is the development of the modern administrative system. In premodern Southeast Asia, the power of the state was imperfect, and various levels of chiefs coexisted and their power was stratified. Scott focused on the resistance of people in various parts of Southeast Asia to the power of the state, describes the mountainous areas of Southeast Asia as areas that are not encompassed by the state, and depicts the independence of the people living in these mountainous areas from state power (Scott 2009). However, colonial powers introduced a hierarchical administration based on territorial units and applied laws and institutions in a centralized manner. Even in Siam, which escaped colonization, the central government sent governors to replace local chiefs in the process of modernization. Although there were many imperfections due to the lack of finances and manpower and the complicated geographical terrain, the system of governance that was established became the basis for the present administration.

Part of the administration was carried out by native inhabitants. Europeans were in the absolute minority, and as the administration expanded, their dependence on locals inevitably increased. In the early twentieth century, colonial governments began to train local bureaucrats in large numbers, establishing institutions of higher learning such as the Indochina University in Hanoi in 1906. The local elite, who had acquired the language of the suzerain state and the modern Western way of thinking, became an intermediary between the suzerain state and the local people.

In terms of the economy, Southeast Asia was positioned as a source of primary commodities under the Western-dominated world economy, which led to the development of commodity crops (sugar cane, coffee, rubber, etc.) and mining of mineral resources (tin in the Malay Peninsula, oil in the Dutch East Indies, etc.). Monoculture plantations created through vast amounts of capital extended across swathes of rainforest. Colonial development took place through the introduction of capital and laborers from outside into sparsely populated forests. In particular, the number of Chinese migrant workers increased rapidly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The export-oriented economy was transplanted to local societies in its entirety.

The colonial economy had an international structure that transcended the relationship of colony and suzerainty under the principle of free trade. In the Malay Peninsula, rubber plantations funded by British capital were manned by Indian laborers, and the products were exported to the United States. In addition, rice from the continent was imported to feed the workers, and people and goods were connected beyond the boundaries of the colonies. In particular, inter-Asian trade expanded substantially through networks of Chinese people, and economic relations within Asia deepened. Sugihara (1996, pp. 95–156) reveals the deepening of intra-Asian trade and economic relations in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia in the inter-war period. This

shows that even under the colonial system, the economies of Southeast Asia had relative autonomy from the colonial suzerainty through the mediation of Chinese and other Asian immigrants.

The expansion of the economy led to the development of colonial cities such as Singapore, Saigon, Rangoon, and Kuala Lumpur. In these cities, immigrants, mainly from China (and some from India), made up the majority of the population. A unique culture was created in these cities in which the suzerain nation, Asian immigrants, and local society mixed, as represented by the architecture. In the colonies, Asian immigrants played a major role in creating a complex society in which multiple communities coexisted in a single political unit without social intermingling. Furnivall (1967, p. 446), a colonial bureaucrat in British Burma, pointed out that colonial societies in Southeast Asia, such as Burma and Indonesia, were “plural society,” divided into layers of Europeans, foreign Orientals, and locals that did not intersect with each other.

The role of the native population in the politics and economics of these colonial spaces was limited, but in the early twentieth century, people began to adapt to modern political and economic regime. The administrative elite, educated in European languages under colonial rule, became the new leadership class, while the number of people literate in local languages increased. In addition, religious forces such as Buddhism on the continent and Islam on the islands were revitalized by adopting modern values. Among those who were exposed to modernity, there emerged a group of people who had doubts about the framework of colonial society itself. For example, the modernist Islamic reform ideology developed in the Middle East flowed into Southeast Asia and played a major role in Indonesian political movements. This was due to the development of transportation infrastructure and the penetration of the monetary economy, which led to an increase in the number of Muslims from Southeast Asia studying and making pilgrimages to the Middle East (Laffan 2003). Such local elites became the bearers of nationalism, criticizing the political inequality among ethnic groups and the outflow of economic wealth and pressing for a change in the status quo.

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East Asia and Imperialism



Takashi Okamoto, Shin Kawashima, and Kaoru Iokibe

1 State Transformation in China During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century

1.1 *Internal and External Troubles to the 1870s*

1.1.1 Opening of Ports

As Qing China entered the nineteenth century, the prosperity of the previous era gave way to internal and external troubles, such as the rapid expansion of population growth, social mobility, and the resulting ineffectiveness of the governing system. This was the case both inland and along the coast, and both foreign relations and domestic systems were plunged into turmoil at about the same time.

Foreign relations were a process that resulted in the Opium War. Order along the coast, which had been maintained with as little intervention as possible by government authorities, was collapsing, and security was deteriorating due to the rapid expansion of trading activities. Opium smuggling and the conflicts surrounding it were just one aspect of this.

It is true that the old methods of maintaining order were no longer effective. However, the only thing that changed before and after the Opium War, regarded as the starting point of “modern history” in the Chinese speaking world, was the existence of treaty-based amicable relations. From the Western point of view, this

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was the establishment of new international relations, (Fairbank 1969) but from the standpoint of the Qing Dynasty, it was a continuation of the previous method of maintaining order. The reorganization of rules and procedures in the form of treaties merely prevented conflicts from occurring.

This was true for both the Opium War in the 1840s and the Arrow War (also known as the Second Opium War) in the 1850s. Therefore, it was still inconsistent with the Westphalian system and modern international relations (Banno 1964).

1.1.2 Civil Wars

The internal situation in China was far from peaceful, either. After the suppression of the White Lotus Rebellion in the early nineteenth century, it became customary for civil society to take up arms, regardless of right or wrong, and law and order worsened.

At the same time, secret societies that dealt in prohibited goods such as salt and opium proliferated, leading to repeated uprisings against the Qing government (Kuhn 1970). From the mid-nineteenth century onward, the Taiping Rebellion and other major civil wars broke out simultaneously in various regions, and it took around two decades until the 1870s for the situation to be brought under control. Some estimates put the death toll at 70 million during this period.

Although these were long and tragic wars, there is no time, and perhaps no need, to go into the details. The reason for this is that there was no major change in the political or economic system or in the structure of society. It was the same armed groups that started these civil wars as suppressed them, and their particular stance (i.e. whether they were for or against a particular cause) determined the fate of Qing China.

The social structure that formed the nucleus of these groups remained virtually unchanged before and after the civil wars. What did change was the way the groups were organized. Provincial governors took control of armed groups as volunteer armies to maintain security in the field. In order to maintain the armed forces, they were entrusted with a great deal of political and financial discretion.

From the beginning, the rule of the Han Chinese during the Qing was left to the provincial governors, while the leadership and control of the Beijing government was also effective. The balance of power that had been maintained was, however, clearly tilted in favor of the provincial governors after the end of the civil wars. It might be said that, as a result of the instability of ever-expanding Chinese society, political initiative shifted from the Manchu central government to the Han provincial authorities without changing the institutional and systemic framework to suppress the unrest (Okamoto 2019a).

1.1.3 The Tongzhi Restoration

This period of stabilization is called the Tongzhi Restoration because it coincided with the reign of the Tongzhi Emperor. The era name Tongzhi, which means “joint rule,” is suggestive of the system and reign of the time.

China’s traditional system of government was based on an imperial autocracy, and Qing rule is seen as a typical example of this. However, the Tongzhi Emperor was young, and his position was shared by his mother and the Prince Regent. The actual administration was carried out by the provincial governors, who were entrusted with greater discretion than before, in collaboration with the Beijing government. In the area of foreign affairs, the powers that had concluded treaties with the Qing government had a cooperative relationship with it through the so-called “Co-operative Policy.”

In this way, the essence and framework of the system did not change in China after the internal and external troubles of the mid-nineteenth century. In the transition of events up to the 1870s, the kind of state of affairs that was inevitable under the traditional system was resolved by reorganizing the internal and external regimes into a system of joint governance in the manner of a minor change (Wright 1957).

1.2 Conflict with Japan to the 1890s

1.2.1 Meiji Japan

This stability, however, began to falter in the 1870s. Volatility in European international politics eventually spread to East Asia, where conflicts and contradictions with the major powers began to emerge. In particular, conflicts over borders frequently occurred. The most notable of these was the conflict with Japan.

In this same period, Japan underwent the Meiji Restoration and reformed its national system. It was Li Hongzhang, the leader of the provincial governorships, who kept a close watch on Japan’s modernization and Westernization. Li Hongzhang took into account the history of Japan’s threats to China, such as past incursions by Japanese pirates and the Japanese invasions of Korea and tried to prevent a repeat of these threats. This came with the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Amity in 1871.

The Sino-Japanese Treaty of Amity, the first treaty between Japan and China, was a way for Japan to establish new international relations, while from the perspective of the Qing government, it was a way to prevent external conflicts that had been occurring since the Opium War. This is evidenced by the article in the treaty that stipulates the mutual inviolability of what is termed “land belonging to the state.” This “land belonging to” one state included not only the areas effectively controlled by the Qing government, but also its tributaries such as kingdoms of Korea and Ryukyu, which were called *shuguo* (lit. dependent states). The Japanese, however, had in mind sovereign states with demarcated borders, and therefore did not think that

this idea of “land belonging to the state” included China’s tributaries. This difference in the order system would determine the rest of history.

1.2.2 Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands

In the same year that the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Amity was signed, a castaway from Miyako Island in the Ryukyu Islands was killed by natives in southern Taiwan. This incident exposed the discord between Japan and the Qing.

The Qing government took the position that the indigenous people of Taiwan were not under its direct control, but Japan, seeking to hold these indigenes accountable for the incident, considered Taiwan to be “*Terra nullius*” under international law and sent troops into Taiwan to attack the indigenous people. In the eyes of the Qing government, this invasion was nothing more than a violation of the treaty and an invasion of “land belonging to the state.” Thereafter, the Qing focused on building a navy to counter the Japanese, who could not be deterred by treaties.

Japan demanded that the Ryukyu Islands, which had been under the control of the Satsuma clan and had been undergoing assimilation with Japan, stop paying tribute to the Qing Dynasty. While this was part of Japan’s modernization efforts, it also signified the subversion of the existing external order of Qing China, and the conflict between Japan and the Qing once again intensified.

In 1879, Japan responded to the Qing authorities’ protest against the cessation of tribute and seized Shuri Castle, abolished the Ryukyu Domain, and established Okinawa Prefecture in its place, thus completing the so-called “Ryukyu Disposition.” However, the Qing Dynasty refused to recognize this measure, and the conflict between Japan and the Qing continued.

It is not that the Qing government at that time attached any particular importance to the Ryukyu Islands. It was concerned that the destruction of the Kingdom of Ryukyu, a “dependent state,” would spread to other “dependent states” that were more important for its geopolitical security concerns.

1.2.3 The Status of the Dependent State and the Sino-Japanese War

Vietnam and Korea were representative of this. To begin with, dependent states had only a ceremonial hierarchical relationship with the Qing dynasty and had a certain degree of autonomy in their internal and external affairs. However, in the 1880s, Li Hongzhang, who was in charge of the foreign affairs of Qing China, reserved the right to protect and interfere in the military affairs of the two countries, and attempted to make them into “buffer states,” so to speak. The world powers that had a strong interest in the autonomy of the two countries did not easily approve of the policy of the Qing government, which led to confusion in negotiations, frequent disputes, and even war.

France, which had been pursuing the colonization of Indochina, contested with Qing China over the right of military protection over Northern Vietnam, and in the mid-1880s, the two sides became embroiled in war. This was the Sino-French War.

At the same time, a power struggle with Japan on the Korean Peninsula led to an armed conflict. At that time, both sides exercised restraint and did not engage in a full-on war. However, ten years later, the Sino-Japanese War began when Japanese troops attacked the Qing troops during the civil war in Korea.

All of the above conflicts can be likened to a kind of allergy manifested by the modern international order to the Qing government's attempt to transplant the unchanged old order system to the application of military protection. Defeated Qing China found it impossible to maintain the old system. The Sino-Japanese War coincided with the Second Industrial Revolution and the era of imperialism. In consequence of China's defeat in 1895, the scramble for concessions of imperialist powers spread to China, and the sense of crisis over the division of the country occurred and led to a change in the existing system.

1.3 Toward Revolution: The Journey to 1912

1.3.1 *Fanbu* and China

These problems appeared intensively in Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang, places where Han Chinese originally did not live and which were known as *fanbu* (lit. outlying regions). Tibetan Buddhists, Muslims and other peoples practiced customs and ruled differently from the Han Chinese.

However, these regions, caught in the middle of the Great Game being played between Britain and Russia, became the focus of international politics. In the midst of this situation, the Qing government, especially the Han officials, who took advantage of the Muslim defection to reconquer Xinjiang, translated the Tibetan and Mongolian *fanbu* into English as "colonies" and began to position them as subordinate territories.

These movements accelerated early in the twentieth century as the sense of crisis increased and the momentum for change grew. The Chinese adopted Japan's concepts translated into Chinese from the West and began to aim for the construction of a centralized nation-state using the Meiji Restoration as a model and medium (Okamoto 2019b).

It was at this time that the country name *Zhongguo* (lit. China) finally took root. Terms such as "nation," "state," "sovereignty," and "territory" were all modern translations of Chinese that came from Japan and were political concepts that had never existed before. Thus, Tibet and Mongolia were positioned as inseparable "territories" over which "China" had "sovereignty," and the move to centralize power in China proper also accelerated (Okamoto 2017).

1.3.2 The Quest for a Nation-State

After the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the construction of a nation-state and constitutional government became the irreversible course that “China” was aiming for. Regardless of the form of government it was aiming for, both the government and the people were united in calling for patriotism and a sovereign state.

This was true not only of the most radical revolutionaries who wanted to overthrow the Qing Dynasty, but also of the constitutionalists who wanted to preserve it, and even of the Qing government authorities. In the end, all three parties agreed to eliminate the Qing court and form a republican government. This was the 1911 Revolution. Therefore, no matter how the regime or political system changed in the years that followed, China’s stance on this point never wavered. This has been true even up to the present day (Okamoto 2020).

However, at least at that time, such a stance was far removed from the reality of the situation. Tibet and Mongolia gained de facto independence in the 1911 Revolution and continued to be at odds with China. Even in China proper, each province wielded its own considerable power. The 1911 Revolution had been accomplished as a result of the independence of the provinces from the central government, and this turned into a war of competing factions that led to political turmoil. The unification of the nation-state was still a pipe dream. The struggles of the Republic of China, which had been born without substance commensurate with the name both in domestic politics and in foreign relations had begun.

2 The History of the Republic of China to the Second Sino-Japanese War

2.1 *The Xinhai Revolution and the Establishment of the Republic of China*

In the early twentieth century, the Qing Dynasty fell in China due to the Xinhai Revolution. This closed the curtain on over two thousand years of monarchical rule in Imperial China, and a new form of government called the Republic of China was established. This new country was constructed as a modern sovereign nation, but agreement could not be reached within the country for just how a modern nation should be structured, and the nation building process brought with it many difficulties.

On January 1, 1912, the Republic of China was formed at Nanjing with Sun Yat-sen as the Provisional President. However, a powerful Qing Dynasty government faction still existed in Beijing. In February, talks were held between the Qing and the Republic of China with mediation by the United Kingdom at a peace conference between north and south governments. The Qing dynasty dissolved and was absorbed into the Republic of China (1911 Revolution / Xinhai Revolution). This

marked the end of two thousand years of long-standing Imperial Chinese monarchical rule, but the Qing Dynasty emperor Puyi was allowed to continue residing in the Forbidden City under the Articles of Favorable Treatment. The Republic of China asserted the proclamation of Five Races Under One Union and inherited Qing Dynasty territory. Yuan Shih-kai, who assumed the position of Provisional President from Sun Yat-sen, inherited the Qing Dynasty bureaucracy, the Beiyang Army, etc. Bolstered by a reorganizational loan amounting to £250 million from a five-nation consortium consisting of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, and Russia, he launched the Beijing government of the Republic of China. Before the establishment of the Yuan Shih-kai regime, a Provisional Constitution for the Nanjing based government had been established. This constitution constrained presidential powers and recognized a strong level of power among the legislature, which included the various ministries and many regional representatives. In the spring 1913 election, the Nationalist Party won. However, Nationalist Party leader Sung Chiao-jen was assassinated in front of Shanghai Station, and Yuan Shih-kai worked with elected legislators in an attempt to dissuade the legislature from constraining the presidency. Yuan was officially installed as president in 1913, and in autumn of that year, other nations also recognized the government of the Republic of China. Unlike the elites in the various ministries who had envisioned a decentralized administration in which the various ministries hold power and a republic in which the president does not hold power, Yuan Shih-kai is thought to have envisioned a centralized constitutional monarchy. And subsequently, he began to seek ways to become an emperor (Kawashima 2010, pp. 142–151).

2.2 From the World War I Era to the 1920s

World War I, which erupted in Europe in 1914, brought new difficulties for Chinese politics in the foreign diplomacy arena. And after the death of Yuan Shih-kai, domestic politics experienced disorder over the issue of joining the war. While the Beijing government did achieve a certain level of diplomatic success through participating in World War I, it faced an even more difficult level of problems in the arena of governmental administration. However, the Chinese economy did show growth during the war period, and the Chinese economic quarter began bolstering the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) in Guangdong.

When World War I first erupted, China was hosting foreign naval bases of both sides on domestic leased territory and originally declared neutrality in the war. However, Japan was already involved in the war. Together with British forces, Japan advanced into Shandong, attacked the German naval base in Jiaozhou Bay and the entirety of the Shandong province to occupy that area until 1922. In January 1915, Japan hit the Yuan Shih-kai regime with the Twenty-One Demands. This called for conditions such as the extension of rights in Manchuria, including control of the South Manchuria Railway (Mantetsu) that Japan had acquired through the Russo-Japanese war, and the acquisition of Germany's rights in Shandong. This sparked

a strong anti-Japanese movement within China. The Yuan Shih-kai regime reacted by rejecting Group V of the Demands, which contained the harshest requirements. It leaked information to English language newspapers and engaged in tenacious negotiations, but finally acceded to Japan's demands in early May. Meanwhile, the Great Powers developed strong misgivings towards Japan for approaching China on its own, without coordination, and failing to disclose a portion of the negotiation demands (Kokubun et al. 2017, pp. 16–17).

The theater for World War I was mainly in Europe, and this generated positive conditions for the economies of the US, Japan, and China. Particularly in China, European product imports decreased, value skyrocketed, and the effects were the same as if high tariffs had been imposed. Thus, the competitive strength of Chinese products, supported by an inexpensive labor force, increased, and a progressive switch to import substitution industrialization began. Together with specialist workers returning home from abroad, people who shouldered the ethnic industries growing during this period formed the support base for the Chinese Nationalist Party. In the 1910s, Chinese domestic development progressed in places like Xinjiang and Manchuria, and the transportation network also expanded. Also, Chinese merchants and migrant workers spread into the Americas, Southeast Asia, Japan, and Siberia. They sent money to their hometowns in China (Overseas Chinese Remittance), and that money funded construction for the villages from which these overseas Chinese hailed.¹ Additionally, in and after World War I, many young people went to France under programs designed to fill the local labor shortage in which school fees were waived for working in factories (“Diligent Work-Frugal Study Movement”).

Yuan Shih-kai gave up on attempting to restore the monarchical system in China and died in 1916. In the following year of 1917, the Republic of China entered World War I under the leadership of Tuan Ch'i-jui. Therein, domestic politics were decisively severed over war participation. Sun Yat-sen and some national legislators opposed the Beijing based government and founded a central government in Guangdong (Military Government of the Republic of China). Furthermore, Japan issued large loans to the Tuan Ch'i-jui regime (Nishihara Loans), which used the financing to successfully unify China, dispatching military force even to Outer Mongolia and Siberia. In 1918 the war ended, and the Republic of China was on the winning side. It attended the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and argued for the return of German territory in Shandong province to China and nullification of the Twenty-One Demands (Kawashima 2004, pp. 264–265). However, China did not succeed, and domestic outrage sparked the May Fourth Movement.

¹ See Fig. 1. Many emigrants from southeast China headed for foreign lands, and the money they sent back to their homes supported things like education and protective architecture for their villages. Additionally, the building styles and lifestyles from their destinations in Southeast Asia also took hold in villages. The tower in this photo also served as a pirate invasion lookout tower.



Fig. 1 Western style building on the Kinmen Islands (photographed by the author)

2.3 The Nanjing National Government

The Nanjing National Government united China. In 1928, under the Dang Guo system (Party-State System) in which the Nationalist Party headed the government, the Nanjing National Government aimed to construct a nation-state even more thoroughly than the Beijing government had accomplished and purged local military leaders, including the Communist Party. However, there was demand from within the country for a transfer to constitutionalism. Due to external factors, such as the Mukden Incident and the Second Sino-Japanese War, that nation-building goal was forced to course correct.

In 1919, Sun Yat-sen and his allies formed the Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT). They received aid from sources including the Comintern (Communist International) and amassed power. In 1924, they held the 1st National Congress of the Chinese Nationalist Party, announced the Three Principles of the People, and called for efforts such as, “alliance with the Soviet Union, accommodation with the Communist Party of China, and assisting peasants and workers.” The Chinese Communist Party was formed in 1921 and, based on instruction from Comintern, it had party members participate in the Chinese Nationalist Party Convention as Nationalist Party members. However, in 1925, Sun Yat-sen died in Beijing while visiting as part of his quest to unify China. His final requests articulated issues such as the necessity to remedy unequal treaties (Kawashima 2010, pp. 219–220). Two months after his death, a large-scale protest (May Thirtieth Movement) was sparked by the shooting of workers by a British Shanghai Municipal Police officer. Against this backdrop,

the NRA (National Revolutionary Army) headed by Chiang Kai-Shek launched the Northern Expedition in 1926. In the process of the expedition, the army gathered local military forces under its umbrella, proposing “Revolutionary Diplomacy” in a bid to regain the reins of a fractured China. The United Kingdom did return some of its interests, such as the British Settlement. However, in March 1927 the NRA launched attacks on several places, including the consulate offices of foreign countries in Nanjing, and engaged in violence and looting (Nanjing Incident). When the Northern Expedition army reached North China, Japan dispatched its military three times from 1927 through 1928, citing the need to protect Japanese citizens living there (Shandong Expedition). During the Jinan Incident of May 3, 1928, Chinese and Japanese forces came to blows. Then, on April 12, 1927, during the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai-Shek purged suspected Communists (April 12 Incident).

The Nanjing National Government, launched in Nanjing by the Chinese Nationalist Party in 1927, employed the *Dang Guo* system (Party-State System), in which the party leads the government. In 1928, the Northern Expedition army entered Beijing, and the Beijing government fell. Leader Chang Tso-lin escaped to Mukden (Shenyang) by train but was killed by the Kwantung Army (an important incident in Manchuria, a.k.a. Chang Tso-lin Explosion Death Incident). Chang Tso-lin’s son, Chang Hsueh-liang inherited his father’s power base, and at the end of that year, he clarified his support of the Nanjing National Government (Northeast Flag Replacement), and the Chinese Nationalist Party unified the entire country. The government formed was based on urban specialist personnel and native capital from organizations including the Zhejiang financial clique. It constructed a governmental foundation with the infusion of a portion of Beijing government bureaucrats.

The NRA aimed to “purge” actors, including regional military powers and the Communist Party, and militarily expand the territory under their control. Additionally, they attempted to directly control cities and agricultural villages through means such as organizing urban commerce groups and implementing the Rural Reconstruction Movement. Also, through efforts such as the New Life Movement, they tried to guide behavior and lifestyle norms towards those of the ideal “citizens” of a modern nation. On the financial front, the NRA succeeded in reviving tariff autonomy in 1929 as a result of tariff conferences that the Beijing government had been pursuing. This stabilized their financial resources and was helpful in protecting and nurturing domestic industry. China adopted a silver standard and did not initially feel much impact from the Great Depression that started in 1929. However, in 1931, the United Kingdom broke away from the gold standard, and the price of silver rose. This sparked troubles such as export paralysis, a decrease in Overseas Chinese Remittance, and foreign investment. As a result, silver flowed out of China and commodity prices fell. This is the backdrop against which the *fabi* (authorized paper money) currency was considered necessary (Ishikawa 2010, pp. 70–71).

Fearing the threat of the USSR and the perceived threat towards treaty interests by the Nanjing National Government, the Kwantung Army sparked the Mukden Incident on September 18, 1931, and in a short period of time occupied the entire region of Manchuria centering on the area along the railway. In response, Chiang Kai-shek pulled Chang Hsueh-liang back to safety in China proper. Declaring a policy

of “maintaining internal security and repelling foreign invasion,” Chiang Kai-Shek initiated several internal and external initiatives. Internally, he avoided direct military engagement with Japan while “purging” local military leaders, including Communist Party loyalists, expanding directly controlled territory, and transforming it into a hub for resisting Japan. Externally, with a focus on the concept of collective security, he brought claims of League charter violations and treaty violations by Japan to the League of Nations and the Nine-Power Treaty member nations. Upon receiving this claim from China, the League of Nations dispatched the Lytton Commission. In January 1932, which was during the investigation period for that commission, the January 28 Incident (Shanghai Incident) occurred, and in March, the nation of Manchukuo was established with Hsuan-tung Emperor Puyi as its magistrate. The Lytton report was submitted to the League of Nations. After representatives from both Japan and China fought in debates, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations out of dissatisfaction with the League resolution.

The Mukden Incident concluded with the 1933 Tangu Truce. And though there was no active warfare between 1933 and the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Japan’s advance into North China continued, simultaneous to several peace negotiations being held between the two countries. During this period, the Nanjing National Government continued eliminating local military leaders and the fighting to purge Communist Party loyalists while also preparing for war with Japan. And even when issuing the silver standard backed *fabi* currency in 1935, they required the handover of silver to the coffers of regional governments and military forces and issued paper notes as collateral. Meanwhile, the Communist Party founded the Chinese Soviet Republic in Ruijin in Jiangxi province, but after being attacked by the Chinese Nationalist Party, they transferred to Yan’an in Shanxi province from 1934 through 1936 (Long March) (Ishikawa 2010, pp. 123–129, 133). Against this backdrop, Chiang Kai-shek visited Xi’an in December 1936 to motivate Chang Hsueh-liang, who was not achieving the expected military success in terms of attacking the Communist Party. However, Chang Hsueh-liang held Chiang under house arrest, and together with Chou En-lai of the Chinese Communist Party, he persuaded Chiang Kai-shek to authorize the United Front and resist the Japanese (Xi’an Incident). But after being released, Chiang Kai-shek did not necessarily throw his full weight into the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression.

2.4 The Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II

When the Second Sino-Japanese War began in 1937, the capital Nanjing was occupied by Japan and the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression was conducted from Chongqing. However, construction of a National Mobilization initiative without thorough governing of basic society proved difficult. And externally, the United Kingdom, the US, and the Soviet Union were not joining the fight against Japan. The Pacific War finally commenced in 1941. China was declared a member of the United Nations Big Four, and its international status rose through factors such as developing

a framework for postwar Asia. However, the status of the Nationalist Government progressively dropped both domestically and from an international viewpoint as well.

On July 7, 1937, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident erupted in the outskirts of Beijing. Afterwards, small incidents continued to occur in the Beijing outskirts. When the Second Battle of Shanghai broke out on August 13, genuine warfare began. To avoid the application of the US Neutrality act, Japan and China did not issue an official declaration of war. The Japanese army was sorely taxed by Chinese forces, which had been trained by German officers. But on December 13, when Japanese forces entered Nanjing, they massacred non-combatants and prisoners (Nanjing Massacre). The Nationalist Government, along with bureaucrats and intellectuals, had already relocated from Nanjing to Chongqing in Sichuan province (Chongqing Nationalist Government), which was territory directly under control by the Nationalist Government. The government laid down a National Mobilization initiative and prepared for a long-term commitment to the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, but they could not completely initiate a family registration system and were limited in their response. Also, with cooperation from the Chinese Communist Party, they were able to create a system for engaging in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (United Front), but trust between the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party did not reach sufficient levels. Additionally, the Nationalist Party had promised a transfer to constitutionalism directly before war commenced and had to handle the pressure to become democratic while engaging in war.

In terms of foreign policy, while receiving support from the United Kingdom, the US, and the USSR through means such as the Allied supply route, Chiang Kai-shek continued working diplomatically with the expectation of war against Japan breaking out with the Great Powers (Zhang 1991, pp. 252–257). When World War II erupted in Europe in 1939, an alliance gradually formed between Japan, Germany, and Italy, but the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II were separate wars. However, when Japan advanced into northern French Indochina to cut off the supply route and then into southern French Indochina, Chiang Kai-shek began to rely on support from the United Kingdom to the Yunnan province through the Burma Route. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and the Malay Peninsula on December 8, 1941, commencing war with the United Kingdom and the US, and the Pacific War erupted, Chiang Kai-shek declared war on Japan the very next day, December 9. Japan, which viewed the Wang Jingwei regime in Nanjing to be the official Chinese government, did not officially declare war on China. In January of 1942, China became a member of the United Nations and was designated as one of the Big Four.

The Chinese front was a three-way stalemate between the Chongqing Nationalist Government, the Yan'an Communist Party government, and Japan, which held the area from North China to Jiangnan, the major rail areas, and major port cities, along with its allies the Nanjing Wang Jingwei Regime and Manchukuo. However, along the front of the Pacific War, from mid-1942 onward, Japan progressively weakened, and the Allied Nations began formulating a postwar vision. At the end of November 1943, leaders of the United Kingdom, the US, and China held talks in Cairo (the Cairo Conference), announced their postwar vision for East Asia (the Cairo Declaration), and laid the foundation for the subsequent Potsdam Declaration. By 1944, the

movement towards forming a postwar international united organization accelerated among the Allied Nations. In 1945, World War II ended, and the United Nations was formed at the San Francisco Conference. China became a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

However, the United Kingdom and the US believed that in order to end the war with Germany and Japan, the cooperation of the USSR was indispensable. Therefore, in February of 1945, a conference was held at Yalta between the United Kingdom, the US, and the Soviet Union (the Yalta Conference). Therein, the USSR was included in the fight against Japan, but China was not invited to the conference. This indicated a decrease in the status of China regarding the war against Japan. At the end of July, the Potsdam Declaration was issued to Japan from the US, the United Kingdom, and China. Then, in August of the same year, the USSR invaded Manchukuo in between the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the US. On August 14, China entered the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and accepted the independence of Outer Mongolia, albeit with conditions, and China later rescinded this acceptance.

Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration and surrendered unconditionally. However, the USSR strengthened its influence on the entire northern region of China, including Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Xinjiang. Conflict would become unavoidable between the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party, which received support from the USSR. Additionally, the transition to constitutionalism also became a major issue.

3 Japanese Meiji Restoration and Modernization

3.1 The Incrementally Strict National Isolation and Peaceful Opening

In the Age of Discovery in which Spain and Portugal came to Japan in their quest to set out into the East Asian maritime region, Japan produced and supplied large quantities of silver for use in trade transactions and was deeply embedded in international commerce networks (Yamaguchi 2006). From the end of the sixteenth century through the seventeenth century, the Toyotomi regime and the Tokugawa shogunate ordered national isolation. But this did not completely ban communications and commerce. Instead, it focused mainly on being wary of, and expelling, Christians. Thus, the law tolerated docking by foreign ships for the purpose of trade, and trade continued with the Netherlands, China, and the Ainu. Regarding Korea, acceptance was given to delegates visiting mainly during the succession of the shogun.

It was the eighteenth century when the situation started to change. First, resources to transact trade dried up. This is because silver production decreased, and production of substitute copper was also sluggish. The need for trade also decreased. This

is because raw silk, which was the main imported product, was being produced domestically, and the cotton trade was also maturing.

Matsudaira Sadanobu, who headed the shogunate administration at the time, decreased Dejima trading with the Dutch East India Company and tightened national isolation. Tightening national isolation also dovetailed with the self-justification of the shogunate, which saw it as protecting the emperor and the people from foreign nations (Jansen 1989, 2000). However, the financial situation of the shogunate was in the process of worsening, and they were not able to build defensive power that could stand up to the West. Moreover, Japan is an island nation, and both Edo, home to the shogun, and Osaka, home to the economic center, were located on coasts and fragile against maritime threats. Information about the Qing Dynasty's defeat in the First Opium War had also spread, and the shogun's cabinet was deeply concerned.

The steamboat fleet commanded by American Commodore Matthew Perry (the "Black Ships") appeared at Uruga in 1853, and in the next year the shogunate signed the Treaty of Peace and Amity and promised to treat visiting ships and people with humanitarian respect. Japan also signed other similar treaties with the major European Powers.

However, the West desired free trade without intervention by administration officials. The shogunate accommodated this as well, and in 1858, it entered into the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with United States Consul General to Japan Townsend Harris. Japan established diplomatic relations, and trade was allowed in Kanagawa (Yokohama), Hyogo (Kobe), Nagasaki, Niigata, Hakodate, Edo (Tokyo), and Osaka. Allowing residence, travel, and commerce in any interior area other than the areas specified above was not required in the treaty terms. The Netherlands, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France immediately followed suit. During the next decade, other European nations also entered into similar treaties.

In this way, Japan developed experience interacting with the West in the beginning of the early-modern period. From the late Edo period onward, Japan had attempted to tighten national isolation, but had also learned that it did not have the power to accomplish that. This culminated with the arrival of Perry's Black Ships, and Japan was able to open up in a gradual and relatively advantageous way without going through war.

This was a favorable time to trade with the West. The United Kingdom had just quelled the Indian Rebellion of 1857 and was engaged in colonizing India and building railways. After winning the 1856–1860 Second Opium War (the Arrow Incident), the United Kingdom and France opened up Yangtze River watershed ports to the West. Inland China and India linked to international markets, and Asian trade expanded. It was in this environment that Japan opened its ports. Moreover, the American Civil War commenced in 1860, and raw cotton exporting came to a standstill. Japan was only able to supplement a small part of the global supply shortage for raw cotton, but nevertheless did reap massive profits from exporting (Metzler 2020).

3.2 *The Joi Movement*

However, the idea that strict national isolation was a part of Japanese tradition was already firmly embedded in Japanese culture, and the decision to open the ports received strong criticism. In particular, the emperor's disapproval of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, and his refusal to grant royal permission to sign the treaty, heightened opposition. The Sonno Joi Movement (translated into English as a movement to "revere the emperor and expel barbarians") criticizing the shogunate for making that decision on its own and opposing the resultant opening of ports spread, particularly among lower-ranking warriors.

At the time, the population of Japan was about 30 million people. Samurai families made up 7% of all households. Amidst the long period of peace in Edo, where once warriors had been the core, now the role of bureaucrat was central. 7% was appropriate for soldiers, but too many as bureaucrats. Therein, low-ranking warriors were poor, and some had to farm to survive. Prospects for upward mobility were extremely rare. Even still, those samurai felt pride in being on the outskirts of the political elite, and there was a feeling of resistance towards becoming a farmer or merchant. Hardship and unhappiness drove some low-ranking warriors to answer a new calling, leaving their master's house to become ronin. Thus, the Sonno Joi movement became more radicalized. These masterless samurai roamed all over the country, propagandizing about a perceived crisis to the independence of the Japanese, and the idea of the Japanese as one people began to spread.

Some daimyo even employed Sonno Joi as an official governing policy. Choshu (current Yamaguchi Prefecture) is an exemplative case of this. In 1863, it fired on foreign ships passing through the Shimonoseki Straits in an attempt to expulse foreigners. However, the subsequent year Choshu underwent a counterattack from the fleets of the Four Powers of the United Kingdom, US, France, and the Netherlands, which resulted in reconciliation. Choshu was also militarily engaged by shogunate forces twice, in 1864 and 1866, but did not back down. Furthermore, the second engagement ended in a Choshu victory, considerably cutting away at shogunal authority.

The Joi Movement experienced a shift in its core purpose from expelling foreigners to overthrowing the shogunate (Beasley 1955, 1972). As symbolized in "Shinron" (New Theses 1825) by Aizawa Seishisai, the Joi concept actually started forming several decades before Japan opened the ports, when Russian and British ships started entering waters close to Japan. It was not merely an emotional sense of abhorrence towards foreigners, but also cultivated the aspiration towards a unified nation with the emperor at its summit (Totman 1980; Watanabe 2012).

3.3 *Political Change and Civil Conflicts*

Some daimyo deployed the *Kobu Gattai* (Cooperation of the Imperial Court and the Shogunate) movement in an attempt to allow the emperor and the shogun to coexist. However, the shogunate was not able to employ this movement effectively. The proponents of this movement were powerful daimyo with relatively large domains, including Satsuma (current Kagoshima Prefecture), Echizen (current Fukui Prefecture), and Tosa (current Kochi Prefecture). The shogunate distanced these kinds of powerful daimyo and excluded them from governance decisions. Thus, the *Kobu Gattai* movement included within it a feeling of opposition to unilateral action by the shogunate and a desire for the shogunate to listen to opinions more broadly than before when making governing decisions. The shogunate repeated the betrayal of using the *Kobu Gattai* proponents to slap down the *Joi Movement* and then distancing those proponents from governance decisions afterwards. Satsuma was outraged and began coming to terms with Choshu and allying with them in an attempt to overthrow the shogunate. In fact, one factor contributing to Choshu victory in battle against the shogunate was its ability to purchase rifles from the United Kingdom through the mediation of Satsuma.

The shogunate realized that it could not successfully respond to the threat of the West under its old system. Similar to Choshu and Satsuma, the shogunate underwent reform centered around the modernization of its military. However, it was still hampered by the many constraints of its old framework and was unable to be fully successful in this endeavor (Hoya 2020). When the American Civil War ended in 1865, the supply of raw cotton rose to an excess, and a global depression occurred. For more than two decades afterwards, import excess was the norm for Japanese trade. For a shogunate on the edge of survival, this was immensely unfortunate timing (Metzler 2020).

Considering the above, it is clear that a wide political spectrum shared the future vision of discarding an inefficient framework and striving to unify the nation. The major point of contention was whether the leader of this unified nation should be switched to the emperor (which would actually mean power being held by Satsuma and Choshu) or if authority should remain in the hands of the Tokugawa shogunate. On January 3, 1868, the Imperial Court under the guidance of Satsuma issued the declaration of Restoration of Imperial Rule. Subsequently, armed clashes of a scale that was not immensely large broke out in the Kyoto area. When the tide turned against the shogunate, Shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu decided to abstain from fighting. Afterwards, a civil strife called the *Boshin War* continued until spring of the following year, but the death count did not even reach ten thousand. The two sides shared a common larger vision but quarreled over politics, and when victory and defeat became apparent, a major civil war was avoided (Mitani 2017).

Thus, the situation was resolved without necessitating the intervention of foreign powers. Some in the shogunate wanted to put down the rebellious domestic forces using force borrowed from the great European powers (particularly France), but this desire did not spread to the mainstream (Ishii 1966).

3.4 *Meiji Reform*

Subsequently, the core of the Meiji government became skilled low-ranking warriors. As mentioned earlier, low-ranking warriors were the victims of the Edo class system. When they attained governing power, they sought to actualize free career choice (Watanabe 2012). There were repeated instances of enacting measures in which they themselves renounced the special privileges of the warrior class and dissolved the class system. Daimyo authority ended in the 1871 abolition of the clan System, and the exclusive role of the warrior as a soldier as well as the cause of revenue was eliminated through the conscription system introduced in 1873. A major portion of the Meiji reform and its success can be explained by the high education standards achieved in the Edo period and a belief in meritocracy brought about by repentance over the Edo period.

Of course, the number of low-ranking warriors who gained political power was very small, and the majority hailed from Satsuma or Choshu. The new government was an oligarchy called the *Hambatsu* (domain clique) government. Some individuals foreclosed from government sought to reclaim the special privileges of samurai and sparked insurgencies with no possible chance of success. However, most supported the Freedom and People's Rights Movement and sought even further equalization. Therein, they were successful in obtaining support and participation from affluent farmers and became an unignorable source of pressure for establishing a national assembly. Two parties developed: the Rikken Kaishinto Party (Constitutional Progressive Party) and the Jiyuto Party (Liberal Party).

The Hambatsu government was unable to ignore this, and in 1889 the Constitution of the Empire of Japan was publicly proclaimed by Hambatsu leading member Ito Hirobumi and his colleagues. The following year, the national Diet was established. Initially strenuous conflicts unfurled repeatedly between the government and the majority of the House of Representatives, the Liberal Party and Progressive Party, but gradually cooperation aiming for the stable operation of a constitutional system was more and more prevalent.

3.5 *Special Privileges for Foreigners*

The effect aspirations towards a unified nation had in the foreign policy domain was in the problem of treaty revisions.

Through the Treaties of Amity and Commerce, Japan had adopted a conventional tariff system. This meant that Japan could not impose tariffs higher than those established in treaties. Japan also allowed consular jurisdiction. This meant that if an individual belonging to a treaty power was accused of a crime or litigated in a dispute, the consul for that treaty power would conduct a trial following the laws of that nation. For example, if a British citizen was accused of a crime in Yokohama,

the United Kingdom consul in Yokohama would conduct the trial following British law.

Furthermore, Japan entered into a Friendship and Trade Treaty with the Qing Dynasty in 1871, and both countries accepted a mutual conventional tariff system and consular jurisdiction. Japan also entered into a Treaty of Amity with Korea in 1876. In this treaty, Japan achieved consular jurisdiction in Korea. Initially the agreement was mutually tariff-free, but later both parties consented to conventional tariffs.

As for the question of just how much these sorts of restrictions on sovereignty caused harm to Japan, that is a subject that requires careful consideration. Reportedly, consular trials were surprisingly fair to Japanese people (Chang 1984). And though foreigners enjoyed special privileges at open ports, because foreign residence and activity was mainly limited to those ports, there were restrictions to both the expansion of foreign trade and the percolation of foreign capital (Hoare 1994). Moreover, though treaties prohibited the closure of open ports in Japan, they did not prohibit opening new ports. Thus, Japan independently opened special trading ports. There were less restrictions on sovereignty from treaties at these ports, and Japanese merchants delved into international trade from a more advantageous footing (Phipps 2015).

However, as Meiji Japan strove to become a unified nation in the Western style, it was only natural that foreigners with special privileges would become an eyesore. The abolishment of consular trials as a means to restoring jurisdiction and the recovery of tariff autonomy as a means to recovering taxation authority were frequently demanded from Japanese government negotiation policy.

But both consular jurisdiction and conventional tariffs were bedrock provisions of the treaties, and Japan also understood that the West would not easily consent to revising them. Therein, until entering the 1880s, what the Japanese government actually pursued consistently was the restoration of administrative power (Iokibe 2010, 2012).

But what exactly did they mean by the return of administrative power? Consular jurisdiction in Japan was only invoked in cases occurring between individuals. Put in other words, there was no clear wording in treaties regarding the placement of trial jurisdiction for cases in which a foreigner had violated legal regulations that codify the relationship between the government and the individual or maintain societal order (frequently called “administrative regulations” at the time). Moreover, for administrative regulations to be applied in consular courts, treaties were handled such that permission must be obtained in advance from the foreign country. Without that permission, there was no guarantee that the administrative regulations of Japan would be observed uniformly by everyone, Japanese and foreigner alike. Revising this method of legal action in new treaties is what was meant by returning administrative power.

To actualize national unification, dexterous and powerful administration force was required. Moreover, because financial resources and competency for public works and public benefits programs were limited in the nineteenth century, regulatory administration was highly important. In order to cultivate healthy, competent,

and cooperative citizens, protect and promote corporate activity and factory labor, and ensure tax revenue and military troops, the government issued, revised, and abolished decrees in an array of areas including hygiene and quarantining, speech and publishing, education, promotion of new industry, and taxation. Domestic criticism was intense against the unwieldiness of constant changes in the law, but this can also be seen as a period of trial-and-error that was unavoidable. Carrying through with these administrative regulations without engaging in prior consultation with foreign countries signified the final step in achieving national unification.

3.6 Negotiations with the West and China to Restore Administrative Authority

The West also had to mostly accept the validity of Japan's assertions. General exemption from administrative regulations was merely a method of applying treaties that was not spelled out within the treaties themselves, except several regulations specified. Japan was merely asserting the independent right to apply the treaties in a legitimate manner, not to reject them. As a result, the assertions of Japan were accommodated in a relatively smooth manner within the framework of Western international law. However, because the administration had a direct impact on the daily rights and environment of foreigners residing in Japan, the West argued unremittingly over terms.

Japan also attempted negotiations with the Qing Dynasty as well over restoring administrative authority. The content of the Trade Regulations attached to the Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty was slightly different from that in trade regulations attached to treaties with Western countries, and this complicated trade administration. Additionally, the Japanese saw the difficulty of clamping down on illicit trade and smoking of opium by the Chinese as a problem. Furthermore, even if treaty revision attempts with Western countries were hypothetically successful, the Japanese government feared that Western countries would take back their special privileges through most-favored-nation clauses if the Qing Dynasty retained special privileges.

When Japan forced through the Ryukyu Disposition in 1879, it petitioned for a revision of treaty terms in exchange for handing over Miyako Island and the Yaeyama Islands to the Qing Dynasty. In October of the following year, Japanese Minister Plenipotentiary to Qing, Shishido Tamaki, and the Qing central authority office Zongli Yamen reached an agreement, but opposition from Li Hongzhang caused Zongli Yamen to change its mind, and the following month it announced its decision to postpone affixing its seal to the agreement. The Japanese government displayed an intense backlash. However, the Qing Dynasty had actually been displaying discomfort from the start with the Japanese negotiation method of roping the Qing Dynasty into the Ryukyu problem while also forcing the Qing to keep pace with future agreements between the West and Japan.

3.7 *Jurisdiction Restoration Negotiations with the West and War with the Qing Dynasty*

Because the restoration of administrative authority was not advancing, from May through June in 1886 Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru consulted with the United Kingdom and Germany and switched the policy to an early actualization of abolishing consular jurisdiction altogether in return for Japan opening up its interior. If there were no more consular trials at all, the custom of consulting with foreign countries before enacting administrative regulations that was engendered by the expansive application of consular jurisdiction would also disappear. Also, the restoration of jurisdiction and the opening up of the interior signified the important accomplishment of dramatic treaty reform for Japan and for the West respectively.

For that purpose, a policy of Europeanization had to be accelerated. And this invited opposition from domestic Japanese society. This policy slightly influenced Japan's stance towards China. The West did not want to abolish its special privileges in China. In order for Japan to put the West at ease with trust that revising treaties with Japan would not lead to a necessity to revise treaties with China, Japan had to present itself as being civilized on a completely different level than the Qing Dynasty. Japan and Qing China had been competing over influence on Korea, but Ito Hirobumi, Inoue Kaoru, and their contemporaries did assent to the superiority of the Qing Dynasty in actual fact. (For details on the relationship between Japan and the Qing concerning Korea, see Chap. 5 "Japan's Expansion into Asia"). However, discourse criticizing the slowness of the Qing Dynasty's own inner-reform and emphasizing the progressiveness of Japan grew strong both inside and outside of the government.

In considering the restoration of jurisdiction from the West, the compendium of legal codes in Japan and the ability of judges were deemed as insufficient, so Japan promised the additional concessions of (1) consolidating the underdeveloped legal code and displaying this to the governments of each treaty power before proceeding with consular trial abolishment and (2) installing foreign lawyers in Japanese courts for legal action involving foreigners.

These terms sparked opposition from within the government, and in 1887 Inoue was forced to cut off negotiations and step down from the position of Foreign Minister. Up to that point, Japanese foreign diplomacy had been receiving hardline pressure domestically concerning policy towards Korea and the problem of treaty revisions (Iriye 1989). However, it was not until the 1887 treaty revision problem that government policy was forced so bluntly into a turnaround and the Foreign Minister forced into stepping down.

This was excellent timing for political parties. Japanese trade had been in import excess for a long period and specialty goods such as silkworm-egg paper and traditional crafts were just barely shoring up exporting. Moreover, in the mid-1880s Lord of the Treasury and Minister of Finance Matsukata Masayoshi forced through redemption for inconvertible paper currency, and as a result, the Japanese economy suffered a deep depression called "Matsukata Deflation." Political party organization

was also pummeled, and the Liberal Party was forced to officially disband. Dissatisfaction over the Europeanization policy symbolized by Inoue was in a highly volatile state.

Moreover, currency deflation increased competitiveness among Japanese commodities, and in the late 1880s an industrial revolution revolving around light industry products occurred. That is to say, exporting and the economy were actually expanding, and economic conditions advantageous for the expansion of political strength of the parties had arrived. In particular, the old Liberal Party regained power by criticizing the blunders of Inoue.

The Progressive Party leader Okuma Shigenobu came back into power as the Foreign Minister and reopened treaty revision negotiations. However, because the abolishment of consular jurisdiction and installation of foreign lawyers in Japanese courts previously negotiated remained in Okuma's subsequent negotiations, albeit in a diminished form, he was criticized by the Liberal Party and the conservative wing both inside and outside of the government. In 1889, Okuma was severely injured in terrorist action, and he stepped down from the Foreign Minister position. After the establishment of the national assembly in 1890, the Progressive Party began advocating a hardline stance in an interference effort against government treaty revision negotiation.

This sort of approach, when the government aspires towards accommodative and reasonable foreign diplomacy, resulted in a powerful pattern seen in Japanese political diplomacy where the opposition party mobilizes nationalist sentiment to thwart negotiations.

After the establishment of the Diet, the government switched to a policy prioritizing negotiations with the United Kingdom, with a focus on minimizing foreign role in legal proceedings. This was the highest possible hurdle for them to face but succeeding would surely mean a significant reduction of factors causing instability both domestically and internationally.

In 1894, under Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu in the second Ito cabinet, treaty revision negotiation between Japan and the United Kingdom was finally concluded. Other treaty powers also followed suit, and in 1899 the new treaties took effect, successfully restoring jurisdiction in return for opening up the interior of Japan. This was an important recovery of restricted sovereignty for the non-Western sphere from the West.

However, this did not bring peace to the non-Western sphere. The treaty relationship with the Qing Dynasty remained unchanged. In fact, instead of negotiations, the First Sino-Japanese War broke out at the end of July 1894, almost simultaneous to the conclusion of negotiations between Japan and the United Kingdom. Winning this conflict allowed Japan to acquire the same special treaty privileges in China that the West enjoyed and resolved the long-standing treaty problems between Japan and the Qing through military force. Simultaneously, Japan was able to expulse the influence of the Qing Dynasty from Korea, absorb Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, and begin its journey towards becoming an empire.

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Japan's Expansion into Asia



Yuichi Sasaki

1 East Asia Before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95

Before¹ the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, China was the dominant power in East Asia. Its overwhelming presence can be clearly seen just by looking at its vast territory and huge population. Moreover, there existed a regional order in East Asia with the Chinese dynasty at the apex and center, and until the eighteenth century, the international order of Europe and the East Asian order coexisted as separate entities.

From the mid-nineteenth century onward, with the Opium War and the Second Opium War (Arrow War), the Qing Dynasty was drawn into the international relations of the modern West as Western nations advanced into the region. However, the Qing Dynasty was still the dominant power in East Asia. This was true both in its own consciousness and in the eyes of Western nations.² The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 changed such status of the Qing and the regional order in East Asia.

¹ This chapter discusses Japan's imperial expansion, focusing on diplomacy, the center of government, and the military. Such an approach differs from recent scholarly trends that pay more attention to the periphery and local areas, and to social and cultural aspects. However, I do so intentionally. On this point, see Doyle (1986) and Sasaki (2017, 2022c). On the other hand, due to the framework of its argument, this chapter lacks a discussion of the economy and colonies. As a supplement to these points, see Myers and Peattie (1984), Beasley (1987), Peattie (1988), Duus et al. (1989, 1996), and Smitka (1998). See also Chap. 6 "Colonialism and War-torn Asia."

This chapter does not list Japanese-language references, except for my own works. For Japanese-language works, see Sasaki (2022b).

Referenced throughout this chapter are Kitaoka (2018), Saaler and Szpilman (2018), Hatano (2022), and Sasaki (2022b).

² For China and the East Asian order before the Sino-Japanese War, see Chap. 2 "The Prosperity of Asia," Sect. 2.1 "China," and Chap 4 "East Asia and Imperialism," Sect. 4.1 "State Transformation in China during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century." See also Okamoto (2022).

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In Japan, the Meiji Restoration led to the formation of a central government, the abolition of domains and the establishment of prefectures, and the delineation of territories. The Meiji government took over the treaties that the Edo shogunate had concluded with foreign countries and sought to revise them (see Chap. 4, Sect. 4.3, “Japanese Meiji Restoration and Modernization”). Japan proceeded to form a modern nation state and attempted to establish relations among nations based on modern Western principles.

Such efforts to form a modern nation state in Japan clashed with the East Asian order, especially China. For example, in the 1870s, the Meiji government incorporated the Ryukyu Kingdom as a Japanese territory, making it Okinawa Prefecture. Originally, during the Edo period, the Ryukyu Kingdom paid tribute to the Qing Dynasty while being ruled by the Satsuma clan, which was part of Japan. The Meiji government severed the relationship between the Ryukyu Kingdom and the Qing, abolished the Ryukyu Kingdom, and made the Ryukyu Islands a distinctly Japanese territory.

Japan also forced Korea to open its doors to the outside world and concluded the Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity (Treaty of Ganghwa Island) in 1876. In the first subsection of the treaty, Korea was positioned as an independent country with equal rights with Japan. The Qing Dynasty positioned Korea as a dependent state, while Japan claimed that Korea was an independent country in order to deny it. Such stances continued until the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95.

The Qing’s policy toward Korea became more powerful in the 1880s. This was an example of how the Qing, confronted with the advance of the Western countries and Japan, responded by strengthening its control over the periphery of its map and the surrounding countries and regions. In 1882, a military uprising broke out in Korea, including an attack on the Japanese legation in Korea (Imo Incident). In 1884, a coup d’état was staged by the radical liberalization faction within the Korean leadership and the Japanese legation in Korea (Gapsin Coup). In both cases, the Qing quickly suppressed the rebellion and coup militarily. The Qing also took the lead in facilitating the conclusion of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Korea and the West. The relationship between the Qing and Korea was based on the traditional relationship of suzerainty and vassalage, but with a strong control that had not been exercised in the past. The Qing tried to make the Western countries accept such a relationship between the Qing and Korea.

Following the Gapsin Coup, Japan and China concluded the Convention of Tientsin in 1885 and withdrew their troops from Korea. The treaty also stipulated that they would notify the other side in advance if there was a disturbance in Korea in the future and they sent troops to Korea. Although Korea did not welcome the Qing’s growing influence over Korea and sometimes made attempts to approach Russia, it did not intend to deny its position as a dependent state of the Qing. Also, Western countries did not seek to expand into Korea at huge cost. The countries concerned recognized the dominant position of the Qing in Korea and acted on that basis.³

³ For the relationship between Western countries and East Asia up to the time of the Sino-Japanese War, see Sasaki (1984) and Okamoto (2022).

Japan, too, had avoided confrontation with the Qing since the Gapsin Coup and had in effect tacitly accepted the Qing's dominance in Korea. However, it did not want the Qing's influence to be decisively strengthened in Korea. In addition, Japan did not change its policy of treating Korea as an independent country. Japan and China maintained peaceful relations for a while, leaving the seeds of a conflict over Korea untouched.

2 The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95⁴

In 1894, a popular uprising broke out in Korea and grew in scale from April to May. In early June, the Qing government decided to accept a request from Korea to deploy troops in order to suppress this uprising. At the same time, Japan also made preparations to deploy troops in the name of protecting the Japanese legation and Japanese people in Korea. At the time of the Imo Incident and the Gapsin Coup, the Qing had quelled the civil unrest in Korea and strengthened its influence. Japan wanted to avoid a similar turn of events again, and thought it was important to dispatch as many troops to Korea as quickly as possible without falling behind the Qing.

However, the rebellion had already begun to subside when some of Japan's troops arrived in Korea. But Japan could not accept the withdrawal of its troops at this point. This is because the Qing had dispatched its troops at the request of Korea, and the Japanese troops were deployed for the reason of protecting the Japanese legation and Japanese people in Korea. As such, if both the Qing and Japanese troops were withdrawn without any particular action, only the record of the Qing's dispatch to Korea in the name of protecting the country would remain.

Japan proposed to the Qing that they should jointly reform the internal affairs of Korea while keeping their troops in the country. However, the Qing, which regarded Korea as a dependent state and held a dominant position in the country, would not agree to this. Korea also refused to accept Japan's demand for internal political reform and repeatedly asked Japan to withdraw its troops. The reform of internal affairs means the development and improvement of various systems such as politics, law, military affairs, finance, police, and transportation. In this case, it was meant to weaken Korea's relationship with the Qing by taking measures to strengthen Korea.

At the request of the Qing, Russia and Britain mediated, and there were times when it seemed that a military conflict between Japan and the Qing could be avoided. However, in the end it was difficult to create a solution that would satisfy both Japan and the Qing. Japan and the Qing were at odds on the fundamental question of whether Korea was a dependent state of the Qing or an independent state, and for the reasons mentioned above, Japan could not withdraw its troops without any positive outcome on its part.

⁴ For Japan's foreign policy during and around the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, see Sasaki (2017, 2022a). See also Paine (2003) and Zachmann (2005).

Diplomatic negotiations between Japan and the Qing failed to reach an agreement, and the Sino-Japanese War began in late July. By September, Japan had gained the upper hand and was dominating the war, and the Japanese forces continued to win each battle thereafter. Japan's military was small until the 1870s, but from the 1880s, it began to expand its armaments in order to compete with the might of the Qing. The Qing, on the other hand, had problems in terms of military training and discipline, and did not have a system for waging war as a whole nation. Japan wiped out the Qing forces in Korea, secured control of the seas, captured the Liaodong Peninsula, Weihaiwei, and the Liaohai Plain, and then prepared for the final battle near Beijing.

In April 1895, Japan and the Qing Dynasty signed a peace treaty (Treaty of Shimonoseki). In this treaty, the Qing recognized Korea as a fully independent country, and the pre-modern order in East Asia, centered on Chinese dynasties, collapsed. The treaty also provided for the cession of the Liaodong Peninsula, Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, the payment of 200 million ryo in reparations, and the conclusion of a treaty of commerce and navigation between Japan and China based on similar treaties that the Qing had signed with European countries. With regard to the Liaodong Peninsula, as a result of the Triple Intervention initiated by Russia, France, and Germany, Japan promised the three countries that it would renounce its claim on this area. In November, the Convention of Retrocession of the Liaodong Peninsula was concluded between Japan and the Qing, under which Japan would return the Liaodong Peninsula to the Qing and the Qing would pay Japan 30 million ryo. The total amount of reparations and additional compensation was more than four times the annual national budget of Japan before the Sino-Japanese War.

In Korea, just before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Japanese troops surrounded and occupied Korea's royal palace, inaugurated a new government, and severed ties with the Qing. Japan then adopted a policy of supporting the independence of Korea and promoted the reform of its internal affairs. In some respects, the policy was carried out with the recognition of its necessity within the Korean leadership. However, Japan also hoped that the reform process would strengthen ties between Japan and Korea through the hiring of advisors, loans, and introduction of technology, and expand Japanese influence and interests in Korea.

But the idea of domestic policy reform, in which Korea relied on Japan to promote its modernization policy, was impossible to begin with. Generally speaking, reforms are invariably met with opposition. Moreover, Japan had sent troops to Korea to fight against the Qing and supported or forced the reform of Korea through military power. It was only natural that there would be a backlash in Korea against Japan and domestic reforms. Once again, a large-scale popular uprising broke out, which was suppressed by the Japanese and Korean armies. In addition, Japan had not been able to establish a stable partnership with the king and government of Korea.

After the Triple Intervention, there was a tendency in Korea to rely on Russia instead of Japan. The Japanese side believed that Queen Min was taking the lead in promoting a pro-Russian and anti-Japanese policy, and in October 1895, Queen Min was assassinated with the involvement of the Japanese Minister to Korea. Japanese involvement was exposed from the beginning, partly due to a miscalculation, and the Japanese government declared to the rest of the world a policy of non-interference by

Japan in Korea. The political situation in Korea continued to be unstable, and finally, in February 1896, King Gojong of Korea sought refuge in the Russian legation, and the growth of Russia's power in Korea and Japan's decline became conclusive. The Japanese government made an agreement with Russia to stabilize the situation in Korea and refrained from involvement in Korea.

3 East Asia After the Sino-Japanese War⁵

After the Sino-Japanese War, the East Asian world changed dramatically. As a result of the peace treaty, Japan acquired Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, which became the starting point for Japan's subsequent expansion. In addition, Japan received significant reparations, most of which was invested in its military expansion. In the Sino-Japanese War, while the Qing did not have a powerful modern army and nor did it fight with all its strength as a nation, Japan fought with almost all its forces. Then came the Triple Intervention, and Japanese leaders feared that the Three Powers might use force if necessary and felt threatened by the inadequacy of Japan's defense. The Sino-Japanese War made Japan's leaders realize that its military was still inadequate. As a result of this military expansion, war with Russia later became a realistic option for foreign policy within the Japanese government.

On the other hand, the international reputation of the Qing declined. The Qing had often sought the intervention of the major powers in the war, and in fact, it was able to regain the Liaodong Peninsula through the intervention of the Three Powers. It also needed to raise funds from European countries to pay reparations to Japan. As a result, it was subject to further incursions by European powers. The Qing Dynasty fell from its position as a great power in the East, and China became a major focus of international politics as an arena or an object. The catalyst for this was the Sino-Japanese War.

In November 1897, Germany occupied Jiaozhou Bay on the pretext of the murder of a German missionary in China, and after negotiations, signed a treaty with the Qing in March 1898 to lease Jiaozhou Bay for 99 years. In March of the same year, Russia signed a treaty with the Qing to lease Port Arthur and Talien. The term was 25 years. Britain, France, and Japan joined in the movement. This was the so-called partition of China. It did not mean that the territory of China was really divided, but that European powers and Japan attempted to expand into China in various ways, such as through leasing, acquisition of various interests, and demands for non-cession of territory to other countries.

In Korea, the king returned to the royal palace in February 1897, the Korean Empire was established in October, and opposition to Russia became apparent. At the same time, Russia was in the process of acquiring Port Arthur and Talien as part of the partition of China, and Russia's interest in these areas was becoming

⁵ For this section, see Sasaki (2017, 2022c). See also Malozemoff (1958), Duus (1995), and Otte (2007).

more focused, and Japan wanted to expand its influence in Korea if the opportunity arose while avoiding confrontation with Russia. In April 1898, the Nishi-Rosen Agreement was signed, in which Japan and Russia confirmed Korea's sovereignty and independence, and Russia recognized Japan's large commercial and industrial interests in Korea. Although Russia did not completely lose interest in the Korean Peninsula, and potential conflicts existed between Japan and Russia, the two countries created a lull by dividing their interests, with Russia going to Manchuria and Japan going to Korea.

4 The Russo-Japanese War⁶

The balance between Japan and Russia was shattered by the Boxer Rebellion. As opposition to increasing foreign intervention grew in China, the Boxer Rebellion broke out between 1899 and 1900. The Qing government took advantage of this development, and war between China and the European powers and Japan ensued. The war itself was won quickly by the Allied forces, with Japan and Russia, situated in close geographical proximity to China, dispatching large numbers of troops. However, in the midst of the war, Russia occupied Manchuria and did not withdraw from the region.

Japan signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in January 1902 to put pressure on Russia. Although elder statesman Itō Hirobumi was concerned about taking a hardline stance against Russia, Katsura Tarō, who became Prime Minister in June 1901, Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, and Yamagata Aritomo, who, like Itō, was also an elder statesman, thought that forming an alliance with Britain would be a powerful means to put diplomatic pressure on Russia. And within the Japanese government, the logic that Russia's occupation of Manchuria would be a serious threat to Korean independence and thus to Japan began to take root. The British were also trying to change their policy of isolation, and their evaluation of Japan and Japanese military power led them to form an alliance with Japan.

In April 1902, Russia concluded an agreement with China concerning Manchuria, and agreed to withdraw its troops in stages. The first withdrawal took place in October, but the second withdrawal, scheduled for April 1903, did not happen. In June, the Japanese government decided to go into negotiations with Russia.

From that point on, negotiations between Japan and Russia continued for some time. The negotiations, however, were structurally difficult to conclude. Prior to the Boxer Rebellion, there were some conflicts between Japan and Russia in Korea, but the two countries were basically divided in terms of where they sought to expand: Russia in Manchuria and Japan in Korea. However, with Russia's military occupation of Manchuria, such a balancing act between Japan and Russia became untenable. This

⁶ For this section and the Russo-Japanese War, see Okamoto (1970), Wolff (1999), Steinberg et al. (2005), Chapman and Inaba (2007), Kowner (2007a, 2007b), Wolff et al. (2007), Ericson and Hockley (2008), Sasaki (2017, 2022c), and Streltsov and Shimotomai (2019).

was because there was a huge difference between Russia's position in Manchuria and Japan's position in Korea. From Russia's perspective, there was no need to negotiate with Japan over Manchuria. On the other hand, negotiating with Russia over Korea only would have weakened Japan's negotiating position compared to a scenario in which both Manchuria and Korea were the focal points, and Japan would not have been able to reach a satisfactory deal.

Furthermore, as already mentioned, Japan had expanded its military after the Sino-Japanese War, and war with Russia had become a realistic option in terms of foreign policy. And if the war was postponed, the military balance concerning the Far East between Japan and Russia would become more favorable to Russia. Prime Minister Katsura and Foreign Minister Komura made up their minds to initiate the war at an early stage, the idea was then finalized among the Japanese leadership, and the Russo-Japanese War began in February 1904.

The main battlefield was Manchuria, where several large-scale battles were fought. A fierce battle was also fought at Port Arthur. There were many casualties on both sides, and it was not a unilateral victory for Japan. But Japan pushed back the Russian army in each battle on the Manchurian Plain and advanced. It also captured Port Arthur. The Battle of Tsushima in May 1905 was a complete victory for Japan. The Japanese government asked the U.S. to mediate for peace, and peace negotiations were held in the United States.

The Russo-Japanese War was an all-out conflict between military powers with modern land and naval forces. With elements of total war and indirectly involving countries and regions around the world, it is sometimes referred to as World War Zero. Based on the provisions of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Britain would remain neutral as long as Japan was fighting against Russia alone, and if other countries took Russia's side and entered the war, Britain would also enter the war. Therefore, Britain remained neutral, but checked other powers to prevent them from joining Russia and provided support to Japan. The U.S. also showed a favorable attitude toward Japan.

In September 1905, Japan and Russia signed a peace treaty (Treaty of Portsmouth), in which Russia ceded to Japan, with the consent of China, the lease of Port Arthur and Talien, the railway between Changchun and Port Arthur, and related concessions. South Sakhalin was also ceded. Russia also recognized Japan's dominant position in Korea.

5 Japanese Annexation of Korea⁷

The Russo-Japanese War determined the fate of Korea. Even before the Russo-Japanese War, Japan and Russia were trying to make inroads into Korea, and there were various moves regarding the acquisition of concessions, purchase of land, territorial lease and loan, but the situation was not such that Korea's status as an independent nation was under threat. However, through the Russo-Japanese War, Korea was quickly brought under Japanese control.

Shortly after the Russo-Japanese War began in February 1904, Japan signed the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1904. This treaty provided for the stable use of the Korean Peninsula by Japan in the war effort against Russia and also placed Korea under Japanese protection. Yet, the content of the treaty was largely abstract, such as that Korea would accept the advice of the Japanese government on improving its administration and that the Japanese government would guarantee Korea's independence.

Therefore, the Japanese government attempted to conclude further arrangements with Korea. In particular, the Japanese focused on seizing control of Korea's diplomatic rights and cutting off the possibility of Korea's becoming associated with any other country besides Japan. In August 1904, the first Japan-Korea Agreement was signed, under which Korea was to engage financial supervisors and diplomatic advisors recommended by the Japanese government and consult with Japanese representatives in advance regarding the handling of foreign relations. In November 1905, after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, the second Japan-Korea Agreement was signed under Japanese military coercion, under which the Japanese government was to supervise and direct Korea's diplomatic relations and appoint representative superintendents in Korea.

The second Japan-Korea Agreement itself related to Korea's diplomatic rights, which at that stage differed from the post-1907 system in which Japan took control of Korea's internal affairs. However, it determined that Korea was to be placed under the exclusive protection and control of Japan. The powers had already recognized Japan's dominant position in Korea in the Taft-Katsura Agreement (July 1905) with the United States, the second Anglo-Japanese Alliance (August 1905) with Britain, and the Treaty of Portsmouth (September 1905) with Russia.

Up to this point, there had been no disagreement among Japanese leaders about policy toward Korea. Japanese leaders were unanimous in their recognition of the need to maintain control of Korea's diplomatic rights in order to keep the Korean Peninsula safe for Japan. In addition, "protection" was a multifaceted concept. It was often, in effect, domination or deprivation of state functions, but it also had implications such as support for independence. Supporting the independence of Korea, for example, was something that Itō Hirobumi had advocated since before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95.

In his own subjective view, Itō, who became the first Resident-General of Korea, tried to use his own experience of modern nation-building as a leader in Japan to

⁷ For the annexation of Korea, see Conroy (1960), Duus (1995), and Dudden (2005).

improve the administration in Korea and support Korea's independence. However, the same problem arose as with the domestic policy reform and modernization measures initiated during the Sino-Japanese War. In other words, reforms are generally met with resistance, and in addition, there was a great deal of opposition to Japan's military coercion of Korea. Also, a stable alliance between the Japanese government and the Korean leadership had not been established. In 1907, during the Universal Peace Congress in The Hague, the Emperor of Korea sent an envoy to complain about the injustice of Japan's domination of Korea, which led to the conclusion of the third Japan-Korea Agreement and the strengthening of Japan's control over Korea in domestic affairs. Even after this, Japan did not achieve control of Korean minds, and the resistance movement was on the rise, leading Itō to approve the annexation of Korea.

Katsura Tarō, who stepped down as Prime Minister after the Russo-Japanese War and became Prime Minister again in 1908, Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, and Yamagata Aritomo believed that Japan should tighten its control over Korea as much as possible in order to make the Korean Peninsula safe for Japan. If control was strengthened based on such thinking, the end result was annexation. After negotiating with Russia and Britain, Japan annexed Korea in August 1910.

6 Japanese Diplomacy in the Age of Imperialism and Foreign Expansion⁸

In December 1905, after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, a treaty was signed between Japan and the Qing regarding Manchuria, in which the Qing recognized Japan's inheritance of Russia's interests in South Manchuria. At the same time, Japan also demanded various concessions in South Manchuria. As a result, some of these were accepted by the Qing, but there were many areas where the conclusions remained unclear and were left to subsequent interpretation and power relations. Japan tried to secure and expand its interests to the maximum extent possible in the face of this ambiguous situation. In 1909, for example, it signed an agreement with the Qing on Manchuria and Gando, which collectively settled several issues concerning Manchuria and the border between China and Korea.

Japan also signed the first Russo-Japanese Agreement (1907) and the second Russo-Japanese Agreement (1910), dividing the sphere of influence into North Manchuria for Russia and South Manchuria for Japan. When the Xinhai Revolution broke out in China in 1911, Japan and Russia signed the third Russo-Japanese Agreement in 1912, extending the existing demarcation line westward and dividing Inner Mongolia as well. Japan's sphere of influence included South Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia.

⁸ For this section, see Iriye (1972), Hunt (1973), Brooks (2000), Murashima (2000), Steeds (2000), O'Brien (2004), Woodhouse (2004), Asada (2010), and Sasaki (2017, 2022b, 2022c).

After the Russo-Japanese War, Russia abandoned its expansion into South Manchuria and the Korean peninsula, and Japan and Russia established a partnership. Anglo-Russian relations also improved, and cooperative relationships were established among Britain, Russia, France, and Japan. On the other hand, conflicts began to arise between Japan and the U.S. over such issues as the opening of Manchuria, although these were not necessarily persistent and serious problems at first.

Japan's territory and influence continuously expanded, starting with the acquisition of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands through the Treaty of Shimonoseki, followed by the acquisition of South Sakhalin and concessions in South Manchuria through the Russo-Japanese War, and the annexation of Korea. This external expansion included not only territorial expansion and the acquisition of colonies, as one might intuitively think, but also the acquisition of rights and interests and the establishment of a sphere of influence, especially in China. There were various patterns of spheres of influence, such as having significant interests, mutual recognition among the powers, or forcing China to recognize non-cession of territory to other countries, and the reality and the degree of subordination differed. For example, although the first and second Russo-Japanese Agreements both used the same line as the boundary of the sphere of influence, the first agreement stated that the two countries would not interfere with each other, while the second agreement allowed the two countries to take necessary measures to protect their interests in the area, which strengthened the nature of the sphere of influence.

The major factor that created such diversity in sovereignty and territory was the mutual checks and balances among powers. Politically, diplomatically, and militarily speaking, imperialism was characterized by foreign expansion and domination and colonization by different ethnic groups, in which military power was used directly or indirectly. However, in the foreign policy of the imperialist era, there was a horizontal relationship between powers, as well as a vertical relationship between the dominator and the dominated, the invader and the invaded. For example, as China was the focus of interest for the powers, countries could not take irregular and extreme actions there. Sending troops to China and occupying an area without any pretext was not acceptable to the other powers, even if China's opposition could be suppressed militarily. While checking with each other, the powers secured their sphere of influence in a way that was recognized by the other powers.

Japan, as one of the major powers, was aware of the norms of such horizontal imperialist diplomacy and had ideas such as equalizing mutual interests in diplomacy and preparing arguments and justifications when asserting something. However, the Japanese government focused on justifiability among great powers, not on the notion of justice. It was neither fair nor just for the oppressed to see the powers "fairly" gain rights and expand their sphere of influence.

7 The Xinhai Revolution and the First World War⁹

From October 1911, China found itself in a state of upheaval. The Xinhai Revolution occurred, the Qing Dynasty fell, and the government of Yuan Shikai was established. However, there were rebellions and conflicts among the various forces in China, and Yuan died in 1916.

In Europe, the First World War began in July 1914, and Japan entered the war in August on the grounds of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, occupying the Shandong region of China, where Germany held the Jiaozhou Bay lease, and the German-held South Sea Islands. The Japanese Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki, who led Japan's entry into the war, attempted to strengthen Japan's interests in Manchuria by capturing the Shandong region and using its return to China as a bargaining chip.

The Japanese government regarded South Manchuria as an area that had been gained at great cost in the Russo-Japanese War; it was certainly within Japan's sphere of influence, and the Japanese government had no intention of giving it up. However, the Russo-Japanese Agreement was only an agreement between Japan and Russia, and Japan did not have firm interests in Manchuria based on an agreement with China. In addition, there was a time limit for the South Manchuria Railway and the lease, with the lease expiring in 1923. The Russian concession was granted in 1898, when the term was set at 25 years, and Japan inherited the concession. Although there was the idea that the term could be extended semi-automatically, the deadline was approaching. Then the First World War broke out, and Katō wanted to use the opportunity to strengthen Japan's interests in Manchuria.

Japan presented China with the so-called Twenty-One Demands, and in May 1915, finally concluded a treaty with China on Shandong Province and a treaty on South Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia. Japan obtained the right to dispose of German interests in Shandong and promised to return the Jiaozhou Bay lease on conditional terms, and the time limit for the leases of Port Arthur and Talien and relating to the South Manchuria Railway were extended to 99 years. However, the negotiations were difficult, and due in part to Japan's military pressure on China, the Twenty-One Demands was condemned by China and the U.S. until later years and was positioned as a symbol of Japan's unwarranted expansion into China.

The First World War was unexpectedly large in scale and unexpectedly prolonged. As a result, a power vacuum was created in East Asia. In other words, the powers were originally advancing on China while keeping each other in check. However, the European countries were putting all of their energies into fighting the war, and thus their attention and capabilities toward China declined. Therefore, Japan found itself in a position where it could take independent actions in China if it wanted to. In addition, China was in a state of turmoil, and there were many groups within Japan that wanted to take advantage of this and implement radical measures for foreign

⁹ For Japan's foreign policy from the period of the First World War to the Paris Peace Conference, see Fifield (1965), Lowe (1969), Dickinson (1999), Kawamura (2000), MacMillan (2001), Elleman (2002), Berton (2011), Minohara et al. (2014), Fratolillo and Best (2015), and Minohara and Dawley (2020).

expansion. The Japanese government did not necessarily adopt such measures, but the pressure and temptation were always there.

Against this backdrop, for example, in 1916, the Japanese Cabinet decided on a policy of encouraging the dissolution of the Yuan Shikai regime in China. Also, in 1918, it provided large loans to the Duan Qirui regime in China. Such large loans tended to lead to the subordination of the regime itself or to the acquisition of significant rights and interests. Furthermore, in the Siberian Intervention conducted with a request from Britain and France, Japan deployed far more troops to North Manchuria and Siberia than it had agreed to with the United States.

Japan ceased such policies of foreign expansion with the end of the First World War. The Hara Takashi Cabinet, formed in September 1918, attempted to change its course from the irregular foreign policy during the First World War to a diplomacy based on cooperation among major powers as before.

8 Paris Peace Conference

The armistice of the First World War was signed in November 1918, the Paris Peace Conference began in January 1919, and the Treaty of Versailles was signed in June of that year. At the Paris Peace Conference, Japan gained the South Sea Islands. Japan, which had entered the First World War and occupied the German-held islands in the Pacific, wanted to take possession of the islands north of the equator and had gained support from Britain and France during the war. In the end, the South Sea Islands were put under mandate of Japan, which was not exactly the same as possession, but it was almost the same result. This was a traditional form of imperialist diplomacy, where promises and agreements between the major powers were valued.

On the other hand, there were conflicts over Japan's inheritance of Germany's interests in Shandong. Japan wanted to take over the rights and interests in Shandong, but China demanded that Germany return them directly to China. Japan argued that it had been agreed between Japan and China that Japan would inherit the Shandong rights and interests and then return them to China later, and that China had also received an advance payment on this basis. In response, China argued that it was coerced by Japan into accepting the Twenty-One Demands and the subsequent treaties. Japan argued for its legitimacy based on the existence of agreements and treaties, while China argued from the perspective that it is not right for a great power to impose a disadvantageous arrangement on the oppressed side against a background of military coercion.

On this issue, U.S. President Wilson was critical of Japan's policies toward China and was sympathetic of China. However, Japan, a major victor along with U.S., Britain, and France, insisted on inheriting the rights and interests of Shandong in a hardline manner, so Wilson had no choice but to accept Japan's demands. And in the end, a settlement was reached by clarifying the details of the rights and interests that Japan intended to acquire. The Treaty of Versailles provided for the succession of Japan's interests in Shandong, and China did not sign the treaty.

9 The Changing International Order and Japanese Diplomacy¹⁰

As can be seen in developments which took place surrounding the Paris Peace Conference described above, the international order was transformed after the First World War, a war of unprecedented magnitude. There was a global shift in thought and norms. Criticism of military action, imperialism, and foreign expansion increased. Peace and disarmament were demanded, and a trend toward the outlawry of war was born. The idea of national self-determination was advocated. Alliances between major powers and secret diplomacy came to be viewed negatively. The League of Nations (in which Japan became a permanent member) was established, thereby putting in place a mechanism to maintain peace and stability through a permanent international organization.

Needless to say, the real situation did not shift in direct alignment with the sudden change in ideas and norms. Fundamentally, in international relations, it was easier for a major power to assert demands than a minor one. The powers did not line up one after another to give up their colonies and interests. In addition, the League of Nations was weak in its ability to discipline world affairs.

However, the change in thought and norms affected the behavior of each country, region, and group, including the great powers. Even if the powers did not give up their colonies and interests immediately, they had to manage their diplomacy with a sense of criticism for imperialism. They were more cautious than ever about expansionist policies and military actions. Disarmament treaties were enacted, albeit in stages.

In addition to changes in ideas and norms, the power structure of the major powers also changed. As far as East Asia is concerned, first, the United States rose to prominence. In the First World War, the U.S. entered the war on the side of the Allies, including Britain and France, and the Allies were able to win the war. By helping determine victory for the Allies, the U.S. gained a greater voice in international society. Furthermore, while Europe had been devastated by the war, the United States was in no such situation. Also, the United States was influential in terms of morality, as President Wilson announced the Fourteen Points, the principles of the postwar order. From the final stages of the First World War to the ensuing postwar period, the U.S. became the world's major power in all aspects, including politics, diplomacy, military, economics, and norms. The changes in thought and norms after the First World War were closely tied to the rise of the United States.

Second, the Russian Empire collapsed as a result of the Russian Revolution. It was a little later that the Soviet Union was established as a state and increased its presence, but in terms of ideology and movements, socialism and communism began to have an impact in the surrounding regions and the world immediately after the

¹⁰ For the international order and Japanese diplomacy after the First World War, see Iriye (1965), Silberman and Harootunian (1974), Dingman (1976), Waldron (1992), Goldstein and Maurer (1994), Goto-Shibata (1995, 2020), Akami (2002), Asada (2006), Manela (2007), Burkman (2008), Gorman (2012), Shinohara (2012), Dickinson (2013), and Hattori (2021).

First World War. Also, as mentioned later, the collapse of the Russian Empire had great significance in China.

Third, China's role in international society shifted. China entered the First World War on the side of the Allies, became a victorious nation, and joined the League of Nations. The growing criticism of imperialism in the world and the weakening of the system of cooperation among the powers surrounding China also contributed to the strengthening of China's autonomy.

The above changes in the international order after the First World War also had a major impact on Japanese diplomacy. The Hara Cabinet, which was formed just before the end of the First World War, was trying to abandon aggressive foreign expansion measures that had been developed during the First World War and return to traditional Japanese diplomacy. In other words, it was a return to standard imperialist diplomacy in which Japan's power and interests were to be developed to the extent that they were recognized by the major powers.

In addition, challenges in coping with the new international order emerged. After the First World War, in the world, the general view of military action, imperialism, and foreign expansion became more critical. The United States, which had become a major world power, criticized Japan's policy toward China and was wary of Japan's tendency toward foreign expansion. Also, with the fall of the Russian Empire, Japan lost the partner with whom it had concluded a series of agreements regarding Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. And with the collapse of the Russian Empire and the defeat of Germany in the war, imperialist diplomacy over China became less viable. Aside from Russia and Germany, the other major powers involved in Chinese affairs were Britain, France, Japan, and the United States, but the United States was critical of imperialist diplomacy, in which the powers secured their interests and spheres of influence by checking and cooperating with each other.

In response, the Japanese government refrained from taking advantage of the unstable political situation in China, gradually pulled out its troops from Siberia and tried to compromise with the Chinese side on the Shandong issue. It also took a joint stance with the other major powers on such issues as the elimination of spheres of influence in China.

The Japanese government thus curbed its foreign expansion in many areas and narrowed its focus to a specific region. That region was Manchuria and Mongolia (*Manmō*), where it sought to protect its interests. Moreover, in the process, it strengthened its resolve and logic for securing *Manmō*. In other words, the positioning of *Manmō* as a sphere of influence based on mutual recognition among the powers was insufficient as a basis for justification under new international norms in which imperialist diplomacy came to be viewed critically. Therefore, it was argued that *Manmō* had a unique connection with Japan, and that *Manmō* interests were necessary for Japan's national defense and economic survival. This logic, strengthened by the need to explain the situation to the outside world, guided Japan's discourse and policy on *Manmō*.

10 The Possibility of Changing Course?

As we have seen above, the Japanese government adapted to the changes in the international order after the First World War. At the Washington Conference held in 1921–22, the treaty for the limitation of naval armament was signed between the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy. Japan demanded a 70% gross tonnage ratio of its main ships to the U.S., which ended up being 60%, but this was not seen as much of a problem within the Japanese government. Even if the ratio was 60% to the U.S., more importance was placed on establishing the treaty for the limitation of naval armament and avoiding a deepening confrontation with the U.S. Concerning China, the Nine-Power Treaty was concluded, which confirmed such principles as territorial integrity, open door policy, and equal opportunity. Japan's interests in Manchuria were not denied, and thus it was a treaty that Japan could agree to. In addition, taking advantage of the opportunity of the Washington Conference and with the mediation of Britain and the United States, Japan concluded an agreement with China, and the Shandong problem was thus settled. At the Washington Conference, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was abolished, but this was not a blow to Japanese diplomacy. For the U.S., the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was undesirable, and Japan did not intend to continue the alliance in the face of strong opposition from the U.S.

However, the Manchurian (Mukden) Incident broke out in 1931. Japan recognized Manchukuo in 1932 and gave notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933. The Sino-Japanese War began in 1937, the Second World War broke out in Europe in 1939, and Japan entered the Pacific War in 1941.¹¹ Japan had been at odds with the international community since 1931 and seemed to have continued on a straight path to war.

This view of the events that took place following the Manchurian Incident is not the mainstream in recent studies. Instead, there is a tendency to emphasize that a variety of potential scenarios were possible. The Manchurian Incident did not immediately and decisively bring Japan into conflict with international society. There was some time between Japan's notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations and its actual exit. Even after Japan withdrew from the League of Nations, Japan remained within the framework of international cooperation in various fields, and bilateral and multilateral diplomacy existed even if Japan was not a member of the League of Nations. In the case of the Manchurian Incident, the military action itself ceased at a certain stage. And as for the Sino-Japanese War, various efforts were made to resolve the situation.

However, the possibility of such a change in course seems to be an argument that can be made when the situation is viewed in a short-term and limited manner. Based on the historical background and the domestic and international situation of Japan in the 1930s and 1940s, the developments that followed the Manchurian Incident indeed occurred as a chain of events.

¹¹ For an overview from the Manchurian Incident to the Pacific War, see Iriye (1987), Nish (2002), Best (2011), Tsutsui (2016).

First of all, there was a huge gap between Japan's perception of Manchuria or *Manmō* and the reality. Through the build-up of historical events that had taken place since the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese government, military, and public opinion had established that Japan would never give up Manchuria and *Manmō*. However, Inner Mongolia and North Manchuria were of course not Japanese territory, and neither was South Manchuria. In the latter half of the 1920s, with the advance of the Northern Expedition in China and the rise of the Soviet Union, Japan's interests in Manchuria became unstable in relation to both China and the Soviet Union. As we will see later, the Manchurian Incident itself was initiated by a part of Japanese soldiers who were out of control, but fundamentally, a structure existed in which the Japanese side had a strong determination to defend Manchuria or *Manmō* but did not have sufficient grounds to back this. In China and Manchuria, the interests of the powers of the imperialist era remained, while on the other hand, nationalism and anti-imperialism were growing, and various incidents involving Japan occurred, and each time, hardline views were voiced in Japan.

Also, in the 1930s, the military emerged as a significant political force in Japan. After the Washington Conference, Japan was in an era of disarmament, and criticism of the military increased. However, in response to this, arguments were also developed that strongly emphasized the significance of the existence of the military and the importance of national defense and security. A fierce battle of words was waged over the military, with those on the side of condemnation and those on the side of advocacy. Public opinion, as represented by the leading newspapers, was mainly critical of the military in the 1920s, but after the Manchurian Incident, it quickly came to support the military's logic, advocating hardline foreign policy and encouraging military action. In the midst of this, criticism of the existing political system and ruling class led to frequent terrorist attacks, coups, and attempted coups involving military personnel throughout the 1930s, and the military's influence was not limited by these incidents, but rather increased. In addition, the Emperor was absolutized, and a tendency arose in which criticism and opposition were not tolerated if the Emperor's presence was invoked. This was also a factor that increased the power of the military, which was directly subordinate to the Emperor. The system under which the Cabinet, led by the Prime Minister, considered and decided on foreign policy, including the start and end of military operations, was shaken. Although the Meiji Constitution did not institutionally guarantee a parliamentary cabinet system or party cabinets, the political status of political parties had gradually improved, and party cabinets continued from the 1920s to the early 1930s. However, political strife among parties was fierce, and parties and parliamentarians did not unite to block the military's political advance. The people, too, were dissatisfied and distrustful of the political parties rather than the military, and they did not become more critical of the military.¹²

¹² For the domestic situation in Japan around the 1930s, see Berger (1977), Young (1998), Banno (2014), and Kitaoka (2020).

11 The Manchurian Incident¹³

In September 1931, the Japanese troops stationed in Manchuria (the Kwantung Army) blew up the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway and carried out military operations in the name of restoring public order (the Manchurian Incident). In addition, Japanese troops stationed in Korea joined them. They then overran the whole of Manchuria. Aside from the intrigues of the Kwantung Army, the actions of the Japanese Korean Army were also carried out at the sole discretion of the local troops. At the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the Japanese government initially adopted a policy of non-expansion. However, this was not achieved, and the situation was allowed to continue.

Japan claimed that the Manchurian Incident was an act of self-defense, and at first the European powers did not condemn Japan. However, as the story spread that the incident was initiated as part of a plot by the Kwantung Army, the Japanese military conducted a wide range of military operations that could hardly be called self-defense, and Manchukuo was established, leading to increased condemnation of Japan. The U.S. was critical of Japan, and in the League of Nations, a number of countries also voiced their criticism.

The League of Nations dispatched the Lytton Commission. While condemning Japan, the conclusions reached by the commission also suggested a compromise favorable to the Japanese. However, Japan was successful militarily, domestic public opinion was upbeat, and the major powers did not condemn Japan or intervene strongly. Therefore, Japan took a hardline stance, acknowledged Manchukuo in September 1932, and gave notice of its withdrawal from the League of Nations in March 1933.

In May 1933, a ceasefire agreement was signed between Japan and China, bringing the hostilities of the Manchurian Incident to an end for the time being. However, the signing of the ceasefire agreement between Japan and China and the further negotiations for conflict resolution and stabilization of the situation did not guarantee stability in the medium to long term. Following the Russo-Japanese War, the area that Japan considered its sphere of influence had been expanding from the Kwantung Leased Territory and the South Manchuria Railway to South Manchuria, and to *Manmō*, and there were no criteria as to how far this expansion should go before it was brought to a halt. In addition, the Manchurian Incident brought Japan to the option of securing its sphere of influence through the use of military force, which had been planned but never implemented. Even before the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, conflicts in the region were not uncommon, and of course, after the Manchurian Incident, as the situation became more fluid, problems of this kind occurred frequently. Moreover, the Japanese government was no longer able to fully control military forces on the ground. In Japan, public opinion was leaning toward hardline foreign policy, and the military's presence and voice as a political force was increasing. The Manchurian Incident did not automatically and inevitably lead to the Sino-Japanese War from 1937; however, the historical background and

¹³ For the Manchurian Incident, see Ogata (1964), Thorne (1972), Morley (1984), and Nish (1993).

domestic and international circumstances underlying the Manchurian Incident and the Japanese government's approval of it led to the Sino-Japanese War followed by the Pacific War.

12 The Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War

In July 1937, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident occurred, which eventually led to an all-out war between Japan and China.¹⁴ The battle lines expanded one after another, and China was so vast that no matter how many local battles Japan won or how much territory it occupied, it could not pursue effective military actions further. As the fighting continued, the situation became a stalemate in which neither Japan nor China could militarily determine victory, and political and diplomatic solutions were attempted but never achieved.

On the global stage, the Second World War began in September 1939, and Germany conquered France the following year. Therefore, Japan, wanting to cut off the route of support to China, entered the northern part of French Indochina, where it was easier to advance. And so the Tripartite Pact was signed by Japan, Germany, and Italy. The U.S. imposed economic sanctions on Japan, including an embargo on scrap iron.

In July 1941, Japan occupied the southern part of French Indochina so as to secure resources and cut off further support routes to China. The United States then imposed an oil embargo on Japan. Japan, which was heavily dependent on oil imports from overseas, the lifeline of its war efforts, was forced to make an immediate decision, which led to the outbreak of war with the U.S. In other words, the stationing of troops in southern French Indochina was a major turning point that ultimately led to the outbreak of war with the United States, but at the time of the stationing of troops in southern French Indochina, the Japanese government had by no means resolved to start a war with the United States. It had an optimistic outlook on the American response. The Prime Minister, Konoye Fumimaro, was trying to avoid a war with the United States.

When the situation became quite urgent, Tōjō Hideki, Army Minister in the Konoye Cabinet, became Prime Minister. The army was a major focal point in negotiations with the U.S. However, the negotiations failed to reach an agreement, and in December 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and the Pacific War began. Japan was engaged in a never-ending war with China, and although Japan had a neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union, the two countries were in a tense relationship that could

¹⁴ For the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45, see Chap. 4, Sect. 4.2 “The History of the Republic of China to the Second Sino-Japanese War.” See also Morley (1983), Oka (1983), and Peattie et al. (2011).

be severed at any time. It was against this backdrop that Japan went to war against such major powers as the United States and the United Kingdom.¹⁵

In the beginning of the war, Japan won many battles and expanded its frontiers in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, but it was soon outnumbered, and by 1944, it was in a state of defeat. 1945 saw air raids on Tokyo, the fall of Okinawa, and the surrender of Germany in Europe. In July, the Potsdam Declaration was issued, which called for Japan to surrender. The Japanese government did not accept surrender immediately, but after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August and the Soviet Union's entry into the war on the side of the Allies, it accepted the declaration. Even after the atomic bombings and the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, the political and military leaders of Japan continued to argue over the terms of surrender, but the Showa Emperor demonstrated his leadership for bringing the war to an early end. Under the Meiji constitutional system, the Emperor in principle exercised his power in a restrained and passive manner, but the Showa Emperor had taken important political actions several times before. And in a situation where political and military leaders were unable to reach a unified decision on the acceptance of defeat, the Emperor's intervention was necessary. After the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, sporadic fighting continued in various areas, and although there were still problems with the repatriation of Japanese troops and Japanese nationals overseas, the document of surrender was officially signed in September.

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¹⁵ For the Pacific War and its background, see Morley (1976, 1980, 1994), Thorne (1978, 1985), Best (1995), Nish and Kibata (2000), Hasegawa (2007), Kudō et al. (2009), and Hatano (2021).

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Colonialism and War-Torn Asia



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1 Taiwan

1.1 Two East Asian Wars and Colonized Taiwan

Modern Taiwanese history¹ is outlined by several wars of differing character. First, Japan asserted military force in Taiwan in 1874 (Mudanshe Incident), almost immediately after the Meiji Restoration. Next, the 1884 Sino-French War burst into northern Taiwan. The Qing Dynasty changed its ruling policy for each of these wars, and though it had previously prohibited intrusion by Han Chinese and disbanded effective control in the lands of aborigines in the southernmost Laongqiao Peninsula as well as the eastern low mountain region and central mountain range, it started to aim for actualization of effective rule in those lands. In the former, administrative organizations (Hengchun county and the Beinan district) were installed. In the latter, a campaign of military coercive pressure and punitive force was deployed, but it met with harsh resistance and successes were scarce.

Furthermore, during a period lasting a half of a century starting towards the end of the nineteenth century, two wars between China and Japan occurred, and this

¹ For a general survey on the history of Taiwan, Wan-yao Zhou (2018) is worth reading. In addition to the English translation (Zhou 2015), there are also translations in Japanese and Korean. As a general survey for Japan's colonial rule period, Wu Micha (2002) is limited, but covers the main points accurately.

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changed the very international ownership of Taiwan. As a result of the 1894–95 First Sino-Japanese War, Taiwan (the island of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands) was ceded to Japan. And as a result of the 1937–45 Asia–Pacific War, it was incorporated into the Republic of China. The half-century between those changes was Taiwan’s half-century as a colony under the rule of Japan.

1.2 *Two Wars for Colonization*

When Taiwan was ceded to Japan through the Treaty of Shimonoseki between Japan and the Qing, Japan decided to install the Government-General of Taiwan in order to govern their new territory. The Government-General began functioning on June 17, 1895, in Taipei. However, as soon as armed forces started pushing south of Taipei, they faced armed resistance in each region. From then onward, in order to establish control over the entirety of Taiwan, two colonial wars were necessary. That is to say, war was required to quell resistance from both the flatland Han Chinese society and the aborigines of the mountainous areas.

The backdrop to all of this was the nature of Taiwan society that had formed up to that point. Taiwan was originally an island inhabited by aborigines belonging to the Austronesian-speaking group, but from the seventeenth century onward, migration and land cultivation began by Han Chinese from a region centering around the southern part of Fujian on the Chinese continent facing Taiwan across the sea, and rice paddy development advanced from the western plains to the northeastern Yilan Plain up to the early nineteenth century. Rice produced in Taiwan was transported to mainland China, and through the eighteenth century, Taiwan became a food supply base for Fujian across the water. After the Zhu Yigui Uprising broke out in southern Taiwan in 1721, the Qing Dynasty drew a segregation line and employed a policy of prohibiting border-crossing and land cultivation by Han Chinese. However, the effect was weak, and land cultivation by the Han Chinese advanced to the geographical limits of farmable land.

During this time, aborigines living in the western plains (the Pinpu-zu people) assimilated the majority of cultural elements from the Han Chinese, who were growing in predominance, and were buried in the culture of Han Chinese society.² However, the Qing Dynasty was not able to implement effective rule over the central mountain range and eastern aborigines. In other words, when Japan took control of Taiwan, there were two different societies existing there. Those two societies were the traditional Han Chinese society stretching from the western plains through northeast Taiwan and the mountainous aborigine society that was not successfully included

² Though they did absorb Han Chinese culture, the Pinpu-zu did not necessarily lose its sense of identity as separate from the Han Chinese. This can also be seen in whole settlements converting when Christian missionary activity was approved with the opening of ports in the nineteenth century (Shepherd 1993, Chap.11).

under state rule. Linkage between these groups did exist through trade, but they were both separate and distinct societies.

The militarization of society in what is referred to in Chinese history as the late Qing Dynasty included the Han Chinese of Taiwan. And through factors such as the acquisition of firearms abandoned by Qing forces, that militarization also extended to the mountainous area aborigines as well. This bolstered the fierceness of armed resistance to intrusion by Japanese military and police forces. Regarding the Han Chinese, it took seven years to quell the last armed group. And even after this, several armed uprising attempts and attacks on police departments occurred, the final of these being the 1915 Tapani Incident.³ Concerning the mountainous area aborigines, in 1903 the police division set forth a policy of overseeing mountainous area governance. From 1906 onward, full momentum was infused into a decisive military campaign mobilizing the police and the army to quell aborigine resistance mainly in the northern area. And in 1915, a sufficient level of completion was finally attained.⁴

1.3 The Dual Colonial Governance of the Government-General of Taiwan

The Governor-General of Taiwan engaged in governing invested with the tyrannical power of not only possessing administrative authority, but also legislative power limited to the Taiwan region and even some judicial power as well. Until 1919, only military officials were appointed to the office of the Governor-General, but subsequently the system of only appointing military officials was abandoned, and civilian officials were appointed. However, from 1936 onward, military officials were once more appointed.⁵

The colonial administration system that was established was a dual system corresponding to the inherent social and cultural duality of the Han Chinese and aborigine split in Taiwanese society and the duality of the process of quelling the two types of resistance. In the mountainous aborigine region, as stated above, a special system was installed in which the police oversaw governance. That region was called *banchi* (aborigine territory) and that system of governance was called

³ Regarding the Tapani Incident, author Katz (2005) offers insight.

⁴ From then until 1945, no armed uprisings occurred in the Han Chinese region. And the only relatively major armed rising including the aborigine region was limited to the 1930 Mush Incident (Zhou 2015, Chap. 8). 1915 is the year in which the entire island of Taiwan was, through military force, finally unified politically for the first time, and was also the year in which the demilitarization of society throughout all of Taiwan was basically achieved. In this way, Japan passed along a disarmed society to the Republic of China, which became the ruler of Taiwan a half century later.

⁵ Concerning the political history revolving around the powers of and requirements for appointment as a Governor-General of Taiwan, and the changes therein, Ng Chiau-tong (1981) provides a general survey.

riban (aborigine administration). The approach was distinctly different, both institutionally and regionally, from the approach employed in the Han Chinese region, in which the majority of the population resided. The former duality of Taiwan rule by the Qing Dynasty that placed the mountainous aborigine region outside of effective rule switched to an administrative and legal duality within a unified state rule that extended over the entire island of Taiwan.

Generally, in traditional China the governing structure of the state usually did not exist below the *xian* (county) level, and the duties of the *xian* were limited to taxation and processing legal actions. The linkage between a highly differing state and society was the regional elites and their groups. In Qing Taiwan, countryside imperial examination certification holders and former bureaucrats called *xiangshen* (local gentry), powerful merchants, and landowners performed the public duties for basic level regions called districts or villages in the position of informal officials called *zongli*. In Taiwanese history, this way of local rule is called *xiangzhi*.

Though the Government-General of Taiwan did first establish official administrative agencies, *gai sho yakuba* (township/village governmental offices), to maintain safety and security, it revived the traditional *baojia* system of community organization and placed those organizations under the management of police outposts. Part of the staff at township and village governmental offices and officials in the *baojia* was appointed from among individuals belonging to the regional elite class. However, their authority progressively decreased. Thus, the past *xiangzhi* system was modified, and switched to a dual governing approach in which spaces were controlled by township and village administrative organizations and people were governed by *baojia* and the police outposts.⁶

The Han Chinese residents living in the flatlands were forced to face modern state rule that was different from the pre-modern era empire, but the mountainous area aborigines were experiencing the very concept of state rule for the first time in their semi-agricultural, semi-hunting preliterate society. Aboriginal lifestyle revolved around collective units called *she* (tribes) according to Qing Dynasty records. The *she* also determined whether to make peace or fight in clashes with other nearby *she*, vying over hunting territory as well as encroachers from outside such as the Han Chinese. When the aborigines were successfully suppressed militarily, the Government-General of Taiwan installed police outposts in strategic spots in the *banchi* territory. *She* autonomy switched over to direct control by the state.

Regarding the land, in 1896 the Government-General declared all mountainous land with no written certificate to be state-owned. Subsequently, when flatland land surveying was completed, surveying extended to the forests and fields as well, and in the 1930s, approximately 260 thousand hectares of land called “land reserved for aborigines” was demarked to ensure land for aborigines to live in forests and fields

⁶ The Han Chinese region governing structure is from Nitta (2020). This change in governing structure was a modernization of administration in the sense that it infused the arm of modern bureaucratic organization of the state into the basic administration level. However, it was also colonization in the sense that Japanese citizens living in Taiwan were treated differently in the system, and the introduction of citizen autonomy commensurate with the level of infusion of the state into society only progressed at a very sluggish pace.

that were designated as land required for economic development.⁷ Regarding the people, in practice they were placed under the discretion of the police, which was the *riban* administration, with no establishment of policy regarding whether aborigines would be granted legal personhood or not.⁸

1.4 “A Meiji Restoration Without Parliamentary Governance” and the Birth of the “Parliamentary Governance” Dream

Taiwanese historian Wan-yao Zhou (2014, pp. 140, 142) summarized the modernization that Taiwan experienced under colonial rule by commenting, “You can look at it as a foreign version of the Meiji Restoration, but it did not have parliamentary governance.” Furthermore, she asserts that because there was no “parliamentary governance,” “Colonized people did not have the right to make decisions regarding their own language, culture, and history.”

Regarding this “Meiji Restoration without parliamentary governance,” we will take a look at the construction of soft and hard infrastructure⁹ that became the base for modern state governance and a capitalist economy.

The integral factor in soft infrastructure was assessing information on people (individual registration and population) and land (land registration and geography). Concerning individual registration, *koko chosabo* (household survey records) were created using the police network which was integrated into the basic level and the *baojia* organization was used to create a system that was intended to be updated routinely.¹⁰ Concerning population, in 1905 a census was conducted using modern methods for the first time in the flatland general administration region.¹¹ By this

⁷ Regarding the transition of the aborigine land problem, see Yen Ai-Ching and Yang Kuo-Chu (2004). The land allocated to each aborigine settlement was much smaller than the scope of the living environment (called “traditional territory” in current Taiwan aborigine policy), which the aborigine settlements had traditionally used for shifting cultivation, employing slash-and-burn agriculture and hunting activity and at times vying for territory from other settlements.

⁸ Regarding the legal status of aborigines under Japanese colonial rule, see Tay-Sheng Wang (2011). Incidentally, the question of how the 1890 Constitution of the Empire of Japan (the Meiji Constitution) would be applied to the new Taiwan territory was debated within both the government and the Imperial Diet from the beginning.

⁹ The individual who displayed particular competency in this process was Goto Shinpei, who served as Chief of Home Affairs (in office 1898–1906) under the 4th Governor-General Kodama Gentaro (in office 1898–1906).

¹⁰ In the mountainous aborigine region, “aborigine household records” were created by the police. Also, regarding the doorway survey record, related items were subsequently developed, and it was given the function of personal identification. However, the Family Register Act of mainland Japan was not implemented in the colony even up to the end of Japanese rule, and systemic integration with mainland Japan was not executed even up to the end of colonization.

¹¹ The population of Han Chinese recorded for the general administration region in that census was approximately 2.97 million.

time, the Government-General had attained an administration competency that could accurately execute these tasks.

Decisively important regarding land was the land survey work executed in the western plains from 1898 through 1905, and the creation of maps based on the triangulation employed in that work. Regarding the former, successively in each region as their armed resistances were successfully suppressed, land rights were declared, land surveying and official rights confirmation were conducted with the right holders present, and the land tax system was also revised. Furthermore, in 1905 land registration rules were established, and the transfer of land ownership rights now required registration with the government.¹²

This land survey work was also important financially as part of the effort to establish a base for tax revenue from land, but in terms of economic growth as well, it also possessed the significance of dramatically improving the trade environment concerning land.¹³ And in fact, after this basic system was organized, capital from mainland Japan was quickly injected into the sugar production industry through guidance from the Government-General. In the 1910s, the modern sugar production industry grew into a core thriving agro-industry for colonized Taiwan. Furthermore, concerning map making in this period, 37,869 “village maps” and 465 “district maps” were created, and these maps displayed authority in the subsequent maintenance of regional administration.¹⁴

For hard infrastructure, construction of a longitudinal railway linking port cities in the north and south (Keelung and Kaohsiung) held major significance. Construction of the longitudinal rail started in 1898, and though it halted temporarily due to the Russo-Japanese War, the entire line was usable in 1908. This overcame the barrier to supply distribution from north to south that had been hindered by the rapidly rushing rivers flowing to the west from the central mountain range. Together with this effort, various kinds of roads, light rail, and *kaisha-sen* (company lines installed by sugar production companies to transport sugarcane for making sugar) were interlocked into the transport network, and the Taiwan western plains experienced a transportation revolution in a short period of time as Taiwan was integrated into a single market. Moreover, the markets thus integrated were connected to the economy of mainland Japan via Keelung Port and Kaohsiung Port, which were renovated to become more modern. Initially sugar was the main item sent to Japan, but when a food shortage began during World War I, *horaimai* rice (a type of Japonica rice developed in Taiwan) also became a shipped product.

While the colonial modernization imposed by Japan did not exceed the boundaries of “A Meiji Restoration without parliamentary governance,” it is also not the case that there were no proponents voicing a need for “parliamentary governance.” After World War I, with the propagation of trends in thought at the time advocating national

¹² For the most recent research into that land survey work, see Wu (2017) and Lin (2017).

¹³ In the Taiwan research classic “Taiwan under Imperialism,” author Tadao Yanaihara (2001, p. 74) asserts that the land survey work, currency, and the unification of the system of measurement was, “work that laid a foundation for converting the economy of Taiwan to capitalism”.

¹⁴ For information on map making during colonial period Taiwan, Lin Chun-yin (2012) is detailed.

self-determination and democracy as well as the Taiwan Han Chinese academic elite coming to the forefront of society amidst the improvement of the Japanese modern school education system, multiple political and social movements arose. Movements such as the Petition Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament,¹⁵ which attempted to interfere with the tyrannical power of the Governor-General of Taiwan, and the cultural enlightenment movement of the Taiwan Cultural Association, which attempted to promote cultural and national identity among Taiwan residents, sprung up. In the mid-1920s, conflict between sugar production companies and farmers over the price of sugarcane as a raw ingredient sparked a farmer's movement, and in 1926 the Taiwan Farmer's Union formed. 1927 saw the formation of the Taiwan People's Party, the first political party in the history of Taiwan. The Taiwan Communist Party formed as a small group in Shanghai that next year. It soon infused itself into the Cultural Association and the Farmer's Union. However, these movements underwent pressure around the same time as the 1931 Mukden Incident and organizational social movements mostly dissolved.

After World War I, Japanese colonial rule policy changed to one of "the principle of extending the homeland institutions and regulations to the colony" in which the laws and systems of mainland Japan (*naichi*) were given precedence over laws and orders based on the legislative power of the Governor-General of Taiwan. Together with the progression of Japanizing law and systems in Taiwan, bestowing of the same suffrage allowed to Japanese citizens in Japan was also envisioned. However, backing for bestowing suffrage was ultimately the opinion of Japanese state elites, and what the Government-General accepted, after a fashion, before the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War was only limited suffrage towards regional administration.¹⁶

Riban Rule as the "Iron Fist of Civilization".

Conversely, for the mountainous area aborigines, it would be closer to say that they did not experience colonial modernization as much as something that can be compared to the "iron fist of civilization" imposed by a modern state. The "iron fist" was direct rule by the *riban* police and the "civilization" component was the teaching of writing and farming methods to "barbarians," the normalizing of a currency-based economy in their culture, and the transformation of their population into a "peasant class" that had the ability to pay taxes. To that purpose, aborigine youth schools for teaching children in aborigine settlements were installed. Police officers served as teachers, teaching things such as simple Japanese language and agriculture

¹⁵ The Petition Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament was a social movement seeking democracy and autonomous governing through actions that employed a feature of the Meiji Constitution allowing the right to petition the Imperial Diet in Tokyo to establish a law that would install a Taiwanese legislature with the power to deliberate on the lawmaking of the Governor-General of Taiwan, limited to Taiwan and the Government-General of Taiwan's budget (Wakabayashi 2001).

¹⁶ The principle of extending the homeland institutions and regulations to the colony can be thought of as a kind of attempt for assimilation and governmental integration into the colonial empire. However, due to the manifold experiences of discrimination permeating many areas of daily life among Taiwanese residents under colonial rule, and in accordance with the creation of a "Taiwan sized" social and economic integration brought about by colonial modernization, it also ultimately engendered the imagining of a Taiwanese identity that was unintended by the Japanese authorities.

methods. Meanwhile, traditional customs such as headhunting and indoor burial were prohibited as barbaric and unclean practices. Moreover, firearms and ammunition were controlled by police outposts, and this became a factor in the decrease of opportunities to hunt, leading to the decline of a unique culture and set of social norms that had been deeply tied to hunting.

According to Matsuoka (2012), these kinds of policies aimed to dissolve the unique administrative character and ultimately place the *banchi* under the general administration system as just another region within the system. However, in reality, Japanese rule came to a close with the demarcation between the *banchi* and Han Chinese region regulated even stricter than ever.¹⁷

1.5 *The Asia–Pacific War and Colonized Taiwan*

Together with the amplification of the Asia–Pacific War, Taiwan was also deeply caught up in Japan’s military efforts. The military mobilization of the Taiwan people began with dispatchment of military porters and civilian personnel (miscellaneous labor and translation among armed services) to the Chinese battle theater after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, Japan expanded this to an army enlisting system in 1942 and then added a navy enlisting system the following year. During this time, Taiwanese women, on a level estimated to be approximately several thousand, were sent to places like China to serve as “military comfort women.”¹⁸

Additionally, aborigines were recruited from 1942 onwards, and inserted into the war in places such as the Philippines and New Guinea eight separate times. Their courage inspired Japanese forces to promote them as the “Takasago Volunteers.”¹⁹ The sons of aborigine settlement warriors who had once fought against intruders into their living environment were now being sent to fight in battle theaters as colonial empire soldiers.

In 1944, the war situation worsened, the depletion of new recruits became a serious problem, and Japan feared a Taiwan landing invasion by U.S. forces. Thus, the Japanese government decided to lay down a conscription system in Taiwan as well and began implementing it in April the following year. Simultaneous to that decision, the House of Representatives election law was implemented for Taiwan, and it was announced that the right to vote in national elections would be granted in return for asset resources. This was a part of what can be called an “improvement in

¹⁷ Barclay (2017) believes that because advance into the mountainous area by flatland Han Chinese forces was blocked for a half-century, the dual governing approach of the Government-General of Taiwan ultimately possessed the significance of transmogrifying the Taiwan aborigines into an ethnic minority within a modern state.

¹⁸ Regarding Taiwanese military comfort women, see Chu Te-Lan (2005).

¹⁹ Chih-huei Huang (2011, p. 143) estimates the total number as at least eight thousand. The aborigine population at that time was approximately 162 thousand people, so this is not a small number.

treatment” in return for the systemization of the appropriation of the lives of colony residents.²⁰

1.6 The Demise of Japanese Control and Two Wars in Postwar East Asia

In truth, around this time U.S. forces changed their strategy from a Taiwan landing operation to an Okinawa landing operation. Instead of a landing push, in the autumn of 1944 bombing raids of major Taiwan cities commenced, and in May of the subsequent year the Government-General building was destroyed.²¹ On August 15, the “Jewel Voice Broadcast” given by the emperor played in Taiwan as well, and the war concluded. Japanese rule finished without Taiwan ever advancing from its structure as “a Meiji Restoration without parliamentary governance.”²²

The Republic of China had been promised in the “1943 Cairo Declaration” by the leaders of the U.S. and the United Kingdom that Taiwan would be returned to Chinese control. Therein, moving forward, the Republic of China inherited Taiwan from Japan as a condition of Japanese surrender and simultaneously integrated Taiwan into its republic. All Taiwan residents, except for the Japanese who had been ordered by the Allied forces to return to Japan,²³ became citizens of the Republic of China and residents of the Taiwan Province. However, this did not signal the end of a wartime system for Taiwan residents. Conflict continued due to internal clashes within the Republic of China and the Cold War that spilled over into East Asia as both coalesced at the Taiwan Strait. Chiang Kai-shek-led Republic of China forces that were torn apart in civil conflict, government officials, and a massive influx of refugees flooded into Taiwan, and Taiwan was once again placed under a wartime framework.

²⁰ Regarding Taiwan during the War, Kondo (1996) is a basic research book.

²¹ According to the research of Chien-chiu Zhang (1999, p. 162), the human damage alone in bombing raids from October 1944 to August 1945 was a total of 6,100 dead and 435 missing.

²² The mobilization of Taiwanese bodies (sex, lives) to the war theater, including aborigines, left complex problems within postwar Taiwan and regarding its relationship with postwar Japan. According to total numbers announced by the postwar Japan Ministry of Health and Welfare, the number of Taiwanese people mobilized into the military during the eight years from 1937 was 297,183 people across both the army and navy (80,433 were mobilized as military personnel and soldiers, the rest as civilian personnel), and 30,304 of those individuals died (Ng Chiau-tong 1981, p. 265). The population of Taiwan (including aborigines) in 1943 was 6.13 million people. Furthermore, regarding the situation of current issues related to the problem of comfort women, see Liu Hsia-ju (2020).

²³ At the time of its defeat, the number of Japanese people in Taiwan was approximately 488 thousand people (of which approximately 166 thousand were military personnel and soldiers). Military personnel and soldiers, as well as civilians, were ordered to return to Japan, and completely disappeared from Taiwan within the year of 1947, except for a very small amount who stayed behind at university positions, etc. (Ng Chiau-tong 1981, pp. 26–268).

2 Southeast Asia

During World War II, almost all regions in Southeast Asia were placed under Japanese control and influence, but the format and level of power exercised was different in each case. Because the declaration of war at the commencement of the “Greater East Asia” war on December 8, 1941, was initially issued towards the United Kingdom and the U.S., and then to the Netherlands, military invasion by Japanese forces was limited to the colonies of these three countries (the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, Burma, British Malaya and Singapore, and British Borneo). In these regions, Japanese forces eventually accumulated victories, overthrew the colonial regimes, and then subsequently laid down military rule (military administration) and exercised almost complete sovereignty (Defense Ministry Institute 1985).

Meanwhile, France had been put under the control of Nazi Germany and given a puppet regime, and because Japan did not see France as an enemy, it did not militarily invade its colonies in Southeast Asia (three Indochina countries corresponding to current Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia). However, in reality Japan had already been applying pressure before the outbreak of war and had won the right to station Japanese forces. Through the Japanese army actually stationed there, Japan interfered with French rule. This control format was referred to as joint Japanese-French control. In a similar fashion, East Timor was a colony of the neutral nation Portugal, so while Japanese forces did avoid a direct attack there, they dispatched occupation forces and interfered with internal governance. Towards Thailand, which was the only independent nation in Southeast Asia, Japan sought an alliance, and pressured Thailand to declare war against the United Kingdom, the U.S., and the Netherlands (Yoshikwa 2010). Furthermore, Japan also dispatched Japanese occupation forces into Thailand as well and executed all sorts of pressure on the Thai government.

As seen in these cases, while the format of control and level of power was different for each area, all 11 countries in present day Southeast Asia were placed under some sort of Japanese control and stitched into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In this chapter, we will consider the format of Japanese control centering mainly around the cases of British, American, and Dutch colonies that were placed under Japanese military rule.

2.1 *Military Rule*

Military rule entails temporarily exercising sovereignty and implementing administration over occupied territory during wartime until the war concludes. In the Southeast Asia Dutch East Indies (current Indonesia), the Philippines, Burma (current Myanmar), British Borneo (current Malaysia and Brunei), British Malaya (current Malaysia), and Singapore, military personnel in the Japanese force units that militarily occupied each region exercised military rule. The large Dutch East Indies was divided into three parts, with Java Island placed under singular 16th Army control

and Sumatra Island initially grouped with British Malaya and Singapore under 25th Army occupation. The remaining islands, such as Celebes Island (current Sulawesi), Borneo Island (current Kalimantan), New Guinea, Maluku, and the Lesser Sunda Islands, were placed under naval control (Kishi and Nishijima 1959). As stated above, British Malaya and Singapore were initially grouped with Sumatra into one occupied territory, but in the subsequent year of 1943, they were split off from Sumatra to become their own occupied territory. Also, British Borneo, which is present day Malaysia, was its own occupied territory. The Philippines and Burma were placed under the oversight of the 15th and 28th Army, respectively.

In regions wherein military rule by army was enforced, official offices called *gunseikanbu* were installed as administrative organizations, and the chief-of-staff for the occupation forces stationed there served as the military superintendent (*gunseikan*). Other important posts were held by military personnel, but most key bureaucratic positions were filled by administrators dispatched from Japan, and local officials who had been serving in the colonial government previously were kept on staff unless they had particularly strong anti-Japanese sentiment. Japan also used existing administrative agencies as much as possible (Kishi and Nishijima 1959).

However, citizens of the colonial ruling powers or of any Allied nations were eliminated as enemies and placed in detention camps. However, in the early days, when staff dispatched from Japan alone was insufficient, citizens of enemy nations were kept on staff as exceptions in order to utilize their specialist skills.

Japanese military personnel and bureaucrats were not very familiar with the Southeast Asian environment, so in order to make governance proceed as smoothly as possible there, one unified policy they took in all occupied territories was to befriend local leaders who had powerful influence on the locals. In most cases, nationalists who had been at the forefront of the anti-colonial struggle were considered to be the perfect choice. For example, in Indonesia, Japanese representatives befriended Sukarno and Hatta (Kishi and Nishijima 1959). In the Philippines, they befriended Laurel and Aquino (Ikehata and Jose 1999, pp. 21–58). In Burma, they befriended Ba Maw (Nemoto 2007).

And in Malaya, they befriended anti-British Malay youth who received educations in the Malay language and not in English. And in all occupied territories, in efforts to galvanize and educate the local population, they placed these ethnic nationalists between the public and the Japanese forces and made the nationalists face off directly with the public in an attempt to minimize unrest.

Below, we will take a slightly more detailed look at the kinds of specific governing policies that were implemented under the above-mentioned basic framework.

2.2 *Economy Policies*

The true goal of the occupation of Southeast Asia by Japanese forces was to acquire important national defense resources to facilitate the continuance of war on the Chinese front that had already started in the 1930s. Prewar Japan had relied on

imports from the U.S. for most of its natural resources, including petroleum. However, the U.S. was critical of Japan's invasion of China, and in 1939, it levied economic sanctions on Japan and restricted exports. After those sanctions began, Japan tried to shore up their shortages through trade with places such as the Dutch East Indies and initially made repeated attempts at diplomatic negotiation. But the effort ended in failure. Therein, with other international relations also serving as motivating factors, ultimately Japan came to the decision to attempt securing resources by absorbing the resource-rich Southeast Asia through military force. In that sense, places like the Dutch East Indies, Malaya and British Borneo, which were rich in resources including petroleum and iron-ore, were the most promising occupied territories. But in addition to that, to actualize food self-sufficiency, places like Burma and Indochina, with their high rice production, were also vital (Kurasawa 2012).

Japanese forces confiscated all enterprises and resources owned by citizens of enemy nations in occupied territories, like oil fields, ore mines, farmland, and factories, then entrusted business management of those enterprises over to Japanese companies and brought over staff from those Japanese companies. In this way, many Japanese citizens came to southern occupied territories to engage in economic activities.

Because trade was restricted to within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the previous trade structure completely collapsed, major change was enforced onto the production structure. For example, the production of cash crops such as sugar, coffee, tea, and rubber experienced a decrease in importance due to a loss of exporting channels. Meanwhile, difficulties arose in the securing of manufactured products that had previously been procured through importing, and some daily essentials now had to be made regionally through the self-sustaining efforts of locals. The most classic example of this was clothing. Places like Indonesia and the Philippines had been procuring most of their cotton thread and cotton fabric through import from places like India, but because this source grew cold, locals began cultivating raw cotton and worked hard to secure a supply of cotton thread (Ikehata and Jose 1999, pp.171–195; Kurasawa 1992).

Meanwhile, in addition to supplying foodstuffs such as rice to Japanese citizens in Japan, it also had to be supplied to the large number of Japanese officers and soldiers stationed in the various southern regions. Thus, demand grew, and production increasing campaigns were put into place in each region. However, because the produced rice was coercively sequestered for the Japanese forces, the producers themselves faced rice shortages. These kinds of agricultural structure changes had a major impact on farmers (Kurasawa 1992, pp. 89–136).

Moreover, roads and railways were destroyed in combat, and air bombing and marine safety could not be ensured. This diminished delivery capacity. As a result, in some regions necessary goods built up in an unneeded surplus of stock while other deficient areas were experiencing extreme supply shortages. In this way, locals suffered shortages of food, clothing, and other items necessary for daily living (Kurasawa 2012).

2.3 *Labor Force Requisitioning*

Amidst these developments, another factor that caused further suffering for locals was the semi-compulsory requisitioning of labor force by the Japanese forces. This was a labor force mobilized mainly for Japanese force military purposes such as military facility construction, airfield construction, and road and railway construction. They were referred to using the Japanese word for laborer: *romusha*. This requisitioning was the most severe in Java Island with its high population density. Locals there were shipped off the island to other various regions. One famous effort was the injecting of a large labor force to cut away the jungle and construct the Thai–Burma Railway connecting Thailand and Burma. Most *romusha* were made to work in secluded places with poor working environments and a lack of sufficient food and medicine, causing many to lose their lives. Additionally, because *romusha* were left behind when Japan pulled out at the end of the war, this became notorious as being the most draconian of the policies during the Japanese military governing period (Kratoska 2006; Kurasawa 1992, pp. 180–241).

2.4 *Educating and Galvanizing Locals*

In the enforcement of these kinds of harsh policies, Japan’s ultimate goal was not to make locals follow their orders through sheer force, but rather to educate and enlighten them, lead them to understand Japan’s purpose for fighting and gain their heartfelt cooperation. Furthermore, Japan attempted a policy of integration out of an arrogant desire to instill its sense of values and cultural system as the “Leader” of Asia within its “little brothers” in Southeast Asia with their inferior standard of living and culture, and to raise them up to the same level as Japanese citizens. To this end Japan installed a propaganda department within its military administration (*gunseikanbu*), gathered top cultural producers from Japan such as authors, painters, and musicians, and had them come up with propaganda slogans and propaganda material. In addition to print media, Japan used all other kinds of media as well, including radio broadcasting, movies, theatrical performances, *kamishibai* paper theater, and posters. The core concept for propaganda was that Japan was fighting for the prosperity of Asia, and ultimate Japanese victory would bring happiness to Asia as well. In other words, based in the logic that Japan and Asia were a collective linked by a shared destiny of coexistence and co-prosperity, Japan appealed to what should be done to actualize this (Goodman 1991; Kratoska 1998, pp. 122–153).

Furthermore, under the idea that school education was also necessary to strengthen the locals, the content of education was used to instill in local populations the same outlook as Japan. To this end, the curriculum included Japanese history that emphasized the nobility of Japan and moral education based in Imperial ideology. Moreover,

the Japanese language was seen as necessary to learn the Japanese spirit, and educators also worked to popularize it as the common tongue linking the various East Asian peoples (Kurasawa 1992, pp. 343–367).

Above this sort of educational effort, attempts were made to set up organization to inspire cooperation with Japan among locals. For example, Jawa Hokokai (the Java Service Association) was established, and locals were taught to devote all of their activities and spirit to Japan. Local ethnic leaders who were cooperating with Japanese forces were placed at the head of these organizations and galvanized locals (Kurasawa 1992, pp. 334–339).

One noteworthy factor regarding the enlightenment and education of locals is that Japanese forces respected local religions and did not attempt to force Shinto upon communities. In fact, they even used local religious leaders to galvanize locals into cooperating with Japan. Particularly in places like Indonesia and Malaya where Islam was the major religion, Japanese forces used the logic that the Greater East Asia War was a holy war against Christianity in an attempt to gain their cooperation. (Kurasawa 1992, pp. 368–418).

2.5 *Military Training*

The spirit of “giving your all for Japan” linked to a campaign urging occupied territory locals to defend their land on their own in preparation for the return of Allied forces. Physically healthy youth participated in *seinendan* (youth organizations) formed in their territories and received fundamental military training including marching and how to use weapons such as bamboo spears. Additionally, some locals were employed as *heiho* (an auxiliary soldier) in Japanese force units stationed locally under the title. They received the same military training as Japanese soldiers, and some units were even dispatched to the theater of war where they experienced actual fighting (Kurasawa 1992, pp. 308–321).

Furthermore, in Sumatra, Java, and Malaya, military organizations independent from Japanese forces called *giyūgun* (volunteer forces) were formed, and they received even higher-level military training. In the case of Indonesia, which declared independence after Japan surrendered, these trained youth became the core of the newly established national military and fought a war of independence against the Netherlands (Kurasawa 1992, pp. 322–333).

2.6 *Surveilling Locals*

Japan was constantly aware of, and on guard against, the danger that locals could be secretly conducting anti-Japanese activities in linkage with Allied forces. The Japanese military organization called *kenpeitai*, which means military police corps, instilled fear into the locals. To even more thoroughly surveil enemies amidst daily

living, in Indonesia and the Philippines, Japan introduced the *tonarigumi* (neighborhood association). This organization played an important role in controlling society within Japan domestically as well at the time. All local households living nearby were grouped together and made members of their neighborhood *tonarigumi*. Through the method of holding everyone in the group accountable if even one member committed an offense, the *tonarigumi* system prevented not only spying and anti-Japanese speech or actions, but they also prevented acts in violation of economic policies such as concealing or illicitly selling goods (Kurasawa 1992, pp. 242–252).

2.7 *The Independence Problem*

Right before invading Southeast Asia, Japan used media, such as Radio Tokyo broadcasts, to issue messages claiming that it would free Asia from Western colonial rule. However, after subjugating the region, the word “independence” was prohibited, and freedom of political action and speech was stolen from the populace. However, in 1943, “independence” was allowed for the Philippines and Burma. Because the Philippines and Burma had already been granted a certain degree of autonomous governing before the war, and occupation by Japan was actually antithetical to this, the idea was, Japan attempting to continue complete control any further would actually backfire. Of course, the “independence” that was created in this way was completely a puppet regime, and Japanese forces continued to remain stationed there, strictly controlling the new administrations behind the scenes (Nemoto 2007; Ikehata and Jose 1999).

Independence was not permitted at that time in Indonesia, Malaya, Singapore and Borneo, and dissatisfaction increased among local residents. The war situation grew gradually disadvantageous for Japan, and when living conditions worsened for Indonesians, sporadic anti-Japanese outbursts started erupting in the various regions. In order to loop in cooperation for Japan from Sukarno and contemporaries and stop these outbursts, some concessions had to be made. Therein, in September of 1944, future independence in Indonesia was promised. However, in Malaya and Singapore, when the policy of permitting independence in Indonesia was announced, independence was not allowed due to the perception of a “low standard of living and level of culture,” and they were left unchanged.

In Indonesia, the Commission on Inquiry into Preparatory Measures for Independence was formed in May 1945. Within the committee, blueprint on the possible framework and philosophy of the future Indonesian state were discussed, a constitution was drafted, and preparations for actualizing independence advanced at a rapid pace.

However, on August 15, Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration by Allied forces and agreed to surrender. Based on this Declaration, the status quo at the time of surrender had to be maintained. As a result, the entire plan for independence was cancelled, but Sukarno and contemporaries overcame the opposition of Japanese forces and declared independence on August 17 (Kishi and Nishijima 1959).

In the three Indochina countries that Japan had ruled jointly with France, because France was released from German control on June 1944 and was thus no longer a nation allied with Japan, in March of the following year Japanese forces, instigating local nationalists, sparked a coup d'état to oust France from the region, and established a regime in Vietnam that was independent in name only. Meanwhile, the Viet Minh under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, which was already against both France and Japan, had been expanding its power through the continuance of secret guerrilla activities. When the Japanese forces were defeated in World War II, the Viet Minh declared independence in September 1945 and commenced combat with the colonial ruling power of France, which did not accept this declaration. Then, in 1954, it ousted France from the northern part of Vietnam and achieved independence there.

In Indonesia, an independence declaration was also not accepted by the controlling Netherlands, but nationalists there achieved complete independence after pushing forward their long-cherished desire in a four-year conflict. This was not a Japanese-made independence by any means, but instead an independence won by the sheer strength of the ethnic nationalists there.

Because the Allied forces nullified the "independence" of 1943 in the Philippines and Burma, the leaders of those puppet regimes escaped to Japan before the arrival of Allied forces but were later returned by the Allied forces. Control of these two countries was reverted to their previous colonial masters, after which both countries eventually achieved independence under new leaders in 1946 and 1948 respectively.

The Japanese occupation is frequently cited as having accelerated the move towards independence for Southeast Asian countries, but the truth is, there is no direct causal relationship therein. However, it also cannot be denied that the anti-West sentiment was inspired and strengthened by a Japan that shared common enemies.

3 Annexation of Korea and Japanese Colonial Rule

On August 29, 1910, the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty took effect, Imperial Korea lost sovereignty, and Korea was subsequently a colony of Japan for 35 years until August 15, 1945.²⁴

For a governing institution, the Government-General of Korea was installed. The Governor-General, who served as the head of that government, was a new official post directly subordinate to the emperor. The Governor-General was selected from among acting generals in the army and navy (the Governor-General military attaché system) and possessed sweeping powers such as the power to issue decrees and the power to lead army and naval forces. Also, Japanese forces that had been stationed in Korea since before the annexation remained stationed there.

²⁴ Korea as a colony of Japan was outside the scope of application of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan and a separate legal jurisdiction from Mainland Japan. Because of this, fundamental problems existed from the beginning to end, concerning issues such as the unconstitutionality of delegated legislative authority of the Governor-General of Korea and the disparities between Japanese and Koreans in the application of law, and in rights allowed and obligations enforced.

Most staff in the Government-General and affiliated offices were Japanese, and all-important positions were filled with Japanese. Most Koreans were only present as marginal bureaucrats. The discrimination of treatment between Japanese and Korean staff remained until the end of the colonial period.

The colonial era is divided into three major periods: 1910 to 1919, 1920 to the early 1930s, and the late 1930s onward. First, we will trace a brief outline of the general flavor of colonial Korea following those period divisions.

3.1 The 1910s: “Martial Policy” and “Assimilation”

Governance of Korea in the 1910s is referred to as *Budan Seiji* (martial policy), and this was due to Government-General rule strengthening the military character of governing. Together with the aforementioned Governor-General military attaché system and the power of the Governor-General to lead the army and navy, what strengthened the military character was the existence of a military police system. In this system, the military police, who would normally only handle military police matters, were responsible for normal police functions together with the civilian police and became the central core of police organization. Military and civilian police duties ranged over a wide scope, from the suppression of racial and independence movements to general administration such as identification registration procedures, road repairs, and agricultural improvements. The military and civilian police system took on the structure of executing sweeping authority (Matsuda 2009a, b).

Through land survey projects, the Government-General established the base for land tax collection and aimed to construct the foundation for financial administration of the colony. As a result, through the buying and selling of land and requisition of land owned by the previous government, land owned by Japanese people increased (Miyajima 1991a, b).

In addition to this, in the realms of farming, commerce, industry, and finances, Korea became subservient to *Naichi* (the Mainland). Thus, the lifestyles of common Korean people were coercively changed, discrimination between Koreans and Japanese deepened, and sentiments of backlash and dissatisfaction accumulated.

In order to “Japanize” the Korean populace, the Government-General valued primary school education and particularly used the normalization of “Japanese language studies” in their main goal of cultivating good subjects who were loyal to the emperor. However, throughout the entire colonial period, a compulsory education system was not established in Korea, and the rate of Japanese popularization dropped. “Japanizing” was definitely not an easy task.

The development of national and independence movements within Korea became extremely difficult. Independence movement hubs transferred abroad, and new activist hubs formed in places like Jiandao, Russia’s Primorskaya Oblast, China, Japan, and the U.S. This network operated the March 1st Movement.

In 1918, U.S. President Wilson’s invention of the principle of self-determination sparked hope for Korean independence in independence movement activists and

intellectuals. An international independence movement network activated, and in addition to preparations being laid for independence movement activities in the various regions, it majorly influenced religious leaders and students within Korea. Korean religious leaders drafted a declaration of independence, and on March 1, 1919, they distributed it. Additionally, students and residents in Seoul held a demonstration in the city and clashed with police and soldiers. Subsequently, the movement spread throughout the entirety of Korea and to the Manchuria and Primorskaya Oblast regions. Regionally, violent actions spread among the populace in opposition to forced changes in lifestyle customs and daily discrimination, and clashes occurred everywhere (March 1st Movement).²⁵

3.2 *The 1920s to Early 1930s: Rivalry Between “Cultural Policy” and Nationalism*

After the March 1st Movement, the Government-General majorly changed its governing policy to a *Bunka Seiji* (cultural policy). It abolished the Governor-General military attaché system that had been the core of the “martial policy,” and supreme command of the army and navy stationed in Korea by the Governor-General was also dissolved. This allowed civilian officials to serve as Governor-Generals. However, moving forward, civilian officials did not actually serve as Governor-Generals even after the shift to a “cultural policy.”

Other characteristic policies were adopted as well. Clampdowns on speech, publishing, assembling, and associating were eased. This led to an expansion of opportunities for racial and social activism among Koreans. Furthermore, the previous military police system was abolished and switched to a normal system.²⁶ The police became involved in cracking down on independence movements and surveilling the daily lives of Koreans.

Concerning education, the Government-General advanced a policy of strengthening primary school education and aimed to increase the number of primary schools. Moreover, regarding higher education, the government took the approach of transplanting the Japanese imperial university system to Korea, and in 1924 the Keijo Imperial University opened.

Regarding agriculture, an increase in rice for shipping to “Mainland Japan” was planned (the Rice Production Increase Plan). This was an approach to resolving the rice shortage in Japan, most notably symbolized by the rice riots that occurred in 1918. In this sense, there was no change in the structure of subservience to Japan.

²⁵ There were differences in format, scale, background, etc. between movements conducted in urban areas and by intellectuals and movements springing up in agricultural villages. In that sense, this can be called a movement that possessed a mixture of composite elements.

²⁶ However, this led to a major increase in the amount of police officers.

From the 1920s onward, large changes occurred in Korean society. Urbanization advanced, and urban mass culture grew and expanded.²⁷ However, due to deviations in the normalization of lifestyle infrastructure and differences in economic levels, many Koreans were alienated from accepting these urban culture elements.

Meanwhile, in farming villages, Korean landowners and independent farms failed, and the amount of tenant farmers increased. Tenancy disputes revolving around tenant farming rights started occurring frequently. The impact of the agriculture crisis flowing from the 1930 Showa Financial Crisis extended to Korea and exhaustion spread through farming villages, pushing this trend forward even more. The farm retirement trend accelerated. Koreans who had given up their farms went to places like Japan and Manchuria and moved to urban areas to take whatever work they could find. To reenergize farming villages that were suffering from fatigue, in the 1930s the Government-General deployed the Campaign for the Advancement of Farming Villages. However, this did not achieve a sufficient effect. Meanwhile, in northern Korea the government advanced industrialization, attracted Japanese capital into Korea, and attempted to absorb the surplus farming village population as workers to construct infrastructure needed for that industrialization and as marginal laborers for companies.

The Japanese government and the Government-General aimed to nullify the nationalism of the Korean people that came out of the March 1st Movement, but instead, opportunities for national and social activism among Korean people spread. Thus, they were forced to continue responding to Korean nationalism moving forward.

After the March 1st Movement was thwarted, ethnic nationalist affiliated movements preaching for the cultivation of actual power became energized (Robinson 2015a, b).²⁸ Within the ethnic nationalism movement, a living improvement movement and farmer education movement grew. Concerning the aforementioned cultural movement as well, it was mostly promulgated by ethnic nationalist intellectuals. Additionally, socialist movements were also energized, and activism diversified. Some socialist movement examples are movements to guide farmer tenancy disputes and create the Communist Party of Korea. Furthermore, along with the expanding of socialist activities, linkages were explored between ethnic nationalist leftwing adherents and socialists, and *Shingan-hwe* was formed as a united front organization.

Independence activity occurred abroad as well. In April 1919, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea established the Shanghai French Concession. In addition, Russia and the Manchuria region became the largest foreign hubs for the independence movement. And activity had continued from the from the 1910s onward. Moving forward, an intense resistance movement would continue until the 1940s.

²⁷ Department stores, movies, music, entertainment, etc. Many of these were established in Korea through the influx of Japanese capital.

²⁸ Nationalism movements split into rightwing ideologies that espoused a route to national reform and leftwing ideologies that espoused prompt independence.

Entering the 1930s, racial and social movements reached their high tide. But as a Japanese advance into mainland China became possible after the 1931 Mukden Incident, crackdowns on nationalism became strict and the Government-General began to press intellectuals to change their ideologies.

3.3 *The Late 1930s Onward: Towards a Wartime Framework*

Jiro Minami was installed as Governor-General of Korea in August 1936. In order to prepare for a Chinese invasion, he aimed to strengthen integration with the Japanese “populace” by constraining the Korean nationalist identity, mobilizing Koreans towards war, and unifying Korea and Manchuria. Then, when the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in July 1937, Minami promulgated the “Unity of Japan and Korea” idea and deployed a “Japanization policy” to galvanize Koreans to the war effort. He enforced shrine visiting, *Kyujo Yohai* (worshipping the Imperial House from afar), and reciting of the *Kokokushinmin no Seishi* (Oath of the Imperial Subject) at schools and the workplace. Moreover, he infused the *Kokutai* (National Polity) concept through the introduction of a special army volunteer soldier system and established a system of executing military drills. And by revising the education system, he unified the Korean school system with Japan, changed the previously compulsory Korean language studies to optional curriculum, and increased the importance of “Japanese language studies.”²⁹

In February 1940, *Soshi-kaimei* (enforced change of family system and name from a Korean to a Japanese name) was established (Mizuno 2005). In place of the traditional family system in which the paternal “colloquial family name” was passed on to children and husbands and wives would each use their separate family name, Koreans were now made to establish an official family name serving as the title for the family register and apply that name equally to the husband, wife, and children. This was a policy that forced a change in the family system. Registering an official family name was enforced systemically. Changing names was optional, but there were many cases in which Koreans were forced to use a Japanese style name.

In January 1938, peace negotiations between Japan and the Chinese government broke down, decisively signaling that war would be a prolonged affair. The National Mobilization Law was issued in Japan in April of that year and in the following month in Korea. Based in this law, the Korean Federation for National Spiritual Mobilization was formed in July. It was integrated with the administrative agency as a supplementary institution to the Government-General. Furthermore, under this, Patriotic Units were established, comprised of about ten households as a public implementation organization for the Japanization policy. In addition to striving for the normalization and thorough implementation of the aforementioned Japanization

²⁹ However, compulsory education was not introduced even up to the end of the colonial period, and “Japanization” education also never exceeded a limited rollout.

policies, these units were set up to be mutual surveillance groups in which community residents surveilled each other. In October 1940, corresponding to the Imperial Rule Assistance Movement in Japan, the Korean Federation for National Spiritual Mobilization was renamed and revised into the Korean Federation of Total Warfare. In Korea at this time, war mobilization that made use of the mass culture formed in the 1930s was also implemented.

When the Asia–Pacific War commenced in December 1941, Japanese troop deficiency became a clear reality, and urgency was placed on the construction of a system to mobilize Koreans as a means to enhance and supplement war strength. In May 1942, the implementation of a conscription system in Korea was approved by the Cabinet. Actual conscription began after alteration to military service laws in July of the next year.

In addition, a special youth training system to deploy preparatory education to turn preschool children into soldiers and military industry laborers, the special naval voluntary soldier system, and the student volunteer soldier system were also unfurled, and mobilization for student war participation among Korean volunteer soldiers commenced.

Following the prolonging of war, the labor force within Japan became severely depleted. Therein, the Japanese government formed a plan to mobilize labor in Japan and its outer territories through the issuance of the National Mobilization Law and the 1939 National Requisition Ordinance. Initially through the format of “recruiting” (which was actually coercive) and later through the format called *kan-assen* (government-coordinated recruitment), Korean laborers were forced into grueling work in land and lumber, coal mines, and ore mines (later expanded to metals, chemicals, aircrafts, transport, etc.) (Tonomura 2012).

From 1941 onward, many Koreans were pressed into civilian work in the military and mobilized to places like China, Southeast Asia, and the southern sea islands. In 1944, mobilization commenced for both student and female labor. Furthermore, there were also “comfort women” for the Japanese military who were made to interact sexually with officers and soldiers at Japanese military brothels that had been constructed with direct and indirect assistance by the military in Japan, China, and Southeast Asia from the Second Sino-Japanese War onward.

From among the ranks of Korean intellectuals who had previously served in leadership positions in national and social movements, there were many intellectuals cooperative to Japan who took an accommodating stance towards the country. They placed their hopes in being allowed to retain ethnic autonomy by cooperating with Japan, but those hopes ended in disappointment. Meanwhile, there were also movements that directly resisted Japanization policy. These included the energizing of activity by socialists, resistance to the culture of shrine visiting, and the spreading of rumors among common citizens (Miyata 1985).

Up to its final days, Japanese colonial rule would come to a close without ever resolving its contradictions.

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From the Concept of Postwar Order to the Cold War System



Yasuhiro Matsuda, Ayako Kusunoki, and Tadashi Kimiya

1 From the Postwar to the Cold War

1.1 *Civil War in China*

1.1.1 Causes of the Chinese Civil War

Although the Republic of China (ROC) won the Second Sino-Japanese War, the national economy was exhausted, and the war was derided as a “Pyrrhic victory” (Pepper 1978, Chaps. 1–2). The defeated Japanese puppet government and the ROC government and Communist Party of China (CPC), both led by the Kuomintang (KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party), confronted each other with their own spheres of governance, people, and armies. The victors, the ROC and the CPC, began a struggle for supremacy over China after Japan’s withdrawal. This led to the Chinese Civil War fought between the ROC, led by the KMT, and the CPC. However, as one side had the backing of the U.S. and the other the backing of the Soviet Union, it can be said that it was an international civil war that anticipated the Cold War.

After Japan’s defeat in the war, with the mediation of the United States, which did not want a civil war, the two parties signed the Double Tenth Agreement on October 10, 1945, which set the basic policy of postwar China. The two parties agreed on the peaceful founding of the nation, “peaceful and democratic reunification of China,” and the “avoidance of civil war. However, problematic issues such as the area of the

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liberated zone governed by the CPC and the handling of CPC-affiliated troops were postponed, and the country continued to remain divided.

In June 1946, the ROC Army invaded the New Fourth Army area in Huazhong in large numbers, and the Nationalist-Communist Civil War began in earnest (the New Fourth Army Incident). Initially, the ROC Army, which boasted superiority in terms of numbers, continued to have the upper hand. On the other hand, the CPC reorganized its forces into the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in February 1947 and attempted to resist, but was repeatedly defeated. Stalin had chosen the initially superior Chiang Kai-shek as his partner. The Soviet Union provided military support to the CPC but did not predict or expect eventual victory.

On the other hand, the KMT and its allies proceeded unilaterally with the constitutional process, holding a National Assembly in November 1946 and enacting the Constitution of the Republic of China (Matsuda 2006 Chap. 1). While the ROC continued its civil war with the CPC, it shifted to a constitutional government in 1947, forcing the election of representatives to the National Convention and legislators under the new constitution. Chiang Kai-shek was elected president at the National Assembly, but the CPC and its allies were completely excluded from the transition process of the constitutional government. Chiang Kai-shek tried to strengthen the legitimacy of the country as a democratic nation and win support at home and abroad, but the forceful election resulted in a split within the KMT, and the democratization of the country, in which the leading political forces for democracy were eliminated by force, did not strengthen support at home and abroad.

1.2 From the “Three Major Campaigns” to the Conquest of the Entire Country

Initially, the ROC Army had the upper hand, but after June 1947, the situation gradually reversed, and decisive progress was made in three military campaigns in late 1948 (Pepper 1978, Chap. 9). In the PLA, these are known as the “Three Major Campaigns.” The first was the Liaoshen Campaign (September 11 to November 2, 1948), a major decisive battle in the northeastern region centering on Shenyang, Liaoning Province. The ROC Army, which had maneuvered over a long distance, was met in battle by the PLA, which had had ample preparation. In the end, the PLA annihilated 470,000 ROC Army troops and succeeded in capturing the northeastern region, and the wheels of the ROC Army began to turn. This was followed by the Huaihai Campaign (November 6, 1948 to January 10, 1949: known in Taiwan as the Battle of Hsupeng). The Huaihai Campaign was a decisive battle in the Zhongyuan (Central Plain) area, where the major transportation routes from east to west and north to south intersected. On this occasion, the PLA's Zhongyuan Field Army and East China Field Army defeated 550,000 ROC Army troops. Finally, there was the Pingjin Campaign (November 29, 1948 to January 31, 1949). This was an offensive and defensive battle between Beiping (another name for Beijing) and Tianjin.

Here, the PLA launched an all-out attack against Beijing and Tianjin, which were defended by an ROC Army numbering 520,000 that had withdrawn from the Liaoshen Campaign.

In Beijing, the ROC Army negotiated with the PLA for a “bloodless” victory. (Pepper 1978, Chap. 9) The CPC raised the issue of peace negotiations and put pressure on Chiang Kai-shek, the advocate of war. As a result, Chiang Kai-shek stepped down from his duties as president in January 1949, and the advocates of peace proceeded with peace negotiations with the CPC. However, the “peace agreement” proposed by the CPC contained a list of unilateral demands that amounted to a “demand for total surrender,” which led the peace faction of the KMT to reject peace with the CPC.

With the peace negotiations in limbo, on April 21, 1949, Mao Zedong and PLA commander-in-chief Zhu De issued the order for all troops to advance, and they crossed the Yangtze River. The war was no longer over, and on April 24, they succeeded in capturing the capital city of Nanking (Nanjing). On October 1, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established.

The PLA steadily continued to occupy and exert its control over Mainland China. However, the PRC maintained the status quo in Hong Kong and Macau in order to avoid a decisive confrontation with the United Kingdom, which believed that it was possible to embrace the PRC, and in response, the United Kingdom recognized the PRC the following January 1950. In May 1951, the PLA moved into Lhasa, Tibet, and in the first half of 1950, the CPC’s power in Mainland China was established.

1.3 Causes of CPC Victory and the Impact of the Chinese Civil War

At the outbreak of the civil war, there was a more than threefold difference between both sides in terms of military power alone, but the CPC won the war. The PRC’s publications tend to emphasize the moral righteousness of the CPC, which represented “democracy and peace,” and the disaffection caused by the reaction, arrogance, and corruption of the KMT, aided by “U.S. imperialism,” as well as the terrorist attacks on leftist intellectuals. On the other hand, KMT publications tend to emphasize international factors, such as “inadequate” U.S. support for the ROC and the Soviet Union’s covert military support for the CPC.

Inflation, unemployment, and corruption during the postwar turmoil, along with internal disunity, caused the ROC to lose its credibility and fail to mobilize the civil war-averse public and the international community into a war against the CPC, despite its victories against external enemies. The CPC, on the other hand, took advantage of this social unrest and, through “land reforms,” succeeded in mobilizing the peasantry and others militarily (Pepper 1978).

In addition, factors that contributed to the CPC’s victory include the fact that the CPC had more military support in the Soviet-occupied northeast (the former

Manchuria) than the ROC had expected; that the CPC was able to use northern Korea, which had been occupied by the Soviet Union, as a strategic hinterland; and that the U.S.'s military support for the ROC, which wanted to continue peace negotiations, was insufficient.

After the formation of the PRC, the ROC under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek moved to Taiwan in December 1949 and developed a plan to counterattack the mainland. The PRC, on the other hand, stood for the "liberation of Taiwan" and the two sides continued to confront each other militarily. However, with the Korean War, the division and confrontation of the Chinese nation across the Taiwan Strait became fixed.

In Taiwan, the KMT became a one-party dictatorship in which an alien minority ruled over a large number of mainland Chinese who had been subjected to Japanese colonial rule. Also, the establishment of the Communist regime in Mainland China also enabled the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to attempt to reunify the country by invading the south with logistical support, which led to the Korean War.

2 The Allied Occupation of Japan and the 1951 Peace Settlement

2.1 The U.S. Occupation of Japan

Japan's surrender to the Allied Powers in early August 1945 in the form of acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration enabled the U.S. government to exclusively exert its influence on the Occupation of Japan for more than six years. Formally, the authority of the General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP), was under the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) in Washington, the decision-making body organized by 11 Allied countries including Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council for the occupation policy, while the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ), an advisory body to the SCAP composed of the U.S., the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, and China, was established in Tokyo. However, the U.S. government was often able to carry out its policy intentions by invoking its veto power or emergency interim directive power in the FEC.

The presence of Douglas MacArthur, nominated as the SCAP, further strengthened the character of the U.S. occupation. Driven by a strong sense of duty, with the belief that transforming militaristic Japan into a democratic and peaceful nation was a noble God-given mission, together with his incredible political sense, MacArthur shortly succeeded in establishing authority over the Japanese people and government based on his cooperative relationship with the Emperor Showa. Under his absolute power, Japan was largely isolated from the international situation as well as U.S. domestic politics and concentrated on demilitarization and democratic reforms (Schaller 1985; Cohen and Iriye 1990; Fukunaga 2021).

2.2 *Demilitarization and Democratization Reforms*

The U.S. government believed that Japan's ability to wage war must be destroyed so that it would never again attempt to challenge the international order, and that the political, economic, and social systems that had become breeding grounds for militarism must be transformed into free and democratic systems. The enforcement of demilitarization, including the arrest of war criminals, the dismantling of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, and the purge of the people that was identified to be responsible for the Asia Pacific War, was launched at the beginning of the occupation, followed by democratic reforms.

The formulation of the 1947 Constitution was the highlight of the series of occupation reforms. The reluctance of the Japanese government to revise the Meiji Constitution made the Government Section of GHQ determine to draft the new Constitution that would provide more freedom and equality to the people. The process by which the Japanese government was virtually forced to accept the U.S.-made Constitution damaged its legitimacy in postwar Japan. On the other hand, the emperor as a "symbol" without political power, the parliamentary cabinet system, and basic human rights was institutionally guaranteed, which in the long run facilitated liberal democracy as norm in the Japanese society. Reforms in the political sphere, such as the amendment of the Election Law to allow women's suffrage or the enactment of the Diet Law that stipulated the supremacy of the Diet over administrative organs, and the social and economic reforms represented by the expansion of labor rights or land reform, along with the dismantling of zaibatsu and anti-trust policies, supported this norm on the outer fringes of the Constitution. And Article 9, stipulating the renunciation of war, became the foundation of postwar Japanese foreign policy (Dower 1999; Iokibe 2007; Miller 2019).

Major demilitarization and democratization reforms were completed within about two years, and after around 1947–1948, the U.S. began to focus on stabilizing and rebuilding the Japanese economy. The shift in occupation policy coincided with the growing tensions between the East and the West both in Europe and Asia, and thus took an ideological hue. While the economic revival was a necessary step that had been envisioned by the U.S. government when it formulated its occupation policy for Japan during the war, the program of rebuilding the Japanese economy was accompanied by the consolidation of state power lest Japan should fall into communist hands, which was based on the U.S. government's policy toward Japan (NSC 13/2), a very product of George F. Kennan's containment policy. This is why it is called the "reverse course." (Schaller 1985; Gaddis 2005; Kennan 2020).

The U.S. government undertook economic stabilization program for Japan in the end of 1948, and Joseph M. Dodge, president of the Bank of Detroit, dispatched to Tokyo, provided the Yoshida Shigeru cabinet guidance on a financial and monetary contraction policy, including the fixing the exchange rate to 360 yen to one U.S. dollar. The Dodge Line, a series of drastic policies for Japan designed to promote its economic independence trying to eliminate subsidies, government loans, and multiple exchange rates, rapidly brought the inflation that had plagued occupied Japan

to a halt. In the long run, this had the effect of promoting management rationalization and fostering international competitiveness, along with the easing of the reparations policy, the GARIOA and EROA program, the limited resumption of private trade, as well as the moderating the antitrust policies also implemented between 1947 and 1949. It is important to note that the Yoshida cabinet decisively carried out this drastic policy, although the Dodge Line created a severe depression and social unrest in Japan in the short term. Yoshida's Liberal Party, with its roots in prewar political parties, adapted to the demilitarization and democratic reforms and won the general election in January 1949 with a comfortable majority after the collapse of center-left coalition governments with all-out support from the Government Section. From the U.S. perspective, the goal of nurturing Japan as a member of the West could be supported by indigenous anti-communist groups. The cooperative relationship between the U.S. government and conservative forces thus created would become the driving force behind Japan's long-term conservative rule (Gordon 1993; Kusunoki 2013; Miller 2019).

2.3 The Choice of Majority Peace

Another theme of the second half of the occupation was the peace treaty with Japan. In order to clarify Japan's national responsibility for the Asia Pacific War, it was necessary for the Allied powers to create a punitive peace treaty to Japan. On the other hand, the peace treaty also had to prevent the next war: many U.S. and British leaders shared the view that the Treaty of Versailles after World War I was too harsh on the defeated Germany, which foreshadowed the emergence of Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany, consequently leading to World War II. The "lessons of the past" for the Allies were serious for Japan as well, since the enforcement of peace by the victors on the losers could plunge the latter into national bankruptcy, obviously shown in Germany. That is why the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began preparatory studies for a peace treaty at the start of the occupation.

The balance between the conflicting demands of punitiveness and non-punitiveness was tilted heavily in favor of the latter by the Cold War. Peace drifted away as the environment for an agreeable peace with Japan between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was largely lost, and the demands that would have been included in a peace treaty in the past were accomplished through a prolonged occupation. More than that, the U.S. Cold War strategy determined the nature of the peace treaty—rather than seeking to hold Japan accountable for the war, the U.S. government placed more importance to welcoming Japan into the Western camp through the peace treaty with Japan and building the security framework for non-Communist countries in the Asia Pacific region. The Harry S. Truman administration negotiated with the Allies on a policy of "soft peace" that would not impose political, economic, or military restrictions on Japan and would waive reparations. Meanwhile, the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949 and the breakout of the Korean War in June 1950 increased Japan's strategic value, necessitated U.S. long-term strategic

control of Okinawa and the Ogasawaras, the stationing of U.S. forces on the Japanese mainland for the defense of Japan as well as the entire Asia Pacific region, and the rearmament of Japan itself as conditions for peace for the U.S. military (Schaller 1985; Kusunoki 2013).

Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru decided to stake Japan's future on the U.S.-led peace process. In Japan, left-wing political parties and intellectuals advocated the "Three Principles of Peace"—peace with all Allied countries, neutralization of postwar Japan, and opposition to military bases for any foreign forces—which later became "Four Principles of Peace," adding one more principle, the opposition to Japan's rearmament. Yet the overall peace was not feasible as long as the Cold War continued, although it was undeniably ideal, and virtually meant the duration of the occupation which had been already prolonged for more than four years and begun eroding the spirit of independence within the Japanese people. Therefore, he believed that Japan should restore its independence as soon as possible through concluding the peace treaty with countries of the willing, or the Western countries. As one of the prominent anglophiles, Yoshida considered that Japan would be able to regain its international status and pursue its survival in cooperation with the United States and other liberal countries.

It was inevitable that Yoshida decided Japan's dependence on the United States for its security after the occupation. Considering that the Cold War nearly plunged the United Nations into dysfunction, and Japan's geographical environment did not allow it to choose neutrality, Yoshida reached the conclusion that Japan, with the Peace Constitution, had no choice but to look to the U.S. for defense guarantees, which could be ensured by offering military bases in the Japanese mainland to U.S. forces. This was the very decision from the realistic viewpoint of international relations, but interestingly, Yoshida was negative to rebuild Japan's own forces for self-defense before the peace process ended. While he thought that Japan needed rearmament as a sovereign nation in the future, he feared that it would place a significant burden on the fragile Japanese economy at that moment. Seeing communism as a political rather than a military threat, it was more realistic fear for him that economic instability would trigger social unrest, which would be exploited by Communists and consequently hand Japan over to Communist camps from within.

A security agreement between Japan and the U.S. with the provision of bases at its core and the future rearmament of Japan were agreed upon, through negotiations between both governments from the end of January to February 1951. Although Japan and the U.S. were severely divided over the issue of rearmament, the U.S. side decided to proceed with the peace negotiations after confirming the Yoshida administration's intention to build a self-defense capability (Kusunoki 2009; Pyle 2018; Miller 2019).

2.4 *Peace Treaty with Japan and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty*

It was not necessarily an easy task for the Japanese government to accept the Peace Treaty with Japan, signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951. Besides overseas properties held in the Allied countries to be generally seized, Japan was required to provide its assets held in neutral countries to the International Red Cross for the purpose of appropriating them to compensate captive Allied servicemen. As for territory, Japan was supposed to renounce all right, title, and claim to all overseas territories as well as the Kuril Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin, and Okinawa and the Ogasawara Islands were not returned to the mainland at this stage, although they were designed to be interpreted as potentially sovereign to Japan. Furthermore, the arrangements for territorial treatments were rather ambiguous—the scope of rights, title, and claims to be renounced by Japan was not always clear, and the destination of these claims was not specified, which constituted one of the origins of the territorial disputes between Japan and its neighbors.

At a time when the memory of the war was still fresh in the minds of the Allies, it was probably impossible to completely erase the “punitive” nature of the peace treaty. The very fact that power was still a decisive factor in international politics made it inevitable for countries concerned to accept the borders drawn by the powers at the end of the war. Nevertheless, in principle the San Francisco Peace Treaty imposed no political, economic, or military restrictions on Japan, and restrained demands on the Japanese government regarding claims and reparations, without mentioning Japan’s responsibility for the Asia–Pacific War. The idea of creating a legitimate order even for the losers was injected into the system of power politics, however imperfect it was, the Peace Treaty with Japan can be regarded as a “fair and generous treaty” (Eldridge 2001; Hara 2015; Kawashima and Hosoya 2022).

The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, concluded on the same day as the Peace Treaty with Japan, was an unequal arrangement for Japan in that obligations and rights between both countries were conspicuously asymmetrical. Above all, Japan was obliged to provide bases in the Japanese mainland to the U.S., while the U.S. forces stationed in Japan were not necessarily required to defend Japan. Regardless of the text of the treaty, the presence of a certain size of U.S. military power in Japan was expected to function as deterrence against the Soviet Union, but the fact that formally no mutual defense relationships existed between both countries was understood as a flaw in the treaty in Japanese political and diplomatic circles, along with the arrangements that the U.S. forces stationed in Japan could be used to suppress civil unrest and disturbances, and the term of the treaty was not set. Furthermore, the possibility that the U.S. military bases in Japan would be used for international peace and stability in the Far East, the most important role from the U.S. point of view, gave rise to fears of entrapment among Japanese. The gap between the perceptions and sensitivities of Japan and the U.S. over text of the treaty as well as the role of the U.S. forces in Japan became an intrinsic destabilizing factor in the Security Treaty, casting a shadow over U.S.-Japan relations in the 1950s (Packard 1966; Kusunoki 2009).

The Soviet Union and other eastern countries participated in the peace conference but did not sign the treaty. China, whose legitimacy was disputed by the Communist and Kuomintang governments, was not invited, and the Japanese government opted to make peace with the Kuomintang government, finalized as the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Republic of China in April 1952. This was because it was deemed difficult to establish diplomatic relations with the Communist China that had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union and was at war with UN forces supporting North Korea, but it is also undeniable that the U.S. government strongly desired Japan's peace with the KMT regime. India and Burma did not come to the peace conference. Diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian countries necessitated at first negotiations over reparations, which they were exceptionally recognized the right to claim in the form of the services of the Japanese people in production. As a result of the priority given to welcoming Japan into the Western camp, it can be said that the Peace Treaty with Japan did not necessarily have an immediate effect on building relations between Japan and its neighboring countries.

Nevertheless, the peace treaty enabled Japan to be linked to the international monetary and free trade system and to enjoy the security and economic assistance provided by the U.S, which had the effect of promoting Japan's economic recovery and supporting political and social stability in the long run. At the same time, the Peace Treaty served as a framework for building relations among the nations constituting and involved in the Asia-Pacific region, ensured by several security agreements that the United States concluded with non-Communist countries in the region, including Japan. The Peace treaty and mutual defense arrangements consequently functioned as a "system" that maintained the regional order and complemented the collective security system of the United Nations and the free trade system. One obstacle to the sustainability of the "system" was Japan's domestic desire for "independence" from the U.S., or for neutrality from the East-West conflicts, especially among leftist forces. The other was the issues that were not necessarily addressed in the peace treaty: when concepts that were excluded from the design of the peace treaty, such as compensation for individuals and apology and remorse for Japan's colonial rule, are introduced into interstate relations, the framework of the "system" is no longer able to handle them. By the 1990s, when human rights norms became mainstream and nationalism in Northeast Asian countries grew stronger against the backdrop of economic development, the function of the peace treaty as a "system" may have reached its limits.

3 The Korean War

3.1 Divided Occupation by the U.S. And the Soviet Union and the Establishment of the North–South Divided Regimes

In August 1945, the Korean Peninsula was liberated from 35 years of Japanese colonial rule. However, it was not an immediate independence. This is because the United States and the Soviet Union had already agreed to divide and occupy the peninsula along the 38th parallel. Since the U.S. and the Soviet Union were already engaged in a struggle for hegemony over the postwar world order, there was a high possibility that the divided occupation would result in the establishment of a divided state. However, even within Korea, there were divisions carved into society in the process of modernization under Japanese colonial rule. Specifically, there were splits caused by people's relative cooperation or clear resistance to the Japanese rule, as well as class divisions between landowners and peasants, as well as capitalists and laborers. At the same time, it should also be noted that these social divisions were politicized as the left–right conflict over the anti-Japanese national independence movement. These splits in the domestic political and social spheres and the U.S.-Soviet divided occupation, which intensified the inter-Korea conflict, aggravated each other, and in 1948, the Republic of Korea (ROK), an anti-communist South Korea, was established south of the 38th parallel under U.S. military rule, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), a communist North Korea, was established north of it under Soviet occupation. These two nations existing in parallel formed a divided system in which each asserted its own exclusive legitimacy.¹

3.2 Outbreak, Development, and Consequences of the Korean War

Despite the establishment of the North–South divided regimes, both the North and the South shared the position that they had the legitimacy to govern the entire Korean Peninsula and that the other side was merely a puppet of a major power. Therefore, neither side was content to maintain the status quo, and both sought opportunities for reunification, even if it meant mobilizing their military forces. However, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which were cautious about becoming embroiled in a war, sought to restrain both sides. But with the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the 1949 Chinese Civil War and the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Josef Stalin of the Soviet Union allowed Kim Il Sung, the North Korean leader to invade the South on the condition that they would gain the support of China. Stalin

¹ For a study that seeks to trace the origins of the Korean War to the social and political cleavages in Korea caused by the Japanese colonial rule, see (Cumings 1981).

aimed to expand international communism across the entire Korean Peninsula and even to Japan, while Kim Il Sung aimed to achieve the reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

China was cautious, wanting to prioritize the opportunity to invade Taiwan to achieve one China, but in the end, Mao Zedong decided to give substantial support to North Korea's invasion of the South by sending back Korean troops who had participated in the Chinese Civil War. This was because Mao Zedong regarded the Korean War as an extension of the Chinese Civil War (Shen and Xia 2020). As a result, the Korean War began on June 25, 1950, with the aim of North Korea's invasion of the South and military reunification.² However, North Korea claimed that it was only responding to aggression directed upon itself, a position it still maintains to this day.³

South Korea was founded with rightist Rhee Syngman as its first president. While leftist forces were originally dominant in the country, the U.S. military government suppressed them, and a rightist government was established. South Korea was inferior to North Korea in terms of political stability and military and economic power. Therefore, immediately after the outbreak of the war, North Korea's invasion of the South was successful, and the reunification was imminent. As such, in order to defend South Korea, the U.S. convened the U.N. Security Council in the absence of the Soviet Union, which was one of the permanent members having veto, and formed the United Nations Forces with the other 15 like-minded nations, including the U.K, France, and so on., to participate in the war. As the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union intensified, the U.S. sought to change its policy in the wake of the Korean War, from the traditional defensive "containment" against the Soviet Union to a "roll back" to counter the expansion of communism by military means and to retake the areas that had been under the Soviet influence. In addition to pushing the North Korean army back to the north, it also invaded the north across the 38th parallel and closed in on the China-North Korean border (Cumings 1990).

Faced with a threat to its own security, China brought the Chinese People's Voluntary Army into the war and pushed the UN forces back to the south. As a result, after more than two years of back-and-forth fighting across the 38th parallel, the UN forces, the Korean People's Army (North Korean Army), and the Chinese People's Voluntary Army signed the Korean War Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953, and the Military Demarcation Line, which roughly coincided with the 38th parallel, was established, marking a "ceasefire" in the Korean War (Foot 1990). Syngman Rhee was dissatisfied with the failure to achieve the reunification and chose not to sign the agreement, although he did not want to hinder its effectiveness. Later, however, the South Korean government changed its position that the South Korean army was a party to the agreement because it had acted in unison with the UN forces. Thus, while this "ceasefire" served to halt the Korean War, no peace treaty or peace agreement

² For an analysis of the relationship between the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea over the start of the Korean War, see (Wada 2014)..

³ For an introduction to the history of the Korean War by North Korea itself, see *Echoes of the Korean War* (1996).

has yet been signed to legally end the war. Both South Korea and North Korea went on to firmly establish different political and economic systems, and based on these systems, pitted the rivalling systems of South and North against each other. With South Korea's sustained development, political democratization, and the end of the global Cold War, the regime competition ended in favor of South Korea. However, as North Korea has chosen to avoid South Korean-led reunification and prioritize the survival of its own regime, the North–South division will continue.

3.3 Legacy of the Korean War

The Korean War broke out when Kim Il Sung of North Korea, with the support of China and the Soviet Union, attempted to overcome division and achieve the reunification by military means. The U.S. along with other U.N. forces and China's People's Volunteer Army joined the war, turning it into an international war. The Soviet Union also got involved in a limited way by deploying air force pilots. In addition, Douglas MacArthur, the United Nations Forces Commander, advised the U.S. President Harry Truman to drop atomic bombs not only on North Korea but also on major cities in northern parts of China and the Far East Soviet Union. If this had been done, it would have inevitably led to the Third World War. In the end, however, this option was not chosen, and the battlefield was limited to the Korean Peninsula (Wada 2014).

For the Korean Peninsula, the entire land became a battlefield and was left in ruins. In addition, the war caused a great loss of human lives, including 1.3 million South Koreans and 2.5 million North Koreans including not only the military but also civilians, or more than 10 percent of the total population of the Korean Peninsula. What is more, because it was a civil war in which Koreans massacred Koreans and because many areas had been occupied and controlled by both North and South Korea, civilians were also killed in those areas (Cumings 2010). These experiences resulted in the subsequent strengthening of the dictatorial political systems of North and South Korea. In South Korea, the existence of all leftist forces was outlawed, and in North Korea, Kim Il Sung purged and exiled his political rivals and opponents. This further strengthened the dictatorships of Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung.

In 1953, the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea was signed, and the U.S. and South Korea became allies, with U.S. forces continuing to be stationed in South Korea in case of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese troops stationed in North Korea were withdrawn in 1958, but North Korea concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with both the USSR and China in 1961. In this way, the Cold War system on the Korean Peninsula was further solidified with the establishment of a system in which Japan and the United States supported South Korea, and China and the Soviet Union supported North Korea.

3.4 The Korean War and Japan/East Asia

When the Korean War broke out, Japan was under the U.S. occupation and had no choice but to become involved in the Korean War under the leadership of the GHQ (General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the United Nations), the main body responsible for the occupation of Japan. Above all, Japan became a sortie base as the U.S. forces in Japan entered the war. It also served as a logistics base for the production and supply of goods necessary for the war effort, given that the war dragged on for more than three years. In this way, Japan, which was supposed to be a “peaceful nation” according to the terms of demilitarization under the Constitution of Japan that had been enforced in 1947, was transformed into a “base state” with the Korean War (Nam 2016). In addition, it has become clear in recent years that UN forces mobilized hundreds of Japanese working at U.S. military bases for the war effort, resulting in at least 58 war dead (Fujiwara 2020, p. 318). What is more, the “special procurement for Korea” that accompanied the war contributed greatly to Japan’s postwar economic recovery.

And the war led to the “rearmament” of Japan with the Police Reserve Force, the National Safety Forces, and the Japan Self-Defense Forces, as well as the conclusion of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, which led to Japan’s deep integration into the anti-communist block led by the United States. Because of Japan’s historical experience of invading and ruling Korea, Japan and South Korea did not enter into a formal alliance, but a relationship was established in which Japan would help ensure to South Korea’s economic development and political stability through economic cooperation, and to South Korea’s superiority in the regime competition between North and South Korea.

Furthermore, the Korean War had a profound impact on East Asian international relations with China, and thereafter became the direct origin of the Cold War between the United States and China in the 1950s and 1960s. Immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. dispatched the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait and imposed a blockade of the strait to suppress any chance of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Thereafter, the U.S. and Chinese armies exchanged fire as the main forces of both sides in the Korean War. And even after the armistice, the Korean Peninsula became part of the Cold War between the U.S. and China, with the U.S. and China serving as the backers of the militarily opposed South and North Korea, respectively.

4 Taiwan Strait Crisis: An “Extension” of the Chinese Civil War

4.1 *The 1954–55 Crisis: The First Taiwan Strait Crisis*

After 1949, the civil war in China continued across the Taiwan Strait, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) calling for the unification of China through the “liberation of Taiwan,” and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan calling for the unification of China through counterattacks on the mainland (Lin 2016, Chap. 8). The reality of the “Cold War in Asia” was that, even though it was a Cold War system on a global basis, locally, the goals were “national unification” and the “accomplishment of revolution,” and many actors were waging a heated battle for victory. With the Korean War, the United States declared the neutralization of the Taiwan Strait and had its Seventh Fleet patrol it constantly.

The PRC became a nationwide regime, but it exterminated 2.4 million people between 1950 and 1953 through a campaign to eliminate the remaining forces, including the ROC’s regular army and guerrilla forces. The PRC neutralized the former Kuomintang (KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party) forces through the establishment of a national surveillance system, as well as ceaseless political struggles, such as the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and the Three-anti and Five-anti Campaigns.

In Taiwan, the KMT rebuilt its one-party dictatorship, and its efforts to eliminate the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) infiltration efforts went too far, leading to a major purge known as the White Terror (Matsuda 2006, Chap. 4). Thus, a pair of divided states meant the birth of a pair of police states. The ROC launched a series of small-scale counterattacks on the mainland, including maritime assault operations, but these were completely thwarted by the PRC.

The military confrontation across the Taiwan Strait continued, and the ROC attempted to use the Korean War to launch a counterattack on the mainland from the north, which was halted by the U.S. After the Korean War ceasefire in 1953, the PRC launched an offensive against the remote island areas off the coast of Zhejiang Province, which were then under ROC control. It took about a year from 1954 to successfully occupy this area. During this period, the United States even considered using nuclear weapons against the PRC, but both the United States and China continued to avoid direct conflict.

The PRC succeeded in driving out the ROC Army from the Zhejiang coast, but it also resulted in the Formosa Resolution and the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China (Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty), which encouraged closer security relations between the U.S. and ROC on Taiwan. The U.S. sent a navy escort to oversee the withdrawal from the above-mentioned islands (Garver 1999, this chapter).

In July 1955, Premier Zhou Enlai called for the “peaceful liberation” of Taiwan and for talks with the “responsible authorities in Taiwan’s provinces.” At the same time, Mao Zedong advocated the Hundred Flowers Campaign and allowed the democratic

factions allied in the struggle against the Kuomintang to criticize the Communist Party. In June 1956, however, Mao launched the Anti-Rightist Campaign, an all-out crackdown on dissenters. This may have been due to his fear that incidents in Eastern European countries such as Poland and Hungary against the socialist regime would also occur in the PRC, but on the other hand it also meant that compromise with the CPC would be dangerous for the KMT.

4.2 The 1958 Crisis: The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis

The Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty limited the territory of the ROC to be defended by the United States to Taiwan and the Penghu Islands and excluded the outlying islands off the coast of Fujian Province (such as the Kinmen/Jinmen Islands and Matsu/Mazu Islands) from the scope of defense.

Then, the PLA suddenly launched an intense artillery bombardment of the Kinmen and Matsu islands on August 23, 1958. In the 46 days between the start of the bombardment and the PRC's declaration of a unilateral ceasefire on October 6, the PLA launched a total of nearly 500,000 shells into the area around the Kinmen Islands, resulting in a total of 591 casualties for the ROC Army. However, the ROC held out against this attack, and the U.S. military supported the ROC Army while avoiding direct combat (Garver 1999, this chapter).

The war gradually became a stalemate. The U.S. military again seriously considered using nuclear weapons against the PRC. But the war between the two Chinese sides was more political. This time, the PLA's offensive to capture the Kinmen and Matsu islands failed to achieve its goal. The PLA shelled on odd-numbered days, switching to leaflet projectiles and temporarily increasing its shelling when politically necessary. Gradually, the ROC Army began shelling on even-numbered days, and the ritualistic bombardment with blanks continued for about 20 years until the normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC.

In July 1958, prior to the bombardment, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev visited China and met with Mao Zedong, but despite being an ally, the Soviet Union was not informed of the planned bombardment. The distrust toward China that grew in the Soviet Union at that time became the fuse for the later confrontation between China and the Soviet Union.

U.S. Secretary of State John F. Dulles stated in the Joint Communiqué (the Dulles-Chiang Communiqué) immediately after the 1958 crisis that Chiang Kai-shek had supposedly abandoned counterattacks on the mainland. However, it was only because "the use of force" was not the "the principal means," and Chiang Kai-shek did not give up counterattacks on the mainland (Garver 1999, this chapter).

In 1960, Chiang Kai-shek was elected to a third term, which was forbidden by the Constitution, and he continued to be president until his death in 1975, having been elected to a fifth term. Taiwanese society was caught up in the dream of Chiang Kai-shek and KMT to unite China, and the dark era of the White Terror and military mobilization continued.

4.3 *The 1962 Crisis*

Traditionally, the Taiwan Strait crisis has been regarded by the U.S. as a crisis of Taiwan's defense and the accompanying possibility of military conflict with the PRC. In fact, many of the military conflicts over the Taiwan Strait were initiated by the ROC. In particular, in 1962 the ROC almost launched a large-scale counterattack on the mainland led by Chiang Kai-shek (Garver 1999, Chap. 6).

The failure of the Great Leap Forward policy (1958–60) and a long drought caused a serious calamity in the PRC, where more than 30 million people are said to have died of starvation. The PRC was plagued by troubles both at home and abroad. Internationally, the Sino-Soviet relationship was destabilized, and the Sino-Indian War broke out due to a border dispute. This was an opportunity for Chiang Kai-shek to make a move.

The ROC proposed launching a large-scale counterattack on the mainland to the U.S. and requested its support. The U.S. administration of John F. Kennedy was opposed to any large-scale counterattack that could have resulted in Soviet intervention but supported a small-scale attack to hold the ROC together. The 1962 counterattack on the mainland was a well-prepared move but was frustrated when the U.S. cleverly forestalled it, forcing the ROC to switch to small-scale guerilla warfare (Garver 1999, this chapter).

On the other hand, the PLA crushed the ROC Army's assault in the southeast coastal region and also sank four ROC Navy ships. Furthermore, the PRC successfully conducted a nuclear test in October 1964, which made the ROC's mainland counterattacks more and more hopeless. The ROC Navy was defeated in naval battles in 1965, forcing Chiang Kai-shek to adopt a passive policy of waiting for a good opportunity to launch a counterattack on the mainland.

Just as 1958 was a turning point in which Chiang Kai-shek was forced to realize that military action by the PRC could not change the status quo, 1965 was a turning point in which the ROC was forced to realize that counterattacks on the mainland were virtually impossible.

The ROC's last attempt at a counterattack on the mainland was in 1967, when the ROC saw the Vietnam War as an "opportunity" and approached the Lyndon Johnson administration in the United States with a proposal for a counterattack on the mainland, which was rejected. The "extension" of the Chinese Civil War thus became unwinnable, and the diplomatic struggle for diplomatic recognition took center stage.

The extension of the Chinese Civil War also cast a large shadow on the internal affairs of the PRC and the ROC, respectively. In Taiwan, the hopeless dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek continued, and his eldest son, Chiang Ching-kuo, took over the reins of power. In the PRC, the wartime regime in the coastal areas was maintained through military confrontation with the ROC on Taiwan.

Although the PRC unilaterally ceased fighting on New Year's Day 1979, and the ROC unilaterally declared the end of the civil war in 1991, the hostilities between the

PRC and the ROC on Taiwan have not strictly ended yet since no ceasefire agreement has even been signed.

However, the move away from civil war changed both the PRC and ROC on Taiwan. For the PRC, the normalization of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and PRC led by Deng Xiaoping after 1978, Taiwan's peaceful reunification policy, and the Opening of the PRC were mutually complementary strategic packages. On the other hand, Taiwan's democratization in later years politically empowered the native Taiwanese who made up the majority in Taiwanese society, which was an indirect factor in the deterioration of relations with the PRC and the improvement of relations with Japan.

5 Alliances in the Asia–Pacific

5.1 *U.S. Security Treaties with Japan, the Philippines, Australian and New Zealand*

Alliances in the Asia–Pacific region, like those in Europe, were a product of the Cold War. However, the basic conditions differed from those in Europe in two respects. First, as a result of the Asia–Pacific War, the United States was able to enjoy predominance in the Pacific region, in contrast to Europe where the Soviet Union's massive land forces were barely balanced by U.S. nuclear capability. The other was the existence of Communist China, the only country other than Russia to achieve communist revolution. In George F. Kennan's containment strategy, the continental part of Asia was not necessarily strategically important for the United States, and the basic policy was to secure and strengthen the island chain from the Aleutian Islands through the Japanese archipelago to Okinawa and the Philippines. Nevertheless, with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and Communist China's entry into the war, the security of the southern Korean Peninsula was incorporated into the U.S. Cold War strategy, while the U.S.-China confrontation reached a point of no return. In addition to the Soviet Union, the challenge faced by the United States and other Western countries was how to reduce the authority and influence of the Chinese Communist Party in the Asia–Pacific region (Leffler 1992; Gaddis 2005).

The peace with Japan, pursued in the midst of the Korean War, constituted an integral part of the U.S. Cold War strategy to solidify the West. While welcoming Japan to the West through a generous peace treaty, the U.S. government decided to maintain and strengthen Japan's security and U.S. strategic interests, specifically through the continued presence of U.S. armed forces in Japan after the Occupation, the long-term control of Okinawa, and Japanese rearmament. The Truman administration considered forming a regional collective security framework, the Pacific Pact, between non-Communist countries in the region, including Japan, the U.S., and other Western countries, which was supposed to position U.S. military bases in Japan as well as Japan's self-defense capabilities as the measures to maintain peace

and stability in the Asia Pacific. In other words, the United States expected that the regional collective security framework would simultaneously satisfy the security of Japan and the security against Japan.

The Pacific Pact failed to gain the support of the Commonwealth countries and Japan, and as a result, the United States concluded the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, and the ANZUS Treaty from July to September 1951, respectively, along with the Peace Treaty with Japan. All three treaties were provisional arrangements pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area. Japan and Okinawa, providing the largest U.S. bases, functioned to support the forward deployment of U.S. forces in the entire Asia-Pacific region. The Peace Treaty virtually guaranteed that the United States had the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands; from around 1953, the U.S. military began to coercively construct and expand bases in Okinawa. Meanwhile, for mainland Japan, the Security Treaty, the Administrative Agreement on the U.S. use of facilities and areas in Japan, and the Notes Exchanged between Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and Secretary of State Dean Acheson, legally allowed U.S. forces' freedom of action in the Japanese region and the Far East. However, Japan's dissatisfaction with the 1951 Security Treaty, which did not oblige the United States to defend Japan, and various base problems caused by the stationing of U.S. forces, constituted one of the factors that generated anti-U.S. sentiments among Japanese. Establishing the stable bilateral security relationship under the Security Treaty posed a major challenge for the United States throughout the 1950s (Kusunoki 2009, 2016; Miller 2019).

5.2 Mutual Defense Treaties in the Mid-1950s

The sequence of events from 1953 until 1954, from the Korean War Armistice Agreement, the 1954 Geneva Conference, the Geneva Accords, and the first Taiwan Strait crisis, created and entrenched divisions in Asia, which was accompanied by individual and multilateral mutual defense treaties between the United States and non-Communist countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

Although Stalin's death in the spring of 1953 promoted armistice talks on the Korean War, President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea (ROK) was negative about the armistice agreement, which did not ensure the security of Korea and preferred to conclude a mutual defense treaty with the United States beforehand. The Eisenhower administration decided to enter into negotiations with the ROK lest Rhee's intransigence that would not rule out unilaterally using force might crumble the cease-fire. The two countries tentatively signed the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty in Seoul (officially signed in Washington on October 1), while the ROK government agreed to cooperate in the implementation of the armistice agreement and to place South Korean forces under the operational control of UN military commanders.

The primary objective of the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty was to maintain the armistice and prevent the recurrence of Communist attacks on the south. On the other hand, this treaty was limited to “territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other” (Article 3), which meant that the United States did not have the obligation to assist ROK if it attacked North Korea. As was the case with the ANZUS Treaty and the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, the preamble to this treaty, stating that both countries desired to strengthen their efforts for collective defense “pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area,” showed that this treaty was envisioned to eventually function as part of a collective security system in the Asia–Pacific region. However, the immediate goal of the United States was to maintain and strengthen ROK’s position as the peaceful settlement of the Korean question became stalled (Stueck 1995; Sakata 2005).

As the Indochina peace process got underway in the spring–summer of 1954 in the midst of the Communist offensive, the Eisenhower administration considered more vigorous measures to strengthen defense capabilities of non-communist countries in the Asia–Pacific as well as building a regional security system in order to prevent Indochina from falling into Communists’ hands and reduce China’s influence in the region. After discussions led by the United States and the United Kingdom on the cooperation for regional security between Southeast Asian countries and the West, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty was signed in Manila on September 8, 1954. Each of the member states (the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand) of the newly established Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) “recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes” (Article 4.1). The treaty area was defined as “the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties,” and “the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 min north latitude” (Article 8), which meant that non-member states, such as Indochinese countries, might be included in the treaty area. It was also designed to allow for the expansion of membership in the future.

SEATO gradually constructed its institutions and procedures throughout the 1950s, and advanced cooperation among member countries through meeting challenges such as economic development or the improvement of the ability to counter Communist subversion. The U.S. government emphasized SEATO’s greatest role to draw a line which, if crossed, would permit the member states to retaliate at the source of aggression and to do so with the support of other nations; it did not envision itself obligated to provide large-scale military or economic assistance to Asian countries or to deploy U.S. armed forces for the purpose of territorial defense in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the member countries did not always share common interests. When the political situation in Laos got destabilized in the late 1950s and early 1960s, they

were at odds over intervention, consequently leading SEATO's failure to undertake coordinated actions (Nishida 2016; Terachi 2021).

Taiwan became a focal point in the post-Indochina region as Communist China intensified its offensive against the KMT government through seizing island areas in the Taiwan Strait under Nationalist China's control around the spring of 1954. The formation of SEATO raised concerns that the KMT government, to which the U.S. had no treaty obligations, would be isolated in Asia. In September, the Peking government launched a massive bombardment of Kinmen Island. The U.S. government was inclined to conclude a mutual defense treaty with the KMT government for reassurance and deterrence, while avoiding escalation of the crisis. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China, signed on December 2, provided that both countries "recognize that an armed attack in the West Pacific area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes" (Article 5). The treaty was supposed to be applied to Taiwan and the Pescadores, the island territories in the West Pacific under U.S. jurisdiction, and "such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement" (Article 6). Both Kinmen and Matsu, areas validly under KMT control, were understood to be "such other territories," but the KMT's use of force in those areas was subject to consultation except in case of emergency, and the United States would not have the obligation to defend the Republic of China if it would resort to military actions beyond its territories without consultation. In other words, this Mutual Defense Treaty was given a dual function: the deterrence against Communist China and the prevention of ROC's attack on the mainland. Through the first Taiwan Strait Crisis and the conclusion of the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S. government confirmed military capability and the will of the Communist regime, inevitably pursuing the "two Chinas" policy (Tucker 1994a, b; Accinelli 1996; Matsumoto 1998).

While promoting bilateral or multilateral security frameworks with the United States as one party, the Eisenhower administration maintained the goal to establish a regional collective security system encompassing Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. The ROK, the Philippines, and the ROC also presented various visions of the cooperative security framework among non-communist countries in the region. Nevertheless, the NATO-type comprehensive regional collective security organization has never been realized in the Asia-Pacific region. Three factors should be mentioned. First, there was a deep-seated anti-Japanese sentiment in Asian countries, particularly in South Korea and the Philippines. Reconciliation between Japan and its neighboring countries slowly progressed through sluggish negotiations on reparations between Japan and Southeast Asian countries as well as on the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and ROK. Second, U.S. strategic interests were not necessarily shared with the countries concerned. The U.S. government expected to develop the defense capabilities of Asian countries to counter the Communist threat, but Japan, in particular, neither developed its self-defense forces at the scale and speed that the U.S. had hoped for, nor had little intention to contribute to the security of the entire region. Many countries in the region were expecting to obtain

Western economic assistance through regional cooperation. The degree to which the situation in the Taiwan Strait or Indochina was linked to their own security interests was not always the same, which impeded the Western countries in the region from reaching a consensus on collective defense.

Third, relations between European countries and newly independent Asian countries were also strained. Although the United Kingdom and France were indispensable to peace and stability in Southeast Asia as former colonial rulers with grave influence and interests in the region, their actions were perceived as colonialism by Asian countries and provoked opposition. In confused situations associated with nation-building processes in which nationalist movements driven by strong anti-colonialism directly or indirectly had connection with communist forces, it was not easy to identify “communist forces” as a threat. Many countries in the Asia–Pacific were eventually inclined to maintain and enhance their security relationships with the United States throughout the 1950s.

5.3 *Communist Alliances*

Security cooperation among Communist powers in Asia also took the form of a cluster of bilateral agreements. The Soviet Union and Communist China established mutual assistance in February 1950, followed by agreements between North Korea and other two powers in July 1961, respectively.

As it became clear that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would prevail in the Sino-Communist Civil War around the fall of 1948, relations between the Soviet Union and the CCP deepened. The cognitive framework of Mao Zedong and CCP leaders, based on revolutionary theory and their fundamental attitude to the growth in international tensions at that time, largely influenced CCP policy, propelling Mao’s concept of “leaning to one side” into the basic tendency and choice of the CCP’s leaders. After a series of secret talks and negotiations between the leaders, Mao visited Moscow in December 1949 and, finally, achieved the Sino-Soviet Friendship and Alliance Mutual Assistance Treaty on February 14. Both countries were supposed to “immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal,” if either of them was attacked by “Japan or by States allied with Japan” (Article 1). The treaty was explicitly against Japan and the United States, on the basis of which the Soviet Union initiated economic, financial, and military assistance to China. The establishment of the People’s Republic of China and its close relationship with the Soviet Union became the decisive factors that resulted in the Japanese government abandoning the idea of peace with all Allied countries. And the Korean War and the Chinese Volunteer Army’s participation in strengthened the Sino-Soviet alliance through demonstrating the CCP’s loyalty to the Soviet Union and the socialist camp.

While promising mutual assistance, the Treaty also reflected the power differential between China and the Soviet Union at the time. The Sino-Soviet Friendly Alliance Treaty between the Kuomintang regime and the Soviet Union in August 1945 was to expire with the establishment of the new Sino-Soviet Treaty in 1950; however,

both countries agreed that the Changchun Railway and the naval base at Port Arthur was to be handed over to PRC, and the treatment of Dalian would be decided only after the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan, which was envisioned around 1952. Moreover, the supplementary agreement on Northeastern China and Xinjiang stipulated that foreigners would be prohibited from owning management rights, or the activities of industrial, financial, commercial, and other enterprises, institutions, companies, and organizations in which third countries other than China and the Soviet Union and their citizens participated and invested in a direct or indirect manner would not be permitted. Mao Zedong, longing for Soviet military aid, accepted this Soviet request as a secret agreement. In addition to disagreements over Hong Kong and Taiwan, these issues suggested that the Sino-Soviet alliance was fraught with tension (Westad 1998; Chen 2001; Qing 2007).

North Korea had no formal treaties of an alliance nature with the Soviet Union as well as with China throughout the 1950s. The Soviet Union had almost complete control over North Korea; both China and North Korea were theoretically revolutionary regimes with identical principles, but in reality, they were independent ethnic groups whose cooperation was tense. Because both were in a position to look to Moscow for guidance, there were few direct inter-institutional channels between the two. China, however, backed by the close Sino-Soviet relationship, secured the initiative in the strategy and tactics of the Korean War, which instilled a sense of frustration in North Korea since they had no choice but to follow the CCP (Shen 2016).

The gradually escalated rivalry between China and the Soviet Union in the late 1950s increased North Korea's importance to both countries. After the complete withdrawal of Chinese troops from Korea in October 1958, Kim Il Sung, fearing an imbalance of military power between North and South Korea, requested a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance from the Soviet Union in January of the following year. While Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev pursued the improvement of relations with the United States, the PRC moved toward building relations with North Korea and other communist countries, driven by tensions in China's periphery that began around the summer of 1958—the second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the border dispute with India, and the fears of a fluid situation in Vietnam. In November 1959, China agreed to military aid with North Korea.

When the Sino-Soviet confrontation became more decisive in the summer of 1960, both countries offered economic and technical assistance, loans, and trade agreements to win over North Korea to their side. In July 1961, Kim Il Sung visited Moscow and succeeded in concluding the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. On his way back, he visited Beijing and concluded an almost identical treaty with the PRC. The two treaties stipulated mutual defense a prohibition on the formation of hostile alliances, or the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and in the spirit of friendly cooperation, with both the Soviet Union and China each assuming defense obligations toward the DPRK. The only significant difference was the validity period. While the Soviet-DPRK treaty was valid for a period of 10 years, the Sino-DPRK treaty would remain in force until the contracting

parties agreed on its amendment or termination. This meant that China assumed a stricter and more permanent obligation with regard to North Korea's security (Lüthi 2006; Shen 2016).

North Korea took advantage of the Sino-Soviet confrontation to extract maximum benefits from both sides in the form of aid and security. Through equidistant diplomacy toward the PRC and Soviet Union, Kim Il Sung further strengthened his political position within the Workers' Party of Korea as well as the DPRK. The presence of Communist China, an independent "great power" that had succeeded in revolution, was a major factor in shaping the Cold War structure and alliances in the Asia-Pacific region differently from those in Europe. On the other hand, while the alliances between the U.S. and the West in the Asia-Pacific region were strengthened and served as a basis for coordinating bilateral relations, the individual alliances among three Communist countries in Northeast Asia did not necessarily serve as a basis for bilateral relations.

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Kazuya Nakamizo and Hiroyoshi Kano

1 Decolonization of South Asia

The decolonization of British India can be summarised in the following three main points. First, independence was achieved through a movement based on non-violent principles and led by political parties; second, independence was achieved not through war but through a transfer of power; and third, independence took the form of a partition based on religious identity. This section first reviews the development of the independence movement, then examines the decision-making process behind the partitioning of India and Pakistan, and finally explains how the partition came about in practice and what its consequences were.

1.1 Development of the Independence Movement

1.1.1 Formation of the Indian National Congress

Section 3.2 described the process by which British colonial policy underwent a major shift after the Great Rebellion of 1857, leading to the strengthening of colonial rule and increasingly conservative policies. The second half of the nineteenth century was a period in which the impact of British social reforms dwindled and political organizations gradually emerged in major cities, mainly led by the Indian upper and middle class. Various proposals to bring these political organizations together on a pan-Indian scale emerged in the 1880s. Among these developments, A.G. Hume, a

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retired Indian Civil Service (ICS) officer, organized the Indian National Congress, which held its first session in Bombay in December 1885; this marked the birth of the Indian National Congress (hereinafter referred to as “Congress”).

The primary objective of the Congress was to create a sense of identity as “Indian” among the people of India. This identity development was based on promoting friendly relations among nationalists in different parts of India; developing and strengthening nationalism irrespective of caste, religion, or region of origin; bringing together the demands of the people and presenting them to the government; and finally (and most importantly) forging and organizing Indian public opinion.

The core of the Congress leadership comprised elites from Bombay and Calcutta who had studied in the 1860s and 1870s for the positions in the Indian Civil Service and legal professions. As such, participants were primarily English-educated urban upper and middle-class elites. At its inception, the organization was not a political party in essence. Meetings of the Congress were called literally “congress,” and they were little more than public debates or entertainment events held for three days at the end of the year.

In terms of policy, the Congress first called for the reform of the central and local legislative councils, which had been established as advisory bodies to the Viceroy, and the introduction of a limited representation system to the councils. With regards to administration, they called for the Indianisation of government officers. For the economy, they called for policies that would promote economic growth in India. However, the Congress movement remained an elite movement during this period. It had to wait for the arrival of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (Mahatma Gandhi) to expand its base and involve the masses.

1.1.2 Emergence of the Muslim League

The initial style of the Congress movement was mainly petition-based and was derided as a form of begging. However, the Congress gradually became more anti-British and actively campaigned against the partition of Bengal in 1905. The Muslim League (hereinafter the “League”), which later became the main force of the Pakistan movement, was formed during this period.

Although Hindus and Muslims fought together to re-establish the Mughal Dynasty, the development after the Great Rebellion of 1857 against British rule precipitated the disharmony between Hindus and Muslims. After the uprising, the British explicitly treated the Muslims coldly and favored the Hindus in an attempt to divide them. This situation heightened a sense of crisis for Syed Ahmad Khan, who started the Aligarh Movement as a Muslim reform movement. He argued that the future of Muslims lay in distancing themselves from the nationalist Congress and cooperating with the British through modern education programmes. He feared that since Hindus were the majority in India, if British rule was weakened or withdrawn, they would come to dominate the Muslims. Indeed, many leaders of the Congress were of Hindu Brahmin origin.

As a response to the movement against the Partition of Bengal in 1905, which was the largest since the Great Rebellion, the British supported to form the League as a political organization for Muslims in 1906. It was aimed to counter the influence of the Hindu-dominated Congress. Subsequently, accepting the League's demand, the Indian Councils Act was amended in 1909 to introduce separate electorates for the first time. This system created Muslim constituencies and restricted suffrage in those constituencies only to Muslims. It institutionalized the idea that Hindus and Muslims had separate interests and served to demarcate the boundary between them. This institutional design would later lead to the partition of India and Pakistan.

However, younger Muslim leaders opposed the pro-British attitude of the League. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who later became the "father of Pakistan," was a member of the Congress and worked with Bal Gangadhar Tilak, a prominent popular leader of the Congress, to conclude the Lucknow Pact in 1916, based on the position that the League should cooperate with the Congress to achieve Indian independence. The pact called for cooperation between the Congress and the League to press the British for Home Rule (self-government), and Jinnah distinguished himself as a connecting bridge between Hindus and Muslims.

Thus, during the First World War, the Congress and the League were poised to fight together. However, both organizations were mainly composed of English-speaking upper class and middle-class elites and were therefore detached from the people. Tagore described the situation aptly when he lamented that "a great ocean separates us educated few from millions in our country" (Sarkar 1983, p. 122). It was Gandhi who brought the two together.

1.1.3 Gandhi's Independence Movement

Today, seventy-seven years after the India-Pakistan partition, there are mixed assessments of Gandhi and his legacy. However, it is virtually impossible to speak of India's independence movement without mentioning him. Specifically, there are three main reasons to focus on Gandhi's movement.

First, during the history of the Indian independence movement, the interwar period (also known as the Gandhi era) played a major role in the formation of the "Indian Nation." Second, the movement's ideology (which criticized modern Western civilization) and methods (non-violence and disobedience) were original and novel; they greatly influenced not only the Indian independence movement, but also the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa and the Civil Rights movement in the United States in later years. To this day, they continue to have an impact on democratization, anti-war, and environmental protection movements. Finally, he demonstrated and practiced, in his own way, a method to break the vicious cycle of violence. In a modern world still unable to overcome the vicious cycle of violence, the non-violent movement he led offers hope and an alternative.

Gandhi honed his non-violent ideology and movement style during his long struggle for human rights in South Africa, before returning to India in 1915. Upon his return, he led the three major independence movements. The first were the Khilafat

and Non-Cooperation Movements that he led from 1921 to 1922, and the second was the Civil Disobedience Movement organized from 1930 to 1934. These movements led to the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935, which made it possible for Indians to take up positions of power at the state level. The third and final movement, the Quit India Movement, was launched in 1942 during the Second World War.

What distinguished these movements was that they developed based on a dynamic of popular demonstrations and participation in the parliamentary system. In other words, they first exerted pressure on Britain by launching large-scale popular movements with the goal of *Swaraj* (self-rule). The British conceded by progressively expanding representation. While participating in the expanded representative government, dissatisfaction with its concessions once again took the form of a popular movement, pressing the British to make further concessions. Britain responded by further expanding Indian participation in the representative government. This dynamic, based on popular movements and participation in representative government, was a key characteristic of the Indian independence movement and an important factor in India's ability to establish democracy after independence.

Why, then, were Gandhi's movements able to garner popular support? This was largely due to the following three innovations. The first was organizational reform, which strengthened the foundation of Congress as a political party by establishing a chain of command and introducing inter-party elections. This election system involved party leaders trying to acquire new party members who would support them. Second, the movements set goals and symbols that were able to overcome the cleavages in Indian society based on religion, caste, class, and region etc. The goal of self-rule (*swaraj*) was defined ambiguously such that anyone could attach their own dreams to it, and symbols such as salt and yarn spinning, which could be accepted irrespective of class, caste, gender, and religion, were utilized. Last but not least, the method of non-violence, which rejected class struggle and preached harmony, succeeded in winning the support of capitalists, merchants, and landowners who would otherwise have feared losing their property or even their lives in a violent socialist revolution. In other words, "non-violence" served as an umbrella for the "Indian people" to unite under and formed the basis for the establishment of the Congress as a catch-all party after independence.

1.2 The Partition of India and Pakistan

1.2.1 Hindu-Muslim Relations

The Civil Disobedience Movement led to the Round Table Conference, which led to the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935. Elections planned under the 1935 Act were held in 1937, and the Congress won in eight of the eleven provinces. Subsequently, the Viceroy of India maintained ultimate authority, but the Indians were in charge of provincial-level governments. Although the governments formed by the Congress resigned en masse following the outbreak of the Second World War

(due to their refusal to cooperate with the British in the war effort), independence was finally on the cards. The problem that emerged at this stage was the presence of the Muslim population, comprising about twenty-five percent of the population of British India.

The first test of cooperation after the 1916 Lucknow Pact were the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation Movements, which were launched in 1921 and 1922. Despite having significant momentum, Gandhi halted them after the Chauri Chaura incident in which more than twenty policemen were killed by the mob. The abrupt end of the movement created a sense of frustration, and also cast a shadow over Hindu-Muslim relations. The conflict was fuelled by religious riots that broke out during this period. In 1925, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), one of whose former members would later assassinate Gandhi, was formed, fuelling the conflict between the two communities.

Hindu-Muslim relations did not improve after this. Participation in the Civil Disobedience and Quit India Movements also varied according to region: the areas in which the Quit India Movement gained momentum would later become present-day India, and the areas where participation was weak would become present-day Pakistan and Bangladesh. The varying degrees of participation appear to have implied the later borders.

1.2.2 The Core of Muslim Interest

This raises the question of why Hindu-Muslim relations could not be re-established after this point. The core of the Muslim interest was protecting Muslims as a minority. Jinnah, who was instrumental in the formation of the Lucknow Pact, left the Congress Party after harshly criticizing Gandhi's collaboration with the Khilafat Movement, which he described as a politicization of religion. After temporarily retiring from politics and going to England, Jinnah returned to India in 1934 and re-entered politics, continuously conducted tough negotiations with the Congress. He insisted that the League was the "sole spokesman of Indian Muslims" (Jalal 1994[1985], p. 4) and demanded an equal footing with the Congress in the post-independence central government. This position became known as the two-nation theory, which argued that Hindus and Muslims constituted separate "nations" by introducing the concept of "nation," since Muslims could not escape from being a numerical minority. He then aimed to stand on an equal footing with the Congress, which he considered to only represent Hindus.

The resolution that first called for the establishment of Pakistan based on the two-nation theory is commonly known as the Pakistan Resolution, adopted at the Lahore Congress of the League in March 1940. The essence of the Pakistani resolution were the demands that (1) Muslim-majority areas such as the north-western and eastern parts of the Indian subcontinent be created as independent states, and (2) their constituent units should have autonomy and sovereignty. However, the resolution included no mention of "Pakistan" or "partition." Jinnah avoided giving a strict definition of "Pakistan" until the very end, leaving it to the League's supporters

to envision whatever Pakistan they wanted. The ambiguity made it a convenient slogan for mobilizing the Muslim masses, a trait it shared with Gandhi's *swaraj*. Nazimuddin, a prominent leader of the League, explained this problem in 1947, the year of independence, as "he 'did not know what Pakistan meant,' in fact, 'nobody in the Muslim League knew, so that it was very difficult for the League to carry on long-term negotiations with the minorities'" (Jalal 1994[1985], p. 238).

Given that the Muslim population was only twenty-five percent of the population of British India and that the League did not have the support of all Muslims (as evidenced by its disastrous defeat in the 1937 elections), Jinnah's demand that the League be the "sole spokesman of Indian Muslims" and on equal footing with the Congress Party was unreasonable. However, Jinnah's concerns cannot in themselves be described as the result of paranoia. Post-independence India experienced several religious riots in which thousands of Muslims were massacred, and the movement to abolish Muslim personal law is still going strong today. Against this background, let us now summarize the differences between the claims of the League and the Congress Party.

1.2.3 Differences Between the Claims of the League and the Congress

The differences between the Congress and League's claims can be summarized from three perspectives: the relationship with Muslims, the distribution of power at the center, and the center-state relationship.

From Table 1, we can see that compromise would be difficult to achieve on any of the points. However, the possibility of compromise was not completely absent. According to Jalal (1994[1985], p. 57), Jinnah's real aim was to extract concessions from the Congress Party, and the idea of Pakistan was merely a bargaining counter. The decisive factor in the realization of this just "bargaining counter" was the shift in British policy.

Table 1 Fundamental conflicts between the league and congress

	Muslim League	Indian National Congress
Relationship with Muslims	"Sole spokesman"—Muslims would not be represented by the Congress	Secularism—Representing all Social groups (rejecting the notion of sole representatives)
Distribution of Power at the Center	Equal	Rejects equal distribution
Center-State Relations	Decentralization—aims to prevent domination by the Congress	Centralization—"strong centre," aversion to interference by the League

Source Author

1.2.4 British Policy

British policy changed dramatically after the Second World War. Prior to this point, their basic policy was “divide and rule”; they believed that pitting Hindus against Muslims would stabilize British rule. The Hindu-Muslim conflict was seen as the bulwark of the rule over India. However, this attitude changed after the end of the Second World War. Labour Party leader Clement Attlee, who had been in favor of Indian independence, won the general elections in July 1945, leading to the formation of a Labour government. The Attlee administration dispatched a Cabinet Mission and began negotiations for Indian independence.

The Cabinet Mission visited India in March 1946 and presented Indian leaders with two schemes (Schemes A and B). The main points of Scheme A were that British India would be made independent as a united Indian federation, with central authority limited to diplomacy, defence, and transportation, and the key elements of executive and legislation vested in a second level of administration, known as the Groups. The Groups corresponded roughly to today’s India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The provinces would form the third level. In contrast, Scheme B was the actual partition that took place.

The Cabinet Mission gave priority to Scheme A; Scheme B was thought of merely as an alternative in case it was difficult to reach agreement on Scheme A. Negotiations were very tough. During the process, the greatest tragedy of the partition, the communal riots, started in Calcutta. We will return to the Great Calcutta Killings for a discussion; for now, it is enough to mention that they spread to various parts of the country and the situation became extremely unstable. In the process, Britain headed to a policy of shifting “the burden of responsibility for these troubles squarely, if not fairly, onto the shoulders of Indians themselves” (Jalal 1994[1985], p. 244).

In these circumstances, the Attlee administration announced on February 20, 1947 that it would withdraw from India by the end of June 1948. Attlee dismissed Viceroy Archibald Wavell, who understood well Jinnah’s demand for the creation of Pakistan was only a bargaining counter and had been carefully negotiating for independence, and appointed Lord Louis Mountbatten as his replacement, with a deadline for withdrawal as a condition of his acceptance. Unlike his predecessor, Mountbatten could not understand that Jinnah’s demand for Pakistan was aimed at “equal status for Muslims.” He was prejudiced against Jinnah, calling him a “psychopathic case,” “lunatic,” “evil genius,” “clot,” and “bastard” (Jalal 1994[1985], p. 259, note 46), while he described Nehru as “most sincere” (Jalal 1994[1985], p. 250). It was under this new Viceroy that the independence process accelerated. Mountbatten presented a proposal for partition on June 3, 1947, resulting in Pakistan gaining independence on August 14, 1947 and India on August 15, 1947. He praised himself for completing one of the “greatest administrative operations in history” (Jalal 1994[1985], p.293) in less than two and a half months. However, the hasty partition led not just to the tragedy of the wave of massive communal riots but remains at the root of the India-Pakistan conflict to this day.

1.2.5 Outbreak of the Great Calcutta Killings

The India-Pakistan partition was a tragedy that continues to traumatize both populations to this day. Although exact figures are unavailable, the partition created some 15 million refugees and caused the death of approximately one million people.

The Great Calcutta Riots created a chain reaction of violence. The initial catalyst was the League's proclamation of the Direct Action Day. At the time, the League had finally won the 1945–46 elections and was getting closer to its long-held claim to be the "sole spokesman of Muslims," but it could hardly compete with the Congress in terms of popular mobilization. They feared that this lesser mobilization would make them unable to compete with the Congress in the ongoing independence negotiations. Jinnah therefore declared August 16, 1946 to be the Direct Action Day to demonstrate the mobilizing power of the Muslim League. Jinnah explained such as "'direct action' day should be a day of peaceful reflection, not a day 'for the purpose of resorting to direct action in any form or shape'" (Jalal 1994[1985], p. 216). However, in reality, a massacre took place.

Detailed empirical studies have revealed that, rather than being impossible to suppress, the Calcutta Killings were deliberately not contained. According to Nakazato (2004), the British security authorities were well aware of the danger of religious riots breaking out and spreading, yet deliberately turned a blind eye. This was because they feared that if the authorities intervened, the violence of the mobs would be directed against the colonial government. One can imagine the concerns of the British colonial government in the aftermath of the Second World War, when anti-British sentiment had been heightened by the Indian National Army trials that began in November 1945 and given the Royal Indian Navy mutiny in February 1946. However, given that maintaining security was the primary responsibility of the rulers, ignoring the riots was a clear abdication of responsibility. Considering that the chain of violence spread to all of India and led to a hasty partition by making negotiations impossible, Britain's responsibility in these events is extremely serious.

As mentioned, the religious riots spread to other parts of British India. In October 1946, Muslim gangs attacked Hindu landowners, lawyers, and others in Noakhali, in present-day Bangladesh, and Tripura, in present-day India. In the same month, the Bihar Riots, in which about 7,000 Muslims were killed, occurred in retaliation for the Noakhali riots. From March to August 1947, Punjab was in a state of civil war and 5,000 people were massacred before independence was sealed. However, the violence worsened after independence. Roughly 180,000 people were massacred in Punjab (60,000 Hindus and Sikhs and 120,000 Muslims). By March 1948, 6 million Muslims and 4.5 million Hindus and Sikhs had become refugees (Sarkar 1983, pp. 432–434).

1.2.6 Gandhi's Activities: His Final Struggle for Non-violence

In the midst of the riots, Gandhi continued to preach his lifelong belief in Hindu-Muslim harmony, but he was increasingly isolated. In the independence negotiations, he proposed that Jinnah be made Prime Minister of India and, in a reversal of his

previous position, that the British should stay on for a while to protect the interests of the majority. However, Congress leaders dismissed this as “quixotic” (Sarkar 1983, p. 437) and removed him from the center of the independence negotiations. He eventually endorsed the partition though he personally did not accept it. After that, he devoted the remainder of his life to stopping the riots. In Calcutta, he undertook a “fast unto death” to stop the riots and succeeded in stopping them. It was described as the “Miracle of Calcutta.”

However, Gandhi’s suffering did not end there. As mentioned earlier, religious riots intensified everywhere after independence. Riots in Delhi were frequent at this point, where many Hindu and Sikh refugees fleeing present-day Pakistan were present. On January 30, 1948, after fasting to protest the riots, he was assassinated by Nathuram Godse, a former member of the RSS, at the residence of Birla, a nationalist capitalist known to be a close supporter of Gandhi.

The assassination of Gandhi, though anticipated, came as a great shock and deeply wounded the new India. Japanese prominent political scientist and historian Chiharu Takenaka (2018, pp. 190–191) astutely analysed that the Mahatma’s death was the cornerstone for moving the Hindu majority of the nation in the direction of Indian-style secularism, where many religions would peacefully coexist, rather than in the direction of anti-Islamic communalism. For the first two decades after independence at least, religious riots were indeed suppressed.

1.3 Consequences of the India-Pakistan Partition

The slipshod partition and independence process, as well as the accompanying religious riots, left major scars on both India and Pakistan. Let us now examine the impact on both countries in terms of national integration and the political structures upon which it is based.

1.3.1 India

India became independent while maintaining its territorial integrity, despite the partition of the north-western province of Punjab and the eastern province of Bengal. The question of the majority of the princely states that were indirectly ruled during the British era was settled upon the independence of India and Pakistan, with the princely states located in the Indian territory belonging to India and the princely states located in the Pakistani territory belonging to Pakistan. The princely state of Kashmir (known as Jammu and Kashmir state before the abolition of Article 370 which allowed more autonomy to the state in 2019), Junagadh (part of present-day Gujarat) and Hyderabad (part of present-day Telangana and Andhra Pradesh) resisted joining India. Possession of Kashmir is contested between India and Pakistan to this day. The statuses of Junagadh and the Hyderabad were eventually settled by their belonging to India. Although disputes continued in the northeast between the Indian

government and the Nagas and other ethnic minorities seeking independence, the issue of national integration was generally resolved by 1950, when the Constitution was promulgated.

With territorial national unity on the horizon, India held its first general elections under the 1950 Constitution in 1951–52. The Congress, which led the independence movement, overwhelmingly won the elections and formed a one-party dominant rule, which Rajni Kothari modelled as the “Congress system,” until the late 1960s. This political stability laid the foundations of Indian democracy. However, the experience of Partition remained traumatic and became the undercurrent of religious conflicts that continue to this day. From the late 1980s onwards, the Sangh Parivar (the conglomerate of RSS and other affiliated organizations including the present ruling party of Bharatiya Janata Party) became increasingly active, aiming for making India “Hindu *rashtra* (nation)”; religious riots became more frequent in many parts of the country. The politicization of religious identity was linked with the growing power of the Bharatiya Janata Party, the political arm of the Sangh Parivar, and led to its current rise to power.

1.3.2 Pakistan

Pakistan, by contrast, faced more serious challenges of national integration. It gained independence in the form of a divided state, with West Pakistan (now Pakistan) and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) some 2,000 km apart. This was the very Pakistan that its founding father Jinnah resisted to the end as the “mutilated and moth-eaten” Pakistan (Jalal 1994[1985], p. 246).

The problem of the divided state was not just a question of territory, but that it created a fractured sense of political belonging. The challenge that Pakistan faced from its inception was the imbalance under which West Pakistan seized political leadership while East Pakistan held the majority of the population. If general elections were held, as in India, it was highly likely that East Pakistan would wrest control from West Pakistan. Indeed, the League suffered a disastrous defeat in the 1954 East Pakistan Provincial Assembly elections. In the general elections of 1970, which were the first general elections at the national level, the Awami League, the main party in East Pakistan, also won a majority, leading to the outbreak of civil war and ultimately the Third Indo-Pakistani War, which led to Bangladesh’s independence in 1971.

This fragmentation of the state also had a significant impact on the political system. Whereas India enacted a constitution shortly after gaining independence, Pakistan underwent a difficult constitution-making process. The Constituent Assembly submitted a draft constitution in 1954, but it was dissolved by the Governor-General, who did not want his powers restricted, and the new assembly finally enacted a constitution in 1956. However, the Chief of Army Staff, Ayub Khan, who was wary that the implementation of universal elections based on the 1956 constitution would lead to deprivation of West Pakistan’s power by East Pakistan, carried out a coup d’état in 1958. From this point onwards, Pakistan would experience cycles of military and civilian rule.

Hence, despite both being born out of the British India independence process, a long-lasting contrast emerged between India, which maintained a stable democratic system, and Pakistan, which experienced cycles of democracy and authoritarianism. The process of partition set the tone for the Indo-Pakistani conflict which continues to the present day.

2 Decolonization of Southeast Asia

Most areas of Southeast Asia were under Western colonial rule before the Second World War. There are eleven independent nation states in the present Southeast Asia, namely, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar in Mainland Southeast Asia, together with the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and East Timor (Timor Leste) in Maritime Southeast Asia. Let us look back briefly upon the historical formation processes of these eleven nation states.

2.1 The Birth of Nationalism and the End of Western Colonial Rule in Southeast Asia

2.1.1 The Final Phase of Colonization and the Emergence of Nationalism

By the middle of the 1910s, the whole area of Southeast Asia, except Thailand whose name was Siam at that time, came under Western colonial rule. At the same time, the geographical boundaries of each territorial units were clearly demarcated. As a result of unified territorial rule, the prototypes of national identity, territory, and single state sovereignty as the three basic elements of the modern state were nurtured. A sense of solidarity among people who resided in the same territory intensified. On the other hand, a new intellectual class emerged through the introduction of the modern education system. In parallel with these changes, the national consciousness, the nationalist movement in search of independence from colonial rule, and the creation of nation states arose.

Such modern nationalist ideas and movements appeared first in the Philippines at the end of the nineteenth century, which was under the Spanish colonial rule. The founding of the Republic of the Philippines was declared in 1899. However, it was crushed down by the United States, which conquered the Philippines after the Spanish-American War in 1898 (Agoncillo 1990, pp. 129–243). Early in the twentieth century, modern nationalism also emerged in the Dutch East Indies, and by the end of the 1920s, developed into a political movement that aimed to create the Republic of Indonesia (Ricklefs 2008, pp. 188–234). Together with the emergence of modern educated intellectuals, nationalism was born and developed in Vietnam

(then a part of French Indochina) and British Burma as well. Particularly in Vietnam, the socialists took leadership of the movement.

Even in Siam, which maintained its independence under royal rule, the demand for establishing a diet and promulgating the constitution had become greater. In 1932, such reform was realized through a coup led by a group of young elite officials. As a result, Siam was transformed into a modern state based on a constitutional monarchy (Wyatt 2003, pp. 210–231), which was renamed the Kingdom of Thailand in 1939.

2.1.2 The Second World War and Southeast Asia Under the Japanese Occupation

After the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941, the Japanese army invaded various parts of Southeast Asia. By the middle of 1942, every part of Southeast Asia was occupied by Japan or came under its strong influence. The responses of nationalists in each Southeast Asian country to Japanese military rule were diversified according to specific historical conditions.

In the Philippines, the existing autonomous government (the Commonwealth of the Philippines) had sought asylum in the United States after the Japanese intrusion. Accordingly, the Philippine government organized under the Japanese occupation could not get genuine support from the people (Agoncillo 1990, pp. 387–423). On the contrary, many nationalist leaders of Indonesia, such as Sukarno (1901–1970), chose to cooperate with Japanese rule and preparation for national independence had officially started since March 1945. In the case of Burma, a group of young nationalists, such as Aung San (1915–1947), fled Burma shortly before the outbreak of the war, and they organized a voluntary army for independence in cooperation with the Japanese. Then, under the Japanese occupation, the government led by the Burmese prime minister was set up.

On the other hand, the pro-German French government maintained control in Indochina until March 1945 when it was dissolved by the Japanese occupation army. Accordingly, there was no room for cooperation between the nationalists and the Japanese army. The Communist Party of Indochina, which went underground led by Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969), was preparing for confrontation against the French and the Japanese.

2.2 National Independence and the Formation of ASEAN

2.2.1 National Independence Through Armed Struggle: Vietnam and Indonesia

After the end of the Second World War, movements toward national independence in Southeast Asia accelerated. The process was remarkably diversified. In Indochina and Indonesia, France and the Netherlands fought for the revival of colonial rule;

whereas in areas such as the Philippines, Burma and Malaya, the United States and United Kingdom acted more flexibly to nationalist trends.

In Vietnam, the League for the Independence of Vietnam (abbreviated as Viet Minh) and the communist People's Army led by Ho Chi Minh joined together soon after the surrender of Japan. On September 2, 1945, they declared the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hanoi. As France did not approve the independence of Vietnam as a unified nation, they went to war with the Viet Minh in 1946. The armed resistance against France had also started in Cambodia and Laos, which developed into the First Indochina War. The war ended in July 1954 by a peace agreement reached in Geneva, Switzerland. As a result, Vietnam was divided at the 17th parallel into the Democratic Republic in the north and the pro-French government of the State of Vietnam in the south (Lam 2010, pp. 208–252). On the other hand, the national independence of the Kingdom of Laos was attained in 1953 by a treaty with France. However, three separate groups, the right wing, the neutralists and the left-wing, contended for power, and Laos entered a state of civil war (Stuart-Fox 1997, pp. 59–98). Cambodia also gained its independence from France in 1953 as the kingdom ruled by Norodom Sihanouk (1922–2012) (Chandler 2008, pp. 211–232).

In Indonesia, the founding of the Republic of Indonesia (RI) was declared on August 17, 1945 at Jakarta, and Sukarno was inaugurated as its president. However, an armed conflict took place at the end of October between the people and the British Indian Army that had landed in Java on behalf of the Allied Forces. It developed into the war of independence fought by the Indonesian National Army (TNI) against the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL), which had replaced the British Indian Army. The war ended at the end of 1949 by a peace agreement concluded at the Hague, and the Federal Republic of Indonesia (RIS) was established by uniting RI and plural local states that were backed up by the Netherlands. However, those local states dissolved one after another, and by the abolition of the federal system, the unitary state of RI was finally established in August 1950 (Ricklefs 2008, pp. 249–271).

2.2.2 Peaceful Routes to National Independence: The Philippines, Burma, and Malaya

In 1934, the Philippine Independence Act was enacted by the United States Congress and was accepted by the Congress of the Philippines. Based on this act, the autonomous government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines led by the Filipino president and vice president came into being in 1935. After the Second World War, formal independence from the United States was finally attained by the establishment of the Republic of the Philippines on July 4, 1946 (Agoncillo 1990, pp. 328–370, 427–440).

After the surrender of Japan, British colonial rule in Burma was restored for a short time. However, within a year, an agreement for independence was reached in January 1947 between the British government and Aung San as the representative of Burmese nationalists. Then, on January 4, 1948, the nation seceded from the British

Commonwealth and became an independent republic named the Union of Burma (Charney 2009, pp. 62–65). Later, in 1974 it was renamed the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, and in 1989, was renamed again, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, which has continued up to the present.

In the Malay Peninsula, the concept of the Malayan Union was proposed under the British military administration after the end of the Second World War as a new form of colonial rule that replaced the former British Malaya. It was put into practice in 1946 but was fiercely opposed by the local Malay leaders. As a result, it was abolished at the end of January 1948 and was replaced in February of the same year by the Federation of Malaya. It comprised of nine Malay states, together with Penang and Malacca, which had formerly belonged to the Straits Settlements (Andaya and Andaya 2001, pp. 264–282). However, Singapore, another part of the Straits Settlements, did not join the federation. The autonomous Singaporean government was established after the election of the Legislative Assembly in May 1959 (Turnbull 2009, pp. 225–277).

2.2.3 The Formation of Malaysia and the Birth of ASEAN

In May 1961, Tunku Abdul Rahman (1903–1990), the prime minister of the Federation of Malaya proposed the formation of a new federal state named Malaysia by uniting Malaya, Singapore, Sabah (former British North Borneo), Sarawak (former kingdom ruled by the British royal family before the Second World War) and Brunei (Malay sultanate that had become a British protectorate in 1888). In Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (1923–2015) agreed, but there were forces of opposition in Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei. Particularly in Brunei, a rebellion broke out against this plan. Accordingly, the Sultan of Brunei called off participation in the new Malaysia (Saunders 2002, pp. 139–160).

Indonesia, as a neighboring country under the leadership of President Sukarno, also clearly demonstrated a confrontational stance and considered Malaysia a product of neo-colonialism. The Philippines also opposed the formation of Malaysia by claiming sovereignty over Sabah. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Rahman took every opportunity to persuade, such as the Prime Ministers' Conference of the British Commonwealth, and finally secured the support of the British government.

On September 16, 1963, Malaysia was established as a new federal state by uniting the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak (Andaya and Andaya 2001, pp. 282–290). However, the pro-Malay policy promoted by the federal government in Kuala Lumpur gave rise to conflict with the government of Singapore, where most of the population were ethnic Chinese. In 1964, violent clashes took place between Chinese and Malay residents in Singapore, which made the discord inextricable. As a result, Singapore separated from Malaysia and became an independent nation as the Republic of Singapore on August 9, 1965 (Turnbull 2009, pp. 291–295). On the other hand, Brunei, which had not joined Malaysia, finally became independent on January 1, 1984 as Brunei Darussalam, an Islamic state led by the Malay Sultan (Saunders 2002, pp. 161–177).

In the meantime, Indonesia had officially declared a confrontation against Malaysia and started a military operation to crush it. However, this was unsuccessful because of the counterattack of Malaysia, which was militarily supported by the United Kingdom and others. The abortive coup on September 30, 1965 in Jakarta had led to the downfall of Sukarno, and the birth of a new regime led by Army Minister Suharto (1921–2008, later inaugurated as president), to whom presidential power was delegated in 1966. Then, the new administration put an end to the confrontation against Malaysia (Ricklefs 2008, pp. 308–319, 327–328). Diplomatic relations with the Philippines were also disrupted by the advent of Malaysia. However, after the birth of the new Philippine administration led by President Ferdinand Marcos (1917–1989) at the end of 1965, a reconciliation was gradually realized between the two nations.

On August 8, 1967, the founding of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) was declared at Bangkok by the foreign ministers of five countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Its major purposes were to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region, and to promote regional peace and stability by paying respect to the rule of justice and law as well as following the principles of the United Nations Charter. In November 1971, ASEAN laid the foundation for further expansion and development by adopting the declaration to create the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN Secretariat as a standing organization was set up in 1976 at Jakarta. The ASEAN member states increased by accepting Brunei in January 1984 (soon after its independence), Vietnam in July 1995, Laos and Myanmar in July 1997, and Cambodia in April 1999. Thus, now it covers ten countries in the whole region of Southeast Asia.

2.3 The Final Process of Decolonization

2.3.1 The Second Indochina War and the Decolonization of Three Nations in Indochina

After the French had withdrawn from Vietnam in compliance with the Geneva Agreement of 1954, a military coup broke out in the South and the Republic of Vietnam was set up. The leadership of this government refused to carry out the nationwide general election that had been stipulated by the Geneva Agreement. Though they built a dictatorship backed up by American aid, it was met with opposition from peasants, urban intellectuals and Buddhists, which developed into a resistance movement in 1960. The National Liberation Front of Southern Vietnam (FNL) was set up in December 1960, and armed conflict broke out with the government forces. Starting in 1963, repeated military coups occurred in South Vietnam, and the political situation remained unstable. The government forces of South Vietnam proved powerless, and the U.S. armed forces began to engage directly in warfare.

In March 1970, a coup supported by the United States took place in Cambodia. King Sihanouk was ousted from Phnom Penh and U.S. forces intruded into Cambodia. Sihanouk organized the National United Front of Kampuchea together with the left-wing Khmer Rouge and started guerilla war (Chandler 2008, pp. 233–254). In February 1971, U.S. forces also intruded into the southern part of Laos to block the supply route from North Vietnam to the liberation front in the South. As a result, the war escalated and spread into the entire region of Indochina (the Second Indochina War).

Nevertheless, the military strategy of the U.S. and South Vietnam forces was unsuccessful, and the final withdrawal of U.S. troops was decided by the Paris Agreement in January 1973. Even after U.S. withdrawal, civil war continued between the South Vietnam forces and the liberation front backed by the North. However, due to a massive offensive starting in December 1974, the South Vietnam forces collapsed and surrendered unconditionally on April 30, 1975. With this surrender, the war finally ended, and national unification was declared in July 1976 with the establishment of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Lam 2010, pp. 253–310).

In Laos, the fourth united national government was established in April 1974, in which the left wing Pathet Lao held a dominant position. Until August 1975, the right-wing groups were swept away, and royal rule was also abolished in December 1975 by establishing the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Stuart-Fox 1997, pp. 135–167).

In Cambodia, the war ended in 1975 with the triumphant entry of the united front forces, mainly composed of Khmer Rouge. In 1976, the country was renamed Democratic Kampuchea. However, the Khmer Rouge (Pol Pot faction) started a reign of terror soon after the liberation of Phnom Penh, and Cambodia again lapsed into civil war. This ended in October 1991 with the conclusion of the Cambodian Peace Agreements at Paris. In 1993, a new constitution was promulgated by the constituent assembly established after the general election conducted under supervision of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). In this way, the Kingdom of Cambodia ruled under constitutional monarchy was restored (Chandler 2008, pp. 255–300).

2.3.2 Independence of East Timor (*Timor Leste*)

Timor Island, located about 1,100 km east of Java, had become a Portuguese colony in the sixteenth century. In the nineteenth century, it was divided by Portugal and the Netherlands into east and west. Thus, the eastern half of the island remained as a Portuguese territory, while its western half became a part of the Dutch East Indies. After the independence of Indonesia, West Timor became part of its territory, but East Timor remained under Portuguese rule. However, in 1974 a revolution broke out in Portugal, and its right-wing dictatorship was overthrown. The new Portuguese government decided to approve the independence of its overseas territories. In concert with this change, the left-wing organization named Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin) was organized and the independence of East Timor was declared by this organization in November 1974.

Nevertheless, Indonesia urged the anti-Fretilin groups in East Timor to make a petition for annexation out of fear of a socialist government rising to power. Indonesian troops disguised as volunteer soldiers started an invasion in East Timor. In July 1976, Indonesia declared the annexation of East Timor as its 27th province. However, in December 1975, the United Nations Security Council condemned the Indonesian invasion and required immediate withdrawal from East Timor. Fretilin continued to struggle for independence and engaged in guerilla warfare with an appeal for the international support. Accordingly, the armed struggle continued in East Timor for many years.

In May 1998, riots broke out in various parts of Indonesia against the background of political and social unrest triggered by the Asian economic crisis that started in the previous year. As a result, President Suharto was driven to resign. With the agreement of the new Indonesian government, the referendum for self-determination of East Timor was held in August 1999 under the supervision of the United Nations, and separation from Indonesia was decided (Ricklefs 2008, pp. 339–384). Because of this decision, East Timor came under the provisional control of the UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) from October 1999, and finally became a new sovereign state named the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste in May 2002. This resulted in the birth of the eleventh nation state in Southeast Asia.

2.4 Ethnic Composition of Southeast Asian Nations and Their National/Official Languages

All of the eleven Southeast Asian nations whose formation processes have been described above are conspicuously multiethnic states. They are integrated into single nations with common national or official languages. However, we find great variety in the manner of integration, particularly between five countries in Mainland Southeast Asia and six countries in Insular Southeast Asia. Let us briefly observe each country's condition.

2.4.1 Mainland Southeast Asia

Figure 1 shows the total population, estimated percentage of major ethnic groups in the population and the national languages in five countries of Mainland Southeast Asia. In all these countries, we can find the predominant ethnic groups whose ratio in the total population exceed 50 percent. In Vietnam, which has the largest population among the five countries, more than fifty different ethnic groups exist. Among them, *Kinh* account for more than 85 percent of the total national population. There are no other ethnic groups whose population accounts for more than two percent of the national total. Vietnamese, the national language, is also the mother tongue of the *Kinh*.

Countries	Total population		Major ethnic groups (% in population)				National language
	('000)	(Year)	The largest one	Others			
Vietnam	96,209	2019	Kinh (85.3)	Tay (1.9)	Thai (1.9)	Muong (1.5)	2019 Vietnamese
Laos	6,492	2015	Lao (53.2)	Khmou (11.0)	Hmong (9.2)	Phouthay (3.4)	2015 Lao
Cambodia	15,552	2019	Khmer (95.8)	Chinese (0.6)	Vietnam (0.5)		2019 Khmer
Thailand	68,977	2020	Thai (90.7)	Malay (2.2)	Burmese (1.3)		2010 Thai
Myanmar	51,486	2014	Bamar (68)	Shan (9)	Karen (7)	Chinese (2.5)	2007* Burmese

* Rough estimation.

Fig. 1 Total population, major ethnic groups and the national languages in Mainland South-east Asian countries

In Thailand, with the second largest population in Mainland Southeast Asia, more than sixty ethnic groups exist. Among them, *Thai* people, the largest group, amount to more than 90 percent of the total population, and their mother tongue has become the national language. However, the *Isan*, who mainly reside in northeast Thailand and speak a peculiar dialect, are counted among the *Thai* as a subgroup. They account for approximately 30 percent of the total population. Among non-*Thai* groups, Malays reside in the southern part of the country and has the largest non-*Thai* population. However, it amounts to a mere 2.5 percent of the total population.

More than a hundred ethnic groups are living in Myanmar, which has a population of over 51 million. The largest group is the *Bamar* who amount to nearly 70 percent of the total population. The national language of Myanmar, Burmese, is the mother tongue of these people. However, other large groups whose populations respectively exceed five percent of the national total exist, such as the *Shan* (about five million people) and *Karen* (about 3.6 million people). Some of these groups have their own militias to confront the central government.

In Cambodia, which has a population of more than 15 million, approximately twenty different ethnic groups reside. Among them, *Khmer* amount to more than 95 percent of the total population and hold the predominant position. Their mother tongue has become the national language of Cambodia. Even in Laos, which has the smallest population among the mainland countries (less than seven million), more than a hundred ethnic groups are present. Among them *Lao* is the largest one, and their population exceeds 50 percent of the national total. Their mother tongue has also become the national language.

2.4.2 Insular Southeast Asia

The ethnic composition and language variety in Insular Southeast Asia is more complicated than in Mainland countries, where particular ethnic groups hold the predominant positions, and their mother tongues are adopted as national languages. Figure 2 shows the total population, percentage of major ethnic or language groups

Countries	Total population		Major ethnic/language groups (% in population)			Official languages	
	('000)	(Year)	The largest one	Others	(Year)	National	Others
Philippines	100,981	2020	Tagalog (34.5)	Cebuano (27.9) Ilocano (10.2) Hiligaynon (9.2)	2000	Pilipino (Tagalog)	English
Indonesia	270,204	2020	Jawa (40.2)	Sunda (15.5) Batak (3.6) Madura (3.0)	2010	Indonesian	
Timor Leste (East Timor)	1,414	2021	Tetun Prasa (30.6)	Mambai (16.6) Makasai (10.5) Tetun Terik (6.1)	2021	Tetun Portugese	Indonesian English
Malaysia	32,657	2020	Malay (54.7)	Chinese (23.2) Indian (7.0) Non-Malay Bumiputera (14.1)	2017	Malay	English (de facto)
Singapore	4,044	2020	Chinese (74.3)	Malay (13.5) Indian (9.0)	2020	Malay (de jure) English (de facto)	Chinese Tamil
Brunei	454	2020	Malay (65.8)	Chinese (10.2)	2020	Malay	English

Fig. 2 Total population, major ethnic/language groups and the national/official languages in Insular Southeast Asian countries

in the population and the national or official languages of six countries in Insular Southeast Asia.

Within the Philippines, located at the northeast edge of Southeast Asia with the second largest population in the region after Indonesia (more than 100 million), there exists a great variety of language groups whose total number may exceed 180. (In the Philippines, these groups are seldom referred to as ethnic groups.) However, there are only four major languages whose number of speakers respectively exceed nine million, namely *Tagalog* (spoken principally in Central Luzon), *Cebuano* (spoken mainly in the central part of the country such as Cebu), *Ilocano* (spoken in North Luzon) and *Hiligaynon* (spoken in central and southern parts of the country such as Panay). Among them, *Tagalog* is widely used in Manila and adjacent areas and has been adopted and standardized as the national language, Filipino. However, the population of native *Tagalog* speakers is less than 40 percent of the total population, and a large number of the Philippine people could not speak *Tagalog* well. Accordingly, English (widespread in the period of United States colonial rule from 1898 to 1946) has also been accepted as an official language. Although today the majority of people speak Filipino, English is still widely used in schools and government offices.

Indonesia has the fourth largest population in the world after China, India and the United States (about 270 million in 2020). Several hundred different ethnic groups (*suku bangsa*) exist. The group with the largest population is Javanese (*Jawa*). Their homeland is Central and East Java, but there are also a number of Javanese transmigrants in other parts of the country. Their total number is more than 100 million, the largest population of a single ethnic group in the whole of Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, they merely account for about 40 percent of the total population of Indonesia. Besides Javanese, there are many other groups whose population amount to several million (sometimes more than ten), such as the Sundanese and *Batak*, whose homelands are respectively West Java and North Sumatra. In addition, the national language of Indonesia (*bahasa Indonesia*) is not Javanese. Its parent is Malay (*bahasa Melayu*), the native language of the Malays who reside in various areas such as Sumatra, Borneo (called Kalimantan in Indonesia) and the Malay

Peninsula across the national borders of Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. Though the population of Malay people in Indonesia is much smaller than that of Javanese, their language is much easier to learn. Javanese has an intricate system of honorific language (termed “speech levels” by linguists), so Malay had been widely used as a common language in the region historically. However, as the independently developed national language, *bahasa Indonesia* is rather different in vocabulary and usage than *bahasa Melayu*, the national language of Malaysia and Brunei.

Although the population of East Timor is merely over 1.4 million, it also consists of many small ethnic groups that have their own native tongues. Among these languages, *Tetun* (or spelled *Tetum*) is widely used as a common tool of communication and is adopted as an official language together with Portuguese. Besides these two official languages, Indonesian and English are also adopted as working languages in East Timor.

In Malaysia, of which the total population is over 32 million, a plural society is made up from indigenous people generically called *bumiputra* (meaning “children of the earth”) and the descendants of immigrants from other Asian regions, especially China and India. According to population statistics in 2017, *bumiputra* accounted for about 69 percent of the total population, while the proportion of Chinese is over 23 percent and Indians account for seven percent. Among *bumiputra*, Malays amount to slightly less than 55 percent, and the residual 14 percent are made up of non-Malay indigenous groups in Borneo (states of Sabah and Sarawak) together with minority groups related with Mainland Southeast Asian areas such as *Thai*, *Khmer* and *Cham*. The national language of Malaysia is Malay (*bahasa Melayu*), but it is also called Malaysian (*bahasa Malaysia*) to differentiate it from various domestic dialects and Indonesian. As a legacy of former British colonial rule, English is also widely used as the de-facto official language.

The population of Singapore as a city state is more than four million. It chiefly consists of three major ethnic groups of Malay, Chinese and Indian. In contrast to Malaysia, the proportion of Malays as indigenous residents to the total population is less than 14 percent, whereas the Chinese population amounts to more than 74 percent. The national language of Singapore is constitutionally Malay. However, English is used as the common tongue, thus the de-facto national language. In addition, Chinese (Mandarin) and Tamil (from south India) are also adopted as official languages. For the MRT (mass rapid transit) trains that crisscross the island of Singapore, announcements are made in the four languages of English, Malay, Chinese and Tamil.

In Brunei Darussalam, located at the north coast of Borneo, the total population is just over 450 thousand. Nevertheless, it consists of more than ten different ethnic groups. The largest group is Malay (nearly 65 percent of the total population), followed by Chinese (a little more than ten percent). The national language is Malay, but English is also widely used as the official language.

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The Cold War in Asia After 1953



Toshihiko Aono

In the first decade of the post-war period, Asia was exposed to and impacted by two major historical currents: The Cold War and decolonization. Going through such events as the Chinese Revolution and the Korean War, Asia was divided into two military camps. In the meantime, political forces in ex-colonies, such as Korea, China, Indochina, India, and Pakistan, declared independence and sought measures for state formation, nation-building, and economic modernization. In some cases, they fought bloody civil wars with each other and/or wars against colonial rulers.

The Cold War was a geopolitical and ideological struggle between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR) on a global scale. The Cold War and decolonization not only coincided, but also closely intertwined. From their security and ideological concerns, the superpowers repeatedly and fiercely intervened in the so-called Third World and left significant political, economic, and social marks there (Westad 2005). Yet, the influence did not flow in one direction: The development of regional and local conflicts stemming from the process of decolonization often informed the course of the Cold War. In the words of Robert McMahon (2003, p. 36), “[d]ecolonization and the Cold War were fated to become inextricably linked, each shaping and being shaped by the other, in Asia and elsewhere.”

Nevertheless, we could not fully understand the dynamics of the Cold War in Asia without examining the role of another communist power: China. Indeed, since the early 1950s, the development and transformation of the triangular relations among the US, the USSR, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) became the focal point of the Cold War in Asia.¹

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¹ As Tsuyoshi Hasegawa (2011a, pp. 1–2) argues, Japan was also an important player in the Cold War in (East) Asia. To grasp its dynamics, therefore, an analysis of the “quadrangular relations” among the US, the USSR, China, and Japan is essential. However, due to limited space, this chapter focuses on the “triangular relations.” As to Japan’s Asia policy after 1945, see Chap. 13 by Akihiko Tanaka.

Drawing on these insights, this chapter provides an overview of the Cold War in Asia after 1953, covering important events in East, Southeast, and South Asia. The primary focus will be on the intersections between the two major aspects of the Cold War in this region: Triangular relations among the US, the USSR, and China, on the one hand, and local and regional conflicts, especially those in Indochina and South Asia that stemmed from the decolonization process, on the other hand.

This chapter kicks off with the story of post-war Sino-Soviet relations up to the end of the 1960s, followed by sections that deal with such events as: The three wars in Indochina, the Sino-US rapprochement and its regional impacts, the wars between India and Pakistan, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Sino-Soviet normalization, and the political settlement of the Cambodian Civil War.

1 The Sino-Soviet Split

1.1 The Golden Years of Sino-Soviet Relations

After Soviet dictator Iosif Stalin died in early March 1953, his successors began to pursue a policy of “peaceful coexistence” with the West. Stalin’s tyranny and misbehaviors, they believed, had not only damaged the legitimacy of socialist regimes, but also undermined Soviet national security (Mastny 2010a). Stalin’s death opened the way for closer Sino-Soviet relations. Mao Zedong, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), believed that China should become the leader of the socialist camp in the long run. However, he had to focus on restoring his country, which had been destructed by the Korean War. In mid-1953, the Chinese government started the “First Five-Year Plan” aiming at rapid industrialization and collectivization of agriculture based on the Soviet model. Chinese leaders were keen on learning from the Soviet experience. In addition, political, economic, and military support from the communist “big brother” was essential for the reconstruction and development of the war-ravaged country (Chen and Yang 1998, p. 258).

In Moscow, Nikita S. Khrushchev, then emerging as a top leader among Stalin’s successors, saw “unlimited opportunity” in Sino-Soviet relations. Soviet alliance with the “most populous” country, he believed, “would propel Communism to global victory” (Westad 2017, p. 237). Indeed, Khrushchev chose Beijing as the destination for his first foreign travel in the autumn of 1954. During the visit, the Soviets offered a substantial amount of loans and technical assistance for the First Five-Year Plan. Moreover, in October 1957, the Soviets promised to provide a model atomic bomb and relevant data by 1959 (Lüthi 2008, p. 74). The mid- and late 1950s witnessed the “golden years of the Sino-Soviet alliance” (Westad 2011, pp. 35–62).

1.2 *The End of the Alliance*

In 1956, a series of events shook the communist world. At the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956, Khrushchev delivered the famous “secret speech” advocating the policy of “peaceful coexistence” and blamed Stalin for abuse of power and policy mismanagement. Khrushchev’s speech seriously undermined the legitimacy of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and, consequently, led to anti-Soviet riots in Poland and Hungary in October 1956.

Along with the development of Chinese domestic politics, these events had a significant impact on Mao. The success of agricultural collectivization and other economic schemes after 1953 convinced him that the socialist transformation of China could be accelerated in its own way, not in direct accordance with the Soviet model. Moreover, Mao’s views on Stalin differed from that of Khrushchev; the CCP leader believed that Stalin significantly contributed to the Soviet Union and the socialist world despite his misconduct. In addition, the Polish and Hungarian riots strengthened Mao’s skepticism about the “de-Stalinization” of the USSR (Chen and Yang 1998, pp. 268–69).

Mao’s determination to pursue his own vision, e.g., continuous revolution, led to the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet alliance in 1958. Early in this year, Mao started a policy of the “Great Leap Forward,” an ambitious plan to accelerate transformation of China into a socialist country. By the end of the year, however, its failure became apparent; it triggered a disastrous famine. Moreover, Mao’s foreign policy disturbed Sino-Soviet relations. In the first half of 1958, the Soviet Union made two proposals for closer military cooperation: The construction of radio-wave communication systems for the Soviet Navy in China and the establishment of a joint submarine flotilla. Yet, Mao thought the Soviet proposals would threaten “Chinese sovereignty and integrity” (Chen and Yang 1998, pp. 268–69). The second Taiwan Strait Crisis in late August further soured relations. Since 1954, the United States had committed itself to the defense of the Republic of China (ROC), i.e., Taiwan, based on the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty.² While firmly supporting Beijing in public, in private Moscow feared that the Chinese shelling against Quemoy and the Jinmen Islands would provoke Washington.³

By 1960, the Sino-Soviet alliance virtually collapsed. The experience of the Second Taiwan Crisis made the Soviets worry about China going nuclear. In June 1959, Khrushchev informed Mao of his decision to withdraw the nuclear assistance program, which in turn drove China toward its own nuclear program. Two months later, China and India clashed at their border. The Soviets remained neutral, and China felt betrayed, believing that their Soviet ally chose to side with India (Chen and Yang 1998, p. 273).

There was an “ambiguous truce” between Moscow and Beijing from early 1961 to mid-1962. In this period, moderate leaders like Deng Xiaoping took the lead in Chinese decision-making while Mao was marginalized for the failure of his Great

² See Sect. 7.5 of Chap. 7.

³ As to the crises over the Taiwan Strait, see Sect. 7.4 of Chap. 7.

Leap Forward. Despite continuing public disputes over ideology, the “rollback of the Great Leap Forward and the need for food aid,” which the Soviet Union offered in 1961, “led to some relaxation in Sino-Soviet relations” (Lüthi 2008, p. 194).

The “truce” did not last long. Mao re-emerged in the CCP by the summer of 1962 and resumed his quest for continuing revolution. For Mao, Khrushchev’s decision to back down in the final phase of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 proved that the Soviets were “revisionists” and reinforced the correctness of his own ideology. Unsurprisingly, the Sino-Soviet party talks of July 1963, which were to reconcile ideological differences, reached nowhere.

1.3 Collision Course

In October 1964, China successfully exploded its first atomic bomb. In the same month, Khrushchev was ousted by his colleagues. The new collective leadership in Moscow, headed by Leonid Brezhnev, tried to rectify relations with Beijing. For his part, Mao decided to send a delegation headed by Premier Zhou Enlai to the Sino-Soviet meeting in early November. Yet, “[e]ven before the start of the meeting in Moscow, both sides occupied irreconcilable positions” (Lüthi 2008, p. 291). Naturally, again, the Sino-Soviet meeting reached nowhere.

Along with ideological differences, security concerns loomed large in Mao’s Soviet perception. After the Cuban Crisis, the US and the USSR pursued a *détente*, which culminated in the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of August 1963. The Chinese recognized the LTBT as a joint venture between superpowers to prevent China and West Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, the Soviets began to increase levels of force along the Sino-Soviet border and attempted to make Outer Mongolia a member of the Warsaw Pact. These Soviet actions resulted in Mao’s fear of Soviet attack against Xinjiang, Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia. Furthermore, by 1965, when the US increased its commitment in Vietnam, “Mao was probably as much concerned with the Soviet threats in the north as with the American threat in the south” (Radchenko 2010, p. 364).

For their part, in 1966, Soviet leaders increasingly worried about the Cultural Revolution, the radicalization of politics and society in China. Inspired by Mao’s radical thoughts, groups of students formed the Red Guards and held mass rallies across the country. The Red Guards encircled the Soviet Embassy in Beijing to condemn Soviet “revisionism.” In addition, Moscow was concerned about China’s military buildup in the border area. Moscow countered by stationing troops in Mongolia according to the Soviet-Mongolian alliance treaty of 1966 and building up forces in the Far East. By so doing, Brezhnev hoped to deter the Chinese from attacking the Soviets (Radchenko 2009, pp. 174–90).

The Soviet deterrence strategy backfired. The Chinese reacted with “a show of force to dissuade the opponent from hostile action.” In early March 1969, the Chinese military ambushed the Soviet border troops around Zhenbao (Damansikii in Russian) Island on the Ussuri (Wusuli) River. Within six months, another military

clash occurred in Xinjiang. Ominously, Moscow hinted at a nuclear strike against China in both incidents. On September 11, Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin met his Chinese counterpart Zhou Enlai at the Beijing Airport. They reassured each other that they had no intention to start war and agreed to resume negotiation over border issues. Nevertheless, Mao still suspected that Moscow would take advantage of the border talks to deflect Beijing's attention to the Soviets' first strike. Though the Soviets never attacked, strong concern over a war with the Soviets drove Beijing to rapprochement with the Americans, who were then suffering from a bitter war in Vietnam (Radchenko 2010, pp. 367–8).

2 Wars in Indochina, 1954–1969

2.1 Geneva Conference and Its Aftermath

The United States began its commitment to Vietnam in early 1950, when it decided to support French war efforts in Indochina.⁴ The beginning of American involvement in Vietnam coincided with diplomatic recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) by the Soviet Union and newly established Communist China in January 1950. Beijing soon started providing military assistance with the Viet Minh, the leading organization of Vietnamese anti-colonial struggle against France. The US countered this move through diplomatic recognition of the State of Vietnam, the French-backed regime in the south. According to Logevall (2010, p. 286), it was a watershed moment. “Henceforth, the First Indochina War was simultaneously a colonial conflict and a Cold War confrontation.”

Despite American support to France, the Viet Minh maintained the upper hand militarily throughout the war. Indeed, when ceasefire talks began on May 8, 1954 in Geneva, the Viet Minh controlled three quarters of the country. Yet, in July, Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the Viet Minh and the premier of the DRV, decided to accept the Geneva accords, which secured nation-wide elections to be held within two years but only half of the country for the DRV. In Geneva, the American delegation headed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles threatened military intervention unless the US's terms were accepted. Even the DRV's allies, the USSR and China, wanted a ceasefire and pushed DRV leaders to acquiesce. While anxious about the “prevalence of fatigue and war weariness” among the Vietnamese, Ho's “greatest concern” was the prospect of US intervention. “[F]inalizing a settlement represented the only way to avoid US intervention and protect the long-term interest of the Vietnamese Revolution,” believed Ho (Asselin 2018, pp. 73–74).

Ho and his comrades were confident that they would win the national elections scheduled in 1956 and reunify the country. In July 1955, however, Ngo Dinh Diem, the leader of South Vietnam, refused to hold the elections, with the blessing of the

⁴ For the decolonization of Southeast Asia, including Indochina, see Sect. 8.2 of the chapter by Kazuya Nakamizo and Hiroyoshi Kano.

Americans. Washington was determined to prop up Diem, seeing South Vietnam as a cornerstone for its containment policy in Southeast Asia. In April 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower emphasized the importance of South Vietnam with his famous domino theory: If South Vietnam fell into the hands of communists, other countries would quickly follow suit in the region. With such an ominous prospect in mind, in September 1954, the Eisenhower administration signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (the Manila Treaty) which led to the establishment of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). In addition, Washington started pouring massive military aid into South Vietnam.

In the late 1950s, it was already apparent that Diem had failed to consolidate his domestic political base. His oppressive and despotic rule, often favorable to the Catholic population, alienated the majority of South Vietnamese society, who were peasants and Buddhists. Towards the end of 1950s, Viet Minh members that stayed in the South increased their pressure on Hanoi to restart liberation efforts.

In the beginning, the leaders of the Vietnamese Worker's Party (VWP) in the north were cautious and pursued the liberation of the south only through non-military measures. Although they did not abandon the policy of reunification, they first and foremost had to consolidate their new country while avoiding provocative measures against the Americans. With strong pressure from their comrades in the south, however, the Hanoi leadership gradually changed their strategy. Early in 1959, the Central Committee of the VWP decided to restart their armed struggle and support anti-governmental activities in the south. The decision included the opening of the famous "Ho Chi Minh Trail," a hundred-mile-long route from the south to the north through Laos that supplied materials and manpower. In December 1960, a number of anti-Diem groups formed the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF). Waging guerrilla warfare and garnering wider support from the South Vietnamese, the communist led NLF soon became the central force in the southerners' battle for liberation and reunification (Asselin 2018, pp. 81–104; Furuta 1996, pp. 17–18). The Indochina War then entered its second phase.

2.2 *Kennedy and the Second Indochina War*

In January 1961, John F. Kennedy, the new American president, inherited the conflict in Indochina from his predecessor. At that moment, Laos, not Vietnam, was the immediate concern for the new administration. In contrast to his predecessor, Kennedy saw little American security interest in Laos. Thus, JFK decided to pursue a negotiated settlement on Laos. In July 1962, the International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos was signed (Logevall 2001, pp. 40–41).

While the Laos crisis was successfully defused, the situation in South Vietnam was deteriorating. Anti-Diem protests expanded and intensified. Protesting against religious oppression by Catholic Diem, Buddhist monks burned themselves in the street. Diem's tyranny, corruption, and nepotism alienated South Vietnamese and helped the NLF increase its force and popularity in the south. American officials

found that the US backed South Vietnamese Army lacked the ability to wage a counter-insurgency against the NLF.

Yet, in Vietnam, JFK had no intention of negotiating. He was afraid that by opting for a diplomatic solution in Laos “he had opened himself up to charges of being ‘soft on communism’ from his domestic opponents” (Logevall 2010, p. 293). Strategic concerns also loomed. For Kennedy, Vietnam was a touchstone of “the credibility of America’s commitment” which was essential “to convince adversaries and allies alike of American firmness, determination, and dependability.” From mid-1962 onwards, the US began to see China, which pursued radical foreign policy under Mao’s tutelage,⁵ as a more serious threat than the USSR. In this context, Vietnam became a keystone for containing Beijing. Yet, JFK was faced with a dilemma. “[H]e did not want to expand the American military commitment,” which he believed would easily slip into a quagmire, “but he feared a continued military and political deterioration in South Vietnam” (Logevall 2001, pp. 43–6).

Kennedy ended up taking a middle course and increased financial assistance to Diem’s government while sending US military advisers to train and help the South Vietnamese Army. The number of American military advisers gradually increased and, by the end of 1963, reached around 16,000. Kennedy’s cautious approach, however, did not work well. Indeed, JFK allowed a group from the South Vietnamese military to proceed forward with a coup against Diem, hoping new leadership would restore political stability. Diem was ousted in November 1963. Nevertheless, the turmoil in the south continued.

2.3 Americanization and Its Consequence

With the assassination of JFK, Lyndon B. Johnson took over the Vietnamese problem in November 1963. LBJ maintained Kennedy’s policy in view of the November 1964 presidential elections. However, an important event happened, which furthered American involvement in Vietnam. In August, the president was informed that two American destroyers were attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin. Though lacking conclusive evidence, Johnson decided to retaliate by launching air strikes against North Vietnam. In addition, at Johnson’s request, Congress decided to authorize the president to “take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression” of Southeast Asia (United States Congress 1964).

In February 1965, after his landslide victory in the presidential elections, LBJ decided to escalate the US war effort. In the wake of a communist attack against an American air base (the Pleiku incident), he decided to start continuous bombing of North Vietnam. In July, Johnson authorized an increase in the number of American ground forces in Vietnam. By the end of 1965, the US sent more than 180,000

⁵ See Sect. 9.1 of this chapter.

ground forces. The war in Vietnam was now fully Americanized, and the US military presence reached its peak of 536,100 in 1968.

The more the American war efforts increased, the greater the Soviet and Chinese military and economic assistance to the DRV became. Here loomed large the ongoing Sino-Soviet split.⁶ The two communist giants competed with each other to support the DRV: “[T]hus growing US pressure on North Vietnam merely stimulated that rivalry to Hanoi’s advantage” (Haslam 2011, p. 222). Still, neither Moscow nor Beijing wanted a direct conflict with Washington. Indeed, in 1965, China tried to send signals to the US that it had no intention of sending troops as long as the American army did not invade China. (Hershberg and Chen 2006).

Assistance from the Soviets and Chinese partly explains the reason why the North Vietnamese could continue their fight against the Americans. To achieve an upper hand in the guerrilla warfare waged by the Vietnamese, the US exerted enormous fire power and the most advanced technologies, e.g., carpet bombing, napalm, armed helicopters, and crop defoliants. However, alienated by such cruel American tactics, many Vietnamese not only supported the communists but also volunteered to fight in the war.

In the meantime, skepticism about the American war effort grew. Anti-war movements pervaded not only in the United States but also around the world. Against this background, the DRV and NLF launched an extensive attack in the south during the Tet lunar new year in late January 1968. Although the Tet offensive failed to achieve all its military goals, it made clear that the United States could not win the war. In his TV address on March 31, President Johnson announced a partial halt of bombing against the DRV and called for armistice talks. He also stated that he would not run for president in the upcoming election. Increasingly, it came to be believed that American power and international role were in decline. Finding a way out of the quagmire of Vietnam and restoring US influence became important tasks for Johnson’s successor.

3 Asia in the Era of Détente and Post-Vietnam

3.1 *Superpower Détente and Sino-American Rapprochement*

When President Richard Nixon took office in January 1969, the United States faced a wide range of problems. The US failure to succeed in the guerilla warfare waged in Vietnam had seriously discredited American prestige. The war also imposed heavy financial and human costs on the Americans, although the Vietnamese suffered from a much larger number of war casualties. Even in military terms, American power appeared to be declining. By the end of 1960s, the Soviet Union had caught up with the United States in terms of strategic nuclear power.

⁶ See Sect. 9.1 of this chapter.

Such international difficulties urged Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, Nixon's special assistant for national security affairs, to reorient the American grand strategy towards "détente." The basic goal of détente was the same as their predecessors' strategies to contain the Soviet Union. Interestingly, a Sino-American rapprochement constituted an integral part of détente. The Sino-Soviet split, they believed, had brought about a propitious moment to "play the Chinese and Soviets off each other." In addition, with the strategy of détente, Nixon and Kissinger hoped to induce the Soviets and Chinese to help the Americans get out of Vietnam (Hanhimäki 2013, pp. 39–40).

For its part, China had strong motivation to improve its relations with the US. Towards the end of 1960s, China increasingly felt threatened. American involvement in Vietnam was a major threat for China in the south. In the West, it was faced with India, an enemy since the border conflict of 1959. Yet, the "worst threat" was now in the north: "[A] former ally—the Soviet Union." Encircled, Beijing decided to shift its strategy to seek a way out (Chen 2001, pp. 240–241). For Beijing, rapprochement with Washington was a strategic countermove against Moscow.⁷

With these thoughts in mind, from mid-1969, the Americans and Chinese exchanged a series of secret messages through Pakistan and Romania.⁸ These attempts led to Kissinger's secret trip to China in July 1971, followed by Nixon's official visit in February 1972. In Beijing, Nixon met Mao and Zhou.⁹ Their central concern was the status of Taiwan. While the US had committed itself to the defense of Taiwan since 1954, "No PRC leader could retreat from Beijing's basic position that there was only one China, that Taiwan was a part of China, and that the People's Republic was the only legal government of China" (Accinelli 2005, pp. 9–10).

After lengthy discussions, China and the US worked out terms acceptable to both. In the final communique announced on February 28 in Shanghai, the Chinese "reaffirmed" its position: "[T]he PRC is the sole legal government of China"; "Taiwan is a province of China"; and "the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair." For their part, the Americans stated: "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position" (United States Department of State 1972).

The Americans and Chinese respectively obtained what they had wanted. Sino-American rapprochement boosted the PRC's prestige in the world. In 1971 and 1972, thirty-three countries extended diplomatic recognition to China, breaking their diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Since then, the PRC has enjoyed the upper hand in their competition with Taiwan. Indeed, in September 1972, Japan agreed to normalize its

⁷ As Rumi Aoyama (2011, p. 314) points out, recent studies highlight the role of ideology in the making of new Chinese policy. Chen Jian, for example, argues that the receding of Mao's ideology of "continuous revolution" in 1968–69 enabled the Chinese leadership to make a fundamental shift in their security strategy (Chen 2001, pp. 239–245; Chen 2006, pp. 33–35).

⁸ On Pakistan's role in the Sino-US rapprochement, see Sect. 9.4.

⁹ William Burr (2003) has provided a good collection of the declassified documents on Nixon's China visit.

relations with China, while abandoning its official diplomatic ties with Taiwan.¹⁰ The Sino-American rapprochement also prodded the Soviets into turning to détente with the Americans. In May 1972, three months after Nixon's trip to China, the president visited Moscow and signed such important agreements as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the Basic Principles of US-Soviet Relations. The "triangular" strategy worked vis-à-vis the Soviets. But this was not case for the Vietnamese. Why? To answer this question, we need to examine the Sino-North Vietnamese relations of this period.

3.2 *The Sino-Vietnamese Split and the Paris Peace Accords*

While relations among long-standing enemies drastically shifted towards détente, relations between China and the DRV—old allies since the early 1950s—kept deteriorating. Until the end of 1968, China was the most significant supporter for the DRV's war effort while Hanoi also received military and financial assistance from Moscow. Well aware of the ongoing Sino-Soviet split, Hanoi leadership tried to postpone the moment when they would have to choose one side as long as possible.

The 1968 Tet Offensive marked a turning point in the Hanoi-Beijing relationship. Beijing had worried that a major operation as such would increase Hanoi's dependence on Soviet weapons and, in turn, expand Moscow's influence on Hanoi. Worse for China, DRV leaders decided to participate in the Paris peace talks with the Americans to seek a way out of the military impasse. Unsurprisingly, Beijing strongly opposed the US-DRV talks that Moscow endorsed. As a result, after 1969, the Soviet replaced China as the biggest supplier of aid. Hanoi's tilt towards Moscow scared Beijing as, by then, the Soviets had become the most dangerous enemy for the Chinese.

Naturally, China sought to break the impasse by improving relations with the US while they simultaneously kept fighting with Moscow and Hanoi. The Chinese and North Vietnamese involved themselves in a "struggle for mastery in Indochina" (Nguyen 2006, p. 15): They tried to extend their influence over Cambodia and Laos in order to secure their regional allies. As we will see, the Sino-Vietnamese political battle over Indochina paved the way for the Third Indochina War. In terms of relations with the Americans, both the Soviets and Chinese pursued their strategic goals to the detriment of the Vietnamese. Indeed, upon Washington's request, Moscow and Beijing made constant efforts to persuade Hanoi to restrain its military actions and sign a ceasefire agreement in vain; Hanoi was determined not to repeat their mistakes at Geneva in 1954 (Nguyen 2006, pp. 12–32).

In the meantime, the Nixon administration pursued the policy of "Vietnamization" by strengthening the South Vietnamese military so that the Americans could withdraw their forces. Nixon gradually pulled American forces from Vietnam, from 543,000 in the spring of 1969 to 60,000 in the fall of 1972, while increasing military

¹⁰ As to Sino-Japanese normalization, see Chap. 13 by Akihiko Tanaka.

pressure on Hanoi through bombing. By so doing, the president hoped to squeeze out a better deal at the Paris talks. He also sent troops to Cambodia in 1970 and to Laos in 1971 in order to destroy the Vietnamese footholds. Hanoi, however, did not yield to the American pressure.

3.3 *Third Indochina War*

On January 27, 1973, the Paris Peace Accords were signed. The North and South Vietnamese countries agreed on ceasefire while the Americans withdrew their troops from Vietnam. It did not take long before the battle between the two Vietnamese regimes resumed. By early 1975, the DRV assumed the dominant position on the battleground, and Vietnam was reunified in April 1976. The DRV was renamed as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Meanwhile, communists seized control in neighboring countries. In December 1975, the Lao People's Democratic Republic was established under the leadership of the Pathet Lao. The Kingdom of Cambodia, which had been under the rule of Prince Norodom Sihanouk since 1953, had plunged into a civil war in 1970. The bloody conflict ended with the victory of the Khmer Rouge led by Pol Pot, a radical Maoist and aggressive nativist leader. In April 1976, Pol Pot declared the creation of the Democratic Kampuchea (Kiernan 2006, pp. 187–206).

Yet, neither the Paris accords nor the communist victory brought peace to Indochina. Towards the end of the 1970s, the Third Indochina War, a series of military conflicts among China, the DRV, and Democratic Kampuchea, erupted. All the belligerent countries espoused Marxism, but their ideological affinity did not prevent them from fighting with each other, as the leaders of each power were “influenced by nationalist sentiments as much as by communist ideologies” (Best et al. 2014, p. 326). After the conclusion of the Paris accords, China was increasingly concerned about the Moscow-backed DRV becoming a dominant regional power. Perhaps, the Chinese fear of the Soviet-Vietnamese coalition was overshadowed by the long-standing history of Sino-Vietnamese animosity dating back to the second century BC (Matsuoka 2001, pp. 117–118). Accordingly, Beijing increased its support for the Khmer Rouge, hoping the anti-Vietnamese Pol Pot's regime to be a counterbalance against Hanoi (Nguyen 2006, p. 26). In 1977 and 1978, there were frequent border clashes between the Vietnamese and Kampucheans.

The anti-Vietnamese coalition of China and Kampuchea pushed Vietnam further towards the Soviet Union. In November 1978, Moscow and Hanoi signed the treaty of friendship and cooperation, which provided the Soviets with a naval base in the strategically important Cam Ranh Bay. In December, the Vietnamese army crossed the Kampuchean border and replaced the Pol Pot regime with the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), a pro-Vietnamese government led by Heng Samrin. The Vietnamese army remained there until 1989. The Vietnamese, however, failed to capture Pol Pot and his subordinates who continued armed struggles against the PRK.

Convinced that Moscow had pulled strings behind the scenes to counter China, in February 1979, China invaded Vietnam to “teach a lesson” to Hanoi. The Vietnamese army, however, effectively resisted and forced the Chinese military to retreat.

In resisting Vietnam and the PRK, China and the ASEAN countries worked together on both military and diplomatic fronts. They shared security concerns vis-à-vis Vietnam. Militarily, China and such ASEAN countries as Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia supported non-communist rebellions in Cambodia against the PRK. China also kept providing Pol Pot’s group with military equipment. In parallel, ASEAN took a series of actions in the United Nations to isolate Vietnam. In June 1982, China and ASEAN helped to establish the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), a government in exile consisting of three anti-Vietnamese political groups: The royalist FUNCINPEC led by Sihanouk, the communist Khmer Rouge, and the antiroyalist and anticommunist Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) (Scott 1996, pp. 85–91; Tanaka 1992, p. 194).

As we will see in Sect. 9.5 of this chapter, in the late 1970s, the United States, like China, was increasingly concerned about the reemerging Soviet threat, which pushed Washington and Beijing to form a quasi-alliance. Accordingly, in Indochina, the Americans “began to counter what was perceived as Soviet expansionism through its client, Vietnam” (Scott 1996, pp. 84–85). And the US government under Presidents Jimmy Carter and, from 1981, Ronald Reagan would support China and ASEAN’s move against Vietnam in Cambodia (Scott 1996, pp. 84–104). The aforesaid story demonstrates the dynamic interactions inherent to Sino-US-Soviet triangular relations and the regional conflicts in East and Southeast Asia in the 1970s. We can observe similar developments in South Asia.

4 South Asia in the Cold War

4.1 *India-Pakistan Relations in the Early Cold War*

India and Pakistan attained their independence in August 1947. From the beginning, the two countries disagreed over the ownership of Kashmir and clashed as early as October 1947.¹¹ In addition, the two countries took different stands on the Cold War.

The new Indian leaders, prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his Congress Party, saw themselves as “nonaligned, anticolonial and socialist.” As a political leader of an underdeveloped country, Nehru was attracted by the Soviet economic model of centralized planning. Nevertheless, he strongly opposed the Cold War. For him, it was the European centered international system deflecting “attention” from “the real problems” of the world: “[U]nderdevelopment, hunger, and colonial oppression.” And the Cold War threatened the possibility of nuclear catastrophe. “Third World

¹¹ On the independence of India and Pakistan and the origins of the Kashmir issue, see Sect. 8.1.2 in the chapter by Kazuya Nakamizo and Hiroyoshi Kano. For a concise overview of the Cold War in this region, see Artemy Kalinovsky (2014).

solidarity, national sovereignty, and freedom of action was essential,” believed Nehru (Westad 2017, pp. 423–424). Indeed, India played a leading role in organizing the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, and the Non-Aligned Movement, in order to resist the Cold War system.

In contrast, Pakistan leaned toward the United States. While acting as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Muslim leadership in Karachi hoped to derive from the US not only economic and military assistance, but also a security commitment against India. For this purpose, they tried to portray their country as a cornerstone of American containment policy in South Asia. In 1954, the two countries signed a mutual defense assistance agreement. Pakistan also became members of SEATO in 1954 and of the Baghdad Pact in 1955.

In the early phase of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had little interest in involving itself in the Third World. Stalin’s death, however, changed Moscow’s course. The new Soviet leaders, especially Khrushchev, found increasing opportunities to expand Soviet influence among newly independent countries including India. Moscow, they believed, could take advantages of strong anti-colonial/Western feelings and desires for economic modernization among Third World countries (Gaiduk 2015).

4.2 The Sino-Soviet Split and the Cold War in South Asia

In the mid-1950s, security concerns over American-backed Pakistan, together with its sympathy towards the Soviet economic model, pushed New Delhi towards Moscow. The Soviets could not miss the chance. In February 1955, India became the first non-communist Asian country that concluded an economic assistance agreement with the USSR. Two months later, Nehru made an official visit to Moscow. Alarmed, Washington started providing India with massive economic aid in the late 1950s, while maintaining its military commitment to Pakistan. In so doing, US officials hoped to “cultivate friendly, productive relations with both countries” in order to contain the expansion of Soviet influence in the region (McMahon 1994, p. 333). In South Asia, local rivalry between India and Pakistan intermingled with the US-Soviet conflict.

International politics on the Indian Subcontinent were further complicated by the emerging Sino-Soviet split. As we have seen, the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1959 disclosed a rift between Moscow and Beijing.¹² During the second Sino-Indian border incident in October 1962, which coincided with the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow sided with Beijing. The Soviets wanted to secure Chinese support for their actions in the Caribbean. Not surprisingly, Moscow’s dismissive stance drove New Delhi towards Washington. Kennedy took this opportunity to cultivate friendly relations with India. Upon Nehru’s request, the US provided India with military equipment. JFK’s policy, however, backlashed. US assistance could not prevent India’s defeat, and it only angered its Pakistani ally.

¹² See Sect. 9.2.

The 1962 Sino-Indian war changed the international dynamics in South Asia. On the one hand, the incident made Moscow and New Delhi closer as they began to see Beijing as their “common enemy” (Mastny 2010b, pp. 62–63). On the other hand, feeling betrayed by the US, Pakistan tilted toward China. The Sino-Soviet split and the post-Cuba superpower *détente* overshadowed this process: The US and the Soviet Union was now seeking *détente*, while their respective relations with China deteriorated.

It was against this complicated background that Pakistani General Mohammed Ayub Khan started a series of military moves against Kashmir in August 1965. Indian Prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, the successor of Nehru who had passed away in May 1964, immediately responded. This alarmed the Americans. If China intervened in the Indo-Pakistani War, the regional conflict in South Asia might escalate into a global war. In addition, Beijing’s move could have wider repercussions for US interests by undermining the “faith” of US Middle Eastern allies “in American commitments,” pushing Pakistan further toward China, and driving India to go nuclear (McMahon 1994, pp. 328–330). Naturally, Washington attempted to ensure an armistice through the United Nations. Such American attitudes, however, alienated both India and Pakistan. In contrast, the Soviets succeeded in mediating a ceasefire. In January 1966, Shastri and Ayub went to Tashkent in Soviet Uzbekistan and agreed to declare an armistice (Perkovich 2000, p. 110; Kalinovsky 2014, p. 182).

4.3 South Asia in the Era of *Détente*

After the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, the Johnson administration decreased its commitment to the Indian subcontinent. With the inauguration of President Nixon, however, the United States again changed its South Asia policy. Nixon entered the White House with strong pro-Pakistani and anti-Indian sentiments, which had been formed during his 1958 visit to the region as vice president. Nixon’s South Asia policy also reflected his new strategy of *détente*. Throughout 1969 and 1970, Nixon tried to inform Beijing of his readiness to normalize Sino-American relations through Agha Mohammed Yahya Kahn, the president of Pakistan who had replaced Ayub in March 1969. In early December 1970, Nixon received what he had longed for: Zhou Enlai’s message welcoming Nixon’s special envoy to Beijing (McMahon 2008, pp. 251–256).

Nixon’s effort coincided with a serious political development in Pakistan. In East Pakistan, the Awami League Party, which had demanded full autonomy for Bengalis, won a major victory in the national elections. Next spring, Yahya’s government in West Pakistan decided to use force to crack down on the independence movement in East Pakistan. Many Bengalis were killed. Nixon, however, remained silent. His priority was to maintain good relations with Yahya, a key figure for Sino-US rapprochement (McMahon 2008, p. 259). Indeed, in July 1971, Kissinger made a secret trip to Beijing by way of Pakistan and successfully arranged Nixon’s visit to China early in the next year.

The emerging coalition of the US, China, and Pakistan inflamed the security concerns of the Soviet Union and India. Indeed, early in August, New Delhi and Moscow signed a friendship treaty. The treaty convinced Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter and then the Indian prime minister, that her government was now well prepared to use force in order to solve the problem of East Pakistan. Although Moscow hoped to avoid another Indo-Pakistani war, New Delhi did not care about Soviet opposition. When Pakistan declared war against India in early December, Gandhi did not miss the opportunity to "dispose of India's principal adversary by splitting it in two parts" (Mastny 2010b, pp. 68–69). In two weeks, India won a quick victory, and a new independent Bangladesh was established in East Pakistan.

4.4 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

The quick end of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War did not stabilize the political situation in South Asia. In May 1974, India conducted a "peaceful" nuclear test, code-named "Smiling Buddha." It is widely believed that Gandhi made this decision because of security concerns about Pakistan. Recent studies, however, persuasively argue that pressure from the Indian defense and scientific establishment along with domestic political concerns were more important for Gandhi than the Pakistani threat (Perkovich 2000; Chap. 7; Mastny 2010b, p. 72). Pakistan countered India by accelerating its own nuclear project. The nuclear arms race in South Asia was set in motion.

In Pakistan, army general Muhammad Zia ul Haq seized power in the coup d'état of July 1977. As a pious Muslim leader, Haq intended to transform his country into an Islamic state based on Shariah. At the same time, neighboring Afghanistan experienced a major political change. In April 1978, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power. The new government intended to transform a rural country into a modern socialist state and hoped to receive aid from the Soviet Union. Moscow was not involved in the PDPA's seizure of power and, initially, was cautious to help the new regime. Yet, "[t]he growing instability on the southern frontiers only increased a temptation to turn Afghanistan into a stable satellite under Soviet tutelage." In December 1978, the two countries signed a friendship treaty (Zubok 2009, pp. 259–260).

Early in 1979, the situation in Afghanistan began to deteriorate. The PDPA's radical socialist-oriented policy alienated a broader range of Afghan people, and they soon committed themselves to the Islamist rebellion called *mujahedin*. Initially, the Soviets were cautious to send troops to the country. The assassination of Afghan Prime Minister Nur Mohammad Taraki by his deputy Hafizullah Amin in September 1979 became the turning point for Moscow. Taraki was Brezhnev's favorite. Moreover, the KGB Soviet intelligence agency informed Moscow from Kabul that "Amin was playing a double game and meeting secretly with the Americans" (Zubok 2009, pp. 260–262).

From the mid-1970s, US-Soviet relations kept deteriorating on many fronts, including strategic arms control negotiations, the Third World, and human rights, among other issues. Against this background, Soviet leaders made a critical decision to “eliminate Amin and ‘save’ Afghanistan” (Zubok 2009, p. 262). In late December 1979, the Soviet army crossed the Afghan border. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, despite its defensive motive, marked the end of the superpower détente and the beginning of the so-called New Cold War (Njølstad 2010, pp. 135–155; Hanhimäki 2013, pp. 77–154).

5 From the “New Cold War” to the End of the Cold War in Asia

5.1 *The Making and Unmaking of the Anti-Soviet Coalition*

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan intensified Sino-Soviet confrontations. Deng Xiaoping, who had consolidated authority within the CCP after the deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in 1976, criticized the Soviet move as “an important step toward pursuing worldwide hegemony” (Chen 2019, p. 17). As suggested in Sect. 9.3, faced with a Soviet-Vietnamese alliance, Beijing increasingly recognized Washington and Tokyo as strategic partners in the late 1970s. In addition, there loomed a large economic consideration. Pursuing the policy later known as “reform and opening-up,” Chinese leadership desired that their country enter the global market by expanding political and economic ties with capitalist powers in the Asia–Pacific: the US, Japan, and the ASEAN countries. With these calculations in mind, China began to decrease its aid to revolutionary and communist forces in Southeast Asia and, eventually, cut it off in the early 1980s. In August 1978, Beijing also signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Tokyo.

Deng expected the Sino-Japanese treaty to be a stepping stone to Sino-American normalization. For its part, the US wanted a closer relationship with China to resist global Soviet threats. Again, the greatest stumbling block was the Taiwan issue. For normalization, China demanded that the US “must break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan, must withdraw its troops from Taiwan, and must abolish its mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.” Beijing also insisted that Washington should not continue its arms sale to Taipei. In addition, China continued to assert that “the liberation of Taiwan was an internal Chinese affair, and other countries had no right to intervene.” Washington was ready to break off its official relations with Taipei (Gong 2005, p. 134, pp. 138–139). The US, however, intended to continue selling weapons to Taiwan. They also hoped to “terminate,” not abolish, the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 with one-year notice to Taipei. Moreover, the Americans hoped to “get the Chinese to renounce the use of force against Taiwan,” a position Beijing would never take (Foot 2005, p. 110).

Neither side, however, wanted to miss out on this opportunity. In the end, the US and China “decided to postpone settlement of their differences” on the sale of arms. As to the liberation of Taiwan, they formed a compromise by agreeing that each party unilaterally declare its own position (Gong 2005, p. 144). On December 15, 1978, the US and China issued a joint communique declaring that the two countries would normalize their relations on January 1, 1979. They also agreed that the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty would be terminated at the end of 1979. In March 1979, however, the United States Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act. With this Act, Congress demonstrated its willingness to maintain the US’s defense commitment to Taiwan after the US-ROC treaty expired (Sahashi 2015, pp. 199–201).

In any case, an anti-Soviet coalition among the US, China, and Japan was formed by the end of the 1970s, though it did not last long. After President Reagan took office in January 1981, the issue of arms sales to Taiwan flared up again. By August 1982, Washington and Beijing managed to put the blaze under control by issuing a joint communique on this matter (Tucker 2009, pp. 134–147). However, the renewed debate on arms sales made Chinese leaders reconsider their strategy. Indeed, by mid-July 1982, Deng decided to abandon the policy of anti-Soviet alignment with the US and Japan. The Chinese leader also sought to improve relations with the Soviets, provided Moscow remove what Beijing called the “three obstacles” to Sino-Soviet normalization: (1) the withdrawal of Soviet military force in the Chinese-Soviet and the Chinese-Mongolian border areas, (2) the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and (3) the withdrawal of the Vietnamese military from Cambodia (Masuo 2010, pp. 161–181). In September 1982, “Beijing declared that Chinese foreign policy would accord the principle of ‘independence and self-determination’ and thus would attempt to maintain neutrality between both superpowers” (Chen 2019, p. 18). Yet, it would take another six years for the two ex-allies to normalize relations.

5.2 Gorbachev and the Difficult Path to Sino-Soviet Normalization

Moscow had already called for a dialogue with Beijing. In a speech given at Tashkent, Uzbekistan in March 1982, Brezhnev announced that the Soviets hoped to improve Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet move was “an attempt to play the China card against the United States” as Moscow hoped to break off the encirclement by the US, China, and Japan (Lüthi 2020, pp. 535–536). China agreed to have secret talks, though the resumed dialogue soon hit a snag. Soviet leaders certainly wanted to improve relations with their Chinese counterparts. However, for them, agreeing to the “three obstacles” was tantamount to making “one-sided concessions.” Moscow “wanted to engage Beijing for normalization, but not on China’s terms” (Zubok 2017, p. 125).

The Sino-Soviet talks continued to stall even after Mikhail Gorbachev assumed his position as the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in March 1985. It

was well known that Gorbachev pursued the foreign policy of “new thinking,” which consisted of two basic principles: Mutual security and interdependence (Hasegawa 2011b, p. 339). The policy of “new thinking” would eventually make a significant contribution to the end of the Cold War. In 1985 and 1986, however, no diplomatic breakthrough had yet been made between the USSR and the West (Rey 2008, pp. 23–35; Taubman 2018, Chaps. 7, 11, and 13). Recent research argues that Gorbachev sought a Sino-Soviet rapprochement in Asia, or even a “triangle” alignment among the Soviet Union, China, and India, to counter the Reagan administration’s hostile Soviet policy (Zubok 2017, pp. 128–129; Radchenko 2014, pp. 98–100).

In this context, Gorbachev outlined his political vision for Asia during his visit to Vladivostok in July 1986. As “an Asian and Pacific country,” he emphasized, the Soviet Union hoped to build “together new fair, relations” and promote economic interdependence in this region. For this purpose, Moscow hoped to expand political and economic ties with China, Japan, ASEAN, and other countries. Gorbachev also proposed a collective security system in this region. This speech embodied the application of “new thinking” to the Asia–Pacific (Gorbachev 1986, pp. 250–258; Hasegawa 2011b, pp. 340–341).

In this address, Gorbachev also indicated his willingness to meet two of the “three obstacles.” He announced the partial withdrawal of Soviet troops in Afghanistan by the end of 1986. In addition, the Soviet leader mentioned the on-going talks with Mongolia over force reduction. Five weeks later, however, Deng (1986) criticized Gorbachev, who had “evaded” the question of Vietnamese withdrawal in Vladivostok. For Deng, this was “the main obstacle in Sino-Soviet relations.” Deng emphasized that “if he [Gorbachev] urges Vietnam to end its aggression in Kampuchea and withdraw its troops from there, I for my part will be ready to meet him.”

It is worth noting that Deng had already shown some flexibility. In April 1985, Deng remarked that the Soviets would not need to “lift all three obstacles at once.” “[T]hey can first eliminate one, then progressively one by one” (Gladstone 1985). After 1987, Sino-Soviet reconciliation proceeded as Deng had suggested. The Soviet Union started the partial withdrawal of troops from Mongolia in early 1987 and from Afghanistan in May 1988. By February 1989, all the Soviet forces left Afghanistan. During this period, from 1987 to 1988, US-Soviet relations improved at a rapid pace, especially in the field of nuclear arms control (McMahon 2003, pp. 162–165). Yet, a solution to the Cambodian problem was left up to the local actors in Indochina, and not in the hands of the major Cold War powers.

5.3 Sino-Soviet Normalization and the End of the Civil War in Cambodia

Throughout the 1980s, the quagmire in Cambodia continued. Phnom Penh was under the control of the pro-Vietnamese PRK government, while the CGDK in exile received wider international recognitions and held a seat in the United Nations. With

Vietnamese hostility to China, Deng wanted Moscow to press Hanoi on the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. The Soviets were reluctant. Vietnam was a strategic asset to counter the anti-Soviet coalition. And, unsurprisingly, the Soviet leaders did not want to “upset the fragile Soviet-Vietnamese alliance” (Radchenko 2014, p. 130).

Moscow’s attitude to Hanoi did not change even after Gorbachev took office. Like his predecessors, Gorbachev saw Soviet strategic interests in Vietnam. Indeed, Soviet assistance to Vietnam between 1986 and 1990 “amounted to 8.22 billion rubles, that is, a half of all of Soviet aid to Vietnam since 1955.” The aid to Vietnam, however, was a heavy burden. In addition, the Vietnam’s Cambodian quest hindered Moscow from improving its political and economic relations not only with China but also with the ASEAN countries. While hoping for a ceasefire to the Cambodian conflict, Gorbachev hesitated to put pressure on Hanoi (Radchenko 2014, pp. 130–139).

Meanwhile, from the mid-1980s, the Vietnamese were increasingly aware that a stable international environment was essential for economic recovery. In the middle of the 1980s, Vietnam suffered from “high inflation and lack of access to FDI [foreign direct investment].” To overcome the economic crisis, Vietnamese leaders adopted a policy of *Doi Moi* renovation in December 1986, which aimed for market-oriented economic reform. For this purpose, foreign policy had to be shifted. Vietnam’s high military spending caused a huge fiscal deficit, which in turn led to high inflation. And because of the inflation, foreign investors turned their back on Vietnam. For economic recovery, Hanoi had to end the Cambodian war and normalize its relations with Western countries, the ASEAN powers, and China (Szalontai 2008, p. 244).

In the mid-1980s, other regional powers endeavored to settle the Cambodian conflict. In July 1987, Indonesia proposed a “cocktail party,” an informal talk among four Cambodian parties, Vietnam, and the ASEAN countries. Three months later, the PRK government announced that Prince Sihanouk and PRK Prime Minister Hun Sen would meet in Paris in December 1987 and January 1988. The meeting between the two Cambodian leaders paved the way to the first Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM 1) in July 1988. JIM 1 was the first international meeting among all “the parties most directly involved in the conflict.” The second JIM was held in February 1989. The two JIMs helped clarify conditions for a peace settlement (Ratner 1993, p. 4).

Throughout 1987 and 1988, Vietnam sought for normalization with the ASEAN countries and China. In November 1987, 20,000 Vietnamese troops left Cambodia. Six months later, Hanoi announced that it would pull 50,000 troops by the end of 1988 and all troops by the end of 1990. In the meantime, Vietnam succeeded in improving its relations with Indonesia and Thailand. In contrast, the path for Sino-Vietnamese relations took a zig-zag. In the spring of 1988, the two countries clashed over disputed islands in the Spratlys. Eventually, however, they agreed to resume talks in January 1989 (Radchenko 2014, pp. 136–150; Szalontai 2008, pp. 230–245).

Deng continued to be concerned about the Vietnamese military presence in Cambodia. The Chinese leader thus hoped to ensure Soviet commitment on this issue. This was what the Chinese tried, in vain, to do during the Sino-Soviet foreign minister meetings in December 1988 at Moscow and in February 1989 at Beijing

(Zubok 2017, pp. 136–137). After all, Deng had no choice but to decouple Sino-Soviet normalization from the Cambodian problem.

Deng's decision opened the way to the Sino-Soviet summit. In late May 1989, Gorbachev visited Beijing. The Gorbachev-Deng meeting marked the end of the Sino-Soviet split and normalized relations. Yet, Sino-Soviet normalization did not bring peace to Cambodia. Two more years were needed for the four Cambodian factions and related regional powers to settle the problem with assistance from the United Nations. In October 1991, the Paris Peace Agreements, officially known as the Comprehensive Cambodian Peace Agreements, were finally signed (Ratner 1993). Next year, the United Nations dispatched around 15,000 peacekeepers under the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to supervise the implementation of the Paris agreement (Hanhimäki 2015, p. 84). After national elections in September 1993, the new constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia was promulgated, and Sihanouk returned as King of the constitutional monarchy.

6 Conclusion

Between 1953 and 1989, the evolution of Sino-US-Soviet “triangular” relations, which the Sino-Soviet split and the superpower détente had brought about, shaped the course of local and regional conflicts in Asia, and vice versa. For example, the US played a significant role in the making of the 1954 Geneva Accords, which divided Vietnam into two parts. Sino-Soviet competition in the late 1960s, which supported the DRV, helped Hanoi to keep fighting a protracted war against the US. And the Vietnam quagmire, along with the Sino-Soviet border clash, helped Washington to reorient its strategy towards superpower détente accompanied by Sino-American rapprochement. The same kind of complicated dynamics are also observed in South Asia.

Historian John Lewis Gaddis once called the Cold War the “long peace” (Gaddis 1987). This is certainly the case between the superpowers and in Europe, where there was no direct military clash among major powers. In contrast, the Cold War in Asia did not remain cold. There were “hot wars” in, say, Indochina, South Asia, and Afghanistan. In post-war Asia, there were many local and regional struggles that stemmed not only from the on-going decolonization process but also from historical rivalries among local and regional actors. Interventions by the Americans, Soviets, and Chinese often intensified and protracted these conflicts beyond what they likely would have become without external intervention.

It is difficult to make broad generalizations about the impact of the end of the Cold War on subsequent local and regional conflicts in Asia. As far as the examples examined in this chapter are concerned, it seems reasonable to make the following points. The cessation of foreign intervention brought about by the end of US-Soviet hostilities and Sino-Soviet normalization formed the background for solutions to local and regional conflicts. Nevertheless, the end of these conflicts seem to have depended on local and regional actors. Certainly, Sino-Soviet normalization removed

a major obstacle for the end of conflict in Cambodia. However, the end of the civil war did not occur until the four Cambodian factions and the regional Southeast Asian powers agreed to terms of settlement. By contrast, the Indo-Pakistani conflict continued beyond the Cold War era. India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests and again fought over Kashmir in the late 1990s. South Asia remains a potential flashpoint even after thirty years have passed since the end of the Cold War (Talmadge 2019). Yet, the Indo-Pakistani confrontation might have taken a different form in the twenty-first century if it had not been impacted by the Cold War. This suggests that there is still room for studying the history and legacy of the Cold War in Asia.

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Experiencing Development: The Resistance and Adaptation of Thailand Over Half a Century



Pattajit Tangsinmunkong and Jin Sato

The elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification of any thought; and the starting point for thought is the analytic observation of components of this experience.

-Whitehead (1930)

1 “Development” in Southeast Asia

1.1 *Economic Miracle and the Development Dictatorship*

East and Southeast Asia are known for their remarkable successes in economic development in the latter half of the twentieth century. The World Bank report *The East Asian Miracle* published in 1993 reflected on the amazing growth rate of the region and glorified the proactive role of the state (World Bank 1993).¹ To date, the region’s strong economic growth has more than tripled household income and greatly improved access to basic services, such as health care, education and electricity. As a result, a billion people have been lifted out of extreme poverty, which is an outstanding achievement, particularly compared to other geographical regions and earlier time periods (UNESCAP 2020, p. 1).

Table 10.1 demonstrates a relatively constant rise in GNI per capita in the region despite certain regional variations in time and place. Growth was characterized by a strong emphasis on intra-regional trade stimulated by investment from multi-national

¹ The report focused on Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan. China and North Korea were excluded from “Asia” here, perhaps because these cases were not perceived to fit the “risk” model expounded in the report.

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Table 10.1 GNI per capita in Southeast Asia (1975–2019 in USD)

Country name	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2019
Brunei Darussalam	43,937	59,413	42,602	37,081	37,714	35,932	36,329	35,270	32,873	32,327
Cambodia					342	431	613	786	1,025	1,269
Indonesia	949	1,231	1,387	1,708	2,220	2,144	2,524	3,122	3,824	4,451
Lao PDR			432	462	548	673	843	1,141	1,539	1,841
Malaysia	2,498	3,317	3,768	4,537	6,278	7,007	7,974	9,041	10,912	12,487
Myanmar	169	206	235	194	242	342	598	979	1,335	1,608
Singapore	9,674	13,534	16,633	22,572	29,473	33,851	40,499	47,237	54,010	58,830
Thailand	1,071	1,404	1,667	2,504	3,532	3,458	4,338	5,076	5,741	6,502
Vietnam			383	433	583	765	1,018	1,318	1,667	2,082

Source World Bank Economic Indicators

companies into increasingly open markets (Goto et al. 2020). ASEAN as a region has faced many challenges in the past decades, including increased domestic income gaps, environmental damage, and a range of human security threats associated with centralizing state power.

One important aspect of development in Southeast Asia is the role of authoritarian regimes. Political leaders in the eras of growth in each region, particularly in the 1980s, also tended to be despotic figures who created strong governments, and might be labeled as “development dictatorships.” They include the Sarit-Thanom regime in Thailand (1957–1973), the Suharto regime in Indonesia (1965–1998), Marcos’ in the Philippines (1965–1985), Mahathir’s in Malaysia (1981–2003), and Lee Kuan Yew’s in Singapore (1959–1990). Under these regimes, “development” was a socio-economic allure to legitimize power, often supported by a public who were blinded from the brutal dimension of dictatorship.² As mentioned earlier, development under strong leadership had real and positive impacts on improving quality of life indicators such as literacy and health. Nevertheless, there was also political sacrifice such as curtailed freedom of speech and democracy.

1.2 Focus on People’s Experience

The meaning of “development” varies depending on the standpoint of the observer. It is for this reason that we focus on the experience of people who went through such “development”, despite international influence. “Experience” here refers to the constant (re-)forming of norms and perceptions of living people. Experience of development must be felt. Also, since “development” is an abstract concept, its

² Human rights violations under Suharto Indonesia are perhaps the most well documented. See for example, Robinson (2018).

experience has to be mediated by something such as access to improved goods and services.³ Accounting for experience, therefore, requires an identification of such “mediums” and the long-term perspective on how actors interact with them.

This chapter examines the postwar development experience of Thailand, a country that has been exposed to sequential waves of outside influence seeking development opportunities. Despite its success in avoiding direct colonization, Thailand sequentially dealt with dominant influences from the U.S., Japan, and China. Thailand provides a powerful case to examine how the government and the people experienced such waves and positioned themselves in the process. We argue that the encounter and struggle to respond to a series of waxing and waning of influence and confronting dominant forces coming from abroad forms the essence of development experience. Examining the long-term trajectory of a particular region with a focus on the multi-layered “makeup” of a country allows us to produce valuable insights unavailable to previous research that treats the nation state as a monolith.

In Thailand, development (*phatthana*) was pervasively promoted under Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat (1959–1963). Sarit was the first to formulate the idea of development as one of the main drivers for political reform (Thak 2006, p. 9).⁴ The motto of the administration was, “good roads, running water, and bright light,” and those years have been labeled as the “era of development” in modern Thai history (Pinyapan 2015, p. 3).

From the perspective of Thai people, there have been continuous waves of foreign influence that have (re)shaped the idea of what “development” means. Conventional analyses have emphasized economic aspects by using the generic term “globalization” (e.g., Felker 2008), yet our approach focuses more on the sequential adaptations to such external forces and its domestic repercussions from taking an inside-out approach (Sato and Sonoda 2021).

By examining the experience of Thailand since the 1950s, we explore how waves of development have impacted Thai society and how, through these waves, the image and idea of development have been mediated and practiced within Thailand and beyond.

2 The Wave of Americanization in the 1950s to the 1970s

The initial global wave of development that reached Thailand’s shores after the Second World War was shaped by the influence of the United States. American interest, driven by national security and anti-communism, resulted in a lasting impact that surpassed its strategic goals.

³ We owe this focus on “experience” to Giddens (1991).

⁴ As in conventional usage, Thai people are referred to by their first names while Westerners are referred to by their surnames. In the list of references, Thai names are entered according to first names.

American engagement with Thailand intensified toward the end of World War II when the Thai elite, growing wary of the Japanese military, increased collaboration with Allied powers. The U.S., envisioning the postwar landscape, recognized an opportunity to forge an alliance with Thailand (Kakizaki 2006, p. 184). This partnership was solidified when Thai troops were deployed to support the U.S. military during the Korean War (Thak 2006, p. 155).

Unlike in other Southeast Asian countries, anti-Western sentiment was not intense in Thailand as it had never experienced direct colonization. This unique condition also motivated the U.S. to influence Thailand to lean further toward them.⁵ Southeast Asia, therefore, turned out to be the frontier at which the U.S. experimented tested its model of political influence through foreign aid (Montgomery 1962, p. 6).

Thailand was considered one of the countries least susceptible to the perceived threats of communism. However, the United States invested in Thailand primarily because of the political situation in neighboring Laos after the retreat of the French occupation and the war in Vietnam. Consequently, USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) made substantial investments in the northeast of Thailand, focusing on the reconstruction of strategically important roads. U.S. development investments constituted approximately 10% of Thailand's National Budget between 1951 and 1954 (Issara 1968, p. 29). At a more macro level, the first wave of Americanization from the 1950s to the 1970s brought about urbanization, the establishment of military bases, modernization of weaponry, and a corresponding increase in GDP.

American intervention was most impactful in its investment in human resources, especially in the planning section of the government. In 1959, a World Bank mission to Thailand similarly recommended the establishment of a planning machinery within the government (IBRD 1959). Nevertheless, the financial support in the form of loans and grants from the U.S. far surpassed that of the World Bank and other countries (see Table 10.2). For the Thai government, the United States played a crucial role in constructing institutions to facilitate aid, primarily from America. Even a formidable leader like Sarit found it necessary to rely on foreign capital and expertise to implement his development vision.

Although the Governmental Committee to Implement the Point Four Program of President Truman in July 1950 was placed under the National Economic Council—a creation of the Sarit administration from 1959 to 1963 (Issara 1968, p. 29)—the salary of the TTEC staff was being covered by the United States Operations Mission (Issara 1968, p. 37). The U.S. not only established these institutions but also funded the training of personnel working within them (Baker and Pasuk 2009, p. 151). Subsequently, this organization underwent reforms and evolved into the Thai Technical and Economic Cooperation Committee (TTEC), which later transformed into the Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation (DTEC) in 1963. Consequently, the initial influence of American power became ingrained in the Thai government's

⁵ Leaders of Thailand approached the U.S. as well. Marshal Phibun (Plaek Phibunsongkhram), who served as the Prime Minister of Thailand (1938–1944, 1948–1957), sought U.S. assistance for political support, as well as economic and military aid to lay a strong political foundation.

Table 10.2 International Aid to Thailand in the 1950s (unit: 100,000 baht)

	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958 (first half)
Grant and Loan from US	0.8	1.3	1.6	3.3	7.0	7.7	2.5
World Bank Loan	1.7	1.6	0.4	0.4	0.8	1.8	0.8
Japanese War Reparation	–	–	–	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
UN and Colombo Plan	–	–	–	–	0.1	0.1	0.1
Other loans and Grants	–0.1	–0.1	–	3.2	1.6	2.8	0.6
Sum	2.4	2.8	2.0	7.5	10.1	13.0	4.6
Interest	–0.3	–0.3	–0.3	–0.5	–1.0	–1.3	–0.5
Total	2.1	2.5	1.7	7.0	9.1	11.7	4.1

Source International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1959: 238)

operations, persisting even after American cooperation ceded to Japan in the 1970s (Muscat 1994, p. 7).

The strong influence of the U.S. and World Bank on Thailand did not, however, necessarily mean that their policy recommendations were followed. In the first National Economic Development Plan (1961–1966), the Thai government emphasized irrigation and agriculture, though they were not highly emphasized by the U.S. and World Bank (Thak 2006, p. 169). In doing so, the Sarit administration gave priority to the domestic needs of the farmers in the impoverished regions rather than focusing exclusively on strategic roads and communication under a narrow application of *phatthana*.

Perhaps more importantly, the American and World Bank approach to development that encouraged the activation of private sector business to promote growth met with resistance and hesitation from Thai elites who feared an increase in Chinese influence in the business sector. Though the prevailing economic model suggested that the economy needed the Chinese, policymakers could not separate it from the communist ideologies attached to their participation in business (Riggs 1966, p. 390).

From the perspective of ordinary people, American influence was felt most strongly through music, movies, and television. Thailand was the first country in Asia to introduce major record shops such as Capitol and Columbia (Pichai 1986, p. 45). America's RCA won its bid to set up a television network in 1953, initially broadcasting mostly American programs (Pichai 1986, p. 48). Behind the scenes, the United States Information Agency was operating most of the media exposure in Thailand with strategic objectives (Findley 2016).

One critical period was during the Vietnam War. From the beginning of the Richard Nixon administration in 1969 until the Paris Peace Agreement in 1973, there was a progressive American disengagement from Thailand (Kullada 2010, p. 75). In 1969, Henry Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, observed that Thai-U.S. relations were undergoing "the greatest strain since the Laotian crisis." He noted that the challenges stemmed from "Thai sensitivity to being treated as something less than a full partner in the struggle for Southeast Asia" and "displeasure

that its contribution to the Vietnam effort has not been fully appreciated” (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Vol. 20: 42).

Thanat Khoman, the Thai Foreign Minister from 1959 and a staunch supporter of pro-American policy, also began expressing clear doubts about U.S. intentions. In a paper written in 1973, he argued that the foreign military base in Thai territory was deemed “outdated” and unnecessary for Thailand within the swiftly evolving international context. He harbored doubts regarding the U.S. commitment to combating communism in the region and questioned the profit-driven agenda of the U.S. military (Thanat 1973, pp. 31–34). Thanat concluded that Thailand “earned the least benefit but bore the most burden” as the presence of American forces led to problems such as cultural and societal degradation, prostitution, and drug-related issues (Thanat 1973, p. 35). Consequently, he began to advocate for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Despite U.S. efforts to win hearts and minds through various propaganda techniques, an undercurrent of anti-American sentiment emerged. Although the Thai government asserted that U.S. military bases were established to prevent Thailand from falling into the hands of vilified communism, public opinion took an increasingly critical stance. Over time, skepticism grew regarding the true intentions of the United States and the purpose of *phatthana*. The U.S. was perceived as a “white threat,” a form of “imperialism” attempting to control Thai politics, the military, and culture, leveraging USAID as a political tool for intervention (Pattajit 2020, pp. 18–19). From 1968, Student movements in Thai politics gained momentum.⁶ Led by the National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT), students were organizing a campaign against the U.S. military presence in Thailand, presenting arguments that largely paralleled those of Khoman. Some argued that the construction of U.S. military bases itself posed a threat to neighboring communist countries and conveyed undesirable signals about Thai intentions toward North Vietnam, and thereby endangered Thailand (Kullada 2010, pp. 86–87).

Anti-American sentiment intensified in the subsequent years due to several incidents. In January 1974, a C.I.A. agent sent a letter to Sanya Dharmasakti, the Prime Minister at the time, falsely claiming to be from an insurgent leader seeking peace with the government. This incident was viewed as interference in Thai affairs and led to vigorous protests from student organizations (Clanty 1974, p. 4). In 1975, associates of Thanom handed over tin mining rights to the U.S. company TEMCO in exchange for kickbacks. In May, the Khmer Rouge seized the U.S. merchant vessel *Mayaguez*, prompting the U.S. to mount a rescue operation using the U-Tapao military base without permission from the Thai government. This triggered anti-American movements three times in the same year. A song titled “American Antarai” (“Dangerous American”) by Karavan, released in 1976 to criticize the

⁶ Student movements in Thai politics gained momentum after 1968, following Prime Minister Thanom’s enactment of a permanent constitution that granted freedom of speech. The active involvement of students in politics emerged as a reaction to the authoritarianism of the Thanom regime, exacerbated by a declining economy. Additionally, the global spread of left-wing ideology, anti-regime movements, and anti-war sentiments played a significant role in influencing the students’ participation in political activities.

imperialistic nature of the U.S., gained popularity during this period. The tone of the song can be gauged from the following lyrics:

Let us come together, go forward with the people with a great hope.

Thailand is our land. Why would we let them in? The imperial American came to oppress us...Thailand is Thai's, not theirs, the American's. The imperial American, they love to invade all other countries... Let us come together as Thai people, American must get out, so that we could have full sovereignty.

Crystallizing anti-American sentiment, the newly established Kukrit government in 1975 pledged that U.S. military bases would withdraw from Thai soil within the first year of their administration. The successful withdrawal was completed in 1976.

As the Vietnam War unfolded in the late 1960s, the American strategy of engagement with the Third World started to become a burden for itself. The U.S. began to shift its reliance towards countries that had achieved a certain level of economic development to share the burdens of defense and development (White 1974, p. 215). This change in policy, coupled with the forced withdrawal of military bases, led to the handing over of development initiatives to Japan.

U.S. influence diminished in the late 1970s due to a decrease in economic aid and the withdrawal of American expertise and military presence following the Vietnam War. Concurrently, a violent crackdown on the student movement and the 1976 coup d'état reestablished authoritarian rule in Thailand, silencing expressions of dissatisfaction for about a year. As the wave of Americanization receded, it paved the way for a second wave—Japanization—to emerge.

3 The Wave of Japanization in 1970s to 1990s

Since the conclusion of World War II, Japan has existed in the shadow of American political and military influence. The foundation of the so-called “Yoshida Doctrine” was the entrusting of Japan’s security and defense to the U.S., coupled with a commitment to economic development in Southeast Asia.

In the 1960s, a wave of Japanization began to sweep into Thailand. Aligned with the *phatthana* doctrine, Thai policymakers initiated the first Industry Promotion Acts in 1954, offering a range of economic incentives for industries.⁷ These included tax exemptions on raw and imported materials, reduced export tariffs, and relaxed immigration control for highly skilled foreign professionals. Japan, resurging as a dominant economic and developmental force in the 1960s, actively responded to this initiative. Throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s, Japan emerged as Thailand’s primary trading partner and foreign investor, contributing to 35.4% of Thailand’s total trade volume in 1969 (Institute of Developing Economies 1970, p. 285).

⁷ The act was retitled the Industrial Investment Promotion Act in 1962 and was further amended in 1965 and 1969.

Japan's monopolistic capital exerted influence over the Thai economy, particularly in transport equipment, textiles, automobiles, chemical products, and electrical appliances (Institute of Developing Economies 1970, p. 285). During this period, the majority of products from Japanese-related companies were consumer goods tailored for the domestic market. Noteworthy Japanese enterprises that established a presence in Thailand during the 1960s and 1970s included Ajinomoto (1960), Panasonic (1961), Mitsubishi Motors (1961), Toyota (1962), Suzuki (1967), Toshiba (1969), Wacoal (1970), Sharp (1972), Shisedo (1972), and more (Tongta 2010).

Concerns about the "over-presence" of Japanese people and consumer products became a focal point in Thai media, articulated by both politicians and the popular press. In 1969, Minister of Commerce Bunchana Atthakorn described the Japanese presence as follows:

Japanese visitors arrived via Japan Airlines, accompanied by guides from Japanese travel agencies. They traversed Bangkok in Japanese-made buses, lodged in Japanese hotels, dined at Japanese restaurants, and went to Japanese nightclubs. (Thanet 1972, p. 58)

A poem crafted by Sakda Chintanawikan in the Thairat newspaper in 1972 encapsulates the essence of Thai sentiments towards the Japanese presence and the impact of Japan on Thai society.

After waking up, I brushed my teeth with *White Lion*,
 Brewed a cup of tea with *National*, set my hair with *Tancho*.
 Then I wear *Toray Tetoron*, on my way out I wear *Seiko* (watch).
 For news, I tuned in to *Sanyo*, then pick up my girl with *Toyota*.
 "Where should we go shopping?"
Daimaru has it all.
 ...
 In our modern daily lives, doubt starts to creep,
 So, I ask the mirror named *Asahi*,
 Am I still a Thai? *Watashi wa Taijin desu ka?*
 (Sakda 1972, p. 9)

The trade deficit echoed a similar narrative, adding fuel to the fire. While Thai exports to Japan primarily comprised agricultural products, the production process by Japanese industries in Thailand heavily relied on imported capital equipment. Over the ten-year span between 1967 and 1977, the value of Thai-Japanese trade quadrupled from 11 billion baht to 44 billion baht, and Thailand experienced a rapid increase in GDP from 5.6 billion in 1967 to 19.7 billion in 1977. Concurrently, it also sustained a consistent trade deficit. Thailand's trade deficit with Japan surged from 5 billion baht in 1967 to 16.4 billion baht ten years later (Suthi 1983, p. 80).

The "over-presence" of Japanese products in the Thai market triggered the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment. In 1972, college students under the NSCT organized

an anti-Japanese product movement. This sentiment expanded into a large-scale anti-Japanese movement, coinciding with Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's visit to Southeast Asia in January 1974. Moreover, an opinion survey conducted by Khien Theeravit in 1974 revealed that among 1,985 respondents, 45% of ordinary citizens perceived Japanese enterprise investment as a form of imperialism, 54% viewed Japanese investment as unequal to Thailand, and 54% expressed concern about the trade deficit with Japan (Khien 1975).⁸ In the 1970s, Thai media characterized Japan as an "economic animal" with imperialistic tendencies, Japanese enterprises as "exploiting" local resources, and Japanese people as "arrogant and selfish" (Pattajit 2017, p. 45).

In response to the growing anti-Japanese sentiments in Southeast Asia during the 1970s, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo introduced a new doctrine, replacing "contact through money and goods" with "contact between good friends." To counter accusations of imperialism, the Fukuda Doctrine pledged that Japan would not become a great military power again. It further assured that Japan would seek a "heart-to-heart relationship" with Southeast Asia, and Tokyo would actively play a political role by supporting ASEAN as a regional organization and acting as a bridge between ASEAN and the communist Indochinese countries for regional peace and stability. In 1977, Fukuda declared in Manila:

It is not enough for our relationship to be based solely on mutual material and economic benefit. Our material and economic relations should be animated by heartfelt commitments to assisting and complementing each other as fellow Asians.

...speaking repeatedly of the need to communicate with each other with our hearts as well as our heads, the need in other words for what I call "heart-to-heart" understanding among the peoples of Japan and Southeast Asia. (Speech by Takeo Fukuda 1980, p. 71)

While most literature acknowledges that the Fukuda Doctrine marked a new chapter in Japanese diplomacy toward Southeast Asia (Sun 2012; Fukushima 2011), this does not necessarily indicate a perceptual shift by Thai people toward Japan. Several years after the launch of the Fukuda Doctrine, criticism persisted from Thai scholars. Rachaneekorn (1980) contended that "ASEAN leaders were delighted to hear the speeches by Prime Minister Fukuda in the capitals of each country... However, today, a year later, Japan acted completely differently from what it has promised" (Rachaneekorn 1980, p. 137). Nantawadee wrote in 1983 that "Southeast Asia nations continue to doubt Japan's intention" (Nantawadee 1983, p. 167). Prasert (1985) posted the following question.

Fukuda emphasized mutual trust and heart-to-heart relationship. However, Japan did not regard overdependence of these countries on Japan its problem. This led me to question: if the general populace, if not the elites, felt a high degree of dependence on Japan, how could they trust Japan? Despite having a thorough understanding of Japan, the prevailing image of Japan remained negative. (Prasert 1985, p. 32)

⁸ The research sample included 1,985 ordinary people, 100 civil servants, and 40 student leaders surveyed from October 15 to November 11, 1974.

Following the declaration of the Fukuda doctrine, Official Development Assistance (ODA) and cultural exchange programs saw a significant increase. Yet again, despite the substantial sums invested in ODA and exchange programs that aimed to improve the quality of life and expand educational opportunities for the Thai people, Japan encountered resistance. There still existed anti-Japanese sentiment, albeit on a smaller scale, during the 1980s. Figure 10.1 depicts the cover of an anti-Japanese album released in 1988 by Katon. A piece of sushi is shaped like the map of Thailand, held by chopsticks ready to be consumed. This sushi sits on a circular red plate on a white tablecloth, resembling the Japanese national flag, suggesting the metaphorical idea that Thailand was at risk of being economically devoured by Japan.

It is noteworthy that much of the criticism directed at Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) and cultural exchange during the 1970s and 1980s centered on the notion of Japan's "lack of sincerity" (Mai-Ching-Chai). Prasert (1990) clarifies the concept of "sincerity" in the Thai context as "the absence of any calculated desire to profit from an act of generosity" (Prasert 1990, p. 16). He explicitly states that in the Thai context, the act of "giving aid" should be genuinely altruistic, with no expectations of reciprocity. He underscores that "if giving is coupled with taking, it is not giving; it is business" (Prasert 1990, p. 16).

The discourse around the "lack of sincerity" in Japanese aid and cultural exchange during the 1970s and 1980s can be attributed to two factors. Firstly, the assistance was perceived as "string-attached." Given that a substantial portion of Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds were allocated to large-scale infrastructure projects, the primary beneficiaries were seen as the contractors, engineers, and architects involved in these projects rather than the local communities (Prasert 1990, p. 16).

Fig. 10.1 The sleeve design of "Yipun-Yunpi," an anti-Japanese album by Katon. *Source* taken by the first author



The “tied” nature of the grant aid was also considered problematic, exemplified by the construction of the Thailand Cultural Center in 1984 and Ayutthaya Historical Study Center in 1987, which were criticized as instances of Japanized Thai cultural buildings. Many Thai architects viewed these projects as a form of “cultural invasion” and, in more severe terms, “cultural enslavement” (Yupa 1998, p. 19). This discontent manifested in a resistance campaign during Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s visit to Thailand in 1987.

Secondly, there was a belief that assistance and cultural exchange initiatives were orchestrated to divert attention from “real” economic problems. Prasong (1987) interestingly depicted the situation as follows: “Japan, the economic animal, uses cosmetics called ‘cultural exchange’ to make it appear more human” (Prasong 1987, p. 26). The string-attached nature of the aid, coupled with the concurrent cultural exchange programs and trade conflicts, fueled skepticism among many Thais regarding Japan’s “real” intentions.

However, the situation began to change in the latter half of 1980s, with a crucial milestone being the year 1985 when the Plaza Accord came into effect.⁹ The dramatic appreciation of the Japanese yen compelled Japanese companies to seek cheaper labor in other countries. Japanese investment, previously focused on import-substituting industries in the 1970s, shifted towards an export-oriented strategy based in Thailand. Consequently, the export volume witnessed a significant increase. By 1991, Japanese firms in Thailand accounted for over one-fifth of the country’s total exports.

The influx of Japanese investment significantly boosted Thailand’s GDP and created job opportunities. Starting in 1988, Thailand experienced over 10% annual GDP growth for three consecutive years, marking the highest growth record in its history. It is estimated that Japan’s direct investment contributed to about 2% of the 11% growth in 1987 (Liu 1994). The economic growth also resulted in the expansion of the middle class, with Japanese products becoming an integral part of everyday life for the new generation. This shift, combined with the adaptation of Japanese companies and increased cultural exchange programs under the Fukuda Doctrine, gradually improved Japan’s image. Since the 1990s, anti-Japanese sentiment has become a relic of the past.

While the wave of Japanization began to decline with the collapse of the Japanese economic bubble in the 1990s, Japan has consistently remained the largest foreign investor, holding that position as of 2023 (National News Bureau of Thailand 2023). Additionally, Japan retained its status as Thailand’s primary trade partner until 2013, when it was surpassed by China.

⁹ A joint agreement to depreciate the U.S. dollar in relation to the Japanese yen and German Deutsche mark signed by five developed nations.

4 The Wave of Chinization in the Late 1990s and Onward

The wave of Chinization¹⁰ accompanied massive economic influence beginning in the 1990s. However, strategic and military cooperation had already started a decade before that. The shared perception of national interest and cooperation over the Cambodia conflict in the 1980s had helped foster trust between Thailand and China, particularly between their militaries. This laid a solid foundation for bilateral relations to grow in the post-Cold War era.

After the end of the Cold War, China faced two forms of isolation: economic sanctions by Western countries following the Tian'anmen incident and its newfound status as the sole socialist superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fact that ASEAN countries, adhering to non-interference principles, refrained from making critical statements on China's domestic politics allowed Beijing to view the region positively (Peh 2018).

Isolated by the West, China began shifting its diplomatic focus from the United States to neighboring Asian countries. In the 1990s, China restored and established diplomatic relations with all Southeast Asian countries, strengthening its ties with ASEAN. Thailand, as the first ASEAN member to strictly follow the One China policy (Storey 2011, p. 132), played a pivotal role in smoothing relations between the two countries.

Economic ties between China and Thailand deepened through commercial and economic agreements, resulting in a tripling of trade volume between 1990 and 1999. Furthermore, relations were reinforced after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, during which China contributed \$1 billion USD to the International Monetary Fund's \$17.5 billion rescue package (Storey 2011, p. 133). Additionally, the Chinese government's decision not to take advantage of the crisis by devaluing the Yuan earned praise from leaders in the region.

China's role in the development of Thailand has become increasingly prominent, particularly since the Thaksin Shinawatra administration (2001–2006). During this period, Thaksin's foreign policy prioritized ASEAN neighbors India and China. Among these, China emerged as the country best positioned to assist Thailand in achieving its economic development goals. Thaksin aimed to leverage China's economic strength to propel the growth of the Thai economy, seeking to ride on China's economic coattails for mutual benefit.

Thailand has faced political upheavals, marked by two coups d'état in 2006 and 2014, which saw first the end of Thaksin's premiership, and later that of Yingluck Shinawatra. These events triggered various international responses. The U.S., for instance, suspended military aid and distanced itself from the junta government, while Europe halted trade negotiations. In contrast, China adhered to its non-interference principle, recognizing the new junta government and even extending a substantial \$49 million military credit to Thailand (Storey 2015, p. 21). In the interim between the two coups, Abhisit Vejjajiva, a civilian leader of the conservative Democrat Party,

¹⁰ We use the term "Chinization" to emphasize the modern economic aspect, as contrasted with "Sinicization" which tends to focus more on historic and cultural influence.




Fig. 10.2 Changing trade volumes between Thailand and three major countries: Japan, US and PRC¹². Source IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Database

served as Prime Minister from 2008 to 2011. Despite his political affiliations differing from his predecessors, this shift did not alter the trajectory of China-Thai relations. The following excerpt is from his 2015 interview with Benjamin Zawacki, shedding light on his perception of China.

When China emerges because of her size, because of history, some other countries start talking about a China threat. But for Thais, because we are so close by blood, we are naturally more at ease in engaging with China. You would be surprised at how many western delegations came through that used the term “China threat” or “Chinese threat”, and my response was always, “Well, what threat?” We didn’t see China as a threat. We obviously saw her as a major power and therefore maybe having a lot of influence, but we didn’t have this feeling that she would be a threat.¹¹

Maintaining strong relations through numerous changes in government, China has held the position of Thailand’s largest trading partner since 2013 (Fig. 10.2).

Given the generally positive stance of Thai leaders towards China, it appears that Thailand is open to embracing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).¹³ To achieve its goals, China has sought cooperation with countries along the corridors and maritime silk road by accelerating economic growth, trade, and investment. This involves constructing infrastructure and transportation routes and launching cultural exchange programs.

Thailand’s strategic location at the center of the China-Indochina Economic corridor, coupled with the availability of its workforce, raw materials, and convenient transportation, makes it an ideal hub for trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from China’s perspective.

While there are concerns regarding the true intentions behind China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), most Thai leaders view the rise of China positively. They

¹¹ Abhisit Vejjajiva interview with Benjamin Zawacki February 6, 2015 (Zawacki 2017, p. 194)

¹² The trade volume was calculated based on imports on a cost, insurance and freight (CIF) basis, and exports on a free on board (FOB) basis. Data on China excludes Macao and Hong Kong.

¹³ For details of this initiative, see Chap. 14 in this volume.

anticipate that China will play a significant role in both regional and global economic development (Anuson 2015; Piratorn and Jiranuwat 2018; Pattajit 2020). Chulacheep (2009) summarizes the perception of Thai leaders as follows:

The majority of Thai leaders perceived the rise of China as an opportunity for economic cooperation. They believed that economic growth in China should be encouraged not only because it created valuable trade and investment opportunities but also because it kept China stable and facilitated its integration into the regional community and the world, giving China a stake in the international status quo.

Thai leaders also recognized that China is destined to be a major military power and could upset the regional balance of power. This did not mean that China would pose a threat or come into conflict with countries in Southeast Asia. The feeling instead was that China mainly wanted to be recognized and respected as a major power. (Chulacheep 2009, pp. 98–99)

However, while the wave of Chinization is generally welcomed by the Thai government, civil society does not wholly share this perception. The most prominent wave of Chinization was experienced by Thai society through the influx of Chinese tourists, which began to soar after the slapstick comedy named “Lost in Thailand” became popular in 2012. The number of tourists reached 4.6 million the following year, increased to 7.9 million in 2015, and hit 10 million in 2018, accounting for almost 30% of the total visitors and overall tourism receipts (Ministry of Tourism and Sports of Thailand 2020).

Although the influx of Chinese tourists brought GDP growth to the country, criticism over rude manners, such as spitting, littering, cutting lines, and flouting traffic laws, were frequently reported in the media, and sparking anti-Chinese tourist sentiments (The Associated Press 2014). A poll conducted in February 2014 by Chiang Mai University, located in a popular destination among Chinese tourists, found that 80% of 2,200 Chiang Mai residents said they were highly displeased with Chinese behavior. The survey, along with numerous comments on Thai social media, blamed Chinese visitors for “uncivilized” behaviors.

Skepticism toward the nature of this rising power has been expounded by its dam-building and rapid blasting activity in the Lancang-Mekong River, which affects the ecosystem and lifestyles of people in riparian communities. Also, Thailand has recognized lessons from investments made by China in infrastructure and transportation projects in Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia where the lives of inhabitants were strongly affected. The “over-presence” of Chinese capital in Sihanoukville and Northern Laos confirm that concern over Chinese influence in the Thai economy is warranted (Yossapon 2020).

To comprehend how Thai people perceived this wave, we conducted interviews with people who experience the wave of Chinization.¹⁴ The interviewees included three researchers (referred to as R1, R2, and R3), two opinion leaders (referred to as OL1 and OL2), one diplomat (referred to as D1), and two ordinary people (referred to as P1 and P2). Here are the answers to the questions, “Can you use three keywords to define China?” and “Do you regard Rising China as a threat or an opportunity?”.

¹⁴ The interviews were conducted by Pattajit Tangsinmunkong on May 4, 5, 6, 11, and 12, 2020 via Zoom.

As depicted in Table 10.3, a majority of the word choices, such as ‘strong,’ ‘confident,’ ‘paradise’ and ‘harmonious,’ are positively inclined. Notably, five out of eight interviewees perceive China more as an opportunity than a threat. However, it is essential to acknowledge that a sense of threat has begun to gain momentum.

Interestingly, the criticisms directed at Chinese tourists share similarities with those targeted at the Japanese in the 1970s. A researcher highlighted that one of the contributing factors to anti-Chinese sentiments was the perception that ‘the tourists arrived with a budget tour group, stayed in Chinese-owned hotels, dined in Chinese restaurants, and shopped in Chinese-owned stores’ (R3). This phenomenon led Thai business owners to question the benefits Thailand gained from this influx.

The third wave of Chinization expedited internal and regional connectivity, fostering infrastructure development, and bolstering economic progress. Nevertheless, the surge of Chinese companies into the real estate market within the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC), along with opaque deals associated with High-Speed Railway projects and a rise in “grey businesses” in Thailand, has also stirred skepticism regarding China’s intentions (Sophon 2018).

One researcher (R2) explicitly likened Chinese people to a ‘grasshopper in the paddy field,’ signifying that ‘they come here to eat rice and then go back.’ The assertion is that Chinese companies are earning profits by ‘exploiting’ Thai resources to sell back to the Chinese market. Examples supporting this claim encompass Chinese

Table 10.3 Perceptions of China by our interviewees

Category	Abbrev	3 keywords to define China			Threat or opportunity?
Researcher	R1 (May 4)	Strong	Great	Aggressive	40% opportunity, 60% threat
	R2 (May 6)	Variety	Confident	Redemption	40% opportunity, 60% threat
	R3 (May 11)	Business opportunity	Threat	Partner	70% opportunity, 30% threat
Opinion leader	OL1 (May 6)	Great	Paradise	Chinese people	Opportunity
	OL2 (May 12)	Populous	Rich culture	Rich	Opportunity
Diplomat	D1 (May 12)	Big brother	Resolute	Show off	60% Opportunity, 40% threat
Ordinary people	P1 (May 4)	Populous	Resolute	Harmonious	Threat
	P2 (May 5)	Big	Fast	Scary	70% opportunity, 30% threat

Source by the first author

involvement in the real estate business, durian trading, the employment of Chinese migrant workers, and the operations of Chinese tour agencies in Thailand (P2, R2, R3, OL2).

With the upsurge of anti-government protests in 2020, the Thai government's perceived deferential stance towards China came under renewed scrutiny, leading to China itself becoming the subject of criticism. Since the coup in 2014, the Thai government has faced international condemnation for repatriating over a hundred Uyghur refugees to China. Additionally, it drew attention by opting to purchase millions of doses of the Sinovac vaccine as the primary solution for combating the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. This perceived overdependence on China has earned Thailand the derisive moniker of being the "Thailand Province of China" [tai guo sheng] (Wasana 2022). The slogan "Thailand and China are one family" (Zhongtai Yi Jia Qin) is now used in a more sarcastic context.

In our interviews, some participants argued that the Thai government exhibits excessive subservience to China (R2, D). Another shared perspective was: 'The Thai government places disproportionate value on 'sincerity' and 'friendship.' China is likened to a big brother surrounded by many younger brothers, and what it decides to give depends entirely on its discretion' (D1). A different viewpoint highlighted that 'China is not as generous as many Thais might think; its actions are clearly driven by self-interest' (R2). Simultaneously, most interviewees acknowledged the existing power imbalance and a sense of helplessness in the situation. However, as expressed by two participants, 'Although we may be dissatisfied with certain aspects, we lack the power to negotiate being a smaller country' (P1, OL1). They added, 'Quarreling with China would yield no benefit to Thailand; it would be akin to trying to lever a log with a small piece of wood' (P1, OL1). Despite uncertainties regarding China's intentions, most interviewees concurred: 'It is challenging to envision a conflict between Thailand and China, or even an anti-Chinese movement in Thailand' (D1, P2, OL2). In the end, the stark reality of an unbalanced power dynamic prevailed.

In recent years, the anti-Chinese tourist sentiment has seen improvement, attributed to the adaptability of Thai society and the evolving behavior of Chinese tourists (Itthichai 2019). The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic prompted a realization of the extent to which the Thai economy relies on Chinese companies and tourists. In response, in 2023, Thailand initiated the waiving of tourist visa requirements for Chinese nationals to entice their return. Despite some individuals having negative experiences or feelings toward China, a consensus has emerged: regardless of these sentiments, China will stay integral to the Thai economy.

5 Redefining "Thainess" Through Development Experience

An analysis of the three waves of external developmental power at the macro level emphasizes the profound impact of foreign influences. This viewpoint, however, leans towards portraying Thailand as a passive recipient of political influence during

the era of Americanization under the ‘anti-communism’ ideology, economic influence from the wave of Japanization under foreign aid, and societal and economic influence from the wave of Chinization through mass tourism and construction. Yet, a closer examination of the people’s experiences unveils two crucial insights.

Firstly, as societal development unfolds, resistance to new forces tends to precede adaptation. Given Thailand’s history of avoiding direct colonization, the population initially felt relatively less hostile to foreign influence. Nevertheless, the Thai experience highlights the price the country paid in its effort to accommodate waves of external influence for the sake of *phatthana* and GDP growth. The influx of American personnel into the government, Japanese companies and products into the Thai market, and the substantial flow of Chinese tourists into Thailand during the ‘waxing’ phase of each wave exhibited a similar pattern of initial resistance.

While Thailand may be perceived as a ‘passive receiver’ in the eyes of an (ostensible) donor, the Thai people strongly identify with and claim ownership of their cultural and physical assets. The direct resistance from the populace, especially against the Americans in the 1950s–1960s and the Japanese in the 1970s–1980s, eventually compelled powerful donors to acknowledge the true ‘owners’ of the country. This recognition led to the necessity for policy adjustments that emphasize equal treatment with sincerity and respect. During the height of anti-U.S. sentiment in 1974, actions by the U.S., which ‘made it look as though Thailand was a territory of the U.S.’ became a significant cause of antagonism (Kullada 2010, pp. 86–87).

Various expressions of resistance, such as the song from Caravan urging ‘Americans must leave, so that we could have full sovereignty,’ the poignant poem by Sakda ending with the question ‘am I still a Thai?,’ and the opposition against the construction of Japanized Thai cultural buildings in Ayutthaya and Bangkok, all highlight the resistance to external influences. These incidents turned the Thai people inward, sparking an introspective scrutiny of their ‘Thainess.’ In essence, the influx of external influences prompted a critical examination of self-identity. A similar process of resistance and a growing sense of cultural ownership can be observed against the Chinese after the 1990s.

However, examining Thai responses to the three waves indicates that, despite initial antagonism toward the influx of external influence, the impact of each developmental power permeated every corner of society, fostering social adaptation almost simultaneously. Throughout Thai history, there has never been a time when dependence on greater powers, whether economically, politically, or both, did not exist. The response of Thai society suggests that when external influences permeate society, initial resistance may naturally arise. However, a long-term perspective reveals that the crucial aspect lies in the continuous nurturing of a complex negotiation—embracing, negotiating, and adapting to social change. An exemplary instance of this evolving social sentiment is the Thailand Cultural Center. Initially heavily criticized as ‘cultural enslavement’ in 1987, it now stands as a symbol of ‘friendship’ between Thailand and Japan in the 2020s, portraying the transformative nature of such social dynamics.

Secondly, a reexamination of the Thai experience under the waves of development suggests the boundless nature of Thainess (Khwampenthai), a prevalent discourse

representing a shared Thai identity. From this chapter. We can see that Thainess continually fluctuates, and identity is in constant negotiation. There are many interpretations of this term. For some, the core of Thainess presumes that a great leader selectively adopts only the ‘good things’ from foreign countries while preserving traditional values at their best. For others, it can also encompass attributes such as love for national independence, tolerance, and compromise or assimilation (Thongchai 1994, p. 3–4).

Thongchai argues that ‘Thainess’ is often defined through ‘negative identification,’ meaning that once the ‘un-Thainess’ is identified, its opposite, Thainess, becomes apparent (Thongchai 1994, p. 5). Throughout history, the opposite of Thainess has been defined by different ‘others’ depending on the standpoint and ideologies. In the nineteenth century, for the administration, the Chinese were used as negative identification, and during the Cold War, the Vietnamese played a similar role. For left-wing nationalism during the Cold War, the ‘others’ were equated with the U.S. and Japanese. Thainess has been redefined by others over time, depending on the global and social context in each period.

However, as this chapter illustrates, the self and external others are not two dichotomized concepts. Through recurring interactions and the enduring legacies of external developmental powers, Thai people have adeptly positioned themselves in relation to the external world. Developmental powers left long-lasting legacies, ubiquitous in the Thai lifestyle, through the medium of their experience, which in turn becomes a medium of their expression.

For instance, a young Thai might wear Nike shoes, sport a Xiaomi watch, carry her iPhone into a Honda car, drive on a road built by USAID, cross a bridge constructed through Japanese ODA, watch a Hollywood movie in a department store built with Chinese capital, and finally, enjoy sushi at Ootoya in Siam Square. The legacies from these waves of development are seamlessly woven into the Thai lifestyle. However, the essential question arises: do these infrastructure, commodities and experiences make Thai people any less Thai? The resounding answer is “no”.

In a globalized world, independence does not necessarily exclude dependence or interdependence, and Thai identity need not be defined solely through negative identification. To accurately reflect reality, “Thainess” should no longer be exclusively tied to exceptional identification. Instead, it should be embraced as an inclusive definition derived from intertwined experiences of negotiation and adaptation that extend beyond national borders.

6 Conclusion

The experience of modernization and the development changes it forms depend on one’s standpoint. One can easily draw a success story by focusing on the economic transformation and integration of the region into the global market, highlighting material improvements in living standards. One can also draw a negative portrayal of what happened *in the same period* from the perspective of agency and self-determination.

Shifting the perspective toward experience moves us away from the conceptualization of Thailand as a monolithic entity designed by the state planner to the diverse members of civil society proactively navigating themselves through the waves of influence from external powers. These navigating experiences are sequential and cumulative, preparing actors through and between each wave.

If one shifts the emphasis to external relations, one can look back and see modern Thai history as a series of incomplete endeavors by Americans to Americanize, the Japanese to Japanize and the Chinese to Chinize. Conversely, one can also turn the perspective around to focus on the Thai people's journey as they strategically position themselves to resist these influences, navigating the forces—at times riding the wave, at times reconstructing identities, and at times cultivating wisdom and resilience. It is this latter narrative that we aim to convey.

Whether what we observed in Thailand can be observed more broadly in other parts of Asia remains an open question. Yet, one can safely recognize that globalizing forces do not simply nullify local cultures; they can facilitate their self-discovery by strengthening identity at the local level where bottom-up development is expected to occur.

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Economic Development in Korea and China



Tadashi Kimiya and Akio Takahara

1 The Dynamics of Economic Development in Korea

1.1 *From a Developing to a Developed Country*

In 1960, South Korea's GDP per capita was only \$79. South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world, as can be seen from a comparison with North Korea at that time, which had a GDP per capita of \$177 (Hwang 2010, p.131).¹ However, through double-digit economic growth rates every year from the 1960s onward, South Korea recorded a per capita GDP of \$569 in 1974, surpassing North Korea's \$520 and completely overtaking it thereafter. By achieving sustained economic development ever since, the GDP per capita reached \$31,838 in 2019, almost on par with Japan. In 1996, the country joined the OECD, which can be regarded as joining the ranks of developed countries, and currently ranks about 10th in the world in terms of GDP.²

South Korea's rapid and sustained economic development has attracted global attention and has been called the "Miracle of the Han River."³ It achieved economic development by increasing its presence in the world economy through increased industrial production and exports.

¹ Estimated data based on Hwang (1994).

² See UN Economic Statistics <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/Index>.

³ Han River or Hangang is the name of a major river flowing in Seoul.

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1.2 *Internal Factors Behind Economic Growth: Development of Economic Policy*

In the 1950s, South Korea achieved postwar recovery from the Korean War by choosing import substitution industrialization centered on the processing of U.S. aid goods, mainly wheat, raw cotton, and raw sugar, but the growth rate slowed down with the decline in U.S. grant aid.⁴ Against this backdrop, there were a series of political upheavals, such as the April Student Revolution in 1960, followed by the May 16 Military Coup in 1961, which led to the establishment of the Park Chung Hee administration.

The Park Chung Hee administration lasted for 18 years (1961–1979), but despite opposition to a long-term dictatorship, it achieved political stability without a change of government and implemented consistent economic policies under strong leadership. In this sense, it was a typical example of a “developmental dictatorship.”⁵ Initially, the Park Chung Hee administration had an ambitious plan to give priority to the construction of heavy chemical industries at the initiative of the government. However, this was met with opposition from the United States, and the necessary capital mobilization proved difficult. Therefore, the government adopted an export-oriented industrialization policy, in which the driving force for economic development was the increase in exports of labor-intensive light industrial products that utilize cheap and industrious labor. One of the reasons for this was the availability of cheap labor due to the existence of surplus labor in rural areas. However, at this time South Korea did not only specialize in light industry, but also promoted the import substitution industrialization of the heavy chemical industry.⁶ The main players in economic development were not state-owned enterprises, but rather chaebol, a group of private companies characterized by family management. Today, these include Samsung, Hyundai, LG (originally Lucky Gumsung), and SK (originally Sunkyung), all of which have become world leaders in semiconductors, automobiles, and other industries.⁷ But until the 1970s at least, economic development was led by the government, as banks and other financial institutions were effectively nationalized, and the government had the authority to introduce foreign capital.

In the 1970s, there was an emphasis on autonomous national defense in response to détente and the reduction of U.S. forces in Korea, which in turn called for the development of a full-fledged defense industry. This prompted a government-led effort to develop a full-scale heavy chemical industry to support the defense industry. Although the South Korean economy was hit by two oil shocks, the heavy chemical industrialization that was aggressively pursued during this period, together with the international economic boom favorable for Korean export drive (low oil price, low

⁴ For more information on Korea’s economic policies in the 1950s, see Woo (1991).

⁵ For a consistent explanation of the economic policies of the Park Chung Hee administration in South Korea in terms of the “development dictatorship,” see Lee (2006).

⁶ For more information on Korea’s economic development policies in the 1960s, see Kimiya (2011).

⁷ For more information on the relationship between the government and the chaebols in economic development under the Park Chung Hee administration, see Jones and Sakong (1980).

interest rates, and low foreign exchange rates) that followed in the 1980s, supported sustained economic growth through increased exports. In this way, the country has achieved sustained development by seizing the right opportunities, thanks to efficient cooperation between the public and private sectors led by the government. Although the government has been criticized for favoring conglomerates, this was an inevitable aspect of Korean-style development.⁸

Then, at the end of the 1970s, the country faced the crisis of stagflation associated with the second oil shock. The Park Chung Hee administration's adherence to government-led growth-oriented policies made it difficult to make the necessary policy changes. However, the demise of the Yushin regime with the murder of Park Chung Hee and the establishment of the Fifth Republic regime (1981–1988) of President Chun Doo Hwan made it possible to shift to liberalization and stabilization policies.⁹ In addition, during the economic crisis that forced the IMF to make an emergency loan under the conservative Kim Young Sam administration (1993–1998) at the end of 1997, the change of government to the progressive liberal Kim Dae Jung administration (1998–2003) led to the implementation of neoliberal policies, including raising flexibility of the labor market based on the limited cooperation of labor unions, and the reintroduction of foreign capital. The crisis was overcome in a little over a year by bringing foreign capital back into the country.¹⁰ In this way, the crisis could be overcome by political changes and governmental changes that brought about the necessary policy changes.

1.3 External Factors Behind Economic Growth: Constraints and Opportunities

The external environment surrounding South Korea has been important as a driver of its economic growth. However, it did not work unequivocally in the favor of economic growth; rather, it was used as an opportunity by the South Korean government and businesses. As a divided country under the Cold War regime, South Korea was forced to confront North Korea militarily, a condition that was supposed to be unfavorable for economic development due to the burden on the defense budget and investment risks. The economic stagnation of North Korea, which was placed under similar constraints as South Korea, was due to its inability to overcome the disadvantageous conditions of military budget burden and capital shortage.

The differences between South Korea and North Korea can be found in the following two points. First, while China and the Soviet Union, which were supposed to help North Korea together, in fact intensified their confrontation in the 1960s and

⁸ For more information on heavy chemical industrialization in the 1970s, see Kim (2011).

⁹ For more information on the political process of economic liberalization and economic stabilization policies in the early 1980s, see Choi (1987).

¹⁰ For more information on the response of the Kim Dae-jung administration of South Korea to the IMF economic crisis, see Haggard et al. (2003).

1970s, Japan and the United States effectively supported economic development and political stability in South Korea through the division of labor cooperation.

Second, the South Korean government adopted a foreign policy of turning the external constraints imposed by the Cold War system and other factors into opportunities for economic development. This included economic cooperation with Japan following the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea in 1965, and the continued stationing of U.S. forces in South Korea following the deployment of South Korean troops to Vietnam and the acquisition of special demand due to the Vietnam War (Kimiya 2011, pp. 72–78). Furthermore, in the 1970s, South Korea was faced with the challenge of fostering its own national defense and the defense industry that would support it as a result of détente such as the U.S.-China rapprochement and the reduction of U.S. forces in South Korea, and it actively used heavy chemical industrialization to upgrade its industrial structure. Then, from the 1980s onward, as the global Cold War was coming to an end, South Korea sought to improve its relations with the former communist bloc countries with its Northern Diplomacy, which led to the cultivation of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern European countries as South Korean export markets and investment targets. Furthermore, from the 1990s onward, with the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea, South Korea sought to strengthen its economic ties with China and use this as an opportunity to further develop its economy.

1.4 Japan-South Korea Relations from an Economic Perspective

After the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea in 1965, South Korea began importing industrial materials and machines from Japan and processing the materials to make labor-intensive light industrial products such as textiles and miscellaneous goods, which were then exported to the United States and other developed countries. As a result, the more the economy grew, the more imports from Japan and the trade deficit with Japan increased. In parallel with light industry, South Korea also promoted heavy chemical industry and introduced the necessary technology and equipment from Japan. Japan was tolerantly supportive over South Korea's economic cooperation in the heavy chemical industry. This is because South Korea's national security is directly linked to Japan's national security, and there was a high level of interest in heavy chemical industrialization, which was necessary for the development of South Korea's defense industry. Thus, economic cooperation between Japan and South Korea was "security-based economic cooperation" in the sense of cooperating for the sake of national security.

However, since the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the securing of South Korea's superiority over North Korea, relations between Japan and South Korea have changed from asymmetrical complementary relations into symmetrical competitive relations. In economic terms, Japan and South Korea are in a competitive

relationship. As a result, in addition to confrontation over historical issues, this competitive relationship in security and economy has become more pronounced and is more likely to escalate into confrontation (Kimiya 2021a, b).

1.5 Outlook for the South Korean Economy

Even after becoming a developed country, the South Korean economy experienced the IMF economic crisis of 1997, among other problems, but has managed to overcome them and laid the foundations for today's advanced capitalist country. Especially in the field of IT, such as the semiconductor industry, the country is one of the world's leaders. At the same time, however, rather than raising the level of South Korean society as a whole, an increase in non-regular employment and social disparities has become a serious problem. There is a mismatch between a highly educated society and the Korean job market, a declining birthrate, and an aging population that is advancing at a pace rarely seen in the rest of world, and preparations for the reunification through peaceful coexistence with North Korea (Onishi 2014). And in terms of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, South Korea succeeded in keeping the number of victims to a relative minimum thanks to its effective quarantine system but suffered a serious economic blow.

What direction will the South Korean economy take? In a political situation where there is a pronounced division between the conservatives and progressive liberals, will it be possible to secure political guidance that will provide a direction for the South Korean economy? Necessary policy changes have historically been secured through political or governmental changes, but we need to keep a close eye on whether these mechanisms will continue to be secured.

2 The Opening of China and Subsequent Reforms

2.1 Development Under Mao's Rule

When the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, it was not a socialist country. To win the hearts and minds of the peasants, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) implemented land reform. They confiscated land and other assets and tools from landlords and distributed them to the peasants. In the cities, capitalists and owners of small businesses that supported the revolution were allowed to keep their assets. Only a few years later, however, Mao Zedong launched the movement of socialist transformation and most private assets were expropriated. The first Five Year Plan started in 1953 with the help of the Soviet Union, and by 1956, a Soviet-style planning system was established. In the countryside, agriculture was collectivized,

and People's Communes were introduced, despite reluctance and resistance among some of the peasantry (Uno et al. 1986).

Mao was not content with the Soviet style, centralized planning system. He was also displeased with the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, who bitterly criticized the brutal reign of Joseph Stalin in his 1956 secret speech. With an aim to catch up with industrialized countries and lead the international communist movement Mao embarked on a unique development strategy called the Great Leap Forward in 1958. It relied on decentralizing power to the provinces and on the revolutionary spirit of the workers and peasants. But excessive decentralization and enthusiasm without scientific and technological basis resulted in a catastrophic famine that claimed tens of millions of lives (Dikötter 2010). Except for a short period of time in the early to mid-1960s when material incentives were reintroduced, Chinese economic growth relied on the increase in the factors of production while productivity stagnated.

2.2 *The Advent of “Reform and Opening”*

In 1966 Mao launched a radical, political movement called the Cultural Revolution. His motives included power and revolutionary idealism, and the violent movement caused havoc among the elite and the public. After Mao's death in 1976, the CCP leadership decided to change course and prioritize economic development. Their new measures were reforming the planning system and opening the national economy to the outside world. The planning system was problematic in two ways. First, it was not flexible enough to adapt supply to demand and caused an inefficient distribution of resources. Second, it failed to provide provinces, enterprises, and individuals with enough incentives to improve their productivity and avoid wasting resources. In China, however, there was an additional issue. Unlike the Soviet Union and the East European countries that suffered from labor shortage, China's planning system could not accommodate the increase in the labor force. Therefore, initial reforms included the following measures: introducing market mechanisms (i.e., liberalizing prices); fiscal contracting of revenue between the central and provincial governments with a view to promoting regional development; enterprise reform (i.e., making enterprises responsible for their profits and losses); dismantling People's Communes and reviving individual farming; and allowing individuals to start private businesses. These were theoretically justified later in 1987 by the judgment that China was still on the initial stage of socialism (Zhao 1987).

Externally, Mao had to emphasize “self-reliance” after Khrushchev pulled out Soviet engineers from China in 1960. Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated and ideological disputes and even border clashes erupted. In the post-Mao era, Deng Xiaoping, the champion of reform and opening policies, understood the importance of technology and the need to import it from abroad. Under his auspices, Special Economic Zones were set up to invite foreign investment. Overseas Chinese and the Japanese were the earliest to invest big in China. In 1979, which was the year China normalized its relations with the U.S., Japan started to provide Official Development Assistance

(ODA) and strongly supported China's reform and opening (Kokubun et al. 2017). The CCP stopped supporting the revolutionary movements overseas and turned to a moderate diplomacy with a view to preserving a peaceful international environment conducive to development. However, international competition with the Soviet Union continued. China carried on with its external aid and called it South-South cooperation, which constituted an important means of diplomacy with the developing world.¹¹

2.3 *The Politics of Reform and Opening*

Since the 1981 downfall of Mao's heir, Hua Guofeng, CCP has asserted that reform and opening began at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in 1978. In reality, what CCP decided then was to free themselves from the shackles of Mao's previous decisions and instructions, and to place economic development as their top target (CCP 1978). However, individual farming was flatly denied, and it was as late as 1984 that the phrase, "reform and opening" (*gaige kaifang*) appeared for the first time in the People's Daily.¹²

Reform and opening policies did not enjoy smooth sailing. First, there was the ideological hurdle, since planning was considered a top element of socialism. Chen Yun, who ranked equal to Deng Xiaoping in terms of Party career and authority, insisted that planning was primary, and market was secondary. Conservative cadres were also wary that the Special Economic Zones functioned as conduits for foreign capital and liberal ideas to infiltrate. Second, government officials in charge of industries resisted giving up their power over the enterprises they administered. Third, since prices of basic goods such as energy and transportation had been set arbitrarily low, price reform had to be introduced in a gradual, selective manner to avoid inflation.

The policy process of China's economic reform in the 1980s evolved around three policy groups, which was a typical case of the politics of transitional economies (Takahara 1992). First, there were the central planners, who argued planning was primary and that centralization of economic power was necessary to achieve macroeconomic balances in goods and money. Second, there were the productionist reformers, who promoted marketization and decentralization for the sake of growth but were reluctant to cancel the economic power of the government agencies since the enterprises still lacked the management capacity to do well in business by themselves. Third, the financial reformers aimed at thorough marketization, viz. dissolving the bureaucracy that administered planning and establishing an economic system in

¹¹ China waged one war soon after normalizing diplomatic relations with the U.S. It attacked Soviet-backed Vietnam, which had invaded Pol Pot's Cambodia with China's backing. The Chinese army pulled out a month later claiming victory. Chinese casualties reached 6,594 even according to China's own count, but Deng Xiaoping was able to establish control over the military, which constituted a big political asset.

¹² The CCP decided to abolish the People's Communes in 1982, but some remained until 1985.

which the central government regulated the market through fiscal and financial policies. When the announcement of price reform triggered a run on the banks and caused inflation in 1988, central planners such as Premier Li Peng took over the initiative in policy making and tightened financial control in the style of a command economy. This resulted in stagflation, which constituted the backdrop for the student protests in 1989.

2.4 June 4th: The Rise and Fall of Political Reform

Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues were serious about reforming the political system, albeit in their own way. In early 1979 they forcefully suppressed people's cry for political liberalization that filled the big-character posters on the so-called Democracy Wall in Beijing. In 1982, however, they abolished the CCP Chairmanship and introduced a system of collective leadership to prevent power concentration in the hands of one person. Division of labor was introduced among the members of the politburo standing committee, and the General Secretary, the new top leader, had very limited power. Institutionalization and legalization of government constituted an important part of the reform design. For Deng, promoting political reform was also a means to demote Hua Guofeng, Mao's heir, whom he criticized for upholding Mao's deity and cultivating a personality cult for himself (Takahara 1998).

In addition, following the advent of economic reform, CCP leadership began to perceive the need for further political reform in two distinct ways. In 1986 Deng called for the separation of the party and government, democratization, institutionalization and decentralization to increase efficiency and deprive the intermediate bureaucrats of their power over the enterprises. While this was for promoting economic reform, then Premier Zhao Ziyang perceived the need to deal with the pluralization of social interests and conflicts between them, an issue that newly emerged in society as a result of economic reform. He advocated organizing social interests into associations, galvanizing trade unions to truly represent the interest of the workers and creating mechanisms through which the CCP could act as mediator and coordinator of the interest groups.

The latter type of reform allowed the emergence of independent social actors and inevitably relativized CCP's power, and eventually the two lines of thinking clashed over the handling of the students' pro-democracy movement in April–June 1989. After the June 4th brutal suppression of the movement and the demotion of Zhao, strengthening CCP leadership became the norm and political reform was put on the back burner. Although China-USSR relations were normalized by Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Beijing in May, the socialist camp in Eastern Europe collapsed later in the year and the Western nations turned against China in the wake of the June 4th Incident.

2.5 *Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour*

Although Deng picked Shanghai CCP chief Jiang Zemin as Zhao's successor to continue with economic reform, criticism of marketization and the opening of China became dominant among leadership. As a result, the Chinese economy stagnated. After a failed attempt in 1991, Deng made a southern tour centering on Guangdong province in early 1992 to revive the tide of reform and opening. This time he gained support of the growth-hungry localities and proved successful, after his pep talks were taken up by the Hong Kong press and then "imported" back into mainland China.

Deng asserted that a policy is socialistic, and not ideologically heretic, if it was advantageous for increasing three things: comprehensive national power, productive forces, and people's living standards (Deng 1992). He argued that the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist regimes failed because of their bad economic performance; the Cold War ended, and China should not miss this opportunity for development. At the 14th National Congress held in September 1992, the CCP discarded planning from its charter and declared that it aimed at establishing a "socialist market economy." The central planners were defeated, and since then a major economic policy debate involved financial centralism (pursuing macroeconomic balances) and entrepreneurial localism (pursuing local government-led growth).

2.6 *The Socialist Market Economy: Contradictions and Solutions*

The champion of bold reform measures was Vice-premier Zhu Rongji, acknowledged by Deng as someone that understood economics. Zhu took the initiative in breaking the "three irons" in state owned enterprises (SOEs), viz. "iron rice bowls, iron wages and iron armchairs," meaning whatever happens there is no dismissal, no wage decrease and no demotion of cadres. This resulted in an increase in laid-off workers who protested by sit-ins and road blockages, but Zhu pushed through with determination. He also introduced new measures for macroeconomic control, including the central bank system, state-owned commercial banks separated from policy banks, and a modern taxation system.

Deng's southern tour emancipated people's desires and triggered a staggering growth in the Chinese economy. Per capita GDP jumped from somewhat above 300 U.S. dollars in 1991 to just below 1,000 U.S. dollars in 2000 (The World Bank 2021). However, serious debates erupted within CCP over the contradictions between socialism and the market system. Zhu Rongji had introduced a modern company system in which the management held authority over personnel affairs. This conflicted with CCP's organizational principle that "the party manages the cadres." For economic efficiency, turning SOE assets into shares was desirable to facilitate their circulation and achieve an efficient distribution of resources. From

a political standpoint, however, this would lead to privatization and undermine the basis of CCP's rule. Some localities quietly started to sell their deficit ridden SOEs, more so after the eruption of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 (Takahara 2006).

Many enterprises dealt with the conflict over personnel affairs by making party committee members executive board members, and vice versa. In 1999 the CCP decided that the vital element of the socialist public ownership system was its qualitative superiority and SOEs need not be quantitatively dominant except in key sectors of the national economy such as infrastructure, public utilities, and defense industries. Jiang Zemin announced in 2001 that the CCP would admit private enterprise owners. In the following year, the CCP changed its self-identification from the vanguard of the working class to that of the working class, the Chinese people and the Chinese nation. Thus, the CCP pragmatically adapted their ideology to reality without worrying about being labelled revisionist. The pantheon of orthodox Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet Communist Party, had collapsed by 1991.

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Democratization in Asia



Yuko Kasuya

1 Asia and Democracy

Asia's history of democracy is relatively short. Modern democracies, namely, polities in which representatives are elected through universal suffrage, emerged in Europe and the United States starting in the early nineteenth century.¹ In Asia, some jurisdictions started to have elected governments in the late nineteenth century. However, it has only been since World War II that many Asian countries began to hold relatively free and fair elections with universal suffrage. This chapter focuses on the period after World War II and investigates the experiences of transition from autocracy to democracy in East, Southeast, and South Asian countries.

Samuel Huntington (1993) famously claimed that the history of democratization can be summarized in terms of "waves."² According to his periodization scheme, the first wave of democratization started in 1828 in the United States when it held the first presidential election with white male suffrage and continued until 1926. Following the breakdown of democracy in Europe during the interwar years, the period from 1943 to 1962 is regarded as the second democratization wave: many newly independent countries in Asia and Africa became democracies while multiple nations in Europe re-democratized. The 1960s and 70s saw a reverse wave characterized by democratic breakdowns, followed by a third wave, which spread to the world having been sparked by Portuguese military officers retreating to their barracks in 1974. This chapter adopts this wave metaphor and periodization scheme to examine the history of democratization in Asia.

¹ For the history of how modern democracy emerged, see Stasavage (2020).

² For an alternative view of democratization waves, see Gunitsky (2018).

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Table 12.1 List of democratized countries and territories in the second and third waves

Second Wave	Foreign imposition (war defeat) - Japan (1952)	Decolonization	
		- India (1947) - Indonesia (1949) - Myanmar (1947)	- Philippines (1946) - Sri Lanka (1948)
Third Wave	Transformation	Replacement	Transplacement
	- Bhutan (2007) - Pakistan (1988) - Taiwan (1996) - Timor-Leste (2002)	- Bangladesh (1990) - Nepal (1990) - Philippines (1986)	- Indonesia (1998) - Maldives (2008) - Mongolia (1990) - South Korea (1987) - Thailand (1992)

Source Compiled by the author

Note For countries that democratized via decolonization in the second wave, the years in parentheses refer to the years when the country in question gained sovereignty by being recognized by a substantive number of nations, including the former colonizer. For countries in the third wave of democratization, the years in parentheses refer to the years typically regarded by specialists as the years of the major democratization episode

Another useful conceptual device is to classify the “mode” of democratization, which refers to the manner of transitioning from autocracy to democracy. In the second wave, as Huntington (1993, p. 112) notes, foreign imposition and decolonization were the two major modes of democratization. For the third wave, while scholars have proposed a handful of classifications,³ we adopt Huntington’s (1993, p. 114) three types: *transformation*, when regime elites took the initiative in democratization; *replacement*, when opposition groups took the lead in overthrowing authoritarian regimes and bringing about democracy; and *transplacement*, when the democratic transition took place through joint actions by both government (regime elites) and opposition groups. Table 12.1 classifies Asian cases of democratic transitions according to the modes proposed by Huntington.

The following sections overview the situation in three of Asia’s sub-regions: Sect. 12.2 focuses on East Asia, Sect. 12.3 on Southeast Asia, and Sect. 12.4 on South Asia. For each sub-region, we provide graphical illustrations of regime trajectories using the V-Dem database’s Electoral Democracy Index (EDI).⁴ The EDI measures to what extent a polity approaches the principle of electoral democracy, that is, the government is elected through free and fair elections. Specifically, the extent to which a polity approximates this principle is evaluated using the following five components: universal suffrage, clean elections, freedom of assembly, freedom of media and alternative information sources, and elections determining the chief executive of the polity. The closer the score is to 1.00, the more democratic the polity is. In Sect. 12.5, we discuss the prospects for Asia’s democratization by applying existing major theories of democratization.

³ For examples, see O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and Munck and Leff (1999).

⁴ For the contribution of each component to the final EDI score, see the V-Dem Codebook available at the V-Dem website (Varieties of Democracy 2021).

Before we proceed, some caveats are in order. First, since this chapter is concerned with democracy as a real-world political regime, it does not discuss ideals of democracy, such as the Asian democracy debate.⁵ Second, regarding conceptions of democracy as a political regime, we employ a minimalist view, under which the requirements for classification as a democracy mainly entail the electoral process.⁶ Put differently, as indicated by our choice of the EDI as the measure of democracy, we classify a country as a democracy when multiparty elections determine the chief executive and legislators; other conditions such as the rule of law and civil liberties are not included as necessary conditions.⁷ The democracy-autocracy threshold of the EDI also reflects this minimalist view of democracy (Kasuya and Mori 2022). Third, the list of democratization episodes discussed in this chapter is not exhaustive; there are other incidences regarded as democratization that are not included here. Readers are encouraged to consult with country-specific references for further examples.⁸ Fourth, due to space constraints, this chapter cannot provide extensive references for each case of democratization covered. Readers who wish to learn the specifics regarding a particular democratization process are encouraged to refer to Triesman's (2020) online Appendix.

2 Democratization in East Asia

Japan's democratization followed its defeat in World War II. Although a parliamentary system had been installed under the Meiji Constitution (1889), the emperor was endowed with the authority to override laws passed by the legislature. The Meiji Constitution provided suffrage to propertied men, a right later extended to all adult males in 1945 shortly before the end of the war. The Allied forces to which Japan surrendered introduced many democratizing reforms including universal suffrage, freedom of association and speech. The country regained sovereignty in 1952 and has been a democracy since then.

South Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia belong to the third wave democratizers. South Korea became independent following decolonization from Japan and three years of the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK). The first elected president of the Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee, ruled the country as an authoritarian dictator, despite provisions in the 1948 Constitution for democratic institutions and procedures. Rhee's personalistic rule ended after civic unrest in 1960

⁵ For this debate, for example, see Fukuyama (1995) and Thompson (2001).

⁶ On the various ways to conceptualize and measure democracy, see, for example, Merkel (2004) and Coppedge et al. (2011).

⁷ For a democracy measure that includes rule of law components, consult with the Liberal Democracy Index of the V-Dem Project (Varieties of Democracy 2021), Freedom House's (2021) Freedom in the World index, and Polity score (Center for Systemic Peace 2021).

⁸ Useful references include the annual review of major political developments in *Asian Survey*, Freedom House's (2021) country reports, and Triesman's (2020) online appendix. For a discussion of what constitutes "democratization," see Triesman (2020).

and was followed by several short-lived cabinets under a parliamentary system. A 1961 coup d'état led by Park Chung-hee was the beginning of a military regime that lasted until democratization in 1987. One hallmark of this democratization was the direct election of the president, newly stipulated in the 1987 Constitution.

South Korea's democratic transition took the form of a "transplacement," in which both the ruling military elites and the opposition forces—politicians, student activists, labor unions, and civic groups—were instrumental in the process. Park's de facto successor, Chun Doo-hwan, maintained authoritarian rule under the new constitution of the Fifth Republic, ratified in 1980. Chun was elected president by the electoral college in 1981. In early June 1987, he handpicked General Roh Tae-woo, his long-time colleague, as his party's presidential candidate, which put him in line to be his successor. This announcement ignited massive demonstrations across the country and people demanded direct election of the president. The US government pressured Chun not to use force to quell the demonstrations. On June 29, Roh made the "Declaration of Democratization," announcing the direct election of the next president, amnesties for political prisoners, and the guarantee of free and fair elections.

Taiwan's democratization can be characterized as democratization from above, which is "transformation" in Huntington's terminology because of its elite-led nature. In the wake of the Japanese occupation, Taiwan was ruled by the Kuomintang (KMT) government that fled mainland China, where the KMT was fighting against the Communist Party. KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek placed Taiwan under harsh dictatorship. His son, Chiang Ching-kuo, succeeded to the presidency after Chiang Kai Shek's death in 1978. Political liberalization proceeded under Chiang Ching-Kuo, who permitted opposition parties and lifted martial law in 1987. Lee Tung-hui, who became the president of the KMT after Chiang Ching-Kuo's death in 1988, further liberalized Taiwanese politics, allowing the direct election of the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan. Taiwan's democratic transition culminated in 1996, when direct election of the president took place, with Lee taking office as its first elected president.

Mongolia's democratization occurred alongside the collapse of the Soviet Union and is classified here as a "transplacement." After being ruled by a series of Chinese dynasties for centuries, Mongolia became independent in 1921 with the assistance of the Soviet army. Under heavy influence from the Soviet Union, the country had adopted one-party rule by the Mongolian Peoples' Republic Party (MPRP), a Marxist-Leninist party, since its independence. When the Soviet Union embarked on political and economic liberalization under Gorbachev in 1985, the leaders of the MPRP began debating Mongolia's own version of liberalization. In December 1989, the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU), an opposition party, was allowed to be formed. The MDU organized a series of mass protests calling for reforms, and the resulting pressure led to the resignation of the entire Politburo in March 1990. The newly installed replacement members of the Politburo guided the country to hold a multiparty legislative election in July 1990.

The remaining East Asian countries and territories, namely, China, Hong Kong, and North Korea, have shown few signs of democratization as of the time of this writing. Since the birth of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Communist Party has ruled China without tolerating political pluralism. Even before the

handover from the UK to China in 1997, China had pledged that Hong Kong would have a democratic political system under the “one country, two systems” principle. However, the territory’s autonomy has been increasingly encroached upon by the Beijing government, as indicated by the decline in its EDI score in Fig. 12.1. Since its independence in 1948, North Korea has been ruled by Kim Il-sung, the Korean Communist Party leader at the time of Japan’s defeat in 1945, and his heirs.




Fig. 12.1 Democracy scores for East Asian Countries and Territories. *Source* Compiled by the author based on V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index (Varieties of Democracy 2021). *Note* The red dotted line indicates the threshold dividing democracies and autocracies, set at 0.39, following Kasuya and Mori (2022)

3 Democratization in Southeast Asia

Some countries in Southeast Asia were part of the second wave of democratization. Indonesia, Myanmar (then Burma),⁹ and the Philippines became democracies at the time of independence. The Philippines became independent in 1946 from the US, and Burma in 1947 from Britain. The Republic of Indonesia was born in 1949, upon the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands.

However, democratic politics in these three countries did not last long. In Indonesia, Sukarno, the first president of the Republic, staged a “palace coup” in 1957 and declared the country under martial law. He replaced the elected cabinet with appointed members to install a “guided democracy.” Sukarno’s rule ended through a military coup in 1965, and Suharto, one of the coup plotters, assumed the presidency in 1967. His authoritarian rule continued until he resigned in 1998. Burma’s fragile democracy came to an end when General Ne Win took power through a coup d’état in 1962 and became prime minister.¹⁰ In the Philippines, President Ferdinand Marcos, who was twice elected in 1965 and 1969, declared martial law in 1972 and suspended democratic institutions and processes.

Southeast Asia’s third wave of democratization began in the Philippines in 1986. Its mode of transition was “replacement” in Huntingtonian terms, as it was led by the anti-Marcos movement, later joined by the mutiny faction of the military. Marcos declared martial law during his second term as president, in September 1972, creating a government of what he called “constitutional authoritarianism.” His regime was characterized by gross corruption and human rights abuses, including incarceration, torture, and “disappearances.” Triggered by the assassination of Marcos’s political rival Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, Jr. in 1983, street demonstrations calling for Marcos’ resignation mounted. Pressured by the US government, Marcos agreed to hold a presidential election in February 1986. Benigno Aquino’s widow, Corazon, became the opposition forces’ united candidate challenging him. Marcos was officially proclaimed the winner, but the fraud committed by the Marcos camp ignited massive protest rallies that caused this transition to be called the “People Power Revolution.” Eventually the Marcoses fled the country and a new government led by Corazon Aquino was installed.

Indonesia’s return to democracy in 1998 took a “transplacement” mode, as the ruling elites and opposition forces jointly led the process. The Indonesian economy grew rapidly during the early part of Suharto’s rule, but by the 1990s, criticism mounted against his regime for being corrupt, collusive, and nepotistic. Against this backdrop, the Asian financial crises of 1997 and 1998 triggered a series of massive anti-Suharto demonstrations. Amidst this turmoil, Suharto announced his resignation, with Vice President B. J. Habibie assuming the presidency in May 1998.

⁹ In 1989, the government changed the country name from Burma to Myanmar. The US still officially uses the name “Burma” while the UK used “Burma” until 2019. The EU often calls the country “Myanmar/Burma”.

¹⁰ Ne Win had previously served as interim prime minister of the caretaker government from 1958 to 1960.

Habibie initiated a number of liberalizing reforms, including the restoration of press freedom, free and fair electoral competition, and decentralization of government structures. In contrast to the Philippines' 1986 democratization, Indonesia's transition came through a series of incremental steps.

Timor-Leste (also known as East Timor) achieved democratization in 2002, after a period of transition from occupation by Indonesia. The island of Timor was colonized by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century, and the Dutch came to control the western part of the island a century later. The two colonizers concluded a treaty in 1859 to determine the border between Portuguese Timor (present-day Timor-Leste) and Dutch Timor (West Timor, which became part of Indonesia upon Indonesia's independence). As civil war erupted among Timorese factions in the early 1970s, the Portuguese, preoccupied by their own upheaval at home, essentially pulled out of the territory. In 1975, one Timorese faction declared independence for the territory, a pronouncement recognized by only six nations. A mere nine days after this declaration, taking advantage of the chaos, Suharto brutally invaded the territory, annexing it the following year as Indonesia's 27th province.¹¹ Human rights abuses including mass killings and enforced starvation followed, with many calling the occupation a genocide. Timorese resistance continued until Suharto's fall in 1998. Habibie, Suharto's successor, called a referendum in 1999, and the East Timorese overwhelmingly voted in favor of independence over special autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia. A United Nations interim administration assumed authority over Timor-Leste in 1999 as the territory undertook its transition to a democratic nation by ratifying a democratic constitution and holding elections. Timor-Leste became a fully independent nation in May 2002.

Thailand's regime transitions are difficult to classify within the comparative framework used in this chapter. As shown in Fig. 12.2, the country's democracy score fluctuates, with short intervals of relatively democratic periods interrupted periodically by autocratic dips. This reflects the so-called "vicious cycle of Thai politics," which refers to the cycle of having a democratically elected government ousted by a military coup, followed by the withdrawal of the military from politics after a period of junta rule. This cycle appeared to have ended in 1992, when King Rama X brokered a pact between the military leaders and street demonstrators demanding democracy, resulting in democratically elected prime ministers holding office continuously from 1992 until 2006. However, in September 2006, military leaders staged a bloodless coup while Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a populist leader perceived as a threat to the established elites, was abroad. The vicious cycle of Thai politics resumed, with another coup staged in 2014. Although rule by the military junta officially ended with the holding of the 2019 election, the political influence of the Thai military remains strong in the new government led by Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, who headed the military junta from 2014 to 2019.

¹¹ The United Nations never recognized the administration installed by Indonesia; for the 24 years of Indonesian occupation, Portugal continued to be recognized by the UN as the administering power in East Timor.




Fig. 12.2 Democracy scores for Southeast Asian countries. *Source* Compiled by the author based on V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index (Varieties of Democracy 2021). *Note* The red dotted line indicates the threshold dividing democracies and autocracies, set at 0.39, following Kasuya and Mori (2022)

In 2018, Malaysia experienced its first-ever change in government through elections. The United Malays National Organization (UMNO), together with its minor coalition partners, ruled the country from its independence in 1957 until the UMNO-led coalition lost its majority status in 2018 to the Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition led by former Prime Minister Mahathir. However, in 2020, the PH coalition lost its parliamentary majority upon the defection of some members, ushering in the return of the UMNO to the new ruling coalition Perikatan Nasional (PN), led by Prime Minister Muhyiddin. As of the writing of this chapter, Malaysian politics can be best described as a regime in transition.

Myanmar (Burma) returned to democracy in 2015 but this was shuttered by the military coup staged in 2021. After General Ne Win took power in the 1960s, unelected governments ruled the country. Beginning in the 2000s, the military junta

undertook gradual political liberalization, and the 2010 election marked the return of elected government although the ruling party (Union Solidarity and Development Party) was filled with former military officers. In the 2015 election, the National League for Democracy (NLD) won and replaced the military-backed government. The NLD was led by Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of the national foundational hero Aung San and the focal leader of the anti-military democratization movement since the 1980s. The 2020 general election gave another landslide victory to the NLD. However, on the day the new parliament was to convene, February 1, 2021, the military staged a coup d'état and annulled the results of the 2020 election.

Brunei,¹² Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Singapore remain authoritarian since independence, although to varying degrees. Brunei gained independence in 1984 as an Islamic sultanate. The country has been ruled by a sultan up to the present. Vietnam and Laos are one-party regimes ruled by the communist party. Cambodia experienced several decades of civil war from the 1960s until the early 1990s. In the wake of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, multiparty elections started in 1993. However, especially since the 1998 elections, Prime Minister Hun Sen and his Cambodian People's Party (CPP) have ruled the country by harassing opposition parties, civic groups, and independent media. By the time of the 2018 election, viable opposition parties had vanished, resulting in all seats going to the CPP. Singapore's democracy score temporarily surpassed the threshold level of electoral democracy until just recently (cf. Fig. 12.2). As this democracy score (EDI) focuses heavily on the holding of multiparty elections, this score faithfully reflects the fact that Singapore regularly conducts multiparty elections with universal suffrage. However, the reader is reminded that the EDI does not incorporate such factors as opposition forces being severely disadvantaged under the rule of the People's Action Party (PAP), or civil liberties being harshly curtailed. It is worth noting that most area specialists, mindful of these factors, continue to regard Singapore as an autocracy.¹³

4 Democratization in South Asia

In South Asia, India and Sri Lanka emerged as democracies in the wake of decolonization. During the rule of the British in India, the institutions of self-rule were gradually introduced.¹⁴ For example, the Indian Civil Service started accepting local applicants in 1858. The Congress Party was established in 1885, and the 1909 Indian Councils Act introduced elections for Imperial Councils. Further, the 1935 Indian

¹² Brunei is not included in Fig. 12.2 because, as of the version released in 2021, the V-Dem database does not code its democracy scores.

¹³ In the Polity score, Singapore has consistently received a score of minus 2, well below the democracy threshold of 6 (Center for Systemic Peace 2021). In the Freedom House (2021) measure, Singapore has attained "Partly Free" status but has never been in the "Free" category that many scholars regard as necessary to be regarded as a democracy.

¹⁴ This development came especially after the Indian Rebellion of 1857, which shifted control of the territory from the East India Company to the direct rule of the British government.

Government Act provided for elected legislatures at both the central and state levels. Upon independence in 1947, India inherited these democratic institutions. Nevertheless, India did experience crises of democracy: Fig. 12.3 shows that India’s democracy score dropped dramatically between 1975 and 1977. This reflects the period of the state of emergency proclaimed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. During the 19 months of the state of emergency, basic political and civil rights were curtailed, with anti-Gandhi politicians and activists arrested. This dictatorial rule came to an end when the Congress Party lost the 1977 general election.

Sri Lanka (Ceylon until 1972) gained independence as a democracy in 1948. Similar to what had transpired in India, British colonial rule had gradually introduced institutions of self-rule, most of which remained in place after independence. The




Fig. 12.3 Democracy Score for South Asian Countries. *Source* Compiled by the author based on V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index (Varieties of Democracy 2021). *Note* The red dotted line indicates the threshold dividing democracies and autocracies, set at 0.39, following Kasuya and Mori (2022)

Legislative Council, an advisory body to the Executive Council made up of British colonial officers, started to include elected local elites in 1901, with the proportion of local members increasing over time. In 1931, 50 out of the 61 members of the State Council (the successor to the Legislative Council) were elected by locals, with voting rights enjoyed by all men 21 years of age or older, and all women 31 or older. Sri Lanka's female suffrage was realized only three years after Great Britain introduced it. Although Sri Lanka experienced intermittent civil wars from 1983 to 2009 between the Sinhala-dominated government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, multiparty elections were held regularly.

Pakistan also gained independence in 1947 when the British left British India, but it did not start as a democracy as in India or Sri Lanka. The initial regime type after independence is best described as an oligarchy because the country was run by a handful of political elites without universal suffrage. In December 1970, the first general election to elect the members of the National Assembly was held, and the Awami League, a party based in East Pakistan, won the majority of seats. However, political turmoil surrounding the formation of the cabinet and other matters developed into a civil war, which resulted in the independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh in 1971. Pakistan's second general election was held in 1977, resulting in the government led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of the Pakistan People's Party. Shortly after this election, General Zia-ul-Haq staged a coup d'état and placed the country under martial law.

South Asia's third wave democratizers begin to emerge in the 1980s, ultimately including Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, and Pakistan. Bangladesh's mode of democratization can be characterized as "replacement," similar to the Philippines. Its first regime after gaining independence from Pakistan in 1971 was a personalist dictatorship under elected politician Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and two military officers-turned-president, Ziaur Rahman and Hussain Muhammad Ershad. Although Bangladesh held general elections under these dictatorships, they were often marred by fraud, violence, and opposition party boycotts. By the 1980s, demands for democratic reforms gained momentum. In particular, a coalition of university student associations (All Party Students' Unity or APSU) played an instrumental role in brokering the alliances of all major opposition parties and in organizing strikes against President Ershad. Ershad was compelled to resign in December 1990 in the face of a massive opposition campaign calling for his resignation and for free and fair elections. The election held in January 1991 was relatively free and fair, with multiple parties competing.

Bhutan's democratization was a case of "transformation," or reform from above. The absolute monarchy of the Wangchuk dynasty ruled the country since the early twentieth century. Its fourth king, Jigme Singye Wangchuk, initiated the transition from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy by transferring most of his political and administrative powers to the popularly elected parliament and the Council of Cabinet Ministers that are elected by the members of parliament. A new constitution was adopted in 2008, and the first multiparty election was held in 2007 and 2008. In contrast to other cases of third wave democratizers in Asia, there were few street

demonstrations calling for the resignation of the incumbent leader as in the Philippines, or internal elite splits as in Indonesia. The initiative of King Jigme Singye Wangchuk was instrumental in this smooth democratic transition.

The Maldives' democratic transition happened in 2008, in the form of "transplacement." Like Bhutan and Nepal, the Maldives became a British protectorate in the late nineteenth century while recognizing the rule by its sultan for domestic affairs. Having achieved independence in 1965, in 1968, it became a republic with an elected president. However, its first two presidents, Ibrahim Nasir and Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, did not tolerate multiparty elections. In particular, President Gayoom publicly promised democratic reforms when he took office in 1978, but substantive changes were not seen during the first two decades of his rule. Starting in the mid-2000s, amid mounting civic discontent, reforms gradually started. Registering political parties became legal in 2005, a roadmap to reform was announced in 2006, and a new constitution was ratified in 2008. Under the new democratic constitution, a new president, Mohamed Nasheed, was elected through a relatively free and fair election. However, Nasheed was forced to step down in 2012 because of his alleged mishandling of the economy and his vice president Mohamed Waheed Hassan Manik assumed presidency until the next election. In the 2013 presidential election, Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom, Gayoom's half-brother, was elected president. Yameen oppressed his political opponents, and political crisis continued until 2018 when Ibrahim Mohamed Solih was elected as a new president.

Nepal's 1990 democratization took the form of "replacement." In 1951, the Rana dynasty, which started as the rule of prime ministers serving the Shah monarchs, was replaced by a constitutional monarchy upholding the Shahs as royals. The monarchs were expected to introduce democratic reforms, but such reforms never took place. Instead, the king introduced a partyless council system, which in essence was an absolute monarchy. Civic discontent grew despite dissidents being brutally repressed by the military and police apparatus. By 1989, opposition forces formed the *Jana Andolan* (People's Movement) and staged a non-violent gathering of over 200,000 people in early 1990. Even though this gathering was brutally crushed by the government, protests continued for several months. In April, the king announced he would concede shifting to a multiparty democracy. Nepal's democratic period did not last long, however, because of the civil war waged by Maoist groups beginning in 1996. After a peace agreement in 2006, the parliament, dominated by Maoist legislators, abolished the monarchy completely in 2008.

As for Pakistan, its 1988 democratization happened upon the sudden death of a dictator, so its mode of democratization can be categorized as "transformation." General Zia-ul-Haq, who imposed martial law rule in 1977, died of a plane crash in 1988. His death was followed by a general election in which multiple parties were allowed to compete. From 1988 to 1999, civilians formed governments, but frequent changes in administrations resulted in political instability. Against this backdrop, the 1999 military coup led by General Musharraf was largely welcomed by the public, and it was legally legitimized by the Supreme Court. Although the military's influence remains strong, electoral politics returned in 2002.

5 Prospects for Regime Transitions in Asia

This chapter provided a historical overview of democratization in Asia in the post-World War II era. Will more Asian countries become democracies? Will democratized cases remain democratic? Various theories of regime transition may help place these questions in perspective. In this final section, we apply some of these theories to countries in Asia.

One of the classic theories of democratization known as the Lipset thesis claims that countries with high levels of socio-economic development have a higher likelihood to democratize and remain democratic (Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000). Applied to Asia, this theory might fit well to explain why low-income countries such as Cambodia and North Korea remain autocracies.

However, the Lipset thesis fails to explain the case of Singapore's prolonged authoritarian rule under the PAP. To make sense of Singapore's case, comparative studies of authoritarian survival might be the place to look for answers. Many studies on this topic found that autocracies ruled by parties, in contrast to personal dictators or military junta, survive longer because the ruling party tends to have stable succession rules and the mechanisms to calibrate governance (e.g., Geddes et al. 2018). This institutional theory might explain how Singapore's party-led autocracy continues on. Further, this perspective might also apply to China, Laos, and Vietnam, where communist parties have ruled these countries for decades.

Besides domestic politics, scholars emphasize that international factors also influence regime transition and non-transition. Levitsky and Way (2010) argue that the combination of two international factors is important. These two factors are leverage—the extent to which countries have ties with major democracies—and vulnerability—the extent to which countries cannot resist democratization. For example, Taiwan's democratization was partly due to a high degree of economic, political, and social linkage with the US; Cambodia's introduction of multiparty elections in the early 1990s was attributable to the country's high vulnerability to democratization pressure, because the country was greatly dependent on foreign aid from the EU and the US around that time. Adapting this theoretical perspective to the recent context, the presence of China, an authoritarian country, as a major power in the region might make democratization more unlikely for those countries that have stronger linkage to China and greater vulnerability to authoritarianism.

To address the question about democratic survival, the literature on democratic consolidation, and more recently, on democratic backsliding, can be illuminating. Scholars found that conditions for democratic consolidation include a long history of democratic rule (Gerring et al. 2005), a developed economy (Svolik 2008), a well-developed state bureaucracy (Linz and Stepan 1996), the absence of military rule in the past (Svolik 2008), and a relatively homogenous society (Lijphart 1977). In light of these theories, the prospects for Asian countries' survival as democracies are rather worrisome because many countries lack these conditions. Indeed, recent examples of democratic backsliding—the executive aggrandizement in India by Prime Minister Modi, and in the Philippines by President Duterte, the military coups in Thailand

and Myanmar—have taken place in contexts that lack many of the above-mentioned consolidation conditions.

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Japan's Economic Growth and Engagement in Asia



Akihiko Tanaka

The San Francisco Peace Treaty was a milestone for Japan as it ended the occupation in April 1952. Challenges were formidable for Japan, however. Although the United States considered Japan a strategically important country during the Cold War, Japan, an aggressor in the Second World War, had to make special efforts to regain trust as a member of the international community. A series of democratic reforms were launched during the occupation, but the political system was yet to be stabilized; political parties were making and breaking alignments in a fluid manner. Under strong pressures from the United States to increase its defense capability during the Cold War, Japan had to adjust its interpretations of the Constitution that appeared to have prohibited Japan from having even defensive forces. Political adjustments were inevitable. Furthermore, Japan's economy was still extremely tenuous. Very few observers expected that Japan would experience miraculous economic growth in subsequent years.

1 Normalization Diplomacy

While the San Francisco Peace Treaty normalized Japan's relations with the major countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, it failed to address Japan's relations with many other important countries. Neither the People's Republic of China nor the Republic of China was invited to San Francisco because the United States and the United Kingdom had different attitudes toward China; the US continued to recognize the Republic of China while the United Kingdom recognized the People's Republic of China. Neither the Republic of Korea nor the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were invited to San Francisco as they were not

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considered parties to the war with Japan. Although the Soviet Union participated in the San Francisco conference, it did not sign the treaty. India, considering the draft treaty prepared by the US and the UK too harsh on Japan, did not participate in the conference. While many signatories of the treaty waived war reparations, several countries maintained that they normalize relations with Japan pending agreed upon reparations.¹

Normalization of relations with India went smoothly. India was ready to accept Japan with more lenient terms than the San Francisco Treaty. India notified Japan on September 8 that it intended to establish diplomatic relations in timing the San Francisco Treaty. The two countries established diplomatic relations on April 28, 1952 and signed a peace treaty in June that went into effect in late August. India waived war reparations.

When Prime Minister Yoshida signed the San Francisco Treaty, which stipulated that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores,”² he was not interested in choosing either Beijing or Taipei; he wanted to wait and see which China would be accepted by the international community. The United States, however, intended to settle Japan–China relations outside of the San Francisco Treaty framework; John Foster Dulles, special envoy to the peace treaty negotiations with Japan, urged Yoshida to start negotiations with Taipei. According to Dulles, the ratification of the San Francisco Treaty could have become difficult if Japan did not select Taiwan since there were many supporters of Taiwan in the Senate. Yoshida gave in, and Tokyo and Taipei started peace treaty negotiations. The Taipei negotiators demanded war reparations, to which Tokyo negotiators responded in the negative by claiming that the damages caused by Japan were limited to mainland China, which Taipei’s government did not control. The San Francisco Treaty was ratified on March 20, lifting the pressures on Japan. Determined to establish diplomatic relations with Japan as early as possible, Taiwan decided to waive reparations from Japan, as was the case with the United States and many other US allies. The Peace Treaty between Japan and the Republic of China was signed on April 28, 1952, exactly when the San Francisco Treaty went into effect.

Another important country Japan needed to normalize relations with was the Soviet Union. As long as the Soviet Union was antagonistic to Japan, there was no

¹ In the early stages of the occupation, the United States intended to impose reparations. As “interim reparations,” plant facilities, machines, and other equipment worth \$45 million were shipped to China, the Philippines, and other countries. But as the United States changed its occupation policy and began to regard Japan as a strategically important country in the Cold War, the US decided to scrap the “interim reparations” (Kitaoka 2000, p. 170). In the runup to a peace treaty with Japan, the United States was inclined not to demand reparations from Japan; John Foster Dulles, who participated in the Versailles peace conference, remembered the destructive consequences of harsh reparations on Germany. But as several countries opposed, the treaty stipulated that “Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused during the war” but that as “it is also recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient,” Japan’s compensation should be “by making available the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work for the Allied Powers in question.” (Article 14 of the San Francisco Treaty, <https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/docs/19510908.T1E.html>).

² Article 2 of the San Francisco Treaty.

hope of Japan becoming a member of the United Nations since Moscow had a veto in the Security Council. The biggest difficulty was the issue of the Northern Territories,³ which the Soviet Union occupied in the weeks after Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on August 14. In the San Francisco Treaty, "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands."⁴ Japan claimed that the "Kuril Islands" mentioned in the treaty did not include the "Northern Territories." Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro, who succeeded Yoshida in late 1954, agreed to start negotiations with the Soviet Union in June 1955 but was not able to achieve immediate progress.

At one point, the Soviet Union suggested to cede Habomai and Shikotan if Japan agreed to Soviet sovereignty over Kunashiri and Etorofu. The United States noted to Japan that recognizing Soviet sovereignty over these islands, which Japan "renounces all rights, title, and claim," would represent giving "greater advantages"⁵ to the Soviet Union than to the signatories of the San Francisco Treaty and could lead the United States to demand the same "advantages." This meant that the United States might claim complete sovereignty over Okinawa, which remained under US occupation by stipulation of the San Francisco Treaty. Prime Minister Hatoyama, who visited the Soviet Union in October, gave up on concluding with a peace treaty that would satisfy Japan's demands and agreed to establish diplomatic relationship by a joint declaration. In the Joint Declaration, two countries simply agreed to "continue ... negotiations for the peace treaty" and the Soviet Union "agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan, the actual transfer of these islands to Japan to take place after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty ..."⁶ The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, though unsatisfactory to many Japanese with respect to the lost territories, paved the way for Japan's membership to the United Nations in December 1956. In the subsequent years, the Soviet Union denied the existence of any territorial issues with Japan. After the disbandment of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation recognized the existence of territorial issues. However, subsequent negotiations for a peace treaty have never resulted in a mutually agreeable compromise.

Six countries demanded Japan pay reparations: Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Negotiations with these countries became complex and time consuming, largely because the San Francisco treaty left the settlement of reparations to bilateral negotiations. As each country made its own demands without coordinating with others, the total sum of their initial demands were beyond anything Japan could possibly pay. Japan had to weigh how much it should be obliged to pay to whom within these multiple bilateral negotiations.⁷

³ Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu. Other issues Japan wanted to resolve included the return of Japanese POWs detained in Soviet labor camps and fishery issues off the coast of Hokkaido.

⁴ Article 2 of the San Francisco Treaty.

⁵ Article 26 of the San Francisco Treaty.

⁶ Article 9 of the Joint Declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan. <https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/docs/19561019.D1E.html>.

⁷ The following description of Japan's reparations with Southeast Asia draws on Kitaoka (2000) and Nagano and Kondo (1999).

The negotiations on war reparations between Burma and Japan proceeded first; they concluded the agreement in October 1954, and Japan agreed to pay \$200 million in reparations to Burma in the following 10 year period. Japan and the Philippines reached their agreement in May 1956; Japan agreed to provide \$25 million each year for the first 10 years and \$30 million for the second 10 years (totaling \$550 million). In addition, Japan agreed to provide \$250 million in loans. Japan and Indonesia reached an agreement in September 1957, when Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke visited Indonesia for the first time as Japanese prime minister; Japan agreed to pay \$223 million as reparations and cancel \$177 million in debts that Indonesia owed in trade payments. Japan also agreed to provide \$400 million in loans.

Japan and Vietnam concluded a reparations agreement in May 1958; Japan agreed to provide \$39 million over five years. In addition, Japan agreed to provide loans up to \$7.5 million. In observation of Japan's reparations agreements with the Philippines and Indonesia, both of which were supposed to receive \$800 million including reparations, cancelation of debts and loans, Burma demanded Japan to increase reparations; Burma insisted that the damage it suffered was equivalent to these two countries. Japan insisted that their original agreement with Burma was fair, but after several years of negotiations, in 1963 Tokyo agreed to extend grant aids totaling \$140 million and loans of \$30 million. In November 1954, Cambodia notified Japan that it would waive reparations. Laos also waived reparations in 1956. In appreciation of these decisions, Japan concluded economic and technical cooperation agreements with both countries in 1959, in which Japan offered \$4.19 million grants to Cambodia and \$2.78 million to Laos. Grants given to Cambodia and Laos were referred to as "sub-reparations."

Although the San Francisco Treaty stipulated that Japan's reparations should be made by "the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work,"⁸ it turned out that "services" alone would not add up to the required amount of reparations and would not meet specific demands of the recipient countries. As a result, reparations were provided in the form of capital goods procured in Japan and paid in yen. In other words, reparations were often implemented as "projects" of importance to the recipient countries. In Burma, the Balu Chaung Hydro Power Plant was constructed as reparations; when it was completed in 1960, it provided 60% of electricity in Burma (Fujikura and Nakayama 2016, p. 43–44). In Indonesia, early projects to develop the Brantas River Basin were implemented through Japanese reparations, such as the Nejava Diversion Tunnel and the Karangates Dam (JICA 1998, pp. 44–49).

Japan's colonization of Korea cast a long and extremely complicated shadow. It took more than a decade for Japan and South Korea to establish a diplomatic relationship in 1965. No diplomatic relationships have been established between Japan and North Korea even to this day. Difficult issues included legal and moral assessment of Japan's colonization, the status of the two Koreas, geopolitical reality involving the United States and Soviet Union, and specific bilateral issues, such as

⁸ Article 14 of the San Francisco Treaty.

fishery in the case of 1950s South Korea and abduction issues in the case of North Korea since the 1980s.

Despite South Korea's insistence that it was entitled to participate in the San Francisco conference as a member of the allied forces, it was not invited to the peace conference as this was not recognized by the United States and United Kingdom. As a result, all concrete issues between South Korea and Japan had to be worked out between the two countries. The negotiations, started in 1951, bogged down almost immediately; South Korea insisted that Japan's colonization had been illegal since annexation in 1910 while Japan insisted that the annexation was made in accordance with the international law then applicable. Japan protested against South Korea's occupation of Takeshima, a small island in the Sea of Japan that both Japan and South Korea claimed sovereignty. Japan also protested South Korea's capture of Japanese fishing boats in the area within the "Syngman Rhee Line," the line beyond the then internationally accepted territorial waters. Negotiations terminated for some time due to what South Koreans called "Kubota's absurd statements." In response to South Korea's claims of huge losses suffered from Japan's colonization, Kubota Kan'ichiro, Japan's chief negotiator, was said to have argued that Japan contributed to the development of Korea by making investments in railways, ports, and agriculture.

Negotiations resumed in 1957 when Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke retracted Kubota's statements, but they stalled again almost immediately as South Korea opposed the Japanese government's decision to return residents in Japan of North Korean origins back to North Korea. 1960 was a year of political turmoil in both Japan and South Korea. Prime Minister Kishi, considering the Japan-US Security Treaty of 1951 inadequate, engaged in negotiations with the Eisenhower administration to revise it. The revision was mostly clarification of purposes and obligations of the two countries but triggered a massive anti-government movement after the two countries signed the revised treaty in 1960; the protesters believed that the Kishi cabinet was about to introduce more repressive rule in Japan. The demonstrators surrounded the Diet Building and a female student was killed in the chaos. A planned visit by President Eisenhower was cancelled. The revised treaty was ratified by the Diet on June 19, and the Kishi cabinet resigned in July. As the new government under Ikeda Hayato displayed a "low-profile" posture with the promise of "income-doubling," the political tension subsided significantly in Japan.

In Korea, the government of Rhee Singman was toppled by the student-led April Revolution. The government led by Prime Minister Chang Myon, established by the new Constitution, was not able to bring stability. The military led by Park Chung Hee staged a coup in May 1961; Park organized a military government and, in 1963, drew up a new constitution to establish the third republic in which he became the elected president. It was after the May military coup that progress was made in Japan-South Korea negotiations. Under the encouragement of the Kennedy administration in the United States, Ikeda and Park agreed to work out the details of normalization. Park, determined to achieve improved economic prosperity, was eager to settle a deal to obtain necessary funds for development. Realizing the futility of adding up objective evidence to justify claims incurred by colonial rule, the two countries made a deal in which Japan agreed to extend \$300 million in grants and \$200 million in low

interest loans to South Korea, and both sides agreed not to make any more claims. As there was still opposition to normalization in both countries, it was not until 1965 that both countries finally signed the treaty and other related agreements to establish diplomatic relations.

The statement made by Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina Etsusaburo during his visit to Seoul in February 1965 was positive in easing tensions between the two countries. He immediately said after landing in Seoul, “It is regrettable that there was an unhappy period in the long history of our two nations. We deeply regret this” (Yoshizawa 2005, p. 219; Fukushima 2021, p. 294). The “Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea,” stipulates that the “problem concerning property, rights and interests of the two Contracting Parties and their nationals (including juridical persons) ... is settled completely and finally.”⁹ The basic treaty that establishes diplomatic relations has a clause that each party interprets in its own way: “all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and the Empire of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void.”¹⁰

2 From the Ashes to High Growth

The period in which Japan engaged in normalization diplomacy was also a period of Japan’s economic recovery and the beginning of high growth. Japan had to start as a completely devastated country in the immediate aftermath of the war. The gross national product (GNP) of Japan in 1946 was one half the GNP of 1938, the highest in the prewar period. Steel production became 7% of the prewar level (Yoshikawa 1997, p. 14). While production was severely constrained, inflation became rampant: 364.5% in 1946, 195.9% in 1947, and 165.6% in 1948 (Ito and Hoshi 2020, p. 54). By applying the methods of command economy used during war time, the government gave priority to the production of coal and steel by giving substantial subsidies to these sectors and tried to stabilize prices by introducing “official” prices. Although the production of coal and steel increased, three-digit inflation continued. The United States, in control of the occupation forces, introduced drastic fiscal discipline and forced the Japanese government to abolish many subsidies.

As a result, the Japanese economy overcame inflation but ended up with serious deflation. The initiatives known as the Dodge Plan, named after the US banker Joseph Dodge who was sent to take charge of fiscal discipline, stagnated the economy, but it revived “free competition” by transforming many industries virtually nationalized during the war and propped up by postwar subsidies into real private industries.

⁹ “Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea,” June 22, 1965. <https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPKR/19650622.T9E.html>.

¹⁰ “Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea,” June 22, 1965. <https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/docs/19650622.T1E.html>.

The Korean War broke out in 1950. Although it destabilized international security, the war provided an opportunity to the stagnant Japanese economy. The United States procured many products in Japan needed for the war effort. Japan's exports in 1950 were about \$800 million, and the US "special procurement" poured \$600 million into Japan over the two years from 1950 to 1951 (Nakamura 1998, p. 439). The bottleneck of the Japanese economy was the shortage of "hard currencies" to purchase raw materials and intermediate goods necessary to produce manufactured goods for export. The "special procurement" gave Japan necessary dollars to restart manufacturing production.

The Japanese economy recovered from the devastation of war, but difficulties continued in terms of the balance of payments. Japan suffered from trade deficits from 1951 to 1957. In 1953, trade deficits constituted -4.5 percent of GNP (Ito and Hoshi 2020, p. 54). In 1955, Japan's foreign currency reserves were \$770 million, less than 30% of its total imports (Fukao 2020: 196). By the middle of the 1950s, however, Japan's per capita GDP reached the highest level achieved in the prewar period. The official white paper for the economy, published in 1956, pronounced, "it is no longer the postwar period."¹¹ The Japanese economy restored a semblance of normalcy even though there were many pessimistic economists.

By the middle of the 1950s, Japanese politics reached a state of equilibrium of a sort. During the occupation period, many political parties emerged along the political spectrum from the rightist conservatism to communism. The Yoshida cabinet that presided over the end of the occupation was a coalition of various anti-communist conservative forces. The end of the occupation revealed submerged differences among conservatives as many politicians purged by General Headquarters came back to the political arena. One important issue was the revision of the Constitution; Yoshida did not support revision, while many other conservatives argued for revisions so that Japan would be able to rearm.

However, the political parties in support of Constitutional revisions did not gain the two-thirds majority necessary to propose constitutional revisions in the two general elections held in 1952 and 1953, although conservatives as a whole, including those in opposition of Constitutional revisions, kept the majority in the Diet, thus allowing Yoshida to be in power until late 1954. Now that constitutional revisions became politically impossible, the conservatives reached a consensus to establish Self-Defense Forces partly in response to US pressure for rearmament. Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro, who succeeded Yoshida in 1954 and had insisted on constitutional revisions, now argued that the Japanese constitution did not prohibit Japan from exercising its right to self-defense as a sovereign country. In response to the conservatives, the leftist parties decided to establish the Socialist Party of Japan in October 1955. So then, the conservatives decided to form a unified party named the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in November 1955. The establishment of two political forces ushered in a new structure to Japanese politics, which many political scientists call

¹¹ Economic Planning Agency of Japan, *Showa 31 nen Nenji Keizai Houkoku* [Annual Economic Report], 1956. <https://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/keizaiwp/wp-je56/wp-je56-010501.html>.

the 1955 System. In the 1955 System, the two forces were not equal in power; the LDP continued to keep the majority in the Diet until 1993.

As the 1960 Japan-US security treaty revision indicated, LDP rule was not without political crises. But LDP predominance provided political stability, in which Japan enjoyed an unprecedented period of “high growth.” The average annual economic growth from 1955 to 1970 was 9.7%.¹² Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato set the goal of doubling income in 10 years; the gross national product actually doubled within 7 years. Japan surpassed West Germany in terms of gross national product in 1968, becoming the second largest economy in the capitalist camp of the Cold War.

The high growth was realized by active introduction of advanced technology, investment in the private sector, expanding domestic demands and the favorable international environment. The 1950s was a period of technological innovation for many products: Japanese companies actively engaged licensing contracts with technologically advanced Western companies and invested heavily in the production of key products such as steel, chemicals, and consumer products such as radios, television, and automobiles. Large scale steelworks were built at Kashima, Kimitsu, Mizushima, and other places on the seacoast. Petrochemical refineries were also built on the seacoast. TOYOTA built its first factory specialized in producing passenger cars in 1958.¹³ Japan’s share of the world’s steel production grew from 6.4% in 1960 to 15.7% in 1970; synthetic fibers, from 16.9% to 21%; shipbuilding, from 20.7% to 48.3%; passenger cars, from 1.3% to 14.2% (Nakamura 1998, p. 550). Full scale infrastructure developments were launched in the 1950s, often with the financial assistance of the World Bank. Major projects included the expressway from Nagoya to Kobe and high speed rail, the *Shinkansen*, from Tokyo to Osaka. The Tokyo Olympics scheduled in 1964 were a major impetus to accelerate further infrastructure developments such as the metropolitan expressways and subways. As the economy grew, so did wages. The average Japanese household began to be equipped with the “Three Sacred Treasures”: television sets, washing machines, and refrigerators. Many Japanese began to identify as middle class; while about 70% felt they belonged to the middle class in the late 1950s, 89% did so in 1969 (Nakamura 1998, p. 521).

The international environment was favorable to Japan. In 1955, Japan acceded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and regained access to global markets, although several countries were reluctant to give full access to Japanese products because of their memories of pre-war competition with “cheap” Japanese goods. Trade was important because Japan needed hard currencies to purchase necessary raw materials. But trade was not the single most important engine of growth in the 1950s and 1960s. The ratio of private fixed investment to GNP increased rapidly from 10% to more than 20% by 1970. The ratio of exports to GNP also increased in the same period but lower than 10% (Ito and Hoshi 2020, p. 58–59). This does not

¹² Calculated by the author from the Gross Domestic Expenditure at 1990 constant price. The data source is from Naikakufu, *Heisei 30 nendo Keizai zaisei hokoku* [Economic and Financial Report for Fiscal Year 2008], 2008, <https://www5.cao.go.jp/j-j/wp/wp-je18/pdf/p08000.pdf>.

¹³ For a historical review of Toyota’s domestic plants, see the webpage below. https://www.toyota.co.jp/jpn/company/history/75years/data/automotive_business/production/production/japan/general_status/motomachi.html.

Exports of Major Economies: 1960-1972




Fig. 1 Exports of Major Economies: 1960–1972

mean that trade was not important. Japan’s exports to the whole world grew dramatically and surpassed France and the United Kingdom by the early 1970s (Fig. 1). The average annual growth rate from 1960 to 1970 was 17%, and Japan’s exports constituted 6.8% of total exports in the world.¹⁴ The largest market for Japan’s exports was the United States, comprising nearly 32% in 1970. The second most important was Southeast Asia; the five Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand accounted for 9.5% of Japan’s exports in 1970.

Dramatic changes in the economy, while improving people’s living standards, also created serious problems domestically and unexpected challenges internationally. Domestically, the most serious problem was pollution. Pollution related to petro-chemical industries included Minamata disease, *Itai-itai* (“it hurts, it hurts”) disease, and Yokkaichi Asthma. Minamata disease is mercury poisoning caused by wastewater containing methylmercury released from a chemical factory in Minamata, Kyushu. The number of officially recognized deaths was 1,963, but those who died before the disease was discovered in 1956 are not accounted for. The same disease was found in Niigata prefecture in the 1960s. *Itai-itai* disease was caused

¹⁴ The author’s calculation based on the data from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics.


by contamination of cadmium released from mines in Toyama prefecture. Yokkaichi Asthma was caused by air pollution from an industrial complex in the Yokkaichi region. Smog became prevalent in most metropolitan areas, and sludge filled many rivers and coastal seas in the 1960s. The government response to pollution was slow; the Pollution Control Basic Law was not enacted until 1967, and the Environment Protection Agency was established in July 1971. It was during the 1970s that regulations became more and more strict.

Internationally, Japanese were perplexed by the criticism targeted at its increasing exports. The first instance was textile exports to the United States. Although complaints about Japan's textile exports started in the 1950s and an agreement on "voluntary export restraints" of cotton textiles was made, it was not until the late 1960s when the issue became highly politicized. President Richard Nixon, in his presidential campaign of 1968, promised stricter regulations on textile imports from Japan and demanded that Prime Minister Sato Eisaku bring Japan's exports of textiles under control. At that time, the major issue facing Sato was to persuade the Americans to return Okinawa to Japan. In 1965, Sato told Okinawans that unless Okinawa was returned to Japan, the postwar era would not end. Although the United States recognized the strategic importance of maintaining military bases in Okinawa, it decided that it would be better to return Okinawa to Japan in order to solidify relations. However, this was only allowed as long as Japan gave the US free use and control of the military bases. In order to realize the return of Okinawa, Sato strategically made the decision to cooperate with the United States, and in 1969, the US agreed to return Okinawa in 1972. However, as the Japanese textile industry did not agree to a voluntary restraint of exports, Sato did not make further efforts to resolve this issue. President Nixon was extremely unhappy and pressured Japan to make progress on this trade issue, too. Until the early 1960s, the United States had a bilateral trade surplus with Japan. The trend reversed in the middle of the 1960s. By 1970, the US bilateral trade deficit with Japan increased to become second only to that with Canada (Fig. 2). Under these economic circumstances, Sato's reluctance to solve the textile problem became particularly frustrating to Nixon.

More broadly, the United States began to question the basic international framework established in the postwar period. First, President Nixon decided to change the strategic environment so that the United States could achieve an "honorable withdrawal" from Vietnam. By secret negotiations, he struck a deal with Mao Zedong, who also wanted to make a strategic shift under increasingly tense Sino-Soviet relations. In July 1971, Nixon announced that he would visit China in the following spring. Sato was notified about this only a few minutes before the announcement, the Japanese media called it the "Nixon shock." Since 1952, when Japan was pressured by John Foster Dulles to make peace with Chiang Kai-shek, Japan had consistently followed the US anti-Beijing position. Now, Japan had to cope with the prospect of a US-China reproachment.

Exactly one month later, President Nixon brought another "shock" to Japan. On August 15, 1971, President Nixon announced a "new economic policy," which included the imposition of a 10% import surcharge on all imported products and suspension of the convertibility of the dollar to gold. He stated: "now that other

Fig. 2 U.S. Trade Deficits:
1970



nations are economically strong, the time has come for them to bear their fair share of the burden of defending freedom around the world. The time has come for exchange rates to be set straight and for the major nations to compete as equals. There is no longer any need for the United States to compete with one hand tied behind her back.”¹⁵ In Nixon’s view, the fixed exchange system gave unfair privileges to countries like Japan. The textile problem was finally resolved in the autumn of 1971 when Japan mostly conceded to US demands. This was not the end of trade frictions with the United States. In subsequent years, trade issues continued on items such as electronic equipment, automobiles, and semi-conductors, while criticism increased regarding Japan “free riding” on security affairs.

3 Re-engagement in Asia

Normalizing diplomatic relations is one thing. Constructing positive relations is quite another. Japan normalized diplomatic relations with most Asian countries by the middle of the 1960s. As trade with mainland China was limited because of Japan’s decision to normalize relations with Taiwan,¹⁶ Southeast Asia became a very important market next to the United States. As described above, Japan’s exports to Southeast Asia expanded rapidly. But other than the projects implemented by reparations, Japan’s engagement in Southeast Asia was limited. Japan explored various concepts of regional development but none of them took off (Hoshiro 2008). The only significant development was the establishment of the Asian Development Bank in 1966. Its concept was originally nurtured by a private study group in Japan and the discussion in the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). The Japanese government and the US government agreed to become the largest contributors in the spring of 1965, and the final agreement of establishing the bank was signed in December 1965. Japan proposed to host the headquarters in Tokyo, but final voting favored Manila. Prime Minister Sato wrote in his diary: “Asian people haven’t yet

¹⁵ “President Nixon’s Address Announcing his New Economic Policy, The Challenge of Peace,” August 15, 1971. <https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPUS/19710815.S1E.html>.

¹⁶ After normalizing diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, Japan was engaged in informal trade with China by a series of private sector agreements. The trade relations were terminated completely from 1958 to 1962 due to political controversy over Taiwan.

approved Japan's power. Unpleasant" (Sato 1998, p. 342). However, all presidents of the Asian Development Bank have been Japanese (Takahashi 2004; Cho 2009).

A major adjustment to Japan's engagement in Asia was normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China. Arguments for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing had existed in Japan all along. But as long as Washington continued to have antagonistic relations with Beijing, shifting Japan's diplomatic relationship from Taipei to Beijing was out of the question. However, the Nixon shock and subsequent Sino-American reproachment changed all this. Zhou Enlai sent a secret message to Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, successor to Sato, that China would not make demands that Japan could not accept. In September 1972, Tanaka decided to visit Beijing to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China. In the joint communiqué to normalize relations, China "declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan" while Japan "is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself."¹⁷ However, relations with China remained limited in the 1970s. China was still an economically isolated country. Relations with South Korea were expanding, but political relations with Seoul were always tenuous. The most promising relations in Asia appeared to be those with Southeast Asia.

However, in 1974, shocking events happened in Southeast Asia. When Prime Minister Tanaka landed at the Bangkok airport, he found thousands of student protestors on the street denouncing "economic aggression" (Asahi, January 10, 1974). Tanaka then moved to Indonesia and found even more fierce anti-Japanese protests. More than 10,000 protestors took to the streets. Japanese automobiles were burned, Japanese companies were set on fire and the Japanese flag in the embassy was taken down (Asahi, January 16, 1994). The riots in Bangkok and Jakarta reflected people's frustration against the authoritarian governments in their respective countries and Japan, which appeared to be in support of such governments. The Japanese appeared engaged in aggression, this time in economic rather than military terms. Japan became the largest source of imports to Indonesia, Thailand, and Burma by 1960. It became the largest exporter to these three countries and Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore by 1970. In 1973, exports from Japan to Thailand were \$732 million and 2.7 times as much as imports from the United States, the second largest origin of imports to Thailand.¹⁸

¹⁷ "Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China (English translation)," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. <https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/docs/19720929.D1E.html>.

¹⁸ Calculated by the author from the Direction of Trade Statistics.

4 Expansion of Official Development Assistance

In other words, in the 1970s, Japan faced criticism from what it considered its most important partners: the United States and Southeast Asia. Japan was criticized by the United States for not fulfilling responsibilities commensurate with its economic power. Japan was criticized in Southeast Asia for engaging in economic aggression instead of military force. Increasing defense capability could be an answer to the problem with the United States. But it was counter-productive to the problem in Southeast Asia, where war-time memories were still vivid and did not appeal to many Japanese who believed that militarism had brought Japan to catastrophe. One policy measure many Japanese thought suited this context was Official Development Assistance (ODA).

Japan's development assistance began in the 1950s as part of its efforts to re-join the international community as well as to support Japan's economic recovery (Kato et al. 2016; Shimomura 2021). By joining the Colombo Plan, a regional organization established in 1950 for the development of human resources in Asia, in 1954, Japan intended to show its willingness to engage in international cooperation despite its still poverty-stricken economic conditions. Under the Colombo plan scheme, Japan initiated small-scale technical cooperation programs. To promote such technical cooperation, the Organization of Technical Cooperation Agency was established in 1962. In 1958, Japan extended a concessional loan to India. By establishing the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) in 1961, Japan began to extend a series of concessional loans (yen loans) to Southeast Asia, often complimenting on-going reparations projects. The OECF took charge of concessional loans programs established in conjunction with the reparation and sub-reparation agreements. As these loans limited procurement to Japanese companies, their projects were opportunities for Japanese exports. This was positive for Japan's economy but became a source of friction, especially with the United States and other donor countries. By the end of the 1960s, when Japan became the second largest economy in the capitalist camp, the "tied" nature of Japan's yen loans began to attract international criticism for it was regarded as more an export promotion than international aid. The United States, in addition, was eager to demand that Japan expand the ODA in Asia, where it wanted to prevent an expansion of communism.

Domestic politics in Japan became turbulent from 1974 to 1976.¹⁹ The establishment of the cabinet of Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo resulted in Japan's international position becoming more clear. Fukuda, in his meeting with President Jimmy Carter in March 1977, "expressed his intention that Japan would further contribute to the stability and development of that [Asian-Pacific] region in various fields, including

¹⁹ Inflation (CPI) reached 30% in February 1974. Prime Minister Tanaka resigned in December of that same year. The cabinet organized by Takeo Miki was slow in putting inflation under control, while the political scandal surrounding former Prime Minister Tanaka erupted in late 1975, and Tanaka was arrested in 1976.

economic development.”²⁰ Fukuda directed an increase to the ODA budget for FY 1977, and in May, Japan announced its intention to double its ODA budget in the coming five years. In January 1978, Japan announced that all of its yen loans would be “untied,” and in July, it made its “first medium-term target for the ODA,” which shortened the period of doubling its budget from five years to three years. In subsequent years, Japan set several such targets and the amount of ODA increased substantially. In 1989, Japan became the top ODA funds provider in the world.

Along with the decision to expand ODA budgets, in August 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda elaborated his policy toward Southeast Asia in a speech given in Manila. He declared:

First, Japan, a nation committed to peace, rejects the role of a military power, and on that basis is resolved to contribute to the peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia, and of the world community.

Second, Japan, as a true friend of the countries of Southeast Asia, will do its best for consolidating the relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on “heart-to-heart” understanding with these countries, in wide-ranging fields covering not only political and economic areas but also social and cultural areas.

Third, Japan will be an equal partner of ASEAN and its member countries and cooperate positively with them in their own efforts to strengthen their solidarity and resilience, together with other nations of the like mind outside the region, while aiming at fostering a relationship based on mutual understanding with the nations of Indochina and will thus contribute to the building of peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia.²¹

This declaration was later to be called the “Fukuda Doctrine,” ideas repeatedly referred to by subsequent Japanese leaders.

An important development in Japan’s Asia policy was its decision to extend the ODA to China. As discussed above, China waived “reparations” from Japan when the two countries normalized their relations in 1972. China had maintained its position not to accept foreign aid until Deng Xiaoping came to power. When he visited China as Japan’s prime minister for the first time since normalization of relations in 1972, Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi, announced that Japan would extend large scale yen loans for infrastructure development. ODA support was not considered delayed reparations; Japan found that it was in its strategic best interest to support Deng Xiaoping’s modernization efforts under the Cold War. However, Ohira was deeply indebted to the “Chinese people’s great magnanimity,” and in his mind, ODA support needed to be more than a strategic calculation.

Japan, to accommodate US strategic interests, extended ODA to such countries as Pakistan and Turkey, but the major portion of Japan’s ODA went to the Asia–Pacific region, including China. As Fig. 3 indicates, Japan was the dominant donor to the Asia–Pacific in the 1980s to 1990s. Projects started as reparations, such as the Brantas River Basin Development in Indonesia, continued with the massive financial and

²⁰ “United States–Japan Joint Communique of Prime Minister Fukuda and President Carter,” March 22, 1977. <https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPUS/19770322.D1E.html>.

²¹ “Speech by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda,” August 18, 1977. <https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/docs/19770818.S1E.html>.




Fig. 3 Net ODA to Asia-Pacific

technical support of Japan's ODA, resulting in increased electricity production with huge irrigated areas suffering from fewer floods. Japan's ODA was the major source of funds and technical cooperation for the Development of the Eastern Seaboard, a major industrial complex that transformed Thailand into an industrial hub in Southeast Asia. Japanese ODA to China financed major infrastructure developments in the 1980s and 1990s. Though obviously not the only source of economic development in the Asia-Pacific, the Japanese ODA was at least one of the important factors that contributed to the economic miracle of the region (Tanaka 2017).

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The Rise of China in Asia



Rumi Aoyama

1 Asia and the Rise of China

1.1 *The Rise of China and the Asian Regional Order*

One of the most significant events in international affairs after the end of the Cold War is the rapid economic growth of China, an authoritarian state. Spanning 40 years, China has made remarkable progress, with an average double-digit economic growth rate. When the edict for reform and opening-up came in 1978, China's GDP was estimated at 364.5 billion yuan, and the GDP per capita was a mere 381 yuan. Nevertheless, some 30 years later, in 2010, the per capita GDP reached 29,762 yuan and the GDP reached 397,459 billion yuan (approximately 5 trillion US dollars), surpassing Japan and jumping to second globally after the US. Some forecasts suggest China's economy will overtake the US by 2031 at the earliest (Zhu and Orlik 2021). If China's economic growth continues, it will be the first time that an undemocratic nation has the greatest influence in the postwar international order.

In the process of power transitions, the risk of conflict and war is even more likely to increase. The prominent American international political scientist Graham Allison warns about the pattern of structural stress that results when a rising power challenges the incumbent power, which is the tendency described by the term the Thucydides Trap, a scenario that Allison urges to avoid (Allison 2017).

Although academic opinions differ greatly on how the rise of China will affect the international order, it can be summarized by the following three lines of thinking: first, some scholars argue that China is attempting to overturn the Western-led international order to fashion an order that excludes the West (Barma et al. 2009); second, some hold that while the American era of unipolarity may eventually come to an end, the US-led international order can remain dominant even while integrating a

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more powerful China (Ikenberry 2008); and third, others argue that China is both a supporter and reformer of the international order (Swaine 2016). In the midst of these debates, China itself takes the stance of being a “supporter and reformer of the international order,” and President Xi Jinping has frequently noted that the world order is not perfect, but it cannot be easily overturned.

Asia is probably the best region to analyze the dynamic pattern of China’s rise, and its regional and global impact. Asia is China’s backyard, the region first and most affected by China’s rise. Moreover, in addition to the strong influence the United States continues to exert over the Asia–Pacific region, a variety of other world and regional major powers—including the global power Russia, the world’s third largest economy Japan and emerging power India—are also clustered here, playing key roles in shaping the regional and global order. Thus, the Asian region harbors two simultaneous factors: the competition for global strategic advantage and the reestablishment of regional order.

More than 30 years after the end of the Cold War, while China’s rise is evident, it has not achieved absolute dominance in Asia and is still struggling to forge a regional order that works in its favor. The Asian region currently features three prominent characteristics. First, there is no regional economic integration movement that spans the entire Asian region, nor is there a regional institution like the European Union that spans most of Europe. Although there are the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in central Asia, the Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia, ASEAN in Southeast Asia, and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in South Asia, there is no single regional organization that sets the rules for political, security and economic development of the entire Asian region.

Second, among the numerous organizations in the Asian region, most are regional organizations for economic cooperation, while there are few regional organizations related to security (Pekkanen 2016). In February 2018, 11 countries, including Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Australia and Canada, signed the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership). Then, in November 2020, 15 countries, comprising ten ASEAN countries and Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP). As globalization declines around the world, the momentum for economic cooperation is increasing in the Asia–Pacific region. Even so, hopes for economic cooperation covering the entire Asian region remain unrealistic.

Third, while the US plays an important role in the security arena in Asia, China is beginning to play a central role in the economic sector (Feigenbaum and Manning 2013). This “dual hierarchy” or “dual dependence dilemma” in economy and security (Kato 2012) is another characteristic of the Asian regional order that accompanies the rise of China.

In sum, in Asia, where the rise of China is most evident, US dominance in the political-security arena remains, with various regional organizations wielding influence in the subregion. All of this amplifies the fact that China’s regional rise in Asia is uneven in terms of military, economic, diplomatic, and soft power.

1.2 *Competing Interpretations of the Nature of the Asian Order*

Why does the Asian region embody all three of these salient features as China became more influential? The mushrooming establishment of regional organizations in Asia is a result of institutional balancing in the region (He 2008) and the prominence of individual national strategies in effectively addressing regional issues (Pempel 2010). Furthermore, due to the existence of the “consociational security order” (Acharya 2014) in Asia, the reluctance of middle powers, which depend on the United States for security and on China for trade and economics, to adopt a full-scale balancing strategy against China acts as a restraint on the dynamics of the balance of power (Ikenberry 2016).

The question is whether the above explanatory variables enable lasting competitive coexistence between the US and China (Shambaugh 2018), or, as Mearsheimer argues, the rise of China cannot be peaceful, so will the middle powers of Asia eventually join the American camp (Mearsheimer 2010)?

This chapter explains the characteristics of the current Asian regional order from the perspective of China’s Asian policy after the end of the Cold War, and it verifies how the characteristics of the Asian regional order were created amidst Chinese policy and the reaction to China from Asian countries.

1.3 *What is China’s Asia Diplomacy?*

The term “Asia diplomacy” only appeared in Chinese foreign policy after the 2000s. For a long time after the founding of the country, China adopted an Asian-African policy. For a long time after the Cold War, “peripheral diplomacy” was a synonym for China’s Asia diplomacy. The term “periphery” has three geopolitical meanings in China. Asia in the narrow sense refers to the 14 neighboring countries that share land borders with China, and this is also referred to as the “narrow peripheral” (*xiao zhoubian*). Asia, in the broad sense, refers to a wide area from the Persian Gulf at the western end to the South Pacific region at the eastern end, and this is termed as the “grand peripheral” (*da zhoubian*).¹ Periphery as an intermediate concept refers to the four regions of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Central Asia. Although the policy category of “Asia diplomacy” is still not widely used in China, China’s peripheral diplomacy can be rearticulated as China’s Asia diplomacy.

Asia is a very hazy concept both geographically and culturally, and it is not always clear which countries can be called Asian ones. According to the definition of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Asia refers to a large

¹ Since the launch of the “Silk Road on Ice” (Northern Sea Route) in 2018, the North Pole tends to be included in the grand periphery of Asia.

Table 14.1 Asia and regional organizations

Region	Countries covered	Regional organizations
Northeast Asia	Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, North Korea	Six-Party Talks (North Korea, US, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea)
Southeast Asia	Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, The Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, East Timor	ASEAN (10 countries: Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, The Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos)
South Asia	India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives, Afghanistan	SAARC (8 countries: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives, Afghanistan)
Central Asia	Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan	SCO (8 countries: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan)

region consisting of 46 countries.² Based on this concept, this paper defines Asia as Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Central Asia in line with the reality of China's Asia diplomacy, which has gradually formed since the end of the Cold War. Hence, this paper analyzes 28 countries, including the Six-Party talks, ASEAN, SAARC and SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) participating countries (29 countries including China but excluding the US) (Table 14.1).

While China's presence in the region is growing rapidly, the strengthening of China's relations with its Asian neighbors has only really progressed since the end of the Cold War, which is a relatively new phenomenon. Looking back on the regional rise of China after the Cold War, it can be divided into the following three periods.

1. Improving and Establishing Diplomatic Relations (End of Cold War–1996)
2. China's Engagement Policy and its Rising Influence (1996–2006)
3. US-China Strategic Competition and China's Asia Policy (2006–Present)

Throughout these three periods, China's sphere of influence has shifted from the "narrow periphery" to the "grand periphery," and China is undergoing a transformation from a regional power to a global power, aiming to achieve global supremacy.

² The 46 countries in Asia are as follows: Afghanistan, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Palestine, Bahrain, Bhutan, North Korea, East Timor, the Philippines, Georgia, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Kyrgyz, Cambodia, Qatar, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Maldives, Malaysia, Mongolia, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Brunei, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Singapore, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Israel, India, Indonesia, Jordan, and Vietnam.

2 Improving and Establishing Diplomatic Relations (End of Cold War–1996)

China has been unswervingly proud of being an “Asian country,” but it did not begin to develop foreign policies specific to the Asian region until the 1990s. In the 1980s, adopting a reform and opening-up policy and positioning its own economic development as the most important policy issue, China emphasized relations with Japan and the developed nations of Europe and the US, devoting itself to the introduction of funds and technologies from those developed nations. This foreign policy turning point came shortly after the Tiananmen Square incident, when China cracked down on pro-democracy students. Economic sanctions against China by Western countries, including Japan, led China to recognize the importance of Asian and African countries, which had been neglected in Chinese foreign policy in the 1980s. To break international isolation, China turned to strengthening ties with Asian countries.

Immediately after the end of the Cold War, China adopted a foreign strategy consisting of four strategic pillars: peripheral diplomacy (“One Circle”: *yi quan*), diplomacy for developed nations (“One Line”: *yi lie*), diplomacy for developing nations (“One Area”: *yi pian*) and diplomacy for the US (“One Point”: *yi dian*). Since then, peripheral diplomacy has emerged as one of key components of China’s foreign strategy.

China’s strong interest in Asia is evident from the fact that it played a key role in maintaining financial stability during the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis by not devaluing the Chinese currency (Renminbi). In fact, China’s enormous efforts to improve relations with its neighboring countries began in 1990 with the normalization of diplomatic relations with Mongolia in May 1990, Indonesia in August 1990 and Vietnam in November 1991. Further, it established diplomatic relations with Singapore in October 1990, Brunei in September 1991, and South Korea in August 1992.

After cementing diplomatic relations, China began to demarcate its land borders, involving approximately 22,000 km of borders with 14 countries. In the 1960s, China signed border agreements with Myanmar (Burma at the time), Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan, North Korea and Mongolia. China again proceeded to conclude border agreements in the 1990s. Over the course of some ten years, China signed border agreements with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as land border agreements with Laos and Vietnam. To date, demarcation of about 90% of the border line covering 22,000 km has been completed.

In tandem with the work to establish land borders, China’s awareness of the sea (18,000 km of territorial waters) increased dramatically from the 1990s. In December 2000, China and Vietnam signed agreements on the maritime boundary for the Gulf of Tonkin and for Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). The median line principle was applied to these agreements. The question of possession in attributing the median line located on Bach Long Vi Island was not mentioned in the agreement for the maritime boundary for the Gulf of Tonkin, and the concept of “joint fishing area” was proposed by China and Vietnam in order to shelve this issue (Yang and Zhang 2002:

319). This border agreement with Vietnam is currently the first and only maritime border agreement that China has signed.

While instability in the domestic political situation may have brought about China's cooperative stance (Fravel 2008), the success of border demarcation negotiations has led to a dramatic expansion of trade between China and its neighbors as a result of deepening political relations. In this sense, China's peripheral diplomacy, which began in the early 1990s, has laid the foundation for political, economic, and cultural integration with its neighbors.

3 China's Engagement Policy and Its Rising Influence (1996–2006)

Whereas Western democracies have adopted a policy of engagement with China in the post-Cold War era, China has also commenced an active engagement policy in Asia since the latter half of the 1990s. Especially after the official decision of the National People's Congress in 2000 to "develop western China," relations with neighboring countries, which are a valuable source of energy and an important overseas market, have become increasingly important as a policy issue. Under these circumstances, a proactive diplomatic stance toward neighboring countries was ratified at the 16th Party Congress, making diplomacy in Asia the most important issue in foreign strategy. In the five-year diplomatic guidelines adopted at that congress, the first 20 years of the twenty-first century are regarded as a "strategic opportunity," with the tenets turned into the slogan: "big powers are the key; neighbors are paramount; developing countries are the foundation, and multilateral diplomacy is an important stage."

Since around 1996, several factors are entwined in the background of China's proactive diplomatic offensive in the Asian region. First are security factors. Since 1995, from the perspective of China, there have been a series of events that have shaken the very foundations of structural stability of Japan-US-China relations. In June 1995, US President Clinton allowed Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to visit the US, and in March 1996, China conducted a menacing missile military exercise in the Taiwan Strait during the first direct presidential election in Taiwan, raising tensions in US-China relations. Likewise, China's sense of crisis leapt in the wake of the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security—Alliance for the 21st Century signed by President Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in April 1996. China considered the strengthening of the Japan-US security setup in Asia in connection with the eastern expansion of NATO in Europe and was deeply concerned about being cordoned off by the US and the implications for the Taiwan issue. To disperse such concerns, China reviewed its foreign strategy, which places the greatest priority on the US, and commenced outright development of diplomacy in Asia.

Second, the growing membership of ASEAN to include Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997 as well as Cambodia in 1999. As its membership has expanded,

ASEAN has become physically adjacent to China, which has prompted China to focus on its strategy toward ASEAN.

Third is the takeoff of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) economic cooperation program. The GMS regional cooperation framework involving Yunnan, which started in 1992, was formed in 1996, and six priority projects were selected. Needless to say, the economic benefits that came with specific joint development were attractive to China.

From this period, China's influence in Asia expanded rapidly. This success was brought about by China's engagement strategy in Asian countries, which consists of the following three pillars.

3.1 Proactive Engagement in Asian Regional Organizations

In addition to the bilateral diplomacy in which China excels, China has been proactively participating in regional organizations in the Asian region since the latter half of the 1990s. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a framework for cooperation between China and Central Asian countries. The SCO began in 1996 as the "Shanghai Five" (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) with the aim of conducting border demarcation negotiations and was upgraded to a permanent organization, the SCO, in June 2001. SCO's participating members, including observers and dialogue partners, have now expanded to the Indian Ocean and Eastern Europe.

China has been actively promoting security and economic cooperation in the SCO initiative, and through the SCO it has significantly expanded its presence in Central Asia, a region in which it previously had little influence. While China is now an important trading partner for all SCO countries, Russia remains the dominant security player in the region. China's security cooperation with the SCO countries is limited to activities centered on border control and counterterrorism.

Since the latter half of the 1990s, China is also proactively striving to galvanize relations with Southeast Asian countries. A major obstacle to promoting such relations is the issue of sovereignty over the South China Sea. To resolve this obstacle, in 1997, China entered into a good-neighbor and mutual trust partnership with ASEAN countries oriented toward the twenty-first century and, in 2002, signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in The South China Sea as a step toward peacefully resolving the sovereignty issue of the South China Sea. Additionally, in August 2003, at the ASEAN-China Summit, a joint declaration on strategic partnership for peace and prosperity was signed. With this, China became the first foreign country to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. This series of agreements undoubtedly promoted political trust between the two sides.

During the Asian financial crisis of 1997, China's policy of not devaluing the yuan helped the economic stability of Southeast Asian countries, rapidly bolstering China's presence in Southeast Asia. The image of China in Southeast Asian countries has gradually shifted from a security threat to an economic opportunity.

In Northeast Asia, China presided over the Six-Party Talks and proactively engaged in mediation and diplomacy. In China, at the time, there was very little support for the Six-Party Talks within top-level discussion on North Korea's nuclear development. Yet, the US attack on Iraq from 20 March 2003 gave a significant boost to the Chinese government's decision to host the Six-Party Talks. In the same month, US President George W. Bush revealed the possibility of armed confrontation in response to the North Korean nuclear threat. Against this backdrop, North Korea is increasingly seen as the Far East's version of Iraq. Thus, unlike the first nuclear crisis, concerns about the logic of a first strike applied to North Korea were spreading widely not only in Japan and South Korea, but also in China (Rozman 2007). This concern eventually prompted China to agree to hold the three-day Six-Party Talks in China from 27 until 29 August 2003.

After efforts to build relations in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and Central Asia, China has turned to engage with neighboring SAARC in the mid of 2000s. At the 13th SAARC Summit in November 2005, China and Japan were approved as observers at the same time. Nepal strongly supported observer status for China, but India pushed for Japan's participation as an observer to counter China. The penetrative influence of China in South Asia (where India is robustly influential) lags behind compared with other Asian regions.

Thus, by participating in the various regional organizations in Asia, China's influence permeated all of Asia.

3.2 Promotion of Economic Integration in Asia Centered on China

One of the vital strategies for establishing China's superiority in the Asian region was the construction of an FTA area centered on China, which was, in real terms, Asian economic integration. China's Premier Zhu Rongji proposed an FTA to ASEAN countries in 2000, and in 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao proposed an FTA to SCO. China also bolstered relations with SAARC and proactively developed diplomacy in Asia with the idea of strengthening economic relations through multilateral cooperation. In fact, ACFTA (ASEAN China Free Trade Agreement) came into effect in 2010,³ while the FTA offered by China to the SCO is currently unlikely. Nevertheless, if the economic integration strategy to promote the rise of China evolves smoothly, a huge China-based FTA will emerge in Asia, forming a unified Asian market mediated by China.

In addition to GMS, China is also focusing on subregional economic partnerships, such as development of the Tumen River region and a CAREC (Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation) initiative spearheaded by the ADB. Although the latter two projects have stagnated due to North Korea's nuclear development and the Eastern

³ An FTA with countries that later joined ASEAN came into effect in 2015.

Turkistan Islamic Movement in Central Asia, relations between China and Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand have made great strides via GMS.

Even though China's foreign strategy promoted since the 2000s has not lived up to its expectations, the construction of an FTA area centered on China is still being undertaken as one of its important strategic goals.

3.3 Consolidating Relations and Building Military Cooperation via Non-Traditional Security

During this period, China strengthened interaction with neighboring countries in the field of non-traditional security and promoted substantial military exchanges to consolidate security relations. What is noteworthy here is that the proposal of China's new security concept played an important role in promoting security ties between China and Asian countries. Coupled with a strategic shift toward focusing on Asia, China raised the new security concept in the latter half of the 1990s and presented a position paper on it at the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) foreign ministers' meeting in July 2002. This new security concept emphasizes cooperative and comprehensive security, and by tacitly acknowledging the hub-and-spokes security system led by the US, many Asian countries have found it possible to cooperate with China.

Amidst minimal military interaction with Asian countries, China is consolidating military relations via joint patrols, anti-terrorism activities, protection of sea routes, humanitarian and disaster assistance, and peacekeeping operations (Aoyama 2013). According to Japan's Annual Defence White Paper, China is conducting joint patrols with Russia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Vietnam and other countries in border areas. Additionally, China, Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand are working on drug control in the Golden Triangle with some success. Moreover, China regularly holds joint military exercises geared to anti-terrorism and maritime rescue with SCO countries, such as Pakistan, India, Thailand, and Indonesia.

Indeed, the cooperation of the four countries of China, Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand in the Golden Triangle is remarkable and has had some success, too. The task-force has been formed since 2000, and the cooperation of the four countries on drug control continues.⁴

Through these non-traditional security engagement policies, China sought to build substantial military interaction with Asian countries while avoiding conflict with the US.

⁴ "China to enhance cooperation with ASEAN on drug control," Xinhua, August 31, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-08/31/c_137431662.htm

4 US-China Strategic Competition and China's Asia Policy

Since the latter half of the 2000s, China, which had been steadily deepening relations with Asian countries, revised its Asia policy based on the doctrine of “hide one’s capabilities and bide one’s time” (*taoguang yanghui*). Under these conditions, the geopolitical regional environment surrounding the rise of China has also changed significantly. As globalization declines around the world, the momentum for economic cooperation is increasing in the Asian-Pacific region. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on the Pacific Rim Partnership (CPTPP) came into effect in December 2018, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement came into effect in January 2022. Conversely, with the rise of China, strategic competition between China and regional powers, such as Japan and India, has escalated, while the US has also adopted a robust policy toward China to consolidate its strategic primacy.

4.1 A Confident Turning Point in China's Foreign Policy

China's foreign policy came to a turning point in 2006. At the central foreign affairs work conference held in August 2006, China clearly stressed the importance of sovereignty and security, and sought national interests in economic development, sovereignty, and security (Aoyama 2013). The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1994) triggered China into redefining national interests. UNCLOS introduced a new EEZ, setting the deadline for submitting application documents as 12 May 2009 for all countries. In view of that deadline, from around 2006, China added “national sovereignty and security” as a new national interest in addition to conventional economic development. Since then, China stresses foreign policy that contributes to national sovereignty, security, and development of interests, and it takes a strong stance on core national interests, such as maritime issues.

Since redefining national interests, the conflict between China and other countries⁵ involved in the South China Sea issue is escalating. On 12 July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, Netherlands, ruled that China's claim of sovereignty in the South China Sea had no legal basis. Nevertheless, China remains obdurate on the issue of maritime territorial disputes, deeming territorial rights of the South China Sea as being outside the jurisdiction of the court of arbitration and issuing a statement ignoring the ruling.

Even the Senkaku Islands issue, stifled by the governments of Japan and China since the normalization of Japan–China diplomatic relations (Fravel 2010), has suddenly flared up. Following the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands by the

⁵ Regarding the South China Sea, China is in conflict with the six countries/regions of Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Taiwan.

Japanese government in 2012, the Chinese government announced in 2013 the establishment of an air defense identification zone over a wide area of the East China Sea, including the sky above the Senkaku Islands, hence mutual distrust is intensifying.

In an effort to transform itself into a maritime nation, China is implementing an Anti-Access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy and is now using it in an attempt to pierce the second island chain⁶ connecting the Izu Islands to Guam and Papua New Guinea. Since 2013, China is undertaking reclamation work on seven islands in the South China Sea, including Mischief Reef and Fiery Cross Reef, installing control towers, radar equipment, runways and storage facilities capable of accommodating fighter jets and the deployment of surface-to-air missiles.⁷ Thus, China is bolstering its effective control in the East China Sea and South China Sea under the Xi Jinping regime's policy of not conceding any inch of territory in territorial disputes.⁸ Not only does China send navy and coastguard vessels to patrol regularly, but it is also pursuing gray-zone tactics using private fishing vessels.

China is also discussing a binding code of conduct (COC) framework with ASEAN countries. In March 2017, China and ASEAN member countries compiled a draft code of conduct for the South China Sea. However, amidst the intensifying conflict between the US and China, COC negotiations have been deadlocked since 2019, without a settlement on eliminating foreign countries as China intended.

It is also worth noting that the Tibet and Xinjiang cases further boosted China's sovereignty-focused foreign policy. The outbreak of Tibetan unrest occurred on 14 March 2008, while the Urumqi riots in Xinjiang took place on 5 July 2009 (Urumqi 7-5 riots). Both incidents occurred while China was celebrating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the country, so the mood was for greater emphasis on national unity and sovereignty, thus China strengthened oppressive policies in the regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. Then, in June 2020, China introduced the "Hong Kong national security law" and discarded the "one country, two systems" principle, which should have remained in place to maintain the capitalist system and lifestyle of the people of Hong Kong for 50 years after its return to mainland China.

4.2 *China's Belt and Road Initiative*

China's foreign policy has undergone a further shift since Xi Jinping took power. He announced the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative in September 2013 and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative in October 2013, which are the two pillars of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Via BRI, China seeks to expand its influence

⁶ The first island chain is a line connecting Kyushu, Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines.

⁷ For further information, see Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative website, at Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, USA. See also Testimony by Gregory B. Polling, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 20, 2020.

⁸ It is called "never compromise or give up an inch of soil on a matter of principle (原則問題上寸步不讓、寸土不讓)" BBC, 「习近平中共党校讲话强调“丢掉幻想、勇于斗争”为何引发关注？」 September 6, 2021, available at <https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-58435149>

in the international community through cooperation in areas such as logistics, trade, finance, politics and thinktanks with the countries involved in the BRI.

China's strategic rationale underpinning the BRI is extremely ambivalent. Although the Chinese government has not officially stated that the US is in decline, it has acknowledged since around 2017 that the world will undergo a once-in-a-century transformation (Swaine 2021). And, regarding the future international order, the perception that the US and China are moving toward a bipolar international system is becoming mainstream in China. According to the prominent scholar Yan Xuetong, in ten years, the GDP of any given country will be less than half or a quarter of the US and China, and he envisages the world to be a place where these two superpowers compete.

Furthermore, there is also a deep-seated sense of crisis in the Chinese government about the survival of the communist regime. A Chinese diplomacy white paper first mentioned "safety diplomacy" in 2010, and at the first meeting of the Central State Security Committee held in April 2014, President Xi Jinping further introduced the concept of "overall national security (Zhang 2016)," appealing for the ensuring of "human security, political security, economic security, military, cultural and societal security" in the socialist national system. Amid concerns about the security of the system, China's foreign policy has become more ideological, and economic self-reliance is now greatly emphasized.

4.3 Characteristics of China's Foreign Strategy Since 2006

The BRI sets the strategic goal of creating an area of influence centered on China. In 2016, the Chinese government submitted the "Green BRI", and, in October 2020, it submitted the "Dual Circulation" strategy at the 5th plenary meeting of the 19th CPC Central Committee to promote the digital yuan, making the building of a digital economic zone through financial cooperation and e-commerce an important policy issue.

China's foreign policy, which has been gradually changing since 2006, has the following five characteristics. First, since 2006, China has focused on "south-south cooperation," which strengthens cooperation with developing countries. The main constituent countries of the BRI are developing countries, and the construction of a digital economic zone and a Green BRI are being promoted via the galvanization of relations with those developing countries.

Second, especially since the 2010s, China has been focusing on establishing an organization centered on itself. Following the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) launched in July 2015, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) opened in January 2016. And, to counter the Shangri-La Dialogue Summit staged by the UK-founded International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), China launched the Xiangshan Forum. Also, proactively involved in the development of the GMS since the 1990s, China established in 2016 its counter organization, the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, which it spearheads.

Third, economic integration has become an important pillar of China's foreign strategy. The construction of an FTA network centered on China along the BRI is also being incorporated into China's 13th Five-Year Plan. China believes the rules of the CPTPP, Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) and Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) will become global standards from here on, so it is aware that it ought to also proactively adopt the rules that govern the TPP, EPA and other such agreements (Ka and Shen 2013: 56–7). The Chinese government also recognizes that it needs to take measures to address issues, such as negative list, Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), intellectual property, environmental protection, worker protection and state-owned enterprise policies, with the aim of the policies being to build a broad, advanced-level FTA. Against this background, China officially applied to become a member of the CPTPP in September 2021.

Fourth, since its founding, China has consistently dangled its huge markets as carrots and used them to strengthen political relations with other countries, but in recent years, it has used its increased economic power as a stick to punish the actions of other countries. Now it frequently imposes economic sanctions on policies of other countries that are not in line with its own national interests—for instance, rare earth export sanction against Japan after a fishing boat collision in the waters near the Senkaku Islands; import restrictions on Philippine bananas as part of the standoff between Manila and Beijing over the Scarborough Shoals (commonly known as the China-Philippine Banana War), and a ban on tour-group travel to South Korea as economic retaliation against South Korea for deploying US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles.

Fifth, while focusing on foreign interaction centered on non-traditional security, China is also trying to play a role in security in the Asian region. It is actively developing diplomacy over the upkeep of stability in the area around Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US troops and in the handling of the Rohingya issue.

5 Strategic Competition Between China and the United States and the Future of Regional Order in Asia

After the Obama administration's pivot back to Asia policy from 2011 onward, the US gradually strengthened its policy of deterrence toward China. Under the Trump administration, which advocated the US first principle, the US-China trade war intensified. The Biden administration, which expresses the view that Western democracies are competing with a dictatorship, is strengthening the cohesion of democracies and building various international frameworks to counter China.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), a framework for discussing security and economics in which Japan, the US, Australia, and India participate, covers seven fields: global health, infrastructure, climate change, human interaction and education, important emerging technologies, cyber security and space. On 15 September 2021, AUKUS, a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the UK, and the US, got

underway. To counter China's BRI, the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) is focusing on (1) trade; (2) supply chains; (3) clean energy, decarbonization, and infrastructure; and (4) tax and anti-corruption.

On top of the Quad, AUKUS, IPEF and other such initiatives, the Biden administration and its allies are promoting the exclusion of Chinese telecom companies and Chinese manufactured telecommunications equipment from their networks, building a semiconductor supply chain and strengthening cooperation in forming common standards related to areas such as trade practices, AI and cyber security, which are all handled in China without being based on market economies.

Conversely, as the annexation of Crimea worsens the relations between Russia and Western countries, China-Russia relations are swiftly warming. In 2015, China and Russia signed a joint statement on cooperation between the China-led Silk Road Economic Belt and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), with the cooperation agreement on economic trade between China and the EAEU coming into effect in October 2019. Cooperation between the two countries has been strengthened by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the escalating rivalry between the United States and China.

Currently, the two countries are cooperating not only in energy and infrastructure, but also in a wide range of fields, such as data communication, e-commerce, space and Arctic development. In June 2021, they announced that they would extend the treaty of good-neighborliness and friendly cooperation for five years, and they also signed a military cooperation agreement (five years) in November 2021. Under these circumstances, the SCO spearheaded by China and Russia expanded further, and in 2021, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar became dialogue partners of the SCO.

And Southeast Asian countries have not relaxed their stance of balanced diplomacy to strengthen relations with the US and China. In June 2019, the AOIP (ASEAN Outlook on Indo Pacific) was announced, with emphasis placed on ASEAN centrality, and in October 2021, ASEAN simultaneously upgraded its relations with China and Australia to full strategic partnerships.

Hence, especially since the Trump administration, strategic competition has escalated between the US and China, giving notice of the end of the era of "parallel resurgence" (Goh 2013). Now, in the Asian region, the US-Japan-led Free and Open Indo Pacific (FOIP) and the China-led BRI are being simultaneously promoted, and, while the Quad countries are strengthening relations, China and Russia are getting closer to each other at the same time. The US is putting pressure on China through its ties with democracies, but China is trying to expand its influence in partnerships with developing countries.

In addition to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, issues in the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea and South China Sea as well as the mercurial situation in Afghanistan have created a fluid security environment in the Asian region. Under these circumstances, the head of Pacific Command in March 2021, Admiral Philip S. Davidson, warned that the risk of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan within the next

seven years is extremely high,⁹ which in turn triggered a debate on how the Taiwan Strait is “The most dangerous place on Earth,”¹⁰ hence, the security of the Taiwan Strait too has surfaced as an important issue in Asia.

The American foreign strategy and Chinese foreign strategy are synchronized in a stance of emphasizing ideology and economic security over strategic superiority. Nonetheless, economic decoupling of the two blocs (US and China) is not easy, and the trend of economic integration and security conflict are progressing simultaneously. Needless to say, this is also due to the direction China’s foreign policy. The foreign strategies that the US and China are aiming at contradicts the status quo of regional economic partnerships, and the role of steering a course for the Asian regional order is instead being taken up by the ASEAN and other middle powers.

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⁹ “China could invade Taiwan in next six years, top US admiral warns,” *The Guardian*, March 10, 2021.

¹⁰ “The most dangerous place on Earth” *The Economist*, May 1st, 2021.

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Opposition and Cooperation: The Asia Pacific After the Cold War



Ryo Sahashi

Over the past three decades, the Asia Pacific saw the gradual erosion of hope for cooperation that initially budded with the end of the Cold War. Instead, opposition between major powers and neighboring nations became notable. The goal of this chapter is to clarify major currents within the entire region and the overall composition encircling the specific points of opposition, such as the international relations surrounding the flashpoints that made long-standing crises in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. Before getting into the details, it is worthwhile to point out the major characteristics of the region that ran throughout this entire period.

First, U.S. presence is preeminent. The U.S. continued to entrench regional engagement based in predominant power and the forward deployment of military strength. And by adjusting and revising the San Francisco System that took form during the Cold War (Calder 2004), the U.S. was able to wield strong influence in the region even after the end of global rivalry. However, the U.S. did not always have a constant clear vision regarding the formation of regional order. While the U.S. did stand out from other nations in proclaiming political values like liberalism, democracy, and the rule of law, the U.S. also took many actions that contradicted this in consideration of strategic benefit, such as supporting political leaders who could not be called democratic. Also, the U.S. has often reacted to the development of events. From the late 2010s, Washington reviewed its engagement policy with China since reconciliation in the 1970s, which has deepened distrust of Beijing and fear of its technological growth. As a result, a new rivalry between the U.S. and China emerged, and it largely influenced political and social economic relationships in the region.

Second, the rise of China has resulted in a clear change in the power balance of this region. China was not even 10% of the U.S. nominal GDP in 1990 but rose to the level of 50% in 2011 and 70% in 2021. China not only became the world's factory, but it also became the world's market, and its economic power leads the world. In the global value chain, China has risen to displaying a presence second

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only to the U.S. Its scientific and technological expertise also grew rapidly, and from the mid-2010s onward, its number of journal articles in cutting edge fields has become comparable to that of the U.S. It has also inflated its military budget. The modernized People's Liberation Army has come to possess a level of power that overwhelms its neighbors through naval and air strength, missile capabilities, and cutting-edge technology. Against this backdrop, the political influence of China is also growing, particularly in surrounding areas such as Southeast and Central Asia, not to mention the world stage as well. (An analysis spotlighting China is explored in chapter "[Japan's Economic Growth and Engagement in Asia](#)".)

Third, in the late twentieth century, Japan, which was defeated in the Asia Pacific War, rose to become the strongest power in Asia and the second strongest economic power in the world, and it strengthened its economic and diplomatic involvement in the region. In recent years, with Japan's power relatively low compared to both the U.S. and China, debate has been divided on just how much Japan's political influence and presence can sway international relations in the region. However, Japan is gradually rethinking its previously cautious diplomatic stance and is increasing its presence not only in the economic sphere, but also in terms of security as well. While Japan has practiced caution towards the rising power of China and North Korean nuclear missiles and participated in international operations such as Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and the counter-piracy task force, Japan has also modernized the capabilities of its Self-Defense Forces, even revising the legal platforms concerning its so-called Peace Constitution and expanded its sphere of military and police action throughout the world. Its economic diplomacy, through providing economic aid and promoting free trade, is also vigorous, and its political influence in the region is still large.

Fourth, in this region, emerging market-based countries, also called middle powers, have come to employ a large amount of influence in the formation of regional order. These are nations such as Australia, India, Indonesia, and South Korea. As the fifth point, there are numerous regional institutions in Asia. The viability of regional cooperation achievable by these groups is loose compared to Europe, but the formation of forums presupposing consensus building among nations, as exemplified by ASEAN, can also be considered to provide a different model for international collaboration. (This point will be explored in the chapter "[Regional Concepts and Regionalism in Asia](#)").

Sixth, domestic politics and governance capacity face many obstacles. Not only is nationalism on the rise following the worldwide trend, there are still now many countries in which democracy and civil liberties are restricted, and there are also many countries that have backed down from a certain level of free and democratic society. Furthermore, while the governance capacity of central and local governments was generally low in the region, it is hard to say that it has been sufficiently strengthened even following economic growth. Large disparity in the development rates inside nations still persists. There are places where the feebleness of governance capacity is robbing governments of the ability to handle largescale disasters and transmittable disease pandemics. (The problem of democracy is discussed in chapter "[The Cold War in Asia After 1953](#)".) There are even cases where because governance capacity

is weak, countries allow an adjacent major power the ability to exercise policing power, and problems related to sovereignty have arisen.

Seventh, enduring rivalries define international relations in Asia. Continued political opposition arises from differences in opinions related to the demarcation of territory and historical perceptions. For this region, major examples include Japan–China relations, Japan–South Korea relations, China–India relations, and India–Pakistan relations. In China–South Korea relations as well, friction has arisen in recent years. After democratization in Taiwan, the Taiwanese identity is growing even stronger. South Korea and North Korea recently engaged in dialogue, but this fell apart. It is definitely true that U.S.–China opposition is a major theme in recent Asian international relations, but rival relationships between local nations is still a major opposition axis.

In this chapter, the development of regional critical problems will be presented in chronological order. First, throughout the gradual end of the Cold War from the 1980s to the 1990s, the region experienced economic growth and the democratization of the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. Regional institutions for security cooperation were explored through efforts such as the recognition of South Korea as a nation by China and Russia. The region as a whole saw a plentitude of bright hope for the future. Moving forward, this chapter will consider the deepening of opposition between nations that developed from the 1990s onward by looking at the examples of the Taiwan Strait and North Korea nuclear crises and the South China Sea territorial disputes. Furthermore, friction between major powers grew in intensity between the U.S. and China and between Japan and China. The bitterness therein would continue to grow in the late 2010s.

1 The End of the Cold War in Asia

1.1 Formation of Cooperation: The 1980s to the 1990s

From the 1980s through the 1990s, positive currents were seen to a level that justified an optimistic view of the future in Asia. Economic growth was actualized, and the fruits of this were extending throughout Asian society. As seen in The World Bank's (1993) publication of "The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy," growth in various Asian countries was astonishing up to the mid-1990s. And this was not all. In the late 1980s, democratization was accomplished in the Philippines and South Korea, and martial law was lifted in Taiwan. There was also hope for political development as well. In Cambodia, peaceful general elections were held after a long period of conflict.

Furthermore, many new systems were proposed to ensure peace and prosperity in the region, and some of these were actualized. Led by Australia and Japan, Asia Pacific nations gathered to establish a new body toward an open, free trade-oriented

institution, and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was created. In addition, amidst an atmosphere of Cold War tensions relaxing in Asia, countries like Russia, the U.S., and Japan explored new security collaborations. Proposals from and regional diplomacy by Japanese Foreign Affairs Minister Taro Nakayama bore fruit in the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Concerning the manifold positive changes that came to Asia after the U.S.-Soviet Cold War ended, Amitav Acharya accurately summarizes: “Asian security was shaped by economic nationalism, security bilateralism, and political authoritarianism. These have gradually but unmistakably given way to market liberalism and economic interdependence, security multilateralism (coexisting with US-centric bilateralism) and growing political pluralism” (Acharya 2014).

Politicians of the time felt that positive, elevated atmosphere as well. Minister of Foreign Affairs Yohei Kono, who was present at the establishment of ARF in July 1994, expressed the following candidly.

In the economic sphere, the Asia-Pacific region has achieved dynamic growth benefiting from diversity and liberation and has developed interdependent relationships one step at a time. Meanwhile, in the sphere of security, because the peoples, religions, and ideologies are diverse in the Asia-Pacific region, and because there are many threat concerns as well, unlike Europe for example, the difficulty of advancing talks in a region-wide manner has been the topic of repeated discussions. It is true that in regions which have seen continued unrest and opposition, just a few years ago starting region-wide political and security related talks was nothing more than a mere dream ... ARF is a historical opportunity arising within that kind of rise in awareness.

In Asia, the end of the Cold War did not eliminate problems sparked by security concerns and political conflict. First of all, after normalization of their relationship in 1979, the U.S. and China deepened their full-fledged economic, security, and technological cooperation in the 1980s, together with Japan and the European nations. When the Tiananmen Incident occurred in 1989, the differences in political values between China and Western nations became clear. However, due to a hope for Chinese economic growth and political reform in the future, there were repeated efforts to stabilize U.S.–China relations. The uncertainty of China’s future remained a problem as its economic power rose in the 1990s. Second, the structure of differing political bodies vying over legitimacy of control in the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait continued even after the Cold War. In fact, growth and democratization in South Korea and Taiwan altered the identity of people there, and the problems actually increased in complexity. Third, democratization and growth of civil society seen across the entire Asian region accelerated friction revolving around historical perceptions as represented by the tensions seen in Japan–South Korea relations.

Even still, it is also an undeniable truth that in this era, cooperation in Asia did grow and relations between nations were relatively stable. Not only did democratization spread, but also large-scale wars between nations did not occur, and numerous frameworks formed for new international cooperation in military, economy, and financial arenas. Another factor is, the U.S. was once again accepted by countries in the region as a force to actualize stabilization in the region. For example, when U.S. military presence in the Subic Bay of Luzon Island became problematic due to politics

within the Philippines, Singapore decided to provide an alternative location to ensure continued U.S. military presence in the region. Japan, which was located within the region, did not serve that kind of a role, and the rivalry with China dragged down Japan's leadership power (Goh 2013). The regional economy was deeply connected by the division of production processes, and the migration of people became energetic. It is true that there were many challenges, but hope for peaceful order was not lost for this region.

1.2 The Seeds of Conflict: The 1990s to the Early 2000s

From the 1990s onward, there were incidents that pointed to the uncertainty of stability and prosperity in East Asia. North Korea nuclear missile development, the Taiwan Strait crisis (1995–1996), and the Asian financial crisis are all good examples of this. Territorial disputes and competition for military superiority following economic development rang alarms indicating a potential to destabilize the order of this region. There was enduring rivalry and a wall of mistrust among nations, which prevented them from negotiating toward comprehensive solutions. The global structure of the Cold War had partially contributed to such relationships, but the indigenous background in each case can explain the long-lasting existence of problems and the difficulty of concessions.

1.2.1 The North Korean Nuclear Missile Problem

Around the time the Cold War ended, a new current started to flow through the Korean Peninsula. South Korea was suffering under the repressive politics of the Chun Doo-hwan regime, and forces seeking democratization began forming a coalition. There was also pressure from the international community, including the U.S., and in 1987, the constitution was revised to allow direct presidential elections. Roh Tae-woo was elected as the first president after democratization. Against the backdrop of economic growth and the preparation of an international environment, including improvement of relations with China and the Soviet Union as Northern Diplomacy, Roh Tae-woo explored beneficial negotiations with North Korea. Diplomatic relations were successfully normalized between South Korea and the USSR in 1990 and between South Korea and China in 1992. And partially thanks to persuasion by China, the North and South were simultaneously granted membership to the United Nations in 1991. North Korea, which understood the implications of the dramatic changes in the international environment due to the end of the Cold War, was amenable to foreign diplomacy with South Korea and participated in repeated high-level talks between the North and South. The results of this culminated in the “Inter-Korea Basic Agreement.” This was a landmark agreement stating that each side would recognize the political system of the other, stop actions to overthrow the other, and

promote mutual interaction. A joint declaration regarding the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was also made during this period.

However, this positive atmosphere in the Korean Peninsula was swept away by suspicions of nuclear development in North Korea. North Korea had already been involved in nuclear cooperation with the USSR since the 1950s. According to American intelligence agencies, North Korea embarked on its operation of a nuclear facility in the Yongbyon area in the 1980s, and it was assessed that plans were advanced to include plutonium reprocessing for weapons development. It is highly likely that even during this period, North Korea had already started viewing nuclear arms as an important means for surviving within an environment of international isolation. North Korea joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 and agreed to safeguard measures with IAEA in January 1992. IAEA began having more serious suspicions starting with an inspection in 1992 and requested an unusual special inspection in 1993. This was also backed by the United Nations Security Council. However, amidst the restarting of Team Spirit, the U.S. and South Korea joint military exercise, which had not been executed the prior year, North Korea declared a withdrawal from the NPT. This was partially an attempt by North Korea to force the U.S. into talks. The U.S. and North Korea held repeated high-level talks in New York and Geneva as an attempt to find common ground. However, in March 1994, North Korea refused a follow up IAEA inspection. And with UN sanctions becoming a potential reality, the North Korean representative declared, "If there is a war, Seoul will become a sea of fire." Furthermore, in May, North Korea publicly announced that it extracted nuclear fuel rods. Tensions reached an all-time peak.

But why was there such a strong concern that North Korea may possess nuclear weapons? The reason is that the North Korean secretive political system and the actual existence of covert operations, which had been repeatedly carried out up to that point, had sparked a fear of possible North Korean nuclear arms possession. This was not only a concern to the U.S., but across the entire world. U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry considered it a top priority to do whatever they could to prevent North Korea from obtaining nuclear arms and recalls that he believed a surgical strike against North Korean nuclear facilities was absolutely necessary even if masses of civilians were caught up in a North Korean counterattack. In the face of that imagined massive scale of devastation, President Clinton did not put this plan into action. Nonetheless, U.S. forces at that time systemically prepared for the outbreak of war, taking measures such as updating weaponry deployed in the Korean Peninsula and convening high level meetings among military officials.

An ease to tensions came suddenly. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter visited North Korea without a strong push from the Clinton administration and intervened between the two governments. In response to Carter reaching out, President Clinton requested actions such as freezing nuclear development and Kim Il-sung agreed to some basic concessions, including promises to allow IAEA inspectors back into North Korea to resume operations for monitoring equipment. Immediately after, the demise of Kim Il-sung was announced. Nevertheless, in October 1994, "The Agreed Framework" was formed, the supply of light-water reactors and heavy oil was planned, and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)

was established to implement the agreement. At the time, it was thought that this arrangement would halt nuclear development for the time being (Oberdorfer and Carlin 2014).

South Korea was not able to display leadership during the central point of the crisis, but after the Kim Young-sam administration proposed a four-party dialogue framework, the Kim Dae-jung administration actualized an engagement policy. This is also called the Sunshine Policy, and the core concepts are the regulation of military provocation, a renunciation of attempts to absorb and unify the North and South, and the promotion of amicability between the South and North. Meanwhile, in the U.S., Perry was reappointed to the role of special envoy at the request of the president, where he began the Perry Process. He applied a comprehensive approach while forming a foundation made up of the coalition of Japan, the U.S., and South Korea through shuttle diplomacy. And regarding the missile problem, he also expanded negotiations there as well. North Korea also responded by sending an envoy to the U.S., its highest military officer who was also the third highest official in North Korea, to announce a joint U.S.-North Korea communique. Following this, U.S. Secretary of State Albright visited North Korea. In these ways, international relations were on a positive footing. Towards the end of his administration, President Bill Clinton prioritized Middle Eastern peace negotiations and did not visit North Korea. However, an Inter-Korean summit was held. The North–South Joint Declaration envisioned the construction of a long-lasting relationship. Plans including a Kaesong Industrial Region initiative and Mount Kumgang tourism initiative were promised. And it became a groundbreaking turn that would actualize the strengthening of economic and social relations.

1.2.2 Taiwan Strait Crisis

After the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1979, both the U.S. and China strove to maintain a stable relationship. The U.S. had discovered the strategic value of China in resistance against the USSR and the stabilizing of Asian international relations, and it freely gave aid to support modernization in China. As seen in its response to the Tiananmen Incident, the U.S. did not renounce engagement with China, even when relationship-building was strained over issues such as human rights. Instead, it continued a policy of stabilization in diplomatic relations across multiple U.S. administrations. In the 1990s, the relationship between China and Taiwan was strained over the Taiwan Strait, and the U.S. was forced to respond. While both China and the U.S. flaunted military strength amidst an increase in tensions, a military clash was ultimately avoided. Hope for beneficial outcomes in both American industry and Chinese business, coupled with a strong desire for change in China, resulted in the U.S. continuing to aim for a stabilized relationship with China after the crisis. This bore the fruit of both China and Taiwan being admitted near-simultaneously to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001 and January 2002 respectively.

The event that served as the direct trigger for the Taiwan Strait crisis was a June 1995 visit to the U.S. by President of the Republic of China Lee Teng-hui, who was

scheduled to speak at his alma mater Cornell University. He attempted to expand Taiwan's presence in the international space and change the approach in Washington political circles regarding cross-strait relations from the 1970s. When strong support from the U.S. legislature resulted in both houses of Congress passing a resolution to ask the President to let Lee Teng-hui to make a private visit, the Clinton administration had no choice but to approve the visa. China displayed a bitter reaction to Lee Teng-hui's U.S. visit, aborted government talks with the U.S., recalled her Ambassador from Washington, and delayed approval for the U.S. Ambassador to Beijing. In the subsequent month (July 21–26), China conducted largescale military drills in the East China Sea, in the northern area of Taiwan's maritime territory, that included firing DF-15 and DF-21 missiles. Earlier that year President Jiang Zemin had offered the Eight-Point Proposal and had taken a positive stance towards cross-straits talks. However, his distrust deepened due to the actions of Taiwan and the U.S., and he developed a hardline stance.

Both the U.S. and China worked to calm the situation, and diplomatic efforts brought temporary stabilization to the relationship by autumn. However, in the winter, both China and the U.S. ramped up military activity in the Taiwan Strait, including the Fujian coastal area. Then, with the March 1996 Republic of China presidential election approaching in Taiwan, the situation became even more tense. China commenced military drills that included the firing of DF-15 missiles landing several dozen kilometers off the ports of Kaohsiung City in southern Taiwan and Keelung City in northeastern Taiwan. Additionally, China mobilized the People's Liberation Army, about 150,000 troops. The U.S. was outraged, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry told the Communist Party delegation visiting the U.S. that this would bring "grave consequences." Furthermore, the U.S. dispatched two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait in an effort to clearly communicate the U.S. administration's position of opposition. China's desire was to close off any active foreign diplomacy by Lee Teng-hui that attempted to expand Taiwan's international space. And China believed the U.S. government response to Chinese action would not be more than mild, so it chose to implement a threatening message through military strength. The U.S. hardline response exceeded China's expectations. To avoid creating the impression that its actions were restricted by threats from other nations like China, and to avoid suffering a resulting blow to their own credibility, the US ultimately chose a path of strong action to show its resolve (Ross 2000). Incidentally, in October 1995, leadership from the People's Liberation Army commented to a former high-level government official in the U.S., "Would you sacrifice Los Angeles to protect Taiwan?" However, apparently the threat of nuclear attack by China was not taken seriously.

After the Taiwan presidential election was completed, neither China nor the U.S. took any new action, and the crisis cooled. Afterwards, the U.S. put even more effort into managing its relationship with China and simultaneously started putting pressure on both China and the democratized Taiwan to avoid breaking down stability in the Taiwan Strait. This crisis should not be seen as a successful case of military threat from China. Instead, it was a continuation of the unchanged American China strategy to avoid conflicts in East Asia. The Clinton administration put more value on directly engaging with China, rather than being cautious, and claimed that if China took steps

to join the international community, universal values would spread within the nation. While visiting China in 1998, President Clinton publicly announced his “Three No’s.” In 1999, an accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade occurred, but permanency of the most-favored-nation trade status of China was enshrined in law, and China’s advance towards WTO membership progressed.

The origin of the 1995–1996 crisis was generated through the democratic process of Taiwan and differed from a past that had culminated out of crises born from Chiang Kai-shek’s dream of a counteroffensive toward mainland China and mobilization by the People’s Liberation Army (Garver 1997). Mutual mistrust formed a foundation of suspicion in which responses only pushed the crisis into progressively dangerous territory. However, it cannot be said that any of the three parties involved foresaw at the time how dramatically the situation would change, or what the cost would be of military action. In the end, the crisis ended with the conclusion of the election as a thankful gift. While U.S. efforts contributed partially to hamper further deterioration of the situation, both sides were satisfied to display their military strength. However, this was not the result of a shared diplomatic effort on the part of the U.S. and China, nor did it signify any effect of restraining war though an interdependent relationship.

As seen in the examples of North Korea and the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. played the role of actualizing a stability in the region that nations like Japan and China could not achieve. It is true, of course, that in the Asian financial crisis, Japan was a key part of the process, and China, as well, did start increasing its presence in the region together with its economic growth. The Japanese proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund was halted by opposition from the U.S. and Chinese ambivalence, but Japan worked to stabilize currency in Asian countries, and this effort was deployed as the New Miyazawa Initiative. Furthermore, Japan, China, and South Korea formed the group “ASEAN Plus Three” (APT), and Southeast Asian regionalism and Northeast Asian leading countries strengthened ties in a quest for stability and prosperity in the region. Even still, the American role was critical both militarily and in terms of diplomatic negotiation on the economic front through APEC and bilateral negotiations. Japan possessed preeminent economic strength in the region and exercised political influence in times when it promoted regional cooperation from behind the scenes. However, friction over historical perceptions had already begun to form with a democratized South Korea.

2 Arising Frictions: The 2000s to the Early 2010s

Following the September 11 attacks in 2001 and the onset of the “War on Terror,” not only did allied nations such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea intensify their security collaboration with the United States, but Singapore and Thailand also enhanced their security cooperation. Counter-terrorism efforts are a significant concern in Southeast Asia, leading to increased collaboration with the U.S. in this area. Regionally, the U.S. placing importance on the anti-terrorism war would also bring criticism for the resultant perceived lack of focus on Asia diplomacy. Entering the

twenty-first century, economic growth in the various Asian countries was significant. Supply chains grew across Asia, region-internal trade was invigorated, and the individual nations became strongly linked to the global value chain. There were significant aspects of Chinese economic growth, but in addition to this, many economies throughout Asia experienced growth. Countries that became wealthy simultaneously increased their military budgets, and arms trade aimed at Asia rapidly accelerated.

Though the global financial crisis sparked by the American subprime loan problem tied up the world economy, the Chinese economy was able to escape that fate with extraordinary speed through immense fiscal spending. This left an imbalance in the domestic Chinese economy from preferable treatment to state enterprises, but externally there was an increase in the severity of conflict revolving around maritime security and surrounding nations in a fashion that could reflect Chinese overconfidence in its power.¹ Regional frameworks such as the East Asia Summit, including both the U.S. and China were actively deployed, but power politics in East Asia gradually became rocky.

2.1 Maritime Security Sharpens

Conflict over maritime territory in Asia grew in severity. This first started arising around the South China Sea, for which conflicting international claims overlapped in complicated ways. Immediately after the Chinese government was established, it claimed sovereignty over the South China Sea, but when its military strength increased and opportunity arose from the movements of other major powers, it began taking concrete steps. After U.S. forces withdrew from South Vietnam, in 1974, China expelled South Vietnam forces from the Paracel Islands and seized the entire territory. Also, after China-Soviet relations improved, in 1988, China clashed with Vietnam and obtained territory including the Fiery Cross Reef. In 1992, China established the territorial waters law. This act claimed as Chinese territory the South China Sea and the Japanese Senkaku Islands (the Diaoyu Islands), and it also made unique claims that differed from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (formed in 1994). Thus, the territorial waters law seemed to foreshadow subsequent conflict between China, the surrounding areas, and even the U.S. as well.

From the late 2000s onward, China strengthened its forays into the sea. The background elements behind this are cited as a deepening desire for maritime interests, to gain resources and energy following economic growth and to secure sea shipping lanes due to an increase in trade, and also newly built confidence as U.S. strength began to weaken. Using maritime law enforcement agencies, China strengthened actions claiming sovereignty over Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan as well. ASEAN nations began to worry, and maritime problems came to be frequently

¹ The debate continues over whether China's experience during the Global Financial Crisis resulted in increased overconfidence and assertiveness. For a more in-depth analysis, refer to A.I. Johnston (2013). The author expresses gratitude to Mon Madomitsu for highlighting this aspect.

brought up in regional frameworks led by ASEAN. Meanwhile, the U.S. under the Obama administration announced its pivot to Asia and began moving to increase diplomatic influence. In this effort, the U.S. used the maritime problems as a rare opportunity to strengthen relationships with ASEAN nations.

Japan and China experienced deepening political conflict revolving around resource development in the East China Sea and the Senkaku Islands. In 2010, when a Chinese fishing ship collided with a Japan Coast Guard patrol boat and was seized, the governments of both countries entered into intense negotiations revolving around the release of the Chinese ship captain. Furthermore, in 2012, the Chinese government forcefully protested against the Japanese government nationalizing some of the Senkaku Islands and began to repeatedly penetrate marine territory with government boats in the Senkaku area, which was effectively controlled by the Japanese government. Japan transitioned from a government predominantly led by the Liberal Democratic Party, which had been in power for many years, to one led by the Democratic Party. This change was a significant factor behind the inability to properly manage relations with China (Sahashi 2015). Afterward, even when relations between Japan and China stabilized, action by Chinese government ships and aircraft in the Senkaku area remained active (Sunohara 2020).

In the South China Sea, starting from around the end of 2013, what are referred to as artificial islands were constructed by China from massive landfills in the Spratly Islands. Moreover, the construction of military facilities was gradually confirmed through satellite photographs. Additionally, People's Liberation Army exercises intensified, and pressure on surrounding nations also increased. In response, diplomatic resistance from other countries in the region also increased. For example, the government of the Philippines initiated an arbitral tribunal that was established based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the 2016 ruling for that arbitration generally dismissed China's claims. The U.S. government stance towards China started to become hardline. Towards the end of the Obama administration, it publicly announced the Freedom of Navigation Operations and began to clearly demonstrate a stance of not accepting China's claims. Additionally, the U.S. and Japan started providing aid to strengthen the maritime security of nations in the region. However, economic ties with China became important to each nation, and the composition of international relations made cooperating with the opposition difficult to navigate.

2.2 Strengthening the American Ally Network

After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. revised its alliances with Japan and Australia. The cooling of relations with Japan over trade friction was an issue of concern, but with the Korean Peninsula crisis serving as a motivating opportunity, both governments developed closer relations, and in 1996, the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security was issued. In the same year, the U.S. and Australia also reaffirmed the importance of their alliance through the Sydney Statement. In addition to the clear

purpose of security cooperation for the Korean Peninsula threat, uncertainty about the future regional balance and factors such as China's growth also served as background for the U.S. decision to pursue maintaining alliances. And, as touched on above, the War on Terror also reminded the U.S. of the importance of allied nations and partners.

To make an even more complex network out of the hub-and-spokes structure with the U.S. as the hub, from the 2000s onward, actions to strengthen cooperation among the spokes increased. Japan, Australia, and India strengthened intra-spokes security cooperation. Additionally, unallied Southeast Asian nations started increasing cooperation with the U.S., Japan, and Australia as maritime security became an issue.

The Obama administration called for a rebalancing policy toward Asia, but it cannot be said that the administration had gone all the way up to envisioning measures to cut off Chinese growth. By strengthening bilateral alliances and enhancing cooperative relationships among a small number of nations called minilateralism, and by advancing cooperation even with unallied Southeast Asia nations, the U.S. formed an advantageous network. This allowed the U.S. to gently increase their ability to curb China. It should be thus said that the U.S. was acting to apply pressure on China to assimilate into the existing international order. However, starting right about this time, the debate in China became critical towards the actions of the U.S. In particular, the discussion in favor of strengthening partnerships with surrounding nations gained momentum in Chinese academic circles. Additionally, amidst growing distrust towards the U.S., the Xi Jinping administration began to put out feelers for exploring a new international order (Lim 2020).

2.3 The Second North Korea Crisis

The 1990s North Korea nuclear crisis appeared to have been resolved. And, under a stabilized international environment, in September 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited North Korea, shook hands with Chair of National Defense Commission Kim Jong-il, and the governments of both nations released the Pyongyang Declaration. However, that next month, the North Korean government failed to deny U.S. diplomatic officials' suspicions of an uranium enrichment program, and once again suspicion of North Korean nuclear capabilities became a destabilizing element in the region. The George W. Bush administration was already in disagreement with the Clinton administration's framework, and at Bush's State of the Union Address in early 2002, he placed North Korea in the Axis of Evil along with Iraq and Iran. The U.S. halted energy aid to North Korea, and in 2003, North Korea once again declared that it would withdraw from NPT.

Crisis tensions increased, but the U.S. was pursuing the Global War on Terror and did not have much leeway to act. A Six-Party Talks framework commenced under the leadership of China, including North Korea, South Korea, the U.S., Japan, and Russia. After the Fourth Round in 2005, a Joint Statement was issued. North Korea promised to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. For its part,

the U.S. assured that it had no intent to attack North Korea. It seemed as if stability had been reached, but when the strongly suspicious U.S. instituted sanctions on the Macau-based bank Banco Delta Asia (BDA), which was North Korea's financing source, North Korea rebelled. In addition to implementing a missile firing test in 2006, it finally conducted its first nuclear test.

Afterwards, there were times when both the U.S. and North Korea showed a willingness to compromise, and the Bush administration lifted both its BDA sanctions and its designation on North Korea as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. However, North Korea did not abandon nuclear missile development. It conducted its second nuclear test in 2009, its third nuclear test in 2013, and then three more times between 2016 and 2017. Additionally, North Korea conducted tests on long-range missiles with artificial satellites, showing that its missile technology is overall very advanced. In 2010, the Cheonan sinking incident and the Yeonpyeong Island bombardment incident occurred, repeatedly stretching tensions between North and South Korea.

Even after Kim Jong-un took over as the new leader in North Korea, the situation did not change. In fact, when the Libyan Gaddafi regime, which had stopped its nuclear development program in the past, was overthrown, North Korea took this as a lesson and strengthened its resolve to possess nuclear capacity. The U.S. did not wish to be disturbed by brinkmanship policy with North Korea and instead maintained an approach of strategic patience, which values waiting for economic sanctions to have sufficient effect to motivate them into negotiations. However, North Korean development kept advancing. And towards the end of the Obama administration in 2016, the U.S. saw North Korean nuclear and missile development as a grave threat. When the Trump administration began to develop even more concern over the potential of intercontinental missiles with a firing range that could reach the U.S. mainland, the U.S. strengthened its hardline stance.

3 Increasing Force of Opposition and the Continuing Search for Cooperation

After passing through 2020, international relations in the Asia–Pacific region experienced not only an escalation of rivalry between the U.S. and China and continuing nuclear missile development in North Korea, but also the strain of severe impact to the economy and society by the coronavirus pandemic. And national border issues continued to remain unstable, as seen in the 2020 clashes along the China-India border that incurred deadly casualties. The interests of the involved nations were in opposition, caught between both Japan and China, in disputes over the South China Sea, and places like Sabah. There were also non-traditional security issues, including human trafficking, piracy, terrorist actions, and the inability of governments to effectively counter them.

Therein, we may ask, what will happen to the future of peace and prosperity in the region? What country will shoulder the important role of fostering peace and

prosperity? In other words, will the players be major powers like the U.S. and China, or will change be actualized by the efforts of cooperation and institution-building by the regional states?

3.1 The U.S.–China Relationship and Their Contest of Power

From 2014 through 2016, numerous cyber-attack incidents thought to have originated in China occurred on U.S. government facilities and businesses. Moreover, in the South China Sea, China installed a landfill in rock reef areas by constructing an artificial island and started work to turn it into military bases. This resulted in increased tensions over territorial claims. Because of these factors, the U.S. gradually developed a growing hardline stance towards China. The U.S. responded by deploying the Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea and increasing aid to allies and partner nations. Concerns were growing that China was in the process of developing the capability to inhibit U.S. military actions in the Western Pacific region, and this was also thought to pose the possibility of severe impact to U.S. alliances. Support for America's previous mainstream policy of engagement with China was also weakening. The Obama administration had, up to that point, favored a position of deepening regional involvement while valuing dialogue with China, but it began to display a transition to a policy that valued more hardline pressure on China. Meanwhile, China did not change its existing policy regarding territory sovereignty and maritime interests.

During the Trump administration, U.S.–China relations changed dramatically. Initially, U.S.–China leadership talks were held in April 2017 with a visit to the U.S. by General Secretary Xi Jinping, and the U.S.–China comprehensive dialogue was newly established. Expectations even existed for China to play a role in resolving the problem of North Korea advancing with nuclear missile development. However, by 2018, a change in U.S.–China relations was becoming apparent. In an effort to eliminate a massive trade deficit, the Trump administration strengthened pressure on China, and from July onward both countries began to retaliate against each other by expanding tariff targets. Moreover, in addition to Chinese military expansion, its political maneuverings towards other foreign nations and technology thefts from U.S. companies and universities also garnered attention. Awareness also spread of China beginning to close in on the U.S. in terms of science and technological capabilities. The U.S. under the Trump administration began to lay down laws and regulations restricting exports to China, the usage of Chinese goods, and investments and the inflow of people from China. The Chinese government continued talks aimed at stabilizing their relationship with the U.S., and this led to the Phase One deal of trade talks with President Trump. However, diplomatic efforts failed in settling down the deep-rooted distrust between the two nations. Suspicions of human rights violations in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and the decrease of civil liberties in Hong Kong led to an acceleration of an anti-China stance in the U.S., particularly in 2020 after the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic.

Both the U.S. and China are dissolving economic dependence on each other and strengthening policy to enhance their own competitiveness in innovation. The U.S. is attempting to respond by increasing not only its military budget, but also its science and technology budget as well, and it is also strengthening its industrial policy. China has accepted the need to renew itself from a long-term perspective and is making an entire nation backed effort to advance growth in science and technology. In addition, it is commanding an acceleration of national defense buildup and strategic deterrence capability. In the public opinion within both countries, harsh stances towards the other are surfacing.

In consideration of the globalized economic social structure, global environmental and health problems, and the necessity to manage the high risk of military clashes for both nations, Beijing and Washington will probably maintain dialogue and explore paths to stabilized relations. However, when looking at U.S.–China relations in the long-term, it is most likely that neither party will be able to set aside mistrust of the other, and both will most likely act to maintain even just a small edge over the other in terms of competitiveness in science and technology, military might, and political influence. The difference in political values between both the U.S. and China are clear, and China is growing more concerned over American alliance strengthening and its closer ties to Taiwan. The U.S. under the Biden administration is basically maintaining the stance of the Trump administration in that it considers China the only competitor against the international system.

This U.S.–China rivalry is necessarily beginning to vastly impact the region and global order. ASEAN countries are taking a position called hedging and maintaining policies of not taking sides between the U.S. or China while simultaneously working to take leadership in regional order and rulemaking. Meanwhile, the U.S. and its allied nations have made clear their policy of strengthening ties in the form of bilateralism and minilateralism. Not only is the U.S. strengthening its direct partner alliances to Japan and Australia, in 2021, AUKUS was formed between the U.S., Australia, and the United Kingdom as a new security cooperation framework. Furthermore, the QUAD framework between Japan, the U.S., Australia, and India has taken to frequently holding leadership talks. The U.S. has come to recognize not only the importance of Taiwan geopolitically, but also its economic importance as well, and has started strengthening its relationship with Taiwan without much reservation. Regarding the relationships between nations in Asia, frameworks of security cooperation between nations have become closer knit and more diverse than ever before. However, as to whether this will lead to stability in the region, that is still not known.

3.2 Crisis Revolving Around North Korea

In 2017, President Trump displayed strong interest in the North Korea nuclear missile problem, and within the U.S. government, a limited military strike proposal was considered. Increasingly concerned over the deteriorating situation, South Korea's Moon Jae-in administration moved for mediation diplomacy between Trump and

North Korea's Chair of State Affairs Commission Kim Jong-un. In the spring of 2018, an Inter-Korean summit was held at Pyongyang, soon followed by the U.S.–North Korean Summit in Singapore. North and South Korea went so far as to sign a landmark military pact. However, regarding the U.S.–North Korea relationship, the Hanoi Summit of the subsequent year ended inconclusively, and while the leaders of both countries did meet again at Panmunjom in the DMZ, the Trump administration withdrew without any notable advancements in U.S.–North Korea relations. Moving forward, North Korean missile development continued, and capability was increasingly significant. South Korean government exploration of North and South Korean relations ultimately could not break through the situation.

Considering the significance of nuclear arms to the North Korean government from a security viewpoint, it is clear that the road to denuclearization is steep. And in fact, when one looks back on the North Korea crisis spanning the past 30 years, it is doubtful if any lost opportunities existed that could have created a situation in which North Korea did not possess nuclear arms. In 2008, North Korea performatively demolished part of its Yongbyon nuclear facilities. But countless other nuclear facilities remain in the country, and many scientists and technicians are involved in the work, with some nuclear warheads already completed and stored. Even if North Korea agreed to denuclearization, there are many obstacles to just how that would even be achieved.

3.3 An Active Japanese Security Policy

Japan pressed forward with economic growth during the time overlapping with the Cold War era and secured the economic strength of the second strongest economic power in the world. However, militarily, Japan had an allied relationship with the U.S. And while it did establish U.S. military bases on Japanese territory, it continued to have a passive stance militarily. But from the 1990s onward, Japan started to engage in active international contribution. This was not limited to beefing up economic aid, but also seen in efforts such as United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in places like Cambodia and dispatching the Japanese Self-Defense Forces overseas for disaster relief. Simultaneously, with the continuation of crises breaking out in nearby areas such as the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, Japan continued to place importance on its alliance with the U.S. even after the end of the Cold War. And in 1996, a joint declaration from both heads of state was issued. This was also called a reaffirmation of the Japan-US alliance.

Entering the twenty-first century, in addition to a long period of economic stagnation referred to as the lost decade, Japan experienced domestic political turbulence and an absence of leadership. Most notable, the prime minister changed six times in six years from 2006. This also contributed to Japanese diplomacy losing influence in Asia. Moreover, domestic nationalism in Japan rose, and due in part to a similar rise in nationalism in China and South Korea as well, control became difficult in Japan–China relations and Japan–South Korea relations, not only in terms of the

governments but also in terms of the sentiment of the populaces. As a rare long-lasting administration, the Shinzo Abe administration governed Japan from the 2012 until 2020. During this time, Japan clarified its diplomatic policy of a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), strengthened its alliance with the U.S., proclaimed the importance of forming rules founded in the promotion of free trade, and simultaneously strove to repair its relations with China and South Korea. However, escalation of the U.S.–China competition placed Japan in a difficult diplomatic position because, like other countries in Asia and around the world, it had deep political and economic ties to both countries.

Despite the change in leadership, the administrations following Abe have continued to prioritize relations with the United States, centering their policies on traditional security and economic security. Particularly, under the administration of Fumio Kishida, a revision of the National Security Strategy was undertaken in 2022, which included a rapid increase in defense spending and the adoption of counter-strike capabilities, as well as the unveiling of advanced concepts in cyber and space strategies. These moves can be attributed to the domestic political vulnerabilities of Prime Minister Kishida and his pursuit of political survival. It is also likely due to a significant shift in security consciousness within Japan following the Ukraine war, accompanied by increasing concerns regarding the future of security in East Asia (Teraoka and Sahashi 2024).

Furthermore, Japan–South Korea relations were difficult to repair, with both sides demanding concessions from the other related to historical problems. However, with the emergence of a conservative government in South Korea in 2022, Japan–South Korea relations rapidly improved. Supported strongly by the United States, a trilateral summit among Japan, the U.S., and South Korea was held at Camp David in August 2023, during which an unprecedented level of cooperation in security was promised.

3.4 The Asia–Pacific Region After the Coronavirus Pandemic

The regional economy in the Asia–Pacific formed via a global value chain that was sturdily assembled through the frequent traffic of people and intermediate material trade. Japan and China were not the only advanced scientific, technological, and production hubs. Instead, these hubs were sprinkled throughout the entire Asian region. However, with the spread of the coronavirus, a growing authoritarian strain crossed national borders at the same time people experienced difficulty traveling. Furthermore, with the continuance of U.S.–China rivalry, revisions to supply chain networks begins to be needed.

As to the question of whether the Asia–Pacific region could continue to act as the engine for the world economy, the answer rests not only in the power of growing economies such as China, but also on whether or not the free trade system can grow. The U.S. withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), but even after this, action in the region arose in the form of Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement of Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and Regional Comprehensive

Economic Partnership (RCEP). Meanwhile, there is an increase in unfair trade practices such as digital localization efforts and industry subsidies. Amidst a wobbling WTO system, the question of whether or not liberalization can advance in this region rests in the question of whether or not the major powers, including the U.S. and China, can form and comply with agreements.

The future of this region is becoming increasingly more influenced by geopolitical elements. The U.S. and Japan have brought forth the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific and are displaying efforts to actualize a balance of power against China and place value on the existing liberal international order. Meanwhile, with the hope to maintain a peaceful and mutually beneficial order in the Asia-Pacific region, there are many countries that desire protection against the U.S.–China power competition impacting the region. The ASEAN nations are a classic example of this, but not the only one. Furthermore, one viewpoint is that China exudes a larger impact on its surrounding adjacent area, the mainland, while the U.S. maintains more influence among the region's maritime nations. However, most countries firmly distance themselves from the contest of power between the U.S. and China as much as possible.

The formation of order is not accomplished only by major powers, but also constructed through the conduct of the many nations who participate therein. If the influence of ASEAN, and nations like Japan and South Korea, grows even stronger, a new order and set of rules in the region will surely arise while conflicts restrained. Should the United States experience a rapid decline in credibility in its foreign strategy due to changes in leadership, resulting in a loss of influence, the weakening and confusion of the Asia Pacific order would likely accelerate further.

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Regional Concepts and Regionalism in Asia



Mie Oba

Regionalism is an ambiguous term, so it is necessary to first define its meaning with reference to the current existing research (Hurrell 1995; Gamble and Payne 1996; Pempel 2005). In this chapter, “regionalism” is used to describe a situation where multiple states located in a given geographical scope promote coordination of policies and regional cooperation in an effort to attain peace and prosperity within the region in question. It is a political orientation that develops a “cohesion” that is more than a mere gathering of states. Hence, regionalism is a concept that indicates a process where actual cooperation and policy coordination are being promoted by states under such an orientation. Further, regionalism is not limited to the conclusion of regional trade agreements (RTAs) or free trade agreements (FTAs) but may include cooperation in a wide range of fields, such as politics and security as well as culture and society. Regionalism should be distinguished from “regionalization,” which is defined as a process that leads to a deeper degree of economic interdependence within this area.

Asia has been dominated by various conflicts, rivalries, competitions, antagonisms, and divisions. Nonetheless, even under such circumstances, various forms of regionalism have developed, and solidarity and coalition between nations have been sought based on them, leading to the formation of a number of regional institutions.

This chapter deals with what kind of ideas on regionalism have been advocated in Asia, how regionalism was actually promoted, what kind of regional institutions were established, and what kind of activities were developed there. It will also discuss the reasons why various kinds of regionalism have developed and how a lot of regional institutions were established even in regions such as Asia where conflicts are unremitting.

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1 History of Regionalism in Asia

1.1 *Independence Intent and Cold War Factors*

Since before the war, the emergence of regionalism has been seen in forms such as the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), a non-governmental regional organization established in 1925. IPR was a non-governmental regional institution in the Pacific during the interwar period and one of the pioneers of regionalism in the region (Kata-giri 2003). Additionally, Japan advocated regional ideas, such as the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” (Gotou 1995). Yet, the advent of regionalism, promoted by sovereign states on at least formally equal footing, had to wait until after World War II.

As the Japanese empire collapsed in defeat and the order of the Asian region changed drastically, the move to decolonize each region accelerated, bringing about the birth of various newly independent states in each region, even as some aspects of the Cold War had repercussive influences that entangled Asia. Under such circumstances, early Asian regionalism was strongly influenced by two factors: the desire of each Asian country for autonomy and the strategic choice of each to deal with turbulent regional circumstances caused by the Cold War.

In 1947, the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), the first intergovernmental international organization in Asia, was established (Wightman 1963). In 1950, the Colombo Plan was established as a framework for developed countries in the (British) Commonwealth of Nations, such as Australia, to support the underdeveloped regions of Asia under the idea of preventing the spread and penetration of communism in Asia (Watanabe 2014). Support for this idea gained momentum as the US in 1951, and Japan in 1952, joined the Colombo Plan. Likewise, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was established after the First Indochina War, was a regional security alliance that was strongly encouraged because of the Cold War (Fenton 2012). However, SEATO’s joint defense obligations were vague, and in fact, it hardly functioned during the 1960 Laos Crisis and the subsequent Vietnam War.

In the 1960s, inspired by the European integration that evolved throughout the 1950s, regionalism became particularly vigorous in non-European countries, such as Latin America, Africa, and Asia. In 1961, Thailand, the Federation of Malaya, and the Philippines formed the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) with the aim of economic, social, and cultural cooperation. In 1963, the Federation of Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia agreed to establish the Maphilindo. However, both of these groupings collapsed amidst a territorial dispute over Sava and the conflict over the formation of Malaysia.

The “hot wars” of the Cold War in Asia, such as the outbreak of the Vietnam War, boosted the tendency for a type of regionalism that aims to counter the threat of communism. The Asia–Pacific Council (ASPAC) was established in 1996, prompted by the proposal of South Korean President Park Chung-hee. Due to the efforts of

countries such as Japan, Thailand, and Australia to dilute the anti-communist orientation that ASPAC had at the outset, the cooperative content shifted to economic, social, and cultural cooperation (Oba 2004, pp. 195–204). The Ministerial Conference for Economic Development of South-East Asia was first held in 1966 as a framework for Japan's support for anti-communist countries and countries closing to the western camp (Oba 2004, p. 98; Hoshiro 2008, pp. 249–258). However, ASPAC collapsed in response to drastic changes in the strategic environment due to the China-US rapprochement in 1972 (Oba 2004, pp. 219–220). The Ministerial Conference for Economic Development of Southeast Asia also halted its activities in the early 1970s (Oba 2004, pp. 98–100; Hoshiro 2008, pp. 298–299).

1.2 Establishment and Development of ASEAN

Many of the above institutions were short-lived. However, the institution established in those times that survives to this day, and since those times has become the core of Asian regionalism, is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was founded in August 1967 by five countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

While ASEAN highlighted economic, social, and cultural cooperation, its true purpose was exceedingly political (Yamakage 1991, pp. 111–115). The initial intention was for anti-communist (pro-Western bloc) countries to unite and counter the threat of communism. Leaders of ASEAN's original member countries shared the objective of preventing the penetration of communism domestically in their countries and in the Southeast Asian region. Even more important was the stabilization of relations between the founding ASEAN states. Conflicts continued between these countries from the early-to-mid 1960s, including the mackerel issue, the armed confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, and the independence of Singapore from Malaysia. Hence, there was a need for a mechanism to stabilize their own relationships. Acharya (2001, pp. 4–8) argues that the process of advancing cooperation among ASEAN countries are leading to the construction of a regional "security community" in this region.

At the time of its inception, the internal and external assessments and expectations of ASEAN were not high; yet, after that, ASEAN overcame the crisis that brought about an order change in the Southeast Asian region and deepened and expanded cooperation. Following the communization of the Indochina Peninsula in 1975, the first ASEAN Summit was held in February 1976, and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord was adopted, proclaiming cooperation in various fields, such as politics, economy, society, and culture. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), which was signed at the same time, included ASEAN's norms and rules, such as respect for national sovereignty, non-intervention in domestic affairs, peaceful resolutions of disputes, and the renunciation of the use of force. These norms and rules were later collectively referred to as the "ASEAN Way," along with

practices such as maintaining informality and making consensus-based decisions (Acharya 2001, p. 61; Severino 2006, pp. 35–37).

The “ASEAN Way” has enabled ASEAN to partially maintain solidarity and unity among the various member states. And, as will be described later, such efforts have facilitated the expansion of ASEAN. Conversely, the more emphasized the principle of national sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs, the more limited the cooperative content that can be agreed upon, and the more difficult it is for practical cooperation to proceed.

1.3 The Emergence of Asia–Pacific Regionalism

In the 1960s, Pacific cooperation became a hot topic, and private organizations were established, such as the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) in 1967 and the Pacific Trade Development Council (PAFTAD) in 1968 (Woods 1993). In November 1979, the advisory study group to Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira advocated a Pacific basin community, the Pacific Rim Solidarity Initiative (Oba 2004, pp. 266–271; Tian 2013a). Taking the opportunity afforded by this idea, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC), consisting of industry, government, and academia, was established in the early 1980s (Oba 2004, pp. 272–284; Tian 2013b). Again, in the 1980s, the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC), bringing together ASEAN and ASEAN dialogue countries, functioned as a framework for informal government-level dialogue on politics and economics in the Asia–Pacific region.

Asia–Pacific regionalism has become even more active since the mid-1980s. Foremost, it was stimulated by the renewed intensification of regionalism in North America and Europe. Moreover, since the Plaza Accord in 1985, Japanese investment in Asian NIEs and ASEAN countries of the day (6 countries) has increased, and many Japanese companies have relocated their production bases to the ASEAN region, which has deepened and expanded the borderless production network (Hatch and Kozo 1996). Driven by this, the economic interdependence of East Asia has intensified, East Asia has received a great deal of attention as a growth center, and the recognition that cooperation for sustaining its development is necessary and has been strengthened in each country concerned.

In addition, the US intensified its protectionist trade policies. We strongly pressured Asian countries, including Japan, Asian NIEs, and ASEAN countries, to open their market to reduce the trade deficit of the US. These Asian countries were seriously annoyed by the US’s intense pressure. They began to plan a forum to talk about trade, economics, and other Pacific-wide issues to mitigate trade frictions (Ravenhill 2001; Oba 2004, p. 314).

Under these new circumstances, Japan and Australia took initiatives that led to the November 1989 launch of Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). APEC’s “open regionalism” aims to be a regionalism that contributes to the liberalization

of the world by implying that APEC extended its trade liberalization to any non-APEC member countries on a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis (Ravenhill 2001, p. 165). This open regionalism was instrumental in showcasing the characteristics of Asia–Pacific regionalism at that time.

2 Intensification of Regionalism During the Post-Cold War Period

2.1 Regionalism and the End of the Cold War

The drastic changes in the strategic environment following the end of the Cold War in 1989 acted as a factor in activating regionalism in various parts of the world (Fawcett 1995, p. 17). Asia was no exception. Although the threat of full-scale nuclear war disappeared due to the retreat of the Soviet Union, the question of how to incorporate China, which had been isolated internationally after the Tiananmen Square incident, and the USSR/Russia, into the regional order has come to be recognized as a serious issue. While the conflict over ideology has been resolved, threats such as the possibility of regional and local conflicts, terrorism, and cross-border crime have gained recognition. The end of the Cold War also meant that capitalism and market economies had defeated socialism and planned (command) economies. Hence, the idea that it is advantageous to promote economic cooperation aiming at development in the market economy has been given greater credence. In order to construct a stable and prosperous new regional order in the changing regional circumstances mentioned above, various movements to promote regionalism appeared in Asia.

2.2 Rapid Development of Asia–Pacific Regionalism

In response to alterations in the strategic environment due to the end of the Cold War, as early as 1990, Canada and Australia advocated the establishment of an organization in Asia similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In 1991, Japan's Foreign Minister, Taro Nakayama, made a proposal to utilize ASEAN-PMC as a framework for dialogue in the new era. In the end, in July 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established (Katsumata 2009). It was the first political and security cooperation and dialogue organization in the Asia Pacific region. At the second ARF in 1995, it was declared that this organization would be placed at the core of ASEAN and operate in accordance with the consensus-oriented ASEAN style, and it would deepen cooperation via three steps: (1) trust building, (2) preventive diplomacy, and (3) cooperative security.

APEC also expanded and developed after the end of the Cold War. In 1991, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong simultaneously joined APEC. Additionally, the US put its

hope on APEC as an organization that would achieve liberalization of trade and investment, which created the direct momentum for an attempt to provide support that led to the rapid institutionalization of APEC. A manifestation of this was the first APEC Economic Leaders' Summit hosted by the US as the chair of APEC in 1993.

While some countries, such as the US and Australia (following in the wake of the US), tried to accelerate APEC cooperation as an organization to speed up liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment, other ASEAN countries strongly opposed such acceleration because they did not want rapid economic liberalization. However, at the second APEC Leaders' Summit presided over by Indonesia in 1994, the "Bogor Declaration" was adopted with time-frame goals for APEC members: developed countries to fulfill trade liberalization by 2010 and developing countries by 2020. At the time, this was regarded as a groundbreaking agreement. (Kikuchi 1995; Ravenhill 2001; Oba 2014, p. 113).

2.3 Stalling of Asia–Pacific Regionalism

Nevertheless, since the mid-1990s, Asia–Pacific regionalism has lost momentum. A serious problem was the actual effectiveness of Asia–Pacific regional institutions. ARF surely includes various countries, some of which had serious conflicts with each other, like India and Pakistan. North Korea, which does not join a few regional institutions, also joined ARF. Inclusiveness of ARF comes from its strictly following principles of respect for national sovereignty, non-interference, consensus decision-making, and informalism, which are the core elements of the "ASEAN Way." However, because of such a soft and informal approach to institutionalization, ARF could not produce concrete results through dialogue and cooperation in the traditional field of security, which is directly related to the individual interests of each country. Hence, ARF has focused on cooperation in non-traditional security, where agreement is relatively easy to reach. ARF has often been ridiculed as a place to "talk shop" because its work does not go beyond dialogue and exchange of opinion.

APEC also showed its limits. At the Osaka APEC in 1995, it was agreed that liberalization of trade and investment should be promoted voluntarily while flexibly considering the circumstances of each country, and it was confirmed that trade liberalization in APEC would be promoted by an informal and non-binding procedure (Oba 2014, p. 115). Since many member countries opposed strengthening the binding force of APEC and the directional shift to promoting rule-driven liberalization of its forum, settling on such a policy was unavoidable. However, the momentum to promote substantial liberalization with APEC was lost. Finalization of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations in 1994 and the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 also made APEC relatively less important (Oba 2014, p. 115). Moreover, the lack of any real response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis further reduced confidence in APEC (Ravenhill 2001).

3 Emergence and Rapid Development of East Asian Regionalism

As the Asia–Pacific regionalism to bring peace and prosperous regionalism stalled, East Asian regionalism flourished in the mid-1990s and 2000s (Oba 2001; Stubbs 2002; Terada 2003; Ba et al. 2016). East Asian regionalism initially emerged in the early 1990s with the proposal of the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) by Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir. This proposal aimed at pursuing dialogue and cooperation on the economic issues of East Asian countries consisting of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. The US and Australia expressed strong opposition to this idea, and Japan and China also expressed reluctant attitudes from beginning to end. The EAEG proposal was not supported by ASEAN countries, and, upon consultation in ASEAN meetings, it was renamed as the East Asian Economic Caucus, before actually being shelved.

Even so, the move toward grouping East Asia did not disappear. In the process of preparing for the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) launched in March 1996, Japan, South Korea, China, and the ASEAN countries were regarded as East Asian countries. Then, in December 1997, after the Asian financial crisis broke out with the Thai baht plunge in July 1997, the first ASEAN Plus Three (APT; Japan, China, and South Korea) Summit was held. This summit had been planned and decided before the crisis, but in hindsight, it functioned as a forum to confirm the will of East Asian countries to promote cooperation both to overcome the damages by the crisis and to reconstruct a resilient and durable regional economy. The APT Summit became a regular fixture and was rapidly institutionalized as a framework for promoting wide-ranging East Asian regional cooperation on political, economic, social, cultural issues. A notable advancement was financial cooperation. For instance, specific schemes, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) launched in 2001, were advanced in the form of cooperation under the ASEAN + 3 Finance Ministers’ Meeting.

Further, ASEAN + 3 decided the setting of the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) in 1998, which comprised of non-governmental experts from ASEAN + 3 countries in order to examine the future vision of East Asian cooperation. The EAVG released the final report in 2001, which advocates the construction of an “East and progress” in East Asia (East Asia Vision Group 2001). It also provided a lot of recommendations, including establishment of an East Asia Summit (EAS) and East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA). The East Asian Study Group (EASG) comprised the representatives from the ASEAN + 3 member countries’ government reexamined the recommendations by the EAVG final report and positioned EAS and EAFTA as long-term goals. After that, discussions on an East Asian Community activated, and in conjunction with this, the establishment of the EAS became a specific political agenda. After discussions with countries concerned, EAS was established in December 2005 as a framework to take “an important role” in the establishment of an East Asian Community (East Asian Summit 2005).

3.1 *Expanding and Deepening ASEAN Integration*

ASEAN has notably shown immense development in response to changes in the environment since the end of the Cold War. First, the end of ideological confrontations has enabled ASEAN to expand. In addition to the removal of ideological obstacles, expectation that ASEAN would serve as the gateway to economic development pushed non-ASEAN member countries in Southeast Asia to eagerly join. Although, until the 1980s, economic cooperation did not directly cause the economic development of ASEAN member countries at that time. Furthermore, ASEAN member countries also welcomed and supported the expansion of ASEAN because they wanted to achieve the long-term goal of the construction of a community that included all of Southeast Asia. Against this backdrop, Vietnam became a member in 1995, followed by Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999, expanding ASEAN membership to ten (Yamakage 1991, pp. 157–187; Acharya 2001, pp. 102–127; Severino 2006, pp. 53–67).

Second, a shift has taken place in ASEAN's strategy toward external powers. Until the end of the 1980s, ASEAN took a passive/defensive approach to reduce the influence of great powers. However, after the end of the Cold War, ASEAN began to take a more proactive approach toward external powers (Ba 2009, p. 179). In the 1990s, it expanded its Dialogue Partners, initially limited to Western powers including Japan, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the European Economic Community (EEC), to welcome China, Russia, and India. In the 2000s, ASEAN tried to enhance such ASEAN + 1 relations by allowing each external power to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and to conclude a FTA with ASEAN. ASEAN began to take positive roles to construct a new regional environment the initial manifestation of this shift was the accession of ASEAN member states to APEC. In the 1990s and 2000s, the proactive ASEAN external strategy led to the formation of various ASEAN-centered regional institutions embracing broader regions, such as ARF, APT, EAS, and ADMM+. In this way, a multi-layered ASEAN architecture was formed.

The formation of the ASEAN architecture was seen as evidence that "ASEAN centrality" was working. The "ASEAN centrality" concept states the importance of ASEAN-led regional architecture. Simultaneously, it includes the implicit assertion of ASEAN countries that ASEAN plays a major role in maintaining broader regional order in Asia-Pacific/East Asia through the ASEAN architecture, and that ASEAN should continue to play such a role (Ho 2012; Oba 2016). Thus, it became a stock phrase used to explain the usefulness, or role, of ASEAN.

Third is the substantial and proactive promotion of ASEAN economic cooperation to realize ASEAN-wide economic integration (Severino 2006, pp. 202–250). From the 1970s to the 1980s, ASEAN tried to develop several schemes for economic cooperation, but these cooperation schemes provided small outcomes. However, at the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in January 1992, it was agreed to create the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by 2008. The motivation of ASEAN countries to promote economic integration was to enhance international competitiveness of

ASEAN's local industries, further expanding market size, securing economies of scale and attracting more foreign capital.

In the early 2000s, East Asian regionalism and ASEAN cooperation showed remarkable progress. In the midst of this, the competition for leadership between China and Japan over the promotion of regionalism became apparent. For instance, during the process of establishing the EAS, China and Japan clashed over members to include in this new framework (Oba 2017). China insisted on the establishment of the EAS in the member states of APT, while Japan insisted upon ASEAN + 6 (extra states being Australia, New Zealand, and India), finally, the EAS was established as a framework comprising ASEAN + 6 members per Japan's insistence. In addition, it was also decided that APT would continue to exist even after the establishment of the EAS, and those two frameworks would be set to each contribute to the formation of the East Asian Community.

Since the 1990s, the move toward negotiation of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) became a new trend. Apart from ASEAN's agreement to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1993, there was less momentum for concluding FTAs in this region—bilateral or multilateral—in comparison with other regions. However, Japan had a large economic presence in Asia during the late-1990s and sought an FTA in tandem with global liberalization (Munakata 2001; Solis 2017; Katada 2020). Momentum accelerated in competition with China.

Then, during the 2000s, various FTAs were concluded in Asia. First, an FTA was signed between Japan and Singapore in January 2002. In November 2001, ASEAN and China declared that they would conclude an FTA within ten years. China and Japan competed with each other over the conclusion of an FTA with ASEAN, and the ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA) was signed in 2004. Also, the ASEAN Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) was signed in 2008. In parallel with the conclusion of the FTA with ASEAN, Japan signed bilateral FTAs with each member country of ASEAN.

In addition, South Korea, India, and Australia-New Zealand (Common Economic Region) also each negotiated an FTA with ASEAN. Finally, those countries' negotiations with ASEAN resulted in five ASEAN + 1 FTAs being signed in the 2000s.

3.2 Moving Toward Regional Integration with Mega-FTAs

After the rush to sign all the ASEAN + 1 FTAs had settled down, a move toward mega-FTAs aiming for economic integration across wide geographical areas, such as the Asia-Pacific and East Asia, took off in the latter half of the 2000s. The EAFTA, mentioned above, aimed at concluding an FTA comprising of the ASEAN + 3 member countries, and China and South Korea mainly supported this concept. On the other hand, Japan proposed the creation of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement of East Asia (CEPEA), adding Australia, New Zealand, and India. The parallel examination of these two proposals for a mega-FTA in East Asia

was deeply intertwined with competition between China and Japan over leadership to promote regionalism and regional integration (METI 2006).

On the other hand, movement to promote a mega-FTA in the Asia–Pacific also emerged. The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPSEP or P4 [four Pacific Rim countries]) was signed in 2005 by Singapore, New Zealand, Chile, and Brunei. The establishment of P4—aiming for advanced and comprehensive economic liberalization—acted as a factor to boost the momentum for economic integration throughout the Asia–Pacific region. It became feasible to talk about the idea of a Free Trade Area in the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), which aimed to realize economic integration of All APEC member economies. The US, fearing that the movements of EAFTA and CEPEA would promote economic integration in a way that excluded it, supported FTAAP and showed enough interest in the P4 agreement. The US’s strong interests in FTAAP and P4 became the “driving force” to encourage Asia–Pacific regional integration (Oba 2014, p. 235).

Then, in March 2010, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations commenced among the P4 members and the US, Australia, Vietnam, and Peru. And, in October of the same year, Malaysia joined the negotiations. Commencement of TPP negotiations served as a catalyst for the unification of the two EAFTA and CEPEA initiatives for regional integration in East Asia since China feared exclusion from the TPP (Oba 2014, p. 238). In the summer of 2011, Japan and China agreed to shelve membership and jointly consider East Asian regional integration. And, worried that the unity of ASEAN would be damaged by the TPP, ASEAN came up with the idea for an FTA comprising the six countries (China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India) that had already signed FTAs with ASEAN. Thus, in November 2012, it was announced that the ten ASEAN countries and those sixteen countries were launching negotiations in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

3.3 *ASEAN Charter*

Every time ASEAN was exposed to upheaval in the external environment, it continued to show its intention to deepen regional integration by advancing the schedule for elimination of tariffs and expanding the scope of that elimination, even after the setback of the Asian financial crisis.

The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) was adopted at the ninth ASEAN Summit held in Indonesia in October 2003 (ASEAN 2003). This declaration made it clear that the ASEAN Community (AC), comprising the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), would be established by 2020. Subsequently, the ASC was renamed the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC). Furthermore, in order to reform and strengthen ASEAN, the formulation of the ASEAN Charter was started in 2004. The ASEAN Charter was signed in 2007 and came into effect in 2008 (ASEAN 2008).

The ASEAN Charter clarifies the principles, objectives, structure, and procedures of ASEAN as an organization, based on the practices accumulated so far and the contents of documents issued. In the process of formulating this charter, discussions were held to review decision-making by consensus in order to promote effective cooperation to speed up integration; yet, in the end, respect for sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs were kept as the core tenets of the “ASEAN Way,” which was reconfirmed as the ASEAN principle.

On the other hand, new elements were introduced to the Charter to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and rule of law and promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. These are all clearly stipulated in the objectives and principles of ASEAN. The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights was established in 2009, and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration issued in 2012. The inclusion of provisions on the state of the domestic political system and human rights meant that ASEAN embraced norms that contradicted the conventional “ASEAN Way,” which had emphasized the principle of non-interference.

4 Regionalism in the Transformation of Order

4.1 Gathering Momentum of Wide-Area Regional Economic Integration

In the 2010s, the change in the balance of power between the US and China became visible. The balance of power between China and Japan also changed after China’s nominal GDP overtook Japan’s in 2010. Furthermore, competition between the US and China escalated with these changes. In the 2010s, the regional order of Asia became unclear due to the regional transformations mentioned above. As planned, AC was established in 2015, and within one of its integral components, the AEC, efforts toward economic integration of Southeast Asia continued.

One of the characteristics of regionalism in Asia during the 2010s was that negotiations of mega-FTAs advanced and actually led to concluded agreements. The TPP negotiations, an attempt to integrate the Asia–Pacific region, and RCEP, aiming at East Asia regional integration, had been promoted in parallel (Wilson 2015).

The TPP agreement was signed in February 2016 by 12 member states. However, the US under the Trump administration withdrew from the agreement in January 2017. The rest of the eleven countries renegotiated because the TPP could not proceed without the US. Finally, with Japan’s leadership a comprehensive and progressive TPP (CPTPP) was signed in March 2018 and came into effect at the end of that same year. On the other hand, the RCEP negotiations were difficult and slow. In November 2019, India announced its withdrawal. The other member countries were shocked, but they kept and rather accelerated negotiations in 2020 despite the COVID-19 pandemic. Eventually, in November 2020, RCEP was signed by 11 member countries, excluding India, and came into effect in January 2022.

4.2 Intensifying Strategic Competition and Regional Integration

The negotiation processes of these mega-FTAs were greatly influenced by changes in the strategic environment of the region, including intensifying competition between the US and China, and the strategic implications of these mega-FTAs grew stronger. China's assertive policies toward neighbor countries, which had been strengthened in the last stage of the Hu Jintao administration, was further strengthened after the Xi Jinping administration took over. China's foreign policy has moved ahead in stick-and-carrot fashion, with the stick being wielded in an attempt to change the status quo by force in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, including efforts concerning the Senkaku Islands, while the carrot has taken the form of expanding investment and aid. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an example of the latter and was seen as a tool for China to attempt to form a new order that reflects a new balance of power. The BRI has stimulated some of the TPP member countries, leading them to increase efforts in negotiations, and vice versa (Ye 2015).

Again, in the 2010s, due to concerns about the expansion of China's political and economic influence, the US, Australia, India, and Japan proposed the concept of the "Indo-Pacific"—One strategic space comprising of the two sea regions of the Indian and Pacific Ocean, including their surrounding areas. The "Indo-Pacific" concept has spread rapidly. Various "Indo-Pacific" proposals have been put forward, including whether to consider China as a threat and thereby try to counter it, or to strengthen cooperation, including with China. From the perspective of balancing China's influence, Japan and the US, in particular, have come to place importance on cooperation with India. Japan, the US, Australia, and India revived the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in 2017, which once had a meeting in 2007 but had been suspended for about ten years. Quad has been developing rapidly. In March 2021, the first Quad summit was held online, and four leaders adopted the "spirits of the Quad," which clearly stated that the four countries "commit to promoting a free, open rules-based order" (Quad 2021).

4.3 Relationship with a Free and Open Liberal Economic Order

The CPTPP and RCEP are frameworks for promoting trade liberalization in the region and further strengthening the free and open liberal economic order. And they share a common characteristic in that they are agreements that go beyond conventional FTA agreements, further expanding the formulation of common rules in various fields, such as investment, rules of origin, intellectual property rights, e-commerce, and government procurement. And despite being in a situation where the US has withdrawn from the TPP and India has withdrawn from the RCEP, Asia widely shares the perception that the conclusion and effectuation of both mega-FTAs means that

the importance of a free and open economic order is essential to future development and prosperity.

On the other hand, the difference in strategic and economic implications of TPP/CPTPP and RCEP should also be noted. These two initiatives have different members. RCEP is a framework centered on ASEAN, with ASEAN taking the initiative in the negotiating process. Whereas, TPP/CPTPP has only four members from ASEAN (Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam), so, in a sense, it is a framework that divides the AEC. And CPTPP/TPP sets a higher liberalization level than the RCEP. The TPP covers a wider range of fields, such as labor, environment, and state-owned enterprises, while the RCEP does not. The RCEP is also the first FTA in which Japan, China, and South Korea are participating together. At this juncture, it is estimated that Japan will benefit most from the efficacies of tariff elimination (Petri and Plummer 2020). Yet, if the RCEP has the effect of deepening and expanding the already existing East Asia cross-border production network, and if consideration is given to the core position of the Chinese economy in that network, the RCEP can be expected to increase China's economic leverage, as well.

5 Conclusion

Regionalism in Asia is undergoing new developments in connection with escalating strategic competition. This chapter raises some points that should be noted for the times ahead. The first point is the trend surrounding the CPTPP. In September 2021, amidst a backdrop of domestic politics presuming that the US will not return to the CPTPP, China and Taiwan applied in quick succession to participate in the agreement. With escalating US–China competition entangling issues further, it is unclear whether China and Taiwan can individually join. The second point is that amidst the intensifying conflict between the US and China, economic statecraft has become an important theme—hence, in the name of strengthening supply chain resilience, it is apparent that moves are being made in the areas of cutting-edge technologies and strategically important supplies as well as moves to enclose supply chain networks related to them. These are also moves that contain contradictions to the liberalization of trade and investment under the mega FTAs, such as the CPTPP and RCEP. In October 2021, the US Biden administration announced that it would propose a new economic framework and established the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in May 2022. The IPEF is composed of four pillars: (1) trade facilitation; (2) supply chain resilience; (3) clean energy, decarbonization, and infrastructure; and (4) tax and anti-corruption (White House 2022). Approximately 14 countries, including Japan, India, and seven of the ASEAN countries joined, but the effectiveness and endurance of this framework are still unclear.

Furthermore, the impact of European re-entry into Asia will also be a point of focus moving forward. Throughout the 2010s, the EU entered into individual FTAs with some Asian countries, such as South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam, and Japan, which meant transregional economic partnerships developed. Additionally, with growing

suspicious and concerns about the rise of China and the intention of relativizing economic relations with China alone, Europe, in tandem with the above-mentioned move to conclude FTAs, has launched various Indo-Pacific strategies from the latter half of the 2010s. Subsequently, in January 2021, the UK applied to participate in the CPTPP, and negotiations for membership began in June of the same year. In other words, at present, economic partnerships concluded originally in Asia are expanding beyond their initial regional geographical sphere.

Finally, although ASEAN has played a central role in the institutionalization of regionalism in Asia after the end of the Cold War, the prospect of ASEAN is unclear. The unity of ASEAN has been shaken by the disagreement among member countries' attitudes toward the South China Sea issue. Recently, the differences of opinion between the member countries toward democracy and human rights issues have come to the surface in efforts to address the coup d'état in Myanmar. Moreover, as China and the US intensify their offensives under the banners of "BRI" and "FOIP," ASEAN's role in the regional order seems to be decreasing. In an era of intensifying strategic competition that threatens the existing international order, it is rather significant that the ASEAN architecture provides a forum for dialogue and cooperation among the major Asian countries. However, it is incontrovertible that the effectiveness of regionalism in Asia, including not only the ASEAN architecture but also APEC and mega-FTAs, will be further questioned over the peace and prosperity of this region.

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